QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY

POLITICS OF ALLIANCES:

A CASE STUDY OF ISLAMI JAMHOORI ITTEHAD (IJI)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

BY RAHAT ZUBAIR MALIK

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN 2014
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

Department of History
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research, and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree.

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APPROVAL OF THESIS FOR SUBMISSION

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Final Approval

This is to certify that we have read the thesis submitted by Miss Rahat Zubair Malik titled "Politics of Alliance: A Case Study of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI)" as partial fulfillment for the award of Doctorate of Philosophy in the Department of History. We have evaluated the dissertation and found it up to the standards and requirements in its scope and quality for the award of PhD degree.

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<tr>
<th>S. No.</th>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>Prof. Dr. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah Supervisor</td>
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MY PARENTS

and

THE PEOPLE WHO BELIEVE IN SUPREMACY OF LAW
ABSTRACT

Alliance politics is one of the prominent features of democratic form of government. Pakistan is an example of such democracies where alliances of political parties play an important and at times decisive role. In Pakistan, there exists a large number of regional and national political parties. The division on the basis of various ethnicities and regions is the greatest hindrance in the nativity of national political parties representing the whole country. Another phenomenon that has severely struck the political developments in the country is suspension of democratic rule by military dictators off and on. That resulted in long intervals of democratic rule and prevented the natural growth of political parties which would, otherwise have evolved to a national stature.

In Pakistan, political parties are mainly personality oriented and are generally formed for attaining petty objectives. Many of the parties get divided into further factions due to internal differences of party’s leadership. Due to all these factors Pakistan is still lacking national political parties having national agenda. Divided Due to the division in mandate, political parties have to coordinate with each other to achieve short term goals like suspending a government or to achieve any other goals. Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) was one of such alliances that operated in the political history of Pakistan. It was formed by eight political parties in 1988 to contain the power of PPP in the elections of 1988. The alliance was neither planned nor organized. In the beginning, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group) (PML-N) and National Peoples Party (NPP) of Ghulam Mustufa Jatoi joined hands to contest the 1988 elections from a common platform. The alliance was later joined by a few small parties and Jamaat-i Islami (JI). There was no strong ideological cohesion among the allied parties except the agenda for the enforcement of Sharia and prevent PPP from winning elections. Therefore, IJI could not work smoothly although it survived for more than four years, contested two general elections under one election symbol and remained in opposition and in government as a political alliance. This alliance participated in the elections of 1988 under one electoral symbol and gave a tough time to PPP during its rule from December 1988 to August 1990. Subsequently, it won the elections of
1990 and formed the government at center as well as in the provinces. The alliance was formally dissolved in 1993.

IJI is the most controversial alliance in the political history of Pakistan as there are many myths regarding its formation: it is argued to be a command performance under the auspices of the ISI, and that the alliance was formed to counter the power of the PPP and to prevent it to form government, and also that the alliance had all the traditions of previous alliances made in the history of Pakistan. The present study is an effort to find answers to all such questions.
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Malik

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLITERATION TABLE

Transliteration in the modern history literature can prove to be pedantic for the readers, however, present research extensively relies upon the non-English sources for which transliteration is required to maintain pronunciation uniformity. A standardized transliteration is done for the titles of non-English researches in order to maintain the uniformity in the references and bibliography and for the facilitation of non-Pakistani readers. However, the proper nouns in the main texts are not transliterated to keep the reading less arduous.

Vowels:
Short vowel -i in possessive or adjectival form is transliterated as -i. (Wazīr-i-Ā‘zam) و as an Urdu conjunction is transliterated as -o. ى is transliterated as y.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIML</td>
<td>All India Muslim League</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAEC</td>
<td>Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<td>AL</td>
<td>Awami League</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>Awami Tehrik</td>
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<td>BNA</td>
<td>Balochistan National Alliance</td>
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<td>BD</td>
<td>Basic Democracies System</td>
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<td>CMLA</td>
<td>Chief Martial Law Administrator</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Combined Opposition Parties</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Constituent Assembly</td>
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<td>CML</td>
<td>Council Muslim League</td>
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<td>CCI</td>
<td>Council of Common Interest</td>
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<td>DPRs</td>
<td>Defense of Pakistan Rules</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Democratic Action Committee</td>
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<td>EPAL</td>
<td>East Pakistan Awami League</td>
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<td>ECP</td>
<td>Election Commission of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GD</td>
<td>Ganatantri Dal</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>General Inter-Services-Intelligence</td>
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<td>HJ</td>
<td>Hizb-e-Jihad</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPG</td>
<td>Independent Political Group</td>
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<td>IJI</td>
<td>Islami Jamhoori Ittehad</td>
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<td>IJT</td>
<td>Islami Jamiat Tulaba</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Islamic Democratic Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIC</td>
<td>Islamic Ideology Council</td>
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ae used in words such as Jarnæl and shækh
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<th>Party Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Krishak Siramik Party</td>
<td>KSP</td>
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<td>Markazi Jamaat-i-Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi Group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Movement for Restoration of Democracy</td>
<td>MRD</td>
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<td>Muhajir Qaumi Movement</td>
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<td>National Awami Party</td>
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<td>National Democratic Front</td>
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<td>National Democratic Party</td>
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<td>National Economic Council</td>
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<td>National Finance Commission</td>
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<td>Pakistan Awami Ittehad</td>
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<td>Pakistan Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>Pakistan Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>Pakistan International Airline</td>
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<td>PNP</td>
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<td>Pakistan Peoples Party</td>
<td>PPP</td>
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<td>Pakistan Telecommunication</td>
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<td>Peoples Works Program</td>
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<td>Political Parties Act</td>
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<td>Provincial Assembly</td>
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<td>Public Accounts Committee</td>
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<td>Pukhtoonkhwah National Awami Party</td>
<td>NAP- Pukhtoonkhwah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi</td>
<td>QMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Round Table Conference</td>
<td>RTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student Action Committee</td>
<td>SAC</td>
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<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>Tehrik-i Istiqlal Pakistan</td>
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<td>The Bank of Punjab</td>
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<td>United Democratic Front</td>
<td>UDF</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Front</td>
<td>UF</td>
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ALLIANCES FORMATION IN PAKISTAN:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In juvenile democracies like Pakistan where there are numerous regional political parties and where there is a history of tumultuous political upheavals, it is not unusual for the formation of political alliances. In fact, these political alliances must be forged in order to ensure a strong democratic structure that will ultimately lead to the achievement of national political goals allowing democracy to flourish in their wake.

There have been many such alliances in the history of Pakistan’s politics. It can be said that because no political party has been in a position to win nation-wide popular support, alliances had to be made to achieve even smaller objectives. Some of them were electoral alliances such as Combined Opposition Parties (COP) and Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), others were opposition alliances like Democratic Action Committee (DAC), Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), and Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). The formation of parliamentary opposition alliances like United Democratic Front (UDF) has also been part of the political history of Pakistan. At the outset, a brief history of major alliances, that have played an important role in the political developments of the country is briefly described in order to set the context of the present study, a comprehensive account of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) which was formed by eight political parties in 1988 to contest elections from one common platform. This study will highlight different facets of IJI and its workings but before that major alliances that were formed during 1947 to 1988 are briefly discussed.

I. Major Alliances Pakistan (1954-88)

After the creation of Pakistan, the very first challenge that it faced was formation of a representative government according to the norms of western-democratic traditions. In such a scenario, different regional political parties and individuals emerged as political leaders along with the PML most of whom represented their particular regions, tribe and their specific social group. In this way a diverse leadership emerged which resulted in the establishment of regional political parties who represented their particular regions. This division resulted as a hindrance in the development of national
political parties as representatives of the whole country. Since there are too many political parties, representing different regions, they have to form political alliance at the time of national crisis, and to meet any challenges faced by the nation. In Pakistan, political parties made many alliance from time to time to meet any challenges, to form government, to get a government dismissed and for getting approval for certain demands from the government. Most of these alliance did not last long and were dissolved after achieving their immediate goals such as National Democratic front (1962), some remained active for comparatively longer duration like Movement for Restoration of Democracy (1981-88) and some enjoyed different facets of national history like Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (1988-1993) which contested two national elections in 1988 and 1990 and remained active as opposition alliance and ruling alliance.

**United Front (UF) (Jugto Front) 1953**

After the inception of Pakistan it was the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) that formed government and took the responsibility to run the state system. After the death of Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan took the responsibilities as the president of PML. Simultaneous changes in government after the death of Liaquat Ali Khan increased the problems of the newly created country. As PML, the then ruling party did not enjoy a strong political base in the regions that were included in Pakistan, it kept on delaying to hold national elections for an appropriate time. Although PML was aware that the opposition was weak, but in order to avoid holding elections it used delaying tactics. However, after the government made the decision to hold general elections, the political parties of East Pakistan found it an ideal opportunity to form an alliance of different parties to win the elections and improve social and economic conditions of their region. To this end, a coalition was formed by four political parties of East Pakistan, namely Awami League (AL), Krishak Siramik Party (KSP; Peasant-Worker Party), Ganatantri Dal (GD) and Nizam-i-Islam Party (NIP). As a unit, they formed United Front (UF).

Although in its nascent stage of development, from the beginning there was dissension. The fragmented nature of the UF stemmed from the fact that each party had a different orientation. GD was a Communist party. It was a staunch supporter of provincial autonomy and promoted nationalism and secularism. KSP’s basic objective was making Bangla one of the state languages, and adoption of a better system of education. AL wanted to establish a strong provincial government. NIP supported the idea of the Islamic system of government and linked that to the elimination of corruption and poverty alleviation. The prominent leaders of the alliance were Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani, A.K. Fazalul Haq, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy (Suhrawardy) and Abul Hashim. These leaders were prominent during the freedom movement and had played important role in uniting Muslims on the demand of Pakistan. They also remained active politicians after the inception of Pakistan and played their role in nation building. Despite the fact that these leaders often had
different tenets of belief and sometimes even conflicting ideologies, were bound by their shared objective of winning election against PML. UF had a twenty-one point agenda with provincial autonomy at the heart. As mentioned earlier it demanded that Bengali should be declared lingua-franca of the state and that they should have representation in the Legislative Assembly on the basis of population and abolition of parity of representation between the two wings of Pakistan. The party stirred a wave of popularity within a few days. In 1954 Provincial Assembly (PA) elections UF won 223 seats in East Pakistan and PML could only win 9. The remaining 72 seats were won by other parties. A ten members’ cabinet was formed which consisted of members of the coalition parties. Fazalul Haq, one of the leaders of the party, began the implementation of alliance’s twenty-one point agenda based on provincial autonomy. The alliance leadership was stubbornly unwilling to tolerate an influence or interference of the Federal Government except in matters of currency, defense and foreign policy.

The UF victory altered the electoral-college for the Constituent Assembly (CA) and it demanded its dissolution or at least resignations of its members from East Pakistan. The UF was purely interested in attaining power at the center as it was now in a better bargaining position on the autonomy issue. The central government wanted to negotiate with UF on provincial autonomy but the UF adopted an uncompromising attitude despite the rejection of the idea of dissolution of the CA by central government.

The alliance was formed on precarious grounds primarily due to the diversity of opinions between the leaders. For the first time, difference of opinion amongst the alliance members came to the fore, on the matter of how to form provincial cabinet. The AL leader Suhrawardy and KSP leader Fazalul Haq could not avoid pre-partition political rivalries against each other and created problems in running the government in a positive and progressive manner. The first challenge faced by the UF ministry was riots between Bengali labor and non-Bengali administrative staff at the Chandragona Paper Mills. More serious riots erupted at Adamjee Jute Mills near Dhaka in which more than six-hundred people lost their precious lives. Other prevailing conditions also worked against the UF government. Poor harvest in 1952-53 resulted in famine in the province. Most of the regional disturbances were directed against non-Bengalis. Furthermore, most of the increasing industrial investment belonged to the non-Bengalis which increased unrest in the region and made things difficult for the government to handle the law and order situation of the Province. Fazalul Haq’s support for provincial autonomy, his efforts to make economic agreements with India and his visit to India in this regards provided excuse to the federal government to take a tough decision against the UF government in East Pakistan. Due to the deteriorating situation of law and order in the province, the Governor General took over the government and dismissed the UF ministry in the province after two months of its formation. Major General Iskandar Mirza was sent to East Pakistan while the ministry was dismissed.
and assembly was prorogued. The Communist Party was considered responsible for breakdown of law and order in the province. The central government ordered arrest of all communists in order to control the situation. Attaur Rehman of AL invited the Governor General to visit East Pakistan to monitor the situation and suspend the governor’s rule but he did not agree immediately. The UF government was restored after about one year.

As the hope for a reinstatement of peace and cooperation, parliamentary government was created for another time. AL and KSP began efforts to gain favour of the central government. AL’s leader Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy accepted membership in the federal cabinet. Fazalul Haq established an alliance with Muhammad Ali Bogra and was appointed as interior minister in the federal cabinet. The then Governor General’s relationship with Attaur Rehman of AL enhanced conflict between AL and KSP. In this situation AL and KSP could not agree on a common platform and efforts of Maulana Abdul Hameed Bhashani could not prevent break-up of the alliance. AL was expelled from the UF and Abu Hussain Sarkar of KSP formed a cabinet after this breakup. AL took the responsibility to render its service from the opposition benches. Until the imposition of Martial Law in October 1958, none of the parties could form a strong provincial government in the province.

The UF survived for two years but due to internal differences it could not play an important role in politics. In May, 1956 GD withdrew its support from UF because of an unsatisfactory response to its seven points demands. The salient points of its agenda were confiscation of foreign capital, abolition of Zamindari system without any compensation, adoption of Bengali as one of the national and official languages, adoption of joint electorate, quitting the Commonwealth and establishment of Pakistan-Bharat amity. In September 1956 it withdrew from the alliance and refused to support a joint electorate. In July a splinter group in AL deserted the UF.

To conclude, the crux of the problem regarding the UF lay in the fact that member parties did not share any ideological proximity. One believed in Islamization, the second in a communist ideology and the third was for provincial autonomy. With little common ground between them, they were fragile as a coalition government from the beginning. The only factor that they shared in common was to defeat the PML. As soon as the PML lost its position in the province after the elections, the common factor was gone and the alliance seemed to have no intrinsic value, hence reached the ultimate breakup of the alliance.

**National Democratic Front 1962 (NDF)**

The NDF was the first alliance during Ayub Khan’s regime. It consisted of three opposition parties: Council Muslim League (CML), National Awami Party (NAP) and KSP. Suhrawardy played a leading role in uniting these political parties. On October 4, 1962 Suhrawardy announced formation of the Front as a “movement”. Primary objective of the Front was restoration of democracy. NDF opposed Presidential System in the country and demanded a new federal structure. It also demanded restoration of parliamentary democracy as enshrined in the Constitution of
1956. To prove its democratic credentials, NDF opened a debate on already settled issues such as the unification of West Pakistan under one Unit Scheme and the principle of parity between the two wings of the country.

In West Pakistan, Amir (President) Jamaat-i Islami (JI) Syed Abul Aala Maududi (Maududi) endorsed demands of NDF. Maududi stipulated the suspension of political restrictions and democratization of the constitution.

Thirtyeight leaders of NDF met at Suhrawardy’s residence in Karachi on January 19 and 20, 1963. In this meeting a ten member committee was set up to organize NDF in West Pakistan and passed a resolution, demanding restoration of democracy. The government cautiously monitored activities of NDF. After this meeting leaders who had met in ‘Lakham House’ (Suhrawardy’s residence) were arrested on charges of subversive activities against the state.

The government issued ordinances to curtail activities of EBDOed politicians. These ordinances prohibited the disqualified members from becoming public officers and for associating themselves with any political party. In case of non-compliance to the orders, the individual would have to face two years imprisonment or a fine or both. The government also misused its power to prevent any EBDOed politician from giving any political or press statement. These powers were meant to immobilize the politicians of NDF and the government was successful in achieving its objectives.

After the implementation of these ordinances, NDF collapsed. All prominent leaders were detained. Although they were released from jail by December 1963, the environment was not congenial anymore for any further political machinations by the leaders. CML, JI and NIP dissociated themselves from the front and reorganized their party set up.

NDF did not have a well-defined program with well thought thorough objectives and another disadvantage was that most of its members were EBDOed politicians. It was unable to achieve much success and ultimately fell prey to the President’s hostility. The process of deterioration started soon after its formation. Furthermore the death of Suhrawardy on December 5, 1963 caused irreparable damage to the alliance. Its members started participating in the political activities of AL, NIP and the Justice Party (JP). This alliance, however, could not achieve its aims but provided a basis for yet another alliance known as the Combined Opposition Parties in the Presidential elections of 1964-65. NDF was not formally dissolved and later its ideology was apparent in the Pakistan Democratic Movement formed in 1967.

**Combined Opposition Parties 1964 (COP)**

The announcement of the Presidential Elections of 1965 gave impetus to the opposition political parties to make an alliance in order to counter the power of President Ayub. The alliance, named the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) was formed in July, 1964 by Khwaja Nazimud Din. It consisted of the CML of Nazimud Din and Mumtaz Daultana, AL (Sheikh Mujeeb), NAP (Maulana Bhashani and Wali Khan for East and West Pakistan respectively), NIP (Ch. Muhammad Ali) and JI (Maududi).
COP was an electoral alliance that participated in elections on the basis of a nine point agenda which included freedom of press, civil liberties and abolition of repressive laws. It called for a democratic constitution, direct elections for national and provincial assemblies and full legislative and budgetary authority to the assemblies, a federal parliamentary structure with in-built provincial autonomy consistent with the integrity of Pakistan, curtailment of presidential powers, separation of the judiciary from the executive, withdrawal of a ban on political parties, release of political detenues and the repeal of all repressive and draconian laws. Regarding other matters, COP’s political agenda was almost similar to that of the plans of President Ayub Khan. The ruling party, Convention Muslim League (ConML) considered COP a confused alliance of divergent parties supported by discredited leaders who wished to attain power at any cost. It was perceived in a similar way that UF was in East Pakistan. The most acute and knotty problem faced by COP was selection of a common candidate for the presidential election. General Azam Khan’s nomination was eliminated as he was part of the martial law regime in previous years. The other expected candidate was Khwaja Nazimud Din but he died on October 22, 1964, just before the elections. After his death, it became difficult for the alliance members to select a common candidate to contest elections. Ultimately, it was decided that Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of Mohammed Ali Jinnah would be fielded as a candidate for Presidential Elections. The decision was made public on September 18, 1964.

Miss Jinnah was initially reluctant to participate in the elections but in the end she accepted the offer in the name of democracy, nationalism and patriotism. Her selection by the opposition was a tactical move because it needed a candidate of national repute and she was the ideal candidate from that point of view. In addition, she held no office at the time, so she could not be accused of inefficiency, maladministration or corruption. Another reason of her selection was to avoid any conflict among alliance members with reference to the alliance’s presidential candidate.

The then government launched strong propaganda against the establishment of a government run by a woman in an Islamic state. Ayub wanted to invalidate the candidacy of Miss Jinnah on the grounds of Islamic interpretations regarding appointment of a woman as head of the state of a Muslim country. Ulema were divided on the issue. Maulana Maududi gave a verdict against his previous one, allowing a woman to become head of the Muslim state. He based his explanation on a Quranic Verse according to which eating of Haram (prohibited the usage of something in Islam) was permitted if it was necessary to save life. He believed that it was question of the survival of Pakistan to terminate the government of Ayub. As there was no other suitable competitor of Ayub available so a woman (Fatima Jinnah) was selected as a presidential candidate.

This time the Presidential elections were personality oriented rather than based on any political agenda of the candidates. Miss Jinnah symbolized political revival and security of the military-bureaucracy was prime objective of Ayub Khan. Miss Jinnah brought to the fore issues on the failure of foreign policy in the face of heavy arms
supplies from America to India, the unsettled issue of Kashmir and constitutional corruption of which she stipulated Ayub and his family were a part. The elections were held on January 2, 1965. In the election Ayub secured 49,691 (63.31 percent of the total votes polled) and Miss Jinnah received 28,691 (36.36 percent of the total votes polled). The party position in the National Assembly (NA) was: ConML: 124, COP: 15, and the Independents managed to bag 17 seats. COP made all-out efforts to win the elections. It organized, coordinated and concerted election campaign with a remarkable presidential candidate but still could not manage to win. One of the major reasons for its failure was COP’s stance for the restoration of parliamentary democracy. The revival of parliamentary democracy would bring to an end the political career of the Basic Democrats, which was not acceptable to them. President Ayub used the state-controlled media as an instrument and Miss Jinnah, was never allowed to make a speech on national Radio. Hence Miss Jinnah could not use national media as a platform to gain popularity which was a major set-back. Other reasons for her failure were mass rigging at many polling stations and the opposition of social reforms such as an equal status for women vis-à-vis men.

This was the first alliance made at national level and was an attempt at unity. In a press release on January 1965 COP pronounced that the BD system was responsible for the defeat of Miss Fatima Jinnah against popular will of the masses. It also referred to official interference, which misused its resources to promote the view point of the ruling party. It was also told that the government was campaigning for an extended amount of time while Miss Fatima Jinnah had just three months to promote her agenda. Though they tried, COP did not have the freedom or the platform to propagate its viewpoint. The State owned the radio and the newspapers. The media was used as a tool to distort the image of COP’s candidate rather than presenting views of both the parties in a fair manner so that the public could decide who they wanted to vote for. COP also had limited finances. During the campaign preventive laws restricted the activities of the party. Polling agents were coerced and were forced not to enter in the states of Dir, Swat and the Tribal Areas. In addition a fatwa was obtained from Ulema that a woman cannot become head of a Muslim state. It was propagated that the US intelligence agency-CIA financed the campaign against COP. COP had some internal problems as well that were enhanced after losing the elections. Although Abdul Wali Khan presided a public meeting at Peshawar during Fatima Jinnah’s visit to Peshawar for a public meeting as part of her election campaign still COP leaders forwarded complaints against NAP for halfhearted support for the presidential candidate. It also had issues regarding the question of participation in the elections for national and provincial assemblies. CML, NIP and JI wanted to boycott the elections whereas AL and the NAP were determined to participate in the elections. COP’s defeat in the elections made it lose the basic purpose for which it was made, i.e. to defeat Ayub Khan in the elections. After the presidential elections, COP participated in the National Assembly elections but could not perform well. It only got 25% of the polled Votes. In the elections of provincial assemblies COP was hardly visible and most of its members participated in the elections as independent
candidates. After losing *raison d’etre* there was nothing that could keep it united. After a very brief period of time of the presidential elections, COP leaders realized that it was difficult for them to work together. There were two major drawbacks that COP suffered, i.e. it did not have a leader of national stature and secondly COP was an electoral alliance but its member parties had difference of opinion regarding major political issues. Although COP could not win against Ayub Khan, the then president of Pakistan, but it was COP that determined the future course of political developments against the government of a military ruler.

**Pakistan Democratic Movement 1967 (PDM)**

The PDM was founded in May 1976 by the politicians of East and West Pakistan. Negotiations for an alliance began in April. Five parties, the CML, NIP, JI, AL and NDF participated in discussions until they reached an agreement. The new alliance was based on an eight-point program. The organizational structure of PDM comprised of a national executive, consisting of six members, including respective chairman or the president of each of the constituent parties. According to PDM, the upcoming elections were absolutely unacceptable under the Constitution of 1962. PDM called for a Federal Parliamentary Government based on direct elections on the basis of adult franchise, leaving defense, foreign affairs, currency, federal finance, inter-wing communication and trade with the centre. The alliance demanded removal of all disparities between East and West Pakistan in ten years, establishing complete fundamental rights, free press and shifting the Naval Headquarter to East Pakistan. The appointment of a defense council with equal membership for East and West Pakistan was another demand of the alliance. Regarding the country’s foreign policy, it had only recommendation, that Pakistan should maintain friendly relations with all the countries. Later it added the demand of the restoration of the 1956 constitution, withdrawal of the emergency, release of political prisoners, dissolution of national press trust, lifting of a ban on newspapers such as *Ittefaq* and the repeal of Loudspeaker Ordinance. PDM’s economic program was about equal distribution of wealth among all sections of society. Except East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) all member parties ratified the program. EPAL, barring a few members, preferred to pursue its Six Point Program. At first, the government perceived it as a threat but later it realized that EPAL and NAP were out of the movement and the remaining members could easily be contained through restrictive measures. PDM strictly followed peaceful measures. Due to the implementation of Section 144, PDM leadership could only communicate with small gatherings. It gained momentum in 1968, but this was curtailed by the government through prohibitory orders. Its leadership faced serious problems when its workers started working for the movement even before it had begun to properly plan for this purpose. Initially PDM succeeded in winning concessions from Ayub Khan through approval to revert to parliamentary democracy and adult franchise. But its component parties could not maintain a consolidated front to achieve success. Policy differences within
PDM caused damage to its credibility in the eyes of the populace. The breakthrough in the movement came in the last quarter of 1968, which led to the conversion of the PDM into an eight party alliance that was given the name of Democratic Action Committee (DAC).

**Democratic Action Committee 1969 (DAC)**

Ayub Khan intended to celebrate from October 27, 1967 to October 27, 1968 the ‘Decade of Reforms’ (1958-1968) at the completion of ten years of his rule. This announcement sparked off agitation at a mass level which proved to be a major reason of the downfall of Ayub Khan’s Government. On January 8, 1969 PDM and three other parties AL, NAP and JUI announced the formation of a new alliance called the Democratic Action Committee (DAC). Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and NAP of Maulana Bhashani decided to not participate in it. Political parties announced a country-wide strike from January 17, 1969 to put pressure on the government. This resolution was similar to the one which was passed on February 22 and 23, 1968 at Dhaka by Tehrik-e-Jamhooriat (Movement for Democracy). Country-wide strikes made it difficult for the government to control the situation as it was decided that the Army would not be used to maintain law and order. Agitations created political chaos in the country. Some bold steps were required to tackle the problem but President’s falling health did not allow it.

President Ayub invited opposition leaders to reach a solution to the political problems the nation faced. He allowed the convener of DAC, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan to invite all the political leaders to participate in discussion. He also announced that he will honor the demand if any of the politicians wanted to have a one-to-one meeting with him to resolve problems. The opposition accepted the offer of the president to discuss issues in order to reach to an amicable agreement. However, they laid some conditions before they would engage in a discussion with the government. The president was unwilling to enter into a dialogue without any preconditions. DAC announced boycott of the upcoming elections unless the government was ready to accept its eight point agenda which consisted of the following demands:

1. Elections should be held on the basis of adult franchise.
2. Assemblies should be sovereign.
3. The ‘State of Emergency’ should be abolished.
4. Citizen’s rights and liberty must be restored.
5. Political prisoners should be released from jail.
6. A federal parliamentary form of government should be established.
7. Direct elections on the basis of adult franchise.
8. Restoration of rights of labor to strike and withdrawal of all restraints on the press.\textsuperscript{82}

The government was quick to respond to DAC’s demands as it withdrew section 144 and lifted restrictions on the press. On February 18, 1969 the state of emergency, which had been imposed since the Indo-Pak war in 1965 was lifted. As a result of this action, politicians detained under the Defense of Pakistan Rules (DPRs) were released. The government also promised to make arrangements to bring Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman (Mujeeb), the Awami League Leader, to participate in the second round of the Round Table Conference (RTC) which was held at the end of February.\textsuperscript{83} At the time of first round of the RTC Mujeeb was imprisoned for Agartala conspiracy case. Agartala conspiracy case was a treason case against Mujeeb and thirty four other civil and military personnel for conspiring to separate East Pakistan through an armed revolt supported and funded by India. The case was disclosed by the government in January 1968. It is believed that the main conspiracy was prepared in the Indian city of Agartala that is why it is generally known as Agartala Conspiracy Case. A three-member tribunal was appointed for trial of the accused.\textsuperscript{84} Second round of RTC was attended by DAC leaders and Mujeeb. In the first session of RTC, Mujeeb was not invited to participate. Before the second session of RTC, leaders of DAC, the Student Action Committee (SAC) and others like Mumtaz Daultana, Bhashani, Azam Khan, Asghar Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Bhutto) demanded his release. Due to political pressure Mujeeb and other politicians accused in the Agartala Conspiracy Case were released. To justify this release the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Tribunal) Ordinance, 1968 was repealed. The Agartala Conspiracy Case was also withdrawn by the government. This made the environment more conducive for prolific talks.\textsuperscript{85}

Mujeeb called the DAC leaders to devise an agreed formula. Political leaders particularly of small provinces of West Pakistan openly demanded dissolution of “One Unit” into autonomous provinces. The DAC appointed a subcommittee to devise a formula but failed and it was decided to bring forward two principles in RTC: a federal parliamentary system with regional autonomy, and direct elections on the basis of adult franchise. In the meeting held on March 10, 1969 the leaders could not adhere to the agreed formula. Mujeeb raised the issue of six points\textsuperscript{86} and SAC’s eleven points. He also demanded representation on the basis of population and dissolution of One Unit. Muzaffar Ahmad (NAP) fully supported his demands and Mumtaz Daultana’s (CML) partially. Khan Abdul Wali Khan and leaders of Sindh and Balochistan were supporting Mujeeb’s demands for a federation because they believed that it was only through following this process that they would be able to attain provincial autonomy for their provinces.\textsuperscript{87} Chaudhri Muhammad Ali (NIP) and Maududi (JI) restricted their efforts for the endorsement of the two agreed demands. No positive result could come out of RTC. On March 13, 1969 only two points could be made that were acceptable
to all: a parliamentary system of government and direct elections of the basis of adult franchise.

Ayub Khan agreed to amend the constitution accordingly but was against the dissolution of One Unit. Sheikh Mujeeb was dissatisfied by the decision and withdrew from RTC and DAC. The primary reason why Mujeeb left DAC was that he was unable to convince others for the provincial autonomy to the extent of his satisfaction. The next day Nasrullah Khan dissolved the DAC. According to him the DAC had achieved its basic motive and there was no further need to continue an alliance of multi-dimensional political parties.

**United Democratic Front 1973**

Pakistan went through a difficult phase of history during 1970-71. First general elections were held on the basis of adult franchise removing the principle of parity between East and West Pakistan. The elections results remained truly unexpected. Awami League won in the East Pakistan and PPP got majority in the West Pakistan provinces. There was a controversy regarding formation of government. Awami League wanted to shift of government to Dhaka but Z. A. Bhutto challenged the victory of Awami League arguing that Awami League won only in one province so it did not have the right to form government. This controversy led to an armed conflict of Pakistan army and the common people of East Pakistan which turned into full fledged war as Indian army came forward to support the people of East Pakistan. This war resulted in the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan and a new country consisting of the regions of East Pakistan came into being with the name of Bangladesh. PPP formed government in 1971 in the West Pakistan.

The expectations of politicians after 1971 veered towards democratization of politics but Bhutto was unwilling to move in this direction. The opposition, which consisted of NAP a liberal-left oriented party and Jamiat ul Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), a religio-political party made alliance against the government for its efforts to revive relations with India. The Opposition was also united against the constitution, prepared by the government without its consent. Discontented members of the ruling party also joined hands with the opposition. Many of the prominent members of the PPP were against victimization of the members of other parties. Dismissal of the provincial governments of NWFP and Balochistan was also not acceptable for the senior members of the PPP and other political parties. UDF also included former opposition League and some members of Qaiyum League of Abdul Qaiyun Khan, who disapproved policies of their leader. Formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formally announced in a convention that was called by the opposition parties to oppose the dismissal of Balochistan Provincial Government. It consisted of JUP, a Muslim religious community organization Markazi Khaksar Tehrik, United Muslim League (UML), Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), NAP, JI and Independent Parliamentary Group. It was led by Pir of Pagara Syed Mardan Ali Shah. Mufti Mahmood became its
vicePresident.\textsuperscript{94} Abdul Wali Khan, the leader of NAP, was elected leader of its Parliamentary faction.\textsuperscript{95} Tehrik-e Istiqlal announced its support for the UDF later but did not formally join it.\textsuperscript{96} Opposition parties had 12 seats in the Senate so they formed a UDF faction in the Senate as well and elected Muhammad Hashim Gilzai of NAP its leader.\textsuperscript{97} Most of the leaders of UDF were from former NWFP\textsuperscript{98} and Balochistan.\textsuperscript{99} It formulated a twelve-point declaration. Its major concern was to protect the country’s geographical boundaries\textsuperscript{100} and to achieve an Islamic, democratic, federal, parliamentary constitution. It pledged to secure fundamental rights for all citizens, to liberate people from all forms of exploitation, and to provide basic necessities of life to the common man. It promised to protect provincial autonomy from encroachment by the center, to protect ideological frontiers of the country from the external and internal threats and to secure the extraction of national emergency, which provided the government with authoritarian powers.\textsuperscript{101} UDF prearranged a number of demonstrations in order to pressurize the government into ensuring approval of its demands. UDF boycotted the NA session held for the formulation of constitution.\textsuperscript{102} At the time of the third reading of the Constitution, the then Law Minister Ahmad Raza Qasoori brought the opposition back to the floor of the House. Before joining the session UDF met with President Bhutto and suggested some amendments in the Constitution. Bhutto accepted the demands in order to bring the opposition into the Assembly for commendation of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{103} UDF sought to remove all the clauses referring to Socialism and the government’s right to enforce an emergency. It also demanded an ‘Independent Election Commission’ having full authority to check activities of the political parties during the elections and otherwise.\textsuperscript{104} PPP rejected almost all the amendments suggested by the UDF in the Constitution of 1973.\textsuperscript{105} UDF decided to forward its demands in another way. It asked for the establishment of the Islamic Advisory Council (IAC) on March 15, 1973 suggesting that if one-fourth of the members of the Parliament or any of the PA asked about any law repugnant to the teachings of Islam, that law must be referred to the IAC for the revision and if IAC finds it against the teachings of Islam that will automatically be repealed. Opposition wanted this method to be adopted to secure its position in the parliament as it had a very limited number of supporters in the parliament and could not create any impact on the government decisions.\textsuperscript{106} Contradictions within the opposition and measures taken by the government to
consolidate its position prevented opposition to get its amendments approved.\textsuperscript{107} Later it announced its support to the approval of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{108} UDF demanded enforcement of the Constitution on April 16, 1973 but the government refused this demand as it assumed that the opposition wanted to exploit the freedom awarded through the Constitution to political activities. After facing refusal for this demand, the opposition decided against entering into any negotiations with the President until their demands were accepted.\textsuperscript{109}

As the UDF was an alliance of parties with contradictory ideologies, it had to make hectic efforts to sustain unity within its ranks. It announced its intention to launch a collective struggle for democratic rights of the people of Balochistan against the dismissal of the NAP government. The 1973 flood prevented UDF from completing the campaign of civil disobedience, which was already weak due to lack of support of some prominent opposition leaders like Mian Zahid Sarfraz (Sarfraz)\textsuperscript{110} and his faction of the Muslim League, as he was not in favor of cooperation with NAP.\textsuperscript{111}

The UDF decided to launch protest movement to protect its political and economic interests. Professor Ghaffar Ahmad (leader of JI and General Secretary of UDF) said that his party would use constitutional methods to bring a change in the regime. JI believed that if opposition used violence in the protest, the government will have justification to use coercive methods which will be harmful for opposition itself. That was the basic reason that forced the opposition to keep its protests peaceful.\textsuperscript{112} On August 24, 1973 UDF demanded abolishment of the state of emergency and the restoration of fundamental rights and the reinstatement of provincial governments in NWFP and Balochistan.\textsuperscript{113} With the passage of time, the opposition realized that it would be difficult to maintain a state of peaceful agitation. Later, they planned to boycott Parliamentary Institutions, advocated holding protest days, disrupting the work of government offices, staging strikes etc. All these actions had approval of the UML.\textsuperscript{114} At the same time UDF started making efforts to muster support against the PPP as well as student organizations.\textsuperscript{115}

The government amended the Constitution in January 1976 to cope with the political situation created by the opposition. With the support of new clauses in the Constitution, government arrested some of the prominent leaders of the opposition, these were, Ghulam Mustafa Khar (Khar), Ch. Ziafar Ilahi, and Senators of UDF such as Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Syed Hussain Shah and others.\textsuperscript{116} Opposition forces became weak due to measures taken by the government and by inter-party, interfaction and personal contradictions and rivalries. UML had no particular agenda to pursue so instead of cooperating with UDF some of its members preferred to join hands with the government. On February 10, 1975 NAP was banned and UDF lost its left wing ally.\textsuperscript{117} From February to October 1975 UDF boycotted the legislature, including budget session of the NA to prevent approval of the budget and the next five-year plan and to create mistrust among the masses against the government.\textsuperscript{118}

UDF faced many organizational problems as well. Leaders of member parties were not united on major issues such as the boycott of legislative bodies, participation in the elections and the leadership of combined opposition. Leaders of UDF and of the UML
(one of the member parties of UDF) headed by Pir of Pagaro stood for continuing the boycott of legislative bodies. At the same time they were ready to contest upcoming by-elections on certain conditions, which included lifting of emergency, release of political prisoners, introduction of political freedom; including freedom of Press, abandonment of anti-democratic tactics and laws by the government amongst others. TI and JUP were against the boycott of the legislature. JUP, contrary to UDF’s decision, participated in the NA sessions as well as in the by-elections held in Sindh and Punjab. So UDF expelled JUP from the alliance.  

UDF had never been unified and could not pose a real threat to PPP. When the possibility of holding elections grew impending became prominent in mid-1976, JUP tried to reunite opposition parties but Maulana Noorani rejected the idea of making any alliance with JI. The party started to fragment and a rift in UDF began when three MNAs from Punjab supported the recognition of Bangladesh. Maulana Noorani was criticized by Sahibzada Nazar Sultan for joining hands with NAP, JUI, JUP in UDF on May 26-27, 1973 in a convention of JUP because it had differences with NAP and JI on religious and political grounds. Some prominent members of the alliance deserted UDF and joined hands with PPP and the Independent National Democratic Party, which encouraged a split in the opposition. UDF’s working committee’s decision in July 1976, to win support from the masses could not yield the desired result, which was consolidating UDF’s agenda and strengthening the party. It can be said that the only prominent achievement of UDF was to pressurize Bhutto to hold fresh elections.  

Pakistan National Alliance 1977 (PNA)  

After the announcement of elections by Bhutto in 1977, the combined opposition of nine political parties established a political alliance called the PNA and they were to contest elections against PPP from a common platform. These were Muslim League, Tehrik-i Istiqbal, Jamaat-i islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), Pakistan Jamhoori Party (PJP), National Democratic Party (NDP), Khaksar Tehrik (KT) and the Muslim Conference of Azad Kashmir. The alliance was formed on January 11, 1977. This alliance was composed of political parties that were Islamic, ethnic, socialist and secular. Religious parties like JI joined them. Due to the authoritative policies of Bhutto many of the PPP members also joined the opposition. PNA manifesto was based on religio-economic issues. The alliance promised to implement the Islamic system of government after winning elections. It promised denationalization of some industries and freedom of private enterprise. It also promised to make arrangements to maximize cooperation of industrialist and the worker.  

Political parties including JI played an important role according to their level of popularity in the alliance’s activities. JI organized processions against the government. The business community, the professional middle class and orthodox sections of the bourgeoisie also supported PNA. These sections of society were naturally opposed to Bhutto due to his policy of nationalizing small and medium businesses.
Public meetings were banned by the Bhutto administration hence mosques were used as the center for political activities. PNA contested the elections in the name of implementation of *Nizam-i Mustafa* (Islamic System). The PPP used undemocratic methods in order to suppress the opposition. These included house arrest and kidnapping aimed at creating negative impact on the election campaign of PNA.

It was expected that PPP would win the elections with a clear majority but the quantum of the victory was still surprising for the opposition as it won one hundred and fifty-five (155) seats and PNA was successful in only thirty-six (36) constituencies. It was common knowledge that the elections were rigged on a very large scale and in order to cause fear amongst opposition leaders, some of them were assaulted, threatened and coerced. One example of the coercion of Bhutto was Jan Mohamma Abbasi from Larkana who contested elections against Z. A. Bhutto. The rejection of nomination papers was a frequent occurrence which helped many of the PPP members get elected unopposed. Complaints of rigging were so frequent that Chief ECP suggested for reelection for all the 200 NA seats.

On March 8, 1977, a day after the polling was held; the central working committee of PNA met in Lahore and rejected the election results. Elected members of the alliance were asked to resign from the membership of the Assembly. It also announced a boycott of the elections for provincial assemblies, and appealed to the nation to launch a protest strike throughout the country. One of the major reasons why the strike was held was that Bhutto was elected unopposed on February 6, 1977 and later CMs of the Punjab and Sindh were also elected unopposed. PNA alleged that its nominees were not allowed to submit nomination papers which resulted in the success of the PPP members in the elections. PNA called it one of the sources that Bhutto used to win the elections.

In March 1977, the PNA demanded Bhutto’s resignation from the office and the appointment of a neutral Election Commission. It also demanded fresh elections under the supervision of army and judiciary. Bhutto was unwilling to accept these demands. Attorney General Yahya Bakhtiyar suggested that the PM request provincial governments to dissolve the provincial assemblies and if the PNA were to win a majority in the provincial elections the NA would also be dissolved. PNA did not accept this offer. April 14, 1977 was observed as a protest day. It was said that the agitation was in favor of democracy, the implementation of Sharia and a protest against the dread created by the government on April 9, 1977. It launched a fullfledged civil disobedience movement and it became impossible for the government to control the agitation. JUI, JI and JUP played a vital role in the movement. The leaders of the alliance dissuaded the people from paying government taxes. It also told the people not to deposit any money in banks. Government ministers started pro-Bhutto processions in April as well.

On April 17, 1977 Bhutto announced restrictions on the sale of wine, and the running of night clubs. He also offered to create an Islamic Ideology Council (IIC) and to
provide membership to *Ulema* of all sects in the Council. He guaranteed the approval of the suggestions of the IIC in order to appease the *Ulema* and the people. PNA called it just a political formula and rejected it because it believed that the assemblies had come into being through unfairly held elections and were illegal. In a meeting held on April 18, 1977 it was decided by the central council of PNA that public meetings would be held throughout the country on April 22 against the Bhutto administration. On April 21, the government imposed martial-law and a curfew in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad to control the deteriorating situation of law and order and under the defense of Pakistan Rules, prominent leaders of PNA were arrested.

On April 23, 1977 Bhutto met with Mufti Mahmood (leader of PNA) and both leaders agreed to begin talks. Negotiations began on June 3, 1977 and more than a dozen meetings were held between them. On June 7, 1977 Bhutto released PNA leaders and lifted press censorship and removed martial law from the country. He also agreed to hold fresh elections and agreed to the involvement of the army and the judiciary in election process. He acquiesced to the appointment of governors of the provinces acceptable to PNA. Despite the compromises Bhutto was making, leaders of the member parties of PNA refused to sign the agreement because he was not willing to resign. Another thing that disturbed the situation was Bhutto’s visit to Middle Eastern countries which he planned before signing the accord. This visit showed that Bhutto was not sincere or serious about any effort of compromise with opposition and opposition started its movement to dislodge Bhutto with a fresh vigor and vitality. Later, the central executive committee of PNA presented a charter of demands consisting of thirty-two points for reconciliation with the government. The government rejected the charter stipulating that only basic demands were to be presented by the PNA for consideration. After this response the alliance published its demands and it became more difficult to come to an amicable solution. On May 13, 1977 Bhutto offered a referendum to gauge the opinion of the people of Pakistan with regard to a solution to the political deadlock faced by them, but the PNA rejected their offer. On June 3, 1977 a second round of discussions between the government and the opposition began. At first, the government agreed to release Asghar Khan, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani and Muhammad Ashraf Khan of Khaksaar Tehrik. It also agreed to curb censorship on the media, control the arrest of political workers and leaders and avoid registering any further political cases. Both the groups decided that until the conclusion of discussions none of the groups would organize public meetings and processions.

During the second session of the discussion, a nine point agreement was concluded between the government and the PNA. It was announced that within a few days an agreement would be signed after the sub-committees would write a draft of the agreement. On June 22, an agreement was approved by the sub-committee of PNA and presented to the government. This was returned by the government on June 25. The central executive council of the PNA was of the view that it could not compromise on
its basic demands. After long discussions among the government’s consultation committee, the central executive committee of PNA, an agreement was concluded on July 3, 1977 but could not be implemented.\textsuperscript{156} It is said that PNA, itself was reluctant in any agreement with Bhutto with a fear of losing elections again.\textsuperscript{157}

On July 3, 1977 Ghafoor and Maulana Kausar Niazi told the members of their respective parties that all controversies had been resolved and an agreement was prepared according to the demands of PNA. They said that the agreement had to be signed within few days after the approval of the central executive committee of PNA. However some leaders did not follow through.\textsuperscript{158} During the episode from March to July the political conditions worsened drastically. There was distrust between the government, the opposition and the army.\textsuperscript{159} Air Martial (Retd.) Asghar Khan (Asghar Khan) and Begum Nasim Wali Khan did not accept some of the clauses of the suggested agreement by Bhutto and Mufti Mahmood. They suggested amendments in the agreed formula that further aggravated the situation.\textsuperscript{160} Military Chief General Zia-ul Haq realized that the differences between the PNA and PPP were irreconcilable and imposed martial law.\textsuperscript{161} The leadership of PNA welcomed martial law and agreed to cooperate with the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) Zia.\textsuperscript{162} If the politics of PNA is closely followed, it reveals that it was the religious appeal that attracted common people. Otherwise PNA had nothing to attract the people towards its movement against Bhutto. It was unable to offer any comprehensive agenda to the people regarding their problems but the slogan, implementation of Nizam-i Mustafa helped PNA to win sympathies and support of common people but things could not be moulded towards implementation of Nizam-i Mustafa and the then COAS got an opportunity to impose Martial Law and take the reign of government in his hands.

Zia announced elections in October 1977 but they were eventually deferred because the opposition’s major demands had not been met. These were the Islamization of laws and accountability of the corrupt politicians. However, there was dissension within PNA over whether elections should be held.\textsuperscript{163} After the imposition of martial law on July 5, 1977 the leaders of PPP and PNA were taken into so-called protective custody. Until 1979 the members of PNA who joined Zia’s cabinet were set free.\textsuperscript{164} Zia was also trying to make new coalitions of interest groups particularly from JI, landlords, and Pir's of Sindh and the Punjab and some members of the business class and the judiciary.\textsuperscript{165} He decided to include PNA members in his cabinet. This was a strategic move because of the following reasons

a) He knew that PNA was popular with the masses

b) They were campaigning to overthrow Bhutto’s government.

To add to that he tried to merge PNA parties so that they could become a single, more powerful unit; however this was not possible because there were so many diverse views of the member parties within PNA.\textsuperscript{166} The only common factor among members of PNA was opposition to PPP.\textsuperscript{167}
As early as 1978, the fragmentation of PNA began to become more visible, especially when PML, JI and PDP joined hands with Zia. Others preferred not to become involved. Asghar Khan had already withdrawn from the coalition to maintain a separate identity for his party. Abdul Wali Khan entered into the alliance at alternate date. By August 1978, 13 politicians belonging to different political parties of PNA joined Cabinet of Zia. Since PNA and Zia were fighting from a similar platform, Zia conveyed to the people of Pakistan and the international community that PNA was also of the opinion that Bhutto should be executed. This was only an attempt to get legitimacy for the decision of execution of Z.A. Bhutto. Zia also made such statements to prove that he had support of the political parties for his decisions.

The post Bhutto phase proved to be more demanding and difficult for the politicians. Zia sidelined PNA after using the party’s support to achieve his primary objective i.e., the execution of Bhutto. The PNA leadership became aware that they had no real power despite being cabinet members. After Bhutto was hanged on April 4, 1979, PNA demanded holding fresh elections. In reaction to these demands Zia dismissed members of the PNA from cabinet. In fact Zia used support of PNA during the life time of Bhutto. As soon as Bhutto disappeared from the national politics, Zia was no more dependent upon the support of the political parties as he needed to implement the decision of hanging Bhutto, so decided to get rid of the political burden he dismissed many of the PNA members from his cabinet.

The business community, the professional middle class and the more orthodox sections of bourgeoisie which had formerly supported PNA in the movement against PPP developed a working relationship with the martial law regime and became less dependent on PNA. This was a reflection of the fact that with the passage of time PNA started losing support from different social groups. The PNA chief Mufti Mahmud and TI’s president Asghar Khan separately started making efforts to persuade the PPP to join a broad based alliance against the military regime and were successful until the middle of 1980. PPP and PNA started working together for a common cause; to get rid of Zia’s regime and restore parliamentary democracy. Only JI and ML (Pagara Group) continued its support to the martial law regime. This is how the political foes became friends by joining hands against the government to restore democracy.

Movement for Restoration of Democracy 1981 (MRD)

After losing the support of JI, ML (Pagara Group) and JUP, the PNA leadership realized that it had to evolve a working relationship with PPP to counter the martial law regime, which was consolidating its power in the country instead of holding free and fair elections. Except for JI, ML (Pagara Group) and JUP other member parties of PNA decided to make an alliance with PPP to form a stronger front against Zia’s regime. This alliance was called the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). A broad based alliance was required, as PPP could not face the tyrannous nature of the government since its workers were being arrested and jailed on a large
scale. Other political parties lacked the mass support that was needed to challenge the military regime.\textsuperscript{179} PPP, TI, National Democratic Party (NDP), Pakistan Democratic Front (PDF), PML-Khairuddin-Qasim Group, Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi (QMA), Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party (PMKP), Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam Fazalur Rehman Group (JUI-F), Pakistan National Party (PNP), Awami Tehrik (AT), Pukhtoonkhwah National Awami Party (NAP-Pukhtoonkhwah) became members of the alliance.\textsuperscript{180}

MRD’s basic demands were: the restoration of political parties, abolition of censorship, abolition of Military Courts and the reinstatement of Civil Courts with their basic rights and responsibilities and restoration of the 1973 Constitution as well as holding elections according to it.\textsuperscript{181} MRD wanted transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{182} It announced the launch of a movement from August 14, 1983. It continued for almost five months but could not muster much support except in the province of Sindh. The main reason for this failure was that the leadership of PPP could not maintain its contact with the masses.\textsuperscript{183} At a later stage, MRD decided to set up a permanent secretariat and cadres at the provincial and district levels before starting a full-fledged movement for the restoration of democracy.\textsuperscript{184} However, the movement was crushed by the dictatorial regime of Zia. Henceforth the policy of censorship was made even stricter for print media.\textsuperscript{185}

The movement shed a negative light on the government. To save it from a tarnished reputation, Zia announced an election formula, according to which elections were going to be held before March 1985. A plan for constitutional amendments was announced before the commencement of elections to make the constitution compatible with the existing political situation. This was considered the biggest success of MRD.\textsuperscript{186} At the same time the government announced holding a referendum in the country to ask the public on whether Zia should continue as the President of Pakistan. This also created a negative impact on the political activity of the MRD.\textsuperscript{187} The government announced a non-party election which was boycotted by MRD. The eighth amendment in the constitution also caused animosity between the government and MRD, which was prepared by the Zia regime with all effective powers shifting from the office of PM to the President. The MRD leadership appealed to the masses and other political parties to cooperate with it to prevent elections from taking place on a non-party basis.\textsuperscript{188} One reason why MRD avoided participation in the election was the list of reservations the government had specified with regard to the nomination papers. This included an assessment of moral character of the nominee, whether they were corrupt and whether they were registered with the party. These restrictions ensured that the party candidates would be rejected in the upcoming election. This resulted in a more unified resolution to boycott the elections. The referendum before the general elections added to the unanimity of the decision to boycott. A low turn-out in the referendum assured MRD that its decision was correct and wise.\textsuperscript{189} Although the decision to boycott the elections was unanimous by all member parties, they had
their own particular reasons to boycott, for example PPP was not sure of whether its leadership would return and smaller parties were aware of the fact that they could not win much success. TI had its own reservations, especially as it did not want to break its alliance with MRD. Two weeks before the elections most of the prominent MRD leaders and many of the activists were arrested, some were convicted by military courts and others were kept in detention without trial.

The central committee of MRD stipulated that all those who took part in the elections would be guilty of subverting the constitution of 1973. It also announced that the membership of the members of allied parties of MRD would be terminated if they participated in the elections. Many of the members of the alliance abandoned their membership to their party to participate in the elections. MRD suffered a great setback due to defections, which were due to the pressure on the members from their constituencies and their disagreement on the question of boycotting the elections. Some members lent their support to candidates standing against progovernment candidates.

Some of the defectors were permanently expelled from the PPP; other parties also reacted in a similar way. Consequently MRD parties had been shaken by serious organizational problems and dissentions. MRD leaders professed that it was only logical to boycott the elections after the boycott of the referendum. Fifty-three percent of the registered voters polled their votes, which proved to be enough to neutralize the boycott call of the MRD. It can be said that MRD misread the general mindset of the public which was election oriented and lost a chance to become a part of the government of the country.

MRD pursued its plan to start a general agitation in the country. The disturbance maintained its momentum for several months without showing any signs of retreat but it was unfortunate for MRD that it could not mobilize a substantial number of people for support from all over the country. It had success in Sindh but could not attract people of NWFP and Balochistan. It did not have much support in Punjab either because it did not tackle issues that were of current interest to the people of Punjab, such as the Kashmir issue. At the same time it could not win over the support of student bodies.

One major reason that prevented its success was lack of unity and multiple differences among the leadership of the component parties of MRD. For example, some parties favored violent means while others were not willing to go beyond constitutional methods of opposition. Some of the member parties wanted to make a closer organizational alliance while others preferred a loose association among themselves. Another weakness of MRD was that it could not propagate its program to the masses. In the interior Sindh its leadership remained confined to the Sindhi nationalists. Formation of another alliance, Sindh-Baluch-Pushtoon movement, curtailed the success of MRD. ANP’s efforts to unite the ‘left’ were another obstacle to success.
On August 2, 1986 MRD parties demanded provincial autonomy barring only matters of foreign policy, currency, communication and defense to the central government and demanded all other matters be included in provincial jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{203} It was also decided that if the MRD were to win the next elections it would implement the above-mentioned agenda.\textsuperscript{204} In 1986 an effort was made for the approval of the government to hold mid-term elections on a party basis but it could not gather nation-wide support. The only place it had some support was in Sindh and eventually it was crushed by the government.\textsuperscript{205} As the movement failed in August 1986, it made the PPP leadership review its strengths and weaknesses and it decided not to call for an early election before the end of 1986. It also realized the importance of the cooperation of other member parties of MRD as opposed to launching a movement alone.\textsuperscript{206}

**Problems of MRD:** MRD was a broad-based alliance but it could not become successful to a reasonable extent. Internal contradictions of MRD parties, strict Martial Law Regulations and a lack of strength and support from Punjab were some of the factors that did not allow MRD to be successful on a massive scale.\textsuperscript{207} Leaders of the member parties of MRD (other than PPP) did not feel comfortable with each other as many of them were part of the PNA (an alliance against Bhutto) with the leadership of PPP.\textsuperscript{208} These parties preferred an alliance with PPP because none of the other parties enjoyed broad based street power.\textsuperscript{209} The alliance faced desertions soon after its formation. First of all Sardar Abdul Qayum’s party left MRD after plane hijacking in March 1981.\textsuperscript{210} Within a brief period of time PDP and JUP also parted its ways with MRD.\textsuperscript{211} Constituent parties of the alliance did not enjoy an analogous level of popularity. PPP was more popular than the rest of the parties and that caused mutual envy. Ideological differences were prominent among the parties. They could not evolve a consensus on various issues such as the fact that the Tehrik-i Iqtiqlal broke its alliance with MRD in 1986 and registered itself according to the Political Parties (Amended) Act.\textsuperscript{212} All other parties submitted statements of their accounts but did not register themselves until October 1986.\textsuperscript{213} Initially the restoration of the Constitution of 1973 was a shared goal among all the parties but later Wali Khan of NDP raised the point that the 1973 Constitution was redundant and the new assembly had to frame a new constitution for the country guaranteeing adequate safeguards to the rights of smaller provinces. Another controversy was about the conversion of MRD to an electoral alliance and the formulation of a common sociopolitical and economic program.\textsuperscript{214} Lack of common interest and having different goals did not allow the member parties of MRD to work in coordination.

The MRD failed to carry the alliance to a positive culmination. Perhaps it failed to conquer antagonistic images of the past among the member parties. A common cause against Zia kept diverse political parties together but it seemed that in the 1988 election they could not maintain this unity mainly due to two reasons. One was the death of Zia on August 17, 1988. As their enemy was no more there, there was little common ground for cohesion and the restoration of democracy was announced by the acting president. The second reason was that the member parties of MRD could not decide
the quantum of seats in the National and Provincial Assemblies’ elections. Smaller parties of the MRD and the JI wanted to convert it to an electoral alliance but PPP was not interested in doing so. For example in Sindh the distribution of seats had to be decided in a meeting of the Central Working Committee of MRD but nothing could be decided in two meetings held in September. In the Punjab PPP did not participate in the alliance meetings that were conducted in this regard. Later, when MRD asked its members to give the list of their safe constituencies PPP mentioned all the 47 NA seats and 100 PA seats in Sindh which was not acceptable to the other parties, whereas JUI wanted to get tickets of 27 NA seats and 19 PA seats, ANP demanded membership for 7 NA and 19 PA seats, MQM wanted to contest for 7 NA and 16 PA seats. PPNP demanded 5 NA seats and 18 PA seats. PDP asked for 7 NA seats and 15 PA seats and ML (Malik Qasim Group) 3 NA and 18 PA seats. MNA (Pakhtunkhwa) asked for 3 NA and 5 PA seats. In this way for 147 seats 369 members of the MRD parties demanded the alliance ticket. PPP knowing the winning potential of these parties; did not give much importance to their demands. At the same time PPP only had joined the MRD to avoid facing animosity of the government alone. PPP could not ignore the role of these political parties in assassination of Bhutto so it only remained with them when it had no other choice.

The alliance mobilized masses against the oppressive and repressive Martial Law. It was the impact of the movement that led Zia to use referendum as a tool to legitimize his rule and then hold elections in 1985. PPP received benefits through the MRD. It rehabilitated its lost image as a democratic party. It also had a chance to establish itself as a national party which it had lost after 1977. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was of the view that after the announcement of the elections in 1988, on a party basis, the basic objective of the alliance was achieved so there was no need to continue it. According to the PPP leadership, MRD was formed purely to abolish martial law. As soon as its main objective was achieved, MRD parties were free to plan their future course of politics. The death of Zia not only removed the fear of the military regime but also removed the main constraint within the political parties to work together. So death of Zia and announcement of the government to hold elections on party basis removed the cause of unity of the member parties of MRD and it was dissolved before the elections of 1988.

II. Alliance Politics in Pakistan: An Appraisal

Pakistan is a multi-cultural and multi ethnic state. Its people are bound to different social ideologies which could not integrate with each other with the passage of time. Another thing that played an important role in the development of political attitudes is that most of the political parties and their political activities are confined to cities. Elections are not held at regular intervals for which politicians are not required to consult the common people at gross-root levels and political growth is neglected in
rural areas. Mushroom growth of political parties is another important feature of politics of Pakistan.

At the emergence of Pakistan there were different political parties who represented different regions. Muslim League could be the national political party but it had a nominal support in the regions that formed Pakistan. Different regional parties represent their regions but hardly any of them could adopt role of a national political party. Some of the political parties only represent particular ethnic groups like Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and they have hardly any influence in other regions except their ethnic representation. Religious political parties are another feature of Pakistani politics but they had never been able to provide a comprehensive program to attract the voters like JI which has representation in the whole country but it can hardly win few seats in the assemblies. Along with a limited role of the political parties in different regions sub-divisions in the political parties is another common feature of the politics of Pakistan. Most of the parties are sub divided due to the personal grievances of the political leaders like JUI which was divided into JUI (F) and JUI (Sami group) after the death of Maulana Mufti Mahmood. Similarly Muslim League is being renamed and by different personalities like Ayub to get legitimacy as the president of Pakistan. So none of the political parties has been able to adopt stature of a national political party and these parties have to make alliances to achieve certain national political goals.

Political alliances had been an important feature of the history of Pakistan since 1954. In 1954 UF was formed and after that at different occasions different times political parties got to make alliances. These alliances are formed to mobilize common people at national level like anti-Ayub movement, Anti-Bhutto movement and later restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Some of the features in these alliances are common as; these are made in haste without having proper political program just to achieve some immediate goals. These alliances could not survive for a longer duration, these alliances had great impact on the political developments but could not provide a common platform to the people. Another thing that can be highlighted is that these alliances provided a common platform for certain situation which prevented formation of national political parties. IJI was not an exception. It was formed in 1988 to contest elections against a common political foe without deciding basic issues which prevented the political leadership to provide people of Pakistan a common political platform which was hoped at the time of its formulation. Some of the critics of the alliance say that the alliance was made in haste so it dissolved in a similar manner. In the following chapters formation and working of this alliance is discussed in detail to study these observations and the problems that were faced by the alliance to convert it into a national political party.

It can be said that alliances among political parties are a natural result of feeble organizational structures and poor support bases of the political parties. Seen against the backdrop of constant political unrest and weak leadership, these alliances were often formed to achieve short-term goals, which tended to be unrealistic and based on
tenuous grounds with regard to long-term objectives and matters of principle. It safe to say that in developing countries transitory phases create more problems for the masses and if political leadership is not strong and does not identify the major issues of the country and try and tackle them in a united and systematic manner, it will always be difficult for these nations to achieve political maturity because of their short term political plans and alliances.

**Notes and References**

1 National elections could not be held in Pakistan from 1947-58. Only provincial elections could be held and that also were managed at different times and results were not accepted by the losing parties in the provincial elections in West Pakistan. In the Punjab elections were held from March 10-20, 1951 for 187 seats. Remaining 10 seats were filled unopposed. Voter turnout remained very low. NWFP held elections on December 8, 1951 for provincial legislature and for Sindh provincial legislature elections were held in May. In April 1954, elections were held for East Pakistan in which PML lost and Bengali nationalists returned successful. These elections were held on the basis of adult franchise. M. Rafique Afzal, *Pakistan: History & Politics, 1947-1971* (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2001), pp. 57-64. Also see Muhammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994), pp. 126-27.

3 This alliance was based in the eastern wing of the country but it had its impact on overall politics of Pakistan. Keeping in view the role of UF in the politics of Pakistan it has been considered the first major alliance in the history of Pakistan and is being discussed in the history of major alliances of Pakistan. KSP was formed by A.K. Fazal-ul Haq and Nur-ul-ameen. A.K. Fazal-ul Haq, often referred to as “Sher-e-Bangla” (Tiger of Bengal) was a very popular politician in the pre-partition days. He was a well-known Bengali statesman in the first half of the 20th century. He held different political posts including those of General Secretary of Indian National Congress, (1918–1919), Education Minister (1924), the first Muslim Mayor of Calcutta (1935), Chief Minister of undivided Bengal (1937–1943) and East Pakistan (1954), Home Minister of Pakistan (1955–56), Governor of East Pakistan(1956– 58), Food and Agriculture Minister of Pakistan (1958–61). In 1953 he formed his own party against Nur-ul Amin who was leading the ML if East Pakistan. Akhtar Hussain, “Politics of Alliances in Pakistan: 1954-1999, (PHD Dissertation submitted to National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i Azam University, Islamabad, 2008), p. 4.

4 Bhashani (1885-1976) was left-wing peasant leader in East Pakistan. He led the PML movement in Assam before independence. After the creation of Pakistan, he became leader of the East Bengal Awami League which was one of the members of the United Front made in 1954 provincial elections in East Pakistan. In 1957 he formed National Awami Party (NAP) which was revived after lifting of Martial Law by President Ayub Khan. Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1999), p. 379.


7 UF demands were: to recognize Bangla as one of the state languages, to abolish Zamindar System without compensation and distribute surplus lands to landless cultivators, to national the Jute trade and give it under the direct control of government of East Pakistan, to introduce co-operative farming and establish cottage industries with government’s subsidies, to start salt industry, to rehabilitate all the poor refugees belonging to the artisan and technician class, digging canals to improve irrigation system and to save the lands from floods, to modernize methods of cultivation and industrialize the country to improve economy, to introduce free and compulsory primary education, to restructure education system and to repeal all reactionary laws along with other such demands for regional development and security.

8 Parity system was working in the East and West Pakistan which meant to the equal representation of East and West Pakistan. Because the population of East Pakistan was more that West Pakistan so they wanted to get representation in the federal legislature on the basis of population.


Mohammed Ali Bogra (October 19 1909—January 23, 1963) was a well-known Pakistani Foreign service officer. He originally belonged to Bengal. He also served as the third Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1953 until 1955, and prior to that, was also the Foreign Minister of Pakistan from 1954 to 1955.

Younis, *Siyasi Ittehād*, pp. 55-56.


One Unit scheme was introduced to solve constitutional issues between East Pakistan and West Pakistan through which Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Frontier were merged into one province. Although small provinces and AL was not happy with the decision but it was approved by the CA. For details see Rizwan Malik, *The Politics of One Unit: 1955-1958* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Auaid-i-Azam Campus, 1988). Also see Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan*, Vol. I, pp. 282-84.


EBDO stands for Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order. According to this ordinance any person who held public office or had been member of any of the legislative body and was accused of misdeeds will have


Hashmi, *The Governing Process in Pakistan*, p. 204. The COP made a comprehensive agenda which consisted of a parliamentary form of government, constitution based on civil rights and liberties, direct elections on the basis of adult franchise, budgetary powers for national and provincial assemblies with full provincial autonomy, improved administration in tribal areas and development plans for the tribal areas and withdrawal of ban on the functioning of the political parties. Furthermore it asked for repeal of repressive laws and discriminatory executive directions, release of all political prisoners, restoration of their properties, remission of all fines and withdrawal of all warrants against the political workers. It also demanded economic reforms, guarantee of the protection of the rights of the minorities, solution of Kashmir issue on the basis of their right to decide their future through plebiscite, implementation of the Islamic provisions of the constitution, formulation of an independent foreign policy keeping the sovereignty and interests of the state intact. It also asked the government to take the measures to decrease differences between the two wings of the country. Mujahid, “Presidential Elections”, p. 49. Also see Asaf Hussain, *Elite Politics in an Ideological State: A Case of Pakistan* (Kent: Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd., Cannon House, 1979), p. 137.

This party was founded in May 1963 by Chaudhri Khaliquz Zaman as pro-government party. President Ayub Khan became its president in December 1963. Ayub Khan contested presidential elections with the support of this party in 1965. Talbot, *Pakistan*, p. 406.

Mujahid, “Presidential Elections”, p. 45.

Lieutenant General Azam Khan served under general Ayub Khan (later he was called field Martial Ayub Khan), the first military ruler of Pakistan. He also served as a top Army commander in East Pakistan and Governor during the early days of martial law regime.


Mussarat, ed., *Quest for Democracy in Pakistan*, p. 42.


Ibid., pp. 205-6.  
Salim Younis, *Siyasi Ittehād*, pp. 73-75.  
PDM asked for a federal parliamentary form of government based on direct elections through adult franchise leaving defense, foreign affairs, currency, federal finance, inter-wing communication and trade with the center; removing the disparity between the east and west Pakistan within ten years, establishing complete fundamental rights, a free press and an independent judiciary, shifting the Naval headquarters to East Pakistan and appointing a defense council consisting of equal number from both the wings. Regarding the foreign policy it said that Pakistan should maintain friendly relations with all the countries irrespective of their ideological differences, and fraternal relations should be made with Muslim and Afro-Asian nations. Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan*, Vol. II, pp. 223-25. Also see Sayyid A. S. Pirzada, *Politics of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan: 1971-77* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 29 and Hamid, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, p. 190.  
According to this ordinance the government banned use of loud speakers for public meetings and other political activities. For details see *Muslmaan, October 26, 1963. Also see Dawn, April 30, 1967.*  
This section prohibits larger gatherings. According to this section “Whoever, being armed with any deadly weapon, or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, is a member of an unlawful assembly/shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both”.  
Ibid., p. 278.  
Ibid., p. 267.  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the founder of the PPP. He belonged to a leading family of Sindh with the degreed from Berkeley, Oxford and London. He joined the Cabinet in 1958 for the first time. Retaining different offices he got the portfolio of foreign minister in the cabinet of Ayub Khan. Being young and bold he enjoyed the confidence of Ayub Khan but after the signing of the Tashkent Declaration differences


80 Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was born in Khangarh in 1918. He emerged as a student leader in politics around 1933 and joined a revolutionary group ‘Majlis-i-Ihrar’ till the creation of Pakistan. After the creation of Pakistan he started his political career from the platform of Muslim League. In 1950 he was elected as the Member of Provincial Assembly. He joined the opposition party, ‘Jinnah Awami League’ and later on this party was renamed as ‘Awami League’. He was selected as its vice president when Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardi was the president of the party. Nawabzada played an important role during the Tehreek-i-Khatam-i-Nabuwwat in 1953. He was elected the Member of the National Assembly through indirect elections in 1962. He strongly supported Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah in the Presidential Elections of 1964 against Ayub Khan. On 30th April 1967 he succeeded in forming a five-party alliance for opposition which was named as ‘Pakistan Democratic Movement’. In 1977, Nawabzada was one of the senior leaders of the Pakistan National Alliance. In the elections of 1977 he was elected as the Member of the National Assembly. He also played an active role in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) against Gen. Zia-ul Haq. http://storyofpakistan.com/nawabzada-nasrullah-khan/ retrieved on August 20, 2013.


85 Yusuf, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy*, p. 90. Also see Hashmi, *The Governing Process in Pakistan*, p. 210. Six point program of Mujeeb consisted of: (a) A federal parliamentary form of government with Universal Adult Franchise, (b) Federal government portfolios to be limited to defense and foreign affairs only, (c) the two provinces should have separate currencies with restrictions on the movement of capital funds from one region to the other, (d) All taxes to vest in the provinces of collection, (e) All foreign exchange earned by East Pakistan to be at the disposal of East Pakistan, (f) An independent militia for East Pakistan. Afzal, *Political Parties*, Vol. II, 1998. p. 169.


92 A convention was held to oppose PPP government against its decision of dismissal of Balochistan provincial government at Rawalpindi from February 28 to March 1, 1973.


Presently the province is named as Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KP). During 1988-1993, time span of the present research, the name of the province was North West Frontier Province (NWFP), so in this dissertation KP is mentioned as NWFP.

Zafar, “Constitutional Development in Pakistan”, p. 49. Also see Safdar, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments, p. 150.

This was against First Constitutional Amendment that was introduced in the assembly to get approval of the recognition of Bangladesh from the assembly. Opposition was against this amendment.


Williams, Pakistan Under Challenge, pp. 145-46. Also see Talbot, Pakistan, p. 228 and Mujeeb, “Jamiat-al-Ulama-i-Pakistan”, p. 179.

It was demanded by the opposition that the chairman of the election commission must be selected with the approval or at least suggestion of the leader of the House (Prime Minister) and the leader of the opposition in the parliament house. Pirzada, Politics of JUIP, p. 95.


Mujawar, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, p. 151.

Ponomarev, The Muslim League, p. 189.


Pirzada, Politics of JUIP, p. 99. Mian Zahid Sarfraz was one of the prominent leaders of PML. He also remained interior minister of Pakistan during the interim period in 1988 after the dismissal of Junejo’s Premiership.


Mujeeb, Jamiat-al-Ulama-i-Pakistan, p.181.


Ibid., p. 207.

Ibid., pp. 211-12. Ibid., p. 202. Z.A. Bhutto filed a reference against the leaders of NAP. The case is generally known as the Hyderabad tribunal (1975-1979). It is also known as Hyderabad conspiracy case. The case was filed to prosecute opposition politicians on the charges of treason and acting against the ideology of Pakistan.


Ibid., p.201.

Ibid., pp. 203-4.


Pirzada, *Politics of JUIP*, p. 164 and Jehandad Khan, *Pakistan: Qayādī kā Bohrān* [Urdu] (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 2002), p. 145. Khan is a common name so complete name is given in the following references of the present study to avoid confusion in the name of the author of the book.

Hussain, *Elite Politics*, p. 156.


Seyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p 183. Also see Siddique, Political Culture in Pakistan, p. 299. PNA’s basic purpose was to oppose the policies of Bhutto. They raised the slogan of Islamization to counter Bhutto and particularly his socialism. The slogan actually was raised to win over the sympathies of the common people. Shaukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religious-Political Study (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1997), pp. 179-80. Also see Pirzada, Politics of JUIP, pp. 166-7. Details of election campaign are available in Pirzada’s work.

An Interview of Benazir With Naeem Bukhari, in Apnei Andaaz Sei” HUMTV, October 4, 2009, Telecasted at 10.00 PM.

In an interview with Hum TV Benazir said that none of the leaders could win from the constituencies they selected to contest the elections. She was of view that the opposition leaders did not submit their nomination papers to dramatize the whole situation and save their image among the people. An Interview of Benazir With Naeem Bukhari, in Apnei Andaaz Sei” HUMTV, October 4, 2009, Telecasted at 10.00 PM.


Bhutto got the approval of seventh amendment from the newly elected assembly to make the referendum legal but the offer of referendum did not impress the PNA. Pirzada, *JUIP*, p. 177.


Shafqat, *Civil and Military Relations in Pakistan*, pp. 191-93 and 211.

Safdar Mahmood, *A Political Study of Pakistan* (Lahore: Educational Book Company, 1984), p. 115. According to Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri (General Secretary of PTI at that time) while in exile at Murree with other PNA leaders. Asghar Khan got the news that some of them had joined hands with Zia who was planning to conduct elections. For this reason Asghar Khan also left PNA. Asghar Abdullah, “Khirshid Mahmud Kasuri sei Mulāqqāt”, *Weekly Zindagi*, (February 9-15, 1990), pp. 2728.


Shafqat, *Civil and Military Relations in Pakistan*, pp. 191-93 and 211.


These parties joined hands with Zia and accepted offices in government.

Waseem, Pakistan under Martial Law, p. 5.


Anjum, Kawn Kaisie Giā, p. 222 and Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, p. 461.

Bukhari, Benazir, p. 104.

Ibid., pp. 125-6. After the death of Bhutto, his family lived in exile. His wife and children had to face house arrest and imprisonment in Pakistan and later they were asked to leave Pakistan. In such a situation leadership of the PPP remained in the hands of the supporters and companions of Bhutto such as Jatoi and Khar. Later Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto returned to Pakistan in 1986 and took the reigns of the party into their own hands. During the time period of exile of Bhutto family PPP was not as active as was during the life of Bhutto or after return of his family from abroad. Also see M. Asghar Khan, My Political Struggle, pp. 305-11.


Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, p. 24. Also see Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, p. 462 and Shafqat, Civil and Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 191. Details are also available in Talbot, Pakistan, p. 251.

Shafqat, Civil and Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 191.


Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, p. 56 and Younis, Siyasi Ittehād, pp. 172-74


Rizvi, “The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan”, p. 1076-77. Also see Asghar, Politics and Military Power, p. 185 and J. Henron Korson and Michelle Maskiell, “Islamization and Social Policy in


Ibid., p. 62.

Ibid., p. 43.

Ibid., p. 40.


Hollen, “Pakistan in 1986”, p. 147.


Ibid., p. 122. AL-Zulfikar was a terrorist organization. It was believed that its main control was in the hands of Murtaza Bhutto, son of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (the late PM of Pakistan). On 2 March, 1981, Pakistan International's flight PK-326 began as a routine domestic hop from Karachi to Peshawar. In midair three heavily armed men seized the plane, diverted it to Kabul, Afghanistan, and demanded the release of 92 "political prisoners" from the Pakistani jails. On 7 March, twenty nine hostages including women, children and sick men were released in Kabul. The Boeing 720B sat in Kabul for a week, and the hijackers shot a Pakistani diplomat Tariq Rahim. Next, on 9 March, the plane flew to Damascus, Syria. The execution forced the Zia regime to accept the demands of the hijackers, releasing dozens of Pakistan Peoples Party and other

211 Siddique, Political Culture in Pakistan, p. 248 and Talbot, Pakistan, p. 248.
212 Political Parties Act issued by the Ayub Government in 1962 remained in practice in different elections with modifications from time to time. Under the amended law, a political party was required to get itself registered through an application to Election Commission of Pakistan along with copies of foundation document of the party. The Commission had the authority to register the party after getting satisfied from the conduct of the party according to the Political Parties Amended Act. Details are available in Report on the General Elections 1988, Vol. I (Islamabad: Election Commission of Pakistan), pp. 43-47. 213 Hollen, “Pakistan in 1986”, pp. 145-46 and Kaushik, “Opposition Fronts in Pakistan”, p. 236.


216 Kamran Rajput, Qazi Hussain ki Dini Awr Siyasi Khidmat (Lahore: Shirkat-ul Imtiaz, 2005), p. 29.

218 Zahid Hussain, “A Month of Surprises”, The Herald, October 1988, p. 34.

220 Bukhari, Benazir, p. 129.
221 Zaheer Ahmad, “Sitōn ki Jang MRD kaw Kahān lei jāæ gi”, p. 29.


CHAPTER 2

FORMATION OF THE ISLAMI JAMHOORI ITTEHAD (IJI)

Pakistan has a long history of political alliances, many of them made for different reasons at different times. Most alliances were made to achieve short-term goals, which were achieved either fully or partially. However, due to a number of reasons none of the alliances could remain intact for a long period of time. IJI was one such alliance. Although IJI was formed with the idea that it will remain intact for a long period of time and after some time it may eventually be converted to one national party instead of an alliance. But it remained an elusive dream.

The present chapter is an effort to discuss how and why IJI was made. The role of the then President of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the then Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg and that of the then Director General Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) General Hamid Gul is also discussed in detail. The machinations of these “political players” and their actions during this period provide the political context of this alliance. In addition, the political history of the member parties of IJI is also examined which will help decipher whether the alliance was just an administrative/strategic one or whether these parties actually had some common interests that led to the formation of this alliance. The organizational structure and manifesto of the alliance are also discussed to gauge the
interest of the member parties and to understand the differences amongst the allies under
the banner of the IJI.

Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Jamaat-i Islami (JI) and the National Peoples’
Party (NPP) were prominent members of the alliance. Some smaller parties and splinter
groups of other political parties also joined the alliance. These were Jamiat-ul-Ulema-
eIslam (Darkhwasti Group) (JUI-D), the Markazi Jamaat-i-Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi Group)
(MJAH-L), Jamiat-ul-Mashaikh (Sahibzada Fazal-e-Haq Group) (JM), Hizb-e-Jihad
(HJ) of Agha Murtaza Poya (Poya) and Fakhar Imam’s Independent Political Group
(IPG).\(^1\) This seems to be a combination of right wing, religious political parties and a
liberal (NPP) party.

It is generally believed that it had nine member parties but that is not true. This
misperception generally stems from the fact that there were nine stars in its flag but those
nine stars were merely representative of the coherence with PNA\(^2\) to prove honesty of the
purpose with regard to implementation of Nizam-e Mustafa and an anti-PPP stance. IJI was
formed in 1988 by eight political parties, i.e. PML (Fida and Junejo Groups), JI, NPP, HJ,
IPG, JUI-D, MJAH-L and JM.\(^3\) With hindsight and by examining the careful strategic
planning of the opposing parties, it is obvious that the overarching reason for the alliance
was actually to counter the power of PPP after the dissolution of the National Assembly
in 1988 but it was not the solitary reason. There are many controversies and counter
arguments surrounding IJI and the reasons for its formation. This discussion is expounded
below.

**I. Causes of Alliance Formation**

As mentioned earlier, during the course of the political history of Pakistan there had been
a large number of political parties, but due to a difference of opinion amongst the parties
and regional stature of the political parties this often resulted in a split mandate in the
elections. To avoid a divided mandate generally before the elections, electoral alliances
were made such as COP (1964-5) and PNA. The 1988 elections were no exception. There
were many national and regional political parties that decided to contest the elections.
They too had their sub-sections.\(^4\) Some of them decided to contest the elections from a
common platform to attain better results in the elections.\(^5\) The most prominent alliance in
the elections of 1988 was IJI. IJI was an alliance of different political parties so the
member parties could agree only on basic points which were mentioned as political agenda
of IJI which was later used as its election manifesto with slight modifications. There are
many explanations for the formation of this alliance which are discussed below:
Reasons and the Interests of Establishment in the Formation of IJI

It is believed that in 1988 some of the middle and upper ranking army officers believed that the army was not responsible for resolving the political problems. They believed that these matters were meant to be handled by the politicians and not by the armed forces. This was one of the reasons that kept the high command of the armed forces away from politics after the tragic incident of Bahawalpur in August 1988. The army believed that some drastic steps needed to be taken to cope with the situation in Pakistan, but it also believed that the elected government of the people was in a better position to make those decisions. Among such decisions was a change in the consumer price of petrol, gas, electricity and the percentage of taxes of imports were more prominent. Political and regional problems like the issue of settling the Biharis in Karachi which the local people were not willing to accept believing that it would create negative impact on Sindhi nationalism and the construction of the Kalabagh Dam could be handled in a better way by a political government. This was a time when many were expecting that the army would take over the government and elections would be delayed for an indefinite period but the army kept itself away from direct involvement in political procedures as the elite of the Military and the Army Chief felt that the military should steer clear of politics for some time.

To keep the army out of direct involvement in political matters the military and bureaucracy wanted a PM whose attitude and policies could be easily influenced by them for corporate interests and presumably for the interests of nation. To keep itself away from direct involvement in politics it planned to guide the direction of electoral competition. It is said that through ISI military imposed its design over the politicians and guided the political parties that were against the PPP to makes an electoral alliance. Many people still believe that it was only possible due to the guidance and support of military that political parties succeeded in making an alliance, which was named IJI. Although it is not hundred percent true that the guidance of army made the formation of the IJI possible but the role of army cannot be fully denied.

General Aslam Beg, the then Army Chief conceded that it was he and Ghulam Ishaq Khan who decided to unite the right-wing parties to avoid a negative impact of polarization among the right and left-wing parties which could only be avoided if both stood at an equal level, which was only possible if the right-wing parties were united. Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmad was of the view that the formation of IJI or an alliance of the right-wing parties was necessary because the country was facing severe crisis because of the incident of Bahawalpur in which top hierarchy of the armed forces was killed. The immediate need was that in order to avoid a political crisis as many right-wing votes as possible should be won. He said that this activity was not meant to stop any party from winning a clear majority but it was to avoid the negative effects of political polarization and ISI was successful as the elections of 1988 remained free, fair and peaceful. Brigadier Imtiaz while persuading some of the members of JI to join IJI told them that it was the only way to keep Benazir Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s daughter and Chairperson of the PPP, out of power.
Furthermore, the army believed that the PPP was not sincere with the country mainly because of the relationship\textsuperscript{17} of the PPP leadership with the Jewish lobby in America. To avoid the possibility of PPP winning an overwhelming majority in the elections the army decided to form the IJI.\textsuperscript{18} The establishment’s fear of PPP’s growing popularity increased and it did not want PPP to be able to reopen Z.A. Bhutto’s death sentence again.\textsuperscript{19} One of the major purposes in creating IJI was to curtail the powers of PPP and continue some of Zia’s policies particularly the policy of Islamization.\textsuperscript{20} In these few lines one can see the contradictions but these contradictions are found in the statements of those who played major role in the formation of IJI. No clear argument has still established about the formation of IJI but many other reasons can also be attributed as explained by different politicians. Some of these are discussed below.

**Political Reasons for Formation of the IJI**

IJI members explained that the alliance was formed to fill the political vacuum that was created due to the split in ‘Like Minded, Islam Loving Religious Political Parties’. It was believed to be created to restore the confidence of the people in democracy and to create true Islamic democracy and not merely for the sake of attaining popularity or the right of a few “choice” politicians to rule.\textsuperscript{21} The main point in the agenda was the enforcement of Shari’a (Islamic Law) in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{22} At different occasions the leadership of IJI announced that IJI would maintain its unity for the integrity of Pakistan and the enforcement of Shari’a which was the basic reason of its creation.\textsuperscript{23} Different political leaders justified the formation of IJI in their own way. Maulana Sami and Qazi Hussain Ahmad stated that a broader alliance was needed to create consensus on national issues and to enforce Shari’a in the Pakistan for which IJI was made.\textsuperscript{24} According to Maulana Sami it was also important for the solidarity of the country and to maintain law and order. He also considered it important to support the freedom struggle in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{25} He said that the alliance was formed to introduce true democracy in the country.\textsuperscript{26} Almost the same arguments were made by the Deputy Secretary General of JUI (D), Maulana Zahidur Rashidi. However, he also supported the idea of making Pakistan a nuclear power.\textsuperscript{27} PPP on the other hand had assured America and India that after coming to power it would roll-back the nuclear program.\textsuperscript{28} The protection of nuclear centers of Pakistan was also highlighted by the IJI leadership as its primary objective.\textsuperscript{29} Agha Murtuza Poya considered IJI an alliance for Jihad (Holy war against non-Muslims).\textsuperscript{30} Pir Fazale Haq of Jamiatul Mashaikh Pakistan said that IJI was not a family party\textsuperscript{31} but was formed to enforce the Quran and Sunnah in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{32}

It was maintained that the alliance was formed to control secular elements and to give the people of Pakistan an Islamic system and “decent” politics. Qazi Hussain Ahmad repeatedly said that IJI was formed to foil the conspiracies hatched by the enemies of Islam and Pakistan\textsuperscript{33} as it was believed that PPP would not adopt or continue any of the policies of Zia including Islamization, which, was apparently not acceptable to the people of Pakistan. It was also true that chances of PPP’s victory in the elections were high, therefore other political parties and interest groups who had identified themselves with the legacy
of Zia became part of IJI. Many politicians felt that that the fear of PPP’s victory caused the rest of the parties to become even more united, mainly so that they could contest elections from one common platform as a stronger force. A senior JI leader Professor Ghafoor Ahmad who was secretary General of IJI, also admitted that the anti-PPP alliance was set up to avoid an overwhelming majority for the PPP in the elections. JI Amir told the people that the alliance was formed to eliminate the chances of any party working against Islamic teachings coming to power; whereas PPP’s agenda was to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, to bring all laws according to the existing socio-economic realities.

Besides, efforts to form an alliance of PML (J) with the PPP also persuaded others to be united but because of doubts and reservations regarding a joint venture in the minds of both the parties they could not formulate an alliance. Pir Pagara, Junejo’s mentor, was not prepared to cooperate with PPP which was also a hindrance in the alliance formation and Junejo formed an alliance with Tehrik-i Istiqlal Pakistan (TI) and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) called the Pakistan Awami Ittehad (PAI).

PML and other pro-establishment parties were concerned about PPP’s growing political strength and rising graph of popularity. In order to counter the growing power of PPP these parties decided to make a broad based alliance named IJI. Before this alliance, PPP was being opposed by two alliances; PAI, a three party alliance and the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) which was later named IJI to attract more people with the leadership of PML (F) and four caretaker chief ministers. These political parties realized the fact that their conflicts were strengthening the PPP. It was believed that with the backing of four chief ministers and organizational capabilities of JI, IJI would be able to become a strong political power as well.

Jatoi, anxious to become PM of Pakistan, was well aware of the fact that in the presence of PPP and Benazir he would not be able to win a majority under the banner of a newly created party, the NPP. He was facilitated to join hands with PML (F) through appointing ministers, from his party, in the caretaker cabinets at the national and provincial levels. There were minor differences between the NPP and PML about their foreign policy and Islamization of the laws in the country but it was believed that both the parties could handle the issues easily so the alliance was formed. Both the parties decided to have common candidates for the elections of 1988. Nawaz Sharif and Jatoi were both trying to include other political parties in the alliance. Jatoi wanted a strong man in the Punjab and he chose Nawaz Sharif. Later JI and other smaller parties also joined hands and formed IJI. The joining of IJI by PML and JI was a strategic move because these parties had different constituencies and could support each other with their vote bank and street power respectively.

Smaller parties opted for a bigger alliance to keep themselves in political arena of the country. Under the banner of IJI these parties felt their future comparatively safe and secure. Unification of many parties helped avoiding the votes of the right-wing parties. Syed Fakhar Imam’s acceptance to join the IJI was considered positive. It was said that this attitude would lead the right wing parties towards success. The slogan of the enforcement of Shari’a was used as a primary objective of IJI in its election campaign as well.
The split of PML into PML (F) and Junejo League after the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1988 was also a cause of tension for the pro-Zia faction. That’s being the reason that attempts were made to make an alliance at the national level to create a stronger competition for PPP in the forthcoming elections. Although these efforts could not prevent PPP from coming to power, it could not prove to be the sole power in the country, which gave a chance to ISI and Ghulam Ishaq Khan to influence decisions of PPP government. Keeping in view these points some of the critics of IJI believed that the component parties of IJI had divergent ideologies with only one common point- the hostility towards PPP. There is another common factor, which was that all these parties were pursuing right-wing politics but according to the critics of the alliance it was not something that could bring these parties to a common platform. Another question that arises is that why was NPP, being a liberal party, accepted as a member of this alliance by the other member parties?

Many explanations about the formation of this alliance are given by different people, thinkers, political parties and others. A few generalized reasons for making of this alliance were as follows:

- It was expected that many individuals would be deserting the PPP and they could easily be accommodated in the new alliance
- There was an assumption that many of the individuals would win their secured constituencies in the elections and it is always easier to manipulate the opinion of individuals as compared to convincing political parties.
- Most of the component parties of IJI had the support of the top army officials or had been associated with the military regime directly or indirectly.
- Involvement of judiciary made it difficult to achieve the desired results in the elections. So it was considered an important source to create impact on election results with the help of a broader alliance instead of individual or single parties.

Considering the reasons for the formation of the IJI it is revealed that the formation of a broad based alliance was the result of many factors such as weak political organization of political parties, the army’s wish to keep out of politics and the establishment’s probe that the PPP should not be allowed to form the government at least with a clear majority. Moreover, the member parties of IJI had their own reasons to join the alliance as well which are discussed below:
Why Different Political Parties Joined the IJI

One explanation for the formation of the alliance was to counter the power of the PPP but that was not the only reason because the member parties of IJI had their own reasons for joining the alliance. Many political analysts are of the view that member parties of IJI had nothing in common but at the time of alliance formation, IJI members had at least three basic things in common

• Wish for rapid Islamization of society
• Support of Afghan Cause
• Fear of the PPP.\(^{52}\)

Different political parties had their own justifications for joining the IJI. Some of these reasons are given below:

**Pakistan Muslim League (PML):** After the death of Zia, the PML (F) found itself in dire trajectories as the government had promised free and fair elections. Being a caretaker government it was an issue of personal prestige for the PML (F) to win the elections. To maintain its status in politics its leader Fida M. Khan and other prominent politicians decided to make an alliance with like-minded political parties. It showed that the party lacked the organization and confidence, which was necessary to win the elections.\(^{53}\)

The PML lacked the power to mobilize the voters. The PML had a wide support base of the bourgeoisie. But it lacked organization, planning and support of the committed, organized and vocal sections of urban society. This deficiency was met through the formation of an alliance with JI which enjoyed the support of some of the best orators. It also had an apparatus of propaganda.\(^{54}\) Although there were differences of ideology between PML, JI and other member parties, JI was a well-organized party representing the interests of the middle of class. Its student organization was far superior to all others and it had a countrywide set up. PML needed a lot of time to create its support base amongst the middle classes and to establish a nationwide set up. At that time it was easier to win over support of JI and other religious and right wing parties in the elections for the success of IJI.\(^{55}\)

Ejaz Gillani, a political Analyst, was of the view that PML lacked a proper link between the leaders and the masses at the grass root level\(^{56}\) which took it towards the politics of alliances. After the dissolution of the assemblies in May 1988, Nawaz Sharif realized that PML was not organized in other provinces except the Punjab so he preferred
to make an alliance with other parties to win the elections and avoid the division of votes of the right-wing parties.\textsuperscript{57}

**Jamaat-i-Islami (JI):** JI had five basic demands to join the alliance:

- Release of its students and party workers
- Lifting of the ban on student and labor unions\textsuperscript{58}
- To take the Afghan Jihad to its logical conclusion
- To continue peaceful Nuclear Program
- Enforcement of Islamic System\textsuperscript{59}

Qazi Hussain Ahmad told the media-men that he was very well aware of the chances of JI’s quantum of victory in the elections. So, to play an effective role in the decision making of Pakistan, he decided to join the IJI. JI considered the Islamic motives of IJI as the main cause of its joining the alliance. Qazi Hussain Ahmad said that IJI had given the highest priority to the Islamic agenda. The promise of the enforcement of Shari’a by the alliance leadership was another reason for JI to join IJI. It had also promised to support the Afghan Jihad and to accommodate five point agenda of JI, which led to JI joining hands with IJI parties. He was also satisfied about the IJI leadership which shared the opinion with JI that the elections must be held on November 16, 1988.\textsuperscript{60} The change of government could bring change in the Afghan policy and JI wanted to avoid any change in it so it decided to join IJI.\textsuperscript{61} JI hoped to convert its votes into seats in the assemblies on the IJI ticket.\textsuperscript{62} The Jamaat had never been able to win success to the extent worth mentioning as in 1970 elections it could win only 4 seats in the National Assembly. In the elections of 1977 the result could not bring a major change in its position despite the controversial aspects of that election. Keeping in view its past record the Jamaat leadership considered it more conducive to become part of some alliance in order to play an important role in the government of the country.\textsuperscript{63} Student unions were not restored but IJI approved to withdraw all cases against IJT if won the elections. JI joined the alliance mainly because it was well aware of the fact that it would not be easy to win a considerable success in the elections as an individual party.\textsuperscript{64}

Qazi Hussain Ahmad believed that all the political parties who believed in Islam and the solidarity of the country including open support to the Afghan Jihad would be cooperated with by the JI.\textsuperscript{65} Qazi Hussain Ahmad even met with the leader of JUI (F) Fazal to cooperate with each other in the elections believing that the mutual cooperation of the religious political parties could bring better results in the elections. He was also willing to cooperate with Khan Abdul Wali Khan only if he would accept the victory of the Afghan Mujahideen in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{66} *Naib Amir* (vice president) of JI Maulana Jan Muhammad Abbasi was also involved in bringing religious and like-minded parties under one banner for the promulgation of Islamic Order in the country.\textsuperscript{67}
Qazi Hussain Ahmad announced that it was difficult for JI to play an effective role as an independent party which is why they had to join the alliance. Qazi Hussain Ahmad believed that the alliance membership would enhance the political and administrative status of the Jamaat. He explained that his party wanted to join hands with PML-J but it had reservations about the Afghanistan issue that prevented JI from joining hands with Junejo. IJI was willing to accommodate the five point agenda of JI, which JI could not have accomplished individually.

Professor Khurshid Ahmad alleged that JI joined the IJI because Nawaz Sharif and his companions were unwilling to participate in the elections unless IJI was strengthened so that they could contend with PPP especially when Sharif’s relations were also strained with the leadership of PML. This persuaded JI to join IJI because the leadership of IJI did not want elections to be delayed and JI wanted to cooperate with it for the same purpose.

National Peoples Party (NPP): Jatoi was of the view that Pakistan needed a national government as it was a critical time for the national solidarity and integrity of the country and the growth of democracy. He clearly showed his intention to make an alliance with like-minded parties except PML (J) and the PPP. It was for this reason that he had been busy in discussions with a few political parties of MRD and certain others as well for considerable success in the forthcoming elections. First success in this regard for the NPP was its political alliance with PML (F) and the decision was endorsed by the members of both the parties as an important source to achieve success in the elections and play a vital role in the national politics. M. Ibrahim Jatoi explained that the alliance was made to launch a joint electoral campaign and win the elections and form a broad based government. Jatoi told the press that he had three options. He could join MRD, PML (F) or parties outside the fold of MRD. He said that it seemed to him more practical to join PML (F) as it was strongest among other available options. For Jatoi withdrawal from the alliance or the cabinet was out of the question because of his differences with PPP leadership. Some of the critics of the alliance of NPP with PML (F) were of the view that NPP made an alliance with PML (F) to get Ghulam Mustufa Khar (Khar) (former C.M. and Governor Punjab under ZAB regime) released from jail but Nawaz Sharif denied this fact as the basis of the alliance.

Jamiatul Mashaikh Pakistan (JMP): IJI had announced that any of the parties that were committed to the enforcement of Shari’a will be supported. IJI used the enforcement of Shari’a as the basic slogan for its campaign and gave it an important position in its manifesto and that attracted JMP so it joined the alliance.

Hizb-e Jihad (HJ): Agha Murtaza Poya professed that he joined the IJI because it was a suitable choice for his party. He said that the party manifesto was almost similar to the basic agenda of IJI. These two were the guiding force behind the alliance. Another reason that was not publicly mentioned, but was clearly evident from the situation of the party, was its political status among the masses. A newly formulated party, hardly known to the people, suffering from lack of members could not expect to win the elections. So in order to survive in political scenario it was more beneficial to join a major alliance instead of
remaining in isolation. Extreme negative views about the PPP made the Hizb-e Jihad attractive for IJI and it was accepted as the member of the alliance.

**Independent Political Group (IPG):** The group was invited by ISI through Ch. Shujaat Hussain. IPG decided to join IJI as its politics matched IJI’s political agenda. Another reason for joining IJI was that it was not properly organized to participate in elections in its individual capacity.

**Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Darkhwasti Group) (JUI-D):** Secretary General of JUI (D), Maulana Zahidul Rashedi said that JUI (D) joined IJI for the supremacy of Islamic order, support to Afghan *Jihad* and acquisition of nuclear power. He said that JUI (D) will keep supporting IJI until the time it follows these principles.

Keeping in view the perspectives of the member parties of IJI, it is clear that only those parties joined IJI who felt that it was politically safe for them to do so. Major parties such as JI, who had street power but not enough votes, needed the support of other parties. Although it had a radical agenda but its previous support to martial law weakened its image among the common people along with its limited vote bank which cannot turn its support into seats in the assemblies. At the same time PML (F) without any specific agenda and PML (J) having three years of service of the people but being split in factions could not create a particular constituency to expect a reasonable victory in the elections. Considering these factors the formation of such alliances does not seem to be something particularly extraordinary. To understand and relate these reasons it is required to study political history, agenda and performance on these political parties in previous elections for which a brief history of the member parties of IJI is discussed in the next section of this chapter.

**II. A Brief Introduction of Coalition Parties of IJI**

PML, JI and Jatoi’s NPP were prominent members of the alliance. Some smaller parties and splinter groups of other political parties also joined the IJI. These were JUI (Darkhwasti Group), the Markazi Jamaat-i-Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi Group), Jamaat-ulMashaikh (Sahibzada Fazal-e-Haq Group), Hizb-e-Jihad (Agha Murtaza Poya) and Fakhar Imam’s Independent Political Group. This was a combination of right wing, religious political parties and a liberal (NPP) party. It is important to discuss the political agendas and political history of these parties to attain a better understanding of their attitude under the alliance. A study of the history of these parties will also be helpful in explaining the difficulties that made the formation of the alliance difficult. It will also help to grasp the causes of tension between the alliance members during its working as parliamentary opposition alliance during 1988-90 and as parliamentary governmental alliance during 1990-93.
Right-Wing Political Parties

**Pakistan Muslim League (PML)**

Pakistan Muslim League was the successor of the All India Muslim League (AIML) that was formed to secure and safeguard the rights of the Muslims of this region. Its basic purpose was to enhance the relationship between the British government and the Muslims of the region. To this end it made a dual policy. It tried to prepare the Muslim community to cooperate with the British and to protect the rights of the Muslims of the Subcontinent through their presentation to the government in a convincing, respectable and comprehensive manner. Following this policy, AIML not only protected the rights of Muslims of the subcontinent but lead the successful struggle for freedom. After the creation of Pakistan it was divided into two parts: one remained in India and the other came to Pakistan as the ‘Pakistan Muslim League’.

The Muslim League led the Pakistan movement of British India and enjoyed the support of the landed elite and middle classes but within a few years of the inception of Pakistan it lost the support of the middle classes for adopting a role of the government party. There were many problems that took people away from the PML i.e. lack of character in the political leadership, weak party system, lacking a political program to inspire the common people and solve their problems, control of traditional elite and feudal who were hardly interested in democracy, control of military and bureaucracy on the state and absence of free and fair elections. It mainly enjoyed the selective support of the bureaucracy, the military elite and businessmen.

Pre-independence AIML’s stance with regard to upholding the Muslim ideology kept the party united, but once independence had been gained, AIML’s foundation became weak as it did not manage a strong hold in the regions included in Pakistan. PML did not even hold a single party convention for nine years after the creation of Pakistan. Quaid-i-Azam was too old and weak to fulfill the responsibility of organizing it and after losing its leader, the League lost its character in the politics of the country, which became even more evident with the passage of time.

