SINO-US RELATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

The thesis has addressed one central question: what are the implications of Sino-US relations post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security. The thesis maintains that amicable Sino-US relations would enhance Pakistan’s security, while Sino-US rivalry would erode Pakistan’s security. Within this context, Sino-US competition post 9/11 has diminished Pakistan’s security at the domestic and regional levels. Theories of realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence provide an interesting theoretical framework to explore underlying features of Sino-US bilateral relations post 9/11. Sino-US relations at the strategic, political and economic relations can be explained on the basis of realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence. Ever since the 18th century, Sino-US relations exhibited both conflict and cooperation. In the geo-strategic environment of the post 9/11 era, China’s rise to power in Asia has made Sino-US relations complex. A broad convergence of interests has prevailed in the US-China relations to maintain stability at the international level, yet divergences have developed at the strategic and economic levels in the Asia-Pacific region. Sino-US economic interdependence and trade has marked mutual stakes. Within this context, the US pivot Asia strategy of global forward defence and the Chinese counter balancing move of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has held implications for Pakistan’s security post 9/11.

Sino-US relations post 9/11 has had strong implications for Pakistan’s domestic and regional security. At the domestic level, Sino-US competition has eroded Pakistan’s security through increasing political violence and reducing socio-political cohesion in the country. At the regional level, Sino-US competition has diminished Pakistan’s security vis a vis India and Afghanistan. Where India is concerned, Sino-US rivalry has increased Pakistan’s traditional rivalry with India, reduced India-Pakistan deterrence stability and weakened Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir. However, the Indo-US strategic nexus has allowed China to forge a strategic partnership with Pakistan. Pakistan’s security vis a vis Afghanistan has suffered due to the spill-over affect of Afghan instability and militancy into the western border of Pakistan. India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership has further deteriorated Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan.
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>Air-Sea Battle Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>Anti-Access Area Denial Strategy</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Conference</td>
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<td>ASBMs</td>
<td>Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABMD</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRI</td>
<td>Belt &amp; Road Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Accord</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISMOA</td>
<td>Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Combined Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4IS</td>
<td>Command &amp; Control Intelligence Surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter Services Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSA</td>
<td>Logistic Support Agreement</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium Range Ballistic Missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>US Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPEC</td>
<td>China Pakistan Economic Corridor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>Research and Analysis Wing</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLOCs</td>
<td>Sea Lanes of Communications</td>
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<td>SLBMs</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The thesis addresses one central question: What are the implications of Sino-US relations post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security? The thesis analyses the implications of this relationship for Pakistan’s security at all three domestic, regional and global levels. Historically speaking, Sino-US relations have involved interesting features of both conflict and cooperation since their inception in the 18th century. Built around the myth of China trade, Sino-US interaction has been a mix of converging and clashing interests involving both cooperation and hostility. The US involvement in China exacerbated the Chinese civil war, leading to the establishment of Kuomintang Nationalist Party’s (KNP) rule in Taiwan. Mao’s leadership played an instrumental role in China’s resurgence after establishment of Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule in 1949. Overt antagonism developed in Sino-US relations during the initial period of the Cold War. Transformation in the global context, however, marking the Sino-Soviet split in (1960-1989) made Sino-US relationship cordial. Sino-US relations continued to evolve ‘while agreeing to disagree’ on important security issues during this period in the face of common enmity against the Soviet Union. Sino-US relations remained stable during the later course of the Cold War due to the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in 1979. In the aftermath of the Cold War, however, Sino-US relations became strained following certain incidents on the international landscape. Complex interdependence in bilateral economic interests featured more in overcoming hostility while granting stability to Sino-US relations in the entire course of the post Cold War era.

Sino-US relations developed a unique complexity in the post 9/11 period, entailing rivalry, conflict and cooperation. Economic interdependence marking billions of dollars of trade and clashing national security objectives have defined the contours of Sino-US relations in the post 9/11 phase. China has emerged as a major stake-holder in the contemporary global order based on its military and economic clout, which has raised

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1 China has emerged as the second largest military spender in the world, second only to the US post 9/11. China’s more than 7 percent average GDP for the past three decades (except for the recession in Renminbi in August 2015), its $10 trillion economy, $142.2 billion military budget and $3 trillion in the US Treasury bonds has made China an important stakeholder at the international level. China holds the largest foreign currency reserves and is the number one customer for US Treasury bonds. From a mere $2 billion in 1978, the country’s trade boosts $2.56 trillion in 2011, making it the largest trading partner of America. For earlier US China trade patterns, See William W. Keller & Thomas G. Rawski, (eds.) China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007).
questions on its future role as a status-quo or revisionist challenger to the US security interests. Sino-US relations have been variously defined as ‘China threat’ to ‘China opportunity,’ ‘panda hugging’ or ‘panda bashing.’ China’s rise has contributed to the shift of global power from Atlantic to the Pacific. In scale and magnitude, China’s ascendance resembles the US rise to power in between the Civil War (1861-1865) and the First World War (1914-1919). Scholarly opinion has oscillated between prospects of rivalry to collaboration in Sino-US relations. Leading to the self-fulfilling prophecy of becoming one, scholars have warned against the tendency of treating China as a strategic competitor. In the perspective of various assumptions, Sino-US clash or convergence of security interests becomes all the more interesting in the contemporary era.

**Statement of the Problem**

Sino-US relations post 9/11 has been complex entailing features of rivalry, conflict and cooperation at the strategic, political and economic levels. China has earmarked on the conception of ‘major-power relationship’ with the US based on improved maritime and land access. China has endeavored to improve its voice in global economic and institutional governance. Simultaneously, China has emerged as the second largest military spender, second only to the US. China’s construction of artificial islands in

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6 Announced in the fifth plenary session of the 18th National Congress, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has marked China’s Look East and Look West approach based on China’s bid to improve its geo-strategic and economic space in various parts of Asia.
7 At the economic level, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has offered a substitute to the US dominated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
8 Beijing has viewed PLA’s modernization as essential to achieving the ‘China Dream’ of national rejuvenation. China’s military budget grew at an average of 9.5 percent per year from 2005 to 2014. The PLA continues to improve its amphibious and airborne capabilities. The US military budget, however, doubles the world top fifteen states’ militaries combined. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), the military budget of the US, estimated at $597 billion in 2016. The US spent $600.4 billion on its military expenditure in 2013 as against the Chinese $131.3 billion, which marked a 12.1 percent increase from the previous year. The US further spent $633 billion on military budget in the year 2014 as against Chinese $215 billion for the year 2015. India had followed the Chinese lead in economic growth and military modernization with its military budget estimated at $50.1 billion for the year 2015.
the South China Sea has triggered international concern for stability in the South China Sea. Moreover, from passive integration into the Western system since the 1911 Revolution, China has strived to shape a new world order along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s Defense White Paper 2013 has emphasized the period until 2025 as a window of strategic opportunity. Endogenous and exogenous structural constraints have hindered China’s global policy ambitions post 9/11. Jervis has argued that the US, being the unipolar power, has adopted the strategy of ‘strategic denial’ to maintain hegemony and to contain military and economic capability of potential rising adversaries like Russia and China in Asia. The contours of Sino-US relations, however, become evident from the US President Obama’s State of the Union address in January 2015. As the US optimal policy of dealing with a rising China, Obama’s role played by India cannot be ignored in shaping the security order in Asia. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), starting from the top, Brazil’s budget stands at $34.7 billion, India’s defense budget stands at $38 billion, France $40 billion, Germany $40.2 billion, Japan $41.6 billion, UK $51.5 billion, Saudi Arabia $56.725 billion, Russia $60.4 billion, China $145 billion and the US defense budget stands at $600.2 billion. This portrays a resurgence of focus on high military spending, now amounting to over 81 percent of the world total military expenditure by the top fifteen states. See SIPRI, Fact Sheet, April 2015, available at: http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1504.pdf accessed May 24, 2015.


12 Referring to the Asia-Pacific region, the president stated that the US has modernized alliances to ensure that other nation (China) play by the rules. The US anticipated that China must trade well, resolved maritime disputes and participated in meeting common international challenges. The president warned that China wanted to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region (and) put the US workers and businesses at a disadvantage. Obama’s Pivot Asia policy has been a continuation of the Bush legacy of balancing against a rising China — the US policy of global forward defence manifested in extension of ‘defence security pacts’ and ‘military re-enforcement’ in Asia-Pacific. The US president George H. W. Bush announced the US Defense Guidance in 1992 — the policy of forward global defence in the absence of bipolarity to
pivot Asia strategy has induced Cold War binary divisions in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, states are enjoined to choose between the US or China. The Chinese scholarly perspective has termed pivot Asia as the US containment strategy, believing that the US wants to pin down China in the Asia-Pacific. The US public officials have termed the pivot Asia strategy as aiming at risk reduction in a highly volatile and militarized region.\textsuperscript{13} The US scholars have termed Pivot Asia as one of ‘engagement and reassurance.’\textsuperscript{14} With increase in China’s energy consumption over the next two decades, potential for Sino-US security competition remains high along the Persian Gulf region. Since 2010, however, many contentious territorial disputes have surfaced in the South China Sea. Although Sino-US are not diametrically opposed, yet while the Chinese underestimate the US military capability,\textsuperscript{15} China overestimates its own to control the course of conflict and wage war in the Asia-Pacific region.


\textsuperscript{13} Uni-polarity grants to the US freedom of action to intervene militarily in distant regions. Robert Jervis has opined that with a greater share of military and economic power than any other state, unilaterialism is the US way of foreign policy. See Robert J. Art, America’s Grand Strategy And World Politics, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 125.


\textsuperscript{15} Factors that have driven the US rebalance to Asia have included volatility and uncertainty between North and South Korea, Taiwan and the South China Sea. The US has remained committed to the security of Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) to foster the health of global economy. Moreover, as Asia-Pacific has remained a heavily militarized region marking inter-state hostilities, the US sought to foster peaceful modes of conflict resolution based on multilateral cooperation achieved through good governance and an integrated free economy.
Pakistan’s geo-strategic location has served as a force multiplier for China’s expansion of economic and energy interests in the US traditional sphere of influence.

The thesis contextualizes Sino-US competitive balancing of interests in wider Asia, the underlying dynamics of involvement in Southwest and Central Asia while focusing on the impact upon Pakistan’s security. The US Pivot Asia strategy has encompassed a region starting from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea. Historically speaking, geo-strategic developments on the South Asian regional theatre have granted direction to world politics. Of the several factors contributing to Pakistan’s global profile is its geo-strategic location adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s energy lifeline in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, the vehemently-contested energy security zone of Central Asia and beyond, contiguity to China in the north and to India adjacent to the Arabian Sea. Beijing’s economic rise rejuvenates China’s relationship with Pakistan in several new dimensions. Pakistan remains an integral part of China’s western Development Strategy. Pakistan remains China’s energy conduit, a balancer against India and an integral southern component of China’s BRI strategy.

In the past, great powers’ involvement held a direct bearing on conflict and cooperation in South Asia. For example, the bipolar structure of the international system saw India and Pakistan involved in an intense security competition as they sided with their great power collaborators. Sino-US competing dynamics have a direct bearing on Pakistan’s regional stability and security. China’s new acquired status has contained alarming prospects for the uncontested US dominance of the South Asian region. If China is going to build an alternate world order post 9/11, how would it affect Pakistan’s security? The study tends to examine Sino-US patterns of amity and enmity in South Asia and its affect on Pakistan’s security dynamics post 9/11.

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17 South Asia has housed seven of the world’s nine declared terrorist organizations, three de facto nuclear powers in close vicinity and one third of the world population. The region has contained the world’s most volatile nuclear flash-point and eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation in India-Pakistan belligerency. Contemporary global environment post 9/11 has made Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance increasingly relevant to Sino-US rivalry. See Devin T. Hagerty, South Asia in World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 13.
18 Srikanth Kondapalli and Emi Mifune, China and Its Neighbors (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2010), 12.
Objective of the Study
The study attempts to explore great powers’ pattern of involvement in wider Asia, the underlying dynamics of competitive interplay in Southwest Asia in order to draw implications for Pakistan’s domestic and regional security. Sino-US competitive interplay of power politics has marked alarming trends for Pakistan’s security. The study seeks to identify the indicators and variables which affect Pakistan’s domestic and regional security post 9/11.

Significance of the Study
The study is an attempt to comprehend the phenomenon of great powers’ competitive interplay of power competition in South Asia and how has it unleashed patterns for small powers’ security. Sino-US competitive relations in the post 9/11 era has yielded interesting new patterns of power competition in all parts of Asia. The Indo-Pakistan security dynamics of South Asia makes the study all the more significant in terms of the impact of the US and China policies towards the region. Interesting new patterns of strategic alignment and realignment has marked the security architecture of South Asia, which has yielded important lessons for Pakistan’s security.

Literature Review
The literature on the subject can be divided into three categories. The first category of literature deals with the historical context of Sino-US relations. The second category deals with Sino-US relations from 9/11 to 2014. The third category of literature reviews Pakistan’s security in general without connecting it to Sino-US relations. The first category on Sino-US relations reviews different phases in the evolution of Sino-US relations from the 18th century to 9/11. To review Sino-US relations from the 18th century to 1949, authors such as Warren I. Cohen’s *American response to China*¹⁹, Henry Kissinger’s *On China* ²⁰, John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman’s *China: A New History*²¹ offer a fascinating overview of US-China relationship in the past. Franz

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Twenty First Century\textsuperscript{34}, Robert Kaplan’s ‘China’s Grand Map: How Far Will Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea’ \textsuperscript{35} categorize Sino-US relations post 9/11 quite well. Scholarly accounts have oscillated between the prospects of Chinese ascendancy to the world stage and the way it may or may not pose a threat to the US global security. The optimist camp has included authors that focus on a broad convergence of interests in Sino-US bilateral relations while the pessimists’ camp has predicted clash in the evolution of Sino-US relations. Still others have adopted a mixed approach predicting negative and positive implications of China’s rise to power. In this category, scholars have emphasized Sino-US reciprocity of interests based on shared global norms of coexistence, while others have anticipated rivalry or clash of interests in Sino-US relations post 9/11.

For example, Baogang Guo & Sujian Guo have argued that the world will most likely be reconstructed by the interactions between Ameriglobalizaion and Sino-centric globalization in the next decade, granting a much higher level of Sino-US consensus over common challenges to humanity. China’s rise is a watershed event taking place in an era of rapid globalization with immense potential to transform the global landscape. Globalization facilitates China’s rise enabling economic growth and military modernization by providing access to Western technologies and the global trading system. Simultaneously, globalization also promotes integration of the once disconnected Chinese societies of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.

Judith F. Kornberg & John R. Faust’s, \textit{China in World Politics: Policies, Processes, Prospects} has emphasized on China’s revisionists ambitions in the contemporary world order, influencing events at both the regional and global levels. Adopting a historical perspective, the authors furnish a substantive overview of Deng Xioping’s policies on the emergence of modern China to emphasize on China’s cautious approach in adopting the western liberal model. Describing the evolution of Beijing’s policies since establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the book tends to explore the Chinese Communist Party’s quest for legitimacy based on appeal to traditional Chinese values and popular aspirations. Analysing China’s domestic vulnerabilities and challenges,

future goals and aspirations, the book offers a review of China’s role in the international security system.

The third category of literature involves books on Pakistan’s security in general. This category has included books on Pakistan’s domestic security such as, Pervez Musharraf’s *In the Line of Fire*[^36], Abdus Sattar’s *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Concise History: 1947-2012*[^37], Ahmed Ishtiaq’s *Pakistan the Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences*[^38], Hamid Khan’s *Constitutional And Political History of Pakistan*[^39], S. M. Qureshi’s *Contemporary Power Politics and Pakistan: An Ambassador’s Reflection*[^40], Robert W Wirsing’s *Pakistan’s Security under Zia: 1977-1988*[^41], Lawrence Ziring’s *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*[^42], S. M. Burke & Lawrence Ziring’s, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*[^43] provides an indigenous perspective on Pakistan’s domestic security.

Perspective on Pakistan’s regional security include authors such as Riaz Mohammad Khan’s *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity*[^44], Aparna Pande’s *Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Escaping India*[^45], Devin T. Hagerty, *South Asia in World Politics*[^46], Ajay Darshan Behera and Mathew Joseph, *Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context*[^47], Hall Gardner’s *American Global Strategy*

and the War on Terrorism48, and Wang Yusheng’s ‘Some Observations on the post September 11, US and International Situation’49 provides a regional scholarly perspective on Pakistan’s regional security vis. a vis. Afghanistan and India.

The literature on Pakistan’s global relations have included books such as Llyod & Sussane Rudolf’s Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives And The Imperial Presidency50, Howard & Teresita Schaffer’s How the US negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster51, Stephen P. Cohen’s Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum52, and Vali Nasr’s The Dispensible Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat53, Bruce Riedel & Pavneet Singh’s ‘US-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan’54 and Barry Buzan’s ‘Will the global War on Terrorism be the new Cold War? 55 summarize the global perspective well. Several oscillations mark deterioration in Pakistan-US relationship post 9/11. Scholars have variously interpreted US-Pakistan relations such as ‘deadly embrace,56 ‘business like and corporate’. Scholars in this category have provided an overview of bilateral factors, resulting in deterioration of the US relations with Pakistan.

Original Contribution to Knowledge

In the above-mentioned literature, research that studies the implications of Sino-US engagement in South Asia for Pakistan’s security is missing from analytical inquiry.

50 Llyod I. Rudolph, Sussane Hoeber Rudolph, Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives And The Imperial Presidency (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008).
55 Barry Buzan, “Will the global War on Terrorism be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, Vol. 82, Issue 6, November 2006, (1101-1118), 1103.
Scholarly research has focused more on Sino-US involvement post 9/11 in the Southeast Asian region rather than the South Asian region. Literature has overlooked the broad macro-level perspective, involving Sino-US involvement in South Asia post 9/11 and its implications for Pakistan’s domestic and regional security. The present study will fill the gap in the existing literature. The thesis reviews Sino-US global strategic rivalry, competition and cooperation post 9/11 and the implications for Pakistan’s security. It furnishes analytical inquiry of Sino-US balancing of interests in South Asia and the implications for Pakistan’s domestic and regional security, hence making an original contribution to knowledge.

**Relevance of the Study**

This research is highly significant and carries a strong utility because it deals with the relationship between a superpower — the US and an emerging great power — China. The exploration of this relationship has implications for the new world order. Whether the latter will be uni-polar, multi-polar or will follow a hybrid uni-multi-polar model depends on this relationship as well. The nature of cooperation and competition between the US and China carries implications for the world at large including various regions of Asia such as Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. The US-China relationship will be one of the determining factors for the degree of stability or instability in these regions.

The research is also very significant because it deals with the implications of Sino-US relations post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security. Being a nuclear state, Pakistan is an important actor in South Asia. The security dilemma and rivalry between India and Pakistan have traditionally determined the security of the South Asian region itself. After 9/11, South Asian security rests on the triangular relationship between India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Located in South Asia, Pakistan’s geo-strategic proximity to Central Asia, Middle East and China makes Pakistan an important actor in the region. Pakistan’s security and insecurity can strongly impact on the stability or instability of not only South Asia but other adjacent regions as well. Pakistan has had strong relations with both the US and China. Within this context, the US-China relationship can strongly affect Pakistan’s security. Given all these factors, this research is highly significant.
Hypothesis
Competitive Sino-US relations post 9/11 have eroded Pakistan’s security both at the domestic and regional levels.

Research Questions
Q1: Given the complexity of Sino-US relations post 9/11, what is the nature of Sino-US relations post 9/11?
Q2: How do Sino-US competing interests affect Pakistan’s domestic security?
Q3: Why and how do Sino-US relations affect Pakistan’s regional security?

Research Methodology
Theories of Realism and Complex Interdependence are most relevant for the discussion of both Sino-US relations post 9/11 and its implications for Pakistan’s security. The thesis will utilize various dimensions of Realism namely classical realism, neo-realism, neo-classical realism along with offensive and defensive realism. All realists agree on survival, security and self-help as the central organizing feature of state relations in the anarchical world of international relations. The realist strand has emphasized quest for ‘power’ as the main aspect regulating state behavior at the international level. Traditional realists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes argue that quest for power is rooted in human nature. According to them, states expand their dominion on one pretext or the other to ensure survival. Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr maintained that maximization of state power is a national security imperative, statesmen can afford to ignore at their own peril. Structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz hold that quest for security is an exogenous compulsion in the ‘international world of anarchy without hierarchy.’ Neo-classical realists like Fareed Zakaria enunciates that endogenous and exogenous imperatives

drive statesmen in the quest for security to ensure survival. Offensive and defensive realists like John J. Mearsheimer\textsuperscript{64} emphasize that states are ‘offensive positionalists.’

States maximize power to survive in the anarchical world of international politics. Defensive realism portrays that incumbent hegemons seek to maintain their dominating position over potential rivals, while offensive realism maintains that rising hegemons constantly seek to expand power. Within this context, the thesis will explore the interplay of Sino-US relations post 9/11 directed at the quest for power to ensure survival in the anarchical world of international politics. Simultaneously, Sino-US relations have entailed complexity structured on economic relations and trade, which make theories of Complex Interdependence most relevant to the thesis. Complex Interdependence holds that multiple channels connect societies: interstate, transnational and transgovernmental, with no hierarchy of fixed state agenda directing relations between states. Statesmen cannot manipulate interdependence due to the effects of their policies on different transnational groups, which revolve around the concept of national interest.

Interdependence thus occurs within networks of rules, norms, and procedures related to international regimes that regularize behavior and control its effects. International regimes are the sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence. International regimes govern arrangements through which governments influence interdependence. Sino-US relations exhibit complexity involving features of interdependence centered round economic and trade relations along with rivalry focused on the quest or pursuit of power post 9/11. Interdependence, contention and conflict go side by side in the evolution of Sino-US relations post 9/11. Hence the theoretical paradigms of Realism and its various strands along with Complex interdependence are most relevant to discuss the complexity entailed in Sino-US relations in the post 9/11 era.

The thesis will be based on qualitative research. The qualitative research method is exploratory in nature. It aims to develop general ideas to understand the underlying dynamics, factors, reasons and motivations to analyze the political phenomenon under

study. It incorporates a process of both inductive and deductive reasoning to organize the evolving ideas and thought patterns into a coherent whole. The thesis will also rely on qualitative methods of field interviews and data collection techniques to study Sino-US global competitive dynamics post 9/11 and the impact on Pakistan’s security.

The thesis will rely on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include Sino-US official treaties, Sino-US policy declarations, Sino-US joint communiqués and press releases, official records of bilateral treaties, press statements made by state officials during exchange of dignitaries. The thesis will borrow from various interrelated disciplines such as International Relations, Strategic Studies, History, Political Science, Political Philosophy, International Political Economy, Sociology and Economics. Whereas secondary sources are concerned, books, articles from journals and newspapers will be utilized. Articles in American journals such as World Politics, American Journal of International Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Comparative Politics will be used. The Chinese journals will include journals by China Institute of International Studies, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Journal of China and International Relations, China International Studies.

American newspapers such as The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune and The New York Times will be reviewed. Chinese newspapers such as China Daily, Xinhua News Agency, Guangzhou Daily Newspaper, China Global will be utilized. Pakistani newspapers will comprise Dawn, The News, Express Tribune, Daily Jang, Observer and others. The thesis will also rely on author’s interviews, along with informal discussions with high officials, academicians and experts of the field. Secondary sources will also include studies emanating from American think tanks such as the Library of Congress, the Brookings Institutions, Henry Stimson Centre, Council on Foreign Relations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Centre for the National Interests, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Atlantic Council, RAND, Wilson Centre, Aspen Institute, Centre on Global Interests, Belfer Centre for Science and International Development.

Chinese think tanks include China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and China Institute of International Politics. Pakistani think tanks include Institute of Strategic
Studies Islamabad (ISSI), Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA), Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad (SSII), Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Institute for Strategic Studies Research & Analysis (ISSRA) and South Asia Strategic Studies Institute (SASSI), and Institute of Regional Studies (IRS) Islamabad. Official and other websites from the US, China and Pakistan will also be utilized.

**Division of the Study**

In order to analyse the implications of Sino-US relations post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security, the thesis has been divided into two parts and nine chapters in all. The First Chapter, ‘Theoretical Framework’ will argue that the theories of realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence are the most relevant paradigms for the discussion of Sino-US relations and its implications for Pakistan’s security. Part One has three chapters. Within this context, the Second Chapter ‘Sino-US Relations: 1949-9/11’ will argue that Sino-US historical relationship has been a mix of mutual mistrust and cooperation. China regarded the US equitable partners in Chinese exploitation along with the Westerners in the spoils of war. This chapter will further argue that important developments during the Cold War era allowed China to forge an alliance partnership with the US against the Soviet Union. Chapter Three ‘Sino-US Engagement in South Asia: 1949-9/11’ will argue that global dynamics of the Cold War era dictated the course of Sino-US involvement in the South Asian region. Sino-US regional involvement reflected bilateral interplay of competition and cooperation, while offering political and strategic patronage to regional rivals in South Asia. The US and China exhibited a functionalist rather than a regionalist approach without considerations for the security impact on India-Pakistan rivalry. Within this context, Sino-US competition exacerbated than resolved India-Pakistan regional hostilities during the Cold War.

Chapter Four ‘Sino-US Competition post 9/11’ will argue that Sino-US relations converge and diverge at the bilateral, regional and global levels. This chapter will argue that the US-China inter-dynamics of security competition in Asia have exhibited both the quest for security and marks of economic interdependence on important bilateral, regional and global issues. This chapter will further argue that Sino-US strategic relations have exhibited a remarkable potential for conflict and cooperation on regional issues. In the economic domain, Sino-US relations have marked each side’s high stakes
in the success of the other in the competition for energy security and regional dominance in trade.

Part Two of the thesis “Implications for Pakistan” has five chapters. Chapter Five ‘Sino-US Maritime Rivalry in Asia-Pacific: Implications for Pakistan’s Security’ will argue that great powers’ involvement in the Asia-Pacific region is based on opportunism, expediency and short term gain coerced by the strong against the weak. It argues further that the US maritime strategic collaboration with India has inflated Indian preponderance in the Arabian Sea. Sino-US strategic balancing of interests in the Asia-Pacific has dragged great powers’ strategic rivalry to the coastal belt of Pakistan with implications for Pakistan’s security. Chapter Six ‘Sino-US Competition post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan’s Domestic Security’ will argue that Sino-US competition held consequences for Pakistan’s domestic security. The US expansion of influence post 9/11 alarmed China, leading to Beijing’s geo-strategic and economic enhancement of influence in Pakistan. The chapter will further argue that Sino-US interplay had implications for Pakistan’s socio-political indicators of economic growth, promotion of democracy and security. Sino-US competition post 9/11 weakened Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion while aggravating political violence in the state. Sino-US expansion of influence exaggerated the civil-military divide, impacting adversely on the growth of democracy.

Chapter Seven ‘Sino-US Competition post 9/11: Implications for the Kashmir Dispute’ will argue that the US and China converge on the maintenance of status-quo on the Kashmir dispute. Sino-US insistence on bilateralism rather than UN resolutions, the US alignment of geo-political and economic interests with India post 9/11, and China-Pakistan informal alliance have aggravated rather than resolved India-Pakistan positions on Kashmir. Chapter Eight ‘Sino-US Competition post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan-India Strategic Rivalry’ will argue that great powers regional polarization has induced conventional and nuclear imbalance to the detriment of Pakistan’s stability. Chapter Nine ‘Sino-US Competition post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan’s Security via a vis Afghanistan’ will argue that Sino-US convergence and divergence of interests in Afghanistan had implications for Pakistan’s regional security especially concerning Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. This chapter will argue further that during the post 9/11 era, the US-China interests converged at a broad level to maintain stability in
Afghanistan. In practice, however, Sino-US security interests have diverged at all three strategic, political, and economic levels in Afghanistan.
CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter holds that the theoretical traditions of realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence are the most pertinent theoretical frameworks for the discussion of Sino-US relations post 9/11 and their implications for Pakistan’s security. Within the context of the above-mentioned theories, the patterns of Sino-US relations can be amply understood. As the thesis explores the implications for Pakistan’s security, theoretical paradigms dealing with security question assume primary significance.

This chapter is divided into the following three sections: 1) Realism: A Critical Appraisal; 2) Structural or Neo-Realism: A Critical Analysis; and 3) Complex Interdependence: An Exploration.

A theoretical model that reviews significant features of the relevant paradigms is essential for a multi-dimensional understanding of Sino-US bilateral relations and involvement in South Asia. The present analytical inquiry has incorporated a blend of realism and complex interdependence framework to understand the complex dynamics of Sino-US bilateral relations, the pattern of their involvement in South Asia and the implications for Pakistan’s security. The theoretical cushion provided by realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence has furnished a rational understanding of Sino-US bilateral relations involving features of rivalry, cooperation and competition and the implications for Pakistan.

1.1 Realism: A Critical Appraisal

This section critically explores realism’s basic postulates to establish understanding of the state and the international system. Three factors make realism as the most pertinent theoretical framework for the present thesis. First, realism incorporates a variety of approaches and includes a long theoretical tradition. Second, developed as an anti-thesis to liberalism, realism exercises great influence on the practice of international diplomacy. Third, realism continues to guide state behavior in world politics.

Realism has exercised ascendancy amongst the subsequent growth of theoretical traditions. The growth of the discipline of international relations has marked a debate
between two contending schools of thought — namely idealism and realism.\textsuperscript{1} The British theoretician Tim Dunne has termed the rest of the story of International Relations as a footnote to realism.\textsuperscript{2} Realism and liberalism have offered different concepts about the nature of man, state and international relations. The idealist school refers to universal moral principles as the basis for framing international politics. Realism argues that conflictual human nature causes conflict in the world, which can only be curtailed by further conflict.

To develop familiarity with realism’s basic strands, it is important to review the three distinct periods of the paradigm’s intellectual growth separately. This would help to understand how classical realism has offered the most pertinent intellectual insight for the study. In the realist tradition’s growth, a distinction can be made based on different periods. Classical or radical realism held influence till the 20\textsuperscript{th} century followed by modern realism from 1939-1979, while structural neo-realism grew from 1979 onwards. Two diverse strands of radical philosophers include names of Greco-Western realists such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Prominent names added after Second World War includes E.H. Carr (1939), Hans Morgenthau (1948), Reinhold Niebuhr (1947) and George F. Kennan known as modern realists. Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer are the latest names in the realist list.

Radical realism owned its growth and origin to the philosophical writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Radical realism has regarded the quest for power rooted in human nature and power imbalance as the root cause of international conflict. Athenian historian and General Thucydides’ book, \textit{History of the Peloponnesian War}, has been the only acknowledged classical text on classical realism, which saw politics as primarily involving characteristics of power.\textsuperscript{3} Thucydides has set the central argument of the realist thought in the famous \textit{Milan Dialogue}. Thucydides asserted that the fundamental difference of power allowed the strong to dictate terms to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Edward Hallett Carr, Michel Cox, \textit{The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations} (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 27.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Chankiya’s philosophy of \textit{Raja-Mandala} implied that states exploited fissures across the board caught in a circle of rival kings.
\end{itemize}
the weak rendering the weak to submission. The choice offered to the weak, ‘either submit or perish’ defined the position of the weak in the realist tradition.

Machiavelli, however, reoriented the concept of politics on more radical terms. Machiavellianism has been a doctrine, which highlighted irrelevance of morality in politics and justified moral and immoral means to achieve political ends. In chapter XV of *The Prince*, Machiavelli has separated politics from ethics.⁴ Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) propagated antithesis of the Christian writings and a negation of western idealism that emphasized humans as moral agents. Machiavelli challenged moral political traditions based on the teachings of Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. To Machiavelli, men never did any ‘good’ unless through necessity. Yet simultaneously Machiavelli while borrowing much from Plato and Aristotle,⁵ emphasized glory and power, substituting self-discipline and control with vigor. Machiavelli has made no distinction between moral virtue and moral vice. Machiavelli had little confidence in the human potential for improvement and spiritual growth. Machiavelli thus projected a distorted view of human nature.

Thucydides, however, regarded political prudence rather than moral considerations to guide statesmen actions and considered moral or immoral actions justified as long as these met the criterion of political rationality.⁶ Thomas Hobbes has added a yet additional dimension of power rooted in human nature. Rather than moral or social, Thomas Hobbes’ (1588–1683) book *Leviathan* portrayed human nature as ‘nasty, brutish and short.’⁷ According to Hobbes, humans were caught up in a continuous and an impatient desire of power for control – a state of war of all against all that ceased only in death.⁸ Yet lust for power rooted in human nature compelled egoistic sovereigns

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⁴ Aristotle and Plato laid rules how tyrants can stay in power and how state can be ruled. Both emphasized that virtue is important for public, but not for rulers or leaders. They also asserted how rulers should appear or seem to be religious without actually being so. Both taught that ends justify the means in politics and that propaganda in education should be resorted to. Plato believed that justice meant keeping classification of society intact.


⁷ Hobbes attributes certain features inherent in human nature as glory seeking, competitiveness, diffidence, un-trust worthiness and fundamental equality.

to enlarge their dominions on pretence of danger and fear of invasion by subduing their neighbors. Hobbes portrayed the pursuit and struggle for power inherent in the relations among states. According to Hobbes, war has remained as a central element in state relations and can never be eliminated from the earth.

Evaluating critically, however, it can be argued that obsession with the pursuit of power as a necessary feature of all human relationships is a problematic concept. It is equally unconvincing to regard power as rooted in human nature. Piety, charity and forgiveness are equally compelling human characteristics. It is difficult to regard every individual as engaged in an unending thrust for power. The purpose of power, dimension and extent of accumulation is an ambiguous concept. Similarly, state actions cannot be explained by a restricted focus on power alone. Universal ethics sometimes grant direction to state actions under certain circumstances.

Figure 1.1

Figure 1.1 shows that the hard core realists have viewed the greed of power to be grounded in human nature. From an explanation of human nature has flown all their ideas about the perception of statesmen, question of survival of state, pursuit of power along with peace and war. The concept of hard core realism has set the base for the subsequent evolution of the realist tradition.
Figure 1.2 has explained the criticism on hard core realism. The concept has contained problems with portrayal of human nature as egoistic, rational and selfish, containing the endless desire for the pursuit of power. Human nature has been intangible and unobservable, while it contained the equally compelling attributes of piety, love and forgiveness. To portray the pursuit of power as the only end of statesmanship has been flawed. Moreover, realism has failed to inform the purpose of power: An end or as means to achieve something else. By defining power both as a means and an end, realism has unleashed ‘security dilemma’ resulting in war and conflict.

The British theoretician, E. H. Carr’s (1892–1982) *Twenty Years Crisis*, portrayed a rational understanding of the practice of International Relations. Terming liberal analytical mode as wishful thinking, Carr stated that liberalism granted a teleological end to International Relations aimed at the preservation of peace. Carr introduced instead the concept of scientific realism emphasizing the study, analysis and acceptance of facts as they existed in actual. Carr proposed that the greatest wisdom rested in accepting the irresistible strength of existing forces, which one remains powerless to alter. Without an overarching authority in the international system regulating behavior,

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Carr believed that the propensity of conflict has stayed constant. The state’s pursuit of national power remained an endogenous natural drive for survival.

Realism proposed that war could only be eradicated by understanding its underlying dynamic: the imbalance of power as the root cause of conflict. Balance of power rather than the liberal utopia of collective security could prevent the advent of war. The only legitimate medium to reallocate power in the international system has been the instrument of war. Preservation of peace served the interest of the dominant powers at the expense of the weak. Political prudence rather than dictates of morality guided state action. Power sets the principles of moral norms. State protectionism either in protective legislation or protective tariffs has been the weapon of self-defense of the economically weak states against the strong.

American political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) emphasized human desire to dominate others as the root-cause of international conflict. In his book, *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau proposed that international politics was a struggle for power and a few principles had a timeless universal validity. Regardless of statesmen’s personal motives and ideological preferences, power dynamics shaped a state’s national interest. Classical and modern realism are centered on three Ss — state, survival and security. A state’s economic and strategic power shaped its position in the international hierarchy. Realist tradition offers the recipe to coexist and maximize national interests in a hostile international environment. Power maximization and security are embodiment of laws that remain true across time and space in realism. Classical realism has regarded political prudence as the guiding principle rather than religion, morality and norms of international justice for the pursuit of national power to ensure survival in an anarchical society.

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11 Morgenthau’s ‘six principles’ emphasize human nature as fixed on a rational pursuit of maximization of power. Prudence rather than exigencies of morality to guide political behaviour; peace as a temporary truce based on rough equilibrium of balance of power; universal moral principles code particular national or cultural interests; radical changes will be doomed to failure, if they challenge the laws of international politics.
Figure 1.3 shows that classical realists have regarded politics as an autonomous sphere emphasizing the pursuit of several national interests. Classical realism suffers from a number of serious problems in its portrayal of statecraft. Contending theoretical paradigms of liberal, critical, and post-modern paradigms have criticized the realist perspective. The British Political Science Professor Robert W. Cox has termed realism as a problem solving theory.\(^\text{12}\) According to Cox, Realism’s emphasis upon the state as the ultimate form of political organization has obstructed paths to alternate historical developments. The notion that politics was an autonomous sphere that existed independently of economics, law or ethics has been misleading as well. Richard K. Ashley has asserted that realism made international politics a pure political game without gains or stakes.\(^\text{13}\) Marxists argued that realism’s emphasis upon perpetuation of the state system structurally supported the capitalist mode of production at the domestic and international levels.\(^\text{14}\)


Figure 1.4 shows that classical realism’ emphasis on key assumptions of statecraft has been a misleading conception. Hence realism’s portrayal of power politics alone is an incomplete projection of the art of statecraft than has been the case actually.

1.2 Structural Realism or Neo-Realism: A Critical Analysis

This section elaborates on the theoretical paradigm of structural realism while evaluating it critically. States pursued multiple national interests in addition to the maximization of power. Classical realism emphasis on the exclusive pursuit of a boundless extent of power is based on a vague notion of maximization of national interests. The concept has tended to confuse the ends with means. Power preponderance leads to the security dilemma unleashing a spiral of inequality and war. Realism has paid little attention to international economics; it has viewed economy only as an ingredient of state power.

Leading pluralists including the American academicians Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have proposed ‘interdependence’ rather than balance of power politics in defining the changed complexion of world politics.\(^\text{15}\) Theories related to international political economy have dealt with the ways in which states have collaborated to achieve

economic goals. The sub-discipline of international political economy represented ideas based on the hegemonic stability theory to suggest state’s significance despite the existence of globalized world economy. Scholars such as Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner emphasized the state’s role despite transnational contacts trying to reduce its significance and superiority. Structural Realism or neo-realism was an attempt to curb classical realism of its anti-positivist orientation by grounding it on a more scientific understanding and methodologically rigorous approach. Kenneth Waltz’ neo-realism presented an attempt to withstand the liberal assault on realism on two fronts: The disappearance of distinctly international due to the emergence of sub-national and transnational actors and the emergence of supranational organizations.

The American theoretician Kenneth Waltz's in *Theory of International Politics* presented a critique of traditional realism while projecting its subsequent intellectual growth. Waltz depicted the international system as a whole with structure and unit levels at once distinct yet interconnected. Waltz’s neo-realism was an attempt to comprehend and connect phenomena that translated into systemic level constraints on state behavior. Waltz’ approach suggested system structure at two levels: Evolving or organized by the interaction between units (states) and imposing systemic level constraints on foreign policy behavior of individual units. In the international system, Waltz portrayed how states interacted with each other while explaining their relative position in relation to each other. Waltz’ system structure had three important characteristics in the system’s organization, the character of its units and the distribution of power capabilities.

Waltz international system existed independent of state level endogenous considerations. This point marked the beginning of Waltz’ structural theory while it portrayed its departure from traditional realism. Realism failed to propose similar attributes to the international system, which showed outcomes resulting from units’ interaction. This implied a reciprocal interaction where structure of the international system shaped the conduct of actors. Waltz termed liberal theories as reductionist for failing to explain the whole (the global system) by explaining the interaction of its parts.

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(the states). Realists argued on the importance of human nature and liberals emphasized democratic norms and free commerce. Marxists objected to the capitalist and labor classes’ struggle. All theories ignored systemic level structural constraints on foreign policy behavior of states.

Waltz argued that the drive for power had been a systemic level structural constraint that homogenized states’ foreign policy behaviour. Accumulation of power was fundamentally a means to the logical end of survival in the international anarchic domain. Waltz argued that Soviet Union and the US behaved similarly in military power and strategic competition during the Cold War. Consequently, Waltz had a different conception of power compared to the classical realists. The drive for security led each state to enhance power in the international system.

States therefore become socialized into the rationale for self-help resulting from inherent international anarchy. States enhanced power and security through accumulation of military equipment to wage war. A functional similarity existed among all actors without distinction. The resultant security dilemma had a logic of its own. Gilpin explained that in the wake of irreducible uncertainty about other’s intentions, security measures which one actor took generated a spiral effect of insecurity for the others. This led to a spiral effect of mutual suspicions and counter measures for security and protection, letting loose an entire chain of illusory fears and unnecessary defenses. The whole exercise thus made security a zero sum game.

Waltz' neo-realism proposed the logic of balance of power to address the security challenge. States balanced one another's powers to maintain international stability by alliance formation, compelling the weaker ones to join hands against the more powerful state. Balancing took two forms. In internal balancing, states took measures such as military build-up. In external balancing, states formed alliances to ensure survival and security. Both internal and external balancing allowed states to overcome the threat perceived under the security dilemma.

18 Ibid., 11.
The units of an anarchic system had differing capabilities — unequal and constantly shifting power — for performing similar tasks. States’ power capabilities determined their foreign policy behaviour. Insecurity and unequal gains limited cooperation in the international system. Despite trade and commerce regulated through liberal ideals, states avoided putting themselves in situations of increased mutual dependence. Considerations of security over-rote economic gains. States focus on relative gains made actors more difficult to cooperate. To cooperate, one’s gains must outweigh the other party. States, however, refused to cooperate unless cooperation entailed mutual benefit to both parties. If economic engagement proved more beneficial to the other party, states refused to cooperate. States would maintain conflict as long as it inflicted more damage to the adversary despite bearing the costs itself. Structural realism explained that despite interdependence among states, international relations would remain prone to conflict and war-mongering. The basic proponents of neo-realism are demonstrated in Figure 1.5.

**Figure 1.5**

![Diagram of Basic Proponents of Neo-Realism]

Figure 1.5 shows a systemic view of world politics projecting states as unitary and rational actors in international anarchy. Differentiation in state positions is based on variation in capabilities, necessitating survival through internal and external balancing. Matters related to military security are regarded as high politics, while those of economics as low politics. The criticism of neo-realism is shown in Figure 1.6.

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21 Ibid.
Figure 1.6 shows that Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism projected a much too narrow view of the international system centered on the struggle for power. Neo-realism overlooked the significance of economic interdependence and trade relations between component units. Neo-realism resisted change and justified war, granting primacy to the balance of power politics. Realism’s concern with continuity and logic of reproduction has tended to neglect the logic of change. Realism’s emphasis to succumb and adapt rather than oppose to the strength of irresistible existing forces, nevertheless, has militated against structural change in the international system. Realism failed to predict the upcoming change in the international system based on the end of the Cold war.

Jack Snyder in his *Myths of Empire* differentiated between two types of realism, which became the dividing line between offensive and defensive realism.22 The debate’s controversy rested on whether states had a motivational desire to ensure bare survival or sought expansion based on dominance. Defensive and offensive realism classification led to the modeling of the states as status-quo or revisionist powers. US scholars like Michael Mastanduno and Joseph Grieco23 termed nation states as ‘defensive positionalist’ holding that states although avoided increasing power on their

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own, sought to balance the power of their adversary. This, however, was a lop-sided view as states tended to maximize power to respond to emerging security threats in their geo-strategic environment.

John J. Mearsheimer contended that states were offensive positionalist instead. Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* argued that states tended to maximize power relative to others. Mearsheimer’s states were offensive positionalists—short term power-maximizers. To respond to the uncertainty of international anarchy, Mearsheimer claimed that states expanded their power whenever opportunity allowed it. According to Mearsheimer, all states were expansionist in nature and it was difficult to find a status–quo power in international politics. Fareed Zakaria argued that to increase control over their uncertain external environment, states expanded political interests abroad. Offensive realism relied on idea of prevalence of offensive strategies. Mearsheimer viewed only regional hegemon as status quo states whereas Waltz regarded all states as status quo powers. Yet Mearsheimer’s view appeared to be reductionist for ignoring economic interdependence between various states. A further expansion of the tradition occurred in what has been termed as neo-classical realism.

Neo-classical realists tended to supplement rather than refine structural realism. Neo-classical realists argued that purely structural theory did not allow for accurate predictions. Offering a synthesis between realism and structural realism, neo-classical theorists argued that states responded differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, with their reaction conditioned by and dependent on their domestic considerations. The neo-classical project sought greater depth in terms of domestic variables and investigated patterns in state behavior that interacted with structural forces. Although the three theories were different, yet they shared a common concern-

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-the search for power as the main driver for security. Classical realists emphasized the human drive to seek power, offensive realists stressed end goal of states to attain dominance through power, while defensive realists laid claim on power to ensure survival. The common strands of the realist tradition are manifested in Figure 1.7.

**Figure 1.7**

*Universal Strands of Realist Tradition*

- **Statism**
  - State is the legitimate repository of force and guarantor of security for its people within its territory.
  - States are rational actors, engaged in rational pursuit of power to ensure security in international anarchy.

- **Survival**
  - Survival can be understood internationally with logical connection between means and ends.
  - Military and strategic issues are matters of high politics; economic and political affairs are matters of low politics.

- **Self-help**
  - Security in the international system can only be ensured through self-help based on military muscles and alliances.
  - Self-help or balance of power is the guiding principle for state survival.

Figure 1.7 explains monolithic strands of the realist tradition based on statism, self-help and survival. The realist tradition has regarded state as the rational and unitary actor, acting as the prime repository of force and guarantor of security for its people. In the anarchical world of international politics, the prime obligation for states is the quest for survival achieved through the logic of self-help based on the balance of power, arms build-up and alliance formation.
Figure 1.8 shows main strands of realism vested in the supremacy of the state system in the anarchical world of international politics. Realism emphasizes state centrism as the guarantor of human security and survival, achieved through maximization of power based on a system of self-help.

Reviewing critically, there exist many loopholes in the realist tradition. The realist view of international anarchy is exaggerated. The hierarchical nature of the international system has granted stability to world politics. The American analyst Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein has argued that the core-periphery dichotomy has created a relatively stable international environment. Moreover, it is easy to discern cooperative mode of interaction guiding state behavior based on humanitarian and moral considerations in times of natural calamities. The English School and Hedley Bull have termed the international system as a society of states sharing common assumptions and values contrived after strenuous efforts. States limit chaos by maintaining a sufficient

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level of order in the international system to attain higher goals. War and great power politics have played a positive role to maintain international order.

The American scholar John Gerard Ruggie has argued that unit level processes induced structural changes in the international system itself. 32 Waltz’ theory offered only a reproductive logic but no explanation for structural transformation. Its major drawback was reflected in neo-realism’s failure to account for the systemic level change that arose from bipolarity to multi-polarity. International anarchy did not necessarily create a non-cooperative system. Rational egoism induced the drive among states to cooperate in the international system. Thus realist assumptions about international politics were not in line with the making of institutionalized arrangements for the promotion of cooperation.

To conclude the realist tradition’s primary focus on power as a major determining force is reductionist in nature. It is asymmetrical in offering the explanation of state behavior from the perspective of balance of power politics alone. There are equally compelling aspects of states’ interaction in world politics based on interdependent dynamics. Simultaneously, the neo-realist emphasis on structural constraints reflected in the state’s rational pursuit of power appears to be exaggerated. Such an approach makes politics and neo-realism, as Richard K. Ashley put it, as a ‘pure’ technique for achieving the goals set before political actors. 33 The neo-realist scheme of things appears inapplicable to a world order unaffected by the dynamics of complex interdependence, rapid transportation and information networks. There is a dire need to develop a theory which would explain the states’ behavior in terms of multiple channels, inter and intra-state linkages, economic interdependence and the role of institutions. Complex interdependence theory has tried to address such concerns.

1.3 Complex Interdependence: A Critical Appraisal
The American Academician Robert Owen Koheane and the American political scientist Joseph Samuel Nye Jr. developed the theory of complex interdependence dismissing

realism to portray alternate assumptions as the reflection of reality.\textsuperscript{34} Both scholars questioned realism’s core assumptions. In \textit{Transnational Relations and World Politics} published in the early 1970s, both scholars stipulated conditions under which states cooperated and the role of institutions therein. In 1984, Keohane attempted to synthesize the two traditions his book, \textit{After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy} to stipulate what is known as ‘modified structural realism’ or ‘neo-liberal institutionalism.’

Complex interdependence entailed three basic assumptions that gave rise to distinctive political processes that changed power into control of outcomes. Keohane painted an image of world politics as involving features of interdependence between transnational and non-state actors rather than interstate relations. Interdependence as opposed to dependence meant a state of mutual dependence. Dependence entailed effects executed by external forces whereas interdependence in world politics referred to conditions involving mutual effects among actors in different states.\textsuperscript{35} According to Keohane, interdependence did not entirely involve condition of squarely balanced mutual dependence. It was unequal dependence, which was likely to influence actors in their transactions with one another. At the other extreme was pure reliance.\textsuperscript{36} Most cases rested between the two extremes. The heart of interdependence was placed in this interconnection.

Interdependence did not imply mutual benefit. Competition and distributional conflict would still persist. Interdependence was created through the growth of global contacts that constrained political activity. Interdependence referred to situations where actors were influenced by external forces in a mutual relationship, which limited their self-reliance.\textsuperscript{37} Although these relationships incurred costs, the benefits could surpass the costs.\textsuperscript{38} Interdependence referred to situations featured on reciprocal costs among actors in different states. Interdependence would always involve uneven costs and effects of transactions, as interdependence relationship restricted autonomy of action.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 8.
According to Keohane, where there were reciprocal yet uneven costly effects of transactions, there existed interdependence. However, where interactions did not entail costly effects, there was simply interconnectedness rather than interdependence.\footnote{Ibid., 8.} Keohane further explained that understanding of this distinction was important to understand the politics of interdependence.\footnote{Ibid., 10.}

According to Keohane, this also implied that those less dependent would use the interdependence as a bargaining chip to influence different issues. Power could be referred to as the capability of an actor to force others to do something they otherwise would not do. It could also be viewed in terms of control over outcomes. To understand the position of power in interdependence, it is important to distinguish between two dimensions: Sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity involved degree of receptiveness within a given policy framework. It pertained to how rapidly changes in one state could affect changes in other states. Sensitivity was the speed and magnitude with which a change in one country within one policy framework was felt in another.

Within this context, power would be determined by the allocation of resources and vulnerabilities within particular issue-areas, irrespective of military power. Vulnerability was particularly important for understanding the political nature of interdependence relationships. According to Keohane, vulnerability could be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after it changed policies. Vulnerability could be judged from the costliness of making adjustments to a situation over a period of time. Vulnerability interdependence was more imperative in granting power resources to actors. Effective alternatives allowed states to overcome the effects of sensitivity. Vulnerability could take on a military dimension, as less vulnerable states would inflict costs on others by taking advantage of their sensitivity. Military force would be used if higher risks existed.\footnote{Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., \textit{Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition}, (Boston: Little –Brown, 1989), 3-32.} Physically powerful states would use military strength to win through in issues where they had little influence.

Governments influenced interdependence through international regimes that governed relationships of interdependence. In the traditional linkage, strong states used military
dominance to prevail in issues where they had weaker influence. In complex
interdependence, domestic, transnational and transgovernmental actors would use their
economic influence to limit resistance. Statesmen could not manipulate
interdependence due to the affect of their policies on different transnational groups that
blurred the concept of national interest. Networks of rules, norms, and procedures
related to international regimes thus controlled interdependence. The allocation of
power resources among states, system norms and procedures shaped the nature of the
regime.43

Keohane maintained that governments controlled transnational and interstate relations
by creating rules for regulating specific activities.44 Thus international regimes
provided for the determination of governmental preferred options.45 International
institutions determined international agendas by acting as catalysts for coalition
formation, policy options and linkage by weak states. Institutions acted as platforms
that allowed states to achieve their goals. Within institutions, agenda formation was
subject to international and domestic problems as there was no clear hierarchy of issues.
Transnational or domestic groups created hype about certain issues, which were then
discussed and accepted in international regimes. Institutions hardly ever indulged in
centralized enforcement, but worked on mutual reciprocity leading states to keep their
own commitments.46 Institutions helped to achieve collective gains by decreasing the
likelihood of non-observance.

Regimes were the intermediaries between the international power structure and the
compromises on politico-economic issues within it. Regimes were the out-put of the
power structure of the system. According to Keohane, the perpetuation of the
hegemonic conditions was not necessary to the maintenance of institutionalized co-
operation among states. Instead, regimes were established to allow states to produce
collective agreements and reduce uncertainty. Power and self-interest were essential yet
structural realists like Kenneth Waltz and Gilpin over-emphasized the degree to which
the international system was chaotic.

43 See also Stanley J. Michalak, “Theoretical Perspectives for Understanding International
Interdependence” World Politics Vol 32, no. 1 (1979): 145.
44 Ibid., 5.
46 Ibid.
In complex interdependence, regimes offered functional utility regulating state behavior on a given issue-area. Thus states had a rational self-interest in dispensing cooperation, despite shifts in the balance of power. Complex interdependence, thus, had three main characteristics: Firstly, states were not the only dominant and coherent entities. Multiple channels including trans-governmental, transnational and interstate relations connected societies. Secondly, the agenda of inter-state relationship consisted of multiple issues with no hierarchical distinction between military security and economic or social issues. It meant that military security did not control the agenda with no division between domestic and foreign issues. Third, military force would not settle issues with other states when complex interdependence prevailed. According to Keohane, military force would not settle disagreement on economic matters, yet it would be significant for maintaining political and economic relations with a rival bloc.

**Figure 1.9**

**Basic Strands of Complex Interdependence**

Figure 1.9 demonstrated linkages among issues where interdependence is prevalent. The arrows show inter-linkages and cross border transnational, trans-governmental and interstate relations. The bigger wheel shows that transnational, interstate, and transgovernmental relations are the main attributes of complex interdependence that translate power resources into power for control on outcomes.

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47 Ibid.
Neo-liberalist approach stressed the likelihood of mutual gains through cooperation in multilateral organization.\textsuperscript{48} The insignificant function of force led states to depend on other means to exert power. Less vulnerable states would try to use asymmetrical interdependence in particular group of issues as the source of power. Asymmetrical interdependence would limit the losses due to mutual gains. Multinational organizations acting as transmission belts would make government policies more responsive to one another. Contact between governmental bureaucracies would lead to the making of trans-governmental coalitions on specific issues.

Interdependence is, therefore, a relative concept, distinct from relationships of pure symmetry to pure dependence. Complex interdependence has integrated both the realist and liberal traditions by resorting to interdependence that focused on mutual gains. Interdependence necessarily has raised questions about linkages among issues. Exerting influence on one issue implied making concessions on another.\textsuperscript{49} A weak actor with strong inclination on one issue may make great allowance on other matters to win objectives. Fully reflecting bargaining power, a powerful actor would not exercise influence on a certain issue if it had to grant concessions on issues that outweighed the gains.

Interdependence involved a two stage definition. First it was a condition of dependence; and second, a condition of mutual interdependence. Interdependence required a condition into which hierarchy of policy issues had been dissolved, multiple channels of contact had been established and the utility of force had been reduced. Interdependence has laid a higher emphasis on mutuality of interests and circumstances that are central to the usage of the concept. Interdependence has been a deliberate construct that in its elaborate form has simplified a far more complex reality. As distinct from pure symmetrical dependence, interdependence has involved a condition of asymmetry in which the costs of maintaining or disrupting relations would differ for


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
those involved.\textsuperscript{50} It has been an imbalanced relationship in which the total level of costs for one side would be greater than the other.

Complex interdependence in international politics has entailed competition yet large mutual benefits could result from cooperation. The theory has been termed as complex interdependence due to the complexity involving competition and cooperation, costs as well as gains. Neo-liberal institutionalisms have criticized the neo-realist assumption that relative gains were the focus of decision making in foreign policy. Instead, they argued that the significance of relative gains was based on the nature of relations, type of issues and the number of states involved.\textsuperscript{51} In non-security issues like health, trade and environment, states compromised their obsession with relative gains and focused instead on their own gains. Institutions helped to neutralize the effect of anarchy and provide a focal point for joint action by reducing complexity and uncertainty.

Keohane has been an important figure to examine institutions in a variety of issue-areas in international relations. Yet Keohane has been widely criticized for building a positivist research programme for neo-liberals. Realists were less persuaded to believe that institutions really mattered. For example, Joseph Grieco argued that states remained relative gains maximizers, even if regimes facilitated the search for absolute gains through cooperation.\textsuperscript{52} While criticizing neo-liberal institutionalism, John Mearsheimer maintained that Keohane failed to establish the significance of institutions in reducing the emergence of war among states.\textsuperscript{53} Keohane's work during the new millennium has focused primarily on the normative and structural dynamics of legal and political institutions. Yet it can be argued that the sovereign states coordinated rules


for the working of institutions rather than the latter wielding authority over the former.\textsuperscript{54} In the study of international relations, Keohane has attracted rather different kinds of criticism from critical theorists and liberals. Richard Leaver, for example, has lamented the joining of international political economy with hegemonic stability theory, regime analysis and rational choice models.\textsuperscript{55} David Long argued that complex interdependence eliminated the essential goodness of liberalism as an emancipator for individuals.\textsuperscript{56} In its ambitious attempt to combine the realist and liberal traditions together, complex interdependence alienated both the traditions.

It can be argued that Joseph and Nye have presented a synthesis of the neo-realists and neo-liberal positions. In the economic realm, Adam Smith’s advocacy of the laissez faire economy had emphasized the principle of harmony of interests. The theory of complex interdependence has tried to integrate both the elements of economic liberalism and power politics. Keohane and Nye have juxtaposed two opposite yet complementary models of world politics for understanding reality and framing appropriate policies. Keohane has pointed to the need of studying internal-external interaction, and emphasized the significance of international institutions in bringing cooperation among states. Keohane has maintained that governments can form international regimes on the basis of shared interests based on mutual stakes. Keohane has stressed the significance of regimes to reduce anarchy and promote cooperation. International regimes enforced binding rules and allowed governments to start mutually beneficial contracts with others. It can be reasonably argued, therefore, that the international system has only been conditionally anarchic with interdependence and balance-of-power politics existing side by side in the interaction among states.

Therefore, this chapter reviewed Thucydides, Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes’ contribution to explore the philosophical roots of radical realism. It then examined the work of classical realists like E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Evaluating Kenneth Waltz’s contribution in the 1970s, it reviewed Mearsheimer’s defensive-offensive

realist debate, and analyzed the contribution which neo-classical realists have made. To regard realism as an all encompassing paradigm is to leave too many aspects of international politics in ambiguity. Neo-realism has emphasized the international structure as imposing the drive for statism, self-help and security for survival in the anarchical international domain. Neo-liberal institutionalists criticized neo-realists’ emphasis on survival, pointing to interdependence as prevailing between states.

Complex interdependence has prevailed through multiple channels regulated along transnational, transgovernmental and societal levels to grant complexity to interstate relations, rather than strict hierarchy observed between high issues of military politics and low issues of commerce and trade. Nevertheless, by focusing on structural constraints and interdependence, neo-realism as well as complex interdependence has furnished a substantial understanding of power dynamics as regulating relations between states. Both neo-realism and complex interdependence would be useful for the thesis due to their emphasis on the logic of power.

All the above-mentioned theoretical traditions, however, have been manifested during the entire course of Sino-US relations. A blend of realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence has the power to explain the dynamics of conflict and cooperation involved in Sino-US relations along with their engagement in South Asia and Pakistan. These theories can also help in understanding the implications of Sino-US relations post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security as well. The next part of the thesis concentrates on the historical context of Sino-US relations.
This chapter explores the nature of Sino-US relations from early eighteenth century upto the 9/11 era. It argues that Sino-US historical relationship has been a mix of mutual mistrust and conflict due to three reasons. Firstly, the Chinese blamed the US along with the Westners for the period of Chinese humiliation and unequal treatment. Secondly, the Chinese regarded the US as foreign invaders ready to take a share in the British spoils of war in China. Thirdly, China forged an alliance partnership with the US to make use of its stronger position in their common enmity against the Soviet Union. Sino-US relations acquired a functionalism vested in the promotion of stability in international relations during the Cold War era.


2.1 Sino-US Relations: 18th C – 1949

This section explores China’s relations with the West beginning from the 18th century, tracing key developments leading to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949. Exploring China’s Confucius ideology along with its social and political history, this section argues that China faced a period of humiliation, exploitation, unequal treaties and forcible entry into Western style state system at the hands of the Western powers in which the US played an equitable partner. Sino-US relations were strained since inception due to the US mistreatment of Chinese nationals, lack of grant of diplomatic recognition, introduction of Christian missionaries and the US support to Japan in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894.

The People’s Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949 with Mao tse-Tung’s peasant-backed communists’ success against the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek who fled to establish an independent government in Taiwan. It is difficult to explore the beginning of Chinese civilization. Two significant names in
China’s history are the Yellow Emperor and Confucius.\textsuperscript{1} Chinese written script developed during the Shang dynasty in the second millennium B.C. prior to the emergence of classical Greek city states and Rome.\textsuperscript{2} China encompassed a vast territorial stretch that added to China’s self impression of a ‘world unto itself’ until the West set foot onto Chinese soil.\textsuperscript{3} Historically, Chinese emperors’ authority extended from Siberia in the north to the impenetrable ice-packed Himalayan peaks towards the south, the coastal villages in the east to the deserts of Central Asia in the west. China regarded Japan as a rival in social and political institutions towards its east. Europe appeared to China as a far off territory, incapable of senticizing into Chinese superior culture and civilizational influence.

The Chinese emperor styled himself as a universal figure, ruling over \textit{tian xia} or all in the universe through the Mandate of Heaven — the equivalent of what ‘social contract’ serves for the West.\textsuperscript{4} China treated societies around its periphery as gradations extending from the Middle Kingdom. China chose to remain largely self-sufficient and inward-looking in approach. Confined to a tributary status, nations on Chinese periphery were obliged to pay tribute to Chinese emperors. The tribute system marked audience of foreign missions with the Chinese emperor, performance of the \textit{kowtow}— a series of kneeling and prostrations, while the emperor bestowed gifts in return. Peripheral invasions occurred, resulting from barbarian desire to sanitize the Confucius way of life or superior Buddhist culture. China would rediscover its natural harmony with a resounding faith in the superiority of Chinese civilization.

\textsuperscript{1} Mencius & Confucius (372-289 B.C.) were two renowned philosophers of Chinese civilization, See Yuanxiang Xu and Bing Zhang, \textit{Mencius: A Benevolent Saint for the Ages}, (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2007), See also, Yuanxiang Xu, \textit{Confucius: A Philosopher for the Ages}, (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2007).


Lucian Pye observed that China in the modern era remains a civilization that only
pretends to be a nation state.\(^5\) No civilization matched China in technology and style.\(^6\)
Chinese scientific and technological achievements outmatched the Europeans long
before the Industrial Revolution. In the 1820s, China generated more than 30 percent
of the world’s GDP remaining the world’s most productive economy — exceeding
Western, Eastern Europe and that of the US.\(^7\) For quite long, China chose to remain a
closed society, reluctant to seek information about the outside world. Chinese naval
expeditions stretched as far away as the Strait of Hormuz and the Horn of Africa
between 1405 and 1433.\(^8\)

The Western invasion interrupted the Chinese traditional way of life. The West claimed
superiority based on their technical knowledge, ordaining an international world order
that China was forced to accept. China, on the contrary, found it hard to reckon with
the Western world’s international system based on the notion of equality of status. The
concept contradicted Chinese idea of zhonggu signifying the Middle Kingdom with its
inherent capacity to allow for adaptation based on superior Chinese traditions.\(^9\) Unlike
the past, the Westerners refused to sanitize as they had become more powerful than
China.

2.1.1 Opium Wars and Unequal Treaties

This sub-section discusses the British Opium wars with China. It argues that the British
desire to access free trade in China eventually led to ‘un-equitable treaties.’ The treaty
system let loose the era of Chinese exploitation, which eventually established allied
powers’ formal control on China. The treaty system subjected Middle Kingdom’s

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132 (1992):., 1161. Doi10.1017/s0305741000045556.

\(^6\) John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Michael, *China Through the Ages: History of a Civilization*, (Boulder: Westview Press Ltd,
1986).

\(^7\) John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap

\(^8\) John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap

forced entry into the Western state system, extorting trading concessions that remained unreciprocated to China.

The British came to the doorstep of the Middle Kingdom to establish free trade in the late 18th century. Interestingly, it was Chinese tea dumped into the rivers of Boston that started the American war of independence in 1773. The British insistence led Chinese Emperor Ch’ien Lung (1773-1774) to allow limited access to English merchants, confining them to coastal cantons restricting contact with the natives. To China, trade symbolized foreign control as evident from China’s grant of half-hearted concessions. Trade and commerce was regulated at the private level through grant of a license to British, Polish, Dutch, Americans and other foreign merchants. Traders remained submissive to Chinese courts, as trade offered considerable profits to foreign merchants. China’s power was strong enough to control the nature of Sino-Western relations during the initial period. The Westerners, however, responded in kind when the balance of power shifted. The balance of trade initially favored China. To redress the imbalance, British merchants began selling opium to China grown in neighboring India and Afghanistan. The negative effects of smoking opium on his nation distressed the Chinese emperor, who banned British imports. The imperial command led to British merchants’ complaints of mal-treatment. A punitive naval expedition was launched to protect English interests in China leading to the start of the famous Opium Wars.

The Western outreach to China transformed the traditional Chinese society beyond definable limits. British naval superiority resulted in an easy victory on China. After the war, the British imposed a series of unequal treaties initiating what Chinese interpreted as ‘a period of humiliation and unequal treatment.’ The treaties subverted China’s national interests and perpetually declined its status as an independent power. Two significant treaties i.e., the Treaty of Nanjing and the Treaty of Bogue signed

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11 Ibid, 6.
between Chinese Manchu Prince Qiying and British envoy Sir Henry Pottinger solicited numerous unjustified exactions from China.\textsuperscript{15} The Treaty of Nanking established equality of stature as a condition for Sino-Western diplomatic interaction. The treaty’s emphasis on equality violated imperial court’s ancient tradition of superior status and high grandeur.\textsuperscript{16} The British now demanded trade concessions for five other ports namely— Ningbo, Shangai, Xiamen, and Fuzhou; $6 million as indemnity of war; cessation of Hong Kong; permission for keeping permanent trade missions with extra-territoriality clause granting exemption from Chinese laws.\textsuperscript{17} The extra-territoriality clause failed to reciprocate similar concessions to China. The extra-territoriality clause eventually ended as a virtual blueprint for the resident foreign mission to indulge in criminal activities in China.\textsuperscript{18}

More humiliating for China had been the British drive to bypass Chinese courts in securing the right to negotiate with Chinese merchants directly. The British envoy also retained the right to exercise discretion in modification of Chinese tariffs on British imported goods. The Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause offered no reciprocity of trade concessions to China. In addition, foreign powers looked for and coerced trade concessions over and above those already extracted by other foreign missions.\textsuperscript{19} This clause gave each nation a vested interest in the success of demands that others made.\textsuperscript{20} Chinese coastal trading regions became bifurcated as contending western powers’ spheres of influence.

The Qing dynasty gradually succumbed to the ever-increasing political and trade coercions. In 1859, the British envoy Frederick Bruce’s attempt to take up residence

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 27.
led to allied coalitions’ forcible entry into Beijing.\textsuperscript{21} China refused to grant resident diplomatic mission in Peking putting up armed resistance to the British known as the Dagu Repulse. This led the allied powers to impose exemplary punitive measures on China, putting the Emperors’ Summer Palace to ashes which destroyed the priceless treasure of centuries’ old Chinese civilization. The allied act symbolized to the Chinese the horrendous consequence of showing resistance to the British. Following the allied victory, the Treaty of Tienjin fixed Chinese tariff on minimum five percent, legalized opium trade and granted permission to foreign diplomats to reside in Peking.\textsuperscript{22}

The British sought granting of traveling and navigating right up to Yangtze, which meant foreign goods could be distributed widely, subject only to nominal tariff lower even than the internal transit charges on domestic products. Extracted at the ‘gun point,’ western treaty system reduced the Middle Kingdom’s erstwhile superior stature to that of a subjected power. Every new allowance increased the Western demand for new concessions. From a position of pre-eminence, China became a contending object of conflicting colonial aspirations. The treaty system unleashed an exploitative process by which China lost control over much of its commercial and foreign policy.

\textbf{2.1.2 The US Contact with China: Jackal diplomacy}

This sub-section discusses the beginning of the US interaction with China, setting in the basic trends in the subsequent evolution of Sino-US relations. Extorting concessions one step ahead of the Western powers, the US had been an equal partner in China’s exploitation. Seeking grant of trading concessions in the allied controlled sphere of influence and other parts, the US insisted on ‘Open Door Policy.’ The bid to extract equitable concessions in the British spoils of war made the US guilty of what J. King Fairbank termed as ‘Jackal diplomacy.’\textsuperscript{23} To the Chinese mind, the US played an equitable share-holder in China’s exploitation.


In retrospect, the US private investors took little time to reach Chinese shores. However, fear of loss of trade prevented the US from interfering in the Anglo-Chinese war. The Chinese imperial court could hardly distinguish the US from other diplomatic missions in China’s exploitation. However, the US traders appeared more friendly, docile and easier to approach compared to other foreigners. In the British war, China had learnt the US would act as a silent spectator without rendering tangible support. To the Chinese, American resort to ‘Jackal diplomacy’ made the US guilty of China’s ‘humiliation and servitude.’ Mutual perceptions developed during this period remained crucial for subsequent Sino-US diplomatic relations.

The US President John Tyler (1841-1845) sent the US Commissioner Commodore Lawrence Kearny to gain comparable concessions for traders in China, following the British victory in the Opium wars. Trade with China comprised only one to two percent of the total US volume for most of the 19th and 20th century. The US traders drifted to the more profitable sale of opium to increase profits, depriving China of its hard currency. In the 1830s, the US President Andrew Jackson (1829-1837) sent Edmund Roberts to negotiate a formal trade treaty with China, signed by Imperial Commissioner Chi-ying and his American counterpart Caleb Cushing on July 3, 1844, known as Treaty of Wang-Hsia. By the mid 1850s, consular services were established making William Reed as the US first minister in China.

Subsequently, the US increased demands for trade concession under the Open Door Policy in the western spheres of influence. The demand for equitable concessions and status, Marilyn B. Young argued, became evident from an official letter sent to Britain, Germany, Russia and Japan by the US in 1899. Qing dynasty Emperor Hsuan-Tsung (1644-1912) sought to introduce symmetry in China’s foreign relations by extending

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24 Ibid., 23.
similar trade concessions to all western powers. Cohen argued that China wanted to tranquilize foreigner powers’ avarice for money, winning gratitude in the hope of banking goodwill.\textsuperscript{29} Trade concession demonstrated China’s employment of the traditional approach of \textit{wei qei}. To circumscribe foreign ambitions, China engaged with multiple set of foreigners, using barbarians against barbarians to avoid dominance by any one power.\textsuperscript{30} The US perceived its own image as a benign power for not maintaining a trading post in China.\textsuperscript{31} A T. Steele argued that the move did not help much to change China’s impression of the US in Peking.\textsuperscript{32}

Failure to extend extra-territoriality clause for Chinese industrial workers in America, lack of grant of diplomatic reciprocity and support for Japan in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894 strained the US relations with China. According to A. T. Steele, Chinese workers played a major role in industrialization of the US.\textsuperscript{33} Trade and Christianity determined Sino-US interaction in the revolutionary period. The US scholar Robert G. Sutter argued that Christian missionary zeal for reformation motivated the US interest in China, which angered the local residents.\textsuperscript{34} Only one percent of Chinese converted under the influence of some 3000 US missionaries.\textsuperscript{35} As Christianity symbolized foreign influence, the Chinese were reluctant to accept it. Warren I. Cohen has argued that the US, however, did not entertain any territorial expansionist designs in China. But the Chinese regarded Americans much like Europeans in eroding China’s sovereignty, contributing troops to suppress armed resistance and impose Christianity. In 1894, a weak China sought to resist Japan’s stretch of influence in the Korean peninsula, leading to high tensions and war. A sharp contrast in the combatants’ size worked to

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 39.
tilt the US sympathies for Japan against China. However, western power’s high territorial and political stakes prevented Japan from making inroads into Chinese territory. The US intervention and support for Japan invoked Chinese scepticism, anger and protest.

The western barbarians now dictated the terms of Sino-Western contact for the next century, reducing a once proud empire to a semi-colonial status. With acquisition of a foreign office in 1861 and the start of diplomatic practices, China was forced to join the ranks of the international community as a new power. The US played an equal role in eroding Chinese sovereignty. Sino-US relations remained strained despite the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1844.

2.1.3 Boxer Uprising and Chinese Nationalism

The Boxer uprising played a significant role in China’s national resurgence and subsequent developments leading to the Chinese civil war. The Taiping rebellion or Boxer uprising (1898) had been a manifestation of Chinese nationalism against foreign control. The attempt aimed at the revival of the Qing dynasty. Instead, it unleashed a period of civil war in China. The Taiping rebellion saw the US and the British joint action to quell the rebellion against the weakened dynastic rule at the centre. Monetary interest prompted the US and Britain to sell weapons to the imperialists and the rebels alike.

By the 19th century, the Chinese imperial court had ceased to exist as a meaningful entity. The court’s receding authority provoked popular resentment and revolt known as Boxer uprising in 1898, supported by the Chinese workers abroad. To protest against the new world order and to revive Chinese nationalism, the Boxers targeted everything that symbolized foreign control. Ironically, an allied attempt to relieve the besieged embassies led to the imposition of another unequal treaty upon China. The treaty

demanded indemnity for the loss of foreign interest along with the grant of further occupation rights to the foreigners.

Foreign interference in the systematic operation of the Chinese bureaucracy led to the Boxer uprising.\(^{38}\) The rebels wanted to overthrow the imperial dynasty regarding it as too weak to resist the expanding Western encroachment.\(^{39}\) Interestingly, the British and the US had a vested interest in the survival of the regime in Peking.\(^{40}\) An allied joint action against the rebels liberated the Yangtze valley. On the one hand, the US and the British fought for imperial dynasty’s survival; on the other hand, they sold weapons to the rebels. Marilyn B. Young has argued that such double crossing weakened the imperial court.\(^{41}\) Failing to resist allied encroachment, the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) succumbed to the pressure of successive foreign marches on the capital and collapsed eventually in 1912. A Chinese republic emerged with Sun Yat-Sen proclaimed as the president. A swift transfer of authority to Yuan Shikai occurred as political power devolved into the hands of regional governors and military commanders.\(^{42}\) Meanwhile, a shadow government, aligned with the world’s communist party, had also been formed in the name of the Communist Party of China in 1921.

The Boxer uprising symbolized imperial dynasty’s last attempt to revive old China. In the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the US agreed to transfer the Chinese Shandong province to Japan, controlled by Germany before the First World War (1914-1919). As Woodrow Wilson had already committed to transfer Shandong to Peking, the Chinese regarded the transfer of control as a dishonorable treatment to China. On May 4, 1919 anti-western and anti-Japanese demonstrations started, contributing strongly to the resurgence of Chinese nationalism.\(^{43}\) A civil war ensued between the Chiang Kai-shek


led Kuomintang Nationalists Party (KNP) and Mao tze-Tung’s Communist Party of China (CCP). In the late 1920s and 1930s, the US interest in China significantly reduced, following the rise of fascism in Europe. Moreover, internal civil war and less trading clout compared to Japan made China less significant for the US. As late as 1940’s, the US exports worth $78 million came to China while $227 million made way to Japan. For almost 40 years from 1927 to 1950, Chiang Kai-shek became the controversial symbol of the US successes and failures in China.

Sterility in Sino-US bilateral relations developed following mutual suspicions and mistrust. China made a reluctant entry into the modern state system, suffering exploitation at the hands of the western powers. Jackal diplomacy and Open Door policy played an equitable role in China’s humiliation leading to a tug of war and the fear of China’s geographical partition at the hands of the allied powers.

2.2 Sino-US Relations: 1949-1971

This section explores China’s relations with the US from 1949-1971. It argues that various international developments shaped Sino-US relations during the early phase of the Cold War. This argument has three corollaries. First, the US involvement exacerbated the Chinese civil war, which ended in the establishment of Kuomintang Nationalist Party’s (KNP) rule in Taiwan. Second, Mao’s leadership played an instrumental role, following Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule in mainland China. Third, context of the Cold War prepared ground for the orchestration of Sino-US rapprochement in 1971.

2.2.1 Civil War in China: Establishment of PRC

This sub-section explores key developments involving Chinese civil war, establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Kuomintang’s rule in Taiwan. The US support for Chinese nationalists against Japan strengthened the Kumintong, paving way for nationalist rule in Taiwan. After the civil war in mainland China, Mao’s leadership played a key role in Chinese resurgence.


Japan’s defeat in the Second World War (1939-1945) and subsequent disarmament in China strengthened the nationalists against the communists. The US sought to form a united front against the Japanese invaders in China.\footnote{The antecedent of the Kuomintang Party was a secret revolutionary league established by Chinese reformers in Tokyo in 1905. See Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, China in World Politics: Policies, Processes Prospects (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 134, See also ‘Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan and the old China hands’ in A. T. Steele, The American People and China (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966).} President Roosevelt (1901-1909) sent General Joseph Stilwell to explore the possibility of a joint national front against Japan but without much success.\footnote{A. T. Steele, The American People and China (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 43.} Following the US infliction of defeat on Japan,\footnote{Roger Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p 76.} the US disarmament of the Japanese strengthened the nationalists,\footnote{William Morwood, Duel for the Middle Kingdom: The Struggle Between Chiang kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung for Control of China (New York: Everest House, 1980), p 87.} intensifying the Chinese civil war, detrimentally affecting China’s national unity. General George C. Marshall, the US military forces commander, endeavored to form a nationalist-communist coalition government in China after the victory against Japan.\footnote{Judith F. Kornberg and John R. Faust, China in World Politics: Policies, Processes Prospects (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 130.} However, on October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of China was formed in mainland China based on CCP’s success carved on Mao’s leadership, reputation for incorruptibility and
appeal for Chinese nationalism. The Kuomintang Nationalists eventually set up a parallel government in Taiwan. Establishment of the communist rule in mainland China provoked uncertainty in the US. A debate on ‘Who lost China?’ sparked off when the US Department of State issued a White Paper signifying China’s great loss for the US global security interests in the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia. The US policy options oscillated between granting recognition to preventing the threat posed by Communist China in the context of the Cold War. The US concern for prospective two communist states in the Security Council dictated the course of American diplomacy towards China.

Mao’s leadership played an illuminating role in Chinese resurgence. Mao invoked a phase of continuous revolutions, to redefine Chinese identity and reshuffle China’s foreign policy stance. Mao inspired psychological equivalence to the superpower. Mao extended China’s claim to Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Mangolia, Burma and the Himalayas. However, Mao considered the US imperialism as China’s greatest enemy. Mao applied the new strategies of ‘Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom,’ and the ‘Great Leap Forward & Cultural Revolution’ to revive Chinese culture. While the Great Leap Forward aimed at sharing of resources and services, the Cultural Revolution, lasting

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54 The State Department issued a *White Paper* in August 1949 explaining factors that led to the Nationalists defeat in China. The debate continued in Washington’s domestic and policy circles into the 1960s.


60 On socio-economic construction in China’s drive for modernization, See Guangyuan Yu, *China’s Socialist Modernization* (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1984).
from 1966 to 1969, purged the Chinese Communist Party of its anti-revolutionary elements and provided for national resurgence.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{2.2.2 Sino-US Relations and the Korean War (1950-1953)}

This sub-section discusses the implications of the Korean War (1950-1953) for Sino-US relations. It argues that the Korean War increased Sino-US bilateral hostilities bringing both armies in a direct military confrontation. Although Sino-US militaries came face to face in a direct confrontation, the Korean War (1950-53) demonstrated the Chinese resolve to resist the American and Soviet pressure.

Sino-US interaction moved under the shadow of the Cold War, exhibiting patterns of opportunism and mutual exploitation in the initial period.\textsuperscript{62} The Soviet threat dictated the course of Sino-US relations.\textsuperscript{63} Mao, however, steered China in a triangular relationship with the US and the Soviet Union, maintaining equidistance to assert independence in China’s foreign policy stance. Stuart Schram argued that Mao regarded the US as highly unreliable and incapable of granting one ‘a full meal.’\textsuperscript{64} Earlier, following the Communist victory in mainland China, the Truman administration (1945-1953) had expected Mao to mount an attack on Taiwan, putting an end to the civil war. Despite the US army’s reservations on this,\textsuperscript{65} the US decided not to intervene in such an eventuality.\textsuperscript{66} China condemned the US action as a strategic design to forestall the

\textsuperscript{61} The policy led to a complete chaos and China became increasingly isolated internationally. The policy overhauled the Chinese society with a new system that barely worked and turned China into further diplomatic isolation. See Mao Tse tung: \textit{Prefaces to Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside}, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, 1977.


mainland’s occupation of Taiwan. Mao perceived the US policy makers as hypocritically enhancing the Chinese civil war. However, Mao’s refrained from intervening in Taiwan due to lack of internal consolidation during this period. The Korean War (1950-1953) further dimmed the prospects of mainland intervention in Taiwan. Fighting alongside each other a few years earlier to push Japan out of China, Sino-US armies now fought face to face in the Korean War.67 Covert Sino-Soviet animosity was also brought to the fore in the Korean War.68

The US withdrawal from South Korea in 1949, communist resurgence, and the Soviet nuclearization hurried North Korea to invade South Korea on June 25, 1950.69 To the US, China acted as an instigator of communism in the Northeast and Southeast Asia. To resist North Korean expansion into South Korea, the US under the UN mandate staged a march to the Yalu River—the natural border connecting mainland China to Korea. To halt the UN march, Mao pushed the US further inward across the Yalu River to prevent American annexation of North Korea. Mao’s military and personnel assistance strengthened North Korean position versus South Korea. China’s action aimed to prevent strategic encirclement by the enemy. Chinese offensive was a preemptive strategy aimed to prevent the US presence at Yalu. The prospects of a reunified Korea along with Japan might also have served the US strategic designs in Asia. Mao also defeated the Soviet plan of creating an exile Korean government, threatening ethnic instability in Manchuria. Moreover, Stalin’s conflict with the US in Korea allowed Mao to successfully extort military and logistic supplies from the Soviet Union. China’s intervention to forestall the US-UN mandated march beyond the 38th

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68 An earlier attempt by Mao to forge a peace treaty with Stalin to allow time for China’s domestic build up had received a lukewarm response from Stalin. At that juncture, Mao was greatly apprehensive of the threat Stalin posed to a communist China. On the face value, the Soviet Union was an ideological partner; its support was needed as a strategic partner to balance the US. Yet earlier, Soviet Union had successfully extorted its share in the unequal treaties by annexing Far East Maritime Provinces and a special zone in Manchuria and Xinjiang. Stalin, a staunch nationalist and an excellent military strategist, ruled out the need for a formal Sino-Soviet treaty, citing no threat to China and to international peace.
69 Korea had been bifurcated along the 38th parallel between the Soviet Union and the US in the Second World War. Multiple factors could be enlisted on the North Korean rational for invasion of South Korea. On Cold War developments in post Communist Chinese history from 1950s to early 1970s, See Greg O’Leary, The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy (St. Martin’s Press, 1980).
parallel brought an end to the Korean War. China’s northeastern flanks were secured as on July 27th, 1953, the UN armistice maintained the status-quo on pre-war positions.

The Korean War proved as a litmus test of Chinese resolve to withstand the military might of a much larger power. In communism’s ideological march, Stalin was determined to maneuver the prospects of the communist victory in China, retaining leadership role in Moscow. The Korean War added to Mao’s confidence in statecraft. Despite being the weakest and the most vulnerable, China could defy both the US and the Soviet Union successfully. The Korean War allowed China to strategically engage the barbarians against each other, being confident that neither of the two superpowers would stand China’s defeat by the other. Mao allowed for China’s resurgence from a position of relative weakness to become an equal of the nuclear powers. China had learnt how to play its cards. Like a triangle, Mao maintained a policy of equidistance from both the superpowers. This allowed China to steer clear of alignment with any of the two superpowers during the first decade of the Cold War. Mao simultaneously engaged China in the crises of 1954-1958 with the US involving Taiwan. The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 officially bound the US to the defense of Taiwan. The Eisenhower administration withdrew the seventh fleet from the Taiwan Strait, which served as a buffer between the mainland and Taiwan.

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70 A vehement nationalist—Mao remained apprehensive of Stalin’s predominance and claims to ideological guidance. Soviet Union maintained a sphere of influence in China’s northeast, including an occupation force and a fleet in the strategically located Lushun harbor. Stalin had also solicited concessions from Chiang Kai-shek in wartime agreements and claimed the validity of those from Mao Tse-tung.


73 See Donald S. Zagoria’s ‘China, the Soviet Union, the United States’ and George F. Kennan’s ‘US policy towards the Communist World’ in Clement J. Zablocki, Sino-Soviet Rivalry: Implications For U.S. Policy (New York: Published for the Center for Strategic Studies by Georgetown University, Praeger, 1966).


75 For a detailed discussion of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the context of the Cold War, See Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, China, the Soviet Union and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982).
2.2.3 The Taiwan Issue and Sino-US Relations

Sino-US relations came to the verge of a nuclear war in the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954 and 1958. This sub-section argues that Mao’s brinkmanship dwelled on the contours of the Cold War, allowing Mao to manipulate successfully between the US and the Soviet Union. Mao had learnt from the Korean experience that neither the US nor the Soviet Union would withstand China’s defeat by the other, Mao steered clear of a pro-tilt in favor of either of the two superpowers. Mao asserted China’s independence in foreign policy stance, successfully employing the Chinese traditional approach of wei-qei.76

Of the two Taiwan Strait crises of 1954 and 1958 that brought Sino-US relations on the verge of a nuclear war, the first crisis erupted in 1954. The Western nations had proposed the two-state solution to the problem in Taiwan. The first offshore crisis involved Communist China’s shelling of Quemoy. Lying a few kilometers from the mainland, the island was controlled by the Nationalists. As the Eisenhower administration withdrew the seventh fleet from the Taiwan Strait, Taipei began to reinforce Quemoy and Matsu with thousands of additional troops. The communists reciprocated by shelling the islands. Bound by the treaty obligation, the US responded to defend Taiwan along with Quemoy, Matsu and the Pescadores islands--small islands 25 kilometers off the Taiwan Strait.77 In January 1955, the situation flared up again with the communist invasion of the Tachen islands, 200 miles north of Taiwan.78 The Chinese move instigated the US counter offensive in force redeployment in Taiwan, believing that the island’s loss to communist forces would demoralize Taiwan. The Eisenhower administration hinted to use tactical nuclear weapons, should the dispute

76 Mao foresightedly refused to issue an outright rebuttal to the US. The American administration referred to Soviet presence in Mongolia, Manchuria and Xinjiang as the ultimate threat to China’s sovereignty. To pacify Stalin, Mao solicited a low profile response from the Chinese politburo, which termed it as a slander by the US.

77 The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 known as the Shanghai Communiqué bounded the US to the defense of Taiwan. The nuclear crises (1954-1958) brought the US and China to the forefront of a nuclear war. The US, however, took the plea of extending diplomatic support to the Kuomintang in Taiwan. China regarded the US political and military assistance to Taiwan as prevention of One China policy. According to Kissinger, however, no US president so far seriously considered revising the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war. The US also considered Taiwan as a legal heir to the seat in the UN.

escalate to involve China’s invasion of Taiwan.79 The Soviet Union also implied a readiness to use nuclear weapons to support regional allies in Southeast Asia.

Informal cease-fire lasted for three years. The situation improved with the Chinese offer to start negotiations on the issue and resumption of Sino-US consular level talks in Geneva. However, Sino-US traditional policy positions derailed further progress on the issue.80 During the Second Taiwan Strait crisis in August 1958, China began to bombard the islands to check the limits of the US commitment to defend Taiwan. Moreover, China wanted to resume ambassadorial level talks with the US. The crisis led to a debate in the UN, which allowed China to shell only on alternate days. The US resolved to defend Taiwan against the mainland invasion, simultaneously refusing to assist KMT’s unilateral invasion of mainland China. The situation on the Taiwan Strait remained intact despite the two nuclear crises.

The Taiwan crises also helped to highlight Sino-Soviet animosity. The Chinese bombing aimed at engaging the Soviets to build China’s nuclear capability. Soviets wanted to put the responsibility of China’s defence off its shoulders. Stalin wanted to retain leadership role, refusing to relent Chinese territory in Xinjiang, Far East and Manchuria. Mao, however, needed Soviet support to balance the US strategic presence in the region. From 1953 to 1960, Sino-US relations remained strained on the issue of China’s UN membership, trade imbalance and repatriation of the US citizens stranded in China since the Korean War.81 A half-hearted implementation of the agreement on repatriation of civilians came about in the ambassadorial level talks in Geneva in August 1955.82 Direct contacts had continued along the past 14 years’ framework of Warsaw Pact. Sino-US relations remained sterile and unprofitable during the period of John F. Kennedy’s presidency.

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79 Highlighting the motives for Chinese shelling, Kissinger observed that China shelled Quemoy to reaffirm its claim to One China policy, yet it refrained to invade to prevent emergence of two Chinas.
80 For example, China insisted that Taiwan be included in mainland China. The US, however, remained adamant on renunciation of force and resumption of talks with the nationalist government in Taiwan.
82 Ibid, 135.

Sino-Soviet split proved to be the catalyst of a more meaningful dialogue between the US and China. The specter posed to the US the prospect of increased instability in Southeast Asia. The US list of worries became manifold with having two rivals rather than one. The split with the Soviet Union dragged China closer to the US. China, however, learnt to manipulate to win favors from the US. Insecurity moved Mao to lessen the prospects of Soviet encroachment in Zhenbao and Xinjiang, while he improved China’s relations with the US.

2.2.4 Vietnam War and Sino-US Relations

This sub-section focuses on Sino-American relations in the context of key developments in the mid 1960s. The US involvement in Indochina and the Vietnam War strained Sino-US relations in the mid 1960s. The Indochina and Vietnam War ended with the conclusion of the Paris agreement in which three exploitative powers — the US, the Soviet Union and China were involved. The US was confronting China and the Soviet Union in an effort to contain communism. China and the Soviet Union were

84 This is despite the fact that Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylors’ had testified before the US Congressional Committee that India might have started the Sino-Indian War, see Abdus Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, (1947-2009): A Concise History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 84.
85 Ibid., 144.
competing for influence over Hanoi and for leadership among Communist states and the Third world.

The US increased regular aerial bombing of North Vietnam and dispatched troops to South Vietnam from March 1965, generating the possibility of sending ground troops across the north-south frontiers toward the Chinese border. The first major air battle of the Vietnam War started when the US fighters shot down two North Vietnamese MIG-17s, 70 miles north of Hanoi on April 23, 1965. On April 28, 1965, the US Senator Robert Kennedy warned about the dangers of expanding the war in this way. Dean Rusk reiterated that the US would not allow any sanctuary in this war, and the US president would decide whether to send the US aircrafts in pursuit of Chinese planes.  

The Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao retaliated in an article that Mao’s guerrilla warfare was the most formidable strategy to fight the US. Amongst Asia, Africa and Latin America, Vietnam would prove to be the prime example of beating the US in a people’s war. Lin Piao’s arguments implied that China held no hold-barred strategy in its resolve to fight the US imperialist aggression. Foreign Minister Ch’en Yi also warned that China would fight the US with resilience, if the US invaded North Vietnam. On April 17, 1966, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated that the US lacked any intention to attack China. Rusk argued that the US was hopeful of restoring relations with mainland China, provided if Peiping gave up the belief that force was the best way of resolving disputes. Rusk, however, warned that although the US had no intention

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to attack mainland China but the risk of war had become ripe in case of Vietnam. \footnote{TKarki Hussain, \textit{Sino-Indian Conflict and Int’l Politics in the Indian Sub-continent, 1962-66}, (Faridabad: Thomson, 1977).} Chou En-Lai’s publication of China policy on May 10, 1966 stated that the US needed to withdraw its troops from Taiwan.

invasion of Indochina strained Sino-US relations, provoking resistance in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. President Richard Nixon’s announcement to visit China on July 15, 1971, followed by his actual visit on February 21, 1972, marked a clear change in the US foreign policy stance towards China. The US move deprived the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) of the Chinese support. Simultaneously, Nixon ended 22 years of the US policy to contain China. It gave an opportunity, however, to the Soviet Union to enlarge its own influence with Hanoi. 97

The Soviet support led North Vietnam to a massive action against South Vietnam on the assumption that the US move would prevent American military adventures near the Chinese border. The US escalated response strikes while Nixon made it clear to the Soviet Union that Moscow’s national interests with the US were more important than Moscow’s national interests involving North Vietnam. 98 The US-Russian agreement on May 29, 1972 committed both states to seek peaceful solutions to disputes, sending a strong signal to Hanoi of the transformation in the Soviet support. The US-China détente had ensured the prospects for China of the US withdrawal from the Indochina war. As a goodwill gesture, the US halted the bombing in all of Vietnam, and on January 27, 1973, the conclusion of the peace agreement between North Vietnam and South Vietnam brought an end to the Indochina war.

2.2.5 Sino-US Rapprochement 1971: A Tactical or Strategic Move

This sub-section discusses key developments from 1969 to 1971 reviewing the complete overhauling of Sino-US bilateral relations. It argues that Sino-Soviet split facilitated Sino-US rapprochement. Orchestrating a rapprochement with the US in the hostile environment of the Cold War, Mao capitalized on China’s national interest. The US sought the possibility of having one rather than two communist states in the region.

China stood at crossroads, following straining of relations with the Soviet Union. Mao had steered China into a period of dangerous isolation. Chinese foreign policy position did not allow much room for maneuverability. China’s relations with Japan were

97 Soviet military aid to North Vietnam included tanks, long range artillery and mobile anti-aircraft missiles.
marked with historical animosity. China had a regional dispute involving 29,000 square kilometers of territory with India. The US stronghold in Vietnam in Southeast Asia posed a dangerous prospect for Peking. An era of peaceful cooperation and reconciliation had been proposed by President Johnson (1963-1969) earlier. The US State Department undertook social contacts with China on the sidelines of Ambassadorial talks first in Geneva and then in Warsaw in 1966.\textsuperscript{99} In October 1967, Nixon wrote in \textit{Foreign Affairs} that ‘a population of a billion people could not be left in angry isolation forever.’\textsuperscript{100}

Senator John. F. Kennedy had earlier called on the need to revise the US policy on China. Nixon wanted to toe the broad policy option proposed by Lyndon Johnson. Sino-Soviet down-turn of relations, however, prompted China to the softening of policy approach towards the US. Mao had to face the uphill task of overcoming domestic opposition, while Nixon had to surpass the US legacy of blaming China of expelling the US influence out of Asia. Mao picked up the hint President Nixon offered in his inaugural address on January 20, 1969 of opening up all lines of communication with China. Mao threw the issue to public debate with Nixon’s speech reprinted in the \textit{People’s Daily} — the first US president to receive such an attention.\textsuperscript{101} Contact with the US pre-empted the Soviet design of military expansionism against China. A larger Soviet Union with resources multiplied in case of a victory over China was an equally alarming prospect for the US.

