PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

A dissertation submitted to the School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR), Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU), Islamabad

In partial fulfillment of requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

By

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2017
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Student/Author Signature: ___________________

(Talat Shabbir)
DEDICATION

To my beloved wife Naheed Talat
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Talat Shabbir
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armored Personnel Carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRI</td>
<td>Belt and Road Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPEC</td>
<td>China Pakistan Economic Corridor</td>
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<td>CPFTA</td>
<td>China Pakistan Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>DTMB</td>
<td>Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asia Summit</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investments</td>
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<td>FIEO</td>
<td>Federation of Indian Export Organizations</td>
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<td>FMCT</td>
<td>Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>HIT</td>
<td>Heavy Industries Taxila</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monitory Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSI</td>
<td>Institute of Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jamaat i Islami</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUI (F)</td>
<td>Jamiat Ulmaaye Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JWG</td>
<td>Joint Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANUPP</td>
<td>Karachi Nuclear Power Plant</td>
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<td>KKH</td>
<td>Karakoram Highway</td>
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<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRL</td>
<td>Khan Research Laboratories</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Line of Actual Control</td>
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<td>LeT</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>Main Battle Tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favored Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multi-National Companies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MODP</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense Production</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Megawatt</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Development Complex</td>
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<td>NDRC</td>
<td>National Development and Reforms Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>NESCOM</td>
<td>National Engineering and Scientific Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Supplier Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSSP</td>
<td>Next Step in Strategic Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBOR</td>
<td>One Belt One Road</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAEC</td>
<td>Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>POF</td>
<td>Pakistan Ordnance Factories</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCG</td>
<td>Quadrilateral Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>Research and Analysis Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEZ</td>
<td>Special Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Strategic Plans Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF-88</td>
<td>Task Force-88</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre Missile Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Taliban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nation General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation has addressed a central question as to why and how various regional and global developments have impacted Pakistan-China relations in the post-Cold War period. Within this context, the dissertation has attempted to analyze continuing evolution in political, strategic and economic spheres of Pakistan-China bilateral relations. China’s 1978 reforms and opening up policy, disintegration of the Soviet Union and events of 9/11 were three major developments that characterized regional and global politics of South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. China’s reforms resulted in its massive economic growth as well as brought transformation in its foreign policy behavior. The disintegration of Soviet Union accelerated the end of the Cold War and marked the beginning of American unipolarity with major US objectives of nuclear non-proliferation, countering terrorism and promotion of democracy. These developments had a deep impact on Pakistan in general and on Pakistan-China relations in particular. In the given period, Pakistan-China relations evolved in political, strategic and economic spheres. In the regional context, the study addressed Pakistan’s and China’s India centricity, emerging relations of Pakistan, China, India, Afghanistan and also Iran as important regional stakeholders along with political, strategic and economic imperatives of the region itself. In the global context, the assessment dealt with emerging international order, Indo-US strategic partnership and the US containment of China strategy impacting Pakistan-China relations. Underlying assumptions of realism and complex interdependence formed the basis of the study. Analysis of the relations in the light of variables such as emerging global order, India-US strategic cooperation and US strategy of containment of China were important indicators on the basis of which Pakistan-China relations would continue to remain cordial and an increase in cooperation in foreseeable future would be likely due to the alignment of political, strategic and economic interests of both the countries.
China Pakistan and Adjacent Regions

Source: listofmaps.com/map-of-asias-countries
INTRODUCTION

Pakistan and China being neighbours shared a common border of 520 Kilometres. China was proclaimed a Republic on October 1, 1949, two years after Pakistan’s inception on August 14, 1947. Despite its Islamic ideological foundation as opposed to China’s communist system, Pakistan established formal diplomatic relations with China on May 21, 1951. India which had developed differences with Pakistan over several territorial issues including Kashmir, established diplomatic relations with China a year before. Three regional countries, Pakistan, China and India had since been a part of a complex regional triangle.

Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889 – 1964), ever since his assumption of office, had longed for developing amicable relations with China. Both the countries began to develop closer ties however, the border dispute between them led to 1962 Sino-Indian war that strained their bilateral relationship. The China-India border conflict was immediately followed by Trans Karakorum Tract that marked the beginning of Pakistan-China friendship. China-India hostility on the other hand, provided considerable space to Pakistan to forge stronger ties with China and both the countries began to share commonality of interests. Since then, the relations between the two countries evolved into close and supportive relations with cordial diplomatic, strategic and economic ties. China would be compassionate to Pakistan on several issues including the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. On its part, Pakistan was always supportive of China on sovereignty related issues of Taiwan and Tibet and several of its border issues.

Pakistan-China relationship had been referred to by the Chinese President Xi Jinping as ‘higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey.’¹ This would also be viewed as a time-tested and an all-weather relationship.² Some scholars termed it

as mere diplomatic rhetoric\(^3\) in international politics where the states viewed their ties with other states through the prism of their own national interests. Pakistan-China relations were founded on ‘sound geostrategic and realist calculations’.\(^4\) Clearly, both the countries had to appreciate each other’s domestic, regional and international constraints and obligations. As a rising regional and global player, China would face constraints as it had to be a responsible international player working for the establishment of an international order. A discourse to this effect was available in Chinese foreign policy debates.\(^5\) Pakistan on its part needed to see as to how far it could fit into China’s future scheme of things.

The foundations of China’s current foreign policy perspective was laid during Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms and opening up of China. Following seven phrases amply described Chinese strategies and their world view i.e. ‘watch and analyse [developments] calmly, secure [our own] positions, deal with [the changes] with confidence, conceal [our] capacities, be good at keeping a low profile, never become a leader and make some contribution.’\(^6\) The reforms and opening up, referred to as socialism with Chinese characteristics, was a major breakthrough having two fold impacts on China’s futuristic course of action. Firstly, it addressed changes related to agriculture and industry and secondly it opened up China’s broader role in international political and economic spheres. Despite criticism on China’s strategies of reforms and opening up, these developments led to double digit growth of China’s economy. This, of course, changed China’s foreign policy behaviour from the pre-1978 period.

During the 1990s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union coupled with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe brought an end to the long drawn Cold War. The end of Cold War and the Soviet collapse produced significant developments in the international as well as in the regional perspectives. In the post-Cold War period, China became a

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\(^3\) Dr Charles Ramsey, Pakistan-China Relations, March 3, 2017.
strong contender for regional supremacy with global aspirations while striking a fine balance between its emerging international posture and bilateral ties. Within this context, China began to view all contentious regional and international issues with change of perspectives. The shift became evident when Chinese President Jiang Zemin (1926 - ) advised China’s long-time ally Pakistan during his visit to India in 1996 to bring normalcy in India-Pakistan bilateral ties. To achieve that end, both the countries would be required to shelve or freeze controversial and contentious issues temporarily and amicably settle their outstanding issues through negotiations.7

The events of 9/11 shifted the rules of global as well as regional politics. While examining Pakistan-China relations, it would be pertinent to relate them in the historical perspective of US-China, US-India and US-Pakistan relations. Following 9/11, the US initiated global war on terror and established in its military presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan became the US frontline ally in the war on terror. This arrangement was contrary to China’s interests and the Chinese were apprehensive of the expansion of US regional presence. It was taken as an attempt to grab regional resources and contain China.8 These developments had implications for Pakistan-China relations and impacted deeply on political, economic and strategic interests of both the countries. It would be imperative for both Pakistan and China to examine how both countries would live up to the challenges that emerged as after 9/11.

As part of geopolitical strategy, the US shifted its focus on Asia-Pacific region by carrying out active diplomacy and re-posturing of its military assets in the Asia-Pacific region.9 It began to forge alliances and initiated substantial measures to improve relations with states located in this region.10 Though the US claimed that it’s Asia-Pacific strategy would benefit China, but the later considered it contrary to its interests in the region. The India-US comprehensive nuclear deal that had the aspects of political, economic, military

10Ibid., 3-4.
and nuclear cooperation too undermined China’s interests in the region. In the regional context, India centric perspective of both Pakistan and China and emerging relations of important regional actors such as Afghanistan, Iran and India would be the focus. In the global context, emerging global order, India-US nuclear deal and US-China Asia-Pacific competition and US containment of China strategy were bound to impact Pakistan-China relations.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The dissertation would be a significant contribution because of the regional and global implications of Pakistan-China relations. In the context of Pakistan-China relations, there had been frequent changes in the policy behaviour as happened with other states also, due to political developments occurring in the region. The end of the Cold War, rise of China, post 9/11 global political order, India-US nuclear deal, US strategy of containment of China and US-China Asia Pacific competition were major developments that would influence and shape the contours of Pakistan-China relations. This study therefore, would seek to focus on evolving pattern of Pakistan-China relations in view of important global and regional changes. In the light of the existing literature on Pakistan-China relations, no major study has thus far dealt with emerging challenges and related shifts in the foreign policy goals of both the countries. While the present study did not ignore the historical dimension of Pakistan-China strategic, political and economic relations, it would also explore the multiple dimensions of this relationship in the post-Cold War period and the evolving nature of these relations along with their regional and global implications.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The major objective of this study was to explore Pakistan-China relations in the context of various developments taking place in the post-Cold War period. Within this context, the dissertation would focus on the possible responses and foresee developments in the future which would impact Pakistan-China relations. Most importantly, the aim of the

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study would be to understand the regional and global implications of Pakistan-China relations.

**STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

During the past three decades, three significant regional and international developments had a deep impact on Pakistan-China relations. First, China’s 1978 reforms and its opening up brought considerable changes in its foreign policy behaviour. Second, disintegration of the Soviet Union signified the end of the Cold War allowing the US to expand its sphere of influence. Third, events of 9/11 confronted the US with new threats. China’s rise in the same era gave birth to conflicting US-China interests in South Asia and elsewhere and Pakistan faced a precarious challenge to cope with both the countries which had conflicting regional interests. Pakistan supported China on issues of its interests and coped with irritants which emerged in the context of Pakistan-US relations. China, despite having commonality of economic and strategic interests with Pakistan, would continue to pursue an independent regional and global agenda.

There was a rapid shift of alignments in the regional and global arena. The US partially pulled out of Afghanistan with its focus shifting towards Asia-Pacific. India would emerge as a regional power and as a competitor to China’s interests. China would emerge as a strong regional power and would expand its global influence. The US role in the Asia-Pacific and its nexus with India would be contrary to China’s political and strategic interests. The pertinent questions addressed political, economic and strategic consequences for Pakistan-China relations with regional and global implications. Both Pakistan and China, therefore, needed to respond to the challenge. Complimenting their ties would ensure that both the countries were not threatened by the emerging US Pivot to Asia strategy and the India-US strategic partnership.

**SIGNIFICANT RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

In the context of Pakistan-China relations in the post-Cold War era, following would constitute major research questions:-
1. What was the historical significance of Pakistan-China relations and how did the relationship evolve at strategic, political and economic levels during the post-Cold War period?
2. Why and how did Pakistan-China relations have implications for the regional actors including Iran, Afghanistan and India?
3. How did global developments such as emerging global order, India-US strategic partnership, US strategy of containment of China and competition in the Asia-Pacific have implications for Pakistan-China relations?

These significant research questions were explored on the basis of a central argument. The underlying assumptions of dissertation analysed the emerging global political order, India-US nuclear deal and US strategy of containment of China which would enhance Pakistan-China bilateral relations at political, strategic and economic levels in the post-Cold War period.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Theories of international relations attempted to describe, explain and predict phenomena such as war, conflict, peace, cooperation, the structure and rules of international political system and change in the behaviour of states under various circumstances and developments. Underlying assumptions of these theoretical frameworks were rooted in Realism and Liberalism. Realism remained the most powerful theory and influential concept, attempting to analyse state behaviour during the 20th century and it continued to be the predominant explanation of state behaviour. The notions of realism such as perpetual struggle for power and security in an anarchic system continued to be relevant in contemporary international politics. When China was seen as a rising power seeking to expand its regional and global influence, realist paradigm seemed to be more relevant and explained its behaviour. From the perspective of Pakistan-China relations, both countries had ‘cooperation’ as hallmark of their engagement which would rather be a strand of liberal theoretical discourse. This would make theoretical explanation of Pakistan-China relations relatively complex.

12 Timothy Dunne, in Realism, 1997.
To address this theoretical complexity, the dissertation would carry out theoretical analysis of strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China. It would argue that complex interdependence as envisaged in terms of liberal and neo-liberal discourses explained most of the contours of the relationship including alignment of political, economic and strategic interests of both the countries. On the other hand, expansion of strategic cooperation between the two countries aimed at achieving goals of ‘power’ rooted in realist paradigm i.e. driving the states for survival and preserving sovereignty by means of maintaining, maximizing and employing power. This behaviour pattern of both the countries would be best explained by the realist paradigm.

**SCOPE OF RESEARCH**

This research was important because it would focus on Pakistan-China relations in the changing and challenging times. Various regional and international developments made this relationship significant. Recent developments like the India-US strategic partnership, US-Afghanistan strategic relationship, Indo-Afghan strategic partnership, competitive US-Chinese-Indian interests in Afghanistan would call for a critical appraisal and in-depth study. To analyse the regional implications, this dissertation would focus on Pakistan-China-India-Afghanistan-Iran relations and their emerging significance and India-Pakistan standoff and China’s perspective on it. For global implications of Pakistan-China relations, the study would focus on emerging global political order, India-US strategic partnership and US containment of China Strategy and its impact on South Asia and Pakistan-China relations.

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

In order to carry out this study, a pragmatic approach would be applied. The research would be based on qualitative analysis while taking in to account literature review, historical perspective of the events and published contents related to the dissertation. With a view to obtain scientific objectives, quantitative approach would also be used to supplement qualitative approach. Qualitative tools like relevant literature, historical
perspectives and published contents and discourse analysis along with quantitative tools like set of graphs, tables and statistics would be utilized.

The study would be carried out by making use of both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources would include foreign policy documents such as speeches and statements of the decision makers, their official interviews, joint communiqués, declassified official agreements and opinion of selected respondents. The secondary sources would include books, journals, newspapers and websites. The dissertation would use books from a range of diverse disciplines such as International Relations, History, Pakistan Studies and Chinese Studies which dealt with the nature of Pakistan-China relations. Articles from international journals such as *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *World Politics* were also used. Articles from Pakistani journals such as *Regional Studies*, *Strategic Studies* and *Pakistan Horizon* were also used.

The researcher also had an opportunity to work as a visiting scholar at Sigur Centre for Asian Studies, George Washington University, which was of immense help regarding the collection of relevant data and having interactions with scholars from diverse backgrounds. Articles and editorials in Chinese newspapers such as *China Daily*, *People’s Daily*, articles in Chinese journals of international relations and in periodicals published by Chinese think tanks in Beijing and Shanghai were consulted. Moreover, articles and editorial in Pakistani newspapers such as *The News*, *Dawn*, *Express Tribune* and *The Daily Times* were utilized. In addition to using scholarly articles and reports from the internet, websites of international think tanks such as the Henry Stimson Centre, Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Sigur Centre for Asian Studies were also referred to. Besides using primary and secondary sources, the author conducted interviews (see Appendix F and G) with scholars, policy makers and officials such as Andrew Small, Dr. Fazal Ur Rehman, Ambassador Akram Zaki and Ambassador Khalid Mehmood. Besides, the author also conducted a survey by attaining input on a questionnaire focusing on significant research questions of the study and obtained SPSS analysis over the responses.
LITERATURE REVIEW

To address significant research questions, diverse literature with broader focus was reviewed. There was an abundance of sources available on domestic, regional and international changes affecting Pakistan and China. However, limited literature was available that covered evolving pattern of relations between Pakistan and China in the backdrop of developments occurring in the post-Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era, China’s continuing economic growth, US invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, India’s ambitions for regional primacy, US Asia Pacific focus, US-India strategic partnership created political ripples thus evolving international order had given new impetus to Pakistan-China relations. These developments had been a major focus of this dissertation. Literature covering various aspects of these regional and international developments was reviewed.

The study used multiple sources of information to identify significant areas of research that needed focus. Besides books, research papers, academic articles and policy papers, an interaction with scholars, media and members of civil society was availed. Available literature on Pakistan-China relations could be divided into three broad categories. The literature related to international relations theories, history of Pakistan-China relations (1949-2001), and post 9/11 international order, US Asia Pacific focus and rising China having regional and global implications for bilateral Pakistan-China relations. This study reviewed works of authors of diverse viewpoints about issues addressed in the study.

One should note that in the post-Cold War era, 9/11 was a landmark event that triggered a new international relations discourse. The event shaped contours of emerging international political order coupled with US Asia Pacific strategy and impact of rising China on regional and global political landscape. However, the existing literature did not adequately cover regional and international developments impacting Pakistan-China bilateral relations. The two available texts which moderately covered the subject were
The China-Pakistan Axis Asia’s New Geopolitics\textsuperscript{13} by Andrew Small and China in world politics: policies, processes, prospects\textsuperscript{14} by Judith F Kornberg and John R. Faust. Both the books covered deepening formal alliance between Beijing and Islamabad culminating at China becoming strategic partner of Pakistan and China’s assertive role in world politics respectively. This dissertation, however, analysed emerging global order with US Asia Pacific focus and its specific impact on Pakistan-China relations.

The first category of literature dealt with the theoretical context of the dissertation based on the theory of realism and complex interdependence. With a view to construct a theoretical framework of the study, it was imperative to understand various theoretical debates by various international relations theorists. The works of noted scholars on international relations theories have been reviewed to create a theoretical construct of the study. One of the most important works on international relations theory was Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace\textsuperscript{15} by Hans J. Morgenthau. Considered a classical realist, Morgenthau’s work primarily enunciated classical realist’s perspective on international power politics. He gave six principles of political realism identifying realism as the most important phenomena governed by objective laws that have their roots in unchanging human nature. With a view to understand classical realist’s perspective, Morgenthau’s work served as an important source to the preparation of this dissertation.

E. H Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations\textsuperscript{16} was a founding text of classical realism written immediately before the World War Two. Carr criticized the theorists who advanced utopian thoughts not giving due consideration to realities of survival and competition that existed among the nations. His work and approach was an antithesis to utopianism, yet he stood

somewhere in the middle of realism and utopia. His work dealt with pre-war period and was an important work with regards to realist paradigm.

*Theory of International Politics*\(^\text{17}\) by Kenneth N. Waltz was another important work on international relations theory, particularly on neo-realism. Waltz in his work described anarchy as an ordering principle of international politics in which there was no defined authority that could enforce decree on states. There existed no central authority over the states and a principle of ‘self-help’ was followed in their interactions. States would work to enhance their survival.

Donnelly’s *Realism and International Relations*\(^\text{18}\) gave a detailed analysis of various facets of realism paradigm. He described various elements of realism advanced by Thomas Hobbes, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Thucydides and Machiavelli. Donnelly gave a detailed account of realist paradigm advanced by various theorists and argued that in international politics realism would become the realm of power and interest. It was a thought provoking account that provided an insight into theory and practice of international politics.

Another important work was *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever.\(^\text{19}\) The authors argued that after decolonization, security at regional level gained importance and end of Cold War strengthened the idea. The book discussed at length three post-Cold War theoretical perspectives: neorealist, globalist and regionalist. An important aspect of the book was that it elaborated South Asian regional security complex in detail which was an important facet of the dissertation.

*Introduction to Global Politics*\(^\text{20}\) by Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Taylor was another important book which explained theory and its application. The book provided various levels of analysis and gives an insight of individual, state and global system. The

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book reviews important debate over theory and methods covering major international relations theoretical paradigm. The book gives an insightful account of world’s wars, cold war and major global issues in light of various theoretical debates. The book *Theories of International Relations* by Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater was another important work on international relations theories. This book was considered a leading text on major theoretical approaches in International Relations. Different theories were discussed in detail and contributed by leading authority on the theoretical approach. The text provided a methodical and inclusive introduction to international relations debates and discussion in the book was undertaken in explaining the significance and function of theory in world politics.

*International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction* by Cynthia Weber was, indeed, a comprehensive book on international relations theories. The author argued that international relations theory would make sense of international politics. He stated that knowing just the theory would not mean that one knows how the theory works. The author concluded that international relations theories made sense of the world by focusing on sovereign nation states as the main actors in the context of international anarchic situation where states interacted to possibly resolve question of war and peace. That was how theory helped us to rethink the relationship between politics and various other facets of society i.e. culture and ideology.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s *Power and interdependence: World politics in transition* focused on analysis of international politics from the viewpoint of economic and societal interdependence. The concept of complex interdependence authors of the book argued had some essential fundamental characteristics. The concept entailed multiple channels to connect societies and states, multiple interstate issues with no consistent hierarchy of issues and no use of military force in the presence of complex interdependence.

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The study entitled ‘Is Waltz a Realist?’\textsuperscript{24} by Jonathan Joseph was an article that referred to the opening chapter of Kenneth Waltz’s \textit{Theory of International Politics} in which he drew distinction between scientific laws and theory construction. That work gave distinction to Waltz as a scientific realist as well as a constructivist. Waltz’s assertion suggested that there were differences between theories and laws would be in accordance with the philosophy of social science. The article generated discussion over whether Waltz was a constructivist or a scientific realist though Joseph thought he was an empirical realist.

Yuan Kang Wang in his article ‘Offensive Realism and the Rise of China’\textsuperscript{25} referred to realism in the Asian context and then discussed the implications of the rise of China in world politics. The author referred to ‘Realism, Revisionism and the Great Powers’ work of Professor Steve Chan. He made a mention of Professor Steve Chan’s argument that realism did not explain Western experience. He argued that revisionist and status-quo assumptions contradict the basic elements of realism. He considered Professor Chan’s assertions as thought provoking as they referred to China as a revisionist state. The writer found three main problems with Chan’s criticism. Firstly, realism was a paradigm not a theory. Secondly, he mischaracterized important realist theories, including John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, and presented evidence that would pose a significant challenge to offensive realism. Thirdly, he confounded revisionist intentions with behaviors. States with revisionist intentions would not necessarily exhibit revisionist behaviors.

The second category of literature would deal with Pakistan-China relations from 1949 to 2015. In order to have deeper understanding of China’s behavior pattern, literature on history of Pakistan and China’s history has been reviewed. An important book that provided an insight in to China’s history was a book titled \textit{A Short History of China}

Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence by Martin Stuart – Fox.²⁶ A detailed account was given in the book on the early Chinese Confucius world view in to expansionism in to world order, communism and reforming trends.

Michael Dillon’s China: A Modern History²⁷ was an important book on the history of China. Besides elaborating on the rise and fall of Chinese Empire, it gave an account of events before the birth of People’s Republic of China and focused on many important happenings such as Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution and Reforms and Opening up of China. Although it did not cover Pakistan-China relations in detail, it explained as to how modern China evolved. It also gave brief account of Xinjiang problem that had an impact on Pakistan-China bilateral relations.

Christophe Jaffrelot’s A History of Pakistan and Its Origin²⁸ was another important work on history of Pakistan – China relations. This book focused on how Pakistan faced religious and ethnic identity crisis and how it coped with the crisis. The author also dwelt on Pakistan’s foreign policy vis-à-vis global and regional power game that ensued after its inception and how Pakistan would deal with these issues. The book also touched on certain important milestones of Pakistan-China relations. Latif Sherwani’s book entitled Pakistan, China and America²⁹ discussed the historical perspective of Pakistan-China-US relations and explained various dimensions of Pakistan-China-US relations. The author identified various issues that Pakistan faced on the foreign policy front with regards to Pakistan’s alliances with West, its alignment with the US and coping with China.

An important book on the history of Pakistan-China relations was China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale.³⁰ It was written by Syed Anwar Hussain. The book discussed Pakistan-China relations from 1949 to 1972. It covered important developments including initial misunderstandings in Pakistan-China relations, Pakistan’s signing of SEATO and CENTO, Bandung conference in 1955, Ayub Khan’s era and

²⁹ Latif Ahmed Sherwani, Pakistan, China, and America (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980).
Pakistan-China alliance, Indo-Pak war of 1965 and China’s military and economic assistance in the post Tashkent phase. Pakistan-China rapprochement and cooperation that began in the 1950s and 1960s has been explained in this book and it provided an account of the shaping of Pakistan-China relations.

Islam in China\(^{31}\) was another important book that deserved mention here. Its authors Mi Shoujiang and You Jia explained the spread and development of Islam in China. The book explained historical perspectives of Islam in the ancient dynasties of Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing and its revival in the modern mainland China. The authors described the beginning of Islam in China and how Islam wielded political influence in parts of China. It informed that the Muslims played an effective role in political, economic and cultural development of China. One should add here that there were fifty nine ethnic groups in China from which ten were Muslim groups. These groups took part in Chinese politics and policy making process and helped China promote friendly relations with other countries.

A book which needed to be mentioned here was by Sawaran Singh. The title of the book was *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation: Indian Perspective*.\(^{32}\) It was an important book on evolving Pakistan-China relations. It contained perspective of various Indian scholars on Pakistan - China relations in which they highlighted the importance of economy and defence ties between the two countries. The contributors analysed various issues that Pakistan and China faced after their inceptions and identified areas of cooperation between both the countries, particularly China’s persistent supply of conventional arms along with continued political support to Pakistan.

Another book in this category is by L. P. Bhola’s *Pakistan China Relations, Search for Politico – Strategic Relationship*.\(^{33}\) It was an important work on why Pakistan and China developed friendly relations despite the fact that both the countries were ideologically opposed to each other right from the beginning of their evolving ties. It also covered in

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detail the determinants and objectives of each other’s behaviour pattern and discussed at length the economic and cultural ties of both the countries.

Wayne’s *India, Pakistan and the Rise of China*34 addressed issues related to India and Pakistan in the context of peace. It also covered India’s hegemonic aspirations in the region and rise of China and its increasing influence in the region. Hameed Rai’s book *Readings in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*35 was another book on the subject. A chapter in the book comprehensively covered Pakistan’s relations with China. It gave a historical account of relations between both the countries. In addition, India as factor in Pakistan-China ties has been studied at length in this book. It covered the Chinese role in India-Pakistan war of 1965. The category of literature reviewed above was historical in nature and did not address a futuristic orientation of Pakistan-China relations.

The third category of literature addressed issues of regional cooperation and conflict with particular reference to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, India, post 9/11 International Order, US Asia Pacific focus and containment strategy and Rising China in the era of globalization having regional and global implications for Pakistan-China relations. Jenny Clegg’s *China’s Global Strategy, Towards a Multi-polar World*36 was an important work on international political order and the way China envisions world politics. While not challenging or getting into confrontationist mode like USSR and opting for a multilateral approach, China viewed as apt the multi-polar international order with multiple centres in order to influence world affairs. Clegg analysed the position of US and China as they were shaped by a unipolar and multi-polar dynamism located in opposite poles in the global international order.

*Greater China in an Era of Globalization*37 was another important work in the context of China’s transformation and globalization. It explained China’s disposition in the era of globalization. It also focused on how China viewed its global role in East Asia, Africa, Latin America and regional cooperation. Based on various research papers presented in

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an international conference, it addressed important questions including how could globalization impact China and what role did China play in the process of globalization. This study raised another important question: how did this globalization impact balance of power in Asia Pacific or the world at large.

The book *China’s Economic Revolution*\(^{38}\) by Alexander Eckstein was first published when China was about to embark upon economic reforms programme. Written by a Professor of Economics and Director of the Chinese Economic Studies Program at the University of Michigan, the book outlined the aspects of the Chinese economy beginning from 1949 when Communist Party came into power and the measures taken by the communist leadership to initiate economic growth within the socialist framework. The book explained various developmental strategies and policies in detail with a view to meet economic objectives and goals. In addition, there was a detailed account of Chinese development model with institutional support mechanism.

Here, a volume entitled *South Asia: The Quest for Regional Cooperation*\(^{39}\) and edited by work Ashok K. Behuria might also be mentioned. It contained papers which explained what regional players were thinking in terms of political and economic issues to which China was connected in some way or the other. The book covered wide range of issues from regional connectivity to cooperation and identified various challenges that the region faced which contained 22% of world population. The study explained that major challenges were connectivity, economic integration and political differences among the countries. It focused on the quagmire of insecurity in which South Asian region found itself. This study was of immense importance for present dissertation.

Famous US diplomat Henry Kissinger’s *On China*\(^{40}\), was a recollections of his meetings and conversations with the Chinese leadership. He had interacted widely in China both as diplomat and a scholar and became an admirer of Chinese people. The book gave a


detailed account of Chinese perspective of international politics, war and peace. He had the opportunity to speak to Chinese leaders like Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and many other officials. Kissinger’s work was a reflection of how the Chinese dealt with various crisis situations in the past decades and could they deal effectively with certain historical and political developments. In order to know the Chinese mind set and political philosophy, *On China* was an important book.

The book *China: Twenty Years of Economic Reform* edited by Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song focused on China’s economic rise and structural changes that it made in its economy since reforms in 1978. The book was a detailed account of Chinese economy prior to reforms and effects on economic growth in the wake of economic reforms. It focused on reforms agenda of CPC which included a comprehensive reforms programme focusing on agricultural, trade, state owned enterprises, financial system and labour market. The book gave an insight on China’s economic strategies that helped the economic rise of China and enabled it to face the challenges.

Shalendra D. Sharma’s book *China and India in the Age of Globalization* focused on how China and India consolidated economically. The book explained as to how the countries like China and India turned into economic power house through a sophisticated interplay of economic and political forces. China and India has emerged as competitor for expanding their sphere of influence. Both the countries made efforts to tackle issues of modernizing banking and financial arena, globalization of technologies, and expansion of trade and integration. Importantly, the book discussed Pakistan as a factor in Sino-India relations and argued that despite improvement in Sino-India relations, there was immense Chinese support for Pakistan that would enhance Pakistan’s power and influence in the strategic balance of the region and Pakistan was viewed by Beijing as a counter weight to India.

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Asia Pacific Security: Policy Challenges\textsuperscript{43} edited by David W. Lovell was another important read on Asia Pacific region. Following 9/11 attacks on World Trade Centre in New York and subsequent war on terror by the US motivated various Asia Pacific analysts to evaluate newer possibilities and impact of international terrorism and its aftermath on the region. Though the scenarios had changed in the Asia Pacific, the regional dynamics and challenges of the Pacific countries had remained somewhat the same. This book focused on the dynamics, challenges, regional repercussions and relations of major powers and stake holder in the region. The collection of research work addressed two major assumptions: first, Australia should have an important role in the region; and second the core realities of the region would be the US, Japan and China. These realities would be taken into account while shaping future outcome.

Doug Guthrie’s book \textit{China and Globalization}\textsuperscript{44} addressed the Chinese economic reforms covering past three decades. The changes that impacted China were the key focus. There were three points central to the work of Guthrie. Firstly, changes seemed to be more dramatic than most observers thought they could be. There was an underestimation about social and political reforms taking place in China. Secondly, reforms registered a success because the state took it upon itself to ensure that they were done. Thirdly, in China, democracy seemed to be inevitable because economic reforms helped alter the structure of political system for better. Globalization, therefore, might have a role for an inevitable transition from socialism to capitalism.

Jan Willem Blanket’s book \textit{China Rising: Will the West be able to Cope}?\textsuperscript{45} addressed the challenges and opportunities resulting from the economic rise of China. This book provided a newer perspective as it focused on what the Europeans think about the rapid growth of China. Blanket put forward three major prepositions in the book. Firstly, he attempted to give out economic explanation or justifications of China’s rapid growth. Secondly, he addressed the question as to whether globalization had taken effect or not.

and what would be the impact of globalization? Thirdly, he asked if there would be question of sustainability of life vis-à-vis China’s environmental woes. The author also argued that European Union (EU) would be in a better position than US to face competition from China.

Amardeep Athwal’s book *China-India Relations Contemporary Dynamic*46 was a detailed account of relationship between China and India. Both the countries were important actors in contemporary regional and international political order and have gained attention as rising economic power and competitor of each other. The book covered increasingly important issues and challenges relating to the maritime security issues, rising energy needs and economic growth. China and India being major powers in the South Asian subsystem would be pursuing policies that helped them maximize their power. The book discussed the inevitability of conflict and cooperation as both the countries expanded their sphere of influence and a measure of cooperation has also begun to emerge.

*Resurgent China: Issues for the Future*47 was a book edited book Nazarul Islam. It was a comprehensive book on various issues that China faced. It dealt with important questions that the rising China faced about sustainability of growth indicators. The book addressed questions as to whether China had sustainability mechanism and would China be able to cope with issues arising out of the process of growth? The issues identified included demographic problems, employment, migration, urbanization, industrialization, inequality and disparity, reforms of State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and above all environmental problems. The distinctive feature of the book was that it collected the perspectives of experts from Japan, UK and US and the writers having diverse expertise. There were writers who were economists and non-economists giving out divergent views on different issues.

A book which deserved mention for its relevance to the present study under preparation was *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures* by Kishore C. Dash. It examined the dynamics of regionalism in South Asia. Regionalism as an idea did not work well during the Cold War. The idea, however, received due attention in the post-Cold War era. Major political developments like European integration, collapse of the Soviet Union, adjustment in the US strategy and changing perception on trade in the region worked well for the integrations. In December 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formed by seven South Asian countries. SAARC as an institution, however, could achieve limited growth because of the attitude, policies and rivalries of the member states. An important factor in advancing regional integration was always the domestic factor as no meaningful policy decision could be taken without anticipating domestic reaction. For instance, the leaders of India and Pakistan often have to emphasize on security or military intensive policies as they have to think of their political survival and know that any radical departure from traditional security policies could be counterproductive.

Harsh V. Pant’s book *The Rise of China: Implications for India* addressed China’s rise and its impact on India in the region. India and China could not ignore each other due to geographical constraints. Rising China was a fact that India needed to adjust to. With economic growth that it achieved, Beijing was building a strong security apparatus while making demands for energy and resources. The book discussed China’s domestic and foreign policy with regard to India and focused on issues that it confronted in the region. It argued that despite the fact that China and India had bilateral issues, they have to interact and compete for their interests. China’s influence in the South Asian region has grown with Pakistan being an ‘all-weather friend’ and an important factor. In view of the challenges that India faced in the region, Harsh Pant argued that India would have to first engage with its regional neighbour positively and productively. India would find it a hard

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task to prevent China from gaining a foothold in the South Asian region and would even be difficult to preserve its status in the region.

An important work on India-China relations by Pushpa Adhikari entitled *China Threat in South Asia*\(^5\) was quite relevant for the present study. It gave an insightful detail to understand China in relation to the South Asian region, particularly India. The book discussed the possibilities of cooperation between China and the South Asian countries and arising confrontations between the two Asian giants ‘China and India’ who would wish to expand their sphere of influence in the region and subsequently expand to global level. There were concerns over how China and India aspired to pursue their regional and global ambitions. There would be conflict of interest and differences of opinion but there would be opportunities for economic cooperation as well.

Another relevant study entitled *China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization*\(^5\) by Bo Zhiyue offered an insightful account on important issues that China confronted including governance and democratization. Zhiyue argued at length about political elites of China and various leadership tiers, Central Committee and other institutional representatives. The book focused on leadership abilities and professional services of political elite to deliver and govern. The book also focused on various challenges to governance in China and how governing capacity of CPC regime could be enhanced through institutionalization. With regards to democratization, the author argued that like economic transformation, democratization would be a gradual process.

Emilian Kavalski’s book *China and the Global Politics of Regionalization*\(^5\) was a collection of literature on the concept of global politics of regionalization and China’s behaviour pattern towards it. The book discussed China’s regionalization politics and strategies in existing international order. Analysing from western prism, the contributors to the book identified two major issues. First issue related to the difficulty of weighing

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the international behaviour pattern of non-Western actor from Western standard. Secondly, lack of language that ought to be language of explanation and understanding of international politics. The book also reflected China’s strategies in Asia, South East Asia and Central Asia and its comparison was drawn with EU which was a relatively successful integration model.

Edward S. Steinfeld’s book Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West explained China’s rise and its immense political and economic implications inducing China to march into the global system of its own making. Steinfeld argued that China’s rise would not represent a threat to West or the US. It was also argued that any energy or human rights reforms initiated in any part of West or Europe would have its effect on China and China would follow the suit. The author of the book took up an argument that general scholarship did not share which held the view that rising China would not be a threat but an opportunity.

China Rules: Globalization and Political Transformation was an edited work that had contribution from known scholars on economy. Focus of the book was Chinese enterprise and effect on globalization with China’s impressive entry into the global market economy and its impact on the world and China itself. The book explained how Chinese firms were internationalized through internal institutional mechanism and what precise impact it had on governance. Contributors argued the effects of institutional change on outward investment and emerging EU-China trade relations. The book provided an insightful analysis of Chinese economy and transformation vis-à-vis globalization.

Another book Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics was an edited book on China’s soft power strategies in international politics. The book briefly examined the potential of Chinese soft power, perception of Chinese elite and its impact

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on China’s international politics. The book discussed Chinese soft power at home and abroad, strength and weaknesses of Chinese soft power from the perspectives of foreign policy, political economy, culture, history and education. The soft power was exceedingly delicate concept as it attracted and persuaded through culture, values and foreign policy. The soft power has become an important concept in China and various strategies have been explored to put into practice. Promoting Chinese culture abroad, economic diplomacy and image building has helped China to have mileage in soft power outlook.

Likewise, *China’s Peaceful Rise in a Global Context*\(^5^6\) by Jianghao Zhou was an important book on China’s rise and challenges that the rise posed to China’s political elite. The book examined new perspectives on some of the structural issues that China faced in this regard. Zhou argued that China's rise under the CPC was unprecedented. Its rise did not threaten the global order but some domestic issues like inequalities, political corruption, and prostitution did cause social instability. Democratization and transition from a one-party to a multiparty system would be the answer.

Jasper Becker’s book *Dragon Rising-An inside look at China Today*\(^5^7\) was an important book and it covered China’s problems and opportunities in the contemporary world. Becker has addressed all the questions about China’s governance, communist system, culture, economy, shift from authoritarian to market driven society, pollution, unemployment, demands for energy and how could China cope with these issues. The writer argued that changes were reshaping global strategies to deal with economic and military strategies. A number of themes taken up by the chapters of the book referred to regions with local issues viewed in the context of Chinese society. This book provided a good account of China’s problems and opportunities.

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*China Goes Global: The Partial Power*\(^58\) by David Shambaugh was another important work which provided an insightful account on China’s role in future international politics. The writer argued that it was required to focus on how China became an increasingly powerful and assertive state in the world. In his book, *China Goes Global*, the well-known scholar on China David Shambaugh has given an account of China’s prominence in international politics. Three decades back, China had a little role outside East Asian periphery, but today China’s presence was being felt across the globe. Shambaugh argued that though China had attained global primacy, it was yet to be proved that it was now the global power. He suggested that China’s current and future role in international political order would be important.

The edited volume entitled *Rising China; Power and Reassurance*\(^59\) by Ron Huisken was also an important work that addressed rise of China in contemporary era and signified the bilateral and multilateral relations with regional as well as rising powers. These powers, one might add here were stakeholders in the rising China. India, US, Japan and Russia were important countries in this context. The book emphasized the re-emergence of China and its role in the emerging international political order. Though the US was trying to expand or increase its influence in Asia pacific to hedge China, it was likely that China’s rapid economic growth would induce US to embrace China as a global power. The book highlighted the reassuring narratives of China on its foreign policy which would be reflective of cooperation in economic and developmental spheres. To achieve that end, China would continue to act cautiously and defensively.

An important book entitled *China and India: Prospects for Peace*\(^60\) and edited by Jonathan Holslag was helpful in understanding the dynamics of regional policies in South Asia. It argued that all their remarkable growth, China and India must lift a hundred million citizens out of poverty and create jobs for hundreds of thousands of workers. Both the countries hoped trade and investment would be an area of mutual interest. The author identified these points as new sources of rivalry and argued that China and India

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could not grow without violent contest. Though he maintained that both the countries wished to sustain steady relations, he argued that success in applying economic reform would give way to conflict. This rivalry was already tangible in Asia, where fluctuating patterns of economic influence had reformed the balance of power and led to short sighted policies that weakened regional stability. The author also revealed that despite two decades of peace, mutual perceptions had become aggressive, and a military game of tit for tat promises to reduce prospects for peace. He therefore, challenged the idea that development and interdependence led to peace, and he tried to strengthen his argument by referring to rich pragmatic evidences within broader debates on international relations theory.

The book *China Counting: How the West Was Lost*\(^{61}\) edited by Alex MacKinnon was on the significant rise to domination by China and how it affected the world at large. The work focused on those patterns, presented an attractive perspective on modern China and made a global clarification on its future direction. It identified as to how China's historical values concentrated on the need for knowledge. The most creative step that the Western companies could take was to offer work experience and jobs to young Chinese graduates. It pointed out that the Chinese business decisions were dependent on international and domestic forces. China would now be the international counting house, cashing Western debts financially, socially and diplomatically. The main goal of China was however, internal stability and external security, aiming neither for international supremacy nor military conflicts. The author explained as to how was China defining its destiny. The book identified China's policy of steady global expansion and the substitutes it offered to capitalism and liberal democracy.

The book entitled *Asian Strategic Review 2014, US Pivot and Security*\(^{62}\) and edited by S.D. Muni and Vivek Chadha examined the US pivot policy towards Asian region and the role of emerging China as well as India. Papers included in the work elaborated the


US strategy to influence the region including military implications and restructuring maritime strategies. The book discussed China’s rhetoric, responses, and repercussions to the US strategy including nuclear dimension. It compared the perspective of Japan and India with reference to China and their interests in the region simultaneously. By and large, the authors presented the views that China and the US would have their own interests in pursuing bilateral relationships whereas threat perception shaping their world views challenged the stable relations. China would be concerned about the challenges posed for it in the region and the US would make inroads to impede China’s emergence as a global power centre. Correspondingly, the US would remain cautious about China’s trajectory and its implication for American primacy in world order.

In his article ‘Building China-India Reconciliation’ Shen Dingli discussed China-India relations and its complexities. Despite their growing economic cooperation, both the countries had a perception problem and continued to have mutual distrust over a number of issues such as Dalai Lama, nuclear proliferation and China’s relations with Pakistan. The author suggested as part of non-realist approach, reconciliation by giving a higher priority to peaceful coexistence than national sovereignty issues and both the countries could adopt a constructive approach in stabilizing their relations. He concluded that closer ties between China-India would not undermine US interests and US-India relations would not be used as balancer against China.

The article entitled ‘South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations’ by J. Mohan Malik gave an insight of characteristics and perceptions of Chinese foreign policy in its relations to all the South Asian countries. China maintained regular contact with South Asian countries to assure them that enhancement in China-India cooperation did not come at their cost. China’s enhanced relations with Pakistan and other South Asian countries often raised concerns for India and New Delhi would keep eyes on the developments. Though Beijing insisted on peaceful settlement of disputes but it remains critical of India’s policy to guard its security interests. The analysis suggested that the South Asia

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would remain an important region as far as China was concerned and China–India rivalry in South Asia would continue to be the central element of region’s geopolitics.

‘Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality?’ by Jianyong Yue was another insightful article on peaceful rise of China. It discussed two critical issues. The first related to rise of China and the other to the myth or reality of rising China. The economic growth of China which continued to persist projected China as a potential global power, but the focus moved from rising China to peaceful rise of China. Currently, the peaceful rise of China would depend on the international system dominated by the US, which created conflict situation and caused destabilizing effects on international system. The author suggested that China should become a modern nation state by democratizing, transforming its neo-liberalist view, changing its social policies and seeking positive ties with countries to promote regional integration in the East Asian region.

The article by Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retired) on ‘Addressing Nuclear Dangers: Confidence Building between India-China-Pakistan’ addressed the nuclear dangers in the region. The paper sought to explain the rationale, essence and the measures in order to undertake confidence building measures (CBMs) to lessen the nuclear danger in Asia. There were reasons to believe that nuclear danger in Asia existed and India, Pakistan, and China needed to undertake CBMs to avert this looming danger. Though India-Pakistan CBMs were stressed but without China’s participation in these CBMs, India would have limited strategic incentive to follow any of the initiative. The writer argued that CBMs and cooperation on the issues like Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and terrorism would be vital if objectives of peace were to be achieved.

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The article ‘The China-Pakistan Strategic Relationship: Trade, Energy, Investment and Infrastructure’ by Sumita Kumar focused on Pakistan-China relations spanning over six decades and entering in newer phase of cooperation in trade, investment and energy areas. The writer said that there were huge investments in Pakistan by China but trade aspects needed to be worked out as it required restructuring of Pakistani economy. Cooperation with regards to energy would benefit China as it would provide access through Gawadar port. Though cooperation between Pakistan and China has mostly been in defence and security domain, economy and energy have gained importance at the turn of the millennium and China continued to provide assistance to Pakistan in these areas. The author also discussed China’s concern regarding terrorism and wished greater cooperation with Islamabad in countering terrorism. He stated that Pakistan-China relations would be of interest and concern to powers interested in the stability of South Asia.

‘The Reorientation of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy toward its Region’ was an article by Lisa Curtis on foreign policy of Pakistan. This paper covered certain areas which were directly related to the dissertation under preparations and highlighted certain improvements aspects of Pakistan-China relations in South Asian regional context. In the current geopolitical situation, the writer argued that Pakistan’s foreign policy needed to be re-evaluated and its links with China and Saudi Arabia and Iran should be bolstered to diversify its foreign policy and lessen its dependence on the US. He argued that the recent events called upon Pakistan to reassess its regional relationships and reach out to neighbours in new ways. The Islamist extremism and terrorism that posed a threat to the country’s long-term stability was required to be tackled on priority basis. He also added that Pakistan was required to develop wide-ranging counterterrorism strategies. According to the author, Pakistan was not likely to follow a major shift in its counterterrorism policy unless it was helped by its important regional allies, i.e. Saudi Arabia and China.

Another study somewhat related to the areas being covered by the present dissertation was on ‘Exploring Strategies and Implications of an Opportunistic Alliance: A Case Study of Pakistan and China’.\textsuperscript{69} Authored by Sangit Sarita Dwivedi, the article focused on the factors highlighting the threat perceptions of Pakistan and the strategies which it developed to cope with the security threats. In this article, the author gave an overview of Pakistan’s security dilemma during the Cold War period and period along with its significance in the contemporary era. The paper supported the theory of balance of threat by illustrating that the offensive powers and aggressive intentions which India possessed, posed a serious threat to Pakistan. The paper said that Pakistan’s policies towards India were based on its perception of threat, hostility and aggression which it perceived from India, and it was for India to assure that it posed no threat to Pakistan. It concluded by saying that Pakistan and India would need to work mutually in order to gain mutual trust and secured future.

The article written by Rizwan Zeb entitled ‘Pakistan-China Relations: Where They Go From here?’\textsuperscript{70} discussed the futuristic trends of Pakistan-China ties. The writer argued that the relations of the two countries were based on mutual trust, friendship and respect, and leadership of both the countries always described their relations as higher than mountains, deeper than oceans and sweeter than honey. In the current international system, however, relations of the states were required to be based on geostrategic and realist calculations, and improvement in economic relations was important for further strengthening of their ties. The article argued that there was no chance of any irritant in their relationships as the need of the hour was that Islamabad needed to understand the Chinese mindset, and China would continue its support to Pakistan in the future also. The author said that Pakistan needed to understand the important issues which were shaping its relations with China.

\textsuperscript{70}Zeb, “Pakistan-China Relations.”
In his article ‘The China-Pakistan-United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the War on Terrorism’ Paul J. Smith described the triangular relations between China, Pakistan and United States during the Cold War and post-Cold War period. During the Cold war, China and the US competed with each other to keep Pakistan in their own sphere of influence, whereas, Pakistan took advantage of it by consolidating itself against India. This strategic triangular relationship was created during the Cold War period. At the end of the Cold war, US sanctions on Pakistan led Pakistan-China relations to flourish as both the countries shared common perception of threat from India and common interests. Since terrorism posed serious threats to Pakistan’s security and economic progress, both the US and China had a potential for taking a constructive approach to eliminate terrorism from Pakistan. This triangular relationship would work if Beijing and Washington identified and pursued their common interests and initiated measures to keep the relations smooth and amicable.

The literature survey suggested that sufficient literature existed on Pakistan-China relations providing details in the historical contexts regarding the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. However, most of the studies in this regard rested either on the Western or Indian, Pakistani or Chinese perspective. This dissertation analysed the relationship objectively and kept in view the contemporary Pakistani and Chinese policy and the future trajectory of the policy. Although regional and global implications of this relationship were discussed in the literature referred above, no comprehensive study existed on the regional and global implications of this vital relationship. The dissertation aimed to fill the gap in the existing literature by both taking an in depth look at Pakistan-China relations in the post-Cold War phase as well as by emphasizing the regional and global implications of this relationship. The study, therefore, aimed to fill the gap in the existing literature and contribute to knowledge in the vital area of study and research.

ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

There was a plethora of literature available on the theoretical framework of the dissertation, evolution of Pakistan-China relations from 1949 to 2016, emerging global order post 9/11, India-US nuclear deal and US strategy of containment of China. However, none of the available literature found connect between major regional and global developments and Pakistan-China relations in the post-Cold War period. The dissertation would therefore endeavour to fill this gap in the available literature and hence provide original contribution to the existing knowledge.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To plan and conduct any research, a research design was an essential step. It was selected to elucidate research question and hypothesis of the study. Research design explained overall strategy of the study. In case of this dissertation, the research design would be a case study of Pakistan-China relations. It would analyse events, decisions, policies and institutions to explain the behaviour patterns. The case study would investigate singular political phenomenon in a given time frame. Research strategy for this study would be an empirical inquiry based on a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. With a view to maintain validity of the study, a deductive approach would be adopted and a hypothesis would be formulated and confirmed in the light of original and secondary sources consulted, survey conducted and interviews held.

This study would be based on both primary and secondary sources. For the primary sources, official documents, treaties and Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) were consulted. In this connection, the author visited National Archive of Pakistan and National Documentation Centre at Islamabad and obtained primary data. Primary documents, where necessary, were affixed as appendices. Interviews with various scholars conducted have been referred to in the dissertation. Notable among the interviewees were Andrew Small, Ambassador Akram Zaki and Ambassador Khalid Mahmood. During the research, the researcher faced certain constraints like language barrier, access to classified documents, interview of Chinese policy makers and scholars.
as visit for research and interviews could not materialize. The researcher had an opportunity to work as a visiting scholar to Sigur Centre for Asian Studies at George Washington University, USA. The interaction with the scholars and students from diverse backgrounds was greatly beneficial.

**STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY**

For the discussion of regional and global implications of Pakistan-China relations in the post-cold war period, the thesis would be divided in eight chapters in all. The first chapter would be the introductory chapter explaining the problem statement, central argument, significant questions, objective and methodology of research. Relevant literature would also be reviewed in this chapter. The second chapter would deal with the theoretical and conceptual analysis of the study and expand as to how the theories of international relations such as realism and complex interdependence would explain political, economic and strategic dimensions of Pakistan-China relations. A discussion on the application of such theories on bilateral relations would help one understand regional and global developments that had strong implications for Pakistan-China relations in the post-Cold War period.

The third chapter would provide a historical overview of Pakistan-China relations from 1949 to 1990, while the fourth chapter would focus on dimensions of Pakistan-China ties in the post-Cold War period stressing political, strategic and economic dimensions of the relationship. The fifth chapter would discuss the regional implications for Pakistan-China relations. This chapter would stress on three areas of regional debate i.e. India centric perspective of Pakistan and China, Pakistan-China-India-Iran-Afghanistan emerging relations and regional imperatives of Pakistan-China relations. The sixth chapter would explore global implications of Pakistan-China relations. It would highlight the emerging international political order, India-US strategic partnership and US strategy of containment of China and its impact on Pakistan-China relations. Chapter seven offered an analysis of survey conducted on the basis of the responses of different categories of respondents to a set of questions circulated to them. Chapter eight would provide the main finding and conclusion of the dissertation.
CHAPTER ONE
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

This chapter would discuss theoretical and conceptual dimensions of the dissertation which dealt with Pakistan-China relations in the post-Cold war era and its regional and global implications. It would seek to explain the framework of underlying theoretical assumptions and epistemological basis of the study. The construct of the study is two dimensional: first explained bilateral relations between the states; and the second referred to their relationship in terms of nexus or alliance. Realism would explain nexus or alliance dimension of the relations whereas complex interdependence would explain bilateral relations of the states. The chapter would seek to explain the elements or assumptions of aforementioned theoretical paradigms. The details describing the behaviour pattern of the states and core issues raised in the study would be explained in the succeeding chapters. The dominating theoretical explanation of the study would be realism whereas complex interdependence explaining bilateral relations of states would be referred to as conforming to ultimate realist objectives.