After the death of Quaid, Chaudhry Khaliquz Zaman was elected president of PML. Being a politician, he believed that as the president of the ruling party, political and other issues must be discussed with him but due to the attitude of some members of PML including Liaquat Ali Khan, Gen. Sec. of AIML and the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, he could not adopt this policy. A movement against Chaudhry Khaliquz Zaman resulted in his resignation from the office of the president of the party. After him Liaquat Ali Khan became president of PML. He seemed more capable of taking care of the party’s organization but he was assassinated in 1951. The PML maintained its status only with the cooperation of the Bureaucracy. Even during the life time of Liaquat
Ali Khan the party had been facing internal problems and conflicts amongst its leaders.\textsuperscript{91} Liaquat combined the PML presidency with the office of the PM of Pakistan, which was followed by his successors.\textsuperscript{92} Its status was followed particularly by the political parties from E. Pak. Landlords and the landed aristocracy strengthened its hold over the party and the principles of politics that are based on democratic values were ignored by the party leadership.\textsuperscript{93}

The PML remained in power for seven years after the establishment of Pakistan, in the provinces as well as at the Centre. The party enjoyed a majority at the central legislature and in the provinces even when the CM belonging to PML was suspended from his office and was replaced by the Nawab of Mamdot in the Punjab and in Sindh Ayub Koro was replaced by other League members. It was able to win provincial elections in Punjab, Sindh and NWFP but faced a humiliating defeat in E. Pak. in 1954, which proved to be the beginning of negative criticism on the League.\textsuperscript{94} The League however did not pay much heed to the controversies brought out against it.\textsuperscript{95} After the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly by the Governor General in 1953, the PML was manipulated by Government servants like Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and Iskandar Mirza.\textsuperscript{96} PML faced a setback when its government was dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad.\textsuperscript{97} After that till the imposition of martial law in 1958, PML was unable to regain its prestige among the common people and was unable to form government with a clear majority.

After the imposition of martial law, PML was largely absent from political landscape as all political activities were banned. After it had lost its government its leaders were no longer motivated to organize the party and it began to dwindle in terms of its popularity.\textsuperscript{98} When there was a revival of political parties PML was taken over by President Ayub Khan (Ayub) who used PML as a platform for winning popularity and substantial membership in the West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{99} Ayub exploited the name of the party.\textsuperscript{100} The party projected and praised the government’s policies.\textsuperscript{101} The cabinet held the responsibility of policy making; therefore PML had a small role in this capacity.\textsuperscript{102} Another faction of PML that was called the Council Muslim League\textsuperscript{103} formed the opposition during Ayub era. Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Sardar Muhammad Zafarullah, Chaudhry Muhammad Husain Chattha, Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi and Khawaja Muhammad Safdar were its prominent leaders. In 1967 five political parties made a combined effort for the restitution of democracy in the country; Council Muslim League was one of them.\textsuperscript{104}

PML’s policies during the Ayub era gave a major set-back to its already feeble position in the eyes of the masses. This was reflected in the results of the 1970 elections. In the Punjab, the Council Muslim League became the Daultana League and in NWFP Qaiyum Khan named the party after his name.\textsuperscript{105} In the opposition, the PML was unable even to maintain its identity as it was merely a small party in the alliance against Bhutto and was named UDF.\textsuperscript{106} In 1977, PML (Pagaro Group) participated in the movement against the Bhutto government under the banner of PNA. After Z. A. Bhutto’s fall, it supported the martial law regime. The PML (Khawaja Khairuddin Group) was opposed...
to lending any support to the martial law regime and joined MRD a broad based alliance against it.\textsuperscript{107}

In 1984, President Zia announced non-party elections which were boycotted by the PPP. Certain other parties boycotted it as well but their members contested these elections independently. In the parliament it was apparent that democracy could not work properly without a ruling party and an opposition so the PM, Junejo decided to unite his supporters and named the group PML, which played the role of the government party or the Official Parliamentary Group under the leadership of Junejo as PM of the country.\textsuperscript{108} While Junejo was in power PML did not emerge as a mass based, ideologically coherent party in fact it was seen as serving the interests of the feudal groups and some of the trader-merchant groups. Therefore, the party could not emerge as a stronger one but was fragile and remained dependent upon the military regime to achieve its agenda.\textsuperscript{109} His government was dismissed in 1988 by President Zia on the charges of corruption and mismanagement.

After the dissolution of National Assembly and the dismissal of the Junejo Government, PML was divided into two major factions\textsuperscript{110}, PML (Junejo Group) who had sympathies with Junejo and PML (F) headed by Fida Muhammad Khan and supported by Nawaz Sharif who supported the decision of Zia regarding the dismissal of Junejo’s premiership.\textsuperscript{111} In the beginning of August 1988, the Junejo and Pagara factions seemed strong. Junejo and Pagara decided to create cooperation of both the factions of PML and to unite them if the councils of these parties agree in doing so. On the issue of selection of the president of the party the PML was divided into two factions, i.e. PML (Junejo) and PML (Fida).\textsuperscript{112} Junejo demanded the restoration of democracy and party based elections. He adopted strong views against Zia. On the other side Nawaz Sharif had a strong base in the Punjab and NWFP. He was also working to draw support in the industrial classes of Karachi and Lahore. He also announced the continuation of Zia’s policy of Islamization. Junejo criticized PML (F) as simply a collection of pro-Zia politicians.\textsuperscript{113}

The split in PML weakened it and it appealed for support to smaller parties and leaders to win elections. The Fida League made an alliance with NPP, JI and six other parties while the Junejo League formed an alliance with Tehrik-e Istiqlal (TI) and JUP.\textsuperscript{114} It was also realized by the two factions of PML that a split in the party would create a negative impact on their election campaign and the possibility of success in the elections would be minimized\textsuperscript{115} and if their candidates contested elections against each other they would lose.\textsuperscript{116} Keeping in view the existing political scenario JI also demanded the unification of both the factions for better success in the elections.\textsuperscript{117} This was followed by efforts to reunite the PML.

The Junejo faction explained the political fissure on the basis of principles. It explained that it wanted to hold elections in time but PML-F did not agree. It also criticized the Slogan of Ziaism\textsuperscript{118} adopted by PML-F and that PML-J was pressing for the dismissal of the caretaker government even though PML-F was actually running it. These were the basic issues for which PML-J out-rightly rejected any possibility of unification of both the factions.\textsuperscript{119} Junejo believed that party offices and government responsibilities could not be simultaneously fulfilled by the same person. For the unification of PML all the four caretaker CMs promised to resign from any of their offices on November 16, 1988 (the
date for National Assembly elections). This was accepted by Junejo. Previously a two-member committee consisting of Hamid Nasir Chattha (Chattha) and Manzoor Wattoo (Wattoo) failed to bring out any formula for the unification of PML. It was believed that the unification of PML was made after the permission of Pir Pagara. JUP, TIP and NPP had issues with the unification of PML. PAI had made seat adjustments with PML (J). Leaving the alliance PML (J) left PAI with no candidates for many seats for the elections of 1988.

The unification created problems for both the factions of PML as well because in principle they were members of both the alliances; IJI and PAI, so they had to follow the decisions of both. Jatoi of NPP had serious problems with Junejo so the unification of PML created a difficult situation for the member parties of IJI as well. Many believed that both these persons wanted to reign supreme but of course there could not be two PMs in one country. After long discussions it was decided that both the factions of PML would join hands as Junejo did not have appropriate candidates for many of the constituencies. Fida left the office of the president of PML and Junejo was selected the President of the United Muslim League. It was also decided that the clause of the party constitution that one person can keep one office at a time would be implemented after the elections. Junejo recognized the efforts of the party leadership for its unification and he believed it was not too late. Another reason of the merger of the two factions was that many stalwarts of PML had deserted the Junejo League and had joined the Fida League as well some other parties.

It was decided that both the alliances would maintain their independent status but would still cooperate in the elections. In this way PML was given 80 seats, and the parties of IJI would be given 50 seats. PAI or Pakistan People’s Alliance demanded 33% of the total seats for joining the IJI. TI and JUP had to have 35 seats each and the remaining 7 would have to be decided on merit. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani was of the opinion that the PAI would maintain a separate position. He insisted that since the Fida Group had joined PML Junejo it had to follow the decisions of Junejo and PAI. Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi said that the distribution of tickets was a matter of merit and not of quota. The consideration of making a grand alliance between PAI and IJI did not materialize. Both alliances could not reach a workable solution with regard to the issue of the distribution of tickets. PAI had an easy distribution of tickets as PML (J) did not have the appropriate candidates for most of the constituencies. At the same time these were the only three parties so it was easier to decide the issue. IJI already had to share party tickets with eight political parties, so it was difficult for it to satisfy three more parties appropriately without alienating any of the parties. After this episode the Junejo faction of the League decided to leave PAI and participate in the elections under the banner of IJI.

A connection was made between the unification of PML and the fear of a PPP victory in the forthcoming elections. JI’s was also taking the pride in this unification. The members of PML were satisfied with the unification believing that they could compete with PPP without using the support of another alliance although they were not averse to an alliance either. They were of the view that if the country has two political camps it would be good for the growth of democracy in the country as well. Small factions of
PML such as Daultana, Qaiyum, Pagaro, Khairuddin, and Qasim League joined the PML (F) faction, which later became a major political force after its merger with the Junejo faction of PML. By this time NPP (Jatoi) had also joined PML (F) in early September. 

Professor Khurshid Ahmad of JI was of the opinion that recent steps taken were unwise. Both IJI and PAI believed that after the unification, PML would remain their member. There was an impression that after the unification of PML both the alliances would be sub-merged. Junejo tried to unify both the alliances but they had different manifestos and the personalities of the parties were too varied and opposed to each other. JUP and JI were poles apart. They had a difference of opinion about two major issues: the nuclear program and the Afghan issue. Professor Khurshid said that IJI was an Islamic alliance and it had a very clear position about Islamic ideology, the nuclear issue, foreign policy and relations with India. He said that any party or alliance that agrees to the plan could join the alliance. JI opposition to PAI also compelled it to join IJI. JI had not joined PAI for its pro-Moscow and pro-India stance regarding the Afghanistan Issue so it was not practical according to JI to combine both the alliances for having opposite opinion about the basic issues of that time period.

In the local politics, the unification of both the alliances could make the sharing of the seats even more difficult. Some of the people believed that after the unification of PML, it did not need an alliance with any other party. Many of the members of PML believed that it did not need to get involved in any alliance to win the election, so it should contest the election in its own individual capacity. During the different phases of political history, the rulers who needed to legitimize their rule sought the support of PML. This was the case because in 1954 it was said that PML and the government of Pakistan were one and the same and could not survive without the support of the other. Keeping this point in mind Ayub, Zia and Junejo gained legitimacy by including PML in government but in 1988 realizing its weakness PML decided to join an eight party alliance in order to win the elections.

Independent Political Group (IPG)

Syed Fakhar Imam formed the “Independent Political Group” comprising most of his colleagues in the National Assembly who wanted to oppose the policies of the government in 1986. This assembly was elected on the basis of non-political party elections. Later a need was felt for an organized opposition in the assembly and an important step was taken by the former speaker (Fakhar Imam) of National Assembly. It was meant to be understood that all those who contested the elections had accepted the policies of Zia and would run the system on a non-party basis but without an opposition democracy.

First Secretary General of the IPG was Makhdoon Javed Hashmi. The group consisted of more than 70 MNAs of the 1985 Assembly that had been reduced to 33 members due to the government’s efforts to win the support of most of the MNAs. After the resignation
of Syed Fakhar Imam as the Speaker of the National Assembly, he joined IPG and was later elected as the head of this political group. The agenda of this group was:

- To facilitate the promotion of democracy
- To establish socio-economic justice
- To improve the quality of life of the common man. It demanded:
  - Party based elections
  - Reinstatement of the constitution of 1973 and the repeal of the eighth amendment in the constitution
  - It also demanded a president without uniform and balance between the powers of the President and the Prime Minister of the country.

Religious Political Parties

After the creation of Pakistan, most important task was to frame a constitution for it. From the outset, religious parties pressed hard to form an “Islamic” constitution as they believed that Pakistan was made in the name if Islam. As for the first time on a political forum, on January 13, 1948 JUI demanded the establishment of Islamic political order in Pakistan. A history of the member parties of IJI and their manifestos are discussed hereunder to explain their workings and attitude towards the political system of Pakistan and its constitution. It will also help explain the behaviors of these parties under the banner of IJI.

Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)

JI is a disciplined religious political party having a democratic internal setup. It has a consistent attitude towards Islamization of laws but lacks the necessary flexibility to achieve its political goals. It was formed by Abul Aala Maududi on August 26, 1941. According to Maududi, its sole purpose was to clean up the society and prepare a team of people who could work for the glory of Islam. Maududi wanted to guide Muslims to put into practice Islam in all spheres of life. He was of the view that JI was not only for the Muslims of the Subcontinent but it had a comprehensive international agenda to help all Muslim countries to engender their social, political, economic, and public life according to the set pattern of Islam. Piety was the basic condition to join JI.
JI was against communism and western culture. According to the JI ideology, the survival of the Muslims of the whole world was in the adoption of the role of the preachers of Islam. It was of the view that under the western democratic system, the Muslim community may be fused with the other communities of united India. It warned them to be careful to maintain their separate identity and religious uniqueness for which a group of religious guides, who could devote their lives to educate the Muslims, was needed.

For many years, Maududi worked to create an environment in which his thought could be accepted by the people before the formation of Jamaat. After the approval of the Pakistan Resolution in 1940, Maududi wished to create awareness amongst the Muslims about establishing a government according to the teachings of Islam. Not many people paid attention to the suggestions of Maududi so he decided to form a political party that could spread his message in a more effective manner to the people. That political party was named JI in August 1941. In its inaugural session in 1941 Maududi said that the working of this party, its aims and its beliefs were derived from Islam and that was the reason why it was named Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Party). In the beginning Punjab, UP, Deccan and Madras responded positively to the message of JI but with the passage of time it was able to spread its message to other regions as well.

At the inception of Pakistan Maududi travelled from India to Pakistan with refugees. In the beginning, he stayed at different places and formed teams to work for the betterment of the migrants to Pakistan. In February 1957 summit of JI was held. After this summit Maududi decided to organize JI as a political party in Pakistan. In the early days of Pakistan different workers of JI got residence at different places but later Maududi decided to unite them at one place to focus on the ideology of JI. For this purpose he selected a place named Mansoora at Lahore which is now a central office of JI.

JI had only 75 members before 1947. At the inception of Pakistan in 1947, the number of its members rose to 625. JI did not support the idea of creation of Pakistan but instead it wanted to concentrate its efforts on the creation of an Islamic state. Maududi had been a critic of the Muslim League because according to him it was a secular political party and was therefore incapable of creating a separate Islamic state for the Muslims of the sub-continent. After the creation of Pakistan, JI took an active part in politics which was not accepted unanimously and many prominent leaders of JI left it. The change in the workings of JI took place gradually. It played an important role in the process of formulating the constitution. It demanded laying down the guiding principles for the constitution as it felt that otherwise it might not follow the teachings of Islam. According to it the leadership of ML was acquainted with a western education and had a clear tilt towards western democracy which could hinder the implementation of Islamic laws. Due to the efforts of the religious parties the Objectives Resolution was passed in 1949 and later in 1951 twenty-two guiding principles were suggested by the religious scholars from all sects and different schools of thought, unanimously. JI played a major
role to gain the approval of these twenty-two points. In November 1955, a nationwide movement began by JI leadership demanding to formulate the constitution according to the teachings of Islam which was supported by other political parties as well. JI accepted the constitution of 1956 with a little criticism.

In 1950 JI decided to participate in the election of 1951 and nominated limited members for a few constituencies of the Punjab. This decision faced a severe reaction from the government which banned the publication of JI’s Daily Qasid (messenger) and the Daily Tasneem. This was a major set-back for the election campaign of JI and it was debarred from using the press. In the elections of Karachi Corporation in 1958 it won more than 12 seats. This success brought a prominent change in the policy of JI and it began serious efforts to gain political power and join the government. There is a general observation that JI’s shift towards active politics took it away from its basic purpose of purifying the society and it started to indulge it in party politics and power struggles.

The party was banned at the time of the enforcement of martial law in 1958. After the approval of the Political Parties Act 1962 (PPA), JI restarted the work of its organization throughout the country and gained momentum within a very brief period of time. On August 6, 1962 JI highlighted the un-Islamic aspects of the constitution of 1962 and dubbed it un-suitable constitution for an Islamic state. In January 1964 JI was dubbed an illegal political party by the government and all the members of its Majlis-i Shura (consultative body) were arrested. But the Supreme Court of Pakistan gave a decision against the opinion of the government. Due to these circumstances JI did not have enough time to make preparations for the Basic Democracies Elections of 1964. Later JI refused to accept the election results due to allegations of rigging against the government.

During Ayub’s Regime JI had been fighting for democratic liberties instead of the Islamic constitution. The basic reason of this shift was that JI believed that the constitution of 1962 was un-Islamic and un-democratic. Along with other reasons of its failure in achieving its objective, the basic reason was the complex details as well as the implementation of Shari’a made it more difficult to be accepted.

The party had its own labour wing, and organizations of its supporters among lawyers, doctors and teachers. In 1970, the PPP and JI were fighting for the same constituencies. JI had a strong hold in urban centers of Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad. It had a strong support among the urban professionals, the lower middle classes and the trader-merchants but the performance of the JI in the elections had not been good as it had only 4 successful candidates for National Assembly in the elections of 1970 out of 148. In East Pakistan JI gained popularity because of its efforts to highlight the Qadiani issue. JI faced a tough time during the ruling era of Z. A. Bhutto because of the opposition to its policy on nationalization. Workers and members of the JI faced imprisonment. In the elections of 1977 it was part of the PNA. In the party-less elections of 1985 it won 7 seats inclusive one by-election victory. JI joined the cabinet of CMLA Zia in 1978 and resigned with other members of PNA but continued to support the Zia regime. It did not join the MRD but kept demanding the restoration of the democracy.
During the Zia era, Because of its street power and politics that caused agitation JI was used by Zia to counter the power of PPP especially in the media and in street politics. It participated in party less-elections of 1985. JI allied with other political parties under the banner of IJI and managed to play a role in the Parliamentary Opposition Group from 1988-90.

Maulana Maududi continued as Amir of JI until 1972. Due to health problems he decided to hold elections in the party and Mian Tufail Muhammad was elected the second Amir of JI. In 1977 Mian Tufail Muhammad was again elected as the Amir for the second term. JI played an important role in all agitations in the country from the Objectives Resolution to the Qadiani issue in 1950s. Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT) played a significant role in the politics of the agitation of JI supporting it through its street power.

Under the Zia regime, JI acted as pro-government party and supported the government’s Kashmir policy politically and militarily which resulted in the establishment of a positive relationship of the party with the army, which continued until the end of Zia era.

After the death of Z. A. Bhutto, JI reaped political and financial gains through the Afghan Jihad (holy war). After the end of Zia’s rule, JI remained part of different antiPPP alliances the most prominent of which was IJI. To expand its support base, JI launched organizations such as ‘Pasban’ and ‘Shabab-i-Mili’.

After its decision to take active part in politics the party became part of political maneuvering and various political manipulations. It kept taking major shifts in the politics of the country as at one time it strongly opposed the NAP for its pro-Moscow and pro-India stance and at certain other occasions it even join hands with it. JI also always supported Martial Law regimes of Pakistan. These factors led to the party losing sight of its basic purpose and the ideology for which it was formed.

**Organization of JI**

Its central offices are Amir of JI (president or leader), Majlis-e Shura (Central consultative body), Working Committee, Secretary General of the Party and seven central offices existed on a permanent basis. JI is organized in the similar manner in different regions of the country. The Amir nominates all the office bearers.

The Amir of the party is selected through indirect votes of all members of the party. Important matters of the party are decided through consultation with Majlis-e Shura, which consists of 50 members elected through indirect elections. Shura is elected after every three years. Shura is responsible for the approval of the budget, planning for the party, setting the goals and making plans to achieve those goals. It is also responsible for keeping a check on the working of the central offices of the party and even on the activities of the Amir of the party. Shura can suspend the Amir of the party with 2/3 votes. The Amir of the party appoints a twelve member working committee from the members of Shura and this working committee can use powers of the Shura when it is not in session or it is difficult to call a meeting of Shura. But Shura has the power to totally or partially accept or reject the decision of the working committee. The party has a regional setup similar to the central setup.
The female wing of the party is independently organized which is responsible to the Amir of the party. The female section of the party sends a report of its activities to the Amir of the party. It also sends a copy of the report to the regional office of the party. It has a comprehensive system of record keeping and its membership is annually renewed.

**Working of JI**

JI managed to translate its literature in Arabic and tried to preach its message to the people of Arabian countries. It also translated its literature in English and sent it to America, England, Germany and Sri Lanka. JI followed a budget system at the national, provincial and regional level which is passed every year. It approves annual plans of the party and allows funds for them. An annual audit of party funds is conducted to prohibit the misuse of party funds. Maulana Maududi believed that friendship treaties or mutual cooperation treaties with India were a hindrance in using power against India in Kashmir. He believed that the government of Pakistan should conclude all such treatise and use power to liberate Kashmir as was done by India in Junagharh.

JI’s support base consists of the people inclined towards religion. An anti-PPP faction of the country also supports the JI. Mostly urban educated population supports the JI. Certain conditions were laid to allow people to become members of JI. It was decided that only those people could join the party who were the real followers of Islamic teachings and were accustomed to avoid sins. It was difficult to qualify for the membership of JI but still number of its members increased with the passage of time. In its annual session of 1941 only 75 people participated but the number increased to 7000 in 1963 that reached 70,000 in 1989.

**Difference of Leadership**

A change in leadership brought a change in the working of JI as well. Maududi was a reformer. He worked for the reconstruction of thought of the Muslims. To achieve this goal he did not see JI as a party of the masses. He left this assignment for his successors. His successor Mian Tufail concentrated on the party’s organization. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the next Amir, administered the party in a little different manner. He wanted to make the party as a party of the masses. Due to the constitution and its organizational structure, the membership of the party could not be extended according the plans of Qazi Hussain Ahmad so he decided to form another group of young people and named it “Paasban”.

**Manifesto of JI**

Efforts for the enforcement of Shari’a were the basic principles of the JI and its policy is prepared. The manifesto was presented to and approved by the members of JI in November 1951. It had some basic objectives to achieve

- Refinement and configuration of the positive thought among the people
• Identify the righteous\textsuperscript{218} and train them to educate others

• Correction of the society generally.

• To make efforts to bring a change in society through constitutional sources and to establish an Islamic government in the country.\textsuperscript{219}

• It has a comprehensive agenda regarding the foreign policy of Pakistan, which is mainly based on its pan-Islamist design.\textsuperscript{220}

To achieve this goal it was decided to go ahead step by step. It was believed that the desired form of government could be achieved through the training of the people in such a way that within a few years a group of righteous people could be brought forward to govern the country.\textsuperscript{221} JI wanted the National Assembly to formulate the constitution on the basis of Islam as Pakistan was made in the name of Islam so any other system of government in the country was unacceptable.\textsuperscript{222} It also believed that the elections are the only source that can engender change in the system of government and the Jamaat had to participate in the elections directly or indirectly to play its role in the process of constitution making.\textsuperscript{223} According to JI the intervention of Indian forces in Kashmir was intolerable and that region could never be accepted as the part of India at any cost.\textsuperscript{224} The election manifestoes of JI had been prepared following these guiding principles.

**Guiding Principles for the Working of Jamaat**

JI believes in the Quran as a basic foundation for all the legislation. It believes in the separation of the judiciary and the executive and supports the security of the rights of religious minorities. JI does not believe in the nationalization of national wealth but at the same time it believes in the limitation\textsuperscript{225} of the right to own agricultural land in a fair manner. It also emphasizes the distribution of wealth on just grounds and promises equal opportunities for employment for every citizen of the country. It believes that labourers must be allowed the freedom to hold strikes for the protection of their rights and demands proportional representation in elections.\textsuperscript{226} “The Islamic state of the Jama’at was to be ‘and all powerful, monolithic state, upholding a definite religious ideology and using the full weight of police and judicial powers to ensure that all aspects of its life will reflect the character of its Islamic ideology”.\textsuperscript{227}

**Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Darkhwasti Group) (JUI-D)**

JUI was formed in October 1945 in response to the activities of Jamiat Ulema-i Hind’s support to the Congress. It was actually made to support the idea of Pakistan from *ulema*. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was elected its first President who supported Jinnah before the inception of Pakistan and had been the member of its first constituent assembly.
It had been a great support for All India Muslim League in the elections of 1945-6 and in the plebiscite in NWFP and Sylhet.²²⁸

In Pakistan the party was organized in December 1947. After the death of Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Syed Suleman Nadvi became head of the party. It was better organized in E. Pak. as compared to West Pakistan and participated in the elections of 1954 in coalition with Nizam-e Islam party.²²⁹

On January 13, 1948 JUI demanded the enforcement of Islamic political order in Pakistan.²³⁰ It worked hard to bring constitution in tune with Islamic tenets. With its efforts a convention of thirty-one religious scholars was conducted and twenty-four basic principles were decided that are the guiding principles for all the governments of Pakistan regarding the promulgation of Islamic injunctions in the constitution of Pakistan. The conference was presided by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.²³¹

The political parties were expecting holding of the general elections. JUI decided to contest the elections and began preparations for the elections but martial-law was imposed in October 1958, and all political activities were banned. Till 1962, JUI worked under the name of ‘Nizamul Ulema’ in a manner that if they were preoccupied in preaching Islamic practices.²³² At the revival of the political parties in 1962, Mufti Mahmud revived the party.²³³ During the Ayub era its three members represented the party in National and Provincial Assemblies.²³⁴ JUI opposed Muslim Family Laws Ordinance VIII of 1961²³⁵ and earned fame for the party although the ordinance could not be amended. Later the party lost its prestige for supporting the amendment in the constitution which helped Ayub to contest the presidential elections which otherwise was not possible as the constitution did not allow the president to contest the presidential elections.²³⁶ In the war of 1965 JUI supported the government but after that it joined DAC and actively participated in the anti-Ayub movement. Joint movement of opposition did not led Ayub survive in government. He resigned and his successor Yahya Khan took every measure to hold fair elections.

In the elections of 1970 the party performed well in Baluchistan and in the NWFP; particularly in Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. It got seven seats in the National Assembly, four seats in NWFP provincial assembly and two in Baluchistan provincial assembly.²³⁷ JUI made a coalition with the National Awami Party (NAP). Mufti Mahmud became Chief Minister of NWFP. As a Chief Minister he prohibited the consumption of liquor in NWFP and a similar step was taken by his counterpart in Baluchistan. He granted relief to the farmers as usury for their bank loans was withdrawn and teaching Urdu was made compulsory at school level. NAP-JUI coalition government could not work for a longer duration of time as its government in Baluchistan was dismissed in February 1973 by the federal government. In reaction to the dismissal of the coalition’s government of Baluchistan, it resigned in the same month, from government in NWFP as well.

After resigning from the government, JUI remained active in the politics of opposition throughout the Z. A. Bhutto rule.²³⁸ In the elections of 1977 its victory was more comprehensive in Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. JUI contested the elections under an alliance with PNA. JUI played an active role in the anti-Bhutto movement. Its
Amir (President) Mufti Mahmud was member of the committee that was appointed by PNA for a dialogue with Bhutto to resolve the issues between the government and opposition. In 1980 Maulana Fazal ur Rehman\textsuperscript{239} became president of the Jamiat after the death of his father Maulana Mufti Mahmud. Members of JUI did not agree with the decision of appointing Maulana Fazal as the president of the party and the JUI divided into two factions. The second faction of JUI was named as JUI Darkhwasti Group (JUID). This group joined IJI in 1988.

Maulana Sami believed in upholding the supremacy of Islam to ensure the integrity and solidarity of the country thereby espousing the cause of law and order in the country leading to unity. He also emphasized the need to cooperate with the people of Afghanistan in their \textit{Jihad}.\textsuperscript{240} JUI did not agree with the existing electoral system but accepted it as a tool for the enforcement of Shari‘a.\textsuperscript{241} In the elections of 1988 the Darkhwasti Group joined hands with PML (F) group. Later, it remained a member of IJI an alliance of the right-wing parties.\textsuperscript{242}

\textbf{Manifesto}

JUI wanted to adopt 22 points given by ulema in the 1950’s for the Islamization of the laws. It wanted to make Islam the official religion of Pakistan and wanted to implement the beliefs of Ahl-e Sunnat wl Jammat (one of the religious sects). It also wanted to enhance the laws for the protection of the concept that that there can be no \textit{Nabi} (messenger of God) after the Holy Prophet (PBUH). It also believed that the offices of the president and the PM should be specified for Muslims and elections must be held on proportional representation. It also wanted to make education free of cost till matriculation and curriculum was to be made according to the teachings of Islam.\textsuperscript{243} It believed in a system of Government in Pakistan based on Shari‘a that should be governed by the people of Pakistan or their elected and most capable people.\textsuperscript{244}

\textbf{Objectives}

The basic purpose of JUI was to gather religious scholars under the banner of JUI to enhance unity amongst the Muslim community. It also wanted to work for the enforcement of Shari‘a and bring all the aspects of their lives in accordance to the preaching of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). With reference to the economic system of the state it was a critic of both capitalism and communism and instead of that it wanted to adopt a balanced system avoiding the extremist version of both these systems. It wanted to create an Islamic society for which it wanted to use the education system as a tool. According to JUI the educations system was required for Pakistan that could help people to adopt Islam with all of its aspects and to inculcate the true spirit of \textit{Jihad} to defend the country and work for the betterment of the society in general.\textsuperscript{245} With reference to the foreign policy it wanted to support all the Muslim countries that were enslaved by the other countries and wanted to work for the protection of the rights of the non-Muslim communities living in Muslim countries as well. It also believed in freedom of speech and expression.\textsuperscript{246}
Functions of the Party

Amir (head or the President) was the caretaker and responsible for all party activities. The Amir of the party was authorized to call meetings of Shura (consultative body) at any time but it was compulsory to hold at least one meeting every three months. Members of Shura could not avoid meetings without any particular reason and could not remain absent without intimating the Amir of their absence.247

Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith (Lakhvi Group) (JAH)

JAH was formed in 1955 by the followers of a religious group called Ahl-e Hadith.248

They believed that after Sahaba [Companions of the Holy Prophet PBUH] and Tabieen [Companions of the Companions of the Holy Prophet PBUH], people added their own aspects to their beliefs what had not been relevant to the real teachings of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and thus became divided into different groups. They believe that these problems can only be solved if the Muslims consult the Quran and Hadith instead of consulting interpretations of different religious scholars.249 It was formed in 1955 for a purely non-political religious purpose. Its first president was Maulana Daud Ghaznavi. JAH started its political career in 1970 and participated in the general elections of

1970.250 Maulana Moeen Uddin Lakhvi was its president when the party started its political career in Pakistan for which some of the authors have mentioned him as the first president of this party. Jamiat contested the elections of 1970 for the first time and one of its members Maulana Moeenuddin Lakhvi became the member of the National Assembly. In 1982 he joined Majlis-e-Shura under the rule of Zia. He participated in the

Nizam-e Mustafa Movement of PNA. In the elections of 1985 and 1990 he became MNA.251 In 1982 Jamiat faced a two-way split. One was called Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith and the other was called Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith Markazi which later joined IJI as Jamiat Ahl-e Hadith (Lakhvi Group). In 1990 both the groups merged into one and remained part of IJI.252

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Basically, it believes in the supremacy of Quran and Hadith (teachings of Holy Prophet) and believes in the Islamic system of government in the country.253 They want to create an Islamic society in Pakistan, adopt an Islamic educational system and a welfare state. The party also wants to create friendly relations with other Muslim countries based on shared Islamic identity. It believes that all the decisions of national importance must be made through a meeting of different minds.254 In its constitution MJAH has explained that Shura must be elected through elections and the suggested pattern of the elections seems to be an indirect election as it suggests that
• General members of society will select basic members

• These basic members will elect their representatives for city or district level

• These district representatives will elect a council or *Shura* for federal/central level.255

**Jamiatul Mashaikh Pakistan (JMP)**

JMP was formed by Pir Fazale Haq (Pir Fazal) in 1963 which was registered and was headed by Sheikhuul Mashaikh Pir Sahib of Dewal Sharif, Pir Abdul Majid. A large number of Pirs from all over the country, belonging to different branches of *Tasawuf* were connected with it. Its central leaders included as Pir Sahib Zakori Sharif, Pir Sahib Manki Sharif, Pir Sahib Ouch Sharif, Pir Sahib Sultan Bahu Sharif, Pir Sahib Taunsa Sharif, Pir Sahib Khura Sharif, Pir Sahib Sharaqpur Sharif, Pir Sahib Saida Sharif, Pir Pinanwal Sharif, Pir Sahib Sehjuwal Sharif and large number of other Sajjada Nasheen, Ulema and Mashaikh.256

It was formed as a representative of the Ulema (religious scholars) of Pakistan. It basic purpose was to serve humanity and propagate the teachings of religious scholars. It did not lay any hard and fast rules for its membership except being a Muslim, having strong belief in the finality of Prophet-hood of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). It had a party flag of dual shades green (representative of the Muslims) and White (guaranteeing the security of the rights of non-Muslims in Pakistan).257

On October 8, 1988 additional Sec. Gen. Sahibzada Roohul Husna in Moeen Dewal of central Jamiatul Mashaikh Pakistan denied membership of any alliance. He said that it was a religious and a non-political organization. He said that party has decided to support any political party which showed its commitment with the enforcement of Shari’a in the country.258 Later Pir Fazl (JMP) agreed in discussion on telephone with PML leaders to join the alliance (IJI)259 and its first appearance in the national elections was under the banner of IJI.260

**Hizb-e Jihad (HJ)**

The party was formed in 1988 after the dissolution of the National Assembly. Agha Murtaza Poya261 believed that there was a vacuum in the political arena and HJ would be able to fill it. But before formulating its manifesto or the basic principle for how the party would function it joined IJI.262 Until that time none of the prominent politicians had joined the party except Poya himself and he himself became president and convener of the party.263
Manifesto

- Implementation of Islamic ethics
- Rule of law be established in the country
- Equitable economic equilibrium
- Muslim third world oriented foreign policy
- Sovereign deterrence based on peoples professionals’ technological tri-axes.

Poya mentioned that it was almost similar to what IJI adopted as its elections’ manifesto which is what made him join the alliance.\(^{264}\)

**Nizam-e Mustufa Group (NMG)**

NMG\(^{265}\) was formed in 1985 by Haji Hanif Tayyab. It was a splinter group of JUP consisting of those leaders of the party who did not agree to boycott the elections of 1985. This group won three National Assembly seats in the elections of 1985. Later Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani leader of JUP announced that all the members who left the party would be welcomed if they wanted to re-join the party. Along with member of National Assembly, Usman Khan Noori, many members went back to JUP. This step weakened the group. In that situation the group joined the IJI. Being a member of the alliance the group got tickets of those National Assembly seats that it had won in the elections of 1985 but they refused to contest elections against JUP and withdrew all of its candidates from the elections and from the alliance as well.\(^{266}\)

**Manifesto**

Its basic purpose was the implementation of Shari‘a in all spheres of national, political and personal life of the people of Pakistan. It wanted to implement Islamic Laws, to create an Islamic welfare state in Pakistan with an independent foreign policy and ensure the protection of the rights of women and minorities. It also wanted to take the Muslim community to its past glory.\(^{267}\) NMG did not formally join the alliance. It only participated in the initial discussion regarding the formation of the alliance. As generally this group is considered as a member of the alliance so its introduction is given but it had nothing to do with the working of the IJI.
Liberal Political Party

One of the member parties of IJI was the NPP which called itself the political heir of the PPP and it was a liberal party having an economic agenda of equal distribution of sources among the common people but it joined the IJI because of its political differences with the PPP leadership and being a new party was not properly organized to win the elections so it joined the alliance. Its political history and political agenda is given below.

National Peoples Party (NPP)

NPP was formed in 1986 by a breakup of a faction of PPP.\(^{268}\) Ghulam Mustufa Jatoi\(^{269}\) and Khar deserted the PPP and formed a new party named National Peoples Party.\(^{270}\) Hanif Ramay also supported the formation of NPP but he was unable to work with Jatoi for a considerable duration and left the party and joined hands with Fida league.\(^{271}\) S.M. Zafar (a former law minister) Kamal Azfar (a former minister and governor of Sindh), Syed Hamid Raza Gillani (leading Parliamentarian and Speaker of the National Assembly), Pir Aftab Hussain Shah Jillani, Nasrullah Khattak, Begum Nargis Naeem, Mian Sajid Pervaiz, Ch. Mukhtar, Bashir Ahmad Bhutta, Makhdoom Hamiduddin, Sardar Ghaus Bux Raisani (a former federal minister), Syed Umeed Ali Shah and Nafees Sidiqui were also a few of the prominent political leaders of the PPP who joined NPP along with powerful feudal lords from all four provinces.\(^{272}\)

The basic reason for the formation of NPP was a conflict of leadership with Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto. Jatoi was of the view that being a close lieutenant of Z. A. Bhutto, he deserved to be the leader of the PPP.\(^{273}\) He had been the federal minister and CM of Sindh under the leadership of Bhutto. He did not leave the party even when it was facing a tough time from the ruling authority during Zia’s martial law regime. He was of the view that the PPP was an ideological party. Due to this difference of opinion with the Bhutto family he decided to form an independent party that was supposed to be the actual heir of the ideology of the PPP and Bhutto.\(^{274}\) Another reason of this split was Benazir’s attitude towards Socialism as she had decided to adopt a moderate economic system instead of following socialism to attract more people towards the PPP.

Jatoi was elected its first president by consensus. Hanif Ramay was nominated as the first Secretary General of the party and S. M. Zafar was made the chief organizer of it. The four Provincial Chiefs of the party were Ghulam Mustafa Khar (Punjab), Pir Aftab Shah Jillani (Sindh), Nasrullah Khattak (NWFP) and Sardar Ghaus Bux Raisani (Baluchistan).\(^{275}\) Office bearers had to be nominated by the elected chief and then endorsed by the general council of the party.\(^{276}\) Jatoi was a huge critic of the non-party democracy introduced by Zia. He believed that it was not the system for which the people had made great sacrifices. He was of the view that the system was introduced just to
prepare the people to follow the patterns of an authoritative ruler. He criticized the family members of Z. A. Bhutto for amending the party program from Islamic Socialism to a moderate economic program. PPP leadership had accepted the conditions laid by Zia which also was not acceptable to Jatoi. He believed that it was only done to attain premiership of the country. Those who (Sheikh Rashid, Hanif Ramay and Khar) criticized the PPP’s decision to accept the conditions laid by Zia were denied membership of the Party. Holding elections for the party offices was another issue. The Bhutto family wanted to nominate people but Jatoi wanted to hold the elections for the party offices. When the suggestion was rejected Jatoi asked to acknowledge the active workers of the party through nominating them for the party offices. He prepared a list for this purpose but his suggestions were denied and many of those who were nominated had been supporting the national office holders during the Martial Law. Jatoi did not accept the decision although he was nominated provincial president of the Sindh PPP. Benazir and her supporters demanded to make Pakistan a confederation which was against the actual demand of the PPP. Making Pakistan a federation was not acceptable to Jatoi. Later the PPP leadership left the idea of confederation but it was not publicized properly. For important offices those leaders were nominated who supported the idea of a confederation. Later Jatoi was terminated from the office of the President of Sindh PPP. Jatoi believed that main objectives of the PPP were to work for the sovereignty of Pakistan and to save its people from exploitation to make it a welfare state but the party leadership had ignored its real objectives so it was imperative for him to work separately to achieve the actual agenda of the PPP. Jatoi and his followers not only adopted Bhutto’s policies but considered themselves as political heirs of late Bhutto.

Political Agenda of NPP

The main objective of NPP was the establishment of a modern welfare state in Pakistan. The central Committee of NPP approved its manifesto in August 1988 and later it was approved by the National Council of the party on August 30, 1988. NPP showed its commitment to make the country a social welfare state. To achieve this goal it promised freedom from oppression, want, fear, disease and ignorance. It also promised freedom of faith and expression. It had a commitment to ensure a strong defense for the country. The basic principles of the party were: Islam as the guiding source, democracy and piety as its politics and justice for all. NPP promised to re-enforce the constitution of 1973 in its original form, a federation in which the provinces enjoyed a freedom that had to be provided through constitutional amendments. An independent foreign policy based on the principles of positive working relations with other countries and friendly relations were preferred especially with the neighbouring and Muslim countries. NPP had a firm commitment to enhance the living standard of the people of Pakistan and provide basic necessities to all. Its economic policy was based on two things; to increase self-dependence denying foreign aid and to reduce economic disparity among the provinces. Eradicating corruption and drugs was considered to be key to development of the country. NPP also was committed to repealing punishments given to political prisoners by the
martial law administration. NPP based its electoral manifesto and election campaign on the slogan of five freedoms of a just society:

- Freedom from oppression
- Freedom from want
- Freedom from fear
- Freedom from disease and ignorance
- Freedom of faith and expression

These were the basic principles on which the detailed manifesto was framed by the party.

NPP could not create any significant impact of the electoral politics of the country. One of its major reasons was that it joined the government and accepted cabinet portfolios in Sindh in the caretaker government for which Khar deserted the party who had played a very important role in the formation of the party. The other reason for resignation was that Khar could not reconcile himself with Jatoi’s decision of making an alliance with PML-F and parted ways with Jatoi.

This brief introduction gives a picture of the differences among the member parties of IJI. It tells how far they stood ideologically. It shows another thing that many of the political parties were not properly organized or prepared to contest the elections which took them to a common platform. Still, it was difficult for them to become together on one platform for which a lot of efforts were made by the leaders of the political parties and by some other people from outside the practical politics.

III. Fluctuating Contours of the Alliance

In the wake of Zia’s death, it was announced by the acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan that the elections will be held on an announced date. Later the Supreme Court gave its verdict to hold party based elections. Because of these decisions political parties tried to increase and enhance the chances of their victory in the forthcoming elections. In that particular scenario, efforts were made to form political alliances with other parties to receive a majority in the national and provincial assemblies. IJI was the result of such efforts.

Being the member and provincial president of a divided PML, Nawaz Sharif tried to strengthen his hold over the party to prepare for the forthcoming elections. Because of the division of PML in PML (F) and PML (J) it became weak and felt it in its best interest to make an alliance with other political parties for which it had to work hard. PML leadership contacted other parties to form a broader alliance including Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, chief of JUP. Serious efforts
were made to win the support of Noorani. The same kind of efforts was made by Jatoi in his meetings with Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Mir Ghous Bizenjo.291

Fida Muhammad, the president of one faction of the Muslim League, announced that he would try to seek cooperation of like-minded parties to counter MRD, which according to him was working against the ideology of Pakistan. The Vice President of PML (F) Asif Vardag also made it clear that his party was ready to cooperate with every political party opposed to PPP.292 His first success was the positive attitude and tilt of NPP towards PML (F).293 ML (F) won over Jatoi’s NPP.294 After reaching an agreement about the electoral alliance Jatoi announced that the alliance was made to contest the elections and to secure a safe future of the country based on the idea of making Pakistan a welfare state.295 On that occasion Jatoi announced clearly that he had no objection to PML (F) propagating Ziaism but his party was committed to “strengthening national solidarity, guarding Pakistan’s territorial and ideological frontiers, and was committed to bring all the laws of land in conformity with the Holy Quran and Sunnah”. He was clear about the creation of a workable formula if other political parties were willing to join the PML (F)-NPP alliance.296 It was also announced by Jatoi that the alliance would make every effort to make further alliances with other parties even after winning the elections. He was of the view that mutual cooperation of the political parties was important to create an environment of integrity and honesty, and committed leadership to eliminate corruption, bribery, smuggling and drug trafficking from the country.297 Other leaders of NPP were not happy with the alliance such as Khar. He was not willing to cooperate with right-wing political parties like PML and he resigned from the membership of NPP. He formed his own faction of NPP named NPP (Khar Group). This was the first step towards the formation of a broader alliance.

Nawaz Sharif, Jatoi and Fida held discussions with leaders of other parties independently to reach a positive conclusion.298 PML (F) contacted JI, JUI (Darkhwati Group), HJ, Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith (Lakhvi Group) and ex-opposition Parliamentary Group (IPG) for the formation of a political alliance. Participants of the discussion were Fida Muhammad, Nawaz Sharif (CM Punjab), Akhtar Qazi (CM Sindh), Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Fazle Haq (CM NWFP), federal ministers Naseem Ahmad Aaheer, Mahmood A. Haroon, Mir Afzal Khan. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Professor Khurshid Ahmad, Ch. Rehmat Ilahi from JI. JUI (D) was represented by Maulana Sami, Maulana Ajmal Qadri, Bashir Ahmad Shad, Mian Arif Advocate. From NPP Ghulam Mustufa Jatoi, Dr. Sarfraz Mir, Syed Zia Abbas, S. M. Zafar and Zafar Bakhtawari participated in the meeting.

Agha Murtaza Poya represented HJ and JAH was represented by Mian Fazle Haq and Choudhary Muhammad Yaqub. Syed Fakhar Imam participated in the meeting representing IPG.299 Aheer, former interior minister, played a key role in arranging the meeting.300 He professed that he was responsible for making the alliance.301
Jatoi made efforts to enhance the alliance and discuss the matter with Qazi Hussain Ahmad and Syed Fakhar Imam as well. Certain efforts were made by the leadership to make an alliance with JUP as well. Qazi Hussain Ahmad believed that it was the need of the hour to make an effective alliance at the national level so that prosperity could be achieved within the framework of Islamic Ideology which would safeguard it from all internal and external threats. Qazi Hussain Ahmad wanted to make an alliance of religious parties, but this did not materialize. JI also had some discussions with Junejo faction of Muslim League but they could not reach an agreement. One of the reasons for this failure was that Junejo was trying to reach at an agreement with PPP. Later JI joined IJI, which based its manifesto on the Islamization of laws in Pakistan.

It was decided that smaller religious parties would also be consulted. In this regard, Jatoi met with the head of Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiqae-Jaffaria. A meeting of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqae Jaffria had been called on October 10, 1988. Nizam-e-Islam Party, Shia Political Party and a faction of the National Democratic Party also wanted to be a member of the IJI. Some of the leaders of the alliances were of the opinion that to strengthen the alliance in Sindh MQM should be included. To achieve this goal some efforts were made to create a dialogue with MQM but most of these efforts could not bring any positive results.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan was made President after a promise with Beg that he would continue the policies of Zia. He also had to support the prevention of PPP winning the elections with a clear majority. Ghulam Ishaq Khan in active collision with the openly politicized COAS Beg asked Gul to organize an effective alliance of right wing parties to counter Benazir Bhutto’s seemingly bright prospects of winning the 1988 general elections. To narrow down prospects of victory of the PPP it was important to unite anti-PPP voters on one platform. For this Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Beg planned to make an alliance of anti-PPP parties for which the services of Gul were availed. Hamid Gul, the then ISI Chief became an ally of Brigadier Imtiaz and worked to bridge differences among different political parties and to bring them to one forum. These efforts were successful as some of the parties like JI who wanted to join hands with PML-F but had some reservations joined it with the guidance and support of Gul.

There is an argument that immediately after the dismissal of the Junejo government on May 29, 1988, Gul started working on the formation of IJI or some broader alliance of right-wing political parties, but this process was delayed because JI took longer than expected to join the IJI. He also admitted that the alliance formation was delayed due to certain reservations of JI. If it had agreed a little earlier the performance of IJI could have been far superior in the elections of 1988. He also accepted the support of establishment and ISI in the process of alliance formation. He used his influence to persuade some politicians who had had close ties with Zia to participate under one platform. Gul himself accepted that he worked to make alliance, the IJI to counter the power of the PPP and to maintain the image of the army amongst the people as PPP was expected to distort it after coming into power with an overwhelming majority. To
counter the PPP not only its opponents were tried to be strengthened but the negative character of PPP was also made the topic of discussions.

The formation of IJI was considered necessary by the military top brass. In 1990 while defending herself in response to Ghulam Ishaq Khan in the Supreme Court, Benazir told the court that during her premiership the authority concerned had told her that under superior orders Gul helped to set up IJI. She alleged that she was informed that elections would not have held at all if the PPP had free reign. It was discussed in her chamber that the ex-Air Chief Zulfiqar Ali asked Gul about his role in the political matters of Pakistan after Zia’s death. Without denying anything Gul said ‘In whatever I did, I was carrying out orders’. Saeed Shafqat also referred to the involvement of ISI in the formation of IJI in his work Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy. The only hope of success in the elections of 1988 against PPP was a complete union of the right wing faction in Pakistani politics for which the army, the intelligence and the caretaker government used every available source to make an alliance among the right wing political parties.

The army had portrayed the PPP as traitors throughout the Zia era. The thought process behind that was that in order to maintain a positive image of the army, it was important to portray a negative image of the PPP. Gul, with the guidance of Beg and Ghulam Ishaq Khan, devised a strategy and brought different political parties to one forum named the Islamic Democratic Alliance. So that it would appeal to the general public it was later named Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). In an interview Nawaz Sharif himself admitted that the idea of an anti-PPP alliance of the different political parties was forwarded by Beg and Gul. He also accepted the fact that JI was not prepared to make an alliance with PML and other parties but Gul played an important role in bringing JI closer to IJI. JI was not willing to be part of the alliance because it was not offered enough seats for the elections but PML wanted to make the alliance at any cost so it accepted JI’s dictate. JI had its reservations about joining any alliance. It gave a five point agenda and asked for its approval for joining the alliance. These points are mentioned earlier in this chapter. Qazi Hussain Ahmad told the people in a public meeting that if its five point agenda was not acceptable to other parties it would had prefer to go ahead independently. At the same time he highlighted the importance of an alliance to prevent the PPP, to form government. It wanted to include other parties in the alliance except TI, JUP and PML (J). It also demanded final approval to establish student unions and was promised by Nawaz Sharif that all the student leaders of Islamic Jamiat-i-Tulba (IJT), arrested would be released. JI was of the opinion that the alliance should be broad based but at the same time demanded the right to nominate its candidates in each and every constituency, where ever its interest lay. JI joined the alliance on October 10, 1988. The decision was made after long discussions among the JI leaders such as Qazi Hussain Ahmad, and Professor Khurshid Ahmad and leadership of IJI comprising of Jatoi, Nawaz Sharif, Pir Fazl, Aheer, Maulana Sami, Qazi Abdul Lateef and other leaders at the residence of Dr. Sarfraz Mir, Islamabad head of NPP. Qazi Hussain Ahmad believed that the alliance could be a better choice for Jamaat’s long-term goals given the political instability in the country. Nawaz Sharif said that the support of JI for IJI was unconditional as preconditions could make working of the alliance
difficult. It cannot be said that the alliance was made just because the army and the establishment demanded it. The member parties of the alliance had their personal reasons for joining the alliance as well but it is true that if the formation of the alliance was not facilitated by the ISI it might had not have been so easy to form such a strong alliance just before the general elections in 1988.

It is generally said that ISI also played its role in unifying PML-F and PML-J. In the 1988 general elections the ISI persuaded Muhammad Khan Junejo to leave the alliance of his party with TI and the Jamial-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan, only two days before the last date of filing nomination papers for the elections, and join the IJI. Later Gul claimed that he was responsible for its success in the 1988 elections. Brigadier Imitiaz, Additional Director General of the ISI, and Major Aamir, an ISI officer and Section Incharge Islamabad in 1988 helped Gul to make an alliance of anti-PPP parties. Beg contacted Jatoi, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leaders of PML, Maulana Sami, Fakhar Imam and Poya to inform them that the elections could only be held on time if chances of PPP victory were minimized and that could only be achieved through an alliance of anti-PPP parties. Hasan Askari Rizvi commented that the alliance was made by the parties without considering the cost that had to be paid in the long run.

Brigadier Imitiaz said that IJI was formed by ISI. He said that he personally met with the leader of MQM Altaf Hussain to convince him to join the IJI but he declined to accept this suggestion. He also said that in order to fund the publicity campaign of the IJI 15 million rupees were given to a committee consisting of Aaheer of PML and a member of JI. He specified that after the elections a justification of the money spent through vouchers of each and every rupee would be submitted and the remaining money would be returned. He also informed everyone that this money was provided by the Presidency. Farooq H. Naik, Chairman Senate told Qayyum Nizami that two billion rupees were spent at the time of formation of IJI which were withdrawn from Habib Bank Ltd. Brigadier Imitiaz accepted the fact that to prevent the PPP to win an overwhelming majority of agencies played a historic role.

After the unification of PML it had two options either to join PAI or IJI because it was possible to unite both the alliances. JI and TI had conflicts on the national policy about the Afghanistan issue and JI had won approval of it stance on Afghanistan issue before joining the IJI. At the same time IJI could not take the risk of losing JI as it was the most important religious political party. IJI was stronger than PAI because of the support of JI, NPP, JUI –D and the Lakhvi group. Keeping in view the entire situation it was in the best interest of PML to maintain its link with IJI as compare to PAI. It was also difficult for NPP and JI to continue under the leadership of Junejo. From PAI, Noorani’s JUP and TIP could not work with a League, dominated by CMs whose dismissal they were demanding. Junejo’s decision to reunite ML was not acceptable to other members of the PAI. So Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and JUP decided to keep themselves away from the alliance. IJI also tried to attract MRD member parties but despite their opposition to PPP they rejected the offer. Junejo told the people that there were differences amongst the member parties of IJI but that this was inevitable in politics. He said that he had accepted the seven point agenda of IJI and on the basis of that he had joined the IJI.
It was said by an eminent member of IJI in the 1990 elections over the issue of the next PM that if the IJI could manage to win the elections, “those who got us together will sort out even this muddle”. Apart from the efforts of ISI and the Army Chief, it was the anti-PPP stance of some political parties that was the main reason for creating an alliance under the banner of IJI. PML (F) preferred an alliance with Jatoi to counter Junejo and Benazir in Sindh. It was supported by many politicians because it enjoyed patronage from the men in authority.

Most of the people believed that the formation of IJI was a command performance but it cannot be accepted as a complete truth. There are certain reasons for such a statement. Firstly, all the parties who joined the alliance had their personal reasons for joining it. Secondly, Brigadier Imtiaz said that he tried to bribe Altaf Hussain but Altaf did not agree with his idea to join the alliance. Makhdoom Javed Hashmi said that although ISI had some role in the formation of the alliance particularly bringing different political parties on one platform but it did not interfere in the internal matters of the alliance and decisions were made by the alliance members. This shows that ISI or any other agency or institute did not force it to join the alliance. MQM was interested in the Sindh politics and wanted to gain victory in Karachi and Hyderabad in particular and in Sindh in general. It was more interested in the politics of Sindh and wanted to be in a position to be able to manipulate Sindh politics for which joining the IJI could hardly create a strong impact. So it did not deem it wise to join the alliance. Another factor was that PML (F) and NPP had already made an agreement and they were contacting with other parties as well. Lastly, it cannot be denied that the army or ISI had a role in the formation of IJI.

IV. Manifesto of IJI

PML (F), JI, NPP, JUI (D), JAH (Lakhvi Group), JMP, Hizb-e Jihad and Independent Political Group of Syed Fakhar Imam agreed on a few points to cooperating with each other under the banner of IJI. These points were

- Supremacy of Islamic Laws in the country
- Provision of acceptable economic opportunities on the basis of equality for all the sections of society including traders, workers, peasants and students and the arrangements to be made to safeguard their rights.
- Provision of inexpensive justice for every citizen without discrimination on the basis of color, race or sex.
- Safeguarding the rights of women
- Full support to Afghan Jihad
• Promotion of Nuclear program and its use for the progress of the country
• A non-aligned foreign policy which could support the struggle for independence for the people of Palestine and Kashmir and ensure cooperation with the countries of the Third World. \(^{353}\)

In fact, these objectives were decided as a common strategy for the PML (F) and NPP but both these parties were ready to welcome other parties to agree to these points which made it easier to form a broader alliance. Eight political parties signed the manifesto\(^{354}\) and formally joined the IJI.\(^{355}\) These were the basic points that were supposed to provide the basis for the legislation. Other issues were also addressed in the manifesto of the Alliance as given in the appendix.\(^{356}\) The manifesto of the IJI was revised before the elections of 1990 but hardly any major changes were suggested. At the same time the manifesto committee had to avoid any plans contradictory to the seven basic points of the political agenda of IJI.

V. Organizational Structure of IJI

It is generally believed that IJI did exceptionally well. Although the facts proved that it did not live up to its reputation. Firstly, only those parties joined it that had at least some benefit for it. MQM denied joining the IJI because it believed that it would not serve its interests.\(^{357}\) The alliance faced criticism because it did not frame any constitution for its working.\(^{358}\) Not much attention was paid to its organization either. Only a few committees and subcommittees were formed but it was not done at the time of the formation of the alliance. These committees were formed from time to time to meet the challenges faced by the alliance. A brief organizational structure is given below:

Professor Ghafoor Ahmad was nominated its first Secretary General. This office was left at the discretion of JI which nominated Professor Ghafoor for this office.\(^{359}\) The office was retained by Professor Ghafoor until 1992 when JI left the alliance. Jatoi was first convener of IJI and was succeeded by Nawaz Sharif.\(^{360}\) At the time of the formation of this alliance it was decided that the president would be appointed for the term of three months in alphabetical order but on February 11, 1989 Nawaz Sharif was elected its president instead of Maulana Sami for one year. This was done on the recommendation of Maulana Sami as he believed that the circumstances of the country demanded a strong and more popular leader of the alliance. Nawaz Sharif accepted his suggestion and the decision was made unanimously. Maulana Sami was nominated as the vice-president and was nominated as assistant secretary general. Agha Murtaza Poya was appointed as
Information Secretary of the alliance. All these appointments were made for a period of one year. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad had to continue as Secretary General of the alliance for the following year. The decision was made in the meeting of the central council of IJI which was attended by heads of eight member parties of the alliance along with other members of the IJI. A few committees were also constituted to promote the cause of IJI.

- A three member-committee consisting of Asif Vardag as convener and Maulana Fidaur Rehman Darkhwasti and Liaquat Baluch as members. This committee had to visit all the provinces to organize IJI. The committee had to submit its report in the next meeting of the central council of IJI.
- A Law committee was also constituted to save IJI from the legal complication that had been created by the PPP. S.M. Zafar was nominated as the head of this committee. MNA Chaudhry Abdul Gahfoor, MNA Chaudhry Muhammad Ashraf, and Raja Haq Nawaz vice president of Punjab Bar Council were members of this committee.
- A constitution Committee was also appointed by the central committee of IJI headed by Ghulam Mustufa Jatoi. Members of this committee were Ghulam Hyder Wyen, S.M. Zafar, Prof. Khursheed Ahmad, Maulana Sami, Senator Hussain Bungalzai and Choudhary Shujjat Hussain. This committee had to examine the constitution of IJI to examine if any of the provisions needed revision.
- For the supervision of the election campaign of the IJI a 21 member committee was created. Those politicians were included in this committee who did not intend to contest the elections for any assembly.

The central council of IJI also decided to establish the Headquarter of IJI in Islamabad. Another office was created in the Punjab Muslim League House.

VI. Criticism on the Alliance

It was generally agreed that it should have been the alliance’s primary responsibility to first resolve tensions within the party and then alliance’s with other parties should have been formed. Junejo group was trying to form an alliance with TI and JUP and the Fida group had its own plans to form an alliance with certain other parties amongst which JI was most prominent and it could not agree to work with JUP at any cost. Many analysts
were of the opinion that these parties joined hands just to counter the PPP but even for this purpose they could not make a solid plan to attract the people. Pir of Pagaro criticized the alliance considering it unnatural. He was of the opinion that an alliance can only be made by parties who have a mutual understanding about the basic issues of national life. He said that as JI opposed the idea of an independent country for Muslims in the subcontinent and NPP was not a follower of the rule of law so the alliance was technically incorrect. Two major factions of PML became united too late and by that time JI had adopted a key role in the alliance and had reached an agreement about the distribution of party tickets with PML. The alliance could not organize its members properly as many representatives of the member parties were contesting the elections as independent candidates and were supposed to make it difficult for the nominee of the alliance. It was said that the alliance was formed more for personal gain than for the progress of Pakistan.

The alliance was criticized because it had no particular agenda at the time of its formation and member parties did not sign any agreement of a formula or any program which it had to follow in case of success in the elections. It was generally said that the alliance was made to win more seats in the national and provincial assemblies of Pakistan so that these parties could become successful in the elections as they were not confident enough that they would be successful against PPP if they contested the elections in their individual capacities.

It was said that JI lost more than it gained in the alliance as it had been participating with its own manifesto and was winning an average 4 to 6 seats. Being a member of an alliance it could not bring about a positive change in its success rate but it lost its image as became consumed with feuds with opposing parties.

In the political alliance Junejo was ignored by the party hierarchy which was considered by many political critics as a blow to the party as PML had no other leader of his cadre and nobody was able to organize the party as he had the capability of doing so. Instead of giving him a respectful place in the national politics he seemed to participate in the elections as an independent from Tharparker as he had to resign from Sanghar from where he was going to contest the election as an IJI nominee.

There are also opinions that support the idea that the ruling party felt that it was too weak to stand alone and that it had to make an alliance to come into direct contact with the masses. Retired Air Martial Asghar Khan, President of TIP criticized the IJI by saying that it was opposite to its nomenclature as according to him it was neither Islamic nor Democratic. He said it was an assembly of hypocrites and thieves. He told that the member parties were spending huge sums of money on their election campaign that they were going to get back after winning the elections. He also criticized JI by saying that it was a party that always supported the martial law and was also responsible for the breakup of Pakistan. He was of the view that the parties that had been in the government under the support of Zia and failed to introduce Islamic laws in the country now made a new alliance on similar jargons of Islamization to deceive the people.

Many of the political thinkers believed that the IJI was just an extension of PNA. Its member parties did not have any proper agenda or a unanimous program but they were merely working on a one point agenda which was to keep PPP out of government. They
believed that if IJI had public support its member parties could go to the public as independent parties instead of making an alliance of different parties with different orientations. It was believed that if politics of PML and JI is analyzed carefully, it can easily be judged that both these parties had opposite stance regarding almost every issue, so they could not have had a common program. Some of the people criticize the alliance believing that Jatoi made an alliance with Fida League to secure some of the seats at national and provincial level. The alliance was so much unplanned that members of the parties were confused and in an indecisive position as Khar left the NPP and made a splinter group but his brothers’ Malik Murtaza Khar and Noor Rabbani Khar remained part of the NPP (Jatoi Group). IJI was considered a fragile alliance as smaller parties like NMG and Khaksaar Tehrik could not work with the alliance except for a few days perhaps for not agreeing to the distribution of the alliance tickets for the elections. Pir Pagara said that he was against the alliance as he professed to have had enough experience of being part of alliances and was aware of the negative impact of them on the politics of the country. The IJI had a negative start right from the beginning. The PML had split into the Chief Ministers faction (Fida) and the Junejo Group in the wake of the dismissal of the PM; however it re-unified few hours before the closing of the acceptance of nomination papers. The former split led to a number of its leaders withdrawing from the contest like the Sec General Iqbal Ahmad Khan in Punjab citing non-cooperation as a reason. In NWFP Arbab Jahangir Khan, the former Chief Minister worked overtime for the defeat of the IJI candidates. In Sindh Junejo refused to share a platform with other alliance leaders. IJI was called an unnatural alliance. JI also faced criticisms from different sections of society because it was believed that it joined the alliance without getting the approval of any of its demands such as the withdrawal of cases against students and its workers and without lifting of ban on student and labor unions which was a basic demand of JI. If we see the composition of IJI consisting of urban business and professional and rural landlords alongwith the religious political parties it seems hardly possible that they can unite on their own. Confession of Beg, Gul, Brigadier Imtiaz, at the same time partial acceptance of the support of Army and ISI by Makhdoom Javed Hashmi, Siddique al Farooq, makes things more clear that if it was not a command performance than definitely was supported or facilitated by the ISI and other state machinery.

VII. Other Contemporary Alliances

Following the IJI other smaller parties also formed alliances. An alliance of five parties was formed before the elections of 1988. This included PML Zuhari Group, Pakistan Muslim Muhaaz, Tehreek-i-Taameer-i-Pakistan, Pakistan Liberal Party and Jeeway Pakistan Party. The alliance was named the Pakistan Qaumi Jamhoori Ittehad. None of its member parties played any sort of significant role in the politics of Pakistan so it could not attract the attention of the people at the level of the masses. The conflict, which is part of our politics, has three distinct features that are personal, ideological and regional. In the post military hegemonic system these are that of the Bhutto pattern and the anti-Bhutto which continued till 1999, the takeover by Musharraf.
Political parties and alliances are an important feature of the politics in Pakistan. IJI was one of the prominent alliances in the political history of Pakistan which participated in the elections of 1988 along with other political parties and alliances. The elections of 1988 were one of the fairer elections in the history of Pakistan in which PPP stood victorious at Centre and IJI was a winner in the Punjab province. These elections determined the future course of history of Pakistan and the leadership that emerged on national scenario in the elections of 1988 is still prominent in the national politics of Pakistan.

Notes and References

2 For details see Chapter 1, pp. 60-68.
3 Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, *Wažūr-i A’zm Benazir Bhutto: Nāmzadgi Sei Bartarfi Tak* (Lahore: AlQamar Enterprizers, 1995), p. 18. In the beginning, Nizam-e Mustafa Group (NMG) participated in the discussion regarding forming the alliance but it did not join the alliance. IJI’s manifesto was signed by eight political parties. 4

PML was divided into many factions among whom PML (Fida) and PML (Junejo) were prominent. JUI was divided into two major groups one belonged to Maulana Fazal ur Rehman and other JUI (D) under the leadership of Maulana Sami. National Peoples Party was a splinter group of the PPP consisting of the political leaders who belonged to the PPP in past but did not agree to the policies of Benazir Bhutto, the acting Chairperson of the PPP which was further divided to NPP Jatoi Group and NPP Khar Group. 5

6 In the incident of Bahawalpur, President Zia-ul Haq and many high officials of Pakistani armed forces died in the mysterious plane crash. This created an unusual condition in the country as that was the time when National and Provincial assemblies had been dissolved and a confusion about holding the elections and its method were there. But the acting president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the COAS Beg decided to take every step to hold elections on the decided time and the elections were held in October 1988 in which political parties were allowed to participate.

7 Kalabagh Dam was opposed by the NWFP and Sindh. People of NWFP believed that Nowshera city will be drowned due to the construction of the lake for the water storage of the Dam while people of Sindh were of the view that the construction of the Dam will reduce the water share of Sindh which will create negative impact on the agricultural yield of the region. The issue is discussed in detail in chapter six.

8 Humayun Adeeb, *Zia kei Ba’d* [Urdu] (Lahore: Maqbool Academy, 1990), pp. 244-45.

14 Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmad Billa was an Army Intelligence officer. He is former senior operative in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and director of Pakistan’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) 1990-93. He earned name for his role in the covert Operation Midnight Jackal against the government of Benazir Bhutto in 1989.

17 It was believed that the PPP leadership had links with Jewish lobby in USA which was anti-Pakistan. A general perception was that PPP will roll back the nuclear program of Pakistan which was being highly criticized in Pakistan and to avoid implementation of such agenda it was considered important to keep the PPP out of power or let it gain limited mandate to prevent any of such measures.


24 Jasarat, October 25, 1988
31 By saying this Poya meant to refer to the PPP, JUI and some other political parties with confined leadership for one family. 32 Pakistan Times, November 9, 1988.
This actually was said to hint about the PPP which selected its chairperson, widow of Bhutto.
33 Brigadier Imtiaz told in an interview that Zia was no more needed to super power as Russia was no more a threat in the region after its decision to leave Afghanistan. Russia was also facing internal threats and problems which minimized its fear in the region. Brigadier Imtiaz believed that the Bahawalpur incident was not an accident but was a conspiracy. Interview of Brigadier (Retd.) Imtiaz, with Salim Safi, Jirga, Geo
One of the major reasons of this concern was previous era of the PPP as being in government PPP used every source to curtail the power and popularity of opposition. Many believed that it was one man rule in the name of democracy and if the PPP was again in government it might adopt same kind of policies so to curtail its power was important for the parties opposite to PPP.


41 The Muslim, October 1, 1988.


46 Syed Fakhr Imam was the President of Independent Political Group that was formed by the parliamentarians of the National Assembly in 1986-88.


48 After the dissolution of the National Assembly by president Zia, PML was divided into two major factions along with already many other factions. PML was divided on the issue of joining or not the caretaker government. It also had problems with the president. One faction which favored to join caretaker government elected Fida Muhammad Khan (Fida) as its president and the other faction retained Junejo as President.


56 The Pakistan Times, September 2, 1990.

57 Although the PML was comparatively better organized in NWFP but it was really unorganized in the provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh. Syed Asif Jah Jaffari, Quaid-i Pakistan Nawaz Sharif (Multan: Sohni Dharti Publishers of Pakistan, 1997), pp. 41-43.


After the death of Zia, Qazi Hussain Ahmad had been talking about a broad based alliance to run the government properly instead of making of a government of one or two political parties. Muhammad Sallahuddin, “Jamaat-e Islami ki Na’i Hikmat-e ‘Amali”, Takbeer, September 8, 1988. Also see Pakistan Times, October 11, 1988, Jang, October 11, 1988 and Dawn, October 12, 1988.


Shafqat, Civil Military Relations, p. 89. Also see Faheem Ansari, “Election mein Islami Jamhoori Ittehad kā Hashar kā ho gā?”, Amn, November 13, 1988. Basic steps for the release of the students were taken by the caretaker government of the Punjab while about the student unions; JI announced that the issue will be resolved in joint effort of the alliance members. Dawn, October 11, 1988.

Qazi Hussain Ahmad wanted to prevent the political parties, who were working against the teachings of Islam, from becoming part of the government. He actually was hinting the PPP whose manifesto stressed resolving the discrimination against women and making all the laws compatible with the present day socio-economic conditions. This was something that was not acceptable for JI and other religious political parties. Askari Rizvi, “Last-Ditch Battle to Save the Old Order”, Dawn, October 14, 1988 and Dawn, September 12, 1988.


Ibid., October 3, 1988. Pakistan Times, October 11, 1988. JI had not been able to play a decisive role in the parliament as it had not been able to win enough representation in the parliament through the process of election. One example of this is the elections of 1970 in which it won only four seats in the National Assembly. Its performance in other national and provincial elections was not an exception. So the decision to join a major alliance was taken to get a due share in the decision making process of the country.


Inayatullah, “Democratization in Pakistan”, p. 148. Nasr writes that it was only ISI which compelled JI to join the IJI and other arguments are only statements to hide the truth. Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, p. 207. Pakistan Times, October 11, 1988. There were doubts about the elections as some of the people were expecting Beg to decide the future of the country. Establishment did not want the PPP to form government for that reason as well some people believed that in one way or the other elections will not be held in the country on November 16, 1988.


Ibid., September 17, 1988. 75

Ibid., September 21 and 29, 1988. Almost same views were shared by Nafees Siddiqui, Information Secretary of the NPP.


The details of controversy of Jatoi with PPP are discussed later in this chapter.

Party manifesto was not properly prepared till that time and only basic points of the manifesto were decided. Agha Murtaza Poya, Interview by Author, Islamabad: July 22, 2007.

Meeting took place at the residence of Ch. Shujaat Hussain. Personal interview with Makhdoom Javed Hashmi, Islamabad: August 11, 2007.

The Pakistan Times, November 9, 1988. Also see Haider, November 8, 1988.


After the war of independence, it was the Muslim community of India that suffered the most because the British considered them responsible for the war. AIML tried to improve relationship between the British government and the Muslims of India to minimize their sufferings and get at least some facilities for the Muslims to improve their quality of life in the British India. (amend with three objectives of AIML). AIML’s basic objectives were: 1. to create among Muslims the feelings of loyalty towards British Government and to remove misconception and suspicions, 2. to Safeguard the political rights of the Muslims and to bring them into the notice of the Government.3. to prevent among the Muslims, the rise of prejudicial feelings against the other communities of India.

There is a long story of the struggle of the All India Muslim League since 1906 but the focus of the present study is the political structure of Pakistan so only a brief introduction of the political activities of AIML during the pre-partition days is discussed.

Constitution of Pakistan Muslim League-N, Islamabad: Central Secretariat Pakistan Muslim LeagueN., pp. 6-7.


Ministry of Kawaja Nazim uddin was dismissed by Ghulam Muhammad and Muhammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan’s ambassador in America, was called to take the responsibilities as PM of the country although the real power was in the hands of Governor General and not the PM. Abu Zafar, “Muslim League kā Intishār” Musawat, Lahore: October 24, 1988.


To draw legitimacy Ayub Khan created a faction of PML called Convention Muslim League. This faction supported Ayub’s policies. There were some members of PML who did not agree with this decision of Ayub and created their own faction of Muslim League called Council Muslim League.

PML was divided in many small groups but Junejo faction and Fid League were the most prominent among them which could create prominent impact on the politics of Pakistan. Others could have a minor impact so only these two factions of PML are discussed in detail.


Chattha told newsmen that CM NWFP Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq was informed of Junejo’s demand of the resignation of two CMs. Fazle Haq said that this demand was not fair. Either all the CMs should resign or not. Chattha had suggested that both the factions had made alliances with other parties so it was a must to consult with the allied parties to improve the situation but Junejo did not accept the suggestion. *Nawa-i Waqt*, October 10, 1988.


The Muslim, October 15, 1988.


Jang, October 18, 1988. Also see Shabbir Hussain, “What Happened on October 18”, *Pakistan Times*, October 20, 1988. The satire of the situation was that at the time of unification of both the factions of ML Junejo announced that the unification will not affect the party’s position in any of the alliances. *The Pakistan Times*, October 15, 1988. A statement that hardly seemed practical was given by the president of one of the largest political party. Maulana Noorani, the JUP president denied any merger and said that the organizational structure of PAI would be maintained without any change. *Dawn*, October 18, 1988.


The Muslim, October 15, 1988.


Sultan, “Awaiting Elections in a Climate of Uncertainty”.

The Muslim, October 15, 1988.


Details of the efforts made by Junejo to unite IJI and PAI are available in Ghafoor Ahmad, *Wazīr-i Ā’zam Benazir*, pp. 83-84. Also see “Muslim League kei Ittehad kei Bā’d”, *Jang*, October 16, 1988.


Syed Fakhar Imam had been active in politics since 1979. In 1985 he became Speaker on the National Assembly but due to problems with government he resigned from the office and joined opposition. After

150 Makhdoom Javed Hashmi, Interview with Author, Islamabad.


153 Makhdoom Javed Hashmi, Interview with Author, Islamabad.


156 Ibid., 157 Maududi started his career as a journalist. He became editor of the Daily “Muslim”. In 1923 Muslim was banned and Maududi joined a weakly “Al-Jamia‘at” as its editor but in 1928 he resigned from the job because he did not want to adopt yellow journalism to enhance the market of the journal. In 1931 he started working for Tarjamaan-ul Quran. This was the real source for Maududi’s preaching. In 1937 Congress won the general elections and proved that there was nothing in common between the Hindus and the Muslims. To counter the aggressive plans of Hindus, Maududi wanted to strengthen Islamic perceptions among the Muslims of the Sub-continent. For this purpose, he decided to form a party to help the Muslims to follow the teachings of Islam. That party was named as Jamaat-i Islami. Tasdeeq Hussain Raja, *Syed Maududi: Mard-e Athar-o Surat Gar-e Mustaqbil* (Lahore: Idara Tarjamaan-ul Quran (Private) Limited, 1996), pp. 275-79.


163 Ibid., pp. 249-50.


165 Maududi was critic of extremist views in any sphere of life either it was following of Hadith (Statements of Holy Prophet Muhammad PBUH) or its total rejection, concentration of Ijethad (independent thinking about religious matters) or following of the decisions taken in the past. He also tried to explain religion in such a way that could satisfy educated youth and the followers of tradition. He believed that those who wanted to follow Islam at a practical level; those must be supported to serve for the preaching of religion and its practical implementation in life. Siddiqui, *AlMaududi*, pp. 257-59.

166 Ibid., pp. 263-69. Maududi tried to make the Muslim community aware of the negative impact of Nationalism for the Muslims for which he did three things: first he tried to present Islamic ideology in front of the people that had been ignored. Secondly he tried to create desire of implementation of Islamic system on each and every practice of life and then at the third stage he preached the importance of Islamic government without which it was difficult to adopt this system while living in India under western democratic system that was being demanded by the Hindu community of the Sub-continent. He also highlighted the ways and means that could help to implement Shari’a from the platform of JI. Abul Alla Moududi, *Tehrik-i Islami ka Lā’hia-e ‘Amal* (Lahore: Islamic Publications (Pvt.) Ltd. 2003), pp. 59-67.


168 Ibid., 64.


Maulana Amin Ehsan Islahi and Dr. Israr Ahmad were the prominent members of JI who left the party on its decision of taking active part in politics. “Party Time: Jamaat-e-Islami”, p. 21.


Amir-e Jamaat believed that to participate in the election was not correct if was to manage a secular government. But if the elections were held in an environment when the Jamaat can be confident of its victory and feels free to formulate the next constitution there was no harm in participating in the elections. Maududi believed that a secular Muslim government or a non-Muslim government could be equally problematic in formulation of an Islamic government. Moududi, *Tehrik-i Islami ka Lā’hia-e ‘Amal*, pp.707-77 and Safdar, *Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamā’taīn*, p. 119.

*Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamā’taīn*, p. 119.

PPA sought to define the political party as “a body of individuals or as an association of persons setting up organizational structure or collecting funds or owning property with the object of propagating political opinions”. The PPA prohibited the formation of all those parties that were foreign-aided. The PPA tried to curtail the scope of political opportunism among unscrupulous politicians. The PPA also debarred four categories of persons from becoming members or office bearers of the political party: any one (a) sentenced by any court of law, (b) removed from the office of governor or minister for misconduct (c) dismissed from the services of Pakistan (d) Disqualified from holding public office under EBDO. Further details are available in Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1958-69*, Vol. II, pp. 61-66. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-16.

*Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamā’taīn*, p. 120.


Shafqat, *Civil and Military Relations in Pakistan*, p.89.

Ibid., p. 22. Poor performance of JI in the elections created unrest inside the party against the Amir. Details are available in Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*, pp. 53-54 and 165-68.

*Rudād Jamaat-i Islami*, Vol. VII, p. 97. A nation-wide movement was started against the Qadiani sect. People demanded to declare them non-Muslims due to the contradictions in their beliefs with that of the basic beliefs of Islam. For the first time this demand was raised in early fifties but the government ignored it and no action was taken against the Qadianis but in 1973 there were disturbances in the different regions of Pakistan and people started killing Qadianis. The government called a NA meeting and amended the constitution of Pakistan and added a definition of the Muslim according to which qadianis were declared non-Muslims as they do not believe in the finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH).

Safdar, *Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamā’tain*, p. 121.


Arif Azad, “Jamaat over the Years”, *The News*, Rawalpindi: August 31, 2008. Pasban and Shbab Mili were the sub-sections of JI.

Ibid., pp. 105-6. Also see Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*, p. 56-57.

Rudād Jamaat-i Islami, Vol. VII, pp. 118-19. Also see Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*, p. 53. Arshad Baloch in his Book *Qazi Ya Baghī* has mentioned that structure of Shura was approved with the efforts of maulana Amin Ahsm Islahi, a prominent member of JI. Arshad Balouch, *Qazi Ya Baghī* [Urdu] (Lahore: Ilm Dost Publications), p. 83.

Ibid., p. 107.


Passban was a parallel organization that had the responsibility to help the poor and needy, support them in legal, social and financial matters. It was also entrusted the responsibility to work against the police, landlords and other sections of society that were involved in victimization of the poor. Maududi also had formed an organization on this pattern named “Majlis-e Tahafuz Ikhlāq-e Āmā Lahore (organization for the protection of manners of people)” in 1956-7. Muhammad Khalil-ur Rehman (ed.) Muḥtram Qazı Ḥusayn Ahmad Sahib ‘Pakistān Islami Front’ aur “Paasban” par Taṅgād karni wālōn kei liye Da’wat-e Fikr-o Nazar (Lahore: 1993), pp. 6 and 9-10.

Kamran Rajpoot, Qazī Ḥusayn Ahmad ki Dīni awr Siyāsī Khidmāt (Lahore: Shirkat-ul Imtiaż, 2005), p. 34. According to JI righteous people are those who abide by Islamic laws strictly in every sphere of life.

Maududi, Tehrik-i Islami ka Lāhori-e ‘Āmal, pp. 9 and 130.

Ahmad, Waqeer-i A’zam Benazir, p. 43. Also see Jafri, The Political Parties of Pakistan, p. 29.

Maududi, Tehrik-i Islami ka Lāhori-e ‘Āmal, pp. 9 and 130. Also see Qazi, Jamaat-i Islami, p. 7.


Maududi, Tehrik-i Islami ka Lāhori-e ‘Āmal, pp. 96 and 134.

Rudād Jamaat-i Islami, Vol. VIII, p. 64.

JI believed to limit the agricultural land up to 200 acres just for the time being. Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyāsī Jamā’tain, p. 120.

Ibid., p. 120.

Bahadur, The Jama’at-i Islami of Pakistan, p. 199.

Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyāsī Jamā’tain, p. 161.

Ibid., p. 162.


Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyāsī Jamā’tain, p. 162.


Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyāsī Jamā’tain, pp. 162-64.

Taqqi-ud-Din, Pakistan kī Siyāsī Jamā’tain, p. 361.

The Ordinance provided that (a) marriage and divorces be registered; (b) permission be sought from the court for second and subsequent marriages; (c) divorce be effective after the approval of the court; (d) minimum age of marriage for girls be fixed at fourteen and sixteen for males; (e) grandson of a predeceased son could inherit property of his grandfather. These clauses of the ordinance were considered unislamic by the majority of the people, Ulema and the religious political parties. Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan: 1958-69, Vol. II, p. 14.

Mufti Mahmud did this only because he believed that Islam does not allow any woman to become the head of a state but this argument was not acceptable for the general public as otherwise Miss Fatima Jinnah could be the president. Taqqi-ud-Din, Pakistan kī Siyāsī Jamā’tain, p. 362.

Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyāsī Jamā’tain, pp. 162-64.
Maulana Fazalur Rehman is son of Mufti Mahmud. After the death of his father he assumed the party leadership which was not acceptable for other leaders of the party and it got divided into different groups.


Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamā’taīn, pp. 162-64.

Jami’at Ulema-e Islam Pakistan kā Dastūr awr Manshūr, p. 21.

Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamā’taīn, p. 165.

Jami’at Ulema-e Islam Pakistan kā Dastūr awr Manshūr, p. 5.

Ibid., p. 6.

Ahl-e Hadith are the people who don’t believe in Fiqh. They don’t believe in the teachings of any of the Imams like Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Maalik, Imam Shafie or Imam Ahmad bin Hunbal. They directly consult Quran and Hadith for the religious guidance and follow that as they believe that the only reliable sources are Quran and Hadith so the Muslims should not consult any other sources for guidance.

Dastūr Markazi Jami’at-e Ahle Hadith Pakistan (Lahore: Muhammad Ismail Nazim-e Aala Markazi Jamiat-e Ahle Hadith Pakistan Shesh Mahal Road, Approved in 1955), p. 2.

The Parliament Book 1997, p. 129. Also see Taqqi-ud-Din, Pakistan kī Siyasi Jamā’taīn p. 3.


Taqqi-ud-Din, Pakistan kī Siyasi Jamā’taīn, p. 302.

Ibid., p. 6.

Ibid., p.

14.

Pakistan Times, October 9, 1988.


Confidential File of Election Commission of Pakistan No. 3(74)/2002-confidential. Information submitted to ECP in August 2002.

Poya was a journalist who launched the daily The Muslim in 1979. It was first independent newspaper published from Islamabad at that time. In 1988 Poya established his own political party named Hizb-e Jihad but after few days of its creation the party joined the IJI so there are a very few details available about its independent working and organization.

All this information is based on personal interview with Poya because none of the documents of the party are available even with Poya himself who was the president and the founder of the party. He could not even name any other members of his party.
It is said by some authors that the party consisted of just one member and that was Poya. Hafiz Abdul Haq, “Tasvīr-e Wat·an”, Takbeer, October 20, 1988, p. 31.

Presently it is known as Nizam-e Mustafa Party which was formed with this name on August 3, 2002.

Khurrum Baddar, “Elections 1988”, Takbeer, November 3, 1988, p. 22. There are different views about the alliance of this group with IJI. In a telephonic conversation Haji Hanif Tayyab himself told that the party did not join the IJI. The group was represented by Begum Qamar-un-Nisa in the opening session of the alliance formation but she did not join the final session. Still alliance members announced that this group was part of the alliance. Dawn, October 7, 1988.

Dastūr Nizam-e Mustafa Party (Published by the Department of Information of the Nizam-e Mustafa Party), pp. 3-6.

Grover, Elections since 1945, p. 262 and “Party Time: Jamaat-e-Islami”.

Jatoi was elected MNA in the elections of 1965 for the first time. Since then he had been active in the national politics. Jatoi was a front ranking leader of the PPP and remained CM of Sindh during the ruling period of ZA Bhutto, the founder of the PPP. After the implementation of Martial Law by Zia ul Haq he was appointed president of Sindh PPP and remained in the office till 1986. Parliament Book (Islamabad: 1997), p. 178 and Jafri, The Political Parties of Pakistan, p. 74.


Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamāʿatī, pp. 221-22.

Jafri, The Political Parties of Pakistan, p. 74.


Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamāʿatī, p. 222.

Jafri, The Political Parties of Pakistan, p.75.

Ibid., p. 78.

Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamāʿatī, p. 223.

Ibid., pp. 225-27.

Ibid., pp. 229-33.

“Party time: Jamaat-e-Islami”.


Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamāʿatī, p.235.

Dawn, August 31 and September 1, 1988. Also see Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamāʿatī, p. 236.


Detailed manifesto of the party is available in Safdar, Pakistan kī Āham Siyasi Jamāʿatī, pp. 235 to 253. 265 Jafri, The Political Parties of Pakistan, p. 77.


Present day’s Muhattida Qaumi Muhaz which is a regional political party based mainly in the urban areas of Sindh particularly Karachi and Hyderabad.


MQM asked for a commitment to resolve the problems of the Mohajirs [refugees], to release all arrested members of MQM responding to the Karachi disturbance. But the MQM could not reach at any agreement with the alliance leadership did not join it formally. *Dawn*, October 14, 1988. Accepting these demands PML could lose face in the Punjab and other provinces and even in other regions of Sindh as well. *Ahmad, Jarnæl Shahi*, p. 41.


Many authors have referred to the fact that Gul initiated the alliance. Murtaza Anjum is one of such authors. Anjum, Siyasat, ʾĀʾīn awr ʿAddālat, p. 22. Benazir transferred Gul from his post as Director General of the ISI accusing him for initiating the formation of the IJI. Mahnaz Isphahani, Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity (Dehradun: The English Book Depot, 1997), p. 18.


Ibid., p.

Ibid., p.

Ibid., p.

Ibid., p.

Ibid., p.


JI wanted to make sure that the elections were not postponed. It also demanded release of IJT members and withdrawal of the cases against them. It also demanded to re-instate workers of the labor unions who belonged to the IJI. Jamaat believed that these steps could improve the relations of the government with the students but Nawaz Sharif did not make any commitment with JI. JI also got the impression that the interim government might try to postpone the elections and Jamaat decided to not participate in the meetings held for the alliance formation. On that day the seven point agenda passed by the alliance members had no reference of the elections. Haq, “Tasvīr-e Watān”, p. 27.


Pakistan Times, October 11, 1988 and Haq, “Tasvīr-e Watān”, p. 27.


Jang, October 11, 1988. JI decided to cooperate with IJI believing that the basic agenda, enforcement of Shari‘a and opposition of the PPP was common between both of them. Having common objectives decreased the need to be involved in more comprehensive discussions or drawing boundaries for cooperation.

Asghar, We Have Learnt Nothing from History, pp. 196 and 250.


The credit for the formation of this alliance had been taken by Gul. Justification of this alliance was that if these parties participated in the elections individually the PPP could win the elections with a great majority and the establishment believed that it was not in favor of the sovereignty of Pakistan. It is also believed that if the alliance was formed a little earlier
the PPP could not win the elections even with simple majority. The statement is justified through the performance of IJI in the elections of 1990. Ahmad, *Jarnail Shahi*, pp. 41-42.

338 Brigadier Imtiaz also told that Altaf Hussain returned a briefcase full of currency notes the amount of Rs. 50,00000 but this statement did not receive any support from any other person. This duty was performed by the ‘Political Cell’ of ISI. Geo News, News Bulletin, August 25, 2009, 12 AM and “An Interview of Benazir With Naeeem Bukhari, in Apnei Andāzi Sei” HUMTV, October 4, 2009, Telecasted at 10.00 PM.


340 Benazir had formed a committee to find the reasons for the formation of IJI and the power behind this alliance. Farooq H. Naak was one of the members of this committee. Later the work of this committee was stopped for unknown reasons. Qaiyum Nizami, Interview by Author, Islamabad: October 6, 2009.


348 Later Junejo became a part of that alliance and the political power was used to counter the popularity of Bhutto family. 349 Khalid Mahmood, “The Election Scenario: Final Call for the Combat”, *The News*, October 13, 1988.

350 Altaf Hussain was founder and President of Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM).

351 To explain his point he told that his name was proposed as the Secretary General of IJI but Nawaz Sharif opposed it and he could not become Secretary General of IJI. Later his name was proposed for the office of the President of the alliance but this suggestion was also opposed by Nawaz Sharif as being CM of the Punjab Nawaz Sharif himself wanted to become President of IJI. Javed told that these decisions were taken by the alliance members and ISI or any other agency did not interfere in any of these decisions. Qaiyum Nizami, Interview by Author, Islamabad: October 6, 2009.

352 According to Qazi Hussain Ahmad socio-economic justice could be brought in the society through the introduction of economic system based on ‘Adal-o Ehsān (social justice and care). He also referred to the abolition of Jāgīrdāri system to provide social justice to all the people of Pakistan. *Pakistan Times*, October 30, 1988.


354 Eight political parties who signed the election manifesto of IJI were PML (Fida), JI, NPP, HJ, IPG, JAH (Lakhvi Group), JUI (Darkhwasti Group), JMP. *Election Manifesto of IJI 1988*.

355 *Election Manifesto of IJI*, 1988. *Also see Pakistan Times*, October 13, 1988. JI believed in the establishment of independent Islamic government of Afghan Mujahidin in Kabul after the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. It believed that this new Afghan government will be friendly with Pakistan. *Pakistan Times*, November 5, 1988. Vice President of PML Asif Vardag said that his party was against Dictatorship but it was carrying out the program of Zia because of his policy of Islamization, and support to Afghan Jihad. *Dawn*, October 6, 1988. Professor Ghaffoor in his book *Wazir-i Aʿẓam Benazir*, p. 86, mentions that NMG left the alliance on October 18, 1988 but we cannot consider that NMG joined the IJI formally as it did not sign the manifesto prepared by IJI for the elections of 1988.

356 See complete Manifesto in the appendix.

Sidiqul Farooq, Laiquat Balooch of JI, Poya of HJ, and Makhdoom Javed Hashmi who were prominent leaders of the alliance accepted that the alliance did not formulate its constitution. Personal interviews with Sidiqul Farooq, Laiquat Balooch, Makhdoom Javed Hashmi and Agha Murtaza Poya. *Pakistan Times*, October 13, 1988.

At the conclusion of the time of this office Jatoi announced Maulana Sami’s name as the next convener for next three months. Maulana Sami told that keeping in view the conditions of Pakistan, IJI needed a strong president and he nominated Nawaz Sharif as more appropriate person for the office. Time of office was also extended from three months to one year. Ahmad, *Wazir-i A’zam Benazir*, pp. 324-25.

Ibid., February 12, 1989.

Ibid., October 22, 1988.

Ibid., October 22, 1988. Also see *Pakistan Times*, February 12, 1989.


Ibid., 370


*Dawn*, November 5, 1988


CHAPTER 3

ELECTIONS OF 1988:

IJI POLICIES AND PROBLEMS

The year 1988 witnessed crucial political changes in Pakistan which altered the outlook of Pakistan government for the time being. First prominent development that took place was the dissolution of the NA and PAs in May 1988. After a few days, in a plane crash President Zia-ul Haq, Chairman joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, Brigadier Siddiq Salik, US ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Raphel, General Herbert M. Wassom, the head of the US military aid mission to Pakistan and few other army officers lost their lives. This incident created vacuum in the governing hierarchy. Chairman Senate Ghulam Ishaq Khan immediately took the responsibility as the caretaker president and Aslam Beg became the COAS. It was expected that the army would prefer to impose Martial Law but Beg decided to avoid direct involvement of the army in politics.
Elections were announced to be held on the time decided by the late president Zia in November 1988. Benazir had filed a case against non-party elections and Supreme Court’s verdict favored party based elections which paved the way for all the political parties to participate in the elections.

Before the decision of the Supreme Court, many of the political parties were expecting non-party elections and many believed that the army will impose Martial Law. Because of such rumors political parties did not concentrate on the preparations for the upcoming elections. The elections of 1985 also had a negative impact on the organization of some of the political parties as the elections were held on non-party basis and many of the members of the political parties denying the decision of their respective party’s leadership of the boycott of the elections contested the elections which disturbed the organization of many parties. Non-party elections also had oriented the politics towards the politics of constituencies. All such political shifts and measures added to difficulties in chalking out and espousing national agenda by the political parties.

Previous political alliances such as MRD also created impact on the electoral preparations of the political parties. Many of the member parties of MRD wanted to contest the elections from a common platform but the issue of the distribution of seats for the elections did not allow them to work together as PPP nominated its candidates from almost all the constituencies. Member parties of MRD demanded equal share of representation in the parliament which was not acceptable for PPP. Because of such demands of the member parties of MRD and hard stance of the PPP regarding sharing of seats, it resulted in the breakup of the alliance just before the elections of 1988. That was a situation when a major alliance (MRD) broke and some political parties joined alliances with others to increase the quantum of their success. Two major alliances made before the elections of 1988 were IJI and PAI. IJI consisted of eight parties and PAI had three member parties. PAI could not survive as one of its members PML (J) joined IJI three days before the last date of the withdrawal of the nomination papers of the candidates. In conclusion, in the elections of 1988 only one major political alliance, IJI participated. This chapter is a study of the IJI’s election manifesto, its politics before the elections, its election campaign and performance.

Elections of 1988

Pakistan’s constitution envisaged it a federation, consisting of four federating units, i.e. Balochistan, NWFP presently named as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Punjab and Sindh; Capital Territory Islamabad and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). President of Pakistan is elected by the Electoral College, consisting of the members of Senate, NA and the PAs for the term of five years. All the elections are held under secret ballot. The lower House had 237 members, amongst which 207 were elected on the basis of adult franchise from the provinces, federal capital and FATA. Ten members represent non-Muslims, directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise by their co-believers. Twenty women members were nominated by the member parties in the
187

Assembly. Same procedure was adopted for the election of the members of the PAs.

### Distribution of Seats among Provincial Assemblies in 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Assembly</th>
<th>Muslim Seats</th>
<th>Non-Muslim Seats</th>
<th>Seats Reserved for Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### I. Preparations for the Elections

Preparation for the election was also a difficult task as elections were going to be held after a long time on party basis. Government made different arrangements to make the elections fair and impartial. Some of the rules of the elections for contestants were amended before the elections of 1988 to make the process more transparent and acceptable for contestants in particular and for the people of Pakistan in general. It was announced that a Pakistani nationality holder could contest from any of the constituencies for the NA. Previously, it was a must for the candidates to contest the elections for NA seats from the native province. Candidates were also allowed to contest elections from more than one constituency. Presentation of National Identity Card (NIC) was made compulsory for the issuance of the ballot paper to avoid or decrease the chances of rigging in the elections but the decision was criticized particularly by the PPP believing that a large number of voters would lose the right to vote due to this compulsion. Compulsion of the NIC to poll the vote gave way to another kind of activity of stealing NIC. Both the major parties levied allegations against each other for stealing the NICs.

Election Commission prepared new electoral rolls to avoid chances of rigging. The final lists contained names and particulars of 4,7869,856 voters. In total 58.34% of the total population was registered as eligible voters. It was suggested to include numbers of NIC of the voters in the electoral rolls to avoid or at least to reduce the chances of rigging but the idea faced serious criticism of prominent political leaders and some analysts and was dropped. The constituencies were delimited on the basis of population density. The process of delimiting the constituencies was completed till October 1, 1988. With forging allegations and counter allegations, government’s new legislations through ordinances and Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)
arrangements the political parties started their campaign for the forthcoming elections. Before discussing the political scenario and activities of the political parties for the elections of 1988, election history of Pakistan is discussed to explain about the elections and attitude of the nation in general and political parties in particular about the elections.

II. History of Elections in Pakistan

Generally, the process of elections is adopted to form government in most of the countries who claim to be democratic societies. The method of election varies from place to place like adult franchise, restricted franchise, simple majority, plurality system or any other mode of the elections. Important thing about the elections is that those countries are considered more democratic who manage to conduct free and fair elections. Pakistan is also a democratic country but the basic feature of democracy, elections are usually doubtful or controversial because of the conditions under which they are conducted and non-acceptance of the election results by the losing parties. Another problem is that electoral process had never been smooth as different rulers changed the system according to their will. They did what could provide them legitimacy and help extending their ruling era as long as possible. First Constituent Assembly (CA) was elected by Muslim and non-Muslim members of its PAs. In 1955 second CA was elected by the PAs following the dissolution of the first CA by the Governor General Maj. Gen. Isikander Mirza.

The first major change in the electoral system was brought about by Ayub in 1962 as he introduced Basic Democracies System (BD). According to him it was a mode of guided democracy. Adult franchise was altered by the restricted franchise. In total, 80,000 constituencies were created. These 80,000 members were the electoral-college for the election of members of NA and PAs and President. Under this system elections were held in 1962 and 1965. This system was challenged during the anti-Ayub movement in 1967. In 1970 elections were held on the basis of adult franchise. This was the first general election ever held in Pakistan. Yahya Khan made a lot of efforts to check rigging. Constituencies were delimited and new electoral rolls were prepared on the basis of census of 1961. ECP was established under a Bengali judge named Justice Abdus Sattar. 63% of the registered voters participated in the elections. In 1970 elections two major parties were successful: Awani League won in the East Pakistan and PPP appeared as a major party in West Pakistan. This split mandate created controversy over the issue of formation of government and faced the most brutal consequence in shape of fall of Dhaka in December 1971. This was not the only reason for the fall of Dhaka. There were other factors that had been working since the creation of Pakistan i.e. language controversy, difference in the income of the common people in the East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Most of the posts in the bureaucracy and Military were obtained by the people of West Pakistan and most of the industries established in East Pakistan were owned by the people from the West Pakistan. All these reasons created sense of hatred and deprivation in the people of East Pakistan which came in forefront after the elections of 1970 and resulted in the separation of East Pakistan from the West Pakistan. In the constitution of
1973, electoral procedures were explained by the PPP government but according to this format only 1977 elections could be held. Due to rigging\textsuperscript{22} by the government, opposition parties refused to accept the results of the elections and started a movement against Bhutto administration. Severe strikes were held, which resulted to the enforcement of Martial Law by Zia in July 1977. In 1984 he held a referendum\textsuperscript{23} to prove legitimacy for his rule. Later, general elections were held on non-party basis in 1985 which made the electoral system open for discussion once again. The NA was dissolved by Zia on May 29, 1988 and he announced next elections in November of the same year. Elections of 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 were initiated by and a consequence of administrative fiat but their impact set a course for the future of Pakistani politics.\textsuperscript{24}

Generally, it is believed that the 1988 election was an election without issues and was fought on the basis of political rivalries of different political groups. But there was another thing that mattered a lot in political dynamics of Pakistan during the elections of 1988 and that was the pattern set by the non-party elections of 1985. The non-party elections of 1985 took the politics from the national agenda to local agenda with minor issue like supply of electricity and availability of tap water in different constituencies. Impact of the elections of 1985 could not be wiped away from the politics of Pakistan in the future politics for many years and politicians’ concentrating shifted to the local issues from the issues of national importance and legislation.

In Pakistan, major determinant of the elections results is not the previous performance of the politicians and political parties but other factors like biradari (family) affiliations, economic status and personal connections are more important. The politicians usually have no fear of losing the elections if they maintain good relations with the people of their constituency. The good rapport with public compensates for their pathetic performance.\textsuperscript{25} Social, economic and personal constraints of common people force them to follow orders of the Tribal Sardars (head of a tribe), in case of being member of a tribe, or the landlord whose land they cultivate. In cities people are not forced through such things but still they vote keeping in view the fact that certain person will help them get job for their jobless children or can help them get their taxes right-off. Such petty issues are the basic determinants of the voters’ interests. Consequently militarism, hypocrisy, hatred, selfishness, wickedness, corruption and violence have become the most prominent feature of politics of the Pakistani political leadership. At times public sentiments are fanned through parochialism. Another factor that creates a clear impact on the election results was rigging or the allegations of rigging. Islam is another slogan on which the people are being exploited since the inception of Pakistan particularly in this region as a tool of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{26} Negative propaganda is another characteristic of our politics. Each of the politicians used this to earn name and to disgrace the others. Z. A. Bhutto came forward and earned name for his opposition towards Ayub, the president of Pakistan in 1960s. Benazir got legitimacy from the people due to opposition to Martial
Law in the country and highlighting oppressive policies of Zia. Later Nawaz Sharif and Benazir used each and every tactic to defame their political opponents. These factors played important role in determining the 1988 elections’ results as earlier.