The Sino-Soviet clash on Zhenbao provided the necessary impetus. Concentration of Soviet forces onto the Chinese border and harassment strikes in Xinjiang prompted serious diplomatic efforts to avert pre-emptive strikes on nuclear installations in China.\textsuperscript{102} Resumption of Sino-US dialogue became a strategic necessity for China in the face of the Soviet pressure.\textsuperscript{103} Rapprochement offered the US prospect of a long

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 139.
\textsuperscript{102} Kissinger observed that the US vocal stance of non-neutrality in case of a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear installation in fact prevented the Soviet pre-emptive strike. China’s occupation by the Soviet Union contained the fearful prospect of a much larger Soviet Union—bigger than the US in manpower and resources.
term peace with China besides improvement in its international standing due to the war in Vietnam. The US ambassador in Warsaw approached Chinese diplomats to express the desire for a dialogue.\textsuperscript{104} The question of Taiwan was delinked as a pre-condition for talks. Ambassadorial level talks alongside Genève negotiations resumed at a higher level.\textsuperscript{105} Pakistan, Romania and France were chosen as intermediaries as the two sides came close. While highlighting Chinese rational for rapprochement with the US, Mao referred to the Chinese position as the ‘lone monk walking with a leaky umbrella. The metaphor implied that China was bound by neither human nor divine law but the condition of necessity.

The ping-pong diplomacy finally melted the thaw. Mao threw the debate onto the public to ask whether China should invite an American team for a visit. Finding public support, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, reiterated China’s willingness to receive a special envoy from the US via Pakistan. The US reduced military operations in Korea and agreed to halt bombing in Vietnam as a goodwill gesture. In Henry Kissinger’s secret mission facilitated by Pakistan in 1970, a broad agenda was developed to reflect on Sino-US pragmatic issues. Kissinger’s announcement of a visit to China on July 15, 1971 amazed the international community, while it gave China an opportunity to escape international isolation.

The Sino-US period of overt hostility and conflict became formally over with Nixon’s visit to China on February 1972. Within this context, it would be interesting to view how this relationship developed after 1971. Caught between two rival nuclear powers, fear of insecurity led Mao to manipulate China’s foreign policy to maximize national interest. China’s rapprochement with the US reflected a prudent tactical move, rather than a strategic change in ideological inclination. Given the historical context of Sino-US relations, Mao was all set to ensure China’s survival in the hostile context of the Cold War.


\textsuperscript{105} Softening of policy stance was evident from the US easing of trade restrictions followed by the Chinese release of two American yachtsmen.
2.3 Sino-US Relations: 1979-9/11

This section explores major events from 1971 to 9/11. It argues that the twin growth of conflict and cooperation has marked the evolution of Sino-US bilateral relations in the post Cold War era. Sino-US rationale for cooperation yielded to dynamism of conflict and cooperation on regional and global security concerns, developing a functionalist approach to sustain relations in the future. While the US and Chinese interests coincided to prevent the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in the 1980s, both ‘agreed to disagree’ on matters of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea.

President Nixon and Chairman Mao, followed by Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and his Chinese counterpart Deng Xioping constructed a partnership that helped stabilize Sino-US relations from 1972-1989. With China’s entry into the community of international powers and the US acceptance of CCP regime, the year 1971 marked the end of China’s angry isolation. Following Nixon’s visit to China, the US facilitated China to acquire the UN Security Council seat in 1971. The Carter administration granted de-jure recognition to China in 1979, delayed until then due to the Congressional reservations on abandoning a long time ally — the Nationalists in Taiwan.

The ‘Shanghai Communique’ of 1972 established the broad framework under which both powers agreed to disagree on Taiwan, Korea, Indochina, Indo-Pakistan conflict and Japan. The US military was withdrawn from Taiwan, yet Congress refused to accept the Chinese demand for immediate abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. Sino-US areas of cooperation included trade, human rights and support to third parties in Afghanistan. Following Mao’s death in 1976, after internal power squabble Deng Xioping took charge as the next in line of command.107 The year 1978-79 could be marked as the most important one in Sino-US bilateral relations.108 Trade and

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tourism picked up as Deng Xioping paid official visit to the US in early 1979.\textsuperscript{109} Restoration of full diplomatic relations also marked a simultaneous political process of de-recognizing the US embassy in Taipei.

The US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, sanctioning arms supply while preventing the use of force or coercion against Taiwan. China avoided a tough response to Taiwan Relations Act 1979. Taiwan Relations Act allowed the US and China to adopt a functionalist approach by lieu of this standstill agreement, putting Taiwan on the sidelines of Sino-US diplomatic relations. It served the US and China’s strategic interests to ignore Taiwan for a considerable period. Mao spoke of a hundred years while Deng referred to a fifty year period for postponement of negotiation on Taiwan with the US. Overall, the US interest was driven by security, while China sought access to the US capital and technology.

\textbf{2.3.1 Soviet Intervention of Afghanistan and Sino-US Relations}

This sub-section focuses on Sino-US relations in the backdrop of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in October 1979. It argues that despite marks of rivalry, Sino-US interests converged to prevent Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan during the 1980s. The fear of an expansionist Soviet Union paved the way for Sino-US cooperation in the Afghan jihad.

During the Reagan administration (1980-1988), Sino-US relations displayed a mix of realism and complex interdependence. Animosity with the Soviet Union joined Sino-US in an informal ‘hostile-allied’ relationship. The two sides learnt to co-exist and cooperate despite their different approaches. On its part, China sought to overlook the US-Japan security alliance partnership just as it ignored the US other security pacts elsewhere. Despite the anti-China pre-presidential electoral rhetoric, the Reagan administration issued the Communiqué on the US Arms Sales to Taiwan. The document re-instated Shanghai Communiqué position by terming Taiwan as an integral part of China. The US also agreed not to increase arms sales to Taiwan until the problem’s final resolution. China appeared as a factor for stability for the US security policy in Southeast Asia.

\textsuperscript{109} Serving to ‘humanize’ China in the US public perception, the visit played a crucial role in changing public impression of China as a security threat. Following the visit trade picked up by 200 percent and tourism by 300 percent in between 1978-79.
The Soviet threat provided the credibility of cooperative rationale in Sino-US bilateral relations. China feared an expansionist Soviet Union in its periphery.\textsuperscript{110} Despite the US enhanced weapons sales to Taiwan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased China’s cooperation with the US.\textsuperscript{111} Pakistan became a bastion against the Soviet ‘expansionism’ in South Asia. The US began to pour in military supplies, ignoring the Symington Act as slambad willing played the role of the US satellite in the region. Indian analysts Jaya Krushna Baral and V. Eshwar Anand argued that the US military supplies to Pakistan strained Indo-US relations, confounding tensions in the sub-continent.\textsuperscript{112} Baral and Anand argued further that the Reagan administration’s decision upset the military balance in the sub-continent.\textsuperscript{113} The US decision to induct F-16s introduced a new element into the sub-continent’s security.\textsuperscript{114} Sino-Pakistan, Sino-US military alliance and China’s rapid defence modernization programme in the wake of Sino-Indian border dispute aggravated India’s security dangers vis. a vis. China and Pakistan.

Sino-US security nexus against the Soviets provided incentive to cooperate on trade, human rights, suppression of Tibetan activists and missile sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{115} China supplied Soviet made defence equipment to Pakistan for use by the mujahideen fighters in the Afghan jihad. Afghan invasion affected the Sino-Soviet normalization process as the Soviets refused to change policy on Vietnam, Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{110} Following the visit of the US Secretary of Defense to Beijing in January 1980, the Chinese even agreed to the establishment of a joint intelligence listening post in Xinjiang to monitor Soviet military activities.
\textsuperscript{111} The US sales of weaponry to Taiwan amounting $200m in the year 1979 increased to $625m in 1980. The US arms supply worsened Chinese apprehension of the US support for the two China policy on Taiwan.
\textsuperscript{112} K. Arif, ed., \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives} (Lahore, Vanguard Books Ltd, 1984).
\textsuperscript{113} The Indian Defence Ministry compiled a comparative data since the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war to mark the impact of the US arms supplies to Pakistan. From a mere 10 infantry divisions, Pakistan had jumped to 20, increasing independent armored and artillery regiments from 23 to 32 and 79 to 165 in addition to the available ones attached to every Corps. The number of infantry battalions increased from 133 to 228 along with paramilitary forces, operationally integrated into the regular field formations.
\textsuperscript{114} To hold a distinct advantage over Pakistan’s air power, India needed counter-defensive measures to beat back the challenge posed by the F-16 aircrafts.
\textsuperscript{115} A complete rupture of relations would have brought increased military pressure and heightened tensions on Taiwan. Reagan had realized that China carried more weight age compared to Taiwan. A China allied to the US carried less prospects of threatening other states of Southeast Asia compared to China allied to none of the two superpowers.
and force deployment along the Chinese border. Rise in the US defense budget and escalation in arms race placed new burden on the Soviet foreign policy. China had long criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, offering weapons and aid to the Afghan resistance forces. The Soviet occupation appeared to China as instance of Soviet encirclement. The US arm supplies led to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The new Russian policy aimed at consolidation of the western supported Kabul government to prevent radical Islamist spill over into the Russian region and Xinjiang. In the absence of the Soviet security threat, cooperation gave in quickly to friction for regulating Sino-US relations in the post Cold War era.

2.3.2 Sino-US Relations: Post Cold War Era (1989-2001)

This sub-section explores key developments in Sino-US relations during the post Cold War era. It argues that although Sino-US learnt to resolve differences through diplomatic interchanges, friction continued to surface in Sino-US bilateral relations.

Sino-US relations underwent two distinct phases from 1972 onwards. The first phase (1972-1989) was a period of grand bargain which rendered stability to Sino-US bilateral relations for two decades. The Soviet threat underlined the Chinese rationale for cooperation. Leaders on both sides ‘agreed to disagree’ on Taiwan, US alliance with Japan, and South Korea, while convergence of interests related to Afghanistan, trade and human rights. The second phase (1989-2000) marked the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several issues surfaced in Sino-US relations such as the speed of China’s growth and the Tiananmen Square during this period. Major developments that strained Sino-US relations include the incident of the Tiananmen Square crisis on June 4, 1989. The illusions of normalcy in Sino-US relations became increasingly at stake, with the Chinese tanks crushing the pro-democracy demonstrators. Strong public and Congressional reaction followed suit. A certain degree of stability developed in Sino-

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117 The imperative of the grand bargain had a far reaching strategic implication with respect to Taiwan. The terms of the conditions stipulated that the island’s status be put to the background for a hundred years as per Mao’s suggestion, while Deng spoke of a period of fifty years—the approach emphasized side stepping a problem for which the two sides had no answer. The Soviet Union posed a greater security threat compared to Sino-US trade imbalances and human rights concern. See David Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams, Managing US-China Relations, 1989-2000* (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 3.
US bilateral relations during George H. W. Bush (1988-1992) era. To pacify the reaction, the Bush administration (1988-1992) sought to slam trade and contact restrictions on China. President Bush’s presidential veto prevented the Congressional bid to impose conditions on renewal of MFN trading privileges to China. The Bush administration believed that diplomatic and trade restrictions would tantamount to inducing instability in Southeast Asia.

International security environment defined the context in which the Bush administration was constrained to operate. The US needed China’s support for the former’s diplomacy on Iraq. A Chinese veto could restrain the UN action against Iraq in the first Gulf War. China, however, abstained on the UN ‘Resolution 678’ failing to support the US action against Iraq. China sought to maximize its security interests by abstention: it evaded the international commitment of its forces; it reduced the normative costs by avoiding incurring the displeasure of its African and Asian allies. Sino-US relations’ development was further impaired due to a negative balance of trade and disputes related to restricted access to Chinese markets and human rights concerns. The MFN renewal through Congress became a political liability for successive US governments.

Deng Xiaoping perceived the US linking of trade with human rights as infringement on Chinese sovereignty and reacted strongly to any such conditions.

Patterns of realism, complex interdependence and neo-realism can be discerned in Sino-US bilateral relations during the post Cold War period. The US allowed the sale of a supercomputer to China, despite Pentagon and Congressional reservations on its military use in November 1991. After agreeing to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991, China acceded to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in early 1992.

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119 China regarded itself as the leader of African and Asian non-allied powers.

120 China finds textile and toy export market in the US, while the US sells agricultural and high technology items to China.

121 Several agreements were signed to resolve the trade and human rights problems including a MoU whereby China agreed to reduce controls on imports by December 31st, 1993. Greater enforcement measures were imposed to check corruption in quotas and restrictions were added on Chinese textile imports to the US.
However, the US sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan led to a down turn in its relations with China in September 1992. The US imposed sanctions on China in high technology trade in August 1993, following CIA reports indicating Chinese shipment of missiles to Pakistan in violation of MTCR.

The second Clinton era (1996-2000) marked China’s entry to World Trade Organization (WTO), grant of MFN status and arms control agreement with the US. In June 1998, the US reaffirmed its policy of not supporting independence for Taiwan. Sino-US relations became strained, however, when Nato bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.\textsuperscript{122} China demanded a public apology for the incident, which the US termed as a technical intelligence failure. Sino-US relations strained when the US accused China of espionage and illegal fund raising. Yhr US intervention in Yugoslavia downgraded its relations with China even more.\textsuperscript{123} The Clinton administration criticized China’s arms transfers and building of nuclear capability in violation of MTCR to Pakistan. In April 2001, the EP-3 incident stirred the junior Bush administration’s reaction against China.\textsuperscript{124} Suspending arms sales to China, the Bush administration authorized the sale of defence equipment to Taiwan. Taiwan began to figure out more prominently as Sino-US bilateral anxieties grew.\textsuperscript{125} However, the US resumed military contacts with China as strings of complex interdependence worked under the constraints of a largely interdependent world.\textsuperscript{126} The period of 2001-2014 marked the intervening influence of a number of factors in Sino-US bilateral relations, which have been discussed in subsequent chapters.

\textsuperscript{122} China termed the incident a deliberate action, while Nato termed the bombing an accident.

\textsuperscript{123} China condemned Nato’s action as intervention in internal affairs and violation of territorial sovereignty of Yugoslavia.

\textsuperscript{124} A Chinese fighter plane collided with the American Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea. The EP-3 made an emergency landing on Hainan Island with the crew surrendering to Chinese authorities. The US linked the incident to the Chinese pilots aggressive positioning against the US reconnaissance fighters. The crew members were released by April 12, 2001.

\textsuperscript{125} Emergence of new multi-polar identities had a direct bearing on the two straits inter-state relations. Growth of cross strait bilateral anxieties led to a direct fall out on Sino-US relations, escalating to the danger of a direct military confrontation in the year 2000.

The chapter, therefore, argued that Sino-US relationship has been a mix of mistrust and cooperation over the years. China developed the perception of the US as equitable partner in China’s unequal treatment and exploitation. Common enmity with the Soviet Union allowed China to forge an alliance partnership with the US during the Cold War. Sino-US relations marked ups and downs after the Cold War while ‘agreeing to disagree’ on key international issues. Promotion of bilateral trade and international stability offered a commonality of interests in Sino-US relations during this period. Domestic politics assumed a greater significance compared to international concerns owing to growing social and bureaucratic pluralism in both societies. Consideration of domestic politics has weakened the ability of political leadership to determine the direction of international politics. In case of the US, Congress tends to wield considerable influence on the US foreign policy. While in case of China, economic rise and military modernization have led to greater public demands for nationalistic assertions abroad. Within this context, the next chapter involves a historical overview of Sino-US involvement in South Asia from 1949 to 9/11.
CHAPTER 3
SINO-US ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA: 1949-9/11

This chapter provides a brief overview of Sino-US involvement in South Asia from 1949 to 9/11. It examines Pakistan’s congruence of interests with the US and China during the Cold War and post Cold War era. It argues that Sino-US involvement in South Asia ensued from their competitive security interests in the region. While offering politico-strategic patronage to India and Pakistan, Sino-US regional involvement reflected interplay of competition and rivalry.


3.1 Sino-US Engagement in South Asia: 1949-1962

This section discusses Sino-US involvement in South Asia from 1949 to 1962 while reviewing the implications for Pakistan’s security. It argues that Sino-US competition offered India and Pakistan the opportunity to develop congruence of interests with the US and China based on their inherent rivalry. India maintained a closer relationship with China and the Soviet Union compared to the US during the 1950s. The 1962 Indo-China War, however, tilted New Delhi closer to the US against China.

Sino-US competition in South Asia strengthened the potential for conflict rather than cooperation among the regional contestants of power—India and Pakistan. External pressures limited choices, adversely affecting India and Pakistan autonomy in world affairs.1 India and Pakistan, like other developing states, were constrained to interact with the world driven by the desire to overcome their security vulnerability.2 Determinants for national security required the three dimensional concept of military, economic and political security.

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2 Existential threat from India led to Pakistan’s foreign policy duress,wedding the state to formal and informal security alliances with the US and China.
Scholars such as Abdul-Monem and Pakistani defense analyst Hassan Ali Rizvi have pointed several internal and external security compulsions obligating developing states’ security relationship with great powers. During the Cold War, a correlation between alliance partnership and aid policy existed: great powers distributed military aid in the context of alliance partnership. Weak states were exposed to external pressures, manipulation, opportunism, short-term gain and exploitation on the pretext of security collaboration. National security liability tended to restrict foreign policy independence of a security conscious and vulnerable state.

Pakistan’s perception of geo-strategic vulnerability stemmed from its adverse relationship based on multi-dimensional grievances with neighboring India. Moreover, Pakistan’s domestic vulnerability developed from its diversity of multi-ethnic composition. Indian research scholar Maya Chadda has argued that presence of ethnicities developed fissures in Pakistan’s unity and cohesion. Scare resources, poverty, need for modernization, institution building, international cooperation and expectations for respect and dignity necessitated Pakistan’s collaboration with the US and China. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location, adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz, its coastal belt neighboring Afghanistan, Iran, China, India and the Soviet Union made it important in the eyes of the great powers. On its part, Pakistan’s own insecurity remained centered on India. Multiple national security interests lay at the core of Pakistan’s ‘look-out’ approach. Pakistan’s diplomatic and strategic overtures towards

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5 Pakistan’s split national identity incorporates five major ethnic groups, i.e., Punjabi, Pathan, Sindhi, Balochi, Kashmiri, and numerous other sub-national groups divided further along caste and linguistic differences. The geographical stretch of such ethnic communities spread over the territorial boundaries of neighboring ethnic-kin states. Ethnic unrest in South Asia has international dimensions by generating spill over to the ethnic-kin community next door, leading to intra, inter-state and civil wars. For more details on ethnic conflicts causing inter-state tensions in South Asia, See Maya Chadda, “International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict,” in Devin T. Hagerty, (ed.), South Asia in World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 187-213.
6 Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (New York: Routledge, 2011). See also, Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
the US and China during the Cold War era aimed at overcoming the state’s precarious security against a more powerful India and the resultant vulnerability in South Asia. Mutual security contest became evident from the US, China and Soviet involvement in the South Asian region.

Similar to the Portuguese policy in the early 15th century, competing security dynamics determined Sino-US regional approach in South Asia. Stanley Wolpert has opined that to maintain hold on major transportation bottlenecks, the Portuguese won subsidiary allies based on the policy of ‘divide and rule’ in the strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, Aden on the Red Sea, Colombo in Sri Lanka and Malacca in the Indian Ocean.7 Employed later by François Dupleix of France and Robert Clive of England during the early 18th century, the policy allowed great powers to control South Asia and South East Asia on the continental landscape of the Indian Ocean.8 A similar pattern was adopted by the Cold War adversaries — the US and the Soviets with China as a junior partner during the Cold War. Great powers in early 16th century played ‘nabobs against nabobs’ in order to expand their influence in South Asia.9 The Cold War contestants played ‘state against state,’ to win allies in the region.

The US policies influenced Indo-Pakistan bilateral relations, generating deep misunderstanding between them.10 The US had no formal policy for the South Asian region earlier than 1947. Its prime interest lay in safe transportation of the adjacent Indian Ocean — a purpose well safeguarded by the British, the US ally in the subcontinent. The British departure, however, left the US in a catch 22 situation. It left the US with the dilemma of pleasing two competing, angry, jealous dominions.11

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8 A subsidiary ally retained his throne as long as he agreed to station a Portuguese agent stationed at his palace along with his troops, and consultations in matters of policy. Later, François Dupleix (1697-1764) learning from the Portuguese experience, employed the policy against the Mughal Empire paving the way eventually for Robert Clive’s (1725-74) expansion into the Deccan peninsula. See Stanley Wolpert, *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia*, 41.
9 Op cit, Stanley, 42.
Challenging the reputed wisdom of King Solomon, the dilemma caused interludes of incompetence in the US policy interests towards South Asia,\(^\text{12}\) terming it of inept intervention.\(^\text{13}\) In policy formulation, the US had to face the problem of Indo-Pakistan regional parity in South Asia.

The US had declared to pursue a policy of ‘objectivity, impartiality and friendly interests’ in both India and Pakistan at the two states’ birth.\(^\text{14}\) However, India’s strategic, economic, and political size weighed heavily in any regional comparison with Pakistan. The Soviets treated both India and Pakistan as pro-western bourgeoisie states.\(^\text{15}\) When the US invited Indian Prime Minister Jawaher Lal Nehru, Pakistan ‘extorted’ a quick similar invitation from the Soviet Union. Former diplomat Abdul Sattar has observed that Pakistan later flouted the Soviet invitation to procure an invitation from the US.\(^\text{16}\) Liaquat Ali Khan’s historic visit to the US in the 1950s thus resulted from Pakistan’s strategic calculations of a pro-western orientation and anti-communist popular aspirations.\(^\text{17}\)

Staying aloof was not a viable option for Pakistan amid great power competition during the Cold War. Dire security compulsions during the early 1950s required Pakistan to offset Indian economic and military imbalance, while offering a chance to overcome its pangs of ‘siege mentality.’\(^\text{18}\) Strobe Talbott has argued that Pakistan’s existence was

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12 Wolpert asserts even the sagacious and wise prophet King Solomon would have found the job as most the difficult task. Wolpert, *Roots of Confrontation*, 45.
13 Ibid., 45.
14 Ibid., 46.
18 Perception of the Indian leaders desire to ‘undo’ Pakistan based on All India Congressional leaders Patel and Nehru’s statements, non-deliverance of Pakistan’s due resource shares, lack of division of assets, imposition of a water blockade in 1948 followed by a trade embargo in 1949, the difficulties encountered in refugee rehabilitation, ethnic, communal and religious riots and the war on accession of Kashmir were the major factors contributing to such a frame of mind. Pakistan believed certain historical ‘wrongs’ based on Nehru-Mountbatten collaboration gave enough leverage to its rival India adding to the state’s multifarious set of complexities. See Shahid Amin, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 34.
regarded by India as a historical mistake and an insult to India’s secular identity.\textsuperscript{19} Pakistan’s alliance with the US and China showed the nascent state’s drive to secure its physical and ideological existence against belligerent India.\textsuperscript{20} Strobe Talbott has argued that the Indian ruling elite felt neglected, patronized and bullied by the US during the Cold War. Believing to be a victim of the US ideological and geo-political antagonism, the Indians sided with the Soviets.\textsuperscript{21} With Sino-Soviet split surfacing by late 1950s, the Soviet courting of India served reciprocity of interests for the interlocutors. The Soviets wanted India to dilute China in South Asia.\textsuperscript{22}

Figure 3.1
Pattern of Alliance Formation in South Asia
during the Cold War Era

Pakistan
\hspace{0.5cm} \rightarrow \hspace{0.5cm} \leftarrow \hspace{0.5cm} \text{India}

\hspace{0.5cm} \downarrow

\hspace{0.5cm} \text{China}

\hspace{0.5cm} \text{United States}

\hspace{0.5cm} \text{USSR}

Figure 3.1 illustrates Cold War pattern of alliances in South Asia. Pakistan had a formal alliance with the US and informal security relationship with China. India had a socialist tilt towards the Soviet Union that turned into a formal alliance partnership in 1971. To the Indians, the Indo-Soviet alliance forged in 1971 tended to offset both the Chinese threat and the US alliance with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{23}

Within South Asia, convergence of interests remained a security initiative, serving different ends for different collaborators. However, regional policy formulation implied an uphill task for the US, the Soviet Union and China based on the inexorable and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 40.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 7.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Stanley., 43. See also Mushtaq Ahmed, \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy} (Lahore: Space Publishers, 1967).
\end{itemize}
inflexible Indo-Pakistan rivalry. 

Having a border dispute with India, China demonstrated its traditional policy of *wei qei* aimed at prevention of strategic encirclement in South Asia. China wanted to co-opt Pakistan against a hostile India. China worked on Kautilya’s historic maxim of *Rajamandala* against India — implying the logic: faced with a circle of kings the ‘enemy of my enemy is my friend.’ While Pakistan sought to strengthen itself against India, the US wanted to contain the Soviet march to warm waters of the Indian Ocean.

The US research expert Robert Wirsing has argued that despite imposing limitations on available policy options, India-Pakistan enmity offered great powers tremendous opportunities for alliance formation, arms sales and increased political influence in the region. Arguing on the point, Wirsing argued that in theory, a country’s policies towards India and Pakistan could be ‘de-hyphenated’ or ‘de-coupled.’ Yet in practice, the zero-sum character posed the enormous difficulty of framing policy towards one side without offending the other. It showed Indo-Pakistan deep strategic entanglement with one another. Framing policy towards South Asia had been a difficult task for the US in the early period of the Cold War.

Religious theocracy was an insufficient base for constituting a separate state of Pakistan for the US. With a pre-disposition towards the Congressional stance of a united India, however, Pakistan’s location at the mouth of Hormuz next to the Middle East petroleum resources could benefit the US. The convergence of interests could be forged on Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s—the founding father and the first Governor General of Pakistan—inclination for alliance for mutual gains. Pakistan could successfully benefit from Mackinder’s idea of Middle East as the heartland—as the eastern most front against communism. Making itself relevant to the world’s wealthiest nation accounting for 40 per cent of global GDP, Pakistan sought ‘security along with parity’

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25 See also Ajay Darshan Behera, Mathew Joseph C., *Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context* (New Delhi: Center for Strategic and Regional Studies, 2004), 23.
28 Ibid., 113.
against India. Although the initial request for the US aid worth $2 billion was politely turned down, relations with the US could serve Pakistan’s geo-strategic and economic interests in the region.

The Indo-Pakistan war on Kashmir (1948) hurried Pakistan’s drive for finding an equalizer against preponderant India. Following solidification of the US-Soviet hostility during the 1950s, the US-Pakistan interests converged as the US co-opted the world’s largest Muslim state, serving to defend the Middle East and the Persian Gulf oil reserves. The San Francisco Conference in 1951 had served to portray Pakistan’s image as a moderate and cooperative country. The US observed Pakistan as a low key state against the hyperactive role of India, with its policy stances readily endorsed by the Soviet Union. Korean War (1950-1953) set in the stage for the US-Pakistan goodwill and cooperation in the early 1950s. North Korean invasion of South Korea appeared an instance of Soviet expansionism to the US, materializing in less than a year of the communist victory in China. The Persian Gulf security greatly became a matter of concern, eventually leading the US to take Pakistan into the loophole. The US might catch itself in India-Pakistan conflict, antagonize the politically and economically more important India, foreclose prospects of India-Pakistan relations and prospects of solution on Kashmir. Yet Pakistan could hardly resist the temptation to

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31 India amassed troops on the Pakistani border while putting forward ‘No War’ proposal. The Pakistani efforts to mobilize the UN as well as the commonwealth against India’s intransigence in Kashmir made no real headway.

32 Leela Yadava, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistan’s Relations with the US of America,” K. Arif, (ed.), *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1984), 34.

33 Rise of Mohd Mossadegh in Iran and nationalization of Anglo-American Oil Company increased the US list of regional concerns, increasing its interests in defence cooperation with Pakistan. The US Congress by mid 1955 passed the Act for international Development. Point Four of the Act authorized the president to initiate programs to assist underdeveloped nations. More than charity, the Act was basically designed to improve the climate and streamline ground for private investment. Regularized under the Point Four Agreement, defence cooperation so far had been limited only to arms sale worth $10m with technical and economic development assistance amounting $15m against the $200m requested in 1952. For more details See Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2009: A Concise History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 38.

34 Ibid., 39. Abdul Sattar argued that the said position reinforced by British officials to their American counterparts tended to endorse Indian position on Kashmir, ignoring the fact that the dispute arose because Pakistan was militarily weak. Denial of arms to Pakistan could hardly improve prospects of a fair settlement.
pick up Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles idea of ‘northern tier countries,’ despite British and Indian criticism. The US defense arrangement comprised Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. To overcome anticipated Indian reaction, the US extended only modest aid to Pakistan, which did not threaten Indian military preponderance in the region. The US Department of State offered a similar amount to India as a conciliatory move prior to actual commencement to Pakistan. The Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) assured India that Pakistan would not use military aid for aggression against New Delhi.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) signed on May 19, 1954 was framed on the US Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and Mutual Security Act of 1951. MDAA showed the US resolve to provide defense equipment to Pakistan for regional security. The South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was signed in 1954. Nehru criticized the agreement for compromising freedom in Asia, complaining that SEATO smelt of colonialism as it granted white nations a hand in Asian security. However, contrary to Pakistani expectations, the treaty made defence obligations specific to communist aggression, refusing to grant assistance against India. The US, however, assured not to stay impotent against non-communist aggression inflicted by India. The Pact of Mutual Cooperation or the Baghdad Pact — renamed as the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO in 1959 was a similar such pact signed on the Turkey-Iraqi initiative for defence of the Middle East. The grant of Badaber Air Base near Peshawar for surveillance against the Soviets although added to Pakistan’s strategic weightage for the US, it adversely affected Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union.

35 Paul Nitze, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff in 1952 recommended that Pakistan be granted assistance to defend the Middle Eastern region. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in his visit to South Asia was impressed of the Pakistani forces’ spirit and courage to resist Communism. See Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 18.

36 Ibid., 54.

37 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “Thoughts along the China Border: Will neutrality be enough,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 1960, 245.

38 Leela Yadava, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistan’s Relations with the US of America,” K. Arif, (ed.), *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1984).

39 Ibid., 55.

40 The base was used for launching US U-2 spy planes that surveyed the Soviet Union until a plane was shot down in 1960 by the Soviets. Pakistani fears in response to Russian threats led to dismantling of the air base.
Prospects of military and economic aid acted as a stimulant for Pakistan’s partnership with the US. Article I & II of MDAA committed the US to protect Pakistan’s sovereignty against external aggression and provide for economic assistance. Article I stated the US commitment to preserve Pakistan’s independence and territorial integrity in the US national interest and world peace.\(^{41}\) In case of aggression, Article II committed the US to take ‘such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces’ to ‘assist Pakistan at its request.’\(^{42}\) The US ambassador in a formal note committed to a prompt and effective assistance in case of armed aggression against Pakistan.\(^{43}\) In 1955, as part of ‘Atoms for Peace Program,’ the US granted $350,000 to establish Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the institute of PINSTECH. The US also assisted Pakistan to acquire a commercial nuclear power plant Kanupp – I from Canada in 1965. However, Pakistan’s relations with India and the Soviet Union deteriorated, followig conclusion of the US defence pacts and Pakistan’s grant of the airbase in Badaber at Peshawar.

The US scholars Llyod I. Rudolph & Sussane Hoeber Rudolph argued that the US militarized grand strategy had exacerbated rather than marginalized Indo-Pakistan intra-regional antipathies in South Asia.\(^{44}\) Although the US sought to marginalize Soviet influence, prevent intra-regional conflict and promote economic growth, Pakistan’s ‘client-ist’ credentials posed tightrope balancing for the US security interests in South Asia. The US aimed to prevent Pakistan’s fall to communism while preventing it to emerge strong enough against India. Counterproductive to its grand strategy, the US policy obstructed Pakistan’s democratic evolution, retarded its socio-economic development and increased hostility with India.\(^{45}\) The Soviet influence increased in the region as India endeared itself to the Soviet Union. The US ambassador J. K. Galbraith asserted that US long cherished the desire to incarnate India, preferring a united sub-


\(^{43}\) Op cit., 57.


\(^{45}\) Ibid., 25.
continent well equipped to fight communism. The Kennedy administration urged Nehru to take up leadership role in Southeast Asia, granting it massive economic assistance. To balance the US tilt towards India, Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan threatened to manoeuvre towards China.

Although the US defence pacts allowed Pakistan access to sophisticated modern weaponry, the Soviets gained a license to intervene in the regional security dynamics. The US policy increased Soviet influence in the region. The US-Pakistan defence pacts antagonized India, incorporating Soviet military support while escalating arms race in the region. Soviet military assistance brought Soviet MIGs and steel plants to India. Anti-communist partnership with the US worked counter-productively for Pakistan’s national interests. India exploited Pakistan’s SEATO or CENTO membership to renounce plebiscite in Kashmir. Tantamount to ‘playing with fire,’ the US defence pacts pitted the Soviets against Pakistan on Kashmir. Moscow vetoed the UN resolution asking for a plebiscite on Kashmir. Pakistan expected support from the US on Kashmir. Soviet stance on Pashtunistan also spoke volumes about Moscow’s antagonism towards Pakistan.

The US security concern vis-a-vis communist advancement exacerbated rather than minimized the propensity of Indo-Pakistan conflict in the region. The pursuit of a militarized strategy foiled the US grand objective of security in South Asia. Pakistan’s anti-communist alliance partnership offset the 3 to 1 Indo-Pakistan military balance in South Asia. Arming Pakistan cost the US an amount of two billion dollars in military aid during the 1950s. In the ‘worst’ and most ‘costly’ US policy blunder towards South Asia, the regional stage was now set with two armies, heavily supplied and

49 Wolpert, *Roots of Confrontation*, 140.
50 Nehru declared that American defence aid to Pakistan had increased the rationale for India to invest in domestic arms and defence armament.
52 Ibid., 145.
trained by superpower antagonists ‘eager to go at one another.’\textsuperscript{53} Stanley Wolpert has observed that to balance the Soviet influence, the US Point Four and the World Bank investment program aimed to upsurge the private and public level economic assistance for India.\textsuperscript{54} Contrary to the protagonists’ expectations, a total of only four billion dollars aid in military hardware and economic assistance came to Pakistan during the first decade.\textsuperscript{55} With the US supplied weaponry, however, Pakistan’s armed forces became a powerful defence machine, confident of defending themselves against a belligerent India. To Pakistani perception, the convergence of interests had served for Pakistan the security, it needed against India.

The defence pacts foiled Pakistan’s relationship with the US due to misperceptions and disenchantment.\textsuperscript{56} The seeds of dissatisfaction were inherent in the ‘ambiguous bargain,’ as no common adversary sought to keep the US-Pakistan alliance intact.\textsuperscript{57} Pakistan was focused on the threat from India while the US expected Pakistan to play a role in the defence of the Middle East. Pakistan resented the end tail interference in eventual deployment of the US supplied weaponry.\textsuperscript{58} Lack of support at the popular level became a liability for both parties. The Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) became critical of its own policy of ‘rushing out to the allies’ and termed the alliance with Pakistan a terrible error.\textsuperscript{59} With neutrality acquiring a mantle of respectability, intellectual and public opinion in the US began to favor India as greater economic assistance found way to Delhi during the late 1950s.

Within the regional context, however, the alliance bore grievances for Pakistan’s security concerns vis. a vis. India. The Indian factor was never lost to the US South Asia policy calculations. The US maintained near parity with a non-allied India, which

\textsuperscript{53} Leela Yadava, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistan’s Relations with the US of America” in K. Arif, (ed.), \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives} (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1984).
\textsuperscript{54} Wolpert, \textit{Roots of Confrontation}, 145.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 68.
\textsuperscript{58} Ayub Khan objected to the US inquiry about Pakistan’s use of its defence equipment given by the US against Afghanistan and India. Ayub held that resort to weapons’ use was obligatory whenever anyone threatened Pakistan’s security.
\textsuperscript{59} Wolpert, \textit{Roots of Confrontation}, 146.
had a neutral stance and a pro-Soviet approach. India en-cashed its natural position of having a larger geo-political clout. With both the US and the Soviet Union competing for its favor, India was rewarded in terms of ‘hunting with the hounds and running with the hare.’ With the Kennedy administration (1961) in office, the US South Asia policy shifted to granting a greater significance to India, downgrading Pakistan’s relations with the US. The US strategy moved from over-commitment and incompetent interference to the opposite side of total abandonment of creative responsibility. Public and official opinion became critical of the US duel-facet policy in South Asia.

To the Pakistani perception, Islamabad was taken ‘for granted’ by its allies, while penalized by its adversaries. The superpowers’ courting gave Nehru a god-sent opportunity to have the cake and eat it too. The US economic aid to India reached a larger component of $6 billion while despite being ally, its aid to Pakistan remained only a meager sum of $3 billion. India could successfully leverage from superpower hostility, bargaining from the position of neutrality to annex maximum strategic and economic benefit. From a path of overt neutrality, Nehru exploited Pakistan’s pretext of membership to incite the US. In a rational analysis, the security Pakistan wished to secure through military alliances worked only to strengthen its rival India, making security a zero-sum dynamic in the South Asian context.

Pakistan asserted to multilateralism by establishing relations with both the Soviet Union and China. Security concerns compelled Pakistan to carve out an informal security alliance with China. Pakistan-China convergence of interests built on the need for development based on equality, non-interference and prevention of foreign domination as Pakistan’s alliance with the US outlived its utility following the advent of satellites and Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). Disenchantment with the US led Pakistan to accept economic and military aid from the Soviet Union. Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek had inclination towards Gandhi and Nehru before 1947.

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60 Ibid., 67.
61 Ibid., 147.
64 Ibid.
However, Pakistan became the first Muslim and third non-communist state to accord recognition to China in October 1949. Contiguity to northern borders necessitated Pakistan’s cordial relations with China. Presence of Muslim population in China on Pakistan’s north-eastern borders also played a part in the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1950.

Pakistan’s support for Chinese participation in the San Francisco Conference in 1951 had won the goodwill of China. Pakistan-China trade relations started in 1953, following the Indian drive to destroy Pakistan’s nascent economy by imposition of a coal embargo.65 China’s purchase of raw materials and supply of coal won Pakistan’s gratitude for China. Pakistan’s neutrality on Tibet and stance on the UN Korean resolution favoured China. Peking could foresee that Pakistan would pay a useful dividend against Chinese clash of interests with India.66 Pakistan served as China’s corridor against western embargo on Chinese goods and the Muslim world. Sino-Pakistan convergence of interests developed following Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s. In the face of the US desire to isolate China, relations with Pakistan decreased China’s international isolation. Pakistan wanted to maximize security options within South Asia by forging close relations with China. As Sino-Soviet split began, India served as a substitute ally for the Soviets instead of China. The Soviet support for India alarmed China of two inimical fronts. China allied itself with India’s arch rival Pakistan to neutralize the threat.

To the Chinese, friendship with Pakistan offered new partnerships in South Asia.67 Exchange of high level state officials visits paved ground for diffusing mutual apprehensions in 1956. Exempting Pakistan of any guilt, China blamed the US for dragging Pakistan in the US security alliances.68 In blistering contrast to the Soviet criticism, China understood Pakistan’s security compulsions and the rationale for membership in the US defense pacts. Chinese leaders showed patience when Field

65 The Indian action had both economic and psychological consequences for Pakistan, as India was Pakistan’s largest trading partner. Pakistan had to export cotton and Jute, while it needed coal for its industrial development. China bought jute and cotton in exchange for coal on barter agreement.
68 Ibid.

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Marshal Ayub Khan proposed Joint Defence Agreement to India in 1950, envisioning collective security against communist threat from the ‘north.’ To the Chinese, Indo-Pakistan differences were too deep to allow for materialization of such a prospect. Pakistan took up the case of China’s membership in the UN, envisioning Chinese prospective support on Kashmir.\(^{69}\) Pakistan’s close ties with China continued to irk the US in the 1960s. The US criticized China-Pakistan 1963 air agreement as free world solidarity breech, adversely affecting the sub-continent’s security.\(^{70}\) The US postponed aid-to-Pakistan Consortium Meeting to discuss ‘other matters’ presumably related to China. To bail Pakistan out, China offered a $60 million loan to enable Pakistan to buy items from China in July 1964. The US Congress refused to authorize aid to Pakistan, although $240 million to India was pledged well in advance of authorization by the Congress.

In the same way, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 contributed in a massive way to increase Indian strategic clout in the region. Sino-Indian friction of interests developed in the wake of China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950, differences on the delineation of Sino-Indian border, leadership role in Asia and regional hegemonic ambitions.\(^{71}\) China sought to secure its border with India, re-invoking the imperial boundary. Following the British boundary demarcation, Nehru insisted on the legalistic and customary approach. China claimed 55,000 square miles of territory along the northern tier from Ladakh to Assam. Sino-Indian border skirmishes in 1957 culminated in the Sino-Indian War in 1962. China wanted land access to Xinjiang via the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh in Indian occupied Kashmir. Sino-Indian skirmishes led to the beginning of hasty negotiations in 1961 on Sino-Pakistan border demarcation. To rule out two hostile fronts, Pakistan concluded successfully border settlement with China in 1962, nine days before beginning of the Sino-Indian War.\(^{72}\) The US took Sino-Pakistan border agreement as a tactic to pressurize India, considering it as Pakistan’s drift towards

\(^{69}\) China lived up to Pakistan’s expectations many a times by projecting Pakistan’s national interests.

\(^{70}\) Following the Sino-Pakistan air agreement, the US placed on hold a proposed loan of $4.3 million for Pakistan’s airport improvement.

\(^{71}\) To the North West, India claims 27,000 sq miles of territory in Aksai Chin, occupied by China in 1962 war. The Chinese claim invokes imperial borders between Tibet and British India as the legitimate border, rejecting British demarcations with Tibetan defacto representative. To the East, Chinese claim extends to 90,000 sq miles of Arunachal Pradesh area towards the east.

\(^{72}\) The Sino-Pakistan border agreement was ratified in 1963.
communist China. Describing the war as a defining moment in the history of democracy’s crusade against communism, the Kennedy administration took India in its orbit, forgetting Pakistan on the way as a liability. The China factor had transformed the contours of the US policy towards India.

The US pressure constrained Pakistan from siding with China in the 1962 war. Pakistan, however, successfully averted the US pressure, establishing air links to bring an end to China’s international isolation. In the 1962 war, India built up its armed forces with the US and Soviet assistance. Billions of dollars kept flowing into India long after the war. Galbraith and Kennedy overreacted as wastefully in India’s ‘defense’ as their forerunners Dulles and Eisenhower had in ‘protecting’ Pakistan. The US supplied 22 Indian divisions with latest weaponry against those of Pakistan’s six and a half divisions it had supplied earlier. Kennedy administration’s ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith termed the rush of the US military equipment to ‘our (US) own military invasion’ of India. More brass reached India than Pakistan could amass as formal member of the US security umbrella by 1963. Senator Hubert Humphery suggested an Asian coalition under India to counter China in 1964. India received $120 million military assistance from the US and UK during the war, while another $120 million package by 1964. Another sum of $100 million military aid was promised to India per year. Indian attitude on Kashmir became more adamant.

Immense security implications ensued for South Asian regional stability, entangling India and Pakistan in the 1965 and 1971 wars. The US policy also translated into giving

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75 Wolpert, *Roots of Confrontation*, 147.
76 Ibid., 48.
78 Wolpert, *Roots of Confrontation*, 149.
a freehand to India to spend more on defence and military equipment. The war resulted in western frenzy to pour in weaponry, strengthening a militarized India. The US policy eventually ended in India-Pakistan entanglement into each other. Indian scholar Aparna Pande has argued that the US assistance to India in the 1962 War created frustration in Pakistan manifested in the start of operation Gibraltar and 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.\(^8\)

The Sino-Indian clash of security interests had implications for China’s relations with Pakistan. China had accommodated Pakistan’s security concern along its northwestern borders. China’s role in regional polarization had not been less significant for Pakistan’s regional security concerns vis. a vis. India.\(^8\) The Sino-Pakistan 1963 border agreement concluded a very sensitive issue, bypassing the sovereignty issue on the region — the defence of which lay within Pakistan’s control between Xinjiang and the contiguous areas involving the disputed region of Kashmir.\(^8\) Along the Murtagh River in the Shimsal Pass, China agreed to the amendment of the Karakorum watershed principle by conceding 750 square miles of territory to Pakistan to prevent hardships to inhabitants of Hunza valley.\(^8\) During the 1963 boundary talks, Bhutto and Chou Enlai discussed Chinese help in the defense of East Pakistan against Indian aggression. An Indian attack on Pakistan would put China’s national interests at stake.\(^8\) It would imply that India wanted to expand in Asia, which China would take notice of.\(^8\)

### 3.2 Sino-US Engagement in South Asia: 1963-1979

This section explores key developments involving Sino-US security competition in South Asia from 1963-1979. It argues that national security interests shaped Sino-US competitive interplay in South Asia. The US wanted to contain China in South Asia,

\(^8\) Military ties developed after trade and commercial links in the aftermath of the 1965 war. Pakistan struck a $120 million arms deal with China for the delivery of defense and military equipment.
\(^8\) The Pakistan-China boundary agreement concluded in March 1963 was signed as a provisional arrangement. Article 6th of the agreement provided that after final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, the boundary would be renegotiated by China and the concerned sovereign authority. See Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 80.
\(^8\) Ibid.
through supporting India, while China desired to dilute Indian hegemony in the region through forging a strategic and political relationship with Pakistan. Although the US wanted to promote cooperation between India and Pakistan, Sino-US competition enhanced India-Pakistan strategic rivalry. This was especially so due to the non-resolution of the Kashmir dispute between the two traditional adversaries — India and Pakistan.

Sino-Indian war in 1962 strengthened Indian position in the strategic balance vis. a vis. Pakistan. While moving a motion in the Pakistani National Assembly, Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra referred to the US assistance to India as a matter of grave concern to Pakistan.\(^87\) India received support from the Soviet Union and the western camp. Pakistan’s membership of the US defence pacts closed for it the Soviet option. Moreover, although the US per capita aid to Pakistan was twice as much as that of India, the Pakistani component was qualitatively inferior with too many political strings attached to it.\(^88\) The US employed denial of economic aid as the most effective tool to prevent Pakistan’s flirtation with China. Periodic demonstrations in the 1960s to this effect aimed to pressurize Pakistan from tilting towards China.

Pakistan had faced an acute security dilemma in early 1960s. The U-2 incident in May 1960 served as an eye-opener to Pakistan. Security guarantee was not forthcoming despite Pakistan’s membership of SEATO/CENTO. Moreover, Indian liberation of Goa in December 1961 and inaction on the part of Portugal’s Nato allies had sent a wave of fear and disenchantment among Pakistani policy makers, turning them to look towards China.\(^89\) The Sino-Indian 1962 war brought in the twin support of the US and Soviet Union for India based on their common enmity against China. The South Asian clients now developed an upbeat mood shored up by their formal and informal strategic and political mentors. The South Asian theatre was now set for the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan 1965 and 1971 wars.

\(^88\) The US insisted to finance the Pakistan’s Steel Mill, if the project entailed the private sector as well. Economic aid was the most frequently used weapon the US used to browbeat Pakistan in the 1960s.
\(^89\) K. Arif, (ed.), *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1984), 280.
The Indo-Pakistan war started in April 1965 at Rann of Kutch — the marshy land area in Sindh. Ironically, the US Patton tanks supplied earlier to Pakistan blasted those of Shermons given to India by the US.\(^\text{90}\) Ironically, the US was taken for a free ride by its clients. Both India and Pakistan used the US supplied military hardware originally granted to counter communist aggression against each other. Victory in the Rann of Kuch allowed Pakistan to start Operation Gibraltar in September 1965 to liberate the Indian Occupied Kashmir. India regarded Pakistani move as a diversionary tactic instigated by the plan to start a major assault across the south. Across the international border, India opened a second front in retaliation. India attacked Pakistan on September 6, 1965. The war led to further Pakistani disenchantment with its western allies and the US.

The US policy in South Asia had turned out to be in shambles. The US-Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 under article 1(2) had allowed the use of the US military aid for Pakistan’s legitimate self-defense. Yet the US response to the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan war was one of frustration at best. The US played no role in helping South Asia find an amicable solution to the Kashmir problem.\(^\text{91}\) After extending excessive weaponry to both sides, the US policy oscillated from its peak of over indulgence to total abandonment of productive responsibility. It adopted a neutral policy leaving to the UN Security Council to end the 1965 war.\(^\text{92}\) Taking an even handed policy, the US imposed a strict arms embargo on all military weapons en-shipments to India and Pakistan, calling for the warring parties to an immediate cessation of hostilities.

Amidst this, China maintained a pro-Pakistan stance in the 1965 war. China extended full diplomatic and military support to Pakistan, mounting pressure on India.\(^\text{93}\) China’s support was instrumental as it sent a three days ultimatum to Indian charge de affairs in...

\(^{90}\) US ambassador to Pakistan Horace Hildrehth argued that the only limitation on the use of military aid to Pakistan was that it should not be used for aggression against India. See Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2009: A Concise History*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 68.


Peking to halt all military works along the China-Sikkim boundary. Issuing an ultimatum to return captive Chinese nationals and livestock, China warned India to be prepared for a second front. Chinese ultimatum carried the prospects of disturbing the equilibrium in Asia. China put security on high alert and denounced Indian act of aggression. In the heat of war, China’s standing in the Pakistani popular perception reached sky high. Extension of support earned China the title of a time-tested friend who stood by Pakistan in dire need. Chinese pressure was instrumental in Indian acceptance of the UN resolution passed on September 20, 1965, making ‘ceasefire conditional to political settlement of the problem.’

Pakistan felt betrayed by the US even-handed policy. Pakistani former ambassador Shahid Amin argued that the US neutrality shocked Pakistan. It refused to extend the help it promised in the actual war. Deep anger ensued at the popular level for what the Pakistanis believed as the US ‘betrayal.’ The US failed to interpret Indian escalation as an act of ‘aggression.’ Henry Kissinger argued that the US even-handed policy injured Pakistan more compared to India as the latter kept receiving weapons from communist nations or from its own armories. The US rather justified Indian move as a retaliatory action driven in consequence of Pakistan’s initiation of Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir. Without a steady flow of the US supplied spare parts to keep many weapons in effective operation, Pakistan’s military could hardly sustain more than two weeks’ war. With neither side achieving any decisive break-through, the India-Pakistan 1965 war ended in a stalemate.

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96 Ibid., 80.
97 Pakistan invoked the bilateral defence agreement 1959, which stated that the US regarded as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan. The Ayub-Kennedy communiqué of July 13, 1961 reaffirmed commitment to the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan and the US aide memoir of November 5, 1962 assured assistance to Pakistan in the event of aggression from India. See also, Mushtaq Ahmed, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy* (Lahore: Space Publishers 1967).
98 In an article published by USIS, prior to President Ayub’s visit to the US, the correspondent termed the Indo-Pakistan war as a ‘civil war,’ warning that the US now took a serious view of Pakistan’s drift towards China.
The threat of Chinese intervention led India and Pakistan to accept a UN ceasefire and a Soviet sponsored settlement.\textsuperscript{100} The US blamed Pakistan as responsible for provoking the war. It imposed sanctions accusing Pakistan of employing regular army personnel as \textit{mujahideens}. The 1965 war insurmountably widened the gulf between the US and Pakistan. It demonstrated to Pakistan of the US unreliability. The US duplicity on both sides of Indo-Pakistan divide proved harmful for the South Asian collaborators.\textsuperscript{101} Consequently, the increase in Indian military muscle led Pakistan to rely on Chinese arms transfers. To the Indian mind, Sino-Pakistan friendship thrived on opportunism, expediency and collusion directed against India.\textsuperscript{102} Newspapers reports cited ‘imperialists US involvement favoring plebiscite as essential ingredient to a lasting peace in South Asia.’\textsuperscript{103} The US State Department issued a prompt disclaimer to the ‘rumor,’ instead of arguing and defending that obviously valid position.\textsuperscript{104} Hence exemption of constructive responsibility can be discerned in the US pattern of intervention in South Asia leading to exacerbation of Indo-Pakistan hostilities.

China granted military and economic assistance to Pakistan after the 1965 war, filling up the gap created by the US embargo. China’s leverage in Pakistan increased following transfer of technology, infrastructure development, and extension of generous loans for economic and strategic assistance.\textsuperscript{105} Chinese material assistance, explicit declaratory and covert support worked miracles to win Pakistan the political and material security it had envisioned from the US. Pakistan was now compelled to improve its relations with China and the Soviet Union. Many analysts believe that Pakistan and China had an understanding with regard to Pakistan’s territorial integrity and security.\textsuperscript{106} The

\textsuperscript{100} See S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis} (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 34.

\textsuperscript{101} The Indian military budget, which in 1955-57 was around Rs.2000 million, reached the alarming figure of about Rs.10000 million in 1967. India’s military potential increased as did Indian indigenous military production.


\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 148.

\textsuperscript{105} Pande, \textit{Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy}, 123.

\textsuperscript{106} Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bhutto stated that any Indian attack on Pakistan would involve in the area’s geopolitics — i.e., the security and territorial integrity of the largest state of China in Asia. Analysts believed that Bhutto-Chou En Lai border talks in 1963 involved the Chinese pledge to defend East Pakistan against Indian aggression. Thus, the assurance confined the 1965
Chinese ultimatum shook even the western powers, which saw geopolitical repercussions much beyond the frontiers of India and Pakistan. However, a corollary to the 1965 war was yet another war in 1971.

Contrary to the UN promise of looking into the political rationale underlying the 1965 war, the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966, simply chose to brush the Indo-Pakistan hostilities under the carpet. Russia offered to clean the garbage created by major clients of the Cold war contestants. The Russian sponsored Tashkent Declaration obliged to resume pre-war military positions as necessary condition to establish peace between India and Pakistan. During the 1960s, the US had a splendid opportunity to pull India in its orbit in the global ideological confrontation. The US discontinued military aid to Pakistan, making its resumption conditional to Islamabad’s curtailment of relations with China. Divergent pulls of state interests in a competing global environment tore apart the US-Pakistan defence alliance. China could win a corridor to the outside world based on political and strategic leverage in Pakistan. China’s unequivocal support strengthened its relations with Pakistan, en-cashing on pro-China popular sentiments.

With President Nixon (1969-1974) coming to power, the temporary decline in Pakistan-US relations was over. Nixon bore a sympathetic orientation and granted military sales and economic assistance to Pakistan. In the wake of reconfiguration of the global strategic environment, South Asia became a victim in yet another way. As the Cold war

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107 Ibid., 143.
108 On April 12, 1967, the US announced termination of military assistance to Pakistan and India.
109 Following the 1965 war, China and Pakistan developed military relations in addition to trade and commercial ones. In May 1967, Pakistan struck a $120 million arms deal with China for the delivery of 100 T-59 tanks, 80 MiG-19s and 10 III-28s aircraft. In 1967, China built Pakistan’s heavy mechanical complex at Taxilla and the East Pakistan’s first Ordinance factory, while it completed the Karakoram Highway in 1968, inaugurating it in February 1978, which further improved Pak-China trade and communication links. In 1970, Sino-Pakistan signed a maritime agreement on Chinese assistance in industry, mining, transport and communication. In 1967, China offered Pakistan 10 million Yuan for economic development, while it offered $200 million for Pakistan’s Fourth Five Year plan in 1970. By 1971, Chinese supplied tanks comprised 25 percent of Pakistan’s tank force, Chinese supplied air-craft 33 percent of Pakistan’s 270 planes, 65 per cent of all interceptor – bombers and 90 per cent of Pakistan’s modern fighter planes.
110 Starting from 1969, the US relaxed the ban on military supplies, allowing the sale of a limited number of B-57 and F 104 aircraft, replacement of fighters and bombers, 300 armour personnel carriers and four maritime patrol aircraft in addition to granting $72 million for food.
contestants reshuffled power positions globally, Pakistan had to face the direct brunt on
its internal security. The ingredients of the 1971 debacle undoubtedly were of an
indigenous origin, in which the eastern wing ceded from the Pakistani federation. No
less significant, however, was the role of the great powers in damaging Pakistan’s
political and geographical unity. Following Sino-Soviet split, the US policy makers
were desirous of a détente and envisioned Pakistan’s role in softening grounds with
China. Pakistan’s new administrator Yahya Khan was chosen for the US secretive move
that ‘eventually stunned the world.’\(^{111}\) Yahya Khan sought to en-cash Pakistan’s
extraordinary leverage with China, soliciting services of Poland and France diplomatic
missions. In the common enmity against the Soviet Union, China’s political leadership
was equally willing to befriend the US—its erstwhile rival. Pakistan acted as a political
corridor facilitating Henry Kissinger’s visit to Beijing starting from July 9\(^{th}\), 1971.\(^{112}\)
The visit led to China’s breakthrough invitation to Nixon to visit Beijing. Failing to
anticipate the fallout of his role in providing a secret channel between the US and China,
Yahya Khan had to bear the brunt of the strong Soviet reaction to the Pakistani move
provoked in the Soviet Union.

Sino-US relations’ incipient trends induced radical changes in the global strategic
environment. The reshuffling of great power alliances created strong ripples in South
Asia. Following recession in US-Pakistan relations and termination of the Badaber base
agreement, Pakistan expected improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. Yet
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and Pakistan’s role in the US rapprochement with
China had a direct fall out on Pakistan’s security. In a stunned, angry and quick reaction,
Soviet attitude transformed suddenly. Moscow threw its full weight to ally itself
formally with India. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation
concluded on August 9\(^{th}\), 1971, overtly positioned the Soviet Union with the
strategically and resourcefully more stronger India. For many political observers, the
alliance purpose was unmistakably strategic.\(^{113}\) To the Soviets, the treaty earned greater

\(^{111}\) See Sarmila Bose, *Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War* (New York:
The University Press, 2011).
\(^{112}\) See also Mohd Ahsen Choudhari, *Pakistan and the Great Powers: A Study of Pakistan’s
\(^{113}\) Ibid., 146.
leverage in South Asian security architecture in the context of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{114} To its treaty partner — India, it provided a security umbrella against China in the crisis unfolding between Indo-Pakistan. The Soviet move appeared to have been geared to inflict injury to Pakistan for the latter’s participatory role in the Sino-US rapprochement.

Following election results in December 1970 in East Pakistan, Yahya Khan resorted to a military action in order to secure the geographical cohesion and unity of Pakistan. Sandwiched between its two wings, the emergent crisis offered Indian political and military planners a historic opportunity to break the geographical stretch of Pakistan. Indian Intelligence agencies’ provided military training and material support for Mukti Bahini, a paramilitary force supported by Mujib-ur-Rehman’s Awami League secessionists exiled in Mujibnagar at Calcutta which subsequently created Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{115} Pakistani defence analyst Hasan-Askari Rizvi has argued that international political and public opinion favored the secessionists on account of both real and fabricated stories of West Pakistan’s military atrocities. The Indian Chief of Staff General Manekshaw had advised to delay the Indian action until weather conditions made Chinese intervention more difficult. India had been ostensibly shored up by its political and strategic mentor — the Soviet Union by lieu of the treaty concluded in August 19th, 1970.

Nixon argued that Mrs Gandhi’s duplicitous hypocritical stance and purposeful deceit incapacitated the US to act on the Pakistani side.\textsuperscript{116} The US expert on South Asia Stanley Wolpert has argued that Nixon’s dislike of Mrs. Gandhi was stronger than his affection for Pakistan’s military administrator.\textsuperscript{117} By lieu of this approach, Nixon served

\textsuperscript{114} Article IX committed the two states of India and the Soviet Union to mutual consultation in the event of an attack or threat of attack and to appropriate effective measures to ensure their peace and security.


\textsuperscript{116} To influence political opinion, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made a visit to the US. Nixon later recorded in his personal diary that on the subject Mrs. Gandhi purposefully deceived him. At the time when she assured him that she would not, she had made up her mind to attack Pakistan just then. Despite her overt claims to make peace and de-escalate the tensions, Indira Gandhi made little concrete efforts to grant concessions. Her analysis did not support her claim that she was not opposed to the very existence of Pakistan, See Sattar, \textit{Pakistan's Foreign Policy}, 148. See also, Mohd Ahsen Choudhari, \textit{Pakistan and the Great Powers} (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1970).

\textsuperscript{117} Wolpert, \textit{Roots of Confrontation}, 148.
more to strengthen Indo-Russian friendship bond than any other US president. Nixon failed to negotiate a political settlement or take overt political stance favoring Pakistan. Hand-cupped by the resistance offered by the US State Department and strong public opposition on the issue, Nixon policy looked the other way at its best. Instead of diffusing the situation, the US president raised proposed aid to Pakistan ten-fold, including an extra $5 million for weapons while $250,000 for police training. In fact, the increased aid was geared to help Nixon conclude his China visit.

Watergate scandal and domestic political concerns related to impeachment and prosecution did not allow Nixon much serious thought on any South Asian policy. Nixon referred to the 1971 crisis as ‘internal Pakistan matter.’ Research analyst Sharmila Bose has argued that Nixon’s advisors had reported that the situation was ‘under control in East Pakistan.’ Consequently, India blamed the US for impotently refusing to take action to avert war in South Asia. Pakistan, on the other side, blamed the US for not backing the alliance more vigorously. The US woke up to action from an attitude of indifference, alarmed finally by the reports of Indian designs to escalate the war to a usurpation of West Pakistan. Such a prospect entailed loosing hard-earned labor of Sino-US rapprochement, while threatening Soviet enlargement in South Asia. If the China policy was to be successful, the US would not allow the Soviet Union to intimidate China. Nixon believed the US should create enough pressure on India and the Soviet Union to dissuade them from taking the war to its ultimate consequences. If Indo-Soviet alliance succeeded in breaking Pakistan as a military and political entity, this would change the balance of power in South Asia.

Nixon dispatched a task force of eight ships and aircraft carrier **Enterprise** to the Bay of Bengal. The US president warned Leonid Brezhnev of unintended consequence

118 Ibid., 148.
120 On December 2, 1970, Yayha Kahn invoked the 1959 agreement asking for the US assistance. The US State Department argued that the agreement did not oblige the US to give a positive response. According to Kissinger, the plain import of the agreement obliged the US to assist Pakistan, if it was attacked by Pakistan. It was not worthwhile of the stature of a state like the US to look for such loopholes. It would have been tantamount to the US losing credibility upon allies. For more details See S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990).
121 Pande, *Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, 32.
entangling the US and Soviet Union in a direct military confrontation, if Indian advancement expanded to West Pakistan. The Soviets clarified to the US of any such Indian intention, pressurizing Indira Gandhi in turn to declare unconditional ceasefire on December 16, 1971 to bring the war to a halt. Nixon could now claim, much like Bhutto did the fateful day military operation was launched in East Pakistan, ‘Thank God, Pakistan was saved.’ 122 For Nixon, Indian conquest of (west) Pakistan would imply Soviet victory over China. This would allow the Soviet Union to play the same tactics elsewhere without impunity.

Interestingly, Sino-US global strategic rivalry and competition dictated Nixon’s policy approach towards the 1971 war. Contrary to Pakistani rulers’ expectations, neither the US nor China rescued Pakistan in East Pakistan. The Soviets had amassed troops on Sino-Soviet border and China feared nuclear retaliation in case of action against India in East Pakistan. It served both the US and China to prevent Indo-Soviet expansion in West Pakistan. A triumphant Indira Gandhi told Lok Sabha (Indian parliament) that India had avenged centuries of Hindu humiliation and defeat inflicted by the Muslims.123 In the aftermath of 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, India emerged as the supreme single power of South Asia with a grateful neighbor towards the East and a disgracefully defeated and reduced to size enemy towards the West. The change in global strategic environment involving Sino-US rapprochement had dictated the rationale for great powers to develop convergence of interests during the 1971 war. Thus, in the 1971 war, Pakistan had to clean what many observers term partly as the consequence of its own doing. Yet great powers — namely, the US, Russian and Chinese reshuffling of alliances and power tussle in Asia had a direct bearing on the security of Pakistan.

The 1971 war resulted from great powers’ realignment within the regional context of the Cold War. In the 1960s, Pakistan suffered the Soviet wrath for aligning with the US in the security treaties. Pakistan lost its geographical cohesion in the 1970s, when it played as the political navigator between China and the US. The 1971 war left everlasting wounds on the region’s collective psyche, with deep scars on the prospects

122 Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia, 149.
123 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 59.
of South Asian peace, cohesion and security.\textsuperscript{124} During the 1971 war, China limited its support to what it regarded as the internal affair of Pakistan. China, however, condemned Indian gross violation of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. China’s new found relationship with the US scared it of offending the Soviet Union further. To the Chinese, Soviet nuclear threat in its own war along the Ussuri River was still fresh. Intervention against India would engulf China between two hostile neighbors. Indian design of launching offensive in late November during harsh weather conditions ruled out the prospects of Chinese intervention in the Himalayan range. The US took China into confidence about measures aimed at preventing India from escalating the war. Sino-US rapprochement marked evolution of the new global order, as a tactical aspect of the Cold War. Pakistan had outlived its utility for China as a gateway to the world.\textsuperscript{125}

With the revolutionary leader Mao in receding health, China had wider regional and global priorities to settle. Widely left on its own, leadership in Pakistan had to build what was left of the state of Pakistan — a demoralized nation, a humiliated national psyche, shattered economy, despiritied army surrounded by a puffed up enemy and non-responding apathetic international community. Granting eventually recognition to Bangladesh in 1974, Pakistan found a less than honorable exit from the 1971 debacle by signing the Simla agreement with India in 1972.\textsuperscript{126} The 1971 debacle had great implications for South Asian security. Pakistan’s anti-communist alliance had hardened India’s anti-Pakistan stance.

Pakistan’s policy makers now made an iron-fisted resolve to opt for the nuclear option. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had already announced in early 1960s that India’s development of a nuclear bomb would necessitate a likely Pakistani response even ‘if the nation had to eat grass.’ The 1971 experience had illustrated the need to make Pakistan’s territorial integrity in-frangible by development of a nuclear program. Chinese leverage in Pakistan had increased, however, after the 1971 war.

\textsuperscript{124} See Burke and Ziring, \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis}, 54.
\textsuperscript{126} Shimla Agreement negotiated the terms of peace between India and Pakistan conditional to withdrawal of forces from occupied territories to the prewar condition; bilateralization of the Kashmir issue rather than third party or international involvement; and return of 90,000 Pakistani POW in Indian prison cells. See original document of the Shimla Agreement 1972 in Sattar, \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy}, Appendix 1.
From 1971 to 1974, the Chinese forgave four loans amounting to $110 million and delayed for 20 years the repayment of the 1970 loan. China provided $300 million worth of military equipment to Pakistan during this period. China also helped Pakistan by constructing arms and ammunition factories including the aeronautical complex at Kamra. Following the 1971 war, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wished to alienate Pakistan completely from the US. By November 1972, Pakistan decided to pull out from SEATO while it retained membership of CENTO. The US, however, continued economic and military assistance to Pakistan, as part of the Foreign Assistance Act. The 1971 debacle had contributed to Pakistan’s quest for nuclear security. China assured to strengthen Pakistan’s sovereignty and independence in response to Indian nuclear tests in 1974. While undertaking a critical reappraisal of its nuclear policy, Pakistan sought to acquire nuclear weapons’ technology from North Korea and China. In contrast to the US pressure and sanctions on Pakistan’s nuclear program, China remained sympathetic to Pakistan’s development of nuclear designs and uranium enrichment program. Chinese nuclear assistance and technological know-how played an instrumental role in Pakistan’s acquisition of fissile material for developing its own bomb.

The US imposed restrictions on industrialized states to export nuclear technology to Pakistan. Following the US pressure on France to cancel uranium supplies, China helped Pakistan to establish an enrichment plant at Kahuta. As early as 1961, the US suggested that India should be helped to acquire nuclear explosives prior to China. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission sanctioned the sale of more than 5,000 pounds of uranium to India. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s leftist inclination put him on less than amicable relations with the US. Bhutto’s pursuit of bilateralism appeared to the US as

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129 Pande, *Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, 42.


131 See Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan, the Enigma of Political Development* (Folkestone, Kent: Dawson, 1980), 245. See also George Perkovich, *India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*, (Berkeley: California University Press, 1999).
‘playing a larger than life role on the world scene.’\textsuperscript{132} The US-Pakistan relations deteriorated following the 1977 elections, domestic unrest and accusations of rigging in Pakistan. The Pakistan army under General Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977 launched a coup to curb political unrest. From Trueman’s neutral to anti-Pakistan stance, from Eisenhower’s pro-Pakistan to Kennedy’s anti-Pakistan stance, from Nixon’s pro-Pakistan to Ford’s neutral, the US-Pakistan relations till the Carter administration had seen drastic variations.

Pakistan’s insistence to build nuclear capability worsened its relations with the US. The Ford administration sought to buy Pakistan’s acceptance of not building the bomb by offering the sale of 110 A-7 aircrafts.\textsuperscript{133} Two navy destroyers were also transferred to Pakistan on a long term lease. In the downfall of relations with Pakistan during the Carter administration, the US even considered the option of destroying \textit{Kahuta}.\textsuperscript{134} The US Department of State issued denial to diffuse bilateral tensions. The US-Pakistan relations worsened in the late 1970s on the nuclear issue. Consequently, the Carter administration excluded Pakistan from its enumerated list of visits to the South Asian states. As a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the US imposed Symington and Glenn Amendments on Pakistan in 1977-78 along with sanctions on aid worth $50 million a year. A built-in loophole exempted India and Israel from the NPT preview, authorizing the import of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes from Canada and the US.\textsuperscript{135} It also withdrew the offer to sell A-7 aircrafts to Pakistan.

The US-Pakistan relations were at their lowest, when Ayotollah Khomeini’s Islamic revolution in February 1979 ended reliance on Iran as the US key security ally in the Gulf.\textsuperscript{136} The catalyst of transformation in the US-Pakistan ties, however, turned out to

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} See Ayaz Naseem, \textit{Pakistan’s Security Predicament and Foreign Policy Options} (Lahore: Fisco Press Ltd, 1989).
\textsuperscript{135} India reportedly diverted the material later to make nuclear explosives in violation of the agreements.
be the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27th, 1979. A month prior to the Soviet invasion, the US embassy in Islamabad was attacked in October, 1979. Global geo-strategic environment placed Pakistan in a security dilemma, allowing for a new direction in Pakistan’s foreign policy. The US, China and Soviet involvement in the region became an important factor in exacerbating hostility in Pakistan’s relations with India.

### 3.3 Sino-US Engagement in South Asia: 1979 – 1991

This section discusses the nature of Sino-US rivalry during the last phase of the Cold War era. It argues that the Sino-US interests converged to combat Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The US and China settled at Pakistan’s frontline role to combat Soviet expansionism by supporting Afghan Jihad. Moreover, security concern surfing on the Soviet invasion allowed the US to overlook Pakistan’s nuclear program during the entire course of the 1980s. The US-China policy foiled Pakistan’s relations with India on account of military arms’ transfers and sales to Pakistan and the latter’s pursuit of its nuclear program. A manifestation of exacerbation of hostilities during this phase occurred when India and Pakistan engaged in a low scale conflict on Siachen.

Sino-US approach in South Asia during the last phase of the Cold War era developed in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Global rather than regional approach marked Sino-US convergence of interests leading to Pakistan’s frontal role against the Soviet invasion. A qualitative change for the worse in the regional and international strategic environment ensued mandating a quick resolution of the Afghan crisis. Hence the new cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy became a resolution of the Afghan crisis. Pakistan offered a ‘No War Pact’ to India, following the Soviet invasion.

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137 The sacking of the US embassy on 21 November 1979 had been caused by inflammatory broadcast emanated from Iran, stating that the US and Israel attacked Kaaba in Macca. The PPP and the Marxists group tried to turn demonstrations against the US to anti-Zia mobilization. See Lawrence Ziring, *The Enigma of Political Development*, (Boulder: A. Preager Publishers, 1980), pg 243.

of Afghanistan to solicit a joint policy on *Afghan jihad*, which India hastily turned down. More than a genuine desire for peace and a common understanding on Afghanistan, the initiative reflected Pakistani attempt to secure its eastern front, while it was engaged at the West. India hastily turned down the Pakistani offer against its Cold War ally the Soviet Union.

Until the Soviet occupation shifted the US focus to Afghanistan, Pakistan remained relatively insignificant for the US policy interests in the South Asian region. The Soviet expansion into Afghanistan became the catalyst of change in the US relations with Pakistan.139 The Soviet invasion made Pakistan a preferred state for the US policy interests for almost a decade from 1979 to 1989. The Carter Doctrine of January 23, 1980 had a key objective that signaled to the Soviets that the US would thwart any attempt to expand in the Persian Gulf. The Carter administration launched *Operation Cyclone* termed as *Afghan jihad* in Afghanistan, making Pakistan a frontline state to facilitate bases for *mujahideen* operations in Kabul.140 The US sought to perpetuate the crisis for a number of reasons.141 Soviet involvement in Afghanistan released the US pressure from other strategic areas. It allowed the US to tarnish Soviet image in the developing world and to make Afghanistan a Vietnam for the Soviets. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US resumed military aid for Pakistan.

The Brown amendment approved military transfers to Pakistan, while ensuring that the US defence supplies should not up-set the strategic balance in South Asia. General Zia ul Haq turned down as ‘peanuts’ the initial US offer of $400 million, arguing that the assistance was ‘incommensurate with the size of the threat involved.’ Even before the

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140 Prior to the revolution in Iran in February 1979 and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, South Asia was only marginally important for the US. Europe and Korea were the focus of the US-Soviet East-West confrontation.

Soviet invasion, Pakistan had maintained relations with Islamist groups while they waged guerilla warfare against Afghan Communists. In siding with the US, Pakistan anticipated that the US would bleed the Soviets in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, Pakistan exploited the US fear that the next in line of Soviet expansionism was Islamabad. Zia stated that the free world owned a responsibility to protect Pakistan. Islamabad now shouldered the responsibility of a new buffer state instead of Afghanistan.\footnote{Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India, (Routledge: Contemporary South Asia, 2011), 104. See also Sajjad Hyder, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Reflections of an Ambassador (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987). See also Mushtaq Ahmed, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Lahore: Space Publishers, 1967). See also Mohd Ahsen Choudhari, Pakistan and the Great Powers: A Study of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1954-1970 (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1970).}

The Reagan administration (1981-1989) raised economic and military aid for Pakistan, offering $3.2 billion assistance over five years. In the 1980s, Congress passed Symington Amendment waiving restrictions on military assistance for Pakistan.\footnote{Teresa Joseph, Reporting Nuclear Pakistan: Security Perception and the Indian Press (New Delhi: Reference Press, 2009), 34.} The US Congress also approved the sale of F-16s aircrafts, although many congressmen had misgivings about their employment against India. The US covert assistance included CIA training and intelligence sharing with the mujahideen via ISI- the Pakistani intelligence service. The Gulf States, western and the US assistance trained the mujahideen.\footnote{Robert W. Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security under Zia, 1977-1988: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State (London: Macmillan, 1991), 45.} India claimed that western military assistance helped Pakistan to wage a low intensity conflict in Indian held Kashmir. Pakistan denied any such Indian allegations. It claimed that Pakistan had no ties with the Kashmiri jihadis. Pakistan sought physical security assurances against India, similar to the one the US had offered to Israel, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan.\footnote{Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 104.} Instead in the years 1982-1987, the US offered $3.6 billion in economic and military assistance which increased its leverage in Pakistan.

Sino-US interests converged on preventing Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan. Pakistan made support to the Afghan jihad conditional to certain conditions: it would not wind up its nuclear program; it would not grant military bases to the US; it would
not renounce its non-aligned status.\textsuperscript{146} In June 1984, Indian and Pakistani military forces fought one another in Siachen glaciers for controlling transportation routes, the world’s largest glacier in Pakistan’s north, bordering Chinese province of Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{147} The struggle continued till Zia’s death in a plane crash on August 17, 1988 as a low intensity conflict. The Siachen Glacier problem erupted at a time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{148} The Siachen issue endangered the much delayed Indo-Pakistan normalization process, increasing prospects of conflict between India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{149} Siachen’s capture influenced China as it affected the 1963 border agreement with Pakistan. Kashmir and Siachen involved the same issue of Indian preponderance, which was counter productive to Pakistan’s interests. With the Russians’ capture of the Wakhan Corridor earlier, 20 miles away from the Karakoram Highway, India’s military occupation of the Siachen Glacier mattered much for China’s regional interests. While playing at the rare, China exploited Pakistan’s strategic position to confront the Soviets. China maintained an arms distance from directly involving itself in Afghan affairs. Sino-Pakistan cooperation to capture the disputed territory in northern Kashmir certainly proved to be a significant factor, given their long standing military association.\textsuperscript{150} China and Pakistan had joined hands in the struggle against Kabul government since start of the Afghanistan war in 1980. Pakistan received weapons and economic support to assist the Afghan resistance forces during the Zia rule.\textsuperscript{151} The China-Pakistan commercial embrace deepened further in 1982 with the setting up of the China Pakistan Joint Committee of the Economy, Technology and Trade. Chinese

\textsuperscript{146} The Zia administration attempted to portray Pakistan as a tranquil country in the process of restoring its strategic balance. On 12 March, 1979, Foreign Office announced that Pakistan was withdrawing from its one remaining alliance with the western world. See Lawrence Ziring, \textit{The Enigma of Political Development} (Boulder: A. Preager Publishers, 1980), 243. See also Sajjad Hyder, \textit{Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Reflections of an Ambassador} (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987).


\textsuperscript{148} Indian published accounts of \textit{Operation Meghdoot} (Cloud Messenger), the deployment of specially trained units of the Kumaon regiment and the Ladakh scouts onto the glaciers in mid-April 1984 indicate Indian planned designs to catch Pakistan by surprise. The Pakistani military had a seasonal presence, restricted to sponsoring foreign expeditions to the north.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 54

\textsuperscript{150} China had developed into Pakistan’s principal and indispensible supplier of conventional arms. Pakistan’s air, ground and naval forces were all heavily dependent on Chinese military equipment, and China contributed significantly to Pakistan’s indigenous defence production.

\textsuperscript{151} Wirsing, \textit{Pakistan’s Security under Zia}, 91.
weapons systems provided the base to the Pakistani military, providing 75 percent tank force and 65 percent air force during this period. China supplied Soviet-made arms to Pakistan for use by the mujahideen. The threat of Islamic radicalism kept Chinese policy makers on high alert due to a likely spill over in Muslim dominated Xinjiang. Many Uyghurs had participated in the Afghan jihad.

The Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the nuclear field can be traced back to the 1980s. The US sanctions to pressurize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program solicited Chinese support in the nuclear field. The US chose to look to the other way as long as Pakistan did not ‘explode the bomb.’ In 1985, however, the US Congress passed the Pressler amendment, requiring presidential certification on Pakistan’s compliance with non-nuclearization. In 1986, China and Pakistan concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement to assist in weapon grade uranium enrichment and nuclear designs. China also supplied Pakistan nuclear products, nuclear technology and reactors.

Ironically, the US presidential verification kept forthcoming as long as the US engaged in Afghanistan. Signing of the Geneva Accords marked end of the Afghan jihad and defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In 1990, as Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan drew nearer, President H. W. Bush refused to issue non-nuclearization certification for Pakistan. An obvious casualty was the $564 million economic and military aid program for the fiscal year 1990. The US obstructed the sale of arm supplies worth $300 million along with the delivery of F-16s. The sanctions provoked a strict response in Pakistan against the US, terming it as ‘a fair weather friend,’ who dumped Pakistan when it failed to serve interests. The US sanctions coincided with the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War.

152 An insurgency grew in Xinjiang during the 1990s and the year 2000s.
153 Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 106.
154 Hyder, Reflections of an Ambassador, 54. See also, Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Pakistan alliance was victimization of the democratic forces in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{157} The idea of ‘establishment’ flourished under the US patronage in the national politics of Pakistan, when it supported Zia on holding non-party elections in the state in 1985. In March 1986, the US agreed on $4 billion security assistance program for Pakistan.

Security analyst Ayaz Naseem has opined that the US most modern military assistance never allowed Pakistan to maintain a quantitative or qualitative parity with India. He opined further that Pakistan was never able to obtain any guarantee from the Reagan administration that in a comparison involving India and Pakistan, it stood first in the matter of preferences.\textsuperscript{158} The US refused to consider India as a Soviet proxy. On the contrary, the Reagan administration played a great role to help India get assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. It also supplied enriched uranium and spare parts for Indian Tarapur nuclear program.\textsuperscript{159} The US had made clear that it would not take sides in problems between India and Pakistan.

The US military aid under the Zia regime, however, allowed Pakistan to build up its conventional capability against India. while it allowed to aim for a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan assisted by other Muslim countries in the region. Pakistan maintained exchange of high-level visits with Chinese and the US leadership during the 1980s and early 1990s. Following Zia’s mysterious death in aviation crash and the restoration of democracy, the US-Pakistan relations deteriorated once again.\textsuperscript{160} Chinese military, economic and nuclear support continued during the 1990s as China’s influence expanded in the South Asian region. Sino-US involvement in South Asia from 1979-1991 portrayed a convergence of interests to counter the Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan making Pakistan a frontline line state. The Carter, Reagan and Bush administration all framed rules of the game to make use of a militarized Pakistan. India’s ability to remain on the sidelines of the Afghan struggle paid dividends in relieving its capital and infrastructure resources for industrial development. Connected with the global economy, India became a dominant regional power.

\textsuperscript{157} Saeed Shafqat, Raheem ul Haque, \textit{Pakistan, Afghanistan and US Relations: Implications and Future Directions} (Lahore: Center for Public Policy & Governance, 2011).
\textsuperscript{158} Op, cit, Shafaqat,198.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 198.
\textsuperscript{160} Hyder, \textit{Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Reflections of an Ambassador} (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1987), 36.
3.4 Sino-US Engagement in South Asia: 1991-9/11

This section explores implications of Sino-US engagement in South Asia during the post Cold War era. It argues that Sino-US amicability developed during the Cold War was lost in the post Cold war era as China developed friendly relations with Russia. In the wake of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US disengaged from Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment. Sino-Pakistan strategic cooperation in conventional weapons and missiles continued during this period to dilute Indian hegemony in South Asia. The US engaged with India both strategically and economically during this period. In the wake of Indo-Pakistan nuclearization, the US and China desired to promote stability in South Asia.

Following the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and conclusion of 1989 Geneva Accords, the US policy interest in Southwest Asia receded. The US interest vanquished from the South Asian region to consolidate its gains in Eastern and Western Europe.\(^{161}\) South Asia remained only marginally significant for the US policy preferences during this period. The post Cold War global strategic environment began to show marks of unfolding threat posed to US hegemony through radical Islamism and a resurgent China. India could act as a counter-balancer to China given its geo-strategic weight and list of territorial problems.

Sino-US rationale to maintain cordiality in bilateral relations had been obliterated given absence of the Soviet threat. At a benign level, Sino-US global security competition began to impact South Asia, when China’s politico-economic resurgence broke the stasis in Beijing’s relations with India in the late 1990s.\(^{162}\) Sino-Indian official visits in 1993 and 1996 raised prospects of Sino-Indian rapprochement. Subsequently, the Clinton administrations’ interest in South Asia developed on account of three imminent issues: China’s rise in Asia, Indo-Pakistan nuclearization and insurgency in Kashmir.


Sino-Indian convergence of interests in the late 1990s developed due to the structural transformation offered by the US unipolarity. India began to tone down the earlier rhetoric of non-alignment, much like China’s redefinition of ideological orientation. Accordingly, Jiang Zemin envisioned a new role of South Asian economic cooperation during his visit to South Asia in 2000. The Chinese president stressed on the Indo-Pakistan regional competitors to rise above their traditional stances on Kashmir. Although his speech in the Pakistani Senate was a disappointment to Pakistani diplomacy, the Chinese premier subject content had two underlying assumptions. It was a call for China-South Asian cooperation in opposing the US domination and hegemony; it indicated that New Delhi was only one of Beijing’s partners in the region.163 Given the transformation in the regional and global order, India began to rank itself in the same status as China. For India, the equal culpability thesis vis. a vis. Pakistan became defunct.164

The nuclear issue became a flashpoint in the US-Pakistan relations. The US became intrusive and demanding about Pakistan’s nuclear research program in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) invoked Pressler amendment, passed on October 1, 1990, soliciting Pakistan’s compliance on non-weaponization. Meanwhile, Indian nuclear program continued, while the US took zero cognizance of the existential threat it posed to Pakistan’s security. The desire to seek nuclear parity with India led the US to inflict sanctions on Pakistan instead. Following CIA reports on Pakistan’s development of nuclear capable missiles with Chinese assistance, the US put restrictions on Pakistan’s space program under Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In 1991, the US foiled a Pakistani commercial 900 MW power plant deal with France. This led China to assist Pakistan in building its first commercial nuclear plant CHASNUPP-1 at Chasma to seek nuclear parity with India.

Pakistan-China missile and nuclear collaboration increased manifold during the 1990s. Consequently, the US suspended all military and economic aid to Pakistan. Under the Pressler amendment, the US cut off $700 million financial assistance and other military

164 Llyod I. Rudolph & Sussane Hoeber Rudolph, Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives And The Imperial Presidency,(New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008).
equipment, while it suspended the transfer of F-16s. The US even imposed embargo on Pakistan’s own military equipment sent for repairs to the US. In 1994, the Clinton administration (1993-2001) agreed to deliver F-16s, if Pakistan capped its nuclear program. Pakistan, however, termed the US offer as discriminatory in nature as no similar pressure was put on India. In 1995, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s visit solicited the Clinton administration’s (1993-2001) passage of the Brown amendment to return Pakistani equipment, resume economic assistance and reimburse payments made for the F-16s. The US embargo, however, on further arms sales to Pakistan continued.

The Taliban control in Kabul endangered the US security interest in South Asia. Pakistan’s extension of recognition and support to the Taliban strained its relations with the US in the intervening period of 1991-1996. Pakistan became the first state to grant diplomatic recognition to the Taliban and open a consulate in Kabul. India served as a better politico-strategic partner for the US global security interests in the late 1990s. However, a more clear crystallization of the Indo-US convergence of interests developed in the wake of Indian nuclearization. The US refusal to grant security guarantee to Pakistan against Indian leaders’ provocative statements led Pakistan to detonate six nuclear tests at Chaghi on May 28, 1998 in response. South Asian nuclearization provoked worldwide criticism, soliciting Sino-US convergence of interests in the stability of South Asia. The Clinton administration postponed the president’s South Asia visit scheduled for the first quarter of 1998. The US foreign

167 Pakistan believed that its Muslim credentials made its nuclear program less acceptable to the US compared to that of India.
181 The Indian nuclear tests on May 13, 1998 provoked an equating Pakistani response on May 28, 1998 at Chaghi. India pointed to China as the instigator of the Indian nuclear tests while Pakistan cited the threat from New Delhi.
policy analyst Strobe Talbott opined that Clinton’s South Asia visit in the year 2000 aimed at bringing New Delhi out of its post-Pokhran isolation.

Real-politik balancing based on regional enmity and distrust led to Indo-Pakistan nuclear detonations. China termed Pakistan’s nuclear detonations as a strategic compulsion, blaming India as the chief instigator of South Asian nuclear hostilities. Nuclearization of South Asia, however, provided the pretext for India’s convergence of interests with the US. Clinton’s South Asia visit in the year 2000 marked a few hours stay in Pakistan compared to a grant of $4 billion and five days stay in India. Globalization, Indian market potential and the rise of China made South Asia a priority area for the US global security interests. Growing instability in Pakistan made India a better choice for the US global designs in the post Cold war era. The US began to co-opt a strategically non-aligned and volatile India against the threat of a rising China in Asia. From estranged to engaged democracies, India and the US moved to elevate Indian status realizing the US long term strategic interests in the Southwest and Central Asian region.

In May 1999, the Kargil crisis surfaced, soliciting strong US criticism on what it considered as Pakistani establishment’s ‘misadventure.’ The Kargil crisis brought the US to an India-Pakistan conflict. As the conflict entailed the proportion to spin out of control, Clinton sent General Anthony Zinni to talk to General Musharraf. The US unilaterally pressurized Pakistan to withdraw forces and restore the status-quo on the LoC. This offered a contrast to the Chinese approach that put equitable pressure on both

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174 A large number of jihadi fighters had crossed the LoC in the northern part of Kashmir near a town called Kargil, providing the strategic link between Srinagar and north eastern part of Ladakh. Kargil turned out to be a diplomatic and international failure for Pakistan despite being a tactical success.
India and Pakistan to resolve the crisis. The US failed to realize the inseparable link between nuclear weapons, Kargil and Kashmir.

The October 1999 military coup further strained Pakistsan’s relations with the US. Another layer of sanctions was imposed under Section 508 of the US Foreign Appropriations Act.\(^{176}\) Pakistan continued to receive, however, limited the US assistance in counter-narcotics and refugee assistance. The historic landmark of 9/11 worked as a neorealist constraint on Pakistan’s foreign policy. The incident constrained Pakistan to join the US sponsored Global War on Terror (GWOT). The US retrieved Pakistan’s status as a Non-Nato Ally, granting exemption from both types of sanctions. The US allowed Pakistan sale of 28 F-16 fighter jets worth $658 million, restricted by Congressional sanctions on account of non-proliferation concerns.

Pakistan’s strategic significance surfaced once more to revive its relevance to the US security interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The War on Terror provided a limited basis for Sino-US cooperation, while it failed to alleviate the underlying sources of Indo-Pakistan conflict. The US scholar Aaron L. Friedberg has argued that Sino-US competitive relationship was deeply entrenched in their approach towards the international system.\(^{177}\) Sino-US interests converged and diverged to allow for strategic partnership.\(^{178}\) China and the US faced a security dilemma in Pakistan due to two sensitive issues. From the Chinese perspective, it was the US military presence in Pakistan; and from the US perspective, it was Beijing’s military relations with Pakistan.\(^{179}\) Sino-US competition thus held implications for Pakistan’s security post 9/11.


The chapter argued, therefore, that great powers involvement in the region had a counter-productive influence on Indo-Pakistan bilateral relations. Global rather than regional considerations marked Sino-US convergence or divergence of security interests in South Asia. Pakistan’s search for security against India fostered its alliance with the US and China in South Asia. Disappointment with Sino-US role in the 1965 and 1971 wars led to Pakistan’s quest for the acquisition of nuclear technology to strengthen its security vis-a-vis India. The context of the Cold War offered Pakistan manoeuvrability in its alliance formation with the US and China. Unlike great powers, Pakistan’s regional security interests, based on its threat from India, mattered more in Islamabad’s alliance partnership with the US and China. Following China’s development of border rivalry with India, regional rather than global considerations marked Beijing’s alliance partnership with Pakistan. However, China successfully substituted the US’ strategic, military and economic assistance, building a stronger partnership with Islamabad. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US policy faced ups and downs based on the dictum of the ‘law of necessity.’ China, however, followed a consistent policy approach based on a friendly orientation towards Pakistan.

Having explored the historical background of Sino-US relations, it is imperative to understand the contemporary context of this relationship. Within this context, the next part of the thesis deals with Sino-US relations 9/11.
CHAPTER 4
SINO-US COMPETITION POST 9/11

Tong chaung, yi meng
Same bed, different dreams
Observe calmly; secure our position, cope with affairs calmly,
hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining
a low profile; never claim leadership.
Deng Xioping

This chapter discusses multifaceted dynamics of Sino-US relations from 9/11 to 2015. It argues that Sino-US security interests converged and diverged at the bilateral, regional and global levels. To understand the dynamics of security competition, the chapter critically examines Sino-US convergence and divergence of interests in Asia. China-US economic, military and political relations have exhibited the interplay of power politics and complex interdependence at the bilateral level post 9/11. The quest for security and marks of economic interdependence has appeared side by side in the conduct of Sino-US relations.

This chapter is divided into four sections: 1) Sino-US Perceptions of each other 9/11; 2) Sino-US Military Relations; 3) Sino-US Political Relations; and 4) Sino-US Economic Relations.

4.1 Sino-US Mutual Perceptions
This section discusses Sino-US perceptions regarding the role each one plays on the global landscape in the post 9/11 era. It argues that the central organizing principle of Sino-US relations remained constructive management of mutual distrust and rivalry. The past has held a considerable imprint on Sino-US mutual perceptions centered on contention, cooperation and rivalry. Simultaneously, both powers have viewed each other with increasing optimism for mutual cooperation and economic opportunity. Sino-US leadership has resolved to steer clear of undesired ripples in the conduct of their strategic, political and economic relations.

At the strategic level, Sino-US exhibited a remarkable potential to shape relationships based on cooperation or constructive management of differences on regional issues. At the political level, the US relations with China marked a broad convergence of interests on important bilateral, regional and global issues. At the economic level, Sino-US relations reflected each side’s high stakes in the success of the other besides marking competition for energy security and regional dominance in trade.
China’s resurgence in the post 9/11 era has added a new dimension to Sino-US relations, letting loose a whole chain of mixed mutual perceptions. The state’s economic growth has become a focus of widespread scholarly attention.\(^1\) Entailing one fifth of the world’s population, China shares borders with fourteen states. It covers a vast continent wide area close in sq.miles to that of the US. A civilization traceable to 3000 years old or more, China has cemented its status as a giant in economic, military, technological and diplomatic dimensions. Tremendous clout accredits China’s rise in terms of a matchless Gross Domestic Product (GDP) calculated averaging above 10 percent for the past four decades.\(^2\) Chinese official newspaper Xinhua News Agency has estimated China’s GDP at $10 trillion US dollars in 2014 with a growth target set at 7.5 percent in a third year consecutively.\(^3\) China has emerged as the world's second-largest economy.\(^4\) It has maintained the largest foreign currency reserves at $3.1 billion in the US Treasury bonds.

Socio-economic success has helped China to drag 600 million people out of poverty. From a mere $2 billion in 1978, the country’s trade boosts more than $4 trillion in 2014. Chinese military budget for 2014 rose to $160 billion, marking a 12.2 percent increase over the last year. In 2013, China’s defense budget increased by 10.7 percent over the previous year. The country has emerged as number one trading partner of the US, Japan, Taiwan, India, EU and the ASEAN. Reminiscent of China’s inflating global role as a great power, multilateralism has paid dividends in granting a soft power image to Beijing’s foreign policy stance.\(^5\) In an interview with the author, a prominent Chinese professor Chounzi of the Tsinghua University of the Institute of International Relations

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\(^2\) China’s economic development resulted from reform and liberalization policies of the last thirty years, contributing to 30 trillion yuan GDP in 2014. Surpassing Japan in 2010, China emerged as the world’s second largest economy, behind only to the US. China’s GDP was expected to surpass the US by 2030 to become world number one.

\(^3\) China’s *National Bureau of Statistics* calculated 7.7 percent GDP growth in 2013, overshooting the government target of 7.5 percent to reach 56.9 trillion yuan about 9.3 trillion US dollars. See “China’s GDP to top 10 trillion USD by 2014,” *Xinhau News Agency*, assessed March 24, 2014.

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Multilateral institutional mechanism involves Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
argued that ‘Sino-US relations have exhibited a considerable degree of maturity overcoming ripples in the conduct of bilateral diplomacy.’

China’s emerging clout makes sense in the backdrop of the swing of world power from Atlantic to the Pacific known as the ‘Asia-Pacific’ century. The Asian continent post 9/11 has rivalled the geopolitical weight of North America and Europe. Asia contains 29 percent of the world’s population and 19 percent of its GDP. Global boom in oil prices, low-cost labor production and transfer of service industries following recession and unemployment in western economies are some of the factors responsible for Asia’s growth and preeminence. The ‘Asia-Pacific century’ resulted from transformation of Southeast Asian economies from earlier specialization in labor intensive manufactures to market oriented policy reforms. Liberalization in Asia happened due to three general conditioning factors governing investment worldwide: structural changes, commercial policy environments, and global institutional and technological factors. International production fragmentation rather than the earlier traditional notion of horizontal specialization also played a part in Asian states’ economic vitality and resurgence. With more countries embracing market oriented policy reforms, the twenty first century increasingly began to be referred to as the Asian century. Asia is an important global production network with foreign trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

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6 Interview conducted by the author with Assistant Professor Chounzhi, Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University, Beijing.

7 Vast Asian consumer markets, natural and human resources, vital energy transfer routes, traditional and non-traditional security concerns including non-proliferation and cross border international terrorism work collectively to add to the multidimensional influence of Asia on the world stage. See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, (Lahore: Profile Books Ltd, 2012), 42.

8 Economists began to speculate about start of the Asia-Pacific century, as East Asia emerged as the major trading partner of the US. See Prema-Chandra Athukorala, The Rise of Asia, Trade and Investment in Global Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1.


10 The traditional concept of horizontal specialization implies that states trade in goods manufactured from start to finish in a given country.