It would be argued that a single theoretical perspective would not explain in wholesome term various dimensions of relations between the states. Qianian Liu argued that some particular theoretical paradigm would fall short of explaining state’s behaviour in regional and global settings. According to him, theoretical perspectives developed over the years taking into account behaviour pattern of states would not explain a state’s posture or strategies towards cooperation or conflict.\(^\text{72}\) International relations theory or paradigm would provide a basic framework or concept with a view to analyse international relations. A certain paradigm would give out different perspective or standpoint shared by realist scholars with regard to an event and the similar event would not be seen in the same light by the liberal scholars. It would therefore, be appropriate to examine or analyse interconnection between approaches or strands of theoretical paradigms.

In order to understand the pattern of international politics and behaviour of various states, it would be imperative to understand the concept of theory. The theory would give an understanding of any international political occurrence and detailed analysis of political practices carried out by states in response to international developments. From the standpoint of political science, Charner Perry referred to theory as ‘study of norms’ and an ‘art of constructing and reconstructing norms’.\(^7^3\) Kenneth Waltz referred to theory as an explanation of the laws of international politics and a ‘collection or set of laws pertaining to particular behaviour or pattern’.\(^7^4\) International relations theory also attempted to explain and sometimes predict the behaviour of a nation or state actor.\(^7^5\) The objective of theories of international relations would be to address the complexities of international politics and issues of conflicting magnitude. Theories sought to improve understanding of political or social events and help devise a framework or strategy.

While theories of international relations would give pattern of behaviour of states in terms of their relations with other states, there would still be a gap between theory and practice. Though the practitioners who were entrusted to shape the pattern of state behaviour would tend to dismiss academic theorists, there were certain connects between the theory and the real world of policy or practice. It would also be difficult to construct theory without an in-depth knowledge of realities on the ground.\(^7^6\) There could be another viewpoint related to this argument. Theories might be contested but it would be inappropriate to analyse theories as opponents of one another. Theories might be based on assumptions and epistemologies and restricted to some specific conditions within an analytic objective but still theories might not be considered definitively ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.\(^7^7\) Theories would explain specific behaviour of state in a set of events that emerged due to various international developments.

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Scholars and lawyers had written about international politics but formal recognition of international relations occurred after the First World War. The discipline of international relations owed its origin to the World War that brought colossal human losses.\(^78\) Theories of international relations took formal roots during the inter war years and during the post Second World War period, when realists and idealists began to explain various international developments through their own theoretical prisms. Hans Morgenthau’s work triggered a debate on international relations approaches that subsequently gave birth to various branches of realism like classical realism, neo-realism, neoclassical realism, offensive realism and defensive realism. On the contrary, the theory of complex interdependence suggested that states were dependent on each other and there existed a relationship of interdependence among the states. Eminent proponents of realism were Thomas Hobbes, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and Henry Kissinger whereas complex independence as an idea was put forth by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. In the context of this study, it would be appropriate to have understanding of both the theoretical paradigms before relating them to the questions raised for this study.

International relations theory would enunciate both phenomena and patterns that would be related to conceptual and fundamental assumptions of international relations domain. These assumptions would be referred to as ontological and evaluative.\(^79\) In international relations, various world views emerged that reflected a variety of competing approaches and strands of worldviews. There would be some overlap in various paradigms or between various variants of the same theoretical paradigm. Complete convergence between worldviews, however, would not be possible as various intellectual positions taken by various thinkers and theorists would be supported with reason.\(^80\) In subsequent analysis of variants of certain theoretical paradigms, it would be important to analyse as to what extent a worldview gave an insight into the issues faced by various states in international politics.

\(^80\)Ibid.
1.1. REALISM

With a view to describe realist paradigm, it would be appropriate to make mention of some of the thinkers and scholars from across the world who had profound impact on shaping the realist world view of political relations among states. Those who achieved prominence were Sun Tzu (544 BC - 496 BC), author of Art of War, Thucydides (460 BC – 400 BC) wrote History of Peloponnesian war, Chanakya Kauṭilya (350 BC-275 BC), an Indian statesman who authored the ancient Indian political treatise, known as Arthashastra. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 - 1527) shared his political philosophy in his famous book The Prince, Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679), a political thinker wrote Leviathan and Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), the Prussian General and military theorist, wrote On War. The works of these thinkers reflected their understanding about various political events of their times and explained the events from their perspective.

Among international relations theories, realism became the leading theoretical paradigm that explained international politics between the two World Wars and then focused on the inter-state relations during the post Second World War era. However, the concept dated back to centuries when wars were waged for survival and influence. In this process, the powerful would make the difference. Outlines of realist paradigm became evident after World War I, when enormous loss of human lives forced scholars to explain the causes of the catastrophe and look for an appropriate course to prevent future wars. The scholarship on international relations theory came to conclude different strands or variant of realism that shared core element of power in terms of military and economic ascendency of one state over the other. Realism would be termed as a continuous struggle by a state to acquire certain power and then maintain that power in any way it could. In order to describe realism in essence, three important realist thinkers would be discussed on whose writings realism rested and then the approaches and various strands of realism would be explained.

The concept of realism was as old as the Peloponnesian War itself. In realist tradition, Greek historian, General and author of History of Peloponnesian War, Thucydides had been referred to far more than any other thinker. Thucydides, who was known as the
founder of tradition of political realism\textsuperscript{81} gave his political analysis of twenty one of twenty eight years of Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. In his view, the interstate relations were based on the concept of power and self-interest. It was such an account of war that described ‘heroism and brutality, victory and defeat, brilliance and stupidity and honour and deceit.’\textsuperscript{82} The account of Peloponnesian Wars necessarily focused on struggle for military and political power.\textsuperscript{83} It was weak or strong hierarchy that decided the stability of the system and the Peloponnesian War was the consequence of an increasing power of Athens over Sparta. Thucydides influence on realist scholars and its impact in the post-1945 period was distinctly visible. The same had an impact on American diplomacy during the Cold War era and the conduct of smaller states during that period.\textsuperscript{84}

Niccolo Machiavelli was another important exponent of realism. Machiavelli was a Florentine registry official who emerged as realist philosopher and thinker after his classic work ‘\textit{The Prince}’ appeared in 1513 and made a mark on political behaviour of state and the rulers. In his book that was regarded as a text book for political rulers, his advice to ruler was to attain power and to that end the ruler could opt to do anything to maintain that power. Besides the debate that his work was moral or unethical, realism became hallmark of what Machiavelli thought of politics by the ruler to attain and maintain power.\textsuperscript{85} Machiavelli argued that states would be absolved of their moral duties in international political system and he would endorse repression of the weaker by the stronger.\textsuperscript{86} He described the world as it was not the way it ought to be and held that politics and ethics were concepts divorced from each other.\textsuperscript{87} Though Machiavelli

\textsuperscript{83}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86}Terry Nardin and David Mapel, \textit{Traditions of International Ethics}, vol. 17 (Cambridge Univ Press, 1992), 64.
\textsuperscript{87}Viotti and Mark, “Realism” 59.
appeared unethical in his advice to the rulers, his recipe to rulers later became reflective of realist approach.

Thomas Hobbes was yet another important realist writer and thinker. His book *Leviathan* was considered to be an important study on theory of politics and western political thought. His work largely related to issues that had impacted on the social and political order of the time and therefore had pessimistic view of human nature. Realism was considered the oldest perspective on international politics after patriotic moralism which implied a struggle between right and wrong. Thomas Hobbes was among thinkers following Thucydides and Machiavelli who were not adherents to the tradition and shared the same perspective of international politics.88 Hobbes was widely regarded as a thinker who had realist interpretation of international politics and gave a well-known concept of state of war by every man against every man.89 Nur Yurdusev, however, argued that Hobbes was not always conflict oriented and did have penchant to alliances and cooperation in international politics.90 Following three eminent thinkers of their time, it would be imperative to discuss realism and different variants of realism like classical realism, neo-realism, neoclassical realism, offensive realism and defensive realism.

Realism would be aptly regarded as the leading theoretical paradigm in history. Though realism comprised of various theories and approaches that would be discussed in succeeding paragraphs but it shared a concept that states would be driven by their quest for power mainly by economic and military power. In fact, realism offered a kind of “manual” that ought to maximize interests in unfriendly environments.91 Ideals based on ethics and morality would be concepts contrary to realist mode of thinking. In the realist scenario, states would be in security competition with each other so that the states would prepare themselves against such threats by forming stronger militaries, building sizable

89 W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations,” 2010.
arsenals and forming various alliances to address the threat emanating from such security competitions.

Realism became a dominant tradition during the Cold War that reflected a continuous struggle among nation states to acquire and maintain power. Realist argument during the Cold War explained states relations based upon military competition between states and blocs they formed part of. Realism also gave strength to an idea that it was difficult to eliminate conflict and war from amongst states and war could not be done away with as an instrument of policy. Realism dominated Cold War because it gave an explanation for attaining power, waging war and forging alliances amongst states to achieve that end. Stephen Walt referred to Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr who believed that like human beings, states had an intrinsic longing to dominate others that led them to wage wars. Neorealist theory, on the contrary, referred to international system instead of human nature. International system, according to Kenneth Waltz, consisted of great powers who would seek to survive. Anarchic international system lacking central authority would lead the states to make arrangements for their survival a part of their integral strategy. The weaker states in the scenario would strike balance with dominant rivals.

Despite differences between proponent of variants of realism, realists shared set of three major elements of realism namely statism, survival, and self-help. These elements however, have been shared by classical as well as neorealist alike. Statism was a manifestation of the will of people and a state would exercise authority within its territorial boundaries. The second element of realism was survival and realists believed that one of the goals of the state leaders was to assure survival in the anarchic world. The states, according to defensive realists, would seek to attain power to ensure survival as the primary goal. Self-help was the third core element of realism that called upon state to attain power to ensure security. This would be described as a power struggle between

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94Ibid.
96Ibid, 101.
97Ibid, 108.
self-interested states. In the anarchic international system, a state would wage war against the other and no mechanism existed to stop it. States therefore, would be under compulsion to seek security through self-help.98

In international relations, realism had been an important theoretical paradigm that gave out vital conclusions about international politics and behaviour of states. With the title of realism, the theory was divided in various perspectives. Conforming major perspectives there was a division between traditional realist and neorealist along with division between those focusing on maximizing powers and attaining particular amount of power to ensure security.99 Before discussing various strands of realist paradigm, it would also be pertinent to discern the basic elements that realists agreed upon the hallmark of the paradigm. The elements described the contours of domestic and international politics and how the states would deal with these international political developments. The measure of pessimism of human nature, conflictual international relations which would be dealt with by waging war against other state, focus on national security and state survival and domestic politics would stem from international politics were key elements of realism.100 Realists thus believed that political activity centred on the attainment of power and use of power.101 In the given scenario, realism would be predominant desire of states who would wish to seek power instead of ideals and morals.

Realism would be termed as a state centric concept in which state representing the nation would be the primary actor in the conduct of international relations. In international system, the most powerful state would decide the fate of international community.102 Realists would emphasize on the element of power and use of force in the conduct of international relations. In their view, international politics would become a continuous struggle for attainment of power. In this process, conflict would be inherent and

98Ibid,108.
100Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Oxford University Press, 2007), 60.
101Ibid.
unavoidable.\textsuperscript{103} In the same context, two realist interpretations of international politics would be referred to. First one would be state centric realism that focused on state as the principal actor. The second one would be system centric realism or structural realism that emphasized on the state and state’s interests.\textsuperscript{104} This would be discussed in subsequent sections while discussing various strands of realism.

While explaining the realist world, Anne Marie Slaughter gave out four basic elements which were essential for realist worldview. Firstly, survival of the state would be the primary objective of a given state. In order to ensure survival, the states in the anarchic scenario would always ensure attainment of power to achieve survival even if it ran contrary to national ideals and culture. Secondly, the state was a rational actor that implied that in order to exist and address the first element of survival, a given state would act as best as it could implying that the state would take a rational approach to achieve that end. Thirdly, in the uncertain world, no state could know the intention of the other state. Fourthly, in the scenarios of great power politics, states with greater economic and military power would dominate.\textsuperscript{105} In the anarchic power political setting, where intentions of other state would also be unclear, states being rational actors would work to ensure that their survival and sovereignty were not threatened.

The realist paradigm in international politics would focus on power. All the leading realists would term power as the primary component of realism perspective. Realists believed that power structure was due to international system. Hans Morgenthau would define international politics as struggle for power among states. The immediate aim of politics in his view would always be power though ultimate aim could be anything. He further argued that whatever goals, statesmen and people set, realizing these goals would always be through power. He also gave a reflection of power as non-violent measure when he contended that power would also mean man’s control over the minds and actions

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\textsuperscript{103}Jens-Uwe Wunderlich, \textit{Regionalism Globalisation and International Order Europe and Southeast Asia} (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008),17.
\textsuperscript{105}Slaughter, “International Relations, Principal Theories.”
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of other men.\textsuperscript{106} By political power, however, he referred to control among the holders of authorities and people.\textsuperscript{107} Some realists, however, believed that power was the sum of military, economic technological capabilities at the disposal of the state.\textsuperscript{108}

Jack Donnelly contended that there existed two realist dimensions and five kinds of proponents of realism. An emphasis would be laid on ‘egoism’ that had linkage with human nature and ‘anarchy’ that would be referred to as structural realism. Structural realists emphasized on international anarchy that would be an outcome of continuing power struggle. On the contrary biological realists emphasized on human nature which had lust and quest for glory ingrained and conflict and war rooted in man’s very nature.\textsuperscript{109} In the second dimension, he described radical realists who adopted ‘extreme’ version of anarchy, egoism and power politics and strong realists who would give a modest space to non-realists. Fifth kind of realists was of hedged realists. Hedged realists would find themselves in sync with definition of the problem emanating from anarchy and egoism in international politics but would find it difficult to cope with the solution of power politics.\textsuperscript{110}

Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes were the true precursors of realism in international relations and their assumption was that human beings were essentially driven by their self-interests and lust for power. International politics, in their view, involved continuous power struggle, which would result in a readiness to war, continuing for alliance-building and maintaining a balance of power favourable to the state.\textsuperscript{111}

Observing the perspectives of various realist authors, it would be evident that relations among the states had very conservative and pessimistic disposition in international politics at least with proponents of realists approach.

\textsuperscript{107}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{108}\textit{Viotti and Mark, “Realism”64.}
\textsuperscript{109}Jack Donnelly, \textit{Realism and International Relations} (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 11.
\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Ibid}, 12.
Realists would also take a dim view of human nature with no faith in world organizations, international law and liberal institution building. These ideas dominated the thinking of world leaders during the post Second World War era. During the cold war era, the thinking of the US and West European political leaders was influenced by realism though many others disagreed with the realists world view.

**Figure 1.1.1. Dimensions of Realism**

Before briefly discussing various realist strands, it would be desirable to mention what Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye concluded with regards to the realist assumption. This would be relevant as subsequently in this study, a relation would be established between two theoretical paradigms opposite in their essence but relevant to the state’s behaviour addressed in this study. In their book *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* they rightly contended that three assumptions would form an integral part of realist vision. Firstly, states would be dominant actors in international

\[\text{\textsuperscript{112}}\text{Ibid.}\]
political arena. Secondly, force would be instrument of policy and thirdly, military security would top the hierarchy of issues in international politics.\textsuperscript{113}

In the context of classical realism, Plato’s \textit{Republic} containing conversation on statecraft between Socrates and Thrasymachus and History of Peloponnesian War by Thucydides were important scriptures.\textsuperscript{114} Classical realism traced its origin to ancient thinker Thucydides. Following Thucydides were Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr who became notable proponents of classical realism. Classical realism gave an explanation of international politics in terms of human nature. Despite various variants of realism, realists shared that the states pursued interests in anarchy and humans would act in groups with political instinct to become conflictual.\textsuperscript{115} Hans Morgenthau too enunciated that politics like society was governed by objective laws having roots in human nature making it imperative to know societies and laws by which societies lived. Most realists believed that human nature that had desire for domination and power did not change throughout the history.\textsuperscript{116}

Principal thinkers of classical realism Thucydides, Machiavelli, Carl Von Clausewitz and Morgenthau were fixated on order, justice and change at domestic, regional and international levels.\textsuperscript{117} Classical realists advanced a belief that human nature had an instinct or desire for domination and power due to which existed a primacy of self-interests over morality in politics. By doing so, states tended to manifest that self-interest was just right of the state. And when it came to self-interest then morality or moral principle would cease to be applicable. If national interests had the support of moral principle then self-interest would have primacy. Relatively, classical realists would tend to be uncompromising and had philosophic thought in their approach and orientation.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{116}Colin Elman and Michael Jensen, \textit{The Realism Reader} (Routledge, 2014), 53.
\textsuperscript{117}Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, \textit{International Relations Theories}.
\textsuperscript{118}Nardin and Mapel, \textit{Traditions of International Ethics}, 62.
Hans Morgenthau was an important thinker in classical realist tradition. His work *Politics among Nations (1948)* was a very important work in the wake of the Second World War. When Compared to E.H. Carr, Morgenthau seemed to be influenced by natural sciences. In his views, theories of International Relations must be independent, retrospective and must be based on facts. Morgenthau’s six principles were: 1) Politics was governed by objective laws that were based on human nature so political theory should be based on human psychology and reason. 2) The concept of national interest could be defined in terms of ‘power’ and not in terms of morality and religion. 3) Interest was not fixed and is shaped by environments. 4) Universal moral principles are not applicable to state actions and there has to be difference in the standard of morality of state and individual. 5) There is no identity between moral aspirations to a nation and moral law which governs the universe. 6) Political sphere is autonomous and political actor thinks in terms of interest as the economist thinks in terms of utility.  

Classical realists considered state as primary unit of analysis so the study of international politics from realist’s view point would be through state-centric approach. There were some underlying assumptions of classical realism that would affect the pattern of behaviour of a given state. These assumptions were: 1) principle actors in international relations would be states, 2) states would be considered unitary and rational actors, and 3) national security issues revolving around power would determine state behaviour. On the basis of these assumptions, it would be concluded that states would tend to move to conflict than cooperation amongst each other.  

Jonathan Cristal’s criticism of Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism was objective. He was critical of the concept of power, objectivity and particularly negative perception of morality that these six principles portrayed to create in international relations scholarship. He argued that classical realism did necessarily mean that states must strike a balance between power and moral principle while trying to achieve national interests. National interest would agreeably be survival. He also argued that Morgenthau’s six

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principles of political realism were not part of the book’s first edition and their subsequent addition in his classic led to a misperception about classical realism.\textsuperscript{121}

Robert Jackson advanced another interesting argument describing classical realism. Argument followed that states would exist in state of anarchy which meant absence of central authority with no law to regulate actions of all the states. States dealing with each other would not be able to deal in terms of law, instead they dealt in terms of power and power in this competition defined how much influence one state could enjoy over another. The argument corroborated with Thucydides when he referred to Peloponnesian wars and stated that in relations among unequals, strong did what they had to and weaker accepted what they had to.\textsuperscript{122} It would be power that would be the decisive factor in measuring the influence of a state.

It would be apt to argue that the realists formed their view in reaction to the liberal-utopians of inter war years.\textsuperscript{123} Realists would look for reality of conflict in international relations and suggest appropriate analysis of recurrent pattern of events. Literature on realism lacked consensus and there was scepticism if realism could be called a coherent theory. The unifying concept that emerged was anarchy requiring states to ensure their security. Resultantly, states would compete for power and security.\textsuperscript{124}

Neo-realism emerged in the 1970s, as a response to the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau. Kenneth Waltz reformulated realism in international politics. His neo-realism or structural realism was both a critique of traditional realism and a substantial intellectual extension of theoretical tradition that became a significant prism of looking at international politics. He also responded to liberal criticism and used scientific approach to cure the effects of realism.\textsuperscript{125} Classical realism explained international politics on the basis of human nature and egoism engrossed in human nature whereas neo-realism did not focus on human nature. Instead, it stressed the structural constraints of international politics. Waltz,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[122]Jackson and Jackson, \textit{Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations} 19-20.
\item[124]Baylis, Smith, and Owens, \textit{The Globalization of World Politics}.
\item[125]Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations.”
\end{footnotes}
who was a key proponent of neo-realism, identified two ordering principle of international politics: firstly, anarchy with absence of central government among states\(^{126}\), and secondly, hierarchy in which domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic.\(^{127}\)

Before dwelling on neo-realism, it would be pertinent to elucidate power and its outcome that Kenneth Waltz argued in his famous work *Theory of International Politics*. According to Waltz, power would help attain means for any state to maintain autonomy and power would afford the possessor a room for wider action though outcome of such action might remain vague. He also contended that more power would afford wider safety particularly safety against less powerful and weak and great power would give bigger stakes to the one who possessed it and ability to act at his convenience.\(^{128}\) Going by what Waltz argued, power would be an important factor to decide the stature of any state in international politics.

For the purpose of explaining structure of political systems, Kenneth Waltz argued that international political system would compose of a structure and interacting units. The structure he believed would be the component which made it possible to understand the system as a whole.\(^{129}\) The structure would be embedded in international system and would be defined as to how the units were related to each other, political functions allocated and power distributed. Political units would have anarchy or hierarchy which meant either a relationship of ‘authority and subordination’ or without the relation of ‘authority and subordination’.\(^{130}\)

Power would be a central preposition in the realist paradigm that most realist scholars would agree to and there would be a structural explanation for why states competed for power in international system. John Mearsheimer argued five assumptions in the international system that spawned security competition. Firstly, operating in anarchic system, the great powers were the major actors in international politics. Secondly, all the


\(^{127}\)Ibid, 88.

\(^{128}\)Ibid. 194-195

\(^{129}\)Ibid, 45.

\(^{130}\)Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*, 36.
states acquired offensive military capability to inflict harm to other states. Thirdly, there would never be a certainty about intentions of other state. Fourthly, states would have survival as their most important goal and lastly, states would be rational actors having capability to devise strategies with a view to ensure their survival.\textsuperscript{131}

Describing myth of anarchy in international politics, it would be important to know neo-realist approach. The first and important element or assumption of anarchy would be sovereignty. Nation states are all sovereign with no authority above them and enjoying absolute authority over territory and people. The second important assumption of anarchy would be lack of world government. It referred to the absence of world government and therefore states would not be subject to any world government. The states enjoyed international independence and even if they joined an international organization that would not impinge on their sovereignty as the membership of any international organization was voluntary and states could quit an organization if they desired so. The third assumption of anarchy related to its meaning. It denoted the \textit{lack of an order} which implied that \textit{anarchical} situation in international politics was essentially due to the absence of world government.\textsuperscript{132}

It would be imperative to analyse the two important strands of realism discussed above. The major difference between classical realism and neo-realism is that neo-realism emerged as a response to some of the inadequacies of classical realism. Classical realism had deep roots in selfish human nature whereas neo-realists would find linkage to anarchic global system. Classical realists would distinguish between status quo powers whereas neo-realists would regard state as a unitary actor. An important commonality was that the proponents of both classical realism and neo-realism would see international political arena in hostile competition where power was the most important factor.\textsuperscript{133}

Neoclassical realism, a combination of classical realism and neo-realism, was an important strand of realism. The theoretical strand was advanced by Gideon Rose in his

article ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’. He argued that in the concept of neoclassical realism, the ‘scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country’s relative material power. Yet it contended that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy was indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure’. Prominent neoclassical realists were William Wohlforth, Gideon Rose, Alastair Murray and Fareed Zakaria.

The relative material power of any state would be an important factor in neoclassical realist perspective that set the scope and aspiration of a state when it came to formulate the foreign policy of the country. The impact of power on foreign policy would be complex as it would affect the policy makers and structure of the state. It would thus be important to know the linkage between power and policy. Neoclassical realists would discard the assumption that the only aim of the state is security. They maintained that states made effort to use power to serve their own goals and objectives in order of priorities. The states with more power would therefore, be more effective in realizing the foreign policy objectives in international political arena.

There were two important strands of realism that explained a given state’s behaviour in a conflicting manner. Offensive realism was different from defensive realism in essence. A division persisted in scholars as to whether states sought power aggressively to dominate other states or they only sought power enough to ensure minimum credible level of security. Offensive realism would therefore relate to optimally maximizing security apparatus in a bid to aggressively pursue state’s objectives whereas defensive realism would relate to security without generating conflict and war. To defensive realists, defensive strategies are best to ensure the security of a state.

In offensive realist model as presented by Peter Rudloff, states would make an all-out effort to maximize relative power. He asserted that in the context of relative power,
variables of military spending, formation of alliances and conflict are addressed by the states. He argued that in an offensive realist model, with the increase in economic capability of a state, simultaneous increase in military spending, expansion of alliances and use of conflict against states would occur.\footnote{Ibid.} In the realm of security competition that existed, a state would choose to adopt an aggressive posture when its economic capacity so warranted. Offensive realists would be for maximizing power to attain and maintain influence and enhance security sphere.

Realists held that certain states were aggressive. Offensive realism was a structural theory that belonged to the realist school of thought that was responsible for aggressive state behaviour in international politics. It essentially varied from defensive realism by portraying states as power-maximizing states. Offensive realism was developed as a concept by various scholars like Robert Giplin, Randall Schweller, Eric J. Labs and Fareed Zakaria. The most important scholar of offensive realism is John J. Mearsheimer who authored a book titled \textit{The Tragedy of Great Power Politics}. According to him, main tenets of offensive realism were: 1) great powers were the main actors in world politics and the international system would be anarchical; 2) states were rational actors, capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximized their prospects for survival; 3) states had survival as their primary goal 4) all states possessed some offensive military capability and 5) states could never be certain of the intentions of other states.\footnote{Mearsheimer, \textit{Structural Realism}, 73-74.}

There would also be another line of arguments whereby offensive realism did differentiate itself from the realism that Morgenthau and Waltz had advanced. Morgenthau argued that states tended to maximize power in their sphere because states had lust for power while Mearsheimer termed it as an essential consequence of international anarchy. Waltz and Mearsheimer presented the goals of state from the standpoint of anarchic system. Waltz contended that states pursued security that was enough
for survival whereas Mearsheimer argued that states pursued power to seek and attain hegemony.\textsuperscript{140}

In his article ‘Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and the Role of Constraints’, Peter Rudloff explored three variables namely military spending, alliances and conflict that he considered appropriate to attain realist objectives. Military spending of any state aspiring to be a major power would enhance if economic capabilities of that state swelled. Economic well-being would prompt a state to spend more on acquiring military hardware. Likewise, the major power would get into alliances with other states if its economic capabilities increased. Similarly, the chances of a major power using conflict as a tool to advance its realist objective would increase when the economic capabilities of the state increased.\textsuperscript{141}

In the study of international relations, defensive realism would be one of the important components of political realism. Defensive realism envisaged that anarchy was the reason for states to become concerned or obsessed with security. Consequently states in the security dilemma urged to increase their security. Offensive-defensive theory was an important theory that argued an inherent balance in technology, geography, and doctrine that favors either the attacker or defender in battle. The First World War is cited as an example of this theory where balance favored the offense.\textsuperscript{142}

Peter Rodloff in his article explored variable that would explain defensive realist perspective. And for defensive realists it would be appropriate to evaluate threat a state was faced with. It would be a measure of threat related to measure of power acquired by other states. So the presence of a threat was central to the model of defensive realism. The state would increase military spending if the threat to a state increased. In defensive realist evaluation, a state would increase its alliances membership when the amount of threat increased. Likewise, a major power would enhance its use of conflict against other

\textsuperscript{140}Walter Carlsnaes et al., \textit{Handbook of International Relations} (Sage, 2002), 283.
\textsuperscript{141}Rudloff, “Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and the Role of Constraints.”
\textsuperscript{142}http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defensive_realism accessed on 2 June 2012
states when threat to the state increased. The threat therefore, would be a deciding factor in the scheme of defensive realism.\textsuperscript{143}

John Mearsheimer argued that though there were gains of attaining power but from the viewpoint of defensive realism, it would be unwise to pursue hegemonic posture in place of striving for the right amount of power. Defensive realists argued that if a state attained power the other powers would build up their power and make the hegemon less secure.\textsuperscript{144} Attaining power would also create an offence-defence balance and even the conquest would not be feasible as the cost would outweigh the benefit. Limiting the desire for more power would lessen security competition among the powers.\textsuperscript{145}

Jeffrey Taliaferro argued that four assumptions would explain defensive realism. These assumptions were: 1) security dilemma that referred to increasing one’s security at the cost of other’s insecurity would be international system’s feature; 2) the security dilemma was a factor but it would not always generate conflict; 3) foreign policy would be influenced by material capability of state; and 4) domestic politics of a state would shape its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{146} Defensive realism would present an optimistic point of view of international politics and interface of states and states in defensive realism would endeavour to have increase relative security.\textsuperscript{147}

The realist perspective would be subject to criticism for some of its assumptions that various scholars believe did not conform to ground realities and controversies between realism and its critics. Realism, according to critics, could neither make some point predictions nor empirically predict simple occurrences nor explain salient phenomena like the end of the Cold War or other systemic changes.\textsuperscript{148} The realists claimed that all great powers would always be concerned with maximizing their power to ensure their security. The presumption that the great powers would be ambitious, self-cantered and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{143}Rudloff, “Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and the Role of Constraints.”
\bibitem{144}Mearsheimer, \textit{Structural Realism},76.
\bibitem{145}Ibid.
\bibitem{147}Ibid.,159.
\end{thebibliography}
prone to conflict would require reconsideration.\textsuperscript{149} Though the realist theory gave credence to military power, defining power in military sense alone would not be appropriate too. Despite criticism, realist theory emerged as a relevant approach in international relations.

Realist authors and commentators would claim that there was a deterministic, and negative undercurrent to a significant part of the realist work. Wolfers, Morgenthau, Kissinger, and conventional realists had frequently made distinction between the revisionist and status quo power who wished to attain a position in international and regional order.\textsuperscript{150} It would be important to mention the state as the centrepiece of realist work and few would differ with regard to the significance of the state in global issues. But the contention that realists would be so fixated on the state that they would overlook different issues not specifically identified with state security. Moreover, given the national security prism through which realist would see the world, different concerns, like socio economic issues would not be important for the realists. An obsession with national security was such that the state would make other issues less important or ban them completely from the realist plan.\textsuperscript{151}

The realist paradigm evolved over the years. Many modifications to the initial concepts, clarifications on realist terms and additions and innovations were made to various assumptions of the realist paradigm but the core elements of realist concept remained the same. Realists became the challenge for idealists in interwar years who thought of peace in the world through international organizations and international law. Realists claim seemed appropriate when they claimed that they dealt with actual practice of international relations rather than how it ought to be. Realist contention would be that the formulation of policies based upon wishful thinking and questionable appraisal would lead to


\textsuperscript{150} Viotti and Mark, “Realism.”

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
devastating policies.\textsuperscript{152} The world in the realist perspective was a practical one where states would always pursue their objectives based on self-interest.

This study maintained that realism explained states as part of security competition that has so far remained the norm of international politics. Due to this security competition, two prepositions have emerged. First, states would define their interests in terms of power and would strive to attain it; and second, larger states would wish to expand their influence, whereas smaller states would do that for their survival. So in the process, states would increase military spending or enter into alliances to confront a threat. Being a part of security competition would be the dictate of realism. On the contrary, the paradigm of complex interdependence explained international relations from a perspective that differed from realism.

1.2. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE

This section would dwell on what formed the basis of Complex Interdependence and what were theoretical underpinnings of the perspective. It would also seek to explore as to how Interdependence became phenomenal in explaining bilateral ties of two states that pursued common objectives. Complex interdependence would be discussed as a paradigm contrary to realism. Before dwelling on the concept of interdependence in detail, a realist perspective on interdependence would also be discussed briefly.

\textsuperscript{152}Ibid.
A pluralistic concept of interdependence would have a realist emphasis too. To a realist, relations of interdependence would always be dominance-dependence relations and dependent state being vulnerable to the dominance party. Contrary to the concept of interdependence, realists would urge states to have independence or as minimum dependency as possible. Interdependence, according to the realists, would breed vulnerability in terms of weak state and would give an edge to the stronger state. The vulnerabilities, however, of various actors like their sensitivities would vary according to the circumstances.

Theory of interdependence was a response to the weaknesses in the realist paradigm that were manifested in 1970s. The proponents of realist paradigm contended that state had centrality in international politics and all actions of a state flowed from its stature whether weak or strong. On the contrary, the interdependence theorists argued that non-state

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153Ibid.
actors such as various corporations would begin to have an influential position in the global political arena. They argued that power or security competition would be relegated to far less importance. Interdependence scholars would expect optimism from human nature and would consider it as something mutually beneficial and contrary to the realist thought.\textsuperscript{155}

Cordial bilateral relations between two states would best be explained by the theory of Complex Interdependence. The concept of economic interdependence was given by Richard N Cooper in his article published in 1972 using the term ‘economic transactions between two or more nations to economic developments within those nations.’\textsuperscript{156} Concept of Complex Interdependence was then advanced by Robert O Keohane and Joseph Nye to analyze international politics in terms of interdependence. The theory of Complex Interdependence made way in the 1970s when realism despite being a dominant theoretical discourse, fell short of addressing certain dimensions of international politics and relations of states.

In the age of globalization, states would depend on each other. Dependence affected by external factors referred to reciprocal affects among states or different actors of state. There could be two dimensions of interdependence, sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity interdependence could be social, political and economic whereas vulnerability interdependence could be an actor’s liability to suffer something forced by external factors. According to Keohane and Nye, interdependence required states to cooperate and not to get into competition with each other. In the post Second World War scenario, economic considerations for interdependence became more relevant. According to Nye, interdependence had four dimensions; sources, benefits, costs, and symmetry. The popular idea of economic interdependence flouted by Cooper became a reality in this modern world and the idea gained great popularity after Second World War and during the Cold War period as well.

\textsuperscript{155}Wilkinson, \textit{International Relations}, 4.
\textsuperscript{156}Richard N. Cooper, “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies,” \textit{World Politics} 24, no. 02 (1972): 159–181.
The post-Cold War era witnessed new developments in international politics. With a view to attaining their goals of attaining and maintaining influence over global and regional arena, international players rearranged their political as well as economic agendas to suit their global and regional objectives. Conventionally, the competition among the states was characterized by security imperatives, but debates on forging cooperation and interdependence among the states for mutual advantage gained currency. The scholars initiated a debate that real power would be something beyond building arsenals. Instead, real power would be sound economy with economic influence and contemporary technological advancements. This paradigm opened enormous opportunities for states towards a relationship of cooperation and interdependence.

Henry Kissinger, a distinguished post World War Two realist, had come to terms with the change and stated that the old pattern of international order were collapsing and the world had become interdependent in many spheres of human interaction. Various global political events in the post-World War Two period brought changes in the theoretical perspective of international politics. Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin in his article “World Orders in Theory and Practice of International Relations: Implications for Pakistan” wrote that there were five paradigms that dominated the discourse of international relations during the post-Cold War era. These five paradigms are End of History, Clash of Civilizations, Multipolarity, Complex interdependence and Coming Anarchy. Complex interdependence envisaged that the states were linked with each other on multi-tier level and there were diverse transnational connections and interdependencies among states. The work of Keohane and Joseph Nye, which surfaced in 1970s, became a challenge to political realists of international politics.

Power became an elusive concept in international politics. The realists considered power in military terms alone but explanation of power, according to interdependence theorists differed. Power, Keohane and Joseph argued, was the ability of an actor to force another

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actor to do what he would not do in normal circumstances. Before highlighting various characteristics of Complex Interdependence, Keohane and Nye referred to interdependence as a situation which was not in an ‘evenly balanced mutual dependence.’\textsuperscript{159} Further, asymmetries in dependence could give an influential position to one actor while dealing with another actor. A less dependent actor would be at an advantage to use his position as a bargaining chip for one issue and might impact other issues as well.\textsuperscript{160}

Complex interdependence would either mean bilateral interdependence of state or multifaceted interdependence the states would come to have in different spheres of governance involving other states. The proponent of complex interdependence considered the concept as ideal that conformed to the existing international political realities. Another very closely related concept was globalization that carried the concept of multi-dimensional bilateral interdependences.\textsuperscript{161} The concept revolved around dependencies of one state on another state with stress on mutuality of interests.

Robert O Keohane and Joseph Nye illustrated three core characteristics of Complex Interdependence that provided different perspective of international system. The framework focused on dissolution of traditional hierarchy in the system, introduction of multiple channels and reduction of use of force. Pattern of interdependence however would be vital to these characteristics. It would also be important to note that in the contemporary international system, salience of these characteristics would bring in various constraints and many opportunities for the interacting states.\textsuperscript{162} Multiple channels was the first characteristic of complex interdependence that aimed at connecting various societies, which included all governmental, nongovernmental elites giving way to trans-governmental relations among the states.\textsuperscript{163} Moreover, transnational organizations, Multi-National Companies (MNCs) would have great impact on domestic as well interstate relations. The activities of governments, corporations, banks and trade

\textsuperscript{159}Keohane and Nye, \textit{Power and Interdependence}, 1977.
\textsuperscript{160}Ibid, 11.
\textsuperscript{161}RJ Barry Jones, \textit{Routledge Encyclopaedia of International Political Economy: Entries GO}, vol. 2 (Taylor & Francis, 2001), 790
\textsuperscript{162}Ibid.
unions would take place and impact different states as transnational communication would reinforce these impacts. Multiple channels would ensure that ‘foreign economic policies touch more domestic economic activity than in the past, blurring the lines between domestic and foreign policy and increasing the number of issues relevant to foreign policy’. With non-state actors, there might be sub-state actors forming part of multiple channels.

Figure 1.2.2. Multiple Channels of Complex Interdependence

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164 Ibid.
165 Juliet Kaarbo and James Ray, Global Politics (Cengage Learning, 2010), 9.
The second characteristic of complex interdependence was the absence of hierarchy among issues. It implied that there would be multiple issues on the agenda of interstate relations and these issues would not be arranged in a clear hierarchy. For instance, as opposed to realists interdependence proposition would not list military security at the top in the order of priority. There would not be a distinction between domestic or foreign issues\textsuperscript{166} which would make foreign policy a larger and diverse area or domain. Issues threatening some of the domestic groups and not considered a potential threat to the nation would be attended to and would help in forming a rational and consistent foreign policy.\textsuperscript{167}

The third characteristic of complex interdependence is the use of military force. If complex interdependence prevails between two states, military power will not be used by governments towards each other. Though it restricted states to use power against each other, it could allow power to be used against a rival bloc. Force would not be an appropriate means to achieve economic and other goals. Certain traditional theorists of international politics expressed concern over accuracy of these characteristics, but it was thought that complex interdependence would be quite well approximated on global economic and ecological issues.\textsuperscript{168}

Discussing complex interdependence in relation to realism, there would be a different explanation of international relations with regards to two theoretical paradigms. There would be three important differences between realism and complex interdependence. First, complex interdependence would allow multiple channels of access among communities including the state and non-state actors whereas realism would refer to the unitary state assumption. Second, in the interdependence, force would be of low salience whereas in realism it would assume central importance. Third, there would be absence of hierarchy of issues in complex interdependence whereas realism would assume security as the most important issue among states. There would be a measure of acceptance in complex

\textsuperscript{166}Keohane and Nye, \textit{Power and Interdependence}, 1977.
\textsuperscript{167}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168}Ibid.
interdependence that all factors did not exist all the times so challenge to realism as a theoretical paradigm became feeble.\textsuperscript{169}

The concept of complex interdependence perceived a system that two or more societies followed to accrue the benefits of mutual dependence. The system did not revolve around security alone but covered various other aspects like economic and technological interactions that states would carry out with each other.\textsuperscript{170} Many non-state actors operating at the level of societies became important actors alongside state. Regions in the state of interdependence would not be divided or disconnected but would be in a state of mutual interconnectedness and interdependence at the level of various tiers of society. Interdependence, therefore, became a sort of deterrence or prevention of conflict and created an appropriate environment for peace. This concept therefore, gave societies with diverse outlook to connect in ‘complex and interdependent ways’.\textsuperscript{171}

Interestingly, the domestic and foreign policy aspects can be explained through Complex Interdependence as well. There would be different models for different states to exercise mutual interdependence. For instance, the US would in all likelihood exercise international leadership without capacity for hegemony and United Kingdom’s hegemony on world oceans would be linked with domestic interests. The argument of interdependence would be using various approaches to different situations for which innovation was required.\textsuperscript{172} Interdependent world would be a harmonious world where states could look towards each other to accrue economic cooperation and have gains of mutuality of interests. In the era of interdependence, the nature of world politics changed and states would increasingly become dependent on each other for various governmental and non-governmental businesses. Many scholars with realist outlook in the past three decades had expressed enormous potential of states to have interdependent and mutually beneficial relations.

\textsuperscript{169}Brown and Ainley, \textit{Understanding International Relations}, 36.
\textsuperscript{171}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172}Keohane and Nye, \textit{Power and Interdependence}, 1977.
The theorists of realism and complex interdependence were aware of conflicting elements of both theoretical paradigms. Realists contended that the security factor dominates all other factors whereby power assumed the most important position. On the contrary, exponents of theory of complex interdependence asserted that the world had become a global village with distances squeezed, dependence on the other states increasingly became one of the fewer choices in bilateral relations.

Complex interdependence in itself would not be a perfect theoretical solution to any international political issue. Both realism and complex interdependence had contradictions in the way they explained the behaviour of states, both were relevant yet both invited criticism. Complex interdependence offered an idealistic worldview but the quest for power with a view to maximize strength and expand influence by states continued. Though complex interdependence had international institutions and multinational corporations (MNCs) as tools but still powerful states used them for their realist interests. The fact that complex interdependence did not fit into all situations and benefited few powerful states did not let it become a global theory.\textsuperscript{173} The failure of complex interdependence would pave a way for realism to remain relevant in international politics.

The paradigm of complex interdependence differed from the realist approach. It defined different dimensions of interstate relations. Complex interdependence became relevant in the age of globalization when states sought to depend on each other for their own interest. Complex interdependence focused more on cooperation than on acquiring and maintaining military power. Three characteristics of complex interdependence amply explained the dimension of interdependence. Multiple channels that would help states and societies connect with each other formally or informally. Absence of hierarchy among issues meant issues were not influenced by military security alone. Issues would be discussed at several governmental tiers and generate different responses at domestic and interstate level. Third important characteristic that was elaborated in complex

interdependence was lack of use of military force while states were exercising interdependence amongst each other.

Though some realist assumptions seemed pertinent to international politics of today, interdependence scholarship believed that there occurred a transformation in international politics and states enhanced bilateral and multi-lateral interactions. Transnational interdependence between various tiers of societies increased due to multiple channels that linked the states. This brought a change in the outlook of governments who also began to think in terms of connectivity. In the dissertation, salient characteristics of complex interdependence like multiple channels, absence of hierarchy of issues and considerable decline in use of military force would be referred to while discussing bilateral relations of states.

The translation of events in international politics would be different from the realist’s perspective and from the perspective of complex interdependence. In realist vision, military security would dominate all state objectives whereas the complex interdependence perspective envisioned that various state objectives would be pursued simultaneously and they might not necessarily be dependent on each other. The exponents of realist theory contended that the world would continue to remain a hostage to power or to the security dimension of international politics. On the contrary, proponents of complex interdependence believed that states were increasingly becoming dependent on one another. Economy rather than military power was important in the view of scholars who advanced interdependence in international politics. Due to this interdependence, states ceased to be enemies and had forged economic cooperation. Realism and complex interdependence had conflicting assumptions as in view of realists, security competition to attain power dominated international politics. On the contrary, proponents of complex interdependence viewed the world as a global village where interdependence was increasingly becoming an important option in bilateral relations of the states.
In short, theories of realism and complex interdependence explained various dimension of the paradigms that reflected conduct of states under different set of circumstances in international politics. The paradigms addressed the bilateral relations of the states as well as their relations as alliance in the context of regional and global politics. Realism would explain alliance in regional and global context where military security would top the priority and complex interdependence would explain bilateral relations of the states.

With a view to provide a theoretical basis to address the questions raised in this dissertation, assumptions of realism and complex interdependence were explored. There existed two dimensions of Pakistan-China relations addressed in this study. Pakistan-China relations were marked with an exceptional cooperation and interdependence and such alignment of interests would be explained by complex interdependence in terms of liberal and neo-liberal discourses. Second dimension was strategic cooperation between the two countries aimed at achieving goals of ‘power’ rooted in realist paradigm. In this context, states had been preserving sovereignty by means of maintaining, maximizing and employing power. This behaviour pattern of both the countries would be best explained by realist paradigm. In the given context and in the light of assumptions referred above, the study would explore Pakistan-China relations within perspective of regional dynamic and global imperatives.
chapter two

pakistani-china relations (1947-1990): a historical perspective

This chapter would offer a historical perspective on Pakistan-China relations during 1947-1990. Both the countries belonged to ancient civilizations and their interaction had given both the countries a sense of centuries old common history. This chapter would trace the events prior to the inception of Pakistan on August 14, 1947 and proclamation of Peoples Republic by China on October 1, 1949. Important event in case of Pakistan would be March 23, 1940, a day when resolution for Pakistan was passed demanding a separate country for the Muslims of the sub-continent and for China July 21, 1921, when the Communist Party of China (CPC) was formed. CPC was a political party that came to power in 1949 and had continued to govern China up to the present times. The historical perspective has thus focused on the evolution of relations between non-entities to newly born entities.

In order to know China’s future behaviour and its world view, it would be important to have a closer look at its history. Michael D Swaine maintained that national pride, image of peace loving polity alongside virtuous central government and mutually beneficial view of interstate relations have influenced China’s thought and behaviour,174 which in turn impacted on China’s gradual understanding of the world and manifesting in its foreign policy behaviour as well. China’s case would be a complex example because its behaviour had varied during various epochs of history. Certain Chinese would view the Western world as hegemon with vested interests but still some would admire their values and practices.175 It is largely due to this very complexity of China’s behaviour that making any generalization about China’s political conduct and its worldview would be difficult.

175 Ibid.
Here, it may be added that the history of a country would be vital to explain the impact of time and civilization on individual or collective behaviour and the perceptions of the general populace of that country. Other factors in human nature being equal, civilizations especially ideology, cultures, arts, language, philosophy, historical modes of war and peace would transform a given population inhabiting a certain terrain. It would, therefore, be vital to analyse the impact of history as well as cultural developments on the populace to illustrate the behaviour patterns of the state as a whole. This insight would be applicable to China as well.

China would be the most populated country in the world with 1.39 billion population, which formed 19.24 per cent of the global population count. According to an economic survey, China’s GDP growth attained 7.4 per cent mark in 2014 as against the target of 7.5 per cent.\textsuperscript{176} In the past few decades, China witnessed unprecedented growth indicators which helped pull more than 500 million people out of poverty. Being located in Eastern Asia, it bordered with the Korea Bay, Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea between North Korea and Vietnam. China had an area of 9,596,960 square kilometres out of which 9,326,410 square kilometres was land and 270,550 square kilometres was water.\textsuperscript{177}

Existence of China dated back to pre-history and had successively been ruled by ancient dynasties and empires which determined the political system of China. Historically, Chinese history could be divided into eras of pre-history, ancient, imperial and modern China. Pre-historic era comprised the Palaeolithic that meant the Old Stone Age and the Neolithic that meant the new Stone Age. Late Palaeolithic times would trace back to about 10,000 to 40,000 years\textsuperscript{178} whereas the Neolithic time would date back to an era about 7000 years\textsuperscript{179} ago discovered around the Yangtze River and Yellow River.

\textsuperscript{178}Cao Dawei and Yanjing Sun, \textit{China’s History} (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2010),6.
\textsuperscript{179}Ibid.,8.
Shang dynasty was the first of ancient origin that ruled China from 1600 BC to 1046 BC followed by Zhou Dynasty (1046 BC-256 BC). Qin Shi Huang, the King of Qin Dynasty (221 BC – 207 BC) declared himself as the first emperor of imperial China. Qin Dynasty was followed by Han Dynasty (202 BC – 220 AD), Sui Dynasty (581 - 618), Tang Dynasty (618 - 907), Song Dynasty (960 - 1279) and Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644). Qing dynasty (1644-1912) was last of imperial China that was defeated as a result of Wuchang uprising that began on October 10, 1911. The overthrow of the emperor of Qing dynasty put an end to imperial era and marked the foundation of Republic of China (ROC).

In February, 1912, the last Qing emperor announced abdication and a republican era in China began. Nearly four decades of era witnessed certain major events in the history of modern China. These included turbulent transitory arrangements from imperialistic to republican rule. The era of warlords beginning from 1915 when the country was controlled by military factions ended by 1928 with the elimination of major warlords though some minor warlords continued to wield certain power well in to 1940s. Adhering to Marxist-Leninist and Mao Zedong’s philosophy, CPC was formed in 1921 and has continued to be the ruling party up to the present times. Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), Japanese invasion (1937-45), and CPC’s control of mainland China and founding of China (1949) were the landmark events of the recent times that have left indelible marks on the history of China. Among the post First World War events, the formation of CPC was one of the most important developments which took place under the leadership of Mao Zedong. The process was clearly accelerated by events shaping up in the neighborhood in particular.

For instance, Russia’s 1917 October Revolution and 1919 May Fourth Movement had a profound impact on the formation of CPC. The October revolution was successful

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181Dawei and Sun, *China’s History*, 192.
184Dawei and Sun, *China’s History*, 193.
185The October Revolution or the Bolshevik Revolution took place on 25 October 1917 when state power was seized in Petrograd, Russia in coup led by left Socialists revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks and approved by Russian Congress.
in Russia and it considerably influenced China’s political and ideological landscape. In fact, the May Fourth Movement was a reaction to the Treaty of Versailles (June 28, 1919) that had arbitrarily given parts of Chinese territory in Shandong to Japan in a covert move. The political movement was essentially characterized as an anti-imperialists movement. The movement began with thousands of student’s demonstrations on May 4, 1919 demanding Chinese government to effectively respond to the unjust treaty.\textsuperscript{187} In 1921, an informal Chinese network had communist’s leanings. Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, both active members of the network, founded the Communist party.\textsuperscript{188} In July 1921, First Congress was held in Shanghai to formally declare the formation of the exclusive and centralized party aimed at seeking power. The meeting was attended by thirteen delegates and asserted that the party would stand for dominance of class struggle.\textsuperscript{189} The first Congress was attended by prominent communist leaders including Mao Zedong and host of others.

With formation of CPC against imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism, the party led the Chinese people to believe in the revolutionary struggle which was for the benefit of the people. CPC’s struggle could be divided into four distinct periods: Northern Expedition (1924-1928) and Kuomintang-CPC cooperation, Autumn Harvest Uprising (September 1927), War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945) and the Chinese People's War of Liberation (1946-1949). Initiated in the Guangdong province, the Northern Expedition was a military campaign led by Chiang Kai-Shek against the Beiyang government and warlords.\textsuperscript{190} It was also an attempt towards a unified China. The campaign which was actively supported by the CPC led to the establishment of Nanjing government (1928-1937).\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{186}An anti imperialist political movement initiated by students in China on May 4, 1919 was a protest against China’s weak response to Treaty of Versailles that allowed Japan to take territories surrendered by Germany in Shandong

\textsuperscript{187}Alan Hunter and John Sexton, Contemporary China (New York: Macmillan, 1999),14.

\textsuperscript{188}Ibid,15.

\textsuperscript{189}Ebrey and Liu, The Cambridge Illustrated History of China ,273.

