UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: 2001-2010
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

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To my beloved daughter Sabeeka Fatima

Her adore and love always gives me strength to accomplish
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>CARs</td>
<td>Central Asian Republics</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN-IBN</td>
<td>Cable News Network-Indian Broadcasting Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>COAS</td>
<td>Chief of the Army Staff</td>
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<td>CPEC</td>
<td>China-Pakistan Economic Corridor</td>
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<td>CSLA</td>
<td>Commercial Space Launch Agreement</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>DAE</td>
<td>Department of Atomic Energy</td>
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<td>ESG</td>
<td>Executive Steering Groups</td>
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<td>EUMA</td>
<td>End User Monitoring Agreement</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FMCT</td>
<td>Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IPI</td>
<td>Iran-Pakistan-India</td>
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<td>IUSSTF</td>
<td>Indo-US Science and Technology Forum</td>
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<td>JCERDC</td>
<td>Joint-Clean Energy Research and Development Center</td>
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<td>JWG</td>
<td>Joint Working Group</td>
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<td>KPKP</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Countries</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Multi-national Corporations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authority</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>NDTV</td>
<td>New Delhi Television Limited</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Supplier Group</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>NSSP</td>
<td>Next Steps in Strategic Partnership</td>
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<td>ORF</td>
<td>Observer Research Foundation</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Patriot Advanced Capability</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAPS</td>
<td>Tarapur Atomic Power Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSA</td>
<td>Technology Safeguards Agreement</td>
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<td>U.S</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMDs</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Ms. Salma Amjad has done Masters in Women’s Studies (2005-2007) and Masters in Pakistan Studies (2009-2011) from University of the Punjab, Lahore. She achieved a Degree of M. Phil in Pakistan Studies (2013-2015) from University of the Punjab, Lahore.

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Salma Amjad
1.1: Map of World

The bilateral relations of the United States and India remained significant towards each other from formative phase and progressed in the nuclear age of South Asia. Their bilateral relations initiated with the inception of India as an independent state in 1947, continued by gradual development and certain divergent approaches of their foreign policies did not impair them. India came into existence in the early years of the Cold War period, when the foreign policy goals of the United States were chiefly associated with strategy of containment of communism and the threats stemming from the Soviet Bloc. Under the leadership of Nehru (1947-64), India embraced the policy of neutralism and avoided to join in the Cold War's politics of alliances. The Indian perspective of peaceful coexistence was founded on 'Panchsheel Doctrine' which reinforced its non-aligned status and its foreign policy goals in regional setting which were largely focused to a acquire a leading role in South Asian region. It is imperative to note that despite reciprocated gesticulations for mutual relations, a thriving bilateral relationship was not commenced between United-States and India due to incompatibility of their foreign policy goals. Discrepancy in foreign policy priorities of both countries became the foremost reason of 'estramgement' in the early years, which lasted till the commencement of 1962 Sino-Indian War. It is a matter of fact that U.S never viewed India as a problematic state, however close association of India with the Soviet Union, Indian reluctance to support the American policy of containment of communism and U.S backed military alliances to counter Soviet Influence in the region during the Cold War years were the main reasons of disagreement and lack of mutual concerns between the two states. This Indian policy of non-alignment was not supportive for the U.S security options in Asia; however, Americans did not turn back to India and always considered it as a significant state of South Asia. Thus the relations between the two countries, persistently moved on without facing a severe setback.

China’s growing military power since Sino-Indian War of 1962 was one of the foremost reasons which paved grounds for shared strategic concerns of U.S and India. Subsequently, due to emergent Indian military power and potential nuclear build up in the region led America to view India as a counterbalance to the threats emanating from China’s expanding power in the Asia. Pakistan as the part of South Asian milieu and in the wake of its traditional rivalry with India, repeatedly uttered its apprehensions over the enlargement of the Indian military and nuclear capabilities. These reservations by Pakistan were largely overlooked by the American policy makers while considering it the blame game strategy of two traditional adversaries of South Asia. In the post-cold war setting, the American pronouncement of the New World Order in the 90s provided to search for new power players where India was bracketed as a ‘reliable’ and ‘natural partner’ in U.S strategic scheming. United States seemed to structure an Indian-centric policy that meant to initiate collaboration of both states in Asian Pacific Rim with an aim to counter Chinese power in the area. Thus U.S and India swiftly inclined to establish a tactical partnership in various fields including military and nuclear in particular.

Under the American global strategy of primacy, a policy of rapprochement between the United States and India became a prime strategy during the second term of U.S president Bill Clinton (1996-2001). U.S strategists started viewing India as a ‘natural ally’ and a prospective strategic cooperation between the two countries was envisioned to deal with the competitor China. This was the result of firmly imbedded thinking of American policy makers to consider Asia as a new center of gravity for various reasons. American President George W. Bush (2001-2009) during his two terms accomplished rapprochement in a vigorous manner and later it was expanded to structure a strategic partnership between Washington and the New Delhi. Conversion of these bilateral relations into a strategic partnership between U.S and India was evident under American president Obama (2009-2017 where substantial policy measure were ‘Hinge’ or ‘Rebalancing Asia’ largely establishing United-States-India strategic collaboration as ‘irreversible partnership’.
The American strategic partnership with India is the maneuver of choices, preferences largely associated with their mutual ideological, political, economic, strategic securities and interests. The strategic cooperation is the chief result of India’s evolving multi-dimensional character and U.S perception of its value in support of American global goals. Keeping in view the altered configurations of world politics, U.S-India bilateral relations transformed structurally and stirred the mutual efforts by both states to deal with the shared concerns at the regional and global level. U.S-India partnership is encompassed of all-embracing areas of cooperation, including defense, missile technology, nuclear cooperation, space and trade. Transformation of shared strategic concerns and security interests also led America and India to view enlargement of their cooperation decisive to espouse long-term stability in South Asia and countering the threats of global terrorism.

The essence of U.S-India strategic partnership is encompassing of several dynamics such as alteration in the international system as an outcome of the collapse of USSR, shift of balance of power in Asia Pacific region, rising hegemony of China as a military and economic power which provided to formulate strategic alliances in Indian Ocean to counter the Chinese influence. The other factors strengthening the strategic cooperation are prospects of trade and investment in defense, compulsions of counter terrorism strategies, and threats of militancy. People to people connections between U.S and India are also one of the significant features due to an influential role of Indo-American community as a robust minority in U.S which vigorously brought conjunction of interests and highlighted shared values of both countries.

The strategic cooperation between U.S and India is a new facade of foreign relations. Strategic partnership between these two countries is not just the formal relations comprising the official covenants and accords but it is a progression of granting extensive standing to India to provide her a proactive role as Asian power. Growth of India as an economic hub and a potential military power in a regional context utterly matches to the American global designs and interests. Strategic cooperation is all about enabling not only the Indian state, but also the Indian nation as a whole to capitalize its human resource capacity and potential in its full swing. The strategic dialogues persisted between U.S and India not only expanded the developmental vision of India, but also stimulated the prospect of new strategies consideration for the world security and peace by strategic collaboration of U.S and India. United States-India strategic relationship cannot be realized as mere association in the field of science and technology, but it aims to contrive a strategic plan of refurbishing the role of India as a newfangled driver of economic generation.

In South Asia, regional milieu is mainly characterized by an uneasy relationship between Pakistan and India as both countries are traditional rivals, which is the key reason for undermining political stability in the region. In the initial years of the Cold War, the United States largely played the role of a balancer between these traditional enemies. Under U.S containment strategy against USSR and its emergent coercions, Pakistan was largely seen as a vital ally due to its geo-strategic setting and prospective cooperation in favor of U.S containment goals in Asia and Middle East. Pakistan’s readiness to support containment policies of U.S inevitably brought her reciprocal support and assistance from America, which significantly helped her to manage its security issues and economic shortcomings. U.S tilt towards Pakistan continued as a key reason of Indian reservations regarding U.S-Pakistan relations. Collapse of communism pledged a reassessing of American policies and strategic priorities where India was perceived as a compatible and like-minded partner due to various reasons. India’s geographic position is contiguous to the two problematic regions that are significantly relevant to the American national interests and strategic design. First India has a history of the border conflict with China; on the other hand, U.S also gauges China as a potential threat due to its rising power in military and trade areas which is largely facilitating the enlargement of Chinese influence in manifold regions. China is vigorously influencing the Asian Pacific region, especially South Asia and Central Asian Republics (CARs), which are mainly relevant to the U.S scheme of primacy and its global interests. The challenges triggered by political Islam stemming from Islamic world comprising North Africa, passing through the Middle Easter region, fortifying political troubles and belligerency in South Asia, where Afghanistan and Pakistan have become a cradle to militancy and largely viewed as negative relationship for U.S.
The United States has to have relations with these two states because breaking ties with them would be a catastrophe and can accelerate expansion of Chinese influence and penetration of non-state actors located in Asia. U.S recognizes India as a more appropriate regional power to catch up the Chinese influence, impetus, power and most importantly to deal with Islamic militancy.

The traditional enmity between Pakistan and India is one of the significant features of the South Asian security environment. It is a patent fact that the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and India establishes the major directives of security policies in the region. It is imperative to note that Pakistan and India are key countries of the South Asian region, and progression of military status of one of them by any means can increase the anxiety and insecurity of the other country, largely causing the regional destabilization. The historical record reveals that the security apprehensions of Pakistan mainly revolve around hegemonic postures of India in the region. The U.S-India strategic partnership in the arena of technology initiates the flow of equipment related to high-tech defense to India, which is largely a matter of stern concern for Pakistan. Keeping in view the nature of Pakistan’s foreign policy primarily Indian centric and security obligations arising out of it, U.S-India strategic partnership may compel Pakistan to rely more on China for procurement of advanced weapons technology. Pakistan’s security concerns are mostly associated with its global and regional perspectives where India arises as a traditional regional contender for Pakistan. U.S-India strategic partnership is steadily amplifying problems for Pakistan on a global level due to the prospects of securing the status of a global player by India. U.S and India view Pakistan as a problematic state which serves as a safe haven for various Islamist militants and terrorist groups. Both strategic partners have shared vision, similar concerns and emerging consensus to design security strategies regarding global and regional challenges which certainly distress Pakistan and its regional interests. It is significant to note that American strategic tilt towards India eased the preceding policy of the United States to balance Pakistan and India and substituted it as ‘Rebalancing Asia’. American Policy makers under their strategic calculus started viewing Pakistan and India with the breadth of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ relationship. An analysis of U.S-India strategic partnership cannot be an appropriate analysis without considering the Chinese perceptions of U.S-India strategic alliance which can advance a drift between the United States and China. Chinese apprehensions regarding the potential threats emanated from U.S-Indian multidimensional alliance will drive her to take care of Pakistan as an effective stratagem to counter India and U.S. This emerging strategic reckoning may encourage to form two key blocs led by major powers and their regional bullies. The U.S-India strategic partnership will not only advance numerous repercussions and security apprehension for Pakistan but it will also significantly trouble the security structure and authenticities of South Asian region.

**Review of Literature**

Plenty of literature is available on the United States-India bilateral relations. The American-Indian strategic partnership has become a significant part of academic literature, but much of this literature has been constructed on the bases of U.S dominance in global context. That is apparently not India and Pakistan specific. Most of the literature is a product of American think tanks that projects U.S global agenda and portrays its role as superpower. A similar kind of literature on Indian perceptions and ideas of power are also elaborated mostly in the context of its relations with U.S and specifically from an American standpoint. The U.S-India strategic relations from Pakistan stand views are not extensively discussed and valuable work related to the implications of the U.S-India strategic partnership for Pakistan is missing because most of the literature is produced by western scholars who do not assess this relationship as a source of distressing other regional actors like Pakistan or from a neutral stand view. This indicates a real dearth of academic research. A limited collection of books is available by Indian writers that mostly discuss the historical perspective of bilateral relations, but most of them present one side of the picture. These writings, mostly compromised of articles by various authors are dedicated to explain the transformation of role of India from regional to a significant power at the global level, but the implications for Pakistan in an extensive manner neither discussed nor were relevant questions raised.

United States-India strategic partnership advanced in the year of 2010 through series of strategic dialogues that’s why reliable and authentic research base sources in the form of published
books are not available yet. As a part of literature on U.S-India strategic partnership, most of the articles and reports are either contributed by different think tanks, U.S Council on Foreign Relations, international organizations and scholarly work by academia. Selective review of literature is following:

“American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process” (USA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2003) written by Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, and James M. Scott is an impressive work to understand and to become familiar with new themes, perceptions and strategies of American foreign policy especially in a globalize world. Writers have provided a comprehensive analysis of U.S policy themes concerning different regions of the world. This book is a master piece of literature to understand the basis of U.S foreign policy but the time period covered is before the commencement of U.S India strategic partnership.

Bruce W. Jentleson, “American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century” (New York: W.W Norton & Company Inc., 2007). This book (3rd edition) explains the American national interest in the framework of 4Ps (Power, Peace, Prosperity and Principles). This book provides the detail of transformation of U.S foreign policy with reference to great debates of American’s foreign policy. Post-Cold War geo-politics and globalization agenda of U.S foreign policy comprehensively discussed in this book. This book specifically explains the approach of primacy, and unilaterality through American foreign policy. Jentleson is of view that American power is the ‘defining feature of the world affaires’ and power balancing is one of the tactics to avoid multi-polarity and mainly derived from realist perspective. Bruce argued that approach of primacy by American’s policy makers is applied through deterrence against a rising power is either through alliance or through strategic partnership. This also established that ‘Pivot to Asia,’ means increase in U.S efforts to contain rising China, which needed a strategic partnership with a potential power like India.

“India’s Foreign Relations 1947-2007” (New Delhi: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2011), an extensive study of Indian foreign relations is written by Jayanta Kumar Ray. This book is part of series of South Asian history and culture to develop a detailed study on region and not especially on India. This provides a detail of historical overview of Indian foreign relations with major powers and regional states with analysis of interesting questions of the evolution of Indian foreign policy maker’s approach of looking their interest and goals via speculation of ethics and realism. Each chapter is dedicated to relations with Pakistan and U.S and helpful to narrate the historical evolution of perceptions and threat perceptions from Indian stand view. This book presented more a historical narration of events rather analyzing foundations, issues and substance of foreign policies.

V. N. Khanna “Foreign Policy of India” (New Delhi: VIKAS Publishing House PVT LTD, 2005). This book is another description of Indian foreign policy in general. This book lacks the analytical approach of evaluating Indian foreign policy goals and assumptions; rather it is an attempt of narrating the detail account of the foreign policy of India including its nature, principles, objectives and national interest. The writer also highlights the India’s foreign relations with its neighboring countries and super powers. Only a single chapter is devoted to discuss the U.S-India relations from 1947 till 2003 viewing significant events.

Another significant academic work on Indian foreign policy is written by Dr. Seema Varma, entitled “Foreign Policy of India” (New Delhi: Mohit Publications, 2004) which provides the basis and dimensions of Indian foreign relations. Varma, exclusively covers the various aspects of foreign policy of India that largely built on the national security, keeping in view its internal problems and issues of the country. It not only highlights the India’s relations with super powers (USA and USSR) and other countries like Pakistan, China and Sri Lanka but also elaborated the factors or bases that determined the foreign policy of India towards different countries. It also discusses the role and responses of the Indian Parliament on the foreign policy of the country.
Kamal Mitra Chenoy and Anuradha M. Chenoy, “Indian’s Foreign Policy Shifts and the Calculus of Power” (Economic and Political Weekly 42, No. 35, 2007). The authors of this research paper points out dramatic shift and transformation of approaches of Indian foreign policy which replaced the non-alignment approach and support to multi-polar world by new defense agreement. The authors claim that if India will continue to move this way they will definitely lead to military alignment with the U.S. They extend their claim by saying that this cooperation will restrain Indian foreign policy to promote militarization and greater instability.

Another Valuable work is contributed by renowned scholar Dennis Kux “The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Dennis Kux is a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy and Council on Foreign Relations. He has served as U.S ambassador in Karachi, Pakistan from the period 1957 to 1959, in the meanwhile also visited India. From 1969 to 1971 again he served in Pakistan. Kux extensively enlist the American and Pakistan foreign policy perception which led to shape ups and downs in this citrous relationship. Kux comprehensively explained the nature and dimension of unstable partnership by labeling it as ‘a union of unequal’. Indian factor is also discussed, but this book also does not provide any information on strategic aspects of U.S relations with India and impacts on Pakistan, as it only covered the period from 1947 till 2000.

Another comprehensive academic work produced by Dennis Kux entitled, “India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991” (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993). This book traces the relations between U.S and India on a historical account. Kux finds that the divergence of interests between the two countries curtailed less from lack of dialogue, misperceptions or misapprehension than from basic differences over primary national security policies. He argues that the end of the Cold War brought a positive influence on U.S-Indian bilateral relations as two principal sources of past friction were faded out due to changes in the international environment. End of U.S supply of arms to Pakistan and India’s close ties with the Soviet Union the altered the bilateral relations of U.S-India and offered a new point of departure for both sides.

G. W. Choudhury, “India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent” (New York: Collier Macmilian Publishers, 1975). Choudhury argues that U.S tilted towards India in the decade of the 60s when during the Presidency of Kennedy, arm assistance was provided to India to defend her against China. Latter American support was given by pressurizing Pakistan for not taking action on Kashmir front during the Sino-Indian War. This was the era when policy of arming India was partially incorporated against China. Choudhury also explains that roots of strategic partnership were grounded by Nixon ‘New Asian Policy’ in which he claimed the role of U.S as Asian Pacific power and indicated that the national interest would be achieved through partners. The writer further explains that American perceived new ‘Asian Grouping’ including India, China, Japan and U.S as Four Joint having the capabilities of determining Asian’s future.

Another similar work produced by Timothy George, Robert Litwak and Shahram Chubin entitled “Security in Southern Asia: India and the Great Powers” (The International Institute for Strategic Studies). This book is divided into three parts where third part “Place of India in U.S Policy” by Shahram Chubin covers the nature and dimension of U.S-India relationship but the strategic notion is not discussed. As this is more an analysis of perceptions and counter perceptions of different state actors in the Asian game plan. Chubin argued that Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan disputes have driven the politics of Sub-Continent and on other hand, U.S policy considerations have been manifested by the Sino-Soviet rivalry and East-West rivalry. The great power approach made Indian complains relevantly less important to the definition of American interests. In a strategic context, India is seen obstructionist and irrelevant. The writer further explicated that relation between the two countries, though never characterized by warmth in the estrangement phase but have not always been stressed. It was the War of 1962 on Sino-Indian border where U.S interests convergence were more visible and policy to contain USSR has been reinstated by apprehensions over the obvious perception of a looming threat from communist China.
Shirin R Tahir-Kheli, "India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking with the Past" (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1998). This book also presented the picture of triangular study about U.S and two South Asian rival countries, India and Pakistan. It unfolds the relationship chemistry among Washington, Islamabad and New Delhi focusing on two decades of 80s and 90s. This book traces the key issues in South Asia such as nuclear weapons proliferation, Kashmir issue and problematic Afghanistan. This book highlights systematically the interplay between Delhi, Islamabad and Washington and identifies their tumultuous relations. Writer eludes that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made containment of communism a principle objective of U.S foreign policy, which needed to focus on maintaining effective relations with China, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Pakistan was also seen as an important ally and this initiated the U.S policy of balancing India and Pakistan. End of Cold War brought a shift in the American approach to look South Asian region. In the changed scenario, India was seen as an asset of economic generation rather a state capable of bilateral relationship.

Council on Foreign Relations shaped a valuable work under the title “The United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Inc., 2011). Council on Foreign Relations published this joint group study in 2001 with the collaboration of ASPEN Institute India. This report highlighted the strategic convictions, which manifested, that a powerful and influential India is supportive to U.S national interests and Indian relations with U.S matches with her agenda to upgrade her from regional to global level. This research favors the notion that this relationship will manifest a favorable balance of power in Asia and global level. This research identifies the main feature of the relationship, but still it lacks the account of the concerns and perception of other South Asian countries like China and Pakistan. Moreover, it does not provide its consequences for politics of South Asian that is already characterized by traditional rivalries of India and Pakistan.

“American Strategic Opportunity with India: The New US-India Partnership” (New York: CFR, 2007) is a significant contribution by Nicholas Burns, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Nicholas himself is a supporter and initiator of strategic dialogue between U.S and India. He clearly reveals that when it comes to the future role of U.S in the world, the rise of India is a positive opportunity to enhance U.S global interests. He is of the view that in an increasingly independent globalized world, it is needed for Washington to collaborate with like minded allies as threats are of multidimensional, so cooperation and relationship must be based on a strategy. As a part of the strategic cooperation regime, this effort by Nicolas is more about marketing the U.S-India strategic partnership rather encompassing the nature, dimension and prospects of relationship. He neither discussed Pakistan’s role, nor touched the concerns of most allied ally of U.S.

Another relevant work comes under the title of “United States-India: Partnership of Democracies for the 21st Century” (PISM, 2010) by Patryk Kugiel. This research paper is published by PISM research paper retrieved at www.ceeol.com. It is a historical, cross section and by-issues study, which categorizes the basic determinants and the future prospects. This is a detailed study of ‘estrangement to engagement’. The writer argues that it was the event of Kargil War when changes in U.S perception about India were prominently observed. This abbreviated India insecurity about U.S engagements in the region and started assuming that this would not be contradictive to Indian interests. Kugiel expounds that end of Cold War paved grounds for new

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2 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. This Joint Study Group, cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and Aspen Institute India, was convened to assess issues of current and critical importance to the U.S-India relationship and to provide policy makers in both countries with concrete judgments and recommendations.
international system where policy makers gradually saw India as growing power and strategic partner. This paper also manifests that containing China is one of the significant common interests and increase in India power was seen as compatible with U.S interests. A significant research paper is produced by S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly entitled “The Transformation of U.S-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for Future” (Asian Survey 47, No. 4, University of California Press, July/August 2007). Writers comprehensively explained the role of domestic, structural and individual leadership dynamics, which initiated the conversation, and transformation of relations. Writers only focused on factors of enhancing the strategic partnership, but a detail of strategic partnership itself is not discussed.

Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari, “India-United States Strategic Partnership: Implication for Pakistan” (Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences: Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan 2011) maintained that this strategic relationship will put Pakistan with less secure position and it would offset the balance of power in the region. Bukhari explicates that it’s not just the matter of security and defense for Pakistan, but the political and economic relations would be deeply affected if India gets a permanent seat in United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Unfavorable changes provoked by this strategic partnership would lead Pakistan towards other states, especially China for rescuing herself for the damages caused by U.S-Indo partnership.

Muhammad Ishaque Fanni, in “The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan” (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, 2009) comes up with a valuable argument on strategic partnership between India and U.S, and its ramification for Pakistan. He explains that the evolution of this strategic partnership was based on U.S assumptions of viewing Pakistan in the term of negative relationship where Pakistan emerged as an obligation rather an option; Whereas India was seen under the spectrum of positive relationship.

In another research paper written by Ahmad Ejaz, entitled “United States-India Relations: An Expending Strategic Partnership”, provides U.S-India strategic partnership deteriorated Pakistan relations with U.S and it is destabilizing the strategic balance of Asia. This relationship not only destroyed the strength and credibility of the non-proliferation regime, but also pave ground for discrimination between the nuclear weapons states.

Hafeez Malik a renowned Pakistani scholar and expert on South Asian politics in his research paper “U.S. Architectural Design for South Asia” manifested, that due to trade relations and economic interests, the U.S policy towards China can be explained as ‘soft containment’ which needed a strategic partner like India having potential to compete Chinese development in multi-dimensional manner. Hafeez Malik’s work is more concentrated on China as a dynamic of South Asian security and U.S-India strategic partnership has not been discussed.

Sylvia Mishra, a research fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF, 2015) has provided ample knowledge on “India and the US: New Directions in Defense Partnership”. This paper expounds the challenges and limitations of this dynamic cooperation. Author claims that US-India defense cooperation is not only driven by the imperatives of trade, but profoundly it is the result of geopolitical and geostrategic orientation of both countries.

Two significant and authentic books are also devoted to explicate the nature and growth of strategic partnership between U.S and India. “Global Security Watch-India” (California: Praeger, 2012) by Amit Gupta is a comprehensive research work illustrating the Indian foreign policy considerations in the age of globalization and with special reference to its partnership with the United States. He described the U.S-India diaspora and its outcomes on their foreign policies in an ample way. The writer also analyzed this relationship as a major influence on power politics of Indo-Pacific region.
Another relevant work is contributed by B. M. Jain as “India-US Relations in the age of Uncertainty: An uneasy courtship” (Routledge: London, 2016), under the border theme of re-thinking Asia and international relations, this book comprehensively depicts the history of a complex interdependence to the current challenges, opportunities and future prospects of this thriving relationship between the two countries.

Another important and relevant book “China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation: Indian Perspectives” edited by Swaran Singh (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007). This book is a detailed analysis of Indian perspectives on multiple themes and dimensions of China-Pakistan Strategic Relations. This research is written from the Indian stand view and illustrates the Indian perceptions of threat from a potential China-Pakistan strategic partnership. This volume contends the various myths of India forcefully debates on China—Pakistan ties.

It has been argued earlier that plenty of academic literature is available on U.S-India relations. Though most of it either lacks the detail of strategic partnership or deprived of extensive and critical approach to view the transformation of U.S–India relations and its implications for Pakistan.

The underlying study is an endeavor to provide a detail and critical analysis of changing pattern and transformation of U.S-India relations. Moreover, it also offers to provide the detail on the development of this strategic partnership. Furthermore, this research also explains that how and in what way this U.S-India strategic partnership can alter the South Asia scenario by not addressing the Pakistan’s apprehensive largely emergent of this strategic equate of U.S and India.

**Research Questions**

1. How and in what ways, the changed pattern of world politics in Post-Cold War compelled United States and India to revise their policies?
2. What are the major factors, which remodelled United States-India bilateral relations into strategic partnership?
3. In what context this strategic partnership would be helpful to achieve United States interests in South Asia?
4. How this strategic partnership will fetch modifications in South Asian politics in general and for Pakistan in particular?
5. What sort of implications, Pakistan will have to face as a result of U.S-India relations leading to a strategic partnership?

**Hypothesis**

The U.S-India strategic partnership could upsurge the asymmetry in the balance of power between Pakistan and India as traditional rivals in South Asia, which might escalate the resentment between the aggressive neighbors. Implications emerging out United States-India strategic partnership for Pakistan can further destabilize the region and graft Pakistan toward China as a countering strategy.

**Objectives of the Study**

- To investigate the transformation of bilateral relations to strategic partnership between the United States and India
- To highlight nature, dynamics and theme of United States-India strategic partnership
- To find out the factors which enhanced strategic partnership between the United States and India
- Aims to uncover the major developments and convergence of interests between the United States and India
- To unveil how United States-India strategic partnership is adversely distressing Pakistan and intensifying problems in its relationship with United State and India.
- To disclose the United States-India strategic collaboration in the field of civil nuclear and ramifications for Pakistan
Research Methodology

This research work is materialized while using the primary as well as secondary sources. It is based on authentic documents related to U.S-India relations. These documents also included official data released by Indian and U.S governments. Books, newspapers, journals, articles and periodicals published by U.S, India, China and Pakistan are consulted. Qualitative research techniques are used to accomplish this challenging task that is primarily based on historical, descriptive and analytical approach. As a part of qualitative research, this research attempted to probe deeply into the research setting to acquire in depth understanding about U.S-India strategic relations and its link with Pakistan’s emergent problems. Collected data from different sources is summarized, described and analyzed by applying above mentioned research techniques. This research is an analysis and interpretation of comprehensive narrative and non-numerical data to gain an insight of this particular area of foreign relations of U.S, India and Pakistan.

Significance of the Study

The process of globalization has altered the dimension of international politics. Economic globalization and cooperation has transformed the notions and spirit of foreign relations. South Asia being a significant region has a substantial role in international politics. India-Pakistan traditional rivalry in a nuclear age with the prospects of giant economic China, unstable and political troubled Afghanistan has made this region a matter of great interest for academic writings. U.S being a major world power has its principal interests in South Asia and transformation of relationship with India is result of shift of policy priorities mainly stem from change of power order after the collapse of communism. China and Pakistan are also keenly watching and observing this new strategic alliance of U.S and India and much is still under the carpet from their side. Initiation of a strategic partnership between America and India not only affected the South Asian balance of power, but also provoking China and Pakistan to finalize the strategies to respond and alter the undesirable change in the power structure of South Asia. This study identified the determinants and dynamics of developing and nurturing partnership of U.S and India. This study also classified ways and means of transformation of foreign policy perceptions in accordance with their national interest. This study covered the impacts and consequences of strategic partnership at global level in general and South Asian politics in particular. This research also attempted to calculate responses from China and Pakistan and their counter strategies to deal with assumed danger and insecurities. This study not only described the nature of strategic partnership, but also expounded the expected changes and future prospects. Ramifications for Pakistan are also listed. This study aimed to serve as a valuable contribution to provide a comprehensive study on triangular relationship.
UNITED-STATES-INDIA BILATERAL RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

"The Past is Prologue"

The U.S-India bilateral relations in historical context can be analysed under the two border periods of the Cold War and Post-Cold War. U.S-India relations can be classified further, according to the key policy shifts, foremost political, economic and military progressions between the two states. The bilateral relations of United and India in Cold War years can be divided into five phases according to the nature and advancement of their relationship.

Partition of Sub-continent gave birth to an independent Indian state in the early years of the Cold War, where international politics was largely characterized by bipolar competition and antagonism between U.S and Soviet Union and this provided limited conjunction of Indian goals and interests with American strategic priorities. The Indian foreign approach of non-alignment and neutrality provided a lack of mutual agreement on strategic interests which led both countries to live in the period of estrangement which continued almost for the five decades of foreign relations with slight alterations and revisions. In the Cold War era, United States-India bilateral relations were mostly characterized by discrepancies and lack of concurrence of interests especially regarding Asian affairs. Furthermore, America’s foreign policy approach towards Pakistan and U.S diplomatic stand over the Kashmir dispute during the estrangement period significantly continued as an irritant element for India with modified intensity for its foreign policy approach towards the United States. The estrangement was further increased between U.S and India when nuclear test of 1974 was conducted by India, which made nuclear non-proliferation as another significant issue of conflict and incongruity among the two largest democracies of the world. During the estrangement period, India largely focused on its non-alignment policy and U.S prime goal of foreign policy was containment of communism.

S. Chubin states that "US relations with India have never been of sustained or overriding importance to the US in the post War era. They have in practice been the subject of sporadic and derivative interest, the sum of tactical expedients rather than overall design" (as cited in Bradnock, 1990, p. 98). Choudhury (1975) elaborates by saying that in Post-World War (II) period, U.S was engrossed by immediate problems in Europe due to fear of communist expansion and that’s why its relation in South Asia remained limited to showing only goodwill gestures and issuing diplomatic statements to welcoming the new born states of the region. Prospects of economic assistance were probed but military and political connections were out of American foreign policy considerations (p. 74).

1.1 American Perception of Power and Security after World War II

“Other nations have interests. The United States has responsibilities.”
(Dean Rusk Former Secretary of State 1967)

The United States espoused the policy of isolation for a long time in international affairs as they apprehended by the perception that involvement in world matters would bring conflicts and threats of intervention of the imperial powers of that time to the American periphery. The collapse of major powers as a result of World War II due to overspending and ‘economic depression’ changed the power structure of international politics that provided enough space for U.S to extend its penetration beyond the Latin American region. The end of colonialism and imperial hold over the different parts of the world gave birth to new true states which were economically and politically not fully prepared for running their political and economic affairs independently. This led to develop
new complex political and economic systems prone to decline which needed financial assistance and support from other countries. Bloc and alliance politics of the Cold War was characterized by a consistent competition between two major powers (U.S and USSR) for bringing these newly independent states under the domain of influence and access to their unexplored recourses to feed the Defence and security needs of these major players of bi-polar World Order. The significant feature of Cold War politics was a clash of economic ideologies which pertained posture of non-existent to the other side. Liberal internationalism became a defining feature of western bloc and expansion of communism was perceived as a direct threat to capitalism.

The isolation legacy was pushed asides as policy makers in U.S enthusiastically developed thrust for shaping the world according to the American preferences. In 1947, Truman (1945-53) through his doctrine took this task as a missionary zeal and stated, “The free people of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedom ... if we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the welfare the peace of the world and we surely endanger the welfare of our nation.” Later policy proclamations prescribed U.S missionary role and it was asserted by a policy of containment of communism. Principal architect of containment strategy was George F. Kennan, who served as American ambassador in the USSR and wrote articles famously known as ‘X Articles’ to initiate containment of communism. U.S President John F Kennedy (1961-63) in 1962 justified U.S policy of containment by saying that “For our nation is commissioned by history to be either an observer of freedom’s failure or the cause of its success” (Peters & Woolley, n.d.).

The similar expression was reverberated by American president Ronald Regan (1981-89) nearly two decades later that lastly, disclosed U.S policy and determination of ascendency and this was envisioned by leading the world under ‘New World Order.’ The U.S approach of primacy was apparent by Reagan while declaring that “We in this country, in this generation, are-by destiny rather than choice--the watchmen on the walls of world freedom” (Wittkopf, Kegley, & Scott, 2003, p. 37). Global activism arose as one of the leading policy of U.S to secure the goal of ‘policing the world.’ American global initiatives comprised of sponsorship and support to United Nations (UN), development of regional institutions and organisations, expansion and advancement of foreign trade, foreign aid programs and networks of global regional security and military alliances. These policy designs were intended to foster unchallenged U.S influences and access economic markets in various parts of the world (Peters & Woolley, n.d.).

1.2 Nehru’s Influence on Indian Foreign Policy

Jawaharlal Nehru as Indian prime minister played the role of a visionary leader and worked hard in developing unanimity among the political leadership of the country regarding foreign policy stratagems. His approach was largely beyond and above the respective political associations which left less room for severe disagreements over the foundation and fundamentals of the foreign policy approach of India, which were mainly laid down as non-alignment, Panchaheel, peaceful co-existence, peace, and anti-colonialism. V.N Khanna (2005) applauded Nehru while stating that “An outstanding contribution of Nehru was the shaping of a foreign policy, above party consideration which has grown into the national policy” (p. 25). Indian foreign policy intents determined under Nehru premiership generally remained unchanged in later years.

India is positioned at the crossroads of South East Asia, Middle East and neighboring communist China. Nehru’s vision of peaceful co-existence leading to acquire an influential role in South Asia kept India away from the politics of alliances. Under the perception and visualization of Nehru, Indian role was expected to be a potential leader of all neutral states. Nehru’s exertions to form the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 was another endeavor to incorporate the Indian goals. Even before coming into power as Prime Minister of India, Nehru viewed the politics of alliances as the main source of instigating two World Wars (Rana, 2000, p.32). Indian National Congress took up the Indian position of keeping it away from any imperialist or any other military conflict as. Since 1920, the fundamental foreign policy principles were anticipated by Indian National Congress, which largely intended to keep Sub-continent away from any military and territorial conflicts between the imperialist powers. Indian policy of non-alignment was a result of its historical learning as a colonial territory which led its diplomatic positioning away from Cold War.
compulsions and the politics of alliances and counter alliances. In later decades, propensity of non-alignment continued as an official approach of Indian foreign policy.

In Cold War settings, India aimed to develop an independent foreign policy and amiable relationship with communist and capitalist blocs, however Indian political leadership was clear in their diplomatic expressions for not becoming part of alliance politics. Nehru manifested clearly to keep India away from bloc politics while he stated, “We shall make history of our choice. We propose, as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to the World Wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale” (Khanna, 2005, p. 43). He added that non-alignment is an approach of neutralism where India would act independently and come to a decision on each international issue based on its case to case policy analyse. However, it is important to note that Indian proponents of non-alignment did not provide an ample definition Furthermore, they also lacked the logical parameters to enunciate the phenomena. Neutrality was pronounced as a fundamental principle of Indian diplomacy, but it also aimed to increase the Indian role as a significant player in regional and international milieu. Nehru determinedly expressed the advancement of “world peace and enlargement of human freedom” as vital values of foreign policy. Along with his reiteration to the non-alignment, Nehru expressively itemised Indian stance by saying that “We are neither blind to reality nor do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge to man’s freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral” (Choudhury, p. 77). Nehru was a firm supporter of liberal democracy, however he did not support the formation of military alliances to limit the communist influences. He was also inspired by democratic socialism, but the idea of developing a monolithic communist state was never appreciated by Nehru as he measured Marxist pattern as an out-dated idea. (p. 77)

Three cogs of national interests in Indian foreign policy were wholly comprehended under the leadership of Nehru. First, it was guided by India’s internal and external security concerns, which laid down the foundation of taking short term and long-term security measures. Secondly Nehru manifested the Indian approach of assuring security through its intimate relationship with economic development. Nehru and his descendants focused on rapid economic development under the cover of non-alignment policy. India was kept away from power politics by her political leadership, but aid and assistance were appreciated without giving strings to others. Thirdly, Nehru sought Indian security depending on international peace based on multi-polar world order (Khanna, 2005, p. 17).

Apart from Nehru’s outstanding role to frame a clear foreign policy approach for India, he along with his close political associates especially V. K. Krishna Menon was criticized internationally and nationally for shortage of rational approach to the world view of India. Nehru’s perceptions which were believed to be largely idealistic were viewed as anti-American stances. Although India’s marketing for non-alignment and repugnance for Western colonialism received much appreciation from developing states, however Indian political leadership of that time did not resist the notion of communist imperialism and evaded to condemn USSR hegemony and its colonial rule over states of East European. It is imperative to note that the focus of Nehru’s criticism on imperialist designs under his non-alignment ideals was more towards Western Europe. India goals of foreign policy were largely driven by stimulus of acquiring a leadership role of NAM which led her almost an estranged position with West. Jayanta Kumar Ray, (2011) a renowned scholar on Indian foreign policy has provided an account of estrangement while stating that “Nehru developed the habit of exhibited high-mindedness, and pouring advice on great powers, especially Britain and the United States.” Ray criticized further by stating that during the first visit to U.S in 1949 as a prime minister, Nehru was more vocal and apprehensive about power politics and he paid less attention to the progression of Indian interests “which was neither ethical and nor realistic approach” (p.580). U.S Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1969) explicated Nehru’s advisory and directing approach in following words “Nehru had kept the talk on the failing of the Dutch and the French. I wanted as innocently as possible, to get him to talk about his own... When, finally, I urged Pandit Nehru to help me by a frank discussion of a practicable solution of the trouble over Kashmir, I got a curious combination of a public speech and flashes of anger and deep dislike of his opponents.....” (p. 334).
It had been pointed out by many commentators that under the spell of non-alignment and an idealistic conception of world peace, India formulated a "word play and papering cracks" who did not endure fruitful results all the time (Ray, 2011, p. 589). Kux (1993) has quoted Acheson’s experience of hard dealing and negotiation with Menon while providing that “he was a master of putting words together so that they conveyed no ideas at all” (p. 76).

1.3 Era of Estrangement and Cold War Compulsions

British Prime minister, Winston Churchill once remarked that “Americans always do the right thing after they have tried everything else.” In spite of American determinations to promote democracy, earnest U.S-India bilateral relations were not maintained. In Cold War era, nature of U.S-India bilateral relations made Dennis Kux (1993), an international renowned author remarkably coined both states as “Estranged Democracies” (p. 76). In the terms of American vigorous foreign policy compulsions in a Cold War setting, South Asia was seen as a peripheral region. Though in initial years, India could not become the part of United States Cold War stratagem, but America always regarded it a significant state of South Asia, thus America never ignored it. In spite of Indian willingness to advance mutual relations with the United States, it was largely less unsuccessful to accomplish the reciprocal association towards America due to Indian inclination towards communist Soviet Union. This is imperative to note that U.S and Indian policies towards each other were largely the hostage of Cold War compulsions; the estrangement years between the both states were generally characterized by resentment and more often indifference.

There are two key factors which led to outline the United States-India bilateral relations. First was that how both countries viewed Asian and World affairs and secondly the extent of economic interests. At the time of inception of India as an independent state, the United States was determined to exercise all probable measures and strategies to counter communism as America’s prime security interests. The American strategy of containment was largely continued for 44 years where U.S perception of Strategic association and alliance was mainly related to secure support and alignment from other states against the threats emanating from perceived communist expansion. It is a matter of fact that India in particular Asian states in general were neither appreciated nor convinced by the United States idea of containing communism by every means to promote liberal democratic order and safeguard International peace. The non-aligned stand view of India along with other regional realities, including her inclination towards Soviet Union troubled U.S and India relations by diminishing the prospects of cordiality and consensus to incorporate a collaborative stance over certain foreign policy issues. It is also apparent from the historical facts that Indian non-alignment, stance largely developed incompatibilities with U.S perception of dividing the world into capitalist and communist blocs lacking co-existence and primarily leading to an inevitable conflict with each other. During the presidency of Eisenhower, U.S Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles explicated India as “incompatible with friendship with U.S” (Mansingh, 2006, p. 1).

