INDO-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of

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in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

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The PhD thesis titled "INDO-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN" has been carried out by Ashfaq Ahmed Malik, under my supervision. The work is approved for evaluation by the foreign referees.

Dr. Nazir Hussain
Professor/Supervisor
DECLARATION
The PhD thesis “INDO-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN” is based on the original research. No part of the thesis is copied or plagiarized; all sources are properly documented as per the guidance provided by the QAU/HEC.

Ashfaq Ahmed Malik
DEDICATION

To my mother who is my everything
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ABSTRACT

In the international system there is often an interplay of states and systems where two or more states partner up in order to change an existing system. The India-US partnership works in a similar fashion because it is a partnership of two states and it has made some alterations in the regional as well as international system. The US used to be the old allied partner of Pakistan and because of its own variations in the national interests and greater strategic purposes; it has now developed cooperation with India. This partnership has many dimensions to it; there are economic aspects, political motives, security factors, military and defense needs and most of all strategic grounds. This makes the ultimate reason of US-India cooperation one where greater strategic characteristics exist, i.e. every aspect is then held by the thread of strategic partnership. Afghanistan issue, trade balance, space, IT, curtailing Chinese influence in South Asia and most of all defense and nuclear motives take the pedestal of the greater strategic motivations. Yet this is not as much of an asymmetric relationship. There is truth to the fact that Pakistan will be at a setback because of the US withdrawal of interest in being its partner but there are so many more ways in which the implications for this relationship will be positive for it as well. For one thing, Pakistan and China will be working on making their bond a stronger one and this vacancy of a foreign ally can be filled. Furthermore, this gives Pakistan plenty of chances to rethink its foreign policy agenda and turn from West to East. Pakistan can make structural changes and fixate itself with Russia, China, Iran and CARs to gain a strategic and security advantage. This will work well even for Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy and schemata in which Pakistan can grasp at a more individualistic role. The US-India partnership will also push for some changes on the regional level as there are bound to be many re-alignments as well. This study does not just discuss the US-India partnership in a factual and historic analytical manner but also focuses on the ‘can-be’ aspect of Pakistan in the contemporary present and the near future as well.
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Ashfaq Ahmad Malik
September 27, 2017
Islamabad
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BECA</td>
<td>Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARC</td>
<td>Bhabha Atomic Research Centre of India</td>
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<td>BIT</td>
<td>Bilateral Investment Treaty of the US and India</td>
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<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party</td>
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<td>BPO</td>
<td>Business Process Outsourcing</td>
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<td>BRI</td>
<td>Belt and Road Initiative of China</td>
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<td>CEIP</td>
<td>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact)</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNNC</td>
<td>China National Nuclear Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISMOA</td>
<td>Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBMS</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage</td>
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<td>CPEC</td>
<td>China Pakistan Economic Corridor</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTTI</td>
<td>Defence Technology and Trade Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense of the US</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<td>EUMA</td>
<td>End User Monitoring Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GSOIMA</td>
<td>General Security of Military Information Agreement</td>
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<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalized System of Preferences Program of US</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGP</td>
<td>Defence Policy Group of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>Indian National Congress</td>
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<td>ISRO</td>
<td>Indian Space Research Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDSA</td>
<td>Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAFT</td>
<td>Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (Saudi Arabian-led)</td>
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<td>JSV</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Vision of the US and India</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Province of Pakistan)</td>
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<td>LEMO</td>
<td>Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<td>LSA</td>
<td>Logistics Support Agreement</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Maritime Domain Awareness</td>
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<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSSP</td>
<td>Next Steps in Strategic Partnership of India and the US</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
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<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Supplier Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy of the US</td>
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<td>OBOR</td>
<td>One Belt One Road of China</td>
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<td>PAEC</td>
<td>Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Patriot Advanced Capability</td>
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<td>PNE</td>
<td>Peaceful Nuclear Explosion</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCG</td>
<td>Quadrilateral Coordination Group for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rashtriya Swaymsevak Sangh of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zones</td>
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<td>TASL</td>
<td>Tata Advanced Systems Limited of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAPI</td>
<td>Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (Gas Pipeline)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTCG</td>
<td>High Technology Cooperation Group of India and the US</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL

Certificate of Approval

This is to certify that the research work presented in this thesis, entitled "Indo-US Strategic Partnership: Implication for Pakistan," was conducted by Ashfaq Ahmed Malik under the supervision of Professor Dr. Nazir Hussain Professor of International Relations.

No part of this thesis has been submitted anywhere else for any other degree. This thesis is submitted to the School of Politics and International Relations Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field International Relations.

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Name of Student:

Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed Malik
INTRODUCTION

The end of World War-II ushered the bipolar world order, characterized by disintegration and alignment of the states along capitalist and communist ideologies. India’s refusal to succumb to the Cold War era divide generated an alternative geopolitical code, which steadily grew, greased and culminated in the creation of Non Aligned Movement (NAM). In fact, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then India’s Prime Minister, wanted to project a new image of the third world, where people can make a decision independent of the world powers. The non-alignment policy of Nehru along with other countries was aimed at disengaging the newly independent countries from their colonial heritage. Although, it seemed to be a comprehensive objective, yet hardly achievable in view of the global structure.

During the Cold War era, India under Nehru struggled to chart a niche for itself, which eventually led to the formulation of Nehru Doctrine on the lines of Monroe Doctrine. The Nehru Doctrine was established in a manner to depict the preponderance of India and more importantly the portrayal of Indian-centrism of regional affairs. From an existentialist view, Pakistan had to be assertive with the ground realities of its environment. Its closeness and alignment with the US-led military alliances outside the umbrella of NATO should also depend on the same. Yet the fact remains that the US foreign policy towards South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan have always been oscillating right from the independence. Taking sides between the two necessarily does not suit the US in the long-run. Therefore, Washington often exploits the divide between New Delhi and Islamabad for its short-term benefits.

The end of Cold War has been noted to have aided new form of regionalism and regional cognition and the adoption of liberal market economy. For the Clinton Administration, end of Cold War was a departure from ideological tussle and a beginning of a bilateral and economic friendship. Hence India, in the eyes of the Clinton Administration, carried a certain degree of economic potential that should be explored and exploited. The Bush Administration further strengthened the economic and strategic ties initiated by the Clinton administration. Both Administrations offered India an unprecedented military support that
added a new and dangerous element to the already complicated security environment in South Asia.

Since 1947, Pakistan and India have remained at loggerhead; their animosity has been manifested in different shapes and forms. Both countries have aligned with external entities at different points in their history to outmatch the other. The tragic event of 9/11, acted as a watershed in the contemporary global history. It altogether changed the relations between the US and the arch-rivals; Pakistan and India. In the post-Cold War era, Washington had a rethinking of India as much as the Indian policymakers refined their policy towards the United States. The end of Cold War meant the end of USSR as a prime enemy and thus, anti-US foreign policy on the part of New Delhi makes no sense. The new trend in Indo-US relations for many Indians and its political elite was a dream coming true. India is nurturing the belief since long that it can play a significant role in the global politics, which is technically termed as Indian exceptionalism.

Geo-strategically, despite bestowing Pakistan the designation of a non-NATO ally, the Indo-US nuclear deals (2004) and strategic partnership (2011) altogether accentuated the tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad and widened the strategic imbalance in the region. By all accounts, the nuclear deal with the purview of the partnership has raised India’s pedigree remarkably, whilst isolates and estranges Pakistan keeping in view the accessories and positive externalities associated with the deal. This is evident as India became the largest purchaser of US arms and conducted more military exercises with the US than any other country in the world.

The strategic relations between India and the US have grown dramatically. It can be gauged by the increased Indian involvement in Afghanistan and the desire of Washington to see a greater New Delhi involvement following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan; even though New Delhi often claims that its engagement in Afghanistan is solely civilian and developmental. Such desires and facilitations by Washington undermine Pakistan’s long-standing strategic influence on Afghanistan; Pakistan can choose to undermine the US smooth withdrawal.
Statement of the Problem
The India-US relationship has grown with the course of time in such a way that the US going further away from Pakistan. The dawn of the Indo-US partnership following explicit and implicit indulgence, negotiation and sway brought forth a new factor in South Asia and apparently changed the regional equation of balance of power. There are many aspects to this relationship; strategic, economic, political etc. and it is one which is perhaps looking to change the structure and trends of regional politics.

For Pakistan, there are going to be many implications as a result of the changing balance of power in the region. In the political framework of its foreign policy as well as the governing strategic rationale are bound to go through a change as well. Not only is the growing Indo-US partnership likely to strengthen Pakistan-China strategic partnership, which by extension boosts Pakistan’s survival and territorial integrity but it is also going to redirect Pakistan to look eastwards especially towards Russia. Moreover, these trends would put South Asia in a place wherein Pakistan-India relations would perhaps go through into more hostility.

Significance of the Study
The research methodically analyzes the pros and cons of the fast-growing India-US partnership. The research uncovers how efficacious is the Indo-US partnership especially in the wake of the fact that US and Pakistan used to be allies. Analytically, the research shows that the US has lost Pakistan as its traditional ally as the US propensity of being pro-India has grown the trust deficit between the two.

The increasing partnership of New Delhi and Washington can make the former a proxy for the latter and become the reason of continuous stay of the US in the region. This research argues that regional players like Pakistan and China perceive and believe that Indo-US partnership is a harbinger of a rift in the region. The situation demands a skilful and unprovocative approach of regional players (like Pakistan and China) to deal with the complex and entangled Indo-US alliance. The research shows ways through which Pakistan can reframe its foreign policy, which from the onset has been premised on its survival. The
study is significant as it shows how and on what grounds Pakistan needs a pragmatic and eastward-looking foreign policy.

**Objectives of the Study**
The research is an effort to dissect Indo-US strategic partnership and put it in perspective as well as measure the degree to which it carries political and strategic implications for Pakistan. The research highlights how the US extended an element of ‘American exceptionalism’ towards India and furthermore keeps on strengthening Indian exceptionalism. Using a cross-sectional analytical approach, the research collated data and analyzed the pattern and attitude of different Indian administrations towards the India-US partnership. Hence, dissecting and comparing the attitude of BJP; a nationalist party and attitude of the Congress towards the partnership.

The research dissects the implications of Afghanistan-India-US nexus and the extent to which the new political elites and power structure in both Afghanistan and India have collectively dampened Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. The research expounds on the degree to which India-US partnership has bolstered India’s propensity to isolate Pakistan and how well the cooperation of Pakistan and China mitigated against that. The research considerably explores and expounds on the trajectory of Indo-US partnership, the implications of Indian integration into the US security design, and how that blurs the long standing of Pakistan as a strategic partner of Washington. Finally, the research discusses how the strained Pakistan-US relation strengthens Pakistan-China and Pakistan-Russia ties, and how there is bound to be something like eastward foreign policy of Pakistan. Thus the study has two parts; while it begins with discussing the India-US relationship and its various nodes it ends with implications on Pakistan and how the state can manage to sustain its power trajectory in the region.

**Literature Review**
The end of Cold War turned out as a watershed for India-US relationship. Indian foreign policymakers rightly understood the exigency for a shift in policy as Cold War policy gathered irrelevancy and naturally, for the two to come together, the necessity of leaving
behind the past and forging strategic relations became paramount.\(^1\) The current India-US partnership makes less sense without putting the relationship in perspective, by which the historical chain of actions between the two countries can better be understood. One could take a note from Subhash Kapila’s essentialist narrative of US relations with the region, delineated as decades of fluctuation in foreign policy according to the US strategic interests.\(^2\) During the Cold War, India-US relations were never stable, rather punctuated as an oscillated friendship, which according to Dennis Kux was rather a disenchanted alliance.\(^3\) The end of Cold War meant a new reality dawned and hence such understanding does not elude Indian policymakers, who saw the need to recalibrate New Delhi’s foreign policy and aligned it with the new reality. The ultimate outcome of the prompt decision is the increasing relational stability between Washington and New Delhi. Uttara Sahasrabudhe states that the end of Cold War was a decisive movement in the region and a shift in foreign policy.\(^4\) It is unrealistic if Indo-US relations are merely painted as meaningful to New Delhi alone without underlining similar interest for Washington. The India-US strategic partnership has caught greater attention in the region, but not a novel reality giving the strategic importance of the region to Washington. Vandana Mohla opines that “South Asia is a transitional zone between West Asia and South East Asia, where the US has important, perhaps, vital interests. Linked to it has been the American access to the strategically important Gulf region for oil supplies.”\(^5\)

States have always been prone to change according to the reality in their hemisphere, as Kenneth Waltz believed.\(^6\) Zhang Guihong believes that the growing Indian-US community; one of the wealthiest immigrant communities in the US is a significant player in making the

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partnership a manifest reality. The latter reality underpins the logic of the Clinton Administration and focused attention towards South Asia, a process that culminated under the Bush Administration. The US Senator Doug Bereuter, Chairman Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, once observed that “the recent political changes in South Asia have made India, Pakistan, and the rest of South Asia much more receptive to the US Business investment. India seems to have moved past the phase where Pepsi and Kentucky Fried Chicken were vilified as evil, foreign influences. The new privatization laws are ensuring that the US trade investment will continue to rise in India. Similarly, in Pakistan, the anti-corruption campaign against Prime minister Nawaz Sharif has made it much more likely that the US investment will resume. These are very positive trends.”

Besides economic impulse, the increasing influence of China in terms of economic, geostrategic and diplomatic strength and more importantly the strategic ties between China and Pakistan raises the bar of concern for the US. The 21st century’s global reality is a changed and distinctive reality of what is generally known during the Cold War era. China emerged stronger from the ashes of Cold War; its influence has not just been visible globally but conspicuous regionally. China’s geostrategic importance in Southeast and South Asia respectively remains indisputable reality, featuring an all-weather friendship between Beijing and Islamabad. Washington policymakers have never hidden their concern to this growing trend of China’s power; hence, the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia and the controversial Indo-US nuclear partnership came into existence. In the post-Cold War era, states were relieved from the strategic over-layer, placed on them during the bipolar world system, hence selective friendship in the post-Cold War, be it Sino-Pakistan or Indo-US.

Alliance and realignment in global politics always comes with both benefits and misconceptions. This is true for the realignment of relations between US and India,

following a strained Cold War relation. Prior to the end of the Cold War, relations between
India and Pakistan have never been smooth rather they have been tense and suspicious.
Against this backdrop, India-US alliance creates a hysteria perception in Pakistan that the
US aims to use New Delhi strategically as a proxy for future and continuous stay in the
region. Vandana Mohla’s assertion illuminates “the importance of the region to
Washington, and how the latter will continuously remain relevant directly or tacitly in the
region.”

Meanwhile, from a realist prism, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal believes that the India-US strategic
partnership would offset the existing regional balance of power. There is a broad
consensus among Pakistani security experts and strategic community that the deepening of
India-US strategic partnership is an apparent challenge to the defense doctrine of Pakistan
that “alliances with major world powers to augment defense capability and (from the 1970s
onward), nuclear deterrence to offset India’s conventional superiority” that has long been
Pakistan defense doctrine. Jaspal also argues that the India-US strategic partnership is not
merely a challenge to Pakistan’s military doctrine but more importantly paves the way and
ultimately increases the “asymmetry in the balance of power between India and Pakistan,
which might lower the nuclear threshold between the belligerent neighbours.”

Nirupama Rao accentuates this fear as she opines the strategic alliance between India and the United
States has reached a matured stage and therefore accords India a global role. This
evidently supports Jaspal’s view that India-US strategic alliance further creates an
asymmetric situation in the region. Zhang Guihong buttressed a view that unlike Pakistan,
US-India relations is that of estrangement to rapprochement and places India in such a
position to obtain more influence in South Asia, compared to Russia and China and
ultimately moves India from the balance of power to power advantage.

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12 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “The India-US Strategic Relationship and Pakistan's Security” *South Asian Strategic
13 Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari, “India-United States Strategic Partnership: Implications for Pakistan” *Berkeley
16 Zhang Guihong, “US-India Security Relations: Implications for China” *South Asia Terrorism Portal*,
available at www.satp.org
adds that for its strategic and economic interest, the United States is closer to India and simultaneously retains a partnership with Pakistan on the war on terror because the latter is an undisputable friend.17

Historical analysis helps to place Indo-US strategic relations in perspective. Even though some would argue that India had long been eyeing the US (with pro-liberal policy) long before the Cold War ended.18 The reality between the two started merely with economic friendship and transformed into strategic partnership as both countries were engaged in military deal of F-16, which complicated the issue of security environment in South Asia and further made it volatile.19 Bush Administration made the issue more complex with the India-US civil nuclear alliance, challenging the existing balance of power in the region and the world at large.20

Strategically, India-US partnership is not simply a coincidence; instead a thoughtful plan of the US leadership that often sees the presence of China in the region from the lens of a competitor. According to the United States Congressional record, a partnership with India meant a check on China in the region.21 The same view has been shared by the Congressional Research Service, insinuating that India-US partnership is not merely shared values and convergent geopolitical interests, but an alliance that can further add to counterweight China’s growing clout.22 The critical question is how well other regional players in general and Pakistan in particular can manage the India-US partnership. Evidently, Pakistan will not alone be affected by the alliance; hence, Pakistan alone cannot manage the situation. Therefore, this brings forth the debate of Pakistan-China alliance as a counterbalance to India-US partnership.

19 Ibid, 308.
Ajey Lele and Archana Mishra, however, offer a new dimension to the strategic alliance. Both argue and somewhat attempted to allay and dispel the fear that India-US strategic cooperation is exclusively military, rather it touches the realm of “economic growth and trade promotion, energy and the environment, democracy and development, non-proliferation and security and high technology and space.”

Their article exposes the common and narrow bearing of Pakistani epistemic community, by which the latter accords much energy in analyzing the military aspect of Indo-US alliance while other aspects are accorded less importance. Most of the literature does not talk about how Pakistan can avail similar and equal advantages to the United States. The US-Pakistan relations have been heavily tilted towards military domain instead of state building. It does not shed light on how Pakistan can be a friend of US beyond the military area. The way the European Union (EU) places Pakistan along with five other countries as strategic partners, should equally be important and doable for the US in opening more market opportunity for Islamabad. There is less debate on how to deepen the engagement, besides acting as proxy during crisis and war.

The gospel truth is that the sense of insecurity acts as a stimulus for Pakistan’s alliance making policy with foreign powers. The series of war between India and Pakistan and continuous acrimonies will never cease such outward looking. Hence, the India-US strategic partnership is a potential driver for Pakistan to look further eastward towards China. However, Pakistan-China relations can be traced back to 1940s when both nations were existentially struggling to fit into the system. Although both states went differently on the ideological plane it never stood as a hurdle to the relationship. In both thin and thick, China has remained an all-weather friend to Pakistan, instrumentally in developing nuclear technology, facilitating infrastructural development and more recently China

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Pakistan Economic Project (CPEC). Unlike China, it is a universal truth that Pakistan has always perceived its closest neighbour (India) detrimental to its peaceful existence. The dismemberment of Pakistan and contentious issue of Kashmir are testimonies to that effect. Such existential threats also substantiate the reason why Pakistan has been moving closer to China to balance the threat posed by India.

Pakistan-China relations are strengthened by the fact that Beijing was the first country that acknowledged the effort of Pakistan in fighting extremism at home and abroad. “China is the first country to make an open statement to show its respect for Pakistan's sacrifices and contribution to the war against terrorism after Osama bin Laden was killed in the US operation in Pakistan.” However, the closeness of Beijing and Islamabad offers yet another explanation for India-US partnership. A deepened Pakistan-China relations and partnership strategically are unsuitable for India’s hegemonic design in the region. India cannot bear such deep cooperation and hence India-US partnership can act as a counterbalance, though the new level of India-US relations could buttress China-Pak military and political relationship on the one hand and further strengthens eastward foreign policy of Islamabad, hence deepening the already strained Islamabad-Washington relations.

Irrespective of the difference between China and Pakistan, both states have found convenience in their partnership and that surfaced during President Asif Zardari’s visit to China. According to the President “Pakistan-China friendship is higher than the peaks of the Himalayas is now a truism without exaggeration.” Many scholars also concurred with the assertion of President Zardari, while the on-going CPEC project further underpinned the relations. Meanwhile, Subash Kapila looks at Pakistan-China relationship not just

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30 “Pakistani PM: Pakistan-China relations magic lies in historical bonds” People Daily Online, May 21, 2011.
32 Ziad Haider, “Navigating the China-Pakistan-India-US Relationships” Foreign Policy, (November 30, 2010).
through the lens of how it affects India but the implications for Pak-US cooperation. Kapila states that “the Pakistan-China strategic alliance did not emerge as a matter of convenience. It emerged out of strategic compulsions of both Pakistan and China and ensuring strategic convergences.”

Relevance of the Study
The research is a contribution to the existing literature as it overcomes the limitations of most of the existing work looks at the India-US partnership only from the military strategic lens. Furthermore, the research has added value to the existing discourse and more importantly show that India-US strategic partnership might though impair regional balance of power, yet Islamabad can take sound advantages from India-US partnership by restructuring itself to remain relevant as an indisputable and indispensable to all players in the region. The research displays that India-US strategic partnership is a marriage of convenience and carries the potential to exacerbate tension in the region. It logically draws a conclusion on the debate through multidimensional approaches not exclusively limiting itself to the strategic implication but making a mark by projecting how there is a greater strategic aspect to the Indo-US partnership which encompasses other characteristics as well.

Research Gap
Usually in works which deal with India, the US and Pakistan, the prism via which the relationship is studied is based only on the bilateral relations of the two states and the third is often disregarded. And when there is work done from the perspective of the three states, there is usually far too much emphasis on two factors; at one time there is an emphasis on strategic factors and manifestations and on the other side there is the adopted rhetoric that the US is making a mistake by fixating itself to India and Pakistan is presented as a better option for the West. Furthermore, the rhetoric used for Pakistan in such studies is also one which depicts the state as one in loss. Although, it is obviously a matter of loss but at most times there is either no substitute of foreign options given for Pakistan or if it is given then it is portrayed in somewhat contrite manner. This is the usual Western borrowed narrative

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and this study attempts to fill this gap and present not just the Indo-US relationship in the contemporary environment and incorporates various other angles on the cooperation but also looks upon the various implications for Pakistan as well which it can explore. Furthermore, the newly formed relationship is one which will matter to Pakistan but not necessarily in a remorseful manner because it shows that out of the various dynamics this is an opportunity for Pakistan to rearrange its foreign policy and look towards other options especially in the East. It will also be looking at the Indo-US partnership in a new light wherein it is not just simply strategic factors but a combination of economic, political and others but which are tied and bound together by strategic factors making the pretext of their relationship a greater strategic one.

**Hypothesis**

The Indo-US strategic partnership would adversely affect the regional balance of power, exacerbating tensions in the region and will further bolster closer strategic ties between Pakistan and China as well as Russia. The Indo-US strategic partnership is a fulfilment of nurtured Indian-centric world order and promotion of Indian exceptionalism, which by extension belittles Pakistan’s strategic importance.

**Research Questions**

The hypothesis would be tested by posing following research questions to be explored;

1. How does the India-US partnership fit in the framework which encompasses variant approaches like balance or power, sovereignty, national interests and unitary actors and makes the overall construct within which the prism of US-India partnership under exceptionalism and containment can be fit and how Pakistan is at the core of this construct?

2. Starting from a point of no relationship, what pattern of relationship did India and US follow in the contemporary dynamics that a greater strategic relationship has now been forged?

3. How the regional dynamics, international theatre, greater strategic goals, domestic policies and administrations impacted the US-India cooperation while undercutting Pakistan and US relations?
4. What are the various implications of US and India cooperation on Pakistan in the regional and international settings and how will this augur for the policies of Pakistan in terms of politics, economic and strategic aspects?

5. To what extent will the US-India cooperation motivate Pakistan to redirect its foreign policy, especially towards Iran, Afghanistan, Russia, China and CARs?

6. In the greater strategic prospects of South Asia, how will US-India cooperation and the redirection of Pakistan’s foreign Policy towards the East stimulate the alignment patterns?

Methodology
The research employs a qualitative approach, focusing on primary and secondary data that helps in understanding the US-India and Pakistan relations since independence and thereby provides the ability to comprehend the present scenario analytically. Besides, analytical literature (books and journal articles) and given the necessity to see how events have unfolded in recent times, newspaper articles have been methodically utilized. This provides ample fresh information on the current debate on India-US partnership, which remains in transition and evolving. The research also draws analysis from events and (direct and indirect) policy analysis, as events and policies are useful tools for understanding the dynamics of the partnership.

Organization of the Study
Chapter-1 explores the theoretical discourse surrounding the India-US partnership. Chapter-2 looks at the history and evolution of India-US strategic partnership, the post-independence India-US ties, the Cold War dynamics of India-US relations and the dawn of the India-US strategic partnership. Chapter-3 focuses on the Indian centric disposition of the Americans; hence it looks at the different aspects of India-US strategic partnership and at the same time effort of the Modi-led BJP government to isolate Pakistan and extent to which US-India relations are cemented under the Trump Administration. Chapter-4 explores the strategic, political, economic implications of the Indo-US partnership for Pakistan and equally looks at how well Pakistan has made effort to repair ties with Moscow. Chapter-5 discusses the tendency of Pakistan to redress its foreign policy and re-
alignment of strategic interest with its neighbours. Chapter-6 explores Pakistan’s trajectory from the lens of futuristic approach.
CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The core of any academic or scholarly work lies in the theoretical manifestation because international relations is an amalgamation of historical facts, current policies and interests, futuristic plans but what binds them all together happens to be the theoretical account. Without the understanding and application of theory, one is left with mere opinionated or fact based accounts; so, in social sciences the base of any study becomes the theoretical foundation. Moreover, the undertaken study is based on triangular states; Pakistan, India and the US, the likes of which have been often studied and these have given off many new constructs and theoretical foundations. Yet, one must never actually forget the core of the relationship dynamics which persists between these states in South Asia.

This makes the study an interesting one because there are quite a few factors which are involved and are under scrutiny. In the first place there are a total of three states which are the main proponents of the study; the US, India and Pakistan. The relationship is a triangular one i.e. the US-Indian partnership, US-Pakistan elusiveness and unsteadiness as well as Indo-Pak rivalry which are all being scrutinized in such a way that ties the whole study together. While the main focus is on the US-India partnership and its growth these other variables will automatically be considered. Secondly, there is the idea of the region of South Asia within which this political parley is taking place which means that the region will also be dissected and later analysed along with how the states behave in the current dynamics. Finally, the presence of US which is a foreign actor makes ground of the study because this presence does affect the regional dynamics as well as the dynamics between India and Pakistan in a large way and how this presence invited other foreign states in the regional turf.

There might be new age concepts, theories and even constructs which can explain the age old yet complex matter but the best way is to understand the core of it. But given the new details and adages there are also going to be certain new age concepts which are studied. The overall aim of the chapter is to understand various approaches which tie the actors involved the regional dynamics and the relationship interconnection. This chapter then ties
these approaches and builds a construct which serves as an innovative way to the understanding of the dynamics at hand. The approaches which are studied largely deal with factors like politics, national interests of the states, power and its utility, foreign policy making and instrumentalization of power. At the end of the chapter, there is the theoretical construct which is achieved as a result of the combination of all the approaches. In doing so it largely talks about what it is which propels the US and India to cooperate and how various approaches justify this behaviour.

1.1 Balance of Power Approach
Realist school of thought is considered as a traditional approach in International Relations. It provides the utility of balance of power approach and focuses on alliance relationship as one of the methods to offset the adversary’s power. Historically, groups of states are formed to protect the territorial integrity of member states through strong military power. Sometimes, territorial integrity is maintained through the concert of nations or alliance as a strategic mechanism for maintaining the balance of power in the international system. In the contemporary international politics, the political economy of a state also plays a vital role in maintaining the balance of power between polar states.

To begin with, Ernst B. Haas originated around eight distinct connotations for the term: a) any distribution of power; b) an equilibrium or balancing process; c) hegemony or the search for hegemony; d) stability and peace in a concert of power; e) instability and war; f) power politics in general; g) a universal law of history; and h) a system and guide to policymakers. Furthermore there is also the prism within balance of power which entails to alignments and how certain states can either balance the power or go for band-wagoning. But there is the more traditional approach to it which revolves around the point of equilibrium, state survival, arms race and alliance formations for the sake of survival.

According to Hans Morgenthau, the interest of a state is primarily governed by its pursuit to gain power, although human nature and natural environment equally cultivate and

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incentivized such propensity.\textsuperscript{37} India and the United States are no different from other states and thus such a theoretical template can be used to understand the Indian strategic relationship. India carefully observed and vigilantly adapted itself to the post-Cold War political landscape. The world had become unipolar, and the US stood at the pedestal of supremacy. Employing the same political realism template was no more difficult to fathom and identified the driving force for Indian inclination towards the US. Rationality and well-calculated tactics serve as the foundation of Indian national interest. Morgenthau although argues that “history shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{38} This is true in both moral and political terms but the India-US partnership contradicts this line of thinking. The necessities that motivated India to take a new direction and redirect its foreign policy away from Cold War politics towards a pro-American policy paid off.

One can observe the extent to which ‘state motive and foreign policy’ re-engineered and strengthened the India-US partnership. After the Cold War, Indian foreign policy had developed depth as well as a proper disposition with the US. These nurturing relationships between the two countries insinuated a good yield of foreign policy efforts. Similarly, the Indian foreign policy makers differed from Morgenthau’s view to an extent that they did not simply look beyond the immediate reality of the post-Cold War but further looked into the entire portrait that lies behind the photographic representation of the post-Cold years.\textsuperscript{39} Therefore, it is safe to claim that the India-US partnership offered the Indian foreign policymakers to embrace a “rational foreign policy…which… minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success.”\textsuperscript{40}

Thucydides once said that "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals" and this is clearly exhibited in the India-US partnership. Earlier, Pakistan was at a better standing with the US than India before the Iron Curtain was drawn.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 9.
With the passage of history there was mutual convenience which brought India-US interests together and a strengthening of relations took place between the two which served as a reminder of “no permanent friend or foe” what really matters is "the absence of all clashing interests.”

The statement “end justifies the mean” comes back to us when we examine the nuclear deal of India and US that has facilitated the national survival of India. Although Morgenthau puts the argument well enough that the state has a long connection with classical and medieval thinkers respectively, as (political) philosophy is always an inherited heritage of mankind.

'I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference.'

The evolution of balance of power dates to the very origin of politics itself according to Morgenthau. This popularly debated theory creates equilibrium in the international system and associates to the application of smart realism. From Morgenthau’s lens, the India-US partnership is not far from being within ‘the pattern of competition’ under the balance of power. On examining the history of scholarly work, Aristotle chalked out different types of government and constitutions, while Morgenthau sketched out the methods of the balance of power. For Morgenthau, traditional alliances amongst states define how the balance of power historically shapes the state’s interactions.

For a better understanding of Indo-US cooperation, Morgenthau’s two general principles of an alliance better explain the Indian motive of allying with the US. New Delhi elevated itself in power by being at Washington’s side and the latter seeks to contain China by strengthening India in the region. Such inter-continental alliances almost never result in a zero-sum game. Indulging in cooperative efforts yields maximum influence for both sides.

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41 Ibid., 10.
42 Ibid., 11.
43 Ibid., 181.
44 Ibid., 188.
without one side gaining at the expense of the other.\textsuperscript{45} As far as the international relations are concerned, the idea of balance of power or alliance seeking is always measured through the scale of cost and benefit analysis.

1.2 Statist/Unitary Actor Approach

One important aspect of traditional realism is a characterization of international relations as being statist. Most traditional realists hold the state as a unitary actor, whose decisions, actions, and choice of doing a thing is always rationally shaped (rational choice). The ‘statism’ of international relations suggests that state will do everything to save itself, its integrity and sovereignty. Regardless of what another opinion espouses within other school of thought, statist realism firmly believes in unitary actor status of the state,\textsuperscript{46} because only the state alone can make the right choice and has the legitimacy to decide right things for its people within the anarchic international system. The statist approach has been more significantly used in European political discourse before and after the modern era. This approach constitutes two forms; monarchism and totalitarianism.

Monarchism is a libertarian political philosophy that refers to state’s involvement in national affairs. As a night watchman state protects people from theft, aggression, fraud with state’s law enforcing institutes, and breach of contract. Whereas totalitarianism indicates total control of the state over political, economic, and social dynamics of state functioning, this tends to regulate both private and public life of the citizens. Coming over to the research in hand, choice of shifting alliance from Islamabad to New Delhi was committed and finalised at the policy and state level, it was never a choice for the masses of both states. There was no form of referendum or public opinion that can rightly be tapped to have cogently engineered the Indo-US alliance. Similarly, the choice and decision to enhance the level of mutual interest by supporting and providing information for better military and strategic capabilities was not out of the purview of the state.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 188-189.
The relational shift between India and the US from a stagnant to a vibrant strategic partnership can simply be understood by highlighting the amount of benefit and importance they carry for each other. The cost-benefit analysis was the preoccupation of the two states. It is obvious that the newly found romance between India and the US is bound to have consequences for Pakistan. The insensitivity of Washington towards Islamabad again proves the unitary actor decision making of the state, whose choice of decision is independent of external interference.

1.3 Sovereignty
Besides its application in IR, sovereignty is a historical, controversial, and highly debated political concept. Historically, monarchs would count themselves as the sovereign, claiming their sovereignty is backed by the divine right. The religious elite equally employed this doctrine and theory to provide legitimacy to their command over state authority. While the history of the world is replete with political ups and down, the European world (from the lens of international relations) offered a defining explanation to sovereignty. In the 17th century Europe, after a series of reforms, sovereignty became associated with the nation-state. It became the cardinal philosophy and doctrine that guides how the state is defined, expected to conduct itself among the comity of the nations and how status is granted to a state. Since the Westphalian arrangement, sovereignty is the guiding principle and feature of a state, perhaps the heart of a state in that the state seems to lose its integrity if it loses its sovereignty. From 17th century onward, the concept of sovereignty meant a state would have the absolute prerogative to decide its own destiny and reject any form of external interference within its sovereign territory. State’s national interest is thus attached with sovereignty and it became mandatory for the state to protect that interest with all measures at its disposal.47

The protection of the state’s national integrity is true for both India and the United States. The alliance of the two sides is a testimony that both realized the need to forgo all differences and submit for a common cause towards an aligned national interest. Hence, the Indo-US cooperation can be seen as an amalgamation of steps taken by both countries.

47 Ibid., 11.
relinquishing the past barriers and differences which they held, valuing each other’s respective national integrity. Using the prisoner dilemma and game theory paradigm\textsuperscript{48} both sides collaborated to have a win-win game. India needs the US to grow; the latter equally needs India for its strategic interest in the region. Hence, their actions are explicable under the lens of rational choice and decision a prisoner would make to survive and in case of both safeguarding their sovereignty.

From the neo-realist approach, the actions of both India and the US prove that the conduct of states or their actions could become uncertain and unpredictable. This unpredictability of state’s behaviour is always geared at protecting its national interest and sovereignty. Despite the strong anti-American rhetoric during the Cold War, when it comes to its national interest and sovereign integrity, India had to change the tune. This is true for Washington that was once committed to Islamabad, but the wind of change drew it closer to New Delhi, all in the name of protecting national interest and sovereignty.

Protection of one’s sovereignty can make a state looks like an opportunist, which is true for the United States which breeds on opportunism. Washington shares its strategic cooperation with any country of choice according to the need of the time. Therefore, sovereignty helps any student of international relations and global politics to understand how states shift alliance the US was at stake; it became so much pertinent and cogent to ally with Pakistan. For example, through the concerted support and proxy status of Islamabad, it facilitated the Mujahideen and Taliban (in 1979) to fight, defeat and purge the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. That episode remains an indelible part of modern Pakistan history.\textsuperscript{49} Although one cannot ignore that Pakistan stood at an ideological difference with the USSR, but more importantly the Soviet invasion if unchecked would have resulted in political and social chaos within Pakistan and risk its access to the warm

water in the South. Therefore, Pakistan engaged in a self-preservative alliance with the US and secured its vital national interests and integrity.⁵⁰

Seemingly, sovereign national interest is not a stagnant notion as it has always been affected by both domestic and external factors. The dynamic of national interest and how it corroborates sovereignty is indicative of how unpredictable a state’s imperative could be.⁵¹ In the international system, states naturally try to offset the relations between their foes as Pakistan intends to drift India away from them. Following the end of the Afghanistan war, Washington retracted from Islamabad and somehow showed sensitivity towards Delhi; a disposition that hurt Islamabad. Quite sooner, Islamabad once again saw the loving eyes and hand of its heyday friend because of 9/11 and successive events following the disastrous occurrence in New York. Islamabad gained much worth for the US at the onset of the war on terror, which brought it to the frontline of fighting a long war under the banner of a non-NATO ally. “I hereby designate the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States for the purposes of the act and the Arms Export Control Act.”⁵² The designation was meant to secure Pakistan’s cooperation, boost security cooperation between the two countries and yet protect the US national interests and sovereignty which were perceived to have been attacked by the terrorists.

