THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BALUCHISTAN
IN THE LAST DECADE OF THE BRITISH RAJ

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my individual research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree.

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FINAL APPROVAL

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It was in 1974 that I first became involved in research on Baluchistan during a project at Department of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Since then it became my life-long commitment with the people and area of Baluchistan. I also got a chance to become a faculty member at the University of Baluchistan, Quetta, in 1987, which further cemented this relationship. Literally, many people have contributed to this work, some in providing the literature, and others in personal communications, mostly in face-to-face situations. Eventually, I hope to be able to thank one and all in the traditional Baluch face-to-face manner.

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INTRODUCTION

Baluchistan's location, strategic importance, ethnic composition, and the unique legacy of British administration give it a special place in the annals of history. A cursory glance at its history demonstrates at once its involvement as well as isolation from the main channels of the history of South Asia. This vast stretch of deserts, rocky mountains and pockets of inhabited areas have attracted travellers, invaders, archaeologists, anthropologists, traders, and a host of curious social scientists. Their travel accounts, impressions, reports, studies, and experiences constitute interesting, but at times, extremely biased versions about the people of this area. The scholars engaged in research on different aspects of this province are confronted with the dual challenge of sifting the reliable material as well as understanding the motives of the various actors involved in order to present a balanced picture.

The present study is devoted to political and social developments in Baluchistan under British rule and has used written reports, travelogues, policy statements, official records, memoirs, and the correspondence of British officers who served in Baluchistan. In addition, wherever available, local sources have also been used in order to provide a more balanced view of the events and the personalities involved in the process of these developments. Last, but not least, various academic studies undertaken by foreign scholars as well as local researchers have also been
utilized. It will indeed be relevant to understand the scope as well as the underlying themes of these studies.

British writings dominate the literature and archives on Baluchistan. The writers obviously, reflected the British viewpoint. They either highlighted the achievements of the British administrators or narrated the difficulties encountered by them during their rule of Baluchistan. Even in areas where some development was undertaken, such as communications like rail and road constructions, these writers depict the opposition of the various tribes in an exaggerated manner. The information provided in their accounts, therefore, had to be carefully sifted, as it reflected the bias of the authors rather than necessarily the actual situation obtaining during the times these studies were undertaken. But while limitations of reliability, objectivity and scope diminish the value of these writings, the researcher must depend on these sources due to the absence of many alternatives. However, there was no denying that the British officers were good writers. Most of what we know today about Baluchistan emanate from these writings. Therefore, in a sense, we can say that British imperialism laid the foundations of Baluch historiography. At the same time, it is also fair to say that the British writings are useful in describing British perceptions and policies regarding Baluchistan.

The second category of studies can be described as ‘nationalist’ historiography. The authors glorify the deeds of the Baluch people. They blame the rulers for their collaboration with the occupiers. In this sense, their writings reflect anger, frustration at the services rendered by the Baluch leaders to the various rulers
of their province. Like all nationalist writers, these writers glorify their heroes and exaggerate the achievements of Baluchi people. However, within this category, there are contradictory claims by the Pashtoons and the Baluch, each claiming a major share in the scale of important turning points in the history of Baluchistan. The result is that each group overemphasizes its share and degrades the achievements of the other. Often, these writings were used as political manifestos by the politicians who used to finance such studies. Even the recent works appearing on Baluchistan are based on the source material from the magazines or the newspapers which used to appear from outside Baluchistan.

Apart from anthropologists, whose primary concern was studying the origins and manifestations of cultural and social norms, there are a few studies in English language on Baluchistan, which appear to be academic undertakings with strong political message. Fred Scholz's doctoral dissertation in German, but it has been translated into English and published. It covers a hundred years of Baluchistan's history (1872-1972), and focuses on nomadism and colonialism. This work is based on the theory of ‘dependencia’, analysing the impact of British colonialism on the traditional structures of tribal nomadic societies, establishes the magnitude of such changes and is a major breakthrough in anomalism research. Two important doctoral dissertations, first by Heathcote, and secondly by S. Dutta were completed at University of London, mostly covering the 19th century British policies towards Baluchistan. Inayatullah Baluch's doctoral dissertation concentrates mainly on the Kalat State National Party. It is more or less, a one-sided version of the political group that, according to the author, stood for Baluch nationalism and an independent
Baluchistan. Syed Abdul Quddus’s dissertation interprets and discusses the Baluch tribes, their language, culture, and way of life. Col. Iqbal Ahmad’s dissertation is mainly concerned with strategic issues relating to Baluchistan during and after British rule. It represents the military’s view of strategic interests and can hardly be considered a purely academic undertaking.

However, it needs to be pointed out that Inayatullah Baluch’s work, in spite of the fact that it is based on extensive sources both written and oral, often reflects the personal bias of the author. The result is that we do not get a fair and objective assessment of the situation in Baluchistan. Dutta indeed, has used all the sources that were available to her in different archives of England more objectively. But the problem is that she did not have access to Baluchistan archives which could have immensely changed her findings on Sandeman’s policy.

The present study draws available material in the British archives in London as well as in Baluchistan, Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad. This material consists of intelligence reports, and official high-level correspondence of Agents to the Governor General, the Viceroy and other British officers. The ample use of colonial records is meant to enable the readers to benefit from the wealth of information, which is hidden in the archives. Since the study is devoted to the last decade of political developments in Baluchistan before independence, i.e., 1937-47 period, we had to examine the social and economic infrastructure of Baluchistan; hence, ethnic composition, economic and natural resources have also been included in this study.
On the eve of the British advent, the social and economic infrastructure of Baluchistan represented almost all characteristics of a desert society, such as isolation, group feeling, chivalry, hospitality, tribal enmity and animal husbandry. There was hardly any area in Baluchistan that could be considered an urban settlement. Even the capital of the state of Kalat looked like a conglomeration of mud dwellings with only the royal residence emerging as a symbol of status and power. In terms of social relations, economic institutions, and politics, the society demonstrated almost every aspect of tribalism in every walk of life.

The British advent in Baluchistan was important both in terms of its impact on Baluch social and economic structure and resultant re-adjustment and re-orientation of relations in the tribal society. New relations were introduced at three levels: Inter-tribal, intra-tribal, and relations with new rulers. Therefore, the study includes a chapter on the British century followed by an analysis of the pattern of the British administration. The idea is to highlight some unique features of the British administration in Baluchistan, as it was very different from the other parts of the British India. It depended less on the directives of the British government or the office of the Viceroy and more on the hunches and instincts of the Agents to the Governor General, serving in Baluchistan. During this period, the British perceived threats to the British Empire from the Russians, the French, the Germans and the Turks. Therefore, where necessary an effort has been made to highlight how these threats, real or imagined, influenced the British policies in Baluchistan. The over-all scheme of the study is as follows.
The first chapter deals with the usual question addressed by such studies, that is, the land and the people. It should not be confused with the ‘orientalist’ idea of capsules where most tribal or even urban societies are dealt with in a few sweeping statements. We have approached this question keeping in view the opinions of the foreigners as well as the indigenous people. Moreover, in the absence of any industry or urban culture, it was important to look at the natural resources and their exploitation. We have avoided using strong statements about the characteristics of the people but have included what the British felt about them in order to see how far these perceptions informed their policies.

The British discovery of Baluchistan was not an accident in their numerous adventures beyond the frontiers of the East India Company but a well-planned and gradually evolved intrusion. The second chapter, therefore, presents a historical survey of the involvement of Baluchistan in the power politics of various empire-builders. In particular, those circumstances and factors have been examined that brought the British to Baluchistan. The First Afghan War was fought apparently to send a message to Moscow that the British would not tolerate any Russian advances towards their Indian empire. To what extent the Russian threat, or for that matter, later French threat under Napoleon, were real or imagined, is also covered in this chapter.

The third chapter traces the development of an administrative pattern in Baluchistan under the British. Why was this province treated differently from the other British possessions in India? This question is discussed in the light of both the
British considerations as well the social and economic situation obtaining in Baluchistan. Most of this analysis is based on the declared as well inferred motives of the administrators keeping in view the 'frontier policy'. There is a close relationship between the administrative structure and political developments, hence, it was deemed useful to see the extent to which the border policy of the British was instrumental in keeping this province under tight control.

Chapter four deals with the origins and the development of political parties. The term political party should not be understood in the sense the term is used in political science but as a group of concerned people united for a specific political purpose at a given time. Its composition, message, and even leadership could change as quickly as the situation demanded. These groups were influenced by major political events—both within and without. A new law, an attack, or a major event anywhere in the world, could trigger a response from some people leading to the establishment of a new party. Many of the leaders, as we shall see, were members of more than one group and quite often changed their loyalties according to their needs. Essentially, it was the work of a small minority, who was educated in the British institutions, and had become conscious of the negative impact of traditional tribal system particularly the Sardari system, on their political destiny.

To what extent ethnic considerations, the urge to reform the social institutions, and the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution, acted as major factors in organizing the people in different political parties, are addressed in the fifth chapter. Since most of these parties were concerned with domestic issues like political
reforms, better educational facilities, and radical changes in the tribal structure, their interaction with the British rulers, the Khan, and the Sardars is also discussed. It also reveals a unique characteristic of the system, that is, the system is not only resilient to the outside pressure but it is also resistant to internal change.

With the passage of time, Baluchistan started receiving influences from major political parties of India. In 1935, Quetta was struck by a major earthquake in which the city lost an overwhelming majority of its population. The British reconstructed the whole city, which took a couple of years but, in the process, Quetta emerged as the only multi-ethnic, multi-tribal and multi-religious city in Baluchistan. It soon became the hub of activities of all the major political parties and interests. The role of some of the more important parties such as the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, the activities of other parties like the Kalat State National Party, the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, the Anjuman-i-Watan, the Majlis-i-Ahrar and the Khaksars is discussed in this chapter.

One of the most important forms of protest against colonial rule a decadent social system, and indifference of the political leaders, was expressed in poetry and prose by bards, poets, and the educated elite. All available methods were employed to convey to the readers and listeners what these people felt about the political situation in Baluchistan. Sometimes, they were inspired by a particularly harsh event. Popularly referred to as 'resistance literature', magazines, newspapers, and pamphlets published in Baluchistan and in the adjacent areas contain this material in abundance. The contents were invariably directed against the British policies, the status of the
traditional Sardars, economic miseries and absence of political rights. We shall see how the challenges of a new system were channeled into one of the oldest forms of literature in this area, the ballads. Newspapers, even under the strict control and supervision of the authorities, played a crucial role in political developments, thus substantiating Marshall MacLuhan's famous statement that 'medium is message'.

Chapter six is devoted to the role of the press and the resistance literature in the political development in Baluchistan.

Unlike the other British-administrated areas, Baluchistan did not experience significant political, social, and economic reforms despite persistent demands by the local political leaders as well as other leaders in British India. Being the last part of South Asia to come under the colonial system, the British resisted the introduction of substantial reforms here till the very end of their rule of India in 1947. Participatory politics did not exist in Baluchistan even in those parts that were under the direct British rule. The arguments advanced by the proponents of political reforms as well as those who opposed it, are examined in the seventh chapter. Since this struggle, in many ways, was related to the demand for Pakistan, Baluchistan's accession to Pakistan is also included in this chapter.

Finally, the findings of this study are analyzed at some length. Philosophers and social scientists have attempted to explain the factors that contribute to social, economic and political development in different societies. We have attempted to see how Baluchistan was affected by the British rule and policies. What was the fate of Baluchistan in the hands of the so-called torchbearers of development? How much
changed and how? How much did not change and why? Who was responsible? What was the end result?

These and other related questions indeed are worth exploring. The methodology followed in this study is essentially descriptive and chronological. Although the study is related to the last decade of the British administration, in order to highlight certain events and developments, earlier phases of history have also been brought into the discussion. This was also important partly because of their relevance to the people struggling for freedom, and, partly, because in South Asian politics, the single most important factor, after religion, has been the selective reading of history and its uses in different movements. An effort has been made to use all available sources on the subject. Therefore, the study is not confined to the political agenda of the British or of the Khan of Kalat or of any political party but attempts to give a comprehensive account of all the important actors who were involved in shaping the political destiny of Baluchistan during 1937-47 period.
Notes

1 Fred Scholz, Translated from the German by Hugh van Skyhawk, *Nomadism & Colonialism: A Hundred Years of Baluchistan 1872-1972* (Karachi, 2002).


7 Marshal Macluhan, *The Medium is the Message* (New York, 1967). This is not just a statement but the title of his very popular book.
CHAPTER 1

LAND AND PEOPLE OF BALUCHISTAN

The colonial administrators and chroniclers used to introduce their subjects with the titles like “the land and the people” giving an impression that it was possible to describe societies in a few pages. This is certainly not the aim of this chapter. This chapter introduces the various features of the Baluch society, such as area, demography, geographical settings, climate, ethnicity and tribal structure in order to situate the political developments in Baluchistan in that perspective where the above-mentioned features interacted not only with the various stages of its development but also were perceived with mixed feelings by the British. The idea is not to make any political statement on the basis of these characteristics but simply to see how they interact with the political developments. Similarly, the brief description of its history is not meant to compress a hundred years of the history of this area but to highlight only those aspects of its history that remained active during the British administration with particular reference to the way Baluchistan acted as a buffer state between the British Empire and its perceived and real rivals i.e., the French, the Russians, the Turks and the Germans.

In the historical context of South Asia, Baluchistan's size, sparsely populated area, and a long coastal line make it a unique place in strategic and political terms. Being the western most part of the British Empire in India, it played a crucial role in international politics throughout the colonial period. The contours of this role were largely shaped by its proximity to the so-called threat states and the ethnic composition of its people.
Presently, Baluchistan is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of territory. Its total area is about 347,188 square kilometers, and its population, according to the census conducted in the year 1998 is 6,511,000. The 1901 census showed its population to be around 811,000. In 1931, the population was 869,000. The population was reduced to 858,000 by 1941. However, the 1951 census showed that the population had registered an increase of 36.01 percent. It now stood at 1,167,000.

The Greek historian, Herodotus, commonly known as the “father of history”, is reported to have visited Baluchistan in order to collect information about the wars between the Greeks and the Iranians. His description of its physical features has been amazingly corroborated by the later geographers. He divided Baluchistan into three distinct parts: 1) Aracosia consisting of Kandhar and Quetta region, 2) Drangiana comprising Helmund, Seistan and Chagai, and 3) Gedrosia including Makran Coast. However, because of similar geographical and ethnic features in areas around Baluchistan, different scholars have determined its exact boundaries according to their respective political and sociological interests. R.N. Frye, for example, considers Baluchistan in terms of ethnic features: “it occupies the south eastern part of the Iranian plateau from the Kirman desert east of Bam and Bashagird to the western borders of Sind and the Punjab.” An Iranian scholar views Baluchistan as the “eastern expansion of the great Iranian plateau.”

According to British official sources, Baluchistan’s borders, stretched from the Gomal River in the north east to the Arabian Sea in the south and from the borders of Iran and Afghanistan in the west and northwest to the Sulaiman Mountains and the Kirthar Hills in the east, inclusive of the region of southeastern Iran.
However, since the present study concentrates on Baluchistan under the British rule, it will be safe to argue that this province of Pakistan has its natural boundaries. On the west, Baluchistan shares 520 miles of border with Iran. In the north, it is bounded by 720 miles with Afghanistan. On the south, its territory touches the waters of the Arabian Sea with a coastline of 472 miles. On the east, the Sulaiman Ranges separate it from the Iranian part, while in the north, Toba Kakar, and in the west, Chagai hills separate it from Afghanistan and Iran.

In terms of topography, Baluchistan consists of the Upper Highlands, the Lower Highlands, the Plains and the Deserts. The Upper Highlands are locally known as Khorasan, and they constitute the central and northeastern parts of Baluchistan. The Lower Highlands are distinguished by steps of the Sulaiman Range in the east and the Pub and Kirthar Range in the south. While the Ranges of Makran, Kharan and Chagai stand on the west, the northwestern part of Baluchistan consists of the deserts, which are distinguished by black gravel sand and salt and are called the Kharan deserts. Some experts consider it as an extension of Iranian Seistan and Dasht-i-Loot. The plains in the valleys are as inlets on the coastal areas. The major plains comprise of Kachhi, Las Bela and River Dasht valleys, in addition to the Quetta valley and the plateau of Kalat.

Walter Fairservis has looked at Baluchistan from the perspective of its water channels. In his view, Baluchistan could be divided naturally into four broad regions.

This remarkable variety in the landscape of Baluchistan is also reflected in climate, which can be hot, humid, temperate and cold, depending on the time and place. The greater part of Baluchistan has a sub-tropical continental climate. In
the Upper Highlands, the winters are severe, the temperature falling many degrees below freezing point, whereas the summers are temperate.

The coastline of Baluchistan provides a spectacular view. Though it is barren, one is struck with watercourses intercepting its arid clay plains. It has four natural ports, Sonmiani, Pasni, Jiwani and Gwadar. The waters of the Arabian Sea wash this coastal strip. The climate is hot, humid in summers, and moderate in winters.

The valleys of Baluchistan have temperature variation according to their altitude, soil structure, vegetation, proximity to lakes, and direction of winds. The valleys of Quetta, Zhob, (Fort Sandeman) and Ziarat are usually cold with chances of fog, rain, and snow in winters, and the people of adjacent hot areas consider them good summer resorts. The valleys of Kalat and Khuzdar in Lower Highlands also fall in the same category along with Panjgur in the Upper Coastal Region, which, also provide good summer resorts.

The plains and deserts become extremely hot during summers and the temperature occasionally exceeds fifty degrees centigrade. Noshki in the north, Sibi and Dhadar in the middle, and Turbat in the Coastal Region are considered to be among the hottest inhabited places on the earth.

Unlike the rest of the country, Baluchistan is not covered by the Monsoon rains. Average rainfall is only two to three inches per year and it rains mostly during winter. However, some areas in the Lower Highlands and the coastal areas receive rain mainly in the summer. Such extreme temperatures, paucity of rainfall, strong winds and soil erosion are not conducive to the growth of natural vegetation. But, nonetheless, the Upper Highlands are blessed with some dry hill
forests and the area of Las Bela in the Lower Highland shows some river rainforests. Valleys and oasis show lush patches of green where a variety of fruits and vegetables grow.\textsuperscript{16}

Baluchistan has many rivers but because of very low rainfall, they do not flow round the year. In fact, many of them simply remind the visitors of water flowing at some stage in the past. The largest river of Baluchistan is the Hingol. It flows southward and empties itself in the Arabian Sea. Makran coastal areas have the Dasht, the Nal, the Porali, the Mashkhel and the Hub rivers. The northeastern Highlands have the Zhob and the Gomal rivers. Pishin Lora flows in the west of Quetta and further in the south is the Nari river. If we look at the volumes of water and timing of its flow in the rivers, they appear to be seasonal water channels rather than rivers in the literal sense of the word. Consequently, one of the most visible features of Baluchistan is the scarcity of water resources and its impact is shown not only on human consumption but also on the agricultural, industrial and socio-economic life of the people.

The ethnic composition of Baluchistan reveals three main groups, with distinct languages and cultural backgrounds: the Baluch, the Brahui and the Pashtoon. It is difficult to document the origins and the movement of the population during the past centuries because the earlier period is wrapped in legends and mysteries. However, an attempt will be made to show the general trends about the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Baluchistan. An effort will also be made to delineate the interaction of the three main components of the population of Baluchistan.
It has been estimated that there are about five hundred tribes and sub-tribes in Baluchistan\textsuperscript{17}, which, together, make up the social, economic and political profile of Baluchistan. However, for the purposes of present study, while recognizing the distinction of Brahis and Pashtoos, we would apply the term Baluch to all the inhabitants of Baluchistan who either migrated to this area or were assimilated with the passage of time in the culture of the Baluch people.\textsuperscript{18}

Like all tribal societies, the Baluch also represent ethnic identity, patron-client relationship and participation in common blood feuds, and admission to kinship within the tribes. The structure of Baluchi language also shows the impact of racial amalgamation of many people. Even today, along with Baluchi and Brahi, Pashto, Persian, Saraiki and Sindhi languages are spoken in Baluchistan. Baluchi is dominant language of 10 out of 23 districts of the province. Brahi is dominant in Kalat district only. Pashto is the language of majority in 9 districts. Sindhi language is mostly spoken in two districts.\textsuperscript{19}(Appendix-I) The ethnic composition of this area was highlighted for the first time in the Census of 1931. This Census also showed how its ethnic composition has undergone changes during the different phases of history.\textsuperscript{20} During the pre-British period, movements in and out of Baluchistan were mostly voluntary or activated by the usual ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors indicated generally by the sociologists. However, the British brought in people from the other areas of the subcontinent for administrative as well as professional jobs such as engineers for the construction of railroads and soldiers for the cantonments, which added new ethnic and linguistic groups to the profile of Baluchistan. To work on new projects, skilled labour was imported to work on railroads and telegraph. These activities converted some areas of
Baluchistan into multi-lingual entities, where in addition to Baluchi, Brahui, and Pashto, Persian, Saraiki, Punjabi and Urdu were also spoken. In addition to these languages, the elite and the educated classes adopted English.

A fascinating aspect, which continues to influence generation of the people of Baluchistan, is the way they look at their distant past. Like most other societies of the region, the Baluch trace their origins back to those times, which cannot be determined scientifically.

However, it will be useful to see how the people of Baluchistan view themselves. True to their nomadic origin, the word Baluch is said to mean, "Wanderer." Braho is supposed to be a corrupt form of Ibrahim, hence the Brahvis consider themselves as descendants of Braho. Another version of the word Brahui is linked to its construction; it is composed of two words, Ba and Rohi, meaning "people of the hills." In addition, since the word "Uch" means desert and "Ba" people, therefore, Baluch means "people of the desert." Still another view holds that Barohi or Brahui may mean "people of the mountains."²²

The history of the Baluch people is also wrapped in legends and facts. There is a historical evidence of some Baluch settlements as early as the seventh century A.D. in the south east of Iran, particularly in the area of Kirman but it seems that their migrations to modern Baluchistan in significant numbers occurred in the second millennium. Some scholars have accepted the Baluch claim that their ancestors came form Aleppo, in modern Syria, at the time of the ninth century Arab conquest.²³

Apparently, the Mongol invasions and large-scale destruction in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan led to frequent Baluch migrations into the present Baluchistan,
which because of its difficult terrain provided security to various tribes. Therefore, we see that by the fourteenth century A.D. the Baluch people appear in big numbers in their present homeland, coming in contact with the Pashtoons, Punjabis, Sindhis and some Dravidian groups, which occupied the Jhllawan hills at the eastern edge of Baluchistan.24

However, before we proceed any further, it will be interesting to see how the Baluch were perceived by the western scholars. According to Robert Wirsing, "The Baluch are an ancient people, with a history going back over two thousand years. Much of that history is clouded over with uncertainty, and controversy exists about many aspects of it."25 In fact, various conflicting theories about their original homeland led Sir Denys Bray to conclude, "The Baluch are Syrian because of their names, Arabs because of their own claim, Turco-Iranian because of their head measurements, Mongolians because of their tribal names, Sumerians because of their ancient pottery found in the country."26 Of course, some western scholars, relying on the information from phonological and etymological sources, have traced their history to the North-West Iran adjacent to the southern coast of the Caspian Sea.27

Being in closest proximity to nature, a Baluch appears to Ibbetson, "frank and open in his manners and without servility fairly to his words temperate and enduring and looking upon courage as the highest virtue."28 Their pastoral background coupled with the harsh environment makes them excellent horsemen. According to one perceptive observer, "the Biloch is an expert rider, horse racing is his national amusement; and the Biloch breed of horses is celebrated throughout Northern India."29
We would not like to get involved in this debate about the origins of the Baluch people, as it does not directly relate to the purpose and scope of the present study. It will suffice to examine here the conditions of Baluchistan shaped their socio-economic interests and political institutions over a period of time. According to Ibn Khaldun, climate, environment, and natural resources shape the character of the people. In his profile of nomadic societies, Ibn Khaldun enumerates different characteristics that people adopt in order to survive in specific areas. The Baluch also fall in the same category.30

The terrain of Baluchistan is not friendly to urban settlements and the scarcity of food and other resources provide a constant challenge to the people, which definitely show their imprint on the character of the people. Apart from hunting and search for green pastures, another striking phenomenon of the people of Baluchistan is raiding and plundering, which makes every Baluch a warrior. In the old times, it was stated that a Baluch could be identified by sword, knife and shield and some tradition would go to the extent of saying, "Baluch is a thief by tradition and descent, for he says, God will not favour a Baluch who does not steal and rob, and the Baluch who steals secures heaven to seven generations of his ancestors."31

The advent of the British in Baluchistan brought them face to face with these people and they could not help praise their courage, bravery and endurance. T. Lambrick, the biographer of John Jacob, wrote: "the Baluch is indeed well fitted by constitution and physique to perform such feats of endurance. No race in the world can endure without water for such long hours under a burning sun."32

The British recognized that their soldiers were no match for the Baluch in the
open field. According to Eastwick, "from the first it was clear that no ordinary soldier could match the Baluch in hardness though constant frustration tended to produce among the troops an equal ferocity." The Baluch themselves were well conscious of their strengths and weaknesses. In the words of a Baluch:

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Survival has been the paramount factor in shaping the character of these people. The dimension of his character is raiding the enemy's camp, vengeance, jealousy and pride. But at the same time he is also kind, benevolent, generous, hospitable, sympathetic sincere, honest and tolerant.
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Brahui is another important ethnic group in Baluchistan and they constitute about twenty-five percent of the total population of this province. Fred Scholz suggests that they are a group separate from the Baluch, being part of the Dravidian family. However, according to many analysts, in spite of a separate language, the Brahuis are essentially belong to one racial stock. The main areas of their concentration are from Bolan Pass through the Bolan Hills to the coastal area of Ras Mari on the Arabian Sea. Like the Baluch, they are also nomadic and fairly similar in character particularly in chivalry and straightforwardness. The British, however, most probably because of their 'divide and rule' policy, projected them of different ethnic origins.

If we look at the literature produced during the British period, there is a clear emphasis on the differences between various ethnic groups of Baluchistan. More than unity it was the diversity and differentiation that helped the British prolong their rule. Haitu Ram, a native officer and assistant to Robert Sandeman, for example, insisted that Brahuis were superior to the Baluch. He observed that: "Although Brahuis are Baluch but there is a difference in their language and dress, and they are superior to the latter. Their way of living and other traditions
are quite different to each other.”38 Since the Brahuis constituted the ruling class of the confederacy of Baluchistan, this view was, to some extent, accepted by the Baluch also. For example some Baluch adopted the Brahui names i.e., Bangalzais who are actually Baluch but call themselves Brahui.39 Having said that, it is important to mention that in some areas there are indeed notable differences between these two communities. Haitu Ram is right to some extent in emphasizing that the “Brahuis are more open in establishing matrimonial relations with non-Brahui tribes whereas the Baluch marry within their clans and tribes; the Brahuis breed cattle and sell milk and butter whereas the Baluch do not consider these activities honourable.”40 This openness of the Brahuis is perhaps a manifestation of their political position as well as their being comparatively more settled. However, it must be pointed out that such characteristics indicate the state of economic activities rather than ethnic dimensions.

The real or false divide between the Baluchis and the Brahuis becomes meaningless if the economic or political interests of these communities do not collide. The academic relevance of their distinct ethnic qualities is confined mostly to ethnologists and philologists. But it is true of any area in the world where various groups compete for the acquisition of limited resources or seek outside help to overcome the other. Such views are almost invariably expressed not only between people involved in the struggle but also the outsiders. Since this study is devoted to the political development of Baluchistan, we shall see that, in addition to economic considerations, the competition did exist between the two main communities in political arena. After the British advent, we will see how these two communities vacillated between joining against the foreign power and
seeking patronage from them. This is where one has to be careful in exaggerating the divide or undermining it. Such characteristics are exhibited even in homogenous societies.

The Pashtoons of Baluchistan also have their tribal and clannish system but the institution of 'Jirga' and their relative urbanization have made them more "democratic" than the other tribes of Baluchistan. According to 1931 Census, the Pashtoons constituted the second largest group in population. They speak Pashto but often with a different dialect, twenty-five percent inhabitants of Baluchistan speak what is called "Kanadhari" Pashto. Their advent in Baluchistan is commonly considered an overflow from the adjoining areas of Afghanistan and the Northern West Frontier Province of Pakistan. "They are more mobile, more open to new ideas, and are mostly engaged in trade, commerce, and transportation. They are more prosperous and less aggressive than their fellow tribesmen of Afghanistan and the North West Frontier of Pakistan."42

Some negative judgments on the behaviour of the Pashtoons by the British administrators need to be taken in the context of their political encounters and difficulties rather than a true reflection of their character. For example, Robert Sandeman's remarks about Pathan and Baluch that "Both are warlike, revengeful, predatory, but while Afghan is bigoted and priest-ridden, the Baluch pays scant respect to the Syed or Maulvi,"3 should be viewed in terms of his political problems with the Pashtoons. That this was a deliberate policy of the British to divide the Pashtoon and the Baluch is also evident in the writings of the British administrators of Baluchistan. Edward Oliver, for example, would say, "The
Baluch has less of God in his head and less of the devil in his nature. The Afghan
is a dangerous fanatic while the Baluch prefers to have his prayers said for him.
The Pathan is radical, obeys no one but Jirga." In differentiating their respective
habits, he continues that "the one attacks his enemy from in front, the other from
behind, the one is bound by his promises, the other by his interest; in short, the
Baluch is less turbulent, less treacherous, less blood thirsty, and less fanatical than
the Pathan, he has less of God in his creed and less of devil in his nature."  

Later scholars have accepted most of these comments, which were
politically motivated and betrayed administrative biases, uncritically and without
much empirical evidence. But, then, one task is not to pass any moral judgment or
to provide character sketches of the rulers and the ruled but simply to highlight
perceptions of the British administrators, whose written works constitute most of
the source material on Baluchistan and dominate the discourse on the history of
this area.

While looking at social and economic dynamics of politics in Baluchistan,
one has to keep in mind that the Baluch are indeed a tribal people but not nomadic
in the true sense of the word. Nomadism is based on constant mobility of the
people involving not only their herds and flocks but also homes and other
property. This feature is now quite rare in Baluchistan because change of dwelling
place of a whole tribe does not take place. In other words, the people are more
settled, though not quite exposed to the pressures and incentives of urban
settlements.

In this context, the role of tribal chief is quite important in understanding
the political organization of the tribes. The head of a Baluch tribe is called
'Tumandar' or 'Sardar' who is assisted by heads of different clans of the tribe who are called 'Mukadams.' They also act as a council of war and most of these offices are hereditary. Similarly, the head of different sections of each clan is headed by 'Wadera' whose office is also hereditary. This could be considered the third important position and is usually solemnized by placing a turban on the head of the 'Wadera' as a mark of respect and status. Like the 'Tumandar', a 'Wadera' is also assisted by 'Mukadams' of sub-sections. Major tribes where this system is prevalent are: Marri, Bugti, Buldi, Chandias, Dombki, Gishkori, Jatoi, Lashari, Magsi and Rind. The Baluch tribal system is not only hereditary but also closed in the sense that it does not admit any interference from outside. Khetrans and Bugtis, for example, even persuaded the British government to give an undertaking as early as 1878 "not to interfere with the internal affairs of Baluchistan (i.e., of these two Baluch tribes), unless disturbance took place." The Bugti and Marri tribes are considered to be more independent as compared to other Baluch tribes.

As stated earlier, the tribal structure of Baluchistan is dominated by the 'Tumandar.' He is like an absolute administrator and if any tax or revenue has to be collected, it is left to him. So far as the internal administration of the tribe is concerned, heads of various clans, sections and sub-sections assist the chief. He is empowered to levy tax on flocks of sheep and goats. He also receives a share of the fines in criminal litigation. It is amazing to see that 'Tumandars' status combines almost all-possible dimensions of life. In many ways, he is like a mini monarch covering political, social, economic and even religious authority. Indeed, one of the chief characteristics of the Baluch tribes, to use Ibn Khaldun's
expression, is 'Aasbia', i.e., "the people feel strongly bonded like child is bonded to mother, towards the chief of their tribe."  

This bonding has played a very important role in the social development of Baluchistan as well as in the Baluch Diaspora throughout the Indian sub-continent. Social affiliation begins at the family and tribal levels. In the times of alien threat, this circle is widened. The people of Baluchistan have shown that if the group feelings are properly utilized, these scattered tribes could act as empire builders also. However, the presence of Baluch tribes in adjoining areas of Baluchistan and else where is a testimony to the fact that the Baluch had come to these regions as conquerors but, as is the case with such tribal formations, they could neither hold these areas for a long time nor could channel the 'Aasbia' into a national consciousness and cohesiveness. The result was that their presence as a collective entity was of much shorter duration than their feuds among themselves which were regularly exploited by the outsiders. In the words of a Baluch scholar:

The Baluch rigid tribalism, marked with inter-tribal, inter-clannish and inter-family feuds, pride and jealousies on the one hand, and alien intervention on the other hand succeeded in paving the way for the complete dismemberment of the whole race, and the fatal result has been that majority of the Baluch territories and tribes submitted unwillingly to the intrigues and viles of diverse alien families of diverse blood, who in the course of time became their hereditary masters.

After this brief introduction of Baluch tribal system, it will be pertinent to point out the prominent features of the structure of the Pashtoon tribes, the other major ethnic group in Baluchistan. Though overall social philosophy is quite similar, yet, both in structure and group feelings, the two are very different from each other. The tribes are divided into groups, which are further divided into such
multiple sub-divisions that one is lost in the maze of lineages and affiliations. Nonetheless, four features are distinguishable and are in common use. In general terms, the word 'Qaum' is used for the main tribe. The 'Qaum' consists of 'Khels' and 'Zais' which represent both the clan (in general terms conveying a sense of common lineage and common loyalty) and groups whose members live in close proximity and hold common land.\footnote{52} The next level consists of the clients who demonstrate their solidarity through their affiliation with a tribe but belong to a different ethnic or linguistic group. They are known as 'Mindun' or 'Hamsaya' (neighbour). Unlike other members of the tribe, they could be considered as the farthest extension of the tribal system. In other words, it is more open and much more dynamic in terms of social relations than their counterparts are. Another chief characteristic of the Pashtoon tribal system is that it is not organized around the personality of a common leader, as is the case with the Baluch or Brahui tribe. The leader in the Pashtoon tribe is elected and this process begins at the smallest component of a tribe. In this sense, a Pashtoon tribe appears to be more democratic where each constituent group matters than the Baluch tribe where the leadership is mostly hereditary. The main Pashtoon tribes in Baluchistan are, Jogazais, Kakars, Kansis, Panezais, Pannis, Tarins, Zarghuns, etc.\footnote{53}

As discussed earlier, the British viewed the Baluch and the Pashtoon as belonging to two conflicting tribal systems. In actuality, they share more characteristics. For example, in many Baluch tribes, the Tumandars /Sardars were also elected by the elders of the tribes. It was not hereditary in strict sense of the word but stayed within the same tribe. This election was to be confirmed by the Khan of Kalat who was the chief of the confederacy of different Baluchi and
Brahui tribes. This confirmation was more or less a formality because the chiefs, subsequently, did not obey the Khan except in external matters or when they felt the need to seek his intervention or to seek his confirmation to death sentence and to provide their quota of troops when called upon. What has been more fascinating to know is the fact that even the Khan was elected by the chiefs though the choice was restricted only to the members of Ahmadzai family. This system was quite strict in the sense that every body knew his strengths and limitations.

Baluchistan's tribal system worked, more or less, like a confederacy under the Khan of Kalat. This relationship between the Khan and the Sardars was not reflective of the political strength of Kalat but was based on the pledges of mutual respect and security. Being a small and mostly a barren state, the Khan had to seek the loyalties of the chiefs of the tribes in the neighbourhood of Kalat. These chiefs were given fiefs in Kalat, who, in turn, pledged their support to the Khan, in terms of furnishing troops in specified numbers. Thus, this relationship which was more or less voluntary, converted independent tribes into quasi-feudal vassal of the Khan. Any territory conquered by the troops raised by the chiefs of the affiliated tribes, belonged to the Khan and was conquered in his name.

In addition to this relationship with the minor tribes, the Khan of Kalat had more intimate relations with two prominent Baluch tribes. This can be traced to the times of Mir Naseer Khan I (1749-94). During his period, there were two great provinces of Sarawan and Jhalawan, meaning the Highlands and the Lowlands, respectively. The area of the Sarawan was under the hereditary leadership of the
Raisani tribe and the Jhalawan under the Zahri tribe. The two chiefs enjoyed more respect and authority in the affairs of the state than any other chief. They occupied chairs in the darbar. The Raisanis sat on the right side and the Zahri on the left of the Khan, and they were consulted in all deliberations about the state even though it was believed that their authority was consultative and not executive.  

Apart from these consultative hereditary offices, there was another hereditary office of Vizier or Prime Minister, which was believed to be of Hindu origin due to their hereditary loyalty towards the ruling Khans. But since long had been occupied by a Muslim family. This family was known for its loyalty to the Khans. The Khan was almost supreme and absolute (except the consultative control of the two supreme chiefs of Sarawan and Jhalawan and the Vizier) and could make peace or war on behalf of the state. All the tribal levies were at his disposal and he could use any or all the levies for war or the maintenance of peace. He could make treaties with foreign powers, which were binding on the state. But if these treaties damaged the interests of any chief, he could claim compensation.

In this relationship between the Khan and the tribes, there is no way of knowing whether the Sardars had some say in the decisions about external affairs or whether they gave their opinion, directly or indirectly, through the Raisani or Zahri chiefs. In internal affairs, while the Khan had power to make general laws, the implementation of these laws, however, was not his sole prerogative but depended on the cooperation and participation of the tribal chiefs. The only exception was that the approval of the Khan was sought before awarding the
death sentence to criminals, his arbitration was needed in disputes between chiefs, and his consent was required in the boundary disputes within Kalat itself and the conquered or annexed territories. The Khan administered through his naibs and lieutenants. However, this system underwent drastic changes after the advent of the British, as we shall see in the following pages.

In order to understand the complexities of the British policies in Baluchistan, we have to keep in mind that it was the part of "Great Game" that the European powers were playing in this area. Being at the crossroads of trade and military routes, Baluchistan offered enough attraction to the adventurers from all sides. In order to illustrate this point, let us give a brief panoramic view of the interplay of different powers in this area.

In the year 640 B.C., Baluchistan appears as a part of the Achaemenian Empire. Most of Baluchistan and a part of Sind made the 27th Satrap (province) of the Iranian Empire. As a matter of fact, most of the present Pakistan was part of Achaemenian Empire. The Punjab and the Frontier province at that time were called Gandhara, the 20th Satrap.58

The question is as to why, despite its hostile environment, Baluchistan was considered important for the empire builders? The reason, perhaps, can be found in its long coastline and the vast desert that provided a cushion to the areas north and east of it. In other words, Baluchistan played a very important role in the wars between the Greeks and the Iranians. That would also help explain as to why Alexander invaded this part of west India. The conquest of this area for the Persian Empire has been attributed to Cyrus the Great. Darius, later on integrated
these parts all the way down to the Indus Delta. According to an Iranian archaeologist at Susa, a tablet was discovered on which the following words were inscribed:

These are the countries outside Pars which I have conquered. They are under my domination. Their tribute is paid to me, and whatever command is issued by me, is carried out and my decisions are honoured by them. Media, Elam, Parthia, Aria (Herat), Bactria, Sogdiana, Chorsmia, Dragiana, Arachosia, Sattagydia, Gandara, Sind, Amyrgian, Scythians.... provinces were in commotion: no man was smiting the other.⁵⁹

The official British account prepared after the first Afghan War (1839-1842) suggests that all the early western invaders of India before Alexander had come through the territory of Makran i.e. Semiramis (23rd Century B.C.), Sesotrie Cym (538 B.C.), and Darius. Similarly, Alexander returned from India through the same territory with two detachments: one under Cratros through Mula Pass and the other through Quetta and Pishin. Nicarchas sailed from Thatha passing Karachi and Sonmiani, and followed the Baluchistan coastline up the Persian Gulf.⁶⁰ Being a part of the Iranian Empire, Baluchistan and the adjoining areas provided a tempting trail to all the conquerors who had subdued Iran from the time of Alexander's invasion to the Arab conquest of Iran. Indeed, we see a constant push of the imperial forces through Baluchistan on the way to the north or from north all the way down to the coastal areas of Baluchistan. The Indus and its tributaries provided a natural boundary and as we shall see, that whosoever controlled this area, played a significant role both on the west and on east of Baluchistan.

After the Arab conquest of Iran, the second Caliph, Hazrat Umar (reigned 634-644) started expeditions in Baluchistan. Thus, this part of land saw the first
Arab soldier in 22 Hijra, on the initiative of Usman Bin Abul Aas, the governor of Behrain. Another expedition under Abdullah Bin Umar Bin Rabi established his head quarters at Bela and Makran. By 664 A.D, during the caliphate of fourth Caliph, Hazrat Ali, the areas of Turan, (Sarawan, Jhalawan, Kharan and Siestan), were captured and Khuzdar was made its capital, probably due to its proximity to the sea.

If we go through the reports, which were sent about this area to the caliph, we are indeed, reminded of the present times, as very little has changed. For example, a report during the time of Hazrat Umar says:

The disadvantages in coming to this area outweigh the advantages. Mountains are indeed difficult to cross but even its so-called plain areas are also hostile. Fewer soldiers are in danger of being over-powered but if their number is increased, they will starve to death as there is nothing to eat or drink.

The contents of this report probably, caused the suspension of this expedition. The celebrated historian ‘Al-Balazuri’ quotes a letter, which is quite descriptive of the environment of Baluchistan, when Hazrat Usman, the third Caliph (644-656) sent one of his officers to this area in order to obtain information about it and its confines. The learned historian opines that this Arab officer’s route must have been through Makran. The graphic account of this officer reads:

Commander of the faithful, It is a country of which the mountains are mountains indeed and the plains of which are real mountains. It is a country with so little water that its dates are the worst of dates, and the inhabitants are the most warlike of men. If thou hadst a less numerous army there, it should be annihilated and could do nothing; and if the army is considerable, it will perish of hunger, because there are no victuals. The country beyond is still worse.
Hazrat Usman also postponed the idea of conquering Baluchistan like his predecessor.

The Arab general Mohammad Bin Qasim who laid the foundation of Muslim Empire in South Asia, also passed through Makran in 712 A.D., and, for several centuries, Makran served as a conduit between Sind and the Arab Empire for commercial and military purposes. After weakening of the Arab Empire and the emergence of sultanates in the north, Baluchistan receded into background. But if any ruler wanted to establish an empire, we do see his interest in Baluchistan.

The Mongols raided Baluchistan in 1223 A.D., since it was part of the dominion of Sultan Mohammad Khan of Khawarzam. Therefore, when the Mongols invaded the Khawarzam, they also came to Baluchistan and unleashed such horrors that even today they are remembered with fear and hatred.

After the Mongol invasions, the history of Baluchistan is "intimately" connected with Kandhar, whose rulers generally exercised suzerainty over the whole of Baluchistan. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are most important in Baluch history. During this period, the Baluch spread over Kalat and Kachhi into the Punjab and Sind, and the wars between Mir Chakar Rind and Gwahram Lashari, celebrated in Baluch folklore, took place. This period, with Sibi as the Capital of confederacy, is called the Rind era in Baluchistan's history. The frontier of the Rind regime reached Multan through Marri Bugti areas and to the shores of Kharan.

Another important development took place in 1485 A.D. when the Arghuns from Kandhar invaded Kachhi through the Bolan Pass and captured
some areas of Baluchistan. Shah Beg son of Shujaeddin Zunnun captured Pishin and Sibi. Peaceful and prosperous Sind fell next. The Arghun Dynasty was established. Magsi, a Baluch tribe suffered the most. However, Meeroo Meewani united the Brahuins and defeated Arghuns and established his control at Kalat. Subsequently, Shehak Rind (1485-1490) captured Kalat.

Baluchistan also played a very important role during the early decades of the Mughal rule. After his defeat at the hands of Sher Shah Suri, the Mughal emperor Hamayun, used this area as a safe passage to Iran. During 1539, we read some interesting details about the help that he received from different Baluch Sardars and how gifts were exchanged. The future Mughal ruler of India, Akbar, was born during Hamayun's flight to Iran in 1539. The emperor left the infant Akbar under the care of Lawang Khan Baluch, who was later on rewarded by the award of the area of Quetta and Mastung on Hamayun's return as ruler of India. Because of this relationship, these areas came under the Mughal suzerainty. Some Baluch idealize Mir Chakar Rind (1485-1512) as the best of Baluch rulers, whereas others ridicule him and regard him nothing more than a bandit. Both these positions appear to be poles apart, yet they help us understand these facts of Baluchistan's history, at least from the standpoint of its people. The idea of Baluch unity and glory is inextricably tied to its wars with an external enemy or territorial expansion. This is what helps them distinguish a hero from a bandit. The absence of these wars leads to internal feuds and chaos.