\textsuperscript{190}Peter Zarrow, China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949 (London: Routledge, 2006),232.

\textsuperscript{191}Ibid.,248.
During Kuomintang-CPC cooperation, Mao Zedong realized the potential of peasants and he changed his emphasis from urban workers to rural peasants. He introduced land reforms and won the support of peasants. After Northern Expedition’s success Chiang Kai Shek began to consider the CPC as an ideological threat. Within this context, he ended the coalition and began to kill the communist leaders. The CPC mobilized peasants and organized an army and controlled Jiangxi till 1934. Alarmed by the growth of Mao’s army, Chiang Kai Shek launched campaign against the Red Army and in fifth attempt pushed them out.\(^{192}\) In October 1934, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Mao and some 80,000 soldiers, porters and followers set off towards west through the hilly areas. This was the beginning of Long March. The marchers experienced awful hardships. Many perished on the way while the survivors did 6,000 miles Long March. About 8,000 men from Red army survived the Long March that had begun in 1936.\(^{193}\) In 1937, a joint resistance by CPC and Kuomintang began against Japan.\(^{194}\)

In August 1937, Chiang Kai-shek and leaders of CPC called off their confrontation, concluded an agreement and established another united front in the face of Japanese invasion.\(^{195}\) While Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist forces basically set out the war in Chongqing, the CPC tremendously expanded its strength by fighting the Japanese invaders of China. By the end of the war, the CPC controlled areas of some 90 million people and had an experienced army of one million backed by twice the number of irregulars.\(^{196}\) When the Japanese army invaded the heartland of China in 1937, Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to give in major cities to Japan. In an effort to beat the Japanese, he agreed to collaborate with Mao Zedong and his communist army. As soon as the Japanese surrendered, Communist forces began a war against Kuomintang and gradually gained control of the country. After Kai-Shek’s retreat to the island of Taiwan, Mao

\(^{192}\) Hunter and Sexton, *Contemporary China*, 20.


\(^{194}\) Xiaobing Li, *China at War: An Encyclopedia* (California: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 1.

\(^{195}\) Zarrow, *China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949*, 303.

\(^{196}\) Hunter and Sexton, *Contemporary China*, 21.
Zedong announced the establishment of People's Republic of China (PRC) on October, 1, 1949.\textsuperscript{197}

While a new China was emerging under the leadership of Mao, significant developments were taking place in the subcontinent where two territorial states eventually surfaced: India and Pakistan. Both India and China had existed for centuries in geographical proximity and had religious, cultural and commercial linkages. Buddhism, a popular Chinese religion had roots in Pakistan that dated back to about 232 BC, when King Ashoka was the ruler.\textsuperscript{198} Both the countries shared 523 kilometres long border and were connected by Karakoram Highway which had traces of many paths of ancient silk route. Before reviewing the circumstances leading to creation of Pakistan, Pakistan’s ancient connection and subsequent ruling classes of sub-continent would also be discussed to provide a perspective of history shaping the behaviour of the state.

James Mill (1773-1836) in his account of British India had divided India in to four periods, namely Ancient, Classical, Medieval and Modern. The ancient history was traced back to Neolithic (6000-4000 BC),\textsuperscript{199} followed by the Indus Valley Civilization (2300-1750 BC)\textsuperscript{200} extending to North West of South Asia that included most of modern day Pakistan. Indus valley Civilization flourished alongside River Indus Basin that ran through Pakistan. The ancient period included some important dynasties like Vedic Civilization (800-400 BC)\textsuperscript{201}, Maurya Dynasty (322-185 BC)\textsuperscript{202} and Kushan Dynasty (15-272 AD)\textsuperscript{203}. Whereas Classical history included Gupta Empire (320-550)\textsuperscript{204}, Harsha's Dynasty (606-647 CE)\textsuperscript{205}, Karakota Dynasty (724-813 AD)\textsuperscript{206}, Utpala Dynasty (883-939 AD)\textsuperscript{207} and Yashaskara Dynasty (939-848AD)\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{197}“Proclamation of the Central People’s Government of the PRC,” \emph{People’s Daily}, October 2, 1949.
\textsuperscript{198}Kanai Lal Hazra, \emph{The Rise and Decline of Buddhism in India} (New Dehli: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt., Ltd., 1998),42.
\textsuperscript{199}Sailendra Nath Sen, \emph{Ancient History of Bangladesh, India & Pakistan} (New Dehli: Vanguard, 1988),19.
\textsuperscript{200}Ibid.,29.
\textsuperscript{201}Ibid.,46.
\textsuperscript{202}Ibid.,107,140.
\textsuperscript{203}Ibid.,165,169.
\textsuperscript{204}Ibid.,172,184.
\textsuperscript{205}Ibid.,209.
\textsuperscript{206}Ibid.,248,249.
\textsuperscript{207}Ibid.,250.
The medieval period of history of sub-continent began with Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526 CE) that comprised Slave, Khilji, Tugluq, Sayyid and Lodhi Dynasties. Pandyan Dynasty (1251-1323 CE), Vijayanagara (1336-1646 CE), Bengal Sultanate (1342-1576 CE), Mughal Empire (1526-1540 AD), Suri Dynasty (1540-1556 AD). The Mughal Dynasty (1556-1764 AD) was included in the medieval period of sub-continental history. The modern history included John Company Raj (1765-1793 AD), the New Mughals Rule (1793-1848 AD), and British Rule (1858-1947 AD). After subduing the 1857 uprising on August 2, 1858, Queen Victoria (1819-1901) assented an Act of Parliament that transferred rights to Crown through the Secretary of State for India. The British Empire then became protector of the system of governance in the sub-continent for ten decades that followed.

The land, now Pakistan, had been home to ancient to modern civilizations and was ruled by people of diverse cultures and faiths. Though the sub-continent was ruled by foreign invaders and adventures for centuries, the British rule had considerable impact on the future political course of the sub-continent. The British rule over British India, as it came to be known lasted for nearly hundred years from 1857 to 1947. During this period, the sub-continent came under the domination of political, economic, cultural and political change. This system remained in vogue till culmination of struggle for freedom and British India was divided in the sovereign states of Pakistan and India. The geographical location of both these dominions was such that they would impact future regional and global politics.

Situated in South Asia, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan had been a gateway for various continents in the past and offered exceptional opportunities for connectivity in future.
Pakistan became the sixth most populated country of the world. According to Pakistan Economic Survey of 2015-16, its population has reached the numeral of 195.4 million in 2016.\textsuperscript{216} Pakistan’s economic growth has averaged 4.71 percent in 2015-16 as against 4.04 percent in the previous year.\textsuperscript{217} The country shared borders with Afghanistan in the west, China in the north-east, India in the east and Iran in south-west. It had an area of 796,095 square kilometres with 1046 kilometres of coastal areas along the Arabian Sea. Though the history of Pakistan dated back to ancient times and archaeological evidences existed across the country, Pakistan’s political history began with the formation of All India Muslim League in 1906 with the objectives of protecting and advancing the rights and the interests of the Muslims of India.\textsuperscript{218} More recent historic references might be made to March 23, 1940 when the Lahore Resolution was adopted, which demanded a separate homeland comprising the Muslim majority states.

All India Muslim League had its historical session at Lahore from March 22 to March 24, 1940. During the session, Abul Kasem Fazlul Haq (1873-1962), a lawyer by profession, presented a resolution which was later transformed into the demand for the Muslim state of Pakistan. The resolution was a significant development in the Pakistan movement as it set a path for the attainment of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. This also aroused feeling among Muslim rank and file that living under the Hindu rule necessarily meant change from one master to another. Following the Lahore Resolution, on March 11, 1942, Britain sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India with constitutional proposals. The proposals offered general elections after the war, an Indian dominion associated with the United Kingdom and provinces not joining the dominion to have their own separate union and protections of minorities.\textsuperscript{219} Both the Congress and All India Muslim League rejected these proposals.

\textsuperscript{216} Pakistan Economic Survey 2015-16” (Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad)., 10.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{219} Paul Ernest Roberts, History of British India under the Company and the Crown, vol. 7 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952)., 639-640.
When Lord Mountbatten (1900-1979) failed to keep India united, he asked Vappala Pangunni Menon (1893-1965), the only Indian in his personal staff, to present a new plan for the transfer of power.\(^{220}\) Nehru abridged Menon’s formula and then Mountbatten himself took the new plan to London, where he got it approved in a hasty cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee (1883-1967). Lord Mountbatten returned from London on May 31, and met seven Indian leaders on June 2, who approved the proposed plan. He also discussed it with Gandhi convincing him that it was the best plan under the circumstances. The plan was made public on June 3, 1947. It was known as June 3rd Plan.\(^{221}\) August 16, 1947 was the day fixed by Lord Mountbatten as a day for boundary award.\(^{222}\) It also provided for the complete end of British control over Indian affairs from August 15, 1947. The Muslims of the subcontinent finally achieved their goal of having an independent state for themselves after a persistent struggle under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Pakistan was thus created on August 14, 1947, while India decided to celebrate its independence on August 15, 1947.

One of the major problems that would figure out prominently in this study would be the issue of the state of Jammu and Kashmir which surfaced soon after partition. The issue would call for some details. To begin with, British India, at the time of partition, was running a governance system comprising two kinds of administrative units. Provinces under the British comprised nearly 60 per cent and princely states comprised about 40 percent of the territory. The states were indirectly governed by British India. Kashmir was one of 562 princely states of subcontinent that owed allegiance to British Crown.\(^{223}\) Addressing the question of princely states, Lord Mountbatten said that the suzerainty of British Empire over princely states would lapse by August 15, 1947 and they would be free to accede to any of the dominions. Most of the princely states joined India and nine joined Pakistan. The outcome of Hyderabad and Kashmir differed as in Hyderabad, a

\(^{220}\) Wolpert, *A New History of India*, 347.


\(^{222}\) Riddick, *The History of British India*, 120.

Hindus majority state, the ruler was a Muslim and in Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim population was ruled by Hindu ruler.\textsuperscript{224}

Events surrounding accession of three princely states i.e. Hyderabad, Junagarh and Kashmir would elaborate their respective positions. Stretching over 212,000 Square kilometers, the princely state of Hyderabad was ruled by a Muslim ruler Nizam Osman Ali Khan its population comprised 85 percent Hindus.\textsuperscript{225} At the time of partition, the Muslim elites of Hyderabad declared through an order in June 1947 to be an independent state like Pakistan and India. India rejected the order on the pretext of being suspicious validity. India pushed its claim over Hyderabad and raised national security concerns as it asserted that due to the strategic location of Hyderabad the state could be used to threaten India. India also asserted that Hyderabad’s location, people and history made it undeniably Indian. The Nizam of Hyderabad was facing communist rebellion since 1946 and situation became worst in 1948. A Muslim militia set up under the influence of Qasim Razvi began supporting the Nizam against the upsurge. A political agitation by Hyderabad Congress Party further affected the situation. On September 13, 1948, Nizam’s efforts failed to convince India and Britain and Hyderabad was absorbed in to India by force.\textsuperscript{226}

With the lapse of British control over princely states, the states were free to accede to any state they wished but this wasn’t so. Mountbatten took a position that geographic compulsions could lead a state to join a dominion. That meant the states that shared a border with Pakistan could choose to accede to it. Junagarh, a princely state at the time of partition did not have common border with Pakistan. The Nawab of Junagarh disregarding Mountbatten’s view of geography declared accession to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{227} The two states Mangrol and Babariawad subject to the suzerainty of Junagarh declared independence from Junagadh and opted for accession to India. Reacting to this, the Nawab of Junagarh occupied both the states. India opposed Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan and called for a plebiscite to decide the question of accession. Then it moved in

\textsuperscript{224}Stein, \textit{A History of India},357.  
\textsuperscript{225}Wynbrandt, \textit{A Brief History of Pakistan},166.  
\textsuperscript{227}Ibid.,345.
troops and reclaimed Mangrol and Babariawad. On October 26, 1947, the Nawab along with the family fled to Pakistan. On November 7, 1947, the Government of India took over the administration of Junagarh. A plebiscite held in February 1948, decided Junagarh’s accession to India.

Kashmir had different story to tell. When Partition was taking place Maharaja Hari Singh was ruling over Jammu and Kashmir. He was a Hindu ruler whereas three-fourth of four million people of Kashmir were Muslims. Though the state had Muslim majority, the Maharaja did not want to accede to either Pakistan or India and hoped to remain independent. Sheikh Abdullah of the National Conference opposed him. In September 1947, the Muslim peasants revolted against Dogra Rajput land owners and the revolt was supported by tribesmen from North West Frontier Province (modern day Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa).228 The Maharaja sought India’s help to deal with the situation. On October 26, 1947, an instrument of accession was signed and interim government was set up to which Maharaja comply.229 Nehru promised to hold a plebiscite to confirm accession. Meanwhile, the Indian troops which had moved in were able to secure Jammu and valley. Prime Minister Nehru declaring the ceasefire sought UN help. The pledged plebiscite could never be held.230 Jammu and the valley were secured by India and northern and western Kashmir came under Pakistan’s control.

After the creation of Pakistan, Kashmir became the flash point while other disputes also emerged in connection with partition. A friction that began between the ruler of the princely state and his Muslim subjects turned in to war. Following unrest in Jammu, an uprising began in Poonch. On October 22, 1947, irregular Pakistani troops along with tribal militias crossed in to the princely state. The Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir signed an instrument of accession with India which Pakistan thought was unjust. On this issue, both the newly born states went to war only weeks after their inception. A ceasefire was managed but the issue remained an inconclusive issue having potentials of catastrophic fallout in the region. Due to this conflict position, Pakistan and India

230 Mellor, *India since Partition*,63.
continued to have strained relations and have fought wars including 1948 Kashmir war, 1965 war, 1971 war and 1999 Kargil conflict besides periodic skirmishes along the Line of Control (LOC) and international border.

Again both Pakistan and China faced problems. A number of initial years were spent by both the states grappling with problems. Pakistan faced numerous problems, such as allocations of financial assets and liabilities, boundary demarcation, transfer of population\(^{231}\) besides large scale massacre of Muslim refugees, annexation of princely states and war. China faced the problems created by years of civil war across country. The Chinese leadership had to grapple with growing inflation, corruption, illiteracy and inequality besides unemployment, poverty, shortage of food and population growth.\(^{232}\) These issues posed huge challenges for Chinese leadership. In short, both China and Pakistan had to face a number of obstacles and issues during the formative periods of their emerging political identities and nationhood consolidation process. It seemed that their experiences at this stage helped them understand each other and that had impact on their bilateral relations.

In 1949, China proclaimed itself the People’s Republic of China. It was an important phase in the history of the world. The World War Two had recently ended and the world was adjusting to political and economic changes that had occurred due to the long drawn war. The war had shattered the economies and political influence of great European powers in particular. Again, many new states were becoming independent and new alliances were being formed with a view to address issues of sovereignty, security and economic wellbeing of states. Soon two fractious power centres emerged and the world got divided into two blocs. One bloc was spearheaded by the US and the other by the Soviet Union. Pakistan and China too had to experience the impact of these global changes, make policy choices and correct some of the measures hastily taken by them. Little wonder therefore, that Pakistan-China relations witnessed ups and downs in the relationship before it became solid and mutually beneficial.


Figure 2 explained three phases of Pakistan-China relations from 1949 to 1990. The first phase would be described as the phase of reluctance and aversion (1949-1961). During this phase, there was measure of reluctance on the part of both the countries primarily because of ideological underpinnings and global political environment. The phase two, marked by reconciliation and empathy, began with India-China hostilities culminating in border war. Both India-China war and US-China rapprochement facilitated by Pakistan brought Pakistan and China closer to each other. The third phase of Pakistan-China relations was marked by friendship and cordiality (1979-1990). During this period, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and diminishing Soviet influence in Eastern Europe were important political changes that took place. Economic and strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China also enhanced during this phase of Pakistan-China relations. These three phases would be discussed below.

2.1. **PHASE OF RELUCTANCE AND AVERSION (1949-1961)**

Where bilateral relationship between Pakistan and China was concerned, the period from 1949 to 1961 could be described as a period of reluctance and aversion. Ideological underpinnings, closer India-USSR and India-China relations, expanding Pakistan-US ties, security apprehensions of Pakistan and uncertain global political environment were the major causes for lack of warmth in Pakistan-China relations. Ideologically, Pakistan and
China treded different paths as inception of Pakistan was due to constitutional struggle whereas CPC came to power through revolution with communist foundation. Following independence, Pakistan’s joining the alliances that carried Pakistan to the US or the western camp brought the country face to face with uncertain and unclear global political environment. During this period, Pakistan-China relations remained that of reluctance and aversion towards each other.

In the beginning, Pakistan-China relations seemed unusual as both the countries had different ideologies and had stuck to their positions. The struggle leading to inception of Pakistan was based on Islamic ideology where the Muslims of the subcontinent wanted a separate country and where they could have religious, social and economic liberties. Modern China, on the contrary was spearheaded by CPC and their struggle was founded on the communist ideology laying emphasis on the basic needs of people and protecting independence. The contrast between the two countries was more evident when China followed a revolutionary path and Pakistan followed a constitutional path. The political ideology also ran contrary to the ideals that Pakistan wished to pursue in the future. True enough that a geographical linkage between Pakistan and China had existed since ancient times, but both the states did not have much in common in history, culture, political system or religion. Despite these differences, Pakistan realized the importance of China and recognized it.

Pakistan was among the first countries that recognized the People’s Republic of China when, on January 5, 1950, a note was initiated by Pakistani Ambassador to the Soviet Union for Chinese Premier Mr Chou En Lai declaring Pakistan’s recognition of the People’s government as the legal government of China. Following the note, on January 29, 1950, China’s Ambassador in the Soviet Union was informed of Pakistan’s decision

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of withdrawing recognition from Kumintang (KMT) government in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{236} Pakistan thus ceased to have relations with Taiwan by officially recognizing China. It also supported China’s case for representation in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). In this regard, a statement was released by Mohammad Zafar Ullah Khan in United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) on September 25, 1950. Pakistan became first Muslim country, second Commonwealth country and third non-communist country that established diplomatic relations with China on May 21, 1951.

Pakistan and China began their journeys in an international environment in which the world was divided into two rival blocs: the Eastern bloc was spearheaded by Soviet Union and the Western bloc by the US. The clash between these blocs was due to their differing ideologies of communism and capitalism.\textsuperscript{237} The geographical proximity of Pakistan and China was a factor that would shape their regional and global concerns as both were located in the immediacy of their rivals. China shared borders with Japan, India and the Soviet Union whereas Pakistan had unfriendly relations with both Afghanistan and India at the time. The relations with their neighbours at the time of their inception and ever since have been a constant concern for their security. Both the countries faced issues that related to their territorial integrity.

In the early 1950s, India had amicable relations with China while Pakistan remained distant from China. However, two subsequent developments deeply affected their relations. First was the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which shaped positive China-India relations and second was Pakistan’s decision to enter into security alliances led by the West. To be non-aligned in the times of two powerful blocs went well with China and the slogan \textit{Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai} (Indian and Chinese are brothers) began to echo.\textsuperscript{238} Pakistan’s joining of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955 to check the expansion of communism did not go well with China and created a distance between the two countries. However, maintained

\textsuperscript{236}Ibid.
amicable relations with Pakistan due to its desire to promote good relations with neighbouring states and Chinese understanding of Pakistan-India hostility and the constraints that Pakistan faced. China, however, carefully watched Pakistan’s role in these alliances.

A Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed on May 19, 1954 between US and Pakistan. On September 8, 1954 Pakistan became signatory to the US backed SEATO. On September 23, 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact. It was later renamed as CENTO. SEATO was formed to counter communism in South East Asia while CENTO intended to fight back in West Asia and the Middle East. Driven by security calculations, Pakistan’s aim in joining these alliances was to make itself more secure vis-à-vis India. The US tilt towards India became clear to Pakistan when the US increased its economic aid to India in 1957. Diplomatically, these alliances became counter-productive for Pakistan as the later had signed them at the cost of gaining annoyance of important neighbours. Moreover, Pakistan’s expectations from these alliances remained largely unfulfilled and that of disappointment.

Pakistan confronted risks of annoying the Soviet Union and displeasing China. Both were Pakistan’s important neighbours. The US and the West regarded these alliances as an arrangement to deter communism from expanding its influence in South East Asia South West Asia and the Middle East. Pakistan entered into these alliances expecting that it would receive US support on issues of Jammu and Kashmir, gain economic assets and resolve the question of Indus waters. Most importantly, Pakistan wanted to gain the US as

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an ally against Indian hegemony.\textsuperscript{245} The alliances did not benefit Pakistan much. Instead, these led Pakistan to face risks of confrontation with the Soviet Union because of U2 spy plane issue in particular. The US also failed to honour its obligations that it was required to fulfil in case of war with India and no provision of agreements was invoked.\textsuperscript{246} These treaties and agreements were to meet natural demise when it became evident that their provisions would unilaterally benefit the super power and not the smaller member states. This was largely due to the reason that the US had global security interests, while Pakistan’s security interests were regional in character.

Driven by certain geo-political constraints, Pakistan and China were pushed to opposing blocs. Pakistan joined the US and Western backed alliances and went in to the fold of the Western bloc. China, on the contrary, supported the Soviet Union which spearheaded the communist bloc. Again, Pakistan faced with challenges to its territorial integrity had to seek assurances to preserve itself whereas China got into alliance with the Soviet Union due to common ideology and similar global and regional political perceptions. Though these security alliances paid Pakistan in terms of gaining enormous US military assistance from 1953 to 1961, it was at the cost of imposing trade restrictions with the communist countries and resultant distancing of China and the Soviet Union from Pakistan. Despite these problems and contradictions, Pakistan and China were able to maintain normalcy in their relations. During this phase, Pakistan-China relations were not warm enough due to Pakistan’s inclination towards the US and China’s leaning towards India.

In the history of Pakistan-China relations, therefore, security alliances did cast a shadow. The US on various occasions reiterated that these alliances were imperative to check the expansion of communism. The US considered the Soviet Union as major competitor in its quest for global supremacy. The US also regarded China as an ally of the Soviet Union on ideological basis. Confronting communism meant challenging the expansion of the


\textsuperscript{246}Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, “SECURITY GAME: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan,” \textit{Pakistan Economic and Social Review}, 2011, 122.
clout of Soviet Union and China. Pakistan had joined these security alliances for its own security and survival related interests. It had also clarified its position during the Bandung Conference which Chinese Premier Mr. Zhou Enlai acknowledged in his statement on April 23, 1955. He referred to the statement of Pakistan’s Prime Minister that Pakistan had become signatory to the security treaty but it was in no way against China. It was an assertion that Pakistan was neither hostile to China nor suspected aggression from it. This showed explicit desire for peace and cordiality from both the countries.

Bandung conference was a major event that showcased China’s approach towards the world. China was able to carry out diplomacy in a manner that the guiding principle of China came to be known as ‘Bandung Spirit’. Zhou Enlai was able boost China’s image as a ‘prestigious and responsible power’ and persuaded the participant to integrate ‘Five Principles of Peace’ in to the manifesto of the conference. China pursued the spirits of Bandung conference and set off a number of agreements with various countries. Through Bandung conference, China sought to engage with the Third World to check the US onslaught against expansion of Chinese influence in the region and in the world. Though China was willing to facilitate on various regional issues, the US became inflexible and uncompromising.

On December 31, 1953, Premier Zhou Enlai of China gave out famous ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’. These principles were: 1) Mutual respect for each nation’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 2) Mutual non-aggression 3) Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs 4) Equality and mutual benefit and 5) Peaceful co-existence. China formulated its foreign policy on the basis of these principles. China was a very strong proponent of five principles. It desired to develop friendly relations with the South Asian countries. On April 29, 1954, the five principles were included in the preamble to the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China

250Ibid, 22.
and India, which was inked by India and China.\textsuperscript{251} The agreement was known as ‘Panchsheel Agreement’.\textsuperscript{252} This treaty was later adopted and registered by the United Nations (UN). These principles later became important pillars of China’s foreign policy.

The decade of the 1950s was a decade of alliances. New states had emerged on the world map and Cold War rivalries took shape while the US forged alliances with the newly born states. Weighing advantages and vulnerabilities, smaller states entered into alliances with major powers that most for their own security interests. Some would seek assurances for their security and survival and some would negotiate compensations for their defence cost with the superior states. Alliances would also accrue the economic benefits for some smaller states. In the 1950s, China and India developed friendly relations while Pakistan-China distance remained. India followed the policy of non-alignment which China welcomed while Pakistan could not claim neutrality as it had joined the US supported alliances.

There were two different prepositions that impacted on Pakistan-China relations in the times to come. Firstly, Pakistan could maintain normal neighbourly policy towards China which could be affected due to China’s inclination towards India and Pakistan’s joining Western backed pact that was directed against China. China’s inclination towards India as Pakistan envisaged a security threat from India and its joining an anti-China pact did not critically impact their relations. Secondly, China correctly assessed Pakistan’s position particularly in the wake of India-Pakistan hostility and Pakistan’s security compulsions.\textsuperscript{253} This meant that China could clearly see that Pakistan was not a member of Western alliances to combat China but only to protect its own security vis-à-vis India. No wonder therefore that China’s response to various initiatives taken under geo-political compulsions did not appear to be impulsive.

\textsuperscript{251}Vishakha Sharma, “Relevancy of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) in Post Cold War Era,” \textit{Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies} 2, no. 5 (2014), 60.
\textsuperscript{252}Jayanta Kumar Ray, \textit{Aspects of India’s International Relations, 1700 to 2000: South Asia and the World} (New Delhi: Pearson Education India, 2007), 171.
Bandung Conference was held from April 18 to April 24, 1955. It was attended by 29 delegates from newly born countries of Asia and Africa. The conference was the first opportunity for a summit level meeting between Pakistan and China. The meeting was held between Zhao En Lai and Mohammad Ali Bogra and invitation to visit respective countries were exchanged. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy visited China from October 18 to 29, 1956. The joint statement issued on October 23 declared that talks between the two leaders stressed the need to strengthen friendly relations between the two countries, develop mutual understanding and promote commercial and cultural relations.\(^{254}\)

Apart from the misgivings created by Pakistan’s joining security alliances supposedly against the Soviet Union and China to check communist onslaught, the decade witnessed a rough patch in Pakistan-China relations during the 1950s. The declaring of international communism as threat to the free world by Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Chinese map showing Pakistan’s territory as China’s area, minor border skirmishes on Pakistan-China border, an offer by President Ayub Khan to Indian Prime Minister Nehru for joint defence and voting in favour of a UN resolution condemning China’s action in Tibet were instances which led the gulf between Pakistan and China continued to widen.\(^{255}\) However, towards the end of the decade, India-China relations deteriorated to such an extent that both the countries which had amicable bilateral ties plunged into war. The India-China hostility and Pakistan’s support for China’s admission to UNGA\(^ {256}\) heralded the beginning of cordial relations between the two countries.

Indeed, the event that encouraged friendly ties between Pakistan and China was the hostility between India and China over the border dispute. The foundation of this dispute was laid when Indian Prime Minister Jawaher Lal Nehru along with his advisors unilaterally decided that the extension of Indian border would be accelerated to

\(^{255}\)Zeb, “Pakistan-China Relations.”
McMahon Line\textsuperscript{257} drawn by the British before the partition of the sub-continent. That decision was also ratified by the parliament on November 20, 1950. India also moved troops to carry out annexation of the territory up to McMahon Line. This escalation strategy ruled out negotiation and China was made to realize that the doors for negotiation over territorial disputes were closed. China responded by launching an offensive on October 20 and November 16, 1962. The war caused heavy casualties to India: 1400 killed and 1700 missing.\textsuperscript{258} After overcoming the resistance, the Chinese army withdrew to their original positions as part of their plan.\textsuperscript{259} The issue that began with Nehru’s times remained unsettled until today.

2.2. PHASE OF RECONCILIATION AND EMPATHY (1962-1978)

The phase of post 1962 Sino-India war might be termed as an era of reconciliation and empathy between Pakistan and China. Clearly, Sino-Indian hostility had created an opening for establishing friendly bilateral ties between Pakistan and China. The deteriorating relations between India and China had proportionately prompted improvement in Pakistan-China ties. In this era, Pakistan and China began to understand upcoming geo-political realities and adjusted their sails accordingly. Both the countries came close and developed an understanding of shared economic and strategic interests which were evident from their focus on regional and global challenges and prioritizing socio economic growth. Since 1962 Sino-Indian war was waged due to territorial dispute between India and China, it was important for Pakistan to address the issue of boundary demarcation with China to avoid any confrontational path.

The Karakoram Highway (KKH) or known in China as Friendship Highway was a vital development of late 1950s. Though Pakistan and China were not enjoying cordial relations when this project was initiated, it has emerged as one of the most important projects jointly undertaken by both the countries. The gigantic project that formally

\textsuperscript{257}Frontier negotiated between Tibet and Great Britain in July 1949 was named after British negotiator Henry McMahon. This frontier ran East of Bhutan along Himalayas, Brahmaputra River and tapping Assam.

\textsuperscript{258}Roy, China’s Foreign Relations, 25.

\textsuperscript{259}Neville Maxwell, “Settlements and Disputes: China’s Approach to Territorial Issues,” Economic and Political Weekly, 2006, 3876–3877.
began in 1966, though initial work on the project had begun in 1960. The project was completed in two decades and was opened for the public in 1979 and formally inaugurated in 1982. The project which claimed lives of 400 to 500 Pakistanis and between 80 to 200 Chinese: one per 1.5 kilometres, connected Abbottabad in Pakistan through Gilgit-Baltistan to Kashghar in China’s Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{260} The 1300 kilometres long KKH was built to promote trade relations as well as people to people contacts between Pakistan and China besides gaining political and logistical dominance with a view to deal with threat.\textsuperscript{261} The highway would assume vital importance in the future. Details regarding this would be discussed in later part of the dissertation.

with the US. It was therefore decided in a special meeting of the cabinet held on November 18, 1960 that Pakistan ought not to carry on with the inflexible position towards China and Russia the way it had done since its inception. Moreover, Pakistan decided to support China’s rightful admission in UNGA.\textsuperscript{262} Depending on the US for security and economic assistance, Pakistan’s support of China seemed an unwise option. The US had certain geo-political compulsions and acting beyond certain defined limits was not possible for the US. Pakistan’s decision to vote for China’s membership of UN created a measure of warmth in Pakistan-China relations.

While relations between India and China were deteriorating following the Tibetan uprising,\textsuperscript{263} Pakistan found out a Chinese map that was showing some important passes belonging to Pakistan as part of Chinese territory. Some movement of Chinese troops was also reported which was possible. Due to inaccessibility of the areas, the rugged mountainous terrain was not frequented from Pakistani side. Some of the Chinese air planes were also observed to be violating Pakistani air space. With a view to resolve the issue, President Ayub Khan proposed border talks on October 23, 1959 to settle the issue. The territory was part of Kashmir and owing to the disputed nature of the issue, China

\textsuperscript{260} Sarina Singh, \textit{Pakistan and the Karakoram Highway} (Melbourne: Lonely Planet, 2008), 239.
\textsuperscript{263} Tibetan Uprising of 1959 referred to the rebellion that began in the capital of Tibet, Lhasa. A conflict that started between Tibetan rebels and Chinese army in 1956 in Kham and Amdo regions intensified in March 1959. The guerilla war continued till 1962.
did not respond to the offer for quite some time as it did not want to further escalate its conflict with India.

As a matter of fact, there was certain reluctance on the part of China over the resolution of border dispute with Pakistan. It was due to Pakistan’s political and diplomatic inclination. In the beginning of 1960s, Pakistan’s response to international and regional issues was cautious. Within the context of Indian confrontation with China over the border dispute along with skirmishes between the two states, Pakistan considered offering an agreement of joint defence to India. Pakistan’s leaning towards the US and West and cautious approach to One China policy led to China’s reluctance. This was communicated to President Ayub Khan by the Chinese ambassador who called the proposal a complicated matter.\(^\text{264}\)

Following Pakistan’s vote for China in UN in December 1961, there was improvement in bilateral relations as this was taken as a good gesture by the Chinese leadership. China received it as a positive change on the part of Pakistan. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Manzoor Qadir was instrumental in negotiating with China for headway on Pakistan’s proposal on the border dispute. Due to diplomatic efforts, on May 3, 1962 both the governments made an announcement to resolve the dispute. On March 2, 1963, Pakistan and China signed an agreement (see Appendix A) to demarcate the borders between both the countries. It was also taken into account that the agreement would be considered as a provisional arrangement and on the settlement of the Kashmir issue, the agreement would be replaced by the sovereign authority over the area.\(^\text{265}\)

The 1965 war between Pakistan and India was the second round of war since their inception. The first one had occurred over Kashmir in 1948 and ended up with Karachi agreement. Two important developments preceded the war. Firstly, the territorial dispute between India and China led both the countries to war in which India faced defeat and China emerged victorious. That alarmed the US and Western powers about vulnerabilities


of India and its effectiveness to deal with the communist onslaught which the West had desired to check. Equally importantly, they resolved to assess India’s need to deal with the issue. Secondly, Pakistan had concluded a border agreement with China bringing an end to all the misgivings resulting from the issue. This agreement made the US cautious of Pakistan’s leaning. Though on part of the US, there was a measure of support for the Kashmir dispute, but India had influence over the policy making circles in Washington. It was hard for the US to fathom that the country the US supplied arms was getting closer to communist China.

Among a host of other reasons, Kashmir was the major cause of 1965 War which was left as incomplete task of partition in 1947. The Kashmir problem, according to Indian scholar Ashutosh Varshney, was the result of three factors; Pakistan’s religious nationalism, India’s religious nationalism and Kashmir’s ethnic nationalism. Many contradictions and paradoxes haunted the issue all along.  

Negotiation that were carried out between India and Pakistan did not find headway and both the countries went for war. The war that preceded with infiltrations of nearly 7000 men going into Indian held Kashmir to initiate an uprising remained inconclusive. The status quo that had existed before the war continued even after the war.

Skirmishes that had begun in August 1965 were followed by attack by India in the early hours of morning of September 6, 1965. Among all the allies and friends of Pakistan, China was forthcoming and aggressive in its support of Pakistan. China provided unqualified support to Pakistan and warned India of serious consequences for violating Pakistan’s territorial integrity. China’s support was significant in the manner that it prevented great powers from openly siding with India. China deemed India as an aggressor and supported Kashmir’s right of self-determination. It was endorsed by the Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi who visited Karachi on September 4, 1965. Yi reiterated that the problem of Kashmir ought to be resolved in accordance with UN

267Ibid,1012.
resolutions and the wishes of the people of Kashmir. This showed Chinese strong support for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. It also showed that China was not in favour of Kashmir dispute being resolved through a war. Rather, China wanted the Kashmir issue to be resolved through peaceful means. This was China’s official position before September 1965 Indo-Pakistan war.

On September 7, 1965, China officially denounced the attack by India on Pakistan as an act of aggression and condemned the action as violation of principles that guided relations among states and called it a threat to this region. China expressed firm support for Pakistan and warned India to bear the responsibility for this act of aggression. Commenting on India-Pakistan war, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai termed India as an aggressor in the conflict in Kashmir as well as in the general war. Addressing a rally in Lhasa on September 9, 1965, Vice-premier Hsieh Fu-Chih also accused India for having expansionist and aggressive designs with intrusions and provocations. People’s daily, a leading official newspaper of China, also declared that India had provoked the conflict and rejected India’s assertions that infiltrators had come from across the border.

After the uprising in Kashmir, India swiftly internationalized the issue. The UN was asked to play a role where Resolution 211 was initiated and passed by the Security Council to end the fight. The world community called for talks over the resolution of Kashmir dispute. India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on September 21 and September 22 respectively. The war between both the countries remained inconclusive and status quo could not be changed. At best, it was a drawn out war since the aims of both the states were not fulfilled. Negotiations that followed the ceasefire were concluded by January 1966 and Tashkent agreement reached. Both sides agreed to move to pre-war positions, giving up territories captured and withdrawing troops to prior to war locations. This provided some relief for the time being, but the conflict in one form or the other continued in times to come. The war between India and Pakistan did not change much,

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269 Arif, China Pakistan Relations, 1947-1980, 73.
270 Ibid, 76.
271 Ibid, 76.
but it had a bearing on the future involvement of the US, China and Soviet Union in the region.

Before the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan had sided with the Western backed alliance while India had supported nonalignment. Meanwhile, Pakistan received limited support from Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. China however, supported the Pakistani position and on September 9, 1965 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai termed India as an aggressor. There were apprehension about Chinese intervention but it did not take place due to logistical reason and because of US and Soviet Union warnings to China against intervention and expanding the conflict.\textsuperscript{272} Despite international pressure, China did side with Pakistan during the 1965 war.

During early 1970, Pakistan had to face an existential crisis. There existed a sense of deprivation and discontentment among the population of East Pakistan with regard to the policies of the government. This discontentment became distinct in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Host of other issues came up in the elections that were held on December 7 and 17, 1970 for National Assembly and Provincial assemblies respectively. The issues raised in the run up to the elections showed a drift towards separation and oneness of political directions also appeared unworkable.\textsuperscript{273} The key issues were related to demand for political autonomy, which almost meant separation and exploitation of East Pakistan resources by West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{274} This was to result in the dismemberment of Pakistan.

The civil war between eastern and western wings of Pakistan along with the persistence of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan led to 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. Extreme Bengali nationalism came to the fore in reaction to alleged exploitation West Pakistani dominated establishment. With a view to suppress the uprising, a military operation was launched on March 25, 1971 and separatist Bengalis were the prime target of this

\textsuperscript{272}Panagiotis Dimitrakis, \textit{Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain’s Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East} (New York: IB Tauris, 2011), 58.
\textsuperscript{273}Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, \textit{First 10 General Elections of Pakistan} (Islamabad: Pildat Publications, 2013), 12.
\textsuperscript{274}Ibid.
operation. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, who had won majority of seats in the general elections, was put under arrest. In the wake of operation, mass killings and displacement occurred. Nearly 10 million refugees had to flee to India and 30 million were displaced. A liberation army named Mukti Bahini was formed of 5000 military men, 16000 para-military soldiers and 45000 policemen deputed for duty in the then East Pakistan. They were trained by India who was till then covertly supporting the liberation movement. Bangladesh government was formed on April 17, 1971 and was moved to Calcutta. Pakistan army came under criticism for atrocities in Bangladesh. India joined war on December 3, 1971 and fall of Dacca took place on December 16, 1971.

After assessing the situation, Pakistan appealed to the UN for intervention. A meeting of UNSC was held on December 4, 1971. A resolution for immediate ceasefire and withdrawal was moved by the US but it was vetoed by the Soviet Union and abstained by the United Kingdom and France. On December 12, 1971, UNSC was convened again on the request of the US and deliberation continued for ceasefire. In the meantime, Pakistan army surrendered and the war came to an end. During the war, Pakistan was supported by the US and China whereas Soviet Union and India provided support to the cause of liberation of Bangladesh. India’s support to Mukti Bahini was by designs. It was aimed at dismembering Pakistan. The US was also apprehensive of increasing Soviet influence in the region.

Response to creation of Bangladesh was mixed. It was recognized by the Soviet Union and the US on January 25, 1972 and April 8, 1972 respectively. China reacted to the

278 Ibid.,11.
279 Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh,64.
situations cautiously and threw its weight behind an immediate ceasefire. It also vetoed Bangladesh’s request for membership to the UN, and non-implementation of resolution regarding repatriation of Pakistani civilians and prisoners of war.\footnote{Joel Wuthnow, “Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council” (Columbia University, 2011),32.} China recognized Bangladesh on August 31, 1975 and it was one of the last countries to do so. 1971 India-Pakistan war had changed the political landscape of the South Asian region. The war was complex as it involved major stakeholders of the Cold War. India wanted Pakistan to bleed for its unchanging position on Kashmir question.

On May 18, 1974, India successfully tested its first nuclear bomb at Pokhran in Rajasthan. Indian Ministry of External Affairs termed it a peaceful nuclear explosion, whereas independent observers maintained that it was part India’s deliberate effort to become a nuclear weapon state. Pokhran nuclear test explosion was the first nuclear weapon test conducted by a nation other than the five permanent members of UNSC. The explosion was criticized by Pakistan and China as it was expected to trigger a competition in South Asia and prove detrimental to peace and stability in the region. Pakistan’s Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto responded by making it clear that he would never succumb the nuclear blackmail\footnote{Arif, China Pakistan Relations, 1947-1980, 156.} and won’t accept Indian hegemony in the region.\footnote{Ibid., 157.} The explosion was criticized by the world at large. Soon after a explosions, a Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) was created with a view to check proliferation. This aspect has discussed elsewhere in the dissertation.

Another development that would have regional and global implications was reform and opening up of China. In December 1978, reformists led by Deng Xiaoping initiated ‘reform and opening’ which was referred to as ‘socialism with Chinese Characteristics’.\footnote{Clement A. Tisdell and others, “Thirty Years of Economic Reform and Openness in China: Retrospect and Prospect” (Brisbane: University of Queensland, School of Economics, 2008),12.} The reforms were carried out in two phases. The first phase included decollectivization of agriculture, and opening up for foreign investment and entrepreneurs for businesses. In the second phase, privatization of state industry,
introduction of protectionist policies and regulations were carried out. As a result, there was remarkable development in private sector and growth maintained by nearly 9 per cent annually. The reforms have not only brought economic dividends but also brought changes to Chinese society. This aspect of has been discussed in section of the dissertation dealing with rise of China.

2.3. Phase of Friendship and Cordiality (1979-1990)

The phase of friendship and cordiality was marked by four major domestic as well as regional developments that helped Pakistan-China relations enter into a new phase: a phase of cooperation. China’s reforms and opening up, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 and dismemberment of the Soviet Union were important developments of this phase. These developments affected the regional and global politics. China’s initiative to carry out economic reforms and opening up has not only helped China promote its soft image in the world but has also brought economic dividends for it. Again, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979 and what ensued was a significant phase of the Cold War that shaped the course of future events. Both Pakistan and China worked closely during the Afghan War which had a positive influence on their relationship. Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 projected China in bad light internationally, dismemberment of Soviet Union changed the course of regional and global politics. These developments had strong implications for Pakistan-China relations.

Before the Great Depression, China could maintained significant economic growth. But the Chinese economy faced difficulties during the China-Japan War (1937-1945) and long years of Civil War (1927-1949). Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) further worsened the situation. Such developments had profound impact not only on Chinese economy but also on Chinese society. The Chinese economy

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286 The Great Depression (1929-39) was the economic depression in the history of the Western world. In the US, the Great Depression began with the 1929 crash of stock market resulting in to panic in Wall Street and investment of millions wiped out. Worldwide GDP fell by an 15%1932 and around 15 million Americans became unemployed by 1933. This state persisted till 1939, when World War II boosted American economy.
was barely managed in the 1970s due to fiscal inefficiencies and lack of appropriate economic structure. After the death of Mao Zedong, the new Chinese leadership desired to initiate market reforms and open up China to the outside world. With this in view, China focused on agricultural development, promotion of economic relations and reformation of urban industries.\(^{287}\) Deng Xiaoping and his fellow reformists faced opposition to their reforms and opening up policies but interestingly, this policy paid huge economic dividends in times to come.

Deng’s policy reforms and opening up focused on agriculture, industry and foreign investment.\(^{288}\) In 1978, after the assumption of office by Deng, 250 million people faced shortage of food in rural China.\(^{289}\) He introduced household responsibility system in which land would be divided among the farmers who would pay a share to the state and keep rest of the output with them. This system improved agricultural production as individual farmers got attracted to the offer. State-owned enterprise reform-1979 and Industrial Responsibility System-1980s were also introduced alongside opening of industries to private businesses. That brought in private ownership and innovation resulting in larger industrial output. By creating economic zones, the state opened doors for foreign investment which never came when China had closed economic infrastructure.

Reforms and opening up initiated by Deng Xiaoping and his reformist fellows has continued at gradual pace. Due to reforms, there was significant decrease in government control over business and considerable increase in private sectors freedom that enhanced economic activity. The conservative communist party leaders were clearly apprehensive of reforms agenda of Deng and opposed the reforms, but Deng remained firm and continued with his plan. There were intricacies involved due to inefficient economic structure of the state and difficulties grew causing heavy losses to the state. Resultantly, inflation took a sharp rise and became a problem in 1985 and 1988. Nevertheless, China


\(^{289}\)Ning Fang, *China’s Democracy Path* (Beijing: Springer, 2015), 132.
continued to grow at substantial rate during this period. Furthermore, owing to reforms, China began to recognize private economy as ‘complement’ to state sector and later as an ‘important component’ of state’s fiscal scheme.\textsuperscript{290}

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was another major development of the Cold War. It had significant impact on Pakistan-China relations. Beginning in December 1979, the war continued for nearly a decade and triggered lasting changes in regional and global politics. The Soviet-Afghan war was a distinct illustration of Cold War rivalries and super power competition. For the Soviet Union, the war brought devastation when 14,454 men lost their lives, about 50,000 sustained injuries and the war’s cost rose to $ 96 billion.\textsuperscript{291} However, Afghanistan suffered much more. More than 870,000 Afghan civilians were killed during the war, nearly three millions were wounded or maimed, one million were displaced inside Afghanistan and nearly 5 million Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan, Iran and other countries seeking asylum.\textsuperscript{292} The Soviet-Afghan war was an important event in which the Soviet Union showed its expansionist designs and the US used all its military and diplomatic might to check the communist agenda of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 came as a shock to the world. It had its troops to Afghanistan and begun the Sovietization process of Afghanistan by initiating many steps. It called upon its advisors to administer government institutions with a view to influence decision making process in the civil and military spheres of Afghanistan. Soon after the invasion, as records show about 1500 Soviet advisors and nearly 4000 military men worked for civil administration and armed forces respectively. The Soviet presence in government institutions, organizations and educational institutions was massive and seemed as if that organizations and institutions were remodeled on the


pattern of Soviet Union. It didn’t take long for a strong resistance movement to rise against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

The decade of 1980s was the decade of Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union, which had committed nearly 80,000 personnel to maintain the occupation of Afghanistan. Multiple rebel factions who had support from the US, Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) fought against the Soviet forces and their Afghan allies. By the end of 1981, two broader factions of rebels were formed consisting of moderate and fundamentalists and severe fighting continued to inflict colossal human and material losses. The matter was taken up and discussed at UNGA in an Emergency Special Session on Afghanistan and a resolution was adopted calling for withdrawal of forces and contribution towards humanitarian assistance.

In February 1986, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev called the conflict in Afghanistan a bleeding wound in his address to the 27th party congress and stated that the troops should be withdrawn to end the war in Afghanistan. Following his announcement, fierce battle ensued to attain a quick victory and 1985 became the bloodiest year of Soviet-Afghan conflict. A year later, in 1986, the US began supplies of stinger missiles to the rebel factions to target Soviet gunship helicopters. On September 30, 1987 Mohammad Najibullah became the leader of Afghanistan and on April 14, 1988, a peace accord was signed between the US, USSR, Afghanistan and Pakistan and soon after the withdrawal of troops began. On February 15, 1989, the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of its last soldier from the soil of Afghanistan. The Soviet withdrawal did not mean peace in Afghanistan as fierce civil war continued well into the 1990s. However when Soviet Union was disengaging from Afghanistan, China confronted the challenge of Tiananmen in 1989.

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293 Ibid., 626.
Though the Tiananmen Square incident did not impact Pakistan-China relations directly, for China it had ramification not only in the context of domestic politics but with regard to its global image. This incident was clearly an unpleasant episode for China and did leave mark on the stature of China as a state. The incident was blown up when the people gathered to commemorate Hu Yaobang, a deposed former general secretary of the party, and raised voices against his dismissal. On April 22, 1989, three representative students demanded to meet Premier Li Peng at the Great Hall of People, but he did not act in response. Angry students boycotted the classes. On April 26, official newspaper People’s Daily said that handful students were creating disorder to oust communist party and undermine government authority. Responding to the editorial, students from nearly 40 universities marched to Tiananmen Square.

On May 13, 1989, the students began a hunger strike. On the following day, government officials made an effort for peaceful negotiation but failed. Prominent writers and scholars also made an effort to settle the issue amicably. They appealed to the government to acknowledge the movement as patriotic and called upon students to end their hunger strike. On May 18, Premier Li Peng summoned student representatives at the Great Hall of People but peaceful dispersal of students did not take place. Failing to find an appropriate solution, the government prepared to declare martial law and called for stern action. On May 20, martial law was imposed in Beijing. When the troops marched towards Tiananmen Square, the students blocked the advancing army and troops had to move to the peripheries of Beijing.

Many efforts were made from May 24 to June 3 to bring peace and normalcy. While a number of reconciliatory activities were taking place at the end of the protestors, various efforts for reconciliation were also pushed by the government. On June 3, the troops received orders to reclaim the Tiananmen Square. At 10 pm, the soldiers began to fire on people who would block the advance. Along with tanks and armored personnel carriers, the army advanced towards the city. On June 4, at 1 am, army surrounded Tiananmen Square and waited for orders to follow. At 4 am, the four men Liu Xiaobo, Hou Dejian,

Zhou Duo and Gao Xin, who had begun a hunger strike on June 2, started to negotiate with the army to permit the students to leave the Square. On this, many thousand students along with their teachers and supporters left the Tiananmen Square. Meanwhile the military crackdown also began. An independent source claimed the death toll to be 3000 against the official Chinese figures of 300. Whatever the casualty estimate, the incident caused considerable damage to China’s stature.

The collapse of the Soviet Union marked a change in global order and regional politics and it also impacted Pakistan-China relations. It marked the end of an era and the beginning of another. In 1917, the revolutionary Bolsheviks had established the Soviet state by overthrowing the Russian Czar. Vladimir Lenin, who was a Marxist, became the leader of Soviet state after Kerensky. Though the Russian state was perceived to be a true democratic society, in essence it became repressive and ruthless. By 1924, when Joseph Stalin came to power, the state was exercising totalitarian control over the economy and industrial activities. Single party system that Stalin maintained continued even after his death in 1953. Around this time, the focus of the Soviet Union was the Cold War, which had engaged both the superpowers in an arms race and competition for the expansion of influence in the world.

Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in March 1985. He faced a dormant economy and a political structure that was hardly appropriate for reformation. He introduced policies of glasnost and perestroika. Glasnost implied political openness, and aimed at purging repressions, reducing omnipresence of secret police, accepting criticism of government by newspapers, giving freedom to citizens and allowing political parties other than the communist party to carry out political activities and contest elections. Perestroika meant restructuring economy that aimed at allowing private business initiatives and encouraging foreign investments. These reforms were to

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become part of an economic structure in the longer time frame and resulted in the shortages of food and other related problems increasing the frustration of the people.

Gorbachev vowed to take steps that would make the Soviet Union prosperous and economically a viable state. He longed for good relations with the US and desired to come out of the arms race. He thought it appropriate to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and reduce considerable presence in East Europe. His tilt towards non-intervention weakened the Soviet grip over Eastern Europe. With Poland taking the lead, a revolution sparked across East Europe. This had an impact on the fringes of the Soviet Union, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia announced independence followed by the breakup of Belarus and Ukraine from the Soviet Union. A suit was followed by the remaining eight republics and it was pronounced that the Soviet Union had disintegrated. This marked the end of the power struggle between two super powers that had ensued in the region after the World War Two.

While discussing Pakistan-China relations, it would be imperative to analyse the impact of various global, regional and domestic developments taking place after the World War Two. The period from 1949 to 1990 was the time of political and military upheavals. The super power rivalry was evident in this part of globe as the Soviet Union, one of the bipolar powers, was in the geographical proximity of South Asian region. This super power struggle did impact the states. Choosing to be part of the US backed alliances though restrained by its own security compulsions, Pakistan remained on the wrong side of the Soviet Union for a long time. China was also uncomfortable with Pakistan’s alignment with the West and a host of other foreign policy initiatives.

