Iqbal and James Ward

(Similar Thoughts and Differences)

Thesis

Ph.D

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PREFACE

Just after doing M.Phil (Iqbal) in 2000 I had started try to search out a topic for Ph.D because topics on 'Iqbal' were very rare but I succeeded to find out the Topic "Iqbal and James Ward's Similar Thoughts And Differences" in 2002. Prof. Dr. Muhammad Siddique Khan Shibli, the then Chairman of the Department of Iqbal Studies, AIOU and was my tutor in M.Phil appreciated the topic. He encouraged me and asked me to submit the synopsis on the topic. I applied for admission and submitted the synopsis in 2002 which was approved in 2004. Prof Dr Muhammad Ashraf Adeel, professor of philosophy in the Department of philosophy, Peshawer University, NWFP was appointed my guide and supervisor for the research work but by chance he was outside the country at that time and still he has been teaching in Kurtztown University, Pennsylvania State, USA. Anyhow I had contacted with him through e-mail and on telephone and started my research work under his supervision.

This dissertation is intended to serve as a comparative study of Iqbal and James Ward's similar thoughts & differences on some metaphysical problems such as conception of God, pluralism and singularism, creation, evolution, ego and destiny or fate etc. Here my endeavour is to establish the priority of the Real Thoughts proved more authentic by the comparative study of Iqbal and James Ward.

Chapter I is reserved for the life and works of Iqbal and James Ward. In chapter II, the conception of God has been discussed with reference to the pluralistic point of view of Iqbal and James Ward rather than the idealistic and spiritualistic standpoint.
Chapter III is consisted of the views of Iqbal and James Ward on the pluralism of the world and the theistic Conception of God. Further stated that how did Iqbal differ with James Ward and agreed with William James and Ibn-e-Sina.

In chapter IV, the conception of creation has been defined in the light of Bergson's theory of an 'Elan Vital', the acosmosic view of Spinoza and the pluralistic opinion of James Ward.

In chapters V, VI, VII, VIII and IX conceptions of evolution, ego, freedom of fate or destiny, religion and time and space have been discussed in detail and proved that the pluralistic view would provide them a solid foundation to be compatible, rather than naturalism whose ultimate result is the absolutism.

In chapter X, different views of Iqbal and James Ward have been discussed and tried to find out the reasons of their differences, as James Ward ascertained to get the knowledge of God through the pluralistic way of thinking whereas Iqbal assumed the same knowledge through 'ecstasy' and 'love' or 'rapport'.

Last chapter XI, is a brief conclusion of the whole dissertation.

At the end, I owe my gratitude to Dr Khalid Almas, Department of Philosophy, Govt. Islamia College Civil Lines, Lahore who helped me in research of the material, Mr. Asadullah Khan M.A who made the communication of the dissertation material & other correspondence possible between I and the Venerable Guide through e-mail and he had intelligently re-composed the corrected version and Mr. Shafqat Ali, a professional composer in the law chambers of the District court Lahore who skillfully composed the first draft of the thesis.
I pay especial tribute and gratitude to the Honourable Guide Prof. Dr. M. Ashraf Adeel whose kind attitude and valuable guidance made this arduous work possible.
I am very thankful to the renowned scholar, Professor (Ret) Dr. Absaar Ahmad, Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore who kindly guided me to remove the discrepancies in the thesis.

Kunwar Zafar Iqbal
IMPORTANT PORTION OF THE GENEEOLOGICAL CHART OF IQBAL’S FAMILY

Cf. Javed Iqbal, Dr, ‘Zinda Rood’
Chapter I

LIFE AND WORKS

OF

IQBAL AND JAMES WARD

(1)

ALLAMA MUHAMMAD IQBAL

Hafeez Malik wrote in his essay 'Muhammad Iqbal', "Allama Muhammad Iqbal's ancestors were Kashmiri Sipru Pundits who had accepted Islam in 18th century. His grandfather Shaykh Muhammad Rafiq had left his ancestral village of Looehar in Kashmir not long after 1857, as part of a mass migration of Kashmiri Muslims, fleeing brutal repression under the British backed Hindu Dogra rulers installed in Kashmir in 1846. Although the family never returned to Kashmir, the memory of the land and its people was never erased from their minds and Iqbal himself remained dedicated to Kashmir and the principle of self-determination for the people of Kashmir throughout his life"¹.

Dr. Javed Iqbal had written in Zinda Rood ² that once Shaykh Muhammad Rafiq, Iqbal's grandfather went to Roper, a city of Eastern Punjab, District Ambala (India) to see his younger son Shaykh Ghulam Muhammad (Iqbal's uncle) who was employed there but unfortunately he died of Cholera there.

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² Javid Iqbal, Dr., Zinda Rood (Urdu), p-12.
Iqbal’s father Shaykh Noor Muhammad, was born in Sialkot. He had worked both as a tailor and embroiderer. Though Shaykh Noor Muhammad was not highly educated but he had the ability to understand deep mystical and philosophical thoughts. His elder son, Ata Muhammad, married the daughter of a retired soldier who secured his son-in-law a position in the army and after a few years he entered Thomson Engineering School at Rurki. Then Ata Muhammad joined the army as an engineer. His success paved the way for Iqbal’s progress later.

Allama Muhammad Iqbal, a great poet-philosopher of Islam, was born in Sialkot, a border city of the Punjab, on November 9, 1877. There has been a controversy about Iqbal’s date of birth but research and long discussion has led scholars of Iqbal, finally, to settle on 9th November, 1877 as his date of birth. In Sialkot Iqbal finished high school and then joined the Scotch Mission College, subsequently named Murray College. He completed two years of studies there and then went to the Government College Lahore.

By this time Iqbal had acquired a good command of Urdu, Arabic and Persian languages under the guidance of Syed Mir Hassan (1844-1929), who had been profoundly influenced by the Aligarh Movement of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898). Under Syed Mir Hassan’s care, Iqbal’s poetic genius blossomed early. He taught him the mechanics of classical Urdu and Persian poetry. Then he found Nawwab Mirza Khan Dagh (1831-1905), a great master of Urdu poetry, for guidance. Dagh was the poet laureate who guided Nizam Mir Mahbub Ali Khan of Hyderabad as well in his poetic efforts. Iqbal was now well on the track, destined to take him to
success and international fame. However, the year of his high school graduation laid the foundation for the personal unhappiness that was to mar much of his life. In 1892 his parents married him to Karim Bibi, daughter of an affluent Physician in the city of Gujrat. She was two or three years older than Iqbal. Two children were born to the couple. The daughter who was named Meraj Begum was born in 1895. She died at the age of 20 and the son Dr Aftab Iqbal, born in 1899, grew up to be a doctor in law and an eminent advocate. Soon after the marriage, differences began to emerge between Iqbal and his wife, which finally became intolerable. Finally they separated. In 1914 he decided to marry a girl belonging to a respectable Kashmiri family of 'Mochi Gate' Lahore. The Nikkah was solemnized but the ceremony of Rukhsati was decided to be held later which was never held. Iqbal then married Mukhtar Begum from Ludhiana and Sardar Begum from Lahore and had two children with those wives. They are Justice (Rt), Dr. Javaid Iqbal and Munira Banu.

"At the Government College Lahore Iqbal graduated Cum Laude and was also awarded a scholarship for further study towards the Master degree in philosophy. Two years later in 1899, he won a Gold Medal in Philosophy for the unique distinction of being the only candidate to pass the final examination"[^1]. The most pervasive influence on Iqbal's mind at Government College was that of Sir Thomas Arnold, an accomplished scholar of Islam and modern philosophy. "In Arnold, Iqbal found a loving teacher who combined in his scholarship a profound knowledge of western philosophy and a deep understanding of Islamic Culture and Arabic literature. Arnold

helped to instil this blending of East and West in Iqbal as well. Arnold also inspired in Iqbal a desire to pursue higher graduate studies in Europe. In May 1899, a few months later, Iqbal got the Master degree in philosophy and he was appointed the McLeod Punjab Reader of Arabic at the University Oriental College of Lahore. From January 1901 to March 1904 Iqbal also taught intermittently as Assistant professor of English at Islamia College Railway Road and at Government College Lahore”¹.

In 1905 Iqbal went to Europe, where he studied both in Britain and Germany. In London he studied at Lincoln's Inn in order to qualify at the Bar, and at Trinity College, Cambridge University, he enrolled as a student of philosophy, while simultaneously preparing to submit a doctoral dissertation in philosophy to Munich University. He could not submit his thesis in the Cambridge University due to some reasons. The German University exempted him from a mandatory stay of two terms on the campus and he submitted there his dissertation, "The Development of Metaphysics in Persia”.

In Hiedelberg he was taught philosophy by two young lady teachers, Frauline Vaganast and Frauline Senechel, who had good command on philosophy and fluently, spoke English, French and German. Iqbal learnt German language from Ema Vaganast who did not know English. He wrote her so many letters in German and sometimes cut a sorry figure because he could not express his feelings very well in German. She also wrote him many letters in reply. Ema had remained un-married through out her life and spent her life alone. She lived with her sister Sophi Vaganast and died in

¹ Ibid.
the very old age. Dr Saeed Akhtar Khan Durrani has collected letters of Iqbal and Ema and published them under the title of 'Iqbal in Europe'.

During his London tour he met Attiya Begum who became his fast friend later and remained with him throughout his tour of Germany and Britain. Iqbal was very much impressed by her because of her charming personality and intelligence. She belonged to the "Bohra" community. She was sister-in-law of "Nawwab" of the "Janjira" state (India). She was also a student of philosophy. They usually exchanged their philosophical thoughts and personal feelings through letters published later by Attiya with the title of "Iqbal". Attiya was married to an artist named Faizi Rehman and started to be called Attiya Faizi. Allama Shibli Noumani had also friendly relations with Attiya Faizi because of Iqbal's friendship with her.

After successful defense of his dissertation, Iqbal was awarded the Doctorate Degree in philosophy on November 4, 1907. The dissertation, which was published the following year in London, was dedicated to Sir Thomas Arnold, his former teacher. In Cambridge, Iqbal came under the influence of the neo-Hegelian's John McTaggart and James Ward. McTaggart lectured on Hegel and Kant and believed in personal immortality. James Ward, the author of Naturalism and Agnosticism, believed in the doctrine of spiritual pluralism. Both men exerted influence on Iqbal. With the passage of time, Iqbal became more familiar with the following:

1- English Empiricism.
2- German Rationalism.
3- Dutch (Spinoza's) Pantheism.
4- Nietzschean and Marxist doctrines.
5- Romanticism.
6- European political ideology and institutions, legal traditions and concepts.

He became skeptical about many things and, as he acknowledged in his diary, he was about to become an atheist but Wordsworth's poetry checked this trend of his thought. His skepticism probably was fostered by the English education with its strong rationalist flavor and Islamic modernism which he had observed during his school years. Two outstanding orientalists at Cambridge, E.G. Brown and Reynolds A. Nicholson, also became his mentors; the later translated Iqbal's Persian masterpiece *Asrar-i-Khudi* published at Lahore in 1915.

Hafeez Malik writes “Iqbal's philosophical and political works (in prose) are actually very few. Most notable among them are: 'The Development of Metaphysics in Persia' (Cambridge 1908) originally a dissertation submitted to Munich University, and 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam' (Lahore 1930), a collection of seven lectures delivered in December 1928 in Madras. Iqbal took three years to compose these lectures and considered them reflective of his mature philosophical and rational approach to Islam. He expected the younger generation to follow him in a responsible *ijtihad*, fresh interpretation of the *Quran* and the *Sunnah* and the formation of an entirely new opinion by applying analogical reasoning. Iqbal had hoped to lay the groundwork for religion and science to discover mutual harmonies that would enable Muslims to learn modern science and to use technology to improve their
material existence.” But, I think, Hafeez Malik’s observation is absolutely wrong because the existence of Muslims totally depends on the strong belief in one God and following the ‘sunnah’ of the Holy Prophet (pbuh). But, of course, material progress is also a must along with spiritual progress. Out of these seven lectures six were delivered at Madras, Hyderabad and Aligarh in 1928-29 and the last one was included later in the book published in 1934.

Iqbal’s whole life was spent under the British colonial rule, during which Muslims in India were profoundly influenced by the religious thought of Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762) and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). Shah Wali Allah was the first Muslim thinker to realize that Muslims had entered a new age in which old religious assumptions and beliefs would be challenged. His monumental study *Hujjat Allah al-Balighah* provided the intellectual foundations for updating Islamic literature.

After 1857, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan’s movement came to be known as the Aligarh Movement. It attempted to update Islam, popularise Western education, modernize Muslim culture and encourage Muslims to cooperate with the British government in order to gain a fair share in the administration and political framework of India. The intellectual legacy of Shah Wali Allah and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was inherited by Iqbal.

Iqbal was never adept at politics, but he was invariably drawn into it. In May 1908 he joined the British Committee of All-India Muslim League. With one brief interruption Iqbal maintained his relationship with All-India Muslim League throughout his life.

When Iqbal came back from Europe in 1908, after getting three degrees from Britain and Germany, he embarked simultaneously on three professional careers, as an attorney, a College professor, and a poet. However, the poet and philosopher won at the expense of the professor and attorney. He had also become an active political leader to some extent.

Iqbal was elected member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly for a period of four years from 1926 to 1930 and soon emerged as the political thinker among the Unionist politicians led by Sir Fazl-i-Hussain. In 1930 the All-India Muslim League invited him to deliver a presidential address, which became a landmark in the Muslim nationalist movement in the sub-continent, leading to the creation of Pakistan.

Iqbal started writing poetry from his school days and it was in full swing at the time of freedom movement in India. His fame started with his poetry which was written in the classical style for public recitation. Through poetic symposia and in a milieu in which memorizing verse was customary, his poetry became widely known, even among the illiterate masses. Almost all the cultured Muslims of his own and later generations came under the spell of his poetry, one way or the other.

Before his visit to Europe, his poetry affirmed Indian nationalism, as in Naya Shawla (The New Altar), but the time spent away from India caused a shift in his perspective. Now the standing themes of his poetry became the glory that was Islam, the current decadence of Islamic civilization, and a call to unity and reform.
Three significant poems from that period, *Shikwah* (The Complaint), *Jawab-e-Shikwah* (The Answer to the Complaint) and *Khizr-e-Rah* (*Khizr*, The Guide) were published in 1924 in his Urdu collection *Bang-e-Dara* (The Caravan Bell). In those works Iqbal gave intense expression to the anguish of Muslim's powerlessness. Khizr, the Quranic Guide who asked the most difficult questions, was pictured bringing answers from God, to the baffling problems of early 20th century.

Notoriety came in 1915 with the publication of his long Persian poem *Asrar-e-Khudi* (The Secrets of the Self). In this work he presents a theory of self that is a strong condemnation of the self-negating quietism of classical Islamic mysticism. His criticism shocked many and incited controversy. His critics framed a charge that he imposed themes from the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche on Islam whereas Islam was quite different from them.

The dialectical quality of his thinking was expressed by the next Persian poem *Rumuz-e-Bekhudi* (The Mysteries of Selflessness), 1918, written as a counterpoint to the individualism preached in the *Israr-e-Khudi*. This poem called for surrender of the self.

After that he published three more Persian poems. *Payam-e-Mashriq*, (Message of the East), 1923, written in response to Goethe's West-Öslicher Divan (Divan of West and East), 1819, affirmed the universal validity of Islam. In *Zabur-e-Ajam* (Persian Psalms) of 1927, he displayed an altogether new talent for the most delicate and delightful of all Persian poetry genre, the ghazal or lyrics. *Javed Nama* (The Book of Abiding), 1932, is considered his
masterpiece. Its theme, reminiscent of Dante's Divine Comedy, is the ascent of the poet, guided by the great 13th century Persian mystic Jalal-ad-Din ar-Rumi, through all the realms of thought and experience to the final encounter.

Iqbal's later publications of poetry in Urdu were Bal-e-Jibril (Gabriel's Wing), 1935, Zarb-e-Kaleem (The Blow of Moses), 1937, and the posthumous Armughan-e-Hijjaz (Gift of the Hijjaz), 1938, which contained verses in both Urdu and Persian.

Hafeez Malik writes, "Poetry, like visual art, is susceptible to varied interpretations; consequently his admirers, relying primarily on his poetry, have various attempted to prove him a Pakistani nationalist, a Muslim nationalist, a Muslim socialist and even a secularist," but I disagree with his statement because Iqbal was not a secularist but in fact he actually was a reformer and revolutionary to the Muslim 'Ummah' who tried his best to activate the true spirit of Islam in 'Ummah'.

Before Iqbal Indian Muslim political thought was primarily concerned with their own community. For example, to Sir Sayyid love was like a pyramid: at the top was the noblest form of love - love for the universe. This kind of love, however, was "attainable". In the middle was love for those who "share human qualities with us". For Sir Sayyid, this was far too elusive a quality to be comprehended. He reasoned that at the bottom of the pyramid is placed the love of nation. Iqbal's intellectual evolution was the reverse of Sir Sayyid's. In his early works, Iqbal was absorbed in himself, agonizing over his personal disappointments. His emotional horizons then expanded to

include, India, particularly the Indian Muslims and the larger world of Islam. Then his love enveloped mankind, and a still later stage it changed into a passionate involvement with the universe. Despite his commitment to the concept of a separate Muslim state but he remained a philosophical humanist, and humanism was truly his message. But he strongly believes in religion as well as in human effort.