The people of Baluchistan experienced the European explorers in the early sixteenth century, when the Portuguese reached the Makran coast. They looted the boats, and set on fire the huts of the fishermen. Mir Hamal Khan, the son of
Makran's ruler, Sardar Jeehand, mobilized the local people and armed them. He made a counter attack on the invaders, and destroyed their ships, and they suffered humiliating defeat. The Portuguese attacked again after being reinforced from home. After a pitched battle, Mir Hamal was arrested and later killed after he refused to accept the Portuguese terms. Mir Hamal kindled the light of freedom in the hearts of the Baluch. He is considered as the first freedom fighter to embrace martyrdom while fighting an alien European power.\(^7\)

During the second half of the sixteenth century, Baluchistan stands almost divided between the Mughal and the Safavid influences. Akbar, the Mughal Emperor, annexed Upper Sind and it was during that expedition that his forces faced Baluch resistance. In order to punish these insurgents in 1573 A.D\(^7\), Akbar sent a punitive force, and, apparently occupied some areas of Baluchistan. Abul Fazal, for example, mentioned Quetta in the *Ain-i-Akbari*, as a place where Emperor Akbar received revenue and soldiers. It is also reported that Mastung was declared as eastern part of Kandhar and it generated a revenue of eight thousand dinars. After Akbar's death, the Mughal governor was assassinated and thus the Mughal influence in Baluchistan came to an end.\(^8\)

The scholars of this period stress that, although most of the seventeenth century witnessed some Iranian pressure, it was mostly a period of in-house settlements. This period also gave birth to Kalat Confederacy, which was preceded by a civil strife for about a century. Though this period was dubbed as a period of darkness and confusion, we do see assertive tendencies among both the Baluch and the Brahui tribes. They not only settled their own differences, but also repulsed an Iranian attack in 1699.\(^9\) The Safavid rulers claimed Mastung and
Kalat but, with the help of the Mughal governor of Multan, the Iranian army was defeated and Emperor Aurangzeb granted a stipend of rupees two lakh per annum to Mir Sakhi Samunder Khan (1697-1714), the Khan of Kalat, as token recognition of his bravery against the Iranians. Sumandar Khan was succeeded by Mir Ahmad IV (1714-1716). After his death, by Mir Abdullah Khan Qahar (1716-1730) took over who was quite ambitious. He attacked Sind and Afghanistan. Kalhoras of Sind responded and, although Quetta was successfully defended, Qahar himself was killed on February 11, 1730. During the first quarter of eighteenth century, the Kalat ruler took part in the political affairs of the sub-continent. When Nadir Shah Afshar invaded India in 1739, Mir Mohabat Khan (1731-1749) joined him and, in return, obtained Kachhi, Gandhawa and other Lowland areas of Sind as a reward.

The next invader from the north, Ahmad Shah Abdali, was more friendly and conciliatory towards the rulers of Kalat especially towards Khan of Kalat’s brother, Mir Naseer Khan. He had known Naseer Khan since his visit to Kandhar during the reign of Nadir Shah. He had accompanied his brother, Khan of Kalat who had been summoned for urgent consultations. During their stay in Kandhar, Mohabat Khan was interned and perhaps killed in captivity. However, during these days, Mir Naseer Khan was able to develop friendly relations with Ahmad Shah Abdali, a senior general and confident of Nadir Shah. After Ahmad Shah Abdali came into power he appointed Mir Naseer Khan as the ruler of the Kalat in 1749.

Mir Naseer Khan (1749-1794) is remembered for his good administration, bravery, and dignity that he brought to Baluchistan. During his reign of forty-four
years, he captured Karachi form Kalhoras in 1756, although it was re-taken immediately after his death in 1796. His friendship with Abdali did not last long because of the latter's invasion of Kalat in 1758. Nevertheless, after he repulsed the Afghan forces, he earned the respect of the Afghan ruler. Impressed by his bravery and valour, Abdali treated him as his equal, concluded a treaty (Appendix-II), and afterwards Naseer Khan fought on the side of Abdali when he took action against the Sikhs (1764), who were contemplating attacks on his territories.

Mir Naseer Khan brought Baluchistan not only on the map of the Sub-continent but also in the world affairs. During his time, the territory of Kalat was bounded on the north by the Afghan areas of Pishin and Sibi and the tribal territory of Kakar and Tareen Pashtoons. He established good relations with Ahmad Shah Abdali's son, Taimur Shah, who was governor of the Punjab. Mir Naseer Khan often helped him in his wars against the Marhattas and the Sikhs. It was because of his vision, courage, diplomatic and strategic partnership with the Afghans that Mir Naseer Khan was able to unite the Baluch people. He extended the frontiers of his state to the farthest areas of Makran, Kharan and Las Bela. Ultimately, he emerged not only as a great ruler but also as spiritual head of the Baluchi/Brahui Confederacy. He was succeeded by Mir Mahmud Khan II (1796-1817) who could not prove to be equal to the status of his father. From 1817 to 1839, his son Mir Mehrab Khan was the ruler of Kalat.

Mir Naseer Khan's death witnessed the emergence of the British as the new players on the horizon. These new players from the east replaced the age of invaders from the north. It was during the reign of the two immediate successors
of Mir Naseer Khan that the British started sending travellers and spies to understand and gauge the political and economic situation of Baluchistan and beyond to Afghanistan and the Central Asian states to counter the hostile Russian power. Travellers and adventurers such as Pottinger in 1809, Connolly in 1830, and Haji Abdun Nabi in 1838, visited Baluchistan, wrote about it and concluded that the Confederacy was very loosely kept and could be easily broken.87

It will not be easy to understand the British policies in Baluchistan or for that matter even the idea of British presence in this part of the world without knowing what was happening in Europe during the last years of the eighteenth century. Napoleon Bonaparte, the archenemy of the British had reached Egypt and was in constant contact with Tipu Sultan88 of Mysore for a possible alliance against the British. Napoleon knew that he could not fight the British in waters but land route was an option for his possible attack on India, which would definitely have involved Baluchistan.

Another important development in Europe was the emergence of Russia as an important player whose designs on the areas of Afghanistan, Iran and India (Baluchistan) were well known. Treaty of Tilsit (1807) between Russia and France had the British really worried. In the areas of the Punjab, the feuding Sikh Misl had been united under Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799-1839) as a strong confederacy. The British were not comfortable with Ranjit Singh and, in case there was a danger from across the border, they did not know how to reach there. As we shall see, the First Afghan War (1839-1842) provided them with a clue as well as an excuse to paint the Baluchistan people and their Khans in as negative terms as they possibly could in order to justify their occupation.
We shall return to a more detailed discussion on this interplay between major powers in the next chapter. As a preface to the British involvement in Baluchistan, it is worth noting, however, that Mir Mehrab Khan, the grandson of Mir Nasir Khan, was the ruler of Baluchistan. He provided passage and whatever help he could provide to the British troops when they used his territory to invade Afghanistan in 1839. Their adventure in Afghanistan was disastrous and most humiliating. But they understood the importance of Baluchistan in their future agenda in Afghanistan. Therefore, in order to ensure the loyalty of the ruler of Baluchistan, they attacked Kalat without any provocation and killed the Khan on November 13, 1839.89

This was only the beginning. Soon, the British annexed Baluchistan and the adjoining areas for the same reason that they had gone to fight against the Afghans. A chronology90(Appendix-III) of the rulers of Kalat appointed by the British shows similar pattern of appointing loyal rulers and removing those who could not be trusted.91

In this chapter, we have attempted to situate the Baluch society in their natural environments. The populated areas appear like oases in the desert with vast stretches of land either uninhabited or infrequently visited by the moving columns of caravans or fortune hunters. The paucity of resources stands out as the most predominant factor in shaping the social, economic, and political formations of these people. We have also dealt with the tribal structures of the three main ethnic groups highlighting their similarities as well as differences. In addition, an attempt has been made to show the relationship between the different tribes and the traditional Khan of the confederacy, which appears to be based on patron-
client relationship but, in fact, shows the accommodation and adjustments on both sides. Because of their geographical location, the Baluch had been often victims of aggression. However, brief periods of unity amongst them demonstrates their will and resolve to fight for their rights and freedom. Since most of the written material on Baluchistan was produced by foreigners, especially the British, it led to subjective judgments about its ethnic and social institutions. However, these views were incorporated into subsequent studies. Even the most serious authors used them. These studies led to further reinforcement of the biases and value-judgments. This situation, indeed, presents a serious challenge to the historians in sifting the polemics from the real and objective situation of Baluchistan.

Finally, we briefly alluded to the so-called ‘Great Game’ in order to identify the British interests in Baluchistan. Perhaps more than any other, this factor shaped the British policies towards Baluchistan. In the next chapter, we shall see how the British discovered Baluchistan both in terms of their global interests as well as an extension of their empire in the sub-continent.
Notes


2 Ibid. In large part, it was due to the increase in the area of the province after the creation of Pakistan and the merger of former princely states, including Kalat.


5 Muhammad Mehdi Tavassali, Cultural Relations in the Asian Area; Iran-Pakistan-India (Islamabad, 1999), p. 3.

6 Hughes Buller, The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Baluchistan, Vol. VI (Lahore, 1976), p. 266.


9 Buller, The Imperial Gazetteer, p. 266.

10 Fairservis, The Roots of Ancient India (London, 1975), p.136. "The northeast running from the Gomal River Valley in a great loop, south and west to include the Zhob, Pishin and Anambar river system of the districts of Zhob and Loralai and the well-watered Quetta Valley; the flat plain of Kachhi, lying in the cou-de-sac between the Bugti hill in the east and the central Brahavi range on the west. Central Baluchistan, the old Kalat state of the districts of Sarawan and Jhalawan, which lies essentially in that system of north-south trending ranges that includes the Kirthar on the west of the southern Indus River Valley; and the district of Las Bela, including the valleys of the southern Porali River and the Hab River and including the hill country west to the Hingol River drainage. To these divisions can be added to the great coastal country known as the Makran,"
which is really an entity of itself, the Mashkhel basin and finally the Chagai Hill country."

11 Baluchistan and The First Afghan War, p. 9.

12 Kazi Ahmad, A Geography of Pakistan (Karachi, 1976), p. 45. Also Imperial Gazetteer of India; Baluchistan, pp. 272-273.

13 Ibid.

14 Buller, The Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. VI, p. 273. A famous proverb reflects the extensive heat of both the places: If you have shaped Sibi and Dhadar as hot as they are: O God! What was the need of Hell?

15 Ibid.

16 Ahmad, A Geography of Pakistan, p. 48.


18 Ibid., p. 51.

19 For details see appendix-I.


23 Wirising, The Baluchis, p. 4.

24 Ibid., p. 5.

25 Ibid., p. 4.

26 Quoted by Ahmad, Baluchistan, p. 34.

27 Wirising, The Baluchis, p. 4.


29 Ibid., p. 43.


31 Baluch, Greater Baluchistan, p. 71.
32 T. Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad (Karachi, 1975), p. 35.

33 Lt. E.B. Eastwicks, Dry Leaves from Young Egypt (London, 1849), pp. 112-114.


35 Fred Scholz, Nomadism & Colonialism; A Hundred Years of Baluchistan 1872-1972 (Karachi, 2002), p. 22. Sir Denys Bray came out with a theory that Brahui language had Dravidian features and thus the Brahuis were Dravidians. Soon a campaign was launched within and outside Baluchistan that the “Baluch race” was superior than the “Brahui race”. However, one noted historian Nasser Brohi, a Brahui himself, argued that no local person was in a position to challenge this ‘fanatic claim’ due to “illiteracy and lack of knowledge” about it. See Nasser Brohi, Studies in Brahui History (Karachi, 1977), p. 34.

36 Nasser Brohi, Studies in Brahui, pp. 7-12. In fact, the whole confusion was caused by the English writers, particularly Sir Denys Bray, who deliberately tried to create this distinction among the people in Baluchistan to weaken the opposition to the colonial rule. No wonder Pakistani authors of modern times such as Ahmad Abdullah, Justice Khuda Bakhsh Marri, Gul Khan Naseer and Mir Ahmad Yar Khan did not agree with the notion that the Brahuis were Dravidians. They insisted that the Brahuis were essentially Baluch. In fact, in their estimate the Brahuis were the first to initiate Baluch immigration into Baluchistan and adjoining provinces of Pakistan. See Bray, The Life History of a Brahui (Karachi, 1977), Ahmad Abdullah, The Historical Background of Pakistani and its People (Karachi, 1973), Justice Khuda Bakhsh Marri, Searchlight on Baluchis and Baluchistan (Karachi, 1974), Gul Khan Naseer, Tarikh-i-Baluchistan (Quetta, 1979) and Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, Inside Baluchistan (Karachi, 1975).

37 Ibid.

38 Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, Tarikh-i-Baluchistan (Lahore n.d. Ist ed, 1907), pp. 33-34.

39 Quddus, The Tribal Baluchistan, p. 97.

40 Hittu Ram, Tarikh-i-Baluchistan, p. 33.


42 D. Y. Fell papers, Euro D. 971/1, p. 4.


48 L/P & S/12/3174—NWFP Reforms, *Baluchistan Kalat Affairs*.


50 Ibid.


53 Ibid.

54 *Baluchistan and the First Afghan War*, pp. 34-35.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., p. 36.

58 Tavassali, *Cultural Relations*, p. 31.

59 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

60 *Baluchistan and the First Afghan War*, p. 13.


62 Ibid., p. 155.

63 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, *Mukhtasar Tarikh Quaum-i-Baluch wa Khawaneeni Baluch* (Quetta, 1972), p. 27.


65 J.I. Norris, *The First Afghan War, 1838-42* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 14. Ruins of large towns along its main route testify to its having been the connecting passage between East and West the open sesame of India, these cities were well known throughout the Arab World and quoted by Arabian writers.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Sardar Baluch, A Literary History, pp. 9-11.


71 Ibid., p. 94.

72 Gulbadan Begum, Hamayun Nama, Urdu translation by Prof. Syed Hasan, (Lahore, n.d.), p. 56.


74 Mir Khuda Bakhsh Marri, Searchlight on Baluchis and Baluchistan (Karachi, 1974), p. 239.

75 Mir Gul Khan Naseer, Tarikh-i-Baluchistan (Quetta, 1977), p. 112.

76 Inamul Haq Kausar, Pakistan Movement and Baluchistan (Quetta, 1999), pp. 7-8.

77 Ahmadzai, Tarikh-i-Baluch, Vol. IV, p. 218.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

80 Ibid., p. 43.

81 Ibid., p. 185.

82 Ibid., p. 162.


84 Appendix-II

85 The Baluch assistance to Ahmad Shah Abdali is claimed by certain Baluch writers in the Third Panipat War (1761), but it is not proved by the authentic contemporary sources. However, Mir Naseer Khan, the Baluch chief is reported to have taken part in Ahmad Shah’s 7th invasion on the Punjab is referred by all
'the original sources. Nur Muhammad, the Chief Qazi of the Kalat state was follower in the train of Mir Naseer Khan, took notes of his deeds on personal observations, and compiled the Jang Namah, in Persian verse covering 226 pages. Only copy was available in the library of Khan of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. As referred by Hari Ram Gupta, The later Mughal History of the Punjab, 1707-1793 (Lahore, 1976), pp. 197-98. See also Ashiq Muhammad Khan Durrani, Multan under the Afghans, 1752-1818 (Multan, 1981), pp. 65-66. “The Afghan King marched from Afghanistan in the month of October 1764 and simultaneously the Baluch chief (who was making preparations to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca was called up to join him) started from Baluchistan. Ahmad Shah encamped at Eminabad when the Baluch chief joined him at the head of twelve thousand Baluchiis. The Afghan King, with the help of Mir Naseer Khan defeated the Sikhs everywhere. When he started for his homeward journey in April 1765, he granted Mir Naseer Khan Baluch the territory of Quetta at his request and also offered him the neighbouring territories of Derajat, Multan and Jhang, which he respectfully declined to accept for fear of involvement with the Sikhs”. See also Ganda Singh, Ahmad Shah Durrani (New Delhi, 1959), p. 297.

86 Baluchistan and The First Afghan War, pp. 36-37.

87 Ibid., p. 37.

88 Mir Muhammad Hussain Anqa Baluch, Baluch Quam Kay Daur-i-Qadeem Kay Tarikh; 2600 B.C. to 1956 A.D. (Quetta, 1974), pp. 289-90. Anqa has declared Tipu Sultan as a Rind Baluch. He has further noted that Haider Ali, father of Tipu Sultan sought help from Karim Khan Rind, the ruler of Irani Baluchistan who sent 2000 Baluch fighters for his assistance. It is indeed interesting to know that Tipu Sultan’s ancestors originated from Baluchistan. We do not know whether this ethnic affiliation played any role in the British treatment of the Baluchistan people.

89 Ahmadzai, Tarikh-i-Baluch, Vol.VI, pp. 118-120. Also see Malcolm E. Yapp, Strategies of British India, Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798-1850 (New York, 1980), pp. 233-55.

90 Appendix-III.

91 Sardar Baluch, A Literary History, Vol. II, p. 47. See also the Appendix-(III) containing the list of Ahmadzai Khans of Kalat.
CHAPTER 2

THE BRITISH ADVENT IN BALUCHISTAN

A holistic account of British advent in Baluchistan must begin with “The Great Game” in which Russia, France, and England, were involved. Since the time of Peter the Great (1672-1725), the Russians were desperately looking for access to warm waters. The Dardanelles were guarded by Turkey. After many abortive attempts, Russians concentrated on the Central Asian steppes in order to find a route to the Persian Gulf as well as the Indian Ocean. The British perceived the Russian advances in Central Asia as a threat to their Indian empire because of the ancient historical, religious, and cultural linkages between Central Asia and India. The linkage between South Asia and Central Asia goes all the way back to the period of the Indus Valley civilization. Successive Indian rulers from Chandragupta Maurya onwards pursued a “forward” policy towards Central Asia. In turn, successive Central Asian leaders and people penetrated South Asia during the latter’s long periods of internal weakness. Central Asia and India were particularly linked since the Sultanate period. Apart from religious, cultural and linguistic links, commercial relations were perhaps the most important. Although the British did not want to lose the trade with Central Asia, they were apprehensive of possible influences emanating from the Muslim population of the region. No wonder, Russian advances in Central Asia were cause for much concern in London. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Russians had occupied the Central Asian steppes and, in fact, had started sending diplomatic
missions to Iran, Afghanistan and to the Punjab, which was an independent state under Maharaja Ranjit Singh.

These developments were complicated by Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798. The French had lost their Indian territories and were now keen to make up for the lost “French prestige in India.” After his initial success in Egypt and Syria, Napoleon had sent missions to the Qajar Shah of Iran, Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834). His chief envoy, M. Jaubert, persuaded the Qajar King to seize Georgia from Russia. A military mission was also sent to train the Iranian Army. The other area of the French contact was my sore under Tipu Sultan who was fighting a desperate war against the British. After Tipu’s defeat and death in 1799, the French concentrated on Iran. In 1807, the Russians defeated the Iranians at Arpatch and under the humiliating Treaty of Fars, Iran lost more territory to Russia. They also lost faith in the French pledges of help against the Russians. The British did not wait for long to take advantage of the changed situation. After the Treaty of Fars, the British Resident in Basra offered the Shah of Iran 125,000 rupees and several diamonds from George III to fight the Russians. Not only that, the Governor General of India sent Mount Stuart Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, who was well versed in Eastern languages, to Peshawar where the ruler of Kabul, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, had his winter capital. In 1809, he managed to extract a treaty of mutual defense between the British and the Afghans.

Although the battle of Waterloo in 1815 put an end to the French threat to the British India, the Russian presence remained effective in the region. Indeed, they emerged as the major rivals of the British in Asia. The Iranians tried to recover their lost territories from the Russians but invariably ended up losing even more. Even the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814, which promised military and
financial aid to the Iranians in wake of a foreign aggression, did not change the situation. In fact, when Shah Abbas Mirza Qajar tried to recover part of the Caucasus in 1826, with the help of the British, it again resulted in a disastrous defeat. To add to their woes, the British never fulfilled their commitments. By the Treaty of Turkomanchik in 1828, the Russians not only gained full control of the South Caucasus but also received a heavy indemnity from the Iranians (equal to 15 million dollars) along with external territorial rights and commercial advantages. It seemed that the British had some sort of understanding with the Russians and in fact wanted to weaken Iran so that it would no longer pose a threat to the British interests in India and Afghanistan. In fact, one may argue that this attitude was typical of the British policies and postures in this region. On the one hand, they signed treaties with Iran for help in case of foreign invasion and, on the other, with Afghans against the Iranians, as was evident in Elphinstone's contacts with Shah Shuja.

In 1809, however, Shah Shuja was replaced, and after unsuccessful attempts to seek help from different rulers of the area, he fled to Lahore in 1813. After five years, he became a British pensioner. By now, the Sikhs, under Ranjit Singh had become a formidable power and the British sought their help in reinstating Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul. However, after many years of civil war the Afghans acknowledged Dost Mohammad Khan as the Amir. In the process, of course, the Afghans had lost their territories in Sind and Baluchistan. The Mirs of Sind and the Khans of Baluchistan had broken away from the influence of Kabul. During the turmoil and uncertainty in Afghanistan, the Sikhs had occupied Peshawar in 1834. In 1836, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan defeated the Sikhs and had almost recovered Peshawar but instead of occupying the city, he
sought British approval. He sent a letter to the new Governor General, Lord Auckland, and asked permission for retaining Peshawar. In the words of Louis Dupree, a noted scholar on Afghanistan, “Auckland replied that the British government followed a consistent policy of non interference in the affairs of independent nations.”11 Ironically, “Auckland himself,” according to Fraser Tytler, “in fact, was responsible for the First Afghan War”.12 Yapp also agreed with this assessment. According to him, “Auckland went to war to safeguard the internal rather than the external frontier.”13

Auckland dispatched Captain Alexander Burnes to sort out the Afghanistan situation. Burnes arrived at Kabul in 1837. He declared that the objective of his mission was to restore the commercial relations between India and Central Asia and to “workout the policy for opening River Indus for commerce.”14 Amir Dost Mohammad Khan wanted the British help in recovering Peshawar, only to realize soon that the British would do nothing at the expense of their relationship with the Sikhs.

Interestingly, on December 19, 1837, a Russian diplomat, Captain Ivan Vickovich, arrived at Kabul with letters from the Russian government (the Czar also wrote a letter in response to a letter sent by Amir Dost Mohammad through Mirza Husain) ostensibly for the same purpose that Burnes had come.15 In order to make the British position absolutely clear, Burnes delivered the following ultimatum to Dost Mohammad Khan on March 6, 1838:

You must desist from all correspondence with Persia and Russia: you must never receive agents from (them) or have ought to do with him without our sanction: you must dismiss Captain Vickovich with courtesy: you must surrender claims to Peshawar on your account as that Chiefship belongs to Maharaja Ranjeet Singh: you must also respect the independence of Candahar and Peshawar and cooperate in arrangements to unite your family.16
Although the Amir agreed, but Burnes, the British envoy, refused to spell out the terms particularly with reference to Peshawar. Burnes refused. Disappointed and frustrated, Dost Mohammad Khan entered into negotiations with the Russian representative. Meanwhile the Russians continued to help the Iranians in the siege of Herat and pledged more help in the future. These events in Herat and Kabul made the British reassess their policy in the area, which ultimately led to their occupation of Baluchistan. Since Iran was wooing the Russian ambassador to the embarrassment of the British, Lord Auckland sent an army to Persian Gulf to occupy Kharaj Island in June 1838. In the same month, a treaty was signed between the British Governor General, the Sikh ruler (Ranjit Singh), and Shah Shuja. The treaty stipulated that with the Sikh and the British help, Shah Shuja would rule Kabul and Kandhar. Herat would remain independent. In turn, Shah Shuja would recognize the Sikh government in the Punjab in North-West Frontier including Peshawar. Consequently, the British raised a large military force known as the “Army of Indus,” at Ferozpur to attack Afghanistan and install Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul. Accordingly, in 1839, war was declared on Afghanistan: the so-called First Afghan War had begun. Since the present study is not directly related with the causes of the war but only to the extent that this war brought the British in Baluchistan, we will confine our discussion to the route that this army took and how this invasion impacted the people and rulers of Baluchistan.

When the time came for the Indus Army to attack Afghanistan, Ranjit Singh not only withdrew his pledge to support this mission but also refused to let Lt. General Sir J. Keane, Commandant of the Indus Army, to march through his territory. General Keane had to find an alternate route (almost thrice as long and
through difficult terrain) through Sind and Baluchistan. Keeping in view the hostile environment in terms of supplies, General Keane denuded Baluchistan of much of its resources to keep his army moving. 21

The British had already signed a treaty with the Khan of Kalat who honoured this agreement to the best of his abilities. The army reached Quetta in March 1839 for its onward journey to Kandhar. General Keane took Kandhar without a fight on April 26, and then moved towards Ghazni, which was occupied on July 22, 1839. On August 7, 1839, the army entered Kabul along with Shah Shuja. 22 Without any resistance, Dost Mohammad Khan fled to Bukhara.

During this period, two important events influenced the future history. Ranjit Singh died in 1839, and, with his death, the British prospects of occupying the Punjab became brighter, and, secondly; the British realized that Shah Shuja was extremely unpopular among the Afghans and if they withdrew their forces, he would be dethroned. It was decided therefore, to maintain a British garrison in Afghanistan. Realizing the difficulty of persuading the Afghan chiefs to accept a British 'stooge' as their leader, William Macnaghten was sent to do the job. Almost every conceivable move was made to reconcile the people to Shah Shuja but in vain. In a letter to Captain Macgregor, he confessed:

I have been striving in vain to sow ‘Nifag’ (dissension) among the rebels and it is perfectly wonderful how they hang together. 23

Finally, in desperation, when the British decided to leave Afghanistan, their retreat showed how foolish this adventure was to begin with. Their retreat began on January 6, 1842. In addition to the hazards of the freezing weather, the resistance and the attacks of the local people combined to make this retreat one of
the most humiliating and bloody in the history of wars. The sole survivor, Dr. Brydon, saved the gory details for the future historians.24

The disastrous aftermath of the First Afghan War proved to be even more disastrous for Sind and Baluchistan. The British had realized the importance of both these areas for their Afghan policy. They were also aware of the vulnerability of the political and administrative set-up of the local rulers. Thus, they lured the Brahui Khan of Kalat to enter into various treaties with the British starting from 1839 to help reinforce their position in this area.

On March 28, 1839, the British had entered into a treaty with the Khan of Kalat to provide a passage and supplies to the Army of Indus on way to Kandhar through Shikarpur, Jacobabad (Khangarh), Dhadar, Bolan Pass, Quetta and Khojak Pass; 25(Appendix-V). The son of a deposed vizier, Akhund Mohammad Hasan, secretly opposed it. Even the Khan did not like such terms of the treaty, which included acknowledgment of the supremacy of Shah Shuja, his reinstallation in Kabul, to collect and protect supplies of British troops and to get in return an annuity of 150,000 rupees. The Army of Indus faced problems when passing through the Bolan Pass as they were attacked by the tribes of Kachhi and Bolan and it was alleged that all was done at the instigation of Akhund Mohammad Hasan. The British held Mir Mehrab, Khan of Kalat, responsible for this “violation”. General Willshire, on return from Kandhar, proceeded towards Kalat and deposed the Khan. Mir Mehrab Khan was killed fighting and the British occupied Kalat on November 13, 1839.26 Now it has been established that Akhund Mohammad Hasan was, in fact, a protege of the British, and, in order to avenge the removal of his father by the Khan, he had informed the British of the machinations of the Khan.27
If Mehrab Khan would have acted like Ranjit Singh and had made an alliance with Amir Dost Mohammad Khan perhaps the future history of the area would have been different. However, with the passage of time, the British involvement increased and they gradually extended their control in Baluchistan through further treaties, military expeditions and intrigues.

By signing a treaty on October 6, 1841, Khan of Kalat, Mir Nasir Khan II agreed that the British Government would station troops in Kalat, control its foreign relations and rule the State with the British Resident. Within the next few years, the British had annexed Sind (1843) and the Punjab (1849) and now there was hardly any possibility for the Khan to look for a potential ally in the neighbourhood. (Although in 1863 Mir Khudadad Khan had offered the province of Shal (Quetta) to the ruler of Kandhar if the latter would help him consolidate his position at Kalat).

After many abortive attempts to have a clear Afghan policy, the British realised that it was best to keep the pressure through the frontiers to make sure that the Russians did not succeed in their efforts to move towards Herat and then towards Kandhar. Most of the diplomatic correspondence and the concern of the travellers manifest the danger of Russian advance in this region. Nonetheless, we also come across some evidence which suggested that some tacit agreement existed between Moscow and London about the extent to which the two will not pose a threat to each other. But when the Iranians, encouraged by the Russians, occupied Herat in 1853, it was considered a clever Russian move. The British immediately moved to establish friendly relations with Amir Dost Mohammad Khan of Kabul through the Treaty of Peshawar, which was signed on March 30, 1855. But before that, the British had concluded a treaty with the Khan of Kalat.
on May 14, 1854, \(^{31}\) (Appendix-VII) which abrogated the treaty of 1841. The new treaty recognized the Khan as an independent ruler while he was expected to oppose the enemies of British and to be friendly with their supporters. These foes and friends were not named; however, it was clear that the Khan would act as a close ally of the British. In return, the British promised to pay an annual subsidy of 50,000 rupees and to provide military help in case of foreign invasion. This treaty was signed at Mastung, and Khan’s authority was recognized over the areas from South of Kalat to Arabian Sea and West of Sind to Iran including Las Bela. According to a British source, “In 1854, when war was anticipated between England and Russia, to strengthen the position on the frontier, a fresh treaty was made.”\(^{32}\) This treaty was further strengthened in 1862 when the boundary between Baluchistan and British India was defined and Kalat was declared as a neighbouring state of India. The subsidy was also doubled, \(^{33}\) (Appendix-VIII).

Another treaty was signed in 1863 which also sought pledge from the Khan to safeguard the British installations. The British Government agreed to pay 20,500 rupees per annum to the Khan towards the establishment of posts and development of traffic along the trade routes, \(^{34}\) (Appendix-IX). In this year, the Khan received further boost from the death of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the ruler of Kabul. In fact, the British Agent in Kandhar reported to the government that Khan of Kalat, Mir Khudadad Khan (1857-1893) had offered the province of Shal (Quetta) to the ruler of Kandhar if the latter would assist him in consolidating his position at Kalat.\(^{35}\)

By now, the British had realized that, for the Khan to be an effective and successful ruler, it was essential that he should have the best of relations with the Sardars of different tribes in his area. If this relationship was good and friendly,
the Khan would feel secure. If there was mistrust or enmity between the Khan and the Sardars, the former would either look for help from the British or from the neighbouring rulers. Therefore, it was stipulated that it would be better if the British presence was secured in that area to ensure that this relationship stays good and cordial as well as to keep an eye over the activities of the Khan. It was in view of this that the British occupied Quetta in December 1876, and a new treaty was signed (Appendix-X). It was a renewal of 1854 treaty with a few supplementary provisions and was named as the Treaty of Kalat. Some of the provisions of this treaty were:

1) A British Agent would permanently reside at the court of Kalat.
2) The British Agent would use his good offices to settle any dispute between the Khan and the Sardars so that the peace of the country is not disturbed; and
3) The British Government would be at liberty, by arrangement with the Khan, to construct in Kalat territory such lines of telegraph or rail roads, which might be beneficial to the interest of the two governments.36

This treaty was literally imposed on the Khan by the special representative of the Governor-General. It is reflective of the way the British influence in the affairs of Baluchistan had increased. It is pertinent to point out that many years ago, John Jacob had written on July 28, 1856, to the Viceroy, Lord Canning, “we should continue to exert such influence which is absolutely necessary and it would neither be advisable nor necessary to assume, in these respects, greater power, either in nature or extent than we now virtually possess or exercise.”37 But, now, the situation had changed and the British had assumed more power in this region than was envisaged before the Uprising of 1857.

This treaty was essentially concerned with the relationship between the Sardars and the Khan, but neither for this treaty nor for the treaty of 1854, were
consultations with the Sardars deemed necessary. These treaties were between
the British and the Kalat Khanate, yet the Sardars were mentioned with the Khan
as parties. This treaty, of course, led to the construction of telegraph and railway
lines through the Kalat territory. Sandeman who was Deputy Commissioner of
Dera Ghazi Khan during 1866-1876 was instrumental in stationing a British
garrison at Quetta. The subsidy of the Khan was increased to rupees thirty
thousand per annum with the appointment of Sandeman as Agent to the Governor
General with his headquarters at Quetta. On February 21, 1877, the foundation of
the Baluchistan Agency was laid. The British extended their influence around
Quetta and the Bolan Pass and the Khan’s control was reduced to nominal.

In order to understand subsequent events in Baluchistan, we have to take
into account how the British perceived their interests in Afghanistan. As discussed
earlier, the relevance of the vast territory of Baluchistan to the British Empire
became manifest during the First Afghan War (1839-1842), which, was
apparently fought to protect Afghanistan from the Russian influence. Since
Baluchistan provided easy access to Qandhar and Herat, developments in
Afghanistan and Central Asia shaped the British policy towards Baluchistan. A
loyal and friendly Baluchistan definitely meant a safe and reliable launching pad
for the necessary interventions in Afghanistan and even in Iran. We will see how
the ‘Great Game’ shaped the destiny of Baluchistan after the Second Afghan War.

The First Afghan War was fought on the pretext of the presence of a
Russian diplomat in Kabul. It needs to be noted that at time the Russians were
more than two thousand miles away from the Afghan border. The Russians kept
advancing in Central Asia without eliciting any reaction from the British. By
1872, they had subdued Khiva, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Turkistan. Instead of
strengthening Afghanistan, the British had annoyed the Afghan ruler by awarding the Siestan proper (about 950 square miles, with a population of 45,000) to Iran and leaving the Outer Siestan, and the district on the right bank of Helmand, to Afghanistan as a result of the deliberations of the Siestan Arbitary Commission in 1872. It is true that Siestan was, initially, a part of the Iranian territory but had been attached at different periods to Herat and Kandhar. Amir Sher Ali (ruler of Afghanistan) did not approve these arrangements. The British Viceroy, Lord Northbrook (1872-75), anticipating more trouble, refused to accept Amir Sher Ali's nominee, Abdullah Jan, as heir-prince.

The new Viceroy, Lord Lytton, added fuel to the fire when he demanded that the Amir of Kabul should accept a British Resident at his court. On the Amir's refusal, he invaded Afghanistan in 1878, and thus the Second Afghan War started. How the fate of Baluchistan was tied to the British adventures in Afghanistan is obvious from the role and activities of Sir Henry Rawlinson. In 1868, Rawlinson advised his government to "occupy Quetta, gain control of the Afghan area by subsidizing the Amir in Kabal, and establish a permanent British Mission in Kabal to keep the Russians out." After the occupation of Quetta, Rawlinson pressed for another war against Afghanistan. The Second Afghan War, like the First Afghan War, was started on the pretext of keeping the Russians out and feeding the home government with the fear of Russia. Ironically, the declared policy of the British in Afghanistan since the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853-1856) was "to build up a strong, friendly and united Afghanistan which should serve as a buffer between the British and the Russian aggrandizement." Apparently, not only was Russo-phobia unfounded but also some tacit understanding existed between the two powers. For example when
Amir Sher Ali asked the Russians for help against the British during this war, he was advised to make peace with the British. Frustrated, the Amir had to escape to Turkestan. He died near Balkh on February 21, 1879.45

Amir Sher Ali was succeeded by his son, Amir Yaqub Ali Khan in 1879. In order to prevent further advances of the British, Amir Yaqub Ali Khan acceded to their demands in the Gandmak Treaty (Appendix-XI) that was concluded on May 26, 1879.46 This treaty added the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi to the British Empire along with permanent control of Khyber and Michni passes. The British were also given Loralai and the Pashtoon territories lying to the north and east of Quetta. A British Resident was to reside at Kabul. The Amir was prohibited to engage with any foreign power without approval of the British. He was granted 600,000 rupees stipend in return. Not only the treaty extended the boundaries of Baluchistan at the expense of the Afghan territory, it reduced Afghanistan to dependency.

This was a very important development because now the British had established themselves on the western frontiers of Baluchistan which sandwiched the Khan and the Sardars between British India and British Baluchistan. Now the British frontier stood across the Khojak Range to Chaman near Kandhar. Within the next decade, a broad gauge railway line was constructed up to Chaman by tunnels through the hilly areas. In the words of Edward Oliver, “Baluchistan thus became the first point of advance in the pursuit of Forward Policy.”47

The next decade witnessed the contours of the British administration in Baluchistan, which remained intact, more or less, for a long time. The near eastern part of Baluchistan, inhabited mostly by the Pashtoons, came under the direct administration of the Baluchistan Agency. The southern part of Baluchistan
remained predominantly Baluch in population, whereas the Brahuis were concentrated in the Highlands. Further division of Baluchistan took place in 1877 whereby some Baluch tribes of the Derajat were put under the Punjab administration. These included Buzdar, Khetran, Khoşa, Leghari, Mazari, Qaisrani, etc.

In order to finalize the demarcation of border between Baluchistan and Afghanistan, a Baluch-Afghan Boundary Commission was instituted in 1895. Colonel McMahon brought to a successful conclusion the demarcation of Durand Line from Gomal to Koh-i-Mulk Siah. The latter is tri-junction of British India, Afghanistan and Iran. Sir Thomas Holditch proposed a boundary between Baluchistan and Iran in consultation with the Iranian Commissioner. The Administration Report of Baluchistan Agency 1886 gives the background to this situation. The report describes in detail the dissensions among the Makrani Chiefs that invariably led to the raids on Iranian territory. In order to put an end to these raids, the Iranians brought these areas under their control and imposed tribute on these tribes. With the passage of time, they extended their claims over Kej and its dependencies, which were under the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat.

In order to remove the threat of the raiders and to demarcate the areas under the Khan, the British government and the Shah of Iran had already approved a proposal in Tehran in September 1871. According to the memorandum by the British Commissioner, Major General Goldsmid, Panjgur, Parum, and other dependencies with Kohuk. Boleidee, including Zamiran and other dependencies; Mand, including Tump, Nasirabad, Kej, and all districts, dehs, and dependencies to the eastward; and Dasht with its dependencies as far as the sea, were declared to be beyond the Persian frontier.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the British had consolidated their hold on Baluchistan, reduced the Khan of Kalat to the status of a vassal, and secured their borders with Iran and Afghanistan through rail and road links, and cantonments.

It is interesting to note the way the British saw the role of Khan of Kalat and the Baluchi Sardars. In a memorandum, Sir Robert Montgomery described the political structure of Baluchistan and advised the British Government to strengthen and secure the position of the Khan of Kalat. According to him, this would secure not only “our borders of Sindh and the Punjab against the inroads of Baluch robbers, and the plunder of travellers and merchants to and from our territories to Central Asia but also to the protection of India itself against the possible dangers from the direct or stimulated advance of Persia.”

He conceded that the revenues of Baluchistan were not sufficient for the Khan and the Sardars to effectively manage the affairs of the confederacy. But since there was the British Resident in Kalat, he suggested, “Would it not be possible to make arrangements for the subsidizing of inferior chiefs guaranteed and secured by English power, through English payment. It is my opinion that great political advantages may be gained by the extra grant of the subsidy to the Khan.”

This preoccupation with the subsidies seemed to be the cornerstone of the British policies. Though nominal, these subsidies, nonetheless, gave the British Resident an upper hand in the affairs of the state administration. Sir Henry Green, a Political Agent at Kalat, proudly mentioned the effect of these subsidies on his status: “The Chiefs and people seem to think that I and the Khan should divide the throne equally, but I have told the Khan I want to place the power I have gained over his people in his hands.” This situation had shaped Lord Lytton’s “Forward
Policy”. It appears that this policy also inspired Lord Lytton’s Afghanistan policy, "It had been the policy of Lord Lytton’s government to subdivide the Kingdom of Afghanistan, on the grounds that no Chief could be found sufficiently strong to rule the whole country and secondly, that it was necessary on the line of Quetta, Kandhar, and Herat.”

While this policy proved successful for the British, it became a handicap for the Khan especially when the subsidy was withdrawn. Again, Henry Green’s reflections on the position of the Khan are revealing. Green had assumed his office when the Khan was only twelve years old. This provided him enough opportunities to win his confidence. He wrote:

The Khan is absolutely powerless to exert, unaided, any physical force over his unruly Chiefs and their followers: he can but rule by setting Chief against Chief and the tribe against tribe, and he can only do this with the assistance of money and by its use maintaining on his side the most powerful of his Chiefs. By depriving him of his subsidy we have rendered him to equality with the weakest of his Sardars. We have deprived the country of any semblance of a head.

It was under these circumstances that the Khans operated under British supremacy. The diplomatic skills of the British officers were not wanting when it came to giving the Khans a sense of false pride. For example, on January 1, 1877, the Khan of Kalat (Khudadad Khan) and various Sardars of Baluchistan were invited to attend the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi. Robert Sandeman was the Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan. In his account, he mentions how these local chiefs were overwhelmed with the railway and telegraph system and how for “the first time they realized the strength of the British Government.” The Khan, the Jam, and the Sardars from Baluchistan were placed apart from the other Indian chiefs as “distinguished strangers.” When the Khan resented this
discriminatory treatment and complained to Sandeman that he was not even considered worthy of receiving a banner which was presented to every other prince, "I (Sandeman) was desired to assure His Highness that no slight of any kind was intended; on the contrary the reason that he had not received a standard was that he occupied the position of a Sovereign Prince entirely independent of the British Government. The Khans and the Sirdars were satisfied with this explanation." Lord Lytton also paid return visit to the Khan whereas the native Indian Princes were not granted this high protocol.

The British did not follow a clear and consistent policy in their relations with the Khan and the Sardars. They acted according to the given situation and demand of that situation. Thus, at times, they humiliated them, as indicated above. At times, they were honoured and decorated. For example, Lord Lytton admitted Khan Khudadad Khan to the rank of a Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India. Some Sardars also received honours. However, such gestures were mostly extended in the time of war or any other grave crisis which demanded loyalty, and support of the local rulers. On special occasions, pleasantries were exchanged. Sir Robert Sandeman wrote to the Khan of Kalat before he went on leave in 1881: "I pray you to think of this sincere friend who is ever with you like a second Kernel in one almond". In response, the Khan acknowledged Sandeman’s contribution to the settlement of disputes of the frontier tribes, opening up the trade routes, administration of the country and the peace of its inhabitants. However, not all Khans acted with dignity and self-respect. Mostly it depended on their status and standing with the Baluch Sardars. Khudadad Khan, in particular, was so weak and servile that when Colonel Colley, the Military Secretary to the Viceroy, brought a letter to the Kalat Darbar on
October 10, 1887, the Khan "received the viceregal letter under a salute of twenty guns and pressed the document to his forehead." 

In this context, it would be worth exploring a little further how the British really perceived the position and status of the Khan. Did they consider Baluchistan as a protectorate, a confederacy of different tribes under the Khan or a divided state between directly administered areas and the region under the Khan? Indian rulers normally found it to their advantage to maintain a high level of ambiguity towards turbulent border regions. This was often deliberate as it allowed the paramount power greater freedom of action. This freedom was necessary for the center to avoid getting drawn into conflicts too often. Surprisingly the British were not clear about the real status of Baluchistan and its rulers. For example, Colonel Graham, the Commissioner of the Derajat and Colonel Phayre, the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind Frontier, were not even sure whether Baluchistan was a confederacy or a state with a sovereign ruler. The Administration Report of 1886 reflected this confusion. Indeed, in its estimate the view to be taken of the conduct of the Sardars towards the Khan during the prolonged struggle between them, which involved so much loss of life and property, depended entirely on the answer to be given to this question:

If the Khan were a supreme ruler, the Sardars were rebels without excuse for their rebellion; but if the Khan were the head of a confederacy, of which the Sardars were members, the latter must be regarded as men engaged in an earnest endeavour to defend their liberties and privileges. 

In an earlier Conference held at Mithankot in February 1871 on the question of the relations of the Khan of Kalat towards the Sardars of Baluchistan, the British administrators expressed conflicting opinions. Sir W. Merewether and Captain Harrison, Political Agent at Kalat regarded the Khan as a supreme ruler
and the Sardars as his subjects and feudatories. On the other hand, Colonel Phayre, Police Superintendent of Sindh, held that the Khan was no more than the head of a confederacy. He could not rule without the support and countenance of the British Government. Robert Sandeman and Colonel Graham were of the same opinion.

During his feuds with the Sardars, the Khan used to ask for the British armed intervention to settle the problem. However, unless the British interest demanded such an intervention, the Viceroy would not oblige. On one occasion, the Khan told the Political Agent, Major Harrison, that if he failed to obtain assistance from the British Government, he would have to ask Afghanistan or Persia for aid. The Political Agent reminded the Khan of the article 3 of the Treaty of 1854, which restricted him not to enter into negotiation with other States without the consent of the British Government. He also told the Khan that the Viceroy would not extend any help unless the Kalat government was established on a just basis, the rights of his subjects were properly cared for, and their grievances enquired into and redressed. As a matter of fact, he had simply conveyed to him what the Viceroy had observed: "If we were to intervene in force to support his authority, it would be necessary to enquire into and guarantee the rights of those whose alleged grievances have driven them into what may possibly be a justifiable rebellion."