1.3.1 The first phase, 1947-1951: The spell of neutrality

International developments in Post-World War II redirected American foreign policy by discarding the isolation paradigm and mainly focused on her ‘Internationalism’ approach to counter the expansionist designs of the USSR. There were vigorous American foreign policy measures to fix the communist problem which included the incorporation of Truman Doctrine, the economic recovery program devised by Marshall Plan for certain states, forming a Western Europe alliance as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Program Four. These diplomatic strategies and measurers were series of American efforts to confront the threat originating from ideological and territorial aggressive expressions of the Soviet Union. Despite an emergent shared vision of democracy and liberal order with U.S, India not at all considered communism as a leading threat thus Indian distress and apprehensions were more concerned with colonialism and neo-imperialism as crucial issues. Nehru’s efforts to maintain good bilateral relations with both super powers, which made U.S policy makers to believe that India was least committed and supportive to the American determination to promote ‘free world’ and that needed to counter aggressive communist ideology. Despite all these issues and disagreements to deal with communism and the Soviet Union between America and India, a short span of warmth was observed between the two states after Nehru’s
address at Indo-American Conference and later during his visit to the United States in 1949. Though Nehru repetitively asserted on non-alignment not only as a major approach of Indian foreign policy, but also envisioned this as a resolution to challenges of bloc politics. Nehru also acknowledged the need to have mutual bilateral relations with the United States and pronounced that “However the voice of India and U.S appear to differ, there is much common between them” (Bukhari, 2011). The American policy of containment in the Asian region was the result of U.S fears of Soviet potential expansionism in Asia as it was successfully accomplished in Eastern Europe where a large number of states came under the communist influences. In U.S perceptions, threats stemming from Soviet expansion were coupled with the rise of China as a communist state which rigorously disturbed the security scheme of South Asia region which put interests of Western bloc at stake. In the backdrop of these regional and international developments and increasing rift between the capitalist and communist blocs, Indian inclination towards the Soviet Union was not at all supportive for American policy managers to view bilateral relations with India as significant at the expense of their containment strategy.

Furthermore Nehru drifted more from United States largely on Asian affairs as India was not on an ease with America policy towards Kashmir dispute which was suspected as pro-Pakistan by Indian policy makers. This lack of trust between U.S and India in initial years was mainly grounded in American support to the idea of UN supervised plebiscite in Kashmir in 1948. On the other hand, India tried to materialize efforts to declare Pakistan as an aggressor in UN Security Council (UNSC) for its alleged part in provoking “tribal invasion” in Kashmir. United States bilateral relations with India were stressed by U.S efforts of initiating negotiations between Pakistan and India to reduce the chances of escalation of conflict over Kashmir (Kux, 2002, p. 2). The mistrust was further augmented between U.S and India when the United Kingdom (UK) and the American press criticized the imposed annexation of a princely state, Hyderabad by India through resort to arms. This made an Indian inclination towards Soviet Union an obvious strategy as USSR largely remained neutral on both Hyderabad and Kashmir issue. In the early phase of the United States-India bilateral relations, a short span of cordiality had been also observed between America and India during the Korean War (1950-1953) when India was convinced to brand North Korea as an aggressor at the UN but this cordiality was not continued as an Indian was not ready to pronounce China as an aggressor which was her immediate neighbor. Additionally India also rebuffed to send troops to the UN contingent. Furthermore, in the course of her anti-colonial stance, diplomatic recognition in favor of China was also plead by India at UN. India made an analogous assumption during the Korean War and Japanese peace treaty when America anticipated to brand China as an aggressor. Indian policy was evidently indifferent from an American standpoint during the crisis of Suez and Hungry. It was due to the reason that in spite of an uttered commitment for anti-colonialism and non-alignment, India did not denounce the Soviet policy of crushing the Hungarian revolt but on the other hand sternly opposed France, Great Britain and Israel for invasion of Suez (Choudhury, 1975, p. 76).

Korean War episode and its subsequent outcomes turned U.S uncertainties into worst realities and this led American policy makers to clearly differentiate between the communists and non-communist states where later were expected to provide support to the containment strategy of the United States. The enthusiasm for fighting against communism was even evident in the domestic politics of America where ‘McCarthyism’ was vigorously thrived which made it politically hazardous for the political leadership to advocate China’s recognition and such efforts were branded as pro-communist and anti-Americanism (Ray, 2011, p. 586). The former foreign secretary of India, Subimal Dutt explained the effects of Korean War and respective policies of U.S and India on their bilateral relation in following manner “on the whole, however, the Korean War left a legacy of misunderstanding on both sides” (p. 589).

It is a matter of facts that despite their disagreement on certain issues, America and India did not confront fundamental differences as both states had shared factors and areas of consensus ranging from the promotion of democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech and preservation of world peace. Apart from diplomatic and political differences between U.S and India, economic collaboration between the two states was commenced during the Dulles period. Though to
conserve its standing as a non-aligned state, India remained away from American defense schemes which were SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). However America provided an economic assistance program to India largely to help her to become a strong case of successful liberal democracy to diminish communist tendencies of economy in the Middle East and Asian region. Despite all issues related to power politics, economic assistance continued as a high priority and this was due to the fact that in American perceptions, skirmishes between the communist directives and liberal democratic order was overwhelmingly reliant on Indian accomplishment of espousing free enterprise. The emergence of China as a communist state in 1949 and the subsequent domino effect on the Indo-China region, causing loss of further states at the communist hands left no choice for U.S policy makers, other than economic backing of India. This economic aid to India was apart from America’s widespread humanitarian activities and echoed the U.S perception of viewing the ideological tussle between communism and liberal democracy deeply dependent upon the Indian absorption of the liberal paradigm pronouncing capitalist economy rather totalitarian approaches. This led U.S policy makers to rescue India in the terms of economic aid which was indispensable to American containment strategy.

In 1950, the first American tide of technical assistance was initiated to India, however this economic assistance wasn’t advanced up to arms and military assistance due to the Indian repudiation to support U.S strategic interests which were chiefly linked with containment policy. However, the Indian indifference of policies was mainly ignored by U.S. despite its frequent disagreement with American policies as it did not materialize as a direct military threat to its United States strategic goals. In 1959, American Ambassador Chester Bowles (1951-1953) played a significant role to ease the bilateral relations between two countries which arose from the Indian stand during the Korean War and refused to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty, nevertheless an economic assistance agreement was signed between the two countries (Choudhury, 1975, pp. 73-78).

Pakistan became strategically an appropriate ally for U.S due to its support to the American policy of containment. Some of the observers of U.S-Indian relations often identified Indian policy of supporting China during the Korean War as illusion of idealism that incited American antagonism where propping up Pakistan became an operative strategy as a counter balancing approach to teach a hard lesson to India (Ray, 2011, p. 590). Since its inception, Pakistan was engrossed by regional problems and apparently less interested into East-West conflict. Regardless of advocating anti-colonialism, Pakistan was neither fascinated by Asian lead nor concerned with the idea of Asian Grouping, as knowing that it would occupy by Indian dominance in any case. Pakistan’s foreign policy of initial years was characterized by countering Indian aggression and threats to its existence. The foreign policy of Pakistan in early years was highly Indian-centric and justified its leaning towards West on the basis of its ideological orientations contrasting the communist ideology. This ideological preference was disclosed by a prominent Bengali leader Fazlur Rahman that “Pakistan can never go communist” (Choudhury, 1975, p. 78). Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to U.S in 1950 though, did not bring immediate and spectacular outcomes as neither Pakistan was assured of arms shipments nor foreign investments were offered by U.S but this helped America to understand Pakistan expectations and commitments in comparison with India.

Kux expounded the India-centric approach as a conspicuous drive of Pakistan foreign policy towards U.S. in following words “Relations with India overshadowed everything else. Pakistan’s traumatic birth would have made the India-Pakistan relationship difficult and complex under the best of circumstances." Indian hostility and aggression was the prime reason which made Pakistan foreign policy orientation completely different from India. Dennis Kux also identified the determinations of Pakistan’s pro-western orientations by noting that the financial vulnerability of the country which made seeking help from U.S as an irresistible option. Other than Persistent Indian threat, Pakistan also faced insecurity on its North West boarders as tensions with Afghanistan were enflamed by pronouncing their claim and call for Pushtunistan by questioning the validity of the Durand line. These geostrategic realities did not allow Pakistan to search other than security and defense and it was incorporated by foraging friendship with U.S.
1.3.2 The second phase, 1952-1959: Constraints of containment

Although, U.S as part of enhancing its containment strategy indicated to shape closer links with Pakistan during the Truman administration but it was under the Eisenhower presidency, which brought these two countries on the track of military and defense cooperation. Various developments in South East Asia and Middle Eastern region served as prime cause to intensify the strategic importance of Pakistan, though the reason behind Pakistan’s decisions for joining Western bloc were built on diversion grounds from U.S. This ‘Marriage of Convenience’ was facilitated by Pakistan’s active participation in the San Francisco conference and diplomatic favorable impressions to U.S on Korean War which were not at all opposing to American policies. These foreign policy gestures by Pakistan were entirely different from Indian ambitions of regional leadership and independent foreign policy which might appeared contradictive to U.S approach of lining against socialist order. Choudhury (1975) identified that though defense scheme for the Middle Eastern region was not finally concluded, but the inclusion of Pakistan was definite till the end of 1952. This not only ended the Pakistan’s policy of keeping it away from the East-West conflict, but also brought a slight decline into U.S approach of viewing Asia as a peripheral region (p. 80).

India was apprehensive over the U.S. supply of arms and assistance under the containment strategy and Indian concerns were variously expressed. U.S ambassador to India, Chester Bowles recorded Indian reservations on supply of arms equipment to key ally Pakistan as:

The Indian Government pointed out that military equipment that we were giving to Pakistan had no relevance to our alleged military objectives. If the Pakistan army were actually designed to become part of a U.S-sponsored defense system to discourage a Soviet or Chinese military movement through the Himalayas or the Hindu Kush Mountains, it would be seeking equipment appropriate for fighting in the mountains area. However, the equipment we supplied to Pakistan—tanks, motorized artillery and the like—was suitable for use only on a relative flat terrain, in other words, on the plains of North India. - - - - the Pakistan Government had itself made clear that it had no quarrel with either the USSR or China and privately admitted that its military build-up was in fact, directed against India. (Ray, 2011, p. 591)

Choudhury (1975) elucidated further that since 1947 U.S-India relations passed through the periods of warmth as well as coldness and delusion due to their perception of power, peace and prosperity related to a number of issues at International and regional level. He is of the view that during the period of 1953-1954 when relations between the two countries were most agonized of that time, Indian reservations and concerns regarding provisions of American arms and ammunition to Pakistan were variously expressed on forums of foreign policy communications between USA and India. India expressed that this not only threaten the security, but it would jeopardize Indian notion of establishing “as an area of peace in Asia” (p. 91). George Allen (1953-1954), American ambassador to New Delhi while briefing U.S Senate foreign relations Committee revealed that despite the fact that India was also a recipient of U.S economic aid but its objection over military aid to Pakistan was less about finances but more of its political consequences. He articulated Indian stand view by saying that “the most important question that really excites American-Indian relations at the present time is the question of granting military aid to Pakistan” (“Hearings before the U.S Senate,” 1954). The American policy during this era was firmly associated with U.S interest in the Middle East and compulsions of the Cold War. This manifested these two bilateral relationships of U.S with India and Pakistan relative to each other. Just as U.S relations began to cordial with Pakistan, their relations deteriorated with India. This led India to improve its relations with Moscow, which had a distress with U.S and Pakistan for forming an alliance against Communism.

There are many American writers and men of academia who severely criticized the U.S mode of strategic alignment towards South Asia in Cold War period that caused the loss of India
as an important regional player. Robert J. McMahon is one of those writers who contended American strategic ties with Pakistan as a result of emergent communist threats and in the wake of securing the Middle Eastern region from USSR potential penetration. McMahon argued that the U.S-Pakistani alliance, concluded in 1954, was a “monumental strategic blunder” which amplified Indo-Pakistani resentment, destabilized South Asian Region and most decisively led India to pursue closer ties with the USSR.

U.S-India bilateral relations were characterized by major disagreement over the issue of American perception of forming a military alliance against Communism as it was established as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Europe. The U.S Cabinet Officer John Foster Dulles was on urge to form a military grouping in Asia and Middle East which wasn’t encouraged by India for three reasons. First such military arrangement would include Pakistan, which was a traditional rival of India and this might harm Indian national interests. Secondly India did not share the American perception of communism as a menace to be eradicated. Thirdly joining defense pact or grouping with either of the bloc would undermine the essence of Indian acclaimed neutrality, a core principal of Indian foreign policy and a valid justification to lead Asia. Unlike the Indian cold response to U.S security strategies, Dulles found Pakistan enthusiastic about the alliance by promptly retorting collective security arrangements. This led Dulles to call Pakistan as a “dependable bulwark against communism” (Choudhury, 1975, p. 83). Though good will gestures were not the only reason to conclude Dulles to consider Pakistan an important regional player to fix menace of expanding Communism, but it was due to his comprehension of geostrategic certainties of Pakistan adjoining to the Regions of American interests.

Nehru was as an idealist and his doctrine of defense was more about cooperation and friendship rather compulsions and obligations. On the other side, Dulles was keener to assure security through alliances. Moreover, from U.S perspective, non-alignment policy of India was not a problem as they themselves exercised this policy for more than one century. U.S disagreement was over the practice of this policy by India that was not truly translated into neutrality. Despite its support to non-aligned movement, India developed close and cordial relations with the USSR, which was the leader of the communist bloc and arose as a main source for the supply of military equipment to India. Furthermore, India was also unattractive economically due to its persistent underdevelopment. Other than strategic problems, economic shortcomings of India restricted its military strength for which it paid a heavy price in later decade during the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Despite the enthusiasm, security pacts sponsored by U.S did not bring a convergence of fundamental interests with Pakistan and this relationship remained complicated and predominantly a circuitous one. U.S and Pakistan relations were hostage of divergent stand views forming the problematic nature of their alliance. The sole purpose of letting Pakistan into American alliance was no other than U.S global approach of Containment. Pakistan’s alignment was surely based on its India centric policy and expectations from alliance were also stemmed from its perception of immediate defense and security against India.

On the other side, apart from disagreement on certain issues with India, Dulles and Eisenhower did not underestimate India power in the region and security alliance with Pakistan did not sternly strained U.S-India relations, however disagreements persisted. Eisenhower indicated that U.S would be careful about providing aid to Pakistan as realizing that this move might upset India in an adversarial manner. India was one of the principal factors which made U.S administration to give a second thought for aiding Pakistan. This was the reason that much awaited arm supply to Pakistan was finally announced in 1954 (Choudhury, 1975, p. 86). Eisenhower administration also made reasonable efforts to address Indian apprehensions. An unusual gesture was made by President Eisenhower by writing Nehru to offer military aid if needed. It was U.S attempt of not taking the risk of discontinuing economic aid to India as it might slip this neutral state into Communist orbit. This was the significant reason that despite being lowest at political relations, $84 million were provided in category of economic aid to India (p. 92). U.S soften policy towards India not only made the Indian attempts successful by repelling American pressure to join the alliance, but also helped to manage with its economic shortcomings.
During the mid-fifties, India was on track to improve its relations with U.S as perception of Indian foreign policy circles to view America as hostile to Indian interests was somewhat on decline. This led Pakistan to allege its Western allies for not taking account of its difficulties. Pakistan was not at all in comfort zone as neither U.S policy over Kashmir was in its favor nor America provided any guarantee to aid Pakistan against aggression other than any communist country as a part of U.S security architect in Asia. As a hostage of relative association, strains were bred in U.S-Pakistan relations, whereas U.S-India relations experienced signs of advances. These developments were further aided by Nehru’s visit to U.S in late 1956 where Eisenhower made auspicious impressions on him. Personal cordiality between the two leaders was soon visible into state relations as U.S rescued India in its financial crisis of 1957-58 by signing an agreement to provide large scale food sales. The transformation of Baghdad Pact to CENTO in 1959 also provided a certain commitment of an appropriate action in an event of aggression against Pakistan, if requested and this led India to express its concerns which were largely addressed by U.S assurance that “Eisenhower Doctrine” is only concerned with the aggression from Communist states. It was further confirmed to India through the American Ambassador Allen that “no military aid except under the previous commitments aid would be given to Pakistan” (Choudhury, 1975, pp.94-95).

In 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first American president to visit India and this managed to take bilateral relations forward. While addressing the joint session of the Indian parliament, American president affirmed that “Above all, our basic goals are the same” (p. 95). Eisenhower guaranteed India about the U.S support to the South Asian countries against the threat of Chinese aggression as Indian relations with China were worsening due to border clashes in the Himalayan region. This comprehended India about advancing its relations with the U.S.

1.3.3 The third phase, 1960-1968: U.S tilt towards neutral India

After experiencing a good turn in U.S-India relations in the last two years of the Eisenhower presidency, the fruits of development were more visible under U.S President J.F Kennedy. The Dulles notion of India’s neutralism as “immoral” was outdated. Kennedy (1960) previously as U.S senator was a staunch supporter of improving relations with India. He often showed his concern and reservations about losing India at the expense of weak and unstable Pakistan. In 1959, Kennedy as a Senator strongly stressed the importance of India by saying that “We want India, to be free and thriving leader of a free and thriving Asia” (Kennedy, 1960). Later, Kennedy as an American President with his foreign policy team famously known as “Harvard Intellectuals”, including Chester Bowles, W. W. Rastow, Prof. J. K Gal Barth, Averell Harriman and many others strongly advocated an inclination towards India. However, there were other factors which also formed suitable environment for the nourishment of U.S-India relations. Kennedy was in favor of economic alliances rather military alignments. His vision was more of ‘new alliance for progresses for eradication of poverty and the promotion of economic development. However, this improvement of the relationship was little affected by a temporary setback by U.S criticism of Indian resorting to arms on the Goa issue in late 1961. This led to an upsurge of anti-American sentiments in India and Nehru envied it by calling “Colonialism in itself permanent aggression” (Choudhury, 1975, p. 107).

U.S-India bilateral relations also experienced another short span of warmth and cordiality during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 to counter the rise of China. U.S branded China’s act as a “blatant Chinese communist aggression against India” and aided the country with armaments, ammunition, and diplomatic support. U.S approach of guarding India by different means other than direct involvement against potential China was the part of its larger containment strategy and less relevant to Indian regional apprehensions. Advances were observed into U.S-India relations in the early years of the decade of 60s for two significant reasons. First was U.S perception of viewing India a strategic player to counter and blocking the Chines growing influence as the Indo-China region was rapidly turning on the track of socialist ideology. Secondly, personal inclination of American President John F. Kennedy was visibly towards India rather Pakistan.
Kennedy eminently said that Chinese Communists have been moving ahead the last 10 years. India has been making some progress, but if India does not succeed with her 450 million people, if she can't make freedom work, then people around the world are going to determine, particularly in the underdeveloped world, that the only way they can develop their resources is through the Communist system. ("India-United States Relations," para, 10-11)

In the formative phase of U.S-Indo Bilateral relation, China was considered as a key reason for developing a sense of cooperation among U.S and India. Sino-Indian war of 1962 stirred the non-alignment stance of India and this led Nehru to look towards U.S for urgent rescue. U.S provided diplomatic, political and international support as a part of its policy for the containment of communism. An American decision to send arms to India to provide assistance in war was popularly admired in India. Moreover, huge quantity of aid was surged by U.S to India throughout the decade of the 60s. U.S eagerness to help India against Chinese aggression through every possible mean was evident from Kennedy's letter to Ayub Khan. Kennedy while explaining the rationale of giving Arms assistance to India, affirmed support to Pakistan and also asked Pakistani president to provide a gesture of assurance to India for not taking any action on Kashmir front. This request was not answered by providing guarantee by Pakistan; however “Ayub indicated that Pakistan would not exaggerate Indian problems” (Choudhury, 1975, p. 110). Later this policy of Ayub was severely criticized at home, especially by his foreign minister, Z.A Bhutto for not availing a tremendous opportunity of liberating Kashmir. U.S policy of arming India brought several problems for its relations with Pakistan. Various attempts were made to reduce tensions by providing reassurance of American assistance in case of an Indian aggression, however term ‘aggression’ remained in ambiguity and confusion. Choudhury explained that “Pakistan’s growing dissatisfaction with the West led it to shift from a policy of alliance to a policy of bilateralism” (p. 114).

The American flow of economic assistance to India seemed irritant for Pakistan by perceiving a minor variance between the military assistance obtained by her and an economic assistance to its traditional rival. It is imperative to note that flow of American economic aid made India capable of investing her resources for buying weapons that was utterly objected by Pakistan. Pakistan’s reservations were repetitively uttered by its President Ayub Khan during his visit to the United States in 1961. Nevertheless Ayub Khan’s charisma provided a good impression on U.S president Kennedy, but Americans seemed less interested to address Pakistan’s anxieties. Later America’s “special representative on International Affairs” Hennery Kissinger during his visit to India explicated unfriendly and harsh comments regarding Pakistan, which provided that U.S acted less respectful to its major ally in the South Asian region. Whereas responding to a question, Kissinger openly called the preceding defense pacts with Pakistan a “disease called PACTITIS” and additional disrespected Pakistan by stating that “If Pakistan were stupid enough to enter into an alliance with China, how long could she survive without a strong independent India”? (Choudhury, 1975, p. 107)

The end of the Kennedy presidency as a result of his assassination slightly altered the course of American perspective towards India, however U.S policy of backing India against China was sustained under American president Johnson. The successful nuclear test by China in 1964 strengthened U.S and Indian apprehensions regarding unrestricted and enlarged Chinese power. U.S Defense Secretary McNamara pronounced in 1965 about American priority of empowering India relevant to U.S goals and stated “it is in our interest to assist them” (Choudhury, 1975, p. 116). Presence of seventh fleet by U.S in Indian Ocean in favor of India and Pakistan's foreign minister Z. A. Bhutto’s blunt response from Pakistan mirrored the varying configurations of alignment and non-alignment. Furthermore, American discontent with Pakistan’s policy to get close to China was conveyed by George Ball and Dean Rusk. Diplomatic pressures on Pakistan were amplified by delaying aid to her. In response to American policy, Ayub khan (1967) expounded that “We want friends, not masters” (Khan, 1967). Dutt (1985) provided that “the conflict with China introduced the new elements in U.S-India relations.” He expanded by saying that the American transformation of foreign policy perception towards India was an outcome of Chinese aggression
in waging Sino-Indian war in 1962 (p. 53). Despite positive strategic notions towards each other, there were various inferences which troubled the United States-India cooperation. Most significant was lack of enormous American assistance either to back Indian economy or building strong Indian military, which made Indian political leadership realistically aware of the obligations of abandoning its non-alignment policy. Other related dynamics were restlessness caused by Pakistan-American relations and India’s leaning towards Soviet Union due to the valuable assistance from her which even did not entail India to line up against America in favor of USSR.

Prospects of policy of Détente between U.S. and USSR, split in communist power, emanating from the Sino-Soviet ideological disagreements and most importantly Sino-Indian border dispute and clashes increased the very possibilities of enlarging cooperation with India to counter China. Process of Détente developed the convergence of interests among U.S and USSR for containing China and India’s role was crucially required for the task. Though, American policy towards India under the Johnson presidency was not much cordial, apart from its support against China. Postponement of the visits of the respective leaders of India and Pakistan to U.S.A and later Indian criticism over American policy towards Vietnam brought unpleasant gestures. Johnson was of the view that “if India and Pakistan expected U.S aid, they should appreciate, if not support, U.S policy.” Johnson adopted a policy of bulling both Pakistan and India to line up other recipients of aid; however this technique did not work as Pakistan inclined more towards China and India drifted away (Choudhury, 1975, p. 119).

The persistent hostility between Pakistan and India caused an international armed conflict on September 5, 1965. Apart from the realities about putting responsibilities of waging war on either India or Pakistan, this led to anguish American relations with both countries. United States had conserved neutrality and supposedly rebuffed Ayub’s request for involvement and also warned China to avoid an intervention in Indo-Pakistan war, however this did not gratify India (Dutt, 1985, p. 53). India stressed that Pakistan attained the potential and strength to challenge Indian regional power due to American military aid. This Indian concern about arming Pakistan was repetitively voiced. Jayanta Kumar Ray explicated that India was not ready to consider the American justification of losing all control over the use of weapons once they were in Pakistani hands. Indian frustration was variously conveyed to U.S Ambassador Bowles (1963-1969) by claiming that “every Indian casualty had been caused by an American bullet, an American shell or an American grenade” (Ray, 2011, p. 606). This made United States-India relations again a mere hostage of the relativity of their relationship with Pakistan. The warmth and goodwill which were produced under American president Kennedy as a result of American response in favor of India and to condemn Chinese hostility in 1962 expeditiously vanished in the late 60s.

During Johnson Presidency, America lowered its profile in South Asia and its hopes to line up India against potential China was lessened; as well as cordiality with Pakistan was diminished. Johnson wanted to make it clear to India and Pakistan that whether military or economic category, extensive aid was given to both states for purposes other than waging war with each other using American resources and weaponry (Choudhury, 1975, p. 127). Politics in Sub-continent again emerged as a “Zero Sum Game” and despite U.S policy of balancing the two traditional rivals, neither was on good terms with U.S with their own set of apprehensions. As a result of growing disappointment from alignment, Pakistan started a process of disengagement rather officially breaking away from defense pacts. American policy during the 1965 War towards sub-continent gave birth to Pakistan’s anxieties of not getting due share of military and diplomatic support from U.S.A as part of its alliance and this appointment led her to surrender to the Soviet influence in the region by participating a peace conference in Tashkent in 1966 to settle the territorial issues with India which originated from the war of 1965. Ray (2011) is of the view that it was U.S deep involvement in the Vietnam War, which might have initiated a reconsideration of its policy towards South Asia (p. 607). Kux (1993) also explicated the same logic while stating that “the United States supported this move—a startling reversal of policy after a decade of trying to limit Moscow’s role in South Asia” (p. 238).
Despite Indian apprehensions over U.S military aid to Pakistan, its role in Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and India’s criticism over American policy towards Vietnam, relations between U.S and India were further improved for two specific reasons. First was its shocking memories of humiliation at Chinese hands and another was the economic crisis, which made India inevitably dependent on U.S. Advances into U.S-India relations were further aided by Indian Prime Minister Indra Ghandhi’s visit to U.S on March 28, 1966. Indra very wisely and delicately manifested Indian claim as a significant regional power and a potential International player to be catered essentially as part of the welfare of the world democratic order. She clearly pronounced the multilateralism approach while stating that “We no longer live in a bipolar world.” She straight forwardly went further by presenting India a significant contestant of Asian power and alternative to China’s economic power while addressing the press club in the USA (Dutt, 1985, p. 56-59). Notwithstanding the fact that strong warmth was felt during her visit, but she repudiated to the American pressures of providing concessions and making up with Pakistan for the sake of effectively meeting the challenge of communist China. Indira’s visit to U.S was an important step to initiate structural change in India’s policy towards America in particular and accordingly to its regional approach of leading Asia. Dutt (1985) manifested her visit as “most serious, the most extensive and the most determined bid to establish and promote rapport and a close, secure structure of U.S-India relationship” (p. 62).

Bilateral state relations between the two countries sustained and continued by developing several agreements regarding providing loans, food aid, and fertilizers, mineral explorations tailed one another in the coming years. But on diplomatic front both sates experienced another episode of bitterness and disagreement by Indira’s blunt criticism on U.S bombing on Vietnam as a result of pressure of leftist elements in India (Ray, 2011, p. 612).

First bilateral negotiations between U.S and India were held in July 1968 which did not contribute considerable impacts; however, few Indian concerns as part of its reservations about Asian affairs were expressed as over growing U.S-USSR Détente, Sino-U.S relations and China’s sales of weapons to Pakistan. Americanization of Vietnam War made Sub-continent less important to U.S policy makers. Moreover Communist influences and penetration into Southeastern region and Soviet expansion of influence towards Arab areas of the Middle East were source of great concern for the USA. Bradnock (1990) elucidated that “there were only comparatively short periods before 1971 when U.S-India relationship prospered” (p. 98). Dutt (1985) shared the analogous understanding while stating that “whether it was non-alignment, the peace-area approach, the Cold War, the Indian Ocean, question of colonialism, the international and political economic order, and their outlook has been wide apart” (p. 76).

1.3.4 The fourth phase, 1969-1978: U.S Opening toward China and Indian apprehensions
The American foreign policy process involves various individuals and institutions and change of leadership in the White House generally doesn’t incorporate structural alterations into their foreign policy choices as they are manifested by strong political belief, robust debate and a complex process of articulating national interests. Although Richard Nixon’s arrival as U.S president in January 1969 brought subsequent changes into foreign policy choices of U.S. However Nixon’s previous experience as a former vice president with India and Pakistan before coming to the White House and a personal tilt towards Pakistan was not the only exclusive factor of shaping policy and there were other international realities and changing regional dynamics of Asian and Middle Eastern politics. Nixon during his visit to India in August 1969 again experienced lack of cordiality from the Indian side and completely contrasting gestures of warmness from Pakistan, though previous ally of America was distressed by its policy of constraining arms supply since 1965. Thomas P. Thornton identified that “the experience rankled in Nixon and probably colored his approach to the Sub-continent” (Ray, 2011, p. 613).

In Asian sphere, Nixon administration under its new thinking of “opening towards China” was more tended to develop bilateral relations with potential power of Asia to take advantages from divisions of the communist bloc. China’s conflict with the USSR over the Marxist interpretation, leadership and several other issues distanced it from the leader of the communist world. U.S viewed China as a significant and potential market as Nixon once stated that we cannot pretend that a nation of millions does not exist. Developing bilateral relationship with communist China was
advantageous for U.S from all sides as it made serous cracks within communist bloc, which later served significantly for the collapse of communism. Economic budding of China was another expedient, which was hard to resist. Even almost a year before his coming into power, Nixon had expressed his preference towards China in an article by stating that “There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation” (Mann, 1994, para, 10). Relations between USSR and China had been waning since the 1950s and during Nixon’s first year as President it had ventured into ideological conflict and border clashes. The President Nixon recognized prospects and began to approach China through secret diplomacy via Pakistan. The Nixon-Kissinger initiative towards China in 1971- 1972 deteriorated the relations with India. Under the administration of President Nixon, the relations inverted U.S tilt towards China and Pakistan and this provided solid grounds to India to perceive that the Nixon administration had been helping India's adversaries by aiding them diplomatically, militarily and economically.

Two factors played an important role for drifting them away, which were the transformation of U.S thinking and India’s fear of potential alliance of China with U.S and Pakistan. Some observers also indicated that it was fear of the possibility of a Soviet-Pakistan alliance that pushed India immediately to refresh its cordial relations to a treaty of friendship with the USSR. It has been noted by a few writers that USSR intended to approach Pakistan for providing military equipment to counter Pakistan’s alignment with China. India-Soviet relations were also nourished up to the military cooperation as a response to U.S-China Detents. The USSR also reinforced relationship with India through supporting it on Kashmir issue by vetoing in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and supply of sophisticated arms on favorable conditions. As a reciprocal act, India diplomatically sympathized with the USSR in a constant way.

U.S administration and foreign policy makers under the Nixon administration were not much inclined to enhance cooperation with India as it seemed irrelevant in US strategic calculations. However, some American diplomats at New Delhi expressed their concerns for lack of strategic association of U.S and India, while concluding that “it was an American engagement in the Vietnam War, which allowed Soviet influences to take over of India by default” (Dutt, 1985, p. 72). One of the main causes of lack of cordiality and warmth between India and U.S was that India prominently tilted toward the USSR, which was further emphasized during India-Pakistan War of 1971. Kux (1993) expounded that India assumed that the Nixon administration was intended to pressurize India during the course of War and they sent an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal to halt India to off their military advantage over Pakistan (p. 307).

These circumstances did not allow U.S to consider India strategically appropriate for its designs in South Asian politics. In previous decades, threats from Communist China had been a key dynamic for convergence of interests between U.S and India, where lining up India against China was largely viewed as an effective strategy to contain communism, which was utterly outdated in the spectrum of Détente under Nixon.

Bradnock (1990) pointed out that since 1971; India appeared prominently as an irritant factor for U.S policy in South Asia. Indira’s continued opposition to American policy towards Vietnam, support to Hanoi (North Vietnam) through posting an ambassador and her repeatedly allegations on U.S for destabilizing her government made it quite difficult for both states to improve their relations with a sense of divergence. Henry Kissinger considered Indo-Soviet treaty as an obvious move away from her non-alignment stand (p. 99). India was vigorously condiment by U.S for its role in the secessionist movement in East Pakistan, which might facilitate to enhance Soviet influence in the region. However, it is important to note that U.S policy of propping up Pakistan as a counter balance force against the regional ascendency of India was slightly on collapse. U.S decision of sending her fleet into the Bay of Bengal turned India towards the USSR to guarantee the support in the case of an American support to Pakistan (p. 100). U.S-India relations fluctuated and remained unpredictable throughout the decade; however, despite these pros and cons of their relationship, India received $75 million from the USA in the form of assistance in 1973.
Since 1971, the chief concern of India was not only the projection of power across the South Asia, but its efforts were fully characterized by defense strategies and attempts to enhance her primary security interests. The triangular relationship grew among U.S., Pakistan and China during 70s which cautioned India. Varying regional certainties, India significantly opted to budge its posture of non-alignment and concluded a ‘Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’ with the USSR in August 1971 which enhanced the commitment from the both sides to provide aid in a case of a perceived military threat (Kapur & Ganguly, 2007, p. 644). The Indian elite generally believed that the USSR was more in a capacity to protect India from regional adversarities. Indira Gandhi very wisely availed the advantages without compromising the stature of non-alignment. Most important fact about this treaty was that India did not pursue for an alliance and it was also not surrendered against the pressures of USSR to join the collective security pacts; though obtained huge qualities of arms and related equipment’s on favorable terms from USSR and also facilitated by successive economic developments offered extensive mutual benefits (Bradnock, 1990, pp. 110-111).

However, military security and diplomatic support remained an important attraction of this treaty. For USSR, India appeared as a stable friend, especially when Communists China was in a process of initiating Détente with U.S.

It was obviously not the non-aligned stance of India, but its close relations with the USSR and its claim about the right to be nuclear power threaten the non-proliferation regime and U.S interest altogether. In May 1974, India’s verdict of testing a nuclear weapon at Pokhran distressed the U.S-India relations. This also added another significant issue of principal disagreement in U.S-India ties other than U.S economic and military support to Pakistan. U.S seemed more interested to apply nonproliferation measures and conditions on India. This made U.S conscious about non-proliferation policy and because of said development, later London Club came into existence to control and limit the technology Assistance Act in 1978 (Bukhari, 2011, p. 5). This also manifested an optimistic thinking among the American foreign policy experts that India possesses the ability to hold up the U.S professed global interests (Gupta, 2005, p. 2).

The departure of Nixon from the presidential seat in August 1974 as a result of Water Gate Scandal slightly declined the notion of viewing India strategically irrelevant. Another determination of improving U.S-India bilateral relation were made by Hennery Kissinger’s visit to India as Secretary of State in October 1974 by acknowledging Indian preeminence in the region. During his visit to India, a U.S-Indo Joint Commission with subgroups was established to initiate cooperation in trade, education, culture, science and technology (Ray, 2011, p. 617). Indira’s declaration of emergency in India in June 1974, India’s unrealistic responses to U.S lifting arms embargo in February, 1975 upon Pakistan (as well as on India) again hampered the process of maturing the bilateral relations of U.S and India.

Ray (2011) precisely explained that the root cause of the problem between the two potential democratic partners by saying that “the disagreement between two sovereign countries was natural, but excessively rancorous reactions to such agreements were neither normal nor desirable” (619). However uncertainties existed and led to the cancellation of visit of American President Ford to India in April 1975 (Bradnock, 1990, p. 101).

U.S-India Relations were enhanced under the stewardship of President Jimmy Carter and Indian Prime Minister Morari Desai (1977-79), as his government was consisted of a coalition of groups called Janata Party (JP) and was less inclined to the USSR. Warren Christopher as U.S Deputy Secretary of state visited India in July 1977 and conveyed Carter administration’s policy of focusing on regionally leading states. The U.S acknowledgement of India as South Asian power was obvious as Christopher did not visit Pakistan as it was practiced by U.S officials in the past. This U.S policy shift was again expressed in 1978 when Carter visited India but not Pakistan. This provided a meaningful assurance to India that U.S would not equate Pakistan with India anymore. However, regarding discouraging an arms race in South Asia, Carter administration practiced “an even handed approach” (Ray, 2011, p. 621). The warmth which was generated by Carter’s state visit to India soon vanished as Carter Administration as a part of American non-proliferation policy banned export of nuclear material to India.
1.3.5 The fifth phase- 1979 -1989: Compulsions of containment: Revisited

The U.S suspended economic and military aid to Pakistan in 1979 as a result of accusations of its secret efforts of acquiring the nuclear capacity which provided a sense of ease to India. This did not last as the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was launched on December 29, 1979 which changed the whole policy paradigm of U.S policy of previous years which was characterized by Detente. Decade of 80s brought the U.S containment policy finally into the South Asia to contest the expansion of the USSR in Afghanistan. It is a matter of fact that the policy of containment of communism was the prime goal of U.S foreign policy and the invasion of Afghanistan by USSR in 1979 turned the worst fears of U.S into reality. Fear of expansion of communist philosophy and American perception of ‘Domino Theory’ shaped U.S Policy of rescuing states who could be directly or indirectly contribute to containment strategy. American concerns were further amplified by perceiving Soviet invasion as a step to extend the communist occupation of the warm waters and the oil rich territory of the Middle East. This left hardly any option for U.S other than designing its policy towards India and Pakistan utterly subordinate to its core objective of countering Soviet expansionist moves. As a part of the containment strategy, Pakistan overnight became strategically relevant and appropriate to act as a front line state against Soviet invasion.

India under the spell of non-alignment, neither was ready to become a part of any bloc nor did it denounce the Soviet invasion. India seemed only interested to get economic and military advantages rather becoming a ground of an indirect war. Under containment compulsions, U.S had to provide considerable military aid to Pakistan, which again gave birth to Indian annoyance, but this time these complains failed to aggregate support in favor of India within American policy circles. Many in Indian government felt a sense of discomfort by USSR presence in Afghanistan not due to fear of its expansionist designs, but panic was aggravated by U.S efforts of rearming India’s traditional rival Pakistan. India first under the premiership of Indira Gandhi and later Rajiv Gandhi continuously pushed U.S government to be acquainted with the threat emanating out of arming Pakistan. Under Reagan Presidency, policies of Carter administration were followed with little alternation. Pakistan under President Zia UL Haq considered Carter’s offered military aid of $400 million just ‘peanuts’ and not justified to reimburse its efforts. Reagan administration firmly believed that U.S interests could be best served by the flow of financial and military support to Pakistan. Many U.S foreign policy experts like Brzezinski, a National Security Advisor during the Carter era suggested the ‘soft underbelly’ of the Soviet Union which included:

- Reinforcement of resilience against the USSR by giving more aid to Pakistan and getting better relations with Iran
- Afghan resistance should be continued and sustained and searching the option to pressurize USSR to reinstate neutrality (Bradnock, 1990, p. 23).

Indira Gandhi, unlike her previous tenure as Prime Minister of India was eager to establish friendly relations with Regan administration. India was not comfortable with U.S policy of arms supply to Pakistan. Moreover U.S disappointment was cultivated by Indian refusal to oppose Soviet intervention in Afghanistan by the mid of 80s. Special envoys were also sent by Indra to U.S to convey Indian reservations over U.S military assistance and arms supply to Pakistan, though India wasn’t succeeded to convince Americans about an adverse outcome of arming Pakistan. Despite the disagreement over the American policy of arming Pakistan, relations between U.S and India got momentum by Indira’s visit to U.S in 1982 and improvement in bilateral relations continued after her assassination in 1984.