The opportunity for another journey to the West was provided by the second (1931) and third (1932) London Round Table Conferences, called by the British Government to consult with Indian leaders on the problems of constitutional reforms for India. In February 1933 Iqbal was back in Lahore. Thereafter Muhammad Nadir Shah, the King of Afghanistan, invited him to visit Kabul along with Syed Sulaiman Nadvi and Sir Syed Ross Masood. The Afghan King wanted him to advise his government in the establishment of a new University and in utilizing the best of modern Western and traditional Islamic values in the reorganization of higher education. However, not much is known about the educational recommendations of Iqbal and his associates. It is still a researachable project for the scholars.

In the period 1930-1934, Iqbal provided ideological leadership by articulating the Muslims' demand for a separate state. It was in light of political split within the ranks of the Muslim League that Iqbal's presidential address of 1930 at Allahabad should be viewed. The Allahabad address formulated the two-nation theory, which Jinnah finally accepted when he presided over the Muslim League's
annual meeting in Lahore in 1940. Creation of Pakistan was, in this sense, Iqbal's dream which was actualized by Jinnah.

After his return from Afghanistan Iqbal's health had deteriorated but his intellect remained sharp and meanwhile he conceived many new projects, including proposed studies on Islamic Jurisprudence and the Quran. In 1936 his health had sharply declined and he passed away on 21st April, 1938 and was buried in the left side of the stairs leading to the Badshahi Mosque in Lahore. Construction of the present mausoleum on his grave started in 1946 and the marble was provided by the government of Afghanistan.
HIS THOUGHTS

i. Being a great Muslim scholar, he strongly advocated revival of Islamic culture and civilization. He believed that God is the sole creator of the Universe and His creativity continues without limit.

ii. Muhammad, the Holy Prophet, (peace be upon him), is the greatest personality, born in the world history and there is no prophet after him.

iii. Man should get internal and external control over nature by his spiritual and intellectual power.

iv. He criticized European culture and civilization for its superficiality and materialism. However, he had admiration for European educational progress.

v. He proposed to reform European material culture by blending it with spirituality.

vi. He was a great advocate of Islamic ideas and Islamic way of life.

vii. He was an advocate of Islamic tenets in practical life and insisted on their spiritual aspects too.

viii. He absolutely turned down the un-Islamic mysticism and the Christian dogma of the world-renunciation. He was very much impressed by Rumi, the great Muslim Sufi, on matters of mysticism.

ix. As a philosopher, he believed in creative evolution and was impressed by Bergson and Nietzsche. He differed from Nietzsche regarding the existence of God and said that Nietzsche totally failed to understand this issue because he had no proper guide.
x. Ego or self is his most typical subject and its analysis plays an important role in his philosophy.

xi. He took love to be the soul of creation of the Universe and more powerful than logical knowledge. It is the only way that leads the man to the Ultimate Truth. Mystic knowledge and ecstasy are also his favorite subjects.

xii. Francis W. Pritchett's observation about Iqbal is very right when he says: "His philosophy is radically activistic, vitalistic and voluntaristic. He rejects all forms of fatalism, passivity, resignation and materialism. He demands that the human will and spirit transcend all barriers soaring into a closeness to God. In Western terms, if poetically he is indebted to Goethe, Dante and Milton, philosophically he is the heir of Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Bergson and Nietzsche. But Iqbal is by no means intellectually subservient to Western culture; he in fact provides a strong critique of its materialistic self-complacency. Though he particularly addresses Muslims but his real concern is with the restless dynamism and self-transcendent upward struggle of the human spirit"1.

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CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IQBAL'S WORKS

1. *Ilm-ul-Iqtasad*. (Urdu) (Science of Economics)
2. *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*. (English) 1908.
   Written in response to Goethe's West-Öslicher Divan (1819) (Divan of West and East).
6. *Bang-e-Dara* (Urdu) 1924 (The Caravan Bell)
7. *Zabur-e-Ajam* (Persian) 1927 (The Testament of Iran)
9. *Bandagi Nama* (Persian) 1927 (Song of Obedience)
10. *The Reconstruction of Religion thought in Islam* (English) 1930
11. *Javed Nama* (Persian) 1932 (The Book of Abiding)
12. *Musafir* (Persian), 1932 (The Traveller)
15. *Pus Che Bayad Kard* (Persian) 1936 (What Then Must be Done)
17. *Speeches, Letters and Statements of Iqbal*. 
"James Ward is an English psychologist, philosopher and metaphysician. He was born at Hult in England on January 27, 1843. He studied theology in England and further continued his education at the Liverpool Institute, in Berlin and Göttingen, and at Trinity College, Cambridge. In the University, he studied under the philosopher Rudolf Hermann Lotze whose influence on him was everlasting. Ward also worked in the physiological laboratory at Leipzig. He had actually studied for the Cambridge Ministry and remained a minister at the Emmanuel Church, Cambridge for a year. After preaching for a year, he turned from formal religion, entered Trinity College, and delved further deep into psychology. He devoted himself to psychological research, became Fellow of his College in 1875 and Professor of Mental Philosophy in 1897. He was the Gifford Lecturer at Aberdeen from 1895 to 1897 and at St. Andrew from 1908 to 1910. His works show the influence of Leibnitz and Lotze as well as the biological theory of evolution. His psychology marks a definite break with sensationalism of the English School. Experience is interpreted as a continuum by him, into which distinctions are gradually introduced by the action of selective attention. The role of the subject in experience is emphasized by him, and its operation in development of the subjective, as well as, natural selection is highlighted. After 1894 the emphasis of his work
shifted to philosophy, which he treated in Naturalism and Agnosticism (1899) and the Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism (1911) based on his Gifford Lectures. His views are also summarized in Psychological Principles (1913) and Essays in Philosophy (1927). In addition to Lotze, ideas of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Charles Darwin helped shape his views.¹

"His first series of lectures was acclaimed as a powerful polemic against nineteenth-century philosophy of science as preached by Huxley and Spencer. The second series developed positive arguments for theism and teleology based on a pan-psycho pluralism similar to that of Leibniz but allowing casual interaction between the monads. Ward’s place in the history of philosophy rest upon his important contributions to the philosophy of mind: an original analysis of mind and "genetic" psychology.

Ward’s analysis of mind: Ward’s analysis of mind was a tripartite analysis in two dimensions. In the first dimension three kinds of experiences are distinguished: cognitive, affective and conative. Although implicit in the writing of Kant and other Continental philosophers, this analysis was developed most systematically by three British psychologists, Ward, G.F. stout and William McDougall. In Ward’s system each of these three modes of experience involves a subject (self or ego) actively or passively engaged with certain objects; this is the second dimension of the analysis. In cognition the subject attends to its "presentations"—a term which Ward used in the sense in which Lock used "idea". In feeling pleased or in feeling some other emotions, the subject undergoes distinctive changes of

Cf.¹ The New Encyclopedia Britannica (Ed. 15Th), Chicago University press, 1985, p-494.
state. In conative experience the subject is in part active again, attending to a distinctive class of presentations---"motor" presentations, or idea of movement---through which bodily movements are produced. The subject, not being a presentation or object, is not directly known but rather is inferred on the principle that "thinking implies a thinker". By the same ruthless logic Ward held that our feelings, not being presentations, are not directly known but are inferred from effects upon our thought and behaviour. So, too, by this same logic acts of attention are unintrospectible. This analysis is also an account of a casual cycle of events: Cognition determines feeling, which in turn determines conation. Thus, for example, a child's attention is attracted by a visual presentation, if the presentation is pleasant—that is, if it induces pleasure in the subject—attention is directed to motor presentations which determines bodily movement tending to retain the object in the field of vision. If the sensory presentation is unpleasant, attention is directed to motor presentations which determine aversion of the eyes or other "Ostrich-like" avoidance behaviour. Such behaviour, in the course of development, results in more effective and rational ways of dealing with pleasant and unpleasant presentations.

**Ward's genetic psychology:** Before the rise of systematic empirical psychology, philosophers had attempted by observation, introspection and reflection to define the main phases in the development of mind. The general formula was "From the senses to the imagination and from this to the intellect". The dominant school of thought in the nineteenth century had been that of the associationists, who conceived of the process of the development of
mind as consisting in the progressive aggregation of sensations and images, forming complex presentations and trains of thought. In place of this mechanical and atomistic account, Ward proposed one based on a biological model. Presentations, he argued, are not discrete objects but partial modifications in a total presentational continuum, also described by him as a psycho-plasm"—the psychical counterpart of the "bioplasm", which becomes differentiated into the several organs of the various types of organism. In this genetic process as a whole, three main stages or phases are distinguished.

First, within the broad concept of the plasticity of the presentational continuum, three partial processes are distinguished—differentiation, retention and assimilation—all of which are prior to the transition from sensation to ideas.

Second, there are the several processes of integration, through which sensory presentations become percepts—recognition, localization and the intuition of things.

At some stage in the process of integration a third stage of development begins—the emergence, from the primary continuum of sense experience, of a secondary continuum composed of images, and the organization of these images into a "memory thread and an "ideational tissue". The detailed working out of this genetic theory was carried through with subtlety and considerable and erudition which covered much of the growing body of experimental evidence flowing from the psychological laboratories of Continent."¹

Murray writes: "James Ward grew up in a Calvinist home which must have been considered strict even when Calvinism was at its

heyday. As a boy he appears to have displayed the characteristics of that class of humanity whose religious convictions are founded rather on emotional intensity than on critical meditation.

Wards boyhood and youth were spent in pursuit of natural science in an uncritical religious atmosphere. Many years later when his thought matured, he wrote: "Religion must thus ever transcend science, which can never prove it false not yet show it to be true". The infidelity of the present generation which tries to dethrone religion by science is the perfectly logical and natural outcome of the mistaken endeavours of the past generation to establish religion by appeals to science. It is important from point of view of an apologia for philosophy, to see how Ward turned neither to pure science nor to religion, but to philosophy in his search for a coherent view of experience, even though philosophy was not held in high esteem at Cambridge at this time"\(^1\).

"Wards natural aptitude for scientific work and his scientific experience, besides helping him to see fully the implications of this problem, influenced his philosophy in two ways. In the first place it led him to adopt as a prolegomenon to philosophy, a theory of the nature of mind which was based on genetic psychology. Instead of making a clear distinction between the study of individual mind in its individual setting and the study of mind as such, there is throughout his work confusion between what may be called the logical or philosophical study of mind and the psychological. The result of this confusion is that he talks psychology when he ought to have been talking philosophy and develops a view which, stressing the

limitations of individual mind, curtails the speculative power of mind. In spite of his idealism and his theory of panpsychism, according to which everything is mind, Ward rarely follows the idealistic procedure of studying the nature of mind in order to discover the structure of the universe, and on the occasion when he does so, does not carry his argument to its conclusion. This comes down to saying that when Ward speaks of theory of knowledge as the fore-study of philosophy he really means psychology. It is obvious that his failure to make this distinction could not but have very serious effects on his philosophic system.\footnote{A.H. Murray, The philosophy of James Ward, 1937,p-xi.}

James Ward’s scientific bent of mind had another serious and unfavourable influence on his philosophy. He lived at a time when the problem of psychology as a separate science, and its relation to philosophy was becoming acute in England, and as a trained scientist as well as philosopher he clearly saw the true nature of the problem. He was aware of the problem of relation between science and philosophy and more particularly of psychology and metaphysics as a theologian. His analysis of this relation and of the implications of this relation is perhaps his gifts to contemporary thought. The study of Ward's psychology is, therefore, important for three reasons. Firstly, for the influence it had on his philosophic position. Secondly, it is necessary for a better understanding of Ward's importance in the history of psychology. And thirdly, a study of Ward's psychology is important in connection with his philosophy for the insight it gives into the very difficult problem of the relation of science to philosophy.
Wards scientific bent of mind had another serious and unfavourable influence on his philosophy. He was facing the problem of relation between science, philosophy and religion. At that time he was trying to make a place for idealism because he was convinced of naturalism. Naturalism was beginning to feel its own inadequacy and desiring to negate itself and to transform itself anew in to thought. James Ward was divided between the conflicting influences of naturalism and idealism and his philosophy often contains the sound of idealism with the meaning of naturalism. He was faced with the danger of repeating naturalism in the words of idealism. This is the least satisfactory part of his philosophy.

From 1897 until his death, he occupied the chair of mental philosophy and logic at the Cambridge University whereat Iqbal had studied from 1905 to 1908.
HIS THOUGHTS

i. In metaphysical work analysis of scientific concepts leads to a criticism of naturalism and dualism, and to a view of reality as a Unity, encompassing both subjective and objective factors. This view is further worked out, through criticism of pluralism and as a theistic interpretation of the world, in the ‘Realm of Ends’.

ii. Naturalistic and agnostic views have been given, in detail, in the book ‘Naturalism and Agnosticism’ (1899, 3rd ed. 1907), and psychological thoughts are stated in the grand book ‘Psychological Principles’ (1918).

Atheism is a belief that there is no God whereas agnosticism is a doctrine that knowledge of God is impossible.
WORKS

2. *Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism*, the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews (1907-18), Cambridge University Press, 1920.
3. *Heredity and Memory*, 1913
8. *A Pluralistic Universe*, ND
9. *Pragmatism*, ND
CONTEMPORANEOUS INFORMATION

Iqbal had travelled to England for higher education in 1905 and got admission in the Trinity College, Cambridge with the help of Professor Arnold who was his teacher at the Government College Lahore. At that time (1906-1907), a series of Lectures of McTaggart, Whitehead, James Ward and, perhaps, Brown and Nicholson, were going on at Cambridge. Iqbal attended those Lectures with the permission of the University because he was very anxious to learn about European philosophy. McTaggart was teaching philosophy of Kant and Hegel at Cambridge. Iqbal studied under McTaggart and James Ward at Cambridge from 1905 to 1908 but their influence appeared on Iqbal after his return from England. James Ward and Whitehead were prominent as philosophers like McTaggart. Iqbal and James Ward are contemporaries and had common thoughts though with some differences. Iqbal was a student of James Ward, no doubt, but he differed from him on several philosophical and religious issues. The main topics on which Iqbal and James Ward had common thoughts and some difference of opinion are as under:

i. Concept of God.

ii. Pluralism, Pantheism and Monism

iii. Concept of Evolution

iv. Concept of Ego.

Iqbal and James Ward had different outlook in religion and life. Iqbal had studied Eastern and Western philosophies but Ward was not familiar with Eastern philosophy, particularly the Muslim and
Hindu philosophies. Ward's psychology and philosophy are somewhat confusing and this confusion always remained in his writings throughout as A.H. Murray wrote, "It is the confusion between what we would call a psychological study of mind and epistemological approach to the problem of mind. This confusion comes out very clearly when Ward makes the point that thought has never, in the whole history of philosophy, discovered a relation which was not discarded by subsequent philosophy. This may be perfectly true, and may be an interesting fact for the psychologist who is busy with the mind of the individual, but it does not affect the philosophical problem of relation at all. The important fact philosophically is that thought works relationally. One suspects the same confusion when Ward, quoting Kant, says that the fore-study of philosophy is theory of knowledge. What Ward appears to understand by his fore-study is the examination of the limitations besetting the individual mind in its attempts at thinking. Kant obviously was concerned with the philosophical or universal principles embodied in the individual mind. In other words, Kant was concerned with theory of knowledge, Ward with psychology. This confusion in terminology and standpoint is due to a difficulty-which Ward sometimes overcomes and often does not-in distinguishing between the philosophical and other plans or contexts on which a problem can be discussed. Another similar confusion also occurs in the same criticism."¹ He was a puritan and spent his whole life in the church whereas Iqbal's life is not limited to the mosque. Iqbal is a great poet-philosopher, politician, reformer and also hero of the nation. He had a great goal to achieve and his

mind was set on this goal. They share some philosophical thoughts but their differences always remain. James Ward was a psychologist-philosopher and nothing beyond. On the other hand Iqbal is a multi-dimensional personality with a high profile in the Muslim world.

It is surprising that no book of James Ward is available in the list of "The Descriptive Catalogue of Allama Iqbal's personal library" prepared by Prof. Muhammad Siddiq, Govt. Islamia College Civil Lines Lahore. About 433 books are included in the catalogue and introduction of 426 books on philosophy, literature, metaphysics, theology, psychology, religion, politics, economics, law, mysticism, history, science, travelogue, education and geography has been given but nothing about the works of James Ward.
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Chapter II

IQBAL AND WARD'S CONCEPTION OF GOD

The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate the conception of God in the light of thoughts of Iqbal and James Ward.

M.M. Sharif wrote in his article "Iqbal's Conception of God" (collected papers- v.1), "Iqbal is a philosopher and poet. It is not easy to decide whether he is a poet-philosopher or a philosopher-poet. We have more poetical writings of his than purely philosophical ones, and while much of his poetry is highly finished, of his philosophical works, which are only two, one is mainly historical and the other is scholastic in conception and, though exhibiting complete unity of thought, lacks unity of treatment"\(^1\). But I think that he is first a poet and then a philosopher because his poetic output is larger than his purely philosophical work. His philosophical work consists of two types, historical and scholastic. However, there is a unity of thought in the philosophical work and also unity of treatment. His poetry and philosophy are both considered great. Perhaps his poetry is so because of his philosophy and his philosophy because of his poetry.

In this chapter I don't deal directly with his poetry. Here the scope of my research is confined to his philosophy, particularly his conception of God. Iqbal's philosophy and his idea of God have passed through three periods of development and it is very difficult to

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draw a clear line between these periods. However, each period bears a few features by which it is distinguishable from the others.