The fluctuating frequency shows the rate with which Pakistan and the US relations resonate the famous saying of ‘no permanent friend or foe.’ At some point during the war on terror campaign, Islamabad once again lost the favour of Washington, thus showing that state conduct in global affairs has always been spurred by interests rather than morality.⁵³ This oscillation between the US and Pakistan on the one side and on the other side between the

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⁵⁰ The support given by the Americans to Pakistan and the Mujahedeen to root out communism from the region coalesces with American sovereign national interest and is well explained by the answer proffered when asked why Washington had to gather huge international pressure to surmount Saddam’s incursion and acquisition of Kuwait.


⁵³ Willard D. Keim, Ethics, Morality, and International Affairs, (Maryland: University Press of America, 2000):84.
US and India (though now the two are much closer) speaks volumes on the extent to which realism continuously shapes state behaviour.

1.4 National Interest
From the realist paradigm, the core concept of national interest explains how the state chooses to pursue its goals. For a state to maximize its power, it must first identify its national interests. This will help the state to channelize its political energy in the right direction. National interest equally helps to measure the quality and quantity of power a state possesses. If the bearing of a state is exhibited through its national interest, then Indo-US relations should least be understood far from the idea of national interest. President Kennedy once said, “every nation determines its policies in terms of its own interest.” The interests of both states coalesced and improved their bilateral cooperation from mere economic cooperation to strategic and nuclear deals. The Indo-US partnership in all ramifications raised the profile of India in the region and allowed Washington to keep an eye on its perceived strategic competitor (China) in the region. In both ways, the two states are facilitating each other. Washington though foresees the benefits that a healthy relationship with India may foster for its regional hegemonic relevance. New Delhi is by proxy instrumental to the US as the regional check and balancing tool against Pakistan and China.

Interestingly, deepening of Indo-US alliance is directly proportional to enhancement of the Sino-Pakistan relations, while the former is a concern for Pakistan and China; the latter also makes India and the US impulsive. National interest makes China closer to Pakistan; it is true for Pakistan towards China and true for both India and the US. Therefore, a see-saw like power projection is observed in the region and it reiterates the assertion that national interest lies at the heart of foreign policy formulation. Accordingly, the US foreign policymakers the sole responsibility of ensuring the overall objectives of the US national interest are achieved in whatever measure possible. In similar token, the shift in Indian

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52 “Washington woos India to checkmate China” *Deccan Herald*, (New Delhi), June 6, 2012.
foreign policy following the end of Cold War was rightly guided by national interests at walking side by side with Washington,\(^57\) though same national interest alienated India from the bipolar politics and rather made New Delhi an opposition to any form of imperialism even if that emanates from the US.

### 1.5 Rational Choice Theory

Scholars like Subash Kapila see the inconsistency in American foreign policies towards the subcontinent region as nothing new. According to him, the phenomenon more or less characterises the US-South Asia foreign policy since the partition. The unstable relationship between the US and India is proven by how the latter makes sense of New Delhi; as a prominent member of the non-alignment movement. At the regional level, the sensitivity of India towards Kashmir and the position of the US shifting from self-determination of the Kashmiri people to the choice of the Kashmiri, a position often affront to New Delhi.\(^58\) Nevertheless, the US has equally been sensitive towards India. Alluding to Kapila, Warren Austin, the United States envoy to the United Nations (UN) stated before the UN General Assembly on February 4, 1948, that “The external sovereignty of Kashmir is no longer in the control of the maharaja. With the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, this sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India.”\(^59\) One thing is evident, the Nehru Doctrine that followed the partition era showed that Indian leadership and policymakers are less concerned about the external pressure and they would always be bent to channelling their foreign policy resources towards national interest maximisation. The Indian foreign policy during the Cold War era was displayed to be independent of external sway, regardless of whether it was supported by the US or not.

The Indo centric foreign policy (with a motive of channelling and promoting Indian national interest) can best be understood on how New Delhi dedicated its weight towards the creation of NAM. As part of the founding fathers of NAM, India utilised the movement

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 38.  
\(^{59}\) Ibid.
to draw distinction or craft alternative doctrine to the bipolar world order. Preserving the sovereign integrity and national interest of the state is the preoccupation of all systems, thus the Cold War politics and integration with the Middle East Treaty Organisation or Baghdad Pact, later Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) by Pakistan is instructive to fathom the extent to which state rationalise its foreign policy for a bigger strategic interest. Unlike the anti-global order posture of India, Pakistan was rather supportive of the order though for its own national interest.

In support of Kapila, Lloyd Rudolph and Hoeber Rudolph also believe that the foreign policy of US for the region is rooted in calculated rational choice for which neither is India nor is Pakistan considered as an eternal friend or enemy. Instead, the US has played a wise game of not resolving the protracted conflict between the South Asian foes, as an alternative to the relationship of convenience and has rather exploited the situation to its own interest and advantage. The rationality of the US lies in where its national interests can best be achieved at any given time.

It was part of the US foreign policy to fight communism because the latter is perceived as endangering to the principles which the US stands for. Yet, the US cannot fight it alone thus its aim was achievable with the cooperative effort of states which subscribe to the US worldview. Therefore, rationality in international relations suggested that any state which finds American interest appealing and ready to support would find the support. This was true for the opposite. Foster Dulles, Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration stated that if the country is not with us (India), it is against us. Pakistan participated in the US alliance and dedicated its energies to either contain or root out communism. The support of Pakistan against communism was well appreciated during the Cold War. American policy assigned a clear priority to relations with Pakistan by providing a total of $3.8 billion military aid to Pakistani military rulers that was nominally directed against the

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62 Ibid., 704.
communist powers but was in practice used to strengthen Pakistan against India. For the most part of the Cold War, Pakistan remained in the good books of the US, while US-India relations were imbalanced, an evidence on how rational choice operates in global politics.

The priority of any state is not immune to change based on cost-benefit analysis. This was true for the fluctuated Indo-US relations during the Cold War (1948-1950) and the relatively blossomed Pakistan-US relations (1952-1990). The calculus of relations obviously changed as soon as the new reality came forth. The end of Cold War opened a new beginning in Indo-US relations and a sour interaction in Pakistan-US relations. The end of Cold War was not just a mere end; it heralded a new reality in international relations. The closure brought forth certain dynamism and vulnerability of states, especially within the third world, an important partner in the bipolar world. The end of Cold War took away the over-layers, the third world that was once the competition arena of the super powers in becoming self-reliant. The new arrangement in global politics meant competition would be tougher, new alliances would be made as evident after Cold War states would have to rebrand, retune and reshape their foreign policy. In a neo-realist world order, Goldstein opines that “states will work with other states for mutual gain and take advantage of each other only at the margin…they do so because of self-interest.”

Like the economic dislocation that once characterised China, India was a typical third world nation ridden by economic complication and imbalance. Towards the end of Cold War, policymakers longed to create the Indian economic liberalisation, which was by no means impossible without external support and development of domestic economy worthwhile enough to sensitise foreign investment. The development of IT hub in the South of India created the magic India which had longed for. The development of a viable IT hub and the economic liberalisation policy captured foreign attention; Washington was not an exemption. Rudolph and Rudolph argue that the Indian IT hub came under international

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63 Ibid., 706.
radar, grabbed the attention of global investors, and further pushed India to augment its economic policy. At the start the foreign investment brought India to the economic growth of 8 per cent of GDP, while the middle-class consumption level rose to an estimate of $250 million; as India experience huge foreign direct investment so was the hike in jobs and India became one of the outsources for these firms. In addition to the fact that rational choice prism explains why the US had to reshape its policy towards India, because of the economic incentives of the latter, the role of the Indian diaspora in the United States for the change of thought towards India cannot be understated.

1.6 Hegemonic Stability and Consolidation

The Indo-US strategic partnership would remain incomplete without an exhaustive hegemonic stability discourse. A profound understanding of this discourse has been greatly addressed in Colin et al., discursive work. The latter’s characterisation of a hegemon having primacy in production efficiency over rivals, having a commercial advantage, command over a network of economic tentacles, grip and control over financial institutions in order to control the world economy, almost impossible to gang-up against, would often dictate the rule of the international game. It takes responsibility in propagating “supposed” liberal ideas while having grown and superior in all space of human endeavours (particularly technical and strategic knowledge. In addition, commanding a powerful diplomatic network, leveraging over others, and powerful enough to sway and manipulate the global situation to its favour and desire. Over the last six decades, such a description (primacy in production efficiency) has been true for the US and Japan respectively. Arguably, it is equally true for India in the subcontinent and has always been used and reiterated by Indian foreign policymakers as part of Indian exceptionalism narrative.

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narrative sold well in Washington, thus explains Clinton Administration’s determination toward acknowledging India as an economic hub.\(^73\)

The web of huge commercial network adds another feather to the cap, comparatively in the region; India outmatches any other country in terms of commercial network. Since the end of Cold War and the newly convergence of interest between New Delhi and Washington, strengthening to checkmate China has always been part of the US policy in the region.\(^74\)

Considering the impossibility of ganging up against a hegemon, since the partition of the region and formal independence of all states in the region, India has tried maintaining hegemonic tendency, according to itself being the “Big Brother” it sees itself morally responsible to instil discipline. Even though not all states will assent to the Indian hegemonic tendency, yet India cannot explicitly claim an existential threat to its survival and at the same time claim that there have been to attempts to gang up against New Delhi. Doing the latter could be practically risky,\(^75\) though measures to doing that have equally be tamed or undermined by India. Has clearly articulated in the hypothesis section, the new alliance of India and Washing-ton has great potential to incentivize Pakistan-China alliance, hence ‘gaining up’ against India, even though neither Islamabad nor Beijing would consent to that supposition.\(^76\) The balanced equally in the region is undoubtedly bound to shift as Indo-US alliance gets more consolidated; sharing military and strategic tools, a strengthened economy, admission into the nuclear weapon regimes,\(^77\) cements the Indian narrative of being the regional hegemonic power and nourishes its bid for the permanent seat in United Nations Security Council (UNSC).\(^78\)

\(^{73}\) The Clinton Administration’s Policy toward South Asia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives One hundred fifth Congress First Session, October 22, (1997): 10.

\(^{74}\) Hari Sud, “India and US Relations: Ground Realities” South Asia Analysis, (December 2004).


\(^{77}\) Kamrenda Kanwar, “India’s admission into Wassenaar Arrangement may be ticket to NSG, key to decreasing world’s nuclear stockpile” First Post, December, 11 2017.

1.7 Theoretical Construct
1.7.1 Indian Exceptionalism

Documented history is true to the extent of two or more states entering bilateral and multilateral relations. Same documented history records the state relations having multiple dimensions; they can either be healthy or unhealthy relations, though in certain circumstance inter-state relations are meant to achieve a certain end. In this backdrop, the post-Cold War US-India relationship serves as the means to an end. Historically, both states share dissimilar political, economic, and foreign policies, while the US is a superpower with its own world order and system, India is not. Small and medium power states are expected to oblige by the norms and values of the hegemon. The relationship between India and the US speaks volume to the extent to which New Delhi is enjoying certain privileges within the world order and system and this serves as the exceptionalism of India.

Theoretically speaking, the primary purpose of this research is to carefully analyse the role and ramifications of exceptionalism in global politics vis-à-vis India-US relations. India is obviously enjoying a very high level of exceptionalism within the US-world order in many directions. Such privileges at some juncture become an extension of US hegemony on one hand while on the other hand, a strategic proxy to balance regional power struggle. Even though the element or political entity (India) used for the proxy strategy takes advantage of such exceptionalism amass power and privilege and subsequently becomes a jeopardy for sovereignty of a neighbouring state (like Pakistan). Karsten Frey, Jasjit Singh et al Priya Chacka, Gregory Moore are amongst other scholars who offered the exceptionalism narrative for the understanding of Indo-US partnership, which by all accounts betrays the externalities.

Indian exceptionalism from the Indian standpoint is rooted in history, culture, societal composition, strategic location, proximity, and connection with other non-South Asian

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countries. In addition, the value of India as the ‘jewel’ in the British Empire crown and its successive role following the decline of the British Empire in global politics amount to why India is exceptional. The contextual and socially constructed exceptionalism of India is rooted in many factors. Regardless, whatever counts now as Indian exceptionalism has always been there, the question is why and how it had no recognition by the US for too long and the answer is not that farfetched. The variables which constitute Indian exceptionalism had no direct bearing to the US foreign interests and were not meaningful to the latter state.

Prior to its “opening to the world” policy, China was a typical third world nation, grappling with poverty, economic and infrastructural development. It posed no direct or immediate threat to the US strategic interests and an example of that is the Sino-US rapprochement which was evidently initiated by the US (with the support of Pakistan) given the importance of China at the time as it was considered an expedient tool for American foreign policy against the Soviet Union.\(^\text{83}\) As Henry Kissinger noted that the Sino-US rapprochement will “change the world”\(^\text{84}\) a change that eventually shifts the binary order to tri-polar world order.\(^\text{85}\)

It is worth understanding that in the US foreign policy toolbox, India is a tool for South Asia and beyond similar to the way in which Israel is used as a tool for the US Middle East foreign policy. The strong Indo-US relations flowering over the course of the new millennium is a calculated political, economic, and diplomatic expediency; a tool which can be instrumentalized and especially used to pronounce its importance. In the case of India, the narrative of Indian exceptionalism is the special description needed to make India feel the sense of being highly recognised. Arguably, the complete discourse of Indian exceptionalism carries no weight if measured from the level of sanctions and bombastic insults from the US towards India. In Kissinger’s indelible words, “scare those goddamn

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Indians to death”86 and Clinton’s ballistic comment “we're going to come down on these guys like a ton of bricks.”87 India was not that special, its speciality lay in its strategic exceptionalism for which it became the expedient tool for the US to truncate China's emerging power in South Asia and beyond. This brings up the argument of why not Pakistan exceptionalism. At some point in modern history, Pakistan enjoyed a similar (though not deeper strategic cooperation as India now enjoys) position and then Islamabad was the most appropriate expedient tool.

The exceptionalism of nuclear and strategic US-India Deal opens multiple possibilities of explanations. The nuclear program of India exists outside the nuclear regime, yet the US chooses to incorporate India into the forum meant only for states which are signatories of the nuclear regime. The US-Pakistan strategic partnership surpasses that of India, in terms of CENTO and SEATO, though Pakistan shares similar non-nuclear regime signatory like India, the US has no deep-rooted trust in Islamabad to warrant a similar nuclear deal. Furthermore, going by population and market, Pakistan is not a match for India, while the latter can relatively stand shoulder to shoulder with China in terms of regional influence. Indian exceptionalism is an indication that the US foreign policy which can always be reshaped and redirected in accordance with the dynamics of regional and global politics. As clearly mentioned above, the primary purpose of this research is not just to highlight the ramifications of Indian exceptionalism as promoted by the US but also to see how it is connected to the containment, counterbalancing and checking China and Pakistan respectively.

1.7.2 Containment Theory
The cycle of power of this model illustrates clearly the five-spherical dimension of how to power one power loses it hegemony leading to the emergence of a new power.88 China has long been identified as a rising power, having the propensity to challenge the US-led world order. The research underlines the fact that Indo-US strategic alliance is an effort aimed at

87 Ibid., 52-3.
double objectives; one, to contain rising power of China in the Asia Pacific and the region closer to India; and on the other hand, counter the strategic Sino-Pakistan closeness. Therefore, the US is arming India to police the region on its behalf.

Dana Allin and Erik Jones portray the India-US partnership within the theoretical debate of Containment Theory; India as a US proxy for containing Pakistan and China and as a watchdog on the happenings in South Asia.\(^{89}\) Ted Carpenter argues, “Pakistan is Beijing’s most important ally in the region, and any US action that strengthens Islamabad’s long-time rival, India, will be seen as a direct menace to Pakistan and an indirect threat to China.”\(^{90}\) The fear of being encircled increasingly makes sense because of the so-called Pivot to Asia policy by the US, drawing alliance of the Pacific countries against a common threat. The "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" espoused by Japan and its acceptance by India is yet another indication of a border containment strategy against Beijing.\(^{91}\) Bolstering the national power of India will not merely diminish China’s expansionist tendency but will also “constrain Beijing’s behaviour and limit its capacity for aggressiveness and at the same time engage Beijing to be more globally responsive.”\(^{92}\) Although, there are cynical views of the containment strategy, which paint a gloomy outcome of such engagement, yet it reduces India to a vassal state instead of a global aspiring power and challenges India’s pivotal claim of independent foreign policy formulation.\(^{93}\)

Both the exceptionalism and containment theories are blended into giving a bigger picture of Indo-US partnership from multidimensional approaches. The latter is instrumental in understanding how India’s power through Washington can upset strategic balance of power in the region, contain Pakistan and China, yet displays the double standard of the US-led world order which creates exceptionalism in global affairs for a selfish interests but have huge ramifications.

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1.8 Application of Theoretical Construct

Indo-US strategic cooperation is a convenient alliance geared to achieving certain objectives. Counterbalancing China and checking Pakistan is a major objective of the US and to do that India is now selected for the task. Hence Indo-US economic, space, military, intelligence, agricultural and nuclear cooperation all point to that objective.

Strategically speaking, as Daryl Kimball argues and widens the understanding of Indian exceptionalism as an extension of US policy under the Bush Administration that “sets the United States above and apart from the rules other states are expected to follow” as a measure for “counter-proliferation and pre-emptive action to “deter, dissuade, and defeat” adversaries armed with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).”\(^4\) The strategic alliance between Washington and New Delhi was at some point clearly suggested to counterbalance Beijing, even though such countermeasures pose serious concerns for Pakistan. Sharon Squassoni further echoes Indian exceptionalism as a violation of decades of global non-proliferation policy, “rather than India moving into the mainstream, the mainstream has moved to it.”\(^5\) Exceptionalism in the case of India, clearly suggests a change in the US domestic and international laws in favour of India, though the US has legitimised its Indian exceptionalism by commanding the support of other established nuclear power states.\(^6\) This exceptionalism has been further extended to the realm of NSG. Expectantly, Indian exceptionalism brought yet another US-Russia clash of interest and simultaneously provides latitude for China to deepen its strategic cooperation with Pakistan.\(^7\)

Priyanjali Malik’s exposition on Indian exceptionalism brought forth the argument from a domestic prism as Indian exceptionalism can be analysed from both external and domestic lens. According to Malik, Indian strategic exceptionalism began much more before the BJP nuclear test in 1998. Meanwhile, Indian idea of exceptionalism revolves around the protection of Indian independence and sovereignty from international nuclear policy, a

\(^7\) Sharon Squassoni, “The US.-Indian Deal and Its Impact” *Arms Control Association*, July/August 2010.
strict adherence to Nehruvian legacy. During the testimony of Vikram J. Singh to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, on July 16, 2014, he suggested that such exceptionalism was not just a calculated effort to advance mutual interests, but an attempt geared at braving up a role for India in the region and Asia Pacific. Catherine Kelleher and Judith Reppy argue that US policy of exceptionalism towards India reverberate the call for universal proliferation norms and shows the manner with which the Bush administration ignited pressure on agitations against the strategic deal, which by all account stand contrary to international norms. Indian exceptionalism has equally received considerable critiques from not just Pakistan but also China and other international observers. Critics of exceptionalism argue that it is a ploy to destabilize the region, upset the regional balance of power instead of offsetting it.

The recent National Security Strategy (NSS) by the Trump Administration reiterates Indian exceptionalism. The NSS document is often used by the different US governments to outline strategic priority and dealing (with foreign countries) at a given year. While Trump’s National Security Strategy chastised Pakistan, it comforted India, with a portrayal that grabbed the ire of Nasser Khan Janjua, Pakistan’s National Security Advisor (NSA). The document depicted Indian as a growing power and economy which has the potential workable for the US, while Pakistan is either labelled as a supporter of terrorism and is also chastised and threatened of curbing the economic cooperation if Islamabad does not change course from supporting terrorism or acting responsibly as a good neighbour. Even though India cannot be sanctimonious in similar regards, yet Washington chose to overlook New Delhi’s doing. Such appraisal of India was not unnoticed by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. According to Raveesh Kumar, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs

99 Vikram J. Singh, United States Senate, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sub-Committee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, July 16, 2014.
102 Ibid.
spokesperson, “we appreciate the strategic importance given to India-US relationship in the new National Security Strategy released by the US. As two responsible democracies, India and the US share common objectives, including combating terrorism and promoting peace and security throughout the world.” By extension, NSS report and the Indian response underpins the strategic partnership between India and the US and boost for India to further claim a self-appointed (political and economic hegemony of the region) contributing to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

Interestingly, there is a connection between the US space technology and non-proliferation policy. Such connections put the Indo-US strategic partnership in question, upon the possibility and eventuality of the clash of interest between the two. Though not every scholar subscribes to the Indian exceptionalism narratives and believes that the US needs to be cautious against putting arms in New Delhi’s hand, which in future could undermine Washington’s interest. Richard Speier, warning the US to ensure a perfect “glide path” that does not turn India in future into the strategic target than being a strategic partner. The target of an Indian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) would be the US. The technology of an Indian ICBM would be that of a space launch vehicle, either directly via the PSLV or indirectly via the Agni, which is based on India’s SLV-3. The US would not have facilitated the acquisition or improvement of that technology directly or indirectly. In this matter, the US clarity and restraint are what the world, and India, need. The US needs to divert from the present “glide path” and reorient itself and India onto a more productive course of cooperation. It would be ironic if, in the hope of becoming strategic partners, the two end up becoming each other’s strategic targets.

In inference there has been given a quite extensive study of various approaches and theories which depict how, why and with what reason the US and India are getting closer and cooperating more. In doing so, it also entails how and what part does Pakistan plays.

104 “India lauds America's new security policy for emphasis on Indo-US ties” The Express Tribune, December 19, 2017.
106 Ibid.
Moreover, it pushes the extreme notion of long-standing rivalries in the international history between not just India and Pakistan but also China and the US. Largely, all of these approaches together make for a construct which is comprised of exceptionalism which is not a new idea but one which is now making a comeback especially in India and the US. There is also the idea of containment theory which makes a part of the construct. The reason for that is the fact that the US and India both seek out to contain China and Pakistan. This construct also enumerates the idea of greater strategic aspects and purposes between India-US and Pakistan-China. In a way these approaches are all looped in and then they are intertwined with greater strategy as well as Indian exceptionalism and the US containment of the Chinese influence.
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The historical legacy is important for the content analysis of the current dynamics because the roots of the present crises can be found in history. It is well known where the relationship of India and US stood historically and how that intertwined with the South Asia politics between India and Pakistan and perhaps this is where the larger relationship dynamics began to be unfurled between the US and India.

For one thing, the rivalry which was borne out of ideology and the need for sovereignty by Pakistan somewhere turned into malevolence on India’s part which was utilized by the US. This was the reason that the two states, which came unto the map of the world, grew apart as it was largely driven by ideologies and interests which ran parallel to the others. From there onwards, there has been inbred insecurity which perhaps exists in the relationship between the two. And as this grew, there was a race towards achieving power and sway over the other. There is no doubt that the clash of interests and policies between Pakistan and India have often been given way to many other factors. Consider the fact that the balance of power which is between Pakistan and India turned into a bigger race of military, political and economic as well as strategic grandeur. In this regards, both states went forth and utilized tools like alliances and partnerships with other foreign states. This is where the history with the US comes in and spreads out to larger patterns. Both states, India and Pakistan have a history with the US but this history is verily intertwined. As mentioned before, the US’s need based realities twined with the Indian need based factors in the region of which Balance of Power and Exceptionalism are big parts.

This chapter looks upon the historical perspectives of the relationship which is now in the making i.e. India and the US. In point, this chapter discusses the changing patterns with which the US and India kept getting closer at the expense of policies of other states. The key factor here is that the preceding pages throws light on the evolution process of the Indo-US relations. In that there is mention of various eras; the decolonization era, the Cold War and Post-Cold War era, the period wherein South Asia was being nuclearization and then the various defence deals between India and the US. The aim is to analyse at what point the Indian policy shifted to being mildly pro-US to unrestrictedly pro-US. It also throws light on some other areas of interests between the two sides.
2.1 Evolution of Indo-US Strategic Partnership

The US foreign policy towards India is geared at achieving multiple objectives, which include having a reliable and dominant ally which is powerful enough to truncate China as an emerging major power in the continent and to counter-terrorism within the region. An agreement between the US and India developed by the Bush Administration in October 2008 strengthened this relationship, fortifying the global nuclear non-proliferation cause and strategic partnership goals of the United States foreign policy in the subcontinent.

Interestingly, the Bush Administration did not open the chapter of the relationship between Washington and New Delhi; their interaction stretches back to the pre-partition era. During the colonial era, the US position towards colonial regimes was distinctively anti-imperialist, a propensity that craved for the independence of the colonies, which definitely does not preclude India. Concurrently, during the colonial era, the US and India were on the same page and their interests aligned towards anti-imperialism and independence of colonies.107 Diplomatically in 1941, India opened the Office of Personal Representative of the US President, which was later given the status of the US embassy in 1947.108 The US favoured good relations with India to gain military support in the Western-led World War as the support of Indian army was very important to the US as much as the British crown. Hence to win the support of India, London was influenced by Washington to temporarily award dominion states status to India, this incentive would provide Indian army with the cause to bandwagon in the US war.109

The persistent US foreign policy towards India indicates the favoured attitude of the US towards India. Whether it was the Roosevelt Administration, Truman or Bush Administration, all were keen to develop and strengthen strategic relationships with India. This argument can be further supported by the position of the US on Kashmir issue at the time of independence.110

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108 Ibid., 38.
The variegated sentiments of the partition and post-independence crisis cautioned the US from dictating policies and establishing a friendly government with little realization of ground realities in the region. Post-independence India was not clearly positive towards the US, though New Delhi understood the role of the Washington in world politics and acknowledged it as a major power. Acknowledging the US position and cautioning it from mis-stepping, Prime Minister Nehru stated, “We send our greetings to the people of the United States of America to whom destiny has given a major role in international affairs. We trust that this tremendous responsibility will be utilized for the furtherance of peace and human freedom everywhere.”

The post-independence stance of the United States on Jammu and Kashmir according to Warren Austin, the US representative to the UN, 1948, “The external sovereignty of Kashmir is no longer under the control of the Maharaja. With the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, this foreign sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India” asserts that the United States had a supportive and friendly policy to India. India and the United States had a great relationship from 1948 until the mid-1950s but this did not mean that they had no problems; Subash Kapila believed the United States and India relations to be fluctuating relations also Norman Palmer, and Dennis Kux agreed that the partnership was not just fragile but disenchanted respectively.

2.2 Post-Independence: 1960-1974
The US-India relations were always strong, but they became more cordial under President Kennedy. Robert McMahon states "Kennedy discussed India with more frequency and with more passion than any other nation.” Kennedy Administration made serious efforts to develop a good relationship with India in that Kennedy invested so much on his ‘South

111 Ibid., 38.
Asian team: policymaker and diplomats to devise and improve strategies towards a stronger relationship with India. McMahon best explains Kennedy’s consideration of India; "India's importance to Kennedy administration strategists derived also from their fixation with China's presumed importance to the Asian equilibrium." President Johnson who succeeded Kennedy did not discontinue from his predecessor’s policy towards India, rather followed the tradition and made stronger and tighter bond with India by initiating Tarapur Atomic Plant. To attain the strategic partnership goals, the US proposed an agreement which was contracted and signed in 1966, the agreement proposed delivery of enriched uranium till 1994 to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station in India but on the condition that India would be restricted to obtain the uranium supply from elsewhere. President Jimmy Carter’s Administration ensured and promised New Delhi that Washington will not fall short of uranium supply thus explains the US role in the nuclearization of the subcontinent.

It is interestingly odd that the US was the one which supplied India with uranium, though the latter was not part of non-proliferation regimes (non-proliferation treaty established in 1968 but became effective in 1970 and subsequent regime such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 1970) led by Washington. India had long been reluctant to be a signatory of the regimes on ideological grounds and staunchly opposed for being discriminative against the “nuclear have not” as the nations with existing nuclear arsenal could test and retain the arsenal.

Despite its firm support for India, the relationship between the two was not immune from waning, which due to the post-independence insecurities, regional tensions, the sensitivity of India towards sovereign integrity and above all India’s Cold War politics. The result of these factors was the unsteady relationship between the US and India. The Indo-China war of 1962 and the subsequent consequences for India laid bare opportunity to Washington to

\[\text{117 Ibid.}\]
\[\text{119 Ibid., 241.}\]
exploit, a unique opportunity by which the United States provided India with military support to strengthen ties against a common foe. This initiative proved to be not effective. While the US Congress was debating its annual foreign aid bill, which does not preclude India which surprised Washington when it bought the MiG-21 jets from the Soviet Union; the situation generated tensions between both states. Following the war between India and Pakistan, the two states were again hyphenated together in the US policy. The US policy towards South Asia during this period led to the arms embargo on the sub-continent and reduction of aid to India in successive years. The UK and the US jointly took this decision under the Johnson Administration. During this period, the India-US relations became strained, sensitive, and sour.

Multilateral negotiation was the product of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) held in Geneva in 1965. The conference was based on global nuclear disarmament, a theme that incentivized India’s participation, hoping that such multilateral agreement would eventually lead to general disarmament and guarantee the security of India. Banking on the conference outcome was not enough for India, whose indignation for article VI of the NPT was well articulated. According to the Indians, the article was a weak promise for the non-nuclear states as stated "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." It was clear to the nuclear states that such article was mere concession, which is not immune to rupture. Hence, the article in India’s view does not effectively curtail the activities of the nuclear weapon-possessing states. Unlike the Partial and Comprehensive Test Ban treaties, a legal framework that seeks to constrain and stop nuclear production and proliferation globally, the final version of the NPT had no inherent power to challenge the

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125 Ibid., 139.
The final version of NPT has no clear-cut indications to alleviate the fear and concern totally of states with limited or no nuclear technology. This was the position on which India was sceptical to join the NPT. George Perkovich holds that the treaty was unable to provide security to India, especially the perceived threat from China. Hence, “in 1967 and 1968… the question shift from whether India should produce nuclear weapons to whether India should sign a treaty relinquishing the right to produce nuclear weapons” became discursive.127

India was always interested in keeping its nuclear options open, but according to the NPT, non-nuclear states have a cloud of restriction on them, whereas the states with existing nuclear capabilities were waved off naturally. India had reservations to the treaty due to two major flaws in the agreement. One being exceptions to the already nuclear states and the other was the restrictions on India’s nuclear options. This treaty effectively maintained the status quo of nuclear weapons but was still unable to devalue nuclear weapons importance in international affairs and an instrument of foreign policy. The treaty made a distinction between the states that had tested the nuclear explosives before January 1, 1967, and state either without nuclear capability or had not detonated such weapon. As per the treaty, the proof of explosive ability (to detonate nuclear devices) seemingly appears menacing than just the nuclear capability.

V.C. Trivedi, India’s negotiator on NPT strongly opposed the artificial distinction as “global nuclear apartheid”. The formalization and operationalization of NPT in 1970 became a watershed and new beginning for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Even with the formalization, India never became (till date) part of its signatories.

During this period, there was a major shift in the US foreign policy recorded under President Nixon, when Henry Kissinger, the national US Security Advisor revised the US policy for the sub-continent. This transformation in policy resulted in the development of good ties with Communist China for which Pakistan was instrumental in developing trust

between US and China. It marked a significant trend in US foreign policy since the start of Cold War. The double diplomatic rapprochement between the US and two foes of India (Pakistan and China), was not well received by the latter. The decision of Nixon strained the India and US relations further. At the end of the year, 1971, Indian armies were deployed to support the liberation of Dhaka (disintegration of united Pakistan). Kissinger was quick to react by flexing American military muscle to “prevent 'a Soviet stooge, supported by Soviet arms', from overrunning an ally” and encouraged the Chinese to open a new front in the war to "scare those goddamn Indians to death.”

Another intervention by the Nixon administration further alienated India in global politics and worsened the relationship between both countries. The intervention was to show China the power of US as an ally by sending a nuclear-armed Seventh Fleet under the USS enterprise into the Bay of Bengal during the crisis. This move was resented by the Indians and brought relations to a new low. The decision though proved unhelpful for Pakistan at the end of the day. Indian elites never forgot the incident referred to the ‘enterprise.’

2.3 1974 till End of Cold War Era

The fallout of the Sino-India war, the war with Pakistan and the decision in 1972 to test a bomb, which eventually happened in 1974, was the calculated policy by India to display regional strength. The bomb though added to the regional status of India but showed a nation in the developing world has the effrontery to challenge the global powerhouse in the West. As the need demanded in May 1974, India tested its first nuclear bomb in the Rajasthan desert thus becoming the sixth country to test a nuclear explosion. Regardless of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, India tested its nuclear capacity not only for the purposes of domestic needs, agitation, and pressure of notable nuclear scientists, but the test was also used for political gains by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The architects of the bomb believed the test was a re-writing of history, projecting India as a reckonable state with a nuclear weapon. It was termed by Indira Gandhi as a “peaceful nuclear explosion”

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(PNE), echoing India’s reservation of NPT.\textsuperscript{130} The test was unacceptable to many, particularly the US and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Washington was forced to distance itself from New Delhi for more than two decades due to the 1974 test.

In the following twenty-five years, the US discontinued cooperation and whilst pressured its allies not to engage in nuclear cooperation with New Delhi.\textsuperscript{131} Carter Administration officially ended cooperation with nations which were violating nuclear treaty agreements. This defined the US approach and relations with many other nations. As part of the comprehensive response to the 1974 nuclear test by India, the US introduced the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act passed in 1978. This Act laid the foundation for the US sanctions on India and other nuclear-motivated states. Interestingly, the CIRUS reactor used by India in producing plutonium effective for the explosive was provided by Canada. While the US supplied the heavy, water necessary for the reactor to become functional.\textsuperscript{132} Regardless of the support, whether the test was expected, it rather distanced India from its allies on grounds of violation of cooperation, test ban treaties, and the NPT. The test affected the US-India relations badly and this would take years to recover from the distress between both the states.

India developed its nuclear capabilities and tested it with an explosion, violating and disregarding the United Nations sanctions. The motive for the initiative came from the founder of the global nuclear non-proliferation treaty; the US, which being the leader of the drive kept distinct policies towards different allies. Although, “the underlying assumption of non-proliferation policy is that the spread of nuclear weapons is a threat to the US and international security”\textsuperscript{133} in practice there was a mixed record of US commercial and

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\item Both the preamble and Article V of the NPT make reference to the potential value of "peaceful nuclear explosions." India would seek to justify its decision to test a PNE, not a bomb as falling well within the mainstream consensus of the time.
\item Esther Pan, "Backgrounder: The US-India Nuclear Deal" Council on Foreign Relations, October 2, 2008.
\item Paul Leventhal, among others, argues that the executive branch deliberately misled the Congress about the presence of US-supplied heavy water in the CIRUS reactor, implying that India has been a nuclear "cheater" for decades.
\item Zachary Davis, "Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Issues in the 104th Congress" CRS Issue Brief, 91023, November 1, 1996.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
strategic interests. Yet, Washington would claim that the spread of nuclear weapons was a threat to the US and international security.

Nuclear development was considered as a threat and while India was being a target of sanction Pakistan being an ally of the US was given a waiver because of the war in Afghanistan in which the US was supported by Pakistan. Pakistan enjoyed covert nuclear programs that were known to the US but were ignored, even though both countries remained non-signatories of the NPT. This unequal and inconsistent behaviour alienated India and convinced it to take a more pragmatic approach. The mixed reaction of the US on nuclear proliferation continued wherein nations like Pakistan and Israel were supported by the US in their nuclear programs, whereas nations which were not the US allies (India and Cuba) were restricted to develop their civilian nuclear capabilities. Contrarily to the Executive Branch of the US, the Congress has the jurisdiction to articulate, and legislate based on, universal principles. Executive branch behaviour towards India, from this point, would be constrained by statutory pressure from Congress in relation to nuclear matters.

In search of a powerful partner, in 1971, India signed a “peace and friendship” agreement that would span for 20 years with the Soviet Union. This agreement cemented relations between both the states in the coming decades. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets was an unfavourable development for India, whose indignation for any superpower within its immediate border was unhidden. The war further put Indo-US relations in cold storage. Moreover, the war further underpinned the strategic location of Pakistan. Islamabad sacrificed and benefited hugely from the US aids as a strong supporter (ally) in the war. President Reagan was covertly using Pakistan to support Afghan freedom fighter or Mujahedeen with military and economic support. India viewed this motive of the US in a highly negative light and as history records, India-US relations was not just bad but on a record low. At some point, efforts were made to improve ties by both sides after General Zia’s regime in Pakistan.134

134 By the late 1980s, both India and Pakistan were well on their way to developing nuclear arsenals, and, recognizing their mutual capability, Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto signed, in December 1988, the first confidence building measure between the two countries agreeing not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities.
2.4 Post-Cold War

During the Cold War, Indo-US relations were far from being the all-weather friends, rather replete with oscillation, irritation, short-term cooperation, and sanctions. At the heart of the relations lies India with its acclaimed neutrality and anti-Western hegemony. The end of the Cold War opened a new chapter between the two states. Prior to that, Nehru doctrine of neutrality never posed any meaningful and direct challenge to Washington’s interest, yet there were instances where both states found common ground for cooperation. The swift bilateral relations between the two in the post-Cold War era demonstrated that the Cold War was not entirely cold between the two and that they had room for deeper cooperation.