This policy was certainly meant to ensure that the Khan would not emerge as a strong leader. The British wanted to keep for themselves the role of the final arbiter between the Khan and the Sardars without committing their soldiers to strengthen the office of the Khan. Hence, the memorandum on his powers and the responsibilities of the British government clearly stated that:
It was not the duty of the British Government to settle by armed intervention the administration of the Kalat, or to adjust the quarrels between the Khan and his nobles or to help the Khan to assert nominal suzerainty over recalcitrant tribes; and that His Excellency in Council would only give moral and material support.63

In fact, the memorandum clearly curtailed the powers of the Khan by suggesting that, “we shall take our own measures, without reference to him, to protect our territories and the lives and properties of our subjects; that any of his subjects who may commit offences in British territory and be apprehended there, will receive the utmost penalty of the Law.”64

That does not mean that the British did not intervene in the feuds between the Khan and the Sardars. Often, they settled the disputes between the Khan and the Sardars, but, each time, the Khan’s financial and administrative powers were further curtailed. The real author of this policy was Sandeman who ensured that the Khan had no right to money contribution from the Sardars. He was allowed income only from crown lands and custom duties, after paying the share to the local Sardars. The Sardars remained supreme in their own tribes whereas inter-tribal feuds were adjudicated by Jirga in which the Khan did not enjoy any special privileges. Thus, for all practical purposes, the Agent to the Governor General was the real head of the Baluch Confederation. The glory of the Khan’s status was confined only to rituals of his court where “His Highness is still the nominal head, the Sarawan and Jhalawan Chiefs still sit on his right and left in the Darbars. And till he (Sardar) is invested by the Khan with the robe of succession, a Sardar, is not legitimizized as a representative of his tribe”.65

With the passage of time, the Agent to the Governor General (AGG) assumed the power of nominating the Sardars, summoning of Jirgas for the
settlement of inter-tribal disputes, and the general observation of law and order in the country. The British believed that the AGG commanded more respect and obedience than the Khan in spite of the fact that in certain parts of the tribal areas like Sarawan and Jhalawan, the Khan was still respected.\(^6\) The presence of five thousand British soldiers at the Quetta Cantonment further strengthened the position of the AGG. The local chiefs were either ruled through the Khan or received money from the AGG, either as pension compensation for custom dues or for rendering services in the levies. Wherever either the Khan crossed his limits, in internal matters or in relation to the British interest, he was changed and replaced by a son or brother, whatever the requirement. On March 29, 1893 Mir Khudadad Khan was imprisoned and his son, Mir Mahmud Khan II was placed on the throne of Kalat.\(^6\) Mir Khudadad died in captivity on May 21, 1907 at Pishin.\(^6\) The Khan functioned virtually like a dummy and the British AGG, in the name of the Khan, passed practically all court and administrative orders.

However, these measures were in no way endearing to either the Khan or some Sardars. Khan of Kalat, Mir Mahmud Khan II, for example, though weak, could not hide his feelings against the British. "He neither went to visit a British official nor went out of his way in welcoming them. On the contrary, he is reported to have encouraged many anti-British uprisings in Baluchistan. Realizing his failure in regaining his lost prestige, he died in his palace on November 2, 1931".\(^6\) His several abortive attempts to regain his powers through all possible means did not earn him a good name in the annals of Baluch history. One nationalist Baluch author however, declared all his reign of thirty-eight years as "shameful" and described him as the "Prince of Darkness."\(^7\)
The British had established themselves as rulers of Baluchistan without much opposition. They received enthusiastic support from the loyal Sardars during the First World War. Official communications showed that the Khan and his associates offered recruits, camels, and, in certain cases, even cash to finance the British war efforts. Though there were reports of the presence of Turkish and German agents in Iran and Afghanistan, yet there was no major uprising in favour of Turkey in Baluchistan during the war. The British, however, highlighted exaggerated the German threat. In 1916, the infamous, future "butcher" of Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar, Brigadier-General Dyer was sent to Baluchistan to deal with the threat. The British thought that the Germans would invade India through Baluchistan, and would ultimately break their Indian Empire. In 1916, the "German agents" allegedly killed two British officers, Lt. Horst and Lt. Hughes in Makran, which resulted in unleashing of several punitive expeditions under General Dyer. The areas particularly hit were Jhalawan, in 1916 and Marri-Bugti areas in 1918.

The whole Pashtoon belt adjacent to the Afghanistan border, including the Zhob, Qila Saifullah, Loralai, Sanjawi areas were up in revolt at the advent of the Third Afghan War in 1919. Although the war lasted hardly a week or so, the British had to face a staunch resistance from the Pashtoon freedom fighters. Among Pashtoons, there is a long list of such freedom fighters but the place of Shahjahan Jogazai was the most prominent of all.

The first two decades of the twentieth century witnessed many developments that affected the people of Baluchistan significantly. Pan-Islamic movement, the Khilafat movement, and the Third Afghan War directly impacted the people, particularly the Pashtoons. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia
replaced the Czarist threat to the British Empire with an ideology that was
directed against the capitalist and the colonial West. The Indian National
Congress had assumed a new dimension after the arrival of M.K. Gandhi in India
(1915). It demanded self-rule and freedom in India. Partly because of their ethnic
identity with the Afghans and partly because of the anti-British statements of the
Congress leaders, the independent-minded and anti-authoritarian Pashtoon and
Baluch tribes of Baluchistán were genuinely impressed with the anti-British brand
of the Congress politics. These factors, indeed, shaped the destiny of the future
politics of the nationalist and radical elements of Baluchistán.74 The British forces
were kept engaged quelling various disturbances during this period. During 1915-
1919, the British faced revolts from both Baluch and Pashtoon tribes. They
mounted about fifteen major expeditions and several minor expeditions to subdue
the defiant forces in Baluchistán.75

But there were some developments that helped ease British relations with
Russia and Afghanistan, and thus allow them more freedom to deal with the
situation in Baluchistán. The Durand Line76 was drawn under a treaty signed on
November 12, 1893 between Sir Mortimer Durand on behalf of the British India
and Amir Abdul Rahman of Afghanistan.77 In 1887, the Ridgeway Line, named
after Sir West Ridgeway, fixed the northern boundaries of Afghanistan and
Russia.78 Thus, Afghanistan emerged as the buffer state lying between the
Imperial British India and the Czarist Empire (after 1922, the Soviet Union) in
Central Asia.79

In summation, several conclusions can be drawn from this discussion.
First, it can be said that by the time political activities began in India at a large
scale, especially with the entry of Gandhi in Indian politics. Baluchistán was still
struggling to cope with the advent of the new British administrative set-up. After
the death of Mir Mahmood Khan on November 2, 1931, his brother, Amir Azam
Khan was taken out of captivity, and installed as the Khan of Kalat. Lord
Willington, Viceroy of India, visited Baluchistan to install the new Khan himself.
A Grand Darbar was held at Quetta on April 26, 1932 for the purpose. Khan
Amir Azam Khan died in December 1932 and his son, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan,
succeeded him in 1933, who eventually saw the transformation of Baluchistan
from a British dependency to a part of Pakistan.

Secondly, the British had employed the policy of 'divide and rule' by
keeping the Khan under their supervision, curtailing his powers, and acting as
intermediaries between the Sardars and the Khan. Instead of establishing a clearly
demarcated role of the Khan and the tribal chiefs, they ensured that confusion and
complications existed between their relationships. They had established their rule
in Baluchistan but continuously faced opposition from different tribes.

Thirdly, the British never lost sight of their initial objective in occupying
Baluchistan. That was to guard the frontiers of India against possible intrusions
from the mountain passes, which separated the Sub-continent from Iran and
Afghanistan.

Fourthly, since the major victims of British colonialism in India were
Muslims, the British wanted to ward off any linkages between the Muslim world
and Muslim India. They achieved this through a clever use of strategic points in
Baluchistan, demarcation of boundaries, and actively intervening in the affairs of
the two neighbouring Muslim states of Afghanistan and Iran.

And finally, though in the traditional sense, the Russian and the French
threats were over, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the emergence of Germany
as a major power, and, Turkey being its ally, never let the British sit comfortably in their saddle of power. All this indeed determined the administrative patterns of the British rule in Baluchistan.
Notes


4 Ibid.


9 Ibid.


11 Ibid. p. 369.


15 Norris, J I *The First Afghan War, 1838-1842* (Cambridge, 1967), p.134. It is amazing to see that both the hostile envoys paid visit to each other and were combined together at Christmas Dinner at Burnes’ residence in 1837.


18 Ibid., p. 332. Appendix-IV.


Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 378.

L/P&S/5. Enclosures to Secret Letters received from India, Vol. 82. January 9, 1842, No. 9. India Office Records (British Library), London.

Baluchistan and The First Afghan War, pp. 375-76.

Ahmadzai, Tarikh-i-Baluch, Vol. VI, pp. 57-58. It must be pointed out that Alexander Burnes negotiated this treaty. Appendix-V

Ibid., pp. 67-68.

Ibid., pp. 79.


Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 401.

Hughes, The Country of Baluchistan, pp. 216-217. Appendix-VII.


Baluch, Greater Baluchistan, pp. 226-227. Appendix-IX.

The Press List of Old Records, Serial No. 2346.

First Administration Report, pp. 54-55. Appendix-X.


Ibid. p. 413. T.H. Thornton, Acting Foreign Secretary to the Govt. of India in the year 1877, states that, “while the treaty of 1854 is between the British Government and the Khan of Kalat alone, in the Treaty of 1876 the Sardars are mentioned with the Khan as parties”. Thornton, Sir Robert Sandeman, p. 93.

Ibid.
40 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan 'Mukhtasar Tareekh Qaum-i-Baluch, p. 61. Also Edward Oliver, Across the Border: Pathan and Baloch (London, 1890), pp. 22-23.


42 Ibid.


44 First Administrative Report, p. 88.

45 Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 409.

46 First Administrative Report, pp. 77-78. Appendix-XI.

47 Oliver, Across the Border, p. 123.


49 Ibid.

50 Political & Secret Department, L/P&S 18 A pp. 6-20 Memorandum by Sir Robert Montgomery on the Punjab and Scinde Frontier, Khelat, etc. February 7, 1870.

51 Ibid., p. 7.

52 Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad, p. 412 The ruling Khan was Mir Khudadad Khan. The letter was written to John Jacob.


55 First Administrative Report, p. 56.

56 Ibid., following it, the Government of India published its Resolution on February 21, 1877, ordering the re-establishment and extension of the Baluchistan Agency. Robert Sandeman was appointed the Agent to the Governor General.


58 Thoronton, Sir Robert Sandeman, p. 58.
First Administrative Report, pp. 15-17.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 31.

Ibid. Robert Sandeman further noted in this respect: “His Excellency in Council has long ceased to expect from the Khan any efficient action towards the establishment of even responsible Government. During the last 17 years, the British Government has done everything in its power to strengthen his hands and enable him to fulfill his treaty obligations. Extra subsidies have been given; he has received from us presents of money. The Viceroy with distinctions has received him. In short everything has been done by the British Government that could have been done to raise him in the estimation of his subjects, and enable him to discharge all the duties which devolve upon him as the ruler of the Kalat State but all has been of no avail.”

Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 36.

Ibid., p. 9 But in the essential questions of the nomination of the Sardars, the summoning of the Jirgas for the settlement of inter – tribal disputes and the general preservation of peace in the country, the Agent to the Governor General was recognized all over Baluchistan as having taken the place of the Khan, and his mandate naturally commanded a great deal more respect and obedience than did ever of His Highness (the Khan). Moreover, the Sardars looked to the AGG for protection against the Khan. The fact of the matter was that the Khan had no right to money contribution from the Sardars, though they were bound to fellow him to battle against a foreign foe. He derived his income from Crown Lands, from custom dues, to a share of which the local tribes were in place entitled, and to a very small extent from land revenue shared with local Chiefs. He had no power over the lives and property of the tribesmen outside what may be called the crown domains. The Chiefs settled disputes in their own tribes, and Jirgas of all the Chiefs adjudicated disputes between men of different tribes by Jirga. On very important occasions, the Khan presided the Jirgas. Such a state of affairs naturally led to in-fighting and feuds between the Khan and Sardars. Indeed since Sir Sandeman’s Missions in 1876-77, the AGG has practically taken the place of the Khan as head of the Baluchistan or Brahui Confederation.

Ibid., p. 9.

Ahmadzai, Tarikh-i-Baluch, Vol. VI, pp. 562-563. He is also blamed,” was an ogre and had executed his 3500 subjects. Minor theft charges were
stoned to death. Vizier’s 90 years old father was hacked to death.” Charles C. Trench, *Viceroy’s Agent* (London, 1987), p.87.

68 Ibid., p. 569.

69 Ibid., p. 216.


72 Ibid., pp. 454-455.

73 Abdul Rahman Ghour, *Hamari Jido Jihad* (Quetta, 1995), pp.11-13. The Pashtoons had been residing in Zhob, Loralai, Harrai, Quetta and Pishin districts of Baluchistan for thousands of years. They had resisted the invaders throughout the ages. In 1338, the Kakars of the area had fought against Peer Mohammad, the grandson of Amir Taimur. Ahmad Shah Abdali had assigned the Sardari of Zhob to a pious Jogazai, Baqaneka and entitled him as “Badshah -i- Zhob”. The Jogazais fought against the British also. The most active person against them was Shahjahan Jogazi. He inflicted heavy losses on them. He fought two major battles with the British. In 1879, a British force of about one thousand troops under General Biddulph challenged Shahjahan Jogazai’s 500 men at Baghao near Sanjawai. The British wanted to occupy Loralai. But the Jogazai force equipped with primitive swords repulsed the well-armed troops. Consequently, till the next year, the British could not dare another expedition. On August 16, 1880, Colonel T.W. Pierce was sent at the head of 300 soldiers of Bombay Infantry. Shahjahan Jogazai and Sardars Faiz Mohammad Khan Panezai led Panezais, Sarangzais and Kakars of Zhob. The ill-equipped indigenous tribals repulsed the British army in three hours tough fight. The last two battles of 1883 and 1884 are very remarkable which were fought at Thal Chotali against the British. Shahjahan Jogazai stood victorious in these fights and the British had to bear heavy losses. Shahjahan fought the British till his death. The British had acknowledged his bravery (Zhob Gazetteer).


76 Percy Sykes, *Sir Mortimer Durand* (London, 1926). The Durand Line running between Afghanistan and Baluchistan marks a common border of about 720 miles. It is considered one of the best-demarcated and easily recognizable boundary lines in the world. The British historian Fraser
Tytler regards it “Illogical from the point of view of ethnography, strategy and geography.” Tytler, Afghanistan, p. 188. Lawrence Ziring is of the view, “Durand Line met some of the defensive needs of the British Indian Empire”. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan the Enigma of Political Development (Colorado, 1980), p. 149.

77 Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 424.

76 Ibid.


80 Ibid. p. 256.

81 Ibid. p. 267.
CHAPTER 3
THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

Analyzing the role of frontiers in the history of nations one of the most perceptive viceroys of India, Lord Curzon remarked: "Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hangs suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations." This, in fact, explains the major goal of the British administration in Baluchistan. The prime objective was to guard the frontiers and if there was any real or perceived danger to these frontiers, it was to be suppressed, indeed eliminated.

If we look at the British administrative system of Baluchistan in 1937, it was clear that its present shape had been achieved after a long and protracted vacillation between the Close Border Policy and the Forward Policy System identified also as the Sind System and the Punjab System authored by Major John Jacob and Major Robert Sandeman, respectively. A close examination of these policies will reveal that the fundamental differences between the two systems of frontier were best represented in Lambrick’s observation that, "Mobility and anticipation do not constitute uncompromising militarism,"

Historians have often studied these two developments either in chronological order or in evolutionary process. But if we look at the British policies, we could safely say that whenever there was a threat across the border, the British went for a Forward Policy, and in that process they tried to pacify the Baluch tribes and showed respect to the Khan. But at times when they felt safe from the external threats, they pursued a Close Border Policy, also termed as the
“Scientific Border Policy”, which meant minimizing defence expenditures. Internally, however, these periods witnessed the humiliation of the Khan and punitive raids in the tribal belts. Indeed, the British philosophy was very simple: during the period of peace abroad, they exercised utmost discipline and clamped down the rod of royal authority on the independence-minded Baluch.

The administrative system, which the British introduced in Baluchistan, was essentially a response to the political developments and threats across the border. Therefore, it not only changed from time to time but also lacked the systematic pattern of institutional set-up.

In order to pursue their imperial policy as well as to control the tribes inside Baluchistan, the British had divided the Baluch territories into four political divisions:

1) British Baluchistan
2) The Leased Areas
3) The State Territory
4) The Tribal Areas

British Baluchistan consisted of the areas on the North-West and Western borders such as Pishin, Chaman, Shera Rud, Dukki and Shahrig. These six tehsils covered an area of 9,178 square miles with a population of 137,358 according to 1941 Census.

The Leased Areas included Quetta, Noshki, Nasirabad, Bolan Pass and a corridor that connected the British Baluchistan with the Punjab and Sind. These areas covered 4,266 square miles, with a population of 162,000. 
The State Territories constituted those areas, which were governed by the local rulers under the supervision of the British Residents. Kalat, Lasbela, Kharan and Makran came under this category. The State Territories covered an area of 79,382 square miles, with a population of 356,000 according to 1941 Census.

The Tribal Areas included Zhob, Kohlu, Marri Bugti areas, Chagi and Sanjrani territories. These areas were also termed as Chief Commissioner's Province, which covered an area of 41,000 square miles, with a population of 201,951. The Agent to the Governor General governed British Baluchistan while the Leased Territories and the Tribal Areas were administered through the political agents.

It will be useful to see the evolution of this fragmentation or 'Balkanization' of Baluchistan in order to understand the administrative pattern of the colonial rulers. During the Second World War, the British realized the importance of their presence on the borders of Afghanistan and Iran. These borders placed them in a strong strategic position from where they could anticipate and control any intrusion either from the Herat-Kandhar Route or from the Sistan area. In addition, the British wanted to keep the lines of communication open with the Punjab and Sind in case more troops or supplies were needed for the frontline British areas.

Quetta emerged as the most important outpost in the British India. In the words of Karslake, "from the end of 1928 the Baluchistan garrison had been greatly augmented. The general headquarters of the Western Command moved to Quetta. The backdoor was not only closed but also provided with a substantial bar". By May 1935, the need for defence of Baluchistan had reached its peak. The
Quetta garrison was the largest in the British Empire. As Karslake further observed, "in case of emergency, within ten days of initial warning some 100,000 troops would be immediately available for action thus forming an effective barrier to any aggression of the enemy from the west to north-west."\(^\text{12}\)

This was a strategic move in the sense that in the east, the Kandhar-Quetta-Bela sector with approached from Khojak and Bolan passes, and, in the west, the Farah-Zahidan-Chabahar sector secured the British position against any possible intrusion from across the border. Physical occupation of the northern tracts of Baluchistan, in addition to the above-mentioned considerations, was primarily meant "to break the centuries old link between the Kalat state and Afghanistan and deprive them of natural support."\(^\text{13}\)

Thus, confining these territories to their own areas, the British corridor from Jacobabad to Sibi, not only linked Sind and British Baluchistan but also isolated Marri Bugti tribal territory from the Kalat State. The western border with Iran was considered safer than the northern border, and, finally, when the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 took place, it helped the British to have even a freer hand to control the administered areas beyond the Goldsmid Line in Siestan, Iran.

It needs to be emphasized that the corridor mentioned above was not simply aimed at keeping the communication line open with the Punjab and Sind; it considerably reduced the fighting spirit of the Baluch and the economic well-being of Kalat.

By leasing Nasirabad, the fertile and agriculturally rich areas of Kachhi were taken away from Kalat in the east, as was the fertile Zhob valley in the
north, which deprived Kalat of agricultural produce. The Marri-Bugti tribal belt being severed from the Zhob Valley reduced any potential threat from these territories. As Syed Iqbal Ahmed explained it: “The wedge thus driven through the heart of the Baluchi people split them into two halves”. It helped the British deal with them piecemeal. The corridor, which had parallel rail and roadways, provided facilities to the British, and afforded them political and military advantages. Thus, they were richly compensated for all the expenses and efforts incurred.

It is amazing that this corridor went through one of the most difficult routes, through the sixty miles long Bolan Pass and one of the hottest deserts in the world, Sibi. They did not consider a more convenient route that connected Quetta to the Punjab and passed through Dera Ghazi Khan, Fort Munro, Loralai and Ziarat. This route would have avoided the Bolan Pass and the Sibi desert but would not have caused a split between Kalat and Marri Bugti areas, something the British wanted to achieve. This route, also called Thal Chotiali route, was recommended by Sir George Macmunn. In his words: “This was a shorter route from Delhi. In the past, traders and invaders used it frequently from Kandhar to Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan and Lahore.” Therefore, it will be fair to say that the British preferred to travel through difficult areas because of long-term political and administrative considerations rather than to enjoy travelling in comparative ease. That said, the Thal route was vulnerable to Baluch attacks from the south and Afghans from the north.

As we have seen earlier, the ruler of the Kalat state, though officially considered as sovereign, was totally dependent on the Agent to the Governor
General. Moreover, he controlled only one fourth of the territory. The remaining area was under the control of tribal Sardars. The Sardars acknowledged him as their ruler but never allowed him to interfere in their internal affairs. The biographer of Robert Sandeman, Tucker suggested that the Khan’s policy towards the Sardars was: “First beat them, then treat them.” Sandeman followed almost the same policy, which, more or less, occupied the minds of his successors: “when reason fails, then twist their tails.” Though himself a Brahui, the Khan rarely trusted his own tribesmen. As he put it in a lighter vein, “should a Brahui chance to find his way to Heaven, I will apply to God either to allot me a separate room or permit me to go and live in Hell.”

Realizing the impact of the British predominance in the area, some tribes willingly accepted British occupation. For example, the Baluch Khan who was Tumandar of Khetran tribe, and was considered inferior to Marris and Bugti (who were hostile to his tribe) approached Sandeman for inclusion of Khetran area into the British territory. In order to ensure loyalty and peace in those areas, which were adjacent to the Punjab or Sind, but were volatile, the British placed them under the governments of these two provinces. Harrand and Dajal were included in the Punjab and Khangarh and the surrounding areas were included in Sind under the new name of Jacobabad. The State of Kalat and other states like Lasbela, Kharan and Makran were officially called the Baluchistan Agency territories.

To understand the political status of Baluchistan in 1937 we must trace the rationale and the debate surrounding this issue. As far back as 1873, shortly after his appointment as a Resident and Agent to the Governor General, Sir Robert
Sandeman proposed that ethnic, linguistic, and cultural, considerations should be kept in view and all the Baluch regions should be unified in the name of the Khan of Kalat.¹⁹ However, this proposal was rejected because of the opposition of the Government of the Punjab.¹⁹ This issue was raised again during the period of Lord Curzon by John Bright and Risely who suggested (in 1903) the reorganization of all the provinces of British India on the basis of language, but this was also not agreed to.²⁰

The division of the Punjab in 1901 into two provinces of the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province had to a greater extent, separated the potential threat area from the British Empire and most of the tribal areas were grouped separately even from the North-West Frontier Province. But this pattern was not applied to Baluchistan. Somehow, the British felt that the newly-created province of North-West Frontier and the tribal areas were strategically more important than Baluchistan.²¹ Moreover, as a Baluch historian has argued, "the British denial of a Baluch frontier province was caused by their concern that the linguistic basis of framing a province should "have certainly strengthened the feelings of hostility towards the alien rule".²²

We are not sure whether this was a correct assessment or not because those areas which were grouped into provincial units with a language bias, like the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, did not pose any threat to the British rule. What was important, however, is the fact that the British did not want to accord a provincial status to Baluchistan, because of its vast area, scattered population, and the administrative expenditure involved. Perhaps, this decision
was based purely on "cost-benefit consideration," to avoid unnecessary burden on the exchequer.

However, at various levels the British officers and policy-makers kept the issue of language-based provinces alive not only with regard to Baluchistan but also to the other British Indian provinces. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report (1919) rejected it. In 1927, the Simon Commission favoured the idea of the reorganization of the provinces on the basis of language and other ethnic, religious and geographic considerations but it met the same fate. In 1930, a "Dispatch on Proposals for Constitutional Reforms" was sadly deficient with regard to Baluchistan. It dismissed off hand the idea of introducing administrative changes in British Baluchistan on the plea that "no present change is required where no desire in western institutions has yet expressed itself."

Even when the articulate sections of Baluchistan protested the provisions of 1935 Act regarding Baluchistan, no such step was taken. The Act, contrary to the pledges of earlier British authorities, such as Lord Lytton and Sandeman, included the Khanate of Baluchistan in the British Empire. The attitude of the political parties towards this issue will be discussed at a later stage.

Administratively, Baluchistan was divided into two parts: British Baluchistan and the Baluchistan States. As stated earlier, British Baluchistan consisted of those areas, which were either occupied by the British or leased from the Khan and those tribal areas from which the railroad lines and other routes of strategic importance passed. Its administration was under the Agent to the Governor General (AGG), who was directly accountable to the Viceroy. He was
helped by two Commissioners, the Revenue Commissioner and the Judicial Commissioner whose writ was executed in the name of the AGG. The districts were under the political agents in the tribal areas and the deputy commissioners in the relatively settled and urbanized districts. These political agents and deputy commissioners were usually commanders of the army stationed in those areas in addition to the tribal levies, which were recruited from the local areas and acted as police. Within the districts, the subordinate officers simply carried out the orders of the district authorities. It should be emphasized that the district officers of Baluchistan, though identical in status to those in the other districts of British India, had far more sweeping powers and authority.26

The states of Kalat, Las Bela, Kharan and Makran constituted the other administrative unit in Baluchistan. The Khan was given the power to collect taxes, rule through the tribal chiefs, settle intra-tribal disputes and maintain law and order. The Treaty of Mastung (effected on May 14, 1854) clearly outlined the structure of the relations between the Khan and different tribes. These administrative units were called “Nizamats” which were under the “Nazims” who were invariably from the family of the Khan. The “Nazims” were helped by “Mustawafis” and “Naibs” in collection of taxes.27

The underlying philosophy of this organizational pattern was to strengthen the tribal system and to buy the loyalties of tribes through the Sardars. But even here, those areas, which provided passage to rail, road and telegraphic poles, such as Nasirabad and Chiagi, were not included.

The British kept their army and police in these areas and did not trust the Khan or the Sardars to maintain law and order in their areas. The Khan of Kalat
was sovereign in name only. The British Resident or the AGG took almost every
decision and the Khan remained happy with his annual stipend and helped the
British whenever it was needed.28

On November 15, 1939, Lasbela was declared as a separate state and Mir
Ghulam Qadir Khan was appointed as the Jam (ruler). The rationale of separating
Las Bela from the Kalat territories was based on three considerations: 1) to curtail
the powers of the Khan of Kalat; 2) to recognize the separate status of Lasbela
ethnically and linguistically, as it was a non-Baluch area inhabited by the Sindhis;
and 3) to create a buffer zone between Sind and Baluchistan, and thus help
prevent tribal raids on the Sindhi territories.

Kharan had been a part of Kalat since a long time but, during the First
World War, this area became a center of anti-British activities. The suspected
presence of German and Turkish agents and the Iranian immigrants demanded
immediate attention. However, the British acted only after the outbreak of the
Second World War. To preempt a hostile attack as well as to safeguard the new
communication lines of the coastal areas, Kharan was separated from Kalat, and,
in July 1940, it was carved as a separate state with Nawab Habibullah Khan
Sherwani as its ruler. Makran was also separated for similar reasons.

The internal administration of all these states was left to the respective
rulers. The British interest and constant intervention nonetheless remained
supreme. Those areas, which were directly administered by the British, were
governed under those rules, which were operative in the other parts of British
India. However, in the tribal areas or those districts, which were considered
problematic, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)29 was applied, which provided
for the suppression and punishment of crime. There was no separation between
the judiciary and the executive. Baluchistan was administered like a big
cantonment where strategic interest always prevailed and it was more visible
because of the fact that the contingent of British administration consisted of
officers from the British Army. The Police and Levies executed the orders of the
district officers and the political agents. The result was that the administrative set-
up hardly left any room for political activities. Those areas, which were perceived
as "rebellious", were preoccupied by the internal feuds or wranglings over the
acquisition of grants and stipends rather than for political or social reforms. The
only institution that could be considered a kind of representative was the Quetta
Municipality, which consisted of members nominated by the AGG and acted
under his direct supervision and control.

The introduction of rail, roads, postal and telegraphic services was meant
for either facilitated the troop's movement or helped to exploit the mineral
resources of Baluchistan.

Political development usually precedes a sound system of social and
economic reforms and education. When we look at the educational institutions of
Baluchistan in this phase of the British rule, it is hardly worthy of a serious note.

Before the advent of the British in Baluchistan, the Muslim religious
scholars promoted education on traditional lines. There was no school system but
the Holy Quran, Hadith, and Persian classics like Gulistan, Bostan and Sikandar
Namah were taught. This system did not produce any trained personnel to be
inducted in the services of the state. It was simply aimed at religious instruction.\(^\text{10}\)
It must be noted that even this system was prevalent only in the Pashtoon areas
and the teachers were called "Mullahs" which was a respectable and prestigious status in the tribal society. This system offered free education. The students were not supposed to pay any fees for their education. Zakat funds and donations were used to finance these institutions. The Baluch tribal society did not have even this traditional institution except that they, too, had a "Mullah" or a "Syed" who was consulted on religious matters. This system was considered complimentary to the tribal society's social and economic needs.

With the advent of the British, the relevance of the old educational system ceased to exist. The British recruited workers, petty officials and officers for their departments, post offices and railroads from other parts of the sub-continent. But, soon, this made the local people realize the importance of the new educational system. In 1881, the first Anglo-Vernacular Middle School for boys was opened in Quetta, which was later renamed as Sir Robert Sandeman School. After eight years, Lady Sandeman established a primary school for girls in the same city. A Parsi merchant, Patel, financed the construction of the building. The same year, the Church of England started a European School at Quetta.

In 1904, the Khan of Kalat established a primary school for boys at Mastung, which was upgraded to a middle school in 1918 and to a high school in 1937. A retired sub-inspector of the police, Syed Ghulam Hussain Shah, started a school in 1912 in Makran at Shahi Tump. More primary schools followed at Panjgur, Kalat and Nasirabad between 1925 and 1926. In 1937, Turbat Primary School was elevated to the level of a middle school. Jam Mir Ghulam Qadir, the ruler of Las Bela (1921-1937), had studied at Aligarh. He established three primary schools at Bela, Uthal and Sonmiani.
There was no separate department of education even in British Baluchistan before 1920. The Head Master of the Sandeman High School, Quetta used to act as Superintendent of Education. In 1920, however, a Superintendent of Education was appointed in Quetta. "But it took eight years before the department of education conducted an examination for middle school."36

The strong co relation between education and political development is now almost universally accepted. The British did not pay any attention in this regard simply because they understood the implications of educating the people. Education was bound to create a sense of their rights and interests. The British did not want them to develop that sense, to be politically conscious and demanding. Thus, they did not encourage education. The result was that the overall situation was dismal particularly in the tribal areas and the independently governed states. Moreover, the British did not feel the need to educate these people because for most part, they had imported petty officials and clerks from other provinces to work in Baluchistan.

Another interesting feature that needs to be noted is the state of education among the Muslims and non-Muslims. Although not more than eight percent of the population of the area according to the census of 1931, the non-Muslims settled in the region after the British occupation, did much better in education.37 The Sikh community of Quetta established the Khalsa High School. The Hindu community established two schools, namely D.A.V. High School, and Sanatam Dharma High School. In comparison, there was only one Muslim High School, the Islamia High School, Quetta. The Muslim students were not even considered worthy of scholarships for higher education.38
The state of education was thus extremely poor for the ninety-two percent of the population of Baluchistan that was Muslim. The traditional mosque schools, despite the lack of official patronage, continued flourishing. In 1939-40, the total number of such mosque schools was 605, where about six thousand students were enrolled including two hundred and eighty five girl students.\(^{39}\) As far as the new school system was concerned, the situation had improved somewhat by 1947. On the eve of the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, there were 138 primary schools of which 9 were for girls. There were 16 middle schools, with 3 for girls. There were 11 high schools. One of them was for girls. In addition, there was one higher secondary school (co-education) and one teachers’ training school. Thus the territories under the British had 115 schools. The situation in the states was dismal. There were only 52 schools. In all, the province of Baluchistan had 167 schools. In 1942, the first Intermediate College was opened in Quetta, and after four years, it was raised to degree level.\(^{40}\)

If we compare these statistics with those of the earlier period, we will only see a marked increase in mosque schools. In 1919, the number of mosque schools was 199.\(^{41}\) Shortly before independence, their number had increased threefold. On the other hand, the number of government schools or privately-funded modern schools did not increase correspondingly. The result was that Baluchistan’s educational system hardly produced any leader who was well-educated in the modern sense of the term. Those who had attended some modern educational institutions had gone out of Baluchistan for the purpose.\(^{52}\)
Another indicator of educational facilities is the public access to the libraries. In British India there were sixteen Special Libraries and fifty-nine Public Libraries. However, in the areas constituting Pakistan, not a single Special Library existed. In 1947, this country inherited only three Public Libraries that is, the Punjab Public Library in Lahore, Karachi Central Library, and the Sandeman Library in Quetta. The Sandeman Library was opened in 1885. Unfortunately, this rare collection of about 14000 books was destroyed in the earthquake of 1935 and the library could not be revived.

Different scholars have debated the issue whether it was a deliberate policy of the British rulers to deny Baluchistan modern education as it was merely an oversight. After all, the British had encouraged modern education in British India. In the words of one author, in particular, "it was not merely a case of neglect but what might be called purposeful side-tracking even suppression." One analysis also suggests that the British were not interested in education at all. It did not suit them. Baluchistan was occupied and kept aloof from rest of the Sub-continent not only physically, but politically, economically and socially. Due to its strategic location, the British were more concerned with threats for neighbouring Iran, Afghanistan and Russia. Education and economic development would have definitely resulted in improving the standard of living of the people of the province. But, the British did not care. They had other priorities. In particular, they wanted to hold Baluchistan for its strategic value and importance to its empire in India. Interestingly, for instance, rather than exploiting the natural resources of the province for the good of the people, they made a special effort to
keep the mineral resources of Baluchistan less known to the outsiders, particularly Russians. Thus, discoveries of minerals remained minimal.

The establishment of various departments and agencies of government reflected the main priorities of the British administrators in Baluchistan. As discussed already, the British Baluchistan consisted of the areas directly under the British administration. Those areas which were inhabited by the tribes were handled through the political agents. These areas were divided into A and B categories, respectively. The areas designated as A were administered by Baluchistan Police Force, which came into existence in 1877. At first, three hundred trained soldiers were brought from the Punjab Frontier Force under Captain Scott by Robert Sandeman in 1876. From 1879 to 1882, this force was replaced by the Police Force with its headquarters at Quetta. With the passage of time, more areas were brought under Police administration. The number of this force also grew substantially, the numerical strength of the Police Force was quoted to be 12,127. Most of this police force was taken from the British Indian Army. In order to protect the railways, a Railway Police Force was also instituted.

The B areas were administered through the Levies. The area under direct police administration was only 2200 Square Miles and constituted four percent of the total British Baluchistan.46 The B areas that spread over 120,000 square miles were administered by 6658 Levies. The Levies were recruited from the local tribes and usually remained with the successive members of the same family. They worked under the ‘Risaldar’, but whenever their number increased, they were put under ‘Risaldar Major’. The British also established a jail system in order to punish the criminals. These jails were constructed in different areas.47
In addition to the Police and Levies, other forces in Baluchistan were the Military Scouts and the Auxiliary Scouts. In the words of Lambrick, "the idea of Baluch Levy was a misnomer, for there was not a single Baluch among them. It was mainly composed of local Pathans, about 200 of the Khyber tribe".48

The British knew that their weakness was given both in numbers and being in strange lands. They also knew that their stay and strength depended on the loyalty and support of native troops. There were constant reminders of the Government to the administrators to show an invincible face to the native people who worked for them. Charles Metcalf, for example, succinctly wrote:

We are to all appearance more powerful in India that ever were; nevertheless, our downfall may be short work the cause of this precariousness is that our power does not rest on actual strength but upon impression ... we have ceased to be wonder we were to the natives; our greatest danger is not from a Russian Army, but the fading of the impression of our invincibility from the minds of the native inhabitants of India.49

The British encouraged the Irregular Corps or another reason that their cost was much lower than the cost of Regular Cavalry. As Lambrick explained, "the men themselves found their horses, arms, clothing and equipment, which remained their private property, placed at the disposal of the state in return for pay calculated to provide for the maintenance of horse as well as rider."50 The native soldiers and policemen were kept away from their families and in constant engagements. Essentially, the policy was "the farther the men are from their homes and their comrades the more likely are they to remain obedient. The troops must be engaged if they are not required."51

After the First World War, the British recognized the threat of Communist Revolution from the Soviet Union. They now started maintaining
strong garrisons at strategic points, which were linked with a network of roads for reinforcement whenever necessary. Thus, by 1935, Quetta had emerged as the biggest cantonment not only in India but throughout the empire where 100,000 troops were stationed for immediate actions and could be reinforced with another 100,000 soldiers within ten days. A rare show of how much value the British attached to Quetta was witnessed after the 1935 earthquake when the whole city was sealed from the outside world for a year. The Royal Air Force played the same role in Baluchistan that Lufth War was going to play after five years in France.

The British Agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan had faithfully followed the Sandeman System of strengthening the tribal system with loyal Sardars, giving them stipends and light arms, and keeping an over-whelming majority of Baluch away from the benefits of education and in enforcing oppressive laws through military and police. During the First World War, they realized that, in the case of another threat to the British empire, the people of Baluchistan would not behave differently. During the First World War, Ottoman Turkey and Germany were allies against the British. Many Baluch tribes, when contacted for recruitment by the British authorities, not only refused but encouraged other tribes not to offer themselves for service in the British war effort. It was certainly due to their strong historical, cultural and religious linkages with the Middle Eastern co-religionists. While Marris and Mengals were traditionally known as anti-British, even Khetrans, who had earlier asked the British to be included in their administered areas, joined hands with the Marris and the Mengals and resisted the British attempts to raise a Baluch Army to fight
in the First World War. The presence of some Germans in Baluchistan further aggravated the situation for the British. The result was that there were widespread uprisings against the British. Raids were carried on those tribes who were not loyal to the British.

As stated earlier, General Dyer was also sent to Baluchistan and he ruthlessly suppressed anti-British elements. Contrary to the commonly held belief that the Baluch did not pay much attention to Islam, the real cause for their agitation was the fate of the Ottoman Caliph of Turkey who was fighting a losing battle against the British. As a British officer wrote to Denys Bray on December 7, 1918 from Quetta in his Fortnightly Report:

On the whole the frontier Mohammadans seem to be resigned to the prospect of great changes, though they cling to the hope that Great Britain may, with a grand gesture of forgiveness restore to Turkey the greater part of her former dominions. I have tried to impress on them, on the basis of various communiqués, which have been issued the unlikelihood of this being found possible. While I have exhorted them to have faith in the future of Islam, helped by the gifted Arab race from whom it sprang and who will now be free from the deadening control of the Turks. This reflection seems to bring a good deal of comfort to some of those to whom I have spoken. The greater number of them, however, seem to be convinced that they are about to witness according to a prophecy, that complete decline of Islam which is footed to take place before its final restoration. Then envisage the breakup of Persia and Afghanistan and say that, however much we may try to hold aloof from interference in these countries or to bolster them up, we shall find the course of events, by the decree of God, too strong for us.²⁴

The British also remained apprehensive of the fact that any threat to their empire from outside or from within India could upset the loyalties of the different ethnic groups of Baluchistan. Therefore, they were keen to appease and placate the Baluchi sentiments, especially during the world wars. It was certainly not as
James Spain claimed that "the British were humane, civilized and sympathetic to the people of Baluchistan." While the British indeed introduced some new, and, at times, useful changes in Baluchistan, they were mainly for the benefits of either the settlers who could not afford to go against the British interests or for their own strategic considerations, particularly that of facilitating the security and movement of their own troops in the region.

Amazingly, all the efforts to bring Baluchistan to a better level of administrative set-up were rejected not only by the British policy-makers but also by the Indian National Congress. So much so that when the All-India Muslim League emphasized the need to introduce political reforms in Baluchistan, Sir Olaf Caroe, then Foreign Secretary in the Government of India, stated, during the debate in the Central Legislative Assembly, that the "size of Baluchistan (population 200,000) is not more than a tehsil of the Punjab or the U.P." He was referring to only the directly administered area of Baluchistan (Quetta and adjoining areas), and was indeed catering to the interests of an extremely small minority which was not more than a bright spot in width and breadth of one of the largest areas of the British India which was engulfed in social backwardness, economic deprivation, and bad governance.

The political development of Baluchistan, therefore, has to be seen in the context of the environment marked by the absence of those elements which enlighten people, offer them opportunities for assembly, for expression, and for widening their contacts with the other parts of the region. These factors were further complicated because of the settlements of scattered population, isolated like islands, by the intervening areas of the British presence.
In the end, the administrative system introduced by the British did not prove to be a blessing for the local people of Baluchistan. Before the advent of the British, Baluchistan had its own "Jirga" and "Panchayat" System, which, if not so useful and dynamic, at least provided intervention of the elderly and respected people in settling the disputes. The British retained this system but deprived the "Jirga" of its ameliorating influence because they started nominating tribal leaders of their choice to this institution.

Moreover, Jirgas were brought under the supervision of the Political Agent who had more powers than even the Deputy Commissioner of the regular districts of the British India. The AGG had ultimate powers and his advice was almost binding even on the Governor General without his approval the Khan of Kalat who had been given the status of an independent sovereign could not leave Baluchistan. In fact, the AGG was an autocrat with all judicial, executive, legislative, and financial powers over Baluchistan. His pleasure could open the door of opportunity and prosperity. His anger and his wrath could destroy the Khan or Sardar or even the whole community. He made sure that everybody knew who was the real ruler of Baluchistan. Most of the Sardars were not as loyal to the Khan as they were to the AGG and, in order to please him, they would go even against the normal etiquettes of dignity and self-respect.⁵⁷

Before we conclude our discussion, it will be appropriate to note two events that had lasting impact on the British approach towards the political development in Baluchistan. The first was the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 which instantly revived centuries old Baluch contacts with Central Asia. The Bolshevik propaganda was effective and it was further strengthened when some
people from Baluchistan visited the Soviet Union and came back to share and promote their sentiments with their fellow countrymen. Lenin's philosophy was to disseminate communist literature in different languages of the Sub-continent. The Baluch and the Pashtoons of Baluchistan came under the spell of this literature produced in their own languages. Most of this activity was done through Afghanistan (after the 1920 Afghan Revolution with King Amanullah in power) and through Iranian Baluchistan via Makran.

The second event was the earthquake of 1935, which resulted in the complete destruction of the Quetta city. The strange feature of this earthquake was that the cantonment area did not receive any tremor. The city, however, lost more than three-fourth of its population. The British sealed the city for one year, and after the reconstruction, they made sure that only loyal people should be settled in the city. Indeed, the political situation in Quetta took a new turn and we do not see much resistance during the Second World War. Still, the British remained watchful and apprehensive. Even those feature films, which were allowed to be shown in other parts of India and the popular literature such as newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets, which were in circulation throughout the sub-continent, were not allowed in Baluchistan, if the contents were considered "dangerous" for the British interests in the province. The British were keen to isolate this province from all possible sources of information that could create problems. Even people coming from other parts of British India into Baluchistan were searched at railway stations and other places of entry for any 'subversive' material in their possession. Under such circumstances, if there was any political party on the scene or there was any newspaper circulating in Baluchistan, it was
entirely because of the courage and deep-seated aversion and hostility among the Baluch for colonialism that made it possible.

To sum up, it will be fair to conclude that the people of Baluchistan remained under tight control of administrative bureaucracy headed by the AGG and Political Agents. The Khan and the Sardars were kept under control, with most of their powers increasingly curtailed. The British did not encourage education, economic, development or any other political participation of the people. The political development in Baluchistan, therefore, was not as promising as that of their counterparts in other provinces of the British India. Things would change eventually with the adoption of Act of 1935, the outbreak of the Second World War, and the activities of the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League demanding self-government and freedom for India. The next chapter will concentrate upon the response of the people of Baluchistan through their political parties and leaders to these significant developments.
Notes


2 The Close Border Policy or Stationary Policy was to follow the principle of “Masterly Inactivity”. Border was closely guarded, to keep raids to the minimum. Forts were built along the administrative boundary and were connected with each other by a military road and finally river Indus was declared as a borderline. The policy was followed for about 30 years, i.e. 1849-1879.

3 The Forward Policy recommended “Westward advance across the river Indus”. It was declared as “human, sympathetic and civilizing”. Buller, *Baluchistan*, p.16.