The first period, which extends from 1901 to 1908, in which, Iqbal conceives of God as Eternal Beauty. God as Eternal Beauty brings into existences all movement of things. He creates force in physical objects, growth in plants, instinct in beast, and will in man. Eternal Beauty is the source, the essence and the ideal of every thing. God is universal and all-inclusive like an ocean and the individual is just a drop in the ocean. He is like the sun and the individual is like a candle. This worldly life is transitory like a bubble or a spark. This idea is fundamentally Platonic, as interpreted by Plotinus, and adopted by early Muslim Scholastics, Pantheism in general and pantheistic mystics like Iqbal.

The second period of Iqbal's mental development extends from 1908 to 1920. During this period he changes his attitude towards the distinction between beauty as revealed in things on one hand, and love of beauty on the other. In the first period he regards beauty as eternal and as the efficient and final cause of all love, desire and movement. But in the second period there is a great change in his conception. Now there is a growing conviction of the eternity of love, desire and pursuit or movement.

Iqbal studied under Mc Taggart and James Ward at Cambridge from 1905 to 1908. Meanwhile, he also delved deep into studies of Rumi in connection with his Ph.D thesis in the Cambridge University. Influence of Mc Taggart and James Ward on Iqbal did not continue after his return from England. He was a pantheistic mystic while there. Mc Taggart wrote a letter to Iqbal on the publication of
Nicholson's English translation of his Asrar-e-Khudi. "Have you not changed your position very much?" inquires McTaggart, and adds: "surely, in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you were more a pantheist and mystic"\(^1\). Iqbal himself quoted this remark in his article, which proved that he regarded it as true. In 1908, Iqbal began to appreciate McTaggart's conception of personal immortality. He also began to see the similarity between the theistic pluralism of James Ward and the metaphysical thought of Rumi\(^2\). A little afterwards, Iqbal adopted Rumi as his spiritual leader and he became a theistic pluralist. Rumi was his life long guide because he had anticipated some fundamental ideas of Nietzche and Bergson. Iqbal came to know that Rumi had affinity with James Ward on one side and with Nietzche and Bergson on the other. Rumi believes in evolution, freedom, eternity of the self and possibilities in the destruction of the old for the construction of the new like Nietzche. And he believes in movement as the essence of reality, and in intuition as the source of knowledge like Bergson. Iqbal was impressed very much by Bergson's elan vital in which the sentiment of self-regard was taken as the core of human personality. All these ideas are a part of Iqbal's philosophy in the second period.

This was the time when Iqbal emphasized the efficiency and eternity of will and disbelieved in the efficiency and eternity of beauty. This change of attitude took him far away from Platonism and pantheistic mysticism. He formulates new philosophical thoughts in his poems of Bang-e-Dara, in Asrar-e-Khudi and in Rumuz-i-
Bekhudi. His thought now consists of a view of the self as the dynamic centre of desires, pursuits, efforts, resolves, power, and action. The self does not exist in time but time is a dynamic of the self. Time as action is life and life is self. The world with all its sensuous wealth including time, space, the world of feelings, idea, and ideals is a creation of the self. Like James Ward and Fichte, Iqbal believes that the self posits from itself the non-self for its own perfection. All the beauties of nature are creations of our own wills. Our desires create them, not the other way round. God is the ultimate reality, the absolute self and the supreme Ego. He cannot be conceived as Eternal Beauty. Iqbal condemns such views as a legacy of Plato and poets like Hafiz Shirazi. God is regarded as Eternal will and beauty is only an attribute, which covers both the aesthetic and moral values. Iqbal now emphasized on God's Unity instead of his beauty. The belief in Unity is of high pragmatic value for Iqbal because it gives unity of purpose and strength to individuals and nations, increases power, creates desires, hopes and aspirations and removes all fear of everything other than God.

God reflects himself in the finite self but not in the sensible world. One can approach Him through the self only. The search for God is conditional upon the search for one's self. God cannot be sought by begging or beseeching because that is a sign of weakness and helplessness. Approach to God has to be consistent with dignity of the self. Man can seek Him by the strength of his own will. He can capture Him in the same way as a hunter captures his game. God is Himself is anxious to be captured because He is as much in search of man as man is in search of Him. No one is allowed to be absorbed
in Him and be thus annihilated. But one should absorb God in oneself by absorbing His attributes. Human Ego grows by absorbing God in itself and it rises to the rank of vicegerency of God when it grows into a super ego. Such was the conception of God Iqbal had during this second stage of his thought.

From 1920 to his death, is the third period of Iqbal's mental development and it is regarded the period of his mental development and maturity. In other words, it is a time of change in his philosophical thoughts although the idea of Reality as self is still prominent. My research is confined to Iqbal's conception of God, therefore, all other aspects of his philosophical system are ignored at present and an account of his views about God is given.

According to Iqbal, "God is, Reality as a whole" and it is essentially spiritual-spiritual in sense of being an individual and ego1. He is regarded to be an ego, the absolute Ego. He is absolute because He is all-inclusive and there is nothing outside Him. The Absolute Ego is not static like the universe as conceived by Aristotle but is a creative spirit, a dynamic will or a living energy. There is nothing besides Him to put a limit to Him. He is absolutely free and infinite but not infinite in the spatial sense because spatial infinities are not absolute. His infinity is intensive, not extensive, and consists in the infinite inner possibilities of His creative activity. His being a free living energy with infinite creative possibilities means that He is omnipotent. Iqbal asks, "Does not individuality imply finitude? If God is an ego and as such an individual, how can we conceive Him as infinity? The answer to this question is that God cannot be conceived

Cf.1 M.M.Sharif, About Iqbal & His Thoughts, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1964, p-18.
as infinite in the sense of spatial infinity. In matters of spiritual valuation mere immensity counts for nothing. Moreover, as we have seen before, temporal and spatial infinities are not absolute."¹

Discussing the ultimate Ego with reference to space and time Iqbal continues:

"And this is only another way of saying that space and time are interpretations which thought puts upon the creative activity of the ultimate Ego. Space and time are possibilities of the Ego, only partially realized in the shape of our mathematical space and time. Beyond him and apart from His creative activity, there is neither time nor space to close Him off in reference to other egos. The ultimate Ego is, therefore, neither infinite in the sense of spatial infinity nor finite in the sense of the space-bound human ego whose body closes him off in reference to other egos. The infinity of the ultimate Ego consists in infinite inner possibilities of his creative activity of which the Universe, as known to us, is only a partial expression. In one word God's infinity is intensive, not extensive. It involves an infinite series, but is not that series."²

God is an absolutely free creative spirit. He is an omnipotent energy and a creative movement. According to Iqbal things can be derived from movement but movement cannot be derived from immobile things. Movement is original and static things are derivative and they become static because they are derived from the movement by finite thought working with static concepts. Modern

physics supports this concept, which reduces all physical things to mere centres of energy.

Is the Ultimate Ego constantly changing if He is an all inclusive movement? No, because, the change cannot be predicated of Him in the sense in which it is predicated of us, as a serial change. But in another sense Yes, because, change is an attribute of His in another way.

The serial change, in our view, implies want limitation or imperfection. Whereas the Absolute Ego is the whole of Reality. He is not surrounded by an alien universe. So, change as a movement from one imperfect form to a perfect form or vice versa, is inapplicable to Him. Therefore, the conception of serial time does not apply to Him. He is a continuous creation, so changes only in the sense in which a continuous creation or continuous flow of energy can be said to change but change as continuous creation does not imply imperfection. Iqbal does not conceive perfection as a final stage of completion. Such a stage must be characterized by inanition. To think of Him as perfect in this sense is to make Him, as utterly inactive, motiveless, stagnant neutrality and an absolute nothing. Iqbal means by a perfect individuality, like Bergson, an organic whole. God is perfect in this sense and His perfection implies the infinite scope of His creative vision. The Absolute Ego follows no process of reproduction in Him, from His perfection. He is absolutely perfect and unique, cannot be conceived as procreating. He, therefore, has no progeny. Aristotle and Ibn-e-Hazm\(^1\) conceive

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\(^1\) Ibn-e-Hazam was a Spanish Muslim Philosopher of 11th century, disciple of Muhiyyuddin Ibn-e-Arabi and author of Lam’at (Flashes).
perfection as a final stage of completion but Iqbal does not agree with them." His perfection also implies "the infinite scope of His creative vision". His "not-yet," therefore, means the infinite creative possibilities of his being".

If God is a free, infinite and perfectly creative, all powerful movement, are we to say that He is all good, as Browning thinks, or that He is all evil as Schopenhauer claims. According to Iqbal, the fact of moral and physical evil stands out prominent in the life of nature. Evil arises from the conflict of opposing individuals and is relative to finite beings. Good and evil, though opposites, must fall under the same whole but we can see our way only by faith in the triumph of goodness.

God is also omniscient and His knowledge is not like the knowledge of a finite being always moving round a veritable "other". There is no other for Him. His knowledge is not the same as human knowledge.

Jalal-u-din Dawwani, Iraqi and Royce suppose the Absolute Ego as a single indivisible act of perception, grasping the entire sweep of history, regarded as a sequence of events. This is attributing to Him a kind of passive omniscience, an awareness of an already finished structure. God's knowledge is not like a mirror reflection of His all-inclusive Being. If it is supposed as a mirror reflection of a preordained sequence of events, then no chance is left for initiative, novelty and free creativeness. We conceive His

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Cf. 2 Dawwani was a Muslim thinker of 16th century, author of the celebrated work of *Akhlaq-I-Jalil*.
Cf. 3 Fakhar-u-Din Ibrahim of Hamadan better known by his poetical *nom de guerre* of Iraqi, a poet, mystic and philosopher of 13th century.
knowledge as a perfectly self-conscious, living and creative activity; therefore, His activity is at once the knowing and the creating of the Object of knowledge.

Bergson says that thought is a feature of life of the Ultimate Ego and He is not pure will. He is a conscious organic growth in which thought and being are really one. This point leads us to the question of relation of time with the Ultimate Ego. Time is not external to Him. He is eternal and has a constant movement, constant change and change is unthinkable without time but His time is not a serial time in which past, present and future are essential. It is a change without succession. His time is a pure duration and the real nature of pure duration is revealed by the experience of our own consciousness. It is in the movements of profound meditation that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience. The states of consciousness melt into each other in the process of this deeper ego. The unity of this ego is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. There is no direction of states in the whole of the inner ego. There is a change and movement but this change or movement is indivisible. Pure time of our own true self is not a string of separate instants. It is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities. It is time as felt, not as thought and calculated. It is not something outside in which the ego moves. It is its inward reach, its realizable possibilities that live within the depths of its nature and are being actualised in a free creative movement. It is intensive time, not extensive. The time of the Ultimate Ego is pure. "It is His creative
movement, regarded inwardly as the infinite inherent possibilities of His nature, unfolding themselves in ever-new creations. He is pure duration in which thought, activity, and purpose interpenetrate to form a unity. A unity in which the past is rolled into the present and the future exists in the form of open possibilities.\textsuperscript{1} Iqbal says that Bergson is wrong in denying the teleological character of Reality on the basis that the gateways of the future must remain open to Reality. "He is sound if by teleology is meant the working out of a pre-ordained end. Such a view would make the temporal order of things a mere reproduction or an imitation of an already determined end. It would make pure time inapplicable to Reality. The Ultimate Ego is devoid of purpose if by purpose is meant a foreseen end, a far off fixed, predetermined destination. The Ultimate Ego is purposive but in the sense in which our own consciousness is purpose. Our unity of consciousness does not fold within itself the past but has a forward movement. It has reference to a purpose and purpose cannot be conceived without reference to future. Purpose is really nothing but a forward movement in consciousness."\textsuperscript{2}

Iqbal was impressed by the philosophies of Rumi, Mc Taggart, Bergson, Nietzsche but chiefly by James Ward. Nietzsche's philosophy is Godless. Bergson's "creative impulse" is very much like Schopenhauer's unconscious purpose. But the ultimate reality for Iqbal is God, conscious and personal.

"Mc Taggart finds the destiny and goal of the self in eternity and not in serial time but he is an atheist. Rumi has a lot common

\textsuperscript{1} M.M. Sharif, \textit{About Iqbal & His Thoughts}, p-24.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
with Iqbal, although much of his thought can be interpreted in pantheistic terms. James Ward's influence on Iqbal is greater”\(^1\).

Both Iqbal and James Ward reject the three traditional arguments for existence of God, discard Platonism, pantheism and Absolutism and object to regarding omniscience as fore-knowledge of a preordained reality and to applying the idea of serial time both to God and to finite self. They do all this for exactly the same reasons. Both are pluralists, theists and spiritual monists. They both uphold pan-psychism and windowed monadism. Both believe in the creative freedom and immortality of the individual. Both believe that the sensuous world is due to interaction between egos, the body is created by the mind to serve its own purpose and serial time is only an act of the mind. Both hold on exactly the same grounds and in exactly the same sense that God is an infinite, conscious, omnipotent and omniscience spirit, which is immanent in the finite egos and yet transcends them just as every organism is immanent in its parts and yet transcends these parts. For both He is a perfectly free creative spirit that limits its own freedom by creating free finite egos. For both this internal limitation is not consistent with His own perfect freedom. According to both, "God is perfect throughout His creative progress, for this purpose is progress in perfection, not towards perfection. Both hold that God's will functions through the will of the finite egos. Both believe that reason can prove the necessity of faith, but cannot turn faith in to knowledge. Both agree that belief in God is ultimately a matter of faith, though of a rational faith, that conviction about Him comes not from reason but from

\(^1\) Ibid, p-27.
living, that direct communion with Him is gained only through love, and that it is only through love for Him that immortality is achieved by the finite self\(^1\).

Iqbal's indebtedness to James Ward is obvious from the above discussion. He was a true disciple of James Ward. But he goes beyond Ward's conception of God. Ward regards God as eternal, but fails to explain His eternity because he has no idea of time as non-serial whereas Iqbal takes his clue from a saying of the prophet of Islam in which time is identified with God.

"Deal not in invective against Time (with Time's vicissitude), Lo, Time (with Time's vicissitude) is Allah"\(^2\)

Or (in other words)

'Don't vilify time, for time is God.'

"Life is time and time is life"

"Don't abuse time! Was the command of the prophet" (Nicholson's Translation.)

"That time is the mind of space and space the body of time." (Alexander's metaphor, space, time and deity).

Iqbal's idea of perfection is not the same as that of Ward. It is partly his own and partly Bergsonian.

When we compare the methods of Ward and Iqbal, we find that like the Neo-Idealists, both start from the individual experience. Both


see nothing wrong with the procedure. The danger of viewing everything anthropomorphically, is a pitfall and Iqbal and James Ward have fallen into this pitfall. Nevertheless, it is clear that what reality is as a whole must for ever remain hidden from the finite self, for how can the part with all its limitations comprehend the whole, which essentially goes for beyond its range.

Iqbal's conception of God is a corollary of his view of the nature of the Ultimate Reality because he identifies God with the Ultimate Reality. But he is a theist and not a monist of any type or a pantheist. It is not only God who is real but the egos created by God are also real and they share both the essence and the creative urge of the cosmic creator. God is the perfect Ego, the perfect self, the perfect Individual; for all created egos, individuality is an aim to be progressively realized. He agrees with Bergson but he derives his conception of God from the Holy Quran.

"Say: Allah is One:
All things depend on Him,
He begetteh not, and He begotten;
And there is none like unto Him".¹

God, the Ultimate Ego, is infinite but His infiniteness is not temporal or spatial but consists in the infinite inner possibilities of His creative activity. God's infinity is intensive not extensive.

"God is the Light of the Heavens and of the Earth. His Light is like a niche in which is a Lamp - the Lamp encased in a glass - the glass, as it were a star."¹

(The Qur'an, 24:35)

Commenting on this verse, Iqbal says: "But I venture to think that insofar as the Quranic identification of God with Light is concerned Farewell's view is incorrect. Personally, I think the description of God, as light, in the revealed literature of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, must now be interpreted differently."²

Thus in the world of change, light is the nearest approach to the Absolute. The metaphor of light as applied to God, therefore, must be taken, in view of modern knowledge, to suggest the absoluteness of God and not His Omnipresence, which easily lends itself to a pantheistic interpretation. Further he says that human thought is discursive. But knowledge in the sense of discursive knowledge, however infinite, cannot be predicted of God because His knowledge is also creative of the objects' that He knows. He does not conceive of God's knowledge as Omniscience in the sense of history - past, present and future - regarded as an order of specific events in an eternal ever present "now". It was thus that Jalal-u-Din

¹ Ibid P-63.
² Ibid.
Dawwani, Iqbal and Josiah Royace conceived God's knowledge. Iqbal does not agree with them.

