Identity in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:
Collaboration with USA

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A dissertation submitted in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

School of Politics and International Relations
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad, Pakistan
2015
This dissertation meets the requirements for award of a degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my individual research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree.

Imran Syed
Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, my wife and my family.
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Acknowledgements

I thank Almighty Allah for the kindness he has bestowed upon me and for the completion of this dissertation.

My sincere thanks are due to my supervisor, Professor Dr. Lubna Abid Ali, for her encouragement and advice. Dr. Lubna always had time to meet me and discuss my research and whenever I gave her material for feedback she was quick in returning the material along with suggestions that were useful.
Abbreviations

CENTO: Central Treaty Organization
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas
ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate
KPK: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFP: North West Frontier Province
OIC: Organization of the Islamic Conference
PBUH: Peace Be Upon Him
SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SEATO: South East Asia Treaty Organization
UN: United Nations
USA: United States of America
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UK: United Kingdom
WoT: War on Terror
Glossary

Afghans: The people of Afghanistan.

Congress: Indian National Congress.

dewali: The ancient Hindu festival which is celebrated in autumn.

Haram Sharif: The Sacred Mosque of the Muslims in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

Hijra: The Islamic calendar which begins with the migration of the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) to Medina in 622 AD.

.jihad: An Islamic holy war.

jizya: A per capita tax imposed, under certain conditions, on non-Muslims of an Islamic state.

Khalifa: The ruler of the Muslim Ummah.

loya jirga: A mass meeting to discuss important matters that includes the attendance of tribal elders.

madressa: An educational institution providing Islamic religious instruction.

mujahedeen: Used in this dissertation to describe those engaged in the armed jihad to oust the USSR from Afghanistan. The term has a general meaning of one engaged in jihad.

Muslim League: All India Muslim League.
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<td>The rebellion against the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent in 1857. The Mutiny is also referred to as the First War of Independence.</td>
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<td>Sharia</td>
<td>Islamic religious law.</td>
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<td>subcontinent</td>
<td>Pre-partition India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>The adherents of an Islamic fundamentalist political movement in Afghanistan and also in Pakistan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ulema</td>
<td>A Muslim religious scholar.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ummah</td>
<td>The collective community of Muslims.</td>
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<td>9/11</td>
<td>The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA.</td>
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## Maps

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Abstract

This dissertation aims to understand the identity constructions that accompany Pakistan’s security related foreign policy collaboration with USA. This research is motivated by three questions. Firstly, can an appropriate theoretical framework be designed to conduct this inquiry? Secondly, what were the identity constructions that attempted to accommodate Pakistan’s collaboration with USA? Thirdly, were there any contradictions in the identity constructions that accompanied the collaboration? A review of literature has shown that not much scholarly work has been undertaken on the identity of Pakistan and no scholarly literature could be found to have focused on the dissertation’s topic. This research is significant because it will help advance the understanding of Pakistan’s foreign policy and will illuminate aspects of Pakistan’s relation with USA. Using a constructive theoretical framework the dissertation looks at three distinct periods of security collaboration between Pakistan and USA, which cumulatively span thirty seven years. The findings from the research illustrate that during the first period of cooperation with USA, Pakistani identity constructions sought to build convergences around shared values of democracy and progress. In the second period the focus shifted to Islam and saving Muslims. In the third period the identity constructions focused on projecting a moderate Islamic world view and distancing Pakistan from radical Islam. Islam is an aspect of identity that is important during the three periods of Pakistan’s cooperation with USA. However, Islam is invoked in different manners
and, overall, no single identity construct anchors the cooperation. The Pakistani attempts at identity constructions are weakened because of inherent contradictions. These include the general lack of support by USA for Muslim countries of the Middle East, the divergence between USA’s support for democracy and Pakistan’s intermittent dictatorships, and the comprise of Pakistan’s sovereignty that comes with Pakistan’s support for the USA led War on Terror.
Chapter: I

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1

Introduction

USA has played a palpable role in the foreign relations of Pakistan, especially, with regards to security issues. This dissertation maintains that since Pakistan’s independence there have been three extended periods of general convergence on security issues in the foreign policy of Pakistan and USA. The first period extended from Pakistan’s independence in 1947 to the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The second period of collaboration began with USSR’s venture into Afghanistan in 1979 and extended till its withdrawal in 1989. The third period of cooperation began with the launch of the global War on Terror (WoT) in 2001 and continued till the appreciable decline in the Pakistan and USA cooperation in 2012.

This research attempts to design a theoretical foundation that will help in understanding the identity constructions that accompanied the Pakistani foreign policy collaboration with USA. Developing on this theoretical foundation, the research then seeks to understand what national identity constructions are attempted by the Pakistani foreign policymaking elite in the context of a foreign policy convergence between Pakistan and USA. The constructed nature of identity opens up the possibility of contradiction in the identity constructions attempted. The research, therefore, also examines the contradictions in the attempts at identity construction.


1.1 Significance

Pakistan has cumulatively spent more than three decades in security related foreign policy positions that were in alignment with USA’s foreign policy orientations. By far, the review of literature has not been able to show an academic publication that combines a study of Pakistan’s identity and foreign policy with a focus on Pakistan’s collaborative relations with USA. This research will, therefore, contribute towards the creation of new knowledge and understanding of Pakistan’s foreign policy and, particularly, will illuminate aspects of Pakistan’s relations with USA.

1.2 Research Questions

This dissertation seeks to understand the identity constructions that accompanied Pakistan’s security related foreign policy of collaboration with USA. The three central research questions that will be addressed in this dissertation are:

1. Can an appropriate theoretical framework be designed to provide a foundation for conducting this inquiry?

2. What were the identity constructions that attempted to accommodate Pakistan’s security related foreign policy collaboration with USA?

3. What were the contradictions in the identity constructions that accompanied Pakistan’s security related foreign policy of collaboration with USA?
1.3 Underlying Assumptions

An underlying assumption of this research includes viewing the social world as different from the natural world and the assumption that the nature of the relationship between the social phenomena being studied is not causal but constitutive. In consonance with these assumptions this dissertation is geared towards understanding rather than explaining.\textsuperscript{11}

Further, this research takes a position that understanding the world, and the phenomena in it, is based on the social construction of meanings. This fluidity points towards an anti-foundational conception of truth claims, similar to the theoretical conceptualizing of those constructivist researchers who feel that there is “no objective Truth ... only competing interpretations”\textsuperscript{12}. This view of the world opens up question of validity in interpretation and “constructivists agree that not every interpretation is equally supportable”\textsuperscript{13}.

The discursive methodology used in this research underscores that discourse is viewed as a reflection of a reality. However, the social construction of a discourse does not mean a complete divorce from material reality but, rather, discourse is constrained by the contexts, including the material context, in which the discourse occurs and these constraints are reflected in the discourse that emerges.\textsuperscript{14} Validity is commensurate with the evidence that is used to support the interpretations and empirical evidence is used in the dissertation to support the interpretations and not as a philosophy of knowledge.\textsuperscript{15}
1.4 Limitations of Research

The limitations of this research include the non-availability of primary research material. The second limitation is the focus on security policy, and the final limitation is the placement of the state in a privileged position in this research.

A major limitation this research faced was the non-availability of documents, especially, primary documents, such as the bilateral agreements. These documents are held by the different government departments and academic researchers have no access to them. Contrary to expectations, libraries at the major academic institutions visited by the researcher proved to be an inadequate source for these primary materials.

The second limitation of this dissertation is that it is focused on the security related aspects of foreign policy. Here the study of security is understood to mean a focus on conflict and the “specific policies states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war”¹⁶. This definition further acknowledges that in addition to military conflict, security also includes “statecraft” such as diplomacy, arms control, etc. The rationale for broadening security to include these other aspects is because they “bear directly on the likelihood and character of war”¹⁷.

Since the 1990s, there has been much debate on the need to expand the study of security from its traditional focus on military force to conceptualizations that involve economic and environmental aspects (among other facets) and the addition of other levels of analysis¹⁸. In
this dissertation the foreign policy focus is mainly on security, as defined above by Walt\textsuperscript{19} since, generally speaking, the occurrence or the possibility of occurrence of violence, destruction and death are hard to ignore, and violence, by its given nature, has a deep effect on all other social relations\textsuperscript{20}.

More importantly, in the case of Pakistan, violence has accompanied Pakistan throughout its history (beginning with the bloody partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, followed by three wars, the more than sixty years of territorial dispute over Kashmir, the bilateral dispute over water, the break-up of Pakistan in 1971, etc.). Consequently, violence and insecurity have dominated Pakistan’s foreign policy. In addition to India, Pakistan has also faced major military threats from other countries, such as, USSR.

The focus on security is also motivated by methodological concerns, specifically, the need to maintain a relatively parsimonious definition of security, which echoes a concern raised by Walt\textsuperscript{21}, for maintaining the “intellectual coherence” of security as a concept of research. However, the identity construction in support of a security related foreign policy does not necessarily have to be exclusively constructed on a discourse that only draws on war and peace. In order to facilitate cooperation or confrontation, the identity constructed may also draw on non-security related spheres such as progress, development, religion, etc. Thus, even though this dissertation focuses on the study of a security related foreign policy, still, the study of
identity includes different constructions that have been used in support of security collaborations.

The third limitation of this dissertation is that the research is focused on the state. The reason for focusing on the state is because states are still the primary channels through which violence and the consequences of violence are mitigated in the international system. Additionally, the topic of the dissertation focuses on governmental foreign policy and this necessarily implies a level of analysis at the state level.

The study of state policy is not necessarily a dismissal of the influence of the sub-state level actors on policy making. The sub-state level has been of consequence in two periods out of the three periods of Pakistan and USA’s foreign policy collaboration. These periods occurred during the Afghanistan Mujahedeen resistance against the USSR and during the WoT which followed in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) on USA.

The assumption of this research is that the foreign policy that emerges for a state is the culmination of various inputs (sub-state and supra-state). The context in which foreign policy decisions are taken is consequential and may include contention and conflict. Though there is some theoretical work, such as Role Theory, that provides possibilities for combining foreign policy analysis with constructivist theorizing, this dissertation focuses on formulated national foreign policy and, thus, is not concerned with the process of policy formulation. The thrust of the dissertation is on examining how foreign policy
collaborations are accompanied and supported by identity constructions.

1.5 Research Design

This dissertation takes a case study approach and focuses on three periods that can be characterized as periods of extended foreign policy collaboration between Pakistan and USA. These periods are from 1947 to 1962, from 1979 to 1989, and from 2001 to 2012. The research does not look at the entire spectrum of USA and Pakistan’s bilateral foreign policy relations over the sixty-five years since Pakistan’s creation.

The reasons for concentrating on these three periods of collaboration, which roughly equate to thirty-seven years, are, firstly, that this approach is in consonance with the dissertation’s focus on collaboration rather than the overall relationship. Secondly, given the limitations of resources, the research on thirty-seven years rather than on sixty-five years provides for a more detailed study of foreign policy and identity.

It should be noted that the focus on these three extended periods is to enable an examination of identity construction during periods of collaboration with USA. This focus on periods of collaboration, however, does not necessarily imply a complete disregard for events that have occurred in the interim periods where there was little or no collaboration. Identity constructions by the foreign policy elite of Pakistan during periods of collaboration with USA also have to address
events that occur in periods outside of the periods of collaboration. The events that transpire in the periods of limited or no cooperation exert an implicit influence on the periods of collaboration and thus they are not totally precluded from the study of identity construction in the three periods of extended cooperation.

The dissertation is organized in seven chapters. The introductory chapter examines the significance of the research, elaborates the central research questions, states the underlying assumptions of the research, describes the limitations, details the research design and the discursive methodology and provides a literature review. The second chapter provides a theoretical framework that can be used to conduct the research. The third chapter looks at the historical foundations of insecurity and security. This chapter examines the period before the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Chapter four looks at insecurity and Pakistan. The fifth chapter focuses on the security collaboration between Pakistan and USA over the three distinct periods of foreign policy convergence between the two countries. Chapter six attempts to understand the identity constructions that accompany the Pakistani foreign policy of collaboration with USA. The seventh chapter examines the contradictions in the identity construction and the final chapter is the conclusion of the dissertation.

1.6 Methodology

The method that is used in this broadly qualitative research is discourse analysis. This choice of method is in line with constructivist
theorizing and with a post-positivist epistemology. Constructivist theorist, such as Wendt, recognize that interpretive methods, including discourse analysis, are generally suitable for answering constitutive "how possible" or "what" questions but Wendt does not recommend any specific method of discourse analysis. This section looks at a definition of discourse, looks at some of the choices of discourse methods available, and, also describes the discourse method that has been used in this dissertation.

Discourse, in somewhat general terms, can be seen as Michel Foucault described it “a linguistic system that orders statements and concepts.” In terms that are more specific to this research, discourse could be defined as “any coherent body of statements that produces a self-confirming account of reality by defining an object of attention and generating concepts with which to analyze it.”

Discourse analysis is based on the “details of speech ... or writing that are arguably deemed relevant in the situation and that are relevant to the argument that the analysis is attempting to make.” The methods to analyze discourse should begin with the cognizance of the different varieties of social languages that can be used in the course of a discourse. Secondly, there must be recognition that language can be combined, among other things, with “actions, interactions ... and using various symbols, tools, and objects to enact a particular sort of socially recognizable identity.” Thirdly, intertextualitly, or the linking of a text with other texts needs to be examined, and finally, there should be an
understanding that discourse may be laden with themes or debates that elaborate on the meaning of the text or discourse. 

Three useful and diverse approaches to discourse analysis can be seen in the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, in critical discourse analysis, and in discursive psychology. These approaches share a commonality in that all three view language as not objectively reflecting the world but rather see language as contributing to creating and changing the world as it is seen. However, these approaches differ in the extent to which they see discourse shape the social reality and also the focus of inquiry. Laclau and Mouffe see discourse as constitutive of our world the other two theories see the social world function under logics that include discourse but also may include other logics. The focus thus shifts from discourse to a focus that includes other tools.

The level of focus may vary between the myriad of everyday discourse and the general patterns of discourse in society. Laclau and Mouffe concentrate on the macro level and the other two approaches look at a less macro level of discourse analysis. This research is more in conformity with discourse theory because the focus of the research question is very much at a macro level of analysis and discourse is seen as the central means to understanding the construction of a social world.

The emphasis on texts and discourses involves a methodological enunciation of what should be chosen to be read and how it should be read. In this dissertation the foreign policy of the state, as mainly
delivered by the heads of the state, prime ministers and the foreign ministers, is used. This text has been selected because of its formal authority. The reading of the selected texts required their placement in a “wider discursive terrain”\textsuperscript{37}. Thus the primary documents that are used in this research are the texts of the public speeches and statements made by the presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, foreign secretaries and ambassadors of Pakistan. The secondary documents include commentaries and opinions and other texts on the foreign policy and the identity of Pakistan.

1.7 Literature Review

There is a paucity of scholarly literature on the dissertation topic and no literature could be found to have focused on the foreign policy of Pakistan in combination with identity and collaboration with USA. However, there was literature to be found that looked at selected aspects of the dissertation topic. These selected aspects include the literature that looked at only the foreign policy of Pakistan, or on Pakistan and USA foreign relations, or scholarly literature that looked at Pakistan’s identity.

In literature that looked at the foreign policy of Pakistan a number of publications were found that were authored by former diplomats of Pakistan’s diplomatic service. These publications looked at a wide temporal sweep of foreign policy that, in many cases, paralleled the diplomatic careers of the authors (for example: Sattar\textsuperscript{38} and Amin\textsuperscript{39}). While these publications provide a rich, quasi-
autobiographical, description of diplomacy and foreign policy, still they do not engage with international relations theory and none of the publications reviewed in this genre was found to concentrate on identity as a focus of foreign policy.

A similar, somewhat related, category of literature was made up of publications by academics on the foreign policy of Pakistan and noteworthy in this category was the work of S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring. Burke and Ziring’s publication, like the works authored by diplomats, also looked at a wide temporal sweep and primarily provided a descriptive account of foreign policy. An example of publications that seem to straddle both the previously mentioned categories was made up of books that were authored by those who have worked as both diplomats and also as academics. An example of such an author would be Husain Haqqani. Haqqani’s book focuses on the contestation between institutions within Pakistan and the influence of this contention on ideology, identity and policy. However, he also does not engage with the theory of international relations. Haqqani’s book covers mostly national politics and some international politics but his coverage of the international extends mainly to neighboring countries such as India and Afghanistan.

Another category of foreign policy literature is edited books, not authored books, which includes contributions by academics and diplomats. A good example of this genre, but with authorship by academics of Pakistani origin, is the book on Pakistan edited by Maleeha Lodhi. This book presents a diversity of academic work
which covers the political, economic, social, and foreign policy, but no chapter in the book focuses on identity.

An important category of literature is the limited number of books that focus on USA and Pakistan foreign relations. An important book in this category is by Dennis Kux\textsuperscript{44}. A more recent example is the book edited by Butt and Schofield\textsuperscript{45} which is focused on the relations between Pakistan and USA, and includes the work of various academics and a diplomat. The book focuses mainly on geopolitics and there is no article in the book that is primarily interested in identity. Similarly, the 2013 publication by Daniel S. Markey\textsuperscript{46} looks at USA’s relations with Pakistan but the focus is not on identity and the theories of international relations are not explored.

There is an allied group of publications that focus primarily on the politics of Pakistan and are authored by academics based at universities mainly in the UK or USA. These publications focus on national and sub-national politics but provide only a limited examination of Pakistan’s international politics (for example, Talbot\textsuperscript{47}, Cohen\textsuperscript{48}, and Lieven\textsuperscript{49}). Thus, despite the diversity that is found in the books that fall in the above categories, still, this review shows that they all share a commonality in not engaging with the theory of international relations and in not focusing on identity.

There is a sparse amount of scholarly work that focuses exclusively on the identity of Pakistan (Ali\textsuperscript{50}, Raja\textsuperscript{51}, and Iqbal\textsuperscript{52}). Raja’s 2010 book is a case of scholarship on the identity of Pakistan that uses a post-positivist epistemology. Raja looks at the constructing
of a Pakistani identity through a textual reading of literary works (such as the works of renowned poets of the colonial era: Mirza Ghalib and Altaf Husain Hali). The limitations of this publication, from the point of view of the dissertation topic, are that, firstly, the period of purview is from 1857 to 1947 and thus the period since the creation of the state of Pakistan is not examined. Secondly, the study of foreign policy and international relations are not undertaken and the attention is primarily on culture and literature.

Another book that takes an interpretive approach and looks at the identity of Pakistan is Farzana Shaikh’s 2009 book. This book, however, does not focus on Pakistan’s relationship with USA and the foreign policy of Pakistan in general, and international relations, in particular, are not a major area of inquiry. Ayesha Jalal’s book in a somewhat related approach looks at how the Muslim identity has been shaped through a mix of religion, nationalism and culture in the period from 1850 to partition in 1947. Raja, Jalal and other publications reviewed in this category of literature, despite providing important scholarship on identity, are limited in their comparability and usefulness for this research mainly because none of this reviewed literature links identity with foreign policy or vice versa.

The review of literature shows that there was literature to be found on the foreign policy of Pakistan, on the foreign relations between Pakistan and USA, and a limited quantity of literature was also available on the identity of Pakistan. However, there was no literature that could be found to combine the foreign policy of Pakistan
with a focus on relations between USA and Pakistan and with a further focus on identity.
Endnotes

1. The abbreviation USA is used throughout this dissertation to refer to the United States of America.

2. The definition of security policy is drawn from Stephen Walt (as described on page 212 of his 1991 article “The Renaissance of Security Studies” published in the *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol 35 No. 2) as the “specific policies states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war.” The dissertation elaborates on this conceptualization of security by Walt in Section 1.4.

3. Pakistan gained independence from the British on 14 August 1947.

4. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

5. The USSR withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989.

6. The term War on Terror (WoT) was used by President George W. Bush during an address to the Congress of USA on 20 September 2001.

7. The logic for using these three periods is explained in the Research Design section (1.5) of this dissertation. Further pp30 details of these three periods of Pakistan and USA foreign policy collaboration are given in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

8. Details of the theoretical foundations provided in Chapter 2.

9. Details of the foreign policy convergence provided in Chapter 6.
10. Details of the contradictions in identity provided in Chapter 7.


17. Ibid., 213.


24. For a more detailed description of a post-positivist epistemology see Section 2.3 of this dissertation.


29. Ibid., 20-22


32. Ibid., 3.

33. Ibid., 19.

34. Ibid., 20.

35. Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*.


37. Ibid., i-ii.


42. Ibid. 34


53. Raja, *Constructing Pakistan*.


56. Raja, *Constructing Pakistan*.

Chapter 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

This research aims to explore the security driven collaboration between USA and Pakistan. An attempt has been made to understand the construction of aspects of Pakistan’s national identity that support a foreign policy of cooperation with USA. The search for an appropriate theoretical framework for this research begins by focusing on the general tenets of constructivism and later, specifically, on Alexander Wendt’s constructivist theoretical framework. The final section of this chapter deals with some of the criticisms of Wendt’s theorizing and in the light of these criticisms a theoretical framework for the dissertation is formulated.

2.1 The Constructivist Framework

Overall, constructivist theorizing in international relations, with its focus on identity and on matters ideational, provides an appropriate theoretical framework for undertaking this research. In this section we have conducted a general examination of the tenets of constructivism by looking at its ontology, epistemology and other important elements of this theoretical framework. We conclude this section by looking at some commonly used classifications of constructivist theorizing.

The basic foundation of constructivism is that social structures, identities and interests are determined mainly by shared ideas\(^1\). The
constructivist ontology can be explained around the concepts of intersubjectivity, context and power. The intersubjective understandings of norms, rules and ideologies can influence identities, interests and actions\(^2\). The context, be it spatial, historical or social, is important in the construction of meanings, but the meanings may be contested, and the study of power explores how certain meanings dominate over others\(^3\). Another important ontological assumption of constructivism is that of mutual constitution\(^4\).