During the meeting, the US expressed its concerns about the rise of “Militant Islam” in the region. The US also viewed that in the most volatile part of the world, which included the Islamic Crescent from Turkey to Malaysia, India was the only actor, which possessed the ability to safeguard the US interests and act as an active regional stabilizing force. This strategic partnership and military cooperation between India and the US further developed and strengthened by the setting up of the Joint Steering Committee of the two Navies, which conducted joint naval exercises in 1992.\footnote{Muhammad Ishaque Fani, “The India-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan” \textit{Pakistan Vision}, 10:2, (December 2009):133.}

In the post-Cold War, it was important for the US to re-engage with India, via promoting friendly relations. It was the need of the hour for the US to make India as a close ally to strengthen the latter’s position in the region. Similarly, India was never reluctant to refining its foreign policy; the post-war scenario encouraged and provided India with the opportunity to develop good ties with the US. As mentioned in the Kondar’s report to the Congress, the strategic development, and the fallout of Cold War in the region incentivized the change of foreign policy and the need to forge a mutual, engaging, and cooperative alliance between them.

India was quick to recognise the US interests in the region and the need to forge a long-term alliance. Such strategic plan was made possible through the instrumental role of the
Indian diaspora (expatriates), lobbying in Washington, consolidating mutual understanding with Congress and ultimately a new dawn in Indo-US strategic cooperation in the region. ‘In 1993, the US Congress sought to establish the new categories for providing military and economic assistance to India and developing more cooperation with India that would be in keeping with the new realities to bring India closer to the US position. In January 1995, the US and India signed the “Agreed Minute on Defence Relations” which provided for joint exercise and a trade programme.’

The post-Cold War and the dissolution of Soviet Union opened new windows of possibilities for US-India relationship. It was soon understood by the US that India was of great importance to them if they wanted global access to the sea-lanes. This strategic need was spurred by the US Navy in collaboration with the US Department of Defence which was geared at establishing a long-term friendship with India in promoting and supporting the geo-strategic interest of the US within and beyond the region. The new development was consolidated by the visit of Henry Rowen, Assistant Secretary of Defence to India in December 1990; the secretary was accompanied "with a large delegation." Soon after, the commanders of the US Pacific Command, Claude Kickleighter and Charles Larson visited India. This visit determined the major shift in the Indian foreign policy as Kickleighter proposed expanding US-India defence cooperation, including “annual exchange of visits, regular seminars and discussions, and joint training and participation in military exercises.” The new level of relations spiked up grew swiftly and culminated in the first joint naval exercise (May 1992) between India and the US, an exercise that has not discontinued but transformed into one of the massive military exercises along the Indian ocean.

Prior to the naval exercise, Indian Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit had held a meeting with the senior defence official Paul Wolfowitz in Washington. The meeting was meant to "assess how far the US was interested in defence cooperation" Wolfowitz was "fully supportive of

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136 Ibid.
the new beginnings." The visit of Dixit was not entirely shielded from the reservation while meeting with the Office of the Trade Representative, members of the Congress, the press, and the State Department, the Indian representative was accosted with issues "concentrated entirely on issues of non-proliferation and Kashmir." This depicted how different branches and institutions of the US deal with India and what matters most to them. Dixit’s memoir was more insightful of the Washington visit, the frequency for which ‘non-proliferation’ featured in the talks and how irritated that was for him and his government, Dixit states "India was absolutely firm about not signing the NPT." India was still unwilling to sign any treaty that would make it weak in the continent, while nuclear development was trendy and a significant indicator ensuring a nation’s sovereignty and military capabilities.

Despite the unfavourable talks in Washington, the military ties between the two states never ceased to progress and that provided an important platform for the turbulent decade of the 1990s. Understanding the sensitivity and uncertainty in world politics of that era, nations understood that political cooperation should be strengthened, developing mutual trust on which military ties should be further forged.

For the next two decades, non-proliferation negotiations and greater strategic relationship agreements dominated the US and India discussions concurrently. During the early 1990s, commerce and the global balance of payment crisis became important points of discussion. A country like India having a huge gold reserve was forced to put its gold on sale to meet debt obligations. This followed the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies, which marked a transformation in India’s economic performance and realisation that “India's lack of economic growth in the preceding four decades, by extension, was the product of decades of state planning, autarkic policies, and lack of technological innovation.” It is a general consensus within the Indian elite circle that India became a prosperous and major economic power in the region and the world will be premised on the committed

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141 Ibid., 182.
implementation of a neo-liberal economy. The shift in economic policy and relative economic development characterised by fairly improved GDP, development of Indian information technology and software companies, the transformation of Bangalore as the hub of many of these companies never failed to entice the attention of Washington, which explains the Clinton’s Administration economic policy towards India.

The rapid economic growth in India changed its global image; while on the sideline, it enjoyed sound military relations with Washington, yet New Delhi remained un-immune from the fear and debate that once strained its relationship with the US and the rest of the world in the 1990s. The occasional political and strategic brawl between Pakistan and India, which sometimes reaches the threat of nuclear confrontation, confounded the “predictions of deterrence optimists, who expected that the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides would promote a more stable relationship.”

The conflict between Pakistan and India presented the world a unique scenario when two nuclear power states positioned across the same borderline. The incessant border skirmishes and conflict situation somewhat falsified the theories of deterrence. The fear of an all-out nuclear war spiked the world over culminating in both bilateral and multilateral meetings aimed at ‘confidence-building measures and strategies for conflict-prevention’.

Understanding the volatility that surrounds the Indo-Pakistan relations, Washington for the first time in 1992 established South Asia Bureau (though now refer to as the Bureau for South and Central Asia) headed by Assistant Secretary of US State Department.

According to Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State in President Clinton’s Administration was very passionate to improve the US-India relationship but the little was accomplished. In December 1995, the US had intelligence reports suggesting that India was likely to go for a nuclear test, an action that troubled the US and its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. Prime Minister P.V. Narashimha Rao was convinced to back down from the nuclear test following the intercession of a US diplomat in Delhi who "warned that a

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test would backfire against India.”144 As much as the Clinton administration was ready to have a new dawn with India, Talbott writes that India’s non-commitment to non-proliferation frustrated the Americans, hence “India’s refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty... made it hard for the Clinton administration to develop traction with India.”145 The possibility of similar test happening in future drove the US to pressurise India even more on the non-proliferation agreement, reducing its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The US pressure failed to change the Indian behaviour, even with the visit to Washington by Prime Minister P.V. Narashimha Rao, New Delhi remained reluctant to enter into any treaty. Even successive diplomatic cloud in 1995 characterised by the visit to India by “US cabinet officials, the secretaries of Defence, Treasury, and Commerce, and First Lady Hillary Clinton” were a fruitless adventure to convince India otherwise.

Canberra Commission, an independent Australian Government Agency on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons stated, "the end of Cold War has created a new climate for international action to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new opportunity. It must be exploited quickly or it will be lost.”146 In addition, the sweeping trend of economic globalisation gave little incentives to many nations (both nuclear and non-nuclear states) to celebrate the testing of nuclear weapons. While there was huge pressure on many states to join the non-proliferation regimes, China and France tested their nuclear weapons for the last time before becoming signatories of CTBT. In response to the global pressure and demand, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) forwarded a request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue an order regarding nuclear proliferation. In 1996, the court responded though not in absolute term. The court ruling was divided and refused to prescribe nuclear weapon and its use or even considered it illegal nuclear; "threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”147 Ironically, India supported the

145 Ibid., 25.
147 ‘Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ available at www.icj-cij.org/en/case/95
court ruling, as it does not labelled the weapon illegal, but urged the nation to recognise the possible human crisis associated with the weapon.

In the context of being an ardent vanguard of global weapon equality and anti-nuclear apartheid, India’s indignation over the monopoly of nuclear technology and weapon can very well be fathomed. India though was never a signatory of the NPT but remained watchful of the unfolding happenings around the non-proliferation debate, particularly within the NPT, but was the first country that proposed the establishment of the CTBT in the 1950s. On both platforms (NPT and CTBT), there was a clash between US and India’s interests. The 1995 resolution of the NPT conference to indefinitely renew the treaty and reiterate the importance of Article VI (commitment to work towards arms reduction and disarmament) was welcomed by India. During the CTBT summit, New Delhi’s strong position against testing and proliferation of weapon was not well received; rather India was on the verge of isolation and was forced as a member to veto the “treaty on Disarmament.” New Delhi rather wanted assured commitment from the nuclear weapon states to state categorically when disarmament talk will commence, a time-bound debate than a blanket promise.

The CTBT Article XIV requests all nuclear weapon states to sign and ratify the treaty, such article put India at peril though CTBT members like Russia, China and Britain wants to tie India to the article, even though India is not a declared nuclear state and doing that does not fall within the framework of the treaty. Domestic hardliners in India were quick to caution against declaring India a nuclear state, as it will jeopardise India’s strategic interest in the region. India hesitation within the CTBT stained its non-proliferation profile and added up to the global isolation of India. This dilemma of India was well depicted by Bidwai and Vanaik, "what, after all, is the point of India not signing the CTBT but then remaining where it would have been if it had signed?... There is more internal pressure than ever before to carry out tests... [even though] there has been no qualitative shift in Chinese and Pakistani nuclear behaviour."\(^{148}\)

\(^{148}\) Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, “After the CTBT, India’s Intentions” \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists}, 53:2, (March–April 1997).
2.5 Nuclear Explosions by India and Pakistan

In the following years, India witnessed major political shifts and pre-eminence of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). While campaigning for the forthcoming elections; BJP that commanded sizeable electorates as (one of the Indian major political parties) emphasised the need to declare India ‘a nuclear state’. The election was in favour of the BJP, with a coalition government, in May 1998, the BJP did not simply fulfil its election promised of naming India a nuclear state, it actually tested the weapon regardless of the pressure mounted by the US against it. The test equally offset regional strategic and sent loud meaning across the region and beyond. Following the India test, Pakistan wasted no time to follow the suit, as Islamabad experimented and went forth with a nuclear test in Baluchistan province of Pakistan. This opened yet a new chapter in the regional and the world history as it was the first time two neighbouring states with proximal borders, went nuclearized and had a confrontation tendency. South Asia becoming nuclearized was a huge embarrassment for the US politicians whose pressure and inducement had no effect. Although there was huge international anger which was not directly disproportionate to the passion of the Indian elites who were excited that India had marked its position in regional and global politics. The embarrassment incurred by the US induced President Clinton to say, "we're going to come down on these guys like a ton of bricks", while "the machinery of government cranked out an array of sanctions against India that reflected the requirements of the law and the intensity of the president's feelings."150

Apart from these, there were other states which expressed their reservation over the Indian test; China which had maintained a silence. In response to the test, the UN Security Council also registered their concerns and hence the UNSC Resolution 1172. India shockingly remained firm in developing their nuclear capabilities, conducting a series of nuclear tests in 1998. These developments triggered the United States not just to re-examine but also to equally recognise the need to re-visit its nuclear policy towards India. Clinton Administration understood that absolute non-proliferation and denuclearisation would be an unfeasible policy, stead the administration promised to help India with civil nuclear facility

150 Ibid., 52-3.
and technology in exchange for India becoming CTBT signatory and terminate its fissile material production for nuclear arms. India was not entirely convinced by the US incentive, particularly on issues like capping its nuclear arsenal, yet both states found a common ground for cooperation. The cloud of international anger and anxiety following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan showed how much the world was sensitive to the weapon; the Japanese horror remains an indelible history. It is equally astonishing how the anger died down and the world came to terms with the reality of nuclearized South Asia.\textsuperscript{151}

Though the rest of the world was at ease, the sub-continent remained turbulent with India-Pakistan being aggressive in their nuclear production and tests. Sooner than expected, there was anxiety in the international community, as both states had gone to war over Kargil and the overthrow of democratic government and replacement by a military administrator in Pakistan due to the war.\textsuperscript{152} Despite the sensitivity of the situation, the world saw this development as fait accompli as neither Pakistan nor India was willing to relinquish their nuclear arsenal.

The BJP government realised the need to make a case for itself before the US government and hence a successive meeting was held in Washington led by the BJP Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh. In addition to arguing that the bomb explains India’s insecurity, Jaswant also credited for opening new possibilities of cooperation between the US and India. Jaswant and Clinton Administration had eight rounds of discussions that practically had less fruition but opened windows of opportunity and chances for confidence and trust building between both the nations. The US now understood that they had neglected India for so long and that the new leadership of BJP was reliable enough to trust. The talks clarified many ambiguities felt by both states, promoting goodwill in them that was to become a major resource in the future. This new bond between US and India was further strengthened by the visit of President Clinton to India in March 2000 and was considered an event that was a major breakthrough in their relations. Indian policymakers believed the

\textsuperscript{151} Japan reconsideration of ties with India, in August 2000, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori made the first visit of a Japanese Prime Minister to India in a decade.

nuclear test was a rational decision at the end of the day, irrespective of the cloud of anger and reservation. India still possessed the diplomatic skill to negotiate with Washington, hence nuclear test paid off. Clinton’s visit to India eventually laid the foundation for India-US partnership that has morphed from economic cooperation to nuclear and defence pacts. Without mincing word, the rapprochement between the two countries fit into the general narrative of Indian exceptionalism, they might have tested a nuclear bomb, but they are trustworthy and have the potential for cooperation at different levels. The meeting of President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee in Delhi resulted to ‘The Vision Document’ which “resolve to create a closer and qualitatively new relationship between the US and India’ on the basis of common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security.”

India’s decision on nuclear tests proved to be beneficial, as they were soon recognized and accepted as a nuclear state. A commentator comments, "Fifty years after independence, India now wanted to become a normal nation placing considerations of realpolitik and national security above its recently dominant focus on liberal internationalism, morality, and normative approaches to international politics.” The end game appeared fruitful for Indian realists, whose pragmatic decision to declare the country ‘a nuclear state’ and test a bomb was an insinuation that rational realist approach can suggestively be used to accomplish what its long adopted ‘liberal internationalism, morality, and normative approach to international politics could not attain. Rational realism is the new “normalcy” for India to prospect and survive in an unpredictable anarchic system.

2.6 Bush Transformation Era

President Clinton’s administration might have opened the channel of economic cooperation between India and Washington, but Bush Administration cemented and consolidated the ties from mere economic cooperation to strategic (military) pact. Bush administration prioritized Indo-US strategic partnership in 2001. While denuclearization and non-


proliferation were important issues of concern, the economic partnership was not off the list. The new bearing of Washington towards South Asia (particularly with India) marked a serious change in the US foreign policy and world politics. Bush administration surprised many observers of the region, shifted the enduring political equation, and eventually crafted an unprecedented strategic partnership. Indian policymakers got the vibes and played along with the rhythm to their advantage.

The intellectual and ideological underpinning for the Bush-India policy goes back to the argument of Condoleezza Rice featured in the Foreign Affairs, January 2000. Her argument laid the foundation upon which the Bush Government shaped its Indo-US policy. The article urged the US to be cognizance of its declining defence expenditure, unchecked and lavished multilateralism, the case of the so-called rogue states. The supposed threat emanating from Russia and China (the extent to which China will affect US interest in the Asia Pacific) and why an unchecked Chinese power will disturb the enduring balance of power in the region. The need for the US to deepen (military and economic) cooperation with Japan and South Korea and in South Asia, preference should be accorded to India, given its ability to emerge as regional balancing force. The nuclearization of South Asia (a serious matter of concern for India and Pakistan) and the Kashmir imbroglio should be a matter of concern for the US.

Any serious US Administration would regard India as a tool in balancing China’s calculation. Hence, it became important to note that “India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one. It is important to promote China's internal transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions. Cooperation should be pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide.”155 Contrary to his predecessors that were non-confrontational towards China and considered Beijing as "strategic competitor", Bush perceived and treated China as a potential threat which could bring unrest in South Asia and places of interest to the US. Aside from South Asia, the Bush Administration outlined the importance of the Asia Pacific region to the US and the need to work with Asia Pacific partners towards

155 Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest” Foreign Policy, Jan-Feb 2000.
"containing Chinese power and security ambitions."

The US foreign policy ought to be friendly and cooperative with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and India to contain China from its geostrategic adventurism. Specifically for South Asia, the Bush Administration felt the need to prioritize cooperation and alliance with India over its nuclear programme and facilitate New Delhi to containing China. Such policy was warmly welcomed as ever-awaited news by New Delhi.

At a confirmation hearing, the Secretary of State, Powell stated that the strategic partnership with India was very important to US interest, but assurance of removal of nuclear sanctions was also to be taken in account. Following the meetings of Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh with his new counterpart and National Security Advisor Rice in Bush Administration, it was recorded that President Bush personally met the Foreign Minister at his stay in Washington, expressing his interest in developing strong ties with India. This diplomatic move was effective as India was now comfortable and saw the possibilities of an alliance with the US. President Bush’s desire translated into the development of Theatre Missile Defence Systems simultaneously abrogated the enduring Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. India was at the forefront to welcome the development. In furtherance to President Bush desire, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited India to consolidate the newly developed strategic partnership in May 2001. The presence of Armitage in India dealt with very high-level issues and consultations. The attack of 9/11 came as a surprise to the US which consequentially affected the on-going Indo-US strategic partnership. Prior to 9/11, the Delhi was enjoying a field day with Washington, but the dastard event was a good omen for Pakistan as it retuned US-Pakistan relations to a point where they could be recovered beyond means. Pakistan and entire South Asia were once again placed on US strategic radar, though not to drive out Soviet influence, but against global war on terrorism.

India had always complained about the extremism from Pakistan across the shared borders. India claimed to be the victim of Islamic extremism, mainly initiated by Pakistan. Such accusation did not merely irritate Islamabad, but the latter often request New Delhi to

\[156\] Ibid.
substantiate its claims with convincing and compelling evidence. New Delhi’s campaign of terrorism emanating from Pakistan began to find consent in Washington. The attack of 9/11 gave India and US the rationale to agree on a common policy at defeating terrorism. Quite interestingly, Pakistan was not in any way identified as having a direct link with the attack. Since the 9/11 meant the US was directly affected by terrorism, New Delhi exploited the situation to elevate the issue of terrorism threats from Pakistan at the high-levels before the administration. The motives of India were pitted against Pakistan. Because of the involvement of Afghanistan as a safe haven for the mastermind of 9/11, Pakistan was yet again needed by the US to launch their war campaign in Afghanistan. The importance of Pakistan was irritating to New Delhi. The invasion of Afghanistan unveiled new challenges for the region and the American forces in Afghanistan. Soon after Afghanistan invasion, political instability broke out in the Indian occupied Kashmir and followed by an attack on the Indian parliament. Pakistan was quick to be blamed for the two incidents. The situation ignited political and diplomatic uncertainty, resulting in the positioning of armies at the borders of India and Pakistan. Foreign embassies and diplomatic staff of Pakistan-India were called back by both the nations as the threat of war was more than ever. This was when the US and British government stepped in as mediators in the volatile relationship between India and Pakistan this time. Delegations were flying back and forth to India and Pakistan in hopes to prevent a full-scale war that could result in nuclear exchange from both sides. Islamabad and New Delhi were being guided by the US to cooperate and to develop the confidence of each other; India in October 2002 took the initiative to suspend its forces from the border. This action of India proved to be peaceful for both the nations as Pakistan also called off their army shortly after India’s decision. Diplomacy prevailed and the cloud of war waned.  

Fight against the so-called radical extremism brought Indo-US alliance to a juncture, although the challenges from extremism and terrorism were placed on different geographic terrain and scale. Sharing information and intelligence on how best to combat the menace further underlined their cooperation. Hence in January 2003, during a speech at the Institute

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for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), the US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill identified that the two nations were facing similar issues, "to promote peace and freedom in Asia, combat international terrorism, and slow the spread of weapons of mass destruction."158

Ambassador Blackwill was given a mandate by President Bush to develop a US-India relationship; this mandate was meant to re-project India as a workable partner and rebrand the US as a trustworthy partner. Bush Administration tactically chose Blackwill given his profile and suitability for the task. Being a former Harvard professor and a specialist in National Security Council, Blackwell was accomplished in areas that his predecessors failed. During his 2-year stay in Delhi, he successfully established a new line of relations between the two states, all of which was coherent with the mandate from President Bush. Blackwell upgraded the working policy between the two countries. Meanwhile, the advisory role of his senior advisor Ashley J. Tellis exponentially contributed to whatever achievements of Blackwell is credited for. Tellis was a former Rand Corporation and currently Carnegie Endowment senior fellow, an expert in nuclear issues and Asian strategic affairs. He was always operating alongside Blackwill on his mission of promoting good ties between India and the US and more importantly ensuring effective policy and decisions. Their work soon resulted in a mutual trust between the two nations, Tellis recalls;

‘During 2001-3, when the bilateral relationship was at its most intense, the strategic dialogue possessed an intimacy that was displayed in the willingness of both sides to engage in genuinely freewheeling conversation rather than a scripted recitation of talking points. Success during this period was enhanced by. Blackwell’s insistence that the U.S. government routinely brief senior officials in New Delhi on major American policy initiatives completely unrelated to bilateral relations. [This had the effect of] underscoring the conviction that the United States mattered to the United States not just within South Asian but on a global scale.’159

Blackwill very brilliantly handled the situation by altering the US embassy policies and structure, a structure that facilitates a closer relationship between Indian officials and another major stakeholder to connect well with the embassy. The open policy in the embassy never resulted in any major agreement between the US and India, but it did involve all the possible stakeholders in promoting US-India relations. The stakeholders which were previously unheard of and were the possible barriers to forming a good relationship with India were now given a chance to speak and relate to the embassy. This change in the political environment gradually built a bridge of trust and confidence between Washington and New Delhi. Other than refining Indo-US relations in New Delhi, Blackwill had to do the same in Washington amongst stakeholder with the old perceptions of India. Blackwill had to overcome legal constraints stopping smooth Indo-US relations. In addition, he had to change the common negative perception of the Indian civil bureaucracy considered in the US as a Soviet client.

2.7 India-US Defence Deal
Since independence, Pakistan had enjoyed good relationships with the US, whereas for many reasons that do not preclude Cold War politics and the discursive debate of non-proliferation, Indo-US relations could not follow a similar trajectory of US-Pakistan relations. The closure of the Cold War and the inception of Bush Administration (under the influence of neoconservatism) marked a tangent from Cold War-style and level of relations. Under the Bush Administration, Indo-US relations strengthened more and wore a new look through strategic partnership.

Arguably, the new partnership was never geared to undermine or downgrade US-Pakistan relations. For the US, the motive was to compete and curtail the emerging power of China in South Asia and the Asia Pacific concurrently. Indo-US readjusted foreign policies transformed the two countries from enduring foes to friends. As part of their commitment to charting a new path of friendship, the two countries cemented their alliance under the
India-defence Policy Group (DGP). DGP is an amalgam of four distinct yet interconnected four sub-groups namely; the Military Cooperation Group, Joint Technology Group, Senior Technology Security Group, and Defence Procurement and Production Group. The group was in all ramifications a progressive development for India.

The defence policy group morphed and sooner led to major weapon procurement. On April 17, 2002, the Indian government made the first significant procurement from the US. The procurement set the motion for the defence cooperation decades to come. Although in the same year, US sold long-range weapon of a radar system to India, the radar system is estimated to be $146 million. In the following year (2003), Washington banked yet another military deal (procurement) with India. Through the last purchase, India added the “Israel’s Phalcon airborne early warning system” to its weaponry. The last deal was estimated at $1.2 billion. India invariably became a worthy market for American military hardware. The defence pact and weapon procurement were aligned with India economic liberalisation and weapon refurbishment. The consolidation of such pact came from multiple players, one of which was the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) that lobbied on behalf of India and promoted the idea of alignment of American and Indian military industry. In one of its reports, the CEIP suggested and recommended;

a) The US should help India to grow its military and economic power to prevent China’s dominance in Asia.

b) There should be the end of the illusory idea of military balance between India and Pakistan and India should be provided more military and economic aid.

c) The US should endorse India’s membership in the UN Security Council, G-8, APEC, and International Energy Agency.

d) The US should remove the objections to the Iran-India gas pipeline project.

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161 The Indian Embassy Press Release, March 9, 2011.


163 Ibid.
e) The US should allow the sale of dual-use technology, including nuclear safety equipment to India.\textsuperscript{164}

In 2005, the Bush administration reached a ten-year defence pact with India, as a gesture of goodwill. Upon her visit to India, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice made it crystal clear to the Indians that “President Bush very much values to enhance the relationship between the US and India, the fact that we are becoming in many ways important global as well as regional partners.”\textsuperscript{165} Rice also signalled to India that the foreign policy dispensation of Washington intends to effect changes in the regional strategic equation, overhauling the long-standing American non-proliferation policy, all in the bid to integrate India into the league of states controlling nuclear technology and related materials. Such policy intent sooner translated into the nuclear deal between the two countries.\textsuperscript{166} By no means was Pakistan sensitivity taken into account while the US preferred to co-opt and facilitate India with nuclear technology.

The Indo-US deal can be broadly seen from two angles; co-production and transfer of technology, and cooperation in missile defence and technology and defence procurement and production. Regardless of being a major achievement for India, the element within the policymaking circle never ceased to mark their reservations about the whole deal. The sceptics contend that such a deal will overwhelm India’s independence and thus the vulnerability to American influence. However, the cost-benefit analysis outcome was in favour of the strategic partnership, which India pursued diligently to its national interest.\textsuperscript{167} These fears were not simply confined to India; the US had its own concerns which included an assurance from India which was the purported custodian of the Indian Ocean, that US interest will never be undermined around the Indian Ocean. Assurance from the Indian side led to the 2006 comprehensive cooperation on Maritime Security Cooperation Agreement.

\textsuperscript{165} Muhammad Ishaque Fani, “The India- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan.”
\textsuperscript{167} “Drawn out, but not ready to fire” Rediff, April 24, 2003.
The US was in favour of stretching their defence relationship in the sub-continent overlooked the risk associated with the India-US strategic partnership. The partnership is undisputedly grounded in the common principles of realism and promotion of national interests. Interestingly, same principles were followed since Clinton down till the Bush Administration, and successive governments have made no departure, rather accelerate the pace. India-US relationship was very beneficial to both the nations, but there were people that will tag this partnership as a threat. Many allies of America felt left alone and neglected as an effect of this partnership. The Taliban were once considered as angels and agent of freedom, fighting for the same cause. They were armed with American weapons, but as history and geopolitics turned out, the angel of yesterday is today’s devil.

Deciding and making a rational decision has never been easy for statecraft, same goes for the Indo-US alliance. As much as there were elements in India that supported the notion of getting closer with Washington, many other objected on solid grounds. This polarity was not a mere peculiarity of the policymaker alone, but it cut across party line. Before the recent BJP government, the Indian National Congress (INC), the oldest party in India had struggled with the idea of Indo-US partnership. There were reservations both within and outside the party. Regardless of the concerns of INC over opening-up to the United States, whatever party rules India, it will always support the idea of deepening relations with Washington. Since the end of Cold War has augmented India’s position in the region and the world over and ultimately suit Indian national interest. The replacement of the INC following its defeat by BJP during the 2014 general election did not mark a tangent rather continuity in India-US relations. In 2015, a year after being sworn in as the prime minister, the Modi’s government added up to whatever achievements the INC has on the record.

‘In 2015, the two countries concluded the Joint Strategic Vision (JSV) for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, underscoring closer US-India ties and the importance of our cooperation on promoting peace, prosperity, and stability in the region. The JSV emphasizes regional cooperation between the United States and India, particularly on maritime security. While the United States and India enjoy close defence cooperation across a range of areas, maritime security has become an important focus of our cooperation, consistent with the JSV and the defence framework. Both nations share a commitment to a rules-based international order, the free

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flow of global commerce, and the freedom of navigation. Moreover, both countries share concerns about maritime threats and a desire to respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises. As a result, the United States and India established a Maritime Security Dialogue in 2016 to coordinate our maritime-related security and defence cooperation.169

In the following year (2016), the Modi administration finalised and concluded the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), a long-delayed defence pact.170 The defence pact was the manifestation of the Obama Administration’s Indian exceptionalism. The pact laid the foundation by which the two countries will “increased strategic and regional cooperation, to deepened military-to-military exchanges, to expanded collaboration on defence technology and innovation.”171

In a joint report to the Congress by the Department of Defence (DoD) and the State Department, the two institutions identified nine areas of focus upon which US-India defence cooperation and defence trade will be further intensified.172 The status of “Major Defence Partner” which was awarded by US to India added more feathers to New Delhi’s hat and thus explains the multiple and levels of bilateral defence exercises between the US DoD and the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD). As part of the defence deal, annual and seasonal military exercises between the countries have become conventional practices. The YUDH ABHYAS, a battalion-level field-training exercise, the multilateral (annual naval) MALABAR exercise, the biennial Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise hosted by the US. Pacific Command, the joint Air Force and multilateral exercise flagged as RED FLAG-Alaska exercise and the TARKASH and VAJRA PRAHAR exercise for counterterrorism and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) are evident and depth of defence cooperation between the two countries, recently in 2017 and in recent past.173

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171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
It is evident that over the last decade that the military collaboration has manifested in many forms, one of which is the “Cope India” a joint exercise of US-India navy in the Indian coast also known as Malabar and the joint Special Forces training. The Malabar exercise is one of the most important annual exercises held between the navies of both the countries.\textsuperscript{174} Besides, for India, the Malabar training exercise is a pride to the Indian army as it commissioned Indian navy to engage in a training exercise with twenty-seven (27) warships, an occasion where other US allies in the Pacific joined India on the Bay of Bengal.\textsuperscript{175} While the agreement and cooperation are well aligned with India’s national interest, it nevertheless did not erase serious concerns why aspect of the pact had long been procrastinated. On one hand, analysts believe the defence deal will entrap India to become subservient to the United States, while on the other; New Delhi will be entangled in confrontational issues related with Washington even for those that have no bearing with India’s national interest. Hence, Pallam Raju says “we resisted this agreement for long because we didn’t want to give the perception that we are ganging up with Americans against somebody else, in particular, China.”\textsuperscript{176}

2.8 India-US Defence Trade

The strategic relationship between India-US was to initially collaborate on the certain military venture, this picked up its pace in 2002 as the exchange of military capabilities increased between both the countries.\textsuperscript{177} The official report from the US confirms that India is among the top states for joint military operations and procurement of US military weapon.\textsuperscript{178} The Indo-US cooperation gave India the assurance of benefiting hugely from American military industry. Washington promised and pledged to sell India hundreds of billions of dollars weapons in decades to come. Such weapons equally draw India closer to the American military technology vis-à-vis its Soviet-era military arsenal. Invariable sale of military hardware to India contributes to the American economy and fortifies Indo-US

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\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{176} Rama Lakshmi, “India and US deepen defense ties with landmark agreement” The Washington Post, August 30, 2016
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\textsuperscript{177} Muhammad Ishaque Fani, “The India-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan.”
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partnership. Both the US military complex and security companies recognized India as a major market for their products. The opportunity to trade their state of art surveillance and detection system, which gives Indians the joy and pride of being protected by advanced American technology, cannot be underrated. Having such technology and machines are expected to accelerate efficiency for the growing Indian economy. The connection between security and economic growth is apparently undeniably. Meanwhile, the benefit of the trade was not meant to be monopolised by the Americans, Indian companies were equally interested to invest in American defence industry. In both ways, Indo-US relations were getting complimented and strengthened.179

‘The first-ever major US. arms sale to India came in 2002 when the Pentagon negotiated delivery of 12 counter-battery radar sets (or “Fire-finder” radars) worth a total of $190 million. In 2006, Congress authorized and New Delhi approved the $44 million purchase of the USS Trenton, a decommissioned American amphibious transport dock. The ship, which became the second largest in the Indian Navy when it was commissioned as the INS Jalashwa in 2007, set sail for India carrying six surplus Sikorsky UH-3H Sea King helicopters purchased for another $39 million. The Security Cooperation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-266) authorized the President to transfer to India two Osprey-class coastal mine-hunter ships as Excess Defence Articles. In 2008, Washington and New Delhi finalized a deal to send to India six C-130J Hercules military transport aircraft (along with related equipment, training, and services). The deal, which represented the largest-ever defence sale to India to date, is worth nearly $1 billion to the manufacturer, Maryland-based Lockheed Martin (the C-130Js, configured to support Indian special operations requirements, were delivered in December 2010). In 2009, New Delhi signed a $2.1 billion deal to purchase eight P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft from Illinois-based Boeing. These aircraft, slated for delivery in 2013, also provide anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and their sale set a new record as the largest-ever US arms transfer to India. In 2010, the Pentagon notified Congress of a potential sale to India of ten C-17 Globe-master III military transport aircraft (with training equipment, spare parts, and other support). Yet another new record sale was realized when, in June 2011, New Delhi formally approved the $4.1 billion purchase, the largest-ever Indian defence contract with a US company. Washington welcomed the sale as both advancing the US-India partnership and in sustaining some 23,000 American jobs in 44 states.’180

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The level of defence trade between the two countries is estimated to more $15 billion, an amount that stretched back to 2008 to 2017. During these years and the transfer of military hardware, India now rank top among the countries having US military aircraft which include the “C-130J and C-17 transport aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, Harpoon missiles, Apache and Chinook helicopters, and M-777 lightweight Howitzers. India operates the second largest C-17 and P-8 fleets in the world.” However, going by the factsheet of the US embassy and consulates in India, the traffic of the trade in defence materials is not simply favouring the US, but Indian companies are also taking full advantage of the partnership.

‘In 2012, Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) and Lockheed Martin established a joint venture to produce C-130J Super Hercules airframe components. The 50th empennage was delivered in September 2016. TASL also has a joint venture with Sikorsky, established in 2011, to co-produce S-92 helicopter cabins. In June 2016, TASL and Boeing announced a Hyderabad-based joint venture to manufacture components for Apache helicopters and collaborate on integrated systems development opportunities in India.’

By all account, the Obama Administration remains in history as one of the most significant benefactors of the US government that ever-pushed India to a higher pedestal. Indo-US defence trade relations felt significant spike during the first Africa-American leadership, Obama’s administration initiated the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), though launched in 2012 but consolidated in 2015 during Obama visit to India. The Obama administration further granted India the status of “Major Defence Partner” which does not preclude India from benefit from American trade. The visit of PM Modi visit to Washington in 2016 spiced up the craving for deeper American-Indian trade partnership. Modi flagged his “Made in India” initiative, wanting firms to settle and produce from India.

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The DTTI was launched as a mechanism to facilitate senior officials from both countries with a focus on exploring opportunities and challenges related to the defence pact. The DTTI had four main areas of concentration namely:

a. Transform the bilateral defence relationship into one that is limited only by independent strategic decisions, rather than bureaucratic obstacles or inefficient procedures.

b. Strengthen India’s defence industrial base by moving away from the traditional “buyer-seller” dynamic toward a more collaborative approach.

c. Explore new areas of technological collaboration from science and technology cooperation through co-development and co-production.

d. Expand US.-Indian business ties.\textsuperscript{184}

Looking at some of the impediments of the Indo-US defence trade, the US Ambassador to India Richard Verma opines that "we need to follow through on any export control reform matters that prevent this vision from becoming a reality. But I would like to see even bigger advancements under this rubric" if truly the aim of the trade pact was to “go big” and make India a major defence partner of the US.\textsuperscript{185} Analysts would argue that the trajectory of the trade in defence has not been forthcoming. The stringent US domestic laws, coupled with the strategic implication of the whole deal and the never-dying fear over Indian autonomy prevented technology trade between India and Washington.\textsuperscript{186}

‘One of the most significant challenges to expanding US-Indian defence trade is the fact that Americans and Indians are neither treaty allies nor partners in combat. The United States and India are not yet engaged in the kind of combined military planning that allows the advocates to win the debate when it comes to sensitive technology transfers. A related challenge is one of trust and information security. Increasing cyber threats from countries that seek to steal military technology compounds these challenges to information security.’\textsuperscript{187}

\textsuperscript{184} Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “India-US: Defence Technology and Trade Initiative” available at www.acq.osd.mil


\textsuperscript{186} Jakub Zajączkowski, Jivanta Schottli, Manish Thapa, India in the Contemporary World: Polity, Economy and International Relations, (New Delhi: Routledge, 2014):368.