4 The Sindh System, Thornton dubs the Sindh Frontier System as “uncompromising militarism”. Thornton, *Sandeman*, p. 40. Thornton further notes: “For the preservation of peace upon the border, the Sindh authorities depended more upon military measures of protection and repression than upon conciliatory treatment of tribes”. Ibid. p. 31 The System was followed from 1843–1875.

5 The system of border defence maintained by the Punjab Government was not purely military, but partly military, partly political and conciliatory. Thornton, *Sandeman*, p.17. This system was less expensive, only one third of the Sindh System. The main proponents of the Sindh System were: Major John Jacob, Gen. Green, Henry Rawlinson, Col. Merewether, Fiore, and G.Birdwood. The Punjab System was led by Sir John Lawrence, Herbert Stewart, Henry Lumsden, Robert Sandeman, Lord Lytton, and Issac Bruce.


7 L/P&S/12/3174-NWFP Reforms, Memorandum.

8 Ibid. See also Noris, *The Afghan War*, p. 2.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

13 Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Baluchistan, its Strategic Importance (Karachi, 1992), p. 51.

14 Ibid., pp. 51–52.


17 Hetu Ram, Tarikh-i-Baluchistan (Lahore, 1970), p. 572.


19 Ibid., p.135.


21 Ibid.

22 Baluch, Greater Baluchistan, pp. 53–54.

23 Ibid., p. 3.


25 Baluch, Greater Baluchistan, p. 54.


27 Ibid., p.71.

28 Ibid.

29 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism (Karachi, 1999), p. 40. It provided for powers of courts and officers, the civil references to a Jirga appointed by the government; penalties in shape of fines on communities and tribes, with powers of demolition of properties used by anti-state elements; power to arrest and imprisonment; and no right to
appeal except a restricted power of civil or criminal revision by the Chief Commissioner.


31 Ibid.


34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., pp.74-75.


37 *The First Administration Report*, p. 98.


41 Ibid., p. 75.

42 Ibid.

43 However, it existed separately till 1979 when the writer containing certain rare publications, journals and few manuscripts pertaining to 19th and 20th century history of Baluchistan consulted it. But later on the building was acquired for other purposes and the precious historical material was dumped into a room in the Municipal Library, Quetta.


45 Ibid., p. 34.

46 Ibid., pp. 274-275.


48 Ibid., p. 20.


53 Ibid., p.13.

54 Denys Bray C.I.E. Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and Political Department, Delhi, *Fortnightly Report*, December 7, 1918.


57 AGG's Chariot pulling event.
CHAPTER 4

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The political consciousness in Baluchistan can be traced to the educational and social movements in the other parts of India, particularly through the Aligarh movement. This movement emphasized the need for social and educational uplift of the Muslims. In 1879, The Majlis-i-Islamia Hanafia Ahle Hind-o-Punjab was established at Quetta. Subsequently, it was renamed as Anjuman-i-Islamia Baluchistan. Its primary objective was "to train the Muslims in politics and ethics". It started its activities by administering a mosque and an attached Madrassah. However, soon, the Anjuman-i-Islamia launched a political program and actively participated in the selection of Muslim members of the Quetta Municipality. Ultimately, it emerged as a non-Baluch political organization consisting mostly of non-Baluch settlers and the Pashtoons of Quetta.

Whereas educational institutions under the Anjuman inculcated the spirit of acquiring knowledge, this new urge to receive education also brought the residents of Quetta and other settled areas in contact with the political and educational organizations in the neighboring areas of Baluchistan. The Pan-Islamism of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, the Balkan Wars, and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, provided enough fuel to the few educated to relate their own plight with the rhetoric of revolt against the oppressors all over the world. The British already knew the presence of Baluch tribes in Merv (in the Soviet Union) and their possible impact on British Baluchistan.
After the Bolshevik Revolution (1917), the British Military Reports confirmed that the majority of the Baluch in Iran were under the influence of communism. These apprehensions were further confirmed by the reports of Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, then a British Army Officer. In his autobiographical account, Ahmed Yar Khan noted: “In my report submitted in 1927, I reported that from Iran, Afghanistan, and Chagi, the Baluch people go to the Soviet areas in Merv and Ashakabad and send reports of economic prosperity in the Soviet Russia to their countrymen”.3 He estimated that about 200,000 Baluch had migrated to the two Soviet towns.4 In addition, in his report of 1928, King Amanullah Khan, ruler of Afghanistan, who received Soviet aid, was perceived as the spokesman of “Pashtoon Nationalism”. He pointed out, that if the Afghan ruler was allowed to keep his links and continue with his activities, the British position in India would be weakened, and, within next few years, Baluchistan and North-Western Frontier Province would come under the occupation of the Soviet Union.5

In another revealing statement, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan emphasized that the Baluch nationalists were in favour of a Soviet, “Forward Policy” as this would help them avenge the British atrocities in their area. In fact, he confided: “Even my father, Mir Azam Jan, Nawab Mehrullah Khan Marri and their companions were also supporters of this idea”.6

Such intelligence reports had alarmed the British to an extent that even muffled opposition against their rule prompted them to take strong action. One instance was their treatment of Mir Yousuf Aziz Magsi who was educated in Multan and Lahore and who had come under the influence of the freedom fighters of India. He was a well-known figure in Baluchistan.7 His lyrics and other writings
were aimed at inculcating spirit of nationalism and communism. In November 1929, he wrote an article entitled, “Cry of Baluchistan” in the Musawat of Lahore. It invoked the Baluch self-respect and dignity against the British rulers. In June 1930, he was put under house arrest for a year and was also fined rupees 12, 900.8

The Young Baluch (Ajuman)

Prior to the Magsi’s coming into prominence, Abdul Aziz Kurd, son of a civil servant of the Kalat State, had initiated a political movement in Baluchistan called ‘the Young Baluch’ (Anjuman-i-Naujawan-i-Baluch). The members were asked to pledge loyalty on the Muslim holy book, the Quran. The founding members resolved to restore dignity among the Baluch people, to eliminate bribery, corruption, and to promote honesty and fair play in every-day life. In 1926, the party was launched at Abdul Aziz Kurd’s Mastung residence.9

The Young Baluch party approached Mir Yousuf Aziz Magsi while he was still in captivity. On his release in July 1931, the party renamed itself as “Anjuman-i-Ittehad-i-Baluchan-wa-Baluchistan,”10 (Anjuman hereafter). It was the first political organization in the Khanate of Kalat. The aim of the Anjuman was to work for a united and independent Baluchistan as well as to demand reforms in the state. In 1931, the demand for constitutional reforms was put forward.11 The same year, the Anjuman also demanded the removal of Sir Shams Shah from the premiership of Kalat. His non-Baluch origin and loyalty to the British were the main issues. In addition, the Anjuman saw the prime minister as the stumbling block against any meaningful reforms. Many Sardars, who were sidelined and unhappy with the prime minister, supported the Anjuman. The Anjuman also wanted the Khan to be replaced by Prince Mohammad Azam Jan who was under
house arrest. He was in contact with the party through one of its prominent members, Dr. Mir Faiz Mohammad Khan Shahwani.¹²

During this period, a pamphlet written by Aziz Kurd on November 20, 1931, entitled, "Shams Gardi" caught the attention of the educated Baluch, as it enumerated the misdeeds of Sir Shams Shah. Soon a serious effort for his removal was initiated throughout Baluchistan. Jhal Magsi emerged as the center of this effort. Following the pattern of the contemporary Hijrat Movement in the other parts of the British India, Magsi encouraged his people to undertake Hijrat (migration) to other provinces of the Sub-continent. The result was that about 40,000 Baluch Magsis migrated to Sind and the Punjab. A strong delegation comprising of 100 notables was also sent to the Viceroy in order to present their demands.¹³

The Anjuman's tactics were so effective that its efforts eventually assumed the character of a popular movement and indeed attracted many influential people to its cause led by Yousuf Aziz Magsi and Abdul Aziz Kurd, the movement was joined by people like Mohammad Hussain Anqa, a prominent writer and Nawabzada Mir Shahbaz Khan, a respected tribal chief. Many Baluch tribes such as the Bugti, Mengal, Raisani, Rind, and Rustam Zai lent their support to the movement. Some of these tribes even revolted against their Sardars who were supporters of the prime minister, Shams Shah, and the British authorities.¹⁴ Sardar Rasul Bakhsh Zankzai, Chief of Jhalawan was at head of the main supporter of the prime minister.¹⁵ Ultimately, the British gave in, and the Council of Sardars installed Prince Azam Jan as the Khan of Kalat on December 10, 1931.¹⁶ Price Azam Jan replaced Shams Shah with Khan Bahadur Gul Mohammad Khan and
invited Mir Yousuf Aziz Magsi, President of the Anjuman, for deliberations. However, once again, the Sardars prevailed upon the Khan not to endorse Magsi's proposed reforms. They did not want to disturb the tribal system. Magsi himself was apprehensive and suspicious of the designs of the new Khan. In a letter to Mohammad Amin Khoso, on December 18, 1931, he wrote: "the present Khan has invited me to put our demands before him. I am afraid that I will be arrested there but come what may, I have to go".  

The meeting was held on December 22, 1931, but it ended in failure, and the new Khan warned the General Secretary of the Anjuman, Aziz Kurd, that the activities of the Anjuman were objectionable and could not be tolerated any more. Obviously, the Khan supported the Anjuman so long as it was aimed at bringing him to power. He reckoned the tribal system to be more important for his survival than the reform package demanded by the Anjuman. The British were also at his back. They were apprehensive of the pretensions of the movement. The British Viceroy Lord Willingdon, attended the coronation of Mir Mohammad Azam Jan on April 26, 1932, and promised him all help and guidance in discharge of his duties.

It needs to be pointed out here that Magsi considered the Sardari system more dangerous to the uplift of Baluchistan than any other single factor. When he was given the title of Nawabzada at Delhi, he "protested" in a letter to his friend, Muhammad Amin Khoso, in these words:

It has hurt my soul as to why the title of Nawabzada has been added as a scar to my name ... The first thing in the morning I did was that I brought a craftsman and asked him to cleanse the title of Nawabzada from my travelling kits. Even the word Magsi was
removed. If you ask me I like only two words, the Muslims and Baluch and more superior to these two is human.\textsuperscript{20}

In another note, he added: “titles like ‘Maulana’ and ‘Leader’ have ruined our youth and their aspirations.”\textsuperscript{21}

Magsi’s basic goal was to introduce reforms and true Islamic teachings through the Anjuman. He wanted to establish “Hezbollah” (Party of God) in order to disseminate the true teachings of Islam. In a letter to Amin Khoso on May 21, 1932, he wrote: “The British alone are not responsible for our backwardness. Those who abuse religion (for political purposes) are responsible.”\textsuperscript{22} He wanted his organization to be situated in Jacobabad and the adjoining areas of the Punjab to avoid the manipulations and control of the Baluchistan government.

Magsi is often presented as a communist because he was opposed to the feudal (tribal) system but in view of his poetry in which love for Islam and a dynamic economic system is eulogized, this appellation does not seem to truly reflect his philosophy. Apparently, most of the Muslim intellectuals were inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution but, in reality, only its economic dimension and social equality moved them. As a matter of fact, these ideas reminded the Baluch of the dynamics of Islam’s social and economic system. Magsi’s view could be summarized as one of “unity of the Baluch, radical (economic and social) system and educating the masses in the true spirit of Islam.”\textsuperscript{23}

During this period, we witness an amazing concern for the social uplift of the people of Baluchistan from the platform of the Anjuman. Waja Mir Ghulam Sarwar Khan, Secretary of the Jacobabad Anjuman branch, appealed to the local Baluch to celebrate the “Baluchistan Day” on September 30, 1932. The idea was
to popularize Magsi’s appeal for reforms in Baluchistan. He condemned the ignorance of the Indian people about the backwardness of Baluchistan. He stated that, in respect of education, politics and economy, Baluchistan was a land of the illiterates where humans were treated like animals. He appealed to the Indian Muslim leaders that they should not forget the plight of their Muslim brethren of Baluchistan.

When the British Government introduced political reforms in other parts of India, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd issued a statement in the Zamindar, Lahore; on September 13, 1932 in which he demanded that he wanted to see in Baluchistan a truly Islamic constitutional Government, which would be free from the twin yoke of the British and the Hindu domination. However, it is ironic that the idea of independent Baluchistan was not welcomed by the newspapers like the Muslim Outlook, which called it “the British Imperialistic design”, and the Zamindar also advised Aziz Kurd to establish a Muslim United Front, (Muslim Mutihida Mahaz), against the Hindu bureaucracy of Baluchistan. However, Kurd insisted, “I cannot like the fact that Baluchistan remains under the slavery of the Hindus, I am also opposed to my country wearing the enslaving chains of the colonizing Europeans.” Although the Punjab Muslim press opposed the idea of independent Baluchistan, Baluch nationalist leaders such as Yousuf Magsi and Sardar Jamal Khan Leghari, fully supported Aziz Kurd and his call for independence.

The Baluch Conferences

On October 20, 1932, some prominent leaders of Anjuman, Yousuf Aziz Magasi, Sardar Jamal Leghari, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani and Sardar Ghulam Rasul Khan Kurai issued a joint statement regarding the forthcoming
Jacobabad Baluch Conference. “The aim of the Conference”, they pointed out, “is to organize ourselves by establishing bonds of unity and alliance, otherwise, this will result in our lagging behind all other nations. Our objectives are unity of Baluch, compulsory education, protection of rights, religious education and constitutional reforms.”  

Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, editor of the Zamindar, was invited to inaugurate the conference. He could not participate but sent his son, Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan, to represent him with a novel idea, which, *inter alia*, not only “proposed” that constitutional reforms must be introduced in Baluchistan but also suggested that, “Baluchistan and the Frontier Province should be united under states of Peshawar and Baluchistan.”  

Of course, these ideas were very controversial and did not suit the Baluch especially.

About two hundred delegates representing various tribal and ethnic groups of Baluchistan attended the Conference held from December 27 to December 29, 1932. A strong contingent of Iranian Baluch nationalists, led by Nigarish Saeedi Baluch, also participated which reflected its international call. Mir Ali Nawaz Khan Talpur, ruler of the Khairpur State, Sind, inaugurated the Conference on December 27, 1932. In his Presidential address, Talpur asked the Baluch, “to stay away from imitative politics which ends in the destruction of the nations”. He also condemned the extra-constitutional and agitational politics and policies of the Indian National Congress and held them dangerous for the Muslims and the Baluch.

The Conference demanded an improvement in the educational institutions of Baluchistan including facilities for women. Its other demands and objectives were:
1. Improve the economic, educational and political conditions of the inhabitants of Baluchistan and of the other Baluch residents of India and to produce among them feeling of cooperation, unity and brotherhood;

2. Constitutional reforms in Baluchistan on the pattern of the other provinces;

3. Provide women equal opportunities in education and to give them the same rights as conferred on them by Shariat with regard to marriage, divorce, and in inheritance of property;

4. Ban the 'Lab' and 'Valiver' system. (Dowry related head price of a bride);

5. Urge the government to prohibit and limit the sale of alcoholic drinks and to close down brothels in Baluchistan;

6. Publish the Customary Laws in a book form and to request for the appointment of committees to edit the same in the light of the Muhammadan Law. (The members of these committees were to be people well versed in Shariat Laws);

7. Open recruitment of Baluch and other inhabitants of Baluchistan in Baluch Regiments;

8. Increase the number of hospitals;

9. Open ginning, canning and wooden mills in Baluchistan;

10. Open a Degree College in Baluchistan from the next year and to make primary education compulsory;

11. Provide service for bona-fide natives in proportion to their population; and

12. Grant educational scholarships to the sons of the poor and not the sons of Sardars only.33

The Conference rejected the border agreements between the British Government and Iran. It also condemned the British policy of dividing Baluchistan between the AGG and the Khan and voiced resentment against the censorship imposed by the British.34 In a separate resolution, the Conference appreciated the efforts of Mir Mohammad Azam Jan the ruler of Kalat, and commended him for good governance.35 This seemed to be more of a courtesy than a genuine estimate of his rule.

Many of these demands, particularly related to female education and introduction of a constitutional set up, were indeed radical in the context of the prevailing Sardari system, which was a source of strength not only for the British
and the Khan but also for the Sardars. As we shall see, subsequently, this led to a rift between those who wanted to change the socio-economic patterns of the Baluch society and those who wanted to use such political platforms for their own narrow, sectioned interests. Equally disturbing was the address of Talpur who had advised them not to indulge in agitational politics. Many radicals saw in his speech a pro-British stance. Some argued that agitational policies, if not supported by corresponding social consciousness, were bound to end in disaster. In many ways, the First Baluch Conference represented the social and political awakening of the Baluch people.

On May 1, 1933, the Conference submitted a memorandum regarding the proposed reforms in Baluchistan to the British Parliament, including the House of Commons. However, the House of Lords did not agree to these reforms, particularly concerning the consideration of Baluchistan at par with other provinces of British India, because of its special strategic, ethnic, and constitutional position.36

The first session of the Conference was convened largely because of the efforts of Nawab Yousuf Magsi. Its proceedings and demands, despite Talpur's pro-British speech, were not liked by the British administrators. Thus, when the Second Conference was convened in Hyderabad (Sindh) in December 1933, Nawab Magsi was asked by the authorities to stay away. In fact, he was threatened with dire consequences in case he participated in the Conference. However, these threats did not prevent Magsi from attending and actively participating in the conference. He tendered his resignation from Nawabship and went on to participate in the Conference. The Second Conference supported the resolutions
of the previous one. It further demanded the establishment of a constitutional government in Baluchistan.\textsuperscript{37}

The Second Baluch Conference coincided with another development, which had long-range impact on political development in Baluchistan. Mir Azam Jan died in September 1933 and his son Mir Ahmad Yar Khan became the Khan of Kalat on September 20, 1933.\textsuperscript{38} The new Khan was perceived to be a supporter of the Anjuman. Thus, his accession gave the impression that the Anjuman’s mission for the independence for Baluchistan would be achieved. However, the fact of the matter was that the new Khan had been an employee of the British and he was the one who used to send reports to the British about the pro-Soviet Baluch and the Pashtoon activists working in concert with King Amanullah of Afghanistan. Furthermore, he had been Personal Assistant to the AGG for more than a year. Afterwards, he was transferred to active military service on his own request.\textsuperscript{39}

In the wake of this development, the British became all the more apprehensive of the activities of Yousuf Magusi. As already stated, he was discouraged from attending the Baluch Conference. The AGG, Sir Norman Cater, summoned him to Quetta. The Assistant Political Agent, Wakefield, who was present in the meeting, recorded their conversation as follows: “You are young and you have not been wise in the selection of your friends. I advise you to leave Baluchistan for a year. You should go to Europe and witness developments there.”

Magusi resisted. He did not want to leave his homeland. But the AGG gave him no other option. After discussing the matter with his associates, Magusi decided to
go. Was it an exile or his own decision to leave Baluchistan? As we shall see later, he opted for it against his will.

The Khan of Kalat was equally keen to get rid of Magsi. He invited him to Dhadar to participate in a meeting of the State Council, of which he was a member because of being a Sardar of the Magsis. The Khan advised him to go to England for a year in order to negotiate favourable sanctions for him from the British authorities. In fact, as indicated earlier, this trip was planned by the AGG and the Political Agent at Sibi. At such a crucial moment, when the Anjuman needed his services in Baluchistan, Magsi was forced to leave the scene. Magsi left for Bombay where he is reported to have visited Muhammad Ali Jinnah's residence before going on his exile in February 1934. In a letter to Mohammad Hussain Anqa, on March 25, 1934, he wrote a farewell message to the people of Baluchistan wherein he publicly stated: "Against my will I am going to Europe. I am conscious of your feelings in my absence." Quoting verses from Ghalib (famous Urdu/Persian poet), he lamented that "though occupied by the harshness and repression of the time, never my thoughts were isolated from you".

In the meanwhile, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, Secretary General of the Anjuman remained actively involved in a campaign to mobilize the people of Baluchistan against the British rule designs and the Sardari System. He wrote a serious of articles in a Lahore-based newspaper, Azad, to press his viewpoint. The Punjab Muslim press was very encouraging and supportive of his campaign. The main objectives of the campaign were:

1. To establish an assembly of elected representatives in the Kalat State.
2. The Leased areas of Bolan, Quetta, Naushki and Nasirabad should be included back in the Kalat State from the British occupation.

3. Lasbela, Marri, and Bugti tribal areas being component parts of the Kalat State should be given to the State.\textsuperscript{45}

This open and harsh criticism of the British policies and priorities was not acceptable to the authorities. Consequently, the AGG advised the Khan of Kalat to arrest Aziz Kurd. The Khan, having a soft corner in his heart for the Baluch nationalist, was reluctant to do so. He told the AGG that, Kurd, being a resident of the tribal areas, did not come under his jurisdiction. The Assistant Political Agent, Wakefield, was of the same view. Still, since the AGG was bent upon arresting Kurd, he ordered the Political Agent to arrest him. He was arrested in January 1934. Shahi Jirga, at Sibi, sentenced him to 3 years Rigorous Imprisonment. Kurd was put in the Machh Jail.\textsuperscript{46}

However, Aziz Kurd did not submit to the hostile and changed situation. Keeping his morale high, he continued to motivate and inspire his followers from the jail. In fact, he exhorted them:

You always remember this fact that the British had neither purchased your land nor won it by sword. Therefore, they are neither your masters nor you are their slaves. The British had temporarily established their rule through trade sanctions and treaties. These circumstances should inspire you to determine your rightful position.\textsuperscript{47}

Reference to another contemporary political figure, Abdul Samad Achakzai, is also noteworthy at this point. Achakzai was one of the prominent Pashtoon leaders, who was influenced by the political situation and had become active at the tender age of 15 years. He led a procession of school boys of Gulistan, his home town, in support of the Khilafat Movement launched in 1919
in support of the Ottoman Caliph. Religious and ethnic sentiments may offer some of the explanation behind his anti-British activities. However, he was equally inspired by the developments in Afghanistan. The Third Afghan War and King Amanullah’s revolution had a very deep impact on the contiguous areas of Baluchistan in general and on the Pashtoon belt in particular. In fact, according to his biographer, Achakzai was arrested for his anti-British activities and was kept in the police custody for 29 day at that time. In 1928, when King Amanullah was leaving for a visit to Europe, he passed through Chaman and Quetta. Achakzai was among the people who welcomed him at Quetta.

The dethronement of King Amanullah in 1929 severely demoralized the Pashtoons of the British India. This event also coincided with the passage of the Nehru Report of 1928 and formulation of Jinnah’s famous ‘Fourteen Points’ of 1929. These developments further charged the political atmosphere of Baluchistan. Samad Achakzai was deeply moved. In December 1929, he went to Lahore to attend a meeting of the Indian National Congress along with two of his close associates, Mohammad Qahir Khan and Abdullah Khan. His weeklong stay at Lahore helped him make up his mind as to his future role in politics. Upon his return to Baluchistan, he immediately started congregational Friday prayers in his hometown and also started political activities. Achakzai’s political agenda was similar to that of the Anjuman-i-Watan. He wanted to promote a modern educational system, an Islamic way of life, and a representative system of government in Baluchistan. He firmly believed in expression of truth in every walk of life. Soon, Achakzai, along with his brother, Abdul Salam Achakzai, and other associates, was arrested. To press the British Government for his
release, his tribesmen took a British officer and an English lady as hostages. This led to a trial by Jirga, which imprisoned Achakzai and his party associates.50

In the post-1928 period, Jinnah, "The Ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity" was forced into "the parting of the ways" with a heavy heart. Now his ideal of Hindu-Muslim Unity was replaced by "Muslim Unity." He asked the British Government to convene of a Round Table Conference in London to solve the worsening constitutional and communal problems of India. The Indian National Congress was not interested in this Conference. In fact, to press their demands for the independence of India, the Congress decided to launch a countrywide "non-cooperation" movement. Consequently, anti-government elements were put behind bars. Abdul Samad Achakzai was also one of the detainees in Baluchistan. The conclusion of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact on March 5, 1931, witnessed the end of the British-Congress tussle. It was only after the release of the Congress detainees that Gandhi proceeded to London to participate in the Second Round Table Conference. Samad Achakzai still waited for his release until Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, the editor of Zamindar made an issue of it in his newspaper. After his release, Achakzai decided to proceed to London, which had been turned into a centre of political activity for Indians of all hues and shades. On his way to England, Samad Achakzai met Gandhi at Bombay. This meeting resulted in a lifelong influence on his person. The cruise to London further cemented their bonds. At London, however, he also met Jinnah, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and many other important political leaders from India. Achakzai wrote a booklet on Baluchistan. This was translated into English by Piaray Lal, Gandhi's Personal Secretary. After
getting it published, about 500 copies of this booklet were distributed among the
delegates of the Round Table Conference and other officials. 51

Upon his return to Baluchistan, Achakzai contacted different Baluch
nationalist leaders such as Abdul Aziz Kurd and Yousaf Ali Magsi who were
already active against the British and the Sardars. They had planned an All India
Baluch Conference at Multan in 1932, a purely Baluch gathering. Achakzai
prevailed upon them to invite the Pashtoons too, and thus hold a united moot of
the Pashtoons and Baluch. 52 In view of this suggestion, the First Baluch
Conference was entitled "the Conference of All India Baluch and Baluchistan".
Achakzai presided the conference. 53

Next year, Achakzai attended the Delhi Joint meeting of the All-India
Muslim League and the Muslim Conference at the persuasion of Maulana Shafi
Dawoodi of Bihar and Syed Murtaza Bahadur. He was also made the member of
Executive committee of the Muslim Conference.54 The same year, after attending
the Second Baluch Conference held at Hyderabad in December 1933, Achakzai
proceeded to Karachi along with Yousuf Ali Magsi to discuss the political
problems of Baluchistan with Sindhi politicians. Achakzai and Abdullah Haroon
jointly addressed a political meeting. Achakzai criticized the government for its
heavy-handedness and arbitrary rule in Baluchistan. Upon his return to
Baluchistan, Achakzai was arrested at Quetta on January 29, 1934, under the
Frontier Crimes Regulations. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment. He
was sent to Machh Jail where Abdul Aziz Kurd was already detained. 55
Like Kurd, and largely in the same tone, Achakzai exhorted his followers to rise against the British. He insisted that there was no other way out. For instance, in one of his letter from jail, in February 1934, he wrote:

He always thought that the British are wrong but not foolish and they understand that suppression always leads to more resistance. But I was wrong. I understand that our movement is not well organized and widespread but if the Government continues repressive policies, my fellow countrymen will be awakened from their slumber, would give up the comfort of their homes and join the sons of the soil in guarding their interest.56

More than once Achakzai was tempted by the British to accept an office of authority, pursuing the policy of “give a rebel an office”. First, he was offered the Sardarship of his Achakzai tribe but he declined by saying that he was the son of a poor widow of Gulistan and did not want to become a Sardar. Secondly, in 1937, he was offered to become the Extra-Assistant Commissioner of Chaman, but he rejected the offer saying that he wanted to continue with the mission of freedom for his homeland.57

As discussed earlier, Aziz Magsi had gone into self-imposed exile in England for one year. During his stay, he learnt about the way democracy worked and how the leaders pursued and promoted democratic ideals. In a letter to the editor of the Young Baluchistan, he gave vent to his feelings in these words:

Public meetings, demonstrations political organizations and newspapers are the pillars of democracy. The British imperialism on the contrary discourages these things and imprisons those who ask for their rights. From the Darbar of Sibi, Commandments are issued that a few instigators are trying to cause ripple in the calm waters of Baluchistan. Such manifestation of absolute power leaves no other option for us but to hoist the flag of independent Baluchistan in those frontier regions of Baluchistan, which McMahon had given to Afghanistan. Reviving the historical legacy of the Baluch people, they should invade the British with a Baluch army.58
Magnsi returned to India on January 31, 1935. He visited Jinnah before returning to Baluchistan.\(^5^9\)

It is pertinent to point out that the Anjumman was divided into two ideological camps. The "left wing" led by Aziz Kurd, Magsi and Achakzai, whereas the "right wing" including people such as Mir Banday Ali Talpur and Nawab Mushtaq Gurmani who were commonly perceived as pro-British leaders. This ideological split finally led to the formation of Kalat State National Party by the leftist progressive group in 1937. Magsi wanted to pre-empt this split by reorganizing the party. But due to his tragic death in May 1935 in the Quetta earthquake, his efforts remained incomplete, and thus the split became inevitable.

In evaluating the contribution of Aziz Magsi, it will be fair to say that he was the first torch of political consciousness in Baluchistan. Enormous strength of resistance, an uncanny knack for organization, and an imaginative leadership were some of traits, which impressed the people most. His writings, his verses, his speeches, and his sincere efforts to bring the Baluch together, still provide an interesting chapter of the freedom struggle in an otherwise dull, depressing, and despotic period. He donated half of his property for the cause of Islam, particularly for those areas where public welfare was needed.\(^6^0\)

The Anjumman did not survive long after the death of Aziz Magsi. His death created a major vacuum. However, due to the activities of the Baluch and Pashtoon leaders such as Aziz Kurd, and Abdul Samad Achakzai, Baluchistan and its people were no longer isolated from the Indian politics. These leaders had established contacts with the political parties at the all-India level. The All-India Muslim Conference had, in fact, passed resolutions for the release of Samad
Achakzai. Therefore, as we shall see in the next chapter, influences and inspirations from these national parties dominated the political scene of Baluchistan during the next decade.
Notes


2 Justice Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijrani Marri Baluch, The Baluchis through Centuries (Quetta, 1963), p. 44.

3 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, Tarikh-i-Khawanin-i-Baluch (n.d.), p. 68.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, Inside Baluchistan (Karachi, 1975), pp. 112-114.

7 Baluchi Dunya, May 1971. p. 35.

8 Mir Gul Khan Naseer narrates that this article was published on November 17, 1929 in the weekly Hamdard of Lahore. This was Yousuf MagSI's first writing aimed to arouse the Baluch nation. Mir Gul Khan Naseer, Tarikh-i-Baluchistan, Vol. II (Quetta, 1979), pp. 404-405.

9 Baluchi Dunya, June 1968, p. 28.


14 Baluch, Greater Baluchistan, pp. 149-50.


18 Ibid., p. 423.

19 Baluchi Dunya, May 1971, p. 43.

21 Ibid., p. 119.

22 *Naukin Daur*, June 8, 1965.

23 *Zamindar*, September 20, 1932.

24 Ibid., September 13, 1932.

25 Ibid., September 18, 1932.

26 Ibid., September 28, 1932.

27 Ibid., October 18, 1932.

28 Ibid., October 22, 1932.

29 Ibid., December 29, 1932. The venue of the Conference was Jacobabad. Such a gathering was not possible in the confines of Baluchistan. Therefore, the organizers chose a border town.

30 Ibid., December 29, 1932.

31 Inamul Haq Kausar, *Pakistan Movement and Baluchistan* (Quetta, 1999), pp.16-18.

32 Ibid.


36 *Young Baluchistan*, January 15, 1934.


40 Ibid., p. 32.
41 Inamul Haq Kausar, _Baluchistan Main Urdu_ (Lahore, 1968), pp.121 – 122.


43 Ibid., p. 122.


45 _Baluchi Dunya_, May, 1971, p. 34.


47 Abdul Ghani Ghano, _Baba-i-Pashtoon Wa Pashtoon Khawa_, Vol. III. (Quetta, 1990), pp. 21-22.

48 Ibid., p. 23.

49 Ibid., p. 21.

50 Pakhtoon Khawa Students Organization, _Khan-i-Shaheed Number_ (Quetta, 1985), p. 34.

51 Ibid., p.39.


53 Ibid., p.58.


55 _Baluchi Dunya_, May, 1971, p. 36.

56 Sher Ali Bacha, _Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai an Independence Soldier_ (Quetta, n.d.), p. 3.

57 _Meezan_, June 1, 1951.

58 _Baluchi Dunya_, May 1971, p. 38.

residence. He had met him several times before, and had discussed with him the conditions in Baluchistan. Nawab Yusuf had earlier visited England in February 1934 to present the Baluchistan case for reforms.

60 Baluchi Dunya, May 1971, p. 41.
CHAPTER 5

THE PARTY POLITICS IN BALUCHISTAN

1. The Anjuman-i-Ittehad-i-Baluchan wa Baluchistan

The Anjuman-i-Ittehad-i-Baluchan wa Baluchistan could not survive the death of Yusuf Aziz Magsi. Moreover, those political leaders who wanted to introduce radical socio-economic reforms failed to find any common ground with the Sardars whom they considered the symbols of the old system. They felt that the Sardars simply wanted to exploit the political platform of the Anjuman without having much to do with its reform agenda. Yusuf Aziz Magsi was also aware of these political considerations, but nonetheless, he had found the presence of the Sardars useful, especially in the formative phase of the party. With his death, the Anjuman lost a pragmatic leader.

The radical wing of the Anjuman met at Sibi on February 5, 1937, renamed the party as Kalat State National Party¹ (hereafter cited as the National Party), and vowed to seek support among all sections of the Kalat state. Because of this 'nationalistic' outlook, the party attracted the Baluch intelligentsia, particularly the employees of the Kalat State. Some of them also financially supported the party. The party also became quite popular with the Baluch masses. But, in the state of Kalat, the Sardars and the British officials opposed the party. They jointly made efforts to obstruct its efforts to establish an independent Baluchistan.² However, because of the continuous and consistent efforts of the party, some internal reforms were implemented nonetheless, with the help of the Khan.
The Khan’s policy was to appease as many political groups and parties as possible, either through open or secret alliances. He had a good rapport with the radicals and was equally friendly with the pro-British and other conservative elements. In 1938, the National Party conferred the title of “Khan-i-Moazzam” on the Khan of Kalat for his services to the party. In turn, the Khan offered ministry to Abdul Aziz Kurd, the leader of the party. Thus, began a new relationship between the two. However, there were fundamental differences over the issue of Sardari system. While the National Party did not approve of the Sardari system as an institution, the Khan had no problem with the institution except that he did not like some of the Sardars. In particular, he did not like the Sardars of Kharan and Las Bela. He wanted the National Party to help him suppress these Sardars. But, then, soon problems emerged between the Khan and the party over a question that was not related to the Sardari system at all.

In 1939, the British approached the Khan for leasing the port of Jaimy. The National Party openly opposed the move. It was generally believed that the British failure to get this port leased was because of this opposition. Naturally, the British turned against them. The Sardars were already unhappy with the party for opposing their old privilege of receiving taxes from the people. They encouraged the Khan to challenge the party.

The National Party held its first annual conference at Kalat on July 5-6, 1939. Keeping in view the sparse population of this area, it was a big gathering. About 800 delegates participated. The speakers mainly condemned the Sardars and the Sardari system. The Sardars were provoked. A tribal Lashkar headed by Sardar Bahar Mohammed Khan Shahwani attacked the conference during the concluding session and disrupted the meeting leaving many casualties. The next day, the Sardars met the
Khan and demanded strict action against the party. The Khan obliged by declaring:

"The tribes are our right hand while the Sardars are members of our Government. Your dignity is the dignity of the Sardars and the Sardars' dignity is that of the Khan."\(^6\)

One of the demands of the National Party was free education for girls. Many Baluch Sardars considered it an insult to their patriarchal system. After getting the assurance from the Khan that the tribal system was the backbone of Baluch society, the Sardars decided to act against the party themselves. On July 20, 1939 the Prime Minister of Kalat declared: "The party is illegal within the boundaries of the state." Its prominent leaders like Malik Abdul Karim Khawaja Khel, Abdul Karim Shorish, Mir Gul Khan Naseer and Mir Ghaus Bhakhsh Bizinjo, were exiled from Kalat. Bizinjo, the leader of "the Baluch League" who was in Kalat to negotiate merger of his party with the National Party was also expelled. The Party leaders, after being expelled from Kalat, established their new headquarters at Quetta in 1939. They renewed their pledge to introduce reforms in a widely circulated pamphlet which, *inter alia*

... condemned the Sardari and Jirga system and demanded the introduction of Shariat Laws for the state, proper representation of tribes in Shahi Jirga and the State Council, participation of the people in the state administration, financial betterment of the people of the state, to spread education, equality of Justice for all, freedom of the press and civil liberty, and to strengthen the centre.\(^7\)

Soon, Second World War broke out and all political activities were banned under the Defence of India Act in British India. However, the party workers continued their activities and remained involved. Indeed, a meeting of the party was held at Quetta on June 23, 1940, presided by Abdul Rahim Khawaja Khel. In his speech, Bizinjo highlighted the program of the party, especially its reform agenda, and called for unity among Baluch. He asked the Kalat government to remove restrictions on the
party. In the meanwhile, the party decided to work closely with the Indian National Congress. After the outbreak of the war, the Congress had launched an anti-British campaign, and the party supported this position. However, the party still demanded Shariat’s enforcement because, in its opinion, it favoured the masses and condemned the Jirga system. Moreover, since it had an alliance with the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, it turned against the Muslim League. The result was that, by the end of the war, it had lost its original character and was transformed from a royalist-cum-Baluch National party into a subsidiary organization of the Congress. The leaders of the party approached Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who promised to help them. In late 1944, the National Party formally joined the All India States People’s Congress formally.

Even after the end of the war, the Kalat Government continued its harsh policies towards the National Party. Some of the party leaders now approached Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (during his 1945 tour) to intervene on their behalf with the Khan of Kalat, and to support the democratic movement in the Khanate. Jinnah assured them that he would inform the Khan about their demands.

As a result of this meeting and Jinnah’s efforts, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, lifted the ban on the National Party and allowed it to operate in Kalat, but by then it had moved further more towards the Indian National Congress. The party leadership did not quite recognize or appreciate Jinnah’s help in removing the restrictions. Indeed, in 1945, it merged with the Congress. The merger made the National Party a little more secure. This also enabled it to secure financial assistance from the affluent Hindus in the province and the rest of the country.

Rejuvenated, the National Party organized conferences at Delhi, Jodhpur and Jaipur. Its leaders such as Malik Faiz Mohammed Yousafzai and Mir Gul Khan Naseer reiterated the need for reforms in Baluchistan. After coming closer to the
Congress, the British seemed to have charged their attitude towards the party. They approved of its opposition to the Muslim League. The party was freely allowed to operate in Kalat. The party vehemently opposed the scheme of Pakistan and worked for accession of Baluchistan with India.

In a widely circulated pamphlet, the party opposed the separation of Kalat State from India and advocated constitutional government. Party leaders like Muhammad Hussain Anqa and Bizinjo favoured the merger of Kalat with India. They also started opposing the Khan and his demand for an independent state of Baluchistan. This shift in the party’s program and policies resulted in the division of the party itself. On question of independence of Baluchistan or its merger into Indian Union, some founders of the party, particularly Abdul Aziz Kurd and Shahnawaz Khan opposed the new stand of the National Party. Shahnawaz Khan, the former president of party, founded a new political party, Baluch League, which aimed to support the Khan’s struggle for an independent state of Baluchistan.

In 1947, the National Party realized that it had made a mistake in aligning itself with the Congress. It was largely due to public pressure. The party, therefore, decided to sever its relations with the Congress and returned to its ‘nationalist’ position. In this context, it is also important to bear in mind an explanation provided by the then president of the party, Bizinjo, in an interview with Inayatullah Baluch, one of the scholars working on Baluchistan. Bizinjo told Baluch that during the Cabinet Mission’s visit to India in 1946, he went to Delhi to discuss with the Congress leaders the special constitutional and political status of the Khanate. He made it a point to meet with the Congress President Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Bizinjo believed that that Khanate had never been a part of the Sub-continent and, in fact, had an independent status according to 1876 treaty with the British. He
wondered, what would be the position of Khanate after the transfer of power? He was shocked to find out that Maulana Azad believed that Baluchistan could never survive as a sovereign, independent state unless it had protection of the British Government which, in turn, he stressed, would compromise the independence of the Sub-continent. Obviously, the Congress could not support the demand for independent Baluchistan. The National Party was disappointed.

The National Party was founded on lofty ideals. The main plank of their political programme was to get rid of the Sardari system, to initiate the process of political and social reforms, to introduce Muslim (Shariat) Law in the area and to launch a universal education system for the people of Baluchistan. The party leaders believed that the Khan, the Sardars, and the British who were the main beneficiaries of the Sardari system, did not allow these demands to be implemented. After having failed to make a major impact on its own, the party sought help form the Indian National Congress. This alliance did provide the party a bigger platform but, in terms of its standing in Baluchistan, it did not make much difference. In fact, it made it an unpopular party.

Fact of the matter was that the affiliation of the National Party with the Indian National Congress was more of a marriage of convenience. The party leaders were shocked when the Congress let them down on important issues like introduction of political reforms in Baluchistan. The Congress not only ignored this demand but also strongly opposed it at the floor of Central Legislative Assembly. Secondly, the Congress did not feel the need to establish a provincial wing in Baluchistan unlike the All-India Muslim League. Finally, the Congress did not accept the claim of the Kalat National Party opposing merger of Baluchistan into India. This realization dawned on the leaders of the party only after Pakistan was established, with Baluchistan as one of
its five provinces. That is why the party was so disappointed with the attitude of the Congress, as indicted in Bizinjo’s interview referred to earlier.

5.2 The Anjuman-i-Watan

Two prominent political leaders to appear on the political scene of Baluchistan during the decade of 1937-47 were Abdul Samad Achakzai and Qazi Mohammad Isa. In spite of their common Pashtoon origins and their parties reflecting the Pashtoon point of view, the two leaders led opposite and hostile camps of Muslim public opinion.

Abdul Samad Achakzai laid the foundations of Anjuman-i-Watan (hereinafter, Watan) in 1939. The party sought constitutional reforms in Baluchistan. Achakzai supported the Indian National Congress and, in 1945, he formally affiliated his party with the Congress. Although in a subsequent statement before the Lahore High Court in October 1956, Achakzai denied any link with the Congress, the party record and the press reports contradicted his stand.14

However, the Watan failed to achieve its demand of reforms, because of the opposition of the British on the plea that “British Baluchistan” had a small population with a small area as well as little financial resources for running a full provincial administration.

The first annual conference of the Watan was held at Quetta from June 16-18, 1939. The principal speaker was Mohammed-Amin-Khosa, Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) of Sind. Two prominent leaders of Majlis-i-Ahrar (a pro-Congress Islamist party founded at Lahore in 1931) Qazi Ihsan Ahmad and Mazhar Ali Azhar, were also present. The major theme of the gathering was criticism of the All-India Muslim League and its policies. It seemed, at least from the count of the audience, that this party was more popular among the non-Muslims. Out of about 1500
participants, half of them were non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{15} Apparently, the Watan had little appeal for the Muslim masses. Even in subsequent years, the gatherings in predominantly Pashtoon areas, such as Qila Saifullah, the number of Watan meetings never exceeded three to four hundred participants. Even Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's presence and ethnic Pashtoon appeal could not help much.

But then, the onset of Second World War did not help matters at all. Indeed, if anything, it made things more difficult for Watan as Baluchistan was a very sensitive area. Indeed, because of this sensitive strategic position, political activities were banned and the press was also closely watched and controlled. Like the National Party, Watan also followed the anti-British rhetoric of the Indian National Congress. Thus, the authorities were very watchful of their contacts and concerns. Obviously, it made difficult for the Watan to influence the Muslim masses. But, perhaps, the major reason for its poor hold on the masses was the increasing appeal and support for the Muslim League in the Pashtoon areas in particular. Like other provinces in India, the Muslim League was the main beneficiary of the Muslim support during the war years.

A public meeting of Watan was held at Quetta on July 12, 1939. Total participants were reported to be one hundred and fifty, and majority of them were non-Muslims. The meeting was convened to protest against disturbances created in the meeting of the National Party at Kalat on July 6, 1939, and the subsequent restrictions put on the party. This meeting simply wanted to share the anguish of the National Party with a possible motive of broadening its base. Muhammad Hussain Anqa was the main speaker. He stressed the same demands that he had elaborated earlier at a meeting in Mastung which were: i) abolition of Sardari system; ii) abolition of Jirga system; and iii) purdah arrangements for women to attend political meetings.\textsuperscript{16}
Since these demands were not acceptable to the Sardars, the Watan could not make much impact upon the masses. To complicate their problems, as indicated earlier, the press were closely monitored and suppressed, especially in the Kalat State, and thus the party could not reach out to the masses the way they would have liked to. Some newspapers, such as *Istaqlal, Kamal-i-Hind, Al-Hanif, Baluchistan*, and *Baluchistan-i-Jadid* were banned in the Kalat State. The party could do no better than passing a number of resolutions in this meeting.