Epistemologically, constructivists are divided between the poles of positivism and post-positivism. The essential differences between these polar positions can have considerable implications on interpretation and issues of causality. The constructivist who lean towards positivism look at norms as being stable while those who are inclined towards post-positivism see structures and meanings as unstable. In terms of causality the positivists seek explanations and lean towards generalization while the post-positivist are inclined towards case-specific understandings\(^5\).

Two other important elements in the constructivist theoretical framework are identity and interest. In very general terms, identities may be thought of as “a sense of self [that] often tells people what they should do”, and additionally; in the constructivist view, identities are social relationships that are mutable\(^6\). Identities help in formulating national interests or what the states or leaders of the state deem as the state’s needs; thus constructivist theorizing challenges the neoliberal, neorealist and the neomarxist position that the material interests are
the prime drivers of state interests. There is a general consensus among constructivist theorists that identity construction is based on a formulation of “us” and “them”.

In terms of labels, one parameter according to which constructivist theorizing is categorized is the unit of analysis or the level of analysis. A division along this aspect distinguishes three levels of analysis: systemic level, unit-level, and the holistic levels. The two extremes of this spectrum are the systemic and the unit level with holistic constructivist straddling the middle ground. Systemic constructivism posits that the identities of the state are to a great extent shaped by the structures of the international system and unit-level constructivism focuses on domestic factors as shapers of state identity. Another manner of classifying constructivist theorizing is between the labels of conventional and critical constructivism. The conventional constructivist view is reflected to some extent in the work of Alexander Wendt, and suggests the possibility of working in proximity to the epistemological and methodological frameworks of traditional, or relatively positivist, international relations theory. Critical constructivists take a more post-positivist view towards theorizing international relations.

A word of caution is needed here, because it is not always easy to draw the line between conventional and critical constructivism and on many accounts these classifications overlap. To further develop the theoretical framework of this research we specifically looked at the framework put forth by Alexander Wendt in 1999.
2.2 Alexander Wendt’s Constructivism

The most comprehensive attempt at elaborating the constructivist theoretical framework has been made by Alexander Wendt. Wendt’s 1999 book *Social Theory of International Politics* is recognized as a seminal work in the formulation and promotion of the constructivist framework. This section looks at Wendt’s theorizing in detail by focusing on his ontology, his epistemology, his development of the concepts of power, security, state, identity, interest, and, finally, the manner in which he theorizes the intersubjective norms of the international system.

In terms of ontology, defined here as that which relates answers to the question “What exists?” Wendt’s primary ontological position is ideational. Idealist, contrary to materialist, are of the view that the “most fundamental fact about society is the nature and structure of social consciousness.” To further clarify, what idealism does not necessarily imply is that ideas do not have an associated material reality and that power, or specifically military power, is of no importance.

The materialist ontology privileges causal questions while the idealist privilege constitutive questions. According to Wendt ideas have a constitutive relationship with phenomenon that the ideas or social structures have helped create. Wendt feels that ontological issues are important to the way in which International Relations is studied and these issues have not received the importance they deserve. Some international relations theorist have said that one
major reason for ontology not receiving enough importance is because epistemology, more specifically, because the positivist epistemology, has dominated the discipline of international relations. Wendt underscores this position by stating the “Constructivism should be construed narrowly as an ontology, not broadly as an epistemology”.

Epistemology can be described, quite literally, as “a theory of knowledge” and that study which seeks to further clarify the “nature and scope of knowledge”. Epistemological debates have been prominent points of division within International Relations theorizing and the epistemology of positivism has produced influential ontological ramifications. Positivism can be summarized as based on a belief in the unity of science, both natural and social science; and, a belief that there is a difference between values and facts, and, that objective facts do exist. Further, positivism holds that there is regularity in the natural and social world and, lastly, positivism posits that empirical verification is an important basic quality of research. The post-positivist take a position that observation is never entirely objective. Additionally, post-positivism implies a methodological inclination, because addressing constitutive questions means using interpretive methods.

Wendt does not feel that the ideational view of the world is necessarily incompatible with positivism. The approach he favors is scientific realism. This position advocates that objective facts exists independently and that scientific theories make reference to this reality even if the objective reality is not directly discerned by sense.
experience\textsuperscript{28}. Though Wendt leans towards positivism\textsuperscript{29}, still, he concedes that his method of social inquiry recognizes “a significant role for ‘understanding’”\textsuperscript{30}.

Other important elements of constructivist theorizing are power, security and the state. This section looks at how each of these three areas are covered in Wendt’s theorizing and, to better elucidate these concepts, briefly, also examines how Wendt’s conceptualizing of these important areas is similar or different from other mainstream theorist of international relations. The concept of power is an important element of neorealist theorizing, but power is also an important concept for neoliberals, Marxist and postmodernist. From the constructivist point of view, similarly, power is important. The distinguishing feature among these different theoretical frameworks is not the relative importance of power but rather the constitution of power. For realist power is constituted by material forces whereas, for constructivists, it is ideas\textsuperscript{31}.

An area with exhibits seemingly similar perspectives between neorealist and constructivist theorizing is the concern with security. Kenneth Waltz writes in his seminal work, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, that for states “security is the highest end” and states are most concerned about survival since this is a prerequisite for the pursuit of other goals\textsuperscript{32}. Further, Waltz suggests that states that balance the power of other states will prevail in international relations\textsuperscript{33}. The importance of security is also emphasized in other, non-realist paradigms of international relations and in some it “commands moral
The constructivist theorizing does not posit that these concerns of states are intrinsically justified or unjustified; rather, constructivists focus on how these formations came about. Constructivists theorize that it is the shared ideas of norms and institutions that constitute the ideas of the states about the international distribution of power and whether this distribution poses a threat.

The state is central to the theoretical framework being used in this dissertation. There are several conceptions of the essential state that are discussed by Wendt but he deems the Weberian concept of state as the most suitable for his theorizing. This concept is summarized by Wendt as “an organization possessing sovereignty and a territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence.” This definition lends itself to conceptualizing the state as an agential actor that is capable of being assigned interests and is able to take decisions to progress its interests.

Wendt recognizes that constituting states with anthromorphic qualities has not received much attention in international relations theorizing. Even though Waltz theorizes the state as an actor and he assigns the state qualities, still the qualities he assigns to the state, such as preserving the status quo and being egoist, are not susceptible to change. Post-positivist theorizing does not see the state as a pre-social, self-help driven actor and the state is not seen as a unit that is ahistoric. Despite the assignment of actor-like qualities to the state
the state has an ontological structure in Wendt's theorizing and he does not see the state reduced to the action of individuals\(^3\).  

The justifications of the state being “real” include that the state actions generate a pattern of empirical effects which have regularities over time and space\(^4\). Further conceptualizing the state Wendt posits that the state is a social structure that is driven by collective knowledge that is institutionalized and provides a basis for collective action\(^5\). The view of the state being used in this dissertation draws on the constructivist conceptualizations and is different from the way the state is theorized in the mainstream theories of neorealism and neoliberalism.  

Wendt sees identity as an important element in constructivist theorizing. He looks at identity formation as a social process and sees identities as dependent variables that are formed through a mechanism of social learning\(^6\). Thus the constructivist framework sees identities as being shaped through interaction\(^7\).  

In addressing the matter of state identity, Wendt acknowledges the complexity of this subject, when, after beginning with a philosophical and fairly general definition of identity as being “whatever makes a thing what it is”, he clarifies that this definition is much too broad to be useful in theorizing. Wendt identifies four different kinds of identities, namely: corporate, type, role, and collective. He is quick to caution that this is not necessarily a definitive or exhaustive list of possible classifications of identity. Wendt in examining the concept of corporate identity writes that this
kind of identity is “constituted by the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make international political actors distinct entities”. He says that a state can only have one such identity and this identity has a material and tangible foundation. Elaborating further Wendt says that corporate identity is constituted by a consciousness of “Self as a separate locus of thought and activity” and this form of identity is “exogenous to Otherness”. Thus corporate identity is a very intrinsic form of identity.44

The next identity is “type” identity and it refers to a shared characteristic or characteristics, which, among other things, may include attitudes, values, history, etc. Clarifying this concept Wendt says that only those characteristics are important that have social content, meaning that there is a commonly held definition of what counts as a type. The type identity increases the role of others in defining identity but still this identity retains a more intrinsic base than the role identity and collective identity.45

The third kind of identity is the “role” identity. Role identities show a greater dependence on culture and exist primarily in relation to other actors or, more particularly, states. An entity or an actor can have these identities by taking a “position in a social structure and following behavioral norms toward Others possessing relevant counter-identities”46. The three roles of enemy, rival and friend, provide a clear description of arrangements the relations between states may take. In the specific sphere of the use of violence, with enemies there may be no limits to the use of violence, with rivals violence may be used but it
is constrained by an avoidance of killing, and with friends there is no use of violence, rather, there is an inclination to work together to address security threats.47

The designated enemy will not respect the sovereignty of a state and there are no constraints placed on the use of violence.48 The representation of a state as a rival means that the designated rival does not respect the other’s right to sovereignty and liberty but will not use violence to resolve disputes.49 The third role relationship of is of a friend and Wendt feels that this conceptualization has been under theorized and says that one plausible reason may be that enmity and violence have been the primary concerns in international relations.50 This relationship of friendship may be defined as one in which disputes are settled without violence or the threat of violence and that the two states work together to ensure the security of each other.51

The final kind of identity classification that Wendt lists is “collective” identity which takes the relationship between one state and the other to a level where the distinction between these two blurs.52 Wendt acknowledges that except corporate identity all the other three identities can take different formulations. However, the activation of the different formulations is specific to the context that the actors or states find themselves in. Nonetheless, if conflicts do arise between identities within an actor then the solution to the identity conflicts will mirror the hierarchy of identity commitments in the actor and this hierarchy will follow the order in which the identities have been listed above, i.e., corporate identity taking precedence and collective identity.
coming in last place. However, Wendt acknowledges that there can be exceptions to this very general rule.\textsuperscript{53}

Wendt also details the nature of the link between identities and interests. He says that while identity implies interests it is not reducible to interests. Wendt also states that identities precede interests and the link between identities and interests also imparts interests with variability since identities can vary. Wendt, while indicating that identities precede interests, nonetheless, says that the relation between these two elements is constitutive and identities may also be influenced by interests. Wendt sheds light on his concept of interest by describing two different kinds of interests: objective and subjective. Objective interests are needs which must be fulfilled if an identity is to be reproduced and subjective interests refer to those beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their identity needs.\textsuperscript{54} Wendt draws on the 1980 work of George and Keohane\textsuperscript{55} in using three categories of national interests and supplements these three with one other category. The three interests include: physical survival, autonomy, and economic well-being (or maintenance of the state’s resource base). To this list of three interests Wendt adds a fourth state interest of collective self-esteem or a state’s need to feel good about itself and the need to be respected by others.\textsuperscript{56}

Wendt elaborates on the concept of intersubjective ideas by referring to the term culture. Culture is equated with shared ideas and Wendt concedes that there can be instances when international politics has no culture.\textsuperscript{57} He divides the concept of culture into two parts:
common knowledge and collective knowledge. Common knowledge is beliefs about the “rationalities, strategies and preferences” regarding states and the international system. Collective knowledge is more than beliefs and includes the knowledge structures that generate patterns of collective behavior. The norms and other intersubjective ideas have “constitutive effects when they create phenomena ... that are conceptually ... dependent on those ideas or structures.” Thus the relationship between norms and identities is one that is constitutive.

Taking aim at Waltz’s structural realism, Wendt examines the international system and the structure of anarchy in detail. Wendt theorizes that the structure of the system has influence on the identity and interests of the states. Thus, looking at the international system and the structure of anarchy, Wendt theorizes the role that the state takes is influenced by the social structure and reasons that the tendencies of system are contingent upon which role dominates the system. With regard to the role of foreign policy in Wendt’s theoretical framework, he says that social structures and agents are results of what actions are taken.

2.3 Theoretical Framework of this Research

The theoretical framework that has been adopted in this research is to a great extent based on Wendt’s theorizing, and shares many elements of Wendt’s theory, such as, the focus on security and the linking of norms, identity interests and practices. In the case of identity, also, this research draws heavily on Wendt’s
conceptualization but still there are some qualified departures. In some facets of the theoretical framework being used in this dissertation the deviations from Wendt’s theorizing are quite pronounced. These facets include the level of analysis, the epistemological positioning, and the emphasis that is accorded to social construction.

Like Wendt this research focuses on security related issues and adheres to the central tenet of constructivist approaches to security\textsuperscript{65}, which is, that security is a social construction and this construction is modulated through different constructions of identity\textsuperscript{66}. The focus of this research is on security leading to a particular kind of policy outcome which is then accompanied by certain identity constructions. However, there is need to clarify that the focus on security does not imply a focus on those aspects of identity that look only at security issues, but rather, the concern with the identity leaves the door open for identity constructions that, in addition to security, also draw on economic or cultural or political areas.

The constructivist conceptualization of international relations theorizes that identity provides an important link between intersubjectivly held ideas on the one hand; and interests and social practices on the other. Even though the constitutive nature of the constructivist theoretical framework configures a relationship between these elements that is not neatly linear, still, identity is positioned as a central constituent element in the constructivist theoretical framework. For instance, the bilateral relations between USA and Pakistan exercise a major influence on the foreign policy choices that Pakistan exhibits.
and consequences of this influence are incorporated in the identity that accompanies the bilateral foreign relations. The identity that is being investigated in this research is the identity that is constructed in an environment of prevailing intersubjective norms. The norms to consider are those that will influence and will interact with identity and vice-versa. Here the regional context is by far the most influential geography in evaluating the security scenario and in identifying the intersubjective norms that are most consequential.

There is a subtle divergence between Wendt’s conceptualization of identity and the conceptualization of identity being used in this dissertation. Wendt sees identity partially comprised at a level of basic, objective and unchanging identity called “corporate identity” and to a lesser extent “type identity”\textsuperscript{67}. The conceptualization of identity as is being used in this dissertation, views identity, in its majority, as socially constructed\textsuperscript{68}. The conceptualization of national identity in this research is ideational and is aligned with the conceptualization of an “imagined political community”\textsuperscript{69}. This conceptualization fits in with the ideational and social foundations that are being used in this dissertation.

This research also takes issue with another aspect of Wendt’s conceptualization of identity. This issue is with regards to the vagueness that accompanies Wendt’s conceptualization of identity and, particularly, his classification of the four types of identities which could also benefit from clearer demarcations. Wendt’s breakdown of the different kinds of identities can be seen as being anchored in two
related but different kinds of continuums: one is on the basis of level of external influence and the other is on the basis of mutability. Thus corporate identity is the least susceptible to external influence and the least mutable. While collective identity is most influenced by the external and is the most dynamic. The dissertation’s theoretical framework recognizes that the sources of influence in the construction of identity can be both internal and external.

Social phenomenon can be inherently relational, meaning that the social relational aspect is critical in a phenomenon’s constitution. This research takes a position that international relations between states are social and dominated by the relational aspect. Like Wendt’s conceptualization of role identity, this research takes the position that the relational aspect is important in understanding identity and foreign policies contribute to the constitution of identity “through the construction of threats, dangers, challenges...” Thus identity, especially identity that is relevant in a security context and that deals with an external threat or an external ally, is driven by a social relational aspect and is contingent through the external.

There remains a question about the sources of identity construction and in this research we focus on the elite who both formulate foreign policy and also propagate identities that support and legitimate foreign policy positions. The concept of “interpellation” sheds light on the nature of the relationship between leaders and societies and the process through which people acquiesce to the identity that is voiced by the elites. Interpellation, as used by Louis
Althusser, is an “act of recognition by which individuals are subjectified” and Althusser emphasizes that an individual becomes a subject when interpellated by another. In interpellation the population is moved towards a particular identity through a discourse of “us” and “them.” A good example of this phenomenon is seen in the work of David Campbell where the Cold War identities of USA and USSR are constructed through representations that consolidate an adversarial relationship.

The press is not utilized in this dissertation as a major source of identity construction. The dissertation takes the position that while the press in Pakistan does have an influence on the propagation of an identity that has been formulated by national foreign policy elites, still, the press has little ability to formulate an identity that deviates from the identity position of the foreign policy elite of Pakistan. To confirm the passive role of the press in the identity and policy formulation process we examine how the freedom of the press in Pakistan has been constrained by the government and other institutions. This constraining of the press has limited the press’s ability to offer a counter-discourse on matters of state security policy.

The restricted press freedom in Pakistan is reflected in the limited books available on this subject. Most of the books on the lack of freedom of the press in Pakistan are written by Pakistani journalist. These publications are limited, a reality that, by itself, may lend credence to the fact that restrictions are placed on the press in Pakistan. Zamir Niazi, a journalist, recounts the difficulty he faced in
getting his 1986 book *The Press in Chains* published, as none of the established publishers was ready to print it. Niazi writes that journalism is a “dangerous profession” and the press in Pakistan faces a variety of constricting pressures, including angry mobs demonstrating against certain contents of press coverage. Three such major mob incidents had occurred in the first ten years after Pakistan’s independence and in one case, in Dhaka in 1952, the offices of the *Morning News* newspaper were set ablaze. The attacks on newspaper offices continued through Pakistan’s history and between 1947 and 1991 thirty six major incidents had taken place.

The curtailing of press freedom, in addition to the attacking of newspaper offices, sometimes even includes the murder of journalists. It is estimated that in the period 1965 to 1991 nineteen journalist were killed in Pakistan.

Burhanuddin Hasan had worked for over four decades in print and broadcast journalism in Pakistan when he wrote his book *Uncensored: An Eyewitness Account of Abuse of Power and Media in Pakistan* in 2000. Commenting on the imposition of Pakistan’s first martial law in 1958, Hasan says that the press in West Pakistan “did not editorially protest against the abrogation of the constitution or the dissolution of the assemblies” and in East Pakistan the press was guarded and discrete in voicing criticism. Laws promulgated, such as the Press and Publication Ordinance of 1960 and amendments made to it in 1963 resulted in “strangulating the press and press freedom”. The placement of restrictions on the freedom of the press has been a
fairly consistent policy in Pakistan and this policy has not been limited to military led governments only. Z. Bhutto, Pakistan’s first elected prime minister in the early 1970s, has been accused of curtailing press freedom evidenced in how “he had closed down over three dozen newspapers and periodicals and sent about a dozen journalist to jail”85.

Another journalist, Inam Aziz, in a similar vein, provides an insight into journalism in Pakistan in his autobiographical book *Stop Press: A Life in Journalism*86. This book was first published in 1991 in Urdu and eighteen years later was translated to English and republished. Aziz began his journalistic career in 1949 and his achievements included working as the news editor of the widely read Urdu newspaper *Jang*. He recounts the first action that was taken by the government against a newspaper in which the *Civil and Military Gazette* newspaper was shut down for a period of three months for printing a story that the government was unhappy with. Aziz writes that this first instance began a “never-ending process against the press in Pakistan”87. Along with the attacking of newspaper offices and the killing of individual journalist there are a myriad of freedom constraining measures that journalists face in Pakistan. These measures include threats, harassment, physical beatings, jailing, etc.

The harassment and violence against the press, in addition to the government machinery, also comes from other quarters of society, and includes political parties and religious groups. The effect of this violence is to limit the effectiveness of the press as a site for conducting a meaningful dialogue among competing narratives. The
press in such conditions becomes a repository for the dominant discourse of the time, which in the case of security, is the government’s foreign policy position.

A prominent area of difference in this dissertation from Wendt’s theorizing is the departure from Wendt’s systemic level of theorizing to a Pakistan centered approach to security that focuses on bilateral foreign relations with USA. The analysis that is being conducted in this research is centered on Pakistan, on a regional security situation, and on bilateral relations with USA. This focus places the present research somewhere between the systemic and the unit (country) level.

Drawing on the work of Buzan and Waever on the regional security complexes, this dissertation takes a position that the regional level of security dynamics will usually be of importance in the regional and also the international security picture\(^8\). Wendt also supports a view that systemic cultures of the international system may be applied to regional sub-systems\(^9\). Thus the foreign relations between USA and Pakistan are shaped by a particular regional and international context which cannot conclusively by explained by exclusively focusing on either only the unit level or only the systemic level. The norms of the systemic international level are influential but the extent of their influence may be mitigated by national, bilateral, or regional factors.

Another area where this research framework differs from Wendt’s theorizing is on epistemological positioning. Wendt sees his epistemological position as one that leans towards positivism\(^9\) and he sees scientific realism as providing a “via media” between positivism
and post-positivism. Critics of Wendt’s theorizing have looked at the compatibility of constructivism and scientific realism with particular attention and some insist that the two are not entirely compatible. The debate around scientific realism and positivism is one that involves ontological issues and it is not limited to just the epistemological or methodological areas. One point highlighted is that Wendt’s use of scientific realism points toward the existence of things as an objective reality that is independent of our descriptions. However, to understand things descriptions are needed and these descriptions are not neutral and objective but rather are social and subjective. The framework that has been adopted in this research is a departure from Wendt’s scientific realism and takes the view that the natural world is different from the social world and, therefore, the methods used to study the natural world are unsuitable for the study of the social world. The social world also does not hold law-like generalities and, therefore, understanding rather than explaining the social world should be the endeavor for a researcher.