12 Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand adopted outward looking development strategies by 1970s and 1980s. China adopted state owned liberalization in late 1970s along with Sri Lanka. India opened up in mid 1980s, while Indochina-Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia began to liberalize by early 1990s. India, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan and Korea lowered tariffs to almost half with the exception of Nepal and Vietnam. India and Pakistan are having the highest average tariffs, with Indian tariff three times that of China. Asia’s share of world GDP rose from 22 percent in the early 1960s to 29 percent by 2007 and to 35 by 2013-
China emerged as the direct beneficiary of Asia’s emerging clout on the world stage with the fastest growing economy recorded at 12.7 percent GDP in 2014. An important source of China’s raw material, technology import and management expertise comes from Asia. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) containing best managerial practices has brought to China the most sophisticated and technically advanced manufacturing processes, which has contributed to almost 60 percent of Chinese exports. China has become the highest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Asian region due to less tax regulations and low wages, which has kept the cost of production considerably low.\(^\text{13}\)

China’s rise has deserved an intense scholarly focus from both quarters. Chinese scholars have regarded the US policy towards China from diverse perspectives of cooperation to confrontation. Optimist camp has viewed the US China policy as entailing a qualitative change focused on China’s increased role as a responsible member of the international community. This group of scholars has studied China’s cooperative mechanism from the perspective of complex interdependence. Soft power projection has won diplomatic favors for China from several African and Asian states.\(^\text{14}\)

For example, China participated in the UN peacekeeping missions, international disaster relief, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy missions in the Asia-Pacific region. Analysts have attempted to assure China’s rise as not a zero-sum game, rather entailing opportunities for global growth.\(^\text{15}\)

China’s foreign policy conducted through diplomacy is an important indicator of how the state views its future role.\(^\text{16}\) Chinese academicians and think tanks on the pessimist

\(^{14}\text{ Its share in non-oil trade increased to 33 percent. FDI increased from 22 percent in the early 1980s to nearly 50 percent in 2007. See Prema-Chandra Athukorala, }\textit{The Rise of Asia, Trade and Investment in Global Perspective,} (New York: Routledge, 2010), 2.

\(^{13}\text{ Foreign Direct Investment remained more than$500 billion for the year 2014 in China.}

\(^{14}\text{ Venezuela and Uzbekistan have preferred China over the US in granting access to their oil industry.}

\(^{15}\text{ Masafumi Iids, (eds.) “China’s Shift: Global Strategy of the Rising Power,” }\textit{NIDS Joint Research, Series No. 3, 2009.70.}

\(^{16}\text{ Generally speaking, diplomacy refers to the means preferred over the use of force for achieving ends or desired outcomes. Diplomacy responds to state concerns with respect to its neighbors and the international community at large. A coercive foreign policy at the tactical level involves continuum of threats alongside action. A foreign policy marked by compellence tends to resort to threat of force besides employing economic leverages to coerce another state into obedience. Cooperative strategies involve integrative bargaining to bring about a win-win situation for all those involved in a given situation.}
camp such as Wang Jisi have invoked the Mencius philosophy calling for a Tit for Tat response. Scholars have argued that a state without an enemy or external peril is absolutely doomed. This group believes that the US sets off periodic rounds of China threat to create friction and obstacles, warding off Beijing’s march towards progress. The pessimist camp has argued that the US malign China’s economic and trade relations with friendly countries. Deng Xioping’s philosophy can help China to keep a low profile in order to overcome domestic weaknesses at home.

On the US dominated world stage, China’s emerging clout has raised concern for its global role. The US scholars have tended to regard China’s growth as one of the processes of globalization itself. For example, the US scholars Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth have argued that as China was nowhere near a peer to the US, its rise offers a major transformation to the US role of the world’s sole superpower. Chinese scholar Wenshan Jia has referred to China’s growth as Chiglobalization — the fourth wave in the world’s successive waves of globalizations. The process has entailed a creative fusion of the Eastern and Western cultures. Jia has argued that the world future is likely to be impacted by the interplay of Ameriglobalisation — and the Sino-centric globalization. The US former diplomat Henry Kissinger has attributed China’s growth to ‘Deng’s indestructible vision and agenda of economic liberalization and reform.’ Scholars such as DN Yates have employed interesting metaphors, using

18 Foreign military analysts said China’s actual annual military spending was higher than the official figure. Certain defense consulting agencies put China’s defense budget at $148 billion, still much less than $526.8 billion military budget of the US in 2014.
20 Ibid.
21 China adopts a measured approach towards free market principles and integration with global economies. Globalization allows China easy access to western technologies and the global trading system. See Athukorala, The Rise of Asia, 18.
22 Building on his concept, Wenshan Jia informs about three earlier waves of globalization. The first originated from the Chinese culture in pre-modern times during the reign of the Tang dynasty along the Silk Road. The second termed as Anglobalization built on it. The third wave Ameriglobalization grew upon Anglobalization. Chiglobalization has been an inter-mix of earlier globalizations. See Wenshan Jia, “Chiglobalisation? A Cultural Argument,” in Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, Greater China in an Era of Globalization (New York: Lexington Books, 2010), 11.
expressions and terminologies such as ‘panda hunger,’ ‘Adam Smith on steroids’ or ‘elephant riding a bicycle’ to catch China’s rise.24

As China’s ascendance challenges the US unipolarity in Asia, metaphors like China threat thesis or dragon slayer approach have built on the realist perspective. Scholars on the US side have emphasized on-shore and off-shore containment strategies to counter Beijing’s growing political, economic and military preponderance in Asia. The US scholar David Lampton has identified three levels in Sino-US overall bilateral security relations: one, the global level marked by the influence of international organizations and regimes; two, the domestic level with influence of governmental and civic institutions, internal politics, ideologies, and public opinions; three, the influence of individual political leaders. According to Lampton, two sets of domestic and international constituencies have rendered management of Sino-US relations complex.25 Susan Shirk has cited Chinese leadership tendency to exploit nationalistic sentiments to thwart external pressures.26 Shirk argued that China holds a sense of entitlement for rectification of past injustices. China’s global strategy rests on the inherent historic legacy of belonging to the community of great powers.

In wider Asia, towards the west, China’s economic interests have extended to Central Asia, Caspian Sea and Europe. To the east, the Chinese curve of energy security has stretched from the South China Sea to Indian Ocean, Myanmar, South Asia, to Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Africa. 27 To China’s North and Northwest, Chinese demographic and corporate influence has extended to Mongolia, Far East and beyond. The realization of China’s global designs has required international stability and a peaceful world environment. China’s grand strategy has necessitated engagement and


interaction with the US and the world community based on self-restraint. In an interview with the scribe, Pan Yan, the third Secretary in the Chinese diplomatic mission in Pakistan, opined that “the US is like a monitor, and we (China) are like vice monitors. We want to make less trouble and keep the situation manageable.”

Various perspectives have gained currency in the international scholarly debate on the issue. The realist perspective holds that hegemonic states seek to maintain the established international system based on preferred values, interests, institutions and soft power asymmetry. Rising powers demand a change in the power hierarchy leading to restructuring of the international system. Realists emphasize on the inevitable rise of a state’s political power, resulting from the relative reduction of the incumbent power’s weakened status and political hegemony. The power competition often causes disruptive conflicts and even large-scale wars. By this logic, Susiheng Zhao has argued that China’s rise will unavoidably modify the international status-quo. China has defined its interests more expansively, seeking a greater degree of influence. The US scholar James Steinberg and Michael E. O Hanlon have argued that the pessimistic outcome of a Sino-US conflict is not inevitable. Yet in the absence of a comprehensive strategy by both states to resist such tendencies, there are powerful forces that make it quite likely. The scholars have argued that the US has loosened the basic nature of Sino-US relations from a benign relationship into one of strategic competition. Applying the realist perspective, China has appeared to act like a gap-minimizer or offensive positionalist, projecting its ascendancy in global power politics. The incumbent hegemon, the US appears to act like a defensive positionalist, preventing China from gaining dominance.

The second perception - China peace thesis or the panda-hunger approach has built on the neo-liberal narrative to term China’s peaceful rise as a factor for stability in Asia. This approach has emphasized that the US should grant concessions at the global and

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28 Interview conducted by the author with Pan Yan, Third Secretary, China Embassy, Islamabad on April 29, 2013.


30 Ibid., 3.

31 Substantial evidence can be found of an unsatisfied China fraught with tensions with the US in economic, political and geo-strategic dimensions.

regional levels to accommodate China’s increased role in multilateral and regional structures. The liberals’ contends that globalization has marked a large degree of interdependence in Sino-US relations, constraining both states from pursuing zero-sum strategies. The scholar argued that China has followed a policy of economic integration and institutionalism to build international strength. Vidya Nadkarni argued that China’s foreign policy represents a tactical response to international and domestic prerequisites, aimed at projecting influence at par with the US. The US security analyst John J. Mearsheimer has contended that geo-economic interdependence may not cast a significant effect on geopolitical considerations. Major European powers were all highly mutually dependent and flourishing in 1914, when the First World War broke out.

The third ‘fence-sitter’ approach has contended that Sino-US share common bilateral, regional and global concerns. Research analyst Masafumi Iids has argued that China’s rise has contained both opportunities and challenges based on convergence and divergence of interests, and the US, therefore, must hedge its bets against a rising China. The Japanese researcher Masafumi Iids has highlighted two views on the conduct of China’s foreign policy. First, China is intensely incorporated into the world economy. Yet economic ties become a major cause of hostility between great powers. Second, Beijing is unlikely to disrupt the contemporary configuration of world politics, given the inter dynamics of complex interdependence, marking China’s global financial and market transactions. This school of thought has emphasized the role of complex

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33 Neo-isolationists argue that the US alliances in Asia tend to restrain its relations with China. A counter perspective views the US alliances as a factor for stability in Asia. The US forward deployment, alliance commitment and survivable nuclear forces enable effective deterrence against a Chinese attack on Japan or South Korea. A US withdrawal would not serve China’s regional ambitions. Japan and South Korea would acquire stronger conventional military and nuclear capabilities, greatly reducing China’s potential. The US alliance allowed Japan to spend less on defence, hence indirectly benefitting China.


35 The first view regards China’s low profile as a tactical move of diplomacy resulting from constrains of domestic development. See Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances (New York: Routledge, 2010), 129.


38 Op, cit, 382.
interdependence, economic imperatives and multilateral institutions for the growth of China’s national security.

Sino-US relations post 9/11 have evolved from a period of intense standoffs to a complex mix of intensifying diplomacy and increasingly intertwined economies. Scholars have frequently resorted to view Sino-US relations in diverse terms. The US research analyst Fareed Zakaria has termed China both different and unique; the complexity of which cannot possibly be understood with western theoretical bifocals. The US and Chinese oil companies compete each other for energy resources. Sino-US offer reassurance to one another on benign strategic intention. However, the US scholar Robert J. Art has observed three reasons why Sino-US relations will not face the dismal picture of the past. According to Robert Jervis, although China’s goals will expand in the future, the US cannot stop China’s rise through economic and military denial strategy. Sino-US economic interdependence involving mutual vulnerabilities, fear of political backlash, lack of partners’ support, loss of trade and investment prevents the US to pursue outrightly China’s containment strategy. China might act on the self-fulfilling prophecy to become an actual enemy. The scholar argued that the US cannot pursue economic warfare due to high stakes in China’s economy.

According to John J. Mearsheimer, the global strategic environment has marked Sino-US peer competition in Asia post 9/11. Mearsheimer has predicted that much like the

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42 Ibid.
43 John Mearsheimer’s theoretical precept of realism holds that systemic constraints enjoin upon states to maximize power not as an end in itself, rather as a means to ensure survival in an anarchic international domain. When states seek bare survival in the international anarchic domain, it is called defensive realism. But when states seek survival through expansion of power and capabilities, it is called offensive realism. States share a uniform attribute: they are the key unitary actors and repository of ultimate authority. Yet states differ in terms of capabilities and intentions. Capabilities are material objects while intentions are intangible and difficult to measure. With difference in offensive military capabilities and malign intentions, states tend to fear each other. Territorial integrity and political autonomy ranks as the most important cherished goals ensuring survival. The more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely its survival will be at stake. Thus, states are ‘gap maximizers’ or
US dominance of the western hemisphere, China would dominate Asia based on its economic success. To maintain its global pre-eminence, the US would contain Chinese power, unleashing an intense security competition in the Asian region. As all states aspire to become a global hegemon, military asymmetry and prospects for miscalculation has increased the prospect of instability in Asia. According to Mearsheimer, ideological competition reinforces the condition of Sino-US war. China has remained apprehensive of the US encirclement and ideological subversion.

The propensity of conflict between a great power and a rising one has depended on two factors: One, security — higher the level of security, lower the propensity for conflict; the intense the security competition, the greater is the likelihood of distrust and war. Two, economic interdependence has contributed to peace only when trade contributes to prosperity and does not develop a condition of military vulnerability or asymmetry. Hence varying perspectives have tended to define Sino-US relations post 9/11.

Sino-US has steadily built a resilient relationship by maintaining an intensive schedule of bilateral engagements since 9/11. The legacy of Mao tse-Tung and Deng Xioping’s détente with the US has set the stage for China’s relationship with the US. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972, Sino-US relationship has portrayed a positive trend for progress marked by practical cooperation on priority issues. Sino-US has sought constructive management of differences to avoid conflict through active diplomacy maintained by Sino-US successive leadership. Sino-US have exhibited offensive positionalists relative to the adversary’s capabilities. The resultant power competition unleashes external balancing or internal spiral of arms race ultimately leading to war. See John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: Norton & Company, 2001), 23.


46 A long chain of destabilizing events had preceded Sino-US rapprochement including the death of Stalin, the 1953 East German uprising, the 1956 Poznań protests in Poland, Khrushchev’s secret speech denouncing Stalin, the Hungarian Uprising, and the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968 upsetting the political equilibrium and exposing splits within the Communist bloc. Continuing Mao’s policies, Deng made an official visit to the US soon after assuming office. Simultaneously, Deng launched a border war with Vietnam while consolidating his political power at home.

47 Sino-US has maintained an intensive schedule of bilateral engagements since 9/11. In 2013, the US President Barack Obama met with Chinese counterpart in Sunnylands, California,
rational management of differences through high-level cooperation on critical issues of bilateral, regional and global interest. Mutual perceptions have played a strong role in determining Sino-US relations. Analyzing Sino-US mutual perceptions in the post 9/11 era, it can be argued that contending views prevail about China’s rise and the potential role Beijing is likely to play on the global landscape. A broad consensus, however, has prevailed on the transformation of China’s role commensurate with major power status on the global landscape.

4.2 Sino-US Military Relations

This section explores Sino-US military relations in the post 9/11 era. It argues that despite growing security tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, Sino-US have evolved confidence-building mechanisms to enhance bilateral cooperation at the strategic level. Tactical level differences have prevailed in Sino-US foreign policy goals at the regional level in the South China Sea. China has desired the US to accommodate Beijing in the capacity of a ‘major-power-status,’ recognizing Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea. On the contrary, the US has sought maintainence of the status-quo based on American hegemonic predominance in the region.

According to John Mearsheimer, a global hegemon has the following main objectives to project power over huge distances. One, it needs to attain regional hegemony by dominating one’s surrounding neighborhood. Two, it wants to prevent other great powers from intervention and influence in one’s own backyard. Three, it seeks to acquire the freedom to move around the globe and interfere thereby in other areas of the world. Fourth, it has to prevent other great powers to gain ascendancy and dominance in distant regions. At the tactical level, hegemons seek to ensure the following: One, cause trouble in each other’s backyard to disrupt regional dominance by a rival power. Two, if a rival state achieves regional dominance; it should end rival hegemony as expeditiously as possible. This reduces one’s own vulnerability by incapacitating rivals’ ability to roam around the globe and cause trouble into one’s own backyard. The strategy implies an important practical step: Have multiple great powers meeting twice more since then. In November 2014, Obama visited China on the eve of Asia Pacific Economic Conference. In October 2015, President Xi Jinping visited the US on a state visit.

rather than one in all other areas. This would ensure that the great powers worry more about each other and interfere less in one’s own backyard.\textsuperscript{49} Thus to remain global hegemon is to become the sole regional hegemon.

Sino-US relations are likely to be shaped by three benchmarks. China’s expansion of goals in the future, the US capacity to deal with China’s rise and prospect of Sino-US display of dominant power-rising power dyad as portrayed by Richard Organski’s power transition or cyclical theory.\textsuperscript{50} China has regarded the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s up-gradation as elementary to achieve great power status. Military modernization remains a key ingredient to acquire the ‘China Dream’ of national rejuvenation. Chinese leaders have regarded powerful military as crucial to protect Chinese interests abroad and for maintaining a robust defence against adversaries. China has desired to maintain stability along its peripheral regions without engaging in direct conflict with the US. China’s military has planned preparation for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, along the East China Sea and South China Sea. Increase in Chinese global interests has led to military preparedness to protect Chinese missions abroad through the SLOC, anti-piracy, international peacekeeping and disaster relief abroad.

The US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2014 has marked with skepticism China’s military modernization program, making China’s Southeast Asian neighbors wary.\textsuperscript{51} Despite the growth in Sino-US military contacts and defence relations, the US has tended to keep a check on China’s military development and deployment. A transparent posture in military contacts and defence modernization program would enhance Sino-US bilateral confidence in military relations. Marking 9.5 percent increase on the average since 2005, China’s military budget has increased by 12.2 percent to rise to $160 billion\textsuperscript{52} in 2014 from an estimated $132 billion in 2013.\textsuperscript{53} According to the US Annual Report to Congress, the anticipated figure was higher than $148 billion

\textsuperscript{49} With no serious trouble in the Western hemisphere, the US maintains military forces all around the globe and intrudes in the politics of virtually every region.

\textsuperscript{50} Robert Jervis, \textit{America’s Grand strategy And World Politics}, (New York: Tylor & Francis Group. 2009), 343.


\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
officially released by China’s defense ministry.\footnote{Much of the increase in military budget is to be spent on more expensive naval trainings at greater distances, due to rise in tensions over islands, fisheries, and sea lanes in East Asia and Southeast Asia. “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD, 2008.} The Pentagon has termed the increase as the second highest in the world after the US.

China’s military modernization has tended to indicate the route Beijing seeks to follow either as a stakeholder or as a revisionist challenger in a unipolar world.\footnote{Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 129.} Indian research analyst Vidya Nadkarni has argued that marking a successive increase from 1999-2014, China has sought its indigenous defence industries to stay competitive. Accordingly, the National Defense Strategy of China has built upon the concept of ‘People’s War.’\footnote{The concept addresses three issues of People’s War: a) the political connotation of warfare; b) actual guiding principle for the conduct of warfare; c) tactical guidance for the conduct of military campaign.} Announcing the 2014 military budget, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang showed resolve to modernize China’s armed forces to build deterrence and increase in China’s combat capabilities.\footnote{See “China successfully develops drone defence system,” Xinhau News Agency, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com, accessed March 16, 2013.} Chinese companies have developed drone capability for People’s Liberation Army and for commercial uses.

The US has carefully monitored China’s military deployment, encouraging Beijing to exhibit greater transparency on military modernization and defence expenditure. The US has desired that China’s military capability should promote stability than instability in the Asia-Pacific region. Southeast Asian states have increasingly viewed China’s military modernization as threat to the region. In September 2013, China announced an Air Defence Identification Zone over East China Sea, mandating foreign planes to report flight paths particularly Japan and North Korea. The US flew a retaliatory B-52 flight from Diego Garcia to declare the zone null and void. Scepticism and growth in the spiral of suspicions against China has led to inter-state defence ties. Transparency would restore clarity on People Liberation Army’s motivations in the region.\footnote{India, Japan, and Russia, along with smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam look for ways to balance against China. India and Japan, for example, signed a “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation” in October 2008. India and the US forged strategic partnership against China. In July 2010, the US resumed relations with Indonesia. Singapore forged defence partnership with the US, as it built a deepwater pier at Changi Naval Base,}
China has improved theatre war preparedness with integrated air defence, cruise and ballistic missiles operations. The PLA has increased China’s operational reach by developing conventional small and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles. China has worked to improve its capability to push rival forces farther away from regional spot of conflict. China’s space, cyber operations and electronic warfare are the other areas of advancement that deny the rival forces the advantage of new techniques of modern warfare. In 2014, China reclaimed land on the controversial Spratly islands for use as military bases to enhance presence in the disputed areas.

The US has adjusted to China’s new position as evident from Sino-US military relations. China has aspired for a ‘major-power status’ asserting the right to maintain hegemonic rights in its own periphery. The US strategy for the Asia-Pacific region has emphasized stability framed on free economic and political order. The US policy has envisioned practical cooperation with China in areas where both states’ interests overlapped while managing differences constructively. Sino-US militaries have made progress in confidence-building mechanisms to reduce the risk of miscalculation. Both militaries have developed new channels of communication, agreeing in 2015 to hold joint training exercises and elevating exchanges in policy dialogues.

President Obama appeared to comply with China’s demand of international recognition. For example, the US invited China to join regional cooperative exercises to enhance coordination on international security issues. Moreover, high-level Sino-US military exchanges aimed to expand operational coordination on anti-piracy and security. In 2014, the US Army Chief started a military exchange program by facilitating China’s participation in RIMPAC at Hawaii. The US-China Strategic Security Dialogue (S&SD) has remained the highest-ranking joint civilian-military exchange program for promoting mutual understanding and trust. S&SD developed in allowing US Navy to operate aircraft carrier out of Singapore. Japan in mid-2010 allowed the US Marines to remain on Okinawa to seek shelter under the US security umbrella.

Ibid.


2014 on the US initiative to promote Sino-US military to military dialogue, emerging as an important bilateral security mechanism.

The dialogue has enabled Sino-US leadership to review constructive management of regional and international issues. Sino-US has consulted intensively for policy coordination to advance shared goals. Institutional mechanisms increase senior defense participation at S&SD and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). Sino-US has built military to military contacts through the US Department of Defense (DOD) and China’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) on joint areas of cooperation to reduce risks. China’s National Defence Strategy 2013 has stipulated a policy of ‘Active Defence’ to resist aggression and guard China’s territorial integrity. The White Paper recognized Asia-Pacific as increasingly significant for major-powers’ strategic interaction and the world economic development. The paper observed that Asia-Pacific has gained primacy in the US security policy. As a matter of principal, China has proclaimed to oppose hegemony, while refraining from interference in other states’ internal affairs. China holds a defense strategy, which is inherently defensive in nature. China proclaims not to attack unless it was attacked first. Yet China would surely retaliate, if attacked first.

China’s national development strategy as announced in the White Paper aims to resist all types of threats to security. Given Beijing’s added international profile, the Chinese military budget has marked a 12.2 percent increase in 2014 to ensure national security. Under ‘scientific development and conditions of information,’ the Chinese military has entailed a greater war readiness through enhanced coordination and joint employment of military triad of forces. It has raised the level of military readiness to handle conflict through scenario oriented exercises, coastal and territorial air patrols, multilateral and

62 Ibid.
64 The policy outlines specific parameters to contain separatist forces, safeguard borders, coastal and territorial air space to protect national maritime rights, maritime interests, and China’s national security interests in outer space and cyber space.
65 Ibid.
66 “China Announces 12.2 percent increase in its Military for 2014,” Xinhau News Agency assessed October 20, 2014.
67 Op, cit.
68 Ibid.
issue oriented diplomacy. The Chinese regular army comprises Mobile Units and Static Operational Units, the Police Force and the Militia, border and coastal guard. China’s land operational defence mobility comprises eighteen combined corps along with additional independent operational divisions.69 The PLA Navy responsible for protection of China’s maritime security and sovereignty interests over territorial seas controls naval warfare operations at sea. The PLAN has modernized submarines with improved electronic and information systems. China has built blue water capability for carrying out sea operations.70 China commissioned its first aircraft carrier Liaoning in September 2012, developing the concept of Far Sea Defence strategy, within which to defend China’s coastal periphery. PLAN aims to acquire a true global reach akin to that of the US by building multiple aircraft carriers and associated ships by 2020.

The PLA Air Force comprises radar operations and electronic warfare capabilities with new fighter aircrafts, missiles and electronic system to conduct air warfare.71 PLA has acquired space warfare technologies to attack space assets. An anti-satellite missile was test-fired by China in 2007 up to 500 miles. Yet the US communication and targeting satellites remain at higher altitude than this. China holds second strike capability vis. a vis. the US. China’s nuclear forces comprise effective missile forces with enhanced mobility and survivability. In 1964, China conducted its first nuclear test, successfully carrying out 45 others so far. In 2002, China ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol to

69 The PLAA is divided into seven Military Area Commands (MACs) — Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu with a total strength of 850,000 men each.
70 The PLAN has a total strength of 235,000 men, commands three fleets, namely, the Beihai Fleet, the Donghai Fleet and the Nanhai Fleet with fleet aviation headquarters, support bases, flotillas and maritime garrison commands as well as aviation divisions and marine brigades. China commissioned its first aircraft carrier Liaoning in September 2012. The PLAA mobile operational units include 18 combined corps along with additional independent combined operational divisions, and have a total strength of 850,000 men. See The White Paper on China’s Armed Forces, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, White Paper on China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, news.xinhuanet.com assessed on March 30, 2013.
71 The PLAAF has a total strength of 398,000 men with air command in each of Military Area Commands (MACs). The PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) is the core force for China’s strategic deterrence. Mainly composed of nuclear and conventional missile forces and operational support units, PLASAF is responsible for carrying out nuclear counterattacks and precision strikes. Under each air command are bases, aviation divisions (brigades), ground to air missile divisions (brigades), radar brigades and other units. From a limited territorial defense force to a more flexible agile organization, the PLAAF is able to operate off shore in offensive and defensive roles with a limited power projection capability. See The White Paper on China’s Armed Forces, 2013.
improve its export controls. Research scholar Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris have argued that China has improved its quick reaction offense and defense capability. China has started to build small and lighter warheads for Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). To keep a robust deterrence policy, China needs to maintain transparency in its nuclear and conventional capability. So far, China has maintained a policy of nuclear ambiguity, adopting limited deterrence against the US and other nuclear states.

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73 China is estimated to have about 400 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and stocks of fissile material sufficient to produce a much larger arsenal. “Country vs Country: China and US Compared: Military Statistics,” available at: http://www.nationmaster.com, accessed May 24, 2013. As nuclear weapon state, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. China provided nuclear reactors and technology to several countries in the 1980s and early 1990s, including design information and fissile material that reportedly helped Pakistan develop nuclear weapons.
Table 4.1
Comparative Analysis of US-China Power Parity

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>United States</th>
<th>China</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Power</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Aircraft</td>
<td>13,892</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighter/Interceptors</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>1,066</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fixed-Wing Attack Aircraft</td>
<td>2,797</td>
<td>1,311</td>
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<td>Transport Aircraft</td>
<td>5,366</td>
<td>876</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trainer Aircraft</td>
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<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>6,196</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopters</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>196</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Land Power</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Tanks</td>
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<td>9,150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armor Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)</td>
<td>41,062</td>
<td>4,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled Guns (SPGs)</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>1,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed Artillery</td>
<td>1,299</td>
<td>6,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple-Launch Rocket System</td>
<td>1,331</td>
<td>1,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval Powers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Naval Strength</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvettes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense Craft</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Man Power</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>320,202,220</td>
<td>1,355,692,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available Manpower</td>
<td>145,212,012</td>
<td>749,610,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fit for Service</td>
<td>120,022,084</td>
<td>618,588,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Frontline Personnel</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>2,333,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Reserve Personnel</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget</td>
<td>$577,100,000,000</td>
<td>$145,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt</td>
<td>$15,680,000,000,000</td>
<td>$863,200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve of Foreign Exchange and Gold:</td>
<td>$150,200,000,000</td>
<td>$3,821,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity:</td>
<td>$16,720,000,000,000</td>
<td>$13,390,000,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.globalfirepower.com

The White Paper 2013 has acknowledged that despite general trends towards stability and world peace, challenges of globalization, information technology, multi-polarity, and interdependence have added complexity to international security. China’s traditional security concerns relate to Taiwan, Japan and claims on Diaoyu islands, counter-terrorism, separatism and extremism. Non-traditional security concerns have arisen from social instability, natural disasters and accidents related to public health. Development of sophisticated military technologies in outer space comprises another important security concern for China. By playing the China threat thesis, Beijing
blames the US for creating rift with China’s maritime neighbors in the South China Sea. Beijing blames the US of irresponsible accusations on China’s mineral resources exploitation in what it considers as its own territory.

Chinese defense ministry has criticized the US for militarizing the South China Sea. China has blamed the US of conducting joint training exercises with the Philippines and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{74} China expressed its displeasure at the US maritime surveillance mission in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{75} The US has expressed concern on China’s enhanced military planning and preparedness in the Asia Pacific known as Anti Access/Area Denial strategy (A2/AD). China’s A2/AD capabilities include nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines and surface combatants, capable air forces along with radars and sophisticated C4ISR networks to influence security in the Asia Pacific.\textsuperscript{76} Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, long range conventional and nuclear missiles, bombers and stealthily arsenal ships, space and cyberspace have enhanced China’s war-fighting capability, while undermining the US qualitatively superior forces in the Asia-Pacific region. China has developed increased military and naval capability to sink enemy surface vessels, far off its coastal belt including the ability to hit the US warships.\textsuperscript{77}

The US global interests require maintenance of Global Strike Capability to project military force abroad. China’s progress on A2/AD strategy has aimed to confront the US traditional power projection and naval superiority in the South China Sea. To counter China’s A2/AD capability, the US has developed the Air-Sea-Battle Concept (ASB) in July 2009 on the direction of the US Secretary of Defence. The US Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) seeks to ensure freedom of action for achieving


hard missions as a military imperative. Terry S. Morris argued that the US ASB concept has provided for three triad forces joint action to address China’s A2/AD strategy.\(^78\) Sino-US divergence of interests in the Asia-Pacific have related to China’s coercive actions to assert claim in the South and East China Sea. The US has emphasized peaceful management of disputes through bilateral or multilateral third-party dispute resolution mechanisms. Rebalance to Asia-Pacific has strengthened the US strategic engagement, while reinforcing alliances and partnerships in the region.

The US has welcomed China’s rise as a stake holder in the contemporary global order as long as the latter promoted peace and stability. On Xi Jinping’s visit to the US in October 2015, Obama emphasized that China’s rise would stabilize the Asia-Pacific region while contributing to its further development. China should realize the benefits of engagement in upholding global norms of international order, on which China’s rise and survival had depended. S&SD dialogue has acted as a tension diffusion mechanism on the US concern on China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea. Sino-US leadership exchanged views on the East and South China Seas.

Within this context, the US encouraged China to promote stability by exercising restraint, by showing respect to neighbors and adhering to norms of international law.\(^79\)

At a broad level, Sino-US shared common interests on international stability, based on free air and land passage within the limits of international law.

Reiterating the unhampered right of all states to free water and air passage, Obama indicated the US resolve to ‘sail, fly and operate anywhere that the international law had allowed’.\(^80\) China needed to uphold a high standard of behaviour, commensurate to its new status as a rising power. With respect to Asia-Pacific security, Obama said that merit of legal claim based on provisions of international law rather than individual strength of militaries or the size of economies should decide the case on disputed islands. The US termed China’s wilful disregard of peaceful ways of resolving

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\(^{79}\) Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in a joint Press Conference,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, available at: [https://www.whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov), assessed March 5, 2014.

\(^{80}\) Ibid.
disagreements and economic or physical coercion as destabilizing and dangerous for stability and international security.\textsuperscript{81}

Table 4.2

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Defense Budget in South China Sea} & \textbf{2014 (USD)} \\
\hline
China & $136.3 \text{ b}$ \\
Russia & $76.3 \text{ b}$ \\
Japan & $47.6 \text{ b}$ \\
India & $38.2 \text{ b}$ \\
Republic of Korea & $33.4 \text{ b}$ \\
Taiwan & $10.3 \text{ b}$ \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


Table 4.2 illustrates comparison of China’s official defense budget with other regional powers, i.e., Japan, Republic of Korea, India and Russia in the year 2014. It showed that China’s military budget was slightly double than Russia, three times higher than Japan and India and five times higher than the Republic of Korea.

The US security objectives in the Asia Pacific underscore strategic, economic and ideological considerations. Chinese strategy of ‘winning without fighting’ has allowed China to extend its reach to East and South China Seas, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and Africa. China’s expansion has held strategic and economic implications for the US global security interests. China would restrict the US companies to access to world markets for trade and resources in its sphere of influence. China’s sway would dim the prospects for political reformation along democratic lines. Extension of support to authoritarian regimes for commercial and trade benefit would end democratic accountability in those states. China would build disruptive military capabilities threatening hostile action against the US or its allies in the region. Chinese establishment of cooperative relationship in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Africa and Asia would make the US regional interests subservient to China’s discretion.

Xi Jinping during his visit to the US in 2015 reiterated China’s compliance with the international law on freedom of navigation and over-flights. The Chinese president asserted that China has exercised sovereignty rights and maintained legitimate maritime interests on its own territory by lieu of the international law provisions. Xi Jinping claimed that China has up-held the international standards of peaceful means of conflict resolution and dialogue. While abstaining from overt militarization, China has remained committed to the path of peaceful development for mutual benefit. China has continued construction activities in the Nansha Islands as China’s exclusive territory.\(^2\) China has pursued good neighborly foreign policy based on partnership with neighbors. Broadly speaking, Sino-US military relations were evident in three broad categories—military trade, transfer of technology, and production of high technology products.\(^3\) Susan L. Shirk has argued, however, that the US has regarded technology transfer to China as risky. More tangible areas of Sino-US military cooperation included better communication mechanisms and hotlines, missile defence, cyberspace and conventional strategic weapons.

In broader Asia, Sino-US military relations have reflected convergence and divergence of interests. The dynamics of complex interdependence and neo-realistism has determined China’s approach towards counter-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, environmental protection, piracy, UN peacekeeping mission and energy security. Domestic constraints defied China’s commitments to international commitments. For example, China’s dependence on Iranian oil ran counter to China’s international commitments to non-proliferation. Complex interdependence on trade with India has prevented China’s condemnation of human rights violations in Kashmir. China has warded off western pressure in areas such as carbon emissions. Neo-realism has dictated Sino-US collaboration in avoiding conflict and instability in the Korean peninsula. Table 4.3 shows the US and China military contacts and defense exchanges.

\(^{82}\) Op. cit.

Table 4.3
Sino-US Military to Military Contacts Year 2014
High Level Visits and Multilateral Engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Army Chief of Staff to China</td>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Secretary of Defense to China</td>
<td>April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Chief of Naval Operations to China</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRC HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO US</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC Chief of the General Staff to the US</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC Nanjing Military Region Commander to the US</td>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC Deputy Chief of the General Staff to the US</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SINO-US HIGH-LEVEL MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Naval Symposium in China</td>
<td>April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Pacific Command Chiefs of Defense Conference in Brunei</td>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RECURRENT EXCHANGES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Strategic Security Dialogue</td>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group in the US</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Security Dialogue</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence Building Measures Working Group</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS BLUE RIDGE Visit to China</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA Navy Ship Visit to San Diego</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Consultative Talks in the United States</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff Strategy Talks in the United States</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Policy Coordination Talks in China</td>
<td>December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JOINT AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBRA GOLD in Thailand</td>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMODO in Indonesia</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHAAN QUEST in Mongolia</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC in the United States</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORTUNE GUARD Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOWARI in Australia</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Piracy Exercise in the Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>December</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Firepower: Comparisons of World Military Strengths

The American researcher Michael D. Swaine argued that strategic distrust has prevailed at the tactical level of Sino-US relations in the Korean peninsula.\(^{84}\) Sino-US has shared, however, a divergence of interests in the Korean peninsula on North Korea’s nuclear capability. The Six-Party Talks have served as a conflict resolution mechanism on the US nuclear security concerns regarding North Korea. China has wanted to keep North Korea as a viable regime, seeking to negotiate with it through P5+1 mechanism. China’s non-proliferation concern has appeared transactional to the US as Beijing has opposed

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a regime change in the Korean peninsula. The US-ROK military exercises have raised the Chinese security concerns in the region.

Sino-US has maintained a tactical level divergence of interest on Taiwan. China has suspected the US of knotting it down on Taiwan. China’s national security policy has emphasized ‘One China Policy,’ maintaining a claim on unification. The US has had the capability to shape, deter, and defeat China’s use of force or coercion against Taiwan. The American scholar Charles Glaser has argued that Sino-US relations entailed the prospect of conflict on Taiwan. Chinese military modernization has aimed to forestall separation and prevent the US intervention in the event of a conflict involving Taiwan. To the Chinese mind, however, the chief obstacle to reunification has been the US support to Taiwan and its insistence on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue.

The US has abstained from involving in cross-strait dialogues between Taipei and Beijing. However, it has allowed Taipei to match China’s military capability by increasing arms transfers to Taiwan. In its relations with Taiwan, the US has balanced between cooperative engagements and maintenance of deterrence against China. The US arms sales to Taiwan have strained Sino-US relations. China has desired to acquire much greater military capability to deal with the Taiwan problem. The US seeks to prevent China from capturing Taiwan for two reasons. One, Taiwan has wielded importance for controlling the SLOCs; two, the US concern for credibility and reputation. With the status of Taiwan as unresolved, the threat of a crisis has loomed large in the Asia-Pacific.

In a rational analysis, power is the ability to inflict change in the adversary’s behaviour. Chinese drive to secure its maritime and territorial defence interests has tended to make it a revisionist challenger. According to Mearshiemer, the US has acted as a status-quo power while China has behaved like a revisionist challenger. The US security

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86 Analysts go as far as to suggest that the US needs to back down on its commitment to Taiwan as a policy of territorial appeasement, given the fact that Sino-US relations have also improved. Opponents, however, argue that concessions on Taiwan would lead China to develop extensive revisionist claims on islands in East and South China Seas. China test-fired ballistic missile in South China Sea to express displeasure at the US decision to permit Le Seng-hui’s visit to the US.
initiative have tended to respond to the China challenge — the imbalance of security in the Asia-Pacific region. Hyper-nationalism has yet been another potent source for initiating war in an intense security competition.\textsuperscript{87} Security has preceded economic factors when states face a conflict of politico-military and economic considerations. Inter-state defense ties have grown in South China Sea as has the spiral of suspicions.\textsuperscript{88} Economic interdependence might delay or thwart the prospect of war but may not erase it altogether in Asia Pacific.

The US and China have retained a broad convergence of interests to enhance bilateral military cooperation and interchanges despite growing security tensions in the Asia-Pacific. Sino-US has evolved confidence-building mechanisms through high level military contacts to enhance bilateral trust. Tactical level differences have prevailed in Sino-US foreign policy goals at the regional level in the South China Sea. The US has sought to maintain the status-quo based on American hegemonic preponderance in the Asia-Pacific. China has, however, desired to be treated in the capacity of a ‘major-power’ with assertive rights of sovereignty on its own territories. Sino-US divergence of interests has prevailed at the tactical levels with a broad convergence of interest on maintaining stability in South China Sea and Taiwan. Despite tactical level policy differences, both the US and China have developed bilateral collaborative mechanisms to maintain regional security in the Asia Pacific region.

### 4.3 Sino-US Political Relations

This section analyses Sino-US political relations in the post 9/11 era. It argues that despite carrying the past legacy of both engagement and strategic balancing in their

\textsuperscript{87} Instances where state leadership has resorted to hyper-nationalism as a threat-inflation strategy to fleece out vengeance against mal-governance and socio-economic unrest are rampant. Beijing has interpreted the US bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 Kosovo war as another example of a powerful country humiliating China. In 2001, when an American spy plane crashed into a Chinese military aircraft over the South China Sea, China reacted in the same vein. China and Japan ownership claims on Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have frequently ignited a firestorm of anti-Japanese protests across China, like the ones in 2012-13.

\textsuperscript{88} India, Japan, and Russia, along with smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam looked for ways to balance against China. In October 2008, India and Japan signed a ‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.’ India and the US forged strategic partnership in 2006. In July 2010, the US resumed relations with Indonesia. Singapore forged defence partnership with the US, allowing it to build a deepwater pier at Changi Naval Base. Japan in mid-2010 allowed the US Marines to remain in Okinawa to seek shelter in the US security umbrella.
relationship, Sino-US political dynamics has revealed a broad convergence of interests to maintain stability in their bilateral relations. The imperative of national security has driven the course of Sino-US foreign policy goals post 9/11. Sino-US leadership has exhibited political maturity based on a firm conviction to uproot tactical level policy differences on both regional and global issues.

A unique complexity has marked the successive growth of Sino-US relations post 9/11. Complex interdependence and neo-realism have set the tone of Sino-US relations post 9/11. According to Henry Kissinger, a fundamental difference in Sino-US relations pertains to divergent political ideologies. Stalin claimed that communist China is like a red radish — the meat is all white. As China’s military and economic stature has risen, it has drawn comparison with the US. Economic interdependence in trade and regional competition for security has defined the nemeses of Sino-US relations post 9/11. Scholars such as Joshua Ramo talk about the bicultural nature of the Chinese model in his essay—zhongguo muoshi or ‘the Beijing Consensus.’ The scholar argued that China’s rapid economic growth has challenged ‘the Washington Consensus’ based on a free market economy. To the US, China’s success would promote the counter model of ‘the Beijing Consensus’ symbolizing rapid economic growth achieved through promotion of authoritarian governments home and abroad.

Sino-US have made state level visits and improved means of bilateral coordination since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972. Sino-US engagement has been evident from conduct of bilateral trade, scientific cooperation, educational and cultural exchanges. The two sides resolved to build a Sino-US partnership based on mutual benefit. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in January 1979 and President Li Xiannian in 1985 followed by President Jiang Zemin in 1997 and 2002 visited the United States. President Hu Jintao visited the US in 2006 and 2011. On the US side, from 1972, nine presidents have had state level visits to China apart from Obama, who paid visit to China three times while in office. Sino-US maintained official level contacts at the vice

president levels as well. Since 1980s, Sino-US started more than 60 dialogue channels.\textsuperscript{92} Sino-US interests have sought to maintain major-country relationship by settling policy differences and sensitive issues constructively.\textsuperscript{93}

The American scholar Fareed Zakaria has argued that China’s international stature will determine China’s new role in the global order whether revisionist or status-quo.\textsuperscript{94} From Nixon to Obama, Sino-US relations have demonstrated a mix of engagement to strategic balancing.\textsuperscript{95} The US has engaged Chinese participation in international institutions such as China’s accession to WTO in 1999, which paved the way for Sino-US constructive partnership.\textsuperscript{96} The US ‘balancing’ half has aimed to deter Chinese attempts at coercion in South China Sea. As policy differences surface in the Asia Pacific region, Sino-US relations have strained. The US has sought to prevent China from setting up parallel monetary and financial institutions at the global level.\textsuperscript{97} Sino-US state level meetings aim to promote cooperation on areas of disagreement to avoid misunderstanding or miscalculations. Simultaneously, the Pentagon’s \textit{Quadrennial Defense Report} (QDR), 2001, 2006, 2014 has termed China as a military competitor in the Asian region, a long-term threat to the US security objectives in the Asian architecture.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{92} These include the Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED), the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchanges (CPE), and the Joint Commission on Science and Technology Cooperation. These channels provide for Sino-US multifarious contacts in political, economic, military, educational, scientific and technological, cultural, counter terrorism, nonproliferation, and regional and international affairs.


\textsuperscript{97} Evident since 1990s, the US strategy is fixed on strategic cooperation with traditional allies in Southeast Asia, bolstering of their military capabilities, and building new partnership with India, Singapore and Australia.

\textsuperscript{98} The QDR 2006 states explicitly China as having the greatest potential to compete militarily with the US. It mentions Chinese disruptive technologies, offsetting traditional American military advantages if no counterstrategies are adopted by the US. The QDR 2014 categorically
Sino-US bilateral relations improved after a long impasse following Chinese President’s visit to the US in 1997 followed by the US to China in 1998. In the Clinton era, a mix of cooperative and competitive interests marked the US China policy in the year 2000. Criticizing Clinton’s engagement policy, the Bush administration (2000-2008) declared China as a ‘strategic competitor’. Bush pursued a consistent approach towards China, carefully ‘hedging’ against its growing military power around Taiwan. Sino-US relations became strained during this period as Congress approved the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act and included Taiwan in the US Theatre Missile Defense System. The Bush administration alleged China of ‘mercantilist attempts’ to lock up energy resources in the world and of involvement with ‘troublesome states.’

In the wake of 9/11 Twin Tower’ attacks in New York, however, the US policy moved beyond strategic competition to cooperation with China in the fight against terrorism. Encouraging China to act like a ‘responsible stakeholder,’ the US encouraged China to adopt democratic reforms. Signifying the US approach towards China in 2005, the Bush administration welcomed China’s membership of the international system as a responsible stakeholder to strengthen it. China could move thereby beyond the traditional means of becoming a power. The statement implied that the Bush administration would accommodate China, if its rise does not threaten the stability of the international system. To China, however, the term stakeholder implied China’s duty to the US. China believed that the Bush administration relegated China the role of a junior partner, dictating cooperation on its own terms.


In the earlier period, Sino-US relations strained on Tiananmen Square, Milky Way Incident, Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US, Taiwan Missile crisis, Most Favoured Nation clause and human rights issue.

The *Taiwan Security Enhancement Act* specified terms of the US intervention in a Taiwan war. Favouring the status-quo, the Act abstain Taiwan from declaration of unilateral independence by resorting to war. Doing so will deprive it of the US support on behalf of Taiwan. Should the mainland impose war, the US would resort to the use of force on behalf of Taiwan.

Sino-US bilateral relations had strained on Kosovo War as a human rights intervention issue, Falun Gong issue, Li Wenhe case and Cox Report on China stealing the US secrets.

Figure 4.1 illustrates Sino-US pattern of relations to reflect Cold War and post Cold War realities.

Examination of China’s White Papers reveals successive phases in the evolution of China’s foreign policy from ‘China’s rise’ to ‘harmonious rise’ to ‘harmonious development.’ Chinese strategy has aimed to achieve what Sun Tzu dictated as ‘winning without fighting’ to help perpetuate China’s multidimensional power and influence abroad. China incorporated the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ incorporating a collaborative approach to tackle with international security. In December 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stipulated the concept of ‘China’s peaceful rise’ in New York. Substituting the word ‘rise’ with ‘peaceful development’ in 2004 lest it may scare China’s neighbours, Wen Jiabao, while speaking at the UN General Assembly in 2005, changed it further to ‘harmonious development’. In 2006, Hu Jintao dismissing Bush’s characterization of China as a ‘strategic stakeholder’ termed Sino-US relationship as one of ‘constructive partnership.’ In the year 2009, Hu Jintao articulated ‘sovereignty, security and development’ as the main contours of China’s foreign policy.104

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103 On September 15, 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao called for ‘harmonious world’ at the summit for the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the UN.

104 China tries to divert relations with the US beyond traditional issues of Taiwan, human rights and economic frictions, through a proactive policy on Northeast Asia, on six party talks on
During the Obama administration from 2008 onwards, Sino-US relationship became smooth. The Obama administration called for ‘strategic reassurance,’ establishing deeper engagement with China. The US policy announced the rationale to accommodate China as a prosperous and successful state in 2009. Yet simultaneously, it asserted that China’s military buildup should remain transparent to reassure its peaceful intentions abroad. In the post 9/11 strategic environment, European Union had lacked the clout as a potential political rival to the US. Japan had been tightly knitted with the US in a joint defence security treaty. Russia had started to assert influence, aligned informally with China. India hedged with the US in Asia. China appeared, however, as the revisionist challenger to the US hegemony on the Asian geo-strategic landscape.

The US global security objectives required maintenance of hegemony based on preventing the rise of regional hegemons — equaling the US power and influence in Asia. According to Vidya Nadkarni, hegemony referred to the application of hard power by preponderant states to influence conduct of the weak through provision of material and security. Imperialism has included tactics of coercion with some degree of acquiescence from subject peoples, yet it too has entailed the use of force. In general, the concept of hegemony has implied a rigorous effort to impose one’s preferences and maintain a security order based on own capabilities. Scholars have interpreted power as a multidimensional concept. Graham Evans & Richard Newnham has defined the concept of power in terms of possession, projection and mobility. To military, economic, political and cultural aspects, Alice Lyman Miller has added up the dimension of influence to the concept of power. Power and security are interrelated

North Korea, UN operations in Gulf of Aden and Sudan. Sino-US joint collaboration on non-proliferation in North Korea and Iran, international terrorism, transnational crime, global financial stability, environmental degradation and piracy on the high seas can be studied from the Complex interdependence perspective.

106 Hedley Bull’s stipulates three alternating concepts of dominance, hegemony and primacy built on use of coercion and element of respect for norms of international law. John Ikenberry characterizes hegemonic orders as coercive, entailing congruence of interests in institutionalized set-ups. See Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia, 8.
concepts. While power has pertained to projection of influence along the aforementioned dimensions in distant regions, security according to Stuart Craft\textsuperscript{109} has implied the ability to thwart influence from a foreign source.

The US National Security Strategy 2010 defined a clear commitment to advance the US national security interests in Asia.\textsuperscript{110} China’s rising potential and the prospects thereof were crucial to the US security objectives in Asia.\textsuperscript{111} A framework of comparison provides the clash or overlap of Sino-US security objectives in Asia. The US scholar Samuel P. Huntington argued that a wide range of power asymmetry has certified to the US hegemonic preponderance at the systemic level.\textsuperscript{112} In the aftermath of the Cold War following the success of military action in former Yugoslavia, the US established hegemony in Asia. The US economy retained strength, despite the collapse of Soviet ruble. The US dollar withstood the financial crunch of the Asian financial crisis of 2007-08. Moreover, 9/11 incident allowed the US to leverage power by initiating counter insurgency war in Afghanistan, built strategic bases in Central Asia and entrench its clout in the Middle East. The American scholar Zbigniew Brzezinski has termed the US as the only ‘truly global power.’ Joseph Nye has declared the US political and military clout comparable to Rome in scale and magnitude.\textsuperscript{113} Hubert Vedrine termed the US as a hyper-power, while Wo Xinbo referred to the US as omnipresent around the world.\textsuperscript{114}

The US economy remained four times higher than China at $14.29 trillion in 2014. The US has produced one-fifth of global total production and yielded a higher per capita income than China. The US military budget was $608.2 billion for the year 2014, doubling the defense budget of next top ten states combined.\textsuperscript{115} The US has boosted

$50 billion Annual Military Research & Development spending in 2014. With 500,000 military personnel, the US has retained Global Strike Capability benefitting from its naval aircraft carriers and military bases at Guam and Diego Garcia.\textsuperscript{116} The US has maintained maritime superiority in the Asia-Pacific region since World War II. Its port facilities and jet run-ways have contained the world’s most sophisticated radar and electronic monitoring devices. The US has wielded enough soft power in Asia—manifested in terms of legitimacy of attraction based on moral or voluntary appeal rather than coercion.\textsuperscript{117} Upholding liberal values of free trade, democracy and the rule of law, the US soft power projection has world-wide attraction.\textsuperscript{118} Of the world’s 100 top commercial brands, 52 were American in origin.

In 2010, involving incidents off China’s eastern coast, the US reverted to assertive balancing against China. Announcing its pull out from Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration announced ‘the US pivot to Asia strategy’ as Obama’s policy of global forward defense. The US move sparked intense security competition entailing deployment of US marines to Australia and reallocation of air and naval assets from other theaters to the Asia Pacific.\textsuperscript{119} The US Secretary of State in the first Obama administration Hillary Clinton argued that the next theatre for global politics will be Asia.\textsuperscript{120} To quote Vali Nasr, Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia policy’ is at its core a policy aimed at containment of China — the US policy of ‘forward defense deployment’ to face China in its backyard.\textsuperscript{121} The Obama administrations envisioned earlier commitments of building the US power on strength, influence and leadership.

\textsuperscript{116} The US can easily deploy 350,000-men Rapid Deployment Force of soldiers, paratroopers, and marines to almost any quadrant of the world within twenty-five minutes.


\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{119} Pivot Asia or rebalancing strategy is one way of addressing or nullifying smaller states fears against a resurgent China.

\textsuperscript{120} Hillary Clinton opined the US ought to reset its global strategy, paying more attention to Asia as China poses the real strategic challenge. The US broader interests in the Middle East already intersect with those of China. The Middle Eastern region is growing in importance—and in the coming decades it will matter more to Beijing than Africa or Latin America. A retreat from the Middle East will constrain US ability to manage security competition in Asia.

Retaliating to the US pivot Asia move, China’s White Paper 2013 announced Beijing’s commitment to a new security concept entailing ‘comprehensive security based on scientific outlook on development.’ The concept called for a fusion of the ‘internal with the external’ to build a harmonious international society. China’s concept envisioned 20 years’ period of ‘strategic opportunity’ as the guiding principle of China’s grand strategy. The word ‘harmony’ implied in the traditional sense everything from state affairs to neighborly relations. The impediment of complex interdependence necessitated China’s international responsibility and increased commitment in the successful functioning of global financial institutions. The strategy at the international level of collaboration included UN peacekeeping missions, counterterrorism, disaster relief, joint exercises and training, maritime security & surveillance, anti-piracy collaboration and international stability & security. China’s vision of international security entailed the strategic concept of conducting military operations of a benign nature to maintain security.

China’s White Paper 2013 declared a resolute commitment to contribute to international development. China proposed joint action with the international community to grasp collective opportunities and challenges abroad. China’s White Papers emphasized the pursuit of a docile international policy in principle. Based on a broad acceptance of international norms, China acted more like a status quo power at the systemic level. China cooperated with the US in regulating transparency, improving supply chain efficiency, strengthening global economic recovery, cross-border education, climate change, clean energy and cyber security, wildlife trafficking and human rights. China embarked on the projection of Chinese values and soft power to improve its international image abroad.

123 Ibid.
124 Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang constitute Beijing’s core security issues. And as long as leadership in Taiwan refrains from seeking formal independence, and Tibet and Xinjiang are pacified by the central government in China, a peaceful international environment is conducive to realization of China’s grand strategy. See Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2011, 70.
Global and national imperatives guided China’s foreign policy at the practical level in the post 9/11 era. Deng Xiaoping’s ideological orientation set in the national imperative in the 1970s. The domestic imperatives of national development, political stability and economic growth shaped the contours of China foreign policy. China doubled its basic income in just nine years, much earlier than the 50 years taken by western powers based on this approach. Yet Beijing still sought to escape the middle income group, let alone rank in a higher group. The course of China’s foreign policy was dictated by vulnerabilities at home, necessitating observance of global norms of international security. Chinese economy remained fragile, requiring equitable distribution and maintenance of quality growth. Scholars argued that China’s economic growth had resulted from artificial boom. Beijing held protectionist policies involving subsidies to support important industries. Liberalization threatened control on interests, exchange rates and capital outflows. Recession in global financial market tended to impact China’s sustenance of GDP.

Corruption threatened China’s economic growth, costing an estimated 15 percent annual loss to the GDP in 2013. Lack of accountability resulted in massive socio-political unrest and inequality. The policy of controlled liberalization affected China’s ability to generate employment. China needed more than 24 million new jobs to sustain its average growth of GDP. Low paid, unemployed and under-employed workers remained a country-wide phenomenon at the domestic level. The American scholar Peter Navarro argued that China lagged behind the western standards in health services. The American journalist Philip P. Pan highlighted that bio-security and

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125 Deng Xiaoping’s seven key guiding principles include the following diplomatic tactics: watch and analyse (developments) calmly; secure (our own) position; handle (changes) with confidence; conceal (our) capacities; be good at keeping a low profile; never become the leader; and make some contributions.

126 Only 10 percent of Chinese are as well off as 90 per cent Americans. Average income in China is only $1,500 annually, compared to $40,000 in the US.

127 Corruption marks a successive high increase in China’s economic growth.

128 Liberalization of state-owned enterprises has led 20 million Chinese migrant workers to loose their jobs.

health hazards remained high. The American scholar Susan Shirk argued that lack of charismatic leadership created political challenges for Chinese leadership. Susan argued that to inflate dissent, Chinese leadership tended to risk confrontation with the US. Use of advanced technologies posed a significant challenge for Chinese leadership to maintain control.

Chinese domestic vulnerabilities emanated from a number of challenges faced in the post 9/11 era. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) offered opportunities for reverse engineering and technology inflows contributing to China’s economic success. However, illegal practices including bribery, covert purchase and evasion of intellectual property rights were common problems in China. Excessive security check on Chinese investment abroad impaired Beijing’s desire to tap expertise. Yet resort to mal-practices kept inflation low, created jobs and resulted in high export revenues and technology imports. As China entered the international market, it faced immense competition and scrutiny on intellectual property rights from the industrialized states. The Western scholar James Kynge argued that China’s high growth rate fluctuated with the decline in natural resources’ supply and raw material high prices, followed by improbabilities of exploration. Moreover, systemic level institutional and environmental constraints greatly limited China’s productive output, forecasting bleak scenarios for the future. Income and regional development disparities remained rampant in China. Security

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130 Swine Flu Pandemic and strain of H5NI bird flu, HIV/AIDS with SARS being the riskiest. The UN estimated 700,000 cases of aids by 2007 caused by unsafe sexual and criminal practices, spreading from far western underdeveloped areas to more developed coastal areas of China.

131 Chinese leaders have tended to inflate nationalistic sentiments when confronted with domestic opposition. Susan Shirk, recalling the US bombing on Chinese embassy in Belgrade, has argued that The People’s Daily had announced the incident as ‘flagrant intentional bombing.’ Chinese leaders demanded public apology from the US. President Clinton made an instant call to Chinese President Jiang Zemin who refused to take the call till the fourth day. President Clinton apologized on the television. The US Secretary of State Madeline Albright went to the Chinese embassy to record condolences. Yet the US request to send emissary for presence on airport to receive Chinese dead bodies was turned down by China. Clinton apologized at least four times to China.


133 China remains the largest buyer of world copper; second largest buyer of iron ore; third largest buyer of alumina, coal, steel and cotton. In 2010, China surpassed the US to become the largest consumer of energy in the world.

134 See James Kynge, Fragile Economy, 29.
across land borders had remained a major threat in the wake of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism in China.\footnote{135}

At the global level, the dynamics of complex interdependence shaped China’s foreign policy imperatives. China held high stakes in playing by the rules of contemporary international politics. Global issues involving common stakes required joint action and interdependence among the US and China. China feared losing credibility and legitimacy of growth, if it undermined international regimes through coercion or belligerence. The Chinese leadership sought to dispel the negative impression of China’s rise.\footnote{136} China emerged as the US largest trading partner. Holding one fifth of the global population, China’s rise triggered international socio-economic development and progress.\footnote{137} China could hardly afford to threaten its partners, as adverse economic penalties on its own economic stakes. Hence an unprecedented degree of interdependence prevailed in China’s interaction with the world particularly its largest trading partner — the US.

Sino-US bilateral relations improved since the Sunny land summit in 2013. Obama termed Sino-US cooperation as advancing the interests of the two states and a peaceful omen for international security.\footnote{138} The US president welcomed the emergence of a stable and responsible China in world affairs, expecting bilateral resolve to enhance cooperation. On his state visit to the US in 2015, the Chinese president aspired to establish ‘majority country relationship,’ with rights in its own region without being pushed on issues of sovereignty. The concept implied Sino-US mutual respect and collaboration, while developing convergence of interests on bilateral differences.\footnote{139} The concept implied that old pattern of great power relations had changed to give way to more equitable expectations. China acknowledged the US support for the former’s new role as a stable and responsible stakeholder, leading to its greater resolve to share

\footnote{135}{SCO serves as Sino-Russian joint mechanism to keep a check on US increased involvement in the region. The organization provides for border cooperation against terrorism, organized crime, potential instability, radicalism, drugs and arms smuggling.}

\footnote{136}{Beijing fears balancing or bandwagoning by states in favor of the US particularly in Southeast Asia.}

\footnote{137}{Terms coined by scholars ‘Beijing Consensus’ has tended to reflect on such a mindset.}

\footnote{138}{Ibid.}

\footnote{139}{“Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in a joint Press Conference,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov, accessed March 16, 2013.}
international responsibilities.\textsuperscript{140} At the domestic level, China reiterated efforts to further improve reforms related to internal governance, enforcement of party discipline and law and order in society. China showed a commitment for improvement in political and economic reforms as well. Xi Jinping appreciated the US support for China’s liberalization reforms.

The US and China shared common grounds to resolve common challenges of global security.\textsuperscript{141} Moreover, Sino-US acknowledged the inter-connection in promoting common interests of global security. The US and China resolved to show perseverance to advance bilateral relations on areas of common interest. Sino-US agreed to cooperate speedily to make advancement on the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) agreement.\textsuperscript{142} To encourage an equitable partnership at the global level, Sino-US showed mutual resolve to maintain communication for executing the post-2015 development agenda. Sharing a joint concern on promotion of global security, Sino-US signed a MOU to promote cooperation in regions such as Asia and Africa. A convergence of interests prevailed to strengthen international peacekeeping in Afghanistan, to implement the nuclear deal in Iran and to implement the UN resolutions.

To encourage societal level contacts, different forums were launched for cultural or commercial exchange.\textsuperscript{143} In 2015, Sino-US agreed to extend 50,000 mutual scholarships to maintain students’ exchange program. The ‘One Million Strong Initiative Program’ has planned to enable 100,000 American students to learn Mandarin Chinese, extending the program from university to elementary levels by the year 2020. Declaring the year 2016 as a year of tourism, Sino-US has desired that the door of friendship and cooperation will continue for the two peoples. Sino-US resolved to build upon the spirit of mutual cooperation between the people of the two countries for shaping the future direction of relations.\textsuperscript{144}

Sino-US cooperated on climate change, energy and environment under the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S& ED) and Ten-

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} In 2013, the US received 1.8 million Chinese visitors, which collectively spent $9.8 billion on goods and services in the US economy. More Chinese students study in the US than from any other country.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
year framework for energy and environment cooperation. Sino-US has pledged financial commitments to the Green Climate Fund to help reduce carbon emissions for the most vulnerable countries. Expanding practical cooperation, Sino-US has strengthened coordination in multilateral negotiations such as the Paris climate change conference. Sino-US has announced ‘Clean Power Plan’ which commits China to limit emissions from its industrial sectors. People-to-people exchanges enhance mutual understanding to further strategic and economic goals.

Some degree of friction is inevitable in the complexity of Sino-US relationship. Extensive communications at senior and working levels, however, tend to manage ripples in Sino-US bilateral relations.\footnote{145} A cause of bilateral friction is the worsening human rights situation in China. Crackdown and the imprisonment of political prisoners, workers, journalists, and political activists have raised the US concerns on human rights situation in China. Censorship of the media and the internet in China raised concern. Terrorism and violence in Tibet and Xinjiang led to the US criticism of Chinese policies in these regions. To curb instability and violence, the US has urged China to reduce tensions, introduce reforms, and promote religious freedom along with peaceful forms of expression. China has sought to step up Sino-US multilateral and bilateral cooperation to combat terrorism. On Xi Jinping’s visit to the US in 2015, Obama acknowledged China’s claim of sovereignty on Tibet and Xinjiang. Yet the US expressed strong criticism on lack of religious and cultural freedom for the Tibetan people, and the need to engage the Dalai Lama.\footnote{146}

The US president’s statement implied that Tibetan human rights issue constituted a red area in Sino-US relations although its status as part of Chinese territory remained undisputed. On the human rights issue, Obama stated that the US maintained unequivocal faith in liberal ideals of human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people without discrimination. The US viewed the Chinese detention of people from different walks of life such as lawyers, journalists and political workers and denial of


religious and political freedom, suppression of minority rights as problematic. All these prevented China and its people from realizing their full potential.\textsuperscript{147} Obama implied that human rights and ethnic identities are part of the western liberal ideological tradition that could not be overlooked in the maintenance of the US-China relations.

Implying a major deviation in Sino-US bilateral concerns on the human rights issue, Xi Jinping stated that democracy and human rights had been mankind’s common concern. Yet states had different historical and cultural setups. Indigenous traditions need to be respected, allowing states to pick and choose their own development paths. To achieve social equity, justice and advancement of human rights, China was ready to hold dialogue with the US on the basis of equality and mutual respect.\textsuperscript{148} The Chinese president’s statement implied that China remained firm to stand up with the US in the promotion of the great ideals of equality, mutual respect, and advancement of human rights. Yet differences pertaining to the indigenous processes of historical evolution and development constituted a major concern in the conduct of Sino-US bilateral relations. Human rights issues, however, had strained the smooth development of Sino-US political relations. Yet, the fear of decline in mutual investments and international organizations’ loss of support exercised a check on Sino-US bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{149} Sino-US relations have remained subservient to power politics and the crackdown on domestic dissent at home.

The US and China have shared a broad convergence of interests in maintenance of stability at the political level. The national security drive has directed the course of Sino-US political relations in the post 9/11 era, making them subservient to mutual vulnerabilities at home. Trade and economic interdependence reigns supreme in the conduct of Sino-US bilateral relations. Sino-US trust has remained low on US non-proliferation concerns. Yet Sino-US convergence of interests prevailed on North Korea

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} For example, the US President Bill Clinton restrained from discontinuing the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China — now called the NTR status. The anticipated reaction of global financial markets reserved Clinton’s decision in 1996. The US also feared that its allies would not follow suit to impose sanctions on China. Similarly, while Beijing sought to limit Taiwan’s international strategic maneuvering in 1996-97 by test-firing missile in South China Sea, it assured western and Taiwanese investors that its domestic reform policies had not changed.
and climate related issues. Sino-US divergence of interests has been evident in cybersecurity issues and activities in the South China Sea. Compared to the previous rising powers, China has been much more tied into the international system than it had been before 9/11.

4.4 Sino-US Economic Relations

This section discusses Sino-US economic and trade relations in the post 9/11 era. It argues that complex interdependence has prevailed in Sino-US trade and economic relations. Mutual vulnerabilities have under- lied the complexity of Sino-US trade and commercial relations. Sino-US political and strategic relations have remained subservient to trade and economic relations. Both the US and China developed bilateral mechanisms to overcome policy differences on economic and trade issues.

Sino-US bilateral level engagement has built on mutually constructed common platforms to promote cooperation. The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) with its twin level agenda reflect the broad space of Sino-US bilateral relations. The annually held S&ED has aimed to expand relations through high-level dialogue — the first major platform informed by the Sunny lands Summit. The platform has provided an important forum to promote Sino-US cooperative relationship despite strategic rivalry and confrontation. The Chinese president stated that Sino-US were two major cyber states that needed to reinforce dialogue and cooperation. Both states had to overcome friction for building consensus on fighting cyber-crimes and developing joint mechanisms for identification of cases, investigation assistance and information-sharing. Both states needed to desist from online theft of intellectual properties, finding ways of better state behavior to observe cyberspace security through establishment of hotline contacts.

China has emerged as the fastest growing export destination for the US, despite a long-standing trade imbalance favoring Beijing. Sino-US trade has increased on China’s
membership of the WTO since 2001. On the economic front, the US exports to China mark a 90 percent increase from 2007 to 2013. Sino-US economic and trade interdependence has increased the purchasing power parity in both the states. The Chinese direct investment inflows have more than doubled in the US. The US holds more than $50 billion FDI investments in China. The US economic concerns in China have included forced technology shifts, trade secrets and theft of intellectual property rights. The US has appreciated China’s role in the observance of rules based global economy. It has, however, wanted China to acquire a growth model based on real estate and infrastructure development.

Sino-US economic and trade issues have signified the complexity entailed in bilateral relations. Sino-US has revealed mutual vulnerabilities reflecting interdependence. A Chinese reserve of $3.1 trillion dollars has defined the parameters of Sino-US financial vulnerabilities. China’s policy makers have clenched on the US freedom of action — using the option of currency withdrawal as a coercive tactic. By lieu of its dollar denominated assets in the US treasury banks, China has tended to act as offensive positionalist, trying to reduce its economic vulnerability vis. a vis. the US. A trash in the Chinese economy has worried the US, as China remains an important trading partner of the US.

The US coercive strategy towards China has relied on using the dollar as a reserve currency. The US coercive manipulation eventually has driven down China’s exports and foreign exchange reserves by printing dollars or by increasing borrowing assets. Commercial and military espionage, however, has negatively affected Sino-US relations directly impacting on the US innovation and employment capacity. The US has complained that Chinese discriminatory policies tend to harm US companies and workers, killing incentive for innovation. The subsidies tilt in favor of Chinese national companies restricting competitive level playing field for the US companies. Moreover,

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152 To review the impact of China’s joining of WTO on economic resurgence, See Supachai Panitchpakdi and Mark L Clifford, China and the WTO: Changing China, Changing World Trade, (Hong Kong: John Wiley and Sons (Asia) Ltd, 2002).
153 The US has resorted to the use of pressure tactics a process deemed detrimental to the economic interests of both the states.
154 President Obama on the eve of Sunny-lands conference indicated the difference between commercial and military espionage. The former involves stealing secrets from the private sector to give to own firms for competitive advantage, whereas military and political espionage relates to matters of statecraft.
China has pressurized the US companies to transfer intellectual property rights as a precondition to grant access to Chinese markets.

Sino-US has promoted macroeconomic co-ordination to provide for global economic growth and monetary stability. China’s leaders have introduced sweeping economic reforms to shift to a market exchange rate and to tackle trade related problems. Although Xi Jinping’s government has made minimal progress in implementing these reforms, China could sustain economic growth at 7.5 percent through the first three quarters of 2014. One critical issue in Sino-US trade and economic relations has related to currency manipulation. China has tended to fix the exchange rate instead of keeping it floating in the free market — pegging the value of Yuan to the US dollar. Since Beijing’s accession to the WTO, Europe and the US have increasingly complained about China’s unfair practices, related to exchange rate manipulation. China has tended to manipulate the exchange rate to give unfair subsidy to Chinese exporters, resulting in trade deficit for the US. The practice has far wider implications. The US has needed an estimated $5 billion to $6 billion trade surplus to assert hegemony in the Asia Pacific region. Trade deficit has impaired the US capability to generate the desired surplus. The US has viewed China as a geopolitical competitor, which has used commercial relations for its strategic advantage.

The US has remained as China’s chief source of FDI and technology transfers. Sino-US bilateral concerns have remained vexed on the issue of dual use technology transfers. The US has accused China of theft, bribery and open purchase tactics to gain access to high-tech US technologies. Although China has permitted end-use checks, it has blamed the US as a revisionist power. China believes the US has restricted dual-use technologies export to restrict competitive advancement of China’s aerospace and telecommunication industries. China has insisted that the US should build multilateral mechanisms to ease restrictions on technology transfers.

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155 These include a revised tax system, financial liberalization, partial reform of restrictions on imports and in-bound foreign investment.
156 The US trade deficit with China has been estimated at $238 billion for the year 2014.
The US and China have agreed to prevent cyber-related theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information for commercial advantage. The US has hoped to expand cooperation on cyberspace with China, while continuing to protect the US interests. In 2015, the US raised alarm on cyber-threat to its companies and citizens, although the US expressed satisfaction for Chinese commitments to accelerate market reforms and to avoid currency devaluation. A chief Chinese concern has related to Beijing’s allegation of offensive cyber and space programs directed against China by the US. Obama had assured his Chinese counterpart that the US did not indulge in cyber economic spying for commercial interest. Containment, pre-emptive war, slowing down of China’s economic growth and rollback were some of the strategies at hand for the US. A stop to China’s growth may not be available as an option to the US, a slow down certainly was on the cards. China’s nuclear retaliatory capability has made the first option unworkable. Policies aimed to damage Chinese economic growth, through a cut down on US trade and investment, were equally unfeasible.

Other states would decline to follow suit, serving as a substitute for China’s trade with the US. Economic interdependence made containment of China unworkable for the US. Roll back might pay the necessary dividends envisioned in terms of toppling regimes friendly to Beijing and fomenting trouble inside China. Fuelling unrest in Xinjiang or Tibet might increase the cost of internal security — a manifestation of bait and bleed strategy. The Chinese scholar Dr. Xuemei Qian already complained about the US double standards on international terrorism. Scholars, such as Pakistani research analyst Akram Zaki, have indicated the discrepancy in Obama administrations’ official and practical policy stance on international terrorism. Chinese expansionist ambitions in the region can only be severed, if South Asia remains mired in conflict.
Graph 4.1: China’s Annual GDP Growth and Other BRICS Average GDP Growth

Graph 4.1 has indicated that starting from the 1990s successively over the past two decades, China’s GDP has remained higher than other BRICS states.

Table 4.4: Top Five US Exports to China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product Type</th>
<th>2014 H1 (US$ billions)</th>
<th>Percent Change (year-on-year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Equipment</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer and Electronic Products</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Products</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery (Except Electrical)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Genus Bureau

Table 4.4 illustrates top five US exports to China in the year 2014 indicating that transportation equipments marks the highest exports to China, followed by computer and electronic products, agricultural products, chemicals and machinery.

Table 4.5: Top Five US Imports from China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product Type</th>
<th>2014 H1 (US$ billions)</th>
<th>Percent Change (year-on-year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Computer and Electronic products</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Equipment, Appliances &amp; Components</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Manufactured Commodities</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery (except Electrical)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparel and Accessories</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Genus Bureau:
Table 4.5 illustrates top five US imports from China for the year 2014 indicating computer and electronic products as the highest imports, followed by electrical equipment, appliances & components with miscellaneous manufactured commodities, machinery, apparel and accessories.

**Graph 4.2**

Sino-US Trade Deficit for the year 2014

![Graph showing Sino-US trade deficit](image)

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis

Graph 4.2 illustrates Sino-US trade deficit for the year 2014 indicating a successive increase in trade deficit directed against the US starting from the year 2001 to 2013. Sino-US relations were highly corresponding economically and there was a huge margin for further cooperation. China had sought to increase mutual cooperation in multiple fields of mutual cooperation. For establishing a more equitable economic ground for the US companies, Sino-US had worked to sign a high-standard Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Entailing tangible progress for Sino-US economic relations for the future, the BIT would establish a transparent regulatory regime with increased access to Chinese markets. Sino-US had cooperated within G20, the World Bank, IMF, and other multilateral mechanisms. China had expected the US to abide by its commitments to increase the Chinese share in the IMF structure reforms plan approved at the G20 Summit in 2010. RMB’s inclusion into IMF Special Drawing

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159 Sino-US established the regular phone conversation mechanism to stay in close communication on economic affairs and major global economic issues.

160 Ibid.
Rights has been agreed to by the US, conditional to its observance of certain standards.

Mutual vulnerabilities define the context of Sino-US trade and economic relations post 9/11, featured on currency manipulation and foreign reserves. Sino-US trade and commercial relations have remained vexed on the issues of commercial and political espionage, labour rights, state-controlled subsidies, stringent economic reforms, intellectual property rights and trade deficit. In the conduct of economic and trade relations, the US and China have developed bilateral cooperative mechanisms to diffuse tensions.

Domestic, regional and global imperatives have shaped Sino-US political, strategic and economic relations post 9/11. Multiple dynamics of Sino-US relations reveal that conflict and cooperation has shaped Sino-US mutual perceptions, with the main focus on maintainence of stability at the strategic, political and economic levels. At the political level, the US relations with China mark a broad convergence of interests on important bilateral, regional and global issues. Both China and the US have exploited nationalistic sentiments directed against the other to diffuse domestic dissent. Sino-US bilateral relations have witnessed state level interchanges and high level visits, people to people contacts along with political coordination mechanisms to diffuse ripples in bilateral relations. At the strategic level, Sino-US have exhibited a remarkable potential to shape relationships based on cooperation or constructive management of differences on regional issues. A broad convergence of interest has prevailed to maintain stability despite tensions on South China Sea, Taiwan, Korea and Japan. Military to military exchanges and joint defence training exercises have worked as mechanisms to diffuse apprehensions and enhance trust. At the economic level, Sino-US relations have reflected each sides’ high stakes in the success of the other marked by competition for energy security and regional dominance in trade. Sino-US economic relations have remained subservient to mutual vulnerabilities in trade and commercial relations, raising stakes in mutual collaboration. Within this context, it is important to review Sino-US maritime policy interests in the Asia-Pacific region. If Sino-US relations’ future is the dominant-rising great power dyad, how has it impacted on India and Pakistan policies in the South Asian region?
CHAPTER 5
SINO-US MARITIME RIVALRY IN ASIA-PACIFIC POST 9/11: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN’S MARITIME SECURITY

If the world were an egg, Hormuz would be its yolk;
Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice

Felipe Fernandez-Armesto

This chapter discusses the nature of Sino-US maritime competition in the Asia-Pacific region. Focusing on the pattern of Sino-US off-shore balancing, it argues that great powers’ involvement in the Asia-Pacific is based on opportunism, exploitation and short term gains coerced by the strong against the weak. It is pertinent to explore China’s naval strategy to analyze the rationale for the increase in China’s maritime influence. Simultaneously, it is important to analyse the impact on Pakistan’s maritime interests in the Indian Ocean. Chinese manoeuvres have entailed the conduct of joint naval exercises with Pakistan, the first ever outside the Chinese coastal waters in the Arabian Sea.

This chapter is divided into the following three sections: 1) Sino-US Maritime Strategy in the Asia-Pacific; 2) Sino-US Convergence and Divergence of Interests in the Asia-Pacific; and, 3) Implications for Pakistan’s Maritime Security.

5.1 Sino-US Maritime Strategy in the Asia-Pacific

This section focuses on Sino-US maritime strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific. It has discussed China’s Asia-Pacific maritime strategy interests as an instance of offensive positionalism. It argues that competing Sino-US security interests in the Asia–Pacific has entailed the potential to dilute Sino-US convergence of interests in global stability. China has embarked on Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy of offensive positionalism based on the construction of artificial islands, ASBMs sub-marines and supersonic aircrafts in the region. The US Air and Battle Concept (AB) can be viewed as defensive positionalism to counter China’s challenge.

As the People Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) grows in size and capability, the Southeast Asian have increasingly viewed China’s naval projection as a formidable offensive force. China has acquired off the shore operational capability as far as the
Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. Beijin’s blue water navy has extended its reach as far as the Gulf of Aden and the shores of Libya. China’s warships now routinely make port calls in the Middle East. China’s sources of regional strength have included growing economic interaction and soft power projection with states in the Asia Pacific and Southeast Asia to dilute the China threat thesis. Embarking on the policy of multilateralism in its diplomatic approach, Chinese strategy has built on trade along with aid, extension of easy loans, debt forgiveness and investment incentives. Win-win and mutual benefit are the key words for China’s economic diplomacy in the region.

The US hegemony has presupposed a congruence of interests with states of the Asia Pacific region. The US hegemonic order in Asia is based on promotion of regional stability for international security, open trade and promotion of global economy. In March 2012, China warned the US that it would not allow anyone to interfere in the South China Sea. China indicated its extent of off-shore reach, making the South China Sea as its core area of interest like Taiwan and Tibet. The launch of China’s Liaoning—the first aircraft carrier in September 25, 2012 and China’s construction of islands has added to regional anxieties in the South China Sea. Regional anxieties became all the more evident from China’s imposition of a No Fly Zone in the South China Sea, which the US instantly invalidated with B-52 bombers flown from Diego Garcia.

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161 Indian Ocean contains the body of water caught in between Africa, Southern Ocean, Asia and Australia. Of the world’s five oceans, Indian Ocean is the third largest, after the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean. Four important access waterways are the Suez Canal (Egypt), Bab el Mandeib (Djibouti-Yemen), Strait of Hormuz (Iran-Oman), and Strait of Malacca. The value of international trade that transits through SLOC amounts to $1 trillion and 8.7 billion tons in 2014, which is likely to increase further in future. Covering an estimated one-fifth of the earth’s water surface, spread between longitudes 20 degrees E to 120 degrees E, Indian Ocean contains rich energy resources such as 55 percent of global oil and 40 percent of gas reserves; minerals such as gold, tin, uranium, cobalt, nickel, aluminum and cadmium and abundant fishing resources. Indian Ocean ports handle about 30 percent of global trade including the world’s busiest — Singapore and Port Klang, Dubai and port of Tanjung Paellas in Malaysia. Indian Ocean regulates half of the world’s container traffic, two thirds of global oil shipment and an estimated 40 percent of the world’s offshore oil production. Strategically, important for global trade and energy flow, great powers maintain naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

162 Multilateral institutional mechanism involves Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC).

163 Ibid., 7.

China’s stretch of naval influence as far as the Indian Ocean has alarmed the US.\textsuperscript{165} China’s building of a dominant naval position in the Asia-Pacific has increasingly clashed with the US ambitions.\textsuperscript{166} Henry Kissinger, the US architect of rapprochement with China, argued that China’s naval projection and maritime influence has stretched not far beyond the Cape of Good Hope even during the heyday of Qing dynasty (1644-1912).\textsuperscript{167} The US Naval strategist Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan has pointed to the Indian Ocean as the true focus of power and strife in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.\textsuperscript{168} Similarly, the US scholar of Politics Robert David Kaplan has argued that the Indian Ocean is the domain where liberal ideals of democracy, free trade and religious freedom would be challenged.\textsuperscript{169} According to Robert Kaplan, “the greatest drama of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is that the US—hegemon of western hemisphere will prevent the rise of a hegemon in the eastern hemisphere.”\textsuperscript{170} Similarly, the American research analyst John J. Mearsheimer has held that China’s peaceful rise thesis has been a misleading assumption\textsuperscript{171} — an incorrect historical analogy as despite high claims, states could not be sure about the other’s intentions whether revisionist or status quo.\textsuperscript{172} Mearsheimer argued that the nature of a state’s military capabilities remains ambiguous. Mearsheimer predicted that China offensive military power would increase far more by 2030 than 2010.\textsuperscript{173}


\textsuperscript{166} The US July 2010 naval exercises had to be conducted further east into the Sea of Japan. In response to North Korea’s alleged sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the US and South Korean navies had conducted naval maneuvers to protest the incident.


\textsuperscript{168} Alfred Thayer Mahan has remarked about the rich potency of the Indian Ocean’s sea wealth of energy resources. The Ocean contains a third of the world’s population, 25 per cent of its global landmass, and about 40 percent of its oil and gas reserves. The continental shelf of Saudi Arabia, Iran, India and Western Australia contribute to 40 percent of world off shore oil production. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, \textit{The Influence of Sea Power upon History} (New York: Routledge, 1890), 41.


\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
Consequently, Mearsheimer predicted that as the Sino-US power asymmetry shrinks, the US strategic primacy in Asia-Pacific maintained since 1945 would diminish.

Prominent analysts from Kissinger to Zbigniew Brzezinski have emphasized that the US needs to maintain balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, viewed as the arc of crisis from the Sea of Japan to the Straits of Malacca.\textsuperscript{174} The US has considered China as a potential threat to stability in the Asia Pacific. As early as the year 2000, the US former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice opined in an article in \textit{Foreign Affairs} that China was still a potential threat to stability in the Asia Pacific region. Its military power was inferior to the US yet this condition may not be permanent. China had been a great power with unresolved vital interests in the Asia-Pacific. Condoleezza Rice implied that the US should not view China as a benign power. China was not a ‘status quo’ power. China’s aspiration to change Asia’s balance of power in its own favour makes it a strategic competitor to the US.\textsuperscript{175} China aspires to build blue water navy with long term operational presence in the Asia-Pacific by 2020-2025. Chinese scholar Wang Hanling in an interview with the author defined China’s naval modernization policy as such:

\begin{quote}

Chinese naval up-gradation has derived from maritime trade interests requiring maintenance of blue water navy in the High Seas and not due to any bad intentions of rivalry with the US. Chinese expansion of interests required the protection of Chinese human resource, commercial and trade interests to build and maintain blue water navy.\textsuperscript{176}
\end{quote}

It implied that Chinese scholars tend to defend Chinese naval expansion as defensively oriented — as ‘Far Sea Defense.’ The Chinese strategy has regarded the Korean peninsula, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and Vietnam as the ‘First Island Chain’ in the Asia Pacific. Robert Kaplan argued that China’s Second Island Chain of defense comprised Northern Mariana Islands and archipelago extension of Guam.\textsuperscript{177} China has aspired to build blue water navy with enhanced offshore oceanic capabilities. China has

\textsuperscript{176} Interview conducted by the author with Wang Hanling, Director, \textit{Center for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Institute of International Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Islamabad}, October 17, 2014.
sought to expand its naval reach, which is currently restricted to its coastal periphery. Map 5.1 shows images of China’s first island and second island chain in the Asia-Pacific.

While analyzing the rationale for Sino-US power balancing, it can be observed that China is widening its naval stretch in two dimensions. First, China has extended its naval reach beyond the ‘First Island Chain,’ which the US terms as the US ‘Forward Defence Perimeter,’ and up to the Second Island Chain. In the 1950s, Dean Acheson and Douglas MacArthur coined the term ‘First Island Chain,’ which comprised Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and the islands in between. A Congressional Report by Ronald O’Rourke has observed that in 2010 China deployed North and East Sea Fleets through and beyond the ‘First Island Chain.’\(^{178}\) China has positioned its naval units between Japan’s Okinawa and Miyako in June 2011. The American Naval Expert Tom Hone has argued that China’s current policy drive has aimed to ‘hold down strategic costs for itself, while increasing it for rivals.’\(^{179}\) For the Chinese, the US ‘Forward Defense Deployment’ has served as a protective shield, interpreted as ‘the US great wall in reverse.’\(^{180}\) The US forward defense deployment has provided for the preservation of the US maritime hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s naval expansion has sought to break through the US protective shield. The American naval experts James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara have argued that China’s maritime drive has entailed the potential to change the balance of power on eastern and western flanks of the ‘First Island Chain.’\(^{181}\) China’s naval expansion has made the US position unsustainable in the long run. The ‘Second Island Chain’ has comprised another geopolitical zone of Sino-US competition in the Western Pacific. The area has consisted of the Bonin Islands controlled by Japan and Northern Marianas, Guam, Palau and the Carolinas controlled by the US. Chinese naval deployments and

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\(^{180}\) In the maritime area extending from the Chinese mainland to the first island chain, the US PACOM officials warn that China restricts foreign, in particular, the US maritime and air activities in the near seas.

naval submarines creep beyond the Forward Defense Islands, stretching as far as the waters off Guam. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara argued that China has posed a challenge to the US as it extends its maritime interests up to the Second Island Chain.\textsuperscript{182} Guam has served as bastion of the US naval power in the Asia-Pacific.

Hegemonic ambitions may lead China to push the US beyond the ‘Second Island Chain,’ — Japan to Guam, the Moluccan Islands, the Bonin, Caroline and Marianas Islands. China’s military capabilities and rapidly growing economy has engendered a security dilemma in the region.\textsuperscript{183} China may block the US access to Korea, Japan and the Philippines, reducing American legitimacy to intervene in the South China Sea disputes.\textsuperscript{184} Naval modernization reflects China’s indogenous compulsion for energy security to sustain economic growth and exogenous compulsion of security. China’s maritime strategy appears offensive positionalism to enhance security interests in the Asia-Pacific.

The US naval officer Admiral James L. Holloway has opined that the US needs to position appropriate forces to protect allies and trading partners against Chinese aggression in the region.\textsuperscript{185} Various maritime issues from 2009 to 2014 have highlighted Sino-US maritime divergence of interests in the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{186} The \textit{USS Impeccable} surveillance ship incident on March 8, 2009 provided ample evidence of the unfolding maritime rivalry. Five Chinese ships, operating 75 miles south of China’s new submarine base—\textit{Yalong Bay} on Hainan islands, surrounded the \textit{USS

\textsuperscript{182} In 2009, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, warned about China’s clear shift of focus from a ground-centric force to a naval and air-centric force, stretching its leg beyond the First Island chain into the Second Island chain and beyond.

\textsuperscript{183} China seeks unification with Taiwan; settle territorial disputes in South China Sea over the Spratly islands with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam; over the Paracel islands with Vietnam; and, over Senkaku and Diaoyu islands with Japan. Assertion of territorial claims, when China is comparatively weak than a superpower, pays dividends for its neighbours.

\textsuperscript{184} In July 2010, China objected to the conduct of naval exercises by the US in the Yellow Sea, located between China and the Korean Peninsula. The US Navy had planned to send aircraft carrier \textit{USS George Washington} into the Yellow Sea.


\textsuperscript{186} US-China relations strained following the \textit{USS Impeccable Incident} of March 2009 in South China Sea, US arms sales to Taiwan, suspension of military relations during 2010–11, US naval exercises in the Yellow Sea in September 2010, and in 2011 with Vietnam and the Philippines.
Rested so far on the US strategy of global forward defense — termed as off-shore balancing or far from the sea strategy, intelligence estimates have indicated the shift in the balance of power in the Western Pacific. MAP 5.2 illustrates South China Sea and East China Sea disputes in the Asia Pacific.

Over the past 60 years, the US strategic posture has depended on three carrier task forces positioned in the Pacific Rim and the Indian Ocean. Chinese naval modernization has strained the US to maintain 11 to 12 large-deck nuclear-powered carriers for maritime stability. Tactical cover over a longer duration would not be ensured with smaller carriers. The shift in the balance of power has occurred on account of three key features: The Chinese development of *Jin* class nuclear powered submarines, missile ships, and supersonic maritime strike aircrafts. American naval strategists Andrew S. Erickson and Michael Chase have argued that China has sought to prevent Chinese latest nuclear powered submarine—*SSBNs, Type 092*, or *Jin* class surveillance and its area of operations.\(^{188}\) *Jin* class submarines development has reflected China’s improvement of extended patrol capability. China has reportedly planned to build improved long range 7,200 km *Type 094 SSBNs*, equipped with improved penetration aids *such as JL-2 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).*\(^{189}\)

China’s first generation *Type 092 Xia SSBN* with 1,770 km range and *JL-1 SLBMs*, argued Andrew S. Erickson and Michael Chase, were incapable of conducting an extended patrol.\(^{190}\) The US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) assessed China has planned to build a fleet of probably five *Type 094 SSBNs* to provide for a near continuous presence at sea.\(^{191}\) *Jin* class submarine have aimed to enhance China’s capacity for deterrence against a third party intervention in a regional conflict — something the Office of Naval Intelligence and US Quadrennial Defense Review has

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\(^{187}\) The Hainan facility provides for 23 meter-wide and over 19 meter high cave entrance designed to accommodate the 148 meters long and 12 meters wide *Jin* submarine. The potential vulnerability of Chinese SSBNs to detection and the challenge of locating dispersed road-mobile missiles appear to be the prime factor to build *Jin* and *JL-2* long range missiles.


\(^{189}\) Ibid.

\(^{190}\) Ibid.

\(^{191}\) Ibid.
referred to as A2/AD capabilities. China has sought to enhance strategic nuclear cost for first use by the adversary. The Chinese Type 094 Jin class equipped with JL-2 can penetrate the US missile defenses interception, if launched from certain patrol areas of operation. Certain scholars have invoked prestige and inter-service politics as the motivational influences to construct the Jin class Type 094 JL-2 submarines, and their deployment at Xiaopingdao, Huludao and Yalong Bay.

China’s second strike nuclear capability has sought to lessen China’s probability of detection, improve crew members and naval commanders’ sea training to cope with nuclear command and control issues. China has improved its submarine force by increased submarine presence in the Asia Pacific. Ambiguity persists regarding command and control in case of crisis and instability and the number of SSBNs China has planned to build for deployment. New developments have reflected significant improvement in China’s confidence in maritime strategic nuclear forces. The Chinese White Paper 2013 stated that installation of DF-31 and DF 31A Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and JL-2 missiles on Jin SSBN have enhanced PLAN nuclear counter-attack capability. The US naval strategists Andrew S. Erickson and Michael Chase opined that China would soon develop a credible nuclear deterrent with survivable deterrent capability. So far, China has relied on land based strategic missiles and SLBMs for nuclear deterrence. China had developed supersonic long range maritime attack aircraft and nuclear powered submarine to neutralize the US Fleet carrier. Yet China’s development of the Anti Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) would be the ultimate game changer. The US intelligence sources, however, stated that Beijing pursued an ASBM with 1500 km plus range along with the DF-21/CSS-5 solid propellant Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM). ASBMs could put at risk the US carrier strike in the Asia Pacific.

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194 Ibid
196 Op, cit.
197 Ibid.
China plans to make ASBMs development a high priority area for its Research & Development program. China has sought to improve detection to achieve pinpoint accuracy necessary to hit a fast moving target. American analyst Admiral James L. Holloway III argued that China worked on a desired angle of impact to make a break in carrier’s outer armor.\(^{198}\) China’s development of ASBM with a nuclear warhead mounted in it can solve the accuracy problem. The US Navy maintains nuclear deterrence through aircraft carrier striking forces. China is capable of projecting power as far as Guam in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean towards the East. China’s development of ASBMs would change the strategic equation between the US and China.

Interestingly, the American architect of rapprochement with China Henry Kissinger has mentioned the Chinese offensive oriental strategy as *wei qei*.\(^{199}\) The strategy aims to prevent China’s strategic encirclement guiding foreign policy choices since the times of imperial dynasties. Offensive positionalism dictates Chinese maritime strategy in the Asia-Pacific through minimizing gaps in one’s own favor, while increasing with respect to the adversary. Obama administration has embarked on the ‘Pivot Asia Reinforcement Strategy’ to counter-balance China’s naval expansion. The move implies the US military reinforcement and defense ties with allies along the First Island Chain along China’s eastern periphery termed as the ‘strategic ring of encirclement.’

The US has encircled China both on its eastern and southern flanks through deployment of the US Pacific Command in the Asia-Pacific region. The US has moved in Centcom from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific region.\(^{200}\) Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore and Australia are the US list of formal and informal allies in the region. Bob Woodword has argued that the US land operation capability has relied on well-guarded chain of existing allies.\(^{201}\) The pivot Asia strategy has portrayed the US rationale for

\(^{199}\) Kissinger, *On China*, 43.
\(^{200}\) The Centcom covers an area from Central Asia to Egypt with 325,000 military and civilian personnel, 180 ships and 1,900 aircrafts. It includes the US contingent of troops deployed in Afghanistan, and an extended access to an air base in Krygyzstan. See Bob Woodward, *Obama Wars*, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 56.
deploying additional military assets by way of ‘strategic reassurance.’ The US power enhancement at Australia’s northwestern coast has aimed at power projection at the strategic juncture of the Asia-Pacific nexus in the South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, and the Bay of Bengal.

The US has deployed combat ships at Singapore in close vicinity to the Strait of Malacca into the South China Sea. The Obama administration has strengthened the US Marines presence at Darwin, Australia by sending 2,500 additional Marines in 2011.202 In March 2012, the US proposed to base US P-8 surveillance planes and drones at Australia’s Coco islands for operation over the South China Sea. Based on strategic partnerships with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, the US has maintained maritime partnership in the region.203 The US has expanded joint naval exercises with Japan, Philippines, Indonesia and New Zealand. The US conducted annual training exercises with the Vietnamese navy, following the US-Vietnamese strategic partnership in 2011. In a clear reference to China, US former Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel termed strengthening of the US-Australia security ties as ‘sending a clear signal to those (China) that threaten us (the US).’204 South China Sea disputes and the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) constitute Sino-US competing security interests in the Asia-Pacific. Western scholars have interpreted the US moves as part of the US Asia-Pacific war plan to fight China. 205 The American researcher on Southeast Asia Joshua Kurlantzick argued that the US has patrolled Seventh Fleet apparently to show resilience in support of its allies in the region.206 China’s maritime naval ambitions have

\[\text{\textsuperscript{202}}\text{Upgrading the defense cooperation, Australia pledged to grant the US military increased access to its bases.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{203}}\text{In 2011, Japan and Philippines pledged to boost bilateral maritime security ties. Both states assert freedom of navigation, peace and stability as a common interest of the international community. In 2013, Japan ordered a refocusing of its self-defence forces, citing concern about China.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{204}}\text{Remarks by the US Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, accessed May 14, 2014.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{205}}\text{Op. cit., China took the Parcel Islands from Saigon as US forces withdrew from Vietnam. Similarly, following Soviet withdrawal from Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay and the US termination of its base agreement with the Philippines, China quietly occupied Mischief Reef to the dismay of Manila. The Chinese scholars assert that no South China Sea issue existed before the 1970s. The problems only occurred after North and South Vietnam were reunified in 1976 and the new state of Vietnam started to lay claim on Nansha and Xisha islands.}\]
grown, keeping in view China’s inflated role in the global economy. China has embarked on a policy of maritime expansion and naval up-gradation. China’s naval ambitions have necessitated the US resort to strengthening of the defence deals and pivot Asia strategic reassurance for increased maritime presence.