Iqbal criticized the doctrine of *Wahdat-al-Wujud*, which had been innovated by the Hispanic-Arab mystic Muhyi’d Din Ibn al 'Arabi (1165-1240). Although in his doctoral dissertation Iqbal had paid a glowing tribute to Ibn al 'Arabi, in his introduction to the first edition of the *Asrar-i-Khudi*, repudiated him. To Ibn al 'Arabi all "paths lead to one straight path which leads to God. The different religions were thus in his opinion identical. Ibn-al-'Arabi's Indic disciples during the sixteenth century had sought to reconcile the symbols of the poetry and other devotional Hindu songs with Muslim beliefs. In order to meet the *Wahdat-al-Wujud* brand Islam halfway, "the Hindus also wrote the Allopanishad". The Mughal Emperor Akbar's *Din-i-Illuhi* was designed to synthesize Islam with other religions and creeds, and was the triumph of *Wahdat-al-Wujud* in India. Iqbal believed that if this synthetic trend had been allowed to continue the distinctive culture of Indic Islam would have been assimilated into the dominant Hindu culture and would have completely disappeared from India. Iqbal came to believe that the pantheism of Ibn-al-'Arabi would dissolve their "collective khudi" in the Hindu cultural milieu. Praising the virtues of Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi (Mujaddid Alf Thani), Iqbal says in *Bal-i-Jibril*:
I stood by the Reformer's tomb, that dust
Whence here below an orient splendour breaks
Dust whose least speak stars hang their heads,
Dust shrouding that high knower of things unknown
Who to Jahangir would not bend his neck,
Whose ardent breath fans every free heart's ardour,
Who to Jahangir would not bend his neck,
Whom Allah sent in season to keep watch
In India on the treasure-house of Islam

(Punjab Ke Pir Zadon Say)

Iqbal elaborated ideas of different Muslim and European philosophers and stated nothing new about God but his thoughts were different in style. As a Muslim he is monotheist; as a philosopher he is pluralist-pantheist and as a Sufi he is a pantheist but not confused like William Wordsworth. He concludes that God has existence but His existence is extensive not intensive in nature and His knowledge and power are extensive. He used a more wider
term 'Pan-an-theism' than 'Pantheism' to clear the Conception of God. On the other hand James Ward is naturalist-pluralist. Iqbal says:

In this world of contingency don’t seek the Absolute; 
For there is nothing absolute except Heaven’s Light.

(Garden of Modern Secret)
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Chapter III

IQBAL AND WARD’S CONCEPTION OF
PLURALISM AND MONISM

When you observe things, keep your wisdom’s eye unclosed
That in the Many you may see the exposed.

(Garden of the Modern Secret)

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the thoughts of Iqbal and James Ward on the pluralism and monism in the light of their writings and other authentic sources.

James Ward wrote, "All is beyond us and Reality is inscrutable in the end, says Bradley. Science, he thinks, is a poor instrument to measure the real Universe and we can attempt for greater insight through other methods because the Universe has many aspects. Two of these various aspects are those which lead us to the world mechanism and the world of morals, the subject-matter of the natural sciences on the one hand, and that of the moral sciences, including history, on the other. Kant called them, the Realm of Nature and the Realm of Ends. To the former he applied the notion of empirical necessity and to the latter of practical freedom"1.

Cf.1 James Ward, The Realm of Ends or Pluralism And Theism (2nd Ed), Cambridge University Press, 1912, p-1,2.
The world of nature and the world of history have nothing in common; to the one notion of ends is fruitless, to the other, they are of great importance. The two cannot be separated, however, these so called realms are aspects of one and the same world and their contrariety and incompatibility is a great problem. Where and how can we find the final unification of the two? Those who give priority to nature are called Naturalists and those who favour free agents are called spiritualists. James Ward contends for the superiority of the spiritualists. Qualitatively he tries to account for things in terms of a spiritual monism. The naturalists use the term 'phenomenal' for the contents of the world mechanism and those who derive knowledge from consciousness, call it epiphenomenal. The deadlock of dualism always confronts the naturalists and they have to appeal to metaphysics to solve the problem and they ask the Unknowable Reality to unite the mechanical phenomena with the psychical phenomena that runs parallel with them. It is sufficient to note that the agnostic monism has connection with the world mechanism but is inexplicable. Not only we find a dualism of material phenomena and mental phenomena, but also a duality of object presented and subjects affected and their interaction is inexplicable. Berkeley says, "the facts of experience in which subject and object interact, rather than the conclusions of dualism, that mind and matter are for us two alien worlds and all knowledge of nature an inexplicable mystery." Whereas, James Ward accepts the spiritualistic standpoint and its Realm of Ends as the more fundamental. James Ward has called this position spiritualistic monism to distinguish it from materialistic

monism and it is an attempt to get round the dead lock of dualism. The problem of the one and the many is the old and formidable philosophic problem of the 20th century. The idealists begin discussion with the one as absolute what may be generally described as a speculative or a priori method and the Naturalists begin with the many, therefore, the desert of Naturalism is on the one hand and the barren Summit of the Absolute on the other. In a lecture to the Aristotelian Society in 1919, he says, "Our knowledge is acquired apart from any speculation about the Absolute, speculation that first becomes urgent as the limitations and difficulties of the pluralism from which we begin make themselves felt"\(^1\).

The idealism or spiritualism is synonymous with theism and idealists are rarely atheists. "They deny the reality of the world so they may be called pantheists if not monotheists as Spinoza said and atomists as called by Hegel, but pantheism in the sense of identifying the world with God is a polite atheism as Schopenhauer has said because such pantheism is not compatible with idealism. So "from a world of spirits to a supreme spirit is a possible step," Ward said. He does not admit a multiplicity without any unity"\(^2\). He assumes beyond and above the many and their unity an absolute one, of which they are some how the appearance and calls it the problem of the one and the many. The duality of an individual subject and its objective is usually described as a duality of Ego and non-Ego, of self and not self. The objective, not-self is not presented as another self but

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simply as another and it never disintegrates in to a mere plurality. Man knows the world as it faces him and he interacts with it and he knows it only so far as he finds it intelligible. So he concludes that it is not an alien other but has its ground and measuring either in another self or in a community of selves. This is pantheism as Schopenhauer maintained a polite atheism.

Experience brings us into communication with our fellow-creatures, and we can imagine the duality of subject and object, but cannot reach the thought of the Absolute One. The history of religion shows that the idea of supreme God has been developed through polytheism. As for, pure monotheism, Dr. Caird said, "God was merely one subject among other subjects; and though lifted high above them, the source of all their life, was yet related to them as an external and independent will."\(^1\) The entire objective world and the many finite subjects which interact with it or within it, in all their totality and in all their distinctness are, it is said, to be conceived as eternally present to God as His own creative intuition and self-manifestation. The world is for God too, but not as for us, merely as given fact but entirely as thought or deed. All finite beings are in part passive and only in part active, but God as the supreme is then to be regarded as purely active and wholly free from external constraint. For God, there is no nature; no need of mechanism; and for him there is only his own creation but this idea of creation is out of nothing and hard to seize. According to Plato and Aristotle 'materia prima' is a sort of generative process of life, which amounts to nature but not to creation. Such an idea points to a dualism not to an

absolute unity. God and nature are distinct. They differentiate nature as the sensible world and an intelligent world is the direct object of the divine thought and contemplation but they have failed to establish my satisfactory connection between the two worlds. Plato's world is a sensible world and is consisted of ideas, it is superfluous and imperfect, it is neither real nor be really known, whereas, in the divine world of Aristotle, there is a unity of the subjective and objective, therefore, it may be called the Absolute because it is perfect and complete in itself. The idea of creation out of nothing culminates the idea of generation or of production, which suggests the sort of eternal, static perfection. Such has been the outcome of philosophic monotheism which ends in a cosmism. Dr. Caird sums up the position of Aristotle as, "the pure self-consciousness of God in which subject and object and the activity that relates them each other are perfectly unified and which, therefore, complete in itself without reference to any other object, but such absolute self-consciousness can not logically be conceived as going beyond itself to create the finite world of movement and change. The same dualism between God and the world reappears in the philosophy of Plotinus. As Dr. Caird puts it, "how God, who is absolutely complete in himself, can yet be the source of existences which are external to him and not included in the process of his own life\(^1\)." Same is the defect in the philosophy of Spinoza as the world of finite existences created out of nothing is nothing, the mysticism hails 'Naught as every thing and everything as Naught; Eckhart said, Couldst thou annihilate thyself for a moment thou wouldst possess all that God is in himself, also

\[^1\] James ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p-33.
said, "I am as necessary to God as God is necessary to me". Bradley says, in religion, God tends always to pass beyond himself. He is necessarily led to end in the Absolute, which for religion is not God. God, whether a 'person' or not, is, on the one hand, a finite being and an object to man on the other hand, the consummation, sought by the religious consciousness, is the perfect unity of these terms (the Absolute and God). And, if so, nothing would in the end fall outside God. If you, identify the absolute with God, that is not the God of Religion. If again you separate them, God becomes a finite factor in the whole. And the effort of religion is to put an end to, and break down, this relation - a relation that nonetheless, it essentially presupposes. Hence, short of the Absolute, God cannot rest and, having reached that goal, he is lost and religion with him".¹ The same perplexing alteration between asserting and denying a position for the many in compatible with the absoluteness of the one is found in the history of philosophy. The pendulum of human thought swings continually between the two extremes of Individualism or pluralism, leading to atheism, and Universalism or absolutism, leading to pantheism or acosmism as Pringle Pattison said. "Sometimes the reality of the many is either flatly contradicted as by the Eleatics; or it remains inexplicable as with Spinoza or Hegel²." Thus Spinoza, who begins with an absolutely infinite, that is indeterminate, substance, end with a conative many mutually determining each other. Again with Hegel, the Absolute seems at one time to be a perfect self with no hint of ought beside or beyond its own completed self -

¹ Ibid, P-44.
consciousness, and at another not to be a self at all, but only the absolutely spiritual. According to James Ward, not that the absolute is self-consciousness, but that self-conscious is the Absolute; not that God is love but that love is God and so forth. Herbert's Pluralism is a rebound from the absolutism of Fichte. Obviously it seems that pluralism has failed to reach a satisfactory solution of the problem of the One and the Many. A priori, method has proved itself illusory. The seeming attainment of the One has meant the disappearance of the Many.

The most important issue of the nineteenth century was the Absolution or monism as discussed by such different philosophers as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and others. The pluralism assumes that the whole world is made up of individuals and each distinguished by its characteristic behaviour. Before considering the pluralistic spiritualism thus to interpret the world, it will be better to inquire what we are to understand by an individual or one of the many, and what by the unity that ever their plurality implies. We must start at the level of self-consciousness. The monistic spiritualism or absolutism starts from this level of self-consciousness and pluralism has no better position. In self-consciousness we get the knowledge of that duality of self and not self, of subject and object. It is assumed that there exist an indefinite variety of selves; some indefinitely higher, some indefinitely lower than ourselves. If there is the highest, it will be assumed, one among the many and not an absolute really including them all. Even the lowest will have whatever be the irreducible minimum necessary to being a self at all. Such minimum proves its behaviour of self-conservation or self-realization. An
individual is defined as something that cannot be divided without being destroyed. But some things are not true individuals or selves and they have no interest in their conservation, however, self conservation is strictly taken and realized everywhere and it would result nothing better than a static world, in which there would be no new events and no history and in such a state, the drama of evolution must close. But the actual world is full of cross-purposes and self-conservation is a call for effort and perseverance. The self-conservation implies the minimum to be striven for, self-development or realization is still the aim of many and of all and it further expresses that each one is in touch with all the rest collectively and with some more specially.

The well-known Monadology of Leibniz is the Type, to which, all modern attempts to construct a pluralistic philosophy. But the theology on which Leibniz found his Monadology is set aside, and in particular his famous doctrine of pre-established harmony is rejected altogether. Finally, every system of pluralism accepts the Leibnizian principle of continuity, at least to the extent that there is no infinite gap between one monad and another but it is itself, against the Leibnizian theology itself offends"1.

Now we consider the pluralistic schemes exhibited in the world which are ordinary called "historical such as a great multitude of human beings; and Adam and Eve did, in the paradise enriched with natural resources to make the attainment of a high civilization possible. This chapter of accidents seems to be the first chapter of the history and fortune. The traditions and products of the past would

\[\text{Cf.}^1 \text{ James Ward, The Realm of Ends, p-54.}\]
afford a progressing ground of wisdom and wealth for each succeeding age and a corresponding security against the variations and changes of earlier times. In place of an incoherent multitude all seemingly acting at random, we have a social and economic organization; every one has his appropriate place and function, whereas the ever-increasing coincidence of private ends and public ends tend continually to increase the Unity of the whole.

We see the biological world, and regarding the several species of living form, we find a similar contrast between the continuity and stability of the physical environment, and the mutual isolation and ceaseless variation of an indefinite multitude of elementary organisms. Further we find the advancement of certain forms of life to a higher level of development, which are known as bionic adaptations came more and more in to play. The primary forms of life apparently are the so-called phototropic bacteria, lowly organism which have the power of working up non-living in to living materials but they have no such direct relation or concern with other living beings as all the higher forms of life have. All the plants and animals depend on one another, therefore, half the romance of natural history lies in such bionic facts. Darwin illustrates the wide range of its correlation of organisms in 'The Origin of species'. "A naturalist has shown that even on the high seas bacteria are present, playing their usual part of middle man between death and life, by transforming dead organic matter into inorganic substances which can be used again by plants."¹ Plants alone are able to assimilate inorganic matter: hence in a physiological sense it is true that, all flesh is grass

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for the food of animals. On the other hand plants decompose the carbon dioxide, which animals exhale and thus restore to the atmosphere the oxygen, which animals need to breath. We find that there is a close parallel between the development in the economic aspects of human history and that in the bionomic aspects of natural history and we see a multitude of isolated and independent units gradually advancing, by the survival of the innumerable random variations, towards a vast and complex web of life.

With the external correlations of organisms to each other, we see the internal correlations within each organism, or from bionomics to what might he called physionomics. But the real problem has to be faced of interpreting the inanimate world in like fashion. There we can discuss no signs of active striving or progressive organization. There is no unique individuals, no tentative efforts to be followed by success. Everywhere and always, there seems to be only fixity and uniformity. This is a serious crux for the pluralists. We find in the historical world, the progress and development of some societies, species and individuals halt at a certain point while others, on the other hand, have progressed remarkably within the same period whereas the environment is substantially the same for all percipients. The correlation of percipient and environment will still be found at every stage.

Discussing the pluralism, Nicholas of Cusa says, "there is nothing in the universe, that does not enjoy a certain singularity, which is to be found in no other thing." On the same point, Leibniz writes, "there are no two indiscernible individuals. This is an

argument against atoms, which not less than a vacuum are repugnant to the principles of true metaphysics.”¹

The modern pluralists do not follow the principle of continuity as Leibniz does. They hold that there are never two things, which are perfectly alike, but they could not maintain. But Leibniz determines the character of every monad. Pluralism in fact has no status at all save as a form of idealism or spiritualism, for it matter can only be phenomenal, it cannot be real. In the real world we can nowhere find the exact similarity that the mathematician can readily conceive, and the contention is that it nowhere exists. The principle of continuity broadly appeals the pluralists. The pluralist insists upon three points:-

1. The appearance of uniformity and regularity is compatible with the spontaneity of living agents.
2. The uniformity and order, which the physicist ascertains avowedly, pertain to matter as phenomenal i.e. as appearance, which Leibniz referred to confused perception.
3. Some adequate ground for this appearance, there must be.

Regarding the last point we ought to notice that a two-fold interpretation is possible, the pluralist's is one possibility, the theist may prefer another. The theistic hypothesis affords prima facie a more satisfactory explanation of Nature's Laws than pluralism at first sight seems to do.

All such development presupposes the orderliness of things, and pluralism undertakes to explain how this orderliness has itself been developed. Order is God's first law but pluralism attempts to get

¹ Ibid.
back of all this and to start from Chaos where no repetitions and no progress.

A pluralist believes in a universal tendency toward perfection as the very principle of life as Leibniz announced several times. The pluralist's view of the world leads him also to regard the progress as consisting in the advance towards a higher unity; all things in the main and in the long run, work together for good not for evil. Not even immaterial things subsist always, but also their lives, progress and changes are regulated so as to attain to a definite goal. The pluralistic goal is clear in itself that a pluralist, at least, seeks the good and, therefore, tends to replace an initial state of comparative isolations and conflict by progressively higher form of unity and cooperation.

The philosophy of Hegel is a philosophy of history in the widest sense. Regarding things historically Hegel found development everywhere, he found not a static world like that of the Eleatics but dynamical one like that of Heracleitus. His leading ontological concept was more akin to the active subject of the pluralist Leibniz than to the indifferent substance of the monist Spinoza. No doubt he reached in the end a unity, which he called absolute; but in his philosophy of Nature and of Mind, where he first comes in to touch with the real world, it is plurality that chiefly obtrudes itself. Nature is for Hegel historically the first stage of the real world, and here at the outset he finds himself confronted and limited by the very plurality and contingency from which the pluralist too makes his start. Hegel recognized the principle of interpreting the lower on the analogy of the higher. He says that to proceed from the more perfect to the less
perfect is more advantageous. The changes in nature, he says, "indefinitely manifold as they are, exhibit only a routine that is ever repeated, in nature there happens nothing new under the Sun. It is only in the changes taking place on the spiritual platform that novelty comes to the fore".\(^1\) His philosophy of history, is full of passages which suggest not a pre-conceived plan steadily carried out by a singly over ruling mind employing passive instruments, but a living organization slowly and tentatively achieved by a long and painful efforts of generations of struggling individuals. Regarding the limits of pluralism, James Ward says, "the world is the object of God's experience, not the abstract totality in which the distinction of subject and object disappears."\(^2\) Discussing the theism and pluralism, he writes, "when the theist says that man is made in the image of God and then proceeds to describe God as infinite and absolute, it needs but a very slight acquaintance with the meaning of these attributes to realize that both statements can not be literally true."\(^3\)

Iqbal is a pluralist like James Ward and he also starts his philosophical discussion, with the many as he states in his Urdu poem.