This research thus differs from the positivist position on epistemology and takes the position that a post-positivist approach that looks at understanding and discourse is better suited to understand foreign policy and identity. The post-positivist framework being used in this research places great emphasis on social construction. This approach, for lack of a better label, may be categorized as interpretive. However, there is a need to exercise caution with the assignment of an all-encompassing label to the research framework, as has been
prudently pointed out by Bevir and Rhodes that generally, "Interpretation is perhaps ubiquitous". The nature of this theoretical framework holds that there are no “objective” identities and the only identities are those that are produced in discourse.
Endnotes


3. Ibid., 9-11.

4. Ibid., 105.

5. Ibid., 12-15.

6. Ibid., 65.

7. Ibid., 86.

8. Ibid., 74.


15. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 24

16. Ibid., 24-25.

17. Ibid., 88.

18. Ibid., 37.


24. Ibid., 16.


26. Ibid., 85.

27. Ibid., 39-40.

28. Ibid., 47.

29. Ibid., 90.

30. Ibid., 39.

31. Ibid., 97.


33. Ibid., 121.


35. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 104.

36. Ibid., 199.

37. Ibid., 195.

38. Lene Hansen, “Poststructuralism,” in *Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (*5th*


40. Ibid., 216.

41. Ibid., 219.

42. Ibid., 318-319.

43. Ibid., 336.

44. Ibid., 224-225.

45. Ibid., 225-226.

46. Ibid., 227.

47. Ibid., 258.

48. Ibid., 260.

49. Ibid., 279-280.

50. Ibid., 298.

51. Ibid., 298-299.

52. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 229.

53. Ibid., 230-231.
54. Ibid., 231-232.


56. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 235-236.

57. Ibid., 158.

58. Ibid., 159.

59. Ibid., 161-162.

60. Ibid., 88.

61. Ibid., 247-248.

62. Ibid., 264.

63. Ibid., 259.

64. Ibid., 313.

65. Ibid.


67. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 224-227.


70. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 71.

71. Ibid., 224-228.


78. Ibid., 11.

79. Ibid., 16.

80. Ibid., 249.

81. Ibid., 250.

83. Ibid., 6.

84. Ibid., 8.

85. Ibid., 129.


87. Ibid., 71.


89. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 257.

90. Ibid., 90.

91. Ibid., 91.


Chapter 3

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
Chapter 3

Historical Foundations

The period before the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan is important to understand the historical foundations of a Muslim view of themselves and their perception of the international political system. In this period the Hindus, Muslims and the British interacted with elements of religion, history and politics to evolve perceptions of security, insecurity and identity.

This chapter examines the sweep of history that sees a Muslim community from the pre-partition era of the Indian subcontinent eventually redefine itself as a Muslim nation. The foundations that are explored here provide a background of continuities of relations that are of relevance for Pakistan’s identity and foreign policy. This approach to identity is social and, therefore, history provides a structure but not of an invariable nature, but rather, a structure that incorporates variability in the construction of identity.

3.1 Interaction between Muslims and Hindus

The interaction between the Hindus and Muslims began in the seventh century. The Arab Muslims initially came to the Indian subcontinent as traders. In 710 AD the pirates of Diabul seized an Arab ship. This seizure led the governor of the eastern part of the Arab
Empire to send an army led by Mohammad Bin Qasim to battle the Hindu King Raja Dahir.

In 711 Qasim was victorious against Dahir. The land conquered remained a part of the Arab Empire for the next couple of centuries. The initial conflict was followed by subsequent conflicts between the Arab Muslims and other Hindu rulers of the area and included conquests by armies led by various Muslim leaders, including Sultan Mahmood, Sultan Khalji and, later on, Zaheeruddin Babur.

In 1505 Babur, who would go on to become the first Mughal emperor of the Indian subcontinent, launched his first invasion of the Indian subcontinent through the Khyber Pass and in 1525 Babur launched his fifth and final invasion. By 1527, after major battles at Panipat and Khanua, Babur established himself as the dominant ruler of the northern part of the Indian subcontinent.

The Mughals, once established in the north, undertook expansion of their Empire. In the areas that they conquered the Muslim Mughal rulers instituted the jizya or tax on non-Muslims and this was resented by the Hindus. The Mughal Empire reached its peak during the reign of Aurangzeb and with his death in 1707 the empire started to decline.

Aurangzeb is widely viewed as a Mughal emperor who was more religious than the Mughal rulers who preceded him and his policies stoked resentment among the Hindu population. Aurangzeb’s reign saw many Hindu rulers rebelling against the Mughal Empire. In the century and a half that followed the death of Aurangzeb the political influence of the Muslim princes receded and there was a trend towards
an increase in the strength of selected Muslim religious leaders. These leaders included Shah Waliullah, Shah Abd-ul-Aziz and Sayyid Ahmad Barelawi. The growing importance of the Muslim religious leaders implied the growing importance of religion.

Religion provided a basis for augmenting the difference between the Muslim and the Hindu. The Muslim conquests had set in motion a process of influencing the indigenous population of India. The manifestations of this influence included the conversion of the local non-Muslim population to Islam and even though the majority of the population remained Hindu, still, the conversions created resentment among the unconverted Hindu population. The Hindus and Muslims were different in many ways as both religions provided a relatively full code of living and, therefore, there were many points of friction.

In addition to the differences that were directly derived from religion there existed distinctions that extended beyond religion. These distinctions were evidenced in the design of living spaces, cuisine, cooking utensils, language, poetry, music, etc. Among the differences between the two communities some were deeply divisive, such as, some members of a religious community viewing the other as impure and unclean and, thus, shunning contact with the other. Each community also restricted contacts with the other, partly because they were apprehensive over the loss of difference and because the religious beliefs of one community were, in some ways, the very antithesis of the other. Thus, over an extended period of Hindu and Muslim
interaction in the Indian subcontinent, by and large, the two groups remained segregated communities\textsuperscript{12}. 

As the influence of the British increased over the people and territory of Indian subcontinent, so did the competition between the Hindus and Muslims for the receiving the benefits that could be gained through cooperation with the British. Britain consolidated its rule over the Indian subcontinent after the Mutiny of 1857 (also referred to as the First War of Independence) by replacing the East India Company's control over Indian subcontinent with direct rule by the British government\textsuperscript{13}. The Muslims reacted to the strengthening British power by resisting what they regarded as the forcing of the British education and administrative system upon them but the Hindus were more enthusiastic towards the British and more eager to learn English\textsuperscript{14}. 

The British on account of the hostility of the Muslims, evidenced in Oudh and Delhi in 1857, were particularly harsh on the Muslims\textsuperscript{15} and, generally, the aftermath of the Mutiny saw the Muslims suffer more than the Hindus at the hands of the British\textsuperscript{16}. This persecution by the British led to a further withdrawal of Muslims from public affairs and resulted in accentuating the collective decline of the Muslims, as a group, compared to the Hindus\textsuperscript{17}. 

The disparity between the Hindus and Muslim, in terms of government jobs, can be seen in the province of Bengal in 1871, which had an almost equal population of Muslims and Hindus. Here, of the 773 responsible government jobs held by Indians, Muslim held only ninety-two positions and Hindus held 681\textsuperscript{18}. 


The political competition between the Muslims and Hindus was primarily reflected in the competition between the All India Muslim League (Muslim League) which was founded in 1906 and the Indian National Congress (Congress) which was founded in 1885. The Muslim League eventually became the prime representative of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent and was a powerful driver for the consolidation of a Muslim political identity that was exclusive of the Hindus. However, in the 1937 provincial election the Muslim League was not very successful and won only 104 of the 489 Muslim seats\textsuperscript{19}. The 711 seats won by the Congress resulted in the Congress forming governments in seven of the eleven provinces of the Indian subcontinent\textsuperscript{20}. The Congress as a policy decided to not provide the Muslim League representatives a place in the provincial cabinets\textsuperscript{21}.

The obtaining of political power by the Congress after the 1937 elections did not result in reducing the friction between the Hindus and the Muslim but rather in increasing it. Despite the increased representation of the local population in local politics the sources of violence between Hindus and Muslims remained, just as it had been, over land, cow slaughter, and other religious beliefs\textsuperscript{22}. This continuation of violence consolidated the perception among the Muslim minority that the rule by the Hindu majority would not improve the living conditions for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.

Concrete actions by the Congress in the aftermath of the 1937 elections, which were interpreted as manifestations of Hindu nationalism, were very much the reason for galvanizing anti-Hindu and
anti-Congress sentiments among the Muslim community. The actions by the Congress included the adoption of the *Bande Mataram*, which was seen to contain elements that were anti-Islam, as a national anthem of sorts and replacing the Urdu language, which was popular among Muslims, with the Hindi language, which was popular among Hindus, as the language of instruction in schools.

The interaction between the Muslim and Hindus began in a context that saw peaceful coexistence interspersed with periodic confrontation. The episodes of violent confrontation were followed by centuries of interaction between the two communities in the process of living alongside each other. The purely religious differences were supplemented by the cultural differences and both combined to sustain a distance between the Hindus and Muslims that persisted over centuries. During the colonial era there arose a competition between Hindus and Muslims in matters of employment. In the four decades before partition there was competition between the two communities over political power. The actions of the Hindu dominated Congress after the 1937 elections provided a tangible indicator that the political interests of the Muslims and the Hindus were at odds with each other.

### 3.2 Interaction between Muslims and British

In the effort to consolidate their hold over the Indian subcontinent the British instituted policies to weaken the hold of the former Muslim rulers, and the Muslim population, from position of influence in the affairs of the subcontinent. The measures adopted
towards this end included the change of the official language from Persian to Urdu in 1837\textsuperscript{26} which resulted in the Muslims losing their position of prominence in civil administration\textsuperscript{27}. The British policy towards Muslims in the period immediately following the Mutiny of 1857 heightened the confrontation between the British and the Muslims because the British felt the Muslims were mainly responsible for the Mutiny and, therefore, the Muslims were persecuted\textsuperscript{28}.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan strove to stem the decline the Muslims were experiencing by encouraging the Muslims to become loyal subjects of the British rulers\textsuperscript{29}. Khan’s aim was to get the Muslims to obtain government positions through gaining of a western education and through developing an understanding the British administrative system in the Indian subcontinent\textsuperscript{30}.

Khan himself had demonstrated his loyalty to the British by sheltering British families from the violence of 1857\textsuperscript{31} and he attempted to convince the Muslims of the benefits of obtaining an education of English and of loyalty to the British. He also tried to convince the British that the Muslim could be trusted\textsuperscript{32}. Khan’s efforts eventually resulted in a reversal of the Muslim confrontation with the British.

The Muslim support for the British was clearly evident during the Second World War. The British declared war in September 1939 and unlike the Muslim League the Congress was clear in its lack of support for the war. The Congress party’s Working Committee issued a resolution on 15 September 1939 that stated that they could not support
the British war effort unless the Indian subcontinent was free\textsuperscript{33}. Earlier, Nehru in 1938 had criticized the British policies and had said that these policies were increasing the likelihood of war and that he would be opposed to an “imperialist war”. Nehru’s and the Congress’s reluctance in supporting the British during the war made the British more sympathetic towards the Muslim\textsuperscript{34}.

Beginning with the twentieth century the British undertook several concrete steps to help augment the political power of the Muslims. In 1905 the British launched a scheme to divide the Bengal province into an eastern and a western part. This division would result in a predominantly Muslim Eastern Bengal and thus would provide an important geographical area where Muslim could dominate politics. This move was, therefore, opposed by the Hindus and supported by the Muslims\textsuperscript{35}. Even though the decision to divide Bengal was reversed by the British later, still, the early twentieth century saw the British increasingly support the Muslim in obtaining political power in the subcontinent.

In 1906 a delegation of about seventy prominent Muslims called on the Viceroy, Lord Minto, at Simla. This delegation called for a separate electorate for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent\textsuperscript{36}. Later in 1906 the Indian Secretary of State, John Morley, and the Viceroy, Lord Minto, announced the Morley-Minto parliamentary reforms. These reforms included the establishment of separate electoral representation for the Muslims\textsuperscript{37}. The promise of separate Muslim electorate provided an impetus for the resolution to create the Muslim League at the
November 1906 meeting of the Aligarh’s Mohammedan Education Conference.

To fully capitalize on the political opportunity that had been provided by the British the Muslim League had to transition from an elitist party in 1906 to a populist party. At its founding in 1906 the membership was limited to 400 members. The annual membership fees was Rupees twenty-five and membership was limited to those who had an annual income of at least Rupees 500. The Muslim league continued to remain a party of the elites and in 1927 it had a very limited base of membership that numbered less than a couple of thousands. In fact during the elections of 1937 one of the claims used by the Congress party to appeal to the Muslim population was to depict itself as the champion of the poor Muslims and portray the Muslim League as a party of privileged lawyers and large land owners.

The Muslim League was sensitive to the need for wider appeal and it reduced its annual subscription from Rupees six to Rupee one in 1931. In 1939 it was estimated that the Muslim League had a membership that numbered in the millions. The growing political strength of the Muslims led them to formally announce that the Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations. The Muslim League and the Two-Nation theory received the resounding support of the Muslims of India in the December 1945 and January 1946 provincial elections when the Muslim League won 446 of the 495 Muslim seats.

The initial sense of rivalry that Muslims of the Indian subcontinent felt towards the British was based on the resentment the
Muslims of the Indian subcontinent felt towards the British for displacing the Muslims from their position of power as rulers. The resentment reached a peak in the period around the Mutiny of 1857. After the Mutiny there was a process of reversal of the animosity between the Muslims and the British and, later, the British were instrumental in providing increased political power to the Muslims. The cooperation between the British and Muslims generally continued to increase till very close to the time of the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent.

3.3 Identity and Confrontation with the Hindus

The Muslim identity was homogenized in relation to difference with a Hindu community. Some have challenged this homogeneity by emphasizing the diversity that has existed and still exists within the Muslim of the Indian subcontinent, saying that the Muslims “never were and still are not a homogenous, monolithic community …”\textsuperscript{46}. On the basis of ethnicity, the diversity of the Muslims in India can be traced to the three major waves of Muslim ethnicities that invaded the subcontinent. The first invaders were the Arabs and they ventured onto the Indian subcontinent during the seventh and eighth century. The Arabs were followed by Afghans and Persians in the tenth and eleventh century and, finally, the Turkic-Mongols invaded the subcontinent between the twelfth and sixteenth century\textsuperscript{47}.

The strengthening of the Muslim identity necessitated a suppression of the differences that existed among the Muslims by
depicting the Muslims in the most basic commonality. This commonality was in basic difference to the Hindus. The stabilization of a Muslim identity in difference to Hindus took recourse to the most basic of the basics: the monotheism of Islam versus the polytheism of Hinduism. A portrayal of such a Muslim identity is found in the April 1946 Cabinet Mission meeting between Stafford Cripps, the representative of the British government, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League and eventual Quaid-i-Azam or founding father of Pakistan. Cripps asked Jinnah if he thought that the difference between the Muslim Pathans of the N.W.F.P. (now corresponding to the KPK province in Pakistan) and Muslims of Sind was greater or the difference between the Muslims of Bengal and Hindus of Bengal. Jinnah replied that basic principle that united all Muslims was the oneness of God …"48.

The Muslim identity established in religious difference to the Hindus was further strengthened in the face of a threatening Hindu. The existential threat the Muslims faced from the Hindu is reflected in cultural, physical and political terms. The threat from one community group to the other was realized as multilayered and potent. This posture is reflected in the comments made by the Muslim League’s first President Viqar-ul-Mulk in 1906 when he says that if the majority Hindu community was to rule India then the Muslim of India should realize that “our life, our property, our honor, and our faith will all be in great danger”49.
The loss of faith was perhaps the most threatening of all the threats that the one community posed for the other. This powerful threat found sustenance in a Hindu perception that “Islam is not indigenous to India [and] came to India wielding the evangelizing sword of the invader ...”\(^5^0\). The existential threat that was posed by Hindus to the Muslims is reflected in the Hindu movement of Sangathan which aimed at organizing the Hindu against the Muslims and the Shuddhi movement which “used social pressure against poor and ignorant Muslims to get [them] converted to Hinduism”\(^5^1\).

The basic division between Hindus and Muslims on the basis of religion was further strengthened by the infusion of politics into the divide. The creation of a political organization ushered in a Muslim identity of a nation and not just as a community and the first use of the term “national interest” by the Muslims was in 1906 at Simla in an address to the Viceroy\(^5^2\). The political recognition and future empowerment of the Muslims through the mechanism of the separate electorate helped the Muslims emerge as a political force. Jinnah and the Muslim League reflect the political threat the Hindu posed for the Muslim. Jinnah in a statement made on 12 March 1947, when he was president of the Muslim League, makes reference to the danger the Hindus posed for the Muslim by saying that the goals of the Muslim League and the Muslims of India were not only different from the Congress and Hindus but were in “conflict.”\(^5^3\)

The consolidation of a Muslim identity was contingent on broadening the political participation of the Muslim in the Muslim
League. The Muslim League represented the vehicle that would ensure security for the Muslims and the League had evolved from a rather elitist party of privileged Muslims, at its founding to a party that catered to the Muslim masses. The Congress policy of excluding the Muslim League representatives from politics, apparent in the exclusion of Muslim League representation in the cabinet after the 1937 election, also severed as a catalyst for galvanizing the Muslims towards the Muslim League. This trend was apparent in the 1937 meeting of the Muslim League in Lucknow where erstwhile Muslim leaders, like Fazul-ul-Haq of Bengal and Muhammad Saadullah of Assam, who had not joined the Muslim league up till that point, openly advised Muslims to join the Muslim league.

The Muslim League and Jinnah were both important pieces in the identity formation of the Muslims. The Muslim League provided a much needed political base and Jinnah provided directional and symbolic leadership. Jinnah has a singular place of “primacy” in the history of Pakistan, however, Jinnah was both an initiator and an embodiment of the views of the Muslim. He symbolized the resurgence of Muslims as a group and his dress and manner reflected the transition of the Muslim League from an elitist to a populist party. From the early 1940s Jinnah often appeared in public meetings dressed in the traditional coat or sherwani.

The religious platform was also used to reinforce the political difference between the Muslim and the Hindu community. The sermons that were delivered from the mosques in the subcontinent reinforced
the two-nation theory by emphasizing the Muslim incompatibility with the Hindus and the need for Muslim cohesion\textsuperscript{58}. Religion was used to mobilize the masses and establish a distinct Muslim identity.

Jinnah knew that religion was an important focal point even though many of the Muslim elites in India were not devoted Muslims and also many of the poor rural area Muslims were not strict in their Islamic observances, still, Muslims had a feeling that a Muslim state was good for Islam\textsuperscript{59}. In the politics of the Muslim League the uniting of Muslims under a Muslim identity was potent and Islam was important element in forging such an identity. The Muslim League recognized this reality and, therefore, Islam and Islam in danger, emerged as the rallying calls of the Muslim League in the 1937 elections\textsuperscript{60}.

The danger of the cultural influence of the Hindu is reflected in the admonishments of Shah Waliullah, a prominent Islamic leader of the 18th century, who told Muslims not to adopt Hindu customs such a participation in the Hindu festival of \textit{dewali} and to not follow the Hindu tradition of playing music at weddings\textsuperscript{61}. The cultural threat to Muslims from the Hindus was in many instances a conflation of culture and religion, and what was merely a cultural tradition for one group was sacrilege for the other. One such act, that had been a long-standing area of Hindu-Muslim friction, was the conflict between the Hindu veneration for the cow and the Muslim fondness for beef\textsuperscript{62}.

In terms of international politics the Hindu threat to the Muslims of India was projected beyond a regional context to a global scope.
This scope is reflected in a 1946 meeting between Egypt’s Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha and Jinnah, where Jinnah says that the “menace” of the Hindu rule if consolidated in a undivided “Hindus empire ... will mean the end of Islam in Indian, and even in other Muslim countries...”  

With the decline of the Mughal Empire and the ascendancy of the East India Company there was a feeling of decline amongst the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The construction of identity on the basis of religion helped establish a connection between the Muslims living in the Indian subcontinent in the twentieth century and the Mughal emperors of the several centuries prior. This glorious past was steeped in honor and the Muslims were searching for pride in their past and this pride saw a turn to the era of Mughal rule in India. This linking with a glorious past is depicted in Jinnah’s Eid-ul-Fitar message that was read at the Eidgah, New Delhi, on October 12, 1942. Jinnah says that the Muslims came to India “as conquerors, traders, preachers and teachers and brought with them their own culture and civilization and founded mighty empires and built up great civilizations”. This glorious past is incommensurate with a future of subservience to the Hindus and Jinnah is reported to have said in a speech a few years before partition, while campaigning in the Muslim majority north western part of the subcontinent, that if the Hindus had their way than the Muslims would be reduced to being the slaves of the Hindus. Thus one appeal of the two nation theory drew on the history of the
Muslim as once rulers and therefore unwilling to accept being ruled by the Hindus\textsuperscript{68}.

The demand for Pakistan reminded the Muslims of their past glory and Pakistan became a possible vehicle for attaining greatness again\textsuperscript{69}. Jinnah, in a statement made on 12 March 1947 talked about the goals of the Muslim League and the Muslims of India and said that independence is the only solution that will bring “credit and bring honor” to the Muslims\textsuperscript{70}.

The construction of a Muslim identity involved the homogenizing of a Muslim “self” against a Hindu “other”. The differences between the two communities helped ferment a threat perception from one to the other. The religious and cultural threat was consolidated through political competition.

3.4 Identity and Cooperation with the British

The confrontation between Islam and the Christianity has its genesis in the advent of Islam. The expansion of the Islamic Arab Empire, in instances, led to contention between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. In the Indian subcontinent, the displacement of the remnants of the Mughal Empire and the persecution of the Muslims by the British also increased friction. However, the post-Mutiny cooperation between the Muslims and the British was accompanied by a Muslim identity that was more accommodating of difference with the British. Syed Ahmad Khan was an important influence in the accommodation.
Khan emphasized that the Muslims would have to be loyal to the British. He emphasized that Islam was tolerant of Christian doctrines and that the religious differences between Muslims and Christians were almost like the differences between the Unitarians, Christians, and Orthodox Christians. Khan sought to recast the history of religious confrontation between the Muslims and Christians by saying that the Crusades were partly political wars and should not be seen as purely religious wars. He also reinforced the possibility of accommodation with the British by displacing the historical position of confrontation with the Christians by pointing out that Islam was itself in need of a religious reformation.