5.2 Sino-US Convergence and Divergence of interests in the Asia-Pacific

This section reviews Sino-US competing security interests in the Asia-Pacific in the perspective of South China Sea territorial disputes and the International Sea Lanes of Communication. It argues that the expansion of maritime ambitions have allowed China to stretch its naval influence along the SLOC to the Strait of Malacca. China’s drive for territorial claims in the South and East China Sea has pushed the US to maintain strategic reassurance for ensuring SLOC stability and security.

Karl Haushofer used the term Indo-Pacific first as *Indopazifischen Raum* in 1920s referring to the Indian Ocean, Western Pacific region, and South China Sea making it as a single strategic concept.  

Indian research scholar Shreya Upadhyay has argued that the region in conceptual and dialectical frameworks has comprised the fulcrum of global geopolitics — an area of global rebalancing of strategic and economic interests. In the words of research expert Ashley J. Tellis, politics and economics join to make a fantastical integration of these two ocean spaces. The geo-political and strategic security architecture of Asia-Pacific has been marked with partnership alliances.

Developing on the legacy of the Bush administration, President Obama has sought to sustain the positive direction in Sino-US relations, integrating China into the

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207 Nicholas J. Spykman, Dutch American geo-strategist, championed the concept of Rimland, referring to the circumferential maritime highway, linking the offshore island arcs of the Western Pacific and Bay of Bengal. Alfred Mahan stressed on sea power considerations in the Indian and Pacific Ocean.


210 Ibid. The US has constructed alliances with Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and India.
international system. The core areas, however, defining Sino-US divergence of interests has included the following:

- South China/East China Sea Territorial Disputes: Sino-US has divergent strategic goals and differing policy perspectives on disputed islands in East China and South China Seas.

- Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs): Sino-US maritime interests have diverged on the security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC).

Large scale military exercises in the Asia-Pacific are illustrative of the US extensive military involvement in the region. In June 2006, the US held biggest Pacific Ocean exercise since the Vietnam War.\(^{211}\) In 2007, it conducted another exercise in the Bay of Bengal along the SLOCs. Two US aircraft carrier battle groups joined hands with Indian, Japanese and Australian naval aircrafts. South China Sea territorial disputes lay in between the Strait of Malacca in the Southwest to Taiwan in the Northeast. Ferocious quest for energy security has underlined Sino-US claims on hydrocarbon and mineral reserves of the disputed territories. The Atlas for Marine Policy in South East Asia has informed that the region has comprised 250 small islands,\(^{212}\) which are the territory of Paracel or Spratly Islands stretching two square miles.

The US Energy Information Administration holds that huge untapped oil and gas resources attracted the regional states’ claim of ownership.\(^{213}\) The US Geological Survey informed about the region's hydrocarbon resources of natural gas.\(^{214}\) The region provides 10 percent of the overall global fisheries catch in the South China Sea. Rival claims and the construction of the disputed infrastructure facilities have compounded the problem in the South China Sea.\(^{215}\) The following contested regions are included in the East China and South China Sea.

\(^{211}\) This exercise involved 22,000 personnel, 280 aircraft (including B-2 and B-52 bombers), and 30 ships (including three US aircraft carrier battle groups, operating together in the Pacific Ocean for the first time.


\(^{215}\) Certain countries including China have built more than 1,000 oil and gas wells, four airports and numerous other infrastructure facilities.
• East China Sea archipelago atolls/extensions between China and Japan on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Japan terms the islands as Senkaku, while China has termed these as Diaoyu.216

• Claims on the Spratly Islands between China and the Archipelago states of Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia.

The South China Sea has become a bone of contention between the littoral states, China and the US.217 China has raised sovereignty claims over entire South China Sea based on historic legacy as China’s natural area of influence.218 Official maps as early as the 15th century remain the strongest basis for China’s claim extending to the nine-dashed line in the South China Sea. The US researcher Shen Jiangming has opined that ancient Chinese maps entitle Beijing’s claim to the area encompassed by the nine-dashed line.219 China, Japan and South Korea depend heavily on the South China Sea for communication and trade. A total of $5.3 trillion mass of trade passes through the South China Sea each year.220 The US trade has accounted for $1.2 trillion of this total. China has built its claim on the continental shelf of disputed territories based on a historic legacy.221 Economic interests rather than global power ambitions have guided China’s South China Sea policy.

216 Chinese vision of Asia incorporates Asia-Pacific: Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, etc.) plus Northeast Asia (Japan, North Korea, South Korea with Taiwan as integral part of China). The Chinese larger conception of Asia stretches from Pacific Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.

217 Rivals contest four main archipelagos in the South China Sea: the Pratas, Macclesfield Bank, Paracels, and Spratlys. Potential for armed conflict is the highest in case of the Spratlys. Large claimants maintain physical presence except Brunei. Indonesia objects to China’s nine-dashed line, which overlaps with the EEZ of the Natuna Islands. Except for Natuna Islands, China claims all islands in the South China Sea. Malaysia, Vietnam claim a few islands of the Spratlys, with Philippines claims extending to 53 islands, including the Kalayaan Island and Scarborough Shoal. The most intense claims arise between Vietnam and China, followed by hostile exchanges including two wars in 1974 and 1988. Taiwan claims both the Spratly and the Paracel islands, possessing Itu Aba or Taiping, and the Pratas. China currently controls Paracel and fifteen shoals and reefs in the Spratly islands.

218 China asserts that states began to assert sovereignty claims following reports of huge oil and gas reserves discovery. Rival claims object to the use of a dashed line by China, jurisdiction over the entire sea within the nine-dashed line or the islands and their territorial waters’ EEZ.


220 East China Sea is the area of the sea that extends above Taiwan whereas South China Sea is the region that stretches below Taiwan.

221 In 2010, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries consumed 2 percent more energy than in 2000. Energy consumption in the European Union
Located off China’s eastern seaboard, China has claimed Senkaku and Ryukyu on the way to the wider Pacific Ocean in close proximity to Taiwan. Administered by Japan, Chinese naval and commercial vessels have navigated the islands as outlet to the sea. China has aimed to mitigate the US naval superiority in war over Taiwan. Japanese Prime Minister Abbey defined the region as the ‘arc of freedom’ between Japan, its traditional allies the US, Australia and India. Japan’s revised National Defense Program Guidelines announced enhanced surveillance and reconnaissance operations in the Senkaku and Ryukyu islands with additional support for submarine activities.

The realist perspective has guided the US balancing strategy. The US global strategy has sought to prevent China’s expansion of influence into the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and Africa, controlling the resources off the South and East China Seas. The US forward policy of defense has aimed at the prevention of any hostile power from dominating either end of the Eurasian landmass. States are to surrender their historical claims in favor of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China became a signatory to the UNCLOS in 1996. Chinese research fellows Yann-Huei Song & Zou Keyuan argued that the legality of Chinese claims have ceased to apply to the disputed islands. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, however, has asserted claims on the geographical features termed ‘islands’ in the UNCLOS. Under the law, Chinese jurisdiction will extend to territorial waters of the island’s continental shelves, including 12 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zones around them. This has allowed China to extend its claims to include the whole of South China Sea.

American scholars such as Joshua Kurlantzick have interpreted Chinese regional claims as ‘broad and sometimes without total merit.’ The US Senate is yet to ratify the 1982

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UNCLOS. The US has supported international freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the International Law. China has objected to the US patrolling as ‘intelligence gathering.’ China has demanded that foreign warships obtain prior notification before entering the EEZ. Series of incidents in the region since 2010 have included attacks on foreign ships, cutting the cables of exploration ships and seizure of naval vessels. China has blamed the US for instigating rifts in the South China Sea. Joshua Kurlantzick argued that China has resented the US involvement in the region, believing regional states’ band-wagoning and emboldened attitudes result from American provocation. China has regarded regional states’ claims on South China Sea as ill-legal, preferring a bilateral approach for settlement against the regional states preference for a multilateral one.

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224 The convention only allows maritime zones to be used for peaceful purposes, while it prohibits carrying out of clandestine activities against another country.
225 China and the US interpret several articles of the UNCLOS convention variably. Article 58 of the UNCLOS provides that all states are entitled to freedom of navigation and over-flight within the EEZ. However, the same article also stresses that states shall respect the rights of the coastal state and its laws and regulations in accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS. China’s objections to US claims are based on articles 38, 39 and 40 of the UNCLOS. Article 38, paragraph 2 of the UNCLOS defines the meaning of the term ‘transit passage.’ It is defined as freedom of navigation and over flight for continuous and expeditious transit. This implies that vessels and ships of other states may use the EEZ of a coastal state for transit, but not without consent of the coastal state. The US insists on conducting surveillance and intelligence gathering activities close to China’s coast.
226 UNCLOS Article 39, paragraph 1, obliges ships and vessels not to pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the littoral states. Foreign ships while exercise the right of transit passage, they are prohibited to conduct research or survey activities under Article 40 of UNCLOS.
227 China has pushed back against the pivot with concrete policies. The PLA exert pressure on China’s neighbors. In 2011, tensions between Beijing and Hanoi escalated. Chinese patrol ships harassed Vietnamese seismic survey boats in disputed waters. China sent combat-ready patrols to defend its claim to the shoal. After the Philippines withdrew its ships, China established a permanent presence there. Chinese national oil companies begin to drill oil in the disputed waters.
230 Mutual suspicions prevail. China fears regional states may reinforce territorial claims collectively in a multilateral forum to balance against Beijing. On the other hand, regional states fear bilateralism might lead China to extract trade and economic concessions.
The White Paper 2013 has termed China’s greatest traditional threat resulting from the US military presence and strengthening of alliances in the region.\textsuperscript{231} China has complained that neighboring countries complicate the situation, particularly Japan’s threat over the Diaoyu Islands. China has called for military preparedness to win local wars.\textsuperscript{232} China has developed integrated plans to ensure military attentiveness through joint services and arms.\textsuperscript{233} China has organized naval exercises and air patrols exercises to ensure war preparedness.

The US policy makers have viewed Chinese coercive tactics in South China Sea as acts meant to disrupt the status quo.\textsuperscript{234} China has blamed the US of instigating conventional military forces along its periphery. The US defence alliances strategy can be interpreted as defensive positionalism expanding gap in own favor while increasing with respect to adversary. The rationale of Chinese coercive tactics has appeared to respond to Obama’s Pivot Asia strategy. The US research scholar Robert S. Ross has argued that pivot Asia, much like the US administration previous policies, has constituted an effective response to China’s rise.\textsuperscript{235} Comparative deviation, however, has appeared in Obama administration’s clear support for the littoral states and Japan against China.

The US has tended to take sides against China in the South China Sea disputes. Hillary Clinton, former Secretary of State in the first Obama administration, denounced the


\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{235} Since 1997, the US deployed naval and air weapons system to Guam and Japan, built an aircraft carrier facility at the Changi Naval Base, and strengthened US defense cooperation with Japan and the Philippines. The Bush administration assigned an additional aircraft carrier to the Pacific theater, and deployed 60 percent of US submarines to Asia. Military funding for the Pacific theater remained at high levels during Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
earlier neutral approach by taking sides in the disputes. While supporting the Philippines and Vietnam positions, the US has emphasized that competing claims should be negotiated among the disputing parties — not imposed by China. The Southeast Asian states through joint defense collaboration have bandwagoned with the US against a rising China. Hence China’s coercive tactics have attempted to thwart the US defense alliances and military collaboration in the South China Sea.

The International Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) have comprised a prime area of Sino-US balancing of competing strategic interests. Pivot Asia is a policy of strategic reassurance to the US key allies in the region. It has, however, provoked Chinese counter measures through coercive tactics. The US has regarded the entire region from India to New Zealand, the Pacific Islands to northern Japan until the Korean Peninsula as a geo-strategically significant one, attracting high degree of attention through bilateral and multilateral security mechanisms. In the initial period of the pivot Asia rebalancing strategy, a number of military initiatives were taken. In mid-2010, the US Navy demonstrated an impressive show of naval power through its ballistic missiles submarines reconfigured for cruise missile attack in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Busan in South Korea and Subic Bay in the Philippines. In response, China continued to assert its naval power in the South China Sea. The US researcher Thomas Christensen argued that China’s regional foreign policy marked a contrast with its ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. For example, the US Navy ship Impeccable incident in 2009, China’s warning to foreign powers in ASEAN Regional Forum in 2010, warning to Japan in 2010 for arresting a Chinese captain showed China’s aggressive posture.

Chinese research scholar You Ji argued that security of SLOC may start maritime conflicts. Integral to international and regional geo-politics, the SLOCs security may

237 Hedging or bandwagoning is resorted to by states in realist parlance to thwart rival pressures and assert relative independence in foreign policy stance.
complicate major-power relations. International geo-strategic concerns increasingly decide China’s political cooperation and military hedging. You Ji further argued that China’s national security is critically linked to safe energy transportation. A large scale military initiative required huge amounts of oil in reserve. China has maintained a policy of cooperation while building sufficient naval strength to ensure the security of SLOC. The US expert on Middle East Vali Nasr argued that the growth of Chinese economy is critically linked to free and secure navigation passage along the SLOC. Energy import, raw materials and foreign trade have remained high on China’s security agenda.

South China Sea energy reserves have comprised a vital significance in the South China Sea disputes. Presently, a report by the Heritage Foundation has indicated that accounting for 20 percent of global energy consumption, China has surpassed the US in global energy consumption in 2010. Chinese oil imports are expected to rise to 7.3 million barrels each day by 2020. China is likely to use much of Saudi Arabian oil produce over the next few years. China’s supply of oil and natural gas comes from the Middle East and Central Asia. It has competed with the US, India and Russia in Latin America, Middle East and Africa for energy procurement. The US diplomat Vali

241 Coal accounts for 70 percent of China’s energy consumption and 80 percent of its electricity supply. Oil still remains the main topic of concern when China considers its global outlook and interaction with international markets. See Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Doubleday Random House Inc., 2013), 653.
243 China will be responsible for one-quarter of additional growth in [global] oil demand. High economic growth rate requires much higher energy consumption in Asia. India, currently the world’s fourth-largest energy consumer, would double energy demand by 2035. Relatively energy-inefficient economies worsen the problem in Asia. In non-western countries, producing $1,000 worth of GDP consumes 3.4 barrels of oil compared to only 1.1 barrels in western countries. Economic growth in Asia is three times while four times in China more energy-intensive than in western economies. China, the largest coal consumer consumes almost half of the world’s coal with both China and India accounting for one-fourth of the entire global coal trade. In oil, China and India continue to account for a lion’s share of demand in annual crude oil consumption. In 2010, the United States imported 9.6 million barrels per day of crude oil, of which only 18 percent (1.7 million barrels) came from the Persian Gulf. China and India each import roughly the same quantity of crude from the Persian Gulf region.
244 Beijing procures 50 percent of its oil supply from the Middle East including 20 percent from Saudi Arabia. In 2009, China signed a $3.2 billion natural gas deal with Iran.
Nasr has termed African oil production networks as China’s ‘low hanging fruit,’ where China has invested $44 billion in oil projects.\textsuperscript{245} Energy security has comprised the key to China’s rise. Energy procurement along with security of the main supply routes has determined the contours of Sino-US global power competition and rivalry.\textsuperscript{246}

The US has aimed to shift more sea power to the Pacific in view of Chinese naval modernization. The US research scholar David Scott has argued that the US PACOM based at Hawaii has been monitoring the Asia-Pacific region, along the entire Indian coastline up to Diego Garcia since 1963.\textsuperscript{247} The US plans to shift 60 of its naval fleets, along with six aircraft carriers to the Asia-Pacific by 2020.\textsuperscript{248} As a major transportation lane between Europe and Far Asia, the South China Sea holds immense strategic significance. Geographically speaking, three water passages, separated otherwise by the geographical boundary of Southeast Asian littorals have connected the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean. To counter-check revisionist ambitions, China has needed to ensure safe access to any one of the three navigation passages to sustain its economic growth.

- First is the narrow, five hundred mile long, less than two miles wide passage between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula known as the Straits of Malacca surrounded by Singapore.
- Second is the Lombok Strait farther towards the south in the Indian Ocean.
- Third is the Sunda Strait. Cutting through Indonesia towards the south, Lombok and Sunda straits are located in the Indian Ocean towards the north-west of Australia.

Chinese scholar Qian Wensong highlighted the US security architecture in the Asia-Pacific resting on nuclear deterrence, joint defense alliances, littoral states’ naval collaboration and military forces forward-deployment.\textsuperscript{249} Indian research scholar

\textsuperscript{245} Vali Nasr, \textit{The Dispensable Nation}, 652.
\textsuperscript{246} Vali Nasr presents a parallel from history in which key oil supplies were blocked by western powers to resource-poor Japan from Southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies — a lesson learnt well by China’s strategic decision makers.
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid, 85.
\textsuperscript{249} The US possesses 520 nuclear warheads at sea, land and air triad. The US deploys US Marines to Australia, upgrades the Philippines navy, increases US troop presence in South
Premvir Das has argued that located in the Phillip channel just south of Singapore, the Malacca Strait is the most heavily traveled maritime chokepoints, comprising the eastern doorway into the Indian Ocean. Singapore has recently built a deep-water pier at its new Changi Naval Base, enabling the US Navy to operate an aircraft carrier in case of need. The US navy’s clear advantage of superior sea power has made China’s oil supply vulnerable at its exit and entry points in the Indian Ocean. Increased rivalry amounting to Sino-US war might provoke the US embargo on China’s access to energy. American researcher Ian Storey has opined that Hu Jintao rightly referred to the prospect as the ‘Malacca Dilemma.’ Ian Storey has further argued that big powers have long desired to control navigation along the straits.

Along with the US, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and now India patrol the SLOC. Almost 85 per cent of Chinese energy products pass through the SLOCs, which makes the US control a point of concern for the Chinese. By disrupting the oil supply lines, the US can start energy crisis in China. The US defense ties with Australia and Japan has added to China’s set of worries. Sitting astride the Lombok or Sunda straits, Australia has controlled the alternate transportation passage with 2,500 additional Marines provided by the US. Chinese scholar Chunhao Lou has argued that Australia has become the pioneer of regional security organizations in the Pacific. Hence China

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250 Over 100,000 ships, 66 per cent of world oil, 33 per cent of world’s bulk cargo, and 50 per cent of world’s container shipment pass through the straits every year. See Premvir Das, “Maritime Powers: Key to India’s Security Interests,” *Policy Papers*, Series No 1, *Aspen Institute India*.

251 Ian Storey, “China’s Malacca Dilemma,” *China Brief*, Vol. 6, Issue 8, *The James Town Foundation, Global Research and Analysis*, available at: [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3943#VPmEQmUF4s](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3943#VPmEQmUF4s) accessed April 14, 2013.

252 Almost 50 percent of Chinese oil import is brought in from the Middle East, with 20 percent from Saudi Arabia. Chinese 85 percent oil import pass through the Strait of Malacca.

253 The US attended the first ASEAN ‘Defense Ministers Plus’ meeting (ADMM+) in 2010. In 2011, the US President attended the East Asia Summit (EAS) for the first time.

254 Australia has been the pioneer of the Pacific Regional Organizations, including APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit. See Chunhao Lou, “Power Politics in the Indian Ocean: don’t exaggerate the China threat,” *East Asia Forum, CICIR*, available at: [http://www.eastasiaforum.org](http://www.eastasiaforum.org) accessed October 24, 2013.
needs to maintain naval presence along the waters of Australia and Indonesia. Multilateral security institutions in Asia have provided shared ground for Australia, India, and the US trilateral cooperation for regional security.\footnote{John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, 381–396.} Trilateral informal strategic cooperation has entailed joint exercises, training activities, building a security dialogue on a code of conduct for naval and other maritime vessels and activities.\footnote{India-US-Australia trilateral cooperation entails surveillance, maritime expeditionary operations, anti-submarine warfare, and integration of theater missile defense systems, national missile defense technologies, intelligence sharing and tightening controls on the flow of technology and materials. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) provides a new forum with conditions of entry based on capabilities, interests, willingness to contribute, and abiding by the rules.} Map 5.3 has illustrated China’s conventional missile range capabilities indicating Southeast Asia as far as the second island chain, South Asia and northeast Asia falling in China’s maximum missile range capability.

Realism explains the US horizontal escalation strategy of building joint naval defenses with China’s strategic competitors, i.e., India, Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, and Australia. Employing John Mearsheimer’s anatomy, one could discern the US working on the defensive strategy of ‘gap maximizer.’ The US scholar John J. Mearsheimer has argued that Beijing has worked on the offensive strategy of ‘gap minimizer’ vis. a vis. the US.\footnote{John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, 381–39.} The US has deployed Pacific Command on China’s doorstep since 1979, moving in Centcom under the Pivot Asia strategy. The US has included the Indian Ocean in its maritime surveillance reach. The Chinese strategy has sought to minimize power asymmetry with respect to the US, while maximizing it with respect to Southeast Asian littorals. Simultaneously, marks of complex interdependence can also be discerned in Sino-US cooperation in multifarious projects such as non-proliferation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, anti-piracy and maritime security.

In its strategic guideline 2012, the US has linked developments in the Indian Ocean as crucially connected to its economic security. The US has elevated Indian position as regional anchor with Iran and China identified as the most potential threats to the US security interests in the Indian Ocean. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in 2012.
declared India as a ‘lynchpin’ of security in the US Pivot Asia strategy. Panetta disclosed at the Shangri-La Security Dialogue the US intention to shift multitudes of naval power to the Pacific by 2020. President Obama while addressing the joint session of the Indian parliament termed the Indo-US relationship as ‘defining partnership in the 21st century facing joint challenges and opportunities.’ The Congressional Research Service Report termed India as ‘a vital pillar of stability in the Asia-Pacific.’ The US Department of Defense (DoD) has included South Asia in the US Strategic Guidance Policy 2014. DOD has announced that the US Military Cooperation Group and Indian Integrated Defence Staff will jointly co-chair the US Pacific Command known as PACOM.


India will play the role of a ‘net security provider’ to the Indian Ocean littorals and the India Ocean. The Indo-US maritime collaboration builds on two major aspects: Indo-US common perspective on regional security and Indian naval capability. Indian research analyst Sudha Ramachandran has argued that India’s redefined role has structured on Indo-US and allied forces maritime exercises. The Indo-US convergence of maritime interests has framed on the common perspective of security

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263 In 2003, the Indo-US navies conducted search and rescue exercises. In 2004, the exercises expanded in scope to include helicopter cross-deck landings, submarine operations and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
in the Asia-pacific region. Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands at port Blair has taken the responsibility for regional security in the Asia-Pacific.\footnote{The Indian Navy has sought to upgrade its inferiority vis. a vis. the PLA Navy or PLAN. The commissioning of a naval base, INS \textit{Baaz}, with a 10,000 foot-long runway for fighter operations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands has allowed India to assert itself more forcefully in the Malacca Strait. Chinese naval analysts warn Nicobar and Andaman island have the potency to block western entrance to the Malacca Strait. Located around 650 nautical miles from Visakhapatnam, the headquarters of the Eastern Naval Command, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, have comprised a chain of 572 islands, spread across the eastern exit of the Bay of Bengal in the Deccan peninsula. The \textit{Baaz} station has allowed India to keep a hawk-like eye on the strategically important Malacca Strait. Port Blair at Andaman and Nicobar islands have held a tri-service naval, air and ground assets command. See Sudha Ramachandran, “India Extends Malacca Strait Reach,” \textit{Asia Times}, available at: www.atimes.com, accessed August 8, 2012.}

The US-Indian military cooperation revived rapidly after 9/11. India formally undertook the responsibility for escorting the US ships into the Bay of Bengal across the Strait of Malacca, allowing naval deployments against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Traditional and non-traditional threats have transformed the stature of Indian Ocean from a zone of peace to international maritime intervention.\footnote{The traditional and non-traditional challenges in the Indian Ocean have included the threat of piracy, maritime terrorism, security of trade and energy, nuclearization, and competing strategic interests for domination.} Foreign military involvement has increased due to volatile security threats in the region.\footnote{Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the Iraq-Kuwait War in the early 1990s, the Iraq War in 2003 and the War in Afghanistan are recent examples.} In addition to Diego Garcia, the US Navy holds bases in the Indian Ocean littorals such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands have played an important role to ensure stability along the Indo-Pacific corridor. The Indian Naval Chief described \textit{Baaz} as blessed with a brilliant strategic location.\footnote{The primary function of \textit{Baaz} is to provide airborne maritime surveillance. At present, Baaz can operate medium sized aircraft capable of short field operations. It will soon start operating heavier military planes like the US supplied Hercules C-130J Super Hercules meant for Special Forces Operation. Baaz tends to enhance Indian capability to monitor its 600,000 sq km Exclusive Economic Zone in the Andaman & Nicobar islands. See Sudha Ramachandran, “India Extends Malacca Strait Reach,” \textit{Asia Times}, available at: www.atimes.com, accessed August 8, 2012.} Overlooking the Six Degree Channel that separates Indian Nicobar from Indonesia, the venue has served as a strategic bottleneck from which all 50,000 merchant ships and 40 percent of the international seaborne annual
navigation must pass. The US has delivered Indian navy INS Jalashwa and P-8I Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) with reconnaissance and ASW capabilities. The Indo-US strategic dialogue comprises another significant aspect of Indo-US defense ties, providing for US collaboration on two specific technology areas: Indian indigenous aircraft carrier and High Altitude Long Distance (HALD) Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) System. 268

The Indo-US maritime collaboration has built India’s long-range maritime surveillance, maritime and air interdiction capabilities including strategic airlift and patrolling. The Indian navy’s strategic reach has extended as far as Oceania and the South Pacific Rim. Indian presence in the South China Sea holds repercussion for regional stability. It has irked the Chinese naval missions in the Indian Ocean. India has aimed to contain Chinese naval stretch into the Western Pacific region. Sino-Indian friction has encompassed competition for energy procurement in littorals of the Indian Ocean. Sino-Indian rivalry has featured on rival historic claims of great power hegemonic ambitions, territorial disputes and offshore balancing ambitions in the Indian Ocean region.269 The India-US-Australia triangle and the India-US-Japan triangle comprise maritime coalitions in the Asia-Pacific theatre.

The US-India Malabar naval exercises have provided for a joint operational strategic nexus to ensure SLOCs safety for the US, west of Malacca in case of a Sino-US conflict. Malabar exercises have successively progressed from sea drills to anti-submarine exercises, involving aircraft carriers to show combined power projection.270 The Indo-US naval exercises have sought to achieve procedural and technological compatibility in conducting aircraft-carrier operations and joint amphibious exercises.271 The Indo-

268 India welcomes US interest in becoming the dialogue partner with the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR-ARC).
269 China resents India’s oil deal with Vietnam. The visit of INS Airavat to Phnom Penh was also viewed as evidence of Indian trespassing of contested territorial waters.
270 Bi-annual series of Malabar exercises, starting from 2002 involve elements of the Japanese, Australian and Singapore navy, Indian and US warships, including the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. Bilateral formats were held in October 2008, April 2010 in the Arabian Sea apparently to deter China. Malabar 2012-2014 were held in the Bay of Bengal. Salvex exercises took place in the Arabian Sea in 2005, in Bay of Bengal in 2011, and in the Pacific. Malabar 2011 took place in the western Pacific, east of the Luzon Strait. It involved the US Seventh Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge as well as five powerful Indian warships.
271 In 2009, a trilateral component included the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF), with the Malabar exercises becoming an annual regular feature of Indo-US maritime
US joint naval training has entailed mutual benefit for both parties. Indian navy could benefit from exposure to ASW capabilities as the US nuclear submarine (SSN) participated in joint-exercises. The US navy built experience to detect Indian diesel fuelled electric submarines to en-cash on operational capability against the Chinese diesel fueled submarines (SSBN).\(^{272}\) Sino-Indian rival claims on border territory and contentious history has allowed common grounds for Indo-US nexus.\(^{273}\) Sino-India hold rival claims for energy competition\(^{274}\) in the Middle East, Central and West Asia to sustain high economic growth levels.\(^{275}\)

Instead of complete structural and procedural integration, the Indo-US defense cooperation provides for an informal alliance for practical arms-length collaboration. Divergences in Indo-US strategic relations relate to lack of procedural policy coordination, Indian desire for strategic autonomy, and operational coordination.\(^{276}\) India and the US hold different interpretations of freedom of navigation passage.\(^{277}\) Unlike the US, India does not incorporate freedom of navigation as a vital national collaboration. The Indo-US naval exercise was held in 2010 in Gao, Okinawa in 2011, and the Bay of Bengal in 2012.


\(^{273}\) Sino-Indian strategic interests clash in Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, and Aksai Chin. Ideological differences and animosity for great power hegemony define the clash of India-China regional aspirations in South Asia including a war in 1962. Complex Interdependence framed on trade complementarities set the context of contemporary Sino-Indian relations.


\(^{276}\) Overall, the Iranian factor plays an important role in Indo-US strategic relations. Systemic level constraints are witnessed in the US insisting India to limit its relations with Tehran. The US made Indian support on sanctions against Iran conditional to the grant of a nuclear deal. The US put pressure to constraint the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. It also pressurized India to reduce oil import from Iran, critically reducing energy imports.

\(^{277}\) The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the right of freedom to enter territorial sea to all ships under Article 17. India’s grants passage without prior permission. Washington makes it mandatory to take prior notification and permission.
interest. Indian policy makers have desired to maintain strategic autonomy remaining averse to signing a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) to provide for communications system interoperability. Indo-US strategic collaboration has awaited the conclusion of Logistics Support Agreement.

China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and energy security interests have allowed Beijing to resort to coercive tactics leading to the rise in regional anxieties. China’s offensive expansionism of interests has in turn led to the US policy of ‘strategic reassurance’ to allies, which has been manifested in the Pivot Asia strategy. The US up-gradation of defence treaties has allowed the South East Asian littoral states to increase their defence budgets and resort to hedging. The US naval collaboration with India, Japan and Australia has created maritime strategic nexus while increasing the Indian regional clout and stretch of maritime influence in the Asia-Pacific.

5.3 Implications for Pakistan’s Maritime Security

This section reviews Indo-US maritime collaboration in the Asia-Pacific and its impact on Pakistan’s maritime security interests. It argues that Indo-US maritime collaboration has alarmed China and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean. Indo-US maritime manoeuvres have allowed Sino-Pak to counter-balance by resorting to resource dependent strategies.

Great powers’ policies have borne directly on South Asia’s geo-political and strategic landscape entailing implications for regional security. Sino-US maritime cooperation and rivalry in the Indian Ocean has specified a tough competition. Neo-structural realism tends to explain Sino-US convergence and divergence of interests in the Indian Ocean with wider repercussion for Pakistan’s security and stability. Pivot Asia is the manifestation of US ‘strategic ring of encirclement’ to contain China in Asia. To counterbalance the move, China has projected the policy of wei qei, a preventive strategy manifested in String of Pearls—the net of ports in the continental shelf of the Indian Ocean. The term was first published in Booz Allen Hamilton report ‘Energy Futures in Asia’ for the US Department of Defense, a consultancy firm defining China’s energy supply strategy. China’s development of commercial maritime bases in Pakistan

(Gwadar, Pasni), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Myanmar (Sittwe and Kyaukpyu) and Bangladesh (Chittagong) reflect such a counterbalancing strategy.

The String of Pearls has acted as China’s node of influence in the Indian Ocean — the exit point of the Indian Ocean from east to west. The Chinese strategy has sought to achieve two key objectives: ensure security of the SLOCS and diversify route for the acquisition of energy resources. China has hoped to bypass the SLOC via ports built from the Indian Ocean. China has sought to link the seaports to Chinese heartland, while emphasizing that these ports are meant for trade and commercial storage facilities. The US and Indian scholars such as James R. Holmes & Toshi Yoshihara have cited evidence to show China’s naval espionage via the alleged SIGINT facilities in Coco Islands or via discreet hydrographic research. The scholars have argued that ports signify China’s reconnaissance and surveillance facilities on Indo-US maritime expansion along the Indian Ocean Rim.279

China has sought to neutralize Indian naval hegemony in the Indian Ocean, while counter-balancing the US global ambitions. The String of pearls has reflected Chinese drive to improve logistical support built on economic and diplomatic relations. China believes that Indo-US maritime collaboration has sought to encircle China in the Indian Ocean. String of Pearls has allowed China to modernize its military capability to outmaneuver the Indo-US maritime collaboration in the Indian Ocean. International Law has prohibited neutral states to provide logistical support for naval operations during the war. However, it has not obliged states to close their bases either. The String of Pearls may allow refueling and provide logistical cushion to Chinese naval deployments in the Indian Ocean in case of war.

The US has built on Stephen Walt’s ‘balancing against threat logic’ to counter balance China’s development of global interest. To prevent emergence of a rising hegemon, the US has aimed to work on the prospect of having two hegemons — India and China rather than one in the Indian Ocean region. The US has wielded financial stakes in conventional arms sales to the Indian Ocean region besides protection of oil interests in

the Pacific and Far Eastern region. The US corporate sector has held capital investments in Persian Gulf oil production, transportation and sale. Indian reverse strategy called the necklace of diamonds has built on conduction of maritime exercises with Australia, Japan Singapore, Vietnam, Burma and the US. While hedging with the US, the Indian policy can be interpreted as overt balancing against China. Map 5.5 has shown International Sea Lanes of Communication.

China has initiated joint naval exercises and counter-terrorism collaboration with Pakistan such as Amaan in the Arabian Sea. China has signed a MoU on defense cooperation with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Seychelles. A defense agreement with Bangladesh has allowed China to use the harbor of Chittagong to avail refueling rights for Chinese aircrafts. Chittagong port has exposed India to pressure from the Chinese navy, allowing it to bypass the Strait of Malacca. In February 2007, China has signed a treaty with Maldives to increase strategic leverage. China has constructed a naval base at Marao Atolls and a one billion dollar port in Himbantota, Sri Lanka. China has reinvigorated ties with the African states. China and Thailand have discussed construction of a canal at Kra to link the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea. China has conducted joint naval exercises with ASEAN in 2008. China has built several military and commercial facilities in Myanmar, Cocco Island and Sittwee.

China’s naval expansion has stimulated economic activity providing venues for shipping, energy and infrastructure development. Yet it has raised Indian security concerns in the Indian Ocean. To counterbalance, India has held Simbex naval exercises with Singapore in the Bay of Bengal. It has conducted Milan exercises involving 15 participants, Mauritius, Seychelles, Maldives, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Vietnam, Philippines and Australia excluding China. India has systematically stretched its naval access as far as Mauritius, 1,200 miles southwest of Addu Atoll in the Maldives, 960 nautical miles

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280 China’s oil consumption reaches to 10.6 million barrels per day by 2015. Indian demand for oil import reaches to 91 percent by 2030.
281 Indian navy has become increasingly active. Naval drills include joint exercises with the US, Russia, UK, France and Australia as well as with Indonesia, Oman, UAE and Bangladesh, etc.
to the west and south of Diego Garcia. India can use atolls as combat bases, intelligence sharing, logistics and support functions, using maritime patrol aircraft and UAVs. India has stretched its naval reach to the southwest of Indian Ocean with its combat aircrafts deployed in Africa and Alaska. With Indian maritime position well entrenched, India has enjoyed free access to large expanse of the Indian Ocean to the south and to the west.

The PLAN navy so far has not engaged in activities of overt military nature on its maritime bases. Indian security analyst Gurpreet S. Khurana has cited several factors for China’s maritime expansion from reducing vulnerability of strategic imports to protection of energy investments to economic competition. China may want to achieve geo-strategic leverage against adversaries and seek to reinforce nuclear strike capability against India. Mearsheimer’s logic can be applied: States intentions are intangible to measure whether offensive or defensive in nature.

For China, Russia may not obstruct access to oil and gas supplies in Central Asia, China’s Persian Gulf dilemma stands more vulnerable to the Indo-US hegemony extending from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca. For China, the maritime threat has entailed the uneasy specter of a likely Indo-US-Japan-Australia coalition blocking the SLOCs. The US Pacific Strategic Command (PACOM) monitors India, while it has put the rest of South Asia and Central Asia in CENTCOM. Series of chokepoints have limited entry and exit from the Indian Ocean. Indian naval deployment has demonstrated appreciation for all key points: the Cape of Good Horn in the southwest; Red Sea to the west; the Straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda to the East; the waters around Australia to the distant southeast. The Indian navy is extending its reach westward by developing ties off the East coast of Africa. The Indian Far

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284 Ibid.
287 Scholars point to three options for China in case of such a scenario: accept US hegemony; challenge it through inevitable growth of China’s economic and military power; adopt a win-win solution to energy related problems.
288 Ibid.
289 Indian combat aircraft have deployed to South Africa and Alaska for exercises. The Indian navy has conducted round-the-world-cruise with a training ship. See Lawrence Saez, “US
Eastern Naval Command based in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands have extended Indian naval reach eastward.

Though constructed on reciprocity of convergence of interests, Gwadar has placed Pakistan in the strategic camp of China. Great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean has made Pakistan’s geo-strategic location a strategic liability. Construction of the Gwadar port has made Islamabad a prawn in great power politics. Gwadar has served as Pakistan’s outlet to far-off energy reserves in Central Asia as far as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan and beyond. Pakistan can serve as the ‘evacuation point’ for the Caspian Sea oil reserves. While Asia-Pacific defines the exit point of the world’s key oil transportation networks starting from Aden to Lombok and Sunda to Malacca, the straits of Hormuz defines funnel entrance of the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location in close vicinity to the global oil life-line has made it part of the great powers’ impending rivalry. It is imperative to analyze Gwadar’s geo-strategic and geo-economic advantages served for China, followed by those for Pakistan.

The US desire to contain China in the Southwest and Central Asian region holds repercussions for Pakistan’s territorial integrity and its inter-state relations. Obama’s pivot Asia strategy has demonstrated a defensive positionalist orientation at the ‘entry point’ of what Zibignew Brzezinski termed as ‘Arc of Crisis.’ The designated region has started from Hormuz and extended to Malacca in the Asia-Pacific. At the global level, Sino-US maritime strategic competition for dominance has unveiled in China’s construction of Gwadar, close to Hormuz. At the regional level, great powers competitive dynamics have spurred in a chain reaction in the construction of Chabhar, straining Pakistan’s relations with Iran and India. The Pentagon has termed the bid to control major chokepoints from Middle East to South China Sea as indicative of China’s grand strategy aiming to control the SLOCs. China’s development of blue


290 Strait of Malacca represents the end point of Zibignew Brzezinski’s Arc of Crisis.

water navy, sea mines and long range ballistic missile capability has rendered the US credibility of oil supplies as uncertain.

China’s maximum missile range capability extends up to 13000 kms. Chinese short range missile range capability can hit South Asia. Indian security analyst Anirudha Gupta has observed that external factors have made South Asian security climate riddled with undesirable complexities.292 Over the years, West Asia has emerged as energy hub for the rapidly growing economies of Asia-Pacific and South Asia. Requiring Russian, Central Asian and the Persian Gulf vast oil and gas reserves, these economies have needed the transport corridor of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan to fuel their growth. China envisioned numerous energy delivery options, including building overland pipelines and roads benefitting from Pakistan’s prime location.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a manifestation of China’s energy security strategy. Gwadar has allowed a strategic outlet to China in great powers’ quest for energy, serving as the downstream energy outlet of oil and gas import and transportation for China. Gwadar has offered the shortest distance from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea compared to other sea routes. Leased for 40 years, Gwadar has entailed strategic, economic and commercial advantages for China, making it an integral component of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In an interview with the author, Senior Research Fellow Professor Michel Lun at China Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), a think-tank associated with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has stated that ‘in the initial period, China intends to use the Gwadar port as an economic base. Yet with the passage of time and depending upon the requirement as it may be, China intends to use the port as a strategic base.’293

Sustenance of China’s economic rise critically depends on the feasible access of energy imports on the more competent option of Gwadar compared to the alternate maritime options in Chahbhar or land access across the Bay of Bengal. The port has allowed China the supreme advantage of being the only great power with access to twin seas —

293 Interview conducted by the scribe with Senior Research Fellow Professor Michel Lun at the China Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), Beijing, China.
Arabian Sea and Asia Pacific. Construction, planning and execution of the port comprise China’s important maritime vision reflected through the CPEC, the southern tier of BRI strategy.

Located 72 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz and linked to China’s western regions via the Karakoram Highway, the port has cut China’s sea transportation from 24 days to only 72 hours journey. Furnishing Western China’s trade link to the sea outlet in the Arabian Sea, the proposed pipeline reduces China’s oil shipment by more than 4000 nautical miles. China has planned to pipe-down petrochemicals from Central Asia (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) for land transportation across Khunjerab to Western China. Gwadar has allowed China to ship the Persian Gulf oil overland to its hinterland via Xinjiang. It can load minerals from Afghanistan via tankers for road transportation to China. A proposed pipeline has entailed the prospect of oil import from Africa and the Middle East. China’s Port Holding, China Merchant and Cosco Shipping handle the seaport at Gwadar. The port has provided China speedy access to energy imports, overcoming growing militarization in the Indian Ocean and a feasible solution to China’s Malacca dilemma. The upstream land based energy transport route has secured China from external disruptive influences. Offshore energy investments in Africa and Middle East have factored largely in China’s rationale for naval presence in the Arabian Sea.

The construction of Gwadar port has entailed multifarious opportunities and challenges for Pakistan. An integral southern tier of BRI, Gwadar constitutes the vital life-line of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It holds huge potential to serve as the economic inter-link for Pakistan’s south, central and western regions. Pakistan’s maritime convergence of interests with China contains a substantial revenue generation resource as a trans-shipment port for natural resources from land-locked Central Asian states.294 In an interview conducted by the author, Senior Research Fellow Moazzam Khan of Pakistan Naval War College has opined that Pakistan would quickly collect $60 billion a year in transit fees over the next 20 years.295 Additionally, the port will

294 Inaugurated in 2002, China bore bulk of the port’s construction costs. In 2002, Phase I was started completing it successfully in 2006, while work on Phase II started in 2007 and completed in 2010.
295 Interview with Moazzam Khan, Senior Research Fellow, Pakistan Navy War College, Islamabad, November 18-19, 2014.
generate employment opportunities for economic growth in the under developed hinterland of Pakistan. Pakistan has enjoyed a coastal stretch of 990 kms west to east with its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covering a continental shelf of 240,000 sq kms. An additional 50,000 sq km has been granted to Pakistan in a recent settlement with India.

Moazzam Khan disclosed that Pakistan has joined hands with the great powers to undertake international maritime responsibilities. Pakistan has also developed maritime infrastructure alongside its Makran coast. As part of its international maritime collaboration strategy, Pakistan has become an active member of the US-led multinational Combined Task Force, CTF 150. The mission has covered an area of responsibility from Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Oman, to the Red Sea in the Arabian Sea. In January 2009, the Combined Maritime Task Forces headquarter in Bahrain formed CTF 151 — a maritime coalition composed of ships and aircrafts from 20 countries. As part of international maritime diplomacy, the Pakistan navy instituted a multinational exercise called AMAAN in 2011 to reinforce regional security.

Pakistan Maritime Doctrine entitled *Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan — Preserving Freedom of the Seas* has provided for national perspective on maritime security. The vision of Pakistan Navy has embodied the concept of ‘a modern potent navy manned by motivated professionals that contribute efficiently to provide for deterrence and national security across the full threat spectrum and is capable of generating influence region-wide with a global outlook.

Strategically, Gwadar has served as the farthest seaport from Indian naval bases and airfields. As an additional port further west from Karachi, Pasni and Ormara, Gwadar has provided a strategic edge against Indian maritime dominance, 72 nautical miles away from the key supply lines on the Strait of Hormuz. The bottleneck of Gwadar has

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296 The task force has aimed to counter the threat of piracy at the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has commanded the CTF151 six times since 2009. With 36,000 ships passing through its area of influence, Pakistan navy’s role acquires a considerable importance in anti-piracy.
297 The concept has entailed information sharing, identifying areas of common interest for participating navies and a shared understanding on maritime security operations, counter terrorism and humanitarian assistance. Pakistan has formed a joint Maritime Information and Coordination Center JMICC for sharing information to the threat of piracy.
evaded Indian imposition of a naval blockade, as happened in the 1971 war. Although Pakistan has not granted basing rights to Chinese naval warships,’ yet it has leased Gwadar port for a period of 40 years to China. In September 2014, a flotilla of the PLA Navy made a friendly visit to Karachi, followed by several other Chinese navals to Pakistan’s coastal periphery.²⁹⁹

The Gwadar port has reinvented Pakistan’s role as the most significant player on the global arena. At the diplomatic level, Sino-Pakistan has co-operated at the bilateral and multilateral levels, while taking a common position on global and regional matters.³⁰⁰ Pakistan’s location has served as a gateway to the West and Central Asian States amid China’s growing energy security concerns. Surpassing the US in 2010, China’s oil consumption is likely to double by the year 2025—of which almost 70 per cent will be pooled from the Middle East. As Gwadar has served as the closest access point from the Persian Gulf, energy access and regional influence has made Pakistan strategically crucial for Beijing.³⁰¹

As China has aspired for a greater naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the benefits of Sino-Pakistan security relationship are more manifest for China.³⁰² The US has viewed with concern China’s naval presence at Gwadar close to the bottleneck of Hormuz, allowing China to monitor the US warships. Gwadar holds the potential to serve China as a strategic ‘listening post,’ monitoring ship traffic in the Arabian Sea. The port facilitates China as a strategic foothold in the provision of logistics, supplies and repairing facilities for naval ships during sea-operations. India has viewed with concern the Chinese ability of refueling long time maritime operations in the sea. The US raised concerns with Musharraf on Gwadar’s construction, citing alarm that it had ‘disturbed the regional maritime balance.’

The port’s viability and success is directly linked to operationalization of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Serving as the mouth of the CPEC, the port’s construction

²⁹⁹ Talat Masood, “Pakistan’s unique relations with China,” The Express Tribune, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, February 11, 2015.
³⁰⁰ Ibid.
has raised security challenges for Pakistan’s physical integrity and political unity. Pakistan has irked the US by conceding Gwadar’s construction rights to the Chinese Harbor Engineering Port, reclaiming from the US affiliated Singapore Company that had the construction rights initially. The CPEC project has unduly caught Pakistan into great powers offshore and onshore strategic balancing of interests. Pakistan has been intertwined in Sino-US ‘new great game’ fought on the strategic chessboard of Central Asia and Afghanistan. The Indo-US defence and maritime collaboration has thrown Pakistan into the strategic basket of China. The China-Pakistan strategic nexus has developed as a counter-reaction to Indo-US strategic partnership. Pakistani research scholar Humayun Gauhar has argued that the US grand design aims to move China ‘out of every strategic advantage that it enjoys in Pakistan.’ Otherwise China’s encirclement would be futile.’

The US research scholar Robert D. Kaplan has linked the future of Gwadar to security condition in Balochistan. Kaplan has further argued that Gwadar’s development will either ensure the riches of Central Asia or push Pakistan into an endless civil war.’ The US security expert Bruce Riedel argued that the project has positioned Pakistan ‘into the Intensive Care Unit of the global state system, casting large doubts on its survival and continuity.’ The American expert Selig S. Harrison has argued that Pakistan has granted China a base at Gwadar within the center of the Bloch territory. An independent Balochistan may serve to counter the anti-radical forces fighting the US. The henceforth deserted and hostile land has become alarmingly significant for its strategic location and the rich potential of oil and uranium resources. The crisis in Balochistan has entailed socio-political dividend detrimental to Pakistan’s political cohesion and unity. According to Selig S. Harrison, the dispute has pit the Bloch against the Pushtoon tribesmen in the rough borderlands of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. If remained unresolved, it would yield regional and global repercussions to the disintegration of Pakistan itself.

Gwadar signifies Sino-US interplay of global competitive dynamics. Forcing Pakistan to face a volatile security threat along its southern coastal boundary, the port has caught Pakistan into a spiral of suspicion and hostility with its regional neighbors India and Iran. The interplay of Sino-US maritime power politics in the Indian Ocean has thrown Pakistan to swing between the devil and the blue sea. Evidently, the Chinese maneuvers to prevent strategic encirclement by the US have led to Indian matching response of strategic maritime expansion in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan faces Indian expansionist ambitions in the Arabian Sea. Indian maneuvers have created a security threat for Pakistan’s maritime and coastal security. Meanwhile, regional interlocutors India and Pakistan have been required to maintain overt strategic balancing on great power’s roller coaster ride.

Interestingly, the Gwadar project has held security impediments for the Chinese workers. A series of attacks targeting Chinese nationals have become a regular feature since the Chinese engineers have undertaken the construction of Gwadar deep seaport. Pakistani research scholar Ahmed Rashid Malik, while un-wielding the rationale of attacks, has argued that energy corridor is being targeted rather than construction workers. On July 8, 2007, three Chinese mechanics were killed in an attack in Peshawar. Pakistan has alleged the Indian RAW agents’ involvement in the attacks on Chinese engineers/workers in Balochistan. Pakistan has believed that by intimidating Chinese engineers, India seeks to disrupt CPEC developmental activities. The Chinese deaths have scared the private sector out of Pakistan.

Citing concern, the editorial of Pakistani English newspapers have demanded security for Chinese workers. The Chinese construction company Hogs demanded fool-proof security as a primary condition to initiate construction work at Neelum-Jhelum hydel power plant.

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308 Of the numerous similar instances of attacks on Chinese workers, a car bomb killed three Chinese engineers out of the 500 employed at the Gwadar seaport in 2004. At the Gomal Zam Dam, two Chinese engineers were kidnapped in South Waziristan. Gwadar airport too came under rocket attack. In 2006, three Chinese working at the Gwadar seaport were gunned down by unknown attackers at Hub. On July 19th 2007, a time-bomb blast on the RCD Highway killed 24 policemen and local citizens in a bid to target Chinese engineers travelling from hub zinc mines in Balochistan. See editorial, “Why are the Chinese being Targeted?” Daily Times, Peshawar, July 20, 2007.
309 Ibid.
A newspaper has reported that the Pakistani law enforcing agencies arrested terrorists who confessed RAW involvement in the murdering of Chinese nationals on July 8, 2007 at Peshawar. The Pakistani officials have cited substantial evidence of Indian assistance to the terrorists. The Indian ex-naval officers, Kulbushan Yadav’s indictment by the Pakistani officials on spying and running a terrorist network has validated the Pakistani claims of Indian involvement in Balochistan.

Pakistan has believed that regional and extra-regional forces have fuelled the conflict in Baluchistan apparently in the attempt to weaken Pakistan. Baluchistan has served as the gateway to the rare hinterland of the subcontinent — the focal point of the immense mineral wealth in Southwest and Central Asia. Balochistan’s strategic potency has derived from its rich mineral wealth, natural gas, oil, gold and copper reserves resources. Most significant is the Rickodek gold reserve, the world’s 4th largest deposit of gold, worth $260 billion. The Bloch conflict has involved the demand by Baloch nationalists for greater autonomy and increased royalty from natural resources. The conflict has taken the form of a sustained insurgency fuelled by Bloch insurgents of multifaceted brands for greater autonomy against the centre.

312 Following Musharraf’s crackdown on Baloch nationalists, Baloch sardars took refuge in Afghanistan. Nawab Akbar Bugti, however, was killed in a military operation in Balochistan. “Pakistan summons envoy on ‘spy’ arrest, India rejects claims,” *The Hindu*, International Islamabad/New Delhi, March 26, 2016.
313 Metallic mineral deposits discovered in Balochistan province are copper, chromite, iron, lead, zinc, titanium, manganese and antimony. Vast resources of copper and gold have been discovered in Chagai district of Balochistan at Saindak, Koh-i-Dalil, Dash-i-Kain, Durban Chah, Kabul Koh, Zairat Pir Sultan, Rekodiq and a number of other places. Total recoverable metals from Saindak deposit will be 1.69 million tons of copper, 2.24 million ounces of gold, and 2.49 million ounces of silver, worth thousands of million dollars. The Rekodiq Mining Project is a US $ 3.3 billion investment project, with an estimated mine life of 56 years. The annual production of the TCC Rekodiq project is estimated at 200,000 tons of copper and 250,000 ounces of gold from 600,000 tons of concrete. Non-metallic minerals deposits of Balochistan include, barite, gypsum and anhydrite, limestone and dolomite, magnetite, onyx, marble, sand, sulphur, coal, flour and gravel etc.
315 The province boasts of 19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves and 6 trillion barrels of oil, in addition to other minerals.
316 Baloch nationalists namely the Balochistan Liberation Army allege that the federal government of Pakistan systematically suppresses progress to keep the province weak. As manifestation of ethnic unrest demanding a greater share in national resources, the insurgency in Balochistan picked up following Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s assassination in 2006. Jon Sloki, the “Head of Human Rights Commission” was kidnapped in 2009, which caught the attention of the world media to the issue of insurgency in Balochistan. On 12 August, Khan of Kalat, Mir Suleman Dawood declared himself the ruler of independent Balochistan, setting up
The western and north eastern portions of Balochistan have encompassed Mackinder’s theory of the Rimland, unveiling new geo-political realities. The Baloch Liberation Army has received offers from foreign powers for compensation for allowing exploiting Rickodek reserves in independent Balochistan. External powers have also used Balochistan as a platform to stage hostilities against Iran and Afghanistan. The kidnapping of Chinese engineers, workers and investors have unveiled the global designs of engendering instability in Balochistan, preventing Pakistan’s prospects to benefit from the region’s wealth.

Baluchistan’s strategic location has invited contending powers, riding on the roller coaster ride of sub-nationalist leaders, to establish a foot-hold in the coastal belt of Makran. International powers, ostensibly the US and China and regional powers India and Iran appear to have an interest in Balochistan. The conflict’s international dimension has sought to exploit Baluchistan’s potential as a gateway to Afghanistan, creating the predicament of security for Pakistan. Vision of an independent Balochistan for its international sponsors will create a buffer between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Instability in Balochistan can hamper the land-link preventing Pakistan’s direct access to neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan has viewed with skepticism the US elevation of Indian role in Afghanistan instigated by the desire to weaken Pakistan. Bloch perpetrators have received backing from the US Congressmen at the behest of Indian lobbyists.

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317 Government and state intelligence agencies confirm reports of Indian links with insurgents in Balochistan.
318 Operationalization of the Gawadar port will lead ports in the neighbouring countries to lose significance. Hence states retain interest to destabilize the region. The government of Pakistan has signed trilateral transit trade agreements involving Afghanistan with Central Asian Republics namely Tashkent and Uzbekistan to avail the Gawadar port facility and land routes.
Pakistani research scholar Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti has argued that terrorists have sought to derail Pakistan’s economic growth and foil its strategic partnership with China.\textsuperscript{320} Although the center vs. provincial resource allocation has factored in Baloch leaders’ resentment against the federation, Pakistan has alleged that India has instigated the anti-nationalist and sub-nationalist elements on mineral reserves royalty rights in Baluchistan. Through formulating joint strategies and guidelines for local law-enforcing agencies,\textsuperscript{321} Sino-Pakistan has formed a joint task force to ensure fool-proof security for the Chinese nationals in Pakistan.

Energy and trade outflows earmark China’s national security interest in Gwadar, increasing prospects for its economic development and military growth. Independent Balochistan may serve to establish the US foot-hold along the southern borders of Iran, while checking China’s access to the Arabian Sea. Global and regional balancing has framed the Indo-US strategic policy designs in Balochistan. India and the US have held much geo-strategic and economic interest in China’s containment of investment interests in Balochistan. India has held multiple financial stakes in the Gulf financial centers. Gwadar’s development would eclipse Indo-Gulf financial interests in the region. Research analyst Shireen Mazari has argued that a Chinese strategic port uncomfortably close to the US forward deployment base in the Gulf has become strategically unacceptable to the US.\textsuperscript{322} Moreover, the Indo-US corporate interests have entrenched in the energy reserves of Central Asia and the Middle East. Instability in Balochistan will retard operationalization of CPEC in the southern belt.

Regional integration framed on economic collaboration has held the prospects of making it a strong foot-hold for China. The Iran Pakistan India (IPI) and Turkemanistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) gas pipeline projects are inextricably linked to promotion of stability in the region. The Iran-US-India coalition is more acceptable to the US than a neutral, rogue or non-aligned Iran.\textsuperscript{323} The Indo-US strategic interest is

\begin{itemize}
 \item Ibid.
 \item In a way, the US had helped Iran by removing two important threats: Taliban and Iraq post 9/11. The thaw in Iran-US relations has developed following the nuclear talks between Iran and p5+1 in November 2013, which has led the interim government to resolve the nuclear issue of
\end{itemize}
desirous of a downturn in Pakistan relations with Iran. A US aligned Saudi Arabia may
in-filter regional instability acting against its ideological rival Iran in Siestan. This has
led to mutual allegations of support for cross border insurgency in greater Balochistan
and Pakistan’s border tensions with Iran. Moreover, Iran-Pakistan interests have
clashed in neighboring Afghanistan. Iran has supported *Hizb-e-Wahadat* against
Pakistani support for *Hizb-i-Islami* in Afghanistan.

Iran has believed that the US presence in Afghanistan has promoted a fierce cycle of
violence and instability, strengthening Tehran’s adversaries the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Iran has granted training and funds to support the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and
Baloch Republican Army (BRA) to prevent Pakistan’s regional backing for the Taliban
in Afghanistan.\(^{324}\) Iranian belief in Pakistan-Saudi nexus has sustained Tehran’
contours of relations with Pakistan. Tehran has reined in as the mentor of the 20 percent
Shia community in Pakistan. Islamabad has, however, accused the Shia militant groups
of receiving training and financial support from Iran for infusing sectarianism in
Pakistan. The Sunni retaliation has resulted in resurgence of support to Baloch
insurgents in Seistan, while back-firing counter attacks on Sunnis and the state assets
in Pakistan.

To highlight Chabhar, it has suited the Iranian interests to in-filter a low level
insurgency in Balochistan. Iran has, however, abstained from supporting full
independence for Balochistan, fearing a backlash in Seistan. An apparent hurdle has

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\(^{324}\) State agencies repeatedly complain about presence of Afghanistan sponsored militant
training camps, supporting terrorism in Balochistan. The Baloch sub-nationalist leaders reside
in foreign countries and frequently visit India to highlight the problem of insurgency in
Balochistan. Radicals and rogue elements found refugee post 9/11 in Balochistan. Human
trafficking, weapons, smuggling and illegal trade are rampant in the Pakistan-Iran and Pak-
Afghanistan regions of Balochistan.
been Iran’s interest in the export of gas from Pars fields to Nawabshah in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{325} Internal fissures of instability deriving from impoverishment in Iran and Pakistan have sustained external regional and international influence in Balochistan. Uneven socio-economic development and regional disparity has caused ethnic mobilization, resulting in the regional spill over of ethnic affinities. Persian dominance in Siestan and Punjabi dominance has led to socio-political unrest and polarization against the center in Iran and Pakistan. Empowering the Balochis will avoid fissures on both sides of the border in Pakistan and Iran.

The international dimension of the Baloch conflict is evident from the issue of greater Pushtoonistan and independent Balochistan. The operation of drone strikes, presence of Central Intelligence Agency operatives and ‘Black Waters’ to spot Al-Qaeda is linked to the US greater design to maintain stability in Central Asian region. It also reflects on the US strategic design to develop a condition of dependence to sustain regional hegemony.\textsuperscript{326} Pakistan has alleged that the Indo-US connection has made Tehran a hot-bed of intrigues, a constant source of support and inspiration to RAW functionaries in Baluchistan.\textsuperscript{327} The Indian consulates in Afghanistan have reportedly actively engaged in establishing links with disgruntled elements of Baluchistan to promote instability in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{328} Insecurity in Baluchistan has increased the prospects for Chabhar, while it has forced China to shift and divert investments from Pakistan. Iran has received massive investments from India to connect Chabhar with Central Asian states via rail/roads networks, bypassing Pakistan.

In the post 2014 geo-strategic environment, Pakistani research scholar Nazir Hussain has argued that the Indo-Afghan-Iran accord on Chabhar has constituted a strategic threat for Pakistan. India has funded rail and road networks to link Chabhar to Herat in

\textsuperscript{325} Pak-Iran Joint Venture Refinery built at Hub in Balochistan is another instance of regional cooperation, creating mutual interdependence in the right direction, helping to save $300 million per annum for Pakistan in foreign exchange.

\textsuperscript{326} Indian designs for proxy involvement have been supported by the Pakistan’s Secretary of Defense Report to Senate Standing committee with undeniable proofs of Indian involvement in Balochistan.


Afghanistan and onward to Central Asia. Contributed by $100m offered by India, a 200 kms road has connected Chabhar to Zaranj and then Herat in Afghanistan, bypassing the transit to Central Asia available through Pakistan. In the prevalent strategic environment, Chabhar’s fast paced development and well-connected rail/road infrastructure has made the port a better strategic option compared to Gwadar. Complex interdependence explains Sino-Pakistan convergence of interest post 9/11. Indian analyst Gurpreet S. Khurana has argued that China’s desire to corridor Pakistan as an energy conduit from Central Asia and the Persian Gulf has dovetailed on Islamabad’s desire to expand economy by promoting trade. China has multiple interests in Gwadar. The project has allowed Beijing access to warm waters, ensure oil supplies from the Middle East, maintain trade outlet to the Gulf, and check Indo-US hegemonic ambitions. On the contrary, India has aspired to prevent China from projecting power in the Arabian Sea, while hampering Chinese prospects for transit trade in Central Asia and the developmental projects of Balochistan.

Sino-US maritime involvement and great powers’ off-shore balancing of maritime interests has carried immense security implications for South Asian regional stability. Sino-US interplay of security competition in the South China Sea has implications for Pakistan’s regional security in South Asia. Sino-US naval presence in the Indian Ocean has brought forth great power rivalry to the coastal doorstep of South Asia. The Indo-US maritime, nuclear and strategic collaboration has increased the propensity for armed

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330 Full potential of Gwadar remains subject to rail-road construction networks linking Afghanistan via Quetta/Chaman and upstream towards the north through the Indus Highway near Sukkur to KKH in Abbottabad. KKH provides the vital link across the Khunjerab pass to Xinjiang. China can access to the Gwadar port through overland links stretching to and fro from the Karakoram Highway further inland through the National Highway grid in the south. The under-construction 950-km Gwadar-Turbat-Khuzdar and Ratodero highway projects, construction of the Quetta-Loralai-Dera Ghazi Khan road, the under-construction Sibi-Kohlu road, and building of Gwadar-Dalbandin-Kandahar railway lines aim to provide inland connectivity. However, Indian perspective holds that these routes traverse insurgency affected areas of Pakistan and China, effecting Pakistan’s vision of an economic hub in Gawadar. Therefore a military strategic intent overrides commercial and economic motivations in construction of Gwadar. See Gurpreet S. Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications,” Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Vol. 32, No 1, 2008 available at: http://www.tandfoline.com, accessed February 27, 2008.
polarization along Indo-Pakistan coastal periphery. Great power rivalry has unleashed a maritime security competition in the Indian Ocean, implicating Pakistan in regional security competition with India. The Indo-US collusion of maritime security interests has inflated the role of the Indian navy. The move has compelled Pakistan’s counter balancing to neutralize Indian preponderance along its coastal belt. As a strategic compulsion, Pakistan has been impelled to increase its maritime collaboration with China.

This chapter therefore argued that threat perception from China has fit in a neat fix to explain the Indo-US maritime convergence of interests in the Asia-Pacific region. While the US strategy has worked on neo-structural realist balancing, India resorts to what can be termed as ‘hedging’ or softer balancing. As an implied concept and a policy, involving a process of engagement, hedging includes both internal and external balancing. While both the US and India indulged in external balancing, both have resorted to internal balancing to invoke independence in their respective foreign policies stances.

Neo-structural realism tends to explain the Indo-US maritime convergence of interests in the Indian Ocean. To Indian analysts, Indo-US naval collaboration promises an instance of Indian strategic expansion into the Indian Ocean. India’s strategic alliances and maritime inter-operability has offered India magnanimous prospects for increasing its power and expanding its influence. In striking an informal strategic alliance with the US, India has tended to counter China’s naval expansionism in the Indian Ocean. The convergence of maritime strategic interests has brought Indian naval collaboration with Australia, while eliminating traditional distinctions between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. At this juncture, it would be interesting to examine how Sino-US competition post 9/11 affected Pakistan’s overall security. Within this context, the next chapter analyses the implications of this very competition for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level.

CHAPTER 6
SINO-US COMPETITION POST 9/11:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN’S DOMESTIC SECURITY

This chapter discusses the implications of Sino-US rivalry post 9/11 to argue that Sino-US competition has consequences for Pakistan’s domestic security. Sino-US competition post 9/11 weakened Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion while aggravating political violence in the state. Sino-US expansion of influence exaggerated the civil-military divide while adversely affecting the growth of democracy in Pakistan. The increase in the US influence alarmed China, leading to Beijing’s subtle expansion of geo-strategic and economic influence in Pakistan.

This chapter is divided into two sections: 1) Sino-US interests in Pakistan; 2) China-US competition: civil-military relations and democracy in Pakistan; 3) The US and China: Implications for terrorism in Pakistan; 4) Sino-US competition: Implications for Pakistan’s economic stability.

6.1 Sino-US Interests in Pakistan

This section discusses Sino-US competing interests and the implications for Pakistan’s domestic stability. It argues that strategic, economic and political factors have guided Sino-US policy interests in Pakistan. Sino-US has desired for socio-political cohesion, stability and continuity while showing a convergence of interests to contain the threat of radical Islamism in and around Pakistan. Simultaneously, Sino-US interests have diverged on geo-economic resource competition and the expansion of political influence, which has had implications for Pakistan’s domestic stability.

Sino-US involvement in South Asia has framed on geo-strategic and ideological competition. Stephen Walt’s logic of ‘balancing against threat’ has defined the context of Sino-US involvement in South Asia. Two significant global developments set forth the stage for the US involvement in South Asia: the US perception of China’s rise and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Western scholar Franz- Stefan Gady has argued that great power politics has been manifested in the US policy of regional alignment with India and reinforcement through the ‘re-balance or pivot to Asia policy.’

Consequently, the US policy in South Asia post 9/11 focussed on building political, strategic and economic ties with India as a counterweight to China. India acquired formidable presence in the US National Security architecture for South Asia since 2001 based on the US strategic calculations of Indian advantageous position in geography and maritime capability in the region. Meanwhile, the US relations with Pakistan became trans-lucid, fluid and opaque during this time-period.

Sino-US power interplay has had an impact on South Asian regional stability and Pakistan’s domestic security. Great powers competitive dynamics has strengthened regional polarization, exacerbatating Indo-Pakistan imbalance of power parity. Realism has thrown light on Sino-US power balancing in Pakistan. Standing at the crossroads of a rising Asia, competitive dynamics of Sino-US power interplay in the South Asian region can be discerned. Sino-US security competition has engulfed the South Asian region, which stands in close vicinity to energy-rich regions of the Middle East and Central Asia. To the key energy resources in Central Asia, Pakistan provides shortest outlet to the Arabian Sea. Hence Pakistan’s geo-strategic location is intrinsically exposed to the fluidity of Sino-US strategic competitive alignment policy. One Belt and One Road Initiative (BRI) has reflected China’s expansion of policy interests or pivot to West Asia. Instigated as the reactionary move to the Indo-US nexus, Sino-

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2 The US has denied a similar nuclear deal for civilian purposes to Pakistan despite its allocation of up-graded Non-Nato Allied Status to Pakistan.  
4 The US pressurizes Pakistan to act in FATA, while China has sought action against the Pakistan-based militants working in Xinjiang. Counter-terrorism is a neo-structural constrain that has shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy post 9/11.
Pakistan relations have gained a new momentum, dragging Pakistan further into China’s basket.

Historically speaking, Sino-Pakistan relations served as an ‘enduring entente and all weather friendship,’ compared to what Musharraf termed as Pakistan’s ‘fair weather’ friendship with the US. China has presented alternative political and economic support in the downturn of Pakistan’s relations with the US. Enduring relations with China have served to the US a reminder that Washington’s ‘off again and on again approach’ cannot take Islamabad for granted. Pakistan’s political and trade relations with China upsurged when the US-Pakistan relations declined. China’s ‘behind the scene diplomatic’ approach contrasted sharply with the US ‘uproar’ leading Pakistani leaders to hold Beijing in high esteem.

Sino-US involvement in Pakistan has exhibited strategic underpinnings. In the post 9/11 era, the US has maintained multi-dimensional strategic, politico-economic interests in South Asia.\(^5\) Iranian-American academician and expert on the Middle East, Vali Nasr has argued that Pakistan remains integral to the US security interests in the region.\(^6\) Pakistan remains important for the US policy on China, its nuclear weapons security and stability give the West an enormous stake in the country’s stability. The US has sought to maintain peace and stability in South Asia against the threat of international terrorism and nuclear weapons insecurity. Indo-Pakistan normalization and promotion of democracy pose key challenges to the US foreign policy goals in South Asia. China alignment with Pakistan has reflected its drive to balance the US expansion of interest in South Asia. China’s nuclear and missile transfers have aimed at achieving two instant objectives: China has sought to maintain Pakistan’s relative power parity with India; it has wanted to prevent Pakistan’s excessive reliance on the US.\(^7\) The Chinese balancing tactic has focused on providing economic and strategic assistance to Islamabad. Chinese exports have flooded Pakistan markets importing 90 percent manufactured

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\(^6\) Ibid., 546.

\(^7\) Indian conventional capability has become multi-fold due to the US assistance, given New Delhi’s development of Agni missile program allowing India deployable and credible nuclear deterrent capability against China. Israeli-Russian and the US weapons technology and equipment transfer such as the US P-3 Orion aircraft force multiplier has created a power imbalance in the region.
commodities from China. According to Vali Nasr, the US has set itself back in far more important rivalry with Beijing by granting Pakistan to China.8

Sino-US power interplay has elevated the South Asian erstwhile marginal stature to its new geo-strategic significance. In the ‘New Great Game,’ great powers have tended to intertwine South Asian states in the quagmire of international politics. The increase in world demand for energy has made the South Asian region increasingly significant for energy-laden economies like China and India. The South Asian milieu has represented what Stanley Wolpert mentions as the British ‘game of nabobs’ for trade control and local allegiance.9 The US and Chinese interests have converged in promoting stability in South Asia.10 Former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta termed the US policy of pivot Asia as a forward power projection to ensure world stability against a rising China.11

Beijing has responded to the US drive through greater connectivity and multilateralism in diplomacy. Evidently, the BRI and its body components have signified wider competitive underpinnings. Greater geo-strategic and political factors have motivated Beijing for the initiative. Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, Chairman Defense Committee has opined personal factors as underlying Xi Jinping’s vision for economic and maritime connectivity in reviving the historic route.12 Yan Xuetong, Director, Department of International Relations Tsinghua University, however, has argued that domestic factors have coincided with the international in a neat fix to stipulate China’s vision of new grand strategy.13 BRI has built on former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s idea of New Silk Road announced in Chennai 2011 to promote trade inflows between Central and Southeast Asia. A competing interest drives the US to create a

8 Ibid., 547.
9 Stanley Wolpert, Roots of Confrontation in South Asia, 43.
10 A UN resolution 1267 proposes a ban on specific individuals’ travel and bank assets involved in perpetration of terrorism, China approved the resolution after rejecting it initially in 2006.
11 Leon Panetta, Former US Secretary of Defense, while addressing the Naval Postgraduate School in California in November 2011.
12 Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, Chairman Defense Committee, Youlin Magazine, Pak-China Institute, Issue No. 6, January 2013.
New Silk route that bypasses China. Hillary Clinton’s New Silk Road version is vertical as opposed to horizontal. It seeks to bypass China and Iran, while inter-connecting CARs to Southeast Asia from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan via Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.\textsuperscript{14} The prospective energy and transit inflows have impinged on the prospects of stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ending in Mumbai rather than Shanghai, the US initiative can effectively be interpreted as an effort to undermine China’s regional integration. Sino-US competition has led to China’s announcement of plans to build ports in Afghanistan and India, given appropriate socio-economic feasibility conditions.\textsuperscript{15}

Greater national interest drives Beijing to link Western China to the Persian Gulf in the Arabian Sea. A high level of sustained GDP will ensure Beijing’s expansion of status to become a global power. Simultaneously, it will catch on reducing Chinese vulnerability in the Asia-Pacific in case of hostilities with the US, India and Japan in Asia. Great powers’ tug of war, push and pulls have resulted in a security backlash for Pakistan while it has deteriorated Islamabad’s relations with the US. Sino-US security competition has brought challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. Simultaneously, it has granted Pakistan a central role in great power politics. Pakistan has acquired a frontline role in Sino-US future ambitions for primacy in the region. For example, CPEC monetary investment worth $75 billion has sought to alleviate Pakistan’s monetary concerns in the wake of US regression of support post 2014. China has planned to invest $33.8 billion in energy and $11.1 billion in infrastructure projects in

\textsuperscript{14} In the post 9/11 period, the US has built strategic bases in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, while it maintains presence in Afghanistan through conclusion of BSA concluded in late 2014. The agreement has provided for US/Nato joint strategic collaboration with Afghan Security Forces (ASF) in Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{15} China has offered India to join the Maritime Silk Road to revive greater connectivity in February 2014 during Moodi-Xi-Jinping talks. Connectivity, inheritance, record are the key words defining China’s vision. The Maritime Silk Road aims to link China’s Fujian province with port cities to develop Xi’an and Quanzhou. Trade and cultural exchanges might prompt New Delhi to join the Silk Road. China’s 13th five-year plan for 2016-2020 envisions construction of a railway, connecting Shigatse with Kyirong in northern Nepal and with Yatung in the Chumbi valley between India and Bhutan. One way to join South Asia to the Silk Road is to connect the new railway line linking Lhasa to Shigatse. The vision of greater connectivity requires opening of regular and alternate routes like Demchok in Ladakh in the Himalayan region particularly for the Kailash/Mansrovar yatra. For India to join the New Silk Road, the traditional passes to Tibet and Xinjiang including the Karakoram pass, near the disputed Depsang Plains needs to be opened to revive a spirit of confidence. Progressive reopening of the traditional passes will lead the Himalayan belt to recover its vitality and India could think of participating in projects such as the New Silk Road.
Pakistan. Western scholar Michael Kugelman has argued that Pakistan has acted as a strategic partner of both the US and China on the global strategic chessboard.\(^\text{16}\) China’s broad objectives in South Asia have aimed at expanding multi-dimensional military, economic and political cooperation, while reducing rival influences in the region.\(^\text{17}\) Beijing has engaged regional governments on issues of mutual security by maintaining regular state level exchanges. China’s expansion of interests has posed a direct challenge to the US global ambitions in the Southwest and Central Asian region.

Interestingly, Southwest Asia served as a strong foothold of the US policy interests prior to Iranian revolution in the Middle East. In a way, the Chinese counter balancing tactic has infringed on the US traditional area of strategic interests. South Asia has served as the US traditional area of geo-strategic influence. Within it, Pakistan played as an important regional player for the US close to the Strait of Hormuz, China and Saudi Arabia. The US-Pakistan alliance stood on the fulcrum of Sir Olaf Caroe’s strategic conception — protection of western oil interests against Communist expansion in Southwest Asia and the Middle East.\(^\text{18}\) The British Foreign Secretary Sir Olaf Caroe feared that Nehru’s post-independence, anti-imperialist approach would be counterpoised to protect western oil interests and ‘wells of power’ in the Middle East. The US professor Sussane H. Rudolph has argued that the US policy post 9/11 has impaired Pakistan’s ability to play Sir Olaf Caroe’s orchestrated role of the protection of western oil interests in the Middle East.\(^\text{19}\)

The US military presence post 9/11 in its peripheral region had alarmed China. Beijing, therefore, sought to hedge against the growth of the US influence by initiating a subtle


\(^{17}\) China’s expansion of influence, however, compromises the US primacy in the region. The US trade with India grew from $14 billion in 2002 to $41 billion in 2007. In the same period, China’s trade with India grew from $3 billion to nearly $38 billion. This trend applies to China’s trade with the entire region. Beijing is likely to emerge as the largest trading partner of all South Asian nations in the near future.

\(^{18}\) Nehru’s anti-imperialist approach could not be trusted to secure British oil interest in the region — a purpose well expected to be served by Pakistan. The state’s position on the Middle Eastern defense periphery was well serviced with new substitutes, the US and Pakistan, in the New Great Game in Asia. See Rudolphs, *Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia*, 40.

\(^{19}\) The British Foreign Secretary Sir Olaf Caroe during the last days of British rule favored the subcontinent’s partition in order to protect western oil interest in the adjacent Middle Eastern region. See Rudolphs, *Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia*, 90.
response of regional engagement with both India and Pakistan. Sino-Indian trade calculated at $70 billion is a significant jump from the previous $3 billion in the year 2000. China’s trade competes with the Indo-US trade targeted at $100 billion for the year 2014. Similar statistics have applied to Chinese expansion of trade with other South Asian states, signifying a relative decline in the US influence compared to a resurgent China.

Consequently, the South Asian geo-matrix has involved a complex quadrangle of relationships. Developments in one set of Indo-US bilateral relations are viewed in terms of the impact upon Pakistan and China. Beijing’s geo-strategic and economic interests in Pakistan post 9/11 has resulted from several key factors. At the regional front, Sino-Pakistan commonality of interests has thrived on the territorial and ideological conflict with India. China pursues alignment and missile transfers to Pakistan in line with the policy of wei-quei. At the global level, CPEC is a manifestation of great powers’ strategic competition in the Southwest Asian region.

Sino-US competitive expansion of influence has let loose a spiral effect of alliance formation in the South Asian region. In the New Great Game, the US partnership with India has pushed Pakistan subtly into the opposite camp of China and Russia. Generating a spiral effect of insecurity, a Chinese counter balancing response has sought to address Pakistan’s strategic weakness vis-à-vis India. Pakistani research analyst Shireen Mazari has argued that Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus has been a manifestation of the two states’ counter balancing drive to neutralize the US arms transfers to India. With Sino-Pakistan strategic ties cemented, Pakistan’s alignment with Russia has made Islamabad part of the Turkish dominated China centered model — ‘Heart of Asia.’ The US Foreign Policy Adviser and Expert on the Middle East

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21 Turkey is Europe’s fifth largest economy, sitting at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and Europe. Writing off the West, Turkey has moved into China’s orbit in search of markets and financial investments, goods and Chinese technology along with Egypt. China sees rising Turkey as an economic partner, a new market for Chinese goods and technology. Turkey’s special economic relations with Europe, its open border and relaxed visa policy, its well-developed infrastructure, growing middle class consumer market, its transport corridor and commercial ties have made it essentially attractive for Beijing. Turkey provides a convenient gateway to large European, Middle Eastern, and smaller markets in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, with potential grant of access to energy sources in Iraq, and the Caucasus to
Vali Nasr observed that the concept implies Sino-Turkish collaboration of economic interests to shorten the geo-strategic space between East and West Asia. Vali Nasr further argued that the concept ostensibly serves as a reflection on how the US thinks of Asia, its geographic region, economic zone and geo-strategic space.

The China dominated ‘Heart of Asia Model’ has embarked on the vision of shrinking the distance between East and West Asia upto the Yellow Sea. In alignment with the US and China, India and Pakistan have resorted to broad multilateral patterns. Russia has sought to make for a Pakistan-China-Russian axis despite Indo-US indignation. Russia has sought to secure its southern borders against the spread of Islamic resurgence, improving its economic ties with China and Pakistan. In November 2014, Pakistan signed a strategic arms deal with Russia, the first ever in its history. The agreement has provided for arms transfer and military supplies to Pakistan, promising 20 Mi-35 combat helicopters to replace the 35 American AH-1S and AH-1F gunships. Russian analyst Mathew Bordner argued that the US refusal to supply required helicopters forced Pakistan to approach Moscow for the purchase of Mi-35. At the symbolic level, Chinese President’s visit to Pakistan in early 2015 implied a regional political balancing strategy to reciprocate Obama’s visit to India in early February 2015.

Director National Defence University Lt. General Noel Khokhar, (retd) in an interview with the author indicated Pakistan’s strategic balancing overtures to both Russia and China. In his own words:

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China. China is also keenly interested in Central Asia where the Turkish influence runs deep. A Chinese-Turkish partnership could rival the influence that Russia and Iran exert in Central Asia and the Caucasus. See Vali Nasr, The Disposable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, (New York: Random House Ltd, 2013), 598.

Ibid.

Islamabad wants to exploit Russian leverage in sophisticated weapons purchase, nuclear reactors, technology import, economic and trade investments in Pakistan. Russia seeks Pakistan’s leverage and connections in Afghanistan to counter the terrorist threat in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia linked to radical Islamism in Pakistan. Russia wants expansion of rails and roads constructed through Afghanistan to Pakistan.

It is not that Pakistan is throwing itself into the strategic basket of China in great powers global reshuffling of alliances. In fact, the US economic, political and strategic strangulation of Pakistan has left options open for Islamabad in a multi-polar world.  

It implied that Pakistan army felt that the world was moving towards a multi-polar world order. Further, the world was open for new alliances, both formal and informal. Within this context, General Noel felt that Islamabad must remain open to pick and chose allies strategically more beneficial for Pakistan.

6.2 China-US Competition, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in Pakistan

This section explores the implications of Sino-US competition for Pakistan’s domestic stability and internal security. It argues that Sino-US involvement in Pakistan at the strategic, political and economic levels has caused fissures in the state’s socio-political cohesion and domestic stability. Raising the cost of political violence, Sino-US competition has increased the rift in civil-military relations. Simultaneously, it has dampened the prospects of growth of true democracy in Pakistan.

Alignment with Pakistan has followed the US waxing and waning of interests in the South Asian region. The US-Pakistan relations post 9/11 has marked ups and downs following the GWOT. Bruce Riedel, US leading expert on South Asia, has termed the twists and twins in the US policy as ‘unquestioning embrace of Pakistani policies to the US slamming of sanctions for provoking wars.’ According to Bruce Riedel, the US policy has thrown Pakistan to the brink of economic collapse, growing insurgency and political instability. The US diplomat Henry Kissinger has argued that the US performed the role of offshore balancer in South Asia during the Cold War era. During the 1960s, Soviet-US global rivalry shaped the US interests in South Asia. The US research scholars Llyod I. Rudolph & Sussane Hoeber Rudolf have argued that the US observed rough power parity towards India and Pakistan in the Cold War. The US

25 Interview conducted by the author with Lt. General Noel Khokar, Director Institute of Strategic Studies & Research Analysis, ISSRA, National Defence University, Islamabad on October 20, 2014 in Islamabad.
28 Llyod I. Rudolph and Sussane Hoeber Rudolph, Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives And The Imperial Presidency (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008), 79.
military assistance aimed to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence, while granting a distinctive edge to Pakistan against India. Indian scholar Amitabh Mattoo argued, however, that the US preferred India over China to offset the latter’s ideological superiority in South Asia.\textsuperscript{29} India kept receiving American economic aid despite being a non-aligned state. The US was led by the belief that if India was lost to China in an economic competition, it implied millions of people were lost to communism. In practical terms, the policy implied Pakistan’s growing disillusionment with the West as an aligned state.

In a policy memo, prepared by the US Assistant Secretary of State, George C. McGhee recommended that India should acquire nuclear capability prior to China.\textsuperscript{30} Accordingly, in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the US granted military assistance to India. Transformation in the global context, however, following the Sino-Soviet split, modeled the US orchestration of a rapprochement with China in the 1970s. The US exploited Pakistan’s leverage on China for ping-pong diplomacy. Within this context, the US rapprochement with Mao’s China was more of a tactical retreat than a change in American strategic stance.

The US policy post 9/11 has earmarked a blatant up-gradation of India’s multidimensional economic, political and strategic profile in the regional balance against a resurgent China. The US scholar Stephen P. Cohen has termed the US policy of ‘de-hyphenation’ as an Aristotelian approach for being inherently ‘discriminatory, functional and impartial’ in approach.\textsuperscript{31} According to Cohen, the US optional oscillation and policy tilts in the past had destabilized the South Asian region, leading to subsequent Indo-Pakistan wars.\textsuperscript{32} The US offshore tilt towards India post 9/11 has worked counter-productively for American long term security objectives in the region.

\textsuperscript{30} The policy memo was entitled ‘Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese Communist Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability, prepared by George C. McGhee for Dean Rusk.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
The US policy in South Asia post 9/11 involving the nocturnal twins India and Pakistan has been paradoxical in nature. In a way, Cohen has argued that the US has granted India a say in the US approach towards Pakistan. The US de-hyphenation towards India has sought to balance China’s resurgence in Asia. The US policy has treated India and Pakistan separately, granting each weight in accordance with their regional and global standing. Indian analyst Milind Thakar has, however, argued that the US role has gained primacy in India-Pakistan relations. Mutual animosity has led both India and Pakistan to keep a close tab on the other’s relations with the US. Islamabad’s insecurity syndrome has stemmed from Pakistan’s threat perception of India. The US policy has inflated the content and nature of Pakistan’s perception of India, deteriorating the former’s relations with New Delhi.

The policy of global forward defence manifested in the GWOT formed the US convergence of security interests with Pakistan post 9/11. The partnership extracted a high toll on Pakistan’s internal security. Based on ‘forced convergence of interests,’ Pakistan suffered adverse security challenges for owning an ‘alien war’. The 9/11 incident had pushed Pakistan to the role of a frontline state in the GWOT. Pakistan’s alliance partnership with the US responded to the exogenous threat perception posed by a resurgent India coveted by the US. Neo-structural realist impediments structured Pakistan’s alignment with the US in ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ and the subsequent Global War on Terror (GWOT). Pakistan had little choice in becoming a part of GWOT. Pakistan’s former COAS and Chief Executive Pervaiz Musharraf termed 9/11 attacks as irrevocable turn from the past into an unknown future. As Pakistan policy caught in between the devil and the blue sea, the Indian prompt offer of all-out facilitation of support to the US conditioned Pakistan’s quick response to shoulder the global responsibility. The British International Relations Professor Barry Buzan has argued that to maintain international stability, the GWOT—a key goal in the US National Security Strategy offered the US a legitimate excuse for involvement in South

33 Ibid.
Asia. The US alliances, military bases and naval escorts in the Indian Ocean increased American presence in the region. US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that post 9/11, ‘the US reshaped a good part of South Asia embarking on a quiet, steady course of diplomacy.’

President Musharraf (1999-2007) capitalized on the only two options available to Pakistan In the Line of Fire. Colin Powell had warned whether Pakistan is ‘with the US or against it’. Richard Armitage, the US Deputy Secretary of State was even blunt. In his meeting with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Armitage emphasized that non-compliance would push Pakistan to the stone-age. Musharraf acknowledged that the US had decided to hit back hard with note of warning unmistakable. Pakistan’s final choice contrived to reduce risks to national security interests. Pakistan’s socio-economic and military weakness had ruled out the option of non-compliance and a likely military confrontation with the US. India would find a commonality of anti-terrorist support with the US in Afghanistan and seek concessions for limited action in Kashmir. Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could become vulnerable to Indo-US-Israeli attack.

Ditching the Taliban would create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, installing Northern Alliance on the seat of power in Kabul. The Bush administration worked on Musharraf’s fear of India to seek Pakistan’s alignment of support on GWOT. George W. Bush speech of ‘good versus evil’ granted Pakistan the so-called ‘broad’ option for a limited ‘chance to cooperate.’ Former foreign minister of Pakistan Abdus Sattar has argued that rational approach steered Pakistan clear of defiance and offence to the US. The weightier and decisive factor was the predictable cost of non-cooperation. Pakistan, therefore, decided to become a front-line state on the US GWOT.

Maximization of Pakistan’s national interest required cooperation with the US. Abdus Sattar has argued that Pakistan could exploit its strategic location for economic and

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38 Ibid.
39 See Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201.
political benefits. Neo-structural imperatives guided Pakistan’s decision to support the US-led GWOT post 9/11. Acknowledging Pakistan’s key role in the GWOT, the US, EU, and Japan dismantled nuclear sanctions, resumed assistance, rescheduled debt, and promised trade and aid benefits to Islamabad. The Brownback-II amendment waived the democracy sanctions while Ackerman amendment in 2004 waived the nuclear sanctions against Pakistan. Waiving off part of Pakistan’s $12 billion debt, the US provided $600 million as economic aid and $177 million as military and security assistance for 2002, raising it to $3 billion to be provided over a period of next five years. The US non-military assistance included low interest credit to purchase airliners for PIA, and expanded trade access for increasing Pakistan’s exports to the US.

In March 2005, the US further decided to sell F-16s to Pakistan.

Of the seven demands handed over by the US ambassador Wendy Chamberlain on September 13, 2001, president Musharraf agreed to allow use of Shamsi air base in Balochistan and Jacobabad in Sindh, while providing logistics and aircraft ‘blanket over flight and landing rights.’ Pakistan refrained from providing the US access to its naval ports, fighter aircraft bases and strategic locations on borders. Initial years of the GWOT saw Pakistan-US cooperation on terrorist deportation, logistics and intelligence assistance. The US granted Musharraf military and economic assistance, forging a strategic partnership. In the economic domain, the US offered $5 billion over a period of five years. In an interview with the author, reputed academician and researcher, Professor Dr. Tahir Amin remarked that Pakistan could leverage the Bush administration to waiver off Pakistan’s entire debt in return for Pakistan’s support on the GWOT.

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41 See Abdus Sattar, *A Concise History*, 258.
42 From 2001-2007, the US wrote-off $1,600 million in debt. The Paris Club assisted to reschedule $12 billion in bilateral debt reducing the burden by 30 percent.
43 The US supplied C-130 transport planes, a P-3 Orion marine surveillance aircraft, TOW anti-tank missiles, and other equipment for defence valued at $1.2 billion.
44 The US list of demands included: end to logistical and popular support for Bin Laden, assistance in military and intelligence operations through blanket over-flight and landing rights, access to US military intelligence and use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases and strategic locations on border, intelligence on immigration, information and databases, curb all domestic expression of support for Al Qaeda and against the US, disrupt personnel and logistical support for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, cut-off diplomatic relations with the Taliban. See Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 206.
45 Interview conducted by the author with Professor Dr Tahir Amin, Former Director School of Politics & International Relations, (SPIR), Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
Sino-US relations developed with India and Pakistan more resiliently in the wake of GWOT. Accordingly, the US and China are the most important states in Indo-Pakistan foreign relations post 9/11. Pakistan’s partnership assistance to support the US military presence in its immediate vicinity had alarmed the Chinese. Sino-Pakistan relations took a down turn following the initial period of 9/11. Pakistan distanced itself from China as a deliberate move to develop reliance on the US. Beijing acknowledged the neo-structural constraints shaping Pakistan’s geo-strategic environment, aligning Islamabad with the US. China realized Pakistan’s limitation in joining the GWOT and to provide logistical assistance to the US. Thomas J. Christensen, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs argued that in the aftermath of 9/11, China desisted from directly challenging the US growth of influence in South Asia. Yet it refrained from out-rightly accepting the US hegemony in the region.46

To off-set the US presence in the region, China began to pour in massive investments in Pakistan. China began to pour in investments for new projects such as Saindak copper mine, Lakhra coal mine in Balochistan. Sino-Pakistan signed an agreement to expand trade in December 2004, granting $350m for Chashma II nuclear power plant. Chinese cumulative loans and investments reached $4 billion by the year 2004. China signed 21 other agreements to promote trade and economic ties.47 Following Pakistan’s elevation to non-Nato ally status, the US permitted access to advanced weaponry. In the South Asian regional parity context, the Bush administration in its second term granted a nuclear deal to India to pacify Indian fears.48 The US move instigated a matching response. In 2005, China upped the Sino-Pakistan relations by signing the treaty of friendship with Pakistan. The treaty broadened the scope of China’s political, economic and strategic ties with Pakistan.

47 In 2005, Joint manufacture of JF-17 Thunder fighter aircrafts and F22 modern frigates started each worth $175m each.
48 This was a US deliberate move to silent Indian protests as the offer was made right before India was relegated in status via the Hyde Act in 2006. Bush announcement now tilted the balance in favor of India against the earlier destabilizing effect of the US sale of F-16s to Pakistan.
In the conflict-ridden context of regional hostilities, the US move alarmed Sino-Pakistan security apprehensions against India. Indian research analyst Shalendra D. Sharma argued that SinoPakistan strategic partnership aimed to build fences against India.\textsuperscript{49} To promote a strategically cooperative South Asia and enlist support in GWOT, the US pressurized for normalization in Indo-Pakistan relations. China, however, opted for a cautious approach in alignment with Pakistan. To promote a multi-polar world order, China has encouraged cooperation with Pakistan and India for Asian stability and peace.

Realism, however, has dictated China’s counter-balancing response to the US strategic moves in the South Asian region. China’s relations with India have improved post 9/11 to undercut the US strategic assertions in South Asia. A Chinese research analyst Dr. Zhouming Mu has argued that ‘China-India relations are not based on enmity. Standing on rival claims of territorial demarcation, Sino-Indian relations do not retain the level of animosity found in India-Pakistan relations.’\textsuperscript{50} Simultaneously, as India has envisioned strategic partnership with the US post 9/11, abandoning its previous policy of non-alignment and third world leadership, China has built an informal alliance with Pakistan contriving strategic depth while pursuing containment through surrogates. China’s strategic and balancing role in Southwest and Central Asia is evident from the land and maritime connectivity of Belt and Road Initiative — BRI, and the functioning of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Southwest and Central Asia. Sino-US engagement has manifested in counter-balancing moves towards India and Pakistan in South Asia.

The US involvement in Pakistan’s domestic milieu resulted in the accusation of Islamabad’s surrender of ‘independence and sovereignty.’ Pakistan paid enormous cost at the domestic front: Musharraf had to face widespread popular opposition for rendering support to the US. Pakistani scholar Hamid Khan has, however, argued that Musharraf’s personal inclination to linger hold onto power worked as the prime

\textsuperscript{49} Shalendra D. Sharma, \textit{China and India in the Age of Globalization} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 179.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview conducted by the author with Dr. Zhouming Mu, Associate Professor, Department of Mass Communication and Journalism, Tsinghau University, Beijing, China.
motivation to support the US.\textsuperscript{51} Scholars accused Pakistan such as former Pakistani diplomat Hussain Haqqani of a ‘renter state’ whose military establishment thrived on the rent extorted of its geo-strategic location.\textsuperscript{52}

The US alliance partnership with military dictators exacerbated the problem of civil-military divide in Pakistan. To procure Pakistan’s support for GWOT, the US supported either military autocrats or inept civilians, which strengthened the military at the expense of democracy and civil leadership. US research analyst Hall Gardner argued the US feared that undue pressure to install democracy might lead to radical Islamists’ take over of power.\textsuperscript{53} As a demonstration to this effect, Musharraf’s pro-US and anti-Taliban policies allowed religious parties to win a decisive majority in the general election of 2002.\textsuperscript{54} Two factors have underlined the US rational for interference in Pakistan’s domestic milieu. Washington has desired political reforms aimed at reconstitution of democracy and collaboration on counter-terrorism and counter insurgency. The US scholars Howard B. Schaffer & Teresita C. Schaffer have argued that confronted with the quagmire of the civil-military divide, political leadership in Pakistan sought to leverage the US support for gaining civilian access to power.\textsuperscript{55} US ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley’s (1988-1999) attempt to interfere in civil-military divide earned him the title of ‘viceroy’ in Pakistan. Networking with Zalmay Khalilzad, US representative to the UN, allowed Zardari to win succession as president in 2008.

Social cohesion and political stability requires promotion of true democratic institutions in a state. The US desire for stability has converged with the disputing parties’ desire to overcome mistrust. This led to generation of misconception about the US role and extent of authority in Pakistan. The US support for Musharraf could not prevent his ouster from power in February 2008 elections. However, the US inability to extract

\textsuperscript{52} Hussain Haqqani, \textit{Magnificent Delusions, Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding}, (New York: Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group, 2013), 47
\textsuperscript{53} Hall Gardner, \textit{American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism} (Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2014), 123.
concessions leveled allegations of ‘US betrayal,’ ‘interference’ and the like. The US needed to strengthen civilian set-up to support democratic processes in Pakistan. Bruce Riedel, American leading expert on South Asia, has argued that the US encouraged ‘military interference’ in the weak civilian set-up of Pakistan, serving to sustain the civil-military divide.