A sea change has taken place in the global arena and both Pakistan and China like the US, former USSR and other states had to adjust with the changing and challenging times in the bilateral, regional and global context. Indeed the post-Cold War era threw up new challenges and opportunities and in the wake induced both the countries to look for greener pastures elsewhere and also optimize benefits arising out of their bilateral ties. At the same time, both Pakistan and China became more aware of the need to address the
emerging domestic challenges to attain enhanced security, prosperity and stability by forging better ties with the near and far away countries, economies and peoples. Such development had significant impact on Pakistan-China relation in the post-Cold War era. The next chapter would discuss such development and their impact on the bilateral relations of the two countries.
CHAPTER THREE

PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: 1990-2016

This chapter aimed at discussing Pakistan’s relations with China in the post-Cold War era. The end of the Cold War was signified by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of US as the sole super power. With this global development, the world order changed from bipolar to unipolar. It was a significant change: bipolarity denoted the influence exercised by Soviet Union and US during the Cold War, without necessarily asserting control over each other but protecting their individual interests everywhere.\(^\text{302}\) Unipolarity, on the contrary, referred to the emergence of US as the sole super power after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the Cold War.\(^\text{303}\) In the given context, Pakistan-Chin ties required a new dimension and direction. Their relationship would be discussed in the chapter highlighting political, strategic, and economic dimensions along with the expanding US influence in South and South East Asia. It would also explore how both the countries supported each other politically, carried out strategic cooperation, and initiated economic partnership.

3.1. POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS (1990-2016)

To begin with, Pakistan-China relations from 1990 to 2016 flourished due to commonality of interests of both the countries and there could be referred to on three counts. Firstly, both the countries desired to contain Indian hegemony and expansion of its political influence in the region and beyond. Secondly, China required Pakistan to contain militancy in China’s Western province Xinjiang, which was thought to be cultivated in Pakistan’s tribal areas and Afghanistan following Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and series of events taking place in the post Soviet-Afghan war. Thirdly, owing to a significant geopolitical locale of Pakistan, China would like to use this geographic advantage to advance its trade and economic interests in South Asia, Central Asia and Persian Gulf.


Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that political relations of Pakistan and China have grown from amicable to admirable during the six decades, with certain misgivings in the beginning. The relation has been described as sweeter than honey, deeper than the sea and higher than the mountains, showing the depth of the relations. The most important thing in Pakistan-China relations was trust and good will that both the countries continued to carry along.\textsuperscript{304} Since both the countries did not share common ideology or political and economic system, their coming together was termed unusual and a result of their India-centricity. Despite great differences, China and Pakistan not only peacefully co-existed but also shared commonality in the recent global affairs.\textsuperscript{305} The hallmark of this relation, that cemented it further, was the exchange of high level visits of ruling elites, government officials, diplomats, and civil and military officials of both the countries. It had become customary for Pakistan’s head of the state or government of Pakistan to pay visit to China soon after coming to power. With the end of the Cold War, relations among many countries changed, but Pakistan-China relations remained constant.

In the immediate decade following the Cold War, in the 1990s, the number of visits by heads of state and heads of governments of both the countries increased extensively.\textsuperscript{306} On December 2, 1996, Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to Pakistan and asserted on ‘solidifying and strengthening’ bilateral ties between the two countries.\textsuperscript{307} The visit also marked a shift in the foreign policy of China which would be described as striking a ‘balance’ in forging ties with regional countries, notably India.\textsuperscript{308} The significance of the visit lies in President Zemin’s first leg of the journey that he made to India. The visit reflected China’s attempt to shift its foreign policy focus from Cold-War rivalry to economic cooperation in the context of trade diplomacy and secure regional

\textsuperscript{304} Khalid Rahman, Pakistan-China Relations, February 15, 2017.
\textsuperscript{305} Prof. Tsui Yenhu, Pakistan-China Relations, February 14, 2017.
\textsuperscript{307} Jiang Zemin, “Carrying Forward Generations of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations” (Islamabad, 1996).
Around the same time, various new expressions like ‘anti-hegemonism’ and ‘multi-polarity’ surfaced in the Chinese foreign relations lexicon. However, this new shift did not diminish Pakistan’s relevance for China. However, it did convey the kind of relations China wished Pakistan to evolve with India and other neighbouring countries.

During the visit, President Zemin made a speech in the National Assembly of Pakistan and explained this shift in the Chinese policy. Zemin began his speech reiterating closeness enjoyed by both the countries. He termed Pakistan and China as ‘friends in need’ and described them as ‘brothers bound by common fate’. In the later part of his speech, he asserted that it was normal to have ‘differences’ and ‘disputes’ with neighbours. He recommended shelving issues, albeit temporarily, that needed long-term dispute resolution. Normal relations, he suggested, could still be maintained despite the disputes. Zemin implied that just as China had moved forward with India despite having contentious issues over border disputes, Pakistan too could follow suit. The allusion was to the Kashmir issue. Zemin was suggesting Pakistan to set aside the Kashmir issue for the sake of having productive relations with India. The audience did not receive the message in its essence. It was a tough decision that China wanted Pakistan to take.

China had been consistently cooperating with Pakistan throughout the 1990s in its economic and internal security issues. However, its decision to avoid intervention in India-Pakistan dispute if it led to war remained unchanged. The diplomatic caution that China was exercising became evident when Kargil war broke out between Pakistan and India in May 1999. China displayed restraint during the Kargil war and asked both the countries to find a mutually agreed peaceful solution to the problem. Instead of lending

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309 Ibid., 48-49.
312 Ibid., 264.
unconditional support to Pakistan as it did during 1965 and 1971 wars, China showed restraint. To avoid regional instability emanating from Pakistan’s foray into Kargil, China opted for conciliatory intervention. In spite of the policy shift, China-Pakistan approach towards India did not change much.

China supported Pakistan’s interest to maintain balance of power with India as its legitimate right. It was in this spirit that China had always thwarted India’s effort to gain the membership of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The group comprised forty-eight countries, which was formed in reaction to India’s effort to build nuclear warheads using nuclear material supplied by US and Canada.\footnote{Malik Ayub Sumbal, “India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” \textit{The Diplomat}, February 14, 2015.} US used its influence to convince international community to grant NSG membership to India. In 2008, the NSG issued an India-specific waiver allowing it to carry out nuclear trade with various countries. A full membership was however denied to India.\footnote{Ibid.} China might have had its own reasons to oppose India’s inclusion into the NSG; Pakistan saw it as an alignment of Pakistan-China interests.

The US-India nuclear deal in 2015 emerged from the waiver that India had received from the NSG meeting at Vienna in 2008. China viewed the deal as a potential anti-China move or a containment effort and a new version of Indo-US alliance.\footnote{Small, \textit{The China-Pakistan Axis}, 51-52.} Again in June 2016, India made enormous efforts to garner western support to achieve a decision in its favour for the membership of NSG. Once again, China along with a few other countries blocked India’s effort. The main hurdle that India faced was its reluctance to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the bedrock of the NSG scheme. Later, during the plenary session of the NSG, India-Pakistan dispute became another bottleneck for India.\footnote{Anwar Iqbal, “Formula for New NSG Members Leaves Pakistan out,” \textit{Daily Dawn}, December 28, 2016.} China’s opposition to India’s NSG membership was read as supporting Pakistan’s reservation on India getting into the group.
India’s nuclear ambitions disturbed China, which was emphasising on regional stability for the advancement of its economic goals. On May 11, 1998, India conducted five underground nuclear tests in Rajisthan. Pakistan followed India’s posture by conducting six underground nuclear tests in Balochistan on May 28, 1998. China showed restraint at India’s nuclear explosions but did not buy India’s justification for its act. According to India, it was the threat from China that led the former to conduct the nuclear tests. The exposition was made in a letter by the Indian Prime Minister Attal Bihar Vajpayee who wrote to US President Bill Clinton. India also mentioned China’s assistance to Pakistan as another motivating factor behind the move. Though China was unhappy with Pakistan for conducting the nuclear tests, the onus of initiating the nuclear race in South Asia was laid on India. Like China, Pakistan too had reckoned its nuclear tests a ‘forced response,’ while the international community had taken it as India’s bullying attitude. Despite China’s contestation of having a nuclear arms race in the region, it remained inclined towards Pakistan.

Pakistan-China cordial relations were the outcome of China’s support to Pakistan and various projects they mutually undertook over the period of their diplomatic relations spanning over 65 years. The Karakoram Highway was one such project. It was built to establish communication links, improve commerce, and develop regional trade linkages. Through the Highway, China wanted to strengthen the western flanks of its country by connecting Kashgar (Xinjiang Uighur region of China) with Gilgit-Baltistan and rest of Pakistan. The Karakoram or Friendship Highway, as it was proudly referred to by the leaders of both the countries, was a marvel and symbol of connectivity and collaboration. This Highway would always be considered as a bridge between the two countries.

In the post-Cold War era, the relationship has kept growing in different dimensions with the bilateral visits paid to each other by their high-level leaders. In November 2003, President Pervez Musharraf visited China and a significant ‘Joint Declaration on Direction of Bilateral Relations’ was signed. Both the countries were committed to promoting economic, technological, defence and security ties by enhancing their partnership through high level visits devising diplomatic consultation mechanism and building on existing cooperation. They also agreed to work out bilateral and multilateral frameworks to address extremism and terrorism. It was a roadmap that would guide them in their mutual relations while consolidating existing ties in different areas.\textsuperscript{322} During his visit in November 2003, President Musharraf reiterated Pakistan’s role in eliminating terror activities in China and promised to keep terrorists, including those from East Turkistan, from using Pakistan’s soil.\textsuperscript{323} He tried to adequately address Chinese concerns over militancy issue in China’s Western province Xinjiang.

In times to come, Xinjiang would become an important issue in the context of Pakistan-China relations. Situated in Western China, Xinjiang comprised one-sixth of landmass of China, bordering eight Central Asian states and possessing rich natural resources. Xinjiang was home to Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Mongols, besides Uyghurs who according to 2002 Census were 8.2 million.\textsuperscript{324} Xinjiang, with the separatist tendencies of its majority Muslim population spanning over centuries, had become a challenge for China. The problem exacerbated with the Soviet-Afghan war, providing religious militancy an easy inroad to Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{325} China had been wary of Pakistan because of its tribal areas that had remained the hotbed of terrorists even after the end of Afghan war. China suspected that the religious militancy rising in Uyghurs was getting support from the Jihadi organizations in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{326} China wanted a full cooperation from Pakistan to purge militancy from Xinjiang.

\textsuperscript{322}Joint Declaration Between China and Pakistan on Direction of Bilateral Cooperation,” November 4, 2003.
\textsuperscript{325}Kulbhushan Warikoo, \textit{Xinjiang-China’s Northwest Frontier} (New York: Routledge, 2016), 173.
\textsuperscript{326}Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors, “The Limits of the Pakistan-China Alliance,” \textit{Backgrounder} 2645 (2012), 4.
On the issue of non-state actors, Pakistan had always been accused of harbouring elements that fuelled militancy and terrorism. In China’s case, however, Pakistan had been very cautious and went to all lengths to address China’s fears of Uyghurs getting support from Pakistan. Many Uyghur settlements were closed in Pakistan and many Uyghurs were arrested and deported to China. In 1997, 14 students connected with bombing in Urumqi were deported and in December 2000, two community centres providing shelter to Uyghurs were closed at Kashgarabad and Hotanabad. Not only the government, the religious organizations in Pakistan, the sympathizers of Uyghurs, also preferred geo-strategic imperatives to religious solidarity. China’s repressive measures against the Muslims of Uyghurs like closure of mosques, defilement of religious texts, restricting Islamic education and banning fasting during Ramadan did not draw any condemnation from religious outfits in Pakistan. If a similar treatment had been meted out to the Muslims in any western country, there would have been widespread protests across Pakistan to show solidarity with the suffering Muslims.

In the same context, two major Islamic political parties from Pakistan, perceived to have patronized militancy were engaged by the CPC. In February 2009, a group of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) delegates visited China and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the CPC and pledged cooperation on issues related to security. When Head of the JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmad returned Pakistan, he described his visit as an effort to bring the atheists into the fold of Islam. CPC also expressed satisfaction and said that one of Pakistan’s important Islamist parties backed the one China policy and had shown indifference to the separatist movement in Xinjiang. In April 2010, the International Department of CPC invited a delegation of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI-F) to Beijing. The leader of JUI-F, Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman was considered father of the Taliban and the Head of a Sunni Fundamentalist Deobandi movement that had linkages with religious hardliners. The conciliatory statement issued by both the parties was taken

328 Small, The China-Pakistan Axis, 80.
329 Ibid., 68.
as an exceptional development.\textsuperscript{330} The quality of Pakistan-China relations depended to a large extent on Pakistan’s seriousness to tackle terrorism.

Now Pakistan and China were naturally inclined towards improving their capacity to conduct counter-terrorism operations. Intelligence sharing and joint operation became vital to collectively deal with the menace of terrorism.\textsuperscript{331} In August 2004, to enhance the capacity of security forces, China and Pakistan conducted first joint anti-terrorism exercise named, ‘Friendship 2004,’ in Xinxiang. Two hundred soldiers from both the countries participated in the exercise. In another exercise, ‘Friendship 2006’, 400 soldiers from both sides participated. The third joint exercise ‘Friendship 2010’ was held in 2010 and was successfully participated by soldiers from both sides.\textsuperscript{332} These drills were conducted to improve the skills of counter-terrorism forces of both the countries.

The 2008 Beijing Olympics was important for China to showcase its economic achievements, brand national image, promote tourism, and advance China’s business to an international audience.\textsuperscript{333} On August 4, 2008, as the Olympics drew closer, violence erupted in Kashgar. Terrorists belonging to East Turkistan Movement killed 16 policemen and injured 16 others in Xinjiang. The rumour that terrorists would place a bomb in Air China increased security challenges.\textsuperscript{334} Prior to the Olympics, on April 10, 2008, President Pervez Musharraf, made a stopover in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{335} This short visit was to show solidarity with China and to acquiesce in China’s policies in Xinjiang.

Another security issue that mattered to China was the killing of Chinese workers in Pakistan by the Taliban, the Baloch militants or some violent criminal faction. In 2004,

\textsuperscript{330}\textsuperscript{Ibid., 67-68.}
\textsuperscript{331}\textsuperscript{Zia Ur Rehman, “ETIM’s Presence in Pakistan and China’s Growing Pressure,” \textit{Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, Oslo, August}, 2014, 5.}
\textsuperscript{332}\textsuperscript{Kerry Brown, \textit{The EU–China Relationship: European Perspectives: A Manual for Policy Makers} (Singapore: World Scientific, 2014), 152.}
\textsuperscript{334}\textsuperscript{Ibid., 17.}
\textsuperscript{335}\textsuperscript{“Musharraf Wraps up State Visit to China,” \textit{People’s Daily}, April 16, 2008.}
many attacks were carried out on the Chinese workers at work on various projects in Pakistan. On May 3, 2004, a bus was hit killing three Chinese in Gwadar. On October 9, 2004, two Chinese engineers working on Gomal Zam Dam project were kidnapped. One worker was rescued as a result of commando raid. Other than aforementioned occurrences, many incidents occurred where the militants hit Chinese workers on various projects. This remained a thorny issue in the cordial relations that existed between Pakistan and China. It did not, however, hurt relations of the two countries as there existed an understanding about ‘outside involvement’ to contain Pakistan-China collaboration. The issue, however, lingered on as security challenges facing Pakistan exacerbated, making Chinese workers more vulnerable.

Chinese workers faced another bout of security challenge in 2007, when Lal Masjid students made Chinese nationals hostage. China gave stern warning to Pakistan to ensure that all the Chinese working on various projects were safe and secure. Chinese pressure worked on Pakistan with the result that President Pervez Musharraf ordered operation against Lal Masjid. It was a massive operation causing bloodshed in the Lal Masjid premises. The supporters and sympathizers of Lal Masjid threatened to avenge the operation. The first retaliatory attack took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where a convoy of Chinese workers was hit in a suicide attack. A joint task force was formed in August 2007 to deal with the threat faced by 13,000 Chinese workers in Pakistan though the force was not sufficient to stop these attacks. Despite all the odds, China’s resolve to work on various projects in Pakistan continued unabated.

On May 2, 2011, twenty-five US Navy SEALs raided a compound in Abbottabad, the heart of Pakistan’s military establishment, and killed the most wanted man Osama Bin Laden. Forty minute long operation by SEALs left Pakistani authorities embarrassed and

friends of Pakistan wondered as to how could Osama Bin Laden’s presence go unnoticed. In this moment of moral crisis, China was the only power which supported Pakistan. Its Prime Minister Wen Jiabao issued a statement saying that Pakistan and China would remain good neighbours, friends, partners, and brothers.\textsuperscript{340} China reinforced that Pakistan’s sovereignty and solidarity must be respected. It also warned in unequivocal terms that an attack on Pakistan would be considered an attack on China. This was conveyed to the US at China-US strategic dialogue and economic talks that were held in Washington, DC in May 2011.\textsuperscript{341} Being an all-weather friend, China vowed to protect Pakistan’s interests and help Pakistan to preserve its sovereignty.

In April 2005, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao paid a three day visit to Pakistan and signed a landmark ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations’. The treaty was significant as both the countries committed not to join any alliance or bloc, which could infringe upon the ‘sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity’ of any of the two states.\textsuperscript{342} The treaty could be viewed in the backdrop of 9/11 when Pakistan became an ally of the US in the war on terrorism. In the beginning, China too supported the war but distanced itself from it when the US prolonged its stay. This treaty would forbid both the countries from entering into any alliance against each other. The treaty had two fold effects on Pakistan-China friendship. Firstly, Pakistan would be a significant factor in the US-China relations having implications for the geopolitical landscape of Central and South Asia. Secondly, Pakistan-China cooperation would blossom into a combined competition against India.\textsuperscript{343} Pakistan and China would in times to come make many more headways in mutual relations.

\textsuperscript{342}Fels, \textit{Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific?}, 470.
\textsuperscript{343}Ibid., 470.
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang paid a visit to Pakistan on May 22-23, 2013. This visit was significant in the sense that it explored the potential avenues of trade, logistics and connectivity in both the countries to further strengthen China-Pakistan relations. What later transpired as Pakistan-China Economic Corridor (CPEC) was also proposed by Premier Li. With a focus on transportation, energy, connectivity, an agreement to expand infrastructure from China’s Western region to Pakistan’s poor domestic locale was put in place. With a view to attaining public support, both the countries agreed to step up people-to-people contacts and expand Chinese language learning opportunities across Pakistan.  

This visit was a landmark by Chinese Premier, which set the future course of bilateral relations.

In February 2006, when the US President George W Bush was about to visit Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf made a short visit to China from February 20 to 24. It was considered a signal to the US that Pakistan gave more importance to its strategic relation with China. During this visit, emphasis was laid on the need to improve bilateral relations between both the countries on the issues of trade, investment, nuclear energy and defence cooperation. The visit also coincided with the commemorations of 55 years of diplomatic relations. During the visit, 13 agreements in the fields of energy, trade, defence and communication were signed. President Hu Jinato referred to President Musharraf as an old friend of the Chinese people and commended his efforts in consolidating relations between the two countries.  

During the visit, Defence Minister Cao Ganghuan committed to expand defence development and production arrangement with Pakistan.

On June 5, 2013 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minster of Pakistan. In his inaugural speech he talked about the plan that was discussed during Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s May 2013 visit to Islamabad. The plan proposed building of rail and road

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346 Ibid., 3.  
networks from the Chinese city of Kashgar to Gwadar port in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{348} Later Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif paid an official visit to China from July 3 to July 8, 2013. He had meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang and several other senior level officials and business leaders. The visit was a reaffirmation of bilateral commitments and cooperation in trade, investment, and agriculture. Both the countries also agreed to the broader framework of CPEC.\textsuperscript{349} Following this visit, preparations began for putting this plan to practice.

Pakistan-China relations made history when President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan from April 20 to April 21, 2015 and endorsed the establishing of all-weather strategic cooperative partnership. Both the countries formally announced the construction of CPEC.\textsuperscript{350} The project was aimed at not only utilizing full potential of Pakistan-China relations but to have an impact on the geo-strategic landscape of South Asia. Pakistan-China wrote history by inking 51 MoUs in various areas of mutual interests (see \textbf{Appendix B}). Chinese investments ran in billions of dollars on various projects in Pakistan in the fields of energy, infrastructure, research and technology. The main focus, however, would be 3000 km long network of roads and railways costing approximately $46 billion.\textsuperscript{351} The project, CPEC, was just one part of One Belt One Road (OBOR) scheme that China had charted out to connect the region through trade and economic deals. CPEC which was a game-changing New Silk Road investment designed to simultaneously benefit both of their economies would give China direct, reliable and strategic access to the Indian Ocean through which almost all of its European and African trade traverses.\textsuperscript{352}

\textsuperscript{350}“Joint Statement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan, April 20, 2015).  
\textsuperscript{351}Abrar Saeed and Maqbool Malik, “Pakistan, China Begin an Epoch Unparalleled,” \textit{Daily The Nation}, April 21, 2015.  
\textsuperscript{352}Andrew Korybko, Pakistan-China Relations, January 24, 2017.
OBOR initiative (see Map 3) was a unique venture of China having global significance and covering more than four billion people of the world with $21 trillion of economic volume of Asia, Europe, Africa and Middle East. OBOR would have southern, central and northern routes. The southern routes would be initiated from Guangzhou to Kashgar in Western China to Gwadar in Pakistan and onward to the Arabian Sea. The central route would begin from Shanghai and move to Tashkent, Tehran and onward to Persian Gulf. The northern route would start from Beijing connect Russia and proceed to Europe. Pakistan would become part of the OBOR initiative of China through CPEC falling on its southern route. In view of the outline of the inimitable initiative, it would be right to conclude that OBOR would fetch far reaching regional and global political and economic dividends for China and the region.

The OBOR was considered as a ‘repost’ to the US President Barrack Obama’s ‘Asia Pivot’ strategy although Asia Pivot strategy faced distractions due to American preoccupations elsewhere in the world. With CPEC in place, Pakistan would become the main beneficiary of largest project covering numerous areas of cooperation and partnership. The project has kicked off and China has made $46 billion commitment to help with infrastructure development, energy, road and rail networks. The project would be contributing a great deal for economic uplift of underdeveloped areas of Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. Due to this flagship project as it termed now, China exceeded the US aid that was $5 billion during 2010-2014 allocating $2 billion for infrastructure development. Pakistan believed that it would be the single high scale beneficiary of this huge project. The Chinese would also see it as an opportunity for Pakistan’s economic uplift as the project would help Pakistan grow economically. However, CPEC would not only fetch huge economic dividends for Pakistan, it would also be fruitful for the region and beyond. But certain regional actors were wary of the project and considered CPEC

354 Ibid., 145.
contrary to their larger political interests. The phenomenon of external factor has emerged to undermine security along the CPEC routes. In times to come, attacks on CPEC workers in Balochistan and suicide attacks in other provinces supported the argument that strategic attacks by hostile agencies including India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) were at play to undermine CPEC. The issue of external factor aiming to fail the project would constituted an important consideration for Pakistan and China while dealing with the challenges that CPEC posed.

The all-weather friendship that Pakistan enjoyed with China has grown each day of their contact. If regional imperatives such as allowing India only enough space to manoeuvre its influence in regional politics, kept China and Pakistan on the same page, China helped Pakistan in putting a strong front to the western forces aiming at making Pakistan a feeble state. The post-Cold War era had been significant for two reasons: the disintegration of Soviet Union and, the emergence of a unipolar world order spearheaded by the US. For Pakistan, this era meant an end of a decade-long bonhomie with the US and a litany of sanctions to punish Pakistan for its ambitions to go nuclear. The end of the Soviet-Afghan war left in its wake an unfinished business of Jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In times to come, this backlog of Jihad became another reason for the US’s wrath to such an extent that Pakistan was contemplated to be designated a state sponsoring terrorism. It was during these hard times that China supported Pakistan in getting it through its ambitions of becoming a nuclear power and retaining its sovereignty.

The rising incidence of terrorism in Pakistan did not restrain China from further strengthening its ties with Pakistan. When the separatist movement in the province of Xinjiang began gathering support from the tribal areas of Pakistan, both states collectively addressed the issue. China helped Pakistan build its operational and functional capacity to combat terrorism, and Pakistan assisted China in gaining control over the dissidents that had dispersed in different cities of Pakistan. In the meantime, economic relations with China flourished with the initiative of CPEC. The venture had a

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cure to one of Pakistan’s worst governance maladies namely energy. Combined with terrorism, it pushed the foreign investors out of Pakistan. However, China’s strategy to live peacefully with its neighbours by putting off the resolution of lingering political issues till some other time needed Pakistan’s appreciation, as well. The thorn in Pakistan-India relations, the Kashmir issue, could as well be put on the back burner for the time to engage with India on positive terms.

3.2. STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS (1990-2016)

The strategic relations between China and Pakistan were based on a long-term partnership grounded in political, economic, social and historical factors. While the term strategic relations usually referred to defence and security cooperation between two or more countries, in the context of Pakistan-China relations, this term could be used to denote bilateral relations also covering education, health, trade and investment. Here, it would be apt to discuss infrastructure development that has helped Pakistan enhance its strategic capacity in the area of security and defence. Development infrastructure also stabilized the economy, which was essential to support the strategic construct of a country.

In the early 1960s, security was the main ‘stimulus’ behind China-Pakistan emerging relations that subsequently expanded into political, economic and strategic dimensions. Two events, the 1962 India-China conflict over borders and India-Pakistan war in 1965, significantly altered the strategic outlook of both the countries. In times to come, security considerations underscored every encounter, both in peace and war time, between the two countries. Pakistan’s foreign policy specially carved out a place for China in the area of security, and China reciprocated by arming Pakistan with the expertise and technology to develop the missile system and military and defence facilities. The contours of China-

360 Ibid., 18.
Pakistan relations were reshaped in the post-Cold War era when the world was faced with a new world order defined by unipolarity.

The conventional and unconventional cooperation between Pakistan and China had existed since the establishment of diplomatic relations in the early 1950s. In the 1960s, Pakistan reached out to Western Europe to fulfil its requirement for conventional arms. But high cost and limited supply forced Pakistan to look for other suppliers and found China willing to help. The Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962 had propelled China to provide Pakistan with conventional arms to strengthen its close ally in South Asia. This assistance was followed by interest free loans amounting $60 million and over $40 million in 1969. These loans helped Pakistan build heavy mechanical complex.\(^{361}\) In 1972, China also offered Pakistan $300 million loan for the development of its military and economic infrastructures.\(^{362}\) It was the beginning of China-Pakistan relations that has lasted to date.

Historically, US Europe and China had been Pakistan’s major suppliers of arms and ammunitions from 1970s on. Pakistan had depended on all these sources for the procurement of defence supplies for all of its three forces. In the 1980s, the country received fighter aircrafts, helicopters, self-propelled guns, armoured personnel careers (APCs), ship to ship and air to air launchers from the US.\(^{363}\) During the 1990s, Pakistan procured fighter aircrafts, helicopters, submarines, and tanks from the western countries.\(^{364}\) However, in 1980s and 1990s, aircrafts, tanks, surface to air missiles and host of other defence equipment were procured from China.\(^{365}\) The West and the USSR were reluctant to sell arms to Pakistan fearing it would alienate India.\(^{366}\) It was eventually China that covertly and overtly made Pakistan capable to develop its defences on modern lines.

\(^{364}\) Ibid., 104.
\(^{365}\) Ibid.
\(^{366}\) Syed, *China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, 140.
China supported Pakistan in building a host of defence related infrastructures notably Pakistan Ordinance Factories (POF) and Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT), which was an important step towards indigenization. In the 1960s, China had helped Pakistan establish POF at Wah. It comprised 14 factories, which made various kinds of equipment, ammunition, and clothing. The factories made products for all three services. The High Industries Taxila was initially dedicated to rebuilding Chinese T-59 series tanks. The facility had five units for the overhauling of Chinese T-series and American M-series tanks, assembly and production of main battle tank (MBT) and APCs and manufacturing of gun barrel. The indigenous production of HIT comprised MBT-2000 or Al-Khalid tank. In 1999, Pakistan Aeronautical Complex started developing JF-17 Thunder with the help of China. This single-engine multi-role fighter Jet had enhanced the capability of Pakistan Air Force in Beyond Visual Range engagement. In 2015, China agreed to supply technology for the construction of four of eight submarines that it was selling to Pakistan.

To regulate and streamline strategic partnership, both the countries remained engaged in defence dialogues to discuss issues related to military and defence cooperation.

Although Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-1977) was the pioneer of nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and China, this cooperation continued in the later period as well. The cooperation peaked in the 1980s and immediately after the Cold War in 1990’s. The extent to which China supported Pakistan in helping it achieve its nuclear ambitions could not be fully known, but according to US surveillance Pakistan’s nuclear project would not have been a success without active Chinese support. China provided critical support for the development of weapon system to Pakistan. Based on Chinese designs and technologies, Pakistan was believed to have seven to 12 nuclear warheads by the 1990s. This nuclear relationship forced the US to impose sanctions against various

367Ibid., 118.
368Ibid., 120.
Chinese and Pakistani firms.\textsuperscript{370} However, no restriction could deter China from aiding Pakistan to get it accomplish its nuclear mission.

Like rest of the world, South Asia changed in the post Cold War era. The security paradigm of the Cold War period was no more suitable to the changing circumstances and needed recalibration. Pakistan was therefore, forced to rethink its strategic options especially when it was abandoned by the US after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The end of Afghan-Soviet war also brought an end to the US assistance to Pakistan due to its nuclear program. Pakistan’s insistence that its nuclear facilities would be used for peace and economic development failed to restrain the Bush administration from invoking the Pressler Amendment that suspended economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Relations between the US and Pakistan began faltering and by 1993, they had become so strained that the US had almost decided to declare Pakistan a country that aided and supported terrorists.\textsuperscript{371} It was China’s support that eventually helped Pakistan endure the US sanctions.

The diminishing interest of US in the South Asian region and particularly in Pakistan acted as a push factor in bringing Pakistan and China closer in both military and political spheres. In the 1990s, when the US had imposed Pressler sanctions on Pakistan to force it to curtail its nuclear program, China came to Pakistan’s assistance and provided it defence related technologies. Congressional Research Service Report for the Congress in 2011 stated that between 1994 and 1995, China transferred ring magnets to Pakistan which were used for uranium enrichment.\textsuperscript{372} Senior Research Fellow at Asian Study Centre Lisa Curtis observed in her report that China had supplied technology and scientific expertise to Pakistan to assist it build its nuclear program.\textsuperscript{373} General Banerjee went even further and claimed in his article that appeared in \textit{India Review} that China not only helped Pakistan in building its nuclear arsenal but also assisted it in conducting first

nuclear test on China’s soil in the 1980s. Again, China was to become an important supplier of nuclear and missile products to Pakistan albeit through ‘unwitting private suppliers’. In fact, China was the only country that helped Pakistan build its defence and military capacity despite international criticism. The US disagreement with Pakistan on nuclear issues brought China and Pakistan yet closer in the post Cold War era. China, however, restrained itself from openly admitting that it was aiding and assisting Pakistani military nuclear program.

The silence of China’s covert support to Pakistan was broken for the first time on February 9, 2015, when in a press brief, Wang Xiaotao, a key official at National Development and Reforms Commission (NDRC), admitted the fact that China had assisted Pakistan in building six nuclear reactors and it would export more in a short time frame. The nuclear reactors had 3.4 million Kilowatts of energy generating capacity. The disclosure was made when voices were raised against this cooperation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

To further its military and nuclear program, Pakistan had indigenously established various facilities such as: Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) and Ministry of Defence Production (MODP). The sheer existence of these institutions speaks volume for Pakistan’s pursuance of its nuclear ambitions. China supported Pakistan in building nuclear power plants to overcome energy shortfall. Since mid-1990s, China has provided technological assistance to build Nuclear Power Plant Chashma 1 (300 MW), Chashma 2 (300 MW), Chashma 3 (340 MW), Chashma 4 (340 MW) and Chashma 5 (1000 MW). In collaboration with China, Pakistan built K-Coastal 1 and K-Coastal 2 energy generating capacity of 1100 MW each.

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375 Ibid., 7.
376 Ibid., 149.
378 “Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear and Missile Industries.”
under the safeguards set by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Though China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration was source of unease for the US and India, Chinese strategic assistance to Pakistan nevertheless continued.

In 1992, China supplied 34 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. The transfer of this technology was done under the framework of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In 1993, the US imposed sanctions on China for violation of MTCR. China denied the allegations. Later, China supplied missile technology and expertise to indigenize production of M-11 and M-9 Missiles at National Development Complex (NDC) in Pakistan. According to reports, China also gave Pakistan the expertise and technologies to build 750 kilometres long-range solid fuel ballistic missile. Since 1998, China had supported Pakistan through technology transfer the development of M-11, Hatf-1, Hatf-2, Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 in addition to 12 shipments of various components for building plant. Among the military weapons supplier countries, China was the only country that never attached any condition on Pakistan for providing military supplies to Pakistan. All other military purchases from the US, France, and Russia had pre-conditions attached to them. China had been providing Pakistan with arms and ammunition, defence system and infrastructure without putting any condition or policy restriction.

Defence cooperation between Pakistan and China has continued to grow. The cooperation ranged from nuclear assistance to conventional arms sales to joint exercises including anti-terror military drills. With institutional trust enhanced, both the countries developed an excellent network at establishment level. Of late, Gwadar port has increased the prospects of strategic naval collaboration with a view to check expansionist agenda of India and to potentially undermine its clout in the Arabian Sea and the India Ocean.

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With this new development, Pakistan’s strategic relations with China are bound to grow further.

There was another dimension of China-Pakistan relations where Pakistan provided China access to western military technology to enable Beijing’s scientists to carry out reverse engineering. During the Cold War, in order to solidify its relations with China, the US had tacitly approved covert transfer of technology to China. In 1982, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) warned that if the US sold AN/ALR-69 radar warning system to Pakistan as part of F-16 Fighter Jet Package, the US should expect it to reach China. Eventually, the sale was approved.\textsuperscript{386} China greatly desired Western aircraft technology. When the US started selling F-16 Fighter Jet to Pakistan in 1981, China was particularly interested in getting the top-of-the-line technology, which was then offered to only closest ally of the US. The biggest access was given in 2011 following the raid by the US Seals in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden. The US intelligence officials charged Pakistan’s spy agencies of supplying the skin of the downed Hawk helicopter, which contained stealth technology.\textsuperscript{387} This quid-pro-quo further consolidated Pakistan-China relations.

In the post-Cold War era, as the geo-political focus of the world changed, China too altered its priorities vis-à-vis its global engagements. Becoming a more responsible country, China wished Pakistan to manage its security environment equally well.\textsuperscript{388} The strategic relations between Pakistan and China evolved with India being a common compelling strategic threat. The Indian factor was more important than terrorism and here both the countries would not conform to the order that the US thought fit for its vision of South Asia.\textsuperscript{389} Pakistan-China strategic ties took five decades to strengthen. In the Pakistan-China strategic calculus, India had the centre stage because of different unresolved issues that India had with both the countries. In the changing dynamics of regional and global politics, particularly in the post-Cold War era, Pakistan-China

\textsuperscript{386} Jonah Blank, “Pakistan and China’s Almost Alliance,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, October 15, 2015.
\textsuperscript{387} Ben Quinn, “Pakistan ‘Gave China Access’ to Downed US Helicopter,” \textit{The Guardian}, August 15, 2011.
\textsuperscript{388} Isaac B. Kardon, “China and Pakistan: Emerging Strains in Entente Cordiale” (The Project 2049 Institute, 2011), 1.
\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., 20.
strategic relations were a ‘reaction to India-US strategic partnership’. 390 There had always been a difference between the type of engagement that the US and China had with Pakistan. In terms of strategic relations, the US would always take political advantage by providing strategic leverage, whereas China would always opt for self-reliance and assist unconditionally with no interference in the internal matters of Pakistan. 391 China-Pakistan relations grew further and continued to defy the international theory that there were no permanent friends or enemies in politics.

Of all types of relations that China and Pakistan enjoyed, the strategic or military relations took the lead. If not for China, Pakistan would not have been able to develop its nuclear capabilities as early as it had been able to. China provided Pakistan with weapons-grade uranium, a steady stream of conventional arms, a major portion of its ballistic missile program and a consistent diplomatic support spanning over half a century. Pakistan’s relation with China began with military assistance when of all the countries, China not only provided defence equipment to Pakistan at lower rates but also without any condition attached to the supply like the US or other western countries did. The trajectory in the strategic relations between the two countries came after the Cold War when Pakistan was literally abandoned by the US with a host of sanctions imposed on a country that was struggling to become a nuclear power.

China’s assistance to Pakistan to become a nuclear power came at a faster pace because Pakistan’s nuclear programme was essentially a reaction to India’s nuclear programme. However, both Pakistan and China denied having any nuclear relations between them. It was only recently, in 2015, that the Chinese officials made some assertions to this effect. Pakistan-China relations further deepened with China providing armaments ranging from fighter jets to guided missile fighter. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), with 47 per cent of China’s arms exports to Pakistan, the country had been China’s biggest arms buyer. China’s military and strategic assistance to Pakistan had the Indian and the US factor at the back. India had been assisting the US in

391 Ibid., 179.
its policy of containment of China not only in the Arabian Sea but also by becoming partner in a civil nuclear deal with the US. The events leading to CPEC, defence cooperation and building of submarines in Karachi would counter Indian maritime threat that was a reality in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.

3.3. ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS (1990-2016)

Though cooperation in defence sector was remarkable, the economic dimension of the Pakistan-China relations was also significant enough. Again, while relations with China started with the inception of diplomatic relations in the 1950s, it was with the grant of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to each other that economic relations between the two countries became vibrant. Later on, the Trade Agreement signed in 1963 gave a roadmap to be followed for trade relations. In 1982, the two countries established the Pakistan-China Joint Committee on Economy, Trade and Technology. In 2006, bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed to accelerate bilateral trade. By 2013, China became Pakistan’s second largest partner in trade. In 2015, both the countries took a quantum leap when they agreed to initiate multidimensional CPEC project. The economic relations of Pakistan and China would thus focus on trade, investment development, energy and infrastructure in the post-Cold War era.

Pakistan-China business relations, as former Ambassador Masood Khan put it, has thrived on the enabling environment both the countries provided each other due to their shared position on regional and international issues. Trade and economic relations, with a well-defined road map has always remained at the top of the agenda of any bilateral engagement China and Pakistan have had during the high-level visits of their leaders to each other’s country. The trade statistics of 2014-15 alluded to this fact when the trade volume between Pakistan and China increased by 18.2 per cent. In the first three months of 2016, this upward trend stayed put and a 10 per cent ($4.4 billion) increase in bilateral

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The balance of trade however, remained in favour of China due to lack of infrastructural development in Pakistan’s trade sector.

Pakistan’s major exports to China have been cotton, rice, hides and skins, chemical material, fish and crude mineral. Major imports from China have been all kinds of machinery and its parts, garments, textile products, stationary items, construction material, crockery and sanitary wares, tyres and tubes of rubber. A real boast in trade relations between the countries was experienced in the decade 2000-2010. In November 2002, Pakistan and China agreed to sign Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with a view to provide tariff preferences on various products. Negotiations began on free trade areas in 2005, and agreement on FTA was finally reached in November 2006. The FTA was ratified in July 2007. Under the agreement, Pakistan kept zero duty on certain items while China reduced 50 per cent tariff on knitwear and woven garments. Pakistan’s export to China increased by 33 per cent from 2007 to 2011, and imports registered a 9 per cent increase per annum. China had tried to help Pakistan strike trade balance but it remained in favour of China with an increase from $2.34 billion in 2007-2008 to $2.5 billion in 2010-2011.

In the backdrop of 1978 reforms, China made a policy decision to develop good relations with its neighbours for sustainable economic development. Pakistan, in spite of having close relations with China, compared to other nations in the region, could not take full economic advantage of its close relations with China. The business community in Pakistan regarded economic relations with China as lopsided. With an increase of even 400 per cent in exports to China in a decade, trade volume that China managed to achieve remained larger. For instance, in 2014, China exported goods worth $9.3 billion to Pakistan while Pakistan could export goods worth $2.62 billion to China. This clearly shows that Pakistan had been unable to derive full benefit from the Free Trade

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396Abdul Qadir Memon, “Pak-China Trade: Importance of Negotiating the FTA,” The Express Tribune, August 24, 2015.
397Noor Ahmed Memon, “Pak-China Economic and Trade Relations Remain Strong and Vibrant,” Chinese Review, 40-41
Agreement.\footnote{Usman Shahid and Tridivesh Singh Maini, “Should Pakistan Put All Its Eggs in the China Basket?,” \textit{The Diplomat}, July 22, 2016.} According to a review conducted by the Ministry of Commerce, Pakistan could not utilize concession it had under China Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (CPFTA) and used only 3.3 per cent of tariff lines. The ministry review divulged that Pakistan was able to export in 253 tariff lines out of total 7550 granted by China. The tariff negotiations on various items were conducted between Chinese officials and Pakistani business leaders.\footnote{Peer Muhammad, “Pakistan Has Failed When It Comes to Trade with China,” \textit{The Express Tribune}, June 26, 2016.} However, the benefit of FTA remained in favour of China.

A study by the Pakistan Business Council in 2013 identified various challenges that Pakistan-China relations faced after the signing of the FTA. Initially Pakistan and China agreed to achieve bilateral trade to the tune of $15 billion. The bilateral trade however grew from $2.8 billion in 2005 to $9.3 billion in 2012 due to structural factors. On the contrary, trade between India and China grew from $17 billion to $68 billion, with an objective to take it to $100 billion.\footnote{“Preliminary Study on Pakistan and China Trade Partnership Post-FTA” (Karachi: The Pakistan Business Council, 2013), 83.} The phase I of FTA ended in December 2012. Negotiation on phase II began in July 2013 and since then both sides have conducted six meetings without reaching any consensus on preferential concessions.\footnote{Shahzad Paracha, “China and Pakistan Reluctant to Give Concessions in FTA II,” \textit{Daily Times}, December 1, 2016.} Trade balance in phase I of FTA tilted heavily in favour of China because of which Pakistan wanted China to extend unilateral tariff regime to Pakistan under FTA II. Initially China agreed but later backed off from its promise and instead asked Pakistan to further liberalize its tariff regime up to 90 per cent.\footnote{Khalid Mustafa, “Pakistan, China May Restart Talks on FTA-II,” \textit{The News International}, May 22, 2016.} Since Pakistani industries were getting affected by the dumping of cheap Chinese products, Pakistan had offered to eliminate duties only on half of the total product line in the second phase of FTA.\footnote{Paracha, “China and Pakistan Reluctant to Give Concessions in FTA II.”}

Even in the realm of investment, Pakistan could hardly attract any impressive figures. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Pakistan was $322 million in 2000, which increased to $5.4 billion in 2008, dropped to $3.7 billion in 2009 and $1.7 billion in 2011. Larger
investments in shape of FDI came from the US, UK, UAE and Switzerland. Chinese share in the FDI was 0.5 per cent except, in 2006-2007 when it increased to 14 per cent.\textsuperscript{404} A visible change in the Chinese investment in Pakistan was seen after CPEC agreement. Even during 2000-2005, when investment in Pakistan grew by 600 per cents, the share of Chinese investment was miniscule; it amounted to $400,000 in 2004-2005. China became first of three top investors in Pakistan in 2006-2007. According to an informal estimate, Chinese investment ran between $5 billion and $7 billion in 2013.\textsuperscript{405} In 2008, when Pakistan was on the verge of default China refused to rescue the country from financial crunch through any bailout package that the then President Asif Ali Zardari had sought from China during an official visit.\textsuperscript{406}

China began assisting Pakistan in early 1960s in terms of financing and investment. The Heavy Mechanical Complex, Heavy Electric and Aeronautical Power Plant, Karakoram Highway, Gwadar Deep Sea Port, Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, Karachi Nuclear Power Plants (KANUPP), Indus Highway, Thar Coal Development, Saindak Metal Project and Makran Coastal Highway were few joint ventures that Pakistan and China initiated in the fields of energy, infrastructure development and heavy engineering.\textsuperscript{407}

In the post-Cold War period, China readjusted its political as well as economic model to reflect the changing scenario of the world order of which China was fast becoming an important stakeholder. In the 1990s, China not only opened its doors to international trade for growth and development but also revisited its relations with countries across the globe to forge new friendships and partnerships. President Xi Jinping aptly raised the slogan of ‘constructive engagement’ to make his intention known to the world.\textsuperscript{408} It was in line with China’s strategic objectives that it aggressively forged cooperation and partnership with the result that trade between both the countries grew from This enhanced cooperation led to the foundation of CPEC in 2105.

\textsuperscript{405}Small, \textit{The China-Pakistan Axis}, 96.
\textsuperscript{408}Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Chinese Dream Being Materialized Through Pakistan” (Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2016), 1.
In its pursuit of constructive engagement across the globe, Xi Jinping presented his vision of Silk Road Economic Belt in Kazakhstan in 2013 with the objective to cultivate closer ties with Euro-Asian region. In the beginning of 2015, China outlined the contours of the Silk Road Economic Belt that would pass through Central, Southeast and South Asia. Both, the Silk Road and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road also known as One Belt One Road (OBOR) would provide an opportunity for the promotion of trade cooperation and cultural exchanges. The objective of OBOR would be fourfold: 1) improving regional infrastructure, 2) enhancing policy coordination 3) removing trade barriers and 4) encouraging cultural exchanges. China hoped to have an increase in annual trade exceeding $2.5 trillion in a decade.

The grand OBOR initiative would, on the one hand, connect China with Central Asia, West Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe and on the other Africa, Asia, and Europe. In next 15 years, it would connect countries with developed economies with the under-developed or developing economies. The OBOR initiative (see Map 3) had six corridors: 1) New Eurasian Land Bridge 2) China Mongolia-Russia Corridor 3) China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor 4) China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor 5) China-Pakistan Corridor and 6) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor. Among all the projects, CPEC was considered the most priced corridor because of the deep sea Gwadar port.

During his visit to Pakistan in May 2013, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang gave out broader contours of CPEC. Immediately following the visit, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited China and signed eight agreements worth $18 billion for the construction of tunnels under CPEC. In April 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan and signed 51 agreements worth $46 billion to formally begin the CPEC project. This amount exceeded all the FDI Pakistan had received in recent years including the aid from the US since 9/11. The CPEC, part of China’s 21st Century Silk Road initiative the

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410 Ibid., 7.
OBOR, would be completed by 2030 (see Map 1 and Map 2). According to the adviser to Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz, loans taken under CPEC projects would be paid back at two per cent interest spread over 20 to 25 years. Called a ‘game changer’ CPEC was expected to change the fate of Pakistan by bestowing it a vibrant economy.

CPEC would connect Pakistan’s southern port city of Gwadar to Kashgar, China’s North Western region of Xinjiang through a network of railways, roads, airports and energy pipelines. The 3,000 Kilometre corridor was considered a ‘crown jewel’. It was hoped that CPEC would unfold an economic roadmap having the potential of benefitting not only Pakistan and China but also the region at large. It would attract investment and trade from the regions and beyond. Though China would be the biggest beneficiary of CPEC investment, the benefits that Pakistan looked forward to reap from this combination of transport and energy project would be extraordinary.

Here, it would perhaps be pertinent to look into the reasons for China’s unprecedented investment in a country facing security challenges. To Louis Ritzinger, there were three reasons for China’s exceptional support to Pakistan. Firstly, China wanted to provide economic support to a long-time ally in the region, when the US turned its attention towards India, to contain China’s expanding influence in the region. Secondly, China was interested in an energy trade route to the Middle East. Thirdly, Pakistan would facilitate China achieve its global ambitions by linking it with the Middle East, Africa and Europe. CPEC would prove to be a cornerstone of China’s OBOR vision.

From Chinese’s perspective, besides fetching gigantic economic dividends by opening it to the Indian Ocean and giving it maritime access to West Asia and Central Asia’s land locked states, it would also expand Chinese regional and global influence. From Pakistan’s perspective, connectivity spanning different regions converging at the Gwadar

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414 Butt and Butt, “Impact of CPEC on Regional and Extra-Regional Actors”, 27.
port would increase Pakistan’s strategic importance. Along with increasing their economic stakes, CPEC would also extract political and strategic advantages from Iran, Afghanistan, India and Central Asia. With this new phase unfolding, it is expected that the differences between the neighbouring countries such as India and Pakistan would get resolved.

According to the Ministry of Planning and Development, Government of Pakistan, CPEC has 23 energy related projects of which 15 would be priority projects and eight actively promoted projects. Out of eight infrastructure related projects, five would be road and three rail sector projects. With a view to developing Gwadar port city, twelve projects would be dedicated to developing port facilities and social sectors. Besides aforementioned projects, Cross Border Optical Fiber Cable and Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast (DTMB) also form part of CPEC initiative. Certain other projects like mass transit, special economic zones (SEZs) and social sector development have also been included in CPEC.416

CPEC would have ‘One Belt, Three Passages, Two Axes and Five Functional Zones’.417 One Belt referred to strip to be formed by arterial traffic route that ran from Kashgar to Islamabad to Lahore to Sukkur terminating at Gwadar and Karachi. The Belt formed core areas of CPEC. Three passages referred to East, Central and West traffic passages in the core area from Islamabad to Karachi and Gwadar. East passage, the main traffic artery of the corridor, ran from Islamabad to Karachi via Lahore. Faisalabad, Multan, Sukkur and Haiderabad. The Central passage starts from Islamabad in the north and reached Karachi, via Darya Khan, Jacobabad, Khuzdar through N25 highway or reaches Gwadar through M8 motorway. The west passage starts from Islamabad, and reaches Gwadar via Dera Ismail Khan, Quetta, Basima and Hoshab. With a view to coordinate construction of regions, two Axes namely East and West Axes i.e. Lahore-Islamabad-Peshawar and Karachi-Gwadar axes have been formed. Five Functional Zones on the basis of

development, resource capacity, structure of industry and growth potential also formed part of CPEC.\textsuperscript{418} Every route converges at Gwadar, the heart of CPEC.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, during the CPEC summit held in Islamabad on August 29, 2016, stressed on the importance of CPEC initiative for Pakistan and the region. He reiterated that the CPEC would bring under-developed areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and parts of Sindh in the mainstream by providing connectivity, energy, industrial zones and job opportunities.\textsuperscript{419} Various projects covering important areas would be constructed across Pakistan. These projects ranged from short (2020) to medium (2025) to long term (2030). Early Harvest projects would be completed by 2017-2018.\textsuperscript{420} Both the countries were committed to work together for the prosperity and wellbeing of their people. The corridor would be a game changer not only for Pakistan but also for the entire region.

Xinjiang, the one-sixth of all the China, had been victim of militancy after the Cold War. China planned to address the security challenges of its western region hit by militancy, separatist movement and terrorism, through extensive security initiatives and wide-ranging economic development. This handling of the situation in Xinjiang was expected to bring about political stability and sustained economic development.\textsuperscript{421} It would not be wrong to say that China would bring a meaningful development to the least developed province of Xinjiang.