The leaning towards the British was also, in part, influenced by the economic and industrial progress that Britain had made since the 1500s. The Eurocentric myth making of the 1500 to 1900 period depicted a superior West that was capable of progress and development and compared it to a East populated by “despotic and irrational institutions that block economic progress”.

The perception of European development and progress during this period was in many ways supported by European advances such as the growth of the international economy, the Industrial Revolution, stability in Europe, and improvement in European military technology. The West, and Britain as a particular case, had made significant progress compared to the East, and the subcontinent in particular. This relative change is evident in the examining the level of industrial production between 1760 and 1860 where the British share of
world industrial production increased from 1.9% to 19.9%, however, the share of Indian subcontinent, in the world industrial production, actually declined. The progress of Britain was not lost on the Muslim leadership and Khan was also known to be impressed with the industrial, scientific and economic progress of the West and he emphasized to the Muslims that they cannot progress without adopting a modern attitude.

The empirical realities of Western progress were accompanied by a narrative deprecating the East. Both these powerful ideas were partly reflected in the discourse of the Muslim leaders of the subcontinent. On a personal level the positioning of Britain as a source of benefit is mirrored in the lives of two important Muslim leaders: Khan and Jinnah. Khan was an employee of the British government at the time of the Mutiny and the British later provided him help in the establishment of educational institutions for Muslims. The firm owned by Jinnah’s father was associated with the British managing agency Douglas Graham and Company. The agency’s general manager in Karachi, Sir Fredrick Croft, recommended Jinnah for an apprenticeship at the Company’s office in London in 1892. This provided the sixteen year old Jinnah an opportunity to commence his journey of Western education which culminated in 1896 with Jinnah becoming a barrister from the Lincoln’s Inn.

The Muslim perception of themselves recognized that they, as a community, were weak and threatened. This was recognized by Khan soon after the Mutiny of 1857. He also became weary of the Hindu
motives after the 1867 Hindu campaign in Benares to substitute Hindi in place of Urdu as the language of the courts. Later, Khan discouraged Muslims from joining the Congress party which was founded in 1885 as a representative political organization for the Indians of the subcontinent. Khan felt the Congress would go on to become a voice for representing the views of the Hindu majority and not the Muslim minority. Khan linked the loyalty with the British to the religious freedom and survival of the Muslims and said that the British had kept the Hindus in check.

The founders of the Muslim League were also loyal to their British rulers and believed that British protection was necessary for their safety and security from the Hindu majority. This sentiment is echoed by the first President of the Muslim League, Viqar-ul-Mulk, in a public speech to Muslim supporters in 1906 where he says that “a powerful British administration is protecting its subjects” meaning the Muslims but he adds that still the Muslims are not safe and to ensure continued safety the Muslims should “congregate under the banner of Great Britain, and to devote their lives and property in its protection.”

The Muslim population resented the manner in which the Hindus had handled matters of governance following the elections of 1937 and what was worrisome for the Muslims was that they had received this unfair treatment from the Congress whilst the British remained in control of the central government and if the British were not in the
Indian subcontinent and if the Hindus alone controlled the government then the treatment of the Muslims was sure to be much worse.\textsuperscript{86}

The Muslim accommodation of the British faced important challenges during the World Wars. The first challenge revolved around the support for the British versus support for the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. There was a clear viewing of the confrontation between Turkey and Britain as a confrontation between a once powerful Muslim Empire that was no longer so, and a Christian British Empire that was gaining in strength. The support by some Muslims for Turkey and the \textit{Khilafat} movement from 1918 to 1924 was laden with emotion as the Muslims of the subcontinent looked at the Ottoman Empire as a symbol of Muslim’s glorious past.\textsuperscript{87} Earlier on, Khan had sought to convince the Muslims of the subcontinent that they were not the subjects of Sultan Hamid of Turkey who was a monarch and not their \textit{Khalifa}.\textsuperscript{88}

In 1914 when the Ottoman Empire, or what remained of it, chose to align with the Central Powers and not with Britain and its allies, the Muslim leaders in the subcontinent were divided between pan-Islamism and the Caliphate, on the one hand, and the loyalty to the British, on the other. The Muslim League leadership, by and large, advocated for suppressing a possible confrontation with the British. This was evident in how several Muslim League leaders had argued against the holding of the annual meeting of December 1914 to avoid publicizing the anti-British sentiments of some of its members.\textsuperscript{89}
The progress of the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent required a revision of the relations that had existed between the Muslims and the British since before the Mutiny of 1857. The revising of the traditional antagonism towards the British required the review of relational identity between Christianity and Islam. There was also a necessary acknowledgement of weakness of the Muslim community and recognition of the powerfulness of the British rulers. The cooperation with the British was constructed as means for overcoming the weakness and insecurity of the Muslims.
Endnotes


5. Kazimi, *Concise History*, 46

6. Ibid., 48-49.


10. Ibid., 25.


15. Ibid., 13.


18. Ibid., 13-14.

19. Ibid., 83.

20. Kazimi, *Concise History*, 130


24. Ibid., 88.


26. Ibid., 85.

27. Sayeed, *Pakistan*, 13


30. Ibid., 8.


36. Ibid., 28.


38. Ibid., 24.


41. Ibid., 90.

42. Ibid., 177.

44. Kazimi, *Concise History*, 140.

45. Ibid., 145.


47. Ibid., 13-14.


49. Ibid., 25.


58. Ibid., 10.
59. Ibid., 198.


62. Ibid., 25.


64. Dani, “Introduction,” 7.


68. Ibid., 10.

69. Ibid., 179.


72. Ibid., 16.

73. Ibid., 16.

74. Ibid., 16.


77. Ibid., 190-193.


84. Ibid., 15.


87. Ibid., 101.


Chapter 4

PAKISTAN’S INSECURITY PERSPECTIVE
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Pakistan’s Insecurity Perspective

Security issues have been a prime concern in Pakistan’s foreign relations. The primary source of insecurity is seen to be across the border from India, but, to varying extents and in different periods, other threats to security have also emerged with other neighbors, such as, Afghanistan (see map on following page). Threats have also materialized from countries like the USSR and from USA’s WoT. Two additional factors magnify the insecurity Pakistan has faced from the outside world. These factors include the periods during which Pakistan was receiving little or no security cooperation from USA and the marginal support, militarily and otherwise, that Pakistan has usually received from Muslim countries.

4.1 India

The partition of 1947 created the states of Pakistan and India. This was a significant change from the pre-partition political setting of British colonial power ruling over a majority Hindu community and a minority Muslim community. Now Pakistan was a new and independent state where Muslims were in the majority and a Hindu majority lived in the newly created state of India.

The formation of a Pakistani and Indian state altered the context in which the Hindu and Muslim communities in the subcontinent had
Map of Asia
interacted with each other during the time of the Mughal Empire and, later on, during the British rule. The context changed from one of communal interaction to the interaction between two independent states. The historical foundations of the interaction between these two communities now conflated with the intersubjective norms of relations between states, to define the new relationship between Pakistan and India. The modern concept of the state brought with it the norms of sovereignty and borders to the newly formed states of India and Pakistan. Alongside these configurations the new states also carried forward the historical foundations of the communal confrontation between the Hindu and Muslim communities in the Indian subcontinent.

The primary source of insecurity for Pakistan in the early period after independence was India. The two countries, from the very outset, realized the threat from each other in the massive loss of life and property seen during the migration that immediately followed partition. The cross-border migration of Muslims to Pakistan and Hindus and Sikhs to India resulted in the deaths of around half a million people and over ten million were displaced. This scale of this migration and its violent nature left a deep mark on the minds of the population of both India and Pakistan. The new state borders also brought with them territorial contention and resulted in a dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. The territorial dispute over Kashmir was, and remains, one of the major sources of conflict between Pakistan and India.
Jammu and Kashmir was the largest princely state in the Indian subcontinent and, though the ruler was a Hindu, around eighty percent of the population was Muslim. In October 1947 a section of the local population rebelled against the ruler and later this group was joined by a couple of thousand armed Muslim tribesmen from the northwestern part of Pakistan. On 26 October 1947 the ruler fled the capital Srinagar and announced the state’s accession to India. On 27 October 1947 India flew in troops to Srinagar and quelled the revolt and drove back the tribesmen. Since that time the issue of Jammu and Kashmir has remained a dispute between Pakistan and India with part of the area of Jammu and Kashmir being in the control of Pakistan and part being in the control of India. In addition to the violence of the migration and the territorial dispute over Kashmir, there were also other issues of contention between India and Pakistan in the period immediately following partition.

The issues of contention between Pakistan and India, in addition to the Kashmir dispute, included the division of assets of the Indian subcontinent, the distribution of the waters of certain rivers, the property claims of the migrants, and the demarcation of the international borders. India withheld Pakistan’s share of the cash balances and this singular act created great difficulties for Pakistan. Acts such as this, among others, posed a serious threat to the very existence of Pakistan and Jinnah is said to have remarked to the former viceroy, Mountbatten, in November 1947, that he felt India was out to throttle Pakistan at its birth.
The issues with India became more threatening for Pakistan in view of the lack of symmetry between the economic and military strength of the two countries. The scale of the disparity between the two countries is evidenced in Pakistan having less than ten percent of the industrial base of undivided Indian subcontinent and twenty-three percent of the total population of the subcontinent. In terms of military strength, India had seventy percent of the army of the Indian subcontinent and Pakistan had thirty percent.

The threat to Pakistan from India was instantiated in three wars between the two countries over a period of around seven decades. The first war took place in 1948, the second in 1965, and the third in 1971.

The security threat to Pakistan from India has been persistent except for those periods during which it was overtaken by other threats. One such period was during USSR’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. India reacted to this new development in the regional geopolitical situation by failing to condemn USSR for invading Afghanistan. This was a clear indication that India was not opposed to USSR’s moves in the region. India’s response to USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan was also evidenced in India being the only country, other than communist bloc countries, that did not vote against USSR in the 1980 UN General Assembly vote condemning USSR’s action in Afghanistan.

However, as the Afghan resistance started gaining ground and USSR came closer to withdrawing the Indian threat one again gained in prominence. In 1987 India conducted its largest military exercises in
Rajistan near the Pakistani border which caused tension to rise between the two countries\textsuperscript{9}. The rising tensions between India and Pakistan also brought to the forefront the nuclear issue. After the 1987 military exercises by India, Zia in an interview with \textit{Time} magazine said that “Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes”\textsuperscript{10}.

Pakistan’s foreign relations with India remained tense through the period 1989 to 2001. There was an improvement in the relations in February 1999 when Prime Minister Vajpayee of India visited Lahore, Pakistan, travelling on the bus service that had recently opened between the two countries. This visit signaled an opening up of a process of dialogue between the two countries. However, this process was curtailed a few months later by the occupation of a tactically superior position near the mountainous town of Kargil by Kashmiri insurgents who were reportedly aided by Pakistan\textsuperscript{11}.

Following the 9/11 attacks India tried increasingly to show Pakistan as a country that supported terrorism both in South Asia and in the world. Pakistan was said to be responsible for the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, diplomatic relations between the two countries were downgraded and India moved its troops to positions closer to the Pakistan border\textsuperscript{12}. Pakistan responded by also moving troops closer to the border and this precarious situation lasted for close to one year. In April 2003 there was a gradual reversal of this tension between India and Pakistan. Following the January 2004 meeting between President Musharaff and the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in Islamabad, at the SAARC Summit, there was a gradual resumption of
the composite dialogue between the two countries\textsuperscript{13}. The leaders of India and Pakistan again met in New Delhi in April 2005 and announced that the peace process was now “irreversible”\textsuperscript{14}.

The views on the effect of nuclear weapons on the relationship between the India and Pakistan varies between those who feel that nuclear weapons have resulted in stabilizing the volatile relations and others who argue that nuclear weapons have had a destabilizing effect\textsuperscript{15}. The fact that it has been more than a decade since there has been any major hostility between a nuclear Pakistan and a nuclear India supports the claim that the nuclear deterrence may be contributing to averting a conventional war. Though war between the two nuclear weapon states has been averted still the ensuing peace has been, and remains, tense.

The threat from India has been the main source of insecurity for Pakistan. The threat from India is underpinned by a lingering and unresolved territorial dispute over Kashmir. The Indian threat has manifested itself in three wars and in a persistent cross-border tension between Pakistan and India.

4.2 Afghanistan

In addition to India, Pakistan also faced a threat from Afghanistan, albeit, a lesser threat than the threat it faced from India. The territorial contention with Afghanistan had its roots in certain areas that lie in the northwest of Pakistan. These areas were part of the territory conquered by Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah in the 1700s. After a
period of conflict and uncertainty the border between the British and the Afghans settled at the Durand Line in the 1890s. The Afghan government continued to harbor a desire to regain what was once its territory. As the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent neared, the Afghans approached the British government in 1944 to gain those Pashtu speaking lands that extended beyond the Durand Line. The British refused the Afghan claim but this refusal did not resolve the matter and the contention over territory continued\textsuperscript{16}.

In July of 1947 the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) voted to be a part of Pakistan and, subsequently, the tribes of what later would become the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan, held a \textit{loya jirga}, or a public meeting of local notables, who also decided to stay with Pakistan. Afghanistan reluctantly accepted these decisions but the issue remained a source of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan\textsuperscript{17}. A good indication of the Afghan attitude towards the newly formed state of Pakistan is reflected in Afghanistan’s opposition to Pakistan’s membership in the UN\textsuperscript{18}.

The territorial contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan has intermittently resulted in the disruption of trade and transit between the two countries. Since Afghanistan is a landlocked country the trade and transit through Pakistan is very important for it. To lessen its dependence on Pakistan the Afghanistan government looked northward for transit routes and in 1950 signed a trade agreement with USSR. This agreement helped strengthen the relationship between the USSR
and Afghanistan and the relationship grew rapidly from this point onward\textsuperscript{19}.

In 1955 Afghanistan opposed the decision by the Pakistani government to integrate the NWFP province into a single western unit. Mobs attacked the Pakistani embassy in Kabul and this was followed by attacks in Pakistan on the Afghan consulate in Peshawar\textsuperscript{20}. The USA was apprehensive that the disruption of the Afghan transit routes through Pakistan would push Afghanistan towards USSR\textsuperscript{21}. In 1955 USA interceded to reduce tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan and, later that year, diplomatic relations were restored between the two neighboring countries\textsuperscript{22}.

Pakistan regarded the threat posed by Afghanistan as one that could be handled since Afghanistan had a smaller military than Pakistan and Afghanistan was to a great extent dependent on Pakistan for its transit trade\textsuperscript{23}.

In Afghanistan, after the withdrawal of USSR, a civil war developed between the different mujahedeen factions. The Taliban, managed to wrestle power to a great extent in 1995 but the civil war continued. During the civil war in Afghanistan, Pakistan supported the Taliban and after they came to dominate most of Afghanistan, the Afghan threat to Pakistan significantly receded.

\section*{4.3 USSR}

The growing cooperation between USSR and Afghanistan contributed to the shaping of USSR as a more concrete threat for
Pakistan in the 1980s. The USSR was viewed as a threat in two different ways. Firstly, there was a concern around territorial integrity based on the recognition that USSR was interested in attaining access to the warm waters south of Afghanistan\(^24\), and, secondly, the threat came from the ideology of communism.

The USSR had explored the possibility of developing friendly ties with Pakistan and had even reportedly extended an invitation to the Pakistani prime minister in June 1949 to visit USSR. At that time, since neither Pakistan nor USSR had established embassies in the others country, this diplomatic maneuver was carried out through the Pakistan embassy in Iran\(^25\). The USSR suggested that Liaquat Ali Khan, the Pakistani prime minister, arrive in Moscow on 15 August 1949. Liaquat said that because of the Pakistan Day celebrations he could not arrive on that date. The next dates that were looked at were in early November. However, there was an apparent delay by USSR in both approving the Pakistani ambassador to USSR and in appointing USSR’s ambassador to Pakistan\(^26\).

In reaction to USSR’s invitation to the Pakistani prime minister, in December 1949, USA extended an invitation to Liaquat to visit USA and, subsequently, Liaquat’s USSR visit was indefinitely postponed. In May 1950 Liaquat visited USA\(^27\) confirming Pakistan’s leaning towards USA not USSR. The preference for USA was subsequently cemented by Pakistan’s joining the Western alliances of SEATO and CENTO in the mid-1950s.
In the late 1950s Pakistan further deepened its cooperation with USA by granting USA permission to set up a facility for intelligence gathering on USSR and also provided USA usage of the Peshawar airport for secret U2 aircraft intelligence gathering flights over USSR\textsuperscript{28}. These were important concessions to USA and they eventually contributed towards aggravating Pakistan’s relations with USSR. A notable incident in the deteriorating relations occurred when USSR shot down a U-2 aircraft in 1960 and captured the pilot. In the aftermath of the U-2 incident the Soviet leader Nakita Khrushchev issued a warning to Pakistan, Norway, and Turkey to “not play with fire”\textsuperscript{29}.

After almost a nine year struggle between the Afghan Mujahedeen and the army of USSR, USSR relented and on 14 April 1988 the representatives of USA, USSR, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva accord thus formalizing the drawing down of USSR’s presences in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{30}. In February 1989 the remaining USSR soldiers left Afghanistan and later the Najibullah government fell\textsuperscript{30}. The USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and its subsequent break-up brought to an end the longstanding USSR threat to Pakistan.

\textbf{4.4 Noncooperation with USA}

The 1962 border war between India and China had major consequences on the geopolitics of the South Asian region. The USA favorably viewed the fact that India was treating China as an enemy\textsuperscript{32}. This war was a harbinger for increasing USA’s support for India.
Pakistan was apprehensive at the change in the role of USA in the region. On 22 June 1964 the Foreign Minister, Z. Bhutto said before the National Assembly that USA had no regard for Pakistani interests. In 1965 India and Pakistan went to war. During the hostilities Pakistan asked USA to intervene and help under the 1959 USA-Pakistan bilateral agreement and the aide-memoire of November 1962, but USA responded by announcing a suspension of military and economic aid to both Pakistan and India. This suspension of military aid impacted Pakistan much more negatively than India because Pakistan was armed mainly with USA supplied military equipment, and India, on the other hand, had received military equipment from USSR in the past, and even after the beginning of the war, continued to receive support from USSR. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z. Bhutto, in a meeting with USA’s ambassador on 9 September 1965 said that the suspension of military aid to India and Pakistan was a clear siding with India given how Pakistan was dependent on USA’s military equipment.

In March 1966 there was some relaxation in USA’s arms embargo but there remained restrictions on the supply of major equipment such as tanks, artillery and aircrafts to Pakistan. The lack of USA’s support to Pakistan during the 1965 war had consequences on Pakistan’s foreign relations and Pakistan started reducing its involvement in the Western alliances. Even though Pakistan remained a member of SEATO and CENTO, by the late 1960s Pakistan was hardly
an effective member of these security pacts\textsuperscript{38}. Pakistan also did not extend the lease of the communication facility that had been provided to USA at Badaber and the lease of this facility expired in 1969\textsuperscript{39}.

In 1969 some major changes took place in the political leadership of both Pakistan and USA. In Pakistan the Ayub Khan era ended and Ayub was replaced by General Yahya Khan; and in USA, Richard Nixon was elected president. Though the trend was towards a decline in cooperation between Pakistan and USA, still there remained some level of cooperation between the two countries. One notable assistance that provided by Pakistan to USA was secretly helping progress diplomatic contact between China and USA, including facilitating the July 1971 secret visit of Henry Kissinger to China\textsuperscript{40}. Overall, USA’s policy toward Pakistan remained under constraints but there was a decided “tilt” towards better relations with Pakistan\textsuperscript{41}. The Indian reaction to this inclination towards Pakistan included the signing of a friendship treaty with USSR on 9 August 1971\textsuperscript{42}.

In December 1971 there was another war between India and Pakistan. The war resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of the new state of Bangladesh from what was formerly East Pakistan. The world community generally looked at the east and west Pakistan dispute as a civil war and there was little intervention by the world powers, including USA\textsuperscript{43}. Soon after the breakup of pre-1971 Pakistan into Bangladesh and Pakistan, Pakistan (or what was formerly West Pakistan) announced its withdrawal from SEATO and the Commonwealth of Nations\textsuperscript{44}. Pakistan’s disappointment at the lack of
support it received from USA in the 1965 and 1971 wars against India led to a period of declining cooperation with USA.

In 1971 Z. Bhutto took over as prime minister of what was formerly West Pakistan and now was Pakistan. Z. Bhutto pursued a foreign policy he described as “balanced bilateralism”. This policy entailed forging satisfactory bilateral relations with USSR, China and USA; and cooperating with each of the three without antagonizing any one of the three. Pakistan as per this policy, in addition to continued development of relations with China, also developed relations with the Muslim countries, made diplomatic overtures towards North Korea and USSR, and worked to reduce tensions with India and Afghanistan. Z. Bhutto also pursued friendly relations with USA even though the foundations of his foreign policy primarily rested on having strong relations with the Muslim world and with China.

USA’s prime issue during Z. Bhutto’s time at the helm was to discourage Pakistan’s interest in acquiring nuclear weapons capability. In the middle of 1974 India detonated an underground nuclear device. The Indian nuclear explosion weakened India’s position in Washington and in February 1975 USA announced the lifting of the arms embargo that had been imposed on Pakistan since 1965.