Making tall claims is very easy but converting those claims into manifest reality is quite tricky. Since the defence pact was signed, defence trade between India and the US has moved from zero to almost $billion in all facets of military hardware. Between 2007 and 2014, the data on arms contracts between the two countries was recorded around $7.011 billion, but the actual amount and delivery of weapon were estimated around $959 million. The long terms nature of the contracts and bureaucratic bottlenecks are factors to be considered explaining the latter amount.\textsuperscript{188}

Irrespective of the significant developments, the level of cooperation, the joint military ventures, and defence trade, scepticism within the Indian policymaking community never ceased. There has always been the fear of increasing US influence could undermine Indian freedom and sovereignty. The presence of the US Navy in the Indian Ocean raises domestic anxiety, having closer ties with Washington disturbs the traditional Indian bureaucracy, even though both countries might share certain interest, there is always an exceptional complication in how things should be done,\textsuperscript{189} particularly when it does not augur well with Indian domestic sensitivity and larger national interest. The Indian fear was founded, given the speech of the Indian Army Chief, who warned against a bilateral military deal between the US and India.\textsuperscript{190}

Observers are of the view that Delhi’s hesitation not to swiftly agree to the agreement on Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA), and the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) speaks volume of the harboured fear.\textsuperscript{191} Trusting Washington wholeheartedly is a dangerous venture for India in the long run, some Indian officials cautioned against taking the US as an all-weather friend. Though this appeared to


\textsuperscript{190} “Army Chief Warns Against Govt-to-Govt Deals With US” Times of India, (New Delhi), May 25, 2010.

\textsuperscript{191} “CISMOA, LSA Not on Table of India-US Strategic Dialogue” Press Trust of India, July 15, 2011. CISMOA, BECA and LSA are not treaties but official agreements between Washington and New Delhi as expediency for different level of cooperation.
be one-sided fear, as policymakers in the US were indisposed to such thinking, Washington has no desire to undermine India’s sovereignty.\textsuperscript{192}

Regardless of the embedded doubts and concerns, India-US military trade has exponential grew. The trajectory of their relations is indicative that Washington would be providing New Delhi with the state of art military hardware and technology, which are serious concerns for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{193} To deny the fact that Indo-US defence pact has created mixed feelings world over and in South Asia, in particular, are not misleading. The level of shared intelligence, technology and military expertise is indicative of the point that India is increasingly becoming a major military power state in global affairs.\textsuperscript{194} During a speech at the Council of Foreign Relations, Defence Secretary Ashton Carter states, “the US.-India relationship is destined to be one of the most significant partnerships of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.”\textsuperscript{195}

Such statements raise a serious question about the regional stability.

\textbf{2.9 Other Areas of Interests between US and India}

It might seem that the entire premise of the Indo-US relations is based on the strategic, defence or nuclear relations but there were other areas of interests between the two which might have been dwindling but came out on the surface in due time. Of course the core of the relationship is still grounded to strategic aspects because it were the strategic aspects which decided which way the ship will sail. In more ways the political or social etc. would become waned if there were any issues on the strategic plane between the two sides.

Economic and trade relations between the two sides have been problematic in the past. US policymakers used to identify in the Indian political system some values they deemed shared and this facilitated all the time more friendly relations between the two

\textsuperscript{192} “Drawn out, but not ready to fire” \textit{Rediff}, April 24, 2003.
\textsuperscript{193} For example, in a June 2011 report, the Senate Armed Services Committee raised the idea of potential future sales to India of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, as well as a potential US.-India co-development partnership on other weapons systems, perhaps to include the anticipated program to replace the US Air Force’s T-38 trainer jet.
governments. In addition, the trade and investment reforms implemented by India over the last 25 years have generally nurtured enhanced trade relations. Indian representatives opine that the two national economies presented parallel business interests instead of a standard developed-developing relationship. Though the enhancement in trade relations has been punctuated by episodic issues it is based on political instead of economic variances of opinion. A major discrepancy occurred in 1998, when the US levied trade sanctions on India in response to its nuclear weapons tests.

The bilateral trade relations between India and US were and still to some extent are primarily administered by the terms of their connections in multilateral organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Apart from these the two sides have had various deals in terms of economy and trade, duty free tariff, economic dialogues which historically made their relationship balanced even if there were issues in the strategic sides. In more ways, the two treated the economic and trade aspects as parts of the larger scheme of strategic issues.

The idea of democracy which was shared between the two sides had a historic relevance for US. With time when India became the biggest democracy in the world, the political attractiveness for US pulled it towards India. This was the kind of factor which US could not count on Pakistan for given the latter state’s track record with democracy. Apart from democracy, ever since the dawn of technological innovation in the US and the part which the Indian diaspora played in it was a point where US and India saw eye to eye with each other. This went on despite sanctions because even in this aspect the US’s need for the Indian talent was kind of relentless.

All in all, if one analyses their history it seems that there was a pattern which the two sides followed. Regardless of the ups and downs especially in terms of the US’s need based policies and the nuclear explosion turmoil, India fit in the picture sketched by US well. The whole tone of exceptionalism and the Indian projection of its power, economy and defence showed this as well. The relationship went through an evolution because it started from a small node and expanded more and more. One can pin-point all the instances when the US
perceived the Indian side a valid strategic option for their South Asian policy. What more are the idea and the rationality of how the US exceptionalism was not in clash with the Indian power projections. This was somewhere beset in finding equilibrium between the two sides. Even though the strategic qualms between Indian and US were present but even then throughout the discrepancies, the two sides did follow a point to work together with even though it was one largely motivated by the changing US interests.

So in a way the two sides went through a periodic phase of ties where at the one time India sought complete neutrality and then with time this faded down and the mutual interests of the two sides began to be more visible. The motivation for such relationship dynamics might have many but the idea of exceptionalism bound the two to each other and it was further bound by the nuclear deal which paved the way for the relationship to grow strong. The idea that, it is the larger strategic gains by both sides is embedded here. It must be made clear that though other aspects exists between the two, there are larger strategic gains which are being projected and sought which makes this relationship perhaps work. All other aspects are in one way or another tied down to the strategic ones. It also shows that for both sides the administrations, leadership and the leading political party also play a vital role in the forging of relationship between the two sides.
CHAPTER 3
INDIA CENTRIC US APPROACH

After establishing what the historical context of US-India has been, one can enumerate various new determinants in Indo-US relations. In one way it is now fervently established that there was a certain pattern following after which India and the US got closer. It happens to be nothing short of gaining advantages in strategic and security features in the region and international arena. The strategic leeway holds much importance for the US and India and it is in fact the reason as to why the two states grew closer to each other. In fact this relationship has now many dimensions to it. Not only are there strategic ties but economic and political as well.

This chapter explores some of the ways via which the US and India have gotten tied up in a constructive and viable relationship. In fact this chapter seeks to establish how the US approach came to become an Indo-centric in South Asia. In doing so it is going to analyse how India maneuvered this change in the US approach to fit its own larger agenda. It explores the dimensions of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, economic and trade cooperation, how India has gotten various advantages in the realm of space cooperation with the US and the spectrum of nuclear suppliers group and the part played by the US. Furthermore, it also elaborates on the aspect of Pakistan in the US-India relations especially in the era of Modi-Trump leadership.

3.1 India-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Paul K. Kerr highlights the short history of India-US nuclear cooperation and issues associated with this cooperation.\(^{196}\) India was once an estranged state for being strictly against what was popularly considered as “nuclear apartheid” which allows certain countries the privilege to have, produce, procure, and proliferate nuclear technology and materials. The nuclear apartheid simultaneously legitimizes their positions and subsequently deprives other nations particularly in the global south. India along with many countries believes that the NPT is a double standard treaty that has no moral ground save

protecting the interest of the nuclear haves over the nuclear have-nots. Defying the NPT for whatever it stands for, India denoted its nuclear device in 1974, which spurred international sanction, particularly from the US. The latter has been championing the cause to tighten up the noose for all “rebellious states” against the nuclear regime. American exceptionalism and cherry-picking policy dispensation came to spotlight when the US decided to turn the pages of its nuclear history. The US granted and extended its notion of exceptionalism to India, upon which the Indo-US nuclear deal finds footing. The India-US civilian nuclear deal turned out to be a watershed and acknowledgement by Washington of India’s nuclear status.

The plan to share the US civilian nuclear programme with India surfaced during the Bush Administration, which was formally announced in the joint statement by the two heads of states in 2005. The statement and the proposed deal were geared at lifting the three-decade of a moratorium on nuclear trade with India.\(^\text{197}\) The deal was formalized by the US Congress approval on October 1, 2008, three years following its announcement by the Bush Administration. The nuclear deal bounds India and its nuclear programme coming under the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) supervision.\(^\text{198}\) The deal was designed to recognize India as a nuclear defacto state, irrespective of not being the NPT signatory. The US Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns claims the deal was ethical because “India's trust, its credibility, the fact that it has promised to create a state-of-the-art facility, monitored by the IAEA, to begin a new export control regime in place, because it has not proliferated the nuclear technology, we can’t say that about Pakistan.”\(^\text{199}\) In support of the US position, Mohamed ElBaradei, the ex-IAEA head opines, “it would also bring India closer as an important partner in the non-proliferation regime.”\(^\text{200}\)

The puzzles yet to be unfurled by the India-US partnership are many. One of them is that even if the Indian nuclear programme comes under the watchful eyes of the IAEA, India


\(^{198}\) Ibid.

\(^{199}\) “Pakistan not eligible for similar n- deal: Burns” The Hindu, August 1, 2008.

still holds the prerogative as a sovereignty to discreetly decide what is best for its national interest, which conversely might undermine international law and commitment. According to the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India “retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian… This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements.”

The second is the fact that for Pakistan and any conscious state in the region, what exactly the Indian government meant by “credible minimum deterrent” remains vague and despite the rhetoric of Washington over disarmament, New Delhi has not resolved to become a signatory of NPT or accept IAEA’s authority over Indian’s nuclear facilities and material. Although it remains a part of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine that Islamabad signatory status to the NPT will be determined by the seriousness of New Delhi to consent and join the treaty. The third puzzle is a cogent concern shared by Nicholas Burns as a rejoinder to Manmohan Singh’s assertion that "this means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements." The former Undersecretary of State says, "we are having trouble understanding the argument that somehow this deal makes it more likely that India is going to engage in an arms build-up. That's not at all the sense that we have from the Indian government."

Giving the new level of nuclear cooperation between New Delhi and Washington, the conviction that India will respect international rule on global non-proliferation remains unclear. Although in December 2009, M.K. Narayanan, the then National Security Adviser to Prime Minister Singh, holds; “India has a long-standing commitment to global, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament.” Though it is puzzling and confusing that while India stockpile nuclear materials just as any other nuclear state, yet it claims to be a supporter of global nuclear disarmament. During a 2007 Conference on Disarmament, New Delhi registered a working paper that called for the “[n]egotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of

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201 “India’s PM defends nuclear deal” BBC News March 7, 2006.
202 Ibid.
203 “Nuclear energy benefits should not remain confined to a few: Manmohan” The Hindu, September 30, 2009.
nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe.”  

Similarly, on April 13, 2010, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made it known that the New Delhi had “decided to set up a ‘Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership’ in India. A state of the art facility based on international participation from the IAEA and other interested foreign partners” by November 2010, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Washington and New Delhi called for an effective centre.

However, the MOU did not stop India from altering its nuclear doctrine under the nose of the US, which is expected to include a delivery triad and ballistic missile defence. The resultant effect will be widening the gap of misunderstanding between Islamabad and New Delhi and a phenomenon that the US might not be able to control in the future. At this moment, the point is that various deals between India and the US appear to be a package even though in piecemeal. The nuclear deal paves way for other deals, such as the defence deal, reached eight years after the nuclear deal. The connection between the two cannot be dismissed. The defence deal covers three “basic agreements, including the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA)” Although back in 2002, the two states signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which in the words of former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld these deal “[paved] the way for greater technology cooperation.”

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205 Statement by the Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Nuclear Security Summit, April 13, 2010.
In 2016, Obama Administration further strengthened the defence pact as the LEMOA was signed. The latter accords the “militaries of both countries access to each other’s facilities for supplies and repairs.”209 While the two agreements are pending, Indian policymakers nurture the concern of whether or not India can rely on the US particularly when it comes to signing the CISMOA. The question of whether or not US would live up to the expectation of ensuring and guaranteeing that the CISMOA is implemented in spirit to such an extent that countries like India purchasing American defence equipment should be guaranteed to having a compatible system to that of other American systems. Meanwhile, the LSA gives members the comfort of reciprocity in the use of facilities for communications, servicing, maintenance, refuelling and medical care. But the question is whether the US is putting the offers all of these. These are the puzzles which delay the final inking of the agreement.210 The issue still lingers on and surprisingly during the 2011 India-US Strategic Dialogue, the issue failed to be ironed out.211 Although, prior to 2011, New Delhi signed an End User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) following a protracted negotiation that lasted for two years, Washington made an agreement after concession on the location of equipment verification on the behest of New Delhi. Meanwhile, pending agreement between the two countries is said to be “an obstacle to Indian access to the very highest level of technology.”212 Another Army chief pushed aside the argument that failure to sign certain agreements with the US will obstruct Indian military capability as assertion having no weight.213

Even though a nuclear deal was to be in place, but the market was yet to open for the US nuclear companies to start operation in India owing to many unresolved issues. The Congress was yet to approve the reprocessing of nuclear substances as a matter of liability lingers between the two partners. India was insisting that its market would cease to be open to the US companies until the Congress resolves the concerns revolving around nuclear

reactor operators and suppliers and policies on liability.\textsuperscript{214} The matter was further complicated by the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). The Indian government stance on CSC is that New Delhi wants nuclear operators to bear the liability for damages and reactor accident, a matter of concern for American operators seeking investment in India.\textsuperscript{215} During its 2011 visit to India, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urges New Delhi to live up to expectation and ensure the ratification of the CSC by the closure of 2011. On the Indian side, Nirupama Rao, India’s then Foreign Secretary holds “the rules and regulations concerning the civil nuclear liability bill ... are in the process of being framed and in this process, we are consulting with both the domestic companies and the foreign companies concerned.”\textsuperscript{216} It is not a hidden truth that a host of issues are still pending between the two partners around the nuclear deal. The height of such pending issue could better explain Balachandran’s view that the ratification of the CSC will be of greater advantage to the American nuclear companies and a huge exploitation of the Indian market. This inclusive privilege meant that the new market will be less competitive for other companies, more exclusively for the American.

“If India ratifies the CSC, both the right of the operator for recourse against the supplier and any third party action against the supplier would be nullified. In short, with India’s ratification of the CSC, US suppliers would be freed from the fear of either any right of recourse by the operator or third party action; and would, therefore, be free to enter into nuclear commerce with India. Unfortunately, the same would not be true for suppliers from other countries, none of whom are members of CSC. It is not surprising, therefore, that US negotiators are insistent on India ratifying the CSC. It is equally not surprising that with exception of one or two Indian analysts, none has pointed out these factors or brought them to the public attention. For one early analysis of this issue, refer to an October 2010 IDSA brief “Should India sign the Convention on Supplementary Convention?”\textsuperscript{217}

Although at some point, the BJP was wary of the Indo-US deal, the post-Cold War Indian foreign policy transcends party politics. Upon becoming the new Indian prime minister in 2014 under the banner of the BJP, Narendra Modi visited Washington and reiterated India’s

\textsuperscript{214} “India Weighs Measure to Ease Nuclear Liability” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, October 10, 2010.
\textsuperscript{215} “India Risks Nuclear Isolation with Break From Chernobyl Accord” \textit{Bloomberg}, August 26, 2010.
readiness to join the larger league of the nuclear regime and the desire to get more of nuclear advantage from the US. Modi’s forceful request reflected Indian frustration over the deadlock of the nuclear talk and as the report suggested ever since the deal was signed, India did not buy a single reactor from the US.218

Prime Minister Modi has not been relenting at crowning the nuclear deal with substantial achievement. Given the media debate that the deal actually has no value for India, it has failed to actually pick momentum let alone become operational. In June 2016, Modi again visited the US and an agreement was reached between the two countries to have six reactors in India under the auspices of the American Westinghouse company. As a takeaway gift from Washington, President Obama further promised the Indian premier of US support of India integration into the NSG. Such commitments remain in the tunnel of ambition as no reactor is placed in India till date and India’s aspiration of NSG membership is a deadlock.219

3.2 India-US Economic and Trade Cooperation
The end of Cold War brought up new opportunities and prospects for India. Soon after the Indian foreign policymakers realized the changes that were happening globally and the extent to which globalization can change the economic well-being of India, hence opening doors of opportunities for the rest of the world. It was quite clear that continuing with Cold War policies will no longer be useful or helpful in the changing dynamics of the new world order. China which happens to be a powerful neighbour of India was equally caught up in a similar dilemma, before adopting the “Opening Up Policy” which gave China access to the rest of the world and vice versa. China’s realization was pragmatic and it no longer preferred to be stuck in the shambles of Communism. China synchronised itself with the rest of the world, opened up to globalisation and adopted the liberal capitalist new world order.220

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218 Raja Mohan, “10 yrs of Indo-US civil nuclear deal: Transformation of the bilateral relationship is the real big deal” Indian Express, July 20, 2015.
219 “India-US nuclear deal: All you need to know about the landmark agreement” First Post, June 13, 2017.
The Indian economic reforms and policies resulted in bringing India into the limelight and it was a matter of time for the US to notice the changes in the economic sector of India. Shortly enough, India became one of the leading investment and trade partners of the US. The Clinton Administration played a vital role in the establishment of the centre structure of the US-India Trade Policy Forum in 2005. This forum was intended to create new as well as strengthen the already existing multilateral and bilateral economic ties between the two countries. Even after the Clinton Administration, the relationship did not fall back rather it kept on progressing.221 Although in 2011, the US trade statistics say, “US exports to India in 2010 totalled $19.222 billion and imports from India totalled $29.531 billion, for a bilateral trade deficit of $10.309 billion. With a total trade of $48.753 billion, India was the 12th largest trading partner for the United States in 2010.”222

In a report presented to the US Congress by two American scholars on South Asia, the report offers a complete tabulation of imports and exports between US and India. The report suggested that all exports of the US to India were technological and non-technological in nature. The list of US exports to India in 2010 suggests that;

‘Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal and articles thereof and imitation jewellery, amounting to $4.206 billion; nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and mechanical appliances, or parts thereof $ 2.607 billion; and electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof running to $1.367 billion.’223

While the imports from India consisting of the following;

‘Natural or induced pearls, precious and semi-precious common stones, metals, metal clads, jewellery costing $6.850 billion, the pharmaceutical products amounting $2.388 billion, mineral fuels, oils and by-products of mineral distillation consisting of at least $2.324 billion of the imports.’224

It is clear that Indian import from the US surpassed the number of exports to the US. However, this imbalance of trade ratio is not significant as the economic and trade interface

221 As of October 2017, the United States Census Bureau puts US trade in goods with India at ($2,419.1 billion) https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5330.html
224 Ibid., 6.
is still going on in a positive and inclined way, resulting in billions of dollars of trade revenue for both the countries.\textsuperscript{225} Meanwhile, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis claims a total of $12.377 billion volume of import between India and Washington.\textsuperscript{226} Trade between two states is not limited to the goods of technical or natural states only. There is a significant exchange of palpable services between the two sides as well. This includes technical, professional, business, and educational exchanges. Despite the level of economic and financial intercourse, the degree of concerns never ceased to exist. There was a time when India raised its concerns over the loss of professionals from its home market as they were inclined to move to the US. More seriously was the concern over the US visa regime that almost shattered and strained relations. There were instances of restriction in the visa process for the Indian professionals that aimed to settle in the US while leaving India for good, even before the harsh immigration law of Trump Administration.\textsuperscript{227}

Economic growth of a country is always multifaceted and dependent on multi-variables and pragmatic decision-making process. One of such variables is the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). There is a significant increase in FDI from the US to India, cementing and increasing the economic cooperation and bilateral trade between the two countries. In 2000, the data from the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry puts FDI from the US to India at around $9.4 billion.\textsuperscript{228} However, data from the Office of the US Trade Representative records an exponential increase.\textsuperscript{229} The table overleaf gives a graphic representation from 1995 till 2016. The US FDI in India (stock) was $28.3 billion in 2015 (latest data available), a 4.4% increase from 2014. US direct prof., scientific, and tech. services, manufacturing, and wholesale trade lead investment in India.\textsuperscript{230}

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{226} Data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), available at \url{www.bea.gov} accessed on September 22, 2018.
\textsuperscript{227} “H-1B visa: Trump administration’s proposed changes and how they can affect Indians” Hindustan Times, February 1, 2017.
\textsuperscript{228} Data from the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry (IMCI), available at \url{www.commerce.gov.in} accessed on September 22, 2018.
\textsuperscript{229} Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, U.S.-India Bilateral Trade and Investment’ available at \url{www.ustr.gov} accessed on September 22, 2018.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid.
### US Goods and Services Trade with India (in billions of dollars)

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Source: Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President, U.S.-India Bilateral Trade and Investment’ available at [www.ustr.gov](http://www.ustr.gov)

Over the years, multinational companies like Microsoft, IBM, Dell and Oracle have strengthened their foothold in India by putting million billion dollars investment in the Indian economy. The Indian market for automobile production has also seen significant changes owing to the offshore development of the US automobile companies in India. In addition to spreading their operations by setting up their production units in India; the Indian manufacturers can now assemble American cars and manufacture similar automobile based on US technology. As far as investment is concerned, it is a two-way process, which goes back and forth between the two countries involved in the trade. A White House report in 2009 puts India’s FDI in the US at $4.4 billion for which the Tata Group was on top of the ladder.231 Meanwhile, the Office of the US Trade Representative suggested:

‘India's FDI in the United States (stock) was $9.3 billion in 2015 (latest data available), up 3.7% from 2014. India's direct investment in the US. is led by prof., scientific, and tech. services, depository institutions, and manufacturing. Sales of services in India by majority US.-owned affiliates were $22.7 billion in 2014 (latest data available), while sales of services in the United States by majority India-owned firms were $13.4 billion.’232

Such economic and financial dealings between both sides are one side of the story given the various forms of hurdles in this economic friendship. Numerous economic issues have come to the surface. These issues include incomplete accessibility to selected India markets, the question about the intellectual rights, the readiness of the US market and industry to accommodate India into the US Generalized System of Preferences Program (GSP). Upon digging down further, there is a big question mark about the dual-use technology trade between both the states.233 Conversely, the major trouble faced by India is Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and its repercussions on the Indian trade with the US. It

233 Ibid.
is in Indian interest to bring the US to the table over the bilateral investment treaty as a launching pad for the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). In 2009, the preliminary talks took place due to the Indian lobby and pressure, though a very remarkable progress was not observed. Later in 2011, the matter again came to the surface during the US-India Trade Policy Forum in Washington. Going by the Indian calculus and US position as the largest market, New Delhi wants to take advantage of the economic partnership and seeks a non-diverted attention from the US in its bilateral trade setup.\textsuperscript{234} India has set its eyes on the US farm subsidy programme, which will grant access to Indian agriculture market to have a direct entry and participation with the local American farmers.

Roads became a little bumpy when the US government condemned India for imposing Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) restraints, which made it difficult for the American farmers to export to Indian agricultural produce. The Indian government rejected this accusation and claimed that America’s farm subsidy is posing a serious challenge to the local Indian farmers. This argument laid a fearful framework for the corporate retailers like Wal-Mart. The Indians believed to allow Wal-Mart is tantamount to the latter overtaking the local Indian retailers and marketers. Having a level and fair playground seemingly is longed by both sides,\textsuperscript{235} but practically impossible to achieve.

In the realist paradigm, the powerful states dominate and dictate the rule of the game, while the weaker states are bound to submit. This argument was evident in the demands made by US Ambassador Tim Roemer, published by the Wall Street Journal “India needs to be asking itself: Is it delivering on the global partnership?.....There’s no doubt this needs to be a two-way street.”\textsuperscript{236} In a similar vein, the White House demanded India to accelerate and make an enabling environment for the growth of economic ties between the two states. To the dismay of US and despite the demands, the Indian government handed subsidy to its power plant industry; an alarming development for American business opportunity in

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{236} “US Envoy Prods India on Reforms” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, May 18, 2011.
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India. The US-India financial and trade partnership held in Washington brought forth another opportunity to mend and patch all grievances, and the realization that only a true economic and commercial liberalization will aid and support trade between the two countries.

The need for reforms put pressures on the US as it had to provide concessions to India on several occasions under the premise of true liberalization. Since 1998, both sides have grappled over the issue of Trade in dual-use technology. Finally, India could get more benefits from the US high technology industry in an inaugural session of the US-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) formed in 2003. On the account of NSSP implementation, the US modified some export licensing policies in 2004. This opened the gateway for the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) removal from the entity list. In 2011, Indian standing further culminated and a number of Indian space and defence related companies were removed from the entity list, such relaxation summoned up the commitment on both sides for more consolidated cooperation.

### 3.3 Space Cooperation

The US did not stop at economic and financial cooperation as a way of boosting the standing of India in the region as the cooperation also extends to space cooperation. This bilateral cooperation was instrumental and an enabling factor in building the capacity and facility of the Indian civil space agency, which by extension enhances Indian agricultural productivity. Acquired technology from space cooperation is an effective and efficient tool for forecasting weather and climate conditions necessary for the agricultural sector. Likewise, the participation of India in the field of Earth Observation Satellites and the Group on Earth observations was highly encouraged and supported by the US. There is a great deal of connection between economy and geography, hence having a sophisticated space technology will facilitate an enabling economy in many ways. The monitoring of the environment through state-of-the-art technology provides useful information and

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knowledge on how best to strategize and manage any given economy. The Indo-US space cooperation allowed the US Commerce Department to initiate certain degree of commercial relaxation for India by way of lifting ban and restrictions in order to have a hurdle free trade with India’s civil space agency.²⁴⁰

The space cooperation is considered as refurbishing and upgrading opportunity for the trouble-ridden Indian space structure.²⁴¹ It is worth mentioning that Indo-US space cooperation is not a new development, rather its history stretches back to 1963 “when India first launched a US-manufactured sounding rocket – sometimes called a “research rocket” from Thumba to study the atmosphere above Earth’s magnetic equator.”²⁴² Interestingly, the space technology allows the two states to cooperate in weather systems and applications for which space technologies are shared. Based on the cooperation, the US has projected India to a high level beyond the reach of any other state in the region. Although Indians have gained from the partnership, they equally “provides data, technical assistance, and financial support to the monsoon desk at the US National Weather Service.”²⁴³ The level of space cooperation continues to get deeper in that, Washington has helped New Delhi to launch itself into space. At the same time, the cooperation of the two space agencies was geared at “developing…joint satellite and plan to launch it from India’s impressive Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle in 2021.”²⁴⁴ Conspicuously, the Obama Administration played an enormous role in upgrading the space cooperation to considerable synergies.²⁴⁵

Alan Kronstadt in his report to the Congress offers a chronology of Indo-US space cooperation at the turn of the century, even though India has long been pressing and seeking access to American space technology since the 1980s. However, at the turn of the

²⁴¹ “New Delhi, We Have a Problem: India’s Space Woes” Time, December 29, 2010.
²⁴² The Special address of the US Ambassador to India Richard Verma at the ORF Kalpana Chawl, “Bringing US.-India Space Cooperation to the Edge of the Universe” US Embassy New Delhi, February 25, 2016.
²⁴³ Ibid.
²⁴⁴ Ibid.
century, both countries reached a strategic partnership, which grew into the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative. By 2001, New Delhi demanded Washington “to ease restrictions on the export to India of dual-use high-technology goods (those with military applications), as well as to increase civilian nuclear and civilian space cooperation.” Subsequently, a 2004 implementation of the NSSP saw the “modification of some export licensing policies and removal of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) headquarters from the Entity List.” Between 2004 and 2006, both states held several meetings that culminated into enhanced space cooperation and the “agreements that permit the launch of US satellites and satellites containing US components by Indian space launch vehicles and the welcoming and the inclusion of US instruments in a planned Indian lunar mission.”

Bharath Gopalaswamy opines “the US National Space Policy (NSP), 2010, considers its space cooperation with India as international partnership” upon which NASA and ISRO would freely collaborate in four principal areas. This includes Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Space Situation Awareness (SSA), Earth Observation and Science Education and Space Sustainability and a much deeper cooperation into the outer space in the higher orbit. The bilateral Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation was indeed another development that enhanced Indo-US space cooperation. The Group’s meeting at Bangalore on July 13-14, 2011 paved way for major space cooperation, exchange, and collaboration which include OCM2, INSAT3D, nano-satellites, CSLA, global navigation satellite systems and space debris mediation.

The facilitation of the Indian space technology has although never been the monopoly of the US; almost at the same time (the 1960s), India had similar space understandings and cooperation with France. Paris was instrumental in “providing assistance to India’s Rohini sounding rockets programme” although there were certain degrees of dormancy to that

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cooperation in the 1990s, but that changed for a better space cooperation in 1998 and further strengthened in 2013 as “India …relied on French launch services in order to put strategic communication satellites into space for the Indian Navy.” Space cooperation between Washington and New Delhi further underlies the Indian exceptionalism narrative. Despite US non-proliferation policy, it does not actually hold much on India, even when US sanctions India, the relations between the two never got beyond repair. Both sides have always come to the degree of exceptionalism; (big democracies, huge population, and large market) hence the need for cooperation emerged rather than being indifference to each other interest. Despite the known fact that the Indians are exporting nuclear technologies to states like Iran it that does not necessarily wake the ire of Washington because of Indian exceptionalism.

‘The United States has a policy against missile proliferation, but the policy has not been in place as long as the Indian missile program. Nor has the policy been applied consistently. The common thread in these developments is that the US clarity about the relationship between space launch vehicles and missile proliferation appears close to being obscured in the case of India. India’s agreement to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime’s (MTCR) export control guidelines is a welcome development but does not entitle India to missile (or space launch vehicle) technology. Without India’s adherence, if India were to export missile technology restricted by the MTCR, it would be a candidate for the imposition of sanctions under US law. In fact, India’s exports already have triggered US sanctions. But exceptionalism comes to play.’

3.4 Indian Benefits of IAEA and Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a 48-nuclear suppliers’ state group established in 1974 which collaborates to prevent any non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology for harmful purposes. In accordance with its aim, the group follows the guidelines for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear or nuclear-related exports precept in conjunction with the IAEA. Before the formation of this group, the Zangger Committee was the organisation to assist the nuclear states to get more expertise about the

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technicallities related to the nuclear technology transfer. The group was an informal body to deal with the nuclear technology transfers, and the decisions made were not legally binding on the member states. However, when India shocked the world by using peaceful nuclear technology provided by Canada to conduct its first nuclear test, the Smiling Buddha in 1974, the need for a formal regulatory body to govern look over the nuclear technology transfers surfaced. The group was formed in the same year, to deal with the grave issue of the misuse of nuclear technology. It oversees the protection of sensitive nuclear material that could be used to develop nuclear weapons, their export and retransfer. To date, this group along with other export control regimes like MTCR, Wassanear arrangement and Australia Group regulates the international nuclear trade.

India being a worthy member of the NSG is a major question troubling many who have resented New Delhi’s integration with the NSG. However, it is interesting to understand how India has conducted its policy to influence the group and international community. India has carefully propagated itself as an emerging economic power of the world and with this status comes into sight the emerging energy needs. This is where India’s major dependence on the fossil fuels is becoming a headache for the government and membership of NSG has become one of the major foreign policy goals of the Indian government. The growing Indian economy is dependent on the conventional fossil fuels and a major part of its energy needs are met by petrol, diesel and fossil fuels which have made India one of the leading states in green gas emissions. This situation contradicts the Paris Climate Agreement that India signed and guaranteed that 40 per cent of India’s energy sources would be clean and climate-friendly.

The membership of NSG will give Indian economy a boost as it would favour the production of nuclear equipment and the “Made in India” programme. Strategically, India aims to use the platform of the NSG to acquire and maintain a major power status along with the need to cope up with its energy needs, India deems to get access to elite groups

254 Sree S. Resmi, “Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and India’s Membership” ClearIAS, January 16 2017.
like NSG and its likes. India has presented its stance to the NSG personnel with four main arguments which make the normative argument, the energy security argument, the climate change argument, and the commercial argument. The normative argument narrates that it is committed to supporting the ‘international ban treaty’ and that India adheres to the NSG guidelines. India has signed the additional protocol of IAEA, this has led it to ensure the separation of civilian, and military nuclear facilities, and it allows the IAEA inspections in the civilian nuclear facilities. India claims that in accordance with the international norms on non-proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons, it has a clean non-proliferation record. The second argument of energy security is related to the socio-economic development of India and the current energy deficit that India faces. It is the need of the hour for India to buy nuclear technology from other states, which would be a safe and clean energy source. The third argument by India is that the increasing drastic effects of climate change have terribly affected the economy of the state and the ecosystem. Ozone depletion, air, land, and water pollution have drastic effects on the state and the only safe source of energy that can prevent any further degradation of the ecosystem is through nuclear technology. The last argument is regarding the commercial benefits of Indian membership in NSG, which India has carefully projected over the last few years portraying its market potential.255

3.5 US-India Relations during Trump and Modi Era

Presently, India is projecting a "win-win partnership" with the US. Prime Minister Modi wrote in an Op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in June 2017 that "The logic of our strategic relationship is irrefutable. It is further underpinned by faith in the strength of our multicultural societies that have defended our values at all costs, including the supreme sacrifices we've made in distant corners of the globe...I expect the next few decades to be an even more remarkable story of ambitious horizons, convergent action and shared growth."256

255 Debu C., “What is NSG and why is India seeking its membership?” My India, June 9, 2016, available at www.mapofindia.com

The first diplomatic meeting between the US President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in June 2017 received both media and a political attention. Before the meeting, there had been media debates on the direction of relations between the two leaders. The June 27, 2017 summit meeting accorded President Trump to reiterate his campaign pledge as making India a true associate of the White House. "And that is now exactly what you have -- a true friend," For Trump, Indo-US partnership has “never been stronger, has never been better”\textsuperscript{257} and his administration hopes to augment the partnership. Modi tried to pay back to the US gesture, offering President’s daughter and adviser an invitation to "Entrepreneurship Summit" in India. In Modi’s word "be assured that in this joint journey of our two nations towards development, growth and prosperity, I will remain a driven, determined, and decisive partner for time to come."\textsuperscript{258} Prior to the meeting, PM Modi told top American executives that India is a business-friendly state of "minimum government." This message highly resonates with President Trump, who has proposed streamlining what he calls business-hampering US regulations and cutting the budgets of several US government agencies. Considering long pending US concerns about market access in India, both sides reiterated the exigency of removing all obstacles hurling towards the easy commercial transfer of manufactured goods and services, information technology, military hardware, and agricultural produce.

The June Summit featured the commitment of the US to India in areas of investment and maritime collaboration. Trump Administration agreed to continue an annual trilateral military exercise involving, the US, India, and Japan. Referring to the Naval Malabar Exercise, President Trump holds that "Our militaries are working every day to enhance cooperation, and next month they will join together with the Japanese Navy to take part in the largest maritime exercise ever conducted in the vast Indian Ocean."\textsuperscript{259} Trump Administration believes that President Obama had not done enough, hence the proposal to bridge the trade deficit between the countries, particularly in the areas of defence trade, which include a “multi-billion dollar sale of 22 Sea Guardian Unmanned Aerial

\textsuperscript{258} White House, “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Modi of India in Joint Press Statement” June 26, 2017.
India, being the world’s largest weapons importer has been offered the most upgraded version of the Lockheed Martin's F-16 Block 70 aircraft that is potentially worth $15 billion by the US firm. Such benevolence alone is enough to extrapolate what the US-India ties may hold in the future for the world, especially Pakistan. While the Indo-US partnership is both economic and strategic in nature, the rise of China has further made the strategic aspect ever more pronounced. Trump Administration is set for drone deal with the Indian Navy as a counterweight to an increasingly assertive China.

The first meeting of Modi with Trump was anticipated to change the course of India-US relationship that has persisted over the past decade. Owing to the radical and nationalistic approach towards international affairs of Trump Administration, India was influenced in some major areas; including Iranian policy, visas for skilled workers and climate change. Trump’s predecessors were encouraged to sacrifice short-term payoffs for longer-term economic and diplomatic investment in India.

During Modi’s visit to Washington, North Korea’s nuclear fiasco came up, while India remains one of North Korea importing partner, Indo-US partnership is more likely to jeopardize the Indian economy. It is reported that India is the second largest exporting state to North Korea following China. North Korea imports millions of dollar worth of medicine and food from India. In a 2015-2016 report, India exported goods worth $111 million to North Korea and the latter imported about $88 million worth of goods. The commerce between the two is strained and halted on Washington behest in connection over Washington-North Korea strategic spat; though it is believed that India is cutting off from its trade partner to be “into line with United Nations sanctions on North Korea.”