The US intervening role made the army the real wielder of authority, which worked behind the popular government at the front since 2008. For example, the US sought extension in ex-chief of army staff, Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani’s tour of duty in mid 2010 making him real power behind the throne.56 Contrary to the US larger design, defense assistance to the army undermined the prospects of political stability and democracy in Pakistan. A Taliban-Al Qaeda backlash ensued due to the US military assistance to Pakistan. The US scholar C. Christian Fair has argued that the US aid to Pakistan’s military establishment has promoted anti-American sentiments, strengthened radicalization and suspicions about the US larger designs in the South Asian region.57

The US military assistance eroded democratic institutions’s credibility and growth. The US support to Musharraf instigated socio-political unrest in the state. The ensuing civic disorder strengthened radical forces who opposed Nato and US presence in the region. Ironically, despite the US apparent support for the military, the CIA had suspected Musharraf of ‘double play.’ Political unrest led to the hasty imposition of an emergency rule in 2007 and the promulgation of NRO — National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) to install a sham democracy, which brought in Musharraf’s downfall. Promulgation of National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) provides an empirical illustration of the US involvement in internal political dynamics of Pakistan. The Ordinance signified a US negotiated deal between Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf granting the former immunity from corruption charges, while ensuring for the latter prospects of controlled democracy in Pakistan.

Western scholars and independent circles such as Howard B. Schaffer & Teresita C. Schaffer have argued that it served the US interests more to install a weak civilian set-

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56 Ibid.
up to reign supreme in Pakistan. Corrupt and weak government set-ups are believed to be more receptive to toe-chain the US policy interests in the region. In an interview with the author, reputed media analyst Kashif Abbassi has argued that the US pursued selective democratization, installing weak civilian set-up as a means to pressurize the state. The US mildly criticized Musharraf when he dismissed Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Choudhary, a step that led to his eventual loss of power in subsequent pro-democratic demonstrations in the state.58 The US support for Musharraf had successively declined on his alleged ‘double play’ in the American anti-terrorism drive. A docile government — an aim well served by subsequent Zardari government in power — was better suited to serve the US strategic interests in the region. If promotion of democracy meant serving the US legitimate policy interests, Washington supported civilian democratic governments in Pakistan.59 The inept yet docile Zardari government had been installed onto the seat of power in 2008 elections. Resultantly, Pakistan emerged as a dangerously unstable country, suffering from political turmoil and unrest.

Ironically, weakening of democratic political institutions engendered socio-political instability. Besides, civilian institutions lack of ability to govern increased reliance on the military, relegating it to the center stage of policy making in Pakistan. If civilian control on the state’s security policy and power corridors established, democratic accountability would have flourished in Pakistan. The US scholars Howard and Teresita Schaffer have cited Pakistan’s geopolitical position, strategic environment and the split structure of authority — between the civilian, army, and the bureaucratic component as chiefly responsible for the US asymmetrical approach towards India and Pakistan.60 The US interlocutors have included the army, its political wing the ISI and the bureaucracy. For the US, army’s institutional discipline made it a better attraction for negotiations, proclaiming superior than civilian bureaucracy. The Pakistan army, mainly the intelligence chief or defense attaché, has worked with CIA or Pentagon to decide on matters of security and formulate policy on Afghanistan, India, China and the

58 Musharraf’s pre-emptive drive to prevent ouster from power by a Supreme Court ruling against re-election by rigged assemblies and declaration of emergency on November 3, 2007 led to the fall of his government in Pakistan.
59 Ibid, 122.
60 Ibid, 98.
US. According to the Schaffers although Pakistan army has relied on the fairness and legalistic approach to provide for a convincing rational for its interlocutors, yet the military leadership has remained ‘deliberately deceptive’ in the negotiations with the US.

Suspictions about the US intentions have pervaded in the army, the government and the public at large. Pakistan interlocutors assume that the US needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs the US. Pakistani negotiators tend to exploit their position of weakness vis-à-vis India. Reliance on an extra-regional balancer — the powerful yet ‘unreliable US’ has arises from Pakistan’s need to escape Indian existential threat to security. The rhetoric of suspicions has guiled the US real intentions. For example, Bruce Reidel argues that Kerry Lugar Bermann Bill received won severe criticism to investigate AQ Khan net-work and end support for Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. The bill sought to triple economic aid and failed to win appreciation for the US.

The US unrelenting pressure forced Pakistan to conduct counter-terrorism operations in FATA and Swat, resulting in human casualty, infrastructure losses, internal displacement and insecurity. Starting from 2008, Pakistan’s relations with the US deteriorated during the Zardari era (2008-2013). Pakistan-US divergence of interests developed on the GWOT at the tactical level. Public support led to social pressures for initiation of peace deal with the Taliban. Reconciliation attempts for peace with the Taliban resulted in broken promises and fake agreements with the government.

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61 The establishment in Pakistan signifies the army, its related institutions primarily Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Military Operations (MO) and Strategic Plans Division (SPD). See Howard B. Schaffer & Teresita C. Schaffer, How the US negotiates with Pakistan, 53.
62 Schaffers have argued that military officials sought concessions by inducing the threat impression of a Pakistan ‘collapse theses.’ The Pakistani interlocutor’s extensively rely on appeals to the US law and ‘fairness’ argument to get through on key issues with the US, skeptical of Israeli and Indian lobbyists in the Congress. Ambassador Riaz Khokhar’s role in F-16s reimbursement and Maleeha Lodhi’s role in the passage of Brown Amendment is a case in point. See Howard B. Schaffer & Teresita C. Schaffer, How the US negotiates with the United States, 93.
63 Ibid., 118.
64 Ibid., 23.
65 Ibid., 87.
66 Bruce Reidel writes that criticism and fervor in media on Kerry Lugar Bill was perpetrated by the army and ISI. See Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of the Global Jihad,(Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 45.
67 Ibid., 115.
US pressurized Islamabad for military action on the terrorist sanctuaries along the Pakistan-Afghan border. The oft repeated term ‘do more’ greatly symbolized the US suspicions and allegations of ‘double play’ in Pakistan’s half-hearted military action against the Taliban.

Daniel Pearl’s assassination and church bombing in Rawalpindi in 2008 led the US to declare Pakistan as the most dangerous country in the world. Pakistan’s relations strained further when the CIA indicted Pakistan in its report on ‘dirty bombs.’ Pakistan began to face worst upsurge in terrorist activities domestically. Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a regional and transnational terrorist network, engaged in militant activities against Pakistan helped by its international proxy collaborators. Religious parties provoked anti-American propaganda, which served to radicalize the society even more. Poor governance, incompetence, slow economic performance and worsening law and order added to the list of Pakistan’s daunting complexities.

In a nutshell, Pakistan’s alliance with the US on GWOT won worst case antagonism and criticism of religious parties, aggravating the problem of internal security in Pakistan. Sino-US involvement post 9/11 has hampered Pakistan’s domestic stability, strengthened the civil-military divide, resulting in a compromise on the promotion of democracy and growth of civic institutions in Pakistan. Sino-Pakistan ties have flourished more under the military to military contacts maintained between respective armies. China’s involvement strengthened the military against the civilian institutions, resulting in a compromise on the promotion of true democracy and stability in Pakistan. The US-Pakistan alliance worsened Pakistan’s relations with India and Afghanistan. The Afghan claim of Pushtoonistan that remained dormant during the Taliban regime also resurfaced in Afghan-Pakistan bilateral relations.

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68 Establishment in Pakistan decided to crackdown on Taliban in 2009, maintaining a distinction between good Taliban and bad Taliban after internal insurgency caused two years of deadly attacks on military, civilian and police targets. Another military operation Zarb-e-Azab sought to eliminate the bad Taliban in a massive military operation from their hideouts on the Pakistani side of the western borders adjacent to Afghanistan.
6.3 The US and China: Implications for Terrorism in Pakistan

This section discusses Sino-US involvement’s implication for terrorism in Pakistan post 9/11. It argues that Pakistan’s collaboration with the US on the GWOT post 9/11 exacerbated the problem of internal security, resulting in the growth of terrorism and instability. As Pakistan became weak and unstable, Chinese defence and military involvement increased to allow Islamabad to counter the threat of militancy. Generating a spiral effect of insecurity, the Chinese defense collaboration with Pakistan alarmed the Indians, leading New Delhi to increase India’s proxy involvement in Pakistan.

Sino-US interests have converged on Pakistan’s stability and continuity against the threat of radical Islamism. However, upsurge in the US drone strikes caused a backlash of terrorists’ attacks on Pakistan’s key civilian and military installations. In 2009, Obama’s Af-Pakistan strategy increased the US military presence in Afghanistan. Additional 30,000 troops’ deployment for counter insurgency and counter-terrorism operations resulted in the Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives escaping to the Pakistani side of the border. The US/Nato military action increased terrorist activities and suicide bombings in Pakistan. The US boosted the number and frequency of drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan causing public fury and resentment. In an interview in April 2013 to ARY news’ anchor person Mubashir Luqman, Musharraf disclosed that his administration had sanctioned limited drone strikes against the terrorists’ networks in Pakistan. However, the presence of American CIA operatives, security networks, ‘Black Waters’ and others constituted a serious threat for Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Edward Snowdon revelation that the CIA spent 50 percent of its budget on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ surveillance added to Pakistani security concerns. Mark Mozzetti in his book, Way of Knife disclosed that Pakistan was the most penetrated country in the world, as the CIA had been involved in a massive covert warfare in Pakistan.

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69 Musharraf, in an interview in April 2013 to ARY news anchor person Mubashir Luqman, disclosed that his administration had sanctioned limited drone strikes against terrorists in Pakistan. Drone strikes helped the US kill Al Qaeda’s high value targets in Pakistan.

70 The Pakistani initiative to hold peace talks with the Taliban as endorsed by All Parties Conference led to drone attacks by the US, resulting in a backlash of terrorist attacks in the state.

As the collateral damage increased, the *US Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009* sought to rectify the damage by raising the level of economic assistance from $600 million to $1.5 billion a year for the next five years for Pakistan. The US relations with Pakistan suffered another set-back, when Faisal Shehzad, a Pakistani American had been indicted as the prime suspect in the *Time Square* bombing in New York in May 2010. The then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared severe consequences for Pakistan as the TTP claimed responsibility for the incident. The year 2011 proved to be more consequential in US-Pakistan relations. As the CIA-ISI war ensued, the hallmark in the downturn of US relations with Pakistan occurred. Three incidents — the Raymond Davis issue on January 27, 2011, US *Operation Geronimo* to capture Osama Bin Ladin in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011 and the *Salala* check-post incident on November 26, 2011 opened up a new chapter in US-Pakistan relations. Code named as ‘*Operation Geronimo,*’ the US captured Osama Bin Laden from his secret hideout in Abbottabad.

In a worst move, Al-Qaeda avenged the incident by attacking Pakistan’s air and naval bases in Mehran and Kamara on May 22, 2011. In terms of their significance and impact, the three incidents opened up a whole new chapter in US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan termed the military action as the US violation of Pakistan’s air space in utter disregard of international law. Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) decided to redefine relations with the US in line with Pakistan’s national interests. Violent protests

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72 To remedy the damage in bilateral relations, the *US Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009* increased economic assistance from $600 million to $1.5 billion a year for the next five years.

73 TTP is a Pakistani brand of terrorist organization, fighting the Pakistan army for its support to the US in the GWOT.

74 In the first incident, two Pakistani youth, believed to be Inter-Services Intelligence personnel were shot dead by the CIA agent Raymond Davis, investigating links between Pakistani terrorists and *Lashkar-e-Taiba*. Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi submitted resignation to protest against his government’s inclination, under pressure from the US, to declare Raymond Davis American diplomat and not a CIA agent. In the second incident, the stealth helicopter attack to kill Osama Bin Laden in his hideout in Abbottabad on May 2, 2014 triggered a national fury of protest on violation of Pakistani territory by the US. The Pakistan army was accused of its inability to defend the borders. In the third incident, on November 26, 2014, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed at the Salala check-post near the Afghan border, turning the US-Pakistan relations to an all time low. Washington termed the incident as an unintentional accident. Pakistani protest led to suspension of cooperation with the US on intelligence and logistical support.

75 The attacks killed four military officials and injured nine others, leading to a severe downturn in Pakistan’s relations with the US.
led to Pakistani parliament’s unanimous decision on May 14, 2011 demanding an end to US missile strikes as a pre-condition to continue undisrupted NATO supply lines to Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s reliance on China for protection of its territorial interests and integrity increased following the US overtures. Pakistan’s COAS Pervaiz Kayani announced to sharply reduce Islamabad’s intelligence sharing with the US and to cut down the size of the US personnel in Pakistan. Interestingly, Kayani’s move resulted in a retaliatory Wikileaks cable, what many regarded as a CIA design. Apparently in the attempt to discredit the Pakistani commander, the cable had showed that Kiyani demanded more Predator drone attacks, not fewer, on the Pakistani territory. In the wake of Operation Geronimo conducted by the US special marine forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan’s ex-prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, paid a three days hurried visit to China from May 17-21, 2011. The Pakistani press hailed Gilani’s visit as a ‘historic landmark’ to cement relations with China, ensuring mutual defense against foreign (US) aggression. The visit acquired an unprecedented importance for the blatant threat rendered to the US, given Chinese assurances of support for Pakistan’s sovereignty. The Pakistani move can be interpreted as a hedging tactic to assert independence in foreign policy against threats to Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ security acquired an unprecedented degree of significance in this period. Seeking China’s intervention, Gilani’s visit aimed to thwart a similar US unilateral operation on Pakistan’s key nuclear installations. The US concern for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ security arose due to Osama’s presence in Abbottabad and the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. The Pakistani military establishment became alarmed when the US former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta declared to retain the US Bagram military base post 2014 in Afghanistan, citing concern for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The retention sought to support the US contingency plans for securing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons against the threat posed by radical Islamic forces. Media reports indicated that the US had put force in Afghanistan to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear bombs. General Stanley McChrystal plan aimed to capture

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76 An ISI estimate had indicated that about 7,000 CIA operatives were working in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s nukes. The US would order troops to protect key nuclear missile sites such as Sargodha Headquarters, which had been the base for nuclear-capable F-16 combat aircrafts. Policy makers in Islamabad, however, believed the US plan envisioned covert designs on Pakistan’s strategic weaponry.

On December 20, 2010, former COAS General Pervaiz Ashraf Kiyani termed the US as intrusive and overbearing, seeking to achieve a controlled chaos in Pakistan to denuclearize Pakistan. Kiyani had sent a letter to General Mike Mullen mentioned by Bob Woodward in his book, Obama Wars. The contents of the letter alleged that the US deliberately wanted to destabilize Pakistan to lay hand onto nuclear assets. Islamabad wanted the US endorsement of no ‘designs’ on its nuclear weapons security. Senator Kerry offered ‘to write in blood’ that the US did not intend to attack Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Instead of a categorical declaration, the US official position only declared that it had no designs on Pakistan’s weapons.

To Pakistan’s comfort, China was more than forthcoming in granting support to Pakistan to maintain stability. Expressing its intent, China offered all possible assistance to make Pakistan’s defense impregnable. China warned categorically that attack on Pakistan would be regarded as one on Beijing and that ‘Pakistan was Beijing’s Israel.’ According to an essay posted on Qatari website, the Chinese diplomat confronted a US diplomat by saying that ‘Pakistan is dearest to China as Israel to the US.’

A Pakistani daily The News on May 19, 2011 reported that Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in mid-May 2011 advised the US to show respect to Pakistan's independence, sovereignty and physical integrity. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao reiterated the Chinese stance to the Pakistani counterpart that the US should respect Pakistan's stability and sovereignty. Wen Jiabao assured Pakistan of China's support stating that no matter what changes happened on the global landscape, China and Pakistan would remain good neighbors and good brothers. The statement implied

78 The contingent comprised Army Delta Force, Navy SEALs and a high-technical intelligence unit known as Task Force Orange.
80 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
that in the global transformation, China was willing to add up a strategic depth to its relations with Pakistan.

Gillani apprised the top leadership in Beijing of the lessons learnt from the US violation of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and the threats involved there in. The Chinese military leadership assessed the implications of a likely US military attack into Pakistani tribal areas along Afghanistan. Pakistan upgraded its naval capability with Chinese assistance and formulated its naval defense strategy with a new vigor. Pakistan-China expressed a joint desire to convert the commercial port at Gwadar to a naval port. Pakistani defense minister Chaudhry Ahmad Mukhtar informed China that Pakistan would be grateful if China built a naval base at Gwadar. Earlier in July 2010, a news report by China Daily informed that the Chief of Pakistan Navy Admiral Nouman Bashir had informed about Pakistan’s desire for expansion of cooperation with China. Pakistan navy would provide facilities to Chinese ships at Gwadar. The navy admiral informed that Pakistan wished to buy larger ships with increased firepower from China.

This implied that the US action had prompted a fundamental shift in Sino-Pakistan strategic relations, bolstering military ties in multidimensional direction. China upgraded naval cooperation to build four new warships for carrying missiles and heavy

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84 The shooting between US and Pakistani forces escalated on May 17, 2011, when a US NATO helicopter violated Pakistani airspace in Waziristan, injuring two soldiers. Pakistani forces retaliated in a quick response of heightened alert status. Counter intelligence warfare ensued, with the Pakistani side revealed on the media the cover-up of a CIA station chief in Islamabad. On May 19, 2011, Marc Grossman, US Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, arrogantly rejected Pakistani demand that the US would not violate Pakistan’s territorial integrity in future. Instead Grossman claimed that no such guarantees were ever demanded by Pakistan on border security before.

85 In October 2010, a high-level delegation of the Chinese Army visited the Landikotal Army Garrison in Khyber Agency. The Chinese team comprised five high-ranking officials led by Director General of the People's Liberation Army Major General Yan Hu to assess the likely implications of a US military incursion of the area.


87 China sent a special envoy to Islamabad to express solidarity with Pakistan. On May 19, 2011, Jia Qinglin, the chief of the powerful Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), declared that Pakistan will never be left in the lurch and the strategic cooperation between the two countries will be taken to new heights. On May 12, 2011, Pakistan's third nuclear electric power plant, the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant Unit-1 (CHASNUPP-2), became operational with Chinese support for Pakistan’s civil nuclear energy program. China promises assistance on two more nuclear plants Chasma-3 and Chasma-4.
weapons for Pakistan. To prevent the US jamming of radars and the violation of Pakistani airspace in future, China has upgraded Pakistan's radar system and satellite technology. China possesses 66 Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs') with a target range reaching as far as the US, 118 intermediate, 36 submarine-launched missile and numerous short range missile systems.

Ironically, the US policy makers and politicians suspected Pakistan of complicity with Al-Qaeda. Nato forces attack on Pakistani check post Salala proved to be last straw in the down-turn of US relations with Pakistan. Threatening to obstruct Nato supplies, Islamabad demanded public apology for what it termed as an attack on its sovereignty. Logistical assistance to US/Nato troops in Afghanistan had been supplied through the transit passage via Karachi to Chaman and Torkham. The clear degree of dependence increased Pakistan’s indispensability for the US as the alternate route in the north was long and difficult. The Iranian route of Chabhar and Bandar Abbas was inaccessible due to UN sanctions. To coerce the US, Pakistan had the Shamsi air base vacated — a leverage Pakistan well exploited to thwart the US pressure. Perhaps retaliation for the US/Nato action occurred as Nato headquarters in Kabul was attacked by the terrorists.

The US officials linked the attack to the Pakistani supported Haqqani network, which US military commander Mike Mullen termed as the veritable arm of ISI. Pakistan demanded $5,000 per truck for Nato transit passage. US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta termed Pakistani action as ‘price-gouging,’ while turning down Pakistan’s demand for apology. Criticism in the Pakistani parliament led to a demand for a reversal of engagement policy with the US. The parliament resolution of April 12, 2012 earmarked Pakistan’s stipulation of new policy conditions for engagement with the US. Pakistani stipulated the demand for US cessation of drone strikes, termination of the US military bases and an end to intelligence sharing with the US. The US exerted fiscal

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88 The first Chinese-built F-22P Frigate had been inducted earlier to Pakistan Navy in July 2009. The Chinese frigates, which are medium-sized warships, are equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and anti-submarine helicopters.
89 On May 20, 2011, China briefed the Pakistani prime minister about the latest Chinese radar systems and satellite technology, offering 10 state-of-the-art radar systems and satellite technologies to Pakistan.
90 China has offered Pakistan 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter planes, along with J-20 Stealth and Xiaolong/FC-1 multi-purpose light fighter aircrafts to protect Pakistan’s air space.
91 The attack on November 26, 2011 killed twenty four Pakistani soldiers and injured thirteen others.
strangulation to seek Pakistan’s acquiescence. At the symbolic level, Obama turned down a meeting with Pakistani president at the Chicago summit in May 2012.

Interestingly, Sino-US strategic balancing provoked a spiral of Indo-Pakistan mutual hostility. The strategic crisis in Pakistan continued amidst India’s strategic maneuvers to target Pakistan such as Vijayee Bhava held in the Thar desert. On May 19, 2011, Indian Defense Minister A. K. Antony expressed concern on Chinese supply of new JF-17 warplanes, expressing Indian resolve to match the Pakistani capability. Indian defense minister also decided to match Pakistan’s acquisition of Stealth capability. In mid-May 2011, Lieutenant-General K. T. Parnaik, Commander of the Indian Army's Northern Command, went as far as to warn against Sino-Pakistan deep collaboration in weapons’ delivery and infrastructure projects that included dams close to the Line of Control (LoC). The Indian general also warned against Chinese strategic moves to link to Gwadar via the Khunjerab pass.

Earlier the international media reported the presence of Chinese soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan since 2010. Sino-Pakistan joint interest to enhance strategic and operational preparedness on the LoC led India to reassess the altered threat in the wake of China’s collaboration with Pakistan. In May 2011, reports indicated that Chinese engineer corps’ was present in Pakistani occupied Kashmir. Commander Northern Command of the Indian Army Lt.-General K. T. Parnaik warned that India was facing danger from Chinese troops in Pakistani Kashmir. The Pakistani military had hoped that Chinese presence raised Beijing’s stakes in the physical protection of Pakistan. India even accused China of assisting Pakistan in the making of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.

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93 Ibid.
94 At a recent meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Indian Army Chief General V. K. Singh presented a three-pronged strategy to counter China’s growing presence in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in Pakistani Kashmir. The strategy calls for a dedicated mountain strike corps, significant enhancement in the army's tactical airlift capability and improvement in the border infrastructure along the border with China.
95 A serving Pakistani army officer on conditions of anonymity spoke about Pakistani defense calculations on Chinese physical presence in Azad Kashmir.
Ironically, *Operation Geronimo* took a toll on public appreciation of the army’s role, invoking controversy on its reliability to defend Pakistan. The US move raised a question mark on the military’s transparency as the guardian of Pakistan. Popular support turned low as the public became disillusioned with the role of the military in ensuring internal and external security. If a surprise US assault had caught it unguarded, Pakistan army’s credibility to guard against India began to be questioned. Even if one were to buy the argument that the US had the Pakistani military on board, the charge of compromising Pakistan’s sovereignty could not have been evaded. Just as the action was consequential, so were its implications for Pakistan’s security.

Up-surge in terrorist attacks in May 2011, following the US increase in drone strikes worsened the condition of internal security in Pakistan. Intelligence termed the Israeli Mossad, Indian RAW and CIA as directly responsible for TTP militant activities to destabilize Pakistan. Raymond Davis, the US contractor, was indicted by Russian intelligence to provide weapons to Al-Qaeda to target important military installations in Pakistan. Additional raids followed as the CIA reported Al-Qaeda’s new boss Saif al-Adel residing in Waziristan. Haqqani militia’s presence in Pakistan headed by the Quetta Shura contributed another controversy in bilateral relations. Raising the number and frequency of drone attacks, the US pressurized Pakistan to curb the network’s activities. Political temperatures raised as suicide bombings increased mutual suspicions on both sides. Internal security problems aggravated due to large scale suicide attacks, bomb blasts and commando style operations on army and naval bases in Pakistan.

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96 India has accused that the operational capability of the Chinese supplied nuclear power plants allow Pakistan to acquire 8-10 nuclear weapons every year. India believes the plant allows Pakistan to follow the Chinese model of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to provide for a flexible response in case of escalation with India. Pakistan’s conducted flight test of nuclear-capable Hatf-8 (Ra’ad) missile, over 350 kilometers range on April 29, 2011. The cruise missile has stealth capabilities and is a low altitude terrain missile with high maneuverability. Pakistan has also conducted the first test of a surface-to-surface ballistic missile Hatf-9 (Nasr) in early 2011.

97 The US has alleged that the Haqqani network supported the Afghan Taliban, fighting against Nato/US presence and the Kabul government in Afghanistan.
From a marginal concern, terrorism and militancy surfaced as a huge problem for internal security and stability of Pakistan. A considerable cost of worsened internal security situation entailed repercussions for Sino-Pakistan economic collaboration. Consequently, the rise in militancy and extremism, political unrest and instability dampened Pakistan’s potential prospects to serve as energy corridor for China. Indian analysts, however, such as Shashi Tharoor argued that Pakistan suffered from ‘the whiplash of the very pain it has sought to inflict on others.’ India has accused Islamabad of installing a Kabul regime, as a ‘wholly owned subsidiary’ of the military establishment in Pakistan. An important distinction has related to ‘Good Taliban’ vs. ‘Bad Taliban’ attribute. The US ‘Good Taliban’ proved to be ‘Bad Taliban’ for Pakistan. Islamabad has alleged that CIA-RAW-Mossad nexus have funded the TTP (Pakistan’s Bad Taliban) to launch attacks against the army, state institutions and the public to weaken Pakistan. On the contrary, Washington has alleged that the Afghan Taliban (the US Bad Taliban) have attacked the US/Nato military presence and opposed the Kabul government in Afghanistan.

Indian analyst Shashi Tharoor has argued that Zardari government remained the best-suited civilian set-up to resume normalization with the US. Through liberalization of trade and ease on visa, Zardari sought to normalize relations with India. In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks and Kabul bombings on Indian embassy in July 2008,

98 From a marginal concern in 2005, terrorism became rampant and cost 42,000 lives including $72 billion loss in infrastructure by 2012. By 2014, terrorism had cost multitudes of lives and incalculable loss to Pakistan. See Abdus Sattar, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Precise History, 105.
100 Ibid., 48.
101 Sustained US pressure led to release of a report, linking five of the terrorists involved in Mumbai attacks to have roots in Pakistan, including the handover of Zaki-u- Rahman Lakhvi in 2009. The US in April 2012 has announced a bounty of $10 million on Hafiz Saeed’s head—the leader of the banned organization Jamaat-ud-Dawaa in Pakistan.
102 For example, multiple peace efforts were made to resume India-Pakistan stalled composite dialogue like the Maman Singh and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani’s joint statement in Sharm-ul-Shiekh, the ‘cricket diplomacy’ that offered Gillani to watch cricket semi-final at Mohali, India, the ‘designer diplomacy’ entailing Pakistani Foreign Minister’s visit to New Delhi in 2011 and the ‘dargah diplomacy’ of Zardari’s visit to Ajmer, India in 2012. India conditions resumption of a meaningful dialogue to Islamabad’s firm commitment to stop support for alleged perpetration of attacks in Indian Occupied Kashmir. Pakistan holds that it denounces all forms of terrorist activities irrespective of territorial distinction and does not support any anti-state activity in Indian Occupied Kashmir.
the Zardari government went so far as to propose that the ISI be put under the interior ministry clipping its political wings. Yet the civil-military divide in the country failed to follow the US chartered role.

The Nawaz government decided to reset ties with the US in 2013. Subsequent rift in civil-military relations have set the military well-saddled to take charge of the US-Pakistan relations post 2013. The down-turn in Pakistan’s relations with the US began to improve. Simultaneously, the US sought to re-engage Pakistan by a milder approach on counter-terrorism and counter insurgency by lessening the frequency of drone strikes. The US administration also back paddled on public statement of links between Islamabad and terrorism.103 The US Secretary of State John Kerry, unlike his previous mentor Hillary Clinton, played an instrumental role to resume ties with Islamabad. John Kerry’s visit to Pakistan in late November 2013, however, stirred Chinese suspicions on the improvement of the US-Pakistan relations.

The CCP’s mouth piece — *The Global Times* interpreted John Kerry’s visit to India and Pakistan as ‘the US pivot to South Asia.’ Juxta-positioned between Asia and Europe, the region is too important for the US to ignore. A Chinese observer Wang Yusheng in an article in *Foreign Affairs* has reflected precisely on the US multidimensional interest in Afghanistan and Central Asia.104 The scholar has argued that the US has long coveted the region, aspiring for military presence and influence. In terms of politics and security, the region holds the potential to check Russia to the north, China to the southeast and Iran to the west. The US could not afford to lose its military presence and influence.

Insurgency and terrorism are only a manifestation of low intensity conflict, involving a ‘bait and bleed strategy’ to weaken or break the adversary’s determination to resist. *Spearhead Research Terror Incident Monitoring Cell* has compiled data on deterioration in Pakistan’s internal security, following large scale suicide attacks, bomb

103 Washington decreased the number of drone attacks in a bid to improve the US-Pakistan relations. Reports quoted by New America Foundation state 122 drone strikes in 2010, 73 in 2011, 48 in 2012, and 16 in Pakistan in 2014.

blasts and commando style operations on army and naval bases in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{105} Pakistan’s former president Musharraf pointed at the Indian army role for perpetrating terror in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{106} In an interview to ARY news channel, Musharraf termed the incident of December 16, 2014 as a ‘black day’ in Pakistan’s history.\textsuperscript{107} Speaking on institutional weaknesses i.e., lack of civilian institutions’ support to curb terrorism, Musharraf stated that:

The army needs strength, support and back-up from the civilian institutions in Pakistan. Death sentences are not implemented, convicts are bailed out and no witnesses dare appearance! For how long can the nation and the state sustain this pressure? We have to find a joint (army, civilian) solution to the problem. Escapist attitudes need to be shunned. TTP claims responsibility for the incident, and Fazl ullah is its head! We now know he sits in Afghanistan in Kunar! How come he sits protected there! Karzai protected him; abetted him due to Indian support! India perpetrates terror in Pakistan through the TTP. Does the US not know about this? The US needs to implement an even-handed approach on counter-terrorism. A partial implementation will not do!\textsuperscript{108}

It signified that while the former president pointed to internal weaknesses in the institutional set-up of Pakistan to curb militancy, he also pointed to the covert support

 nacta accessed May 24, 2015.

\textsuperscript{106} The ISI capture of Indian Serving Navy Commander Kul Bushan Yadav along with 400 other Raw agents in-filtered and working in Pakistan has proved the authenticity of Musharraf’s argument. See RAW’s Serving Indian Commander held in Balochistan,’ The News, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, March 25, 2016.

\textsuperscript{107} The incident termed as ‘Pakistani 9/11’ involved the brutal massacre of 144 students in a terrorist attack on Army Public School, Warsak Road, Peshawar.

\textsuperscript{108} Musharraf said laws of evidence and conviction needs to be revisited as no judge can afford to endanger the life of his kids and family by passing conviction on terrorists. Terrorism has to be uprooted with a strong commitment of support from the civilian governments. Feeble and weak civilian set-ups, fail to implement punishment for the convicted. Sanctity of terrorists law needs to be maintained and judiciary be made part of it. Terrorist laws and courts need to be made to defend the judiciary. In the absence of laws, judges are scared to take decisions. In the absence of such laws, the problem of missing persons erupts. It’s not the army’s job to make laws. The civilian set-up needs to make counter-terrorist laws. There is another big issue, the problem of external interference. See Daily Motion Video Channel Mubassahar Luqman, daily motion video channel, available at: http://www.dailymotion.com.
the US granted to the TTP militant activities in Pakistan. He also implied that India was involved in terrorists’ training to perpetrate terror in Pakistan. Zia Khan in an article published in *The London Post* on March 8, 2014 has, however, argued that internal security is the realm of the police, the IB and FIA that have local knowledge, intelligence and presence. Musharraf’s deployment of the army, configured and trained to deal with external threats and the grant of permission to foreign intelligence agencies complicated the situation. Reports, for example, in the *Asia Times* on October 4, 2003 revealed that FBI exercised direct control on the law enforcing agencies with access to their offices, handsomely rewarding them financially. The sophistication of weaponry and tactics has remained a hallmark of foreign supported professionalism. More than internal weaknesses, foreign involvement had a direct hand in exacerbation of terrorism in Pakistan. The former president stated that:

> Pakistan fights a war of survival, we are at war. We should be supported in this, lest be stabbed by rendering covert support to our enemies. Terrorism is being in-filtered into Pakistan and people launched to engage in such acts. It is happening right here in the heart of Pakistan. This should be put an end to; international support and across the border help must end. If not, Pakistan will have to take steps of its own. We have to save ourselves. A tit for tat response is abetted. We are fighting a war of our survival. No matter what the world thinks, we need to take counter action, irrespective of what the world thinks of us.\(^\text{109}\)

The president implied that Indo-US action had put Pakistan in a state of war. A retaliatory response was abetted since it involved a case of Pakistan’s survival. The former president implied that the US should assist Pakistan by curbing the TTP instead of covertly assisting its nefarious activities in Pakistan. Musharraf further disclosed:

> Afghanistan is being used for terrorism in Pakistan. Afghan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) was the chief guest in the passing out parade of the Indian Army Academy, 85 Afghan army officers were being trained there. Pakistan shares geographical, cultural, religious, and historical affinity with Afghanistan yet Karzai sent his men for training to India. We offered (Karzai) many a times to train the Afghan forces, yet the Karzai government builds an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan. We see this happening. India promotes a proxy war in Pakistan. We asked Abdul Ghani to take stock of the situation, lest we find solutions to these problems at our own, and this will not be good for Afghanistan either.\(^\text{110}\)

\(^{109}\) Ibid.

The former president meant that despite Pakistan’s multi-dimensional affinity with Afghanistan, India was trying to create an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan along Pakistan’s western front. India was building strategic partnership with Afghanistan over and above Pakistan. Regarding the Peshawar incident on Army Public School on December 16, 2014, the Pakistani Federal Minister for Defense Khawaja Asif alleged that:

India has designs on Pakistan. India helped the TTP to carry out ‘heinous acts’ in Pakistan. India’s involvement in the insurgency in Balochistan and Pakistan has been supported by substantial evidence. Proofs cannot be disclosed in statesmanship. India assists our enemies. I hold no bars in stating that. Whatever odd reason binds them (TTP) to India, it’s a low intensity conflict and India extends support to perpetration of terror in Pakistan. I have my own conjectures, conclusions, and proofs to support my statement.  

The federal minister implied that Pakistan had substantial evidence to prove Indian proxy involvement in Balochistan and extension of support to the TTP. Norms of statesmanship, however, prevented Pakistan to disclose the proofs publicly in media.  

The federal minister further stated that:

India seeks to engage Pakistan on the eastern front, to distract it from the west in order to prevent Pakistan’s resistance to the enemy that fights Pakistan internally and externally. Certain forces do not want Pakistan to progress beyond a certain level. Their interest lies in Pakistan’s regression to backwardness. We intend to share the evidence of Indian involvement with international forces in this regard. We need to prove that our survival both at the western and eastern front is at stake. Pakistan is fighting a war of survival. TTP and India have clubbed hands together. India holds duel standards. When Islamic extremism was in Kashmir, Indians opposed it, now that it’s in Afghanistan, India supports it. This contradiction suits our enemy.  

The minister’s statement implied that India wanted to retard Pakistan’s economic progress, throwing it into failure and regression. He further implied that international factors were involved to destabilize Pakistan and retard its stability and progress. Interestingly, Chuk Hegel, US former Secretary of Defense alleged that India has been involved in proliferation of terrorism in Pakistan. Chuk Hegel said that India had for

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112 COAS General Raheel on a visit to the UK and the US handed-over the proofs of Indian proxy involvement in Balochistan and the terrorists attacks in other areas of Pakistan.
113 Ibid.
114 India financed problems for Pakistan in Afghanistan says US Defense Secretary, Chuk Hegel, available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-financed-problems-for-
sometime used Afghanistan as a second front and financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border.

On the contrary, however, Indo-Afghan analysts have argued that neostructural imperatives have guided Pakistan on its Taliban policy to oblige a more powerful patron — the US. In an interview with the author, Afghan Policy and Capacity Development Advisor Hameed Hakimi has argued that Pakistan hedged with the US to manipulate and leverage the US against India. Pakistan can ostensibly milk the US for funds on the pretext of counter-terrorism operations against the Taliban, the Pakistani policy can serve as an effective, low-risk tool to throw the enemy off-balance.

India has accused Pakistan of perpetrating terrorism as an instrument of state policy. It has stated that Pakistan extends support to those who attack Indian interest, while it punishes those who escape the ISI control and attack Pakistan military establishment. India believes that Pakistan has amassed the US supplied weapons and equipment to build military strength against New Delhi. India has accused Pakistan of putting up the false pretext of political reappraisal, preventing action against radical extremism in Pakistan. Links with the Quetta Shura and Mullah Omar has served Pakistan as strategic assets to check Indian interference. India has accused the US of a dreary role to pressurize Pakistan on counter-terrorism in Afghanistan and Kashmir. India believes that the US asserts a lukewarm pressure on Pakistan due to the latter’s extension of logistical, intelligence and military support for counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan.

India has alleged that Musharraf anti-terrorism support to the US in Afghanistan entailed a bargaining cost on Kashmir. It committed the US not to raise non-proliferation and anti-terrorism concerns in Indian Occupied Kashmir. The US hands remained clutched on Pakistan’s counter-terrorism support in Afghanistan. Hence the militant networks found a green chit to upsurge their activities in Indian held Kashmir. Indian analyst Shalendra D. Sharma has argued that the US in a way has contributed to


115 Interview conducted by the author with Hameed Hakimi, Policy and Capacity Development Advisor, Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, in Islamabad, October 19, 2014.
the increase in the ‘relative cost’ of terrorist activities in Indian Occupied Kashmir.\footnote{Shalendra D. Sharma, \textit{China and India in the Age of Globalization}, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 24.} A down turn in Indo-Pakistan relations occurred post 9/11, when Lashkar-i-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed increased their activities in Indian held Kashmir. Consequently, India has believed that retaliation would ally the terrorist in a common cause against New Delhi. India has feared that New Delhi’s direct retaliatory counter-action against the terrorist will be counter-productive for Indian strategic and political interests in the region. Indian analyst Shashi Tharoor has argued that peace\footnote{See Shashi Tharoor, \textit{Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century} (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2012), 48.} will dawn upon the sub-continent by making counter-terrorism as a common cause of Indo-Pakistan joint policy objective.

Sino-US balancing has raised the cost of terrorism and militancy, regional polarization and mutual hostilities. Pakistan’s extension of support for the US GWOT held enormous consequences for Pakistan’s internal stability and security. Sino-US power balancing has engendered Muslim backlash and radicalized the society, increasing suicide attacks and militancy in Pakistan.

### 6.4 Sino-US Competition: Implications for Pakistan’s Economic Stability


Musharraf’s joining of the GWOT resulted in economic regression and the decline in GDP of Pakistan. Militancy and instability led to the flight of human and financial capital, decline in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), industrial growth and development in Pakistan. A loss of $10 billion occurred as Pakistan joined the US global policy of forward defence in the GWOT.\footnote{A US CENTCOM report published in 2002 has estimated that Pakistan’s economy suffered a loss of over $10 since 2001. See Manzoor Ahmed, ‘US-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Coalition
of terrorism and militancy. A CENTCOM report published in 2002 estimated that ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ had a worse effect on Pakistan’s economy. Many industries suffered major losses. Pakistani exports underwent heavy losses and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) faced a rapid decline.\(^{119}\) Zia Khan in *The London Post* argued that more than religious and ideological factors, foreign intervention excited rage or revenge for the loss of property and families in Afghanistan and the tribal belt of Pakistan.\(^{120}\) Terrorism caused the flight of capital and talent, damaging Pakistani economy.\(^{121}\)

A Pakistani academician Manzoor Ahmad has argued that the cost of US-Pakistan counterterrorism is more serious than anticipated.\(^{122}\) The coalition gave rise to insurgency and terrorism, seriously hampering socio-economic development and growth. It increased the civil-military divide while increased ethnic sub-nationalism in the state. It increased US influence in the domestic and foreign milieu of Pakistan. The effect was all the more evident as Pakistan’s fragile economy suffered from nuclear and proliferation sanctions prior to 9/11. Military regime’s installation to power dampened the prospects of debt-re-scheduling in the wake of weak governmental institutions and political chaos. Economic inequality and social divisions rendered Pakistan weak over the decade. The cost-benefit analysis showed a mixed response.

The GWOT brought for Pakistan the happy prospects of re-scheduling the state’s enormous debt. From 113.2, Pakistan’s GDP fell to 62.4 percent in the year 2008. Pakistan also received huge defence supplies and military assistance from the US, worth $8394 billion from 2002 to 2008. Several constitutional measures were started like the Anti-Terrorism Act to keep a check on terrorist activities. Measures like Voluntary Registration and Regulatory Ordinance were introduced to bring Madrassa education

\(^{119}\) Ibid.

\(^{120}\) Ideological, financial and coercive factors have motivated the terrorist acts. Terrorism came to Pakistan when Afghanistan was occupied by foreign powers, it will end only once the US leaves Afghanistan. See Zia Khan, ‘Terrorism in Perspective,’ *The London Post*, March 8, 2014.


\(^{122}\) Ibid.
into the mainstream. To ensure economic stability, certain measures were introduced to up working relationship with international donor institutions, implement structural reforms and improve governance. In the economic sphere, programs like the US Economic Support Fund from 2002-2011 gave more than $7.1 billion funds. Pakistan’s trade with the US flourished during the Musharraf regime, amounting to $22.18 billion imports and $10.744 billion exports respectively with a trade deficit of $11.436 billion. The US investments amounted $385.1 billion during this period.

The US action against the Taliban resulted in public demonstrations, chaos and violence based on ethnic and tribal affiliations across the border in Afghanistan. The anti-terror policies and resultant militancy created insecurity for FDI in Pakistan. The Pakistan army faced serious casualties in the GWOT. The anti-terror operation inferred heavy cost in terms of men and resources, creating trade deficit and lack of FDI in Pakistan.

Table 6.1
Economic Cost of the War on Terror on Pakistan (Rs.bn)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Cost</td>
<td>67.103</td>
<td>78.06</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>108.53</td>
<td>114.03</td>
<td>450.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Cost</td>
<td>192.0</td>
<td>222.72</td>
<td>278.4</td>
<td>375.84</td>
<td>563.76</td>
<td>1632.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>259.103</td>
<td>300.78</td>
<td>361.0</td>
<td>484.37</td>
<td>677.79</td>
<td>2082.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.1 illustrates the economic cost of GWOT from 2005-09 amounting Rs. 2083 billions.

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123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
Table 6.2
Selected Economic Growth Indicators of Pakistan (1999-2008)
(Percent growth)

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monet. Assets</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.2 illustrates the affect on Pakistan’s economy. The enormous cost of the war has resulted in high inflation and lack of socio-economic development in Pakistan. Macro and micro level growth remained sluggish, marking fluctuations in GDP, which declined to 4.1 percent in 2008. The growth in the agriculture sector remained a mix during 2002-2008, dropping to 1.1 percent in 2008. The Economic Survey of Pakistan revealed mixed trends in the agriculture, manufacturing and the service sectors.127 Pakistan’s monetary assets also stayed static at 15.3 percent by the year 2008. Pakistan’s trade deficit increased as the import-export ratio showed more imports and lesser exports.

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127 Agriculture’s share in the GDP increased during 2002-06 from 23.6 percent to 26.3 percent but declined after wards falling to 24.3 percent in the year 2008. The manufacturing sector reached to 5.5 percent in 2005 but declined to 4.8 percent in 2008. The services sector reached, however, 6.6 percent in 2008 as compared to 4.2 in 2000.
Table 6.3
Gross Domestic Product in Pakistan (2000-2013) $ bn dollars

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>10.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>9.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>117.7</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>9.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>136.3</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>152.1</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>151.1</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>7.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>161.5</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>7.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>174.5</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>211.7</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>1167</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>7.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>214.6</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>221.3</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>251.3</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>1288</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.3 illustrates a successive decline in the Gross Domestic Product of Pakistan starting from the year 2001 to 2014. Militancy, terrorism and energy shortfall has resulted in the decline of GDP and the flight of investment from Pakistan.

Table 6.4
Foreign Direct Investment

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Year Book of Pakistan.

Table 6.4 reveals a successive decline in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Pakistan. Comparative statistics in South Asia also reveal the trend towards the decline in Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan.
Table 6.5
REGION-WISE FDI INFLOWS IN SOUTH ASIA (US$ BILLION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>World Developing Economies</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5.470.079</td>
<td>832.56</td>
<td>212.01</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>5.62 0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5.62 0.052</td>
<td>621.99</td>
<td>166.31</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>5.77 0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5.77 0.45</td>
<td>564.07</td>
<td>178.69</td>
<td>0949</td>
<td>7.70 0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7.70 0.81</td>
<td>742.13</td>
<td>283.03</td>
<td>1.524</td>
<td>5.32 0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.32 0.27</td>
<td>945.79</td>
<td>314.31</td>
<td>3.521</td>
<td>7.00 0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7.00 0.66</td>
<td>1305.79</td>
<td>379.07</td>
<td>5.1396</td>
<td>20.33 0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20.33 0.70</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>5.409</td>
<td>25.400.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>25.400.66</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>3.1799</td>
<td>43.40 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>43.40 1.00</td>
<td>1114.1</td>
<td>478.3</td>
<td>2.1508</td>
<td>35.60 0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>35.60 0.97</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>524.8</td>
<td>1.739</td>
<td>24.16 0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Investment Report 2010

Table 6.5 statistics show that India attracted more FDI in South Asia than Pakistan and Bangladesh. From 2001-2010, Pakistan received $24.96 billion FDI and India received $177.77 billion FDI, which is almost 7 times higher than Pakistan during this period. Statistics also indicate that in 2006-2010, India attracted $149.89 billion of FDI, which is almost 6.5 percent of the developing states share of FDI inflows. Pakistan and Bangladesh received $17.68 billion and $4.04 billion respectively in this period, which is 1.34 percent and 0.31 per cent share of developing states FDI inflow. It implies that India performed well in receiving FDI inflows than Pakistan and Bangladesh.128

Table 6.6
Pakistan’s Savings and Investment (2001-2008) (percent of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Saving</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Investment</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving-Investment Gap</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.6 shows the saving-investment gap on the increase in Pakistan from the year 2001 to 2008. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) has reported a Saving-Investment Gap successively on the increase in Pakistan.

### Table 6.7

**Social Indicators in Pakistan (1999-2008)**

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita Income</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy rate</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>22.54</td>
<td>27.63</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.27</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.7 illustrates selected social indicators in Pakistan from 1999-2008, showing poverty on the increase in Pakistan. Within the South Asian context, viewed from another perspective, Sino-US clash of commercial and economic interests has prevented regional integration in South Asia. The US policies have restricted economic opportunities for regional collaboration, resulting in South Asian states’ dependence on major powers. For example, China’s policy of CPEC has envisioned Sino-Pakistan strategic and economic nexus at the expense of regional integration in South Asia. Trade and commerce regulated internationally through CPEC has raised Chinese stakes in Pakistan.  

Simultaneously, China has invested in Pakistan’s economy on a major scale with immense implications for Pakistan’s indigenous economy.

Functional spill over in trade and economic ties can foster the prospect of regional integration in South Asia. The US scholars Lloyd Rudolf and Sussane Rudolf have opined that regional interdependence can end instability in South Asia.  

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129 Sino-Pakistan has explored ways to bolster economic ties from $12 billion to $15 billion trade by 2015.

130 Executive Order 13059 signed in August 1997 prohibits all American companies to trade and invest in Iran. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act broadened the scope by prohibiting non-US companies from transactions in Iran although not restricting other states directly. The restriction makes import of crude oil and gas to South Asian countries difficult. Also, Executive Order 13047 and Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 had put a ban on US companies to make new investments in Myanmar. The US has sought Indian collaboration to counter-influence the Chinese strategic and economic interest in Mayanmar. See Lawrence
context, however, the CPEC has raised Indian concerns, provoking foreign collaboration to foil the project and destabilize the region. Simultaneously, Lawrence Sa’ez has argued that the US geo-economic policy in South Asia is paradoxical and asymmetrical in approach. The US policies have restricted Indo-Pakistan capacity to overcome their energy deficit, despite tremendous increase in their population growth. The US sanctions on oil and gas import from Iran and Myanmar makes the South Asian oil-dependent economies vulnerable to a decline in reliable energy imports.\textsuperscript{131} This impairs the regional states’ capacity to uproot poverty, while generating unrest and terrorism in South Asia.

\textit{Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)} has regulated US-Pakistan economic relations at the bilateral level. The US has remained as Pakistan’s largest export market and a major source of investment in Pakistan. The US has provided Pakistan $30 billion in aid for collaboration on the GWOT in the form of Coalition Support Fund or CSF since 2001. Under the \textit{Enhanced Partnership Act of 2009} or the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, the US committed $5 billion in civilian assistance and over $1 billion in humanitarian assistance for Pakistan. To help overcome energy deficiency, the new \textit{US-Pakistan Clean Energy Partnership (USCEP)} project will assist Pakistan in the energy and power generation sector. The US has funded the construction of thermal and hydropower generation since 2009.\textsuperscript{132} The US has also played an important role in facilitating Pakistan’s access to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) markets in the world.\textsuperscript{133} The US contributed an amount of $15 million for \textit{Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000)} to transmit electricity from Central Asia to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan and the US are increasing trade, investment and economic cooperation. The US has strengthened cooperation to improve governance in FATA and the tribal belt of

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133}“Pakistan, US agree to enhance economic cooperation,” \textit{The News}, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, April 19, 2015.
Pakistan. To encourage implementation of the *Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement*, the US has provided for construction of Pakistan’s road infrastructure to facilitate trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Economic and trade relations have remained subservient to the ups and downs in US-Pakistan political relations. The decline in support for the US in Pakistan post 9/11 has led to a corresponding increase in public support for China. The US strategic, economic and political influence has stipulated a Chinese counter-influence in the South Asian region.

As an integral component of Sino-US global interplay of security competition, Beijing’s policy of BRI has sought to expand China’s geo-strategic and economic weight in South Asia and Central Asian region. A southern component of BRI, the CPEC is a reflection of China’s broader global and regional ambitions. The CPEC has held strategic underpinnings for Islamabad. CPEC is a manifestation of China’s expansion of influence in Pakistan with wider implications for the latter’s domestic, regional and security interests. The BRI reflects a two pronged strategy: A program of economic and industrial development for China’s western regions; and, infrastructure connectivity to promote regional economic integration. In the attempt to respond to Obama’s pivot Asia, the BRI has aimed at economic revival through border diplomacy. Announcing the rationale for the policy initiative, Chinese president Xi Jinping stated that China must strive to make its neighborhood friendlier in politics, economically more closely tied to Beijing, and China must have deeper security cooperation and close societal ties with the states in the region. The president’s statement implied that China plans to increase its strategic, economic and political influence in the peripheral region.

Map 1 shows BRI’s route across the Pamir Plateau and its connection to its southern tier, the CPEC in the region. The BRI was formally announced in the CCP Standing Committee and Political Politburo’s high-level meeting in Beijing in November 2013.

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134 The US-Pakistan people to people contacts have included scholarships for students and training programs. Since 2003, the bilateral *US-Pakistan Science and Technology (S&T) Cooperation Agreement* has provided a framework to increase cooperation in science, technology, engineering and education, contributing nearly $34 million in collaborative research projects. The US funds 23 partnerships between Pakistani and US universities to facilitate professional development for faculty, curriculum reform, joint research, and peer-to-peer interaction.

The New Silk Route Economic Belt or BRI specifies Beijing’s ‘Look West policy,’ envisioning construction of road/rail networks across China’s western and southern neighborhood. The policy tends to join China to Central Asia and beyond to eastern shores of Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. China has built three new railway corridors—the Northern, Central and the Southern corridors as part of BRI. From Shanghai and Lianyungang in China, the Central corridor transverse Central Asia and terminates at Paris in France. From Tainjin in China, the Northern corridor passes through Moscow. Towards the west, it ends at Rotterdam; and towards the north, it ends at Helsinki. Southern end of the New Silk Route Economic Corridor starts from Fangcheng and Guangzhou in China.

Chinese scholar Cui Jia has observed that China has envisioned economic and political dividends from the New Silk Road Strategy. Explaining the motivation underlying China’s ‘Look West policy,’ Yan Xuetong has stated that the Chinese policy provides for border diplomacy, while downplaying US cynicism on Beijing’s westward expansion. The US has been skeptical of China’s expansion of influence in the region. China has sought to adjust to Russian concerns in its sub-regional economic integration policy. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) comprises BRI’s southern tier.

Passing through Kashghar, the corridor enters Pakistan across the Khunjerab pass. Towards the south, it connects to Islamabad and goes to Karachi and Gwadar. The Northern and Central corridors have stipulated greater land-connectivity along the 6,447 kms old silk route to Europe and Russia across the Allataw Pass in Kazakhstan.


137 The original plan had railways, oil and gas pipelines bypassing Russia. Yet to prevent competition with Russia, these were revised to pass through Russia itself. The move eased states concerns of having to side with either China or Russia. President Xi invited Russia to join the Silk Road Economic Belt and even the Maritime Silk Road. For more, See “Silk Road Economic Belt shows China’s New Strategic Direction: Promoting Integration With its neighbors,” Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University in 21ST Century Business Herald, op-ed, February 27, 2014, available at: http://carnegiestinghua.org/2014/02/27/Silk-Road-Economic-Belt-Shows-China-S-New-Strategic-Direction-Promoting-Integration-With-Its-Neighbours accessed May 24, 2012.

138 Ibid.
The Southern corridor links China to the Arabian Sea towards the south. To provide for speedy transportation, China has planned to connect Urumqi to Beijing through 12 hours speedy railway journey. The 1800 kilometers of rail/road network built across the Pamir Plateau and Karakorum mountains will integrate CPEC to BRI along the historic Silk route.

Pakistan has been playing the role of China’s backdoor to West Asia, the Middle East and the world at large. Islamabad has served as China’s bridge to the Muslim world. Unleashed in October 2013 and revived in November 2014, the CPEC connects Pakistan’s northern areas with Xinjiang. Kashgar has gained eminence as the pivotal centre in China’s western development strategy. Across the Kunjerab pass in the south, CPEC has connected Kashgar to Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan via the Karakoram Highway (KKH) termed as the ‘friendship highway’ or ‘the eighth wonder of the world.’ Further south, the KKH links Kasghar to Gwadar via the Indus Highway. The Makran Coastal Highway interlinks Gwadar to Pakistan’s industrial hub of Karachi. A railway track towards Hazara connects CPEC to Karachi and Quetta. Towards the northeast, a branch of the railway track connects the CPEC to Muzaffarabad.

Gwadar has served as China’s backyard to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Travelling through the length and breadth of Pakistan, CPEC materializes the promise of oil import from the Middle East to offload at Gwadar and to be transported to Kasghar. In May 2013, Li Keqiang’ signed the CPEC during his visit to Pakistan. Vali Nasr opined that Pakistan has been serving as a strategic balancer for China, tending to neutralize many of New Delhi’s military and diplomatic overtures. The projects’ formal inauguration in February 2014 led to Indian indignation and protest. Pakistani analyst Mehreen Zahra Malik observed that Pakistan has vowed to provide

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139 China’s expansion of trade plummeting from $46 million to $4.6 billion by 2012 with CAS remains a major economic factor to stipulate greater connectivity.
140 In June 2006, China and Pakistan signed a MoU to upgrade KKH width from 10m to 30m transport capacity. In July 2010, China and Pakistan agreed to connect Kashgar with Abbottabad along a 3000 kilometer railway line network. The KKH connects to Chinese border at Taxkorgan in Xinjiang. The road has 80 bridges and average height of 4,700 meters.
141 Ibid.
security to Chinese workers and engineers despite adversity. In November 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promised to grant security to the Chinese, while signing $45.6 billion deal on CPEC. The China Development Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd will finance the CPEC projects. The Chinese companies will operate the CPEC related energy and infrastructure projects as profit making commercial ventures.

With China’s massive oil investments in Iran worth $200 billion and 50 percent oil imports from the Middle East, Pakistan remains an integral channel to China’s overland and sea route development strategy. Pakistan has remained as the vital channel for China’s economic growth. Gwadar has provided China transit terminals for crude oil import from Iran, Africa and the Middle East. China’s economic and security interests’ in the Middle East, Central Asia and Southwest Asia are linked to the geo-strategic stability of Pakistan. China’s two vital energy life lines have connected to the north and the south of Pakistan. Xinhua News stipulated the pivotal focus of Chinese Premier Li Keqieng in May 2013 stipulated Sino-Pakistan strategic maritime collaboration, bilateral trade and joint infrastructure development to enhance Sino-Pakistan long-term connectivity.

The China Desk in Pakistan Foreign Office has emphasized that both China and Pakistan have enjoyed unique relations built on high level interaction.  

144 The CPEC allocates $622 million for projects related to development of Gwadar port. Chinese funded projects, worth $15.5 b of coal, wind, solar and hydro energy will add 10,400 megawatts of energy to the national grid by 2017. The CPEC also includes $5.9b for road projects and $3.7 b for railway projects by 2017. Additional 6,120 megawatts be included in the national grid worth $18.2 billion by 2021.
145 A number of options offer prospects for reducing energy vulnerability in the region: the IPI project, pipeline from Oman to Pakistan and then overland to mainland China — Maritime Silk Route Project, and revive the old Silk Route for energy import from Central Asia and beyond.
146 A serving officer in Pakistan Navy disclosed, however, that barring two terminals, China is yet to construct oil storage and terminal facilities at the port.
148 Talking Points for Prime Minister’s Meeting with Chinese Foreign Ministers, China Desk, Foreign Office of Pakistan, Islamabad.
Ministers’ Dialogue,’ ‘Strategic Dialogue and other consultative mechanisms have strengthened Sino-Pakistan strategic communication to promote their strategic and defence partnership. China has exercised leverage through across-the-board political, institutional and popular support in Pakistan. China and Pakistan share a convergence of interests on regional and global issues. Sino-Pakistani leadership has made a conscientious effort to strengthen economic relations, at par with political and strategic relations. China’s leverage is increasing in Pakistan with the initiation of the energy and infrastructure projects envisioned in the CPEC.

In the post 9/11 era, there has been integrated economic and strategic collaboration between China and Pakistan. Sino-Pakistan convergence of interests has been manifested in multifaceted economic, energy, trade and social development projects. China’s trade with Pakistan has surpassed the benchmark set by US-Pakistan bilateral trade. China’s economic leverage in Pakistan has extended to military equipment sales, direct investment in infrastructure, banking, telecommunication, and energy generation sectors. Despite difference in ideology and culture, Sino-Pakistan friendship has stood on three prominent pillars of bilateral economic, political and strategic cooperation. Historical precedent has served as an example in this regard. The US arms assistance to India in the 1962 war and arms embargo in the Indo-Pakistan 1965 war led to Pakistan’s strategic reliance on China in the 1960s. China has pursued a ‘step-by-step’ approach to fulfill Pakistan’s needs for nuclear energy, following the US conclusion of a nuclear deal with India.

Pakistani defense analyst Talat Masood has argued that China has rendered cooperation in building a strong industrial base for Pakistan. With Chinese help, Pakistan has built Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Heavy Industries Taxilla, Ordinance Factories, the Heavy Mechanical Complex and the Heavy Forge Factory as well as intrinsic technological and industrial base. China has built for Pakistan nuclear power plants at Chasma, maritime projects for the navy and missile

149 Ibid.
150 China has invested $198m, four times the amount spent by Pakistan, to construct three multipurpose berths. It has spent another $200m in the construction of Makran Coastal Highway that links Gwadar to ports in Karachi and Bin Qasim.
151 Talat Masood, “Pakistan’s unique relations with China,” The Express Tribune, February 11, 2015.
152 Ibid.
factories.\textsuperscript{153} \textit{The Frontier Post} has reported General Lee Lang’s, Gen. Secretary of the \textit{China Arsenal Central and Disarmament Association} statement that China has been committed to build Pakistan’s atomic reactor under the aegis and guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency.\textsuperscript{154} To boost trade and investment in energy and infrastructure development, China has signed a \textit{Free Trade Agreement (FTA)} in 2006, along with \textit{Bilateral Investment Treaty} and many other agreements. The balance of trade, however, has remained in China’s favor due to lesser exports by Pakistan. Initial enthusiasm for Chinese investment and trade has given way to anger at the net outflow of wealth to China.\textsuperscript{155} Chinese investment ventures have resulted in socio-political unrest, unemployment and resentment in Pakistan.

China has signed 300 agreements on building close co-operation with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{156} However, Pakistan’s local textile production has suffered decline or shutdowns due to trade imports from China. India has registered anti-dumping complaints with WTO against China. The general impression in public circles has prevailed that China would dump cheap manufactured goods in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{157} Sino-Pakistan energy collaboration has focused on hydel and renewable energy projects: Chashma Nuclear Power Projects, Neelum-Jhelum Power Project, Gomal Zam Dam, Kohala Hydro-Power Project, and Bunji-Dam. The renewable energy power projects built with Chinese investment include Thatta Wind Farm Project and the Thar Coal Project.

\textsuperscript{153} The spokesperson of China Foreign Affairs Miss Jian Ju informed the Pakistani press that China will not only build Chashma series of nuclear power plants but safeguard them as well. The US administration must stop its vicious and negative propaganda against Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear programme. See Shaukat Hayat, “Pak-China Nuclear Cooperation,” \textit{The Frontier Post}, May 24, 2011. China has assisted Pakistan in the commercial nuclear power generation complex, consisting of Chasma series, i.e., Chasma Nuclear Power Plant-I (CHASNUPP-1) completed in June 2000, Chasma Nuclear Power Plant-II (CHASNUPP-II) completed in January 2011, CHASNUPP-III to be completed by June 2015 and CHASNUPP-IV to be completed by March 2017.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{155} Orange Train project, Nandi Pur and such other Chinese ventures have aroused local resentment against the Chinese initiatives in Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{156} Aneeqa Rehman, “Pak-China relationship and our economy,” \textit{The Frontier Post}, August 21, 2013.

Exogenous neo-structural imperatives have guided Pakistan’s foreign policy to neutralize the US tilt towards India through the liberalization of trade, Chinese investments, and increase in defense budget and missile collaboration with China. Beijing has built allies and local enforcers, significantly challenging the US hegemony in South Asia. Islamabad has opened gates to China’s massive investments due to the fear of ‘Chindia’ materializing by 2025. Monopoly preservation has required that China assert greater political control, exercised through persuasion and indulgence in the domestic political milieu of Pakistan. Although China has avoided taking sides, the CPEC has become entangled in political intermingling, with the designated route becoming a provincial tug of war in Pakistan.

China’s grand vision of development has directed its investment in Pakistan, which has dovetailed on Pakistan’s short term energy needs. Pakistan and China have built joint bodies and forums to objectively analyze current trade trends and propose remedial measures. Chinese investments, however, have failed to generate expected number of jobs in Pakistan. Chinese investment in the mining sector has aroused local resentment in FATA and Balochistan. China, however, needs to develop new strategies for successful implementation of projects. Procedural delays in implementation have created disgust and indignation, leading Pakistan to rely on international financial institutions. Witnessing delay in Chinese commitment, the US has announced to finance the Gomal Zam and Satpara Dam projects in Pakistan.

Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, Chairman Defense Committee, has asserted that Pakistan’s political stability, economic strength and prosperity remains linked to alignment with China. Apart from the nuclear issue and Kashmir, friendship with China has cut across party lines as a unified view. Pakistan has constituted the soft southern underbelly of China. Rising China is as a source of strength for all of Asia. While defining its orientation towards a rising China’s political and economic potential in Asia, Sino-Pakistan has focused on peace, security and stability as common strategic objectives in Southwest Asia.

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159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed has argued that Sino-Pakistan collaboration has been a response to the Indo-US strategic partnership.\textsuperscript{161} Sino-Pakistan, in principle, has agreed to ‘close ranks’ to face extraordinary global and regional challenges. More solid and stable, Sino-Pakistan relations mark a resilience of their own, in view of the regional and global transformations.\textsuperscript{162} Sino-Pakistan relations have acquired a broader regional and global ramification, setting a new reference point within which states have calculated their perceptions, responses and policy decisions. Pakistan chooses to stay away from any attempt aimed at containment of China.\textsuperscript{163} Pak-China cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology,\textsuperscript{164} operationalization of CPEC, and the handover of the Gwadar Port are the central planks of Sino-Pakistan leadership priorities.

The thrust of Sino-Pakistan strategic collaboration has been maritime cooperation and anti-terrorism joint training exercises.\textsuperscript{165} Pakistan continues to adhere to ‘One China’ policy, while supporting Chinese efforts to curb the three evils of ‘extremism, terrorism and separatism’.\textsuperscript{166} China–Pakistan relations have included unprecedented high level state visits.\textsuperscript{167} Sino-Pakistan has maintained a joint front to sustain pressure during global and regional volatility. China stands in competition over commodities and resources with the US in Southwest and Central Asia. Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan has argued that despite considerable gain based on the Indo-US strategic partnership, the US needs to restore the subcontinents’ influence in China’s Xinjiang, Tibet and Yunan.\textsuperscript{168} Regional integration on expansion of the role of Saarc and cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council can rebalance a resurgent China in Southwest Asia.\textsuperscript{169}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Senator Mushahid contends that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not about the nuclear issue since India gets only 3 percent of its nuclear energy requirement from nuclear sources. It is a strategic step to build a new relationship with a China centric component to it.
\item Ibid.
\item In the aftermath of Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Kennedy administration pressurized Pakistan to stop ‘flirtation with China.’ In the same vein, Soviet Union in 1969 proposed of Asian Collective Security architecture to isolate and counter China in Asia. In both instances, Pakistan refused to take anti-Chinese stance.
\item Talking Points for Prime Minister’s Meeting with Chinese Foreign Ministers, \textit{China Desk}, Foreign Office of Pakistan, Islamabad
\item These include \textit{Youhi} (friendship) and \textit{Shaheen}, four successive exercises have been held so far starting from 2011 to 2013.
\item Ibid.
\item The Chinese National Development and Reform Commission is the related forum on CPEC project.
\item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
prevent the region’s drift into the basket of China and provide for regional integration, the US needs to offer preferential tariffs, encourage FDI and promote regional initiatives like IPI and TAPI. The US, however, has opposed an initial Chinese National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) interest to finance Iran Pakistan India pipeline (IPI) project, known as the IPI project or the peace initiative.\textsuperscript{170} India has withdrawn from IPI due to the US pressure on the project.

Aligning itself with the US rather than China, India has declined the option of becoming the ‘pipeline of power’ in South Asia.\textsuperscript{171} With the Iranian section of the pipeline (over 900 km) mostly complete, Pakistan faces $3 million penalty on daily basis for failing to construct its share of 780 km segment. Financial constraints have prevented Pakistan to complete the project. The Asian Development Bank has indicated that stalled progress has raised the IPI’s cost by an additional $2.5 billion to its current $10 billion price. Saudi Arabian reservations on the project and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif links to Saudi Arabia have further dimmed the IPI prospects in Pakistan. The US former ambassador to Pakistan Richard Olson stated that the US preferred Turkemanistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project instead of the IPI. The US has opposed Indian move to source natural gas from Iran across Pakistan.\textsuperscript{172}

Indian Former Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Ayar, however, stated that the Iran Libya Sanctions Act, rather than the pressure from the US, has led India to back-pedal on the IPI project.\textsuperscript{173} Indian analyst David M. Malone has argued that two factors have

\textsuperscript{170} Initial agreement for the import of natural gas from Iran via a proposed 1,620 miles (2,775-kilometer) pipeline was signed in Tehran on May 24, 2009. Rising from the previous 33 billion cubic meters per annum in 2005, India is predicted to require 146 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per annum by 2025. President Zardari and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad revived the project on March 11, 2013. President Zardari left the deal as a difficult decision for the next government to implement. See N. D Khan and NM Khan, “Iran-Pakistan Peace Pipeline,” IPRI, Factfile, 2010.

\textsuperscript{171} See Llyod I. Rudolph and Sussane Hoeber Rudolph, \textit{Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives And The Imperial Presidency}, (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008), 43.

\textsuperscript{172} Richard Olson, former US ambassador to Pakistan stated that the US would want to promote the TAPI pipeline project instead. The US State Department spokesman also warned that it was in Pakistan’s best interest to stay away from the project that involved violating sanctions against Iran. “US Supports TAPI but not Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline: Richard Olson,” The Nation, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, March 5, 2013.

accounted for Indian slow progression on the project: the US pressure on New Delhi’s dealings with Tehran, and the Indian suspicion of Pakistan’s reliability as a partner.174 Pakistan’s former petroleum secretary has disclosed that as Pakistan was about to seal the IPI deal, the US offered civil nuclear technology to India leading to its withdrawal from the project. The project has also faced security hindrances in Afghanistan. The $10 billion project for India has passed through Kandahar in Afghanistan and Quetta in Pakistan — regions regarded as the heartland of the Taliban militancy. The pipeline travels more than 2,775 kms (1,724 miles) from Iran through the Pakistani city of Khuzdar to join Xinjiang across the Hindukush in China.

The US energy collaboration initiative in South Asia has entailed construction of the TAPI pipeline along the historic trade route between China and Europe.175 The US, however, has objected to China’s participation in both the IPI and TAPI projects.176 The TAPI project has entailed the promise of meeting Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indian demands for energy.177 China can also join TAPI from Ashgabat to Afghanistan into Pakistan at Gwadar and overland into Xinjiang. China can import gas from Oman through underwater pipeline to Pakistan, connecting and transporting the energy supplies overland to the mainland China. The IPI pipeline project passes through more of Pakistan running through the troubled province of Baluchistan than does TAPI.178

The TAPI project, however, has suffered delay due to the change in the US policy stance. Pakistan’s Former Petroleum Secretary Dr Gulfraz has disclosed that directives

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175 TAPI project was signed between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India on December 11, 2010. The pipeline will transport 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh field, the world’s second largest natural gas deposit to the neighboring South Asian region. The proposed 1,680-km pipeline will run from the Dauletabad (Ashgabat) gas fields to Afghanistan, alongside the highway from Herat to Kandahar, and then via Quetta to Multan. TAPI will provide Afghanistan with 0.5 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) of natural gas, while India and Pakistan will each receive 1.365 bcfd. available at: http://www.indopia.in/India-usa-uk-news/latest-news/36896/International/2/1/2.
176 Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi expression of interest to participate in the IPI led to US opposition.
177 To be successful, the US policy requires stability in Afghanistan, financial commitment to build infrastructure, facilitation of trade, and improvement in relations with Pakistan and Iran.
178 Mutual suspicions retard progress on IPI. Pakistan alleges that India covertly supports Baluch insurgents to promote instability in Balochistan. India, for sure, wants a guarantee against disruption of gas supplies with penalties imposed for disruption. Pakistan finds it difficult to extend such an assurance given the troubles it faces in Baluchistan.
from the US Department of State led UNICOL, the consortium leader, to pull out of the TAPI project leaving Pakistan in a fix. Pakistan had secured gas supply from Turkmenistan at a cheaper rate and Afghan warlords had already given assurances of security for its construction and successful operation. The US had actively promoted the TAPI project in an effort to drive Pakistan away from the IPI pipeline project. In December 2014, Pakistan awarded Russian Rostec the contract to build Pakistan’s gas infrastructure under the TAPI project, following signing of the first military cooperation agreement between Moscow and Islamabad a month earlier. The US has preferred import of LPG from from Kazakhstan under the CASA-1000 project.

On the IPI project, international sanction on Iran prevented Pakistan from purchasing compressors and generators to implement the project — a point well emphasized by the US.\(^ {179}\) Conditional to the US withdrawal of sanctions on Iran, Pakistan announced to complete the IPI project by the end of 2016 or early 2017. Pakistan’s Petroleum Secretary Arshad Mirza stated in the Senate Committee that Pakistan has agreed to execute the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project once the (UN) curbs are removed.\(^ {180}\) The UN sanctions so far had barred Pakistan to implement the project. Pakistan’s State Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources Jam Kamal termed the agreement bounded under the UN.\(^ {181}\) The US pressure prevented Pakistan to push ahead with the project despite Pakistan’s ailing economy suffering from acute energy shortfall causing industrial and commercial slow down.

Following the US Excel and Mobil withdrawal the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has approached Turkmenistan for consortium leadership on the TAPI project.\(^ {182}\) Lack of settlement on land ownership led Turkmenistan to consider


\(^ {181}\) Ibid.

\(^ {182}\) In October 2014, the ADB commissioned a feasibility study for the TAPI pipeline project as part of its effort to establish a consortium that would construct the pipeline by 2018. Failure of negotiations to finalize consortium leadership in Islamabad has dimmed prospects of progress on the project. See Micha’el Tanchum, TAPI And India’s Future in Eurasia, *The Diplomat*, Pulse, available at: [http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/tapi-and-india’s-future-in-eurasia](http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/tapi-and-india’s-future-in-eurasia) accessed September 14, 2013.
Chinese, Russian and French firms as candidates for consortium leadership. CNPC leadership will lead to Turkmenistan’s economic dependence on China. As TAPI pipeline has entailed bright prospects for alleviating Turkmenistan’s desperate need to diversify its export markets, the candidacies of Rostec and particularly CNPC are alarming developments for India. The US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf may imply a greater role for Iran and Pakistan backed by China. The pipeline project fits into the larger regional context. The US has defied both Iran and China to outflank US influence in the region, while prohibiting prospects for Indo-Pakistan cooperation.

New Delhi’s failure to construct the TAPI pipeline on favorable terms will marginalize Indian status in Central Asia — a region considered critical for Indo-US strategic and energy collaboration. Consortium leadership by CNPC will compromise New Delhi’s efforts to improve its geo-strategic position in Central Asia. As per Obama-Modi January 2015 meeting in New Delhi, Indo-US strategic partnership has required that India secured its strategic edge in Central Asia. Dependence on China for energy supplies will imply Turkmenistan’s alignment with Beijing in foreign and economic policies. This may prove counterproductive to the US hegemonic designs in the region. India-US policy alignment has led to Sino-Pakistan enhanced collaboration. China’s grand strategy has tended to support political stability, economic prosperity and strategic strength in Pakistan. Reciprocity of national interests rather than proverbial

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183 Turkmenistan’s inclination from neutrality to developing security relations with the US, NATO, and Israel has alienated Russia. Turkmenistan’s energy relations with China result from Ashgabat’s concern about protecting its strategic assets in the Caspian from Moscow and Tehran. However, with Russia having slashed its gas imports from Turkmenistan by 80 percent, China has become the only major market for Turkmenistan’s natural gas. See Micha’el Tanchum, TAPI and India’s Future in Eurasia, The Diplomat, Pulse, available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/tapi-and-indias-future-in-eurasia/ accessed May 24, 2015.

184 However, scholar argue that the revenues that Ashgabat earns are offset by the debt it owes CNPC for building the China-Turkmenistan pipeline. Turkmenistan now exports 35 bcm annually to China.

185 Ibid.


187 Sino-Pakistan amity was India specific in the regional context during the 1960s. Sino-Soviet split and rapprochement with the US shaped the global context of Sino-Pakistan friendship during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. However, rapprochement with India brought progressive transformation in China’s stance from pro-Pakistan to overt neutrality in the context of Indo-Pakistan rivalry on Kashmir.
Himalayan friendship has defined the parameters of Sino-Pakistan ‘all weather’ friendship.

This chapter, therefore, argued that Sino-US global security interests have guided the content and nature of involvement in Pakistan. Sino-US strategic, political and economic involvement has carried implications for Pakistan’s domestic stability and internal security. Sino-US policy post 9/11 has sought to prevent the growth of rival influence in South Asia. At the strategic level, Sino-US interests have converged in the promotion of stability in Pakistan against the threat of radical Islamism. However, Sino-US policies post 9/11 has strengthened the rise of terrorism and militancy in Pakistan. At the political level, Sino-US involvement in the domestic milieu has strengthened the military against the civilian institutions, impairing the growth of true democracy in Pakistan. At the economic level, Sino-US policies post 9/11 has prevented opportunities for economic integration and regional collaboration in South Asia.

A divergence in the US-Pakistan policy preferences developed due to the US failure of apprehension for Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns in Afghanistan vis. a vis. India. The US policy shifted from soliciting Indian support on GWOT to entrenching the Indian support for the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The US supply of strategic weaponry to India has let loose a spiral of mutual animosity, exacerbating regional polarization and mutual rivalry. Pakistan has become a pawn in great power politics in Southwest Asia. Sino-Pakistan convergence of strategic and economic interests has dovetailed on Islamabad’s dire need for rapid economic development. China’s expansion of interest for infrastructure development and investments in mineral reserves has offered Islamabad a compelling opportunity for socio-economic advancement.188 CPEC has envisioned the promise of development, while offering to stimulate Pakistan’s economy through energy and infrastructure development projects.189 Yet the project has entailed security challenges for Pakistan’s political unity, social cohesion and regional integration.

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189 China has created a new development bank—the Asian Development Bank with $40 billion reserved to finance the New Silk Road Economic Belt. The action has a symbolic significance.
CHAPTER 7
SINO-US COMPETITION POST 9/11: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

For an idea of what unconditional love might look like on the geopolitical stage, look no further than Pakistan’s relationship with China.

Nicholas Bruliiard
Global Post, December 17, 2010

This chapter explores the implications of Sino-US conflict and cooperation for the Kashmir dispute. This chapter argues that there exists Sino-US convergence of interests on the maintenance of status-quo on Kashmir. Sino-US insistence on bilateralism rather than UN resolutions, the US alignment of geo-political and economic interests with India post 9/11 and Sino-Pakistan informal alliance have aggravated rather than resolved Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir.

This chapter is divided into the following four sections: 1) Genesis of the Kashmir dispute; 2) The US perspective on Kashmir; 3) China’s perspective on Kashmir; and 4) Implications of Sino-US rivalry for the Kashmir dispute.

Sino-US Kashmir policy can be viewed from the realist and complex interdependence perspectives. Realism has dictated a rough balancing of powers between the US and China to maintain the status-quo on Kashmir. Through extension of support to regional proxy collaborators, the Kashmir dispute has created room for Sino-US intervention in the South Asian region. Historically speaking, conflicts have served as prime mediums for great power to promote their security interests in a particular region. They have offered an equally compelling reason for small states to bag international support — military, economic and diplomatic to neutralize their rivals in an unequal strategic situation. Concurrently, the dispute’s unresolved status has permitted Sino-US to perpetuate their global policy interests in South Asia. The dispute has allowed the US to check Sino-Indian regional ambitions and hegemony in the sub-continent. Simultaneously, China keeps a tab on Indo-US regional and global ambitions. By engaging India in a power squabble with Pakistan, China has prevented Indian access to Central Asia. With access to markets, China has prevented prospects of regionalism

It serves as increasing rejection of the global financial structures to project an alternate developmental vision.

190 China sells 47 percent of its defense sales to Pakistan with the US remaining second only to Beijing in conventional military and arm transfers to Islamabad.
in South Asia. Complex interdependence can be seen in Sino-US convergence of interest in avoiding confrontation and conflict in Kashmir.

7.1 Genesis of the Kashmir Conflict

This section discusses the genesis of the Kashmir dispute in a broad historical context. It argues that pre-partition political, cultural, and economic factors have contributed to the Kashmir dispute. Divergent national ideologies created the basis for Indo-Pakistan rivalry, subsequently paving the way for great powers’ involvement in South Asia.

Located in the Northwest of the Indian sub-continent, India, China and Pakistan’s rival geographic claims have entrenched on Kashmir’s destiny rooted in ancient history. The term Kashmir, in contemporary nomenclature, has referred to the Indian administered state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistani Kashmir called Azad Kashmir and the region of Gilgit-Baltistan. Ever since the Indo-Pakistan War of 1948, India has controlled 43 percent of the region of Kashmir, occupying Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, and Baltistan (Drass, Kargil and Turtuk). Pakistan has controlled 37 percent of Kashmir that includes Azad Kashmir and major portion of Baltistan, currently referred to as Gilgit-Baltistan. The third part of Kashmir has been controlled by China, comprising Aksai Chin in Ladakh and the Trans-Karakoram Tract of Ladakh in the Himalayan boundary of Indian Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The Chinese portion has included Hunza and the Shaksgam Valley in Pakistani Occupied or Azad Kashmir. The geo-matrix of the disputed region of Kashmir has revealed a mix dynamics.

Internally, Kashmir’s demography has marked opposing affiliations. A political standoff among three different socio-political and communal affiliations is evident internally: pro-Pakistan, pro-India and pro-independence communities. The US scholar Nick Easen has opined that historical, cultural and religious links have interconnected rival claimants of India, China and Pakistan through the ancient Silk Road along the border regions. Historic and cultural connections allow China to extend claim to its

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192 Kargil changed hands several times, moving to and fro from India to Pakistan in successive Indo-Pakistan wars.
southern region in Kashmir. Pakistan’s research analyst Maqbool Ahmed Bhatti has observed that China’s ‘celestial empire,’ provides unbreakable strategic, economic and spiritual links to Aksai Chin — the land route and gateway to Xinjiang and Central Asia. To India, with spiritual and historical links connecting the Himalayan region to northern India, Kashmir has constituted a part of Akhand Baharat or Aatot Ang of Maaha Bharata.

Apart from the cultural and religious connect, Kashmir has drained Pakistan’s vital Indus system — the hydrological stronghold that sustains the Indus lifeline connected to Mansrowar in Tibet. Rival internal and external factors have added to the complexity of the situation in Kashmir. The post Cold War strategic environment has shown a clear upsurge in the on-going demand for self-determination in the Indian Occupied Kashmir beginning from the early 1990s. At this stage, it is imperative to review the genesis of the Kashmir conflict to understand its root-causes.

The origin of the Kashmir dispute lies in the incomplete agenda of British India’s partition in 1947. The Chinese expression has found the most appropriate description for Kashmir — ‘unresolved dispute left over from history.’ Indian research analyst M. C. Bhandare observed that the dispute has borne considerable strategic significance as it has held Pakistan and India apart. The dispute is the prime factor for Indo-Pakistan post-independence war-trodden history bearing three wars: 1948, 1965, 1971 and several nuclear standoffs. The Pakistani approach relates to what has been referred to as certain ‘historic injustices related to the ‘Redcliffe Award.’

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195 India blames Pakistan for supporting the separatist movement while Islamabad contends only moral and political backing. It calls for implementation of the 1948-49 UNSC resolutions for a plebiscite on Kashmir.
197 A LoC in January 1949 divided Kashmir into Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir. North of the LoC is the un-demarcated area of Saichen Glacier, occupied by the Indian forces in 1984, leading to a costly, high-altitude military standoff between Pakistan and India. The Kargil crisis in 1999 and the Indo-Pakistan mobilization in 2002 mark the subsequent history of Indo-Pakistan bilateral hostilities on the dispute.
ambassador Shahid Amin argued that the Award granted to Muslims what Jinnah referred to as ‘moth-eaten and truncated Pakistan.’

Aptly described by French scholars Larry Colins & Dominique Lapiere in *Freedom at Midnight* as the ‘most complex divorce in history,’ certain observations have beset the Pakistani mindset while analyzing the Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir. For example, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali has mentioned in *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Indian last viceroy Lord Mountbatten’s controversial visit to Kashmir followed by that of Nehru to ‘impose’ its accession to India. Pakistan has termed the act as violation of the rules set-in by the ‘Redcliffe Award.’ Pakistani scholar K.B. Saeed has observed that the visits influenced Maharaja’s hasty decision to sign the ‘Instrument of Accession’ rather than the original ‘Standstill Agreement.’ The genesis of partition thus contained certain anomalies that subsequently aggravated Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

From the Pakistani perspective, the ‘Redcliffe Award’ had been manipulated. Mountbatten at the behest of Nehru demarcated the Indo-Pakistan border. Colins and Lapiere remarked that Sir Cyril Redcliffe unduly awarded Pathankot, Ferozpur and Gurdas Pur districts of Muslim majority areas relegating Indian strategic land access to Kashmir via Aakhnur. Ferozpur granted India canal head works, which drained 24 million acres irrigated land area in the Indus basin, allowing Pakistan’s hydrological strangulation during Indo-Pakistan war (1948) on Kashmir. Pending resolution, the Kashmir dispute is one of the oldest under the UN charter. India has invoked the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh on October 26, 1947, as validation of Indian occupation and legitimacy of claim on all parts of Kashmir. Pakistan has invoked transparency of historic record as the legal basis to question Indian claim.

201 The Redcliffe Award had set the majority principle on the basis of population census to decide the fate of princely states in terms of accession with either India or Pakistan.
Pakistan has questioned the legality of accession, calling it the unfinished agenda of partition. As the most sparkling ‘jewel in the British Queen’s crown,’ British India had been divided into three parts for administrative convenience. The US scholar Sten Widmalm has observed that the viceroy governed two-third of the British Indian Empire directly, while the rest comprised 662 princely states, internally autonomous with their external defence furnished through royalty paid to the British crown.\textsuperscript{204} The peripheral areas, for example, NWFA and the NEFA were kept as buffer zones under British representative control to ward off the threat from Russia.

The 1935 Government of India Act granted as a rule the princely states right to accession. Sten Widmalm argues, however, that it never became an option for most of them as most had little chance of resisting accession to India.\textsuperscript{205} A majority vote by their elected assemblies had to decide the fate of rest of India. Maharaja Hari Singh faced a popular uprising against his rule in Kashmir. By the time of signing the instrument of Accession, Maharaja had lost popular verdict. Indian forces forcibly entered the Srinagar airport in violation of the Standstill Agreement on Kashmir. Moreover, the Redcliffe Award had forbidden any princely ruler to declare independence unilaterally. The Award had set majority principle on population census as the basis to decide the fate of princely states.

States of Bhopal, Travancore, Hyderabad and Jodhpur had little chance of resisting accession to India. Junagadh and Hyderabad, however, presented different cases. Their Muslim population demanded accession to Pakistan against their Hindu rulers. In Junagadh, a plebiscite was held before it was brought into the Indian union. Hyderabad was assimilated finally by force. The state of Kashmir had a Muslim population. Under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, Sher-e-Kashmir — the Lion of Kashmir, All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference staged opposition both to the British and the Dogra dynasty. In 1939, the conference dissolved into Muslim Conference aligned with Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Jammu and Kashmir National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah’s tilt towards India. The Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 32.
ideological and geopolitical factors apart from emotional, which forged his strong bond to Kashmir.

Vicinity to China and the Soviet Union prevented Kashmir to act like the ‘Switzerland of Asia.’ Its accession to India dominated by the Muslim majority under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah could serve as a blow to Jinnah’s two nation theory. As communal violence had engulfed partitioned India, the Kashmiri State Forces succumbed to popular resistance against the Maharaja, forcing him to seek help from India. Conditional to the real or fake controversial signing of Accession on October 26, 1947, Indian troops captured Srinagar airport on October 27, 1947 to halt Pathan tribal advancement from the north-west of Pakistan.

Successful governments in Pakistan along with the Kashmiri masses have denied the legality of the Instrument of Accession. The United Nations Resolutions and the world community have recognized Kashmir as a disputed territory. The external ministry of India states that Jammu and Kashmir Assembly was a representative body of the Kashmiri people, which had ratified the Maharaja’s decision to accede to India. Kashmir enjoys sufficient autonomy under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. India claims Kashmir as its territory based on the Maharaja’s decision of signing the Instrument of Accession on October 25, 1947, the Government of India Act (1935), Indian Independence Act (1947) and the International Law.

The Kashmir dispute has provided legitimacy of ground for great powers’ involvement in India-Pakistan disputes. Its nuclear dimension has made it of dreadful regional and international consequence. By emphasizing a stalemate, great powers have lessened the

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206 In the British census of India of 1941, Kashmir registered a Muslim majority population of 77 percent, a Hindu population of 20 percent, and a sparse population of Buddhists and Sikhs comprising the remaining three percent. See BBC, ‘The Future of Kashmir?’ available at: http://www.geohive.com/cnty/in-01.aspx accessed September 14, 2014.

207 The basic points about the UN Kashmir Resolution indicates: one, India brought the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council itself in 1947; two, the Security Council has rejected explicitly Indian claim to Kashmir as Indian territory by declaring Kashmir a disputed territory; and third, the Security Council has established self-determination as the governing principal for settlement.


209 Ibid.

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prospects of resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The US and China role has demonstrated the dispute’s international dimension. The dispute’s nuclear dimension has acted as a catalyst for Sino-US involvement, offering a legitimate pretext for enhancement of regional influence, strategic counterbalancing, defense and military arms sales and technology transfers. Consequently, the interplay of Sino-US competing interest post 9/11 has aggravated Indo-Pakistan hostility on Kashmir. The significance of the conflict has remained alive on policy makers and analysts’ security calculus. Stephen P. Cohen has written about international credentials of the Kashmir dispute as one, which draws importance from larger issues of regional power balance and conflict of national identity. In an interview with the author, Pakistan’s Major General (retd) Athar Abbas referred to the Kashmir dispute as not just a regional problem but an international imbroglio with different powers having stakes in Kashmir. Ex-Army Chief General Raheel Sharif referred to Kashmir as an international rather than a bilateral conflict in March 2013. Referring to the dispute as the ‘jugular vein of Pakistan,’ General Sharif re-invoked the Kashmir dispute's international credentials.

In September 2014, accordingly in his address to the 69th session of the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif incited the relevance of UNSC resolutions on Kashmir. Sartaj Azia, Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, emphasized on Pakistan’s commitment to find a peaceful solution based on aspirations of the people of Kashmir. Such a solution would be in line with India’s own commitments, to the world at large and above all to the people of Jammu & Kashmir. Sartaj Aziz statement implied that Pakistan adhered to the UN resolution for resolving the Kashmir conflict.

The Kashmir conflict has remained as the oldest chronic dispute in the list of UN unresolved issues. Enormous costs has entailed in Indo-Pakistan conventional wars, nuclear crises, human sufferings and Human Development Index (HDI). Indo-Pakistan

211 Interview conducted by the author with Maj General (retd) Athar Abbas at National Defense University, Islamabad on January 27, 2014.
defense competition and strategic rivalry has held hostage policy makers’ capacity to provide for socio-economic development. South Asian post-partition history and missile arms race has continued amid spiral of suspicions and hostilities.\textsuperscript{214} On a visit to forward locations in Jhelum, General Sharif warned India of facing severe consequences.\textsuperscript{215} Asif Bashir Chaudhary has commented on the spiral effect of hostility. In retaliation, Indian Prime Minister Narinder Moodi directed Defense Minister Arun Jaitley to teach Pakistan a lesson.\textsuperscript{216} India suspended the Composite Dialogue and increased border violations along Sailkot sector and the LoC. Emphasizing a peaceful resolution in line with the wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people based on UNSC resolutions, the Army Chief reiterated Pakistan’s resolve to respond to Indian aggression in a befitting manner.\textsuperscript{217}

The conflict’s nuclear dimension post 1998 has made it a dispute of dreadful regional and international consequence. The threat to international peace and security has become all the more alarming. In terms of legitimacy of scale and horrendous consequences, the Kashmir dispute has stood at par with the conflict in the Middle East. The conflict has awaited resolution, serving as a litmus test of human resolve and sturdy skills. However, equally alarming and posing hurdles for resolution is the indoctrination of Kashmir in Indo-Pakistan national identities. Dr. Maleeha Lodhi in \textit{The World Today} commented that the peace dividend of Kashmir resolution in South Asia — having one fifth of global population — could be enormous as is the mounting cost of absence of peace.\textsuperscript{218} Both the US and China have manipulated Indo-Pakistan regional grievances on the basis of Kashmir.

\textsuperscript{214} Pakistan’s test firing of Short Range Multi Tube Ballistic Missile Hatf IX (\textit{NASR}) has contributed to the Full Spectrum Deterrence against Indian conventional asymmetry. Both India and Pakistan move to achieve Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) capability. The test fire was conducted with successive launches of four missiles from a state of the art Multi Tube Launcher with Salvo Mode. \textit{NASR}, with a range of 60 km and an in-flight manoeuvre capability is a quick response system, with shoot and scoot attributes. See Asif Bashir Chaudhary, “Gen. Raheel warns India against LoC provocation: Pakistan test-fires Hatf IX Ballistic Missile,” \textit{The Nation}, Islamabad, September 27, 2014.

\textsuperscript{215} See Asif Bashir Chaudry, “Gen Raheel warns India against LoC provocation: Pakistan test-fires Hatf IX ballistic missile,” \textit{The Nation}, Islamabad, September 27, 2014.


The Kashmir region is integral to the socio-economic prosperity of Pakistan. Research analyst Muhammed Ilyas has observed that Indian occupied Kashmir has put in New Delhi’s hands the power of Pakistan’s hydrological strangulation.\textsuperscript{219} New Delhi has regarded Kashmir as an inalienable part of Indian multi-ethnic and multi-religious secular identity.\textsuperscript{220} Pakistan and India have termed the option of ‘independent Kashmir’ outside their national security perview. For Pakistan, an independent Kashmir outside its boundary defies full realization of Pakistan’s ideology. The option of an independent Kashmir is unworkable for both US and China. Indian scholar Dr. Subash Kapila has remarked that for the US, the option of an ‘independent Kashmir’ or one decided in favor of Pakistan would create a continuous block of Islamic states, extending from Morocco to Malaysia.\textsuperscript{221} To China, geographically landlocked, the option of an independent Kashmir might serve as a foreign strategic base, allowing extension of western military and political influence along China’s peripheral areas.\textsuperscript{222} Accordingly, over the past years, the Sino-US has adopted a fluctuating and inconsistent policy stance on Kashmir.

Cultural, religious, linguistic and geographical factors have compounded the conflict on Kashmir, generating immense ramifications for international security while creating room for great powers to manipulate Indo-Pakistan hostilities.

### 7.2 The US Perspective on Kashmir

This section discusses successive US administrations’ Kashmir policy post 9/11. It argues that successive US governments have stressed on crisis management rather than conflict resolution on Kashmir. At best, the US has acted like a bystander rather than as facilitator for resolution of the dispute on Kashmir.


\textsuperscript{220} India faces multiple multi-ethnic separatist movements in several parts of India in the South and North-East. India has feared that granting independence to Kashmir would lead to a domino-effect of sub-national breakups detrimental to Indian secular unity.


The Kashmir conflict has served as a catalyst for Sino-US involvement in South Asia. Great powers’ involvement has inflicted more injury than cure in conflict resolution on Kashmir. Within this context, Soviet Union vetoed implementation of the UN plebiscite on Kashmir in 1955. The US post Cold War policy on Kashmir can be empirically studied from the realist perspective. Variations in the national security interests have dictated the US Kashmir policy stance. Over the years, the US oscillated between supporting the UN resolution to emphasizing bilateralism. Indian scholar Parama Sinha Palit has observed that inconsistency has remained the hallmark of the US policy approach.\textsuperscript{223} The US policy has framed on crisis management rather than a conflict resolution approach on Kashmir.

Serving as a catalyst for strategic power balancing in the South Asian region, Indo-Pakistan power parity has complicated the course of the US policy. For example, the US scholar David M. Malone has observed that in the 1962 war, the US prevailed on Pakistan for an assurance not to invade Kashmir in order to allow for Indian deployment against China in the north.\textsuperscript{224} The US national interests have required brushing regional hostilities under the carpet, acting at best as a bystander, rather than as facilitator in conflict resolution.

The former US National Security Advisor for South Asia Bruce Reidel has, however, pointed to elements of discontinuity rather than continuity in the US South Asian regional power parity post 9/11. Indian rise in regional and global stature has brought about a transformation in the US policy stance towards the former. The US scholar on philosophy Aaron Zimmer has held that the US post 9/11 policy in South Asia has not built on Cold War dynamics.\textsuperscript{225} Indian research analyst Rahul Roy-Chaudhury has observed that in a comparative perspective, the US policy post 9/11 has marked an obvious shift towards India, while maintaining a subtle shift away from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{226} The US post 9/11 stance has entailed an informal alliance partnership with India built on

close strategic, economic and political partnership. The US expert on South Asia, C. Christine Fair has also pointed to the contrast in the US policy approach towards India and Pakistan. Citing Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State in the first Obama administration (2008-2009), the contrast becomes increasingly evident from the portrayal of US-India relationship as ‘an affair of the heart’. In the same vein, Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration has described the US relationship with Pakistan as ‘complicated, but necessary.’