In 1977 Z. Bhutto called for early elections. Though officially the elections were won by Z. Bhutto but, amidst charges of election rigging, the elections were followed by political disturbances. In April 1977 USA’s aid to Pakistan was suspended. On 5 July 1977 General Zia-ul-Haq, the chief of the army, declared martial law in Pakistan.
India, in contrast to Pakistan, held elections that year and ended the state of emergency that had been imposed by Indira Gandhi.

In terms of an evolving USA strategy in South Asia, President Carter’s administration looked more favorably towards India than Pakistan and when Carter visited India in January 1978 he, unlike the previous visits by Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, did not visit Pakistan. The relations between USA and Pakistan continued to slide downward and the low point in the relations came with the November 1979 burning of USA’s embassy in Islamabad by an enraged public. This incident was a reaction to a rumor that the Haram Sharif in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, had been seized and desecrated and that the Zionist and USA were behind this desecration. President Carter personally sought the help of the Zia government in controlling the situation and many felt the Pakistani response was not as swift as it should have been, with the army arriving almost four hours after Carter’s telephone call to Zia asking for help. The low level of cooperation between USA and Pakistan started to reverse itself following USSR’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s relations with USA changed during the 1989 to 2001 period from cooperation to a lack of cooperation. With the withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan, the main reason for the USA’s cooperation with Pakistan had dissipated. Now USA’s discomfort with Pakistan’s nuclear program took a more prominent position in dictating the nature of the bilateral relations.
On the basis of USA’s intelligence assessment that Pakistan did have a nuclear device, Bush was unable to certify that Pakistan did not have a device, and in late 1990 the $564 million aid program was frozen as per the Pressler Amendment. At this time Pakistan was the third highest recipient of USA’s aid after Israel and Egypt\(^5^4\). The discontinuation of aid marked the beginning of the end of the cooperation that existed between USA and Pakistan in the 1980s.

USA also took a position on Kashmir that was more supportive of India. In 1992 the under secretary of state for political affairs warned that if Pakistan continued to covertly help the Kashmiri insurgency then Pakistan would be declared a country that supported terrorism and this would the end of USA and Pakistan’s cooperation\(^5^5\).

In addition to Pakistan’s nuclear program and the insurgency in Kashmir, a further point of discord between Pakistan and USA was Pakistan’s contribution to the international narcotics trade. It was estimated that by the early 1990s almost 20% of the heroin consumed in USA was being produced in Pakistan\(^5^6\).

The Pakistan and USA relations faced a new challenge in 1998 after the 28 May underground nuclear explosions by Pakistan. These explosions by Pakistan were a response to the 11 May nuclear explosions by India. Later, in October 1999, General Pervaiz Musharaff removed Nawaz Sharif from power and took over as “chief executive” of Pakistan.

USA and Pakistan’s relations, without the common interest of pushing out the USSR from Afghanistan, now faced challenges with
regards to Pakistani nuclear program, the problems of Kashmir, and the lack of democracy in Pakistan. These concerns were voiced by President Clinton when he visited Pakistan in March 2000. After President Nixon’s visit in 1969 this was the first visit by a president of USA to Pakistan. President Clinton addressed the people of Pakistan and talked about the “long partnership” between the two countries and touched upon some of the challenges that Pakistan was currently facing including attaining democracy, curbing terrorism, achieving regional peace and nuclear non-proliferation. In view of the declining cooperation between Pakistan and USA, President Clinton qualified USA’s support that was available to Pakistan by saying that if Pakistan did not meet these challenges then “there is a danger that Pakistan may grow even more isolated, draining even more resources away from the needs of the people, moving even closer to a conflict no one can win”.

The periodic strains in relations between Pakistan and USA have been a substantial feature of Pakistan’s foreign relations. The non-cooperation between the two countries extends to a cumulative period of over two decades. During these periods Pakistan faced a variety of military, development aid, commercial and economic sanctions from USA. These periods of non-cooperation have been a source of insecurity for Pakistan, especially when declining cooperation with Pakistan was accompanied by increasing cooperation between India and USA.
4.5 Marginal Cooperation with Muslim Countries

The endeavor to forge political pan-Islamism can be traced back to the late seventeenth century when the Sultans of the Ottoman Empire tried to mobilize support for a declining Ottoman state in 1870. The appeal of the sultans “evoked far more response in distant Muslim lands, especially those conquered or threatened by European imperialism, than among their own neighbors or subjects” ⁵⁹.

The efforts by Pakistan to strengthen pan-Islamic institutions included hosting the International Islamic Economic Conference in Karachi in 1949. However, after a few subsequent conferences this initiative lost steam. In 1952 Pakistan tried to gather the prime ministers of twelve Muslim countries for a Muslim Prime Ministers’ Conference in Karachi. The aim of the conference was to discuss and coordinate actions on areas of common concern. Interest in such a gathering seemed to be low as only seven out of the twelve invitees expressed an interest in attending.

There was some resentment in Muslim countries over Pakistan assuming a self-appointed role as a leader of efforts aimed at organizing the Muslim countries. This resentment is reflected in the comment made by the Rector of Al-Azhar University in the Economist issue of 24 May 1952 in which he reportedly says that too many Islamic conferences had been called in Pakistan ⁶⁰.
Some scholars have identified Arab nationalism as a serious impediment to the establishment of a pan-Islamic unity. In effect it appeared that the prominent Muslim leaders and intellectuals of the second and third quarters of the twentieth century “paid lip service to internationalism, such as Pan-Arabism, Islamic Internationalism, or Third World Internationalism, but they were motivated primarily by the realpolitik considerations rooted in the domestic politics or foreign policy of their countries”.

Along with Arab nationalism, the primacy of domestic politics proved to be an impediment to the formation of a collective response from the Muslim countries because the issues facing Muslim countries of the Middle East were quite different from the issues facing Muslim countries in South Asia. India and Afghanistan did not pose a tangible threat to the countries of the Middle East and the Muslim countries of the Middle East and South East Asia did not face the same security threats that Pakistan faced.

However, what seems to have become clear to Pakistan was that given a Pakistani identity of weakness and insecurity, along with the fact that Muslim countries were not economically or militarily powerful, addressing Pakistan’s security needs through alliance with the Muslim countries was not feasible. A very succinct depiction of this reality is found in the 11 December 1956 statement to reporters by H. S. Suhrwardy, prime minister of Pakistan. Asked why the Muslim countries do not get together themselves rather than aligning with USA or Britain. Suhrwardy says that “My answer to that is that zero plus
zero plus zero is after all equal to zero. We have, therefore, to go farther afield than get all the zeros together because they will never be able to produce anything substantial"64.

There was a period in the 1970s when due to economic and political reasons the cooperation between the Muslim countries improved. The growth in the feelings of support among the Muslim countries was aided by two international events. One event was the Six Days war in the Middle East in June 1967, during which the Israeli forces inflicted heavy losses on Egypt and captured territory belonging to Jordan, Egypt and Syria. The other incident was the extensive damage caused to the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem as a consequence of arson in August 1969 while the mosque was under Israeli military occupation65. These two events led to assembling Muslim countries in a series of conferences in Rabat, Jeddah and Karachi in the period 1969-1970. Even though Iraq and Syria refused to attend these conferences still there was an air of emerging solidarity among the Muslim countries and Pakistan’s foreign policy reflected this growing solidarity.

Pakistan’s cooperation with the Muslim countries was strengthened, in the aftermath of the rapidly improving economic situation in some oil exporting Muslim countries of the Middle East, following the oil crisis of 1970s66. In February 1974 Pakistan recognized Bangladesh. The relations between Pakistan and the Muslim countries continued to grow stronger in the 1970s and the strength of the relations is reflected in the aid that Pakistan received from the
Muslim countries in comparison to the aid Pakistan received from USA. In 1975 USA agreed to provide Pakistan wheat worth $65 million and an additional $78 million in the shape of development loans, whereas, Iran and Saudi Arabia during this time promised Pakistan assistance of around $400 million\textsuperscript{67}.

Pakistan hosted the Islamic summit conference in Lahore in February 1974. This conference brought together leaders of thirty five Muslim countries. At this summit the leaders debated the mechanisms for building Muslim unity and support. Pakistan also signed military protocols with several Muslim countries during this period, including Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, and Libya\textsuperscript{68}. Pakistan received much needed aid and economic support from Muslim countries and economic cooperation and trade expanded between the Muslim countries and Pakistan\textsuperscript{69}.

After the USSR’s entry into Afghanistan, Pakistan, developing on the relations that it had built with Muslim countries during Z. Bhutto’s time, looked towards the Muslim countries for support against USSR. President Zia’s inclination towards the Muslim countries was also in consonance with the Islamization measures covering law, politics and society that were introduced in Pakistan by Zia\textsuperscript{70}.

The Muslim world during the decade of the 1980s was faced with internal strife as Iran and Iraq were at war. In addition to this internal strife there was also the lack of unity among the Muslim countries as some countries were aligned with USSR and, therefore, reluctant to
oppose it. In early 1980 President Zia presided over an extraordinary session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

The developing of support against USSR from the Muslim countries was important to Zia but the Muslim countries were not united on this issue and Syria, South Yemen and Libya were too dependent on USSR to oppose it. Similarly, the UN General Assembly resolution in opposition to USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan was passed in January 1980, but South Yemen voted against the resolution, Syria and Algeria abstained and Libya was not present at the vote. Zia realized that Pakistan would only get token verbal support from the Muslim countries and that there was nothing substantial to be gained.

In August 1990 Saddam Hussein ordered the Iraqi army to move into Kuwait. Saddam claimed that Kuwait had stolen oil from the Rumaila oilfield in Iraq and, therefore, Kuwait should write-off the $10 billion debt that was owed to it by Iraq. Saddam also said that Kuwait had been improperly divided to form a new country at the end of the Ottoman rule and it should have been a province of Iraq. The UN Security Council reacted swiftly and passed resolutions that demanded that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait and threatened the use of force if Iraq did not comply with the resolutions. Between August 1990 and January 1991, USA and other nations began amassing troops in Saudi Arabia in preparation for an attack on Iraq. The objective of the UN mandated military action was very specific and focused on the removal of Saddam’s forces from Kuwait.
The Muslim countries were generally unable to forge a united security alliance among themselves. The promise of a pan-Islamic alliance was thwarted, in part, by Arab nationalism and, in part, because of the divergence of geopolitical objectives between different regions of the Muslim world. There was a brief period in the 1970s when political events and the new found oil wealth of the Arab countries of the Middle East helped forge an environment of unity and support but this was short lived. The Iran-Iraq war and USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan saw the uncovering of divisiveness within the Muslim countries. The Gulf War also highlighted tensions between the Muslim countries.

4.6 Conclusion

The issue of insecurity has been a consistent feature of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The main source of insecurity was the threat posed by India. A threat that showed its potency in the shape of three wars. In addition to India, Pakistan has also faced a threat from Afghanistan and USSR. The sense of insecurity that Pakistan has faced has been intensified in the face of extended periods of little or no cooperation with USA. The Muslim countries did not provide a consistent source of security for Pakistan because of Arab nationalism, the limited resources of the Muslim countries and because of the divergence of interests between countries of the Muslim world.
The main sources of insecurity for Pakistan in the period 1947 to 1962 were India, and to a much lesser extent, Afghanistan and USSR. These three threats seemed to come together during USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The presence of USSR in Afghanistan was tacitly supported by India and by the USSR installed government in Afghanistan. The threat posed by USSR was viewed as a major threat by Pakistan during the decades of the 1980s. With the withdrawal of USSR’s army, this threat diminished by the end of the 1980s and India reemerged as the prime security threat for Pakistan.

There are several international events that impacted Pakistan’s foreign policy during the period 1989 to 2001. After the break-up of the USSR in 1989 a unipolar international power structure emerged with USA as the distinctly most powerful country in the world. The end of the Cold War resulted in the settling down of conflicts in which USA and USSR were involved, such as, in Afghanistan, in Central America and also conflicts in Africa.

The period 1989 to 2001 saw the demise of two major security threats that had confronted Pakistan, at different times, since independence, namely, the USSR and Afghanistan. India, however, remained a threat for Pakistan through its history. The cooperation between Pakistan and USA, which had developed after USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan, declined rapidly during the 1990s.

The regionally relevant international system that Pakistan faced, particularly in the context of security, using Wendt’s constructivist framework could be as being of a Hobbesian nature. In such a
context, enmity dominates the nature of relations between states. The persistent insecurity that Pakistan has faced since its independence in 1947 was mitigated to a great extent by the forging of alliances and by cooperation with USA. The next chapter explores the collaboration between USA and Pakistan in matters of security.
Endnotes


4. Ibid., 19.


9. Ibid., 284.

10. Ibid., 285.

11. Ibid., 352.

13. Ibid., 269.

14. Ibid., 270.


21. Ibid., 42.

22. Ibid., 77.

23. Ibid., 19.


26. Ibid., 31-33.

27. Ibid., 32.

28. Ibid., 91-92.

29. Ibid., 112.

30. Ibid., 290.

31. Ibid., 294.


34. Ibid., 161.


37. Ibid., 172.

38. S. M. Burke, “Reprisal of Foreign Policy,” 358.

40. Ibid., 182.

41. Ibid., 194.

42. Ibid., 195.

43. S. M. Burke, “Repprisal of Foreign Policy,” 404.


45. S. M. Burke, “Repprisal of Foreign Policy,” 359-360.


47. Ibid., 231.

48. Ibid., 226.

49. Ibid., 216-218.


54. Ibid., 308.

55. Ibid., 316.

56. Ibid., 323.

57. Ibid., 356.


67. S. M. Burke, “Reprisal of Foreign Policy,” 372.


69. Ibid., 427.

70. Pasha, Islam, 122


73. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 259.

74. Ibid., 260.
Chapter 5

PAKISTAN’S SECURITY PERSPECTIVE
Chapter 5
Pakistan’s Security Perspective

Pakistan turned towards USA for security due to threats from India, Afghanistan, USSR, and from the threats that materialized during the USA led global WoT. This chapter shows that collaboration with USA takes place during three distinct periods of Pakistan’s history. The first period is during the initial years of independence from 1947 to 1962. The second period of cooperation is from 1979 to 1989 following USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan, and the third period is from 2001 to 2012 during the USA led WoT. This chapter examines these three periods and highlights the policies that depict the nature of the cooperation between Pakistan and USA.

5.1 Security Perspective - 1947 to 1962

In the early years of independence Pakistan pursued alliances with USA to balance the security threats it faced\(^1\). Britain as a source of security for Pakistan diminished, in keeping with a trend that was apparent in the last couple of years before partition. The USA emerged as the prime Pakistani ally and the ostensible source of security during the period 1947 to 1962.

In the pre-partition period the level of cooperation between the British and the Muslim League was very high during the Second World War but seemed to decline with the end of the war in 1945. The reason
may have been that Britain felt that an undivided India would better serve British commercial and geopolitical interests\(^2\) and the Muslim League demanded partition and an independent Pakistan. This divergence of views between the British and the Muslim League was a source of disappointment for the Muslim leadership of the Indian subcontinent. The negotiations with the Cabinet Mission of 1946 led to the call for Direct Action on 16 August 1946 by the Muslim League\(^3\) and the Muslim League eventually rejected the Cabinet Mission’s Long-term Plan of 16 May 1946, thereby, leaving the Congress to try and form the interim government in the subcontinent. However, since the Congress had not accepted the Grouping clause of the Long-term Plan, eventually, an interim government was formed with representation from both the Muslim League and Congress\(^4\).

On 8 March 1947 the Congress acquiesced to the Muslim League’s request for a separate Pakistan and asked the British to partition the Indian subcontinent. Some historians feel that this decision by the Congress was taken to keep Pakistan weak so that it would not be able to survive, and would eventually have to rejoin India\(^5\). After partition, in a November 1947 meeting with the former British viceroy Mountbatten, Jinnah told Mountbatten that the “British Commonwealth had let him down when he asked them to come to the rescue of Pakistan”\(^6\).

In the period following independence Pakistan looked towards USA as an ally. The Cold War between USA and USSR was hardening in the 1940s. The Truman Doctrine was announced on 12 March 1948
and this policy sought to constrain the expanding influence of USSR\textsuperscript{7}. The foreign policy of USA was also not supportive of China and, during the Chinese Civil War, USA had lent its support to the nationalist rather than the communist\textsuperscript{8}.

In the Indian subcontinent USA’s role had been limited. An example of the limited presence of USA in the subcontinent is evident in the fact that in 1940 there were USA consular offices in Karachi, Madras, Bombay and Calcutta but there was no diplomatic office in the capital New Delhi, and the majority of USA’s governmental dealings with the Indian subcontinent were handled through the government in Britain\textsuperscript{9}.

Generally, USA was in favor of self-government in the subcontinent and, like the British, was supportive of an undivided Indian subcontinent\textsuperscript{10}. The first official contact between the Muslim League and USA came about in November 1946 in a meeting between Dean Acheson, the undersecretary of state, and a Muslim League delegation comprised of M.A.H. Ispahani and Begum Shah Nawaz\textsuperscript{11}.

During the Cold War the Pakistani choice for alliance was primarily between USA and USSR. Pakistan seemed inclined towards USA. In the early part of 1947, diplomat Raymond Hare of USA spent a couple of months in the subcontinent to better understand the area. Hare met Jinnah in May 1947 and was told that the future state of Pakistan would, like other Muslim countries of the Middle East, resist USSR’s aggression and would look for receiving assistance from USA\textsuperscript{12}. 

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The pre-partition position of USA was not much in favor of a divided Indian subcontinent and implied a posture that was more aligned with the Congress position than the position of the Muslim League. This inclination towards India carries over to the period immediately following the partition in 1947 and is seen in USA’s invitation to Nehru, the prime minister of India, to visit USA in 1949. No such invitation was extended to the Pakistani prime minister. Later, an invitation was extended to Liaquat and in May 1950 he visited USA.

In June 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea, Pakistan supported USA and though it did not provide troops Pakistan did provide 5,000 tons of rice. After Eisenhower became President in 1953 he appointed John Foster Dulles the secretary of state. Dulles visited India and Pakistan in May 1953 and during his visit to Pakistan, General Ayub Khan told Dulles that the danger to the region was of a possible massive invasion of Pakistan by USSR from the north with the aim of reaching the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.

Eisenhower gave formal approval for providing Pakistan military aid on 14 January 1954 and after this approval, on 14 February 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed a treaty for bilateral cooperation on military, economic and cultural matters. This agreement moved Pakistan in the ambit of USA’s northern-tier security policy and provided Pakistan an ostensibly plausible rationale for seeking and receiving arms from USA. Initially Pakistan was to receive around $30 million in aid but subsequent discussions resulted in the amount being increased to $105.9 million in October 1954. The USA also
provided the prime minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Bogra, a secret aide-memoire that committed USA to equipping four infantry divisions, one and a half armored divisions, aircrafts for six air force squadrons and ships for the Pakistan Navy\textsuperscript{18}. Pakistan undertook to enter into security alliances that were supported by USA.

Pakistan strengthened its alliance with USA by joining the security alliances that were supported by USA. The first of these alliances was the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO). SEATO was formed in September 1954 and its member states included the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, Britain, and USA. The SEATO was formed to contain the threat of communist attack but in contrast to NATO it did not commit its members to a military response\textsuperscript{19}. Pakistan tried to enlarge the mandate of SEATO to cover attack from any country but USA made it clear that SEATO would only relate to an attack by USSR or an attack by allies of USSR\textsuperscript{20}. In January 1955 the Pakistan cabinet formally approved Pakistan’s membership in SEATO\textsuperscript{21}.

In February 1955 a pact of security cooperation was signed by Iraq and Turkey and, later, the UK, Pakistan and Iran also signed. This pact was known as the Baghdad Pact and Pakistan’s cabinet formally approved membership on 25 September 1955\textsuperscript{22}. The USA did not become a full member of the Baghdad Pact and maintained the status of an observer state. In 1959 the name of the Pact was changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).
Pakistan’s joining the SEATO and CENTO alliances had negative ramifications on Pakistan’s relations with USSR and with some Muslim countries. The USSR viewed Pakistan’s joining of these alliances as collaboration in the Western hostility towards USSR and in response USSR’s leadership supported Afghanistan’s demand for ‘Pakhtunistan’ and India’s claim to Kashmir²³. Joining these alliances also had unfavorable consequences on Pakistan’s relations with certain Muslim countries, notably, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan.

Egypt was concerned about Pakistan joining the Western alliances because it felt that if the Western countries were able to establish alliances without Egypt’s participation there would be less of an incentive for Britain to resolve its outstanding issues with Egypt (primarily the issues related to the Suez Canal). Saudi Arabia also reacted strongly to Pakistan signing the Baghdad Pact because it resented Turkey’s cooperation with Israel. Afghanistan reacted negatively in 1953 to the news of USA possibly supplying military aid to Pakistan as it saw this cooperation strengthening Pakistan and consequently a weakening of Afghanistan’s hopes of claiming the territory it lost to the British²⁴.

In the early part of 1959 Pakistan granted USA’s Air Force a ten year lease to set up a “communications facility’ at Badaber which was near Peshawar and a one hour drive from the Afghanistan border. This facility provided a cover for USA’s intelligence gathering on USSR. A section of the Peshawar airport was also provided for the landing and takeoff of the U2 aircraft’s intelligence gathering flights over USSR²⁵.
This granting of USA permission to use Badaber and the Peshawar airport increased the tangible benefits that USA was receiving from Pakistan.

In 1962 the border war between India and China caused USA to reevaluate its relations with India. Cooperation between USA and Pakistan declined rapidly in the face of USA providing military support to India.

5.2 Security Perspective - 1979 to 1989

The period from 1979 to 1989 saw Pakistan and USA again cooperate in the security policy area. The invasion of Afghanistan by USSR was a significant enough event and was viewed with concern by both Pakistan and USA.