Washington has worked tremendously to promote the ‘Indian exceptionalism’ narrative in many areas and the Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) which portrays India as a

\[\text{\textsuperscript{260}}\text{Joshua T White, “What’s next for US-India defense ties?” The Hindu, August 1, 2017.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{261}}\text{Ivana Kottasová and Sugam Pokharel, “North Korea cut off by 3rd biggest trading partner” CNN News, May 1, 2017.}\]
leading power, a state worthy of opportunity, country promoting Washington’s interest, constituting no threat or competition.\textsuperscript{262} The NSS says:

‘We welcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defence partner. We will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India. We will expand our defence and security cooperation with India, a Major Defence Partner of the United States, and support India’s growing relationships throughout the region will deepen our strategic partnership with India and support its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region. We will press Pakistan to intensify its counterterrorism efforts since no partnership can survive a country’s support for militants and terrorists who target a partner’s own service members and officials. The United States will also encourage Pakistan to continue demonstrating that it is a responsible steward of its nuclear assets. We will encourage the economic integration of Central and South Asia to promote prosperity and economic linkages that will bolster connectivity and trade. In addition, we will encourage India to increase its economic assistance in the region. In Pakistan, we will build trade and investment ties as security improves and as Pakistan demonstrates that it will assist the United States in our counterterrorism goals.’\textsuperscript{263}

Under the Trump Administration, cooperation with India on fighting terrorism has been significantly taken up. This assertion matches up the desire of Trump since taking over and more importantly how it was spelt out in the NSS report. India will definitely exploit the passage of the NSS to further irritate, accuse, and blame Pakistan for cross-border terrorism. During his visit to Washington reported to have exploited the Trump Administration campaign against terrorism, by accentuating pressure than ever before on Pakistan for allegedly harbouring terrorist groups. Following the official release of the NSS, President Trump’s tweets which have become the signature of his presidency fired yet another offensive at Pakistan, claiming that Islamabad has for years received the US funds to combat terrorism, but instead “do nothing” and taken Washington and its leadership as fools. “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little


help. No more!” It bewilders any serious observer of South Asian geopolitics to see how the US policy makers are selectively enunciating their foreign policy. As the Commander of US Central Command General in 2013, James Mattis concurred to the sacrifice of Pakistan in the war on terror and same man would join the chorus to ask for Pakistan to do more and believed the US is failing in Afghanistan due to Pakistan. The ‘do more’ narrative prompted Trump administration to slash and freeze military aid to Pakistan.

Following the explosive tweet of President Trump, which pointed finger towards Pakistan, diplomatic rattling between the two states has not ceased. Cutting defence aid for Pakistan further lowered the already strained relations. While diplomats and policymakers weigh the consequence, Richard Olson, former US ambassador to Pakistan argues, “There’s some suggestion that we have all of the cards in our hands,” instead “But we don't. The leverage is strong on the Pakistan side as well and arguably stronger than our side.” Hence, the insinuation that Pakistan could block its airspace against the US, which will seriously undermine the US, troops in Afghanistan. Even though Washington is said to be preparing for the alternative costly route, Pakistan should take the tough steps. While experts and policymakers believe diplomacy and backdoor negotiation could dampen the volatile climate, decision-makers on both sides believe nothing is off the table. During an address for a gathering at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad (ISSI), Pakistan’s former Defence Minister Khurram Dastgir Khan said Islamabad has halted intelligence cooperation with the US. He further enunciated what many in the country are saying that rather than being despised and derided “Pakistan does not want to put a price on its sacrifices but wants them to be recognised,” and the US should cease scapegoating Pakistan for its failure in

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269 “Pakistan could use air routes to Afghanistan as bargaining chip for assistance from the US” First Post, January 19, 2018.
Afghanistan. The US officers, however, contend that such suspension has not been formally notified “we have not received any formal communication regarding a suspension.”

The confrontation leapt into the UNSC, where the US and Pakistani representatives exchanged accusations. Reiterating the popular version of harbouring terrorists, the US Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan holds that Washington “can't work with Pakistan if it continues to give sanctuary to terrorist organizations and need to stop this and join efforts to resolve the Afghan conflict.” In response, the Pakistan’s UN Ambassador Maleeha Lodi challenged the US, rather asked Washington to address “challenges inside Afghanistan rather than shift the onus for ending the conflict onto others.”…”those who imagine sanctuaries outside need a reality check.”

Mainly, the security concerns with reference to stabilization of Afghanistan have become a shared ethos between India and the US. The statement made on the part of the US emphasized on the role played by India and the US in rebuilding Afghanistan and how cooperation and communication between the two states would need to be established further to achieve the objectives of peace and stability in Afghanistan. Regional security was primarily discussed during the meeting as Washington was considering the deployment of about 4,000 extra troops in Afghanistan to help local forces in fighting insurgent groups and sought to encourage India’s cooperation in the matter. Relying on the legacy of his predecessor and the designation of India as a "Major Defence Partner" Defence Secretary James Mattis planned on the achievement of common goals by discussing collaborative efforts and administering an elaborate exchange of views. According to him, India and the US are working on common grounds for establishing a nonviolent and progressive future for the Indo-Pacific region and that India undoubtedly holds one of the most influential positions for regional security and safety. Even in the past, Trump has appreciated India’s contribution towards regional stability and for procuring US military hardware multiple times.

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In essence, one can perceive that the US-India relationship has reached new legions in the contemporary era. The US had over time come up with a more Indo-centric approach as compared to its Pakistan-centric one. This is largely because the US and Pakistan had reached the point of strategic stagnation especially in the contemporary times. Once again there are many aspects to this approach by the US towards India; economic, political, security and strategic. All of these are held tightly by the larger strategic goals; Afghanistan crisis, holding and managing the hegemony of association in South Asia and undercutting the China-Pakistan relations. The part which the Indo-US Nuclear Deal of 2011 played here is immense and held everything together. It was through this deal that both states recognized the potential of partnering up to meet the bigger picture. In a lot of ways the focus was also on undermining the Pakistani influence not only in Afghanistan but South Asia for which both sides hankered on more. Of course it also needs to be made clear that largely this nascent partnership is also motivated by the façade of cooperation and is in fact enthused also because of the fact that each state has its own reasons which at some point will undercut their individual agendas. The case in example is the US-Pakistan partnership which reached a point where the US had no more need for Pakistan after utilizing its strategic facets to the maximum, it left Pakistan stranded with a strategic and security gap which the latter state deemed necessary to fill and looked towards China. There is now a similar need which the US has allocated to India and the latter has reciprocated because it has the agenda of dominating South Asia for which it needs the US. Here again the need for exceptionalism and balance of power become relevant. This need based exceptionalism and balancing has made India and the US come closer in not just defence relations but nuclear, economic, trade and even space and other areas of mutual concern.

Much emphasis needs to be put on Trump and Modi administrations where the black dots meet and give a bigger picture. This era took the partnership to newer heights because not only is the leadership alike in dispelling their legacies but also because the two have made the US-India relationship largely personalized as well. The two have realized the concept of larger strategy being in play in the changing regional and international dynamics. One thing which is common between the two leaders is their attacks on Pakistan which proves that
their drive to cooperation in this era is motivated by reason of undermining Pakistan and its relationship with China in the region.
CHAPTER 4
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Even with the relations between the US and India growing up, the credence of Pakistan is left intact. The reason for that is because Pakistan and the US used to be on good terms and eventually Pakistan seems to be side-lined which is bound to have certain implications for the state. There are various dimensions to Pakistan’s adage in this case as there are manifold factors which the state needs to account for. In the brimming geo-strategic reality, which shapes South Asia and Pakistan’s standing in the region, the US-India cooperation has many nodes which need to be analysed.

For one there is the security issue which comes largely from terrorism within Pakistan and Afghanistan. The US, which previously was the strategic partner of Pakistan in the Afghan War, is now favouring India. This automatically will have some impediments for Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Furthermore, there is perhaps going to emerge a new structure in terms of alliances and balance of power in the region. In this regard, China and Russia are supposedly going to have a marked increase in their power-play. Overall, there is a change in the global and regional system and India and Pakistan as well as the US happen to be worthy variables. The reason for that is reiterated by the fact that the US presence has amounted to a lot in terms of security, strategy and politics within the region. So any state, especially one like India which has been Pakistan’s arch enemy, moving closer to the US is going to re-draw certain facets of the game and come out with a new pattern to follow.

This chapter thus focuses on the implications which are to be faced by Pakistan due to the enhanced cooperation between the US and India. There are going to be three dimensions which are discussed here; the strategic, political and economic. After these are established there is an analysis which will throw emphasis on Russia coming in the power-play in South Asia and how the Russian dimension fits in the larger picture of Pakistan’s geopolitical, strategic and economic position and serves as an implication in itself. At the end of the chapter, a clearer picture on the second variable of the study would be proved that rapid changes in the system can cause a change of patterns as well.
4.1 Strategic Implications

The India-US partnership from a strategic point of view carries enough potential to cause asymmetry and imbalance in the power structure between India and Pakistan. From a liberal standpoint, several observers of the India-US civil nuclear deal argue that the deal has made the US non-proliferation policy irrelevant. The deal raises several serious questions and among them one is, how the US which is a nuclear weapon state profoundly indulged India which is a non-signatory of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in nuclear cooperation beyond the expected threshold. Experts say that the deal is an existential threat and undermines the very essence of the NPT. Its first Article, conditions that all the states which possess nuclear weapons ought to be in agreement so as not to help those which do not possess weapons in acquiring them. Although India is proven to be a nuclear state (outside the NPT jurisdiction) but the Indo-US nuclear deal further endangers the foundational roots of the NPT. Each nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture. Otherwise, acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Though the title of the deal includes the word ‘civil’ in it, critics believe that this has been done to avoid potential reservations that could emerge from the deal, the possibility of the civil technology and cooperation morphing or being diverted into military cannot be implausible. The fact that the difference between the civil and military reactor is arguably insignificant gives ground to this widely spread fear that the Indian side will eventually divert the technology for military purposes and as this deal gives them the opportunity to purchase conventional weapons from the US, they will do so. Such acts will not only deepen the animosity between India and Pakistan but also shift the balance of power between the two. Simultaneously, the unsettled Confidence Building Measures (CBMS) between the two will be further obstructed and the possibility to resolve pending issues will

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274 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
diminish. The Indo-US nuclear cooperation would not simply raise the tempo for endless arms competition but could lead South Asia to an ultimate war as tension rises between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan.

As expected from the Pakistani policymakers, the deal prompted a swift reaction and was profoundly resented as it handed India a tool to further justify its hegemonic actions in the region. Invariably, the deal is construed as a plan that further reinforces India’s claim of supremacy over all others in the immediate neighbourhood. Marya Mufti takes a critical appraisal of the deal and holds that “the importance of the pact was spelt out by Dr Singh when he said that it should be observed against the background of India’s 1974 nuclear test and the international community’s decision to refuse nuclear technology to India.”275 The deal in its implicit and explicit outlook underpins the narrative of Indian exceptionalism as championed by the US for its own ulterior motives.

The deal, which has shifted the strategic equilibrium in the region by disturbing the balance of power between the belligerent neighbours, is also a source of preferential treatment for New Delhi over Islamabad.276 It leaves little space to suspect that the profoundness of the deal and other associated cooperation resonates with the greater military strategy and plan of the US that might in the future induct Indian troops in the US-inspired conflict the world over. Strategically, by rewarding the civil nuclear deal to India and undermining Pakistan despite its fight against terrorism and being the major non-NATO ally speaks volume of Washington’s mercurial foreign policy at any given time. If national interests guide the actions and behaviours of the state within the anarchic global system; state is not necessarily philanthropic. However, it always pursues its interest with whatever tool available in its foreign policy toolbox, hence dubbing India as a tool of the US foreign policy; analysts are of the view that New Delhi might have to join in a US war given the depth of facilitation the latter has accorded to the former. Such induction of India into the

276 Ibid.
larger global scheme of the US does not preclude conflict or war that could harm Pakistani interests in the region.\textsuperscript{277}

Within the broader canvass of the deal, analysts also believe that India will get access to more sophisticated hardware like the Patriot Advanced Capability-3, which has a longer range and is believed to be more capable than the PAC-2. PAC-3, unlike PAC-2, which the Indians had already once rejected, is perhaps one of the latest technologies introduced by the US army in 2004.\textsuperscript{278} Granting the Indians access to such technology is not only a clear deviation of the US from its own disarmament policy, but this could also lead to further violations of NPT by causing arms competition, creating an asymmetry situation in the region and by increasing the chances of nuclear proliferation. The asymmetry would force either Islamabad to secure similar deal and weapons from Washington (which has shown no inclination to doing so) or elsewhere (probably from China or Russia in the event of Pakistan-Russia rapprochement). Pakistan will surely desire a balance. By and large, India-US partnership presents the region with a shocking and confusing strategic environment. Some of the implications Pakistan can face are that;

“The value of nuclear deterrence will be reduced due to advanced weapon system in Indian nuclear arsenal along with sophisticated missiles and missile defence systems. The value of nuclear deterrence of Pakistan will reduce with India’s acquisition of advanced weapon system and the addition of new sophisticated missiles and missile defence system, which will allow India to emerge as an Asian power rather than a regional power.\textsuperscript{279} The fact that there exists no concrete legal obligation against Indian nuclear testing, now “nuclear testing by India might enable it to wield nuclear weapons with much larger explosive power than those currently in the Indian arsenal; that in turn would allow important changes in Indian nuclear strategy- for example. It might let India target Chinese or Pakistani nuclear sites that were previously safe; driving Beijing or Islamabad to develop new weapons themselves or to change their currently restrained strategies for using nuclear arms.”\textsuperscript{280}

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\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
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On behalf of Washington’s support, India will increase pressure and reinforce its accusation of cross-border terrorism against Pakistan. India has always exploited the tag “the largest democracy” and a way to sensitise world opinion against Pakistan that Islamabad is sponsoring militant to destabilize “democratic” India, hence another way to shut down the possible resolution of the Kashmir issue. Pakistan has been drawn by the US into fighting a war against terrorism, but the war has proven to be more costly than beneficial. Yet, the state, which lost thousands of its citizens in the war and as a frontline state is always being pressurized and asked to do more, while on the other hand, India and the US are in a joint working group on counter-terrorism. The Indians are now given the task to be on the forefront to eliminate terrorism and stop the proliferation of small arms, narcotics, and sponsoring of cross-border terrorism, all of which they believe often come from Pakistan.

4.2 Political Implications

Owing to the increasing concerns of Pakistan over the India-US cooperation, Pakistan’s Foreign Office vehemently contend and suspect that the cooperation is bound to contribute to regional instability. On June 30, 2005 the Pakistani Foreign Office reiterated this notion that Pakistan had already conveyed its concern to the Bush Administration over its negative consequences of the India-US strategic partnership, in particular, over the induction of new weapons system such as missile defence that would destabilize the strategic balance in the region and may trigger an arms race here.

Both Michael Krepon and Adil Sultan have argued that non-proliferation should be the sole debate of the Indo-US deal; instead, the regional ramifications and implications are well articulated. Sultan opines that “the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement if implemented without checking India’s potential to increase its fissile stocks and eliminating any possibility by India of improving its nuclear weapons could lead to arms competition in the region involving Pakistan, India and China, thus destabilizing the entire region.”

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support of Sultan, Krepon says “no attention on the regional implications of the nuclear agreement has been discussed except non-proliferation.”\footnote{Michael Krepon, “India-US Nuclear Initiative” Henry L. Stimson Centre, (July 18, 2006):30.}

The nuclear deal between India and US has left Pakistan more vulnerable to international finger pointing and being pushed around, although Pakistan has proved its importance when the war against terror was at its peak. Though the situation was exploited by the US, Pakistan took up the challenge as a frontline state to show its commitment to the sense of responsibility expected of it by the international community. This not only helped Pakistan to deprive India of deeply engaging in Afghanistan, but also facilitated in escaping the accusation and tag of being a state sponsoring terrorists. The incident of 9/11 symbolized a new wave of extremism and terrorism whose weight Pakistan has significantly been carrying on its shoulders; efforts of Pakistan should be credited in this regard. Pakistan also has several opportunities for securing similar nuclear deals like the India-US. The blockade of supply to the NATO forces in Afghanistan is one of such opportunities, which can be effectively used for the purpose. The US stands firm that the purpose of the cooperation between Washington and New Delhi in military or other fields is not to influence the calculus of the region between India and Pakistan, instead it is a strategy employed aimed at containing China. However, Pakistan does not subscribe to this argument, from a traditional realist point of view. India-US cooperation will give New Delhi the power and authority to play a key role in holding back the influence of China around the Indian Ocean. By curtailing this Dragon of Asia, India will play a significant part on the stage of regional affairs leaving Pakistan as merely a spectator.

It is never wise for a country to lose an old friend when extending hands to the new ones. Pakistan has proven to be a great ally of the US in the past and can serve in fulfilling the US goals in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan crisis is an important issue for the US and Pakistan and the latter happens to be a major actor which can best help Washington in its safe and easy exit from Afghanistan by playing the role of the real arbitrator in the neighbourhood. Though it is hard for the US to accept the reality, this fact cannot be neglected that Pakistan can play a vital role in solving the Afghan crisis. Not only this, but
Pakistan is also a customer of US manufactured defence equipment. On the one hand, the US will be losing its customer and Pakistan will lose the main source of its military equipment on the other. Thus, if the US continues to estrange Pakistan, Islamabad will be compelled to look towards the East; China and Russia.

The partnership of India with the US will further contribute to the anarchic situation of the region especially when Pakistan will be inclined towards China. Meanwhile, the smaller states of the region will also face the repercussions by finding themselves entangled in the cobweb of alliance and anarchic environment. 286 Like many states in the developing world, whose experiment of the civil and military systems takes many years, Pakistan is not an exception where the military would chant the messiah slogan of being the defender of the national integrity. 287 In Pakistan, the military establishment has been part of the institution for as long as the country exists, though a formidable force that cannot be dismissed. Pakistan’s experimentation with the military has received rejection, denial, and accommodation at home and abroad. Militarisation of politics is considered as one of the impediments to Pakistan’s overall democratic growth. 288 As democracy becomes one of the international norms and many states are growingly rejecting authoritarian system, adoption and functional democratic dispensation become a yardstick of measuring Pakistan and India compliance with the norms of the international community. Although, India has its version of democratic contradictions, yet it has always enjoyed democracy void of military rule. To this end, the notion of democracy is an international norm and which country goes well with it accords India certain degree of the privilege against Pakistan. President Clinton alluded to India’s democracy, “in terms of their own individual merits and reflecting the full weight and range of US strategic, political and economic interests in each country.” 289

Undoubtedly, the US considers India as sharing certain values with them and therefore a candidate for partnership. Interestingly, if India entirely accepts to become a US proxy in the region, it might take little or no time for New Delhi to position itself as Washington viceroy in the region and hence hav the prerogative to interfere in Pakistan domestic affairs.

It might come to a juncture when New Delhi will simply wear upon itself the policeman of the region, though the manifestation and perception of India as a regional bully have always been there. Since independence, Pakistan has refused to be bullied by India on many fronts, while it might be difficult for New Delhi to overwhelm Islamabad. The path of the two would be a clash when Indian bullying factor becomes so rampant in the region; and Pakistan would be forced to react, even though she might have the choice to sit on the fence or fold arms. Any future encounter between India and Pakistan (with or without the support of China) would be a fulfilling of Huntington’s clash of civilization. Philosophically, the Indo-US cooperation goes beyond strategic alliance, it can well be dissected from the ideological lens.

Nevertheless, the India-US cooperation can also serve as a blessing in disguise for Pakistan. If Washington is sponsoring India to be used as a proxy against China and helping it to emerge as a regional power, this will shift the focus of New Delhi from Islamabad to China. Pakistan will get the opportunity to re-channel its military budget towards civilian spending which will have a direct impact on the lives of the citizens who are often more concerned about the economic development of the country than the geopolitics which has always been the centre of policymaking. Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been based on Indian-centric approach and it’s high time to look elsewhere. This approach has not facilitated Pakistan to prosper; rather it has diverted Pakistan from the real path of progress. Thus, this India-US alliance can help Pakistan limit its attention towards India and actively think and act for the development of the nation.

4.3 Economic Implications

Pakistan will also face grave economic implications of the India-US cooperation. Going for the arms race will exacerbate the economic crisis especially when the state is already experiencing an unprecedented and harsh inflation. Pakistan needs to spend a significant part of the budget on social structures and services for better well-being of the citizens. But

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the diversions of the funds for military purposes will further strain the already fragile economy and weakened social infrastructures.

In addition, the space cooperation which aimed “to induce agricultural productivity and predict climate change” upon which India can better forecast for both the agricultural sector and the larger economy. Such an advantage will place Pakistan at the margin because it offers India a blatant vantage point and will create a glaring asymmetric situation in term of productivity. The India-US deal will benefit Indian economy significantly, as it will open gates of the US markets to the Indians. Both the parties will profit from the cooperation owing to the exchange of industries and professionals. This will result in a developing industry leading to a stronger Indian economy. However, the US will be in a more advantaged position than India as the cooperation between the two states will lead US businesses into a new market to sell their technologies. On the one hand, the US defence contractors will get an access to the global market through New Delhi, while India will also serve as a potential alternate market for those searching for US technologies available at a cheaper rate. Thus, Indians will gain direct access to the latest technologies and expertise being sold by the US from which Pakistan will remain deprived. It leaves no doubt that the Indian economy will boost considerably as a result of the India-US cooperation, leaving Pakistan far behind.293

Regardless of this, most Pakistanis expect Washington to be more forthcoming towards their state, as both sides have a long history of friendship, of which Islamabad had played a significant role to protect the vital US interests. Hence, sabotaging a long-rooted friendship for Indo-US partnership does not reflect the sign of good and mature friendship. Being a US ally, though not as equal as Washington, Islamabad often carries the (negative) brunt the friendship. Pakistan’s partnership with the US is important enough to convince Washington that Islamabad needs its market and that should not be preferentially for Indians.

4.4 Pakistan’s Search for Improved Relations with Russia

Beyond shifting the gear towards the East, the radar of Pakistan foreign policy has not been an outright eastward direction. Now Pakistan has shown interest and taken pragmatic steps to patch all disjointed relations with Moscow. The paths of Islamabad and Moscow have crossed so many times, especially during the Cold War. As the national interest of both states will dictate, Moscow and Islamabad failed to have a common and compatible foreign policy even though there were instances they coalesced.

To protect its national interest, Pakistan is alleged to be a ‘patron seeking state.’ The US acted as a patron though not an all-weather patron. Despite the cemented accord between Pakistan and China, Pakistan can further strengthen its alliance and seek the patronage of Russia amidst growing ties between India and the US. Although, the reversal and renewal of relations between Russia and Pakistan will not merely be initiated by the latter, a desire by Moscow was noticed due to the improvement in Indo-US relations. This is understandable given the fact that New Delhi has for many years remained in the orbit of the Soviets even though it claimed to be a champion of the ‘nonalignment movement. In the event of a consolidated Pakistan-Russia friendship, the possibility of a new game of pipeline would not inevitable due to the energy need of Pakistan and Russia’s energy market.

Conversely, the statement of Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhary; “Pakistan is also against foreign military intervention in Syria and fully supports the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic” was construed to mean not mere support for the Bashar al Assad’s regime, but implicit indication that Pakistan is dogging the path of Russia. Pakistan like every other country is making an attempt to diversify its foreign policy, slow withdrawal from a Western-oriented policy direction, hence the ever-concentrated Sino-Pakistan alliance and a recent indication of bending towards Russia. The latter has however remained careful not to jeopardise the long and

296 Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “The Dilemma of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” The Diplomat, August 12, 2016.
traditional relations with India, exemplified by the refusal of President Putin visit to Pakistan.297

For Pakistan’s foreign relations to meet the need of time and to be cognizant with given strategic situation, foreign policymakers must desist from “emotionalism and dramatic exposition”, without doing such, the heavy dependence on the US and the Western world would ever remain.298 Hasan Askri enunciates the reasons and areas for diversification of Pakistan’s foreign policy. While elaborating the slow pace in Pakistan-Russia relations, he notes that Pakistan must make use of the new diplomatic opportunities that are knocking at its door. Russia has been expressing strong interest in upgrading its relations with Pakistan for the last couple of years. The Pakistani government has also responded positively. However, trade and economic relations have not improved much these were some years ago. Some strides have been made in security matters. The special forces of Russia and Pakistan had two military exercises for sharing experience in countering terrorism in the last one year. Russia has supplied MI-35 helicopters and support material to Pakistan about two months ago. This is a good opening for Pakistan, but as long trade and economic relations do not improve, the Pakistan-Russia relations will move at a slow pace.299

While the state visit of a foreign head of state is significantly important for foreign relations, it is also a way to consolidate friendship. The state of President Clinton to India in March 2000 changed the completely post-Cold war narratives between India and the United States. This is not implausible for Pakistan and Russia relations as Putin’s visit to Islamabad is expected to mark a new beginning in between Islamabad and Moscow. In support of such arguments, Pakistan's ex-ambassador to Afghanistan, Rustam Shah Mohmand holds that “possibly relations with Russia will strengthen a [little bit] after Putin's visit. [Pakistan] should have strengthened its relations with Russia long ago,”….this

297 Ibid.
299 Ibid.
visit will likely increase trade, political contacts, but it does not mean that it can bring about change to Pakistan's foreign policy vis-a-vis the United States.”

In the backdrop of fraying relations between Islamabad and Washington, observers around the world are closely watching the development, and Russia is expected to be more watchful. Pakistan’s former advisor on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz opines, “As you know, India's relations had expanded with the United States, although it [India] had good ties with Russia,”…. “it is no longer like Cold War, obviously Russia is watching the Pakistan-US tension and [might be thinking of restoring] some balance.” The search for partnership in Russia is not a recent phenomenon. Despite the direction of Pakistan foreign policy during the Cold War, Islamabad had always found a way to share friendship with Moscow. The Ayub era craving for friendship with Moscow is historically documented; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s effort to secure Russia assistance and goodwill amidst Indo-Russia pact is historically indelible.

No doubt, there had been direct bearings and influence of Washington on Pakistan’s Cold War foreign policy which significantly ruptured Pakistan-Russia relations. The invasion of Afghanistan and the nurtured fear that the Red Army might move towards Pakistan forced Islamabad to adopt some degree of defensive strategy. While it feared for its own sovereignty, the involvement of Pakistan in the Afghanistan war is generally considered a proxy for the US side and as part of the larger containment policy. Since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, efforts to repair the damaged relations between Islamabad and Moscow have not seen full fruition. The need and high realization to diversify Pakistan’s foreign policy is often nourished by event and situations. Whenever Pakistan-US relations is affected or strained, Islamabad becomes dramatic to look elsewhere than Washington. The event of 9/11 and successive war of terrorism revived the strained Pakistan-US relations, but that revival has a life span. Under the banner of fighting terrorism for the US, General Musharraf’s government enjoyed relatively sound relation

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301 Ibid.
303 Ibid., 320.
with Washington, so much that Islamabad was tagged as a non-NATO ally. But for every beginning there is an end, and as many observers have mentioned that Pakistan gets ditched whenever US interest is relatively resolved by its proxy. To limit Islamabad’s dependence on Washington, Musharraf Administration extended a diplomatic hand to Moscow, which led to Musharraf visiting Moscow. For Musharraf, renewed Pakistan-Russia relations must not be entangled with other nations in the region, namely India and Afghanistan, while the two sides should cooperate on trade and energy exploration; the need for Russia to restructure Islamabad’s debt to Moscow. In addition, Islamabad believes Pakistan-Russia relations should encompass the safety of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, cooperation in the field of aerospace and the possible launch of Pakistani satellites aboard Russian rockets. Understanding Russia’s sway over India, Musharraf government believed a Russian partnership could help streamline the discussion over the Kashmir conflict.

Following the footstep of Musharraf, the PPP government under President Asif Zardari initiated a more robust ‘look beyond the West’ foreign policy, which did not preclude Russia. The PPP government made significant steps through the recommendations of Pakistan's National Security Committee, highlighting the need to strengthen Pakistan-Russia relations. The recommendation was not simply ratified by Pakistan’s Parliament; it led President Asif Zardari on an official visit to Moscow. The Zardari government had many platforms to work on; the government wasted no window of opportunities that can cement to Pakistan-Russia rapprochement.

Back in 2012, Moscow showed interest in participating in the proposed Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) pipeline project, which has now progressed to the stage of front-end-engineering-and-design (FEED) in Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan is believed to be endowed with abundant coal in the Sindh province coalmines. The interest of

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305 “Musharraf in Moscow to Improve Pakistan-Russia Relations - 2003-02-04” VOA, October 29, 2009.
Russian investors in the Thar coal project in Sindh Province speaks volume on the extent to which Moscow is making effort to shaping a new dawn with Pakistan. The governor of Sindh, Mohammad Zubair expressed Pakistan’s appreciation for Russian technical air that made possible “the establishment of Pakistan Steel Mills, and Guddu and Muzaffargarh Power Plants” meanwhile during a courtesy visit of Russian consular General in Karachi to the Governor House. The Governor further restated the readiness of Pakistan to seeing a constructive Russian investment in the Thar Coal Project.310

In conclusion, one can easily analyse that whenever new structures are made, there are reasonable impacts and implications for the other presiding structures. In this case there has a new cooperation come up in the face of US and India. The reasons for that are already elaborated in the previous chapter but that has some resounding implications for Pakistan. Since the partnership has been made by undercutting the Pakistan-US alliance, there have been variant implications. Furthermore, there are changes in the sense that Pakistan has now many options, one of them being the re-direction of its foreign policy agendas, more of which are discussed in the next chapter. But here it was easily noted that with US-India partnership etching closer, Pakistan has to face a multitude of implications in areas which effect Pakistan’s policy making. The US-India partnership has turned into a linear yet asymmetric equation where at one side there is Pakistan and at the other side the US and India. What that has done is implored the sense of loss because not only Pakistan has lost an important ally but so has US. One thing is also heightened here that with the US and India moving closer, Pakistan has to face a plethora of issues regarding the military and defence aspects. The US without a doubt will be endowing a lot of benefits to India and this is going to make things difficult for Pakistan particularly in the face of Indo-US nuclear dealings of which there will be more. All in all, this newly formed cooperation is going to be a big factor for Pakistan’s national interests now and is going to be one due to which Pakistan will need to majorly reboot their foreign, defence, economic and security policies.

CHAPTER 5
REALIGNMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN

The cooperation which has stemmed out between the US and India has multiple repercussions and implications for Pakistan. One of those repercussions happens to be regarding the foreign policy objectives of Pakistan. Because of the changed geo-strategic, geo-economic and geo-politics of the region along with the entry of new actors in the game there are bound to be new facets of the foreign policy making. There are going to be changed stakes and perhaps even new ground realities. Of course with one foreign power being in cooperation with one regional power, there are other foreign powers which are obviously going to try to balance the odds out. This also calls for evolved national interests for Pakistan. In such a turf, Pakistan seeks to realign some of its policies especially the foreign policy. Russia and China make for better replacements, for the lack of a better term, as they cater to the state’s geo-political, strategic and economic needs far more than the US. This is also necessary because Pakistan, Russia and China need to be the counterweights for the Indo-US cooperation.

This chapter sheds light on the dynamics which relate to the realignment of Pakistan’s foreign policy in lieu of new power politics in the region as well as the national interest of the state. It analyses the newly emerging patterns on which Pakistan can rely in terms of its foreign policy. These include the ‘look east’ policy by Pakistan, the discourse of foreign policy and national interest relating to China and Russia as well as the various nodes of cooperation Pakistan can have between these states. It also sheds light on the relationship dynamics between Pakistan and Iran as well as Afghanistan and how Pakistan can out-manoeuvre its foreign policy to gain an upper hand in terms of these states.

5.1 Look East Policy by Pakistan

The Indo-US partnership was premised on mutually shared values and interests. Countering China and checkmating Pakistan underpins the entire premise of the strategic cooperation. If Pakistan considers the Indo-US partnership as existentially alarming, Islamabad is bound to review its ties with Washington and seek alliance elsewhere. Amid a growing animosity and trust deficit between Washington and Islamabad, the latter’s choice
for a consolidated eastward forward is not implausible. The current Sino-Pakistan relations are a pointer that Islamabad is cementing its traditional ties with Beijing.

For the strategic balance of power and amid the growing India-US strategic alliance, Pakistan will be potentially urged to re-craft its foreign policy, which is not altogether pro-US rather tainted eastward towards China.\(^{311}\) This is now increasingly vital giving the strained Indo-Pakistan and US-Pakistan relations. On both sides, Islamabad is cobwebbed and hence new balancing alliances are required. More important, to balance the deficit of trust, Pakistan foreign policy formulators see the East as a rational alternative. Existentially, Pakistan must survive as a state. Traditionally, the state does not permanently get glued to a partnership if such is not forthcoming. The increasing understanding between the Chinese and Pakistani militaries is indicative of craving for an existential fortification. In addition to economic cooperation, the two states are equally cooperating on the strategic-military level, procuring military hardware from China, helping Pakistan consolidate its nuclear plants all of which serves as an evidence of eastward alliance.\(^{312}\) A closer China-Pakistan relation is directly proportional to the ire of Indo-US alliance. A Pentagon report highlighted the fear of US over China’s growing military strength and closer China-Pakistan ties, which in fact balances Indo-US strategic cooperation in the region. For the US, China is seen as a strategic competitor yet threat at two separate regions, Southeast Asia and South Asia.\(^{313}\)

If the US is keen to forsake Pakistan for India and Pakistan does the same to Washington for China, it might sound pleasant in the short term but may or may not be a good idea in the long-run. The interest of the US is strategically conspicuous in the region, especially in Afghanistan. Deserting Pakistan for India harms US interest in Afghanistan. Neither Afghanistan nor India and the US can deny the importance of Pakistan in the Afghanistan endgame, though it is a reality which is not easily acceptable. The frustration of Washington and the pleas of Afghan decision makers requesting Islamabad to be


\(^{312}\) Ziad Haider, “Navigating the China-Pakistan-India-US. Relationships” *Foreign Policy*, (November 30, 2010).

responsible towards peace in Afghanistan confirm that importance. It is true for China too,
knowing how instrumental Pakistan can be towards the ultimate success of China’s interest
in Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan’s eastward looking will not be beneficial for Islamabad
alone, but equally advantageous for China that will be using Pakistan as a transit route and
channel of connectivity with the rest of the world.

Besides the regional issues, Pakistan needs to circumvent being isolated on many issues
and hence the necessity of a true friend (like China) that can offer non-conditional support
over the discourse of terrorism and counterterrorism, nuclear arsenal and membership of
nuclear regime, economic and infrastructural cooperation and especially counterbalancing
the Indo-US cooperation. Pakistan’s eastward looking should be understood from these
perspectives. In the war against terrorism, Pakistan has been a staunch partner of US but of
late it has come under the light of new emerging events and Washington does not seem
inclined towards its historically favoured ally. Lately, it has been perceived that Pakistan is
not US’s top priority rather India is, and this had turned some heads for different reasons
and pertaining issues at stake. Pakistan is of the valid, yet debatable belief that the glaring
inclination of US towards India could lead to a serious slip-up of deterrence and strategic
instability in the region. Pan argues, “US favouritism toward India could increase the
nuclear rivalry between the intensely competitive nations, and potentially raise tensions in
the already dangerous region.”314 Robert Blackwill shares similar view of how the fear in
Pakistan of Indo-US alliance is perceived and seen from strategic and deterrence
disturbance “My impression is that [the Pakistanis] are worried this will feed the Indian
nuclear weapons program and therefore weaken deterrence.”315 This perception is not
unwarranted as some experts believe such disposition is potential enough to compel
Pakistan to form a nuclear alliance with China and that bonding might strike the balance in
the region. The fact that Pakistan’s eastward venture could be treated as threatening; the
onus rests on Washington as the harbinger of strategic imbalance (US-Indian deal) in the

314 Esther Pan, “India, China, and the United States: A Delicate Balance” Council on Foreign Relations,
February 27, 2006.
315 Ibid., 6.
very first place. The structure of Pakistani counter argument is definitive and based on two contentions. One is the equal treatment viz-a-viz India over the issue of the civil nuclear deal and the other is the critical need of nuclear energy. The foreign office counter-narrative went as follows;

‘This is not an exercise in damage control. Even before this deal was signed we had said that we would like the US to adopt a package approach because Pakistan also has energy requirements. We also feel that it is discriminatory because Pakistan and India are nuclear weapon states which are not part of the NPT and, instead of making exception for one. It would have been better for the US to work out a package deal that would take care of energy requirements of the two countries, the strategic stability in this region and would also take into account the non-proliferation effort.’