The US South Asia expert Howard Schaffer has observed that the apparent shift in the US policy towards ‘de-hyphenation’ has resulted from Pakistan’s decent into shambles after 1998 and India’s economic rise. Within this context, the US deviation from pro-Pakistan position to greater strategic involvement in India had a global significance. Pakistani research scholar Shehzad H. Qazi has observed that the US policy has been designed to counter the Chinese growing influence in Asia. However, Pakistani analyst Sharif Shuja has argued that the US policy on Kashmir has neither been pro-Pakistan, nor pro-India; it has only been pro-US. Howard B. Schaffer has argued that the US has portrayed neutrality, emphasizing bilateralism for resolution of the Kashmir conflict in the spirit of the Kashmiri people’s aspirations and the Simla Agreement signed in 1972. Bilateralism rather than UN resolutions have guided the US policy stance on Kashmir.

Reciprocity of interests has served the contours of the Indo-US bilateral relations during the late 1990s. In the absence of their erstwhile mentor Soviet Union, the Indian policy

228 Ibid.
makers have realized that animosity towards the US would only serve to benefit Pakistan in a unipolar world. The US expert on South Asia Dennix Kux has observed that the Indian tilt towards the US has eventually borne fruit in bringing geopolitical and strategic advantages to India.\(^{233}\) Under the Clinton administration, the US policy framed on insisting Pakistan to end aid to militants, while restricting human rights violations in Kashmir, and forcing negotiated settlement in the spirit of the Simla Agreement. The US has criticized India on its poor human rights record in Kashmir. Yet simultaneously it advised Pakistan to look beyond the impractical demand of the UN resolution implementation on Kashmir.

Growing political and economic interests with India has dictated the US Kashmir policy. Economic considerations forced the new US ambassador to declare that the US retained only a marginal interest (short of actual involvement) in the Indo-Pakistan dispute. To maintain parity of policy approach towards the South Asian twins, Robin Raphael, the US head of South Asia Bureau, criticized Pakistan ‘as a war mongering state,’ while cautioning India to stop human rights violations in Kashmir. The US factor forced New Delhi to invite Islamabad for resumption of peace talks on Kashmir. The US position has fallen in line with Indian insistence on bilateralism and reversal of internationalization of the Kashmir conflict.

Conflict management rather than conflict resolution had acquired precedence in US South Asia policy. The US scholar Selig Harrison has observed that nuclearization revived the Kashmir conflict as the core dispute linked to maintenance of durable peace in South Asia.\(^{234}\) Earlier, post Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, violent protests started in early 1990s for independence of Kashmir.\(^{235}\) Indo-Pakistan belligerence increased along the LoC, compelling Clinton to send US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage for ‘conflict management and restraint’ in South Asia.\(^{236}\) Armitage’s

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\(^{236}\) Pakistani forces continuously received information of India conducting operation in the Shaqma sector. In a preemptive move, learning from the experience of Indian forcible annexation of Pakistani controlled areas in Kamar and Siachin in 1970s and mid 1980s, the
visit built pressure and stimulated work on Indo-Pakistan ‘bus diplomacy’ in February 1999. The US refused to subscribe to a neutral role in the Kargil crisis. President Clinton demanded unconditional withdrawal of Pakistan’s forces, holding it responsible for the dispute. In the Line of Fire Pervaiz Musharraf has observed that US National Security Advisor for South Asia Bruce Riedel warned that ‘those who infiltrated from Pakistan side to the Indian (side) must go back.’ The US would sanction Indian retaliation across the LoC in case of Pakistan’s non-compliance. The US even frustrated Pakistan’s attempt to bring the conflict before the UN Security Council. Richard Armitage and US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld played a constructive role to diffuse India-Pakistan tensions.

The US position coincided in a neat fix with that of India during the Kargil crisis. The US saved India the trouble of negotiations on the table. Pakistan could neither bring India to the negotiating table nor internationalize the conflict. The US denied Pakistan the only chance to force India to resolve the Kashmir conflict. Instead, the US forced Pakistan to agree on concrete steps for restoration of the Line of Control (LoC). The US-Pakistan joint statement on Kashmir threw the onus of responsibility to Indo-Pakistan diplomacy. The US agreed in principle that Lahore bus diplomacy provided the best forum for resolution of all issues including Kashmir. Pressurized by the US preference for maintenance of the status-quo, Pakistan’s leadership succumbed to signing a unilateral one-sided deal — the ‘Washington Accord’ on July 4, 1999. Interestingly, the Accord failed to induct even a token Indian presence. The US even agreed to provide monitoring assistance to patrol the LoC. The US successfully diffused India-Pakistan bilateral tensions instead of resolving the Kashmir conflict.

Northern Areas Force Command (FCNA) established their posts in Pakistani frontline areas to counter any adventure from Indian side.


239 In the Washington Accord, Clinton demanded withdrawal of Pakistani-backed forces from the Kargil sector. Following a three hour meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Washington on July 4, 1999, the two leaders issued a statement that declared an end to the Kargil crisis. The statement included an agreement between the two leaders on the following issues. One, respect for the LoC in Kashmir by India and Pakistan in accordance with the Simla Agreement; second, withdrawal of infiltrators from the Indian part of Kashmir without any pre-conditions; third, a bilateral framework for future negotiations between India- and Pakistan.
Kashmir featured high on Musharraf’s decision to join the US sponsored GWOT. Pakistani scholar Shaheen Akhtar has observed that 9/11 incident provided India a historic opportunity to bracket freedom struggle as a terrorist activity in held Kashmir.\textsuperscript{240} Pakistani former Foreign Secretary Abdus Sattar observed that Vajpayee projected India as a decade long victim of international terrorism, offering full support to GWOT against the Taliban regime.\textsuperscript{241} New Delhi’s prompt reaction left little room for Pakistan’s maneuverability. Caught between devil and the blue sea, the option of non-action was not available to Pakistani policy makers.\textsuperscript{242} President Musharraf could quite easily gauge the cost of non-compliance to the Kashmir cause. Pakistan would face international isolation and the US intervention in the tribal areas. Abdus Sattar has observed that the Bush administration gave an ultimatum to the world community stating that:

> Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the US as hostile regime.\textsuperscript{243}

Musharraf’s response to GWOT can be studied from the neo-structural realist perspective. Abdus Sattar has opined that Pakistan’s support was made conditional to the US non-bracketing of freedom struggle as terrorism in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{244} Pakistani research analyst Hamid Khan mentioned Musharraf’s personal desire to prolong stay in power as a factor to support US anti-terrorism drive.\textsuperscript{245} Pakistan’s alliance with the US threatened Indian security interests in Kashmir. The US onslaught on terrorist camps in Afghanistan upsurged freedom struggle in Kashmir. Following Soviet withdrawal, many terrorists had migrated to fight in Palestine and Kashmir. The US action forced

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\textsuperscript{242} Abdus Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 129.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., 269.
\textsuperscript{244} Pakistan extended following conditions for supporting GWOT in Afghanistan: the US would not force Pakistan to operate outside the country’s borders; future dispensation will be Islamabad friendly; Kashmir will not be linked with terrorism and no action would be taken against freedom fighters; and, Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program will not be hampered.
\textsuperscript{245} Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 471.
\end{footnotesize}
terrorists to find hideouts in Pakistan’s tribal belt. India found a commonality of anti-terrorism interest with the US. It alleged that Al Qaeda had stretched its leg in the disputed territory. This led US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to equate international terrorism with the freedom struggle. More damage occurred to Pakistan’s interests when terrorists hit Srinagar and New Delhi in early 2001.

The US interest focused on diffusing Indo-Pakistan bilateral tensions rather than resolution of Kashmir. Incidentally, terrorist attacks on Occupied Kashmir assembly on October 28, 2001 and the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 shifted world opinion against Pakistan. The subsequent Indo-Pakistan military stand-off worsened the US fear of less support on GWOT. Bush decided to play the middle ground in defusing Indo-Pakistan military stand-off. Urging India to be balanced and measured, the US pushed Pakistan to stop sponsoring cross-border terrorism, halting infiltration and dismantling training camps in Azad Kashmir. Indian scholar Balraj Puri observed that Bush administration warned India and Pakistan to focus on Afghanistan and ‘forget Kashmir for that matter forever.’ The GWOT offered little to resolve the Indo-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir. Indo-Pakistan bilateral initiatives proved to be ineffective as conflict resolution mechanism.

Track I diplomacy known as the direct resolution approach failed to pay necessary dividends on Kashmir. A total of 35 heads of state meetings and 12 rounds of Indo-Pakistan formal talks had occurred without tangible results prior to the ‘Agra summit’

246 US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is on record to have said that Al-Qaeda operated in areas near the LoC.
247 President Bush referred the GWOT as a ‘monumental struggle of good versus evil stating that those who harbored terrorists would be treated as terrorists.’ Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that the US expected the ‘fullest cooperation of Pakistan.’ The US will give Pakistani government ‘a chance to cooperate.’ According to Abdul Sattar, the note of warning was unmistakable. The NSC Principles Committee on September 13, 2001 threatened Pakistan to be at risk in case of non-cooperation. The US list of demands included: to put an end to logistical support to Al-Qaeda operations; to give US flight and landing rights for military and intelligence operations; to grant territorial access to military personnel; and to break relations with the Taliban government.
248 New Delhi brought Indian forces to the Pakistani border and the LoC within weeks after the attack. It also handed over a long list demanding handing over of 22 suspects accused of attacks on Indian parliament. Vajpayee, in a visit to Kupwara, threatened to give Islamabad a crushing defeat.
in 2003. Track II diplomacy failed to work either through functional interdependence and resumption of trade. Track III diplomacy involving people to people contacts remained an ineffective medium, following emergence of Indo-Pakistan hard core radical constituencies. Musharraf had proposed a four steps approach adopted in sequence to resolve the Kashmir conflict: resumption of talks, centrality of Jammu and Kashmir, unacceptable proposals taken off the table, and the best acceptable solution adopted. Tariq Aziz and S. K. Lambah were involved in back-channel diplomacy on the plan Musharraf proposed on BBC Radio Urdu Service in November 2003. In September 24, 2004, Musharraf and Manmohan signed a joint statement in New York to look for options on Kashmir. Twin portfolio (COAS and President) granted Musharraf the required leverage to deviate from Pakistan’s traditional stance on Kashmir. Failure of the Agra summit halted the Composite dialogue, the resumption of which India made conditional to termination of terrorists camps on Pakistani side of disputed Kashmir. Indo-Pakistan prospects for peace remained mired in distrust and hostility, remaining waxed to the more urgent US priority for maintenance of the status-quo and stability.

In the post 9/11 era, the US long-term global interest in the South Asian region has remained waxed on stability in Kashmir. President Obama’s two terms in office failed to harness progress on Kashmir. Howard B. Schaffer has observed that candidate Obama referred to the difficult task of conflict resolution as a ‘tar pit,’ promising to push it forward. To mark its displeasure, India interpreted Obama’s remarks as ‘uncalled for intervention in Kashmir.’ In 2010, the US preferential approach towards India became clear from Obama’s one hour short sojourn in Pakistan compared to five days stay in India. Declaring Indo-US partnership as ‘defining partnership of the 21st century,’ Obama termed India’s friendship as vitally important for the US.

250 The Indo-Pakistan Agra summit in India was a historic two day summit meeting from 14-16 July, 2001 to reduce nuclear arsenal and resolve issues including the Kashmir dispute and cross-border terrorism. The negotiations broke down and the process was collapsed so the Agra treaty was never signed.

251 On July 16, 2009, Yousaf Raza Gillani, Pakistani prime minister during the Zardari government and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement to delink the Composite dialogue from Pakistan’s prior action against terrorist training camps in Kashmir.


253 Ibid., 21.
position endorsed on the Bush policy of de-hyphenating India granting it preference while breaking away from the US Cold war policy of maintaining power parity in South Asia. In his address to the Indian Parliament on his visit to India, Obama refrained from mentioning Kashmir. Obama chose to ignore the violent protests that had erupted a month ago in the Indian Occupied Kashmir.

In his remarks to the Indian Parliament, President Obama declared that Pakistan and India wielded joint stakes in reducing tensions. The US could not impose unilateral solutions to India-Pakistan problems. The US would rather happily play any role that the two parties would think as appropriate for decreasing tensions. Pakistan-India should engage in confidence-building measures, while focusing on the challenges and opportunities faced by each.\(^\text{254}\) The president’s remarks implied a non-participatory approach, throwing the onus of responsibility to the disputant parties. The US South Asia expert Howard B. Schaffer has interpreted the US post 9/11 policy as bystander approach towards Kashmir. According to Schaffer, the US has assigned itself to a non-mediator role unless ‘the parties think (it) appropriate to appoint the US on a mediatory role in reducing tensions.’\(^\text{255}\) The policy has differing implications for India, Pakistan and the US. At the general level, Schaffer has argued that the US emphasis on bilateralism has condensed the nature of available options on Kashmir.\(^\text{256}\) The US scholar Aaron Zimmer has observed that bilateralism has favored India while plebiscite has suited Pakistan.\(^\text{257}\) On May 1, 2014, a more pro-Indian position became evident when Special US Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan James Dobbins stated that Indian insistence on direct negotiations and refusal to accept mediation has left no room for the US involvement on Kashmir. The US emphasis on bilateralism has restricted options, compelling disputants to stop looking for efforts on settlement.


\(^{256}\) Ibid., 46.

The US policy in a way supports Indian position of non-interference, while backtracking on compliance with the UN commitments on Kashmir. Following the rise in Indian regional and global stature, Indian leverage on Kashmir has increased. Indian scholar C. Raja Mohan has contended that direct American interference would restrict the growth of Indo-US sustainable ties.\textsuperscript{258} The US policy is also non-conducive to Indo-Pakistan peace process and back channel diplomacy.\textsuperscript{259} Mohan has endorsed Obama’s policy of pressurizing Pakistan to abandon violent extremism in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{260} The Indian analyst has suggested that Obama administration need not to coerce India for concessions.\textsuperscript{261} According to Mohan, civilian control on national security policy would facilitate India to sign off an already negotiated Kashmir deal.\textsuperscript{262} The Kashmir conflict has implications for the US policy in Afghanistan.

Kashmir conflict has held immense implication for the US drawdown in Afghanistan post 2014. According to C. Raja Mohan, the dispute’s unresolved status has impaired the US ability to bring stability in Afghanistan and address the menace of terrorism in South Asia.\textsuperscript{263} The US scholar Selig Harrison has argued that Kashmir dispute has created a lucrative venue for attracting multi-national terrorists in Southwest Asia.\textsuperscript{264} Kashmir insurgency has decreased the prospects of a stable Afghan state, while harboring Indo-Pakistan suspicions on the other’s involvement in Afghanistan. From another perspective, stability in Kashmir can serve the US objective of maintaining stability in the South Asian region. The US-Afghan Bilateral Security Assistance Agreement (BSA) has aimed to counter Al-Qaeda and Taliban hideouts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistani research analyst Sharif Shuja has observed that given Kashmir’s

\textsuperscript{259} The Bush administration’s non-intervention and ‘neglect’ triggered Indo-Pak confidence-building measures, including a back channel framework of a political settlement on Kashmir.
\textsuperscript{260} The option of an Independent Kashmir makes the Chinese apprehensive. All major powers echo the statement made by President Obama that the Kashmir dispute can only be resolved by the two countries themselves. To India, international intervention is not welcome. A back channel deal proposes the division of Jammu and Kashmir, with the line of control (LOC) becoming the international boundary.
\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid.
unresolved status and Indo-Pakistan border hostilities Pakistan’s attention gets diverted from the western borders towards Afghanistan to focus on regional warfare in the east.\textsuperscript{265} Indo-Pakistan border violations have been counter-productive to the US non-proliferation and anti-terrorism concerns in Afghanistan.

Indo-Pakistan bilateral relations improvement, resolution of Kashmir, prevention of nuclear war, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear safety and security are the broad indicators of US interests in South Asia. The Kashmir dispute has let loose a spiral of arms race in the region. The US military assistance in the GWOT has increased Indo-Pakistan conventional asymmetry, while maintaining the status-quo on Kashmir. Pakistani scholar Shaheen Akhtar has contended that Indo-US strategic partnership has left less to desire for US positive role in the conflict resolution on Kashmir.\textsuperscript{266} Trilateral arms race involving the Himalayan region has lowered the nuclear threshold for the disputing parties.

The US policy of ‘cheering from the sidelines approach’ while emphasizing bilateralism needs to be revisited for establishing enduring peace in South Asia. The US emphasis on bilateralism for resolving the conflict has caught the dispute in the unequal power parity between Pakistan and India, making its resolution a distant possibility. Being a partner to the dispute, Kashmir has caught China in a regional power squabble with India. The option of an independent Kashmir is equally unacceptable for both the US and China. An independent Kashmir could create a bloc of Muslim states in Central Asia. For an ethnically heterogeneous region, a sub-divided India into more states would be detrimental to the US security interests in South Asia.

\textbf{7.3 China’s Perspective on Kashmir}

This section analyzes China’s attitude towards the Kashmir dispute post 9/11. It argues that global security objectives marked by geo-political and geo-strategic imperatives have directed the course of China’s Kashmir policy. The dispute has served as the prime venue for manifestation of Sino-US global power competition. China’s pro-Pakistan assertiveness on Kashmir can be viewed as realist counter-balancing to Indian

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\item \textsuperscript{265} Sharif Shuja, “America and South Asia Since September 11,” \textit{National Observer}, No. 61, Winter 2004, 41.
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alignment with the US. At the global level, China acts as an offensive positionalist or a ‘gap minimizer,’ seeking to enhance its geo-strategic clout in the power competition with the US.

The Chinese post 9/11 policy stance on Kashmir tends to support the theoretical assumption that great powers’ involvement exacerbates regional conflicts. China’s policy stance has held immense implications for Indo-Pakistan regional security. The Chinese policy manifested in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has tended to exacerbate rather than eliminate Indo-Pakistan regional differences on Kashmir. A wide gap has existed between popular perceptions and practical reality. Contrary to persistent impression of ‘all weather friendship,’ China’s national security interests have guided Beijing’s Kashmir policy stance. China’s has made Kashmir an integral part of its grand strategy post 9/11. China’s approach towards Kashmir has reflected Beijing’s domestic, regional and international interests.

On the global strategic front, realism has dictated China’s hyphenation of interests with Pakistan. The imperative of complex interdependence, however, has underlied China’s softening of trade corridors with India. Set in the realist mode, futuristic ambitions combine in a neat fix with contemporary options to define Beijing’s policy approach towards Kashmir. China’s strategy needs to be understood in the backdrop of its bilateral relationship with Pakistan and India in South Asia. China’s Kashmir policy is directed by the region’s potential for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) East-West and North-South interconnect strategy. The sub-section discusses various phases of Chinese involvement and the clash or overlap therein with the US policy interests in Kashmir.

7.3.1 China’s Involvement in Kashmir: Historical Phases

This sub-section discusses the historical phases of China’s involvement in the Kashmir dispute. It argues that policy twists have dictated the course of China’s approach on Kashmir. In the first phase from 1949-1960s, Chinese policy on Kashmir oscillated between disinterest in the 1950’s to pro-Pakistan stance in the 1960s. The period in between the 1980s and the 1990s saw China’s greater neutrality on Kashmir. China’s policy has marked a clear shift of stance towards pro-Pakistan position post 9/11.

During the 1950s, China was disinterested in the Kashmir dispute. The Chinese nationalists supported Kashmiri right of self-determination prior to Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) ascent to power. Former Foreign Secretary S.M. Burke observed that CCP regarded sub-continent’s division as an ‘imperialist act’ aimed at converting the region into a western base.\(^{267}\) China had suspicions regarding the creation of the state of Pakistan. Ghulam Ali has contended that China opposed the UN involvement in Kashmir, fearing it would lead to the establishment of a US military base along its southern periphery.\(^{268}\) Like ‘Chin-dia,’ the ‘Hindi Cheeni Bhai Bhai’ era characterized Indo-China bilateral relations’ first phase in the 1950s. Pakistani research analyst Ghulam Ali observed that disinterest characterized China’s Kashmir policy during this phase.\(^{269}\) Subsequently, China’s policy approach transformed towards the region.

Following the deterioration in Sino-Indian relations, China established permanent stakes in the Kashmir region. Professor Khalid Mehmood observed that China’s policy stance transformed when Sino-Indian relationship turned sour, following China’s invasion and annexation of Tibet in 1950-51.\(^{270}\) Indian research scholar B.R. Deepak contended that Sino-Indian relationship foiled due to the Tibetan government in exile and Indian support for Dalai Lama seeking refuge in northern India.\(^{271}\) The issue has remained one of the major stumbling blocks in Sino-Indian relations. In 1957, Sino-Indian relations further deteriorated following China’s construction of the Xinjiang-Tibetan road via Aksai Chin. The situation worsened leading to skirmishes and a full-fledged Sino-Indian war in 1962. Consequently, China established its de facto control over the strategically significant Aksai Chin. The Himalayan region became a prime venue of rival claims between Pakistan, China and India.

Sino-Indian claims extend along the long and complex topography of the contentious Himalayan region. Nehru emphasized the Customs & Legalistic approach, proclaiming legitimacy of British inherited boundaries. Chinese leadership, however, has rejected all imperial treaties. China contends that the imperial treaties were invoked forcibly to


\(^{269}\) Ibid.


exploit China’s weakness to defend its borders along the periphery. China has regarded the North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) now known as Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin and Sikkim as its own territory and shows it within its boundary. The North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) was British Indian agency, constituting now the Indian Arunachal Pradesh awarded to India in 1914.\textsuperscript{272}

China’s has refuted validity of Tibetan-British India boundary negotiated by Sir Henry MacMohan popularly known as MacMohan Line.\textsuperscript{273} China has pleaded that Tibetan representative did not represent Chinese mainland authority, while signing the Tibetan-British India treaty. Accordingly, China has extended claim to 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh territory, citing historical, religious, cultural and geographic factors. Indian research analyst Vidya Nadkarni has cited historic documents, which base China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh as Tibet’s ‘southern underbelly’.\textsuperscript{274} China has extended claims to Sikkim and Aksai Chin in the Himalayan border.

Aksai Chin was historically a part of the Himalayan Kingdom of Ladakh. According to Indian research scholar B. R. Deepak, the British took control of Aksai Chin, which led to McMahon Line demarcation following the Tibetan-British India treaty in 1904.\textsuperscript{275} With China’s declaration of imperial treaties as null and void, Beijing’s reclamation of Tibet brought PLA to control Aksai Chin. China has vigilantly guarded its claim on Aksai Chin’s 27,000 square kilometer territory. V.S.M. RA Singh has observed that China has guarded the strategically important region of Aksai Chin which provides the shortest link to the troubled province of Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{276} Sikkim has been part of Tibet—an independent monarchy under the British. China has laid claims on Sikkim, which became Indian protectorate when it gained independence in 1947. In 1973, India declared Sikkim as the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Indian state, which led China to become a stakeholder in the Kashmir dispute. Western scholar Sheldon W. Simon argued that Tibetan-Indian

\textsuperscript{272} The Simla Agreement signed between representative of British India and Tibetan authorities granted control to the British over the area.
\textsuperscript{273} China declares foreign treaties null and void, claiming to have been promulgated during the period of China’s forcible foreign occupation and rule.
\textsuperscript{275} B.R. Deepak, India-China Relations in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century (New Delhi: APH Publishing, 2001), 47.
boundary dispute led to China’s refusal to accept Indian position on Kashmir.277 Following Tibet’s reclamation, China has claimed Aksai Chin in Ladakh within Indian Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). With several infrastructure facilities constructed along the LAC, China has become an important geographical stakeholder in Kashmir.

Contentious claims and spiral of suspicions have engulfed the South Asian northern region, adding to regional animosities. China has maintained large presence of troops along 4057km border with India. Professor Khalid Mahmood has contended that following deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, India has developed a mountainous corps for high-altitude warfare.278 Chinese nuclear tests in 1964 only sought to reinforce arms race with New Delhi. Indian Foreign Minister George Fernandes declared China as India’s enemy number one. Jaswant Singh had to make amends by paying a visit to Beijing in June 1999. Vajpayee referred to the threat from China as the motivational force for Indian nuclear tests in 1998, leading to a matching response by Pakistan. In his letter to Clinton, Vajpayee stated that India countered the threat from China, which committed armed aggression against India in 1962 and helped Pakistan to become a nuclear state.279 Vajpayee had clearly chalked out the inter-link between China and Pakistan nuclear programs.

Sino-Indian positions on the disputed border have shaped subsequent developments on Kashmir. A monumental shift occurred, following leadership transition from Mao to Deng Xiaoping aiming at reconciliation with neighbors for the sake of development. In the second phase from 1970s-1980s, India-China relations restored in 1988 aimed at economic cooperation. A joint working group (JWG) sought political solution to outstanding problems. Premier Li Ping paid a visit to India in December 1991, reciprocated by Indian President Venkataraman in May 1992. Indian scholar Prem Shankar Jha has observed that both states pledged to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC to delink trade from the border issue.280 Indian nuclear and army build

279 See Outlook Weekly, New Delhi, July 1, 1998.
up, however, has remained China-specific since 1962. Simultaneously, China has matched Indian designs by incorporating a pro-China role for Pakistan in the region.

Realism dictated the course of China’s conclusion with Pakistan of the 1963 boundary agreement to prevent Indian strategic encirclement on both sides. Following the agreement, China’s geographical stakes extended to the Pakistani controlled Kashmir. Pakistan’s Ambassador Abdus Sattar has observed that real-politic dictated Pakistan to grant 5,180 sq miles of Hunza and Shaksgam Valley to China in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Realism guided Pakistan’s bandwagoning with China against the Indian threat. Article 6 of India-Pakistan boundary agreement has stated that the territory’s status would be renegotiated due to Indian claims on entire Jammu and Kashmir. The realist perspective explains Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus during the 1960s. The balance of power became evident in Sino-Pakistan regional balancing against India. In joining hands, China and Pakistan sought prevention of strategic encirclement by India. Kautilya referred to the statecraft practice as Raja Mandala while Henry Kissinger, the US reputed diplomat has termed it as the policy of wei qei — prevention of strategic encirclement by rival force India. China out-rightly demanded implementation of the UN resolutions; it took an overtly pro-Pakistan stance in Indo-Pakistan 1965 and 1971 wars; and granted material and spiritual assistance to the Kashmir cause. Realism continued to guide transformation of China’s policy stance in the Kashmir dispute in the third phase from 1970s-1990s.

Following Deng Xioping’s policy of liberalization, Beijing adopted a policy of neutrality (1970s-1980s). The US scholar John W. Garver has observed that China’s Kashmir policy transformed when it declared Kashmir as a dispute left-over from history and needed to be settled peacefully. China’s neutrality reflected in a more pronounced manner in Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Li Peng’s visit to Pakistan.

in 1989-1990. Western research expert Mark W. Frazier cited Chinese spokesman’s statement that ‘the UN resolutions had proved ineffective so far and settlement must be reached through bilateral talks.’

India’s emergence as a rising global power transformed Sino-Indian relations. The Indian prime minister’s visit to China in 1996 and 2003 resumed the pace of Sino-Indian talks, picking up from the positive political atmosphere set-in by Rajiv Gandhi’s regional realignment in 1988. India and China pledged to maintain peace, opened up the Nethu La pass across the Himalayan region with the promise to achieve high-set target of $100 billion trade by 2015. The transformation in China’s stance towards India qualified a modification in China’s approach towards Pakistan.

The variation in China’s policy had an adverse impact on Pakistan’s stance in the UN during the Kargil crisis and Indo-Pakistan escalation in 2001-2002. Indian scholar Jabin T. Jacob argued that the transformation in Chinese policy had security implications for Pakistan. China refused to endorse the Pakistani position or raise the issue at the UN. Western scholars, such as Marika Vicziany had observed that the Chinese foreign affairs ministry ‘in a clear cut position sought the two sides to explore new ways to solve the problem, resorting to negotiations while refraining from military conflict.’ China emphasized a bilateral approach rather than proposing multilateralism in diplomacy.

The US scholar John W. Garver has observed that the Chinese President Jiang Zemin advised President Musharraf in August 2002 to solve Indo-Pakistan differences through dialogue. The Chinese avowed neutrality reflected the mood of fast changing global reality. However, China continued to provide strategic and material assistance to Pakistan. In the absence of Beijing’s diplomatic support, Pakistan gave-in to a quick forces withdrawal during the Kargil crisis. China’s military assistance strengthened

Pakistan’s military muscle while it highlighted the unresolved disputed stature of Kashmir. The South Asian nuclearization induced Sino-US convergence of interests in the avoidance of Indo-Pakistan hostility and conflict.

7.3.2 China’s Post 9/11 Policy Stance on Kashmir

This sub-section analyses China’s Kashmir policy stance post 9/11. While paying lip service to neutrality, China has adopted a pro-Pakistan stance towards the Kashmir dispute. Kashmir holds the key to China’s realization of regional and global objectives as evident from investment endeavors in different regions. Broadly speaking, Kashmir policy can be studied in terms of Chinese involvement in three regions: Gilgit-Baltistan, Azad Kashmir and Indian Occupied Kashmir.

Broad strategic global security objectives have defined the contours of China’s Kashmir policy. Pakistani scholar Ishtiaq Ahmed has argued that China’s global security objectives define the parameter of China’s investment in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Accordingly, China has orchestrated a new public stance from a pro-Pakistan stance to greater neutrality in its approach on Kashmir. In a deliberate effort to invoke neutrality, China has refrained from taking public positions to support Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute post 9/11. For example, in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan military standoff in 2002-2003, the then prime minister’s official visit to Beijing failed to solicit any statement on Kashmir. In January 2003, Kuong Qihuan, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman stated that China had friendly relations with Pakistan, while China and India had friendly relations too. The Pakistani newspaper *Dawn* on January 4, 2003 cited the spokesman’s statement who made it clear that Kashmir needed to be resolved through a direct dialogue between India and Pakistan. … China had always called on these countries to assert restraint and solve their conflict through peaceful means.

The statement’s emphasis on resort to ‘peaceful means’ implied that nuclearization of South Asia had induced Sino-US convergence of interests in stability and avoidance of conflict. Ironically, China’s apparent neutrality came in as a rude shock for Pakistani

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diplomacy. Indian scholar Jabin T. Jacob has cited several factors underlying China’s neutrality. China has abstained from asserting the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris. First, a settlement on Kashmir might lead to Gilgit-Baltistan’s handover to India, cutting off Chinese land access to Pakistan, while preventing implementation of Xi Jinping’s vision of CPEC and its broader component BRI. China’s future ambitions are critically dependent on implementation of BRI and CPEC. Secondly, China will have to yield sovereignty on 5,180 sq km area, it controls under the 1963 border agreement with Pakistan. Thirdly, even soft borders on Kashmir or independent Kashmir will lead to China’s geostrategic encirclement through Indian increased leverage in Northern Areas. Moreover, self-determination for the Kashmiris would excite East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang.

Simultaneously, despite overt neutrality, China has maintained a pro-active role in Kashmir. As a tit for tat response to settle a political score with India, China invited All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) Mir Waiz Umer Farooq to Beijing apparently reciprocating Indian permission to allow the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang in Himachal Pradesh. New Delhi reciprocated by declining Chinese diplomat’s visit to troubled north-eastern state of Manipur. In a clear favour to Pakistan’s stance, staple paper visas are issued by China to Indian Occupied Kashmir residents, while normal visas are offered to visitors from Pakistani Kashmir. Thereby China has sought to project Indian Occupied Kashmir as a disputed territory. In 2010, China declined a visit visa to Indian General B.S. Jaswal, in charge of designation to quell the Kashmiri resistance movement in Occupied Kashmir.

The Sino-Indian boundary commission has showed a lack-luster performance on border demarcation over the years. Fourteen rounds of Sino-Indian talks have failed to produce significant results. Moreover, Sino-Indian trade and economic relations have remained marred in bilateral tensions. A huge trade deficit has marked Sino-Indian trade relations as India exports 70 percent of raw material to China and imports far cheaper

291 With seven years lag in terms of security and economic capability between the two historic rivals, China specific Indian protectionist’s policies waive off much of the aura of diplomatic success of the early post 9/11 Sino-Indian policies.
manufactured goods in exchange. Chinese transportation and energy investment projects in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan have invited sharp criticism and resentment from India. China’s investment has found a lucrative market in Pakistan, the highest in the South Asian region. According to Pakistani research expert Zafar Iqbal, China has started 15 mega projects in power and infrastructure sectors including 200 energy producing and 12 hydel power projects worth $35 billion.\footnote{Zafar Iqbal, “Indo-China diplomatic War Over Kashmir,” Counter Currents, January 7, 2010, available at: http://www.countercurrents.org/iqbal070110.html, accessed May 12, 2014.} CPEC envisions extensive roads, rail, optic fiber cables and energy pipelines network to provide for greater connectivity. Chinese scholars such as Sun Lun, research scholar at China Institute of Global Research stated in an interview with the author that Azad Kashmir energy projects have aimed to overcome Pakistan’s acute shortage of energy. In 2014, Sino-Pakistan volume of trade plummeted to $12 million. Rapid transportation networks have connected the Kashmir region to global economic and energy needs.\footnote{Interview by the author conducted with Sun Lun, a research scholar at the Global Research Center of China in Beijing.} Chinese endeavours in infrastructure development and energy generation are reminiscent of China’s grand desire of great power status. Accordingly, the policy yields ramifications for Sino-US interplay of power politics at the global level, throwing the Himalayan region into the quagmire of international politics.

In various historical phases, China’s Kashmir policy has been determined by its regional and global security imperatives. Chinese approach portrays maximization of national security rather than support for self-determination. In moving two and fro from a pro-Pakistan stance to greater neutrality, China has paid lip service to the cause of freedom struggle for the Kashmiris. China’s policy has resorted to realist balancing against India in toeing a pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir.

7.4 Implications of Sino-US Rivalry for the Kashmir Dispute

This section analyses the implications of Sino-US power competition for the Kashmir dispute. It argues that Sino-US hold a convergence of interests in maintenance of the status-quo on Kashmir post 9/11. Sino-US policies have aggravated Indo-Pakistan bilateral tensions, hardening their respective stances on Kashmir. At the regional level, China’s Kashmir policy falls in line with the traditional Chinese policy of wei-qi—
prevention of strategic encirclement by rival India. China has retained a geo-strategic interest in supporting the status-quo on Kashmir. Michael Yahuda has observed that in view of Indo-US alliance partnership, China’s growing relations with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan must be understood as Beijing’s drive to contain Indian power in the region.\(^2\) Moreover, Kashmir dispute has prevented Saarc’s emergence as a trading bloc in South Asia. A trading bloc with India’s multi-dimensional influence is inimical to China’s investment and trading interests in the region.

China’s grand strategy is directly linked to the imperative of national development. China development strategy has aimed at upgradation of western regions. China has needed to maintain peace and stability on its peripheral boundary towards the west. An essential aspect of China’s grand strategy has entailed the revival of the old Silk route, connecting Europe and Central Asia to Leh in Ladakh and the East. Towards the south, China has envisioned the establishment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Chinese policy of Silk Road Economic Belt strategy has entailed a program of western development, depending on establishment of road and railway networks to provide for land access to energy supply routes in West Asia, Africa and Central Asia. A key feature has entailed linking Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gilgit/Baltistan across the Kunjerab Pass. The Karakoram Highway has linked Hawelian, Abottabad and Islamabad with the National Transportation Network connecting Kashgar with Gwadar seaport via the CPEC.

China aspires to integrate Pakistan’s northern areas into China’s sphere of influence through the expansion of the Karakoram Highway and rail/road networks. China has invested massive investments in the construction of tunnels and mega dams at Diamer, Bhasa, Bunji and Skardu. The PLA’s engineering corps has constructed rail and road networks, along with tunnels across Kunjerab at various places in Gilgit-Baltistan. In the interview conducted by the scribe, an officer of the Pakistan army revealed on conditions of anonymity that the Pakistan army has constructed missile storage silos for nuclear warheads with Chinese help in the region. Chinese engineer corps’ presence

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has added to a spiral of suspicions in the Himalayan region. At the political level, China has granted normal visas to people from Gilgit-Baltistan and AJK, unlike the stapled visas granted to the residents of Indian Occupied Kashmir.

Beijing’s involvement in the disputed region has created all the more distrust among India and Pakistan in the region. The presence of Chinese engineers in Gilgit-Baltistan has alarmed India and the US. Selig Harrison’s report in *The New York Times* stated PLA’s 7,000-11,000 engineering corps’ presence in Gilgit-Baltistan.\(^{295}\) The scholar has interpreted China’s investment as amounting to intrusion, effectively granting China de-facto control over the disputed region.\(^{296}\)

A local newspaper from Gilgit-Baltistan, *Bang-e-Sehr*, wrote that the Pakistani government has leased the region to China for a period of 50 years. India has resented Chinese military presence in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. Tufail Ahmed has cited the Indian Army and Naval Chiefs warning about the consequence of PLA’s presence in Gilgit & Baltistan and along the Line of Control (LoC).\(^{297}\) Indian Naval Chief Lt. General Parnaik in April 2011 raised concern about Chinese stationed presence in case of prospective Indo-Pakistan war.\(^{298}\) In October 2011, Indian Army Chief General V.K. Singh warned about 3000-4000 security personnals’ presence along with certain engineer corps in Pakistani Occupied Kashmir.\(^{299}\) Indian military chief’s warning implied serious consequences for regional security and peace.

The option of an independent Kashmir for China has entailed the prospect of nurturing terrorist safe-havens, hampering stability in Tibet and Xinjiang. From a realist perspective, the disputed region of Kashmir grants China role of the ‘King party,’ creating capacity for regional involvement and maneuverability. For China Kashmir is

\(^{295}\) Ibid.
\(^{298}\) Ibid.
a geo-strategic card, bordering the Xinjiang province.\textsuperscript{300} Indian scholar Bhashyam Kasturi has suggested that early resolution of the Kashmir dispute can help China keep track on terrorists training camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border and FATA.\textsuperscript{301} India has remained apprehensive of Chinese expansionist designs in the region. A Sino-Indian boundary commission was established in 2005 to demarcate Indo-Tibetan boundary in the Himalayan region.

Indian scholar Saurabh Shukla argued that India will let go of 27,000 km sq of Aksai Chin in Ladakh, if China recognizes Arunachal Pradesh 90,000 sq km area as Indian territory.\textsuperscript{302} Tawang has held special significance for both Indian and Chinese Buddhists.\textsuperscript{303} Narinder-Xi Jinping’s meeting in late 2014 held discussions on the culturally and religiously significant issue of Tawang. A stalemate, however, has prevailed between India and China on the issue. India has expected China to play a conciliatory role with respect to Kashmir resolution. US former National Security Advisor for South Asia Bruce Riedel has argued that to cede away its claim on Aksai Chin, India wants Beijing to pressurize Pakistan for making LoC a permanent boundary, and to give away its claim on Jammu and Kashmir.\textsuperscript{304} Indian research analyst Subash Chandaran in an interview with the scribe argued that ‘despite the fact that border demarcation is in Sino-Indian national interests, India should not cede away Tawang’. India’s claim on Aksai Chin and China’s claim on Tawang has restricted progress on Sino-Indian border demarcation.

Claim onto Arunachal Pradesh extends China’s influence to East and South China Seas. Bruce Reidel has observed that China wants to keep the Kashmir card alive to counter the Indo-US strategic partnership. The dispute knocks India down in a regional conflict.

\textsuperscript{300} Interview conducted by the author with a military official on condition of anonymity. The officer disclosed that Pakistan moved some of its nuclear arsenal across the Karakoram Highway for safe-keeping in Xinjiang during the Kargil crisis. The officer dismissed the Indian reports that PLA officials were also present when Northern Light Infantry moved its troops onto the Kargil heights.


\textsuperscript{302} Saurabh Shukla, “India ready to let China keep Aksai Chin if neighbor country drops claim to Arunachal Pradesh,”\textit{ Indian Defence Review}, November 28, 2013.

\textsuperscript{303} Op, cit.

with Pakistan. Reports since 2009 have indicated China’s incursions at the Trig Heights in Aksai Chin in Ladakh. Chinese attempts have a strategic significance. India has alleged that China wishes to occupy the Trig Heights to preempt Indian defence in the region. Chinese strategic designs have wider implications for Indian security interests in occupied Kashmir.

China holds extensive interest in the Indian Occupied Kashmir. India contests what it regards as China’s maximalist claim along the 4056 kilometers of Sino-Indian boundary. China published a map in 1958, which showed 27,000 sq km of Aksai Chin as Chinese territory. In a Lok Sabha resolution passed in 1962, India resolved to recover every inch of Aksai Chin territory. Border skirmishes along the Aksai Chin-Xinjiang road in Eastern Ladakh between the Karakoram Pass to the north and Demchok in Southeast have continued. Tensions have flared up from time to time, with Indian reports of Chinese incursions along the boundary. On June 17, 2013, reports indicated Chinese troops’ infiltration across the LAC. China has termed Arunachal Pradesh as Tibet’s southern underbelly, while it has insisted on substantial concessions to resolve disputes in all sectors. Mutual concessions will develop reciprocal trust to facilitate Sino-Indian border demarcation in the Himalayan region.

China’s rising stature in Asia has repercussions for Beijing’s policy interests in South Asia and elsewhere. Stability in Pakistan is a neo-structural drive, which China shares in common with the US. Sino-US has shared a convergence of interests — to prevent instability beyond the status quo in Kashmir so to prevent terrorist backlash in Xinjiang and Afghanistan. In an interview with the author, Dr. Hu Shisheng, Director, Institute of South & Southeast Asian and Oceania Studies argued that Pakistan

305 Ibid.
306 Defense analysts greatly view the Chinese move as similar to Indian Operation Meghdoot in 1984 to pre-empt Pakistan from occupying heights in the Saichen Glacier. One major concern was to prevent China connecting to the Northern Areas through the territory leased by Islamabad to Beijing in 1963.
308 Ibid.
309 India and China signed an agreement on political parameters in 2005, formulating framework to resolve disputes in all sectors. The first stage was to establish guiding principles, the second included evolving a consensus on a framework for the boundary, and the last step comprised carrying out the border’s delineation and demarcation.
310 Ibid.
constitutes the pivotal link in Chinese scheme of things to revive the old Silk route. Dr Shisheng argued further that Sino-Pakistan convergence of interests will help establish greater connectivity and trade links with western neighbors. Pakistan struggles to build its economy ward off security threats from the volatile situation in Afghanistan. China will not allow Pakistan to weaken further as it will create sanctuaries or safe-havens for Uighur separatists in Xinjiang. However, expansion of Chinese influence in South Asia can be detrimental to the US security interests in the region.

The US scholar Selig Harrison has argued that China’s involvement in Southwest Asia concerns the US for two reasons: one, in facilitating China’s access to the Gulf, it becomes evident that Pakistan is not the US ally. Two, sectarian upsurge in the Gilgit-Baltistan region has served as a reminder that Kashmiri demands for autonomy have needed a final settlement. From the Pakistan’s perspective, the US Kashmir policy has added to Indian strategic advantage. Vali Nasr has observed that Obama administration’s special envoy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke mandate did include permission to deal with India-Pakistan relations on Kashmir. Holbrooke’s only achievement was the Indo-Afghan trade agreement, allowing Afghan transit trade via Pakistan to India. It suits Pakistan’s interests, however, to seek foreign involvement and internationalize the Kashmir dispute.

The US scholar Aaron Zimmer has argued that the US policy on Kashmir post 9/11 has portrayed pangs of self-interested realism. The policy reflects pursuit of the US global security objectives in the South Asian region. Over the decades, the US has played on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan divide. Ironically, the US post nuclearization activism has been forthcoming only in de-fusion of Indo-Pakistan crises. Aggravation of regional tensions leading to the start of Indo-Pakistan war would jeopardize the US

311 Dr. Hu Shisheng, Director, Institute of South & Southeast Asian and Oceania Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, interview with the author on May 17, 2014, Islamabad.
vital security interests in the South Asian region. Resumption of peace process, encouragement of bilateral dialogue and confidence building measures (CBMs) are some of the US tactics to reduce regional tensions involving Kashmir.

The Obama administration’s by-stander, non-mediatory Kashmir policy is perfectly in line with the US global objectives. The US cost-benefit analysis has dictated absolute gains by maintaining overt neutrality on Kashmir. The US South Asia experts Teresita Schaffer & Howard Schaffer have argued that Washington’s preference for incorporating Pakistan’s support on its anti-terrorism policy has receded with its focus shifting to ISIS in Iraq. The US, however, has relied more on Indian support to maintain multifaceted leverage against China’s growing influence in the region. The US benefits by refraining to take clear positions on Kashmir. While a pro-Indian position of the US would lead to terrorist sanctuaries, a pro-Pakistan position would aggravate regional tensions. With significant security priorities in Pakistan and economic interests in India, it is in the US interest to work with both powers. Viewed from another perspective, Kashmir conflict serves the US a roller coaster ride to solicit Pakistan’s support against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in return for pressurizing India on Kashmir. Former Pakistani ambassador Hussain Haqqani in his book Magnificent Delusions has talked about Obama’s secret offer to nudge India on negotiations in return for Pakistan’s abstention of support to Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The US Kashmir policy offers dividends for countering China in the region.

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Kashmir holds global dividends for the US policy on China. In the global strategic environment post 9/11, tussle on Kashmir keeps a natural check on China’s global ambitions via checkmating Beijing in its boundary dispute with New Delhi. The dispute engages China against India in a regional power squabble on Kashmir. The US realist approach on maintenance of the status quo on Taiwan is reminiscent of the same logic. Just as the US has maintained defense ties with Japan to strangle China in a regional squabble. In the same vein, the US has maintained defense ties with India to strangulate China against New Delhi. In case of deterioration of Sino-US relations, Indian Occupied Kashmir can be used as a military base against Beijing. Settlement of the Kashmir dispute and stability in Afghanistan are the key security determinants in South Asia. The US South Asia policy needs to be structured in view of the unbreakable link between stability in Afghanistan and the settlement on Kashmir. To achieve success, the US needs to delink from the Bush administration’s legacy of granting preferential treatment to India. Instead, it should ensure parity of policy approach towards both India and Pakistan. With Islamabad’s threat perception India specific, Pentagon’s patronization of Indian position in South Asia is unacceptable to Pakistan.

The Kashmir dispute has distracted Islamabad’s ability to combat terrorism in the region. Indo-Pakistan tensions have diverted Pakistan’s attention from eliminating terrorist sanctuaries along its western border. Militant groups have used the stalemate on Kashmir to mobilize popular support against the US. A strategic gain for the US in Afghanistan would be to secure Pakistan against the military threat from both east and west. A reputed Pakistani analyst Hassan Askari has argued that with Pakistan's civil-military leadership on board to curb terrorism, Obama administration should use good offices to improve Indo-Pakistan bilateral relations. Jamal Afridi has opined that the US should promote making LoC a permanent border, grant autonomy to both sides and build joint institutions. So far, the US involvement has been forth coming only in crisis-management rather than conflict resolution on Kashmir.

China’s orchestration of the Kashmir policy, short of actual intervention while supportive of stability, reflects Beijing’s broader interests. Selig S. Harrison argued that

319 Interview conducted by the author with Hassan Askari on October 7, 2014 in Islamabad.
Pakistan’s northern areas have offered China investment potential to satiate Beijing’s expansion interests in the region. The CPEC links Kashgar to Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara.\textsuperscript{320} The project’s route and monetary feasibility has been a point of debate in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{321} However, joint anti-terrorism intelligence network and training can help materialize Sino-Pakistan convergence of interests. Simultaneously, China’s global interests have required co-opting India to hedge against the US. Chinese Premier Li Ke Qiangin in his first foreign visit on May 19, 2013 offered India a ‘handshake across the Himalayas.’\textsuperscript{322} However, border skirmishes have continued to foil the political atmosphere.\textsuperscript{323}

The Kashmir dispute has held global and regional implications. Sten Widmalm has argued that Cold war polarization could be awakened after more than a decade of slumbering. In such a scenario, Pakistan could ally itself mainly with China. Sujit Dutta has observed that superpowers fought by proxy in Latin America and South East Asia in the past. In the post 9/11 scenario, a new line of a divided world would run straight through Kashmir.\textsuperscript{324} The GWOT has transformed world opinion on the right of self-determination with changes in Beijing’s perception of Kashmiri resistance. The GWOT has allowed China to curb state separatism in Xinjiang and Tibet. Within this context, support for self-determination for Kashmir becomes a contradiction in terms irrespective of the past support. India has insisted on ‘practical, workable and acceptable solution,’ keeping in view past six decades’ experience, while avoiding use of violence or force. Accordingly, during Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in 2010, New Delhi added Jammu and Kashmir along with Arunachal Pradesh in its list of core interests. To China’s dismay, the Sino-Indian joint statement did not mention Indian

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\textsuperscript{321} Analysts assert that given the difficult topography and limited carriage capacity of railroads, land option may be infeasible compared to sea lanes. The costs of moving oil from Central Asia to Gwadar and then by rail to mainland China has been estimated to cost $8.00 to $12.40 per barrel, making the route economically uncompetitive and limited in capacity, although this does not include the cost of rail network.

\textsuperscript{322} “Chinese Prime Minister’s Visit,” \textit{The Hindu}, New Delhi, 24 May, 2013.

\textsuperscript{323} A platoon of Chinese soldiers in mid April 2013 moved 20 km into the mountains of Ladakh in Indian Occupied Kashmir. A three weeks tense stand-off ensued between the two Asian giants, ending only when the two sides retreated to the pre-existing status quo.

adherence to ‘One China’ policy, making it conditional to Chinese acceptance of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India.\(^{325}\)

The US has favoured maintenance of the status-quo on Kashmir, exploiting the dispute as a ‘bargaining chip’ to extract policy favours from Pakistan and India. The dispute has allowed the US to coerce both India and Pakistan on GWOT, as both fear backlash of US policy reversal on Kashmir. Simultaneously, a ‘nuclear flash point’ along China’s periphery will engage Beijing in a power squabble with India. Moreover, Kashmir’s unresolved status has permitted the US to prevent Indian hegemony in South Asia. The US policy post 9/11 has hampered rather than strengthened the prospects of Kashmir resolution.

This chapter has argued that the Kashmir dispute is pertinent to Sino-US security objectives in the region. Within the context of Indo-Pakistan rivalry, Kashmir has acted as a standstill between the disputing parties, creating room for great powers’ reshuffling of regional alliances. The US Kashmir policy has allowed Washington to manipulate Indo-Pakistan rivalry. The US emphasis on Indo-Pakistan bilateral resolution of the Kashmir conflict has tended to favour the Indian policy on Kashmir. Given the gap in Indo-Pakistan conventional military balance, the US insistence on bilateral approach rather than the UN resolutions has led to a stalemate in India-Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir. Strengthening the Indian position, the US has tilted the regional balance in favor of New Delhi. Kashmir conflict resolution, however, would have incurred more benefit through enhancement of stability in Afghanistan.

From a realist perspective, Kashmir dispute allows China room for regional involvement and manoeuvrability. The dispute has paid China in two ways: One, it has prevented Indian access to Central Asian energy reserves and markets, restricting transit passage via Pakistan, Afghanistan and beyond. Two, lack of settlement on Kashmir has prevented Saarc potency as a regional trading bloc, facilitating Beijing’s own access and monopoly to South Asian reserves. Kashmir’s early resolution can allow China to keep track on terrorists training camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border and FATA. Ironically, India and Pakistan have held differing conceptions of regional security, built

on respective pursuit of national interests and identity. Practically anti-terrorism for India means only the method to deal with the threat of militancy in occupied Kashmir. For Pakistan, the conflict on its eastern and western borders is inter-connected. Without the settlement on Kashmir, terrorism cannot be eliminated from north western Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. Security for Islamabad is inextricably linked to having a peace settlement in Kashmir.
CHAPTER 8
SINO-US COMPETITION POST 9/11
IMPLICATION FOR PAKISTAN-INDIA STRATEGIC RIVALRY

This chapter argues that Sino-US competition in South Asia had dire implications for Pakistan’s strategic relationship with India. Indo-US strategic partnership further strengthened Pakistan-China strategic collaboration though China maintained economic relationship with India as well. It was so because China perceived that Indo-US partnership was built to contain China in South Asia and the adjacent regions. Both Indo-US and Pakistan-China partnerships led to arms races between India and Pakistan at both conventional and unconventional levels. Pakistan has sought to increase its security through enhanced strategic relationship with China, while former’s security has been diluted through arms races between the two traditional adversaries — India and Pakistan.

This chapter is divided into three sections: 1) The US engagement with India post 9/11; 2) China’s engagement with India and Pakistan post 9/11; and, 3) Implications for Pakistan-India strategic rivalry.

8.1 The US Engagement with India Post 9/11

This section analyses the nature of US engagement with India post 9/11. It argues that structural transformation in the post Cold War global geo-strategic environment has shaped the US engagement with India beginning from late 1990s. India began to reduce its earlier rhetoric of non-alignment, much like the US orchestration of a new role for India in the South Asian security calculus to counter China’s resurgence and expansion of interests in South Asia. Theoretically, neo-structural realism has guided Indian maximization of national interest in the contemporary geo-strategic environment. A set of underlying indigenous and exogenous factors tend to explain Indian foreign policy behaviour, in hedging with the US against China. The US has preserved hegemony in South Asia in line with Mearsheimer’s realist prescription.

The global geo-strategic environment post 9/11 has exhibited marks of uni-polarity based on the US strategic primacy. The US scholar William Wohlfforth has opined that
uni-polarity contributes to international peace and stability.\textsuperscript{326} Mearsheimer, however, has interpreted the post Cold War global geo-strategic environment as multi-polar, showing marks of instability.\textsuperscript{327} Shifting amount of power has tended to decide the prospects of war and peace. Incumbent hegemon may instigate war to wrestle with the unwanted prospect of losing it. A rising power may initiate war to lay the international order to its new acquired capabilities. The shift of global power to Asia is evident from China, India and Japan’s geo-economic rise to power. In the post 9/11 geo-strategic environment, India has acquired a global stature, based on new ranking of status in the great powers club.

According to the US National Intelligence Council report, India and China have held the national power potential to usher in a new set of global alignments by 2020.\textsuperscript{328} Major power relations in Asia have depended on a great deal on the US, India and China triangle. Indian analyst Harsh V. Pant has argued that much like the US, neo-realist compulsions have compelled China to cultivate relations with major powers.\textsuperscript{329} The US, China and Indian economies have ranked as the first, second and third respectively in 2015. With Japan’s economic and military capability intact, its lack of nuclear deterrence ranks it inferior than Indian nuclear weapons and missile capabilities.\textsuperscript{330} Offensive realists believe that structural constraints drive the states to pursue relentless power. John Mearsheimer offers the most cogent means for ensuring survival in the anarchic international domain — maintain hegemony and eliminate challenges by other great powers. In Mearsheimer’s view, all great powers are offensive states when internal and external conditions allow. While realists disagree on the continuity of the US uni-polar power, they do not assume that the US hegemony is taken as benign by other states like China. The US capabilities’ and power leads other states to a balancing act regardless of strategic choices. With respect to the interplay of domination, Sino-

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.
US security competition has directed partnership with India as a reflection of great powers’ desire to dominate South Asia.

Defensive realism has dictated the US to contain its peer competitor — the rising hegemon China in South Asia. The US needs to have two regional hegemons rather than one to prevent China’s ascendance to power. Having two regional rivals has prevented the possibility of regional hegemony by one; it has allowed the US to preserve its own influence and hegemony. Alliances with great powers have allowed small powers reciprocity of interests based on the rationale of maximization of power. An interesting feature of the post 9/11 geo-strategic environment is the US partnership with India. The US has made India an integral frontline player of its post 9/11 strategy to prevent China’s regional dominance in South Asia.\(^{331}\)

Mearsheimer’s theoretical perspective can help to review the Indo-US strategic partnership. Indian analyst Ashutosh Varshney has argued that the Indo-US strategic nexus has held global dividends for the US. It has aimed to contain China and prevent it from gaining lone primacy in Southwest and Central Asia.\(^{332}\) The development in

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331 Three significant phases mark Indian foreign policy approach towards the US: the first Nehruvian period (1947-66) marking Indian opposition to US imperialism and Indian indignation against American anti-stance on Indian independence; the second period (1967-89) of Indira Gandhi and post Indira Gandhi phase, when strategic considerations created tensions in US-India bilateral relations; contemporary period marking a shift from ideology to pragmatism, making the most of the past fifty wasted years into building a relationship of ‘natural allies.’ Non-alignment offered India abstention from pursuit of external objectives while focusing on internal challenges. The Indo-US divergences included Indian pro-Soviet tilt, recognition to PRC, opposition to Korean War, refusal to sign the San Francisco Agreement in 1951, Indian nuclear test of smiling *Buddha* serving a blow to US influence in South Asia and non-proliferation regime, US up-gradation of Diego-Garcia in 1974 reversing neutrality of Indian Ocean as zone of peace, divergence in US anti-communist and Indian anti-imperialist drive, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war marking the lowest point in Indo-US relations. In 1967, Indian opposed NPT on two grounds: India claimed it to be an unequal treaty; foreclose any prospects for a future test by India. Indian diaspora, foreign direct investments, trade and grant of financial assistance to electoral candidates selected in the Congress became the catalyst of change in Indo-US relations. The US viewed Pakistan as a military ally, while it viewed India as a political ally sharing common values. From 1991-2001, the average economic aid to India was more than three times the aid to Pakistan. Gary Hess in David M. Malone has argued that the US maintained a two-pronged strategy of engagement in South Asia: Alliance with Pakistan and promoting close politico-economic ties with India. See David M. Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 45.

terms of the magnitude of impact upon the global landscape is as significant as the ground breaking Sino-US rapprochement in the 1970s. The orientation and response of Pakistani elites towards the development is equally interesting. The US has forged a strategic partnership with India. A mutuality of interests has brought in the Indo-US strategic partnership.

Marks of Sino-US global security competition began to take South Asia in its fold, when China’s politico-economic resurgence broke the stasis in Beijing’s relations with India in late 1990s. Sino-Indian official visits in 1993 and 1996 raised the prospects of Sino-Indian rapprochement. Collapse of the Soviet Union had obliterated Sino-US rationale to maintain cordiality in bilateral relations. Following the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and conclusion of 1989 Geneva Accord, the US policy interest in Southwest Asia receded. The South Asian region had begun to show marks of covert resistance to the US hegemony.

The US global forward defense strategy has been framed on building alliance partnership with India in South Asia. The US alignment with India can be studied under Stephen Walt’s theoretical bifocals of balancing against the threat logic.333 The US academician and scholar Davin T. Hagerty has argued that contemporary international security environment is less conducive to formal alliances and more flexible to lose alignment policies.334 Radical Islamic forces and a resurgent yet resilient China posed the threat to the US hegemony in the post Cold war geo-strategic environment. Indian security analyst Prem Shankar Jha has argued that the US and India have viewed China as a potential rival to the prevalent status-quo.335 India’s geo-strategic weight poised New Delhi ideally as a counter-balancer to China.

Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan has argued that China’s engagement of India has built on the calculation of economic rise, and Indian anticipated role in shaping a multi-polar

333 Stephen Walt’s realist balancing logic specifies external balancing not only against the tangible threat but the likelihood of potential threat itself.
334 Op, cit., 23.
world structure. During his visit to South Asia in 2000, Jiang Zemin envisioned a new role of South Asian economic integration rising above regional rivalries. Mohan further argued that although Zemin’s speech in the Senate was a disappointment to Pakistani diplomacy, the Chinese premier subject content had two underlying assumptions. It indicated New Delhi was only one of Beijing’s partners in the region, and it was a call for China-South Asian cooperation in opposing the US domination and hegemony. Indian policy interest towards China was motivated by two factors: it aimed to prevent Sino-US condominium, joint hegemony or interference in South Asia, and it aimed to check China’s engagement with Pakistan.

The Indian security analyst Prem Shankar Jha has argued that the US interest in India post 9/11 is indicative of the US growing uneasiness towards China. Indo-US relations have found a convergence of interests on the common perception of China as a long term threat. The Indo-US relations, historically speaking, have failed to exhibit the type of adversity that runs in Sino-Indian relations. The Indo-US convergence of interest post 9/11 has reflected on the US appreciation of Indian geo-strategic potential, building on the Indian desire to play on a larger canvas than simply South Asia. The dawn of uni-polarity has compelled India to tilt towards the US. During the Cold war, Indian alignment with the Soviet Union, lack of concern for nuclear non-proliferation and human rights has been the US main irritants in rapprochement with India. Indian security analyst C. Raja Mohan has argued that prospects for economic dividend, leverage on nuclear status and support on Kashmir prompted India to align with the

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337 Ibid., 145.
339 Broadly speaking, the US-India collaboration ensures joint security in the Persian Gulf, stability in Afghanistan, and counterterrorism drive. Divergent perspectives include Iran, India’s military ambitions in Afghanistan, and the US relations with Pakistan and China. Indian force projection includes airfields in Tajikistan, military and intelligence presence in Iran and Afghanistan, blue water naval projections including peace-keeping operations and disaster relief operations.
An expert on South Asia Xenia Dormandy has argued that the US has boosted an economically more powerful India to act as a second axis in Asia.

South Asian nuclearization, however, provided the context for India’s convergence of interests with the US. An Indo-US convergence of interests began to take shape in the wake of Indian nuclearization. The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s letter to Clinton, drafted by his principal secretary on foreign affairs Brajesh Mishra, invoked the China threat thesis. Two objectives served India: the letter provoked growing sentiment in the US that India could act as a potential rival to China. India achieved nuclear parity with China without compromising much on the political front. Strobe Talbot has argued that Clinton’s visit to India in 2000 aimed at bringing New Delhi out of its post-Pokhran isolation. Serving as a pivotal redefining moment, Clinton’s sojourn elevated Indian position to a new status.

Sino-US involvement in South Asia post 9/11 has shown contradictions in terms of engagement. At the political front, contours of Sino-US geo-strategic competition had begun to appear in Southwest and Central Asia in the post Cold War era. Condemning the Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests, Sino-US joint strategy had envisioned a ‘peaceful’ and ‘stable’ South Asia. In the South Asian context, Clinton and Jiang Zemin’s June 27, 1998 statements showed paradox between stated objectives and policies on ground. Expressing mutual resolve to strengthen non-proliferation efforts, Sino-US leadership sought to promote peaceful resolution of Indo-Pakistan disputes, preventing acceleration of arms race in the region. Clinton and Zemin’s statement showed the two leaders’ mutual resolve to prevent export of nuclear equipments, materials or technology transfers, related to nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles production, adhering to NPT regulations. Both states shared non-proliferation as the priority agenda in South Asia.

On assuming power, Clinton had defined the Indo-US ties as ‘natural allies.’ Indian scholar Ashley Tellis had engineered this concept in the year 2000 to guide the US South Asia policy to be framed on a rational assessment of Indo-Pakistan intrinsic value rather than the vague concept of inter-state power parity. According to Ashley Tellis, in the US South Asian regional strategy, a non-aligned India enticed with great power status could be relied upon to bandwagon with the US against China. India had two options: either to bandwagon with the US and balance against China or to strengthen a multi-lateral order by siding with other regional great powers. India opted for the former. Ashley Tellis argued that the Clinton administration sought to engage India on the pretext of South Asian nuclearization, ostensibly to prevent its further isolation on the global strategic landscape. Nuclearization and the US role in South Asian crisis management convinced Indian leadership of the US neutrality in Indo-Pakistan disputes.

Indian analyst Gurpreet S. Khurana has argued that Clinton’s visit in March 2000 resumed Indo-US diplomatic and political relations, serving as the most intensive bilateral engagement since inception. Clinton’s five days stay in India stood in sharp contrast with the few hours short sojourn in Pakistan. The US policy of ‘constructive engagement’ with $4 billion investment granted India parity of status with China. Khurana has further argued that transformation in global imperatives based on China’s rising clout and Indian elevated status shaped Clinton’s policy. In January 2001, the Bush administration incorporated India as the centerpiece of ‘US National Security Policy for South Asia’. Lifting sanctions, the US set the stage for a long term Indo-US strategic partnership. The US expert on South Asia Strobe Talbott has argued that Indian support for the US missile defense initiative endeared New Delhi further to the


345 Op, Cit, 32.


347 Ibid.
Republican establishment. This implied that India would leverage the US on the latter’s missile defense initiative.

The US National Security Council (NSC) has prescribed the direction of policy towards South Asia post 9/11. A security perspective has prevailed in the formulation of US policy interests towards the region. The US scholars Howard and Teresita Schaffer have argued that the US policy has been formulated by the ‘functionalists’ or the US Department of Defense rather than the ‘regionalists’ or the US Department of State. The US National Security expert Walter Andersen has observed that preference rewarded to functionalists had influenced the US decision making towards South Asia during the Cold War. The US selective military and economic assistance towards Pakistan had an adverse impact on South Asian regional stability. The policy worked counterproductively for the US long term interests of maintaining Indo-Pakistan power parity in the region. The US policy has marked a tilt in favour of India. According to Llyod I. Rudolph & Sussane Hoeber Rudolph, regional interdependence would reduce tensions in the South Asia, curtailing the prospect of war while inducing stability and prosperity in the poverty stricken region.

The US has granted India preferential treatment through Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson Tasleem Aslam has argued that the Indo-US deal is asymmetrical and discriminatory in nature. An even-handed approach towards India and Pakistan may better serve the strategic objective of stability and non-

348 Talbott, Engaging India, 98.
351 For example, in the in anti-Soviet drive, regional experts did not recommend pursuit of jihad for the likely adverse impact upon secular interests in the region. The policy caused ripples in creating instability in Afghanistan and promotion of sectarianism in Pakistan. The US foreign policy post 9/11 was again being shaped under the influence of functionalist compared to the regionalist approach. See Llyod I. Rudolph and Sussane Hoeber Rudolph, Making US Foreign Policy towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives and the Imperial Presidency (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008), 79.
352 Ibid., 34.
proliferation in South Asia.\textsuperscript{354} The US policy has deprived regional states to secure energy from indigenous sources.\textsuperscript{355} The US relationship with India has shown different set of priorities in South Asia. As a result, Pakistan-China strategic relationship intensified, while creating a downturn in the US relationship with Pakistan.

The Bush administration’s interpretation of China in the new definitional framework — from strategic partners to potential competitor played a role in India’s elevation. In shaping the South Asian balance, China figured in a big way in the US strategic partnership with India. Stipulating the rationale, Condoleezza Rice wrote in \textit{Foreign Affairs} that China’s drive to the balance of power in Asia depends in large part on how the US responds to the challenge….The tendency to think in parallel terms connecting India with Pakistan, while thinking only of Kashmir and the nuclear issue has to be revisited. India’s constitutes an essential part of Chinese strategic calculations in its own capacity and it should be in American calculation too.\textsuperscript{356} Although India was not yet a great power, it had all the likelihood to become one.

Condoleezza Rice implied that the US must revisit its South Asia policy by elevating Indian stature in the region rather than stressing the Kashmir issue or the strategic competition between India and Pakistan. China posed a credible challenge to the US and a more practical approach implied taking the challenge head-on to confront rather than ignore it. The elevation of Indian status in the US policy resulted from the powerful lobbying of Indian diaspora in the US policy circles.\textsuperscript{357} Indian Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran underscored India’s fast growing GDP, export and investment market,

\textsuperscript{354} Interview conducted by the author with Pakistan’s foreign Office spokesperson Tasneem Aslam in Islamabad on the telephone.
\textsuperscript{355} The Indo-US convergence of interests includes containment of China, counter-terrorism, access to energy resources and key markets in Central Asia. The US partnership extends only to counter-terrorism and prevention of radical Islamization with Pakistan and Bangladesh. See Lawrence Saez, “US Policy and energy security in South Asia” \textit{Asian Survey}, July/August 2007.
\textsuperscript{357} Indian economic liberalization policy, its high GDP, consumer middle class, and Indian geo-strategic and economic clout in the South Asian region drove weight in the US policy calculus. India’s rise at the international level is marked by a high growth of GDP more than 7 percent, increasing military modernization expenditure, new orientation of multi-faceted strategic partnerships with great powers and participation in international multilateral forums as BRICS and India Brazil South Africa (IBSA), and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) forums.
India’s economic, political and strategic with-withal and Indian potential as a balancer against China as the motivational factors for Indo-US partnership.\(^{358}\) India has appeared as the US largest trading partner and its main venue for technology exports. At the political, economic and social levels, shared values of democracy, free market economy, trade, people to people contact and commerce have sustained the Indo-US convergence of interest post 9/11.

Indo-US strategic convergence of interests developed more resiliently post 9/11, which had implications for Chinese policies in the region. Neo-structural realism and Complex Interdependence shaped China’s response to GWOT in South Asia. The US policy had affected China’s security interests in its peripheral region. As a veto-wielding member of UNSC, Beijing’s cooperative response to the US military action was important for the success of the US strategy in Afghanistan. Power vacuum in the wake of the Russian decline led to the formation of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in July 2001 — just two months earlier than the US invasion in Afghanistan.\(^{359}\) The SCO’s birth had alarmed the US. The organization’s birth provided the catalyst for the US military presence. Sino-Russian collaboration could forestall the US geo-strategic and economic influence in the pivotal areas of influence.\(^{360}\) This has security implications for the US larger interests in the region.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a telegraphic conversation condemned ‘all violent terrorist activities, including 9/11.’\(^{361}\) To prevent polarization, China’s diplomacy supported the UN-led Bonn process and formation of transitional government in


\(^{359}\) SCO, comprised the Sino-Russian joint collaboration platform to fight extremism, separatism and terrorism in Central Asia, ie., Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China and Russia, and adjacent Southwest Asia.


Afghanistan. Yet China abstained from becoming part of the US-led NATO coalition, invoking non-interference in other states’ internal affairs as the principle rationale of non-involvement in Afghanistan. China, however, viewed the US forces arrival in Operation Enduring Freedom, close to China’s backyard in Afghanistan with suspicion. Viewed from Mearsheimer’s theoretical perspective, the move can be interpreted as the US interference in China’s backyard — the US policy of global forward defense. The move offered a classic case of hegemonic interference to prevent China’s emerging influence in Central and Southwest Asia.

French scholar Jacques de Lisle has argued that as the US pursued China’s backing in Afghanistan post 9/11, it reduced emphasis on issues that irked Beijing.\textsuperscript{362} During the US election cycles that traditionally emphasize a China threat thesis, however, George W. Bush termed China as a strategic competitor rather than a strategic partner.\textsuperscript{363} In the State of the Union Address in 2002, President Bush, however, asserted that common danger (terrorism) erased old rivalries.\textsuperscript{364} To induct China’s support, during Jiang’s 2002 visit to Washington, Bush made only moderate remarks on human rights concerns. The US had also put down pressure on China’s record at the UN Human Rights Commission in 2003.\textsuperscript{365} By granting support to the US GWOT strategy, China made a ‘relative gain’ in its ‘bargaining chip’ through the Bush administration’s grant of neutrality clause on Taiwan.\textsuperscript{366}

Bush and Clinton became the architect of decoupling or de-hyphenation in the context of Indo-Pakistan power parity in South Asia. Tilt in favor of India became evident when the White House paper added India in the category of great powers in September


\textsuperscript{363} Relations became strained on weapons issues; US missile shield; proliferation of missile technology concerns, US reconnaissance plane incident, Bush’s pro-Taiwan statements and US criticism of China’s anti-religious freedoms.


\textsuperscript{365} See, for example, Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, Human Rights Record of the US in 2004.


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369 i) combined military exercises and exchanges ii) multinational operations participation and collaboration, iii) strengthen the combined capabilities of militaries to fight terrorism, iv) interact to promote regional and global peace and stability, v) enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, vi) expand defence trade, reinforce strategic partnership through defence related trade, achieve greater interaction between armed forces, and build greater understanding between defence establishments, vii) technology-security safeguards, increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production and research and development viii) expand collaboration related to missile defence, ix) strengthen the abilities of their militaries to respond quickly to disaster management, x) to conduct peace keeping operations. xi) defence strategy and defence transformation, xii) exchanges of intelligence, xiii) continue strategic level discussions by senior leadership on issues of common interests.


371 Ibid.

372 Ibid.


374 “US-India Joint Statement,” available at: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsreleases\2006\03\print\20060302-5.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsreleases\2006\03\print\20060302-5.html) accessed March 25, 2013.
support from the US Congress on civil nuclear technology transfers, the Bush administration signed the 123 Agreement on July 18, 2005.

In December 2006, the US administration declared India as a responsible state, signing the US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act or the Hyde Act. The act has mandated the US civilian nuclear cooperation with India.\(^{375}\) It has opened the way for Indian nuclear fuel and technology imports, without imposing any restrictions on weapons purchases from elsewhere.\(^{376}\) On September 6, 2008, Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) lifted the ban on nuclear trade with India. The US Congress ratified the nuclear deal on October 2, 2008.\(^{377}\) On October 6, 2008 the presidential approval put an end to India’s three decade long nuclear isolation.

Indian stature emerged to take shape as a great power equivalent in stature to Russia and China. Acknowledging Indian new position, the US National Security Strategy 2006 declared New Delhi as ‘poised to share global obligations in a befitting manner with the US.’\(^{378}\) Indo-US joint collaboration increased during the Bush era to include three specific global challenges: a rising China, a nuclear Iran and joint patrolling and maritime surveillance in the Indian Ocean.\(^{379}\) The US sold high-end defence technologies to India and granted permission to produce such technologies under license.\(^{380}\) India emerged as the main destination for the US technology exports in this time-period. Sussane and Hoeber Rudolph have argued that the Indo-US nuclear deal

\(^{375}\) India post 9/11 policy choices wary in between three options: to balance against the US considering it a unipolar power and larger enemy than China, to bandwagon with the US, considering it as the next winner, and third, to build relationship with other regional players to strengthen a multipolar global power structure.

\(^{376}\) On the contrary, Congress passed an advisory non-binding resolution on July 15, 2003, recommending that Congressional monetary transactions to Pakistan must include investigation on the country’s record on cross-border terrorism.


\(^{379}\) Ibid.

\(^{380}\) Technology transfers remained an issue for a considerable period. Washington persisted on technology transfers as the end tail of a Indo-US structured relationship, while India expected technology transfers as the minimum baseline for the start of a serious partnership.
moved ‘India to the center stage in the drama of the global balance of power.’

Violating the NPT, the deal legitimized India’s standing as a nuclear power. The Indo-US nuclear deal has signified Indo-US proactive and collaborative policy in civil nuclear energy and cooperation. Condoleezza Rice confided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ‘US nuclear initiative aims to benefit the private sector, opening the door to civil nuclear trade and cooperation.’ The US anticipated $100 billion recruitment and services for American firms in the Indian nuclear market. Indian leftist parties vehemently criticized the deal. They argued that the US policy manifested a strategy of locking emerging powers in the global system by developing higher stakes while curtailing their ability to maneuver. Thus the US policy had implications for Indian domestic political set-up.

The Indo-US nuclear deal has found both supporters and opponents. The deal opposes the Non-Proliferation Treaty, sets a precedent for others to follow, artificially segregates the civilian and military components, allows access to fissile materials for nuclear weapons production, while it fuels arms race between India, China and Pakistan, encouraging the threshold states like Iran and North Korea to follow suit. Mohan Malik argued that it has brought India in the NPT regime, while Iran and North Korean nuclear aspirations have predated the Indo-US nuclear deal. The deal proposes a moratorium on nuclear testing. Indian doctrine of nuclear restraint has made India a responsible nuclear actor, while providing for Indian civilian energy needs.

Continuing with the Bush legacy, President Obama received Manmohan Singh as his presidency’s first state guest in 2009. The US president paid an official visit in November 2010 to India — a useful hedge against a rising China in Asia. The US Ministry of Defense Annual Report to Congress mentioned China as a long term security challenge for India. India envisaged a two pronged strategy with respect to

381 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Sussane Hoeber Rudolph, Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives and the Imperial Presidency (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008), prologue.
385 The Indo-US deal had to face a great deal of criticism from Indian leftist parties.
China’s threat perception in its immediate neighborhood: pre-empt confrontation by enhanced political, military, diplomatic and economic ties with Beijing; increase military preparedness in case of confrontation through informal alignment with the US. Leverage of support for UNSC Indian membership served another incentive for the Indo-US alignment policy.

In the regional geo-strategic balance, the Indo–US partnership has built for India military muscle in conventional asymmetry against China. Indian regional front has presented a volatile strategic environment based on two theaters of conflict with Pakistan and China. In the political arena, the US support has projected Indian power against its ideological and territorial rival China. Indian research analyst Mohan Malik has argued that given the growing China challenge, India has facilitated its own rise by diverting from non-alignment to multi-dimensional alignment.\(^{386}\) The past decade has witnessed vigorous Indian military, intelligence and soft power balancing in Asia, Central Asia and Africa. Indian national ambitions have resulted in the development of strategic partnerships with the world major centers of power. Indian security analyst Bajpai has argued, however, that India has failed to translate its predominance into actual leverage at the regional level.\(^ {387}\) India has lost, however, much independence in siding with the US.

Military and technological advancement has served both as a means and an end for India. Yet Indian inflated strategic clout has built capacity to prevent great powers’ regional preponderance in South Asia. India has aspired for construction of a multi-polar world with India as one of the significant poles with a seat in the UNSC. Ashley Tellis has recommended that the US support Indian bid for membership in UNSC.\(^ {388}\) India has built sophisticated arms technologies and weaponry from the US, Israel and Russia. India has opted to maintain two airbases in Tajikistan. Indo-US strategic

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collaboration has played on the two states’ collective desire to neutralize China in Southwest and Central Asia. In an interview with the author, Indian security analyst Dr. Suba Chandaran argued that mutuality or reciprocity of interests based on the drive to maximize power has shaped Indo-US strategic partnership. Chandaran argued further that keeping in view of the global transformation, India has band-wagoned with the US to balance China.\textsuperscript{389} Indo-US regional alignment has made New Delhi an integral component of the US global security policy in the ‘Arc of Crisis’ extending from Hormuz to Malacca.\textsuperscript{390} The US incarnation of India has presented realist balancing to contain China’s ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region, the Indian Ocean and South Asia.\textsuperscript{391}

Neo-structural realism has shaped Sino-US strategic balancing while defining Indo-Pakistan bandwagoning behavior in the South Asian region. The US expert on South Asia Stephen Cohen has argued that Indo-Pakistan conundrum has developed an enduring persistence in alignment with the outside powers and their nefarious role in regional politics.\textsuperscript{392} The US scholar Aurelia George Mulgan has argued that containment implies encirclement by exploiting the adversary’s inimical relations with its rivals.\textsuperscript{393} The US scholar like Robert Kagan has referred to exploitation of internal fissures to weaken the adversary’s resolve to achieve glory.\textsuperscript{394} The Indo-US nuclear deal symbolized for India end of the power equation with Pakistan, while it relegated India a status elevation in equation with China. The US analyst Stephen P. Cohen has argued that the Bush policy of de-hyphenation has served as an Aristotelian approach

\textsuperscript{389} Interview conducted by the author with D. Suba Chandaran, Director, \textit{Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies}, IPS, New Delhi on October 17, 2014, Islamabad.
\textsuperscript{390} Zbignew Brezinski termed the region as extending from Strait of Hormuz to Malacca as the ‘Arc of Crisis.’
\textsuperscript{391} Indo-US nexus has made both states semi-strategic allies and may engender cooperation for strategic space, political influence and economic interest in energy resources in Asia. An alliance with India for that matter also provides access to Iran and the Middle East, by exploiting Indian leverage in that area. The US access to India also opens up huge market benefits to the US’ overstrained economy. It has allowed for the US trade with India.
\textsuperscript{393} Aurelia George Mulgan in Prem Shanker Jha, \textit{India and China}, 349.
\textsuperscript{394} Robert Kagan in \textit{India and China}, 348.
in the regional context of South Asia, devoid of addressing the reality of Indo-Pakistan power animosity towards the other.\footnote{Stephen P. Cohen, \textit{Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum}, (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 2013), 57.}

Over the past four decades, great power intervention has sustained Indo-Pakistan disputes, building military capabilities of one against the other. Indo-Pakistan has resisted the temptation to compromise, banking on support from their great power collaborators. Stephan Cohen has argued that without outside intervention, India and Pakistan can shrink back to their natural size.\footnote{Op, cit., 24.} Indo-Pakistan foreign policy behavior post 9/11 has exhibited power maximization to ensure survival in a hostile geo-strategic environment. Indo-Pakistan has sought external alignment to ensure security against the other. India has resented Pakistan’s alliances with the West, posing a threat to Indian dominance in the subcontinent.\footnote{Ibid.} India has argued that Pakistan crafts shifting alliances with the west; builds on pan-Islamic identity; seeks strategic assistance from China in a bid to balance India. Stephen Cohen has argued that the US intelligence circles have noted that China’s role in nuclear and missile development of Pakistan increased ten times more in the 1990s.\footnote{Ibid, 12.} In its power equation with India, bandwagoning with the US has won Pakistan defence and military assistance and the US leverage on the right of self-determination as non-terrorism in Kashmir. Indian analyst Shashi Tharoor has argued that the policy has signified a litmus test of the Indo-US ties, while simultaneously wielding impact upon the US relations with Pakistan.\footnote{Shashi Tharoor, \textit{Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century}, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2012), 210.} It has meant for Pakistan a strategic wedge with the US in favour of China.

The interplay of Sino-US power politics post 9/11 based on expediency, opportunism and short-term gain has made Pakistan extremely vulnerable with large doubts on its survival and continuity.\footnote{Bruce Riedel and Pavneet Singh, “US-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan,” \textit{Foreign Policy at Brookings}, Policy Paper, No.18, January 2010, 1.} The downturn in US-Pakistan relations have led to the upsurge in Sino-Pakistan relations. Despite being the frontline state on the US GWOT, suffering massive causalities, loss of man-power, and invaluable property, Pakistan’s
relations with the US deteriorated to an all time low. Insecurity increased as Indian geo-strategic designs began to find a convergence of interests with the US in regional and global polarization against China. For the US larger interests in South Asia, a more even handed, symmetrical and functionalist foreign policy approach could reduce Indo-Pakistan hostility. The US strategic balancing post 9/11 has led to a downturn in US-Pakistan relations despite Islamabad’s frontline role on the GWOT. The thrust of the US diplomacy towards Pakistan has included multidimensional dynamics such as non-proliferation, nuclear weapons safety and security, support for stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s social and economic development and conflict avoidance with India. Pakistan has regarded its relations with the US as of intrinsic value. Pakistan has regarded commitment to three basic elements as inherently essential to sustain a long term partnership with the US: safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, the right of self-determination in Kashmir, and prevention of the US support for anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan.

Ironically, the US policy post 9/11 has failed to address Pakistan’s vital security concerns on all these key issues. Pakistan has emerged more insecure than it was. The US friendship with Pakistan’s arch rival India led Islamabad to term the US as a defector. The US elevation of Indian status as a ‘natural ally’ fell short of Pakistani expectations of the US as a reliable partner. The Indo-US strategic partnership has restricted options for Pakistan, while it has made Islamabad rely more forcibly onto China. The downturn in US-Pakistan relations has led to the up-surge in Sino-Pakistan relations. Pakistan and China strengthened strategic cooperation.\textsuperscript{401} Insecurity increased as Indian geo-strategic designs began to find a convergence of interests with the US in regional and global polarization against China.

Indo-US strategic partnership can be understood through Mearsheimer’s
defensive realism. The US has engaged India against China to preserve own hegemony in South Asia. India and China have circumvented each others’ regional influence, while leading to the emergence of multilateral security structure, antithetical to US ambitions in the

region. Indo-US convergence of interests has given pre-eminence to India in the South Asian regional balance.

8.2 China’s Engagement with India and Pakistan Post 9/11

This section discusses the nature of China’s engagement with India and Pakistan post 9/11. It argues that while China’s involvement with India was predominantly economic in nature, China strengthened its strategic relationship with Pakistan within the context of Indo-US strategic partnership. The US has nurtured a regional rival India against a rising hegemon China in Asia. Given this fact, Sino-Indian economic collaboration or convergence of interest becomes questionable. It was largely due to China’s desire to balance out the negative implications of Indo-US partnership.

Neo-structural realism posits that drive for survival lead states to seek security in the international system by balancing against the superior force. Balancing can be internal leading to arms build-up or external leading to building of alliances with other states. According to Kenneth Waltz, balancing involves the typical behaviour of emerging powers, facing more powerful rivals. Neo-structuralism proposes that the international politics grants both incentives and disincentives for expansion, allowing the states to pursue cooperative strategies when situation allows. Evidently, as evident from Sino-Indian political and economic collaboration, China’s partnership with India increased in the post 9\11 era.

Two alternate views have defined the prospects of Sino-Indian engagement post 9/11. The first view has stipulated that working on Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision, India and China can envision joint leadership of Asia. The alternate view has referred to ‘the dragon vs. elephant metaphor’ implying that China’s revisionist ambitions are a threat to India. As a rising power, China’s vision of the world has envisioned a period of international stability, as ‘strategic opportunity’ to allow for Beijing’s economic growth. The imperative of national growth is the first step to realize China’s grand vision of great power status. China needs to engage actively with the world based on

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403 In building fences with India, China has incorporated Indian acceptance of One China Policy in Tibet and Taiwan, non-alignment with Japan and the US as counterweight to China, non-peddling of China threat theory as the basis of Sino-Indian rapprochement in the late 1990s.
self-restraint. Chinese leaders have capitalized on the country’s economic dynamism, promising a win-win situation for its trading partners. From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, CCP’s leadership has sought economic development through state-controlled liberalization reforms. In an interview with the author, Research Associate Xu Haomiao at XJASS informed that Xi Jinping One Belt, One Road Initiative (BRI) has envisioned a win-win situation of economic integration with all neighbors, including its regional, ideological and territorial rival India. He argued further that in view of the future, China has postponed historic rivalries to buy time to seek national development. Western scholars James C. Hsuing & Winberg Chai have argued that China believes that engagement with India has fostered leverage, allowing for the development of Tibet and Xinjiang. Trade, investment, counter-terrorism and economic development have served as China’s short term national security goal in South Asia.

From the security perspective, China’s strategy of engaging India has reflected counter balancing against the US. Beijing has co-opted India to prevent the latter’s alignment with the US. The Indo-US partnership now has evolved through three successive presidencies, Clinton, Bush and Obama and two governments with different moorings in India — Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and now Narindar Moodi. Pakistani reputed research analysts Professor Khalid Mahmood has observed that starting with Clinton visit to India, two developments marked China’s growing indignation towards Indo-US relations. China celebrated 50 years of diplomatic ties with India in April 2000. Beijing invited Indian President R. Narayanan on a state visit to China. Indian analyst Prem Shankar Jha has observed that Chinese foreign minister Jang Jiaxuan visited India in July 2000. Prem Shankar argued that when Bush made India a partner in South Asian security, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Rongi came to India in

404 Interview conducted by the author with Xu Haomiao, Research Associate, XJASS, on October 29, 2013 at Islamabad.
406 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
January 2002 and signed MOUs on terrorism, intelligence sharing and promotion of bilateral trade.\textsuperscript{410} Simultaneously, China invited Vajpayee on a state visit to Beijing and the two states laid down India\textbackslash China Joint Declaration of Cooperation in June 2003.\textsuperscript{411} China opened the Nathu La Pass, granting de facto recognition to Indian claim in Sikkim. Subsequently, China released a map in 2005 showing Sikkim as part of India. In return, India recognized Tibet as Chinese territory. China was equally quick to respond to the Indo-US joint statement in July 2005.\textsuperscript{412} In his visit to India in April 2005, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao signed strategic and cooperative partnership with India.\textsuperscript{413} Stating that Sino-Indian relations had acquired a global and strategic character, Wen Jiabao expressed Sino-Indian mutual resolve to strengthen coordination on counter-terrorism and security. To Pakistan’s resentment, the Chinese premier even stated that China would hold no reservation if India joined the UNSC seat.\textsuperscript{414} This appeared to be much of a disappointment for Pakistan.

In the new dimension of Sino-Indian bilateral relations, China and India resolved to interpret each other as partners rather than adversaries. The two states’ adopted protocol related to modalities for the Line of Actual Control (LAC).\textsuperscript{415} Most significant aspect

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{410} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{411} The declaration laid down goals and guidelines for bilateral relations and provided a blueprint for cooperation; China decided to open the Nathu La Pass in Sikkim, granting de facto recognition as Indian sphere of influence; Beijing released a map in 2005 that showed Sikkim within Indian borders; Indian recognition of Tibet as part of China’s territory; bilateral dialogue mechanism as a means to counter-terrorism, mutual efforts to strengthen multilateral coordination mechanism on security and cooperation. See “Joint Declaration by Republic of India and People’s Republic of China,” November 2006, available at: http://www.indembosofia.org/joint-declaration-by-the-republic-of-india-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ accessed May 12, 2013.


\textsuperscript{415} The statement called for the two sides resolve to jointly address global challenges and threats. The two sides agreed to broaden and deepen defense exchanges and enhance existing confidence building measures. See Full Text “Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of India-China Boundary
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushleft}
is the Sino-Indian agreement on political parameters and guiding principles for settling boundary question.\textsuperscript{416} Chinese President Hu Jintao visit in November 2006 reinforce Sino-Indian strategic and cooperative partnership through a ten pronged program of action on mutual cooperation including nuclear energy.\textsuperscript{417} Sino-Indian partnership in 2005 sought to counter the US attempt to contain China.

Table 8.1
SINO-US STRATEGIC BALANCING MOVES IN INDIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US policy in South Asia</th>
<th>China’s Counter Engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinton visits India in 2000</td>
<td>50 year celebration of diplomatic ties Chinese foreign minister visits India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US SA Policy 2001: India made centerpiece of US Asian policy.</td>
<td>China invites Indian President: extends support on fighting terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US White House Paper 2002: India declared a major power</td>
<td>China’s PM visits India: starts multilateral engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US announces visit to India</td>
<td>June 2003: Vajpayee invited to China multilateral cooperation initiated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Content Analysis of Indo-US\ Sino-Indian official policy papers.

Figure 8.1 illustrates different moves initiated by the US while reciprocated by China in South Asia. Wen Jiabao meeting with Manmohan Singh in January 2008 promised

\textsuperscript{416} The two sides agreed to hold regular official level meetings, conduct cultural exchanges, people to people contact and promote mutual awareness, friendship and cooperation. A Joint Study Group (JSG) was established to examine complementarities in trade and measures to remove impediments to economic exchange. See Prem Shankar Jha, \textit{India and China: The Battle Between Soft And Hard Powers} (New Delhi: Viking, 2010), 101.

to foster a Sino-Indian joint vision for the 21st century to strengthen cooperation and enhance regional security.\textsuperscript{418} India and China joint communiqué included Sino-Indian defence dialogue and commencement of anti-terrorism joint training exercises to enhance mutual trust.\textsuperscript{419} Sino-Indian joint communique in 2010 has addressed Indo-US relationship in the context of China. Wen Jiabao’s visit to India aimed to neutralize Obama’s visit to India. Complex Interdependence has entailed the Sino-Indian bilateral engagement agreement. ‘Linkage’ strategies explain Sino-Indian bilateral cooperation to foster progress in functional areas maintained through institutionalized links. Security concern in ‘high politics’ does not impair Sino-Indian cooperation in areas of ‘low politics.’ Despite remaining constrained by a competitive mindset, China and India have found a common ground in multilateral forums on issues of global concern.\textsuperscript{420} Complex Interdependence has prevailed in Sino-Indian linkage strategies in the international issues of climate change, trade, labor laws and arms control.

Indian security analyst David M. Ma has cited two prime factors conditioning Sino-Indian relations: the 1962 war syndrome and the Sino-Indian relations with the US. China has remained cognizant of the developments in Indo-US ties post 9/11. India’s rise and its growing ties with the US and Japan have added to China’s list of strategic concerns. Broadly speaking, Sino-Indian interests have converged on counter-terrorism and the promotion of peace and stability in the South Asian region. The complexity in Sino-Indian relations, however, has related to ethnic unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, resurgence of nationalism, recession in economic performance, trade deficit, large territorial claims and China’s sustained support for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{421} Rising inflation, shrinking international


\textsuperscript{419} In forging the strategic and global partnership, Sino-Indian convergence of interests has aimed to maintain high level exchanges between governments, parliaments and political parties. At the social level, cultural exchanges and people to people contact are deemed valuable to promote mutual trust and understanding. Economic Cooperation is regarded as an important dimension of a stronger India-China relationship. Sino-Indian Joint Study Group (JSG) establishes complementarities in trade and the Joint Task Force (JTF) study feasibility of JSG recommendations for procurement of energy resources. See Joint Communiqué of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, available at: http://mea.gov.in/bilateral_documents.htm?dtt/5158/, accessed July 13, 2013.

\textsuperscript{420} Apart from the territorial dimension, Sino-Indian frictions include Tibetans in exile in India, Beijing’s effort to build dams on the Yarlung-Tsango River, China’s alliance with Pakistan and relations with the US.

economic consumption, increasing population, growing social and economic inequality, environmental degradation are some of the serious common challenges faced by India and China.

Indian security analyst Sujit Dutta has argued that China’s diplomacy while avoiding a hostile relationship towards India has shown marks of strategic uncertainty.\textsuperscript{422} India has resorted to a shift from the previous conciliatory to an assertive foreign policy stance towards China. For example, India’s lack of reference to ‘One China policy,’ in 2013 Xi Jinping-Moodi meeting makes Indian commitment conditional to China’s acceptance of Indian claim on Jammu and Kashmir. Indian nuclear weapons and medium range missile tests, air and maritime power, investment in space technology and mountain warfare capabilities have sought to counter Chinese capabilities to create deterrence.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Table 8.2}  & China & India \\
\hline
\textbf{MILITARY} &  &  \\
Tanks & 9162 & 6468  \\
AFV & 4791 & 6706  \\
SP Guns & 1712 & 293  \\
Towed Artillery & 6249 & 7417  \\
Multiple Launch Rocket System & 1773 & 294  \\
\hline
\textbf{AIR FORCE} &  &  \\
Total AC & 2863 & 1907  \\
Fighters & 1068 & 631  \\
T PT AC & 877 & 669  \\
Fixed Wing ATT/AC & 1311 & 762  \\
Trainer AC & 1311 & 762  \\
Helicopters & 909 & 584  \\
ATT Helicopters & 198 & 20  \\
\hline
\textbf{NAVAL} &  &  \\
Total Naval Strength & 677 & 204  \\
Air Craft Carrier & 1 & 2  \\
Frigates & 48 & 15  \\
Destroyer & 25 & 9  \\
Corvettes & 24 & 26  \\
Submarines & 69 & 16  \\
Coastal Defence Craft & 12 & 48  \\
Mine Warfare & 6 & 7  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{China-India Military Power Comparison}
\end{table}

Source: India vs. China Military Power Comparison
World Wide Army, http://worldwidearmy.blogspot.com

\textsuperscript{422} Ibid.
Table 8.3
Defense Budget of India and China

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<tr>
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<th>INDIA</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
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</tbody>
</table>


Chinese President Xi Jinping has aimed to neutralize the Indo-US strategic partnership through a strategy of engaging India and establishing peaceful frontiers. China’s engagement of India has entailed a manifestation of the policy of *wei qei* at the South Asian regional landscape. While the policy builds economy, it has foiled the Indian attempt to encircle China. Chinese research scholars Zhang and Tang have argued that China’s regional strategy in South Asia has aimed to counter the ups and downs in China’s relations with the US.\footnote{India and China have entered into strategic partnerships with all centers of power, with regional states, and with energy producing countries and they have engaged in military modernization to support targeted and limited objectives. See Zhang and Tang in Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Indo-US Combined Defence Exercises: An Appraisal,” *Strategic Analysis*, Bimonthly Journal of IDSA., Vol.32, No.6, 23.} Indian foreign policy drive has shown marks of conflict and cooperation through engagement and balancing with China. As part of engagement, India has expanded economic ties with China. As a balancing strategy, India has sought to match PLA’s increase in defense budget. China’s foreign policy stance post 9/11 has been directed at balancing the US strategic primacy in the South Asian region. The Chinese engagement of India has resulted in reciprocity of political and economic interests for both the parties. In opening its door towards China, India has gained economic dividends, while invoking multilateralism to assert independence in its foreign policy stance. While China had a deep desire to contain India, China’s economic engagement with India has favoured India.
8.3 Implications for Pakistan-India strategic Rivalry

This section discusses the implications of Sino-US competition for Pakistan-India strategic rivalry in the post 9/11 era. It argues that Indo-US strategic partnership resulted in Pakistan-China strategic collaboration. Both China and Pakistan desired to dilute Indian hegemony in South Asia and in the adjacent regions. Ironically, while Pakistan cooperated with China to enhance its security vis. a vis. India, the Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus eroded Pakistan’s security through strengthening the strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan.