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\text{بهمصدت سے کھت مہ مالدیں، برم آتیں}
\text{میرہ بہ کہسکہ ہوں سے نہیں سے نہیں}
(ساقی نامہ، بال بیریان)
\]

\(^1\) Cf. James Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p-143.
\(^2\) Ibid, p-192.
\(^3\) Ibid, p-193.
A Unity, imprisoned by plurality
But always unique, unequalled

(To The 'Saqi')

Does not He like the habit of contention
That neither you are I nor I am you

(Gabriel’s Wing)¹

At places his individualism is obvious but, sometimes ambiguity stays. Generally though for Iqbal even a tiny particle resists annihilation to its utmost and tries to keep its identity and being. Iqbal agrees with James Ward that individuality has different stages; it becomes clearer in upward evolution and diminishes in the lower limits. James Ward writes in 'The Realm of Ends':

"It is assumed that there exits an indefinite variety of selves, some indefinitely higher, some definitely lower than ourselves. But even the highest, if there be a highest, will, it is assumed, be only, primus inter pares, one among the many, and not an Absolute really including them all. Even the lowest also will posses whatever be the irreducible minimum essential to being in my sense a subject or self at all.

Such minimum implies behaviour directed towards self-conservation or self-realisation. An individual no doubt is often

defined as something that cannot be divided without being destroyed as clock for instance. But such things are not true individuals or selves; a clock has no interest in or impulse towards its own conservation. Self-conservation alone, however, strictly taken and regarded as everywhere realised, would result in nothing better than a static world, in which there would be no new events and no history, Such a state as final would correspond to the complete rest and quiescence with which, according to Spencer's Law of equilibrium, the drama of evolution must close."¹

He further writes:

"Thus while pluralism suggests a transcendent upper limit, it is one to which knowledge cannot actually attain. Again the principle of continuity and the historical method, the standpoint that is to say of evolution, suggest also a lower limit, and this proves to be equally unattainable".²

But Iqbal differs from him to some extent as he states in his lectures:

"It is, however, obvious that a finite effect can only give a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish a series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an uncaused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument necessarily excludes its effect. And this means that the effect, constituting a limit to its own cause, reduces it to something finite. The argument really tries to reach the infinite by merely negating finite. But the infinite reached by

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² Ibid.
contradicting the finite is a false infinite, which neither explains itself nor the finite. The true infinite does not exclude the infinite; it embraces the finite without effacing its finitude and explains and justifies its being. Logically speaking, then, the movement from the finite to infinite as embodied in the cosmological argument is quite illegitimate; and the argument fails in toto."¹

Discussing the reality of movement, Iqbal writes:

"The reality of movement means the independent reality of space and the objectivity of nature. But the identity of continuity and the infinite divisibility of space is no solution of the difficulty. Assuming that there is a one-one correspondence between the infinite multiplicity of instants in a finite interval of time and an infinite multiplicity of points in a finite portion of space, the difficulty arising from the divisibility remains the same. The mathematical conception of continuity as infinite series applies not to movement regarded as an act, but rather to the picture of movement as viewed from the outside. The act of movement, i.e. movement as lived and not as thought; does not admit of any divisibility. The flight of the arrow observed as a passage in space is divisible, but its flight regarded as an act, apart from its realization in space, is one and incapable of partition into a multiplicity. In partition lies its destruction."²

Iqbal states the notion of individuality in his Urdu and Persian poems here as under:

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² Ibid, p-37.
What didst though part from thy roots
Why did I part from mine
Was it the impulse to be born
Was it the impulse to be unique

(Gabriel's Wing II)¹

Desire of glory
Is natural for all
But glory with selfhood's death
Is no glory at all

(Gabriel's Wing II, Lyric No 31)²

Cf.¹ Naim Siddiqui, Tr. Gabriel’s Wing, Alhamara Press, Lahore, 1996.
² Ibid.
The Twigs and boughs this subtle point explain
That sense of surrounding wide to plants is plain
The seed is not content with dwelling dark
It has a craze to spire from earth like spark

(The Rod of Moses)\(^1\)

The seer, inspired by God, who fails
To prompt to deeds of might and main
Is just akin to leaf of hemp
That makes oblivious to loss and gain

(The Rod of Moses)\(^2\)

No part of wisdom it is, I trow
The Trusty axe to shun
Within the rock's heart, even now
Are rubies to be won

(Psalms of Persia II)\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) Ibid.
When the tulips heart I viewed
With the gaze of certitude
All I saw was ecstasy
Sighs, and sobbing bitterly

(Psalms of Persia II)¹

Life is the self to beauty
To guard the self right jealously
Upon a caravan thou art
Fare on with all, but go apart

(Psalms of Persia II)²

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
If you wish to see the essence of religion clearly,
Look but in the depth of your heart
Reveal to the world the essence of religion
And the significance of the clear sharia
Non need he dependent on another (for one's primary need)

(What then should be done)¹

The Quranic 'faqîr' is a critical examination of existence
It is not mere rebeck-playing intoxication, dancing and singing
What is a believer's 'faqîr', it is conquering of dimensions,
The slave acquires attributes of the Lord through it

(What then should be done)²

Cf.¹ B.D. Dar, Tr. What Then Should Be Done, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1977.
² Ibid.
He has in his bosom a clarion call to nations

Their destiny is inscribed on his forehead

(What then should be done)

In thy solitude’ alone
Create a company;
Love, that’s made to know the One,
The Many love to see.

(Psalms of Persia)

The basic difference between Iqbal and James Ward is that the philosophical approach of James Ward does not reach any destination whereas Iqbal opens new vistas and explores new horizons in the light of thoughts and contemplations of Muslim scholars and sufis. James Ward only points towards the notion of the self for which everything aspires. He neither explains the real purpose of the individual self nor its relation with other selves. Iqbal rejects this concept of James Ward because such a concept of individuality can shatter the concept of society. According to him, such a concept might be a Christian Dogma but not acceptable in Islam because, in his view, it is necessary for an individual ego to
have a great concern with other egos to establish a society although it keeps its identity separate from other egos. As Iqbal states in his lecture, 'The Principal of Movement in the Structure of Islam'.

"As a cultural movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects blood-relationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earth-rootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.

Christianity, which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification. Its failure to work as such is system drove the Emperor Julian to return to old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History:

"It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown.

The new sanctions erected by Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy."
Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in together mankind once more into unity and to save civilization?¹

He further writes:

"For the present, every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are string and powerful to form a living family of republics. A true and living unity, according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy as to be achieved by merely symbolical overlordship. It is truly manifested in a multiplicity of free independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration. It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us to the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only and not for restricting the social horizon of its members."²

The many depend on God for their existence though they are still dependent on each other as regards their experience. The idea of God would then be meaningless, unless God were regarded as transcending the Many. So there can be no talk of God. On the other hand, it would be equally meaningless to talk of God apart from the many. This is the basic principle of James Ward's philosophy. According to him, plurality is objective not subjective whereas Spinoza, amongst all the pantheists, starts his philosophical discussion with the absolute and considers the world duality as unreal. Iqbal thinks that the pluralistic activity is necessary to create

Cf.¹ Iqbal's *Reconstruction*, p-146-147.
hustle and bustle in the world, and an active striving in life, though it has a negative aspect of alienation and strangeness insofar as every individual is different from the other or stranger to the other. The secret of individuality is hidden in differentiation. However, it can be dangerous, to some extent, for the society, for the characteristics of individuals and for achievement of a great goal. On this point, Iqbal differs from James Ward; and takes a position similar to William James. He tries to eliminate the alienation and strangeness between different egos and the world and God. For this purpose, he artistically creates coordination between the ego and the non-ego.

Iqbal and James Ward have common thoughts on pluralism. A reflection of Ibn-e-Sina’s thought is obvious, on the subject, in the following poem of Iqbal:
The moon started saying, "O companions!"
O! gleaners of the field of night
In motion is the life of the universe
This is an age-old custom of this place.
The Horse of time is ever running
Flogged by the desire for search
The reward for this moving is Beauty
Love is the beginning, the end is Beauty

(Moon and Stars)
(The Call Of Marching Bell)¹

I have concluded from the above discussion that the thoughts of Iqbal and James Ward about the pluralistic world are weighty but the religious point of view is quite different because the pluralistic phenomenon of the universe is the sole reflection of innumerable qualities of God, the Absolute as He is the only creator all of it and He has been knowing every thing and its movement moment to moment but He Himself is beyond approach of every one as He stated in the Holy Quran:–

يَعْلَمُ مَا قَبْلَهُمْ وَمَا بَعْدُهُمْ وَلَا يَجْعَلُونَ به عَلَمًا

Allah knows what is before and behind them
Human being have no knowledge about it.²

[S.20 (Taha), V.110]
He may wind up this obvious pluralistic phenomena whenever He likes and when the destiny of this pluralistic world will comes to its end i.e the Doomsday; He will say:-

لَا مُلْكَ لِلْمُلَكيَّينَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَهُوَ الْحَقُّ الْمُقِيمُ

To whom the sovereignty of the Day? Only Allah the Almighty One.¹

[S.40 (Momin), V.16]

The present set up of the universe will return to the Absolute as He says:

لَهُ مُلْكُ السَّماوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ لَهُ الْهَيَّةُ وَلَهُ الْحَجَّةُ

He is the sovereign in the Heaven and the Earth. All have to return to Him.²

[S.39 (Zumar), V.44]

Unable to perceive infinity,
The intellect just multiplies pure Unity.

(Garden of the Modern Secret)

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
Ward James, *The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism*, Cambridge University Press, London; 1912
Iqbal's concept of creation is very clear from his verses as under:

A unity, imprisoned by plurality
But always unique, unequalled

*(Gabriel's Wing)*\(^1\)

The sea of life has its ebb and flow
In every atom's heart is the pulse of life

*(Gabriel's Wing)*\(^2\)

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\(^{2}\) Ibid.
Why didst thou part from the roots
Why did I part from mine
Was it the impulse to be born
Was it the impulse to be unique

(Gabriel's Wing)\(^1\)

He draws our attention to the two words 'Amr and Khalq used in the Holy Quran to express the two ways in which the creative activity of God reveals itself to us. The word khalq expresses the relation of God and the Universe of extension; and the word 'Amr expresses the relation of God and the human ego. Thus it is seen from the verse:

وبلونك عنة الروح قيل الروح من امر ربي

And they ask thee of the soul. Say the soul proceeded from my Lord's command. (17:87)

"The world is taken as a plurality of active individuals unified in and through their interactions. These interactions are interpreted throughout on the analogy of social transactions. But, on the other hand, there are objections that proceed altogether a priori. It seems trivial to ask for a sufficient reason for why there is something rather than nothing. The notion of being absolutely thoroughgoing, of

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\(^{1}\) Ibid.
building a metaphysics without presuppositions, one that starts from nothing and explains all, is a useless one. If we must start from a thing, let us start from what is necessary, or let us not stop till we reach what is necessary: let us not rest at what is merely actual, for that can only be contingent. But, it may be a necessary being or contingent being, conditioned by its cause as Kant said, "this real or causal necessity extends no further than the field of possible experience, and even then does not apply to the existence of things as substances; because such substances can never be looked upon as empirical effects or as something that happens or comes to be."¹

So to talk of absolutely necessary being as the foundation of the universe is a fallacy because of applying to the whole a concept that is applicable only to the part. The absolute necessary being involves a contradiction because the predicate absolute means dependant on nothing so necessary is thinkable. The absolute totality of being has no cause, it simply is. But if there is no sense in calling the absolute totality of being necessary, there is none in calling it contingent. There is necessity and contingency within it. Every part is related to the rest, but the whole simple is. Then what is a priori' statement of philosophers, concerning the world that are beyond challenge. The logical and mathematical truths would not show us the faintest picture of what the actual world would be. We differentiate relatively to a particular case between form and matter. But when we make the distinction absolute, pure form and pure matter both alike become abstractions. The logical to be in every

case necessary, the empirical in every case contingent but there is a sort of fallacia composition.

The ontology begins with the question: "What is Reality? And pluralist and singularist answer alike. But the difference between them is that the pluralist is content to stop at the totality of finite experiences whereas the singularist or theist maintains that beyond the universe of the Many there is a singly transcendent experient who comprehends the whole. The superiority of the theistic position seems indisputable as Kant says, "an ideal without a flaw". On the pluralistic view each one of the finite individuals is related to all the rest but only for himself. According to Leibniz, "each mirrors the whole and not the whole but only an aspect of the whole. The pluralistic whole is a whole of experiences but not a whole experience, a whole of lives but not a living whole, a whole of beings but without a perfect being. Is such a whole really a unity? Is it more than a totality? There is a type of a higher Unity than this in the experience of self-conscious subjects. There is a unity, which is more than the related objective continuum, a unity to which all this belongs and refers. Now remove from such an experience the relativity which stand point implies then the theistic ideal of an absolute experience approach, the experience of a living and acting spirit whose centre is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere. The pluralist's Universe in the light of this transcendent being would have a unity which otherwise lacks". The pluralist's Universe is immeasurable enriched if the theistic idea of God's relation to this

2 Ibid,p-229.
Universe is accepted. God is not simply a transcendent being, existing aloof and apart from the world but He is immanent and active within it. The theistic idea not only adds to our confidence in the realization of the pluralist's ideal but it enhances the character of that ideal and the presence of God. Attempts have been made to prove the existence of God by the ontological, the cosmological and teleological arguments; but all the three arguments are defective and demonstrations of the existence of God are unattainable, and the idea is theoretically worthless as Kant called it focus imaginarius. The pluralist's universe answers to the wandering orbs and God, which we are supposed not to see but merely to conceive as giving to their motions both reason and unity.

"Theism is not simply the possible crown and completion of pluralism. It introduces one essential modification in the idea of creation. It does not assume that one transcendent being exists above and beyond the whole series of the Many but it assumes further that this one being is related to them in a way in which none of them is related to the rest. They do not simply coexist along with it, they exist somehow in it and through it. In this idea of creation there are two aspects to consider, its relation to the world and its relation to God. As to the first, it cannot be said that the world as we know it involves the idea of creation as a fact. If it did, we should have direct and tangible evidence of God's existence. But the universe cannot have existed forever, at any assigned moment, an infinite time would be completed; and that is impossible. The universe must have had a beginning and so must have had a first cause. If this argument were valid, it would apply equally to the existence of God. If creation
means anything, it means something so far involved in the divine, as Hegel says, that "without the world God is not God".¹ In calling God the creator then it is simply the world's dependence on Him that is expressed. If so it seems clear that this dependence is not causal dependence. For causation relates to change in existence; but creation regarded from the side of the created is not a change in anything existing. To speak of it as a change in nothing, whereby nothing becomes something is mere thoughtless absurdity. Creation is neither a transient causation, nor an immanent causation. God is the ground of the world's creation and the notion of ground is wider than that of cause. Spinoza also conceived God to be ground of the world but interpreted this relation in a way, which the theist cannot accept. According to his view, the reality of the One means that there is no reality for the Many. For pantheism God is the immanent ground of the world, for deism He is the transcendental ground and for theism He is both. Kant's theory of intellectual intuition is very helpful to solve the problem. According to him, our knowledge has two stems to complete our experience. The one, sensibility, that furnishes the material of knowledge. The other, understanding yields the form of knowledge. But together these two sources yield phenomenal knowledge. The Being to whom this intellectual intuition belongs will be creative; its objects will be not phenomenal but nominal, not independent manifestations of another but the creation of itself.

The world is presented as another; so the passivity in our perception. We know the world as its external relation to us, not as it

¹ Ibid, p-233.
is in itself, so it is phenomenal. Here the duality of subject and object is real. But in intellective intuition, difference between being and knowing, thought and thing have vanished. Such intuition implies more than we understand even by omniscience. Our knowledge and it would leave things independent as regards their existence whereas the intellective intuition attempts to disclose whereby they exist. The idea of a transcendent experient is ubiquitous and does not reach to the transcendent idea of a creator of one who is the ground of the objects that He knows. The immediate experience of another subject any knowledge because it involves a contradiction. Whereas the actions of free and advancing intelligence make new beginnings possible, imply real initiative, it follows even complete and absolute knowledge or omniscience, would leave every finite subject in the position of an object: each is known completely as regards its utterances, its objective relation the rest but not as it is in self. But more than this is implied in the divine omniscience, as theism understands it. Such so-called omniscience, in a word, presupposes creation: so it is only for creative intuition that the knowing and the being of object could be said to be in any sense the same. But the intuition of the object and the object itself could not be same. "Do not theism and pantheism after all come to the same thing: God is the world and the world is God?" But identity must imply some difference. The bare and meaningless identity of God and world simply leave us with God only as in the acosmism of Spinoza: or with world only as in the polite atheism of Schopenhauer. But our own self-conscious enables to understand the difference. Self-conscious

is the only form of knowledge that can be in a sense absolute. Knowledge of another must be relative and incomplete. The consciousness of self always involves the consciousness of not self, the two being always correlative and coordinate. "V. Hartmann's clairvoyance of the unconscious or over-conscious is bad setting of the old idea of intellective intuition or Bergson's 'elan vital'. The intellective intuition with an absolute self-conscious will not avail for theism: it leaves no room for the divine transcendence and without this the distinctness of God and the world and the dependence of the world on God both alike disappear. Neither absolute knowledge nor absolute self-consciousness can take the place of the idea of creation and the intellective intuition or intuitive understanding can help us in this connection. The Antigone of Sophocles, Shakespeare's Hamlet, Michael Angelo's Moses, Raphael's Sistine Madonna and Beethoven's Ninth Symphony are great creations and spontaneous output of productive imagination of free spirits, they embody themselves in their works, live in them and love them".¹ But this analogy is imperfect because God is the Absolute Genius: any analogy drawn from our experience must be inadequate to God's experience. God's ways are not as our ways or His thoughts as our thoughts. We cannot represent creation as starting with a blind will to create followed by a selection of the best possible plan of creation. It is a pure activity and original insight, idea and deed, life and light. God is transcendent to it, for it is not God but His utterances and manifestation, He is immanent in it and it is His continuous creation. The theist is bound to admit that this conception of God and the

world is beyond us. We can assign it no beginning and so we say it is eternal. We can find no ground for it so we say it is the Absolute. The pluralist's position is not better in case of the Absolute because he assumes the totality of Many as the ultimate reality. A plurality of beings primarily independent as regards their existence and yet always mutually acting and reacting upon each other, an ontological plurality that is somehow a cosmological Unity, seems clearly to suggest ground beyond itself. The idea of God presents itself to meet this lack. The Many depend upon God for their existence though still dependent on each other as regards their experience. The idea of God would then be meaningless, unless God were regarded as transcending the Many.