An organizational meeting of the Watan Working Committee was held in the next month, in August. A tri-colour flag of black, red and green was approved. It was further decided that the party workers would wear Khaddar (home spun coarse cotton cloth) uniforms with party banners. Party flags would also be hoisted on houses. Among other things, the party expressed its apprehensions about Maulana Zafar Ali Khan's tour sponsored by the Baluchistan Muslim League. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan was editor of the *Zamindar*, and a prominent Leaguer. To counter his appeal, the party also decided to invite Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a prominent leader of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, and Syed Attaullah Shah Bukhari of the Majlis-i-Ahrar.17

This was the beginning of intense competition and rivalry between the Watan and the Muslim League in the coming years. In fact, Abdul Samad Achakzai publicly declared that he would visit all the places where Zafar Ali Khan would go in order to counter his appeal and influence.18 But things could not get better still. The main speakers and the audience still remained mostly non-Muslims. The Muslim masses kept themselves aloof from the activities of the Watan. At Usta Muhammad, a meeting was addressed by Dr. Chand, Manu Lal and Diyaloo Mal, all non-Muslims, and was attended largely by the non-Muslims19.
A joint meeting of Watan and Baluchistan Jamiatul Ulama-i-Hind was held on September 18, 1939, at Fort Sandeman. Still, there was not much response from the Muslim masses. Opposition to the British and the Muslim League was a common link between these two parties. The speakers advised the masses not to render any help to the government since the British had declared war on Germany.20

As indicated earlier, Ghaffar Khan and other leaders were invited to Baluchistan. A large public meeting was held at Quetta on September 20, 1939. Mohammed Amin Khosa, MLA Sind, Ghaffar Khan and other leaders made fiery speeches. Ghaffar Khan was the main speaker. He claimed that the British Government had promised reforms in the NWFP provided he would sever his relations with the Congress, but he refused. He castigated the Baluch for allowing a handful of British to rule over them. He appealed to them to stand up to the Government and force it to concede self-rule to Baluchistan.21 Mohammed Hussain Anqa moved a resolution condemning the proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly resulting in rejection of political reforms in Baluchistan.

Subsequently, Ghaffar Khan toured the length and breadth of Baluchistan. During one week, that is, September 23 to October 1, 1939, he addressed various public meetings at Fort Sandeman, Qila Saifullah, Hindu Bagh, Pishin, Qila Abdullah, Chaman, Gulisthan, Quetta, Machh, Sibi, and Usta Muhammad, Ghaffar Khan exhorted the people to unite and free themselves from the British domination. However, in most of the meetings addressed by him the attendance was very thin, not more than one hundred, with a non-Muslim majority. Hostile Jamali tribesmen disrupted the meeting of October 1, 1939, at Usta Muhammad. As a result, Achakzai, Amin Khosa and Dr. Choit Ram were injured.22 The disruption of the meeting was a great challenge for the party and it decided to re-assert itself by announcing another
meeting at the same place. But the meeting could not be held. However, the party held a large public meeting at Quetta on October 10, 1939, which was devoted to the condemnation of Nawab Bugti and Qazi Isa for attacking the Watan meeting of Usta Muhammad.23

Achakzai was not a well-off person. Due to financial constraints, his press and newspaper faced difficulties. Payments to the staff were always overdue, and hence many of them left his paper. Achakzai had close links with the Congress leadership and he frequently visited Wardha. After one of these visits, the Baluchistan Muslim League newspaper, Al-Islam, accused him of having received twenty thousand rupees (as a bribe) from the Congress Party.24 This really hurt his political standing with the masses. To compound his difficulties, authorities registered several cases against him. All this forced him to seek shelter in Sind, and the nationalist movement was pursued from across the border.

Achakzai toured Sind and told the people that an autocratic and irresponsible system of government still prevailed in Baluchistan. People had no rights and elected representative public bodies did not exist there. Law and justice were nominal. They were dispensed by tribal Sardars in the form of Jirgas. The Watan had been formed to address these problems and improve the situation.25

The Watan party was very critical of the British Government. On November 12, 1939, its newspapers, Istaqlal, published an article highlighting the inequalities and injustices meted out to the people. The author compared the salary of a local worker and a British employee, the latter drawing three times more than the former. The writer further protested against the ill-treatment meted out to the local people by the authorities.26 In a Pashto poem in Istaqlal on November 26, 1939, a poet lamented that his country was in bondage. He vowed to sacrifice his life to oust foreign rule and
to do away with the “enemy and his family”, who, he said were living in luxury. He added that the “Farangi” (i.e. the British) would no longer be allowed to enjoy a luxurious life.  

Achakzai was elected President of Nawabshah (Sind) District Congress Committee. However, he was soon arrested for his anti-British activities and put behind bars. A case was registered against him. In his absence, other Watan leaders such as, Mohammad Hussain Anqa, became active in the campaign to promote their nationalist movement. The Watan considered two proposals in particular to bolster the movement further. They were as follows:

1. Holding meetings throughout Baluchistan to propagate in favour of Abdur Rehman Bugti succeeding his father as Bugti Tumandar.

2. To arrange some kind of counter-blast to the Muslim League’s celebration of Jinnah’s proposed “Deliverance Day,” (on December 22, 1939, after the resignation of the Congress ministries).

As mentioned earlier, a case was registered against Achakzai because of his anti-British activities. When his first hearing was announced, the Congress showed an interest in defending him. In February, 1940, he was brought before the court in Sibi. His defense was conducted by Khan Abdul Qayum MLA (Central) of Peshawar (he was an active leader of the Congress Party and had also written an anti-Muslim League book, Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier but later, in 1945, he joined the Muslim League), assisted by Fateh Chand, a pleader of Quetta and Mohammad Hussain Butt of Sibi.

This was the situation before the demand for Pakistan. After the passage of Lahore Resolution (March, 1940), the word ‘Pakistan’ became so popular that all other slogans were either judged in its light or were simply replaced by it. The pro-
Muslim League circles started campaigning in its favour. However, Achakzai and the Watan party openly condemned the Pakistan scheme and described it as impracticable. 32

While the idea of Pakistan attracted a large number of people, there were many who opposed it. In Baluchistan, many a times, a small group would gather at a tea stall and form a party. For example, the Mulki Party was founded at a tea stall in May 1940 as an anti-Muslim League and pro-Watan group. It was a three-member party consisting of Khan Bahadur Arbab Karam Khan, Syed Zaman Shah and Abdul Ghafoor Durrani. They resolved that the party would cooperate with the Watan and Jamaatul Ulama-i-Hind, Baluchistan branch. 33

Some of these associations reflected the tribal loyalties and feuds. If one tribe supported the idea of Pakistan, its rival would oppose it. On some occasions, people realized that such activities could not go on in Baluchistan. For instance, during the Watan meeting of May 26, 1940 at Quetta, Syed Zaman Shah of Mulki Party, in his speech, told his hosts that he could not cooperate with the Watan party unless it changed its pro-Hindu policy. He further said that the Muslims could never be united with the Hindus. In fact, he praised the Pakistan scheme as practicable and beneficial. This pro-Pakistan statement was a matter of embarrassment for the Watan Party. 34

The fast growing pro-Pakistan Muslim public opinion had a great influence on Watan leaders. They started to recognize the growing influence of Baluchistan Muslim League. Even Achakzai had to concede that, for the political awakening of Baluchistan, he would be willing to cooperate with the Muslim League. 35 However, this shift did not please some of the extremist elements of the party. They opposed it. Certain party members like Mohammed Hussain Nizamani were reported to have
socialistic leanings. Nizamani was believed to be prime mover behind the establishment of a Socialist Party in Baluchistan.36

In addition, pro-Congress elements of the Watan Party were annoyed over Achakzai’s reluctance to merge his party into the Congress party. Indeed, they accused him of making it a branch of Red Shirts (the Khudai Khidmatgars who, too, were associated with the Congress) rather than the Congress itself. Aslam Achakzai and his associates were particularly unhappy with this situation.37

The annual session of the Watan party was held at Loralai from September 25-27, 1940. Ghaffar Khan, the Khudai Khidmatgar leader, was present. Since Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and other Congress leader’s entry into Baluchistan was banned, they could not attend. A Sikh leader, Ajit Singh, proposed affiliation of Watan with the Congress but he was opposed by local leaders. Apparently, only the non-Muslims were in support of its complete merger with the Congress.38 The Pashtoon leaders reluctant to merge with the Congress. They were more interested in strengthening the Khudai Khidmatgars in Baluchistan. It was further confirmed with the arrival of a couple of leaders from the North-West Frontier Province sent by Ghaffar Khan to assist Achakzai in establishing a Khudai Khidmatgar Party in the area.39

The Congress tried hard to promote its influence in Baluchistan through the Watan party. It was reported that a number of Khaddar (home spun cotton cloth) samples were received from Jawaharlal Nehru by the Watan for campaign throughout Baluchistan to take place of foreign cloth, which was being boycotted by the Congress.40 The Watan was very conscious of the sentiments of the local people. It was more interested in the fate of the Pashtoons, particularly those who were fighting against the British in Waziristan than most of the all-India concerns. On October 15, 1940, Watan party held a meeting at Quetta. Abdul Samad Achakzai criticized British
for aerial bombardment of Waziristan. A strong resolution was passed to condemn the war aims of the British and its bombing of civilian population.\textsuperscript{41} Not only did the party condemn the war efforts of the British, the party organ, \textit{Istqal}, published a news item on November 3, 1940, regarding troop’s movement in Baluchistan. A case was registered against the paper under Defence of India Rules.\textsuperscript{42}

After their failure to merge Watan party with the Congress, some of the dissatisfied elements of the party, organized the Baluchistan National Congress. This so-called ‘forward block’ could not muster more than forty members, mostly non-Muslims. They approached the Congress leadership for permission to establish a Congress branch in Baluchistan, to which the Watan, especially Achakzai was reluctant.\textsuperscript{43}

In spite of its strenuous efforts, the Watan, with the passage of time, lost popularity especially in the Muslim Pashtoon areas. An incident in this regard was reported by the intelligence agencies on February 3, 1941. Citing a leader of the party, Said Mohammad, who tried to deliver a speech in favour of his party at the Jamia Masjid at Fort Sandeman, the report noted that he was forcibly ejected from the venue with much disgrace and humiliation.\textsuperscript{44}

In 1942, the Congress had started the ‘civil disobedience’ movement. The Watan leaders were also ready to support this movement in Baluchistan. About thirty workers of the party volunteered to court arrest. Achakzai approached Wardha for the purpose, but the small number of volunteers did not appeal to the Congress leaders. Consequently, Achakzai received a letter from Gandhi informing him that ‘Satyagraha’ for Baluchistan had not been sanctioned. Indeed, he advised him to do some ‘constructive’ work in the province.\textsuperscript{45}
At this stage, the World War seemed to be proceeding in favour of the Axis powers, especially in the East. Japan had come to knock at the gates of India and the Sub-continent was under threat. The Congress had converted its civil disobedience movement into a "Quit India Movement". In Baluchistan, all kinds of agitational political activities were banned. When on August 31, 1942, an office-bearer of the Watan circulated printed handbills for a public meeting, a notice was served on him by the authorities and the meeting was disallowed. Most of the so-called "trouble-makers" were arrested. As a result no one turned up. The ensuing period, till the end of the war, witnessed no remarkable public political activity on part of the Watan.

On the question of political reforms in Baluchistan, the Watan favoured the Muslim League's stand as opposed to that of the Congress which did not support reforms in the province. The Watan blamed the government for depriving it of its legitimate demand. In this context, its paper, Istaqlal, in October 1944, supported Liaquat Ali Khan's suggestion for setting up a Committee of Inquiry to examine the question of reforms in Baluchistan without any further delay.

With the end of the war, restrictions on Samad Achakzai and other Watan leaders imposed in 1943, prohibiting them from addressing party or public meetings in Quetta and Pishin were withdrawn in the first week of July 1945. The Watan had to decide its future policy. Since the Pakistan Movement had gained considerable ground in Baluchistan, the Watan was left with no option but to align itself with an All-India organization for its survival. Consequently, by the end of 1945, the Watan opted to take shelter under the umbrella of Indian National Congress. Although it had resisted the temptation and the pressures in the past, it was left with no other option. In a public meeting held on October 1, 1945 at Sibi, the Watan was affiliated with the Congress Party through an announcement.
In 1946, Achakzai proposed the division of Baluchistan into several parts, including a merger of the Pashtoon areas with the North-West Frontier Province. He had drifted more towards ethnic Pashtoon policies with the passage of time. Ghaffar Khan, also published an article in favour of his stand in his weekly, Pakhtoon, entitled as, Shamla Sadai Bud Nasiba-i-Baluchistan.

The Watan leaders left Quetta for Delhi to meet the Cabinet Mission on April 5, 1946 to present their point of view on the constitutional advance in India. According to the All-India Radio, Nehru had written to Achakzai that the Congress would appeal the return of the leased areas to the Kalat State. The Congress point of view was quite contrary to the Watan’s stand on Baluchistan. But Nehru’s “nationalism” would not allow the loss of strategically important Baluchistan to mainland India on the basis of Muslim majority in that province. He sought a foothold for Delhi in Baluchistan and thus cut it off from the rest of Pakistan and the neighbouring Muslim states of the Middle East.

Viceroy Lord Mountbatten and Nehru were opposed to granting autonomy to the state of Kalat. Jinnah was in favour of it. Jinnah eventually accepted Kalat’s independent status and blamed Nehru for the delay. The National Party had circulated a pamphlet which opposed separation of Kalat state from India. The pamphlet further advocated constitutional reforms in the State. The Watan stood by Congress party in spite of rejection of its demand for reforms in Baluchistan. In fact, Achakzai and other party leaders attended the Meerut session of the Congress on November 19, 1946 as delegates from Baluchistan and took active interest in its deliberations.

For administrative and military services, the British had recruited a number of non-Muslims from other parts of the Sub-continent especially from the Punjab. The
non-Muslims had a strong hold on Baluchistan's trade and business. These non-Muslims were deadly opposed to the scheme of Pakistan. They promoted and sponsored the Congress viewpoint in the area. The British administration was also in favour of these non-Muslim political activists. The Watan party's journal, *Istaqlal*, wrote “That the Punjabis have been brought into Baluchistan by the British and the only way to get rid of them is to put an end to the British authority here". The *Istaqlal* of March 4, 1947 criticized the whole scheme of Pakistan as impracticable. The article further warned the local people against the danger of settlement of four hundred thousand people from outside in Baluchistan.

Predominantly representative of non-Muslim population, the Watan was also an urban phenomenon. Moreover, by identifying itself with the Red Shirts, it promoted the rift between the Baluch and the Pashtoon and thus, lost its chance of becoming a province-wide political party.

When the anti-Pakistan forces failed to appeal to the Muslim masses of Baluchistan, they turned to exploit petty, negative, regional issues. The Watan leaders, both in their writings and statements, fanned Punjabi-phobia. They tried to promote ethnic and linguistic division among Muslims of Baluchistan. This brand of politics damaged the nationalistic cause of the Watan as it alienated the party from other nationalists, mostly their allies in the past. Its insistence on the introduction of Baluchi Language as medium of instruction in Baluchistan was particularly ill-advised. First, Baluchi was demanded as a medium of instruction in the whole of Baluchistan. If the demand was restricted to Kalat, it made a lot of sense, as we shall see with reference to the National Party. But, Baluchistan being a land of many languages, i.e., Pashtu, Baluchi, Brahvi, Saraiki, Persian etc., this proposal was provocative and impractical.
Also this demand was controversial because the promoters of Baluchi language did not accommodate the languages of other inhabitants of the area.

In summation, however, it will be fair to state that although the Watan party represented a very-small-middle class of Baluchistan, it did contribute to public awareness for reform and political participation. However, it was not successful in making any significant impact on the political and constitutional developments affecting Baluchistan for a number of reasons, as discussed above.

5.3 The Jamiat-Ul-Ulama-i-Baluchistan

The Pashtoons of Baluchistan are by and large, very religious people. Their love of Islam and opposition to the British rule in India were fully exploited by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, a religio-political party, founded in India in 1919. In 1937, a branch of this party was established in Baluchistan, with Maulana Abdullah Jan as its president. Many graduates from Deoband and the local Pashtoon Ulama were his associates. They followed a nationalistic and regional brand of politics and in this way a contact was developed with Watan and Kalat State National Party. However, this contact could not attract the Baluch people to its fold and the party remained essentially Pashtoon both in leadership as well as the following. With the passage of time, however, the Jamiat-ul-Ulama lost ground in Baluchistan because of the fast growing popularity of the Muslim League.

Initially, the Ulama were critical of the Watan, but gradually because of the Jamiat’s affiliation with the Congress, they developed a close relationship with the Watan. Even within this framework, the local leaders often vacillated between pro-Congress agenda and anti-Congress slogans. The only factor, which elicited a common response from them, was anti-Muslim League propaganda. The politics of Jamiat thus reflected local view either in favour of one all-India party or the other.
There was little in its manifesto which could be termed as a political agenda for the development of this area. The Loralai meeting, for example, which was held in August 1939, turned out to be anti-Watan simply because of its affiliation with the Congress. Maulvi Abdul-Khalil, Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Baluchistan, asked both the leaders and workers of the party not to attend any meeting of the Watan. A few days later, another leader praised the Congress for its anti-British stand and criticized the Muslim League and the Khaksars (a branch of this party was active in Baluchistan since 1939), for their pro-government activities.

The Muslim League invited leaders like Maulana Zafar Ali Khan on special occasions. The Maulana was well-known because of his oratory and standing as a journalist. In response, the Jamiat invited speakers from other parts of India or attempted to block visits of luminaries under the League’s auspices. Maulvi Akhtar Mohammad, President of the Fort Sandeman branch of Jamiat, in a public speech on August 25, 1939, at Fort Sandeman observed that “the Khaksars and Muslim Leaguers being pro-government were Kafirs and that the Congress was a much better association than the Muslim League.”

With the rising influence of the Muslim League, the popularity graph of Jamiat steadily went down. The Loralai branch of the party was closed down due to lack of funds and interest from the local people. The people were particularly upset about the strong connection of the party with the Indian National Congress. The party branches of Hindu Bagh and Fort Sandeman were already moribund.

A conference of the Jamiat was held on October 1, 1939 at Quetta. The nature of this meeting was purely religious. All the speakers talked about religion. Only one hundred and fifty participants in Quetta Jamia Mosque attended the third and final session of the conference. When Maulvi Muhammed Umar attempted to discuss
politics, he was silenced by the audience.\textsuperscript{53} Maulvi Muhammad Umar was a very active leader of the party and was recently expelled from Kalat State. At Loralai, in a public speech on October 8, 1939, he criticized the Sardars. He further observed that the decisions of Jirga were opposed to Shariat Laws. He also condemned the bombing of Waziristan and showed concern for miseries of the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{64}

The Annual Conference of the Jamiat was held at Quetta from July 5-8, 1940. Mostly pro-Congress elements were present, including Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, Pir Faizul Hasan and Attaullah Shah Bukhari.

The following objectives of the party were identified:

1. To propagate the message of religion;
2. To organize the public for independence;
3. To promote the teachings of the Holy Quran; and
4. To lead the public politically since politics was linked with religion.\textsuperscript{65}

In the final session of the conference, the party resolved to:

1. Achieve provincial autonomy for Baluchistan; and
2. Implement Shariat in Baluchistan.\textsuperscript{66}

In 1942, the party suffered a severe setback. In its annual session at Sibi on February 11, 1942, the president of the session abruptly called off the meeting when Maulvi Muhammed Umar started criticizing the Muslim League and some Sardars of the province. The session was adjourned.\textsuperscript{67}

In the following years, the party's impact on the politics of Baluchistan was minimal. In associations with the local branch of the Watan, the party merely emphasized on local and narrow issues, that is, demanding Pashto or Baluchi language as medium of instruction. But the people of the area were hardly impressed or interested in these demands and interests. Mostly the leaders of the Jamiat were
shunned by the people. Often their cars were stoned and often the Congress flags were torn away from their cars. Two such incidents in particular were reported at Murgha Kabzai on April 11 and at Dukki on April 15, 1947. In politics, the Jamiat followed the philosophy of the Congress, but in religious matters, it had quite a different approach. This conflicting attitude led to its poor performance in the province. It could never dominate the political scene of Baluchistan. However, it remained active in the campaign for the introduction of Islam into political and social fields in Baluchistan.

5.4 The Khaksars of Baluchistan

The Baluch people, because of their socio-economic environment, are simple but brave and any message that appeals to their sense of bravery is received with warmth and enthusiasm. The Khaksar’s call for Jihad, therefore, had a special appeal for them. In 1939, the Khaksars were the only Muslim militant group, which had a sizeable following in Baluchistan. Allama Inayattullah Mashriqi, the Salar-i-Aazam of the Khaksars, came to Quetta on a 3-day visit on July 16-18, 1939. On July 16, he addressed a public meeting. The next day, he joined a parade and “route march” as an ordinary Khaksar, which impressed the public very much. In addition, the Muslims of Baluchistan were attracted to the Khaksars because of its initial anti-Congress and pro-League stance. In 1939, the Khaksars played an active role in cooling off Hindu-Muslim communal tensions in Lucknow (U.P.), in spite of opposition by the U.P. Government. It was because of such development that the public sympathy for the party grew steadily. Maulvi Obaidullah led a Khaksar rally in Quetta on October 14-15, 1939, with a huge participation of the masses.

Allama Mashriqi always argued that the British took over reign of the Subcontinent from the Muslims, and hence they should hand over the charge of the
government to the Muslims before they leave the country. A pamphlet by Allama Mashriqi was circulated in mid-October 1939, at Quetta. The 16 page document assured the Viceroy of support of 50,000 Khaksar volunteers to help the British in their war effort. This pamphlet also reiterated his main argument that the Muslims were the rightful rulers of and, therefore, after the British, the Muslims had the right to rule India. Allama Mashriqi demanded enlistment of two million Khaksars for the purpose. The call went unheeded.

Khaksars owed their presence in the province to the untiring efforts of a dynamic Hakim-i-Aala of Baluchistan, Ghulam Mustafa Bhurgari. The British intelligence authorities used to call him “live wire” for his agility and “dangerous activities.” On several occasions, Bhurgari came from Sibi to Quetta in his car with a Khaksar flag on it, led parades in the city, and returned to Sibi the same day, which was a temporary Khaksar Headquarter. In similar swift visits, he went to Pishin on January 2, 1940, Loralai January 3, Fort Sandeman on January 4, and back to Sibi, by his car.

Initially, the Khaksars supported the Muslim League in Baluchistan. They established camps and organized rallies for the Muslim League sessions. However, in the end, the Khaksar party lost its popularity in Baluchistan and the Muslim masses joined the Muslim League bandwagon. Despite the initial appeal of Khaksars to militancy, its popularity in Baluchistan was short-lived. Their declared policy of providing volunteers to help the British in their war effort did not go well with their religious zeal to revive Muslim empire in India. The passage of the Lahore Resolution in March 1940 literally eliminated the chances of any other political party in Baluchistan. Pakistan became a household word and Jinnah emerged as the undisputed leader of Muslim India. However, the Khaksars suffered an irreparable
loss when a Khaksar (Rafiq Sabir) tried to assassinate Jinnah in 1942. The Baluch reacted very strongly. Not only prayers were held for Jinnah's recovery and safety, the Khan of Kalat sent a special guard to protect the life of the father of future nation state of Pakistan. The Khaksars ceased to be a political entity in Baluchistan soon.

5.5 The Baluchistan Muslim League

Since early 1930s the most popular demand in Baluchistan was the introduction of constitutional and political reforms at par with the rest of the country. This demand was voiced not only by the few educated elite but also by the tribal chiefs and the Khan of Kalat who wanted to see Baluchistan as a full politically autonomous province. The Khan knew that his state would also benefit from these measures provided his status was not challenged. The disagreement between the Sardars and the other parties was on the social and economic reforms, which were aimed at the eradication of the tribal system. The All-India Muslim League was the only party that had advocated the cause of political reforms in Baluchistan since 1927. Jinnah wanted as many Muslim-majority provinces as he possibly could get in the evolving political system of India, anticipating, very rightly, that one day this issue will determine the destiny of the Muslims in South Asia. The Baluch leaders knew that he was the only leader who could make a difference in the lives of the people of Baluchistan. They frequently visited Jinnah's house in Bombay. For instance, as stated earlier, Yusuf Aziz Magsi, both before his departure to England and after his return to India, visited Jinnah. This contact proved useful and helped determine the contours of Baluchistan's political history.

Jinnah was known both as advocate of the cause of the Indian Muslims as well as a leader who could lead the Muslims out of their present difficulties.
In 1935, after his return to India, from his self-imposed exile in London, Jinnah launched a hectic campaign to re-organize the All India Muslim League with a renewed vigour and enthusiasm. So far the Muslim League was a party of the elites and was confined to annual sessions. There was hardly any participation of the masses. Thus, the re-organization of the League was no mean task. However, several factors went on to help his cause and contribute to the popularity of the Muslim League. One was the Muslim mass contact campaign that was aimed at mobilizing the Muslims in pursuit of their special demands and interests as a community. The second was the distressful rule of the Congress in several provinces of India in 1937-39. The Congress-rule, in fact, gave the Muslims, a rallying point in their struggle for political interests. Many Baluch leaders stepped forward and joined hands with Jinnah and the Muslim League. The third factor was the beginning of the Second World War, which unlike the Congress leadership, Jinnah correctly assessed to be prolonged and to result eventually in the victory of the British and their allies. Last but not the least, Jinnah was keen to re-organize the League in the Muslim-majority provinces as well. In 1938, a young lawyer from Baluchistan, Qazi Mohammad Isa, went to Bombay to see Jinnah. He had recently returned from England after studying law. Jinnah was impressed with him, and, indeed, assigned him the task of reorganizing the Muslim League in Baluchistan. The League was recently established in Baluchistan thanks to efforts of a few enlightened Muslim leaders of Quetta.

According to Abdul Ghafoor Khan Durrani, a certain Dr. Fazal Shah, after realizing the necessity of establishing a branch of the All-India Muslim League in Baluchistan, consulted some of his close associates. In early 1938, about fifty prominent Muslims met at the Meat Market in Quetta, and discussed the matter at
some length. The meeting resolved to urge the Muslims of Baluchistan to join the Muslim League. Just after this inaugural session, the enlistment campaign for new membership was launched in and around Quetta, which was further expanded to other adjacent areas. By the end of the year, Qazi Isa had returned to Quetta from London. He was approached by the founding leaders of the new party who were in search of a prominent person like Qazi Isa to lead it to success. He was elected as the new President of the Baluchistan Muslim League. He proved an asset in promoting the influence of the Muslim League in Baluchistan. 

Qazi Isa convened the first session of the re-organized Muslim League at Quetta from June 10–11, 1939. This session was presided by Syed Zakir Ali who was invited from the United Provinces (U.P.), especially for this purpose. Contrary to the expectations of the authorities who had never witnessed more than a few hundred delegates in the meetings of political organizations, the Weekly Intelligence Summary reported the presence of about three thousand participants in this meeting. The presence of Prince Abdul Karim, a brother of the Khan of Kalat, made it even more noteworthy. Another important feature of this conference was that it was also attended by a large number of Sardars from various tribes like the Achakzai, Bugi, Jogazai, Kansi, Mandokhel, Rind, Shahwani, etc. It must be mentioned here that most of the Sardars were disappointed with the attitude of the National Party because of its anti-tribalism and its association with the Congress. It was an amazing achievement of the Muslim League that because of its carefully and consciously planned programme, it was able to attract such a large number of people from all walks of life. In this context, it was important to bear in mind that the Muslim League leadership was essentially pro-British. It did not want to defy the British, as that would have created more sufferings for the already suppressed
people of Baluchistan. Secondly, the social transformation of the province from a purely tribal society to a radical, egalitarian system also seemed far-fetched and fraught with dangers of intra-tribal conflicts. The Muslim League knew what had to be its priorities in Baluchistan. As Qazi Isa, after his election as the President of the Baluchistan Muslim League, an office that he held for the next twelve years, exclaimed: “The Muslims of Baluchistan are Muslims first, Baluchi next and Indian third”. Within a month, the newly elected President claimed that this new branch of the Muslim League had seven thousand supporters.

Qazi Isa was particularly successful in his home town, Pishin. He was able to win over the religious groups. In a meeting of 400 Maulvis held on June 25, 1939, Qazi Isa assured them that the Muslim League would never act against the Shariat. In return, the Maulvis assured him of their full support. Earlier, Nawab of Jogazi had pledged to support the “Old Islam” (Muslim League) and to oppose “New Islam” (the Congress and the Watan). In fact, the Baluchistan Muslim League was mainly dominated by Pashtoons and non-Baluch elements from the Watan. On July 14, 1939, the Muslim League workers patrolled Quetta city with placards and posters advising the public not to attend the Watan’s annual conference, as it was a branch of the Indian National Congress.

The major problem of Baluchistan was the lack of political leadership. The tribal chiefs, enfeebled under the British-controlled Sardari System, could not do much, since they depended heavily on the British power and treasury. Secondly, the Sardars had learned to depend on the British administrators who had assumed the role of arbitrators in conflicts between the Sardars or tribes.

Qazi Isa was against those Sardars only who were subservient to the British rulers and, thus, were prepared to do anything to please them. He was, however, on
very good terms with those Sardars who were humane and patriotic and cared for the people of Baluchistan. For example, he valued the friendship of Sardar Ghulam Muhammad Tareen, Sardar Baz Khan Jogazai, Sardar Abdul Ghaffar Khan Achakzai, and the like. Under Qazi Isa’s presidency, the Baluchistan Muslim League opened branches in all parts of Baluchistan. It carefully chalked out a program for the social, economic and political uplift of the Muslims. The Muslims of Baluchistan thus forged links with their counterparts in other parts of British India.

Jinnah was well aware of the political developments in Baluchistan. He sent quite a few prominent Muslim leaders to Baluchistan to study the situation and present the League viewpoint to the Muslim masses. Prominent leaders dispatched to Baluchistan included, among other, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang, Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni, and Liaquat Ali Khan, General Secretary of the All-India Muslim League. They toured the province and helped turn the public opinion in favour of the Muslim League. The first such tour was reported by the Weekly Intelligence Summary of August 4, 1939. According to the Summary, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan reached Quetta on July 28, 1939, and was warmly welcomed at the Railway Station. Even Khaksars presented him a Guard of Honour. The same day, he addressed a public meeting at Quetta. There were some 14,000 participants at the venue. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan declared that Muslims were a separate nation and not a “minority”. He condemned the pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim policies of the Indian National Congress. On August 1, 1939, he went to Fort Sandeman. The next day, he visited Loralai, along with Qazi Isa and addressed a big public meeting. On August 4, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan sought an interview with Khan of Kalat who contributed five hundred rupees to the Muslim League.
Qazi Isa’s first priority was to establish the Muslim League branches in Quetta, the most important centre of political activities in the province. Due to his preoccupation in holding public meetings and tours, he could not attend to the organizational matters of the party. For example, till August 1939, he could not form the Working Committee of the party to which he was elected President a couple of months before. The hostile parties, especially Watan tried to make political capital out of this situation and encouraged factional leaders like Muhammad Ismail Nawsherwani, one of the founding leaders of Baluchistan Muslim League, who was in close contact with Abdul Samad Achakzai, the head of the Watan Party. Nawsherwani became the self-styled leader of the “Young Party of Baluchistan Muslim League”.84

In the meanwhile, Jinnah decided to give a proper representation to Baluchistan in the All-India Muslim League Working Committee. He informed Qazi Isa that he had reserved five seats for Baluchistan in the Working Committee and that he should send him suitable names for the purpose. On August 27, 1939 Qazi Isa, accompanied Prince Abdul Karim, brother of the Khan of Kalat and a few other leaders of the Baluchistan Muslim League attended the annual session of the League at Delhi.85 In September 1939, he along with Prince Abdul Karim, Arbab Karam Khan, Malik Abdullah, Abdul Ghaffar Khan Achakzai and Nawab Mehrab Bugti attended the meeting of the League Working Committee, again held at Delhi. On this occasion, Jinnah himself announced the affiliation of the Baluchistan Muslim League with the All-India Muslim League, and called upon Qazi Isa to come to the stage and address the participants. Qazi Isa was greeted very enthusiastically. Jinnah appointed him as the member of the All-India Muslim League Working Committee. He was the youngest member of this supreme body.86
After his return from Delhi, Qazi Isa held a meeting of Baluchistan Muslim League Working Committee. In view of the opposition of the Watan party towards the British war efforts, the meeting resolved to favour the British "Whole-heartedly," without any reservations. The pro-British stance of the Muslim League was also reflected in this resolution of Baluchistan Muslim League. As a matter of fact, the League had very few options. They were already disappointed with the attitude of the Congress during its provincial rule of 1937-39. Thus, it was not surprising that the League was happy to celebrate the 'Day of Deliverance' after the resignation of Congress ministries. However, reaction in Baluchistan to the League's policy was mixed. So far as the anti-Muslim and pro-Hindu policies of the Congress government were considered, the Baluch hated the Congress. But, they approved its anti-British stand and were disappointed at the attitude of the League in helping the British during the war years. The result was that a split took place in the Baluchistan Muslim League. Partly out of this dichotomy and partly because of the growing popularity of Qazi Isa, a relatively less known member of Muslin League, Atta Muhammad, headed a splinter group who wanted to remove Qazi Isa from the party presidency.

Differences also surfaced over the nomination of Mehrab Bugti as a member of the Working Committee. Qazi Isa was also accused of having a dictatorial attitude and Master Yar Mohammed, one of the dissenters, even decided to present a vote of no confidence against him. But, with the passage of time, these differences were settled and the opposition subsided. The Muslim League leaders were conscious of the anti-British feelings of the people of Baluchistan. They also knew that the British would not tolerate anti-British activities in an area like Baluchistan, which, strategically, was perceived more sensitive than any other part of British India. A pronouncedly pro-British Muslim leader, Malik Feroz Khan Noon, visited Quetta and
addressed a public meeting on September 29, 1939, praising the British Government, and appealing to the Muslims to help the British in their war against the Axis powers.88

Loralai was a stronghold of the Muslim League due to the support of local religious leaders. In fact, Haji Zaman, Imam of Loralai Jamia Mosque, in a public meeting held on October 6, condemned the speeches of Jamiat-ul-Ulama leaders demanding the ouster of British from India. He warned: “If they were driven out it would result in the Ram Raj (Hindu-Raj)”. He praised the British government for its policy of religious tolerance. He advised the Muslims to join the Muslim League and help the British in its war efforts.69

The Baluchistan Muslim League was very well aware and conscious of the problems Muslims faced in other parts of India. On one such occasion, the Baluchistan Muslim League responded and raised a voice against firing on unarmed Muslims in Sindh (The Manzal Gah Mosque, Sukkur firing case). Baluchistan Muslim League Working Committee held a meeting on November 22, 1939, and decided to convene a public meeting on November 24, to show their concern for their Sindhi brethren. Accordingly, a public meeting was held in McMahon Park, Quetta on November 24. About 1100 people attended. Qazi Isa presided over the meeting and Maulvi Sanaullah, Secretary, Sind Muslim League, and other leaders made fiery speeches.90

The All-India Muslim League had started a campaign to expose the anti-Muslim policies of the Congress ministries and appointed several committees to prepare detailed reports on the working of these ministries highlighting, in particular, the discrimination and atrocities meted out to the Muslims. These reports were widely publicized and when the Congress finally decided to resign from the ministries,
Jinnah asked the Muslims and other minorities to celebrate the "Day of Deliverance" on December 22, 1939. The Baluchistan Muslim League also participated in these celebrations and distributed Jinnah's message through Al-Islam the newspaper of the party across the width and breadth of Baluchistan.91

In early 1940, Lahore emerged as the centre of political activities for the Muslims from all parts of India. There were a good number of Baluch students at Islamia College, Lahore. They were encouraged by the local leaders to take active part in politics. The Muslim press of Lahore covered their activities. A report of a meeting in a newspaper of Lahore showed that Baluch students of Islamia College had formed "The Baluchistan Students Union" on February 20, 1940.92 Office bearers of this organization were also elected.

The Muslim press of Lahore fully supported the Baluch cause. Whenever a Baluch leader visited Lahore, he was invited by the editors and publishers of the newspapers for discussions. Khan Bahadur Arbab Karam Khan and Arbab Abdul Aziz visited the offices of Ehsan, Inqilab, Shahbaz and, Zamindar on February 9, 1940, "inducing the editors to favour the reforms in Baluchistan". They also approached the Nawab of Mardom, President of the Punjab Muslim League for his support.93 Their demands included the abolition of the Jirga and Sardari Systems, which were obviously aimed at the removal of authoritarianism of the Sardars. There was a strong rumour that Qazi Isa had drafted a resolution to that effect which was to be moved in the Central Legislative Assembly of India. The Sardars naturally upset with these developments.94

As indicated earlier, the initial response of the Sardars towards the Muslim League was supportive. But with the passage of time when they realized that Qazi Isa represented primarily the interests of the middle class and was not always responsive
to their narrow, tribal interests, they started creating problems for him and the League in the province. However, there was not much that they could do because the Baluchistan Muslim League was now a part of the larger, all-India organization. Very soon, their disappointments and frustrations were to be drowned in the new enthusiasm of the Baluch youth for Pakistan idea generated by the Lahore Resolution.

When the All-India Muslim League decided to put forward the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims, in its Lahore session of the League scheduled on March 22-24, 1940, preparations started all over Baluchistan to contribute to its success. A meeting of the Baluchistan Muslim League was convened on February 26, 1940 to discuss ways and means to help All-India Muslim League. It was decided that fifteen members and thirty volunteers in uniform would be dispatched to Lahore. Prince Abdul Karim announced a donation of twenty decorated belts and two hundred yards cloth for the uniform of volunteers. Eventually, a strong contingent from Baluchistan left for Lahore to participate in the historic session.95

A smart Baluchi headed the Guard of Honour presented to Jinnah at the Railway Station upon his arrival in the city of Lahore. Qazi Isa, representing the province of Baluchistan, forcefully seconded the Lahore Resolution.96 Impressed by their zeal and enthusiasm at the session, three Baluch students Fazal Ahmad Ghazi, Malik Abdullah Jan Kansi, and Fateh Muhammed Baluch, along with Qazi Isa, were invited by Jinnah to a tea party.97 In a meeting with Sardar Muhammed Usman Khan Jogazai, Jinnah advised him to expand the party into villages. He told him: "Take young students with you and organize mini-Leagues throughout Baluchistan".98

The Lahore Resolution was welcomed by the people of Baluchistan. A public meeting was held at Pishin. The meeting enthusiastically approved the Resolution. Prominent participants were Sardar Ghulam Muhammad Tareen, Arbab Karam Khan
Kansi, Haji Rahmatullah Doomer, and Sardar Usman Jogazi. Later, some prominent leaders also met at Jogazai’s residence at Qila Saifullah, and approved the Lahore Resolution.

To project the idea of Pakistan and to explain the Lahore Resolution to the masses, Qazi Isa, on Jinnah’s advice, invited Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni for a tour of Baluchistan. Maulana Badayuni toured Baluchistan from April 18-22, 1940. During the tour, he addressed public meetings at Rojhan, Quetta and Pishin. In his speeches, he strongly criticized the Congress, Hindu-majority community, and the so-called ‘nationalist’ Muslim leaders. He charged the Khilafat Committee, formed in 1919, of spending seventy thousands rupees just to project Gandhi’s image and make him a national leader.

Yusuf Ali Magasi was a torchbearer of Baluchistan’s political awakening. He contributed a lot for the cause of education in Baluchistan and hence he was regarded as the Sir Syed of Baluchistan. Both the Baluchistan Muslim League and the Watan party held him in high esteem. The Baluchistan Muslim League celebrated the “Magasi Day” on May 31, 1940, and held a public meeting at Quetta. Prominent leaders addressed the meeting. Maulvi Nurul Haq was one of the main speakers. He condemned the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind members who, according to him, used to go to Wardha and present themselves before Gandhi with folded hands and bowed their heads. Such condemnations not only hurt the cause of the Jamiat and its supporters in the Congress but also paved the way for the popularity of League in the province.

With the passage of time, the meetings of Baluchistan Muslim League started attracting more and more people from Baluchistan and other parts of India. In July 1940, the Quetta annual conference of Baluchistan Muslim League was addressed by Muslim League leaders from the U.P. such as Maulana Abdul Hamid
Badayuni and Liaquat Ali Khan Jinnah was also invited. He could not come because of illness but, in a message read at the conference, he exhorted the people of Baluchistan to "organize, unite and stand by the policy of All-India Muslim League like a block of steel and we shall succeed and realize our goal." The conference pressed for constitutional reforms in Baluchistan, electoral system in Quetta Municipal Committee, and demanded that all Muslim Colleges and other teaching institutions should be affiliated with the Aligarh Muslim University. In his Presidential Address, Liaquat Ali Khan proclaimed:

> Your province of Baluchistan, on account of its geographical situation, holds a unique position. The people of the province are the gatekeepers of India and for that reason at least, if for nothing else, God has made them of fine physique and martial temperament. The British Government has treated the province most unjustly, so much so, that its parallel cannot be given anywhere else in India.

So far, the Khaksars were quite close to the Baluchistan Muslim League. Thy supported the League's programmed and its activities. In this conference, the Khaksars came in large numbers. In turn, the Leaders of the Muslim League expressed their grief and concern over the incident of firing at the Khaksar gathering on March 19, 1940, at Lahore. Some speakers in the second annual Baluchistan Muslim League conference held at Quetta on March 25, 1941, strongly condemned the Punjab Premier, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, for his role in the firing on the Khaksars. Malik Jan Muhammad was most vocal in this condemnation. Finally, a resolution in favour of Khaksars and expressing confidence in the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Allama Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi was passed.

The first "Pakistan Day" was celebrated at Quetta with great enthusiasm. A large procession was taken out on March 23, 1941. Qazi Isk took salute of the Muslim
League National Guards.\textsuperscript{107} In fact, after this event, Baluchistan Leaguers became more active and started participating in the League sessions all over India. In April, Qazi Isa led the Baluchistan Muslim League delegates and National Guards to the All-India Muslim League annual session held at Madras in April 1941.\textsuperscript{108}

A well-attended session of the Baluchistan Muslim League was held at Quetta on May 31, 1941.\textsuperscript{109} The Baluchistan Muslim League continued to hold its sessions regularly and each meeting manifested its growing strength. Prominent League leaders from other provinces kept on visiting, addressing and guiding the League members in their struggle for Pakistan. Nawab Iftikhar Maridot presided the fourth annual session of the Baluchistan Muslim League in July 1942. Support for the Pakistan demand, provincial self-government for Baluchistan, a demand to release political detainees, including Nawabzada Abdur Rehman Bugti, and expression of confidence in Jinnah’s political leadership were the main highlights of this session.\textsuperscript{110}

Jinnah had a special attachment with Baluchistan. In 1943, he toured the province for a long time, from June 26 to July 18, 1943. The Muslim League paper, \textit{Al-Islam}, Quetta, covered the tour and reported every detail of his activities. This was Jinnah’s first visit to Baluchistan, and judging by the response of the people, he indeed manifested such qualities that both friends and foes flocked to see him, to seek his guidance and to ask for his help on various issues of interest. Jinnah knew that he was visiting to a tribal society, with its peculiar traditional social structure, but he was also keen to encourage a healthy change. Accompanied by his sister, Fatima Jinnah, and Lady Abduola Haroon, Jinnah impressed upon the Baluch the need to keep women along in every walk of life. As we have seen earlier, the conservative tribal leaders were generally opposed to women’s education and, consequently, their participation in political affairs. Jinnah’s initiative however impressed them, and Begum Qazi Isa and some other educated women of the province
came forward to set a precedent. This visit not only mobilized the people of Baluchistan in favour of Pakistan but also boosted the image of Muslim League in the masses. In addition, Prince Abdul Karim, brother of the Khan of Kalat and Khan’s Secretary, Abdur Rauf, sought an audience with Jinnah, and assured him of Khan’s full support for the cause of Pakistan. In Quetta, Jinnah also received not only the leaders and members of the Muslim League but also the leaders of Baluchistan Jamiat-ul-Ulama and National Party on July 2 and 7, 1943, respectively.

The Baluchistan Muslim League held a public meeting in honour of Jinnah on July 1, 1943 at Quetta. Qazi Isa presided. Next day, Jinnah hoisted the Pakistan flag in a ceremony. Jinnah also inaugurated the annual session of the Baluchistan Muslim League on July 3, 1943. Jinnah’s address was aimed at highlighting the social and economic problems of Baluchistan. He lamented that the lack of local self-government even at the level of Quetta Municipality, was due to the deliberate negligence and indifference of the government. He was dismayed at the lack of development both in the urban and the rural areas of the province and promised that he would raise these issues in the Central Legislative Assembly of India. He also asked the people to strengthen the Muslim League and to help him achieve Pakistan for the benefit of all the Muslims including the Muslims of Baluchistan. He further stressed:

Your strength lies by being with your own people. Take more interest in their betterment and happiness. Don’t depend on the patronage of the official. This patronage will be only momentary and would be withdrawn the moment their ultimate purpose is served. Seek your proper and real place in the hearts of your people and not at local Darbars. Jinnah wanted the people of Baluchistan to adopt a more positive and progressive attitude, and warned them:
Baluchistan has got a wonderful history but you have (you will forgive me) lived the same life. You have not made progress with the world or even with India; you have still your own system. You have been indifferent to what was going on in the world. I wanted to awake you up from fast sleep.114

True to the traditional culture of Baluchistan, the organizers of this convention presented him a historical sword. While accepting it, he did not forget to remind the people of Baluchistan that the real strength was not in the sword but in the pen, in education. As one writer has noted:

The extent of his (Jinnah) faith in the primacy of education could be gauged from the fact that when Baluchistan Muslim League in its conference on 4 July 1943 presented him a historical sword, which was announced to have been wielded in several battles in defence of Islam, he was not moved. He told them it will rise only in defence. But for the present the most important thing is education. Knowledge is a greater force than sword, go and acquire it. When you have done it then comes sword, which we have been wielding for the last thirteen centuries.115

During the conference, Yahya Bakhtiar, Vice President of the All India Muslim Students Federation, moved a resolution demanding more resources and opportunities for education in Baluchistan. Sardar Usman Jogazai seconded this resolution forcefully.116 Apparently, Jinnah’s words had moved them.