Sino-US involvement in South Asia based on expediency of power politics, opportunism and short term gain has worsened Pakistan’s relations with India. Sino-US balancing of interests has led to Pakistan’s conventional imbalance, while exacerbating Pakistan’s strategic rivalry vis. a vis. India. Independent as well as shared interests have underlined Sino-US security objectives in Pakistan. China and the US hold a combined interest in the stability of Pakistan. Yet the objective has received only a peripheral interest on the US priority list. Stability is a security imperative, the US and China share in common, although in different prioritization. For the US, Pakistan’s stability is a subservient objective to the US more pressing focus in Syria and Iraq. For China stability is a neo-structural imperative, linking Beijing’s national development and vision of grand strategy to Pakistan’s regional stability.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and investment in highways, naval ports and energy routes is reminiscent of China’s desire for great power status. Stability thus serves the Chinese geo-strategic and economic interests more than that of the US. Washington has thrown the icon of responsibility for stability in South Asia onto China. The Sino-US conflict of interests has pertained to the degree of responsibility each is willing to hold with respect to ensuring stability in Pakistan. One can argue that a downturn in Sino-US relations post 9/11 will mark negatively upon stability in Pakistan. Indian analyst Shashi Tharoor has argued that South Asia’s nuclearization has attached great powers’ interest to stability. Sino-US shared only a broad convergence of

interest to maintain stability in South Asia with differing perceptions of the responsibility entailed therein.

Pakistani research and defense analyst Shireen M. Mazari has observed that great powers have taken a roller-coaster ride to intervene in South Asian security.\textsuperscript{426} Sino-US balance of power politics in South Asia has cast a considerable impact upon regional security dynamics. The policy has held immense implications for Pakistan’s strategic rivalry with India. Within this context, US research scholar Hall Gardner argued that Sino-US balance of power during the Cold War worked on alliance partnership with India and Pakistan by playing one against the other.\textsuperscript{427} In the post 9/11 era, the US holds a convergence of interests to grant dominance to India in the South Asian balance of power. The policy has proved to be counter-productive for the US long-term objective of stability in South Asia. The US strategic partnership with India is functional rather than regional in approach. The US policy has failed to address the reality of Indo-Pakistan regional animosity towards the other.\textsuperscript{428} The Indo-US strategic partnership has implied for Pakistan a strategic wedge against the US, aligning the former more forcibly with China. The US alignment with India has endeared Pakistan to China apparently in a move to secure Pakistan against the less rewarding partnership with the US.

Tight in rough power parity with its arch rival India, the Indo-US ties have held a direct bearing on Pakistan’s security. The US strategic alignment with India has resulted in India’s enhanced regional and global stature. It has implied acceptance of Indian version on cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, enhancement of Indo-US strategic ties and joint training. It has resulted in the elevation of Indian maritime status to secure the Sea Lanes of Communication, joint research, co-production and development of advanced weapons in defense and space-related technologies.\textsuperscript{429} The US has acquired basing access for aircraft and naval vessels, including Lockheed Martin F-16C and F/A-


\textsuperscript{427} Hall Gardner, \textit{American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism}, (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2014), 125.

\textsuperscript{428} Op, cit, 98.

\textsuperscript{429} A considerable cost for India has, however, entailed the opposition from leftist parties and compromise on independence of foreign policy stance, given its presumed role of bandwagoning with the US for China’s containment in the Asian balance of power.
18-E deals and commercial activities for US firms in India. Strategic partnership with the US has implied a dilemma for India’s relationship with China.

Indian analyst Mohan Malik has argued that India has engaged in multi-dimensional alignment to facilitate its rise to power. Lagging seven years’ behind China economically, India has sought to engage in strategic partnership with the US and Japan. China has built its profile as a major power substituting the US in Asia. China’s expansion of interests has posed a challenge to Indian commercial influence in South Asia. India has blamed that China’s rising stature has swamped the former in its backyard. Mohan Malik has argued that India has retaliated by developing leverage in China’s backyard through expansion of relations with Japan and Vietnam. China believes that the US-Japan-Australia-India nexus has formed an informal quadrilateral alliance to contain China. A manifestation is the Indo-US nuclear deal, which has provided India access to restricted duel use nuclear technology transfers while elevating Indian status to a power parity with China. India and China have long engaged in a zero-sum game in South Asia. The China factor drove India to form a coalition with the Soviet Union during the Cold war. According to Mohan Malik, the China factor has pushed India to forge a strategic partnership with the US in the post Cold war era.

To expand its strategic presence in the region, China has resorted to ‘linkage strategy of economic engagement with India,’ while resorting to external strategic balancing through informal alignment with Pakistan. India has resented Chinese alliance partnership with Pakistan. Times of India, August 28, 2007 reported Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh criticizing China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan at the behest of bogging India down in regional conflicts. China has made significant inroads in South Asia such as Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Maldives and Sri Lanka. China has gained observer status in SAARC to exploit India’s troubled relations in South Asia.

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431 Ibid, 36.
432 Beijing attempts to bar India form regional forums like ASEAN, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, (APEC), Asia Europe Summit Meeting ASEM, SCO, UNSC, and NSG. India has responded by restricting Chinese participation in Mekong-Ganges Cooperation (MGC) and BIMSTEC. See K. Subrahmanyam, “Don’t Get Fooled By China,” Times of India, New Delhi, August 28, 2007.
Sino-Indian bilateral relations post 9/11 has exhibited marks of conflict and cooperation with relationship becoming multifaceted, strategic and intricate. Former Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh stated that the post Cold war strategic environment had failed to ameliorate Indian security concerns. India has punched above its weight as it upgraded its defense budget marking an eight percent unprecedented increase. India has purchased the US defense equipment USS Trenton and C-130 military transport aircrafts. In 2010, Indian declaration has not included routine affirmation of ‘One China policy.’ Indian advanced nuclear and missile capabilities have brought the Chinese major cities under a direct threat.

Historically speaking, India and China have harbored deep mistrust and suspicion towards the other’s strategic ambitions. Bilateral irritants have developed on competition along the border, compounded by prestige and nationalistic power ambitions. China has claims on the western region of Aksai Chin. Chinese research analyst Dr. Zhouming Mu has argued that Indian democratic credentials have prevented a give and take along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Indian research analyst Shalendra D. Sharma has argued that political parties in a democratic India have failed to develop a consensus on border demarcation. Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan has argued that trans-Himalayan Tibetan Buddhism religious politics has disrupted Sino-Indian relations. Sino-Indian trust deficit pertains to disputed Sino-Indian 3488 kms border, Tibetan refugees and Dalai Lama. Sumdorong Chu incident in 1986 brought the two states to the brink of war. China has placed nuclear capable intermediate

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433 Shalendra D. Sharma has cited India’s desire for military capabilities expansion, India’s nuclear stance and the US neutrality in the Kargil war as factors that draw India closer to the US camp.

434 China has established four new airbases in Tibet; three in its southern provinces bordering India. The Indian Air Force augments its own presence near Chinese border by deploying two squadrons of Sukhoi-30 MKI fighters. See Shalendra D. Sharma, *China and India in the Age of Globalization*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 165.

435 Bilateral relations suffer due to misperceptions related to the Himalayan region. India believes its traditional cultural and trading links with Tibet are curtailed under Chinese occupation of Tibet and non-recognition of Sikkim as part of India. China believes Indian hegemony has prevented interaction with the southern kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan. The historic Silk Road via the Nathu La Pass lies in between Sikkim and Tibet, facilitation of trade may lead to resolution of dispute along the region. See C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy* (New York: Penguins Books, 2003), 170.

436 “India, China near pact aimed at keeping lid on border tension,” *The China Post*, October 18th, 2013.
missiles, developed airfields, built infrastructure and deployed 300,000 troops across the Tibetan plateau.

The rise in Sino-Indian regional stature has offered prospects of threat as well as opportunity. The imperative of complex interdependence throws light on Sino-Indian engagement post 9/11. India and China have resorted to internal and external balancing while reaping the fruits of economic interaction. China and India have adopted a functional approach to erode trust deficit, by developing mutual stakes in trade. Despite economic interdependence, however, security issues have retained primacy in Sino-Indian relations. M. Jashim-ud-Din and M. Saleeh Yousaf have argued that China has even showed willingness in the November 2006 India/China Joint Declaration for ‘cooperation with India in the nuclear field.’ Indian air base in Tajikistan, relations with anti-China elements and the CASs indicate Indian drive to counter China’s hegemony in Asia. India dwells on the tight rope between support for Tibetans and trading interests with China. Sino-Indian collaboration in counter-terrorism and economic engagement has provided for the ‘net gains’ in Sino-Indian bilateral relations.

Embarking on the bold strategic vision of India’s rise, Indian engagement of China has aimed to reap political and economic dividends. India has counted to lessen the threat from China. India can rely on China to play a positive role in normalization of Indo-Pakistan relations. India can leverage China to influence Pakistan’s belligerency in the region. Simultaneously, India can look up to the prospects of energy import from CARs across Pakistan. Trade with China will allow India to develop the northeastern and the northwestern regions. Indian stature has elevated as a great power that has risen above regional rivalries. Remaining conscious of the benefit of economic and trade relations, Sino-Indian bilateral trade has crossed a $100 billion target in the year 2014.

Pakistani research analysts Talat Maood has argued that Pakistan needs to consider China’s global policy objectives, while framing its future options. China’s

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438 Beijing’s reaction to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Taiwan’s Liu Xiaobo is a case in point.
439 Ibid, 173.
complicated relations with India have made Beijing cautious when India-Pakistan
tensions increase. Despite regional polarization, China does not want Pakistan to push
Beijing to take sides with any of the two regional powers. China wants to focus more
on winning rather than creating problems for itself. Beijing wants Islamabad to adopt
a more pragmatic attitude just as China itself demonstrated towards Taiwan and the
border dispute with India. China has balanced its economic, political and strategic
interests, and Pakistan needs to remain alert to China’s complicated nature of relations
with India based on Indian strategic and economic clout.

However, Indo-US nuclear deal has wide spread strategic implication for the South
Asian region. Indian research analyst Harsh V. Pant has argued that the deal has
symbolized broad spectrum of global strategic realignment post 9/11.440 Nicholas
Burns, chief negotiator of the Indo-US deal, has termed it as the US highest priority for
the future — a unique opportunity for the global balance of power. The US expert on
South Asia Michael Krepon has termed the Indo-US nuclear deal as a bomb-friendly
deal — the US master plan for India. Indian research analyst Shashi Tharoor has argued
that the special treatment offered status elevation to a nation (India), so far hyphenated
by the US with its smaller dysfunctional neighbor Pakistan.441 The Indo-US nuclear
deal has let loose a spiral of strategic implications for the South Asian regional
contestants of power. India holds 2nd largest standing army after China. Pakistan has 7th
largest standing army.

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440 Harsh V. Pant, Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy, (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 12.
Table 8.4
India vs. Pakistan Military Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force:</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter aircraft:</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank Strength:</td>
<td>6464</td>
<td>2924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed Artillery:</td>
<td>7414</td>
<td>3278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopters:</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Battle Tanks:</td>
<td>5978</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Carriers:</td>
<td>2 (INS Vikram: INS Ivenaat)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvette Warships:</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Submarines:</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Aircraft:</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Jets:</td>
<td>Darsaut, Mig 29 K, HAL Tejas &amp; Sea Harrier</td>
<td>Mirage 5 &amp; Hawks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Military Person</td>
<td>1400,000</td>
<td>710,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Military</td>
<td>1800,000</td>
<td>625,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary Personnel:</td>
<td>1.3m</td>
<td>304,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget:</td>
<td>$42.84b</td>
<td>$7.8B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 8.5
PAKISTAN-INDIA MISSILES COMPARISON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAKISTAN</th>
<th>INDIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nasr (Hatf IX)</td>
<td>Akash – Surface to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaheen I</td>
<td>Nagh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaheen II</td>
<td>Prithvi I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaheen III</td>
<td>Prithvi II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghaznavi (Hatf III)</td>
<td>Prithvi III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghavri (Hatf V)</td>
<td>Agni, I, II, III, IV, V, VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babaur Cruise Missile</td>
<td>Dhanush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raab Air Launched</td>
<td>K15, K4 &amp; K5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruise Missile</td>
<td>Shuriya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Brahmos &amp; Brahmosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Surya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Astra Bvram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Prahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Barak 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Pradyumna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ashwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Trishul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Prithvi Air Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Advanced Air Defence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 8.5 Illustrates Pakistan-India Missiles Comparison in terms of power parity in South Asia. Within this context, the study explored the implications for Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear defence capability. The Indo-US nuclear deal has symbolized the end of India’s strategic parity with Pakistan, while elevating Indian stature to that of China. The US adviser on South Asian security Bruce Riedel has observed that
Pakistan has regarded the Indo-US deal as discriminatory and India-specific in nature.\textsuperscript{442} Denial of a similar deal to Pakistan has tended to enhance Islamabad’s insecurity syndrome towards India. The deal has instigated Indo-Pakistan mutual hostilities, while fuelling arms race in the South Asian region. Bruce Riedel & Pavneet Singh argued that Indo-US nuclear deal is the way forward on the US expansion of strategic interests in the South Asian region. Indian research scholar Emeka Ohajunwa has defended the Indian position by arguing that India’s uniqueness has allowed it to lay claim to special treatment.\textsuperscript{443} India has regarded the deal as a historic opportunity to establish access to global nuclear energy market. The Indian analyst Ashley Tellis has argued that US partnership with India has tantamount to American investment in its own geo-political well-being.

The US partnership with India has promoted the US global ambitions of a new world order at lowest cost to itself. According to Ashley Tellis, India has benefitted from contemporary balance of power siding with the US.\textsuperscript{444} In November 2010, Obama endorsed the Indo-US partnership as enjoying across the board Democratic-Republican consensus.\textsuperscript{445} Obama’s speech contained two key assurances for India in relegating its new role: support for Indian permanent seat on UN Security Council, and lack of tolerance for terrorist safe havens in Pakistan to satisfy Indian security concerns. President Obama held several meetings with Manmohan Singh including the new Prime Minister Narinder Modi in power. Multifarious dimensions of Indo-US relations boost a long list with the US becoming India’s largest trading partner.

The US exports to India excelled than any other state, with service trade showing the highest prospects of increase from $60 billion to $150 billion by 2018. Indian diaspora has conditioned the US-Indian relationship by financially supporting political candidates to the US Congress. The Indo-US partnership has granted a clear tilt to


Indian alignment with the US. It has negated John Foster’s characterization of ‘Indian neutrality as an immoral stance.’ India has established its new status in the global balance of power. An Indo-US general convergence of interests has developed on issues of global security concern as worth the cost on principled pragmatism in the Asian balance based on anti-terrorism, relationship with Israel and India’s Look East policy. Economic interdependence forms a crucial dimension of Indo-US bilateral relations regulated through private business ties, political and bureaucratic forums like US-India Economic and Financial Partnership, the US Trade Representatives Trade policy Forum and Department of Commerce’s Commercial Dialogue and a High Technology Cooperation Group.

Sino-US security competition in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia has provided the logic of US strategic partnership with India. Yet the Indo-US strategic partnership has implicated the South Asian regional rivals in a spiral of mutual suspicions and conflict. Conventional, nuclear and military transfers have elevated the Indian strategic might vis. a vis. China, while it has generated a security lag for Pakistan. Military transfers to India have disrupted the Indo-Pakistan rough power parity of conventional weaponry. The US military and technology transfers, military research and co-production have strained Pakistan’s meager resources to maintain strategic parity with India.

The resultant prisoner’s dilemma has started an arms race in the South Asian region, straining Pakistan’s fragile economy to keep pace with India. According to Pakistani defence analyst, the US Command and Control and Early Warning Systems have acted as a force multiplier for India.446 The US Phalcon and Arrow missile transfers have held a direct bearing on Indo-Pakistan deterrence stability. India’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program has been one of the most advanced programs among the emerging missile nations. The nuclear deal has improved Indian quality of nuclear arsenal, while ensuring its integrity. It has greatly increased Indian ability to develop nuclear warheads through unrestricted and sustained fuel supply.

The Indo-US 123 Agreement in section 2.2 (e) has revealed that the US will help India develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to prevent any suspension of supplies to its nuclear reactors.\textsuperscript{447} Nasrullah Mirza & M. Sadiq has argued that section 2.4 has not prevented India to use for its own purposes nuclear material and technology.\textsuperscript{448} China has emphasized a criterion based approach, unlike the India-specific intent, promoted and endorsed by the International Atomic Energy. The US expert on South Asia Michael Krepon has observed that the nuclear deal has failed to impose restrictions on India’s fissile material production for military purposes, particularly its fast breeder reactors.\textsuperscript{449} The restrictions have related to the US president’s annual certification of Indian adherence to 123 agreement clauses for further nuclear tests and reprocessing of spent fuels. The nuclear deal has also allowed India to violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Indo-US deal has preserved India’s strategic autonomy, while leading it to forge a strategic partnership with the US short of formal alliance. The nuclear security expert George Perkovich has argued that more than the direct approach, Indo-US deal will tend to keep the Indian and US strategic interests intact.\textsuperscript{450}

The US scholar Michael Krepon has argued that the definition of ‘minimum’ in Indo-Pakistan nuclear doctrines has evolved with the passage of time.\textsuperscript{451} Institutions in Pakistan and India have developed new types of missiles superior than those possessed by the US.\textsuperscript{452} According to Pakistan’s security analyst Dr. Rifaat Hussain, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine upholds ‘minimum credible deterrence’ with a nuclear posture of ‘First Use,’ along the three Cs — credibility, capability and communication. Pakistan’s nuclear opacity is deliberately contrived at the lowest level of the nuclear threshold. It


\textsuperscript{452} Ibid., 9.
has ensured the credibility of actual use of nuclear weapons.' The Indo-Pakistan deterrence stability post nuclearization is based on mutual vulnerability vis. a vis. the adversary’s second strike capability. Based on mutual vulnerabilities, South Asian nuclearization has made deterrence more a game of threat of actual use of nuclear weapons than the numbers of nuclear weapons possessed by the belligerents.

The Indo-US nuclear deal has reflected the transformation in the US policy about the role and status of India. It has also transformed China’s strategic view of India as a significant factor in the balance of power in Asia. At one level, it has instigated China to improve relations with India through economic and political engagement. At another level, it has triggered a spiral response of counter-balancing in the development of Sino-Pakistan nexus. The China factor has allowed the US and India to engage in a long list of bilateral strategic concerns. India has employed the China card to foster close strategic ties with the US, while it has solicited a cooperative mode of engagement from China working on its fear of the US. According to the US scholar Christoph Bluth, the US missile transfers, conventional and nuclear fuel supplies has led to a quantitative and qualitative up-gradation of India’s deterrence capability, allowing India to produce conventional, nuclear, short and medium range missiles. The Indian Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program has reduced the Indian vulnerability, making deterrence more of a game of numbers reducing the deterrent intent of threat of actual use. India’s BMD program has lowered the nuclear threshold for Pakistan.

Indian analyst Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu has argued that the China factor has played a decisive role in the US characterization of India as a counterweight to China in South Asia. The US scholar Amelia Gentleman has argued that triggering a chain reaction, however, the Indo-US strategic partnership has added a new dimension to South Asian balance of power. Moreover, the incarnation of India’s expanded role has prompted

\[\text{References:}\]
\[455\] Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Jing-dong Yuan, China And India: Cooperation or Conflict, (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), 102.
\[456\] The agreement provides for joint weapons production and cooperation on missile defense. It has aimed at greater sharing of technology, intelligence and increased trade in arms and
the US to overlook human rights concerns in Indian occupied Kashmir. The Indo-US bilateral relations have thrived at the expense of human rights concerns.\textsuperscript{457} In March 2006, while the Bush administration concluded a nuclear deal with India, it announced to sell 18 new F-16s, $3 billion dollar military hardware assistance and Advanced Early Warning Radar Systems to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{458} To equate the US strategic maneuver, President Hu Jintao proposed a ‘strategic partnership’ to Musharraf the next month in April 2006 to ‘consolidate and deepen bilateral relations.’ Ostensibly, the Chinese move appeared to neutralize the US elevation of India role in the regional balance, by increasing China’s strategic assistance to Pakistan.

The act symbolized the US broader geo-strategic mind-set for the South Asian region. Unlike the zero-sum game of the Cold war era, the US policy had sought to ‘de-hyphenate’ India from Pakistan. The US grant of a nuclear deal underscored the US allocation of a new role to India in the wider context of the power parity with China. While the US admired India’s impeccable record, it had refused to extend a similar deal to Pakistan citing non-proliferation concerns, related to the A.Q. Khan network. C. Christian Fair has mentioned about Indian involvement in clandestine nuclear technology exports. The Indo-US nuclear deal let loose a spiral of regional and international suspicions based on great powers’ involvement in the South Asian region.\textsuperscript{459}

Pakistani defence analyst Shireen Mizari has argued that the Indo-US strategic partnership has led to a persistent pattern of growth in Sino-Pakistan relations. Sino-

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{457} The US Commission on International Religious Freedom’ delegates are normally denied visas to visit India. Similarly, the US did not raise protest against the Muslim massacre in Gujarat in 2002. The Indian Kashmiri Muslims are normally overlooked in the US dealings with India. Narendra Moodi, the Indian Prime Minister, presumably blacklisted for a visit to the US on human rights violations was granted a warm reception by the State Department in 2014.

\textsuperscript{458} The US also promised 26 used F-16s, with another 18 new planes to upgrade Pakistan’s current fleet of 34 F-16s.

\textsuperscript{459} With the passage of the Hyde Act in December 2006, the biggest hurdle to India’s emancipation as part of great powers nuclear support club was removed. See Llyod I. Rudolph & Sussane Hoeber Rudolph, \textit{Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives And The Imperial Presidency},(New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008), 87
\end{footnotesize}
Pakistan defence collaboration post 9/11 has picked up in the backdrop of Indian strategic cooperation with the US. Obama’s visit to India earlier in November 2010 solicited Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pakistan in December 2010. Elevating China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan, Jiabao proposed a coordinated mode to meet international challenges. He asserted that China-Pakistan pragmatic cooperation was an important part of bilateral strategic partnership and enjoyed promising prospects. In the joint statement issued in December 2010, China and Pakistan stressed mutual resolve to cooperate in defence and security to maintain stability. Both states stepped up cooperation in maritime security and defence industry. Wen Jiabao asserted that Sino-Pakistan military and economic relations would expand regardless of the regional implications.

Shireen Mazari has further argued that the US claim of strategic partnership with Pakistan becomes absurd, since the US signaled Pakistan out of the nuclear deal.\footnote{See Shireen Mazari, “Indo-US scheme of things,” \textit{The News}, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, July 06, 2005.} At the political level, the Indo-US strategic nexus has held a bearing on Pakistan’s threat perception, inducing a qualitative transformation in Pakistan’s relations with China. Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan has contended that Indo-US missile defense, nuclear and conventional cooperation has upgraded the quality of Sino-Pakistan security relations.\footnote{C Raja Mohan, \textit{Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy}, (New Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 159.} In 2001, China delivered ballistic missiles technology transfers to Pakistan, which the US reciprocated by arms sales to India in 2002. In 2003, under Excess Defense Articles (EDA) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), the US provided India access to military transfers.

Sino-Pakistan defense collaboration has witnessed upsurge in bilateral strategic relations, ostensibly to keep a matching equity with the US arms and technology supplies to India. Pakistan’s ‘Look China’ policy has built on Islamabad’s dire need to reduce its strategic vulnerability vis. a vis. India. The China-Pakistan policy coordination has provided for a road map for arms trade and investment in Pakistan. China remains the principle supplier of weapons to Pakistan, second only to the US. Of China’s defence supplies in the region, 47 per cent find their export destination in
Pakistan. Chinese and Pakistani militaries have carried out joint training exercises and exchange of high-level visits. Both Pakistan and China have carried out counter-terrorism military exercises to improve counter-insurgency skills. The exercises have reflected collective desire to adapt to the latest techniques. The two states have benefitted from mutual experience in training at the unit and brigade levels to conduct drills for low intensity conflicts. Military exercises aim at boosting existing professional relationship between the two armies. Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership sustains on reciprocal expectations and envisions collaboration in mutual resources utilization.

China has proved to be Pakistan’s savior of the last resort against the US imposed sanctions. Many a times China has used missile transfers to Pakistan to desist or punish the US for weapons’ transfers to Taiwan. In 1992, the US sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan led to Chinese retaliatory move in transferring M-11 systems to Pakistan. A CIA report in 2003 confirmed that China has assisted Pakistan in the development of nuclear and ballistic missiles. Following the CIA allegations of Pakistan’s development of nuclear program, the US imposed Symington and Pressler sanctions, which led to the deterioration of Pakistan’s Air Force capability vis. a vis. India. To off-set the imbalance, Chinese missile transfers have allegedly granted Pakistan the blue prints for short and medium range missiles production.

Military leadership has regarded nuclear weapons as the guarantor of Pakistan’s security against Indian aggression. Western scholars have argued that Pakistan army holds skeptical views about the prospects of rapprochement with India. Pakistan army’s strategic conservatism based on anti-India ideology is responsible for Islamabad’s foiled relations with India. Self-interest for survival as an institution of key importance enjoying largest perks may be the restrictive factor in Indo-Pakistan

463 Ranks and file of the army holds the US as primarily responsible for the split of the Pakistani state into two during the Bangladesh debacle in 1971. Despite blaming it for betrayal and inconstancy, the army regards the US as primary source of high tech advanced military arsenal. See Howard B. Schaffer & Teresita C. Schaffer, How the US negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster, (Islamabad, Vangaurd Books Publications, 2011), 67.
464 Schaffers have argued that the defining characteristics, while on the one hand have emboldened the terrorist organizations, have prevented the army from striking back forcibly at militant groups, even when these groups have attacked it for collaboration with the US. See Howard B Schaffer, Teresita C. Schaffers, 59.
rapprochement. A counter perspective by the US has argued that Indo-Pakistan leaders have fuelled bilateral tensions to off-set the US pressure on foreign policy. India and Pakistan have fanned mutual suspicions as a hedging tactic to assert independence in foreign policy stance. The US National Security adviser on South Asia Bruce Riedel has argued that reciprocity has sustained China-Pakistan strategic convergence of interests. Riedel argued further that China has exploited Pakistan’s foreign relations and geographic location to amplify its own military capabilities. Simultaneously, Pakistan has served as the prime source of the US supplied restricted technology transfers to China. For example, Non-Nato Ally status allowed Pakistan access to restricted French supplied MICA Air to Air Missiles and RC400 radars, which were reverse engineered to install on Chinese JF-17/FCI fighters.

India has pointed to anti-India centric approach in Pakistan-China convergence of interests. India has accused the US as well of over indulgence in Pakistan leading to a compromise in the US relations with New Delhi. Reliance on Pakistan for GWOT and counter insurgency has led the US to overlook Indian security interests in Afghanistan. A spiral of Indo-Pakistan mutual hostilities has sprung due to the US conventional arms sales to Pakistan and India post 9/11. India has alleged that Pakistan has spent $11 billion US anti-terrorism security assistance on purchase of high-quality weapons against India. With the US Foreign Military Financing Program, disbursed from 2002 to 2012, Pakistan has bought conventional weapons from the US. Vali Nasr has argued that Indo-US nuclear deal has set-in imbalance of power, generating insecurity while increasing Indo-Pakistan reliance on great powers conventional weaponry. Pakistan has focused on acquiring conventional war fighting capability against India. Counter insurgency training and equipment has remained a second priority for Islamabad. India has accused the US of partisan military transfers, creating unease while allowing Pakistan to feel more secure against a belligerent India.

The US military transfers to Indo-Pakistan over the decade, however, have exhibited a purposeful dynamic. The US military transfers have been designed to keep a check on Indian hegemony in South Asia. India has, however, sought to maintain a relative

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degree of independence in joint co-production and military transfers from the US. India has rejected the US Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal worth $10 billion, the US fighter aircrafts F/A-18 Super hornet and F-16 Super Viper. India has finally preferred the French Rafael planes in search of Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMCA). In December 2014, India finalized with Moscow $20 billion weapons deal along with helicopters’ co-production. The deal specifies Indian desire for strategic autonomy.\textsuperscript{467}

Exemption from liability in nuclear accidents--‘Nuclear Liability Law’-- has remained a principal impediment in Indo-US strategic relations. In January 2015, Obama finalized the terms of agreement pending since conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Indian research analyst Shashi Tharoor has argued that Indo-US divergence of interests has pertained to US insistence on economic reforms to support business investments in India.\textsuperscript{468} Earlier, President Obama lobbied for the MMRCA deal to finance the US ailing economy. Indian refusal led to US Ambassador Tim Roemer’s prompt announcement of resignation as the US ambassador to India. Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony stated that US offer was strategically inferior to European choice, which was far more suitable to high altitude warfare in northern Kashmir. Moreover, India feared the US past records of unreliability on supplies and military hard-ware. India’s refusal to sign the bid has brought Indian traditional concern for strategic autonomy to the fore.

Restrictions on offensive weapons deployment, P-8 technology and state of the art high technology transfers have constituted divergence in Indo-US bilateral relations. Indian analyst David M. Malone has suggested that the Indo-US entente is a selective partnership, underscored by strong economic interdependence.\textsuperscript{469} Indian scholars have argued Indian alignment with the US is a reactionary move that tends to neutralize the US tilt towards Pakistan post 9/11. According to Indian research analyst Brahma Challaney, India wanted to sustain valuable strategic partner with the US in the South

\textsuperscript{469} David M. Malone, \textit{Does the elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy}, (Published in Great Britain: MPG Books Group, Bodmin & Kings Lynn), 237.
Asia regional balance.\textsuperscript{470} India has blamed the US of acquiescence in Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear technology over the years. The Clinton administration’s pressure to roll back intensified fears on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan divide, leading to a hasty process of South Asian nuclearization. Instead of stability, the Clinton administration’s policy led to a long term nuclear confrontation in South Asia. The Indian perspective has also accused the US of side-playing on the A.Q. Khan network in collaboration with Musharraf. India has further accused that US induction of Pakistan as a front-line state in the Afghan war involved a deliberate neglect of the terrorist activities in Indian held Kashmir.

Increase in terrorist activities led to Indo-Pakistan military stand-off in 2001-2002. Indian analyst Walter See Ladwig has argued that India has developed more lethal, quick reaction war fighting strategy with new doctrines such as the Cold Start.\textsuperscript{471} Pakistan has learnt counter-reactive training exercises such as Zarb-e-Noe, developed low yield tactical nuclear weapons with small range missiles, for example, Nasr (60kms) to respond to Indian overtures. India and Pakistan have resorted to new techniques of low intensity conflict and proxy warfare in the disputed region of Kashmir, apart from regular skirmishes along the Indo-Pakistan international border. India has developed one of the world’s largest nuclear power programs among the developing countries. By the end of 2014, Indian expected number of weapons made from its weapon-grade plutonium was estimated at about 97. These values have been rounded to 100 nuclear weapons with a range of 75-125 nuclear weapons.


\textsuperscript{471} Indian army Chief, Gen N. C. Vij unveiled the Cold Start doctrine on April 28, 2004 — a tri-service doctrine to enhance Indian forces offensive power involving re-organizations into eight Integrated Battle Groups, (IBG) — designated as the pivot core along with the holding corps adjacent to Indian borders to provide for defense. The concept combines Indian infantry, artillery and armor to launch multiple strikes into Pakistani areas supported by highly mobile massive fire support provided by Indian Air force and Naval aviation assets. See Walter See Ladwig, III, “A Cold Start for Hot Waters? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” \textit{International Security}, Vol. 32, No.3, (158-190), Winter 2007-2008) 158, 164-5.
Table 8.6
India’s HEU and Plutonium Stocks in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Reactors</th>
<th>HEU (Kg)</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cores</td>
<td>440-880</td>
<td>180-1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5% containing HEU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thermonuclear Weapons</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>WGU (kg)</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cores</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100-200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon-grade Uranium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total  | 440-990  | 280-1,900 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plutonium</th>
<th>Median-Value (kg)</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Plutonium (separated)</td>
<td>550 Kg</td>
<td>375-750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon-grade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Plutonium in spent fuel Reactor-and-fuel-grade</td>
<td>31,900 kg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Separated Plutonium, Fuel or reactor-grade</td>
<td>2,900 kg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: India’s Stocks of Civil and Military Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 2015, Institute for Science and International Security, November 2, 2015 isis@isis-online.org

Indian stock of weapons-grade plutonium is estimated at 240-395 kg, capable of producing 40-90 simple fusion weapons. India is capable of building low yield to 200 kiloton of nuclear weapons systems involving fission and boosted thermo-nuclear designs. Pakistan is believed to have stored approximately, 580-800 kg of highly improved uranium (HEU) that can build 30-50 fusion bombs. Pakistan’s Khusab research reactor can produce 10-15 kg of weapons-grade platinum yearly. The US has blamed China for helping Pakistan in providing nuclear-related materials, scientific expertise and technical assistance. Both India and Pakistan are non-signatories to Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Table 8.7
INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WARHEADS
Nuclear warheads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>60-80</td>
<td>70-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>80-100</td>
<td>90-110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>80-100</td>
<td>100-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>80-100</td>
<td>100-120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>90-100</td>
<td>100-120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI
Table 8.8 illustrates Pakistan’s defence budget since 2001 along with the percentage shown as share of GDP. Marking a 11 percent increase from Rs 627.2 billion the previous year, Pakistan increased its defence budget to Rs 700.2 billion for the year 2015-16. Pakistan’s defence budget has almost doubled from around 350 billion in 2009-10 to Rs700 billion this year. From Rs131 billion or $2.24 billion in 2000-01, Pakistan's defence budget has risen to Rs630 billion or $6.0 billion by 2013-14. Pakistan's defence budget rose by 4.8 times or 2.7 percent in the past 14 years. India marked an 11 percent increase, spending 47 trillion rupees ($40 billion) in the same years. The Indian defence budget is more than five times Pakistan’s defence expenditure — representing an acute power disparity. The report by SIPRI in March 2014 indicated that India has been the world’s largest weapon importer, planning to spend $120 billion over the next 10 years on its conventional defence program. The report showed that India has remained the world’s largest purchaser of conventional weapons between the years 2008 to 2013. Marking 14 percent of the global total, India had almost three times larger conventional capability than that of China and Pakistan. India spent heavily in air strike capabilities from 2009-2013. Almost 80 percent of Indian nuclear and conventional weapons are Pakistan specific.
Two views have prevailed in India about how to deal with China's military threat. One view holds that India should benefit from its naval superiority in the Indian Ocean while adopting a defensive position on land. This strategy has called for the development of Indian naval and air forces, assisted by Indian defence allocations. The other opinion has emphasized military building and infrastructure construction to strengthen Indian land forces’ development. Following the Indian and Chinese militaries confrontation in May 2013, India granted $9.94 billion for raising a mountain strike corps. India's defence spending ranked it among the world’s top ten defence spending states. India spent $39 billion in defence and accounted for 2.4 percent of the world's military spending in 2009. Its defence spending rose to $47.4 billion and accounted for 2.7 percent of world military spending in 2013. India’s defence spending is close to that of Japan ($48.6 billion) and Germany ($48.8 billion). It has indulged in arms acquisition in a much larger way as well.

Fearing the Indian conventional military build-up, Pakistan seeks to establish a sustainable equilibrium in South Asia. Indian advantage in personnel and weaponry falls in between 1:3 and 1:5 in favor of India. With almost five times the Pakistani defence budget, Indian economic growth has supported such a high grade military spending, while catching Pakistan in a strategic dilemma. To overcome the conventional imbalance of power, Pakistan has relied on its nuclear capability to counter the threat from India. Indian conventional military build-up has lowered the nuclear threshold among the belligerents in South Asia.

At the political front, the US has remained careful not to allow for Indian hegemony in the region either. Framing South Asia policy based on peace, stability and development, the US has relegated India a secondary status in the management of regional affairs. For example, Obama made Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the first guest of his administration in 2009. Yet Obama made China his first official destination. John J. Mearsheimer has prescribed that a universal hegemon ought to preserve hegemony by having ‘two rival hegemons rather than one in the region.’ A strategically allied

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473 India has, however, thrown its weight on international issues behind the US on Syria and Ukraine while agreeing to disagree on Libya, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. The grey area in Indo-US bilateral relations includes India’s oil import and economic interests in Iran.
rather than a totally independent India will prevent both China and India to challenge the US hegemony in South Asia. According to Indian research analyst Shashi Tharoor the US cultivation of relations with China has offered the possibility to keep Indian role to a secondary status in the South Asian region. Unveiling the US National Security Strategy 2015, President Obama stated that the US-China cooperation was unprecedented, despite the fact that the US remained alert to China’s military modernization. China has, however, remained alert to the Indo-US convergence of interests at the regional and global levels. China has also understood the fallout on its economy of an adversarial relation with India.

Terrorism and insurgency are global security imperatives, threatening the Sino-US long term security interests of stability in the South Asian region. Neo-structural realism has thrown light on Pakistan’s convergence of interests with the US and China on counter-terrorism and counter insurgency. Viewed from the realist perspective, a fragmented Pakistan might act as a safe-haven of radical Islam, making Chinese territorial integrity vulnerable in the western regions and Xinjiang. Instability harbored on terrorism will be counter-productive to the US long term interest of a strong India acting as a bulwark against the threat of communism. In the same vein, terrorism has held serious implications for Pakistan’s regional stability and internal security.

Ironically, the US policy approach in Southwest Asia has deteriorated Pakistan’s relations with India and Afghanistan. At the regional level, the US pursuit of strategic partnership with India has held repercussions for the US larger interest of stability and security in Afghanistan. The Indo-US partnership has encouraged Indian involvement at the cost of the neglect of Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, support for Indian strategic expansion has strained the US alliance partnership with Pakistan in Afghanistan. C. Christian Fair has argued that the US security relationship with India has compromised on the US relations with Pakistan.

475 US National Security Strategy 2015
476 Zbignew Brezinski has termed the region extending from Saudi Arabia in the west to Indonesia in the east as “Arc of Crisis.” The US long term interests have aimed to induct a stronger India that serves the US interests in a balance of power in Asia.
Taking a down-turn on Pakistan’s relation with the US, the policy has worsened Pakistan’s internal security and stability. It has allowed India to find an excellent breeding ground in a shambled and weak Pakistan.

The US divergence of position from eliminating Al-Qaeda to supporting the pro-Indian Northern Alliance to power against the Taliban has worsened Pakistan’s relations with India and Afghanistan. The US policy has remained short of addressing Pakistan’s key security interests in Afghanistan. India has, however, defended the US backing of Indian role in Afghanistan. India has argued that the Taliban regime (1996-2001) nurtured hostility against India, while it hosted and trained terrorist in Afghanistan to fight in the Indian occupied Kashmir. Indian scholars have supported the US backing of Indian security links with the Afghan government. The Bush administration had emphasized upon the Indian positive role for supporting democracy in Afghanistan. The US support for Indian security interests in Afghanistan has created the impression of the Indo-US collusion of interests against Islam and Pakistan.

India has blamed Pakistan to set-up a wholly owned subsidiary regime in Afghanistan, as a replica of its military establishment in Rawalpindi. The Schaffers have argued that Pakistan seeks to establish a Pushtoon dominated government to ensure a pliant regime, based on an inclusive coalition government. The US support for anti-Pakistan Northern Alliance has magnified Pakistan’s threat perception of India. It has allowed India to assert hegemony in Southwest Asia. The US believes that ISI and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) have been supporting the Afghan Taliban. C. Christian Fair argued that the US has complained of Pakistan’s ‘double play’ in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the US-Pakistan relations have been well caught in the former’s complaint of duplicity and the latter’s protest about the US betrayal. Pakistan has alleged that CIA and the Kabul

\footnote{Pakistan regards the policy as interference in internal affairs of Afghanistan and a recipe for ethnic conflict and instability. Mujahideen leaders and Afghan refugees within Pakistan also do not approve of the US policy of support to Northern alliance in Afghanistan.}

\footnote{Pakistan seeks to treat the Pushtoon dominated Taliban as an ally of Pakistan against India. The Pakistani elements of the Taliban movement, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), however, have attracted the enmity of the Pakistan army.}

\footnote{C. Christian Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 183.}
government have funded the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for launching attacks on the Pakistan Army.\footnote{481}

The US involvement in Afghanistan has, however, added yet another dimension to South Asian security. It has harbored Sino-Russian skepticism against the US interventionism in the region. The US criticism of Pakistani policy has solicited a wedge in Pakistan’s relations with the US. A divergence in US-Pakistan relations developed, following the CIA-ISI rift in Afghanistan. Divergence resulted from ‘unstated’ strategic objectives. The US sought to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe-haven for the terrorist. Pakistan tried to foment its hold against a resurgent Indian influence in Afghanistan. The western perspective, for example, C. Christain Fair has termed Pakistan as ‘a ‘marginal satisfier’ in implementing mutually agreed policy recommendation.\footnote{482} The US has walked on a tight-rope, while trying to rationalize Pakistan’s security concerns regarding an extended Indian threat in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, it has refrained India from involving in Afghan internal security and political matters. Divergence in US-Pakistan security lies in the US pursuit of short term goals with Pakistan’s pursuit of long term security in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s military establishment has, however, envisaged security in a stable Afghanistan. Indian expanded role and its support by the US has entrenched Indian interests in the development of infrastructure and consulates in Afghanistan. Adjacent to the Afghan-Pakistan tribal belt, Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad have fostered a condition of low intensity conflict, magnifying Pakistan’s threat perception of India. The US policy has sandwiched Pakistan along its eastern and western flanks by its arch rival India. Pakistan has relied on its own set of security tactics inducing it closer to the Taliban. Pakistan has continued to see its security in the context of ‘strategic depth’ against India in Afghanistan. The impact of the Peshawar school incident on the symbolic day of December 16, 2014 has manifested the Pakistani state’s

\footnote{481}{\textit{Tehreek–i-Taliban} Pakistan has resisted the Pakistani government, state and institutions ostensibly for extension of logistical and operational support to the US in Afghanistan and the region.} \footnote{482}{Ibid., 149.}
security vulnerability in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{483} The Pakistan army has stood as the center of gravity of these concerns, suffering backlash and victimization.

Although popular perceptions have remained anti-US among the masses in Pakistan, yet the US National Security Advisor Bruce Riedel has argued that terrorist attacks have turned many against ‘the jihadist Frankstein.’\textsuperscript{484} Obama has remarked about the shift in popular perception. Following the terrorist attacks on the Peshawar Army Public School, expressing his condolences Obama stated that Pakistani reluctance to own the fight against terrorism has ‘witnessed a transformation in public opinion from Karachi to Islamabad.’ The challenge for the US, however, remained to ‘utilize the backlash productively to destroy the terrorist networks.’ The US policy in Afghanistan created a permanent security threat for Pakistan. Within this context, C. Christian Fair has argued that Pakistan blamed the US for pressurizing Islamabad to relegate its security interests as secondary and inferior to those of the US in the region.\textsuperscript{485} The US scholar William von Kemenade has argued that at the domestic level, the US policy has created a rift in state-society relations, creating a problem of law and order in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{486}

The US National Security Council’s Af-Pakistan terminology to ‘destroy, disrupt and dismantle’ the Taliban has led to the US deployment of 30,000 additional troops for counterinsurgency operations in Afghan eastern and southern regions. This led to infiltrate terrorists to Pakistani hideouts to escape ISAF or US/Nato military action. Cross border infiltration increased as did the number of suicide attacks rising to 173 in 2009 alone.\textsuperscript{487} The US counter insurgency and counter-terrorism operations led to a resultant

\textsuperscript{483} The incident was most violent in terms of ferocity of scale and magnitude, killing more than 150 school going children of ages 4 to 15 years. It carried symbolic significance: the attack was perpetrated by the terrorists on children of the armed forces; two, it was carried on 16\textsuperscript{th} December, the day Pakistan lost its eastern wing, now independent Bangladesh.


\textsuperscript{487} Foreign Occupation has resulted in uniting disparate elements under the banner of Afghan Taliban. In 2006, there were only six suicide bombings; in 2007, the number turned up to become 50; 2008 saw 61 such attacks, while in 2009 the figure raised to 173 suicide attacks on military, civilian and law enforcement personnel. Punjabi Taliban, influenced heavily by the Afghan Taliban have constituted a more serious security threat for Pakistan, increasing
boost in suicide bombings in Pakistan. Subsequently, the US-Pakistan relations damaged as drone strikes expanded in intensity and frequency, increasing ‘collateral damage.’ Interestingly, a co-relation can be made between Pakistan-US deterioration of relations post 2008 and the rise in drone strikes, suicide attacks and militancy. In 2008, Obama administration conducted 51 drone attacks, double the number in Bush administrations eight years in office. The number of suicide attacks in Pakistan doubled from nine hundred in 2007 to more than 1,800 in 2008. At another level, drone strikes increased, fueling anti-US sentiments and militant activities in Pakistan. Drone attacks demonstrated to the masses, the Pakistan army’s inability to defend the state.

C. Christain Fair representing the wider Indo-US counter perspective has accused Pakistan of retaliation through proxy elements in India and Afghanistan. Militant attacks have resulted from Pakistani support and connivance on Indian and US interests in Afghanistan. The Zardari government sought to lower temperatures with the US and India by inducing a couple of measures such as trade liberalization and a loose visa policy. In July 2008, when relations became tense following the Mumbai attacks and Kabul bombings on the Indian embassy, Zardari government proposed to put the ISI under interior ministry. Worsening insecurity led to a split set of policies between the civil-military divide on matters related to India and Afghanistan.
The US scholars Llyod I. Rudolph and Sussane Hoeber Rudolph have argued that the US preferential treatment for India post 9/11 has underscored the US larger strategic interest in the Asian context.\textsuperscript{492} The US scholar C. Christaian Fair has argued that Indo-US security nexus has emboldened Indian foreign policy stance.\textsuperscript{493} The US Afghan policy has tended to exacerbate Indo-Pakistan bilateral tensions and conflict, potentially destabilizing the entire South Asian region. On the contrary, it has made peace in Afghanistan subservient to reduction of Indo-Pakistan bilateral tensions and hostilities. According to the US scholar on South Asia Stephan Cohen, Indo-Pakistan extended rivalry in Afghanistan has represented the struggle over Kashmir, battled without the fear of direct escalation between India and Pakistan. Both states have begun to find Afghanistan as a zero-sum zone of strategic competition and rivalry. Pakistan has supported the Taliban while India has claimed to provide only economic assistance for the Kabul regime.\textsuperscript{494}

India has denied proxy involvement for the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. India has feared that Obama would press ahead for Indian grant of concessions on Kashmir — ‘a happy deal’ to secure Pakistan’s more stringent commitment on counter insurgency along the western border.\textsuperscript{495} India has feared that the US post 2014 withdrawal would reinstall Pakistan on the seat of power in Afghanistan. The Indian perspective has accused Pakistan to preserve security rather than stability in Afghanistan. India and Pakistan have offset the US pressure by increasing bilateral hostilities. Pakistan has exploited the rationale of border tensions to assert independence in foreign policy. India has exploited border tensions as a political tool to alleviate its own fears of the US pressure on Kashmir. Cohen has argued that external intervention has inflated the propensity of Indo-Pakistan conflict. According to Cohen,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{492} See Llyod I. Rudolph & Sussane Hoeber Rudolph, \textit{Making US Foreign Policy Towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives And The Imperial Presidency}, (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 2008), 89.
\item \textsuperscript{495} Pakistan’s concentrates more on defense deployments against India in the eastern borders than its north-western borders adjacent to Afghanistan.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
India and Pakistan will shrink back to their normal proportion, when outside intervention will evade.\textsuperscript{496}

The US intervention has tended to elevate Indo-Pakistan hostilities, working counter productively for the US long term interest of stability in the region. The US has backed Indian accusation that Pakistan supports militancy in Indian occupied Kashmir. The US public statements have generated a backlash of terrorist activities, while destabilizing the South Asian region, bringing India and Pakistan to the verge of war. Attack on Srinagar Assembly in September 2001, Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001, the Bangalore incident in 2005, bombings in Mumbai in 2008 continued to disrupt Indo-Pakistan bilateral trust with the impending threat of war. Indo-Pakistan bilateral relations have remained hostage to the activities of multifarious terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Kashmir.\textsuperscript{497}

The US conventional military assistance has deprived Pakistan of the much needed counter insurgency weaponry, while conventional arms transfers have let loose a spiral of arms race in the region. Interestingly, the Pakistani perspective has complained about the US lack of counter insurgency military transfers on the equipment promised.\textsuperscript{498} The

\textsuperscript{496} Op, cit, 75.
\textsuperscript{497} The terrorist ‘safe havens’ were nurtured by the US to support the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union in 1980s. Terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Kashmir acquire a dynamic of their own, threatening Pakistan’s survival and integrity. The remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda scatter into the mountain retreats of Afghanistan and Pakistan over the frontier to launch activities. The terrorist hideouts in Pakistan’s western tribal border provide an efficient resort to the Taliban seeking to evade American pressure. Nor could skirmishes between Pakistani border troops and Americans be avoided.
\textsuperscript{498} In 2007, the US Special Operations Command started a training program for Pakistan’s Frontier Corps and Special Services Group including law enforcement agencies. In 2009, in the operation against Swat insurgents, the US provided intelligence sharing, UAV counterinsurgency surveillance assistance and gunship helicopters’ spare parts. Assistance under Foreign Military Funds includes updated kits for F-16 A/B combat aircraft, M-109 self-propelled howitzers, F-16C/D Block 52 combat aircraft, F-16 armaments, including AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, HARPOON anti-ship missiles, Sidewinder air to air missiles, and Six Phalanx Close-In Weapons System naval guns. Items transferred include F-16 A/B combat aircraft, T-37 military trainer jets.\textsuperscript{499} The US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, launched in April 2006, sought to broaden the US-Pakistan multifaceted cooperation.\textsuperscript{499} Defence Consultative Group (DCG) has sought to coordinate policies and expand cooperation on defense and security issues. The Security Assistance Working Group (SAWG) provides a forum for defense sales and military repairs, while the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) provides a policy coordination mechanism. Under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) program, Pakistan has claimed monetary reimbursements for such activities as maritime patrols and interdiction, combat air-patrol reconnaissance, airlift and air traffic control, US army operations in FATA, and management requirements at the Pakistan Joint Staff Headquarters.\textsuperscript{498} CSFs have been
US officials have complained about Pakistani military establishment’s insistence for conventional weaponry.\(^{499}\)

Islamabad believes the US tends to relent to Indian pressure in making arms supplies to Pakistan. The Obama administration has deviated from the promise of supplying helicopters for counter insurgency in the tribal belt of Pakistan.\(^{500}\) To support counter insurgency, Pakistan has needed to enhance air mobility through gunship helicopters like Apache, Cargo Black Hawk and Huey. Ironically, only eight second hand, MI-17 transport helicopters have been provided by the US so far. Indian pressure has restricted the US to deliver helicopters for counter insurgency for the fear that these might be used in Kashmir. The US conventional arms transfers to Pakistan have compounded Indian fears. The Indian perspective complained that the US granted 9.4 times more arms and 9.9 times more military aid to Pakistan compared to India in the period from 1950 to 1990s.

The US supplied F-16s have exhibited the US tactical level interest in Pakistan. F-16s reportedly loose map-reading capability across the border in India — a manifestation of US de-hyphenating policy towards India and Pakistan.\(^{501}\) For Pakistan, F-16s have failed to pay the necessary dividends in putting up a resolute defence against India. The huge costs have diverted monetary funds from the much needed domestic reforms.\(^{502}\)

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\(^{500}\) Pakistan’s ambassador to the US during Zardari era Hussain Haqqani disclosed that of the 22 Apache helicopters promised, only 8 had been delivered to Pakistan. See Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of the Global Jihad*, (Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 138.

\(^{501}\) A military officer on condition of anonymity revealed that Pakistani F-16s lost certain key capabilities across the international border with India.

The US has exploited Pakistan’s preference for high quality military equipment transfers than the one available from China.

The Pakistani perspective has accused India of internal security and instability. The Indian policy is in line with New Delhi’s larger security interests on Kashmir. Indian implicit design has sought to raise the cost for Pakistan’s prolonged obsession with Kashmir. Shashi Kapoor’s analysis has reflected on the Indian strategic mindset: ‘cost of the prolonged obsession with Kashmir becomes unsustainable for a Pakistan mired in severe internal problems of security.’ Resultantly, for policy makers in Islamabad, saving Pakistan takes more urgency compared to winning Kashmir. Indian policy has framed on unsettling Indo-Pakistan deterrence stability, induced in the wake of Pakistan’s ‘tit for tat’ response to India’s nuclearization in late 1990s. In the regional power equation, as ‘ultimate weapon of the weak against the strong,’ nuclear weapons are the guarantors of Pakistan’s ‘existential deterrence’ against Indian belligerence. Inducing the stability–instability paradox, nuclearization in South Asia induced the belligerent parties’ stakes in low intensity conflict. Ironically, at the same time, it has clipped external powers intervention to find convergence in stability more than resolution of Indo-Pakistan conflicts.

The Pakistani perspective has accused India of reversing the benefits of nuclearization for Islamabad. Engineered at the lower spectrum of a four dimensional front—military, economic, political and soft power, instability has made survival more instant than the less probable option of winning Kashmir. Cohen has remarked that with Pakistan’s integrity failing, India will not grant concessions to Islamabad. New Delhi would give an extra push to hasten the process. A US backed India has found less compulsion to normalize with Pakistan than was the case earlier. During the Cold War, the US preferred Indo-Pakistan normalization as long as it served to enlist South Asia against the Soviets. Russia and China were disinterested to promote normalization either during

503 Ibid., 44.
505 Abdul Moheed Pirzada, Research Analysts, ARY News Programme, opinion expressed in the programme telecast on December 28, 2014.
the Cold War. Sino-Russian policy has found convergence of interest in selling weapons to South Asian belligerents, regardless of the impact upon regional stability.

Sino-US strategic balancing of interests in South Asia has exacerbated Pakistan’s rivalry with India. China’s projection of Pakistan as a frontline state against India has aimed to counter both the Indo-US strategic partnership and hegemony in South Asia. However, Sino-US strategic balancing of interests has imbalanced the Indo-Pakistan conventional and nuclear balance in the region. Exacerbating India-Pakistan rivalry, it has stirred a spiral of arms race in South Asia, inducing conventional defence and nuclear missiles’ arms production. Despite China’s strategic and defence supplies to Pakistan, Islamabad’s existing conventional imbalance has favoured India. The resultant security dilemma has reduced the nuclear threshold for South Asian nuclear belligerents. It has lead to the increase in number as well as development of low yield tactical nuclear weapons.

Thus Sino-US competition has complicated South Asian security by enhancing India-Pakistan strategic rivalry. Sino-US strategic and political balancing in South Asia has induced strict alignment trends of the US strategic partnership with India and Pakistan informal alignment with China. To counter Chinese expansionist designs in South Asia, Indo-US strategic partnership has worsened Pakistan’s security by increasing Indian preponderance in the region. Sino-US competitive interests have exacerbated rather than eliminated Pakistan’s insecurity syndrome. Increasing Indo-Pakistan bilateral suspicions and inter-state hostilities, it has induced a spiral of arms race in South Asia. Reducing the nuclear threshold, it has increased the prospects of Indo-Pakistan nuclear brinkmanship. Within this context, the next chapter will discuss Sino-US competitive balancing in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan’s security vis. a` vis. Afghanistan.
CHAPTER 9
SINO-US COMPETITION POST 9/11: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN’S SECURITY VIS A VIS AFGHANISTAN

Right choices strengthen world peace, while wrong choices destroy it. The world stands at crossroads; it’s an integrated and interdependent world. Right choices should be made at the right time to achieve medium and long term stability.¹ Sartaj Aziz, Adviser to PM on Foreign Affairs

This chapter explores the implications of Sino-US competition and their engagement in Afghanistan post 9/11 for Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan. It argues that Sino-US convergence and divergence of interests in Afghanistan had implications for Pakistan’s regional security especially concerning Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. During the post 9/11 era, Chinese and US interests converged at a broad level to maintain stability in Afghanistan. In practice, however, Sino-US security interests have diverged at all three strategic, political, and economic levels. At the strategic level, stability carved on building American military bases in and around Afghan periphery has brought the US to the doorstep of China. At the political level, the US support for a stronger Indian role in Afghanistan conflicted with Chinese desire to dominate the region. At the economic level, Sino-US corporate level interests have clashed on competing claims for exploitation of mineral wealth and natural resources of Afghanistan. This competition also had implications for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

This chapter is divided in the following three sections: 1) Sino-US Security Interests in Afghanistan post 9/11; 2) Sino-US Competition in Afghanistan; and 3) Implications for Pakistan’s Security vis. a` vis. Afghanistan.

Sino-US interplay of power competition holds implications for Pakistan’s security resulting in adverse Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. The US and Chinese involvement has resulted in foreign intervention, causing resentment and the rise in militancy in Afghanistan. Moreover, terrorism and militancy across the western border has implications for Pakistan’s security, foiling prospects of peace in the region. At the

¹ Advisor to Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, speaking at a two days Seminar in NDU, “Partners in Peace and Development: Regional Stability & Lesson Learned in Regional Peace Building,” on October 22, 2014, Islamabad.
political front, Sino-US has sought to maintain hegemony in South Asia based on convergence of interests with their proxy collaborators. Mutual suspicions have paved the way for reciprocal proxy involvement in the region. Cross border terrorist attacks increased in South Asia post 9/11. China has resented Indo-US collaboration in Afghanistan for regional hegemony. China’s strategic, political and economic interests have required Pakistan’s frontline role to dilute Indian hegemony in Southwest Asia. Consequently, Afghanistan has blamed Pakistan for supporting the ‘Afghan Taliban’ and attacking the Indian consulates in Afghanistan. On the contrary, Pakistan has alleged that CIA-Raw and Mossad have assisted Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for launching terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda and Taliban, in turn, have launched terrorist attacks against Pakistani security establishment for rendering assistance to Nato/CIA intervention in Afghanistan.

Sino-US divergence of economic interests has implications for regional interconnectivity and economic collaboration. A downturn in Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan has dampened prospects for the implementation of Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement. Regional and extra-regional proxy involvement has foiled speedy implementation of CPEC, fuelling sub-nationalist to demand for secession and independence of Balochistan.

9.1 **Sino- US Security Interests in Afghanistan Post 9/11**

This section discusses the nature of Sino-US involvement in Afghanistan post 9/11. It argues that the pretext of countering radical Islam allowed the US to maintain strategic presence in Afghanistan. The US military presence in and around Afghanistan in turn allowed China to keep a security tab on the evolving situation in China’s periphery. Competing Sino-US security interests motivated their competition in Afghanistan post 9/11.

Afghanistan has historically proved to be the graveyard of external powers’ competing interests. This fact speaks volumes about the geo-strategic importance of contending rival claims in the Southwest Asian region. Divisions among various stakeholders along horizontal and vertical lines have foiled the prospects of enduring peace in Afghanistan. However, emerging trends in global strategic environment marked by the interplay of great power politics manifested in Sino-US competing interests has made Afghanistan the geopolitical landmass of the ‘new great game’ in Southwest, Central Asia and
beyond. The policies of the US, China and Russia hold far reaching consequences for Afghanistan’s security. At the regional front, near and extended neighbors, i.e., Iran, Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia are the major stakeholders in Afghan security. The prospects in Afghanistan depend on how various contending players — global and regional make mutual adjustments in Afghan stability.

Historically speaking, Afghanistan has stood at the crossroads of East-West and North-South divide, with major powers and regional contenders poised to invest and make fortunes from the country’s vast expense of mineral wealth and natural resources. The state’s significant geo-strategic location includes Russia to its north with vast stretch of Central Asia caught in between. Afghanistan’s southern border stands adjacent to Iran, connecting Afghanistan by an extensive rail and road network, to Herat and Chabhar in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. To Afghanistan’s north east, the 16 kms wide Wakhan corridor joins the Sino-Afghanistan land border (210 kms long), linking the Badakhshon province in Afghanistan to China’s Xinjiang. Further east, across the Durand Line, the Khyber Pass serves as the historic gateway to Central Asia, inter-connecting Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent. Ironically, over the years, hordes after hordes of barbaric invasions, a trend that continues so far, ravaged the internal stability and institutional development of Afghanistan.

In December 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan, violating the British great power informal legacy — to keep Afghanistan as a buffer between British India and Czarist Russia. The ten years US-supported Afghan resistance resulted eventually in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan with the signing of Geneva Accords in 1989. A power vacuum ensued, which invited local warlords, sponsored by their extra-regional supporters, in a civil war to establish control at the center in Afghanistan. Abdus Sattar has contended that failing to seek ascendance, the competing interests of divergent players failed to grant political stability to Afghanistan, except for a brief period when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001.² Afghan peripheral areas towards the north and south remained a battle ground among competing ethnic claimants, i.e. Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks against the larger in size ethnic Pashtuns or the Taliban.

The US Global War on Terror (GWOT) against Al-Qaeda in 2001 aimed to foster stability in Afghanistan. The US policy of global forward defense sought to curb the threat emanating from radical Islam. On August 7, 1998, the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were hit by Al-Qaeda operatives killing 224 people including 12 Americans and injuring 5000 others in retaliation to US troops’ deployment in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Yet the US Afghan invasion further dimmed the prospect of political stability in Afghanistan. On the contrary, scholars such as Patrick Martin have argued that the US corporate interest in Central Asian oil reserves, blocked by recalcitrant Taliban, led to American military action in Afghanistan during September 2001. As long ago as 1991, the US companies mainly UNOCAL had acquired 75 percent of the Caspian Sea and Central Asian oil reserves, hailing it as a potential substitute for oil from the Persian Gulf. However, a major problem pertained to transportation across the landlocked region to world markets either through Russian pipeline or route across Iran to the Persian Gulf. However, prospects for the move were impaired because of the US hostile relations with the Taliban and Iran.

Jean Charles Brisard has argued that the Pentagon and White House had planned the intervention in Afghanistan much earlier before the terrorist acts provided the legitimate pretext for action. Brisard held that Taliban were offered to grant international recognition in return for facilitation of support for oil pipeline via Kazakhstan. Brisard argued further that despite sponsoring terrorism, the Bush administration would willingly grant legitimacy, in case of Taliban cooperation with the US for developing


5 Alternative pipeline routes towards the west include Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to the Mediterranean; east through Kazakhstan and China to the Pacific; and south from Turkmenistan across western Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.

Central Asian oil reserves. Patrick Martin argued that in July 2001 US-Taliban talks broke off and in September 2001 right after two months, the US began ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. The US Special Forces were trained for action in mountainous Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and northern Afghanistan in a joint operation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Brisard concluded that Al-Qaeda, in a way, provided legitimacy to the US plan in Afghanistan. The US action in Afghanistan had implications for China’s security interests in the region.

China has termed the US intervention in Afghanistan as counter-productive to Chinese long term security interests. According to China, the US intervention post 9/11 has destabilized the Southwest Asian region, leading to a military backlash and generation of support for the Taliban. Within this context, China abstained from joining US-Nato coalition in Afghanistan. Beijing’s low profile paid well in furnishing impression of neutrality in the region. China distanced itself from the Northern Distribution Network, as it declined US/Nato request for logistical supplies’ through its western frontier adjacent to Wakhan corridor. Indian research analyst Melkulangara Bhadrakumar argued that China even came close to granting recognition to the Taliban prior to the 9/11 interlude. Two key objectives have guided the Chinese strategy of keeping a safe distance in Afghanistan: Beijing’s traditional orientation preventing direct confrontation; China sought to prevent the US from establishing a foot-print in Xinjiang. Sino-US security interests have converged on maintenance of stability in Afghanistan.

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7 Ibid., 12.
9 Op, cit. The US willingly turned down investigation of Islamic terrorism as long as the possibility of Taliban acquiescence of the proposed pipeline remained. The US reluctance to investigate led to Deputy Director FBI, John O’Neill’s resignation in protest in July 2001. A new position was offered to him as the security chief of the World Trade Center after leaving the FBI. Ironically, John O’Neill got killed in September 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre.
As a neo-structural drive, Sino-US commonality of interests has converged on counter-terrorism and maintenance of stability in Afghanistan. Sino-US divergence of interests has pertained to offense-defense realist balancing in Southwest and Central Asia adjacent to the strategic chessboard of Afghanistan. Beijing has regarded Al-Qaeda and Taliban linkage to East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang as the greatest threat to its territorial integrity and stability. It has regarded the threat of radical Islamism in Southwest and Central Asia as counter-productive to stability in Xinjiang. Political and strategic developments in Afghanistan post 9/11 have constituted a direct concern for the Chinese security interests in the region. China, however, has regarded the Taliban role as critical for the final settlement of Afghanistan post 2014. Yet, simultaneously, China is not supportive of a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.

American strategic presence in Afghanistan is indicative of the US desire for maintaining bases in Southwest and Central Asia. Operation Enduring Freedom under the US/Nato coalition ousted the Taliban from control in Afghanistan. In 2002, the UN sponsored Bonn Agreement installed the Kabul interim set-up dominated by Northern Alliance. Following completion of Karzai government’s tenure, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah’s unity government was formed in 2013 under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan Security Force (ASF). Staggering financial cost, high casualties and death toll forced the Obama administration to announce forces withdrawal from Afghanistan. Accordingly, the year 2014 officially marked the end of US/Nato coalition mission in Afghanistan. The US policy aimed at drawdown rather than a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The Bilateral Security Assistance Agreement (BSA) Signed in May 2014 with the new Afghan set-up provides for realization of the US security concerns in the region. The BSA ensures the US maintenance of residual force through partial withdrawal supported by high-tech military operative from the Arabian Sea. The US security policy

11 US and China jointly mentor Afghan diplomatic services’ capacity building in Afghanistan.
12 Obama’s first term in office saw a deviation from the earlier promise of withdrawal from Afghanistan in the Af-Pak strategy, a brain child of the security laden conception of National Security Council in 2009. In order to curb growing violence, insurgency and terrorist attacks against US/Nato forces and the Afghanistan government, the president sought to supplement Counter Terrorism mission (CT) with Counter Insurgency (CI) by increasing the number of US combat forces to an additional 30,000 in Afghanistan.
interests have aimed at prevention of international terrorism and countering the safe-havens of Al-Qaeda.\(^\text{13}\) The US military bases now in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and formerly in Uzbekistan have served to check Sino-Russian geo-strategic ambitions in the region. Within the context of US-China relations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) holds a key role in Afghan security. With the US military bases adjacent to Xinjiang in Central Asia, Beijing has sought to keep a low profile in order to avoid challenging the US position in Afghanistan. The BSA, residual American bases and force deployment in Afghanistan has, however, influenced China greatly. Beijing has termed the US long term presence in the Southwest and Central Asian region as interference in China’s backyard. China has projected SCO as a counterweight to the US in the region. A brief history of SCO’s role is essential here to furnish clarity about US-China divergence of interests regarding SCO.

In 1996, China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan created SCO’s predecessor Shanghai Five to tackle with the problem of border security in the backdrop of Taliban take over in Afghanistan.\(^\text{14}\) Through collaboration in border security issues, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or SCO, established in 2001, aimed to tackle three evils of terrorism, extremism and separatism in Central Asia and beyond. Within Afghanistan, the SCO favored Tajik, Uzbek and other ethnic representation against the Taliban. Following the US/Nato intervention in 2001, SCO released a communiqué opposing the Taliban, while it extended support to the Afghan Interim Government. The SCO’s joint communiqué in November 2002 opposed ‘external forces involvement, be it specific countries or organizations, jeopardizing regional security.’\(^\text{15}\) While adhering to the principle of Afghan sovereignty, the SCO communiqué proposed neutrality, limitation of outside intervention while recommending a leading role for the

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UN in rebuilding of Afghanistan. The SCO communiqué implied opposition to foreign intervention in Afghanistan.

The SCO has emphasized that rule in Afghanistan be exercised with the approval of legitimate authorities in Afghanistan, restricting the US/Nato involvement to UN mandate alone. Enhancing interaction with Afghanistan interim set-up, it established the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group in 2004, with a liaison group consisting of SCO secretariat in Afghanistan. In October 2008, the member states resolved to enhance the role of SCO in Afghan security. The SCO has supported the UN sponsored 6+2 formula in Afghanistan. The UN acknowledges the prime responsibility of Afghanistan neighbors, i.e., China, Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Russia along with the US in maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan.

For both the US and China, stability in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to security in Central Asia. Accordingly, Li Lifan & Rafaelleo have argued that following the US/Nato withdrawal post 2014, China has envisioned a larger, more active role for SCO in the future of Afghanistan. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in 2011 emphasized SCO along with other international organizations’ role in Afghan security architecture. The SCO has emphasized on a conflict free Afghanistan. The 10th declaration of the SCO’s Astana Declaration stipulated ‘independent, neutral, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan.’ China has believed that SCO’s geographical proximity, trade and ethnic spill over has called for a superior natural role in Afghan internal security. SCO states have been the most important trading and investment partners in Afghanistan. It has wanted Afghanistan to be stable without US/Nato military and political interference. The US ex-ambassador to Pakistan H. E. Richard G. Olson, while speaking in a seminar termed US military pull-out as drawdown rather than

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16 In March 2009, a special conference on Afghanistan was convened by SCO in Moscow that included the participation of the US and the western powers.
withdrawal. The US has termed retention of military bases as serving the interest of stability in Afghanistan. China has, however, sought indigenous Afghan solution rather than the one proposed by Nato/ISAF in Afghanistan. Dr. Qian Xuemei, a Chinese research scholar, in an interview with the author argued that:

China regards the US/Nato involvement as interference in Afghan internal matters and violation of the international law. The absence of mutual trust has led to external actors’ involvement, whose conflicting goals have remained inconsistent with various groups’ interests in Afghanistan.

Sino-US interplay of power politics is a critical factor to determine prospects of stability and peace in Afghanistan. Sino-US competitive dynamics have impacted on the internal security dynamics of Afghanistan. Geo-strategic and economic factors have shaped orchestration of the US policy of Operation Enduring Freedom, bringing in the US to the doorstep of China. However, both the US and Chinese interests have converged on counter-terrorism and maintenance of stability in Afghanistan. The US military presence in Afghanistan, nevertheless, alarmed regional and extra-regional stakeholders which, in turn, had adverse consequences for Afghanistan’s stability and Sino-US relations.

9.2 Sino- US Competition in Afghanistan Post 9/11

This section explores the nature of Sino-US conflict and cooperation in Afghanistan. It argues that Sino-US engagement in Afghanistan has portrayed both conflict and cooperation at all three strategic, political and economic levels. The US national security interests have guided the US engagement in Afghanistan. At the strategic level, the US military bases in and around Afghanistan have alarmed China. At the political level, Sino-US consensus on bilateral cooperation has framed on anti-terrorism, stability, good governance, institutional and infrastructure development. At the

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20 H. E. Richard G. Olson, US Ambassador to Pakistan, during a speech at the International Conference at the National University of Modern Languages, NUML, Islamabad, on March 6th, 2013.
22 Ibid.
economic level, Sino-US corporate interests have clashed on exploitation of mineral wealth and Afghan economic resources.

The US strategic encirclement along China’s periphery has alarmed Beijing. Dr Xiao Jianming, research fellow at Institute of Dianchi Cooperation for Opening Asia has observed that the US wanted to create a new state alongside northern Pakistan.\(^{23}\) China has kept a close eye on events happening in Afghanistan and the region. Jianming opined that the US desire, however, would remain an elusive dream as in the aftermath of the US withdrawal, Pakistan’s frontline role would begin post-2014. He implied that China knew how to defend itself along its periphery, as it planned to extend open-handed support to Pakistan.\(^{24}\) Sino-US has recognized the Taliban as a real political force in Afghanistan after 2014. China, however, has remained skeptical of various splinter groups within the Taliban, with diverse regional affiliations. China’s policy approach, therefore, in Afghanistan has remained sensitive to security sensibilities of all forms of proxy involvements in Afghanistan. Hence China’s diplomacy has shown marks of a tiptoe approach, signifying the maintenance of a low profile since the past decade in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

Neo-structural paradigm explains’ well China’s policy towards Afghanistan post 9/11. On the one hand, China’s Afghan policy was principally dictated by exogenous compulsions—the threat of instability in Xinjiang. On the other hand, insurmountable significance hinged on the indigenous compulsions of China’s national development strategy. Power and maximization of security for Beijing has served both as a means and an end to China’s survival. Integral to Beijing’s 25 years’ grand vision of strategic opportunity, China has envisioned the success of western development strategy as elementary to the realization of Beijing’s objective of national development. China’s One Belt and One Road Initiative (BRI) or the Silk Road Economic Belt, along the old historic Silk route makes stability in Afghanistan imperative for China’s revival. Beijing remains cognizant that stability in Afghan constitutes the missing link in the success of ‘Silk Road Economic Belt strategy.’

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\(^{24}\) Ibid.
China’s pragmatic regional engagement has built on the luminary significance of the vision of its grand strategy. Keeping a low profile, China has kept a close tab on the geo-political and strategic developments in Afghanistan. Endorsing the post Bonn process establishing the Karzai set-up in 2002, China built a strategic and cooperative partnership with the Afghan government. China granted a $50 million aid in assistance to Afghanistan. In 2006, China subtly upgraded the level of assistance, signing the Afghan-China bilateral relations framework known as Treaty of Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation. China has arranged for state-level high official meetings with Afghanistan while maintaining official contacts at the ministerial and state levels.

In September 2013, China sent a top security delegation to Afghanistan — the first in 46 years to provide assistance for training Afghan law enforcement agencies. In June 2013, Afghan president Hamid Karzai visited Beijing, which was reciprocated the same year by China’s Security Chief and Chinese Communist Party member Zhou Yongkang. China has shown interest in the funding and training of Afghan police, which was trained hence forth by Nato/US alliance to combat terrorism in the region. President Xi Jinping met with Karzai many times while participating in several bilateral and multilateral forums to promote peace and regional stability in Afghanistan. China and Afghanistan have maintained interaction through multilateral platforms such as SCO. Chinese researcher Zhao Hua sheng in CSIS has observed that China’s broader strategic objectives have included development of the Afghan economy, better governance, political reconciliation and stability. Terrorism, extremism, separatism, drug trafficking and organized crime have constituted prime areas of China’s security concerns in Afghanistan.

Chinese long term security interests in Afghanistan have included containment of religious extremism, limiting the role of extra-regional powers in promoting instability

26 Ibid.
in Tibet and Xinjiang. Security and economy have constituted two prime pillars of Afghan-China bilateral interaction.\textsuperscript{28} Beijing has sought to defend its investment in Central Asian resources of wealth, strengthening security for China’s growing workforce through extensive engagement. It implied that China’s desire to restructure Afghan economy has reflected a strong corporate interest in the mineral wealth of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{29} China’s relatively neutral status has helped Beijing win big investments in Afghanistan. China’s Metallurgical Group (CMG) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has provided $4 billion dollars investment over five years.\textsuperscript{30}

In 2007, China undertook $3.5 billion investment in Afghanistan’s Aynak province — the largest deal in Afghan history. Aynak deposits remain China’s biggest foreign investment project in Afghanistan. The country’s extensive lithium deposits are another major source of attraction for China. To boost Sino-Afghan bilateral trade, China has granted tariff-free treatment on 278 commodities.\textsuperscript{31} To make material gains in Afghanistan, H. E. Sun Weidong, Ambassador People’s Republic of China, while speaking at ‘Islamabad Trilateral Dialogue: China-Afghanistan-Pakistan,’ remarked that to promote stability and peace, China’s official policy has proposed an ‘Afghan led and Afghan owned peace process that remained inclusive of the Taliban.’\textsuperscript{32} This implied that the Chinese approach remained cognizant of hard core realities in Afghanistan.

Generally in line with the international community, yet focused on a tiptoe realization of its key strategic objectives, China’s Afghan policy has avoided creating major disruptions on the global strategic landscape. While supportive of international efforts to stabilize the Afghan set-up, China has realized the high stakes involved in Afghan intervention exciting the Taliban in counter offensive in Xinjiang. China’s principled stance of non-interference has declined active military involvement for the fear of

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} China aims to build roads, exploit coal mines, construct a 400 megawatt coal-fired power plant and 1 million ton steel works in Afghanistan. China has expressed interest in infrastructure, agriculture, resources, energy development projects and construction of hydro power plants in Afghanistan.
\textsuperscript{31} China exports value added electronic and industrial items in return for raw material from Afghanistan.
\textsuperscript{32} H. E. Sun Weidong, Ambassador People’s Republic of China, speaking at “Islamabad Trilateral Dialogue: China-Afghanistan-Pakistan,” organized by Pak-China Institute on October 19\textsuperscript{th} -20\textsuperscript{th}, 2014, Islamabad.
arousing western apprehensions about Beijing’s role in Afghanistan. Director Institute of South & Southeast Asian & Oceanic Studies, CICIR, Hu Shisheng opined in an interview with the author that ‘China has restricted its role to capacity building and training of Afghan police and law enforcement agencies in Afghanistan. China has appeared to be in no haste to fill up the vacuum created in the wake of western troops’ withdrawal post 2014.’³³ Shisheng stated that ‘stability in China’s immediate periphery is a prerequisite for the success of the state’s global strategy. China, therefore, plans to develop a long term relationship with Afghanistan based on an overall cooperative partner relationship.’³⁴ Within this context, China has initiated the ‘China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Trilateral Dialogue on Regional Security’ building hopes on its eventual success.

China remains realistic of the difficulties entailed in the process on account of regional and extra-regional involvement in Afghanistan. The success of the Afghan process post 2014 hinges on the government’s performance in Afghanistan and its ability to accommodate Afghan tribal diversity.³⁵ Two options are there for the Taliban: Either to establish hold over the entire country or shun militancy to return legally as an equivalent political partner in the balance of power in Afghanistan. China has faced the worst security challenge in Afghanistan. The ‘structured or engineered’ fallout of terrorism and insecurity has been directly linked to instability in Xinjiang. The exogenous factor has a direct link to indogenous factor meaning that instability in neighboring Afghanistan has made China directly vulnerable in Xinjiang.

China has actively engaged in Afghan peace-making and peace building initiative referred to as the ‘Quadrilateral dialogue.’ In December, 2014, the representatives from the US, China and Afghanistan met in London, to seek ways to forge peace in Afghanistan. Earlier, the Afghan Taliban paid a visit to Beijing. In November 2014, the three countries met in the United Arab Emirates following the Taliban visit. The move is cited as China’s readiness to take initiative in Afghan peace process — a significant

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³³ Interview conducted by the author with Hu Shisheng, Director, Institute of South & Southeast Asian & Oceanic Studies, CICIR, Beijing, China.
³⁴ Ibid.
³⁵ The Kabul process entails first China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Dialogue held in Beijing in 2012; the second trilateral dialogue was held in September 2014 in Islamabad, and the third one was held in July 2015 in Afghanistan.
policy shift as per the 2012 understanding with Xi Jinping and Obama. Western scholar Jeremy Page has argued that the move recalibrated Central Asia’s geopolitics and tested China’s capacity as a regional leader.\textsuperscript{36} China has sought huge dividends in the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan-China bilateral trade has increased and China has remained the second largest export destination of Afghanistan’s raw materials. China-Afghanistan Strategic and Cooperative Partnership has envisioned the China-Afghanistan economic relations and trade, and China-Afghanistan Business Forum to expand investment and economic cooperation.\textsuperscript{37} China has agreed to grant 500 million RMB Yuan to the Afghan government for 2014. China plans to grant 1.5 billion Yuan to the Afghan government from 2015-2017. The agreement on economic and technical cooperation extends China’s support for capacity building and training of 3000 Afghan professionals in various fields. China and Afghanistan have agreed to enhance multilateral and multi-institutional participation framework to keep coordination on major international and regional issues. Afghanistan remains integral to China’s Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative.

Afghanistan has expressed willingness to work with China to re-establish the traditional and historical transit route to promote mutually beneficial cooperation based on regional connectivity. In the strategic domain, China-Afghanistan strategic and cooperative partnership has envisioned resolve to resist all forms of terrorisms to strengthen bilateral cooperation.\textsuperscript{38} The US scholar on Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad argued that Afghanistan needed to ascertain that its growing ties with China were not at the expense of relations with the West. Zalmay argued further that the US must avoid


the temptation to leave Afghanistan and grant greater regional influence to China.\textsuperscript{39} China has Afghanistan’s support to combat East Turkistan Islamic Movement, while Kabul has pledged to provide security for Chinese interests in Afghanistan.

The success of Chinese vision of national revival has manifested in the peace and stability of Afghanistan. The success of Chinese vision of national revival has manifested in the peace and stability of Afghanistan. China-Afghanistan strategic and cooperative partnership has envisioned greater collaboration in the field of intelligence, border security and law enforcement, strengthening cooperation to combat non-traditional security threats.\textsuperscript{40} China has sought to promote political reconciliation, socio-economic development and reconstruction by providing financial support for Afghan development. Hu Shisheng argued that China acknowledged Afghanistan’s key role for promotion of regional stability in Xinjiang and the success of energy supply routes through Pakistan.\textsuperscript{41}

The imperative of complex interdependence has explained the US encouragement of Chinese role for maintaining stability in Afghanistan. The US has encouraged China’s greater participation in the peace initiative in ‘China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Trilateral Dialogue,’ established in 2012, building hopes on Beijing’s relationship with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{42} However, China appears resilient to submit to the US dominance in the region. Simultaneously, China has remained wary of Afghan instability aggravating even more in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan post 2014. However, China appears persistent to ‘win without fighting,’ expanding influence as it pursues \textit{wei qei}. Dismissive of the US monopolistic approach, Beijing has called for the establishment of a multi-polar cooperation system, inclusive of external participation in Central Asia and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{43} In a subtle expansion of influence over the past


\textsuperscript{40} Op. cit.

\textsuperscript{41} Interview conducted by the scribe with Hu Shisheng, Director, \textit{Institute of South & Southeast Asian & Oceanic Studies}, CICIR, Beijing, China.

\textsuperscript{42} China played a role in international peace initiative that included 6+2 including Afghanistan neighbors, Russia and the US under the UN framework, the international conference on Afghanistan in London in 2006, the conference in Paris in 2008, the Hague conference in 2009, and the conference in London, Istanbul and Afghanistan in 2010.

\textsuperscript{43} Winning the oil and gas exploitation project in Sari Pul and Faryab, China’s investment in Afghanistan reaches $10 billion.
decade, China has enlarged trade and economic ties with the Central Asian states in Afghanistan’s resource rich neighborhood. Jeremy Page argued that in the US-China strategic and economic dialogue initiated in 2012, China has showed willingness to work with the US in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{44} China and Afghanistan have agreed to collaborate at the regional level for Afghan development.

China has taken on the responsibility of promoting reconciliation in Afghanistan. China has played an important leading role in Heart of Asia/Istanbul process to promote Afghan reconciliation.\textsuperscript{45} In October 2014, China invited Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai to Beijing to attend the fourth ministerial meeting of Heart of Asia/Istanbul process. China-Afghanistan Strategic and Cooperative Partnership has indicated Ashraf Ghani and Xi Jinping’s resolve to strengthen China-Afghanistan strategic partnership in 2014.\textsuperscript{46} China and Afghanistan have expressed mutual resolve not to allow respective territories to be ‘used for any activities targeted against the other.’\textsuperscript{47} China expressed support for the Afghan led and Afghan owned reconciliation process. China has welcomed Afghanistan’s participation in the SCO.\textsuperscript{48} The US has encouraged China’s engagement in Central Asia and Afghanistan post 2014, while paying lip service to SCO greater role in the region. Afghanistan has emerged as a significant player in Sino-US bilateral relations.

The year 2014 has marked the end of western policies and strategies in Afghanistan. The continuity of Afghan political set-up and the revival of Afghan economy have guided the US Afghan strategy post 2014. Although regional and extra regional interests may not allow Chinese intervention in the security architecture of Afghanistan, yet China has sought to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation for enhancing


\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
Afghan security. However, political and economic dividends have required China’s tiptoe involvement in Afghanistan. China has wanted to emerge politically stable in Xinjiang seeking to maintain sustainable economic growth through implementation of its vision of regional integration. Dr. Qian Xuemei, Assistant Professor at the Peking University, argued that China’s creative involvement in Afghanistan required more assertive role.\footnote{Responsible foreign policy entails responsible international behavior to ensure continuity of the existing regime, and facilitate constructive reforms within the existing framework so as to maximize benefits. It also entails the responsibility of the Chinese government to protect its construction workers. Dr. Qian Xuemei, “Regional Perspectives From China,” Paper presented at International Seminar on “Regional Stability and Lesson Learned in Regional Peace Building,” organized by National Defence University, Islamabad, 22-23 October, 2014.} Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s choice of Beijing as his first destination threw light on China’s leading role in Afghan security.

China became the pioneer in launching the Istanbul process to settle Afghan instability and stabilize economy. The Istanbul process aimed to expand coordination between Afghanistan and other regional players to discuss issues of political and economic challenges and security.\footnote{The “Heart of Asia — Istanbul Process” initiative includes membership of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan.} SM Hali, a research columnist in Pakistan, argued that greater political consultation required implementation of greater confidence building measures identified as such in the Istanbul process.\footnote{S. M. Hali, “China Pumps Adrenalin into the Heart of Asia,” \textit{Daily Times}, Peshawar, November 04, 2014.} Attended by 30 nations’ delegates, the ‘Beijing Declaration’ issued after the fourth ministerial conference of the Istanbul process formally committed China’s greater role in Afghan stability and peace. Sino-US has shown convergence of interests to work for Afghan reconstruction and security.\footnote{China allocated a 500 million Renminbi grant to the Afghan government and pledged 1.5 billion Renminbi in aid to Afghanistan over the next three years and the assurance to help train 3,000 professionals in various fields in the next five years.} Chinese Premier Li Keqiang declared ‘China’s intent to take greater responsibility for regional security by promoting Afghan security and prosperity.\footnote{Beijing Declaration, “Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process: Deepening Cooperation for Sustainable Security and Prosperity of the Heart of Asia Region” October 31, 2014 Beijing, China, available at: http://www.heartofasia-istanbulprocess.af/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Beijing-Ministerial-Conference-Declaration-31Oct-2014, accessed December 24, 2014.}
exemption, granting assistance for reconstruction in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{54} Showing support for Afghan national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, China has asked for greater reconciliation.\textsuperscript{55} Limitation have marred China’s role in this. Dr. Qian Xuemei argued that China’s internal and external challenges have barred a greater involvement in promoting Afghan reconciliation.\textsuperscript{56} China’s involvement in Afghanistan has attracted criticism and suspicion of India.

Afghan President Abdul Ghani’s selection of China as his first official destination has thrown light on China’s importance in the contemporary geo-strategic environment. Sitting at the crossroads of Central Asia and South Asia, the development of Afghanistan’s communications and transportation networks could turn the country into a regional interchange. Afghanistan could enjoy unrestricted contact with international markets simultaneously gathering transit fees from the region’s profitable activity. The US has welcomed China’s initiative in the Istanbul process as a reflection of China’s greater role in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{57} Pakistan has welcomed Chinese involvement in rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{58} The Chinese endeavor has been reminiscent of Afghanistan’s multidimensional stature as a geo-strategic and geo-economic interconnect in the region. Russian resurgence and China’s growth of investment interests have made Beijing increasingly significant in Afghanistan. Pakistani research analyst Amir Mir commented that Pakistan, China and Russia have a convergence of interest in a stable Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{59} Vision of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul process has been built on Afghanistan’s unique location. Premier Li Keqiang, while speaking at the Fourth Ministerial Conference of Istanbul Process on Afghanistan,

\textsuperscript{54} The projects built by China include the Kabul Republic Hospital, Parwan Hydraulic Project Rehabilitation Work, the National Education Centre of Science and Technology and the complex of the Chinese Language Department of Kabul University. China has also trained more than 1,000 Afghan professionals in various fields.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56} Interview conducted by the author with Dr. Qian Xuemei at the International Seminar on “Regional Stability and Lesson Learned in Regional Peace Building,” organized by National Defence University, Islamabad on 22-23 October, 2014.


\textsuperscript{58} Sartaj Aziz, “Pakistan fully supports China’s contribution to Afghan peace process,” The News, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, November 1, 2014.

highlighted Afghanistan’s centrality along South, Central and West Asia on the ancient Silk Road.\textsuperscript{60}

State failure in Afghanistan will have a spillover of Islamic resurgence in Central Asia and Russian southern regions. Russia has made efforts for a Pakistan-China-Russia nexus to improve economic ties and stability in southern borders. Russian interest in Afghanistan has included prevention of Islamic extremism/terrorism, installation of friendly, non-Pushtoon and non-Taliban pro-Moscow regime in Afghanistan to checkmate the US presence. Russia has sought prevention of drugs, arms inflow, oil control, permeability of CARs borders for imports and exports. Russia has sought to curtail the US hegemonic ambitions in the region. Moscow has kept conditions unstable in Afghanistan to prevent CARs from developing transit facilities to the Arabian and the Black Sea.

Consonant to its increased interest as Beijing’s strategic backyard in Central Asia, Afghanistan has served as the strategic launching pad for the US. Pursuant with its national security strategy of global forward defense, the US has sought to develop a long term sustainable relationship with Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{61} In July 2011, Hillary Clinton outlined the vision for New Silk Road to connect Central Asia with Southwest Asia and further to the Southeast.\textsuperscript{62} The US vision in a vertical rather than a horizontal stretch bypasses China and Iran. The route originates from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and terminates in India, out-maneuvering Sino-Russian strategic and economic influence in the region. The US has sought to eclipse the role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the principal security organization in Central Asia and Southwest Asia. At a broader level, the US security interests in Afghanistan have included encirclement of China, checking of Russian and Iranian influence, prevention of Islamic extremism, access to oil resources of the Caspian basin, and the revival of


\textsuperscript{62} Central and Southwest Asia existed as a single geographical unit till Afghanistan’s designation as a buffer between imperial Britain and Tsarist Russia.
secular forces in the region. Afghanistan has served as the prime venue of great power competition in the region.

Afghanistan’s position begins to acquire strategic significance as geo-political competition has taken precedence over cooperation. In a way, the BSA has entrenched the US position in Afghanistan, putting it on the US strategic radar. The BSA has specified significant terms of engagement in maintaining regional presence and Afghan security. Holding a life span of 10 years starting from 2015 to 2024, the BSA has required the US be exempted from monetary payments and rewards for provision of all agreed facilities and areas in Afghanistan. Retention of US military bases has been projected to conduct counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Earlier, the Karzai government had delayed signing the deal, fearing tribal opposition on the US retention of nine bases in Afghanistan. Immunity granted to US soldiers and contractors and the right to conduct night raids caused resentment. President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah new set-up signed BSA just one day after assuming office, as per its ‘accession to the throne arrangement and commitment’ to legitimize the US military engagement post 2014. The Taliban described the agreement as ‘shameful and shocking,’ denouncing it as the US ‘sinister’ plot to control Afghanistan. The White House has clarified that the US did not want to maintain permanent military bases in Afghanistan. Charles Recknagel argued that US forces presence beyond 2014 would be at Afghan request. The US Ambassador to Afghanistan hailed BSA as Afghan choice

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Kabul has surrendered military bases and facilities in Bagram, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kabul, Herat, Kandhar, Shorab, Gardez, Jalalabad, and Shindabad including the areas, which the US is already using.
decided by the new leadership. The Afghan parliament approved the BSA in November 2014. The US defended BSA as marking American support for new Afghan set-up to supplement everlasting partnership for Afghan stability and counter terrorism.

The BSA allowed the US to maintain forces presence to preserve key strategic interests. The US has sought to train Afghan Security Forces (ASF) to have a stable Afghanistan. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani on signing the US Afghanistan Joint Statement stated that China and Russia need not to be threatened by the security pact. The Afghan-US pact does not allow for use or deployment of nuclear weapons in Afghanistan, and is essential for the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan. The Afghan President’s statement demonstrated the complex concerns of neighboring states on the US presence in the region. On the cessation of US/Nato-led combat mission, around 12,000 military personnel mostly Americans were to stay in Afghanistan after 2014.

US-Afghan cooperation envisions US-Afghan strategic partnership to foster close collaboration in defense and security arrangements to provide for greater stability in Afghanistan. It aims to develop capacity to help counter threats to Afghan sovereignty and territorial integrity. While prohibiting permanent US military bases, BSA has contrived to be an insignificant threat to Afghan neighbors. Simultaneously, it has pledged not to allow Afghan territory for launching attacks on other states.

68Ibid.
72Ibid.
73Ibid.
74Without targeting other states, the deal calls for maintenance of US military bases, financial and military training assistance for Afghan Security Forces (ASF), and law enforcement agencies.
military bases have led to regional states’ apprehensions, creating an impression of US hegemony to facilitate growth of economic, trade and political interests in the Southwest and Central Asia.

The BSA has allowed the US to monitor Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan, China and Russia. The US military presence in Afghanistan has appeared to be guided by the same rationale, which has designed the US larger policy interests in the re-balance or pivot to Asia. The News editorial on October 3, 2014 criticized the BSA as failing to win the Afghan war, legitimizing the US military presence to continue with the drone strikes for another ten years. The editorial commented that reduced number of US troops can neither win the war nor cut down losses in the region. In the US global strategic planning, the significance of the region had already been pointed out by Hillary Clinton in the ‘New Silk Road vision’ in 2011. Strategic interests have required that the US restrict China’s expansion of economic interest to thwart Beijing’s drive for modernization and regional expansion.

The US forces presence has been counter-productive to the US long term interest of stability in Afghanistan. Dr. Farooq Ghulam Azam, Chairman, Movement for Peaceful Transformation of Afghanistan has opined that ‘BSA would aggravate the Afghan war by granting the US the legal power to stay in the region for another ten years, exacerbating the fall out on Afghanistan, China and Pakistan.’ The Afghan scholar argued that the US wanted to control the destiny of Afghanistan and that it was half-hearted in Afghan reconciliation efforts. Research and defense analyst, Lt. General (retd) Dr Talat Masood, has argued that the US prime areas of focus have included the Far East, Southeast Asia, Middle East and Central Asia. Russian and Central Asian regional interests are of prime importance to the US. Leonid Gusev has observed that the US has sought to break Russian monopoly of control and Chinese expansionist

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design as a major stakeholder in Central Asian energy and oil distribution networks.  

Breaking Russian monopoly, the US has sought to establish a multilateral system in the Caspian Sea and Central Asian region for supplying oil and gas to Europe.

The US military presence post 2014 has worsened the security situation in Afghanistan. Sudha Ramachandaran has argued that in view of the transformation in regional security environment based on informal military rapprochement among Russia, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan, the Obama administration has decided to stay beyond 2014.  

The US military presence has promised Afghanistan’s neutrality in the US bid to redirect oil and energy reserves including strategic reserves of uranium ore. The US has shown resentment on the construction of the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, operational since 2009 via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Ironically, a newspaper report by Afghan reputed journalist Musa Khan Jalalzai, however, has reported that the security situation in Afghanistan post US withdrawal has deteriorated.  

As President Barack Obama allowed the US forces to continue operations in Afghanistan, reports indicated increased military presence than sanctioned earlier for 2015. Sino-US interests post 9/11 both converged and diverged in Afghanistan at the strategic, political and economic levels. At the political level, both the US and China aspired for stability and peace in Afghanistan. Yet at the strategic and economic levels, the US and Chinese interests exhibited competitive underpinnings in Afghanistan. Sino-US competitive involvement led to divergent goals, causing a backlash of resentment and militancy in the region.