III. Pre-Election Scenario

There were doubts about commencement of the elections even after assurances of Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Beg. A section of people believed that the elections would be delayed because of the heavy floods in the Punjab and the law and order situation in Sindh. Jatoi, convener of IJI openly demanded the postponement of the elections because he believed that it was difficult to attract common people towards the election activity in such situation. But the commitment of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Beg did not opt for delaying the elections and November 16, 1988 was announced as a final date for holding elections. The decision was left for the election commission about holding both NA and PA elections on one day or simultaneously and (ECP) decided to hold elections of NA and PAs with the gap of at least three days due to administrative reasons.

Junejo’s petition against dismissal of his government in Supreme Court also raised doubts about holding the elections. Many people and political parties did not pay much attention to the preparations for the elections as they were waiting for the court’s decision as the court could even nullify the dismissial order and the assemblies could be reinstated. On September 27, 1988 Lahore high court declared the dissolution of the NA unconstitutional but it endorsed the decision of holding fresh elections in November 1988. The members of the dissolved NA tried to hold the session of NA but Supreme Court denied undoing the decision of Lahore high court and the focus got a shift towards next elections.

IV. Demand for the Appointment of Neutral Government

After having a clear idea that government was serious in holding elections PPP, JI, PML (J) and other smaller parties demanded appointment of a neutral government to conduct free and fair elections. A question was persistently raised that could the caretakers hold free and fair elections as the Caretaker Chief Ministers were the presidents of the provincial Leagues as well. The parties quoted examples of the caretaker government using official sources to enhance impression of IJI generally and PML (F) particularly. Some parties demanded that if the caretaker government was inevitable than a national government should be appointed. The attitude of the caretakers could prove their neutrality but none of them tried to do so and kept on supporting their candidates for the forthcoming elections and not hesitated even using national resources for their election campaign. Ghulam Ishaq Khan allowed the caretakers to continue. This gave a general impression to
the common people that he had a soft corner for IJI and its allies.\textsuperscript{36} Having reservations and problems with the caretaker government and the rules and arrangements for the elections, none of the parties boycotted the election. Serious efforts were not made even to get the government changed as they feared the postponement of the election. Possibility of another military takeover could also not be ignored which made them avoid using street power for the appointment of a neutral government.

Political parties had their own problems at the start of elections. Each of them wanted to augment the prospects of its victory. There were transitions in the attitude of political parties. Political developments like; division of PML, shift in Jamaat’s anti-Zia stance, Jatoi’s discussions with PML(F) to make a political alliance, MQM’s swing towards establishment and President of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) Abdul Qayyum Khan’s efforts to establish a pro-Zia group, were clear indicators of change in the political scenario.\textsuperscript{37} There seemed to be four major political groups; official PML, PML Junejo group, MRD, JI combined with other politico-religious groups\textsuperscript{38} but just before the elections unification of the PML, break up of MRD and formation of IJI changed the scenario. As the present study focuses on the IJI so IJI’s electoral politics will be discussed in the proceeding pages.

V. IJI in the Elections of 1988

IJI was a newly created political alliance. Basic purpose of the formation of this alliance was to win against the PPP. To achieve this goal IJI tried to plan well for which different techniques were used in preparations and campaign of the elections. Sine focus of this study is politics of IJI, its political moves and electoral plans are discussed in detail.

VI. Election Symbol

With the consent of member parties of IJI, it was decided that all of them will contest the election under one election symbol\textsuperscript{39} ‘Bicycle’. Although this was a difficult decision because using one electoral symbol, member parties had to surrender or at least ignore their individual political identities for the time being but they decide to make this sacrifice to win over a common political foe ‘the PPP’.

VII. Election Manifesto of IJI

IJI made public its seven point agenda on November 8, 1988. It advocated Supremacy of Islamic Law, the provision of economic opportunity, inexpensive and non-discriminatory system of justice, safeguarding women's rights (with four religious parties as IJI members),
full support to Afghan Jihad (Holy War), and promotion of nuclear power for peaceful purposes and independence of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{40}

There were strong allegations against IJI that it had no comprehensive program to attract masses.\textsuperscript{41} IJI’s program mainly concentrated on the Islamization and Afghanistan issue but it seemed to be too sketchy and ineffective\textsuperscript{42} to attract people. The other problem with IJI was that its member parties did not agree to each other about its manifesto as JI leaders considered Afghanistan issue the basic reason of the alliance while others like PML did not agree to this viewpoint. JI was against Geneva Accord\textsuperscript{43} while PML (J) considered signing of this accord an achievement of Junejo as PM. Alliance partners had difference of opinion about basic principles of Islamization in the country as well.\textsuperscript{44}

**VIII. Choice of Candidates**

In the elections political parties were more interested in nominating strong winning candidates instead of preparing comprehensive and impressive manifestoes to attract the voters. Generally it seemed to be a clash of personalities instead of a competition of different ideologies or programs and almost all the efforts were made to form government than to win favor for the ideology in the elections of general public.\textsuperscript{45} It was difficult task for IJI to reach at a formula of seat adjustment for the member parties of the alliance. IJI consisting of eight political parties with diverse nature and manifesto faced serious problems in reaching at a formula of sharing seats as each of the parties wanted to get more seats than its quantum of popularity. In fact, the leadership of member parties of IJI could not think beyond benefiting their respective parties. This attitude created problems in seat sharing and at some constituencies un-representative candidates got the alliance ticket. Personality clashes and ideological clashes of members of the IJI parties increased the problem further.\textsuperscript{46} There was a lot of tension among the members of the two alliances\textsuperscript{47} regarding the allotment of the party tickets. The central leaders of IJI and Secretary General of JMP, Pir Fazale Haq (Pir Fazal), announced that all parties of the alliance would nominate joint candidates in the elections.\textsuperscript{48} In such a situation distribution of party tickets was a tough job as there had been many considerations like; the alliance wanted to select the best possible candidates for the elections. At the same time it had to keep in mind that it was not just one party but an alliance of eight parties so it was necessary to give enough space to each party to keep the alliance united. Many controversies were linked with the selection of the candidates at party level as well as at alliance level. The issues and reservations of some of the individuals also increased problems of the alliance regarding the selection of candidates for the forthcoming elections.

It was a tough task to decide the alliance candidates but still on October 18, 1988 Professor Ghafoor announced that IJI parties had decided its candidates for NA in all the four provinces. He also informed that IJI decided to distribute tickets on merit and not on any other set pattern.\textsuperscript{49} Almost 65\% seats of the NA were allotted to the unified PML\textsuperscript{50}, which was a major component of the IJI. Two other major components of IJI; NPP and JI got almost 15\% tickets for the NA constituencies and remaining 5\% were divided among
the other members of the alliance like JAH (Lakhvi), JUI (D) and IPG. Most of the exMNAs got alliance tickets from the PML platform which belonged to both PML (F) and PML (J).

**JIJ announced its contestants for the PAs on October 22, 1988.** But this was just an initial decision as from time to time new candidates were nominated and for some constituencies decisions were changed which created problems for the alliance leadership to maintain cohesion among the member parties of the IJI. To solve tension Jatoi suggested convening a meeting of the heads of the member parties of IJI. Junejo, president of PML had two reservations about the meeting of the heads of IJI; firstly, he was not informed about any meeting of the heads of the alliance parties well before time and secondly, he was too busy in the election campaign in his constituency to attend any alliance meeting. According to Junejo the attitude of carelessness regarding him could not be tolerated. Due to the harsh attitude of Junejo, the idea of holding the meeting of the heads of the member parties of IJI could not be materialized. Initial decisions regarding seat distribution were as following:

**Islamabad:** Muhammad Nawaz Khokar, from Islamabad, joined PML (Fida Group) yet it was pending to decide about the allotment of the ticket for the forthcoming election. From IJI two members Dr. Sarfraz Mir of NPP and Gul Andaz Abbasi of JI were strong candidates for the only NA constituency.

**Sindh:** In Sindh NA PML got 11, NPP and JI 5 each, JUI got 2 and JMP got 1 ticket for the elections. Few candidates of the member parties of IJI contested elections as independent candidates such as Umeed Ali Shah (NPP), Shahbauddin Shah, and Mir Innayat enjoyed full support of PML. Initially IJI nominated 62 candidates for 100 seats of the PA of Sindh. These 62 seats were distributed among the member parties of IJI as; PML got 32 tickets, NPP 20, JI 6, JUI (D) 3 and JMP 1. Among these 62, four seats were reserved for NMG which withdrew the alliance even before the elections of 1988 and these seats were redistributed as 1 to PML, 2 to JI and 1 was allotted to IPG. In Karachi, JI had to contest for 8 NA seats. The remaining had to be decided by the IJI Chief Jatoi, PML Chief Junejo and Pir Pagara.

There were problems in distribution of party tickets mainly between PML and NPP about 25 seats in Sindh. In order to sort out the problem a meeting of Junejo, Jatoi and Pir Pagara was held on October 21, 1988 but nothing could come out of it. To resolve the tension separate discussions of different party leaders held which did not help to find any solution of the problem. JI decided to contest seven out of thirteen constituencies of Karachi and faced tough competition from MQM candidates. Amir of Karachi JI, Muhammad Azam Farooqi hinted the dissatisfaction about the ticket distribution in Karachi for NA and PA constituencies. He specifically named ex-Mayor of Karachi, Abdus Sattar Afghani as potential candidate, who was denied the alliance ticket. He was dissatisfied about two provincial seats of Karachi as well.
In Sindh, PML (J) was politically well placed as it maintained its position against the rising tide of nationalism. Junejo believed that after the unification of PML it was necessary to review the nominations of the alliance candidates but Jatoi allotted tickets on his own. Junejo alleged that due to mishandling of the responsibility, NPP candidates were contesting elections against PML candidates in Tharparker, but later he denied all the charges when his candidates Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Muhammad Bashir Khan and Ch. Muhammad Aslam Gill were nominated as IJI candidates for NA-174 Mirpur Khas and PS-54 Digri. There was difference of opinion on the nomination of candidates for Shangar and Tharparker Districts. A meeting of IJI leadership, was arranged on October 25, 1988 to solve the issue in both the districts, but nothing came out of it. Pir Pagara kept on criticizing the distribution of alliance tickets from time to time believing that most of the decisions were not impartial which ignored the merit as well.

Balochistan: For eleven seats of NA IJI allotted 9 tickets to PML candidates. JI got ticket for 1 NA seat to contest elections in Balochistan and 1 for PA. In Panjgoor, Loralai and Quetta, JI expected tickets for the elections but PML avoided giving more chance to JI to win elections in many constituencies. For 40 PA seats 444 members contested the elections amongst which 2 were women. The highest number of candidates was fielded by IJI and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i Islam (JUI-F). PML awarded party tickets to influential Sardars (Tribal Heads) and notables but majority of the decisions were not acceptable to Junejo and his followers. NPP was not satisfied with its share in Balochistan. It also had problems with the decision of nominating Sardars and notables of the province as alliance candidates. Because of these objections NPP withdrew its candidates from the alliance and they contested elections as independent candidates which went against IJI. The basic reason of such conflicts was that the decisions of the parliamentary boards of the member parties of the alliance were not honored properly by the alliance leadership.

Punjab: Almost 65% tickets for NA were allotted to the PML. Most of the selected candidates had been elected members of the assemblies in the previous elections. In this way almost 84 well known politicians were brought forward to increase the chances of the victory in the elections. The NPP got 4 NA tickets for its candidates from the Punjab; JUI (D) got 2, JAH (Lakhvi) got 1 ticket from Kasur for Maulana Moeenuddin. JI got 12 tickets from Punjab for NA constituencies, amongst which 8 were for Lahore. 3 candidates of IPG were selected to contest the elections under the banner of IJI.

For Punjab PA IJI fielded 225 candidates. Till October 18, 1988 the distribution of seats among the member parties of IJI was as: PML got 84 tickets, JI 15, JUI 2, JAH 1 and IPG group 4 tickets for the Punjab PA. For 12 seats of RWP, PML got 10 tickets. For 3 NA and 6 PA seats of Lahore 6 tickets were given to PML (F) and 3 to JI. The decision was not acceptable for NPP and PML (J) so both created problems for IJI. A rebel group of NPP contested from different constituencies of Lahore. Similarly PML (J) fielded its candidates at different constituencies of Punjab as independents. The leaders of the parties could not prevent the members of their respective parties from submitting
their nomination paper which made things more difficult for IJI. This attitude of the political representatives created negative impact on the image and popularity of IJI which ultimately took election results in favor of PPP.

In Punjab choice of candidates was made on almost similar grounds by PPP and IJI. It was all from the old political families. The major political families, unsure of the results, covered themselves by providing candidates to both the major parties. The parties did not bother this attitude and accepted the candidates provided by these political families. Hardly anybody was concerned about the party ideology or the political beliefs of the politicians while selection of candidates was on its way. Only exception was PML (F) which selected pro-Zia persons as its candidates. It appointed a parliamentary board for the distribution of party tickets because it received more than one application for each constituency for NA and PAs. A large number of traders and entrepreneurs participated in the elections on the IJI ticket hoping that their support will pose a strong challenge to PPP in urban areas.

IJI was in a strong position in the Punjab province. Nawaz Sharif had a complete hold over the party. One weakness which was a matter of concern for the IJI was that it lacked strong social and political base in the rural Punjab. It was expected that some of the seats could be won by IJI because of its candidates in rural Punjab instead of the manifesto or the popularity of the alliance itself. Late decisions about the alliance’s candidates adversely affected the performance of the alliance. Some members were awarded party tickets through helicopters at the last moments and some members could not get the party symbol. In fact PML (J) faction joined the IJI lately so many people of NPP and JI were denied the party tickets that were promised earlier. Similarly many of the members of PML (J) were denied the party tickets that were promised for it being a member of PAI. At the unification, Junejo did not realize that IJI had already allocated tickets, leaving only a handful for the Junejo Faction. Because of late joining most of the members of PML (J) could not get IJI tickets to contest the elections, and got only 20% seats. From Gujar Khan, Raja Nadir Pervaiz and at Sargodha Muhammad Aslam Katcheela were denied the alliance tickets who were senior politicians and close associates of Junejo. This attitude towards the close associates of Junejo resulted in an indifferent attitude of the PML (J) towards the election campaign of the other members of the alliance. In reaction to the denial of alliance tickets these and some other prominent leaders decided to contest elections as independent candidates.

Nisar Ahmad Nisar, a member of PML (F) from Rawalpindi submitted his papers. Muhammad Rafi Butt, Mir Abdur Rashid Jillani and Ali Ahmad Shah of NPP wanted to contest the elections from the same constituency. Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad started his campaign before the party’s decision about this constituency. Some members of the PML explicitly criticized the decisions of the leadership regarding the distribution of the alliance tickets. Sheikh Khalid Masud of PML Youth Wing called the distribution of alliance tickets as a blunt example of injustice. Basharat Raja of PML was of the view that the distribution of alliance tickets was against different members of IJI. He said that the changing decisions about PP-3 and PP-4 were not acceptable for the representatives of the public.
Jatoi alleged that the alliance leadership did not abide by its promises made with the NPP. He said that the issue was needed to be resolved in the meeting of top leadership of the alliance. He told that all those NPP members were denied party tickets that had difference of opinion with PML in Punjab. According to him, NPP nominees from Faisal Abad, Gujranwala, Islamabad, Lahore, Sadiqabad and Liaquatpoor were victimized. He also hinted the mismanagement regarding allotment of tickets to more than one nominee at certain constituencies. He was of the opinion that almost eighteen winning candidates of NPP were denied the party tickets. Almost same situation was faced by NPP in other provinces as well. It did not enjoy much support in NWFP. After his dismissal as the provincial president of NPP, Nsarullah Khattak joined Khar group. Provincial Secretary of the party Asif Qayyum also resigned because he could not accept alliance of NPP with PML (F) and joined PPP. JUI (D) also had reservations regarding the distribution of party tickets. According to it, PML had an aggressive attitude and was not accommodating smaller parties properly. Responding to PML behavior its leadership announced that Maulana Muhammad Ajmal Qadri, Malik Shah Ahmad Khan and Maulana Muhammad Ahmad were its candidates and they will not withdraw.

Till October 20, 1988 IJI could not finalize all of its members for Punjab PA. Many of the prominent members could not get the ticket and decided to contest elections as independent candidates which harmed the IJI as the election campaign of these members created negative impression of the alliance and the votes of the alliance got divided. Due to the delay some important politicians could not provide authority letters to election commission due to which they were unable to get alliance’s election symbol “bicycle”. These included federal interior minister Naseem Ahmad Aheer, Haji Nawaz Khokhar from Islamabad and Raja Muhammad Afsar from Jehlum. Different newspapers gave different number of the candidates of the member parties of IJI who got tickets for the elections of 1988 while Ghafoor, Liaquat Balouch of JI, Javed Hashmi and Siddiquil Farooq of PML are unable to tell the exact number of the candidates belonging to the member parties of IJI. Problems and controversies in seat sharing were equally critical at Center as well as at provincial level. Some of the issues regarding seat sharing are discussed below.

NWFP: Seat allocation was a matter of a great tension for the allies of IJI in NWFP. Many members of PML (J) and that of the other member parties of IJI could not be accommodated. Till October 21, 1988 IJI announced list of 74 candidates for NWFP PA. Remaining six had to be announced after one or two days. 14 tickets for the NWFP PA were given to JI. IJI fielded 19 candidates for 26 NA constituencies. 4 NA seats were allotted to JI in NWFP. Late decision of two factions of the PML to join hands for the elections created a lot of confusion among the people and the members of these factions. Junejo group, being the member of another alliance PAI had decided its candidates for the elections and it proved difficult to agree the nominated candidates to withdraw. As the last date for submission of nomination papers approached, party leadership allowed its members to submit their papers with the view that after reaching at a conclusion, nomination papers of extra candidates would be withdrawn.
these parties submitted their nomination papers on their own and started election campaign in their constituencies. Some of the members even shifted their party membership.

In the NWFP, many Muslim Leaguers shifted their loyalties to PPP or ANP. Unification of PML created problems for Junejo as some of his staunch supporters were denied the alliance tickets for the elections amongst them were the senior vice-president of PML (J) in NWFP Mian Muhammad Iqbal and Syed Munir Shah, chief organizer of PML (J). There was a controversy between Gen. Retd. Fazle Haq (Haq) and Arbab Jahangir as the later was of the opinion that Haq was trying to spoil the image of PML in NWFP. He was concerned about the distribution of party tickets in the province. He believed that PML enjoyed majority support in the province and it was going to win the elections. In a scenario of conflict, Arbab Jahangir started campaign against Haq, which was not in any case in favor of PML or IJI in the province and was going to bring ultimate problems to the IJI. Haq decided to contest from 5 PA seats which were later reduced to 3. He had differences with Jahangir for which he wanted to keep Jahangir out of the electoral race. Responding to this Jahangir announced that he will oppose every candidate of the IJI in NWFP. He told the newsmen that he had only one purpose and that was to keep Haq away from the politics of NWFP. Jahangir’s desertion from the alliance minimized the chances of IJI to become a major political force in the province. Chances of PML’s victory were there but IJI was at a critical position for any success in the province. Provincial Chief Organizer of PML in NWFP announced that if he was not provided the alliance ticket, he will contest the elections independently from NA-19 and PF 60. Muzamil Shah was allotted alliance ticket for NA-14 but after the unification of PML the ticket was allotted to former federal Minister Syed Qasim Shah. Another PML member Mian Muhammad Iqbal returned the IJI ticket and decided to contest the elections as an independent candidate but he withdrew his papers following the suggestion of Junejo. Provincial Secretary of PML Aman Ullah Kahn Jadoon returned the party ticket as he was given the ticket to contest for PA seat but he was not satisfied believing he deserved a ticket for a NA constituency. This created negative effect on the politics of Hazara District particularly and minimized the chances of IJI victory in the NWFP generally. A former provincial minister Mehtab Ahmad Abbasi contested elections for PA seat as an independent candidate because he could not get the IJI ticket. PML leadership warned the members of the party to withdraw their nomination papers as independent candidates otherwise the party had to take disciplinary action against them, which was never done. Another point of contention was that IJI announced its support to Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilor, who had been a strong follower of Bacha Khan. None of the members of PML could get the IJI ticket from Peshawar district which was not acceptable to its members as Peshawar has always been considered as the strongest area of influence of PML. The problem further intensified due to the last minute change in the names of candidates for the IJI for PA elections.

Generally in the Punjab and in the NWFP representatives of PML (J) were dissatisfied with the ticket distribution. It was alleged that the General Secretary of PML (F) changed the nominations due to which names of one ex-provincial minister and another
member of PML (J) were dropped from the list. This created serious tension and many of
the members of PML (J) announced their support for PPP and ANP in the
province.\textsuperscript{121} IJI faced splits at the time of distribution of party tickets.\textsuperscript{122} Smaller parties of
the IJI like JUI (D), was unhappy with the alliance leadership regarding the issue of
distribution of party tickets. JUI-D warned to withdraw from the alliance on the problem
of ticket distribution in the elections of 1988.\textsuperscript{123} Major reason of the mess created in the
party matters was considered by Ghafoor the late decision of Junejo to join the IJI as it was
the last day for the withdrawal of the nomination papers. So the problems had to arise,
particularly when the Junejo faction was accommodated at the cost of the smaller parties
in the alliance.\textsuperscript{124} It can be said that if the decisions were taken carefully or at least things
were finalized once, the situation could be different. Changes in the nominations from time
to time were needed but if the announcements were made after final decision it could
prevent many of the tensions that had been part of IJI while it was nominating its candidates
for the elections.

\textbf{IX. Controversies within the Alliance}

The alliance consisted of eight political parties and distribution of tickets could not satisfy
every member. This resulted in desertions of members of the allied parties from the
alliance. Politicians who could not get party tickets contested elections as independent
candidates. This caused division in the vote bank of the alliance.\textsuperscript{125} Some of the leaders of
the member parties, even dissatisfied with the alliance decisions, wanted to keep it intact
till the November 16, 1990 to win over a common foe; the PPP.\textsuperscript{126} A meeting of the heads
of the member parties of IJI was arranged to address the issue of distribution of the tickets
and grievances of member parties, as many of the parties had an impression that they were
not given the decided quota\textsuperscript{127} of the tickets or they were unable to get due share of the
alliance tickets.\textsuperscript{128} It was also decided that all party members, opposing the alliance official
candidates in the forthcoming elections, would be expelled from their respective parties, if
they did not withdraw till October 31, 1988.\textsuperscript{129} The last date for withdrawal was extended
twice on the notice of three days each time and was announced the second time as the last
chance.\textsuperscript{130} It was observed that a large majority of violators was from the Junejo faction of
Muslim League, who were promised party tickets before merger of the PML (J) and PML
(F).\textsuperscript{131} But the decision of expulsion of the
representatives was delayed to reconsider the party tickets at some constituencies because
of the weak position of the IJI contestants.\textsuperscript{132} Such kind of delays and reconsiderations
affected credibility of IJI and the rebel members did not take leaderships announcements
seriously.

IJI leadership failed to make its members follow the party decisions. In many
constituencies, members of IJI parties contested elections against the IJI candidates. In five
out of nine Lahore constituencies of NA, IJI candidates were challenged by other
candidates of the member parties of the alliance.\textsuperscript{133}

Few examples of such practice are mentioned below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Official Candidate</th>
<th>Opposing Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NA-92, Karachi</td>
<td>Akram Nadeem</td>
<td>Maulana Ehtramul Haq Thanvi (PML)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA-186, Karachi</td>
<td>Ghafoor Ahmad (JI)</td>
<td>Athar Siddiqui (NPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA-7, Mardan</td>
<td>Maulana Ghaur Rehman</td>
<td>Dr. Misal Khan (PML)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muree-Kahuta</td>
<td>Raja Zafarul Haq (PML)</td>
<td>Shahid Abbasi (PML)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khushab</td>
<td>Khuda Baksh Tiwana</td>
<td>Nasim Aheer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In NA-52 Nasim Ahmad Aheer and Malik Khuda Bakhsh Tiwana were not willing to withdraw. In Lahore, NA-94, Mian Umer Hayat of NPP decided to leave the party and participate in the elections as an independent candidate after losing the hope to get the alliance ticket. In this constituency PML Secretary General Iqbal Ahmad Khan had got the party ticket initially. Later under the pressure of the selected candidates for provincial seats from this constituency Iqbal withdrew and Hayat was selected as the alliance candidate. In NA-96, Hafiz Suleman Butt of JI faced Azhar Saeed Butt of JUI (F) and Ajmal Qadri of JUI (D). In this constituency PPP had a strong hold and further division of anti-PPP votes made it impossible for IJI to attract voters. JUI (D) was member of the IJI but its leader Sami gave tickets to the members of his faction for which the votes of IJI were divided in some constituencies although it was only able to win one seat in NA and not any seats were won by it in the provincial assemblies. Provincial leaders of NPP and HJ believed that the distribution of seats was unjustified and they considered PML and JI responsible for this unjust exercise. The leaders were of the opinion that workers of the member parties of the alliance, except members of these two parties, were dissatisfied with the distribution of the tickets. The Secretary General of the alliance was considered to be the key person for that disturbance who gave more importance to his party than to the alliance. In NA-98 Mian Asif felt himself deprived of the alliance ticket as being senior member of PML (J). He believed that he was the best deserving candidate for the party ticket in this constituency. IJI selected Mian Usman for this constituency as the alliance candidate which resulted in the division of the IJI’s votes. Some politicians made things worse for IJI leadership contesting elections from a constituency on the IJI ticket and from some other constituency as independent candidate.

This situation improved with withdrawal of some prominent leaders of member parties of IJI. Withdrawal of Iqbal from NA-94 in favor of Hayat was something good that was followed by others as well. Pir Muhammad Ashraf withdrew in favor of Maj. Gen. (Retd.) M.H. Ansari of JUP, for NA-96 Ajmal Qadri of JUI (D) withdrew in favor of Salman Butt of JI and Mian Muhammad Shahbaz withdrew in favor of Mian Shahbaz Sharif of PML. Such decisions not only molded situation in favor of IJI but it also enhanced the image of IJI among the common people which helped to show better results in the elections. There was some positive effect as well on the IJI when some of the members of other parties or independents announced their support for it.
Keeping the IJI tensions in view, it seems that all such problems arose because the alliance was not a planned move of politicians. Issues that were supposed to be addressed before getting involved in a common political activity were not discussed. The alliance was formed by PML (F) and NPP. Later it was extended to nine parties but Nizam-e Mustafa Group left it before the elections of 1988 and it remained the alliance of eight parties without deciding principle issues like manifesto, quantum of representation and principle policies. Conflicting issues were not resolved through mutual consensus or discussions by the member parties before joining the alliance. None of the principles were devised to resolve the conflicting issues. The member parties with different orientations and with different motives could not reconcile themselves with the alliance which remained prominent throughout the existence of IJI.

x. Election Campaign 1988

Election campaign is an organized, coordinated and concerted effort to influence or frame the public opinion in favor of a political party or an individual. Usually it is organized in a systematic way to impress the voters with the political agenda of the political parties but in the countries with flimsy democratic traditions and personality based politics, campaigns are more concentrated on the opposition of the political rivals. It cannot be said that in the developed countries political rivals are not criticized but the criticism is generally based on the political opposition based on the facts, manifestoes and hard realities. In countries like Pakistan as most of the political parties are unorganized and are without any particular political agenda these parties generally base their election campaign on the opposition, particularly negative propaganda and personal attacks on the rival groups and parties. Election campaign of IJI, PPP and other political parties in 1988 was not an exception. The focus of the study is IJI so the following section of this chapter is focusing on the election campaign of the IJI for the elections of 1988.

Generally the election campaigns are based on issues along with a comprehensive agenda for the future plans of political parties in most of the democratic countries. Another factor that is important regarding the election campaign is that it must be tolerant to the views of the political opponents but in the elections of 1988 the whole scenario was different if not contrary to this approach. There was hardly any focus on the issues of national importance. At the same time it was less tolerant to the views of the political opponents. It seemed that the whole process of campaigning was based on bad temper, mud-slinging and mutual character assassination. Political parties perceived these election stunts as the source of their victory in the electoral process.

Prominent features of the election campaign of the major political parties like IJI and the PPP in the elections of 1988 were negative propaganda, absence of any comprehensive program, and dependence on the legacies of previous leaders like Bhutto (PPP) and Zia (IJI). One of the important reasons for such kind of election campaign was that there were minor differences in the political program of the major parties. They did not
have too much to offer the people and there were a large number of turncoats and opportunists, in such circumstances ideology seemed irrelevant\(^\text{144}\) and discussions about ideology could bring embarrassment for them.

IJI was an alliance of political parties with varied ideological outlook and political orientation. At the same time controversies among the member parties regarding the ticket distribution were not a secret. Keeping in view the fact that people were aware of the internal problems of the IJI, it was decided to show unity to the people. So the presidents and prominent leaders of all the member parties of IJI decided to address important public meetings.\(^\text{145}\) It was told by Pir Fazal (Information Secretary of IJI and President of JMP) that Jatoi, Nawaz Sharif, Haq, he himself and other prominent leaders of the alliance would be participating in the countrywide election campaign.\(^\text{146}\) A meeting of IJI party heads held at Jatoi house on October 28, 1988 in which decisions were taken about its election campaign.\(^\text{147}\) JI was entrusted the responsibility to work for the publicity of the alliance.\(^\text{148}\) It had to prepare banners, posters and pamphlets for the election campaign and publicity of the alliance.\(^\text{149}\) Initially IJI published two posters. One poster carried a nine-star green flag on the upper part and a picture of a cycle was printed in black on the yellow background, on the lower part of the poster. The second poster entitled as “the winner, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad”. It showed thousands of people following a leader riding a bicycle with an IJI flag.\(^\text{150}\) The flag was made with nine stars to show relevance with ANP’s struggle for Islamization of Laws in Pakistan. Second part of the flag was designed to give impression that huge number of the common people was supporting the IJI.

IJI started its election campaign from Karachi on October 28, 1988. In the public meeting president of IJI Jatoi, *amir* JI Qazi, secretary general of JMP Pir Fazal, secretary general of JUI (D) Sami, president PML Sindh Akhtar Ali G. Qazi, and head of IPG Fakhar participated in the meeting. People were carrying flags of different parties among which JI flags were most prominent. Poya could not attend the meeting.\(^\text{151}\) It was said by Sami that IJI was not a personality based alliance but was an ideological union of different political parties which was formed with a basic purpose of enforcement of *Shari‘a* to give basic rights to the people and to support Afghan *Jihad*. It was also added that IJI consisted of all colors of Pakistan so nobody can consider it representative of a single ethnic group or representative of any of the provinces.\(^\text{152}\) In the first IJI rally announcements to attract common people were made by the IJI leadership.

In its movement of mass contact a rally was arranged in Lahore. The procession made its way from Mochi Gate, Akbari Mandi, Haveli Nawab Shaib and Mufti Baqar. Throughout the way Nawaz Sharif was warmly welcomed and he made promises to solve genuine problems of the people. At Masjid Wazir Khan IJI office was inaugurated on the same day. During the rally Nawaz Sharif walked on a long way with his supporters. In his jeep a medium size bicycle, the election symbol of IJI, was placed.\(^\text{153}\) IJI leadership also announced to make Pakistan nuclear power. Qazi said that IJI was committed to make Pakistan so strong that it could hoist the Pakistani flag on Red Fort in India.\(^\text{154}\) He also hoped to unite the Muslims of Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan and to work together for the freedom of Indian occupied Kashmir.\(^\text{155}\) In different public meetings leaders of IJI,
particularly Qazi showed commitment to the Kashmir cause. He promised to take every step for the liberation of Kashmir if IJI wins in elections. In the public meetings none of the leaders touched the important issues like inflation, corruption, deteriorating economic conditions, usage of intoxication by youth, education and health policies. Jatoi’s speech mainly revolved around denying internal problems of the alliance and criticism on the attitude of PPP leadership due to which MRD was dissolved. For this meeting of IJI 13 NA and 28 PA candidates had campaigned for four days and each of them was guided to reach at Nishtar Park with a procession of party workers and supporters. It can be said that IJI planned properly to create an impression of its popularity among the common people and to impress its opponents.

IJI held a meeting in Peshawar on November 2, 1988 in Jinnah Park. The meeting proved a JI show with local leaders of the member parties of IJI. Other prominent leaders could not reach to attend the meeting despite a prior announcement. In the meeting Pir Fazl said that Pakistan needed strong men to lead the country and a woman could not perform the duty to lead the nation properly. Pir Fazl and Ajmal Khan of JUI (D) were more provocative while talking about the PPP leadership. To create a positive impression IJI made arrangements to bring people from Malakand, Hazara, Kohat and Mardan district to attend the meeting. A large number of government officials also attended the meeting. In the meeting Sami said that IJI will bring Islamic system in the country. Pir Fazal told that the election was not a battle to get government but a conflict between the believers and secularists. During the campaign IJI called the elections of 1988 a contest between the Islamic and un-Islamic forces. He also said that feudal system will be abolished and the government will impound all the property awarded to the local people by the British government and that land will be distributed among the farmers to improve their living standard. He also discussed that IJI believed in the provincial autonomy instead of maintain a strong Centre. Pir Fazal also announced that an independent foreign policy will be adopted, and Pakistan will not support USA in future. Muhammad Ajmal said that public will reject those who were the major cause of fall of Dhaka. Qazi announced the revival of the student unions and labor organizations. He supported independent government in Afghanistan. He also professed the resolution of Afghanistan issue Kashmir and Palestine problem will also be resolved soon. People were asked to select from pro and anti-Islamic forces. IJI published ‘Green Paper’ to explain its foreign policy. Its main focus was the unity of the Muslim world and independent foreign policy. The pro-Moscow, pro-Kabul, pro-Delhi and anti-Afghanistan elements were severely criticized by the IJI leadership. In the public meetings IJI leadership highlighted the public sentiment without explaining how things would be practically implemented. Similarly nobody raised the question about practical implementation of such slogans.

In the Punjab, election campaign was mainly dependent on Nawaz Sharif’s ability to appeal voters on the basis of his personal performance. Nawaz Sharif kept on highlighting his services for the people of the Punjab like providing homes and distribution of lands among the landless cultivators. He guaranteed continuing same policies if the IJI won the elections. Another source was his influence as caretaker Chief Minister. PML
used government sources to hold public meeting at Lahore which was criticized by PPP and other political parties. During the election campaign different leaders of the alliance like Nawaz Sharif, Junejo, Ch. Shujaat Hussain, Akhtar Ali G. Qazi and others kept on highlighting services of the government during Junejo era. This was an attempt to assure the people that the PML was committed to solve their problems. Jamali warned the people not to be impressed by the catchy slogans of the politicians of different parties. He said it was better to analyze the previous performance of the political parties and judge them on merit. He was of the view that PML was working for national cohesion and to protect the sovereignty of the Pakistan and its people. While making this argument his underlying message was about the past of PPP which was called responsible for the break-up of Pakistan in 1971.

One of the negative political moves of IJI was two parallel election campaigns of major factions of PML in Punjab. PML (F) started it with a public meeting at Mochi Gate Lahore and PML (J) did so at Liaquat Bagh Rawalpindi independently. In the Public meeting at Mochi Gate, Lahore, Nawaz Sharif showed his commitment with the Islamization policy of the late president Zia-ul-Haq. He said that his party had a comprehensive plan to solve the problems of the poor and to provide them basic facilities of life and will make the country a welfare state. He promised to provide residential plots to the homeless, dowry to the poor girls and free education to all. He also promised to provide social justice. IJI could not create a very strong impression in Lahore because its two major component parties, PML and JI, were unable to coordinate for the election campaign. The controversies between the PML (F) and PML (J) also created a negative impact on the election campaign of IJI in Lahore. Qazi managed a procession in Rawalpindi. This procession could not attract as many people as were expected but there were a lot of Suzuki Vans and cars carrying Jamaat’s flags and placards. In his speech Qazi expressed his hopes to form an Islamic government. In a public meeting Junejo told the people that his party could never bow before the un-Islamic forces. Mir Taj Muhammad Jamali in a public meeting tried to convince the people to favor IJI as the votes polled for it will be a support towards the Islamization of the laws. Akhtar Rasool (PML) in a public meeting said that those who were opposing the IJI were anti-Islam and anti-Pakistan and wanted to spread uncertainty in it. During the election campaign Qazi and Pir Fazal highlighted the Islamic teachings regarding the leadership of a woman in an Islamic country as it has been forbidden. But this part of the campaign could not get much appreciation and acceptability as in the elections of 1965 religious political parties including JI supported Miss Fatima Jinnah as a presidential candidate.

PML was committed to the eradication of poverty and ignorance from Pakistan. In a public meeting Nawaz Sharif promised to improve the lot of the poor, to adjudicate justice to all and to strengthen the defense of the country. Professor Ghafoor dispensed that the IJI was committed to improve the lot of the poor for which it had a comprehensive economic plan. He told that IJI will remove the state monopoly over the agriculture goods and promised to start insurance policies for livestock and crops. He also hinted that the
existing tax system needed to be reformed and made easier. He also promised to provide incentives for the establishment of industry in the country. He told the people about the privatization plan of the IJI.\textsuperscript{181}

A cycle rally was organized in Multan as a part of IJI election campaign. Most of the leaders reached the meeting venue through bicycles\textsuperscript{182} which was considered a strategic move as it showed that the leaders of the people were too humble that they were using bicycles without any hesitation. At the same time, it was helpful to keep the people remember the election symbol of the alliance as majority of the people is illiterate and they remember the election symbol as usually are unable to read names. Another important feature of this rally was the placards with the slogans of “\textit{Hamari Manzil Nifazi-Islam}” (Our destination is enforcement of Islamic System) and “\textit{Islami Jamhooriat Laaingay}” (we will bring Islamic Democracy). These slogans were chanted by enthusiastic participants of the rally as well.\textsuperscript{183} The slogans of, “\textit{Aj Ty Ho Gai Cycle Cycle}” (everybody is supporting cycle)\textsuperscript{184} and “\textit{Ittehad Hamara Jaga}” (Our alliance has awaken) were raised by the people. The meeting continued from 3 P.M. to 8:30.\textsuperscript{185} Nawaz Sharif and Qazi focused on the enforcement of \textit{Shari’at} in Pakistan and emphasized it from time to time to prove their commitment with it in their public meetings.\textsuperscript{186} They also highlighted the previous efforts of the religious political parties regarding the approval of \textit{Shari’at} Bill as part of the constitution of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{187} Haq said that those who had been criticizing the \textit{Shari’at} Bill were insincere to the cause of enforcement of \textit{Shari’at} in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{188}

IJI decided to hold a public meeting in Rawalpindi on November 6, 1988. Liaquat Bagh as venue was arranged with banners, posters, flags and portraits of its leaders also adored it. But at the last moment the venue was shifted from Liaquat Bagh to Committee Chowk.\textsuperscript{189} Anti-PPP and pro-\textit{Shari’at} statements without any reference to the economic growth and issues were given by other IJI leaders.\textsuperscript{190} On November 11, 1988 a public rally was arranged by IJI and attendance of the people proved that it was the strongest party there.\textsuperscript{191} The meeting was addressed by candidates for NA and PA. While addressing the rally, Poya said that IJI was formed to counter the powers that believed in politics of confusion and were working to make Pakistan brittle. The speakers pointed that the arrow of the PPP was first directed towards Dhaka and in 1988 their target was Kahuta Plant. They told the people to beware of the plans of enemy and prevent them to become successful in their designs.\textsuperscript{192} During the election campaign Nawaz Sharif did not forget to mention what he did for the people of the Punjab as CM. He told the people in his public meeting at Faisalabad that he divided plots to shelter-less, constructed roads from farm to industry and market, provided electricity, portable drinking water, health and educational facilities to the people. He told them that it was important to continue these things and that was only possible when he was elected with a majority.\textsuperscript{193} His followers adopted the same policy and kept on repeating what they had done for the people during their previous tenures in different offices.

IJI concluded its election campaign on November 14, 1988. It held its final public meeting and a rally in Lahore. Nawaz Sharif presided this rally. Qazi, Poya and Maulana
Ajmal Qadri also addressed the meeting. Another meeting on the final day of the campaign was held at Rawalpindi which was addressed by Ejaz, Sheikh Rashid, Raja Basharat and Dr. Afzal Ejaz. In this meeting leaders of IJI said that the dawn of November 16, 1988 will be the morning of IJI and the end of the political career of the PPP. To bring dawn in the political career of IJI it was decided to keep the leaders present in public meetings to give an impression of unity and cohesion among the member parties in which it was quite successful with few incidents showing internal differences of the leadership of IJI. The election campaign of IJI concentrated more on slogan mongering that of an issue based election campaign but it was quite successful in gaining attention of the common people.

One of the tactics used by IJI was that it involved religious leaders to ask common people to support it. An eminent chief of Naqashbandia-Owasiah Order called the people to vote for IJI as it was an ideological alliance based on Islamic unity and he considered it the only ideology that suits to the Pakistani society. According to him every other ideology and political party was against Islam and the Muslims of Pakistan. Khawaja Hamiduddin, Sajjada Nasheen of Sial Sharif directed the people belonging to Chishti Nizami lineage to support IJI believing it the last chance for the enforcement of Islamic order in Pakistan. He instructed his followers and other Pir (religious leaders) of the lineage to force their friends even out of the lineage to support IJI. One of the prominent features of the campaign of IJI was that it kept on showing its confidence for being successful in the forthcoming elections. One example of such announcements was Nawaz Sharif’s speech during his public rally at Lakshami Chowk, one of the prominent places at Lahore. Other leaders of the alliance like Jatoi, Qazi and Junejo kept on conveying the same message in their own style.

IJI had an election strategy of one against one but it could apply this principle only in six constituencies. It was managed in two ways. One Nawaz Sharif made every possible effort to make alliance with smaller parties. He sent his ministers to the leaders of other political parties all over the country to warn them that Benazir’s victory would be catastrophic for the future of Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif’s caretaker cabinet proved more militaristic and kept inviting the army to come forward to manage the situation.

Some of the activities of IJI were criticized by its opponents because of its expenditure on the election campaign. It was estimated that more than one hundred thousand flags of the alliance were raised in Rawalpindi city by the team of workers from Lahore. The development projects and posters and banners used by the IJI candidates were a source of attraction for the common people but at the same time it invited criticism as such preparations could not be made in the ECP’s authorized amount for spending on the election campaign. Generally it is believed that it is a weakness of ECP which does not fulfill its responsibility of getting vouchers of the expenditures of the representatives before declaring election results.
Vilification Campaign

The alliance politics was an important facet of the elections of 1988. The major alliance ‘the IJI’ remained busy resolving conflicts of member parties. IJI also faced problems in discussing its agenda in public meeting as the member parties agreed only on few points and remaining were left untouched. To cover this weakness IJI focused on negative propaganda against the PPP and achievements of the previous governments of PML.

IJI not only focused on the PPP’s first ruling era under the premiership of Z. A. Bhutto and different statements of the PPP leadership but also personal lives of Bhutto Family were discussed in detail in public meetings. Some of the terrorist activities were also linked with the PPP and were highlighted with a great significance. IJI had the advantage of being in power which helped it to provide evidence of those allegations as well. Some of the allegations levied by IJI against the PPP, most commonly, are briefly discussed in this section of the chapter.

The most conspicuous criticism against the PPP was that IJI held it fully responsible for the fall of Dhaka in 1971. On different occasions Nawaz Sharif asked the people to recognize the patriots and those who disgruntled the country. Maulana Inayatur Rehman, IJI contestant for NA-26, considered the PPP responsible for the fall of Dhaka and told the people that if they wanted to avoid any such situation in Pakistan again they must not vote for the PPP. Most of the leaders of IJI did not forget to mention PPP’s leadership attitude after the elections of 1970 in each of public meetings. Deliberate efforts were made to remind people that it was the PPP who created so much tension to form government which led to the fall of Dhaka. The slogan augmented by Ghulam Mustufa Khar “Idhar tum Udhar Hum” (You can rule in East Pakistan and we will form government in the Western Wing) was mentioned for several times during the election campaign which had lasting impact on the voters’ mind.

Another important point of criticism was PPP’s policies under the premiership of Z. A. Bhutto. Torture cells, dishonoring the girls, artificial shortage of goods of daily use, mal treatment of the politicians, attitude towards NWFP and Balochistan and particularly towards the governments of these provinces, and violation of democratic norms and values were discussed in different public meetings of IJI by different leaders. JI candidate for NA-83, Dr. Athar Qureshi, focused on the political background of the PPP and told the people that during the first governing period of PPP there was anarchy in the country and many people faced extra judicial killings. It was said that in this era, people faced worst torture from the government; particularly political opponents faced reign of terror from PPP leadership. Just before the elections on November 12, 1988, Ghafoor asked the PPP leadership to have a discussion on eight points with him at any forum of its choice. These eight points were related with the past conduct of the PPP like its denial to sit on opposition benches after the elections of 1970, its conspiracy and cooperation with Yahya to grab power in West Pakistan, its usage of Punjab to deprive
smaller provinces from their rights. PPP did not work in accordance with its manifesto during its first rule was also highlighted with a focus on suspension of the constitution by Z. A. Bhutto and he worked as civilian martial law administrator. PPP interfered in the matters of different institutions and did not allow them to work on merit. Most of the leaders of IJI called the five years rule of PPP as a rule of repression. Rigging in the 1977 elections and usage of government machinery to mold election results in its favor, delay in making agreement with PNA, ruthless attitude towards common people during PNA’s movement against the PPP government and creating such a situation that led to the imposition of martial law were other allegations levied by IJI against the PPP.

Ghafoor believed that leadership of the PPP will repeat all the negative practices of Bhutto era. IJI leadership repeatedly said that policies of 1970’s would not be allowed to be repeated and it could only be done if the public rejected the PPP in the elections. All this was done to make the common people indifferent to the PPP and prepare them to vote for IJI who could not read or compare the political agendas of the parties. These people could recall the problems faced by them during 1970’s and could easily get impressed by the slogans raised by the IJI leadership as most of them seemed to be true.

IJI during its election campaign tried to prove that the election campaign of the PPP was being funded by the Jewish and Hindu lobby. In a public meeting it was highlighted that the publicity campaign was being managed by Jewish lobby for PPP. In this regard, efforts of Stephen Solarz (a US Congressman) were highlighted with reference to bringing Benazir to power. Qazi again and again highlighted cooperation of the PPP with Stephen Solarz. IJI leadership pinpointed that Russians, India and the Zionist lobby were preparing to create unrest in Pakistan and to achieve this goal they had selected PPP as their representative in Pakistan. They proved their point by criticizing PPP leadership for its announcement to open Kahuta Nuclear Plant for foreign inspectors. Nawaz Sharif said that PPP leadership announced to allow the inspection of the Kahuta Laboratories but they will never be allowed to do so. Qazi and Ghafoor used Nusrat’s statements regarding opening the Kahuta Laboratory and nuclear power plant at different occasions during the elections campaign and considered it interference in the national issues and stab on the sovereignty and security of Pakistan. IJI tried to tell the people that it believed that anyone who loves Pakistan can never vote for PPP who was impressed and influenced by Indo-Soviet and Jewish lobby. This was basically a hint towards its socialistic economic agenda while Nawaz Sharif showed his commitment to the enforcement of Shari’at and to provide the basic facilities of life to all without any discrimination although in the elections of 1988 PPP had withdrawn its socialist agenda. PPP was also criticized for its selection of candidates as most of its tickets were given to the feudal and some were sold to the wealthy people. It was said by IJI leadership that the PPP broke its ties with the program of Z. A. Bhutto through giving party tickets to landlords and capitalists. The slogan of Islamic Shari’at as compared to socialistic ideals was more attractive for the common man of Pakistan. It was believed that this slogan will attract majority of the people and they will prefer to vote for IJI or at least will hesitate voting in favor of the PPP.
IJI called PPP an organization of traitors. This statement was mainly based on the terrorist activities of Al-Zulfikar.\(^{229}\) Nawaz Sharif illuminated the event of PIA Plane high-jacking event as the hijacker was the brother of the politician who wanted to become PM of Pakistan.\(^{230}\) Ejaz was of the opinion that the Bahawalpur air crash was a conspiracy hatched by the Zionist lobby and Al-Zulfikar.\(^{231}\) JI rendered responsibility of murder attempt on its leader Liaquat Baloch on PPP and called it an attempt to create law and order situation to postpone the elections as PPP was not sure of its success in the elections due to alliance of right-wing parties.\(^{232}\) IJI arranged a long procession on bicycles to protest against the action of PPP workers who attacked IJI office in Rawalpindi.\(^{233}\) Such efforts were made to convince the people that the PPP leadership was not sincere with the people of Pakistan as it was trying to disturb law and order situation to postpone the elections as it was not sure of its victory. The IJI leadership did not spare the election symbol of the PPP from criticism. They were of the opinion that ‘arrow’, the election symbol of the PPP, was a symbol of revenge and violence explaining that PPP was only interested in taking revenge from the people of Pakistan for the death sentence to Z. A. Bhutto. These arguments were prepared to inform the people about the revengeful plans of the PPP and were prepared with the support of realities with which common people were very well aware. The arguments that are factually correct can help to influence the public opinion and that was done carefully by the leadership of IJI in its election campaign.

**Political Maneuvering**

Making tall and high-sounding promises in the election campaign is something normal to attract and impress the voters but being the caretaker government Nawaz Sharif and his colleagues even started some of the projects and some facilities were also provided to government officials particularly those who could benefit the IJI before and during the elections. Certain announcements were made by Nawaz Sharif during the election campaign which invited criticism. He made promises with the regional governments for the improvement of regional conditions. It can be said that such promises are part of the election campaigns but these promises change their status when implementation of such projects is started during the interim period because generally people know that the projects and facilities announced by a caretaker government are not usually completed by the following government. To get the already started projects completed people have to select those members who could take care of such projects. This was the reason that Nawaz Sharif as the CM of the Punjab announced the grant of nine million rupees to the local bodies of the District Jehlum of which five million were devoted to Jehlum District Council 2.5 to the municipal committee Jehlum, and 1 million to the Sohawa Committee. Five hundred thousand were allocated for the Pind Dadan Khan Town Committees. He also announced to upgrade the Jehlum Inter College to degree level and two high schools as higher secondary schools and middle school to high school level. He also announced water supply scheme to Khewra Town.\(^{234}\) Nawaz Sharif promised homes for shelter-less and inaugurated one of the most modern Punjab Institute of Cardiology consisting of 270 beds.\(^{235}\) Jamali, Interim CM of Balochistan, inaugurated agricultural farm at Nasir Abad District.\(^{236}\) Such measures and announcements were considered political bribe to the people of these districts.
as people give importance to their immediate requirements and these promised plans gave them hope and some of them were immediately launched which in turn widened the vote-base of IJI.

XI. Election Results (1988)

Only 205 seats were polled on November 16, 1988. Voting for two constituencies was postponed because of the death of candidates. Army and police were deployed in the whole country to maintain peace and continue election process peacefully. Overall there were only few complaints about the disturbed situation of law and order. A large number of army officials and rangers were deployed where there were fears of unpleasant events. In Karachi and some other districts security arrangements were made more comprehensively. Election results were made public within 24 hours without any delay or confusion.

In 1988 elections average number of candidates contesting for a NA seat was 6.4 but the voter’s turnout was low as compare to the previous elections. It was just 42 percent. In these elections three political parties were principal winners. PPP was the leading party in terms of seats but it could not win a clear majority. It did best in the rural areas of Sindh. The IJI was second and MQM was third with 13 seats. Its success areas were Karachi and Hyderabad. IJI was routed in Sindh, marginalized in Balochistan and did well in the Punjab and NWFP. Another prominent feature of the election results was that the religious political parties could not win considerable seats. The ratio of women contestants was very low in the elections for national and provincial assemblies. Political parties avoided giving tickets to women for the elections. IJI was not exception. It did not give any ticket to any woman for NA elections. Two women were nominated for the PA elections that belonged to the Punjab and one returned successful.

IJI put 163 candidates for NA Elections. It received 59,08,742 votes that was 30.16% of the total valid votes cast. It won only 55 seats in NA amongst which 45 were from Punjab. It could not win even a single seat in Sindh in general elections. Later in the by-elections it was able to win one seat from Sindh NA constituency. It got 37.2% of the votes polled for NA elections in Punjab. In Hazara district IJI won 8 seats for NA; 5by PML, 2 by JI and 1 JUI (D). Most of the independents in NWFP belonged to IJI. These were the members who were denied the alliance ticket or who preferred to contest elections on their own. IJI got 2 NA seats in Balochistan. 4 FATA members sided with IJI which was opposite to previous traditions as FATA members usually prefer to support the government.

In the Punjab IJI nominated 228 members who received 44,84,803 votes. Out of 240 seats in Punjab PA, IJI won 108 seats. Votes polled in its favor were 34.98% of the total votes polled. Nawaz Sharif won support of all 32 independent MPAs after Changa Manga operation. In Sindh, IJI put up 54 candidates. It got 2,94,672 votes which was
7.12% of the total valid votes and could win only 1 seat. Elections were held on 79 out of 80 Muslim constituencies in NWFP PA amongst which IJI nominated 74 candidates and won 28 seats. It received 5,54,550 votes which was 25.78% of the total votes polled. 15 independents won the elections amongst which majority belonged to PML and were denied alliance ticket. IJI could get confidence of those members but its leadership did not pay much attention to them and lost the opportunity to win majority and Aftab Sherpo of PPP formed government with their support. In Balochistan PA elections were held for 39 constituencies out of 40 and IJI nominated 29 candidates amongst whom 9 won elections and received 1,52,199 votes which was 23.19% of the total votes polled. Performance of member parties of IJI varied from party to party. Some parties performed well and other could not do the same. Only PML and JI won considerable seats in NA and PAs which created aspiration to get the role of leaders of the alliance which made cooperation among the member parties difficult but this was only prominent when IJI was able to form government after the elections of 1990.

XII. Performance of IJI Parties in Elections 1988

Results of the elections were surprising for some of the political parties. It not only routed out the religious parties like JI but also brought stunning lose for Junejo and his supporters as Junejo himself was unable to win even a single seat. Political heavyweights of different parties of IJI lost election. Famous personalities who lost the elections were Junejo, Jatoi, Hamid Nasir Chattha (former speaker of the NA), Ghafoor (vicepresident of JI and Secretary General of IJI), Naseem Aaheer (Prominent PML leader and interior minister for interim period), Maulana Jan Muhammad Abbasi, Liaquat Baloch, Raja Zafarul Haq and Aslam Khattak. Despite this lose, Nawaz Sharif and his colleagues not only won in the Punjab and NWFP but formed IJI government in the Punjab, the biggest province of the country. Nawaz Sharif played an important role in the formation of a united front against the PPP. It was generally believed that if PML had fought elections from its own platform it may had suffered a loss of at least twenty to twenty five seats. IJI consisted of eight political parties and the performance of these parties was different from each other. Details of the performance of some of the IJI parties are given below.

Performance of PML:

PML performed well although it was divided into many factions. There were two key reasons behind the PML success; one was the personal interest of Nawaz Sharif who had been CM of the province for a long time and wanted to keep his influence intact. Second reason was tactful distribution of party tickets as they were given to such influential people who had earned positive name and fame in their constituencies for a long time. It got almost 90% seats of the seats won by IJI in the NA and PAs. PML won 22 out of 29 of IJI seats in NWFP PA. At the same time 15 independents too belonged to PML in the 1988 elections. Most of the winning candidates of IJI in NA belonged to PML.
Performance of other Allied Parties

JI had lost its popularity which it enjoyed earlier in Sindh due to its cooperation with Zia regime and was wiped out by MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad which were considered its strong centers. Due to the change of heart of the people of Karachi and Hyderabad none of its candidates could win against MQM in Sindh. In total JI contested from 26 constituencies for the NA. These were 14 in Punjab, 4 in NWFP and 8 in Sindh. It was able to win only 8 seats including one reserved for women. JI won 5 NA seats in the Punjab and 2 from NWFP. For the PA it got 44 tickets which were divided as 20 from Punjab, 14 for NWFP, 9 for Sindh and 1 for Balochistan. JI was able to win in only two provinces. In total its 13 members could return successful to the provincial assemblies. These were 5 from Punjab PA and 6 for NWFP PA. Two women were selected for the reserved seats one each in the Punjab and NWFP.

NPP could not fare well in the elections as it was badly divided. Its leader Jaoti lost the elections from all the constituencies including his ancestral seats. With such a miserable defeat it was difficult for any party to survive. Later Jatoi was elected from a seat vacated by Ghulam Mustufa Khar from his ancestral area, Kot Adu, Punjab.

JUI (D), was member of the alliance but participated in the elections in its individual capacity, put up 8 members and just 1 could be successful in NA elections. It nominated 10 members for Punjab PA, but none of its nominees could be successful in the elections. In Sindh PA it brought 2 candidates forward but there was no success for it. 5 candidates were nominated for Balochistan PA but were unable to win any seat. JUI (D) nominated 3 members for NWFP PA but none could succeed.

Four candidates of IPG were awarded alliance ticket for NA-57, NA-68, NA-120 and NA-121. All of them lost the elections.

XIII. By-Elections of 1988

25 seats fell vacant due to dual membership of some of the members, death of one of contesting candidates in certain constituencies, and elections in three constituencies were considered void by ECP. By-elections were held on January 28, 1989. In the Punjab 9 NA seats and 4 PA seats were vacated. To decide the allotment of party tickets IJI’s provincial Parliamentary Board’s meeting was held which was presided by Punjab CM Nawaz Sharif. It was generally believed that the decision of Nawaz Sharif will be acceptable for all. Strong candidates for the vacant constituencies were Ejaz and Mian Zahid Sarfraz for NA-57, Ch. Bashir Randhawa and Ch. Abdul Majeed for NA-62, for NA-94 and 95 Hayat, Muhammad Hanif Ramy, Liaquat Balouch and Hafiz Suleman Butt were strong candidates. The selection of candidates was difficult but was handled carefully. IJI won 8 NA seats in by-elections and three from Punjab PA. In by elections of NWFP and Balochistan IJI could not win any seat for neither NA nor PA. For NA120 Javed
Hashmi was the alliance candidate for the by-elections. Campaign for the elections for this constituency was well planned but his failure was attributed to internal differences of IJI which were prominent in NWFP and the Centre-province conflict which was prominent between the government of Punjab and federal government. During the by-elections IJI had complaints against the federal government. Mian Shahbaz Sharif complained that PPP government was not issuing NICs to the members and workers of IJI. On the contrary NICs were issued to the PPP workers amass. He alleged that NICs of the dead people were also issued to the PPP workers to make its victory sure.

XIV. Complaints of Rigging in the Elections of 1988

General Elections of 1988 were calm, and peaceful. The teams of the foreign observers testified that the elections were free, fair and impartial. National Democratic Institute (NDI) team came to Islamabad on October 14, 1988 to take a look for the arrangements for the forthcoming elections. It observed that the elections were free and fair. Officials fulfilled their responsibilities according to the law. It also mentioned about few irregularities but these were unable to impinge on the result of the elections. Polling agents monitored election activity that helped to complete the process positively. SAARC delegation and British MPs also had a positive opinion about the conduct of the elections.

Pakistanis political culture is characterized by rejection of the election results that was repeated in the elections of 1988 as well which was done on both; individual and party level. PPP had a landslide victory in Sindh. IJI alleged that PPP rigged the elections in that province. Same was the attitude of the PPP regarding the elections results of Punjab. Commenting about the elections Junejo said that there was rigging in his constituency but that was only in few polling stations. He also alleged that the polling staff supported the PPP candidates in the rural Sindh. If the parties accept the election results they can perform constructive role in the national development while sitting on opposition benches. There can be another positive impact of accepting the election results that the parties can ponder into the reasons of their defeat and work out the solution of the problems or their weaknesses that can help them improve their position in the next elections.

Some petitions were filed by disgruntled candidates against the election results. ECP took action on the petitions and made inquiries to dispose them off according to the merit. In the elections of 1988, 103 petitions were filed. Thirty eight tribunals were appointed to hear these petitions. In NA-16 Mansehra-III fresh polls were held because malpractices in the constituency proved through evidence and M. Ayub Khan was declared elected. In NA-8 one of the candidates filed a complaint that some extra names were included in the electoral roll. The allegation proved and election in the constituency was held again. Defeated candidate of NA-53, Nawazhada Malik Muzzaffir Khan
submitted a petition alleging his opponent for creating problems for his voters reaching at the polling station. He also informed the commission that his polling agents were detained from the polling station. ECP rejected the petition as none of the allegations were proved. Election in PB-9 Pishin-IV was also controversial but nothing was proved having some effect on the election results. Almost same was the case in PB-10 Loralai-1. PF-51 Kohistan II’s returning officer notified malpractices at one of the polling stations but the allegations were rejected because of the non-availability of evidence.286

PPP alleged that many candidates bought NICs of the people of their constituency and were returned back after the election was over.287 According to PPP, IJI managed 30,000 bogus NICs just in NA-95 to make the position of its candidate secure.

Responding to such allegations Haq Caretaker CM of NWFP and provincial head of the PML said that PPP was making such statements just to prepare grounds to reject election results if it was unable to win. These allegations are the attitude of the politicians and political parties in Pakistan. Generally after losing the elections, instead of accepting the election results, the politicians find escape in allegations of rigging.

xv. **Major Determinants of Election Results**

Elections of 1988 were not fought largely on national issues but were fought on different principles from place to place like the regions such as people of Sialkot enjoyed benefits regarding business during Zia era and voted for his followers. In some of the regions personal links and influence was more effective than the party affiliations.288 Mainly trading community and middle class voted for the IJI.289 The slogan which was raised constantly, that IJI was the only force that could lead the country to make it a truly Islamic state, helped the alliance to win support at mass level.290 Another reason of the success of IJI was the ticket distribution of PPP as it gave a lot of tickets to landlords and capitalists, and ignored old party workers which created resentment and dissatisfaction among them.291 PPP propagated different ideas in different provinces. In Sindh it discussed the negligence of different governments with reference to the development of Sindh. In Punjab its focus was on the importance of federation. In Pakistan majority of the people is illiterate and they only rely on the speeches of the leaders, this dichotomy in the statements of the PPP leadership created uncertainties in the minds of the people regarding its policies and some of the people became critical of the attitude of using different slogans at different areas which went in favor of the IJI. IJI also highlighted the dual statements during its election campaign.

Most of the seats where the independents contested elections, it was IJI who suffered because a whole lot of independent candidates were members of the IJI parties who could not get the alliance tickets. If seen from close prospective, it is clear that the delayed formation of the alliance and late decisions about the alliance candidates created problems for the alliance as many candidates could not provide nomination certificates to the returning officers and were unable to get the alliance symbol despite the extension of
time from 4’O clock to 9’O clock that day. Statements of IJI leadership regarding its foreign policy had some negative impact on its performance in the elections. While analyzing IJI’s foreign policy Radio Moscow announced that IJI was committed to continue Zia’s policy regarding Afghanistan it meant that it had a clear plan to interfere in the internal matters of other countries and will continue spending heavy amounts on armed forces. This analysis was one of the major factors that created negative impact on IJI’s performance as many people want the government to concentrate on the economic condition of the country and concentration on the internal matters. Some of the people believe that Afghan issue was a heavy burden on the economy of Pakistan so they wanted Pakistan government to get away from the Afghanistan problem after the war was ended. IJI’s clear statement to keep support of Afghanistan stopped many people to vote for it.

One thing that favored IJI was withdrawal of candidature of its members from elections as independent candidates. Notable withdrawal was that of Iqbal in favor of Hayat. Mian Umer Din also announced his loyalty towards IJI. Pir Muhammad Ashraf, IJI nominee, withdrew his nomination in favor Professor M. H. Ansari of JUP. Ajmal Qadri of JUI (D) candidate withdrew in favor of Hafiz Sulman Butt of IJI. Mian Muhammad Shahbaz, an independent candidate, withdrew in favor of Mian Shahbaz Sharif. In some of the constituencies in Sindh IJI did not nominate any candidate because independent candidates pledged their loyalty to it. It can be envisaged from election results that the dual nominations of IJI candidates and independent candidates from IJI parties created negative impact on the performance of IJI. If the decisions of alliance candidates were not delayed for so long and if independent candidates of IJI parties were stopped to contest election results could be more in favor of IJI.

PA elections were held after three days of the NA elections. This gap of three days created impact on the elections of the PA of Punjab and IJI won majority. After the NA elections’ results were announced, Nawaz Sharif concentrated more on the enhancement of the Punjabi nationalism calling PPP a Sindhi nationalist party. There was a common call for the people of Punjab that ‘any Punjabi who voted the PPP betrayed the Punjab’. Difference of the results of the NA and the PA was also called a result of support of some power or a hidden hand that was not happy with the success of PPP. One reason of the government’s machinery’s support for IJI was that it had been working under Martial Law since long and had good relations with administration which might had a feeling of uncomfortable working relation with the democratic regime for which it supported IJI as follower of Zia. IJI’s slogans also had an impact on the results of the Punjab PA election results. The slogans that were raised by IJI posed a challenge for the people of Punjab. It called the victory of the PPP a threat for the people of the Punjab and raised the slogan “Jag Punjabi Jag, Teri Pag nu Lagya Dagh” (Awake Punjabi awake, your respect is at stake).
It also highlighted the statements of the PPP leadership in which PPP had rejected a Punjabi PM.\textsuperscript{298}

The attitude of worshipping the personalities is another thing which does not allow the common people to analyze things objectively. Politics of martyrs’ is one of the most prominent determinants of the election results which was well used in the elections of 1988 in case of raising the slogans of Bhuttoism and Ziaism. Although these slogans do not comprehend any ideology but these slogans helped Benazir and Nawaz Sharif to reach the highest office in Pakistan. After the death of Benazir it is President Zardari who is enjoying the fruits of the emotional martyrs’ politics in Pakistan. In such a scenario how can we think about a mature behavior from our politicians or the political parties where people vote in love of a dead instead of analyzing things objectively?

Some of the PML members believed that JI while planning the election campaign ignored the services of previous PML government. They were of the view that if the PML’s relation with Jinnah was highlighting it could bring positive results for IJI.\textsuperscript{299} Split in PML ranks after the dissolution of the NA caused negative impact on the impression of PML. Although it reunited just before the elections but this unification was unable to neutralize its negative impression. IJI concentrated more on the negative propaganda against the PPP and its leadership. Publication of obscene pictures of Nusrat also created negative impact on the campaign and many passive PPP supporters became active in favor of PPP. Such negative propaganda diluted the sympathies of women towards the IJI. IJI leadership had been related with martial law regime and majority of the people does not appreciate martial law so they wanted a change of faces considering it a precondition for the change of system.

\section*{XVI. Post-1988 Election Scenario}

Only two out of eight parties of IJI got considerable success in the elections. Although the alliance was unable to get majority in the elections but it claimed to form government. For this purpose the leadership made contacts with independents.\textsuperscript{300} To form government IJI tried to reach at some agreement with MQM and JUI (F)\textsuperscript{301} which could not be materialized. Another development that created negative impact on the alliance was that its smaller parties did not interfere in any of its efforts to form government and only PML and JI were active to win over the support of the independents to form government. Nizam-e Mustafa Group and Khaksar party had announced their dissociation from the alliance before the elections and after elections other smaller parties were not vocal about the political developments.\textsuperscript{302} Nawaz Sharif was of the view that because IJI had won more seats in three provinces than PPP which was victorious in only one province so it was the right of IJI to form government at center.\textsuperscript{303} Iqbal was of the view that IJI had majority in Senate so it should form government.\textsuperscript{304} There were suggestions that if both the majority parties accept the election results they could form a coalition at center and in Punjab, Nawaz Sharif rejected the idea to form a coalition government with the support of PPP.\textsuperscript{305} This suggestion faced criticism from different sections of society as well. They asked if IJI made
coalition government with PPP, how it could justify pre-election allegations against PPP and how the difference of ideologies could be accommodated properly. Another thing that created confusion was that both IJI and PPP were claiming the support of the independents which won third highest number of seats in the national and provincial assembly elections.

Split mandate was received at federal level by PPP and IJI. The situation was almost same in the provinces except Sindh. In NWFP formation of government was difficult for any party as IJI got 28 seats, PPP 20, ANP 12; JUI (F) got 2 seats while 15 independents won the elections. Formation of government in NWFP was difficult for IJI because Haq (Provincial president of PML) lost all the four seats in the province that he contested and no other leader was available in the province to handle the situation. Jahangir could be an option but conflicts between Jahangir and Haq did not allow him to come forward. It also tried to win sympathies and support of other parties and independent candidates but failed get enough support to form government in NWFP. IJI formed government with the support of independent candidates in Punjab. PPP formed government with the support of MQM in Sindh while coalition government was formed in Balochistan.

According to the Eighth Amendment it was the right of the president to nominate PM who had to get vote of confidence from the NA. Ghulam Ishaq Khan took fifteen days to ask Benazir to form government as none of the political parties could manage to win the majority and the government could only be formed by a coalition of political parties. Benazir won the favor of the MQM and formed the government. She got vote of confidence on December 12, 1988. She secured 148 votes in the house of 237. Benazir was invited to form government only after she had promised that she will nominate Ghulam Ishaq Khan as President, will not interfere in the matters of security apparatus and foreign policy. She also promised to form foreign policy through consultation with President and Army Chief. To appease military, she accepted its role in the defense policy of the country. She also appointed Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan foreign minister who was elected senator on the IJI ticket. PPP withdrew its Presidential candidate General (Retd.) Tikka Khan. This resulted in the victory of Ghulam Ishaq Khan with 78% votes from Senate, NA and the three PAs because both IJI and PPP supported his candidature. PA of Balochistan could not participate in the Presidential elections as it was dissolved by the Governor of Balochistan on December 15, 1988.

Split mandate created problems in running the government smoothly as the PPP, which formed government at Centre and in Sindh and NWFP, tried to topple Nawaz Sharif’s government in the Punjab for several times. In response, Nawaz Sharif formed Combined Opposition Parties (COP) with the cooperation of other opposition parties in the central legislature and moved no-confidence motion against her in 1989. The situation of conflict and non-cooperation continued till the dissolution of the assemblies in August 1990.

Notes and References
COAS Beg was invited by the caretaker CM of Punjab Nawaz Sharif and that of NWFP Haq to impose Martial Law but he refused to intervene. Meezan, *Nawaz Sharif Itefāq sei Naftāq Tak*, p. 25. Beg decided to avoid taking reign of government in his hands. Instead he decided to create his control on the political matters through indirect means for which he facilitated the alliance formation of IJI with the help of DG ISI. Details are discussed in the second chapter of the present study. ‘Life after Zia’ *The Herald*, September 1988, p. 45. Also see Yasin Rizvi, *Elections 90 in Pakistan: A Frank and Outspoken Review of the Election Process in Pakistan with Interesting Data List of MNA’s and other Interesting Data* (Lahore: Feroz sons Ltd., n.d), p. 45.

Charles H. Kennedy, “Presidential-Prime Ministerial Relations: The Role of Superior Courts,” in *Pakistan: 1995*, eds., Charles H. Kennedy and Rasul Baksh Raees (Karachi: Vanguard Book Pvt. Ltd., 1995), p. 20. Petition against nonparty elections was filed in Supreme Court on August 28, 1988. Supreme Court accepted the right of the political parties to contest the elections. It gave the verdict responding to the petition filed by Benazir. Supreme Court allowed the political parties to contest the elections under the symbols allotted by the Election Commission of Pakistan on October 2, 1988. After the decision of the Supreme Court in a cabinet meeting it was formally approved to hold elections on party basis. *Dawn*, October 3, 1988. Also see *The News*, October 3, 1988 and *Jang*, October 3, 1988. Before this another reason for uncertainty about the elections was that Junejo had filed a writ petition about the dissolution of the assembly. He was of the opinion that the dissolution order was illegal. Full Bench of High court announced its decision on September 27, 1988 that although the grounds provided in the dissolution order were unable to prove that dissolution was a justified but it ruled out the chances of restoration of the previous assemblies. It also announced that the election should be held on the announced date November 16, 1988. *Dawn*, September 28, 1988.

PPP believing it strongest party decided to nominate its members from all the constituencies without accommodating other MRD parties’ candidates which resulted in the breakup of the alliance. PPP did not need the MRD cooperation any more. It had switched its plan from agitation against rulers towards making efforts to formulate government and MRD parties were considered a liability by the PPP leadership for which it decided to take solo flight instead of being member of a large alliance. Details of the working and the breakup of the alliance are discussed in the first chapter.

The Government of Pakistan issued Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, 2009” on August 28, 2009. The reforms package was introduced through a presidential order which was approved by the Federal Cabinet and set forth for immediate implementation. Through this order GilgitBaltistan got the status similar like a province.

Constituencies were revised before the elections of 2002 which resulted in an increased number of MNAs and MPAs in the assemblies.

Universal adult suffrage to all who had reached the age of 21 was introduced in the constitution of 1956. It was limited to 80,000 in the Constitution of 1962 under the system of Basic Democracies. Direct adult franchise was reinstated in 1970. Grover, *Elections since 1945*, p. 262.

According to the Article 51(4) of the constitution of 1973 twenty seats were reserved for the women in the NA of Pakistan till the expiration of the ten years from the commencement of the constitution or the third elections to be held. 2 women seats were allocated for Balochistan and NWFP each. Sindh got 4 women reserved seats and remaining 12 were reserved for Punjab. Women were elected on proportional representation through a single transferable vote. Electoral College consisted of MNAs elected from the respective provinces. *Report on the General Elections 1988*, Vol. I. p. 5. Also see *Dawn*, November 21, 1988. Quotas system was not new to Pakistan. Popularly known as “reservations”, the 1956, 1962, 1970, 1973 and 1985 constitutions provided reserved seats for women at both the Provincial and National Assemblies. This allotment however was quite small, only being from five to ten percent, and only through indirect elections by the members of the assemblies themselves. This act of specific seats reserved for women lapsed in 1988 after three general elections (in 1977, 1985 and 1988). Socorro L. Reyes, “Quotas for Women for Legislative Seats at the Local Level in Pakistan”, [http://www.idea.int/publications/wip/upload/CS_Pakistan_Reynes.pdf](http://www.idea.int/publications/wip/upload/CS_Pakistan_Reynes.pdf) (accessed: January 27, 2010). International IDEA, 2002, *Women in Parliament, Stockholm* (http://www.idea.int). This is an English translation of Socorro Reyes, Wan Azizah, “*Kuota Kursi Legislatif Tingkat Lokal bagi Kaum Perempuan di Pakistan,*” in International IDEA, 2002, *Perempuan di Parlemen: Bukan Sekedar Jumlah, Tingkat Lokal bagi Kaum Perempuan di Pakistan*, International IDEA.

Report on the General Elections 1988, Vol. I. p. 7. This was the number and division of seats at the time of elections of 1988. IJI participated in the elections of 1988 and 1990 therefore developments in the elections and the facts are discussed according to that time. Later developments are not incorporated while studying these elections.

A large majority of the population did not believe in having NIC due unawareness of its importance or because of their conservative set of beliefs. *Mashriq*, Lahore: October 13, 1988. To provide chances to poll votes to every voter government made special arrangements to issue NIC. About 12,000 post offices were authorized to provide application forms for the issuance of NIC to common people. Through the electronic media the process of issuance of NIC was publicized so that the people do not face problems to get their NIC. *Dawn*, September 8, 1988. Caretakers believed that 87% of the population had their NIC and remaining would easily be able to get them, so it will be a positive source to check bogus voters. “*Intikhābi Dhāndlio kī Rok Thām*”, *Mashriq*, September 1, 1988. PPP opposed the condition to provide NIC for the issuance of the ballot paper. One major reason for this opposition was that PPP believed that majority of Sindhi rural population in particular and that of Pakistan in general do not get their NIC. PPP leadership believed that it was an effort to prevent its voters to cast vote. Responding to the PPP’s argument IJI called this opposition as an attempt to rig the elections which in the opinion of the leaders of IJI was difficult if the provision of NIC was must for issuing the ballot paper.


The arrangement to include the NIC number in the electoral rolls was criticized. It was said that mere mistake in the entry of the number may prevent a genuine voter to cast his vote. It could also provide a chance of frequent objection by the polling agents which could prevent smooth and peaceful process of polling. Due to the objections, NIC numbers were not included in the electoral rolls considering the provision of NIC compulsory to cast the vote will be enough to check bogus voting. Report on the General Elections 1988, Vol. I. pp. 11 and 14.

To check rigging ECP was given judicial powers to deal with bogus voters. “*Election Commission ki Sifārīshat*”, *Haider*, September 1, 1988. Elections Commission had the authority to check the rigging. It had the authority to declare the election results void if it was convinced that the irregularities were committed during the polling. The officers who were found guilty for taking sides or committing malpractices could be suspended from their jobs. “*Intikhābi Schedule kā E’llān*” *Haider*, October 10, 1988 and *The News*, September 20, 1988. It was also recommended that polling agent must be resident of the area where the polls are being observed so that bogus voters could easily be checked. “Election Commission” *The Nation,*
almost fifty percent in Sindh, in NWFP it was almost forty percent. Society and particularly JI were of the opinion that the elections of 1977 were rigged through a comprehensive plan. 69 candidates of the PAs including all four CMs were elected un-opposed. Twenty-five candidates of NA were also elected un-opposed. These events made the common people believe on the argument of the PNA. Qureshi, Political Culture in Pakistan, p. 298.

After the coup by Zia many people who supported him were of the opinion that government should avoid elections if it wanted to keep Bhutto away from winning elections. Emma Duncan, Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey through Pakistan (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 297. This suggestion made Zia think about something else instead of elections and he decided to conduct referendum in 1984 after a long time of the imposition of Martial Law. In the referendum voter’s turn out was seven to fifteen percent. But official sources and Chief Election Commissioner announced it as ninety-eight percent positive votes. Voter’s turn out in 1985 non-party elections was almost fifty-three percent. For provincial assemblies it was almost sixty-two percent in Punjab, almost fifty percent in Sindh, in NWFP it was almost forty-eight percent and Balochistan had almost forty-seven percent voters’ turn out. Qureshi, Political Culture in Pakistan, p. 298.

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Family affiliations and personal contacts also play important role in determining the elections’ results. Pakistan is one of the countries that are facing politics of families and people use to cast their votes without considering its impact on nation as a whole.

Different political parties used slogan of enforcement of Shari’a to achieve their goals. Bhutto used the slogan of Islamic Socialism; Zia extended his rule for eleven years in the name of implementation of Shari’a. After Zia I.I came forward to introduce Islamic system as the sole solution of all the problems of the people of Pakistan.

Frontier Post, October 7, 1988

It was decided that elections will be conducted on separate days for NA and PAs due to administrative reasons, and also because the same procedure had been adopted in the previous elections in the country. Only the elections of 1970 were held on the same day for the national and provincial assemblies. Report on the General Elections 1988, Vol. I. pp. 129-33. Question of a viable system of elections was also discussed comprehensively. Some sections of the society and particularly JI were of the opinion that the elections must be held under a system of proportional representation. But it did not seem to be practical for Pakistan. Sultan Ahmad, “Awaiting Elections in a Climate of Uncertainty” Dawn, September 15, 1988. There were many reasons for people to believe that the elections might be delayed like the floods in the Punjab and ethnic violence in Sindh. But the government announced that any of the reasons could not postpone the elections for the sake of solidarity of Pakistan. Khalid Mahmood, “The Election Scenario: Final Call for the Combat” The News, October 13, 1988. Also see S. M. Hayat, “Pakistan’s Constitution and Elections”, The Pakistan Times, October 12, 1988 and “A Man of all Seasons” The Herald, September 1988. p. 47.


31 PML (J) demanded the appointment of neutral caretaker government, but this demand was withdrawn when the PML got unified. Before the unification of PML, president of PML (J) Junejo announced to play role of strong opposition in the Senate to pressurize it to prevent the caretakers to contest the elections and if they wanted to participate in the elections they had to resign from the government offices. Member parties of defunct MRD announced that the elections under existing set up would not be acceptable to them. Wali Khan and certain other politicians were of the view that if the caretaker government was allowed to participate in the elections it could influence the election results. Imroze, September 28, 1988. He was of the view that in such a situation political parties should not participate in the elections and should boycott it. But his suggestion was not accepted by the leaders of other political parties considering that the boycott was no solution of the problem. Some of them were of the view that the boycott could further exacerbate the political problem and could raise feeling of dissatisfaction among the people. Dawn, October 13, 1988. Senators and ex-MNAs and MPAs of Balochistan demanded the appointment of the non-political figures as caretaker government to hold free and impartial elections. Haider, Rawalpindi: September 20, 1988.

32 Nawa-i-Waqt, September 1, 1988. There was another thing to be noticed that the NPP and JI who were demanding the removal of the caretaker governments. But they changed their viewpoint after joining hands with PML and started defending the caretaker setup. Sultan Ahmad, “Fair Polls and the Caretakers” Dawn, October 27, 1988. After joining the IJI, PML (J) and NPP did not press the demand for the appointment of a neutral caretaker government. Qureshi, Political Culture in Pakistan, p. 322. Also see “Qawm Kei Mutafiaq Mutālbei Nazar Andāz Nahin Honei Chāhiyān”, Amn, September 1, 1988, Waqt kī Āham Tarīn Zararat” Jasarat, September 9, 1988 and “Waqt-i Imtihān” Jasarat, October 14, 1988. JI leadership, even after joining the IJI, was of the view that those politicians who were running the caretaker system must not be allowed to contest the elections.

33 “Life after Zia”, pp. 49-50. Also see Ali Hasan, “In the Shadow of Fear” The Herald, October 1988, p. 40 and Dawn, October 5, 1988. Political parties believed that if the caretaker government was joined by all the prominent parties, the chances of rigging could possibility be limited. At the same time it was clear from the election campaign of the IJI that being a ruling party, IJI used official sources to enhance the graph of its popularity which increased the demand of a neutral or national government.

34 Dawn, September 26, 1988. Before elections Nawaz Sharif changed staff at major posts and appointed his favorite people in the important administrative offices. This further enhanced doubts in the minds of Opposition. Ahmad Rashid, “League vs. League”, The Herald, October 1988, 47. There was a big question mark about the impartiality of the caretakers after the convention of the Union Councils of the Punjab which was attended by all the members of the Councils from peon to Chairman. It was deliberate effort of the CM Punjab Nawaz Sharif to win the support of the Union Councils which could be a source to win the elections. The Muslim, Islamabad: October 7, 1988. Caretaker government was alleged for its statements like Nasim Aheer had said that “we will not allow our political opponents to form government”. This statement was taken as a threat by the political opponents and other took it as plans of rigging in the elections. Anjum Khokhar, “Nigrān Hakumatān, Siyasi Jamā’ātīn awr A’īni Taqāzēī” Haider, October 1, 1988. 35 M.H. Askari, “Playing with Destiny”, The Herald: Election Special, 1990, p. 10. Nawaz Sharif used government sources to hold public meeting at Mochi Gate Lahore for which the doubts about the impartiality of the caretaker government was further questioned by the other political parties. The Nation, September 11, 1988.

36 According to Ghulam Ishaq Khan in democratic government’ caretakers were not supposed to be suspended. He justified this with the argument that these were elected members. But these justifications did not guarantee impartial role of caretakers in the elections. Zahid Hussain, “A Month of Surprises”, The Herald, October 1988, p. 28. Nawaz Sharif used his powers as CM of Punjab and announced some favors for some constituencies particularly that of Sheikh Rashid’s (Rashid) constituency as he did not enjoy enough support in his constituency. This step was taken to help him to win sympathies of the people and make Rashid’s victory possible. The Muslim, November 7, 1988. Yayha Bakhtiyar, former attorney general of Balochistan, voiced his protest against the IJI leadership which was using all national resources like funds, cars and National Press Trust Papers for their election campaign. Sultan Ahmad, “Fair Polls and the Caretakers”, Dawn, October 27, 1988. Role of Ghulam Ishaq Khan was also questioned. Some of the people were of the opinion that he was supporting ‘official’ Muslim League as he had been playing some role in sorting out internal problems of PML. “Life after Zia”, p. 50. All the demands were set aside by the President and he categorically announced that the caretaker government had been appointed till the next elections and it had to continue till the new elected government was able to take charge of the state. “Arms and the Elections”, Frontier Post, September 28, 1988. Caretakers tried to assure the people and other political parties that they will remain impartial and will not use government sources to enhance the image of their respective
political parties. Interior Minister Naseem Ahmad Aheer announced that government will not use official resources in favor of its party. He expected that the other political parties will help the government to maintain peace during the election days. ‘Ām Intikhābāt kā pur Amn En’iqād” Mushriq, September 13, 1988. Mehnaz Rafi, “Munsifāna or Gher Īnīb-dārāna Intikhābāt kei Taqāzei”, Jang, September 10, 1988. Senior Federal Minister Aslam Khattak said that they were not aligned to any political party and were very much impartial. Ch. Shujaat Hussain said that he was in the caretaker government because he wanted to keep democratic forces part of the decision making process of the federal government. Jang, September 14, 1988. It was obvious that a caretaker set up was needed to hold the elections and if the political parties denied running that it could create a systematic vacuum.

37 “Life after Zia”, p. 50.
38 Ibid. 39

Pakistan Times, October 11, 1988. JI and NPP withdrew their demand of a separate election symbol and announced to contest the elections under the banner of IJI using the same election symbol. Before this agreement JI and NPP had an opinion to contest elections under separate symbols. Tariq Butt, “Election Symbols Allotted” The Muslim, October 12, 1988.

40 Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, Manifesto, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, 1988. p. 4. Also see “Party to Power, Pakistan Muslim League”, The Herald: Election Special, 1988. p. 11 and Jang, November 7, 1988. There were doubts in the minds of people about the working of the alliance and its agreement on the election manifesto of the party as JI had a different stance about Geneva Accord and certain other matters as compare to PML and NPP. Jato told the newsmen that being the member of IJI; it was moral obligation on JI to follow the program of the alliance instead of propagating its own. He said that JI was in full unanimity with the alliance’s program. Dawn, October 28, 1988. Details of the manifesto are provided in chapter two. Complete text of the manifesto of IJI is provided in appendix I.
42 IJI’s elections manifesto did not discuss the solutions of the problems. Focusing on the foreign policy and Islamization other issues were taken very light. It was announced that an economic system would be introduced which will be free of usury. But means to achieve this goal were not elaborated. Jasarat, November 4, 1988. Obviously living in an international community, having loans of heavy amounts, and being involved in international trade, a comprehensive program was required that could show how an interest free economy could be developed which was not expressed by any of the IJI leaders.

43 Geneva Accord stands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, Sending five million Afghan refugees back to their homeland that had been staying in Iran and Pakistan due to the war havoc in Afghanistan. It also contains the support for Afghanistan in formation of a broad-based government, representative of all the sections of society living in Afghanistan. Mohsin Ali, “Non-Issues in Polls Campaign”, Dawn, November 12, 1988.
47 IJI and PAI were two major alliances in the elections of 1988. PML (J) joined PAI in the beginning and later unification of two major factions of PML made it member of both IJI and PAI which caused confusions about the alliance
working and its future till the time when Junejo formally left PAL.


51 Till the publication of these lists five NA constituencies from the Punjab were open. *Pakistan Times*, October 20, 1988.


54 *Jang*, October 14, 1988. In Islamabad the situation became critical when Dr. Sarfraz Mir and PML’s Nawaz Khokhar both claimed for getting the alliance ticket from for NA-35. Nawaz Khokhar was of the view that he deserved it as most of the party workers favor him while Sarfraz Mir also had similar kind of claims. *Haider*, October 20, 1988. This situation was created due to changes in the decisions of the alliance leadership at the last moments. *Jang*, October 21, 1988. Following the situation Khokhar decided to contest the elections as an independent candidate. *Jang*, October 27, 1988. To handle the situation Nawaz Sharif started making decisions on his own. Abu Zafar, “Muslim League kā Intishār” *Musawat*, October 24, 1988. There were doubts that Poya of HJ also contested as an independent candidate from Islamabad. “The Rajas Bazar” *The Herald: Election Special ’88*, p. 81.


56 This list was issued by Alhaj Shamiuddin, PML Secretary General for Sindh. Although he announced the nomination of 75 contestants but the list of only sixty-two members was issued. *Dawn*, October 21, 1988. The IJI was unable to nominate more than fifteen candidates in Sindh. This statement was given by Ali Hassan in his article “Pirs, Mirs, Waderas and Mohajirs” *The Herald*, November, 1988, p. 33. Alternative candidates for NMG were NA-148 Ashraf Awan (JI), NA-185 Azad Bin Haider (PML), NA-189 Jamshed Ahmad (IPG), NA-196 Syed Zakir Ali (JI). *Dawn*, October 21, 1988.

57 Khurram Baddar, “Elections 1988”, *Takbeer*, November 3, 1988, p. 22. Also see *Dawn*, November 3, 1988. Some sources have also mentioned 6 NA seats were being contested by JI in Karachi but that was not a correct version. Tariq Ismail Sagar mentioned as 9 PA seats were contested by JI.


61 In Sindh emergence of Mohajir Qaumi Movement created negative impact on the vote bank of JI, JUP, Nizam-i-Mustufa Group and the PPP but PML (J) was not affected like other although negative impact was done to its vote bank as well. Zaffar Abbas, “Sindh: Polls Apart”, *The Herald*, November 1988. pp. 77-78.

62 *Dawn*, October 24 and 25, 1988. In Sindh both PML and NPP were not willing to compromise as Jatoi and Junejo had claims for the Tharparkar constituency. NPP’s Pir Aftab Shah Jillani got IJI ticket to contest for Tharparker seat for which Junejo had submitted his nomination papers. The situation worsened to such
extent that alliance seemed at the brink of dissolution. Zahid Hussain, “The Awami Darbar”, pp. 46-47 and Dawn, October 21, 1988. Pir of Pagara was invited for mediation. Jatoi was of the view that Junejo never thought about the alliance and used to talk about his party and even talks about the success of his party in the elections. It was called just a personality clash between the leaders of NPP and PML. After a six hours session at CM house in Sindh, attended by Jatoi and leaders of PML, JI, JUI (D) and JMP, the IJI chief left for Moro, a district of Sindh as a part of his election campaign. Dawn, October 21, 1988.


Tariq Ismail gave different digits. According to him In Balochistan JI got no ticket for NA and 2 for PA of Balochistan.


Ibid.. Local leaders of PML (J) were against any cooperation with PML (F) but they could not oppose it openly because they were not much influential among the party workers. Jang, October 15, 1988.

Jang, October 19, 1988. Nawaz Sharif, leader of PML and president of IJI, was allowed to contest from three provincial constituencies but he decided to contest two NA and two PA seats. He selected his old constituencies of Lahore and District Murree to contest the elections. Jang, October 23, 1988. Also see Pakistan Times, October 11, 1988.

Till the publication of these lists five NA constituencies from the Punjab were open. Pakistan Times, October 20, 1988. Pakistan Times gives the number of IJI candidates as 15 in its publication of October 19, 1988 while in its report of October 20, 1988 eight seats from Punjab are allotted to IJI. According to Daily Jang IPG got four tickets for NA from Punjab. Jang, October 19, 1988.


Jang, October 19, 1988 and Pakistan Times, October 19, 1988. Nawa-i Waqt published distribution of provincial seats as; PML 190, JI 22, NPP 18, JUI (D) 9 and IPG 1. Nawa-i Waqt, October 23, 1988. This difference of numbers is because the situation was not clear till the elections were held and even leaders of PML and JI are unable to give exact number of the candidates of different political parties.

Jang, October 21, 1988. Some sources mentioned that JI got 20 tickets for the Punjab PA.

After unification of PML there was no formal division in the PML but members of both the factions could not forget previous clashes and somehow this grouping remained intact in the PML till split in 1993 after the death of Junejo.


Ayaz Amir, “Another Kind of Election”, The Herald: Elections Special. 1990. p. 6. Some of the sources have mentioned that Poya himself was an independent candidate in 1988 elections for the constituency in Islamabad. Hafiz Abdul Haq, “Tasvīr-e Wat•an”, Takbeer, November 3, 1988. p. 21. A detailed study of selected candidates shows that members of the same family were candidates of the IJI and PPP. From Multan Corporation, Babu Ferozud Din Ansar was the candidate of PML (F) and his son Anees Ansari was the candidate of PPP. In District Multan Youssf Raza Gillani was the candidate of PPP for NA constituency and from the same constituency his uncle Hamid Raza Gillani was representing the PML. Nawa-i Waqt, October 21, 1988. Such kind of examples is available in different constituencies throughout the Punjab.

Duncan, Breaking the Curfew, p. 298.

Hussain, “A Month of Surprises”, p. 32.

It was generally believed that generally in Punjab PML had some support but as an alliance IJI did not enjoy much support. Being in government in the province, PML was comparatively in a strong position but in many constituencies the alliance was dependent upon the individuals as in many regions still people vote for the individuals keeping in view their relationship, power or at times previous conduct instead of party manifesto.

Rehman, “So Far, So Quiet”, p. 35. One reason for the delay was that PML (F) extended date for the submission of the applications for party tickets due to the heavy floods till October 10, 1988. Pakistan Times, October 22, 1988.


Sarah Inayatullah, p. 148. Lamb. 1991. p. 59. Junejo himself faced a tough time as TI wanted him to support its candidates instead of PML members. Nawa-i Waqt, October 17, 1988. PML (F) and PML (J) decided to unite on October 14, 1988 and the later decided to leave PAI on October 18, 1988. Last date for the submission of the nomination papers was October 15. Most of the candidates had already submitted their nomination papers so it was difficult for the party leaders force them to withdraw which added to the problems of the alliance leadership. Nawa-i Waqt, October 15 and 21 1988

Rehman, “So Far, So Quiet”, p. 35.


1988. For NA-29 it was decided to allot ticket to Raja Basharat and for Provincial Assembly Ch. Afzal but later Bashirul Hassan was named instead of Ch. Afzal. At that time some of the nominated candidates were asked to delay submission of nomination papers which added to the confusions and tension among the alliance candidates. *Nawa-i Waqt*, October 17, 1988.


96 Ibid., 97


100 Last date to submit nomination papers was October 15 for NA and October 18, 1988 for the provincial assemblies. Candidates had the right to withdraw their names till October 18 their nominations for NA and October 22, 1988 for provincial assemblies. Keeping in view this schedule of the elections it can be perceived that IJI was unable to make timely decisions regarding the distribution of party tickets. *Report on the General Elections 1988*, Vol. I. p. 134. Also see *Jang*, October 21, 1988.


106 *Jang*, October 14, 1988. Many of the dissidents of the party were contesting elections against their fellow members of PML. This situation was capable to effect election results in favor of


Contraversies and problems regarding readjustment of seats is available in Ghafoor Ahmad, *Wazīr-i A’zam Benazir*, pp. 84-85. Also see *Dawn*, October 21, 1988.


*Jang*, October 25, 1988. In NWFP Jahangir of PML (J) had filed his nomination papers for one NA seat and one PA seat but he had to leave NA candidature after being awarded IJI ticket and was denied ticket for provincial assembly. Only four members of PML (J) could get ticket and remaining was given to PML (F). IJI did not field candidates on four NWFP NA seats in Peshawar. Muhammad Nasir, “Present Tense”, *The Herald*, November, 1988, p. 42.


At that time workers of PML announced their support to Sec. Gen. of PML, Iqbal even if was not provided with the alliance tickets. Later his withdrawal from the elections controlled the situation. *Dawn*, November 3, 1988 and *Jang*, October 22, 1988.


*Pakistan Times*, October 20, 1988.

Gul quite comprehensively depicted the grievances of member
parties of IJI. Detail of his statement in available in Ghafoor Ahmad, 
Waźr-i 'A'zam Benazir, pp. 94-95. Also see Sultan Ahmad, “Fair Polls
and the Caretakers”, Dawn, October 27, 1988. One of the major reasons of
dissatisfaction of PML-J with reference to PML-F was that both the
factions had announced their candidates for the forthcoming
elections before merger. It was
decided that parliamentary boards of
the two groups will decide the future
candidates but PML-F did not follow
the principle which resulted in the
negative attitude of the PML-J with
reference to the withdrawal of the
candidates; opposing IJI members.
Jang, October 24, 1988. Many of the
members were not willing to
withdraw as in rural areas,
particularly withdrawal means loss of
face which had considered more
humiliation than to lose the elections
after a contest. Maleeha Lodhi,
“Shaky Alliances Litter the Road to
125 Nasir, “Present Tense”; p. 42.
126 Jang, October 24, 1988. 127
Many of the problems of the alliance
were caused because of its unplanned
nature. At the formation of the
alliance none of the issues were
discussed or decided. Being a larger
alliance it was difficult for its
leadership to answer to all the
challenges faced by it and decide the
issues keeping all the members
satisfied. 128 The Muslim, October 24,
1988. It had become a challenge for
IJI to maintain cooperation among
PML and NPP because Jatoi and
Junejo were not willing to work
together. They used to avoid each
other and never bothered to avoid any
chance to give negative statement
about the other leader’s political life
in the previous years. Due to this
controversy many issues faced delay
which needed immediate attention;
one of them was distribution of party
tickets in the 1988 elections for which
Jatoi called a meeting of the leaders of
IJI to discuss the issue but Junejo
declined to attend the meeting for
being busy in his constituency
regarding the election campaign. Due
to the problem of the distribution of
the party tickets in the 1988 elections Junejo decided to run separate


Imroze, November 6, 1988.

The Nation, October 30, 1988. None of the members of PML (J) could get alliance ticket in the capital city of NWFP although Junejo made many calls to Haq who denied to made any change in the nominations considering such decision harmful for the unity of the alliance. Commenting about the decisions of Haq, Jahangir said that because Haq was outsider to the PML so he worked to damage the party. Pakistan Times, October 23, 1988.

At some constituencies extensive discussions were made. Such discussions were made with Umer Hayat, Iqbal Ahmad Khan, Hafiz Salman Butt, Maulana Ajmal Mian, Mian Usman, and Mian Asif. One example of duplication was that the member of PML and JUI Darkhwasti were not asked to withdraw although the alliance ticket had been given to Sarfraz Mir for the Islamabad seat. This duplication divided the votes of IJI among different candidates. Frontier Post, October 30, 1988.


Imroze, October 12, 1988.


Iqbal Ahmad Khan announced his retirement from the elections on the suggestion of Junejo on November 13, 1988 and announced full support for the Mian Umer Hayat of NPP. In fact party members and workers believed that Mian Umer Hayat was the most suitable candidate for the constituency but being Secretary General of PML and dear to Junejo he believed himself the most suitable candidate and got the ticket which was withdrawn keeping in view the choice of the common people. Pakistan Times, November 14, 1988. The decision was changed due to the pressure of the supports on Hayat. Presidents, Secretaries and other office bearers of PML and NPP and provincial candidates for the constituency took out a procession against the allotment of the alliance ticket to Iqbal Ahmad Khan. They all favored of Hayat to contest from the constituency. Dawn, November 9, 1988. Imroze, November 6, 1990.

M. A. Nazir, “IJI yet to Come Out Fully”, The Nation, November 2, 1988. PPP had a strong candidate in this constituency so it was important to agree the alliance members for the selection of one candidate which otherwise could help the PPP candidate to win but Mian Ajmal was not willing to withdraw.


Smaller parties believed that PML and JI did not make decisions on merit. They believed that being major parties in the alliance they made decisions of their own choice that were unjust. Irshad Ahmad Haqqani, “Harif
or Halīf Jamā‘toŋ kei Gillei Shikwei”, Jang, October 25, 1988. Also see The Muslim, October 24, 1988.


142 Pakistan Times, November 16, 1988. From NA-94 Benazir was contesting the election and to secure this seat in favor of IJI internal problems of the alliance were must to be removed. Imroze, November 6, 1988. Tariq Waheed Butt, a member of NPP wrote that there was some problem in the attitude of Nawaz Sharif. He wanted the members of NPP to resign from their party and join PML to get the alliance ticket. According to him Mian Umer Hayat, Maulana Akbar Saiq, Mian Itikhar Taari and he himself submitted applications for the alliance ticket but none of them could get that. According to him he was promised for a PA ticket but later was denied. According to him Mian Umer Hayat, Ch. Anwaarul Haq and Ghulam Mustufa Bajwa first joined the PML and then got the ticket. He wrote that he asked Jatoi to resign from IJI on the issue of ticket distribution but Jatoi did not agree. According to him the members of NPP who represented it in the Parliamentary board of IJI were not sincere and the both Hamid Sarfraz and Allah Bacahyo Lughari played in the hands of Wardag and Nawaz Sharif instead of working for the rights of their party. Tariq Whaeed Butt, Meri Āwāz (Lahore: Tariq Waheed Butt, 1990), pp. 175 and 209-210.


144 S. Akbar Zaidi, “The Big Picture”, The Herald: Election Special, October 1990, p. 42. Also see Anwar H. Syed, “The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab: National Assembly Elections 1988 and 1990”, Asian Survey, Vol. xxxi, No. 7 (July 1991), p. 586. Zia-ism was used as slogan for the election campaign of IJI. The slogan was criticized by different sections of society. Dawn, November 2, 1988. It was difficult for Jatoi to support the ideology of Zia that he had been criticizing for almost eleven years. Nawaz Sharif, CM of Punjab, could confidently raise this slogan but CMs of other tree provinces could not adopt the same program in their respective provinces. Zia wanted to implement Islamic system but his system seemed in conflict with the plan of Quaid-i Azam as in Zia’s plans there was no space for political parties, democracy, or parliament but according to Quaid-i Azam Pakistan had to be governed according to the democratic principles where political parties and parliament play an important role. “Ham Naik-o Bad Hazur ko Samjhā‘ie daitie hai n”, Nawa-i-Waqt, September 15, 1988.