On the other hand it would be meaningless to talk of God apart from the Many. A God that was not a creator, a God whose creatures had no independence, would not himself be really a God. Herein theism differs from thoroughgoing singularism or absolutism. A theism that is reached through pluralism can never end in an absolute in which God and the world alike were absorbed and lost. God and the world constitute the Absolute; but if God is the absolute ground of the world, is not God alone after all the real Absolute? If God is the absolute ground of the world, it would share with him the title of Absolute. A theist does not pretend that the world is coordinate with God or His creation involved external limitation but the point is that if creation is to have any internal limitation. But if the reality of the world be admitted, then this reality stands over against the reality of God. God indeed has not been limited from without but He has limited Himself. But self-limitation seems to imply a prior
state in which it was absent, whereas, a limitation held to be permanent. It suggests ultimate dualism rather than an ultimate unity: duality in Unity is implied here but not dualism.

But how can self-limitation be involved in creation, if creation is pure activity and original intuition, if God is all life and all light? How can God be omnipotent, as theism assumes and yet be limited? An omnipotent being that could not limit itself would hardly deserve the name of God, would in fact be only a directionless energy of unlimited amount. All determination is negation, that is limitation, says Spinoza. We might regard Him as the Absolute notwithstanding possible creational vagaries but He would be the absolute indeterminate. But, according to theistic idea, God does not repudiate but owns and respects His world, a world that is cosmic not chaotic. God is determined by the world's existence, does less than justice to the pluralist's position and a pluralist has no basis for an ideal God. The difficulty still remains; how God creates the world and thereby limits Himself. The idea of creation, like the idea of God is altogether transcendent. It is from the reality of the world that James Ward starts as a pluralist. He admits that he can never understand the creative process and finally surrenders; for what is the use of a hypothesis that can never be verified. As he asserts in his lecture 'Creative and Divine Limitation':

"How God creates the world and thereby limits Himself we can never understand. Even if the idea of creation be valid, we must necessarily fail to understand the process, just because that can not fall within our experience; on the other hand any process that we could understand could not be the creative process, because it
would fall within our experience. This may sound very like a final surrender."

A scientific hypothesis is directly verifiable; because the facts fall within experience but philosophy is not science; it deals not with parts as science does; but with experience as a concrete whole, it justifies its idea to conceive the whole as a complete and systematic unity. The pluralist halts at the Many and their interaction. The idea of creation is rationally justified though it may not be empirically verifiable. But, according to Iqbal's point of view, the idea of God and the idea of creation may be justified and verified by love and ecstasy as he stated in his Urdu poem:

Love breathes spring breezes upon garden bowers
And it star - Sangles hills and dales with flowers
Its Sunbeams piece the darkness of the sea
And give the eyes of fish path - seeing powers

(The Message of the East)

Cf. 1 James Ward, The Realm of Ends, p-245.
I am a slave set free
And love still leadeth me;
Love is my leader still,
Mind bows to do my will.

(Psalms of Persia)

Iqbal does not surrender like James Ward but goes forward a step and searches out the sources such as ecstasy and love; by which the problem is solved; though he also believes in the transcendentalism of God and His creation. He agrees with James Ward on all philosophical points but literally differs from him. Iqbal says:

"As the Quran says: 'God created all things and assigned to each its destiny; the destiny of a thing then is not an unrelenting fate working from without like a taskmaster; it is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualise themselves without any feeling of external compulsion."¹

He continues:

"In fact all creative activity is free activity. Creation is opposed to repetition which is a characteristic of mechanical action that is why

Cf.¹ M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction:p-50.
it is impossible to explain the creative activity of life in terms of Mechanism. 

Hence science cannot comprehend life. On the analogy of our conscious experience, then the universe is a free creative movement.\footnote{Ibid, p.50-51.}

The things are being created by God, but the creation is taking place according to the characteristics, the capabilities and nature of things themselves. The nature of a thing is eternal and unchangeable. It is not created, because it already exits from eternity, therefore, man is considered a free agent, so he is responsible for his acts. This is qadar (freedom). Although everything is created by God, and to this extent, it is determined, still its external realization (creation) and its action are taking place according to its eternal nature. Iqbal steps ahead of James Ward.
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Chapter V
IQBAL AND WARD'S CONCEPTION OF EVOLUTION

"The interaction of a plurality of individuals, intent on self-betterment as well as self-conservation, diminishes the mere contingency of the world and replaces it by a definite progression. This progression we are wont to speak of as evolution". \(^1\) The term, evolution, has different meanings. In the literal sense it means, the unrolling of a scroll or volume, whereby what lies written inside it becomes visible. Later it applied with a similar meaning to the supposed unfolding of an organism regarded as completely pre-existing in miniature within the germ. This was the theory of biological evolution supported by Leibniz. But it is superseded by the theory of epigensis or new formation; for which the term evolution is still used. In fact, the two theories are quite different. The earlier view would render the Darwinian doctrine of the origin of species impossible. "According to the earlier theory, the germ is more than a bud like miniature of the adult and included within itself the next generation. This is just a theory of pre-formation and then the directiveness of evolution.

According to the later theory, each new organism is not an 'adult' but a 'product'; its parts in no sense present in the embryo but are gradually organized, one after another in due order. Such a

theory is in all respects conformable; makes a history; and is called in a word natura naturans and in other words natura naturata".  

Whereas the pre-formation theory is only compatible with singularism because a singularist takes the world as a block universe. " Hegel's view is that the development of an organism is the counterpart of the logical development; and he commands the so-called 'box within box' hypothesis of Leibniz".  

According to his point of view, it is just the realization of a dialectical evolution. It is an immanent and self-determining process of explication of the Absolute One, setting out from and returning into itself. But it is impossible to decide, while the issue between pluralism and absolutism is still undecided, whether the whole is prior to the parts or not. Anyhow it is the parts, the many, with which the pluralist starts the discussion. The whole is more than the sum of its parts. This is the cardinal characteristic of evolution. A unity that is not more than its constituent elements is no real unity at all. All real synthesis entails new properties, which its component factors in their previous position did not possess as in mechanical and chemical actions, where the separate effects lease entirely and are succeeded by phenomena altogether different by new effects. This is the fundamental distinction in nature. "Evolution, for the pluralist is always synthesis, and all real synthesis is creative synthesis. The pluralist extends the concepts of experience and activity far beyond the range of Kant's so-called 'synthetic Unity of apperception".  

It is more exact to say that for the naturalist function depends entirely on structure while the pluralist holds structure to be

Cf.  

2 Ibid, p-100.  
3 Ibid,104-105.
mainly determined by function. The result of interaction of different factors is a perennial epigenesis, the only creation that pluralism recognizes. It is a mistake to attempt to forecast the future course of evolution in detail in so far as synthesis is creative but it is equally a mistake to ignore the tendency to progression as an a priori consequence from the fundamental character of the world as pluralism conceives it.

Iqbal adds to the conception of evolution of James Ward, by clarifying the evolution of individuals, although Ward assumes the completion of an individual as an object but his purpose to individuality is not obvious, whereas, Iqbal clarifies it in detail.

According to Darwin's theory evolution is an outcome of accidental changes such as in biological evolution; simply an adaptation to environment or even an adaptation by environment. The more experience advances, the more there is of adaptation of environment as well as of adaptation to environment. Germ within germ like an infinite juggler's box and nothing new. Bergson turns down Darwin's doctrine by his theory of "the Elan Vital". Iqbal beautifully paints his idea of evolution in his poem as under.
Perhaps the Universe is still incomplete
Because echo of His Saying, "It is and it is done"
is continuously coming
Stream of life is continuously flowing
Every thing is causing hustle and bustle in life.

*(Gabriel Wings)*

Iqbal fully agrees with James Ward's pluralistic theory and calls it essential to solve the problem of perfect and complete evolution. But why do we need the notion of evolution? What is its purpose? One possible reply is that all things are moving towards perfection. Iqbal also accepts "the principle of continuity" of James Ward but adds that the process of evolution is not only for individuals but the world is also in the process of evolution. According to Iqbal, James Ward rightly says that individuality plausible and the dissension makes it ambiguous, for example, the function of a general in the field is the direction of the campaign as a whole. The execution of his orders in detail he leaves to the several members of his staff in

Cf.¹ Naim Siddiqui, *Tr. Gabriel’s Wing*
such-wise, that they in turn have to issue further specific orders to their various adjutants; and so on again and again, till at length thousands of private soldiers are set in motion. But the movements that they perform, are carried out by a so-called psycho-physical mechanism, to which the detailed coordination is left: of this they individually know nothing. And throughout, it is this gradual mechanization of lower functions by habit that makes it possible to concentrate attention on higher functions. In such consentient functions, each unit is a, 'form' for function below it and 'matter' for the function above it. Every form too is conditioned by its appropriate matter: soldiers cannot be effectively manoeuvred till they have mastered their drill. Thus in all organization there is not only continuity throughout, there is also solidarity as well. The higher depends on the lower but it is only half the truth. This relation according to pluralism is good for the synthesis but never will be a single unity independent of the plurality beneath, but only the harmonious coordination, and in this sense, the many become more and more one, therefore, the lower also depends upon the higher. According to pluralism no absolutely fixed environment exists: modification of environment is possible and so is modification by it; so the process of evolution is on going. The creation is a notion of life and it depends on movement, not simply on knowledge; and action creates knowledge, but Plato's concept of life is static whereas Iqbal's concept of life is evolutionary like that of James Ward. As Iqbal states in his poem:
The motionless shore said, thou I have long been here
I am not yet aware of my identity
The restless wave rolled fast and said, for me
To roll on is to be, to be still not to be.

(Life and Action)
(The Voice of the East)\(^1\)

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The self should be submerged in self is an impossibility
To be the essence of selfhood is the self’s apogee.

(Garden of the Modern Secret)

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the thoughts of Iqbal and James Ward on their respective conceptions of ego and to make a comparison between the two with reference to their own books and other sources written on the subject.

Reality, the Ultimate Ego, is manifested according to Iqbal in a hierarchy of ego-unities, a rising scale of egohood culminating in man. The reality of these ego-unities is relative to their consciousness; man is the most real for he alone consciously participates in the creative life of his Maker. By creating the human Ego, God has limited His own creativity, to the extent that individual finite Egos participate in creative action. All life is individual, and the Ego is highest form of that individuality by approaching God, the Ultimate Individual, require him to master nature, to absorb God into himself. The nature of the Self, then demands affirmation:
By the Self the seed of opposition is sown in the world
It imagines itself to be other than itself.
It makes from itself the forms of others
In order to multiply the pleasure of strife.

*(Secrets of the Self)*

First of all Iqbal considers what light modern psychology throws on the nature of the ego. He criticises William James' conception of consciousness as a "stream of thought", and remarks that although it is an ingenious description of our mental life, it is not true to consciousness as we find it in ourselves. According to him consciousness is something single, presupposed in all mental life and not bits of consciousness, mutually reporting to one another. We appreciate the ego itself in the act of perceiving, judging and willing.

The two fundamental principles of classical physics which prevailed in the 19th century, and the first quarter of the present century were those of the absoluteness of matter and energy, and of the determinism in mechanics.

It was believed that matter and energy were two entirely and absolutely differently entities, quite independent of each other. Matter had weight and inertia, whereas energy had no weight. Matter travelled in a corpuscular manner, while energy was propagated by waves. There was a separate law of conservation for matter and another for energy. Matter was never converted into energy, and energy never transformed into matter. The advocates of *jabr*
(mechanism) took advantage of this physical principle, and put forward the notion of a transcendent God, operating upon it from without, and the real author of all that happens in the Universe. Man was nothing but a tool, obey the command of the Master, and doing only what has been pre-ordained.

The opponents of religion took this very difference of matter and energy to point out that since every effect must have some resemblance with the cause, the material Universe could not have been created by God who is immaterial.

Now the theory of Relativity and the Quantum theory have established beyond doubt that matter and energy are not two different things, but two aspects of the same entity, just as ice and steam are two forms of the same substance. Light has weight and inertia just like matter. Both of them travel sometimes like particles and sometimes like waves. Matter is converted into energy and energy is converted into matter according to a formula which is called Einstein's mass energy relation. This discovery has taken away the ground from under the feet of the mechanists and atheists. It shows us clearly that God who is the Light of the heavens and of the earth could very well have created the Universe.

The second argument of the mechanists was taken from determinism of the classical physics, prevalent up to the year 1927. It is a consequence of Newton's Laws of Mechanics that if the state of a dynamical system is known at the present moment, it can be calculated for any instant either in the past or in the future. This was the point emphasized by the poet in his famous lines:
Yea! The First Dawn of Creation wrote
What the Last Day of Reckoning shall read

The success of Newton's mechanics had led people to apply the same mechanical principles even to the psychological phenomena, and the mechanical brain was a favourite term in those days. This had given rise to absolute and rigid determinism not only in the physical domain, but also in human history. All our future actions are determined completely by our past; we have no control over them and no choice in the matter. If we accept Newton's Laws then there is no escape from this conclusion.

In the year 1927, however, Heisenberg made his epoch making discovery of the Principles of Indeterminacy in Quantum Mechanics, which has demolished completely Newton's mechanical determinism.

Heisenberg showed that the behaviour of even a single atomic particle is not determined; there are an infinite number of possibilities out of which any one might happen. We can only be wise after the event, and can say afterwards how it has actually behaved. Determinism has since then dropped out completely out physics. This is due to the fact that in order to know the state of any particle, we have to find both its position and its speed. Now it can be proved that both these quantities cannot be determined simultaneously with exactness. In order to determine the position of the particle, we have to observe it by throwing light on it. But since this is exactly the same thing as striking a ball with another ball, the first ball will be displaced

\[ \text{Cf.}^1 \text{ M.Ikram Chughtai, Iqbal, New Dimentions, p-323.} \]
from its position. The very act of observation disturbs the particle. Hence the uncertainty about its position and speed.

Now consider Newton's mechanistic principle. It says that if the present is known, the future is determined completely. But Heisenberg has shown that it is not possible to determine the present; therefore, the future is indeterminate. This is the Principle of Indeterminacy. It is, however, sufficient to show that the mechanists and determinists have no more basis for their belief. All the same Iqbal has arrived at the right conclusion about the freedom of the ego. He remarks that this freedom of conscious behaviour follows the view of ego-activity which the Qur'an takes. The Qur'an lays down:

وَقَالَ الْحَقُّ مِن رَبِّكُمْ فَمَن شَاء فَلَيْسَ مِن وَمَن شَاء فَلَيْكَفَرٌ

And say: The Truth is from your Lord: Let Him then who will, believe; and let Him who will, be an unbeliever. (18:28)

Again the Qur'an says:

إِنَّ أَحْسَنَتُمْ، أَحْسَنَتْنَا لَنَفْسَكُمْ، وَإِنِّي أَسَاءَتُمْ فَلَهَا

'If ye do well, to your own behoof will ye do well; and if ye do evil, against yourself will ye do it'.

Iqbal points out that "Islam recognizes a very important fact of human psychology, i.e, the rise and fall of the power to act freely, and is anxious to retain the power to act freely as a constant and
undiminished factor in the life of the ego. The timing of the daily prayer, which according to the Qur'an bestows self-possession to the ego by bringing it in to closer touch with the ultimate source of life and freedom, is intended to save the ego from the mechanizing source of sleep and business. Prayer in Islam is the ego's escape from mechanism to freedom.

He explains further the concept of the human ego's freedom by considering the Qur'anic legend of the Fall of Man. He shows that contrary to the account given in Jewish Literature, the Fall (according to Qur'an) dose not mean any moral depravity, it is man's transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of self-consciousness, a kind of waking from the dream of nature with a throb of personal causality in one's own being. He affirm that goodness is not a matter of compulsion; it is the self's free surrender to the moral idea, and arises out of the willing cooperation of free egos. He says that a being whose movements are wholly determined like a machine cannot produce goodness, and then arrives at the conclusion that freedom is a condition of goodness. The Qur'an says:

وَنَبِلْوَكُم بِلَّيْلَةِ الطَّفِيلِ وَالْخَيْرِ فِيهَا

And for trial will we test you with evil and with good.

(21:36)

The Quranic verse describing man's acceptance of the *amana*, the trust of personality, is a clear and irrefutable indication of the ego's freedom:
Verily we proposed to the heaven and to the earth and to the mountains to receive the 'trust', but they refused the burden, and they feared to receive it. Man undertook to bear it, but has proved unjust, senseless.

(33:72)

Malik wrote in his essay 'Iqbal's Conception of Ego' "In Persian and Urdu literature the word Khudi has been used to mean vanity, arrogance and haughtiness. For example the famous poet Iraqi, in one of his Persian verses, says.

أول ائتست و آخشر وانی سیدست _ خورا رخوی تری بیرا قان است

"The beginning is this, do you know what's its end? To achieve deliverance of the self from one's own conceit.