Indira’s son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi proclaimed Indian regional hegemony by intervening in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Maldives in 1988 and this attracted U.S support to India as a significant contestant of Asian lead. Rajiv Gandhi paid a visit to U.S in 1985 and honored to address Congress, however Indian closeness with USSR was evident from his priority to visit communist state before visiting U.S (Ray, 2011, pp. 624-625. A short span of cooperation had been observed in U.S-India relations when U.S and India signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in May 1985, for transfer of technology. Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi while addressing to U.S Congress, asserted that “The people of India and America are not allies in
security strategies, but they are friends in larger causes........freedom, justice and peace" (Bradnock, 1990, p. 32). However, process and measures regarding MOU slowly implemented, but it encouraged the trade between the two countries. During Rajiv’s visit, voices were raised among the policy circles of U.S administration for considering India as a focal of long term interests of U.S. Francine Frankle in 1986 illustrated the need to alter the policy in following words “The time has come for Washington to develop a policy that views New Delhi as more than a minor player in the global superpower competition or simply one of dozens of Third World or non-aligned countries” (p. 28). Such policy suggestions were also acknowledged by Stephen Cohen regarding the enhanced role of India, while identifying important U.S interest as;

- Support of South Asian states to counter the Soviet and Chinese threats
- Preservation of common democratic values
- The large scale movement of trained and proficient Indians to U.S
- Smuggling of narcotics of U.S from Pakistan
- Threat of Nuclear proliferation in South Asia

Interestingly a remarkable development of trade and mutual economic cooperation was also persisted between USSR and India from 1975 to 1985. During the decade of 1980s, U.S emerged as the second largest source of investment in India, where collaboration with local companies grew from 2.25 million in 1981 to Rs. 294 million in 1986 (p. 105). An enormous new injection of military and economic assistance was also promised by the USSR during the visit of Gorbachev to India in November 1986 to overcome the possibility of improvement of Sino-Indian relations. India was also felt insecure by Soviet warmth towards China and fears were amplified by Gorbachev, new policy of “International cooperation and peaceful resolution of the conflict” which left less room for India to get Soviet support and military protection in case of a potential threat by China or Pakistan. Soviet message of “Friendship for All” was understood among the Indian policy circles as “a weaker relationship with U.S” (p. 106).

1.4 Era of Engagement: Transformation of Relationship

 Collapse of Communism changed the balance of power of the international System. Disintegration of USSR terminated the bipolar world order and enactment of “One World Order” became the prime policy of the U.S. Notion of policing the world engendered the American interests in different parts of the world. It has been part of American policy debates for many years that whether U.S should directly intervene where its interests are being hurt or should create the regional bully’s to ensure the fulfilment of U.S goal in a particular region.

Era of engagement between U.S and India was the result of circumstances pushing Cold War to an end as all reasons of estrangement were vanished between these two countries. The gradual collapse of communist regimes throughout the world brought a major shift in U.S policies and priorities. U.S at the end of the Cold War was more inclined to find out areas of cooperation. Arena of global village put all countries in concern of economic partnership and search of attractive markets for the consumption of their goods and services as economic efficiency becomes a prime goal and important factor of development of states.

1.4.1 The sixth phase, 1990 – 2000: Decade of cooperation

End of Cold War not only altered the global order, but also induced major shift into policies of U.S and India towards each other. The collapse of the USSR and the threat of potential China made India conscious to redesign her strategic plans and foreign policy calculations. On the other hand, major changes in International power structures also brought significant alteration into strategic thought of America. The demise of communism made Pakistan strategically inappropriate for U.S as communist threats were faded out. These conditions led U.S to eliminate its policy of balancing India and Pakistan. Talbott (2004), U.S Deputy Secretary of State argued that U.S and India in Post-Cold War scenario were guilty of being of best term with each other principal rival (p. 7).
Nuclear tests by India in 1998 alerted U.S policy makers to finally put an end to estrangement period. Era of engagement was initiated by Bill Clinton during his second term of the Presidency and extended up to the strategic cooperation under George W. Bush (Junior). Course of engagement was commenced on common grounds and threats emanated from potential economic and military competitor China and global security concerns. Pakistan also emerged as a problematic state for U.S and India, though the nature of their concerns remained different. Engagement era helped U.S and India to initiate the transformation of bilateral relations into a strategic partnership.

U.S-India bilateral relations with infrequent signs of progress in previous decades were largely characterized by the differences over the nuclear program of India and India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Kapur and Ganguly (2007) assessed the factors engendering the bitterness and low priority concerns to their policy approaches towards each other in following manner “The Indians for their part viewed the U.S as a quasi-colonial power, determined to deny India both its rightful dominate role in South Asia and its status as an important player on the larger global stage” (647). Talbott further explained that U.S nuclear non-proliferation policy made India irritated and Indian official considered as an act of discrimination. Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was observed by India as combination of three Ds of nuclear policy by U.S; Discrimination, Dominance and Double standard (Mansingh, 2006, p. 2).

The demise of the USSR and the end of Cold War developed reflective consequences on Indian security and foreign policy choices. Keeping in view the changed global realities, India shifted its associations and role. After the disintegration of USSR, India was deprived of a major reliable source of military equipment. India was not able to enjoy anymore the status of a major power’s ally to get diplomatic and military protection. Economic assistant was also badly affected as Indian interests and goals required a trading partner to support her economic generation and defense needs to enhance her role of an influential regional player. India also needed a reliable political and diplomatic support against her traditional rival Pakistan and potential threat and competitor China. Barbra Letch claimed that these shifts of policies from Indian side were the result of a decline of bi-polar order where the Indian goal of obtaining the leadership of non-allied world was outdated. These major alterations in international scenario led India to explore other options and possibilities where gradually they undertook steps to improve their relations with the U.S and China. India has chiefly discarded their reflective disagreement to American strategic thought structure.

Alternation of Indian policy was quite visible when Indian Government provided possible logistic support in the Indian Ocean to U.S during the Gulf War (1990 -1991) by providing overflight rights for “Dessert Shield Mission” to U.S aircrafts. American aircrafts were also facilitated by refueling privileges at Bombay in January 1991. This move was much appreciated by U.S official to elevate the prospects of strategic cooperation. However, Within India, this initiative by Chandra Shekhar Government (Sammaj Wadi Janata Party) stimulated domestic criticism and controversy, including the allegation by the Congress party to injure the India’s spirit of non-alignment for the sake of pro American tilt. This privilege to U. S was withdrawn in February 1991 (Bishoyi, 2011).

### 1.4.2 First high level meetings and discussion

In the altered geopolitical settings, US-India relations in strategic context grew slowly and gradually in the mid-1980s. In 1991, U.S-India Defense ties between two countries were nourished by the visit of Lieutenant-General Claude M. Kicklighter’ to India, later he became Commander in Chief of U.S Army Pacific Command (PACCOM). His visit marked remarkable development in US-India bilateral relations. Kicklighter proposals as the first concrete strategy envisioned the expansion of cooperation and strategic partnership between the militaries of U.S and India. The first high-level meeting based on negotiations over military cooperation and strategic interests between the two countries was held in New Delhi in January 1992. In India and U.S Army Executive Steering Committee, Lt. General V. K. Sood represented India and Lt. Johnny Corin of U.S pacific command from U.S side took part (Fani, 2009, p. 5). Significant concerns were expressed in this meeting about “Militant Islam” in the South Asian region. In this meeting, U.S put across the vision
of empowering India to deal with the threat of Islamic militancy in the most volatile region as India has been considered as a most suitable state to counter such threats from Turkey to Malaysia. Indian strategic relevance was highlighted as the only actor, who could uphold the American interests and vigorous stabilizing force.

This also led to formulate the “Executive Steering Groups (ESG)” in both states to strengthen the military to military collaborations which later established Navy (ESG) in March 1992 and Air force (ECG) in 1993 (Bishoyi, 2011, p. 65). “Kicklighter proposals” paved grounds for common strategic vision. These surfaced to hold first joint military exercise of US-India in February 1992. This was the outcome of U.S policy of ‘cooperative engagement’ with militaries of friendly and like-minded countries. These proposals encompassed;

- Service to service exchange
- Extension of defence cooperation framework
- Steering groups were established among three services to reinforce military-to-military cooperation.

In May, 1992, Navies of U.S and India carried out the first ever joint exercises (Ejaz, 2012, p. 130). In October, U.S and Indian army and air force paratrooper participated into the first joint training exercise called “Teak Iroquois.” Three rounds of joint naval exercises entitled as Malabar I, II, and III were also conducted (Bishoyi, 2011, 65). Efforts of cooperation by both countries were expanded in the aftermath of ‘Gulf War’. In April 1992, an important meeting was held in Washington between American Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Indian Defense Secretary, Sharad Pawar. This led to identify the two significant reciprocal steps of cooperation as;

- Indian assurance to provide port facilities and refuelling to U.S
- U.S assistance to upgrade Indian defence capabilities (Ahmar, 1992).

In 1993, American congress took a step forward by establishing the new categories for providing the economic and military assistance to India, which helped to remove misunderstanding and reservations which grew in previous decades. Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited U.S in May, 1994 where security related issues and concessions were discussed. It was agreed under the MOU to expand the official contacts. Moreover, high technology transfer, defense collaborations and prospects for developing an economic partnership were also significant items into the discussions (Ejaz, 2012, p. 131).

A major triumph in U.S-India defense cooperation was accomplished by visit of U.S Defense Secretary William Perry to India from 12 to 14 January 1995. This helped both states to conclude a breakthrough defense agreement which established a ‘Defense Policy Forum’ to consider the strategic and military interests between U.S and India. This agreement founded a mechanism of “consultations between the Pentagon and Indian Defense Ministry, as well as joint military exercises, military training, defense research and weapons production.” William Parry stated that “the agreement would open a new era in our security relations” (Ejaz, 2012, p. 132). Parry’s visit to India was not the decisive point as later Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown and U.S Secretary of Treasury Robert E Robin too visited India. This led to develop a strong lobbying in U.S in favor of nurturing strategic relations with India (p. 131).

Year 1995 witnessed another landmark development when U.S and India signed an “Agreed Minutes on Defense Relations” offering cooperation in both security and trade. By coming into this agreement, India got an opportunity to participate in joint exercises, received military and economic aid. Despite these developments in the year of 1995, the Clinton administration stressed for indeterminate extension of the NPT at the UN, which was seen by India as an effort to keep her permanently out from the nuclear power circle. From the American viewpoint, India’s sustained opposition over NPT served to destabilize the South Asian region (Kronstadt & Pinto, 2013, p. 2).

On August 6, 1997, American president Clinton while addressing a press conference advocated a robust presence of U.S in South Asia. He expressed that “US presence should be ‘heavily’ felt in South Asia because of the long relationship America had with India and because of
the enormous potential of the region for good if things go well and for ill if things don’t, …we can be an even better friend in the next 50 years and a more constructive supporter of resolving these difficulties in the near term” (The Hindu, 1997, August 8).

Supportive diplomatic gestures were made by Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth by visiting the office of the Indian ambassador to U.S, Naresh Chandra. This reflected the American growing interests in India. These cordial diplomatic gestures were further manifested on August 15, 1997 when on India’s 50th Independence celebrations in Washington, Hillary Clinton as first lady attended the ceremony. More over President Clinton’s videotaped message was also included in the ceremony to greet Indians. In September 1997, Karl Inderfurth visited India and confirmed a ‘positive thrust.’ His discussion with Indian political leadership provided a clear message of a firm American approach of “a welcome departure from the past” and ‘new beginning’ between U.S and India. These gradual and constructive alteration of polices in U.S perception was apparent when On September 5,1997, Burton Amendment as an effort required to cut assistance to India was defeated in American Congress with larger margin (Ejaz, 1999, p. 79).

The U.S-India bilateral relations were further strengthen by visit of Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral on September 23, 1997 to attend the annual session of the UN General Assembly in New York, where he met with the American President. Leadership of both countries agreed to continue the discussions on nuclear issues and disarmament (Ejaz, 1999, p. 79). Later, in October, 1997 Thomas Pickering as U.S undersecretary arrived in New Delhi and successfully initiated a strategic dialogue as expounded by Clinton-Gujral meeting. These strategic cum economic interactions initiated the joint ventures and India was clearly seen as an important market for U.S companies and this led to operationalize the various projects by Motorola, Kellogg CO, General Motors Crop and Du Pont in India (Ejaz, 2012, pp. 131-132).

The U.S re-engagement with India was evidently fostered with the visit of Madeleine Albright as first U.S Secretary of State in fourteen years to India on November 18, 1997. Nuclear cooperation with India was one of the significant items in her priority list and this visit also developed a consensus between the both countries to devise a mechanism to debate unresolved issues (Ejaz, 1999, p. 79). It was no doubt that issue of nuclear cooperation and Indian reservations regarding its nuclear program for its security was central to all debates however Albright’s discussions with Indian officials involved several issues ranging from Indian claim of eligibility for a permanent seat in UN General Assembly to feasible cooperation by America to set up nuclear power plants in India. The most significant development regarding Indian reservations over U.S-Pakistan security relations was that Albright shared the Indian allegations on Pakistan for supporting cross border terrorism. Albright’s visit was seen as “intensive and substantive” and a “step forward” by Indian officials of External Ministry Affairs (p. 80).

Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State engaged Jaswant Singh, the Foreign Minister of India in fourteen rounds of negotiations over two and half years. These talks were broadly identified as first sustained strategic engagements with India. These talks significantly changed U.S perception and policies towards nuclear matters regarding south Asia. Clinton Administration previously focused on “Cap, Reduce and Roll Back” but these rounds of talk convinced Washington to shift its policy to keeping the nuclear forces to the minimum level. Talbott explained the Indian stance during these talks in flowing words “India had put on notice that it was now unambiguously, unapologetically and irrevocably, a nuclear armed power” (Mansingh, 2006, p. 3).

The most significant development took place when U.S President Bill Clinton arrived in New Delhi in March 2000 as the first American president of last twenty two years to visit India (Kugiel, 2010, p. 33). The American administration eased the sanctions against India immediately before this visit (Kronstadt & Pinto, 2013, p. 2). This visit not only increased the prospects of expanding government-to-government collaborations, but also advanced and strengthened the ways for a strategic partnership. President Clinton pronounced the shift of American policy during his five-day stay in India on various occasions. Most remarkable exertion was his speech to the Indian parliament where he called India a ‘Natural Partner’ and recognized India’s scientific and economic advancement, acknowledged Indian devotion to democracy and commended Indian culture and civilization. Though making all these gestures of warmth, Clinton delicately highlighted
American concerns over certain issues like an Indian case of nuclear non-proliferation, Indo-Pakistan traditional rivalry and most irritant of all was the issue of Kashmir dispute which led Clinton to brand South Asia as the most dangerous place of the world.

Immediately after his visit to India, a five-hour stopover in Pakistan by Clinton also indicated the end of the Even Handed policy of U.S towards the two traditional rivals. Clinton’s efforts of pursuing relations with India on strategic lines were appreciated by Yashwant Sinha, the Indian Finance Minister on April 14, 2000 while addressing the Asia Society in New York in following words “Clinton swept away fifty years of misperception, and that the two countries appeared to be on a path of realistic engagement.” Stephen P. Cohen (2000) termed it as “tough-love” what Clinton, delivered to Pakistan during a short visit. Cohen is of the view that Clinton’s visit to India “was a triumph as far as images and symbols were concerned” (p. 1). Cohen contended the Yashwant views by saying that US-India stressed relations were grounded in more than misperceptions and that’s the reason that it took almost seven years to Clinton administration to provide a strategic and cordial gesture to India (p. 1). K. Alan Kronstadt (2013), a specialist on South Asian affairs noted in a Congressional report that “While President Clinton’s visit was generally considered successful; it did not have a transformational effect. His Administration’s policies towards India remained mired in balancing the Indo-Pakistani rivalry and addressing concerns about the region’s nuclear arsenals, despite Washington’s optimistic intentions and increasing realization of shared interests with India” (p. 2).

However, Clinton-Vajpayee initiated “Vision Document 2000” not only changed the patterns of U.S-India bilateral relations, but also altered the strategic notion and defense strategies of other relevant regional actors to reassess their foreign policy calculations. The statement voiced the mutual belief that their relationship would be a decisive factor to shape world peace and democracy. It echoed that “in the new century, India and the United States will be partners in peace, with a common interest in a complimentary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security. We will engage in regular consultations on, and work together and with others for strategic stability in Asia and beyond” (The News, 2000, March 22).

In spite of much advances and progress into defense diplomacy by holding regular joint exercises, and increased military trade between U.S and India, largely expectation of both sides was not fulfilled until this era as matter mired over the concerns of high technology weapons due to rigorous U.S export control legislation. Clinton’s acknowledgement of the need to engage India with an exceptional mode was precisely turned into practical measures by George W. Bush. President Bush detached the Kashmir dispute from its dealing with India as it served as an irritant factor in their relationship, de-hyphenated India and Pakistan and many efforts were vigorously driven at home and abroad by American strategy to end India’s nuclear isolation.

History of U.S-India bilateral relations reveals the fact that both states exhibited a primary unity in practice of long-term goals and objectives of world peace, stability, economic development and freedom. However, approaches to devise cordiality did not emerge consistent throughout the Cold War period. The relationship between the two states was derived by dogmatic and assertive approaches. Indefinable non-alignment was the Indian dogma, which lost its credibility in 1962 and in 1971. Formation of military alliances to counter the communist threats was American dogma, which did not allow her to concentrate on other prospects of development other than the immediate solutions (Ray, 2011, p. 30). U.S emergence as a uni-polar power and single global authority enhanced her obsession to develop a hierarchal structure where chain of command makes lesser units answerable to U.S. Transformation policy of U.S towards India is not at all sudden but result of a gradual development stemming out of change of perception into American strategic thought of looking South Asia, Asian pacific region and Indian Ocean essentially vital to U.S interests especially in 9/11 context. Growing China is not only military and economic terms, but also her ambitions to exceed influence and power beyond and across the Region especially in the Middle East, Central Asia, East Asia, Far East Asia and Indian Ocean developed a convergence of interests between U.S and India.
Despite the prospect of friendly and progressive relations among the two states during the Clinton presidency, Indian doubts were expressed due to U.S inclination towards Pakistan on Kashmir Issue. However, various policy commencements by U.S to initiate strategic dialogues addressed many of Indian apprehensions. Moreover, many in Indian foreign policy and policy maker circles were largely persuaded that Indians must reinforce and expand its relationship with U.S. It has been viewed by them that transformed U.S perceptions regarding India have provided it opportunities to play an effective and influential global role.
RISE OF UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: (2001-2010)

"As we Americans consider our future role in the world, the rise of a democratic increasingly powerful India represents a singularly positive opportunity to advance our global interests. There is a tremendous strategic upside to our growing engagement with India. That is why building a close U.S.-India partnership should be one of the United States’ highest priorities for the future. It is a unique opportunity with real promise for the global balance of Power". (Burns, 2007, pp. 131-146)

Post-Cold War settings led to transformation of global scene which witnessed the transition of power from the Atlantic to Asian Pacific, where India was seen as a better global and Asian player in the geostategic thought of the USA. This transition of power provided India a better place to act as regional as well as a global actor in new strategic game plan. This directed to develop a conjunction of interests and foreign policy goals which included control and dominance over the Indian Ocean and Asian pacific region. Admiral Mahan in 18 century anticipated that Asian Ocean will be “ocean of destiny in the 21st century.” Threat of a potential China, both in the term of economic competition and military dominance compelled U.S to observe the policy of ‘presence and deterrence’ in Indian Ocean even in time of peace. Strategic deterrence against China is one of the key reasons for enhancing and reshaping U.S-Indian States relations. Keeping in view the multi-dimensional nature of Chinese threat, both countries needed a partnership grounded as a strategy for cooperation in trade, exchange of culture, human resource, sharing of defense concerns, ensuing security, naval and air cooperation and nuclear assistance etc. Other significant areas of interest between the two states are measures against drug trafficking, domestic and global terrorism.

2.1 Transformation of American Thought: Significance of Indian Ocean and Asian Pacific Region

Shift of U.S Policy towards Asia Pacific region has given the rise to the strategic partnership between U.S and India. The decade of 1990s brought significant changes in international politics, which led to alter the strategic vision of U.S. Ideological split in communist philosophy finally caused a gradual collapse of the communist bloc. At the end of the Cold War, U.S acquired the role of sole superpower that put forward the New World Order which alter the political, strategic and economic settings in Post-Cold War on American terms. Gulf War in 1991 strengthened American hegemonic designs and provided it a better opportunity to preserve world stability with the gesture of hegemony. This also gave birth to arena of power politics where devotion to market economy, free trade, the influence of non-state actors like MNCs and the increasing role of international institutions contributed significantly to shape the structure of international politics. Many factors transformed the balance of power from the Atlantic Ocean to Pacific-Indian Ocean, as this region secures a strategic importance due to crossroads of various seas, air routes, commercial and trade zone (Ejaz, 2012, pp. 117-187). Admiral Joseph W. Prueher (1997), the Commander in Chief of the U.S Pacific command uttered the connotation of the Asian pacific region in following words; The Asia Pacific, perhaps more than any other region represents a confluence of the security, diplomatic, and economic elements of international power. This confluence helps to define the significance of the region to the U.S and the world, and drives our strategy of presence and engagement to promote and protect our national interests.
American President Bush (Senior) expressed his commitments and devotion to take care of Asia Pacific region in strategic manner through his various statements. Bush considered Asia Pacific region as a significant continent for implementing and maintaining her global order and said, "we will deepen our partnership with our Asian friends in building democracy and freedom………..in the area of security. Asia’s variety has spawned a diverse pattern of political and strategic cooperation. Our custom made agreements and relationship provide a strong foundation for security" (Ejaz, 2012, p. 121). He stressed for American presence in Asia Pacific region during his visit to the area in January 1992 by declaring that “America will remain engage in pacific economically, politically and militarily. We should care about us to build a Post-Cold War world defined by prosperity and trade not by poverty and isolationism” (p. 121). His strategic thought was variously proclaimed by saying that "We will maintain a visible, credible presence in the Asian Pacific region with our forward developed forces and through the bilateral defense arrangements with the nation of the region” (Ahmar, 1992).

For India and U.S, Key to develop influence over Asia Pacific region is somehow linked with rule on ‘Blue Waters’ of Indian Ocean. Renowned U.S naval strategist, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, pronounced, "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the twenty-first century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters.” Indian Ocean emerges significant for major powers policies and influences due its geostategic position as it “covers more than 28 million square miles and 30 nations that constitute its littoral region contain one-third of the world’s population” (Hilali, 2014, p. 127) Likewise, strategic and economic importance has been accentuated as half of the world’s container cargo and two third of oil shipments moved over the Indian Ocean. Since, it linked to the Middle East, East Asia
and Africa with Europe and the U.S. It has become a dome of contemporary geopolitics and geo-economics (p. 127).

Sino-Indian War of 1962 shattered the Indian confidence to act as the dominant regional power and diminished the notion of India’s role as an immediate local policeman. This led India to initiate the modernization and expansion of naval force as “Blue Water Navy” to increase its power in a strategic manner along with its conventional war ability. Moreover the manifestation of interests and influences by extra regional powers has caused widespread militarization of the region. Indian goals range from acquiring extensive dominance and authority in the region, protection of trade routes, especially from the Persian Gulf, and countering threats from potential alliances possibly from the potential nexus of China and Pakistan.

The realities of globalization served as defining features of American age, which strengthen the notion that collaborations with like-minded global allies are significant for Washington’s interests in an increasingly interdependent global village. Transformed U.S global agenda in Post-Cold War was the major cause which shaped its foreign policy principles and goals under the theme of ‘New World Order’. It needed to combine the emerging regional power like India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and others to be with U.S to commendably retort to the crisis. U.S interests in Asia Pacific region and the Indian Ocean are based on its conception of “Freedom of Seas” which could be assured by forming strategic alliances to enjoy an uninterrupted flow of oil and other resources. It is important to note that the American National Security Strategy (NSS) aims to contain China, ensure smooth execution of operations in Afghanistan, monitoring and curbing the terrorist organizations and networks and limiting apparent nuclear ambitions of Iran (Cheema, n.d., p. 17).

2.2 United States Concerns and Threat Perceptions

For U.S, importance of Asia Pacific region is accentuated owing to China. China’s strong and extensive military power and thriving economy can potentially challenge the U.S preponderance, the national security structure of U.S in the region and global designs of unipolarity. China’s presence in the region is being felt by significant investment mainly in Sri-Lanka, Pakistan, Maldives, Bangladesh and Central Asian Republic (CARs) which is linked by U.S as a “String of Pearls.”

A second area of concern for U.S in the region is issue of proliferation and spread of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Unrestrained and unchecked nuclear capacities of China, North Korea, Pakistan and Iran have been an alarm for U.S goals. Third and the foremost challenge is the rise of Militant Islam, which focused U.S policy towards the Asian region. Rising waves of extremism and radicalization in Central Asian Republics (CARs), few parts of the Gulf and Afghanistan are regarded as a serious threat to the New Global Order. Pakistan is also considered as the root of the problem as it is seen as ‘safe haven’ for terrorist organizations and groups, posing violent and aggressive gestures and appearing threat to many states of the world. The talibanization is another threat to the Americanization of the world as integration and merging of culture is an off shoot of the globalization process and U.S being a global power is more in capacity to transform social world order in accordance to U.S values and principles. Serious allegations are made on Pakistan by U.S and India for supporting and exporting talibanization to other countries.

U.S policy since 2001 is driven by compulsions of global war on terrorism, its Global agenda is largely manifested by following preferences;

- Role of United States as a Hegemon leader (as “Hegemonic stability theory” manifests that the presence of an overwhelming hegemon power will help to ensure stability in the international system and Thucydides theory of ‘Hegemonic War’ embodies that threats to the vital interests of Hegemon will cause Hegemonic War) (Williams, Goldstein, & Shafritz, 2006, p. 264).
- Collective security (focusing and maintaining regional power centers rather ensuring global security through international institutions)
• Precluding of WMD, arms control and encouraging non-proliferation regimes (these efforts were part of the perception that irresponsible regimes and governments must not acquire the ability to command, control and manipulate international peace through their nuclear blackmailing)
• Promotion of human rights and democracy (U.S views democracy as a mean of alleviating the international peace).
• Preferment of market economies (liberal economics establishes that through Free trade and proportional gains, adverse effects of traditional political rivalries among international actors can be diminished as their economic interests are associated with each other)
• Protection against terrorism based on extremist ideologies (in Post-Cold War period researches by various Americans think tanks and academic institutions publicised that future conflicts would base on culture and opposing civilizations)
• Issues if international drugs, criminal cartels, trafficking of children and women, (threats from non-state actors and criminal organizations which are often beyond the state control and capable of being posed serious threats to global peace.

These goals needed the establishment of a new regional alliance system in different parts of the world. As a part of U.S global strategy of developing ‘Power Centers’ in significant region to maintain its influence and control certain states of this region are also focused which included Japan, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and India.

The U.S foreign policy and defense experts have developed the strategies to overcome the perceived threats to American power and influence in Asia Pacific region and plan of action is emphasized on;
- Effective diplomacy and joint military ventures
- Robust security structure
- Implementation of free, fair trade and efficient mechanism of economic cooperation
- Promotion of Human Rights and Democratic Governments
- Sustainment of regional political stability (Ejaz, 2012, p. 123)

2.3 India’s Multidimensional Image and Relevance to United-States Foreign Policy Goals

In recent years, relationship with India is considered as an indispensable among circles of American foreign relations. In a geographical context, India is located between the two most problematic regions of U.S national interests. Political instability causing problems from North Africa passes through the Middle East, and continues to the territories of Pakistan and Afghanistan and finally reaches to the western border of India. India’s eastern side faces another Asian power, China shares a contested land border. Despite internal problems like violence and human rights violations against minorities, India is seen as pivotal to ensure prosperity, stability, democracy and rule of law in a communist and Islamic neighborhood (Blackwill, Chandra, Clary, & Rapporteur, 2011, p. 3).

Indian Territory and influence is extending into the ocean, which abides its name and increasingly significant for U.S economic interests as it is a critical global line of communication. Besides all other Indian developments of the economy and prospects of the market, its geographical realities alone make it a substantial partner for U.S. Many of U.S global challenges are considered by India as its regional challenges. The most important realization was made by U.S foreign policy circles in Post-Cold War that India is exceptionally positioned to wield influence, provide resources and reciprocal help to deal with these challenges (Blackwill et al., 2011, p. 3).

Former U.S Defense Secretary, Robert Gates expounded that “India is a strategic partner and a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond” (Bishoyi, 2011). In 2010, Quadrennial defense review (QDR) report also acknowledged Indian relevance to Indian Ocean and noted that “India has already established its worldwide military influence through counter piracy, peace keeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts and as its military capabilities grow, India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and
Indian stakes in maritime security are enhanced due to its status of emergent trading power. Indian foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao in 2010 underlined that “As the main resident power in the Indian Ocean region, we have a vital stake in the evolution of a stable, open inclusive and balanced security and cooperation architecture in the region. By definition this would need to be a consensus-based process, where all the stake holders who have a legitimate presence in the region make their respective contributors to regional security” (p. 4). Blackwill, Chandra, Clary, & Rapporteur (2011) also elucidated the relevance of India in Joint study report by Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) in following words, “Its India’s strength which entices U.S to pursue a partnership on strategic terms as India has the world’s third largest army, fourth largest air force and fifth largest Navy. All of three services are modernizing and have world class technical resources and seeking more” (p. 4).

The other factor is expanding Indian economy. Its average growth rate has risen to 7.6% over the last decade and reached to 10.4% in year of 2010. Economists believe that with continuing the similar trends, Indian economy has potential to provide a sound base for India to become a global power house in next two decades (p. 5). It is needed to mention that Indian potential extends well beyond its strength in military, economy and diplomatic power. Proliferation of Indian culture and media, persistent commitment to democracy, impending scope of Indian ‘soft power’ and global range of its private corporate sector made her internal problems irrelevant to the world. Despite her rampant poverty, religious, ethnic and linguistic discriminations and violent internal conflicts, successful projection of “shining India” is more familiar to the world.

U.S paid enough attention to the Asian region as a part of its global strategy. Long term U.S policy is to acquire a preeminent position in South Asia. U.S comprehends India as a potential market and a strategic partner. On the other hand, China emerges as a central threat to U.S and India. The United States and India shares a vital interest of averting such developments which lead towards a unipolar Asia. They viewed the rise of militant Islam as a risk to global and regional security brought two states closer. These common notions incorporated bilateral state relations up to the strategic heights. U.S policy of primacy needed its political, economic, strategic and diplomatic influences and collaborations in South Asia, South East Asia and Asia Pacific regions especially with potential powers like India. Spread of Islamic crescent from Turkey to Malaysia. China as a potential threat in military and economic terms, unstable and fragile Afghanistan and Pakistan are the prime causes of U.S viewing of South Asia as a central part of his global strategy.

2.4 Indian Security Concerns and Threats Perceptions

Post-Cold War period, primarily transformed the India’s strategic calculus and enlarged the U.S foreign policy options. Fall of Soviet Union provided a realization to India to find out other options where U.S is taken as an alternate to USSR to achieve its regional targets and to balance China. There is also a major shift in Indian foreign policy as an Indian strategy of nonalignment is replaced by alignment into the shape of a strategic partnership and the goal of a multipolar world. These shifts are caused by the Indian perceived goal of a Great Power Status supported by its large middle class, offering attractive market for foreign investors, a strong technology base, rising gross domestic product (GDP). Most significantly its military and nuclear capability as a nuclear weapon state provided her a sound base to be considered as a potential strategic partner. Indian strategic thinkers are manifesting the notion, especially after the Cold War that non-alignment is no more relevant to national interests and it has become an essential part of strategist discourse in India.

- With rapid modernization of military and growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, China emerges as a major threat to India.
- Pakistan's nuclear deterrence to India and exclusive missile arsenals restricts India to play a role of 'Big Boss' in the region. Moreover, it is horrifying for Indian security designs.
- U.S-India partnership would be possibly contained by deepening Pakistan-China nexus turning into the security equation which limits their efforts of 'rebalancing'.
- Despite its hegemonic gestures in the region, India alone cannot handle menace of Islamic militancy which is supposed to be a great danger to its internal and external security.
Development of rapid strategic relations between China and Russia is sign of Chinese activism which is creating equilibrium of power. Islamic militancy and radicalization, protection of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, China’s nuclear, military dominance and Pakistan’s nuclear potential are common factors and grounds which amplified the bilateral relation to the strategic notion between U.S and India.

2.5 U.S-India Strategic Partnership: A New Beginning

“We need to continue to alleviate partnership with India above the political fray because its potential benefits are too important to U.S, to India and to the world”. (Senator John McCacin as cited Baron, 2010)

Cohen (2000) is of the view that “the India-United States strategic relationship is structurally changing.” Previous decade has witnessed an emergent momentum in Indo-U.S relations. These bilateral relations gradually turned into a global strategic partnership which is based on the conjunction of interests and securities on various issues of global, regional and bilateral associations. This global strategic partnership is the result of constant efforts from both sides to maintain convergence of perceptions as it was hampered by various national and international compulsions in previous decades. Thrust to develop a viable relationship was an outcome of viewing India as a “Positive Relationship” by U.S policy analysts.

The United States always praised India’s transformation aftermath of nuclear explosions in 1998. Both countries shared common values of pluralism, tolerance, openness and respect for fundamental rights. Post 9/11 scenario brought two countries closer to counter terrorism. United States Information Service clearly expressed the modification of American foreign policy in their fact sheet “The United States sees its relations with India as central to maintaining long-term stability in Asia and in fighting terrorism the transformation of our armed relationship is essential for achieving these goals” (“US Embassy,” 2002). Significant developments in International politics brought dramatic strengthening of U.S-India strategic relations which are following:

- U.S-Soviet rivalry was no more a principal focus of U.S foreign policy which provided a rationale of the Indians approach of non-alignment.
- Economic liberalizing in India as a result of economic reforms initiated by Mon Mohan Singh which opened India to the global economy and enhanced investment and private sector trade between the two countries (Burns, 2007, p. 134).
- U.S policy experts started believing in Post-Cold War that India being a largest democracy and leading power of the region could serve an important role to overcome the challenges perceived as Indian navy can ensure the U.S designs in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

U.S standard security system requires allies to achieve its global agenda partnership in both strategic and economic fields. India’s economic growth and involvement of large middle class in the economy and economic reforms to open markets are the great prospect of investment and trade for U.S based company (Chenoy, 2007, p. 3549). American Think tanks played an important role to transform U.S strategic thought and evolved new policies towards India. In 1998, a study “India and America after the Cold War” by the Carnegie Endowment identified the American priorities more clearly. This study came up with following significant suggestions:

- In support with American goals and perceptions, a major role of India is required
- Indian endeavour for a permanent seat in UN General Assembly was advocated
- Proposed an alteration into the U.S policy of ‘Roll Back’ towards the Indian nuclear program. (Ejaz, 1999, p. 75)

Many of American think tanks encouraged the “Grand Bargain” to remove those impediments which prevented the strategic perceptions and transformation of US-India relations. A renowned U.S scholar on South Asia, Sumit Ganguly explicated that the American policy of “cap, roll back and elimination of WMD” completely failed to impede the Indian nuclear program, instead nuclear cooperation was blocked. He expounded that nuclear option is associated with security concerns pertaining to India. He further elaborated by saying that “China has the requisite ballistic Missile capabilities to strike the Indian heartland. Consequently, as a matter of practical prudence,
in an anarchic international environment, where each state remains the guarantor of its own security, it behooves India to maintain its nuclear options” (p.77).

A study report in 1997 by CFR entitled “A new policy towards India” also recommended abandoning the “cap, freeze and rollback.” A study report by Asia Society, New York also provided the similar suggestions. Both studies advocated a stable nuclear relationship between US and India, while highlighting the potential Indian market for civilian nuclear investments. CFR report also stressed U.S to diminish the constraints on transfer of ‘dual-use technologies’ and supported the India’s participation into Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and other relevant regional and global forums (p. 77).

In 1997, Selig S. Harrison in his research report manifested that “unless a nuclear bargain eventually emerges between India and the USA, tensions over non-proliferation will poison all aspects of Indo-American relations” (as cited in Solomon, 1991-1992). This report suggested that elimination of American policy of “rollback” and supported the American cooperation with India over nuclear civil energy. It further stated that there is need of U.S reconciliation towards Indian procurement of the nuclear weapons. This report significantly pleaded that “USA would have to learn that it cannot cling forever to its self-appointed role as the “only superpower” in a world characterized by a growing diffusion of power centers and India would have to show a mature recognition that political and economic accommodation with the USA will be a necessary precondition for its own achievement of superpower status” (Ejaz, 1999, p. 77). This report also added that India is distinct entity and it should be treated other than South Asian security system. Harrison further provided that this will discord the ‘Pakistan view’ and lead India to be placed in the category or preferences of Washington where Israel stands. This will also eventually eliminate even the China view in U.S policies, but Harrison also comes up with three major concessions, expected from India as a part of this grand strategic bargain, which are following:

- Signing the CTBT, Though holding the right to conduct the further nuclear tests and experimentation
- Allowing IAEA (International Atomic Energy Act) arrangements over Indian power plants
- Signing the proposed FMCT (p. 78)

Congressional research Centre (CRC) report by Kronstadt and Pinto (2013) manifested that “Washington has changed its policy in South Asia and it appears to be inserting a bigger gamble on India and according to various political analysts; New Delhi and Islamabad are no longer recognized as the same in Washington. Pakistan is observed as a “middle power and India has the much larger perspective down the road.”

Talbott’s scholarly work (2004) “engaging Indian diplomacy, democracy and the bomb” called previous relations between U.S and India “A victim of incompatible obsessions.” Talbot is of the view that both countries were guilty of developing good terms with each other’s principle adversary (p. 7). After collapse of Soviet Union, India lost a reliable partner and supplier of military arsenal as well as economic assistance which led India to look for a trader partner cum ally to counter its immediate neighbors and traditional rivals like Pakistan and China. End of bipolarity, made Indian belief of non-alignment absolute irrelevant and symbolic role of India as leader of non-align movement was no more affluent.

Robert D. Blackwill and Ashely J. Tellies while stressing on strategic partnership, suggested that “The U.S cannot defend its interests in Asia without support from its allies, and should build up the power-political capabilities of its friend and allies on China’s periphery” (as cited in Revere, 2016) U.S-India partnership is part of a new game in Asia, where major players are trying to develop partnership and alliances as it is difficult to the level of impossibility to wage a direct and conventional war against each other. States conflicts in a global scenario are usually detained with breaking the influences of the opponent’s side in the field of economy, military, security deterrence and nuclear supremacy. It is important to note that the realities of globalization have changed the old pattern of conflict and state rivalries. R. Nicolas Burns (2007), Assistant Secretary of State during his visit to Delhi in 2005 stated that “U.S has evolved a strategic
partnership with India as she is a rising and democratic power in the world and a trusted friendly country” (p. 32).

It is generally believed by the proponents of U.S-India strategic partnership that at least for fifty years, U.S is prospectively to be a uni-power of the world which led many in India to advocate a thriving relations with U.S. J. N. Dixit, an Indian analyst, advocated that “India’s US policy should be responsive to the newly emerging trends indicating that Washington is focusing on India in a broader framework. Durable partnership with US would have a vigorous effect on India’s expanding role in the international arena and that in turn would enable it to define and defend its interests in global terms” (Ejaz, 1999, p. 80). The former Indian foreign Secretary K. Shanker Bajpai also stressed on improving US-India relations by stating;

We should not conclude that inherent differences are too great to permit any significantly cooperate Indo-American interactions. As the only power of today that can influence the course of events where it chooses, America has great power to harm us. It is neither wrong-headed nor demeaning to work not only to obviate any such harm, but to develop a relationship in which there is no need to harm us (“US Monitoring World Reaction,” 1991).

Indian analyst, Ranjan Gupta while analyzing the strategic preferences of U.S pointed out that “The American alliance offers India endless possibilities, including getting American support on Kashmir. If there has to be a strategic relation, Washington must be prepared to give Delhi full support on the Kashmir question.” On similar lines, M. D. Naplat explicating the benefits emerging out of U.S-India strategic partnership in following words “It would help India to accomplish its security intents which encompassed of managing the nuclear deterrent competence against Pakistan, the occupation of Azad Kashmir and provocation of ethnicity in Pakistan to disintegrate it finally” (Ejaz, 1999, p. 82). Former national security Advisor of India, Mishra while speaking at CFR, New York, advocated the Indian alliance with US by saying that

In the world order defined by the Cold War, India and U.S were not really allies though, to be fair, nor were they enemies. India-US relations reflected a lack of engagement, coupled with wariness and a periodically recurring suspicion whenever the shadow of the Cold War fell over the region. In the post-Cold War, the situation is dramatically different. We have shared Geo political interests and economics opportunities, which can bind an enduring partnership…...Given its past history, the Indo-U.S relations need to liberate itself from a number of misconceptions and prejudices of past years (Mishra, 2013).