Jinnah also went to Kalat on 5 days tour from July 10 to 14, 1943. Prince Abdul Karim accompanied him from Quetta. The Khan of Kalat offered warm hospitality and pledged to support him to achieve his goal of Pakistan.117

During the early 1940s, the politics of Baluchistan was dominated by the Muslim League public meetings, resolutions in favour of Pakistan, demanding reforms in Baluchistan and identifying the cause of the Palestinians with the struggle for freedom.118 The Nawab of Bhopal and the Maharaja of Jodhpur visited Quetta on September 20, 1944.119 Such visits familiarized the Indian leaders with the situation in Baluchistan and the need for political developments in Baluchistan in line with the
mainstream politics of the Sub-continent. Jinnah was conscious of the commercial
domination of the non-Muslims in the province. In spite of the fact that Baluchistan
was predominantly a Muslim-majority area, the commerce was largely in the hands of
Hindus who were concentrated mainly in Quetta. Because of the constant efforts of
the Muslim League, the Baluchistan Muslim Chamber of Commerce was established
in 1944. 120

Before his departure from Quetta, Jinnah assigned Qazi Isa the task of writing
a booklet highlighting the Baluchistan case and asked that it be distributed among the
members of the Central Legislative Assembly members and the press. Qazi Isa
prepared the report and submitted it to Jinnah for further dissemination.121 Nawab
Muhammed Khan Jogazai and other leaders of Baluchistan sent telegrams to the
Viceroy saying that the “Muslim League is the sole representative of Muslims and
Jinnah is the sole official spokesmen of the Indian Muslims at Simla Conference.”122
The Muslim League members of Baluchistan warmly approved the stand taken by
Jinnah at the Simla Conference.123

Jinnah again came to Baluchistan on a five-week visit. He reached Quetta on
September 14, 1945 and left on October 20, 1945. This time, Jinnah stayed at Kalat
House, Quetta. During a public meeting, Jinnah declared the Islamia School Quetta, a
“Mini-Aligarh.”124

Khan Abdul Qayum Khan of Peshawar who was previously a staunch
Congressite and a Deputy leader of the Congress party in the Central Legislative
Assembly and had written a very critical book against Muslim League, came to
Quetta to plead Abdul Samad Achakzai’s case. During his stay, he sought an
interview with Jinnah on September 21, 1945, and assured him of his full support and
cooperation in his struggle for Pakistan. He also invited him to visit the NWFP. Khan
Qayum addressed a public meeting at Quetta on September 20, 1945, and criticized the British Foreign Secretary’s statement that “Baluchistan was not political minded” and that “There were few Sardars who were sufficiently educated”. He also denounced the Congress policies of opposing the introduction of political reforms in Baluchistan.125

At this stage, the Khaksar and the Ahrar leaders started opposing the Muslim League and Jinnah. The Hindu Press extensively published the hostile assertions of the Khaksar leader, Allama Mashriqi, and Maulvi Mazhar Ali Azhar, a prominent leader of the Ahrar. Jinnah, of course, refuted these allegations and declared them “mean actions.” During Jinnah’s stay, a prominent Punjab Muslim League leader, Sir Feroz Khan Noon, also visited Baluchistan. Jinnah also went to Mastung and stayed there for a week. He was guest of the Khan of Kalat. At Mastung, Jinnah visited a school. Mir Abdul Baqi Baluch, then a student recited a poem: “O God! This is the cry of the Muslims of India: Give us the country that is known as Pakistan”. Jinnah spoke in Urdu and assured his audience: “We will definitely achieve Pakistan.”126

It is usually argued by some Baluch nationalists that Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd was opposed to the Pakistan Movement, but the details of Jinnah’s visits to various Kalat state institutions, including the one to the Mastung School, show a different picture. Aziz Kurd, the Law and Justice Minister of Kalat state, not only himself welcomed Jinnah but his close family members also presented him bouquets. On October 15, 1945, his nephew, Mir Yusuf Kurd, presented him bouquet from his uncle to Jinnah, who, in his address, advised the students to remember that; “they are first Muslims and Pakistani then Baluch” 127Before leaving Baluchistan, Jinnah also addressed the Muslim students of Quetta on October 17, 1945, and advised them to study politics as part of their education.128
During his visit to Baluchistan, Jinnah was presented two Silver bars weighing about 15 maunds by an unidentified Muslim. Baluchistan was the highest contributor to the cause of Pakistan as compared to other areas of the Sub-continent in terms of population. They provided "Silver shells" in place of “bullets.”

Whenever there was an occasion, the Baluch leaders presented their case for reforms to the British authorities. For instance, when the British parliamentary delegation reached Karachi on January 9 1946, Mir Jaafar Jamali (member Sind Legislative Assembly), Malik Usman and Maulvi Ubaidullah Soomro presented a memorandum for introduction of political reforms in Baluchistan. The Baluchistan Muslim League also fought for local Muslims representation in public offices. Baluchistan Muslim League Council demanded on April 16, 1946:

1. A Muslim Education Superintendent should be appointed in place of a European Lady.
2. A Muslim lawyer should be appointed as sub-judge at Sibi. A non-Muslim’s appointment was protested.

Mir Jaafar Jamali generally represented the Baluch people. Apart from the Baluch, the Pashtoons were very conscious of their provincial rights. The Pashtoon tribal chiefs sent telegrams to the Cabinet Mission in 1946 pressing for Baluchistan’s separate entity. For instance, Nawab Muhammed Khan Jogazai and seven prominent Pashtoon chiefs told the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission that they were strongly opposed to the division of Baluchistan or its merger with neighbouring provinces. They insisted that the unity of Baluchistan must be maintained at all costs. The Nawabs, Sardars, Maliks and Motabirs were worried about the rumours of the dismemberment of Baluchistan. They demanded the unity and integrity the province.
In addition to the youth, children were also involved in the struggle for Pakistan. At Sibi, a "Children's Muslim League" formed. Another "Children's Muslim League" was formed at the Loralai meeting at Jamia Mosque on May 24, 1946. The Muslim students, as a whole, were very active in the struggle for Pakistan. The Baluchistan Muslim Students Federation played a major role. It held a major meeting in the Muslim League office at Quetta and pledged "to sacrifice their lives for the cause of Pakistan".

On May 31, 1946, Qazi Isa, in a public meeting of Baluchistan Muslim League, demanded the release of Nawabzada Abdul Rahman Bugti (a staunch Leaguer and brother of nowadays famous Baluch leader, Nawab Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti). He also protested against the atrocities on the Muslims committed by the Dogra Government of Kashmir. It showed that the party was alive to both local and national issues.

The Baluchistan Muslim League demanded was deeply interested in the affairs of Quetta Municipal Committee. It demanded the right of only Muslim members of the Municipal Committee to elect a Muslim Member of the Central Legislative Assembly of India. The League further demanded that Baluchistan Muslim representatives should be democratically elected, and the thirteen non-Muslim members of Quetta Municipal Committee should not vote for the election of the Muslim Member.

In fact, the first show of strength between pro-Pakistan and anti-Pakistan forces in Baluchistan was staged on the issue of elections to the Central Legislative Assembly of India. There were two candidates in the field representing the Muslim League and the Congress respectively. Nawab Mohammed Khan Jogazai represented the Muslim League. In addition, he had the support of some forty Muslim members of
Shahi Jirga. All of them went to the Agent to the Governor General to plead his case. The other candidate was Abdul Samad Achakzai who was supported by the Congress. He tried to divide the votes by encouraging more candidates to stand for elections, but he could get only 13 votes in his favour. Jogazai received 61 votes as reported by Mir Jaafar Khan Jamali to Jinnah. 139

With the passage of time, the Pakistan Movement gained momentum in the province and the Baluchistan Muslim League also progressed. Impressed by its efforts, the local Muslim members of other organization started joining the Muslim League. The Nazim-i-Aala of the Khaksar Party, Abdul Samad Khan, joined the Muslim League on August 23, 1946. 140 When in 1946, the All-India Muslim League protest against the attitude of the British Government over the issues of Pakistan resolved to renounce the official titles in protest against the attitude of the British Government over the issue of Pakistan, the Baluchistan Muslim League wholeheartedly responded to the central organization's decision and, on August 29, Eid Day, its leaders announced their renunciation of titles from the Eid Mosque rostrum. Most prominent leaders to do so were Nawab Arbab Karam Khan Kansi, Seth Fida Ali, Ali Bhai, Malik Faqir Mohammad Kansi, Sardar Ghulam Muhammed Khan Tareen, Malik Shahjahan Khan, and Maulvi Abdul Rashid Khan. 141

The Pashtoons of Baluchistan were very much involved in the fight for Pakistan. They were quite emotional about it. They would not allow any abusive language used against Jinnah or Pakistan. One instance of this emotionalism was demonstrated on the night of October 9, 1946, when a Muslims youth, Faiz Muhammed stabbed to death one Ram Chand at Fort Sandeman. Faiz Muhammed alleged that the Hindu fellow had abused Jinnah, which he could not tolerate. 142
By the end of 1946, the demand for Pakistan had gained considerable support and strength among the Muslim masses of India. The result was communal tension, growing day by day. Baluchistan was also charged with this tension. Being wealthy businessmen, non-Muslims were quite influential people in Quetta. In addition, they had the support of the British authorities. The Muslims felt insecure, and indeed started preparing themselves for physical fights, if need be. A “Jinnah Physical Club” was opened at Quetta to train the Muslim youth in martial arts. The non-Muslims had already started their own preparations. The Sikhs had started exercises with Kirpans (a small sword). The Hindus had opted for Lathis 143

By this time, the division of the Sub-continent had become imminent. But an unfortunate fall out of this development was the communal conflict in which Hindu-Muslim riots created problems everywhere. In Bihar, the Muslims were main victims which disturbed the Muslims of the other parts of India. Qazi Isa toured Baluchistan and addressed public meetings to inform the Muslims of the current situation. At the appeal of Qazi Isa, a “Bihar Day” was observed and a “Bihar Fund” was also generated to help the calamity-stricken Muslims. Relief missions were sent to Bihar to help them. Muslim League National Guards were sent to Patna to help the Muslims of Bihar in dealing with the difficult communal situation. They setup a camp at Patna. The Baluchistan Muslims also helped their famine-stricken co-religionists in Bengal. The Baluchistan Muslim League was keen to forge unity in the Muslim community and to help it as much as they could. Qazi Isa’s two speeches in this regard are worth quoting. He addressed a public meeting at Chaman on December 2, 1946, informing the masses about the “Bihar Massacre”. Two days later, Qazi Isa addressed a gathering at an Imambargah in Quetta emphasizing “Shia–Sunni unity”.144
Baluchistan had sent volunteers to agitate against the incident of Khakسار firing at Lahore in 1940. In 1946-47, the Baluchistan Muslim League sent workers to the Punjab for agitation against Khizar Hayat’s Unionist Government for its anti-Pakistan policies. They also courted arrest along with their Punjabi brethren at Lahore.143

The Quetta Municipal Committee was the only public forum where different sections of public opinion were represented. By the end of 1946, its elections were held. Although these elections were conducted on the basis of joint electorate system, but since the non-Muslims were very influential and opposed to the League, they tried their best to defeat the candidates of the Muslim League. But they did not succeed. The Muslim League managed to get all its candidates elected. They were Seth Fida Ali, Ali Bhai, Haji Ali Bahadur, Hafiz Salim Ahmad, Ghafoor Khan Durrani, and Malik Haji Muhammad Azim. The Watan candidates Mohammed Hashim and Sultan Mohammed were defeated. Agha Ahmad Shah of Jamiat-ul-Ulama was also defeated.146 At the time of Quetta Municipality elections, the communal situation was very tense and the danger of Hindu-Muslim riots was very high, but the Muslim League leaders remained calm and did their best to control the situation.

Nawab Muhammed Khan Jogazai was the only elected member of the Central Legislative Assembly of India from Baluchistan. Some anti-Muslim League circles tried to make a dent in his relations with the Muslim League. He promptly issued a press statement in support of the League.147 He gave proof of his loyalty when the League central command decided to boycott the Central Legislative Assembly proceedings. Jogazai, in a press statement, declared that Baluchistan would follow the League’s decision. He further assured: “Baluchistan is hundred percent with the All-India Muslim League and will offer every sacrifice to achieve Pakistan”. 148
By now, the Muslim League was a very popular Muslim organization throughout Baluchistan. Even in the States, branches of the party were established. However, when the Kalat State Muslim League applied for affiliation with the central organization on February 24, 1947, Jinnah refused. His argument was that, according to the party constitution, its jurisdiction was limited only to British India. It could not operate in the states.

Baluchistan Muslim League convened a Pakistan Conference at Quetta on April 27-28, 1947. Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, a top-ranking League leader from the United Provinces (UP), was invited. He reached Quetta on April 24, 1947. The conference resolved in favour of self-government in Baluchistan and pressed for the creation of Pakistan.

Baluchistan's women were also active in the struggle for Pakistan. The first meeting of the Muslim Girls Federation was held at Quetta on June 1, 1947. About 200 women attended the meeting. Dr. Ziauddin of Peshawar and others spoke on the occasion. A minister in the Interim Government and a top-ranking League leader, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, also visited Quetta from June 29 to July 2, 1947. Many Sardars called on him including Bugti and Jogazai. All of them assured him of their support for Pakistan.

Though youngest in formation and less equipped with the necessary network, the Baluchistan Muslim League had emerged in eight years, from 1939 to 1947, as the most important political organization in Baluchistan. All the prominent Muslim League leaders from other provinces came to address its meetings and to mobilize the masses in favour of the League and Pakistan. In spite of his hectic and busy schedule, Jinnah also spent a considerable time in Baluchistan, promoting the cause of the League and Pakistan. He was convinced that Pakistan promised the long-neglected
The rise and popularity of Muslim League in Baluchistan is indeed a fascinating chapter in the study of political development in an area characterized by ethnic and tribal divisions, urban/rural rifts, and personality clashes. Less than a decade's preserve of the Muslim League, Baluchistan had become a part of the Subcontinent's national politics. Whereas one could attribute this success to a host of factors, it was essentially the able leadership of Jinnah and his understanding of the socio-political environment of Baluchistan where propagation of extremist views was replaced by a careful and conscious program of accommodation and reconciliation of interests, particularly between the various ethnic, tribal, and social groups in the province.

However, there was no gainsaying that, in addition, to Jinnah's able political leadership; it was also the appeal of Islam and the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims, which, in the end, moved the people of Baluchistan. In this context, of course, the Muslim press and the writers and literary figures of Baluchistan also played a very crucial role in casting the final die in favour of Pakistan.
Notes

2. Baluch, Greater Baluchistan, p. 156.
5. Extract from Weekly Intelligence Summaries on British Baluchistan, OIOC-No.1/P &S9/12/3219, July 14, 1939 (on wards WIS).
8. WIS, June 28, 1940.
11. WIS, July 24, 1946.
14. Abdul Samad Achakzai’s statement in the Lahore High Court on October 26, 1956.
15. WIS, June 23, 1939.
17. Ibid., August 4, 1939.
18. Ibid., August 11, 1939.
19. Ibid., September 22, 1939.
20. Ibid.
21 Ibid., September 29, 1939.

22 Ibid., October 6, 1939.

23 Ibid., October 13, 1939.

24 Ibid., November 3, 1939.

25 Ibid., November 17, 1939.

26 Istaqial, November 24, 1939.

27 Ibid., November 26, 1939. Also WIS. December 1, 1939.

28 WIS, December 1, 1939.

29 Ibid.

30 Abdul Qayum, Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier (Bombay, 1945). The book was 'respectfully' dedicated to Dr. Khan Sahib, a Congress leader and brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

31 Ibid., February 23, 1940.

32 Ibid., April 26, 1940.

33 Ibid., May 17, 1940.

34 Ibid., May 31, 1940.

35 Ibid., June 14, 1940.

36 Ibid., August 9, 1940.

37 Ibid., September 13, 1940.

38 Ibid., October 4, 1940.

39 Ibid., October 11, 1940.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., October 18, 1940.

42 Ibid., November 22, 1940.

43 Ibid., December 20, 1940.
44 Ibid., February 7, 1941.
46 Ibid., September 6, 1942.
47 Ibid., October 25, 1944.
48 Ibid., July 4, 1945.
49 Ibid., October 17, 1945.
50 Pakhtoon, March 24, 1946.
51 Ibid., May 17, 1946.
52 WTS, April 17, 1946.
53 Ibid.
56 Ibid., November 27, 1946.
57 Ibid., January 1, 1947
58 Ibid., March 13, 1947.
59 WTS, August 25, 1939.
60 Ibid., September 1, 1939.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., September 22, 1939.
63 Ibid., October 6, 1939.
64 Ibid., October 13, 1939.
65 Ibid., July 12, 1940.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., February 20, 1942.


69 Ibid., July 21, 1939.

70 Ibid., October 20, 1939.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., November 24, 1939.

73 Ibid., November 22, 1939.

74 Ibid., January 12, 1940.


77 *WIS*, June 16, 1939.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., July 13, 1939.

80 Ibid., June 30, 1939.

81 Ibid., July 20, 1939.

82 Ibid., August 4, 1939.

83 Ibid., August 11, 1939.


86 Kausar, *Jido Jihad*, pp. 37-38. Later, Qazi Isa was also appointed a member of the All-India Muslim League’s Committee of Action, entrusted with the task of overhauling the Muslim League in the N.W.F.P. For details see, Stephen Alan Rittenberg, *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns* (Durham, 1988), pp. 184-85, 207.

87 *WIS*, November 10, 1939.
88 Ibid., October 6, 1939.
89 Ibid., October 13, 1939.
90 Ibid., November 28, 1939.
91 Al-Islam, December 15, 1939.
92 Ehsan, February 23, 1940.
93 WIS, February 16, 1940.
94 Ibid., March 1, 1940.
95 Jang, March 27, 1987.
96 Ibid.
97 Interview with Fazal Ahmad Ghazi.
99 Ibid.
100 Inqilab, April 30, 1940.
101 WIS, April 26, 1940.
102 Ibid., June 7, 1940.
103 Ibid., August 2, 1940.
104 The Quaid-i-Azam Papers, File No. 302, p.42. Also Inqilab, August 1 & 2.
1940.
105 Inqilab, August 2, 1940.
106 Al-Farooq, March 25, 1941.
107 Ibid.
108 WIS, April 16, 1941.
109 Al-Farooq, June 3, 1941. A well attended session of Baluchistan Muslim
League was held at Quetta on May 31, 1941.
110 Pasban, July 3, 1942.
111 Al-Islam, July 3, 1943.
112 Ibid., July 4, 1943.
113 Ibid., July 6, 1943.
116 Al-Islam, July 6, 1943.
117 Ibid., July 17, 1943.
118 Inqilab, March 25, 1944.
119 WIS, September 29, 1944.
120 Ibid. October 4, 1944.
121 Inamul Haq Kausar, Pakistan Movement and Balochistan (Quetta, 1999), pp. 46-49.
122 Ibid., July 18, 1945.
123 Inqilab, September 20, 1945.
124 WIS, September 26, 1945.
125 Inqilab, September 26, 1945.
126 WIS, October 3, 1945.
127 Hurmat, August 26, 1981.
128 WIS, October 24, 1945.
129 Ibid. See also Inqilab, October 22, 1945.
130 Kausar, Jido Jihad, pp. 241-43.
131 Ibid., p. 243.
132 Nawa-i-Waqat, April 17, 1946.
133 WIS, May 1, 1946.
134 Pasban, May 4, 1946.
135 *WIS*, February 27, 1946.

136 Ibid., May 29, 1946.

137 Ibid., May 8, 1946.

138 *Nawa-i-Waqat*, June 8, 1946.

139 Ibid., July 5, 1946.


141 *WIS*, August 28, 1946.

142 Ibid., September 4, 1946.

143 Ibid., October 16, 1946.

144 Ibid., October 23, 1946.

145 Ibid., December 11, 1946.

146 Ibid., February 19, 1947.

147 Ibid., December 17, 1946.

148 Ibid., January 22, 1947.


152 Ibid., pp.1046-47. The author has quoted a wrong date of his arrival i.e. April 26, 1947.

153 *WIS*, July 9, 1947.
CHAPTER 6
THE RESISTANCE LITERATURE AND THE BALUCH PRESS

Resistance literature is considered as an important factor in the development of political consciousness among subjugated peoples. Therefore, Baluchi resistance literature against British colonialism merits evaluation. Even a cursory glance at the history of Baluchi literature, manifests the pride and dignity that Baluch poets and epic writers have shown for their heroes. This literature also demonstrates anger and resentment against the intruders and ridicule against traitors. Not withstanding historical accuracy, the Baluch self-perception as the guardians of noble values is perpetuated in their literature. They trace their origin from Arabia and show their presence in almost every great battle, which was fought for the glory of Islam or for the glorification of Baluch culture.

Long before the British occupation of Baluchistan, the Baluch poets had condemned the high-handedness of the Portuguese and eulogized the bravery of a Baluch leader, Mir Hamal Junaidi, who was arrested by the Portuguese and was taken to Portugal.\(^1\) It does not mean that they were critical of only the Europeans. Other invaders like the Mongols and the Arghunides received the same treatment. However, in view of the scope of the present study, we will confine ourselves only to resistance literature produced against the British.

According to Mir Gul Khan Naseer, who was not only a poet but also a literary historian, there were clear, distinct phases of the resistance literature. In one of his books, *Baluchi Razmiya Shairi*,\(^2\) he divides the Baluch resistance literature into four phases. In the first phase, he looks at the pioneers, beginning with Mir Chakar Rind and Mir Gawahram Lashari and ending with the writers in the middle of the sixteenth
century. This poetry is mostly in the shape of ballads and epics, dwelling on the achievements of great Baluch leaders. The second phase covers the writings after the migration of Mir Chakar Rind and Mir Goharam Lashari from Baluchistan covering the period between the middle of the sixteenth century to the advent of the British. The third phase covers the British period up to 1930. The last phase, according to Gul Khan Naseer, is the phase of "National" poetry.

During 1930–47, the Baluch people used different methods and techniques to pursue their struggle for freedom from the British. There were not many battles fought, and thus not too many physical confrontations. Rather, they worked through constitutional and peaceful methods, principally through literature inspired by the political struggle of the Muslims in other parts of India against the colonial rule. Anjunan-i-Ittehad-i-Baluchan provided the platform and took the lead in disseminating diverse ideas, ranging from Communism to Khilafat movement and anti-British slogans borrowed from the Indian National Congress.

Raham Ali Marri (1876–1933) was one of the most prominent Baluch poets who, not only composed poetry, but also actively participated in fights against the British. In one of his long epics, he addressed the "traitors" who sided with the British and says that "like a cattle herd, they followed the pagans and lost their faith both in their history and religion". In fact, there are numerous references of early Islamic heroes in Raham Ali’s poetry to show that the British aggression in Baluchistan and the Baluch resistance was like a war between truth and falsehood: "With the blessing of God and for the honour of Ali’s horse, we will kill this serpent (the British) which has sneaked into our homes". Raham Ali was particularly critical of the British collaborators without whose help the British would never have been able to occupy Baluchistan. He saw them as enemies of the Baluch and Islam. He
was not very happy with the state of society in Baluchistan. In his opinion, “half of
the people were in deep slumber on their guiled cushions and the other half, like
vagabonds, spent their nights in search of resting place. According to him, “some
enslaved others to enhance their status and luxury and comfort, and others starve and
cry for food during the last hours of night”. In this sense, his poetry certainly went
beyond the parameters of the British colonialism as he held traditional Sardari system
primarily responsible for the miseries and backwardness of the Baluchi people.

Raham Ali’s verses reveal his keen interest in ensuring that his tribe, the Marri
tribe, known for its valour and bravery, continued to keep the torch of freedom alive.
He himself participated in the battle of Harab fought in 1918 between the Marri tribe
and the British Indian army. He wrote several poems to inspire the tribe in their fights
against the British. In one of the poems, he said:

The brave fighters of Marri tribe gathered in the valleys at the request
of Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri. All the saints and the Holy Prophet
(PBUH) bless you. They are saddling their horses and their turbans are
following around their shoulders. Suddenly the British appear along
with their fighter planes. These brave Marris stood like a solid rock
with their girdles and tussles, tied with one another. They were
martyred for protecting their honour. The clouds sent rain and they
were blessed by God.8

Another poem, written in the same year on another front, Gumbaz, evokes
even more hatred against the British:

Lo! The final hour has struck for a decisive war between the British
and the Baluch. There is none who will not dance at the sound of
clashing swords. Forward Ghazis9 and Shahids,10 decorate your horses.
This humiliating slavery we are not made for. We have to leave this
world one day, determined we are that we will lay down over lives for
the glory of the Almighty and will be rewarded in the world and the
world hereafter. We loathe the British money and glitter. Our God, He
alone, is enough for us. No one will stay behind in this final clash and
the world will always remember our daring deeds against the British.11
Raham Ali became very popular with the tribesmen, particularly with the Marri tribesmen, both the young and the old used to recite his poetry. And, it always worked. After all, who else told them that: “Before going out to fight the British, the Marri Baluch warrior, wears perfumes on his beard and drenches his moustaches in scent. With velvet he covers his body and with flowers he decorates his horse”.12

Raham Ali strongly condemned those Baluch leaders who had either accepted money from the British or had supported them out of fear. In his view, they were traitors not only to their own glorious tradition of courage and bravery but also had lost their faith in Islam. Raham Ali had nothing but contempt and ridicule for them. He wrote: “That those people who have run away from the difficult times are now safely living in the Karachi area and are enjoying carrot and fish”.13

Raham Ali stands out as the most prominent poet of his time. He participated in many campaigns against the British. His poetry, therefore, is mainly autobiographical. He says, “Those nations who like comfort and peace are ultimately destroyed. Self respect and honour are considered the deeds of real glory for nations”. According to Raham Ali, not only the Baluch and Afghans but other Muslims have bartered their country for a very small price. Hence, slavery has saturated their bone marrow like the wine gets into one’s senses. He emphasized “Self respect,” “honour and chivalry” throughout his writings.14 Like most folk poets, Raham Ali was not formally educated in any school but he had this remarkable ability to convey his feelings in inspiring and provocative language. Raham Ali’s popularity, his glorification of the Marri culture, his hatred of the British, and disparagement of the “loyal” Baluch leaders, ultimately led to his exile. Soon, the people demanded his return and, in fact, a delegation was sent to bring him back. But he could not return to his native place. He died in 1933 and was buried in Musa Khel, Loralai.15
Another poet who also became very popular with the Baluch was Muhammad Khan Marri (1850–1932) who was educated on traditional Muslim lines and who, too, hated the British intensely. This hatred was further intensified because of his active participation in various battles against the British. He is reported to have defeated the British forces at Kochali. In one of these encounters, Muhammad Khan Marri was arrested and sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment. He spent these years in Poona jail and returned to his homeland after his release.16 He was not only a good poet but was very fond of holding poetry sessions at his house, which used to continue beyond midnights. His poetry about the battles of Gumbaz and Kochali became quite popular and continued to influence people even after his death. A specimen of his poetry is as follows:

Early in the morning, I was sitting in the mansion and I saw a plane. I cried, O Marrs! Prepare your army and pray for martyrdom, perfume your beautiful beards and say goodbye to your dear ones. The gardens of Paradise are worth your visit but only if you lay down your lives. Those killed in the battles of Gumbaz and Kochali are the flowers of Paradise. Swings are waiting for them in the dense gardens of heavens.17

Baluch poets were particularly harsh on those who sided with the British. For example, one poet of the same Marri tribe, Giddu Doom noted:

Those who have forsaken the Baluch people against the British atrocities let me tell you that they are cheats. But we are here to stay on the same rocks to face the same aggression that we have been victim of thousand times before. Our bravery and courage has not given way but you people have lost your Baluch honour just for a few rupees that you get in serving these infidels.18

Addressing the Sardars of the Sarawan and Jhalawan tribes who had not helped Mir Mehrab Khan in his encounter with the British in 1839, he went on to chide:
O: The good people of Sarawan, you lost your empire because of your foolishness. But then you had already said goodbye to your honour when you started loving the life of slavery. The British took away your Kalat and took away your camel-loads of treasures through the Bazaars to Calcutta but you, for a few pennies, turned into traitors.19

It must be noted here that from Jhalawan, only Wali Muhammad Khan Shahizai Mengal and Mir Abdul Karim Khan Raisani had helped the Khan of Kalat against the British. Mulla Muhammad Hasan, another poet, refers to Mir Mebrab’s struggle in these words:

Like torrents of rain, your guns roared, but the palace and the fort was occupied by the enemies. When the royal battle began, the Khan roared like a lion with majesty and anger. He had the royal dress, crown in one hand and the rock like shield and sword in the other. He unsheathed his sword and fell on his enemies invoking the power of Ali. 20

Giddu Doom likened the allies of the British to the party of Yazid (the Umayyad ruler who had ordered the extermination of the Holy Prophet’s grandson and family). That is how the Muslim poets, inspired by such phases in their history, often used similes and metaphors in their poetry.21 Raham Ali also commented at the death of Mir Mehrab Khan (1839) in these words:

Did you see how he struck the pagans when world saw his electrifying sword. Like a lion he fell, his face shining like silver. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) welcomed him at the fountain of ‘Kausar’ (the channel of pure and heavenly water in paradise). The way he embraced the martyrdom is without any other rival. May God bless him.22

These verses continued to inspire not only the Marri tribesmen but also other Baluch freedom fighters throughout the British period. However, it was Mulla Mazar Bangalzai who composed a poem, Lat Sahib Ki Baghi, i.e., “The Chariot of the AGG (Agent to the Governor General)”, which moved the hearts and minds of the people and came to be treated as a national anthem. The background to the epic was
coronation of George the V in 1911. The Delhi Darbar, which was held to honour the King-Emperor, became a grand event in the political history of the Sub-continent. All the Nawabs, Rulers, and Rajas of the Princely states in the British India were invited and were told about the special way of salutation while passing before the throne of the Emperor. Khan of Kalat, Mir Mahmud Khan II, however, disregarded this special salute and decided to welcome the King Emperor in his own way by brandishing his sword. The Government of India considered it a discourtesy and decided to humble the Baluch Sardars in their own backyard. All the prominent Sardars of different tribes were invited to the Residency at Sibi and were asked to pull the chariot of the AGG from Sibi Residency to the Railway Station. Except for Sardar Khair Baksh Marri, all the Sardars participated in this disgraceful act.

Mulla Mazar witnessed this event and composed a stirring poem, which ridiculed the Baluch leaders except for Khair Baksh Marri whose sense of honour and dignity was deeply appreciated. Mulla Mazar, in fact, called it as the wrath of God on the Sardars who, like the beasts of burden, pulled the carriage of an “infidel” without any sense of dignity and self-respect. Indeed, he described at length the whole event depicting the Englishman’s carriage being pulled through mud and rain, with Baluch Sardars losing grip on their turbans and leaving their sandals stuck in the mud. According to him, these tribal leaders were good only at looting the poor and betraying their own folks. While, “pulling this carriage, these leaders parted with the honour of their country. Neither had they cared for their own dignity nor for their people. What spectacle it was, every low and high watched them blackening their own faces and those of their people”. He was convinced, “that on the Day of Judgment, God will throw these Sardars in the Hell”. This was indeed a tirade both against the tribal leaders as well as the people who were their subjects.
Mulla Mazar became a legend soon, and writers, poets and historians of Baluchistan consider their work incomplete without paying tributes to him. Since he had condemned all the Baluch leaders, by name, the Sardars asked the government of the British Baluchistan to punish him. Mulla Mazar was exiled from Baluchistan. He went to Sindh, and after his death he was buried at Jacobabad.23

Recalling the shameful episode at the Residency, Raham Ali has also paid compliments to Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri. As he described it: “O Sardar Khair Bakhsh! A million greetings to you because you still have the honour of Baluch in your eyes. You have proved true to your mother’s nourishment. May God give you a life as long as the Jhalgari Mountain”. 24 In another poem, Raham Ali exclaimed:

Sardar Behram Khan Mazari gave the British one hundred men in the First World War. The Buzdars of Highlands gave fifty, Dareshak eighteen and Misri Khan went along with ten horses. But we are Marris and with our leader Khair Bakhsh, we will fight against the British and our Lord Hazrat Ali, on his horse, will come to our help and we will crush the heads of the British like we do with the snakes. 25

This Residency event became a source of aspiration for many poets and a mark of humiliation for these Sardar who released the horses from the Resident’s buggy and pulled it as a sign of loyalty to the British.

Baluchistan has a long tradition of maintaining its identity, dignity and pride. The Baluch always take pride in two things: being a Baluch in true sense of word and showing bravery against the enemy. 26 Even the lullabies of Baluchistan convey these feelings: “I sing to my dear son this lullaby so that he sleeps. I pray that my son becomes a young man, has good friends and wears all the six Baluchi arms on his dress.” 27 Another lullaby says that this comes from the heart of a mother that when there is a battle in the deserts, “my son will be standing under shade of the swords.” Yet another lullaby, which is known as the ‘Lullaby of Mir Qambar, has a mother say:
O, my son, the light of my eyes, if you embrace death and become a martyr for national honour and prestige, I will not cry but would come to your grave with pomp and show, and I will sing the song of celebration and happiness, and for each son who is killed for the honour of my land, I will produce another son.28

Another lullaby addressed Sibi:

O Sibi, you are hidden in the dust of horse riders. You have lost many priceless lives of those seven hundred handsome and youthful men who used to wear their turbans with grace and would ride horses without reigns. There is no one left today. All of them have been swallowed by the Indian swords.29

Baluchi literature, in fact, is full of references against the foreign invaders, that is, the Portuguese, the Mongols, the Arghuns, and the British. They are condemned for attacking the freedom and honour of the Baluch people. The British were a particular target. In the words of one Baluch poet, Yousuf Nami Baluch, “if God grants me an opportunity, I will show you how a battle for freedom is fought”.30

Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, an important literary figure started a political movement called the “Young Baluch” in 1920s. He was inspired by the “Young Turks” and wrote extensively in newspapers, magazines and pamphlets about the Baluch identity as well as an independent state of Baluchistan. What made Aziz Kurd famous was Shamshardi a critique of the rule of Shams Shah, the Prime Minister of Kalat, which was published from Lahore in 1931. Mir Yousuf Aziz Magsi wrote the preface of this book saying:

This is the tale of a destroyed and forsaken people. It is aimed at their awakening. It should be a clarion call. It should act like Moses’s staff against a Pharaoh of the twentieth century. It is clarion call for the inactive and indifferent brethren of Baluchistan. It calls the British Government to honour the right of people in the choice of their rulers.31
Aziz Magsi became an important figure in literary circles. His verses not only showed literary merit but also conveyed a deep sense of commitment to the freedom of his 'motherland', Baluchistan. As he put it: “I swear by the brave blood of the Baluch that I will wipe out the mark of slavery from the face of my country and my motherland will drink the wine of liberty.”

Unfortunately, Magsi has been presented as a lesser Muslim and more of a Congressite and a Communist by certain nationalist Baluch elements. But these are sweeping statements, which do not take into consideration his own words. In one of his poems, he said: “The voices of Gandhi and Jaikar could not do much. Now we need some one like Karim (Ataturk) to put the life in this dead body”. Thus, in politics, his ideal was neither Gandhi nor any one else but the leader of Turkey who had changed the destiny of the Muslims of that country. So far as his intellectual outlook was concerned, he claimed:

I intend to convert the whole world to Islam a fresh. And this is possible if I become a servant of Islam. Once again could I remind every body the forgotten lessons and every Baluch I would turn into a preacher of the Holy Quran. The sermons of Gandhi and Malviya will disappear into oblivion if I show the saying of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH).”

The fact of the matter was that Aziz Magsi was a Muslim like any other Muslim Baluch writer. All he sought for the Baluch and Baluchistan was freedom. As he dwelt at length in one of his poems, addressed to a singer:

Keep singing, keep singing,
Let your Melodies warm our blood,
Let the people of Baluchistan feel ashamed,
What is slavery, whenever it descends on any nation; it is misery and humiliation,
Wake up, the World Revolution.
Let the genie be out of the bottle.
The rich savour chickens and the poor grass.
Destiny changes our fate;
Crush those leaders, who betray their people.
O beautiful singer, Listen to this song of Freedom.
You too O Baluch listen!
Rise and open your eyes.
Eliminate; this instant, eliminate,
Whoever is following the footprints of Changez.
Whether it is a Baluch Sardar or the Englishman,
Both represent the powers of the devil.\(^{33}\)

Nawabzada Abdur Rehman Bugti and Mir Muhammad Hussain Anqa also appear as prominent writers in the resistance literature. In one of his poems, Bugti charged:

The irony of fate produced such Baluch whose heads should be severed. They give their blood in making God out of Devil like-sparks. They burn the harvest of truth. They fight against the truth, days and nights and they say they protect the evil. They let the boat of justice sink the hurricane and bring to shores oppression and injustice. Amazing suns and moons, they are, banish light at the order of their masters and lengthen the shadow of darkness.\(^{36}\)

This kind of protest and resistance targeted not only the British but also the case-loving and status-conscious Sardars of Baluchistan. In some instances, the sons revolted against their fathers for their docility and subservience to the British. Bugti, for instance, wrote a pamphlet against his father who was amongst those who had pulled the carriage of the Agent to the Governor General at the Residency. After condemning his father in the pamphlet called *Mehrabgardi*, he appealed to the Muslims of India in the name of Islam and the Holy Prophet (PBUH) to help the Baluch in their fight against the Sardari system. Quoting the verse of a famous poet-journalist, Zafar Ali Khan, he wrote: “If you no longer have the fear of God, still beware of the angry looks of the Holy Prophet” (PBUH). He continued:

I appeal the Muslims to look at our condition before it is too late.... Help us the oppressed people of Baluchistan, through the columns of your paper and we request the members of assembly and the council, the saints and pirs that the Prophet is not happy at the oppression of the people of Baluchistan at the hands of Sardari system.\(^{37}\)
Bugti was arrested and exiled to Ranchi in Bihar province. After his release, he lived in abject poverty and died at Jacobabad in 1958.

Mir Muhammad Hussain Anqa worked as editor for some of Aziz Magdi's newspapers. He was born in 1907, and, in 1932, he resigned from his job as a school teacher in order to actively join the Baluch 'nationalist' movement. In addition to serving on the editorial board of several nationalist newspapers, he was also one of the founders of the Communist Party of Baluchistan, and he was to spend much of his life in prison due to his political activities. Anqa was one of the first writers to employ the Arabic-Urdu script for Baluchi in 1920. His poems were published in the newspapers he edited. After his death in 1977, a number of his poems in Baluchi were compiled and published in an anthology entitled Tawar.

Anqa's life was devoted to political struggle. He tried to reach the people of Baluchistan through his columns and resistance poetry. In one of his poems, he wrote:

Now that we have put our boat in the ocean, let the waves roar, let the night be dark, we will find our destination. Every oppressor is defeated by the oppressed that is the verdict of history. I know the Baluch sword is broken but let the enemy not be jubilant, we have the determination; indeed, we are weak, but still, we have hands (which will fight against our enemies).

Anqa's poetry inspired other poets like Gul Khan Naseer and Azat Jamaldini (Abdul Wahid). Anqa glorified the Baluch and Baluchi life style. He is, however, not as fervently revolutionary in his poetry as the others. Although in his youth, he was one of the founders of the Communist Party of Baluchistan, he revised some of his communist ideas subsequently. Nevertheless, Anqa remained committed to his people and their national struggle throughout his life. In one of his poems, he asked the Baluch:
Stand up, make yourself aware,
Stand up, Baluchi tribe.
You are Chakar, you are Taimur.
To be without a country is not good.
Looking for the desire of Yousaf Ali's spirit,
Searching for a new life for the new Baluch.
Stand up, oh Baluch,
So that all the people become one.
Now, they look like separate individuals.
May their blood be one.41

Abdul Wahid (Azat) Jamaldini in his first poem, *Owl*, condemned the Sardars and the Sardari System in clear, unambiguous terms. In fact, this remained the hallmark of his poetry. As he noted:

We will pull the Sardars out of the community.
These wolves and Nawabs, the bloodsuckers.
These biting black snakes.
These traitors to the Baluch nation.42

During the last decade of the freedom struggle in Baluchistan, that is, 1937-47, Mir Gul Khan Naseer (1914-1983), in particular, emerged as a political activist, poet and writer of considerable impact. His career began in his school days at Quetta when he started writing inflammatory essays in Urdu. During his university days at Lahore (in 1934), he excelled in Urdu and Persian and studied history and English. Like most young educated people of his time, he was also inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. He joined the *Anjuman-i-Itehad-i-Baluchan* in 1929, and started advocating radical social, economic, and political changes in Baluchistan. After graduating from the University of Punjab (1937), he returned to Kalat and became active in the Kalat State National Party, which was considered the successor of the now defunct *Anjuman*. Soon, he rose to be its Vice President. He was arrested and imprisoned many times, and was finally banished from Quetta and the British Baluchistan and also remained under house arrest for sometime. In 1940, he made
peace with the authorities and accepted the office of Tehsildar in Jiwani, a small town at the Makran coast, "sufficiently remote to preclude much political activity." He wrote primarily in Urdu during the period under review. His works have been published in nine volumes. A critical review of his verses reveal that he was a 'nationalist' Baluch, deadly opposed to the Sardari System and was concerned at the laxity and indifference of his fellow countrymen towards the oppressive policies of the British. In one of his (first) Baluchi poem, *Baya O Baluch*, he said:

Come, oh Baluch, come oh Baluch,
I tell (you) something today,
Come, oh homeless Baluch, you have lost your way,
A gang of robbers has attacked your land,
They have set afire your houses,
They have carried away your possessions,
But you are not aware,
A heavy sleep upon you, has made you unaware,
Hands and tongue have ceased to function,
It has fettered the manly lion.⁴⁴

In another poem, *Faryad*, he lamented and invoked the demand of Baluch pride, rise and fight for their rights. He wrote:

Where are the skilled Mughal riders today?
Where are the brave (and) famous ones today?
Where are the Heroes and Indian tigers?
Where are the fighters with Afghan daggers?
Where are the green scimitars of the Baluch?
Where are the Turks and the swift Tartars-o-sleep?
Let them come today to the fatherland.
For the name and sign of the Mughal have been lost,
The bitter infidels have taken our pure land,
Let them come, let them see, let them be ashamed.⁴⁵

Similarly, in *Swagat*, he complained that the Baluch have fallen from their former glory. He asked them to stand up for their fatherland, as other Muslim nations had done. As he put it:
Stand up, stand up, young man, stand up.
How long will you sleep drunk on the bedding.
You see the Turks with curled moustaches.
They have tied bullets and guns to their body.
(And) are going forward for dignity and fame.
On the other side the Arab with cloak and Turban
The soldiers of the holy war have taken up weapons.
The state of Iran is in dust – storm,
See what the glory of Iran is like...
The sleeping Afghan is now alert,
He is sitting ready with girded loins. 46

In another poem Grand, his patriotic and revolutionary thought was much evident. He glorified Baluchistan, but at the same time, posed the question; “Is it crime to have been born Baluch”? He continued: “I uproar. I drive away oppression; I make the motherland a new bride; I make it free, I am a rebel! I am a rebel! I am a rebel.” He ended his poem anticipating a revolution. 47

In Nowjawanon Gon, the young and brave Baluch freedom fighters were urged to bring the old Sardari System to an end. “Throw a stone on the Sardari System’. He called for the foreign oppressors to be driven out of the country with the word, “deliver the people from the foreign (rule) and in this way Baluch honour and dignity to be saved”. 48

In another poem, Balot–a-Sair, Naseer saw it as his duty to make the Baluch aware of their slavery: “Your plain and open fields (are) slaves; The barren plains and deserts (are) slaves; Your heart and your soul (are) slaves; You (are) worse then slaves. 49

However, Gul Khan Naseer was hopeful that the brave and heroic Baluch will be able to shake off the yoke of slavery, both that of the foreign masters and that of their oppressive Sardars. In Dil Mazan Kan, again, he painted a picture of a future happy state for the Baluch. He said: “The oppressive government of the infidels will
come to an end, suffering and trouble and affliction will come to an end. Light will come and darkness will come to an end".  

Gul Khan Naseer was extremely unhappy with the way the British had ruled Baluchistan. But, in the end, he blamed the Sardari system for the sufferings of the Baluch. In a poem entitled *Prayer*, he wrote:

> O my Creator! Give me courage to awaken,  
> The Baluch from their deep slumber;  
> The Sardars have darkened the faces of the Baluch people;  
> Let me put them one by one on the gallows.  