The security scenario that Pakistan was facing underwent a major change with USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan. The USSR’s Army entered Afghanistan in December 1979 and ousted Hafizullah Amin and made Babrak Karmal president. In the ensuing resistance that took shape against USSR’s military presence in Afghanistan, the USSR provided ongoing support for the pro-Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against the Afghan resistance by the mujahedeen.

The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan was viewed by many as part of a greater USSR strategy to extend its influence not only to Afghanistan but to Pakistan and Iran. Both Pakistan and Iran were vulnerable to USSR’s influence because of their resentment against
USA, further, the Gulf countries of the Middle East were also seen to be vulnerable to USSR’s influence. Given these prospects, USA was interested in garnering support for itself in the region and was interested in cultivating Pakistan as an ally. In the 1980 State of the Union address President Carter took a strong position against USSR’s expansionism and said that any attack against the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack on USA’s vital interests and he also reaffirmed USA’s commitment to help resist outside aggression in the region.

Pakistan also looked towards USA as an ally in addressing its security needs. The modalities of the cooperation between Pakistan and USA were settled in time but USA’s initial offer in 1980 of $400 million aid was rejected by Zia as being not enough to ensure Pakistan’s security. Nonetheless, the covert operations against USSR were already underway under the aegis of USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).

The Pakistan and USA cooperation was further consolidated after Ronald Reagan took oath as president of USA on 21 January 1981. Reagan’s foreign policy involved confronting and reversing the expansion of the influence of the USSR in Afghanistan, and in other countries of the Third World.

The Pakistani alignment with USA was further strengthened by changes in key foreign policy personnel in Pakistan. In February 1982 Agha Shahi retired as foreign minister and was replaced by Yaqub Khan. Yaqub was a retired lieutenant general and had served as
Pakistan’s ambassador to France, USA and USSR. Yaqub did not share Shahi’s confidence in the effectiveness of multilateral organizations, such as the UN, and felt that that the success of the Pakistani strategy of opposition to USSR depended on better bilateral relations with USA\textsuperscript{33}.

Soon after Reagan took office his team proposed an aid package for Pakistan that totaled $3.2 billion and was spread over five years\textsuperscript{34} and in 1981 USA approved a package of $1.65 billion in economic assistance and $1.5 billion in military aid, in addition to other development assistance\textsuperscript{35}. Saudi Arabia and USA jointly funded the covert program to support the Afghan resistance and the ISI and the CIA jointly worked to support the insurgency by the mujahedeen against USSR. This program of covert assistance was worth around $60 million in 1981 and grew to $400 million by 1984\textsuperscript{36}. In 1986 the covert assistance was over $1 billion\textsuperscript{37}.

The Pakistani strategy for dealing with the Afghan situation, in addition to the covert military assistance to the mujahedeen, also included a vocal opposition of USSR’s action in Afghanistan, the provision of shelter to the Afghan refugees, and public support for the Afghan Mujahedeen\textsuperscript{38}.

The nuclear issue was a potential sore point in Pakistan’s relations with USA but the issue was sidestepped through various mechanisms. The sanctions that were in place to stop aid to countries that were engaged in nuclear proliferation were waived for six years for Pakistan by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 May
1981\textsuperscript{39}. By the end of 1982 USA’s aid to Pakistan was substantial and only Israel, Egypt, and Turkey at that time received more aid\textsuperscript{40}. In October 1986 the certification by President Reagan confirmed, as per the requirements of the Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device\textsuperscript{41}.

Zia had undertaken measures to Islamize Pakistani society in 1979 and had adopted Sharia dictated punishments and the promotion of madressas or religions schools\textsuperscript{42}. These measures of the Zia government found support locally with many of the religious parties in Pakistan and this was evidenced by the endorsement provided to the Islamization process by the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and by various other ulemas or religious scholars\textsuperscript{43}. The Islamization process was not without controversy as the Shia minority in Pakistan resented the imposition of a primarily Hanafi jurisprudence on a Shia population\textsuperscript{44}. The JI also assisted in the conduct of the foreign policy of Pakistan during the Zia regime by working with the Afghan Mujahedeen who were leading the resistance against USSR and, in addition to the material support provided by Pakistan, the mujahedeen were also “ideologically indoctrinated by the religious-political parties of Pakistan, particularly the JI”\textsuperscript{45}.

The withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan in 1989 resulted in a steep decline in USA’s interest in cooperating with Pakistan. Not only did the cooperation between Pakistan and USA abruptly decline but the pendulum swung the other way and Pakistan found itself facing sanctions from USA in the 1990s.
5.3 Security Perspective - 2001 to 2012

The international event with major consequences on Pakistan’s security in the period 2001 to 2012 was the 9/11 attacks on USA. Pakistan quickly joined the USA led global WoT and cooperated closely with USA.

USA’s investigation into the 9/11 attacks revealed an association between the 9/11 hijackers and Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Bin Laden was sought by USA even before 9/11 and was believed to have been involved in the 1998 terrorist attacks on USA’s embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Following these embassy bombings, USA launched missile attacks against bin Laden and Al Qaeda in August 1998 in Afghanistan and Sudan\(^46\). Later, in December 2000 the UN Security Council placed sanctions on the Taliban government in Afghanistan because they were providing bin Laden a base for his terrorist activities\(^47\).

The post 9/11 period saw President Bush and USA undertake an approach to foreign policy that was a very different from the Cold War strategies of deterrence and containment. This new approach “relied on the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions” and included a provocative doctrine of preemptive strike\(^48\).

Following the 9/11 attacks, USA demanded that the Taliban in Afghanistan hand over bin Laden. Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban, did not readily agree and asked to see evidence that bin Laden was
responsible for 9/11\textsuperscript{49}. Soon afterwards, in October 2001, USA launched an operation in Afghanistan under the aegis of NATO, called Operation Enduring Freedom, which aimed at destroying Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda had close links with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the operation resulted in the end of the Taliban government and the leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda went into hiding.

Pakistan agreed to cooperate with USA in the WoT and, subsequently, USA’s aid to Pakistan resumed in 2001 and it rapidly rose to around $1.76 billion by 2003. The OIC called for a special meeting of the foreign ministers and in Doha on 10 October 2001. The fifty-seven Muslim member states condemned the 9/11 attacks and expressed a willingness to cooperate in the elimination of terrorism\textsuperscript{50}.

As part of the WoT, USA also launched an intervention in Iraq. This 2003 War on Iraq was very different from the 1991 Gulf War. The major difference was that in 2003 the level of UN support was much lower than the support the UN had provided in 1991 and, also, USA’s intelligence agencies had been unable to provide the international community a convincing link between 9/11 and Iraq\textsuperscript{51}. Consequently, there were varying degrees of opposition to the 2003 intervention from Germany, France, and Canada, among others.

The Bush foreign policy of that time defined the lines of confrontation and stated that "You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror"\textsuperscript{52}. Pakistan’s foreign policy, during this period, was influenced by the coercive pressure of USA. Pakistan received a clear warning from USA that if it did not cooperate it would face
serious consequences. President Musharraf of Pakistan has claimed that Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state, threatened a senior Pakistani intelligence director by saying that “we'll bomb you to stone age” if you do not cooperate with us

The Pakistani Government also permitted the drone (unmanned aerial vehicle) strikes in Pakistan and the first USA drone attack in Pakistan was carried out in 2004. There were only nine attacks reported in the period 2004 to 2007, but thirty-four attacks were carried out in 2008, fifty-three attacks in 2009, and 132 attacks in 2010.

In addition to the escalating level of drone strikes inside of Pakistan there were other incidents that caused friction between Pakistan and USA. These incidents include the killing of two Pakistani soldiers in September 2010 by NATO helicopters. This incident resulted in a closure of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in protest. Similarly, the NATO supplies to Afghanistan were halted for three days in April 2011 to protest drone strikes.

The incident that provoked a very significant reaction, both in Pakistan and USA, was the 1 May 2011 operation by US Navy SEALs and the CIA to kill bin Laden. The operation targeted a compound in Abottabad, a city that is home to the Pakistan Military Academy and is a one hour drive from Islamabad. In USA this event was hailed with celebration and relief and some in USA media described it as a “defining moment in the American-led fight against terrorism”. The newspaper reports highlighted that it was very much a USA operation.
and that intelligence about bin Laden’s compound was shared with no other country, including Pakistan\textsuperscript{56}.

The Pakistani authorities complained against this unilateral action by USA and the reaction from USA was that they had told Pakistan that USA reserves the right to act in such a manner\textsuperscript{57}. A local doctor was recruited by USA to obtain blood samples of those living in the Abottabad compound. The doctor was arrested and later convicted by a Pakistani court for “conspiring against the state” and sentenced in May 2012 to thirty-three years in prison\textsuperscript{58}. There was also a pronounced resentment in the political circles of Pakistan and on 14 May 2011, a joint session the parliament adopted a resolution calling for a review of the terms of engagement with USA\textsuperscript{59}.

The secrecy of the bin Laden operation was indicative of a general trend towards growing mistrust between USA and Pakistan and this mistrust was later highlighted in the statement made by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman joint chiefs, to a USA’s Senate panel where he said that Pakistan was facilitating militant attacks in Afghanistan, a charge that was later rejected as “baseless” by Pakistan\textsuperscript{60}.

Another event that led to further declining cooperation between Pakistan and USA was the 24 Nov 2011 attack on the Salala military base. The attack by NATO helicopters took place inside of Pakistan, a couple of kilometers from the Afghan border, and resulted in the death of twenty-four Pakistani armed forces personnel. The attack was termed “outrageous” by the Pakistani prime minister\textsuperscript{61}.
The Pakistan Government’s policy towards USA started to show clear evidence of declining cooperation in 2011. Pakistan asked USA to reduce the number of CIA operatives and Special Operation Forces working in Pakistan. Similarly, the British were also asked to reduce the number of military trainers who were working with the Pakistani forces in the FATA area and this was viewed as a “likely fallout from the deterioration of US-Pakistan relations”.

Pakistan’s relations with USA were also affected by concerns over the civilian deaths due to drone attacks by USA. According to an article in the Telegraph, the Washington based New America Foundation estimated that 32% of the claimed militants killed in drone attacks were civilians. On 10 December 2013 the National Assembly of Pakistan unanimously passed a resolution against USA drone strikes in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s role in the WoT took a heavy toll of lives and according to the Government of Pakistan estimates, by 2011; almost 30,000 Pakistanis had been killed. This number included over 6,000 military personnel. By 2012 the cooperation between USA and Pakistan had declined quite appreciably.

5.4 Conclusion

The Muslim League’s pre-partition cooperation with the British diminished after the end of the Second World War. Pakistan, in the Cold War politics, faced a choice of forming an alliance with USA or USSR. Even in the pre-partition era there was an inclination by the
leaders of Pakistan to look towards USA for security. USA was not very keen on forging an alliance with Pakistan, but by the mid-1950s things had changed considerably and Pakistan joined the security alliance of both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (the precursor of CENTO). Pakistan also provided USA tangible benefits in allowing USA to establish facilities in 1959 in Pakistan for gathering intelligence on USSR. The 1962 border war between India and China caused USA to begin providing military aid to India and on this basis the cooperation between USA and Pakistan rapidly declined.

The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was the reason for the renewal of cooperation between Pakistan and USA. Both, USA and Pakistan, supported the mujahedeen resistance to USSR’s occupation and this support eventually led to the withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan in 1989. The withdrawal resulted in a steep decline in USA’s cooperation with Pakistan and in the 1990s Pakistan faced sanctions from USA.

Following the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan quickly joined USA’s WoT. Suspected terrorists were targeted in Pakistan and drone strikes were carried out by USA in Pakistan. The terrorist targeted in Pakistan, among many others, included bin Laden in 2011. From 2011 the cooperation between the two countries started to decline and by 2012 the level of cooperation was substantially lower than had been seen in the early periods of the WoT.
Endnotes


3. Ibid., 152.

4. Ibid., 151-153.


8. Ibid., 15.

9. Ibid., 5.

10. Ibid., 6-9.

11. Ibid., 10.
12. Ibid., 13.


15. Ibid., 61-62.


17. Ibid., 66-68.

18. Ibid., 69.

19. Ibid., 72.

20. Ibid., 71.

21. Ibid., 72.

22. Ibid., 73.


24. Ibid., 202-205.

26. Ibid., 245.


30. Ibid., 249.

31. Ibid., 251-252.

32. Ibid., 261.

33. Ibid., 265.

34. Ibid., 256.


37. Ibid., 282.

38. Ibid., 246.

39. Ibid., 260.
40. Ibid., 266.

41. Ibid., 283.

42. Ibid., 240-241.


50. Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, 261.


Chapter 6

PAKISTAN’S IDENTITY AND COLLABORATION WITH USA
Chapter 6
Pakistan’s Identity and Collaboration with USA

This chapter examines the second major research question of this dissertation: What identity constructions attempted to accommodate the Pakistani foreign policy of collaboration with USA? The periods of collaboration that are viewed are from 1947 to 1962, from 1979 to 1989, and from 2001 to 2012.

The conceptualization of identity is covered in detail in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this dissertation. To briefly recapitulate, identity is conceptualized as a social and relational construct that, in the foreign relations of states, congeals around perceptions of threats and allies. The realization of an external threat, therefore, exists alongside an identity that supports a perception of difference and enmity. Similarly, alliances are accompanied by a national identity construction that supports the cooperation. The sections on insecurity in this dissertation have shown that there were substantial social practices or foreign policy actions that corroborate a consistent and distinct realization of a threatening enemy or enemies for Pakistan. The sections on security have shown the Pakistani response to these threats was by alignment and collaboration with USA during selected periods of Pakistan’s history.

This research does not focus on the construction of a Pakistani identity that stabilizes a threat perception but rather on the identity
construction that supports collaboration with an ally. These two identities are not viewed as competing constructs but as constructs that exist alongside each other in a conceptualization of identity that includes multiplicities\(^1\).

This chapter does not attempt to explain the causes of the identity construction but, rather, attempts to understand how the construction of aspects of national identity sought to accommodate the foreign policy practice of collaboration with USA. This construct of identity is, in the case of Pakistan, propagated by the foreign policy elite of Pakistan and the three periods of collaboration with USA are examined in different sections of this chapter and the final section of this chapter summarizes the discussion.

### 6.1 Identity - 1947 to 1962

Ayub Khan, who was very influential in the foreign relations of Pakistan in the period 1947 to 1962, wrote that the “principal objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy are security and development”\(^2\). Pakistan saw a primary existential threat from India during the 1947 to 1962 period and Pakistan’s foreign policy makers felt that both its security and its development objectives could be met through an alliance with USA. The identity that was emphasized during this period was one where the values of the new state were shown to be in alignment with the values of USA and religion was invoked to stabilize these constructions.
The weakness and insecurity felt by Pakistan was to a large extent instituted in the manner of the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent. The British Viceroy, Mountbatten, recounted that during a meeting in 1947 with Jinnah, when told that Pakistan that would include a divided Bengal and Punjab, Jinnah express his disappointment at receiving such a “moth-eaten” Pakistan. The Pakistani sense of weakness and insecurity was built around an enemy that was much larger and stronger. India’s military strength during the early years of independence was more than twice the Pakistani strength.

In a statement on 24 August 1947, in response to the violence of migration, Jinnah warned of enemies who would like to see Pakistan “destroyed at its very inception”. This message recognizing an existential threat is also echoed in Jinnah’s message to the nation on the occasion of Eid-ul-Azha on 24 October 1947 when he says that “Our newborn state is bleeding from wounds inflicted by our enemies.”

The threatening enemy for the state of Pakistan was India and the history of Muslim and Hindu communal violence in the pre-partition era was recast in the relations between India and Pakistan. The threatening Hindu communal violence of the pre-partition era is connected to the post-partition period by Jinnah in an interview with Reuters reporter Duncan Hooper on 25 October 1947, when he says that “India is a Hindu state”. The identity of Muslim Pakistan was consolidated in difference with the Hindu state of India.
The relational identity of Pakistan, in comparison to India, was one of a weak state confronted by an enemy that could not be reasoned with, thus the enemy was even more dangerous. Ayub underscores this when he says that Pakistan’s “major problem is India’s ability to reconcile herself to our existence as a sovereign, independent state.” Ayub felt the Indian attitude could be explained “only in pathological terms” that were driven by hatred for the Muslims. India was seen as menacing and capable to taking violent action and India’s forcible seizure of the princely state of Hyderabad on 13 September 1948 had caused serious anxiety in Pakistan and at that time there was a feeling that an Indian invasion of Pakistan was imminent.

The events around partition served to instill in Pakistan a sense that it was unable to control the violence that may be inflicted on it by Hindus and India. On 12 September 1947, Jinnah, at the time of the establishing of a relief fund for refugees, highlighted that the violence and suffering of the refugees “confronted Pakistan on the morrow of its birth with problems of gigantic dimensions” and acknowledged that the resources of the state were inadequate and would need to be supplemented by private donations. This announcement and appeal both recognizes the violence that was suffered by the refugees and also acknowledges the Government of Pakistan’s inability to meet the financial cost of accommodating the refugees and, thus, the call for private donations. This theme of being a disadvantaged and weak state is also touched upon by the first prime minister of Pakistan, Liaquat
Ali Khan, who, during his 1950 speech at Columbia University, says that “we are a poor and backward people”\textsuperscript{11}.

The Pakistani leadership viewed the foreign relations situation that Pakistan faced, in terms used by Wendt’s constructivist theorizing, as a Hobbesian\textsuperscript{12} state of international relations. Jinnah reflected on this in a 22 December 1947 message to the Boy Scouts of Pakistan, when he said that “We are living in a far from perfect world. Despite the progress of civilization, the law of the jungle, unfortunately, still prevails. Might is considered right and the strong do not refrain from exploiting the weak. Self-advancement, greed and lust for power sway the conduct of individuals as that of nations”\textsuperscript{13}. Similarly, Ayub endorsed this world view when he wrote that “Nobody gives you freedom: you have to fight for it. Nobody fights for you: you have to fight for yourself”\textsuperscript{14}.

The identity construction in Pakistan also invoked a discourse of a certain manner of uniqueness. To begin with there was a uniqueness that could be seen in the manner of Pakistan’s birth. In his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947 in Karachi, Jinnah said that the “world is wondering at this unprecedented cyclonic revolution which has brought about ... two independent sovereign dominions ... it has been unprecedented, there is no parallel in the history of the world”\textsuperscript{15}. These unusual circumstances of Pakistan’s birth led to new and exceptional challenges that faced the new state and this is reiterated in a 3 June 1947 in a speech broadcast from All-India Radio, New Delhi, in which Jinnah says that “The world
has no parallel for the most onerous and difficult task which we have to perform”\textsuperscript{16}.

There was also an exceptional element in Pakistan’s glorious history and its large size. During a 30 October 1947 speech that was broadcast on Radio Pakistan, Jinnah says that “our great nation and our sovereign state of Pakistan ... is not only the biggest Muslim state in the world but the fifth biggest sovereign state in the world”\textsuperscript{17}. Referring to the past glory of the Muslim rule in the Indian subcontinent Jinnah, during a 19 February 1948 talk, says that “We have had a place in India for many centuries. At one time it was a supreme place. This was when the edict of the Moguls ran from shore to shore”\textsuperscript{18}.

The novelty of the overall situation made it easier to break with the past and relinquish the traditional security cooperation with the British. In November 1945 when addressing participants in 1945 in Peshawar, Jinnah said that “Neither the British nor the Hindus are our friends”\textsuperscript{19} and in a 19 December 1947 interview with BBC reporter Robert Simson, Jinnah says “I feel Great Britain is treating Pakistan with indifference” with particular reference to Britain’s reluctance to intervene to settle differences between India and Pakistan\textsuperscript{20}.

This construction of exceptionality also made it possible to forge new and unusual pathways to security and progress. This exceptionalism facilitated an alignment with USA, a relatively new force in the world at that time, which had risen to global prominence after the Second World War when Britain was no longer the power it
had been\textsuperscript{21}. Thus the identity of a weak state, that came about in the most exceptional of circumstances and was confronted with a threatening enemy, underscored the need to garner security through the support of a new and powerful friend. This new friend was USA.

The Pakistani leadership struggled to create a narrative of USA and Pakistan’s past that included security cooperation between the two. Such a relational identity construction is seen in Jinnah’s reply to the USA’s ambassador’s speech on 26 February 1948, when Jinnah says that the relationship between the people of Pakistan and USA was “strengthened and made more direct and intimate during two World Wars and more particularly and more recently during the Second World War when our two people stood shoulder to shoulder in the defense of democracy”\textsuperscript{22}.

Liaquat acknowledges Pakistan’s weakness, USA’s strength and the Pakistani need for USA, during his 1950 speech to USA’s Senate where he says that “we are aware that recent centuries of progress and advancement in the world have by-passed us”\textsuperscript{23}. Similarly, in a 8 May 1950 Town Hall meeting in New York, Liaquat says that “we cannot make up for the backwardness of one or two hundred years sufficiently quickly without the cooperation of more advanced countries who posses advanced technical knowledge”\textsuperscript{24}.

To further ally itself with USA, Pakistan projects an alignment with USA’s objectives of resisting communism and upholding the values of democracy and progress. The preference for aligning with USA, and the West in general, is evident in the remarks made by
Jinnah in a cabinet meeting on 7 September 1949 where he says that Pakistan is a democracy and that its interest lie in alignment with two other “great democratic countries, namely, the UK and USA, rather than with Russia”\textsuperscript{25}.