Another Indian scholar, Amitabh Mattoo at ‘School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University suggested the inevitable convergence of interests between U.S and India as “in terms of strategic issues, the rise of China and continuing uncertainty in the Asia-pacific region should be of critical importance and concern to both New Delhi and Washington” (Ejaz, 2012, p. 129).

U.S interests with India were recognized and manifested in an official document NSS in 2002 which clearly indicated to develop strong relations with India in following words “The Administration sees India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly”. In this document, it was admitted that by following the advances in military capability, China is threatening its neighbors in Asian Pacific region. These modified perceptions into U.S policy towards India were based on following notions as propagated by several think tanks and policy institutions.

- India is considered as ‘Swing State’ by U.S policy experts.
- Evolving American need to ‘Rebalancing Asia’
- India as an open market for sale of defense related items.
- End of illusionary idea of military balance between India and Pakistan. U.S adopted new strategy tilting towards India as “stop losing India for Pakistan.
- Observing Pak-U.S as “Negative relationship” and India-U.S as ‘Positive relationship’ by U.S policy makers.
Growing naval competency of India as ‘Blue Water’ navy, which can serve as valuable asset for U.S.

Potential of Indian booming economy, which can bring the economic prospects for U.S.

CIA reports indicated that India is a ‘Swing State’ that could maintain the balance between war and peace: it has been observed that U.S.-Indo bilateral relations are moving upward to the height of strategic partnership due to India’s multidimensional growth which paves grounds for considering India as a ‘Natural Allies’. It is important to note that this structural change is induced due the notion that common concerns of both states need a long term and effective partnership, more than normal bilateral relations (Fani, 2006, p. 135). The goal of providing India the status of influential regional ally & prospect of a global partner is to counterweight to China. Joint military operations are enough evidences for declaring U.S priority to tackle with the potential threats in economic, military and in leadership roles.

U.S policy makers in accordance with their global goals and broader security interests have decided to put an end of their ‘doctrine of equality’ to balance India and Pakistan. The U.S still needed Pakistan to achieve its goal in Afghanistan to counter terrorism but not at the cost of losing or ignoring India any more. A renowned U.S think tank, The Carnegie Endowment for international peace presented a report to the House Committee on International Relations in 2004 through Ashley J. Tellis. This report came up with significant policy proposals and recommendations to align in with India. These recommendations consisted of five steps to be implemented.

- To avert China’s ascendency in Asia, U.S should support India to increase her military and economic power
- India should be offered more economic and military aid and the illusory idea of balancing India and Pakistan should be ended.
- India’s representation and membership should be endorsed by U.S in UNSC, G-8, APEC and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- The U.S should confiscate the objections over the India-Iran gas pipeline.
- The U.S should permit the sale of dual-use technology, including nuclear safety equipment (Fani, 2006, p. 137).

Increasing military imports of India has been a great source of attraction for U.S in two ways. First, it can provide a status of favored defense supplier to U.S and arrival of defense business at home. Secondly, these purchases can increase the ability and strength of India to monitor the China’s military power in the region. Russia captured Indian defense market up to 80%, Israel and European States occupies 20% trade and U.S companies are determined to capture the Indian market. In 1990s bilateral trade gained with US up to $10 Billion. 2015 offer a market of 80 billion $ for American companies. U.S is expecting its share from the India defense market as Richard G. Kirkland, Lockheed Martin’s president for South Asia asserted that “India is our top market” (Mian, 2007, p. 4096). India has now emerged as the largest buyer of weapons among the world counties and accounted for almost 12% of weapons purchases. R. Nicholas Burns in his article in the Washington post argued “within a generation American may view India as one of our two or three most strategic partners” (as cited in Kapur & Ganguly, 2007, p. 643).

2.6 Bases and Factors Enhancing U.S-India Strategic Partnership

2.6.1 Indian trade prospects

Indian Domestic factors also played a significant role to reassess their foreign policy options. In 1991, acute financial crisis gripped India. Financial crisis was the result of three important factors, as grounds for the Gulf War was prepared; India depleted her foreign exchange reserves for buying of oil. More than 100,000 Indian workers were back to country due to hostilities of War and an important source of foreign exchange was no more operative. Thirdly series of loan payment was due to commercial banks shortly after the war (Kapur & Ganguly, 2007, p. 648). Moreover, structural weakness of economy was the consequences of Indian’s social development
program which was later replaced by fundamental changes in the early 90s by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister of that time Man Mohan Singh based on structural adjustment regime and economic policies which were more market friendly. These initiatives regarding opening India to global market dramatically enhanced Indian economic performance, which later caused as a GDP of over 4 Trillion U.S dollar. This transformed India as the sixth largest economy in the world (p. 648). Despite its problems of inequality, extreme poverty, education and weak infrastructure, Indian middle class made its potential and vast market for foreign goods. These developments heightened the U.S-India trade roughly 4.5 $ billion 1998 to approximately 27 billion $ in 2005 (p. 649).

India is among the 20 advanced economies of the world. Trade and investments secured substantial attention due to growing level of two way trade between India and USA major portion of the talks included U.S-India Business council because year 2009 saw remarkable trade which reached up to 60$ billion. Since 1991, the economic reforms prepared grounds for increasing U.S-India trade tremendously up to 32$ billion in 2006. India is significantly considered as a fast growing Aviation market for U.S investor (Burns, 2007, p. 145). Since 1999, 25$ billion has been spent for buying the military related items. This led to make India a major buyer as according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Indian defense purchases are projected to climb to 40 billion by 2022 (Bishoyi, 2011, p. 85). It has been also reported that in 2010 that “India is likely to spend up to $100 billion on the purchase of military equipment over the next ten years. Till the previous past, the major Indian military related purchases were obtained from Russia and now due to this expanding Indian market, American companies have begun to intensely lobby to sell their arms equipment and high technology” (Schlosser, 2010).

Robert Kaplan measured rise of India as the greatest piece of geopolitical good luck for U.S since the end of the Cold War. He explicated India as a strategic asset because the Indian military modernization program is expected to spend more than 35$ billion over the next five years on defense acquisition. India as an attractive consumption market for defense sale already involved American companies to do business of $4 billion in past four years. India participates with U.S in the maximum number of joint exercises and these joint operations are taken to the advanced level. In the previous decade, U.S-India conducted over sixty joint exercises where India was more interested to learn the ‘War Games’ while U.S was intended to learn from Indian expertise in counter-insurgency, Jungle and mountain warfare abilities (Bishoyi, 2011, p. 71-72).

The U.S-India defense trade has been accelerated by a “successful purchase of INS Jalashwa, 8 Boeing P8-I multi mission maritime aircraft, six C130 J Super Hercules aircraft for special forces, three Boeing 737 business jet and 10 Boeing C-17 Globe master heavy military transport aircraft” (Bishoyi, 2011, p. 68). American analysts are sure of the fact that if India continues to open her economy and integrate with the global economic structure, this relationship will provide more reciprocal benefits. Reports forecast that Indian economy will quadruple in size by 2030; to nearly $8 trillion. This will lead India to emerge as third largest economy. Moreover interests of U.S and Indian companies also strengthen the economic ties. Keeping in view these emerging prospects of trade as one of the major dynamics of strategic cooperation, U.S and India are determined to focus on three areas:

- Broad economic policy
- Financial sector reforms
- Infrastructure financing

2.6.2 Role of leadership

It is evident from the facts of U.S-India ties that certain Americans and Indian political leaders provided a vital contribution to shape up the relations up to the strategic extend. Narasimha Rao and Man Mohan Singh initiated the market reforms and put an end to the development strategy of Autarky. These market reforms tremendously facilitated the growth and enable India to offer herself as a valuable global partner. Both political leaders commenced the departure for the past economic policies, though they face huge criticism in domestic domain.
From the American side, U.S President Bill Clinton was the one who facilitated the process of rapprochement. Though during his first term of presidency, he was more determent to restrict the global spread of nuclear weapons and equal policy of sanctions were imposed on Pakistan and India after the nuclear test of 1998. But it was the Kargil conflict in 1999 between the India and Pakistan, which changed the Clinton policy of equalizing of both states. He showed a good will gesture to India by refusing Pakistani Prime Minister to provide cooperation to devise a solution until or unless all Pakistani forces had returned back to their side. He also informed Indian political leaders about the progress of his discussions with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Eventually Pakistani forces went back to their previous position across the LOC (Line of Control). Clinton’s moves indicated clearly that U.S is restraining the policy of balancing India and Pakistan and support to Pakistan as a traditional ally of U.S would not provide at the cost of losing India. Paul Kapoor and Sumit Ganguly (2007) manifest that “this signaling to India was not simply an accident, but rather a deliberate goal of Clinton’s approach to Kargil” (p. 650). Policies commenced during the second term of Clinton proved U.S good faith to Indians ignoring Pakistan and managing ‘soft containment’ of China.

George W. Bush (Junior) was another individual leader who extended the Clinton’s strategic thought by focusing on India and providing a nuclear energy deal in 2005. Despite a strong opposing argument by critics for undermining the NPT, the nuclear deal to an extent, was an outcome of Bush personal leadership and his inclination towards India. Moreover, Bush himself and his team, which included Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Nicholas Burns under Secretary of State and Philips Zelikow as counselor were in the favor of developing a tilt towards India for ensuring and securing U.S global and regional designs. It is a matter of the fact that proposed nuclear deal has played a significant role to remove the distrust among India and U.S as earlier NPT policies of U.S were considered quasi-colonial and extremely discriminated. This not only provided support to continued economic progress to India, but also helped her to get a de facto recognition of a nuclear weapon State. Two terms of presidency of Bush put an end to Indian complain of ‘nuclear apartheid’. Tellis (2006) expounded the changing pattern of relationship as a result of extensive brand of rapprochement in following words “The nuclear deal symbolizes, first and foremost, a renewed American commitment to assisting India to meet its enormous developmental goals and thereby takes its place in the community of nations as a true great power. The deal thus becomes the vehicles by which the Indian people are reassured that United States is a true friend and ally responsive to their deepest aspirations.”

2.6.3 Role of Indian American community

Indians American have emerged as influential and large group to impact on U.S foreign policy towards India and bringing the two states closer. Nicolas Burns in his article pointed out while praising the Indo American community that “there are 2.7 million Indian American immigrants in the U.S, almost the 1% of U.S population. They are one of the wealthiest, most affluent and best educated minorities in U.S.” It is reported that each year more than 76000 students from India get American visa. There are more Indian student in American academic institutions and universities than other foreign students in U.S as 67.1% of this group have a higher education which is three time greater than national average of 2.7% in U.S (Rajghatta, 2009). Kugiel (2010) expressed the importance of Indian American community as “people of Indian origin are the elite of IT, medical, and executive communities; they attain ever higher positions in the academic community”. This group emerged successful to promote tourism, work and people to people contact. There are significant names of Indian American who remarkably contributed in science, technology, politics, art, culture and business like Sabbeer Bhatia, Vinod Khosala founded Sun Micro system and Hotmail, Kalpna Chawala, famous Indian astronaut, Fareed Zakeriya an expert on International Affairs, film director Mira Nair, politician Bobby Jindal etc (pp. 31-50).

Most important fact about Indo-American community is that they are fast to learn and open to absorb American culture and values, provide no significant resentment to the Americanization of culture. In a global survey conducted in 2009, Indo-American community emerged as second for their pro- American sympathetic approach besides American themselves. In the present scenario, Indian-American society in U.S is one of the most pro-American societies. With reference to
increase in their numerical strength, the political influence and impact of this group is gradually rising to the extent of acting as effective interests groups in the American Congress. Since 1993, a nonpartisan group is actively working in the House of Representative which later in 2009 emerged as the largest group with its 152 members dedicated to a single country. The year 2004 also witnessed the formation of a group under the chairpersonship of Hillary Clinton on similar lines in the American Senate. In year 2009, it was compromised of almost 33 persons, 1/3 of Senate members. It has increased the political strength and affluence of India and Indian community as they were facilitated by getting favorable results on Hyde Act of 2006 (Kugiel, 2010, p. 44). Indian American community and Indian Government are also effective using all available political means by hiring professional lobbying firms to increase their power to influence American politicians.

2.6.4 Role of regional and global determinants

R. Nicholas Burns (2007) explained the bases of U.S-India strategic partnership in following words “our open societies face similar threats from terrorism & organized crimes. Our market base economies embraced trade and commerce as an engine of prosperity. Our people value education and a strong work ethics. We share and attachment to democracy and individual rights founded on an instinctive mistrust of authoritarianism” (p. 13).

The United States Defense Department and National Security Apparatus envision U.S Military dominance, designated as ‘full spectrum dominance’ which required the “capability of U.S forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control situation across the full range of military operations” (“Joint Vision2020,” 2000). U.S global agenda and goals necessitate “freedom to operate in all domains” with a support from a set of Alliances. This is the significant reason which raises the idea of putting India into the category of ‘Great Power’ (Chenoy, 2007, p. 3547). Growing intensity of U.S-India relationship delivers a clear message of devising India the leadership role in South Asia and constant developments into relationship of both countries are indicating about India’s global role. U.S considers India as rising power and largest democracy being effective and influential enough to counter China, which is generally consistent with U.S interests.

There are various factors and dynamic of U.S-India relationship which strengthen their strategic bonding which are following:
- This relationship is founded on shared threats and values which are global security challenges and professed strategic interests?
- U.S and India both have China-centric policy in South Asia
- Both states aim to counter threats and the rise of militant Islam in Asia. U.S believed that in this part of the world, India is the only State Actor who could maintain regional stability as an effective force and protect the U.S interests.

2.6.5 Challenges from Afghanistan

The United States and India view the wave of global terrorism as a common threat to their foreign policy interests. In South Asian region after Pakistan, they view Afghanistan as a base for spreading terrorism. Both countries are determined to find out common prescriptions for their Afghan policy as they perceive threat of attacking their homeland from terrorist groups based in Afghanistan. It is important to note that there is no major difference in policy of U.S and India concerning goals in Afghanistan.

India has restored full diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in 2001 following 9/11 and U.S led war in Afghanistan as its relations with Afghanistan were jeopardized due to rise of Taliban in the 90s. Afghanistan grasps strategic importance for India as New Delhi pursues friendly allies in neighbouring. India considers Afghanistan a gateway to energy-rich Central Asian States (CARs) such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. India has emerged as a largest donor among South Asian to Afghanistan. India has contributed her resources, manpower, services and assistance in Afghanistan to build and reconstruct hospitals, schools, dams, power projects and roads. It is also involved to provide training Afghans parliamentary officials in parliamentary process and governance. Since 2001, over $1.2 billion for reconstruction of Afghanistan have been offered by
India, making her largest regional donor to Afghanistan. As Afghanistan is a potential route to access to Central Asian’s energy, reconstruction of Afghanistan is a significant goal of India to ensure greater regional stability and to pawn Pakistani influence. J. Alexander Their, an expert on Afghanistan at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) elucidated that "India is looking to ensure that other countries in the region favour or at least are neutral on its conflict with Pakistan. On the other side Afghanistan looks to India as a potential counterweight in its relationship with Pakistan" (Bajoria, 2009, para, 2).

India supports the U.S military presence in Afghanistan as a total and rapid military withdrawal would be threatening in multiple ways for Indian interests in the region. India is dreadful by the absence of U.S military as it would cause the intensification of radicalization which further can develop consequential threats to the security and safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. A joint study group report by the American Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) in 2011 assessed that

This radicalization will enhance Pakistan’s conventional forces concentration on Indian front and attacks of anti-Indian terrorist groups will provide a boost to conventional deterrence of Pakistan. Indian security policy makers are worried with available support in various means by China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and terrorist groups located in Central Asian states to fuel the civil war in Afghanistan for maintaining their influences (Bajoria, 2009).

These causes provide enough base and justification for their support to U.S military presence in Afghanistan for a long period of time. Along with diplomatic support to U.S military presence, India is also establishing its cultural and economic links with Afghanistan and providing aid and assistance which is appreciated by U.S. Indian stance and policy towards Afghanistan with reference to Pakistan is fully endorsed by U.S policy makers and they believe that Pakistan has engaged its links with Haqani network and Afghan Taliban which will encroach U.S efforts to interrupt terrorist network and various insurgents in Afghanistan.

A joint study report by CFR also claimed about having reliable reports that intelligence services of Pakistan were involved to pledge attacks against Embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009 and apprehensive of Pakistani state for their involvement in attacks against Indian personals for reconstruction purpose existed among U.S policy makers. The report further suggested that “the United State should not allow Pakistan to exercise a de-facto veto over the dimensions of Indian involvement in Afghanistan. The United states and India should increase their intelligence sharing regarding Afghanistan” (Blackwill et al., 2011, p. 19).

The United States and India both are determine to defeat Talibam and Al-Qaeda. Both states are sharing interests and information to tackle the crisis of global terrorism as a common threat which is rooted in Afghanistan. Promoting and strengthening democracy is the most important strategy of U.S-India policy in Afghanistan to bring political stability, which is essential for their larger interest of commanding South Asia. Indian interests and efforts to reconstruct infrastructure in Afghanistan is largely supported and appreciated by U.S and they view theses Indian efforts as a part of their global agenda and putting both States into the strategic bonding.

2.6.6 Pakistani Factor: US-India Strategic Partnership

In period of estrangement, Pakistan’s factor has played an important role to construct a divergence of security perceptions which constrained the U.S-Indo relationship (Dutt, 1985, p. 86). In Indian view, U.S attempts to build up Pakistan to establish simulated parity between Pakistan and India remained one of the major causes of “uneasy relationship.” Many in Indian strategic establishment are more anxious about Pakistan as compare to troubled and fragile Afghanistan. For Indian policy makers even a diminished American military presence in Afghanistan is more about putting stress on Islamabad. India’s evolving strategic power is challenges by Pakistan by every possible means to be Hazardous for U.S.

With little variation, U.S and India both accuse Pakistan for the similar accusation of militant Islamic bomb and promoting, supporting militancy. Their concern about safety of nuclear material
in Pakistan is based on fear of proliferation in case of political and economic instability where militant and radical organizations can gain control of it. U.S and India both are deeply concerned about nuclear arsenal of Pakistan, but their policy and perception differ to deal with the problem. It is due to the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal provide deterrence against India and U.S is not a direct recipient of nuclear threat, but forestalling a nuclear holocaust in South Asia has become a prime goal of the U.S. This is the most important reason of U.S engagement with Pakistan. U.S tried to empower moderate polity in Pakistan by backing General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) to initiate a shift from confrontation to integration in South Asia, but these efforts remained fruitless due to a variety of reasons.

Strategic elites in Islamabad generally believe that U.S objectives are short-lived and often unfavourable to Pakistan’s preferences. This transitory nature of the association between U.S and Pakistan de-generated the bilateral relationship into infrequently positive and transactional relationship. This relationship is limited in scope and mainly characterized by providing access to bases and land routes into Afghanistan by Pakistan to get a reciprocal aid and assistance from the U.S. Unlike India, relevance of Pakistan only emanates due to her geopolitical realities for U.S National interests and Pakistan never has been taken as a strategic asset in a multidimensional way by Americans. Kux (2001) explicated that “from the Pakistani perspective, the legacy of past dealings with the Americans has been negative. A sense of resentment and distrust of the United States pervades Islamabad” (p. 365). U.S has also put an end to its previous and traditional policy based on ‘Zero Sum Game’ and separate treatment is incorporated for both states according to their strategic relevance to U.S national security and global goals.

On the other side, India considered Pakistan as “the epicentre of global terrorism”. Indian political elite irrespective of their party associations commonly believe that Islamabad is using terrorism as an instrument to wage a low intensity conflict to compel New Delhi for Kashmir dispute resolution. Many of Indian policy makers’ manifest that Pakistan’s anti-Indian policy will not be abandoned as military dominance in Pakistan over the politics is tied with enmity with India. Pakistan-India relations are wedged and likely to persist so and U.S-Pakistan relations are also moving downward.

2.6.7 Rise of China: U.S-India Concerns
“The United States should pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance…India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s, too.”
(Condoleezza Rice’s Foreign Affairs, 2000 as cited in Moore, 2014, p. 190)

Famous ‘four modernizations’ in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping opened China’s economy and raised the prospects of its incorporation into the global economy. This also led to normalize and expansion of China’s diplomatic relations throughout the world. The subsequent transformation of China’s economic posture endorsed it to eventually challenge the hegemony of the U.S. China pursues to be the foremost power in the Western Pacific and aims to amalgamate Asia into an exclusive economic bloc. Though China’s military abilities are not formally equivalent to those of the U.S, but it is still proficient of perpetrating ample damage to upsurge the cost of a conflict to the United States. China’s fast growing development in military and economy is making it a potential threat for U.S to an unacceptable level. Though China’s policy in Asia is not based on its military outreach and its interests are more achieved through the economics of influence rather military preponderance. China has gradually but progressively substituted the U.S as the major trading partner for nearly all the Asian states, and many of these states cogitate China as a vital vehicle for their imminent growth.

The U.S prime goal to address the rise of China gave birth to the strategy of “Rebalance Asia.” The policy was also known as “Pivot Asia” and announced in 2012 by the Obama administration. It is indicated that U.S interests in Asia-Pacific region would intensify by its emphasis on advancing and evolving new capabilities, consolidation of existing coalitions and capitalizing in major partnerships. Although the U.S and China contend on geopolitical and military standings, but they are also profoundly reliant on each other in economic terms. It has become
quite complex for U.S to counter China as it did with the USSR in Cold War due to the multifaceted nature of U.S-China relations. Accordingly, the U.S and its allies are known as ‘Maritime Democracies’ of Australia, Japan, and India caught by a difficult situation. They want the United States to shield them from any Chinese antagonism, but at the similar manner also want the U.S to be subtle to Chinese interests.

There is no renunciation that the U.S presence in Asia offers steadiness, confidence and certainty to India. This is obvious from shift of Indian foreign policy choices from support for multilateralism to acceptance of U.S primacy goal. It is an appropriate measure for its interests and India catches ease in a ‘U.S-centric world order’. United States aims to cultivate India as its effective lever to apply pressure on its strategic rival China. Its growth and rapid development in economy and military capacity is making it a new center of gravity of the world. The Chinese factor is one of the significant causes of nourishing U.S-India ties. It is also evident from the fact that Indian policy in South Asia is China-centric like U.S. 2001 was the year when during the term of George W. Bush, China was called “strategic competitor rather than strategic partner” (Fani, 2009, 134). Keeping in view its communist orientation of economy though significantly different from Soviet perception during Cold War and its advocacy for multipolar world order made U.S suspicious of China’s role in global order in conflict with U.S interests. In U.S calculations, in near future China would be able to acquire a global active role which would eventually lead towards a multipolar world order which is not in any case appropriate with U.S global designs.

The United States Department of defense in 2006 summarized their concerns in annual report about China in following way “China’s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with global aspiration is an important element in today’s strategic environment –one that has significant implications for the region and the world…China has a great potential to compete militarily with United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S military advantage” (Parlez, 2004).

The NSS of U.S in 2002 and 2005 indicated that China’s influences and capabilities intimidate region of South Asia and further suggest caution China “to mend its ways” (“The National Security Strategy,” 2002). There are several issues of conflict and disagreement between the U.S and China including Taiwan, human right, democratic practices, North Korea, proliferation, etc. Incompatibility of Interests with China initiated continuation of Containment policy which made it mandatory to balance China’s power through countervailing forces like India.

Indian is regarded as a reliable and most eligible ally in the military alliance. India and Japan are observing China’s rising economic and strategic capability and perceive her as a threat in Southern Asia. Both were in mutual strategic alliance previously in East Asia and now the new approach is to escalate their strategic collaboration with induction of a non-Asian power like U.S. Chinese economic expansion and diplomatic influence are also a source of irritation and danger for Japan, India and Australia. A nuclear armed North Korea backed by potential Chinese support is a significant factor enhancing mechanically a union of U.S, India, Japan and Australia to restrict Chinese power in East Asia and Asia Pacific region (Fani, 2009, p. 135). Political Analysts believe that U.S-India defense pact 2010 is designed to provide India a meaningful assistance to rescue her to occupy the position of a global key player, which is currently obtaining by China due to her size, population, economic and military power, power projection capacities. As well as Pakistan is concerned, due to her extremely cordial relations and closer ties with China, doesn’t fit into this triangle. An Indian analyst, Raja Mohan articulated the growing Indian concerns regarding China in a report in 2012 as;

If the centrality of China to East Asian Security was never in doubt, its role was relatively marginal to the rest of Asia until the last decade. China’s rapid rise however has raised the prospects of Beijing challenging the primacy of United States in East Asia and emerging as a player of strategic consequences in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. The increasing influence of China in this region has compelled India to rethink its own strategy towards its neighboring regions and to recalibrate its ties with the United States (Kronstadt, 2013, p. 28).
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed U.S concerns about China in following way “Unbridled China is not the U.S. interests and by bolstering India. U.S can contain China and arrest the growth Chinese influences in the Indian Ocean rim and Chinese penetration of Myanmar” (Fani, 2009, p. 136). Senior fellows at CFR, Blackwill and Tellis (2015) claim that “China represents and will remain the most significant competitor to the U.S for decades to come. As such, the need for a more coherent U.S response to increasing Chinese power is long overdue.” Many of U.S policy makers and research scholars don’t prefer to maintain the policy of integrating China into the liberal International order as they believe that these efforts have been generated various threats for U.S. To counter the consequential challenges to U.S global power, it has been recommended that Washington essentially needed a new grand strategy of balancing the rise of China rather facilitating her to preserve its ascendancy (pp. 1-54).

A renowned Pakistani scholar and expert on American foreign policy, Hafeez Malik (2008) explained that U.S is in favor of China to exist as many of American economic interests are closely attached to it due to interdependence of global economy but this existence must be on U.S terms and conditions. U.S expects from China to avoid any resistance and opposition to American security architecture in Asian region, opting a non-threatening and gradual modernization of military and most importantly eluding an Anti-American alliance (pp. 18-20).

2.7 Strategic Persuasion of United States-India Partnership

There are mainly three strategic convictions driving the strategic development between US and India.

- An influential and powerful India in International security system facilitates the American national interests.
- Sustainability of U.S influence and power in the international arena, specifically in the Asian region is profoundly in Indian national interests.
- The consistent policy collaboration between the two States in all possible dimensions of their relationship will help them to incorporate a favourable balance of power in the Asian region and beyond.

2.8 Important Official Visits: Development of Strategic Ties

The leadership of U.S and India in Post-Post-Cold War era stimulated strategic cooperation by developing cordiality and agreements through several initiatives to integrate the course of proceeding of U.S-India partnership. Beginning of strategic partnership can be identified with the historic visit of U.S President Clinton to India in 2000. Clinton gestured U.S desire to forge a new era of economic partnership and investment. President Bill Clinton’s various statements during his visit signaled the institutionalization of mutual relationship. These statements indicated that U.S realized that ignoring India over the preceding 20 years gave birth to nuclear Issues and the strategic loss. The Joint statement emphasized to deepen the India-American partnership intangible ways (Bukhari, 2011, p. 7). Later it was followed by various initiatives to enlarge the U.S-India cooperation.

S. Talbott (2004) pointed out that Clinton’s avoidance to act on Pakistan’s request to mediate on Kashmir dispute clearly indeed that U.S understood the Indian aspirations and strategic concerns (p. 205). It is important to note that this visit ended the U.S policy of balancing South Asia as Clinton after his five day visit, just paid a low profile visit of five hours to Pakistan. Clinton’s initiation to bring India closer was the clear indication that U.S now has stopped looking India as problem for foreign policy, rather it is viewed as a part of the solution to the problems of Global Order. The policies taken during Clinton Administration were far-reaching in following context:

- U.S discarded its policy of “even handed” towards India and Pakistan and a policy of “Rebalancing” was incorporated.
- U.S stopped instructing India for resolving Kashmir dispute and over other matters with Pakistan. Conduct of bilateral talks and negotiation between India and Pakistan were largely stressed.
• Under the policy of combating terrorism, U.S started taking Indian allegations on Pakistan for supporting terrorism seriously as in previous decades, these issues were taken lightly as part of India-Pakistan traditional rivalry.

Last meeting of “U.S-India defense policy group” was held in 1997 and later this forum remained inactive as a result of Indian nuclear tests in 1998 and U.S reservations over it. Regional and global developments in the second term of Clinton helped U.S to comprehend Indian apprehensions regarding its claim of being a victim of nuclear apartheid and threats emanating from U.S aiding of fragile and unstable Pakistan. This persistent dialogue process was initiated as ‘Dialogue Architecture. The Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to the U.S in September, 2000 was part of that ‘Dialogue Architecture’. This visit facilitated to endorse the wider vision of bilateral relations. U.S President Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee accentuated for the perpetuation of dialogue on Defense, security, disarmament and non-nuclear proliferation. Prospects and cooperation over trade, technology transfer and access to energy also remained in high list of priorities of both sides. New Delhi acknowledged this as a thriving development where U.S significantly considered India's security apprehensions and recognized Indian economic potential and competencies in information technology at the highest level in Washington (Hindustan Times, 2000).

Terrorist attack on twin tower in U.S in September 2001 provided India an opportunity to provide its full support to the War on Terror and allowed to use Indian bases for counter terrorist operations in South Asia. U.S President Bush in 2001 also acknowledged the growing reputation of Indian role as a responsible power in Asian politics and its determination as the largest and vibrant democracy of the world. Bush primarily enlarged the U.S stakes by strategically betting on India and pursuing a wide-ranging opening toward it. Four major strategic areas of “Civil nuclear energy, missile defense, high tech commerce and civilian space program” were identified to foster cooperation between the two states to carry a momentum into their relationships (Burns, 2007).

As a part of U.S grand strategy, strategic cooperation and expanded support to India emerged as an effective mean to contain competitive and rising China in coming years. Bush administration regarded this wider strategic association with India as an inevitably essential, which could not yielded until or unless U.S altered its previous stand view towards Indian stance on nuclear proliferation. American strategist viewed India as a counterbalance force on the bases of its potential nuclear ability against China’s nuclearization and military build-up. According to Joseph Cirincione, dealing with China in future said that “India would be more valuable as a nuclear power, rather than a non-nuclear country”. Finally, a “high-handed approach” towards the nuclearization in South Asia was embraced and Americans were deliberately muted on the Indian Nuclear program (Ejaz, 2012, p. 139). The Bush administration’s foreign policy measures towards Asia were characterized by an Indian focused line which further enhanced the transformation process of relations. Regional and global U.S compulsions enlarged the prospects of nuclear engagement with India through its access to nuclear technology. Under the Bush presidency, prime focus on security and strategic cooperation was on three major tasks which included arms trade, combating terrorism and military cooperation. A Significant development took place in this era when India supported missile defense Program of U.S which was previously never appreciated during the period of Cold War as India maintained good relations with the USSR.

Clinton’s initiated policy to engage India into a strategic relationship was further strengthened by a meeting between Indian External Affairs, Jaswant Singh and Condoleezza Rice as National Security Adviser in April 2001. President Bush informally met with the Jaswant Singh in the Oval office, which was much appreciated by New Delhi and viewed as a goodwill gesture towards India. In May 2001, U.S Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage made his presence in India to obtain Indian support to American Missile defense plan. While many American allies condemned U.S missile defense plan, however India clearly supported the Washington’s stand. Jaswant Singh expounded that two countries are “endeavoring to work out together a totally new security regime which is for the entire globe” (Kronstadt, 2013, p. 3).
However the momentum of this thriving relationship was hampered to some extent as Pakistan overnight re-emerged as a crucial geopolitical actor for U.S in aftermath of terrorist attacks on September 2001. This led India to question “With whom will the American align them?” (Kronstadt, 2013, p. 2). In an altered security environment, U.S relinquished the proliferation based sanctions for India and Pakistan. Policy of appeasing Pakistan by U.S was resented by India, which fetched challenges for Washington. Indian allegations over Pakistan for State terrorism were further augmented by terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament complex in December 2001. U.S was in a difficult situation as it “was to avoid either leaning on Pakistan too hard, which could hurt in Afghanistan, or not leaning on Pakistan hard enough, which would alienate New Delhi” (p. 8).

Though the disagreement and unease was persisted on the Indian side over the issue of declaring Pakistan a major ally in the War on terror, U.S-India relations were further reinforced after a meeting between U.S President and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in November 2001. Both political leaders agreed to extend the areas of cooperation by extending to joint Military exercises, civil nuclear safety, arms sale, regional security, scientific collaborations, space, security, counterterrorism and economy. Another important move was initiating a defense partnership in 2001 by establishing a U.S-India defense Policy Group followed by high level and regular policy dialogue (Kronstadt, 2013, p. 2). The year 2001 was also characterized by Indian efforts to pursue cooperation in three extensive areas which is known as ‘Trinity’ including civilian space cooperation, civil nuclear cooperation and facilitation by lowering the restrictions on dual-use high technology. India considered cooperation in ‘Trinity’ essential to transform the relationship in a tangible way (p. 6). Relevance of India for U.S strategic and global goals was emphasized by U.S-India Military Cooperation fact sheet of 2002 as stated “the United States views its relations with India as central to maintain long term stability of our armed relationship is essential for achieving these goals.”

This relationship grew tremendously under the Presidency of George W Bush and touched its fullest manifestation by the first major weapon deal in more than 10 years in 2002 and signing of U.S-India Nuclear Agreement in 2005. George Washington Bush (Junior) acknowledged India’s role to strengthen the means and the process to achieve his two paramount goal of:

1. War on Terror
2. Promotion of democracy

January 2004, witnessed another U.S-India Joint Statement to strengthen strategic partnership by Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee and President Bush, assuring cooperation in “Trinity” areas. Joint statement also included an extension of dialogue on Missile defense, later it was called as ‘Quartet’ As a result of consensus over ‘Quartet’ areas, a loud expression of interests for a strategic relationship by President George Bush (Junior). U.S and India developed an official consensus to establish a working group to negotiate the extent of nuclear cooperation and Indian determination to non-proliferation (Saran, 2005, p. 4). To overcome the divergence and disagreement, U.S and India institutionalized their consultations through a “New Framework of Dialogue.” This new phase of strategic engagement specifically focused on “civil nuclear cooperation” and “high-technology transfer” and trade. Cooperation was further elaborated by the Bangalore Space Conference from 21-25 June, 2004 which apparently transformed the estranged relationship into strategic engagement.

On September 17, 2004 strategic cooperation was obvious through the announcement of “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) Initiative.” This clearly indicated the U.S orientation of providing promising support to India in nuclear field. The first phase of the NSSP encompassed such measures to address the proliferation apprehensions, concerns and compliance of cooperation strategies and polices according to U.S export controls. Fast growing momentum of strategic cooperation also led U.S to introduce relevant modifications in its export licensing rules to foster collaboration in commercial space programs and permitting certain exports to Indian power plants with safeguarded nuclear facilities (US-India Joint Statement, 2004).
Arrival of Condoleezza Rice in U.S Administration as Secretary of State further enhanced transformation of the relationship between U.S and India. During her visit to India in March 2005, she clearly stressed that U.S would modify its long-held approach of balancing its bilateral relations with India and Pakistan. Her visit developed new keystone of relationship by assuring Foreign Minister of India Jaswant Singh about U.S policy of altering its long held strategy of balancing India and Pakistan. She further explained that U.S would reframe its long standing non-proliferation orthodoxy and steps would be taken to provide nuclear cooperation (Fani, 2009, p. 137). She also specified the U.S new policy of ‘De-hyphenate’ which was characterized by pursuing highly individual relations with both traditional rivals of South Asia. Rice also assured Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh that the “U.S would break its long-standing non-proliferation orthodoxy and work to establish full civil nuclear cooperation with energy-starved India” (Burns, 2007, p. 135). It was generally assumed in U.S strategic thought that by earnestly undertaking the Indian apprehensions regarding nuclear discrimination against her, it would gradually allow U.S to outline a more precisely striving strategic ties. Nicolas Burns justified U.S altered policy over the proliferation as previous efforts to restrict India through non-proliferation regime were largely failed. Many in the American strategic community like Nicolas assume that U.S would modernize and strengthen the non-proliferation regime while allowing India and the U.S to forge a larger and more ambitious partnership.

Another groundbreaking defense agreement entitled “New Framework for the U.S-India defense Relationship” was signed between U.S and India on June 18, 2005 in the Washington, D.C. This was the first ever effort institutionalizing defense ties between U.S and India. This defense agreement was signed by U.S Secretary of defense Rice and Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee. “Joint weapons production, cooperation on missile defense and the transfer of civil and military technology to India” were identified as the core areas of defense cooperation (Dawn, 2005). This defense agreement enlarged the prospects of lifting of U.S export controls for sensitive military technology. The agreement was largely intended to accomplish two main objectives:

- To advance U.S strategic goals in Asia and managing the potential threats.
- To empower India as a regional and gradually a significant global power player with essentially equipped with military and nuclear potential that may project its manifestations beyond its boundaries (Mehmood, 2005).

During the first visit of Indian prime minister Man Mohan Singh to U.S in July 2005, India was offered all possible civil nuclear energy collaboration and U.S also assured her to avail same amenities given to a member-state of NPT (Dawn, 2005). A joint statement of July 2005 was a landmark in which President George Bush acknowledged India as “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology” (Ejaz, 2012, p. 142). He further professed the promise “to help India to become a major world power in 21st century” (Bukhari, 2011, p. 9). U.S President showed his determination to seek adjustment in laws from congress and U.S policy according to the strategic cooperation and said that India should obtain the same benefits and advantage as other such states (Ejaz, 2012, p. 144). U.S President also affirmed commitment to get relaxation from other friends and allies to adjust International regime to provide trade and civil nuclear energy cooperation with India (Bukhari, 2011, p. 8). State Department also considered completion of NSSP as a milestone of strategic partnership. Indian Prime Minister Singh also acknowledged the Bush stance by saying that “India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibility and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with nuclear technology, such as the United States” (Ejaz, 2012, p. 144).

More advances were observed in U.S-India strategic partnership in 2006 when India was declared as a key player for enlarging U.S role as a global power. In 2006, NSS asserted that “India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way be fitting a major power” (National Security Strategy, 2006). A significant joint statement was declared on March 2, 2006 by Man Mohan Sign and George W. Bush which emphasized the strategies to advance the strategic partnership to deal with the global challenges. A Joint statement was emphasized on completion of dialogues on nuclear cooperation and India separation plan (Nuclear
Facility). India’s separation plan placed 14 out of 22 reactors under safeguards, consisted of approximating 65% of total output of nuclear energy. This joint statement also included cooperation in investment and agriculture, the environment, military logistics support, public health, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and more significantly maritime cooperation (Bukhari, 2011, p. 11). The Joint Statement also declared that “the historic accomplishment will permit our countries to move forward towards our common objective of full nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States and between the Indian and the international community as a whole” (Ejaz, 2012, p. 146).

December 2006 witnessed another thrust into U.S.-India strategic cooperation when a strong bipartisan majority in American Congress approved the “Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act” (Hyde Act) approving the initiative and allowing U.S investment in the civil nuclear power industry in India (Ejaz, 2012, p. 146). Approval of such policies in an American legislature validated a vast change in U.S perceptions and manifestations regarding some significant areas of global and Asian politics, where India was now declared as an indeed strategic partner. The immediate outcome of this American legislation was nothing but an overnight transformation of Indian status from a victim of structural discrimination by NPT rules to a stakeholder of International non-proliferation regime. Though for the functional benefits to India, a formal agreement was mandatory to provide a legitimate underpinning for advancing the further developments into bilateral nuclear collaboration. Hyde Act was modified by altering the section 123 of “U.S Atomic Power Act” for authorization of nuclear cooperation between the United States and India. It was concluded in July 2007 as “123 Agreement”, after long and sometimes hard negotiations (Burns, 2007, p. 136).

Victory of Indian National Congress in May 2009 elections in India provided sound bases to Indian PM Man Mohan Singh to act independent of anti-American leftist parties and this led to initiate more encouraging conditions to strengthen the partnership. Reaffirmation of strategic partnership was more evident by state visit of Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh to Washington D.C. on November 2009. Later this partnership was further enhanced by President Barack Obama’s three day state visit to India in November 2010 who specifically called this relationship a “defining partnerships of the 21st century.” Obama became the second U.S President who addressed the joint session of Parliament of India. He also supported India’s permanent membership of the Security Council. President Obama while considering India a critical pillar of U.S security strategy demanded deepening cooperation with structures of power that embrace India. The U.S President emphasized by adding that “India is indispensable to the future that we seek.” While Supporting the Indian stance exporting terrorism by Pakistan, Joint Statement Issued on November 8, 2010 declared a clear condemnation to “terrorism in all its forms” and established the consensus that “all terrorist networks including Laskar-e-Taiba must be defeated” (Bishoyi, 2011, p. 73).