145 Arrangements were made to maintain presence of all the prominent leaders in important public meetings by IJI leadership but still it could not be maintained. From the major session in Peshawar Jatoi, Junejo and Ghafoor were absent as they were busy in other activities. Pakistan Times, October 28, November 3, and 11, 1988.


150 Pakistan Times, October 24, 1988.


154 Pakistan Times, November 15, 1988. Qazi Hussain Ahmad’s this statement invited a lot of criticism as it was beyond realistic approach. Major concern of Pakistan at that time was a peaceful environment and an independent foreign policy. People of
Pakistan wanted a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem but such slogans invited criticism as IJI’s dreams seemed funny to its opponents. In that situation announcement of “hoisting flag on Red Fort” was unacceptable from a seasoned politician like Qazi Hussain Ahmad.


*Kamran Khan, “IDA Launches Election campaign”, The Muslim, October 29, 1988.*

Ibid.,


The alliance leadership called the 1988 election as a contest between the Islamic forces with that of anti-Islamic forces, but it was difficult to prove its point because they could not include every Islamic party in the alliance. At the same time NPP being member of the alliance was leaving a big question mark as it was difficult to prove, how Jatoi was more Islamic than any other member of PPP as Jatoi was one of the leading members of PPP till 1986. Maleeha Lodhi, “Shaky Alliances Litter the Road to elections”, *Dawn*, October 21, 1990.


*Pakistan Times*, November 3 and 9, 1988.


Rehman, “So Far, So Quiet”, p. 36.


Public meeting were held at Shangar, Daska, Okara, Larkana and Lahore. *Pakistan Times*, November 4, 6, 13 and 14, 1988. Also see *Dawn*, November 8, 1988.

Jamali was one of the prominent PML leaders in Balochistan.


Junejo hired an international advertising group in Pakistan after his dismissal. The team was hired by President Reagan during the two elections campaigns led by Reagan. PML (F) was also working to hire some international organization for its publicity in the international media. *The Nation*, October 10, 1988.


By un-Islamic forces Junejo meant the leadership of the PPP and some international powers. *Dawn*, November 4, 1988.


Cycle was the electoral symbol of IJI and during the campaign slogans were prepared naming election symbol so that the illiterate and old people could easily keep the thing in mind.

Shari’ah Bill was introduced by Maulana Samiul Haq in the NA in 1985 as a private member bill and debate was going continuous when the assembly was dissolved in May 1985.

It can be said that attendance in public meetings is not a criteria for the judgment in countries like Pakistan as many politicians hire transporters to bring people to the public meetings and many of the government servants are ordered a compulsory attendance to continue their jobs.

Nawaz Sharif did not hesitate to quote that as CM he distributed 750,000 plots to the landless during his election campaign. Pakistan Times, November 11, 1988 and Dawn, November 1, 1988. Also see Jasarat, November 12, 1988.

These were the prominent leaders of PML in Rawalpindi and contesting election on IJI ticket.

Details of IJI election campaign are available in Ghafoor Ahmad, Waqir-i Azam Benazir, pp. 99-104. Junejo and other alliance leaders kept on propagating same kind of surety and confidence for the success of the IJI in the elections of
Syed, “The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab”, p. 586. According to Professor Ghafoor elections were a competition between PPP and IJI. 


Ibid., 

Haider, November 6, 1988.


Al-Zulfikar was a terrorist group. Its links were proved with brothers of Benazir which was a strong source for the PML leadership to dub PPP a supporter of terrorists if it was not directed involved.


Nawaz Sharif, Qazi Haussain Ahmad and different Sindhi leaders at different public meetings called PPP responsible for the fall of Dacca during the election campaign in 1988. Pakistan Time, October 31, November 5, 13 and 15, 1988.

In such statements leadership of IJI kept on hinting about PPP as group of traitors. Dawn, November 1, 1988. Pakistan Times, November 6, 1988.


In NWFP and Balochistan JUI and NAP formed a coalition government which was not tolerated by the Z. A. Bhutto administration. It dismissed the coalition in Balochistan and in protest NWFP government resigned. Both these provinces remained under governor’s rule for a major part of Z. A. Bhutto era.

Most of the time of Z. A. Bhutto government emergency laws were imposed and under Defense of Pakistan Regulations basic freedom of the people was confiscated and people could be kept in jail for six months without informing them the allegations levied on them.

Pakistan Times, October 28, 1988, November 3, 5, 6, 7, 13, 1988. Also see Dawn, November 5, 1988. On these dates IJI public meetings were held at Jinnah Park, Rawalpindi, Nawaz Sharif Park, Rawalpindi; Bahawalnagar, Okara, Lahore, Peshawar, and Hub Chowk.


Pakistan Times, November 6, 1988.

Pakistan Times, November 14, 1988. Dawn, November 14, 1988. Discussing in an interview Benazir said that in the elections of 1977 there were hardly any chances of losing the elections by the PPP. She said the provincial CMs launched a drama of kidnapping and did not submit their nomination papers as they were aware of the chances of their victory in the elections. But because all the CMs of PPP government were elected unopposed so everybody believed that they were kidnapped and nobody considered the meager chances of the victory of their opponents. Benazir said the PPP leadership had hardly any fear of losing the elections so it did not need to plan rigging.

Jang, November 5, 1988. The policies adopted by PPP during the era of Z. A. Bhutto, like “Qouta System” was criticized by IJI leaders. Jasarat, October 29, 1988. Also see Pakistan Times, October 29, 1988. Major reason for criticism about this system was that many of the people in Sindh were against this policy believing that it was a source of creating division in society. They also believed that due to this system deserving people are denied their right.


The Muslim, November 7, 1988, and Jasarat, November 12, 1988.

Jang, October 29, 1988. Also see Jang, November 7, 1988. Benazir had offered a Public discussion (Manâzra) regarding the Kahuta atomic plant. Nawaz Sharif accepted this challenge and said that he will happily join the discussion but such discussion would not exempt plane hijacking and other issues. Pakistan Times, November 12, 1988. In an interview to New York magazine Begum Nusrat Bhutto held out an assurance that if the PPP won the elections it will open Kahuta and other nuclear installations for inspection. The statement was later denied at different forums and even called planted news. Dawn, November 6, 1988. Same kind of statement was published in India Abroad as well. Although the statement was disowned by Nusrat but Poya was of the view that a complete version of the interview was published in India Today. So the denial was just to make fool of the people of Pakistan. Pakistan Times, November 8, 1988.


PPP called it as an election stunt raised by IJI but IJI explained its position by saying that it was not started by IJI but was started by the offer of inspection of nuclear installations by Nusrat Bhutto. Pakistan Times, October 30, 1988 and Dawn, November 8, 1988.

Riaz Ahmad Choudhary, “Enthusiastic Crowd Verdict in Favor of IJI”, Pakistan Times, November 15, 1988. Also see Pakistan Times, November 3, 1988. Pri Fazle Haq said that contest between the PPP and IJI was a contest between Islam and secularism. He said that the people of NWFP were staunch Muslims and they will never support the red revolution (Socialism). Haq promised the establishment of a peaceful and honorable society in Pakistan. Mashriq, November 2, 1988.


Ibid., November 5, 1988. This argument was supported by different candidates of IJI during their election campaign. For Example IJ candidate for NA-83, Dr. Athar Qureshi, highlighting the methods of selection of candidates by PPP told the people that those who raise higher slogans can never fulfill the responsibilities of nation building and they only work to secure their own position in the politics of the state. Jasarat, November 4 and 6, 1988. Hasan Askari commented that both the major parties paid attention to the individuals who could attract voters instead of concentrating on their political agendas or the election manifestoes. M.H. Askari Rizvi, “Last-Ditch Battle to Save the Old Order”, Dawn, October 14, 1988.

Al-Zulfikar was a terrorist group which had accepted responsibility of bomb blasts, plane hijacking in 1981, damage to bridges and important installations in Pakistan.


Pakistan Times, November 15, 1988. Zia had a positive impression in the minds of the people who wanted to bring Islam as a system of government in Pakistan. Because Zia’s services regarding the Islamization in Pakistan are recognized by majority of the people, so any one who had some link with Bahawalpur incident are considered traitors. IJI used this emotional stance very well against the PPP.


Pakistan Times, November 12, 1988. The procession was led by Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad. They alleged the PPP workers an attack of Rawalpindi office of alliance and a protest was arranged.


It was said that the interim government, media and military were not neutral in the elections. They made every effort to prevent the PPP victory. IJI also propagated negative views about Benazir but she managed the whole situation skillfully. She managed to win over the support of various factional leaders and kept her party united. Thus the elections took the country to the process of re-democratization.


Eighteen women contested for NA elections amongst which nine were independent. Six seats went to women amongst whom two seats were won by Nusrat Bhutto and two by Benazir. For PA 21 women contested. Of these 21 there were 18 independent candidates and only two returned elected. Zafeerud Din, *Women in Electoral Politics: 1985-1997* (Islamabad: Institute of Human Rights and Democracy, 1998), pp. 14-15.

One seat was won by the JUI (D) candidate but because it was the member of IJI so the total number of IJI candidates in the NA was 55.


After the elections of 1988 Nawaz Sharif failed to form government at center but he did not leave any effort in forming government in the Punjab. So he took independent MPAs of Punjab and wavering MPAs of IJI to the Changa Manga Rest House where they were kept till they voted in favor of Nawaz Sharif as CM of the Punjab.

Some of the newspapers quoted that IJI nominated 62 people to contest the election for Sindh PA but the *Report on the General Election 1988*, Vol. I mentioned this figure as 54 candidates.


Ibid., November 18, 1988. Jatoi and Ghafoor decided to resign from the alliance offices after losing the elections. *Amm*, November 20, 1988. Defeat of the politicians like Pir Pagaro was stunning for majority of the people as it was not expected to be done through a local land owner. Duncan, *Breaking the Curfew*, p. 300.

“A Two-Party Alliance”, *Dawn*, November 21, 1988. The old leaguers believed that PML could win more than 30 seats if the right candidates were allotted the party tickets. *Dawn*, September 4, 1990. PML also faced trouble that many of its members could not get the alliance ticket and they decided to contest the elections as independent which caused division in the vote bank of PML. In NWFP PML member Yunis Ilahi Sethi withdrew his nomination papers due to fear of defeat in the elections although he was awarded IJI ticket to contest the election. Nasir, “Present Tense”, p. 41. So it can be said that on the one side IJI suffered due to independent candidates who left its ranks but at the same time it enjoyed support of those who returned the alliance ticket due to lack of confidence in the chances of their victory.


M.H. Askari, “Playing With Destiny”, *The Herald*: Election Special, 1990, p. 9. In Karachi and Hyderabad main losers were religious political parties like JI and JUP, which was considered their strong Centre in the past. Both the parties faced crushing defeat and their prominent leaders like Professor Ghafoor Ahmad (Naib Amir of JI) and Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (JUP). “Party time: Mohajir Qaumi Movement”, *The Herald*: Election Special, October 1990, p. 25

These were its traditional constituencies as JI had won in these constituencies in previous elections as well. *Dawn*, November 21, 1988.


Sagar, *Elections 1988*.


Ibid., p. 201.

*Pakistan Times*, October 20, 1990.


Ibid., p. 251.


The situation at almost all the polling stations remained peaceful. People cast their votes under satisfactory security arrangements. In Karachi generally the situation was calm. There were only few incidents of stone pelting and nearly fifty people got injured. *Pakistan Times*, November 19, 1988. According to *Nawa-i-Waqf*, there were hardly few incidents of disturbed law and order situation but these incidents were not capable to create impact on election


279 A team of observers from USA came to visit all important centers of all the four provinces to check how far the elections were free and fair. This Team comprised of the members of National Democratic Institute (NDI). It was a six member team. Three of them visited NWFP and Balochistan to observe the arrangements for the elections and remaining three members meet with officials, government members and politicians of Punjab and Sindh. *Pakistan Times*, October 14, 1988. National Republican Institute was also expected to send a team of observers. Both the organizations associated with two major political parties of USA the republican and the Democratic Party. Anwar Iqbal, “US Teams to Observe Poll Arrangements”, *The Muslim*, September 17, 1988.


281 Talat Aslam, “Long Division”, *The Herald*, December 1988, p. 29. Nawaz Sharif commented that the election results were according to his expectation except in Sindh. He said that whatever happened in Sindh needed analysis and a careful study. He emphasized in the possibility of rigging in Sindh. He believed that the split mandate was a source to keep a check on the government policies. “Benazir Should have given others their Share in Sindh”, Interview of Nawaz Sharif, *The Herald, The Herald*, December 1988, pp. 5051.


283 Ghafoor Ahmad, *Ważr-i A’zam Benazir*, p. 120.


286 Ibid., pp.186-89.


289 Aslam, “Long Division”, p. 29. During Zia era, Nawaz government did well in Punjab. At the same time Benazir had not clearly denounced socialism which became cause of success of IJI. Another reason of IJI’s success was that a large majority of the people disagreed to the idea of a woman Prime Minister. Syed, “The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab”, p. 587.


Some of the people were of the view that one of the major reasons of the success of IJI in the elections of 1988
was the slogan of Zia-ism. Nadeem, “Muslim League ko Bā-'Izzat tawr par Khatam Kijiyei”, Nawa-i-Waqt, August 22, 1989. Zia-ism was meant Islamization for many of the people and those who wanted Islam to be adopted as a government system supported IJI. Some of the PML members were of the view that it was the slogan of Zia-ism that brought irreparable lose to PML. Nawa-i-Waqt, November 28, 1988.

Pakistan Times, November 2, 1988.


Ghafoor Ahmad, Ważir-i A’zam Benazir, p. 122. Also see Sheikh, Benazir Bhutto, p. 118.


The third highest winners were the independents in the elections and they could play a major role in determining the party position in the assemblies. Keeping in view the number of independents in the assemblies Nawaz Sharif announces that his party will form government in three out of four provinces. Even if we take a closer look at the formation of government in Punjab, it was only done through the support of independents that the IJI formed government.


“A Two-Party Alliance”, Dawn, November 21, 1988. Both these parties had joined the discussion for initiating an alliance but NMG could not reconcile it to formally join the alliance and Khaksar Terhreek later realized that it was hardly possible for it to work with the alliance and left it before the elections of 1988.

Pakistan Times, November 19, 1988. Central working committee of PML held a meeting. Majority of its leadership was of the view that Benazir should be allowed to form the government otherwise the situation of 1971 could be repeated. Some others believed that PML had never sat in the opposition, if it had a chance it should work positively. Nawa-i-Waqt, November 28, 1988.

Pakistan Times, November 18, 1988. Having majority in Senate PML leadership thought that the election of the president on the members of senate and NA so the president had no other way except nominating PM from IJI.

Ghafoor Ahmad, Ważir-i A’zam Benazir, pp. 128-29. Poya categorically rejected this suggestion hinting conflicting views about basic issues. Similar kind of response came from Benazir, and other prominent members of IJI and PPP. The Pakistan Times, November 21 and 22, 1988.

Pakistan Times, November 21, 1988. 13 independents won the elections in NWFP PA from that 7 were the primary members of PML that could be persuaded to join the IJI government but it was not done. Dawn, November 21, 1988. Haq after losing all the four provincial seats decided to resign from the party leadership which could further increase the crisis of leadership in the province. His resignation could bring Jahangir back but it was not done. Due to their personal grudges Haq had denied party ticket to Jahangir even from his home constituency but it was not done and PPP formed government there.

Ghafoor Ahmad, *Wazīr-i Aʿzam Benazir*, p. 158. There were conflicts among the leadership of IJI regarding ticket distribution as selection was not done on merit. Haq preferred his friends for party tickets and most of them lost the elections. Prominent members of PML like provincial Chief Organizer of PML Syed Munir Shah and Jahangir were denied alliance tickets. Due to the wrong selection of candidates in NWFP PML was almost eliminated from Peshawar and Mardan Districts. *Dawn*, November 21, 1988.


PPP was in a position to form government in Sindh independently but it needed the support of MQM to form government at Centre so it decided to share power with the MQM in Sindh as well.

Electoral Politics in Pakistan: National Assembly Elections 1993, Report of SAARC-NGO OBSERVERS (New Delhi: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1995), p. 7. Benazir was given the office of the PM on two basic conditions. It had to accept Ghulam Ishaq Khan as the President and Sahibzada Yaqub Khan (Yaqub) as the foreign minister of Pakistan. Benazir also promised to not interfere in the defense matters and will not victimize any of the army officers who were responsible for the death of Bhutto. Anjum, *Siyasat, Āien aur ‘Addalat*, p. 121.

*Keesing’s Record of World Events*, volume 35, No. 12, p. 37150.


*Keesing’s Record of World Events*, Volume 35 No. 12, p. 37150.

Burki, “Zia’s Eleven Years”, p. 3.
CHAPTER 4

IIJI IN OPPOSITION AND GOVERNMENT

Elections of 1988 brought split mandate for political parties. None of them could win majority. Many of the independent candidates returned to the assemblies. The two prominent winners IIJI and PPP could not win clear majority and tried to win sympathies and support of independent candidates, members of the opponent parties and that of smaller parties in NA and provincial assemblies. Efforts to get support of the independents by two major winners of 1988 elections, made the future course of political developments blasé to the democratic values. Common peoples’ mandate was ignored and a tradition of non-accommodative attitude towards political opponents was once again revived. The negative attitude of major winners sowed a seed of resentment between the federal government and the provincial government of the Punjab and Balochistan which was visible throughout Benazir’s first term of premiership.

IIJI won majority in the Punjab and NWFP provincial assemblies. It could not get reasonable success in NA and in the PAs of Sindh and Balochistan but it did not accept the failure. A closed door meeting of the heads of the member parties of IIJI was conducted to formulate future strategy on November 23, 1988. It was decided to make every effort to win over the support of independent MNAs, MPAs and regional parties like JUI (F) in Balochistan and MQM in Sindh to form government at national level. IIJI leadership discussed the MQM’s demands as well. Pir Fazal of JMP was of the view that IIJI had the right to form government as it won throughout the country. JUI-D and Junejo announced their full support and cooperation for Nawaz Sharif if he makes government at Centre and/or in the provinces. IIJI leaders showed willingness to accept Maulana Fazal as a mutual candidate for the office of PM to keep PPP out of power. For the election of speaker, Syeda Abida Hussain was nominated as a potential candidate. Till the nomination of Benazir as PM unity was visible inside the ranks of IIJI as it had to win against a common foe. Benazir’s nomination as PM altered the future course of political developments. Many independents diverted their support towards PPP. Leaders of IIJI like Ghafoor, Jatoi and Qazi considered the PM’s nomination as a favorable beginning for the PPP.
choice was Nawaz Sharif but keeping in view the political progression, he preferred to remain in the Punjab Assembly.\(^8\)

IJI being a huge alliance had to handle its internal problems as well. It had to create consensus on certain issues that will be discussed later in detail. Many of the prominent leaders of IJI lost the elections. Jatoi, convener of the IJI, after losing general elections contested by-elections from the hometown of Khar.\(^9\) Junejo, president of PML, also lost the general elections. After losing the elections he announced the reorganization of PML to improve its performance. This announcement created confusions about the future of IJI because at different occasions during party meetings for its reorganization, Junejo, ignoring IJI, hinted to focus on the manifesto of PML. He also hinted towards party constitution according to which one man could not hold offices of government and the party simultaneously. This announcement started a new era of tensions and conflict between Junejo and Nawaz Sharif who had apprehensions about the election within the party and about the enforcement of party constitution.\(^10\) Nomination of Chairman Senate became controversial as well. Nawaz Sharif wanted to nominate Mahbubul Haq as chairman Senate so he did not attend the meeting of PML that was held to finalize nomination of Wasim Sajjad.\(^11\) Facing such issues inside the alliance, it was not easy for IJI leadership to form government or handle issues as a strong opposition at Center. Only firm political rivalry with the PPP kept it united. In NWFP, these controversies did not allow the IJI to form government though IJI had won more seats than any other party. Formation of government in the provinces is a long story of internal problems of IJI and its controversies with its major political rival, the PPP.

I. Formation of Government in the Provinces

Government formation was not easy in the provinces. Both IJI and PPP faced many problems. Ghulam Ishaq Khan avoided nomination of the PM for judiciously a long time which gave enough time to both the major election winners to show their majority which caused many controversies. These controversies remained unresolved till the end of Benazir’s first term as PM. Government formation in the provinces is discussed in the following pages. A controversy regarding the dismissal of the Balochistan government is also discussed to highlight the attitude of federal government towards the IJI, which resulted in the two years controversial period of Center and the provinces which ultimately led to the dissolution of the NA and all the four provincial assemblies, in August 1990.

II. IJI-PPP Efforts to Configure Government in the Punjab

Formation of government in the Punjab was not a smooth sailing for IJI. PPP tried its best to form government in the largest province of Pakistan but failed and started leveling allegations of rigging against the IJI leadership. A very first step against Nawaz Sharif was the order to governor Punjab Makhdoom Sajjad Hussain Qureshi, to delay to convene the Punjab PA session. This was only done to take more time to form government in the Punjab but governor did not delay the process and Nawaz Sharif got elected as CM Punjab.\(^12\) Then she asked him to postpone Nawaz Sharif’s oath as CM.\(^13\) This was done even before
Benazir had taken the oath as PM of Pakistan. Later, she appointed General (Retd) Tikka Khan as Governor of the Punjab which made things more controversial.¹⁴

PPP adopted a policy of confrontation with the IJI government in the Punjab. It alleged that being part of caretaker government Nawaz Sharif rigged elections in specific constituencies.¹⁵ It also claimed that Nawaz Sharif spent huge sums of money to buy cooperation of independent members and kept them in confinement in a rest house in Changa Manga, near Lahore till the day of meeting of the Punjab PA for the election of CM on December 2, 1989.¹⁶ To destabilize the IJI government in the Punjab, many of the prominent leaders of the PPP came to Punjab and tried to buy loyalties of IJI MPAs.¹⁷ To pressurize Nawaz Sharif, federal government transferred high officials from bureaucracy as well. Moves of no-confidence against CM and the Speaker were also used as tools of pressure. Details of these moves are discussed in the other section of this chapter. All the “revengeful” activities of PPP leadership increased popularity of Nawaz Sharif which was evident in the success of IJI in the by-elections. This proved to be a major setback for PPP.¹⁸ The negative beginning did not allow both the leaders to create a positive working relationship which remained prominent in the following years.

**Controversies Regarding the Government Formation in Balochistan**

Formation of government in the Balochistan province was a challenge faced by winning parties. None of the parties won considerable majority to make deal with others. IJI and JUI (F) formed a committee to discuss the possibility of cooperation in government formation or nominate a common leader of the opposition.¹⁹ Zaffarullah Khan Jamali²⁰ (Jamali), Bugti and JUI, all were contenders for the office of CM. IJI leadership tried to manipulate this situation in its favor. IJI’s central leadership had its own plans for which Nawaz Sharif sent Vardag, as his emissary to Bugti. He offered Bugti, support to become CM Balochistan. In return he asked support in NA for Nawaz Sharif for the election of PM. The problematic thing about this was that all this consultation was done without prior information to IJI provincial chief Jamali. Before the election of CM, speaker and deputy speakers were elected unopposed with the support of IJI and ANP. Speaker Sardar Mohammad Khan Barozai Belonged to PPP.²¹ Later Jamali was elected as CM Balochistan with the casting vote of speaker. To strengthen his position Jamali compromised with PPP, the staunch enemy of IJI and PML.²² He justified his act through his own explanation. According to him party politics did not work in Balochistan, so it was safer to work in cooperation with all the parties. Jamali’s election through the casting vote of Speaker was considered unconstitutional by Bugti. He planned to file no-confidence motion against him with the cooperation of JUI or any other possibilities to get him removed from the office. Earlier Jamali and JUI had decided to cooperate with each other. It was decided that JUI will support Jamali as CM and Jamali will support the appointment of a governor of Balochistan, nominated by JUI. Maulana Fazal denied existence of any such agreement as he was busy in negotiations with Jamali and Bugti both. An announcement of agreement between Bugti and JUI changed the
political realities of the Balochistan. Meanwhile defection of one of the provincial ministers converted Jamali’s simple majority into minority and he asked the governor to dissolve the Balochistan PA just after fifteen days of its establishment. Governor acted upon the advice of CM immediately and dissolved the Balochistan PA on December 15, 1988.

Jamali defended himself by arguing that he asked for dissolution of the assembly for a fresh mandate for the sake of political stability in Balochistan. The split mandate could never help to form a stable government for the province that could be a hindrance in the progress of the province and he only tried to avoid that. Jamali told that it was a must to pass the provincial budget till December 23 and he faced non-serious attitude of changing stances by Maulana Fazal which made him take an early decision of the dissolution of the assembly. He told that central high command of PML and IJI did not respond him properly whenever he tried to consult, so he took a solo flight while making dissolution decision. Contradiction is evident in his statement. The PA could only pass the budget if it was working. Dissolution meant to take three months to get the assembly re-elected and proceed. If Jamali took the step in favor of the people of the province he could step down for the election of such a CM who had majority. The other fact seems more sound that Jamali was elected through the casting vote of Speaker, he was sure that he could not get the vote of confidence for which he decided to dissolve the assembly.

Dissolution of the Balochistan PA received mixed reaction. There were allegations and counter allegations by the federal government and IJI against each other. Many considered it political rivalry of PPP and IJI against each other and others called it a rehearsal to topple the government of the Punjab. Further, some related the event with the dismissal of Balochistan government by ZAB in 1973. Reacting to the dissolution decision, PML leadership cancelled Jamali’s membership of PML. IJI could not develop consensus to react on dissolution in unanimity. Some IJI members wanted to take the issue to the people of Pakistan and start a movement against the federal government but Ch. Shujaat Hussain and some other members rejected the idea. To pressurize the government IJI boycotted the budget session of NA till the restoration of the Balochistan PA. But it was of no use.

Federal government adopted totally a different stance. It took it as provincial matter. Benazir announced that she was not informed about the decision before its implementation. She held Eighth Amendment responsible for this dissolution but at the same time she called it a constitutional act. She asked the members of defunct assembly to go to the court or opt for fresh elections. This statement invited criticism. There was an opinion that the assembly was dissolved with the consent of PM but to keep her democratic image intact she told that she was unaware of the governor’s act.

Nawaz Sharif stated in an interview that Jamali wanted to form government with the support of the PP and he took the decision of dissolution of the PA with the guidance of a federal minister. He called it absurd that the federal government was unaware with the development while the decision was signed by the governor while he was in Islamabad. Benazir’s attitude proved that she did not try to stop dissolution of the assembly as Jamali was an IJI representative and he could be made responsible for the dissolution. This had no harm for PPP or its government at Centre. PM said that governor Musa Khan did not belong to PPP so she was not responsible for his acts. MS. Tahira Khan,
MPA Punjab, was of the view that if the act was unknown to the PM she was incapable to run the state and if she was aware of the drama she was insincere to the country and more specifically to the democracy. She said that the governor of the Punjab and three chief auditors were dismissed immediately after Benazir had joined the office of PM. She found Governor Musa a correct person to materialize her plans so was not dismissed. It was also a known fact that Jamali and governor Musa belonged to IJI but they both were in consistent contact with federal government. Many believed that the whole dissolution episode was planned with the guidance of federal government.

Bugti criticized the dissolution on the suggestion of a CM, who was elected with the casting vote of speaker and yet had not received the vote of confidence. Bugti wanted to revive the assembly with the support of JUI and Pakistan Milli Awami Ittehad (Pashtoon Khwa Quetta) (PMAI) for which constitutional petitions were filed in the Balochistan high court. Legal aspects of dissolution were not ignored by the IJI leadership as well. It also challenged the dissolution in the court. On January 23, 1989 the Balochistan high court ordered restoration of the Assembly considering its dissolution unconstitutional. On February 5, 1989 Akbar Bugti took the oath as new CM of Balochistan leading a coalition of BNA-JUI-IJI-PMAI with a support of 33 MPAs in the house of 44.

There were expectations that the newly elected government will solve the problems of the common people. Initially things improved as the government opened the universities that had been closed for quite some time. But appointment of president of PNP, Mir Ghous Baksh Bizenjo as governor of Balochistan started debate about deterioration of Center-province relations. Bugti’s demand to summon the meeting of CCI for restoration of provincial rights according the constitution of 1973 increased restraints that had been there for a long time.

Balochistan PA was restored by the Balochistan high court which was taken as a surprise as BNA and JUI-F were expecting fresh elections and during their agitation against the dissolution of Balochistan they actually started their election campaign but most of the winners of 1988 elections did not want fresh elections. Most of the political parties did not want fresh elections too. Majority of IJI MPAs had won due to biradri system and family affiliations. There were chances of their shifting loyalties towards PPP or contest as independents. JUI in many constituencies had won with a marginal majority and feared to lose against BNA if the election held again. BNA was the only party which hoped to retain its seats or improve in the PA. So restoration of the assembly was a positive development for IJI and JUI. BNA could improve its position in case of fresh elections were held which could prove positive for the provincial progression but still things remained comparatively smooth till the dissolution of the assembly in August 1990.

**Weakness of IJI Leadership and Creation of its Forward Bloc in NWFP**

In the elections of 1988 in NWFP, IJI won more seats than any other party but did not win a clear majority to form government. Gen. (retd) Fazal-e Haq, leader of IJI in NWFP failed
to win support of ANP and other prominent parties. He himself decided to leave the NWFP PA and retained his seat in the NA which made things more difficult for IJI.

Haq’s absence from NWFP PA created a vacuum of leadership. In that situation Humayun Saifullah, was nominated as IJI candidate for the office of CM in NWFP. PPP asked IJI to form a coalition government in the province. Haq rejected the idea after discussing it with the IJI leadership and PPP formed government with the support of ANP in the then NWFP. Problems for IJI increased due to cooperation of staunch Leaguers like Arbab Jehangir with the PPP. Aftab Sherpao became CM of the province. PPPANP coalition government could not survive for a longer duration as PPP did not fulfill the promises made with ANP. Most prominent among which was appointment of the governor, nominated by ANP.

IJI, after termination of the PPP-ANP coalition worked out some working relationship with ANP in the then NWFP PA to weaken the government of the PPP. One significant thing that was visible was the details of the IJI-ANP alliance were under discussion till its announcement. In the press conference there was no representative of JI, IJI forward bloc and the independent MPAs in the then NWFP PA. This raised doubts about the new coalition but Nawaz Sharif denied existence of any problems among the allied parties. There was a mixed response from the IJI and ANP members towards this parliamentary opposition alliance.

The IJI-ANP coalition was considered unnatural as they had difference of ideology. IJI’s election slogan was ‘Islamization’ while ANP believes in secular policy. IJI’s foreign policy was based on enmity with India and Russia but ANP believed in friendship with them. They both had contradictory views about Afghanistan situation. IJI opposed the appointment of ANP’s governor in NWFP considering it harmful for the Afghanistan war. IJI and ANP both clearly announced that they will not change their Afghanistan policy. Sticking to their past policies IJI-ANP coalition invited criticism from political opponents as well as supporters.

Member parties of IJI had problems with the alliance with ANP. Nawaz Sharif did not consult about this understanding with other member parties of IJI, which made the decision controversial. President of JUI-D was vice president of IJI, and Secretary General of JI was secretary general of IJI as well but both were not consulted regarding IJI’s cooperation with ANP. Many members of PML thought that Nawaz Sharif ignored his status as president of PML Punjab and ignored party’s importance to make important decisions. PML also was not happy. Wyne, leader of the opposition in NA, had submitted a resolution in NA to call Wali Khan a traitor for his letters written to Indian and Russian governments. He denied to withdraw that resolution and told that he could not go ahead with traitors. Qazi also considered Wali Khan a traitor for the same reason. JI stated that if IJI-ANP coalition was successful in making government in the province his party will not accept any ministries. JI and JUI-D asked to hold meeting of heads of IJI to decide about the alliance with ANP. It was stated that none of the parties could be included in the alliance which did not agree to the basic agenda of IJI or believes in secularism. Nawaz Sharif discussed the matter with the members of JUI-D and JI which minimized reservations of these parties about the alliance with ANP. IJI endorsed the alliance with ANP with an
assurance that the alliance would work only inside the then NWFP PA. It was also announced that IJI will not change its stance about basic issues like Afghanistan policy and Islamization. JI and JUI-D were promised that if IJI-ANP alliance was successful in toppling the PPP government neither governorship nor office of CM would be handed over to ANP. Vardag told that ANP did not raise the question of appointment of its governor or CM so there was no need to focus on this question. Sami told that JUI (D) was critical about the alliance of IJI with ANP but they found it the only way to face the PPP atrocities. Remaining parties the IPG, HJ, NPP, JAH (Lakhvi Group) and JMP had no objection on the IJI-ANP alliance as they had been working with ANP since long.

Some of the ANP members affirmed this development, others vehemently rejected. Some took it as a positive step towards the growth of democracy and others criticized their leadership for making alliance with those who did not approve party ideology. Even some members of ANP left the party reacting to its alliance with IJI. Many of the members of ANP accepted the alliance to solve the problems like appointment of the governor, execution of PWP, ban on recruitment and transfers, appointment of chairman District Development Advisory committees and many others. Some adherents of ANP appreciated the decision of joining hands with IJI because their alliance with PPP did not provide them desired facilities. Six out of eighty members of working committee opposed the decision of joining any alliance with IJI. These members did not attend the ANP meeting that was held to endorse the decision of making coalition with IJI. Other members were critical for making decision in the absence of those who resisted the decision of the party leadership. ANP members also prepared a list for sharing of portfolios incase IJI-ANP coalition was able to form government in the province. Some of the members wanted to discuss the issue in the central executive council of the party before finalizing the decision. Wali Khan explained to his supports that the alliance did not harm the ideology of ANP but it was a set-back for IJI as the leaders of IJI had dubbed the ANP as traitor and when they made alliance with it, they either reverted from the previous statements or had made alliance with the traitors.

To avoid indulging in controversies a consensus candidate was needed as leader of the opposition alliance in NWFP PA. Jahangir was found as the most suitable candidate but supporters of Junejo argued that Humayun was more appropriate person than Jahangir. Humayun, leader of the opposition in NWFP PA did not oppose selection of Jahangir as the leader of IJI-ANP coalition. Some ANP leaders also had problems with the nomination of Jahangir. They argued that Jahangir was an independent member and will lead the politics of province to a non-party politics. All these arguments did not prove strong enough to prevent IJI-ANP alliance inside the NWFP PA. After making a parliamentary alliance with ANP, IJI became ambitious of making government in the province before the provincial budget. Jahangir was nominated as IJJIANP common candidate for the office of CM in NWFP after a successful no-confidence motion against Sherpao. They also signed a seventeen point agreement explaining
composition of ANP-IJI coalition government. At that time, out of 86, PPP had support of 51 MPAs including PPP, IJI forward bloc and JUI-F. IJI had 19 MPAs and had support of 14 ANP members. So it was important for it to win support of 13 independent MPAs and those of the IJI forward bloc to form government in the province. The independent MPAs and members of IJI forward bloc were offered attractive packages and withdrawal of references filed against them in High Court if joined IJI to help it form government. After failure of this effort of rapprochement, IJI forward bloc started efforts to increase number of its supporters in the assembly and was fairly successful with the assurance of ministries and other benefits. To make the no-confidence motion successful against Sherpao, IJI tried to get support of JUI-F as well. Punjab government did not hesitate in spending huge money to buy loyalty of many of the PPP MPAs. IJI forward bloc proved a major hindrance in this regard. Nothing could bring them back to support IJI and they remained part of PPP government till the dissolution of the NWFP PA in August 1990.

After the withdrawal of ANP’s support to PPP government in NWFP, it was hardly possible for PPP to maintain its government in the province but an IJI forward bloc, under the leadership of Ayub Tanoli and Shahzada Gustasap, ten members supported PPP and government remained intact. It was generally expected that Tanoli could change loyalties any time when he feels his interests can better be served by the other quarter. In NWFP PML was not organized and was under pressure due to internal problems of the party. The situation was exploited by the PPP in its favor by getting support of the deserters of PML. According to Jatoi this was the beginning of wrong political traditions by PPP. They took the members of the IJI in their cabinet which increased horse trading in the assemblies. Qazi Lateef criticized PPP for having seventeen IJI ministers in the cabinet of twenty-two. Efforts were made to get these members back under IJI flag but this could not be done as democratic group of IJI was provided ministries in the government.

Humayun, Parliamentary leader of IJI in NWFP PA filed a petition, under political parties act (8-B) against Tanoli group in election tribunal which called the case out of its jurisdiction. Humayun went to Peshawar high court which ordered the election tribunal to decide the reference filed by Humayun. At that time, Sherpao was worried about his position in the provincial government as if the tribunal decides against his allies from IJI, they could move back to their party. High Court rejected the petition. It stated that IJI was not a political party but an electoral alliance because none of the component parties of the alliance withdrew their separate identity so any of its members did not come under section (8-b) of the Political Parties Act. This decision opened the way for all the IJI members who were afraid of the above mentioned Act. This decision brought negative effect on the political balance as one of the members of PPP immediately after this decision joined the IJI. More abrupt changes in the loyalties were expected which could disturb the majority of Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab province and same kind of problems could be faced by the PPP government at Centre. IJI leaders filed an appeal against Peshawar high court’s decision in Supreme Court. Supreme Court did not agree to the decision. It considered the IJI a political party and asked ECP to take care of the issue and hear the case according to the law.
Before the decision of High Court, Humayun announced his support to PPP government. It was understood that he was persuaded by Sherpao, Tanoli and Shahzada Gustasap. There were many explanations of his changing stance. Humayun told that he changed his loyalty because of the president’s appeal to strengthen the existing government to control horse trading and to face external threat. He explained that he changed his loyalty because of the attitude of the president of IJI, Nawaz Sharif and his close relations with Haq particularly after his removal from the office of the president of NWFP PML and appointment of Salim Saifullah in the same office. He said that his party members endorsed his decision which was denied by general secretary of NWFP IJI Nawabzada Mohsin Ali Khan. Against changing loyalty in favor of PPP Ghafoor Khan Jadoon (MPA of PML-N) filed petition in Peshawar high court for the dismissal of Humayun’s membership from the assembly under the defection clause of Political Parties Act. These issues remained open for the debate for a long time and nothing came out of this constitutional exercise. Horse-trading continued as a general practice of the assembly. One of the MPAs of IJI, Fateh Mohammad Khan gave an idea that if the PPP government cuts the cabinet to 14 and promises to end horse trading and blackmailing not only he was ready to support the government but could make other IJI members to support the government. The leader of ANP in the assembly Begum Nasim Wali Khan seconded the idea giving details of the cabinet which should consist of five ministers from ruling party, four from ANP, three from PPP’s existing allies (IJI democratic) and two from IJI. Later she asked for a cabinet of 8 and a supreme council of six members comprising representatives from both treasury and the opposition. Opposition prepared a resolution on this but it was not allowed to present it in the assembly as the budget session does not allow other resolutions to be discussed. Later during the windup speech of budget session CM Sherpao shelved the resolution by saying it too immature for a final decision.

**Formation of Government in Sindh**

In the present chapter Sindh is not discussed in detail because only one member of IJI could reach in the Sindh PA. IJI made agreement with MQM in October 1989 after its problems with PPP but this agreement could only create pressure on the federal government. There was hardly any role for IJI to play in the province except holding rallies that’s why the details of IJI politics and policies are not discussed.

Sindh was a difficult province to administer. Its urban regions like Karachi and Hyderabad were even tougher to manage. PPP won the elections with a thin majority at center and it needed support of other parties. MQM was second largest party in the province with 26 PA and 14 NA seats. PPP formed government with its cooperation in Sindh and at Centre. MQM had its package of demands which it wanted to be fully respected. The PPP government could not fulfill its promises. At the same time IJI wanted some space in Sindh. It had no representation in Sindh assembly. To fill this vacuum in its power-base, IJI tried to work out some working relation with MQM. While making agreement with MQM, IJI faced internal criticism. JI and MQM had been political rivals. Both had claims on same regions and were intolerant towards each other. Nawaz Sharif’s non-consultative attitude
increased tension inside the alliance as JI felt ignored for Nawaz Sharif’s independent
decisions. Another point of criticism was that MQM signed an agreement with IJI, containing almost similar clauses as it had signed with PPP. Few believed it unrealistic and impractical and others believed that MQM and JI could not work together which could increase problems of the province instead of resolving them. IJI and PPP proved such political opponents that could not let the other to exist. Both wanted to distort the image of the other. Tensions did not prevail only in the formation of government. IJI’s tussle with PPP remained prominent in running the federal government and in the Punjab. Both the parties created problems for each other throughout the first ruling era of Benazir. The negative attitude of the two major parties towards each other not only increased the problems of the common people both also distorted image of these parties and posed threat to democracy as well. Some of the issues that hindered in the development of a positive working relationship between IJI and PPP are discussed in the following parts of this chapter.

II. IJI’s Relations with Federal Government

IJI and PPP did not accept the government of each other. After the government was formed they made every effort to create problems for the other. PPP government interfered in the provincial matters; it stopped the finances of the provinces and tried to dismiss the IJI government in the Punjab. PPP did not take any positive steps to solve the problems as meetings of CCI and NFC were not called which could help to resolve basic issues. PPP did not hesitate in openly announcing that Khar was made head of “Nawaz Sharif Hakoomat Girrao” (dismiss Nawaz Sharif Government) movement. Responding to this, IJI planned to destabilize to government of Benazir. Efforts of rapprochement were also made by both the parties but hardly any practical steps were taken in this regard.

Efforts to Destabilize the Premiership of Benazir

IJI and its leadership, keeping the political enmity alive with PPP tried every possible thing to destabilize the government of Benazir. They did not want to wait for five years to complete the tenure of assemblies. They did not approve most of the policies of the PPP government which prevented them to cooperate with the federal government. Several attempts were made to topple the PPP’s rule. Prominent efforts among many are discussed below.

Opposition to the Woman Prime Minister

IJI announced that although the constitution of Pakistan did not prohibit a woman to become PM but still IJI was against it. According to religious political parties a woman could not become head of the state in an Islamic country. They showed their commitment to oppose a women’s premiership as it was against the teachings of Islam. JI was against the nomination of a woman as head of the state in a Muslim country, but it could not become
successful to stop a vote of confidence in favor of Benazir.\(^91\) Federal Shariat Court (FSC) rejected the petitions filed against the premiership of a woman in the Islamic state.\(^92\)

Maulana Abdullah Drkhwasti, leader of JUI and Central Deputy Secretary General of JUI, Maulana Zahidur Rasheed rejected leadership of a woman in a Muslim state.\(^93\) Rasheed announced a countrywide convention of religious scholars to make a unanimous decision against the appointment of a woman, as a head of state. He offered JUI-F a reunion if it withdrew support to PPP government.\(^94\) On June 15, 1989 Muttahida Ulema Council, announced a movement against the premiership of a women in an Islamic state: Pakistan. This announcement caused tension for the PPP government. To meet the pressure, Benazir tried to improve relations with IJI. A committee was created to hold discussions with the opposition but nothing positive came out of this exercise because the governments of Punjab and Balochistan were reluctant to cooperate with the PPP. Similarly, the PPP was hesitant to cooperate with IJI.\(^95\) The move by IJI and other religious scholars had no practical impact because of the historical practice of the political parties. JI supported Fatima Jinnah in the presidential elections of 1965 against Ayub Khan. Such past events make people to think about the slogans raised by the political parties and generally such historical references make these slogans weak and fake.

**No-confidence Motion against Benazir**

No-confidence motion was not an individual event. A series of events led this happen. IJI was able to plan this motion only after having cooperation of many other political parties in the assembly. A Parliamentary Opposition Alliance of fourteen political parties or IJI and six other parties was one of such events. This alliance was named as Combined Opposition Parties (COP). Its major component was IJI. Other members of COP were; JUI, Pakistan Jamhoori Party, JUP and ANP. Formation of such a broad alliance was not an easy task. Jatoi put a huge effort to conclude this alliance and met many leaders like; Nawaz Sharif, Nasrullah, Wali Khan and Nasim Wali Khan, Bugti. Junejo and Jatoi explained that COP was an understanding of different political parties on some common points inside the NA as being at odds could not help them to become a strong opposition. It had nothing to do outside the assembly.\(^96\) IJI leadership explained that COP was formed in the lower house of the parliament to prevent the government to avoid delay in making important decisions.\(^97\) The basic purposes of the formation of COP was to fight against the federal government in favor of a proper federal system, provincial autonomy, enforcement of *Shari’ah*, economic and social justice, improvement in law and order situation and accountability of the government through healthy criticism.\(^98\) Some of the people believed that the COP was formed to prevent the federal government from passing the budget to prove the PPP a failure but it could not pressurize the government according to its plan for many reasons.\(^99\)

Different political parties had their own concerns and reservations to join this alliance. JUI, Balochistan National Alliance (BNA) and ANP agreed to get involved in an alliance against PPP for their own problems. Central Working Committee of PML endorsed the decision of IJI for joining COP.\(^100\) Initially, MQM refused to join it but on October 28, 1989 it broke its accord with PPP and committed to join COP and vote against Benazir in the COP’s no-
confidences of different political parties also created problems in the formation of COP but the fear of a common foe kept them together. So we can call the COP, an amalgamation of conservative like IJI with that of left-wing parties like ANP from NWFP and BNP from Balochistan.

Formation of COP was formally announced on June 4, 1989. Jatoi was elected the leader of the COP in NA. This decision was criticized by many as Jatoi did not have political following in Sindh for which he had to contest elections from Punjab. Some had problems with Jatoi’s origin as he was a Sindhi. Few were critical of his past as he was ZAB’s closest confidant. Some of the people believed that the selection of Jatoi as the leader of the opposition in NA was the result of the blessings of Ghulam Ishaq Khan but it was denied by the prominent leaders of COP. PML and JI members demanded to elect leader of the opposition from a party that had a sizeable representation in the NA like PML. PML members wanted to select Abida Hussain to perform this duty but JI and JUI (D) opposed the idea as they did not want to make a woman their leader. To avoid tension on the issue, idea of Abida Hussain’s selection as leader of Opposition in the NA was dropped.

In November 1989 COP established its secretariat in Islamabad and it started a joint opposition movement against federal government. A committee under Shujaat was formed to organize the opposition’s work. To pressurize the government opposition held public meetings in different cities of Pakistan which were well planned. A no-confidence move against the PM was announced but its date was not announced. No-confidence motion was a threat that Benazir faced throughout her tenure. It was all due to the thin majority that she enjoyed in the NA with the help of other political parties. IJI used this threat quite well. First this threat was used by General Sec. of JMP PirFazal in February 1989. In April Sheikh Rasheed, an IJI MNA, announced that IJI had support of 73 members in NA and was enjoying support of JUI, Nasrullah Khan, Abida Hussain and members of FATA. He announced that COP needed MQM’s support to launch no-confidence motion against Benazir. According to him no-confidence motion was the only source to avoid next martial law in Pakistan. While talking about noconfidence motion Sheikh Rasheed did not bother to think that FATA members and MQM was still supporting the PPP.

The no-confidence motion against PM Benazir was a long story of corruption, horse trading and political bribe. To survive this motion, Benazir took her supporters to Swat. The members whose loyalty to PPP was doubtful were prevented to take part in voting and some of the members of the IJI were taken away to preclude them to vote. Many of the IJI members were bribed through offers of ministries and huge sum of money. Same tactics were adopted by Nawaz Sharif in Punjab PA to create a forward block of the members of the PPP and to get support of PPP MNAs in NA. Benazir alleged that Qazi Hussain, Nawaz Sharif and Jatoi with the cooperation of ISI and Army played an important role in the filing the no-confidence motion against her in 1989. Operation Mid-Night Jackal was reference to this allegation. According to Jatoi results could be different if all the members could participate in voting. But PPP managed to make it a failure through restricting two dozen MNAs in PM Secretariat. COP also kept its
supporters in hotels outside Islamabad with the arrangements of security to maintain unity among its ranks.

Before taking the move in the Parliament, Jatoi met with different leaders including Junejo, Pagara, Nawaz Sharif, Fazal, Sheikh Rasheed, Raja Zafarul Haq, IJI president Nawaz Sharif, Shujaat, Wyne and Nasrullah. Some of the sources guessed that these meetings were preparation for no-confidence move which was expected in October, 1989.\textsuperscript{118} Jatoi told IJI leadership that he had contacted 10 members of Punjab, five of tribal area, four of Balochistan and eleven members of Sindh who agreed to support IJI in no-confidence motion against PM.\textsuperscript{119} Other COP members also increased their contact with the PPP MNAs to get their support for the motion. Makhdoom Khaliquz Zaman, a rebel member of PPP was contacted and he gave clear hints of extending support to COP. There were rumors of resignation of Malik Meraj Khalid Speaker of NA. Some of the people were of the view that he was offered office of PM in case of change of government which he denied vehemently.\textsuperscript{120} The alliance claimed favor of 94 members in the NA.\textsuperscript{121} Jatoi explained that opposition planned no-confidence motion due to increasing corruption, lawlessness in Sindh, inflation and price hike, and dissatisfactory internal and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{122} According to Jatoi the decision was made in the best national interest.

The notice of no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Benazir was presented to Secretary Assembly in October 1989 which led to more horse trading in the NA.\textsuperscript{123} IJI wanted to ask for show of hands after presenting the motion but according to law after its presentation, voting could be held after three days and speaker could delay it even for seven days. IJI believed that this gap could create problems as MNAs could revert to PPP or loyalties of IJI MNAs could also be changed.\textsuperscript{124} But the rules could not be superseded as PPP tried to avail every chance of making the motion a failure.

IJI had support of 98 members at that time but was confident for bringing about 119 members against Benazir. It was decided that in case of the success of the no-confidence motion, Jatoi would be the next PM of the country.\textsuperscript{125} High security arrangements were done on the polling day to facilitate members to reach the Parliament House. The motion narrowly failed with the lack of just 12 votes. Benazir received 148 votes in December 1988 and opposition had support of only 55 members but in November 1989, opposition enjoyed support of 107 members which was alarming for the PPP. After failure of this motion, on November 12, 1989 Benazir appointed 3 opposition members as ministers who sided with her at the voting on November 1, 1989.\textsuperscript{126} These were; Ghulam Ahmad Maneka, minister of overseas Pakistanis and manpower, Ahmad Alam Anwar and Ghulam Akbar Laasi.\textsuperscript{127} There was another reason for the survival of Benazir as well. Nawaz Sharif realized that if the no-confidence motion was successful, Jatoi will be the next PM and there will be no-question of demanding mid-term elections as Jatoi was an ally of Nawaz Sharif.\textsuperscript{128} IJI had won support of the required number of MNAs but Nawaz Sharif backed out to support the motion ignoring all the efforts made previously and the money spent because he wanted to become PM and could not wait for this till 1995.\textsuperscript{129} Hardly any evidence is available about this fact but the certain factors cannot be ignored that somehow prove this a truth. Nawaz Sharif’s attitude proves that he wanted to become PM at the earliest possible. Secondly last minute retreat of certain
members hints certain developments behind the sense. These factors cannot be ignored similarly they does not prove anything.

According to Nawaz Sharif the move failed because of four IJI members; Shabbir Ahmad, Makhdoom Ahmad Anwar Aalam, Ghulam Ahmad Maneka and Ch. Anwar Aziz. It was said that these members had signed the no-confidence motion but changed their mind before voting was held. Due to this change some members of PPP who had agreed to support IJI refused to do so and the number of IJI supporters reduced from 119 to 104. Nawaz Sharif and Junejo decided to take disciplinary action against those league members who did not support IJI in its no-confidence move against PM. Many of the observers believe that joining hand of MQM with IJI prevented many PPP MNAs from Sindh to support IJI. Many of the PML members did not agree to the idea of selection of Jatoi as PM if the no-confidence motion succeeds. They believed that PML was a majority party in the NA and they could never allow a person to become PM who had no party of his own in the NA.

Many of the members of IJI did not agree with the idea of no-confidence move. They asked to let the democracy work. They were of the view that the no-confidence move, if successful, could not bring a strong government. They argued that after having spent a huge sum of money in the election campaign, they could not afford the election campaign again in a brief period of time. Some critics were of the view that those opposing the move were actually not sure of coming back to assemblies again as a result of fresh elections. One reason behind the no-confidence move was mentioned that it will help to establish a strong government. It was said that after getting the no-confidence move passed, a new PM will be elected by the support of many parties who will request the president to dissolve the assembly and hold fresh election which will bring a strong government at Center as well as in the provinces. None of these factors played key role in the failure of this motion but each of these had its own place which played its role in the failure of COP to topple the PPP government.

This motion brought a major change in Sindh politics. MQM announced its agreement with IJI that was signed on September 18, 1989. The Agreement did not seem practical. Most of the people and analysts opined that the agreement was signed for face saving. Actual role was played by the money and other facilities extended by IJI for MQM leadership. After the failure of the motion, MQM’s cooperation with Jiye Sindh increased which created problems in the law and order situation of the country. The situation deteriorated to such an extent that CM Sindh resigned from the office on February 23, 1990.

IJI planned for a second no-confidence motion against PM in September-October NA session in 1990 but it was not tabled till the dissolution of the NA. Beg, Qazi and many other believed that no-confidence motion was not advantageous for their own reasons. Qazi believed that IJI should concentrate on its organization while according to Beg in the first move almost 13 billion rupees were spent which was really expensive for a developing country like Pakistan. ANP’s secretary general Rasool Baksh Palijo and Ali Hasan, also
rejected the idea of tabling second no-confidence against PM. Some people doubt that for second no-confidence move IJI had support of Intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{138}

Ghulam Ishaq Khan while explaining the causes of the dissolution of the NA told that to win over the sympathies of the members of opposition party the methods used to bribe them, were shameful. MNAs were harassed, given plots and permits and ministries. Some members got land and loans. Those who did not change loyalties got benefits from their own parties.\textsuperscript{139} Among many other reasons, instability of the government was a prominent reason of the dissolution of the NA and PAs which was caused by the horse trading inside the assemblies.

**Re-election of PM after March 1990**

It was envisaged in the Article 91 (2-A) of the constitution, that president would nominate the PM. This clause was valid until March 20, 1990. Opposition used this clause to pressurize Benazir and demanded fresh elections for the office of PM. Opposition took the stance that according to this clause of the constitution after March 20, 1990 nominated PM had no right to administer the state. Opposition and many others pressurized the PM to get vote of confidence to prove her majority. Benazir avoided this demand as she knew that she had support of less than 100 members of the NA.\textsuperscript{140} She had lost popularity among the MNAs which was proved in the no-confidence move on 1989 for which she made every possible effort to avoid opting for fresh PM election or a vote of confidence for which support of 2/3 majority is required.

Chaudhary Abdul Ghafoor in an interview explained that according to the Article 91-2(A), period of nominated PM expired on March 20, 1990. He said before that date PM was nominated by the president who could take oath before formation of cabinet. He said that after March 20, 1990, it was responsibility of the president to call a session of the NA and ask the MNAs to elect new PM or show their acceptance for the existing one.\textsuperscript{141} Federal Law Minister Iftikhar Hussain Gillani interpreted the Article 91-2(A) of the constitution as it only gave a cutoff date for the nomination of the PM by president.\textsuperscript{142} He said that the opposition tried to use this article to manipulate the political situation. Even they announced to go to the court for the interpretation of this clause but perhaps they had realized weakness of their argument and decided to not go to the court.\textsuperscript{143} There was news that its official lawyer S.M. Zafar refused to take the case denying any legal grounds of this case but opposition claimed that he could not take the case for being busy in certain other cases. Later, opposition itself admitted that there were legal complications for which it delayed to file the petition.\textsuperscript{144} This stance of legal complications was highlighted by government as the opposition did not have any logic in this case to consult the court.

During the month of March, Benazir announced that she might get vote of confidence on March 22, 1990 for which IJI leadership started a campaign to buy loyalties of the MNAs of PPP, but nothing came out of it. Benazir did not take any such step. Some sources mentioned that the troika i.e. President, PM and Army Chief decided “anybody who is anybody will remain in his or her position for the period prescribed by the constitution”. President also had asked opposition to consult superior courts to resolve the issue.\textsuperscript{145} It
seemed that a working relationship had developed between president and PM and opposition could not pressurize the government to such extent which could force it to take any immediate decision or perhaps Ghulam Ishaq Khan did not want to intervene in the matter particularly at political phase of political confusions.

**III. Policy Matters and Controversies between IJI and Centre**

IJI and PPP had problems with each other to such an extent that they did not bother to support each other for any of the issues either if that was a constitutional matter, economic affair or any other issue of national or international importance. They both adopted conflicting point of views and opposed each other using all the slogans of any kind. Some of the matters are discussed below to highlight the extent of vindictiveness towards each other.

**Eighth Amendment**

In the constitution of 1973 president enjoyed ceremonial powers. He could only work with the approval of PM. When Zia decided to civilianize the government he made a constitutional amendment which is known as Eighth Amendment. Through this amendment president was given the right to dissolve government if he feels that the state business was not working according to the constitution. Till March 20, 1990 president could appoint PM. He had the approving authority of the provincial caretaker government appointed by the governor. Appointment of Chief Election Commissioner, chairman of federal Public Service Commission, and heads of army, navy and air force was made discretion of the president through this amendment. President could also return a bill to the parliament for reconsideration of the bill or any of its parts. This amendment was included in the constitution by Zia to keep his control over the civilian government. None of the politicians challenged this during the life time of Zia but the democratic governments elected in 1988 or after considered it faultiness for the growth of democracy. They also believed that this amendment created imbalance in the constitution which made the constitution a source of creating confusions in the smooth working of the parliamentary democracy. For these reasons PPP after making government in 1988 tried to repeal this amendment. Repeal of Eighth Amendment was a burning issue that remained under discussion from 1988 till its repeal. Benazir was afraid of this amendment as it gives right to the president to dismiss the assemblies. At the same time this amendment gives certain powers to the president which generally is exercised by PM in democratic states. After taking the oath of the office of PM Benazir started making efforts to repeal this amendment or amend some of its clauses. She did not enjoy 2/3 majority in the assembly so she needed support of opposition to introduce any changes in the constitution. IJI adopted a clear stance and asked the PPP government to prepare a document of proposed amendments. IJI demanded to hold
detailed discussions of government and opposition leaders before tabling it. Opposition wanted to select the clauses that needed amendments. It also demanded to maintain balance in the powers of PM and the president even after amending the constitutional Eighth Amendment.\textsuperscript{147} It also wanted to keep intact those clauses which were related to Senate, FSC, additional seats in National and PA. Some political parties and leaders like JI and Shujaat wanted to restore original constitution of 1973.\textsuperscript{148} Before the elections of 1988 JI, and many other parties demanded a return towards the 1973 constitution but after PPP’s formation of government most of them demanded balance of power.\textsuperscript{149} Jatoi denied any chances to repeal the Eighth Amendment during Benazir era. According to him this amendment could not stop her to govern the country in an authoritative manner. He hinted towards the atrocities of Bhutto and told that no one could stop Benazir to follow attitude of her father if the Eighth Amendment was repealed. He considered eighth amendment as a source to save people of Pakistan from civil dictatorship.\textsuperscript{150} Contrary to that PM wanted to eliminate the whole amendment. It also denied any negotiations on any of its clauses.\textsuperscript{151} After a brief period of time PPP realized that it could not alter the Eighth Amendment independently it started negotiations with opposition but at that time opposition did not respond properly. To handle this situation PPP used another tactic of buying loyalties of IJI MNAs.

IJI formulated a three members committee which consisted of Shujaat (Chairman), Jatoi, and Wyne. The committee met with other parliamentary parties to discuss the issue of Eighth Amendment and formulate a common program to handle the issue in the parliament.\textsuperscript{152} After discussion with other parties IJI parliamentary group decided to oppose the repeal of the Eighth Amendment.\textsuperscript{153} According to Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi all the debate regarding Eighth Amendment was beyond the actual political realities. He said that there were two points in the amendment that were being criticized the most. One was the permission to the president to hold office of COAS which was no more there after the death of Zia. About the second issue of the president’s power to dissolve the NA, he said that after decision of court regarding the dissolution of the NA by Zia, no one could dissolve without solid reasons. Niazi said that there must be balance in the power of president and PM. He said that president must not be likes Chaudhary Fazal Ilahi\textsuperscript{154} or Junejo, the PM of Pakistan from 1985-1988.\textsuperscript{155}

Benazir did not appreciate these arguments. She wanted to repeal this amendment by any means for which she used different tactics. To increase number of her supporters inside the NA she tried to purchase the support of many of the IJI representatives for which she succeeded to some extent but with the passage of time she lost support of many of the members of her own party and that of MQM and ANP. This loss could not let her to table the resolution to repeal the amendment as 2/3 majority is required to amend the constitution. Another source could be the public support against this amendment but she could not mobilized public support against the Eighth Amendment. Her efforts to repeal this amendment only resulted in creating annoyance of the president against her.

\textit{Shari'ah Bill}
Enforcement of Shari’ah has been an argumentative issue from the inception of Pakistan. At different occasions attempts were made to convert Pakistan to an Islamic Welfare State. Difference of opinion among religious and liberal political parties, and a fear of getting isolated from international community did not allow the governments to adopt and Islamic Shari’ah as the basic governing principles in Pakistan. The efforts to make Pakistan an Islamic republic started from the beginning of the efforts to frame constitution of Pakistan. Very first success in this regard was the approval of objectives Resolution which has been part of basic constitutional agenda. After that efforts for Islamization of the laws had been part of the constitution making process of Pakistan. The Shari’ah bill moved by Sami and Qazi Lateef was part of such efforts.

The bill was moved on July 13, 1985 in Senate and was passed unanimously on May 13, 1990. The objective of the Bill was to enforce Islamic Shari’ah in the country according to the Objectives Resolution and the constitution of the 1973. The Bill was based on the principles that could help to bring judicial system, national economic system, media and education policy according to the injunctions of Islam. Ulema appreciated the bill but other sections of society did not support the idea of making Pakistan a theocracy. Federal government avoided to introduce Shari’ah Bill in the NA due to many reasons. Federal Law Minister was not present in the Senate when the bill was passed so all the amendments he introduced in the bill, lapsed. Federal government tagged the bill as one-sided and denied to introduce it in the NA. Benazir criticized the Islamic system of punishments which received negative response and agitation from the common people. Interior minister Aitzaz Ahsan interpreted it as a source to negate parliament’s powers to legislate. Shari’ah bill gave the right to the IIC to review the laws and call any law null and void if IIC finds it against the teachings of Islam. According to this bill Federal Shariat Court enjoyed the authority to reject any of the decisions of any court if it finds it against the teachings of Islam. Responding to the attitude of PM Benazir, leaders of JAH filed an application in the high court against the statement of PM and requested to stop her to work as PM. He took the stance that a woman who had no respect for the principles of Islam had no right to govern the country as PM.

IJI parliamentary committee decided to present new Shari’ah bill in the NA incorporating the Shari’ah bill approved by the Senate and the Shari’ah ordinance issued by Zia. Qazi Lateef did not oppose the idea to review the bill as he wanted the implementation of the Shari’ah as supreme law in Pakistan for which he was ready to compromises. Hardly any opposition surfaced inside the IJI, regarding the efforts to get the Shari’ah bill passed. Political parties of secular nature like NPP had difference of opinion regarding the bill but it did not oppose it openly. Opposing IJI’s efforts regarding Islamization could spoil the image of IJI among the common people as Islamization was one of the prominent points of the political manifesto of IJI and because IJI was in opposition and its efforts could hardly bring any prominent results regarding the enforcement of Shari’ah. To pressurize the government, all parties Shari’ah conference demanded the approval of Shari’ah bill as earliest as possible. All these tactics could not take thing to any conclusion during the premiership of Benazir.
Discrepancy Regarding the Construction of Kalabagh Dam

Kalabagh Dam has been considered an important source of generating energy and watering the barren lands to attain self-reliance in the production of food items through storage of water since inception of Pakistan. Its construction was first suggested during the life of Quaid-i Azam on March 14, 1948. Plan to construct KBD was prepared in 1953. Different field experts prepared feasibility report of the Dam and selected an appropriate place for its construction. Government of Pakistan has spent more than two billion rupees on this project but till 1988 the project was just on papers. The Dam could provide 2400 megawatts of electricity in the beginning and later could produce more than 3400 megawatts of electricity. Mangla and Terbella Dam, the two major working dams in Pakistan produce only 2500 megawatts of the electricity and the KBD could provide more than the produce of the two. The dam could fulfill the requirement of the four provinces and the Lake of the Dam could help irrigating 5 million acres of land which could bring revolutionary increase in agricultural yield. Despite all the ground work done and the expenditure made, the construction of the dam could not be started due to reservations of the provinces.

There had been difference of opinion regarding the construction of KBD. Provinces had their reservation regarding the construction of the dam. The political parties of NWFP, particularly ANP opposed the construction of KBD. They even threatened to blow up the dam, if constructed. PPP in its election campaign had opposed the construction of KBD in Sindh and had supported in the Punjab. But practically it could not support the construction of this dam in the fear of losing general public support in Sindh. Balochistan had hardly any direct link with the construction of KBD so it did not adopt any clear stance about it. Punjab is the only province that is supporting the construction of KBD. Punjab, taking the support of the opinion of the engineering experts and Chairman WAPDA propagated benefits of the dam. The difference of the opinion became public during Benazir first premiership.

During her first term as PM Pakistan, Benazir decided to create consensus regarding the construction of KBD but faced severe criticism. One of the major reasons of ANP to join Sherpao government in NWFP was PPP’s opposition to the construction of KBD. Almost 1.2 billion rupees were spent on this project by the governments of Zia-up Haq, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif. According to the plans of World Bank the Dam had to be completed till 1988. Any delay in the construction of this dam could increase cost of construction and create agricultural loss which needed to be cared to feed the increasing population of Pakistan. Other arrangements were made to dilute doubts about the dam. To save the Nowshera city, design of the dam was modified and its height was reduced from 925 to 910 feet. It was told that only one-fourth of the water that is generally wasted in the sea would be saved. It was also explained that the water reserved in the lake of dam would be available during the dry weather to all the provinces to take care of the agricultural activity. The dam could prove to be the cheapest source to produce electricity that was a major requirement for the industrial growth and to fulfill other requirements. But all these arguments could hardly bring any positive results as Sindh and NWFP believed that the Dam was only in favor of the Punjab which will absorb share of water of these two provinces.
IJI faced problems in propagating the importance of the construction of the KBD. One of its major allies, NPP belonged to Sindh and it openly criticized the idea of construction of KBD. JI was vocal in favor of the Dam. Later ANP joined Opposition alliance with IJI which had threatened to blow up the dam if any effort was made to construct it. This made things difficult for IJI leadership and it could not emphasize the need to construct the KBD. Similarly it was unable to openly support those, who opposed its construction.

**Nuclear Issue**

Pakistan’s nuclear program was founded in the mid-1950s. A 12 member Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was appointed to prepare the feasibility of producing Atomic energy in 1956. Z.A. Bhutto developed government’s interest in developing atomic energy program after becoming minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources in 1960. As Foreign Minister from 1963-65 Z.A. Bhutto urged President Ayub Khan to focus on Pakistan’s nuclear program as India was proceeding ahead. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program started in 1972 by ZAB with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972. During late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. In 1975 Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan advanced these efforts. Under Dr. Khan's guidance, Pakistan obtained necessary materials for developing its uranium enrichment capabilities. By 1986 Pakistan had produced enough material to produce a nuclear weapon. The process continued and according to sources, in 1987 Pakistan had acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear test. During first half of decade of democracy the (1988-1999) the President and Army Chief exercised decisive power over the sensitive policy matters including the nuclear policy of Pakistan.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan was very well aware with the nuclear program of Pakistan from ZAB’s premiership and after becoming president he took the whole responsibility of the plan. Benazir was not well informed about the details of the nuclear program of state. She generally claimed that she was not informed about the progress of the nuclear program still her attitude during her visit to USA and willingness to take the briefing the CIA chief about Pakistan’s nuclear program created suspicions about her. This provided an opportunity to the leadership of IJI to launch propaganda against Benazir and her plans to cap or role-back the nuclear program.

**Afghanistan Problem**

Afghanistan remained in the state of war with Russia for almost ten years, from 1979 to 1988. Pakistan supported Afghanistan in its struggle for freedom from Russian oppression throughout this conflict. Pakistan not only gave moral support to Afghanistan but also provided it arms and gave training to its warriors in their struggle against Russia. Geneva Accord signed in April 14, 1988 was part of these efforts which gave a comprehensive schedule for repatriation of Russian forces from Afghanistan. Government of Pakistan remained directly involved in the whole process but after the death of Zia in August 1988 the situation changed. During the interim period no clear stance about Afghanistan was
adopted. Benazir did not support Zia’s Afghanistan policy for which she faced criticism from opposition because IJI wanted to continue Zia’s Afghanistan policy and support to Mujahidin.

IJI wanted the Benazir administration to recognize and support the interim government of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Qazi Hussain was of the view that the PPP government avoided to announce support to Afghan Jihad that was unfair on the part of the government as Pakistan had been playing an important role to resolve the tension in the territory since long. Jatoi and JI were of the view that support of Afghanistan at government level was necessary. Contrary to these demands federal government denied recognizing the government of Mujahidin in Afghanistan. The situation further became tense with the PPP government’s decision to remove Hamid Gul from the office of ISI chief. Hamid Gul had been working for Afghanistan cause since long and his removal was a clear hint that the Benazir government did not want to support the Afghan Interim Government. IJI criticized this move as a set-back for the Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. To oppose the decision of the government IJI organized protests and demanded federal government to recognize the interim government of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and exert pressure on international community for implementation of Geneva accord to solve the Afghanistan problem.

Kashmir Issue

Kashmir issue is a major source of contention between Pakistan and India which has been unresolved for more than sixty years. This issue not only has an impact on the international relations of both these countries but also has a prominent impact on the local politics. Political parties use this issue to amass public opinion in their favor. This issue is generally used by political parties to prove the other insincere with the nation. Same kind of policy was adopted by IJI to prove Benazir a traitor particularly during the Rajiv Gandhi’s visit at the occasion of SAARC Conference. The one-to-one meetings of Benazir with Rajiv were made a topic of general discussion. In a press conference Rajiv explicitly called Kashmir an integral part of India and Benazir did not properly present Pakistan’s point of view which was criticized by the IJI parties. They had an opportunity to prove the PPP leadership traitor and insincere with Pakistan because of its inconsiderate attitude towards Kashmir issue. Opposition took the stance that Benazir had an opportunity to discuss the Kashmir issue on the SAARC forum but it did not avail the opportunity.

To counter the opposition’s propaganda federal government convened a Kashmir Conference on January 1990. In the conference all four CMs, PM AJ & K and heads of all parliamentary parties participated. In the conference foreign minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan told that government could not take the issue in UN, SAARC or any other international forum and it needed to resolve it on bilateral level. Opposition parties after the conference criticized the government for its weak stance on the Kashmir issue. All the IJI parties were united in opposing the PPP stance regarding the Kashmir issue.
Contention on Budgetary Allocations

In principle, Pakistan is a federation consisting of four units and the federal government along with semi-independent tribal regions under the direct rule of federal government. There are different types of federations like USA, Switzerland and Germany. In these countries different states are united under certain principles. Pakistan also claims itself a federal government but there is a problem of sharing powers and defining areas of influence of the federal government and the federating units. There is a long concurrent list in the constitution which creates confusion and administrative problems particularly when there is a conflict between the federal government and the provinces. The first era of Benazir’s premiership was worst example of this conflict between center and provinces regarding sharing of powers and resources. The most protuberant was the conflict between the federal government and the government of IJI in the Punjab and the coalition government in Balochistan regarding sharing of funds and powers for the execution of development plans.

A meeting of National Economic Council (NEC) was held to draw solutions of the economic issues but it ended without crafting any positive results. Nawaz Sharif rejected each suggestion for the annual development program, the provincial budget deficit and the Peoples Works Program (PWP). It is said that PM tried to recount economic pressures of the country but many observers were of the view that Nawaz Sharif behaved like spokesperson of those who did not want to solve the issues. Bugti also rejected every argument of PM and asked to convene meeting of Council of Common Interest (CCI). On the issue of holding the meeting of CCI, PPP and IJI remained hostile towards each other. A long episode of allegations and counter allegations also remained continue with reference to the CCI meeting. Issue remained unresolved till the dissolution of the assemblies in August 1990.

Council of Common Interests (CCI)

Government and opposition were dissatisfied with the outcome of the meeting of NEC which took place before the budget of 1989. Government emphasized its own views about the use of economic sources and their distribution among the provinces which was rejected by the IJI CM in Punjab and Bugti in Balochistan. CM Punjab and Balochistan believed that provincial affairs were being interfered by federal government under its PWP like construction of roads, schools, providing electricity etc. Its detail is discussed later in the same chapter. To resolve the economic issues and allocation of budgetary funds among the Centre and the provinces the government of Punjab demanded to hold the meeting of CCI. There were hopes that the CCI meeting could help to resolve the issues. There was a way out to hold joint parliamentary meeting if the CCI failed to bring some solution of the problems so there were no fears of deadlock.

Nawaz Sharif emphasized to call the meeting of CCI as he was confident of his victory against the federal government. Nawaz Sharif enjoyed the support of CM Balochistan and CM Sindh. Issues for which meeting of CCI was demanded were: construction of Kalabagh Dam, distribution of electricity among the provinces and royalty of natural gas. Nawaz Sharif wanted to take the issue of distribution of water among the provinces in the
meeting of the CCI as well to strengthen his position and securing support of the CMs of other provinces.\textsuperscript{194} It was expected that if the CMs of the provinces discuss things, it will be easier to understand problems and concerns of each other. While the federal government was delaying to call the meeting of CCI, Nawaz Sharif demanded to conduct joint session of parliament. The very basic reason of this haste was the federal government’s action of freezing the accounts of the Punjab which had a negative impact on the economic growth of the province.\textsuperscript{195} IJI was relying on joint session of the parliament because it had majority in the Senate. There were only four members of PPP in the upper house of the parliament. IJI also had an edge as all member parties of IJI were in favor of resolving economic and development issues through the meeting of CCI.\textsuperscript{196} The demand to hold CCI meeting or the joint session of the parliament was presented to the president as well by the IJI leaders for mediation to resolve the issues.\textsuperscript{197} The demand to call a joint session of parliament was a pressure tactic as PPP had nominal representation in the Senate to get support for its point of view.

Nawaz Sharif had full support of Bugti as they both shared opinion regarding Benazir’s administrative measures. CM Balochistan Bugti criticized Benazir government for its policies regarding provincial autonomy, distribution of development funds, federal government’s investment policy regarding the provinces and government’s interference in the plans for provincial development. He was of the view that Benazir was running state matters as a unitary state instead of treating national matters according to the principles of federation.\textsuperscript{198} Bugti vehemently opposed the PWP and asked for Sui Gas royalty from the federal government but he had to tone down his reservations and demands after rapprochement between JUI-F and federal government.\textsuperscript{199} Further the discussions of federal minister for Law, Justice and provincial coordination, Iftikhar with Bugti mended the relations between federal government and the government of Balochistan. But there was not any announcement of mutual consensus regarding the issues for which the details of discussions were not revealed.\textsuperscript{200}

Federal government used delaying tactics to avoid calling the CCI. It argued that members of the federal and provincial governments had to agree on the agenda of the meeting before it was called. Federal government also hinted towards the noncooperative attitude of IJI and Bugti and told that the meeting will bring no positive results with the attitude of opposition for the sake of opposition. Benazir was of the view that instead of resolving the conflicts the meeting will highlight the issues and will increase the tension between the central government and its federating units. PPP tried to avoid the CCI meeting because if the government was unable to resolve tension in the meeting joint session of the Parliament was authorized to take the decision and the PPP did not enjoy majority there.\textsuperscript{201}

With regard to CCI Chief Justice observed that this was a source to resolve tensions between federal government and the provinces. But despite repeated demands by three out of four Federating Units, the government failed to call it to settlement the issues which resulted in the polarization and confrontation between the federation and its units.
Provincial Government of Punjab and Balochistan filed lawsuit against the Federal Government in the Supreme Court, calling for Council’s meeting for the settlement of the issues.

The minister of PPP Iftikhar answering to a question said that CCI meeting could be convened if a written request from the provincial governments is received with a particular agenda which covers the issues under the ambit of CCI. He said that he also read such demands in different newspapers but such a high level meeting could not be called after reading some news of such demand. It seems that IJI was busy in points scoring against the government instead of making demands following the procedure properly which gave the PPP space to delay things according to its own choice. Lately federal government agreed to call meeting of CCI after long discussions of reconciliation committee but before any agreement could be reached Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the assemblies.

National Finance Commission Award (NFC)

Positive economic growth brings development which ultimately makes the common people satisfied but this can only be done if the federal government and the federating units cooperate with each other with a clear understanding of problems, their solutions and reservations of each other regarding the problems and their solutions. This can prove to be an impossible task if the central government and the governments of the provinces decide to degrade each other and make every effort to prove the other insincere with the nation. This was the practice of IJI and PPP during 1989-90. They did not realize that the election was over and a totally different attitude and role was required to take the nation on the path to development. In such environment of clashes between the federal government and the provinces particularly the Punjab and Balochistan, sharing of state funds made things more difficult as none was forbearing enough to accept the viewpoint of the other. Impatient attitude of both, IJI and PPP towards each other made it more difficult to handle the tricky task of sharing the state funds among the units of federation.

Previously NFC award was created in 1974 and there was strong requirement of its renewal and revision. Provinces asked to create NFC Award to get their fair share of national income but federal government ignored all such demands. PPP government’s negative attitude towards the Punjab and Balochistan increased the demand and CMs of both these provinces tried their best to get a fresh NFC Award. It was believed that the provinces had limited resources and least autonomy to plan for the growth of their economy. They were dependent on federal government for the funds for their development and public welfare projects. Undefined economic share of the provinces made relations of provinces precarious. There was a need to redefine economic relations between the provinces to create a healthy, cooperative relation for which creation of the NFC was considered important. Previously these problems did not come in lime-light because of the cooperation of federal and provincial governments with each other. But Benazir’s first era proved problematic because there were governments of two different parties at Centre and in the largest province of Pakistan. Another problem was cuts on the provincial funds by the federal government which made things more difficult for the provinces. Most prominent of the sufferers of this cut on funds was the Punjab.
Due to cuts on the development budget of the Punjab, non-payment of interest of Punjab loans by the federal government and federal government’s denial to pay the budget deficit of the Punjab started new phase in the political history of the Punjab. The government of the Punjab asked the federal government to give it due share of its income. Revising the formula of sharing the national income according to the earnings of any province could make things more difficult to decide as sharing of national resources is a formula agreed by all the federating units of Pakistan. The existing population based formula for distribution of divisible pool of taxes amongst the provinces had been working positively and any kind of effort of its revision could reopen an unending debate and could increase the differences among the provinces.

It was also suggested to the federal government that it should leave the sales tax as a provincial matter. Other taxes should also be given to the provinces. It was believed that there were many things that according to the constitution belonged to the provinces and their management by the federal government was even increasing problems of the federal government. Local government, rural development, education, health and agriculture could be managed by the provincial governments. It could decrease the burden of the federal government and burden of the budget as these ministries could be managed only by the provinces instead of being spent on these offices twice at federal and provincial levels. Bugti supported the Punjab government’s view point and demanded to redefine the terms and references of NFC believing that it was not justifying the rights of the provinces. He also demanded a proper quota in jobs for the people of Balochistan and revenue of Oil and Gas.

Generally, Benazir’s PWP, her interference in the provincial matters and freezing the funds of Punjab made Punjab demand for fresh division of divisible national finances through NFC Award. In principle Benazir government accepted the demand but was unable to give any time-frame to fulfill this demand which already being delayed for more than 18 months. NFC was not allowed to meet during the tenure of Benazir. Critics of Benazir administration call it a conscious effort of the PM to avoid giving the due share of national income to the provinces. Others believe that the situation was not conducive to create such award a fresh due to non-cooperative attitude of the provinces.

**IJI’s Clash with the PPP Government on Peoples Works Program (PWP)**

PWP was a comprehensive plan of regional development. It was a project of two billion rupees which had to be implemented through NGOs set up by the federal government under the guidance of PPP MNAs, MPAs and Union Councils. In the constituencies where PPP lost the elections, the plan was executed by the representatives of the PPP representatives amongst whom a large number consisted of those who lost the elections of 1988. This program covered health education, rural roads, water and sanitation. PPP was in government in NWFP and Sindh so provincial governments did not oppose implementation of this program through federal government representatives. Contrary to that, PPP was in opposition in Punjab and Balochistan which made things difficult for it. Before launching
the program, PPP government did not take provincial governments in confidence which further increased the opposition to this. Secondly, provinces were already controlling a few things and most of them were added to PWP. These governments were not ready to allow federal government to interfere in the provincial matters through those, rejected by the people. According to law minister for the Punjab, the projects of PWP were started without fulfilling the formalities. He told that it could not be allowed to construct health center or a school without transferring land to the respective department. Provincial government was of the view that if the scheme was built it had to be run effectively and for that the arrangements were the responsibility of the provincial government and in the administrative matters the provincial government was already having problems. Governments of Punjab and Balochistan considered it a parallel system to the existing provincial government. It was said by IJI leaders that PWP was a unique program for public welfare which ignored the provincial governments, the elected representatives, the official procedures, the local bodies, opposition and all rules and regulations.

For execution of PWP, the federal government created a new structure from federal to tehsil level. It was planned to leave individual projects at district level. At tehsil level the projects had to be planned by administrative officer who could have small technical and secretarial staff, in addition to district committee composed of elected representatives and local notables. One thing that was not acceptable for the IJI was that all the members of such committees consisted of PPP representatives even if they were least popular in the region. Another objection regarding execution of PWP was that instead of using already existing work-force, federal government established new mechanism that was resulting in the usage of development fund on non-development charges. Punjab government was of the view that the execution of this program was being done in a different manner in Sindh and NWFP. If it was done in the same manner in the Punjab as well, the provincial government had no reason to raise any objections. The share of development fund of the Punjab government was being used by the federal government without consent of the provincial government which invited criticism. Nawaz Sharif actually wanted implementation of PWP or any other development program through provincial governments otherwise it was considered interference in the provincial matters. Nawaz Sharif and Qazi Lateef asked the president to ask PM to not launch the PWP or implement the program through provincial governments. Efforts to improve relations with federal government failed due to intolerant attitude of IJI and PPP towards each other.

There were suggestions to consult the Supreme Court under article 184 of the constitution which asks the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction in ‘any dispute between two or more governments’. Openly opposing the program could bring adverse effect for the IJI. It could create an image that it was creating problems in development work. This thought prevented IJI to criticize the program on public forums. So the IJI changed the plan of criticizing the actual program and instead criticized the means of implementation. They adopted a line that the program was a source of political bribe and that the handpicked workers of PPP will increase corruption. They were of the opinion that it was just a source to give huge sums of money
to the PPP supporters under the cover of PWP. But on bureaucratic forums, IJI tried to prove that PPP actually tried to create a parallel administration over the elected representatives of the people of the Punjab.225 Another thing that IJI did was beginning of a development plan named as *Tameer-e Watan* (Construction of Homeland) of its own for the welfare of the people to avoid criticism against its attitude towards PWP.

PWP and the *Tameer-e Watan* program gave impression of competition between PPP and IJI. PPP provided funds only to its MNAs and the development programs were conducted in the areas where the PPP won the elections. Responding to PPP’s PWP, IJI provided 30,00,000 rupees to its winning and the losing candidates to run development projects in their respective constituencies. PPP denied any development funds to the MNAs belonging to IJI. Same attitude was adopted by IJI in the Punjab province.226 Attitude of both the parties was criticized by each other. IJI was of the view that federal government was interfering in the provincial spheres and eradicated what the PPP initiated in the Punjab. Punjab government created administrative problems in the execution of the PWP as well.

Nawaz Sharif ordered the commissioners and deputy commissioners to not allow any work under PWP without prior permission of the provincial government. He also asked them to serve notices to all the contractors that they could not work on any project without getting NOC from the provincial government.227 According to Punjab government NOC was made must to avoid any clashes between federal and provincial plans. It explained that it had its own plans to construct the sewerage system and built drains. If the PPPs administrators plan on their own, they might be opposite to what was planned by the Punjab government. The clash could create hindrance in the development programs for the people.228 All such arrangements could not help to avoid clashes between federal and provincial administration.

Many of the projects started by the federal government were demolished by the government of Punjab. There were allegations and counter allegations regarding this. IJI alleged that the government suspended its plans after spending diminutive amount and remaining goes to the pockets of the workers of PPP. Contrary to that, PPP alleged that it was all the activity of the Punjab government to create problems for the PPP government.229 Punjab government believed that the method for the implementation of the plan was wrong and the federal government was of the view that either if the methods was wrong, nobody had the right to demolish the rooms built for a school.230 PPP government claimed that 964 projects started by the federal government had been left half completed because of the attitude of the provincial government’s non-cooperative and indifferent attitude. Following the instructions of CM Punjab, the PCS officers had a non-cooperative attitude with the representatives of the federal government.231 The conflict created such hype that in December 1989, governor Punjab Tikka Khan threatened the provincial government that if it did not cooperate in the execution of PWP, Punjab could be taken under governor’s administration.232 This increased tension between federal government and the Punjab government.

Electrifying a constituency gives edge to MNAs and MPAs over others. IJI was not willing to hand over this edge to PPP representatives. Secondly most of the projects were focused in PPP constituencies, which was alarming for provincial government. There was an argument that Punjab government was too slow in giving WAPDA its priorities for the
regions for electrification. WAPDA informed federal government about the issue. Keeping in view the incompetence of Punjab government, federal government took the responsibility of electrification of different constituencies. Punjab government explained the issue as federal government’s political stunt to irritate the government of the Punjab. Punjab government demanded the dismissal of WAPDA. It asked for the right of distribution of electricity to the provinces due to discriminatory attitude of the federal government. Punjab government had reservations about electrification of many areas believing that in the narrow streets there was potential of fire hazard. Punjab government highlighted many other dangers of this kind regarding unplanned electrification of many regions.

PWP could not yield positive results for the PPP government due to opposition of IJI government in Punjab and Bugti’s reaction in Balochistan. Benazir realized the fact that without cooperation of provincial governments, she could not perform her duties in the provinces changed the method of the execution of development plans. In March 1990, Benazir announced that all the plans of PWP will be executed with the help of provincial governments. This statement eased the tension between federal government and the government of the Punjab but things could hardly take any positive moves. To handle the allegation that PWP was planned to execute by the non-elected members to provide them economic benefits, PPP government appointed only elected member as administrators.

In the whole episode of premiership of Benazir it seems that Nawaz Sharif played the role of the head of the opposition. While he took the oath of CM Punjab he needed to adopt a different role. He was representative of the government and cooperation between the largest province and the federal government was the basic requirement to run the government smoothly but instead of realizing their responsibilities and demand of their offices they both worked as political enemies of each other. This attitude not only created hindrances in the development projects but also minimized prospects of growth of newly resumed democratic form of government. It was a bitter truth that Centre-province controversy could never bring any positive results. It also proves an eyewash for the people as this attitude made it clear that both the parties had no respect for the public’s mandate. Controversy regarding the PWP was more political than practical. It was more a clang on interests than skirmishes of principles. IJI and PPP both rejected the viewpoint of the other. For IJI, PWP was interference in the provincial purview and for PPP it was a plan for the social uplift of the common people. Through this program PPP tried to challenge the impression that only IJI members deliver according to peoples’ expectations but IJI was to maintain its impression as the only party that works for the people’s uplift. Both PPP and IJI wanted to take the credit of the development works to enhance its support base in the province which took both of them at odds. Public welfare comes under the purview of the provincial administration but the provincial administration is dependent on the federal government to meet the expenses of the development projects. This dichotomy created
tension between the both power sectors. If we closely study the facts it is clearly evident that the Centre-province tension only increased the problems of the common people otherwise the governments at Centre and the provinces were enjoying power and were benefiting their workers and supporters. The tension only diverted their attention from their duties which they could perform for the betterment of the common people.

IV. The Punjab Administration: Conflicts for Provincial Rights or Political Mileage

There had been many occasions in the political history of Pakistan when there was government of the opposition parties in the smaller provinces like NWFP and Balochistan. But government of different political parties in Center and at the Punjab had been a rare case which proved to be full of conflicts and problems. Political developments from 1988 to 1990 are the story of such conflicts. PPP and IJI wanted to distort the image of the other to curtail each other’s vote bank for which both tried to distort the image of the other. To achieve this goal they did not hesitate to create loss on public interest. Both IJI and PPP misused their authority as well to distort the image of the other. This practice did not bring any benefit for both the parties but increased burden on national exchequer and left the problems of common people unsolved. First prominent thing in the administrative matters that was done by the federal government was effort to delay the oath of Nawaz Sharif as CM of the Punjab which was followed by the transfers of the important members of bureaucracy.239

Punjab is the largest province with reference to population and economic growth. It had never faced the fear of central discrimination. This was the first time when IJI government highlighted the fear of federal discrimination. Balochistan was happy with this stance of IJI and appeared cooperating with the government of the Punjab on certain occasions. But motive of the struggle of the both was different. IJI was fighting for ascendancy to power at Centre while Bugti’s struggle was devoted to safeguard the rights of his province.240 To handle the fears of the discrimination the government of the Punjab took different steps some of which were practical and earned good name for the leadership of the IJI and other were criticized by the common people and the alliance members as they could increase differences among the provinces.

The Bank of Punjab (BOP)

Combats between the IJI and PPP did not leave any front open. PPP did not ignore the economic side of the province and took few steps to increase economic problems to pose challenge to the IJI government to run the province positively. When Benazir took over the reign of government, Pakistan was facing serious economic crisis. To handle this crisis, development funds of the provinces were reduced but the major deduction was faced by the government of the Punjab along with suspension of workers welfare fund. To increase the pressure further on the government of the Punjab, additional amount with reference to increased pays of government servants was not given to the Punjab due to which government servants in the Punjab could not enjoy fruits of increased pays for many months.241 Another action that proved discriminatory against the people of the Punjab was the condition to get recommendation of every loan by PPP MNA which made the process of loan very slow. This arrangement provided a chance to PPP MNAs to discriminate
against the Punjab and its industrialists.\textsuperscript{242} One more thing that proved negative was federal government’s denial of paying amount of budget deficit of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{243} All these factors played their part to increase the economic problems of the province which could not be solved without some serious, particle arrangement.

IJI government decided to solve its financial problems and best suitable solution for this was found in the creation of an independent bank of the Punjab. The idea of an independent bank for the Punjab was appreciated by the members of IJI which was inaugurated on November 15, 1989. Federal government termed it unconstitutional and refused the grant of recognition from State Bank of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{244} This was an attempt of the federal government to prevent the creation of the Bank of the Punjab through the State Bank of Pakistan but it did not work as constitution allows the establishment of a provincial bank. State Bank has the authority to check the working of the Bank. While there seemed no harm in the creation of a provincial bank, there was no problem to grant permission in its creation. By creating The Bank of Punjab (BOP) Nawaz Sharif proved his potential as a leader of the province. He also posed challenge for the federal government’s economic planning. To keep the working of the BOP Nawaz Sharif made few arrangements. He ordered all the provincial institutions to draw their funds from national banks and submit them in Punjab Bank.\textsuperscript{245} Provincial government’s all transactions were made complimentary to the BOP. All the contractors also had to open accounts in the BOP as cheques of this bank were not acceptable for other banks. It was also allowed to deal in foreign currency on market rates. BOP also decided to offer higher interest rates to depositors and lower interest rate to borrowers which attracted more business as compare to the nationalized banks.\textsuperscript{246} All these arrangements were made to check any problems created by the federal government in the working of this bank and the development projects of the Punjab due to lack of availability of funds. Creation of the BOP earned positive name in the Punjab for Nawaz Sharif as people considered that he enjoyed more leadership qualities to solve the problems of the people and safeguard the rights of the province.

**Creation of Provincial Television Station by IJI**

Tussle between the IJI and PPP revealed in every arrangement of the government and the opposition. Using National Television (TV) against the IJI government was one of the many tactics to pressurize the IJI government. Federal government launched a comprehensive program of negative propaganda against the IJI government. Every negative event in the Punjab was portrayed as a result of misconduct or mismanagement of the IJI government. None of the IJI incentives get coverage on TV. Due to this attitude, IJI leadership feared of losing its credibility among the common people. Punjab government asked federal government to allow it to telecast its point of view on TV for one hour daily.\textsuperscript{247} It actually wanted to get a forum that could help it to project its positive projects and to defend the allegations leveled by the federal government.\textsuperscript{248} IJI government wanted to use the TV to educate people about Islam and against the social evils as well.\textsuperscript{249} Federal government rejected this demand. After this Punjab government with the consent of the provincial cabinet decided to establish its own TV channel and submitted an application to federal government for permission.\textsuperscript{250} Same kind of applications was submitted by Azad Kashmir government and a private institute Peoples Television Network (PTN).
Application of Punjab government was rejected. Application of the Kashmir government was taken under consideration and PTN was allowed to start a TV channel. The Punjab government filed a petition against the decision of federal government. It took the stance that that the constitution had explained that the federal government would not refuse the permission of broadcasting to the provincial government if it wants to construct and use the transmitters in the province. The petition was pending in the Supreme Court till the dismissal of Benazir government in 1990.251

Squabble between the IJI Government and the Governor

Difference of opinion between the IJI and PPP remained prominent in every sphere of administration. Relations between the provincial government of the Punjab and the governor were not an exception. After joining the government Benazir tried to delay the oath taking ceremony of Nawaz Sharif as CM of the Punjab. The then governor did not follow the instructions which resulted in the change of governor of the province. Benazir appointed (retd.) General Tikka Khan as the governor of the Punjab to keep informed and to influence the provincial government.

Appointment of Tikka Khan raised controversies between federal government and the government of the Punjab. Tikka khan was not welcomed as governor of the Punjab as he had lost election of 1988 in one of the constituencies of Rawalpindi.252 This was not the only issue between the governor and the government of the Punjab. Tikka Khan tried to influence bureaucracy and started giving them instruction. Nawaz Sharif did not like this and told the governor that he could only suggest the CM but could not get involved directly in the administrative matters. To support his stance Nawaz Sharif amended the provincial laws that allowed the governor to involve in the administrative issues. In the response of Nawaz Sharif’s negative attitude, Tikka Khan created hindrance in the provincial legislative and other matters. Punjab government passed some legislation regarding adaptation of Islamic values which was returned by the governor with an observation that such kind of legislation could be done at federal level with the guidance of IIC.253 This kind of controversy and tension remained visible during the twenty months rule of PPP.

Other Issues

While discussing major issues of the provincial administrative issues that remained sources of tension between the federal government and the government of the Punjab smaller issues cannot be ignored. Federal government and the government of the Punjab did not hesitate in creating problems for the other of blaming each other. Among these smaller issues one was federal government’s decision to take the control of Zakat Fund accounts and disburse it according to its own plans. This increased problems for the government of the Punjab as with the Zakat fund it had been helping uplift of many poor families. The Punjab government not only criticized federal government for this action but also created a baitulmaal fund in the budget of 1989 and started distribution of zakat to the needy initially with the amount of one billion rupees.254 It was started to provide basic needs of life to the poor through mosque committees.255
Another point of tension between federal government and the government of the Punjab was shortage of fertilizers. The government of the Punjab blamed that the federal government did not provide ample fertilizers to the Punjab to create food shortage in the province to make the life of the common people difficult to prove that the IJI government in the province was a failure. While federal government took the stance that the provincial government did not inform it on the proper time about its requirement of fertilizers to be imported. It also informed the people at different forums that the government of the Punjab created artificial shortage to blame it, as the province was already provided the fertilizers according to the demand of the government of the Punjab. According to the PPP government the issue was a planned effort to create hatred in the Punjab against Sindh and the PPP government.

Disturbed law and order situation in Sindh and Punjab provided opportunity to IJI and PPP to criticize their political opponents. According to the government of the IJI, all the crimes, and criminal activities were result of the policies and plans of the federal government. Similar allegations were levied by the Sindh government against the government of the Punjab regarding the disturbed law and order situation in Sindh which were denied by the IJI. Who so ever was responsible for the mismanagement of many issues of national interest, none tried to resolve the issues and focus remained on allegations and counter allegations which only resulted in the increasing problems of the common people.

V. PPP’s No-Confidence Moves against IJI Government in the Punjab

Differences and conflicts between IJI and PPP were reciprocal. Similarly efforts to dislodge the government of the political opponent were also simultaneous. Both, IJI and PPP had problems with each other and these problems were visible in their acts. Both tried to dislodge from the seat of government and both created problems for the other. No-confidence moves against CM Punjab and Speaker of PA Punjab were part of such efforts.

Form the very beginning of her premiership, Benazir made efforts to oust Nawaz Sharif from the office of CM of the Punjab. PPP created problems for IJI even at the oath of the CM of the Punjab. Later many of the federal ministers were sent to Lahore to buy loyalties of the members of the IJI. This attitude of the federal government started confrontation between the government of the PPP and the IJI (ruling party in the largest province of the country). The no-confidence move against the CM Punjab was one of such efforts.
No-confidence Motion against CM Punjab

PPP did not leave any front alone to oust Nawaz Sharif from the office of CM of the Punjab. This was due to the rivalry between the IJI and the PPP which was enhanced after IJI’s refusal to support PPP to amend the Eighth Amendment of the constitution. It was a great set-back for the PPP government as the biggest province had refused to cooperate with it. In reaction to this PPP started making efforts to dismiss IJI’s government in Punjab. Nawaz Sharif’s attitude also gave confidence to PPP for its success as his non-consultative attitude made him comparatively less popular among his party members. Some members of IJI were critical towards the confrontationist attitude of Nawaz Sharif towards the federal government. One of his ministers, Sardar Maqsood Leghari, resigned from the cabinet for the same reason. He was of the view that confrontation with the central government was against the national interest. Some Leaguers criticized him for being influenced by the JI. His orders to police to enter in PM office in Rawalpindi to arrest a man who had spoken against him also invited criticism from inside the party. Internal crevice of IJI made the PPP more ambitious to win support of thirty members that was required for a successful no-confidence motion against him.

To make the no-confidence move a success, different steps were taken. PPP tried to create a forward bloc in the Punjab PA but only five members joined this group. Makhdoom Altaf was most prominent among them. Many members of the Punjab PA were bribed as well but it proved a miscalculation of the PPP. It is believed that federal government used more than 25 crore rupees on this move. MPAs of Punjab were bribed through different means. Jobs were offered in police and finance department. Allotment of plots was also used as a tool to won support of MPAs. PPP leadership promised Makhdoom Altaf Ahmad, a senior PML leader as next CM Punjab if they succeeded in ousting Nawaz Sharif from the office of CM. This announcement worked in reverse as many of the IJI members and particularly those belonged to PML did not appreciate this decision. Almost same allegations of bribe and misuse of authority were levied against Nawaz Sharif to pass safely through the no-confidence motion. But there are other arguments that show that instead of using money Nawaz Sharif used other tactics to pressurize his party members.

PPP offered five to ten million rupees for the IJI representatives to change their loyalties but Nawaz Sharif had more incentives. He specified money for the MPAs for development work in their constituencies. While the no-confidence motion against Nawaz Sharif was in the offering, he explained his party members that the confrontational policy against federal government was a must to prevent the authoritative attitude of the PM. Another thing that prevented many MPAs from changing loyalties was the biradri system. Many of the MPAs got party ticket for the elections with the support of their biradaries. Changing loyalties could make them lose thebiradari’s support which could make their reelection under the defection clause impossible. This proved to be a deterrent for many to change the loyalties. Nawaz Sharif also enjoyed support of Army Chief. Furthermore wrong selection of candidate for the office of CM by PPP and its hard cash offers to buy loyalties did not help it to succeed. These factors helped Nawaz Sharif to stop the members of the party to change their loyalties in favor of PPP.
Another thing that worked in favor of Nawaz Sharif was his decision to take the vote of confidence from the house before a motion was moved against him. This not only stopped illegal activities in buying and selling the loyalties but at the same time it did not allow the PPP to make its complete preparations to move a no-trust motion against him. The PA session was called by Speaker Punjab PA, Wattao, eight days earlier as requisitioned and asked Nawaz Sharif to take a vote of confidence. On March 13, 1989 Nawaz Sharif got a fresh vote of confidence securing 152 votes from the assembly and a series of conspiracy against the Punjab Provincial Government ended. Before making this decision he took his allies into confidence which guaranteed his success.