In 1940, in his poem, *Qabailee Sardaron Say*, he addressed the Sardars in these words:

> Look at the horizon, Look at the thunder storm,  
> The lightening has struck your boat,  
> Now you will reap the harvest of what you had sown,  
> Remember the old saying that you receive what you give,  
> The Raj that you have served is now going to be over,  
> Your sustainer had sailed from thousand of miles,  
> His ship is sunk and anchor is lost,  
> Your Lord, Your Master, whom you served,  
> Is leaving now and you better accompany him,  
> Don't lure us into new cobwebs of your words,  
> We are fed up with your presence,  
> Listen carefully; the British Sarkar is doomed for good,  
> Will never return, now the people will rule,  
> Before you fool,  
> No leader, no ruler, no chief, we will allow,  
> None will starve, none will remain in fetters,  
> No capitalist will you see now,  
> This pure land will be ruled by the people,  
> None to prostrate, none to take the throne,  
> The lightening strikes again,  
> Do you hear the thunder, worry not,  
> You sowed the poison Ivy, now taste its fruit.  

In another poem, Gul Khan Naseer attacked the Sardars and the Sardari system for all its excesses:
I am chained without any fault,
Imprisoned without any conviction,
But listen Sardar! I am son of Islam and,
I will burn to ashes your mansions and your soft and gilded chair,
I am intoxicated by the message of Islam and Shariat,
I will not rest until I implement the true spirit of Islam,
What amazing system you have given us,
You sodomize, you rape, but no blemish on you,
You hide all the crimes under the title of Sardar.\(^5\)

The institution of ‘Jirga’ was strengthened by the British and was used by the
Sardars to punish the freedom fighters and particularly those who refused to cooperate
with the British. In one of his poems called \textit{Jirga}, he criticized the system in strong
words:

\begin{quote}
The irony of fate with the Baluch,
Because of Jirga, eliminate the Baluch,
Strengthen Jirga, \textit{"Allah-o-Akbar"},
Has no place in Sardari system,
Disbelief and paganism shows its face in Jirga,
Patriotism and love for land becomes a crime,
Heads of these lovers roll through the sword of Jirga,
If we stop, the hammer of Sardar crushes us,
Escape one cannot,
We are chained by Jirga,
Those who want the flowers to blossom in our desert,
Their hearts are pierced by the arrows of Jirga,
It is nothing but the enemy of laws, principles and Shariat for us,
Straight from the Hell has come the penal code,
That is Jirga,
Naseer! Worry not; it is bound to be eliminated,
Absurd, Absurd, those who say that,
God has decreed Jirga.\(^6\)
\end{quote}

The breadth and depth of Gul Khan Naseer’s poetry is amazing. Sometime, he
addressed his people in the form of a prayer. Sometime, he inspired his listeners with
history and the message of Islam. At times, he employed Altaf Hussain Hali’s verses
from \textit{Mussadas}. Very often, Allama Muhammad Iqbal’s ideas were clearly
discernible. His concept of “Mard-i-Momin,” is evident in many poems. One of his
poems, *The Sleeping Youth of my Country* is written on the pattern of Hali’s epic and begins with a verse of Hali with the same style and same tone. For the most part, however, Gul Khan Naseer remains preoccupied with the plight of the Baluch and the cruel treatment meted out to them by the Sardars and the Sardari system. For example, in one of his poems, *Raj Karay Sardar* (How the Sardar Rules), specifically addressed to the Sardars, he says:

The children cry of hunger,
The old men are homeless,
The mothers weep in hidden corners,
How brother! Neither charity nor even someone to borrow money from,
But Sardar is our ruler,
There is no end to cries of infants,
Lovers go to bed without food,
The beloved are selling even their beauties, but
O brother! The Capitalist is still hungry,
And my Sardar rules over us,
Without food, without clothes are the miserable people,
Wailing and crying is heard from every house,
But Sardar wants work without wages,
Be it a Gardner or a Bijjar,
Our Sardar rules us, cuts throat, picks pockets, blood sucking, leechy creature
Bone ribs and skulls are its victims,
O brother! Through the instrument of Jirga,
Our Sardar rules us,
He creates feuds, banishes brotherhood,
Puts brothers against the brother,
And with both hands sweeps wealth through bribery.
O brother! He is our Lord,
Amazing are the ways of my beloved land,
The people go hungry and naked,
But the music of money makes those parasites dance,
O brother! Sardar rules over us,
Our lords, these darlings of Crown,
Intoxicated with their power and wealth,
Why should they listen to our cries?
O brother! They are gods of this earth,
These Sardars rule us.
The Baluch Press

British colonialism was primarily founded on the ideas of mercantilism and utilitarianism to exploit the natural and human resources of India and to defend British interests against the foreign and native elements opposed to their rule. In Baluchistan, in particular, the British goal was to safeguard the interests of imperialism against possible encroachments and intrusions from the West—apparently the North West.

Among many innovations that the British introduced in India like the rail, roads, post and telegraph, and educational institutions, the printing press was the most important instrument both in educating their subjects on the 'blessings' of the British Raj as well as in inculcating a sense of community among the people. No wonder, while discussing the implications of the failure of the Uprising of 1857 in India, Karl Marx had anticipated that the introduction of modernized systems of communication would bring a revolution in British India.57

If we look at the development of the resistance literature and press in Baluchistan, we realize that the written words went a long way in bringing the grievances of Baluchistan to the forefront not only amongst a few educated inhabitants of this province but also in the larger Sub-continent as a whole. Furthermore, the press outside Baluchistan also played an effective role in the political development of Baluchistan.

Various studies on the role of the press in Baluchistan divide its development into two phases. The first phase started in 1888 and ended in 1935, on the eve of the terrible Quetta earthquake. The second phase began with the rebirth of Quetta city in the after-math of the earthquake to the independence of the area from the British
domination. Quetta being the center of British activities boasted of quite a few printing presses including the Victoria Press, Islamia Press, Albert Press, Curzon Press, Mercantile Press and the Civil and Military Press. However, because of the way in which Baluchistan was governed, the press did not exist in the sense in which it is understood today. So much so that the Indian Press Act of 1867 was not in operation in Baluchistan. Whatever was published in the shape of newspapers and magazines was allowed under a special notification issued in June 1891.

The permission to install a press was granted after a lengthy procedure in which it was demanded that the paper would have no political orientation or ideology. Commercial advertising or the promotion of social issues was considered to be the only relevant areas for journalism. But, most importantly, loyalty of the publisher and the editor to the British Crown was deemed essential before the permission to start a newspaper was granted. The result was that most of the newspapers, weeklies or monthlies issued under these provisions could not be considered very objective or useful because they were not allowed to reflect the true aspirations of the people.

In all, about nine newspapers appeared from Quetta. The monthly *Baluchistan Advertiser*, started its first publication on November 1, 1888, and, as is evident from the title, carried mostly advertisements. *The Baluchistan Gazette* also appeared in the same period. Mancharji, a Parsi businessman owned this paper. A few Englishmen also worked for this weekly, and it carried the news about postings and transfers of the British army and civilian officers, in addition to a few advertisements. Similarly, *The Border Weekly News*, which began its publication on August 23, 1889, carried news of activities and movements of the British army officers. *The Daily Baluchistan Gazette* started appearing on the second day of declaration of the First World War (September 2, 1939), and was aimed at
highlighting the British point of view during the war. During the peak war years, it used to appear twice everyday, morning and evening. In 1915, a Muslim from Amroha, Khalilur Rehman, was appointed its editor. After the end of the war, this paper was turned into a biweekly and, soon after, it was reduced to a weekly publication.64

The Rastgaw was the first Urdu daily which apprised its readers of developments of the World War. It printed only the news that were telegraphically received from Bombay. But like so many other newspapers, it was also closed down after the end of the War in 1918. The Qandeel-i-Khayal was essentially devoted to literary, academic and social activities. By this time, Urdu had become popular in Baluchistan, and the fact that this paper started from Loralai in 1908, indicates the impact of Urdu language and literature in this remote area of the province. The names of Sardar Muhammad Yousuf Khan, Khan Bahadur Nabi Bakhsh Khan Asad, Maulana Illahi Bukhah, Wazirzada Abdul Ahad Khan, Syed Abid Shah and Waqar Anbalvi, the editor of Ihsan, appeared on its editorial board. Because of financial hardships, however, this paper ceased to publish after one year. The Baluchistan Herald and The Quetta News were started by the owners of the Albert Press and the Curzon Press, respectively, from Quetta in 1918 but were closed down even before they were really established, in 1930. Baldev Rai Sihai started the Monthly Nausherman in Urdu, which contained literary and academic news and comments and lasted until the 1935 earthquake.65

This cursory glance at the development of indigenous press in Baluchistan gives us some idea about the situation of the press in this period. It showed that even non-political newspapers and magazine could not take off. The problems were essentially created by the repressive control of the British administration, which were
compounded because of lack of funds, a small readership and the lack of proper infrastructure. Realizing this precarious situation, the concerned publishers, editors and writers thought of starting newspapers either from Sind or the Punjab. These two provinces were also under the British rule but compared to Baluchistan, the press laws were much more congenial for the success of publications.

Those journalists who migrated from Baluchistan included Mir Muhammad Hussain Anqa, Muhammad Nasim Talvi, Muhammad Aslam Achakzai, Mir Atta Muhammad Marghazani and Muhammad Hussain Nizamani. Muhammad Hussain Anqa and Nasim Talvi started Aftab, Young Baluchistan, Karwan, Baluchistan Jadid, Nijat and Al-Baluch, all published from Karachi. These newspapers criticized British policies in Baluchistan and encouraged the people to press for political and constitutional reforms. These papers also did not fare well because of the intervention of the Government of Baluchistan. They persuaded the Government of Bombay to discourage the publication and circulation of these papers because they were campaigning against the British interests in Baluchistan.

The second important center of the Baluch press was Jacobabad. Aslam Achakzai started publishing Kamal-i-Hind, Al-Hanif and Naujawan, and, despite many official and local hurdles, continued their publication until 1942 when the British eventually closed them down.

The second phase of Baluchistan press began with the reconstruction of Quetta in the post-1935 era. It was estimated that about eighty per cent of the population was killed in this earthquake. The remaining inhabitants of Quetta migrated to the adjoining areas of Sind and the Punjab. During this period, they observed the differences between the British administration in Sind and the Punjab and the one in Baluchistan. This was the time when the political leaders and
newspapers were voicing their response to the Act of 1935. This new exposure to a
different political climate inspired many immigrants to initiate political movements in
Baluchistan after their return to Quetta. Therefore, this phase of the press in
Baluchistan, which started in 1936 and continued until 1947, provided a true
reflection of the contribution of journalism in the political development of
Baluchistan. Quetta became a hub of political activities.

One of the pioneers of the Baluchistan press, Aziz Magsi, mentioned earlier,
purchased a Litho Press from Lucknow and brought it to Quetta. However, his death
in 1935 put an end to active period of political consciousness in Baluchistan. Abdul
Samad Achakzai succeeded in obtaining the permission to re-start the press in 1938
under the name of Aziz Electric Press, showing his dedication to Aziz Magsi. This
press played a leading role in the history of journalism in the province. Initially, all
the newspapers including the pro-Congress, Istaqlal and the pro-Muslim League Al-
Islam were printed from this press. In order to keep this press going, Achakzai did not
hesitate to collect donations for the purpose. The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar
Khan donated two thousand rupees, a significant sum in those days.69

Many Baluch and Pashtoons had gone to Aligarh and the Punjab for higher
education. On their return, they contributed a lot in sustaining and even strengthening
the press in Baluchistan. The extension of the Indian Press Act of 1867 to Baluchistan
in 1936 further strengthened the role of the press. Atta Muhammad Marghazani
started his newspaper, Kalmatul Haq, from Sibi in 1930. This happened to be the first
newspaper, which was published from that part of Baluchistan.70

It needs to be emphasized here that these new faces on the horizon of the press
and publication were 'reared or associated, directly or indirectly, with the British
administration. For example, Atta Marghazani, the proprietor of Kalmatul Haq had
served as Extra-Assistant Commissioner. During his service, he came to understand the nature of British administration. He resigned from the service in the 1930s and embarked upon his new career as a journalist. He continued to publish his paper spending money from his own pocket. Although printed in Karachi, the paper was published from Sibi. Whenever the British Government closed down his paper, he would start another paper. He considered the British, the Hindus and the Mullahs as the triangle that was responsible for the backwardness of Baluchistan. Abdul Samad Achakzai also became his target because of his pro-Congress ideology. Atta Marghazani charged that Achakzai wanted the Hindus to dominate the Muslims after the exit of the British. He used to distribute his paper free of cost. In addition to his journalistic activities, he wrote two books, *Ulema-i-Haq* and *Ulema-i-Soo*, in which he distinguished the enlightened religious scholars and the obscurantist, respectively. He considered the half-baked and worldly Ulama as the real enemies of Islam. This led to his murder by some rival Mullah in a Sukkur hotel.  

The *Istaqlal* started its publication from Quetta in January 1938. Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai applied for a declaration and with the blessings of A.G.G., Sir Parsons, who was considered a liberal British officer, started his bilingual weekly in Urdu and Pashto. To begin with, it was a mouthpiece of the Anjuman-i-Watan and Kalat State National Party. Later, it assumed the character of a pro-Congress weekly.

In June 1939, the Jamiatul Ulama-i-Hind started its weekly, *Pasban*, from Quetta. Maulvi Abdullah was brought from Gurdaspur to edit this paper. Like the *Istaqlal*, it was also pro-Congress, nationalistic and opposed to the Muslim League. Because of its good reporting, it was considered credible. During this period, the Hindu newspaper, *Baluchistan Samachar*, also appeared from Quetta.
In view of the presence of so many pro-Congress newspapers, it was suggested by some Leaguers that a pro-Muslim League newspaper should be started from Quetta. Thus, with the establishment of provincial Muslim League branch in Baluchistan, *Al-Islam* appeared from Quetta on September 1, 1939. For one year, it was printed from Aziz Electric Press but soon its circulation increased and its printing was shifted to the Civil and Military Press of Charan Das Dhodi. After the Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, its circulation increased from a couple of thousands to 35,000. This paper was principally responsible for advocating the cause of Pakistan in Baluchistan. The credit for its effective role goes to its editor who was former Principal of Jamia Yousufia, the institution founded by Aziz Magzi at Jhal Magzi.74

In addition to these newspapers, other papers like the *Advertiser* and the *Quetta Times* continued. During the Second World War, like other newspapers of India, the press in Baluchistan also faced censorship and close monitoring. However, after the end of the war in 1945, the press became much more active. This was the period when the Pakistan movement was at its peak, and the implications of the demand for Pakistan were discussed even in the remotest corners of the Subcontinent.

In 1946, an Urdu weekly *Tanzeem* started its publication under the patronage of Mir Jaafar Jamali. A well-known Urdu novelist, Muhammad Nasim Hijazi, was appointed its first editor. The Muslim League leadership of Baluchistan was divided into two groups on the question of Sardari system. Qazi Isa was strictly against this traditional system and *Al-Islam* represented this school of thought. Jaafar Jamali was also in the Muslim League but, being a Sardar, he favoured the Sardari system and in order to propagate this cause, he made the *Tanzeem* an organ of the elitist Sardars of Baluchistan.75 The Baluchistan Muslim Students Federation and Muslim Girls
Students Federation started their own bilingual paper, *Khurshid*, in September 1946, in Urdu and Pashto. It was financed through contributions and sale of the paper. One of the student leaders, Fazal Ahmad Ghazi, edited it.76

Like the Muslim League, the Muslim Students Federation was also divided into two factions: while *Khurshid* represented one faction, *The Jamhoor* (started earlier than *Khurshid* in 1945), was the organ of the other group. This was not because of any ideological confrontation but more due to the personal egos of the top leaders. A close scrutiny of this factional journalism representing the Baluchistan Muslim League in fact showed that it was more of an ethnic divide. Qazi Isa and Fazal Ahmed Ghazi were Pashtoons and were opposed to the Sardari system. Jiafar Jamali was Baluch and was in favour of Sardari system. The *Jamhoor* was his mouthpiece. Masood Ghazanvi was its editor.77

From 1940 to 1947, there was a considerable growth of newspapers, magazines and journals, which represented viewpoints and concerns of different sections of public opinion.78 It is not possible to state precisely the number of their readers because many of them were short-lived and the others were closed down when their editors or proprietors migrated from Baluchistan. However, a striking feature of the Baluchistan press is that there was hardly any newspaper in the Baluchi language before 1947. The Urdu press was the most dominant one not only in terms of its local publications but also in that papers published from other parts of India were eagerly read and quoted in political meetings and processions. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan’s *Zamindar* was quite popular among the educated circles of Baluchistan.

English journalism occupied second position in Baluchistan. Mostly pro-British and commercially oriented, it remained a vehicle of communication among the British officers and the small Westernized elite. *Istqal* and *Khurshid* carried news
and comments in Pashto for the Pashtoon readers. The readers were mostly restricted to the urban areas of Baluchistan. However, we must emphasize that the main newspapers, which played a crucial role in shaping the political destiny of Baluchistan were *Istiqal* and *Al-Islam* which represented the two major political parties of the Sub-continent, the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, respectively.

The resistance literature, whether expressed in poetry or prose, thus, manifested not only the anger and the frustration of the Baluch writers against colonialism but also identified social and economic problems of Baluchistan. Education for boys and girls, end of the Sardari system, political and economic reforms were some of the most frequently emphasized subjects. Moreover, while highlighting Baluch pride and identity in history, the resistance literature stressed their present dilemma of being torn between the ideologies of the All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. In the end, two simple questions were destined to decide the future of Baluchistan: Is Baluch legacy and identity compatible with the idea of Pakistan or not? And who is more representative of the interests and aspirations of the people of Baluchistan? These questions, as we shall see in the next chapter, would decide the issue of Baluchistan's accession to Pakistan.
Notes


3 Ibid., p. 194.

4 Cousin and Son-in-Law of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) who is known for his bravery and nobility both in war and peace.

5 Kamilul Qadri, *Baluchi Adab Ka Mutilia* (Quetta, 1976), pp. 148-152.

6 Ibid., p. 7.


8 Ibid., pp. 130-137.

9 Ghazis, who are successful in the holy war.

10 Shahids, those who are killed in the holy war.


12 Ibid., p. 290.

13 Ibid., p. 196.

14 Ibid.


16 Ibid. pp. 189-194.


19 Ibid., pp. 196-198.


22 Ibid., p. 218.
24 Qadri, *Baluchi Adab*, p. 274.
25 Ibid., p. 286.
29 Ibid., p.38.
31 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 15.
34 Ibid., pp.15-16.
36 Soorat Marri, “Baluchi”, p. 34.
37 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 128.
40 Ibid., p. 129.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p.124.

46 Ibid., pp.117-118.
47 Ibid., p.122.
48 Ibid., p.118.
49 Ibid., pp.118-119.
50 Ibid., p.119.
51 *Baluchi Dunya*, Mir Gul Khan Naseer Number, December 1984, p. 2.
52 Ibid., p. 48.
53 Ibid., p. 42.
54 Ibid., p. 43.
55 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
56 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
60 Ibid., p. 175.
62 Ibid., p. 74.
63 Ahmad, *Sahafat*, p.75.
64 Ibid., p. 76.
Ibid., pp.77-78.


Ibid., p. 37.


Ahmed, Sahafat, pp. 172-173.


Tahir, Baluchistan Main, p.178.


Tahir, Baluchistan Main, pp. 184-187.

Inamul Haq Kausar, Tehrik-I-Pakistan Aur Sahafat (Quetta, 1997), p. 223.


Baluchi Dunya, June-July 1968, p.33.

Ahmed, Sahafat, pp.70-71, He has quoted about sixty such publications.

Interview with Fazal Ahmad Ghazi.
CHAPTER- 7

POLITICAL REFORMS AND ACCESSION TO PAKISTAN

The last decade of British rule in Baluchistan witnessed fascinating trends in Baluch politics, which manifested linguistic, tribal, and political dimensions. The “nationalist” Pashtoons of Baluchistan, who were mainly concentrated in the British-administered areas, suggested the division of Baluchistan on linguistic lines. The Pashto speaking regions of Baluchistan, they urged, should be merged with North West Frontier Province. They were eager to become part of “Greater Pashtoonistan”. The Baluch were, obviously, opposed to this scheme. The interest of Baluch tribal leaders revolved around the existing tribal system, which, they did not want to be disturbed. The Khan of Kalat was mainly interested in retaining his status as the ruler of Kalat and in playing a greater role in the politics of Baluchistan. Similarly, the “nationalist” Baluch population consisting of mainly educated and lower middle class strata (although opposed to the Sardari system) dreamt of a “Greater Baluchistan,” comprising territories inhabited by their ethnic brethren beyond the frontiers of British India. The Baluch Sardars shared the idea of a “Greater Baluchistan” with the nationalists but were not prepared to let the traditional Sardari system disappear in this political struggle.¹ The Khan of Kalat knew that his rule depended on the goodwill of the Baluch Sardars and was keen to negotiate with the British a deal that will help retain his State. However, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, the small-educated minority in Baluchistan demanded political reforms and the elimination of the Sardari system. This group was exploited by almost
every important political leader both within and without Baluchistan. The Khan wanted to use their presence to convince the British to strengthen his own position against such radical elements. The British tolerated them to some degree within the confines of Quetta for it suited their interest too. It helped them in subjugating the unwilling Sardars and the Khan. However, whenever these people questioned the British legitimacy and exposed the unholy alliance between the Sardars, the Khan and the British, they were either imprisoned or exiled from Baluchistan without due process.

In mid-March 1927, Mohammad Ali Jinnah called upon thirty important Muslim leaders of different political schools of thought at his residence, in Delhi, for political deliberations. Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar, Sir Ali Imam, Raja Saheb of Mahmoodabad, Dr. M. A. Ansari, Mufti Kifayatullah, and Sir Muhammad Shafi were among the prominent participants. Jinnah, who was aware of the important problems confronting the Muslims of India, raised the question of political reforms in Baluchistan, Sind and North West Frontier Province. When the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League was held at Calcutta in December 1927, Jinnah again raised the issue of constitutional reforms in these Muslim majority areas, particularly in Baluchistan. Soon, it became almost a regular feature in the annual meetings of the All-India Muslim League and other Muslim organizations to demand a constitutional status for Baluchistan. In December 1928, Sir Aga Khan, the President of the All-Parties Muslim Conference, also demanded that Baluchistan should be given a constitutional status like other provinces of the sub-continent. In his now famous “Fourteen Points” presented in March 1929, Jinnah reiterated this demand for political and constitutional reforms in Baluchistan.
The British, of course, were not willing to grant a provincial status to Baluchistan. Thus, during the Round Table Conferences in London (1930-1932), Baluchistan was left out although the N.W.F.P. was granted reforms.\(^6\)

In 1933, however, the British Government issued a White Paper, which proposed that the future constitution of India would be of a federal nature wherein, in addition to the provinces, the Indian princely states would also be represented in the Central Legislature.\(^7\) This alarmed the rulers of the princely states including Mir Ahmad Yar, Khan of Kalat. They reckoned that they would certainly lose power and privilege if such a federal system was introduced. In January 1935, the Khan wrote to the British Government requesting the restoration of the international status of the Khanate.\(^8\) In order to reinforce his demand, the Khan also toured various areas of his state and sought support of the tribal chiefs for the purpose. In a memorandum presented on January 27, 1935, some of his loyal and favourite Sardars obliged him by pledging their loyalty and trust in his leadership.\(^9\)

This development, as indicated earlier, coincided with the emergence of radical groups in some parts of Baluchistan, which demanded not only radical reforms but some of them also showed communist inclinations. The Khan had already submitted two reports to the British authorities before becoming the ruler in 1933, indicating the possibility of communist insurrection through Afghanistan and other neighbouring areas.\(^10\) The British knew that a weak Khan would not be able to handle the radical elements. Thus, they appeared more than willing to strengthen his hands.

In July 1935, the British Parliament approved the Government of India Act. The Khan of Kalat was still apprehensive of the implications of this legislation on his status. He approached Jinnah for political support and legal advice.\(^11\) Jinnah had
earlier pleaded the case of Mir Jaafar Jamali against the Government of India, and in return, instead of charging him any legal fees, had asked him to help in establishing the Muslim League branch in Baluchistan. Jinnah told the Khan of Kalat that Baluchistan needed a political organization, which would not only raise political consciousness among the people but would also help him in the long run.

In 1937, the All India Muslim League at its annual session, held at Lucknow, demanded political autonomy for Baluchistan. The Khan, in anticipation of the operation of 1935 Act, constituted a self-appointed bicameral legislature of 87 members at Kalat. He also prepared a constitution, which gave all the legal and administrative powers to the Khan. The role of legislature was purely advisory. This showcase legislature was to create the illusion of political reforms for domestic and national consumptions. He also nominated a twelve member "State Council", a provincial system and issued some directives for promotion of social and educational institutions. But these measures remained only on the paper, even though they certainly increased the annual expenditure. On education, for example, contrary to his claims that he had raised the education budget from 13,000 to 400,000 rupees, at the time of independence there was not a single high school in the state. All these measures were taken to discourage the progressive or radical elements in Baluchistan, which, ironically, suited the British also because they too did not want them to succeed.

During the course of the Second World War, the British urged the Khan and other tribal leaders to provide as much financial and material assistance as possible for their war efforts. Mir Ahmed Yar Khan turned out to be more generous to the British than they had hoped. The British knew they were vulnerable without the active
support of their colonies. In fact, this situation demanded foresight and anticipation from leaders of the All-India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, two major political parties of India. But then, the Congress leadership thought that the war would be short and would soon result in the defeat of Britain. Therefore, their attitude was more aggressive and they demanded assurance of total independence of India before pledging any help in the war effort. Jinnah, on the other hand, anticipated the September 1939 conflict as a prolonged one and also sensed correctly that the Allies would be victorious in the end. He, therefore, asked the British to provide safeguards for the Muslims before asking his help in the war effort. Jinnah’s Muslim card went a long way not only in changing the course of the history of India but also of the Muslim-majority areas including Baluchistan.

One of the most perplexing problems with political reforms in Baluchistan was the conflicting attitude of the Congress and the Muslim League. Known as anti-British party, the Congress was popular among the “nationalists” and progressive elements of Baluchistan, but it always opposed political reforms in this province on one pretext or the other. For example, on March 6, 1941, Liaquat Ali Khan, the General Secretary of the All-India Muslim League, reiterated the demand for constitutional and political reforms for Baluchistan in the Central Legislative Assembly of India (already demanded at the same forum in 1936 and 1939). The Congress leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru, sided with the British in opposing these reforms on the ground that granting of a provincial status to Baluchistan would not be financially viable. In the long run, this duplicity disillusioned the Baluch nationalists, which went on to strengthen the pro-Muslim League elements in the province.
It will not be out of place to describe at some length how the question of reforms in Baluchistan was handled in the Central Legislative Assembly of India at Delhi in 1941. Representing the All India Muslim League, Syed Ghulam Bhik made a motion on the status of Baluchistan during the discussion on the budget. He argued that Baluchistan needed radical reforms in education, economy and other fields, and thus must have a full-fledged provincial status. A Hindu member of the Congress from Sind, Lal Chand Navalrai, opposed this motion and stated that Baluchistan was not ready for a provincial status. Moreover, he informed the house that the Hindus of Sind were “regretting the separation of Sind from Bombay and I don’t want that our neighbours should have the same regrets”. During the course of discussion, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan declared that “the British government in pursuance of its War policy wanted to make Baluchistan an important reserve. If they can give one hundred thousand rupees to NWFP, it can certainly give something to Baluchistan”. He further appealed to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Olaf K. Caroe, “to look into the matter of Baluchistan impartially because the Muslim League had pledged to give Baluchistan autonomous status and we are prepared to offer whatever sacrifices are needed in this regard”. Caroe, in response to this appeal, retorted that:

Baluchistan’s population is less than two lakh, therefore, we cannot ignore the number of people in that province, while considering constitutional reforms or representative institutions, it is impossible to have a Governor’s province for such a small number of people.

The All-India Muslim League and its leadership continued to argue for the constitutional rights of Baluchistan. In fact, Jinnah, in particular, left no opportunity or forum where he did not raise this issue. He also visited Baluchistan twice during this period (1943 and 1945), as mentioned earlier, to assure the people of his full support in the matter.
In order to make one more attempt to settle the constitutional problem of India, the British Cabinet Mission arrived in India in March 1946, and among other people, they also wanted to consult tribal leaders and representatives of the princely states. On April 24, 1946, the Pashtoon tribal leaders of British Baluchistan, led by Nawab Mohammad Khan Jogazai, sent a telegram both to the Mission and the Viceroy in which they expressed their apprehensions that "Baluchistan might be amalgamated into other provinces. Therefore it is important to give it a provincial status and to execute meaningful reforms." It was obviously against the wishes of the Khan who was opposed to any such reforms. The Khan, in fact, asked the British to annul the treaties of 1833, 1899 and 1903, which had resulted in leasing out Quetta, Naushki and Naseerabad to the British. He wanted an independent Kalat not only with these areas in Baluchistan but also Baluch areas around Baluchistan. In turn, he was prepared to give all facilities to the British. It must have sounded good to the British because they were also harbouring similar ideas since November 1944 to develop Baluchistan in the post-World War period.

In February 1946, the Khan of Kalat went to Delhi and asked Jinnah to present the case of Kalat before the British Parliamentary Delegation. Accordingly a well attended (about 500) ‘Guest of Home’ was arranged by Jinnah at his residence on February 7, 1946. The Khan also persuaded the Turmandars of Marri, Bugti and Leghari to demand inclusion of their areas in the Kalat State. The Sardars did it instantly and submitted their request. This was the beginning of his plan to have a greater state because one of the signatories, Sardar Jamal Khan Leghari, was a member of the Punjab Assembly from Dera Ghazi Khan, and apparently, wanted his areas to be included in the Khan’s territory.
It is interesting to note that the Khan had started this campaign of expansion of his state at a time when the Sub-continent was in the grip of bloody Hindu-Muslim riots, and the political analysts were sure that the creation of Pakistan was inevitable. But the Khan was only keen to grind his axe. In addition, he was least bothered about the fate of Pashtoon tribes with a large majority of them supporting the Pakistan movement. A prominent leader of these tribes was Nawab Muhammad Khan Jogazai who represented the Pashtoon tribes of the British Baluchistan in the Central Legislative Assembly of India and was not prepared to accept the suzerainty of the Khan of Kalat.

Likewise, Abdul Samad Achakzai who had supported the Indian National Congress but was disillusioned with its leadership for their role in the rejection of the demands for constitutional reforms in Baluchistan had no interest in the Khan’s case. In fact, he now looked towards the All-India Muslim League to help save the Pashtoons from the Khan of Kalat’s political ambitions and greed.

In February 1947, Lord Attlee, the British Prime Minister announced the partition of India. Lord Mountbatten was appointed Viceroy for the purpose of transfer of power to the Indian people. This announcement spurred the Khan of Kalat further into action. He encouraged his brother, Prince Abdul Karim, along with Bugti and Khetran Tumandars to found a new political party, the Baluch National Party. On April 3, 1947, the Khan announced in Quetta, that “when the British would leave India, Kalat will declare its independence along with those territories which were leased to the British”. This announcement created anger and anguish among the Pashtoon supporters of the Muslim League in Baluchistan. Qazi Isa, President of the Baluchistan Muslim League, left for Delhi on April 14, to inform Jinnah about these
developments. Jinnah told him not to worry at all. This will not happen.\textsuperscript{31} The Pashtoons of Baluchistan were indeed so upset with the activities of the Khan of Kalat that they took out a mock funeral of the Khan condemning his policies.\textsuperscript{32} Interestingly, Nawab Jogazai had his own claim on parts of the state. He used to quote the Gazetteer of District Zhob which stated that Ahmad Shah Abdali had appointed his ancestors as the rulers of Zhob, and that, until the arrival of the British, his family was the sovereign of Zhob.\textsuperscript{33}

On April 27-28, 1947, a Pakistan Conference was held by the Baluchistan Muslim League, which demanded the appointment of a committee to prepare a constitution for democratic Baluchistan, which would be based on universal suffrage and would entertain the principle of social equality. One of the resolutions also demanded that since there will be no government machinery which could run the province after the departure of the British, it was imperative that a representative government be formed in Baluchistan immediately.\textsuperscript{34}

On June 3, 1947, the British government announced the plan for the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan and gave option to the States to accede to either of the two dominions. With special reference to Baluchistan, it was stated that it could either join India or Pakistan and that the Governor-General was considering a method which would be adopted by the British Baluchistan to express its will. In the end, after careful deliberations, it was decided that the members of Shahi Jirga (excluding those members who had been nominated by the Khan of Kalat) and the non-official members of Quetta Municipality would decide the issue of joining Pakistan or not.\textsuperscript{35}

The Sardars were of course more interested in protecting and promoting their own privileges and needed a guarantee from Jinnah that the “tribal system and Jirga
system will not be disturbed and that all tribal leaders will continue receiving their allowances, and that they had no confidence in the Khan.36 Sardar Ghulam Muhammad Khan Tareen, Qazi Isa, and other Muslim League leaders presented their case before Jinnah on June 3, 1947. Jinnah assured them that there would be no interference with the old Sardari system.37 In the meanwhile, Jinnah also sent Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar to Quetta to help mobilize support for Pakistan from the Shahi Jirga and Quetta Municipality, comprising mostly of Pashtoons (out of 83 members, 50 were Pashtoons) members.38

By this time, Baluchistan had become a fertile ground for conspiracies and intrigues. D.Y. Fell, Political Agent of Chaman, who was later appointed as the Prime Minister of Kalat, along with some other British officers, was keen to carve an independent Baluchistan on the lines suggested by the Khan of Kalat. It is indeed ironical that after Baluchistan's integration with Pakistan, when Fell was asked to leave the country immediately, he, in his parting advice to the Khan, "advised him to remain loyal to Pakistan as that would serve the interests of Baluchistan."39

On June 29, 1947, 54 members of Shahi Jirga and 10 non-official members of Quetta Municipality met in Quetta. The Agent to Governor General, Sir Jaffrey Pryer, presided over this special session. It was unanimously decided that Baluchistan would join Pakistan.40 The pro-Pakistan elements celebrated this occasion and Nawab Jogazai gave a grand tea party in honour of Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, M. H. Gazdar, Muhammad Ayub Khuho and Bugti Sardars at Town Hall Quetta on June 30, 1947. Sardar Nishtar also addressed a public meeting that day.41

The issues of political reforms and the accession of Baluchistan were intricately linked. This phase in Baluchistan's political development manifested
various complexities, which the British, the Pashtoon and the Baluch politics in this province had woven into the fabric of an amazingly unique, experiment of administration. However, before we analyze the ultimate decision of Baluchistan to join Pakistan, it will be pertinent to recall the attitudes of various players in the most decisive hour of Baluchistan’s history.

The British were indeed the most powerful players. Mountbatten, however, had little knowledge of the politics of Baluchistan. Consequently, the decisions of the Agent to the Governor General and his officials invariably prevailed over other proposed actions initiated at Delhi. As discussed earlier, the British had expressed the desire to retain Baluchistan for imperialist purposes, but it seems that it was more of a fantasy than a real plan. In the absence of any logistics and the declaration of independence for India from London, it was not possible to retain Baluchistan as the last symbol of their power in the Indian Sub-continent. However, there is evidence to suggest that some British officials as well as some members of the Khan’s family were involved in some sort of a plan to secure independent status for Baluchistan. The author of this “conspiracy” theory insisted that D.Y. Fell and the Congress party were involved in this plan. The Khan of Kalat was assured all British help including recognition of the independent status of the state like that of Nepal. In order to implement this plan, Col. Sir Jaffrey Prior, the AGG of Baluchistan, visited Kalat to deliver Lord Mountbatten’s message to the Khan. This message asked the Khan to convene an All-Baluchistan Conference in order to get support for the Independent Baluchistan Plan. However, as it transpired, instead of convening the Conference, the Khan panicked and indeed conveyed the details of this plan to Jinnah. When Jinnah
confronted Mountbatten on this issue, the latter sent a message to Jaffrey: “Stop Baluch Conference. Khan of Kalat Most Untrustworthy.”

There is a possibility that the Khan did not know what was going on between the Viceroy, the AGG, and some members of his family. But then, the idea of taking the Khan into confidence about the Conference does not make any sense. Already, the Khan, had employed a few Englishmen to command his army and conduct his foreign affairs. On August 15, 1947, on the eve of the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan, the Khan promptly proclaimed Kalat’s independence.

There was hardly any representative institution in Baluchistan as late as 1947. The archaic structure of the tribes and the local rulers that had been strengthened by the British in various parts of Baluchistan was not considered worthy of any significant role in the final hour. The institution of Shahi Jirga, therefore, had to play its part.

The Congress had no provincial branch in Baluchistan. An attempt to establish such an office had not been successful at any point in time. Its allies like the Watan Party, the Kalat State National Party and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama could not muster enough support because of the conflicting Congress agenda at the all-India level and the demands of its allies in Baluchistan. The Congress could not annoy the Pashtoons because of its close alliance with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai. Moreover, the idea of an independent Baluchistan had been strongly rejected by none other than Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself. The only activity the Congress could engage in was confined to the use of funds and the influence over the non-Muslim members of the Quetta Municipality, the so-called semi-representative body of Baluchistan.
It must have disturbed the Congress leadership to see that the Sikh population of Baluchistan supported Pakistan and showed their enthusiasm by wearing Pakistan badges during the Legislative Assembly elections resulting in the landslide victory of Nawab Muhammad Khan Jogazai. Moreover, after the vote of Sind Assembly to join Pakistan, the question of Baluchistan acceding to India had become almost redundant. The real struggle, therefore, was between the Khan of Kalat and the Muslim League. The Khan, like all the rulers of princely states, was interested in retaining his hold over his state. Nothing else mattered or was important to him. Freedom had no other meaning for him. The educated and liberal elements in Baluchistan, though much limited in numbers, were nonetheless, articulate and active and they perceived the Khan as the symbol of reactionary feudal system. Furthermore, Kalat was not the only state in Baluchistan and the fate of the Khan’s status was also linked with the decisions of the rulers of Kharan, Lasbela and Makran states. If they would decide to join Pakistan, Kalat would be reduced to a land-locked area cut to almost half in size. The supporters of the Muslim League, which eventually won the battle of accession to Pakistan, were on a much safer ground. And although Jinnah had advocated a larger constituency for the people to decide their future, the Sardars and the tribal leaders still trusted him more than any other leader. The Hindu-Muslim divide on almost every issue confronting the people of India had played its part in shaping the patterns of political loyalties of the people. The referendum in NWFP had proved this phenomenon even more emphatically by rejecting the anti-Pakistan elements.

In conclusion, it has to be emphasized that various political pressure groups and political parties in Baluchistan often vacillated between wholehearted support to
national issues and concerns for the local problems. While they were willing to participate in the struggle against the British colonialism, they were not unanimous in shaping the future agenda of political reforms in Baluchistan. Defense of tribalism or introduction of major reforms was often used as the price for their political affiliation. We cannot ignore the fact that after a century of rule, the British too, faced the same dilemma of whether to bring Baluchistan at par with other Indian provinces or to retain it as a patchwork of urbanized pockets, tribal belts and autocratically-ruled princely states. Those leaders who were exposed to the ideas of development in the other parts of India and in the North-West of the British Empire emerged only as helpless votaries of radicalism with little ground of support in their homeland. Therefore, we can safely argue that the new consciousness of Muslim identity, the old, yet functional system of Shahi Jirga, and numerous cultural, historical, and geographical factors eventually shaped the events leading to accession of Baluchistan to Pakistan.
Notes

1 Baluch, Greater Baluchistan, p. 290.
4 Awan, Baluchistan, p. 160.
6 Ahmad, Baluchistan, p. 107.
7 Awan, Baluchistan, pp. 189-90.
8 10R L/P&S/13/1947. In January 1935, the Khan wrote to the British Government requesting the restoration of the international status of the Khanate.
10 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, Tarikh-i-Khawaneen-i-Baluch (n.d.), p. 68.
12 Kausar, Pakistan Movement, pp. 92-96.
13 Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, p. 280.
16 Kausar, Pakistan Movement, pp. 32-38.
17 Ibid. pp. 34-35. About population data, he was referring to the inhabitants of Quetta and its suburbs only.
18 L/P&S/13/1846, p. 43 Copy of a telegram sent on April 22, 1946.
19 Baluch, Greater Baluchistan, pp. 171-172.
20 L/P&G/13/1846, p. 34 Copy of the telegram dated March 28, 1946 from Weightman. It said: "H.H. Khan of Kalat at recent interview with Political Agent expressed dislike of joining any scheme for a Federal Government of India and said he wished to sever all political connections with self governing Government of India. He would like to inform the Cabinet Committee of his desire but as this
would involve him in enmity with the Congress, League and Princes he did not
dare to do so without support of His Majesty a Government. Unless assured of such
support he would refrain from expressing any views and would very soon be
compelled to join Federation”. In another “Important and Most Secret” telegram
dated April 2, 1946 W. Weight-man reported: “I saw H.H. Khan at his request
today. Only point he made which was not brought out in my previous telegram was
that if the British Government determines to retain hold in Baluchistan he was
willing to put whole of his State at their disposal. He said that Nehru had begged
him not to come to any understanding with the British Government, which would
enable them to maintain a foothold in this part of the world H. H. Khan is, I think,
genuinely nervous about future and anxious to remain under the British protection.”
Ibid. p. 36. But the British Government did not encourage the Khan and the Cabinet
Secretariat was advised to simply acknowledge the Khan politely. Accordingly, his
telegram to Lord Pethick Lawrence for an interview to explain Baluchistan problem
dated April 29, 1946 was regretted on May 1, 1946.

21 IOR-L/WS/1/1401. Confidential Correspondence between the Secretary of State,
“Post War Reconstruction – Baluchistan” handed into the War Office by Maj. Gen.
Money on the subject of making Baluchistan a major Imperial Military Center
when India becomes self- governing. “Basing his argument on the sensible point
that our future Imperial reserve must be largely air-borne, he dwells on the fact that
Baluchistan covers the whole region from Cairo to Calcutta, east and west, as well
as covering Afghanistan and Persia.”(Letter from Amery to Lord Wavell dated
November 23, 1944). Previously, in a letter dated November 18, 1944, to General
Money, Mr. Amery observed, “From strategic point of view the idea has great
attraction…Baluchistan is no doubt well situated in relation both to the Middle East
and to India. The Up-lands of Baluchistan can be made tolerably attractive by well
sinking and irrigation. Incidentally, reading between the lines, I gather that
Baluchistan can even afford facilities for Winter Sports”. In his memorandum, Gen.
Money responded: “There is no use to complicate the issue by the introduction of a
democratic form of government. Baluchistan is largely undeveloped. It is strongly
advocated that the whole agency should become British Baluchistan. The Khan of
Kalat is not taking a very active part in the rule of this state and in any event, it may
be necessary for the British to assume direct control. It is suggested that instead of
an AGG there should be a Governor and C-N-C as in Gibraltar and Malta. The
Civil Service should be British (rather on the Sudan Civil Service model), that the
civil subordinates and skilled labour should be Anglo-Indian and British.
Baluchistan should be kept distinct in every way, even to its currency from India.
Keep Baluchistan absolutely distinct politically from India it would be an
extremely undesirable to open it to unrestricted Indian immigration. It should be
possible to control immigration absolutely and only to accept persons with
approved and very carefully checked credentials. It should necessary to make
educational provisions for the children of British NCOs who decide to remain in
Government or Civil employment in Baluchistan after finishing their time in the
services.”

22 Ahmadzai, Tarikh-i-Baluch. Vol. 7, pp. 382-83, 388-391. Also see Weekly
Intelligence Summary, para-30, February 13, 1946.
21 Ibid. pp. 391-392.


25 L/P&S/13/1846, p. 54. Copy of a telegram sent to the Cabinet Mission from Quetta on May 3, 1946. As a result of a campaign started by H.H. Khan of Kalat for an “Independent separate unit” the signatories included Shahbaz Khan, brother of Chief of Kharian, Abdul Karim Khan, brother of Khan of Kalat, Mahmud Khan Gitchki and Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan Bugti.

26 L/P&S/5/280, Chief Commissioner Report. Fortnightly Report for second half of February 1947. Nawab Jogazai led a twelve-member deputation to meet Jinnah at Malir, Karachi on February 21, 1947, to confirm sympathy of Sardars and tribes with Muslim League and Pakistan. They were opposed to the Sub Committee of the Advance Committee of the Constituent Assembly expected to visit Baluchistan in end of March 1947. They did not want to join Kalat or NWFP. They also intended that the Baluchistan tribal areas must continue to be administered by Customary Laws and not by the Indian Judicial procedure. The same deputation met the Agent to Governor General on March 19, 1947, to convey a warning that if the Sub Committee toured Baluchistan there might be violence.

27 L/P&S/13/1846, p. 22, Nehru’s Letter published in the Hindustan Times, July 18, 1946, pointing out that “When paramountcy ceases to exist, it will not mean that Kalat or any other state will become Independent.”