As a diplomatic gesture of goodwill, Chuck Hagel tried to corner off those arguments of ‘US-Indian nuclear deal aiming at creating a strategic imbalance in the region’, a notion highly prevalent in Pakistani national security circles. He shrugged off those notions as well as giving a green sign for the possibility of signing a similar civil nuclear deal with Pakistan in future, keeping in mind the genuine need for nuclear energy in Pakistan. However, the diplomatic gestures and sympathies diffuse off some tensions in US-Pakistan relations, as the dawn of the civil nuclear deal approaches, practical solutions for the Pakistani concerns are unfulfilled.

Understanding the trust gap in what the US policy makers say and do, Pakistan diversified its foreign policy option and turned it from a typical westward to eastward approach. While there is valid and legitimate energy need and urge to dampen Indo-US pressure on Pakistan, the stage was set for China to step in. Since then, Beijing has remained supportive under IAEA’s rule, facilitating Pakistan in Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 nuclear power plants projects. The eastward approach gave Pakistan supporting hand in the shape of China, challenging the legality of India into the NSG. China has been use to question US nepotism over its deal with India and Pakistan.

317 Noor ul Haq, “Islamabad not fully Informed on N-Deal” IPRI Factfile, (May 4 2006).
319 Rajiv Nayan, “India’s NSG Membership” IDSA, (June 18, 2011):5-6.
Considering the eastward approach in Pakistan’s foreign policy, it became glaring that such eastward cooperation will be a relationship based on mutual reciprocity. The CPEC project is one of the evidence of Pakistan’s redirection of attention towards the east. CPEC ushered into Pakistan’s progressive development; a success story of foreign policy redirection and diversification. It is the real representation and manifestation of eastward cooperation. The infrastructural development that accompanied CPEC further underpinned the importance and benefit of eastward foreign policy for Pakistan. In future, Pakistan should be gearing up to becoming a regional economic and strategic player upon the completion of the Gwadar warm water port, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and improvement of its energy sector.

Lastly, ‘look east policy’ is a diplomatic, strategic careful calculation and astuteness of the foreign policy of Pakistan. The closer Sino-Pakistan ties accords Pakistan an all-weather supporter, ready to stand with Islamabad amidst international pressure and criticism of Pakistan over the issue of terrorism, be it at the UNSC or BRICS, China has confronted all negative label and insinuation against Pakistan with full diplomatic clout. China has not left any efforts to back Pakistan before the nuclear regime and especially acting as a counterbalance against Indo-US cooperation. Pakistan’s resolve to look east proves that south-south cooperation can yield fruitful end results when they are least expected.

5.2 China-Pakistan Cooperation in Nuclear Field
The engagement between Pakistan and China has withstood various challenging scenarios since both the states established diplomatic ties. The relationship between both the states widened to encompass a multitude of avenues of cooperation over time. Their constructive engagement ranges from economic ties, military support, cultural exchanges, diplomatic backing and diversifying to include cooperation in the nuclear field.

The negative connotations attached to nuclear cooperation has repeatedly made the engagement between China and Pakistan a victim of a smear campaign. However, China’s

321 Saibal Dasgupta, “China responds to India on Masood Azhar, says its stand is ‘professional and objective’” *Times of India*, January 5, 2017.
adherence to support Pakistan in establishing and expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy has been unwavering and has increased since the advent of the 21st Century. Significantly, the cooperation in the nuclear field is overbearingingly influenced by the strategic interests of both the sides and is not merely the outcome of historical cordiality. It is led by the US and vehemently supported by India are centred primarily on the following interests.

Firstly, China has been undeniably crucial in aiding Pakistan in exploring varying means of energy, especially renewable means, to meet the growing needs of its booming population. Since Pakistan is constrained in purchasing nuclear reactors in the open market or conducting deals related to the transfer of nuclear materials, technology, etc. in view of its nuclear weapons program, its sole reliance falls back on its oldest and most unwavering ally; China. Pakistan produces 5%\(^{322}\) of its electricity from four small 300MW Chinese reactors at Chashma and aims to boost the electricity generation up to 8,800 MW or amount to 20%, by 2030.\(^{323}\) Pakistan also uses the international limelight to promulgate its inclusion in international nuclear cartels such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), etc. in order to benefit from cutting-edge nuclear technology.

Secondly, Beijing’s motivation in transferring nuclear technology and materials is largely to maintain the regional balance of power in South Asia. The cooperation enables China to exert a strategy of containment over India while using the support of of Pakistan as an extended deterrence against India to curb its nuclear enthusiasm. Moreover, the cooperation in the nuclear field between China and Pakistan warrants the former state the opportunity to showcase the ascendency in the nuclear energy program and its assertiveness and attract more contenders for increasing avenues of nuclear cooperation with other states.

In view of CPEC and the growing nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan, it is essential to highlight the depth and efficacy of such an engagement. Moreover, the role of

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\(^{322}\) “China Signs Deal to Build New Reactor in Pakistan” Reuters, June 24, 2017.

\(^{323}\) Ibid.
China, an economic giant in its unrelenting pursuit of superpower status, and Pakistan, a nuclear power in order to pursue of economic stability and to evade its national energy crises, hold on the international platform makes it crucial to keep in check the facets of their nuclear cooperation. The impact of the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan is perceived as a threat to the growing influence of India in the region of South Asia and it leads India to move towards the US for support to counter the threat from China-Pakistan nuclear nexus.

Understanding Nuclear Cooperation between China and Pakistan needs some perspectives, hence the necessity to understand what transpired between the two countries during the twentieth century. The nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan has always been under the scrutiny of the West. The slightest tilt of Pakistan to engage Chinese support for its nuclear program resulted in a severe backlash from the US during the twentieth century. This was evidenced by the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister in 1981 to Islamabad and the insinuation in the Western Press that a Pakistani nuclear explosion on Chinese soil would result by an absolute cessation of military and economic aid to Pakistan.\(^{324}\) Moreover, in 1983, the US Secretary of State on his visit in Beijing warned China against any support to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, peaceful or otherwise and clearly threatened the Chinese that such initiatives would disrupt the bilateral relations associated with nuclear cooperation between China and US.\(^{325}\)

The nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan is seen to have initiated as an outcome of a treaty signed between China and Pakistan in 1976. Although the 1976 agreement focused on cooperation in science and technology, the nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes was thought to have been an extension of the agreement.\(^{326}\) More significantly, in 1986, China concluded the Comprehensive Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Pakistan, which aimed to establish light water reactors, amongst other provisions, in Pakistan and the lineage of the Chashma Nuclear Power Plants can be traced


\(^{325}\) Ibid.

back to this agreement.\textsuperscript{327} It was also in 1986 that Chinese scientists started assisting Pakistan in the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium.\textsuperscript{328} China also reportedly transferred enough tritium gas to Pakistan for ten nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{329} China and Pakistan began focused negotiations for the construction of a nuclear power plant in 1989, and completed them in 1991 and the construction commenced in 1992 based on the designs of the nuclear power stations in Qinshan in China.\textsuperscript{330} The 300MW Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (CHASNUPP-I) began its operations in 2000 and its operational activities are overseen by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).

Additionally, in 1993, China and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed an agreement to apply the IAEA safeguards to the Chinese nuclear power station in Pakistan based on the allegation that 40-50MW Reactor at Khushab had the potential to produce weapons-grade plutonium.\textsuperscript{331} The nuclear complex at Khushab is a heavy water, plutonium-producing nuclear power plant that began its operations in 1996 largely led by the efforts of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). However, both China and Pakistan vehemently rejected the allegations. It was also on 1993 that US imposed sanctions on China on the grounds of aiding the development of the missile program of Pakistan and transferring M-11 missile technology, but China called these sanctions baseless and threatened to boycott the guidelines of the MTCR.\textsuperscript{332}

Successively, there was a transformation in the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan during the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. The tone of nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan did not change to a great magnitude as the twenty-first century commenced, despite the overarching cordiality between the security nexus formed between Pakistan, US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to curb the threat of international

\textsuperscript{329} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{332} Tarique Niazi, “Thunder in Sino-Pakistani Relations” \textit{Association of Asian Research}, September 4, 2006.
terrorism. Pakistan was sufficiently keen to keep its relationship with China stable against all challenges.

In this vein, in 2003, China agreed to extend its financial and technical help to Pakistan to further develop its nuclear capabilities. In this view, the construction of another nuclear power plant was concocted to expand the nuclear complex at Chashma.\textsuperscript{333} It was hailed as the second phase of CHASNUPP under which another 300 MW nuclear power plant was to be established (ibid). Both countries also exchanged letters for the utilization of 150 million dollars from the preferential buyers’ credit for the Chashma-II Nuclear Power Plant when Prime Minister Aziz visited China in 2004.\textsuperscript{334} Chashma-II became operational in 2011 and combined with Chashma-I, both the nuclear power reactors produced 600 MW of electricity to the grid.\textsuperscript{335}

The deal signed between India and US in 2006 instilled deep insecurity in China and Pakistan and pushed Pakistan towards convincing the US to sign a similar agreement with Pakistan. After an explicit refusal from the US, Pakistan shifted towards China with a similar request and in view of their continued cooperation on the nuclear front, an agreement to ‘further deepen cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear power’ was signed during President Musharraf’s visit to China in February 2006.\textsuperscript{336}

China’s inclusion in the NSG in 2004 drew new strands of criticism for the collaboration between China and Pakistan in the nuclear field, exerting special scrutiny on export licensing, control lists, end-user controls, and import controls\textsuperscript{337} in 2010. The China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) announced its support of establishing two other CHASNUPP units, which it claimed, were \textit{grandfathered} in the 2003 agreement.\textsuperscript{338}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{TariqNiazi} Tariq Niazi, “Thunder in Sino-Pakistani Relations” \textit{Association of Asian Research}, September 4, 2006.
\bibitem{ChinaNSG} “China says its Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan under NSG Norms” \textit{The Indian express}, August 4, 2016.
\end{thebibliography}
However, China had not explicitly outlined its future nuclear endeavours with Pakistan to the NSG prior to its inclusion, which resulted in criticism from the international nuclear nonproliferation regime but justified its nuclear transfers to Pakistan under the reasoning that it concluded the Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy with Pakistan. Moreover, the CHASNUPP-III and CHASNUPP-IV had, comparatively to the previous units at Chashma, increased combined capacity of 650MW.

The nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan escalated as the first decade of the 21st century concluded. After the 2010 agreement, in 2013, China announced its support to build two reactors in Karachi based on the ACP-1000 reactor, developed by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) that can produce 1,100 megawatts of power. The nuclear power plants at Karachi have received financial support amounting to ten billion dollars from China and are scheduled to be completed by 2021, with a combined capacity of 2,200 MW. Moreover, under the same agreement, China also promised to provide enriched uranium for fuel.

In July 2017, China and Pakistan strengthened their nuclear ties by signing another deal focusing on uranium exploration and mining which was signed by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). This agreement is significant as it introduced the Chinese nuclear chemistry industry into Pakistan and paves the way for their joint efforts and enhances the capacity building of those associated with the nuclear industry in Pakistan. China’s recent announcement in November 2017, of construction of a 1,000-megawatt (MW) HPR1000 “Hualong One” reactor at the Chashma nuclear power plant in Punjab has resurfaced the geopolitical

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340 “Pak-China Civil Nuclear Deal to be Okayed by the NSG” The Express Tribune, June 17, 2010.
344 Ibid.
345 “Pak-China Agree to Joint Uranium Enrichment Efforts” MIT Technological Review, August 4, 2017.
security concerns in South Asia. The cooperation agreement was signed by CNNC and PAEC. Such a massive and increased nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan has raised concerns regarding the true underlying intentions of the flow of nuclear technology. By and large, China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation has resulted with four nuclear power plants at Chashma, and two in Karachi with many similar projects underway. The support from China to the peaceful nuclear program of Pakistan displays China’s de-facto *exceptionalism* towards Pakistan since it has been unwavering in supporting Pakistan in establishing its nuclear capabilities. The nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan has increased in the recent years exponentially. The nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan has been perceived as a threat by India and its expansionist designs in South Asia. In this view, the US-India Nuclear deal in 2008, introduced a watershed in US and India relations. The nuclear civil cooperation was hailed as a nuclear nonproliferation success while also granting India an NSG-waiver, allowing US nuclear trade.347 The strengthening of nuclear ties between US and India instilled insecurity in China as well as Pakistan, pushing them to enhance their cooperation on the nuclear front and counter the US-India nuclear nexus. Moreover, China has been instrumental in blocking Indian membership to the census-based NSG, stating that criteria based, the non-discriminatory approach should be pursued by the NSG, essentially supporting the stance of Pakistan to join the NSG. In response to this, the international community aims to incentivize China through foreign reactor technology, in which China seeks greater economic potential in achieving its longer-term ambition of becoming a nuclear exporter than in its shorter-term deals with Pakistan.348 This approach shall strengthen the NSG and give international legitimacy to Pakistan.

Along with shielding Pakistan from threats of Indian nuclear aggression and competition, China tends to the exceeding energy shortage and crises in Pakistan. The Chinese financial investments to make Pakistan an energy corridor have expanded to include renewable means of energy, with a special focus on nuclear power. Moreover, these cooperative endeavours have given Pakistan the chance to highlight its nuclear safety and security

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measures and ensure the international nuclear nonproliferation regime that it’s a rightful contender to be included in the international nuclear cartels such as the NSG, MTCR and AG. The nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan is based on enlightened self-interest where the national interests of both the states collide, giving space to greater cooperation. Hence, the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan will increase and expand in the coming times.

5.3 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

According to the Pakistani government, there are ten fundamentals of CPEC

1. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a major and pilot project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. CPEC has become the framework and platform for comprehensive and substantive cooperation between China and Pakistan.

2. As a large and systematic project, which covers 2013-2030, CPEC needs joint and unremitting efforts from governments, companies and all social sectors of China and Pakistan. In the process of its construction, both sides agreed on the principles of scientific planning.

3. According to the consensus reached by the two states, both sides agreed to promote a “1+4” pattern of economic cooperation, featuring a central role of the CPEC and four key areas including the Gwadar port, energy, transportation infrastructure and industrial.

4. To promote the construction of CPEC, China and Pakistan have set up the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC). There are five joint working groups under JCC, namely long-term planning, energy, transportation infrastructure.

5. Situated at the southern end of CPEC near the ocean mouth, Gwadar port is an important project of the CPEC. In order to improve the operational capacity of the port, China Overseas Ports Holding Company Ltd. (COPHC) has carried out repairs and upgradation.

6. Energy is the source of power for economic development and a key factor in the sustainable development of the Pakistan economy. Efforts are required to speed up
the construction of energy projects to help Pakistan relieve energy shortage and achieve sustainable development.

7. The efficient and fast transportation networks are of vital importance to the economic development. The CPEC shall essentially follow the North-south corridor in Pakistan. The existing road network shall be used in the beginning, developing the missing connections first.

8. Industrial cooperation is an important field of CPEC. It is of vital importance to the uplifting of the level of economic cooperation and the expansion of the space for industrial cooperation between our two countries. It carries huge potential and a bright future.

9. CPEC will bring benefits to its people including the people from the western parts of the country. Some CPEC projects in the western parts of Pakistan are making progress. For example, the KKH (Thakot to Havelian) phase II and Suki Kinari Hydropower Station.

10. China and Pakistan have reached consensus based on "one corridor, multiple passages", aiming to benefit the economic and social development of all regions in Pakistan and provide effective connectivity to Gwadar port. The western route is definitely a part of CPEC.  

Both academic works and infrastructural development related to CPEC remains in the nascent stage, hence analysis could only be meaningfully based on the available materials and evidence of infrastructural development on the ground. Yet the CPEC discourse should be placed in perspective and do that deserves answering certain questions.

5.3.1 Is CPEC a Strategic Game Changer?

CPEC is China’s flagship project geared at linking China through Pakistan with the rest of the world, particularly Central Asian Republics (CAR). The CPEC routes are especially through the northern part of Pakistan and Baluchistan. CPEC is an integral and important part of China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) otherwise known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In addition to the long-established diplomatic and strategic cooperation,

CPEC reinforced the strategic importance of Pakistan to the region. If fully matured, it will simultaneously underpin Pakistan’s transitory position and improve its economy exponentially. The infrastructural contribution of CPEC for Pakistan’s development is noteworthy. Underlining the importance of the CPEC before the Davos summit 2018, Pakistani Prime Minister observes that CPEC makes Pakistan an important part of Chinese BRI. With CPEC, Pakistan is bent positively to improve the effectiveness of its “power plants, highways, modernize its railways and ports, construction of airports and setting up of economic zones for export growth.” The importance of CPEC for Pakistan is premised on the argument that within the region, Pakistan has been chosen by China for its strategic mega projects though that would not have been possible without the strategic location of Pakistan. Hence, it is a game changer, because it has raised the profile of Pakistan from a backward state to a frontline state that is an important route for international commercial connectivity.

In order to avoid contradictory views, CPEC plan appears to some observers as “Cooperation in Shadows” but irrespective of that, Pakistan believes CPEC offers it yet another window of opportunity to repeat history. In the mid-1970s when China started opening up to the rest of the world, beginning with rapprochement with the US. Pakistan was an instrument for the new dawn in Beijing-Washington new affairs. In 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping declared a mega foreign policy initiative geared at having the “New Silk Road” and reviving the Old Silk Route through the “One Belt One Road”, that declaration was incomplete till April 2015, when President Xi paid a brotherly visit to Pakistan and inaugurated the CPEC project. Pakistan automatically became China’s experimental laboratory for the BRI and whilst helping China to materialize its dream. Since 2015, Pakistan has shown a strong commitment to making the dream a reality for both countries and has urged countries within and beyond the region to join the mega

351 Minhas Majeed Khan, Ahmad Rashid Malik Saira Ijaz and Ume Farwa, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Game Changer, (Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 2017).
353 “Chinese president to visit Pakistan on April 20” The Express Tribune, April 10, 2015.
354 Ibid.
project. The numbers of countries that have pledged commitment to join CPEC, and achievement so far attained underpins the argument stated by the Pakistani government on its CPEC webpage.

‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a framework of regional connectivity. CPEC will not only benefit China and Pakistan but will have a positive impact on Iran, Afghanistan, India, Central Asian Republic, and the region. The enhancement of geographical linkages having improved road, rail and air transportation system with frequent and free exchanges of growth and people to people contact, enhancing understanding through academic, cultural and regional knowledge. Culture, activity of higher volume of flow of trade and businesses, producing and moving energy to have more optimal businesses and enhancement of co-operation by win-win model will result in well connected, integrated region of shared destiny, harmony and development. China Pakistan Economic Corridor is a journey towards economic regionalization in the globalized world. It founded peace, development, and win-win model for all of them. China Pakistan Economic Corridor is hope of better region of the future with peace, development and growth of the economy.’

Due to the emerging development of CPEC, Choudhry argues that “CPEC is no doubt a big project with many dimensions and many targets. It is hailed as a game changer. However, debate still goes on in Pakistan and around the globe, about whose favour the game will change. As a weak partner in any game, trade or pact does not dictate terms or win the game.”

5.3.2 Pakistan and China Marriage of Convenience?
The huge investment of China inside Pakistan is a clear testimony to that fact. The readiness of China to ensure numerous infrastructural developments in Pakistan with Chinese money is not merely a marriage of convenience, as no investor capitalist would ever desire to put his money inappropriately. Optimist Pakistani economists and financial experts have argued forcefully that with the CPEC, the country is expected to have a huge economic transformation and that would translate into envious economic development as forecasted by international financial and non-financial institutions. Amid IMF forecast,

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356 CPEC: China Pakistan Economic Corridor, “About CPEC” http://cpec.gov.pk/introduction/1
Pakistan economy is expected to improve alongside other economies in the region that have shown a significant bar of improvement and they (Pakistan inclusive) are expected to do better in the forthcoming years.\textsuperscript{358}

Indian efforts to isolate Pakistan are not receptive to the Chinese and rather than being isolated, Pakistan is beginning to reap the dividends of the rooted Sino-Pakistan relations. Among other benefits the CPEC has given to Pakistan is the revival of an abandoned energy project. The revival of Iran-Pakistan pipeline project will enhance many CPEC projects around the country and particularly in Baluchistan.\textsuperscript{359} Given the existing nature of cooperation between India and the US, the Indian government has successfully sold its isolation of Pakistan narratives to Washington and the latter’s recent behaviours affirm its acquiescence. When the US President tweet harsh words against Pakistan, China and Pakistan followed an agreement to transact business in the Chinese Yuan against the US dollar. Many in Pakistan felt that was a reprisal for insulting Pakistan even though the dollar would remain the main medium of Pakistan international trade. Both Pakistan and China are unnerved by Washington’s reaction, rather believe that such currency move will boost the CPEC transactions and will reduce Pakistan dependence on the dollar and save it hugely from foreign exchange.\textsuperscript{360}

It is important to note that China accounts for almost 28\% of Pakistan’s imports, as the third largest market partner of Islamabad, though falling behind the US and the U.K. The importance of China as a strategic partner explains the acceleration and view of the State Bank of Pakistan “considering the recent local and global economic developments, particularly with the growing size of trade and investment with China under CPEC, [the bank] foresees that [yuan]. It is denominated trade with China will increase significantly, going forward; and will yield long-term benefits for both the countries.”\textsuperscript{361} For Pakistan, the Yuan transaction is a huge development and belies any insinuation that Pakistan is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{358} Shahbaz Rana, “Growth in Pakistan expected to pick up in 2018, 2019: IMF” \textit{Express Tribune}, January 23, 2018.
  \item\textsuperscript{359} Fatima Raza, “Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline” \textit{Issue Brief}, Institute of Strategic Studies, February 17, 2017.
  \item\textsuperscript{360} “Pakistan allows use of Chinese yuan for trade, investment” \textit{Geo TV News}, January 3, 2018.
  \item\textsuperscript{361} Rishi Iyengar, “Pakistan cozies up to China on Trade after Trump Tweet” \textit{CNN}, January 3, 2018.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
isolated, though, in an eventual currency war between the US and China, Pakistan is expected to bear the negative externality.\(^{362}\)

### 5.3.3 What Economic Benefits lies in it for Pakistan?

The CPEC offers huge dividends for Pakistan in the areas of transportation, infrastructure, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), energy sector, and most importantly security enhancement.\(^{363}\) The inclusion of Chinese companies into the CPEC projects requires Pakistan to beef-up its security to secure the safety and security of the Chinese workers and the fruition of the projects. The improved security will not exclusively benefit the Chinese expatriates in Pakistan; it will cover the security of Pakistan business community too. Pakistani business community is optimistic about CPEC and believes that “China-Pakistan economic ties have been consistently growing over the past two decades and they will continue to grow in the future at a faster pace. There is hardly a sector of Pakistan’s economy where China has not invested” … “Pakistan is China’s strategic partner. The country is China’s key energy link that enables China to cut the time and distance for its oil transport from the Gulf. China plans to build a gas pipeline from Iran to China through Pakistan, transfer LPG from the Middle East by using railway carriages and set up a major oil refinery at Gwadar.”\(^{364}\) Since 2015, CPEC has given Pakistan an opportunity to re-engineer its economy, which will be an instrument to de-isolate Pakistan from India’s ploy of isolation. Since 2015, CPEC has recorded achievements in these areas: “energy, infrastructure, Gwadar port, rail-based mass transit, new provincial projects, SEZs, social sector development.”\(^{365}\)

### 5.4 Multilateral Approach by Pakistan (Relationship with Russia)

#### 5.4.1 Historic Foundations

Pakistan’s affiliation with Russia has historically continued to exist as a function of its multi-lateral relationship. The complex relationship can be studied under two trinities in the

\(^{362}\) Shabbaz Rana, “Pakistan could be collateral damage if US, China enter ‘currency war’” *The Express Tribune*, January 26, 2018.


present times i.e. one, Russia, Pakistan, India and second, Russia, Pakistan, US. The first trinity signifies the Russian tilt towards India in the light of Pakistan’s initial signal to follow the American lead, in its early days of bilateral arrangements. The second trinity, however, marks Pakistan’s recognition of Russia as a major player that has the capacity to add to its strengths on international and domestic levels. This recognition, it must be noted, has been made evident in the recent years with continued US dissatisfaction towards Pakistan on various concerns. Hence, the Russian role and influence in Pakistan’s foreign policy and Pakistan’s interests to further engage in Russian bilateral and multilateral arrangements in the present times must be studied vis a vis its dealings with the US and India.

During its years of staunch advocacy of the communist ideology vis a vis US backed capitalism, the Soviet umbrella marked the second great power that stood to the US’s expansive hegemony. It is based on Russia’s indisputable role in shaping international affairs in the post-Soviet milieu and the advanced significance attached to the South Asian region that Pakistan and Russia have continued to deliver to the state of their queasy companionship. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (Pakistan’s western neighbour) in 1979 established strategic divisions in the region that lasted for over a decade. Pakistan’s agreement with the US to reinstate its then crumbling economic engagements and its decision to counter Soviet aggression in Afghanistan as a guerrilla force fighting for the US laid the grounds for an era of Pakistan’s embittered relations with Russia.

It was in 1989 with the formal end of Cold War and Soviet collapse into Central Asian states that Pakistan realized the need for new allies in the region. Russia, in similitude, recognized the need for another stable ally in South Asia apart from India and resultantly, the signature of various bilateral and multilateral arrangements between Russia and Pakistan marked the period that followed. It is noteworthy, that from the 1990s onwards, Russia massively relied on its multilateral stance that it continued to pursue under the institutionalized auspices of SCO after 2001.366 By portraying its might in the economic,

military and socio-political realm and by engaging its fellow states in mutually rewarding affiliations, Russia has emerged as a champion of patronizing multilateralism among world states.

Multilateralism as the name suggests can be explained as a collection of several unilateralism joints for the pursuit of securing options that are mutually beneficial for all state parties concerned. Multilateralism refers to the proliferation of horizontal cooperation among states. This horizontal scope of cooperation and engagement recognizes all state parties as equal in their status to progress towards the advancement of their respective motives. The ‘strategic unity’ inherent in multilateral arrangements among states aims at arriving at a point of agreement that benefits all parties equally, irrespective of their size or contribution to the arrangement.367

From the 1960s onwards, Pakistan’s relationship with Russia has encircled around two parameters, i.e. its relations with the US and China and its relations with India. However, however serious and earnest the efforts of engagement between Pakistan and Russia be, it appears that the reason behind such slow progress in terms of inclusive engagement can be attributed to the distinctive perspectives on multilateralism. Both Russia and Pakistan hold a view of multilateralism that lies at lengths from the true essence of the phenomenon. Where Pakistan views multilateralism to expand its allies in the region, Russia appears to see it as a tool to challenge US hegemony and Chinese dominance. It is for this reason that the Russian course of action has often been ‘instrumental multilateralism’ rather than a ‘principled multilateralism.’368

Despite its irrevocable support for the Indian stance since the Indian independence, Russia proved itself large-hearted in supporting Pakistan’s claim to a nuclear weapon free South Asia and assisted it by holding a multilateral conference on the agenda. Unlikely as it may sound, Russia also advocated Pakistan’s claim for the preservation of human rights in

Kashmir in its initial days. As much as the multilateral policy of the two states towards each other is significant, the roots of the current wave of cooperative engagement lie in the strategic alliances bilaterally materialized in the past. In 1999, with Pakistan’s military establishment in the driving seat and the consequent backlash from the Western community on tormenting the course of democracy, President Gen. Pervez Musharraf recognized the importance of Russia as a major ally. In similitude, Russia realized its potential to manipulate the best out of the circumstances that had led Pakistan to suffer due to a military takeover. Some Russian commentators refer to this period to as a period of ‘enlightened cooperation’.

Apart from military and arms sales, Pakistan and Russia managed to cooperate in the realm of space and technology development, energy sector and trade. Russia’s concern over losing India as its major arms buyer restrained it for quite some time to chalk out an arms sales agreement with Pakistan. In the aftermath of the 9/11 bombings, the pace of cooperation between Russia and Pakistan grew drastically. The two found the common grounds to conclude long-term cooperation that they had been in search for. Pakistan and Russian in their mutual alliance in the War on Terror to defeat terrorism came incredibly close and their relations that were previously marked by mutual mistrust began to thaw. Russia also in this regard, extended its launch vehicle to facilitate the successful launch of Pakistan’s Badr-II satellite. Both sides materialized this path to rapprochement, though marked by hindrances fully.

By the beginning of 2000, Russia and Pakistan had more than one mutual concern. They now were united on securing stability for Afghanistan while fighting side by side in the WOT. Pakistan has kept incredible resolve in communicating with Russia the regard it holds for the quality Russian arms. It has at multiple times, been iterated to Russia that the arms purchases that Pakistan makes from China and elsewhere do not meet the quality of Russian arms. However, Russia has remained cautious in guarding its alliance with India. Another milestone in 2000 was Russia’s policy of economic modernization.

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5.4.2 Russia and Pakistan in Contemporary Dynamics

Pakistan and Russia have lately set examples in the domain of forming meaningful alliances in all areas of cooperation. The two states despite their troubled histories have made significant efforts to move towards an era of the comprehensive alliance. The following section presents the accounts of long-term cooperation deals signed between Russia and Pakistan in the past decade and the implications of these arrangements for their bilateral relations and overall for the entire region. Pakistan’s and Russia’s efforts to lead their way into a politics of engagement serve as an exemplary model of multilateralism that can be followed by other world states as well. Pakistan and Russia have attained major breakthroughs in military cooperation, an area of engagement that had been non-negotiable for quite some time. In addition to the supply of advanced artillery, Russia agreed to send its armed men for the purpose of joint exercises to Pakistan in 2016. This mission was materialized in six phases.\footnote{Sarah Akram, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Future Trends” Institute of Strategic Studies, Issue Brief, (March, 2016):1-6.}

Analysis on bilateral or multilateral relations that will involve Pakistan and Russia is increasingly gathering momentum and it will take strategic prudence to see whether Islamabad and Moscow will once again misplace the opportunities at their disposal.\footnote{Nazir Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations: Lost Opportunities and Future Options” Journal of Political Studies, 19:1, (2012):79:89.} The strained relation between Islamabad and Washington is a ‘wait and see cinema’ though it can be exploited by nations having an interest in the region. Pakistan is weighing its diplomatic options and Moscow is having an important place within the equation. With the US restriction on weapon procurement, the need for a search for new sophisticated military hardware is definitely imminent. Russia will be willing to becoming part of the suppliers of arms to Islamabad, though not without a caution. India remains Moscow’s biggest arms purchaser thus must not be irked.\footnote{“Russia still India's largest Defence Partner, supplies 68% arms” Business Standard, February 22, 2017.} While New Delhi might dedicate effort to isolate Pakistan both at the regional and global level, Pakistani strategists are of the view that such intention has not only failed but also prompted Pakistan to be more proactive. The burgeoning Pakistan-Russia relations are among the many that such strategists believe have driven Pakistan out of isolationism. Talat Masood elucidate the point clearer that “the
current Russian policy neutralises Indian designs against Pakistan and shows that the
country has not been isolated….it is ironic that for almost four decades the situation was
completely opposite….enemies are moving towards becoming allies and friends, which is
beneficial for all, keeping the current geopolitics in perspective.”

The closeness with Russia shows how well Pakistan can play and sustain the regional ball
game. 2014, the Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu visited Pakistan and signed a
defence cooperation contract with Pakistan, and that was followed by military drill between
the two countries. Analysts believe that the “last year’s military exercise is an example of
the countries’ mutual interests, apart from that the naval forces of both countries
participated in ‘Arabian Monsoon’ exercises in 2014 and again in 2015” show how well
Pakistan has drawn closer to Moscow. With the Pakistan Army hosting Russian Deputy
Chief of General Staff Colonel General Isakov Sergi Yuryevich on a visit to North
Waziristan, analysts were quick to note a new friendship developing between Pakistan and
Russia. The Pakistan-Russia closer ties were not a mere surprise for many in Pakistan; it
was true for observers outside the country. The military relations between the two countries
are growing rapidly but we cannot be so forward as to call it an alliance yet, in a similar
vein when the Pakistan military establishment hosted the Russian Deputy Chief of General
Staff Colonel General Isakov Sergi Yuryevich in North Waziristan speaks volume of the
newly developed relations. This was followed by yet another military exercise in Cherat,
in northern Pakistan. The exercise held in September 2016 saw the cooperation of 70
Russian and 130 Pakistani Special Forces. As the military cooperation deepens, it was no
surprise that Moscow expressed the intent to sell military helicopters to Pakistan, while
Islamabad is equally offering Russia access to the Gwadar warm water.

Beyond military cooperation, Pakistan can bilaterally work with Russia, by facilitating
Russia’s induction into the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). That would boost
Pakistan-Russia relations largely and by extension relations with the Central Asia

373 Ali Osman and Hurmat Majid, “Experts weigh in on improving Pak-Russia relations” Dawn, April 2,
2017.
374 Ibid.
Republics (CARS). Through Pakistan diplomatic clout and push, Russia can be granted an observer status in the organisation and in future a permanent member. Russia membership carries dividend for Pakistan in the long run, as a sophisticated member, Moscow might decide to share its technology with the ECO members and that could be a potential stepping stone for many other areas of coordination and cooperation. The window for mutual reciprocity is always open, given Russia’s support for eventual Pakistan-SCO membership, there should be no harm for Pakistan to reciprocate in a similar gesture for Russia-ECO membership.

Pakistan and Russia have often been regarded as the natural gateways to Central Asian natural resources, particularly gas. Pakistan in this regard has made repeated efforts to come into close coalition with the Gazprom. Gazprom is the largest Russian company and a renowned name in natural gas extraction. Following constant efforts, Pakistan finally concluded an agreement with the Gazprom in May 2009, calling for the Gazprom to lay 950 km of the total 2775 km of a gas pipeline under the India-Iran- Pakistan project. By doing so, Russia tactfully supported an on-going project, while simultaneously earning recognition as a state open to multilateral cooperation.\textsuperscript{376}

The first glimpse of cooperation was manifest in the uplift of all embargos from Pakistan in 2014 after which Russia communicated its intentions to engage with Pakistan on mutually beneficial terms. The relationship between the two post-Cold War rivals has matured into the conclusion of economic and trade ventures as well. In this backdrop, by 2015, the two countries inked an agreement worth $2.5 billion geared at building a 1,100 km gas pipeline from Lahore to Karachi. In addition to pledging its contribution towards enhancing Pakistan’s energy viability, Moscow also planned to collaborate with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the CASA-1000 energy project. The project would eventually become a regional consortium that provides electricity to nations like Pakistan and Afghanistan wanting that sector.

Additionally in 2015, Russia extended its military forces to Pakistan to carry out joint military exercises in its troubled Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). This act laid the foundations for an extensive defence cooperation that followed. Adding to the good fortunes in 2015, Russia and Pakistan also managed to seal a historic defence arrangement that called for Russian sales of MI-35 ‘Hind E’ attack helicopters. While making such arrangements, Russia has given repeated assurances to India that any deal with Pakistan would by no means affect Russian romance with India. In addition to the aforementioned arrangements, Russia has persistently supported Pakistan’s promotion to the permanent member from observer state in the SCO. In 2013, Russia also expressed its concerns in facilitating and upgrading Pakistan Steel Mills that was initially set up from Russian assistance too.

The Russian government extensively engaged its interest in the Muzaffargarh Power project through 2017 trying to shift it from oil and gas to coal-fired station. With this, Pakistan has also expressed its urge to become a part of the historic CPEC in Pakistan. Pakistan agreed to Russia’s request and let it use the Gwadar port for carrying out its trade. In similar token, Russia has promised to continue extending the hand of support to Islamabad in all possible and workable areas. The making of Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder aircraft can be credited to the Russian Klimov RD-93 engine. At the regional level, Pakistan and Russia are also a part of Dushanbe 4 along with Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. The D-4 pledged their effort to combat terrorism and drug trafficking within the region. Pakistan and Russia have also materialized arrangements in the realm of energy.

Arguably, Pakistan and Russia have shown incredible resolve in terms of bypassing their long-held perspectives and scepticisms of each other. Despite Indian concern over sharing its major ally, Russia has managed to keep both antagonistic partners at ease, while making efforts to satisfying both. In times to come, Pakistan must continue to engage Russia on all fronts. Diplomatic exchanges between the two countries in this regard will ensure facilitation of a bilateral process that will help the two states to take a leap forward.