PPP members staged a walk out against this move as they were planning to move a no confidence motion in the house within a very brief time. The vote of confidence was not a part of the agenda for the session. They were of the view that the procedure was illegal as the rules does not allow to CM to get a vote of confidence this way. They explained to the Speaker that the CM of a province could take a fresh vote of confidence after getting elected within sixty days of his election or if governor of the province demands the CM to get a fresh vote of confidence or if the no-confidence is moved against the CM in the assembly. The opposition’s walk-out or allegations were not worth-while as after getting a fresh vote of confidence from the house, Nawaz Sharif proved himself unbeatable, at least for the time being. This ended all the activity of the federal government and it had to plan something else to create problems for the provincial government of the Punjab.

Leader of the opposition alleged that Nawaz Sharif spent three crore rupees to handle the no-confidence motion against him. This allegation was denied by Nawaz Sharif. He argued that if it was so he could never get more votes than his first vote of confidence. Nawaz Sharif stated that his supporters were pressurized by federal government but they did not bow against any pressure.

Sheikh Rasheed announced that Benazir wanted to establish one-party government in Pakistan which was not possible because IJI was a hindrance so she made every effort to destabilize the Punjab government. Different leaders of IJI criticized the PPP government for its efforts to oust Nawaz Sharif and told that if the federal government takes any step against IJI government in the Punjab, it will receive same response at Centre. This failure did not prove an end of the PPP’s activities against IJI. The next move was no-confidence motion against speaker of the Punjab PA to destabilize the IJI government in the province.

No-Confidence Move against Speaker Punjab Assembly

PPP planned a no-confidence move against the Speaker of the Punjab PA. It was planned to just check the strength of the IJI in the PA. Some of the PPP members alleged that the speaker was working for his party and had lost confidence of most of the members of the assembly due to his partial attitude. Responding to these allegations, Wyne took fresh vote of confidence securing 152 votes on March 13, 1989. IJI alleged that PPP planned such moves to create instability in the Punjab province and topple its government. They alleged that PPP could not tolerate opposition’s government in the province for which it tried to convert IJI’s majority into minority through its efforts to buy loyalties of the IJI MPAs. PPP denied all such allegations.
PPP criticized the attitude of IJI leaders for the allegations levied by them against the federal government to create political instability in the province. According to Benazir it was a provincial matter but the Punjab government called it a conspiracy hatched by the federal government.\textsuperscript{281} The moves against Nawaz Sharif and the Speaker Punjab PA increased strains between the federal government and the government of the Punjab and minimized the chances of origination of positive working relationship between the federal government and the government of the IJI.

**VI. IJI and PPP: Attempts at Rapprochement**

Five lines of action or the bones of contention between IJI and PPP kept going on throughout the first era of Benazir. Firstly, an attitude of allegations and counter allegations which was supported by the rallies held by both the parties to prove their strength and public support.\textsuperscript{282} Secondly, the federal government’s action of taking provincial resources into its control to provide funds to its MNAs and MPAs to increase their vote bank through solving smaller problems of the common people. Thirdly, the issue of tension was the efforts to dismantle the government of the political opponent. Fourth was the usage of government machinery for personal benefits. Fifthly, was mishandling of government officials for personal gains. Four officers of grade 21, 20 and 18 were transferred by the federal government but were denied to be relieved from the duty by the provincial government of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{283} The problem was that whenever there were discussions between the government and opposition to normalize things, certain political forces sabotaged them through negative remarks along-with strong political rivalry of the two major political parties.

The reconciliations efforts started after some days of Benazir’s taking oath as PM. She offered discussion to IJI on five point agenda to resolve tension between federal government and the provinces particularly the government of the Punjab in February 1989.\textsuperscript{284} Among many efforts of reconciliation, there was a meeting of Federal Minister for Law Iftikhar and Nawaz Sharif. They discussed the probability of ending criticism for the sake of criticism and improve the relationship of government and IJI. In the meanwhile Sheikh Rasheed, IJI MNA alleged that PPP made agreement with Rajiv Gandhi to provide him lists of rebels (Sikhs) of East Punjab. Meanwhile Bugti, coalition partner of IJI in Balochistan, demanded meeting of CCI instead of getting involved in provincial conciliatory committee.\textsuperscript{285} These developments diluted the chances of cooperation between the government and the IJI.

There were suggestions to constitute a committee that could help the federal and provincial governments to discuss the conflicting issues and reach at some practical solution. It was suggested that a committee should be constituted, consisting of Chairman Senate, Speaker NA and the Chief Justice of Supreme Court which should decide about all the conflicting issues between the federal government and its federating units.\textsuperscript{286} Some efforts were made at personal level as well. Federal defense minister, Colonel (Retd) Ghulam Sarver Cheema
held a meeting with Nawaz Sharif. He met with Nawaz Sharif in his personal capacity and discussed matter to improve the relations of federal government with the government of Punjab. Nawaz Sharif showed willingness to cooperate with him and the PPP government in the best interest of the people of Pakistan but he did not forget to inform Cheema that Iftikhar and Happy Menola had made almost same plans but there was no outcome of such efforts.287

In April, Benazir offered to discuss issues with the Punjab government to resolve tension. On May 3, 1990 Shujaat and Wyne met with Nawaz Sharif for discussion on Centre-province problems. A committee was formed. Federal minister Yusuf Raza Gillani and Secretary of PM Malik Qasim were members of this committee which met with Nawaz Sharif for preliminary discussions on the same day. Responding to the federal cabinet committee Nawaz Sharif appointed a three member committee consisting of Speaker Punjab Assembly Manzoor Watoo, Wyne and Malik Naeem. While the discussions were being held for the normalization of relations between government and opposition, Jatoi presided over a convention of the MNAs and Senators of the opposition parties, Mayors of Municipal Committees, Chairmen of District and Municipal committees, and local bodies councilors. The convention forwarded a charge sheet consisting of allegations of corruption, favoritism, misuse of public funds and maladministration against the federal government.288 While reconciliation committee had to meet, minister of state for parliamentary affairs, Dr. Sher Afgan Niazi kept on pursuing his references against Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, Shujaat, Maulana Sattar Niazi and Wyne for making a heavy payment to Maulana Ghafoor Alvari to withdraw his candidature from the bye-elections of February 1990 for NA-99. Sher Afgan Niazi tried to force Speaker to submit the references to the ECP.289

Later, discussions of the reconciliation committee seemed successful in improving the relations. PM agreed to hold mid-term elections and to create NFC. It also agreed to return back the Zakat fund and workers’ welfare fund to the provincial governments. It also agreed to issue agricultural loans to the farmers of Punjab from Punjab Cooperative Bank. This was done by Benazir as an attempt to save her government. Due to positive attitude of the federal government, Nawaz Sharif also stated that opposition will not move no-confidence motion against PM. He also denied any possibility of antigovernment mass movement. He said his party will not join the government but will play role of a positive, constructive opposition.290 Later a two member committee was appointed a two members committee to discuss the matters with the opposition. Nawaz Sharif denied to talk with Malik Qasim and asked for a meeting with just one member of the committee, Gillani. Both the politicians had a comprehensive discussion and agreed to a formula to normalize the situation.291 On July 9, 1990 the reconciliation committee discussed about amendment in constitution regarding floor-crossing rules. Government agreed to give coverage to the opposition’s point of view on media. Federal government also agreed to call meeting of CCI.292 Parallel to these developments, political opponents of Benazir became more active. Jatoi, Khawaja Tariq Rahim and other prominent politicians increased media war against the PPP government.293 There were problems of non-cooperation of the members of the political parties as well. Many of the PPP members denied any reconciliation with IJI. Khar’s
activities were another challenge for the IJI leadership. IJI’s extension as COP made things more difficult. To create consensus on issues among the leaders of fourteen political parties was difficult which was faced by all the rapprochement efforts made by IJI or the PPP. Only one positive development was witnessed that in the meeting of National Economic Council (NEC) for annual development program, there were no walk-outs of the opposition like the meeting of previous year.

Before the government and opposition could adopt the formula practically the assemblies were dissolved. At the time of dismissal of the NA, president Ghulam Ishaq Khan said that there was no such issue that could not be resolved through discussion but both the parties could not respect the mandate of the other party. Federal government had been interfering in the provincial matters and the provinces were not ready to accept the rights of the federal government. The main reason of this attitude was egoistic attitude of the politicians and the un-reasonable attitude to stick at personal viewpoint. Meeting of CCI was not called to avoid the rights of the provinces. Meeting of NFC was not called although it was constituted in July 1989 but the government excused calling the meeting and the division of national resources could not be decided among the provinces that increased differences among the government and the opposition.

VII. Internal Differences of IJI

After a very few days of elections of 1988, internal differences of IJI became prominent.

There seemed hardly any coordination among the member parties. Prominent parties like PML and JI wanted to keep themselves in the limelight. They tried to get most benefits from their position in the NA and the PAs. While making important decisions, leadership of the alliance hardly consulted with the member parties. This attitude not only created rift among the allies but it also created problems for the leadership. Many things that could be handled easily posed challenge and the IJI had to make compromises with other parties. While making compromises with the parties outside the IJI, it had to leave its principle stance at many occasions. Examples of this are IJI’s alliance with MQM in Sindh and ANP in the NWFP. Both these parties had opposite stance on many issues but to counter the power of PPP, IJI made parliamentary opposition alliance with them. It was also evident in the IJI’s working that the problems and rifts among the allies were based on the personal interests and personality clashes along-with the ideological and administrative issues. Member parties generally did not give priority to the alliance. For them, popularity of their respective parties was more important than the growth of the alliance. PML ignoring other allies, nominated its presidential candidate. Explaining this attitude, PML president told that he was responsible to keep the identity of his party intact while working as a member of a broader alliance. Although Ghulam Ishaq Khan got nominated as a consensus candidate but the non-consultative attitude of PML caused apprehensions among the allies. Selection of chairman Senate also created rift inside the alliance. PML wanted to nominate its candidate for Senate as it was majority party there. It argued that in the elections of Senate, there was no IJI so it was discretion of PML to nominate its candidate for the office of Chairman Senate. IJI did not appreciate or approve this attitude.
but to avoid any rifts inside the alliance PML’s decision was accepted and Wasim Sajjad got elected as chairman Senate as PML candidate.\textsuperscript{299} PML was conscious of quantum of its representation in the assemblies for which it tried to create its hold on the alliance’s decisions which made things problematic for the smaller parties in the alliance.

PML’s internal problems also deterred the smooth working of IJI. Junejo was president of PML and he wanted to make all the party decisions on his discretion. Nawaz Sharif was president of IJI and that of the PML Punjab. He was contender of the office of the president of PML as well so he wanted to run things according to his plans to make himself more influential in the party. While exercising his authority as President of IJI, he used to surpass many of the decisions of Junejo. Junejo wanted him to behave as junior partner, as president of a provincial wing of PML. Petty issues also got enough importance that created hindrance in smooth working of IJI. Once Junejo was not called in an IJI-COP meeting and later he avoided attending its meetings which disturbed the IJI-COP working. Junejo was president of the largest member party of the IJI and his absence created problems in decision making process which created a consistent rift between the two leaders i.e. Nawaz Sharif and Junejo.

As president of PML, Junejo focused to improve his party’s performance for which he planned to reorganize the party to make it popular at grassroots level. This decision also received negative response. Haq was removed from the office of the president of PML in NWFP and new election for party leadership was announced. This decision was endorsed by majority of the PML leaders like Fida, Youssuf Khattak, Hamid Nasir Chattha but Nawaz Sharif had problems with this decision.\textsuperscript{300} Nawaz Sharif wanted to reinstate Haq in the office. Junejo denied reconsideration of the decision arguing that the decision was made in the best interest of the Party. This development resulted in the split of NWFP PML into two groups; Junejo group led by Salim Saifullah Khan and the other by Haq.\textsuperscript{301} In the reorganization process issue of selection of next president of PML was also addressed. Supporters of Nawaz Sharif wanted to elect him president of PML but the supporters of Junejo were of the view that Nawaz Sharif was not an old Leaguer with prominent services for the party. At the same time being president of IJI, he will not be able to give proper time to PML. They also had problems with Nawaz Sharif’s relation with JI believing that most of his decisions were influenced by JI which created negative impact on PML’s political image among the common people.\textsuperscript{302} Junejo had problems with Nawaz Sharif’s decision of quitting the NA and taking oath as CM Punjab.\textsuperscript{303}

Some PML members suggested quitting from IJI. They were actually critical about the influence of JI on the policies of IJI. There were doubts that Nawaz Sharif was following JI more than any other party which was against the interests of major political parties like PML. There were counter arguments about these reservations. It was reasoned that if JI influenced the alliance decisions, it could ask for the appointment of its CM in Punjab or at least could get its members on key positions in the cabinet.\textsuperscript{304} PML members also had problems with the projection of JI. They demanded more publicity for PML as it was the majority party in the parliaments.\textsuperscript{305} These reservations also existed other way round. Members of JI believed that the number of members of a particular party in the assemblies did not matter. According to them, PML was able to win just because of cooperation of JI
in many constituencies. The representation in the assemblies was not that of PML but IJI. They believed that all the member parties of the alliance had equal importance and deserved to enjoy equal status regarding the decision making process of the IJI. Attitude of JI leadership on some occasions also invited criticism.\textsuperscript{306} Being a vast alliance, IJI faced problems in making political understanding with the parties, outside the alliance. IJI and particularly Nawaz Sharif wanted to get cooperation of MQM in Sindh but JI opposed it because it believed that relationship with a regional, linguistic party will distort the image of IJI. JI had problems with MQM since long as area of influence of both the parties was same. Some of the people were anticipating that leaders of JI might not join the public meeting in Sindh because of the presence of MQM leadership. NPP also had problems in extension of cooperation with MQM.\textsuperscript{307} Similarly alliance with ANP faced criticism which is discussed earlier in this chapter.

When the alliance was made, there were expectations that it will grow as a party to counter the political power of the PPP but this could not happen due to the efforts to safeguard the identity of member parties of IJI. There was hardly any focus on the growth of the alliance. This attitude did not allow the member parties of IJI to cooperate with each other properly and their internal differences created hindrance in the merger or successful working together. After the failure of no-confidence motion against Benazir the problems increased among the COP members. IJI faced a two-way deterioration; one internal problems of IJI and second IJI’s problems with other members of COP. Some parties were discontent with Nawaz Sharif’s focus on saving his government and others were annoyed with Centre-province problems which only increased problems of the common people and created consistent threat for the growth of democracy.\textsuperscript{308} A parliamentary coordination committee was created to address the issues but due to problems and reservations of the alliance members, the committee could not perform well.\textsuperscript{309} According to Ghafoor Nawaz Sharif did not pay attention to the organization of the IJI. He did not focus on creating central and regional offices of IJI. Ghaofor explained that Nawaz Sharif hardly believed in consultations to run the alliance.\textsuperscript{310}

### VIII. Dismissal of Benazir Government

Democratic form of government could not work properly and the elected government of Benazir was dismissed after twenty months of its election. There were many allegations against her. It is generally believed that most of the allegations were same to those levied by Zia against Junejo administration.\textsuperscript{311} Benazir could not prove herself a mature leader as many of the issues could be avoided to be taken to critical position such as horse trading and non-cooperative center-province relations. Federations conflicts with the provincial governments and mismanagement of the resources was one of the major allegations against Benazir administration. IJI proved to be a weak alliance as being a strong opposition it could perform well but lack of harmony among the member parties did not allow it to take any revolutionary steps. There was hardly any focus of IJI leadership on its organization which further took IJI at a weaker position. The inclination of Ghulam Ishaq Khan against PPP government was visible in the dismissal process which raised doubts about the impartiality of the government for future elections as well. Benazir government at Centre
was dismissed on August 6, 1990. Same action was taken in the two provinces ruled by the PPP. In the remaining two provinces the government was dismissed on the advice of the Chief Ministers. With the decision of dismissal of PPP government a new phase of political development started with a fresh zeal to win the election among the political parties where new alliances were made and previous ones were further enhanced to avail every chance to win the election by the political parties.

Notes and References

1 IJI tried to win sympathy and support of MNAs and MPAs of PPP and vice versa.
2 This attitude is being exercised since the very beginning of the history of Pakistan like dismissal of provincial government of UF in East Pakistan in 1954, dismissal of NAP-JUI governments in NWFP and Balochistan during Bhutto’s premiership.
5 The Nation, November 28, 1988 and Pakistan Times, November 28, 1988. JUI-D announced its support to deny the rumor that JUI-D had parted its ways with IJI.
6 The Muslim, November 30, 1988.
9 Khar was right-hand man of Bhutto. He made NPP with the cooperation of Jatoi but he did not agree with the idea of joining the IJI and parted ways with Jatoi just before the elections of 1988. He was opponent of IJI and supporter of the repeal of Eighth Amendment while IJI had some reservations about that. 10 Nawaz Sharif was President of IJI, PML Punjab and was CM of the Punjab. Leaving two offices could reduce his political influence and authority which he was not ready to accept.
14 Khaleeq Naziri, “Martial Law-Kaesei Āta hai, Kon Lagwāta hai”, Weekly Zindagi, June 2-9, 1989, p. 25. Also see Zahid Hussain, “The Bitter Truce”, The Herald, January 1989, p. 5. Tikka had lost the elections of 1988 with 20,000 votes from a member of IJI from a Punjab constituency which increased apprehensions between the federal government and the IJI.
15 PM Benazir, in her first press conference, alleged rigging in the elections in Punjab. This was taken as a great humiliation by the government of the Punjab. There were complaints about rigging at some of the polling stations but these were from all over the country. If the IJI had managed rigging for the elections
than Nawaz Sharif, Iqbal Ahmad Khan, Hamid Nasir Chattha, Syed Fakhar Imam, Ghulam Dastageer Khan and Liaquat Baloch might not had lost the elections. It was also said that if there was rigging than PPP could not be able to win any seat as IJI was unable to get any seat in Sindh. Such allegations and counter allegations started by the IJI and the PPP after the elections of 1988. “Intikhābi Dhāndli Sirf Punjab mei?” Roznama Kainaat, December 6, 1988.


Jamali was president of IJI Balochistan and a prominent leader of PML Balochistan.


Ghafoor Ahmad, Ważīr-i Ā’zam Benazir, p. 159. Also see Syeda Abida Hussain, “Centre Versus Punjab-Two views”, The Concept, January 1989, p. 30. Speaker Barozai justified his action as an effort to save the assembly. There was only one candidate for the election of CM but BNA members opposed his election and division was called which was completed with the casting vote of Speaker. Zaffar Abbas, “Whodunnit?”, The Herald, January 1989, pp. 63-64.

Saifdor Hassan Siddiqi, Pakistan kī Ta’mir-i Naw: Falsafa Awr Lahia-i ‘Aml (Lahore: Book Printers, 1992), p. 126. Also see Shahid, “Pandora’s Box”, p. 81. During the whole process, JUI was indecisive. It did not side with either Jamali or Bugti. JUI had ten seats and was very well aware of the fact that none of the parties could form government without its support. Because of this situation JUI wanted its representative to get elected as CM. Abbas, “Whodunnit?”, pp. 65-66.


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Awan, Tīn Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’zam kī Bartarfi, p. 196. Also see Hussain, “The Bitter Truce”, pp. 5-6.

Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, December 17, 1988. pp. 362 and 365-67. The Opposition wanted to approve amendment in the constitution to reinstate the assembly and the government wanted to make a deal to repeal the Eighth Amendment to resolve the issue. Kessing’s Record of World Events, Volume 36 No. 12, p. 37150. Also see Amn, December 22, 1988.


Awan, Tīn Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’zam kī Bartarfi, pp. 194-97. An interview of Nawaz Sharif Republished in Muneer Ahmad, Nawaz Sharif. Originally published in Weekly Chattān May 17, 1989, p. 88 and 140-41. Dr. Muhammad Afzal, IJI MPA from Punjab, criticized the statement of Benazir believing that being PM of the country it was her responsibility to take care of the units of the federation. He stated that assembly should have a chance to elect another CM. Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, December 17, 1988. pp. 381-82.

Abbas, “Whodunnit?”, p. 68.

Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, December 17, 1988, pp. 390 and 410 and December 20, 1988. 752. Members of PPP were of the view that General (Retired) Musa Khan was appointed by Zia and Jamali was the IJI member but IJI was of the view that if it was so, why the government did not appoint the new governor and why was Jamali able to become CM of the Province with the votes of PPP. The Muslim, January 9, 1989.

Shahid, “Pandora’s Box”, p. 81.


Report on the General Elections 1988, Vol. I, p. 253. Jamali, CM Balochistan did not enjoy support of the majority in the assembly. He had not yet received vote of confidence as well so dissolution on his suggestion was illegal and unconstitutional. Salim Shahid, “Return of the Nawab”, The Herald, February 1989, p. 32. According to high court the CM had not yet received the vote of confidence from the assembly so he had no authority to advise the governor to dissolve the assembly. It was a relief for the government as it facing criticism from all sections of the society. Kessing’s Record of World Events, Volume 36 No. 12, p. 37150.

Awan, Tīn Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’īzam kī Bartarfi, p. 190. Also see Abbas Nasir and Talat Aslam, “Images of the Decades”, The Herald, January 1990, p. 37. BNA-IJI alliance was seen with suspicion as both these parties campaigned against each other in the election in 1988. Younger lot of BNA and JUI did not like this coalition. Shahid, “Return of the Nawab”, p. 33. This government was just need of the hour. BNA was committed with JUI (F) for the enforcement of Sharia. IJI and BNA did not have any ideological conflict. An Interview of Nawab Akbar Bugti with Mukhtar Hassan, “Peoples Works Program Āīn kī Khuli Khilāf-warzi hai”, Zindagi, May 12-18, 1989, p. 11.


Shahid, “Return of the Nawab”, p. 32.


Nawa-i-Waqt, December 18, 1988. Jahangir was staunch supporter of Junejo and a prominent political figure in NWFP. In the elections of 1988 he could not get the alliance ticket and contested elections as an independent candidate and returned successful.

Kessing’s Record of World Events, Volume 36 No. 12 , p. 37150. In the beginning ANP assured its support to government at Center and at the provinces. It denied any chances of joining major opposition alliance but withdrew it in a brief period of time. Five ANP ministers and one secretary handed over their resignations to the chief minister Sherpao on April 27, 1989. ANP demanded appointment of its governor in NWFP. Government could not accept the demand because the army did not support the idea. Diplomats in Islamabad also told that USA was not in favor of the ANP governor in NWFP as being in such a strong office, ANP could support strong links between the tribes of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This was due to criticism of Wali Khan, leader of ANP, on policies of PPP government about Afghanistan. Government could not appoint the governor of the choice of ANP as the war at Jalalabad (Afghanistan was taking serious moves. PPP and ANP had difference of opinion regarding Afghanistan policy. Ghulam Ishaq Khan also wanted to appoint a governor more reliable who could support federal government in the execution of its Afghanistan policy. Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Governing Passions”, The Herald, April 1989, p. 44. Also see Talat Aslam, “The Year of Living Dangerously”, The Herald, December 1989, p. 40.


IJI leadership was supportive to Mujahidin. They believed the Russian involvement in Afghanistan usurpation and the government in the Kabul was criticized as mere followers of Russian plans. ANP had totally opposite views. They believed the Kabul administration a rightful government in the region and
criticize the refugees. They even announced to give an award of peace to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachov (Gorbachov), president of Russia. “ANP, IJI Ittehad…. Bu‘ad-al Mashriqin!”*, Nawa-i-Waqt, June 10, 1989. Also see IJI-ANP Alliance*, The Nation, June 11, 1989.


49 Details of controversy are available in, Ghafoor Ahmad, Wazīr-i Ā’zam Benazir, pp. 310-13. Also see Haider, July 12, 1989.

50 Haider, June 8, 1989.

51 Mashriq, June 10, 1989.

52 Ibid., Jang, June 17 and 20, 1989. Also see “Suba Sarhad mein Na’ae Ittehad kī Durgat”, Mashriq, July 13, 1989.

53 Jang, June 17, 1989 and Nawa-i-Waqt, July 1, 1989. Nawaz Sharif discussed things with individuals as well to reduce tension in the ranks of IJI. Shabbir Ahmad and some other IJI MPAs in NWFP, had problems with IJI which were resolved after a meeting with Nawaz Sharif. Jang, June 26, 1989.


57 They believed that IJI and ANP had different ideological base so their accord did not make sense as JI could never support a socialist agenda and if it does so, most of its members will leave the party. S.A. Jafri, “Left in the Cold”, The Herald, March, 1990, p. 23.

58 “Arbab Emerges as Kingpin”, The Muslim, June 6, 1989. Also see “JI, ANP to join Hands in NWFP”, Dawn, June 8, 1989.


Nasrullah Ghalzai, “Muslim Līgio mein Iqtidār kī Jang”, *Takbīr*, March 8, 1990, p. 18. In NWFP members of the party could not create an understanding with Fazal-e Haq who had joined the party few months before the elections of 1988. This was one the major reasons of the internal rift in the PML.

*Nawa-i-Waqt*, August 8, 1989.


Ghafoor Ahmad, *Wažīr-i Ā’zam Benazir*, p. 523. Also see *Jang*, July 31, 1989. IJI leadership decided to issue notices to the dissident members for the cancellation of their membership of the assembly. Qazi and professor Ghafoor criticized the dissidents and told that if ECP did not take action against them they will consult the Supreme Court and if Supreme Court did not take any action against them they will go to the constituencies of these MPAs and will inform their voters about their weak character and commitment. *The Muslim*, January 25, 1989 and *Jang*, February 1 , 1989.


Ghafoor Ahmad, *Wažīr-i Ā’zam Benazir*, pp. 367-70. Also see *Amn*, October 8, 1989. Although section (8-b) of Political Parties Act could be applied on MNAs and MPAs of PPP it was not done and changing of loyalties remained most prominent feature of this era. “The Danger to IJI”, *The Nation*, September 27, 1989


83 Tanoli deserted IJI because he did not want to accept Humayun as parliamentary leader but later when Humayun joined PPP government in NWFP, Tanoli accepted his leadership. Many of the people were of the view that being a businessman Humayun could not afford to remain in opposition for a longer duration. After joining PPP he not only got older payments clear but new contract was also offered to him. One source quoted that his mother Kulsoom Saifullah was promised the office of governor of the province. But Humayun denied all these allegations emphasizing that it was not the PPP that contacted him, but he contacted the government to create political stability in the NWFP. Answering to a question about the contract he did not deny any thing clearly and said that being a business family it was their right to get contracts. Some members of IJI demanded to sack Saifullah family and cancel its membership in PML. At that time Yaqub Khan of JI was appointed as acting parliamentary leader of IJI in NWFP assembly. Sultan Siddiqui, “ Sarhad Muslim League mein ab Ikhtlāfāt Khatum ho Jā‘īn gei”, Takbīr, May 18-24, 1990, p. 35.


88 Munir Ahmad, Altaf Hussain (Lahore: Gora Publishers, 1996), pp. 344-51. Details of agreement are also given in the book.

89 Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, p. 211.


91 Keesing’s Record of World Events, volume 35, No. 12, p. 37150.

92 Federal Shariat Court rejected opposition’s petition because the clauses challenged in the petition did not come
under the jurisdiction of FSC. Ghafoor Ahmad, Ważīr-i Ā‘zam Benazir, p. 438.

93 Ghafoor Ahmad, Ważīr-i Ā‘zam Benazir, p. 240.


95 Awan, Ṭīn Muntakhib Wuzra‘ei Ā‘zam kī Bartarfi, p. 379.


99 “Jatoi’s New Job”, The Nation, June 5, 1989 and Iftikhar Ali, “Islami Jarnoori Ittehad aur ANP mein Ikhtilāfāt”, Jang, November 25, 1989. Jatoi, leader of the opposition in the parliament was not well prepared regarding the budget and he tried to pressurize the government by discussing its other mistakes particularly handling of the Sindh situation instead of focusing on the budget. Many other COP members adopted almost the same attitude. It was planned that COP will demand division on every cut motion but being not confident of its strength COP did not implement this plan. Most critical or the prominent weakness of COP came when it could not even oppose properly the most controversial PWP during the budget session to prevent its approval. Ihteshamul Haque, “Budget Blunder”, The Herald, July 1990, p. 41. Also see Abbas Nasir and Talat Aslam, “Images of the Decades”, p. 37.

101 Reasons of the strained relations are mentioned earlier in this chapter.

102 The Frontier Post, August 1, 1989. JUP and JI had problems with each other. JI was part of IJI which had started the move for a broader alliance in the parliament so there were few chances of JUP’s joining it.


COP organized a public meeting in Liaquat Bagh where the opposition tried to prove that the government of the PPP was corrupt, insincere, non-democratic and was more caring about India that to the people of Pakistan. After this public meeting a public meeting was planned in Karachi. IJI, other COP parties and MQM cooperated with each other and the government could not stop this meeting. It was decided that in this public meeting only the Pakistani Flag will be raised. Such public meetings were planned to pressurize the federal government and raise the public opinion against it. Ahmad Saleemi, “Yeh Jalsa, Jalso n kei Record Tordei gā”, Zindagi, January 26-February 1, 1990, pp. 15-16. This public meeting showed that the opposition was united. Any chances of differences among the workers were avoided through banning party flags. The basic purpose of this session seemed that it was held to show the power and unity of the COP and to highlight the mistakes of the PPP government to prepare the public opinion against the government. This public meeting seemed like a session in the election campaign. Political parties were not only trying to prove their strength and unity but they were also discussing the attitude of ruling party which according to them was more tough than an martial law period. The leaders also discussed the increasing prices of the necessities of life and told the people that if this was the government of the common man. In this meeting all the mistakes of the PPP government were highlighted extensively. This started from the dissolution of the NA and the meeting of CCI, NFC, joint session of parliament and hesitation of the PPP government to discuss Kashmir issue strongly and its negligence regarding the Shari'ah Bill were discussed by the opposition leaders. M. Hamza, Ā'in Qadam Barhā'īg, Ik Tehrik Chalā'īg”, Zindagi, February 2-8, 1990, pp. 43-47. Junaid-ul Islam Ansari, “Sh Parcham Lapait liyei Ga'ei Sīrī Aik Parcham Lehrāta Rahā”, Zindagi, February 2-8, 1990, p. 55 and Mahmood Ahmad Khan, “COP kā Jalsa Peoples Party kei Tabōt mei Ākhri Kīl” Takbīr, January 25, 1990, p. 32 110 “Muthahida Hizb-e Ikhtlaf ky Faisly”, p. 7. Also see Ihteshamul Haq, “Blow Hot. Blow Cold”, p. 67.


Hurriyat, April 2, 1989.

Muslim, September 14, 1989.

Mushtaq Ahmad, Benazir: Politics of Power (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2005), p.78 and Awan, Tin Muntakhib Wazra'ei Ā'zam ki Bartarfi, p. 274. Also see “Hakoomat ka Khatma”, Zindagi, October 3-9, 1989, p. 4. Khaleeq Naziri, Tāli Dono Hathō'ī sei Bajī hai Laikin Dōsra Hāth Kahān hai?”, Zindagi, September 1-7, 1989, p. 25 and Jang, September 22, 1989. In the no-confidence movement Punjab government spent two billion rupees. Subā'i Assembly Punjab, Mubahīthāt, December 18, 1989, p. 603. It is said that Beg offered 1.4 million rupees to Altaf Hussain, president of MQM to make the no-confidence move a success. Munir Ahmad, Altaf Hussain, pp. 23-24. Nawaz Sharif denied all the allegations. He stated that policies adopted by the PPP government were not in the best national interest of the country. He said that PPP had lost the confidence of the people for which its representatives joined hands with IJI. Jatoi announced that government was confused and was just doing propaganda without reality. Jang, September 22, 1989 and October 25, 1989.


Brigadier Intiaz and Major Amir planned against Benazir government which resulted in the termination of Brigadier Intiaz (of ISI) form Army who was included in the list of supporters of Nawaz Sharif after his termination. Meezan, Nawaz Sharif, pp. 30 and 48.


The Nation, October 23, 1989. References of such meetings are available in different newspapers of the month of October 1989.

Jang, September 22, 1989.


Meezan, Nawaz Sharif, p. 30. Also see Bashir Soofi, “Operation Fair Play IJI Style”, Haider, Rawalpindi, September 25, 1989. Most of the IJI leaders denied any such activity but Jatoi admitted that some members of PPP were in the protective custody of IJI because they had fear of life. “COP’s Total Strength is 103, Admits Jatoi”, The Pakistan Times, October 27, 1989. Also see Jang, October 28, 1989.

Bukhari, Benazir, p. 159. Both IJI and PPP worked hard and spent huge sums of money to defeat their political opponents and buy favors of weak representatives of the other. But the whole episode went in vain and nothing changed after the long episode of buying sympathies. See details of different statements regarding efforts and chances of success of no-confidence move in Ghafoor Ahmad, Ważir-i Ā’zam Benazir, pp. 374-75 and 392-98.


Bukhari, Benazir, p. 159. Also see Imroze, November 15, 1989. Muneer Ahmad also gives references of horse-trading through money and offers of ministries which saved Benazir’s premiership. Muneer Ahmad, Nawaz Sharif: Na’ei Dawr Ka Mashal Bardar (Lahore: Maktba Faroagh-e Ilm, 1990), p. 36.


Munir Ahmad, Jernel Shahi (Lahore: Gora Publishers, 1997), p. 44.

Ghafoor Ahmad, Ważir-i Ā’zam Benazir, pp. 401-2. Also see Awan, Tin Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’zam kī Bartarfi, pp. 276-77.


“COP’s Total Strength is 103, Admits Jatoi”, The Pakistan Times, October 27, 1989.

Mashriq, October 17, 1989.

Imroze, October 17, 1989.

Meezan, Nawaz Sharif, pp. 30 and 48.

Meezan, Nawaz Sharif, pp. 31 and 48.


Anjum, Siyasat, Ā’in aur ‘Addālat, p. 133.

Mukhtar Hassan, “Kabīna kei Andar Ważiron kā Dngal”, Zindagi, February 2-8, 1990, p. 19. COP demanded that PM should get vote of confidence after March 1990 to continue. Junejo’s statements were quoted differently. The Muslim published on March 18, 1990 that vote of confidence was not required but still if there were confusions about the issue politicians should consult the court. The Muslim, March 18,
1990. But in Nawa-i-Waqt it was quoted that Junejo believed that the fresh election was compulsory for PM according to the constitution and if PM had majority in the House why was she afraid of holding fresh election for the office of PM or otherwise she should get vote of confidence to prove her majority. Nawa-i-Waqt, December 20, 1989 and March 21, 1990. Also see Jang, March 23, 1990 and Masood Sahir, “Waziri A’zam Sāhiba Quami Assembly sei Pardah Keisa”, Zindagi, April 6-12, 1990, pp. 6-7.


Ghafoor Ahmad, Wažr-i Â’zam Benazir, p. 449.


IJ, PPP Muzākrāt kī Andrōni Kahānī”, Jang, January 23, 1989. Bugti, CM Balochistan asked for checks and balances between the powers of the president and PM. He believed that the PPP government was opposing the amendment just to make itself all powerful which was not in favor of Pakistan and democracy. An Interview of Nawab Akbar Bugti with Mukhtar Hassan, “Peoples Works Program Ā’in kī Khuli Khilāf wrzi hai”, p. 13. Bugti asked for an alternative plan believing that the powers delegated to PM in the 1973 Constitution were not suitable for the political conditions of Pakistan. To get cooperation of Bugti to repeal Eighth Amendment Benazir promised him to accept his demands. Masud Sahir, “Peoples Party awr Khār: Apnei Apeï Dā’w par”, Zindagi, May 12-18, 1989, p. 16.


Kamran Khan, “Jatoi Terms Idea of Mid-Term Polls Senseless”, The Muslim, Islamabad September 3, 1989. Also see Nawa-i-Waqt, September 4, 1989 and Mashriq, July 30, 1989. Sultan Ahmad, “Proper Stance for Opposition”, Dawn, January 5, 1989. Benazir’s attitude towards certain decisions prevented the opposition to support the PPP government to repeal the Eighth Amendment. According to this amendment it was the duty of president to appoint chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff committee along with certain other powers. Benazir was trying to influence the decision of the president for the appointment of Iftikhar Ahmad Sirohey (Sirohey). It was said by the members of COP that they were not supporting Sirohey, but they adopted a principal stance. Dawn, August 22, 1989 and Frontier Post, August 22, 1989.

Āwan, Tin Muntakhib Wuzra’eī Ā’zam kī Bartarfī, pp.266-67.

Nawa-i-Waqt, February 9, 1989.

Jang, February 6, 1989. He was president during the premiership of ZAB. He was only a ceremonial head of the state without any practical powers. An Interview of Maulana Abduis Sattar Niazi with Nasir Malick, The Herald, January 1990, pp. 27374. Shari’ah Bill was first introduced in 1985 when the PML was in government but it did not pass the bill in haste because of some reservations. It wanted to avoid any controversial legislation for which it defined Shari’ah as ‘Quān and Sunnah’ to make it acceptable for all sects. A committee was formed which prepared a bill acceptable to different schools of thought with many amendments in the original bill. PPP Government did not take interest in the bill but after its approval different ministers criticized the bill. Ihtashamul Haque, “I Support the enhanced Powers of the President”, an Interview of Chairman Senate Wasim Sajjad, The Herald, June 1990, pp 163-64.

Ghafoor Ahmad, Wazir-i A'zam Benazir, p. 527 and 583. It is said that to ignore the amendments notified by federal law minister, it was passed in the Senate when he was on the international tour of China. Also see Awan, Tin Muntakhib Wuzra'ei A'zam ki Bar tartfi, pp. 258-59.

Also see Anjum, Siyasat, A'in aur 'Addalat, pp. 127-28 and Ihtesham Haq，“Jet-plane Diplomacy”, p. 73.

Ghafoor Ahmad, Wazir-i A'zam Benazir, p. 527 and 583. Also see Awan, Tin Muntakhib Wuzra'ei A'zam ki Bar tartfi, pp. 258-59. The ordinance issued by Zia lapsed in February 1989 because of not getting approval from the NA. In principle ordinance laps in three months after the date of its issuance but this was retained due to absence of NA because of its dissolution.

Jang, January 20, 1989.

Ghafoor Ahmad, Wazir-i A'zam Benazir, p. 566. The conference was held on June 17, 1990.


Ibid., December 15, 1988, p. 332. The arguments raised by NWFP were serious as they believed that the whole city of Nowshera will be drowned in lake. It was also perceived that the weather and the rains are not consistent and the heavy rains will flood the province. Another argument that was raised was displacement of the people. These were the very basic arguments for which NWFP opposed the construction of KBD.

According to Sindh the construction of KBD could give Punjab an opportunity to reserve the water of its need which will result in the lack of water for agriculture of Sindh. It is of the view that there is not enough water available to construct another canal or reservoir. The difference in the flow of water every year is another point of discussion for the people of Sindh. This difference of flow makes the water of River Indus undependable and construction of the reservoir could bring adverse results. It was said that there was not enough water available to collect it in reservoir and also make it available for agriculture. Sindh also argues that lack of water in River Sindh will reduce fish which will result in the economic death of many fishermen.

Riaz Muhammad Fattyana, MPA Punjab was of the view that there were three challenges faced by the nation i.e. Energy, Corruption and un-employment. He was of the view that major hindrance in the development of the country was Load Shedding due to that tube wells were facing problems and the business gets disturbed. Many of the development programs were facing delay due to the load shedding. He told the House that after the Indus Basin Treaty new water reservoirs were the major requirement of the nation. Even before the agreement the need of more water reservoirs was recognized. Subā'i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, December 15, 1988, pp. 330-31.

Sufi, Pakistan ki Zarōrat, pp. 21-22 and 116-17. Benazir changed her opinion from time to time. After becoming PM she stated that if its construction was important to such extent as was being explained by the PML, why Zia did not do it during his eleven years tenure. Later she announced that the government will take every step for the construction of KBD if it was necessary for the growth of the economy of Pakistan. Ghafoor Ahmad, Wazir-i A'zam Benazir, p. 183 and 198. According to Nawaz Sharif it was a negative attitude as the PM is responsible to the whole country and not just for the development of just one province. An interview of Nawaz Sharif Republished in Muneer Ahmad, Nawaz Sharif, Originally published in Weekly Chattān May 17, 1989, p. 86 and 120. Also see An Interview of Nawaz Sharif, originally published in Nawa-i-Waqt, September 22, 1988.

Sufi, Pakistan ki Zarōrat, pp21-22. If the construction of the Dam was delayed it could add 500 crores of the money to the original estimated cost. At the same time delayed construction of the Dam could create damage of 20 billion rupees per year to the economy of the country. Subā'i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, December 15, 1988, p. 346.


It was signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan. USSR and America were guarantors of this accord. This accord gave a schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It was mutually decided that Pakistan and Afghanistan will not interfere in the internal matters of each other that voluntary return of refugees. Afghan Mujahidin were not part of this agreement so they did not accept it which gave birth to civil war in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Russian troops from there.


Rajiv Gandhi was PM of India at that time.

Jang, July 21, 1989. After SAARC meeting while Rajiv was asked his views to solve Kashmir problem according to the agreement signed in 1949. Rajiv told that after that many elections were conducted in the Kashmir and Kashmir was being governed by the representatives elected by the people of the Kashmir. Benazir only stated that issue of Kashmir was a bilateral problem and did not come under the purview of SAARC. Ghafoor Ahmad, *Wazir-i Azam Benazir*, pp. 193-4 and 327-28.

Awan, *Tin Muntakhib Wuzra’ei A’zam ki Bartarfi*, p. 381.

All these countries are federations or loose confederations of different states. They are being governed under single state system but they have devised principles which are strictly being followed.

According to the constitution of Pakistan rights to make laws are divided between federal government and the provinces. There is a long concurrent list consisting of forty seven issues where federal government and the provinces can make laws. Confusions arise when both want to legislate about the issues included in the concurrent list. This list gave room to the federal government to interfere in the provincial matters and the tension arose. Concurrent list of the constitution is available in *Justice (Retd) Muhammad Naseem Chaudhri, Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (Lahore: Lahore Law Times Publications, 2005), pp. 763-66. Article: 156 of the constitution explains that National Economic Council will be appointed by the President. The National Economic Council shall review the overall economic condition of the country and shall, for advising the Federal Government and the Provincial Governments, formulate plans in respect of financial, commercial, social and economic policies; and in formulating such plans it shall, amongst other factors, ensure balanced development and regional equity and shall also be guided by the Principles of Policy set out in Chapter 2 of Part-II. The meetings of the Council shall be summoned by the Chairman or on a requisition made by one-half of the members of the Council. The Council shall meet at least twice in a year and the quorum for a meeting of the Council shall be one-half of its total membership. The Council shall be responsible to the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and shall submit an Annual Report to each House of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament). Chaudhri, *Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, p. 209.


Dated: May 21, 12012.
In the meeting thirteen billion rupees were approved for development funds but Punjab and Balochistan governments rejected the execution of the program and asked to discuss the issue in the CCI. Ghafoor Ahmad, Wazir-i Azam Benazir, p. 279.

Ihteshamul Haque, “Daggers Drawn”, The Herald, June 1989, p. 37. Nawaz Sharif had dissenting note before entering to the meeting of National Economic Council prepared by Dr. Mahbubul Haque, former national finance minister. The article 153 of the constitution explains that the Council of Common Interests would be appointed by the president consisting of all the CMs of the provinces and equal number of the members would be appointed by PM as representatives if federal government. PM will be the chairman of the council and in his absence; President had the authority to appoint any of the federal ministers from the members of the CCI as Chairman. The CCI is responsible to the Parliament. Article 154 of the constitution explains the working the CCI. According to this CCI would legislate in the federal and concurrent matters and the decisions had to be made through majority opinion. It also provided that if there was a conflict in the CCI that matter could be resolved by the joint sitting of the parliament. Chaudhri, Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, pp. 207-8. Also see Ihteshamul Haque, “Daggers Drawn”, pp. 37-38.

CCI was recreated after in the constitution of 1973. It consisted of PM, CMs of four provinces and equal number of the representatives the federal government. PM could work as the chairperson and in his/her absence president could appoint any of the members of the council as chairperson. The council was responsible to the joint session of the parliament. Council was supposed to deal with mainly concurrent list (34) of the constitution and second part of the constitution. Council could decide through majority. If federal of the provincial government disagrees with any of the decision of the council, the issue will be decided in the joint session of the parliament which will be final. PPP was avoiding calling the meeting of CCI because every province had the right to go the Parliament’s joint session if it was not satisfied with the decision of CCI and there was majority of JI-COP coalition in parliament. Some of the people expected that PPP was waiting for the elections after which it could expect to have majority in the Senate. Asghar Abdullah, “Mushtarika Mafadat ki Council Tashkil kon karei ga, Iljas kon bula’ei ga, Iljas kia Naffija kia ho ga?”, Zindagi, May 4-10, 1990, pp. 19-23.

Suba’i Assembly Punjab, Mubahithat, December 12, 1989. 370. Previously IJI avoided demanding the meeting of CCI. CCI consisted of five members; one PM or its representative and four CMs of the provinces. In 1989 PM and CM of NWFP and Sindh belonged to PPP and the CM of Balochistan was neutral. So if there was a meeting of CCI IJI could expect two votes which could not serve its interests. Frontier Post, March 20, 1989.


Jang, September 2, 1989 and The Muslim, September 2, 1989.


A. H. Shabbaz, “Wafaqi Hakomat do Soboon ko Nichord rahi hai”, Takbir, June 14, 1990, p. 48. Also see Salim Shahid, “Caught in the Act?”, The Herald, April 1989, p. 42. Bugti also wanted to reframe principles of division of the sources. He believed that all the sufferings of Balochistan were caused by making the population basis for resource distribution.

Ghafoor Ahmad, Wazir-i Azam Benazir, p. 262. Also see Ihteshamul Haque, “The Meeting Season”, The Herald, May 1989, p. 35. JUI-F was major coalition partner of Bugti in the provincial government of Balochistan. JUI-F’s closer links with the PPP and a stern policy against the federal government could bring the coalition government of Balochistan under pressure. So he softened his stance.

The 1973 Constitution established the basis of transfers of revenues between the federal and provincial governments of Pakistan. Further it was the responsibility of the federal government to fulfill additional financial requirements of the provinces through grants in aid, loan, subsidies and advances. Keeping in view the importance of revenue distribution the Article 160 of the Constitution defined to set up a National Finance Commission (NFC) at regular intervals. This arrangement was made to support provincial governments to meet their expenditure liabilities. Night Bilgrami Jaffery and Mah-Para Sadaqat, “NFC Awards: Commentary and Agenda”, Pakistan Economic and Social Review Volume 44, No. 2 (Winter 2006), p. 209. Also see Ifthikhar Ahmed, Usman Mustafa and Mahmood Khalid, “National Finance Commission Awards in Pakistan: A Historical Perspective” (Islamabad: PIDE Working Papers, 2007:33), p. 1. 

According to the NFC Award of 1974 Punjab: 60.25%, Sindh: 22.50%, NWFP: 13.39% and Balochistan 3.86% share of the National income. Some sources mention that the award was created in 1981 but it was not the fact. After the 1981 census recommendations of 1974 Award were reviewed according to the population. Previously in 1979, commission was appointed but no meetings could be held and the recommendations of 1974 award were revised with reference to the census report of 1981. New division was; Punjab: 57.97%, Sindh” 23.34%, NWFP: 13.39% and Balochistan received 5.30% share of the national income. Ahmed, “National Finance Commission Awards in Pakistan”, p. 5. 


Benazir administration increased economic problems for the Punjab and Balochistan provinces. Firstly, PPP government reduced development budget for the provinces. There were cuts on the funds of the Punjab. Punjab government demanded 179 crore rupees as development fund but the federal government offered only 47 crore rupees. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, February 26, 1990, p. 810. Funds for the ‘Special Development Program’ that were approved by Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNCE) were not released. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, June 2, 1991, p. 154. For the fiscal year 1990-91, Federal government located 63 billion rupees for the development projects. These were divided as 44 billion rupees for the development programs at federal level, 5 billion 30 crore for the special development were reserved. 14.7 billion rupees were reserved for the development budget of the provinces. Nawaz Sharif demanded distribution of these funds according to the population but federal government rejected the demand arguing that the division of funds on the basis of population meant decrease in the amount reserved for Balochistan. A. H. Shahbaz, “Wafāqi Hakōmat dō Sobōn ko Nichord rahi hai”, p. 48. 

Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, December 14, 1988, pp. 266-67 and December 21, 1988, p. 850. Federal government denounced to pay the loans of the Punjab. It had to pay 137.17 crore rupees as subsidy for wheat but it paid only 100.99 crore rupees. 27.70 crore rupees that were promised for the construction of labor colonies was denied by the federal government. It also turned down demand of repayment of the loans of 180 crores of rupees to the Punjab government. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, June 18, 1989, pp. 847-48. Punjab government criticized the decision of reduction in the amount reserved for salinity. The amount reserved for Punjab was 43% of the total amount reserved in the regard but the PPP government reduced it to 32.5%. The saved amount was used to increase the amount of Sindh and NWFP for the same purpose. A. H. Shahbaz, “Wafāqi Hakōmat dō Sobōn ko Nichord rahi hai”, p. 48. According to the seventh five years plan Punjab had to get its 27% share of the national income that was reduced to 21% which further added to the economic problems of Pakistan. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, June 14, 1989. p. 559 and 631, June 9, 1990, p. 5, June 12, 1990.p. 6, June 18, 1989, p. 842 and 847, June 20, 1990. p. 54. June 12, 1990. 6 and June 18, 1989, p. 842.

Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, December 19, 1988, p. 527. Mian Mahmoodur Rashid, an IJI MPA in the Punjab PA explained that Punjab was earning billions of rupees through foreign exports and it
desired to get due share of the money being earned by it which could only be identified through NFC Award. He was of the view that Punjab did not need support of federal government or any grants from it.

What Punjab needed was its due share in the funds earned by federal government through taxes and exports of the Punjab commodities. Subai's Assembly Punjab, Mubahithat, December 20, 1988, p. 690. Punjab was getting 9.54 billion rupees from federal taxes and 2.7 billion rupees from provincial taxes. There was a demand to give Punjab the right to collect its taxes on its own. This demand was raised just to get the right to use the resources in the Punjab generated by it. This demand was put forward just to minimize Punjab's dependence on the Center. Subai's Assembly Punjab, Mubahithat, December 21, 1988, p. 852, June 14, 1989, p. 592.


Subai’s Assembly Punjab, Mubahithat, June 13, 1989, p. 478 and February 13, 1990, pp. 304-5 and December 17, 1989, pp. 450 and 455. Also see An Interview of Nawab Akbar Bugti with Mukhtar Hassan, pp. 11-12, *The Pakistan Times*, July 14, 1989, Meezan, *Nawaz Sharif*, p. 29. Bugti declared that his officials will not cooperate in execution of the program. He said implementation of such program through undemocratic agencies was not acceptable. According to him implementation of PWP by nonrepresentatives will keep all the money in the pockets of PPP workers and leaders and there would be no practical benefit for the people through this program. According the Bugti it was a must to adopt a uniform program in all the provinces. He argued that if in NWFP and Sindh, provincial governments were responsible to take care of PWP why not in Punjab and Balochistan. To counter the PPP Bugti started his own Work’s Program. Salim Shahid, “Bone of Contention”, *The Herald*, May 1989, pp. 39-40. It was announced that each MPA will be given five million for rural constituency and 2.5 million for urban constituency for development programs in the province. Generally article 142 of the constitution is quoted in this reference. According to this article it is expressed that “Provincial Assembly shall and the majlis-ishoora shall not have the power to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in either the federal the concurrent legislative list”. According to opposition this meant that federal government could not spend on the sectors that were not in its purview. Federal government hinting subject 25 of concurrent list rejected the argument of the provincial governments. Sohail Aftab, “A Double Edged Sword”, *The Herald*, June 1989, pp. 25-26. Bugti ordered arrests of representatives of federal government who were appointed for execution of government’s plans under the auspices of PWP in Balochistan. Awan, *Tin Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’zam kī Bartarfi*, p.232. Anwar H. Syed, “The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab: National Assembly Elections 1988 and 1990”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. xxxi, No. 7, July 1991, pp. 59394. Bugti believed that the federal government could prepare the plans but execution was the right of the provincial government. He believed that ignoring elected members was against the mandate of the common people. Salim Shahid, “Bugti’s Blues”, *The Herald*, June 1989, p. 46, Anjum, *Siyasat, Ā’in aur ‘Addālat*, p. 137 and An Interview of Nawaz Sharif Republished in Muneer Ahmad, *Nawaz Sharif*, pp. 88-89. Originally published in *Weekly Chattān* May 17, 1989.


An Interview of Nawaz Sharif Republished in Muneer Ahmad, *Nawaz Sharif*, pp. 100-1. Originally published in *Weekly Chattān* May 17, 1989. Subai’s Assembly Punjab, Mubahithat, December 17, 1989, p. 458. Without the consent of the provincial government construction of water supply scheme was only to over burden the provincial government and to defame it for its failure for not running the system properly. If the
federal government had constructed the schools, hospitals and other institutions, how would it be possible for the provincial government to run the projects? Due to lack of funds how the staff would be appointed and paid.


221 Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, February 26, 1990, p. 738.  

222 Ibid., p. 305.  


224 Afzal Khan, “Battle Station”, The Herald, May 1989, p. 51. Also see Dawn, June 20, 1989 and The Frontier Post, June 20, 1989. According to the Article 184 of the constitution, in the disputes of federal government and the provinces the Supreme Court has the authority to resolve the issue. Chaudhri, Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, p. 225.  


229 In Bahawalnagar a project of water supply was ruined and it was a loss of almost twenty-nine hundred thousand rupees. The government of Punjab arrested all the workers of the project among whom a large number did not belong to any of the political parties. In the Sheikhupura on Bhegi Road the government started construction of roads and sewerage system but the government of the Punjab arrested PPP president and secretary general of Sheikhupura. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, December 17, 1989, p. 450 and 455 and February 10, 1990, p. 101. PWP office was burnt and the workers were tortured by the students belonging to Muslim Students Federation (MSF). The government alleged that it was done with the support of the Punjab government. In another incident in Gujar Khan a building of a school was demolished by the police force which was built by federal government under its PWP. Bukhari, Benazir, p. 150. In Bahawalpur a tube-well was implanted that was broken by the provincial government’s representatives. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, February 22, 1990, pp. 490-91, 538 and 562 and February 26, 1990, p. 719. Many of the projects under PWP in Bahawalnagar, Multan and Faisalabad were reported distorted by the provincial administration and its representatives. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, February 10, 1990, p. 117. Also see Syed, “The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab”, pp.593-94. PPP representatives were of the view that the provincial government was not spending any money in their constituencies and if the federal government was working on development projects IJI government created problems in that as well. PPP MPAs alleged that even the police was demolishing the projects being constructed under the PWP instead of spending time to maintain law and order in the province. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, February 26, 1990, p. 741.


Awan, Tīn Muntakhīb Wuzra’ī Ā’zam kī Bartarfi, p.223.


Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, March 5, 1989, p. 199. After the completion of all formalities WAPDA did not provide electricity in the constituency of the minister for irrigation and power and later only those residents of the constituency were provided electricity who were supporters of the PPP. People of this constituency took the stay order against WAPDA otherwise there could be created a situation of law and order. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, February 13, 1990, pp. 305-6.


Transfer of Chief Secretary of the Punjab started conflicts between IJI and PPP at administrative level. This was an attempt to bring a person of federal government’s choice at a key position in Punjab to remain informed about all the activities of the provincial government. This step was taken without consent of the provincial government which started a controversy between the federal government and the government of the Punjab. Federal government claimed that it was a matter of Centre and the reaction of Nawaz Sharif was not justified. Nawaz Sharif took stand against this transfer and denied to relieve him from the office. IJI took the stance that the transfer were made just to topple the administration of the Punjab. Nawaz Sharif announced that only 115 federal servants were obligatory to retain so he will relieve all the 227 extra federal servants from their duty if forced the relieve one. He told that the provincial administration could be managed through the provincial servants. This could create an unending controversy among the provinces and bring chaos though bureaucracy but Nawaz Sharif compromised. Another reason of his compromis was the constraints of the IJI as many members of the alliance opposed this extremist attitude. This was one among the many examples of the controversies between the federal government and the government of IJI which constitute major portion of the political developments of Benazir’s first era. An Interview of Nawaz Sharif originally published Nawā-i-Waqt, September 22, 1988. Republished in Muneer Ahmad, Nawaz Sharif, p. 113. Also see page 174 of the same book. Hussain, “The Bitter Truce”, p. 6. Also see Hamid Mir, “Ilzām Tarāshi kī Siyasat”, Nawā-i-Waqt, July 22, 1989.

Mushtaq Ahmad, Benazir, pp. 115-16.

Punjab faced deduction of one billion thirteen crore and twenty-seven lac rupees contrary to nominal deduction in the funds of other provinces. Awan, Tīn Muntakhīb Wuzra’ī Ā’zam kī Bartarfi, pp. 226-27. Provincial minister for planning Shah Mahmood Qureshi told that federal government did not issued two billion and seventy-seven lac rupees to the provincial government with reference to Punjab’s share of taxation, increased pays of government servants and labor colonies’ fund. This increased problems of the provincial government and ultimately people of the Punjab. Punjab’s ledger account was frozen by federal government in august 1989 which stopped the development work in the province. Subā‘i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, June 19, 1989, p. 973. Also see Afzal Khan, “Mutiny for the Bounty”, The Herald, October 1989, p. 61. In an interview Nawaz Sharif himself told that development funds for the Punjab were not being released which increased economic problems of the province. An Interview of Nawaz Sharif republished in Muneer Ahmad, Nawaz Sharif, p.83 originally published in Weekly Chattan, May 17, 1989. Also see An

Talat Aslam, “The Year of Living Dangerously”, p. 38. Federal government instructed all the banks to not issue any loans to Nawaz Sharif, Shujaat and other industrialists of Punjab who belonged to IJI. The incentive was taken to create harm to IJI members but it actually created negative impact on the industrial development of Punjab. Income tax department also started reassessment of the accounts of IJI members. These were clear attempts to create harm to IJI member to force them to leave IJI and support the PPP government. There were other allegations against IJI leaders with reference to bank loans and using government resources for personal use. Federal government tried to damage business of the IJI leaders. It Cancelled licenses for industries of Jatoi and Shujaat. These steps created damage to the industrial development of Punjab and increased tension between federal government and the IJI. Responding to this attitude, IJI leaders started leveling allegations against PPP and Zardai family which strained the relations of federal government and the government of the Punjab. Details are available in Awan, *Tīn Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’zam kī Bartarfi*, pp. 235-43.

On October 24, 1988 the caretaker government signed a covenant with IMF which forbade central government to pay the deficit budget of the provinces. This was a practice for last many years. In the Budget Punjab government had plans 8.07 billion rupees funded by the federal government as deficit payment but the government following the IMF covenant denied to pay any deficit grant to the provinces. *Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt*, December 20, 1988, p. 724 and December 21, 1988, p. 887.

Ibid., p. 558. Also see Abbas Nasir and Talat Aslam, “Images of the Decades”, p. 39. State bank had full control over the banking system of the country. State Bank is the advisor and the agent of the state. It has all the authority to control finances of the country. National Finance and credit control is under the governance of the state bank. It even enjoys the authority to take care of the cash reserve of all the banks of the country. *Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt*: July 3 1989, p. 2013.


*Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt*, February 26, 1990, p. 803. Chief Secretary of Punjab Anwar Zahid submitted an application to federal minister for Information to set a frequency for Punjab TV. It was done in response to a statement of Federal Minister for Information that if Punjab wants it can be allowed to start its own TV. Zindagi, January 12-8, 1990, p. 5.


Broadcasting is a part of the Federal legislative list in the constitution of Pakistan and all the powers for legislation bout broadcasting are the prerogative of the federal government. If any of the provinces wanted to make any development in this regard it was bound to get the approval of the federal government and to follow the rules of the federal government. *Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt*, December 11, 1989, pp. 181-84. There was some opposition for the establishment of separate TV station. Ejaz criticized the idea believing that it would further increase the gulf between federal government and the government of the Punjab. Ghafoor Ahmad, *Wazīr-i Ā’zam Benazir*, p. 454.

PPP had majority at Centre and in Sindh PA it could easily get its candidate elected. After a bargaining President Ghulam Ishaq Khan appointed Tikka Khan as governor of the Punjab and got PPP’s support for presidential election. Awan, *Tīn Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’zam kī Bartarfi*, pp. 223-24. Despite all the opposition IJI decided to attend the oath taking ceremony of governor Tikka Khan as a good will gesture to create positive working relationship between elected government of the Punjab and the governor of the province. *Jang*, December 9, 1988.


257 Ibid., December 12, 1989, pp. 330 and 332.

258 Nawaz Sharif alleged that the PPP brought criminals from Sindh to Punjab to prove that the government in the Punjab was a disaster. To prove the argument IJI government reported that many of the criminals arrested from the Punjab who belonged to Sindh. Nasrullah Ghilzai, “Punjab Main Dehshatgradi kon kr raha hai”, *Takbīr*, June 21, 1990, p. 35; Nawaz Sharif held the general amnesty rewarded to political prisoners and many others responsible for the disturbed law and order situation as thousands of criminals got released from jails due to the amnesty and created problems for the administration. Awan, *Tīn Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’zam kī Bartarfi*, p. 192 and Talat Aslam, “Punjab: Clash of the Titans”, p. 48.

259 Government of Sindh claimed that the Punjabi criminals sent there by the government of Punjab disturbed peace of Sindh. Nawaz Sharif rejected this allegation and told that the Sindh government arrested many of those people who had been settled in Sindh for many years and none of them was criminal. Nasrullah Ghilzai, “Punjab Mein Dīhshatgardi kawn kr raha hai”, p. 35.


261 Meezan, *Nawaz Sharif*, p. 27.

262 *Kessing’s Record of World Events*, Volume 36 No. 12, p. 37150.


264 Awan, *Tīn Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’zam kī Bartarfi*, p. 270. Also see Shujaat alleged that the representatives of federal government were present in Punjab with sum of rupees two crore to buy loyalties of the IJI members in Punjab PA. Hamid Mir, “Ilzām Tarāshi kī Siyasat”, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, July 22, 1989.Ch. W iqar Ali Khan, an IJI MPA in Punjab PA told that PPP offered him fifty thousand rupees to not attend the assembly session when PPP will move no-confidence motion against Nawaz Sharif. He told that he rejected the offer. *Jang*, August 2, 1989/265


266 *Kessing’s Record of World Events*, Volume 36 No. 12, p. 37150.

267 Ibid., Also see Ahmad Rashid, “Allies, Opposition Mount Pressure on Benazir”, *The Nation*, March 27, 1989.


Afzal Khan, Over Confidence”, p. 33.


Kessing’s Record of World Events, Volume 36 No. 12, p. 37150. Also see Ahmad Rashid, “Allies, Opposition Mount Pressure on Benazir”, The Nation, March 27, 1989.


“The IJI is Here to Stay”, an Interview of Nawaz Sharif with Talat Aslam, The Herald, April 1989, p. 144.

PPP Moves will be Countered: Rashid”, The Muslim, March 6, 1989.

Ghafoor Ahmad, Wazīr-i Ā’zam Benazir, pp. 233-34.


Ghafoor Ahmad, Wazīr-i Ā’zam Benazir, p. 237.


Khan, “Mutiny for the Bounty”. When central government called back Haji Muhammad Akram (Additional Chief Secretary), Dr. Saifdar Mahmood (Secretary Information), Ch. Manzoor Ahmad (IG Police) and Rana Maqbool Ahmad (SSP Lahore) Nawaz Sharif disallowed them to join in Islamabad alleging federal cabinet to be traitor for having its plans to harm Pakistan in collaboration with India. Nawaz Sharif believed that it was only an attempt to implant PPP’s supporters in these offices to create problems for his administration and provide confidential information to the PPP. Meezan, Nawaz Sharif, pp. 27-29. Also see Syed, “The Pakistan People’s Party and the Punjab”, p. 593. Nawaz Sharif wanted transfers with his consent. He did not want to leave officials of his trust. Establishment in-charge told that federal government was not bound to follow the opinion of provincial government while it has to make decisions about the appointments or transfers of federal government’s servants. Responding to this Nawaz Sharif relieved the officials and appointed officials of his choice in the provincial key post. He also announced return of 227 officials which were more than decided quota for federal servants in the Punjab. This attitude even became critical when in Centre-province tussle federal government servants started obeying central government’s orders. In that situation provincial government started direct contact with provincial government’s servants. In this way bureaucracy was made part of the controversies of the federal government. There was a tussle about appointments and transfers of federal government’s servants. Lastly federal government committed to take such decisions with consultation of provincial government and the tussle resolved. Awan, Tin Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Ā’zam kī Bartarfi, pp. 332-37.

Jang, February 21, 1989.


“Markaz awr Sōbei Thalthi kei Tanāzi’āt hal karai”, Zindagi, February 16-22, 1990, p. 4.


Syeda Abida filed reference against PM for using C-130 planes for boarding to MNAs to Mengora Sawat and pressurizing them to vote against the no-confidence movement launched by the opposition.

Ghaffoor Ahmad, *Wazir-i Azam Benazir*, p. 514-15. Examples of corruption of federal government are available in Muneer Ahmad, *Nawaz Sharif*, p. 235. Also see Afzal Khan, “Close Encounters”, *The Herald*, June 1990, p. 84. Awan, *Tin Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Azam kī Bartarfi*, p.380. Federal government asked for resignations from all the cabinet members and tried to win support of members of COP in return of ministries. Later the government discussed with the opposition to create a broad based national government but the offer was rejected by Nawaz Sharif, Jatoi and Maulana Fazal. These leaders believed that government was trying to create differences among opposition members through the offers of ministries. Shujaat was of the view that the government gave statements of improving relationship with the Opposition but it had adopted a policy of not listening to any of its suggestions. As an example he quoted the attitude of the government during budget session as none of the suggestions were accepted by the government. Another point that was mentioned by Shujaat was that on one side government was talking about reconciliation and on the other side it was trying to win the support of the members of COP individually and of some groups. Shujaat said that PPP had to leave all such activities and then could hope for rapprochement with the COP. Anjum, *Siyasat, Á’in aur ‘Adhālat*, p. 136. Also see Muneer Ahmad, *Nawaz Sharif*, p. 151.


Awan, *Tin Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Azam kī Bartarfi*, p.384-86


There was another source of stress for Nawaz Sharif. Kahr was given the target of destabilizing the government of Nawaz Sharif. Khar had allied with Nawaz Sharif earlier as leader of COP; Jatoi was elected from Khar’s home constituency. To counter the threat of Khar’s activities Nawaz Sharif included nephew of Khar in PML. When the PPP government clearly observed that Khar could not win against Nawaz Sharif, it changed the plan and focused on the policy of . Awan, *Tin Muntakhib Wuzra’ei Azam kī Bartarfi*, pp. 395-96.

A committee was formed to discuss matters with IJI but IJI’s alliance with other COP parties increased problems. IJI could not take any decision without its consent and approval. No Name, “Tasvir-e Wat-an”, *Takbir*, May 24, 1990, p. 34. Also see Afzal Khan, “Close Encounters”, p. 83.

Afzal Khan, “Close Encounters”, p. 84.


Junejo dismissed Haq from the office because he believed that it was Haq’s mishandling of the issues in NWFP that led many of the leaguers to join PPP.


Chattha in an interview told that Junejo was against the decision of Nawaz Sharif of quitting the NA and taking the oath as CM Punjab. According to him Punjab’s administration could be given to any sympathetic Leaguer. He informed that Nawaz Sharif did not bother the suggestion and took the oath as CM of the Punjab. Chattha believes that it was the day when the party was divided into factions. An interview of Hamid Nasir Chattha with Irfan Siddiqui, Takbīr, October 13, 1994, p. 15.


On the occasion of Horse and Cattle Show, Ameer JI Lahore Syed Asad Gillani warned Punjab government that if the government did not stop that show he will withdraw JI minister from Punjab government. This announcement was criticized as national matters could be decided by the government or such criticism could be acceptable by amir JI and not by a regional leader. PML was the strongest party of the alliance as more than 70% candidates of IJI belonged to PML in Senate, NA and in the provincial assemblies. This made PML dominant on other parties, which was criticized by the alliance members. “Taiz Tarak Gāmzan Manzil-i Ma Dōr Nīst”, Nawa-i-Waqt, January 18, 1989.


Ghafoor Ahmad, *Wazīr-ī Āʿzam Benazir*, p. 563. IJI had some organizational problems as time of the office of convener expired on January 10, 1989 but it did not decide new convener on time which had to be decided through the rule of rotation. Some of the people were of the view that the decision was delayed to keep the position of Jatoi intact for the bye-elections to facilitate his election. *The Muslim*, January 26, 1989. In the meeting of the heads of IJI member parties on February 10, 1989, it was decided that the central council of the alliance will meet every month but after February 1989 no meeting could be held till March 1990. In the meeting it was decided that all the office bearers will continue for further two years. Ahmad, *Wazīr-ī Āʿzam Benazir*, pp. 500-1.


CHAPTER 5

IJI VS PPP IN THE ELECTIONS OF 1990

Dissolution of the assemblies gave birth to a new political phase enriched with the enthusiasm of winning elections for the political parties. There was a general demand of holding elections within three months according to the constitution. Some of the actions taken by Ghulam Ishaq Khan were criticized by the general public like appointment of caretaker government from the opposition at Islamabad and in NWFP and Sindh while members of previous government were given the responsibility of running the government for interim period in the Punjab and NWFP. People demanded accountability of the corrupt to avoid them coming back to the assemblies. Accountability was a difficult task to be done within three months of the interim government for which special courts consisting of the judges of high court were appointed. The appointment of the special courts was justified by the argument that these courts were responsible only for accountability process, so they will be able to hear the cases on day to day basis which will help them to concentrate and take decisions earlier. Benazir denied facing these special courts considering them partial. Many politicians wanted the government to complete the accountability first and then hold the elections, but a vast majority believed that the election itself is a process of accountability as those will not win the elections that lost the confidence of the people.

1. Issues Regarding the Appointment of Caretaker Government

The primary objective of the caretaker government was to hold free and fair elections and transfer power to the elected representatives of the people at the earliest possible date. A general demand about the appointment of the caretaker government was that it should be neutral to act impartially during electoral process. Appointment of Jatoi as interim PM was criticized by many because he was one of the prominent leaders of the opposition of the previous government. Many of his colleagues also had problems with his selection due to different reasons. Qazi criticized the appointment of Jatoi as Caretaker PM without any consultation with IJI or JI. He also criticized the selection of cabinet arguing that many of the people who were accountable got appointments in the caretaker cabinet. Ghafoor was of the view that Ghulam Ishaq Khan lost his impartial impression with the appointment of Jatoi. Junejo, president of PML also criticized it in the grounds that this appointment proves that none other party had any capable leader to be appointed as PM except PPP. He was also critical of the method of the appointment of the cabinet as being president of PML he was not consulted before the appointment of his party members in
the interim cabinet. The staunch supporters of Junejo were kept out of the cabinet which according to him was discriminating. He announced that if government wanted the cooperation of PML it had to consult with the PML leadership otherwise the party was not willing to take responsibility of any of the actions taken by the caretaker governments. Later he agreed to the decision of the president and asked his party members to make every arrangement to hold free and fair elections on a given time. Benazir doubted impartiality of Jatoi. She was of the view that this was done to harm her election campaign and to prevent the PPP from winning the forthcoming elections. Asghar was of the view that a partisan government could not conduct free and fair elections. Some of the politicians were critical about the caretaker government because the caretaker government’s basic responsibility is to conduct the elections but Jatoi after taking over the government announced his four point agenda to rule: straightforward political attitude, justice, sincerity and accountability. Accountability issue along with the agenda of caretakers raised doubts about holding elections.

The interim period showed indifference of member parties of IJI. The leaders were basically concerned with the prestige, image and electoral benefit of their parties instead of an overall performance of IJI. They were concerned with their own position in the caretaker government and its impact on the future course of politics. It shows that the priority of the leaders was their impression and the image of their political party. The leadership lacked a collective feeling with reference to the alliance and its performance. This attitude was visible during the interim period and the preparations for the elections. Alliance, its leadership and program were ignored while discussing about the Interim government and elections’ plans. Keeping in view the importance of elections and the electoral process political parties made alliances with other parties and prepared comprehensive plans to win the elections.

II. Political Parties and Alliances in the Elections of 1990

In the 1990 elections major contestants were two alliances IJI and Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) which consisted of PPP, TI, Nifaz-i-Fiaqih Jafria (NFJ) and PML (Qasim Group). There were other alliances as well like ‘Pakistan Democratic Forum’ which was formed by 6 leftist parties on September 10, 1990. Another alliance ‘Pakistan Islami Ittehad’ was formed on September 18, 1990 by the president of Khaskaar Tehrik with the cooperation of 7 other parties but these alliances were too insignificant to create any impact on election results. IJI had to keep its unity and identity among these significant and insignificant alliances in the elections of 1990.
III. IJI’s Election Strategy

Being part of a political scenario, where many alliances were formed, IJI needed to make a comprehensive strategy to get success in the elections. In the meeting of member parties, it was decided to terminate membership of individuals and parties, who did not follow the verdicts of the alliance. Member parties were asked for some donations for the alliance as well. IJI leadership decided that the flag and structure of the alliance will remain unchanged and Nawaz Sharif was asked to continue as the president of IJI. Amendments in the manifesto were suggested to attract majority of the voters. IJI decided to make compromises with political parties outside the fold of IJI to create an environment of one-on-one competition between IJI and PPP.

IJI’s Electoral Alliance with other COP Members: Grand Alliance (GA)

Most of the political parties wanted to defeat the PPP with a clear majority and to achieve this goal they preferred to be united but there was a difference of opinion about accepting different parties as alliance member for some member parties of IJI. Ghafoor was of the view that those parties who agreed to the basic principles of the IJI could be allowed to become member of the IJI or an electoral adjustment could be made with them. Qazi explaining stance of his party regarding a broader alliance said that PPP government disturbed the law and order situation and caused unemployment. He was of the view that solution of these problems was in the Islamization of laws for which JI joined IJI and opposed its alliance with other political parties. There was a possibility of the electoral cooperation with the MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad, with JUI (F) and Nawab Akbar Bugti (JWP) in Balochistan and with ANP in NWFP but Junejo and JI was against any alliance with ANP in NWFP and MQM in Sindh. JI had problems with any cooperation or alliance with ANP since its leadership had opposed the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims before the inception of Pakistan and it had been supporting a pro-Moscow foreign policy regarding Afghanistan problem. In Balochistan IJI wanted to make an alliance with both JUI (F) and JWP but both these parties were not willing to cooperate with each other because of their previous relationship. JWP was an electoral ally of IJI in Balochistan so the cooperation of JUI (F) with IJI was not possible in that province. IJI tried to form an alliance with MQM in Sindh but JI opposed the idea due to its clashes with MQM. Details of this controversy will be discussed later.

Some of the member parties of COP had their own reservations about making coalition with IJI. MQM, ANP, Majlis-e Ahrar agreed to cooperate with each other and with IJI but wanted a free hand to form their strategies according to the party program and their affiliations to specific constituencies or the provinces. Some of the parties like JUI (F), ANP and NDP wanted to make an alliance without the support of the IJI. It was decided on August 18, 1990 to maintain the IJI as it was in the elections of 1988 in simultaneous meetings of IJI and other COP parties because it was a popular alliance and
people were well acquainted with it\textsuperscript{26} and to make electoral adjustments with the members of COP which were not part of IJI. It was also decided to not bring forward IJI candidates against some independents and heads of some parties, who were considered strong candidates.\textsuperscript{27}

To make it truly a broad-based alliance Nawaz Sharif was authorized to consult with the parties out of the orbit of COP like Tehrik-i-Istiqlal Pakistan (TIP) and JUP (N).\textsuperscript{28} Committees were also constituted to discuss possibility of grand alliance with other political parties for cooperation in the elections. These committees consisted of Nawaz Sharif, Qazi, Fakhar Imam, Sami, Iqbal and Asif Vardag.\textsuperscript{29} Discussions held among leaders of different political parties with Junejo, Iqbal and other leaders of IJI.\textsuperscript{30} Responding to the efforts of Nawaz Sharif, chairman TIP Sindh announced his support to IJI-COP alliance considering it the only source to check the atrocities of the PPP.\textsuperscript{31} JUP (N) cooperated with IJI in some constituencies but also opposed at various.\textsuperscript{32} Out of 13 its 8 candidates got IJI tickets among which 7 contested and Haji Hanif Tayyab (Muzafar Garh) withdrew.\textsuperscript{33} Cooperation of IJI and other COP parties was made controversial with the statement of General Asad Durrani, DG-ISI. According to him money was given to different politicians to keep them united before the elections of 1990. He submitted an affidavit to the Supreme Court regarding this expenditure as well.\textsuperscript{34}

Along with such allegations Nawaz Sharif faced severe criticism for his efforts to broaden the alliance particularly with reference to his efforts to create electoral understanding with MQM in urban Sindh. It is important to discuss this controversy in detail because it took the alliance at the point of break-up but was saved due to compromises made by IJI president Nawaz Sharif. This controversy highlighted nonconsultative attitude of the IJI president Nawaz Sharif. At the same time it shows the attitude of member parties of the alliance who were much more concerned about their status in public than the victory of the IJI in the elections.

**Alliance of IJI with MQM**

Serious efforts were made by IJI leadership to include MQM in the electoral alliance with other parties. In the beginning the attitude of MQM was not really positive as it did not attend the IJI-COP meeting held on September 9, 1990 as it wanted one NA and one PA seat in each district along with all the seats won by MQM in the elections of 1988.\textsuperscript{35} Nawaz Sharif wanted to make seat adjustments with MQM in Sindh because in the elections of 1988 PPP won in triangular contests in Tharparkar, Nawabshah and Sanghar.\textsuperscript{36} The electoral adjustment could benefit MQM as well as it was believed that MQM could win some seats in interior Sindh if it was not opposed by JI.\textsuperscript{37} Nawaz Sharif after his discussion with Altaf Hussain announced his cooperation with MQM and the first gesture for such cooperation was the announcement of Nawaz Sharif that IJI will not pit its candidates against MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad. According to Nawaz Sharif in this adjustment the only problem was Islamuddin Sheikh who got the alliance ticket in Sukkur.\textsuperscript{38} Nawaz Sharif asked the IJI candidates to not submit their nomination papers for urban constituencies of Sindh i.e. Karachi and Hyderabad. Responding to this MQM
instructed its candidates to withdraw from interior Sindh. This adjustment could not work because Nawaz Sharif took the decisions without consulting his allies.

Sharing of seats with MQM meant withdrawal of JI from its constituency; Karachi and Hyderabad and accepting the views of MQM which could harm impression of JI in Sindh. Professor Ghafoor, Secretary General of IJI rejected the decision of Nawaz Sharif because he was of the view that Nawaz Sharif was authorized for holding discussions with MQM but he had no right to make decisions on his own. He said that the final decision could be taken in the meeting of the heads of the member parties of IJI. He believed that the decision of the seat adjustment was not even according to the set pattern of the IJI which was decided in the meeting of August 19, 1990, so it could not be appreciated by the member parties of IJI. Provincial president of JI Sindh said that if JI was not provided its due share of seats it will decide its political future independently. Fakhar was member of the committee who was assigned the task of holding talks with MQM said that final decision, about the withdrawal of the candidates, could only be taken with the approval of the Central Parliamentary Board of the alliance.

Other leaders of the alliance Abdul Sami Khan, Yusuf Baloch, Al-Haj Shamimuddin, Asghar Awan, Ayaz Malik, Dr. Athar Qureshi, Syed Munnawar Hassan and Abdul Sattar Afghani also endorsed the opinion of Ghafoor and decided to oppose Nawaz Sharif’s decision of giving move over to MQM. Having an impression that IJI leadership was not giving importance to the JI reservations it stopped attending the public meetings of IJI which even raised doubts about the integrity of the alliance among the people. Ghafoor and Pir Fazle Haq (president of JMP) along with other prominent members of these parties boycotted the public meeting at Sukhkar. Nawaz Sharif made this decision without consulting JI and other parties which was the root cause of the whole tension. If things were discussed before formal announcement opinion of the JI leaders could be molded as JI was unable to win in 1985 and 1988 elections.

Nawaz Sharif held discussions with JI to resolve tension but its leadership rejected the idea of leaving Karachi and Hyderabad open for a regional-linguistic organization. Although there was a whole lot of tension and difference of opinion among the alliance members, still Nawaz Sharif was quite hopeful that he will be able to resolve tensions between JI and MQM. Qazi believed that elections are the only occasion for the workers of the party to share their ideology with people and withdrawal from the elections means to frustrate the party workers and lose face among the masses. Keeping the whole scenario in mind JI called its meeting at Lahore to decide about the future of JI and demanded a meeting of the leaders of IJI to resolve the issue as it was best for national interest to maintain the alliance’s integrity.
IJI did not want to lose any of its members so the IJI Supreme Council (full bench) decided to withdraw its decision of not contesting elections against MQM candidates. Due to the efforts of electoral adjustment with MQM, JI could not submit the letter of the alliance for the allotment of the alliance ticket for which some of its candidates contested elections as independent candidates. For some constituencies alliance paid the cost of reprinting of the ballot papers. Although the performance of JI in the elections of 1988 was not impressive and it could not work significantly to improve the alliance position in Sindh but its quit from the alliance could bring adverse impact on election results in North and overall performance of IJI.

MQM criticized the decision of IJI. Altaf demanded disciplinary action against Ghafoor as he violated the party discipline. According to Altaf, in principle JI could contest only for NA-189 Lyari District where MQM was not even runner-up in the elections of 1988. He believed that it was the right of MQM to contest for the remaining seats of Karachi and Hyderabad according to the decision of COP regarding the selection of the candidates. MQM Sec. Gen. Dr. Imran Farooq also criticized JI for its non-cooperative attitude. MQM did not withdraw its candidates from any constituency of Karachi and Hyderabad but cooperated with IJI candidates for other places. In the whole episode of conflict and tension between MQM and JI, Nawaz Sharif gained a lot. He was able to win goodwill of MQM while making seat adjustment and later following the decision of the alliance leadership he earned popularity as democratic leader by withdrawing his decision of seat adjustment with MQM.

**IJI and JUP (Niazi Group)**

Extension of the alliance from eight to fourteen political parties created problems among the members of the alliance. One of such examples was that of JUP which decided to cooperate with IJI but was not satisfied with the seat adjustments. It said that it agreed to withdraw many candidates but IJI did not reciprocate properly. Actual problem was in NA 64, 118 and for a Punjab PA, PP 170. Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi criticized the IJI leadership for its non-cooperative attitude. Haji Hanif Tayyab, Secretary General of JUP-N was of the view that IJI did not follow the decided formula. He demanded to call a meeting of parliamentary boards of IJI-COP parties and JUP-N to resolve seat adjustment problems but nothing could come out of the tension and Sattar asked his candidates to start their election campaign against both IJI and PPP.

Formation of Grand Alliance before the elections of 1990 by IJI and other members of COP faced criticism of common people and the political parties. Apparently it seemed something unjustifiable as IJI called itself an alliance of right-wing political parties. Alliance with ANP as a member of GA could not be fitted under this explanation. Conflicts of JI with ANP in NWFP, PML with ANP in NWFP, JI and MQM had problems in Karachi, JUI (F) and JWP of Bugti in Balochistan invited criticism. It was also difficult for political leadership to support the parties which they had been severely criticizing till the previous elections. One of the justifications about the formation of the alliance was that the smaller parties were not willing to lose their identity which they were enjoying as
members of COP.$^{55}$ An important question that was being raised was that if IJI won the elections with the cooperation of such a broad based alliance how will it be able to maintain cooperation between secular ANP, religious JI and *Qaum Parast* (refugee representative) MQM smoothly.$^{56}$ PML, ANP, JUI and JI had conflicting views about Afghanistan, *Shari’at* Bill and the economic policy. These parties did not hesitate to give conflicting statements in their public meetings but due to their opposition towards the PPP they were united to contest elections of 1990.$^{57}$

**Seat Distribution among Members of Grand Alliance**

Distribution of alliance tickets among IJI-COP parties was a difficult task. There were eight member parties in the IJI and six other parties were included in the alliance to avoid the division of the anti-PPP votes among many which created problems for the alliance leadership to nominate a consensus candidate. It was decided that seats will be shared with COP parties and then internal agreement among IJI members will be made. Qazi emphasized to prepare a formula to decide the quantum of representation for every party but PML member asked to follow merit instead of any formula. To avoid controversies in nominating candidates, IJI adopted a workable plan.

Parliamentary boards of the member parties of IJI were authorized to submit lists of suitable candidates for NA and PAs to IJI parliamentary board that was headed by Nawaz Sharif. If there were more than one nomination for any constituency, the IJI parliamentary board was authorized to make a final selection.$^{58}$ IJI decided to give alliance tickets to the winners and runners up of 1988 elections, provided that the heads of the parties wanted them to contest the elections.$^{59}$ Only those candidates could not get the alliance ticket that changed loyalties after during previous years.$^{60}$ IJI and its allied parties agreed to support joint candidates against the PPP candidates.$^{61}$ In this way 50% of the seats were decided quite easily.

Candidates for remaining seats were selected on merit.$^{62}$ Nawaz Sharif asked the members of the alliance to submit their applications for the alliance ticket till September 5, 1990, to finalize alliance’s candidates at an appropriate time.$^{63}$ The seats that PPP won in the 1988 elections were distributed among the COP parties. IJI got 78, ANP 6, JUI 4, PNP 2 and 8 to independent members for the elections of 1990. According to the formula in the Punjab IJI got 51 seats won by PPP in the 1988 elections and two tickets went to independent candidates. In Sindh IJI got 13 tickets, PNP 2, ANP 1, and 6 tickets were given to the independents. In NWFP IJI got 6 tickets and ANP 5. In Balochistan IJI got one ticket. Ticket for the constituency in Islamabad was given to Nawaz Khokar of PML.$^{64}$

Lack of consensus was visible within the IJI and outside its fold. Each of the member parties of IJI wanted a lion’s share in the alliance tickets. Provincial committees were formed to resolve internal problems of the alliance and then proceed to discuss with other COP parties.$^{65}$ A Supreme Council was constituted to decide all the problems regarding the party tickets.$^{66}$ In the beginning of October, IJI took important decisions for the disputed seats i.e. NA-42, 53, 54 and PP-7, 14, 15, 24, 27, 37, 38, 82, 103, 110, 118, 140 and 226.$^{67}$
Sharing of seats was even difficult between IJI and PML. The controversy between Nawaz Sharif (president of IJI and President of PML Punjab) and Junejo (President of PML) was not secret. Nawaz Sharif believed that it was he who maintained unity among the IJI parties and created a positive working relationship with other COP members. To improve the relationship of Nawaz Sharif and Junejo and to resolve the tensions it was decided to manage issues before taking them to Supreme Council of IJI. Junejo demanded the right to make decisions first by the parliamentary party of PML which should be followed by others. He was of the view that PML was the largest party so it should have the right to nominate its candidates for all the constituencies where it could provide strong ones. PML leaders believed that for almost 25 seats wrong candidates were selected in the elections of 1988 and wanted to avoid repeating such mistakes. Almost similar stance was adopted by Ejaz. Another thing that created problems for the IJI was its past attitude towards rebellious candidates. These candidates were welcomed after they had won in the elections of 1988. This attitude gave an impression to the members of the IJI parties that if they won the elections without IJI they will be welcomed by the party leadership as was done previously. This made it difficult for the IJI leadership to enforce party discipline.

**Punjab:** There were problems among IJI members in distribution of tickets. Provincial parliamentary board of IJI failed to reach at any agreement with JI as it demanded 52 tickets in NA and PA of the Punjab. JI, having problems in Sindh because of the IJI’s efforts to make electoral adjustments with MQM, demanded more seats in Punjab as compensation. JI got 7 NA constituencies tickets in the Punjab. JI had reservations with the ticket distribution in Chakwal district. PML demanded all the seats of this district for its candidates. JI was of the view that all the success of IJI in 1988 elections was result of JI strategy and campaign in the district. JI asked for a ticket for Dr. M. Nawaz of JI to withdraw from other constituencies.

NPP was dissatisfied with the number of seats allotted to it. NPP had objections on the working of the Parliamentary board which was mainly being controlled by PML. NPP exclaimed that the parliamentary board did not safeguard its rights. It was offered 4 seats in Punjab which even PML could not win in the previous elections. NPP called it a conspiracy to keep it out of the assembly. NPP wanted to discuss the issue in the meeting of central parliamentary board of the alliance and suggested to avoid allotments of more than one tickets to some candidates. Sami asked the PML leaders to distribute alliance tickets on merit. He was of the view that the sharing of seats was such an important issue which could create split in the alliance if not handled carefully. Sami announced that his party will not compromise on its due share of seats in the elections. Mian Ajmal, acting amir of JUI (D) showed his dissatisfaction about the distribution of the alliance ticket. He was of the view that changes were made in the lists after the decisions had been taken. He warned that if it was not given due share, JUI (D) would contest elections from six out of seven constituencies in Lahore. CM of the Punjab Wyne called a meeting of Punjab Parliamentary Board consisting of himself, NPP president Jatoi, IJI president Nawaz Sharif, and amir JI Qazi. This arrangement was done to finalize the nominees’ lists.
Controversies were not only among the member parties of IJI but some constituencies also became bone of contention for the allied parties.

Many candidates had claims for NA-38 which created conflicts among the contenders of this constituency. Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad was the alliance candidate for this constituency but was opposed by Anwarul Haq of PML, Nasarullah Khan of Muslim Students Federation (MSF) and Pir Riaz Hussain Shah of JUP-N. JI, Abdul Rehman, city president of PML and Majeed Abbasi, Sec. Gen. of PML Rawalpindi were not willing to support Sehikh Resheed. Although JUP (Niazi) was a political ally of IJI but its member Syed Riaz Hussain contested elections against Sheikh Rasheed and Ejaz. All these problems reduced the chances of victory of IJI candidates. Ejaz was given the alliance ticket for NA-39 and NA-72 and he withdrew his nomination for NA15, 62 and 90. Raja Basharat agreed to contest only for one PA seat. Anwar was also adjusted for PP-120. Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi had claims for NA-39 which was criticized by Ejaz believing that there was no conflict or tension for NA-39 except Niazi’s demands. Ejaz demanded panel of his choice for PA seats; PP 3 and 4 which JI wanted for its candidates. For Murree-Kahota constituency, Raja Zafar ul Haq and Shahid Khakan Abbasi were the two candidates for the party ticket. Junejo was supporter of Raja Zafar ul Haq and Nawaz Sharif favored Shahid Khakan Abbasi. This was one of the examples of difference of opinion between them.

PML Sec. Gen. Iqbal Ahmad Khan (Iqbal) was denied the alliance ticket and Mian Umer Hayat of NPP was nominated as IJI candidate for NA-94. Same was done in the elections of 1988 and the tension was resolved after a comparatively longer debate and tension among the PML and NPP members. In the elections of 1990 Iqbal decided to not contest the elections but supervise them as Sec. Gen. of one of the largest party of the alliance. Iqbal was not satisfied with the decisions regarding the selection of candidates for NA-36, 92, 94 and 96. He alleged that Nawaz Sharif and Wyne changed the nominations after the approval of the parliamentary committee of PML. Qazi Saedur Rehman won the elections of 1988 and was confident for his nomination for PP-13 as IJI candidate in 1990 elections but was denied. Reacting to this decision, Qazi announced to contest independently. These are some of the examples of internal tensions among the member parties of the IJI regarding nomination of their candidates. Apparently these problems were not serious but at certain points these became serious to the extent of withdrawal of parties from the alliance but the things were managed to keep a common foe out of the government. Such kind of problems was not only at centre but at provincial level as well. Having allied with the parties of diverse nature the alliance leadership faced many problems to keep them united at contest elections from a common platform. Some of the tensions regarding sharing the seats at provincial level are discussed below.

NWFP: Electoral alliance of IJI with ANP was not easy to handle. Both the parties were political rivals for many decades which made sharing of seats more difficult. IJI-ANP
electoral alliance was formally announced on September 11, 1990. Wali Khan asked IJI and other parties to not nominate their candidates for NA-1 and 2 and PF-1, 2, 3, 4 and 6. He announced cooperation for remaining seats. He believed these constituencies were the areas of his strong hold and to make PPP’s victory impossible, he needed cooperation of other parties. But in these constituencies JI, PML and JUI (F) had almost similar claims. In the NWFP, ANP had 13 seats in 1988 elections and 18 candidates were defeated by PPP candidates so according to the set pattern ANP was justified to nominate 19 candidates in the forthcoming elections. But the followers of Junejo were not willing to accommodate ANP under any formula which caused rift among IJI and ANP. Wali Khan was critical about the attitude of the IJI leadership but being appreciative of the idea of one-to-one contest against PPP, cooperated with it.

NWFP NA: IJI awarded 19 tickets to its members for NA elections. These were JI 4, JUI (D) 4, and PML 11. 7 seats were given to ANP. Although IJI had seven member parties but except PML, JI and JUI (D) remaining four parties were not allotted even a single NA seat all over the NWFP. NPP leadership was dissatisfied with the decision to such an extent that it announced parting of ways with IJI in NWFP and nominated four (4) NA and nineteen (19) PA candidates for the elections. NPP’s provincial president Hanif Khan contested elections as an independent candidate. NPP leadership announced that this decision was taken due to the attitude of the IJI leadership which ignored it in the elections of 1988 and in 1990. They told that NPP was not invited in the meeting to decide the suitable candidates for the elections which forced it to bring forward its candidates in its individual capacity.

NWFP PA: Main contenders for elections in NWFP were PML, JI, JUI (D) and ANP.

The PML leadership in NWFP was dissatisfied about the distribution of seats among the IJI, ANP and JUI (F). They believed that they got a very small share of seats as IJI got 40 seats, ANP 32 and 8 seats were given to JUI (F). Out of these 40 JI was allowed to nominate 12 candidates. JUI (D) was not comfortable for an understanding of alliance with JUI (F) because both the factions had tensions among them. For PA seats members of NWFP, PML and JUI (D) challenged each other in some constituencies although candidates for all the seats were decided in the meeting of parliamentary committee of IJI. Qazi Lateef of JUI (D) announced candidates for all the NWFP, PA constituencies because it believed that alliance leadership changed the lists of candidates after approval. This decision increased problems for IJI leadership.

Rift in the PML ranks was a cause of tension for IJI leadership as some of its members denied to withdraw their nomination papers. JI and PML candidates started their election campaign against each other. For NA-10 Maulana Shaheed Ahmed of JUI (D) was the alliance candidate but he alleged that Mir Afzal Khan (Afzal), IJI provincial president of NWFP and Mohsin Ali (Ali) were supporting Aslam Khatak, a member of PML. Amanullah Khan Jadoon (PML) decided to contest elections from NA-11 against IJI candidate after denial of the alliance ticket. From NA-15 a PML dissident Nasim Sethi contested elections with many others against IJI candidate. For NA-18 Qazi Latif
decided to contest against Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman due to personal problems of Qazi Latif and Fazal. In NA-23, despite electoral agreement, IJI and ANP fielded their candidates to contest the elections. In PF-53 candidates of the rival factions of JUI wanted to contest and did not agree to withdraw. For PF-18 Afzal and Haq wanted to contest. These controversies had serious impact on the party’s image and election campaign. Peshawar was a strong hold of PML but all its seats were left for ANP which created negative impact on PML’s impression in the province. IJI’s sharing of seats with ANP in Hazara District raised questions about its position there. There was an impression that IJI had organizational problems in Hazara for which it left the region open for ANP. In such controversial situation IJI’s provincial vice president, M. Yaqub Khan, asked the central leadership of the alliance to intervene and solve the problem. Distribution of alliance tickets was stopped due to these issues. Many of the issues resolved through withdrawal of some candidates. From NA-1 Yunas Ilahi Sethi, Syed Ali Shah and Amir Nawaz Khan withdrew their nominations. Pirzada Nabi Amin (PML) resigned to contest in NA-3. From NA-5, Ihsanullah Khan (PML dissident) withdrew in favor of JUI (D) candidate. Nawabzada Abdul Ghafoor Khan Hoti also had problems but finally he withdrew from NA-6. Haq also withdrew his nomination papers after denial of the alliance ticket.

IJI and ANP could not work together smoothly because their alliance was unnatural and had conflicting viewpoint about most of the issues. JI and ANP had conflicting views about many national and international policies. Because of its conflicts with ANP, JI’s provincial Sec. Gen. Prof. M. Ibrahim announced that if ANP did not withdraw its candidates against JJI, JI will also forget about any agreement with it. PML leaders also had problems with ANP and they opposed it wherever ANP’s candidates were accommodated for the elections of 1990. Haq encouraged PML members to contest elections against ANP candidates as Haq had problems with ANP’s leadership and the new JI provincial chief Mir Afzal Khan. The conflict of Haq with Afzal created problems for JI which had accepted the decision of IJI leadership to cooperate with ANP. ANP responded alike and retaliated withdrawing its candidates at Malakand and Swat district and allowed them to contest elections under ANP’s election symbol ‘Lantern’.

**Balochistan:** Bugti favored the idea of cooperation with IJI believing that it will stand with its promise of not nominating any candidates against the JWP’s candidates. A meeting of joint parliamentary boards of IJI and JWP was held September 12, 1990 which was chaired by JWP president Bugti and decisions about 9 out of 11 NA constituencies and 23 out 43 PA constituencies took place. Out of 43 PA constituencies, 26 were given to JWP, 9 to IJI, and decision for 6 remained pending. Out of 11 NA seats 5 were given to IJI and 4 to JWP. There was a difference of opinion regarding one NA constituency of Loralai.

For Balochistan NA JI got 1 ticket and JUI-D got 3 tickets. For remaining seats PML was authorized to settle the issue with other COP parties. Four PA seats were allocated for JUI (D) and remaining was left for PML to settle the issues with JUI (F) and
JWP and JUI (F) had different opinions about seat adjustment in Balochistan. Similarly JUI (F) and JUI (D) had conflicting stance regarding certain issues.

In Sindh, Junejo and Jatoi were major claimants for the alliance tickets for the forthcoming elections. There was no tension in IJI regarding the distribution of party tickets after the matter was sorted out regarding the sharing of seats with MQM. Although IJI was comparatively a mature alliance but it had problems in electoral politics regarding maintaining the status of component parties. One example of this tension was that PML being largest party could not get that much importance which led to internal rift in the party. JI got 5 NA tickets for Sindh.

It was not an easy task for the IJI leadership to maintain the alliance. The issue of sharing the seats created problems for the allied parties. Problems and tensions existed at different levels; IJI-COP tensions, IJI’s internal problems and the internal tensions of different political parties. The most glaring example of the parties’ internal problems was armed clash between different factions of PML over the issue of the alliance tickets. Issuance of the show-cause notice to the PML Sec. Gen. Iqbal was another example of internal problems of PML which could not remain hidden from the common people. JUI (D), NPP and JAH also had problems with ticket distribution and their share.

IJI wanted to create a one-to-one contest which could be achieved for only forty seats. Most of them belonged to Punjab. First thing that disturbed its allies was the decision of nominating winners and runner ups of the elections of 1988. IJI had won 53 NA seats and it was runner up for 50 seats. In NWFP it won 8 and for 8 seats it was second in counting. In Balochistan it had won 2 out of 11 NA constituencies and was runner-up for 2 and in Sindh it won 1 seat in by-elections but was runner up for 20 seats. In this way IJI had to get a major share of seats which was not acceptable for other COP parties and problems raised for many constituencies. The problems were not just because of the parties other than IJI. It faced problems from internal elements as well. Having a broader alliance many of the prominent members of IJI could not get the alliance ticket and they decided to contest elections as independent candidates. Even Junejo threatened Nawaz Sharif that if he was unable to justify his decisions and could not satisfy its leadership, the PML will contest elections separately under a separate election symbol. Keeping in view the problems of the alliance members, it was decided that any of the candidates opposing the IJI candidate will be expelled from his party. Later when the situation could not be controlled Nawaz Sharif gave ultimatum to all the individuals contesting elections as independent candidates being members of any of the allied parties of IJI that if they did not withdraw their membership of their respective parties would be cancelled. Changing of loyalties was another serious problem as many of the politicians who could not get ticket of IJI shifted their loyalties towards PPP. Same kind of attitude was shown by the members of PPP. Independents also created problems because they could not be managed properly because many of the parties had allowed their candidates to contest the elections as independent candidates. Some of the parties allowed their members to contest elections against IJI.
Keeping all the problems in mind the IJI leadership particularly Junejo and other leaders generally kept on hinting that there was complete harmony in the alliance and there was not any problem among the alliance members regarding the sharing the seats. Discussing about the internal problems of the alliance Qazi said that such problems were part of the elections in broader alliances which can easily be resolved. This was the effort to keep the image of the alliance among the voters. It was also attempt of assuring the alliance members that even having many problems the allied parties will contest elections from a common platform and will win.

IV. IJI Manifesto for 1990 Elections

Elections of 1990 were apparently non-issue elections as PPP remained busy in defending itself for the allegations inflicted by Ghulam Ishaq Khan and IJI throughout the election campaign, while IJI behaved as it was a referendum if the dissolution of the assemblies was justified or not. It seemed that there were no other issues or problems that needed to be addressed and political parties and alliances were only interested in attaining power. Still presentation of manifesto was one of the basic requirements for any of the party to contest the elections so political parties and alliances including IJI prepared manifestoes few days before the elections.