The construction of an alignment with USA on the basis of Pakistan being a democracy is a narrative that is sustained by the Pakistani leadership through the early years of Pakistan. On 8 May 1950 at Columbia University in New York, Liaquat says that the people of Pakistan are “resolved to uphold democracy and liberty”\textsuperscript{26}. The religious identity as a Muslim country was also used to build a bridge between Pakistan and democracy. Jinnah as Governor General designate of Pakistan at a press conference on 14 July 1947, responds to a question about whether Pakistan would become a theocratic state, by saying that “we learned democracy thirteen centuries ago”\textsuperscript{27}.

Religion was also used to show how a Muslim identity is in consonance with Western values. In describing the difference between the Muslims and Hindus on 13 May 1950 at the University of Kansas, Liaquat says that the “Muslims were monotheist, the Hindus were polytheist” adding that the Muslims believed in the Prophet (Peace be Upon Him) “and in Christ and the prophets of the Old Testament whereas the Hindus did not”\textsuperscript{28}. This highlighting of the respect that Islam has for the Christian faith and contrasting the core beliefs of the Hindu faith with Christianity, demonstrates the attempt to project a religious identity of Muslims, and by extension the predominantly
Muslim state of Pakistan, as one that is inherently more compatible with Christianity and a predominantly Christian USA.

While religion on the one hand was used to decrease the distance with USA it was also used to distance Pakistan from communism. In a cabinet meeting, on 7 September 1947, Jinnah said that communism does not “flourish in the soil of Islam” adding that Pakistan’s interests align better with USA and the British. After Jinnah’s death on 11 September 1948, Liaquat, was the dominant figure in Pakistani politics. Prime Minister Liaquat’s views on communism were very much like Jinnah’s. In October 1948 Liaquat met USA’s secretary of state, Marshall, during the session of the UN General Assembly. Liaquat told Marshall that it was “unthinkable” that Pakistan should become a communist state since communism was against Islam. Later, at a press conference in London on 29 April 1949, Liaquat said that “Communism is only a name in Pakistan .... I believe that a Muslim country is not a fertile ground for Communism”.

There was an invocation of Islam to stress difference with India, to support the alliance with USA and to decrease cooperation with the USSR. This importance that is given to Islam propels Pakistan to policy positions that are in alignment with Muslim countries in general. The importance of the Islamic world is emphasized in a speech that Jinnah gave at the University Stadium in Lahore on 30 October 1947, where he says that “the sympathies of the world, particularly of the Islamic countries” were with Pakistan.
Pakistan had also picked up on the discourse of capitalist development as an important concern. In the post Second World War period the discourse of development was a powerful narrative and it had taken on a “hegemonic” status. Pakistan constructed its vision of itself as a country eager to follow in the Western footsteps of development. This prescription for development also promised to provide Pakistan greater development than India, which was assessed to have not achieved strong economic development from independence in 1947 to 1958.

On 9 May 1950 at a joint meeting of the Far East America Council of Commerce and the National Foreign Trade Council, Liaquat expressed the view that Pakistan is “most anxious” to promote trade with USA and added that “there is no democracy in Asia more determined to lead its people along the path of development and progress. On 8 May 1950 at the New York City Hall Liaquat talked about the “colossal progress” that USA had made. Later on, the Harvard University’s Development Advisory Service provided Pakistan advice on economic development programs. In contrast to Pakistan, India’s development planning focused more on socialism and Pakistan development was more in line with capitalism.

In the aftermath of the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962, USA contemplated providing India military aid and this was the beginning of the end of the first period of collaboration between Pakistan and USA. Ayub at a 13 July 1961 press conference at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. said “if any arms aid is given to India,

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naturally, we will feel more insecure, and ... it will put a tremendous strain on our relationship with America”\textsuperscript{38}.

On 20 December 1962 Kennedy, along with British Prime Minister Macmillan, agreed to provide $120 million emergency military aid to India\textsuperscript{39}. In response Ayub wrote that the aid to India would “aggravate the danger” to Pakistan’s security\textsuperscript{40}. According to Ayub, by 1963 it was “becoming clear to us that, in the event of India attacking us, it was most unlikely that USA would honor its commitment come to our assistance” \textsuperscript{41}.

\section*{6.2 Identity - 1979 to 1989}

In this period the chief source of insecurity for Pakistan was USSR and to a lesser extent India. The chief source of security for Pakistan was USA. The construction of USA as an ally was, however, complicated by the events that had transpired in the period 1962 to 1978. These sixteen years had seen the breakdown of the friendly relations between USA and Pakistan.

In the aftermath of the support that was extended to India by USA from 1962 onward the alliance with USA was harder to sustain for Pakistan. The inability to receive the support that Pakistan had expected from USA led Pakistan to develop alternate sources of security. After taking power Z. Bhutto said that he valued good relation with USA and did not engage in the anti-USA rhetoric that he had used during his time as foreign minister and as the leader of the
opposition in the 1960s but his foreign policy was more focused on support from other Muslim countries and from China.

There was an acknowledgement that foreign relations between Pakistan and USA were not the same as they had been and President Johnson, during a December 1965 meeting of Pakistani and USA delegates, said that “Our people must be friends, we must find out what went wrong ...". USA tried to downplay the lack of cooperation with Pakistan over a period of sixteen years that preceded the beginning of cooperation once again in 1979 following the USSR’s entry into Afghanistan. USA’s ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, during a 1988 interview characterized the 1962-1979 period of little or no cooperation between the two countries as a euphemistic “hiatus in relations”.

Pakistan’s cooperation with USA from 1947 to 1962 involved, by design, an opposition to the USSR. The initial cooperation between Pakistan and USA in the early independence years had cast the USSR as no friend of Pakistan and the leaders of Pakistan echoed this view of USSR. In the first year after independence, at a cabinet meeting, Jinnah, on 11 September 1947, said that the USSR was behind Afghanistan’s call for Pushtunistan and was also involved in inciting communal violence in Pakistan. The discomfort that Pakistan felt with the USSR was reinforced by a view among many in the Pakistani leadership, including Ayub, that the USSR also regarded Pakistan with “suspicion and distrust as some kind of a camp-follower of the United States”.
The formal security alliances that Pakistan signed with the West cemented Pakistan’s pro-USA position. Even though these alliances, such as SEATO, had limited capability to respond with force, they had symbolic value and provided Pakistan a forum to express its anti-communist position. For example, at the April 1954 meeting the Pakistani prime minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra said that “We can rid ourselves of colonialism but any country that is overrun by communism is lost forever”\(^47\). Later, at the April 1955 summit in Bandung, Indonesia, Bogra talked about USSR as an imperialist international force\(^48\). In Ayub’s words, by the time he became President of Pakistan in 1958, “the political identification of the country with the West was complete”\(^49\).

The association with USA was further strengthened by invoking religion. Overall, the views of Pakistan’s leaders on the Christian West were “noticeably benevolent” very much in contrast to their views on communism and the USSR\(^50\). The USSR and its ideology of communism was portrayed as a ominous threat by the Pakistani leaders and in an article in Foreign Affairs titled “Pakistan Perspective” in July 1960 President Ayub wrote that if Pakistan does not make significant progress in the next 15 or 20 years “we are bound to be submerged under the tidal wave of Communism which is constantly lashing its fury all round us”\(^51\).

The changing geopolitical scenario following USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a trend towards increasing confrontation between USA and USSR. The USA, in response to USSR invasion of
Afghanistan, boycotted the summer Olympics of 1980 and stopped progress on the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT).

The entry of USSR in Afghanistan also resulted in a change in USA’s policy towards Pakistan. During a speech on 4 January 1980 President Carter said that USA will provide assistance to help Pakistan “defend its independence and national security against a seriously increased threat from the north”\textsuperscript{52}. Later on, USA spelled out its position in the region more clearly and said that any attack on the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack on USA’s vital interests. Pakistan positioned itself, in Zia’s words, as the "backyard of the Gulf" adding that if the backyard was not safe, the front yard would also be insecure”\textsuperscript{53}.

Commenting on Pakistan’s strategy with regards to USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan, General K. M. Arif, a senior military officer, summarized the view prevailing at that time among the top decision making level in Pakistan that the situation required Pakistani action because if Pakistan did not take actions “then it will be our turn tomorrow” adding that action was necessary even if it entailed the “wrath of the Polar Bear and, at least, if we have to go down, go down fighting. We thought this was our moral obligation”\textsuperscript{54}. Here now the moral thrust was to protect Pakistan and the coinciding of this moral thrust with the interests of USA signaled a security policy arrangement that was morally acceptable.

The heightened feelings of insecurity in the face of USSR’s occupation of Afghanistan led Pakistan to reestablish its collaboration
with USA. Both countries found a strong convergence of interests in pushing the USSR out of Afghanistan and thus the period from 1979 to 1980 saw a substantial level of cooperation between the two countries. The aid component of the cooperation started out at a low level and in discussion with a journalist, President Zia described President Carter’s initial aid offer of $400 million as “peanuts”. However, later in 1981, during Reagan’s time, the situation was quite different and the annual aid that USA was providing Pakistan was over a billion dollars.

The potency of Islam as a mobilizing force was high because before USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan the efforts by the pro-communist Afghan government to secularize society had met with resistance from the Afghan population. The internal “Islamization” program within Pakistan by Zia also coincided with this call towards Islam.

On the world stage Pakistan played an important role in garnering support for the Afghan issue, particularly with the Muslim countries and this helped cast the matter in a broader light than just a Cold War conflict. The USSR consequently was viewed as the “fountainhead of atheism and unbelief, the oppressor of many millions of Muslim subjects, and the invader of Afghanistan”. The call to Islam was an important element of the struggle against USSR’s occupation. President Zia’s speech at the 35th session of the UN General Assembly on 1 October 1980 is an important moment. This speech was given 40 days prior to the beginning of the fifteenth Hijra century of the Islamic calendar and Zia was at that time the
Chairperson of the OIC which was composed of forty-two Muslim member states. Zia was nominated by the OIC’s Conference of Foreign Ministers in May 1980 to address the UN General Assembly on behalf of the OIC.

Zia’s speech included many references to an “Islamic brotherhood”, “Ummah”, “Commonwealth of Muslim Nations” and the “World of Islam”\(^5\). Zia emphasized the supra-national brotherhood of Islam and said that Islam “rejects narrow nationalism”\(^6\). The speech also made references to the glorious past of the Muslims and to the contribution made to the progress of the West by Muslim scholars\(^6\). Zia added that the monolith of the “World of Islam is profoundly concerned with the tragedy that has overtaken Afghanistan”\(^6\).

The USA portrayed the Afghan Mujahedeen as freedom fighters and USA’s Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger while visiting the Afghan refugees near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border told the Afghan refugees that that USA will continue to support the Afghan cause “until you regain the freedom that is rightfully yours”\(^6\). Similarly, Secretary of State George P. Shultz told a crowd of cheering Afghan refugees at a camp in Pakistan, near the Afghan border "Fellow fighters for freedom, we are with you!"\(^6\).

Pakistan tries to marry the identity of one who is a supporter of Islam with one who is a supporter of freedom. The challenge of bridging the Islamic with the emancipatory is attempted by Zia by stating that “World of Islam has invariably been at the forefront in espousing the right of peoples to self-determination and independence
as a matter of principle\textsuperscript{65}. The quest for freedom also garners with it support from the Third World countries. Zia in 1980 says that the Islamic World along with its “brethren of the Third World” have suffered and struggled against colonialism and face similar challenges\textsuperscript{66}. Zia adds that the struggle of the Afghan people is “sacrosanct and worthy of respect and support” because it is like the freedom struggles of oppressed people the world over “against foreign domination”\textsuperscript{67}.

Another identity construct found to accompany the Pakistani foreign policy of cooperation with USA and resistance towards the expansion of USSR, is in the bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Here the relations take on both a cultural affinity and a humanitarian urgency. The cultural aspect is highlighted by Zia when he says that Pakistan cannot remain “unconcerned over the tragedy of the Afghan people who are linked to us by indestructible bonds of common geography and history and a glorious spiritual and cultural heritage rooted in rich traditions, nurtured and strengthened over many centuries”\textsuperscript{68}. The pragmatic and empirical aspect of Pakistan being affected by this USSR intervention is premised on the refugees living in Pakistan as a consequence of the occupation. Pakistan was affected by what is happening in Afghanistan because over a million refugees had sought shelter in Pakistan\textsuperscript{69}. President Zia’s during his address at the 40\textsuperscript{th} commemorative session of the UN General Assembly on 23 October 1985, said that “Only an end to this foreign military intervention can restore freedom to the Afghan people and bring
salvation to the millions who have been forced to flee their homeland”70.

6.3 Identity - 2001 to 2012

The end of the Cold War and the demise of USSR brought changes in Pakistan’s relationship with USA. The Pakistani leaders felt slighted at the abrupt withdrawal of support and funding that was provided by USA during USSR’s occupation of Afghanistan71. Pakistan had also faced sanctions from USA since 1991 on account of the nuclear non-proliferation policy of USA. The events of 9/11 and the subsequent WoT saw Pakistan pushed into cooperation with USA. This cooperation led Pakistan to construct an identity that sought to show the terrorist as a threat for Pakistan. Pakistani values were projected to be in conflict with the values of the terrorist and in consonance with USA.

The suspension of USA’s aid and the sanctions of the Pressler Amendment in 1990 caused disbelief and resentment in Pakistan and were denounced as “unfair, anti-Islamic and discriminatory”72. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, though highly resentful of USA’s sanctions still maintained a public response that was muted as he did not want to further disrupt the already strained relations between Pakistan and USA73.

The primary international relations event in the new millennium was the 11 September 2001 attacks on USA. This event had major implications on the foreign policy and the identity formation that
accompanied the foreign policy of Pakistan. The terrorist of 9/11 attack were Muslim and as the details of the incident highlighted they were supported by the Al Qaeda network of bin Laden and motivated by a radical ideology that subverted religion to launch an attack on USA.

Pakistan quickly submitted to cooperation with USA and almost a week after 9/11, Musharraf, the leader of Pakistan went on television to inform the Pakistani public that the government would be supporting USA in its operations in against terrorist in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Pakistan’s decision to cooperate with USA was followed by a couple of weeks of consultations by Musharraf with various opinion leaders on the rationale for cooperation. These included leaders of political parties, intellectuals, media persons, labor leaders, etc. On the whole, the vast majority of those consulted agreed with the President’s decision except the religious leaders, the majority of who opposed the cooperation.

Some in the West framed 9/11 by invoking historical, religiously inspired wars between Christians and Muslims. President Bush clearly attached religious connotations to USA’s reaction to 9/11 while speaking to the press from the lawn of the White House, less than a week after 9/11, when he said that USA “will rid the world of the evil-doers” and added that USA’s fight against the terrorist was a “crusade”.

In addition to religion and religious community, the hatred against USA, in particular, was portrayed by USA as a division along lines of fundamental values. President Bush during his address to
joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, asked the rhetorical question “Why do they hate us?” and responded that the terrorist “hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” adding later in his speech that “We're in a fight for our principles”. In the address Bush also makes a distinction between the “fringe form of Islamic extremism” that guides the terrorist and emphasizes that this fringe form of Islam has been “rejected by Muslim scholars”.

The task for Pakistan was to make a clear choice between cooperation with USA and conflict with USA. Musharraf saw the attacks as a “great blow” to the ego of the world’s most powerful country and felt that USA “was sure to react violently, like a wounded bear”. On 12 September 2001, USA’s secretary of state, General Colin Powell called Musharraf and said “You are with us or against us”. Also, soon after the attacks the director general of Pakistan’s ISI, who was in Washington at the time, was told by the Richard Armitage, USA’s deputy secretary of state, that Pakistan had to choose between USA or the terrorist and if Pakistan chose the terrorist than it “should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age”.

USA had identified the Al Qaeda network as a key player in the 9/11 attacks and the Taliban government in Afghanistan was singled out as a protector of Al Qaeda. Pakistan assessed its national interest lay in cooperation with USA and this essentially meant not supporting the Taliban government. Musharraf puts it succinctly when he said that the ultimate question was if it was in Pakistan’s “national interest to
destroy ourselves for the Taliban …. The answer was a resounding no”⁸¹.

Musharraf wanted to show Pakistan as “victims of terrorism by the Taliban and Al Qaeda and their associated groups for years” and saw joining the WoT as a way of eliminating extremism and foreign terrorist from Pakistan⁸².

USA’s reaction to 9/11 involved targeting particular radical groups such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Pakistan, enunciated an identity that was removed from the Taliban’s and Al Qaeda’s world view. Musharraf describes the Taliban as being motivated by a “zeal inculcated in them by half-baked, obscurantist clerics, a zeal that was contrary to the moderate, tolerant, progressive spirit of the Islam of the majority of the Pakistani people”⁸³. The terrorist were projected as an existential threat for Pakistan and the foreign minister of Pakistan Hina Rabbani Khar said that the terrorist have attacked “the very idea of Pakistan”⁸⁴.

Writing in 2006 Musharraf says that it was “natural for us to join the jihad” against the USSR because we did not want USSR to establish itself in Afghanistan and then to invade Pakistan. He adds, that it was “just as natural to join the war against terror” because we had been a victim of sectarianism and terrorism and we did not want to be “Talibanized”⁸⁵. While emphasizing the natural nature of Pakistan’s decision to cooperate with USA in the WoT, Pakistan also wanted to delink itself from its contribution to the creation of the menace of terrorism. This is attempted in portraying the 9/11 terrorism as
signaling a new era and there are “new threats” to peace and security that are being realized in these times. Zardari also talks about this new issue when he says that “Terrorism and extremism was not known to our society and culture.”

Pakistan also tries to portray itself as not only different from the radical Islamic thought of the terrorist but shows itself to be aligned with the values of USA. Pakistan portrays itself as a country founded on a vision of a state that was interested in promoting peace and prosperity not only for Pakistan but for the South Asian region and for the world. Musharraf in his 2002 speech to the UN General Assembly talks about this vision. A vision that remains anchored in the person of Jinnah the founding father of Pakistan. Musharraf repeated this reference to Jinnah in his address to the UN General Assembly in 2004, 2005 and 2006.

Musharraf tries to project that Pakistan is striving towards fulfilling Jinnah’s vision of making the country a “progressive, modern, democratic, Islamic state.” He emphasizes that “Islam is compatible with modernity.” In explaining this compatibility with modernity, Musharraf says, that Muslims are proud of their own culture and history and at the same time Muslims must strive towards being modern, such as, pursuing civic government, justice, good education and democracy.

The immediate overt USA military reaction in the WoT focuses on Afghanistan but Afghanistan was not the only country that was overtly targeted by USA. In early 2003 USA invaded Iraq. Iraq tried to
frame the confrontation as a war between Islam and the West and tried to shore support for itself from the Muslim majority countries by firing Scud missiles at Israel. This maneuver against Israel did manage to generate some public support for Saddam in the some Muslim majority countries but, generally, the intervention by USA did not serve as a catalyst for uniting the Muslim countries against USA. In part the lack of support for Saddam was due to this earlier invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Saddam had tried to also portray the 1991 Gulf War as a war between Islam and the West. This framing did not work at that time because, firstly, the genesis of the Gulf War was armed aggression by a Muslim country against another Muslim country; secondly, the UN and the world community of nations (including Muslim countries) were opposed to the aggression by Saddam; thirdly, the coalition of military forces that participated in the armed response to Saddam's aggression included several Muslim countries. There was very limited open support provided to Saddam by the Muslim World and the support that was openly provided came from Iran. The religious leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, called for a jihad against the West.92

Even though Pakistan tried to present itself as a country that did not support the radical views of the terrorist, still, the periodic apprehension of terrorist from Pakistan’s territory served to uncomfortably juxtapose Pakistan with terrorism. Musharraf tried to recast terrorism as a foreign induced problem and one that was not intrinsic to Pakistan by saying that “our experience has taught us that foreigners in Al Qaeda have almost invariably masterminded terrorist
acts in Pakistan”\textsuperscript{93}. Still there was no way to ignore that many high value terrorist, including bin Laden were apprehended or killed from within Pakistan. The reality that some parts of Pakistan were safe havens for terrorist saw an escalation of drone attacks within Pakistan by USA.

Pakistan projected itself as a key player in the global WoT. Zardari in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 2008 said that “In our stability lies the world’s security”\textsuperscript{94}. Khar, the Pakistani foreign minister, added that “Eliminating terrorism is in our national interest. We believe that our success is critical to regional and global peace and security”\textsuperscript{95}.

Pakistan also projected an image of a country that has endured immense sacrifices in the WoT. Zardari during his 2008 address to the UN General Assembly said that Pakistan has “lost more soldiers than all 37 countries that have forces in Afghanistan put together”\textsuperscript{96}. This feeling is also echoed by Khar when she said that “Very few countries have been ravaged by the monster of terrorism as brutally as Pakistan”\textsuperscript{97}.

6.4 Conclusion

An examination of the second major research question of this dissertation deals with the identity constructions that attempted to accommodate the Pakistani foreign policy of collaboration with USA. The periods of collaboration that are viewed are from 1947 to 1962, from 1979 to 1989, and from 2001 to 2012. During the first period of
collaboration with USA, Pakistan saw a primary existential threat from India. Pakistan’s foreign policy makers felt that Pakistan’s security and development objectives could be met through an alliance with USA. The identity that was projected during this period was one where the values of the new state of Pakistan were shown to be in alignment with the values of USA. The alignment was in the important areas of the political system and the development model. To stabilize the identity construction in support of the cooperation with USA the leaders of Pakistan invoked religion.

After sixteen years of little or no cooperation the interests of USA and Pakistan, once again, converged around a foreign policy of pushing back USSR out of Afghanistan. This objective was the basis of collaboration between Pakistan and USA during the 1979 to 1989 period. The constructions of the resistance in terms of a struggle for freedom and Islam were central to rallying support for ousting USSR. The Pakistan policy primarily relied on the construction of an identity position that placed Islam as the defining feature of the struggle and for USA it was a narrative that primarily projected a support for freedom.