In a similar vein the famous Urdu poet Sauda says:

اب قلت کہ لگنے میں قید ہوگی سے اس کے سے اس نے دیکھا تھا جو بھارتیہ

Alas! I could not reach him from the prison of my egotism.

It has been difficult to be released from my own trap".  

Recognizing this semantic difficulty, Iqbal stated that "the other words for the metaphysical fact of the "I" are equally bad, e.g, ana, shakhs, nafs and ananiyat". He wanted a "colour-less word" in order to express the concept of self or ego, "having no ethical significance". At last, "considering the requirements of verse", Iqbal adopted Khudi as the most appropriate term to denote self. He states:

"Thus metaphysically the word Khudi is used in the sense of that indescribable feeling of 'I' which forms the basis of the uniqueness of each individual. Metaphysically it does not convey any ethical significance. Ethically the word Khudi means self-reliance, self-respect, self-confidence, self-preservation, even self-assertion, when such a thing is necessary, in the interests of life and the power to stick to the cause of truth, justice, duty, even in the face of death."¹

Dictating his views to Sayyid Nazir Niyazi in 1937, Iqbal explicitly stated that the Asrar-e-Khudi is based upon two principles:

a. that personality is the central fact of the universe, b. that personality, 'I am' is the central fact in the constitution of man. The first principle, Iqbal believed, is described in the Old Testament, "as the great 'I am'." The Holy Quran, however, described the Ultimate personality in much grander terms:

هوَ الْحَقُّ الْحَقُّ الْعَلِيمُ الْمُفْلِحُ الْمُفْلِحُ

المُهْيَمُ الْفَتْرَةَ الْعَالِمُ الْمُتَكَّرِرُ سِيْحَةُ الْلَّهِ عَمَّا يَشَاءُ عَلَّهُ

(سِرِّورٌ)٩٦٣ (٢٣:٥٩)

¹- Ibid.
"God is He, than whom
There is no other God,
The sovereign, the Holy one,
The source of peace (and perfection)
The Guardian of faith,
The preserver of safety,
The exalted in might,
The Irresistible, the Supreme."

(S.59:23)¹

This concept of personality, Iqbal pointed out, is illuminated in the second chapter of his *Asrar-i-Khudi*, for instance.

Cf.¹ M.Yousuf Ali, Tr. The Holy Quran,
"The form of existence is an effect of the self
Whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the self.
Its self-deceptions are the essence of life
like the rose, it lives by bathing itself in blood.
For the sake of a single rose it destroys a hundred
rose gardens.
And makes a hundred lamentations in quest of a
single melody.
When life gathers strength from the self
the river of life expands in to an ocean". ¹

(Secrets of Ego)

About the second principle of the smaller or dependent 'I am',
Iqbal maintained the following:

It "is variously described in the Quran i.e, Daif (Weak), Jahul
(ignorant), Zalum (unjust); yet it is also described as ahsan al-taqwim
(in best of the mould), asfala safline (the lowest condition). 'I' has the
quality of growth as well as the quality of corruption, it has the power
to expand by absorbing the element of the universe of which it
appears to be an insignificant part, it has also the power of absorbing
the attributes of God (Takhallaqu bi-akhalq Allah) (create in yourself
the attributes of God). The various stages of its spiritual expression
are described in the Asrar-i-Khudi as follows: Itaa'at (complete
surrender to law), Zabt-i-Nafs (self control), Niyabat-i-Illahiya
(vicegerency of God on earth)."²

Cf.¹ R.A. Nicholson, Tr. Secrets of Ego.
Cf.² M. Ikram Chughatai, Iqbal-New Dimensions, p-299.
In the tenth chapter of the *Asrar-i-Khudi* Iqbal maintains that complete submission to the law is symbolized by the camel:

"Service and toil are the traits of the camel patience and perseverance are ways of the camel Noiselessly he steps along the sandy track. He is the ship of those who voyage in the desert. Thou, too, do not refuse the burden of duty: so will thou enjoy the best dwelling-place, which is with God. Endeavour to obey, o heedless one! Liberty is the fruit of compulsion".\(^1\)

*(Secrets of Ego)*

Regarding the significance of self-control, Iqbal says:

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"He that does not command himself
Becomes a receiver of commands from others....
One to whom God is the soul in his body
His neck is not bowed before Vanity
Fear finds no way into his bosom
His heart is afraid of none but Allah". ¹

*(Secrets of Ego)*

Explaining the concept of divine vicegerency, Iqbal basically developed in his own way the sufi doctrine of Insan-i-Kamil (the perfect man) and did not present Nietzsche's Superman as an ideal. Here are some of the qualities of the perfect man:

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¹Ibid.
"God's vicegerent is as the soul of the universe, His being is the Shadow of the Greatest Name"¹

(SECRETS OF EGO)

Then Iqbal longs for arrival of such a man in the world:

¹ Ibid.
"Appear, O rider of Destiny!  
Appear, O light of the dark realm of change:  
Illumine the scene of existence  
Dwell in the blackness of our eyes!  
Silence the noise of the nations  
Imparadise our ears with Thy music  
Arise and tune the harp of brotherhood  
Give us back the cup of the wine of Love!  
Bring once more days of peace to the world,  
Give a message of peace to them that seek battle".¹

(Secrets of Ego)

God's vicegerent is obviously not Nietzsche's superman. However, when Iqbal says, "Be as hard as the diamond", a superficial similarity between the two concepts develops. In chapter 14 of the Asrar-i-Khudi, Iqbal compares strong ego to the radiance of the diamond and then concludes:

پھیلی زمردی طا گلدیا شتہ   ازحیات دیگر سے مIASیا شتہ
خطرہ نہ گلاب کے ضرت تک خئین ہو ہو ہو
پھر تفرت سوت کساردیا شتہ - حائل صدارت دیا بانش

(اسرارائودی)

"Whosoever strives hard and grips tight,  
the two worlds are illuminated by him......  
In solidity consists the glory of life;  
Weakness is Worthlessness and immaturity"¹

¹ Ibid, p-79, 83-84.
Unlike Nietzsche's ideal, this is not a message of "callousness or pitilessness". To Iqbal "the diamond" represents "the integration of the element's of the ego so that it may be able to obstruct the forces of destruction in its means towards personal immortality (Iqbal, thus, emphatically claimed that, "in its essence the Asrar-i-Khudi and Nietzsche are diametrically opposed to each other".

In the strengthening of ego, "Ishq (Love) is the determining factor in Iqbal's philosophical system. "Love means the desire to assimilate, to absorb. Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavour to realize them." the opposite of love, to Iqbal is Sawal (asking), and "all that is achieved without personal effort comes under Sawal (asking). Iqbal also defined love as "the power of assimilative action," and described 'asking' as a synonymous with 'inaction' as Iqbal said:

I am slave set free
And love still leadeth me;
Love is my leader still
Mind bows to do my will.

(Psalms of Persia)

1 Ibid, p-244.
Partaking in the creative functions of God, individual ego demonstrates the power of assimilative action, as stated in the Holy Quran:¹

مَتَّى لَكُمُ اللَّهُ أَحْسَنُ الخَلِيفُينَ (آيات 12-14)

"Blessed is, therefore, the God--- the most excellent of makers". (23:12-14)²

Ego, according to Iqbal, remains creative in a state of perpetual tension. If the tension is not maintained, relaxation ensues, leading man to inactivity. " Thus the state of tension, is the most valuable achievement of man, he should see that he does not revert to a state of relaxation, that which tends to maintain a state of tension tends to make us immortal, that which fortifies personality is good, that which weaken it is bad. Iqbal's conception of ego functioned as the frame of reference, enabling him to judge art, religion and ethics."³ Consequently, Iqbal became a firm exponent of the theory of purposive art as against art for art's sake. According to him, "the highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. There should be no opium-eating in art. The dogma of art for the sake of art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power."⁴

Let us turn to James Ward now. Discussing the concept of self, James Ward says:

"Such minimum implies behaviour directed towards self-conservation or self-realisation. An individual no doubt is often

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¹ Iqbal stated it indicated the possibility of the other creators than God, this returning to a Quranic dating from the classical Mu’tazilite Ash’arite controversy.
³ Cf. M.Ikram Chughatai,Iqbal-New Dimensions,p-301.
⁴ Cf. Latif.A.Sherwani, Speeches, Letters and Statements of Iqbal,p-159.
defined as something that cannot be divided without being destroyed as a clock for instance. But such things are not true individuals or selves: a clock has no interest in, or impulse towards, its own conservation. Self-conservation alone, however, strictly taken and regarded as everywhere realised, would result in nothing better than a static world, in which there would be no new events and no history. Such a state as final would correspond to the complete rest and quiescence with which; according to Spencer's law of equilibration, the drama of evolution must close. As an initial state it would correspond to Leibniz's pre-established harmony contemplated from without, if that were possible: there would be no interaction between individual and individual. But the actual world as our own experience teaches us, is full of cross-purposes; and, therefore, self-conservation generally calls for efforts and perseverance.

But though self-conservation implies the minimum to be striven for, self-development or realisation is still the aim of many, and was perhaps at the beginning the aim of all. It is plain then that when talking of self-conservation the main stress is not to be laid on the bare conservation of some metaphysically simple entity, such as the soul of the old rational psychologist. What is meant is rather the maintenance of the most advantageous position attained by the actual self in relation to the world as a whole. This implies that each one is in touch with all the rest collectively and with some more specially.\textsuperscript{1}

Iqbal was very impressed by James Ward and Mc-Taggart, in connection with self-realisation or ego. James Ward mostly derives

his thoughts from Leibnitz who believes that every individual is quite different from the other individual. Leibnitz's "Law of identity of indiscernible" is based on the same idea in a way. Iqbal was indirectly impressed by Leibnitz because James Ward declared Leibnitz, the pioneer of the pluralistic philosophers who started their philosophical discussion from the Many. James Ward totally agrees with Leibnitz but Iqbal partially agreed with him and differs on some points. Iqbal's conception of ego does not totally depend on the thoughts of James Ward or Nietzsche or Fichte or any other philosopher. In this connection, he gets guidance from Jalal-ud-Din, Rumi, a great Muslim Sufi; who is the guide of Iqbal during the spiritual journey stated in "Javed Nama" (Book of Eternity).

As Richrd S. Wheeler wrote in his essay, 'The Individual and Action in the Thought of Iqbal',

"Iqbal regarded himself as a disciple not of James Ward but of Jalal al-Din Rumi, the thirteenth-century Persian mystic and philosopher. From Rumi he drew much of his inspiration in matters of literary form as well as philosophic content, and in Rumi he found anticipated some of the ideas of modern thinkers such as Nietzsche and Bergson."¹

Iqbal believes in self but also believes in other-self like James Ward and against Nietzsche, who does not admit the other self at any cost. According to Iqbal ego is the greatest truth: who is God; the Greatest Ego. His conception of ego is partially derived from the European philosophy but some particular parts have been derived from the mystical thoughts of the Muslim 'sufia' and other oriental

philosophers. This is the main point, which differentiates Iqbal's conception of Ego from the European philosophical thoughts. Fichte says that the creation of truth is the result of his thoughts but Iqbal goes a step forward and says:

"New worlds drive their pomp from thoughts quite fresh and new
From stones and bricks a world was neither built nor grew
The Fellow same is Lord of freaks of fate and strife
Who, with every breath he draws, creates an eternal life".¹

(Creation)
(The Blow of Moses)

The Greatest Ego is the greatest truth, who is the sole creator of innumerable other subordinate egos.

Iqbal's concept of ego is based on the Quranic ideas, as he says:

"The Secrets of the self is hidden in words, no God but He alone. 
The self is just a dull-edged sword, No God but He, the grinding stone". 

(The Rod of Moses)

Similarly, for Iqbal, love of the Holy Prophet is a basic condition of ego. He says:

"And every Muslim's heart is the home of Mustafa 
Our glory is the reflection of the name of Mustafa"

(Secrets of Self)

"Lay a foundation of love in your soul 
And renew your pledge with the Holy Prophet"

(Secrets of the Selflessness)

He defines ego in a very poetic way:

"What is Spirit of Wave?
A Sword!
What is Self?
An edge of Sword!"¹

(The Gabriel's Wing)

"What is Self?
Inner secret of life
What is Self?
Awakening of the world."²

(The Gabriel's Wing)

Sometimes an ego has to undergo a process of decomposition to achieve a new composition.

He calls Khudi the solid ground of life and says:

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² Ibid.
"My style is not Lordship but poverty
Do not sell yourself; make a name (through the ethics of) poverty"¹

(The Gabriel's Wing)

Iqbal further notes that one's fate is in his own hands if one develops his ego:

"The self so cultivate that ere God send a fate
He may ask His slave what does he wish and crave"²

(The Gabriel's Wing)

Iqbal writes in his lecture 'The human ego: its freedom and immortality':

"Whatever may be the final fate of man, it does not mean the loss of individuality. The Quran does not contemplate complete liberation from finitude as the highest state of human bliss. The unceasing reward of man consist in his gradual growth in self-possession, in Uniqueness, and intensity of his activity as an ego.

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
Even the scene of 'Universal destruction' immediately preceding the Day of Judgement cannot affect the perfect calm of a full-grown ego:

Who can be the subject of this exception but those in whom the ego has reached the very highest point of intensity? And the climax of this development is reached when the ego is able to retain full self-possession, even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embracing Ego. As the Quran says of the prophet's vision of the Ultimate Ego:

\[ \text{مَارَّاعَ الْبَصَرُ وَمَفَاطِمُ} \]

His eye turned not aside, nor did it wander.

(15:17)

This is the ideal of perfect manhood in Islam. Nowhere has it found a better literary expression than in a Persian verse, which speaks of the Holy Prophet's experience of Divine illumination:

\[ \text{مَوَىَتُ نَظَّمَرْ بَثَبَتُ عَلَى} \]

"Moses fainted away by a mere surface illumination of Reality
Thou seest the very substance of Reality with a smile."

At the end, it is concluded from the above discussion that James Ward insists on the existence of a thing. According to his philosophical point of view, every living or non-living thing resists to

maintain its existence if any other force tries to diminish its existence, even the smallest tinny particle repulses the force which is harmful to its existence. James Ward calls this habit of physical resistance, an ego, because he was basically a pluralist-naturalist and he mostly concentrates on matter or substance but Iqbal takes a step ahead and goes beyond the material world. His conception of ego is very wide in sense and he applies this sentiment of ego to the human psychology as well as to the psychology of nations. He calls God, the greatest ego and all other egos are subordinate to Him. According to him the nations which could not protect their egos disappeared from the Earth just as Gond and Bhil tribes in India. Every ego is subordinate to the Greatest Ego. This is the new horizon of ego explored by Iqbal because he was more than a philosopher but James Ward never thought such because he was simply a philosopher and a psychologist. Therefore, Iqbal's pedestal is higher than James Ward. He says:

If but one atom I must give
Of this the fabric that I live
Too great a price were that, for me
To purchase immortality

(Psalms of Persia)
O happy rivulet
In selfhood passionate,
Who to earth’s heart dost flee
And flowest not to see.

(Psalms of Persia)


Chapter VII

IQBAL AND WARD'S CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM

If but one atom I must give
Of this the fabric that I live
Too great a price were that, for me
To purchase immortality

(Psalms of Persia)

The purpose of this chapter is to make research on the thoughts of Iqbal and James Ward regarding freedom and determinism as far as fate is concerned. The Holy Quran says:

"Every man acteth after his own manner, but your Lord well knoweth who is the best guided in the path." (17:86)

The problem of Free Will and Predetermination, has always been one of the most significant and crucial problem in the history of human thought. It has been discussed in almost all ages since man began to think consciously. All the great Leaders of religion and
philosophy have tried to pronounce judgement on it, so as to devise a code of behaviour for individual. If we believe in a life hereafter, and in punishment or reward for deeds done in this World, then it becomes a matter of paramount importance and necessary to settle the question whether we are free in our acts or whether there is a higher will than our own which has predetermined the course we would follow in any case. For it is apparent that reward or punishment can be meted out only if we are free agent, making our own choice of the good evil acts. There would seem to be no justice in making a man responsible for acts which are predetermined. As Iqbal says:

جوہان از خوورون گورود کیست؟
جوہاں جہاں ہے پہاد کیست؟
مرا کوئی کر از شیطان عزر کن
گھوہا مین کہ او پہورہ کیست؟

Who has created the world?
Whose beauty does it reflect?
O Lord, you ask me to beware of the Devil,
But tell me who has brought him up?

(Gift of Hijjaz)

Iqbal points out, "Islam recognizes a very important fact of human psychology, i.e the rise and fall of the power to act freely, and is anxious to retain the power to rise freely as a constant and undiminished factor in the life of the ego. The timing of the daily
prayer, which to the Qur'an bestows self-possession to the ego by bringing it into closer touch with the ultimate source of life and freedom, is intended to save the ego from the mechanizing effects of sleep and business. Prayer in Islam is the ego's escape from mechanism to freedom.

James ward's thoughts on freedom and fate are very clear as he makes man's freedom of choice possible by his theory of the self-limitation of God. God limited His omnipotence by giving some of His casual powers to His creatures. This involves the further self-limitation of His omniscience, for if God knew what His creatures were going to create their creations must be determined by his for-knowledge and they could hardly be considered free individual. He is against the view that the original state of the world already had certain definiteness and thus the actually realised state of the world excluded the possibility of realisation of a large number of otherwise possible states, if such the pure chance is limited.