Although majority of the people of Pakistan do not read the manifesto to get an idea of the plans of the parties that wanted to form the government but still it plays an important role in winning the elections as the rival parties can use its points to defame each other. Keeping this reality in view PML president Junejo appointed a 10 member sub-committee to draft a manifesto that was headed by the ex-finance minister, senator Mahbub-ul Haq. In the manifesto of IJI view point of COP was accommodated as well to avoid criticism on the electoral adjustments with other parties. Manifesto of the IJI was based on a few basic points that it actually was formed to save Pakistan from every internal and external threat. It was committed to build Pakistan as an Islamic Democratic Polity and establishing supremacy of Quran and Sunnah and ensure establishment of a just society where free and speedy justice was available to all. It also showed commitment to provide equal chances of progress to all. It discussed to device a comprehensive program for the management of Zakat and Usher. It also mentioned to increase literacy rate to 100% within following ten years. Provincial autonomy was promised. Regarding Kashmir issue IJI believed in the solution of this problem in plebiscite according to the resolutions of United Nations Organization (UNO). It also promised freedom for press and removal of taxes from the import of paper. Principles of foreign policy of IJI were self determination, non-aligned with super powers and promotion of pan-Islamism. The manifesto promised equal rights for the women and minorities and promised to take each measure to safeguard their rights and provide opportunities to make progress. There was great tilt of some of the PML leaders towards Zia’s policies. Once Ejaz told that his party had commitment towards the plans of the late president, Zia as he wanted to make Pakistan a prosperous Islamic country. He wanted to enhance solidarity, integrity and prosperity in the country. He also wanted to solve the
Afghanistan issue. These were the principles that were approved by all the member parties of IJI regarding its foreign policy.

Wyne and others believed that IJI was made for the enforcement of Shari’at in Pakistan and all the Islam loving political parties were united under its banner. According to Jatoi enforcement of law and order and providing justice and eradication of unemployment from Pakistan will be focused by the IJI if it wins the elections. Federal Law minister said that IJI stood for the politics of principles, mobility and honesty and creating a corruption free Islamic country. National cohesion and development of democracy were other things highlighted as the political agenda of IJI.

M. H. Askari commented that the IJI manifesto was a detailed document but it was not issue oriented. It seemed that IJI was working on one point agenda and that was to keep PPP out of government and it did not address the actual problems of the national concern. There were no comments about regional issues, Kalabagh Dam and agricultural tax in the manifesto. One thing that seems weakness of the manifesto is that it has many promises of social development, increased literacy rate, health and education for all and a very strong defense but the manifesto was unable to tell that how these things will be done. One example of such things was that IJI promised to decide all criminal cases within the periods of six months and civil cases within one year but nothing was said about the court system as how could speedy justice be managed by already over burdened courts. Many other claims were made which apparently were difficult to fulfill but nobody tried to fill gaps in the manifest and none of the people questioned about it.

v. Election Campaign

Election campaigns, supported with comprehensive, practical political agendas play vital role in determining the election results. But in Pakistan election campaigns are run in a different mode. Catchy slogans, negative propaganda, mud-slinging on the opponents and political bribe are common feature of election campaigns in Pakistan. Election campaign of political parties and alliances in the elections of 1990 was not an exception. Election manifestoes of two major alliances PDA and IJI were published just a week before the elections. In the elections there were very few banners and wall posters. TV interviews were one-sided as the interviewers were protagonists of IJI.

IJI did not want to ignore any thing that could help it to win the elections. It also cared for the factors that could create negative impact on its election campaign and eventually decrease the quantum of its success. Before starting the election campaign it was decided that heads of the member parties of IJI will address public meetings in all the major cities. Rallies were also planned but it was not a compulsion for all the IJI leaders to address the rallies. IJI leaders decided to travel from Peshawar to Karachi by train for mass contact and address public meetings at Railway Stations. Conventions at the capitals of the four provinces were planned alongwith the separate women conventions. Special attention was paid to Sindh as it was the weakest area of influence of IJI. To get better
results in Sindh different regions were given under the special care of different personalities like Naushahro Frroz and Nawabshah were made the area of sphere of Jatoi, Sanghar was to be cared by Jam Sadiq Ali. Khairpur and Jaikob Abad were to be cared by Soomro and Bajarani Family and Larkana was made the responsibility of Mumtaz Bhutto and Hamida Khorro regarding the election campaign and the arrangements for the elections. Dadu was believed to be the area of influence of Abdul Hameed Jatoi so it had to be cared by him. IJI leadership was hopeful of better results through this arrangement in Sindh.

IJI and PDA used newspapers comprehensively for their election campaigns. IJI’s campaign forced PDA to adopt a defensive, explanatory attitude during its election campaign that was apparent in the newspaper campaign as well. IJI took the help of many senior journalists to launch its campaign in an impressive manner. They included Zahid Malik of Pakistan Observer, Zia-ul-Islam Ansari of Mashriq, Nazir Naji of Nawai-Waqt and many others. This created a very positive impact on its election campaign. People had been reading their articles for so long that it became easier for IJI leadership to convey its viewpoint in an impressive way. Observance of Kashmir Day and a prayer day was also planned to attract Islam lovers and religious minded people.

Nawaz Sharif played a key role in the election campaign and developed a close contact with common people to get as much success as possible for his party. Furthermore he worked harder to establish himself as a national leader. In Punjab Nawaz Sharif gave special importance to Ghulam Haider Wyne, Caretaker CM of the province. In this way he was able to use government sources in the election campaign. Before launching election campaign, the president of IJI, Nawaz Sharif visited Data Darbar with Wyne and prayed for the success of his party. After that he visited Gujranwala and held a public meeting there and then moved to Sukkhar from where IJI started its election campaign formally on September 28, 1990 which was well publicized before time. Public meeting was addressed by Nawaz Sharif which created far reaching impact on the election results in Sindh. Promises were made to impress the common people. Nawaz Sharif showed his commitment to abolish oppression, injustice, disparity and exploitation through the enforcement of Sharia and Islamic justice in Pakistan. Justice and jobs for all, elimination of obscenity and end of goondaism were few slogans used by IJI during its election campaign. Amir JI Hyderabad, Abdul Waheed Qureshi said that IJI was the only force who could save Pakistan from becoming prey to fascism and ruthless dictatorship. This public meeting was a success for IJI but one thing was perturbing that Junejo did not participate in this public meeting. Sindh was Junejo’s province but his indifference towards IJI’s election campaign highlighted internal differences of the alliance leadership.

Junejo and Jatoi tried to win the sympathies of the people in Sindh according to their own designs. During the election campaign Jatoi promised equal opportunities to the female to make progress and play their role in the national development. For this purpose he promised to reserves seats for women in different fields. Strong defense of Pakistan was an important issue during the election campaign. On the one hand through a
propaganda scheme, IJI leadership highlighted that the PPP leadership was called a threat for national nuclear program. Nawaz Sharif categorically announced that Pakistan was justified to protect her boundaries even if it was necessary to prepare nuclear devices Bombs for its defense. He further added that US refused to provide F-16 to Pakistan but she should not forget that we are capable to prepare jet-fighters and antitank guns. While discussing these issues, Nawaz Sharif showed his commitment to make defense of Pakistan unbeatable.

An important feature of the election campaign of the IJI was its leadership’s confidence in its victory and they did not hesitate in making announcements in front of people in different public meetings. Jatoi announced that after winning the elections he will restore the law and order situation within four months failing to which he promised to resign from the government. To improve the economic conditions of the country he promised the imposition of agricultural tax and privatization and denationalization of major units of industries. Professor Ghafoor promised to create one million jobs for youth.

Junejo believed that the election campaign of the PML must be based on its previous services because people were committed to the PML due to its services particularly, rendered during his premiership. The principle was followed well by Nawaz Sharif in his public meetings. He highlighted his services as Chief Minister at different occasions. Nawaz Sharif also took credit of lifting of Martial Law, repeal of emergency laws and giving people freedom of speech and expression during the election campaign. He also discussed the PML’s efforts to improve the living standards of the common people. Nawaz Sharif told the people that his party was committed to create an atmosphere of love, affection and brotherhood among all the people belonging to different nationalities or ethnic groups. He said that his party was committed to solve the problems of the common man, uplift of the less developed area and provide justice, peace and basic amenities to all. He promised agricultural and industrial development with arrangements to evade concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. In a meeting with workers of PML, Begum Kalsoom Nawaz said that Nawaz Sharif not only saved Punjab from devastation because of lack of funds during last twenty months but also worked for the betterment of the people of the Punjab. She gave credit to Nawaz Sharif for distribution of plots among the poor and landless.

Nawaz Sharif and Jatoi on different occasions asked the people to vote for the people who were true followers of Islam and were sincere with the enforcement of Shariā. Nawaz Sharif and other leaders of the IJI showed their commitment towards the enforcement of Shariā and economic welfare of the poor and down trodden. Talking about other issues Nawaz Sharif told the people that the development of Pakistan was possible only through industrial development that provided jobs to a maximum number of the people and in taking best yield from the farms through improved means of agriculture. He told the people that his dream was to make Pakistan strong, stable, exploitation free and self reliant. Qazi made his first public appearance on October 11, 1990. During the campaign he said that it was a must for the Muslim countries to get rid of the American hold. They should not allow USA to overshadow their national interest and internal
policies. He also demanded the solution of the problems of Kashmir, Palestine, Afghanistan and Gulf. He tried to assure the people that the nuclear program would never be rolled back or freeze at any cost. He criticized the PPP as an agent of Europe who wanted to make Pakistan a secular state according to the European norms and values. He visited Lala Musa, Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi to deliver speeches at public meetings.\textsuperscript{179}

Some of the politicians tried to create provincial emotions among the people such as Wyne asked the people of the Punajb to make Nawaz Sharif successful to save the dignity of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{180} Abida said that the people who will vote for IJI will actually vote for the stability, integrity and prosperity of the country.\textsuperscript{181} She discussed the issue of Kalabagh Dam in her election campaign and tried to prove that if Benazir had any sympathy with the people of the Punjab she could have started the construction of Kalabagh Dam which was a basic need for the development of Punjab as electricity generated through this dam and extra water available for agricultural development could help Punjab to make progress.\textsuperscript{182} As this project was not acceptable for the people of Sindh, it was politicized. Need of provincial autonomy was emphasized by Abida. She supported the right of the provinces to administer their resources and problems according to their own requirements.\textsuperscript{183}

Mir Afzal Khan in different public meetings tried to convey the people that the IJI was aware with the problems of common people of NWFP. He said that the problems can be solved through the industrial development of the region. He promised to improve the condition of Gadoon particularly by reducing its electricity bills by 50\%.\textsuperscript{184} The last speech of the election campaign delivered by Nawaz Sharif was heart touching and appealing. He said “we shall prefer to eat grass to extending begging bowl before others for help”. We will extend and enhance national resources instead of asking others for help or foreign aid.\textsuperscript{185} He emphasized the need of self reliance and ending dependence on foreign loans and aid. Iqbal devising the ways and means to take Pakistan on the road to development told the people that the IJI had decided to throw away the foreign aid and will run it on its own resources.\textsuperscript{186} In the public meetings IJI leadership asked common people for support to win the elections with clear majority because otherwise coalition partners does not allow any party or government to follow its agenda properly and pressure groups create problems for the government and being coalition government, it has to follow the demands of coalition partners\textsuperscript{187} while making such arguments IJI leadership did not think even for a while that it was already a formal alliance of eight (8) and informal alliance of fourteen (14) political parties.

\textbf{Political Promises of IJI}

An important feature of the election campaign of the IJI was its announcements of different projects.\textsuperscript{188} CM Punjab announced numerous concessions for \textit{Lumbardars} including increased remuneration, grant of state land and gun licenses with reduced fee. Such grants and announcements according to the PPP were the part of election campaign to influence the election results as \textit{Lumbardars} were the people who could influence the electoral
process in their particular constituencies. At the same time being major part of the caretaker government IJI started different projects in different regions. This was considered as a political bribe offered by the politicians to the people because some of the projects offered by the IJI representatives were started before the elections and keeping in view the centre-province controversies of last twenty months of the PPP government, people knew that if forms government again, it will stop all of the projects started by the IJI representatives.

Nawaz Sharif at different occasions made different promises to the people: for example he promised up-gradation of Lalamusa College for boys, appointment of teaching staff at Lalamusa girls’ college, setting up of Grils’ College at Sarai Alamgir, boys’ intercollege at Kharain. He also promised to provide mobile ambulance with all the first aid facilities along-with the facility of conducting minor operations for the hospital at Sarai Alamgir. Foundation stone of Stadium at Lalamusa was laid by him. He announced provision of Sui Gas for the industries in Malakand Agency and Mingora, Swat. This offer had to work in multiple ways as it contained the offer of industry which had to improve economic condition of the region, provide jobs to the jobless and could make life comparatively easier for the people with increased income.

Establishment of Industry could help the region to create healthy economic relationship with other regions which could help them grow socially and such expectations could mould election results in favor of IJI.

Being the caretaker PM Jatoi had the privilege to announce and even initiate different projects at different regions. This not only helped Jatoi to win the sympathies of the people but at the same time they were aware of the fact that if the government was shifted to the PPP after the elections all the started projects will be suspended which made people to think to vote for Jatoi and his party. As caretaker PM, in two months time Jatoi started Nawab Shah Medical College for Girls, Mehran Engineering College and a Railway overhead bridge in Nawab Shah. He further offered electricity to 250 villages, Sui Gas to various places of Naushahro Feroze, Khairpur and Nawabshah District. He also announced construction of roads from Sakrand to Nawab Shah via Khadar, a high school and health centre to village Khadar. He also announced building of a rest house at Dargah (tomb) Jam Sahib and promised to provide electricity at railway station. He announced 50,000 rupees for Qaumi Razakars (unpaid Servants) at Jam Sahib Dargah. Jatoi launched construction of Indus High Way at Noori-Abad near Karachi to provide an alternative north-south link. Its estimated cost was 5.5 billion rupees. At Larkana, Jatoi sanctioned five lakh rupees for Khairpur municipal committee. Two lakh rupees each for municipal committees of Lakhi, Ruk, and Chak were also sanctioned. Forty thousand rupees were announced for Shikarpur Press Club as well. To win over the support of the women, while addressing a public meeting at Moro, Jatoi promised amount of five million rupees to complete women welfare projects already started. He asked women to plan further projects for the welfare of the females. Jatoi approved funds of Rupees eighty million for the installation of new tube wells and repair of the old ones his son Ghulam Murtaza Jatoi’s constituency and the assignment was completed in one month. Jatoi announced one million rupees for each town committee of Mithi and
25,000 rupees for Mithi Press Club. He also promised up-gradation of Taluka Hospital. He announced several facilities for the people of village Thata Goraho and Nowshero Feroze like proper roads and construction of middle school and telephone connections. He also announced forty thousand rupees for Anjuman al-Falah.

Wyne, the caretaker CM of Punjab promised release of 140 million rupees within one week of his announcement for development projects in Sialkot. In the Punjab the caretaker government released 200 million rupees for the development of the three constituencies of Nawaz Sharif. Punjab government also allowed each IJI candidate to recommend 100 untrained teachers for appointment in primary and high schools. A quota of 40 plots under seven and five Marla schemes was promised to each candidate to be offered to genuine supporters of IJI. For Tulumba, a district of Multan, Wyne announced up-gradation of girl’s school, building of playgrounds and allotment of plots to the shelter-less under 3 Marla scheme. Ejaz announced the construction of Ratta Road which was considered misuse and wastage of public funds by PPP candidate for the same constituency. Raja Nadir Pervaiz distributed allotment papers of forty eight plots under Seven Marla Scheme at Jhang. Establishment of telephone exchange was also promised.

Commenting about the election campaign of the IJI Riffat Hamid Ghani wrote that Nawaz Sharif’s IJI provided outstanding examples of pressure tactics, behaviors and demands that ignored the law. Eitzaz Ahsan, a prominent leader of the PPP said that media was under control of interim government. Public funds were being used by them and they were sanctioning loans and other projects to win over the sympathies of the people which according to him were a source of pre-poll rigging. Benazir, Malik M. Qasim, Asghar and many others alleged that Wyne drew three billion rupees from the national exchequer out of which two billion rupees were given to IJI candidates for the development projects in their constituencies which according to them was an arrangement of pre-poll rigging or the political bribe to win the elections.

Negative Propaganda against the PPP

One of the most prominent features of the election campaign of the IJI was propaganda against the PPP. Political hierarchy of the PPP was condemned as it was called a family party without any democratic traditions. Appointment of Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto as chairpersons of the PPP simultaneously, attracted criticism. IJI highlighted the twenty months rule of PPP, discussed its mistakes and misconduct in such a way that made people to think negatively about the PPP and its policies. Price hike, fear, poverty, anarchy, goondaism and corruption were considered basic features of the working of the PPP government. At different occasions during their election campaign, Junejo and Nawaz Sharif used the slogan of PPP ‘Roti, Kapra aur Makan (Food, Clothing and Shelter), and told the people that instead of resolving the problems of the people of
Pakistan PPP government added troubles in the life of common people. According to Nawaz Sharif, Benazir government did not increase salaries of the industrial workers who suffered a lot due to inflation during her ruling period.

Nawaz Sharif remarked that in the elections of 1988, PPP and IJI both received mandate of the people. IJI spent that time in working for a system to help the poor and for the growth of democracy but the PPP spent that time in anti-president, anti-armed forces and anti-Nawaz Sharif activities. While criticizing the PWP of PPP it was said that the government had no comprehensive plans except distribution of some bicycles, sewing machines and fertilizer bags. He reiterated that PWP was planned to interfere in the provincial matters. Dissolution of the Balochistan Assembly was another point of criticism raised by IJI leadership during the election campaign. Junejo considered the PPP government responsible for disturbed situation of law and order in Sindh. He was of the view that the problems of ethnic groups in Sindh were because of the slogans raised by the PPP. Nawaz Sharif analyzed Benazir era as the era of careless administration and political victimization. He was of the view that if Benazir administration was serious in resolving tensions between centre and the Punjab government it could have done it easily through the meeting of CCI.

Corruption, horse trading, undermining provincial autonomy, defaming the judiciary and armed forces and misuse of power were the charges levied by the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan against the PPP government and these charges were used against the PPP by the IJI leadership during its election campaign. Meet the people campaign alongwith a Peoples Party ‘Mukao’ (Eliminate) plan was prepared by PML which was participated by Junejo, Nawaz Sharif and Ejaz. They planned processions from Peshawar to Karachi in the middle of September to tell the people about the negative deeds and atrocities of the PPP. Jatoi announced that IJI had launched Jihad (holy war) against the PPP as it was enemy of Islam, Pakistan and the poor. Junejo and Wyne told the people that October 24, 1990 was day of contest between saviors of Pakistan and those who dismembered it. Wyne said that to vote for IJI meant voting for the safety and integrity of Pakistan while voting for PPP was to give corrupts way to restart looting and plunder to the national exchequer. IJI told the people that PPP government misused 117 million secret funds.

Main features of the IJI campaign against Benazir were her statements against president, superior courts and armed forces. This was called the repetition of Bhutto’s attitude that proved to be negative for Pakistan in 1971 and later that resulted in the suspension of democracy in 1977. PPP’s foreign policy and particularly visit of Indian PM Rajiv Ghandhi in 1989 was criticized as Benazir adopted an apologetic attitude towards the Kashmir issue instead of highlighting Pakistan’s point of view. This was some thing that was called an anti-national program of the PPP.

IJI tried to prove that PPP could only think about Pakistan when it is in government otherwise it does not hesitate to work against its integrity. One example of this attitude of PPP’s effort to stop US aid to Pakistan through Pressler Amendment. Federal minister
Zahid Sarfraz and many other IJI leaders linked the suspension of US aid with Benazir’s doubtful statements regarding the nuclear program. It was hinted by Shujaat that Nusrat gave some sensitive documents to the American government regarding the nuclear program of Pakistan to invoke Pressler Amendment which resulted in the suspension of military aid. Qazi also alleged that Nusrat Bhutto was lobbying with anti-Pakistan elements in USA. Her visit to USA was considered an effort to stop American Aid for Pakistan which was discussed on different occasion during the election campaign by the IJI leadership like Nawaz Sharif, Shujaat, Kamal Azfar and Wyne. Oakley’s support to the PPP and Benazir’s contacts with Solarz invited criticism as Solarz was well known for his anti-Islam activities who wanted to create Jewish control in Pakistan. Syeda Abida Hussain was of the view that Benazir hired Mark Siegel, a well-known Zionist and anti-Pakistan, for her publicity campaign in USA to prolong her ruling time. She said it was a proof of Benazir’s anti-Pakistan designs and plans.

PPP leadership boycotted the special courts created by the caretaker government for the accountability of the members of the suspended assemblies alleged for corruption. It was said that PPP was spreading rumors that its leadership would be disqualified from participating in the elections just to create negative impact on the election process or to get it delayed. Three Punjab ministers, Malik Saleem Iqbal, Pir Barkat Ahmad and Syed Tasneem Nawaz Gardezi criticized the attitude of the PPP workers outside the High Court Lahore on the hearing of Benazir case. They were of the view that the whole thing was planned by the PPP leadership to create hurdles in the process of accountability against Benazir. They said that such incident of attack on the court had taken place for the first time and was a wrong tradition started by the PPP. After weeks of dissolution of the assemblies caretakers could not present evidence to the courts. To divert attention of common people from accountability IJI emphasized on the propaganda campaign so that people believe on the corruption without asking evidence.

Bhutto era and PPP’s link with Al-Zulfiqar which were focused in 1988 election campaign of IJI were not ignored in the election campaign of 1990. A propaganda against a woman as a leader or head of the administrative set up of a Muslim country was continued even in 1990 election campaign although it had been rejected by the people of Pakistan in the elections of 1988 and even in the elections of 1965. People criticized use of such slogans by IJI that had already been rejected by the people of Pakistan.

PPP’s dual policy in the Punjab and Sindh also faced criticism as it propagated opposite ideas in both the provinces. During the PPP rule it provided almost eighty two thousand jobs among which sixty two thousand jobs were given to the PPP members from Sindh. PPP’s attitude towards the Punjabi settlers in Sindh was also highlighted which resulted in 16,000 Punjabi’s return. Abida said that PPP deprived Punjab from its share of water of river Sindh. IJI leadership told the people that Benazir had no respect for the public opinion that was demonstrated with the appointment of General Tikka Khan as Governor of Punjab who had lost elections.
Nawaz Sharif highlighted the efforts of Benazir era to prove Nawaz Sharif and his family corrupt but had no success as his business was being run according to the rules and the reports of income tax office and WAPDA were proof of that. He said the only mistake done by him was his efforts to provide clean administration to the people of the Punjab and the development projects completed by his administration like construction of roads, schools and hospitals for common people.241 It was said that Benazir was supporting those who could work for PPP ignoring legal bindings.242 After taking the oath as PM, Benazir announced release of the political prisoners but in lieu to following this order proper home work was not done and many of the criminals were released which increased law and order problems.243

PPP for the first time decided to contest elections under an alliance named PDA.

Nawaz Sharif was of the view that the alliance was made to face defeat and nothing else. He also told the allied parties that PPP never cared for its allies. It never keeps up with its promises. The examples of such attitude were its breakup with MRD in 1988 and later it betrayed MQM in Karachi and ANP in NWFP during the premiership of Benazir. It was also said that two major parties of the alliance PPP and TIP believed in family politics instead of democracy.244 During the election campaign Nawaz Sharif tried to convince the common people to not vote for PPP. In the public meeting at Khanewal, Nawaz Sharif said that due to huge attendance of the people in the IJI public meetings it was clear that the people had rejected to politics of looters and plunderers. He asked the people to reject PPP in elections as well to liberate themselves from the negative politics of the PPP.245

**vi. Criticism against the IJI**

IJI being a major share holder of the caretaker government, faced criticism of its opponents because of its usage of official sources, vehicles, and even authority which was highlighted by Benazir and Tahirul Qadri in their election campaign. It was said that GA was a bunch of Jamhoor Dushman (enemies of the masses) who collaborated only to pose challenge for the PPP.246 Benazir told the people that it was a combination of different parties with opposite views regarding basic issues. She assured the people that IJI will lose unity just for a few days after coming into power as it had no consensus on basic issues like Afghanistan and construction of Kalabagh Dam.247 In Quetta, PNP and PPP leaders alleged the caretaker government for registering bogus voters and issuing ID cards. They also criticized transfer and appointments of polling staff considering it an arrangement of rigging for the elections.248 While discussing about the election campaign of IJI, PPP leadership alleged that the IJI leadership was working against the interests of the federation as it was fanning the regional issues and ethnic prejudices.249 IJI was also criticized for using Islam as a slogan to attract and impress common people.250 One of the actions of the caretaker government of IJI was release of G.M. Syed251 which was a point of concern for the common people of Pakistan in general and that of the people in Sindh in particular. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani and other leaders criticized this step
Attacks on personal life and business of Nawaz Sharif and his government in Punjab were also made by the PPP. Responding to the criticism Nawaz Sharif said that accountability of his family business had been continued for twenty months rule of Benazir and if she did not file any references in courts it shows that there was nothing behind her allegations. Regarding Benazir’s comments on the law and order situation in Punjab Nawaz Sharif told the people that those were mere attempts to divert attention of the people from what had been done in Sindh by the PPP government.

VII. Election Day

Elections were generally held in a peaceful environment except a few incidents of law and order situation. In some constituencies army was kept at an alert position. Polling agents generally reported satisfaction about the arrangements regarding the maintenance of law and order. A very few events of violence took place which caused death to some people. A small number of people faced injuries but overall situation remained under control. It was believed that the events of violence were not so frequent to create impact on the election results. Official figures express that 33 lost their lives on polling day and 47 wounded across the country. Overall the situation remained calm and peaceful but in some of the constituencies there were problems. Generally the situation was not much disturbing to create impact on the election results.

VIII. Election Results 1990

Composition of the national and provincial assemblies remained similar to that of 1988. Total number of registered voters on September 15, 1990 was 4,86,48,960. Total number of candidates, for NA, was 2,415 for 217 seats and 6,429 for 483 PA seats. Elections for NA held on October 24, 1990 and PAs on October 27, 1990. Results of the elections of 1990 stunned the PPP. It was also a pleasant surprise for the IJI leadership. Three NA and one PA candidates returned successful without contest. In total IJI nominated 154 candidates for the NA among whom 106 returned to the assembly. Among them 1 was elected from federal Capital, 92 from Punjab, 3 from Sindh, 8 from NWFP and 2 got elected from Balochistan to represent IJI from their respective provinces in the NA. IJI got 37.37% of the total valid votes cast. In Punjab PA IJI brought forward 237 candidates and 214 returned successful. In Sindh, IJI could bring forward only 45 candidates. Just 6 of them were successful. There were 53 candidates of the IJI in NWFP PA among which 33 won the elections. In Balochistan IJI nominated 16 candidates and just 7 were able to win the elections. In the Punjab IJI got 55.13%, in Sindh it got 8.46%,
in NWFP it received 26.67% and in Balochistan got 8.67% of the total valid votes cast by the people in the provincial assemblies’ elections.  

IJJI’s allies MQM got 15 seats in the NA, ANP 6, JWP of Bugti 2. 8 FATA members also announced their support to the IJI which made total of 137 in favor of IJI and it was short of barely 9 supporters to have 2/3 majority in the NA. 21 independent candidates got elected and most of them joined IJI. The real contest in Punjab and Sindh was between PPP and IJI’s core component PML. IJI did not nominate any person in the areas of stronghold of PPP like; Larkana, Nawabshah, Peshawar and most parts of interior Sindh. In the 1990 election the PPP met a stunning defeat which was mainly due to its performance in the previous twenty months. But according to the PPP sources it was all due to the rigging done by the IJI. Those who were successful in the elections from any of the party were from comparable social backgrounds. The great majority were landlords. From IJI a little prominent number of businessmen returned successful. Biradari affiliations still had importance for the voters. Muslim League was known to be more skillful in manipulating these concerns. As it was the party in power its promises attracted more voters than any other party. The success was attributed to IJI’s strategy of one against one.  

IJJI got more votes in some constituencies as compare to 1988 elections for which we can trace many reasons. One reason was that Bhutto’s name had not the same attraction for voters as in the past. Negative propaganda against the PPP government by IJI and its performance during its twenty months rule also lend a hand in the IJI victory. In Punjab vast majority of successful members belonged to PML. Almost the same situation was there in NWFP and Balochistan. In the elections of NA 8 members of JI were successful. 8 candidates of JI got elected for NWFP PA. In Balochistan only PML members could get success. JWP and IJI collectively bagged 16 out of 37 Muslim Seats in the house of 43 members of Balochistan PA. From Punjab PA 10 JI candidates got elected. It also won 8 PA seats of Sindh. IJI lost its three traditional seats to JUI (F). NA-14 was lost by IJI due to doubling of its candidates and divided votes benefited PDA. Qazi Lateef of JUI (D) was defeated at NA-18, Maulana Abdurrauf at NA-19, Maulana Shahid Ahmad at NA-10 and Maulana Abdul Baqi at NA-17. JUI (D) also lost all the five seats allotted to it in NWFP. Another thing that is worth noting is that many of the prominent political figures lost the elections like Abida Hussain, Wali Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Aftab Sherpao, Dr. Sher Afghan, Ahamd Saeed Awan, Jehangir Badar, Maulana Noorani, Pir Pagara, Ghafoor, Asghar, Mairaj Khalid, Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad of PPP, and Sheikh Rafiq Ahmad, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto. Benazir and Asif also lost one seat each in the elections. It was apparent in most of the cases that people elected those people whom they considered to be helpful to solve their problems. Members of the forward block in the NWFP PA of 1988 were denied IJI tickets and they contested the elections in 1990 as independent candidates. All of them
lost the elections.\textsuperscript{279} After the elections IJI formed government with a clear majority. Although there was a minute difference of votes between IJI and PDA but IJI won a many seats more than PDA. This kind of difference happens where majority votes are considered as the standard of success in the elections.

\textbf{IX. Low Voter Turnout}

In the elections of 1990 voter turnout was very low. Different analysts sorted out different reasons for this but mainly three things were emphasized.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Compulsion of NIC for the issuance of the ballot paper to voter
  \item People’s belief that their vote will not create any impact on the election results
  \item Sense of disenchantment with the available options was another reason for low voter turnout in the elections.\textsuperscript{280}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{X. By-Elections 1990}

In the elections of 1990, thirty persons were elected from more than one seat for National and Provincial Assemblies. According to the constitution, one candidate could retain one seat in the assemblies so they had to vacate other seats for which fresh elections are must to be held within 120 days for a vacant seat.\textsuperscript{281} Government held byelections on January 10, 1991 for 10 NA constituencies. IJI won 8, 1 went to PDA and 1 to an independent candidate. Out of 13 Punjab PA constituencies IJI won 11, 1 went to PDA and election for 1 constituency of Jhang was deferred due to law and order situation. All the three vacant seats went to independents in Sindh. Out of 3 NWFP constituencies IJI got 1. Election for one constituency for Balochistan went to IJI.\textsuperscript{282}

In Punjab, 53 IJI candidates applied for the 9 NA seats and 92 for the 13 PA seats. There were serious problems for nominating candidates in few constituencies. NA-72, vacated by Ejaz became a source of tension as Ch. Abdul Sattar wanted to contest from this constituency. He wanted to vacate his PA seat, but the final decision was made by the central Parliamentary board of IJI in consultation with Junejo and Ejaz. NA-62 and NA-91 were also difficult constituencies, which were vacated by Junejo and Jatoi respectively. PP-123 vacated by Nawaz Sharif was expected to go to JI which was
demanding two seats but it got just one.\textsuperscript{283} In Punjab most of the members of the assemblies tried to get ticket for their relatives from the PML (IJI) platform.

By elections brought problems for the alliance in NWFP as well particularly among ANP, PML and JI. JI wanted to strengthen its position in the province. ANP wanted to get some favors from Mir Afzal who had a sympathetic attitude towards it. ANP had problems with JI and wanted to strengthen its position against it. Leadership of IJI and PML had difference of opinion. Mir Afzal was president of provincial IJI and Haq was president of PML in NWFP. Mir Afal and Haq wanted to nominate their supporters in the elections to enhance their support in the provincial politics.\textsuperscript{284} Finally, both the IJI and ANP nominated their candidates for the two constituencies which benefited the PDA at both the constituencies.\textsuperscript{285} Internal problems started surfacing immediately after the elections among the alliance members. Electoral understanding could not be maintained in the by-elections among the IJI-COP. Wrangle among the member parties of IJI also became prominent as each of the member parties wanted to enhance its quantum of representation in the assemblies. In fact none of the leaders or representatives of the member parties thought beyond their party interests which helped PDA to augment its position.

XI. \textbf{Causes of Success of IJI in the 1990 Elections}

IJI’s success was not an incident. Many reasons can be traced behind this achievement. Its organized election campaign was one of the major factors. Being in government many of the candidates had served the people during last eleven years. Nawaz Sharif’s services to the people as CM played an important role in the enhancement of his vote bank.\textsuperscript{286} Being caretaker, IJI was able to use government machinery in its favor. It is generally believed that the official candidate always has better chances to win the elections. As Caretaker government, IJI members enjoyed control on media, official resources, and government machinery which helped it to create a positive impression on the people and helped its victory.\textsuperscript{287} Its efforts to avoid division of anti-PPP votes also played an important role to take the IJI to success. Study of the Benazir era also explains the reasons of the triumph of IJI.

Twenty months rule of PPP added to the difficulties of the common people. Increased prices, high taxation and law and order situation particularly in Sindh made people to think before polling the vote. Centre-province relations and horse trading proved an eye-wash for the masses. One of the reasons of the victory of IJI was the anti-Islamic stance of the PPP. It was said by the IJI leadership that people had elected them for the enforcement of Shari’ah (Islamic Laws) in the country.\textsuperscript{288} PPP efforts to please America and even its announcement to give nuclear plant under the care of international organizations and sharing the names of the Sikhs of the Sikh Liberation Movement with Indian government caused fall in the popularity graph of the PPP.\textsuperscript{289} Benazir stated at several times that IJI government will never be able to get Nuclear Power Plant from
France and financial assistance from America. Problems created by America for financial assistance created image that it was effect of Benazir’s efforts which made a huge number of people indifferent towards PPP. Keeping in view all these factors IJI was provided to the people as an alternative which they welcomed open heartedly.

Benazir had and impression that elections will be postponed or she might be arrested before the elections. These observations created pessimism in the PPP workers which proved negative for her election campaign. Contrary to that, IJI paid full attention to its election campaign which turned the election results in its favor. Benazir’s over dependence on US support was another reason for the success of IJI as she did not make serious efforts to win the sympathies of the people. There is a general observation that PPP voter polls in the favor of PPP of avoid to get involved in the electoral process. PPP voter was disillusioned with the PPP performance so avoided participating in elections which resulted in IJI’s accomplishment.

IJI planned its elections campaign such a way that PPP had to defend itself throughout the election campaign which made things difficult for the PPP. Another thing which is worth mentioning is that different parties joined hands with IJI to secure there position in the elections but they could not get expected benefit. One example of JUI (F) can be quoted as it nominated seventy three candidates for PAs and only two became successful. In Punjab it nominated twenty nine candidates and for Sindh twenty six but none of its candidates could return successful in both the provinces. As soon as PPP realized the chances of victory of IJI it started leveling allegations of rigging against the caretaker government. The allegations were made regarding almost seventy NA constituencies but majority of these could not be justified. If we study the methods of rigging it can be divided into different subjects like pre-poll rigging, polling day rigging and even post poll rigging. It is generally believed that elections in Pakistan particularly the elections of 1990, if they were not rigged on the polling day, there are many examples available for the pre-poll rigging. A detailed study is done about the allegations, response of election commission to these allegations and international reports regarding the elections in the following pages.

**XII. Charges of Rigging in the Elections**

There was peaceful environment on the Election Day and were only few complaints about rigging. PDA leveled rigging allegations just after it realized its weak position in the electoral progression. PDA alleged that there was an election cell in the President House whose approval was required to announce the results along with the acquiescence of Gul and Durrani. An Election Cell was created in Raiwind as well to monitor the IJI performance. PPP rejected the election fallouts as it had contested with the support of three other political parties and still was able to win only forty five seats in the NA. The percentage of votes received by the PPP did not decrease so it purported fabrication of election results. There had been a long debate regarding allegations and counter allegations about fabrication of the results of elections1990. A closer study of the methods
used to make IJI’s success possible in the elections informs nothing clearly, if the elections were stolen or not. A brief account of different expressions is given below to check if IJI was really involved in the rigging or it was just propaganda by the PPP.

Benazir proclaimed that a comprehensive method of rigging was adopted in the elections. In almost fifty polling stations of every constituency, polling staff was instructed about the government plan. In the selected polling stations, presiding officers were appointed with the consent of IJI candidates. They were given clear instructions of not providing certified copies of the election result of their respective polling station to PDA polling agents and to send result to an administrative officer before communicating it to the returning officer. That was the time when the juggling with the figures was done, claimed PPP leadership. She alleged that in Sindh, law enforcing agencies’ personals stamped bogus votes for IJI because returning officers declined to become part of the rigging plans of the caretakers. She suspected that in the constituency of caretaker PM Jatoi, almost 80,000 votes were polled for him after the forcible removal of PPP polling agents from polling stations. According to her, national resources were used to run the IJI election campaign and to bring people in the public meetings of the IJI. She pronounced that the PDA participated in the PA elections just to avoid leaving the field open for IJI.

PPP indicated that increased number of voters in the elections of 1990 as compared to 1988 was seven hundred thousand amongst which almost two hundred thousand bogus votes were registered. Another misuse of the condition of providing NIC to poll votes was that thousands of bogus NIC were issued generally to younger people to cast their votes. It was alleged that postal ballots were stamped by the IJI candidates or their representatives or by the administration. Votes of dead women and of those who did not poll votes were stamped by polling staff. Ballot boxes in rural areas were not sealed in front of polling agents. At some polling stations presiding officers removed PPP votes from ballot boxes or inserted votes for the IJI candidates. PPP alleged that its workers were arrested particularly in Sindh to create negative impact on its election campaign. One thing which adds to the doubts about rigging was chief election commissioner’s statement according to which voter turnout was less as compare to 1988 elections but the election results showed higher to three percentages votes polled as compare to 1988 elections in Punjab. In seventy one NA constituencies of Punjab, voter turnout increased by five percent to twenty-seven percent. IJI won fifty five of these while it had just won thirty in 1988. It also won thirteen out sixteen constituencies, where voter turnout had fallen from point one percent to twenty percent. ECP was informed by the provincial administration that people were arrested under legal charges so it was not the matter of ECP but that of ordinary courts. On the polling day it was claimed that the PPP workers were harassed. Syed Qasim Ali shah, a candidate for Sindh PA reported that PPP workers were arrested on a large scale from his constituency. Sardar Muqeem Khan from Jacobabad reported that Soomro changed election results after losing the elections. NA-95 candidate reported
that seven polling stations of his constituency remained closed till 2 P.M. Islamuddin Sheikh alleged rigging in his constituency, NA-53. He said that thousands of bogus votes were polled in his constituency. He denied to accept election results and demanded fresh polls under the supervision of neutral administration.

Responding to Benazir’s allegations Nawaz Sharif said that rigging was not possible because the ECP held elections under the supervision of judiciary and the teams of foreign observers who endorsed the results. According to Nawaz Sharif, Benazir was habitual of rejecting the election results where ever and whenever defeated. He said that in the elections of 1988 she alleged rigging in Punjab but could not prove it even when she was in government. He further added that she charged rigging to explain her defeat. If the elections were rigged how it could be possible to do it at such a massive level as the quantum of the success of IJI was so high. Mian Shahbaz Sharif alleged that Jehangir Badar, a PPP member rigged elections in NA-96. He told that he had evidence of the rigging. Responding to the allegations of rigging, Mian Ehsan-ul-Haq (a PML member) asked PPP leadership to contest by-election from any of the constituency of Lahore. He was of the view that none of the people casted extra votes but the people of Pakistan used their right to vote and rejected the politics of PPP. Jam Sadiq, Caretaker CM Sindh said that actually it was PPP that was responsible for firing, rigging and other mal practices during the elections in Sindh. Jam announced that polling at four polling stations remained suspended because of the efforts of some workers to detain the polling stations. Ch. Shujaat, Wyne, Junejo, Malik Khuda Baksh Tiwana and Muhammad Yameen Khan challenged the validity of PDA’s White Paper as it was published after a long time of elections. Balochistan government denied all the allegations of rigging saying it was an effort of the PPP to decrease the tension of losing elections.

Mir Taj Muhammad Jamali, CM Balochistan and IJI member, accepted the fact that the rigging was done in the elections for which the caretaker government was responsible. But the facts were telling a different story. In Balochistan caretaker CM was son in law of the Nawab Akbar Bugti, the leader of JWP Mir Humayun Khan Mari. In the elections JWP could win only two seats out of six in the NA and nine seats in the PA, if it had a hand in the rigging or if there was any rigging supported by the government, JWP could manage to win as many seats which could help it to form government in Balochistan. Although chances of rigging at regional level, by the individuals can never be rejected altogether but there is hardly any evidence available of government’s involvement in it. In November 1990, Taj Jamali, announced suspension of ten deputy and assistant commissioners in the province on the charges of rigging in the elections. PPP based its propaganda on the statement of Taj Jamali but in fact none of the Deputy Commissioners were suspended. Later a clarification was issued that CM said that action would be taken against Deputy Commissioners if they were responsible for any corruption or misconduct in the elections. So the story based on the statement of CM Balochistan proved a misunderstanding. Responding to Taj Jamali’s statement Chief ECP said that it was only the prerogative of the ECP to take action against those who were responsible of misconduct in the elections. Keeping in mind all the allegations and counter allegations,
a question arises that if there were no proofs available of the rigging in the elections were fair?

Chief ECP asked to provide evidence for the rigging complains to nullify the election results. Keeping in view the percentage of votes polled for PPP and IJI, chief ECP said that PPP’s vote bank was intact. IJI’s success was mainly due to securing votes of independents. ECP received 1,323 application of misconduct in the elections but most of them were not substantiated with evidence. The applications which had some solid grounds were taken up by the ECP and necessary action was taken. Most of the applications were that of the general nature. Nothing was specified. It was mentioned in the complaints that all sorts of corruption were done. Candidates used official transport. Opposition members were harassed. Transfers were made and members of a party were provided funds from government resources to bribe people in shape of welfare work on the eve of elections. Secretary General of PPP said that IJI used all the methods of pre-poll rigging. It allotted plots to non-deserving people; announced facilities to the Lumberdars and crores of rupees were spent on the chairmen and councilors of district council, municipal committee and union councils to get desired election results. Opposition’s basic source of information was press clippings which was not an acceptable evidence for any court of justice or ECP. The allegations were found too general to be taken any action by the ECP. Some of the people had apprehensions that civil servants were promoted to gain their support in the election campaign of IJI. The Home Secretary denied these allegations. Justice Khalilur Rehman Khan announced that twenty four complaints of rigging were registered in ECP. PPP workers claimed that IJI polled bogus votes in NA-114, 115 and 120. They claimed that the IJI workers took over the polling stations and polled bogus votes with the help of polling agents. The claims were denied by the IJI workers. A complaint was made that in one of the constituencies of Lahore, 476 bogus votes were added to the electoral roll. But the bogus names could not be identified. ECP was informed that each of the IJI candidates was provided with thirty constables to run the election campaign and for this purpose rupees 20 crores were provided to such candidates. The counsel of the complainant was unable to prove his point and the case was dismissed. One of the politicians told the commission that IJI was being given coverage on the electronic media more than any other party. He was of the opinion that unjustified appointments and transfers were made by the caretaker government. The counsel of the complainant could not provide any documentary prove for the allegations and the case was dismissed by the commission. TV was projecting various components of the IJI. It was also telecasting negative propaganda against the previous government of the country. It was told by the ministry of information and broadcasting that all the political parties and alliances were given coverage. As IJI was a larger alliance so it got more time and PTV had no authority to edit whatever was said by any of the party about the other.

One hundred and three complaints were filed before the commission under the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The applications were disposed of by the commission after hearing them at length according to the law. Twelve complaints were filed against the mal practices during polling. Out of twelve, only four were accepted and
fresh polls were ordered at some of the polling stations of three constituencies. Repoll in one constituency was also ordered. Remaining eight complaints were dismissed as were unable to provide any solid grounds to prove their point.³²⁵ Thirty three complaints were filed for recounting of ballot papers. Four were ordered to be done so. Re-poll at three constituencies and thirteen polling stations of one constituency were ordered after the proof of mal practices in those constituencies.³²⁶

XIII. Foreign Observers and Media Reports about Elections of 1990

Three teams of foreign observers visited Pakistan to watch the electoral process. French group consisted of two magistrates and two lawyers. They found that highly sophisticated fraud had distorted the election results. The Washington based National Democratic Institute (NDI) forwarded that in the beginning there was no evidence of rigging but statistical study was evident of serious irregularities. These questions were raised about fifteen percent of the constituencies, most of which were won by IJI. According to NDI results of almost thirty-one constituencies might be suspected. NDI was appreciative for the arrangements made by the government to hold free and fair elections. It was also appreciative to the security arrangements. It also discussed the ECP’s dealing with the complaints. It was also noted that the election campaign was launched under a polarized environment. Dissolution of the assemblies on August and filing of the references in special courts had some impact on the election results. At the same time availability of national resources to be utilized worked in favor of one of the parties contesting the elections. There were also serious problems like killing of candidate, party workers, civilians, attacks by armed men on polling agents, polling officials and voters. There were certain incidents of kidnapping and killing of party workers. Due to our social designs it is difficult to recognize women particularly those who observe pardah (to cover the face with a piece of cloth).

Later in January 1991 NDI issued a final report in which it said that it studied the conditions in Pakistan, reaction of the people about the election results, met different political leaders and judged there are the chances that 15% of the success of the IJI was result of the arrangements made by the government. According to this report media gave almost equal opportunity to different parties to present their viewpoints particularly National Radio. In some of the polling stations polling officers were partial but these things do not hint that the elections were rigged at such a mass scale as was alleged by PDA. The report says that the vote of third party which was one of the major recipients of votes in 1988 was not present in the elections or the electorate ignored the third party that culminated in the victory of IJI.³²⁷ NDI doubted that about 15% constituencies were rigged but it did not mention any mal practices observed by its representatives that could affect results.³²⁸
Independent English language print media covered election campaign. The delegation observed that media gave a balanced coverage to the election campaign of all the parties. It was assessed that Pakistan Radio had more balance approach than the PTV. Delegation did not support the news of change of ballot boxes or expulsion of the poling agents. It was said by the delegation that the attitude of cooperation, understanding and tolerance shown by the polling agents was a positive sign regarding the development of democracy. French members of the delegation were of the opinion that there was some rigging in the elections. The leader of the delegation said “the elections were generally open, orderly and well administered”. It was said that the counting process was conducted expeditiously and in front of the polling agents of the political parties. The delegation found no evidence of massive mal practices which could create impact on the election results.

SAARC mission considered the whole process of polling free and fair. It did not find any signs of rigging and none of the solid complaints about the elections were heard by the mission. But the report mentioned that the appointment of a prominent opposition leader as caretaker PM was against set norms of the free elections. Canadian team called the elections “fair and free, firm and friendly”. Canadian observers were in Gujrat, where Benazir had severe doubts about rigging. They found no misconduct during the polling and were satisfied with the whole process. They reported the elections as free, fair, frank, fine and fantastic. They also visited polling stations of Lahore and Faisalabad. French observers were in Karachi. They felt misconduct at the time of shifting of ballot boxes from polling stations to the central place for counting. But the allegation was not acceptable to the administration because ballot boxes were not needed to be shifted anywhere. Votes were counted at the polling stations immediately after the polling was over.

Different newspapers, journals and individuals commented differently about the elections. Comments had variation about the elections if they were free or not. International media was appreciative for the whole process as it was completed a peaceful environment and there were no signs of harassment visible. George Bush commented about the elections that “the general elections in Pakistan were free and fair which reflected the will of the people. The voting process was generally open, free from violence and orderly”. Spokesperson of foreign office of USA called the elections free and fair. National newspapers like Musawat and Nawa-i-Waqt also considered the elections free and fair. It was reported that the process was free and peaceful. Nawa-i-Waqt mentioned that there was some misconduct in some constituencies but it was so limited that it could not create impact on the success rate of IJI. Analysts at Friday Times compared elections of 1988 with 1990 for turn out, changes in number of registered voters, and votes received by IJI and PPP candidates in all Punjab’s constituencies. They suggested that bogus votes accounted for IJI victory in thirty constituencies otherwise PPP could win twenty eight of them. There was another opinion forwarded by many journalists that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had not dismissed Benazir’s government to tolerate it again through the new electoral victory. They insisted that military and bureaucracy had insisted to keep PPP out of Power. This opinion was supported through the argument that Benazir
wanted to remove the eighth Amendment from the Constitution and IJI did not help it. President considered these efforts to limit his role in the national politics. Many of the newspapers mentioned that the percentage of voters was less than that of the elections of 1988. Some of the papers mentioned that the polling stations were revision of the situation of 1984 referendum. But the election results were telling another story. This difference gave some strength the doubts about the elections and their character as free and fair polls.

ECP published a detailed report responding to the White Paper on Elections of 1990 published by PDA. In this report ECP responded to all the allegations and proved that most of the allegations were baseless and were just an act to save the image of PPP after such a clear defeat. PDA alleged rigging in seventy constituencies but filed only thirty five election petitions. PDA secretary information, Omer Asghar Khan criticized ECP and called it partial as it responded to those allegations that were levied against IJI. Ch. Shaukat Ali, Sec. General of ECP joined PML after retirement in September 1991. He also criticized ECP’s statement of being unaware of the existence of election cell at president house. Commenting about the PPP’s White Paper Jatoi said that most of its information was based on newspaper clipping which is not an authentic source to prove their allegations. PPP focused on a statement of Jatoi given in January, 1991 that Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and some other prominent leaders were defeated due to a plan but even being a caretaker PM he could not interfere in the decisions of ECP. Jatoi denied any of such statements explaining his statement hinted about political planning and not rigging. Later in the long-march against the policies of Nawaz government, Benazir used the statements of Jatoi to prove that the premiership of Nawaz Sharif was illegal because he got the office through rigging in the elections. Poya stated that rigging was done on at least twenty five NA seats in the elections. Professor Ghafoor, Sec. Gen. of the IJI said that Benazir must analyze the causes of her failure in the elections instead of leveling charges of rigging against her political opponents. In response to the allegations of Benazir, Altaf Hussain, Azim Tariq (MQM) and Syed Ghaus Ali Shah (IJI) said that PPP rigged the elections in the Sindh.

Asghar Khan filed a petition in ECP saying that privileges were announced for Lumberdars. Punjab government allocated quota of appointment of thirty constables to each of IJI constituencies. 200 million were given to IJI contestants by the caretakers to start development projects. Many of the federal officers were transferred. ECP rejected this petition as affidavit was not attached with it. According to ECP Lumberdars can be provided concessions by the government and there was no data provided regarding the appointment of the constables. So the petition was rejected as based on apprehensions instead of proofs. Official sources mentioned that Benazir relied on inaccurate figures to prove rigging during polling which was vague, inappropriate and baseless. IJI was of the view that Chief ECP was appointed by Benazir which is based on judiciary and the whole process was conducted by judicial officials directly under the ECP.
xiv. IJI: Taking Over the Seat of Government

After winning the elections with a clear majority IJI formed government at center.

Having secured majority it formed government in the largest province, Punjab. In Sindh, IJI and MQM formed coalition government. IJI and ANP formed a parliamentary government alliance in NWFP and in Balochistan JWP was the dominant party which formed government with the cooperation of other parties. It was difficult for IJI to select a candidate for the office of the PM as there had been many contenders. Before the elections of 1990 the issue was postponed to be decided according to the election results with the consent of the elected candidates of the IJI. Nawaz Sharif, the president of IJI, proved himself the strongest candidate for the office of PM particularly with reference to his role during the election campaign and his opposition to the PPP during its twenty months rule. Jatoi was a caretaker PM and Junejo was ex-PM of Pakistan and both of them had claims for the office of PM. Jatoi was a mature and seasoned politician and had support of some members of IJI to become PM. Qazi of JI was another contender of the office of the PM. Some of the supporters of IJI believed that Nawaz Sharif should continue his services as CM Punjab. Name of Bugti, Ejaz and Abida was also mentioned for the office of PM. Some of the members of IJI suggested adopting a principle of rotation for the office of the PM believing that this will give a chance to the leaders of smaller parties to work for the nation. Ch Shujaat expected premiership for himself as a compromise candidate. Many of the people favored an idea of election of PM from Sindh to counter the power of PPP in that province. Abida propagated to leave the provincial identities. According to her such divisions were responsible for regionalism and provincialism. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and establishment favored premiership of Nawaz Sharif. Position of PML in the elections of 1990 and Nawaz Sharif’s popularity helped making a decision in his favor. Support of JI and JUI (D) for Nawaz Sharif made the decision easier and he got elected with 153 votes out of 193 present. Some of the people appreciated the selection of Nawaz Sharif as PM of Pakistan because he was President of the IJI and was president of Punjab Muslim League. Secondly, he was an industrialist, who could expand industry with his personal experience. Thirdly, the smaller parties had trust on him. Jatoi made attempt to form a coalition government with the cooperation of PPP. In response to the cooperation PPP could form government in Sindh. But the efforts could not be materialized and Jatoi had to leave the PM House. After getting elected PM of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif carefully appointed his cabinet keeping in view the services of different politicians and political parties. Initially, in the Federal Cabinet there were 18 Ministers and 2 Ministers for state. Two MQM members also got ministerial position, which was not appreciated by some of the leaders of IJI.

Selection of provincial CMs was another challenge faced by IJI. In Punjab three PML leaders Wyne, Manzoor Watoo and Ch. Pervaiz Ilahi wanted to get this office and finally Wyne become CM of Punjab. Problems were also there in NWFP. JI, component
of IJI, was not ready to cooperate with ANP as both these parties had problems with each other. JI was of the view that ANP had contradictory point of view regarding the Shariat Bill, Afghanistan issue and Kashmir problem. JI was willing to accept ANP as a part of coalition if it changes its stance regarding these issues. On the issue of selection of CM, ANP was ready to accept Afzal as CM but JI demanded the nomination of Haq as CM of NWFP. After long debate Afzal was elected unopposed. He enjoyed support of seventy MPAs. PPP was the most successful party in the PA elections of Sindh but IJI decided to form a coalition government there with the support of MQM and independents. MQM had problems with JI during the elections so it had reservations in making a coalition government with IJI. JI’s cooperation helped to form parliamentary government alliance of IJI and MQM. Jam Sadiq Ali, an independent candidate, became CM. Sindh. His cabinet consisted of eighteen ministers and twelve secretaries of the State (Musheer). Taj Jamali became CM Balochistan which also was a coalition government. This government worked till 1993 when Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved NA. Handling of important issues by this government is discussed in the next chapter which covers the politics of IJI and the working of such a huge coalition.

Notes and References

1 To conduct the elections and run the state system an interim setup was required that could fulfill the responsibilities till the elections are held and the elected government takes the responsibility. Usually opposition of the previous government is offered to form the government. Following this principle head of COP in the NA, Jatoi was offered the office of PM till the elected government takes its responsibility. Jatoi formed his cabinet with the help of IJI and gave different ministries to the members of IJI and COP parties.

2 Many references of misconduct and corruption of the PPP were filed in the special courts. There were rumors that Benazir will be prevented to contest the elections. The process of accountability did not seem transparent because all the cases filed were against the PPP members and its leadership. Junejo and other senior politicians were of the view that the references must be filed with evidences because if any of the references filed in the courts was rejected it will be a denial of the objectivity of the decision of Ghulam Ishaq Khan. “Intikhābāt: Hakōmat, PP awr iss kei Mukhālfīn kā farz”, Nawa-i-Waqt, August 28, 1990 and Nawa-i-Waqt, August 12, 1990. Also see Frontier Post, September 1 and October 8, 1990, Pakistan Times, October 5 and 9, 1990, Jang, October 8, 1990. Dawn, October 8, 1990. Mashriq, August 11, 1990. In Pakistan practice of dissolving the assemblies is common since 1956 and had been repeated for several times.

3 Bashir Ahmad, “Emerging Scenario”, Pakistan Times, September 9, 1990. Also see Pakistan Times, October 19, 1990. There was a demand that till the process of accountability was not over Benazir must be prevented to contest the elections. Different politicians had different point of view regarding this demand. Nawaz Sharif and other IJI leaders were of the view that she must not be disqualified. They believed that a comprehensive defeat in the elections was actual accountability. Qazi was of the view that if PPP boycotted the elections it will further disturb the image of the party. Pakistan Times, September 3, October 5 and 9, 1990. “Intikhābāt: Hakōmat, PP awr iss kei Mukhālfīn kā farz”, Nawa-i-Waqt, August 28, 1990. Also see Frontier Post, September 1 and October 8, 1990, Jang, October 8, 1990 and Dawn, October 8, 1990.
5 Muhammad Farooq Qureshi, *Nawaz Sharif: Aik Hukmrān aik Siyasatdān* (Lahore: Qaumi Publishers, 1994), pp. 25 and 28. Khalid Kashmiri, “24 October ko ‘Ām Intikhābāt kā Eni’qād yā Martial law: Ab Dō hī Rāstei Haig”, *Nawaz-i-Waqt*, August 31, 1990. Also see *Imroze*, Lahore: August 12, 1990. Initially Jatoi formed a cabinet of five members i.e. Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, Gulam Mustufa Khar, Sartaj Aziz, Ilahi Baksh Soomro and Rafi Raza. The caretaker cabinet was criticized because it had members of different parties including PPP and the members of a party that was dismissed with the allegations of corruption were not acceptable in the caretaker government. IJI parliamentary group in Senate was also critical about the composition of caretaker government. It was believed that induction of people like Khar and Jam Sadiq Ali, the caretaker lost their credibility of holding free and fair elections. There was a general impression that Sadiq and Khar were involved in every crime of Sindh and Jam Sadiq got loan of crores of rupees from Agricultural Development Bank and Khar got 25 crore from the Benazir government and was demanding 100 crore rupees for horse trading in the assemblies. *Frontier Post*, August 16, 1990. IJI leadership was also critical on the appointment of Khar as federal minister. Khar had been a strong enemy of Nawaz Sharif in the centre-province conflict between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir and was member of the PPP. Tariq Ismail Sagar, *Election 90* (Lahore: 1990), pp. 53 and 56.

6 Sagar, *Election 90*, pp. 40-43. Also see *Dawn*, October 9, 1990. Most of the Interim government consisted of the members of opposition of Benazir era which was considered a partial decision by the PPP. Ghafoor was of the view that Gulam Ishaq Khan used to take decisions under pressure. He was of the view that the decision of nomination of Benazir as PM without having majority in the NA was similar to that of the appointment of Jatoi as an interim PM. He said that both the decisions were not free but were taken under pressure by the President.

7 Qureshi, *Nawaz Sharif*, p. 28. It was a reality that the leadership of the IJI was aware of the plan of the dissolution of the assemblies. The caretaker cabinet was formed according to the suggestion of the IJI chief Nawaz Sharif. At the centre five out of twelve ministers belonged to PML. At the provincial level the same thing happened. PML leadership was informed by its members about their joining the provincial cabinets. PML leadership was of the view that the government should have asked the leadership of the party to join the cabinets instead of selecting members of the party as cabinet members. *Jang*, August 26, 1990.

8 *Jang*, August 26, 1990. Meraj Khalid was of the view that the majority of the members of the caretaker government had conflicts with the PPP so it will be a hindrance in holding free and fair elections. An interview of Meraj Khalid with Ihtashamul Haque, “Nothing can be Achieved if Ms Bhutto is forced out of the Game”, *The Herald*, September 1990, p. 47.


10 *Aman*, August 13, 1990. She criticized the appointment of a person as caretaker PM who could not win the elections from his home constituency. In the elections of 1988, Jatoi contested from two constituencies at his home town and lost the elections and later was able to win in by-elections with the help of Khar from Punjab.


16 Sagar, *Election 90*, p. 58. A meeting of IJI was held on August 10, 1990 in which it was decided that in the elections of 1990 IJI will seek the support of members of COP to sweep the elections. *Pakistan Times*, August 10 and August 13, 1990. Also see *Pakistan Times*, September 12, 1990, and *Nawaz-i-Waqt*, August 20, 1990. Information is also available in *Dawn*, August 9, 1990, *Frontier Post*, August 17, 1990 and *Jang*, August 19, 1990. One of the major reasons of the formation of the broader alliance was the elections of 1988. In that election PPP got 38% of the polled votes and remaining 62% were received by other political parties but PPP won the elections because the votes polled against the PPP were divided among different...
political parties. *Pakistan Times*, August 20, 1990. Chattha and Nisar M. Khan of PML were against any alliance with religious parties except JUI (F) because they had difference of opinion with JUI (D) and JI on some of the clauses of Shariat Bill but they did not oppose any cooperation with them to launch a joint venture against PPP. *The Nation*, Lahore: August 9, 1990.

17 Afzal Khan, “Getting Ready”, *The Herald*, September 1990, p. 95. Also see *Nawa-i-Waqt*, August 19, 1990, *Pakistan Times*, August 20, 1990 and “A Positive Development” *Pakistan Times*, August 29, 1990. Qazi believed that IJI was an alliance based on a manifesto and was capable of running government because of having consensus about the basic issues. He believed that only those parties could join it who agreed with its manifesto. While discussing about making a broader single alliance with COP members could create problems as these parties had varied opinions regarding basic national and international issues. *Pakistan Times*, August 27, 1990. Talking about the formation of alliance with ANP Qazi said that ANP and IJI had difference of opinion about the basic issues like Afghanistan problem. He was of the view that ANP could not work with IJI under an alliance because it was a regional political party and its main focus was on the problems of NWFP. *Dawn*, October 21, 1990 and *Jasarat*, August 9, 1990.

18 *Pakistan Times*, October 9, 1990.
21 JWP was new name of Balochistan National Alliance (BNA).

22 Fazal had problems with Bugti and these problems were a clear hindrance in generating cooperation among these two leaders. *Dawn*, August 21 and October 24, 1990. According to Bugti his party joined alliance to reduce the impact of politics of regionalism, hatred and parochialism. *Pakistan Times*, September 28, 1990. Bugti did not want to make any alliance with IJI; instead he wanted electoral adjustment with the PML as being allied of IJI could bring stronger opposition for him in the province. But because PML was not contesting elections separately JWP of Bugti joined IJI. Salim Shahid, “New Deals”, *The Herald*, September 1990, p. 93. Also see Sandra Balchin and Sohail Warrich, “Punjab: Close Encounters” *The Herald*, Election Special, 1990, p. 100. MQM was political rival of the JI which was second largest party of the IJI as its support base was urban Sindh where MQM had won majority seats in 1988 elections. Fazal had problems with IJI. Fazal did not agree to any formula of seat adjustment with IJI. According to Nawaz Sharif his attitude could help PPP win more seats in the elections. To ménage this problem IJI worked to cut-down the vote bank of JUI (F) to avoid chances of the victory of PPP. “Fazalur Rehman Trying to Retain Seat”, *Dawn*, October 22, 1990. Fazal believed that it was must for IJI to cooperate with JUI (F) in NWFP and Balochistan which was not done according to his wish. *Pakistan Times*, October 2, 1990. Lastly it was decided by Fazal to not get involved in any electoral alliance but he decided to cooperate with former COP where ever the seat adjustment was decided by mutual consent. *Dawn*, September 4, 1990. Another point of conflict for Fazal was that he wanted the merger of JUI (D) and JUI (F) which was not acceptable for Sami. *Dawn*, September 1, 1990. *Pakistan Times*, September 24, 1990. Both factions of JUI challenged each other in the elections. JUI (D) brought forward Qazi Abdul Lateef only to challenge Fazal in NA-168. *Dawn*, October 18, 1990. In this way in some constituencies JUI (F) was cooperating with IJI-COP parties and at elsewhere it was contesting elections against them.


24 *Jang*, August 19, 1990. Before the dissolution of the assemblies IJI-COP seemed united but the dissolution of the assemblies made their internal problems visible amongst which some were resolved and remaining deferred. “Intikhābāt: Hakōmat, PP awr iss kei Mukhālfīn kā farz *Nawa-i-Waqt*, August 28, 1990. Also see *Pakistan Times*, August 19 and 23, 1990 and *Nawa-i-Waqt*, August 19, 1990. This union of different parties was not easy. Different parties had their own reservations. ANP wanted to make an election understanding but it did not wish to become member of any alliance. Fazal was against joining the caretaker government by IJI. *Jang*, August 20, 1990. Also see *The Nation*, August 30, 1990. The conference of leaders of COP was attended by Jatoi, Nawaz Sharif, Junejo, Qazi, Sami, Poya, Fakhar Imam, Asif Wardeg, Haq, Yusuf Baluch, Ghafoor, Wyne, Khurshid Ahmad, and senator (Brig.) Hayat Muhammad). *Jang*, August 19, 1990.

and was capable of running government because of having consensus about the basic issues. He believed that only those parties could join who agreed with its manifesto. While discussing about making a broader single alliance with COP he said that members could create problems as these parties had varied opinions regarding basic national and international issues. *Pakistan Times*, August 20 and 27, 1990, *Dawn*, October 21, 1990 and *Jasarat*, August 9, 1990.

The IJI session was presided by Nawaz Sharif and was participated by Jatoi (President NPP), Junejo (President PML), Qazi (Aamir Jamaat-i-Islami), Maulana M. Ajmal (Aamir JUI-D), Maulana Moeenuddin Lakhvi (Head of JAH), Poya (Head of HI), Syed Farooq Imam (head of Independent Political Group), Ghafoor (Sec. Gen. IJI), Yusuf Khan Baluch (Markazi Raabita Secretary) Sami (Voice President IJI), Asif Fasiuddin Vardag (Additional Sec. General IJI), Iqbal (Sec. Gen. PML), Professor Khurshid Ahmad (Naib Aamir IJI), Wyne (CM Punjab), Ch. Abdul Ghafoor (Provincial Minister).


29 Four committees for four provinces were constituted to negotiate with the like-minded and Islam loving parties. All the provincial presidents and general secretaries were members of these committees. NWFP committee constituted of Qazi, Sami and Vardag. Balochistan committee members were Qazi and Vardag. For Punjab Fakhar Imam and Iqbal and Sindh Nawaz Sharif and Fakhar Imam were given the responsibility to negotiate with other parties regarding the possibility of formation of a grand alliance. *Pakistan Times*, August 20 and 23, 1990.


31 *Pakistan Times*, August 26, 1990.


33 IJI did not nominate any candidates against Khar, Nasarullah, Maulana Hamid Saeed Kazmi of JUI (N). It also did not contest against independents of Sindh like Sardar Ghulam Muhammad Mehar, Peer Saddarud Din Shah, Ilahi Baksh Soomro, Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani, Pir Pagaro, and his son Ali Gohar Shah, Arbab Ghulam Rahim, Jam Mashhoq Ali, and some of the members of Haq Parast Group (MQM). Sagar, *Election90*, pp. 92-94. Also see Irfan Siddiqui, “IJI kā Palla Bhāri hai”, *Takbeer*, October 25, 1990, p. 33. Some of the people believed that it was only an effort to defame IJI and some other politicians but many believe that IJI remained intact due to the help, efforts and money invested by ISI on political parties and leaders. But the later developments and the proceeding in the Supreme Court in 2012 under the HRC/19-1996 it is proved and accepted by the court that money distributed by ISI played an important role in the electoral politics of IJI. Zaffar Abbas, “True Confessions?”, *The Herald*, July, 1996, p. 15. The document published in the appendix. Makhdoom Syed Ghayoor Abbas Bukhari, *Benazir, Beifī Seī Quaid Tak* (Lahore: Multi Media Affairs, 2004), p. 195. General Babur presented list of the politicians who remained on the payroll of ISI and were from Anti-PPP block. The amount paid to the politicians with their respective names was Nawaz Sharif Rs. 3.5 Million, Mir Afzal Khan Rs. 10 Million, Lieutenant General Rafaqat -Rs. 5.6 Million (for disbursal to media), Jamaat-e-Islami Rs. 5 Million, Abida Hussain Rs. 1 Million, Altaf Hussain Qureshi and Mustafa Sadiq Rs. 0.5 Million, Ghulam Sarwar Cheema Rs. 0.5 Million, Ghulam Mustafa Khur Rs. 2 Million, Malik Mairaj Khalid Rs. 0.2 Million, Misc smaller groups Rs. 3.4 Million, Ghulam Mustafa JatoiRs. 5 Million Jam Sadiq Ali Rs. 5 Million, M Khan Junejo Rs. 2.5 Million, Pir Pagara Rs. 2 Million, Smaller Groups in Sindh Rs. 5.4 Million, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada Rs. 3 Million, Jousaf Haroon Rs. 5 Million, Muzaffar Hussain Shah Rs. 0.3 Million, Ali Akhtar Nizamani Rs. 0.6 Million, Arbab Ghulam Aftab Rs. 0.2 Million, Pir Noor M Shah Rs. 0.3 Million, Arbab Faiz Mohammad Rs. 0.3 Million, Ismail Rahn Rs. 0.2 Million, Humayun Khan Mari Rs. 5.4 Million, Jamali (first name unavailable) Rs. 4 Million, Kakar (first name unavailable) Rs. 1 Million, Liaquat Baluch Rs. 1.5 Million, Jam Yousaf Rs. 0.75 Million, Bizenjo (first name unavailable) Rs. 0.5 Million, Nadir Mengal Rs. 1 Million, Mubashir Zaidi, “Foreign Democracy”, *The Herald*, April 2000, pp. 27-28 detail of distributed money was also published in *Jang*, June 12, 1996. A petition was filed by Asghar against Beg in Supreme Court which was taken under the Human Rights Case No. 19/1996 in which he told that Beg distributed 15 crore rupees among different politicians to keep them united against PPP. The money was drawn from Mehran Bank through ISI chief Asad Durrani. In the Supreme Court Of Pakistan (Original Jurisdiction), Human Rights Case No. 19/1996. No. F. 15 (12)/94-Alll.Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs. Official notification of Younas Habib, former Zonal Chief of Habib Bank Limited, transfer of money to the account of a national agency for creation of an inquiry commission is given in the appendix. This petition was filed by Asghar Khan and according to Asad Durrani’s statement Asghar...
Khan also received money. CMA No. 109/97. Details of misuse or distribution of money are available in The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates: Official Report, Volume III, No. 10, April 20, 1994, pp. 1318-25. Allegations and counter allegations are provided in The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume III, No. 11, April 14, 1994, pp. 1449-77 and The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume III, No. 13, April 25, 1994, pp. 1696-1715. Details of money and mode and purpose of the money illegally received from Mehran Bank is provided in The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume IV, No. 11, pp. 1333-34. The case remained pending for a long time a PPP tried to reopen it in middle of 1996. None of the allegations were proved by the PPP government against any of the politicians. The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, June 11, 1996, pp. 300-44. Another thing that is important that there was a scam of four billion rupees amongst which 14 crore rupees were given to Beg or on the order of Beg, through an agency were paid to politicians. There rises a question that why 14 crore rupees were being discussed and the remaining amount was totally ignored. It is believed that members of PPP including president of Pakistan were beneficiaries as president sold his land through Younis Habib that was not legally documented 29 benami (fake) accounts are highlighted in which the money was deposited by President of Pakistan Farooq Lughari. Rafiq Tahir, “Sadat Leghari kī Zamīn kā Tanāz‘a”, Weekly Zindagi, June 24-30, 1994, pp. 6-8. Mukhtar Hassan, “Sadat kei Khilāf Dastāvaizī Thabōt”, Weekly Zindagi, June 8-15, 1994. Interview of Younas Habib with Rafiq Afghan, Weekly Zindagi, May 7-13, 1994, pp. 43-45. Rafiq Afghan, “Corruption kei Mutta‘fin Johard mei Siyāsatdāno kī Dubkiān”, Takbeer, May 26, 1994. After the hearing in November 1999 the decision of court remained pending till 2012. Ardeshir Cowasjee, “We Never Learn from History-5”, Dawn, August 25, 2002. There is an argument that establishment did not want PPP to come again in power for which it wanted the IJI to maintain its status as an alliance for which ISI not only supported members of IJI but spent money as well. Zafar Abbas, “Ballot Ahead”, The Herald, Supplement, August, 1990, p. 40. Also see Mubashir Zaidi, “Foreign Democracy”, The Herald, April 2000, pp. 27-28 and Murtaza Anjum, Siyasat, Ā’in aur ‘Addālat, pp. 86 and 159. The case was reopened by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2012 and the court issued its verdict on October 9, 2012 according to which certain politicians and other members of administration were found guilty of corruption and creation of election cell in the president house. The court ordered to abolish any of such election cell. The Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan “HRC No 19 of 1996, CMA No.. 1034 of 2012 and CMA no 918/07. pp, 136-40.

35 Dawn, September 10, 1990. Initial discussions were made by Mian Zahid Sarfraz, federal interior minister and with MQM President Altaf Hussain which seemed quite positive regarding the future alliance. Pakistan Times, September 8, 1990.


39 Nisar Usmani, “Will the Alliance Work”, Dawn, August 23, 1990. Also see Frontier Post, September 1, 1990. 40 IJI made efforts to keep support of MQM in its favor as it was unable to win any success in Sindh in 1988 elections and support of MQM could give it some place in the political arena of Sindh. MQM wanted to be recognized as the sole representative of the people in Karachi and Hyderabad which could easily be achieved after the withdrawal of JI from the electoral scenario of these cities. In this way IJI and MQM both were able to achieve their objectives but the problem was there for JI which could not lose face among the people of Karachi and Hyderabad through withdrawal from the elections. It is generally believed that failing to get any success is less harmful for the image of a party than to withdraw. Ali Siddiqi, “Jamaat ‘Left in Lurch’ by Nawaz
Shari?”, Dawn, October 1, 1990. Also see Dawn, September 30, 1990. An interview of Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, “We will See to it that the PPP does not Benefit from the Situation”, The Herald, October 1990, p. 62. For further information see Dawn, September 12, 1990 and Pakistan Times, October 9, 1990.


Ibn-e Usman, “MQM sei Mafāhimat par Jamaat-i Islami kā Nawaz Sharif sei Ikhtilāf”, Takbeer, October 11, 1990, p. 27. 44

Pakistan Times, October 9, 1990 and Dawn, October 1, 1990. Ghafoor was of the view that MQM cooperated with PPP from 1988 to 1990. He believed that without the cooperation of MQM PPP could not form government at federal level. Qazi believed that MQM was a regional party and it could not go beyond the perspective of it regional thoughts. Dawn, October 19, 1990.


Ihtashamul Haque, “And Now for the Crunch…”, The Herald, October 1990, p. 71. Also see Dawn, October 1, 1990. The list of candidates was issued by the Sindh president of IJI Syed Ghous Ali Shah which was also sent to the IJI Parliamentary Board.

Dawn, October 1, 1990. Qazi said that IJI was not the property of a single person and the decisions of individuals cannot be imposed upon all the member parties without creating consensus upon the issues. Nawaz Sharif was of the view that MQM was the strongest party in Karachi and Hyderabad and none of the parties could win against it so it was not intelligent decision to contest elections against it. He believed that JI did not understand his viewpoint and was creating problems. He believed that he could agree the JI leadership for what he had managed with MQM. Pakistan Times, October 3, 1990.

It was decided that only those candidates could get bicycle as election symbol who will submit letter signed by president and general secretary of IJI. IJI president requested the ECP to allot the alliance symbol with the approval of Ghafoor as well but ECP did not entertain the request as the letter was not signed by the IJI president. Due to this Ghafoor, IJI secretary General could not get the alliance symbol for the elections initially. Nawaz Sharif had told the ECP that without his signatures none of the candidates could be considered alliance candidate. Because of this arrangement many of the IJI candidates had to contest elections as independent candidates. ECP had issued election symbols to the candidates and it became difficult for the JI nominees to get bicycle as the election symbol. Saud Sahir, “Jamaat-i Islami, Nawaz Sharif Tanāza’ kī Asl Kahāni”, Takbeer, October 18, 1990, p. 27. IJI sec. Gen. paid 7,82,343 rupees to the election commission for the reprinting of ballot papers for five out of nine constituencies. These were 106, 191, 192 and 193. Dawn, October 12, 1990 and Pakistan Times, October 11, 1990.

Dawn, October 1 and October 20, 1990.

Farooq was of the view that the attitude of JI was a conspiracy against IJI and Nawaz Sharif. He believed that if the decision was made in the meeting on August 19 that the winners of the election of 1988 will contest from the same constituencies than the problems created by JI were mere action of supporting the PPP. Ibid., October 7, 1990.


Pakistan Times, October 1 and 22, 1990. JUP (N) asked for a meeting of Supreme Council of IJI and heads of COP. It had problems with the IJI election campaign as well. Tayyab was of the view that even if these parties did not agree on many points with each other but the allied members must avoid criticizing other member parties of the alliance.
All the debate between JUP and IJI, JUP divided into two groups. JUP Niazi group decided to continue with the IJI and JUP Noorani decided parting its ways with IJI. Pakistan Times, September 6, 1990.


The decision was taken in the meeting of the heads of member parties of IJI. Aman, August 28, 1990. Also see Frontier Post, September 7, 1990 and Jang, August 30, 1990. While talking about the decisions regarding the selection of the candidates Syeda Abida Hussain said that in Punjab it was the right of IJI to take major decisions regarding the alliance candidates in the elections. She said that in Sindh IJI and MQM, in Balochistan JWP and JUI (F) and in NWFP IJI with JUI had the right to make major selections for the elections of 1990. Pakistan Times, August 28, 1990. Also see Askari, “Playing with Destiny”, p. 9 and Rauf Tahir, “Intikhābi Manzar”, Weekly Zindagi, September 21-7, 1990, p. 5.

The Muslim, September 7, 1990. It was clearly announced that the members who won 1988 elections on the IJI ticket and later joined PPP will not be given the party ticket. As those were the members of IJI forward block in NWFP whose support let the PPP rule for twenty months there. Otherwise the political scene could be different in that province. Junejo and other leaders supported this idea. Dawn, October 1, 1990. Also see Jang, August 20, 1990, Pakistan Times, September 2, and October 10, 1990 and The Nation, September 8, 1990. It was believed that the members who changed loyalties during 1988-1990 had been a source of serious problems for the political developments and the position of political parties. That is the reason that the suggestion was brought forward that all the MNAs and MPAs who changed loyalties will not be accommodated by any of the member parties of IJI or its allies.

Shahid Salim, “IJI, Alliance Finalize Strategy for Polls”, Pakistan Times, August 21, 1990. A decision was made that all the parties must nominate their candidates sooner as IJI leadership wanted to announce final lists of candidates till September 3, 1990.
In the elections of 1988, many members of IJI parties, particularly of PML contested elections and won and these rebel candidates were welcomed in the alliance. Because of this attitude, in the elections of 1990 warnings of the alliance for rebel candidates remained ineffective.

Mashriq, September 8, 1990. NPP was the party of caretaker PM so it wanted its share of seats as a party of PM while PML believed that the Punjab was the basic region of its strength and all the respect earned by the IJI was because of the PML leadership. So it was not willing to accommodate the demands of other parties. IJI leadership did not want to give too many tickets to JI and felt it safer to make the seat adjustments with MQM keeping in view the performance of JI in the elections of 1988.


Iqbal was not willing to withdraw and decided to contest the elections as an independent candidate if the alliance ticket was not given to him. This attitude of the leader of PML created disturbance among the member parties and many of the people asked for disciplinary action against him. It was believed that disciplinary action against him could warn other to be careful in their matters. But Wyne and Nawaz Sharif did not support the idea and tried to resolve the tension without taking any official action against Iqbal. Pakistan Times, September 20 and 26, 1990.

Also see The Nation, September 20, 1990, Dawn, September 12, 1990, Nasrullah Ghilzai, Nawaz Sharif kī Qayādat mein IJI kī Purjosh Intikhābi Muhim”, Takbeer, October 11, 1990, p. 29 and “Lahore kī Intikhābi Sōrat-i Hāl”, Weekly Zindagi, September 21-7, 1990, p. 8. Iqbal criticized the alliance considering that PML was strong enough to contest the elections on its own. He was of the view that being the member of an alliance, many of the potential candidates were denied tickets. He also had reservations against the board that was authorized for the allotment of the alliance tickets. His attitude did not help him to get the alliance ticket but the party leadership issued a show-cause notice against him. Dawn, September 23, 1990.

Dawn, October 9, 1990.

The meeting took place between IJI provincial president Mir Afzal Khan and Wali Khan. Pakistan Times, September 12, 1990 and Dawn, September 12, 1990.


Pakistan Times, August 25 and September 11, 1990. Some sources mentioned the ANP was not ready to make any compromise for NA-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 23.

Frontier Post, September 7, 1990.


Dawn, October 1 and 24, 1990. Some sources mention JI got 5 Tickets and JUI (D) got 5 Tickets for NWFP NA. Dawn, September 16, 1990. Some sources mention IJI fielded 18 candidates for NA constituencies in NWFP and 8 seats were left open. Dawn, September 19, 1990. Some sources mention that PML nominated 10 candidates for NWFP NA constituencies. Pakistan Times, September 14, 1990. Tariq Ismail Sagar mentioned that PML got 9, JUI (D) got 5 and JI got 4 tickets in NWFP for elections of NA. Sagar, Election 90, p. 48. 94

In NWFP NPP was nor satisfied with the sharing of seats and decided to contest elections as independent party.

Pakistan Times, September 14, 1990.


At national level there was no agreement of IJI and JUI (F) but in NWFP they cooperated for only few constituencies.

Pakistan Times, September 14, 1990.


Dawn, September 3, 1990. Controversy about the seat adjustments was prominent. ANP demanded 30 seats for NWFP PA but IJI wanted it to be contented for 13 seats which it won in the elections of 1988 or only a few more. Dawn, September 8, 1990. Nawa-i-Waqat, August 20, 1990.

Dawn, September 16 and October 24, 1990.


Dawn, October 24 1990. Also see Pakistan Times, September 7 and 14, 1990. In NA-3 Pirzada of Manki Sharif was appointed Minister for religious affairs to force him to withdraw his candidacy but he refused to do so and continued his election campaign. Liaquat Siddique, “Sōba Sarhad Mein Muslim League nei ANP sei T‘āwun karni sei Inkār kr Diā”, Musawat, Lahore: September 27, 1990. In NA-13 Gohar Ayub Khan was IJI candidate and Nasim Sethi of PML was contesting election as independent; From NA-14 Syed Muzamil Shah was the official candidate of IJI and vice president of Jatoi’s NPP Muhamma Ghani Khan was contesting elections as independent candidate. In NA-21 Khaliq Dad Khan was official candidate of IJI and PML’s Gul Aurangzaib was contesting as independent candidate. S.A. Jafri, “Split Levels”, The Herald, October 1990, p. 68.

Dawn, October 1, 1990.

For NA-15 there was a controversy between Junejo and Nawabzada Salahud-din. He was not willing to withdraw nomination papers. Dawn, October 30, 1990.

President of PDP, Nawazada Nasrullah Khan criticized attitude of some of the politicians as Qazi Abdul Latif of JUI (D) was contesting elections against Fazal, President of JUI (F) and both were not willing to withdraw. Dawn, September 25, 1990.

Nawabzada Nasrullah’s demands were also


Dawn, October 9, 1990.

Ibid., September 16, 1990.

Pakistan Times, September 14, 1990.

Ahmad Hassan, “IIJ in Strong Position”, Dawn, October 1, 1990. PML leadership was annoyed with Nawaz Sharif particularly because he ignored the PML candidates in Hazara constituencies. PML was of the view that in Hazara PML enjoyed a lot of support and this decision would not only harm PML status in Hazara district but it also would create negative impact on election results. They were of the opinion that none of the other candidates could win the election in that district except PML. Jang, October 08, 1990.


Dawn, September 24, 1990. In PF-6 IIJ awarded ticket to JI candidate, Haji Dost Muhammad. ANP fielded its candidate in this constituency and refused to withdraw. For PF-9 Haq was Awarded ticket but ANP allowed Mian Ifitkhar to submit his nomination papers. In PF-19 IIJ gave ticket to Ghanidad Khan of PML but ANP brought forward Sufaid Khan. According to the decision ANP could not bring any candidate as its candidates were not even runner up in these constituencies in the elections of 1988. Dawn, September 24, 1990.

Nawaz Sharif using his discretionary powers appointed Haq as chief of parliamentary board of provincial IIJ in NWFP. Fida and Salim Saifullah were members of this board. These three people were authorized to distribute alliance tickets in NWFP. Junejo wanted Fida to be the chairman of this board. PML (J) refused to accept the decision of Nawaz Sharif. NWFP PML announced its withdrawal from the alliance. Azhar Sohail, “Ab Siyasi Ittehad Asani se nahi ban sakei gai”, Jang: Siyasi Addition, August 25, 1990, and The Muslim, August 10, 1990. Also see Frontier Post, Peshawar: August 23, 1990 and Pakistan Times, August 24, 1990. The tension was resolved by the withdrawal of the appointment of Haq as President of the board. “Alliance to be Strengthened”, Dawn: August 1990 and Frontier Post, August 28, 1990. Haq did not accept his withdrawal from the office of IIJ president. Haq had problems with the alliance and even with the party leadership. After his dismissal as provincial head of IIJ he separated his faction from PML but later he revised his decision. He not only rejoined PML but also decided to contest only one PA seat in Malakand withdrawing his demand for five PA and one NA constituency. He made this demand because he lost four PA seats in the elections of 1988. Dawn, September 2 and 22, 1990 and Pakistan Times, October 2, 1990. Also see Nasir, “Eye of the Storm”, p. 41. One of the important compromises was the dismissal of Haq and appointment of Mir Afzal Khan as IIJ’s head in NWFP. S.A. Jafri, “Musical Chairs”, The Herald, September 1990, p. 91. Central working committee of PML in NWFP did not accept the idea of the appointment of retired Haq as IIJ President in NWFP. They decided to quit IIJ and contest the elections as an independent party if the decision was not inverted. They believed that the provincial head of IIJ must be a person acceptable to PML and other members of IIJ. Pakistan Times, August 24, 1990 and Jang, August 26, 1990. The issue of the IIJ chief even divided the PML into two faction. One was supporting this appointment considering the decision of Nawaz Sharif regarding this appointment correct and the other faction rejected the decision and was ready to contest elections on its own leaving the alliance at least in NWFP. Ifitkhar Ali, “Na’ei Intikhabat mein Soba Sarhad ki Sirt do Quwatain hogi”, Jang, August 18, 1990. This opposition was due to the attitude of Haq during the elections of 1988 and afterwards. In the elections of 1988 his attitude was negative towards PML members particularly with the supporters of Junejo. This attitude was not minimized even after the elections of 1988 and during the working of the assemblies from 1988-1990. This controversy was resolved by his dismissal as the provincial head of IIJ. In a meeting it was decided to dismiss Haq as the IIJ Chief in NWFP and Mir Afzal Khan was appointed as his successor. The meeting was attended by Jatoi, Junejo, Gulam Wyne, Ch. Shujjat Hussain (Shujjat), Qazi, Ghafoor, Maulana M. Ajmal Khan, Sami, Senator Qazi Abdul Latif (JUI), Senator Fasiuddin Vardag (Vardag), Iqbal, Dr. Naseeruddin Jogeza, Syed Ghous Ali Shah (PML), Fakhar, Poya, and Kamal Azfar (Advisor to the Prime Minister). After this decision president of PML Junejo announced that his party was ready to contest under the banner of IIJ. He told that the nominations will be made by the PML parliamentary board and the lists will be sent to IIJ parliamentary board whose decision will be accepted regarding the allotment of the alliance ticket for the forthcoming elections. Nawa-I-Waqt, August 28, 1990.
Amir of JI of NWFP, Maulana Gohar Rehman said that ANP did not follow the obligations for being the member of a grand alliance and fielded its candidates in NA-22, NA26, Malakand and some other constituencies. He believed that if ANP did not follow the principles of the alliance these were no more obligations on JI any more and announced the withdrawal of its support to ANP in the PA elections. Jafri, “Split Levels”, p. 67.

Also see Pakistan Times, October 27, 1990. Some of the members of ANP did not accept the idea of electoral adjustment with IJI believing that it was giving tickets to the opportunist politicians. They were of the view that ANP will earn negative fame in the province while cooperating with IJI so some of the ANP members submitted their nomination papers as independent candidates after failing a party ticket for the elections. Dawn, September 18, 1990.


Pakistan Times, September 13, 1990.


Dawn, September 10 and 14 1990. Later news mentioned that JI and JUI (D) had to contest for 2 NA constituencies each from Balochistan.


Pakistan Times, September 24, 1990.


Pakistan Times, September 10 and October 5, 1990.


In a large number of constituencies IJI could not create an environment of cooperation with other parties. In NWFP (Peshawar and Mardan) ANP nominees faced JUI (F) candidates. In urban Sindh IJI and MQM candidates were contesting elections against each other. In Faisal Abad Junejo had to face a PML member as an independent candidate who had got alliance ticket for an adjacent constituency. Dawn, October 7 and 13, 1990.

In NWFP it won 8 and for 8 seats it was second in counting. In Balochistan it had won 2 out of 11 NA constituencies and was runner-up for 2 and in Sindh it won 1 seat in by-elections but was runner up for 20 seats. In this way IJI had to get a major share of seats which was not acceptable for other COP parties and problems raised for many constituencies. Dawn, September 6, 1990.

Sagar, Election 90, p. 48. Also see Bashir Ahmad, “The Election Scene”, Pakistan Times, October 4, 1990 and Pakistan Times, October14, 1990. In Bahawal Nagar IJI failed to adopt one-to-one strategy.

While commenting about the problems among Nawaz Sharif and Junejo, Qazi said that Junejo was annoyed with Nawaz Sharif because the later did not give alliance tickets to the close associates of former. He said that if Nawaz Sharif awards tickets to Iqbal, Raja Zafarul Haq, Hamid Nasir Chattha and relieves Haq from the responsibility of IJI president of IJI in NWFP, the problems between the two leaders would be resolved. Shaheen Sehba, “Theories Do Not Go Away”, Dawn, September 3, 1990.

Pakistan Times, September 20 and October 12, 1990.

Sagar, Election90, p. 221.


Ibid., p. 15.
Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid., 1990. p. 21. Detailed manifesto is provided in the annexure III.
Pakistan Times, September 5 and 28, 1990.
Ibid., September 28 and 30, 1990.
Ibid., September 29, 1990.
The Pakistan Times, September 21, 1990.
Jam Sadiq Ali did not join IJI formally but he supported it in the Sindh.
Yasin Rizvi, Election 90 in Pakistan: A Frank and Outspoken Review of the Election Process in Pakistan with Interesting Data List of MAN’s and other Interesting Data (Lahore: Feroz sons Ltd., n.d.), p. 98. There are other writers with sir name Rizvi. So to Avoid confusion in repeated references complete name of the author is used.
Sagar, Election90, p. 9. In his election campaign Nawaz Sharif did not care of using official sources. He kept on using machinery of the government of the Punjab or his personal helicopter. Jam Sadiq Ali (Jam) caretaker CM of Sindh and Jatoi, caretaker PM also adopted same practices which were criticized by their political rivals. “Planes, Trains and Automobiles…”, The Herald, October 1990.
Sagar, Election90, p. 47. Almost similar allegations were levied on NWFP caretaker government as it provided helicopter to Nawaz Sharif for his election campaign and the caretaker government provided funds to the IJI candidates from national exchequer. The Pakistan Times, October 21, 1990.
The Pakistan Times, September 29, 1990. Also see Nasrullah Ghilzai, Nawaz Sharif ki Qayādat mein IJI kī Purjosh Intikhābī Muhim”, Takbeer, October 11, 11, 1990, p. 29. In the public meeting at Sukkhar Nawaz Sharif focused on the protection of the rights of poor and that of the establishment of a federal party equally supported by all the provinces. In the meeting Ghafoor criticized the PPP for its deeds in the 70s and the twenty months of the government of Benazir. He called Benzair as the most undemocratic personality disguised in the cover of the democracy. Jamal Ahmad, “Islami Jamhoori Ittehad kei Jalsei Mein Pōra Shehr Umad Āya”, Takbeer, October 11, 1990, p. 32.
Dawn, September 27, 1990. During the campaign PPP’s attitude towards enforcement of Sharia was also highlighted as in Senate meetings PPP ridiculed the Shari’at Bill particularly Qisās (Revenge) and Huddod Ordinance. Pakistan Times, October 9, 11 and 20, 1990.
Dawn, September 8, 19 and October 16, 1990. Pakistan Times, October 6, 22 and 24, 1990. Almost similar statements were given by Wyne during the elections campaign.
Jamal Ahmad, “Islami Jamhoori Ittehad kei Jalsei Mei n Pōra Shehr Umad Āya”, Takbeer, October 11, 1990, p. 32. If we look the attitude of Junejo it is clear that he wanted to prove himself a central leader of the alliance for which he did not hesitate adopting negative tactics. It could be a source of embarrassment for Nawaz Sharif and Ejaz if the public meeting was a failure. This failure could inform Nawaz Sharif that he was not a national leader but his popularity was confined only to the Punjab. There could be another argument as well that Junejo had lost elections in his own constituency in 1988. To secure his position he wanted to spend time there to impress the common people. This kind of behavior was experienced in other provinces as well. The attitude of provincial president of NPP Sindh, Pir Altaf Hussain Shah Jillani and President of Balochistan NPP, Farooq Shah was also problematic for the alliance. They preferred to concentrate on their own election campaign instead of being vocal for the alliance in general. Jang, August 23, 1990.

Pakistan Times, October 23, 1990. Restoration of the reserved seats for women was another important issue which was to be faced by the next government. In the constitution of 1973 twenty seats were reserved in the NA for ten years or three following general elections which expired after the elections of 1988. Constitutional amendment to increase this time was under consideration when the NA was dissolved and the issue remained unsolved. The government believed that with the passage of time, as democracy takes roots in Pakistan women will be able to come to the assemblies through direct elections. But till the elections of 1988 only a few women were able to win the elections. Even political parties use to avoid giving tickets to women for direct contest in the general elections. Because of such situation it was important to reserve seats for women in the assemblies so that at least there could be some representation of women in the assemblies. Jang, August 7, 1990 and Nawa-i-Waqt, September 6, 1990. Many of the people wanted this clause to be restored or reenacted as otherwise it was difficult for women to reach to the assemblies. PPP and COP leadership assured their members and workers that the seats will be retained after the elections through constitutional amendment. Caretaker PM also paid attention to this issue and checked the possibility to retain the reserve seats for women as many of the people were of the view that this could be done through presidential ordinance and could be regularized after elections by the NA. Tehami, Intikhābāt 90 kā White Paper, p. 106. Having lost the reserved seats in the assemblies women were hardly represented in the assemblies. In the NA there were only two females after the elections of 1990. The situation in the provincial assemblies was not different. Only two women got elected one each from Punjab and NWFP. There was no female representation in Sindh and Balochistan provincial assemblies. Zafeer ud Din, Pakistan, Women in Electoral Politics: 1985-1997 (Islamabad: Institute for Human Rights and Democracy, 1998), pp. 11-13. Also see Jang, August 13 and 21, 1990 and Nawa-i-Waqt, August 17, 1990. Political parties used the issue in the elections but after the elections nothing could be done regarding the reserve seats for women in the assemblies till the dissolution of NA and PAs in 1993.

Prominent leaders who kept on announcing IJI victory were; Jatoi, Junejo, Nawaz Sharif, Lt. General Abdul Majeed Malik, Mian Zahid Surfraz, Malik Majid (Minister for Kashmir Affairs), Kamal Aztar (Special Assistant to PM). There was one contradiction that most of the times Junejo called it the victory of PML and avoided talking about IJI. Pakistan Times, September 28, October 8, 9, 11, 13, 15 and 18, 1990, Jang August 9, 1990, and Nawa-i-Waqt, October 12, 1990.

Dawn, October 18, 1990.

Creation of one million jobs seemed an unrealistic statement but he was of the view that Pakistan is rich in resources and the only problem is utilization of these resources in a proper way and IJI was committed doing that. Dawn, October 21, 1990.


Nawaz Sharif distributed Jahaiz (dowry) Fund among the poor girls of the Punjab. Creation of Baitul Māl (Charity Fund) for the poor was also a prominent service of Nawaz Sharif. He also informed people about 70,000 plots, allotted by him as CM, to the people of the Punjab. He also divided 200 million as Jehaizi (dowry) and almost same amount among the poor people without

174 *Pakistan Times*, October 18 and 22, 1990.
175 Ibid., October 23, 1990.
178 *Pakistan Times*, October 6, 22 and 24, 1990 and *Dawn*, October 16, 1990. Almost similar statements were given by Wyne during the elections campaign.
179 Kamran Rajput, *Qazi Hussain kī Dīni awr Siyasi Khidmāt*, pp. 57-58.
180 *Pakistan Times*, September 27 and 28, 1990.
182 *Pakistan Times*, October 8, 1990. Water politics is always important for the development of the agricultural countries. But PPP government allowed India the construction of Wohler Barrage which could stop flow of water for the lands of Punjab. This attitude of PPP was criticized as an action of traitors. *Pakistan Times*, September 10 and October 12, 1990.

184 *Pakistan Times*, October 15, 1990.
186 *Pakistan Times*, October 18, 1990.
187 Ibid., October 8, 1990. 188

Wyne announced up-gradation of Koat Memon to sub-district. He announced 2.5 crores for local bodies and 10 crores for development work in that region. *Pakistan Times*, September 28, 1990. For Khushab grant of 70 million rupees was announced for the development of that region and 17.5 millions for the local bodies. He also announced boys’ high school at Khushab and girls’ high school at Shah-Pur. He also announced girls’ college at Nurpur and hostel for the girls’ Jauharabad College. *Pakistan Times*, September 27, 1990. Federal minister for Law and Justice announced construction of Dhanawali road. *Pakistan Times*, October 11, 1990. Federal minister for Petroleum and natural resources promised the people of Jhelum city, Kharain and Lalamusa. *Pakistan Times*, October 16, 1990. At Toba Taik Singh CM Punjab announced construction of bridge, setting up a higher secondary School and making arrangements for to provide these regions ample canal water for the improvement of agricultural yield. He ordered former MPA, Syed Makhdoom Ali Raza to distribute Seven Marla plots among the homeless at the earliest possible. *Pakistan Times*, October 7, 1990. In Multan Wyne announced to construct proper drainage system in Chak No. 15/126 L. Additional rooms in schools, and a five kilometer road to link the village with the city, and distribution of plots among the poor under seven Marla scheme was also promised. *Pakistan Times*, October 5, 1990. *Pakistan Times*, October 18, 1990. These announcements were criticized for being capable to affect the election results but Wyne was of the opinion that all the announced facilities could be provided after winning the elections, so there was hardly any importance or truthfulness in the criticism being made against the IJI caretaker government. *Dawn*, September 26, 1990. Same kind of announcements like provision of canal water, up-gradation of schools and colleges, establishment of Sugar Mills at different regions to provide job opportunities to the jobless were made. *Dawn*, October 8, 1990. In a village of Faisalabad Syeda Abida announced installation of tub-wells to sole the problem of the scarcity of irrigation water. She also promised building of schools and distribution of plots through seven Marla scheme to solve the residential problems of the people of Faisalabad. *Pakistan Times*, September 19, 1990. Dr. Noor Jehan Panzezi announced donation of ten million rupees along-with a mobile dispensary having emergency and minor operation facilities. *Pakistan Times*, October 19, 1990. Main Saeed Ahmad Qureshi, former Punjab provincial minister, promised 15% increase in the salaries of the workers of Punjab Road Transport and promised to provide them houses. *Dawn*, October 13, 1990.

189 *Pakistan Times*, October 22, 1990. In such a situation people had to think and vote for the party which initiated certain projects to get them complete because it is the political culture of Pakistan that the successor governments stop the projects started by predecessors to avoid them taking credit of any of the projects. *Pakistan Times*, October 22, 1990. Construction of overhead bridged and stadium was promised with the people of Wazirabad. *Pakistan Times*, October 21, 1990.
Pakistan Times, October 18, 1990 and Dawn, September 18, 1990

Jatoi promised to provide gas to the people of a village of Naushero Feroze. He also promised to upgrade of girls’ school to college level and establishment of telephone exchange. Pakistan Times, October 20, 1990.

Same kind of announcements regarding the construction of roads, upgrading of schools and promises to provide electricity and gas were made frequently and some of the projects got started as well to impress the people and some how inform them to vote for them otherwise these projects would be stopped by their opponents.

Dawn, September 18, 1990

Pakistan Times, October 23, 1990.

Farooq Qureshi, Nawaz Sharif.

Pakistan Times, October 18, 1990.

Ibid., October 1 and 2, 1990.