True enough that Pakistan would accrue huge benefits from the CPEC but the larger benefit would be reaped by China. China, as a matter of routine, imported nearly 85 per cent oil from the Middle East. The Chinese shipments had to travel 12,000 kilometres in the waters of the Strait of Malacca, to reach the Middle Eastern, African and European markets. Other than distance the waters of Strait of Malacca are not China friendly.\textsuperscript{422}

\textsuperscript{418}Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{419}Mubarak Zeb Khan, “CPEC Will Blaze a Trail,” \textit{The Daily Dawn}, August 30, 2016.
\textsuperscript{420}“Fact Book 2016: China -Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),” 9.
\textsuperscript{422}Daniel S. Markey and James West, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan” (Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2016).
With CPEC in place, the Chinese shipments would have to travel only 3,000 kilometres. Gwadar as a trading hub would help revive the Silk route. In the meantime, China has planned to use the connectivity offered by CPEC to promote people to people contact and exchange of cultural, architectural, scientific and technological activities among different regions.423

CPEC would be jointly managed by Pakistan’s Ministry of Planning, Reforms and Development and China’s National Development and Reforms Commission (NDRC). Though construction at Gwadar began in early 2006, its operation was handed over to the Chinese state owned enterprise in November 2015. In 2016, traffic at Gwadar had already reached around half a million ton. It would double in 2017, eventually reaching three hundred to four hundred million tons per annum. Likewise, the massive economic activity would result in the growth of Gwadar port from a city of eighty thousands to two million people.424

Of late, the financial worth of CPEC project has increased to $51.5 billion. Additional funds were earmarked for the up-gradation of railway line from Karachi to Peshawar. China and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) would finance the project by contributing $5.5 billion and $2.5 billion respectively. Initially $3.56 billion were to be spent on the railway network, which has been increased to eight billion dollars.425 Unlike local power purchasers, the Chinese companies would not have to face the burden of circular debt. A revolving account would be set up to cover 22 per cent of monthly electricity billing. The Ministry of Finance would provide the sovereign guarantee to ensure uninterrupted payment to the Chinese power producing companies.426 Other than these financial mechanisms, various instruments would be added along the way to effectively pursue the objectives of CPEC.

424S. Markey and West, “Behind China’s Gambit in Pakistan.”
Economic dividends notwithstanding, CPEC carried certain internal and external challenges. The internal challenges have political as well as security dimensions. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), which faced the woes of terrorism for more than a decade, had feared losing many benefits of CPEC because of uneven distribution of resources across the provinces. Punjab was accused of taking larger share from the harvest. The KP government initially feared that the Western route, carrying financially lucrative projects, would bypass KP. At one time, the KP government announced that, in the absence of Western route, no CPEC project would be allowed to proceed in KP. These fears were removed in due course. Now, apart from other projects, eight industrial zones would be built in KP, raising KP’s share in CPEC to 30 per cent against nearly 12 per cent population.\(^{427}\) The Chinese government was equally concerned about these grievances and had played a significant role in ameliorating them.

The Baloch nationalists had their own apprehensions about CPEC considering it against the interests of the people of Balochistan. They feared that the CPEC would alter the demography of the province. Gwadar, in their view, would be the first to be hit as people from outside would invest and reap benefits. It was believed that the skilled labour from outside Gwadar would take up most of the jobs squeezing space for the unskilled local population.\(^{428}\) The Baloch nationalist, on the other hand, termed CPEC as establishment’s ploy to snatch Balochistan’s resources to benefit Punjab and China. These fears and apprehensions led to attacks on Chinese workers engaged in different projects with an aim to undermine the CPEC initiative.

Another domestic challenge to CPEC came from home-grown militancy and terrorism, resulting in diminishing foreign and domestic investor’s interests. To assuage Chinese government’s concerns about the safety and continuity of the project, a Special Security Division (SSD) was raised. The Division has 15000 troops comprising 9,000 Pakistan Army soldiers and 6,000 personnel from paramilitary forces.\(^{429}\) In December 2016, once

trade kicked off in Gwadar under CPEC, Pakistan Navy raised a special ‘Task Force-88’ (TF - 88) for the security of Gwadar and sea-lanes against all kind of threats.\footnote{“Special Force Set Up to Guard Gwadar Port’s Sea Lanes,” \textit{The Daily Dawn}, December 12, 2016.}

The external security challenge emanated from the continuing India-Pakistan rivalry. The widely held view was that the intelligence agencies of India have patronized insurgency in Balochistan to sabotage CPEC. India was apprehensive that China’s continuous and consistent presence in Gwadar would increase its strategic value in the region and provide the Chinese Navy an easy access to Indian Ocean. Furthermore, India was annoyed over the CPEC route that passed through Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan held Kashmir, territories to be considered disputed by India.\footnote{Usman Shahid, “Balochistan: The Troubled Heart of the CPEC,” \textit{The Diplomat}, August 23, 2016.} India has maintained close contacts not only with the Baloch separatists but also with their leaders across the world.\footnote{Mir Sherbaz Khetran, “Indian Plans to Disrupt CEPC Projects in Balochistan: Options for Pakistan” (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, September 28, 2016), 2} While briefing Pakistan’s Parliamentary Committee, Pakistan’s Secretary Defence, Lieutenant General (Retired) Alam Khattak said that India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had established a special cell, with a huge sum, in Delhi to disrupt the CPEC project. RAW was also known to be working closely with National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghan intelligence agency against Pakistan’s interests.\footnote{“RAW Set Up Cell to Sabotage CPEC,” \textit{The Express Tribune}, April 14, 2016.} However, neither internal challenges nor external threats and conspiracies could dampen the spirit of CPEC and the project has taken off with confidence and speed.

Pakistan and China began their first trade activity under the CPEC project on October 31, 2016. Over hundred Chinese containers carrying trade goods reached the Susat Port, Hunza. Susat was the last town in Pakistan on the Karakoram highway before the Chinese border.\footnote{Jamil Nagri, “First Trade Activity Under CPEC Kicks Off,” \textit{The Daily Dawn}, November 1, 2016.} On November 13, 2016 as a watershed event, the first shipment of Chinese goods rolled off the Gwadar port.\footnote{“Today Marks Dawn of New Era’: CPEC Dreams Come True,” \textit{The Daily Dawn}, November 13, 2016.} According to a US-based consultation firm Deloitte and Touche, CPEC would generate 700,000 direct jobs during the period 2015-
2030. The rising economic activity as a result of CPEC was expected to increase the GDP from five per cent to 7.5 per cent. The cement, housing and transportation sectors would benefit tremendously.\textsuperscript{436} CPEC would change the lifestyle of people across Pakistan offering them not only economic opportunities but also promising a change in outlook and way of thinking.

As mentioned earlier, the benefits of CPEC would spill over the entire region and play a central role in bringing about peace and harmony due to economic stakes. India, for instance, could leverage the CPEC infrastructure for connectivity to Middle Eastern and Central Asian markets. Another possibility lied in the construction of Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline under CPEC. This would not only provide for the required funds but could also solve the geo-political issues because of which India had to be taken out of the pipeline project. Similarly China’s Iran railway project could also increase connectivity between India and Iran.\textsuperscript{437} If this new paradigm of economic connectivity is taken advantage of, the long-standing issues affecting India-Pakistan relations also stand the chance to be resolved amicably.

No wonder therefore that the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has shown eagerness to join CPEC. Iran was economically isolated for more than a decade because of US sanctions. Now the country is striving hard to reach out to the outer world to dilute the effects of long held economic sanctions. The natural inclination of Iran was to connect with its natural allies in the neighbourhood of which CPEC offers a great opportunity. Currently Iran trades with China via Central Asian states which increase the cost of production of Iranian goods and services. Gwadar port was only hundred kilometres from the Iran provides Iran a natural passage to supply its goods across Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{438} Iran had world’s ten per cent oil reserves. With an alternative route, Iran could double its exports of oil to China and other countries within and across the region.


\textsuperscript{437}Abhineet Singh, “Chinese Corridors And Their Economic, Political Implications For India,” \textit{Swarajya}, June 7, 2016

Iran would also have tremendous opportunities to expand its trade towards the East. Likewise, the Pakistan-Iran pipeline could also become a reality if Iran decided to come into the folds of CPEC.\textsuperscript{439} Trade between China, Pakistan and Iran could increase tremendously with the new connectivity offered by the CPEC. A recent trilateral agreement signed by Iran-Afghanistan and India raised speculations that Chabahar would emerge as a competitor to Gwadar. Iran, however, refuted these speculations. Pakistan too disregarded any comparison made between the two ports. Both the ports had great potentials and would complement each other once both the port became operational.\textsuperscript{440}

The CPEC might nevertheless be the beginning of a gradual shift in Pakistan's regional outlook whereby Pakistan would restore its ties with Iran that it had allowed to loosen up due to Saudi and American pressure.

Afghanistan, essentially a landlocked country could have a world opened to it across the Gwadar port because of CPEC. The western route of the CPEC running from Islamabad - Dera Ismail Khan – Quetta – Basima – Hoshab to Gwadar could be used to connect Afghanistan through Chaman, a Balochistan border town. This would shorten the distance between Afghanistan and Gwadar and would be an easy access for Afghanistan. This route would be 600 kilometres shorter than the existing one.\textsuperscript{441} Afghanistan was a transit country and could become China’s trade hub in the CPEC equation. This could eventually bring peace and prosperity to the war-torn country because of indigenous progress. Though the US has poured billions of dollars in various projects in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2015, the situation hasn’t changed much. The CPEC would provide Afghanistan with a suitable transit route for Central Asian states.

The economic relations between Pakistan and China took off in 1963 when Pakistan accorded the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to China. Since then, both the countries have not only closely collaborated with each other but have also improved their economic and trade relations. The bilateral economic ties between China and Pakistan


\textsuperscript{440} Peer Muhammad, “Pakistan Sees No Threat from Iran’s Chabahar Port,” \textit{The Express Tribune}, May 29, 2016.

have remained consistent. Though Pakistan could not achieve the kind of advantage that it could have had from this relation due to various structural inadequacies and inconsistent financial and trade policies. We find a considerable trade imbalance between Pakistan and China where Pakistan’s import from China stands at $ 9 billion while Pakistan’s export to China stands at $ 2 billion.

The economic relation between Pakistan and China has strengthened because of CPEC. This $ 46 billion bilateral development project was considered a game changer in the geopolitics of South Asia. CPEC, a network of 3,000 kilometres roads and other infrastructural project was seen as an answer to Pakistan’s energy woes which has almost crippled its economy. China is spending $ 34 billion in different energy related projects. Its interest in the project is of course multifarious since this network would reduce China’s access to the Middle Eastern and African markets by 12,000 Kilometres. Pakistan’s naval military strength will considerably increase since China will be giving eight submarines to Pakistan under CPEC. The CPEC driven connectivity would bring regional connectivity where South and Central Asian nations would mutually benefit from the opportunities arising in trade and investment in these countries.

Pakistan-China’s political, strategic and economic relations would defy to an extent the belief that there were no lasting friends or enemies in International relations. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location vis-à-vis China’s economic interest in the region and Pakistan-China’s shared hostility towards India was an important factor in consolidating this relation. During the Cold War, when Pakistan was the most dependable ally of the US, certain bitterness existed between Pakistan and China which was rapidly overcome and was never allowed to recur. Immediately after Cold-War era, Pakistan-US relations became strained on account of Pakistan’s efforts to attain nuclear capability. During this period, Pakistan-China came closer and China supported Pakistan and worthwhile political, strategic and economic relations between the two countries came in to being.

The end of the Cold War signified a shift in regional and global political alignments. With the dismemberment of USSR, the US became unipolar power exercising unilateral
leverage across the globe. China with its economic reforms agenda opened to the world and began to expand its political clout in the region as well as across the globe. India after the disintegration of Soviet Union began to make new adjustments and leaned towards the US, exploiting the pretext of big market and largest democracy. Having worked with the US, not very permanent friend for nearly a decade, Pakistan now faced US wrath on being keen on acquiring nuclear weapons. In the given situation, Pakistan and China became logical allies for their political, strategic and economic relations.

The devastating events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) changed the regional and global outlook of the world. In the post 9/11 era, Pakistan gained importance in the US scheme of things and became a dependable ally of the US in its global war on terror (GWOT). China was wary of the US presence in its immediate neighbourhood and Pakistan acting as a front line state in GWOT. Pakistan assured China that its alliance with the US had nothing to do with China and that would not in any case affect Pakistan-China relations. Pakistan-US cordiality was also frustrating India’s hegemonic designs. In the post 9/11 period, Pakistan and China continued to have amicable political relations as many state level leadership exchanges took place to ink agreements to carry the political, strategic and economic relations further.

During Pakistan’s wars with India, China had supported Pakistan with military hardware. After debacle of 1971, when the country was dismembered into two parts, China rendered all possible support to help Pakistan become self-sufficient in military capabilities and avoid such a situation in future. China supported Pakistan in its nuclear ambitions by providing it the needful material, expertise, and technology to attain enrichment of uranium. It was widely believed that Pakistan-China strategic relations were at the heart Pakistan-China deepening ties. China’s strategic support to Pakistan and defence cooperation with its armed forces was motivated by China’s desire to neutralise the effects of Indian ambitions of expanding its influence. China and Pakistan signed nuclear comprehensive agreement in 1986. During their visits to Pakistan, Prime Minister Li-Peng in 1989 and President Jiang Zemin in 1996 assured Pakistan of cooperation in the development of nuclear power plants which were established in
different parts of Pakistan. China did consistently supply military hardware to Pakistan since 1964 and became largest supplier of arms and weapons to Pakistan with the US taking second position. China’s support to build various factories had also helped Pakistan to indigenize its defence support facilities.

It would be clear from the overview above that a sort of consistency was observed in Pakistan-China economic relations that included trade, investment, energy and infrastructure development. China was always forthcoming in extending all kind of support in this regard. The CPEC which has been termed as a game changer would take the economic relation between China and Pakistan to a new high due to the recent spate of investment coming in for CPEC. An enormous $ 46 billion investment would materialise in 3,000 kilometres road connecting the Chinese province of Xinjiang with Pakistan and to the Gwadar port. The biggest benefit that Pakistan would gain from this relation was the energy projects that have been planned to be built in multitude in different areas of Pakistan. Pakistan’s economic outlook changed with this new investment sending a strong signal abroad that Pakistan should not be identified with terrorism. The very fact that trade volume between Pakistan and China has increased by 18.2 per cent in the fiscal year 2014-15 showed that both countries were benefitting from expanding economic ties.
CHAPTER FOUR
PAKISTAN- CHINA RELATIONS - REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

This chapter would discuss Pakistan-China relations and its regional implications. It focused on regional dynamics of Pakistan-China-India troika, relations of important regional stakeholders and impact on Pakistan-China relations. The chapter comprised three sections. In the first, Pakistan’s and China’s perspective on India would be discussed in the wake of Indian hegemonic designs vis-à-vis China’s regional and global objectives. It might be noted that in the regional setting, besides Pakistan-China-India troika, Afghanistan and Iran also made a mark in the changing geo-political environment. As such, the second section dealt with issues in the context of Pakistan-China-India-Afghanistan-Iran relations and emerging dimensions of their relations. The third section discussed as to how has India-Pakistan standoff come into effect over a period of time and how has China viewed this standoff in its neighbourhood.

4.1. PAKISTAN’S AND CHINA’S INDIA CENTRIC PERSPECTIVE

Both Pakistan and China have developed an India centric perspective over a period of time. Pakistan’s India centric perspective would stem from historical baggage that it has carried due to unresolved dispute of Kashmir alongside other territorial disputes. The issue has bred animosity that has continued long after the inception of both the countries and the relations of both the countries have been affected by security compulsions. This resulted in unfriendly India’s attempt to undermine Pakistan’s core interests. Likewise, China too had fractious past with India lest a brief spell of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai. India and China even went to war over their border dispute in 1962. Due to ambitions for regional supremacy and expansion of global clout, both the countries followed a competitive course, though bilaterally, both the countries coped for gaining mutual benefit particularly through trade.
Pakistan and India formed part of South Asia, a region hosting 1.64 billion people representing 24 per cent of global population.\(^442\) This enormous region has been sandwiched between the great mountain chains and the Indian Ocean. In the north and northeast, it is surrounded by the mighty Himalayan mountain ranges, while in the northwest by the Karakorum and the Hindu Kush ranges. In the east, the region has Purvanchal Hills and Bay of Bengal, while in the south it is distinguished by the Indian Ocean and in the south-west by the Arabian Sea. The British ruled over Indian sub-continent for nearly hundred years before Pakistan and India found their diverse identities in 1947 when both the states got independence from British rule. The British while departing left the unfinished agenda of Kashmir.\(^443\)

Here, a brief rundown of events related to Pakistan and India might help explain the evolution of Pakistan’s perspective of India and vice versa. The relations between Pakistan and India became strained ever since their independence in August 1947. Soon after independence, Pakistan faced enormous problems such as unfair boundary demarcation, large scale massacre of Muslim refugees in India, unfair division of military and financial assets, canal water dispute, annexation of princely states including Kashmir besides many economic and administrative challenges. Most of the referred problems were caused and later aggravated by tense Pakistan-India relations. Some of the problems were resolved between the two countries, but the Kashmir issue remained unresolved, igniting security competition between the two countries, which became nuclear states in 1998, giving rise to a never ending arms race in the region. Both the states went to war four times and situation often remained volatile between them.

The Kashmir war of 1948 was the first conflict that began soon after the independence. On the eve of partition, when princely states were faced with a decision to accede to any of the dominions, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir was reluctant to accede to either Pakistan or India. Situation in the state became chaotic when the Muslim population of Poonch and Mirpur revolted against the Maharaja. With the view to support the cause of


rebels, tribal militias crossed over to Kashmir to take Srinagar on October 22, 1947. Faced with the difficult situation, Maharaja Hari Singh asked for Indian assistance. The assistance came but it was subject to Maharaja’s acceptance of accession to India. This led to war between the armies of Pakistan and India. A cease fire on January 1, 1949 ended this inconclusive war, with the armies of the two countries positioned along Line of Control (LoC) in the light of Karachi agreement.

Pakistan and India entered into second major conflict over the issue of Jammu and Kashmir in September 1965. The all-out war was preceded by skirmishes and Operation Gibraltar planned to infiltrate soldiers of irregular forces in the Indian occupied Kashmir. The 17 days war caused thousands of causalities on both sides. The war witnessed largest tank battles fought after the World War Two. The war ended after the intervention of United Nations on September 23, 1965. Subsequently, Tashkent Declaration was concluded in January 1966 with the help of Soviet mediation. The war, due to various geo-political implications and consequences, did attract the world at large including the major to intervene to bring an end to the war. The 1965 war not only hardened Pakistan’s security perspective vis-à-vis India but disillusioned Pakistan which had joined the western alliances, SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955) in order to avail military and political support in warlike situations.

East Pakistan crisis had roots in political and economic deprivations, but there was the involvement of India in this crisis. However, the Agartala Conspiracy case of January 1968 and its subsequent handling evoked bitterness among the Bengali inhabitants of eastern wing. As a consequence of December 1970 elections in East and West Pakistan, Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman emerged as a major political power grabbing 167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan, holding absolute majority in the lower house. On February 11, 1971, Pakistan’s president General Yahya Khan summoned Assembly session on March 3, 1971. But on February 21, 1971, fearing consequences of such as session, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People’s Party decided to boycott the March 3 session. Military action began in Dacca on March 25, 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman

was declared an enemy of Pakistan and charged under the treason act. The military action was responded with armed rebellion by Mukti Bahini. India, all along the crisis emanating from Agartala conspiracy to armed uprising, supported the Bengali rebels as expressed by R R Kapur, exposing the unsoundness of two nation theory and drawing a psychological satisfaction from disrupting Pakistan’s stability.

Conflict over Siachen proved to be another errant for cordial relations between Pakistan and India. Siachen, which is 76 kilometres long and 2 to 8 wide glacier and where temperature dropped to 40 degree below zero, became the most inhospitable terrain where both the armies confronted each other. The Siachen dispute began when Indian army captured part of Siachen glacier adjacent to Pakistan-China border. Since 1984, this conflict was enormously costing both the countries. The cost being suffered was in human and economic loss. The cost of Siachen conflict for both the countries was huge as India has spent Rs. 72 billion and Pakistan Rs. 18 billion from 2006 to 2010. Both the countries have jointly lost 1500 soldiers without having a formal war. Nevertheless, the conflict continued and resolution of the conflict still seemed to be far away.

Sir Creek issue was another dispute that hasn’t been resolved between India and Pakistan as yet. Sir Creek was 96 kilometre long strip between Pakistan (Sind) and India (Rann of Kutch). Pakistan made a claim on it by referring to 1914 agreement between the Government of Sind and Rao Maharaj of Kutch agreeing to a line running in the middle of the Creek as the border. Pakistan claimed 17 Creeks of Sind whereas India claimed half of it. Though many meetings have taken place to resolve the issue, no meaningful outcome has been produced. The issue, like various other issues, remained on the to-do

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list of the traditional adversaries. In view of persistent hostility and continuing impasse, both the countries maintained the status quo.\textsuperscript{450}

Another issue in Pakistan-India security relations was the \textit{Kargil} conflict that began in May 1999 and ended in July. The infiltration took place by Kashmiri militants and paramilitary personnel who occupied positions claimed by India on the Indian side of LoC. On part of Pakistan, it was intended to cut supplies that were vital for sustaining operations by India in Siachen and force the Indian troops to pull out.\textsuperscript{451} Political aim of this ‘ill-conceived misadventure’\textsuperscript{452} as Nawaz Sharif later termed it was to seek a solution to the Kashmir dispute whereas the military aim was to create a military threat leading to a military solution.\textsuperscript{453} India responded to the Kargil incursion by Pakistan by massive use of military power. Short of an all-out escalation, Pakistan withdrew to its original position. Kargil had a deep impact on Pakistan-India relations while India held that Pakistan was an irrational and untrustworthy partner with whom a procedural and not substantive engagement would be preferred.\textsuperscript{454} This episode also added to the already existing distrust between the two countries.

In the post Kargil era, the relations between Pakistan and India remained strained due to various reasons. On December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on Indian parliament left 14 people dead including five terrorists. India blamed Pakistan and responded by mobilizing its armed forces. It deployed troops on the borders. By doing so, India warned Pakistan that if the terrorists continued to draw support from Pakistan as India suspected they did, India might exercise the right to destroy the camps and sanctuaries located inside Pakistan. India moved nearly 500,000 troops in the areas bordering Pakistan. Pakistan also moved troops to its eastern border to deal with the threat posed by Indian mobilization. Both Indian and Pakistan expected the world powers specially the US to

\textsuperscript{450} Ravi Bhushan Rear Admiral Vohra and Hasan Masood Rear Admiral Ansari, “Confidence Building Measures at Sea: Opportunities for India and Pakistan.” (Sandia National Laboratories, 2003), 20.  
\textsuperscript{452} Nawaz Sharif, \textit{Times of India}, May 28, 2006.  
\textsuperscript{454} Peter René Lavoy, \textit{Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 250.
play a strong role to favour their respective positions.\(^{455}\) The military stand-off complicated the peace process and took both the countries away from peace. On November 26, 2008, multiple terrorist attacks in Bombay killed over 174 people including 6 Americans among 22 foreigners and wounding another hundred.\(^{456}\) This posed a fatal blow not only to the Indian security apparatus but to Pakistan-India relations also. Ten terrorists armed with small arms and handy explosives carried out coordinated attacks on ten different locations in Mumbai. The attacks kept over 13 million populace of Mumbai, a commercial and cultural hub, in shock and awe. India instantly blamed *Lashkar e Taiba (LeT)* for the brutal attacks.\(^{457}\) This incident was yet another blow to peace initiatives that both the countries had agreed to take.

Both the countries had trust deficit and this was one major factor poisoning their bilateral relations. Apart from the wars that were largely due to total mistrust, both the countries found themselves close to wars on a number of occasions since 1947. The dispute over Kashmir was clearly the key factor in driving strains in the relationship. Next to the issue of terrorism on which both the countries had conflicting positions. India alleged that attacks carried out in 2001 and 2008 were carried out by militants based in Pakistan whereas Pakistan accused India of actively supporting insurgents and separatists in Balochistan and providing financial assistance to *Tahreek e Talibaan Pakistan* to carry out terrorist activities in Pakistan.\(^{458}\) There was persistent mistrust between the two countries hardened the security factor in the bilateral relations of two countries. Pakistan-India relations, since their inception, have been marked by hostility and mistrust. An atmosphere of suspicion prevailed all along. Even if a period of peace and tranquillity appeared, it was only for a brief period and things swiftly moved back to animosity and bitterness. Several wars (1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999) and crises (1987, 1990, 2001, and 2008) would keep the two countries in a state of constant confrontation.


\(^{458}\) Philipp Kauppert and Sarah Hees, “Future Scenarios of Pakistan-India Relations” (Dubai: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), May 2015), 5.
Both countries accused each other of abetting terrorism and insurgents in each other’s states. India constantly advanced the theme that Pakistan was only a stumbling block in India’s aspiration of becoming a regional hegemon.\(^{459}\) Such narratives might be required to be analysed as history and trail of events coinciding with these themes resulted in hostility and bitterness between the two countries. Irrespective of the gains that Pakistan could have had by forging peaceful relations with India, Pakistan’s India centric perspective was that of viewing India as an unfriendly and hostile neighbour. At this juncture, it would be imperative to examine China’s India centric perspective.

China’s India centric perspective had undergone transformation since the inception of both the countries. The relations between the two countries witnessed ‘friendship, setback and normalization’ phases in their brief history.\(^{460}\) India became the first non-communist country to establish diplomatic relations with India after it was proclaimed as People’s Republic. The Indian Prime Minister Nehru was excited about China’s revolution and ardently supported its membership to the UN. The US argument that communism would emerge as a threat to world peace was not shared by Nehru. For China, Nehru believed that nationalism not communism was the hallmark of the struggle made by the people of China and their leaders.\(^{461}\) That marked the beginning of warm relations between the two countries.

Nehru visited China in October 1954 and his visit was seen as an important milestone in the history of bilateral relations of India and China. During his interaction with the Chinese revolutionary leader Mao Zedong, relations were expected to be built on the basis of respect and dignity. Following the visit, in the mid-1950s, both the countries came closer and an intimate slogan Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai too came up to reflect the relation of the two countries.\(^{462}\) Mao and Nehru at that point of time thought on different trajectories as to how their respective countries could move on to play their role to shape

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\(^{461}\) Ibid.,131.

the world. Nehru, a proponent of non-alignment, wanted the world to follow India in the wake of the Cold War. Mao, on the other hand, saw the third world coming in the fold of global revolution and China had a fine model to offer. That reflected the thought process of leadership with regard to the expansion of their respective influence.

The mid 1950s was a good time for India and China. An agreement was reached between the two countries in 1954 which referred to and validated China’s claim on the Tibet region. The famous five principles of peaceful coexistence were part of the preamble of the same agreement. It was followed by the 1955 Bandung Conference, which was an important event for the countries of Africa and Asia. During the Bandung conference, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru came to limelight supporting the idea of Afro-Asia solidarity with a view to attain world peace. This spell of peace between India and China was maintained from 1949-1957. During this period, high-level visits were exchanged between the two countries. It was partly due Nehru’s political acumen that peace on the north-eastern borders could be maintained for nearly a decade. However, this phase of cooperation and peace could not last for too long.

After a brief bonhomie, in the first half of 1959, events occurred which damaged the political and diplomatic gains which India and China had earned in the first decade of their relations. In January 1959, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai claimed 90,000 square miles of area in Ladakh. India alleged that China had encroached an Indian territory by building a road in Aksai Chin region without the information of New Delhi. Following this irritable claim for India, in March-April 1959, Tibet’s spiritual leader Dalai Lama fled to India. He was granted refuge by the Indian government. The Dalai Lama issue

463 Ibid.
became a turning point in India-China relations as China concluded that separatist elements in the Tibet region were being supported by India.

In the post Second World War era, India and China were emerging as major powers in the region. The leadership of both the countries did not take long to realize that competition for leadership among the contenders would be an issue and it would impede the political gains of the other state.\(^{468}\) So there was a desire to lead and assert political influence in the sphere where India and China were to operate. As such, besides the border dispute that both the countries had, there was another reason that ended both the *Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai* hymn and dented cordial relations. Chinese leaders developed a viewpoint that India had begun to have capitalist leanings and was softening towards imperialism that the West was advancing. Slowly, but surely non-alignment mantra was abandoned\(^ {469}\) and it produced a change of heart and mind on the part of China.

First bloody encounter between India and China occurred on August 25, 1959 when the Chinese troops crossed the border at Longju. The Indian troops from Assam Rifles were arrested with one soldier killed and another one wounded. On this, a heated debate began in the Indian Parliament to review the nature of India-China relations. China continued to turn down the proposal to accept McMahon Line stating that China was never a signatory to any agreement. On October 21, 1959, another encounter took place near Kongka Pass. Nine members of an Indian Police Patrol were killed in the exchange of fire and a Chinese was also killed.\(^ {470}\) Crisis that erupted in Tibet led to a large scale war between India and China towards the end of 1962. India was uneasy about China’s advance to Tibet in 1959 while grant of asylum to Dalai Lama became the main reason for hostilities between the two countries.

Following the Tibetan crisis and Dalai Lama’s asylum issue, there was rise in exchange of fire between China and India. In the face of China’s aggressive posture, India initiated


\(^{469}\) Ibid., 99.

\(^{470}\) Alam, *Pakistan Army, Modernization, Arms Procurement and Capacity Buiding*, 209.
a forward policy by placing its outposts well forward in the areas claimed by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The forward policy was potentially a cause of apprehension for Chinese leadership. Failing to reach any kind of settlement on the issues, China initiated an offensive on October 20, 1962 and captured Rezang La and Tawang. After capturing claimed areas by the Chinese troops, a unilateral ceasefire was declared by Premier Zhou Enlai. Ceasefire was to take effect from November 21, 1962. During the four week encounter, India suffered heavy losses. 1383 Indian troops lost lives, 1047 were wounded, 1696 were missing and 3968 were captured. On the other hand, 722 Chinese soldiers were killed and 1697 wounded. No Chinese soldier was captured.

A period of stalemate was to ensue from 1963 to 1975. In early 1963, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Sirimavo Bandaranaike (1916-2000), mandated by ‘Colombo Powers’, initiated an effort to negotiate a settlement between India and China. She met the Chinese leadership for the settlement of dispute. Zhou Enlai communicated points with regard to interpretation of proposals to which both sides had reservations to agree to. China also supported India’s arch rival Pakistan in its war with India in September 1965 and December 1971. India and China could not establish ambassadorial relations until 1976 when K R Narayanan became the first ambassador after 1962. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Minister for External Affairs of India, visited China in 1979 and held very cordial meeting with Deng Xiaoping, Chairperson of Military Affairs Commission. This was the time both the countries cautiously proceeded with bilateral relations.

Many factors like Tibet territorial dispute, Dalai Lama’s escape to India and grant of asylum to him by India, India-China 1962 conflict, emergence of Pakistan-China nexus and China’s support to Pakistan during 1965 and 1971 wars had marred the ties between India and China. The formal ties were restored between the two countries in 1976 with

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472 Ibid., 343.  
475 Ibid., 66.  
a break of 15 years and Deng Xiaoping also expressed his desire for positivity and friendship. He also talked of solution to problems if concessions by both were made to each other.\textsuperscript{477} In 1981, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua paid a visit to India and set off series of talks on border issues. Some of the border talks ended in impasse but negotiations continued. In 1987, India and China confronted each other on Arunachal Pradesh issue, but somehow evaded a warlike situation therefore the demonstration of maturity on both the sides.\textsuperscript{478}

The visit by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in December 1988 was termed as a major breakthrough and a turning point in the relations of India and China. The visit not only boasted on going border talks but also put into motion a series of high level visits of important leaders of both the countries. Bilateral relations improved in the 1990s as India and China signed peace agreement in 1993 and 1996 to ensure peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and institute confidence building measures along LAC. This thriving bilateralism was hit when India referred to China as a ‘primary strategic enemy’ with a view to rationalize its nuclear tests conducted in 1998.\textsuperscript{479} The relations between both the countries were, however, protected with continued negotiations on border issues and other areas of cooperation.

In June 2003, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid an official visit to China. His visit was followed by eight high profile visits paid by leaders of both the countries between 2003 and 2015. An extensive exchange of senior officials also took place during the same period. During Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit, both the countries agreed to appoint Special Representatives to oversee boundary issue. Notably, India formally accepted China’s claim on Tibet and opened Nathu La for trade. Both the countries also signed a Declaration on principles for relations and comprehensive cooperation.\textsuperscript{480} The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India from 9 to 12 April 2005. The Chinese

\textsuperscript{477} Ibid., 148.
\textsuperscript{479} Hongzhou Zhang and Mingjiang Li, “Sino-Indian Border Disputes,” \textit{Analysis}, no. 181 (2013), 7.
\textsuperscript{480} Ibid., 7.
Premier’s visit created good will and understanding between the two countries.\textsuperscript{481} The visit manifested that India and China had moved from enmity to amity and despite concerns generated the possibility of a strategic partnership between them.\textsuperscript{482}

The visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India from November 20 to November 23, 2006 was quite eventful. In India, the visiting President participated in celebrations of China-India Friendship Year along with Indian President Abdul Kalam. Both the countries agreed to strengthen their bilateral relations and introduced a five year programme for the exchange of youth delegations. First delegation of this programme visited China from October 8 to October 17, 2006.\textsuperscript{483} Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid a visit to China from 13 to 15 January 2008. The visit came to spotlight as the Chinese Premier hosted a private dinner for his counterpart that contributed to personal rapport between the two leaders. During the visit, ‘Shared Vision on the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century’ was signed by the two countries.\textsuperscript{484} During the visit, it was agreed that bilateral trade would be increased from $40 billion to $60 billion by 2010.\textsuperscript{485}

The relations between India and China were marred by a war and various skirmishes and armed confrontations due to border disputes during 1959-1962. With the visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003 and exchange of visits by a number of very high level officials, the relations began to take positive diplomatic and economic turn. A breakthrough was achieved and momentum in the ties of both the countries accelerated.\textsuperscript{486} Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a visit to India from September 17 to 19, 2014. A huge delegation of businessmen accompanying the Chinese president

\textsuperscript{481} Kripa Sridharan, \textit{Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s Visit to India, 9-12 April 2005} (Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, 2005), 6.
\textsuperscript{482} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{484} Arif, “A History of Sino-Indian Relations.” 136.
significantly engaged the Indian and Chinese business leaders.\textsuperscript{487} Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reciprocated with a visit to China from May 14 to 16, 2015. President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi stressed that the re-emergence of India and China would be a great opportunity to realise the ‘Asian Century’. The visit addressed many areas of mutual interest and resulted in the conclusion of 24 agreements worth $10 billion.\textsuperscript{488}

The purpose of giving this brief account of India-China relations was to explain the phases of bonhomie, confrontation, stalemate and reconciliation. Both the states, which emerged on the regional and global scene in quick succession in 1947 and 1949, had to adjust to the myths and realities of bilateral, regional and international dictates of real politics of the post-World War Two and Cold War era. Being rising powers of enormous size, India and China were required to address two main issues, hoping that rest of the issues would stem from them. First, at the bilateral level, the territorial disputes were awaiting resolution and both the countries found it hard to change their position on maps and mechanism. Secondly, there was the issue of seeking bigger share of regional influence, which each country wished to pursue. Apart from confrontation over resolution of border disputes, competition for expansion of influence at regional and global level too existed between two countries.

While discussing Pakistan-China’s India centric perspective, it might be said that Pakistan and India had over a period of time, strengthened hostility and kept all other engagements hostage to the resolution of host of issues including the Kashmir dispute. Hostility would be a popular narrative that would influence the state and/or non-state actors and a large number populace on both sides of the border. The perspective on bilateral level likely would be hostility and unfriendliness. So far India-China relations are concerned; it was likely that the border dispute would continue to irk both the countries, unless a solution was reached to the satisfaction of both the parties. Confrontations and small skirmishes would continue to occur but India and China would

\textsuperscript{488} Ibid., 5-6.
address the issue with political will and capacity and evade negative impact of these confrontations. But the likelihood was there that China’s intention at strategic level with regard to South Asia and much beyond the region would continue to cause uneasiness in India. And both Pakistan and China would continue to share India centric perspective. Pakistan had a hostile attitude towards India and that could be changed with the resolution of Kashmir dispute. China’s relation with India would also remain cautious, swinging between confrontation and competition.

It might be added here that a world outside Pakistan-China-India triangle too existed and it looked at this triangle with hope and concerns at the challenges, complexities and promises of this triangular relations. The world closer to these three Asian countries were more concerned as they were more affected and among them Iran and Afghanistan were closest. This would trigger a need for detailed study of Pakistan-China-India-Iran and Afghanistan relations.

4.2. PAKISTAN-CHINA-INDIA-AFGHANISTAN-IRAN: EMERGING DIMENSIONS

This section explored the emerging relations among the important regional powers namely Pakistan, China, India, Iran, and Afghanistan. It discussed the dynamics of their relationship at bilateral and regional level though the region in question was termed as the ‘region of rivalries’. These five regional powers did not belong to any existing regional integration arrangement. However, for the purpose of this study, it was an imperative to see as to how these states had shaped their bilateral relations. It would also be important to find out as to how the political, strategic and economic preferences of each of these countries made them vital in the regional and global political context. The importance of the study also emanated from the impact their policies and economic dynamics exercised on South Asia generally and on Pakistan-China relations particularly. An analysis would also be done to find out constrains these states faced because of their historical and

489 James M Dorsey, Pakistan-China Relations, March 1, 2017.
geographical baggage and how they have dealt with the developments taking place in the region and at the world at large.

While Pakistan’s relations with China and India have been covered in detail in chapters 3 and 4, certain aspects of the relations in the context of the larger regional scenario would be highlighted here. To begin with, Pakistan seemed to have exceptionally admirable relations with China. Despite changes in the regional environments, different political systems that both countries had and certain disparate foreign policy agendas, the sailing had been smooth. The mutual trust that Pakistan and China had, convergence of national interests and their corresponding views on regional issues have helped boast the ties.\textsuperscript{490} As Pakistani academician Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, pointed out, there were two distinct rationale for this exceptionally positive relationship. First, Pakistan’s ‘neighbourly policy’ towards China and second China’s accurate understanding of India-Pakistan relations.\textsuperscript{491}

Pakistan’s relations with India were marred due to distrust and hostility right from their independence. Partition of both the countries left indelible marks of violence and bloodshed. On partition, Pakistan and India faced numerous issues and many of them remained unresolved including the core issue of Kashmir. Both the countries would have different positions on Kashmir issue and there fixed positions would be a cause of deadlock. In Pakistan, Kashmir dispute would be termed as the major root cause of tension between the two countries and numerous other issues were considered as irritants which could be addressed after the resolution of the core issue of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{492} As such, Pakistan and India continued to suffer major setbacks to their ties and many times, confidence building measures (CBMs) initiated by both the governments failed. There could not be any let up as distrust that existed between the two countries became a

\textsuperscript{490} Ian Storey and Herbert Yee, \textit{The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality} (New Delhi: Routledge, 2004), 308.
\textsuperscript{491} Ibid., 308.
serious impediment to cooperation between the two countries and hindered people to people contact that was essential for bringing peace and prosperity to both countries.⁴⁹³

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations had historically been a mix of hostility at one point in time and cordiality at another. The relations between the two countries could be categorized in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial and post 9/11 phases. Before the partition of the sub-continent, the British government used Afghanistan as a buffer against the Soviet Union, due to which the Durand Line became a thorny issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The creation of Pakistan denied Afghanistan the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa today, which was entirely claimed by Afghanistan. Disappointed over it, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s membership to the UN. The relations were then shadowed by disagreement over the Durand Line.⁴⁹⁴

The Soviet invasion of 1979 was an important event for Pakistan and Afghanistan as it changed the dynamics of their relations for more than a decade. During the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan helped Afghanistan against the occupation forces and hosted nearly three million refugees during and after the war. In the post-Soviet withdrawal period, an insurgency ensued in Afghanistan and Taliban emerged victorious, who formed a government in Afghanistan. During this period, Pakistan not only had friendly ties with Afghanistan but it also exercised influence over the Taliban regime. Expectations were raised regarding Pakistan’s ability to obtain strategic depth and address the peril of encirclement.⁴⁹⁵ Both these advantages faded away. In the event of 9/11, the Taliban regime was overthrown and Pakistan came to face an uncertain situation as both US and India backed Northern Alliance regime that was unfriendly to Pakistan. In the post 9/11 scenario, therefore, Indian influence in Afghanistan increased manifold and an air of suspicion and distrust existed between Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹³ Ibid., 21.
⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., 142.
⁴⁹⁶ Ibid., 143.
In such a situation, Pakistan faced a hard time in safeguarding its national interests in Afghanistan. With regard to Afghanistan, Pakistan looked for four favourable developments occurring in Afghanistan. Firstly, being the home of over half of world’s Pashtuns, Afghanistan should understand Pakistan’s concerns and sensitivities attached to its tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Secondly, in the 1980s Pakistan sought a doctrinal approach of ‘strategic depth’ from a friendly Afghanistan against its confrontation with India. Thirdly, Pakistan needed connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia, areas which were sources of raw material. And fourthly, Pakistan would need be guarded against India’s moves in Afghanistan and wished to have a regime friendly to Pakistan. Currently, Pakistan’s interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan appeared to be in jeopardy.

The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remained strained and irritants like the issue of refugees, drug trafficking, militancy and terror-related problems and cross border infiltrations have caused trust deficit between the two countries. Despite these odds, Pakistan-Afghanistan trade relations have moved on and Pakistan became the largest trading partner of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s trade with Afghanistan has increased from $0.83 billion in 2006 to $2.1 billion in 2013. Again, Pakistan enjoyed largest share in the imports of Afghanistan and that was about 24.3 per cent in 2013. Pakistan was also the largest destination for exports that accounted for 32.2 per cent of the exports where India has followed as the second largest export destination standing at 27 per cent. Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan would face a low if political instability and various other structural issues were not addressed.

Pakistan and Iran shared 900 kilometres border and have enjoyed close friendly ties since the inception of Pakistan. Iran was the first Muslim country to recognize Pakistan as a sovereign country. There were other commonalities ranging from language to culture to religion. Both the countries have also come closer by signing a series of agreement.

499 Ibid., 2.
Friendship Treaty in 1950, Cultural Agreement in 1956, the US led Baghdad pact, later known as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1956 and Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964 were the milestones bolstering Pakistan-Iran relations. The relations were deeply affected because of regional and global political restraints and shift of alliances. There appeared a divergence in the security perception of both the countries. Iran was occupied with West Asia whereas Pakistan was engaged in South Asia and with India.\(^500\)

As a matter of fact, Pakistan-Iran relations witnessed fluctuation since the very beginning and especially since 1970s. This could be explained by dividing the period in three phases. In the first phase (1947-1979), relations were harmonious and both the countries worked together in various regional integration arrangements aimed at promoting trade and socio-economic developments. During the second phase (1979-2001), the relations ceased to be warm. In the wake of Islamic revolution, the US became hostile towards Iran and Pakistan’s relations with Iran dampened after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Pakistan was rendered support by the US and Saudi Arabia and this became a point of contention between Pakistan and Iran. During the period in the 1990s, the US imposed Pressler Amendment on Pakistan, which denied US military and economic aid to Pakistan. In the third phase of Pakistan-Iran relations beginning after 9/11, ties between the two countries remained cold due to continuing US-Iran confrontation, divergent political and strategic interests in Afghanistan, Iran’s inclination towards India and flare up of sectarian conflict in Pakistan.\(^501\)

Despite odds, Pakistan-Iran relations could be built on common grounds of strong religious-ethnic-culture-linguistic ties bondages shared by both the countries. There were opportunities for trade and economic development between the two countries. Both the countries had not only set an objective of enhancing bilateral trade to $5 billion 2021 but also moved forward for Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, a project which could have

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\(^501\) “Pakistan - Iran Relations Challenges & Prospects” (Islamabad: Centre for Pakistan and Gulf Studies (CPGS), 2014), 7-9.
been be a flagship project for both the countries, if it was implemented timely. However, another opportunity would be emerging and Pakistan and Iran could now be part of CPEC initiative.\(^{502}\) Iran’s Ambassador to Pakistan, Mehdi Honardoost said in an address at the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISSI) that Iran and Pakistan have huge potential to complement each other in trade and economic spheres. Massive bilateral trade potential, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, Gwadar-Chabahar ports complimenting each other and providing regional connectivity offered a number options to Pakistan and Iran to benefit from the cordial ties.\(^{503}\)

It might be pointed out here that Pakistan’s geo-political locale would drive its options to foster foreign relations. It had been an advocate of cordial and productive relations with the neighbours in the region. Iran was the first Muslim country to recognize Pakistan. It laid the foundation of strong future relations. Iran supported Pakistan during India-Pakistan wars and Iran, like Pakistan, was in the US camp during the Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era in general and in post 9/11 in particular, many new alignments took shape and Pakistan-Iran relations lost much of warmth due to their differences on ideological and regional issues. Meanwhile Pakistan’s relations with China flourished and ultimately culminated into a friendship that has weathered all tests of time despite the fact that not much of political, economic and cultural commonalities existed between the two countries. China helped Pakistan not only in gaining indigenous defence capabilities but also in building economic infrastructure which was vital for economic growth. The CPEC with the matrix of multiple economic and political interests would further consolidate Pakistan-China relations.

However, Pakistan’s relations with India have remained in doldrums most of the time of their existence as independent countries. Having fought four wars over Kashmir, Pakistan considered India a threat while India viewed Pakistan as a supporter of terrorism in the region. Both the countries continue to live in a state of distrust and animosity, which would not augur well for the region. Among all the neighbours, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have fluctuated between cordial and strained relations. Afghanistan’s

\(^{502}\) “Pakistan-Iran Relations”\(^{\text{TM}}\) (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, May 27, 2016).

\(^{503}\) Ibid., 4.
internal political upheavals, influence of Soviet Union in the Cold War era, insurgencies in the post-Cold War period and the outreach to India in the post 9/11 period increased Pakistan’s worries regarding developments taking place in Afghanistan in particular. It was interesting to note that the presence and influence of US in the region was often a decisive factor in the evolution of Pakistan’s relations with its neighbours.

China has viewed Afghanistan’s geostrategic location as significant in the regional political and strategic milieu. The country’s richness in mineral resources could become a decisive factor in the economic cooperation between China and Afghanistan. In 2007, China made its largest investment amounting to $4.4 billion to develop world’s second largest copper deposit in the Logar province of Afghanistan. In 2011, China made yet another investment amounting to $400 million in the oil and gas sector in Afghanistan.\(^{504}\) Besides significant increase in China’s economic support and cooperation since 2001, China’s diplomatic relations with Afghanistan also became ‘positive, proactive and dynamic’ with many high level bilateral exchanges that took place between the two counties.\(^{505}\) China’s role in Afghanistan would be multidimensional, encouraging the emergence of politically and economically stable Afghanistan.

In the post 9/11 period, China has exercised restraint in its relations with Afghanistan. After the fall of Taliban, it has re-established its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan but it seems that the relations were not very warm with its neighbour. Though President Hamid Karzai paid two official visits to China but the relations could take an upward turn when the US announced in 2012 regarding the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. As part of its non-interference policy, China stayed away from military intervention and preferred contribution in peaceful activities.\(^{506}\) In October 2014, when President Ashraf Ghani visited China, he urged for China and Pakistan led support in Afghanistan peace process.\(^{507}\) China’s hosting of such a peace initiative reflected that China wanted to forge

\(^{507}\) Ibid., 11.
coordination and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours and regional partners.

No wonder, therefore, that China became part of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) that was formed to encourage joint efforts to bring peace in Afghanistan. The first meeting of QCG was held on January 11, 2016 at Islamabad and it was attended by Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the US. It was agreed in the meeting to initiate immediate talks between Afghan government and Taliban and look for prospects for peace and reconciliation. There was optimism about the role of China in QCG for the reason that it had considerable influence over Pakistan whose participation and role were considered to be central to peace in Afghanistan. China was also considered a vital stakeholder in peace and stability in Afghanistan. Though QCG could not achieve the objective for which it was formed, China and other stakeholders made efforts for peace and stability in Afghanistan and in the region.

Though China shared rather a shorter border (76 kilometres) with Afghanistan, it has faced constant instability threat from the western neighbour. Threat emanating from drug trafficking, weapon smuggling and spill over effect of terrorism became a real concern for China. In view of such issues, engaging Afghanistan turned out to be China’s primary objective in the region. In view of the threats faced by it, China became proactive. It initiated regional engagements involving Afghanistan, joined various regional multilateral mechanisms and conducted high level diplomatic exchanges with Afghanistan. China also appointed special envoy Sun Yuxi to have ‘close communication’ with Afghanistan and relevant parties. The appointment was aimed to develop strategic ties and ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region. China’s economic support to Afghanistan had been rising over the years. During 2001-2003, the Chinese government provided $240 million to Afghanistan by 2013. In 2014,

$80 million were provided as aid and $240 million were pledged to be paid in three years’ time.\textsuperscript{512} $330 million worth of grant was also pledged to Afghanistan during 2017 and 3000 thousands of Afghans were to receive training in five years’ time.\textsuperscript{513} China also pledged to construct railway line connecting China to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. China also promised to help build 400 Megawatt (MW) power plant, smelter for copper ore refining, coalmines and build school and roads.\textsuperscript{514} In 2015, China reiterated its support to Afghanistan to help in economic and social reconstruction and accelerated the process of regional integrations.\textsuperscript{515}

In addition, China began to help Afghanistan build its national army to fight against the menace of terrorism. It committed a million dollar military aid to Afghanistan and the first consignment was received by Afghanistan in July 2016. The defence related shipment comprised logistical equipment, spare parts of military vehicles and weapons and ammunition for the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces struggling to organize against militancy and terrorism in the war-torn country.\textsuperscript{516} The gelling of strategic relations between Afghanistan and China could be seen in Kabul’s desire to lend support to China on the issue of the South China Sea.\textsuperscript{517} The South China Sea was a contentious issue for China’s adversaries, who believed that China was asserting control over the sea-lanes. This view was also shared by other countries such as Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines.

China and Iran established diplomatic relations in 1971 and both the countries viewed their relationship based on deep sense of great culture and feeling of being victimized by the Western powers for their vested interests. Both the countries were victimized by the unfriendly international system. Again, both were once great powers, were reduced to semi-colonial states in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century and faced painful subjugation or military defeats. Iran was under the US influence since the 1940s to pursue western agenda and

\textsuperscript{512} Huasheng, “What Is Behind China’s Growing Attention to Afghanistan?”
\textsuperscript{514} Zimmerman, “The New Silk Roads.”
this continued in some form until the Islamic revolution in 1979. China too faced sanctions and censure for being communist regime by the US and the West. Prior to 1979 revolution, China-Iran relations were at the minimum as Iran was a US client state. The Islamic government too was suspicious of China in the beginning, but soon it realized that misgivings regarding China were ill-founded. China, however, managed to foster amicable relations by helping Iran with arms in its war against Iraq.\textsuperscript{518}

With the passage of time strategic cooperation has increased, China had continued to help Iran build its military capacity. It was widely believed by the US led western powers that China had extended considerable support to Iran in the realm of missile and nuclear development. China, one might add here, has provided Iran with advanced technology including access to ballistic missiles.\textsuperscript{519} In 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin was reported to have made a commitment to US President Bill Clinton for the termination of various contracts involving nuclear and missile technology cooperation with Iran, but China continued to supply not only missiles but various components used for the production of missiles. China also helped Iran set up factories where Iran could have indigenous production. These arrangements were put in place to allow China to remain within the norms of international relations and transfer such technologies.\textsuperscript{520}

So far economic relation between China and Iran was concerned, it depended on the propositions that Iran had abundance of energy resources and China was an energy starved country. That was why China became Iran’s biggest customer and a partner in economic relations and a number of Chinese companies interested to carry out oil business in Iran increased manifold.\textsuperscript{521} In 2013, bilateral trade between China and Iran amounted to $39 billion and in 2014; it increased to nearly 72 per cent. In 2014, Iran’s exports to China, mostly energy products, amounted to $27.5 billion whereas Iran’s imports from China were worth $24.35 billion. There was a considerable increase in the

\textsuperscript{521} Harold and Nader, “China and Iran”, 10.
export of Iranian crude oil and according to an estimate, China’s import of crude oil reached 500 thousand barrels per day.\footnote{Lindsay Hughes, “The Energy and Strategy of China – Iran Relations” (Nedlands: Future Directions International, November 17, 2015), 2.} Trading ties have considerably expanded during the recent years.