In November 2010, a momentous speech by President Obama to the Joint Session of Indian Parliament, laid out the wide-ranging, but fundamental interests determining the U.S.-India partnership:

Now, India is not the only emerging power in the world. But the relationship between our countries is unique. We are two strong democracies whose constitutions begin with the same revolutionary words—"We the people." We are two great republics dedicated to the liberty and justice and equality of all people. And we are two free market economies where people have the freedom to pursue ideas and innovation that can change the world. And that’s why I believe that India and America are indispensable partners in meeting the challenges of our time (Kronstadt & Pinto, 2013, p. 39).

Obama’s visit was an effort to reassure India that America valued the strategic partnership and envisioned to shape a genuine strategic association on the advancement made during Bush presidency (Ejaz, 2012, p. 152). Significant developments of Obama’s visit to India comprised of

- U.S efforts to endorse the Indian’s claim for a permanent seat in the UNSC. This commitment was expressed during Obama address to the Indian Parliament in following
words “I can say today… in years ahead, I look forward to a reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent member” (Bukhari, 2011, 11).

✔ Announced the reduction of ‘Controls on the export of high technology items (Ejaz, 2012, p. 152)
✔ During Obama’s visit, the commitment was made to strengthen ties by giving India an influential role in Africa and Afghanistan.
✔ This visit also brought $14.9 billion trade deal at Indian door and also insured for adopting measures for Indian defence and space companies from a restricted ‘entities risk’. Agreements between Washington and New Delhi brought the offer of C-17 and F-35 aircraft and defence related equipment from U.S (“Timeline US India,”).
✔ Obama supported the Indian stance of allegation on Pakistan for being an advantageous place for terrorists and reaffirmed the commitment to help India by saying that “We will continue to insist to Pakistan’s leaders that terrorist safe-heavens within their borders are unacceptable” (Ejaz, 2012, p. 153).
✔ These State visits helped both countries to devise a long term framework of relations to Pivot Asia.

Obama administration played a significant role to transform this strategic relation further. Its special focus on the ‘Indo-Centric policy’ provided strength to the continued process of upgrading the strategic partnership with India with the following measures

- Advancement of Indian role as global power
- Accelerating the implementation process of U.S-India nuclear deal
- Enlarging the military to military interactions through expanding the defence trade and joint ventures
- Augmenting the anti-terrorist cooperation, especially in the process of reconstruction of Afghanistan to ensure regional stability
- Increasing the bilateral trade engagements and intensifying the cooperation over multi trade issues and areas
- Widening the cooperation over the public health, agriculture and education (p. 148).

Obama’s NSS 2010 provided that U.S-India strategic partnership is essential for global stability and peace. This security strategy document authenticated the Obama’s administration’s approach towards India by asserting the determination to uphold military to military contacts and to address the International security challenges through cooperation with like-minded allies. This document also places India as “twenty-first century center of influence in Asia and pledged to deepen cooperation with it” (p. 115). The document further stated that:

United States and India are building a strategic partnership that is underpinned by our shared interests, our shared values as the world’s two largest democracies and close connections among our people. India’s responsible advancement serves as a positive example for developing nations and provides an opportunity for increased economic, scientific environment and security partnership. Working together through our strategic Dialogue and high level visits, we seek a broad-based relationship in which India contributes to global counter terrorism efforts, non-proliferation and helps promote poverty reduction, education, health and sustainable agriculture. We value India’s growing leadership on a wide array of global issues through groups such as the G-20, and will seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in the world (Ejaz, 2012, 152).

<p>| Table: 2.1 Important Official Visits and Meetings of U.S and India 2000-2010 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------|----------------------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visits of Head of the State/Government or official</th>
<th>Dealing Persons</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Strategic Development and Conclusions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
| Bill Clinton  
U.S President | Atal B. Vajpayee  
Indian Prime Minister | March 20, 2000 | • First visit of US President after 22 years  
• Joint Statement 2000  
• Expressed US intentions to forge a new economic partnership with India  
• Signed Vision 21st century on common interests as Strategic Partners  
• Efforts were made to institutionalize of relation  
• Rebalancing of Asia |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Atal B. Vajpayee  
India Prime Minister | Bill Clinton  
U.S President | September, 2000 | • Visit was part of dialogue Architecture  
• New paradigm in Indo-U.S relations  
• Recognition of democracy as a common factor |
| Condoleezza Rice  
U.S Secretary of State | Natwar Singh  
Minister of External Affairs of India | March 15, 2005 | • Visit underscored an upswing in relations  
• Initiated a dialogue on energy security  
• Conformation of de-hyphenate U.S policy  
• Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India was announced |
| Pranab Mukherjee  
Indian Defense Minister | Donald Rumsfeld  
U.S Secretary of Defense | June 28, 2005 | • Supersedes the 'Agreed Minute on Defence Relations signed in January 1995  
• Signed New Defence Framework which initiates defence cooperation in maritime security, humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism  
• In this connection, both countries conducted the largest naval exercises in October |
| Manmohan Singh  
Indian Prime Minister | George W. Bush  
U.S President | July 18, 2005 | • Initiated “Landmark Civil Nuclear Deal” a ten-year Defence Framework  
• India was offered all possible Civil Nuclear Energy cooperation to promote nuclear trade with her  
• India agreed to place all its civil- resources under IAEA safeguards |
| George W. Bush  
U.S President | Manmohen Singh  
Indian Prime Minister | March 1, 2006 | • Both finalized the framework of the Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
<td>S. M Krishna</td>
<td>July 17-20, 2009</td>
<td>Four day exclusive visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S Secretary of State</td>
<td>Indian Minister of External Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intentions were expressed by Hillary for an active expected Indian role at regional and global forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manmohen Singh</td>
<td>Barack Obama</td>
<td>November 24, 2009</td>
<td>Reaffirmed strategic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Prime Minister</td>
<td>U.S President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Michael Gates</td>
<td></td>
<td>January 19-20, 2010</td>
<td>Two day trip to India before Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Praised India for its dynamic market and democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Geithner</td>
<td>Pranab Mukherjee</td>
<td>April 5, 2010</td>
<td>To launch a new Indo-US Economic and Financial Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S Treasury Secretary</td>
<td>Indian Finance Minister</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arranged Ministerial-level meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A delegation headed by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krishna</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>June 1, 2010</td>
<td>President Obama attended the official reception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Minister of External Affairs</td>
<td>U.S Secretary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Convened the first U.S India Strategic Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barak Obama</td>
<td></td>
<td>November 5, 2010</td>
<td>Three days visit, addressed Indian Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supported India’s long held bid for UNSC membership as permanent member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Announced trade deals between U.S and India worth of $ 14.9 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This table is compiled by researcher on the basis of information available at [http://www.cfr.org/india/timeline-us-india-relations](http://www.cfr.org/india/timeline-us-india-relations)

### 2.9 U.S-India Strategic Partnership: Core Areas and Pillars of Cooperation

U.S-India Global strategic partnership is built on three tiers which include people to people contacts, Business to Business contacts and Government to Government contacts. Growing junction of interests brought unprecedented cooperation to benefit the citizens of two major democracies of the world. Strategic partnership is built on five central and broad themes. U.S-India Strategic cooperation is enormous in nature and multi-sectorial which ranges from

- Defence
- Trade and investment
- People to people contacts
2.9.1 Energy (Clean Energy) cooperation

As a part of world’s ten largest economies, top five greenhouse gas emitters and world’s fourth largest oil consumer, India has important stakes in global clean energy, climate change. The U.S-India energy dialogue was launched on May 31, 2005, to encourage trade and investments in the energy sector. Five working groups have been established covering a vast range of issues related to energy which is following;

- Oil and Gas
- Coal
- Energy efficiency and Power
- New technologies and renewable energies
- Civil nuclear cooperation

Dialogue also incorporated on areas like export of liquefied natural gas from U.S. to India, the enhanced generation of energy from low carbon resources. The U.S-India partnership to advance clean energy was commenced in 2009 which has mobilized more than $1.7 billion for clean projects in India. This partnership not only benefited India, but also provided enough investments to American companies mainly from California. U.S. companies installed 40% of India first 1000 megawatts of solar energy (Ejaz, 1999): In November 2010, both countries signed an agreement for cooperation on Joint Clean Energy Research and Development Centre (JCERDC). This was comprised of team of scientists for both sides to promote clean energy innovation initiatives. Three research projects are funded by JCERDC;

- Solar energy
- Generation bio-fuels
- Energy efficiency for building

Both governments committed to provide funding of 50 million $. Moreover, both governments showed their determination to provide 5 million $ each annually for the next five years as a contribution to research cost.

2.9.2 Education collaboration

Education collaboration is one of the important areas of U.S-India cooperation which is growing fast. "More than one Lac Indians students are getting a formal education in U.S educational institutes which are the second largest number of foreign students after China. Singh-Obama
knowledge initiatives, in 2009 led toward considering educational sector an integral part of the strategic partnership. Later India-U.S higher education submits held in 2011 followed by higher educational dialogue in 2012-13. India students received extensive opportunities as full-bright scholarship program and innovative educational joint venture were designed to further strengthen the bond between the two countries. Program like ‘Contact India’ and ‘Passport to India’ expanded the presence of Indian students." India is also keen to follow the United States model of community colleges for vocational education and skill development. Moreover 126 junior faculty members were selected to work in U.S under the Raman fellowship program for post Doc. Faculty exchange and other collaboration are also part of this strategic cooperation ("The US-India Partnership," 2010).

2.9.3 Cooperation in science and technology

An agreement in Science and technology cooperation was signed in October, 2005 which was followed by setting up Joint Commission 2010 which devised an action plan till 2014 and conducted several activities such as Joint Projects, workshop, exchange visits of scientists, and establishment of virtual networking in various disciplines like Basic and Applied Sciences, Environmental and earth Sciences, health and medical Sciences. India-U.S science and technology forum IUSSTF incorporated between U.S. and Indian Scientists. Moreover, this forum supported ten virtual joint research centers, thirty bi-literal workshops, three technology transfer program, four advance schools and provided various students and faculty fellowship. The science and technology endowment boards STEV established in 2009 also initiated projects on improving health and empowering citizens.

In July 2011, an agreement was signed between the United States department of energy and Indian department of atomic energy which paved the ground for collaborating mechanism in various fields like high intensity supper conducting radio frequency proton accelerator and related physical research. Collaboration was further enhanced between the Indian Ministry of Earth Sciences and U.S National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, which reinforced under the MOU on Earth observation and Earth science. Under the United States-India Agricultural Dialogue “Monsoon Desk” was initiated at the U.S National Centre for environment predication.

Keeping in view the long history of cooperation in Civil Space a joint bi-literal working group established. The group has conducted four meetings till arch 2013 working group has extended cooperation in following areas;
- Exchange of Scientists
- Cooperation on Mars mission
- Nano-satellites
- International space station
- Global navigation satellite system
- Space exploration

2.9.4 Cooperation in health sector

This is another significant area of cooperation which is experiencing a strong collaboration to deal with a wide range of issues. The U.S and India have developed a thriving relationship in bio-medical and behavioral health sciences, especially researches related to HIV Aid, debates, cardiovascular disease. India, in June 2005 became the part of collaboration between governments of U.S and Ethiopia for reducing all preventable child deaths by 2035. Under the health initiatives four working groups were organized in the following areas;
- Strengthening health system and services
- Infectious diseases
- Health system and services
- Maternal and Child Health
Low cost medical technology, disease preventions, tackling the sour age of diabetes, Rotavirus vaccine, environmental and occupational health, vaccine development are sub-areas of cooperation.

2.9.5 Cultural and people to people cooperation

More than three million Indian Americans reside in U.S, which provides a large number of human resources in terms of contributing as professionals, educationist and entrepreneurs. This increased Indian political strength in U.S and expanded her influence as an Indian American community is very much significant to fostering relationship and developing ties between the two countries. These Indian Americans not only embraced the local values, but also a major driver of making Indian traditions and cultural patterns familiar to U.S society. Furthermore the presence of more than 100,000 Indian students in U.S is creating the mutual bonds.

Establishment of the "Indian Ministry of Culture Vivekananda Chair at the University of Chicago and an agreement signed between the Ministry of Culture and Art Institute of Chicago for upgrading the skills and potential of museum professionals. Cultural cooperation included activates besides the official agreements. Various U.S academic institutions are offering courses covering Indian history, Art and culture. U.S Embassy is involved with the Indian American Community to organize Indian series which are following:

- Indian Reading Series related to the work of Indian authors and writers
- Performing Indian Series featuring dance, music and Theatre
- Beholding Indian Series, which include film screening, art and photo exhibitions
- Understanding Indian Series comprising the lectures on cross sectional views of India
- Young Indian Series, which caters cultural events for younger audiences
- Spark Lab Project aims to introduce scientific concepts through playing techniques and toys to kids.

Along these official arrangements and people to people contact, Indian Community is influencing through the internet based information broadcasting Indian media is working in a striking way. TV channels like NDVT, TIMES, CNN-IBN and ASIA TV and Newspapers like Times of India, The Hindus, Times, Outlook, Telegraph, Pioneer have correspondents based in the U.S. They are effective to influence public opinion to some extent. These Indian media dynamics are playing significant role for lobbying the Indian interests in U.S. Services and working of these non official entities directly and indirectly intensify the India-U.S strategic cooperation.

CHAPTER-3

MANOEUVRING FOR DEFENCE AND CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

3.1 United States-India Defense Agreements
Throughout the history of U.S-India strategic relationship, defense diplomacy has played a remarkable role to develop confidence and mutual trust between the two countries. This also helped to facilitate the collaborations in political and economic fields. Defense diplomacy is the result of an altered approach of both countries where America maintained the ‘cooperative engagement’ with the armed forces of like-minded countries and India reoriented its foreign policy conception and actively adopted a modest level of cooperation with U.S. An Indian scholar, Saroj Bishoyi* (2011) highlighted that “India has also moved away from its traditional emphasis on the ‘power of the argument’ towards the ‘argument of power’” (p. 65). Indian COAS, Gen. Deepak Kapoor (2007-2010) expounded that “defense diplomacy, thus not only promotes interoperability between the armed forces and good defense relations among the participating countries but, in a wider context, creates mutual confidence and trust between the countries at large.” There are three significant reasons of U.S-India defense diplomacy;

- India’s stable status as a regional power
- Indian as a potential economic market for defence sales and nuclear energy related items and investments
- India's potential to balance Asian region (p. 67).

Barack Obama, an American President and Man Mohan Singh, an Indian Prime Minister (2004-2014) both granted that “U.S and India’s converging security interests and shared values make the countries natural partners.” The United States-India factsheets expounded that “The U.S-India defense relations have grown from solely military to military links into a mature partnership that encompasses dialogues, exercises, defense sales, professional military education exchanges and practical cooperation” (p.68). This defense diplomacy is consisted of

- Joint exercises
- Growing defense trade
- Personal exchanges
- Collaborations in Maritime securities
- Counter piracy operations
- Exchanges between the services
- Consultation for technology transfer policies
- Co-development and co-production of defense system (p. 68).

The U.S and India signed “Agreed Minutes on Defense Relations” in the year of 1995. Ten years later both countries concluded another defense agreement in the wake of changes into regional and global security perspectives. “New Framework for the Defense Relationship” was signed on June 28, 2005 between U.S Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee. The document of framework spell out the determinations stated as;

“We are transforming our relationship to reflect our common principles and shared national interests. As the world’s two largest democracies, the United States and India agree on the vital importance of political and economic freedom, democratic institutions, and the rule of law, security, and opportunity around the world. The leaders of our two countries are building a U.S-India strategic partnership in pursuit of these principles and interests” (“New Framework for the U.S-India,” 2005, p. 1).

It further elucidated that U.S-India strategic relationship was drawn from “common belief in freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and seeks to advance shared security interests.” Moreover, this document also listed the interests based on the convergence of both countries as;

- Ensuring stability and security
- Countering terrorism and aggressive religious tendencies
- Averting the proliferation of WMD and relevant resources and technologies.
- Safeguarding the free flow of land, sea and air trade lines and routes (p. 1)

The ‘Defense Policy Group’ (DPG) was considered as a prime mechanism to direct the U.S-India strategic development and cooperation. Two subordinate forums were also established as “The Defense Procurement and Production Group” and “The Joint Working Group.” For the

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accomplishment of these defined areas of interests, the Framework also provided the means and methods to obtain these common goals, significantly mentioned as:

- Joint exercises and exchanges
- Collaboration and participation in multinational operations based on shared interests
- Reinforcement of both militaries to enhance the potential
- Enlarged interactions with other countries to advance stability and peace at the regional and global level
- Boosting capabilities to combat the challenges of spread of WMD
- Expansion of bilateral defense trade and transactions to aid strategic cooperation and enlarging the interactions and understanding between the defense establishment of both countries
- In the context of defense trade, it also stresses over the technology transfer, co-production and collaboration in research and development.
- Collaboration in missile defense
- Intelligence sharing
- Frequent strategic consultations and discussions (p.3)

3.2 U.S-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation

India is one of those states who denied to sign nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) of 1968 on the claim of its structural prejudice. India always claimed its nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 as peaceful energies to ensure defense needs and to attain nuclear energy for civilian resolutions. Leonard Weiss elucidated that “India’s nuclear development has been accompanied by a dual track strategy of developing and building weapons while criticizing the non-proliferation regime as discriminatory and simultaneously making public statements and proposals in favor of nuclear disarmament” (Weiss, 2010).

In 1954, India held up the idea of a test ban on atomic bomb and in 1963 also signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) (Ejaz, 2001, p. 2). Later, India neither signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) nor engaged with NPT or Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) as it remained out of the global non-proliferation system and did not become eligible for commercial trade in nuclear material. In 1996, India refused to sign when CTBT was presented to a special session of UN General Assembly to accomplish NPT aims. Indian refusals are largely based on following threat perceptions and reservations;

- Opposition to the discriminatory structure and nature of the non-proliferation system by calling it a ‘nuclear apartheid’
- Indian’s denial is also based on its major power ambitions and desire of not losing its ‘nuclear option’
- India’s geographical location close to nuclear power China, a potential competitor and Pakistan, the nuclear weapon state whose relations with India is characterised by enmity creates a sense of insecurity.
- Indian belief about incompetency and ineffectual of NPT regime and system
- India claimed that CTBT doesn’t ensure a complete disbarment and it just aims to reinforce the nuclear hegemony of ‘Big Five’. After its rejection from American Senate, it lost its moral ground (pp. 5-6).

Since 1970s, Indian objections are built on moral grounds concerning “Vertical and Horizontal proliferation.” India claims that precedence to ‘Horizontal proliferation' stresses to make such laws which only restrict non-nuclear weapon states and this leads to divide the world into “nuclear haves and haves not” (Rajain, 2005, p. 270). Indian apprehensions over discriminated nuclear options were well expressed by Homi Bhabha at a Conference drafting the IAEA statute in 1956 by conveying clearly that “We stand on the brink of a dangerous era sharply dividing the world into atomic ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ dominated by the Agency” (Weiss, 2010, p. 259).

Indian policy towards nuclear weapons and nonproliferation is largely manifested by the influences and perceptions of three schools of thought primarily pronouncing the following arguments;
Originated from ‘Gandhian and Nehruvian’ thought, ‘Immoral argument’ demands for a global nuclear disarmament.

“Prestige argument” highlights the significance of nuclear bomb of glory and prestige of Indian state rather its value as security resource.

Third is ‘security argument’ which stresses the value of deterrence power as a valid justification for possessing nuclear arsenals (Rajain, 2005, p. 273).

Jaswant Singh, a former Indian External Affairs Minister who very first time coined the term ‘Nuclear Apartheid’ argued for Indian right to stay nuclear due to persisted realities, including nuclear armed Pakistan and China and threats emanating from militarization in West Asia. He claimed that “India could not accept a flawed non-proliferation regime as the international norm when all realities conclusively demanded the contrary” (Kronstadt, 2013, p. 38). Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajapayi (1996-2004) while addressing the Indian parliament clearly expounded the Indian stance on nuclear program.

Our decision not to sign the NPT was in keeping with our basic objectives. In 1974, we demonstrated our nuclear capability. Successive Governments thereafter have taken all necessary steps in keeping with that resolve and national will, to safeguard India’s nuclear option. This was the primary reason behind the 1996 decision for not signing the CTBT, a decision that also enjoyed consensus of this House. The decades of the 80’s and 90’s had meanwhile witnessed the gradual deterioration of our security environment as a result of nuclear and missile proliferation. In our neighborhood, nuclear weapons had increased and more sophisticated delivery systems inducted. In addition, India has also been the victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism, militancy and clandestine war. At a global level, we see no evidence on the part of the nuclear-weapons states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free-world. Instead, we have seen that the NPT has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally, perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five countries.

India established ‘Atomic Energy Commission’ (AEC) in 1948 with an objective of exploration of its mineral resources for the progress of ‘industrial atomic energy’ and scientific and technical training of Indian personal in the nuclear field. Later Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was also established under the direct control of Indian Prime Minister in 1954 (Mahmood, n.d., p. 92).

Indian development of nuclear energy was commenced under the U.S program of “Atom for Peace” in 1950s. For the material and equipment, India was facilitated by the cooperation from U.S, Canada, France, UK and Belgium. Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) was established in the year of 1969 with U.S cooperation as a result of an agreement concluded in 1963 for thirty years for the supply of enriched uranium. With the help of Canada, it also sets up the second nuclear power station in 1964 (Nawaz, 1985, p. 25).

Indo-Sino War of 1962 played a key role to shape the Indian nuclear designs as it faced humiliation at Chinese hands. Further, China’s nuclear explosions of 1964 also strengthened Indian determinations to go nuclear without any ambiguity. Soon after the show of China’s nuclear capability, Homi Bhabha as chairman of AEC claimed that “India too could produce a nuclear bomb within eighteen months if it so wished” (Mahmood, 1995, p. 93). Later in 1964, Lal Bhadhar Shastri, Indian Prime Minister also asserted that his country is determined for peaceful uses of nuclear energy but this policy could alter in future. He was the one who provided approval to AEC to work on ‘nuclear explosive technologies. Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister in 1972 informed the lower house of Indian Parliament that they had been working on underground ‘nuclear explosive technologies’ (Rizvi, n.d., p. 12). This was soon evident by an Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 in Rajasthan at a place called Pokharan.

As a principle supplier of nuclear fuel, Canada strongly blamed India however U.S response to Indian nuclear explosion was somewhat indifferent. This mild American reaction was apparent from the State Department release stating that “It was only a matter of Indian leaders
making up their minds and devoting the necessary resources” (Perkovich, 1999, p. 211). Hennery Kissinger (U.S National Security Adviser 1969-1975) also expounded that “public castigation wouldn’t undo the event, and it would only add to U.S-India bilateral problems and reduce the influence Washington might have on India’s nuclear policy future” (as cited in Kux, 1993). Later Kissinger in a hearing before the U.S Senate Committee asserted that India did not infringe any American agreement. He claimed that “We (the U.S) objected (to the Pokhran test by India) strongly, but since there was no violation of U.S agreements involved, we had no specific leverage on which to bring our objections to bear” (Perkovich, 1999, pp. 523-524).

It has been manifested by many writers on U.S-Indo relations that due to persistent disagreement and strains, U.S did prefer not to emphasize the proliferation issue with India at the moment. After the Indian nuclear explosions, U.S decided to reschedule Indian debts. Moreover, in 1974, U.S also shipped an installment of earlier approved uranium fuel for TAPS in India (Rajain, 2005, p. 211). Though ‘U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission’ (NRC) attempted to disturb the supplies to TAPS as it was suspended in 1980. Afterwards, American President Jimmy Carter overruled the recommendations of the NRC and its fuel supply was resumed. Later a mutual agreement between India, U.S and France as third party was made a supply of nuclear fuel till the life of that agreement.

It clearly provided that U.S did not have much apprehensions regarding letting India nuclear but these were American domestic legislations and laws which limited the powers of policy makers to continue the supply. Despite United States trivial condemnation of Indian nuclear tests, U.S-India relations were partially strained by reflex activation of U.S non-proliferation procedures following the nuclear test of 1974. These non-proliferation measures included Glenn-Symington amendments, Foreign Assistance Act, nuclear proliferation Act of 1978 and most significantly establishment of western suppliers based ‘London Club’ striking the ‘full scope safeguards’ for averting the horizontal proliferation. These strategies to counter proliferation kept India in isolation on all nuclear issues from the rest of the world for thirty years (Gupta, 2012, p. 76).

U.S-India nuclear cooperation was initiated partially in 1985 over the transfer of technology by signing a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ and ‘Kick Lighter Proposals’ to enhance a strategic vision in 1991. Kick lighter proposals were initiated by Gen. Claude Kicklighter of United States Pacific Command to develop contacts and cooperation between the military establishments of two states. This paved grounds for further defense cooperation as it was the first comprehensive effort which focused mainly on strategic dialogue, consultative mechanisms, training and visits of officials of both sides and other exchanges (Mishra, 2015, p. 3).

An Indian explosion in 1998 and Pakistan’s counter response within few days foster the arms race in South Asian region, which was strongly condemned by U.S through imposing strict sanctions on both countries. Along with theses strict measures, U.S continued to intact with India and Pakistan to diminish the chances of escalation of conflict as a part of their traditional rivalry. However Kargil conflict led U.S to understand Indian stand view for continuing the nuclear option. Jaswant Singh manifested that “the U.S support to India on Kargil was both recognition of the correctness of India’s case and the folly of Pakistan’s misadventure. It is recognition, too, of the altering geostrategic contours in the region.” Rajain (2005) expounded that in this era, CTBT was shelved and U.S was no more interested to pressurize India to settle Kashmir rather insisted that India and Pakistan should resolve their issues through dialogue. To accommodate the divergent expectations for enhancing the bilateral relations between U.S and India, the nuclear issue was put aside (p. 263).

India thrived in achieving its objectives of paving grounds to legitimize her nuclearization and creating a modification in strategic thinking regarding the relevance of India for global and regional goals. The U.S strategic thinkers also contended the policy of keeping India outside the nuclear regime, despite its potential and advancement in nuclear technology. Some researches advocated for “an accommodating attitude towards Indian proliferation” while many urged that “U.S-India relationship should be at the core of America’s Southern Asian policy.” Few of them still called
for a balanced approach to both India and Pakistan; however none of these studies recommended a mediatory role of U.S over Kashmir dispute or providing military and economic assistance to South Asia. The CFR report specifically for India advocated “The medium-term policy challenge is to complete the transition from past estrangement through constructive engagement on to genuine partnership” (Rajain, 2005, p. 265). Adviser to the U.S under Secretary of State, Ashley Tellis described in 2005 that this emerging relationship with India is not at all a risk to nuclear proliferation as deals ensured such requirement to act India as a ‘responsible steward’ (Bajoria & Pan, 2010, p. 3).

Nuclear cooperation between the U.S and India was strengthened when in March 15, 2005; Condoleezza Rice visited New Delhi, as Secretary of State. During her meeting to Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh, she accentuated the alteration of long held U.S policy of balancing Pakistan and India. She confirmed the ‘De-hyphenate’ of U.S policy by adopting the individual relations with both states. She also indicated about putting an end to established “non-proliferation orthodoxy” by providing civil nuclear proliferation. Both also agreed to initiate a “Dialogue on Energy Security” (Burns, 2007, p. 137).

During the Visit of Indian Prime Minister Singh to Washington in July 2005 both countries rationalized their vision by announcing the “U.S-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative.” Joint statement issued on July 18, 2005 provided agenda for nuclear cooperation between two countries. The leadership from the both sides clearly manifested their intentions to come into an agreement regarding civil nuclear energy cooperation. It was a landmark development which broadens the prospects of strategic partnership (Ejaz, 2012, p. 145). This consensus over civil nuclear cooperation was the result of energy dialogue, launched in May 2005 which appointed working Group to foster cooperation in five areas. Energy efficiency and nuclear energy are two most significance focal which were stressed during a visit of Indian Prime Minister to Washington D. C. in July 2005. This visit unveiled “the full nuclear cooperation” as an official strategy (Mansingh, 2006, p. 2). Joint Statement of 2005 was a breakthrough in U.S-India relations as it indicated to remove the U.S Cessation spread over three decades on the issue of nuclear trade with India. It offers to enlarge U.S-India cooperation in satellite technology and energy under U.S assistance to Indian civilian nuclear energy program. U.S offered following facilities to India in the course of their strategic cooperation by;

• Providing the benefits of full civil nuclear energy
• U.S assistance to Indian nuclear program
• Helping India to build new power plants
• Providing flow of advance nuclear energy and technology (Burns, 2007, p. 136)

The civil nuclear Cooperation between U.S and India was aided by Bush’s first visit to India on March 1, 2006. Under the Joint Statement issued on March 2, 2006 leadership from the both sides developed a mutual understanding for the implementation of the process regarding nuclear cooperation. The Joint statement provided “The historic accomplishment will permit our countries to move forward towards our common objectives of full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and United States and between India and International community as a whole.” President Bush expounded the significance and relevance of this cooperation to the U.S goals by calling it a ‘necessary agreement’. He further stated to get expected American legislature approval by saying that “This agreement is in our interest. I am confident; I can sell this to our Congress” (“India-US,” 2006).

The most significant development was acceptance of a ‘separation plan’ under which India agreed to separate and differentiate its civilian and military nuclear program in the prescribed time of next eight years. It was decided that under the successful completion of separation plan; India will be eligible to obtain U.S expertise and flow of nuclear fuel for energy needs. It was also manifested that these Indian civilian nuclear facilities in future would be open for international inspections permanently (Ejaz, 2012, p. 145).

3.2.1 From Hyde Act to 123 Agreement
On December 2006, the American Congress passed the “Hyde Act” modifying the Section 123 of “U.S Atomic power Act” for enlarging the civil nuclear cooperation with India. This endorsed the initiative approving U.S investment in the civil nuclear power industry of India. On, December 18, 2006 when President Bush signed the bill, which broke the nuclear orthodoxy and it was evident from his words when he explicated that “This is an important achievement for the whole world. After 30 years outside the system, India will now operate its civilian nuclear energy program under internationally accepted guidelines and the world is going to be safer as a result” (“India-US,” 2006). It preceded the framework of the nuclear deal. This Act enabled U.S to incorporate required changes into its domestic legal system to provide India an opportunity to be treated exceptionally in return of allowing the Hyde Act abided to ensure following measures and steps while exporting nuclear technology and fuel to India:

- Annually Certification of American president to U.S Congress to provide an overview of Indian foreign policy standpoint and position.
- Certification by U.S President will confirm that Indian foreign policy is corresponding to U.S goals (this was specifically to certain India on sanctioning and isolating Iran) (Chenoy, 2007, p. 3550).
- U.S nuclear cooperation would be ceased in case of an Indian nuclear test. This would also compel India to return all materials, even the reprocessed (p. 3550).
- Hyde Act also stresses India to provide decisive support agreed in PSI (Proliferation Security Initiatives) aiding U.S to apprehend or interrupt ships on the suspicion of carrying nuclear material, fuel or WMD (Weapon of Mass Destruction Act) in International Waters (p. 3550).
- Act also intended to bind India to in line with U.S commenced regimes and treaties which are not signed by her. This included FMTCR (Fissile Material Cut off Treaty).

By these developments India is considered as a stakeholder of the non-proliferation regime. Nicholas Burns elucidated the significance of nuclear cooperation with India and states “Civil Nuclear Agreement serves the national security interests of U.S. It has already become the symbolic centerpiece of new U.S-India friendship” (Burns, 2007, p. 137).

The American Congress approved an agreement enabling nuclear cooperation between the two countries on October 1, 2008. Under the U.S Atomic Energy Act, Congressional endorsement is required to exempt from U.S laws to regulating the trade of nuclear resources. This needed to review the international proliferation rules. The operationalization of cooperation in the nuclear field with India needed to engage her with other related agreements with the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) and IAEA (Chenoy, 2007, p. 3550). IAEA approved a “Nuclear Safe Guard Agreement” on August, 2008 which provided the application the selective and gradual inspection of IAEA to Indian civil nuclear facilities. Later this approved American government.

In September 2008, George W. Bush (Junior) initiated much lobbying in favour of India and as a result, NSG consisted of 46 states granted an extraordinary treatment based on ‘Indian specific exemption’ which paved grounds for initiation for nuclear cooperation for India. This NSG wavier granted on September 6, 2008 which allows India to have nuclear trade with other states despite the fact that it is the only state which is not the signatory to the NPT (Ejaz, 2012, p. 146). NSG’s approval to this deal lifted the ban on India which allowed other countries to reinforce nuclear technology and energy sales to India (Bajoria, 2009, p. 4).

Nuclear deal was approved by the American House of Representative on September 28, 2008 and on October 1, 2008 from American Senate. Later it finally turned into a law entitled as “United States-India Nuclear Cooperation approval and nonproliferation Enhancement Act” when President Bush signed the bill on October 8, 2008. In October, 2008, nuclear deal was further advanced by signing the nuclear accord entitled ‘123 Agreement’ by Condoleezza Rice and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee. Indian Foreign Minister Mukherjee (2008) expressed the relevance of this agreement to Indian goals and larger interests of the international community by saying that:
Indian attaches great importance to this agreement and to civil nuclear commerce with the International community. The increased share of nuclear energy in our energy mix will make a major positive contribution to our sustainable development and to meeting our objectives of eradication of poverty. We therefore, see this as a critical development for civil- for our economic growth and development; the agreement is also important for global economy and energy security as well as a contribution to global efforts to meet the challenge of climate change.

Rice illustrated the manifold aspect of this nuclear cooperation as it “unlocks a new and far border world of potential for our strategic partnership in the 21st century, not just on nuclear cooperation but on every area of national endeavor.” Later American President Barak Obama also came up with its Indo-centric policy which was an expansion of its predecessor’s strategy (“Obama hails India,” 2009).

Indian foreign policy planners counted this nuclear deal as “one of the India’s greatest foreign policy achievement” (Burgess, 2013, p. 13). This deal is considered as a new-fangled aspect of non-proliferation efforts at International level. Along with appreciation and acclaim, it also brought denunciation for reversing the fundamental stance and non-proliferation efforts of U.S for more than half a century. Critics claim that this deal will destabilize endeavor to avert states like North Korea and Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and this will lead to provide a sound base for the nuclear arms race in Asia. A renowned scholar and Senior Director of the South Asia program at the Centre for strategic and international studies, Teresita Schaffer explained the nature and aim of deal to enhance India’s role in accordance to American strategic and global goals by saying “this is part of a process of making India a more durable and reliable nuclear partner” (Bajoria, 2009).

3.2.2 This deal offers following advances

- Recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state
- Acknowledgement of India’s non-proliferation apprehensions and energy needs
- India is presumed to the equivalent liabilities and practices as recognized nuclear weapon states.
- India is provided access to civilian nuclear technology (Hosur, 2010, p. 435).
- This deal lets India to recycle and reprocess the consumed fuel.
- India is now able to get imports of high-tech dual use technology for multiple purposes of space, missile, aviation, defence, medicine and most importantly Nuclear.
- This deal provides assistance to India to develop its naval competences in the Indian Ocean by the advancement of her nuclear submarine and powered ships and making potentially capable of launching water missile mechanism.
- This deal removed one of the reservations of India for being discriminated for nuclear development and cooperation.
- As a result of this deal, India would be able to purchase dual-use technology, comprising equipment and resources that could be used to enhance uranium or process plutonium, possibly generating the material for nuclear bombs. It would also obtain imported energy for its nuclear reactors.
- This deal doesn’t clearly enact the condition to cut off supplies if India conducts nuclear weapons test as it was part of “Hyde Act” of 2006.
- Safeguards and restrictions only apply to the material, resources and abilities manufactured when agreement became operational.
- The agreement does not necessitate to cap, roll back or limit the fissile material production.
- In Indian view by breaking ‘nuclear orthodoxy’ this deal has removed Indian complains of dealing India as discriminated manner and not treating her in accordance with her potential, contribution and strength to foster peace.
This deal provides India prospect to prevent the domination of the Asian region by one power. However, Indian Prime Minister stressed to reserve the Indian right to determine the nature of a reactor as civilian. He further elaborated Indian freedom to take independent decisions to ensure defense and to fulfil nuclear energy needs by saying "This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirement" (Bajoria & Pan, 2010, p. 2).

3.2.3 Conditions and terms of deal for India
India agreed to allow inspection and access to its Civilian Nuclear Programme by March 2006, under the IAEA. India initially indorsed to place 14 out of 22 power reactors under inspection. Following measures would be taken;
• Volunteer cessation on nuclear testing
• Procedures to separate its Civilian and Nuclear Programme
• India dedicated to reinforce security and protection of nuclear arsenals
• All forthcoming civilian thermal and breeder reactors will be retained under IAEA safeguards and inspection enduringly.
• India has assured that any U.S support to its civilian nuclear energy program would not be aided in its nuclear weapons program (Bajoria & Pan, 2010, p. 5).
• India committed to sign an additional protocol for permitting more intrusive IAEA going-over of its civilian nuclear abilities.
• To support international non-proliferation regime, India approved to avert the augmentation and reprocessing technologies to states that don’t retain them.
• Military abilities and stockpiles of nuclear energy that India has manufactured up to now will be immune from inspection (p. 2).

3.2.4 Prospects of nuclear deal for India and U.S
Charles D. Ferguson, a Science and technology fellow enunciates about this deal as “It is an unprecedented deal for India.” This deal is motivated by real politics and part of U.S policy of soft containment of China (Bajoria, 2009, p. 3). On August 20, 2007, the advantages of nuclear deal for India were concisely explained in an editorial in “The Times of India’s "Why is this deal important? This editorial expounded that it was the first time; someone has decided to let India have its cake and eat it too. You stay out of the NPT, keep your weapons, refuse full scope safeguards, and yet get to conduct nuclear commerce in a system that is dead against such a formulation. That’s the bottom line of this deal” (Weiss, 2010, p. 267).

This deal was a result of growing realization among U.S policy makers that in previous decades, neither sanctions enacted on India did bore any significant results nor India compelled to sign the NPT. The proponents favoring the U.S-India nuclear deal are of the view that this is a major step that would embolden India to accept International safeguards as reciprocal to the facilities provided to her. They strongly believed that it will ensure transparency about the nuclear sector of India. Moreover, it is advocated that it would lessen the risk of unchecked proliferation. Many of them rationalized this deal a pragmatic approach as in the past all efforts to bring India into the non-proliferation community largely failed. The IAEA also preferred the deal and shared the concern of the Bush presidency of considering as “it is better to work with India rather than against it” (Bajoria, 2009, p. 3).

The exponents of deal advocate due to an estimable record of India of applying volunteer safeguards on her nuclear program. It has been observed that India intended to establish a new agreement with IAEA to endure restrictions on U.S-supplied TAPS which were expired in 1993. Advocates of nuclear deal validated their stance to consider India fit for nuclear cooperation on the bases of her firm control on its technology and never being accused of sharing or transforming to other states as they blame Pakistan for contributing for ‘horizontal proliferation.’ Moreover they appreciated the Indian efforts in her domestic sphere to counter the threat of proliferation through criminalization of trade and brokering of elusive technology by incorporating a law ‘The WMD Act’
in May 2005 (Bajoria, 2009, p. 4). Condoleezza Rice in her article advocated strongly the U.S-India nuclear cooperation by highlighting the “thirty years of responsible behavior on proliferation matters” by India (Rice, 2006).

There are many in this exponent club who believe that India has enforced the similar export restrictions which is set by NSG. This deal is way to provide incentives to India to continue these voluntary limitations despite facing a strong criticism from Indian hardliners (Hosur, 2010, p. 439). As a strong proponent of U.S-India nuclear deal, Nicolas Burns justify concessions by saying that “it will also send a powerful message to nuclear out-laws such as Iran: if you play by the rules, as India has, you will be rewarded; if you don’t you will face sanctions and isolation” (Burns, 2007, 137).

Rise of China is the most significant factor of fostering the deal between U.S and India. U.S is reinforcing its relationship with India to counter balance China. This U.S nuclear cooperation to India could raise a hazardous nuclear rivalry between China and India.

3.2.5 Objections and reservations over the nuclear deal

On the issue of signing nuclear deal, Indian coalition government confronted huge criticism for limiting its sovereignty and putting security at stake. Issue led Indian government to validate its stance by taking a confidence vote in the Indian parliament. Many experts in India objected the deal on the grounds of extreme U.S involvement in determining of a nuclear facility as civilian and pressurizing for international inspection (Hosur, 2010, p. 444).