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378 Ume Farwa, “Pakistan-Russia Relations on Upward Trajectory” Asia Times, December 17, 2017.
5.5 Improvement of Relations with Neighbours (Iran and Afghanistan)

5.5.1 Pakistan and Iran

The strained relations between the two states of Pakistan and Iran are complex and intriguing, from accusations of cross-border terrorism. The role of Pakistan in Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) geared at undermining Iran, the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav, apprehended as an Indian spy who had cross-bordered from Iran into Pakistan to foment violence in Baluchistan. The attack on Iranian border guards by the Jeaih al-Adl, a Sunni militant group and the continuous attacks on the Shia community in Pakistan were few amongst issues troubling Pakistan-Iran relations.³⁸⁰

Besides being historical neighbours, both Iranians and Pakistanis share deep-rooted cultural, religious, and social connections. Understanding their relations requires comprehending the dynamics of their domestic politics. Pakistan though a nuclear state, shares a strategic interest with Iran, although Tehran has been in a protracted nuclear debacle with the rest of the world, at some point, they have a common interest on the nuclear issue.³⁸¹ Having a shared border with Afghanistan and Pakistan makes Iran vulnerable to the issues confronting its neighbours. Iran like Pakistan has housed tens of thousands of Afghan refugees because of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and its consequent refugee crisis. Pakistan according to a UN report houses the largest number of refugees in the world, followed by Iran. Both states have long been struggling with the issue of drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan. Addressing the problem of the drug should be a common battle to fight head on.

Strategically, the presence of the US troops in the neighbourhood does not augur well for Iran and Pakistan, having a Western (foreign) power in their vicinity threatens their sovereignty and strategic interest. Afghanistan has always been a strategic junction, where the interest of regional powers converges. Pakistan, Iran and India have their stakes in Afghanistan as each wants to have a sway in the endgame of Afghanistan following the

‘eventual exit’ of the US forces from the land and eventually became the “the weak spot of the imperial defence.”\textsuperscript{382}

The strategic importance of Pakistan highlighted itself much better as Iranian and Saudi official made trips to Islamabad,\textsuperscript{383} all in an attempt to secure Islamabad’s trust. While the Saudis would always incentivise Pakistan with financial assistance (and its door open to many Pakistani expatriates). Iran often plays the proximity and energy card. However, Islamabad has made many efforts to play the balance card, delineated by the refusal of Pakistan to join the Saudi offensive in Yemen. Nevertheless, Saudis got compensated as Pakistan agreed to lead the Saudi initiative of Muslim army meant to fight terrorism.\textsuperscript{384} Although the alliance received a strong reservation from the Iranians, given the state of Prince Salman who holds the view that an army needs to confront Iranian ideology and regional muscle flexing. Yet for Pakistan wearing the status of a broker between Saudi Arabia and Iran is important in all ramifications for its domestic and foreign policy both in short and long term. The acceptance of General Raheel to lead the military alliance went through the notification of the Iranian as Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan Mehdi Honardoost observed that though his country has reservation against the alliance. “It was correct that Pakistan had contacted Iranian officials before issuing the No Objection Certificate (NOC) to General Raheel Sharif but it did not mean Iran was satisfied with this decision or it had accepted it.”\textsuperscript{385}

The proximity of Iran and Pakistan is essentially beneficial for both sides as there should be a limit to animosity though in the theatre of international relations, sustaining friendship is all interest based. While Pakistan is plagued by the energy crisis, Iran is endowed with energy and has the capacity which can benefit Pakistan. As the prospect of reactivation of abandoned pipeline projects is on the horizon, Iran can profit from the business, while Pakistan’s energy problem could be eventually resolved. The Iran-Pakistan pipeline is in

\textsuperscript{385} Shafqat Ali, “No Tension with Iran” \textit{Nation}, April 5, 2017.
both countries’ shared interest but the pressure by Saudi Arabia and US saw its abandonment.\textsuperscript{386} However, following the strained Pakistan-US relations and the renewal of interest by the Iranian to revive the project, Pakistan Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, signalled the readiness of his government to put the project back on track. Through the pipeline project, Pakistan is expected to get subsidized gas from Iran; “Iran is bound under an agreement to cut the gas price if Pakistan is able to import energy at lower prices from other sources.”\textsuperscript{387}

Meanwhile, the advantage of having smooth and cordial relations with Iran does not suit Pakistan alone; China will equally be reaping the dividends through CPEC. It is in the best interests all three states (China, Iran and Pakistan) to ensure that the pipeline project is resuscitated, that will save China from expending much on energy for its mega CPEC projects and the whole benefits will trickle down on Pakistan in both short and long-term.\textsuperscript{388} Given the mistrust between Pakistan and Iran, Hassan Askri argues “the Iranian offer of a supply of gas and electricity to Pakistan is not expected to materialise soon. Pakistan is more interested in obtaining these two types of energy from Central Asia and the Gulf region.”\textsuperscript{389}

It is interesting to note that the CPEC project has caused some degree of a rift between Pakistan and Iran due to the Indian realpolitik of making the Iranian port of Chabahar a competitor to Pakistan’s Gwadar port, an integral part of the CPEC project. From the Indian standpoint, “Gwadar will emerge as a competitor to the port of Chabahar in southeast Iran. The port is being developed by India to open up a route to landlocked Afghanistan where it has increased its economic and diplomatic presence. India is actually making efforts to circumvent Pakistan, its arch-rival through Chabahar port.”\textsuperscript{390}

\textsuperscript{386} Parvez Jabri, “Work on Pakistan, Iran gas pipeline halted due to sanctions” \textit{Business Recorder}, November 3, 2017.
\textsuperscript{387} Zafar Bhutta, Iran wants Pakistan to revive gas pipeline project, \textit{Express Tribune}, October 25, 2017.
\textsuperscript{389} Hasan Askri Rizvi, “The search for a new foreign policy” \textit{The Express Tribune}, October 8, 2017.
\textsuperscript{390} Muhammad A. Notezai, “The Dilemma of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” \textit{The Diplomat}, August 12, 2016.
In an effort to boost their strategic understanding, in a separate meeting between Iranian Minister of Defence Brigadier General Amir Hatami and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa and Pakistan’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Nasser Janjua and Iran’s National Security Council Ali Shamkhani. Both states agreed on deepening regional cooperation which best suit their national interests and both states should not cower to foreign pressures which are bent to destabilize the region. The Iranian defence minister holds “respect for territorial integrity, solidarity and national sovereignty of the regional countries are among the fixed principles of the Iranian foreign policies,” while Ali Shamkhani mocked Washington’s tweet against Pakistan and believed (both countries) “we have to continue to work on cooperating against the US.”

Following a prolonged negotiation, Iran and the P5+1 signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015 geared at monitoring Iranian nuclear dealings. The deal was welcomed by Pakistan for many reasons. Businesses and other transaction between the two countries were postponed due to the US-led sanction on Iran. Pakistan was caught in the web being an ally of Washington. The Iranian nuclear deal meant Pakistan and Iran can resuscitate talks on energy matters, particularly the abandoned pipeline project. Energy transaction is a requirement for both sides, while Iran can export its abundant energy to Pakistan, the latter can ease its energy crisis through the support of Iran. Pakistan can always play the religious and cultural card with Iran, given the disposition of India towards Iran. Although relations between Tehran and New Delhi appear to be on the horizon, the momentum may not be sustained on account of competing for interest. At the behest of US, India had to vote against Iran nuclear programme. That was a lesson for Iran, and as a result of that Pakistan should be skilful enough to build on that, hammer it further that for Iran there is always a limit to trusting New Delhi and more importantly the recent closeness of Israel and India. By and large, Nader et al. surmised the relations between the two neighbouring in these words;

391 “Pakistan to improve security, economic ties with Iran: Janjua” Geo TV News, January 8, 2018.
392 Talat Masood, “The global and regional impact of Iran’s nuclear deal” Express Tribune, July 8, 2015.
‘Iran's relations with Pakistan can be characterized as a complex mix of cooperation and peer rivalry. In recent years, political ties between the two countries have improved over trade and energy issues; they also cooperate intermittently on border security. At the same time, tensions continue to exist over religious sectarian issues.’

At the domestic level, Iran is largely a Shia dominated society, while Pakistan is the opposite having the Sunni community as the dominating group. The small Shia community in Pakistan believed the majority Sunni community has not been treating them agreeably and the incessant attacks on the Shia community makes them wonder if they are second-class Pakistanis. While the attacks on the Shia community irritate Iran, it has never been aggressive to express its dismay to the Pakistani authority, though at some point, Tehran considered the humiliation and attacks on the Shia community in Pakistan as the Second Gaza (Parachinar).

A way of measuring the growth of a nation is through the lens of the economy to indicate how much trade volume exists with neighbouring states and the larger world. Pakistan and Iran believe their economic ties are unduly exploited; hence both have planned to raise the bar from to $5 billion by 2021. According to the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, the “trade between Pakistan and Iran fell to $432 million in 2010-11 from $1.32 billion in 2008-09,” the sanctions on Iran is said to have informed economic dwindle. The proposal to resume train service connect Pakistan with Iran is a welcoming development. The resumption is expected by September 2018. The fortnightly passenger train service will run between Quetta and Mashhad and most likely to Qom. Such service will improve people-to-people connection; facilitate pilgrims during Muharram, though the success of the service is heavily dependent on Pakistan to beef-up security along the train line.

397 Mehreen Zahra-Malik, “Pakistan, Iran aim to boost trade to $5 billion” Reuters. March 26, 2016.
5.5.2 Pakistan and Afghanistan

The strategic location and proximity of state play an important role in shaping the state’s behaviour and foreign policy towards its immediate and distant neighbours. The proximity of Afghanistan with Pakistan underlies the historical, sociological, and anthropological fraternity of the two states. Being a landlocked state makes Kabul strategically dependent on its neighbours, particularly Pakistan. Beyond their distinctive political geography, both countries are deeply connected through ethnic relations, religious commonality, cultural and historical similarity. From time immemorial, the proximity of the two countries allows the mobility of persons and goods across the inexplicit border jointly shared. Despite the colonial segregation and partition of the border between the two, the historical and cultural affinity along the border and frontier relations have never ceased.

During the Cold War, Pakistan was an undisputable ally of the US and even though Afghanistan was not a declared ally of Soviet Russia, the latter’s sway on Kabul remains an indelible history. The invitation of Moscow by the Kabul government, which eventually led to the occupation of Afghanistan by Moscow, underpinned the sway of the latter over the former. The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was considered antithetical to international law and norms and undermined UN charter that kicked against the occupation of a sovereign state. The pre-eminence of Russia in Afghanistan and the proximity of Pakistan compounded the whole Cold War politics in the region. The presence of Russia in Afghanistan was considered by Pakistan as an existential threat and to the Washington, Russia’s access to warm water present in Pakistan and onward into the Arabian Sea which is strategic to the US.

Since the era of the Czar, Moscow has always longed to be connected to the warm water, of which part of it lies in the jurisdiction of Pakistan. Hence, for Pakistan, the fear of being the next in line for occupation became an imminent threat. While its sovereign integrity

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401 Ibid.
was to be protected against Russian threat, Pakistan was entangled in Cold War politics of containment. Exploiting Pakistan’s sense of fear, Washington used Pakistan as a proxy against the presence of Russia in Afghanistan. Under the patronage of Washington, Pakistan galvanised Muslims around the world to see the invasion of Afghanistan as a threat to the Islamic world. That effort led to the convergence of Muslim fighters across the Muslim world in Afghanistan, purportedly to fighting for the course of Islam and convincingly energised to purge atheist Russia from the land of Islam.\textsuperscript{404}

The defeat of Russia and emancipation of Afghanistan from the claws of Russia sent a signal to many about the strength of Muslims and significantly impactful on global politics. The event in Afghanistan collaborate with the Iranian revolution, all clubbed together as the emergence of Muslim powerhouses in world politics. The end of Russia’s occupation of Afghanistan culminated the end of Cold War, and thus the end of the bipolar world order. This strategic development was swiftly considered as a new dawn in global politics, though the end of one power (Russia) and the rise of another religion-ideological entity (the Islamic oriented states).

The end of Russia’s occupation coincidentally ended monarchical rule in Afghanistan and eventually led to the emergence of new political (religious-ideological) player. The resistance against Russia generated competing political players in Afghanistan, but the competition concluded with the Taliban as victorious and triumphantly established a religion-ideological government in Kabul, which had the support of Islamabad and Washington.\textsuperscript{405} The Taliban were considered in Washington as part of the league of freedom fighter, whose love of freedom strategically coalesced with the West against an ‘evil empire or evil ideology.’

The shared goodwill and friendship between Kabul and Washington where conditioned by time but especially by interest and as Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston said

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England had ‘no permanent friends or permanent enemies; only permanent interests.’ This strategic dictum has become a currency in international politics; it explained the rupture in Kabul-Washington relations when their interest went unparalleled. The event of September 11, 2001, further complicated the animosity between Kabul and Washington and the resuscitation of Pakistan’s role as a strategic player and a broker between the two. Osama bin Laden, who was harboured in Afghanistan was accused as the mastermind behind the evil act of 9/11. Washington asked for his extradition, which was rejected but conditioned by certain concessions and request by the Kandahar-led Taliban government, though no extradition pact exists between Kabul and Washington. Pakistan being a broker made all efforts to convince the Taliban government to take a rational decision, all effort proved abortive and inconclusive but culminated into the invasion of Afghanistan by Washington.

Pakistan made its own rational choice under Musharraf. The government in Islamabad believed supporting the US best suited the national interest of Pakistan. Pakistan’s support for the US government was though considered as a betrayal US-led forces. The Taliban swiftly turned into a rebellious group challenging the occupation of their motherland. The fall of the Taliban led to the US supported government of President Hamid Karzai, who later was derided as the mayor of Kabul and became critical of the foreign presence in Afghanistan. The presence NATO led by US in Afghanistan re-spirited a perennial discourse and question, Kabul is always the battlefield of empires and powers, be it the British, Russia and successively the US. The proximity between Afghanistan and Pakistan aligns their interest over common enemy in the form of the external invader. Though Afghanistan might be under invasion, the heat cannot be least felt in Pakistan. As an aggrieved political player, the Taliban never considered the Karzai government as legitimate. In as much as the government is illegitimate, peace and order under the Karzai government will be unaccomplished. To water down the Taliban resistance and its violent

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409 Muhammad Dawud, We Fundamentalists. (Bloomington IN: Xlibris, 2014):182.
tactics, Pakistan was considered instrumental; given the perception of Islamabad’s sway over the Taliban, hence the insinuation of ‘why cannot you be a nice neighbour’ by the Karzai government towards Pakistan. The Kabul government at some point failed to conceal its misgiving for Pakistan, believing that Pakistan had a hand in the law and order problem in Afghanistan. President Karzai’s animosity was not confined to Pakistan alone but extends towards the Americans. He bounced on the US officials during his last days in office arguing that “We don’t have peace because Americans didn’t want peace,” “…If the US wants Afghanistan to be a good friend; it needs to match its words with actions,”

Islamabad-Kabul relations were strained due to the mutual suspicion and cross-border accusations and complicated by the incessant Taliban atrocities on one hand and the failure of the US troops to be triumphant in Afghanistan. Even though he was no more in government, Karzai still concurs to the fact that peace in Afghanistan is a non-issue without Pakistan, but critical of Afghanistan is under the tutelage of Pakistan. However, same Karzai expressed support for the recent critical statement against Pakistan by President Trump. Yet when Washington experiment its so-called big bomb in Afghanistan, Karzai was quick at lambasting the US “After it [the US.] dropped the bomb on Afghanistan, it did not eliminate Daesh,” “mother of all bombs [MOAB]”….“I consider Daesh their tool,” and “I do not differentiate at all between Daesh and America.”

The democratic transition from Karzai to President Ashraf Ghani was initially perceived to be a new start between Islamabad and Kabul, but it took no time before relations between the two further deteriorated. Finding a new path with Afghanistan is struggle-bewilderling

413 “Karzai says Pakistan’s role in Afghan peace process critical” Pakistan Today, October 12, 2017.
415 “Former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai praises Trump’s tweet against Pakistan” Express Tribune, January 2, 2018.
Islamabad. Friendship and cordial co-existence with Kabul are definitely is Pakistan’s national interest. Aside from having some degree of leverage over Kabul in the past, Islamabad cannot afford to allow Kabul slip into the orbit of Indian influence. The historical, cultural, religious and commercial interaction should be bases of mutual cooperation. More importantly, Kabul needs respect and pay gratitude for the decades of sanctuary provided by Islamabad to the Afghan refugees, many of which have integrated deeply with the local community. Islamabad must equally understand the importance of Kabul, not just from the strategic view, but commercial and people-to-people relations. As much as Pakistan needs Afghanistan, it is true for the latter. Peace in Afghanistan is directly connected to peace in Pakistan. Helping to secure a peaceful solution to the protracted political unrest in Pakistan would not simply accord and add to Pakistan’s prestige, it will show Islamabad as a responsible neighbour and would emancipate the countries from the grip of US influence and political interference. Peace in Afghanistan through Pakistan will reduce US pre-eminence in the region and most likely defeat or sabotage India’s status as US’s deployed watchman over Afghanistan.

Both Afghanistan and India have heightened in their relations in recent time as they have shifter all blame on Pakistan as the beacon for cross-border terrorism. Whether or not the allegation is factual, Pakistan is morally obligated to disperse the bad image and perception with responsive and reasonable pragmatism. It behoves Pakistan not to display any indication of truncating any effort geared at restoring peace in Afghanistan, rather than allow unwarranted misgiving to deplete the air, Pakistan should learn to enforce the strategy of luring Kabul, not to be hurt but tolerated.

Foreign policymakers in Islamabad need to restructure Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Any expert foreign policy analysis knows quite well that foreign policy is never stagnant but dynamic and bound to change circumstantially. Idiosyncrasy is an important lens for understanding and analysing foreign policy. The personality of Hamid Karzai should not necessarily be same for President Ashraf Ghani they have dissimilar personality traits. While controlling Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai paid more than
twenty visits to Pakistan, but Ashraf Ghani has never once been to Pakistan as the Head of Government though Afghanistan is a few miles away from Pakistan.

Afghanistan under Ghani should be treated with the same relational tools used during the Karzai government, doing that will be a display of myopia of foreign policy. President Ashraf Ghani is an intellectual, trained and groomed to have an independent mind, and rational enough to decide how to navigate his country without suppressing Afghanistan’s sovereignty to any external entity. This personality trait of Ghani has been well pronounced in the manner with which he deals with Pakistan.\footnote{“Afghan President Ashraf Ghani declined invitation for Pakistan visit: deputy spokesman” \textit{Dawn}, May 4, 2017.} For Ghani, Pakistan should act responsibly by denouncing militant group supposedly taking sanctuary in Pakistan. The Haqqani Network is believed to be operating from Pakistan and launching attacks inside Afghanistan. Whether the allegation is factual or fictional, Pakistan should raise its bar beyond ego, by articulating to the Afghans, its readiness to stamp out terrorism wherever it many seeking solace. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have suffered tremendously from terrorist atrocities and their trauma can be best treated by mutually working together. The fact that President Ghani subscribes to the view that Pakistan can leverage the Taliban further reiterate the importance of Islamabad; that is a window of opportunity that Pakistan is not seriously considering, though the window might not remain open eternally. Whenever peace talks fail, Islamabad is always blamed for the failure, though the failure is always due to the non-readiness of a party to the conflict.

‘Talks and negotiations will only succeed when there are certain underlying principles that both sides agree to and when both sides believe in a win-win situation where each side is willing to walk halfway or agree to a give and take. I am one of those who is sceptical of the peace talks. I see these talks as going nowhere because while the Afghan government and the United States may be willing to agree to a give and take, the other side – the Afghan Taliban – believe in an all-or-nothing worldview.’\footnote{Muhammad A. Notezai, “The Dilemma of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” \textit{Diplomat}, August 12, 2016.}

The question still, however, remains, as to how much Pakistan really has an influence on the Afghan Taliban. Arguably, Pakistan cannot be blamed for all that transpired in Afghanistan,
when the Taliban remains a reckonable force, having sway on the local population.\textsuperscript{419} It is the responsibility of Kabul to keep its home in order. The fact that the Taliban has refused to hold talks with the Ghani’s government\textsuperscript{420} even when the latter extend the olive leaf and promised to have the Taliban in government\textsuperscript{421} shows the level and weight of Ghani’s administration. Pakistan has in recent time expressed readiness to help in peace talk and reactivate the sixth Quadrilateral Coordination Group’s (QCG) meeting, but the independence-centric nature and the Pakistan-factor conceived by the Afghan government further complicates the matter. Rejecting Pakistan’s forwardness, President Ashraf Ghani was reported to have said “our approach to internal peace is to own it through Afghan government-led processes,”…. “We would like a push factor from Pakistan vis-a-vis the Taliban, not a Pakistan-managed peace process,”\textsuperscript{422} Giving the Chinese interest in Afghanistan, Beijing equally gave in its good office, hosted the first China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue geared at improving ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{423}

If the Afghan or Pakistani Taliban is the problem and there is degree of understanding between the Pakistan institution and the Afghan Taliban. Then Pakistan should cease the opportunity to display its sense of responsibility either by denouncing the terrorist groups (wherever they are) or block their mobility as depicted by Pakistan’s effort to build a wall across the border in order to regulate and monitor illicit movement across the border. Nonetheless, the Pakistan-Afghan border is expected to be challenged by many factors among which is the “deep cultural ties between Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns”\textsuperscript{424}

Pakistan had in recent past tried to disperse wrong perception emanating from Afghanistan, in an attempt to mend their relations. The visit of Pakistani Army Chief General Qamar Javed to Afghanistan was indicative. According to the report of meeting between President

\textsuperscript{420} Suhrob Ahmad, “Fixing Afghanistan-Pakistan relations” Daily Times, October 11, 2015.
\textsuperscript{421} Ayaz Gul, “Ghani to Allow Taliban Office if Afghan Peace Progresses” VOA, June 6, 2017.
\textsuperscript{422} “Afghan president refuses to join CPEC while access to India is blocked” The Express Tribune, October 25, 2017.
\textsuperscript{423} “1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue” Xinhuanet, December 26, 2017.
\textsuperscript{424} Shamil Shams, “Pakistan to build fence along disputed Afghan border” DW, March 26, 2017.
Ashraf Ghani and General Bajwa, the former believed that both countries are ‘inseparable brother’, whether or not that is true, only time will tell. Besides, it became unveiled that Pakistan agreed with the Afghan to have a religious declaration (fatwa) that will denounce the terrorist attack on both sides of the borders. Pakistan claimed it has fulfilled its part of the deal as 1,800 Pakistani religious scholars outlawed suicide bombings as evil, labelled it as unlawful (haram) and against the Islamic precepts. Pakistan alleges Afghanistan of procrastination as the latter is yet to fulfil its part of the deal. The Afghan president is reported to have raised certain concerns about the religious ruling from Pakistan, saying it failed to categorically mention ‘there must be no attack from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on Afghanistan and the rest of the Muslim World.’

In essence, the Indo-US partnership has in a way sketched a new map for Pakistan to follow. There are now Russia, China and Central Asian States which Pakistan can look out towards. Moreover, in the entire Afghan issue, the paradigm is also going to be changed because Pakistan no longer needs to comply by the terms of the US, Pakistan can focus on its own security agendas which emanate and related from Afghanistan and cause terrorism in its own ground. In terms of economic policies, there are perhaps more opportunities for Pakistan because it can enhance its trade with China and Russia. Another aspect is that because the US-India cooperation is on terms of larger strategic benefits, Pakistan has been left bereft of its larger strategic advantages which Pakistan is looking towards East for. Thus there has been a twist towards eastward approach by Pakistan. Apart from this there are going to be latent changes in terms of Afghanistan and Iran as well. So in a way it is not just US which is changing directions and going from West to East when it is shifting from Pakistan to India respectively, but also Pakistan which is turning eastward in its foreign policy changes, since it can achieve a lot more from Russia, China and Iran as well as CARs.

426 Kamran Yousaf, “Pakistan awaits Afghan ‘fatwa’ against TTP, affiliates” Express Tribune, January 22, 2018.
427 Ibid.
CHAPTER 6

FUTURISTIC ARCHITECTURE OF REGIONAL ALIGNMENT

Although making futuristic assumptions in academia is not always preferred but in some cases the future designs can set the tone for policy making and management. Particularly in this study the future of the regional interplay between actors and foreign states actually adds up. The reason for that is that it is not too vague because already the policy formations and changing realities have taken place as discussed before. This futuristic analysis is then mere foreplay to open up the larger analytical lenses for the region. Of course one cannot say that the changing architecture and its predictability ought to be hundred per cent accurate but it is not going to be hundred per cent inaccurate as well. Because of the given facts and figures it falls in the middle way.

This chapter aims to feature the changing regional architecture and where Pakistan, India as well as foreign powers stand in this fluctuating scheme. The chapter analyses some particulars and parameters within the region. The focus is on the idea of India gaining hegemony in South Asia and how it affects the political fabric as well as ways for Pakistan to counter. There is also mention of India trying to attain NSG membership and what ought to be done about it. This is viewed in lieu of the influence of US in the region which needs to be put into check, especially in the coming times. Finally there is some discussion on regional organizations like SAARC and SCO and how these will fit in the window of the regional fabric.

6.1 Neutralizing Indian Hegemony in the Region

In this regard perhaps the first question that comes to mind is whether India is truly a hegemon in the region or not. If the answer is affirmative, then as a hegemon it might be somewhat difficult to gang up against a hegemon. However, whether or not the influence of a hegemon can be neutralised, the possibility of that seems feasible and plausible but requires a pragmatic and concerted effort. Neutralising Indian influence in the region would require Pakistan to bring in hardened efforts.

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Pakistan needs to learn from the US as well as China; both states became powerful world players not because of their military might but because they adopted a long-term strategy that shielded them from entanglement in conflict and trouble whilst building their states’ domestic capacity and strength. This is an essential factor for Pakistan if it must overhaul its defence and Cold War swayed foreign policy. If Indian exceptionalism is the premise upon which the US accords India a special treatment, then Pakistan needs to plan, generate, construct, and portray its own exceptionalism. Largest and sustainable democratic system has been part of Indian exceptionalism narrative. The burgeoning democracy in Pakistan must be allowed to mature steadily. Political polarity and divide is not alien to a democratic dispensation but shut down of the democratic process due to polarity are ominous for democracy. Political cohesion, liberalisation and integration should be a conscientious pursuit by Pakistan political elite. The growth and survival of democracy in Pakistan should be task mutually shared by all stakeholders irrespective of political, ethnic, institutional, and regional affiliation. Pakistan is bound to garner respect within and beyond the region if it can learn how to tame democracy from slipping away and maintain a non-perturbed democratic dispensation.

Pakistan must develop some form of national cohesion, be it between the civil and military establishment, or among the provinces, or the integration of minds and build national consensus and cohesion. The differences which persist among the provinces need to be patched up and the gap of inequality and perceived marginalisation ought to be bridged. Doing that would deprive any external entity to exploit the polarity and divide within Pakistan as a case of Baluchistan is increasingly making headline be it the US, India, or any other state.

Pakistan would have to tidy up its house, putting the house in order is an essential element for any powerful state. This is true for states that have made a significant impact in global politics. The colonisation of the rest of the world by the European states would not have

430 “Support to Balochistan may backfire; Congress warns Government” Indian Express, August 25, 2016.
431 Naveed Siddiqui, “Pakistan's UN representative asks Swiss authorities to take action against 'Free Balochistan' posters” Dawn, September 18, 2017.
been possible without a stable and progressive home. The Dutch, followed by the British ruled the world in different capacity due to an ordered home. For many years, prior to venturing into global politics, the US maintained a progressive isolation, which resultantly made it the most powerful state within the western hemisphere. The progressive isolationism strengthened the US policy makers to challenge the European however, not all that was due to any external peculiarity.

Interestingly, at the dawn of Chinese ‘opening up’ to the rest of the world, China like the US began its journey as an isolated state then followed pragmatism before ending up engaging or interfering in global affairs. The history of modern China speaks of a state that dedicated its energy to become competitive through economic viability. The Chinese started with the development of their local industries, the latter was made functional to an extent of producing qualitatively and massively well for local consumption and that later morphed into surplus production, leading the state into an export-oriented one. Pakistan should not be an exemption in this regard. Having a huge population and sizeable youth population; the human resources are readily available for utility, it only depends on how the resource is utilised. Pakistan’s competitiveness begins with an educated urban citizenry, lucrative and industrious enough to participate in economic development. The abundant natural resources buried all across the regions of Pakistan do not make any sense by simply stating that, “Pakistan is having that amount of resource in the world” without utility. The essence of any resource rest on its utility, hence it behoved Pakistani government to adopt a more progressive utilitarian ideology, policy, and approach in combating the Indian sway in the region. The Southern part of India, particularly Bangalore became the poster child of India and its capital for information technology that exports IT related services to the rest of world. Bangalore is India’s Silicon Valley and is likened to the Silicon Valley in San Francisco, California. Achieving that stake in information technology was never on the platform of nonentity, non-pragmatic policy, rather Bangalore is what it is today because of education. Besides, generating huge revenue for India, it also represents and makes a positive image of India around the world. The fact that Bangalore was the first place a UA multinational corporation established its base outside the US. Hence, challenging India’s
influence in the region is not merely housing hundreds of missiles but it can be achieved through institutional development.

Furthermore, the rebranding of Pakistan is yet another measure that should be taken seriously. The Indian lobby in the region and around the world is undoubtedly deep. Indian academics are contributing to how India is seen around the world. Indian academics have never ceased to paint their country as the rising star and economic giant that must be reckoned with even though the huge economic dislocation\textsuperscript{432} and conspicuous hunger remains daunting in India.\textsuperscript{433} The active role of the Indian academics fronting the cause of India within and beyond the region is remarkable.\textsuperscript{434} The level of publication by these academics and portrayal of India as one of the citadels of knowledge in the region cannot be understated. Indian academics have instrumentally shaped how India is perceived in terms of its regional clout. Pakistan as a nation has never been short of world-class academics, whose sagacity can help in rebranding Pakistan, by changing the untrue narratives that have for a long time weighed the country down. The battle against India’s hegemonic influence must not necessarily be fought on the level of nuclear deterrence but on the theatre of the idea. Pakistani academics ought to adopt a proactive approach that is not merely defensive but forceful enough to re-engineer the way the country is construed within the region. Secondly, the academics should also become more active in policy and decision-making. Hence, policies that end up as jeopardy for Pakistan should be well examined through an integrative effort of policymakers and the academic industry. The intellectual battle is as important as muscling up military hardware. Among another mechanism, the role of Pakistani academics in challenging India narrative is imperative and paramount. Yet the success of such endeavour depends on the academic resources at the disposal of the academics, handsome salary, academic infrastructure for credible research and appreciable academic funding from the government are necessary ingredients for the battle to reach a constructive and meaningful end.

The possibility of challenging India and neutralising its economic hegemony is to restructure Pakistan’s economy with a utilitarian approach. Alluding to the observation of Jean Francois Captain, the EU ambassador to Pakistan, the industrial growth and development of Pakistan depends on the best utility of its burgeoning youth population. Pakistan needs to learn from the EU by adequately providing quality education, which includes technical training geared at economic development for the growing youth population. For Pakistan to stand at par with economic-wise with any nations “the solution is in technical and vocational education and training and Pakistan could learn from the experiences of the EU.” Adams Smith postulated that nations cannot become wealthy because of their size, but because of their competitiveness. Countering and neutralising Indian hegemonic designs in the region demands Pakistan be competitive in all four areas of the economy. Pakistan needs to prove that it is not just endowed with abundant natural and human resources but having the propensity to enforce qualitative and competitive ‘Made in Pakistan’ products. Becoming competitive requires the combined effort of private and public sectors, and an enabling environment and government support, hence Captain’s position that Pakistan must bridge the disparity between “using very basic, labour-intensive techniques to produce textiles, using automation and robotic methods.”

The global economy is increasingly changing and nations around the world are grabbing their share from the redistribution of the globalized economy. George Friedman’s classification of P16, as the newly emerging economies, points to the role these economies are playing. They redefine their importance and project the niche they hold in the global political economy. Pakistan is not mentioned amongst the P16, but Bangladesh, a neighbouring country is done so prominently. This former part of Pakistan is dubbed as the second largest garment exporter in the world, following China. According to the World Bank report on International Trade Statistics, Bangladesh’s global market share is estimated

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435 Ammar Sheikh, “EU envoy stresses focus on youth technical prowess” The Express Tribune, February 1, 2018.
436 Ibid.
at around 5.1 per cent ($503 billion). This is a lesson Pakistan can learn from and adapt. Bangladesh faces as much political and economic problems, maybe more than Pakistan, yet its propensity to thrive against all odds is remarkable. Invariably, Pakistan needs refocusing on its textile industry; a formidable economy is a tool to challenge India.

Under Modi’s Administration, India’s Look East is morphed into India’s Act East Policy, a policy that is aimed at establishing the strategic connection between the Northeast and Southeast Asia respectively. Over the years, Prime Minister Modi visited the Southeast region lobbied for their military, strategic and economic cooperation with India. According to Jaishankar, the Act East policy is “self-interest, needed to become more integrated into Northeast and Southeast Asia.” Like India, Pakistan equally has historical and cultural ties with countries in that region. It is Pakistan’s interest to underscore the shared values. Countries like Malaysia and Indonesia are vivid examples. Meanwhile, Pakistan can also offer its facilitation to Philippines in terms of counterterrorism. Many other states can learn from Pakistan’s rich experience as enunciated by the EU ambassador to Pakistan. Cooperating with other regional and international states ought to be the tactical and strategic policy of Pakistan. The recent visit to Pakistan by the Indonesian President Joko Widodo exemplified how Pakistan should market itself to the rest of the world; particularly amongst those who share certain commonalities. On the visit to Pakistan, both states agreed to strengthen their defence and security cooperation, though not without a cooperation in the areas like the trade (improving PTA) and counter-terrorism. The visit allowed the Indonesian President to reassure Pakistan of Indonesia’s support for “Pakistan’s bid for full dialogue partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Indian-Ocean Rim Association.” Pakistan should extend the success story of CPEC to the ASEAN countries and implore them to join the economic corridor.

Summarily, Pakistan cannot reach the height of self-actualisation if it fails to disengage from the India centric approach to regional and global issues. While it appears that Pakistan

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is making all efforts of survival, it also appears that Pakistan continues to live within the shadow of India’s game scheme. The essential point is that Islamabad should be able to make decisions without being influenced by the government in New Delhi. Pakistan needs to realise that it is a sovereign state having the right to live independently and chart its path in global politics.

6.2 Blocking Indian Membership in NSG

Both Pakistan and China have reasons for being resentful of Indian membership in the NSG. Irrespective of their positions, objection to Indian membership of NSG should not and cannot be understood in isolation; it is much connected to the Indo-US nuclear deal. China has been very clear with the deal, its reservation of India-NSG membership is an extension of dismay over the nuclear deal, therefore it worth placing the Chinese view of the nuclear deal and India-NSG membership in perspective.

In its very first reaction, China questioned the role of US in terms of nuclear proliferation and reasons as to why it to “make an exception” for the Indians. The state cautioned that the deal would affect the region, particularly the Iranian and North Korean issues, negatively. In addition, China rather construes the deal as an explicit demonstration that US has no tolerance for China’s growing power in the region. While it might be difficult for the US to bear the opposition of China alone, India became the right choice and tool in fulfilling the US foreign policy goals. Jacob contends that China’s reaction was not confrontation, but a quest and call for reason, seeking the US to place an international order above selfish foreign policy interest. In the Chinese worldview and “as a signatory country, China hopes non-signatory countries will join it as soon as possible as non-nuclear weapon states, thereby contributing to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.”

441 In a similar vein, Sadia Tasleem holds;

‘India-US co-operation in space technology can bring a major setback for China. India has a potential to develop missiles by transforming Space technology for civil purposes. India has already done so in the past. Its missile inventory has its origin in its civil-space technology venture with the

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US in the 1960’s. An increased missile inventory with more accuracy and precision would surely be perceived as a threat by China.442

For many around the world, unilateralism has become synonymous with Washington and the Indo-US nuclear deal that negates all reasons because of its illegitimacy was yet another unilateral display of Washington. China’s caution in this regard underlines the fear of many around the world that US unilateralism if unchecked through multilateralism would lead the world to ruin.443 In the backdrop of the nuclear deal, China affirms its position against India-NSG membership. Despite the support from states other than the US to integrate India into the NSG, the effort seem not yielding fruition as expected as NSG continuous to drag the endorsement of exceptional status granted to India back in 2008. It has rather held back by the paramount prerequisite that requires India to sign the CTBT and NPT.