29 Ibid., Manifesto by the Khan of Kalat. Pamphlet distributed in Quetta and Baluchistan widely. Also, Ahmadzai, Tarikh-i-Baluch, Vol. 7, pp. 393-6.

30 Ibid., Fortnightly Report, second half of April 1947. A meeting of prominent Sardars was held at Quetta on April 23, 1947 presided over by Nawab Muhammad Khan Jogazai which appealed Jinnah to come to Quetta to clarify his attitude towards the Khan of Kalat’s proposals. They charged, “The Khan is seeking favour all around. Made donations to Jamiatul-Islam and local Muslim associations, both supporters of Anjuman-i-Watan and opposed to Muslim League. Khan appears to be hoping to win by backing every horse in the race.” It was also reported that Mir Taimur Shah, Son of Nawab Muhammad Khan Jogazai, once in Zhob Militia, was training the local Muslim National Guards. Their number was increased to 1000 at Quetta.

31 Ibid., An interesting situation was created when Jinnah declared in his Radio announcement on May 20 that Baluchistan would be a part of Pakistan. This was resented not only by Anjuman-I-Watan but also by Nawab Mohammad Khan Jogazai who went so far as to join the Anjuman-I-Watan in a press statement protesting against the inclusion of Baluchistan in Pakistan without consulting the population. Telegrams were also sent to the Viceroy, Prime Minister, and the
Secretary of State for India. Division between Muslim League and Pashtoon Sardars was visible.

32 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Kausar, Pakistan Movement, p. 56.
38 Ibid.
39 MSS-EUR-D-971/1-8/5, Letter of D. Y. Fell, July 26, 1948. He wrote, “My last advice to Your Excellency is that Pakistan must come first and Kalat should be subordinated to the best interests of the whole. If Your Excellency sticks to this policy and allows no deviation or backstairs intrigues against the new Wazir-i-Azam, things will come right in the end. I also advise Your Excellency not to shut up in Kalat. It is necessary to visit Karachi and Lahore and meet the leaders of Pakistan however shy you may feel.”
40 Kausar, Pakistan Movement, pp. 55-79. Also the official account of this historical event was reported in the Fortnightly Report, second half of June 1947, “29th June – Joint Session of Shahi Jirga and members of Quetta Municipality. Five Minutes proceeding, Vice President of the Session Nawab Muhammed Khan Jogazai informed the AGG that they had no wish to waste time. The vote was unanimous for Pakistan. The absentees from Musakhel and an Achakzai Malik in sympathy for Anjuman-i-Watan.”
42 Kausar, Pakistan Movement, pp. 34-42.
43 Wyne Wilcox, Pakistan: the Consolidation of a Nation (Karachi, 1963), pp.75-81. Douglas Fell, the Foreign Minister of Kalat asked the British for help in maintaining the independent status of the State. The Khan’s brother, Prince Karim and an uncle sought aid from Afghanistan. In January 1948 Liaqat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, met Kalat’s Defense Minister in Peshawar. Jinnah personally travelled to Sibi to address the Shahi Jirga. During this visit, he also met with the Khan and other Sardars. On February 25, the Kalat National Party sponsored a ‘non accession bill’ in Awan-i-Aam (Lower House) and Fell left for London in search of military or diplomatic help. See Dawn, Karachi, February 28, 1948. Pakistan recognized the accession of Makran, Kharan and Lasbella. Khan of Kalat announced his decision to join Pakistan unconditionally on March 27, 1948. But, according to Wilcox, the Khan continued to support the efforts of Prince
Karim, his brother, Fell and Anderson, his British employees, to recruit a tribal army for fighting against the Pakistan army. The Khan, however, denied these charges but did point out that the Agent to the Governor General, Foreign Minister and Col. S. B. Shah, were real black sheep who opposed the idea of Kalat's merger with Pakistan. Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, *Inside Baluchistan* (Karachi, 1975), p. 156.

44 *L/P&S/13/1846*, p. 22.

45 *L/P&J/S/280*. Chief Commissioner Fortnightly Report for second half of July 1946. “Polling of elections to the Central Legislative Assembly on 19 July. Nawab Mohammad Khan Jogazai elected 61 against 13 by Achakzai. The same evening Baluchistan Muslim League National Guards and Khaksars gave him “Salami”. The *Al-Haq* of Sibi on July 24, 1946, reported that, “Nawab Mohammad Khan Jogazai has been elected.” A lengthy article commented that the Nawab owed his success to Nawab Jaafar Khan Jamali who had killed a number of birds with one stone. For instance:

1. He has strengthened his hold on the Baluchistan Muslim League;
2. By electing a representative of Sardars, he has made it possible for the other Sardars to join the Muslim League;
3. The Muslim League High Command will now pay more attention to Jamali than to Qazi Isma;
4. Influence of Qazi in Baluchistan has been undermined;
5. Jamali will exercise more influence on the Kalat Administration.
CONCLUSION

The political developments in Baluchistan during the last decade of the British raj, 1937-47, posed many questions. The foremost question was how does one comprehend the relationship between a colonial power and the tribal society of Baluchistan? How much the British were prepared and willing to affect change in the society? How much the Baluch themselves were desirous of change? What was the role of the Khan of Kalat, Sardars, and the political leaders of Baluchistan? How did the Baluch relate to the larger developments in the Sub-Continent, especially with regard to the freedom of India and the creation of the Pakistan? What was the role of the poets and the writers in this struggle for freedom? And, finally what, in the end, caused the people of Baluchistan to accede their province to Pakistan? An effort has been made to try to answer these questions as systematically as possible.

The territory of Baluchistan represents amazing contrasts: It is a huge stretch of land punctuated with dry mountains, deserts, and a few green valleys. Scarcity of water and cultivable land are some of its most striking features. Isolated pockets of human population jealously guard their meager resources. These features, however, did not discourage a host of empire builders from either passing through its difficult terrain or, in some cases, even occupying it. This was essentially because of Baluchistan's location. This rocky and dusty bowl has one of its brims as a long coastline; the other parts touch the Indus valley, Afghanistan, and Iran. Needless to say, most of the history of South Asia, Central Asia, and Iran would not be intelligible without referring to the developments in Baluchistan. Among all the factors that shape the cultural dynamics of any people in the world, human interaction with nature and history are the most decisive. The people of Baluchistan, in their habits,
characteristics, and way of life have been reared by these elements just as any other group of people would be identified with their environment. As stated earlier, Baluchistan has been invaded many times in the past. Therefore, the British advent in Baluchistan was neither unique nor unprecedented.

During many of their fact-finding missions beyond the territory of the East India Company's empire, the British spies, surveyors, and soldiers passed through Baluchistan. The first massive entry into this territory happened during the First Afghan War. The proclaimed reason for that aggression and regime change in Afghanistan and Baluchistan was the Russian threat. As we have seen, there was hardly any evidence that the Russians were planning an attack on the British territories in India. But when the Russians finally knocked at the doors of Afghanistan, the British signed a peace treaty with Moscow accepting the river Oxus as the boundary between the territories under the Russian influence and the ones under the British. Imperial factors, indeed, were the main causes. After India became a part of the British Empire in 1858, London needed outposts to watch and monitor the developments in the Muslim World and its possible alliance with any of its rivals in Europe. The nineteenth century technology helped them in extending the railroad connections to the borders of Afghanistan and Iran. Therefore, the British administrative pattern in Baluchistan and other frontier areas reflected their motives and goals for being there. That explains the fact that each call for reform, each plea to change the social and economic system, and each memorandum of political parties and leaders was rejected by the British because they did not consider them worthy of any serious consideration.

Historians are invariably confronted with these questions particularly when analysing the demands for better opportunities, political rights, and educational
facilities under colonialism. The colonial administrator looks at the colonised people as inferior, backward and uncivilized. As Karl Popper has suggested: "He (the colonial administrator) sees the (colonised) individuals as a pawn, as a somewhat insignificant instrument in the general development of mankind. And he finds that really important actors on the Stage of History are either the Great Nations and their Great Leaders or perhaps the Great Classes or the Great Ideas." This statement truly reflects the attitude of the British administration in Baluchistan who perceived this area as nothing more than a pawn in their Great Game.

From occupation of Baluchistan to its eventual independence, as an integral part of Pakistan in 1947, this territory was not found suitable or worthy of political and constitutional reforms that the British had introduced in the other parts of their empire. Their primary concern was to ensure the un-interrupted movement of troops in case of any danger from the west or the northwest. In addition, there was not a single Muslim majority province in the British empire with a full province status at the time Baluchistan was occupied by the British, Sind was part of Bombay; Muslim-majority province of Bengal (created in 1905) was abolished after six years; North-West Frontier Province was created in 1901 but was not given the status of a governor’s province till 1937 and the Punjab, the most developed of all Muslim majority provinces, also remained a lieutenant-governor province for a long time. Obviously, the British did not trust the Muslim populations of the future Pakistan with those reforms and participatory politics that they had given to the Hindu-majority areas. The demography of Quetta also explains this discriminatory attitude. The administration of this small city was in the hands of non-Muslims, who were appointed by the Agent to the Governor-General. This was a typical British formula to
create mistrust and ill-feelings between the different religious and ethnic communities of a particular area.

Regrettably, despite constant pleas for reform by different Baluch leaders, no step was taken to ameliorate some of their grievances. On the contrary, whereas the British offered excuses of lack of funds for undertaking these reforms, officially, they left no stone unturned in condemning the “rustic and conflict ridden tribes” of Baluchistan as primitive and thus incapable of any constitutional advance. No wonder, they strengthened those very institutions that they labeled as primitive. For example, Jirga system and the Sardari system received more support from the British than the politically conscious people of Baluchistan. The local British officers used Jirga system for their own interests. Quetta was chosen as a place from where to control these tribes and their Sardars. For the city itself, they chose a group of different religious and ethnic origins, the non-Muslims, for the simple reason that they were more loyal to their cause and were indeed tied to their administration for its survival. It was through this group that Baluchistan was perceived and governed.

If we look at the demography of Baluchistan, it was essentially divided into two ethnic groups, the Pashtoons and the Baluch, but the group that was chosen to advise the British in the affairs of governance was not composed of any of these ethnic groups. Furthermore, while understanding religious sensitivities of the Indian people, the British depended mostly on non-Muslims in an area which had more than 98 percent Muslim majority population. For their own good and those of their loyal Sardars, the British introduced neither any viable legal system nor a representative political system. The result was that Baluchistan’s division into the British Baluchistan and the Khan’s Baluchistan represented the classic model of Ibn-i-Khaldun’s theory of desert culture and urban culture. The former were called upon
only to perform duties of mercenaries in the time of crisis. The British used ‘carrot and stick’ policy in handling the Khan and the Sardars. In the times of war, the colonial rulers emerged as benevolent dictators but after the war was over, and they did not need the help of these tribes, they returned to their old coercive methods.

The political development of Baluchistan, thus, evolved in this precarious environment. Political parties originated as small, informal associations of the educated people. Their first and foremost concern was to survive in the face of British opposition to either their leaders or programmes, or both. Then came the demand for reforms. These demands included educational institutions for girls, elimination of the Sardari system, and building representative institutions where people could participate in the decision-making process. Obviously, this was an ambitious programme to pursue in a tribal society. To complicate their problem further, the political leaders, instead of making the strength of the traditional system of the Sardars and its exploitation by the rulers, demanded a radical transformation of the social and economic systems. They were convinced that political system will not change unless these systems were transformed first. This was the lesson that they had learned from the anti-colonial campaigns of the communists. It sounded noble but, under the circumstances, highly impractical. Furthermore, those Sardars whose existence depended on the old, traditional system saw an open threat in these ideas to their predominance.

The result was that even those Sardars, who were not happy with the British, sought an alliance with them against this group of political leaders. Consequently, most of these leaders were either imprisoned or were exiled. The Khan of Kalat also played an important role in the failure of the agenda for political reforms. Independent in theory, but subservient in practice, and conscious of this dichotomy,
the Khan constantly opted between suppressing the anti-British elements and exploiting their activism to gain more powers from the British. Therefore, the process of political development, whether in Kalat or Quetta, was always monitored and kept under strict surveillance and control.

The last decade of the British presence in Baluchistan also witnessed another dimension of political development, that is, the Pashtoon and the Baluch divide. Most of the Pashtoon population lived in the directly administered areas of Baluchistan. The Baluch population was mainly concentrated in the indirectly administered zone or in the Kalat state. Gradually, this division started showing in the composition and priorities of the political parties. This division became more pronounced with the intensity of struggle for freedom.

However, there was no gainsaying that most of the political life in Baluchistan was dominated by opposition to the colonial rule, condemnation of the Sardari system, and demands for socio-economic changes and political reforms. We did not see the development of any viable framework that could help bring about the desired changes. Still, the vast range of political activities in the province did help create an environment where people could express their demands and satisfy their aspirations and longings. Of course, initially, these activities started with the pro-British tribal leaders eliciting pledges of loyalty to the British rule. But with the passage of time, anti-British rhetoric increased, partly because of the British policies and partly under the influence of the politics of major Indian political parties, the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. Gradually, the people of Baluchistan started rallying around the banners of the Congress, the Muslim League, the Jamiat Ulama-I-Hind, the Kalat State National Party, the Anjuman-i-Watan and the Khaksars.
By the late 1930s, the Congress had emerged as a powerful political party in India. During the Second World War, it did not cooperate with the British in their war effort, demanding that the British leave India immediately. A 'Quit India' movement was launched for the purpose. It was this anti-British movement that attracted some political groups in Baluchistan to their cause. But the problem was that while the Congress wanted the British to quit India, and let it be free, it was not prepared to support the Baluch demand for political reforms in the province. The result was that soon the pro-Congress elements lost support among the people, a vast majority being the Muslims. Thus, the pro-Congress appeal was restricted to the non-Muslim population of the province. On the other hand, the Muslim League was always supportive of the political reforms in Baluchistan, although its leaders did not indulge in that kind of anti-British rhetoric that was music to the ears of many leaders. But Jinnah's strong support of the Baluchistan's cause, popularity of the idea of Pakistan, the deteriorating relations between the Hindus and the Muslims, and the devolution of British authority in India, ultimately won the day for the Muslim League and Pakistan.

Despite all the negative features of colonialism, one tends to agree with Karl Marx that new economic activity breaks the circles of traditional societies and brings about the consciousness that is required to come face to face with developing societies. This is where colonialism assumes a different role. The British introduced the railroads, telegraph, postal services, educational institutions and other modernizing agents in India. Baluchistan did not get its due share. Most of these agents of change were introduced in those areas where they were considered useful. Still, as argued by Marx, England served as the "unconscious tool of history in bringing about the revolution." Even when the British did not want Baluchistan to
change, it did change. Though most of the resistance literature invokes the feelings of anger and hatred over the oppressive measures adopted by the rulers, yet, it was a decade of development with enduring implications both for the people of Baluchistan as well as the new state of Pakistan that they joined ultimately in 1947.
Notes


3 Ibid., pp. 308-310.

APPENDICES
## APPENDIX-I

**Balochistan Linguistic Profile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Language/Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. AWARAN</td>
<td>Balochi-92.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BARKHAN</td>
<td>Pashto-90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. BOLAN</td>
<td>Balochi-85.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CHAGHI</td>
<td>Balochi-57.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. DERA BUGTI</td>
<td>Balochi-95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. GAWADAR</td>
<td>Balochi-98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. JAAFARABAD</td>
<td>Sindhi (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. JHAL MAGSI</td>
<td>Balochi 45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. KALAT</td>
<td>Brahui-89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. KECH</td>
<td>Balochi-99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. KHARAN</td>
<td>Balochi-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. KOHLU</td>
<td>Balochi-93.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. LASBELA</td>
<td>Sindhi-56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. LORALAI</td>
<td>Pashto-90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. MUSA KHEL</td>
<td>Pashto-85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. NASIRABAD</td>
<td>Balochi (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. PISHIN</td>
<td>Pashto (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. QILA ABDULLAH</td>
<td>Pashto (majority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. QILA SAIFULLAH</td>
<td>Pashto-98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. QUETTA</td>
<td>Urdu (majority), Pashto, Balochi, Brahui, Persian etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. SIBI</td>
<td>Pashto-39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. ZHOB</td>
<td>Pashto-98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. ZIARAT</td>
<td>Pashto (majority)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix-II

The Peace Treaty of Kalat (1758 A.D.)

1) "Khan-i-Baluch, Mir Nasir Khan shall not pay any tribute to the Shah (king) of the Afghan in future.

2) Khan-i-Baluch shall not supply the 'San' (military assistance) to Ahmad Shah Abdali but in case of war against external enemies, the Khan will supply a military contingent. As help in return of this aid, the Afghan king will provide annually
Rupees 100,000 as well as military weapons and expenditure of the army as a reward at the time of requirement to Khan-i-Baluch.

3) Khan-i-Baluch will not provide any help or asylum to any prince of the Sadozai of Afghan chief who has come to him as a rebel. And also the Afghan king would not provide any help or refuge to any prince of the royal family of Kalat-Ahmadzai who has revolted against the Baluch Government.

4) Shah-i-Afghanistan will not interfere in future in the internal affairs, disputes and other matters of Baluchistan.

5) All those areas of Khan-i-Baluch which are in the possession of the Shah-i-Afghanistan will be handed over today to the Khan-i-Baluch.

Royal Seal
Khan-i-Baluch

Royal Seal
Shah-i-Afghanistan

Source; Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, *Tarikh-i-Qoum-i-Baluch, Wa Khawaneen-i-Baluch* (Quetta, 1970), p. 126.
APPENDIX-III
AHMADZAI KHANS OF KALAT

MIR AHMAD-II 1629-1637
MIR ALTAZ-I 1637-1647
MIR KECHI 1647-1656
MIR ALTAZ-II 1656-1666
MIR AHMAD-III 1666-1695
MIR MEHRAB-I 1695-1697
MIR SAMUNDAR KHAN 1697-1714
MIR AHMAD-IV 1714-1716
MIR ABDULLAH KHAN 1716-1731
MIR MOHABAT KHAN 1731-1733, 1736-49
MIR ALTAZ-III 1733-1736
MIR NASEER KHAN-I 1749-1794
MIR MAHMUD KHAN-I 1794-1817
MIR MEHRAB KHAN-II 1817-1839
MIR SHAHNAWAZ KHAN 1839-1840
MIR NASIR KHAN-II 1840-1857
MIR KHUDADAD KHAN 1857-1863, 1864-93
MIR SHER DIL KHAN 1863-1864
MIR MAHMUD KHAN-II 1893-1931
MIR MOHAMMAD AZAM KHAN 1932-1933
MIR AHMAD YAR KHAN 1933-1977
The List of British Residents in the Kalat Khanate (1887-1947)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Assumed charge of office</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col. Sir O. B. C. St. John, K.C.S.I.</td>
<td>19 June, 1887</td>
<td>Officiating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. S. Barnes</td>
<td>23 April, 1891</td>
<td>Held charge until 8 May 1891.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 May, 1891</td>
<td>Officiating. Died 4 June 1891.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. S. Barnes</td>
<td>10 July, 1891</td>
<td>Officiating until 16 Nov., 1891.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. J. Biddulph</td>
<td>30 Jan. 1892</td>
<td>Died at Quetta, 13 June, 1896.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 June, 1896</td>
<td>Officiating from 8 Oct., To 8 Dec. 1892.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. C. E. Yate, C. S. I., C. M. G.</td>
<td>20 Nov., 1900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major J. Ramsay, C.I.E.</td>
<td>14 Jan. 1904</td>
<td>Officiating to 12 April, 1904.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Sir A.H. McMahon, K.C.I.E.</td>
<td>2 April, 1907</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieut. Col. Archer, C.I.E.</td>
<td>3 June, 1909</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieut. Col. J. Ramsay, C.I.E.</td>
<td>25 April, 1911</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieut. Col. C. Archer, C.S.I., C.I.E.</td>
<td>2 April, 1914</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. A. B. Dew, C.S.I., C.I.E.</td>
<td>1 Sept., 1919</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>F.W. Johnston, C.S.I., C.I.E.</td>
<td>15 Sept., 1923</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A.N.L. Cater, C.I.E.</td>
<td>17 Dec., 1931</td>
<td>Officiating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut. Col. J.A. Brett, C.I.E.</td>
<td>10 May, 1932</td>
<td>Officiating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.E.L. Wingate, C.I.E.</td>
<td>1 April, 1936</td>
<td>Officiating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.E.L. Wingate, C.I.E.</td>
<td>20 June, 1937</td>
<td>Officiating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.K. Carce, C.I.E.</td>
<td>28 Nov., 1937</td>
<td>Officiating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Ambrose Dundas</td>
<td>1947</td>
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Appendix- IV

Treaty of alliance and friendship executed between Maharajah Runjeet Singh and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, with the approbation of, and in concert with, the British Government.

Whereas a treaty was formerly concluded between Maharajah Runjeet Singh and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, consisting of fourteen articles exclusive of the preamble and the conclusion; and whereas the execution of the provisions of the said treaty was suspended for certain reasons; and whereas at this time Mr. W. H. Macnaghten, having been deputed by the Right Honourable George Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, to the presence of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and vested with full powers to form a treaty in a manner consistent with the friendly engagements subsisting between the two states, the treaty aforesaid is revived and concluded with certain modifications, and four new articles have been added thereto, with the approbation of, and in concert with, the British Government, the provisions whereof as contained in the following eighteen articles, will be duly and faithfully observed.

1st. Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk disclaims all title on the part of himself, his heirs, successors, and all the Suddoizes, to whatever territories lying on either bank of the River Indus that may be possessed by the Maharajah-viz., Cashmere, including its limits, cast, west, north, and south, together with the Fort of Attock, Chuch Hazara, Khebel,
Amb, with its dependencies on the left bank of the aforesaid river; and on the right bank Peshawur, with the Eusafzae territory, Kheteks, Husht Nagger, Mechnée, Kohat, Hingoo; and all places dependent on Peshawur, as far as the Khybur Pass; Bunnoo, the Vezeree territory, Dour Tuwk, Goraug Kulabagh, and Kushulgher, with their dependent districts; Dera Ishmael Khan, and its dependency, together with Dera Ghazee Khan, Kut Methen, Omerkoth, and their dependent territory; Secughur, Heren Dajel, Hajeepore, Rajenpore, and the three Ketchees, as well as Mankeera, with its districts, and the province of Mooltan, situated on the left bank. These countries and places are considered to be the property and to form the estate of the Maharajah; the Shah neither has nor will have any concern with them. They belong to the Maharajah and his posterity from generation to generation.

2nd. The people of the country on the other side of Khybur will not be suffered to commit robberies, or aggressions, or any disturbances on this side. If any defaulter of either state who has embezzled the revenue take refuge in the territory of the other, each party engages to surrender him, and no person shall obstruct the passage of the stream which issues out of the Khybur, defile, and supplies the fort of Futtehgurh with water according to ancient usage.

3rd. As agreeably to the treaty established between the British Government and the Maharajah, no one can cross from the left to the right bank of the Sutlej without a passport from the Maharajah; the same rule shall be observed regarding the passage of the Indus, whose waters joins the Sutlej; and no one shall be allowed to cross the Indus without the Maharajah’s permission.
4th. Regarding Shikarpur and the territory of Sindh lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will agree to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharajah, through Captain Wade.

5th. When the Shah shall have established his authority in Caubul and Candahar, he will annually send the Maharajah the following articles-viz., 55 high-bred horses of approved colour and pleasant paces, 11 Persian cimeters, 7 Persian poniards, 25 good mules; fruits of various kinds, both dry and fresh, and surdees or musk melons of a sweet and delicate flavour (to be sent throughout the year), by the way of Caubul River to Peshawur; grapes, pomegranates, apples, quinces, almonds, raisins, pistales or chronuts, an abundant supply of each; as well as pieces, of satin of every colour, choghas of fur, kimkhobs wrought with; gold and silver, and Persian carpets, altogether to the number or, 101 pieces; all these articles the Shah will continue to send every year to the Maharajah.

6th. Each party shall address the other in terms of equality.

7th. Merchants of Afghanistan, who will be desirous of trading to Lahore, Umritsur, or any other parts of the Maharajah's possessions, shall not be stopped or molested on their way. On the contrary, strict orders shall be issued to facilitate their intercourse, and the Maharajah engages to observe the same line of conduct on his part in respect to traders who may wish to proceed to Afghanistan.

8th. The Maharajah will yearly send to the Shah the following articles in the way of friendship: 55 pieces of shawls, 25 pieces of muslin, 11 dooputas, 5 pieces of kimkhob, 5 scarves, 55 tinbuns, 55 loads of Bara rice (peculiar to Peshawur).
9th. Any of the Maharajah's officers who may be deputed to Afghanistan to purchase horses, or on any other business, as well as those who may be sent by the Shah into the Punjab for the purpose of purchasing piece goods or shawls, &c., to the amount of 11,000 rupees, will be treated by both sides with due attention, and every facility will be afforded to them in the execution of their commission.

10th. Whenever the armies of the two states may happen to be assembled at the same place, on no account shall the slaughter of kind be permitted to take place.

11th. In the event of the Shah taking an auxiliary force from the Maharajah, whatever booty may be acquired from the Barukzyes in jewels, horses, arms, great and small, shall be equally divided between the two contracting parties. If the Shah should succeed in obtaining possession of their property without the assistance of the Maharajah's troops, the Shah agrees to send a portion of it by his own agents to the Maharajah in the way of friendship.

12th. An exchange of missions, charged with letters and presents, shall constantly take place between the two parties.

13th. Should the Maharajah require the aid of any of the Shah's troops in furtherance of the object contemplated by this treaty, the Shah engages to send a force commanded by one of his principal officers; in like manner, the Maharajah will furnish the Shah, when required, with an auxiliary force composed of Mahomedans, and commanded by one of his principal officers as far as Caubul, in furtherance of the objects contemplated by this treaty. When the Maharajah may go to Peshawur, the Shah will depute a Shahzadah to visit him; on which occasions the Maharajah will receive and dismiss him with the honour and consideration due to his rank and dignity.
14th. The friends and enemies of each of the three high powers, that is to say, the British and Sikh Government and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, shall be the friends and enemies of all.

15th. Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk agrees to reline his heirs and successors, all claims of supremacy tribute over the country now held by the Ameers of Sindh (which will continue to belong to the Ameers an in perpetuity), on condition of the payment to him by Ameers of such a sum as may be determined, under the British Government, of such payment being mad Maharajah Runjeet Singh. On these payments article 4 of the treaty of the 12th of March 1833 will be considered cancelled, and the customary interchange of letters and suitable presents between the Maharajah and Ameers of Sindh shall be maintained as heretofore.

16th. Shah Soojah engages, after the attainment of his object to pay without fail to the Maharajah the sum of two lakhs of rupees of the Nanukshahhee or Kuldar currency, calculating from the date on which the Sikh troops may be dispatched for the purpose of reinstating his Majesty in Caubul, in consideration of the Maharajah stationing a force of not less than 5000 cavalry and infantry of the Mahomedan persuasion within the limits of the Peshawur territory for the support of the Shah, and to be sent to the aid of his Majesty whenever the British Government, in concert and counsel with the Maharajah, shall deem the aid necessary; and when any matter of great importance may arise to the westward, such measures will be adopted with regard to it as may seem expedient and proper at the time to the British Government and Sikh Governments. In the event of the Maharajah requiring the aid of the Shah's troops, a deduction shall be made from the subsidy proportioned to the period for which such aid may be afforded; and the British
Government holds itself responsible for the punctual payment of the above sum annually to the Maharajah, so long as the provisions of this treaty are duly observed.

17th. When Shah Soojah-oool-Moolk shall have succeeded in establishing his authority in Afghanistan, he shall not attack or molest his nephew, the ruler of Herat, in the possession of his territories, now subject to his government.

18th. Shah Soojah-oool-Moolk binds himself, his heirs, and successors, to refrain from entering into negotiations, with any foreign state without the knowledge and consent of the British and Sikh Governments, and to oppose any power having the design to invade the British and Sikh territories by force of arms, to the utmost of his ability.

The three powers parties to this treaty-namely, the British Government, Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and Shah Soojah-oool-Moolk-cordially agree to the foregoing articles. There shall be no deviation of them, and in that case the present treaty shall be considered as binding for ever; and this treaty shall come into operation from and after the date on which the seals and signatures of the three contracting parties shall have been affixed hereto. Done at Lahore this 26th day of June, in the year of, our Lord 1838, corresponding, with the 15th of the month of Assar, 1895, Aera of Bekramajeet.

Appendix- V

ARTICLES OF AN ENGAGEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND MEHRAB KHAN, THE CHIEF OF KALAT, 1839.

Whereas a Treaty of lasting friendship has been concluded between the British Government and His Majesty Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and Mehrab Khan, the Chief of Kalat, as well as his predecessors, has always paid homage to the Royal House of the Saddozais; therefore, with the advice and consent of the Shah, the under mentioned Articles have been agreed upon by Mehrab Khan and his descendants from generation to generation. As long as the Khan performs good service, the following Articles will be fulfilled and preserved:

ARTICLE 1.
As Nasir Khan and his descendants, as well as his tribe and sons, held possession of the country of Kalat, Kachhi, Khorstan, Makran, Kej, Bela and the port of Soumiani in the time of the lamented Ahmad Shah Durani they will in future be masters of their country in the same manner.

ARTICLE 2.
The English Government will never interfere between the Khan, his dependants, and subjects, particularly lend no assistance to Shah Nawaz Fateh Khan, and the descendants of the Mahabbatzai branch of the family, but always exert itself to put away evil from his house. In case of His Majesty the Shah's displeasure with the Khan of Kalat, the English Government will exert itself to the utmost to remove the same in a manner, which may be agreeable to the Shah and according to the rights of the Khan.

ARTICLE 3.
As long as the British army continues in the country of Khorasan, the British Government agrees to pay to Mehrab Khan the sum of one and a half lakh of Company's rupees from the date of this engagement by half-yearly instalments.
ARTICLE 4.

In return for this sum the Khan, while he pays homage to the Shah and continues in friendship with the British nation agrees to use his best endeavours to procure supplies, carriage, and guards to protect provisions and stores going and coming from Shikarpur by the route of Rozan, Dadar, the Pass of Bolan, through Shal to Kuchlak from one frontier to another.

ARTICLE 5.

All provisions and carriage, which may be obtained through the means of the Khan, the price of the same is to be paid without hesitation.

Appendix- VI

TREATY ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND MEER NUSSEER KHAN, CHIEF OF KHELAT, 1841.

Whereas Meer Nusseer Khan, Son of Mehrab Khan, deceased, having rendered his allegiance and submission, the British Government and His Majesty Shah Suja-ool-moolk recognise him, the said Nusseer Khan, and his descendants as Chief of the principality of Khetati-Nusseer on the following terms:-

ARTICLE 1.

Meer Nusseer Khan acknowledges himself and his descendants the vassals of the King of Cabool, in like manner, as his ancestors were formerly the vassals of His Majesty's ancestors.

ARTICLE 2.

Of the tracts of country resumed on the death of Meer Mehrab Khan, namely, hutchee, Moostung, and Shawl, the two first will he restored to Meer Nusseer Khan, and his descendants through the kindness of His Majesty Shah Suja-ool-moolk.

ARTICLE 3.

Should it be deemed necessary to station troops, whether belonging to the honourable Company or Shah Suja-ool-moolk, in any part of the territory of Khelat, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable.

ARTICLE 4.

Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, will always be guided by the advice of the British officer residing at his Durbar.

ARTICLE 5.

The passage of merchants and others into Afghanistan from the river Indus on the one side, and from the sea-port of Soumecanee on the other, shall be protected by Meer Nusseer Khan as far as practicable, nor will any aggression be practised on such persons,
or any undue exactions made beyond an equitable toll to be fixed by the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan.

ARTICLE 6.

Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, not to hold any political communication or enter into any negotiations with foreign powers without the consent of the British Government and of His Majesty Shah Suja-ool-moolk, and in all cases to act in subordinate co-operation with the governments of British India and of the Shah; but the usual amicable correspondence with neighbours to continue as heretofore.

ARTICLE 7.

In case of an attack on Meer Nusseer Khan by an open enemy, or of any difference arising between him and any foreign power, the British Government will afford him assistance or good offices as it may judge to be necessary or proper for the maintenance of his rights.

ARTICLE 8.

Meer Nusseer Khan will make due provision for the support of Shah Newaz Khan, either by pension to be paid through the British Government, on condition of that Chief residing within the British territory, or by grant of estates within Khelat possessions, as may hereafter be decided by the British Government.

 Done at Khelat, this 6th day of October A.D. 1841, corresponding with the 20th Shaban A.H. 1257.

MEER NUSSEER KHAN. AUCKLAND.

Ratified and signed by the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, at Fort William in Bengal, this 10th day of January 1842.

T. H. MADDOCK,

Secretary to the Government of India.

Appendix-VII

Treaty between the British Government and Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, concluded on the part of the British Government by Major John Jacob, C.B., in virtue of powers granted by the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, Kt., etc., Governor-General of India, and by Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat -1854.

Whereas the course of events has made it expedient that, a new agreement should be concluded between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, the following Articles have been agreed on between the said government and His Highness:

ARTICLE 1.

The Treaty concluded by Major Outram between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, on the 6th October 1841, is hereby annulled.

ARTICLE 2.

There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat; his heirs and successors.

ARTICLE 3.

Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to oppose to the utmost the enemies of the British Government, in all cases to act in subordinate co-operation with Government, and to enter into no negotiation with other States without its consent, the friendly correspondence with neighbours being continued as before.
ARTICLE 4.

Should it be deemed necessary to station British troops in any part of the territory of Kheiat, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable by the British authorities.

ARTICLE 5.

Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to prevent all plundering or other outrage by his subjects within or near British territory; to protect the passage of merchants to and fro between the British dominions and Afghanistan, whether by way of Indh or by the seaport of Soumeeanee, or other seaports of Mekran, and to permit no transactions to be made beyond an equitable duty to be fixed by the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, and the amount to be shown in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 6.

To aid Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, in the fulfilment of these obligations, and on condition of a faithful performance of them year by year, the British Government binds itself to pay to Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors an annual subsidy of fifty thousand (50,000) Company's Rupees.

ARTICLE 7.

If during any year the conditions above mentioned shall not be faithfully performed by the said Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, then the annual subsidy of fifty thousand (50,000) Company's Rupees will not be paid by the British Government.

Done at Mustoong, this fourteenth day of May one thousand eight hundred and fifty four.

JOHN JACOB, Major,
MUSTOONG.
14th May 1854.

Political Superintendent and Commandant
on the frontier of Upper Sindh.

Schedule showing amount of duty to be levied on merchandise passing through the
dominions of the Khan of Khelat referred to in Article 5 of this Treaty.

On each camel-load, without respect to value, from the northern frontier to the sea,
either to Kurrachee or other port, Company's Rupees 6. On each camel, as above, from the
northern frontier to Shikarpore, Company's Rupees 5. The same duties to be levied on
merchandise passing in the contrary direction from the sea, or from Sindh to the Khelat
territory.

The foregoing Articles of Treaty having been concluded between the British
Government and the Khan of Khelat, and signed and scaled by Major John Jacob, C.B., on
the one part, and Meer Nusseer Khan on the other, at Mustoong on the 14th May A.D. 1854,
corresponding with 16th Shaban A.H. 1270, a copy of the same will be delivered to His
Highness, duly ratified by the Governor-General in Council, within two months from this
date.

DALHOUSIE.
J. DORIN.
J. LOW.
J. P. GRANT.
B. PEACICK.

Ratified by the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council, Fort William, this 2nd day of
June 1854.

G. F. EDMONSTONE
Secretary to the Government of India.

Source: C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties Engagements and Sanads Relating to India
and Neighbouring Countries, Baluchistan*, Vol. XI (Delhi, 1933), pp. 352-54.
Appendix-VIII

Translation Of An Agreement Made By His Highness The Khan Of Khelat, Dated 24th Suffer 1279, Corresponding With A.D. 21st August 1862.

I, Meer Khodadad Khan, the Khan of Khelat, do hereby voluntarily state that a Surveying Officer, on the part of the British Government, and Shahbaz Khan, Agent on the part of the Government of Beloochistan, were appointed to define the boundary between my territory and that of the British.

They thoroughly examined the boundary according to the detail of durees or pillars numbered 1 to 8 and 14 to 30: the settlement of this portion was accepted and approved by my late brother, Meer Nusseer Khan, and I also accept and approve of the same.

The Following is the detail of boundaries defined subsequent to the demise of my brother between pillars Nos. and approved by the Governments both of British India and Beloochistan. This definition I also accept and approve-

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<td>2. Rungoo.</td>
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Appendix-IX

Convention between the British Government and His Highness Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat and Beluchistan, for the extension of the Electric Telegraph through such portions of the dominions of His Highness in Mekran as lie between the western boundary of the province under the feudatory rule of the Jam of Beyla and the eastern boundary of the territory of Gwadur, 1863.

ARTICLE 1.

That His Highness the Khan of Khelat shall afford protection to the line of telegraph and to the persons employed in its construction and maintenance through the tract of the country lying between the western boundary of the province under the rule of the Jam of Beyla and the eastern boundary of the Gwadur territory.

ARTICLE 2.

That the British Government shall be at liberty to erect stations in such parts of the said country as, they may deem most convenient, for telegraph purposes.

ARTICLE 3.

That the material of the telegraph may be landed, free of duty, wherever the British Government may think most convenient on His Highness's coast.

ARTICLE 4.

That the cost of material, labour, landing changes, housing, provisions, etc., shall be borne by the British Government, who will also make any arrangements they may consider most convenient regarding their own supplies, labour, etc., His Highness the Khan undertaking that no impediment shall be thrown in their way, but that, on the contrary, every protection and assistance shall be afforded on his part.
ARTICLE 5.
That for the protection of the line and those employed upon it, the British Government will agree to pay the annual sum of Rupees five (5,000), and His Highness the Khan of Khelat is not to be called upon to go to any further expense than the above sum.

ARTICLE 6.
That His Highness the Khan shall give notice through the Political Agent to the British Government of the proportions of the sum above mentioned which he may wish to be paid to the various Chiefs to whom he will entrust the conservation of the line, it being understood that the whole sum paid by the British Government for that purpose will be expended amongst the Chiefs and people through whose country the line passes. On receipt of His Highness's wishes in this respect, the sums will be paid to the named parties through the Political Agent or other officer appointed by the British Government.

ARTICLE 7.
That annual payment will commence from the date that the telegraph officers may report that 50 miles of the line have been erected, and that its conservation is complete for that distance.

ARTICLE 8.
That any disagreement between the Telegraph officials the subjects of His Highness the Khan of Khelat shall be referred to the Political Agent at Khelat if it cannot be satisfactorily settled on the spot by the telegraph officers in communication with the Agent of His Highness.

ARTICLE 9.
Continued obstruction or injury to the line may cause revocation of this agreement at any time on the part of the British Government.

CAMP KUSHMORE;
The 20th Feb. 1863.

M. GREEN, Major,
Actg. Political Agent to the Court of
His Highness the Khan of Khelat.
ADDITIONAL CLAUSE (10) of a CONVENTION with His HIGHNESS the KHAN of KHELAT for the passage of the Electric Telegraph through his Mekran territory.

ARTICLE 10.

That His Highness the Khan of Khelet, with the view if accelerating the erection of the Electric Telegraph that the English Government may subsidize with the tribes (his subjects) in Mekran.

It being understood that the above shall not include any cession of Khelet territory without his (the Khan's) consent, and that, should offices or buildings be erected, their sites shall always be considered as belonging to the Khelet Government.

On the part of the British Government.

ACOBABAD, UPPER SIND;

The 23rd March 1863.

M. GREEN, MAJOR,
Actg. Political Agent at Khelet.

KHODADAD KHAN,
Ruler of Khelet.

Appendix-X

TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE KHELAT STATE - 1876.

Whereas it has become expedient to renew the Treaty of 1854, between the British Government and Naseer Khan, Khan of Khelat, and to supplement the same by certain additional provisions calculated to draw closer the bonds of friendship and amity between the two Governments, the following additional Articles are herewith agreed upon between the Right Honourable Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, in the County of Hertford, and a Baronet. of the United Kingdom, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, on behalf of the British Government on the one hand, and His Highness Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, on the other:--

ARTICLE 1.

The Treaty concluded between the British Government and Meer Naseer Khan, Khan of Khelat, on the 14th of May 1854, is hereby renewed and re-affirmed.

ARTICLE 2.

There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government and Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, his heirs, and successors.

ARTICLE 3.

Whilst on his part, Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, binds himself, his heirs, successors, and Sirdars to observe faithfully the provisions of Article 3 of the
Treaty of 1854, the British Government on its part engage to respect the independence of Khelat, and to aid the Khan, in case of need, in the maintenance of a just authority and the protection of his territories from external attack, by such means as the British Government may at the moment deem expedient.

ARTICLE 4.

For the further consolidation of the friendship herewith renewed and re-affirmed between the two Governments, it is agreed on the one hand that British Agents with suitable escorts shall be duly accredited by the British Government to reside permanently at the Court of the Khan and elsewhere in His Highness's dominions, and on the other hand, that a suitable representative shall be duly accredited by His Highness to the Government of India.

ARTICLE 5.

It is hereby agreed that should any dispute, calculated to disturb the peace of the country, arise hereafter between the Khan and the Sirdars of Khelat, the British Agent at the Court of His Highness shall in the first place use his good offices with both parties to effect by friendly advice an amicable arrangement between them failing which the Khan will, with the consent of the British Government, submit such dispute to its arbitration, and accept and faithfully execute its award.

ARTICLE 6.

Whereas the Khan of Khelat has expressed a desire on the part of himself and his Sirdars for the presence in his country of a detachment of British troops, the British Government, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of 1854, and in recognition of the intimate relations existing between the two countries, hereby assents to the request of His Highness, on condition that the troops shall be stationed in such
positions as the British Government may deem expedient, and be withdrawn at the pleasure of that Government.

ARTICLE 7.

It is also agreed that such line of telegraph railway as may be beneficial to the interests of the two Government shall be from time constructed by the British Government in the territories of the Khan, provided that the conditions of such construction be a matter of previous arrangement that between the Government and the Government of His Highness.

ARTICLE 8.

There shall be entire freedom of trade between the State of Khelat and the territories of the British Government, subject to such conditions as the British Government may, at any time, in concert with the Khan of Khelat, deem necessary for the protection of fiscal interests.

ARTICLE 9.

To aid Meer Khodadad Khan, his heirs, and successors, in the efficient-fulfilment of the obligations contracted by them under the Treaty of 1854, and the present supplementary engagement, the British Government hereby undertakes to pay to the said Khan, his heirs, and successors an annual sum of one lakh of rupees, so long as they shall faithfully adhere to the engagements heretofore and hereby contracted.

ARTICLE 10.

The British Government further undertakes to contribute Rupees twenty thousand five hundred annually towards the establishment of posts and development of traffic
along the trade routes in His Highness's territories provided such money is expended by
the Khan in the manner approved of by the British Government.

Executed at Jacobabad, this eighth day of December one thousand eight hundred
and seventy-six Anno Domini.

LYTTON,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

SEAL OF KHAN OF KHELAT.

India and Neighbouring Countries, Baluchistan*, Vol. XI (Delhi, 1933), pp. 362-64.
APPENDIX-XI

TREATY OF GANDAMAK

Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir Afghanistan and its Dependencies, concluded at Gandamak on the 26th May 1879, by His Highness the Amir Muhammad Yakub Khan on his own part, and on the part of the British Government by Major P.L.N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., Political Officer on special duty, in virtue of powers vested in him by the Right Honorable Edward Robert Lytton Bulwer Lytton, 7th Lytton of Knebworth, and a Baronet, Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of Star of India, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, Grand Master of the Order of the Indian Empire, Viceroy and Governor General of India. The following articles of a treaty for the restoration of peace and amicable relations have been agreed upon between the British Government and His Highness Muhammad Yakub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies:

ARTICLE 1.

From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.

ARTICLE 2.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, sparing all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British Forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account.
ARTICLE 3.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States, in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions, the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished.

ARTICLE 4.

With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness's dominions, it is agreed that British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whencesoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external act. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the Court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon.
ARTICLE 5.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honourable treatment of British Agent within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness's dominions.

ARTICLE 6.

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his dominions so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments.

ARTICLE 7.

In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavours to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit goods along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made of the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be lived upon merchandise carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with, and through the dominions of His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within on year, due regard being given to the state of the country.
ARTICLE 8.

With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to foster and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed by, and at the cost of the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the proper protection of this telegraph line.

ARTICLE 9.

In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government stores to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Gandahar and Jellalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenues of these districts after deducting the charges of civil administration shall be paid to His Highness the Amir.

The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Kichni Passes, which lie between the Peshawar and Jellalabad Districts and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these Passes.

ARTICLE 10.

For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the efficient fulfilment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to
pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees.

Done at Gandamak, this 26th day of May 1879, corresponding with the 4th day of the month of Jamadi-us-sani 1296 A.H.

AMIR MUHAMMAD YAKUB KHAN. N. CAVAGNARI, Major,
Political Officer on Special Duty.

This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, at Simla on Friday, this 30th day of May 1879.

A.C. Lyall
Secretary to the Government of India
Foreign Department.

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