U.S Congressional research service report states that “There are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India, nuclear weapon program” (Squassoni, 2005). This led critics to question the credibility of NPT regime which is previously declining in its mission to avert proliferation; even the countries who have signed NPT like North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya have violated rules.

Moreover they call this agreement excessively advantageous for India as it is deficient of reasonable measures to prevent India to yield Nuclear Weapons. Director of Non-proliferation policy education Centre, Henry Sokoski explained the apprehensions in following words “We are going to be sending, or allowing other to send, fresh fuel to India including Yellow cake and lightly enriched uranium—that will free up Indian domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to making many more bombs than they would otherwise have been able to make” (Bajoria, 2009, p. 4).

Furthermore opponents of deal have expressed the fear that India could use the imported nuclear energy to forage its civilian program while the investing its own nuclear fuel to weapon fabrication. President of the Institute for Science and International Security, David Albright revealed the risk and insecurities with reference to article 1 of the nuclear deal “without additional measures to ensure a real barrier exist between India’s military and civilian nuclear program, the agreement could pose serious risks to the security of U.S.” Potentially permitting the Indian companies to proliferate barred nuclear technology and it would lead to Horizontal proliferation from the states especially China and Russia to curvature the International rules to sell their technologies.

Following are the apprehension expressed on nuclear deal;

- This deal will set an instance of nuclear proliferation for other states.
- It will facilitate India to divert its local uranium reserves to its nuclear weapon programme (Hosur, 2010, p. 442).
- The numerous last decades of nuclear activity and production of fissile material in India before the conclusion of deal don’t come under the jurisdiction of the IAEA or any other relevant authority. Lack of “full scope safeguards” is shaping a fear of diversion of peaceful technology to the development of nuclear weapons by India.
- This deal doesn’t entail to limit the production of nuclear weapons by India.
- Critics are of the view that there are other cost-efficient methods to fulfill energy needs of India, which are less dangerous, not of dual use and also not transformable to nuclear weapon fabrication. Energy needs can be addressed by increasing the renewable energy resources and emphasizing the coal industry.
The most significant objection is about taking excessive risks without ensuring satisfactory measures. It has been formulated that without an inclusive high level appraisal of taking an account of its potential consequences on non-proliferation, it would not provide global nuclear strategy (Bajoria & Pan, pp. 5-6).

3.3 Strategic Dialogues between United States and India
Ways and Means

Globally, we face a world where our governments confront eroded authority and problems of collective action, with multilateral institutions that no longer reflect current realities, and globalization’s challenges of rapid contagion—whether financial, biological, or digital—that require governmental coordination of the closest kind. Many of these twenty-first century challenges must be addressed through government Initiatives, but many others will require deep engagement with the private sector. With great strengths, the ingenuity, and the complementary perspectives that the U.S. and Indian public and private sectors can mobilize, the two countries together have the potential to make a difference to the most pressing challenges of our lifetime (Ayres, 2010).

The U.S-India strategic relations have grown significantly over the last decade. Since the conclusion on “New Framework for Defense Cooperation in 2005”, the USA and India have made momentous steps in their strategic relations. This agreement was signed by U.S Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld and Defense Minister of India, Pranab Mukherjee and was the first ever document enhancing the defense ties. The landmark accord was the dynamic mechanism for developing U.S-India cooperation to facilitate “joint weapons production, cooperation on missile defense and the transfer of civil and military technology to India” (Dawn, 2005). This agreement cemented the ways for the probable lifting of U.S export controls for sensitive military technology. India has been involved as the most active participant into joint military exercises with the U.S than any other country. Relations between the two states significantly revolve around the following key areas:

- Bilateral defense trade
- Military-to-military engagements
- Homeland security cooperation

The leaders of the both sides agreed over various initiatives to speed up and integrate the process of forwarding the U.S-India relationship in depth. This constant dialogue process was given the name as Dialogue Architecture to reinforce defence and military relations between both the countries. The U.S officials and foreign policy experts have been strongly advocated the case for expanding the strategic relations with India. On January 13, 2009 American Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, while conversing to the “Senate Foreign Relations Committee” intended to nourish the economic and political partnership with India and said “We will build on our economic and political partnership with India, the world’s most populous democracy and a nation with grooming influence in the world” (Ejaz, 2012, p. 149).

The U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton paid a four day exclusive visit to India on July 17-20, 2009. It was a very momentous step of Obama’s administration to strengthening and deepening the U.S-India Strategic Partnership. Hillary uttered U.S expectations from India to play an active role at regional and global forums. While announcing the prospects of potential strategic dialogue she stated that “We are delighted that our two countries will be engaging in a very broad, comprehensive dialogue. It is the widest ranging that I think it has ever been put on the table between India and the U.S” (Ejaz, 2012, 149).

Leadership from both sides disclosed a new strategic dialogue architecture, which is intended to bring Indo-U.S relations to the higher level strategic partnership. The whole range of issue covers strategic cooperation, climate change, education, healthcare, agriculture, economic growth, nuclear non-proliferation and counter terrorism. The visit undoubtedly continued the unpromising trend in U.S-India relations. Teresita C. Schaffer writes the prime ‘objective’ of Hillary’s visit was “to give the Obama administration and the newly elected Indian government ‘ownership’ of a relationship that both consider vitally important. She certainly did that, with a four-day blitz of
high-profile media and serious official meetings. She hit all the high points that she had defined as ‘pillars’ of the relationship."

The following agreements have been signed by Hillary Clinton and her Indian counterpart S. M. Krishna:

- An End-User Monitoring Agreement (EMUA) agreement was “designed by the U.S Congress for ensuring American oversight, right-of-access and on-site inspection in client states -- that are under the U.S security and nuclear umbrella.” In a conversation with media in Washington on July 17, 2009, Philip J Crowley, U.S assistant secretary of state for public affairs, expounded that EUMA agreement is a significant initiative linked to the nuclear deal between U.S and India. The Indian parliamentary opposition of the right and left alleged that this agreement compromises India’s sovereignty, whereas the proponents argue: “The inspections will be carried out at a date, place and time of India’s choice and not at the forward bases where the equipment may be deployed” (Bannerjee, 2009).

- Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) is a type of end user agreement in the space sector, so that U.S components can be used in Indian satellites. "India will not yet be able to enter the lucrative market for the launch of U.S commercial satellites or third country commercial satellites with U.S components till a separate Commercial Space Launch Agreement (CSLA) is signed. The Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement also envisaged an endowment fund.

There are various means to achieve the targets of this describing relationship between India and USA. But two of them are significant, strategic dialogues and foreign office consultations. The U.S-India strategic dialogue was first announced by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham in July 2009. Hillary Clinton visited India to facilitate both governments (Obama’s government and the newly elected Indian government) the ‘ownership’ of a relationship that both view vitally important. As part of focusing on five pillars of reciprocal interests, India and the USA initiated a ministerial-level strategic dialogue, co-chaired by External Minister and USA Secretary of State in July 2009.

The U.S-India strategic dialogue was formally initiated in 2010 by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Minister of External Affairs S.M. Krishna. It serves as the capstone dialogue between the two countries. It is the highest level regularly scheduled dialogue between the two governments, as evidenced by the leadership of both delegations. The United States and India have over 20 other on-going dialogues between corresponding departments on subjects ranging from higher education to trade, agriculture and homeland security. The strategic dialogue takes into account the progress being made within all of these more specific policy areas and directs their focus into the broader framework of U.S-Indian relations. It reflects a commitment between both nations to capitalize on areas of strategic convergence, intensify their levels of cooperation, and to resolve issues that inevitably arise in the relationship. It was decided that U.S-India strategic dialogue would meet annually, focusing on five pillars of bilateral relations and strategic cooperation identified as:

1) Energy and climate change
2) Education and development
3) Economics, trade and agriculture
4) Science and technology
5) Health and innovation

Both countries also established the formation of a sound structure of joint working groups to address a wide range issues, challenges, shared interest and common concern, at bilateral, global and regional level. Till date five rounds of strategic dialogue have been held. First round held in 2010 where both countries formally re-engaged and India was applauded as “an indispensable partner and trusted friend” by Secretary of State of U.S.

3.3.1 First Strategic Dialogue

The first strategic dialogue was held on June 1-4, 2010 in Washington, D.C. Secretary Clinton and Minister Krishna led the delegations. President Barack Obama attended the official reception, demonstrating the high priority, he places on this relationship. Secretary Clinton and Minister Krishna held eighteen individual dialogues in addition to address the global security and stability. The purpose of the dialogue was to assess progress, provide policy guidance, and
propose new areas of cooperation across the breadth of the U.S-India relationship. The dialogue discussions covered sub-dialogues across the full range of the relationship, for strengthening cooperation in earlier described five pillars. The joint statement issued after the dialogue emphasized the broad shared interests of the two nations, particularly in the fields of counterterrorism, regional security, non-proliferation, and trade. Perhaps most significantly, the dialogue set the stage for Obama's visit to India, which was seen by both sides as a key step forward in U.S-India relations (Latif & Narang, 2011).

Secretary Clinton and Minister Krishna pledged to deepen people-to-people, business-to-business, and government-to-government linkages between the world’s oldest and largest democracies, for the mutual benefit of both countries and for the promotion of global peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity. Both recalled that the India –U.S partnership rests on the firm foundation of common ideals as well as security and economic interests. The guiding principles upon which both nations were founded – democracy, mutual respect, individual liberty, rule of law, and an appreciation for the strength we derive from being pluralistic societies – make the India–U.S bond strong, resilient, and uniquely important for building a peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and sustainable world. They pledged that as strategic partners, India and the United States would continue to consult each other closely on regional and global developments, and remain sensitive to each other's interests. They confirmed that global institutions of governance should reflect contemporary realities and enhance effectiveness, in order to meet the challenges of the new century (US Department of State).

In addition to advancing global security and stability, both recognized that their two countries had enormous opportunities to deepen their cooperation in trade and investment, science and technology, infrastructure investment, environmental sustainability, climate change mitigation, energy security, education, agriculture, food security, healthcare and empowerment of people. The two leaders emphasized that the strategic dialogue and its detailed architecture is a vital instrument to pursue these goals. Commenting on these strategic dialogues, the Hindu reported that the Strategic dialogue had led India and United States to expand significantly the "breath of their collaboration across a range of areas" (The Hindu, 2010).

3.3.2 Second strategic dialogue

The second round of strategic dialogues was held in New Delhi on July 18-20, 2011. The purpose of strategic dialogue was to review the progress in cooperation in the areas of partnership and set guidelines to enhance cooperation and propose new areas of partnership. India’s Minister of External Affairs, Shri S.M. Krishna and the U.S Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met in New Delhi on July 19, 2011. The leaders recognized the achievements made since the inaugural strategic dialogue on June 2010. Agreements were signed covering “counterterrorism cooperation, cyber security, aviation safety, women’s empowerment, scientific cooperation and clean energy, information sharing, and higher education.” The two governments concluded to initiate to the first ever “U.S-India-Japan trilateral dialogue” (held in December 2011 in the United States). U.S-India consultations were also extended to embrace the Middle East and Central Asia regions as these consultations were the underpinning for a larger, regional strategic dialogue over the pertaining issues of decisive importance to both countries. Leadership of both countries also emphasized to broaden their shared values — pluralism, tolerance, openness, and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights. They reiterated Indian Prime Minister, Man Mohan Singh’s and American President Barack Obama’s pledge to connect these shared strengths and to enlarge the India-U.S global partnership for the benefit of their countries; and, for peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia and the world.

The second round of strategic dialogue also brought more vital outcomes as Hillary bracketed India as an important actor on the world stage. She encouraged "India to play a significant role in the region by exercising political influence in consonance with its growing economic weight" (Ejaz, 2012, p. 157). She clearly manifested that India should take a “lead for shaping the future of Asia-Pacific.” By extending her view while reminded India to focus more on economic power rather engaging in political rivalries and said “It has to do more to integrate
economically with neighbors, Afghanistan and Pakistan and take a more assertive role across the Asia-Pacific”.
Hillary added:

This is a time to lead … we are betting on India’s future … that the opening of India’s markets to the world will produce a more prosperous India and South Asia. We are betting that India’s vibrant, pluralistic society will inspire others to follow a similar path of tolerance. We are making this bet not out of blind faith but because we have watched your progress with great admiration (“US wants to play,” 2011).

Hillary’s Pro-Indian stance provoked resentments from China as well as Pakistani side as these statements were carefully observed by them. China’s response seemed more relevant as China has been closely observing the India-U.S strategic development and it is always meant as a way to “put more pressure on China” (The Hindu, 2010). Pakistan also exhibited serious concern on Hillary’s statement. Pakistani Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani (2008-2012) made it clear that Pakistan would not “accept hegemony of any state in the region” (The Nation, 2011). Pakistan's Foreign Minister Hina Rubbani Khar also remarked to show Pakistan’s apprehensions that “bilateral ties, but not a one sided relations with the U.S was required.” She added also by repeating Gillani’s stance that Pakistan would not “accept anyone’s hegemony in the region …. We have to have a reality-based and pragmatic approach and no one down plays Pakistan’s current strategic significance or importance, not the U.S or even India” (Daily Times, 2011).

Just after the strategic dialogue, 2011, Hillary’s in her speech at Chennai, while acknowledging the Indian pledge in Afghanistan, applauded India’s ‘Look East’ policy as essential for prospects for economic integration of the Asia-Pacific region. It was suggested by Hillary that India should not only go for a policy of “Look East,” but also “Act East” and “Be East” (Daily Times, 2011).

3.3.3 Third Strategic Dialogue
India’s Minister of External Affairs Shri S.M. Krishna and U.S Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met in Washington, DC, on June 13, 2012, for the third annual U.S-India strategic dialogue. The leaders reflected on the remarkable expansion and growth of the bilateral relationship since the inaugural Strategic Dialogue in 2010. They were dedicated to further broaden and deepen the U.S-India global strategic partnership and charted a vision for the future, centered on promoting shared prosperity, peace, and stability. On the margins of this strategic dialogue, an unprecedented number of sub-dialogues have taken place, including the following:
• Global Issues Forum, S&T Joint Commission Meeting
• The Counterterrorism Joint Working Group
• The Higher Education Dialogue, co-chaired by Secretary Clinton and Human Resource Development Minister Kapil Sibal
• Cyber Consultations, the Information and Communications Technology Working Group
• The Women’s Empowerment Dialogue

Secretary Clinton and Minister Krishna applauded the expansion of the U.S-India Higher Education Dialogue, which made significant strides in fostering cooperation between the two countries in higher education, research and innovation, and community colleges. The United States and India plan to hold the next annual “Higher Education Dialogue” in 2013 in India. They welcomed the announcement of the award of the first eight grants under the Obama-Singh Knowledge Initiative, which aims to strengthen teaching, research, and administration of both U.S and Indian institutions through university linkages and junior faculty development (“Joint Statement,” 2012, p. 6).

The two leaders also commended efforts by both governments to continue to expand educational opportunities and cooperation, through the Fulbright Nehru Program for students and scholars. These include India’s goal of establishing 100 community colleges in India; the announcement of the C.V. Raman fellowship, under which the first tranche of 300 junior faculty members would be placed for post-doctoral research in American higher education institutions;
India’s launch of a higher education web portal to provide a platform to disseminate information and foster educational and research collaboration and exchanges, such as India’s new connect to India program to facilitate more American students in Indian universities; and new private sector pledges in support of the United States’ Passport to India Initiative, which seeks to increase the number of American students participating in internships in India (“Joint Statement,” 2012, p. 6).

Hillary Clinton also welcomed Government of India’s plans to open a cultural Centre in Washington D. C., noting the powerful U.S-India connections provided by the nearly three million Indian-Americans in the United States, as well as the more than 100,000 Indian students studying in U.S. universities. They also appreciated the establishment of the “Indian Ministry of Culture Vivekananda Chair” at the University of Chicago and an agreement signed between the Ministry of Culture and the Art Institute of Chicago for the “Vivekananda Memorial Program for Museum Excellence” for upgrading the skills of Museum Professionals of India as part of the commemoration of the 150th birth anniversary of Swami Vivekananda. (“Joint Statement,” 2012).

The deliberations of the third annual U.S-India strategic dialogue demonstrated that the U.S and India have many common values and also share a number of strategic interests in the world. In an international environment that is currently experiencing economic instability and political unrest, the United States and India are global partners committed to working together for long-term peace and prosperity. The U.S-India partnership is not only significant for mutual bilateral relations, but also critical for shining the light of democracy, freedom, and human rights around the world (Diplomatic Courier, 2012).

3.3.4 Fourth Strategic Dialogue

The forth strategic dialogue between India and United States were held from 23-25 June in India. U.S Secretary of State John F. Kerry and External Affairs Minister of India Shri Salman Khurshid met in New Delhi and co-chaired the fourth U.S-India strategic dialogue. They reviewed more areas of cooperation and the extensive transformation of the bi-lateral relationship and identified key factors of cooperation that will continue to add strategic depth to the partnership. Indian Americans make up just 1% of the population in the United States, but they create 8% of all the technology and engineering start-ups (“The Fourth Round,” 2013).

3.3.5 Fifth strategic dialogue and joint strategic vision 2015

President Barack Obama paid a symbolic visit to India to attend India’s 66th Republic Day celebrations as Chief Guest on January 26, 2015 in New Delhi. After the meeting of Indian Prime Minister Modi and President Obama in Haiderabad, three separate documents were issued containing a declaration of friendship with a commitment to regular summits, a joint statement called “shared effort, progress for all, and a joint strategic vision statement for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian ocean region.”

A joint statement issued at the meeting’s conclusion claimed that, “ties between the United States and India have never been stronger”. It reaffirmed previous commitments for a five-fold increase in U.S-India trade, as well as the “Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region” that Modi and Obama issued in January 2014 when the U.S President Barak Obama visited New Delhi. The U.S officials view “Joint Strategic Vision” statement as a major diplomatic coup for the U.S, not least because it contains U.S-drafted language regarding the conflict between China and the U.S and its allies over the South China Sea. ‘Joint statement’ also outlined a series of steps to further enhance U.S-Indo strategic ties, including multilateral cooperation with U.S allies (Perera, 2015).

Fifth strategic dialogue and commercial dialogue were held in Washington on 22 September 2015. U.S Secretary of, “John Kerry and Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker welcomed India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Minister of State for Commerce and Industry Nirmala Sitharaman for the first U.S- India strategic and commercial dialogue held in Washington DC on 22 September 2015.”
According to the fact sheet of U.S Department of State issued on September 22, 2015, U.S-India cooperation was titled as “aligned across the globe”. Focal of these dialogues were diplomatic and defense developments and cooperation, people to people ties, commerce, space, agriculture and health.

- Advancement of bilateral cooperation on energy, climate change and most specifically economic cooperation
- To overcome with imperative differences that cause interference to the cooperation up to the subsequent level, such as civil nuclear liability law and intellectual property rights
- In the wake of China’s rise, these dialogues also aimed to persuade India to join a coalition of democracies to balance Asian region and effective means to counter China. Though this policy was neither publically announced nor formal policy version is announced yet. But it has been reported that talks were also focused to “concert of democracies” approach which needed to persuading democracies in the region to addressing the reservations triggered by a rising China.

3.4 Defense Diplomacy: Military Trade, Counterterrorism and Security Consultations

The U.S.-India Partnership is a long-term friendship, not a tit for tat business arrangement. Sales are a way to facilitate technological and strategic linkages, enabling our armed forces to work together more easily, and we plan to continue strengthening our defense ties through increased sales and exercises. (Scholar Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South Asian Affairs)

Indian military force is the world’s third largest military and world’s major open market for defense sales. It is important to note that the United States is the largest export market for India as approximately $2 billion of American military hardware were exported to India in 2013. Since 2008, both countries concluded defense contracts of “more than $9 billion, up from $500 million in all previous years combined” (Hardy, 2014, p. 16).

U.S-India strategic partnership seems to be directed by defense agreements and the arms deal. Sylvia Mishra (2015), a research fellow at ORF explicated that “as India continues to modernize its military recently increasing its defense outlay by 11 percent over the 2013-14 Budget- American defense contractors find that Indian markets present opportunities for investment and trade. Indian defense sector has size, steady growth and longevity of opportunity and return ratios which work in favor of American global defense giants” (p. 8). B.M. Jain comes up with the similar argument while mentioning the fact that America has already taken the lead from Russia to sell military hardware to India. He is of the view that there are two significant considerations driving the increase in supplies of advance items and military hardware to India which are following

- U.S aims to lessen the Indian reliance on Russia for defense and weapon system
- U.S intends to hold the huge defense market of Indian of worth $ 100 billion.

Congressional Research Service (CRS) in 2012 rightly articulated about the U.S eagerness about defense trade with India in following words “New Delhi is undertaking a major military modernization program with plans to spend $ 100 billion over next 7-10 years to update its mostly Soviet era-arsenal. U.S weapon makers are eager to gain a slice of this lucrative pie, and the America companies also see in India huge new markets for sophistication equipment such as surveillance and detector system” (Kronstadt, 2013, p. 18).

This is an undeniable fact that the imperatives of commerce are not the only underlying reasons, but geostrategic orientations of both states also led U.S to become the top supplier of defense components and materials to the Indian Armed forces.

The U.S and India have agreed on various defense deals like the sales of c130j Super Hercules transport planes, the Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft’s, the C-17 Globe masters. Moreover the Indian government has decided recently to augment and modernize our ageing helicopter fleet through a deal of $2.5 billion for the US made Boeing
CH-47 Chinook and Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopters. There are further plans to buy 16 Sikorsky S-70B Sea Hawk helicopters.

Sunil Das Gupta and Stephen P. Cohen stated that Obama’s first visit to India, major advancement was his pledge to support India for the permanent seat of UNSC but this November trip also enhanced the prospects of bilateral military trade between the two countries. It was reported by writers that military trade was viewed to energize the strategic ties and this was evident from the Obama proclamation during visit by saying that the USA “would sell $5 billion worth of U.S. military equipment to India, including ten Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and 100 General Electric F-414 fighter aircraft. With India plans to buy $100 billion worth of new weapons over the next ten years, arms sales may be the best way for the United States to revive stagnating U.S.-Indian relations.” These developments ranked USA as India’s top three suppliers for arms, equipment and military hardware alongside Russia and Israel.

Table 3.1: India-U.S. Defense Trade

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<th>India-U.S. Defense Trade</th>
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<tr>
<td>INDIAN’S TOP SOURCES OF ARMS IMPORTS</td>
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<td>1. Russia</td>
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<td>2. Israel</td>
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<td>6. Poland</td>
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<td>14. U.S. (0.2%)</td>
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India-U.S. defense trade stands at about $1.2 billion and is expected to reach $1.4 billion next year.

In January 2015, President Obama during his visit to India concluded a deal with Indian Prime Minister Modi to produce drones and airplane parts. Joint statement on September 22, 2015 as a result of a meeting held in Washington between John Kerry, the U.S Secretary of State and External Affair Minter of India Sushma Swaraj, clearly stated that “Ties between the United States and India have never been stronger.” It has been claimed by Americans that these arms sales have reinforced India’s role in the Indian Ocean Russia remains an important defense partner.

Another significant development regarding the strategy and security related issues were enhancement of Counterterrorism cooperation. Since 2011, the leaders and officials of both states affirmed their commitments to combat terrorism and counter terrorism cooperation individually and in a number of joint and policy statements. This cooperation was formalized by signing the India-U.S Counter Terrorism Initiatives in 2010. The first meeting of the Joint Working Group (JWG) was held in Washington in 7-8, February, 2000. At the third meeting of the Defense Policy Group (DPG) in December 2001, a joint statement was issued which professed that “A strengthened bilateral relationship will assist both countries to counter threats such as spread of WMD, International
terrorism, narcotic trafficking and piracy” (Bishoyi, 2011, p. 28). Later U.S-India Cyber Security Forum was established and its first meeting was organized in New Delhi in April, 2002. This process was further enhanced by Homeland Security Dialogues announced by Obama presidency (p. 73) Counter-terrorism incorporates progress and cooperation in the following sectors;

- Intelligence sharing
- Information exchange
- Operational cooperation
- Access to advance counterterrorism and technology

The U.S Secretary of homeland security Janet Napolitano, visit to India was followed by the first round of dialogue held in May 2011. Another meeting under this dialogue was held in Washing D.C. on May 30, 2011 the dialogues reviewed engagements of Subgroups. Significant groups were;

a. Mega city policing
b. Combating elicit finance
c. Cyber security and critical infrastructure protection
d. Port, boarder, Maritime, Transportation, and supply chain security
e. Science and Technology Cooperation
f. Capacity Building

### 3.4.1 Strategic Security and Consultations

As a part of U.S global policy Asia has a strategic importance. Asia is comprised of almost half of the world’s population. Many of world nuclear powers and vibrant economies signify the Region. Strategic partnership and Cooperation is an outcome of U.S approach of “Rebalance of U.S foreign policy towards Asia. Many American analysts accused U.S policy makers to maintain relations as compulsion with Pakistan at the expense of larger India. U.S largely supports India’s policy of “Look East” and recognizes its contribution, foster closer economic ties by increasing regional markets through investments and industrial developments. India is also appreciated by U.S to seek military and security cooperation with her neighbors. United States and India both are determined to ensure secure open trade flows through Indian oceans and this stresses the need to cooperate strategically along the trade and investments lines. India is also the largest regional investor in Afghanistan and hosted submit on international investments in Afghanistan, which helped India to act as a driver of economic prosperity and regional political stability.

Various dialogues between U.S and India have been conducted covering the East Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. These dialogues are extended to Latin America and, Africa. Potential threat from china in the terms of economic dominance over the region, political influences also gave birth to a trilateral meetings with Japan held in 2013 in Washington D. C. On one hand and a trilateral relationship with Afghanistan in February 2013 in New Delhi on other hand. Strategic security Dialogue involved;

- Matters related to International security
- Disarmament
- Multilateral export control regimes
- High technology trade(issues related to technology were discussed in India-us high technology cooperation group)

### 3.5 India’s Withdrawal from some of its Principle Stands

India's close relations with U.S also brought some significant compromises over its fundamental stances like its voice in favor of Palestine cause has been virtually muted to secure her defense ties with Israel. The U.S and India deviate on the strategy of dealing with Iran. India prefers the strategy of engagement and U.S is more determined to apply sanctions and containment. India’s cordial relations with Iran, especially involvement in Gas pipeline project is a source of discomfort for the U.S, which provides a divergent perception of both strategic partners to deal with Iran. India primarily aims to conserve cordial relations with Iran in order to access to Afghanistan and Central Asia for the sake of its emergent energy needs (Burgess, 2013, p. 12)
Nicholas Burns cautioned India to review its policy to maintain good relations with Iran in following words "India will also need to be careful about its long-term relationship with Iran (Burns, 2007, p. 144)."

The Hyde Act specified some issues on which U.S needed Indian congruent to its policies which included containing, sanction and dissuades Iran (Chenoy, 2007, p. 3550). India supported U.S policy to restrain Iran's nuclear program by voting for sanctions in IAEA resolution in November 2009. It has been third time since September 2005 that India voted against Iran. The leftist parties in India sternly condemned the Indian government of Man Mohan Singh by accusing her of a 'sell out' to U.S as the civil nuclear deal was being negotiated.

Indian shifts of foreign policy based on Realist paradigm have been questioned by many of its strategists and foreign policy experts for extenuating it in term of national interests. This was an Indian move to restrain her official adherence to non-alignment. Giving up her pervious support to Multi-polarity went in contradiction of the rest of nonaligned countries, a movement which is founded by her, advocated and practiced for years at diplomatic ends. This is also widening gap between India and countries in her locale.

Kamal M. Chenoy and Anuradha M. Chenoy (2007) pointed out that debates in the Indian Parliament over the ‘123 Agreement’ also reflected the muddling of claim to espouse vital Interests of State, where critics and proponents both justified their opposed stances to advocate National Interests. It also brought confusion into the political debate about what constitute 'national interest'. They also probed the alteration of Indian foreign policy with reference to ‘great power status’ package offered by U.S where both states have divergent conception. U.S is considering India as a valid contestant for power to advance its own prominence globally, whereas India concern is to expand its power across and beyond the region with an emphasis on her strategic Autonomy acclimation of her desired status regionally and globally. American foreign policy towards India is a fragment of his strategy of “Hub and spokes” while Indian foreign policy goals are maximization of power. Critics of this growing relationship are branding U.S-India common perception as 'Power over Others'. This leads to outspread their fear of jeopardizing the citizen's interests by crafting India as a “national security state” rather empowering people or societies (p. 3553).

U.S propagation of the notion of identifying “political Islam” as a major threat under the spectrum of most debated theory of Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization” also drives against the Indian core values of secularism and interests of her own populace. It could also lead to maltreatment of its population as two billion Indians are Muslims. This could trigger gradual internal conflicts as a result of religious intolerance and led to speed up secessionist movements and resistance against the Indian state.

### 3.6 Problems, Issues and Fallouts of Strategic Partnership

The strategic transference in Indian foreign policy causes many types of fallout. India has some reservations and fundamental differences over some international issues on the grounds of its foreign policy principles and security perceptions, especially related to American policy in Iraq, Middle East, South West Asia and huge U.S military presence in Diego Garcia. There is a continued reluctance on the Indian part to ally her with U.S determinations. The U.S-India engagement has upraised the distress of repression throughout the region, which is even articulated by American Congress reports by evaluating the U.S ties with India and emergent consequences on Asia and relationship with Pakistan and China (Chenoy, 2007, p. 3551). In 2002, India did not favorably responded to the U.S characterization of “axis of evil” compromised of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Indian standards to consider a state, part of “axis of evil” is presence of militarist regimes, involvement in proliferation, track record of indorsing extremism which fits Pakistan into this category, not Iran (Malik, 2003, p. 108).

Some of Indian strategists and political elites are of the view that the United States and India diverge on foreign policy issues as India has a stake in multi-polarity while U.S global goals are related to the primacy, this is what’s termed as “divergent conception of world order” (Ganguly & Scobell, 2005, p. 39). Cohen (2000) explicated these contrary approaches as “Americans and...
Indians have very different conceptions of a just international order. The United States is comfortable with what it regards as a benign hegemony, India has long preferred a world of six or seven major powers, each responsible for peace and stability in its own region, each refraining from meddling in the affairs of major powers” (p. 23).

Security challenges emerging from West Asia can also impede the Indian policy of ‘Look East’ and U.S-India approach of ‘Rebalancing’. Problems and political instability in Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and coercion from Iran into the “Strait of Hormuz” can potentially divert U.S and India. It will not decisively disturb their policies of ‘Rebalancing’ and ‘Look East’ but security realities can be changed due to increasing activities and interests on Gwadar port as China-Pakistan Nexus nurtures.

Indian capability to deter China and Pakistan by maintaining strategic and diplomatic influence would be hindered by ‘Zero Option’ announced by Obama administration. Withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan can lead to regeneration of militancy. In case of U.S forces withdrawal and lack of an agreement with Afghanistan for keeping troops, concerns of India are ‘Fall of Dominos’ as occurred in 1990, rise of violent resistance in Kashmir and proliferation of militancy and speeding of successions movements to different part of India (Burgess, p. 12). Burgess (2013) expounded that there are many in American administration who still view India as a “geopolitical underperformer” which might not be capable to provide enough devotion and concern to strategic partnership as U.S would like (p. 14).

It seems quite difficult for U.S to provide assurance to India and allies like the Philippines and Japan about the security commitments against expanding China. The U.S is exercising policy of “soft containment” against China which does not allow a direct confrontation and condemnation. The U.S administration is dealing with China through engagement, compromising of economic and strategic dialogues and trade initiatives. As a result of American reluctance to use a hard stick against Pakistan and direct safeguards from potential threat to India from China is creating anxiety in New Delhi.

The United States and India look Pakistan as a problematic element for their regional strategy and goals in Asia, but despite their mounting cooperation into numerous fields, they still differ in their policy over Pakistan. There are many strategists like Dr. Stephen Burgess, who favor to maintain good relations with Pakistan. Burgess (2013) is of the view that “the major non-NATO alliance with Pakistan will remain to guarantee U.S access to Afghanistan, even with the zero option” (p. 13). Markey (2013) stressed on importance of Pakistan by suggesting that “the United States must maintain its major non-NATO alliance with Pakistan in order to continue to have access to Afghanistan and press Pakistan to continue to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the long run”. Even one of the architects of U.S-India strategic cooperation, Nicholas Burns (2000) explicated the U.S distresses on Indian approach over its policy towards Pakistan in following words, “On the American side, there is concern that India’s continued rivalry with Pakistan is complicating our War effort in Afghanistan and frustration that India is often unwilling to use its newfound international influence to pressure difficult regimes in Burma and Iran.”

India views U.S alliance with Pakistan as predominant to hamper the advances of strategic cooperation between U.S and India. India is sure that an alliance with U.S will affect her relations with China by putting it in a problematic position that’s why some of Indian security experts are expecting from U.S to avert China from consolidating its close relation with Pakistan, but there are many in India who would like to see U.S to move away from Pakistan to get close to India (Burgess, 2013, 13). Despite opting a De-hyphenate policy by U.S, Pakistan is still a factor which can intrude the intensity of this partnership. Cohen is of the view that “without a more normal Indian relationship with Pakistan, the India-U.S relationship will remain highly sensitive to the Indian perception of Washington’s relationship with Islamabad” (p. 23).

Through the track of the “civil nuclear initiative” in 2008, USA and India managed to overcome their differences of more than thirty years over the issue of nonproliferation, however both sides are undergoing enduring suspicions regarding non-proliferation agenda. From the Indian
side, some apprehensions and doubts are expressed about U.S efforts to make good on its assurance of “full civil nuclear cooperation” with India due to delays in licensing and other technical requirements. There are also reservations and concerns from the American side about Indian reluctance and interruption to take appropriate steps required for U.S firms and companies to work in India. This might take too long that American companies will miss out by relinquishing Opportunity to Russian and French firms (Ayres, 2010).

After an astonishing period of advances and growth into U.S-India ties in the last decade, especially after the legitimization of nuclear cooperation in 2008, relations between the two countries are settled on certain position and not rising in the previous momentum. This was due to reluctance on Indian part as in second term (2009) of the Congress party, it was more inclined again towards ‘Nehruvians Orientation’ which discourages to alter the traditional pattern of non-alignment (Burgess, 2013, p. 8).

India remains profound to the sensitivity of being subordinate in this strategic partnership and their prominent stress is on conserving its “strategic autonomy”. There is a persistent disagreement over the issue of what this cooperation should eventually accomplish. India seems more interested to get investments into her defense sector and technology transfer has been taken as a key and essential component of this rising relationship. Whereas U.S is less concerned in transfer of technology and there are various bureaucratic and legislative obstacles in U.S hampering the process of transfer of technology. Hyde Act and 123 Agreement also dreaded many strategists in India that instructions of the deal will turn into restrictions to bind India and in case of failure to incorporate; it would lead to suspension of cooperation and return of nuclear material. Dr. Stephen Burgess is of the view that “India will continue to press for the transfer of technology and local manufacturing of weapons and other defense items, which will cause frustration in New Delhi”. On Indian side, technology transfer and self-sufficiency into local production are generally viewed as an operative measure to gauge the success and growth of strategic partnership between the United States and India. Indian purchases of American arms, military hardware and technologies are increasing its reliance on the U.S, which might affect its independent security and strategic paradigms. That’s why some Indian spectators term this relationship as “transactional partnership” where U.S is more interested to sell its military hardware without benefitting the Indian economy. On nuclear cooperation, there is a significant dissatisfaction on U.S part that no nuclear power stations have been purchased by India due to liability issues (Burgess, 2013, p. 7-14).

Many Indian strategic thinkers are not sure of U.S rebalancing and not expecting any dramatic changes in her behavior and believed that U.S is “leading from behind” (Burgess, 2013, p. 8). U.S-India relations confronted stresses and strain over the line of the Obama presidency to link Kashmir dispute to instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. India precluded the U.S approach to deal with India as a part of the problem rather considering her a part of the solution. India proclaims a more proactive role in reconstruction of Afghanistan and Obama’s administration was counseled not to “bark up the wrong tree” (Times of India, 2009). Despite all these divergent trends into their relationship, regular contacts at political and official levels have been initiated to place relations in order to avoid any misapprehension. Uninterrupted determinations from both sides are vastly transforming this relationship into one of the thriving partnership of world politics.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN: SECURITY DILEMMA

“The Study of politics, international or domestic is almost always a study of promises broken rather than kept. This is particularly so with regard to new nations whose politics, internal as well as external, are generally hewn with utopian visions.”
(Gupta, 1988, p. xi)

Most of academic literature and political argument largely considered global non-proliferation concerns as emergent by U.S-India strategic ties. It also prompted the consideration of ramifications for China in case of rise of India as a regional power in the Asian region, but implications for Pakistan has been hardly part of extensive debate. There are primarily two sets of writers dealing with the consequences instigated by the United States-India strategic partnership. One set of researchers, mostly western does not view implications for Pakistan as an upshot of rising United States-India partnership rather they enunciate these ramifications as structural ineffectiveness and internal difficulties. Wirsing (2007) is one of those scholars who proclaims
India's emerging partnership as a leading cause of escalating Pakistan's strategic and security apprehensions. He explicates that "this is to say that India is only one of the many shadows lengthening over the region and over the U.S-Pakistan strategic alliance. India's actions alone will determine neither the fate of that alliance nor of the war in Afghanistan" (p. 168).

While emphasizing the most upsetting aspects, from a Pakistani perspective, Wing Commander Adil Sultan (2006), a visiting fellow at Stimson Centre enumerated Pakistan's anxieties and apprehensions in his research on the "Regional Implications of the U.S-India Nuclear Deal." And claimed that strategies emerging from altered bilateral relations of United States and India would embolden "potential realignment of the United States towards India and away from Pakistan. If this was the case, Pakistan would need to look for ways to strengthen ties with other nations." He pronounces that "if it did facilitate qualitative or quantitative improvements in India's nuclear arsenal, then Pakistan would have to readjust its strategic posture accordingly." Sultan's investigation comes up with the supposition that it was not only about aiding India's energy necessities, somewhat it was about strengthening of India's strategic partnership with America and progressing her strategic competences.

Bukhari (2011) provided that neither Pakistan's foreign policy officials articulated their apprehension and anxiety in a noticeable manner nor demonstrated any prudent resistance to modification into the South Asian balance of power. Denunciation over the alarming 'engagement' was just limited to foreign office statements and apprehensions formally conveyed to America which were not once acknowledged seriously. If Pakistani reservations are expressed, they are generally relevant to non-proliferation at global level rather regional ramifications (p. 18). An investigation strategic cooperation between U S and India's advocates that the implications for Pakistan range from defense coercions, foreign policy compulsions, mending her image internationally and to manage substantial expenditure on defense to contend India for upholding balance of power largely leading decline in social sector spending.

4.1 Geo-strategic and Geopolitical Setting of Pakistan

The nature of strategic locale outlines the threats perception of a state as Karl Marx provides an appropriate reference, "A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small, it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace arises besides the little house, the little house shrinks into a hut" (Gupta, 1988, p. xiv). Security dilemma of Pakistan can be best explicated in words of Jean Jacques Rousseau, a French philosopher of seventeen century, "the state always feels itself weak, if there is another that is stronger" (as cited in Wittkopf, Kegley & Scott, 2004, p. 499). This echoes the veracity that conception of security is related to the periphery of a state. This leads to consider the notion of security by a state through the prism of its own insecurity which is generally augmented by the sensitivity of the locale. This might turn as a valid reason for states to view their security options in peripheral context.

The geographic setting of a state is the foremost dynamic, contributing to shape its foreign policy and severely manifests its perceptual framework. It has been observed that "geography controls the political environment of a country. There is no escape from one's geography and from its impact on one's policies" (Razvi, 2007, p. 183). South Asia is a region where Pakistan is positioned and it is also known as 'Fulcrum of Asia' (Gupta, 1988, p. xi) In case of Pakistan, strategic venue represented as a double edged sword, which enhances its critical importance and creates an underlying security dilemma at the same time. Pakistan's peripheral course is surrounded by ambitious, threatening and hostile India, expanding economic China, unstable and fragile Afghanistan, and its pervious eastern wing Bangladesh. On the bases of Pakistan's relevance in strategic context, Liaquat Ali Khan (1951) defined it as 'Heart of Asia.' Pakistan is surrounded by Arabian ocean in South West and its adjoining to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Red Sea further accentuated the significance of locality. Pakistan's strategic alliance with USA during the Cold War years fetched unpleasant gestures from the Soviet Union. Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 brought USSR close to Pakistan's locale which exaggerated the threats of communist expansion and access to 'Warm Waters' which pushed Pakistan into a proxy war in
Afghanistan to block the communist influence. The close contiguity of Pakistan to Soviet Union via Wakhan corridor stressed western powers to view Pakistan as the “eastern bastion against communism” (Sattar. 2007, p. 37).