China has played a significant role in this lack of fruition. China has always been obstinate against India’s membership of the NSG, for obvious reasons. Hence, India’s membership of WA was incentivised by China as a non-member of the same group. In 2016, China opposed India’s accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, frustrating New Delhi, which had invested considerable diplomatic capital into its membership campaign. Membership in the group is by consensus. Of recent and during the meeting of the NSG, China reiterated its objection position and concern over India’s NSG membership. In the words of Li Huilai, China's Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs “about the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), it is a new issue under the new circumstances and it is more complicated than the previously imagined,”444 even though Delhi was granted a waiver position in 2008, but refused permanent membership on the concerns of China. Although, entry of a new member is practically impossible without a consensus of all members, thus China’s objection is a hurdle for India, though Pakistan has submitted a similar application for membership is also under consideration. Albeit China’s support, admission of India and Pakistan would depend on both becoming signatories of the NPT. China has maintained a glaring stance that rules

444 Shylaja Varma “China Repeats 'No' For Nuclear Group NSG, India Looks To Other Nations” NDTV, June 05, 2017.
will not be bent for India. In addition, states like New Zealand, Russia, Brazil, Ireland, Turkey, South Africa, Ireland, and Austria joined China’s opposition.\textsuperscript{445} These states are equally concerned about the impact of the inclusion of India into the group. By extension, the Indo-US deal and the waiver granted to India were not welcomed rather considered either as a threat to international security or breach of international norms. The recent summit of NSG saw China reaffirmed its opposition, though other members led by the US and Germany threw their support behind India.\textsuperscript{446}

China has long been applying for the membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime but has remained unsuccessful. However, India due to the US favour has acquired the membership. In addition, now it is moving forward for membership in NSG, which would mean that India is acknowledged as a nuclear state, and would be given the status, equal to that of China. It is well known that India and China strive for regional dominance in South Asia, and India being treated as an equal to China is worrisome.\textsuperscript{447} This is the reason that China was initially supporting the states opposing the NSG membership for India, but it is being vocal about this opposition itself. India is rising as a strong economy and provision of easy access to nuclear technology through NSG would be a big step towards becoming a world economic power, also if India gets the membership in NSG that would eventually be consequential for the region. All these intentions of India are challenging the status of China as a regional power, which is making China more resolute about not given consent to Indian membership to NSG.

China does not simply object to India’s membership of NSG but it has unequivocal being tough on the special waiver status India enjoys in the NSG. For China, the privilege of the Indo-US deal should not be extended into the NSG, thus whatever New Delhi enjoys with the NSG is unjustifiable on many grounds. If India, a non-signatory of NPT can be granted such status, it should be true for Pakistan (non-signatory of NPT), the US and other states that supporting India can only prove their sense of equality, justice, and responsibility if

\textsuperscript{445} Baqir Sajjad Syed, “India’s bid to join NSG hits dead end” \textit{Dawn}, June 24, 2016.  
\textsuperscript{446} Indrani Bagchi, “China stays firm, but other countries may back India’s NSG bid” \textit{Times of India}, April 5, 2017.  
\textsuperscript{447} Kate Sullivan de Estrada & Nicola Leveringhaus, “China’s Stance on NSG Membership Shows the Extent of India’s Challenge in the Global Nuclear Order” \textit{The Wire}, June 30, 2017.
such support is extended to Pakistan. In as much as India and Pakistan are on the same footing, then the candidature of Pakistan for NSG should be welcomed.\textsuperscript{448} By employing the narrative of exceptionalism for India, such narrative is as true for Pakistan as well as India. Energy need of the latter is counted as what makes its exceptional candidate of the NSG. If that is true, then Pakistan faces a chronic energy crisis far more horrifying than India and therefore Beijing “believes that expansion of NSG should be able to maintain authority and effectiveness of the group and take into full consideration the actual condition of candidate countries, and a final decision should be made through consultation with all States.”\textsuperscript{449}

In addition to China’s objection, Pakistan’s concern over India’s NSG membership is equally noticeable and has revolved around the fear that if India becomes a member its membership can be misused against Pakistan inclusion into the same group. US Senator Ed Markey supports the Pakistani fear that India-NSG membership would be a harbinger for a “never-ending” nuclear race in South Asia. Such plea has no resonance with Obama Administration, instead says “the United States calls on NSG participating governments to support India’s application when it comes up at the NSG plenary, which I think is next week.”\textsuperscript{450}

Pakistan’s position and opposition to India-NSG membership where depicted by the 48 members of the NSG who raised issues about Indian candidature.\textsuperscript{451} Besides, Pakistan believes the 2008 waiver India enjoyed with the NSG has no significance being a non-signatory of the NPT. India has made insignificant progress towards CTBT and its civilian and military nuclear reactors remain inseparable. The much cry over the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear facility belies the much more complicated and safeguarded Indian nuclear facility with “production capacity 7.7 times greater than that of Pakistan”.\textsuperscript{452} As much as the Western states are supporting the Indian membership bid, Pakistan is not relenting its lobbying for the same candidature. From the Pakistani standpoint, both

\textsuperscript{448} Pranab Dhal Samanta, “China red flags India move to join NSG” \textit{Indian Express}, July 17 2011.
\textsuperscript{449} Ananth Krishnan, “China calls for dialogue on India’s NSG entry” \textit{The Hindu}, November 17, 2011.
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{451} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{452} Baqir Sajjad Syed, “India’s bid to join NSG hits dead end” \textit{Dawn}, June 24, 2016.
applicants for the NSG must merit the consideration of overall peace and strategic interest of South Asia without preferential and exclusive treatment.

The non-proliferation credential of India is another important factor to be considered when examining Pakistan’s position and opposition to India-NSG membership. Along with India, Pakistan is also striving to get membership of NSG, but Pakistan does not possess the support of US, though China has continuously thrown its supports behind Pakistan’s claim that if India gets the membership of NSG then Pakistan should also be granted membership under the same criteria used for the non-NPT member.

The Grossi draft proposal/ Grossi formula of NSG membership that was prepared by NSG Chairman Rafael Mariano Grossi favoured India but was rejected by NSG members, keeping in mind the nuclear record of India. India is the state that introduced nuclear weapons race in South Asia when it illegally used the Canadian and US nuclear technology, which was provided to India for the peaceful nuclear programme. India misused nuclear technologies that were provided to it for peaceful uses under guarantees of peaceful use but illegally used it to produce nuclear weapons. The nuclear tests by India destroyed the illusions of the world regarding the concept of the peaceful atom.

Worsening the case of India is their unsafe nuclear programme and the history of incidents and nuclear thefts at the nuclear facilities of India. Contrary to India’s claim of a safe and secure nuclear programme, the 1996 IAEA report states that Indian nuclear facilities had 130 nuclear security-related attacks. Throughout the nuclear history of India, it had a number of instances of nuclear-related thefts and mis-happenings, for example, from 1995 to 1998 there were more than 145 nuclear incidents reported according to the Indian parliament report. India’s claim of an absolute flawless nuclear record can be challenged on the basis of a report of Central Bureau of Intelligence (CBI) according to which an eight-kilogram racket of uranium was stolen from Tamil Nadu in India of which six

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kilogram was weapons-grade un-enriched uranium. Another example is the event of May 2000 when Mumbai police seized 8.3 kilograms of uranium from scrap dealers that had originated from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). In 2003, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued a report that blamed India for allegedly providing nuclear assistance to Libya for its nuclear programme. This report led to a diplomatic snub between India and the US, but India cunningly came out triumphantly and subsequently managed to get the nuclear deal.

The recent concerns about the safety of the nuclear facilities of India were raised after US-India Nuclear deal was signed. In October 2014, a person of Central Industrial Security Force, which was appointed to guard India’s nuclear facilities and weapons installations, killed several people in the facility that was assigned to him for security. Also, according to the 2014 Nuclear Materials Security Index, which is the body to assess the security of nuclear materials of the world, ranked Pakistan above India, however only Iran and North Korea are ranked below India.

India’s illegal export relations with Libya propagate the fact that it does not implement safe nuclear export control laws. It has been involved in the export of sensitive centrifuge design information and providing procured goods for nuclear weapons programmes to other countries. The poor security and nuclear export record in India have increased the possibility that its nuclear technology is always at the risk of a nuclear theft to illegal nuclear trade. India has been accused of using its national companies to cover its illegal nuclear trade with other countries whom India has provided nuclear material. This tactic was used by the Indian Department of Atomic Energy, which had a website where it had easy access to search tenders including those for Anhydrous Ammonia. Deductively, India had used these front companies to cover its illegal trade with other states like the Trade Fin in South Africa in the 1980’s. These illicit networks of nuclear trade had been

456 Malik Ayub Sumbal, “India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group: Why Pakistan is unhappy at US. support for India’s bid to join the NSG” The Diplomat, February 14, 2015.
458 Anaya Shahid, “India’s Nuclear Record” Foreign Policy, March 2, 2016.
used by India in the black market. Though India has always claimed of following the export control list, it does not sufficiently put in force the export control laws.\textsuperscript{460} It is evident to the world that India has an unsound record of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles under the cover peaceful nuclear cooperation with states like Canada, US, France, China, Norway, etc. India has used heavy water from these states to develop its nuclear weapons; the latest example of this is the largest nuclear-capable missile of India, The Agni, which India built from the technological parts that it imported from NASA.\textsuperscript{461} This data can be used by Pakistan to disprove India’s façade of a ‘good sport’ in terms of nuclear tactics and can be used to undercut Indian interest to attain NSG membership.

India was accused of providing sensitive nuclear material to Iran that facilitated Iran in developing its submarine batteries and in future reference of conflict with the US provided Iran with the advantage of developing lethal weapons against the US in the Persian Gulf. In the same year, the US sanctioned India when two of its high officials were involved in the provision of nuclear secrets to Iran. Even after signing the deal with the US, India was involved in acquiring secret nuclear weapons technology from the US avoiding US export control laws. All these events took place after India had signed a deal with US assuring that it will not bypass US export laws and will abide by the nuclear non-proliferation laws.\textsuperscript{462} All are indicative of the special narrative of Indian exceptionalism played and promoted by Washington to make India a strategic proxy in the region. Apart from this, Indian nuclear deal with the US has been a propagator of nuclear proliferation and arms race rather than the promotion of non-proliferation objectives. This deal between US and India and the idea of proving India with a membership of NSG would add to the risk and possible demise of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.\textsuperscript{463}

Regardless of China and Pakistan’s concerns over India-NSG membership, New Delhi recently added to the membership of Wassenaar Group, a nuclear regime that controls

\textsuperscript{461} Elizabeth Roche, “Why an NSG membership is important to India” \textit{Livemint}, June 8, 2016.
import and export of nuclear materials. But New Delhi’s entry into the NSG remains a deadlock. The support of the US and its other allies (France) in promoting Indian interest and ultimate inclusion in the Wassenaar membership cannot be underestimated. The Vienna based group though established on 12 July 1996, in Wassenaar, the Netherlands recently agreed to grant India its membership. “Wassenaar Arrangement participating states reviewed the progress of a number of current membership applications and agreed at the plenary meeting to admit India which will become the Arrangement’s 42nd participating state as soon as the necessary procedural arrangements for joining the WA are completed.”\textsuperscript{464} For Indian policymakers, the ascension of New Delhi into the elite nuclear group add to India regional and global profile and at the same time increases the possibility of India becoming a member of NSG, though India remains a non-NPT signatory. It is obvious that such inclusion and exception of India verifies the Indian exceptionalism. With its inclusion and integration into the WA group, New Delhi joins the league of countries that control the nuclear export regimes. Wassenaar membership equally grants India membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and it is true for the ET that has signalled that India could soon enter the arrangement.\textsuperscript{465}

All of these are the various data’s and lists of times India did not comply with the rules of nuclear materials etc. which makes them excellent points which Pakistan and China can raise in order to stop India attaining the membership of NSG. Raising such issues at the particular nuclear forums will also make Pakistan seem like a state which is more acceptable as it is keen on the non-proliferation.

\textbf{6.3 Countering US influence in South Asia}

As the quarter of the 21\textsuperscript{st}-century rolls in, the world has witnessed multiple events and nuances in global politics. Pakistan’s policymakers cannot pretend not to understand these dynamics; most especially when its traditional ally (US) is equally refining its strategic interest the world over. The type of Cold War foreign policy is seemingly not tenable any

\textsuperscript{464} Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Significance of Wassenaar Arrangement for India” \textit{The Economic Times}, December 9, 2017.
\textsuperscript{465} Ibid.
longer, even though lesson can be learnt from it, but to adamantly clinch to such would produce little or no expected result amidst a rapidly changing global politics.

It is important to argue now, the fact the US-Pakistan relations are not glowing and friendly. History of US interaction with South Asia suggested oscillating relations, hence the possibility that in the future US will draw back to Pakistan is not implausible. Another important factor that deserves the attention of Pakistan’s foreign policymakers is to formulate a more proactive, pragmatic, and non-defensive foreign policy. Apparently, Pakistan is yoked in fearful temperament given the circumstance that precipitated its creation. Survival instinct has long shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy and that somewhat explains why Islamabad will be ready to be an ally and align its interest with country duly deem to be capable enough to fulfil and complement Pakistan survival. Hence, this is the reason why Pakistan’s foreign policy has for long remains defensive.

To counter the US and by extension, India influence in South Asia such defensive and cowed foreign policy must be overhauled. Pakistan is potentially a strong nation and has been on the frontline in global politics. It is endowed with abundant natural and human resources, a nuclear power, a formidable military institution of world-class, a striving democracy, an established and industrious diaspora, a military force that immensely contributes to global peace missions, home to IT genius, a lucrative and sophisticated military industry. Pakistan cannot afford to isolate itself from regional and global politics, hence the imperative reason for result-oriented bilateralism and multilateralism.

A cemented Pakistan-China relation is viable enough to water down US influence in the region. In the post-World War era, the relationship between the two countries started on a track that has now become one of the most celebrated friendships between nations. The Sino-Pakistan relations have been a generous partnership, so much more for China’s economic and strategic aid and Beijing’s keen interest in Pakistan’s territorial and geographical integrity. China stood beside Pakistan firmly during the Osama drama played
by the US officials and supported Islamabad’s territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{466} During that episode, the US officials tried to represent Pakistan as a nation harbouring a terrorist, an effort geared at defamation of Pakistan. However, the Chinese displayed an excellent diplomatic behaviour by emphasising that the incident does not have any importance in the international domain and instead of playing the blame and labelling game, Islamabad should be rather supported for all brunt of extremism it has experienced. According to Shi Zangshan, the Chinese had taken a diplomatic course of action and do not consider the US action as a victory. Shi Zangshan, iterated: “China’s reaction was just a diplomatic stand. The response time and the language used all showed that the Chinese communist regime is not happy about it. At least, the authorities don’t want Chinese people to feel happy about America’s victory.”\textsuperscript{467} The firm support of China against any attempt to label Pakistan a terrorist-sponsoring state is undoubtedly noteworthy. Be it at the UNSC or BRICS, China has rejected Washington and New Delhi’s effort to paint Pakistan infamously, especially as a state sponsoring or harbouring terrorists.

Deductively, Pakistan should learn to utilize its relations with China in the best of its interests, given China’s sway over the US. Washington has come to the realisation that China is an important global player and its strategic interest with Pakistan is something delicate. While it is not easy to downgrade the diplomatic influence, it is also not easy to undermine Pakistan, particularly when it intersects with Beijing’s interest. Pakistan should also capitalise on the Sino-Pakistan relations for improving the level of national interests. The state of Pakistan should not be afraid of Chinese friendship because it will bring no harm. China’s foreign policy is harmonious, and the two nations have intersecting and compatible national interest. It is most unlikely that China, the world largest global exporter and second largest global importer (world’s second largest market)\textsuperscript{468} would interfere with the domestic politics of Pakistan let alone that of the surrounding neighbours. The Chinese

\textsuperscript{466} Saibal Dasgupta, “China backs Pakistan Government after Osama bin Laden's death” \textit{The Times of India}, May 3, 2011.
\textsuperscript{467} Li Jing and Li Jia, “China’s Reaction to Bin Laden’s Death Muted” \textit{The Epoch Times}, May 5, 2011.
\textsuperscript{468} “The End of China’s Dengist Diplomacy” \textit{Stratfor}, October 17, 2017.
leadership has remained loyal to the Dengist diplomacy of a harmonious world and non-interference.\footnote{Yongnian Zheng and Sow Keat Tok, “Harmonious Society and Harmonious World: China’s Policy Discourse under Hu Jintao” \textit{China Policy Institute}, Briefing Series-Issue 26, University of Nottingham, 2007):2.}

The economic market of China is so huge and progressive that Pakistani economy can only benefit from it. According to analysts, the energy crises in Pakistan can be resolved easily either through the construction of nuclear power plants or other means of generating energy. China has been forthcoming in assisting Pakistan in its energy issue. A blossoming bilateral cooperation between China and Pakistan would reduce Pakistan much dependency on the US.

In addition to bilateral cooperation, Pakistan ought to promote a serious multilateral venture and ties amongst the regional players, namely China, Russia, Iran and Turkey, even Afghanistan and India in the long run. Regional tension, conflict, and war have historically underpinned the relevance of Washington in South Asia. A peaceful and stable South Asia, punctuated by the balance of power will facilitate harmonious climate than chaos. Through multilateral cooperation, a balance of power and cooperation can be ensured within the South Asia and the larger West Asia. The likes of SCO and ECO are important to counterbalancing institutions against US influence in the region. Pakistan does not hold observer status in the two institutions, but happens to be a permanent member, though recently joined the SCO voting power along with the cooperation of China and Russia can limit Washington influence. India alone cannot gang up against other regional players. It is always in India’s national interest to showcase itself as a responsible neighbour and a nation sociable in accordance with the regional or institutional norms. India cannot stand-alone while other players of the multilateral institution say otherwise. It will amount to isolation. India’s membership of these institutions requires a sense of responsibility, yet an entanglement. New Delhi cannot afford to jeopardise its national interest when it collides or not aligned with that of the US. Multilateral engagement can make New Delhi opt for a cause which might not necessarily reckon with Washington (particularly when the latter expects New Delhi to fall in line, given the Indo-US cooperation) hence the isolation of US.
Pakistan should facilitate China and Russia’s membership in the ECO, doing that will allay the notion that the organisation is based on mainly Muslim countries. The membership of China and Russia would add more diplomatic and political influence to the organisation and accord Pakistan the respect it deserves. Invariably the calibre of countries in that organisation will also dispel the notion that Pakistan is isolated internationally. For Washington, the ECO membership of Beijing and Moscow will compound the existing concern over BRICS and SCO.

For Pakistan, multilateral cooperation is an imminent and exigent necessity. The pressure of India at the regional level and that of US on the international level puts Islamabad on its toes. Multilateral cooperation of Pakistan-China-Russia will bring prosperity to Pakistan, help to dampen the pressure and subsequently mitigate against Washington overbearing disposition towards Islamabad. The sign is well written on the wall, and Islamabad needs no procrastination to cement the bourgeon relations. China’s commitment towards Pakistan is glaringly established, Beijing was one of the countries that hurriedly rejected US insinuation of Pakistan over support of terrorism. China's top diplomat Yang Jiechi mentioned before the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson "we must value Pakistan's important role on the Afghanistan issue, and respect Pakistan's sovereignty and reasonable security concerns." In the same token, Russia's envoy to Afghanistan Zamir avers that pressuring and insulting Pakistan “may seriously destabilize the region-wide security situation and result in negative consequences for Afghanistan," adding that Russia viewed Pakistan as “a key regional player to negotiate with.”

In the event of a larger multilateral organisation consisting of China-Russia-Pakistan-Iran-Turkey, collective solidarity will be the tool to match external intimidation or harassment. For instance, China and Russia have thrown their support behind Pakistan following Trump’s tweets. The similar gesture can also be extended to Tehran (by China-Russia-Pakistan-Turkey if all are bounded within a multilateral forum) in the face of Washington confrontational policy towards certain nations (Muslim state exclusively). The Iranian

470 Carlos Ballesteros, “Pakistan Wants to Buy Military Supplies from Russia and China After US. Funding Freeze” Newsweek, January 28, 2018.
471 Ibid.
nuclear deal is top on Washington’s radar through the rest of the deal makers have rejected Washington’s unwarranted reservations about Iran’s compliance to the terms of the deal, Iran needs regional support from states like Pakistan and Turkey. Like Iran, Pakistan’s nuclear programme is being lashed; there has been a varied degree of a sentimental statement from Washington towards its nuclear programme, while India and Israel (clandestine) programmes are accorded exceptional and preferential treatment. In such circumstance, be it Iran or Pakistan, a multilateral voice is undoubtedly required. Besides, the recent nuclear programme talk in Turkey could in future raise a question mark. Hence, the cooperation of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan would imperative over the nuclear issue.

The proximity of Iran is so important, and Pakistan cannot deny Tehran that traditional neighbour-ness. Given the anti-Iran and anti-Pakistan, rhetoric currently bustling in Washington alongside a growing bond of Washington-Israel and India. It is Pakistan-Iran-China collective national interest to work together against outsider and promotion harmonious resolution of regional issues, most particularly in Afghanistan. Pakistan should take Iran into confidence on Afghanistan. All three (Pakistan-Iran-China) are intimate neighbours, sharing a common strategic interest. Peace in Afghanistan is not just for Afghanistan, it will reduce the uncalled for and ballistic harassment from Washington towards Pakistan. Peace in Afghanistan means neither India nor Washington would have a cogent strategic interest there. Whether or not, Pakistan is a friend of Saudi Arabia, Iran will always remain a proximal neighbour, whose concerns cannot be downplayed. While there is a secret dealing between Israel and Saudi Arabia, nothing should stop Pakistan from friending Iran. Meanwhile, India-Israel partnership is on the horizon. Pakistan must extend its tentacles of engagement beyond the ill fear of sectarian polarity; it is overdue for Islamabad to diversify its bond with nations around the world. If the Saudis can extend friendship to Moscow, even though Riyadh-Washington recently celebrated a new dawn of friendship and crowned with multimillion-dollar military cooperation. Pakistan must not be intimidated from operating a multilateral foreign policy. Therefore, now Pakistan foreign relations require a comprehensive and multilateral cooperation, which will include Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and the CARS. Pakistan should lead the effort for the creation of such
comprehensive and larger multilateral group. Such multilateral voice is needed to weigh down US domineering influence in the region.

6.4 Supporting Regional Organizations: SAARC and SCO

Pakistan must come clean from being labelled as supporting terrorism, working with regional countries through improvement in economic and strategic (military) cooperation. Pakistan should start being supportive of other interest, then being centric; Islamabad policymakers should include addressing an issue affecting the lives of countries in the region as part of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Much of Indian-centric policy should be reduced and Pakistan should make attempt to de-hyphenate itself from the shadow of India. Legitimacy comes through many ways, Pakistan can legitimise its position in the region, earn herself respect only when Islamabad becomes responsible monetarily through aid and another measure potential to command respect. CPEC is one way of drawing the attention of regional countries towards Pakistan, therefore domestic politics should rather be united to ensuring that CPEC is all ramifications becomes a glaring manifest reality. When such is achieved, Pakistan can easily sell CPEC to other without much ado. Through CPEC, Pakistan should be able to promote its national interest yet promoting regional economic cooperation with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Economic cooperation is an important tool for regional socialisation, to understand Pakistan’s trade potential with the SAARC members, Kaur and Nanda posited that though “Pakistan's exports to SAARC countries converged towards the estimated export potential. ….among the SAARC countries but Pakistan's net export potential exists for Bhutan, India, Maldives and Nepal. Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal are not only far away from Pakistan but they do not have any common borders with Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan needs a facility for transit trade with Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan, through India to realize its export potential.”472 Although while being the commerce minister, Dastgir holds that Islamabad

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has augmented its trade with the SAARC region,\textsuperscript{473} though other statistic shows there has been nosedive trade cooperation between Islamabad and its neighbours in SAARC.\textsuperscript{474}

Pakistan is at the top among the nations in peacekeeping missions. It has participated in many peacekeeping efforts in Africa and around the world. Same effort and integrity should be replicated in South Asia and Southeast Asia. The fact that NATO was the creation of military imperative, to shield and militarily challenge Soviet Russia during the Cold War, after the Cold War, NATO had to redefine its mission and objectives. Same should be true for Pakistan. Pakistan military should not just focus on peace-making and keeping in Africa or elsewhere, it should be reckonable force in South Asia, should always be there to helping neighbouring states not necessarily during the political crisis, but during a disaster as demonstrated when the earthquake hit Nepal.\textsuperscript{475} The effort of Pakistan was emotional which prompted the Nepalese Army Chief Rana to assert that Kathmandu will remember Pakistan's relief efforts.\textsuperscript{476} Pakistan rich experience since the 1960s in the area of peacekeeping should be promoted in a regional organisation like SAARC and SCO. Instead of allowing India to dictate the rule of the game in SAARC, Pakistan has to make its own niche that no other country can fill. Promoting regional cooperation through help and facilitation can reduce the tendency and frequency of India influencing SAARC member to boycott the organisation’s summit.\textsuperscript{477}

Aside from SAARC, Pakistan should equally exhibit its worth within SCO. Now that Islamabad has gained full membership of the organisation, it is in its best interest to promote the tradition (of peace mission) it is best known for. Within the SCO, peace mission is a biennial event. In 2016, the counter-terrorism exercise involving each SCO member was held in Kyrgyzstan, though in same year Pakistan and Russia held his or her first bilateral military exercise and another in 2017. The next peace mission was held in 2017 in Yekaterinburg and mission next exercise is expected to include Pakistan. “I

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{473}“Pakistan’s trade volume with SAARC countries is $5,630.74m: Dastgir” Pakistan Today, May 13, 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{474} Shah Nawaz Mohal, “Pakistani exports to SAARC countries take a nosedive” Pakistan Today, November 29, 2016.
\item \textsuperscript{475} Irfan Haider, “Pakistan sends relief goods for quake victims in Nepal” Dawn, April 26, 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{476} “Nepal will remember Pakistan’s efforts: Army Chief Gen Rana” Dawn, May 3, 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{477} Jon Boone, “Pakistan humiliated by south Asian countries' boycott of summit” The Guardian, September 28, 2016.
\end{itemize}
understand that the exercise ‘Peace Mission-2018’ is being conducted under the auspices of the SCO, Pakistan attaches importance to SCO events, and we took part in the first round of expert talks related to the exercises, which were held in Yekaterinburg in November 2017. We intend to participate in the exercises this year.”

Beyond strategic cooperation with SCO members, the membership of Pakistan of this organisation opens a window of opportunity to the member state to explore individual markets individually and collectively. Pakistan as a member “offers the SCO enormous opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation and fulfilling the vision of the SCO. …..with its membership, Pakistan’s….CPEC complimented the SCO vision of connectivity and economic integration and Pakistan wanted to see it connected to the six main trade corridors of the SCO as it would help in fulfilling the long-cherished aspiration for land and maritime connectivity between Europe, Central Asia, China and South Asia.”479 The fact that most of the Central Asian Republics are part of the SCO, while China and Russia are important members indicates the high possibility for Pakistan to gain. Regional fraternity in terms of strategic and economic cooperation is bound to deepening and possibility of peace talks and resolution of contentious issues amongst member state.

In summary, the region of South Asia is and will be going through drastic changes especially in terms of alignments. One case at hand is obviously the Indo-US cooperation which is, even if the Indian side does not claim to be one, but an alliance of the contemporary realm. Apart from that, Pakistan has other states available which can give Pakistan buoyancy in terms of economic, trade, security and most of all strategy. Out of this Pakistan can employ its own exceptionalism. Russia, China, CARs and Iran are some of the states which Pakistan can form relations to make alliances with. Together with these alliances Pakistan can not only undercut the Indian interests which are bound to isolating Pakistan but can also enhance its position in the region. Pakistan can, with China and Russia, undermine US’s growing influence in the regional affairs and also the attainment of NSG status to India. With the new alliances, Pakistan can become the front-runner of

strategic regional connectivity. When that occurs, the clout of Pakistan will automatically increase in terms of various regional organizations.

Far more than that, by adopting the aspects of bilateralism and multilateralism in its approach to foreign policy trends, Pakistan can transform into a state which is indeed sought after in good light by other parties. This will be helpful to Pakistan in terms of managing its position in the Afghanistan issue as well. Having other powerful states at its back, Pakistan can actually make sure that the Indian agenda of isolating Pakistan and the US agenda of undercutting Pakistan’s role in the regional crises—is bound to be downplayed. Otherwise not only is India bound to attain NSG but would also gain an upper hand in bilateral issues of Pakistan and India like Kashmir issue etc. Thus in a way it is not just US which will be changing the theme of South Asian regional complexes but also Pakistan which, because of the growing cooperation between India and US, is bound to form its own patterns of alliances which will comply with its greater strategic goals.
CONCLUSION
The level of cooperation between New Delhi and Washington validates and verifies the hypothetical assumption that the Indo-US strategic partnership would adversely affect the regional balance of power. The nuclear deal, nuclear trade, and other forms of military facilitations, trade cooperation between the two states have drastically caused an asymmetric power equation in the region, particularly between New Delhi and Islamabad. Over the years, the US has not concealed the objective of aiding and arming India. By all indications, the actions of Washington under the auspices of the Indo-US partnership justifies the assertion that the partnership was geared at irritating China and by extension Pakistan, a traditional friend.

The Indo-US partnership is glaringly a calculated policy geared to achieve a long-term goal. Checkmating China, which the US considers as “strategic competitor” would obviously require an equipped and powerful India. The strength of China is unmatchable for New Delhi, thus, for India to behave actively and be represented as the US proxy against China, New Delhi deserves to be armed. Doing that was never to pose a challenge to Beijing alone, but was equally meant to widen the gap between Islamabad and New Delhi. Undeniably, a powerful India would be prone to maximizing its regional hegemonic propensity, which in all ramifications would be implicative for Pakistan. Since the Bush Administration has begun arming India, and the Obama Administration to an extent unimaginable accentuated the effort, India has invariably grown more powerful.

Events and reported documents have vividly shown that the Indo-US strategic alliance has not only caused regional strategic imbalance, it has contributed to the deepening of enmity between India and Pakistan, hence the exacerbation of tensions in the region. As part of the positive externality associated with the strategic alliance of India and the US, the former has garnered considerable support from Washington to join the nuclear export regimes. While such treatment is considered in India as a justification of Indian exceptionalism narrative, such support undermines the integrity of Pakistan as a nuclear state. It raised many questions like what special features the Indians are having. Has India been more responsible than Pakistan with its nuclear program? Why Pakistan is not getting similar
support, which has been showered on India, if both countries are non-signatories of the NPT, then what makes India so exceptional. These questions engender tension and animosity. Pakistan is not alone to dismiss the supportive nature of Washington towards championing Indian exceptionalism; Beijing has equally been resentful. While the latter does not support Washington’s tactics and policy to promote instability in the region, Beijing has also been working actively with Pakistan in many areas. The pressure emanating from Indo-US partnership on Pakistan is being dampened by Beijing; the latter has significantly and adamantly rejected any tactics or attempt to isolate Pakistan either at the United Nations or other international forums, where New Delhi had attempted to exercise its diplomatic clout. China has rejected New Delhi’s integration into the NSG and supported Pakistan for a similar waiver as acquired by India. The choice of Beijing to experiment BRI through CPEC and take advantage of Pakistan’s transitory position are all indications of how the cooperation between Islamabad and Beijing have deepened which bolstered closer strategic ties between the two.

In the annals of state relations, states have achieved and fulfilled their national interest through alliances. This is true for all states regardless of whether it is big, medium and small power. Behind India’s national interest lies Indian exceptionalism, the civilizational achievement of India, the historical ties with nations beyond the border of India, the consideration of India as the ‘jewel in the crown of the British Empire.’ Its anti-colonial and imperial struggle, being one of the founding fathers of non-alignment movement, the size and population and its markets, all overwhelm the sensibility of Indian leadership and policymakers as indication of Indian exceptionalism.

One thing is for sure, India would do everything to achieve its national interest. Though the US considers the strategic alliance with India as its strategic policy in the region, in fact, it is being played into the larger game of India. The Indo-US strategic partnership is increasingly becoming a fulfilment of the Indian-centric world order and promotion of Indian exceptionalism. The Modi’s cosmopolitan portrayal of India, his ‘Act East’ and ‘Made in India’ policy, the propensity to resuscitate Nehru Doctrine of Indian-centrism of South Asia are all indicative of a nation that will exploit its alliance to fulfilling its cardinal
national interest. Such disposition has further proven that India is not comfortable to be hyphenated with Islamabad; hence, Modi’s effort of isolation is by extension meant to belittle Pakistan strategically.

The whole narrative of Indian exceptionalism is situational and circumstantial. India is not the first country bracketed as most preferred and worthy of exceptional treatment. Israel, Egypt and even Iran at different points of contemporary history have enjoyed similar preferential treatment; therefore, Indian exceptionalism is bound to eclipse as soon as the strategic interest wane in importance. One thing about exceptionalism is that the supporter of exceptionalism often pretends unaware or less inclined to the shortcomings and iniquities of the supposedly preferred one; though all because of strategic interest.

The role Pakistan playing in Afghanistan has been impaired by the incursion of New Delhi into Afghanistan. Although the peace in Afghanistan is explicitly linked with Pakistan, this is true given the frequency of Kabul’s accusation of Islamabad as abetting terrorist groups hurting Afghanistan. While India is having one of the largest diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, which is supported by Washington, there are concerns about New Delhi’s intentions. The diplomatic clout of India has enlarged so much more than New Delhi could sway countries in the region (to boycott SARRC summit) and Kabul’s reluctance to join CPEC not until Pakistan provides trade access to India.

To an extent, the India-US strategic partnership has caused a strategic imbalance between India and Pakistan and by extension irritated China. Defense and trade deals have provided India with an access to the US markets. India is also getting the innovative technology for developing sophisticated weapons. Over the years, the volume of defense trade between the two has risen and estimated to be more than $15 billion. The strategic partnership allows the US to share technologies with India includes and incorporates New Delhi into wider US strategic and intelligence exchange such as CISMOA, BECA and LSA. These are not mere indications of India’s strategic lift; it also shows that India is enjoying the most significant partnerships of the 21st century. Besides, the strategic partnership is increasingly grabbing the support of the US Congress. This is indicated by the congressional approval of nine
areas of military cooperation between India and US departments of Defense. Although the strategic cooperation is solely between India and the US, yet it is definitely getting the attention of regional players and spectators. Smaller states in the region are bound to perceive the closeness as an indication of New Delhi’s elevated role. Such perception is not limited to South Asia; the fame of India (as a result of the Indo-US strategic partnership) is equally gaining attraction across the Pacific. The military exercise of “Cope India” Malabar is one of the largest military exercises involving the US.

In recent time, Pakistan has encountered multiple pressures, emanating within the region (from India and Afghanistan) and from Washington. The Indo-US cooperation and the badmouthing of Pakistan by India contribute to the tensions between Islamabad and Washington. The relationship of the two is at the record lowest level. Trump Administration through its official strategic document (NSS) and tweets of the President has downplayed any positive vibes with Islamabad in the near future. By giving the tension and the level of distrust, it is near impossibility that the US policy makers would be having any strategic partnership with Pakistan, not to mention the likelihood of status, which India enjoys now. Pakistan would not be able to bargain similar strategic partnership with the US in exchange for the protection of the US interest in the region; events have shown that this is not possible, besides the US is not ready to engage with Pakistan as the bar of distrust has risen considerably.

Prior to the tensions between the US and Pakistan, the writing has been on the wall of a growing Sino-Pakistan cooperation. Be it cooperation in nuclear technology and nuclear plant construction, trade relations and people-to-people cooperation. Pakistan, by virtue of its proximity, historical ties and need for alternate ally forced to strengthen its ties with Beijing. The US presence in the region does not suit China’s interest; therefore, Beijing and Islamabad have shown no consent or complacency to the Indo-US cooperation. Beijing and Islamabad would consider the India-US Strategic partnership as a threat and a strategic ploy by Washington to use New Delhi as a proxy for future and continuous stay in the region. This is clearly depicted by the US promotion of India in Afghanistan and the insinuation that only India can stand up to Chinese alleged hegemony in the region. For Beijing and
Islamabad, the desire for a stronger relationship will be the remedy and answer to the Indo-US cooperation. Meanwhile, the increasing cracks in US-Pakistan relations make the desire feasible and subsequently allows for a deepening and consolidation of Pakistan-China partnership.

For China, an eastward looking foreign policy by Islamabad suits China’s larger strategic interest, yet not perilous for Pakistan. Both Pakistan and China have demonstrated the benefits and ramification of such eastward looking. China has promoted itself as the main supporter of Pakistan on many issues within the international political theatre. China has acted maturely and diplomatically reducing the pressure mounted on Pakistan. Pakistan has reciprocated in all possible ways. The flagship projects of CPEC are test for BRI, the success of that experiment is apparently in the interest of both the states.

All in all, it also shows that the idea of Greater Strategy is something which is not out of the window especially in terms of the US and India cooperation. Though there are a number of facets which are making this cooperation go, they are tied by strategic ones in some way especially the aspects of their relationship which are related to military, defense and nuclear agendas. This is then easily visible to be tied in a loop of strategic and the concept of exceptionalism which both sides have, or claim to have. In a way, the Indo-US cooperation is then the rounded up version of balance of power, idea of national interests, exceptionalism and bilateralism, sovereignty, the idea of developing and reinstating hegemony. These are taken as a construct and when applied then they fit in all aspects but make up a greater strategic aspect for the US and India. For Pakistan this greater strategic element is a lesson with which it can reboot its foreign policy because this meta-structure has a set of implications for Pakistan to be catered for.
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