As observed in the study, China-India relations became significant soon after their inception as both the countries prepared themselves to embark on regional as well as global stream. PRC was founded in 1949; nearly two years after India came into being as a result of partition of the sub-continent. China required diplomatic support on Korean War and Taiwan and it readily came from India and this set the pace of friendly ties between the two countries. In 1954, a major agreement was inked and India accepted China’s sovereignty over Tibet. Both the countries came closer because of their common stand on Afro-Asia socio-economic development issue during Bandung Conference in 1955 and pledged to work for the development of Afro-Asian regions. The relations between the two countries were duly strengthened and it was reflected by the expression of Chini-Hindi Bhai Bhai. However, the bonhomie was soon hit because of divergent perception over border issues that led to 1962 China-India war.\footnote{Zhang Li, “China–India Relations, Strategic Engagement and Challenges,” Asie. Visions, no. 34 (2010), 6.} The border war shaped the future trajectory of China’s relations with India.

In the post reforms and opening phase, China transformed its approach towards regional and global issues and strategized its preferences in international relations. Though no headway was made in the resolution of territorial disputes, the two countries moved on with trade relations and economic cooperation. Indeed, a remarkable progress has been made in the recent years in these spheres. China- India trade was only $2.92 billion in 2000. It rose to $41.85 billion in 2008 and jumped to $70.4 billion in 2015. Exports to China were worth $8.86 billion whereas exports to India were worth $61.54 billion and India suffered a huge trade deficit. Chinese investors continued to be attracted to Indian markets and in 2014, Chinese investments in India amounted to $2.73 billion and India’s
investment in China was worth $0.564 billion.\textsuperscript{524} Thus China and India began to cooperate in economic and strategic realm despite competition between them in regional and global spheres.

China has doubtlessly emerged as an economic power in Asia and beyond during the last two decades or so. Its policy of economic integration with regional and global powers has enormously benefitted it. By opting to shelve many of its territorial disputes with the neighbouring countries, it had built up the trust level with other countries and obtained uninterrupted development. With India, China had a war over border issue in 1962, but this did not become an impediment in furthering economic ties with India. However, it needed to be remembered that China and India were competitors in the region as both were competing to achieve the proverbial hegemonic power in the region and beyond and often try to outmanoeuvre one another on political and strategic issues. At the same time, the warmth in the relationship was also being maintained. Nevertheless, a serious irritant had developed in the recent years. It was the fast developing US-India strategic partnership. This relationship was a source of concern to China, and China considered it an attempt by India to join hands with the US in containing China.

China considered Pakistan an all-weather friend and had consistent political, strategic and economic policy. It has now entered into a gigantic CPEC project that would entail political and strategic gains besides economic returns not only for China but also for Pakistan. In the post 9/11 scenario, China maintained negligible presence in Afghanistan but had always been willing to play its role in the post drawdown peace processes. China wished to help Afghanistan in the economic drive and infrastructure development. China’s relations with Afghanistan aimed at enhancing connectivity to Central Asian region and it sought Afghanistan’s help to address the issue of militancy in the western province of Xinjiang that fuelled separatist movement there. It also spearheaded regional efforts to restore peace and normalcy in Afghanistan. Again, China has forged friendly relations with Iran as it depends on Iran for 20 per cent of its oil needs. China has also played an important role in persuading Iran to comply with the guidelines of International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as China would prefer to have a region without confrontations.

India and Iran had forged diplomatic relations in the 1950s. This relationship was not cordial until the end of the Cold War as the two countries belonged to two different camps. India was supporting Non-Aligned Movement while Iran was siding with the West in its fight against communism.\(^\text{525}\) India’s warm relations with the pro-Soviet regime of Egypt and Iraq further complicated its ties with Iran as Egypt was an advocate of Arab Nationalism and Iran opposed it. The Shah of Iran visited India in 1959 and sided with India during the India-China war in 1962.\(^\text{526}\) The India-Iran relations entered a new phase with the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and Iran began to take independent decisions in defining its national identity free of any external influence. The relations between India and Iran remained tense due to Iran’s preoccupation in its war with Iraq, new regime’s tilt towards Islam, Iran’s position on Kashmir and Indian Muslims.\(^\text{527}\) The end of the Cold War signified important changes in the equation between India and Iran. In the early 1990’s, Iran’s foreign policy was redesigned to reflect national interest rather than to be driven by Islamic Ideology.\(^\text{528}\) It began to consolidate its relations with India and China. A series of high level diplomatic exchanges laid the foundations of amicable India-Iran relations. Prime Minister Narasimma Rao’s visit in September 1993, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s visit in April 1995 and Indian Prime Minister Attal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit in 2001 opened a new chapter of bilateral relations and helped building up strategic cooperation between the two countries. These high level exchanges were reflective of convergence of interests between the two countries. Establishing good relations with Iran meant that India was aspiring beyond the South Asian region and wishing to strengthen its claim for global influence.\(^\text{529}\)


\(^{529}\) Yazdani, “The Dynamics of India’s Relations with Iran in the Post-Cold War Era”, 357.
In the post 9/11 era, India and Iran became wary of the rise of Sunni Islamic extremist regime in Afghanistan. Both the counties supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Iran guarded the interest of Shia community in the region which was facing threat from Taliban in Afghanistan. 530 Iran provided India an opportunity to realise it power projection objectives in Afghanistan and Central Asia and deny Pakistan a space that it always sought. With a view to arresting the resurgence of Taliban and Al-Qaeda, India and Iran established a Joint Working Group (JWG) on counter terrorism in 2003. In the same way, a working group was also formed to address the problem of drug and arms trafficking. 531 Pakistan’s persistence in fostering political Islam in its neighbourhood and beyond drove India and Iran closer. A convergence of interest developed and both the countries opposed Pakistan’s role in support of Taliban. During Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan, both Iran and India made consistent and synchronised efforts to contain Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan. 532

India and Iran did not have of much of strategic relation during the Cold War period. However, according to Congressional Research Service report, it was suspected that Iran and India had availed certain technology transfers from one another. It was suspected that India transferred the technology that could be used for making of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Again, it seemed that India did not provide any significant assistance to Iran during its war with Iraq. Iran did, however, seek India’s expertise on Missile boats, T-72 tanks, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and upgrading of MIG-29 aircrafts. Some military exchanges reported to be taking place were denied by either the countries on one pretext or the other.533

By any count or criterion, the strategic cooperation seems to be deeper and significant enough. India, for example, supported Iran with developing submarine batteries which were effective in warm weather. Interestingly enough, the help that was provided to Iran in terms of maintenance of tanks, infantry vehicles and artillery guns was objected by

532 Ibid., 149.
Israel as India was provided spares and upgrades by Israel and the latter never wanted its technology to find its way to Iran.\textsuperscript{534} Most criticism was received on military engagements that involved the navies of both the countries. The first Joint Naval exercise was, in fact, conducted in March 2003 between the two navies. It was followed by the second Joint Naval exercise in March 2006, immediately before the deliberations about the US-India nuclear deal. India also established outposts in Iran that would help India monitor maritime movement in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf. India’s access to Iran would also augment India ability not only to effectively monitor Pakistan but initiate sub-conventional operations against Pakistan.\textsuperscript{535}

With regard to economic relations, India and Iran have made significant expansion in the areas of information technology, petrochemicals and agriculture. In 2003, Iran proposed an investment of $800 million by both the countries to enhance economic cooperation.\textsuperscript{536} The total trade volume between India and Iran was $9 billion in financial year 2016. To increase Iran-India trade relations, the Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO) was making efforts to allow Persia International Bank, Persian Bank, Bank Pasargad, Bank Mellat and Saman Bank from Iran to operate branches from India.\textsuperscript{537}

India and Afghanistan have maintained friendly ties since the beginning of their diplomatic relations. India had historically been supporting Afghan regime and made consistent efforts to forge cordial relations. In 1996, when the Taliban rose to power, India did not recognize this regime which had the backing of Pakistan and Pakistan was one of the three countries extending recognition to Taliban. The other two were Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate (UAE). In the wake of 9/11, the US waged war against Afghanistan and the Taliban government was removed. India forged cordial relations with the dispensation that came into existence after the fall of Taliban. India not only fostered good relations with Afghanistan but also provided hefty aid for reconstruction and development. Pakistan’s anxieties increased with the increase of India’s influence in

\textsuperscript{534} Fair, “India and Iran”, 150.
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid., 151.
\textsuperscript{536} Yazdani, “The Dynamics of India’s Relations with Iran in the Post-Cold War Era,” 359.
Afghanistan. There began a competition between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan.\(^\text{538}\) India’s growing influence in Afghanistan was perceived as threat by Pakistan. When India began to operate consulates from Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar, Pakistan accused New Delhi of running clandestine operations against Pakistan to encircle it and fuelling insurgency in Balochistan.\(^\text{539}\)

India and Afghanistan fostered strategic and economic relations following the fall of Taliban regime. On October 4, 2011, both the countries agreed to have Strategic Partnership for ‘mutual understanding and long term trust’. This was a very comprehensive agreement covering trade, economy, education, security and politics. It was inked at a time when international security arrangement was about to terminate its operation. In addition, two other agreements related to mining and energy were signed. These are expected to help Afghanistan integrate with regional economies in general and Indian economy in particular.\(^\text{540}\) This strategic agreement would provide India a space it had required to expand its influence in Afghanistan and in the region and deny Pakistan a space that Pakistan thought it should have in the regional sphere. The strategic cooperation was a welcome development for India-Afghanistan ties at bilateral level but it caused anxieties at regional level.

In its quest to achieve the status of regional power in South Asia, India has been tailoring its foreign policy accordingly. In the decade 2000, India’s focus was on galvanizing its relations with the US. Given its foreign policy imperatives that sought geopolitical partnership in multiple spheres, India cultivated strategic and economic relations with its regional neighbours and beyond. Besides the territorial disputes with China, India fostered economic relations and embraced approaches that eluded hostility and nurtured peace. India, however, had been wary of China’s close security ties with Pakistan that had also served to enhance Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile capacity. On the


\(^{539}\) Ibid.

contrary, India’s growing nuclear ties with the US has disturbed China. The net result is that China’s support to Pakistan has increased manifold especially in the strategic realm. India’s animosity with Pakistan had never ceased because of Kashmir issue and both the countries have fought four inconclusive wars over this contentious issue. India had also been accusing Pakistan for harbouring and exporting terrorism. It has also showed reservations over the CPEC on the pretext of its passing through the disputed territory.

With regard to Afghanistan, India has forged political and economic relations with Afghanistan and made hefty investments to deny Pakistan a political and strategic space. Pakistan has, for long, accused India of using Afghanistan’s soil against Pakistan. India seemed to have successfully gathered the support of Afghan ruling elite in its favour and against Pakistan. It has also massively invested in Chabahar port in Iran bordering Afghanistan with the purpose of countering China’s clout in Gwadar port. India was also building up close coordination with Iran to address the issue of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.

Afghanistan remained engulfed in turmoil for the last several decades and so were its relations with the regional countries. It was evident that internal discord has eventually led to foreign intervention to stem the tide of volatility causing spill over effect in the neighbourhood and beyond. Afghanistan being a landlocked country depended largely on Pakistan for connectivity to the outer world. Current dispensation in Afghanistan considered Pakistan and specifically the military establishment in Pakistan responsible for its political upheavals. The worst came when Pakistan tried to contain Indian interests. In the aftermath of 9/11 and now with the US drawdown, the Taliban surge has increased and it is also being linked to Pakistan’s support to the Taliban. This kind of mistrust has poisoned Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and provided India an opportunity to stream into Afghanistan.

Since Afghanistan and India shared similar vision of terrorism and both the countries believed that it had been emanating from Pakistan, India and Afghanistan came closer. In the context of terrorism, China has also drawn closer to the Afghan government. Significantly enough, after assuming power, President Ashraf Ghani paid his first official
visit to China with an aim to persuading it to use its contacts with the Taliban and exercise influence over Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table. Afghanistan was now involved in multiple economic partnership projects with China and India. Iran, on the other hand, would see Afghanistan as a passage to Central Asian states, it has therefore been investing both in peace and economic overtures. Both the countries were averse to Taliban’s complete control of Afghanistan.

Since the revolution and especially in the post-Cold War and post 9/11 periods, Iran had emerged as an important actor in the Middle East and South Asia. In academic circles, Iran was now being increasingly viewed through the prism of Middle Eastern regional framework because of its influence on the Shias in the region and its long standing contention with the Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia. Iran’s nuclear ambition had also been a challenge to Israel since it perceived Iran as a country which would always support Muslim’s cause in the region, especially the Palestine. Again, Iran’s relations with South Asian countries have grown largely due to abundance of energy resources it possesses. Iran’s relation with Pakistan was generally cordial for most part, but in the post-Cold war era, a wedge between them was created due to sectarian conflict in Pakistan, alliance with the US and Pakistan’s support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Iran was already leaning towards India. Pakistan, however, always supported Iran’s nuclear program and defended Iran’s right to pursue the nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Pakistan and Iran alongside Turkey had established Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) way back in 1964 for socio-economic development programmes and recently both the countries agreed to get connected through Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, a sort of flagship project.

Meanwhile, Iran had moved ahead and developed cordial relations with India and both the countries had joined hands to make inroads into Central Asia through Afghanistan. The development of Chabahar port in Iran would not only provide India with trade and transit route to Afghanistan but would also open the door for India to reach out to Central Asian countries and beyond for the expansion of trade and economy. This economic connectivity would doubtlessly enhance Iran’s relations with Afghanistan. Again, Iran
has managed to revive its relations with Afghanistan and become one of its largest trading partners. It was already exporting electricity to Afghanistan, and contributing to infrastructural development in Afghanistan.

The above discussion on the role and interest of different regional actors in Afghanistan and beyond clearly indicates that important stakeholders of the region have deep impact on Pakistan-China relations. Furthermore, the complexities, challenges and opportunities arising out of emerging, competing and conflicting Pakistan-China-India-Afghanistan-Iran larger scenario would put into motion forces having potential to dramatically alter the future of regional harmony and disharmony. To what extent would such eventualities affect Pakistan-China relations was an issue which would keep the policy makers of the two countries engaged for quite a while. Again, due to its significant geographical location, and being part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Pakistan would keep occupying an advantageous position. It would continue to remain a significant neighbour of China and would keep drawing the hostility of India, Afghanistan and Iran because of divergence of political, strategic and economic interests. China would emerge as a benign power willing to share it gigantic economic gains with Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Iran and would be complimented in the same manner. Nevertheless, China would also continue to have India as a competitor in the region to deal effectively with India’s claim for regional and global influence.

India would also continue to foster cordial relations with Afghanistan and Iran and Afghanistan would give India a leverage to undermine Pakistan by denying it political, strategic and economic space Pakistan had once enjoyed and attain larger regional connectivity with the Central Asian states. Iran would also provide India with connectivity through the Persian Gulf. Pakistan-India relations would remain hostage to Kashmir and other issues. Both the countries would continue to confront each other by proxies and India would not approve of CPEC on the ground that the project allowed passage through disputed territory. Though India would continue to foster cordial relations with China to accrue economic benefit, it would remain its competitor in the regional and global contest. Afghanistan and Iran would continue to align with India and
undermine Pakistan due to a number of factors. In the given context, it would be important that the regional imperatives of Pakistan-China relations were highlighted.

4.3. REGIONAL IMPERATIVES OF PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS

This section would explain the impact of Pakistan-China bilateral relations on the regional political, strategic and economic construct. To begin with, in the post-Cold War era generally and in the post 9/11 period specifically, many events and developments have brought changes in the regional outlook. Events like end of the Cold War following the disintegration of Soviet Union, emergence of unipolarity, GWOT and the growing stakes of the US in the region, rise of India and China, impact of bilateral and multilateral relations among the countries and wave of globalization have led to changes in regional outlook. In view of these developments, Pakistan-China relations continue to grow in political, strategic and economic spheres.

However, before dwelling on China’s regional and global role, a reference to the debate regarding China being a regional and global power to reckon with would be helpful. In this context, it needed to understand as to how could its relations with any country become vital and effective. Scholarship on China’s position as to whether it was a global power or regional power was divided. Some scholars contended that China was already a global power, but some would regard it a regional power. The debate grew sharper due to some developments with regard to China. The world power status came to China when it created a miracle of growth. China, according to some scholars, has now moved from the ‘periphery of the world to the centre’ and it has begun to assert as world power. Chinese scholars in general held the view that China was a developing country and the international system categorized it as a developing country with distinct socio-economic indicators.541 However, Chinese economy expanded dramatically since early 1980s, and on its reputation as a global power spread like wild fire.

Indeed, the story of Chinese galvanizing economy is very impressive. Following post 1978 strategy of sustained economic developments, China began to pursue various

objectives in South Asia. The objective that China pursued were: 1) ensuring regional peace by diplomatic means; 2) eluding confrontations keeping the territorial disputes at low key and initiating neutral stance on territorial disputes in the region; 3) initiating multidimensional cooperation in the region; 4) ensuring continued energy supply that was life line of blooming Chinese economy; 5) supporting anti-terror war led by the US, whose spill over could also hit the Chinese interests; 6) taking measures to counter US containment strategy in the region; and 7) have access to resource rich Middle East, Caspian Sea and Central Asia.\textsuperscript{542} With a view to attaining these objectives, Pakistan was bound to figure out prominently in China’s regional scheme of things. That proceeded to overshadow China’s relations with any country in South Asia.

From the point of view of geographical contiguity, China and India were clearly competitors in the region. In the competition aiming at expansion of political as well as economic influence, China was in a better position due to its blooming economy and reaching out to the world. India reacted to Chinese onslaught by modernizing and improving its relations with the Southeast and Central Asian states. China avoided antagonism and supported the regional development course with the policy of multilateralism in South Asia. In all the calculations, China’s potential to dominate the region grew and this was resisted by the US as a global player and India as a regional actor.\textsuperscript{543} In China’s regional and global policy outlook, multilateralism gained importance. As regards strategic periphery, South Asia would be the region where China would desire to assert its influence.\textsuperscript{544}

In the regional context, two important countries India and China sought to strike a balance between contention arising due to unresolved disputes and cooperation elicited by possibility of sharing economic gains offered by either country. The position of India and China became precarious as both the countries had to maintain linkages to


\textsuperscript{544} Ibid., 289.
neighbouring countries and forge cooperation to remain relevant in the region and assert influence over these countries.\textsuperscript{545} China initiated a vital move when it undertook upgrading and operationalization of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. Becoming hub of strategic economic activities, Gwadar had potential to help China realize its ‘Look West’ policy and help Pakistan to have a ‘Look East’ opening.\textsuperscript{546} The major stake for India and China would be to attain and maintain regional political and economic ascendancy which would be key to asserting global influence.

There was another perspective on regional imperatives of Pakistan-China relations. Since Pakistan, China, India and the US were the major stakeholders; their interconnected relevance fluctuated between complimentary and conflicting interests in the South Asian political as well as strategic milieu. The influence and power these countries wished to exercise to advance their regional objectives made it relatively complex political and strategic framework. Pakistan leaned on China for political, diplomatic and economic support and despite being partner in war against terror, relations with the US did not stay as warm as they were. Regardless of diplomatic efforts to improve India-China relations, strategic differences on various issues continued fuelling rivalry and competition between the two countries. Similarly, China and the US, despite advancing trade and economic ties, continued to have key political and strategic differences on how regional and global issues were to be dealt with.\textsuperscript{547} These conflicting and complimenting frameworks impacted regional politics and carried implications for Pakistan-China relations.

While deliberating a regional order or Chinese sponsored regional order, one would contend that South Asia had undergone a profound shift in terms of its interstate relations. China had emerged as principal driver of this order due to a number of factors. Waning influence of the US, expanding influence of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), growth of multilateralism, increased interdependence of the regional actors, improvement in bilateral relations of various countries had altered the regional

\textsuperscript{546} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{547} Rajshree Jetly, “Sino-Pakistan Strategic Entente: Implications for Regional Security” (Institute of South Asian Studies, 2012), 12.
system considerably. China too pushed its way through attaining economic growth, substantial advancement in military power, expanding political influence and involvement in multilateral institutions. With the passage of time, China’s regional posture became proactive in all spheres and regional states began to view China as a good neighbour, a constructive power and a regional power which did not pose any threat to them.\textsuperscript{548}

While it would be apt to explore future political and economic alignments backed by the regional and global rivals, there were certain concerns which needed to be referred to. Firstly, nuclear test by India and Pakistan posed serious threat and both the states declared that they were not ready to abandon the programme. Secondly, acquisition of nuclear weapons by the developing countries raised concerns about the uncertainty of balance of terror and the ability of the states to avoid a nuclear exchange in case of escalations. And thirdly, how would Pakistan, China, India and the US shape the future of the region being nuclear powers and important stakeholders in the South Asian region.\textsuperscript{549} With nuclear armed neighbours like Pakistan and India, the region would remain volatile unless some strict escalation control measures were put in place.

Pakistan emerged as the closest ally of China in the South Asian regional milieu and this relation coincides with China’s interests and priorities in the region. Balancing India, addressing terrorism threat and expansion of economic activities in the region and beyond are China’s priority interests and Pakistan has become a conduit for China to attain these objectives. In the regional context, China’s deep rooted relations with Pakistan were central to China’s security policy framework addressing various concerns with regards to India and Afghanistan. At conceptual level, a debate had triggered and revolved around the idea that a balanced regional approach might be an appropriate initiative in the region and that would be identifying economic potentials of India over the traditional tilt

\textsuperscript{548} David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” \textit{International Security} 29, no. 3 (2005), 64.
\textsuperscript{549} Dittmer, \textit{South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma}.
towards Pakistan. Besides security ties with Pakistan, China would advance diplomatic and economic means to pursue its regional goals.

Pakistan, China and India have emerged as noteworthy members of a strategic triangle formed in the post 1962 period. There were two propositions that were considered to be having an impact on the interstate relations of the three countries. Firstly, strategic triangle yielded an institutional process of ‘conflict formation and management’ but with no hope of peaceful settlement of disputes. Secondly, there were issues of Islamic insurgency and terrorism that had the potential to affect Pakistan-China relations negatively. If these issues persisted, then a pillar of the triangle would be weakened. In the given situation, if India-China contentions continued, it would have more bilateral tinge attached to it. If these propositions were examined in the historical context, they would weigh considerably, but regional and global developments that took place in the last one decade suggested that such an argument might not be tenable.

After all, Indian factor in Pakistan-China relations was an important issue. True enough that, India held a vital position in the regional triangle and there were elements that drove India-China ties and China also seemed to consider these vital for regional outlook. Firstly, India was a significant peripheral country that might help China achieve its objectives of modernization, reunification and maintaining global peace while following objectives of common development. Secondly, China would also like to bring India closer to its orbit with a view to undermine US containment strategy. Thirdly, in order to avail strategic, trade and resources advantages, China would prefer to have amicable relations with the South Asian and Southeast Asian countries. Fourthly, China would like to maintain good relations with Indian Ocean power as 50 per cent of its oil and 80 per cent of its total imports passed by India’s coast via Strait of Malacca.

Andrew Small, “Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns in South Asia: China’s Role” (Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2014), 3.
553 Zeb, “Pakistan-China Relations.”
A perception shared by various scholars that Pakistan needed China more than China needed Pakistan, as suggested by Rizwan Zeb, were likely to change. Outside CPEC arrangements that were termed as unprecedented cooperation, Pakistan-China relations would be deeply affected by four factors. Firstly, China spill over fears in its Western province Xinjiang and it continued to be seriously concerned. Secondly, the safety and security of Chinese manpower working on various projects inside Pakistan was another major concern as Chinese workers were targeted earlier in Pakistan, and they continued to face threat. Thirdly, Pakistan-China relations did appear to be a government to government relations lacking people to people contact. This won’t bode well for future relations. Fourthly and equally importantly, India would continue to project China as a threat and build arms to complicate South Asian regional stability. The problem would be further aggravated because of expanding US-Indian strategic, economic and diplomatic relations. This very factor might drive Pakistan and China to be closer as both trust each other.

In Pakistan-China-India triangular relations all the three countries have remained occupied in conflict framework over three issues. Kashmir is a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan and partly China. The issue remained unresolved though it had triggered wars between India and Pakistan. Both the countries were once on the verge of nuclear confrontation. India and China too have disputes on territorial claims over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh and both the countries went to war over territorial disputes and it still dampens the spirit of cordiality in their relations. It might be noted that the Western province of China, Xinjiang borders eight countries including India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The separatists and militants in Xinjiang posed problems for China, who could find hideouts in Afghanistan and tribal areas of Pakistan in the past. These issues have caused frictions among the three countries as each country opted for diplomatic and material support suiting to its interests and objectives.

One might assert have that the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has shaped the political as well as strategic landscape of South Asia. China has all along been

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554 Ibid., 56-58.
making its position clear regarding resolution of Kashmir dispute. Its advice was to avoid India-Pakistan war on Kashmir because China wished Pakistan to continue to act as a balancer to India and feared that an all-out war might erase the myth by decisively subordinating Pakistan. China would more likely to be supporting Pakistan in the event of war and such a move would harm India-China relations. China also wished to foster cooperation with the South Asian countries and India-Pakistan war would seriously affect such an objective. And China’s support to Pakistan in war with India would also affect its friendly and cooperative ties with other South Asian countries. So far the settlement of the dispute was concerned, India would prefer that Hunza-Gilgit area was transferred to India so that China might not have a border to share with Pakistan. However, China would prefer to ensure that the disappearance of border between Pakistan and China did not take place. In addition, China might also lose as Garver argued the leverage it had because of this dispute and might not be an enthusiastic advocate of Kashmir settlement. Though with regard to China’s position on Kashmir, Dr Ahmed Rashid Malik, Director of China Pakistan Study Centre, Islamabad believed it would fully endorse Pakistan’s view point on Kashmir.

In the given context, there was less likelihood of South Asia’s emergence as a positive regional integration arrangement. The region was plagued with disputes among the regional members, but also within the territories of the regional states. A conflict syndrome dominated the region. Kashmir was a major cause of conflict between India and Pakistan. Irritants like, sub-nationalism in Sindh and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan, secessionist movement in North East India, Maoist insurgency in Central India, religiously motivated terrorism in Afghanistan, conflict over territorial disputes between India and China have kept the regional stakeholders at odds with one another. The conflicts that the states in South Asia have continued to contest for long would be there to stay as no effective mechanism has been devised to find solution to the problems. All diplomatic efforts made by the states as party to the disputes demonstrated their wish

556 Ibid., 18-19.
557 Dr Ahmed Rashid Malik, Pakistan-China Relations, February 14, 2017.
and will to stay firm on their stated positions on the issues. And that would keep the region a conflict prone region.

It was an important fact that China has emerged as a meaningful regional power and regional states and the US were required to adjust to this reality.\textsuperscript{559} David Shambaugh termed rise of China as ‘principal catalysts’ to the shaping regional order.\textsuperscript{560} But there was no such model that could explain the dynamics of the region and the scholarship on Asia generally used multiple approaches to see as to how the Asian region emerged. In his view, neither realism nor liberal institutionalism could offer explanations of such a dynamic environs.\textsuperscript{561} It would, therefore, be imperative for China to decide and design the contours of new regional order for which China had capacity to assert political and economic influence.

It might be added here that regional imperative of Pakistan-China relations would relate to political, strategic and economic stature of the two states. China has become a regional power and it aspires to become a global power. It began to assert its political and economic influence across the region by encouraging economic cooperation and forging trade ties with regional countries. China has continued to use soft power and reflected its benign image in its diplomatic relations. Though it still has unresolved territorial disputes with India and certain other countries in its South and East, it has carried on with trade and economic ties with such countries. China’s outreach was likely to move across continents after the realization of its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative and regional countries were lured to get connected to China’s mega initiative as such initiatives were too attractive to be ignored or cast aside.

Though a nuclear power, Pakistan had been passing through a difficult phase of its existence due to terrorism, political instability, lack of governance and economic difficulties. It had strained relations with India due to territorial disputes, an unfriendly Afghanistan in the West and an inimical Iran. Clearly it did not have a comfortable

\textsuperscript{559} Ambassador Akram Zaki, Pakistan-China Relations, March 10, 2017.
\textsuperscript{560} Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia”, 99.
\textsuperscript{561} Ibid., 99.
regional setting. In this scenario, Pakistan-China relations with huge political, strategic and economic dividends would be a great opportunity to explore. An all-encompassing relation with China would place Pakistan in a comfortable position as it enjoyed the leverage due to CPEC and Gwadar Port. Comprehensive cooperation between Pakistan and China would potentially address Pakistan’s multifarious problems and might also embolden Pakistan to assert its position in the regional political setting.
CHAPTER FIVE

PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS: GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

This chapter would discuss the global implications of Pakistan-China relations. It attempted to explore how post 9/11 political and economic order, India’s nuclear partnership with the US and containment of China in the context of impact on Pakistan-China relations. The chapter would comprise three sections. In the first section, emerging global political order in the post 9/11 scenario would be explored with its impact on Pakistan-China relations. In the second section of the chapter, Indo-US strategic partnership would be discussed and how Pakistan-China would react to such a development that both countries perceived as against their interests. The third section of the chapter would explore how the US containment of China unfolded and how it would impact on South Asia as a region and on Pakistan-China relations.

5.1. EMERGING GLOBAL POLITICAL ORDER IN POST 9/11 ERA

The event of 9/11 was an extraordinary event for the US and the world at large. The global political order that was unilaterally influenced by the US had to contend with multiple powers. The attack on the Twin Towers amounted to undermining and defying the might of the super power. The US was suddenly confronted with new challenges that evoked a massive response with far reaching and detrimental consequences. The war on terror, unleashed in the aftermath of the attack made Afghanistan a perpetual warzone, destroyed the Middle East as a cradle of civilization and Iraq was attacked on the false assumption of latter’s carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The events also led to substantial changes in the global system vis-à-vis political and economic order. This section would therefore, explore the emerging global political order and how rising China supplemented the emerging order. The section would also discuss how the emerging global order and the rise of China together would impact on the South-Asian region and on Pakistan-China relations.

The post-Cold War era followed by the catastrophic 9/11 event gave rise to a relatively insecure world especially when the goal of the new world order had been to achieve
peaceful states, attain economic stability and promote democratic and human rights values.\textsuperscript{562} International system underwent an evolutionary process, by way of which it transformed, from a bipolar world during the Cold War, to unipolar in the post-Cold War era, to multipolar after 9/11 though the international system and the political and economic order continued to evolve to suit the powers of the time. China’s consistent rise in the political, strategic and economic spheres of global politics was an important development. It would also be imperative to explore how various regional and global players had asserted their power to prevail and reorder the international system.

With the inception of nation states in 1648, international politics witnessed multi-polarity until the end of World War Two in 1945. Multipolar system, defined by diplomatic and economic interaction, among different states helped maintain balance of power in the conduct of international system. No single power could dominate and alliances forged among the states were flexible and open to changes. The bipolar international system that emerged after the World War Two was the result of the-Cold War among the two super powers, while the rest of the countries sided with either of the two powers. With the end of the-Cold War, the bipolar international system collapsed and with it the US emerged as the sole unipolar actor. The scholars of International Relations contended that the survival of a unipolar world had always been short, and that the world revert to multi-polarity as competing forces often sought balance of power.\textsuperscript{563}

The transformation of the international system had been a continuous process. Many events that eventually altered the course of history were marked by conflict, innovations, emergence of new ideologies and lately acceleration of process of globalization. The sovereign state system that emerged after the Peace of Westphalia became the basis of the global order that emerged at the end of World War Two and collapse of the colonial system. In due course, the international order and regional institutions became central to

\textsuperscript{562} Michael J. Mazarr et al., “Building a Sustainable International Order” (RAND Corporation, 2016), 2.
the concept of globalization. Chronology of events showed that the international system had been subject to changes. With the dawn of globalization the world was faced with new issues, such as terrorism, climate change, international trade, and commerce. The solutions to these issues required global strategies, which the world had been trying to find ever since. International system therefore, had been a dynamic process, ‘formed, shaped and altered’ by various actors like governments, institutions of the state and non-state actors. The theories of international relations offered theoretical framework to construct and define the international system and explain changes in the order from time to time.

US position in the international system had been reflective of its political, military, diplomatic and economic power. The US kept displaying its power through its intervention in most of the conflicts across the globe. This ascendance gave the US a leverage to frame rules for the global order and get them implemented. In time, the elite and scholars from the US came to relate this exceptional and unrivalled strength with their faith in American values of liberty and free society that they felt should be sustained and replicated the world over. International order that the US dictated was necessarily driven and influenced by the US values. Parallel to reinforcing its values, the US continued to expand its military power to make it difficult for its adversaries to match its military might.

Various world empires such as the Romans, the Spaniards, the Ottoman and the British had in their time of reign, carved the world orders according to their own values and ideologies. As these empires fell, the world lost the power that steered the international system, leaving the global order unhinged and unanchored to any defined system. The fall of empires had shown that to sustain a leading position, the world power needed to keep its economic and political might intact, and its global capacity to do public good. The most powerful state would also be required to attain cohesive supremacy, including

564 Jens-Uwe Wunderlich, Regionalism Globalisation and International Order Europe and Southeast Asia (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 44.
566 Ibid.
hard and soft power, and should have the wisdom to use it objectively for the good of global community. The scholars believed that the US began to lose the power to use its cohesive forces across the globe.\textsuperscript{567} It would be in the light of the historical pattern of the rise and fall of empires and the scholarly investigation into the US military might that the researcher would try to find out which power in the contemporary world would emerge with power to navigate the world order.

In the context of global order, which was dominated by ‘unprecedented and unrestrained power’\textsuperscript{568} of US was now waning. Various other countries had begun to emerge as new powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). BRICS was formed in 2001. In view of their growth indicators, economic potentials and demography, BRICS would have bright prospects.\textsuperscript{569} BRICS was formed with the perspective that capitalism was declining and the re-balanced economic power would benefit mainly Asia particularly these five emerging powers. The economic relevance of BRICS was beyond question but it was impossible for these emerging economic hubs to prosper outside the domain of the western powers.\textsuperscript{570} The decision of the Western economies would continue to affect BRICS and it would be hard for BRICS or states that would strive to expand their political, strategic and economic reach to match the US capability.

Multi-polarity witnessed in the contemporary world was different from the one that existed before. Central to the difference were five variants shaping the new multi-polar world. One, the era of alliances would come to an end, as the emerging powers, in the making of multi-polar world were not likely to form alliances against the West or the proponents of the existing order. Two, interference by key economic powers would be restrictive due to their belief of having common knowledge about how the world should be managed. Three, traditional concept of great power might change and regional powers with no previous global influence might attract attention. The focus would, potentially,

\textsuperscript{567} Robert Kappel, “Global Power Shifts and Challenges for the Global Order” (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2015), 4.
\textsuperscript{569} Dr Morazan Pedro and Knoke Irene, “The Role of BRICS in the Developing World” (Directorate General For External Policies of the Union, 2012), 6.
change from political influence to becoming an economic power. Four, the US would possibly become a part of the multipolar world, and lastly, the competition in the emerging world order would be indiscernible and non-confrontationist.571

In the post 9/11 scenario, China took the world from the perspective of engagement, and participated with other power contenders to form a rationale and fair international order. China was convinced that the world after the Cold War would eventually evolve into multi-polarity. The events, following the post-Cold War era, however, showed that the US while maintaining its super power status, dominated political, strategic and economic spheres. Even though the US dominated world order provided certain economic freedom, peace and stability, the power politics central to this hegemony became the root-cause of much of the turmoil which the world faced.572 Global domination strategy, which the US chose to follow in the aftermath of the Cold War and 9/11 strengthened the belief that the US had hegemonic designs in the world and was indifferent to international laws. This hegemonic inclination earned the US stature of power that was not benign in nature.

The Chinese analysts differed in their views on the international order. One school of thought held that no rational assessment had been done to establish that the world was becoming multi-polar to an extent that the international order could not be ‘changed or reversed,’ it could only be ‘guided and utilized’. The other school of thought, however, contended that the international order was evolving to multi-polarity but it would take another 30 to 50 years for the world to fully transcend into multi-polarity. Therefore, China’s support to multi-polarity could be taken as a ‘moral stance’ and its responsibility to international society.573 China’s international conduct also reflected that China would share with the regions and the world the development dividends. For China, multi-polarity would be helpful to the larger world.

573 Ibid., 28.
With regard to attaining and maintaining the global stature, China and the US emerged as the major competitors in the emerging global order. China’s expansion as a power to reckon with was based on the perception that the global influence of the US was on the decline giving China a leverage to play an important role in the contemporary international system. This argument was strengthened when the US took South Asia low in its priorities after the Cold War ended.\(^{574}\) Later, however, the US reasserted its leadership role by helping China integrate into the global economic system. It was appropriate for the US to remain engaged in the system, create space for China and help reform international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The US also influenced China to play its part in international economic institution.\(^{575}\) The analysts, observed two propositions which the US could follow. Firstly, to prevent the rise of any hegemonic power or any coalition of states that could give rise to collective force. Secondly, the US could maintain the balance of power, so that no power emerged as a single force. However, if China continued on the path of peace and development as their leaders had proclaimed, the US would not hesitate to work with China for meeting collective challenges and interests.\(^{576}\)

With regard to the debate about international order and rise of China, there would be two important propositions to observe. Firstly, it would be seen if the US was willing to accommodate rising China in political, strategic and economic terms. Secondly, it would also be seen if China had the will and capacities to control its nationalist feelings, display military transparency, create positive and a non-controversial global image and increase its soft power impact. To the international relations scholars, the competition between the US and China for a greater role in the international arena could prove potentially dangerous. It was imperative that China and the US to work together for global peace and prosperity. Both the countries shared the opportunity to promote peace, stability, and


\(^{575}\) Ibid., 363.

prosperity in the world.\textsuperscript{577} China’s rise would have to be accommodated in political and economic international system which in all likelihood would be a constructive power in the realm of emerging populism.\textsuperscript{578}

With regard to China’s long standing experience in the international system, it could focus on three strands. Firstly, China could strive to create a balanced multipolar world with restraining effects and under the oversight of the UNSC. Secondly, in rule based interdependent international market, China, which so far had made a meager contribution, could integrate itself into the global economy. And lastly, China could support the idea of a world, which exhibited ‘modern, rational and secular civilizations’. If China adhered to these prepositions, it would benefit in terms of ranking amongst the other respected civilizations.\textsuperscript{579} China and the US had diverse approaches towards international system, but both the countries would prefer to advance their own values in the manner that the US had adopted to shape the world from the lens of its own values.

While China strived to position itself in the regional and global spheres of influence, it paid particular attention to South Asian concerns that related to Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. The noted scholar on China, Andrew Small contended that China would have to play an active role in South Asia. China was mindful of Pakistan’s internal security situation and understood well how Pakistan’s position would be affected after the partial withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan had long standing security ties with China and it had always used diplomatic and economic tools to address foreign policy issues. China pursued goal of having a balanced South Asia and was willing to play a constructive role in addressing other South Asian concerns.\textsuperscript{580} China would always take into consideration the volatility of South Asian region while making policy choices.

\textsuperscript{578} Yuan Jian, Pakistan-China Relations, February 15, 2017.
\textsuperscript{580} Andrew Small, “Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns in South Asia: China’s Role,” \textit{Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)}, 2014, 8.
China’s emergence in the region would reflect political influence, economic growth and military power. China had been proactively pursuing its goals in the regional, political, strategic and economic spheres. On the bilateral and multilateral levels, China was able to make a mark as a beneficial partner, a good neighbour, and as a non-threatening power. China had been able to change its perception amongst its peripheral states, from the one seen as a regional hegemon to one exercising benign power and maintaining a friendly posture. In view of China’s policies, the regional states began to look up to China before making important decisions. In an environment of cooperation and interdependence among the Northeast Asian, Southeast Asian, South Asian, and Central Asian States, China did impact the region as an important actor.\textsuperscript{581}

In the emerging global order post 9/11, China’s rise would be a significant development. In merely two decades after 1978 reforms and opening up, China was at the centre of the international system and with each passing day it attracted global attention. In the regional and global context, China had its eyes set on the world’s resources, investments opportunities, to expand its influence overseas. China used diplomacy, expanded cultural presence, and the principle of market economy for growth and development. By rational standards, China was declared as the second largest economy after the US. It had been predicted that China would outshine the US by 2025 in terms of economy. The world, impacted by China’s regional and global expansion, would appreciate China’s ‘going global,’ manifestation.\textsuperscript{582} This did not happen as a coincidence. It was the result of major policy shift that occurred from December 1978, when at Third Plenary Session of 11\textsuperscript{th} Central Committee, China decided to open itself up to achieve economic and political objectives in regional and global context.

The scholars of International Relations viewed the ‘rising China’ phenomenon from several approaches. For instance, the use of ‘rising China’ expression had increased

\textsuperscript{581} David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” \textit{International Security} 29, no. 3 (2005), 64-65.
tenfold in the academic discourses from 1995 to 2006. In the same period, Chinese academic journal that carried articles on international politics used this expression rising to twenty-seven times. In the post 9/11 era, rising China received more frequency in international relations discourse. China would be referred to as ‘global super power’, and ‘a rising star in the galaxy of great powers’. Some would consider China as the US rival while to others China was at best a regional power.\(^{583}\) Before dwelling on the rise of China, it would be appropriate to deliberate as to what were the foreign policy objectives that China pursued to achieve its political and economic aspirations vis-à-vis the world order.

The rise of China became possible because of four foreign policy objectives, which China adopted in its pursuit of growth and development. Firstly, China’s economic model was based on sustained economic growth with an aim to modernize Chinese financial market. Secondly, China worked extensively on strengthening its social sector, military capabilities and trade volume. Thirdly, China took all possible measures to guard and reinforce its sovereignty. And fourthly, China ensured that it addressed both traditional and non-traditional security threats.\(^{584}\) China was aware that when it would begin to play its role in the international political and economic milieu, it would face challenges of great magnitude both at the regional and global levels.

Given China’s rapid industrialization, urbanization and modernization, it was easy to predict that China would be a major force in the global economy and strategic schemes in 15 to 25 years. China’s economic gain stemmed from its modernization policy and economic gains which out-ranked any expectation that people had pinned on the political leadership or government. If China continued to manage its affairs effectively under the principles of accountability and competency, China would emerge as the single largest force on the world canvas. In the political and governance sphere, unlike the US, China had always emphasized its achieving ‘greater good’ than ‘individual freedom’. China’s

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rise to leadership position would, in all likelihood, realize ‘greater good’ for Asia, Latin America and Africa where China had already started playing a positive and constructive role.\textsuperscript{585}

A pertinent question confronting the US was how to handle a rapidly growing China. The US analysts asserted that the US had to prioritize its policy regarding China, which was undoubtedly a rising power in absolute, as well as, in relative terms. A stable, thriving and accountable China would best serve the US national interests. The analysts such as Denny Roy also contended that the US needed to have a comprehensive China policy that did not seek any reactive modality rather it should come as a piece of strategic wisdom. Rising China was a reality, and all that the US had to do was to plan China policy in a way that it did have order, which was devoid of confrontational strategies.\textsuperscript{586} The US not only had to adjust to the fact of rising China, but also to the unprecedented modernization taking place in China, along with its expanding global reach.

Various scholars had varying opinions on China’s rise. In international relations scholarship, it was debated as to how powerful China would impact on the US and the international system which the US currently dominated. Despite substantial economic cooperation and commonality of strategic objectives between the two countries, their relation had more or less remained frosty. China had always taken the US as its competitor that went a long way in shaping China’s outlook and impacting on its policies. On the other hand, though the US had taken China as a threat to its global stature, but it remained accommodative on the issue of sovereignty or one China and rendering legitimacy to China’s ruling CPC. In the absence of accommodative behaviour on issues central to China’s policy, the confrontation between China and the US would accelerate.\textsuperscript{587}

The leading scholar and international relations theorist John J Mearsheimer asserted that China’s rise would not be peaceful. It was predicted that economically growing China would fall into security competition with the US over share of influence, which could trigger war between the two contenders. Mearsheimer’s argument was based on his theory of international politics in which he stated that mighty states would establish hegemony over the world to ensure that no other contending power dominated the regional and global space attained.\(^{588}\) China would attempt to dominate Asia like the US dominated Western Hemisphere and would maximize power to an extent that no state in Asia could pose a threat to China. That was how China would gain regional supremacy and enable it to address its issues of sovereignty revolving around Taiwan.\(^{589}\) On the surface, as theory of international politics suggested, China appeared to be a benign power but it would not be different from the US when it would come to assert its position as a global power.

The peaceful rise of China would refer to China’s rise as a power in global context without waging any kind of war. Later the expression ‘peaceful rise’ was swapped with ‘peaceful development’ with a view to give a message that there was nothing to fear from China’s rise and China had no design to seek hegemony in the international system. The transition of peaceful rise to peaceful development suggested peaceful rise to development that China would prefer to share with the world.\(^{590}\) The peaceful rise expression became known in the regional and global political spheres after China embarked on ‘reforms and opening up’. When the rising power model was termed as development model, it signified the benign outlook of rising super power.

China’s strategic plans suggested that China would be a medium-level developed country by 2050. Three key challenges China was likely to face: shortage of resources, pollution and lack of social development.\(^{591}\) With a view to address these challenges, China would

\(^{589}\) Ibid., 162.
use three strategies as its future course of action. Firstly, China would take the path of industrialization based on modern technology, fiscal efficiency, low pollution, and optimal allocation of natural resources. Secondly, China would transcend ideological differences for peace, development, and cooperation among the countries of the world. Thirdly, China would build a harmonious society.\footnote{Ibid., 22.} China was fully conscious of competing worldviews of various nations in the world and believed in peace and development as vital for harmonious relations of the world.

Some scholars contended that the rise of China in the global context would not emerge as a challenge to international system. China did not show any intention of following a tough posture. Instead, China changed its domestic policies to become part of the international institution like World Trade Organization (WTO) and changed its domestic discourse from ‘peaceful rise’ to ‘peaceful development’. China contributed in UN’s peace efforts across the globe. With regard to economic overtures, China forged economic ties with nearly all the countries in the world. Failure to maintain this kind of posture would impact on China’s global as well as its domestic position. China’s economic growth had also helped it in strengthening its military might and it would continue to maintain its global position.\footnote{Gunjan Singh, “How Will China Shape the Global and Regional Order?,” \textit{Journal of International and Global Studies} 6, no. 2 (2015): 63.}

China’s relations with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan had never been cordial. All these nations had pursued cohesive relations with the US followed by strong diplomatic and defence ties. This had led to the US military presence in the periphery of China, which was perceived as an effort to contain China’s rise.\footnote{Ibid., 64.} India had also been in a competitive mode with China while maintaining a cordial relation with the US. India could impact China’s regional worldview and had been perceived as the US stooge to hedge China. China had been making an effort to forge warm relations with its neighbours but its territorial disputes with its regional neighbouring countries remained a stumbling block. These misgivings could create China’s friction with its neighbours.
In the post-Cold War period, the world witnessed major structural changes in the international system. The US began to assert its primacy after the dismemberment of the USSR as sole superpower in the world. The 9/11 catastrophe posed a challenge to the supremacy of the world power that pulled the US into a fierce drive against terrorism which had a huge economic cost. In the post 9/11 era, many powers across the globe EU, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Central Asia began to assert themselves in economic terms as well as in regional and global politics. Emergence of many power centres gave strength to the concept of multi-polarity meaning thereby that no single power would dominate the international political, strategic and economic milieu. Multi-polarity would suggest shared values and common goals. Dr Fazal-ur-Rehman, a leading China expert asserted that there were three factor reflecting the contours of shaping global order and they were emergence of multi-polar world, relative decline of the US and China and India emerging as leading economies in foreseeable future.\footnote{Dr. Fazal-ur-Rehman, Pakistan-China Relations, February 14, 2017.}

In the emerging order, among host of rising and asserting powers, China’s rise was a stark reality for the US which would not be comfortable with a competitor having different ideology and value system than the US. China in the multi-polar world would hold an important stature. China’s 1978 reform and opening up gave a remarkable boost to its political and economic outreach. China currently would stand second only to the US in economic strength and in various estimates would surpass the US from 2035 to 2050. Though mere swift economic boost might not fetch China the superpower status however, China by all means would be in a position to spearhead the multi-polarity that was fast becoming a reality. The US too would continue to be a key member of the world community and hold sway in the global decision making as multi-polarity did not mean the waning of the US stature altogether. The US would continue to have same clout with rising powers nonetheless, having greater say in the global decision making.\footnote{Ambassador Khalid Mahmood, Pakistan-China Relations, February 15, 2017.} The multi-polar world would however, be a welcome development for Pakistan-China relations.
5.2. INDIA-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS

This section would explore strategic dimensions of the US-India relations with specific reference to the civil nuclear deal that was outlined in 2001. The section would also discuss the effects of the nuclear deal on the politics of South Asia generally and on Pakistan-China relations particularly. Following its inception in 1947, India could not forge a cordial relation with the US until the end of the Cold War. India’s role in the Non-alignment Movement (NAM) led to difference between both the countries along ideological lines. However, after the Cold War, a new relationship emerged between the US and India in the context of changing regional imperatives. For the US, India being the largest democracy of the world and with 400 million-consumers market had the potential to become its military, strategic and economic partner. India’s interest in the US lied in its ability to redefine, upgrade and overvalue India’s defence power. The US wanted to have its share of political power in Asia where China and India were vying for an influential role in the region.

During the Cold War, India and the US did not get along well with each other. India became the victim of the US ideological and geopolitical disregard. The relations also became a ‘victim of incompatible obsessions’ as they turned out to be friends of each other’s enemies. To India’s dismay, the US supported Pakistan, and was fulfilling the military needs of the newly created country that lacked the wherewithal to raise its military complex. India, on the other hand, collaborated with Soviet Union due Nehru’s socialist agenda. Pakistan had diplomatic advantage over India as it joined SEATO and CENTO in the 1950s while India was spearheading NAM. Since the world was divided in the Eastern (spearheaded by Soviet Union) and Western (spearheaded by the US) blocks, India’s ostensible neutrality for leading NAM created misgivings in the US policy circles.

There were times, however, when India and the US forged strategic ties, such as in 1962 when India and China went to war over the border issue. India reached out to the US for military assistance. The US responded to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s
request by providing military support that included B-47 bombers, fighter aircrafts and air defence systems. This cooperation would be termed more as a symbolic gesture than being substantive because of the differences in outlook towards India between the Pentagon and the US administration, which saw the assistance as a threat to US-Pakistan relations. The disintegration of the Soviet Union with the end of the Cold War provided the US an opportunity to cultivate relations with the South Asian states. This was the beginning of a new relation between the US and India.

In the post 1962 scenario, the US managed its relations with Pakistan and India in the context of regional imperatives. Pakistan was considered an important US ally and India was at logger-head with Pakistan over territorial disputes. In the wake of 1965 India-Pakistan War, the US chose to remain neutral and backed the ceasefire agreement chalked out by the UN. During 1971 war between India and Pakistan, Nixon administration played just an advisory role by asking both the countries to exercise restraint. There was no direct intervention to assist either of the countries. Another hiatus in the warming up of the relations between India and the US was witnessed in 1998 when India carried out five nuclear explosions. The US spearheaded international sanctions against India and demanded a rollback of its nuclear and missile program. It was not until the arrival of George W Bush administration in Washington DC that the US began to mend its relations with India. The Bush administration began to cultivate political, strategic and economic relations with India.

In 1985 a memorandum of understanding was signed on the transfer of technology and a strategic vision was formalized as the Agreed Minute of Defence Cooperation in 1995. This agreement paved the way for the development of the US-India Defence Policy group that further refined the contours of the strategic relations. Before 9/11, the US

Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill acknowledged India was a rising world power and due its stature as a rising power it had an important role in the world polity. He stressed that President George W Bush had adopted a global approach for its relations with India, which was consistent with India’s rise as a global power. This was how the Bush administration paved the way for strategic partnership with India.

China’s expanding influence both at the regional and global level had made it a competitive force for the US to reckon with both at the economic as well as on military front. This led the US to initiate containment of China policy and under this policy India was considered a power that could act as counterweight to China in the region. With this new development, the strategic relation took precedence over all other ties between the US and India. In the meantime, the relation between the US and China became unpleasant and the matter grew worse when the US Navy surveillance plane collided with the Chinese aircraft, that the latter was following, over the Hainan Island, 50 miles South East of China, in 2001. By early 2001, merely three year after the Indian nuclear explosions, the US and India were exploring the options of developing a nuclear policy leading to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The US also committed to build Missile Defence Program that led to a substantial development in the US-India strategic relations. This turnaround in the relations was the result of China’s assertive role in the region.