Durand line originated in 1893 was to aid British India to put on Afghanistan as a ‘Buffer Zone’ from Tsarist Russia. This undemarcated line on north-western side of Pakistan and Afghanistan’s geographic adjunct to India through the Khyber Pass triggered as a potential cause of Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict. Its vulnerability shouldered the defence burden to Pakistan of this volatile region as a compulsion. Emergence of China in 1949 as a communist state enlarged geopolitical significance of Pakistan. It shares a border of almost 400 miles with China in the Kashmir-Xining region. Pakistan also bonds with Iran through 590 miles frontier whose relations were strained during the Zia regime (1977-1988) in Pakistan which developed a predominantly Sunni inclination.

The most important and insecure borderline of Pakistan is shared with India. It is a matter of fact that “Pakistan’s frontiers remained primarily political and violated the natural economic lines. The sources of its rivers and vital economic resources did not lie within its territory” (Siddiqi, 1964, p. 3). This provided India to manipulate the Pakistan’s economy which is largely based on agriculture. Moreover, Pakistan has been a victim of Indian aggression and hostility since the partition of Sub-Continent. It is imperative to note that in the pre-1971 era, Pakistan was consisted of two wings, East and West which were physically disconnected by a large portion of Indian Territory. Additionally, there was a lack of topographical contiguity between the two wings added enough pressure on Pakistan, which was already existed in a regional threat setting. Both wings of United Pakistan had a typical security milieu, which made it exceedingly difficult for the policy managers of Pakistan to contrive a unified strategy of security in the early decades. Hassan Askari Rizvi was right to articulate that “there were no natural barriers on most of Indo-Pakistan border, which made it convenient for troops and heavy armour to cross the frontiers” (Hasnat & Pelinka, 1986, p. 104).

Map 4.1: Pakistan and its Periphery
4.2 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Compulsions

The interactional patterns of countries are determined by numerous factors and conditioned by security dilemma mainly due to their location in hostile neighbourhood. Security dilemma “is strongly related with the fear generated by external and internal conditions of a state. It is an outcome of weakness, and weakness is procreated by incapacity to control the environment that threatens a state” (Hasnat & Pelinka, 1986, p. 84). Enactment of national interests of a state is determined relational to its quantum of power. In geostrategic and geopolitical setting, threat perception of a state regarding its security lies in the precarious sense of insecurity. In community
of states, ethically all countries are equal, but in veracity, they do not appear equal absolutely. If a state like Pakistan is politically unstable, economically weak and fragile then the endurance and survival would be the pivotal perception patterned to the strategic notion of policy makers of respective state. Likewise, India where state is adequately strong and possess sufficient power, then security view is solely an elucidation for dominance and authority. In this regard, a state seeks to emphasize her security where ascendancy becomes primary part of discourse of national interests, then provides inadvertent efforts to declining the security of others (Jervis, 1988, 317).

The British colonial rule in Sub-continent ended in 1947 however, it left its political legacies. The boundaries of new states as a result of partition were demarcated in the sense of haste which lacked just progression and due requirements to be fulfilled. As a result, Pakistan came into being with anxieties and uncertainties. On the other hand, partition of Sub-continent was alleged by the political leadership of India as a renunciation of their conception of the Indian state. Most of the political leaders of India were not at all persuaded about the endurance of a new country mainly established on religion. However, they officially recognized the division with the certainty that Pakistan will not survive as an independent state and soon would be merged into Indian state. It is significant to note that the partition of Sub-continent was characterized by antagonistic, violent, hostile interactions between religious communities and these bloody shrugs made Pakistan to declare India as an adversary rather a neighbouring country. It is a certain fact that nature and progression of Pakistan-India bilateral relationship persisted largely hostage of unyielding historical realities and unpleasant memories of partition. During the initial years of independence, intents and temper of the Indian political leadership kept reminding Pakistan that India would not let her independence to sustain and this Pakistani sense of mistrust towards India was augmented further by Indian occupation of Kashmir and later escalation of Kashmir dispute as a prime conflict between the two states (Tahir-Kheli, 1997).

The prejudiced attitude of British towards All Indian National Congress and Muslim League in pre-partition era left less room for Pakistan to look towards its former colonial master as a source of strength & assistance. In case of Pakistan, Insecurity of boundaries and fragile economy made it requisite for her to search for a trustworthy assistance for economic and defence advancement. The beginning of the Cold War period brought scenarios to both newly born states of South Asia to perform their roles considerably in regional politics. There were several factors, including South Asia region contiguous position to USSR, emergence of communist China and geostrategic deliberations which not only directed American foreign policy considerations, but also served as a dynamic to shape foreign policy paradigm of Pakistan and India.

In the initial years of Pakistan’s inception, death of its founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1948) and the assassination of its first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali khan (1951) paved grounds for a leadership crisis which later led to undemocratic intervention in politics by military leadership. Lack of consistent and visionary foreign policy managers and leadership severely affected the course of assessment of foreign policy options. Personal grudges and differences of Pakistani politicians turned into parochial, regional discrepancies. Politics was mainly focussed on internal issues and efforts of political deliberations and discussions on foreign policy concerns and policies were not materialised as a norm of the political system. Politic in Pakistan was envisioned as a game of musical chair and a relentless power skirmish between the civilian leadership and military elite continued which denoted to power alteration struggle of well-known 'troika'. Pakistani politics largely remained under the influence of direct and indirect military rule for most years of its existence which made it apparent to assess the foreign policy consideration through the military perception of power and security. The foreign policy choices and considerations of Pakistan are mainly characterized by sensitivities and notions of security concerns, strategic depth, Indian threat and this provided the persuasion that a strong military provided a strong nation." The Pakistan’s sensitivity of 'Indian threat' since its inception largely involved army into the domain of foreign policy processes. Over the time due to persisted political instability in Pakistan, the military informally obtained veto power on substantial security and foreign policy apprehensions specifically the policies related to nuclear issue, Kashmir and Afghanistan (Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 150).
A Pakistan's foreign policy expert, Dr. Huma Naz Baqai (2015) pronounced Pakistan’s compulsions in a concise way while stating that “Pakistan's foreign policy is a story of constraints and compulsions. The Pakistani state has remained under tremendous pressures since its independence to make choices that were determined by both existential pressures from outside or within; to consolidate its national identity, internal cohesion, territorial integration and sustainability as an independent state” (para. 1). Pakistan is encountering an unconventional state of conflict where adversaries (largely non-state actors and their presumed backings) are not clearly defined which made it problematic to cope with the shadow enemies. Pakistan foreign policy obligations are more associated with security concerns and defence needs as it had to fight vigorously on its two geographical fronts of East Pakistan and West Pakistan and also struggling against the aggressive religious-ideological anti state actors weakening internal peace and territorial integrity. It has been observed that Pakistan is evidently suffering from a “fifth generation war” where neither battlefields are defined nor enemies are under command and control of an adversary state, rather they are comprised of vicious non-state actors equipped with contemporary technology and arsenal with an additional power of propaganda and persuasive communications (Saleem, 2015). Pakistan's armed forces are directing its military operations in turbulent areas of KPK and FATA. Furthermore, backing of terrorist and separatist elements in Baluchistan has also been linked to an apparent Indian involvement and in 2015 Pakistani officials have handed over relevant documents and evidences to UN to ascertain Indian connections with terrorist acts and groups in Baluchistan (Haider, 2015).

It is imperative to note that the security of any state is mainly relational with its economic strength. In case of Pakistan, foreign policy and security apprehensions made economic conditions and defence compulsions, two significant dynamics to manifest the Pakistan's perception of looking outward the South Asian region. Pakistan also required tide of dynamic economic resources and revenues to fulfill security and defence needs. In previous decades defence and security needs were furnished with the help of foreign aid largely from the United States, which also helped Pakistan to deter Indian expansion of power in South Asia. The strategic between America and India links are empowering the latter to consolidate its military power and economic influence in the Asian region, which would inevitably affect Pakistan as this would confine Pakistan’s choices in relation to its foreign policy obligations.

### 4.3 Pakistan’s Defense Compulsions

The emergent strategic cooperation between the United States and India has advanced the implications on global as well as regional level. Especially the Civil Nuclear Deal of 2008 violates the spirit and essence of nonproliferation regime and also identifies an entrenched discriminated demeanor between globally acknowledged nuclear weapon states and the country which is drifted outside the realm of the IAEA. It marked several questions on the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT regime and reflected the reservations of less developed countries (LDC) of South Pole regarding international institutions for their unrepresentative nature and being used as political stick and diplomatic maneuver to command the LDC.

Under democratic President Barack Obama, U.S consumes 53% of the global military expenses. Other than five major powers of the world “India, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Japan, and Italy also have been convened among the world’s ten top most countries, which spend maximum on their defense expenditures.” During the last decade, specifically since 2006, India dramatically increased its military spending which ranked it as the 7th largest arms buyer of the world. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) noted that India military expenditure increased by 45% during the period of 2005-2009. Later SIPRI reported that since 2010, in terms of global share in buying major armaments, India emerged as the largest importer. The armaments imports of India reached up to 15% of the total global arms trade from 2010-2014. This position was previously held by China during 2005-2009.

A large part of Indian military budget is consumed to buy weapons to advance its technology and to aid its approach of Global reach. India’s defence outlay is growing at a pace that places it at the top ten lists of defence expenditures throughout the world. India consumed $40bn estimated on defence. In 2013, Indian defence spending reached to $47.4 billion which almost
accounted for 2.7 per cent of total world military outlay. India’s defence expenditure is close to that of Japan ($48.6 billion) and Germany ($48.8 billion). It has indulged in weapons procurement in a much extensive way as well (SIPRI, 2014).

Along with its consistence rise in conventional weapons and power, India also established fast breeder reactor to increase its capacity to produce plutonium for manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Arun Jaitley, Finance Minister of India, while addressing the lower house of Indian parliament stressed for a “militarily-strong India” to address prospective coercions from potential China-Pakistan nexus in following way “modernization of the armed forces is critical to enable them to play their role effectively in the defense of India’s strategic interests” (Miglani, 2014). New Delhi has been taking a gradually confrontational stance, with clashes occurring along the Line of Control (LOC) and antagonistic expressions are used over and over. Many of strategists in Pakistan are concerned that against this milieu, the rise in the military budget of India would craft a new edge of strain between the two traditional rivals.

Pakistan’s defense compulsions are evolving by increasing military spending by India, augmented by U.S investment in Indian weapon market, the impetus of the arms race in South Asia. As a part of subsequent security threats and concerns, Pakistan always focused utterly on its eastern border. The incursion of Afghanistan has altered the security milieu for Pakistan completely, which surfaced significant modification in security perceptions and compulsions and led to the rise in defense outlay. It is important to note that Pakistan’s involvement in War on Terror as key U.S ally has significantly contributed to the increase in its defense spending.

Huma Mir (2015) identified multiple threats on border which become prime cause of increase in budget of defense in Pakistan by saying that almost two army corps have been deployed on or near Pakistan’s western borders in the counter terrorism mode. Simultaneously we are constrained not to lower our guard against the Indians in the East. The dilemma of a two front deployment is extremely strenuous on the armed forces limited resources. The Kashmir corps which remains deployed on war footing round the year is logistically the most expensive formation to maintain. Now that instead of maintaining only one corps Pakistan has to maintain three corps on war footing, obviously additional resources are required by the armed forces.

Pakistan is profoundly observing arm build-up and expansion of power in the region and its strategic responses are largely intended to form an alliance rather focusing on diplomatic means to mend its bilateral relations with America and India. On the other hand to enhance its conventional power, Pakistan is also bidding for procurement of American weapons including F-16 Jet Fighters. Pakistan is primarily leaning towards China for the advancement of its arsenal and defence. It is obvious from these moves that Pakistan will utilize all needed actions to confirm its security and preserve strategic balance in the South Asian region. Keeping in view the rise of bloc politics in Asia, regional rivalry between two traditional adversaries would lead inevitably towards the ocean. It is obvious that this arms race would be more expensive for Pakistan as it does not have a strategic backing like America and this can coerce her get more close to China for strategic patronage which can be an operative counter strategy to diminish the constant amplification of Indian power (Mian, 2009, 25). Additionally, as a part of War on Terror, Pakistan not only paid the ‘human cost’ but the “battle against militancy has cost Pakistan $68 billion in the same period.” Interestingly, while the U.S has just provided over $13 billion to Pakistan over the last 10 years, the losses in 2010-11 alone were recorded to be $17.9 billion”. In 2010, Abdul Hafeez Shaikh as Finance Minister of Pakistan briefly pronounced on the increase in defense expenditure by saying that “the current security situation warranted the hike” (Yousaf, 2014).

4.4 Pakistan’s Security Dilemma: An Indian Factor

Wissing (2007) commented that “It is India alone that Pakistan’s leaders view as their traditional enemy---other shadows are encroaching on these lands; but it is to India’s shadow that Pakistanis pay the closest attention” (p. 168). Morgenthau pronounces that states require power
for their respectable survival and for the accomplishment of most vigorous self-interests. The security dilemma of Pakistan can be observed through the notion of ‘image theory’ which manifests that states incline to identify threats through the images they get from the environment and retort accordingly (Alexander, 2005, p. 28).

Survival and security were the Pakistan’s foremost national interests which needed the economic aid and assistance to maintain the defence to deter India. In such harsh realities, ‘policy of neutrality’ was never remained an option for Pakistan. It is important to note that India was determined to upgrade their defence, but fear of expected Pakistani belligerence was never their prime motivator for shaping her foreign policy choices rather it was more responsive to the arrival of the Cold War in South Asia and regional modifications. Insecure borders made Pakistan foreign policy ‘Indian centric’. India focused on Pakistan in the initial years, but 1962 Sino-India War and Indian regional ambitions did not allow her to opt a Pakistan centric approach. Indian political leadership was more equipped to assess foreign policy rationale as they were part of British politics since 1885 and learned the art of bargain and political leverage. Kux (2001) in his valuable work “The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies” stated, “Relations with India overshadowed everything else. Pakistan’s traumatic birth would have made the Indo-Pak relationship difficult and complex under the best of circumstances” (p. 19).

India’s increasing influence on Afghanistan and Iran through bilateral relations is giving birth to Pakistan’s reservations as these two states are located on western border of Pakistan. Pakistan is profoundly viewing India’s bilateral relations with these two states in the context of hegemonic designs of India and its expansion of power. India after availing and extracting much power of strategic partnership with America, would be capable enough to challenge the Pakistan’s claims to CARs on Islamic brotherhood by fraternity of Indian trade, investment and economic incentives. Indian hostile outreach to CARs is also bringing Pakistan’s North under Indian influence by securing a military base in this region would enable India to venture of military power. Central Asia lines into high strategic primacies of India. India’s outreach to CARs is also alarming Pakistan as India is about to acquire a larger role in Asia which would be difficult to handle by Pakistan. India established its very first military and air base at Ayni in Tajikistan outside of Indian Territory. This brings the threat to bypass Pakistan in its attempt to access CARs as an area of influence and energy hub. Pakistan’s Indian centric approach is further emphasized due to American support to a Central Asian policy of India by assigning her a greater role in Asia as part of strategic partnership.

Fair (2007) explains the relevance of countering Pakistan essential to Indian strategy by saying that “Central Asia is an important theatre for India. While India’s objectives in the region reflect interests that reach far beyond Pakistan, the fact remains that India is interested in countering Pakistan in this region.” India endures to equip itself with the latest and modern sophisticated arms and mechanism attained from Israel, U.S, Russia and other European countries. “Indian forces outstrip Pakistan’s by a six to one. Pakistan can neither match the Indian numbers nor does it desire parity. It need is only to maintain a credible minimum affordable deterrence. Translated into actuality means that, it must have better equipped, better trained and a sleek force capable of countering Indian designs through quality” (Mir, 2015).

Wissing (2007) has noted that Pakistan does not have adequate potential to repel with on its eastern and western border at the same time and this sense of insecurity is leading Pakistan to perceptive of U.S-India strategic partnership with consternations. He explained Pakistan’s implication emerging out of these strategic relations in a concise manner as “a development that casts India’s shadow even over the Pakistan-U.S alliance, raising doubts about both its durability and utility at the same time that it deepens the quandary in which Pakistanis find themselves in fashioning a workable national security strategy in Afghanistan” (p. 164).

Pakistani strategists and foreign policy managers admit the fact that Pakistan has an "India centric defense strategy" but they also expound that this approach is built on reciprocal gestures. Many of them strongly believe that “India’s attitude does not give Pakistan an iota of a reason to change existing threat perception.” Former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gillani once specified that “We remain concerned over Pakistan-specific Indian military doctrines such as the
‘Cold Start’ envisaging a limited conventional war under the nuclear overhand, huge increase in the Indian military budget and massive weapon acquisition” (Mir, 2015)

In the course of development of the United States-India strategic partnership, it is apparent that America would recommend the Indian inclusion as a permanent member obtaining veto power in UNSC which has disturbing consequences for Pakistan at both national and international levels. This would not only consolidate Indian claim as a significant international power player, but also can lead to empower India to use its regional influence as a leverage against Pakistan’s interests mainly in the Kashmir dispute. Moreover, facing the hostility at regional level, apprehensions of Pakistan would be aggravated to the international level. It has been apparent from the historical records of Pakistan-India bilateral relations and persisted animosity that both countries frame their strategy towards each other under the zero-sum paradigm. This zero-sum computation has been applied by the strategist of both states for decades. Wissing (2007) asserts that Pakistan’s political, diplomatic and regional problems are not Indian backed but he acknowledges that India may be the “principal beneficiary” of Pakistan’s increasing problems and tumbling its international reputation (p. 165). This seems that growing diplomatic and political isolation of Pakistan would comfort Indian regional design of primacy.

4.5 Pak-U.S Ties: American Disillusionment with Unequal Partner

In the current phase of diplomatic interaction towards each other, Pakistan-America bilateral relations are neither aggressive nor friendly. Their relations towards each other were comparatively cooperative in the past when Pakistan acted as America’s non-NATO ally in War against terrorism, but later due to emerging prospects of withdrawal of U.S troops from Afghanistan, bilateral relations between two countries significantly altered as Pakistan is no more an appropriate state in strategic calculus of the United States. The United States-Pakistan relations were neither built on shared perceptions nor were intended to attain common goals. Their strategic relations were mainly result of other dynamics and shaped as timely convenient where conjunction of interests were mainly missing. Dr. Naz’s (2015) analysis seems appropriate in U.S-Pakistan relations when she stated that:

Pakistan’s relationship with the existing superpower, USA, has always been of a utility partner. It wanes away once the need is fulfilled. Pakistan has swung from being the most sanctioned ally to a front line non-NATO Ally in the War on terror. The relationship is on somewhat better footing but is of accommodation at best with no strategic convergence whatsoever. Pakistan and U.S continue to doubt each other in spite of improved public diplomacy (para, 6).

Kux (2001) coined U.S-Pakistan relationship “A union of unequals” with reference to Zia-ul-Haq’s conversation to Secretary of State George Shultz in 1982 (p. 361). He also highlighted the fact that both countries were not compatible in their status as America being an economically advanced state and global player has its foreign policy concerns and choices largely of global nature while Pakistan regardless of its significant geographical location remained as an economically disadvantaged regional state whose foreign policy deliberations mainly related to its insecure boarders and state interests revolved around balancing and countering India only. America was obviously a senior partner and which contained more preeminence while dealing with Pakistan, which was struggling hard for her endurance (p. 361).

Locker and Breitman (2014) in “US Today” illuminated the nature of the United States-Pakistan strategic relations as:

U.S.-Pakistani ties have long been viewed through the lens of other relationships. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, President Richard Nixon relied on Pakistan to get support to initiate diplomatic relations with China. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration also poured resources into Pakistan because of its backing and supporting the groups who were fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Since 1979, much of U.S. Pakistan policy focused on how Pakistan could help to deal with Afghanistan, which was invaded that year by the Soviet Union. That concern regained momentum after the Sep 11, 2001, attacks and the subsequent U.S invasion of Afghanistan.
The U.S-India strategic relationship turned into a strategic partnership in a fast growing mode and in diplomatic expression both called each other ‘Natural Allies.’ “Decoupling” and “De-hyphenating” policies towards Pakistan-India were articulated in Clinton era and further elaborated by Bush presidency by giving India a prior status which visibly stabbed U.S-Pakistan ties. Policy of “Decoupling” was even apparent by U.S during Kargil conflict in 1999 when Pakistan was forced to withdraw as an outcome of American pressure. This policy provided Pakistan critical realization of shift of U.S weight in favor of India. Though this shift appeared sporadic due to U.S compulsions emergent out of 9/11 attack and brought an immediate modification in Washington’s disposition. This led to consider Pakistan once again a ‘Most Favored Ally’. George W. Bush (Jr), an American president in 2006 while visiting India verified U.S acceptance and recognition of Indian hegemony over the Asian region as a part of American global policy of primacy. President Bush acknowledged and confirmed Indian role when he stated “understanding the prerequisite of a stable and lasting regional polity”. But this did not bring significant changes into the American evolving strategic perception towards India. Researches, think tank reports and strategists continuously suggested for cessation the policy of losing India for the sake of keeping Pakistan allied with U.S.

Ramifications on Pakistan as a result of U.S-India strategic partnership seemed perceptibly in post 2010 scenario. Cracks in the relationship between the two strategic but unequal allies incited in 2011. Few but significant instances impelled considerations among the policy circles of both states to review their strategies to move forward. Arrest of Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor by Pakistani officials on the charge of open shooting and killing of two men in January 2011 in the city of Lahore and later in May 2011, raid of U.S navy seal in Abbottabad which allegedly killed Osama Bin Laden without taking Pakistan in confidence averaged the U.S-Pakistan relations.

Wirsing (2007) claims that “U.S and Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan today are far from convergent, and they are perhaps least convergent regarding India. India’s shadow is lengthening over Afghanistan, indeed over all the lands to Pakistan’s west and northwest” (p. 167). This investigation is still not outdated in current situation and depicts the real picture of consequences for Pakistan as an upshot of the United States-India strategic ties. The way this strategic partnership is fostering, it is inversely shaping the United States-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s reservations are accumulated about the sustainability of their relations with U.S as it is absorbedly engrossed and expedient to American interests. American policy in Asia region is a resultant of its global goal of supremacy and Pakistan currently doesn’t fit into the strategic, diplomatic and economic calculations of the U.S. The Obama administration has overlooked recurrent reprimands from Pakistan that this emergent strategic partnership between U.S and India has disturbed the ‘balance of power’ between nuclear equipped countries of South Asia. Head of the Asia Program at the European think tank FRIDE, Gauri Khandekar rejected Pakistan’s uncertainties over the United States-India strategic ties while considering these concerns as inconsequential. She illuminated that “The U.S is disillusioned with Pakistan. A stronger India would actually enhance regional stability. It would also enable India and the U.S to better tackle terror threats emerging from Pakistan or the broader region” (Shams, 2015).

In the wake of U.S-India strategic ties, elements of anguish can be observed in U.S-Pakistan strategic relations. Pakistan perceives that as U.S-India strategic partnership is cherishing, its adverse effects are cultivating as increased security threats from enlarged India and strategic drift from U.S, which had been a major source of arms, aid and assistance, significantly helped Pakistan to deter India. Reasons of diminishing strategic ties between U.S-Pakistan are of twofold. First, Pakistan and U.S strategic relations are based on one dimensional relationship mainly focused on security concerns which are largely emergence of War against al-Qaeda and Taliban. Pakistan lacks wide-ranging partnership with the U.S, which does not embrace cultural and trade linkages. Moreover, strategic ties between Pakistan and U.S are highly dependent on relations between Pakistan military establishment and the Pentagon (Qazi, 2012).

American policy managers highlighted the need to view United States ties with India and Pakistan under the “gamut of ‘positive and negative relationship.’” Many in American administration and Legislature encouraged for assigning India a larger stake in Afghanistan which is intended to
sustain Pakistan relevance and influence in the area. There are less in American policy circles who oppose to devalue Pakistan from strategic listing and suggest a cautious tread to deal with their alleged problematic state. There are numerous in Pakistan, arguing for disentanglement while others are in favor of new rubrics of ‘engagement game’ (Qazi, 2013). The Pakistan policy working group report manifested that “Washington will need to step up diplomacy in South Asia, and its need to consider how to decrease Pakistan’s fear of India and how to improve U.S ties with New Delhi without alarming Islamabad” (Bajoria, 2009).

4.6 Commencement of an Arms Race in South Asia

Asia’s obsession with weapons is observed by many experts leading to devastate its social development. As it constitutes a third portion of total global arms imports. SIPRI report further exhibited India as the largest weapons importer of the world since 2010. Indian share of buying arms accounted for 10% out of the total 44% arms imports to Oceania and Asia and later till 2014 it was further increased up to 15% share in global arms imports and nearly 34% of total arms imports of Asia. South Korea stands second with 6%, China and Pakistan each constitute 5% and 4% respectively for arms procurement. The study also noted the trends of establishing local arms industries by some Asian countries to decrease their dependence on western suppliers. Due to China’s development of local production of arms, a decline in its arms imports has been reported. Its exports of weapons have significantly increased as Pakistan is the largest buyer of Chinese arms and China has emerged as world’s third largest weapons exporter (Shuja & Mohan, 2014, p. 10). SIPRI also noted that there is a worldwide gradual decline in military spending, but arms expenditures are increasing in Asia.

Pakistan strategists assert that Western developed states, “in order to get their shares of pie, are rushing to India and encouraging it to go for large-scale acquisition of arms and ammunitions” (“Pakistan’s Defence Budget,”). Pakistan contends the Indian stance of justifying its weapons procurement and nuclear power enhancement programmes to counter potential China as India has battled only a ‘low intensity war’ on its border with China but fought major three wars with Pakistan and several border clashes. Pakistan believes that this extensive military expenditure on arms purchase and nuclear developments robustly focused towards Pakistan. Such advances in Indian power inevitably force Pakistan to increase its defence outlay to preserve a minimum deterrence against India.

India-Pakistan traditional animosity is combined with their competitive strategic ties with U.S. Transformation of U.S-India ties grounded into the policy of ‘Rebalancing Asia’ which is making Pakistan and China more observant of these strategic interests. “The Indo-Pakistani conflict has played a very important role in this arms race, and it is continuing to play an important role,” said Siemon Wezeman, an expert at SIPRI. He explained the underlying reasons of arms race in Asia by saying that “On top of that, India feels threatened by China. India views China as a potential threat to its security, partly because China is a partner and an ally of Pakistan and also because India shares a long disputed border with China. India also thinks that in order to be a regional power it needs to show its muscles” (“Asia’s Obsession with Arms,”). Indian strategists justify Indian huge spending on arms on the basis of its defense requirements and in comparison with China and Pakistan’s high proportion of arms expenditures in relation to their GDP where Indian spending is not more than 4% of its GDP. The U.S-India strategic ties are augmenting the perceptions of threat of significant nations of South Asia. Nature of U.S-India relations are built on the notion of strategy which is compelling many others to be strongly armed their forces. This ‘Action-Reaction Pattern’ is persuasively explained by Wezeman as “The problem is when the first country feels threatened and reacts by buying more, a spiral of action-reaction may result - an arms race - that may get out of control and be damaging economically or even lead to one party believing it has an upper hand and is at that point strong enough to use its military power (before the other party has caught up)” (Dominguez, 2015).

The United States policy of cooperation with India in the fields of defense and nuclear energy has alarmed Pakistan as it is encouraging a new arm race between the two traditional rivals which are turned now as nuclear weapon states. The U.S policy of strategic cooperation with India is augmenting fear among the Pakistani circles for pushing them to the wall and forcing them to approach alternative options to deter India. The U.S sales of weapons and unchecked nuclear
build-up of India indicates that American policy is not at all focusing to resolve the conflict and aggravating the rivals states to enlarge their efforts for arms contestation. American cooperation via nuclear deal is supporting an arm competition and translates U.S foreign policy of no more treating Pakistan and India as equal competitor. This deal also provided recognition to India as leading power in South Asia which also strengthens the ways to ensure Indian dominance of authority over Pakistan. The U.S also disregarded Pakistan’s anxieties. Pakistani strategist, Sultan (2006) criticized the U.S-India nuclear deal in particular by warning that this extensive nuclear cooperation would not only allow India to advance its ‘fissile stocks’ and this would ultimately turn into provoking a dangerous arms race involving China, Pakistan and India. The U.S-India strategic relations may not aiming these adverse effects but development of such partnership in strategic environment characterized by mistrust and animosity between the two nuclear rivals would invite other states having stakes in the regional influence and it would eventually destabilize the region.

Supply of most up-dated missile system to India would mostly target Pakistan as China has the capacity to deter India. It is Pakistan which would be more affected by the upset of strategic imbalance. Missile race is initiated by U.S offer to supply of Patriot Advanced Capability PAC-2 system to India and Pakistan’s fear is further amplified by the probability of providing PAC-3 having the capacity to carry chemical, biological and nuclear warheads and four times more missiles with long range (Fani, 2009, p. 150). This would lead Pakistan to avail anti-missile system in similar or parallel capacity. The U.S-India strategic ties are tempting Pakistan for nuclear force multiplications. In 2009, A. K. Antony vindicated Indian policy of arms build-up as a necessary measure by saying “The modernization of armed forces has become a global trend, we must also assume a new approach taking into account a variety of threats to our national security.” It has been reported by various researches and reports that India as world greatest importer of arms had consumed as much as $10.5 billion on military imports; making it the leading arms importers among the developing world. Indian military spending has been increasing gradually and mounted up to $37 billion. In year 2013, India constituted 13.5 % of global imports of weapons (Shuja & Mohan, 2014, p. 7). Due to Strong aspiration for modernization of armed forces, “India has been a top buyer of arms for last three years.” With the emergence of U.S-India strategic partnership, India is accenting to consider the “Indian Ocean to be its own lake.” It’s consolidation of Blue Water Navy indicates an aim to induct “a fleet of three aircraft carriers in the coming years.” It has become obligatory for Pakistan in wake of transformation of U.S-India strategy expanding to waters, to obtain naval weapon to deter any future blockade to its communication lines. American support to Indian policy design in Asia is alarm for Pakistan as this would empower India to advance its competence to choke Pakistani ports and sea lines. Likewise India is preparing for air ascendancy by spending nearly $ 6 billion in coming years to secure air power.

4.7 Pakistan’s Enlarged Rely on Nuclear Deterrence

Krepon, a senior associate of Stimson Centre, Carnegie Endowment and previously worked at the U.S State Department, pointed out in 2004 that:

In South Asia, the conventional military balance is shifting steadily in India’s favor. From 1995-1999, South Asian military expenditures grew more than for any region of the world, with India’s growth rate three times that of Pakistan. This disparity, which could enable the Indian military to employ new military tactics in future conflicts with Pakistan, has grown even more appreciable in recent years.

It is important to note that India and Pakistan are the only two nuclear weapon states, still having unsettled differences. The nuclear armed rivals evidently acted as consistent with the “Glenn-Snyder’s Stability-Instability Paradox” during the Kargil Crisis of 1999. Panday (n.d.) manifested, that:

Kargil challenged traditional Cold War deterrence theory that nuclear weapons would make war too costly. Far from deterring war, the weapons gave Pakistan the assurance needed to initiate cross-border conflict. Nevertheless, that India’s measured and cautious response limited the conflict’s scope and duration supports the argument that nuclear weapons will prevent escalation and keep conflicts under control.

But widespread cooperation emerging out of U.S-India strategic ties is providing terrific nuclear leverage and power to India which is dreadful for Pakistan to deal with. This can impact
Pakistan by twofold scenario, first it can lessen the importance of nuclear deterrence as an effective mean to avoid escalation of large scale war as it was functioned in Kargil conflict. In second scenario, it might let Pakistan to increase its reliance more on nuclear arsenal by restraining its previous strategy as a last resort.

In late 90s Pakistan had beheld nuclear weapons in a different manner as they were the last resort to deter a potential nuclear attack by India. It is the India-specific modification in nuclear nonproliferation Act of 1978 of U.S, which is engendering Pakistan’s concerns (Fani, 2009, p. 153). Nuclear cooperation between U.S and India has established American acknowledgement of India as nuclear weapon state. This deal is set to offer India astonishingly big that is concreting a nuclear discrimination against Pakistan. This would amplify the irregularity in conventional and nuclear balance of power which minimized the chances of intensification of conflict between Pakistan and India in the post Kargil scenario.

The most significant implication emerging out of U.S-India cooperation specifically the nuclear deal is that it provides the prospects to India to build a huge nuclear force as it certainly wishes. Nuclear cooperation with U.S allows India to categorize or ranks its nuclear facilities as civil energy or nuclear energy. It would provide India a civilian cover to build up an unchecked defense related nuclear capability. India has enough plutonium hoards to make warheads earlier formed in the Cirus and Dhruva Reactors. Further stock of plutonium is also added by the material separated from spent reactor energy reprocessing services held at Kalpakkam and Tarapur (Fani, 2009, 154). In absence of appropriate safeguards, manufacturing of fissile material can be enhanced by India for armed purposes and can lead towards a nuclear Arms race. Besides its nuclear weapon state status India is keenly involved in the advance of thermonuclear weapons by increasing a “covert uranium enrichment plant.” India under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his vision ‘Make India’ determined to install more sophisticated weapons to shape up India’s military ability. This policy of arms build-up and expansion of nuclear arsenal would be incorporated by the Modi government by further spending $200 billion in procurement of sophisticated weapons other than the defense allocation (Saleem, 2014).

Pakistan argues that despite still heavy spending on military development, conventional forces are insufficient to deter India and this makes it a compulsion for her to increase reliance more on nuclear weapons. It has been argued by various circles of nuclear field that “Pakistan produces more fissile materials than any other country on the planet” (Blackwill, Chandra, Clary, & Rapporteur, 2011, p. 12). The Pakistani National Command Authority (NCA) identified that, “In view of the fact that the agreement would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met” (Blank, 2007, pp, 2-3).

Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudary on October 20, 2015 just two days before the visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to U.S pronounced that “Pakistan may first use nuclear weapons in a future war with India.” HoodBhoy (2015) identified that this declaration made by foreign office rather Strategic Plan Division or GHQ is just an echo of army’s well known standpoint. This also confirmed that “Pakistan has drastically shifted its nuclear posture.” Pakistan anticipates to use “tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield bombs” to prevent the possible advance of Indian troops into Pakistani territory under an Indian operational doctrine known as ‘Cold Start strategy.’ India vigorously negates such doctrine as official stance that this limited action would not provoke a nuclear exchange (para, 1-3).

The Indian official policy stands for ‘massive retaliation’, as head of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Shyam Saran in 2013 declared that “India would not be first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective” (Hoodbhoy, 2015). Indian policy of massive retaliation conveys a clear message to Pakistan that “she will react accordingly by considering it a nuclear attack whether outside or from its own territory and whether mini-nuke, micro nuke or a city-buster. Indian antagonistic and threatening policies of
Cold Start and massive retaliation are leaving no room for Pakistan to go for further options other than heavily dependent on nuclear arsenal”.

Atlantic Council report of 2014 by Shuja and Mohan acknowledged the Pakistani fear of confronting an unmatchable power at its door by saying that:

India’s growing conventional advantage will force Pakistan to rely heavily on its nuclear deterrent and similarly India’s acquisitions such as the ballistic missile defense capabilities will also arguably push Pakistan to augment its offensive capabilities thus resulting in an endless cycle that may be a huge drain on Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan is prompted in this direction by India’s larger military size and capability (p. 13).

The U.S National Intelligence Council has assessed that:

India will most likely continue to consolidate its power advantage relative to Pakistan. India’s economy is already nearly eight times as large as Pakistan’s; by 2030 that ratio could easily be more than 16-to-1. This will exacerbate the military imbalance for Pakistan, whose conventional forces are a fourth the size of India’s today. The study notes that nuclear powers such as Russia, Pakistan and potential aspirants such as Iran and North Korea see nuclear weapons as compensation for other political and security weaknesses, heightening the risk of their use (“Global Trends,” 2012).

Pakistan views nuclear weapons as the balancing factor to India whereas India is more concerned about escalating threat from China. Its nuclear weapons are also meant for deterrence to deal with the Chinese potential threat. Nuclear arms development and related experimentations have furthered a new and substantial cost and pressure to the budgets of both South Asian rivals.

4.8 Kashmir Issue and Regional Peace

The U.S-India strategic relations had already altered U.S policy towards Kashmir issue. Present Policy of U.S over Kashmir is evidently different from its Cold War stances. Kashmir never remained a significant issue for U.S Asian policy, but its intensity to escalate a possible war between the two states of its strategic circle always engrossed U.S attentions. In a period of estrangement, Kashmir remained an irritant factor in U.S-India bilateral relations and even during the first term of President Obama, American concerns were raised often over Indian policy over Kashmir. Constant negotiations through viable communications channels and growing conversion of interests between the both countries convinced America to understand India stand point on Kashmir. This led to modify U.S policy over Kashmir, which would make Pakistan’s option of applying U.S-Pakistan strategic relations an obsolete one and upset earlier expectations of Pakistan to force India into concessions on the Kashmir conflict.

Pakistan often requested for a U.S role in negotiations over Kashmir dispute. However, President Obama in 2010 specified that the “U.S could not impose any solutions to the Kashmir issue”, he somewhat stimulated Pakistan and India to diminish strains by themselves for their interests. He said that their efforts would be assisted in any way in decreasing these tensions. In Pakistani circles, this statement was taken as support for the Indian stance of not allowing the involvement of any outside forces for the settlement of the Kashmir conflict. Due to the rapidly growing strategic partnership with India and value of Pakistan as strategic compulsion, U.S position on the Kashmir dispute is fundamentally one of a ‘hands-off policy’ and it aims to exhibit an act of strategic balance that would not offend either side. Pakistan reservations are mounted by U.S gradually altered position and it is perceived that it would indirectly support an Indian claim of considering it a problem of bilateral relations. Indian designs of monopoly and authority in the region augmented by U.S multifaceted cooperation would provide India a clear edge of command over Kashmir conflict. Pakistan believes that the prevailing conventional arms imbalance would increase, thus consequentially helping India to succeeding its regional authority. Uncertainties of Pakistan are further heightened as the U.S support declined on the Kashmir dispute.

4.9 Energy Security Rivalry

There are a number of scholars and writers who consider Ballistic Missile and nuclear weapon rivalry as core issues between Pakistan and India. Indian rising and hegemony in South
Asia is also now in the potential list of core issues pertaining to Indo-Pakistan traditional enmity and Asian politics. Wirsing (2007) identified another major issue of conflict over energy and water between India and Pakistan in the list of potential threat emerging out of U.S-India strategic partnership and American support to the Indian pursuit of influence in the region. While labeling it as “New Great Game in Asia,” Wirsing’s inference is that this competition over the energy resources would played over a broader extra regional scenario as these resources are decisive for security scheme of Islamabad and New Delhi. Interest and reservations of both states are extended to maintain their influences and counter influences towards maintaining economic ties with Afghanistan, Iran and most significantly CARs. The writer further extends his view by identifying the alarming of unchecked energy rivalry, animosity and distrust between the both states that could stifle the peace in South Asian region (p. 154).

Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline was previously seen as significant measures to soften the traditional Pakistan-India rivalry. Prospects for projects are extremely blurred as trust deficit between Pakistan and India, intricate transit distance, Iranian ambitious profit drives and most importantly U.S substantial opposition to the project are major obstacles. As a part of growing strategic partnership, U.S is in persuasive position to pressurize India for not being part of this project as U.S perceives this project as a strong support to Iranian ambitions and “contribution to the development of nuclear weapons” (Wirsing, 2007, p. 156). Pakistan as a non-NATO ally and India as strategic partner of U.S are not free to quest a ‘win-win’ strategy to accomplish their energy needs as prospects of Pakistan-India cooperation over energy resources are highly conditioned with improvement in U.S-Iranian bilateral relationship (Kathuria, 2006).