9.3 Implications for Pakistan’s Security vis-à-vis Afghanistan

This section explores the implications of Sino-US security interests in Afghanistan for Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. It argues that Sino-US competing national security interests have eroded Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis Afghanistan due to three reasons. First, the US and Chinese involvement in Afghanistan increased foreign

intervention, leading to the rise in militancy in Afghanistan. Second, terrorism and militancy across Pakistan’s western border worsened Pakistan’s security due to ethnic and tribal affiliations, foiling prospects of peace and stability in the region. Third, China has resented the Indo-US collaboration in Afghanistan for regional hegemony, necessitating Pakistan’s reciprocal frontline role to dilute Indian hegemony in the Southwest Asian region. The Sino-US projection of their respective proxy collaborators for regional dominance has eroded the prospects of peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Sino-US mutual suspicions have paved the way for Indo-Pakistan proxy involvement in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, divergence of Sino-US economic interests has hampered inter-connectivity and South Asian regional economic collaboration. Cross border terrorists attacks have increased in South Asia post 9/11. Afghanistan has blamed Pakistan for the targeting of Indian consulates and for supporting the ‘Afghan Taliban’ in Afghanistan. On the contrary, Pakistan has indicted with tangible evidence that the CIA-Raw and Afghan intelligence have supported the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for launching attacks on civilian and security networks in Pakistan. Accordingly, the downturn in Pakistan-Afghanistan political and economic relations has lowered the prospects for implementation of Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement. Sino-US divergence of economic and security interests has hampered regional inter-connectivity resulting in the proxy involvement to support the sub-nationalist tendencies for secession and independence of Balochistan.

A Chinese proverb exemplified the Afghan-Pakistan equation. It stated that immediate neighbors were better than far-off relatives. Ironically, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have become mirrored in distrust and misperceptions. A number of key security concerns have raised Pakistan’s apprehensions vis-a-vis Afghanistan. First, Pakistan has considered the centrality of its role in Afghanistan as crucial to its security, conditioning the repatriation of the TTP leaders as evidence of Afghanistan’s desire for

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83 Ibid.
a genuine peace. Second, ‘Indo-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement’ (SPA) signed on October 5, 2011 is a source of security concern for Pakistan. The agreement has granted India a larger strategic partnership in Afghan internal set-up for establishing Afghan security administration. Pakistan has demanded equity of stature in Afghanistan’s relationship with India and Pakistan. Stipulating Pakistan’s key security concerns, Sartaj Aziz argued on October 22, 2014 at NDU in Islamabad that an Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Partnership Agreement would address Pakistan’s key security concerns in line with Pakistan’s vision of a ‘strong, independent, self-sufficient and friendly to all Afghanistan.’

The argument implied that Pakistan regarded Afghanistan-Pakistan strategic partnership as central to Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. Pakistan has proposed to limit foreign involvement in the capacity building and institutional development of Afghanistan, while reviewing the rationale for foreign military presence in the region. In the spirit of UN resolution of 1883, Pakistan has suggested that insurgency needs to be curtailed through disarming Afghan militias. To curb militancy, Pakistan has offered to provide training, intelligence assistance and security to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Pakistan believes that a review of the US residual force’s obligations is essential to ensure domestic stability, regional security and international peace. Pakistan has proposed that Afghan internal stability and integrity entail in the strengthening of an inclusive coalition government in Afghanistan.

The Obama administration has regarded the US military presence as essential to countering the Taliban to stabilize Afghanistan. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, however, regarded the US presence as detrimental to Afghanistan’s stability as it promoted a backlash against foreign intervention. The US strategic presence aims to safeguard the US broader objective of access to energy resources and raw materials, to ensure stability of key supply routes, and control strategic reserves of uranium ore in Afghanistan. The US military bases in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have strengthened the US strategic foot-print in Central Asia. The SCO has also demanded that the US withdraw its strategic bases from the territory of member states in Southwest and

85 Sartaj Aziz, Advisor to Prime Minister on National Security & Foreign Affairs, addressing the Inaugural Session of International Seminar at NDU, October 22, 2014, Islamabad.
Central Asia. Foreign intervention has become the main catalyst for militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Iran has accused that the US permanent military presence has a destabilizing effect on the region. Tehran wants to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a hotbed of international intrigues against Iran. Termsing the BSA as against the region’s long term stability, Tehran has argued that the task of guaranteeing Afghan security should be entrusted to the Afghan people. Simultaneously, remaining wary of the US/Nato influence, Iran has sought greater leverage in Afghanistan. Ethnic and linguistic affiliations across Herat, Farah and Nimroz in western Afghanistan have allowed Iran to support the northern alliance to guard Tajiks,’ Hazaras’ and Shiites’ interests against the Taliban. Iran believed that presence of the US forces in Afghanistan has excited resistance and empowered the Taliban. Iran has, therefore, opposed a power sharing process incorporating the Taliban as exacerbating Pakistan’s and Saudi expansion of influence in Afghanistan. At a broader level, Iran’s interests have included prevention of sectarian radicalism, drug trafficking, and refugee spill-over from Afghanistan.

Retaining a significant interest in Afghan export market, Iranian infrastructure development projects have sought to out-flank Afghan dependence on transit trade from Pakistan.

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86 China has promoted three states on top of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization membership list including Iran, India and Pakistan. Afghanistan has acquired the observer status of SCO in 2012. The US emphasis upon universal applicability of democratic institutions has diverged with the SCO’s insistence on the sanctity of local traditions.
87 Iran works to promote Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara’s and other Dari/Persian speaking communities as counterweight to Afghan Pushtons.
88 Iran participated in the Bonn Conference, playing an instrumental role in the establishment of the Afghan Interim Authority in 2001.
89 Almost 90 percent of world’s illicit opium production is smuggled across the Iranian-Afghan border, trafficked through Iran into the Middle East, Europe and beyond. The completion of Kamal Khan dam on the Helmand River constitutes a concern for Iran. Tehran exploits the refugee out flux as a pressure tactic to pressurize the government in Afghanistan.
90 Iran constructed a 123 km road joining Herat in western Afghanistan to the Dogharoun region. Another road links Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chabhar to alleviate Afghan dependence on the Pakistani port of Karachi. In 2009, Nimruz province in Afghanistan was connected to Chabhar in Iran through successful completion of the 215 km highway between Zaranj and Delaram with Indian financial assistance by Indian Border Roads Organization. A multibillion rail project connecting Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan is already underway. Iran encourages trade route diversification through concession on transit import and warehouses to Afghanistan, besides encouraging relocation of Afghan business offices from United Arab Emirates to Iran.
Hedging with the US, India has been actively engaged in the geo-political and economic gains in Afghanistan post 9/11. The US policy approach has projected India’s magnified role in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Two factors appear to have motivated the US policy objectives: the larger strategic interests against China along with the desire to project Indo-US joint corporate and economic interests in the region. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal has observed that Obama’s strategy has appeared contrary to China’s strategic and economic expansion of interests in Afghanistan. The US military presence has encircled China’s vision of New Silk Road Economic Belt strategy or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China has emerged as a strategic competitor to the US, seeking to expand its foot-print in the Southwest and Central Asian region.

Encompassing a broad strategic vision, Chinese involvement post 2014 has entailed civilian capacity building, maintenance of the rule of law, counter narcotics, investment in mineral and energy resources, geo-economic and political involvement in Afghanistan. China’s regional approach has envisioned a special relationship with Pakistan, maintaining a balance of power in Southwest Asia. Pakistani defense analysts Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, addressing ‘Islamabad Trilateral Dialogue: China-Afghanistan-Pakistan,’ argued that global trends have indicated increased cooperation between China, Southwest Asia and Central Asia post 9/11 based on emergence of a vision of ‘Greater South Asia’ along with Russia in the region. India, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan have acted as a pawn in great power politics in the Central Asian region.

Sino-US strategic designs post 9/11 have brought major powers into the limelight of Indo-Pakistan bilateral relations. As the ‘net security provider,’ the US has projected Indian role through defense agreements and expansion of influence in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Reminiscent of the British erstwhile strategy of ‘divide and rule’ in the sub-continent, the bid to resolve geo-political problems in Central Asia has mirrored

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92 Ibid., 40.
95 Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, addressing Islamabad Trilateral Dialogue: China-Afghanistan-Pakistan, organized by Pakistan-China Institute, October 20, 2014, Islamabad.
the US desire to neutralize Sino-Russian influence in the region. India’s projection as a junior partner has allowed the US to restrict China’s monopoly of economic and corporate interests in the Central Asian region. The US scholar, Daniel Markey, a senior fellow for India, Pakistan, South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations commented\(^\text{96}\) that while China and US interests converge broadly on counter-terrorism and avoidance of Indo-Pakistan nuclear war, they differ on the issue of how much power India, China and the US should exercise in Southwest and Central Asia.

The US encouragement of Indian involvement in Afghanistan has neutralized Pakistan’s advantage, while it has induced fissures and rivalry in India-Pakistan bilateral relations. Indo-Pakistan regional interests have clashed at the strategic chessboard of Afghanistan. The Indian security interest in Afghanistan can be identified in two principal motives. India has seen Afghanistan as a potential market for Indian trading goods and as a gateway to access Central Asian oil and gas reserves. India has held a corporate interest in Afghanistan’s infrastructure, capacity building and reconstruction projects. Indian expansion of influence in Afghanistan holds the promise of extended reach in Central and Southwest Asia. The region has served, historically, as a gateway for trade and cross-cultural interaction. Indo-Afghanistan trade has expanded steadily along with Indian grant of developmental funds and financial aid for Afghanistan.

Indo-Afghan security partnership has alarmed the strategic and defence circles in Pakistan. India and Afghanistan signed a ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’ (SPA) on October 5, 2011. Karzai hailed that he viewed India ‘as a steadfast friend and supporter of his country.’ The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement has revealed Indo-Afghan agreement to train the Afghan Security Forces (ASF) in India, avoiding to move Indian troops into Afghanistan\(^\text{97}\) Although Karzai stated that Indo-Afghanistan


\(^{97}\) Text on Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Republic of India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, available at:
strategic partnership agreement would not foil Afghanistan’s relationship with its ‘twin brother’ Pakistan, yet the Indian move has put up an additional western front against the Pakistan military’s strategic depth in Afghanistan. Indian training of ASF has compounded Pakistan’s fear of encirclement. In 2007, India trained two platoon-sized Afghan infantry units in India. The Indian first military airbase overseas in Farkhor, Tajikistan has alarmed Pakistan. The Indian military base, in a way, has checked China-Pakistan strategic nexus, allowing India to guard the Chinese geostrategic and economic expansion in the region.

India envisions political, strategic and economic dividends in Afghanistan. A Northern Alliance dominated set-up suits Indian security and political interests in Afghanistan. Marginalizing Pakistan’s geo-strategic and economic influence, India has sought to manipulate in the internal structure of Afghanistan. Simultaneously, to establish Indian hegemony and enhance leverage, India has developed Afghanistan’s rail and road infrastructure to divert reliance on Pakistan’s trade outlet to the Arabian Sea. The Indian Border Roads Organization has connected the Herat-Kandahar Highway to the Iranian port of Chabahar. Development of Afghan transportation networks has marked Indian interest in the mineral wealth of Afghanistan. Bypassing the transit route from Port Qasim and Karachi, the route has provided Afghanistan a faster road network to the nearest sea outlet in Chabahar.

To provide an alternate trade outlet to Afghanistan and reduce its dependence of exports across Pakistan, India has plans to build a rail network linking Hajigak in Bamyan province through Zaranj to Chabahar. Parallel to the rail-line, India has constructed a 600 km road from Chabhar to Zahidan in the southwest of Afghanistan to reduce Indian exports across Pakistan. Indian drive to dominate Afghanistan as a bridge for trade to Central Asian Republics has been hampered by security challenges. The Zaranj-Delram road and Bamyan Chabhar rail/road pass through Taliban dominated Nimroz province, allowing the Taliban to disrupt trade along the routes. India has, however, alleged ISI’s involvement in attacks on Indian construction workers and consulates in Afghanistan.


98 Indian investment in the development of Chabhar port in Iran, and reconstruction, in 2008, of 218-kilometers (135-mile) road from Delaram-Zarang highway in north-east Afghanistan to Zarang on the Iran border guarantees an alternate exit bypassing Pakistan.
In a statement to the BBC, Former Afghan President Karzai issued a warning threatening to reciprocate the ISI involvement in Afghan internal affairs and territorial boundary.\(^9\) India has deployed paramilitary forces to guard against kidnappings and attacks on Indian workers since 2006. Indian security calculus has sought to hit multifaceted gains beyond the US drawdown in Afghanistan.

India has blamed Pakistan of using jihadist networks to prevent the loss of influence in Afghanistan. Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan held that while Pakistan’s alliance with China has built on Beijing’s hostility against India, Indo-Afghanistan alliance partnership has been constructed on common anxiety against Pakistan. To ward off militancy in occupied Kashmir, India has kept a check on militant Islamism to ward off the terrorists/jihadists from receiving military training in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, India has feared a direct fall out on the rise of militancy in Indian Kashmir. The US military presence has invited local resentment against Pakistan’s collaboration with the US on GWOT in FATA and Afghanistan. Indian scholars, such as Michael Kugelman, have argued that the US reliance on Pakistan’s support for GWOT has prevented The US to mount enough pressure on Pakistan to combat terrorism.\(^1\) New Delhi has, however, hoped that the US termination of combat role would allow it a free hand to expand Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Afghanistan.

Support for the Indian elevated role in Afghanistan has paid off the US in establishing a strategic venue right amidst China’s ‘Heart of Asia.’ An Indo-US convergence of interest prevails to contain China in its backyard in Afghanistan. New Delhi has invested in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, putting itself in a competitive mode with China in Central Asia. Indo-Afghanistan economic ties have been manifested in the mining and hydrocarbon sectors. Highlighting Indian strategic and economic interests in Afghanistan, Tom Wright and Margherita Stancati observed that the Steel Authority


of India has sought to mine iron ore at the Hajigak mine in Afghanistan’s Bamiyan province, and builds steel plants and rail lines to improve access to the mines. The strategy would deliver dividends to the US in the longer run, given multiplicity of actors involved in the power squabble in Afghanistan. Yet, the US move has entrenched the Indian position as a stake-holder in the Afghan spoils of war. This is despite the fact that New Delhi had kept itself aloof from the Afghan jihad during the 1980s, while Pakistan fought as the frontline state in Afghanistan.

India has sought to curtail Pakistan’s influence in the region. Pakistan has served China just as India has served the US as inter-connect between South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and Eurasia. As the sixth largest donor in Afghanistan, India has desired to acquire a stature commensurate to its investment and security interests in Afghanistan. India’s economic investment and desire for elevated role in Afghanistan might call for a shot in the air. Yet it may or may not catch on the other end. The move has, however, circumvented China’s economic and strategic presence — a goal India has shared with the US. Pakistan’s defense analyst, Lt. General (retd) Talat Masood, has argued that the US has retained a long term security interest, which has been based on the elevation of Indian role in Afghanistan. He further argued that ‘counter China is a long term US strategic interest in the sub-continent. Obama’s visit to India in 2015, the third in his presidency, was only a ceremonial call to promote goodwill, with basic motive to promote Indo-US bilateral trade. Lack of a similar treatment to Pakistan has resulted from Indian insistence to be treated separately. Indo-US collaboration in Afghanistan has served both the Indian and the US interests.

The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Afghanistan has eroded Pakistan’s security. This partnership has led to strong Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus in the region. The US support for Indian role as a counter check against China has opened up a new battleground in Afghanistan. The Indo-US partnership has promoted Indian involvement at the cost of limiting Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. On March 2, 2006

Bush reiterated the role of India for supporting democracy in the region.\textsuperscript{103} Indian analysts have rationalized security interests in Afghanistan citing the Taliban support for hosting and training of terrorist camps in Kashmir. Indian commercial and corporate interests have held repercussions for Pakistan’s regional security concerns. Turning into a permanent security threat, Indian involvement has generated a condition of low intensity conflict for Pakistan along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

Pakistan’s geo-strategic location has made the country reign supreme in the great powers’ rivalry. Kenneth Waltz maintains that Pakistan’s regional clout and influence stands poised as a game changer for the US and China in South Asia.\textsuperscript{104}

Pakistan’s policy alignment with the US and China wields significance for regional security. Indian ‘clandestine involvement’ in Afghanistan has brought Pakistan and China closer. Pakistan has alleged that the Bloch separatists have received training from Indian consulates established in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Qandahar and Jallalabad near the Afghan-Pakistan border. Indian support to non-state actors has constituted a serious concern for China in the region. On March 7, 2016, the British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond termed India-Pakistan support to non-state actors as foiling the prospect of peace in the region.\textsuperscript{105} Pakistan’s reluctance to allow Indian stronghold as a substitute for US/Nato presence post 2014 has thrown prospects of ‘peace’ to the reversal of great powers’ proxy involvement in the region.

Sino-Pakistan strategic and economic collaboration has served Pakistan’s regional security interests. Pakistani scholar such as Shahid Javed Burki has argued that reorienting with China’s jubilating economy in a far more meaningful way, while forsaking the traditional approach of looking to the west can offer Pakistan the prospect of survival albeit with caution in strategic balancing.\textsuperscript{106} Pointing to Sino-Pakistan geo-strategic interconnectivity, President Jiang Zemin remarked that shared borders made

\textsuperscript{103} President’s visit to India and Pakistan, March 2006, available at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/india-pakistan/ accessed June 2014.
\textsuperscript{104} Kenneth Waltz, “Pakistan A Suitable Ally, Dawn, Islamabad, April 23, 2013.
\textsuperscript{105} “Pakistan, India should not allow non-state actors to derail the peace process,” The Tribune, March 8\textsuperscript{th}, 2016.
peace and stability in Afghanistan important for China and Pakistan.\footnote{President Jiang Zemin met with the Pakistani President, \textit{Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China}, available at: \url{http://www.fmprc.gov.cn}, February 6, 2002, accessed May 12, 2013.} During the Cold War era, Sino-Pakistan joint defense strategy focused on defending Pakistan against the Soviet threat. The president implied that Sino-Pakistan joint collaboration should continue post 9/11 to counter terrorist militancy in Afghanistan. The US drawdown has raised the prospects for anti-terrorism collaboration against militancy in Afghanistan. Mutuality of political and security interests have required Pakistan to revive its troubled fortunes through alignment with China in Afghanistan.

The US drawdown post 2014 has reinforced the chances of Sino-Pakistan joint partnership in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s ambassador to China, Masood Khan has, however, argued that to consider Sino-Pakistan relationship as a substitute for Pakistan-US relations remains inappropriate as none can fill-in the gap left by the other.\footnote{Masood Khan, Pakistan’s Ambassador to China, Lecture to National Security & War Course, NDU on September 26, 2011.} This, however, implies that stability in Southwest Asia and Afghanistan can add up to China’s geographic area of influence. Hence, China-Pakistan’s Economic Corridor’s derailment or sabotage holds significance for Pakistan’s internal security. Emphasizing Pakistan’s indispensability for the success of China’s vision of 2025, Dr. Hu Shisheng, Director, Institute of South and Southeast Asian and Oceanic Studies, CICIR, in an interview with the author opined that Pakistan’s stability was of immense importance for China in order to build a stable Xinjiang. A dismantled or disintegrated Pakistan would be a disaster for South Asian region. The menace of terrorism could not be controlled without Pakistan’s assistance as China held huge stakes in Pakistan’s stability.\footnote{Interview conducted by the author with Dr. Hu Shisheng, Director, \textit{Institute of South and Southeast Asian and Oceanic Studies}, CICIR on May 29, 2014, Islamabad.} It implied that Pakistan’s stability figures highly in China’s regional strategy.

Afghanistan remained integral to China’s strategy of modernization and westward expansion. The increase in the terrorist activities’ somehow strained Sino-Pakistan relations due to growing radicalism in Xinjiang. Sino-Pakistan counter-terrorism drive has included China’s financial assistance for capacity building of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), Counter Terrorism Training Exercises, and Political Reconciliation.
efforts with the militant organizations working from across Pakistan’s border in Xinjiang. China has suspected that the safe havens in FATA and tribal regions of Pakistan have provided assistance to East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang. China has remained reluctant to conduct joint military action against terrorism, fearing that a Taliban backlash would destabilize its national security interests in Xinjiang. Chinese Muslim separatists allegedly receive military training in Afghanistan, using weapons donated to Pakistan by China during the Afghan jihad. In a press brief, Sartaj Aziz while allying Chinese concerns on counter-terrorism stated that ‘Pakistan had rejected any insinuation or aspersion over its commitment to fight terrorism.’

Indo-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership had made Pakistan vulnerable across its western regions. The US had aspired for a projected Indian presence along the Chinese periphery while elevating greater Indian involvement in the Indo-Pacific region. The US had projected India as interconnector between the Persian Gulf and South China Sea. Pakistan’s defense analyst Air Vice Marshal (retd) Shahzad Choudhary had opined that:

Although Chankya formulated the basic framework of Indian foreign policy, preventing India to look across the north (China), the US pivot Asia strategy, however, has dragged in Indian role in the control of East China and South China Sea. Indian convergence of interest with the US has been based on Indian regional stature, transfer of conventional weapons to India on defense and the nuclear deal. Indian inflated role holds repercussions for the Southwest and Central Asian region.

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110 Uyghur Diaspora, with Turkish roots spread in CA, Turkey and Germany and formed ETIM as their militant wing for liberation of Xinjiang. Sino-Pakistan signed the extradition treaty in 2005, when the insurgency began to pick up in late 1990s. East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) are the two organizations allegedly receiving support from the tribal belt in FATA, Pakistan.


Shehzad Choudhary implied that India had started to look beyond its traditional foreign policy framework to perform a much larger role in the Indian Ocean international politics. According to Ch. Daniel Aziz, Member Pakistan’s National Assembly Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs:

The US has sought to improve Indian capacity as a countervailing force against China, implicating Pakistan’s security concerns in Afghanistan and the Southwest Asian region. India has been involved in the training of Baloch insurgents in Afghanistan. Aligning with the US, India has sought to reduce Pakistan to a secondary stature of the strategic equivalent of Afghanistan.  

Daniel Aziz comments implied that Indian designs had worsened the security situation in Pakistan, reducing it to the status of an unstable state like Afghanistan. Pakistan’s former Secretary Foreign Affairs, Shamshad Ahmed Khan stated that:

Indo-US is a strategic partnership geared in response to China’s rise. Indo-US strategic partnership is unfortunate. Pakistan is the biggest victim of terrorism and we do not expect double standards from the US in combating terrorism. We expect the same commitment from India. In 2006, President Bush had told Musharraf that in terms of its history and outlook, Pakistan is not India. Pakistan should not expect the same treatment, the US has granted to India. Pakistan was put in the category of Afghanistan, and evaluated only in terms of its defense potential while India was categorized with G-20 by lieu of its trade volume, market size and buying capacity.

The former secretary implied that until 1999, the US treated both India and Pakistan in equal parity. Post South Asian nuclearization, however, the US treated both states differently. George Bush ousted Pakistan from categorization with India. The most imminent consequence of the US elevation of Indian role in regional parity is Indian consequential hegemony in South Asia. Emphasizing on Indian drive for regional hegemony, Sartaj Aziz, Advisor to Prime Minster on National Security and Foreign Affairs stated:

Hegemony (Indian) has its own implications and those are difficult and impossible for Pakistan to accept. India conditions resumption of

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115 Ibid.
dialogue to: one, forget Kashmir; two, dialogue initiation on Indian terms. India makes normalization conditional to Pakistan’s forgetting about Kashmir. The previous government had a subtle agenda on this, Modi administration is more vocal and abruptly ‘open’ on this. Attacks from Afghan soil have Indian involvement. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, however, are on a better track and Indian involvement would soon end. Both governments now resolve not to allow respective territories for perpetration of terror against the other.116

It implied that Pakistan pinned hope for regional stability on the improvement of its relations with Afghanistan, conditional to the Indian withdrawal. Increased Indian political and military role in Afghanistan has alarmed Pakistan. TTP leaders Mullah Fazlullah and Umar Khalid Khurasani have worked on Indian behest and served as non-actor Indian proxies in Pakistan. Citing Pakistan’s concern Musharraf stated on February 26, 2015 that:

Indian influence in Afghanistan constituted a danger for Pakistan, the entire region….. Indian presence in Afghanistan had an anti-Pakistan connect. They [India] wanted to create an anti-Pakistan Afghanistan. Indians use elements of ethnic entities in Afghanistan, which in turn forced Pakistan to use its own support for ethnic elements — certainly the Pashtuns in Afghanistan.117

The former president implied that Indian proxy involvement has counted on projection of diverse ethnic elements, for example, the Tajiks and Uzbeks dominated Northern Alliance against the Pushtons in Afghanistan. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, reacting to Musharraf, stated that ‘Afghanistan would not have to become the battleground of Indo-Pakistan proxy war.’ Volatility in Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan has existed due to the Durrand Line dispute, aggravating Pakistan’s fears when a hostile government assumes power in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s long term

security objectives have required that a friendly to neutral set-up prevails in Afghanistan, which is willing to cooperate at bilateral and multilateral levels.

Pakistan’s fears in Afghanistan were put forth on April 16, 2011 during a visit to Afghanistan by a high delegation mission. An Afghanistan-Pakistan joint commission was established including ex-COAS and ex-ISI chief to allow for coordination in Afghan policy and stability. Afghan accused Pakistan of neglecting diplomatic norms by asking for major concessions.\textsuperscript{118} A local newspaper, \textit{Khedmatgar Wrazpanra}, reported that ex-PM Yousuf Raza Gilani asked Karzai that following the US defeat, Pakistan and Afghanistan should prefer China as a strategic ally in the region. The Pakistani concerns were put forth by the delegation included the following points: Pakistan must be consulted on the training of Afghan security forces; future governments in Afghanistan should be Pakistan friendly; Pashtuns should be recruited in Afghan governmental institutions; and, Pakistan should be informed of agreement between Afghanistan and foreign governments.

Unlike the Karzai dominated earlier set-up, Afghan-Pakistan relations improved following Ashraf Ghani’s installation to the seat of power in Afghanistan. President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to Pakistan has marked the resumption of military and intelligence cooperation with Pakistan built on new found trust and spirit of cooperation in Afghan-Pakistan bilateral relations. Army Chief General Raheel Sharif’s earlier visit to Afghanistan and commencement of military operation in North Waziristan has proved to be the catalyst of Afghan-Pakistan relations’ re-engagement on several key dimensions including security, trade, and regional economic cooperation. On the security front, both states have agreed that neither side would allow its territory to be used against the other. Afghanistan also demanded that Pakistan’s military operation ‘Zarb-e-Azab’ in FATA and the tribal belt would make no distinction among ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Talibans. Afghanistan, in return, offered to launch a clean-up operation against the TTP militants, taking refuge in Kunar.

Pakistan’s demand from Afghanistan to have a strategic partnership similar to the one offered to India was problematical. Ashraf Ghani’s government agreed in principle to

\textsuperscript{118} Afghanistan should not allow foreign intervention in the state.
consent to Pakistan’s offer of training Afghan military officers in Afghanistan, to equip an Afghan infantry brigade; and to send Afghan officers to military institutions in Pakistan. Earlier, the Karzai government had refused to accept Pakistan’s offer to train Afghan security forces. In 2012 at Nato summit in Chicago, Afghanistan turned down Pakistan’s offer to commit financial resources for the training and capacity building of Afghan forces. A stumbling block in Afghan-Pakistan relations is the issue of Pashtun representation in Afghan government. Pakistan has sought stability in Afghanistan, yet it has aspired for a relatively stable, inclusive, and adequately Pashtun government to prevent discontent along the Afghan-Pakistan border. A counter perspective, however, has blamed Pakistan to emphasize Pushtun sub-divisions and split the Pashtuns’ politically to prevent the emergence of greater Pashtunistan. Pakistan has worked to promote instability by supporting the Talibán in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has tried to overcome Pakistan’s security apprehensions regarding Afghanistan-Pakistan border security protocols and Afghanistan’s relationship with India. Progress on Bilateral Standing Order Procedures (BSOPs) on border management has begun on Afghan-Pakistan disputed border engagement. President Ghani has declined an arms deal offered by India, pursued by his predecessor Karzai, citing Pakistan’s security concerns. Pakistan saw this as a welcome effort by Afghan government to strike a balance in its relations with Pakistan and India. Afghanistan and Pakistan have concluded agreements to streamline customs’ clearance procedures and to smooth transit trade for expeditious movement of Afghan goods at Port Qasim and Gwadar. Javed Hamim Khan has observed that the Pakistan and Afghanistan have showed mutual resolve to strengthen trade and economic ties. In 2010, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed Afghan Pakistan Transit Trade Act (APTTA) to expand Afghan-Pakistan bilateral trade.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed on key trans-regional energy projects to enhance economic cooperation and connectivity through road and rail networks. Afghanistan

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119 In the proposed arms deal, New Delhi was to pay for and supply Russian arms and equipment to Afghanistan.
and Pakistan have signed a MoU to lay down a railway track between the two states. Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to foster a shared vision of ‘Pakistan and Afghanistan serving as the ‘Heart of Asia’ to ensure that South Asia connects with Central Asia.’ President Ghani, unlike his predecessor Karzai, has agreed to Pakistan’s request for trade access to Tajikistan via Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{121} Pakistan has reaffirmed its support for an ‘intra-Afghan reconciliation, fully Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ to evolve a strategy of action for enduring peace in Afghanistan. The prospects for success depend on how the Afghan Taliban responds to the Ghani-Abdullah offer and the terms put up for peace talks. Another key variable is the role and actions of other regional and extra-regional powers and how they act in pursuit of their interests.

The Peshawar incident of December 16, 2014 — termed by scholars as Pakistan’s 9/11, however, has sabotaged the positive atmosphere of ‘a strong, comprehensive and enduring partnership’ for greater cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In a strange coincidence of timings, Afghan President Abdul Ghani’s visit to Pakistan led to the US Department of Defense’ release of a report to the US Congress\textsuperscript{122} alleged Pakistan’s proxy involvement against India and Afghanistan to the detriment of regional stability.\textsuperscript{123} The report has stated that Pakistan had proxy involvement to resist the loss of influence in Afghanistan and to counter India’s superior military force.\textsuperscript{124} Such groups have continued as hurdles in Afghan-Pakistan bilateral relations. It further stated that proxy involvement has run counter to Pakistan’s commitment to support Afghan reconciliation process.\textsuperscript{125} The report has tarnished Pakistan’s image as a peace maker in Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{121} Establishment of special economic zones in Afghanistan for Pakistani investors; collaboration in joint production especially on textiles; double Afghan-Pakistan annual bilateral trade to $5 billion in the next two years; establishment of a joint business council; beginning of negotiations for a preferential trade agreement were some positive measures indicating improvement in Afghan-Pakistan bilateral relations.
\textsuperscript{122} Entitled as “Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability of Afghanistan,” the report has stated that Pakistan used proxy forces in Afghanistan.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
Pakistan objected to the Pentagon allegations in a strong move of offense. The foreign office registered protest on what it termed as Pentagon’s ‘misguided information to Congress.’\textsuperscript{126} The Pentagon report, however, has acknowledged that Pakistan army has made gains against the TTP and foreign fighters in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On the contrary, the report has portrayed Indian role in Afghanistan as benign and contributing to Afghan stability. The report has acknowledged Indian government’s aspiration for a secure Afghanistan to facilitate economic corridors into Central Asia. In line with the Indo-Afghan strategic partnership in 2011, Indian initiatives have included infrastructure, electricity generation, road construction, and mining projects in Afghanistan. India has shown interest in Afghan security forces training and assistance. India has, however, not provided direct military support or training to Afghan security forces in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{127} A new start has set-in Afghan-Pakistan relations, following Pakistan’s initiation of military offensive \textit{Operation Zarb-e Azab}.

Afghanistan has alleged that Pakistan has aided the Afghan Taliban, its leader Mullah Omar and the Haqqani Network to resist government in Afghanistan. Afghan-Pakistan cooperation on border security is a practical-level objective, awaiting convergence of interests on border security. Afghanistan has regarded Pakistan more of a foe than a strategic ally. Pakistan has alleged that Mullah Fazlullah gets assistance from the Afghan government to work against Pakistan interests.\textsuperscript{128} Afghan Taliban has sought safe-havens in the tribal areas of FATA while the TTP leadership hides in the border towns of Afghanistan. Intelligence sharing can stall cross-border terrorist movement and prevent infiltration. Trade agreements could foster mutuality of interest, cutting down smuggling across the Afghan-Pakistan porous border. Economic progress can help Afghanistan prosper and a friendly Pakistan would help realize that goal. An editorial in \textit{The News} on April 13, 2014 commented that lack of trust should not imply


\textsuperscript{128} Pakistani official position states that the Mullah Fazalullah, head of TTP, has received funds from Afghan collaboration as one official was caught giving funds to TTP.
that the two states should have no trade. Afghanistan, Pakistan and China face the challenge of terrorism and border security. 

The collective strategy of ‘Islamabad Trilateral Dialogue: China-Afghanistan-Pakistan,’ has called for Afghan owned and Afghan led peace process, a trilateral counter-terrorism and economic task force to share intelligence, coordinate policy and formulate joint strategy to promote regional interconnectivity. The US efforts have included the Quadrilateral Peace Initiative to bring the Taliban, the Afghanistan government, China and Pakistan to the peace process. A regional approach cognizant of the new realities can foster bilateral and multilateral trust in the South Asian region. Pakistan’s desire for expansion of trade has faced policy restrictions from India. To move forward, a more pragmatic approach is needed. However, India’s negative policy vis-à-vis Pakistan in Afghanistan has proved to be catastrophic in the region. In the same vein, Pakistan’s reputed research analyst Syed Imran Sardar has argued that Pakistan’s Afghan policy based on assisting China while resisting India is detrimental to regional security. The US policy post 9/11 has been detrimental to Afghan-Pakistan regional security interests.

From the GWOT, the US has shifted its focus to altering the regional security dynamics in and around Afghanistan. A US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement has entailed a certification of support for the existing Northern Alliance dominated Afghan set-up. The Indo-US support for the Northern Alliance has projected Indian role in Afghanistan based on alienation of the 35 million Pashtuns from Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Indian scholar, C. Raja Mohan has argued that Pakistan and New Delhi’s unilateral efforts to promote economic activism or political reconciliation have so far failed to promote regional stability. Instead of the ‘cheers from the sideline approach,’

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131 For instance, there are 24 standard setting bodies in India to check the quality of goods coming from Pakistan whereas Pakistan has only one central body. With such a large number of regulatory bodies operating in India, it is very difficult to identify national Indian standard.
however, the US needs to encourage Pakistan-Afghanistan reconciliation on Durand Line, and promote a trilateral dialogue between Pakistan, Afghanistan and India on economic cooperation and counter-terrorism. Simultaneously, the US support for Taliban participation in power-sharing can be successful only in the context of broader US-Iranian grand bargain, which incorporates the legitimate Iranian security interests in Afghanistan.

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations improved with the installment of the unity government of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah in 2014. Accordingly, renowned Pakistani analyst Dr. Maleeha Lodhi opined that the new government in Afghanistan offered an opportunity to normalize a long troubled Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship. 134 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to Pakistan in mid 2014 improved the bilateral relationship. However, the attack on Army Public School in Peshawar on the symbolic day of December 16, 2014, however, erased the confidence built in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations in the aftermath of President Ghani’s visit to Pakistan early 2014. 135 The incident highlighted the clash of regional security interests between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

An editorial in the Express Tribune on November 18, 2014 commented that the departure of the Karzai government has granted a fresh impetus to Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. The Karzai government perpetrated instability along much of the Durand Line for most of its tenure. Joint action, increased military and intelligence cooperation can allow for greater cooperation to shrink the size of TTP on both sides of the border. 136 Pakistan’s launch of military offensive against the militants has suffered from the most obvious weakness of terrorist infiltration from across the border in Afghanistan. The GWOT will stand a better chance of success, if Afghanistan-Pakistan militaries fight for a joint cause based on convergence of interests, paving the way for symmetry in Afghanistan-Pakistan long-term strategies. The Afghan

135 A press release by DG ISPR revealed that the incident had been planned by TTP stationed in Kunar, termed as Pakistan’s 9/11 killing 141 innocent students.
government needs to extend its writ as far as the borderlands to take on the TTP. As the Afghan army is poorly trained to effectively combat the Taliban insurgency, COAS General Raheel Sharif has offered assistance to train the Afghan Security Forces.

Afghanistan has remained a centerpiece of Pakistan-China convergence of interests in the region. Zalmay Khalilzad has argued that instability in Afghanistan holds a direct bearing on FATA and Balochistan in Pakistan, while inducing instability in China’s Xinjiang province. Being the largest foreign investor, China holds a considerable stake in the peace and stability of Afghanistan. China’s neutral status has raised the prospects of investment in Afghanistan in the wake of the decline in the US aid in the region post 2014. Pakistan’s failure to crackdown on Uighur militants and the desire to diversify its regional security partners has resulted in China’s security collaboration with Afghanistan. China has concluded agreements on security intelligence, counter terrorism cooperation, and increased training for Afghan security forces.

Professor Dr. Tahir Amin, research analyst and reputed academician has argued that the US complete withdrawal may promote lasting peace in Afghanistan. Foreign involvement or fabricated solution would prove to be a failure. Pakistan’s principled approach has supported a broad-based power sharing arrangement among all ethnic groups — fundamentally Afghan-led without interference from any outside party and hostility to the majority Pushtons. Pakistan’s Afghan policy has facilitated, in policy and practice, indigenous Afghan owned and Afghan-led peace process. The foreign element should be reduced to the building of Afghanistan’s institutional capacity, capitalizing on continued engagement and collaborative efforts of foreign forces. Western assistance and international commitments could help ensure multidimensional progress, socio-economic and institutional development in Afghanistan.

From a real-politic perspective, Afghanistan allied with Beijing’s geo-economic interests has challenged the US dominance in the region. Hence Mearsheimer’s bait and bleed strategy appears to describe the low intensity conflict in Afghanistan, allowing the US to maintain strategic presence in the region. Simultaneously, a convergence of interests has pushed the US to seek China’s cooperation to curb militancy and stabilize

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the Afghan situation. Instability in Baluchistan fits into the global strategic framework as does the end game in Afghanistan. A report by Musa Khan Jalalzai in the Daily Times has reported that instability has picked up in the wake of the US/Nato withdrawal.138

Political and economic stability in Afghanistan remains contingent on a shared vision of an integrated and multifaceted approach for socio-economic and institutional development.139 Another civil war in Afghanistan would imply division along Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras ethnic groups carving their own fiefdoms in the peripheral areas. Equally important would it be for the regional stakeholders to avoid a proxy war at the regional and international levels. The US drawdown, as predicted by numerous scholars, has led to a rise in an existential threat to the rise in militancy in Pakistan.140 Multiple challenges have diminished the prospect of a multinational collaborative approach in the development and stability of Afghanistan. Iran, Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia can play a decisive role in the stability of Afghanistan. Compromise and trust developed across multiplicity of opinions is what is required in building a long lasting peace in Afghanistan.141 Pakistan believed in a more representative government in Afghanistan with Pushtons participants granted due recognition.

Pakistan had to develop a long term Afghan policy to help stabilize Afghanistan. By opting not to adopt a ‘go alone policy,’ Pakistan worked closely to integrate regional players, ie, Iran, India and Central Asian states as well as the US, China, Russia and the Western powers in supporting the central government in Afghanistan. All these states had a role in stabilization of Afghanistan. A stable Afghanistan serves Pakistan’s multidimensional engagement with the international community, making Pakistan directly relevant to the ‘new great game’ unfolding in the global scenario.

A comprehensive, multifaceted and integrated regional approach, as a basic minimum prerequisite entails that regional stakeholders establish adherence to the principle of

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139 Sartaj Aziz, Advisor to Prime Minister on National Security & Foreign Affairs, addressing the Inaugural Session of International Seminar, organized by NDU, October 2014, Islamabad
140 In the ferocity of scale, the Peshawar school incident and Hayatabad Mosque incidents have been described as Pakistan’s 9/11.
141 Ibid.
‘independence, sovereignty and non-interference’ in the internal political structure of Afghanistan. Equally important was it for Afghanistan to regulate its external relations with key regional players particularly Pakistan and India on the shared vision of ‘equality, non-interference and non-partisan approach.’ Pakistan has been greatly worried on the Indian involvement in Afghanistan due to its fear of encirclement from both the eastern and western fronts. Right choices strengthen world peace while wrong ones destroy it. Collaboration with diverse factors would stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. A lasting peace based on a broad based consensus that incorporates the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan was essential. Acknowledgement and adjustment to the multiple world orders that have coexisted, a lasting Afghan solution appeared to be a distant thing. A key ingredient of the Afghan development process entailed improvement of the judicial system to improve writ and control of the state over the ethnically divided peripheral areas.

An inter-linked aspect related to combating the menace of drug-trafficking and putting the Afghan economy on the mainstream to prevent local warlords from financing Afghan warring militias. International assistance in Afghan educational sector could help facilitate transition from guns to pens, circumventing in turn regional powers’ involvement in Afghanistan. Afghan capacity building and rehabilitation of Afghanistan could foster winning hearts and minds of the Afghan masses. Indian, Iranian and Pakistan’s positive role is the key for success in Afghanistan. Integration of India and Pakistan in SCO and Afghanistan in SAARC has been a positive step towards regional integration. A regional collaborative developmental effort would foster greater prospects for regional stability in Afghanistan.

This section has argued that the destinies of Afghanistan and Pakistan remain interlinked on account of their geo-strategic and ethnic factors. Pakistan held a crucial position in driving the course of political developments in Afghanistan due to interdependence, shared borders, ethnic overlap and mutual relations between the two states. Pakistan’s Afghan policy assumed a great influence in the wake of the US/Nato forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Sino-US divergence of economic and corporate

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interests had foiled the prospects of peace and stability based on Indo-Pakistan proxy involvement in Afghanistan. Terrorism and militancy across Pakistan’s western borders has eroded Pakistan’s security, based on ethnic and tribal spill over and unrest. It has led to deterioration of peace and stability in the region. Sino-US proxy involvement through their regional collaborators has worsened Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. It has added yet another threat from Afghanistan to Pakistan’s security radar in addition to that from India towards the East. Main findings of the thesis have been discussed in the conclusion to the thesis.

Afghanistan, thus, has faced the daunting challenge of reconstruction from the tribulations of over three decades of conflict. Prospects for the future have greatly impinged on Sino-US convergence or divergence of interests in the stability of Afghanistan post 2014. The US has wanted China to take up greater responsibility in rebuilding Afghan economy and to promote peace. Higher financial stakes might compel China to undertake a larger share in Afghan stability. Without bearing up for the costs involved, Beijing could not be allowed to have its ‘cake and eat it too.’ Peace and regional stability, built on Sino-US convergence of interests, holds the promise of multiple prospects of shared gains in the energy resources and mineral wealth, reconstruction and infrastructure development of Afghanistan. However, divergent interests and the clash thereof will foil the prospects of stability in Afghanistan.

Optimistic views have forecasted scenarios of stability and peace based on a broad regional and international consensus. Engineered peace-making fails to pay dividends. Afghan owned and Afghan led peace deal remained integral to the prospect of ultimate peace in the region. Another challenge related to ensuring continuity of the Afghanistan government. Still another related to acknowledgment of the critical role of Pakistan and to acquiesce its legitimate security concerns vis. a vis. India and Iran in the region. A significant challenge has entailed utilization of the ground positively for international participation for Afghanistan’s socio-economic and institutional development post 2014.143 The recipe for a long lasting peace has remained wedded to a broad based

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143 A possible Taliban victory post 2014 will add to continuing turmoil in Afghanistan, strengthening Tehreek-i-Taliban-i-Pakistan (TTP) in FATA, which may get an immediate boost from such development, complicating existential threat to Pakistan’s security. Maintenance of the status-quo can only be possible when international funds continue flowing into Afghanistan.
consensus that remains inclusive of the Taliban. Indigenous peace process could salvage Afghanistan from the current quagmire of chaos and instability.

With Pakistan’s threat perception Indo-specific, the US should not expect much from Pakistan’s compliance in Afghanistan. Pakistan has envisioned a strategic partnership with Afghanistan, just as India has forged in Afghanistan. A stable, friendly and a strong Afghanistan ‘friendly to all’ and cognizant of legitimate interests of all regional stakeholders is what Pakistan requires in Afghanistan. Pakistani civilian and military leadership is on board on pressing ahead with what Pakistan believes to be the minimalist agenda. The two issues are linked to stability and security of South Asia.

The Afghan National Army, in the face of US-Nato withdrawal, is unlikely to sustain itself without a strong Afghan indigenous economy.
CONCLUSION

The thesis has discussed the implications of Sino-US relations post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security. Sino-US relations have been a blend of both conflict and cooperation. China’s rise to power in Asia marked the shift of global power from Atlantic to the Pacific. Sino-US security interests both converged and diverged in Asia during the post 9/11 period. China’s role has been of critical importance either as a stakeholder or as a revisionist challenger to the US dominated security architecture in Asia.\textsuperscript{144} With a synergy of interests between China and Russia, the US wanted to contain China in Asia due to the probability of Sino-Russian strategic partnership.\textsuperscript{145} Within this context, Sino-US security interests have wielded interesting patterns of both conflict and cooperation in various parts of Asia. Within South Asia, Sino-US security objectives post 9/11 have manifested in the interplay of competitive interests with large implications for Pakistan’s domestic and regional security. Theories of realism, neorealism and complex interdependence were most relevant, offering alternative ideas on anarchy and order to capture the underlying dynamics of Sino-US relations post 9/11 in the Asian security.

On the whole, the thesis has four main findings. First, the thesis found that contrary to general perceptions, Sino-US relations in the post 9/11 era portrayed both conflict and cooperation at all the strategic political and economic levels. From reassurance to constructive engagement to containment, the nature of Sino-US relations post 9/11 displayed both convergence and divergence of interests at the bilateral, regional and global levels.\textsuperscript{146} At the strategic level, Sino-US relations post 9/11 featured both cooperation and competition. Military to military contacts, defence personnel exchanges, joint military and naval training exercises, such as RIMPAC, defence and arms transfers, ports and ship visits were examples of cooperation at the strategic level.

\textsuperscript{144} With the US Global Strike capability, annual Military Research & Development budget estimated at $50 billion and $11 trillion economy, the US has wielded enormous power in Asia. \textsuperscript{145} Russia seemed to be focusing more on its traditional sphere of influence for long-term strategic opportunities. Its military budget had been estimated at $66.4 billion in the year 2015. \textsuperscript{146} Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), the US-China Strategic Security Dialogue (S&SD), the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchanges (CPE), and the Joint Commission on Science and Technology Cooperation Forum acted as significant platforms for Sino-US policy coordination. The US-China ongoing talks on Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) granted interesting new dimensions to Sino-US relations in the year 2016.
Sino-US regional security mechanisms included the Shangrila dialogue to enhance trust and provide for common security concerns such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and anti-piracy measures. At the political level, both the US and China have maintained state level visits and high officials’ exchanges to overcome their differences. Institutional links at the regional and international level allowed both the US and China to address common issues on global security. At the economic level, Sino-US relations have reflected mutual vulnerabilities in trade and Chinese manipulation of currency exchange rates raising the stakes for mutual collaboration.

Sino-US divergences included mutual allegations of technology theft, cyber crime, smuggling, patent rights including regional policy differences on Japan, Taiwan, Korea, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the security of SLOCs. Inflation, uneven currency exchange rate, enhancement of bilateral trade, technology transfers and potent rights pertained to Sino-US divergences in the economic sphere. On issues of global security, a broad convergence of interests has prevailed on maintaining international stability with divergence prevailing at the tactical levels on environmental issues, human rights and cyber security concerns. Following the rise in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea post 2010, the US has viewed China’s naval modernization, integrated sea and air defence system, development of area-denial to sea-control capability and construction of artificial islands with suspicion. The sheer preponderance of Chinese power would prove to be the catalyst of regional transformation with repercussion extending as far as South Asia. Sino-US competition strongly impacted on South Asian maritime and continental security in the post 9/11 era. Sino-US competitive involvement post 9/11 was based on expediency, opportunism and short-term gain in the security dynamics of South Asia.

Second, the thesis has found that Sino-US competition post 9/11 at the strategic, political and economic levels had implications for Pakistan’s domestic and regional security. Within this context, Sino-US policies post 9/11 sought to prevent the growth of rival’s influence in the region with implications for Pakistan’s domestic and

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147 In an informal discussion with the author, the US security analyst Peter Lavoy argued that the geo-politics of Asia-Pacific was too far to have repercussions on Pakistan’s security. The US-Pakistan should contrive to build upon new relationship of the like America has built with India.
regional security. At the strategic level, the GWOT increased the US power in South Asia. Alarming China, it led to Beijing’s reciprocal expansion of influence in South Asia. Sino-US competition along strategic, political and economic levels post 9/11 weakened Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion while aggravating political violence in the state. At the political level, Sino-US policies post 9/11 appeared flawed in the perspective of the fall-out in the domestic milieu of Pakistan. Involving a ‘short term trade-off for supporting military rather than democratic institutions, the US and China bolstered the role of the military against the civilian institutions. Democracy prevailed in Pakistan after Musharraf was ousted from power in 2008. However, military contacts, aid and defence equipment, exaggerated the civil-military divide, hampered growth of true democracy in Pakistan. At the economic level, Sino-US competition to curtail one another’s influence hampered Pakistan’s ability to benefit from energy import projects such as IPI and TAPI based on regional economic collaboration. Chinese ventures worth $46 billion in infrastructure development, power generation and mineral reserves entailed security challenges for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion and geographical integrity post 9/11.

The Indo-US security nexus became the catalyst for Pakistan-China security partnership, granting Pakistan a significant role in China’s grand strategy post 9/11. Following Islamabad’s strategic alignment with China, Pakistan’s relations with the US deteriorated. In the past, Pakistan’s relationship with Beijing emerged from what Kennedy had once termed as ‘Pakistan’s flirtation with China’ during the Cold War era. Pakistan’s alignment with China post 9/11 reversed Pakistan’s earlier role for the US as a bulwark against communism and defender of western oil interest — the ‘wells of power’ in the Middle East. The US ‘defensive positionalism’ sought to reinvigorate

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148 Strengthening of democracy in Pakistan surged up in an ‘uneven’ manner as the US priority objective post 2007. Regional imperatives dictated the US policy in shaping omission of criticism on the irregularities in voter registration and dubious composition of the election commission in Pakistan in the run up to 2008 elections.

149 In the post Musharraf era in 2008, however, the US installed a docile civilian set-up in power in Pakistan, which remained subservient to the US larger interest in the region.

150 Pakistan’s position towards the US was interpreted as that of a ‘rent seeking state, leveraging charge for its geo-strategic location’ to one wronged by the US in its global and regional policy hiccups. Western scholars characterized the US-Pakistan relations as a ‘deadly embrace.’ Pakistani scholars, on the contrary, termed the US approach as ‘interest-oriented, businesslike and corporate.’ Pakistan’s relationship with the US oscillated between partnership and estrangement based on contrasting expectations.
Pakistan in its traditional role as a proxy collaborator in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. China’s ‘offensive positionalism’ aimed to incarnate Pakistan in its peaceful rise strategy. Historically speaking, the US-Pakistan relationship has served as a tactical alliance to address the US short-term security concerns.

The US-Pakistan interest post 9/11 diverged on Pakistan’s alleged support of Kashmiri militants, the Indo-US strategic partnership and the US desire to give India an enhanced role in Afghanistan. Three successive events in 2011 pushed US-Pakistan relations to an all time low — the Salala check post, the US diplomat Raymond Davis incident, and Operation Geronimo involving the capture of Osama Bin Laden. The US did not play any role in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The US lack-luster support for India-Pakistan peace process continued despite cross-border violations along the LoC. Although the US and China sought to promote stability in Pakistan, yet Sino-US policies practically increased terrorism, militancy and proxy involvement in Pakistan.

Third, the thesis found that the Sino-US competition post 9/11 enhanced Pakistan’s rivalry with India. On the surface, there may appear continuity rather than discontinuity in the US and Chinese security objectives in South Asia. Yet a profound analysis of Sino-US foreign policies post 9/11 revealed an obvious tilt towards India with direct consequences for Pakistan’s security. Sino-US strategic competition post 9/11 diminished Pakistan’s security vis. a vis. India. The Pakistan-India rivalry is the most glaring inescapable reality of the power equation in South Asia. Although given their traditional rivalry, the India-Pakistan equation put limitations on Sino-US policy options, yet India held much clout in the strategic calculations of both the US and China in wider Asia. Far less for China, whose territorial disputes and unresolved border demarcations allied it more with Pakistan for strategic gains, the US remained vigilant to the Indian multi-dimensional stature within South Asia.

Sino-US geo-strategic competition post 9/11 exacerbated Pakistan’s insecurity due to the growth of Indian power in South Asia. The deterioration in the US-Pakistan relations allowed the former to lean on India. Facilitating the great powers’ proxy competition in the region, Pakistan’s traditional approach adhered successfully to Chankiya’s philosophy of *Raja-Mandala* implying that states exploit fissures across the board caught in a circle of rival kings. Traditionally, the Pakistani policy relied upon
the US and China against a more powerful India. Suffering from ‘double dependency,’ ideological, religious and territorial factors led to Pakistan’s reactionary foreign policy towards India, which was much larger in size and demography. Truncated and ‘moth-eaten’ as Jinnah defined Pakistan’s post-partition geography, the state’s subsequent history aimed to rectify the ‘tyranny of terrain,’ marked by geographical vicinity to its arch rival India.

Common security concerns vis a vis India had defined the context of Sino-Pakistan relations in the past, leading to Pakistan’s relations with China and the US to benefit from Sino-US competition during the Cold War era. China-Pakistan relations thrived on shared interests in the past. Historically speaking, in forging an alliance partnership with Pakistan, China has banked upon giving India a two frontal war scenario. China has secured its southern borders against its arch rival India, while granting material and technological support to Pakistan. Yet China has maintained a cordial relationship with India in the post 9/11 era. Sino-Indian collaboration in the energy sector, agreement on climate change, trade, and collaboration in multilateral organizations indicated China’s transformed agenda in South Asian politics. Alleviating itself to the position of the US in the resolution of the India-Pakistan crises, China adopted a neutrality of stance vis a vis both India and Pakistan. It meant that China would not support Pakistan directly in any conflict with India.

Fourth, the thesis found that Sino-US competition entailed in their divergent security interests in Afghanistan worsened Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. Sino-US competition at the strategic, political and economic levels in Afghanistan eroded Pakistan’s security vis a vis Afghanistan. At a broad level, Sino-US aspired for stability and security in Afghanistan post 9/11, yet the US military bases in Afghanistan brought the US to the doorstep of China, leading to resentment, backlash and militancy. The rise in terrorism and militancy across the Afghan border had a spill over in Pakistan’s tribal areas in the Western borders based on ethnic and tribal affiliations. At the political level, the US support for India’s strong role in Afghanistan was opposed to Chinese desire for regional domination, leading to Pakistan’s frontline role in Afghanistan. At the economic level, Sino-US clash of economic interest pushed the US for a greater Chinese involvement in the promotion of peace and stability in Afghanistan. Without bearing up the costs involved, the US would not allow China to make gains in

China has viewed, the US establishment of military bases in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan as the US policy to contain China under the garb of GWOT. China has viewed the US policy of global forward defence— the US Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) as China’s encirclement in its backyard. Mearsheimer’s ‘bait and bleed’ perspective throws light on the security backlash China has faced from East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang. China’s relations with Pakistan deteriorated for the alleged support the Uyghur terrorists received from Pakistan’s tribal areas. The kidnapping of Chinese workers constituted another critical concern, foiling Pakistan-China relations. The US and China have diverged on the root-causes of militancy and stability in Afghanistan. China put the blame to the US counter-terrorism drive as the root-cause of militancy and instability. The US termed militancy resulting from the backlash of militants cultivated by the Pakistani ISI. The US drone strikes in Pakistan generated ethnic and political unrest, increased support for the insurgents and deteriorated Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. Pakistan’s domestic security suffered the backlash emanating from retaliation in Afghanistan. With Pakistan’s threat perception being India-specific, Islamabad has been alarmed over the extensive Indian involvement in Afghanistan. Pakistan has envisioned a strategic partnership with Afghanistan like the one Kabul has forged with India.

Along with India, Sino-US competition post 9/11 has added Afghanistan to Pakistan’s security equation. The Indo-US collaboration in Afghanistan has hampered Pakistan’s security, by necessitating a reciprocal frontline role to dilute the Indian hegemony in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s proxy involvement in Afghanistan has deteriorated Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, re-invigorating the Durrand line dispute while foiling the prospects of regional collaboration for energy import and trade in the region. Sandwiched between the two, Sino-US strategic and political interests have added threat from Afghanistan to Pakistan’s security paradigm. Sino-US projection of proxy collaborators has hampered the prospects of peace and stability in Afghanistan. The US and China’s convergence of interests holds the promise of shared gains in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth and energy resources, peace and regional stability. The US and China’s divergent interests and the clash thereof will foil the prospects of stability in
Afghanistan. Political and economic stability remains contingent on a shared vision of an integrated and multifaceted approach for the socio-economic and institutional development in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has sought a new peace deal based on collaboration with diverse factors in Afghanistan. A comprehensive, multifaceted and integrated regional approach has entailed that India-Pakistan should establish adherence to the principle of ‘independence, sovereignty and non-interference’ in the internal political structure of Afghanistan. Equally important it is for Afghanistan to regulate its external relations with important regional players particularly Pakistan and India on the shared vision of ‘equality, non-interference and non-partisan approach.’ Pakistani civilian and military leaderships’ minimalist agenda has looked for a friendly and stable Afghanistan, which is cognizant of Pakistan’s legitimate security interests in the region. Reclaiming the Pakistan-Afghanistan border from criminals and adherence to a regional approach has offered the most appropriate solution to Afghan problem. Pakistan has believed that an Afghan owned and Afghan led peace deal remains integral to the prospect of ultimate peace in the region. An inclusive government in Afghanistan with adequate Pashtun participation, recognized by all stake-holders is the recipe of a long lasting peace in Afghanistan.

The first chapter has discussed realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence. A blend of realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence has the power to explain the Sino-US dynamics of conflict and cooperation along with its implications for Pakistan’s security post 9/11. Realism has stressed the quest for maximization of power rooted in human nature. Neo-realism has emphasized structural constraints directing statesmen to maximize their power, while neo-classical realism has stressed on endogenous and exogenous compulsions that drive the statesmen to ensure security. Yet to view realism, neo-realism and neo-classical realism as all encompassing paradigm is to leave many dimensions of international politics out. The realist tradition has overemphasized the role of statism, self-help and security for survival in the anarchical international domain. Complex interdependence has highlighted the role of multiple channels along with trans-governmental and trans-national links regulating increasing interdependence between states. Complex interdependence tends to blur the strict distinction between ‘high politics’ of military agenda and ‘low politics’ of
economics and trade. States’ interaction is directed both by their military agendas along with their concern for economic interdependence and trade.

The criticism of interdependence lies in its overlooking the fact that the military agenda of ‘high politics’ and security tends to dominate the economic agenda of ‘low politics.’ Interdependence occurs at best as long as it serves the interests of the most powerful state. Survival depends on the adept exercise of force and a well-functioning balance of power. Hence theories of realism, neo-realism and neo-classical realism have furnished a substantial understanding of ‘power dynamics’ which regulates the relations between states. Realism and its various variants have set in the orientation of the present study vested in the logic of power. Complex interdependence has tended to explain the role of interdependence in trade and institutional links regulating state interaction. Despite their short-comings, the theories of realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence have collectively contributed to understand the nature of Sino-US relations post 9/11 and the implications for Pakistan’s security.

The second chapter gave an historical overview of Sino-US relations. From 19th century onwards, Sino-US historical relationship was a mixture of both conflict and cooperation over the years. From Jackal diplomacy to Chinese civil war to the period of the Cold war, conflict and cooperation have co-existed in the US relations with China. Historically, China regarded the US as an equitable partner in China’s unequal treatment and exploitation, along with the British and Western allied powers. The US role in the Chinese civil war tended to strengthen the Kuomintang Nationalist Party (KJP) against the Chinese communist, leading to the KNP’s establishment of rule in Taiwan. Following the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) take over in the mainland, China declared independence in October 1949. During the Cold War era, Sino-US relations fluctuated between conflict and cooperation. The initial period of the Cold War brought both the US and China in a face to face confrontation during the Korean War (1950-1953). Sino-US fought a proxy war in Vietnam and Indo-china from mid 1950s to mid 1970s.

However, following transformation in the global context marked by the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, there was Sino-US rapprochement in the 1970s. The Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in December 1979 led to the US and Chinese collaboration
against the Soviet Union during the 1980s. While ‘agreeing to disagree’ on prominent international issues, both the US and China developed a commonality of mutual interests which showed in the promotion of trade and maintenance of stability at the bilateral and regional levels until 9/11. During the 1990s, Sino-US economic interdependence became the prominent factor in the orchestration of bilateral relations compared to international concerns. The US and Chinese political and economic interdependence led to global stability during this period.

The next chapter has found that the US and Chinese involvement in the region negatively affected India-Pakistan relations. While both the US and China pursued their own competitive security interests in South Asia, Pakistan built formal alliance with the US in the 1950s and in the 1960s with China to enhance its own security vis a vis India. Pakistan built security alliances with the US in the 1950s by entering into SEATO and CENTO and an informal alliance with the US in the 1980s during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Disappointed with the US role in the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, Pakistan began its nuclear program with the help of China. Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union offered Pakistan maneuverability in aligning itself with both the US and China. In granting nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan, China’s rivalry with India acted as the principal motivational factor. To build a strong security nexus against India moved by the realist constraints, China built a stronger partnership with Islamabad following the US imposition of Pressler amendment on Pakistan in October 1990 through which the US terminated all its military and economic aid to Pakistan. During the 1990s, however, China provided strategic, military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Sino-US engagement in South Asia from 1949-9/11 was both competitive and cooperative. During the Cold War era, the US suspicion of China was based on Sino-Soviet closeness and China’s ideological affinity with the Soviet Union. The US competitive approach towards China in South Asia during this period is evident from the US support of India in the 1962 war and the US even-handed policy towards India and Pakistan during the 1965 India-Pakistan war. The Sino-Soviet split directed the US cooperation with China in South Asia during the 1970s. The US rapprochement with China in 1971 directed Sino-US cooperation to defend West Pakistan in the 1971 war and also to collaborate against the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in the 1980s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Sino-
US involvement became competitive in South Asia during the 1990s following the US announcement of Pressler sanctions on Pakistan. The US and China involvement became cooperative in South Asia post India-Pakistan nuclearization and the Kargil episode in the late 1990s.

The next chapter discovered that the US and Chinese global and regional security interests shaped their strategic, political and economic relations post 9/11. Sino-US relations has manifested both competition and cooperation in Asia. In the conduct of bilateral diplomacy at the bilateral, regional and global levels, the US and China have exhibited marks of complex interdependence based on convergence and divergence of interests. At the political level, Sino-US relations witnessed complex-interdependence featured on state level, social and economic interchanges. A broad convergence of interests prevailed in Sino-US desire to overcome differences in mutual expectations. At the strategic level, both the US and China maintained a resolve to maintain stability despite their differences on military trade and technology transfers. At the economic level, Sino-US relations reflected each side’s high stakes in the success of the other marked by energy and trade competition. Sino-US economic relations remained subservient to mutual vulnerabilities in trade and commercial relations, which raised Sino-US stakes in mutual collaboration.

Sino-US relations marked competition in the Asia-Pacific region regarding the territorial disputes and SLOCs in the South China Sea post 9/11. A broad convergence of their interests prevailed to maintain stability despite tensions in the South China Sea, Taiwan, Korea and Japan. Military to military exchanges and joint defence training exercises worked as mechanisms to diffuse mutual apprehensions and enhance trust. At the global level, both convergence and divergence of interests prevailed on important issues of Sino-US global security concern. Both the US and China exploited nationalistic sentiments directed against each other to diffuse domestic dissent.

The next chapter gave insight into the competitive Sino-US maritime relations in the broader Asia-Pacific region. Indo-US maritime convergence of interests in the Asia-Pacific region has largely occurred due to their common perception of threat from China. In striking a strategic alliance with the US, India has tended to counter China’s naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. Convergence of maritime strategic interests has
brought Indian naval collaboration with other regional states such as Australia and Japan, while eliminating traditional distinctions between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. The chapter emphasized that the US and China maritime rivalry in the Asia-Pacific would have security implications for Pakistan adjacent to the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz.

While the US strategy worked on neo-structural realist balancing, India has resorted to ‘hedging’ or softer balancing. In March 2012, a Maritime Dialogue Mechanism was announced between India and China involving Asia-Pacific issues. The concept as a policy has involved the process of engagement including both internal and external balancing. While both India and the US have resorted to external balancing, both have engaged in internal balancing to invoke independence in their respective foreign policies stance. Neo-structural realism has explained the Indo-US maritime convergence of interests in the Indian Ocean. Indo-US naval collaboration has provided for the Indian strategic expansion into the Indian Ocean. India’s strategic alliances and maritime inter-operability has offered India strong prospects for leverage of power and expansion of influence in the Indian Ocean to the detriment of Pakistan’s maritime and strategic security.

The next chapter discovered that Sino-US security competition in South Asia had diminished Pakistan’s security. Sino-US policies post 9/11 sought to prevent the growth of rival’s influence in Pakistan. The increase in the US influence post 9/11 alarmed China, leading to Beijing’s subtle expansion of geo-strategic and economic influence in the region. Sino-US competition in South Asia weakened Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion while aggravating political violence in the state. At the political level, the US and Chinese policies bolstered the role of the military against the civilian institutions in the domestic milieu of Pakistan. Sino-US military contacts, aid and defence equipment strengthened the military against the civilian institutions, exaggerated the civil-military divide and adversely affected the growth of true democracy in Pakistan.

Sino-US competitive balancing strengthened regional polarization while it led to Pakistan’s insecurity. Although the US and China sought to promote stability in Pakistan, yet Sino-US policies at the practical level increased the cost of terrorism and
militancy through their proxy involvement in Pakistan. At the economic level, Sino-US desire to curtail one another’s influence hampered Pakistan’s desire to import energy resources through regional economic collaboration projects such as IPI and TAPI in South Asia. China invested projects worth $46 billion in infrastructure development, power generation and mineral reserves did, however, gave Pakistan an opportunity for socio-economic advancement. Yet Chinese ventures have entailed security challenges for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion and geographical integrity.

The next chapter explored the implications of Sino-US relations post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the regional level. It found that both realism and neo-realism has directed Sino-US security objectives on Kashmir. The US and China policies post 9/11 stressed that India and Pakistan resolve the Kashmir dispute bilaterally implying that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved in the spirit of the Simla agreement rather than through the UN resolutions or US mediation or facilitation. Within this context, Sino-US policies have tended to strengthen the status-quo on the unresolved stature of the Kashmir conflict. Sino-US emphasis on the bilateral approach more than the UN resolutions strengthened the Indian stance on Kashmir. Enhancing Indian preponderance in the region, Sino-US policies post 9/11 encouraged a stalemate in India-Pakistan peace process, while hampering the advancement of peace dialogue on Kashmir. The US and China viewed the Kashmir conflict as a ‘bargaining chip’ to extract policy favours from both Pakistan and India. The US coerced both Pakistan and India for granting concessions on the GWOT post 9/11. From a realist perspective, the Kashmir dispute has allowed both the US and China room for regional involvement and manoeuvrability in Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

Viewed in the perspective of Sino-US competition, the Kashmir conflict’s unresolved status has served the US and China’s different security interests in the region. For the US, the Kashmir conflict has allowed the US to keep ‘a nuclear flash point alive’ on China’s periphery, while simultaneously preventing Indian hegemony in South Asia by engaging it in a power competition with Pakistan. For China, the Kashmir dispute has prevented Indian access to Central Asian energy reserves and markets, restricting transit passage via the disputed region of Kashmir. Simultaneously, Kashmir has prevented SAARC’s potency as a regional trading bloc, facilitating Beijing’s own access and monopoly on South Asian trade. India and Pakistan have held differing conceptions of
regional security, built on respective pursuit of national interests and identity. For Pakistan, the conflict on its eastern and western borders is inter-connected. Security for Islamabad is inextricably linked to having a peace settlement in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Ironically, anti-terrorism for India means only the method to deal with the threat of militancy in occupied Kashmir.

The chapter on Pakistan-India strategic rivalry’ debated that Sino-US strategic balancing has enhanced India-Pakistan strategic rivalry. The US politico-strategic partnership with India post 9/11 spawned a spiral of suspicion and hostility in the South Asian region, with repercussion extending as far as China. The US partnership with India pushed Pakistan to become a pawn in Sino-US competition, which aimed at curtailing rival strategic influence in the region. Generating a counter balancing response, the US alignment with India strengthened rival polarization along the lines of China-Pakistan strategic nexus. Although China maintained an economic relationship with India, the former strengthened its politico-strategic alignment with Pakistan as a counter-balancing move against the US in the post 9/11 era.

Sino-Pakistan convergence of strategic interests was built on Pakistan’s dire need to increase its security against India in South Asia. The US delivery of latest conventional military equipment to India spilled Chinese inflow of strategic weaponry to Pakistan, thereby increasing India-Pakistan military spending. The US supply of advanced technology and weapons to India increased Indian strategic preponderance, exacerbating Pakistan’s threat perceptions of India. Generating a spiral of mutual suspicions, Sino-US balancing of strategic interests has exacerbated Indo-Pakistan rivalry in South Asia. The Indo-US nuclear and strategic partnership has disturbed South Asian deterrence stability based on conventional and unconventional power parity in South Asia. Disturbing the conventional balance, the Indo-US collaboration has lowered the nuclear threshold for India and Pakistan by inducing arms race in the region.

The chapter on Pakistan’s relations with Afghans discussed that the US and Chinese interests have converged and diverged in Afghanistan, while negatively affecting Pakistan’s security interests vis a vis Afghanistan. Broadly speaking, both the US and China aspired for stability and security in Afghanistan post 9/11. However, the
US and Chinese policy interests diverged along all strategic, political and economic levels. At the strategic level, the US military bases in Afghanistan brought the US to the doorstep of China, causing resentment, backlash and militancy in Afghanistan. The rise in terrorism and militancy on the Pak-Afghan border spilled over inside Pakistan’s tribal areas based on ethnic and tribal affiliations. At the political level, the US support for India’s playing a strong role in Afghanistan was opposed to Chinese desire for domination of South Asia.

The Indo-US collaboration in Afghanistan has hampered Pakistan’s security as China has pushed Pakistan to a frontline role in Afghanistan to dilute Indian hegemony. Sino-US projection of proxy collaborators has hampered the prospects of peace and stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s proxy involvement in Afghanistan has deteriorated Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, re-invigorating the Durrand line dispute while foiling the prospects of regional collaboration for energy import and trade in the region. Sandwiched between the two, Sino-US strategic and political interests have added another dimension to Pakistan security paradigm by adding Afghanistan to Pakistan’s security equation apart from India.

Overall the thesis has maintained that Sino-US global security interests post 9/11 made South Asia important for both the states. At the global level, the US factor became the catalyst providing sustenance to Pakistan-China relations, while at the regional level common enmity towards India has defined the context of Sino-Pakistan relations. The decline in the US-Pakistan relations has allowed Islamabad to forge a strategic partnership with China. The southern leg of China’s BRI initiative — CPEC has global underpinnings for Pakistan’s security. The corridor has offered Pakistan a viable option in the face of the down turn in its relations with the US. Pakistan sits at the crossroads of China’s grand strategy of peaceful rise, serving as the prime life-line for Beijing’s global ambitions. Security in Afghanistan and Balochistan would either brighten up or dim the prospects of energy import to mainland China. Beijing has even viewed alternate options such as BCIM corridor to sustain the smooth growth of its GDP.151 The contemporary geo-strategic environment has, however, entailed certain viable security options for Pakistan’s security.

151 China’s GDP suffered a slight recession in early 2016.
Pakistan would need to embark on a multilateral foreign policy rather than throwing all its eggs in China’s basket. In formulating Pakistan’s future policy options, Islamabad must recognize China’s new global role and policy limitations. China would even contribute to India’s development to counter the US influence in the region.\textsuperscript{152} The US politico-strategic alignment with India post 9/11 has provoked China’s counter-balancing of alignment with Pakistan. Despite regional polarization, however, China would not want Pakistan to put Beijing in a position where it has to take sides. China wants to focus more on ‘winning without fighting.’ China’s complex relations with India would make Beijing wary if and when India-Pakistan tensions aggravate.

Interestingly, China has balanced its economic, political and strategic interests vis a vis India despite the border tensions between them. China has wanted Pakistan to adopt a more pragmatic attitude towards India just as China itself has demonstrated towards Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and India. Pakistan would need to remain sensitive to China’s regional and global sensitivities that have surrounded China-Pakistan relationship. Simultaneously, Pakistan should aim to keep its regional options open in the world of multilateral diplomacy. A balanced foreign policy should take into account Indian position in the region to allow for open-ended diplomacy. By adopting a more pragmatic approach on common regional security concerns vis a vis India and Afghanistan, Pakistan would need to adopt a neutrality of stance by rebuilding its relationship with the US. It would be in Pakistan’s long term interest to demonstrate manoeuvrability, flexibility and neutrality in Sino-US competition in South Asia.

Facing a dilemma, the US and China supported stability in Pakistan for different reasons. For the US, strengthening Pakistan’s stability promoted China’s emergence as a global power, while Pakistan’s collapse increased the prospect of militant Islamic takeover in the region. For China, larger US role in the stability of Pakistan enhanced

\textsuperscript{152} In an interview conducted by the author with in Islamabad, October 2015, Mu Zouming, Deputy Secretary General, The Association of Chinese and Pakistani Scholars, Specialist China’s Silk Road Strategy opined that India’s development is good for China to counter the rival growth of influence in South Asia.
Chinese fears of being contained by the US, while its collapse increased the fear of a spill over in Tibet and Xinjiang. Facing this dilemma, Sino-US policies’ led to proxy involvement in Pakistan. The more the US Indo-specific partisan approach in regional power parity pushed Pakistan to the geo-strategic basket of China, the greater the US interest was manifested in a thinner concept of stability in Pakistan. Chinese analysts frequently complained about the US lacklustre support on counter-terrorism policy. For the US, counter-terrorism was a strategic drive to prevent Pakistan’s collapse to radical Islamism. China feared terrorism becoming a garb or breeding ground for a spill over in Tibet and Xinjiang; while damaging China’s larger interests in India, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran and the Middle East. The US would not allow China ‘to have its cake and eat it too’ without bearing the costs. While abstaining to take direct charge, the US had adopted ‘cheers from the sidelines approach’ pushing China to take greater charge for Pakistan’s security, while retaining interest for itself in raising the costs involved.

Current trends in Sino-US relations post 9/11 have made the thesis highly timely. The competitive nature of developments in Sino-US relationship became even more evident from Obama’s State of the Union address in 2015. At the political level, Xi Jinping insisted the US of a ‘major power’ relationship in the Sunny lands conference in October 2015, emphasizing extension of recognition to China’s sovereignty claims in its own territory. New advancements in the South China Sea have granted primacy to Sino-US relations for the emerging security order in Asia. China’s development of cruise and ballistic missile air defence, construction of artificial islands in South China Sea, reclamation of land borders, integrated air-sea defence and electronic warfare capabilities should be seen as the Chinese response to the US pivot Asia strategy of global forward defence. The US Integrated Air and Sea Battle defnecesstrategy, nuclear security guarantees to allies in the Asia-Pacific region, defence treaties reinforcement and littoral states’ increase in military budgets are alarming trends in the contemporary Sino-US relations.

The thesis becomes all the more significant due to the recent developments throughout Asia. To achieve a great power status, however, China would require a peaceful international environment and a sustained supply of energy. Chinese initiatives like the BRI along with its three pronged pillars: the Silk Road Economic Belt, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and CPEC are highly significant for the US global security interests.
in Asia. Aspiring for a larger geo-strategic space across Pamir, Tianshan, Karakoram and the Himalayas, Chinese ventures have reflected its desire to create a larger geo-political and geo-economic consortium based on geographic connectivity and multilateralism in diplomacy. Towards the south, China-ASEAN Trans-Asian Railway, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridors (BCIM), CPEC and the Qinghai-Tibet railway have expanded China’s geographic space in both Southeast and Southwest Asia.

Moreover, the recent Chinese maritime initiatives in the Indian Ocean make the thesis very timely. Indian patronage to Iranian Chabhar has tended to counter Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ strategy manifested in the Gwadar port in Pakistan, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, Chittagong port in Bangladesh and Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar. Within South Asia, significant developments on the regional landscape have granted significance to the present study. President Xi Jinping two days historic visit to Pakistan (April 20-21, 2015) has settled much dust to indicate the position Islamabad has taken in the unfolding Sino-US global strategic rivalry in South Asia. Xi Jinping’s visit has balanced Obama’s earlier visit to India in February 2015 to counter the US expansion of influence in China’s backyard. Moreover, the Indo-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement of October 2011, India-Afghanistan-Iran Trilateral Transit and Trade Agreement signed on May 23, 2016 and the constitution of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) for Afghan Peace and Reconciliation, comprising the US, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan have made the thesis significant.

The thesis has proved the hypothesis that Sino-US relations post 9/11 has had adverse implications for Pakistan’s security. It has manifested proved that amicable Sino-US relations would enhance Pakistan’s security, while Sino-US rivalry would erode Pakistan’s security. Within this context, Sino-US competition post 9/11 has diminished Pakistan’s security both at the domestic and regional levels. At the domestic level, Sino-US relations post 9/11 reduced Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion, while increasing political violence in the state. At the regional level, Sino-US relations post 9/11 diminished Pakistan’s security by worsening its relations with both India and Afghanistan.
The thesis has filled up the gap in the existing literature on the subject. The available literature deals with Sino-US relations or with Pakistan’s security as separate questions. The thesis has explored Sino-US relations post 9/11 in accordance with the theoretical paradigms of realism, neo-realism and complex interdependence as well as linking this very significant relationship with Pakistan’s domestic and regional security post 9/11. Through drawing this linkage between Sino-US relations, on one hand, and Pakistan’s security, on the other, the thesis has provided original contribution to knowledge.

This patterns of amity and enmity amongst great powers—whether colonial or imperialist, capitalist or communist, pagan or monotheistic or atheist—have determined issues of war and peace throughout history. On the chessboard of International Relations, great powers have remained the players, while smaller states have acted as their pawns. The power play among great powers has determined the nature of alliances, the attempts to create balance of power and even provided the rationale for interdependence through centuries. The advancement in science and technology has provided sophisticated weapons to states and opened up new strategic dimensions for the state actors. Despite the existence of certain patterns of history, International Relations have been fluid and open to the making and re-making of history. Old rivalries would break down while new ones would be born. Both Heraclitus and Parmenides were right: Everything changes yet nothing changes. Such is the nature of the evolution of the international system, relations among states and the age old phenomena of war and peace. Everything that happens shall pass. Although wars cannot altogether be eliminated, greater wisdom would always reside in liberalism, interdependence and peace.
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FRAMEWORK FOR THE U.S. - INDIA DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

1. Defense and security cooperation is a key component of the bilateral relationship between India and the United States, and has evolved to become a vital pillar of engagement between the two countries. The United States and India have created a wide-ranging, strategic partnership that reflects their common principles, democratic traditions, long-term strategic convergence, and shared national interests. These interests include:
   -- maintaining peace and security;
   -- defeating terrorism and violent extremism;
   -- preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, data, and technologies;
   -- supporting a rule-based order, protecting the free flow of commerce.

2. In 1995, the Agreed Minute on Defense Relations between the United States and India was signed - beginning a new era in U.S.-India defense relations. In 2005, the two sides reflected the continued evolution of the relationship by signing the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, which charted an ambitious course for the future development of the India - U.S. partnership. In 2013, the Joint Principles for Defense Cooperation stated that India and the United States share common security interests and place each other at the same level as their closest partners - confirming that this would also apply with respect to defense technology transfers, licensing, trade, research, co-development, and co-production involving defense articles and services, including advanced and sophisticated technology.

3. The renewal of the 2005 Framework marks a new chapter in the relationship between two strategic partners. The renewal builds upon the shared understandings and successes of the past, and charts a path-forward for the next ten years. Through defense dialogue mechanisms, military-to-military interactions and exercises,
increased opportunities in defense technology collaboration, the United States and India have expanded the potential of the partnership and bilateral collaboration.

4. In pursuit of a shared vision for an expanded defense partnership, both sides determined that their defense establishments are to:

   A. Conduct regular service-specific, joint, and combined exercises and exchanges;

   B. Collaborate in multinational operations whenever it is in their common interest to do so;

   C. Enhance cooperation in military training and education, including instructor and student exchanges and collaboration between national defense universities;

   D. Strengthen the capabilities of their defence establishments to promote security and defeat terrorism;

   E. Expand interaction with other nations in ways that promote regional and global peace and stability;

   F. Enhance capabilities to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

   G. Increase exchanges of intelligence;

   H. In the context of this strategic relationship, continue to strengthen two-way U.S.-India defense trade. The United States and India commit to work to conclude defense transactions, not as ends in and of themselves, but as means to strengthen both countries’ security, to reinforce the strategic partnership, to achieve greater interaction and cooperation between their armed forces, and to build greater understanding between defense establishments;

   I. Exchange experiences and practices in operating common defense platforms; and increase capacity to use such platforms optimally;
J. Explore collaboration relating to missile defense;

K. Strengthen the abilities of their militaries to respond quickly to disaster situations, including in combined operations;

L. Assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping operations, with a focus on enabling other countries to field trained, capable forces for these operations;

M. Conduct routine exchanges on defense strategy and defense transformation;

N. Continue strategic-level discussions by senior leadership from the U.S. Department of Defense and India's Ministry of Defence, in which the two sides exchange perspectives on international security issues of common interest, with the goal of increasing mutual understanding, promoting shared objectives, and developing common approaches; and

O. Enhance cooperation toward maritime security and to increase each other's capability to secure the free movement of lawful commerce and freedom of navigation across sea lines of communication, in accordance with the principles of international law.

5. The Defense Policy Group (DPG) is to continue serving as the primary mechanism to guide the U.S.-India strategic defense partnership, recognizing the significant contributions the meetings have made to the overall defense relationship. The Defense Policy Group is to make appropriate adjustments to the structure and frequency of its meetings and of its subgroups, as determined jointly by the Defense Policy Group co-chairs, so that it remains an effective mechanism to advance U.S.-India defense cooperation.

6. The sub-groups of the DPG are to continue to meet regularly and to report to the DPG. These sub-groups and their objectives are as follows:
A. The Defence Procurement and Production Group (DPPG), co-chaired by the Director General (Acquisition) and the Director, Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), is to review government-to-government defense acquisitions (including hybrid programs) and other defense trade issues.

B. Senior Technology Security Group (STSG): The objective of the STSG is to develop understanding of export licensing and technology security processes and practices and to establish a technology security dialogue for adequate protection for advanced defense technologies.

C. Joint Technical Group (JTG): The JTG provides a forum for discussion and coordination of defense research and production matters.

D. Military Cooperation Group (MCG): The MCG serves as the primary forum to guide cooperation between the armed forces of both sides.

E. Executive Steering Groups (ESGs): In conjunction with the MCG, the ESGs function as the primary mechanisms to develop military service-related cooperation.

7. Recognizing the transformative effect that the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) can have, the two sides have established a DTTI Group, which is to work towards resolving process issues impeding cooperation and the alignment of systems; increasing the flow of technology and investment; developing capabilities and partnership in co-development and co-production; and intensifying cooperation in research and development. The progress made by the DTTI Group is to be presented to the DPG.

8. The initiatives and activities described above are to proceed in reliance upon this Framework for guidance on the principles and objectives of the U.S.-India strategic relationship, and are to strive to achieve those objectives.
8. The initiatives and activities described above are to proceed in reliance upon this Framework for guidance on the principles and objectives of the India - U.S. strategic relationship, and are to strive to achieve those objectives.

9. This Framework is to be effective from the date of its signature and is to continue in effect for 10 years unless it is revised or terminated in writing. Disagreement, if any, regarding Framework matters is to be resolved through mutual consultations.

10. This Framework is to guide the two sides in further developing bilateral defense ties.

Signed in New Delhi on 03rd June, 2015 in two originals in English.

Secretary of Defence

Minister of Defence

(Ashton Carter)
For and on behalf of the
Government of the United
States of America

(Manoher Parrikar)
For and on behalf of the
Government of the Republic of India

HTTP://ARCHIVE.DEFENSE.GOVPUBS/2015-DEFENSE-FRAMEWORK.PDF
APPENDIX B
JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON ESTABLISHING THE ALL-WEATHER STRATEGIC COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP

At the invitation of President Mamnoon Hussain and Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China is paying a state visit to Pakistan from 20 to 21 April 2015. During the visit, President Xi Jinping met with President Mamnoon Hussain, Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, leaders of the Senate, the National Assembly, the Armed forces and political parties of Pakistan; and also engaged with people from a wide spectrum of the society.

2. The Leaders of the two countries reviewed with satisfaction the historical development of Pakistan-China relations and the progress made in recent years. They agreed that the Pakistan-China relationship had acquired greater strategic significance against the backdrop of complex and changing international and regional situations. The two sides agreed to elevate the Pakistan-China relationship to the All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership, enriching the Pakistan-China Community of Shared Destiny, to ensure the perpetual continuity in Pakistan-China friendship from generation to generation.

3. The Chinese side reiterated that China has always placed its relationship with Pakistan on a priority position in its foreign policy agenda. China appreciates Pakistan’s consistent and staunch support on issues concerning China’s core interests. China reaffirms its support and solidarity for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. It appreciates Pakistan’s efforts for the peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues with its neighbours. In fact, friendship and cooperation between Pakistan and China serve the fundamental interests of the two countries and peoples, and contribute to peace, stability and development in the region and beyond.

4. The Pakistani side described friendship with China as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Pakistan is committed to one-China policy. Pakistan fully supports China in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
5. The two sides agreed to maintain close high-level exchanges, which would provide guidance for the healthy and sustainable development of bilateral relationship. The two sides will further enhance strategic communication and coordination to safeguard their common interests.

6. The two sides highly appreciate the progress to make China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) an important project of “the Belt and Road”. Pakistan welcomes the creation of Silk Road Fund by China and its utilization for CPEC-related projects. The Pakistan side will firmly support and actively take part in the building of “the Belt and Road”. Silk Road Fund has become stockholders of China Three Gorges South Asia Investment Limited Company, and will join hands with it to invest in clean energy projects such as Karot Hydropower Station, which is the first investment project of Silk Road Fund since its establishment. Silk Road Fund is willing to actively seize opportunities to invest in and provide financing for other projects under the framework of CPEC. The two sides believed that the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiatives represent a new model of regional and South-South cooperation, which will offer new opportunities for Asia’s rejuvenation and the common prosperity of all countries.

7. In noting the progress made in the building of the CPEC, the two sides stressed that the planning and development of the CPEC will cover all regions and benefit the entire population of Pakistan, while promoting the common development and prosperity of both China and Pakistan as well as other parts of the region. The two sides agreed to promote a “1+4” pattern of economic cooperation featuring a leading role of the CPEC and four key areas including the Gwadar Port, Energy, Transportation Infrastructure and Industrial Cooperation. The two sides welcomed the successful fourth session of the CPEC Joint Cooperation Committee and agreed to complete the CPEC long-term Planning at the earliest possible date. The two sides will actively facilitate the important cooperation projects including the Karakoram Highway (Phase II) Upgrade and Reconstruction, the Gwadar Port, the Karachi-Lahore Motorway (Multan-Sukkur section), the Lahore Metro Orange Line, the Haier-Ruba Economic Zone, the Suki Kinari Hydropower Project, the Pakistan-China Cross-border Fiber Optic Cable, the Landing of DTMB in Pakistan, as well as a number of energy, infrastructure and power generation projects.
The Pakistani side appreciated the generous help the Chinese side has provided for its economic development over the years. The Chinese side reiterated that it will continue to support Pakistan’s efforts to develop its economy, provide assistance to the reconstruction and related projects on people’s livelihoods in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and provide material assistance for Pakistan to adapt to climate change.

9. The two sides expressed satisfaction at the growing volume of their bilateral trade, which has crossed US$ 15 billion and agreed to make efforts to raise it to US$ 20 billion in next three years. They also agreed to take appropriate measures to ease the imbalance in their bilateral trade. The two sides decided to speed up the second round of talks on the Pakistan-China Free Trade Agreement, and are ready to open up the banking industry wider to each other under the Pakistan-China Agreement on Trade in Services. Pakistan welcomes the establishment of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and both sides agreed to accelerate the preparation for the Bank to promote regional infrastructure construction and economic development.

10. The two sides agreed to further enhance maritime cooperation, bring into full play the Pakistan-China Maritime cooperation dialogue mechanism, strengthen policy dialogue and strategic communication on maritime issues, and conduct close cooperation on navigation security, marine economy, the exploration and utilization of marine resources, marine scientific research and environmental protection. The two sides decided to set up a Joint Marine Scientific Research Centre in Pakistan. The Chinese side announced that it will hold a training course on maritime scientific research for South Asian countries in 2015. The Pakistani side expressed its willingness to take an active part in it.

11. The two sides believed that the security interests of Pakistan and China are closely interconnected. They will actively advocate the Asian security concept featuring common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. The two sides will continue to enhance cooperation in fighting terrorism and national defence, and strengthen coordination on international and regional security affairs. The two sides will continue working together to resolutely combat the terrorist organization, ETIM. China commended Pakistan’s major contribution to the international counter-terrorism efforts, and will continue to support Pakistan in implementing its counter-terrorism
strategy in accordance with its national conditions and enhancing counter-terrorism capacity building. Both sides will continue to regularly utilize their existing mechanisms of Strategic Dialogue and Counter-terrorism Consultations to further promote coordination and mutual understanding.

12. The two sides agreed to actively promote 2012-2020 Space Cooperation Outline between China National Space Administration and Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission. Both sides agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation in space technology applications, expedite the integration process of remote sensing, telecommunication and navigation technologies for their extensive application in communications, hydrology, geology, disaster management, port management, mineral prospection, food security, water prospection and other areas for seeking potential advantage in social and economic development.

13. The two sides agreed to further enhance defence cooperation, maintain high-level visits and exchanges at various levels between relevant departments of the two armed forces, make full use of the Pakistan-China Defence and Security Consultation mechanism, deepen cooperation in areas such as joint exercises and training, personnel training and equipment and technology, and expand cooperation in defence technology and production.

14. The two sides attach great importance to people to people and cultural exchanges between the two countries, and will build Pakistan-China relations as a model of friendly exchanges and cooperation among countries of different civilizations. The two are jointly celebrating the Pakistan-China Year of Friendly Exchanges in 2015, and agreed to further expand exchanges between think-tanks, media, youth, academics and artists of the two countries to make Pakistan-China friendship even more deeply rooted in the hearts of the people. China announced the establishment of the Chinese Cultural Centre in Islamabad, which was welcomed by Pakistan. The two sides announced the agreement on establishment of sister city relations between Chengdu and Lahore, between Karamay and Gwadar as well as between Zhuhai and Gwadar. The two sides will actively encourage and support their publishing organizations to participate in each other’s book fairs and to translate and circulate high-quality publications of each other. The two sides announced the launch of CCTV English News Channel and International Documentary Channel, the establishment of the “FM98 Pakistan-China Friendship
Radio” studio by the China Radio International and the Pakistan-China Small-sized Hydro Power Technology National Joint Research Center in Pakistan. The Chinese side announced a training program of 2000 experts from Pakistan in the next 5 years. The Pakistani side expressed its gratitude.

15. The two sides agreed to strengthen coordination and cooperation on international and regional issues of common interest, and maintain close communication and coordination within international and regional mechanisms such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) to safeguard the common interest of developing countries. China will actively support Pakistan’s efforts to become a full member of SCO at an early date.

16. The two sides recognized that the year 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War. Pakistan and China support the international community to use this opportunity to organize commemorative events, in order to draw lessons from history, reaffirm the solemn commitment to the Charter of the United Nations, and safeguard the victory of the Second World War and the contemporary world order and international system based on the Charter of United Nations; to chart the course for the future, explore effective approaches to safeguard international peace and security under new circumstances, and jointly build a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation. The two sides support the reform of the United Nations and its Security Council to enable it to better discharge the responsibilities enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The two sides believed that the Security Council reform should increase the representation of developing countries and engage in democratic consultations to seek a comprehensive solution that accommodates the interests and concerns of all UN Member States and enjoys extensive support.

17. The two sides believe that a peaceful, stable, cooperative and prosperous South Asia is in the common interest of all parties. The two sides are ready to work together for peace, development and cooperation among the South Asian countries so as to
achieve enduring peace and common prosperity in the region. Pakistan supports China in elevating its relations with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, commended the China-South Asia People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges Plan, the China-South Asia Science and Technology Partnership Plan and other initiatives put forward by the Chinese side, and is ready to participate in these initiatives actively.

18. The two sides believe that cooperation between Pakistan and China is conducive to maintaining peace and stability and promoting common development and prosperity in the region. They reaffirm their commitment to multilateral non-discriminatory arms control and non-proliferation endeavours. They agree to continue bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards, in line with their respective bilateral and multilateral commitments. China appreciates and supports steps taken by Pakistan towards its mainstreaming into the global non-proliferation regime. In this context, China welcomes Pakistan’s engagement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and is ready to strengthen communication and coordination with Pakistan.

19. The two sides believe that the evolving situation in Afghanistan has immediate implications for regional security and stability. Pakistan recognizes the constructive role being played by China in regional peace and stability and in this context, the two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation on Afghanistan, support the “Afghan-owned and Afghan-led” peace and reconciliation process and work with the international community to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region. China will extend full support to Pakistan for hosting a successful Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process in Islamabad in 2015.

20. President Xi Jinping expressed his appreciation to the government and people of Pakistan for the warm hospitality accorded to him and his delegation. He invited President Mamnoon Hussain to visit China again at a mutually convenient time. The President of Pakistan accepted the invitation with pleasure.

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APPENDIX C

CHINESE DYNASTIC HISTORY
2500 BC

Neolithic tomb at Dawenkou

2000 BC

2000 BC

Shang ca 1600-1000

1500 BC

Shang tomb of Fu Hao

1000 BC

Zhou ca 1000-256 BC

Zhou Dynasty China

500 BC

Warring States tomb of Marquis Yi

200 BC

Han 206 BC-AD 220

100 BC

Han Dynasty China

100 AD

Period of Division 220-581

Zhou Dynasty China

200

Famous calligraphers

500

Buddhist cave temples

Sui

Buddhist sculpture and painting

Tang 618-906

Han Dynasty China

Buddhist images
800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000

**Famous calligraphers**

**Military technology**

**Period of Division**

**Sui Dynasty China**

**Tang Dynasty China**

**Five Dynasties China**

**Song** 960-1276

**Paintings**

**Hardwood furniture**

**Elegant gardens**

**Clothing**

**Buddhist worship**

**Ordinary homes**

**Political posters**

**Fayuan temple**

**Minorities**

**1100**

**1200**

**1300**

**1400**

**1500**

**1600**

**1700**

**1800**

**1900**

**1925**

**1950**

**1975**

**2000**
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MAP 1
THE US, CHINA & PAKISTAN

Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/
MAP 2
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

Source: https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=pakistan+map&espv
MAP 3
CHINA’S BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)

The Belt and Road Initiative: Six Economic Corridors Spanning Asia, Europe and Africa

Source: https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=Belt+and+Road+images
MAP 4
SOUTHERN LEG OF BRI: CPEC

Source: https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=MAPS+OF+cpec&espv
MAP 5
TRADE TRANSIT ROUTES FROM CENTRAL ASIA TO GWADAR

Source:https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=TRADE+TRANSIT+ROUTES+FROM+CENTRAL+ASIA+TO+GWADAR+IMAGES&espv=
MAP 5.1
CHINA’S FIRST ISLAND AND SECOND ISLAND CHAIN

Source:
https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=China+first+island+and+second+island+chain+images
&espv=2&biw
MAP 5.2
SOUTH CHINA AND EAST CHINA SEA

MAP 5.3
CHINA’S MISSILE RANGE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

Source:
https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=CHINA%E2%80%99S+MISSILE+RANGE+CONVENTIONAL+CAPABILITIES+images&biw=
MAP 5.4
CHINA’S STRING OF PEARLS

Source: https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=china%27s+string+of+pearls+images
MAP 5.5
INTERNATIONAL SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATIONS

MAP 6
TAPI AND IPI PROJECT ROUTES ACROSS TURKMENISTAN AND IRAN

Source: https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=IPI+and+TAPI+projects+images&biw