In due course, in a sharp reversal to the policy of non-proliferation, the Bush administration waived off all military sanctions imposed on India since 1970. The analysts viewed this exceptional engagement of the US with India as an act of countering China’s rise in the region. The US would, however, continue to claim that its growing relations with India had nothing to do with China and that this new tilt was due to the shared values that both the US and India pursued being the largest democracies of the

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world. The critics however, contended that India had always possessed these characteristics then what made the US took a note of it now.\textsuperscript{606} Convergence over the ‘shared values’ eventually culminated into a civil nuclear deal. The India-US deal raised many eyebrows in the region and across the globe. Though Puruesh Chaudhary, a leading futurist termed it based on short-termism having no immediate impact on Pakistan-China relations,\textsuperscript{607} the development on the whole was deplorable for Pakistan. The India-US deal however, created strategic imbalance in South Asia in favour of India.

A couple of factors drove India-US nuclear cooperation. An analyst observed that in the international arena, the notion of balance of power superseded every other consideration including the moral principles. The US viewed China as its rival power, making it therefore appropriate for the US to deter China from challenging the US stature. Other factors behind the US-India nuclear agreement were India’s democratic credentials and its diaspora that made significant efforts to help India attain the nuclear deal that ostensibly appeared impossible.\textsuperscript{608} The nuclear deal would address the realist objectives of both India and the US though there appeared a void of principles when dealing with across the board non-proliferation regime.

The first step towards the defence ties between both the countries was the Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) forged in 2001. Initially, NSSP was focussed on civilian space programme, civil nuclear cooperation, high technology trade and up-gradation of a dialogue process on missile defence. The NSSP agreement made India the only nuclear power that did not fall in the formal US alliance system. However, erring on the side of caution, the US continued its engagement with India without admitting India as a full-fledged nuclear power.\textsuperscript{609} India was accorded this special treatment, because in the US reckoning, it could rely upon India in the region to contain China’s expanding influence. Though China could also indirectly benefit from the India-US deal but India’s growing stature as a result of the deal was a matter of concern for China.

\textsuperscript{607} Puruesh Chaudhary, Pakistan-China Relations, March 14, 2017.
The second phase of the NSSP began on October 21, 2004. A considerable progress was made in three years on cooperation in biotechnology, advanced information technology, defence technology and Nano-technology. Continuing with the cooperation in the strategic realm, a New Framework in India-US Defence Relationship was signed on June 28, 2005. Under the framework, both the countries agreed, among host of other measures, to carryout collective military exercises, strengthen military capabilities to defeat terrorism, increase cooperation for missile defence and promote peace and stability in the region and across the globe. Interestingly, India, cautious of US position in dealing with the issues of war on terror, drew strategic gains from the US.

India-US nuclear agreement took nearly three years to materialize and it was first made public on July 18, 2005. To enter into a nuclear partnership with India, the US had to take the agreement through various procedures and processed before giving it a final shape. On July 26, 2006, US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act was passed that bestowed on the US the power to execute nuclear cooperation with India and give the latter immunity from signing the NPT. On October 1, 2008, the US Senate approved India-US nuclear agreement with an overwhelming majority of 86 against 13 members of the Senate. Finally on October 10, 2008, a 123 Agreement was signed (see Appendix C) between the two countries. The nuclear agreement was not reached unless both the countries achieved certain milestones such as the Indian Nuclear Separation Plan, the Hyde Act, India specific IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and a waiver to India from the Nuclear Supplier Group that permitted India to do ‘nuclear commerce’, a right that was exclusive to the members of the NSG.

The approval of the India-US nuclear deal by the US Senate enabled India to import nuclear technology and fuel from the US. Analysts on India-US nuclear cooperation

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610 Ibid., 22.
612 The US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, titled "Cooperation with Other Nations", falling under Section 123 give out a precondition for nuclear agreement between the US and any other nation. This agreement will be termed as 123 Agreement.
613 Paddock, *India-US Nuclear Deal*.
believed that the deal brought two advantages to India. Firstly, the US that had persuaded India all along to ‘freeze, cap or roll back’ its nuclear programme, had now vowed to assist India to become a major nuclear power. Secondly, having gained the *de facto* identity of a nuclear power, India could make nukes after obtaining nuclear technology and fuel. The unprecedented facilitation and favours offered to India irked the regional as well as global actors who somehow fell in competition with India. In the regional context, a nuclear arms race was likely to flare up and in the global context; the agreement would damage the cause of nuclear non-proliferation.

The Bush administration justified its unprecedented act of granting India the *de facto* nuclear power status, especially when India had declined to be part of the NPT regime and continued to remain firm on its position. In the reckoning of Bush administration, India had a satisfactory and strong non-proliferation record, and that India had pledged to put in place hi-tech IAEA monitoring mechanism. A key official and the former Director General IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, who was in-charge of inspection team that carried out India’s nuclear reactors inspection also favoured the deal and stated that the US-India deal would help bring India closer to the non-proliferation regime.

The deal also drew considerable criticism despite the fact that it was termed as a step in the right direction by the Bush administration and the IAEA. Certain analysts feared that the deal could accelerate nuclear arm race in the South and Southeast Asia because of India’s new found potential to expand its nuclear arsenal, which was already piling up. Many analysts believed that other than negatively impacting the non-proliferation efforts, the agreement could also embolden the countries pursuing nuclear ambitions. The proponents who supported the India-US deal mostly took in to consideration India’s non-proliferation past and its democratic credentials. The fact that India pursued hegemonic designs towards its smaller neighbours and had human rights violation record was overlooked due to geo-economics and geopolitical interests of the US.

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For the nuclear deal to mature, India had to comply with certain pre-requisites. India, among a host of other measures, agreed to permit IAEA inspectors access to civilian nuclear program, vowed to permanently place 14 of its 22 reactors under the safeguards of IAEA. India also committed to sign a protocol allowing intrusive inspections of its civilian nuclear facilities. According to the terms of nuclear partnership, India agreed to continue moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons, reinforce the security of arsenals, to keep from disseminating nuclear technologies and assist in the global non-proliferation efforts. Under these terms, the US companies were permitted to build reactors in India and were allowed to supply fuel for the civilian nuclear program. These were the essential preconditions of the deal, which was concluded between the India and the US.

The non-proliferation activists and experts were the main opponents of the deal. They argued that India had violated its commitment reached with Canada and the US over the peaceful use of nuclear technology by conducting nuclear tests in 1974. Later, it also refused to be a signatory to the NPT and conducted additional tests in 1998. The critics argued that the nuclear deal would provide India with certain concessions not available to five original nuclear weapon states and that India’s policies were inconsistent with UNSC resolution 1172. The critiques also stressed that by giving immunity to India it would be hard to persuade other states to follow non-proliferation criteria or regime. This would, the experts argued, initiate global nuclear arms race and NPT would be rendered incapacitated. Besides, India did violate a nuclear related commitment it made to Canada.

The US-India nuclear agreement definitely fetched advantages for India. The deal allowed India to pursue its political and economic objectives both in the region and at the international level. India began to be recognized as a nuclear power without being a signatory to the NPT. Through the deal, India would be able to meet its energy needs sufficiently and carry out nuclear commerce with the US and other NSG member countries. The deal brought India and the US closer in other fields as well such as

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619 Ibid.
agriculture, business, economic development and joint military exercises. The US-India nuclear agreement, however, did not restrain India from resuming nuclear testing in clear terms. The NSG waiver gave its member countries such as France and Russia an opportunity to invest in the nuclear market of India. That marked the beginning of nuclear commerce that India desired.

The strategic advantages that India drew from this deal were also significant and worth mentioning. Firstly, the agreement gave India the recognition of a major power to be reckoned with in the 21st century, which had an important role to play in the Asian strategic milieu. Secondly, since the US wanted to have India on board in its ambitions to contain China and influence Asian politics, the likelihood to forego control on India’s use of nuclear technology had risen. Thirdly, the deal ended India’s nuclear insolation and three decades long nuclear apartheid. Fourthly, if the world community had at some point, decided to rid the world of nuclear arms, the US-India nuclear deal and the civilian component of the deal had adversely affected that disarmament plan. India in the nuclear deal was set to draw most of the advantages.

India, as already described, was the largest beneficiary of the deal without being a signatory to NPT. The agreement allowed India to receive advanced weapon systems and space technology. The partnership with the US opened up the doors of opportunities for India to attain sustainable development projects form the industrialized West. India’s stature vis-à-vis China was enhanced enabling India to expand its regional and global reach by way of which it could claim its right to have a permanent seat in the UNSC. India-US deal also offered leverage to Indian diaspora to work towards larger Indian interests in the US. The Indian diaspora in the US had already worked hard to get this deal through. It was commonly believed that Indian-Americans were an important factor

behind getting Congress approval for the India-US nuclear agreement. Had it not been for the professionalized Indian, the deal would have become the victim of proponents of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.\footnote{Jason A. Kirk, “Indian-Americans and the US–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?,” \textit{Foreign Policy Analysis} 4, no. 3 (2008): 297.}

With regard to future testing of nuclear weapons, the US Senate rejected the option to cut off supplies to India, if it ever decided to test nuclear weapons, on the plea that this condition did exist in Hyde Act 2006. Ambiguity on the issue of testing nuclear weapon persisted, which could become a point of conflict between India and the US. The US may decide to use the nuclear deal leverage to hedge China, with the possibility that India would not like to be part of any move against China. However, there was no sign that India would oppose any anti-China initiative by the US.\footnote{Hosur, “The Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement What’s the Big Deal? What’s the Big Deal?” , 448.} The deal did, however, affect the Iran-India gas pipeline project. Though India’s relations with Iran had been independent of US influence but because of strains in US-Iran relations over Iran’s nuclear weapon programme, India never showed enough enthusiasm in the gas pipeline project. To some analysts, India might lose space to exercise an autonomous foreign policy or India would have to take into account the US consideration while pursuing its foreign policy objectives. It would be hard for India to go out rightly against the US interests.\footnote{Pillai Rajagopalan, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for India and the Global N-Regime.” 6-7.} India’s options to move freely in the international arenas would shrink with the signing of the civil nuclear deal with the US.

Apart from the political and strategic implications of the deal for India, and its nuclear future, Indian scientists raised concerns over various elements the agreement. They demanded that before finalizing the deal, various concerns should have been addressed for the future of India’s nuclear program. They pointed and raised four key concerns. Firstly, India’s nuclear program or facilities should not be put under international scrutiny. Secondly, India’s indigenous nuclear programme should be placed outside international safeguards. Thirdly, research and development of the nuclear program should continue to be autonomous and lastly, Indian nuclear scientists considered the US-
India nuclear deal a threat to India’s nuclear autonomy and urged Indian parliament to uphold the national interests. The opposition to US-India nuclear deal from different quarters helped address key concerns that were raised during the long negotiation process of the agreement.

The civil nuclear deal took the US-India relations from ‘strategic to strategic plus’. Despite the fact that the deal negatively impacted on non-proliferation regime and affected South Asian strategic stability, the US endorsed the agreement to gain its own strategic advantage. The US had successfully used its nuclear technology to gain its strategic objectives while meeting the challenges of the world, which was fast becoming multipolar in nature. Of all the advantages, the deal enabled the US to confront China, which was fast becoming an overwhelming reality in the context of regional and global emerging order. Nevertheless, the deal would meet five per cent of India’s nuclear energy requirement in 2020, which would be far lesser than any of the major countries depending on relying on such energy. The US, for instance depended on nuclear energy to the tune of 20 per cent of its energy requirement.

Since China’s rise, India had been considered a strategic partner by the US in its pursuance of Asia policy. It expected India to play a central role in Indo-Pacific region with a view to augment peace and stability in the region. All these raised China’s concerns which it expressed when Japan and certain other US allies joined naval exercises with India in 2007. China termed this multinational joint naval exercise as ‘concert of democracies’. The China factor that appeared the post-Cold War period began to turn into a material peril towards late 1990s and the US needed a friend in Asia that could help maintain deterrence and contain China’s outreach in a manner that did not collide with the US interests.

630 Ibid., 14.
Pakistan viewed the US-nuclear deal as posing a threat to the security of the region and as a source of renewed antipathy between Pakistan and India. Pakistan regarded the India-US deal the cause for generating an arms race across the globe where states would strive to attain nuclear weapons at their will. Pakistan demanded equal treatment from the US as was provided to India. China also supported Pakistan’s position by arguing that many states aspired to get nuclear energy the way India did. Pakistan began to convince many states for the acquisition of nuclear fuel and technology claiming that it had stymied the proliferation networks and had reached safeguards agreements with the IAEA with the placement of two of its nuclear power reactors under IAEA scrutiny. Pakistan, however, expected a response based on equality from the US regarding nuclear agreement.

After the US-India agreement, Pakistan strived to measure up to India’s nuclear stocks of weapons. At the domestic level, Pakistan began to increase the production of uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. On the external front, Pakistan demanded an exemption similar to the one granted to India regarding NSG guidelines. Frustrated with the US-India nuclear deal, Pakistan began a nuclear partnership with China though the deal was not as comprehensive as the US-India agreement. Pakistan desired to keep its deterrent forces strong both qualitatively and quantitatively. China supported Pakistan to maintain a credible deterrence to ward off threats from emerging nuclear India. Pakistan-China’s nuclear cooperation gave Pakistan opportunities for the production of fissile material essential to enhance deterrence. India-US nuclear deal helped build stronger Pakistan-China relations and opened avenues for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries.

Though China did not oppose the US-India nuclear deal, the Chinese media took exception to the extraordinary treatment given to India. Chinese media claimed that geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations were the causes behind the deal that might

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entail serious repercussions for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. They argued that a wrong precedent had been set that would encourage the proliferation of nuclear technology. After the deal, China’s signing of a nuclear agreement with Pakistan was referred to as a violation of NSG guidelines by the US. China refuted the claim on grounds that when China joined NSG, no such commitment was made and that after the US-India civil nuclear deal, NSG had no reason to denounce Pakistan-China deal.633

This in fact gave Pakistan-China nuclear cooperation a moral strength.

In the wake of US-India nuclear deal, China pursued its diplomatic moves wisely and flexibly. China was conscious of the emerging geopolitical realities, and adopted accommodative behaviour towards India especially when it came to its ‘role, identity, and opportunities’. China supported India during IAEA meeting and endorsed safeguard agreement, which was purely India centric. China also agreed to endorse the US in its efforts to exempt India from NSG requirements for trading nuclear fuel and technology. Chinese support helped India-US nuclear deal that eventually gave India an access to international nuclear market. China however had been cautious in not leaving Pakistan behind and provided it reactors and related technologies to help it meet its energy needs. China’s flexibility on the India-US deal helped China build two reactors at the Chashma nuclear complex without any uproar in the NSG meeting in June 2010.634

The relations between India and the US suffered a relative stalemate for nearly three decades and it began to make steady progress after the Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War, the US was the only power ordering and reordering the international system. 9/11 marked an important milestone in the international system. The sole superpower was challenged by unconventional power, China that treaded the path of economic growth in the post 1978 reforms began to emerge as a key stakeholder and various powers like European Union (EU), Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa and Central Asia too began to assert themselves in the regional and global milieu. In the post-Cold War era, China’s emergence as a US competitor was a major challenge to the US.

633 Ibid.
The US tried to maintain its political, strategic and economic clout by restraining China from threatening its interests. The US began to initiate an Asia Pacific strategy to squeeze China in East Asia and to forge strategic ties with India that could be a potential China competitor in the region.

The India-US nuclear deal was a strategic manoeuvre in the Chinese periphery that would not only serve India’s strategic interests against Pakistan and China but would also offer an opportunity to the US to contain China’s expansionist designs. The exceptional favours and waivers that were granted to India spoke volumes as to how vital this deal was for the US. IAEA support, NSG waiver and the US official positive nod were huge impediments that were traversed by the proponents of strong nuclear relations of the two countries. Given its adversarial relations with India, the deal did impact on Pakistan. India and China could develop cordial relations in the recent past despite territorial disputes but nuclear deal led to Chinese misgivings on how India-US nexus viewed China in the region. US officials claimed the deal was not an anti-China move and Indian scholars argued that India would not prefer to be identified as China’s adversary. The nuclear deal, however, would help the US contain China and undermine Pakistan strategic position vis-à-vis India. Some China watchers would consider the deal as a ‘blessing’\(^\text{635}\) for Pakistan as the deal opened new prospects of Pakistan-China relations.

5.3. **US CONTAINMENT OF CHINA STRATEGY: IMPACT ON PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS**

This section would explore the containment strategy of the US vis-à-vis China and would discuss Pivot to Asia strategy by the US. This section would also study the impact of containment strategy on South Asia and Pakistan-China relations. The containment was a Cold War strategy that the US used against the Soviet Union after the World War Two. The significant objective of the containment strategy was to block the Soviet expansion and limit communism as an ideology. In the contemporary times, economically growing China posed a potent threat and became rival of to the US in both political and economic

\(^{635}\) Makhdoom Babur, Pakistan-China Relations, February 14, 2017.
spheres. Containment strategy, therefore, necessarily meant that measures would be taken against China to prevent it from expanding its influence in the region or beyond. The US relations with the countries in the periphery of China and Asia Pivot Strategy envisaged by the Obama administration substantially supported the containment strategy though the US officially claimed that there was no containment strategy against China and wanted China to play its role in global political and economic spheres.

With a view to conduct China’s policy, Evan Medeiros suggested a ‘mixed strategy’ that the US needed to follow. The strategy was technically US hedging strategy. The suggested strategy would require the US to follow cooperative and competitive mode simultaneously. There would three components of the mixed strategy such as engagement, institutional binding and security balancing. China’s growing international behaviour would constrain the US from pursuing the mixed strategy which would have two dimensions. Firstly, China accorded significance to stability and prosperity in Asia as well as across the globe and secondly, China’s future course as rising power was unclear. The policy of engagement that the US envisaged would be apt to give an impression that the US did not want to contain China and it was willing to accommodate China’s interests in the region and across the globe.

The expression containment was coined by George F Kennan, a US diplomat in an article that appeared in Foreign Affairs in July 1947 suggesting the use of ‘containment of Russian expansive tendencies’. There was a perspective to commencement of containment as a strategy. Containment, in the beginning became a Soviet centric. It was a US policy that not only stemmed from the US political and economic considerations but also from foreign policy behaviour of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War Two. The containment, soon after the inception took various shapes in the form of various strategies. Until 1950, it underscored military deterrence and rebuilding allies in

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Western Europe in terms of economy and military capabilities. In Korean War, the strategy was to assist fighting on the borders of the free world to contain communism and in Vietnam too, containment was used as a rationale. Though there was a brief pause in late 1970s, but containment was assumed again after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Soviet specific containment came to an end in 1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.639

The theory of containment as advanced by George F Kennan was related to the use of diplomatic and economic measures to contain expanding influence of the Soviet Union, remained misconstrued in essence. In the post war era, the US administration acted in conflicting offering aid to a nation and sent troops to the other to protect a sovereign nation subjected to armed aggression by a state controlled by international communism. Militarism for containment was characterized by examples of wars in Korea and Vietnam. Militarism would trigger confrontation and aggression which was against the spirit of containment that Kennan advanced. Containment to Kennan signified containment through diplomatic and economic measures avoiding militaristic mode.640

The US persistently, sought primacy on its rivals as it first focused on the North American continent, followed by the Western hemisphere and then going across the globe. The US followed the same grand strategy during the Cold War when it confronted communism with a view to protect its primacy over the Soviet Union.641 In the aftermath of US success in the Cold War and subsequent dissolution of containment, the US policy makers began to brainstorm new grand strategy that could address new set of circumstances that the US was faced with. Maintaining the policy of US primacy, the grand strategy focused on preventing the emergence of future global competitor of the US. The US efforts to incorporate China in to the liberal order created new threat for the

US so it was imperative for the US making it necessary for the US to balance China’s upsurge and not to assist its rise.642

The US containment strategy through US grand strategy concerned China. It caused China’s discontentment regarding US global strategy and its China centric components. In China’s calculations, the US was explicit in its containment strategy when it supported the independence of Taiwan, made efforts to neutralize China’s minimum nuclear deterrent and showed intentions to rearm Japan. Though China ruled out any possibility of an alliance with any country with a view to counter the missile threat that the US posed to China, yet it would take appropriate measures not to allow its nuclear deterrent to be weakened. Confrontation might trigger between US and China if in a US bid to contain China rearming of Japan or US-Japan-Taiwan security alliance was formed.643

With a view to deal with the phenomenon of rising China, the US would have three distinct approaches. Firstly, historically frequented approach was option of ‘war’. To deal with erstwhile competitors such as Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, the US used armed conflict as the option.644 The US, however, would find it hard to use the option of war essentially on moral grounds. The second approach that the US could deploy was shaping through transformation for serving the shared ends, meaning thereby, rising China would be induced to endorse values that were advanced by the US. Given China’s political behaviour and different worldview, from that of the US, this too appeared unworkable.645 Third approach would be the manner in which the US dealt with its last competitor, the Soviet Union. With a view to evade great power costly war and uncertainty about whether or not internal transformation was possible, the US sought to use the containment strategy. The containment of China, albeit, would be vastly different from the containment of Soviet communism.646

642 Ibid., 4.
645 Ibid., 28.
646 Ibid., 29.
The leading scholar on China, Andrew Small would not subscribe to the term containment being ‘offensive’. He would assert that using the containment phrase one would restrict China’s capacity to operate in international system. The US officials too continued to publicly decline that it had any such strategy of containment of China but certain moves and initiatives in the periphery of China suggested that the US wanted to restrain China’s expansion or assertions in the region. The US would not only deepen its diplomatic, economic and military relations but would also build alliances with the countries in China’s periphery. The US in the recent past, strengthened its ties with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and forged exceptional ties with India which was given NSG waiver and IAEA favours to buy nuclear energy from other countries besides the US. These initiatives came under the aegis of Pivot to Asia or rebalancing strategy which apparently meant re-balancing of US interests from Europe and Middle East to East Asia though US interests would go beyond merely managing China’s rise. These were certain strategies that would not only assist the US expand its ties with Asia but would help to contain China’s upsurge in the region and subsequently across the globe.

When the containment would be deliberated in light of Pivot Asia strategy or rebalancing would be considered as a means to achieve containment, it would limit the US worldview which according to the official US sources claimed went beyond China. In December 1999, the Clinton administration highlighted its National Security Strategy. The core objectives of the strategy were enhancing security by effective diplomacy with forces ready to fight and win, bolster US economy and promotion of security abroad. These objectives, Derek J Mitchell argued, did not challenge any other nation’s quest for ‘security and prosperity’. 1997 National Military Strategy brought in an approach which referred to the terms Shape, Respond and Prepare Now. The strategy would require the US to Shape the global environment favourable to the US interests and security across the globe. It required US forces to respond, to the full scale with a view to

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647 Andrew Small, Pakistan-China Relations, January 11, 2016.
protect US interests and in order to Shape and Respond the US would have to Prepare Now for indeterminate future. 650

The US sought to promote security, peace, prosperity and stability in the Asia Pacific region. The US had militarily been involved in the region by fighting three major wars in the region during the past century and faced enormous losses in terms of men and material. The US had trade and investment in the East Asian region. 651 The US maintained nearly 100,000 military personnel in line with its national security strategy not only as a deterrent but as a stabilizing factor in the Asian region. Alongside maintaining overseas military presence, the US, since 1950, continued its alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and Philippines and these alliances were source of political, social and economic transition in the region not like the one experienced in the Cold War when the US alliances were used against other powers. 652

The US established bilateral relations with the countries in the region and initiated multilateralism for effective diplomatic communication. Bilateral relation with China was vital as the US believed that durable security would only be possible with China’s constructive contribution. China’s emergence as a stable, thriving and peaceful country would be in the larger interest of not only the US but also of the Asia Pacific nations. 653 The US also stressed to advance multilateralism by engaging official as well as unofficial forum to initiate multilateral security dialogue with a view to increase trust and cooperation. The US worked to promote democratic values such as ‘free speech, transparency and accountability’ without assertively setting up the US model. The US also considered various transnational issues, not necessarily related to military threat such as terrorism, degrading environment, drug trafficking, disasters and more serious concerns such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 654

652 Ibid., 161.
653 Ibid., 162.
654 Ibid., 163-165.
Before deliberating upon Pivot to Asia and various activities taking place in the Asia Pacific region or in China’s periphery, it would be right to dwell on what challenges Asia Pacific region faced and where did China stand in the Asia Pacific security setting. Apart from environmental damage and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, issues of North Korea-South Korea, Taiwan, disputes over islands in South China Sea had the potential to escalate in the region. Of these issues, Korean issue, Taiwan and Nansha island dispute could result in to major crisis.\(^\text{655}\) In the context of Asia Pacific region, China was an important factor. By making remarkable progress in economy, China was rapidly integrating itself into the world community. China was aware of security requirements of the region and focused on the objectives of safeguarding unity national integrity, maintaining peaceful peripheral environment and establishing amicable relations with neighbouring states.\(^\text{656}\) There was China, in view of its objectives was expected to play a role to address the challenges which the pacific region faced.

In 2011, then US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in an article published in *Foreign Policy* stated that after the war in Iraq and drawdown from Afghanistan where the US forces remained committed for more than a decade, the US found itself at a ‘pivot point’. In the next ten years, Hilary Clinton stressed that the US would be systematic as to where to ‘invest time and energy’. This was an essential step to sustain leadership, secure interests and advance values for the US. It would therefore be imperative for the US to focus on the Asia Pacific region.\(^\text{657}\) Following Clinton’s article, a guideline was also issued by the US Department of Defence stating that while continuing with contribution in global security, the US would of necessity rebalance to Asia Pacific region. In view of new strategic directive, the US would divert 60 per cent of its naval assets to the Asia Pacific region by 2020 which were split 50/50 in the Pacific and Atlantic.\(^\text{658}\)

\(^{656}\) Ibid., 66.
After the principle decision on the Asia Pacific region, the US began to take few initiatives that reflected rebalancing strategy of the US. Earmarking of troops for Australia, deploying navy in Singapore, defence cooperation with Philippines, strengthening military presence in East Asia, joining East Asia Summit (EAS), and initiating negotiations on TPP were indicators of the significance of Asia Pacific region in the US calculations. There were four major developments that drove the focus of the US on the Asia pacific region. Firstly, significance of the Asia Pacific region for economic future of the US would grow. Secondly, China’s military capabilities and its assertive maritime behaviour would be enhanced. Thirdly, the US missions in Iraq and Afghanistan would be terminated and finally an effort would be made to reduce federal budget particularly defence budget.659

In Chinese scholarship, no consensus existed on Pivot to Asia. There were conflicting views about concept of return to Asia, rebalancing or Asia Pacific strategy of the US. Three schools of thought emerged on the strategy. The first argued that the rebalancing was not intended to contain China and it was the economic factor due to which the US shifted its focus from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. They argued that it was usual shift of geo-economic and geopolitical preferences. The second school of thought argued that rebalancing was aimed at containing China and it was a reaction to intentions and behaviour of China and the way it was swiftly expanding its influence in the region. Third school argued that the US was attempting to deepen its footprints in the region and for that it needed to build alliances and forge partnerships. The proponents of this school contended that the US never left Asia so its return was not a factual proposition.660

Professor Shen Dingli of Fudan University observed that rebalancing had a perspective of defence-offense. Defensive explanation was that the US would ensure that nothing hurt the US and its allies whereas offense explanation would be that the Asia Pivot strategy was proposed to contain China’s freedom in the region.661 Whatever Pacific watchers

659 Ibid., 20-21.
660 D. Shambaugh, “China as a Global Power: Understanding Beijing’s Competing Identity” (Sigur Centre for Asian Studies, January 2013), 3.
661 Ibid., 4.
thought about the Asia rebalancing, China and the US appeared to be the powers that were in competition in the Asia Pacific. China’s assertiveness in the region was a worrisome aspect for the states on its Pacific periphery. The states in the region fell prey to diplomatic move by the US on pretext of preventing China gain influence in the region and for Chinese scholars that was the rationale to contain China. The US officials, on the contrary, would not subscribe to the containment theme that many Chinese and US scholars approved of, instead term Asia Pivot strategy as a geo-economics and geopolitical compulsion.

In the context of China’s role as a responsible power in Asia Pacific region or elsewhere in the world, China would prefer a stable international environment with China facing no aggressive designs. That would lead China not only to pursue a policy of reforms, opening up and peace but integrate China into the international economic and political system. This would bring China in to the global fold and push China to play the role of a responsible great power.662 A wave of security competition emerged in the wake of US Asia Pacific strategy and China being part of the region desired peace and stability in the region. There were two imperatives pinned to stability in the region. Firstly the balancing of US-China-Japan relations would be paramount with no single country dominating the region and this could be achieved through holding a dialogue and maintaining beneficial relations amongst them. Secondly, China did not seem to compromise on peaceful reunification of Taiwan. The US by providing Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system to Taiwan not only violated a commitment, it made to China but also reassured separatists that with TMD their capacity to foil attack by mainland would enhance.663

The leaders in China responded to the US rebalancing in a measured fashion. Official restraint though reflected the focus on the realization that China’s rise raised concern among Asian nations that considered the rebalancing as polarizing strategy. An uncertainty though existed in Chinese officials about lasting impact of rebalancing or

663 Ibid., 76.
how much the US would remain committed to it.\textsuperscript{664} China’s domestic discourse about Asia Pacific and its foreign policy choices offered diverse outlooks and inclinations and the discourse was advanced by five contending camps. Of these, first was the populist camp which believed that the world would continue to be dominated by the proponents of Western imperialism so taking Maoist path, mobilizing the third world and leading anti-West drive would be the right choice. Closely following the populist camp was the nationalist camp. The nationalists believed that the policies of the US were an impediment for China’s rise and that the US would continue its China marginalization policy. The lens through which nationalists saw the world offered a grim perception of the US.\textsuperscript{665}

Third contending camp was the realist that believed in the ensuing power struggle between China and the US, hence China would have to resort to competition for power. The realists viewed cooperation between the contenders for regional and global influence as a delusion.\textsuperscript{666} The internationalists and liberals camps were towards the right of opposing spectrums. Internationalists would offer a positive effect of aligning with world community and would reassure China to integrate in the global community. They believed that well-being of Chinese people was far more important than attaining the status of being the most powerful state. Liberalist Chinese referred to the lack of democracy as a stumbling block in amicable China-US relations. Democratization they believed would help dispel the stress both the countries were facing. The camp in fact underrated the power complexities and assumed that democracy that ensured shared political values would mean shared interests.\textsuperscript{667}

In the post-Cold War era, China’s unprecedented growth startled the world. In merely two decades of persistent reformation, China not only became a leading Asian economy but began to strive for global stature after having attained the standing of economic power second only to the US. Rising China was a phenomenon that would have regional

\textsuperscript{664} Elizabeth Wishnick, “China and the Two Pivots” (PONARS Eurasia, July 2015), 2.
\textsuperscript{666} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{667} Ibid., 8.
and global implications. The US, realizing marvel of rising China, was restrained from taking anti-China measures to dissuade China from threatening regional and global interests of the US. With a view to maintain primacy, the US would react to China’s regional and global outreach. Though the US officials denied that the US pursued any containment strategy against China but the US moves in East Asia, Central Asia and South Asia presented enough evidences that the US had chosen to have strong presence in these regions to pressurize China.

The US rebalancing or Pivot to Asia strategy, its military presence in East Asia, alliances with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in China’s periphery were steps that would have a deep impact on China’s freedom in the region. The US presence in Afghanistan and strategic nuclear deal with India too supported the US containment arrangements in the region. Many scholars in the US argued that the China policy of the US should necessarily be both containment and engagement as China’s integration in the regional and global political and economic system would be more beneficial than China’s isolation. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and which was termed as an ambitious enterprise or CPEC would likely undermine the containment strategy and Pivot to Asia or rebalancing as it would be bringing in more than sixty countries across the continents. Yet, China would need to maintain a measure of cordiality in the periphery.

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668 Jian, Pakistan-China Relations.
CHAPTER SIX
SURVEY AND DATA ANALYSIS

Survey has been a reliable tool for collecting data for any research work. Interviews and questionnaires being standard practices of carrying out the survey would facilitate the researcher to find answers to the research questions and build central argument. Data collection, in the social sciences would provide the opportunity to secure the related information. The survey would be orderly way to ask people to give information about their ‘opinion or belief’ and success of survey would be largely determined by how the responses matched the reality.\(^\text{669}\) The survey questionnaire was aimed at obtaining the precise responses within the parameters of some scale and the questions addressed various dimensions of the study. Respondents included individuals who had requisite knowledge of the subject, they were responding to. The software SPSS was used to organize, interpret and analyse the data to reach certain conclusions. During the research, a survey was conducted by preparing a survey questionnaire and obtaining responses on a scale. With a view to test research questions and hypothesis, relevant data was fed to the software to get interpretation and analysis.

6.1. RATIONALE FOR THE SURVEY

During the study, a comprehensive literature review and discourse analysis of historical evolution of various dimensions of Pakistan-China relations were carried out. With a view to quantify the analysis of the discourse, a survey was considered appropriate for the study. Since the study was related to bilateral and multilateral relations of Pakistan and China having regional and global dimensions, a careful balance in gender, age, qualification and professional stature of the respondents was kept to attain a balanced opinion of the respondents. A survey questionnaire, therefore, was structured to obtain responses to the queries related to research questions and hypothesis of the research study.

6.2. TYPES OF THE SAMPLES OF THE SURVEY

Of the four types of samples that were used in the survey, gender was the foremost. Gender balance would be paramount in any survey to obtain the views of both the men and women in the society. Gender balance would increase the credibility and any negative imbalance would cast doubt on the validity of the survey. Out of 205 respondents, 61 were females making 29.8% of the total respondents. Age was the second category of the sample and the respondents included were from 20 years of age to 70 years of age to have representations from individuals of most ages. Third kind of sample was educational qualifications. The survey was aimed at having analysis from people with balanced approach with reasonable minimum standard of education. Minimum level of education for respondents was therefore, kept at graduation. Fourth sample was profession and respondents to survey questionnaire were selected from corporate sectors, research scholars, academia, businessmen, government employees and members of civil society.

6.3. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE AND SUMMARY OF THE DATA

Various research indicators addressed in the sample were Pakistan-China bilateral relations in the framework of region, emerging global order and US policy of containment of China with reference to its Pivot to Asia strategy. The survey questionnaire offered focused information to support the research questions and central argument of the study. A set of five questions in the shape of the questionnaire was structured to address all the research questions and a response was sought from individuals having adequate knowledge of the subject. The questionnaire focused on Pakistan-China relations with focus on the US policy of containment of China, US Pivot Asia strategy, emerging global political order, emerging bilateral and multilateral relations of Pakistan and China with India, Afghanistan and Iran and regional and global imperatives of Pakistan-China relations. The format of the survey questionnaire would be attached to the dissertation as Appendix D whereas summary of the data collected through survey would be attached as Appendix E.
6.4. **LIKERT SCALE**

The Likert Scale was a measurement to gauge the opinion of respondents while the survey questionnaire was circulated to the respondents, their response was obtained on the following Likert scale:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.5. **DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY**

SPSS statistical software generated a set of graphs and tables basing on survey questionnaire as below:-

**Graph 6.5.1. The Samples of the Gender Balance**

- Male: 70.2%
- Female: 29.8%
Graph 6.5.1. specified the gender of the respondents who were represented in the sample questionnaire. The male respondents were 144 that came to be 70.2% of the aggregate respondents whereas female representation was 61 respondents which was 29.8% of the total respondents. The male representation was higher than the females and the reasons for low representation were lesser literacy rate among the females compared to males, social constraints and general reluctance of the females to participate in the survey. The gender balance however was encouraging and the formed inclusive data for the survey.

Graph 6.5.2. Sample Representations of the Respondents - Age

Graph 6.5.2. specified the age of the respondents who were represented in the sample questionnaire. There were five categories of age of the respondents representing a certain age group. Five categories related to age included 20-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60 and 61-70.
The respondents to the survey questionnaire were 20.5 %, 20.5 %, 20 %, 19 % and 20 % with individual representation as 42, 42, 41, 39, and 41 respectively. That made nearly equal representation from all the categories of ages that were set for the survey questionnaire.

**Graph 6.5.3. Sample Representations of the Respondents - Qualification**

Graph 6.5.3. specified educational qualifications i.e. BA/BSC, MA/MSC, MPhil and PhD of the respondents who were represented in the sample questionnaire. Minimum qualification considered for the respondents was graduation and maximum education was doctorate. Respondent’s representation came to be BA/BSC (24.9 %), MA/MSC (24.4 %), M Phil (35.6 %) and PhD (15.6%) that numbered in individuals as 51, 50, 73 and 31 respectively. As evident from the respondents, M Phil category of the respondents ranked
at the top whereas 15.6% of respondents held PhD degrees. It manifested the standard of the survey and contribution by respondents who held with such educational credentials signified a meaningful input.

**Graph 6.5.4. Sample Representations of the Respondents - Profession**

![Pie chart showing percentages of respondents by profession]

Graph 6.5.4. referred to the profession of the respondents that were represented in the survey questionnaire. There were five categories of professions of the respondents representing diverse educational backgrounds and professional training. Five categories included government employees, businessmen, academia, students and others. The response to the survey questionnaire came to 19.5%, 24.4%, 23.9%, 19.5% and 12.7% with representation individual coming to 40, 50, 49, 40 and 26 respectively. The response from specific categories mentioned the sample ranged from 19 per cent to 25 per cent.
with businessmen taking the lead though all categories were amply and judiciously represented.

Graph 6.5.5. Response on Question Number One of Sample Survey

Graph 6.5.5. referred to the first question of the survey sample and the question was ‘Do you agree that the US policy of containment of China exists and brings China closer to Pakistan?’ Most respondents fell into the category of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’. The survey substantiated that 64.4 % (132) of respondents agreed and 23.4 % (48) strongly agreed with the statement. 3.4 % (7) respondents strongly disagreed, 5.4 % (11) disagreed whereas 3.4 % (7) remained neutral. The graph clearly indicated that majority of the
respondents were of the view that there was a US policy of containment of China and in the wake of the containment policy, Pakistan-China bilateral relations would enhance.

Graph 6.5.6. Response on Question Number Two of Sample Survey

Graph 6.5.6. referred to the second question of the survey sample and the question was ‘Do you agree that the US Pivot Asia strategy is in the offing and makes Pakistan the most important country for China?’ The responses by most respondents fell into the categories of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’. The survey substantiated that 65.9 % (135) respondents agreed and 21.5 % (44) strongly agreed with the statement. 3.4 % (7) respondents strongly disagreed, 4.9 % (10) disagreed whereas 4.4 % (9) remained neutral. The graph clearly indicated that majority of the respondents were of the view that US Pivot Asia strategy was in the making and if strategy materialized, then Pakistan would become an important country in China’s scheme of things.
Graph 6.5.7. Response on Question Number Three of Sample Survey

Graph 6.5.7. referred to the third question of the survey sample and the question was ‘Do you agree that a significant Pakistan-China nexus covering political, strategic and economic dimensions is in the making in post 9/11 global environment?’ The leading response by most of the respondents fell in to the category of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’. The sample survey substantiated that 67.8 % (139) respondents agreed and 19.5 % (40) strongly agreed with the statement. 3.4 % (7) respondents strongly disagreed, 4.4 % (9) disagreed whereas 4.9 % (10) remained neutral. The graph clearly indicated that majority of the respondents opined about a significant Pakistan-China relations covering political, strategic and economic dimensions was in the in the making in post 9/11 global settings.
Graph 6.5.8. Response on Question Number Four of Sample Survey

Do you agree that in South Asian region, China’s political, strategic and economic policies serve Pakistan’s interests?

- Strongly disagree: 2.4%
- Disagree: 3.9%
- Neutral: 2.4%
- Agree: 19%
- Strongly agree: 72.2%

Graph 6.5.8. referred to the fourth question of the survey sample and the question was ‘Do you agree that in South Asian region, China political, strategic and economic policies serve Pakistan’s interests?’ Most respondents fell into the category of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’. The survey substantiated that 72.2 % (148) respondents agreed and 19 % (39) strongly agreed with the statement. 2.4 % (5) respondents strongly disagreed, 3.9 % (8) disagreed whereas 2.4 % (5) remained neutral. The graph clearly indicated that majority of the respondents were of the view that in South Asian region, China political, strategic and economic policies would serve Pakistan’s interests.’
Graph 6.5.9. referred to the fifth question of the survey sample and the question was ‘Do you agree that the China’s political, strategic and economic interest in India, Afghanistan and Iran have a positive impact on Pakistan-China relations?’ The responses by the most respondents fell into the category of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’. The survey substantiated that 71.7 % (147) respondents agreed and 20 % (41) strongly agreed with the statement. 2 % (4) respondents strongly disagreed, 3.9 % (8) disagreed whereas 2.4 % (5) remained neutral. The graph clearly indicated that majority of the respondents were of the view that China’s political, strategic and economic interests in India, Afghanistan and Iran would have a positive impact on Pakistan-China relations.
Graph 6.5.10. Response on Question Number One on the Basis of Qualification

Graph 6.5.10. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who opined on question number one of the survey. The survey reflected that 7 respondents who strongly disagreed with the question statement represented graduate category. 11 respondents who disagreed with statement represented 3 BA/BSC, 5 MA/MSC and 3 MPhil. Neutral included 1 MA/MSC and 6 MPhil respondents. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 34 BA/BSC, 31 MA/MSC, 49 MPhil and 16 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 7 BA/BSC, 13 MA/MSC, 15 MPhil and 15 PhDs. The graph reflected that majority of the respondents representing category of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ belonged to highly educated categories.
Graph 6.5.11. Response on Question Number Two on the Basis of Qualification

Graph 6.5.11. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who gave their opinion in the question number two of the survey. The survey reflected that 7 respondents who strongly disagreed with the question statement represented the graduate category. 10 respondents who disagreed with the statement represented 3 BA/BSC, 5 MA/MSC and 2 MPhil whereas neutral category included 9 MPhil respondents. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 37 BA/BSC, 32 MA/MSC, 48 MPhil and 18 PhDs and respondents who strongly agreed included 4 BA/BSC, 13 MA/MSC, 14 MPhil and 13 PhDs. The graph reflected that majority of the respondents representing category
of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ belonged to highly educated respondents of the sample survey.

**Graph 6.5.12. Response on Question Number Three on the Basis of Qualification**

![Graph showing the distribution of responses by qualification level.](image)

Graph 6.5.12. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who offered their opinion in the question number three of the sample survey. The survey reflected that 7 respondents who strongly disagreed with the question statement represented graduate category. 9 respondents who disagreed with statement represented 3 BA/BSC, 6 MA/MSC whereas neutral category included 3 MA/MSC and 8 MPhil respondents. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 38 BA/BSC, 31 MA/MSC, 51 MPhil and 18 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 3 BA/BSC, 10 MA/MSC, 14 MPhil and 13 PhDs. The graph reflected that majority of the
respondents representing category of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ were highly educated respondents who offered their opinion.

**Graph 6.5.13. Response on Question Number Four on the Basis of Qualification**

Graph 6.5.13. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who offered their opinion in the question number four of the sample survey. The survey reflected that 5 respondents who strongly disagreed with the question statement represented graduate category. 8 respondents who disagreed with statement represented 5 BA/BSC, 3 MA/MSC whereas neutral categories included 4 MA/MSC and 1 MPhil respondents. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 38 BA/BSC, 34 MA/MSC, 58 MPhil and 19 PhDs while respondents who strongly agreed included 3 BA/BSC, 9 MA/MSC, 14
MPhil and 12 PhDs. The graph reflected that majority representing category of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ were from highly educated respondents.

Graph 6.5.14. Response on Question Number Five on the Basis of Qualification

Graph 6.5.14. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who gave their opinion in the question number five of the sample survey. The survey reflected that 4 respondents who strongly disagreed with the question statement represented graduate category. 8 respondents who disagreed with statement represented 6 BA/BSC, 2 MA/MSC whereas neutral category included 5 MA/MSC respondents. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 37 BA/BSC, 35 MA/MSC, 59 MPhil and 16 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 4 BA/BSC, 8 MA/MSC, 14 MPhil
and 15 PhDs. The graph reflected that majority of the respondents representing category of agree and strongly agree were from highly educated respondents.

Graph 6.5.15. Response on Question Number One on the Basis of Profession

Graph 6.5.15. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in question number one of the sample survey. The survey reflected that response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 7 strongly disagreed, 11 disagreed and 7 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 15 government employees, 50 businessmen, 34 academia and 33 students. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 15 academia, 7 students and 26 others that comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that majority of the respondents
representing leading category of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ came from the categories of businessmen, academia and students.

**Graph 6.5.16. Response on Question Number Two on the Basis of Profession**

Graph 6.5.16. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in the question number two of the sample survey. The survey reflected that response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 7 strongly disagreed, 10 disagreed and 9 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 14 government employees, 50 businessmen, 33 academia and 37 students. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 16 academia, 3 students and 26 others that comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that majority of the respondents representing leading category of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ came from the categories of businessmen, academia and students.
Graph 6.5.17 Response on Question Number Three on the Basis of Profession

Graph 6.5.17 referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in the question number three of the sample survey. The survey reflected that response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 7 strongly disagreed, 9 disagreed and 10 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 14 government employees, 50 businessmen, 32 academia and 40 students and 2 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 17 academia and 24 others that comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that majority of the respondents representing leading category of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ came from the categories of businessmen, academia and students.
Graph 6.5.18. Response on Question Number Four on the Basis of Profession

Graph 6.5.18. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in question number four of the sample survey. The survey reflected that response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 6 strongly disagreed, 8 disagreed and 6 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 20 government employees, 50 businessmen, 34 academia and 40 students and 3 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 15 academia and 23 others that comprised the miscellaneous respondent’s category. The graph reflected that majority of the respondents representing leading category of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ came from the categories of businessmen, students and academia.
Graph 6.5.19. Response on Question Number Five on the Basis of Profession

Do you agree the China’s political, strategic and economic interest in India, Afghanistan and Iran have a positive impact on Pakistan-China relations?

Graph 6.5.19. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in the question number five of the sample survey. The survey reflected that response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 6 strongly disagreed, 8 disagreed and 6 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 20 government employees, 50 businessmen, 34 academia, 38 students and 3 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 15 academia, 2 students and 23 others that comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that majority of the respondents representing leading category of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ came from the categories of businessmen, students and academia.
With a view to obtain a viewpoint on various dimensions of Pakistan-China relations and quantify the opinion of the respondents, the survey and data analysis was carried out. Five simple questions related to various aspects of the relations were made part of the sample survey questionnaire. Since the discourse was based on intellectual and academic input so an efforts was made to select categories of respondents who not only had requisite formal education but also had firsthand information and knowledge of various aspects of Pakistan-China relations. The sample size was 205 selected from scholars of international relations, researchers, analysts, government official student, businessmen and certain members of civil society to obtain information that was reliable and authentic. Considerable number of MPhils and PhDs taking part in the survey added to the reliability of information and balanced viewpoint.

The survey questionnaire focused on the nature of Pakistan-China relations and its future dimensions and the issues that had deep impact on Pakistan-China Relations. The major issues faced by Pakistan and China were emphasized in the sample survey. In the context of regional imperatives, Pakistan-China bilateral and multilateral relations with Iran, India and Afghanistan vis-à-vis China’s political, strategic and economic interests and its impact on Pakistan-China relations was a vital issue. In the global context, the US policy of containment of China and Pivot to Asia policy and post 9/11 global political order too were significant developments. The considerable majority of the respondents admitted the fact that Pakistan-China relations did have regional and global imperatives and agreed that these developments would have positive implications for bilateral Pakistan-China relations thereby endorsing the central argument of the dissertation.
CONCLUSION

The rationale of this study was founded on the questions raised about the genesis of Pakistan-China relations in the post-Cold War period and evolving regional and global implications of these relations. Regional implications in question stemmed from Pakistan-China’s bilateral and multi-lateral ties with countries such as Iran, Afghanistan and India whereas global implications related to certain selected issues such as the emerging global order, India-US strategic partnership and China-US competition in the Asia-Pacific vis-à-vis US containment of China strategy. Central argument formulated on the basis of pertinent research questions required the study to stress the developments concurrently taking place with regard to regional and global imperatives. Conclusion of the dissertation, therefore, focused the study in parts and as a whole with a view to address relevant areas deliberated in the course of study.

It would be important to mention two limitations, the researcher faced during the course of the study. Firstly, interviews being important qualitative tool have helped to a certain extent in formulating the correct and wider perspective of the issue. The researcher interviewed scholars hailing from the United States, United Kingdom, China and Pakistan but not from India, Afghanistan and Iran which could have helped cover varied viewpoints in the context of regional politics. The fact that most scholars interviewed were from Pakistan did raise the possibility of partiality, though the researcher has tried to abide by the ethics of research and objectivity. Secondly, the purpose of data collection and literature review was to review literature originating from the countries being the focus of research. Though a balance was maintained in reviewing literature from Pakistan, China, India and the US, literature from China, however, posed a language barrier.

The bilateral or multilateral relations of states in international politics were analysed both from the realist perspective and from the perspective of complex interdependence. Pakistan-China relations were analysed by employing two contending paradigms of international relations theories i.e. realism and complex interdependence. Various assumptions were referred to as explanations to establish the link between the abstract
realm of theory and real domain of policy pursued by both the countries. In the context of all-encompassing economic cooperation that included energy, infrastructure and trade, Pakistan and China have become increasingly interdependent over a period of time. This cooperation and interdependence was reflected in linkages that were established between the two countries in the last five decades on multiple channels such as government and private sectors, non-government elites, banks and business organizations. Within this context, a Pakistan-China bilateral relation, the paradigms of complex interdependence was quite relevant and best described the ties between Pakistan and China.

In the realist perspective, one might add here, military security had dominated all the state objectives and the world at large would continue to remain a hostage to power driven security dimension of international politics. From the realist perspective, the states would initiate a security competition to attain power to enhance their stature in international politics. Significantly, Pakistan and China confronted different set of circumstances in the regional as well as international politics as both the countries had diverse security challenges. Being an emerging regional and global power, China faced security concerns in East Asia and South Asia resulting from international security competition aimed at restraining China’s expansionist design. Pakistan too had security imperatives vis-à-vis India over the unresolved territorial disputes. Theoretical framework therefore, addressed bilateral relations by elements of complex interdependence whereas realism explained ‘Pakistan-China ties’ in view of their security concerns in their respective security spheres but not directed at each other. Interdependence had been the outcome of economic necessity and realism had been the consequence of strategic necessity in Pakistan-China relations.

Pakistan-China diplomatic relations began in 1949 and endured through various global, regional and domestic developments. The relations between the two countries saw three distinct phases of historical evolution. The first phase referred to the Cold War era in which Pakistan-China relations were initially marked with aversion and reluctance on account of ideological underpinnings but subsequently moved towards reconciliation and cordiality. In the second phase which began after the Cold War, Pakistan and China
developed deep rooted friendship. It was an era that witnessed the rise of China as an economic giant and the world tried to adjust to the reality of the US primacy after the disintegration of Soviet Union. The third phase began after 9/11 when China was well on its way to assert its position as a regional and global stakeholder and the US in its global war against terrorism stepped into Afghanistan that had implications for South Asia as well as for East Asia.

During the Cold War era, the super power rivalry took place between the two global powers in the geographical proximity of Pakistan and China. With a view to address its security concerns, Pakistan chose to be part of the US backed alliances such as SEATO and CENTO alienating the Soviet Union. China too, had reservations about Pakistan’s choices with regard to alliances and foreign policy initiatives. India opted to remain non-aligned in the times when states were joining either of the two power centres that enjoyed global reach and influence. India also came close to China during this period. China decided to lean on the Soviet Union in the Cold War political setting, when the US was looking for the support of states in order to combat the expansionist designs of communist Soviet Union.