Same kind of announcement was made for the effected people of the crisis of ‘Pucca Qilla’ Hyderabad by caretakers in Sindh. It was announced that fifty million rupees will be released within a few days as a compensation amount for the people who were affected because of Pucca Qilla incident. Dawn, September 8, 1990

Dawn, October 1, 1990

Pakistan Times, September 25, 1990.

Ibid., October 11, 1990.

Ibid., October 2, 1990 and Dawn, October 2, 1990.


Ibid., October 9, 1990.


Pakistan Times, September 28, October 9, and 22, 1990.


Pakistan Times, October 22 and 26, 1990.


Peoples Works Program not only invited criticism during the twenty moths ruling period of the PPP but IJI did not ignore it during its election campaign as well. It kept on informing the people that the development funds went in to
the accounts of the workers of the PPP. The fund was also used in the election campaign of the PPP. IJI leadership not only named the people who had been running their election campaign with these funds but also utilizing that money for their personal benefits as well. Ch. Amir Hussain, federal minister for justice brought details of these funds in front of the people. *Pakistan Times*, September 3 and October 11 and 20, 1990.

*Pakistan Times*, October 11, 1990.

Such allegations were levied against the PPP government not only by Jatoi and Nawaz Sharif but other members of the alliance also did not hesitate in giving such statements in their public meetings. *Pakistan Times*, September 5 and 30 and October 5, 9, 11, 16, 18 and 22, 1990, *Jang*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, September 16 and October 11, 1990 and *Jasarat*, October 19, 1990.

Horse trading was one of the reasons for the dissolution of the assemblies. According to the leadership of IJI, it was the PPP who started this tradition and took it to a peak. In 1988 efforts to win over the support of IJI members for PPP and later to fail the no-confidence motion against Benazir money, plots and other facilities along with ministries were offered to buy loyalties of the IJI members inside the NA. Syed M. Khalid, “Kiā Intikhābāt Multawi ho Jā'iñ Gei?”, *Jasarat*, August 10, 1990. Also see *Pakistan Times*, August 30, October 3, 13 and 20, 1990 and *Jang*, September 5, 1990. This point was raised by Jatoi, Law Minister Choudhary Ameer Hussain, Mian Umer Hayat, Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad, Nawaz Sharif, Mian Zahid Sarfraz, Ghulam Dastgeer khan and others. *Pakistan Times*, September 1, 29, 30 and October 9, 11, 12, 13, 15 16 and 18, 1990.


*Pakistan Times*, October 9, 1990.


*Pakistan Times*, October 9, 18, and 22, 1990. Nawaz Sharif was of the view that the PPP leadership was sincere with its rule and nothing else. He tried to prove that that Nusrat Bhutto was responsible for the stoppage of American Aid to Pakistan. He believed that they were the enemies of Pakistan and were working according to their own agenda. *Pakistan Times*, October 21, 1990. Nusrat Bhutto was even considered as an American agent who worked against the president of Pakistan and dubbed him an antidemocratic leader. *Pakistan Times*, October 9, 1990. As a proof of Benazir’s anti-Pakistan activities a letter written to Peter Galbraith by her was published in the newspapers in which she asked him to stop Pakistan’s military and economic aid. She also requested India to engage Pakistan Army on border. *Pakistan Times*, October 16, 1990.

233 The Pakistan Times, October 4, 1990.
234 Planes, Trains and Automobiles...", The Herald, October 1990, p. 42.
235 Jang, August 8, 1990. Syeda Abida stated that the PPP came twice into power and both these times its policies remained against Pakistan. Pakistan Times, October 6 and 18, 1990. Also see Dawn, October 6, 1990.
236 Pakistan Times, October 12, 1990.
237 Benazir had been talking about Sindhudesh in Sindh but raised the slogans of national unity in the Punjab. This attitude invited criticism against the PPP leadership. Jang, October 13, 1990 and Pakistan Times, October 16 and 22, 1990.
238 Pakistan Times, October 2, 1990.
239 Ibid., October 6 and 18, 1990.
240 Ibid., October 22, 1990.
241 PPP government made cases of income tax, excise duties, custom clearance problems and blockade of financial resources of the Punjab and Iteffaq Foundry through illegal means. Pakistan Times, September 12 and October 3, 1990. Benazir and the vice President of Punjab PPP Salman Taseer alleged Nawaz Sharif for misconduct and misuse of national resources. He was also alleged for taking loans for his industrial setup which was never returned. The distribution of plots, Baitulmāl (Government Charity Fund) and other sources were also alleged as used illegally. Responding to such allegations Nawaz Sharif asked Benazir that being in government for twenty months she could collect proofs of his misconduct and could file references in courts but she did not do so as she had no evidence. Maqbul Sharif, “Guilty or innocent”, Pakistan Times, October 12, 1990. Also see Pakistan Times, September 12, 1990. Response of Nawaz Sharif raised question on the conduct of Benazir government instead of creating negative impact on the election campaign of Nawaz Sharif.
242 Pakistan Times, September 30, October 11, 16, 18 and 22, 1990.
243 Ibid., October 5, 1990.
244 Ibid., October 12 and 21, 1990.
246 Such allegations were forwarded by Sec. Gen. PML (Qasim Group) Syed Khair Ali as well. He also criticized extension of cabinet and release of G.M. Syed. Dawn, September 25 and October 13, 1990 and Pakistan Times, October 6, 1990.
247 Dawn, October 9 and 19, 1990. Asghar Khan, President of TI had almost the same views. He further quoted that five million rupees were given to his rival for the development work to attract voters. He explicitly called it pre-poll rigging. Pakistan Times, Islamabad: October 25, 1990. Highlighting internal differences of IJI he said that one of the member parties of IJI was supporting Najeeb in Afghanistan and the other opposed him severely. He ridiculed the JI statement of hoisting flag of Pakistan on Red Fort. Pakistan Times, September 14 and October 15, 1990.
249 Dawn, October 6, 1990.
250 Pakistan Times, October 15, 1990.
251 G.M Syed was a Sindhi leader of a separatist Political party Jiye Sindh.
252 Pakistan Times, October 18, 1990.
An interview of Nawaz Sharif a PTV program “Qaumi Sisayat” Published in Weekly Zindagi, Jild 11, vol. 35.

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255 October 13, October 28, 1990. Thirteen people of the Punjab lost their lives, seven in Sindh, 1 in Balochistan and 2 died in NWFP.


257 Ibid., p. 24.
258 Ibid., p. 103s.


261 IJI nominated 112 for Punjab, 7 for Balochistan, 1 for federal Capital, for Sindh 9 and NWFP it nominated 18 candidates. 7 tickets were given to candidates of JUP (Niazi Group). Sagar, *Election90*, p. 219. 262

263 Among these were included 4 from JUP (Niazi Group) and Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali. Sagar, *Election90*, p. 94.


265 Ibid., *Dawn*, October 26, 1990. Many of the independents were supporters of IJI as they were unable to get alliance ticket and won the elections as independent candidates. These were the people who did not withdraw their loyalty towards IJI. From NA-106 Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali won as an independent candidate. He belonged to PML. From Sindh Jam Mashoq Ali, Pir Ali Gohar Shah, Arbab Ghulam Rahim and Mir Hazar Khan Bijarani could not get alliance symbol for the elections due to the pre-election controversies and got elected as independent candidates but they belonged to the IJI camp. Irfan Siddiqui, “Ā’inda Wazīr-i Ā’zam Kawn ho gā: Sab kī Nigāhin Nawaz Sharif par Lagī ho’i Hai”, *Takbeer*, November 8, 1990, p. 13.


270 Ibid., p. 584.
271 Ibid., p. 585. 272


276 Names of the winning candidates for NA were Khaliq Dad Khan from NWFP and Raja Muhammad Zaheer Khan, Javed Iqbal Cheema, Ch Bashir Ahmad Khan, Liaquat Baluch, Mian Muhammad Usman, Ch. Nazir Ahmad, Anwarul Haq Ramy, were elected from Punjab. Names of the winning candidates from NWFP PA were Dr. Muhammad Yaqoob, Bakhat Jehan Khan, Pir Muhammad khan, Maulana Ghulam Muhammad, Anwar Khan, Syed Sardar Alam Bacha, Muhammad Shah Haroon and Sana Ullah Khan. Names of the winning candidates from Punjab PA were Dr. Muhammad Aizaz, Ch. Muhammad Hanif, Muhammad Ahmad Khan Haral, Malik Muhammad Deen, Ch. Noor Muhammad Tarar, Muhammad Aslam Kaira, Irsad Hussain, Hafiz Salman Butt, Ch. Asghar Ali Gujar and Waseem Akhtar. *Takbeer*, November 22, 1990, p. 17.

277 Kamran Rajput, *Qazi Hussain kī Dini awr Siyasi Khidmāt*, p. 59. These results include by-elections results. Officially IJI won only six seats in Sindh PA but due to the late decisions of the alliance candidates some of the candidates could not get alliance symbol for elections and contested as independent candidates
which returned successful and did not change their loyalties.

277 Dawn, October 26, 1990.
278 Sagar, Election 90, pp. 66-9.
279 Dawn, October 27, 1990.
285 Tehami, Intikhābāt 90 kā White Paper, p. 249. ANP was a coalition partner of IJI in NWFP so apparently it did not nominate its candidates. PML had vacated NA-07 and PF-20 so it demanded alliance tickets for its candidates. According to the PML leadership seats were shared for general elections and was must to be followed in the by-elections. Omer Amer, “IJI Overconfident of Victory”, The Nation, January 5, 1990. 286 Many people give credit to Nawaz Sharif for maintaining unity inside the IJI and making alliance with other COP parties. Dawn, October 29, 1990 and Pakistan Times, October 26, 1990. When Nawaz visited interior Sindh to address the election rallies of Junejo, he was stoned by the PPP workers. It could not harm the IJI leader but was enough to tell the people of Punjab about the mentality of PPP leadership which was using unintelligent tactics to harm them. Yasin Rizvi, Election 90 in Pakistan, p. 101. It was strongly emphasized that most of the members, elected under the banner of IJI, were successful due to the leadership of Nawaz Sharif and there were a very few members who could claim their success for their personal influence. Raja Majeed Abbasi, “Muslim League kā Mustaqbil….Aik Āham Faisla”, Jang, December 17, 1990.
290 Ibid., p.15.
291 Yasin Rizvi, Election 90 in Pakistan, p. 97.
292 Pakistan Times, October 27, 1990.
295 Sagar, Election 90, pp. 75-78.
296 PDA in its white paper alleged that an election cell was created in the President House which was managed by the army officials and bureaucrats. It was headed by General Rafaqat. All the results reached there before formal announcement. PTV received results from this cell and announced live. PPP alleged that in almost all important constituencies IJI candidates got more than twenty thousand forged votes and those who were still losing the elections were made winners in the election cell in the Presidency through the juggling of
figures. Munir Ahmad, *Jarnel Shâhî*, p. 59. Roedad Khan denied existence of any election cell in president house with the help of General Rafaqat. He said he was not even aware of the existence of any such cell. Sehar, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, p. 362. General Rafaqat and others owned the existence of election cell but no evidence is yet available that could prove IJI’s involvement in the working of this cell.


298 Different sources and methods can be used to get election results according to the will of the authority managing the elections for example changes in the Voter’s Lists, issuance of Bogus ID Cards, altering constituencies, preventing submission of nomination papers of opposition candidates, creating situation to get desired candidate elected un-opposed, to bribe staff at polling stations, to bribe polling agents, misuse of postal ballots, bogus votes of women, to spend more money on election campaign, usage of government’s sources, change of ballot boxes at polling stations, creation of law and order situation at polling stations and change in the election results. Bogus ID cards are mostly issued to those people who are not eligible to cast votes. This has been done mainly through women’s cards. It is generally difficult to recognize women due to *Pardâh* (to cover face). Tihami, *Bad-'Unwânínî: Mo’âshrati Kharâbiyân par Sahâfati Taftîsh*, pp. 342 and 436. It is hardly possible to identify these sources of rigging and their impact on elections results.


300 To prove her point Benazir gave the example of returning officer of Pasrur who refused to fulfill his responsibilities for the PA elections because of the arrangements to change the election results. Similarly returning officers of NA-1 Peshawar and NA-160 Nawab Shah declined to work for PA elections. *Dawn*, October 27, 1990 and *Pakistan Times*, October 27, 1990. Also see Tihami, *Intikhâbât 90 kā White Paper*, p. 169.


302 To get a voter registered is an easy task. All that a person has to do is to send an application with a copy of ID card to the magistrate of his region to get him registered as a voter. Many of the people get themselves registered without submitting copy of ID card. It was believed that many of the people get themselves registered in an organized way to use their vote to mould the election results in favor of IJI. Tihami, *Intikhâbât 90 kā White Paper*, p. 157.


Ibid., October 25 and 26, 1990.


Qureshi, Nawaz Sharif, 30-31.


Federal Minister for information, Syeda Abida responded to the allegations that the government of the Punjab had a Ta’mīr-i Wat·an (construction of the country) program which was not stopped due to the dissolution of the assemblies. This program consisted of the construction of rural roads, up-gradation of schools, medical facilities etc. As these projects were in process under the MPAs so the funds were released for those projects to keep the development work continue. It was said that the public welfare projects could not be stopped due to the propaganda of those who did not do any thing for the underprivileged people during their twenty months rule. Pakistan Times, September 18, 1990. Same kind of explanations was given by other leader including CM Punjab Wyne. He further added that these funds were released without any discrimination of party affiliations for public welfare and not for the election campaign of IJI candidates. The Pakistan Times, October 11 and 19, 1990. Jatoi was of the view that if the caretakers were working to improve the condition of common people there was no harm in it. He said that only those were raising objections that had no interest in public welfare. The Pakistan Times, October 19, 1990. Jatoi rejected all the claims of the issuance of the money to the IJI candidates. He said that the money provided by World Bank for construction of roads and basic infrastructure was not used by the caretakers. Under annual development program some of the projects were being run but these projects were started after following the process prescribed by the government and with the approval of Chairman/Secretary union councils. Report on the General Elections 1990, Vol. III., p. 267. Also see Dawn, October 15, 1990. These were the projects about which PDA raised allegations of distribution of money among the IJI candidates from
development funds. Fazal of JUI (F) criticized the decision of IJI to give fifty Lakh rupees to each of the IJI candidates for development projects during interim period. He was of the view that Junejo and Bhutto did the same and Nawaz Sharif was repeating their mistake. *The Pakistan Times*, September 25 and October 9, 1990 and Tihami, *Intikhābāt 90 kā White Paper*, p. 169.

The Pakistan Times, September 18, 1990.


Dawn, October 25, 1990. Some of the official members told that the number of registered complaints was 30.


Election Commission ordered to conduct elections in 5 polling stations of PS-14 Jacobabad-5. But one of the candidates asked to hold elections again in the constituency as there had been mass disturbance in the constituency. Elections were held again in the constituency in June. Candidate who won the election in November 1990 became successful again in the by-elections held in June 1991. In PF-46 Mansehra-5, one of the candidates filed a petition that he was announced the winner, but later the vote bags were reopened without issuance of any notice to him and his rival was declared successful. Election Commission ordered re-polls in the entire constituency. Re-poll was held in one polling station of PF-51 Kohistan-2 due to complaints of rigging in the elections. Polling was stopped in one of the polling stations of PF-59 Bannu-2 by presiding officer due to the disturbance. Re-poll was held in that constituency to check any kind of corruption or rigging in the elections. The poll was stopped in PB-15 Qilla Saifullah by the member of election commission due to the situation of law and order, and was conducted later. Due to worst law and order situation, the polling at PB-35 Lasbela-2 was stopped and was held later. Polling was stopped in PB-38 Turbat-2 and Election Commission announced to hold fresh elections in the constituency. But re-poll in just three polling stations was held with the order of Supreme Court of Pakistan. Report on the General Elections 1990, Vol. I, pp. 169-75 and 233.

NA-29 tribal area-3 Election Commission ordered re-counting of votes and the runner up won the election. In NA-156 Jacobabad-1 one of the polling stations votes were counted for the second time and the runner up in this constituency won the election for NA-156. After assessment of the conditions it was ordered re-polling in 13 polling stations of PP-82 Gujranwala-4. In PP-134 Sheikhupura-1 re-polling in 21 constituencies was ordered with the consent of the candidates. A candidate and one of the voters in this constituency filed petitions to hold fresh election. But Election Commission rejected the petitions. PF-25 Sawabi-2 Runner up candidate in this constituency wanted recounting of the votes but his petition had no solid grounds, so was dismissed by the election commission. Report on the General Elections 1990, Vol. I, pp. 169-75 and 233-34.


Yasin Rizvi, Election 90 in Pakistan, pp. 103-6. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State said that French observers were provided the information by some political parties and they did not visit the polling stations personally. Report on the General Elections 1990, Vol. I, pp. 276-77.


Report on the General Elections 1990, Vol. I, p. 277. *Washington Times* called elections free, fair and well organized. British journal *Economist* wrote that Pakistani Bureaucracy and Army wanted to separate Benazir from government in a legal manner which was done through elections of 1990. Journal wrote that apparently the elections were free and fair. Tehran Radio broadcasted that the SAARC observers have given the report that the elections were not free and fair and there were many events of violence in the elections. *Times* correspondent wrote that there no complaints of harassment or fraud. *Independent of Sunday* published a report that the allegations of rigging in the elections were not true. *Khaleej Times* wrote that it was asked the government of Pakistan to not disqualify Benazir to contest the elections as she did too many good things for Pakistan at international level. It was the result of this that she was not disqualified to contest the elections but she faced such a comprehensive defeat in the elections. Voice of Germany said that the allegations of rigging are an old tradition in Pakistan which was being repeated in the elections of 1990. *Tihami, Intikhābāt 90 kā White Paper*, pp. 174-76.


*Keesings Record of World Events*, News Digest for November 1992, p. 39193.

Personal interview with Agha Murtaza Poya.


ECP after looking into the matter got the proof that none of the officials involved in the election duty was transferred so the allegation was rejected by ECP. *Report on the General Elections 1990*, Vol. III, p. 265. Also see *Dawn*, October 20, 1990 and *Pakistan Times*, October 9 and 20, 1990. Tehami also levied such allegation on caretakers with slight change of figures as he wrote that in Punjab all the candidates of IJI were given 75 hundred thousand rupees as development fund along with the right to get government jobs for more than 50 people which were rejected by ECP. *Tihami, Intikhābāt 90 kā White Paper*, p. 161. Chief ECP had announced that any of such practices could make election of any of candidate null and void but
it was important that evidence of such allegations was not provided to ECP.


and Abbas Bukhari, Benazir, p. 196.

Nawa-i-Waqt, August 28, 1990. The decision of the appointment of Nawaz Sharif as PM divergent claims could create problems for the alliance that was the reason that the alliance leadership left the decision of the nomination of the future PM after the elections as Junejo announced at several times that the decision about the next PM was supposed to be done by the elected members of the NA. Pakistan Times, September 5, 1990, Dawn, October 26, 29 and 30, 1990 and The Nation, November 14, 1990.

Another thing could prove problematic in the decision that many of the IJI leaders thought that if Nawaz Sharif becomes PM he should leave the office of the President of IJI. Dawn, October 30, 1990. But this issue was left to be decided later and a possible conflict was avoided.


Dawn, October 12, 1990.

Suhail Warraich, The Traitor Within: The Nawaz Sharif Story in his Own Words (Lahore: Sagar Publishers, 2008), pp. 78-79. Lawrence Ziring, “The Second Stage in Pakistani Politics: The 1993 Elections”, Asian Survey, Vol. (xxxiii, No. 2, December 1993), p. 1178. Junejo preferred to remain the president of PML and an ordinary MNA. He denied taking any other responsibility. Some of the people raised doubts that there may be problems in Sindh if PM got elected from Punjab but Nawaz Sharif was confident that there was no danger of any negative reaction. But before any nomination in a meeting of parliamentary party attended by elected MNAs of IJI, MQM, ANP, JUP (Noorani and Niazi groups), JWP, some independent candidates and MNAs from FATA approval for the election of Nawaz Sharif as PM was taken. Dawn, November 2, 1990.


Munir Ahmad, Jarnæl Shāhī, p. 68.

Members of his cabinet were Aslam Khattak, Ilahi Buksh Soomro, General Majeed Malik, Syed Ghous Ali Shah, Ch. Abdul Ghafoor, Sartaj Aziz and Ch. Ameer Hussain. Most of them were working on important positions during era of President Zia. Ch. Nisar and Malik Naeem got important positions due to their closer relations with Army. Ejaz was included in Federal cabinet and Anwar-ul-Haq was appointed minister in the Punjab cabinet to win over the support of the admirers of President Zia. Jam Mashooq Ali, son of Jam Sadiq Ali, a prominent figure in Sindh, was appointed federal minister for his father’s services in Sindh. To satisfy minorities Rana Chandigar Singh and Peter Jan Sahhotra were included in federal cabinet. To maintain a positive relationship with MQM and ANP Islam Nabi and Haji Bilour were included in cabinet. Sons of Junejo, Jatoi and Pir Pagara were included in the cabinet. From NWFP relative of Wali Khan and Anwar Saifullah, son in law of President Ishaq Khan were included in the federal cabinet. From Punjab Hamid Nasir Chatha and Raja Nadir Pervaiz became members of federal cabinet. In the Punjab successful members of the areas of PPP support base were included in the federal and provincial cabinets. It seemed that Nawaz Sharif had a clear planning and a well knit program to run the government. He also called officers of his confidence to Islamabad. Those officers were appointed as Heads of Intelligence agencies which had been sincere with Nawaz Sharif for a long time. Ahmad Meezan, Nawaz Sharif: Ittifaq se Naffaq Tak, pp. 35-37.

Javed Naqvi, Meñallātī Sāzishaiq, p. 13.


Ibid., Dawn, October 29 and November 2, 1990.


Dawn, October 29 and 30, 1990. JI accepted its failure to win in Sindh PA. Ghafoor said that participating in the elections was a matter of principles as none of the political party can leave way open for their political rivals. He said that having majority in Sindh it was the right and responsibility of MQM to form government in the province and solve the problems of the people.
CHAPTER 6

IJJI IN GOVERNMENT

AN ARDUOUS RULING COALITION

Comprehensive victory in the elections of 1990 brought IJJI in the seat of government but nonexistence of common agenda and absence of mutual interests of the coalition partners made things onerous for the IJJI leadership. There were many challenges like Gulf crisis, Afghanistan's problem and enforcement of Shari'ah that needed full support of allied partners but difference of opinion and the clash of interests of the alliance members gave tough time to the government. Contradictory opinions of allied parties created more problems for the government than the difficulties created by the opposition. The three years of government of the IJJI is a story of problems, internal opposition and a consistent struggle to aggregate popularity of the political parties. One thing that was absent in the whole period of IJJI rule was an expression of sharing interests of allied partners and care for the national growth. Some of the issues that proved to be a cause of negative relationship among the members of IJJI are discussed in the following section of this chapter.

I. Tussle on Major Issues among the IJI Coalition Partners

IJI, an alliance of eight political parties, faced troubles in resolving the complex issues. According to some political analysts/observers things became more troublesome when the central leadership of IJI made coalition with MQM, ANP and other regional political parties in different provinces. Early 1990s were a time of worldwide crisis as well due to the Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait and international assault against Iraq to regain Kuwait’s freedom. This global development created a mixed kind of environment in Pakistan as some of the sections of Pakistani community wanted to support Iraq against international attack and others opposed the idea. The Iraq-Kuwait episode increased economic and other problems of Pakistan as well. These problems and issues are discussed in the following section of this chapter, particularly concerning government’s attempts to solve these problems and the criticism launched by its allies.

The Gulf Crisis

Gulf war\(^1\) was an incident that initially, created hatred against Saddam Hussain (Saddam), president of Iraq but soon the emotions of general Muslim community changed when America came to defend Kuwait. In Pakistan, common people did not have a positive opinion about Saddam concerning previous Iraqi attitude\(^2\), but they did not favor the idea of supporting American forces against a Muslim country. The general public emotions were well caught by political parties. JI, ANP, JUP, JUI and many other political parties sided with Saddam. Aslam Beg criticized the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, but he did not support the idea of supporting America against a Muslim country.

Nawaz Sharif was caught in a difficult situation. While formulating Gulf policy, Nawaz Sharif had to take care of the Pakistan-Kuwait relations and Pakistan-Saudi Arabia relations without ignoring public opinion at home. Keeping in view the public opinion, he planned a visit to Middle Eastern countries to check the possibilities to avoid war.\(^3\) Nawaz Sharif had a Peace Mission consisting of four basic Points:

i. Iraq and America must withdraw their forces from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia respectively,

ii. Iraq must withdraw its forces from Kuwait unconditionally,

iii. For the creation of a durable peace, Iraq and Allied forces must make a pledge not to harm the oil reserves,

iv. He demanded to call Islamic Summit Conference to sort out the solution of the problem.

Nawaz Sharif could only visit Iran, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to share his concern regarding the situation in Gulf. Iran agreed to the suggestions and offered its services to share the message with international forces but Turkey had a cold response. Idea of calling Islamic Summit Conference was rejected considering what if Saddam rejected to attend the
summit or decline to accept its decision. Another problem faced by the government was the internal response of the people as most of the people considered Saddam as a hero of Muslim world and criticized George W. Bush, the American President. Majority of the member parties of IJI extended full support the decision of sending forces to Kuwait. JI, a member of ruling alliance opposed the policy of IJI and supported the government of Iraq. This opposition showed that there was lack of consensus among the allied parties in government. This kept the government under pressure and provided opportunity to the opposition parties to exert pressure on government regarding this issue.

JI opposed war in Kuwait and demanded acquittal of Iraqi forces from there. At the same time, it did not favor aggression against Iraq considering it an attempt to save Israel. President of JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmad demanded withdrawal of European and American forces and demanded deployment of forces of Muslim countries in Iraq and Kuwait to regress to things to pre-war situation. He argued that America had no interest in maintaining sovereignty of Kuwait but was interested in the oil of this region for which it took a step to destroy the Iraqi forces and make a permanent stay of its forces in the region. Qazi apprehended that after Iraq, the next American target could be Iran or Pakistan. He believed that Pakistani forces could stay in Saudi Arabia to defend holy places only if America withdrew its troops from there. JI arranged protest in favor of Saddam and criticized government’s policy of supporting Saudi Arab and sending forces there. It demanded to bring Pakistani troops back. Amir JI also demanded the removal of pro-American members from the government. For such statements, Nawaz Sharif met Qazi and asked to adopt a moderate attitude regarding government’s Gulf policy as it was increasing problems of the government. Among many other problems, government had to face anguish of America and Saudi Arabia for JI’s demand to bring the troops back. It was considered unrealistic by many others as well because Saudi Arabia always supported Pakistan in crisis.

Using its street power, JI motivated shopkeepers to host pictures of Saddam in their shops and arrange public meetings in his support. For JI it was a convenient way to use Public’s negative emotions for US, to win over the attention, support and sympathy of the common people. Qazi criticized Beg for his statements believing that foreign policy was a civilian affair and not that of the Army chief. Initially, he appreciated Nawaz Sharif’s meetings with Middle Eastern countries to avoid war and suggested that the OIC conference of the foreign ministers could help to resolve the issue. He also demanded sessions of Arab League and OIC to device a policy to handle the issue peacefully. After the war started Qazi stated that Nawaz Sharif should have gone to England and America for peace and should have told them to withdraw forces from Iraq.

Beg adopted variant stance to the government and supported Saddam. He rejected
Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Middle Eastern countries to find options to avoid war. Previously, during the caretaker arrangement, Beg himself decided to send army to Saudi Arabia. This decision made Pakistan part of US-led allied forces but later he criticized the decision of supporting the US allied forces. His attitude showed that he was trying to undermine the government of Nawaz Sharif. Some believed that if Beg had a choice, he could prefer a person like Jatoi as PM, who had not a strong political base and could easily be manipulated.

Junejo considered Iraq’s attack on Kuwait a mistake of Iraq for creating such conditions which allowed America to attack her. According to him American aggression against Iraq was not a solution of the problem. Junejo and Jatoi believed that the Security Council had asked to help Kuwait to vacate it from Iraqi forces but it did not allow ruining the whole Iraq. PML working committee passed the resolution demanding Iraq to vacate Kuwait and US to vacate Saudi Arabia. According to Junejo, it was the right of Muslim countries to keep their forces in Iraq and Kuwait till the conflict is resolved and governments in Kuwait and Iraq are restored under OIC but America must quit gulf region. Junejo affirmed that Superpowers only intervened for Middle East oil reserves. He declared that government and PML share similar views and appreciated Nawaz Sharif’s peace mission. Jatoi opposed JI’s demand of calling the Pakistani troops back. He stated that the troops were sent on Saudi request and Saudi Arab has always stood with Pakistan so it was unwise and unjustified to call the troops back. There was a perception among the leaders of IJI and general public that the issue could only be resolved if the Muslims were united to solve it.

Gulf war created negative impact on the economic plans of Nawaz Sharif as well. The increased price of oil and return of workers from Kuwait not only burdened the national exchequer but it also closed a source of foreign exchange. It also posed challenge to the government to provide jobs who returned back from Kuwait. Nawaz Sharif tried to handle this problem optimistically but economic condition of Pakistan did not allow him to do much for those who returned from Gulf region in relatively miserable condition.

There were arguments that the government was unable to read the mood of the common people while formulating the policy about Gulf but army chief appeared as a source to fulfill the aspirations of the common people. To win over the sympathies of common people, government announced that it will reformulate its policy and will side with the Muslim nation if Israel got involved in the war. While Nawaz Sharif was trying to defend his policy regarding the Gulf War, Aslam Beg adopted a different viewpoint. Sheikh Rasheed was of the view that the army must support the government’s point of view instead of scoring points against it. He announced that Leaguers had no problems with the government’s Gulf policy and they agreed upon what Nawaz Sharif decided. He said that the government was not against Saddam or Iraq but wanted to help Kuwait to vacate it from Iraqi forces. It was believed that vague policy could help in case of prolonged war to influence the warring states to resolve the issue. In case American led war ends up in favor of US and Pakistan supports Iraq, later Pakistan will be isolated. If Pakistan supports America it could face problems at home so it was best for Pakistan to give a confused or at
least unclear image of its foreign policy with reference to Iraq-Kuwait conflict.\textsuperscript{29} There was an opinion that two opposite statements by two top leaders of Pakistan were actually a policy decision. Government of Pakistan did not want to create tensions in its relation with America and Saudi Arabia and at the same time it did not want to alienate itself with the Muslim world for which such a policy was acted upon otherwise how could army chief give such statement while 11,000 troops of Pakistan were there in Saudi Arabia. Policies of Nawaz Sharif regarding Gulf issue were criticized by JI, Beg and others but in the long run it proved veracious.

**Enforcement of Shari‘ah** (tradition of Islamic Law)

Shari‘ah Bill was approved in the NA on May 16, 1991. It passed through a long journey of problems, criticism, hindrances, doubts and controversies from 1985 till May 1991. The bill faced huge criticism and took a long time to get approval. In the following pages a discussion about the procedure, problems and doubts about the Shari‘ah Bill are being discussed which were faced by IJI government as a ruling alliance. One of its major allies, JI left the alliance predominantly on this issue and other member parties also became critical with the developments and the government’s attitude regarding the implementation of Shari‘ah as it did not have any practical impact on the lives of the common people of Pakistan.

The Shari‘ah Bill, passed in 1990 by the Senate was not acceptable for army, bureaucracy, judiciary and the economic managers of Pakistan for their own reasons. Middle classes and women believed that implementation of the bill will add to their problems.\textsuperscript{30} Criticism on the implementation of Shari‘ah Bill by general public was rejected by Qazi, calling it a conspiracy against Islam and Islamization of laws in Pakistan. The problem actually amplified when the government of IJI introduced a new bill, somewhat different from that of the one passed by the Senate in 1990. Religious leaders had mixed kind of response with reference to approval of amended Shari‘ah bill. They considered it positive, believing it one step ahead to enforce Islamic laws in the state but at the same time they had problems with many of its clauses and asked the government to bring constitutional amendments at the earliest to enforce Shari‘ah as the Supreme Law of the State.\textsuperscript{31} Jatoi, president of NPP, one of the member parties of IJI, favored the idea of implementation of Shari‘ah.\textsuperscript{32} He commented that he was not an authority on religious issues but was concerned with the comments of ‘Ulema. He announced his support regarding the approval of bill believing it an effort to implement Shari‘ah.\textsuperscript{33} He did not appreciate later developments that delayed the implementation of Islamic code of conduct.\textsuperscript{34}

The difference of opinion with reference to implementation of Shari‘ah made the issue difficult to handle for the government. While trying to appease one section of society, government faced opposition of the other. In the summit of IJI heads, it was decided to introduce a constitutional amendment in consultation with IJI members to bring laws in conformity to Islam and remove all the doubts raised by JI and other religious parties. A
committee was also formed under Fakhar. This committee was made responsible to see the suggestions sent to NA and Senate by MNAs and others regarding implementation of Shari‘ah. This committee consisted of one representative of each member party of IJI and Qazi Latif, Sahibzada Faiz Qadri, Syed Ghous Ali Shah, Liaquat Balouch, Lakhvi, S.M. Zafar and Iqbal. Delay in the passing of Shari‘ah bill invited criticism of JI and other religio-political parties and groups. They also criticized the government for making committees as delaying tactics ignoring the fact that formation of committees could delay the bill but it could not delay it for an indefinite period of time.

Qazi was of the view that Nawaz Sharif won elections in the name of Islam but later he ignored the public-will and got busy to win the sympathy of international, anti-Islamic forces. On April 23, 1991 different religious political parties belonging to different sects held a meeting at Mansoora (Lahore) and criticized the government’s Shari‘ah bill. It was said by the ‘Ulema conference that any amendment in the constitution that minimizes powers of FSC will be rejected and demanded passing the bill that was passed by IJI in Senate during the premiership of Benazir. ‘Ulema conference decided to present the bill in NA, as private member’s bill, which was passed in Senate in 1990. They also decided to start a movement for the implementation of that bill. This conference augmented differences among Nawaz Sharif and religio-political parties particularly JI.

Government tried to delay the approval of the bill but under the pressure of its allies and other religio-political parties, it got the Shari‘ah bill passed by NA in May 1991 and promised to pass twelfth amendment in the constitution in order to bring the laws in conformity to the Islamic injunctions. JI and some members of PML demanded that the government must introduce and implement constitutional amendments according to the suggestions of Islamic Ideology Council within one year. Maulana Samiul Haq criticized the government believing that the bill passed in the name of Shari‘ah had just plans of constituting commissions which was of no utility in the enforcement of Shari‘ah. Government’s suggested amendments in the Shari‘ah bill faced criticism of JI as well. The main problem with approved Shari‘ah Bill was that all the practical clauses added in the Private Shari‘ah Bill of Maulana Sami and Qazi Abdul Lateef were deleted; for example in that Bill a method was explained to help the courts to take decisions according to the injunctions of Islam and each and every law that was against Shari‘ah could be challenged in the court. The clause that mentioned that President or the PM could not take any decision against Shari‘ah was deleted. A clause that made it obligatory to follow the rules of Shari‘ah for all the members of government and common people was also eliminated. The amendments in the Shari‘ah bill suspended the practical utility of the bill as it could not create any effect on parliamentary and judicial system and allowed to continue riba based economy.

It was a general perception that Nawaz Sharif became PM of Pakistan as a representative of IJI with the basic purpose of implementation of Shari‘ah as the supreme law of the state. Shari‘ah Bill was submitted in the NA in order to transfigure Pakistan
into an “Islamic Welfare State”. There were difficulties in implementation of Shari’ah and tension occurred when the government got legal advice against the decision of Federal Shari’ah Court, which ordered elimination of bank interest/riba (that is prohibited in the Islamic Law).46

Government’s announcement to continue the existing economic system created unrest particularly among the religio-political parties like JI and JUI. To ménage the issue of riba government transformed it to profits and loss savings accounts but the economy remained riba based. The critical thing was that after a long time of court’s decision against riba, government did not take any steps to legislate about what the court had instructed.47 In an interview, Hafiz Husain Ahmad told that CII and Professor Khursheed Ahmad suggested constitutional amendments to convert economic system to an interest free economy. He added that Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari Commission also worked and gave some solutions. He said that the government was only avoiding the problems. He criticized the government for emphasizing to implement its own legislative bill. He rejected the bill on behalf of his party JUI, because its amendments were not incorporated in the bill.48 Professor Khursheed Ahmad told that International Finance Corporation (IFC), a subordinate institute of World Bank, announced to provide riba free loans to Pakistan but government of Pakistan declined to accept the offer as it was not in favor of the government itself.49

In January 1992 government revived a commission on economic Islamization to seek compromise between banking system and Islamic Shari’ah to meet economic challenges.50 In case of eliminating riba, government had to face multiple problems. The loaning institutions were running their business on riba and if they were unable to earn any profits, they could close the business. At the international scenario, government had to pay loans and to avoid paying riba it had to repay all the loans at once which could lead Pakistan to become bankrupt.51

Demand of abolition of riba created negative impact on the economic policies of Nawaz Sharif particularly on his efforts to attract foreign donors and investors through liberalization of the economy.52 There were perceptions that political parties like JI ignored the fact that being part of an international capitalist community based on riba, Pakistan alone was not in a position to abolish it from the economic system. This declaration could take Pakistan to international isolation and economic blockade.53 The government was in trepidation as maintaining riba in the economic system was invitation to the wrath of religio-political parties and general public; removing it altogether could cut-off all foreign loans and could lead to the collapse of the banking system.54

Finance Minister, Sartaj Aziz established a cell in his ministry consisting of an additional and a joint secretary. In the beginning, the cell completed its home work against the decision of FSC and later asked senior executive vice president of Muslim Commercial Bank to file an appeal in Supreme Court against this decision. Before the petition could be filed the news reached to Qazi and he threatened that if the bank filed petition against the
FSC decision he will ask the people to boycott the bank for being anti-Islam. He also announced to converse its decision to cooperate with the government.

Later a meeting of finance ministry was held which was attended by high officials of State Bank and other economic institutions. Governor State Bank suggested the government to start converting system according to Islamic Laws and if the process was not completed till June 30, 1992 the given time of FSC, government could get an extension to complete the process. But Finance ministry was of the view that if the FSC’s decision was accepted it will cause havoc in the economy of Pakistan.55

In the beginning it was planned that the bill that was passed by Senate will be introduced in the assembly with amendments by a committee consisting of Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, Liaquat Baluch and Qazi Abdul Latif. The amendments were prepared but the government brought its own bill to continue *riba* based economy for an indefinite period. In NA, members of PML and JI spoke against the bill. There were questions, that if the members of PML and JI spoke against the bill, why did they vote in its favor. In Senate nine amendments were suggested but were withdrawn by the members. There was an argument that Nawaz Sharif’s government could not implement Shari‘ah because he did not have two-third majority. But there exists a question that how many of his supporters, in the parliament, were willing to implement Shari‘ah as suggested by JI and other political parties of Islamic orientation. In general it can be said that regarding the implementation of Shari‘ah there was hardly any consensus among the members of the IJI. They hardly shared any opinion regarding implementation of Shari‘ah Bill presented by Maulana Sami in Senate in 1985. Most of the member parties of IJI did not agree to the idea of implementation of Shari‘ah and if they shared some opinion, there was hardly any consensus about the issues. Each member of the alliance had its own choices and priorities for which they were working ignoring any respect for the opinion of other stake holders of the alliance.

**Afghanistan Issue**

Intervention of Russia in Afghanistan in December 1979 started a new era in the history of world generally and that of Afghanistan and Pakistan particularly. Entrance of Russian forces in Afghanistan not only created problems for its people but also created security threat for Pakistan which was dealt by the then president of Pakistan General Zia-ul Haq with the economic and military support of America and financial support of Saudi Arabia. Zia also worked for the solution of the problem as there had been a consistent threat for Pakistan; settlement of Afghan refugees was another problem that was being faced by Pakistan. Due to long shared borders it was easy for those to come and go from Afghanistan to Pakistan, who had been busy in guerilla warfare, of course with the connivance of intelligence agencies, against the Russian forces which added to the security problems of Pakistan. With the efforts and facilitation of the government of Pakistan, Geneva Accord56 was signed which suggested a plan for withdrawal of the Russian forces from Afghanistan. It was criticized on the grounds that the accord lacked a comprehensive plan for the future government of Afghanistan which left the soil open for local adherents for power after withdrawal of Russian forces. Mediation for the solution of
the Afghanistan problem was one of the major points of the IJI which participated in the elections of 1988 and 1990. IJI could not win majority in the elections of 1988 and sat on the opposition benches in NA, henceforth the issue did not create problems for its leadership but after coming into power in 1990 the allied parties wanted to help Afghans to resolve all the issues regarding formation of government and bringing peace in the region according to the Geneva Accord that was signed in April 1988. Pakistan supported Mujahideen government in the region for few years but with the changing realities and Mujahideen’s failure in creating control and bringing peace made the international community including Pakistan to think of some other solution of the problem in the region.

In the beginning, Pakistan’s motive to support Afghanistan was her own defense. After withdrawal of Russian forces in 1988, Pakistan essentially wanted to help to create peace there and handle internal peace threats that were result of free movement of Afghan Mujahideen in both the countries. According to Nawaz Sharif, the policy of government of Pakistan regarding Afghanistan's problems was to create political reconciliation among different groups of Afghanistan, reconstruction of Afghanistan and repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Qazi appreciated any direct talks between Afghan Mujahideen and Soviet Union for a settlement of Afghanistan's problem and the creation of Mujahideen government there. To achieve this goal, Pakistan asked Iran, Saudi Arab and America for support. In the meeting of the heads of IJI on December 28, 1991 all the participant parties appreciated Afghanistan policy of the government aspiring to solve the problems according to the wishes of the people of that country. This was only possible because of the efforts of Nawaz Sharif who addressed all the reservations of the allied parties, particularly JI about the government’s policy of Afghanistan. The real problem for the government of Pakistan started when it changed its policy of supporting Hizb-e Islami with Gulbadeen Hikmatyar as its head in Afghanistan. Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddadi became interim President of Afghanistan in early 1992 but Amir Hizb-e Islami Gulbadeen Hikmatyar opposed it and demanded the appointment of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani as the President of Afghanistan. Government of Pakistan did not favor this idea. Government of Pakistan’s support to a group, against the wishes of JI, in Afghanistan to form government resulted in a conflict between Nawaz government and JI.

JI wanted the implementation of Peshawar Accord which was signed on April 24, 1992 by Afghan leaders according to which the transfer of power had to take place in three steps. A fifty members’ council was formed amongst which 30 were field commanders, and some leaders of Mujahideen and some ‘Ulema. The council was to be headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddadi. He was also given the mandate to run the government in Kabul for two months and make arrangements to transfer the power to Mujahideen, which had to come in the second phase. In the third phase, Muhajideen government had to conduct free and fair elections and handover the government to the elected representatives of the people. The formula was not perfect but at that time it seemed the best available option. Hikmatyar rejected the Peshawar Accord and tried to get government through power. At the same time Sibghatullah Mujaddadi declared himself leader of the proposed political arrangement.
and joined hands with the army. This attitude increased tension in an already fragmented setup.

Islamabad Accord was signed on March 7, 1993 among Afghan groups. It was considered a major success of Nawaz government. Although, through this accord Gulbadeen Hikmatyar got share in government but it could not prove to be a long lasting agreement and problems started between different groups within a very small time period.65

Following this, an agreement was signed by Gulbadeen Hikmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masud on May 25, 1992 to hold elections and hand over the government to the elected members. This agreement also reinforced the idea of acting upon all the points of the Peshawar Accord.66 This agreement could not be fulfilled due to later developments in the region and inter-party conflicts in Afghanistan.

In November, 1989 the United Nations General Assembly instructed Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to work to create a comprehensive plan for peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. Cuellar presented a plan for “An intra-Afghan Dialogue” to work to create a broad based government as first step towards creation of a national government which will be established through free and fair elections following the creation of an interim government consisting of eighty seven members. There was a suggestion to implant UN peace force during the shift of government from Najeebullah to interim arrangement but Gulbadeen rejected the suggestion that the Mujahideen were not going to tolerate external forces in any case. Cuellar appointed Benon Sevan as his special envoy to consult the Afghan leadership to implement it in an acceptable way for the people of Afghanistan. Nearly all Afghan groups and leaders gradually accepted the formula. Keeping in view the opinion of the people and leaders of Afghanistan, government of Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arab also favored the formula to convene an assembly of Afghan leaders to decide an interim government but before the plan could be implemented, the Coalition of the North emerged in Afghanistan and it reversed each of the efforts of Sevan.67

Pakistan’s decision to support UN five point program for settlement of Afghanistan problem and efforts to hold meeting of Loya Jirga (Grand National Assembly) for the election of interim government were criticized by JI, Ijazul Haq, Qazi, Senator Tariq and others.68 JI opposed the plan because the suggestion was opposed by Hizb-e Islami (Hikmatyar)69 and Ittihad-e Islami (Sayyaf), two prominent groups in Afghanistan. For them only a government was acceptable that was committed to Afghan Jihad.70 The government of Pakistan supported the Sevan formula initially but keeping in view the opinion of leaders of Pakistan that some of the parties in Afghanistan did not accept the suggestions, it withdrew its support to the Sevan plan.71

Qazi was a critic of the government’s Afghanistan policy. He believed that the government was not supporting the Afghans to an extent that can help resolve problems of governance there. Qazi was against the American government’s support for Zahir Shah and Najeebullah
in comparison with an Islamic government. He related retirement of corps commander Hamid Gul in facilitation to implementation of American plans. Some people believe that Qazi adopted a hardline opinion in favor of Afghan Mijahideen with the support of the then president of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaq Khan. JI believed that it was the only political party among the IJI members who had been working for the solution of the Afghanistan issue. Nawaz Sharif asked religio-political parties JI and leader of two factions of JUI to use their influence on the Mijahideen to end the conflict but there were no positive results which disheartened Nawaz Sharif. Qazi’s attitude created problems for the government of Pakistan at international level. At the victory of Taliban in Khost, Qazi visited the place and behaved like the supreme commander which invited criticism of international community for Pakistan particularly because JI was part of the ruling alliance. To soften the behavior of JI, government decided to mobilize public opinion in favor of Kashmir and instructed media to give coverage to JI’s rallies in Kashmir. It also asked media to generate debate on JI-MQM relations to divert the attention of JI leadership and government could take some free space to formulate foreign policy.

Nawaz Sharif believed that Pakistan must not interfere in the internal matters of Afghanistan. It had good relations with Mijahideen Government and wanted to maintain positive relations with Rabbani, Chief of the Northern Alliance. Contrary to that, Army Chief and ISI did not agree to the government’s policy that stringent relations of Pakistan with Afghanistan and also the internal relations of the ruling alliance as JI and Ijzaul Haq favored the idea to support Mijahideen government and criticized Nawaz Sharif for his softer behavior towards UN policies. Qazi was of the view that in the name of broad based government Mujaddadi, Masud, Karmal and militia will join hands and transfer of power will not take place practically. JI’s support for Hikmatyar and IJI government’s support to Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddadi increased the gulf between ruling coalition and one of its members JI.

The most critical time of the relations of JI with Nawaz Sharif was when he accepted the formula of UN Secretary General’s envoy Benon Sevan. Nawaz Sharif criticized JI for its support to Mijahideen even after realizing that the Mijahideen could not establish control in the region. He even laid the responsibility of bloodshed in Afghanistan, to some extent, on JI. This attitude became the reason of very negative proximity between JI and Nawaz Sharif which resulted in an indifferent attitude of JI towards Nawaz Sharif particularly after his resignation as PM of Pakistan in 1993.

JI was promised the office of Public Accounts Committee (PAC) which was not fulfilled but JI did not notice it till the government was following its Afghan policy. For JI the only acceptable solution of Afghanistan was the one acceptable to Gulbadin Hikmatyar. JI had decided to cooperate with the government till December 1992 but its support to the government of Afghanistan without Hizb-e Islami Afghanistan was too much for it to decide its future relations with the government. Instead of Mijahideen, communist militia was allowed to form the government which was not acceptable for JI as JI believed that communist militia was a weak party. They also believed that Mijahideen could handle the situation better as compared to communist militia. This continued
difference of opinion between the government and JI increased the gulf between the two and relations became too strained to work as members of an alliance. It was apparent that after the death of Zia, none of the authorities in Pakistan could take care of the Afghanistan issue properly. The meeting of “Afghan Cell”, an institution to work to sort the Afghanistan issue, could not be held for almost six months which was headed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif was its most prominent member.85

Government of Pakistan was facing multiple internal and external constraints due to changing local and international scenarios like Shari’ah issue and Gulf War respectively. Government had to maintain its defense capability for which it had to get American arms embargo removed. One severe example of tension was that most of F-16 were grounded because of non-availability of spare parts.86 Pakistan wanted to increase its horizon to get arms but the required money for this purpose was not available. Due to the suspension of American Aid economic issues exacerbated. The only option available was the improvement of relations with US for which it had to change its Afghanistan policy and support American program in Afghanistan which was criticized by JI believing it a betrayal of Jihad there.

Kashmir Issue

Kashmir problem is a burning issue since the creation of Pakistan and remained a point of concern for the people and governments of Pakistan and India. There had been wars between the two countries and also attempts of reconciliation to resolve the issue. For IJI, Kashmir issue was comparatively more critical to handle because it was given major placing in the political agenda and election campaign of the alliance. This issue did not create any problems for IJI leadership before it formed government at federal level but after joining the government it had to face criticism regarding government’s Kashmir policy from inside the alliance and others. JI had been the flag bearer with reference to the Kashmir liberation movement. It had been involved directly or indirectly for many years in the efforts of the people of Kashmir for their liberation. JI wanted the IJI government to resolve this issue at the earliest and according to the wishes of the people of Kashmir. IJI government had certain constraints regarding taking any hard-lines to resolve the issue which resulted in creating edgy relations of JI with IJI.

JI adopted a stance that the government of Pakistan had never presented a correct picture of Indian atrocities in Kashmir issue in front of the international community. According to Qazi plight of the people of Kashmir could be informed to the international community through embassies of Pakistan in other countries and to the ambassadors of other countries posted in Pakistan. He believed that the government of Pakistan even failed to inform others that India did not act upon the UN resolutions regarding Kashmir issue and that on the Tashkent and Simla agreements. JI considered it a failure at the part of government of Pakistan that it could not generate enough support to get India follow the UN resolutions with reference to the Kashmir problem. JI generally argued that the relations between
Pakistan and India could only improve if the problem of Kashmir is resolved through plebiscite.\textsuperscript{87}

In the beginning, IJI decided to work for the solution of Kashmir problem according to the UN resolutions. IJI members showed satisfaction on this policy in the first meeting of heads of member parties of IJI after formulating government. They also asked UN to take into consideration Indian brutalities in occupied Kashmir.\textsuperscript{88} Qazi also demanded that government should help Kashmiris on every front\textsuperscript{89} which was not possible for the government as government could extend moral support and plead the case of Kashmir on international forums in front of international community but it could not provide assistance to Kashmir liberation movement as was being demanded by JI.

To support the Kashmir liberation movement, JI gave a call for a nationwide strike in favor of Kashmir’s right of self-determination in 1990 which was observed officially by the government of Benazir for the first time\textsuperscript{90} and is being celebrated till now as Kashmir solidarity day. According to Qazi, it was obligatory for every Muslim to fight against the brutality that was being done against women and children in Kashmir by the Indian forces to save the people of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{91} To create harmony of international community with Pakistan’s viewpoint regarding Kashmir problem, JI asked the government to organize an international Kashmir conference to inform the international community about the problems of people of Kashmir and atrocities of the Indian government against people of that region.\textsuperscript{92}

On the call of Qazi, all Pakistan Kashmir conference was held at Lahore. It had three sessions which were presided by Chairman Senate Waseem Sajjad, Speaker NA Gohar Ayub Khan and Qazi respectively. It was attended by the parties from government and Opposition. Nawaz Sharif also attended the conference. In the conference a resolution was passed to make efforts to solve Kashmir problem through combine efforts of government and opposition.\textsuperscript{93}

Nawaz Sharif’s suggestion for a third option\textsuperscript{94} for the solution of Kashmir problem faced criticism of different sections of society. JI could not reconcile itself with government’s policy of reconciliation with India. JI was of the view that government was toeing American policies and the third option was against security of Pakistan so was not acceptable in any case. He asked Nawaz Sharif to not take any decision is haste and asked to take opposition in confidence before making any decision.\textsuperscript{95} Qazi also criticized the government for discussing Wuller Barrage issue with Indian government believing that it was indirect acceptance of Indian occupation on Kashmir. He argued that if the control of India over Kashmir was not justified how it could plan to construct Barrages or other things there.\textsuperscript{96} For Nawaz Sharif third option could be considered only if the government of India was ready to give the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{97}

Nawaz Sharif and JI had difference of opinion in the methods of supporting the
Kashmir liberation movement. JI’s announcement that more than thirteen thousand Kashmiri youngsters were trained by it to participate in Kashmir liberation movement added to the problems of the government as this statement seconded the Indian view that Pakistan was supporting the militants in Kashmir. JI announced strike for the support of the right of self-determination of Kashmir but Nawaz Sharif did not support the idea. JI launched the campaign on its own expenses in the name of Nawaz Sharif as the president of IJI. In 1992 the same style was adopted by the JI but its campaign was stopped because Nawaz Sharif had to meet with Indian PM in the SAARC summit and the government did not want to create any misunderstanding with the neighboring government. In that situation Qazi decided to resign as the member of IJI.

Jatoi also adopted a critical viewpoint against Nawaz Sharif for not taking up the Kashmir Issue in the conference held at Harare. He criticized the government for not raising the issue at any international forum despite sacrifices and sufferings of the people of Kashmir at the hands of Indian Army. He asked the governments of India and Pakistan at different occasions to solve the Kashmir problem. He believed that Simla agreement or UN Resolutions both or any of them can be focused to solve the problem. Kashmir issue remained a source of tension for Nawaz Sharif as he was working to normalize relations with India under the pressure of international community. He had to keep the foreign policy options in mind to take the issue at international forums. JI and NPP adopted critical approach towards Nawaz Sharif’s policy of Kashmir while other member parties did not adopt a consistent critical stance. They had changing opinions according to the situations but generally their opinion regarding solving the Kashmir issue remained consistent with the stance of the government of Nawaz Sharif.

**Repeal of Eighth Amendment**

Eighth Amendment had been one of the most controversial constitutional amendments.

Junejo and Benazir lost their premiership under one of the clauses of this amendment. Nawaz Sharif wanted to save his government from being prey to the same and favored balance in the powers of President and PM as exists in the parliamentary systems of Britain and India, for which he tried his best to get the eighth amendment repealed particularly those clauses under which president had the authority to dissolve the NA and appoint services chiefs but he faced many problems in this regard. He even could not get support of his party members to amend it.

Many of the members of PML did not support the idea to repeal the eighth amendment believing that it was a source to create balance between president and PM and this amendment saved Pakistan from martial law at least twice. They also challenged the authority of Nawaz Sharif to get approval of such important matter in the absence of the president of PML. Nawaz Sharif did not pay much attention to the criticism on his decision from within the party and created four members’ team to consult different political parties to create consensus over the issue of the eighth amendment. This committee started its work with two different fronts. It met with Qazi of JI and Iftikhar Gillani of PPP. Nawaz Sharif
was confident of getting enough support from parliamentary parties but the most viable
dent in his confidence was disagreement of three ministers of his cabinet for the removal
of 58 (2-b). This also was a hint that it was difficult for the IJI government to muster 2/3
majority to amend the constitution. Ch.
Shujaat and Malik Naeem distanced himself from the eighth amendment committee.\textsuperscript{104}
PML members like Iqbal, Junejo, and Chattha were of the view that if PM had the right to
dissolve the assembly there was no harm in extending same right to the president.\textsuperscript{105} In its
parliamentary party meeting, PML discussed possibilities to impeach president if the
Supreme Court declares its decision illegal and unjustified.\textsuperscript{106} It shows that PML was not
willingly prepared to remove this amendment from the constitution. Similar kind of
opposition was faced by Nawaz Sharif from other members of the alliance as well.

Qazi was of the opinion that there was always room for the amendments in the constitution
but the government must form a committee to probe into the suggested amendments to
keep balance in the constitution.\textsuperscript{107} He told that there was no need to amend the clauses that
were related to the Islamic teachings and FSC. As far as the clauses concerned with the
powers of President and PM, must be debated properly and amended through consensus.\textsuperscript{108}
Nawaz Sharif categorically denied any intention of amending the clauses of eighth
amendment relevant with Islamization. Jatoi stated that he had been satisfied with the
amendment when he was in opposition than how could he change his stance at the change
of his status in national hierarchy.\textsuperscript{109}

Ghulam Ishaq Khan stated that this amendment was included in the constitution
before he was president and could be amended through a constitutional procedure. Some
of the people like Naseem Aaheer stated that Ghulam Ishaq Khan was of the view that
government will have to take fresh mandate to alter the eighth amendment.\textsuperscript{110} For Benazir
it was important to reach her secular ends and Nawaz Sharif had an image that he wanted
to become all powerful for which he wanted to repeal the Eighth Amendment.\textsuperscript{111} In such a
situation Benazir handled things politically. She accepted the offer of the government to
become chairperson of a committee and gave signals of her support to Ghulam Ishaq Khan
as well. It can be said that all powerful PM Nawaz Sharif could never be acceptable to
Benazir.\textsuperscript{112} With such huge opposition and criticism, Nawaz Sharif kept on trying to
convince his alliance members to repeal the eighth amendment till April 1993, when his
government was dissolved under one of the clauses of the same amendment.

**Privatization**

Privatization of the state-owned industries and other institutions was one of the important
tiers of Nawaz Sharif’s economic policy. It was initiated to handle the economic
constraints, generally increased due the suspension of economic assistance by USA and the
Gulf war which stopped a major source of foreign remittances. Initially, it was announced
that all the state owned industrial units will be privatized but there were suggestions to
privatize only sick units that were working in loss or were closed because the units that
were earning profits were a source of national income.
Nawaz Sharif was of the view that the industries working in loss were actually depletion of money of the taxpayer of Pakistan which could only be improved through privatization. He announced to take all the pressures to sustain his policy of privatization. There was a consensus that the government must avoid loopholes in its privatization policy to avoid corruption and criticism. PM Nawaz Sharif formed four committees for expert opinion to analyze the economic structure with reference to the new economic policies and plans of the government. One among these committees had the responsibility to evaluate the privatization plans which was headed by Senator Saeed Qadir. The committee identified that the basic purpose of privatization was to increase the productivity of the sick units for which it suggested to reserve 10% shares of the units, being privatized for the employees to protect their rights. Further, for the safety of workers, government announced that national labour laws will remain enforced and none of the workers of the privatized units could be dismissed arbitrarily. Committee also asked to make state bank independent before privatization of banks and DFI’s but the government ignored the suggestion. Merger of IDBP and NDFC was also among the suggestions of the committee that were ignored by the government.

First of all, government decided to sale banks. The government had to take care of the Employs Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) in the privatization which was particularly cared at the time of privatization of Allied Bank Limited (ABL) and decided to give preferential rights to the employees. Senior bankers criticized this method of privatization of banks believing that the privatization of Banks meant to invite heavy investment and the buyer must have interest in the Bank which could not be attained through the procedure following ESOP. Businessmen who had stakes in the banks were against the privatization of banking sector.

There was criticism on the government that none of the investors was interested in buying the institutions/industries offered by the government except few because there was lack of transparency in bidding system. An example of this unfair bidding was selling of MCB which was given to Mian Mansha, who was not the highest bidder but it was claimed that he was major financer of IJI. There were signs of corruption in privatization of Allied Bank as well. When the government assessed the shares of Allied Bank Limited (ABL) as Rs. 70 per share it was criticized for its assessment of MCB’s shares at rupees 56 per share as the ABL was generally considered a smaller bank as compared to the other national banks like MCB. Saeed Qadir rejected the allegation. According to him privatization commission had no discretionary powers to benefit any one. Another thing which went against the program was that it was not given any legislative cover and was never debated in the Assembly for first eighteen months of IJI government.

Initially, government decided to privatize one hundred and fifteen units out of which only ten were earning profits and ten more were earning marginal profits. Few were just working on no profit and no loss basis. Almost seventy were burden on national exchequer as were running in loss. Instead of privatizing sick units government sold profit earning industries and institutes. No loss incurring industrial unit with less real estate value could be sold. Evaluation of the units was done by the private sector and the information was leaked to the buyers before time which caused loss for the government. Further loss was
brought to the national exchequer by ignoring the evaluation and industries were sold at comparatively low prices.\textsuperscript{125} This was proved by the government’s hesitation in revealing the evaluations and the reference prices. Another negative factor was the possibility of monopoly\textsuperscript{126} but government did not take any practical measures to avoid monopoly.

Leadership of JI and NPP criticized the privatization policy of the government as it was decided to sell only sick or already closed units but government sold basic units and those related with defense of Pakistan. Selling of Muslim Commercial bank was criticized as it was earning profits for the government. Secondly, government decided to privatize Pakistan Telecommunication without consulting Privatization Commission, National Assembly or the defense committee which was hazardous for national defense of Pakistan. There was criticism against selling of national units on discounted prices.\textsuperscript{127} The government’s permission to Agha Khan Foundation to establish a private airline, to break monopoly of the Pakistan International Airline (PIA) also received criticism.

Government’s plan to privatize thermal power projects received criticism. The Plan to hand-over WAPDA to private sector was rejected by the NWFP government as it feared of losing royalty on WAPDA and other sources of income.\textsuperscript{128} Workers of WAPDA with a domicile of NWFP could lose huge facilities that were provided to them. Federal government categorically announced that there will be no cut on the payment of profit from the income of electricity from Tarbela Dam to the provincial government of NWFP. MPAs of NWFP were of the view that government should compute the impact of privatization before further selling national organizations.\textsuperscript{129} They particularly hinted about the privatization of WAPDA.

Saeed Qadir told that the government proceeded rapidly to change the environment and encourage private investment to consolidate the gains of its policies. About the method of issuing tenders he told that in this way a broad base of share-holders could be created.\textsuperscript{130} On December 1, 1991 chairman of the privatization commission owned that the results had been disappointing but government could earn profit in the process of privatization of state owned factories in the long run.\textsuperscript{131} One thing was clear that government could not get the desired response from its Privatization Plan as foreign investor could hardly dare to invest at such a place where there was hardly any political stability and local businessman invested only for a personal prrofit.

**Cooperatives’ Scandal**

Cooperatives failure and the havoc created due to this failure was one of the major challenges faced by the government of Nawaz Sharif. Due to this problem he faced multiple kind of criticism as his business and other business of many of the PML members had drawn heavy loans from the cooperatives and it was being considered as major reason of the default of the cooperative Societies.\textsuperscript{132} Although this was not the sole cause of the default of the finance companies but this factor made situation difficult for the government to handle confidently as it had to handle the crisis and had to defend its party members as
well for their borrowings while thousands of poor people had lost their savings in this economic crisis.

In total, one hundred and one cooperative companies were registered among that fifty one were registered by the Punjab government and fifty by the federal government of the PPP. The actual function of the cooperative societies is limited and they essentially work in a very limited area to utilize savings of the people of a particular area to help the people of the same precinct. Its actual thrust is cooperation among the people of a particular area with a very limited enterprise but they expanded their business at provincial level. To expand their business, the cooperative societies started collecting money from the people with creation of greed of heavy profit up-to nine percent. The owners of the societies earned millions of rupees and left the people in dark who were then facing problems to get their own money back. Most of the sufferers of these societies were the poor people who invested their savings to get profit for economic relaxation in their day to day expenditures.

Cooperative societies of Pakistan deviated from the very basic principle and expanded their business at provincial level adopting the designs of banking system, without fulfilling the prerequisites and without making them proficient in the business, which took them to collapse.

In Nawaz Sharif era, problem of cooperatives aggravated with the return of Pakistani workers from Iraq and Kuwait. They were major contributors of these societies. Withdrawal of money by these people, overburdened the cooperatives and they ran out of cash. The finance companies that generally had invested their money in real estate tried to sell lands to make enough cash available to repay the money of depositors. In the same time period, there was a downwards trend in the real estate prices which increased the crisis of the cooperative finance companies. There was another issue that the management of the cooperatives was intelligent enough to deceive the depositors with their accounts’ reports but they were not trained in the commercial banking to run societies as profit earning institutions. Another thing that happened was shift of system from military government to democracy. Benazir’s ruling era was difficult to get economic support from Banking sector for some politicians particularly members of IJI, who had been enjoying banking sector support for their businesses. Due to this problem they had to rely on the cooperatives to run their business. When Nawaz Sharif formed government in 1990, it was a sign of liberty for these societies as the members of the government were their beneficiaries and they ignored maintaining balance in the finances and accounts. It was alleged that some of the cooperatives funded the election campaign of the IJI as well for which IJI gave more liberty to these societies.

The severe most criticism was against PM and Interior Minister who secured heavy loans from the cooperatives. Another point of criticism on the government was that NICFC and Services Credit Cooperative Corporation (SCCC) was owned by the IJI members and these two societies had 75% amount of total deposits of the cooperative societies. It was said that NICFC’s chief executive and president were cousins of Shujaat. It was said by PPP members that the big cooperatives belonged to the Punjab and it was the responsibility
of the Punjab government to look after the cooperatives business. Another thing that was highlighted was the issue of corruption in the cooperatives was being surfaced in 1989. It was a must to ask the then provincial government that why it did not take action against the cooperative members responsible for corruption. IJI government was severely criticized for the conduct of the cooperatives in the Punjab. Punjab government explained that the establishment of these companies was permitted by the federal government of PPP. It was an attempt to shift the responsibility of the scam from IJI to PPP ignoring that both were almost equally responsible for not following the rules of establishment of the cooperative societies and ignoring monitoring of their business.

Politicians did not keep themselves indifferent from the issue and made suggestions for solution of the problem. Junejo asked Wyne to cancel the membership of those PML members who did not returned the money of the cooperatives to solve the problem. Junejo appreciated the formation of Task force and a committee to handle the issue. He also appreciated the decision to include names of convicted people in exit control list and suggested to return the money of smaller depositors on priority to solve their problems. Qazi suggested imprisoning the defaulters of the cooperatives and to confiscate their properties to repay the money of the common people. Jatoi asked to constitute a judicial commission consisting of judges of High Courts and the Supreme Court to probe into the issue. He emphasized to return the money to the small depositors on priority basis. He also asked to suspend those who looted public wealth from public offices and take severe action against the defaulters of these companies. Another thing that was being demanded was publication of the list of those who took loans from these societies but it was not done as this publication could bring many people to limelight that were not still noticed by the people. There was a general demand for legislation, to punish the owners of the societies and those who registered the societies that did not fulfill the requirements to run the business of societies believing that owners of the societies and government representatives were equally responsible for the agony of the people.

The government announced that each and every penny of the people will be returned but the repayment of the amount ranging from twenty billion to two hundred billion was beyond the capacity of the government and the cooperatives. In the meeting of the parliamentary party of IJI it was decided to make two committees to handle the whole issue. It was also decided that head of one of the committees will be an economist to have a closer understanding of the issue and solve it on merit. On public demand, the Punjab Assembly passed two bills to confiscate personal property of the directors of the cooperatives. It also ordered the entire lenders to return their loans within eighteen months. The government added names of two hundred and fifty officials of different cooperatives, in exit control list and confiscated property of fifty one directors and issued warrants to arrest them. At the same time, owners of the societies were restricted to make any decision with reference to the property of these societies. Cooperative societies requested the government for a break of six to nine months to handle the situation but government did not accept this. Supreme Court declared the decision of freezing assets of the owners was illegal. With this judgment of the court the arrangement of repayment left in halt. In this way the only source to return money to the people slipped out of the control of the government.
Almost 2.5 million people were affected due to the failure of the business of the cooperative institutes and fifteen billion rupees of the people were mishandled. Government decided to pay the money to the smaller investors whose investment amount ranged from twenty five thousand to fifty thousand. Government could pay to only two thousand people out of thirty thousand and claimed that it had returned money to more than seventy thousand people whose investment was around twenty five thousand rupees and more than nine thousand people had received their money that had claim of Rs. fifty thousand. The method devised to claim the money was relatively complex which made things more difficult for investors. Many depositors were given checks of the Bank of Punjab which was very much relevant with the Sharif family. This increased doubts about the government’s involvement in the crisis.

Nawaz Sharif gave another solution as well. He announced that the government will give shares of some other companies to the depositors of the finance companies which will pay them 10% interest per annum. He also announced guarantee of provincial government for these shares. He further added that the shareholders will have the right to sell their shares through stock exchange which faced criticism in different sections of society as majority of the people have no idea of the business in stock exchange. There was question of the security of the investment if the prices of the shares of suggested company falls. In general, the plan to repay the money to the people seemed superficial, lacking the pragmatic procedures.

A judicial commission was constituted on November 6, 1991 to investigate the affairs of the cooperatives’ and the reasons of their collapse. It was headed by a Supreme Court Judge Afzal Lone and two other judges from Lahore High Court were its members. The Commission presented its report in March 1992. It was said by the commission that there were multiple reasons of the collapse of cooperatives. It stated that the federal government did not keep an eye on the working of these cooperatives; it did not give incentive to the people to invest money, Mushroom growth of cooperative finance companies. Ignorance of Federal and provincial governments to monitor activities created such a huge crisis. The commission exonerated Nawaz Sharif from any involvement in the scam. According to the commission of inquiry into the affairs of the cooperative finance societies and/corporations Ittefaq group loaned from NICFC and NICCC only 2.58% of the total finance cooperating through these cooperatives. Likewise Shujaat Group got 1.81% of the finance of the NICFC and NICCC. According to the commission’s report this was not such a heavy amount that was responsible for the debacle of these societies. Ittefaq group and Ch. Shujaat got loans from only two companies so they could not be responsible for the collapse of all one hundred and twenty seven cooperatives. Commission also negated all the allegations levied against CM Punjab Wyne. Most of the petitions against Ch. Shujaat’s family were rejected as he paid amount of loan along with interest. The cooperatives received heavy amounts of deposits with the promise of high interest which was mishandled by the employees of the cooperatives or the members of managing committee. The report stated that the actual reason of the collapse of these corporations was not following the rules of operation. It also stated that the cooperatives did not maintain cash liquidity up to 35% which was necessary to run them smoothly. Investment in the business of real estate also created problems as the corporations did not care for their
balance in deposits and assets.\textsuperscript{163} Due to this issue IJI faced severe criticism from inside the ranks of the IJI. None of the allied parties came forward to help government to manage the crisis and criticized the government because few of the most prominent leaders of PML were involved in the business of the finance companies.

**Kalabagh Dam Issue**

Construction of Kalabagh Dam had been a divisive issue for a long period of time. It is a general perception that construction of this dam will not only fulfill the electricity requirements across the country; it will also provide ample water to irrigate huge pieces of land in Punjab, Sindh and NWFP and will be able to provide water for irrigation for limited areas of Baluchistan as well. However, this issue could not remain as simple to be solved easily. Provinces have reservations regarding constructing this dam according to their local perceptions.

It is generally believed that construction of Kalabagh Dam was politicized for limited political gains by the regional political parties. Delay in the construction of the Dam has been a serious set-back to the economy and irreparable loss to the people of Pakistan, but the perceptions that its construction will make lands of Sindh barren and will create salinity in NWFP have become a hindrance in the construction of the Dam. This has been a matter of great concern for the people of the Punjab as they feel prevented of a source which can help to generate resources for progress through the province and ultimately to the country.\textsuperscript{164} Most important thing concerning construction of this dam was to create consensus among the provinces regarding misunderstandings for which first important step was signing of water accord which decided share of the available water resources of the provinces.

The issue of sharing water among the provinces is an ongoing issue since 1935. After the inception of Pakistan Akhtar Hussain commission in 1960, Fazal-e Akbar Commission in 1969, General Anwar ul Haq Commission in 1972 and Haleem Commission in 1977 were formed but suggestions of none of these commissions could be implemented through consensus. However, Nawaz Sharif was the PM who managed to create consensus among the provinces and the percentage of the water share of all the provinces was decided.\textsuperscript{165} The Accord was signed on March 21, 1991 in the meeting of the CCI.\textsuperscript{166} The principle behind the water distribution was to save the water that was wasted every year in sea.\textsuperscript{167}

Nawaz Sharif received multiple responses regarding signing of this accord. Water Accord was criticized believing that many of the aspects were ignored. It was said that could IJI government get this accord signed if the governments were not from the IJI. Second issue was that of the implementation of the Accord. Third issue was that the government showed more water than had been in use since long. Availability of extra water was questioned that was shown in the accord. Another question was that if the government was willing to release water for Sindh *Kharif* Crop from Terbela could it have enough water
to produce required quantity of electricity from the dam?\textsuperscript{168} Junejo appreciated efforts of Nawaz Sharif for signing water accord with the endorsement of all the provinces.\textsuperscript{169} Initially Qazi appreciated the water accord and called it an important decision to solve one of the bones of contention among the provinces\textsuperscript{170} but later changed his stance and started criticizing the agreement. Qazi announced that the water distribution accord was not the solution of the problems and the provinces rejected it. Qazi actually related signing the water accord with the issues regarding the construction of Kalabagh Dam. He pointed that if the agreement was acceptable why the government could not reach at a unanimous decision regarding the construction of Kalabagh Dam.\textsuperscript{171} Dr. Yaqoob of JI was of the view that actual availability was not kept in mind while deciding shares of water for the provinces. He stated that Punjab was getting water through rain and the water available through Indian rivers in winters was also ignored. He also criticized ANP for accepting the water ration as the same ratio was offered in 1972-3 but ANP rejected it at that time which brought seven billion rupees loss per year to NWFP.\textsuperscript{172}

There was an impression that the accord regarding provinces’ share of water would help to decide the construction of Kalabagh Dam but this was not the case. Some of the ministers in the Punjab gave statements in favor of construction of this dam even if the ANP quits the alliance on this question but ANP considered it a conspiracy to create gulf between ANP and PM.\textsuperscript{173} It was said by a representative of ANP and minister for Water and Power for NWFP Fareed Toofan that ANP had clearly rejected the idea of construction of Kalabagh Dam. While Haq and Dr. Muhammad Yaqoob of JI were of the view that ANP had surrendered its stance over the issue of Kalabagh Dam.\textsuperscript{174}

Water apportionment was an issue that was related to the decision of construction of dams. Kalabagh Dam, Bhasha Dam and any other dam could be constructed only after the share of water for the provinces was clearly decided. After signing Water Accord by the provinces, a committee consisting of the Chief Ministers and irrigation secretaries of all the four provinces was constituted by Nawaz Sharif government to reach at a consensus regarding this issue to move forward towards construction of Kalabagh Dam and the other dams necessary for water and energy capacity building in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{175} Qazi was of the view that construction of this Dam was technical issue which could get approved if the technical experts of all the four provinces approve it. He said a committee of technical experts should give its suggestions which must be shared with the people of all the four provinces to create consensus on the issue.\textsuperscript{176}

There was a perception that ANP signed the Water Accord and being coalition partner of IJI at center and in NWFP\textsuperscript{177} it will cooperate with the government in sorting the issues regarding the construction of Kalabagh Dam but the case was different. ANP did not hesitate in threatening the government for severe consequences against the construction of Kalabagh Dam.\textsuperscript{178} In a meeting of central working committee, ANP passed a resolution that if the government approved the plan of the construction of Kalabagh Dam, its members will resign from the assembly.\textsuperscript{179} Nawaz Sharif did not want to lose support of ANP in NWFP and NA to maintain his provincial government and 2/3 majority in Centre. Kalabagh Dam was considered important for the economic survival of the Punjab but ANP
announced that if the Dam was constructed, it will demolish it through bombing. Nawaz Sharif who seemed committed to constructing the dam delayed the plan to agree his political allies, which invited criticism. JI extended harshest comments against the government for postponement of the construction.

Construction of Kalabagh Dam was a source of rift and tension between IJI and ANP in the NWFP. ANP alleged that the IJI government was talking about the construction of Dam as a political bargain as it was important for IJI to win local bodies’ election in the Punjab. It also claimed that Mir Afzal Khan had promised to avoid the construction of the dam. It also announced that if the IJI government tried to construct the dam it could join hands with PDA and with the cooperation of the independent members it could form government without the cooperation of IJI. Activities of Fazl-e Haq group, which attracted most of the disenchanted members of PML, were also alarming for the IJI government. On the contrary, there was a perception that if ANP left the IJI, JI and the independent members of Hazara District could prefer to cooperate with IJI instead of ANP and situation for IJI would become easier to handle the politics in that particular province. A forward block of ANP, headed by Shehzada Gustasap planned to move a motion in favor of the construction of Kalabagh Dam but they were prevented to support the idea of construction of dam by Wali Khan, the leader of ANP.

Earlier, during Benazir era federal government favored the idea of the construction of the dam but its MNAs from Sindh and the members of the Sindh provincial government severely criticized its construction. The then federal minister for water and electricity, Farooq Lughari was of the view that the feasibility report of the Dam had been completed and relevant research work had been done. Construction of the dam was guaranteed being beneficial to all the provinces. All the MNAs and MPAs of the PPP belonging to Punjab supported the construction of the dam. From Sindh reaction against the dam came from G. M. Syed who announced that the construction of Kalabagh Dam would not be allowed. The statement was not denied by any member from the government and faced criticism of opposition and coalition members of IJI.

This is how the issue is still pending and is under consistent debate. The present energy crisis and time to floods are hinting about the importance of the construction of dams but without consensus any step towards construction of any dam can increase provincial conflicts. During his government under the banner of IJI, Nawaz Sharif tried to create consensus but NWFP and Sindh did not agree to the construction of Kalabagh dam and the construction of the dam is still pending.

**Nuclear Issue**

Nuclear technology is considered a key source to generate energy and strengthen defense of any country in the contemporary world. Pakistan is no exception. For a country like Pakistan, nuclear energy attains more importance because Pakistan is unable to build other sources to generate energy as it is still unable to utilize its coal and most of its other natural resources due to lack of technical facilities and resources to utilize this natural wealth.
Pakistan also can not deny importance of nuclear weapons because of having tough neighbor like India, uncertain neighbor like Afghanistan and Iran as with both these countries Pakistan could not create consistent positive relationship and there has always been fluctuation in relations of Pakistan with Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan had been mainly dependent on America for its defense requirement which also puts her into odd situation at the times of crisis America never comes to help her to enhance its defense capability as America has to keep its own interests in mind to take any decisions of support to any country regarding regional problems and conflicts. In such an uncertain situation, Pakistan needs to build its defense as strong as possible and nuclear weapons can prove to be a source of satisfaction particularly when its neighbor enemy India has been working on preparing nuclear weapons since 1974.

The 1990 was a tough year with reference to the economic substances of the country due to Gulf War, increased prices of oil in international market and suspended American military and economic aid to Pakistan. In that situation the government of Nawaz Sharif faced multiple challenges. America showed its willingness to release next installment of aid if it reduces its nuclear enrichment level to fifteen from eighty eight and announces cut on its defense budget. To get the American aid resumed Nawaz Sharif was ready to soften his stance over the nuclear issue. Some of his allies also supported the idea but JI and Ghulam Ishaq Khan were the two major forces that opposed the opinion. He even announced his softer views about the issue in an interview with New York Times. Afterwards he gave the idea of the five nation conference (FNC) to discuss an agreement to make south-Asia nuclear non-proliferated region. This stance created division in the higher cadre of Army. Meanwhile Beg got retired from the office which gave America hopes of improvement in Pak-US relations resulting to Pakistan’s compromise regarding its stance about getting nuclear weapons. But majority of the people believed that Pakistan should not sacrifice its nuclear program to get aid. Sources mentioned that PM and President asked Syeda Abida, Pakistan’s ambassador, designate to US to inform American government that there will be no rolling back of Pakistan’s nuclear program. General Asif believed that Pakistan must get nuclear status to be treated equal to India in international community. Nuclear issue was critical for the reason that it has been considered a deterrent for India to attack on Pakistan. It was believed that signing of NPT could make Pakistan susceptible to its enemies like India which would lead to face India’s military superiority in the region. Many were of the opinion that a nuclear device could not save Pakistan particularly when it is facing internal problems and economic issues which were to be increased if Pakistan was unable to improve its economic condition. International isolation was another fear faced by Pakistan. To handle the crisis Nawaz showed agreement to sign NPT if India agreed to do so and for this statement he faced criticism of his allies and others. Nawaz Sharif also floated an idea of calling a meeting of America, Russia, China, India and Pakistan to make South Asia nuclear free zone. Except India all the countries accepted the suggestion. JI criticized this suggestion believing it a conspiracy against Pakistan’s nuclear program prepared by the American government which was only, made vocal by Nawaz Sharif. Qazi was of the view that being sovereign state it was internal matter of Pakistan to decide about its nuclear or any other program and it must not be linked with any other country. Jatoi was in full agreement with the stance.
of Nawaz Sharif regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program and American aid. Mir Hazar Khan Bijrani stated that Pakistan could not reduce its defense expenditures till Kashmir issue was resolved and relations with India were improved. He exclaimed that Pakistan had to compete with India in its defense capabilities for which there was no question of reduction in defense expenditures.

The Americans suggested for an American secret inspection of Kahuta in January 1992 but the government’s three major sources of power, the President, PM and COAS joined hands on the issue and publically announced the nuclear capability to rule out any chances of rollback. There was a general perception that American aid was not a permanent feature of the economy of Pakistan and if we sign the NPT, it will make Pakistan vulnerable to India and America in terms of its defense strength. At the same time Pakistan’s defense through conventional methods could not be satisfactory in comparison with India having nuclear arms. There was a general perception that Pakistan’s nuclear capability could keep it at an equal level to India militarily.

Government faced mixed kind of response regarding any decision about attaining nuclear capability. There was a belief that Pakistan needed American aid to make progress and run the state positively and others had an opinion that America was not a permanent friend and could not be relied upon. Such debates remained continuous till the end of Nawaz Sharif government without any decision of freezing or rolling back the nuclear program of Pakistan.

Controversy over the Nomination of Presidential Candidate

Election of the president of Pakistan exacerbated problems of Nawaz Sharif. A whole lot of controversies became related with this as not any decision was made regarding presidential candidate at an appropriate time. Ghulam Ishaq Khan wanted to become president of Pakistan for the second term. Contrary to that Nawaz Sharif wanted to bring a person of his trust in the office due to the assertive attitude of the Ghulam Ishaq Khan. There is an impression that the tussle between president and PM started with the draft of the twelfth amendment which gave composite emergency powers to the PM and meant to curtail powers of president in the long run. The amendment could only get approval with several modifications, reducing proposed powers of the PM but it started problems between President and the PM. Secondly, when the President was humiliated by opposition in a joint session of parliament, members of IJI remained silent spectators which created a negative feeling in the presidency for IJI. Later Nawaz Sharif avoided consulting Ghulam Ishaq Khan about Afghanistan policy and certain other issues which increased the distance between the two. Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to improve relations with Benazir were also not appreciated by Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

To curtail powers of President, Nawaz Sharif did not hesitate to contact Benazir with an offer of holding elections a year earlier than the decided time, a common presidential candidate and an independent commission to conduct the elections. Nawaz Sharif offered PDA the office of president in the forthcoming election as well to get support to modify the eighth amendment. Appointment of Benazir as Chairperson of the Committee on
foreign affairs showed rapprochement among the government and opposition which further increased ire of president against Nawaz Sharif.\textsuperscript{203}

In an interview, Nawaz Sharif told that Ghulam Ishaq Khan worked to win over his supporters and kept on informing others that Nawaz Sharif should resign as he had lost majority in the house referring to the resignations of the MNAs and ministers of Nawaz Sharif’s cabinet.\textsuperscript{204} He told that the problems were started with the president from the very beginning of his premiership. In the first week of his premiership, Nawaz Sharif eliminated the posts of Inspector General (IG) police Islamabad and Chief Commissioner Islamabad. On this decision, president sent a letter to him to inform that it was an illegal action and was must to rectify. Nawaz Sharif told that it was just the beginning and interference of the president in the administrative matters remained continuous. The other issue between Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan was annulment of eighth amendment. Nawaz Sharif believed that the amendment could not co-exist with democracy.\textsuperscript{205} Nawaz Sharif also criticized Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s attitude during the Gulf war as he did not take any action against negative and parallel policy of Beg (COAS) about the issue.\textsuperscript{206} Ghulam Ishaq Khan believed that the amendment was part of the constitution and being custodian of constitution he had to stop any such changes that could change the outlook and balance of the constitution.

Difference of opinion on the appointment of the successor of late General Asif Nawaz also played its part in worsening things between Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif told that he could work with any general, except General Farrukh, the nominee of Ghulam Ishaq Khan and asked for anyone except him.\textsuperscript{207} There was news that Nawaz Sharif was not happy with the appointment of General Abdul Waheed Kakar as well so he fastened the moves to amend the eighth amendment which gave the right of appointment of COAS to the President. Nawaz Sharif denied this statement.\textsuperscript{208} This controversy precluded Nawaz Sharif to nominate Ghulam Ishaq Khan as IJI’s presidential candidate for the second term.

There were doubts that America did not like Ghulam Ishaq Khan for his hard core stance for nuclear program of Pakistan so it worked against his election for second term. The other thing that was highlighted was his stance to defend the constitution of Pakistan including the eighth amendment. His letters to PM against privatization of WAPDA and other national industries considering it unconstitutional also increased tension between the two. Ghulam Ishaq Khan also supported NWFP’s objection on WAPDA’s privatization under article 154 without prior permission of the provinces. The same stance was adopted about the privatization of the industries falling in the second part of the constitution. It was a must to call meeting of CCI to make any decision about these industrial units. These arguments made it difficult for Nawaz Sharif to nominate him for second term since he wanted a cooperative president to run his policies smoothly. For this purpose defense minister Ghaus Ali Shah’s name was being mentioned.\textsuperscript{209}
Ghulam Ishaq Khan had a huge support in different quarters of Pakistan. He enjoyed support in government and opposition equally. He was also enjoying comprehensive support in bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{210} He also assembled the dissidents of Nawaz Government, won favor of governors and CMs of three provinces and enhanced his strength against Nawaz Sharif.\textsuperscript{211} Kakar also favored to keep eighth amendment intact.\textsuperscript{212} It was clearly evident that Junejo’s followers extended support to president in the conflict between PM and the president\textsuperscript{213} because the eighth amendment was passed during Junejo’s premiership.

Nawaz Sharif realized the annoyance of the president for his efforts and called off the negotiations with PPP to minimize the polarization between him and Ghulam Ishaq Khan.\textsuperscript{214} To appease him, Nawaz Sharif met with Ghulam Ishaq Khan on April 14, 1993 and informed him about his selection as official presidential candidate of PML and also told that his government will not try to repeal eighth amendment. But Ghulam Ishaq Khan made some other demands in reaction to which Nawaz Sharif delivered a public speech which was used as the foremost reason of the dissolution of the NA by the president.\textsuperscript{215} There were news of rapprochement between the president and the PM but all proved rumors.\textsuperscript{216} Nawaz Sharif called off cooperation with PDA which gave an opportunity to Ghulam Ishaq Khan to get cooperation of the PPP to dismiss the government of Nawaz Sharif. The issue of next presidential candidate and other administrative issues created rift among the members of IJI and member parties started deserting the alliance.

II. The Dismemberment of the IJI

IJI lasted a little longer as compared to the other political alliances in the history of Pakistan. It survived in two general elections, remained in opposition for two years and then was able to form government. It is believed that the process of dismemberment of the alliance accelerated after the elections of 1990. There were many reasons of this deterioration. Some of them were person specific and others were linked with party demands or ideologies. The element of dissatisfaction with the leadership also played an important role in the dismemberment of IJI for example Jatoi was expecting to become PM after the 1990 elections but was refused. Qazi declined to join the government and decided to play the role of opposition. Smaller parties were not given share according to their demands in the government although these parties had hardly any representation in the parliament. Poya, leader of HJ expected to get a seat in the Senate but he was declined the alliance ticket. Sami and Pir Fazal had their own reservations. With the passage of time these reservations and problems became prominent and played their role in the disbanding the alliance.\textsuperscript{217} To handle such a broad based alliance is less difficult while in opposition but to keep such union satisfied being in government is fairly challenging.

Nawaz Sharif, convener of IJI faced many difficulties to run the government smoothly. In 1991, he extended cabinet and gave ministries to many including the members of ANP but failed to make JI part of his vast cabinet. He was also unsuccessful to adjust JUI and JAH in his cabinet. Political parties with religious orientation could not become part of cabinet which proved negative for Nawaz Sharif to administer things positively.\textsuperscript{218} Nawaz Sharif could run the government comparatively smoothly if he was able to keep the support of the
religious parties but being confident of the strength of PML inside the assemblies, he ignored the fact that the religious parties were one of the important sources of his success. These factors did not allow the alliance to work smoothly and one by one member parties detached for their own reasons. HJ was the first among them which was followed by NPP and JI respectively.

**Hizb-e Jihad (September 29, 1991)**

Poya’s HJ was expelled in September 1991 after the meeting of the heads of IJI. The summit seemed an arrangement to expel HJ from the alliance. In the meeting PML, JI, NPP, IPG, JMP and JAH were invited. JUI and HJ were ignored even after demand of other member parties. It was announced that the decision was made unanimously as directed in the constitution of IJI but in fact the decision was made through the vote of majority. The decision was made for Poya’s participation in PDA public meetings and his statements against the IJI government. Poya’s public appearances with Nasrullah, a political foe of PML and IJI was not acceptable for IJI leadership.

After his expulsion, Poya asked the president to dismiss the government and appoint a government of national consensus as in his opinion the existing government had failed to perform its duties. Poya justified his participation in the public meetings of PDA and Nasrullah with the argument that president’s support for Jam and Irfan Marwat in Sindh left no reason for Ghulam Ishaq Khan to continue as president of Pakistan. He called the government of Nawaz Sharif corrupt for its conduct regarding the process adopted for privatization of national institutions like MCB, Toyota company scandal and the cooperatives scam.

Poya criticized the decision of his expulsion from IJI. He said that he was charged of ignoring party discipline but actually was convicted for his criticism against wrong policies of government. Poya stated that he left IJI because it decided to roll-back the nuclear program. According to him, PM had decided to expel him from the alliance before meeting of IJI heads. He said that he was asked to apologize for his criticism against the government but he stood for his words believing that his statements were true. He appreciated the attitude of Qazi and Jatoi for his support. Poya also announced launching of Awami Islami Mahaz (Public Religious Front, AIM) against IJI government with a primary object of implementation of Shari’ah.

IJI adopted a stance that Poya had problems for a Senate seat for which he adopted the policy of opposition. Poya’s attitude shows that he was dissatisfied with the government policies and preferred to adopt the policy of agitation. He adopted the view point of opposition that the only solution of political problems was dissolution of assemblies and change of government. The slogan of formulating a national government was raised by the opposition and Poya picked it at once. Some of the politicians were of the view that a person, having a single member political party, could only bring such demand forward was working with the support of some hidden hand against Nawaz Sharif’s slogan of economic self-dependence. He was the member of Shari’ah Committee and he tried to agree Sami and other committee
members to adopt the method of agitation as was done in Iran during Islamic revolution instead of limiting it inside parliament which was rejected by other political leaders in the best national interests. Others believed that the criticism on government’s policies must be recorded in the meeting of the heads of IJI by its members and whosoever ignored the rule must face disciplinary action.\textsuperscript{228}

Most of the prominent leaders of IJI and others criticized the expulsion of one of the founding members.\textsuperscript{229} The criticism increased for IJI’s decision to appoint Pir Fazal, the prominent leader of HJ as secretary information of IJI replacing Poya till the selection of new secretary information.\textsuperscript{230} Member parties of IJI were planning to change the president of IJI for his non-consultative attitude. Sec. Gen. of IJI resigned from the office for this reason but in the meeting of heads of IJI, HJ was expelled from the alliance.\textsuperscript{231} There was an impression that Nawaz Sharif gave a silent message to all the member parties to avoid criticism against the government otherwise could be expelled.

**NPP (February 1992)**

NPP was second after HJ, which faced expulsion from the eight parties’ political alliance, the IJI. Jatoi and his NPP were sacked from the membership of IJI because of its increasing relations with PDA. IJI leadership had problems with the increasing links between PPP/PDA and Jatoi. Jatoi also made attempts to mend relationship with Khar which was not appreciated by IJI leadership. Nawaz Sharif suggested him to avoid relationship with opponents of IJI but Jatoi refused to reduce contacts with PDA. Nawaz Sharif discussed the matter with other member parties of IJI to resolve the issue. JI stated that IJI was an ideological alliance and if any of its members gets involved with its ideological opponents, its membership could be terminated through a majority vote as was done in the case of HJ. Earlier on March 15, Qazi stated that there were no chances of reconciliation with Jatoi because of his improved relationship with PPP without consulting the IJI leadership. The Central Executive Committee of PML, demanded to call a meeting of the heads of the member parties of IJI and take serious action in response to the attitude of Jatoi.\textsuperscript{232}

IJI did not wish to make decision in haste and wanted to postpone the termination of NPP for an appropriate time but news about Jatoi’s decision to leave the alliance, expedited the process and NPP was formally expelled from the alliance in March 1992. IJI leadership planned to take the issue to the speaker of NA as well to get the membership of Jatoi cancelled to prevent him from creating united opposition in the NA against the government\textsuperscript{233} but the plan was not materialized. Nawaz Sharif stated that this expulsion was made for better and safer future of the alliance.

IJI and NPP both were unhappy with each other and both had problems with the behavior of the other. Jatoi had certain reservations against the IJI leadership; local bodies’ elections in the Punjab and Islamabad-Lahore Motorway which according to him made him think to cooperate with PDA and Nasrullah. Government did not entertain these reservations increased problems between Jatoi and Nawaz Sharif.\textsuperscript{234} From the room of the hotel, where
Jatoi was residing, some spying instruments were found which were called an action of a secret agency. Jatoi criticized this act as being part of ruling coalition and a senior politician; it was not tolerable for him. Jatoi pointed that IJI was following the policies of PML and there was hardly any stance of IJI visible in the alliance plans. He considered himself justified in his cooperation with Benazir and

Nawabzada Nasrullah. Jatoi also felt positive to play the role of a mediator between Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Benazir to reduce conflicts between the two leaders.

All these issues did not become too critical till the election of Syed Muzaffar Shah as CM Sindh. Jatoi wanted to get his son elected for the office of CM Sindh but could not get required support for this and decided to support the IJI nominee. Although Jatoi supported the IJI’s decision for the next CM Sindh but he could not reconcile with this decision and continued his efforts get his son Masroor Jatoi elected as CM Sindh. There was a debate that if Jatoi’s sons and other relatives were enjoying ministries at federal and provincial level than why did he decide to change loyalties. Masroor told that NPP was not taken into confidence while the decision to elect Shah as CM was made by IJI leadership, which became the reason of NPP’s reaction. He explained that his party withdrew his nomination for the office after IJI leadership’s assurance of not taking solo flights for decisions of national interest. Some of the people believed that Jatoi wanted to get sympathies of PPP for local bodies elections for which he strained the relations with IJI. Others believed that Jatoi was looking for his premiership with the support of PPP in near future. Some others mentioned that non-consultative attitude of Nawaz Sharif was not acceptable for NPP who according to many members of NPP and other parties did not pay much attention to IJI or its member parties after becoming PM.

After the election of Shah the task of cabinet formation was delayed to check the decision of NPP as the cooperation of NPP with PPP was evident. Jatoi wanted to get full benefit of his position as he got promise of newly elected CM that he will include three nominees of Jatoi in the cabinet. This showed multiple layers of political strategy of Jatoi. On the one side he tried to get his son elected as CM, later announced that his son will serve the people as leader of the opposition in Sindh and got promise of CM Sindh as well to include his three nominees in the Sindh Cabinet. Giving an afterthought to his decision, he denied any representation of his party members in the cabinet arguing that like JI, his party decided to serve the people without joining any cabinet.

On the contrary, IJI members perceived the whole episode in a different way. They believed that attitude of Jatoi had been problematic since he failed to get office of the PM. He created problems for the government several times and caused embarrassment. Once he announced that the elections of 1990 were rigged and some political leaders were kept out of the assembly through planning. These statements supported PDA’s allegations of rigging in the 1990 elections which has been discussed in the previous chapter in detail. Enhanced relation of Jatoi with Benazir was annoying for the members of IJI. Last nail in coffin of the cooperation of NPP with IJI was his cooperation with PDA at the time of elections of CM Sindh after the death of Jam Sadiq. His plans to get his son elected as CM
Sindh left him nowhere in the politics of IJI and its leadership decided to expel NPP from the alliance. There were doubts that without cooperation of the NPP, IJI government may not survive in Sindh since the newly elected CM Shah did not enjoy support of too many MPAs there but Shah’s assurance of survival to the federal government made the decision of NPP’s expulsion easy.

Nawaz Sharif did not have any problems in surviving at federal level as well even without NPP because PDA and NPP after joining hands could get only sixty members’ support which was not enough to remove his government in the house of two hundred and ten. Nawaz Sharif had support of MQM and PNA as well and there was hardly any chance of these parties to change sides at that particular time period. Because of being confident of not losing government at national or provincial level, Nawaz Sharif confidently decided to part ways with NPP to give an impression that cooperation of alliance members with PDA/PPP will not be tolerated.

Many of the members of IJI appreciated the decision of the expulsion of NPP. Working Committee of PML appreciated the decision of the president of IJI believing that outside the alliance platform criticism on the alliance policies was harmful for the unity of IJI and the expulsion of NPP will bring harmony in the ranks of IJI. Leader of JMP showed his total agreement with the decision of the expulsion of NPP from IJI. He said that Jatoi extended cooperation to those who were enemies of Pakistan which could not be tolerated.

Sami called the expulsion, an egoistic decision. According to him PM did not consult any of the alliance party before this decision. According to Sami, Nawaz Sharif could not ask any member party to follow the alliance discipline while he himself was ignoring all the rules as only in IJI summit any of the parties could be exorcized from the alliance. Qazi and Ghafoor criticized the decision of expulsion of NPP from the IJI believing that the constitution of IJI did not allow so. He even suggested Jatoi to go to the Court against the decision of Nawaz Sharif. They were of the view that Nawaz Sharif sacked Murtaza in haste. It was better to take such decisions in the meeting of the heads of IJI. After dismissal of NPP, IJI leadership wanted to get the decision approved in the meeting of IJI heads but Qazi denied rectifying the decision unconditional. Leader of JUP (Niazi) Maulana Abdus Sattar had a mixed kind of opinion. He did not appreciate NPP’s expulsion believing it worthless to bring any positive impact of the IJI. At the same time he criticized NPP for discussing internal matters of IJI on other forums instead of discussing it in the meeting of the heads of IJI.

Wyne explained that Jatoi was expelled from the alliance after consultation with other parties of the alliance like JAH, JMP, and Fakhar Imam of IPG and Qazi who admitted the fact that Nawaz Sharif discussed matter with him. He said that Jatoi’s lobbying to get his son elect as CM Sindh after the death of Jam and joining hands with PDA was not a democratic attitude and if he wanted to enhance his relation with PDA he should had left IJI before going towards PDA. According to Wyne the IJI meeting could bring mud-slinging against each other and the alliance could destabilize which was avoided by not
summoning the IJI meeting and the alliance president consulted about the issue with different member parties of the alliance separately.

Jatoi said that Nawaz Sharif’s term of office was expired in February, 1992 and the Secretary General of the alliance had already resigned. He said that if there was no top hierarchy in the office, how a member party could be expelled. Minister for health replied that till the next meeting of the heads of the alliance parties Nawaz Sharif will remain its president. He further said that PML was the major party in the alliance so change of the president of the alliance was hardly expected in the next presidential elections of the IJI.

After being expelled from IJI, NPP extended cooperation to PDA which increased problems for Nawaz Sharif calling him hypocrite with a dictatorial mind. He said Nawaz Sharif could never make decisions through consultations with his allies. He said that he would not go to any court of justice against the decision of Nawaz Sharif as the decision was a source of relief for him. Jatoi discussed expulsion of Poya’s HJ and scandal against Sami. Nawaz Sharif never paid attention to any of his suggestions, he added. According to him major decisions like coalition of IJI and PDA in Baluchistan was Nawaz Sharif’s independent decision.

Attitude of both Nawaz Sharif and Jatoi was not positive. Jatoi criticized IJI government, extended his relations with PDA and at the time of election of CM Sindh after death of Jam Sadiq his attitude was critical. Responding to that instead of trying to sort out the problem, Nawaz Sharif expelled Jatoi’s son, Murtaza from federal cabinet and later just after consulting leaders of member parties of IJI he expelled NPP from IJI. He did not consider political position of Jatoi, particularly in Sindh, where Jatoi could create problems in the long run. At the same time such one sided decisions could create unrest inside the ranks of the alliance which soon became prominent as the attitude of JI became more rebellious. In such a scenario Nawaz Sharif wanted to call the meeting of the heads of member parties of IJI to decide about the future of IJI. But the Punjab PML wanted to call the session after a month’s time and during that time future strategy must be decided. They supported the idea of maintaining alliance with the support of PML, JMP, IPG, and JAH. JI and JUI should decide their future. There was another impact of this expulsion that internal differences became known to public. It seemed that alliance had completed its work of countering power of the PPP and then it started dispersing as individual parties as they existed before October 1988.