India’s energy apprehensions are dynamics of her relationship with Washington as well as with Tehran. Despite U.S opposition to India considers relationship with Tehran crucial to her great power ambitions and agenda relevant to CARs. India is also determined to invest at Ghabahar Port of Iran to obtain the trading access to Afghanistan which will provide a base to bypass Pakistan. Pakistan permits transit rights for its export to India but doesn’t let India to move goods to Afghanistan as Pakistan also strives with India to gain access to consumer markets in Afghanistan. This Indian project is intended to offer Afghanistan a route to the sea comparatively shorter than the passage available through Pakistan. Zaranj-Delaram highway is a project to build 218 kilometre road from Iran’s boarder, passing through Afghanistan intercity ring road to Tajikistan and reaching to CARs (Wirsing, 2007, p. 159). Indian efforts to invest at Iranian port would develop an economic rivalry and clash of interests as this will compete Pakistan’s new Gwadar Port built with the help of Chinese assistance. The U.S-India strategic partnership would condition the transformation of Pak-Afghan ties and it will heavily dependent upon nature of Pakistan relations with India.

Noteworthy growth of Indo-Iranian ties remained a significant concern for Pakistan as their collaborative venture would lessen the Afghanistan and Indian dependence on Pakistan towards CARs. Wirsing (2007) noted that by such strategy India would “overcome Pakistan’s renunciation to India transit rights across Pakistan and at the same time threatening to box Pakistan in strategically” (p. 159). However U.S-India strategic partnership doesn’t provide enough freedom to India to enjoy a prosperous relation with Iran.

### 4.10 Indian Penetration and Influence in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s Concerns

**Remarks of Indian Union Home Minister Chakravarti Rajagopalachari in 1951 explicitly explains Indian approach towards Afghanistan as part of strategy to counter and threat Pakistan as “It is no secret that our foreign policy holds Indo-Afghan friendship to be essential: and when we two are bound in friendship we will squeeze anyone in between in the same embrace of affection-a pincer moment for peace, so to speak” (Datta-Roy, 2006). Afghanistan’s strategic alignment is a serious issue between Pakistan and India. Both countries are anticipated to maintain their influence over Afghanistan to take control of South Asian Politics. Upswing in bilateral relations between Afghanistan and India are of great concern for Pakistan’s security interests. As a geographic gateway and a transit route to CARs for India, Afghanistan stands very important for energy security**
policies as it lessen the Indian dependence over Pakistan to access the CARs. Moreover, as an outcome of strategic partnership, U.S also envisioned increasing role of India in Afghanistan to get an edge to the smooth execution of her global and regional policies. American backing of India to have an influential role is causing intensification of accusations between Pakistan and India.

An Afghanistan expert, Barnett R. Robin says that “Pakistan’s military establishment has always approached the various wars in and around Afghanistan as a function of its main institutional and national security interests: first and foremost, balancing India” (as cited in Kaplan, 2010 para. 10). In a 2006 USIP (United States Institute of Peace) report, Abubakar Siddique writes that “Pakistan’s military establishment view Afghanistan in the context of strategic depth.” In Atlantic monthly, Robert D. Kaplan is of view that “Afghanistan has been a prize that Pakistan and India have fought over directly and indirectly for decades. Pakistan is suspicious about presence of Indian consulates in Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif and Pakistan comes with the allegations of using these consulates as a ‘cover’ for covert operations by Indian intelligence agencies. Pakistan has expressed her apprehensions variously for promoting separatist elements and support in the terms of resources to pledge disturbance in Baluchistan by Indian intelligence agencies. Pakistan perceives a two dimension threat from the fact that India is trying to encircle her by acquisition of influence in Afghanistan. From one aspect, India is enjoying the full support of U.S for her policy of reconstruction and assistance towards Afghanistan as part of their strategic partnership which is continuously assuring Indian influence. On the other side, India is utilizing her ‘soft power’ including Indian soaps and films to engage the Afghan population for developing cultural links to counter existed support in Afghan society towards Pakistan for being an Islamic country and having Pashtun ethnic traits. Pakistan’s fear of encirclement is heightened by the fact that India is expanding in the region by developing its very first overseas air base in Farkhor, Tajikistan which is a convenient way of transportation to and from Afghanistan. Moreover, it aims to protect Indian’s potential energy interests.

Indian emergent influence in Afghanistan as part of long term policy of strategic ties with U.S and its counter response by Pakistan is gradually turning this land locked state as a mere battle field for traditional power rivalry which is now fuelled by U.S support to India under the partnership cover. An increasing role of India in Afghanistan as part of U.S Asian strategy of assigning it a bigger share to influence this turbulent region can push Pakistan to review its strategic calculation regarding Taliban. Pakistan comprehends Taliban as a significant instrument in Afghanistan, viewing them least unfavorable to its hold and most adept of blocking enlarged stimulus by India.

Cohen (2007) with reference to his communications with Pakistani officials expounds that Pakistan options and concerns about an Indian penetration in Afghanistan relates to Islamabad’s fear of encirclement. Pakistan is also apprehensive due to increased dependence of Afghanistan on New Delhi. Cohen explicates that it is Pakistan strategic compulsion as it has minimal options other than to tolerate these turbulent non state elements as instruments. Cohen defines Pakistan’s role as ‘Self-defeating’ in Afghanistan and admitted that the role which has been demanded from Pakistan to play is to collaborate with that regime in Afghanistan which is profoundly reliant on New Delhi (p. 15). Further task of suppressing and countering Taliban and its cliques are also shouldered to Pakistan. They are mostly from the ranks of Pashtun in Afghanistan, ethnic allies of Pakistan as political, ethnic and land frontiers are pervious and indistinct between both states. This lead to make it difficult for Pakistan to policing or regulating the crossways penetration and emergent Indian influences turned it more intricate and challenging.

4.11 Strategic Quadrilateral Relationship: Indian Primacy and Fallouts in The Region

Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953) once commented that:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its labours, the genius of its scientists, and the hopes of its children ……This is not a way of
life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

It is undeniable fact that South Asia is one of the deprived parts of the world as greater number of poor concentrate in the region. It is estimated that “almost 571 million people live on less than $1.25 a day” (Nawaz & Guruswamy, 2014, p. 4). South Asia is characterized by the high prevalence of poverty, appalling human development indexes and highest density of population and most importantly a challenging region with poor health structures and resources to fight against diseases like HIV-AIDS and Malaria. Moreover, South Asia is not integrated in economic terms to provide the fruits of development to make it a strong economic zone.

SIPRI reported in 2011 that “over 1,738 billion have been spent on militaries throughout the world.” Almost expenditure of $444 billion has been reported for war in Afghanistan. U.S as part of its global policy and design of primacy U.S may able to afford these spending, but its strategic partnership with India is bringing this arms madness to the Region which is already starving. South Asia is a ‘Zone of conflict’ due to the inborn dispute of Kashmir, which has led two traditional and nuclear weapon states of the region into a relative arms competition. This also led towards maintaining a sharp disparity of spending on social sector. The rise of military spending in the region and U.S relations with India is also lessening the bilateral trade prospects regionally specifically between India and Pakistan.

It is not just the Pakistan who is observing keenly the U.S-India strategic hold over the Asian region with apprehensions, but Russia and West Asian countries also have their securities over the hegemonic policies of U.S and Indian engrossment. A retired Indian Diplomat M. K. Bhadrakumar pointed out that “China and Russia-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is acquiring increasing interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and then both India and U.S have cause to be concerned” (Wirsing, 2007, pp. 163-164). China is also taking this enlargement of U.S-Indian interests in stern manner as intimidation to its policy and support to multi-polarity. Advances into U.S-India relations not only put an end to India’s pervious policy of keeping U.S out of the politics of Sub-Continent region rather India has been perceived as a significant source to supplement American interests in Asia and beyond. The Chinese concerns regarding U.S-India strategic partnership are best explained by a strategist, Mr. Wu Xinbo, the director of the Center for American Studies in following words, “For China, the biggest long-term worry about the developing relationship between New Delhi and Washington may be the advanced military technology that the United States will probably sell to India, said. That will touch China’s security nerve. The more advanced Indian capability will increase the pressure on China.”

Nuclear deal of 2008 provided the confirmation that U.S anticipates India cooperation in arms control specifically in Asia. The U.S efforts were to bring India into the Wassenaar arrangement NSG and their collaborative measures to endorse the FMCT; though FMCT has been obstructed by Pakistan and China. China is countering American strategy by initiating a Space Weapon treaty (PAROS) (Burgess, 2013, p. 13). Pakistani officials have frequently alarmed about the menaces of a “full-scale military conflict.” Pakistan is apprehensive about the Indian emergent role in the region largely due to two reasons. First, that India is seeking to derail the recent Chinese announcement of plans to build a $46 billion economic corridor from western China to Gwadar, a Pakistani Arabian sea port. Second, that the U.S backing and support India is dramatically tilting the strategic balance in South Asia in India’s favor and consequently forcing Pakistan to build up its military capacities. This includes both its thermonuclear arsenal and its plans to develop and deploy tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. On September 17, 2015 Adviser to the Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Sartaj Aziz in a special briefing to the upper house of Parliament of Pakistan highlighted the threatening effects of expanding U.S-India strategic cooperation over Pakistan in regional scenario. By calling these developments as “U.S tilt towards India”, Aziz clearly pointed out the ultimate U.S goal of targeting China by empowering India strategically to counter the Chinese influence in the region. He further expressed the Pakistan's concerns over a regional imbalance that is inevitable and certain in the case of any security and defense collaboration between U.S and India. Aziz made it clear that “Pakistan has repeatedly
without success cautioned Washington that the conventional and non-conventional military-strategic imbalance in the region must be taken into account when the U.S enters into any sort of defense cooperation with India” (Perera, n.d.).

4.12 Politics of Economic Corridor: Prospects of Pakistan-China Nexus

“In the contemporary world, economy is treated as a religion. The time has gone when the superpowers had large arsenals and extensive colonies. This is the era of economic independence and self-reliance. Now the nations which are economically independent, sovereign and self-reliant are dominant” (“China-Pak Economic Corridor,” 2015).

Political and competitive economic corridors are being incorporated in the region and rapidly building energy security alliances by Pakistan and India. Pakistan is also striving hard to succeed some command over the fabrication, dispensation and distribution of energy resources. In March 2007, inauguration of deep sea port of Gwadar mainly assisted by China clearly indicated the intent of Islamabad to become a significant energy and commercial intermediate partner of CARs. It has been observed by many analysts that as a response to fast growing U.S-India strategic ties, the prospects of conjunction of Pakistan-China strategic interests also flourished rapidly by exhibiting their collaboration through the politics of economic corridor (Niazi, 2005).

Pakistan always brands China as its ‘all-weather’ friend whereas United States is generally blamed for having a relationship mainly grounded on transitory nature and momentary issues with Pakistan. Major shifts in U.S policy towards India has increased Pakistan’s vulnerability and it leads to confirm Pakistan to see China as more trustworthy and less Intrude supplier of military hardware. China is also viewed by Pakistan’s security strategists as “silent ally against arch-rival India” (Khan, 2015). Close and Cordial relations with Pakistan is crucial to the Chinese South Asian policy of security and her consideration towards Afghanistan and India. China’s policy towards Pakistan is a reflective of her interest and priorities including increasing economic activities in the region, countering threat perceptions, terrorist intimidations and most significantly balancing increasing Indian role in the Region supported by U.S. (Small, 2014, p. 4). In past, despite a limited scope of relationship in terms of trade and investment, close relations with Pakistan always secured strategic rewards for China. Islamabad always kept India concerned on her Eastern border and this consistent confrontation prevented India from paying enough attention on China as a potential threat. This also led China to penetrate into East Asia. Moreover, China rationalized the strategic importance of Pakistan as it is a gateway to the Gulf States and can provide China an easy access to the Indian Ocean.

China’s sharp contention with India is underpinning possibility of China-Pakistan nexus as a result of U.S-India strategic ties which mainly target the rise of China as an economic and military joint. China views Pakistan as a credible balancer and natural check against India. China does not intend an excessive clash with India, but wants to keep her lesser in power, influence, and position. This would prevent India to steed challenges over Chinese boundaries. China-Pakistan relations are strengthening due to military and economic assistance as China aided Pakistan to amplify its aircraft, missiles and nuclear capabilities. To rescue Pakistan to tackle its economic vulnerability, China is heavily investing in Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy needs. Several bilateral trade agreements have been concluded to finance projects of mines, highways, power plants and most considerably China’s stake in Gwadar port (Small, 2014, p. 7).

Conjunction of strategic interests between the two states specifically emerging out of U.S policy of ‘Pivot Asia’ has provided valid grounds for much wider degree of collaboration. For many Chinese strategists, the ‘Pivot Asia’ denotes to augment U.S and allied exertions to contain China (Burgess, 2013, p. 3). Many Indian strategic experts are keenly observing Pakistan’s enduring partnership with China. The Chinese notion of “Strings of Pearl Strategy” indicates the increasing China-Pakistan nexus by establishing bonds with Myanmar, Sri-Lanka and Bangladesh (p. 3). An American defense analyst, Rory Medcalf in 2013 highlighted that “recognition of China’s massive seaborne oil-supply vulnerabilities has influenced Beijing’s defense, energy and foreign policies for decades. Whether or not the U.S navy has serious plans for the possibilities of blockading China,
through the Malacca Strait and other choke points, there are presumably those in the Chinese security establishment who assume it does.”

China as a principal contributor invested almost $200 million in the Gwadar port project to access convenient trade route for energy transportation from the Persian Gulf, Middle East and Africa to facilitate its energy efficiency (Wirsing, 2007, p. 158). Strategically, it would empower China to avail shortest access to these regions and this route would also help to bypass “Strait of Malacca” as this is increasingly coming under the U.S-Indian strategic planning. Chinese President Xi Jinping, during a brief visit of two days to Islamabad on April 19, 2015 pronounced a huge investment of $46 billion in infrastructure and energy projects in Pakistan. This visit also involved Pakistani and Chinese enterprises by signing 51 agreements. Chinese intentions and goal of policy measures to heighen politics of economic corridors was expressed by Sun Weidong, China’s ambassador to Pakistan by saying that “his country has established a joint agreement with Pakistan to protect their interests” (Tanzeem, 2015). It is important to note that China’s investment is nearly twofold of foreign direct investment (FDI) since 2008 and more than of entire U.S assistance to Pakistan since 2002 (Khan, 2015).

The politics of an economic corridor would facilitate Pakistan in following ways:
- It would completely stun the Indian strategic planning for naval hegemony in the Indian Ocean.
- It would provide better prospects to Pakistan into CARs and Afghanistan through reinforcing material influence.
- It would advance the economic and military ties between China and Pakistan and conceivably Pakistan’s captivation into a “China Centric strategic partnership” (Fazl-e-Haider, 2007).
- It would create opportunities of jobs and spark economic advantages for Pakistan.

Pakistan is determined to use potential advantages as her strategic enhancement to counter the rebalancing approach emergent of U.S-India strategic partnership. Pakistan in collaboration with China is apparently confident about the prospects of development in Gwadar as it would turn into a couple of years as one of the world’s largest deep sea ports. Its vast advantages strengthen Pakistan’s claims to possibly take over her regional rivals like Iran, which is more resolute to establish a Chabahar port on the coast of ‘Gulf of Oman’ located near to Sistan province and close to the Pakistan coast line in Baluchistan. The strategic benefits in the terms of military, nuclear and economic cooperation between U.S and India would be best tackled by Pakistan. Dr. Hasan Askari noted that “real game changer is not the signing of deals but their timely execution”. Dr. Kaisar Bengali, an economic expert claims that “This is Pakistan’s first opportunity since the 1960 Indus Water Treaty to change its economic geography.” Further highlighting the significance of CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) as an effective strategy by Pakistan in a transformed scenario of Asia, he utters that “while Pakistan has many problems to overcome, its move to end militant sanctuaries in the north-west has created an air of expectancy, and the arrival of Chinese investment at this time suggests Pakistan has a once in a lifetime chance to make an economic turnaround” (para, 5-10).

4.13 Pakistan’s Internal Problems Stemming out of Strategic Paradox

Wirsing (2007) identified that “Indian shadows lengthens even over Pakistan.” Internal settings are orientated into an intense situation in Pakistan. There are a number of sources but few of them significantly are emergent of Pakistan foreign policy considerations. Most noteworthy is the strangely indecisive and self-defeating part, Pakistan has in War in Afghanistan. This dangerously furthered the divisions among Pakistani policy makers and society where existing ethnic, parochial, economic and sectarian divides are damaging the social fabric of the state. Pakistan’s role in the war on terror and in Afghanistan has caused to brand Pakistan’s government and military elites as ‘absconder regime’ by Islamist for aligning with the West in a ‘war on Islam’ (p. 165). Shattering reality is that many segments of Pakistani society also share the Islamist views and a widespread public resentment limits policy makers option to heal their relationship with U.S and India. Strategic relationship with U.S stimulated extremism within Pakistan and the problems are mounted and
multiplied as U.S ally. India appears principally recipient of advances as a result of Pakistan’s political turmoil.

It has been reported that “over 50000 civilians and security forces personnel” in Pakistan lost their lives nearby with an amassed loss of “over $100 billion in the last 13 years” (“Pakistan Economic Survey,” 2013-2014) A Pakistani defense expert, Salma Malik, claims that “the higher budget is merely a smokescreen. If we look at the economic profile realistically, I doubt there is any definite improvement other than a cosmetic facelift for the economy; for defense outlays, there is a need for substantial outlays and reforms.” As a consequence of fear and insecurity amplified by U.S-India strategic ties, Pakistan is inclining more towards unproductive activities. In Pakistan due to uncertain options and consideration regarding their relations with U.S and India in a competitive environment of South Asia, it is already committed to increase the military budget at the expense of developmental budget and social spending like health and education specifically. Famous economist Paul Samuelson coined the term of ‘Guns and Butter’ in 1948 which fits appropriately in case of Pakistan that “when guns increases, butter must decrease as there is no alternative allocation of resources” (Shuja & Mohan, 2014, 3). Since 1970, Pakistani government expenditures are not accordingly its revenue generation. Defense expenditures and debt servicing consume the largest share of its budget. Defense expenditure doubled during 1960-1970 as a result of war with India and this imbalance persisted between development spending and defense expenditure and continued in later years. Foreign aid and assistance were largely used to fill the gap of growth and expenditure and somehow relations with U.S benefited Pakistan to deter India (Hasan, 1998, p. 38).

4.14 Pakistan’s Security and Threat Perceptions

Pakistan’s strategic milieu is surfacing and altering briskly. Pakistan observes, following threat perceptions as emergent of growing U.S-India strategic ties which would cause problems and concerns towards its security.

- It would affect the nature and strength of Pak-U.S strategic relations. Pakistan enjoyed as strategic benefactor for a long time and received a reasonable flow of technology and arms, equipment from U.S. It would also weaken Pakistan’s strength in defense, which is previously supported by cooperation with U.S and that significantly served as a key determinant to deter India.

- Conversion of strategic interests between the United States and India would provide a way to United States for compelling Pakistan to overcome the challenges emergent of terrorism on the Pakistan-Afghan boundary. It would upsurge Indian influence and hold over Afghanistan and cause an immense setback to Pakistan’s policy of strategic depth towards Afghanistan by multiplying its security concerns.

- It would lead to destabilize South Asian region as India is acquiring an unprecedented level of cooperation from U.S in conventional arms and nuclear field. On the other hand, without U.S support to Pakistan, the conventional armament disparity would be amplified. This would constrain Pakistan for enduring substitutes and alternatives to encounter the security challenges stemming out of India’s ambitious military and nuclear designs. Politics of an economic corridor with China is one aspect of that lasting alternative which would bring diversion of interests of major powers affecting regional politics and this conflict of interests can exceed to the oceans.

- The amassed and multidimensional joint ventures and exercises between the armed forces of U.S and India would advance the operational knack and the competence of the Indian military. This would generate impediments for Pakistan to strive hard to balance India, which seems extremely difficult to the level of impossibility without an analogous support.

- It would confirm India to acquire a superior role in the South Asian power structure and U.S recognition of Asia as Indian domain of power. This would not only threaten the security of Pakistan, but also affect the economy by limiting its options. This would also confine Pakistan to a subservient role in the region where Indian growing hegemony and influence will harshly affect the Pakistan policy and security options. It would be concluding determinate of India-Pakistan conflict, especially in Kashmir dispute in favor of might is right.
CONCLUSION

It is often said that perception is a reality in foreign policy. This strategic relationship between the U.S and India is the result of the common perception of threats and gains. The U.S admires the successful transformation of India as a regional power and views this transformation up to a global role as an appropriate way of accomplishing U.S designs of primacy. Both countries share the concerns about the common menace like the rise of China as potential economic and military global power, the spread of extremism emanating from political Islam, the threat of nuclear proliferation from the non-state actors, coercions of terrorism, safe havens for terrorist organizations in fragile states like Afghanistan and Pakistan, security and access to major water trade routes and most importantly developing and maintaining a hold in the Asian Pacific region. Their convergence of interests transformed their associations from normal bilateral relations to a strategic possession to increase their leverage in their respective areas of interests. Strategists of
both sides are convinced that these strategic ties would be used as a stratagem to counter common threats. Under the scale of U.S long held policy of policing the world, it was needed to encircle China through soft containment to check its political and economic influences in the Asian region in particular and at global level in general. To accomplish this goal, a future U.S, Japan, Australia and Indian collaboration to save South East Asia from Chinese influence is another dimension of enhanced cooperation. This cooperation is not only to foster development, but to equip India to act as a driver of regional development. These strategic relations in future will not only modify the Indo-U.S partnership, but also sets the future patterns of Pak-U.S relations and advance Pakistan’s association with China.

The U.S-India strategic cooperation elevated as a result of consistent approach of looking each other as an inevitable partner since the Post-Cold War period. The decade of the 90s brought various changes into an international scenario which helped both states to reassess their foreign policy options especially in the Asian Pacific region. The collapse of USSR deprived India a seemly supporter to empower it in terms of economy and military sufficiency. On the other hand, the breakdown of the socialist order removed one of the major impediments between U.S and India as viewing India strategically irrelevant against the containment of communism. Though period of estrangement lasted for more than four decades, but despite the lack of convergence of policy largely concerning the containment of communism and relations with Pakistan, both states never acted in hostile and antagonistic manner towards each other. Normal bilateral state relations were maintained, however cordiality of relations occasionally affected by disagreements over certain issues but primarily these were diplomatically managed. Other than India’s close association with the USSR, Pak-U.S close relations and America’s ‘even handed policy’ to balance the power in South Asia served as another obstruction in US-India relations to forage an association based on strategic calculus.

Phase of engagement was amiably initiated in the late 90s during the second term of American president Clinton. Kargil conflict in 1999 developed a major consensus over security reservations of India with U.S by Clinton’s active role in Indian favor. It was without doubts that Talbott-Jaswant rounds of talks brought a substantial shift in U.S nuclear policy towards Asia. These talks strengthened the ways to legitimize the Indian status as a nuclear armed power. Later Clinton’s visit to India and the conclusion of a joint statement in 2000 initiated the formal declaration of strategic dialogue and extension of cooperation in tangible ways.

United States strategists and policy makers much appreciated Indian policy of not resorting to the nuclear option during Kargil conflict with Pakistan and later this played a significant factor to the manifest American perception of viewing India as a responsible nuclear weapon state. Moreover, allegations on Pakistan for horizontal proliferation of nuclear technology to Iran and North Korea also authenticated Indian claim of a responsible state and eligible for nuclear cooperation. This led to view India as part of solution by American strategists rather a problem or strategically irrelevant. India also modified policies and associations accordingly to changed global realities. There was a high need for India to get a trustworthy trade partner, most importantly a reliable security support as an arms resource to deal with the perceived threats emanating from its regional locale. These international and regional authenticities made India’s previous long term policy of neutralism and the approach of multilateralism an obsolete one.

Transformation of U.S-India relations as an important objective was the steadiest policy carried out by Republican Bush (Junior) administration from previous Democrat administration of Clinton to cope with the new security defies. New Delhi responded positively towards U.S missile defense program and later terrorist attack of 9/11 initiated numbers of high level meetings, cooperative initiatives and military engagements from both sides. The U.S-India ties got strength by India’s apt offer to provide support against Al-Qaeda network. Moreover, Indian gestures showed a strong sense of support and solidarity towards American policy on the war on terror by allowing over flight right, repair and refueling of American aircraft and port facilities in two Indian cities. These positive gesticulations by India laid foundation for expansion of cooperation up to the strategic level. However, Pakistan’s geostrategic locale and U.S foreign policy compulsions did not
allow for getting much benefit from Indian offers. The U.S installation of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ (OEF) compelled it to look again towards Pakistan, which brought unavoidably zero-sum game and this apprehended the pace of development of cooperation between U.S and India. Despite these disappointments U.S-India cooperation grew especially in Central Asia and Persian Gulf region. As India viewed U.S cooperation essential in these regions for ensuring security and flow of energy resources to India. There are other significant factors which played a substantial role in intensifying the eagerness to deploy strategic linking. One of them is the role of almost 2.5 million Indo-American communities in U.S to connect the two countries into cultural bond. India’s huge middle class is also an important attraction for U.S trade interests and U.S is being seen as an important resource to transform India’s regional role to a global one. Despite the disagreements and reservations over certain issues, both states emerged as an inevitable partner due to a consistent process of engagements on different levels and communication channels. Cooperation was gradually manifested on three fundamental areas of security, economy and democracy which later extended to ‘counter terrorism, regional security, civilian cooperation, weapons sale, scientific collaboration and space and most importantly joint military engagements’.

Since 2001 with the inaugural of U.S-India Defense Policy Group, U.S-India cooperation was much enhanced by regular yearly strategic dialogues, covering multiple issues and areas of dialogues and joint statements. NSS 2002 clearly signified the Indian role and also identified the common interests to develop a strategy. India was progressively considered as natural ally and due to the inclusion of missile defense into dialogue; cooperation was lifted up from ‘Trinity to Quartet’. This was what spelled out by the NSSP to heighten the level of cooperation to the arena of dual use, nuclear technology and space. Joint statement and NSS of 2006, both singled the potential role of India carrying the regional and global obligations as key player for supplementing U.S role as a major global power. Strength of cooperation was even more visible by signing the U.S-India nuclear deal of 2008 which gave birth to the prospects of enlargement of India nuclear and military power and also de-facto recognition of India’s status as nuclear weapon state. This not only highlighted the American’s vision of a signing India a greater role in Asia, but also ended the policy of balancing Pakistan and India. A strategic partnership was further advanced during the Obama Presidency as prospects of bilateral military trade and investments grew. Apart from convergence of foreign policy interests, India’s increasing status as open market as largest buyer of arms and its multi-dimensional character further consolidated U.S-India strategic relations since 2010.

Despite wide-ranging efforts of improving strategic ties and security collaborations there are numerous areas and certainties of disagreements between U.S and India, which are hampering or having the capacity to hinder the pace of cooperation. Most important areas of disagreement, where U.S and India have a distinctive approach in their policy towards Pakistan; concerns regarding ever expanding Chinese power pull the India and USA closer but policy over Pakistan pushes them apart. Throughout the history of U.S-India bilateral relations, Pakistan had been a consistent irritant factor. The U.S is performing according its ‘De-hyphenate’ approach while dealing with India and Pakistan, but Washington’s involvement and the campaign in Afghanistan also obligates to maintain a closer link with Pakistan especially Pakistani military. Many in India foreign policy circles understand the U.S dilemma of a ‘negative relationship’ with Pakistan and recent years, both agreed to support a politically stable Pakistan but still approaches to deal with Pakistan are highly divergent.

There are some other foreign policy issues which are deficient of the convergence of interests. One of them is India’s inclination towards a multipolar world order, discouraging the dominance of single power which is clearly contradictive of U.S global approach of primacy. India also has an aspiration of managing her strategic ties with U.S on its own standings especially in case of containing China as India is not at all ready to enter into a formal alliance with USA as Australia and Japan are allied. India also resents the view that cost of strategic cooperation is associated with acceptance of Washington’s policy designs, especially applied to India’s bilateral relations with Unites States’ adversary Iran. Tehran and New Delhi have strong trade interests and India views Iran as an alternative of rival Pakistan for getting access to Central Asia energy
resources. It is a matter of fact that nature of the India-Iran relations is conditioned by U.S-Iran bilateral relations. Despite a tremendous and successful record of civilian rule and adherence to democracy, India is still driven by chauvinist nationalism, characterized by extreme prejudice and discrimination against its minorities, the significant ratio of illiteracy and a devastating high figure of absolute poverty. These harsh Indian domestic realities often serve as barriers to portray India as a key influential player in democratic and global world order.

An examination of U.S-India strategic partnership advocates that this growing relationship had not only impacted adversely on Pakistan, but it would also continue to bring further ramifications on Pakistan’s internal and external certainties US-India strategic ties would mature. These implications range from defense insecurities, security compulsions, rise in the defense budget, ineffectiveness of nuclear deterrence, initiation of a new arms race, Pakistan’s decline in regional milieu, and domestic political disagreements over foreign policy towards U.S, India and China.

The U.S-India strategic cooperation has become an interesting focal of academic and scholarly writings. Along with an intense debate on various aspects of gradual and growing cooperation at various levels, another important consideration pertaining to Pakistan largely remained out of extensive academic debate by the academic circle discussing prospects of U.S-India strategic ties. Critiques of U.S-India partnership largely focus more on its non-proliferation concerns at the international level and in regional scenario, China’s retort and counter strategy based on its threat perceptions emanating from this partnership are of great importance for scholars and academia.

The research identified following ramifications for Pakistan stemming out U.S-India strategic cooperation and due to altered scenario in the Asian region;

- U.S-India strategic cooperation is constantly alarming Pakistan due to supply of advance technology, nuclear energy and other relevant resources to empowering India to expand its power and influence specifically in strategic and in militarily outlook. Pakistan’s fears are evident as history of Pakistan-India bilateral relations are characterized by distrust, animosity and hostility towards each other.
- This research study manifests that U.S-India strategic cooperation would deliberately and inadvertently offset the balance of power in the region. It has been observed that U.S tilt towards India will not only affect Pakistan’s strategic position and defence capabilities, but also adversely alter its political and economic relations with other states of the region. It is important to note that this would also incorporate changes that would be responsive to U.S-India strategic relationship and leading to counter strategies.
- It has been examined that U.S-India strategic partnership is not just a strategic cooperation between the two states, but it is a combination of strong efforts to empower India politically, economically and most importantly in terms of military power expansion, which is leading to develop Indian structural influence in Afghanistan and its primacy over Pakistan through the supremacy of conventional weapons capability and fast growing nuclear power potential.
- This Indian influence would not only confine to locale of South Asia, but it would exceed to help India for playing an influential role as an important power in U.S global designs of primacy. U.S-India cooperation is not just to enhance development and strategy, but it is a matter of providing relevant support to India to get an eligibility of power to acquire the permanent seat in the UNSC. American provision to India’s claim for being the most eligible for the permanent seat in UNSC has invasive consequences, as India would able to exploit its power of veto against Pakistan in a number of conflicts with Pakistan. This would lead to strengthen the Indian power to incorporate its interests in an assertive manner which will bring a politics of manipulation in Asia and counter responses to expand Indian power would accelerate an arm race and adverse conflicts of interests.
- In the absence of legal obligations forced by U.S-India nuclear deal, India might adept of enlarging its nuclear weapons and explosive power that would target Pakistan’s nuclear assets and sites. Pakistan is facing more threats from Indian expansion of power as Beijing
has enough power to deter India. Moreover U.S supply of nuclear technology and ‘advance weapon system’ will upgrade Indian nuclear arsenal which would lessen the importance of nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and India. Weapon sales to India would widen the gap of conventional capabilities, leading to an imbalance between Pakistan and India. The insecurities will lead Pakistan to alter its ‘minimum credible deterrence’ for using nuclear weapons as a last resort.

- As a response to the Indian advancement of weaponry and extensive nuclear build up, it would bring a definite increase in defence budget of Pakistan. This would intensify the internal problems as rise in the defence share will burden weak economy and encourage cuts in social budget.
- Along with enlarging Pakistan’s domestic problems, it would also bring different complex fronts to tackle as Pakistan is bearing heavy spending on defence, human and material losses since its involvement in War against Terrorism. Pakistan’s Western and Eastern boarders are already insecure and it is investing enough of its power and potential to defend her territories. Along with these direct boarder confrontations and hostilities, Pakistan is victim of ‘fifth generation war’ where enemies are not more than shadows and mostly unidentifiable but causing collateral damage.
- Indian designs of predominance in Asia are gradually facilitated by American diplomatic and strategic support which would cause significant ramification on weaker states like Pakistan. India would be able to assert its influence and power to impose settlements in regional conflicts favouring India, especially in Kashmir dispute and Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan. Constant increasing Indian power in collaboration with U.S design of primacy in Asian locale is also giving birth to various difficulties for Pakistan’s diplomacy to sustain gracefully.
- The way U.S-India strategic cooperation is growing, adversely altering the U.S relations with Pakistan as Pakistan has declined in policy preferences of U.S. One of the severe ramifications is that supply of weaponry and sale of defence equipment to India is likely to boost up Indian defence which would initiate a competitive and relative arm race between India and Pakistan.
- The U.S altered policy toward Kashmir as a result of growing partnership with India is likely to become a hindrance to peace in South Asia. This strategic partnership also aims to design and structure regional security of Asia, where these strategic ties fix Pakistan in a less secure place and also enhances Chinese apprehensions. China and Pakistan concerns are likely to develop and their potential economic and strategic nexus as a counter strategy can also initiate politics of alliances and blocs and keeping the region divided and destabilized.
- The politics of alliance and blocs would hamper the process and trends of economic integration as it is occurring in other parts of the world. This would not only lead Pakistan, but also the major part of South Asian population away from the benefits and fruits of economic development and growth.

In order to cope with these ramifications, Pakistan needs to carefully analyze its diplomatic and foreign policy options. Pakistan essentially needed an active and consistent foreign policy employing effective diplomatic measures to access the international support against Indian hostile designs. Pakistan must work to repair its relationship with U.S by putting leverage through its role in the war on terror to avail strategic compensations. Pakistan must utilize its relationship with China as a strategy to counter U.S-India cooperation and it must not restrain to act as a reactionary measure, but a consistent economic and strategic cooperation because two states highly needed to avoid the adverse effects of pivot Asia policy. Pakistan must mend its relationship with its neighboring countries like Afghanistan, Iran, and Bangladesh. This would not only decrease the threats and antagonism from its multiple borders, but also provide prospects of economic cooperation with these states. Pakistan should disclose India’s so called democratic postures by highlighting severe human rights violations and inhumane acts against minorities. Pakistan needs a strong lobbing in favor of its stance on Kashmir in accordance with UNSC resolutions and its efforts and sacrifices in the war on terror especially in American legislative circles and international forums.
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**Alliance:** An agreement between two or more states to work together on mutual security issues. States enter into such cooperative security arrangements in order to protect themselves against a common (or perceived) threat. By pooling their resources and acting in concert, the alliance partners believe that they can improve their overall power position within the international system and their security relative to states outside the alliance.

**Clash of Civilizations:** Samuel Huntington’s article ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ was published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1993 and resulted in a heated public debate. The appeal of Huntington’s theory is his attempt to develop an all-encompassing construct that explains not only the conflicts of the present and future, but also the key features of the international political system. Since it also touches upon intrastate conflicts, its implications reach beyond international relations. Huntington is particularly concerned about the challenge that Islam poses to the West, both because its birthrate is higher than that of other civilizations and because of the resurgence of its popularity at the end of the twentieth century.

**Cold War:** A period in international history (beginning soon after the end of the Second World War and ending in the early 1990s), as well as a description of the overall relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union during that period. Perhaps the most popular view is that the Cold War was intense struggle for power between the superpowers.

**Communism:** This concept has been interpreted in a variety of ways, as a political philosophy, a utopia, an existing system of political and economic rule, a philosophy of history and as a revolutionary ideology of change diametrically opposed to capitalism and liberal democracy.

**Domino Theory:** The domino theory was a theory prominent for the 1950s to the 1980s, which speculated that if one country in a region came under the influence of communism, then the surrounding countries would follow in a domino effect. The domino theory was sued by successive United State administration during the Cold War to justify the need for American intervention around the world. Though he never directly used the term “domino theory”, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower put the theory into words during an April 7, 1954 news conference, when referring to communism in Indo-china.

**Geo-politics:** is the study of the influence of geographical factors on state behavior—how location, climate, natural resources, population, and physical terrain determine a state’s foreign policy options and its position in the hierarchy of states.

**Marshal Plan:** The United States feared that the poverty, unemployment, and dislocation of the post-World War II period were reinforcing the appeal of communist parties to voters in Western Europe. On June 5, 1947, in an address at Harvard University, Secretary of State George C. Marshall advanced the idea of a European self-help program to be financed by the United States. On the basis of a unified plan for western European economic reconstruction presented by a committee representing 16 countries, the U.S. Congress authorized the establishment of the European Recovery Program, which was signed into law by President Harry S. Truman on April 3, 1948. Aid was originally offered to almost all the European countries, including those under military occupation by the Soviet Union. The Soviets early on withdrew from participation in the plan, however, and were soon followed by the other eastern European nations under their influence. This left the following countries to participate in the plan: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and western Germany.

**McCarthyism:** McCarthy was elected to the Senate in 1946 and rose to prominence in 1950 when he claimed in a speech that 205 communists had infiltrated the State Department. McCarthy’s subsequent search for communists in the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and elsewhere made him an incredibly polarizing figure. After McCarthy’s reelection in 1952, he obtained the chairmanship of the Committee on Government Operations of the Senate and of its permanent subcommittee on Investigations. For the next two years he was constantly in the spotlight, investigating various government departments and questioning innumerable witnesses about their suspected communist affiliations. Although he failed to make a plausible case against anyone, his colorful and cleverly presented accusations drove some persons out of their jobs and brought popular condemnation to others.

**Panchsheel Doctrine:** The five principles of peaceful coexistence, known in India as the Panchsheel Treaty (from Sanskrit, panch means: five, sheel means virtues), are a set of principles to govern relations between states. The five principles included as: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and Peaceful co-existence.

**Security Dilemma:** This concept rests on the assumption that security is something for which states compete. In an anarchical international system lacking authority capable of ensuring order, states have to look to their own efforts for protection. Striving to obtain this, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of other states. This, in turn, makes the others more insecure and encourages them to prepare for the worst.

**Strategic Relations:** When relationship between two or more states are driven by defense and security compulsion than bilateral relations transform into strategic context. The term “Strategic” depicts means and the ways by which a state uses her defense potential and power to enhance its political goal.

**String of Pearls:** In 2005, the U.S. consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton came up with the “string of pearls” hypothesis, which posits that China will try to expand its naval presence by building civilian maritime infrastructure along the Indian Ocean periphery. China’s rapid economic development over the course of the last quarter century has been heavily dependent on foreign sources of
energy, and it is likely that foreign sources of energy will prove even more critical to the continued growth of the Chinese economy. The sea lines of communication that link the Chinese mainland with ports throughout the Middle East and coasts of Africa have become a major source of conflict with respect to China's future energy security.

**Swing States:** Global swing states are nations that possess large and growing economies, occupy central positions in a region or stand at the hinge of multiple regions, and embrace democratic government at home. Increasingly active at the regional and global level, they desire changes to the existing international order but do not seek to scrap the interlocking web of global institutions, rules, and relationships that has fostered peace, prosperity and freedom for the past six decades.

**Talibanazation:** The Taliban mean students, changed their name and identity to Islamic country Afghanistan is a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist political movement in Afghanistan currently waging war (an insurgency, or jihad) within that country and beyond. The term Talibanization (or Talibanisation) is a coined following the rise of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan referring to the process where other religious groups or movements come to follow or imitate the strict practices of the Taliban. From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban held power in Afghanistan and enforced a strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law, of which the international community and leading Muslims have been highly critical.

**Truman Doctrine:** Addressing a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman asked for $400 million in military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey and established a doctrine, aptly characterized as the Truman Doctrine that would guide U.S. diplomacy for the next 40 years. President Truman declared, "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The sanction of aid to Greece and Turkey by a Republican Congress indicated the beginning of a long and enduring bipartisan cold war foreign policy.

**Zero Sum Game:** Zero-sum is a situation in game theory in which one person’s gain is equivalent to another’s loss, so the net change in wealth or benefit is zero. A zero-sum game may have as few as two players, or millions of participants.

"**X**" Article: This influential essay in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," was written by State Department official George F. Kennan, using the pseudonym "Mr. X." Kennan, an experienced diplomat and senior advisor to U.S. ambassadors in Moscow, sent the State Department an 8,000 word report in February 1946 known as the "long telegram," urging the United States to view the Soviet leadership as an implacable, expansionist foe. In the "X" article, Kennan amplified his call for a strategy of "patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" through the "adroit application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points.

**Annex B: Proposed Map of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor**
Map of the trading route of Pak-China Economic Corridor Siddiqui, Aasim. "Understanding Economic Benefits of Trade-Corridor between Gwadar-Kashgar Intermodal"
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