Pakistan and China were not only influenced by global and regional changes but also by domestic events and challenges which shaped their behaviour pattern. In case of Pakistan, 1965 India-Pakistan war, 1971 war and subsequent dismemberment of Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role to combat it were the events that deeply impacted on Pakistan as a state. Likewise, the 1949 revolution and CPC taking control, great leap forward, cultural revolution, 1978 reforms and opening up, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Tiananmen Square episode were developments that shaped China’s as a state. However, two factors almost consistently kept Pakistan preoccupied. Firstly, Pakistan was engrossed with Indian hostility over territorial disputes including Kashmir and both the countries were finding it hard to come out of the spiral of animosity. Secondly, Pakistan’s geopolitical position continued to keep Pakistan engaged with the US, first in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in 1980s and later in the US war on terror in the post 9/11 period.
There was a shift in the regional and global political alignments towards the end of the Cold War. The US began to exercise leverage as the sole superpower after the disintegration of Soviet Union across the globe. China in the meantime, with its economic reforms and opening up agenda, began to expand its regional and global influence. India began to realign and lean towards the US after the Soviet disintegration and projected it as huge market and largest democracy. Pakistan, which had worked and engaged with the US for nearly a decade in dealing with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, faced US displeasure on being keen on acquiring nuclear weapons. In the given situation where the US began to distance from Pakistan, both Pakistan and China became rational allies in political, strategic and economic terms.

9/11 transformed the regional and global political milieu of the world. In the post 9/11 era, Pakistan yet again became an important ally that the US began to depend on, in its global war on terror. China had misgivings over the US presence in its immediate neighbourhood and Pakistan became a key ally in the US war. Pakistan somehow, could assure China that its alliance with the US was a sort of compulsion under the circumstances and it had nothing to do with China and that Pakistan’s closeness with the US would not in any case affect Pakistan-China relations. Pakistan-US cordiality however, was neither a welcome development for India nor it could curtail India’s hegemonic ambition in the region. In the post 9/11 period, Pakistan and China continued to have amicable political relations as many state level leadership exchange of visits took place to ink agreements and take the political, strategic and economic relations further.

China had supported to Pakistan during its wars with India. After the 1971 debacle that had dismembered the country, China provided all possible support and helped Pakistan become self-sufficient in military capabilities with a view to thwart any future eventuality. China supported Pakistan in attaining material, expertise and technology to realize its objectives of acquisition of nuclear energy. China’s strategic support to Pakistan and consequent defence cooperation with its armed forces was driven by China’s need to neutralise the effects of Indian ambition of expanding its influence.
Pakistan and China signed nuclear comprehensive agreement in 1986 and during their visit to Pakistan, Prime Minister Li-Peng in 1989 and President Jiang Zemin in 1996, assured Pakistan of cooperation in the development of nuclear power plants to meet Pakistan’s energy needs. China has not only been supplying military hardware to Pakistan since 1964 but also helped build various factories in Pakistan to indigenize its defence facilities.

Pakistan-China economic relations included trade, investment, energy and infrastructure development. The CPEC, termed as a game changer would take the economic relations between the two countries to a new high as an enormous amount of $ 50 billion in investment would flow and more was likely to follow considerably. Apart from connectivity from China’s province of Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar port, the biggest advantage that Pakistan would gain from this relation was the energy projects planned to be built in different areas of Pakistan. Economic outlook of Pakistan would change with this investment. With regard to trade, the volume between Pakistan and China has increased by 18.2 per cent during the fiscal year 2014-15. It reflected the mutual benefits both countries have begun to reap from trade relations.

In terms of political, strategic, economic stature that China had attained over a period of time, China would aspire to become a regional as well as a global power. China began to assert its political and economic influence across the region by carrying out successful economic reforms at home forging strategic and economic cooperation with countries in its periphery. China chose the use of soft power and that would reflect its benign image in its diplomatic relations. Though it still had unsettled territorial disputes with India and countries in its South and East, but it carried on with trade and economic ties by temporarily shelving the differences with them. China’s outreach would connect the continents when its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative would be realized. The regional countries, in their interests, would prefer to connect with China’s mega initiatives. This would place China in higher pedestal in the region.

Pakistan, though a nuclear power, had been passing through difficult phases of its existence due to terrorism, political instability, lack of governance and economic
difficulties. By having strained relations with India due to territorial disputes, unfriendly Afghanistan and inimical Iran, Pakistan did not enjoy a comfortable position in the regional settings. In this scenario, Pakistan-China relations with huge political, strategic and economic dividends would provide a great opportunity to explore. All-encompassing relations with China would place Pakistan in a comfortable position particularly when Pakistan exercised a leverage of CPEC and Gwadar Port and it could use it to address its issues related to energy, trade and infrastructure. Pakistan-China comprehensive cooperation would potentially address Pakistan’s multifarious problems and that would expectedly give Pakistan leverage in asserting its position in the regional political settings.

China’s relations with Afghanistan began to consolidate since the end of Cold War and marred after 9/11 when the US overthrew the Taliban government in its GWOT. China remained a reluctant partner of Afghanistan because of the substantial presence of NATO forces spearheaded by the US. With the US announcement of drawdown, China invested heavily in businesses as well as in infrastructural development to bring economic stability augmenting peace and development in Afghanistan. In the regional context, China had been playing an important part in persuading the regional countries to play their part in getting peace back to Afghanistan. China’s desire to have a peaceful Afghanistan would lie in its strategic and economic interest revolving around the BRI. Peace and stability in Afghanistan would not only supplement China’s desire for peace in its periphery but also in the Western China’s Xinjiang province bordering Afghanistan.

China’s relations with India improved since the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that both the countries had gone to war in 1962 on border issues, that exposed India’s military vulnerability vis-à-vis China, the fallouts of the war were never allowed to overshadow the mutual interests of both the countries revolving around trade and economy. Despite China’s reservations over border disputes with India, continuous surge in bilateral trade between China and India had continued and it was expected to rise from $ 52.14 billion in 2016 to $ 65 billion in 2017. Being enormously interested in significant consumer market in India, China would continue to shelve its territorial disputes with India and
focus on trade and economic growth though China might never want India to expand its political clout beyond what could pose a threat to China’s regional aspirations.

China desired to cultivate strong relationship with the Middle East, not only to fulfil its energy needs, since more than half of which were provided by the Middle Eastern countries, but to keep its Belt and Road Initiative from getting eclipsed by sectarian and religious rivalries surrounding Saudi-Iran and Iran-Israel confrontationist relations. China was instrumental in getting the nuclear settlement consummated between Iran and the P5+1 states, bringing Iran out of detrimental impact of decades-old sanctions. China had invested extensively in the development of Iranian nuclear and missile program. Of late, in the wake of economic relations which took centre stage in the Chinese foreign policy towards Iran, China had invested billions of dollars in Iran’s energy market to ensure steady stream of Iranian oil to the Chinese market. China would prefer a politically and economically stable Iran promising peace in its periphery.

China’s relations with Pakistan had flourished over the decades from being neighbours to all-weather friends whose ties were built on mutual trust and cooperation. In the context of region, Pakistan had supported China’s position on matters of its national interests including One China policy and vice versa. China helped Pakistan build its conventional defence munitions factories and supported missile and nuclear program. Economically, CPEC gave a new dimension to the relations between both the countries as CPEC would give China an alternate route to outside world for connectivity and provide Pakistan a unique opportunity to accelerate its economic development. China would wish to have a prosperous and politically stable Pakistan adjoining its western province of Xinjiang for which China would continue to support Pakistan. China would also require Pakistan to check India and challenge any enhancement in its regional influence that could threaten China’s interests in the region.

Pakistan’s relations with India were subjected to a flawed diplomacy. Both the countries did not deem it proper to shelve their thorny issues temporarily and give peace a fair chance. Since their inception, both the countries have been on confrontationist mode
which not only held sway their governments but also created an environment that led to hostile public mood. The relations thus could best be described as hostile and acrimonious. The unresolved issue of Kashmir was the most daunting bilateral dilemma that had left both the countries in a state of limbo. India had been adamant to resolve the Kashmir issue in complete disregard of the UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite in the valley. Unlike China, India and Pakistan had not been able to keep political issues from affecting the greater economic relations. China partially shared with Pakistan’s India centric perspective and India-Pakistan rapprochement might take place only if both the countries changed their position on the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and Iran had been marked by impulsive diplomacy during the last couple of decades. Pakistan’s cordiality with Afghanistan was short lived during the Taliban regime when the Taliban leadership longed for legitimacy for the regime and it was subjected to world-wide criticism due to its repressive policies. In the wake of 9/11, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan became sour and from then onwards, the successive Afghan regime blamed Pakistan for fomenting terrorism in Afghanistan. Iran too had accused Pakistan for stirring the Shia-Sunni divide to please the Saudis. Pakistan, on the other hand had blamed both Afghanistan and Iran for destabilizing FATA and Balochistan especially after the initiation of CPEC project. Pakistan was also wary of growing Indian influence in Afghanistan and Iran. Pakistan would require forging cordial relations with both Afghanistan and Iran by initiating proactive diplomacy, addressing concerns of both the countries and candidly pursuing the shared values and working for attaining common interests.

In the post 9/11 scenario, India had developed friendly relations with Afghanistan and made substantial investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The nexus of both the countries would be expected to fetch India strategic as well as economic advantage as India would continue to stress Pakistan’s security apparatus on its western border and would have access through Afghanistan to the Central Asian states. Similarly India’s relations with Iran would potentially connect India with the Persian Gulf. India also had shown reservations on the CPEC and used a hostile tone to paint the project as an
undesirable initiative in the Pakistani context. Diplomatically better positioned India would not only use its leverage with Afghanistan and Iran and continue to undermine Pakistan’s security in the region, but would also continue to reap economic benefits from China while remaining competitor for regional influence.

China’s regional behaviour was calculated and benign and it would seek power and assert influence by not treading a confrontational path like rising powers usually do. China would resort to conciliation and peace with the countries in its periphery to forge economic corporation and share development. Though China did have issues with many states in East Asia and South Asia but that never became an impediment for China to initiate economic cooperation with those states. On the contrary, Pakistan faced precarious situation owing to terrorism, political instability, governance issues and economic downturn and suffered strained relations with its neighbours such as Afghanistan, Iran and India. In this scenario, Pakistan’s friendly ties with China would be an asset. Pakistan could make good use of China’s political and economic leverage in the region and forge ties with the regional countries. Positive engagement with these countries would pay dividends of peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

The global implications of Pakistan-China relations seemed to focus on three developments: emerging international order, India-US nuclear deal and the US strategy to contain China. The international order came to be multi-polar with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It marked the beginning of national self-determination and coexistence of sovereign states and continued till the end World War Two. Bipolarity became the order of global governance in the post war era when the US and Soviet Union were pulled into the Cold War complexities. In the post-Cold War era, the world became unipolar with the US becoming sole superpower calling the shots across the globe. In the aftermath of the event of 9/11, international order again tilted towards multi-polar global order when BRICS and EU as entities and China, India and Russia as states began to assert political as well as economic influence besides the US. The world had historically remained multipolar most of the time with brief intermissions of unipolarity. The international order was likely to become more multi-polar with the emergence of
countries strong in political, strategic and economic terms and flourishing of powerful regional entities and coalitions.

In the emerging order, rising China became a stark reality for the US which would be least comfortable with a competitor like China with ideology and value system poles apart from that of the US. In the multi-polar world, China would has emerged as an important stakeholder. Its 1978 reforms and opening up gave a remarkable boost to its political and economic outreach. China became the second largest economy after the US and according to some estimates would surpass the US anytime between 2035 and 2050. Though mere swift economic boost might not fetch China the superpower status the US enjoyed but China by all means would be in a position to spearhead the multi-polar world that was fast becoming a reality. The US too would continue to be a key member of world community and hold sway the global decision making as multi-polarity did not mean the waning of US stature altogether. In terms of international politics, strategic leverage, economic cooperation, the multi-polar world would be a welcome development for Pakistan-China relations.

The India-US nuclear deal was a strategic manoeuvre in the immediate Chinese strategic environment that not only served the India’s strategic interests against Pakistan and China but would also offer an opportunity to the US to keep a check on China’s expanding influence. As such, India was granted exceptional favours and waivers which showed how vital this deal was for the US. IAEA support, NSG waiver and the US official backing were managed by the proponents of nuclear relations between India and the US. The India’s nuclear deal did impact on Pakistan as India’s neighbour and a nuclear weapon state with a history of acrimonious confrontation with India. India and China could develop cordial relations in the recent past despite territorial disputes but India-US nuclear deal led to Chinese misgivings on how India-US nexus viewed China in the region. US officials claimed the deal was not an anti-China move and Indian scholars argued that India would not prefer to be identified as China’s adversary. The nuclear deal however would help the US contain China and undermine Pakistan strategic position vis-
à-vis India. The deal would however, open new prospects for Pakistan-China political, strategic and economic relations.

In the post-Cold War era, China’s exceptional growth was phenomenal development. In merely two decades of persistent reformation, China not only became a leading Asian economy but began to strive for global stature after having attained the standing of second largest economy. Rising China was a development that would have regional imperatives and global effects. Taking note of the marvel of rising China, the US had restrained itself from taking measures to dissuade China from threatening regional and global interests of the US. However, with a view to maintain primacy, the US had also been reacting to China’s regional and global outreach. Though the US officials denied the pursuance of a containment strategy against China, the US moves in East Asia, Central Asia and South Asia suggested that the US had opted to have a strong presence in these regions to pressurize China.

The US rebalancing or Pivot to Asia strategy, military presence in East Asia and strengthening alliance with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in China’s periphery were steps that would deeply impact on China’s freedom in the region. The US presence in Afghanistan and strategic nuclear deal with India too were the measures that supported the US containment arrangements in the region. Many scholars in the US argued that its China policy should necessarily be based on both containment and engagement as China’s integration in regional and global political and economic system would be more beneficial for the US than its isolation. China’s Belt and Road Initiative which was termed as an ambitious enterprise by China was likely to undermine the containment strategy and Pivot to Asia strategy or rebalancing as it would be bringing in more than sixty countries across the continents. But still China would need to have a measure of cordiality in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond.

In the context of expanding influence in the South Asian region, China and India have emerged as competitors. China forged cordial political, strategic and economic relations with Pakistan, developed friendly ties with Afghanistan and amicable relations with Iran.
Its primary focus would be to promote and maintain peace and stability in the periphery to realize its economic and development objectives. The fact that China shelved its territorial disputes with India demonstrated that China’s intention was to engage with regional nations despite having territorial disputes with them. This policy would convey that China kept its economic interests ahead of its political differences. On its part, India too forged cordial relations with Afghanistan and Iran while the relations had all three political, strategic and economic dimensions. India would also choose to advance its economic interests with China and avoid having confrontationist approach. India’s relations with Pakistan however, would continue to remain hostage to hostility and acrimony over the unresolved territorial disputes leading to continuing distrust.

While India and China had an economic rationale for engagement in terms of economy and trade opportunity that both the countries were offering each other, there were reasons to believe that for claiming space for a regional power, the competition between the two countries was also real. In the context of realism, China would endeavour to engage with India until its economic interests were served and China would undeniably begin to contain India if it threatened China’s regional interests. India perceived two threats to its hegemony in the region. Firstly, China that India pointed to as a reason for conducting its 1998 nuclear tests and secondly Pakistan that became a nuclear armed state in the same year and continued to challenge India’s hegemonic ambitions in the region. The competitive nature of relations would remain dominant if the states would view the relationship from the prism of their interests. Engagement would work if states would prefer to collaborate on the basis of interdependence and in the framework of mutual cooperation.

Pakistan-China relations turned out to be remarkably cordial and cooperative. China supported Pakistan in all its diplomatic initiatives, provided strategic support by helping build conventional and non-conventional defence facilities and offered unparalleled economic incentives in different sectors including the areas of trade, energy and infrastructure. China enhanced its stakes in Pakistan manifold and that reflected China’s India centricity. The rivalry between India and Pakistan would put the security of the
entire region in jeopardy and at the moment no letup could be expected. In the realist calculations, this rivalry would serve China’s interests in a competitive mode with India as Pakistan could be a ploy to contain India. This conflict, however, would be counter-productive for China’s required peace in the periphery. In both the aforementioned scenarios, Pakistan-China relations would become even more amicable.

In the global context, there were developments, as discussed in the study which had deep impact on China’s international politics and Pakistan-China relations. Major developments or variable were emerging international order, India-US nuclear deal and US strategy of containment of China. These developments had shaped the global politics in the post-Cold War era generally and in the post 9/11 era particularly. In the post 9/11 era, the US kept engaged in a war that not only stretched the US strategic reach too far off but also drained its economic resources. The post 9/11 era was marked by the rise of China and various other nations and put in motion a multipolar system where no single nation would dominate. EU and BRICS as entities has been exercising influence and countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as states began to make a mark. Since the world had historically been a multipolar entity and uni-polarity came to stay for a brief period so multi-polarity was likely to return. But in no way, rising China or rising nations would imply the diminishing power of the US. In the multipolar world order, the US would continue to be a key stakeholder and remain an important part of global decision making.

After 1998 nuclear tests, a sanction regime was imposed on India and Pakistan. Soon after these nuclear explosions, India and the US began nuclear talks that subsequently fetched a remarkable nuclear package for India. With the kind of status India had in the nuclear world, it was hard for India to get the deal through but the US support helped India to get rid the impediments. The policy and diplomatic circles in Pakistan and China became concerned about the deal. China’s scholarship raised concerns with regard to US intentions to contain China and the deal was considered to be aligned with this notion. The deal not only got India a global standing in the nuclear realm but also strengthened its position as China’s regional competitor. Pakistan, which was a close ally of the US in
the war against terror and long-time adversary of India, felt left out. Apart from the concerns shown by Pakistan and China, the world at large felt that the US discriminating behaviour could stir nuclear arms race across the globe. The India-US nuclear agreement further strengthened Pakistan-China nuclear relationship.

China’s rise seemed to have triggered two kinds of responses from across the world and the US: engagement and containment. The countries wishing to positively engage with China would prefer to benefit from the economic riches that China has accumulated over a period of time having no threat to their political or strategic interests. However, the countries wishing to contain China would anticipate a threat to their political and strategic interests and formulate their policies accordingly. The US officials and scholars contended that the US preferred to engage with China rather than confront or contain the latter as China’s rise, in their view, ran contrary to US interests in the region and across the globe. Without openly referring to containment strategy, the US did carryout certain initiatives that suggested the framework of US containment of China strategy as alliances with the countries in China’s periphery, India-US nuclear deal and US military presence around China were at the centre of US China policy. This too would help build greater Pakistan-China relations as Pakistan never formed part of China’s containment ring in the region.

The objectives of this study were to understand regional and global implications of Pakistan-China relations focusing on political, strategic and economic dimensions. The study has deliberated over imperatives of regional factors such as Pakistan’s and China’s India centricity, emerging ties among Pakistan-China-India-Iran and Afghanistan and multilateral imperatives of the region and global implications like emerging international order, India-US nuclear deal and US containment of China strategy. An obvious response would be to initiate peace and reconciliation mechanism to attain peace and stability in the region and connect the region for economic dividends and collective good. Likewise, global implication would be to evade political and strategic confrontation and begin a process of positive engagement. The confrontation would mean friction and instability whereas engagement would mean peace and stability. Bilateral and multilateral
engagement by regional and international stakeholders was the way forward if the world had to be a peaceful place for all across the board.

Nevertheless, the present study has deliberated upon the important areas of collaboration and concerns relating to Pakistan-China ties. It was clear that relations between the two countries had solid foundations and these relations had flourished despite a number of regional and global events with the potentials to rock these remarkably significant ties. It could be concluded with a degree of confidence that these ties would continue to flourish in various areas and remain solid and mutually beneficial despite the pressure of emerging regional and global developments. This would be possible as Pakistan and China had clear understanding of their ties and discern the significance of relations in the regional and global policy, planning and execution framework. As both the countries were determined to safeguard their historically fraternal ties, they would be expected to confidently deal with storms, setbacks and challenges and jointly move forward.

The present doctoral dissertation has endeavoured to address important aspects outlined in the objectives of research project. However, certain aspects could not be covered in the dissertation. As a matter of fact, there were areas that the researcher would have deliberated upon profoundly but it would have been at the cost of drifting away from the focus of the research and secondly, certain areas were of such significance that they could be taken up as a separate project. In the context of regional and global implications of Pakistan-China relations, some of the substantially vital areas would be recommended for comprehensive study and future research. The future recommendations would include Iran’s prospects of joining CPEC, Pakistan as a factor in India-China relations, position of major powers on CPEC, prospects of South Asian regional connectivity, Pakistan-China-India colliding interests in the region and Pakistan’s policy to balance between China and the US.
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MAP 1: CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR ROAD ALIGNMENT
MAP 2: CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR SPACE LAYOUT

中巴经济走廊空间布局图
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Space Layout
MAP 3: BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE SIX ECONOMIC CORRIDORS
THE BOUNDARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHINA AND PAKISTAN, 1963

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Pakistan; Having agreed, with a view to ensuring to prevailing peace and tranquillity on the border, to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan, in a spirit of fairness, reasonableness, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, and on the basis of the ten principles as enunciated in the Bandung conference; Being convinced that this would not only give full expression to the desire of the peoples of China and Pakistan for the development of good neighbourly and friendly relations, but also help safeguard Asian and world peace. Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present agreement and have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries the following: For the Government of the People's Republic of China; Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs; For the Government of Pakistan; Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of External Affairs; Who, having mutually examined their full powers and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1

In view of the fact that the boundary between China's Sinkiang and contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan has never been formally delimited, two parties agree to delimit it on the basis of the traditional customary boundary line including natural features and in a spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly co-operation.

Article 2

(One) In accordance with the principle expounded in Article 1 of the present agreement, the two parties have fixed, as follows the alignment of the entire boundary line between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan:
(1) Commencing from its north-western extremity at height 5630 metres (a peak, the reference co-ordinates of which are approximately longitude 74 degrees 34 minutes east and latitude 37 degrees 03 minutes north), the boundary line runs generally eastward and then southeast ward strictly along the main watershed between the tributaries of the Tashkurgan river of the Tarim river system on the one hand and tributaries of the Hunza river of the Indus river system on the other hand, passing through the Kalik Daban (Dawan), the Mintake Daban (pass), the Kharchanai Daban (named on the Chinese map only), the Mutsjilga Daban (named on the Chinese map only), and the Parpik Pass (named on the Pakistan map only), and reaches the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (Pass).

(2) After passing through the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (pass), the boundary line runs generally southward along the above mentioned main watershed up to a mountain-top south of this Daban (pass), where it leaves the main watershed to follow the crest of a spur lying generally in a south-easterly direction, which is the watershed between the Akijilga river (a nameless corresponding river on the Pakistan map) on the one hand, and the Taghumbash (Oprang) river and the Koliman Su (Oprang Jilga) on the other hand. According to the map of the Chinese side, the boundary line, after leaving the south-eastern extremity of this spur, runs along a small section of the middle line of the bed of the Keliman Su to reach its confluence with the Kelechin River. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line, after leaving the south-eastern extremity of the spur, reaches the sharp bend of the Shaksgam or Muztagh River.

(3) From the aforesaid point, the boundary line runs up the Kelechin river (Shaksgam or Mistagh river) along the middle line of its bed to its confluence (reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 76 degrees 02 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 26 minutes north) with the Snorbulak Daria (Shimshal river or Braldu river).

(4) From the confluence of the aforesaid two rivers, the boundary line, according to the map of the Chinese side, ascends the crest of a spur and runs along it to join
the Karokoram range main watershed at a mountain-top (reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 75 degrees 54 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 15 minutes north) which on this map is shown as belonging to the Shorgulak mountain. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line from the confluence of the above-mentioned two rivers ascends the crest of a corresponding spur and runs along it, passing through height 6520 metres (21,390 feet) till it joins the Karakoram range main watershed at a peak (reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 75 degrees 57 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 03 minutes north).

(5) Thence, the boundary line, running generally southward and then eastward, strictly follows the Karakoram range main watershed which separates the Tarim river drainage system from the Indus river drainage system, passing through the east Mustagh pass (Mustagh pass), the top of the Chogri peak (K-2), the top of the broad peak, the top of the Gasherbrum mountain 8068, the Indirakoli pass (names on the Chinese maps only) and the top of the Teram Kankri peak, and reaches its south-eastern extremity at the Karakoram pass.

(Two) The alignment of the entire boundary line as described in section one of this article, has been drawn on the one million scale map of the Chinese side in Chinese and the one million scale map of the Pakistan side in English which are signed and attached to the present agreement. (Not attached in this book) (Three) In view of the fact that the maps of the two sides are not fully identical in their representation of the topographical features the two parties have agreed that the actual features on the ground shall prevail, so far as the location and alignment of the boundary described in Section one is concerned, and that they will be determined as far as possible by joint survey on the ground.

**Article 3**

The two parties have agreed that: Wherever the boundary follows a river, the middle line of the river, the middle line of the river bed shall be the boundary line; and that wherever
the boundary passes through Daban (pass), the water-parting line thereof shall be the boundary line.

**Article 4**

I. The two parties have agreed to set up, as soon as possible, a joint boundary demarcation commission. Each side will appoint a chairman, one or more members and a certain number of advisers and technical staff. The joint boundary demarcation commission is charged with the responsibility, in accordance with the provisions of the present agreement, to hold concrete discussions on and carry out the following tasks jointly:

1. To conduct necessary surveys of the boundary area on the ground, as stated in Article 2 of the present agreement, so as to set up boundary markers at places considered to the appropriate by the two parties and to delineate the boundary line of the jointly prepared accurate maps.
2. To draft a protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line and the location of all the boundary markers and prepare and get printed detailed maps, to be attached to the protocol, with the boundary line and the location of the boundary markers shown on them.

II. The aforesaid protocol, upon being signed by the representatives of the Government of the two countries, shall become an annex to the present agreement, and the detailed maps shall replace the maps attached to the present agreement.

III. Upon the conclusion of the above-mentioned protocol, the tasks of the joint boundary demarcation commission shall be terminated.

**Article 5**

The two Parties have agreed that any dispute concerning the boundary, which may arise after the delimitation of the boundary line actually existing between the two countries shall be settled peacefully by the two parties through friendly consultations. Article 6 The two Parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China, on the boundary as described in Article
Two of the present Agreement, so as to sign a formal Boundary Treaty to replace the present agreement: Provided that in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of this agreement and the aforesaid Protocol shall be maintained in the formal Boundary Treaty to be signed between the Peoples Republic of China and Pakistan.

**Article 7**
The present agreement shall come into force on the date of its signature. Done in duplicate in Peking on the second day of March, 1963, in the Chinese and English language, both texts being equally authentic.

Marshal Chen Yi,  
Plenipotentiary of the  
Government of the  
People's Republic of China.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,  
Plenipotentiary of the  
Government of Pakistan.
LIST OF AGREEMENTS/MOUS SIGNED DURING VISIT OF CHINESE PRESIDENT (CPEC)

Both signed agreements worth $28 billion to immediately kick-start early harvest projects, while projects worth $17 billion, which are in the pipeline, will follow as soon as the required studies, processes and formalities are completed. The ground-breaking and signing of financial agreements has demonstrated that there is a strong will on both sides to implement the portfolio of $45 billion agreed under the CPEC framework as early as possible to help Pakistan meet its energy needs. The agreements and MOUs signed are as under:

1. Economic and technical cooperation agreement between China and Pakistan.
2. Exchange of notes of feasibility study of the demonstration project of the DTMB.
3. Exchange of notes on provision of anti-narcotics equipment.
4. Exchange of notes on provision of law enforcement equipment.
5. Exchange of notes on feasibility study of Gwadar hospital
6. MoU on provision of Chinese governmental concessional loan for second phase upgradation of the Karakorum Highway (Havelian to Thakot).
7. MOU on provision of Chinese governmental concessional loan for Karachi-Lahore Motorway (Multan to Sukkur).
8. MoU on provision of Chinese governmental concessional loan for Gwadar port East Bay Expressway Project.
10. Protocol on banking services to agreement on trade in services.
11. MoU on provision of material for tackling climate change.
12. Framework agreement on cooperation on major communications infrastructure project.


14. MoU on Pro Bono Projects in the Port of Gwadar Region.

15. MoU on establishment of China-Pakistan joint cotton bio-tech laboratory.

16. Framework agreement between the National Railway Administration, China and the Ministry of Railways, Pakistan on joint feasibility study for up-gradation of ML1 and establishment of Havelain dry port of Pakistan Railways.

17. Protocol on the establishment of China-Pakistan joint marine research centre.


19. Triple party agreement between China Central Television and PTV and Pakistan Television Foundation on the re-broadcasting of CCTV-NEWS/CCTV -9 Documentary in Pakistan.


23. Framework agreement between NEA and MoPNR on Gwadar-Nawabshah LNG terminal and pipeline project.


25. Agreement on financing for Lahore Orange line Metro Train project.

26. MoU on financing for KKH up-gradation Phase-2 (Havelian to Takot), KLM, Gwadar east bay expressway, Gwadar international airport projects.
27. Financing agreement relating to the 870MW hydro-electric Suki Kinari hydropower project between EXIM Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited and SK Hydro (Private) Limited.


30. Term sheet of the facility for Zonergy 9x100 MW solar project in Punjab between China Development Bank Corporation, EXIM Bank of China and Zonergy Company limited.

31. Drawdown agreement on Jhimpir wind power project between UEP Wind Power (Private) Limited as borrower and China Development Bank Corporation as lender.

32. Terms and conditions in favour of Sindh Engro Coal Mining Company for Thar Block II 3.8Mt/a mining Project, Sindh province, Pakistan arranged by China Development Bank Corporation.

33. Terms and conditions in favour of Engro Powergen Thar (Private) Limited, Sindh province, Pakistan for Thar Block II 2x330MW coal fired power project arranged by China Development Bank Corporation.

34. Framework agreement of Financing Cooperation in Implementing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor between China Development Corporation and HBL.

35. MoU with respect to cooperation between Wapda and CTG.

36. MoU among PPDB, CTG, and Silk Road Fund on Development of Private Hydro Power Projects.

37. Facility operating agreement for Dawood Wind Power project between ICBC and PCC of China and HDPPL.

38. Framework agreement for promoting Chinese investments and industrial parks development in Pakistan between ICBC and HBL on financial services corporation.

39. The financing term sheet agreement for Thar Block –I between ICBC, SSRL.
40. Energy strategic cooperation framework agreement between Punjab province and China Huaneng Group.
41. Framework agreement on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor Energy Project Cooperation.
42. Cooperation agreement between Sino-Sindh Resources (Pvt) Ltd and Shanghai Electric Group for Thar Coalfield Block I Coal-Power integrated Project in Pakistan.
43. Cooperation agreement for Matiyari-Lahore and Matyari (Port Qasim)-Faisalabad Transmission and Transformation Project between National Transmission Distribution Company (NTDC) and National Grid of China.
44. IA on Port Qasim Coal fired Power Plant between Power China and GoP.
46. Cooperation agreement on Hubco Coal-fired Power Plant Project between CPIH and Hubco Power Company.
47. Facilitation Agreement on Salt Range Coal-fired Power Project between CMEC and Punjab Government.
48. MoU between NUML Pakistan and Xinjiang Normal University, Urumqi China for Cooperation on Higher Education.
49. Agreement on collaboration on establishment of NUML International Centre of education (NICE) between NUML Pakistan and Xinjiang Normal University, Urumqi, China.

On this occasion the two leaders inaugurated the following projects by unveiling the plaques:

1. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Lahore Branch.
2. Energization of 100 MW solar power plants at Quad-i-Azam solar park, Bahawalpur.
3. FM 98 Dosti Channel studio PBC-CRI, Islamabad.
4. Demonstration project of DTMB Broadcasting in Pakistan.
5. China Cultural centre Pakistan.
6. China-Pakistan Joint Research Centre for small hydropower, Islamabad.
7. China-Pakistan cross-border optical fibre cable system project.
8. Metro rail transit system on the Orange Line in Lahore.
Appendix – C

Text of 123 Agreement between U.S. and India

The following is the text of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (123 Agreement):

BEGIN TEXT:

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
CONCERNING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (123 AGREEMENT)

The Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

RECOGNIZING the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner;

DESIRING to cooperate extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis;

WISHING to develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and with due respect for each other's nuclear programmes;

DESIRING to establish the necessary legal framework and basis for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

AFFIRMING that cooperation under this Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation;

NOTING the understandings expressed in the India - U.S. Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India covering aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle;

AFFIRMING their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

NOTING their respective commitments to safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to adequate physical protection of nuclear material and effective national export controls;
MINDFUL that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a view to protecting the environment;

MINDFUL of their shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and

DESIROUS of strengthening the strategic partnership between them;

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1 - DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(A) "By-product material" means any radioactive material (except special fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special fissionable material. By-product material shall not be subject to safeguards or any other form of verification under this Agreement, unless it has been decided otherwise by prior mutual agreement in writing between the two Parties.

(B) "Component" means a component part of equipment, or other item so designated by agreement of the Parties.

(C) "Conversion" means any of the normal operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, preceding fuel fabrication and excluding enrichment, by which uranium is transformed from one chemical form to another - for example, from uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to uranium dioxide (UO2) or from uranium oxide to metal.

(D) " Decommissioning" means the actions taken at the end of a facility's useful life to retire the facility from service in the manner that provides adequate protection for the health and safety of the decommissioning workers and the general public, and for the environment. These actions can range from closing down the facility and a minimal removal of nuclear material coupled with continuing maintenance and surveillance, to a complete removal of residual radioactivity in excess of levels acceptable for unrestricted use of the facility and its site.

(E) "Dual-Use Item" means a nuclear related item which has a technical use in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

(F) "Equipment" means any equipment in nuclear operation including reactor, reactor pressure vessel, reactor fuel charging and discharging equipment, reactor control rods, reactor pressure tubes, reactor primary coolant pumps, zirconium tubing, equipment for fuel fabrication and any other item so designated by the Parties.

(G) "High enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to twenty percent or greater in the isotope 235.

(H) "Information" means any information that is not in the public domain and is transferred in any form pursuant to this Agreement and so designated and documented in hard copy or digital form by mutual agreement by the Parties that it shall be subject to this Agreement, but will cease to be information whenever the Party transferring the information or any third party legitimately releases it into the public domain.
(I) "Low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to less than twenty percent in the isotope 235.

(J) "Major critical component" means any part or group of parts essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility or heavy water production facility.

(K) "Non-nuclear material" means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

(L) "Nuclear material" means (1) source material and (2) special fissionable material. "Source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time determine; and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" means plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, any substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other substances as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" does not include "source material". Any determination by the Board of Governors of the IAEA under Article XX of that Agency's Statute or otherwise that amends the list of materials considered to be "source material" or "special fissionable material" shall only have effect under this Agreement when both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in writing that they accept such amendment.

(M) "Peaceful purposes" include the use of information, nuclear material, equipment or components in such fields as research, power generation, medicine, agriculture and industry, but do not include use in, research on, or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other military purpose. Provision of power for a military base drawn from any power network, production of radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in military environment for diagnostics, therapy and sterility assurance, and other similar purposes as may be mutually agreed by the Parties shall not be regarded as military purpose.

(N) "Person" means any individual or any entity subject to the territorial jurisdiction of either Party but does not include the Parties.

(O) "Reactor" means any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium or any combination thereof.

(P) "Sensitive nuclear facility" means any facility designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium.

(Q) "Sensitive nuclear technology" means any information that is not in the public domain and that is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of any sensitive nuclear facility, or other such information that may be so designated by agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION

1. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance
with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

2. The purpose of the Agreement being to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the Parties, the Parties may pursue cooperation in all relevant areas to include, but not limited to, the following:

a. Advanced nuclear energy research and development in such areas as may be agreed between the Parties;
b. Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, as set out in Article 3;
c. Facilitation of exchange of scientists for visits, meetings, symposia and collaborative research;
d. Full civil nuclear cooperation activities covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle including technology transfer on an industrial or commercial scale between the Parties or authorized persons;
e. Development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors;
f. Advanced research and development in nuclear sciences including but not limited to biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry, environment and climate change;
g. Supply between the Parties, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries, of nuclear material;
h. Alteration in form or content of nuclear material as provided for in Article 6;
i. Supply between the Parties of equipment, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries;
j. Controlled thermonuclear fusion including in multilateral projects; and
k. Other areas of mutual interest as may be agreed by the Parties.

3. Transfer of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information under this Agreement may be undertaken directly between the Parties or through authorized persons. Such transfers shall be subject to this Agreement and to such additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the Parties. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information transferred from the territory of one Party to the territory of the other Party, whether directly or through a third country, will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to this Agreement only upon confirmation, by the appropriate authority of the recipient Party to the appropriate authority of the supplier Party that such items both will be subject to the Agreement and have been received by the recipient Party.

4. The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.

ARTICLE 3 - TRANSFER OF INFORMATION

1. Information concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be transferred between the Parties. Transfers of information may be accomplished through reports, data banks and computer programs and any other means mutually agreed to by the Parties. Fields that may be covered include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

a. Research, development, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use of reactors, reactor experiments, and decommissioning;
b. The use of nuclear material in physical, chemical, radiological and biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry;
c. Fuel cycle activities to meet future world-wide civil nuclear energy needs, including multilateral approaches to which they are parties for ensuring nuclear fuel supply and appropriate techniques for management of nuclear wastes;
d. Advanced research and development in nuclear science and technology;
e. Health, safety, and environmental considerations related to the foregoing;
f. Assessments of the role nuclear power may play in national energy plans;
g. Codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear industry;
h. Research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including bilateral activities and contributions toward multilateral projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); and
i. Any other field mutually agreed to by the Parties.

2. Cooperation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not limited to, training, exchange of personnel, meetings, exchange of samples, materials and instruments for experimental purposes and a balanced participation in joint studies and projects.

3. This Agreement does not require the transfer of any information regarding matters outside the scope of this Agreement, or information that the Parties are not permitted under their respective treaties, national laws, or regulations to transfer.

4. Restricted Data, as defined by each Party, shall not be transferred under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4 - NUCLEAR TRADE

1. The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves in the mutual interests of their respective industry, utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade between third countries and either Party of items obligated to the other Party. The Parties recognize that reliability of supplies is essential to ensure smooth and uninterrupted operation of nuclear facilities and that industry in both the Parties needs continuing reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation of nuclear installations.

2. Authorizations, including export and import licenses as well as authorizations or consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear material movement should be consistent with the sound and efficient administration of this Agreement and should not be used to restrict trade. It is further agreed that if the relevant authority of the concerned Party considers that an application cannot be processed within a two month period it shall immediately, upon request, provide reasoned information to the submitting Party. In the event of a refusal to authorize an application or a delay exceeding four months from the date of the first application the Party of the submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent consultations under Article 13 of this Agreement, which shall take place at the earliest opportunity and in any case not later than 30 days after such a request.

ARTICLE 5 - TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components may be transferred for applications consistent with this Agreement. Any special fissionable material transferred under this Agreement shall be low enriched uranium, except as provided in paragraph 5.

2. Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties' respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies.

3. Natural or low enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in reactor experiments and in reactors, for conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed to by the Parties.

4. The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in reactor experiments or the loading of reactors, the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime, use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and the accomplishment of other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties.
5. Small quantities of special fissionable material may be transferred for use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and for such other purposes as the Parties may agree.

6.

(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.

(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:

i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.

ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.

iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.

iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.

(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.

ARTICLE 6 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES

In keeping with their commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation, both Parties, as they do with other states with advanced nuclear technology, may carry out the following nuclear fuel cycle activities:

i) Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment up to twenty percent in the isotope 235 of uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement, as well as of uranium used in or produced through the use of equipment so transferred, may be carried out.

ii) Irradiation within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party of plutonium, uranium-233, high enriched uranium and irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

iii) With a view to implementing full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned in the Joint Statement of the Parties of July 18, 2005, the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will
take place in this new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year. The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities. These arrangements and procedures shall include provisions with respect to physical protection standards set out in Article 8, storage standards set out in Article 7, and environmental protections set forth in Article 11 of this Agreement, and such other provisions as may be agreed by the Parties. Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.

iv) Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

ARTICLE 7 - STORAGE AND RETRANSFERS

1. Plutonium and uranium 233 (except as either may be contained in irradiated fuel elements), and high enriched uranium, transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred, may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of physical protection that are set out in IAEA document INFCIRC 225/REV 4 as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties. Each Party shall record such facilities on a list, made available to the other Party. A Party's list shall be held confidential if that Party so requests. Either Party may make changes to its list by notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification has been received. If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this sub-Article are not being fully complied with, immediate consultations may be called for. Following upon such consultations, each Party shall ensure by means of such consultations that necessary remedial measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels of physical protection referred to above at the facility in question. However, if the Party on whose territory the nuclear material in question is stored determines that such measures are not feasible, it will shift the nuclear material to another appropriate, listed facility it identifies.

2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, and information transferred pursuant to this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred shall not be transferred or re-transferred to unauthorized persons or, unless the Parties agree, beyond the recipient Party's territorial jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 8 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION

1. Adequate physical protection shall be maintained with respect to nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred.

2. To fulfill the requirement in paragraph 1, each Party shall apply measures in accordance with (i) levels of physical protection at least equivalent to the recommendations published in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities," and in any subsequent revisions of that document agreed to by the Parties, and (ii) the provisions of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and any amendments to the Convention that enter into force for both Parties.

3. The Parties will keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of those agencies or authorities having responsibility for ensuring that levels of physical protection for nuclear material in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control are adequately met and having responsibility for coordinating response and recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this Article. The Parties will also keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of the designated points of contact within their national authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transportation and other matters of mutual concern.

4. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.
ARTICLE 9 - PEACEFUL USE

Nuclear material, equipment and components transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, equipment, and components so transferred shall not be used by the recipient Party for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.

ARTICLE 10 - IAEA SAFEGUARDS

1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating Party.

2. Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA [identifying data] and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

3. Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, or components so transferred shall be subject to the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the United States of America, done at Vienna November 18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980, and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

4. If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.

5. Each Party shall take such measures as are necessary to maintain and facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards in its respective territory provided for under this Article.

6. Each Party shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, equipment, or components so transferred. The procedures applicable to India shall be those set forth in the India-specific Safeguards Agreement referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article.

7. Upon the request of either Party, the other Party shall report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party on the status of all inventories of material subject to this Agreement.

8. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.

ARTICLE 11 - ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The Parties shall cooperate in following the best practices for minimizing the impact on the environment from any radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities under this Agreement and in related matters of health and safety.

ARTICLE 12 - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

1. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:

a) to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either Party;
b) to avoid interference in such activities;
c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe conduct of such activities; and
d) to take full account of the long term requirements of the nuclear energy programs of the Parties.

2. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used to:

a) secure unfair commercial or industrial advantages or to restrict trade to the disadvantage of persons and
undertakings of either Party or hamper their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or
domestic;
b) interfere with the nuclear policy or programs for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
including research and development; or
c) impede the free movement of nuclear material, non-nuclear material and equipment supplied under this
Agreement within the territory of the Parties.

3. When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United
States organizations requires exchanges of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their
territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other
cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the
experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices.

ARTICLE 13 - CONSULTATIONS

1. The Parties undertake to consult at the request of either Party regarding the implementation of this
Agreement and the development of further cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a
stable, reliable and predictable basis. The Parties recognize that such consultations are between two States
with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices
and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology.

2. Each Party shall endeavor to avoid taking any action that adversely affects cooperation envisaged under
Article 2 of this Agreement. If either Party at any time following the entry into force of this Agreement does
not comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties shall promptly hold consultations with a view to
resolving the matter in a way that protects the legitimate interests of both Parties, it being understood that
rights of either Party under Article 16.2 remain unaffected.

3. Consultations under this Article may be carried out by a Joint Committee specifically established for this
purpose. A Joint Technical Working Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set up to ensure the
fulfillment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangements referred to in Article 17.

ARTICLE 14 - TERMINATION AND CESSATION OF COOPERATION

1. Either Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written
notice to the other Party. A Party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such
termination. The Agreement shall terminate one year from the date of the written notice, unless the notice
has been withdrawn by the providing Party in writing prior to the date of termination.

2. Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall consider the
relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the reasons
cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking termination has the right to cease further
cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding
issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations. The Parties agree to consider
carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to
take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a
Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other
States which could impact national security.

3. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the reason for notice for seeking
termination, the Parties shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertently or otherwise and
whether the violation could be considered as material. No violation may be considered as being material
unless corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance.

4. Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement, either Party shall have the right to require the return by the other Party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. A notice by a Party that is invoking the right of return shall be delivered to the other Party on or before the date of termination of this Agreement. The notice shall contain a statement of the items subject to this Agreement as to which the Party is requesting return. Except as provided in provisions of Article 16.3, all other legal obligations pertaining to this Agreement shall cease to apply with respect to the nuclear items remaining on the territory of the Party concerned upon termination of this Agreement.

5. The two Parties recognize that exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations. If either Party seeks to exercise its right pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party of any nuclear items mentioned in paragraph 4, undertake consultations with the other Party. Such consultations shall give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the Party concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security. Both Parties shall take into account the potential negative consequences of such termination on the on-going contracts and projects initiated under this Agreement of significance for the respective nuclear programmes of either Party.

6. If either Party exercises its right of return pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items is required, the Parties shall agree on methods and arrangements for the return of the items, the relevant quantity of the items to be returned, and the amount of compensation that would have to be paid by the Party exercising the right to the other Party.

7. Prior to return of nuclear items, the Parties shall satisfy themselves that full safety, radiological and physical protection measures have been ensured in accordance with their existing national regulations and that the transfers pose no unreasonable risk to either Party, countries through which the nuclear items may transit and to the global environment and are in accordance with existing international regulations.

8. The Party seeking the return of nuclear items shall ensure that the timing, methods and arrangements for return of nuclear items are in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Accordingly, the consultations between the Parties shall address mutual commitments as contained in Article 5.6. It is not the purpose of the provisions of this Article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the Parties under Article 5.6.

9. The arrangements and procedures concluded pursuant to Article 6(iii) shall be subject to suspension by either Party in exceptional circumstances, as defined by the Parties, after consultations have been held between the Parties aimed at reaching mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues, while taking into account the effects of such suspension on other aspects of cooperation under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 15 - SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute.

ARTICLE 16 - ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that they have completed all applicable requirements for its entry into force.

2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of 40 years. It shall continue in force thereafter for additional periods of 10 years each. Each Party may, by giving 6 months written notice to the other Party,
terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial 40 year period or at the end of any subsequent 10 year period.

3. Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement, Articles 5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 shall continue in effect so long as any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, by-product material, equipment or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the Party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that such nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.

4. This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.

5. The Parties may consult, at the request of either Party, on possible amendments to this Agreement. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree. Any amendment shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal legal procedures necessary for the entry into force have been completed.

ARTICLE 17 - ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT

1. The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an Administrative Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this Agreement.

2. The principles of fungibility and equivalence shall apply to nuclear material and non-nuclear material subject to this Agreement. Detailed provisions for applying these principles shall be set forth in the Administrative Arrangement.

3. The Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended by agreement of the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at , this day of , 200 , in duplicate.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:

AGREED MINUTE

During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy ("the Agreement") signed today, the following understandings, which shall be an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.

Proportionality

For the purposes of implementing the rights specified in Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement with respect to special fissionable material and by-product material produced through the use of nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, transferred pursuant to the Agreement and not used in or produced through the use of equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement, such rights shall in practice be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material and by-product material produced that represents the ratio of transferred nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, used in the production of the special fissionable material and by-product material to the total amount of nuclear material and non-nuclear material so used, and similarly for subsequent generations.
By-product material

The Parties agree that reporting and exchanges of information on by-product material subject to the Agreement will be limited to the following:

(1) Both Parties would comply with the provisions as contained in the IAEA document GOV/1999/19/Rev.2, with regard to by-product material subject to the Agreement.

(2) With regard to tritium subject to the Agreement, the Parties will exchange annually information pertaining to its disposition for peaceful purposes consistent with Article 9 of this Agreement.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:

END TEXT

2007/658

Released on August 3, 2007
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD:
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

Dear Respondent,

In pursuance to my PhD dissertation initiative entitled “Pakistan-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Period: Regional and Global Implications”, I request you to spare few moments out of your busy schedule to help fill in the attached questionnaire. Your cooperation in this regard will be of great value in contributing to originality of thought and appropriate conclusion of a high quality research. Your response will remain confidential and not attributed individually. Thanking in anticipation.

Talat Shabbir, PhD Scholar
talatsbhatti@gmail.com
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

QUESTIONNAIRE

Name (Optional): ______________ Status (Social/Official): ______________________

Gender: Male ☐ Female ☐

Age: 20-30 ☐ 31-40 ☐ 41-50 ☐ 51-60 ☐ 61-70 ☐

Qualification: BA/B.Sc ☐ MA/M.Sc ☐ M.Phil ☐ PhD ☐

Profession: Govt employee ☐ Businessman ☐ Academia ☐

Student ☐ Other ☐
Q 1: Do you agree that the US policy of containment of China exists and brings China closer to Pakistan?

Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree

Q 2: Do you agree the US Pivot Asia strategy is in the offing and makes Pakistan the most important country for China?

Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree

Q 3: Do you agree that a significant Pakistan-China nexus covering political, strategic and economic dimensions is in the making in the post 9/11 global environment?

Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree

Q 4: Do you agree that in South Asian region, China’s political, strategic and economic policies serve Pakistan’s interests?

Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree

Q 5: Do you agree that China’s political, strategic and economic interests in India, Afghanistan and Iran have a positive impact on Pakistan-China relations?

Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree
## SUMMARY OF SURVEY DATA

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Do you agree that the US policy of containment of China exists and brings China closer to Pakistan?

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Do you agree the US Pivot Asia strategy is in the offing and makes Pakistan the most important country for China?

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Do you agree that a significant Pakistan – China nexus covering political, strategic and economic dimensions is in the making in the post 9/11 global environment?

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Do you agree that in South Asian region, China’s political, strategic and economic policies serve Pakistan’s interests?

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Do you agree the China’s political, strategic and economic interest in India, Afghanistan and Iran have a positive impact on Pakistan-China relations?

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QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEW

PAKISTAN-CINA RELATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

Talat Shabbir, PhD Scholar  
talatsbhatti@gmail.com  
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

Q-1: Pakistan – China relations are marked by political (political and diplomatic relations), strategic (conventional and unconventional cooperation) and economic dimensions (economy, energy, infrastructure and trade). Do you think these areas will remain focus of future bilateral ties or only one these factors will gain preference?

Q-2: Do you think that China’s neutral policy stance on Kashmir serves Pakistan’s political and strategic interests?

Q-3: How in your opinion ‘India centric Pakistan-China perspective’ is evolving? And what is China’s perspective on continuing India-Pakistan standoff?

Q-4: What in your opinion are emerging conclusions about Pakistan-China-India-Afghanistan and Iran (important regional countries in the context of Pakistan-China relations) in the context of regional politics? And do you see cohesive or divisive region (in the context of Pakistan-China-India-Iran and Afghanistan) in future?

Q-5: What in your opinion are contours of emerging global order in post 9/11 era and where do you think Pakistan and China stand in the global order?

Q-6: How will Indo-US strategic partnership impact Pakistan-China relations?
Q-7: How will US Asia Pacific focus impact South Asia in general and Pakistan-China relations in particular?

Q-8: What in your opinion are contours of the US containment strategy and how will this impact Pakistan-China relations?

Q-9: China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will lessen China’s dependence on South China Sea and provide safer and shorter trade route to China. Do you think CPEC is likely to undermine the US Asia Pacific focus or containment strategy?

Q-10: Do you think US policy of containment of China and emerging global order will enhance Pakistan-China relations?