**JI (May 1992)**

After HJ and NPP, it was JI which deserted the IJI. There was a difference in the process as HJ and NPP were expelled from the alliance while JI left it for its own reasons. Although there was not a smooth sailing of JI with IJI leadership in the first two years of the alliance but the problems exacerbated when IJI won the elections and formed government. JI had problems with government stratagem about handling the issues of Afghanistan, Kashmir, Palestine, Nuclear program, Islamization, *riba* based economy and law and order inside
Pakistan. All these issues are discussed in detail in the previous sections of this chapter. First thing that gave birth to differences was JI’s denial to join cabinet. It was said by IJI leadership that JI demanded Foreign and Finance ministries which were denied by the government and it denied accepting any other while Qazi explained that his party was not interested in getting ministries, it only wanted to appoint those who had deep commitment with Islam in the ministries of foreign office, finance, education and information.

JI had a long list of grumbles against the leadership of IJI. According to the leadership of JI, the government ignored the manifesto and constitution of the alliance. Meetings of the heads of IJI could not be held for long period of time. Nawaz Sharif ignored to conduct elections of office bearers of the alliance. Cabinet members were ignored in the decision making process and allied parties were expelled unconstitutionally from the alliance. He said that in foreign policy matters, government did not listen to the point of view of the allies. Qazi told that apparently it was the Afghanistan issue that led the JI’s withdrawal from the alliance with the approval of its Shoora (consultative body of JI) on May 16, 1992 but actually Shoora had decided to dissociate from the IJI in its April session due to multiple issues, aspiring to play a better role as opposition. He further added that even after quitting the alliance, JI will not participate in any movement to dislodge the IJI government as according to him there was no replacement of Nawaz Sharif available at that time. He also announced to not resign from the assemblies and will cooperate with the government in its positive policies. Responding to this IJI president, Nawaz Sharif decided to avoid policy of confrontation for which it announced the decision of not filing any reference of defection against JI in the courts.

Liaquat Baluch listed the reasons of JI’s quit from IJI. These were also shared with common people through a press release. According to him Nawaz Sharif was president of the alliance but he did not follow any rules and never cared for party discipline and ignored manifesto, instead, he contradicted each of its clause. He ignored the promises to implement Shari’ah and sought cooperation of regional parties out of ambit of IJI without consultation of the member parties. JI argued that after joining hands with MQM and ANP, IJI had lost its ideological face. He further added that there was no serious arrangement to improve law and order in Sindh. Liaquat also mentioned that Nawaz Sharif asked bureaucracy to form policies of his own choice. Nawaz Sharif’s deviation from constitution regarding Islamic Laws, his encouragement of ministers to give statements in favor of riba and launching all the schemes including self-employment under heavy interest. Government’s lighter stance about nuclear program to get back economic and military support was also not acceptable for JI. Liaquat said that his party tried its best to get Nawaz Sharif back in the orbit of IJI manifesto but failed. He said that JI lost its independent identity that was based on Islamic ideology for which JI decided to quit the alliance. Almost similar views were given repeatedly by Qazi and other leaders of JI at multiple occasions. Qazi announced that the decision of quitting IJI was a well thought decision.
taken in Shoora of JI and approved by central executive committee so it could not be withdrawn.\textsuperscript{271}

Earlier, to appease or correct these complaints and avoid further disintegration of the alliance, Nawaz Sharif sent his brother Shabbaz Sharif to discuss the issues with JI leadership and prepare the agenda of the meeting of the IJI parties. Qazi wanted to discuss two things: previous efforts of the government to fulfill the promises made in the manifesto and future line of action of the government. To normalize relations with JI, Nawaz Sharif met with its leaders and after discussion a common press release was issued according to which Nawaz Sharif promised to form a parliamentary committee consisting of the representatives of the member parties of IJI according to their quantum of representation in the assembly. It was decided that the committee will work under Nawaz Sharif. One thing that was critical was that JI demanded all decisions of this committee unanimous. Secondly, JI demanded to sort all important issues in this committee before presenting them in the NA which was not acceptable for PM.\textsuperscript{272} Before second round of talks Qazi announced on March 9, 1992 that the dissolution of the alliance was obvious which should be done in a meeting of the heads of IJI parties.\textsuperscript{273} This and other such statements created negative impact on second round of talks which ended without any positive results. It was said that Nawaz Sharif wanted to keep JI under IJI’s fold in the same arrangement or some new arrangement but Qazi did not want to continue with IJI.\textsuperscript{274} Keeping the importance of JI in view, CM Punjab Wyne asked JI to reconsider its decision of leaving the alliance. He believed that difference of opinion on national issues could be resolved through discussions.\textsuperscript{275} PM also issued Kashmir funds to JI to use it for Kashmir Cause but any such move could not appease JI.\textsuperscript{276} JI told Nawaz Sharif that he could be expelled from the alliance if he did not stop using IJI platform for his personal benefits.

Keeping in view the attitude of the leaders of JI, Wyne told them to adopt a balanced demeanor and stop giving deadlines to PM for implementation of Shari’ah and other administrative issues. He further asked to opt for leaving the alliance without making relations nastier, if they did not want to continue. Wyne was critical for JI’s attitude of discussing internal matters of IJI in Public.\textsuperscript{277} Junejo also asked JI to discuss issues in the meeting of the heads of allied parties of IJI instead of discussing them publically.\textsuperscript{278} A PML leader, Senator Mahmood Ahmad Minto suggested Nawaz Sharif to not bow against the pressure tactics of JI.\textsuperscript{279} There was unrest and negative feeling among the members of PML against the JI for its consistent critical attitude and pressure tactics.

There was a mixed kind of response towards the quitting of JI from IJI. There was an opinion that JI and PML decided it mutually to part ways to measure their strength.\textsuperscript{280} The chief of JMP, Naeem-ur Rehman Naemi demanded JI members’ resignations from NA, PAs and Senate. He said that people gave mandate to IJI, not to JI so if it left the alliance it was a moral obligation to resign from NA and PAs and contest elections again for the same seats.\textsuperscript{281} JI’s dissociation from the IJI made people to think that it was in favor of PML. It will be able to grow in the political scenario and make some independent decisions but at the same time it was feared that parting of ways of JI and PML could help the leftist parties to grow.\textsuperscript{282} Nawaz Sharif was not worried about the political scenario after JI’s exit
from IJI. Nawaz Sharif had support of 100 PML MNAs along with MQM (15), ANP (7), FATA (8) and support of some independents kept Nawaz Sharif strong inside the Assembly. After consultation with PML, parliamentary group Nawaz Sharif announced the IJI will be maintained with letter and spirit and for the purpose discussions with leaders of other member parties of the alliance were planned.\textsuperscript{283} Nawaz Sharif believed that most of his party-men were happy so he had no problems with JI’s desertion from the alliance. He believed that JI was major hurdle in the peaceful solution of Afghanistan problem so it was better for the government to get separate from it. Some sources hinted that after dissociation of JI, IJI had become weak for which Nawaz Sharif offered dialogue to PPP but he denied such allegations believing parting of ways by eight MNAs could hardly create any negative impact on the government of IJI. He told that contact with PPP was only an attempt to solve problems of the common people which had nothing to do with JI’ quit from IJI.\textsuperscript{284} JI had never been part of the government as JI did not join cabinet and from the very first day of IJI government it adopted the role of a critic for which Nawaz Sharif and his colleagues felt JI’s resignation from IJI positive as it was more difficult for government to defend itself against the criticism of an ally.

JI played the politics carefully. It demanded the meeting of IJI heads for several times but did nothing seriously as not a single requisition letter was submitted by JI to the president of IJI.\textsuperscript{285} JI kept on asking for enforcement of Shari’ah but what it practically did during the ruling period of IJI when it even denied joining the cabinet. Interest free economy was difficult to adopt at once. Being member of an international economic system and stake holder how Pakistan could change the economic system.\textsuperscript{286} Was it not an attitude of not taking any responsibility? Could it only perform in the office of finance or foreign ministry? Why it did not opt for the ministry of religious affairs? Was it not the effort to save its excuse for future that if the religious parties are elected they can change the society? Was it not possible for JI to work in a practical way being part of government to assure the people the capability or religious parties to bring changes?

For all the way long, during his premiership, Nawaz Sharif remained defensive in front of JI because he was not president of his party and if he had tried to become president the PML could be divided into two factions as many of the PML members had been supporting JI which kept Nawaz Sharif under pressure. To solve the problems between IJI and JI many rounds of talks held between JI leadership and IJI leaders but both the groups were not ready to leave their stance about the national issues for which the relationship could not move towards improvement and ended at the parting of ways of JI with the IJI.

**Other Allied Parties**

The three major parties dissociated from the alliance. Others remained part of the IJI till the dissolution of the alliance but they too did not enjoy cordial relations with the IJI particularly with its president. Only JMP and JAH were the members of IJI that had no grievances but both these parties were relatively less significant particularly JMP was called just paper party having only one or two members.\textsuperscript{287} IPG also did not raise any
significant objections with reference to the performance of the IJI or the attitude of its leadership.

Sami of JUI (S) had multiple problems with the working of the alliance and its leadership. Sami was critic of the policies of the government particularly its toeing the American policy with reference to Afghanistan. He was also not happy with government’s negligence regarding amendments in Shari’ah Bill as were promised in April. He also demanded consultation of the alliance before taking any decisions about issues of national importance.  

Sami also had problems with the ouster on JAH from the alliance. All these issues became burning when sex scandal against Sami came in the limelight after which Sami distanced himself from the alliance and resigned from the office of its vice-president. Later the meeting of the council of JUI (S) was called on December 8, 1991. Before that meeting, during November 1991 most of the office bearers of JUI (S) had resigned from the IJI offices throughout the country. In the meeting of the heads of IJI on December 28, 1991 it was decided to bring back Sami in the alliance and address his reservations about the working of the IJI. Mutual discussions of Sami with Shahbaz Sharif softened his approach towards IJI and resignations of members of JUI were withdrawn. Later in March he changed the stance and announced his conviction to reorganize the alliance by holding fresh elections for the top hierarchy of the alliance and to expel those parties from the alliance which defied its manifesto. With a long story of conflicts, dissatisfaction and mutual disagreements, JUI (S) remained the member of IJI till its dissolution.

There was an impression that after losing the support of its original allies NPP, HJ and JI Nawaz Sharif tried to get support of Islami Jamhoori Mahaz (IJM) consisting of JUP of Noorani and JUI (F) but both the parties showed their reservations regarding the adoption of interest free economic system. Another suggestion was to make an alliance of IJI with ANP, MQM, JUI (F) to strengthen the position of Nawaz Sharif after the loss of IJI’s primary allies. There were opinions that ANP would agree because it found Nawaz Sharif a better ally as compare to PPP. Mutual cooperation could prove beneficial in the next elections for both the parties as well. After dissociation of JI with IJI, NPP started its efforts to form a third alliance along with other two alliances; the PDA and APC which added to the difficulties of Nawaz Sharif.

Since IJI had lost its three important parties there was a debate about the formal dissolution of IJI. After the ouster of HJ only president of the alliance was working. Other high offices were not being cared by any one. Sec. Gen. and vice president of IJI had resigned and the ouster of HJ emptied the office of the secretary information as well, which was filled by Deputy Secretary Information of the IJI. There were problems with heads of the member parties. They had no rule of law or ethics to follow. Many of the leaders used to criticize leadership of their alliance on different forums that brought embarrassment for the members of IJI. Weakness of the alliance leadership was also there. Only two meetings of the heads of member parties of IJI since 1990 elections were held so the member parties had no proper forum to criticize the government policies. The other factor that played critical role was there was no explanation call of those who broke the rules of the alliance which allowed other members as well to do the same.
There were suggestions of dissolving alliance but it was argued that IJI was an alliance which formed government with the mandate of the people of Pakistan and that could not be dissolved till the assembly was working. There was a suggestion to maintain the alliance of PML, JI and JMP and others should be excluded but this idea did not work and instead others JI left the alliance. Some of the thinkers believed that if IJI was dissolved its members will lose their right to remain member of the assemblies. Others believed that it was a political alliance and if the alliance was dissolved all of its parties had the right to form their own parliamentary groups and sit in the assemblies in their own position. Defection Clause was another thing that was considered critical but the ordinance issued by Ghulam Ishaq Khan before 1990 election could not be approved according to which any member of the party had to lose his seat if changes his/her loyalty to its party but this ordinance could not be passed in the assembly so the defection clause was not effective. Justice (Retired) Dr. Javed Iqbal stated that although the defection clause was not effective but it was moral responsibility of all the members of IJI to go to the people for fresh mandate, as after the dissolution of the alliance, the forum will not be there through which these members got themselves elected. The real fact behind these statements was that most of the members of the alliance were dissatisfied with the working of the alliance but none of them wanted to take the responsibility of dissolution of the alliance believing that any party that will initiate it, will lose the confidence of its voters. Within few months of losing the support of JI, government of Nawaz Sharif became under serious crisis due to the pressure of resignations of MNAs and difference of opinion with the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan which resulted in the dissolution of the NA on April 18, 1993.

III. Dismissal of Nawaz Government

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved National Assembly considering it in the best interest of the nation. He criticized the economic policies of the government. According to the dissolution order of the president, Nawaz Sharif did not respect the institutions as PM of Pakistan and interfered in the administrative matters. He alleged that Nawaz Sharif used to use abusive language as well. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan stated that he had no personal problems with Nawaz Sharif but being the custodian of constitution he had to take care of many things. He said that in parliamentary system cabinet has a key role to play but for months cabinet does not meet. Nawaz Sharif had not time to meet members of his cabinet, and above all being president he had the right to know the important policy matters which Nawaz Sharif never cared.

According to Liaquat Balouch Nawaz Sharif gained confidence of establishment as he was a source to contain power of Benazir and Junejo. This made him to think himself a strong leader. After the dismissal of Benazir establishment did not need Nawaz Sharif as he was required earlier. All that he could do was to strengthen his alliance and take political moves intelligently but he relied on MQM and ANP instead of IJI and tried to collect all the powers in his hands. He also had problems with the authority that was being enjoyed by the
president like appointment of higher judiciary and COAS. This thought took him in conflict with Ghulam Ishaq Khan which expedited the process of dismissal of his government.\textsuperscript{301}

Government of Nawaz Sharif was the third dismissal in five years under the Eighth Amendment but this time public response was different towards the dismissed government. Overall the public came out to support Nawaz Sharif against the presidential decision of dismissal of his government. People gathered on railway stations from where the train of ex-PM had to pass raising slogan \textit{Qadam barhao Nawaz Sharif ham tumhary saath hain} (just make a decision we are with you Nawaz Sharif). This announcement of public support was a source of courage for Nawaz Sharif and at the same time an indicator for the establishment that the situation was different from the previous dismissals.

Nawaz Sharif filed a petition in the Supreme Court against the president’s order of dissolution of the NA. Majority of the judges the Court accepted his petition, holding that the discretion conferred on President under Article 58(2) (b) was not absolute. Supreme Court announced that in the instant case the action taken did not fall within the realm of this provision calling it a violation of the Article 17 of the Constitution. With this judgment premiership of Nawaz Sharif and the National Assembly was restored after thirty eight days of its dissolution.\textsuperscript{302} Ten out of eleven judges of the SC declared that the action taken by the president on April 18, 1993 was illegal and did not come in the purview of the Article 58 2(B) and other clauses of the constitution. In the light of this judgment NA, Cabinet and the PM were re-instated at a position of pre-April 18, 1993 on May 26, 1993. Only one Judge Mr. Sajjad Ali Shah opposed the decision of the full bench of the SC.\textsuperscript{303} Within a very few days, on May 27, 1993 he obtained vote of confidence from the House receiving 123 votes but later developments forced him to resign and opt for fresh election in the country.\textsuperscript{304} Provincial Assemblies of the Punjab and NWFP were dissolved and the political situation became more critical than ever before. COAS Kakar played his role in the situation and the assemblies were dissolved to hold fresh elections.\textsuperscript{305} This state of affairs caught Nawaz Sharif in a difficult situation to handle.

\textbf{IV. Nawaz Sharif: Handling the Problems of a re-instated Government}

After getting his government reinstated, Nawaz Sharif had to meet many challenges. Most prominent among these challenges was reinstatement of IJI government in the provinces. The severe most crunch was faced in the Punjab as after dissolution of his government in April, he lost favorable government of Wyne through a vote of noconfidence and was replaced by Manzoor Wattoo. Mian Azhar, the then Governor of the Punjab also resigned. The new Governor Ch. Altaf was an anti-Nawaz person. This created such a crisis in the province that could lead to an armed conflict between the Punjab Police and army.\textsuperscript{306}
There were attempts to create problems for Nawaz Sharif in Balochistan as well for which there seemed some activity against the then CM of Balochistan, Zulfikar Ali Magsi. Instead of waiting for some action from the opposition, Zulfikar Ali Magsi himself asked for a vote of confidence from the House and received twenty two votes. This told all the problem mongers to leave their attempts on the provincial government there. Thus the plan to establish anti-Nawaz government in Balochistan to increase problems for him failed.

In Sindh things were not easy to handle particularly after the exclusion of NPP from IJI and the death of Jam Sadiq Ali. Muzaffar Hussain Shah was the only PML representative in the provincial assembly of Sindh but still IJI was able to maintain its government there which was not easy to handle. During the life of Jam Sadiq there was a balance of power between Jam, MQM, Pir Pagaro, Jatoi, Makhdoom Family and independents but after his death all of these public representatives proved to be sources of problem for the federal government. The Law and order situation was alarming in the province. There were expectations that Nawaz Sharif will improve his relations with the president and will manage things positively but due to confrontation between him and the president, problems in the province increased every day.

Provincial governments of NWFP and Sindh adopted stances against Nawaz Sharif which went against him and he could not handle the national and provincial problems although the Supreme Court decided that dismissal of his government was unjustified. The problems increased when the governments of NWFP and Punjab announced to start long-march and surround the federal capital. Benazir sent a letter to Nawaz Sharif asking for recreation of election commission, announcing of a date for fresh elections and constitutional amendments which could not receive a positive response and Benazir decided to start a long march against the government of Nawaz Sharif with the help of other political parties. Some of the political leaders tried to start direct discussions between PM and Benazir to avoid Martial Law which could interrupt democratic system if the Long March was started. Armed forces of Pakistan asked the political leadership to solve the political problems through discussion and avoid public agitation. There was another speculation that if the long march started Ghulam Ishaq Khan could dissolve the assemblies again. COAS Kakar played a role of a mediator to avoid long-march due to critical condition of economy and the situation on the international boundaries. He discussed things with Benazir and she announced the plummeting the idea of long-march without consulting other leaders of APC. Keeping in view the whole political scenario Nawaz Sharif opted for holding fresh elections to resolve the problems. He also worked to get the resignation of the President as well from the office of the president as he believed that the presence of Ghulam Ishaq Khan in the office will never let the democracy grow. On July 18, 1993 both head of the state and head of the government resigned their jobs because of the mediation of COAS and a six months prolonged crisis ended.

A last minute effort was done by Ejaul Haq to save the NA for which he tried to move no-confidence motion against Nawaz Sharif but the motion could not be submitted and the government of Nawaz Sharif ended with his request to president for the dissolution of the assembly. One thing which was prominent was that there seemed no alliance in the whole political scenario. Although major parties like NPP and JI had left IJI but still it was alliance
of five parties but none of them seemed active and none stood with Nawaz Sharif to handle the problems faced by his government.

Generally Nawaz Sharif was considered responsible for the failure or the dissolution of the assembly and that of the IJI. A foremost point against Nawaz Sharif was his attitude of consulting things at different levels with individuals instead of parties or alliance leadership. He had a group of five members that was generally called his ‘Kitchen Cabinet’ where most of the consultation was done. He met several times with Qazi and Sami separately but general meetings of the heads of IJI were not called at regular intervals which increased misunderstandings among the member parties of IJI. It was generally perceived and told by the other members of the IJI that he did not know to work with a team or keep cooperation of his allies. Nawaz Sharif’s intolerant attitude even in cabinet meetings is also highlighted by his critics.

Another point that was raised more often was that Nawaz Sharif, being the president of IJI did not pay attention to the organization of IJI at grassroots level for which he could not take most of the decision valiantly. There were arguments that having not in his priorities, Nawaz Sharif did not find time to pay attention to alliance’s organization. There was a suggestion to form an IJI forum or a Parliamentary Committee consisting of nine or eleven members. Division of members was suggested as; PML 4, JI 2, JUI 1, and NPP 1. President of IJI had to chair the committee and one member each of JAH and JUI (N) could be added. It was suggested to discuss all the parliamentary issues on that forum before taking them to parliament which could build consensus of IJI parties and harmony in them as well. It was said that this committee could publicize these decisions among the common people and could work to organize IJI at among them. But the idea could not be materialized as most of the member parties including PML and Nawaz Sharif were more interested in building image of their party among the common people instead of the IJI.

Cooperation with ANP in NWFP and with MQM in Sindh created problems for Nawaz Sharif. Due to cooperation with ANP and its aggressive attitude, there were problems in the ranks of PML. JI also became annoyed with the IJI leadership for its alliance with ANP. In Sindh, JI and MQM were political enemies and the cooperation of IJI with MQM forced JI to get away from IJI. This cooperation also created problems in the implementation of IJI manifesto. IJI leadership had to review its Afghanistan policy to gratify ANP and JI had to tolerate MQM’s aggression against its members in Sindh and implementation of Shari’ah as well.

According to another point of view sharing power with ANP and MQM was in the best interest of IJI government and nation as cooperation of regional parties integrate provinces. Secondly IJI’s alliance with ANP was important to keep its government in NWFP and with MQM in Sindh and ultimately at Centre. This argument was not acceptable for JI as it believed that IJI itself had enough representation in the provinces and the IJI being in alliance with MQM and ANP had to surrender its agenda which
resulted in internal rifts of IJI which ultimately resulted in its dissolution.
Nawaz Sharif faced crisis particularly due to his habit of pacifying the criticism instead of properly debating the issues to find solutions. This attitude created problems for him. For example he changed the twelfth amendment to please members of his own party but because of this effort the bill lost its actual strength and invited criticism from within the IJI ranks. Secondly, religious parties kept their demands too high. They forgot the fact that they were the coalition partners of the parties that were not religion based and the votes secured by the IJI were polled by the religious minded people but they did not favor to make Pakistan a theocracy. Their demands were too high to be met by the government of Nawaz Sharif who was leader of a coalition consisting of political parties with divergent views like PML, ANP and JI etc. In such a situation it was difficult to work under the banner of an alliance but formal dissolution of the alliance could make all its members liable to defection clause of the constitution. Nawaz Sharif could not take bold decisions for not being central leader of his own party and in case of alliance’s dissolution it could be difficult for him to remain PM. Despite many efforts alliance could not live for long because its major party PML found more ideological proximity with the parties outside the alliance and tried to get their support instead of taking care of the reservations and point of view of the member parties of IJI.

Notes and References

1. Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 which received world-wide opposition. U.S. President George H. W. Bush deployed American forces in Saudi Arabia and asked other countries for military and economic support. Different countries joined the coalition against Iraq. Majority of the military officials belonged to United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in the war against Iraq.

2. There was hardly any friendly or positive relationship between the two countries. In the past years Iraq had never supported Pakistan. In Pakistan’s wars with India and in other foreign policy issues, the government of Iraq always supported India.


Jalal al Ridha and some other parties were of the view that attack on Kuwait by Iraq was part of American grand design according to which it wanted to weaken the Muslim countries of Middle East at political and defense level. It actually wanted Israel to grow as a great power of the region that could not be challenged by any other country of that region. They also believed that America wanted to get control on the oil reserves of that region which could assure unhindered oil supply to America and American control on the industrial growth of Germany and Japan by having the oil reserves under its custody. Nasrullah Ghilzai, “Dhamkiōn kei bāwajōd Hardtāl Nākām rahī”, _Takbeer_, February 21, 1991. p. 42. Also see “Gulf Crisis Conspiracy against Muslims”, _Dawn_, January 13, 1991, “Qazi Accuses Yaqub of Being pro-America”, _Frontier Post_, January 20, 1991, _Jang_, January 14, 1991 and _Jasarat_, January 14, 1991.


Sheikh, “Islami Jamhoori Ittehad kei Tazādāt”.


Haque, “General Beg is Setting Seriously Wrong Precedents”, p. 24.


Ayaz Amir, “The politics of Instability”.


_Jang_, February 27, 1991 and Sultan, “Juneejo Condemns U.S. Aggression Against Iraq”.


The government condemned Iraqi aggression. Beg adopted the view point that Iraq actually did that because of the guidance of some other power which wanted to wage war in this region. Nawaz Sharif told that Iraq never supported Pakistan in any crisis but Beg pleaded that Saddam was the only defender of the faith. The government branded the
public resentment as foreign funded but army interpreted it as love for the prophet and his family and hatred towards the crime of Yazid. This statement referred to the historical event in which grandson of Holy Prophet (PBUH) was treated with aggression and was killed mercilessly. Beg gave this statement few hours before the PM’s press conference which made the press conference just a failure as most of the questions in his conference were asked about the statement of Beg for which Nawaz Sharif replied to answer later as he had not read the statement. “The Saddam Phenomenon”, p. 23.


Ayaz Amir, “Castle in the Air”, The Herald, May 1991. p. 22. Also see Jasarat, April 11, 1991. “Shari’ah Bill was criticized because it accepted the family laws passed in Ayub era that were criticized by ‘Ulema including Maududi. At that time 13 verses of Quran were not being negated by Ayub Khan. Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt: Official Report, June 2, 1991. p. 117. Shari’ah Bill was passed with an additional clause that it should not be contradictory to the present laws which invited criticism from different section of society from ‘Ulema to common people. Asghar Abdullah, “Sōd kā Masa’la: Nawaz Sharif, Hakōmat awr ‘Ulema kī Chattrī”, Weekly Zindagi, February 29-March 6, 1992. p. 24. There was another problem that dead lines were decided for implementation of different aspects of the bill. It was decided to create two commissions that will devise plan to make economic and education system according to the teachings of Islam. It was also decided to keep international economic agreements until new system was devised for which no time limit was announced. Court system was safeguarded through constitutional protection. Saad bin Asad, “Shari’ah Bill kei Ōnt kei Sāth-Corrupt Nizām kī Billi”, Weekly Zindagi, May 25-31, 1991. p. 41. Also see Hafiz Sallahuddin Youssuf, “Shari’ah kei Nām par—Shari’ah sei Inherāf,” Weekly Zindagi, June 22-8, 1991. pp. 37-38. Maulana Fazal denied to accept any amendment in the bill presented by Maulana Sami but Maulan Sami, Qazi and certain other ‘Ulema accepted it considering something is better than nothing. Mujebur Rehman, “Shari’ah ___ Bāzāria Shari’ah”, Weekly Zindagi, May 25-31, 1991. p. 5.


In the bill people of Pakistan instead of Allah were called all powerful. In judicial system courts were not bound to take decisions according to the Islamic Law and were not provided a comprehensive system to guide the courts. Emphasis on Ijtihād (personal thinking) also faced criticism. Ameer Fayyaz, Qazi Hussain Ahmad: Amir Jamaat-i-Islami (Lahore: Ahbab Publishers), pp. 50-53. Also see “Shari’ah Bill kawn Roak Rahā Hai”, an interview of Maulana Samiu Haq with Farooq Aadil, Takbeer, February 28, 1991. p. 16, Jang, April 20 and 21, 1991 and Nawa-i-Waqt, April 21, 1991.
Fayyaz, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, pp. 50-53. Also see Ihetshamul Haque, “The Big Thaw?, The Herald Annual, January 1991, p. 72. Jang, April 20 and 21, 1991 and Nawai-i-Waqat, April 21, 1991. Joint Secretary of JUI Hafiz Hussain Ahmad criticized the IJI government for bringing amendments in the Shari'ah Bill. He was of the view that if there were problems in the Shari'ah Bill than why IJI passed it unanimously in the Senate during the premiership of Benazir. According to him amendments in the original bill were responsible to create split inside the IJI. An interview of JUI Joint Secretary Hafiz Hussain Ahmad” with Sohail Aftal Khan and Najmul Hassan Arif Takbeer, March 14, 1991, pp. 30-31 and Pakistan Times, January 4, 1992.


Maulana Sami had introduced the bill in Senate as the private member’s bill in 1985 so he was more concerned with the developments regarding the Shari’ah bill as compared to any other member.

Frontier Post, April 19, 1991. Sami asked Nawaz Sharif to amend constitution for the enforcement of Shari'ah. He demanded to omit the clauses from the constitution which were declared against teachings of Islam by FSC. He asked to eliminate riba. These three conditions were laid by Sami to remain member of the parliament. Editorial of Takbeer, June 4, 1992, p. 6. Maulana Sami was of the view that Nawaz Sharif was worried and scared of the enforcement of Shari’ah Bill believing that it would create problems in economic and judicial system. Sami indicated some flaws in the bill, tabled by the government without constitutional amendments to make it effective. He said most critical issues; place for ijtihad in an Islamic society and the matter of riba in the economic system were left open for debate. Sami had problems with the clause which kept the existing democratic system intact keeping PM and President all powerful. Another clause mentioned that women will enjoy the rights according to the constitution of Pakistan. Sami was of the view that the women were not getting their rights according to the teachings of Islam that could be only source of protecting women of Pakistan but this right was denied through this amendment. Sami also suggested to adopt twelve suggestions that were given by the commission created by Zia. Representatives of government, Senator Mazhar Ali and Hassan A. Sheikh requested Sami to not table any amendments in the bill as his amendments could not be rejected as amendments in the bill could only be approved by NA which could further delay the process. He was promised, the creation of a committee to consider all the amendments and improve the bill within a very limited time. Sami did not accept the offer and later in the Senate Minister for Law responded to his amendments and told that a committee will review the amendments and will include them in the law. Sami criticized the members of PML and ANP who opposed the bill considering their attitude against the aspirations of the people of Pakistan. “Shari'ah Bill sei ko’i Inqilāb Nahi a’ei gā”, An Interview of Maulan Samiul Haq with Farooq Aadil, Takbeer, June 20, 1991. pp. 19-22. Maulana Sami boycotted the meeting of the heads of IJI believing that the government was trying to protect riba or interest, did not deserve any support. Jasarat, January 18, 1992.


Pakistan Times, December 11, 1990. In the Punjab Assembly the JI adopted a view that the IJI won elections in the name of Islam and if it was not working for the Islamization of the laws it was working against its manifesto and the mandate of the people. It was of the view that in Pakistan no one could vote against the Shari’ah Bill but still it was facing criticism of the opposition and delaying tactics by the government.

Keesings Record of World Events, Volume 38 Reference Supplement, R78. The bill extended time for the committee to work to convert economic system according to Islamic teachings and it also announced to keep international agreements intact from this bill. In this way riba based economy was protected. In 1984, through a constitutional amendment riba was decided as illegal and the then minister for treasury and present President of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan announced that from July 1985 riba will be abolished from the banking system of...
Pakistan but it was not done. It was expected that IJI after winning the elections in the name of Islam would take serious steps to remove riba from the economy. Instead government of IJI launched a Foreign Currency Bearers Certificate based on riba. Other steps to create riba free economy were ignored and government tried to get decision from Supreme Court to reverse FSC’s decision against riba to maintain foreign economic relations which received criticism from the allies of IJI and others. Chief Justice FSC, Dr. Tanzeelur Rehman gave verdict against riba and told that government had to reform the system till June 30, 1992 as all the riba based laws would become null from July 1, 1992. Details of Judgement of Federal Shari’ah Court responding to S. M. Zafar’s plea that riba free economy did not allow Pakistan to adopt riba free economic system is available in Elimination of Riba from the Economy. pp-16169. Also see “Hakomat par Dinî Halqon kî Bei-E ‘tbâri Kiug”, Takbeer, November 28, 1991. p. 5, Dawn, March 18, 1992 and Jasarat, March 18, 1992.

It was said by ‘Ulema that riba must be equated with usury. According to them riba is not haram (repugnant to the teachings of Islam, Prohibited) but an excessive amount of riba was haram which takes unjust benefit from the borrower for economic ups and downs. In 1987, Justice Tanzilur Rehman gave the verdict that riba could not be paid to any one as it was haram [Urdu: forbidden] and the FSC gave ten years’ time to the government to handle all the economic issues to make the economy riba free. When the time given by FSC to government lapsed different petitions were filed by different sections of society for the removal of riba from the economy of Pakistan. The petitions were heard in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi and Quetta. The courts not only heard the views of lawyers but also jurists and reached at t conclusion that all forms of riba were haram. It was said that riba was haram without consideration of the ratio of riba either charged or paid and all the loans taken for any purpose. Lawyers of the financial institutions took the stance that in an inflationary economy the lender must be compensated for at least depreciated value of currency which was rejected by the court. FSC gave the right of appeal to the government and others and also instructed the government to amend all the laws repugnant to the teachings of Islam. Ahsan Rizvi, “A Question of Interest”, Newsline, December 1991, pp. 70-71. According to Islamic teachings, riba at a fixed rate is not allowed as it asks to create business on the basis of profit and loss sharing which means that the capital provider must share the risk in the business and enjoy share in profit as well. Charging riba on a person who borrows money to fulfill his need is unjustified and cruel according to the Islam. According to the CCI report there are certain spheres where the profit and loss sharing system could not work for which alternative system was required. In consonance with the Islamic injunctions Sharakah and Mudarabah were asked to be adopted. In this system amount of riba on a person who borrows money to fulfill his need is unjustified and cruel according to the Islam. When Capital is provided by one party and enterprise by the other party than total loss will be endured by the capital provider. If the capital was provided by more than one person than loss will be shared according to the ration money invested. CII suggested that there was no need of changing the whole banking system. The only thing that needed amendment was to modify operating procedures and replace riba based transactions by a system of variable return.

Ziauddin Ahmad, Munawar Iqbal, M. Fahim Khan, Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983), p. 9. In the Shari’ah Bill it was announced that the existing economic system will continue till the government can create an alternative economic system according to the teachings of Islam. Most of the religious scholars criticized this arrangement as they believed that if the economic system is maintained it will be difficult to bring change in the society regarding the Islamic System. “Quami Nasbul’aiin kî Jânib Āham Paishraft”, Takbeer, April 25, 1991. p. 6. Muttahida ‘Ulema Council announced that Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali and Sartaj Aziz were representatives of the government and if they argued in favor of riba it means they argued against the constitution of Pakistan so they must leave the government or otherwise people of Pakistan will force them to do so. Asghar Abdullah, “Sōd kā Masa’la: Nawaz Sharif, Hakōmat awr ‘Ulema kī Chattrī” Weekly Zindagi, February 29March 6, 1992. p. 24. Qazi Lateef criticized the government for filing appeal against FSC’s decision to abolish riba. Frontier Post, January 24, 1992. Shoorra (Executive body) of JI Punjab said that one of the ministers announced that there was no economic system without riba which according to it was denial of Quranic verses which clearly gave an economic system without riba even after Islamic Ideology Council (IIC) had given features of a system operating without riba. Jang, February 21, 1992 and Jasarat, February 19, 1992.48 “Mehaz Shari’ah ka Lafz Laga dainy sy koi Bill Shari’ah Bill nahe ho Saktta”, an interview of Senator Hafiz Hussain Ahmad with Irshad Mahmood, Takbeer, June 20, 1991. pp. 15-16.

49 Nasrullah Ghilzai, “Sōdī awr Ghair Sōdī Nizām-i Ma’ishat kī Behath”, Takbeer, February 6, 1992. pp. 42-43. Professor Khurshid Ahmad, vice president of JI, with the help of his ‘Institute of Policy Studies’ prepared answer to all the questions which were creating hindrance adopting riba free economy. He also gave suggestions for cooperative and agricultural banking according to the Islamic injunctions. Khurshid Ahmad (ed.), Elimination of Riba from the Economy (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1994). Different chapters of this book have discussed in detail about the elimination of riba from the economy with relevance to the decision of Federal Shari’ah Court and the Economic System of Pakistan. It also explained riba free economic system with relevance to the banking system along with contemporary practices of Islamic Banking. The suggestions were first published in book shape in 1994 but earlier those were presented to Nawaz Sharif during his first tenure.
Due to the debate of conversion of economy to a *riba* free economic system, economic activity suffered a lot. Hub power project that was planned to be started in February 1992 was delayed. The mega power project was planned with the investment of US $360 million by a consortium of foreign banks to produce 1,300 MW electricity. The project had to be started in March or April but an international donors meeting to set contributions for the project was postponed. Government’s plan to privatize industry and banks also suffered as many of the investors hesitated in investing money in an uncertain economic situation. *Keessings Record of World Events*, News Digest for January 1992, p. 38726.

54 Zahid Hussain, “About Turn?”, *Newline*, February 1992, p. 30. Sardar Asif Ali, minister of state, economic affairs and planning, explained in an interview that the religious parties particularly JI wanted an expedited process of Islamization but if the government agreed to follow its plans it would have to go to war with India, conquer Afghanistan or adopt an anti-US policy and make Pakistan isolated in international community. “An Islamic State Dominated by Mullahs would be a Disaster”: an interview of Sardar Asif Ali, Minister of State, Economic Affairs and Planning with Talat Hussain, *Newsline*, May 1992, p. 38.
55 Government’s this effort was criticized as the IIC provided comprehensive suggestions for commercial Banks in its report with reference to the problems and their solutions regarding the commercial banking to convert it to a *riba* free economic dealings. *Elimination of Riba from the Economy*, pp. 33-52. Also see Ghafoor Ahmad: *Nawaz Sharif kā Pehlā Dawr-i Hakomāt*, p. 12; Mukhtar Hassan, “Pakistan Mein Sōdī Nizām kei Tahafuz kei liye America kā Naīā Hukum awr Wazīr-i Khazānā kā Khufia Cell”, *Weekly Zindagi*, January 11-17, 1992, p. 9. ‘Ulema were of the view that Sartaj Aziz was a *mirzai* (Ahmedi) and he could not accept any of the Islamic law. They demanded to change economic minister if the government was sincere with the implementation of Islamic economic system. *Jang*, July 7, 1991.
56 Details of the Geneva Accord, which actually was a plan for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, are available in Rasul Baksh Raees, *War Without Winners: Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition After the Cold War* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 118-39. Junejo was of the view that if the Geneva Accord was implemented in letter and spirit the Afghan problem could be resolved. He said that its first part of exit of Soviet forces was implemented but second part which suggested formation of the government with the approval of Mujahideen was not cared. Junejo believed that government having support of Mujahideen was the only source to create peace in Afghanistan. “Sindh Law & Order Inherited from PPP”, *Pakistan Times*, July 9, 1991 and Ali Kabir, “Sindh Situation Alarming: Junejo”, *Dawn*, July 9, 1991.
58 *Pakistan Times*, December 5, 1990 and April 9, 1991.
60 “References Against PPP not to be Withdrawn?”, *Frontier Post*, December 29, 1991.
62 Rajpoot, *Qazi Hussain Ahmad*, p. 183.
64 Details of Peshawar Accord are available in Raees, *War Without Winners*, pp. 222-23.
65 *Meezan*, *Nawaz Sharif: Ittīfāq sei Naffāq Tak*, p. 44.
66 A peace agreement was signed between Masud and the Afghanistan government on May 25, 1992 according to which Hekmatyar became Prime Minister but, the agreement fell apart when he was blamed for a rocket attack on President Mojaddedi’s plane. “Jamaat-e-Islami Shoors Concerned over Deteriorating Law and Order Situation”, *The News*, June 20, 1992. Also see *Jang*, June 20, 1992.
“Another IJI Splinter”, Frontier Post, February 7, 1992 and Amir Mir, “Jamaat Opposes Zahir’s Return”, Frontier Post, January 11, 1992. Nawaz Sharif told that behavior of Qazi was negative. He wanted to take Pakistan towards isolation and wanted to wage war against America for which he criticized Sevan and alleged that he was messenger of American government for Pakistan who is consistently dictating government of Pakistan.

Gulbadeen Hikmatyar rejected UN formula and asked Nawaz Sharif to bring his own solution which should be acceptable for Mujahideen as well. According to Gulbadeen they had four point agenda; end of Najeeb government, transfer of power to interim government which should consist of impartial people or technocrats, ceasefire and elections. “Nawaz Sharif Imam Banai- Muqta’di na Rahain- Hikmat Yar ka Mutulba”, Weekly Zindagi, March 14-20, 1992, p. 18.

One of the major reasons of the opposition of this formula was one of the suggestions of UN Secretary General. It suggested to make Dr. Najeeb part of interim government and must be allowed to take part in the upcoming elections. This suggestion ignored that the people of Afghanistan had been in war against this party for last thirteen years for which some of the groups of Afghanistan criticized the formula. Siddiqui, “Afghan Masa’la kei Siyasi Hal ki Koshishai”, p. 28.


General Hameed Gul worked with the CIA to defend Afghanistan against Soviet occupation. At that time he was the ISI chief. But, he became passionately anti-American after the United States turned its back on Afghanistan following the 1989 Soviet withdrawal. The United States earlier had promised to help build a prosperous Afghanistan after it is vacated by Soviet forces. Dr. Yaqub Khan (Yaqub), deputy chief of JI NWFP asked the government not to support to bring Zahir Shah in government as it could destroy fruits of the efforts of Afghan people and sacrifices of the people of Pakistan. Frontier Post, January 9, 1992.


Waaraiq, The Traitor Within, p. 95. According to Qazi at the time when Najeeb Administration had become weak Pakistani government could support Mujahideen to take the war to an end. He was of the view that cease-fire in Afghanistan could only prolong the war without solving the actual problem but Nawaz Sharif did not want to get Pakistan involved in the internal matters of Afghanistan. Rauf Tahir, “Janāb Qazi Hussain Ahmad sei Khasōsi Guftagō”, Weekly Zindagi, March 21-27, 1992. pp. 7-8. Also see Anwar Iqbal, “JI Cracking Up”, The News, March 12, 1992.


Jang, May 6, 1992. Ghaus Ali Shah was of the view that government of Pakistan never supported any individual but the whole Mujahideen movement so the solution of the problem could not be delayed in the favour of one person. Jasarat, May 8, 1992.

Munir Ahmad, Jurnail Shahi, p. 170. Also see Arshad Balouch, Qazi Yā Bāghī [Urdu: Qazi or Rebel], pp. 107-8 and Jang, January 29, 1992.


“JI Meeting Adopts Six Resolutions”, The Muslim, October 1, 1991.

Jang, December 9, 1990.
Also see "Qazi appeals for Protest Day on Feb 5", The Nation, January 30, 1991 and Jang, January 30, 1991.

According to the third option Jammu and Ladakh had to go to India and independent Kashmir had to be made part of Punjab and the valley of Kashmir had to maintain itself as an independent state. Jang, February 29, 1992.


Munir Ahmad, Jarnæl Shāhī, pp. 169-70.


In the Eighth Amendment it was provided that the president could dissolve the assembly when it becomes impossible for the federal government to carry on its duties in accordance to the constitution. Due to this amendment the elected assemblies were dissolved in 1988, 1990, 1993, 1996 and in 1997. This amendment was criticized most severely by the think tanks of the country. Some of the people supported this considering it a source to avoid any more martial laws in the country as by using this power president could call for the fresh elections in case of political or constitutional deadlock in the country. Presidential actions of the dissolution of Assemblies were challenged in the superior courts which faced different opinion of the court. The National Assembly and Cabinet were restored once by the court in 1993. Courts decisions made it compulsory to the president to give solid evidence of the problems due to which smooth management of government became impossible in his opinion. The Thirteenth Amendment in the constitution did away with this provision. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments: 1947-1999 (New York: Oxford University Press. 2003), pp. 103 and 107-8. Benazir and Nasrullah offered Nawaz Sharif support to amend the eighth amendment but at that time he considered it an effort to create problems between him and the president and denied to make any effort to repeal it. This was appreciated by many political leaders believing that Nawaz Sharif understood the real context of Benazir’s offer but Nawaz Sharif could not maintain this vigilant attitude for a long period of time and became prey to this technique in early 1993. Ghafoor Ahmad, Nawaz Sharif kā Pehlā Dawr-I Hakōmat, pp. 105-6.


"JIl to Protest Muslim Genocide in India", The Muslim, December 18, 1990.

Liaquat Balouch said that JI asked Nawaz Sharif to delay discussion on eighth Amendment as it could not be repealed without the support of President and other pillars of state but Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif were confident of its repeal. Liaquat Balouch was of the view that announcement of cooperation by PPP leadership made the government confident of its success and it did not give importance to any other opinion. Rauf Tahir, “Bohrān kī Kahānī --- Liaquat Baloch kī Zubānī”, Weekly Zindagi, May 17, 1993. pp. 9-10. Also see Aqeel Ibraheem, “No Rift between PM and President”, The Nation, January 14.


“We are not Rigid about the Methods”, an Interview of Lt. General Saeed Qadir with B. Ayaz, *The Herald*, July 1991. p. 57. There was criticism on the government’s privatization policy of Banks due to its inconsistency in different provinces. Government had plans to establish Mehran Bank and the Khyber Bank but it did not announce any plans to privatize or deregulate the Bank of the Punjab. Babar Ayaz, “Pakistan: Up for Sale”, *The Herald*, July 1991. pp. 54-56. According to Chairman Privatization Commission was of the view that in Pakistan nobody would invest money unless he gets controlling shares of the business. “We are not Rigid about the Methods”, p. 57.


Privatization Commission suggested a gradual process of privatization. It was of the view that the large scale offering would be disastrous for national exchequer but government ignored this suggestion and announced its broader plan of privatization of industries and other state owned institutions. Javed A. Malik, “The Government’s Privatization Policy may Lead to Concentration of Industries in a few Hands, p. 51.

Maleeha Lodhi, “Our Credibility Rating is Quite Good”, an interview of Sartaj Aziz, Finance Minister”, *Newsline*, March/April, 1992, p. 34. Also see Babar Ayaz, “Pakistan: Up for Sale”, p. 60.

Meezan, *Nawaz Sharif: Ittīfāq se Naffāq Tak*, p. 43. Also see *Keesings Record of World Events*, Volume 38 Reference Supplement, R79.

Most of the industries could not attract buyers and the bids for the industrial units were somewhat low to government’s estimated price for which those units could not be sold. Many of the units sold were actually bought only for the increasing price of the real estate and hardly any of the buyers was interested in running those units. Babar Ayaz, “Pakistan: Up for Sale”, p. 60 (b).


Three cement factories were sold to one group which could create monopoly over the production and prices of cement. Government defended itself by mentioning monopoly laws but these were called too old to handle the issue. Javed A. Malik, “The Government’s Privatization Policy may Lead to Concentration of Industries in a few Hands, p. 51. Also see Farooq Aadil, “Qaumi Budget: Qaum Ki Nazar Mein” *Takbeer*, May 28, 1992, p. 19.

NWFP demanded 20% of the income raised through privatization of the national assets. CM of NWFP Mir Afzal Khan demanded a meeting of the CCI and if it was not held he announced to ask for joint session of NA and Senate for the protection of the rights of NWFP. According to the constitution of 1973 government has to pay share of the province in case of privatization of national assets. Federal government rejected the demands of the government of the NWFP. Ali Javed Naqvi, Mehallātī Sāzishāin (Lahore: Sabih Publishers, 2001), p. 27. NWFP was receiving huge amount as royalty for power generation which it had to lose in case of privatization of WAPDA and NWFP government was not willing to concede this amount at any cost. It was said that NWFP CM Mir Afzal enjoyed support of Ghulam Ishaq Khan in this conflict which added to the problems of Nawaz Sharif. Zahid Hussain, “The Army Changes Guards”, Newsline. January 1993, p. 82.

IIJ government faced severe criticism because the two major companies were owned by IIJ MPAs. National Industrial Credit Finance Corporation belonged to Ch. Najeeb (IIJ MPA) and Ch. Tajamul (IIJ MNA). Services Cooperative belonged to Zulfiqar Awan who was also an IIJ MPA. 13 cooperatives had almost 90% of the total deposit among which 75% was collected by just 2 cooperatives and the owners of these belonged to IIJ. 95% of the total credit of the two major cooperatives was loaned by two families. One was the Choudhary Family and the other was Sharif family. In the beginning they denied any loans of these companies and later announced that they had returned the money to the companies to refund it to those who had deposited it. Subāʿī Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, September 30, 1991, p. 813 and June 21, 1992, p. 51. Subāʿī Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, February 14, 1993, p. 115 and February 15, 1993, pp. 94-95.

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One of the most prominent of these companies was Taj Company which was founded in 1929 and it was unable to pay profits of the depositors since 1990. Taj Company could not manage its resources as it used to pay profits of the people from the principle amounts of the depositors instead of earning profits from the money invested by the common people. One rule was followed by its first director of not letting the amount of company out of it but after his death the tradition could not be maintained. The second reason was that some of the directors invested the money out of the company without keeping its record on the company’s accounts which brought imbalance in the company’s accounts. There was no cashier and any checks and balances were not managed which allowed the directors to use the money for their personal interest and once people got the news of company’s downfall they started withdrawing their principle amounts which created problems as it was not possible for the company to repay deposits of all the account holders. Abu Sheraz, “Qurān-i Pāk kī Ishā’at kei Nam par Lōt Mār awr Šdū kā Ghinā’onā Kārobār”, Weekly Zindagi, April 27- May 3, 1991, pp. 11-18. Also see Aurang Zeb, “Plundered by the Taj”, The Herald, June 1992, pp. 37-38. National Industrial Cooperative Finance Corporation (NICFC) was the largest cooperative company of the Punjab whose audit report of the year 1988 was negative but Nawaz Sharif, the then CM Punjab did nothing to avoid collapse instead Nawaz Sharif and Ch. Shujaat borrowed at least 800 million rupees from NICFC. It was paying high rate of interest and most of its investments were in government securities which hardly pays any profit. Accounts of the company were not properly maintained. The rapid growth from 3.8 billion in 1988 to eight billion in 1991 was the growth rate that could not be attained if followed the rules formed for cooperatives. In fact it was working like a scheduled bank but under no authority without any checks by State bank. The IIJ MPA Ch Abdul Majeed was its managing director. According to him the NICFC collapsed due to higher rate of withdrawals but in fact they were facing shortage of cash since 1988. It was believed that if PM had paid attention a little earlier it could handle the problem but generally people believed that major beneficiaries of the cooperative was PM himself, his friends and colleagues for which he ignored the problem which converted it to a major crisis. Adnan Adil, “Asking for Trouble”, Newsline, November 1991, pp. 77-79.

Some companies were facing economic problems and Supreme Court’s announcement that most of the finance companies were illegal, made common people rush to get their money back. In such pressure old companies like Taj Company could not bear the pressure of the investors. The case was handed over to CIA and FIA whose higher officials made deals with the owners of the companies and set them free after paying the price of their freedom which further aggravated the situation. This was done during Junejo’s premiership and his interior minister was alleged for being involved in corruption. During Benazir era her interior minister was also alleged for making deals with the owners of the investment companies. There was hope that Nawaz Sharif will solve the case but scandal of finance companies in the Punjab ended all hopes. Zaffar Abbas, “Left in the Lurch”, The Herald, September 1991, p. 48.
Lella Aslam, “And Now for the Land Crash”, The Herald, October 1991, pp. 69-70. There was a lot of information published in a paper titled “The Plunder of Pakistan” about the corruption of the family of Nawaz Sharif. Shahbaz Sharif defended his family by saying that none of the statements were proved so were only mere allegations. Secondly he said that for ‘Brothers Sugar Mills’ his family took the loan from NICFC but that was returned with interest. He said the loan was taken from NICFC because during the Benazir era, his family was not loaned by any national institution. He further added that his family did not take any long-term loan from any institution particularly after 1990 when Nawaz Sharif became PM of Pakistan. He told that Chadurys’ loans were suspended when Benazir came into power so they fulfilled their money requirements from DFIs but they had returned all the money. “An Interview of Shahbaz Sharif with Idrees Bakhtiyar”, The Herald, November 1991, pp. 22-25. Add reference of plunder of Pakistan.

138 Ibid., p. 38. According to PPP sources Nawaz Sharif and Shujaat had borrowed 40% of the total loan extended by the National Industrial Cooperative Finance Cooperation (NICFC). It was said that 150 IJI assembly members had taken loans from cooperative societies. Adnan Adil, “Commissioned Whitewash?”, Newsline, March/April 1992. p. 101.
139 Suhail Zia Butt, cousin of PM had loaned fifty million rupees from NICFC which was not paid back to NICFC. Adnan Adil, “Cooperative Juggling”, Newsline, October 1991. p. 51. Also see Aamer Ahmad Khan, “Unlikely Rebel”, The Herald, May 1993. p. 28 (a). It was said by Liaquat Balouch (JI) and M. A. Hamza (PML) that the unreturned heavy loans were severe blow on the banking system of Pakistan and it created crisis in the cooperatives as well. It was said that if PM and Interior Minister had not done taken loans from these companies the government could remain save of such criticism. Nawaz Sharif clearing his position told that it was only propaganda of opposition otherwise he had never denied the loans of Ittefaq Group taken from banking institutes. He said that his group of industries was participating in national development and was feeding more than 10,000 families directly. Interior Minister Chaudhary Shujaat also announced to return his loans in a very brief period of time. “Top Leaders under Fire at IJI Meeting”, Dawn, October 14, 1991.
142 Jang, September 26, 1991.
143 Ibid., September 24, 1991.
146 Syed, “IJI has Failed”. Also see Jang, October 20, 1991.
147 Malick, “The Great Co-OP Scam”, p. 44.
149 Jang, October 23, 1991.
150 Subā‘ī Assembly Punjab, Mubāhithāt, September 29, 1991, pp. 585-87 and February 15, 1993, pp. 99101. Also see Adil,
Punjab Wyne announced that the government would arrange loans for the two major cooperatives to help them manage the issue but it could not be done.


Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhīthāt, September 30, 1991, p. 810. Some sources have mentioned it a scam of 25 billion rupees. The Punjab Government passed law “The Dissolution of the Undesirable Cooperative Societies Bill, 1992” to avoid any more cooperative societies to save the people from being looted. Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhīthāt, February 14, 1993, pp. 103-110. The issue of returning money to the investors was going on from last three governments. Junejo gave the responsibility to Naseem Aaheer, interior minister in his cabinet. Benazir asked her interior minister Aitzaz Ahsan to solve the problem but both the interior ministers failed. Abbas, “Left in the Lurch”, p. 47. Only NICFC returned some money to some account holders but it was not given to small account holders but it was mainly given to the influential people. The real estate was transferred to the big depositors. It was said that corruption was exercised in this way as well. The prices were told three times higher than the actual prices. CICC had deposits of four billion rupees amongst which management announced to return money of small depositors with less than 50,000 rupees deposits but there were no bright prospects of return of this money. Case of Progressive Cooperative Society and Habib Industrial Cooperative also had deposits of 30 million and 350 million rupees deposits respectively but the management of both the societies disappeared and the money of the people as well. It was stated that except Mercantile and NICFC none other society was in a position to repay even to the small account holders.


Ibid., pp. 80-82.

It was alleged that Wyne had a personal branch of NICFC near Mian Chunoo to hide his illegal money but commission denied any such allegations. Report of “Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of Cooperative Finance Societies/Corporations”, p. 94.

Ibid., pp. 108-111.

Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhīthāt, October 25, 1992, p. 76.


Ghafoor Ahmad: Nawaz Sharif kā Pehlā Dawri Hakōmat, p. 134. It was decided that Punjab and Sindh will get equal share of water and the water will be saved near Kotri from being wasted in the sea. Also see Naqvi, Mehallātī Sāzishān, p. 14. Distribution of water among the provinces had been an unresolved issue since the independence of Pakistan. In 1971 a committee was made under Justice Fazl-e Akbar. The committee assessed the availability of the
water 104.24 MAF; later it was discovered that the water availability was 102.24 MAF. As the actual available water was different from that of the assessed quantity of water, water share was decided on the basis of percentages of available water instead of defining specific quantities of water share. According to this decision, Punjab got 50% of the available water, Sindh 42%, Baluchistan 3% and NWFP 5%. The smaller provinces were not satisfied with this division of water share and they asked for more than what they had been receiving. Government made another commission to sort the grievances of the smaller provinces under Justice Haleem. The commission had made recommendations acceptable to all. This committee recommended 53% for Punjab, 42% for Sindh, 2% for Baluchistan and 3% for NWFP. This suggestion was not accepted by the smaller provinces and an Ad-hoc system was adopted according to which Punjab started receiving 51% of the available water, Sindh: 41.83, Baluchistan: 1.60% and NWFP: 5.35% of the available water. The system continued till the water accord signed by all the provinces in 1991. Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhīthāt, June 15, 1991, p.

964.

Shahid, “Ab Kalabagh Dam kī ‘Adam Ta’mār Kufūn-i Ni‘mat ho gi”, pp. 43-46. It is stated in different sources that 450 Million Kiwusk water is being wasted in sea on the daily basis as dams are not built to save this water for utilization. Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhīthāt, June 18, 1992, p. 59.

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“Junejo has Doubts about Shari ‘ah Bill”, The Nation, April 29, 1991. Junejo said that this agreement was prepared during his premiership but could not be signed and announced because of the dissolution of the assemblies and dismissal of his premiership.

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Nisar Usmani, “IJL Government Battered by Series of Crisis”, Dawn, December 15, 1991. It was mentioned by one of the MPAs that Farid Tufan, provincial Minister for Irrigation of NWFP said that the statements regarding the construction of Kalabagh Dam were conspiracy against Nawaz Government’s alliance with ANP. He told that the government could not take any decision regarding construction of the dam without getting approval of the relevant provinces. Subā’i Assembly Punjab, Mubāhīthāt, February 10, 1993, p. 39. Sultan Siddiqui, “Dariā-i Sindh kī Pānī kī Taqsīm kā Mansōba”, Takbeer, August 1, 1991, pp. 50-51.

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Jang, November 19, 1991.

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In NWFP there was a coalition government of ANP and PML. Mir Afzal of PML was elected CM with the support of ANP in the NWFP. An Interview of General Fazle Haq with Abu Sheraaz, Weekly Zindagi, June 8-14, 1991, p. 32. Ahmad Meezan, Nawaz Sharif: Ittifāq se Naffāq Tak, p. 41.

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On the death anniversary of Ghaffar Khan, Wali Khan announced that we will bomb the Kalabagh Dam, if it was constructed. Mian Rafique Khatalana, “Kalabagh Dam par Samjhawātā”, Weekly Zindagi, February 1-7, 1992, p. 115. Mian Rafique Khatalana, “Kalabagh Dam par Samjhawātā”, p. 115. Also see “Dam Issue Threatens IJI Unity”, Dawn, March 11, 1992. Yaqub, one of the prominent leaders of JI stated that Wali Khan signed the water apportionment agreement. Previously ANP leadership signed the constitution which provided the federal government could take any provincial land for projects of national interests against proper compensation. He believed that if NWFP was promised some royalty from the income of Kalabagh Dam, the issue of its construction could easily be resolved. Frontier Post, January 9, 1992.

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America stopped all the economic and military aid under the auspices of the Pressler amendment which asked compulsion of president’s certification that Pakistan had no nuclear weapons. This certification was denied by the US president in 1990 and all the economic and military aid for Pakistan was stopped which created heavy burden on the economic activity and many projects were stopped half completed but the government did not make any compromise on the nuclear issue. According to Waseem Sajjad (Sajjad) the aid could be resumed at once if the government agreed to compromise on the issue. Ghafoor Ahmad: Nawaz Sharif kā Pehlā Dawr-i Hakōmat, p.152. Also see Abdul Sattar, “Foreign Policy”, p. 139, Ihtashamul Haque, “If we had Compromised, Aid would have been Resumed Immediately”, an interview of Waseem Sajjad, Chairman Senate with Ihtashamul Haque, The Herald, July 1991. p. 39


Fayyaz, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, pp. 242-43.


Mir Hazar Khan Bijnari is a senior parliamentarian from Sindh who has played active role in the politics of Pakistan. He was affiliated with the PPP since its inception. He was elected to the Provincial Assembly of Sindh in 1974 and 1977. He also won the trust in shape of electoral victory for NA in 1997, 2002 and 2008. He joined the Senate in 1988. He has also headed various Ministries as Federal Minister such as Defense, Health, Housing and Works, Education and Industries.


Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, “Power Play in Islamabad”, Newsline, June 1992, pp. 28-29. It was told that one of the clauses of the amendment was to give powers to the PM to suspend any of the clauses of the constitution. This clause was opposed by the president and many others.

Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, “Is Nawaz Sharif’s Time up?”, pp. 30-31. Nawaz Sharif wanted to expand his powers and for that purpose he made efforts from the very beginning of his career as PM of Pakistan and approached the opposition to discuss the possibility of amending the eighth amendment. A second move was when in the Shari‘ah Bill a clause was added as a referendum. This clause was added to empower the PM to make a handpicked committee under him which could decide if any rule was repugnant to the teachings of Islam. Third attempt to curtail powers of the president was the emergency powers planned to give to the PM through the twelfth constitutional amendment but the plan was not fulfilled. It is said that Ghulam Ishaq Khan returned the draft of the amendment which gave the powers to suspend any constitutional clause to the PM. It is believed that Ghulam Ishaq Khan engineered a revolt within the ranks of IJI about this clause. Benazir had her own agenda for which she accepted the offer of Nawaz Sharif. She was working to enhance differences between PM and Ghulam Ishaq Khan which was proved by her message through Sardar Farooq Lughari that the mission that was initiated with the help of Mahmood Achakzai and Ifitkhar Gillani was failed and Benazir wanted to cooperate with Ghulam Ishaq Khan to conclude the government of Nawaz Sharif as she did not want to cooperate with the IJI government to curtail powers of the President. Sehar, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, p. 52.

Sehar, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, p. 44. Also see Zaffar Abbas, “The Years of the President”, The Herald, January 1993, p. 50.

Jatoi prepared a list of those MNAs who could be persuaded to resign and this was a clue for Ghulam Ishaq Khan to dismiss the elected government to keep the eighth amendment intact. On June 27, 1992 MQM announced its decision to quit the government and ordered its members to resign from national and the provincial

An Interview of Nawaz Sharif with Zaffar Abbas and Ihtshamul Haque, *The Herald*, May 1993, pp. 31-33. It was said by Nasir Durrani that the conflict started between Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan when the later announced that he will not allow doing anything unconstitutional. Sehar, *Ghulam Ishaq Khan*, p. 280. Ilahi Baksh Soomro who had close contacts with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and was senior leader of PML announced that if Nawaz Sharif wanted to keep his government safe he should not think about repeal of eighth amendment and must announce Ghulam Ishaq Khan as the presidential candidate for second term. Ghafoor Ahmad: *Nawaz Sharif kā Pehlā Dawr-i Hakōmat*, pp. 13-14. Rauf Tahir, “Haqīqat mein Saddar kei såh Ikhtlāfāt kī Kahānī Kuch awr hai: Ma’zōl Wazūr-i ‘Āzam kei Inkishāfāt”, *Weekly Zindagi*, May 1-7, 1993, pp. 6-7. In an interview Brigadier Imtiaz mentioned that Nawaz Sharif was against long formalities but being a bureaucrat Ghulam Ishaq Khan always preferred formalities which increased differences between them. “Agar Nawaz Sharif kā Rāsta Roakā Giā taw Tabāhī kā Rāsta Khul Jā’ei gā”, an Interview of Director Intelligence Bureau, Brigadier (R) Imtiaz with Abu-Bakar Muzeeb Shami, *Weekly Zindagi*, January 3-9, 1997, p. 8.


Zaffar Abbas, “All the President’s Men”, *The Herald Annual*, January 1993, p. 54.

A six party alliance NDA consisting of Jatoi (NPP), Nasrullah (PDP), Bugti (JWP), and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada’s Pakistan National Party (PNP), newly created Awami Jamhoori Party (AJP) and Fateyab Ali Khan’s Mazdoor Kisan Party (MKP) seemed an effort of Ghulam Ishaq Khan to create a loose alliance which could bring change within the parliament keeping Benazir and Nawaz Sharif out of the government. Maleeha Lodhi, “Sharif’s Battle for Survival”, *Newsline*, September 1992, p. 44. These parties had not significant place in the existing political scenario. After the failure of APC this was the other effort of Nasrullah but he had no seat in NA and only two in Punjab, Jatoi’s popularity was restricted and of Nawabshah and Khan’s to Muzaffargarh, Only Bugti’s JWP had a vote bank in Baluchistan but that too was not vibrant one. Remaining two parties could not claim much in the politics but still an alliance of six parties was something worth noticing although these parties could hope to win less than 10 seats in national elections. Adnan Adil, “All the President’s Men”, p. 46. Azhar Jamal in his article “Not the President’s Men” wrote that NDA was opposed to the eighth amendment and in this way it was supporter of the PM. *Newsline*, October 1992, p. 14.


Aziz, *Between Dreams and Realities*, pp. 130-32. An Interview of Afzaal Rehan with Irshad Ahmad Haqqani and Najam Sethi, *Weekly Zindagi*, September 20-26, 1996, p. 12 Also see Fayyaz, *Qazi Hussain Ahmad*, p. 127 and Zahid Hussain, “Ishaq Strikes Again”, *Newsline*, April 1993, p. 28. Sherry Rehman in an article commented that reversal of Nawaz Sharif from his stance of eighth amendment and nomination of Ghulam Ishaq Khan as next presidential candidate of the ruling party were just Nawaz Sharifi’s ‘Clutches on Straws’. Sherry Rehman, “Politics Interrupts”, *The Herald*, May 1993, p. 40 (d). In his speech on electronic media, he told the people of Pakistan that Aiwan-i Saddar (President House) is a symbol of unity but it was converted to the center of conspiracies against the elected government and the president became part of conspiracies against the PM of Pakistan in cooperation with governor of one of the provinces (Sindh) Mahmood A. Haroon. Jan Mohammad Dawood, *The Role of Superior Judiciary in the Politics of Pakistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1994), pp. 120-21.

Hussain, “Ishaq Strikes Again”, p. 28.


“IJI Summit Meeting: JUI, Hizb-e Jehad not Among Invited”, *The Muslim*, September 27, 1991. President of JMP Fazal-e Haq was invited although he was expelled from his party for criticism against his party president publically. Sahibzada Naeemur Rehman Naeemi was appointed president of JMP which was not interfered by IJI president but at the time of summit, previous president of JMP, Fazal-e Haq was invited which was criticized by the leadership of JMP.

Akram Sheikh stated that according to the Political Parties’ Act (2-c) IJI was a political party as it contested elections under one manifesto and election symbol using one platform. He said that according to the laws of IJI most of its decisions had to be made through majority vote but the decision of dissolution of the alliance had to be made through consensus which was not going to leave any aggrieved party and all the member parties of the alliance could create their own parliamentary board in the assembly otherwise dissolution of the alliance meant defection of all the IJI members. “IJI kā Khātma, Hakōmat kā Khātma”, an Interview of the IJI Lawyer Muhammad Akram Sheikh with Raauf Tahir, *Weekly Zindagi*, March 14-20, 1992, p. 10. Also see Nasrullah Ghilzai, “IJI ko Bachā liyā giā: Poya ki Chutti”, p. 25 and Aziz-ud-Din Ahmad, “IJI: The Beginning of the End”.

“The Pir and the President”, *Frontier Post*, August 22, 1991. Poya participated in the Gulf conference held by Nasrullah. Later he called an all parties conference and also attended Nasrullah’s second ‘All Parties Conference’ and then spoke in PDA’s public meetings against the government policies. “IJI kā Sarbrāhī Ijlās”, *Nawa-i Waqt*, September 27, 1991. In a press conference about the outcome of the summit, Vardag told that IJI leaders did not appreciate criticism on IJI policies on public forums. These matters must have been decided within the IJI fold. Vardag told that using the PDA forum to criticize IJI was more critical which could not be explained by Poya. According to him except JI and NPP all member parties agreed expulsion. JI wanted to give Poya a little more time while Jatoi thought it a too strong decision. Salim Bokhari, “Hizb-i-Jihad Expelled: IJI Supreme Council Dissolved”, *The Muslim*, October 1, 1991, and Ashraf Mumtaz, “Hizb-i-Jihad Expelled from IJI”, *Dawn*, October 1, 1991. Also see Salim Bokahri, “Hizbe Jihad Ouster: First Crack in Alliance”, *The Muslim*, October 3, 1991.


President is a symbol of unity and his support for any of the political parties or individual means negation of his official duties.


Junejo was president of the largest party in the alliance but during the whole episode of sacking HJ, Junejo remained inactive and the whole process was handled by Nawaz Sharif’s team. Muhammad Malick, “Behave or Beheaded”, *Frontier Post*, October 4, 1991. Some of the sources mention that Qazi, Jatoi, Pir Fazal, Poya and Sami
had joined hands for the ouster of Nawaz Sharif from the office of the president of IJI but Nawaz Sharif got the news before it could be executed. He ousted Poya and handled others quite well creating a new faction in Pir Fazal’s party and keeping others under the alliance’s umbrella. “Mr Jatoi’s Discordant Notes”, Frontier Post, October 21, 1991. JI and NPP had some reservations about the decision. Qazi criticized the expulsion of Poya from the alliance. It was said that if IJI could create harmony with PPP inside the parliament and form government in Baluchistan with the cooperation of PPP there was no harm in using PDA platform to criticize government’s policies. Salim Bokhari, “Hizbe Jihad Ouster: First Crack in Alliance”, The Muslim, October 3, 1991. Also see The Nation, October 2, 1991 and Nawa-i-Waqt, October 2, 1991.

Nasrullah Ghilzai, “IJI ko Bachāi liyā gīā: Poya ki Chutti”, p. 25. Before expulsion of HJ from the IJI poya, was working as secretary information. After the expulsion of HJ from the alliance its Secretary General was appointed as secretary information of IJI. Expulsion of HJ from the alliance and appointing its member as secretary information of the alliance invited criticism for IJI leadership.


Farooq Aadir, “Sindh mein kī Tabdliān ho Chukī hain, kī honai Wālī hain”, Takbeer, March 5, 1992, pp. 33-34. Also see “Is it a Silver Lining or a Mirage?”, The Muslim, March 18, 1992.


Nawa-i-Waqt, March 10, 1992.


Death of Jam Sadiq Ali, the CM Sindh created many problems for the IJI. There was hardly any politician of the stature of Sadiq. At the same time Jatoi started lobbying to get his son elected as CM. This not only increased problems of IJI but also became the major reason of parting of ways of NPP and IJI.

Jatoi did all the lobbying to get his son elected as CM Sindh but due to shortage of two votes he did dropped the idea and voted for IJI candidate, Jang, March 8, 1992.


Butt, “Jatoi’s U-Turn”, 243 Jatoi was expecting to become PM after the elections of 1990, but Nawaz Sharif’s role in the election campaign and people’s demand as Nawaz Sharif PM made the IJI to elect him as PM. Although Jatoi accepted the decision but his attitude at different occasions gave a contradictory impression.


Anwar Iqbal, “IJI Cracking Up”, The News, March 12, 1992. In Sindh Provincial Assembly Jatoi enjoyed support of 12 MPAs which was alarming for IJI’s survival in the provincial government.


Federal ministers; Abdussattar Lalika, Anwar Saifullah Khan, Jam Yousuf, Ghulam Dastagir Khan, Muhammad Siddique Kanju, and members of Senate; Bostan Ali Hoti, Akhudzada Behrawar Saeed, Yaseen Wattoo and Saeed Hashmi appreciated the decision and told that Jatoi was working against the government and had joined hands with the opposition for which he was warned for consequences. It was said that if he had problems with the alliance leadership he could discuss with the government but making alliance with the political opponents could not be over looked so it was decided to expel Jatoi and his party from the alliance. Jang, March 19, 1992.

Nawa-i Waqt, March 19, 1992. Federal Minister for Parliamentary Affairs and Provincial Minister for Law and
Parliamentary affairs of Punjab Nasrullah Dareshak appreciated the decision, calling it a timely decision. He said that PM made this decision due to Jatoi’s anti-IJI activities. The Muslim, March 20, 1992.

Also see “Timely Expulsion of Jatoi to Save IJI”, The Muslim, March 21, 1992. Provincial Minister for Housing and Physical Planning Ch. Nazir Ahmad said that Jatoi tried to create misunderstanding between Junejo and PM along with extending support to anti-IJI elements which could not be over looked. Jang, March 22, 1992 and Jasarat, March 21, 1992.


Abdul Ghafoor Awan, “Wyne Rules out IJI’s Dissolution”, The Nation, March 26, 1992. Also see Nawa-i Waqt, March 20, 1992. IPG had no significant role as two of its prominent members Soomro and Javed Hashmi had joined PML and IPG was left with only Syed Fakhar Imam and Abida Hussain. Nawa-i Waqt, March 21, 1992.


There was an argument that the expulsion of NPP from the IJI had to bring serious repercussions for the alliance in Sindh as IJI’s other member parties had a nominal membership in the alliance which could affect IJI’s role in Sindh in the long run.


Nawaz Sharif generally used to rely on five members of his cabinet for which he received criticism from the members of allied parties and other cabinet members. These were Ch. Nisar (Minister for Petroleum), Malik Naem (Minister for Trade), Siddique Kanjoo (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Sheikh Rasheed (Minister for Industries) and Rana Nazir Ahmad (Minister for population welfare). Jasarat, May 15, 1992.

Qazi claimed that Nawaz Sharif used to make decisions according to his moods ignoring the significance of alliance cooperation. Ghafoor and Qazi told that according to the constitution of IJI, its founding members could not be expelled from the alliance but it was done with HJ and then NPP while parties could be included in the alliance with consultation of member parties of IJI but Nawaz Sharif being president of IJI included ANP and MQM in the alliance without consultation. Dawn, March 18, 1992; The Nation, March 6, 1992, Pakistan Times, March 6, 1992, Nawa-i Waqt, April 14, 1992 and Jasarat, March 18, 1992.

“The Jamaat should Give its Own Call to the People”, an interview of Qazi Hussain Ahmad with Ihtasham Haque, The Herald, June 1992, pp. 49-50. Aslam Saleemi, General Secretary of JI said that Nawaz Sharif had no right to take decisions independently. If he wanted to keep the alliance intact he should coordinate alliance members. Responding to this Ejaaz, Sheikh Rasheed and leaders of JAH said that JI itself was taking decisions individually. They gave example of the attitude of JI during the Gulf War and Afghanistan issue. Leaders of JAH were of the opinion that JI never helped IJI in solving problems and tensions. Rauf Tahir, “Mansoora Muzākrāt kei Ba’d---Sabrārī ljlās se Pehlei”, Weekly Zindagi, September 21-27, 1991, p. 11 and Nawa-i Waqt, May 17, 1992.

Also see Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, “JI Decided to Part Ways with IJI”, *The Muslim*, May 4, 1992. There was an attractive offer for JI leadership from Maulana Sami. Maulana Sami asked Qazi for support to continue IJI excluding PML. In return Qazi was offered office of the president of IJI. Qazi did not accept this offer. He was of the view that a meeting of leaders of the member parties of IJI must be called and the decision to dissolve the alliance should be made through consensus. *Jang*, March 7, 1992. JI took a long time to decide to quit from IJI because it could never enter into an alliance with PPP keeping in view the conflicting ideologies of both the parties. Another option was to join JUI (F) and JUP of Noorani alliance which was just made. But some reservations were still there. JI did not want to quit the alliance believing that if it leaves the alliance, PML had enough members in the assembly to continue and JI will lose the influence that it was exerting on the government. Secondly its quit from IJI could open way for MQM and ANP, the political enemies of JI and allied members of the government. Nisar Usmani, “Nawaz will Try Not to Lose JI Support”, *Dawn*, March 15, 1992 and *Frontier Post*, January 9, 1992.


Fayyaz, *Qazi Hussain Ahmad*, p. 152. Also see *Nawa-i Waqt*, May 6, 1992.


Tahir, “Mansoora Muzākrāt kei Ba‘d”, *Weekly Zindagi*, September 21-27, 1991. p. 9. Also see Shakil Sheikh, “PML-JI Rīf”, *The Muslim*, March 9, 1992. This kind of meetings saved alliance of JI with IJI for several times. Earlier in September, 1991 there was a situation when it was expected that JI will leave the alliance but through meeting of political leaders the problems were sorted out at least for the time being. To decrease tension among the government and JI Nawaz Sharif, Ch. Shujaat (Interior Minister) and some other associates of Nawaz Sharif met with Qazi at Mansoora. It was decided to hold meeting of Heads of IJI member parties. Creation of a consultative committee was also decided to discuss parliamentary matters under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif. It was also announced that PM will take care of the law and order problems in Karachi and will take every possible step to punish the criminals. Nasrullah Ghilzai, “Peoples Party kei ‘Uhdeidār Jamaat-ī Islami kei Stage par”, *Takbeer*, September 12, 1991. p. 46. Also see Ayaz Amir, “Storm in a Teacup”, *The Herald*, April 1992. p. 36, *Dawn*, March 4, 1992, *The Nation*, March 4, 1992 and *Nawa-i-Waqt*, March 4, 1992.


Nawaz Sharif wanted to maintain the IJI with the support of PML, JI and JAH. Contrary to that Qazi wanted to dissolve the alliance with mutual consent of all the member parties. Ghilzai, “JI Khatam hoā taw Bohat Kuch Khatam ho jā‘ei gā”, p. 60. Qazi did not want to take initiative in dissolving the alliance expecting public wrath in this regard. Amir JI, NWFP Maulana Gohar Rehman laid five conditions to support the government of Nawaz Sharif. He demanded; to pass a fresh *Shari‘ah* Bill from NA and Senate, all the laws declared un-Islamic by FSC must be revoked, withdraw its support for US peace plan in Afghanistan, and announce interest free economy from next July. *The Nation*, March 16, 1992. Also see Faraz Hashmi, “3-Hours Nawaz-Qazi Talks Fruitless”, *Dawn*, March 11, 1992, “Nawaz, Qazi decide to hold IJI Summit within 10 Days”, *The Nation*, March 11, 1992 and *Jasarat*, March 11,
1992. In a meeting of PM with JI’s delegation on February 26, 1992 Qazi asked to declare that IJI had achieved its purpose of defeating secular forces and dissolve the alliance. The leaders could not reach at any conclusion and decided to meet in a week’s time to rethink the issue as dissolution of alliance could make alliance members prey to legal jurisdictions. In the following meeting Qazi demanded some amendments in the riba-based economy and Afghan Policy which Nawaz Sharif accepted. Malik, “Blow Hot Blow Cold”.

“Wyne Sāhib awr Abbasi Sāhib Rāsta Nikālain”, Takbeer, May 28, 1992. p.7. Nawaz Sharif and PML were interested to maintain the alliance because of the internal problems of PML as many political observers believed that if the alliance was dissolved, it would be difficult to keep the PML intact because its members could opt to join hands with Nasrullah. “Saving the IJI”, Dawn, March 15, 1992. At the same time dissolution of the alliance could open a long legal debate for legal right of Nawaz Sharif and his supporters to continue in the government.

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“He considered it a sin without taste being in IJI as the sex scandal according to him was prepared by the government agencies and Nawaz Sharif ordered the inquiry about the matter too late.”


Jasarat, April 11, 1992.

Jang, August 2, 1991.

Jang, March 6 and 8, 1992. It was generally believed that the withdrawal of JI from IJI could be a personal loss for Nawaz Sharif as the PML had not organizational network that could be provided by JI. Secondly the JI could create problems for Nawaz Sharif’s government. Mazhar Abbas, “The Last Straw”, The Herald, March 1991, p. 32.

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“Jamaat’s Dissociation not to Affect Government”, Dawn, May 8, 1992. NPP and JUI decided to dissolve the alliance and the issue was discussed with Ghulam Ishaq Khan by Jatoi. Jatoi and Sami were of the view that IJI did not exist anymore because of the attitude of PML so it was better to dissolve the alliance and the government should use name of PML and not that of IJI. The Last Straw, The Herald, March 1991, p. 32.

Malik, “Blow Hot Blow Cold”.

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“References Against PPP not to be Withdrawn?”, Frontier Post, December 29, 1991.

Butt, “Decision to Keep IJI Ship Afloat Reflect PM’s Thinking in Alliance Future”.

JI was part of IJI but it adopted a policy of criticism against the government on every national and political forum for which Nawaz Sharif opted to increase his support base in the assemblies.


Qidwai, “Ittehad Barqrār Rakhny kā Faisla: Bayānāt Mei Taizī”.

Bukhari, *Benazir*, p. 168. Ghulam Ishaq Khan actually hinted about the speech of Nawaz Sharif that he delivered on April 17, 1993. In his speech on the electronic media Nawaz Sharif told that he tried for reconciliation with the president but things could not be normalized. According to him Aiwan-i Saddar (President House) that is a symbol of unity had become centre of conspiracies against the elected government. He said it was the responsibility of the president to check the conspiracies against the PM OF Pakistan instead he was supporting such activities. According to Nawaz Sharif, president and governor of one of the provinces (Sindh) Mahmood A. Haroon was sitting in Islamabad, busy in hatching conspiracies against the government of the people of Pakistan. In the dissolution order eight reasons were mentioned. First one was mass scale resignations of MNAs. Second reason was un-resolved internal and external problems which were even hidden by the President but were not properly cared. President alleged that the federal government was not running the government properly and was intruding the rights and prerogatives of the provinces. Requirements of CCI, National Economic Council and its executive committee were not fulfilled. Fourth allegation was increased rate of corruption and nepotism and disposal of government properties without proper procedures. It also alleged that the process of Privatization was not transparent. Fifth allegation was against the rough attitude of government functionaries against opposition members. After the mysterious death of General Asif Nawaz whatever was said by his wife gave grounds to the president to allege the government for subverting the authority of the armed forces. The last ground for the dissolution of the government was that it was unable to ménage issues of security and integrity of Pakistan. According to the Ghulam Ishaq Khan these were enough grounds to dismiss the government. Jan Mohammad Dawood, *The Role of Superior Judiciary in the Politics of Pakistan*, pp. 120-23.


Ibid., pp. 9-10. The Supreme Court paid immediate attention to the petition to the application and gave consecutive sixteen days to the hearing of the case. It heard the lawyers of petitioner, attorney general, lawyer of Caretaker PM and passed an order to reinstate the government considering the dissolution illegal. Detailed decision is available in Dawood, *The Role of Superior Judiciary*, pp. 124-47.

Dawood, *The Role of Superior Judiciary*, p.4. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah was of the view that instead of bringing the controversial members back to the assembly it was better to consult with the public as they could be the best judge. He believed that after this decision horse trading of the members will be immensely increased and it will become difficult to run the state matters smoothly. Murtaza Anjum, *Siyasat, Ā'in aur 'Addālat*, pp. 191 and 195. Also see Munir, *Jarnel Shāhī*, pp. 141-42.

National Assembly was dissolved by the president but the governors of the province did not follow the suit. In Punjab most of the MPAs changed their loyalties and elected Manzoor Wattoo the new CM of the province. When the Nawaz government was reinstated both the groups started pressurizing the MPs for support. Some of them were bribed as well. When supporters of Nwaza Sharif tried to move no-confidence motion against Wattoo he dissolved the assembly. CM of NWFP (the other loyalist to Ghulam Ishaq Khan) dissolved the assembly. Nawaz government faced a complete deadlock when he tried to control through fiat of the NA that rendered to be ineffective. The Rangers and Para-military forces did not intervene during the political drama to remain neutral in the whole situation. *Electoral Politics in Pakistan: National Assembly Elections 1993, Report of SAARC-NGO OBSERVERS* (New Delhi: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1995), p. 11 and Iqbal “The Judiciary and Constitutional Crisis in Pakistan”, p. 73.


At the dismissal of the government of Nawaz Sharif Manzoor Wattoo, the then speaker of the Punjab Assembly won sympathies and support of the MPAs moved a successful no-confidence motion against Wyne and was able to form government in the Punjab, replacing Wyne. When the Supreme Court reinstated the government of Nawaz Sharif, many of the MPAs reverted back towards Wyne. Nawaz Sharif after getting the vote of confidence tried his best to form a favorable government in the Punjab for which he used all the available resources. The ex-governor of the Punjab, Mian Azahr who resigned from the office at the dismissal of Nawaz Government also used his powers and links to win the support of MPAs. To defend his position Wattoo consulted with the president and the governor of the Punjab and decided to dissolve the Punjab Provincial Assembly. During the same time supporters of Nawaz Sharif submitted the application for requisition of the PA session. On May 29, 1993 the assembly was dissolved which was
challenged in the High Court by Ch. Pervaz Ilahi. On June 28, the Punjab assembly was reinstated by the court with an order to maintain the status quo but the PA was dissolved again in few minutes of its reinstatement. On June 29, 1993 federal government decided to take the Punjab under the direct control of the federal government. The decision was not endorsed by the president but Nawaz Sharif ordered the implementation of the decision. According to the Article 234 of the constitution parliament took administration of the Punjab under its direct control and Mian Azhar was appointed administrator of the Punjab. Mian Azhar could not succeed to take over the province. Nawaz Sharif ordered the army to take over the control of the province which was denied by the then Army Chief Abdul Waheed Kakar and saved Punjab from a conflict of army and the police of the province. An Interview of Nawaz Sharif with Sherry Rehman and Zaffar Abbas, *The Herald*, September 1996, p. 32. Munir Ahmad, *Jarnai Sh áhí*, pp. 143-54. Sehar, *Ghulam Ishaq Khan*, p. 182. Rauf Tahir, “Punjab ko Fatah Karne kā Grand Plan”, *Weekly Zindagi*, June 19-25, 1993, p. 8, Rauf Tahir, “Bei-E’tmādī kēi Sā’ei GHQ tak Phail Ga’ei”, *Weekly Zindagi*, July 1016, 1993, pp. 7-9, Zahid Hussain, “Day of the General”, *Newsline*, July 1993, p. 30 and Ayaz Amir, “Silver Lining”, *The Herald*, June 1993, p. 49.


There was an environment of distrust among the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and PM Nawaz Sharif. Some politicians and ‘Ulema tried to remove the distrust between Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Nawaz Sharif met Ghulam Ishaq Khan but the relationship could not take a smoother track. A seven points plan was prepared by a committee of political leaders to remove distrust among Ghulam Ishaq Khan and PM. It was said that the future of dissolved assemblies must be decided by the courts and both must accept that decision whole heartedly. Both should meet at regular intervals and if statement of any of them is highlighted with reference to the other leader both should meet and discuss the issue. It was also suggested that for the administrative matters Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif should consult each other to run the system of government smoothly. These suggestions were agreed upon by the president. A time of meeting of the PM and President was decided but when the representatives of the office of PM asked about the schedule of the meeting from the office of president they informed that there was no scheduled meeting of PM and President and if PM wanted to meet him his officials must consult during office hours next day. This denial made situation critical and the issues that could be resolved with the meeting of PM and President remained vague and the already confronted situation became more difficult to handle. Hassan, “Long March________ Ya________ Quick March”, pp. 10-11 and Zahid Hussain, “Day of the General”, pp. 24 and 26.


These five favourites were Ch. Nisar (Minister for Petroleum), Malik Naem (Minister for Trade), Siddique Kanjoo (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Sheikh Rasheed (Minister for Industries) and Rana Nazir Ahmad (Minister for population welfare). Maleeha Lodhi, “Bitter Harvest”, *Newsline*, April 1993, p. 28b and *Jasarat*, May 15, 1992.


Ghafoor Ahmad mentioned that prominent members of his cabinet like Maulan Niazi, Ijlala Haider Zaidi resigned from the cabinet due to intolerant attitude of Nawaz sharif. He also lost Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan. Maulana Niazi resigned due to Nawaz Sharif’s attitude during the Parliamentary Party’s meeting where Maulana Niazi dissected Gulf policy ans the attitude towards Sahriat bill. Nawaz Sharif rejected his opinion expalining that the government makes policies which are best suitable to the nation and dissent could only be done after resigning from the cabinet. Responding to this Maulana Niazi resigned from the cabinet of Nawaz Sharif. Ghafoor Ahmad, *Nawaz Sharif kā Pehlā Dawr-i Hakomāt*, pp.12, 124 and 133.
In NWFP IJI faced real problem because of the conflicts between JI and ANP. Members of ANP used to create disturbance when any of the JI started speech in the assembly. Contrary to that criticized ANP for its approval of water distribution agreement, NFC award and agreement on the construction of Kalabagh Dam. Both these parties had problems with each other to such extent that they were not even ready to tolerate each other. Sultan Siddiqui, “Sarhad main Jamaat-i Islami ko Maflooj karny ki Koshishain” Takbeer, June 27, 1991, pp. 46-7. Two major allegations against Nawaz Sharif were his decisions in NFC Award and Water Apportionment Agreement. In the earlier he promised the provinces an amount of finances that he could never pay and in the later he promised quantity of water that could never be obtained from Indus Basin system through the existing system. Aamer Ahmad Khan, “Unlikely Rebel”, The Herald, May 1993, p. 28(a).


Conclusion

Political alliances have always been significant in heterogeneous democratic politics, Pakistan being one of them. Owing to the inconsistent governing system, political parties could not acquire a national status. Since Pakistan is divided into four federating units and various other regions with a difference of language, landscapes, culture and historical experiences, it had been almost impossible for any single political power to assume the status of a national rather than a mere provincial political party. For this reason, the parties, time and again, had to make political compromises with other political actors to win the elections, to form government inside the parliament and, at times, to form a strong opposition as well. In the history of Pakistan, political alliances have always played a crucial role in determining the course of historical developments. IJI, formed in October 1988, was one of such alliances.

In September 1988, PML-N and NPP decided to work together as an electoral alliance in the forthcoming elections. PML-N was obsessed with the strength of PPP which was not only intact even after a prolonged military regime but was also expected to sweep the elections. PML-N was cautious about leaving any loophole in her election strategy that might result in the victory of PPP; therefore, she put all her strength to win the number game by uniting a large number of political parties on a single platform i.e. IJI, consisting of HJ, IPG, JUI-D, JMP, JAH-Lakhvi Group. Later on, JI joined the alliance and at the very last moment PML-J also became part of this alliance. This alliance of multiple political parties with divergent ideologies gave birth to various issues among the members of alliance regarding seat adjustment in the forthcoming elections. IJI participated in 1988 elections bearing all these uncertainties. Still, it managed to emerge as the second largest party in the NA. In Punjab, it formed the government and in Baluchistan it was part of the coalition government.

Another dominant trend that prevailed during 1988-1990 was horse-trading. It was an outcome of weak organization of IJI and the impuissance on part of PPP’s leadership. The absence of political parties’ democratic foundations within the society was the major reason of the commuting loyalties of the elected representatives. This weakness on part of political actors held them back to take any serious action against the floor-crossers leaving behind most of the MNAs and MPAs to take control over the voters of their constituencies. Another reason of such an attitude can be traced back to the constitutional deficiency which does not provide any clause to prevent the floor-crossing particularly in the middle of the tenure while the government requires majority and is dependent on the cooperation of its members. This changed the whole political scenario and eclipsed the political developments if there were any. The trend of changing loyalties turned the political system to a mere number game in which both the leading parties put all their efforts buying loyalties on one hand and on the other hand, they left their members free of all kinds of checks and balances to appease them and also to confirm their loyalties. It was PPP who initiated the illegitimate practice by making efforts to win over the IJI members and to get its government removed from the Punjab province by making ridiculous offers to its members; however, IJI countered the efforts of PPP by making better offers to her own members. This practice became the major reason of the dismissal of Benazir government in 1990. The two years proved to be very tough for IJI for being in opposition but it did not face serious problems from inside the alliance. Things remained comparatively smoother for IJI till the dissolution of the assemblies in 1990.
IJI did not want to leave any chance for PPP to win the elections of 1990 for which it made electoral understandings with ANP in NWFP and MQM in Sindh. MQM was the political rival of JI and challenged JI’s authority in urban Sindh. Such a development created rift inside the ranks of IJI which escalated after IJI victory in elections of 1990.

The IJI was in a better position when it came to the formation of government as compared to the previous government of PPP; it had majority in the NA and friendly governments in all the four provinces. Being himself an industrialist, leader of IJI, i.e. Nawaz Sharif had a better economic plan to offer like the privatization policy, allocation of larger sums to developmental projects, and reinvigoration of the industry along with various plans to increase foreign investments in Pakistan. Pakistan followed a dynamic economic policy to achieve economic stability as soon as possible; nonetheless, it came across two major challenges: first challenge was to keep its allies satisfied, which was hardly possible as the alliance was too vast with divergent programs and ideologies and secondly, the government had to bear the consequences of the developments in the international arena. Difference of opinion about the issues and the policy matters created problems in the maintenance of alliance. PML and JI had been antagonists since 1941 and could hardly develop any consensus regarding any of the issues. Major allied partner JI refused to join the government after IJI’s victory in the elections and later on, it adopted an attitude of a critical observer which created many problems for the government on one hand and on the other bore misunderstandings among the allied partners. The IJI leadership tried to sort the issues through personal appeals instead of preparing a political program which led to the disastrous quit of JI from the IJI on May 5, 1992. As far as the international political scene is concerned, three major factors made things very difficult for Nawaz Sharif government: first was the deduction in the American aid to Pakistan, second was the decrease in foreign remittances from the Persian Gulf states and third was the decreased support for Afghan Jihad due to the loss of interest of the global community after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. From inside the country, unbridled corruption among the ruling elite took Nawaz Sharif government towards the point of no-return. Within three years of the government, he lost the confidence of allied parties, establishment and that of the common masses. All these factors kept the IJI leadership to take bold steps to improve economic and political conditions of Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif’s conflict with the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and dissatisfaction of the allied partners resulted in the parting of ways of three important allies, i.e. the HJ, NPP and JI which finally culminated in the dismissal of the government and the formal termination of the IJI alliance in 1993.

In any alliance system, it is very necessary to discuss and plan things in a comprehensive manner to develop a consensus about the issue and to avoid misunderstandings among the coalition partners. In case of IJI, both these things lacked. IJI was formed as an alliance of PML-N and NPP and was joined by other parties with a common agenda to defeat PPP in the elections. Since the issues and prospects had not been discussed by the assembly, there remained many issues un-discussed which created problems in managing the alliance’s internal matters. At the time of alliance formation, things like comprehensive plan of the alliance, quantum of representation of members in the forthcoming elections and management and organization of the alliance were not briefed explicitly resulting in malfunctioning of the IJI government.

IJI lacked certain other important features as well. Properly planned alliances take the parties on board and play on the potential of the parties that can help the alliance to grow. Planned alliances take in those parties whose assets and strengths are beneficial for the growth of the
alliance. In this way not too many political parties with same potentials are gathered on one platform. At the same time, this helps to get cooperation of those who can add to the basic assets of the member parties of an alliance. Since IJI was not a planned alliance, it lacked the comprehension of potentials of alliance members which instead of helping the IJI to grow as a political force brought it to the ground. Having an alliance of eight parties with each advocating interests which are in conflict with other party’s interests, the alliance leadership could not satisfy the member parties regarding seat sharing in the forthcoming elections i.e. in 1988 and also in other issues of national importance.

Meetings and discussions of alliance partners about specific issues and at regular intervals help the alliance to grow and address internal and external issues with the support and guidance of the alliance partners. It also helps the allied partners to understand viewpoints and reservations of each other about issues of national importance and of the things important for the members of the alliance. Sharing of information with all the members of alliance is considered much important. It gives a sense of sharing and responsibility. At the same time the members feel themselves important and they try to sustain that alliance which is only possible if the meetings of alliance are arranged at regular intervals. For IJI, it was reasonably a serious challenge to call meetings at regular intervals which was not be done by IJI’s leadership leading to many serious issues and misunderstandings that kept burgeoning inside the ranks of IJI and took it towards a tragic culmination.

Plans and strategies of any alliance and methods of executing those plans, which are normally in written form, play an effective role in the smoother working of that alliance. Political parties have to devise a set of principles to be followed as a member of that alliance because, generally, members of an alliance carry divergent views and their interests and goals are not the same. Alliances are formed with an objective to achieve some common goals without sacrificing the individual interests of the member parties. The probability of misunderstandings and conflicts, within an alliance, can be reduced to a minimum level for its smooth working, if the members are clear about their aims and objectives and their strategy to achieve those aims. In case of IJI, no such rule was ever followed and the only strategy followed by the leadership was to gain and sustain the number of parliamentarians, to give PPP a tough competition. An anti-PPP policy was followed by the IJI. The only greatest toll in the hands of IJI leadership became a nuisance for her when government was formed by IJI. Each member of the alliance wanted her due share in the government and wanted to execute its own policies. Since IJI had only one manifesto, it could not resolve most of its problems within member parties, especially those related to resolution of conflicts among the members of the alliance.

As far as the working of an alliance is concerned, it is not necessary to devise an altogether new working formula. Organizational structure of any of the member parties can be adopted for the working of the alliance and propagating its ideology at grass-root level. The members should have the courage to accept their mistakes and all the members should be given their due credit in case of any achievement. Member parties should arrange joint ventures which induces a sense of sharing and brings out the importance of team work. IJI did not focus on increasing its support base at grassroots level as a combine effort of all of its member parties which resulted in its dissolution soon after it formed government at national level.
While reading the international political theories and paradigms, it can be assumed that the existent political realities in Pakistan are far divergent than that of other democratic countries enjoying democratic system of government for centuries, like Great Britain. While studying the political alliance, Duvergor’s model of Political Understanding was made the framework of analyses but here it is essential to differentiate between the political parties and their alliances in Pakistan and those followed in other countries. Political parties in Pakistan are sort of pressure groups lacking long-term agendas and goals. They generally do not maintain the record of the political developments inside the party and usually the parties are working like monarchies where the dynastic rule is the only precept and things are generally manipulated and changed according to the need of time without any consideration of the basic principles and agendas.

Secondly, having arbitrary rules for the party leadership, parties generally do not follow the rules that lead them to join any alliance that can help them to increase the quantum of their representation in parliament’s benches. Another important factor is that elections are not held on regular intervals which not only resists the evolutionary process of growth of political parties, but, it also causes insecurity among the political leaders and they loosen their hold over the party members that enables the members to make alliances with other parties either they share their ideology or not.

IJI was an alliance consisting right and left-wing parties; the parties of religious orientation made it difficult for other members to work together in a harmony. The alliance lasted longer than other alliances ever established in Pakistan. It participated in two general elections, played the role of joint opposition alliance from 1988-90 and a government alliance from 1990-93 but it could not culminate in the merger of its member parties and dissolved.

The alliance was actually formed between PML-N and NPP; later on, other parties joined the alliance without any cohesive ideology or a common program. The alliance transformed from electoral into parliamentary-opposition, then transformed back into electoral and lastly into parliamentary-government alliance. Without a dynamic and a well-versed leadership, it was difficult to handle altering roles of the IJI which intensified problems for the alliance members and made it difficult for them to stay together. IJI lacked cohesion, necessary to bind together the member parties, leading to its disastrous end and failure to complete its tenure.

Many factors are responsible for the fragility of the electoral alliances. Firstly, the political parties in Pakistan do not have a vast experience owing to the termination of political system time and again. Secondly, the preference to individual interests over joint interests of the alliance makes political compromise a nightmare. The parties’ efforts to maintain their distinctive credentials do not allow any alliance to work smoothly. Thirdly, the coalition members work in individual capacity and highlight their individual role in the political developments and achievements, eclipsing the role of alliance. The coexistence of divergent ideologies under one umbrella is usually very difficult especially when all the members enjoy the similar status in the political scenario of the country. All parties demand an equal share in government and equal say in national issues which is not acceptable to lager parties and the alliance meets their tragic end.

In short, there are two steps of forming any political alliance: one is the formation and second is the organization and the management of the coalitions. In Pakistan, the first part of alliance formation is undertaken successfully; however, the second part has neither existed nor being pursued in any of the alliances, resulting in their obliteration not so long after their creation.
The coalitions can work positively together if they share common goals and are determined to work together, work-out differences properly through discussion on alliance forum at an appropriate time, take important decisions through consultation and stick to the set of principles agreed by all member parties. In general, alliances breakup because the meetings of the members are not held at regular intervals which exacerbates problems among the alliance members or members are not chosen carefully and without keeping in view the coherence in the ideology of alliance and member parties. At times, alliances breakup due to the feelings of the member parties that they may lose their individual identity if they keep on working within the alliance and they decide to part way. Great alliances with members having divergent ideologies also fail to work for a longer duration of time. A closer study of the causes of extinguishment of IJI informs that one way or the other, all these reasons worked together to carry off IJI.

Political alliances with divergent ideologies can only continue positively if the leaders are willing to sacrifice their egos and personal benefits for the growth and development of the alliance but this was not the practice adopted by the IJI. Each of the leaders of the member parties had only two things in mind, firstly, they worked for the political point scoring for their respective political parties and secondly, they tried to earn further name and fame or worked to increase their vote-bank, which resulted in the deterioration in the relationship of the allied partners. A closer look of the causes of the friction within the IJI ranks reveals the all the points of the problem had been there in the previous alliances in the history of Pakistan were there in the IJI which could easily be taken care if the priority of the alliance members was the national interest.