The end of the Cold War and the end of USSR brought changes in Pakistan’s relationship with USA. The Pakistani leaders were disappointed at the abrupt withdrawal of support and funding by USA. Pakistan also faced sanctions from USA in the 1990s on account of USA’s nuclear non-proliferation policy.
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent WoT saw Pakistan pushed, once again, into cooperation with USA. This cooperation led Pakistan to construct an identity that sought to show the terrorist as a threat for Pakistan. Pakistani values were projected to be in conflict with the terrorist and in consonance with USA.
Endnotes


6. Ibid., 56.

7. Ibid., 61.


10. Jinnah, Speeches, 45.


16. Ibid., 1.

17. Ibid., 74.

18. Ibid., 119.


24. Ibid., 39.


30. Ibid., 28.


36. Ibid., 25.


40. Ibid., 136.


42. Kux, United States and Pakistan, 207.

43. Ibid., 166.


45. Kux, United States and Pakistan, 20.


47. Kux, United States and Pakistan, 70.

48. Ibid., 71.


51. Arif, American-Pakistan Relations, 187.

52. Kux, United States and Pakistan, 247.


55. Ibid., 249.


60. Ibid., 5.

61. Ibid., 7.

62. Ibid., 11.


66. Ibid., 15.

67. Ibid., 11.


72. Kux, United States and Pakistan, 310.

73. Ibid., 313.


79. Ibid., 201.

80. Ibid., 201.

81. Ibid., 202.

82. Ibid., 203.

83. Ibid., 202-203.


85. Musharraf, Line of Fire, 222-223.


88. Pervez Musharraf, “Pakistan’s Address at the 57th Session of the UN General Assembly,” United Nations, 2002,
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/statements/020912pakistanE.htm

89. Musharraf, “Address at 59th UNGA.”

90. Musharraf, “Address at 57th UNGA.”


93. Musharraf, Line of Fire, 278.


95. Khar, “Address at 66th UNGA.”

96. Zardari, “Address at the 63rd UNGA.”

97. Khar, “Address at the 66th UNGA.”
Chapter 7

CONTRADICTIONS IN IDENTITY

CONSTRUCTIONS
Chapter 7
Contradictions in Identity Constructions

This chapter addresses the third major research question of the dissertation: What were the contradictions in identity constructions that accompanied Pakistan’s collaboration with USA? In this chapter, we look at the inherent contradictions in the attempts at identity constructions by the Pakistan foreign and security policy elite, during periods of foreign policy collaboration with USA. These contradictions signal an inherent instability in the identity constructions. The chapter analyzes that the destabilizing challenges of Pakistan’s identity constructions involving religion. Also, challenges from a divergence in values related to the nature of the political system of Pakistan and USA are explored. The final challenge analyzed is the contradiction between preserving Pakistan’s sovereignty and the violation of sovereignty that comes along with Pakistan’s cooperation with USA in the WoT.

Pakistan’s identity, to an important extent, draws on religion and this centrality of religion is based on identity constructs that begin with the Muslim advent in the Indian subcontinent and are shaped over centuries of interaction between the Muslims and other communities. The importance of the religious is consolidated in an infusion with the political in the pre-partition period of the Indian subcontinent, and is further consolidated in the post-partition period by international borders demarcating a newly independent Pakistani self against others.
beyond the Pakistani borders. A major challenge to the identity that accompanies the Pakistani policy of cooperation with USA comes from a contradiction that is anchored in policy positions towards selected Muslim states.

The Pakistani identity, drawing on Islam, necessarily involved a policy of support for other Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East. These countries had been suffering since the 1950s under a USA policy of support for Israel. Herein lay a glaring challenge to the Pakistani architects of identity and a challenge that was difficult to allay. The Muslim nature of Pakistan’s national identity was demonstrated in Pakistan taking public positions on international issues that were supportive of Muslim countries. The struggle between the Pakistani sense of obligation towards supporting the Muslim causes and the lack of support for such causes by USA is something Pakistan had to contend with right from the start. This struggle is highlighted in a 19 December 1947 interview given by Jinnah to BBC reporter Robert Simson. In the interview Jinnah said that the Muslims of Pakistan “condemn in the strongest possible manner the unjust and cruel decision … concerning the partition of Palestine” and added that though Pakistan is “obviously reluctant to antagonize the United States … but our sense of justice obliges us to help the Arab cause in Palestine in every way that is open to us”\(^1\). This statement by Jinnah displays the precariousness of balancing a Pakistani position on issues where the policy of USA and the interests of the Muslim countries are in conflict.
Ayub also highlighted the fact that the Muslim countries and their interests seemed to be at odds with the interests of USA by pointing out that when Pakistan joined the Western security alliances there was a general resentment by the Muslim countries\(^2\). Liaquat tried to segregate the two issues as being unrelated by saying that the Pakistani position of support for Muslim countries was different from Pakistan’s security alliances by saying that “we feel a natural affiliation with other Muslim countries and our relations with them are the friendliest ... I do not wish you to infer that I am talking in terms of any power bloc”\(^3\).

The weak pro-Muslim credentials of USA made for a contradiction in the identification of Pakistan as a Muslim country that supported the cause of other Muslim countries and also was an ally of USA. The divergence between the Muslim causes and USA’s policy positions is highlighted in the second period of collaboration between Pakistan and USA from 1979 to 1989. During this period there surfaces the contradiction between a policy of support for a Muslim Afghanistan and the collaboration with a USA that had demonstrated that it was not supportive of the Muslim cause in the Middle East. In the struggle to oust USSR from Afghanistan the identity that Pakistan projected was of an Islamic Pakistan that was supporting the struggle of a brother Islamic country that had been invaded. The Islamic identity of Pakistan and the nature of the struggle were motivated by strategic considerations that involved the existing resentment in Afghanistan against the socialist reforms by the communist government of
Afghanistan and the Islamic reforms that had been launched in Pakistan by the military government of Zia. Also, the struggle of the mujahedeen found strength, in part, in its being viewed as an Islamic jihad.

While the invoking of Islam during the war against the USSR’s occupation of Afghanistan made sense, still, this produced a problem in harmonizing the Pakistani collaboration with USA because of USA’s role in supporting Israel in the Middle East. According to Zia, USA pursues a policy in the Middle East “which brings it into hostile confrontation with the Arab World and extends open-ended support for Israel” and Israel relies on USA’s support to “usurp the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine”\(^4\).

The Islamic jihad of the mujahedeen was supported by Pakistan but USA, given its policy of support for Israel, did not fit neatly in the role of a supporter of jihad. In this instance the cooperation between USA and Pakistan could not be projected in total as a convergence of values and identities. For Pakistan the countering of USSR’s threat was most effectively accomplished through a portrayal of a Muslim country that was supporting other Muslim country’s Muslim peoples. USA, due to the weakness of its pro-Muslim credentials, undertook the primary posture of a freedom loving country that was supporting a struggle for freedom.

The weak credentials of USA as a generally pro-Muslim country are not just challenged in the face of USA’s support for Israel but in the third period of Pakistan’s collaboration with USA from 2001 to
In 2012, during the WoT, there is a sense that USA’s policy is targeting Muslims in general and some Muslim countries in particular. In his 2004 address to the UN General Assembly, Musharraf mentioned several times the divide between Islam and West and he underscored the need for a dialogue to “remove the veil of ignorance and prejudice and to promote harmony and cooperation”.

Musharraf further strengthened this notion by saying that “across the Muslim world, old conflicts and new campaigns of military intervention have spawned a deep sense of desperation and injustice”. He added that “unless we end foreign occupation and suppression of Muslim peoples, terrorism and extremism will continue ...” Later in his speech, Musharraf mentioned Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq as instances of such occupations.

The second major contradiction in the construction of a Pakistani identity that supported a USA and Pakistan foreign policy convergence was evidenced in the construction of a Pakistani identity that was in consonance with USA’s political values.

Islam, in historical continuity, remained a powerful element of Pakistan’s identity and was invoked to construct a compatibility with democracy. Jinnah in 1947 equates Islam with democracy when he says that Muslims “learned democracy thirteen centuries ago”. On 16 May 1950 Liaquat delivered a speech at the University of California in Berkley and shed light on how Pakistan identified itself as a democracy by saying that democracy means the “freedom to be governed as you choose. And how do you think the people of our country would like to
be governed? They would, I can tell you, abhor to be members of a society which is atheistic... or in which the system of caste prevails and all men and women are not born equal, are not free to exercise individual initiative or to enjoy the fruits of individual effort”⁸. This speech makes a spirited attempt to link Pakistan with democracy and at the same time show that the Hindu religion is in conflict with the principles of democracy. What is seen in this attempt is the construction of a democratic identity for Pakistan by indirectly pointing towards principles of Islam which may be viewed as egalitarian.

The contradiction in this identity construct is that the political regime during Pakistan’s first two decades could not really be classified as democratic. To clarify, though democracy has many definitions but for the purposes of this dissertation we take an empirical and a less normative definition of democracy in which democracy, in the minimum, is signified in the conduct of elections in a political environment that allows the freedom of expression⁹. In Pakistan there was no democracy in the first couple of decades of its existence and the first elections on a universal adult franchise basis were held in the 1970s¹⁰.

Further, during the greater part of the three major periods of cooperation with USA, Pakistan was under military dictatorships. The stability of identity during a policy of cooperation with USA was weakened by a divergence of values related to political systems and regimes. The relations between Pakistan and USA also suffered on this
account and often the solution was to maintain a silence on the political regime related issue.

The third major contradiction in identity constructions and the policy of cooperation with USA is seen during the cooperation that emerges immediately following the 9/11 attacks on USA. Terrorism is shown to be a threat to Pakistan and the chief source of insecurity is the terrorist, especially the foreign terrorist. The contradiction seen here is that while Pakistan projected an identity that is opposed to the values of the terrorist, it suppresses the fact that it had quickly agreed to cooperate with USA because with non-cooperation came the risk of being “bombed to the stone age”\textsuperscript{11}. During the course of the WoT the Pakistani cooperation with USA suffered from the inherent contradiction of allowing sovereignty compromising drone attacks.

The principle of sovereignty is an important element of the modern concept of the state and has its roots in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The Treaty legitimized the right of rulers to govern their territories “free from outside interference”\textsuperscript{12}. Also, state borders, once created, were to serve as intrinsic qualifiers of the inside and outside and of situating demarcations of inclusion and exclusion\textsuperscript{13}. In addition to defining identities, the borders also define limits to a state’s control over its people and territory and borders help put in place important boundaries for discourse and meaning construction\textsuperscript{14}.

Pakistan in collaborating with USA had to accept the fact that there was a terrorist presence in the country and USA was out to destroy these terrorist. This terrorist presence may have been, partly,
the outcome of the decade long conflict between the USSR and the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, and partly the result of the post-9/11 attacks by USA on Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan, which led Al Qaeda terrorist into Pakistan. Still, there is no denying the position of Pakistan as a country that has within it a terrorist presence.

The presence of a limited number of terrorist in Pakistan is evidenced in the face of the numerous infamous terrorists that have been apprehended from within Pakistan. One such high profile terrorist arrest in Pakistan that took place before 9/11 was when a key planner of the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yousef, who was arrested in 1995. According to Musharraf, at its “peak strength” in Pakistan the Al-Qaeda core comprised of around 300 experienced fighters of Uzbek, Tajik, Chechen, and Afghan origins. Infamous terrorist apprehended after 9/11 from Pakistan included Abu Zubeida, who had a $5 million reward on his head, and was arrested in 2002; Khalid Sheikh Mohammad who was arrested from Rawalpindi in 2003; and, among others, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, in 2005. Libbi was one of the Al-Qaeda members whose name President Bush knew and had personally asked Musharraf to help arrest. By 2007, 689 terrorist had been arrested in Pakistan and 369 of these were handed over to USA.

The most prominent terrorist found hiding in Pakistan was Osama bin Laden, who was killed in Abottabad, during a May 2013 US Navy SEAL’s special operation. It is noteworthy that the killing of bin Laden was recognized by President Obama as an achievement that is a “testament to the greatness of our country and the determination of the
American people” but Pakistan was not a partner in this achievement and Obama stressed the unilateral nature of the operation by clarifying that “Over the years, I’ve repeatedly made clear that we would take action within Pakistan if we knew where bin Laden was. That is what we’ve done”18.

The presence of high profile terrorist within Pakistan and the coercive way in which USA enlisted Pakistan’s cooperation in the WoT contributed to a consistent policy by USA of violating the sovereignty of Pakistan through drone attacks. Pakistan, in light of these violations of its sovereignty, also shifts from blaming the terrorist to assigning some of the blame for terrorism on USA and Western countries. This was seen in Musharraf’s proposed solution to not only the problems of the Muslim world but also a global solution for ending terrorism: the idea of “enlightened moderation”. The idea involves on the one hand the rejection of terrorism and extremism by the Muslim countries and a focus on socio-economic development, and, on the other hand, the West finding “just solutions” to all political disputes confronting the Muslim world such as Palestine and Kashmir19. Elaborating on USA’s and the West’s responsibilities, Musharraf talked about resolution of international disputes that have dogged the Muslim world20.

This line of thinking also placed the blame on USA and USSR for establishing the roots of terrorism in the 1980s during the war in Afghanistan21. The USA is further blamed because after USSR’s defeat, USA, among others, turned its back on Afghanistan, and Pakistan was left to face many of the unresolved challenges including the three
million Afghan refugees inside of Pakistan. The camps for these refugees “soon became breeding grounds for intolerance and violence ... [a]nd one of its greatest consequences was the birth of Al Qaeda ...”22.

In a thinly veiled reference to USA’s unilateralism with regards to the drone attacks within Pakistan, President Zardari says that “Violating our nation’s sovereignty is not helpful in eliminating the terrorist menace. Indeed, this could have the opposite effect”23. Zardari added in 2012 UN General Assembly address that “Drone strikes and civilian casualties on our territory add to the complexity of our battle for the heart and minds through this epic struggle”24.

The sense of being wronged is demonstrated when Zardari said that “We are an aggrieved nation not one that has caused grief”25. One sore point between Pakistan and USA is when USA asked Pakistan to “do more” in the WoT26. Zardari picked up on this point when he said to “those who say we have not done enough, I say in all humility: Please do not insult the memory of our dead, and the pain of our living”27. The reality of being coerced by USA coupled with the continued violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty caused Pakistan to construct an image of itself as a country that has been treated unfairly by USA. The USA is this scenario and during a period of cooperation on security matters is also viewed as a source of insecurity for Pakistan.

The fourth major contradiction in constructing a Pakistani identity in support of a security policy of collaboration with USA is
the persistent inconsistency of the cooperation between Pakistan and USA. There are three distinct periods of collaboration between USA and Pakistan: from 1947 to 1962, 1979 to 1989, and from 2001 to 2012. Alongside these periods of cooperation there are also large periods, particularly from 1963 to 1978 and 1989 to 2001, where there is little or no cooperation between the two countries.

In the periods of limited cooperation with USA, Pakistan went through some very serious foreign policy crisis, including wars with India in 1965 and 1971. The narrative that flowed during these times was highly critical of USA. Following the decline in cooperation between the two countries in 1962 the Pakistani leadership proposed that what was wrong in the relations between Pakistan and USA was deep rooted. In a June 1964 interview with the Daily Mail Newspaper Ayub said that American foreign policy was “based on opportunism” and was “devoid of moral quality”. Following the civil disturbance in Pakistan after the 1977 election, Z. Bhutto, in an address to the National Assembly on 28 April 1977, blamed USA for wanting to remove him from power because of Pakistan’s opposition to USA’s intervention in Vietnam, Pakistan’s support for the Muslim countries and not Israel in the Middle East, and because of Pakistan’s interest in obtaining nuclear weapons. Generally, USA was seen as a selfish and immoral friend and the interest of Pakistan and USA were seen in certain instances to be in direct conflict with each other.

Whenever cooperation was reestablished between the two countries after 1962 there was the difficulty of having to deal with the
lack of cooperation that had ensued in the past. In 1979, USSR’s occupation of Afghanistan led Pakistan to reestablishing collaboration with USA. This renewed cooperation had to contend with the decade and a half of strained relations between the two countries. Zia, during a 13 January 1980 press conference, voiced Pakistan’s apprehension when he said that USA would have to prove its “credibility and durability” as an ally before Pakistan would consider accepting USA’s aid\textsuperscript{32}.

Zia bluntly summarizes the collaborative relationship between Pakistan and USA in a conversation with Secretary Schultz on 6 December 1982, by saying that the cooperation between Pakistan and USA was a “union of unequals” and the two were not compatible in culture and power but shared a strong common interest\textsuperscript{33}. Zia was speaking in the context of the struggle against the USSR in Afghanistan but he touches on a perennial reality that the security cooperation between USA and Pakistan is not substantially reinforced by convergences in stable identity construction.
Endnotes


10. Ibid., 48.


16. Ibid., 257.

17. Ibid., 237.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


25. Zardari, “Address at the 63rd UNGA.”


27. Zardari, “Address at the 67th UNGA.”

28. See chapter 5 of this dissertation for details of the periods of collaboration between Pakistan and USA.

29. See section 4.4 of this dissertation for details of the periods of little or no cooperation between Pakistan and USA.


31. Ibid., 230.
32. Ibid., 249.

33. Ibid., 268.
Chapter 8

CONCLUSION
Chapter 8

Conclusion

This dissertation has researched the identity constructions that accompanied Pakistan’s foreign policy collaboration with USA and tries to understand the inherent contradictions in these identity constructions. The dissertation also develops a theoretical framework under with the research could be carried out.

The constructivist theoretical framework provides a general foundation for this research and the constructivist focus on ideas and identity provides an appropriate underpinning for the dissertation. The dissertation uses the theoretical framework of Alexander Wendt and like Wendt’s theorizing this research emphasizes security and the social constructed nature of identity. The dissertation further examines how the pursuit of security and consequent policy is accompanied by certain identity constructions. The dissertation, however, mainly departs from Wendt’s theorizing in the level of analysis that has been used in this research.

The identity of the new state of Pakistan was affected by continuities of the pre-partition communal interactions between Muslims and Hindus in the Indian subcontinent. The initial interactions between the two communities, in the ninth century, included intermittent wars and conquests. These interactions provided
foundation for constructing inter-communal resentment and insecurity. The British colonial rule over the subcontinent was consolidated after 1857 and, subsequently, Muslims competed with Hindus for economic benefits and political power. The actions of the Hindu majority, on receiving political power in the elections of 1939, provided the Muslim minority concrete substance for consolidating the construction of a threat to the Muslims from the Hindus.

The political and religious identity of a distinct and homogenous Muslim community in the Indian subcontinent was stabilized in light of the threat and insecurity it faced from the Hindus. The insecurity experienced by the Muslims propelled them to view their collective identity not just as a distinct community but also as a separate “nation”.

The insecurity faced by the Muslim nation on account of the threatening Hindu nation was balanced by a sense of security obtained by cooperating with the British. To facilitate cooperation with the British a relational identity was constructed to accommodate the cooperation. In pursuit of this cooperation the narratives that was suppressed were the Muslim Arab confrontation with the Christian West in the eighth century and the religious difference between the Christian faith and the Muslim faith. There were also silences that were maintained with regards to the British treatment of Muslims internationally. The cooperation with the British was strengthened by the portrayal of the strength and power of the British and by viewing the British as a source of economic and political benefit for the
Muslims. Thus, on the threshold of partition, the Muslim nation felt insecurity in its relations with the Hindu nation and security in its cooperation with the British.

Pakistan, after partition, viewed the international system it faced as one that operated on the principle of the “law of the jungle”. In such a system a defining element of the national identity of Pakistan was that it was a weak and insecure state. In the early period after partition, the prime source of insecurity was India and the violence of partition and the war of 1947 reinforced this view.

The Pakistani identity also incorporated a narrative of uniqueness. Faced with a decline in the support and cooperation of the British, Pakistan was receptive to fostering new security arrangements to address the insecurities it faced. In the early years of Pakistan the overbearing concern with insecurity was addressed through alliances and cooperation with USA.

In Pakistan’s sixty-plus years of existence the cooperation with USA occurred in three distinct periods. These periods were from 1947 to 1962; from 1979 to 1989; and from 2001 to 2012. In the first period Pakistan was threatened primarily by India. In the second period the main threat came from USSR; and in the third period the prime threat came from terrorists and the WoT.

There was considerable difference in the contexts in which the cooperation with USA took place and the commensurate attempts at identity constructions reflected the difference. The first period of cooperation with USA involved Pakistani identity constructions that
sought to build convergences around shared values of democracy and progress. In the second period of collaboration there was no overriding attempt to forge convergences on the basis of shared values. During this second period, for Pakistan, the primary construct that accompanied the policy of ousting the USSR from Afghanistan was Islam and saving Muslims. In the third period, following 9/11, the cooperation between Pakistan and USA was guided by the USA led WoT. The identity constructions in this third period focused on a delineation of the world views of moderate Islam from the radical views of the terrorists. Pakistan identified itself as a country that was upholding a moderate Islamic world view.

Islam is an aspect of identity that is important during the three periods of Pakistan’s cooperation with USA. However, Islam is invoked in different manners and, overall, no single identity construct has anchored all three periods of cooperation between Pakistan and USA. The Pakistani attempts at identity constructions, in support of cooperation with USA, are destabilized because of inherent contradictions. The importance of the Islam provides for a significant contradiction in Pakistan’s identity constructions in support of a policy of security cooperation with USA. This contradiction can be seen in the inability of USA to support Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East. The second major contradiction weakening the Pakistani identity construction in support of cooperation with USA was the divergence between USA’s political preference for democracy and Pakistan’s intermittent dictatorships. The third major contradiction that
identity constructions to support cooperation with USA in the WoT had to face was how cooperation in the WoT was compromising Pakistan’s sovereignty.
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