About religion, he says "religion must thus ever transcend science, which can ever prove it false nor yet show it to be true. The infidelity of the present generation which tries to dethrone religion by science is the perfectly logical and natural out come of the mistake endeavours of the past generation to establish religion by appeal to science."¹

Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. So God created man in His image; in the image of God He created him".² (Holy Bible, Genesis, 1-26)

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"God may have made man in his own image, but it is from the image that men reasons back to God as their Maker. But the notion of making, the potter's notion, is anything but apposite, and the pluralist will have none of it. God's creatures are not manufactured articles."¹ The singularist philosophers are fond of speaking of the world as the differentiation of the Absolute. One impassioned pluralist says, "nothing is really created, unless creators are created."²

According to James Ward's pluralistic point of view God is the sole ground of there being a world to evolve but God has not determined, before the foundation of the world, everything that shall ever be done in it: for then nothing would be done in it at all. But it was not till deeds were done that men talked of fate; then falsely projecting the fixity of the past into the future, he denies the very source of the idea of fate by denying real freedom.

The question concerning the so-called 'freedom of the will' is very controversial. Locke, long ago protested by saying: "we may properly say that it is the singing faculty that sings, and the dancing faculty dances, as that the will chooses."³ James Ward writes, "The real question then is what is meant when it is asserted or denied that in willing a man is free?"⁴ Because there is thus no will that wills but only a person or subject that wills. The determinist, confident that for every event there is a cause, assumes that he must deny that the person in willing is free, while, the indeterminist, confident that this

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³ Ibid, p-272.
⁴ Ibid.
freedom is a fact and assumes that volition has no cause. But a volition is in one sense determined and in other sense not determined. The efficient cause is strictly correlated to the will. The efficient causation is used in two senses, one is the immanent causation and applies to inanimate objects as the sun shines or the tide rises; and the other is the transient causation and applies to animate objects. But, Helmholtz says, "the principle of causality is in fact nothing more than the presupposition that in all natural phenomena there is conformity to law."\(^1\)

He continues that there are, further two grounds of causation; the casual necessitation and the real necessitation. After the causation, there are two determinations, the one form, that of self-determination and the other that of determination based on fixed Law. Those who profess to admit freedom in the sense of self-determination, in common with the Libertarian and who yet maintain necessity in the sense of natural Law, in common with the necessitarian.

According to Kant, "the self is hereby noumenal and its freedom transcendental, but its active manifestations are phenomenal and necessarily determined." Schopenhauer, the only philosopher who points out the error by adopting the Scholastic principle, 'Operari Sequitur esse', says, "It has been a fundamental error to assign the necessity to the esse and the freedom to the operari whereas the freedom pertains to the esse and the operari follows necessity."\(^2\) Objectively considered, a man's behaviour, like

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\(^1\) Ibid, p-275.  
\(^2\) Ibid, p-292-293.
the action of every natural essence, is recognised as falling under the Casual Law: subjectively on the other hand everyone feels that he always does only what he wills. The esse of everything is noumenal and the operari of everything is phenomenal. According to Kant and Schopenhauer, as a thing per se or noumenon, man is free. Kant affirms that all the acts of a man, so far as they are phenomena, are determined according to the order of nature and there would not be a single human action which we could not predict with certainty and recognize from its preceding conditions as necessary. But such freedom of a purely extra-phenomenal character is at variance with the pluralistic interpretation of evolution. If the characters of men are fixed and immutable, just as the qualities of the chemical elements are assumed to be, then we have to accept the firmly rooted conviction of Fate. The thoroughgoing determinist understands the concatenated system of predetermined series by the Uniformity of Nature and the man of science proceeds to picture out this uniformity, on the supposition that the whole is a mechanism. Given a complete knowledge of the whole of such a system at two instants, its state in the future or in the past is ideally calculable.\textsuperscript{1}

James Ward further writes, "The many have all alike had to trust and try, some times succeeding, some times failing, but on the whole always learning and so gradually achieving the order that determinism assumes to exist a priori. This established order or natura naturata to them implies free causes as Kant and Schopenhaur maintained. If the nature or essence of all agents are irrevocably fixed, how can there be any evolution? The ideal of a

\textsuperscript{1} James Ward, \textit{Pluralism and Theism}, p-292 to 296.
'rule' of succession, which the weaving of the phenomenal texture de fecto suggests the causality of nature as Kant calls it the causality of freedom - intelligible or noumenal causality. But if we start from theism the case is quite otherwise. Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin and Edwards have maintained the doctrine of divine predestination, the doctrine "that God orders all events, and the volitions of moral agents amongst others, by such a decisive disposal, that the events are infallibly connected with His disposal."¹

Ward explains, "Theism implies that God is apart from the world that He creates. The absolute omniscience and omnipotence of God are regarded as beyond question; and from these follow, as a corollary, the absolute and eternal decrees. But if God is the real cause of all that is, the Universe would seem to be merely God evolving Himself, and there has been no true creation, no bringing into being of wills separate from His own as a Scottish professor of divinity has said. In a word, starting from the One there is no arriving at the Many. If we attempt to conceive of God apart from the world there is nothing to lead us onto the idea of creation. On the other hand, if we start from the Many, it has become more and more clear as we advance that we find no justification for the notion of a block universe. Defining 'Supralapsarianism' Augustine says, "the dogma of predestination has always appeared so shocking, so excruciating to ordinary humanity, that it has not only been charged on moral grounds with tending to atheism but it has been used either openly or covertly to promote a theism". Distinguishing between the divine prescience and the divine purpose, J. Edwards says, "Gods

¹ Ibid.
prescience is not the cause of things future, but there being future is the cause of God's prescience that they will be."

Hamilton quotes Reid's idea that "the past that is to say is necessary: if then God's prescience resembles our memory, it is only because the past and the future are both alike to Him, as the past is not contingent so neither is the future."\(^1\)

Referring to Royce, James Ward says, "Foreknowledge in time' is possible only of the general and of the casually pre-determined, and not of the unique and the free. Hence neither God nor man can perfectly foreknow, at any temporal moment, what a free-will agent is yet to do. On the other hand, the Absolute possesses a perfect knowledge at one glance of the whole of the temporal order, present, past and future. It is eternal knowledge."\(^2\)

James Ward further says, "Royce, like many theists, is guilty of that vacillation between God and the Absolute which Bradley noted. The Absolute must be in every respect all-inclusive, but God, if His creatures are free, is so far not all-inclusive. As the creator together with His creatures may be called the Absolute; but unless the creatures said he made out of nothing - verily remain themselves but nothing, God is, no longer at any rate, the Absolute".\(^3\)

All is not decreed: the world is not created like a symphony: again, all possibilities are not left open: the many have not severally unlimited freedom, that freedom of indifference which is indistinguishable from chance. God's creatures are creators, the

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\(^1\) Ibid.  
\(^2\) Ibid, p-311.  
\(^3\) James Ward, *Pluralism and Theism*, p-313.  
\(^4\) Ibid.
pluralists maintain: their nature' is partly His doing, partly their own: he assigns the talents, they use or misuse them. Not everything that is possible is possible to any, yet some initiative is open to everyone: none are left with no talent at all.

Dugald Stewart says, "the Deity may, for wise purposes, have chosen to open a source of contingency in the voluntary action of his creatures, to which no prescience can possibly extend. Jowett says that God who is everything, is not really so much as if He allowed the most exalted free agencies to exist side by side with Him. Tennyson says that Free Will, was undoubtedly the main miracle, apparently an act of self-limitation by the infinite and yet a revelation by Himself and of Himself."¹

James Ward assumes that harmony, coordination and administration in the world, are the result of the system automatically maintained as in a society; different individuals of different thinking and habits create a harmonious social system based on different customs and practices; although they are coined by the individuals of the society but become an external spirit of the society. For example, if some soldiers are expelled from an army, they would be free from the army restrictions, although they have their individual identity but lose harmony and coordination which was in army. Harmony and coordination would be automatically maintained if those soldiers are brought to army because there is a perfect system.

James Ward and Iqbal are pluralists. Therefore, they have common thoughts so far as the concept of destiny is concerned. But Iqbal's view is different from Ward's because his conviction regarding

¹ Ibid, p-316.
destiny is more 'Quranic' than philosophical, as he states in his Urdu poems.

"The self so cultivate that ere God send a fate
He may ask His slave what does he wish and crave"¹

(Gabriel's Wing)

"Herbs, vegetables and minerals alike, adhere to what fate pre-ordains
But Muslim true obeys laws of God, All else abhors and much disdains"²

(The Rod of Moses)

Iqbal believes in the concept of freedom, and mostly agrees with James Ward's philosophical thoughts in this connection.

Iqbal denies vehemently that the morally degrading kind of fatalism which the European critics of Islam sum up in the word 'Qismat' has any basis in the Qura'an. It has been thrust on the

ignorant masses by distorting the Islamic teaching, and misinterpreting the Quranic verses at the expense of the plain meaning. He says that the Quranic verse:

"God created all things and assigned to each its destiny", does not mean that destiny of a thing is unrelenting fate working from without like a task master. It only means that every thing is realising its possibilities, and is acting according to its own intrinsic nature without any feeling of external compulsion. He explains in 'Javaid Namah':

"The habitants of the earth lost their ego, and did not understand the secret of taqdir (fate)
That secret is simply this; it (fate) alters when you reform yourselves.
If your become mere dust, fate scatters you in space
But if you turn into stone, it drops you on the glass"
If you become dew, your life is evanescent like the drop; but if you become an ocean, you survive forever"\textsuperscript{1}

Iqbal utilises the incessant creative activity of the Almighty God, to show that a man's fate can be altered."

"O you, who say that 'this and that was destined to happen, and therefore it happened; it could not have been otherwise; You have not understood the true meaning of destiny
You have seen neither yourself nor God
A true believer has a sort of intimacy with God
And says to Him, 'we are with you, O Lord, so You be with us'
The believer's determination is the instigator of God's will; the arrow that he shoots in the battle-field comes from God Himself"\textsuperscript{2}

Iqbal has condemned in strong terms those fatalists who ascribe their miseries and sorrows to the workings of the inexorable fate, and thus try to shirk their responsibility.

\textsuperscript{1}M. Ikram Chughtai, \textit{Iqbal-New Dimensions}, p-325.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid, p-326.
He interprets such a fatalist in *Javaid Nama* as under:

"It is God's will that some people are needy and deprived of all the good things of the world. God has made the rulers and the ruled None but God has willed these things And therefore we cannot fight against our fate".¹

"Then the Martian philosopher enjoins the fatalists to demand another fate from God, if one fate does not agree with him. It is quite in order if a man prays to God for a fresh destiny, because there are an infinite number of fates in the limbs of possibilities, and the work of creation is unending."²

Iqbal knew that the true path for a believer lies between 'jabr' (determinism) and 'qadr' (freedom).

As a matter of fact, the Quran also expresses both these aspects of the question in quite plain words, that God is the creator of our being, our attributes and our actions, in fact of everything:

"God created all things and assigned to each its destiny"

"And God has created you and also your actions"

But there is thesis and anti-thesis. The thesis is:

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
"And whatever has happened to you, it is your own hand that has earned it"¹ (25-54)

This shows man’s complete freedom of action, and his full responsibility. The anti-thesis is:

"And God has created you and your actions"

There is an apparent contradiction in these two aspects and Iqbal has talked of them at different places. He has touched on this point when he says that the destiny of a thing, then, is not an unrelenting fate working from without like a task master; it is the inward reach of a thing its realisable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and socially actualise themselves without any feeling of external compulsion.

But he has not given any detailed arguments or logical analysis, and has not made the point quite clear about the pre-determination and free-will. So the internal conflict is not resolved; the doubt and perplexity still remain in the mind of his reader.

Iqbal is very different from James Ward on the point of free-will and pre-determination because he says that there is no need for us to lament over our fate; our fate is in ourselves:

¹ Ibid, p-329.
"Why is thy river not overflowing?
Why is thine ego not a 'Muslim'?
Thy lamentation of thy fate is in vain
Why art thou not the arbiter of thy fate?"¹

O happy rivulet
In selfhood passionate,
Who to earth’s heart dost flee
And flowest not to see.

(Psalms of Persia)

I conclude from the above discussion that James Ward is a strong advocate of free-will and freedom of fate and totally against the pre-determination of fate because he believes in pluralism and against the concept of Absolutism. Iqbal philosophically agrees with James Ward on the point of freedom of fate but his religious point of view is quite different. James Ward mostly concentrates on the philosophical solution of the issue and fully contents with it and gives less value to religion in this connection because religion bases on theism or absolutism or singularism which is totally against the pluralistic approach of Ward but Iqbal can not go against religion to this extent although he is pluralist, and because the religion starts where the philosophy ends.

¹ Ibid, p-331.


In this chapter, the religious thoughts of Iqbal and James Ward will be discussed in detail because both the philosophers have different religions and belong to different school of thoughts, therefore, the discussion may be interesting. Firstly, I shall search out the religious thoughts of James Ward.

Ward's philosophic justification of religion is not only, a Philosphic justification of religion as a general phenomenon, but of Christian religion in particular. We cannot insist on omniscience as essential to a perfect philosophy, he writes, but it is essential that such a philosophy should satisfy our moral and religious nature. We may even go further, and say that, were our moral reason satisfied, we could acquiesce in a finite knowledge which would not satisfy our merely intellectual nature, abstractly considered. If we cannot have omniscience, then what we want is a philosophy that shall justify religion. Ward is thus faced with two problems: the first one is to justify the fact of religion as a state of mind or act of mind in his philosophy; the second is to justify a particular content of the state of mind, or a particular object of the act of mind-namely, what is generally understood as Christian belief.

In his attempt to justify the fact of religion formally Ward uses two types of argument which are in accordance with his philosophy.
Ward defines religion as that personal trust and confidence in an Unseen Being to which the religious at all ages have attributed their power to overcome the world. Firstly, he points to the principle of continuity: When we try to take stock of the world of life, and observe the relation between experience and action, we see at every stage that action is in advance of experience: all things that live seem to learn by doing. A spirit of hopeful adventure seems to possess everything: I might say a spirit of religion. Lungs were not first acquired by water creatures who then proceeded to live on land: birds were not reptiles that first got wings and then began to fly. The function leads to the structure rather than the structure to the function. The world is full of efforts justified only by the results. There was nothing, we will say, in past experience, to justify the first attempts at living on land or moving through the air; also there was nothing absolutely to forbid it. The attempt was made and practice brought perfection. With a new sphere of life came new experiences and fresh enterprises. Say what we will, the practical man will reason back from consequences, and not merely forward from premises.

He summarises the point of view expressed in this paragraph, which was written in 1889, by a clear statement in The Realm of Ends, written twenty years later: 'In keeping with the great principle of continuity, everywhere displayed in the working out of the world's evolution, we have found this faith foreshadowed in the upward striving that is the essence of life. Secondly, Ward asks: 'Religion on the lower levels was justified by its results: can we here (in the higher spheres of religious faith) apply this test of success or failure? The reply is Yes', and it seems that Ward even considered this argument
from results more important than the argument from the law of continuity. Christ himself, he says, used the text Beware of false prophets. Ye shall know them by their fruits: do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles? In one essay he develops this argument at greater length when he says that the true Christian is influenced neither by hope of heaven nor fear of hell. Thus Ward's argument from results is not the utilitarian argument, nor the merely pragmatic one. Rather is it a rational argument, for developing nature sees the reason-ability inherent in its nature in the ideal held before it by faith. For the sake of completeness a third argument to justify religion which Ward uses should be mentioned here, although Ward does not develop it. A powerful practical argument in favour of religious faith might be worked out on the following lines: first we might point to its universality. Next we might point to its survival. Lastly we might point to the advance of religion that has usually accompanied the increase of morality and intelligence.

Ward's argument in favour of Christian faith in the last instance reduces to the argument of results. To estimate it, he writes, if we know nothing of it by direct experience, we ought-if we were open minded to judge of it by the lives and the language of those who, for themselves, do know the peace and strength which this "new birth" as they call it has brought to them. Impressive pictures might be drawn of what such men and women were in themselves and of what they accomplished for the world. The argument from results is not a good argument in conservative and respectable philosophy. Yet no further proof of any nature would seem possible in this ultimate sphere of experience where the facts are private and the experience
ineffable, so that it can only be described in metaphorical terms. It is true that this faith often shows the influence of contemporary philosophic conceptions in its expression and it may even be objected that the ideals of faith and the Christian representation of God are anthropomorphic. No doubt, says Ward, they are anthropomorphic, but anthropomorphism is the form of expression in consciousness of the flawless ideals of the reason. In the way Ward puts this argument we seem to have a suggestion of the argument of the law of continuity, the pure reason embodying its highest ideals in the contents of faith.

On the other hand Ward refers to the fact of a 'new birth', and what he calls God-consciousness, as being not merely the result of human development but of action from God.

Unfortunately he does not develop this point in any way. Because of this lack of considered and clear statement in Ward's writings on the problem of divine intervention in the act of conversion it has been suggested that, Ward's view of faith leaves out the very essence of religions faith, namely, the belief in the object of faith as God. So Mr. H. Barker writes: 'Religious faith as conceived by the theologian is in truth a totally different thing from the faith of which Ward speaks: it is not any mere "spirit of hopeful adventure" but an intense conviction of the reality of its object. Mr Barker continues: 'But the fact is that of faith in the theologians' sense Ward had not any left. In a letter from Germany in his critical years he speaks of himself as "admitting the ethical worth of Christianity but uncertain as to anything else in it", and in a letter of 1873 he says, "The doubting phase is pretty well passed from me now. I reject the whole system
of Christian dogma from beginning to end and rationalise the history." Mr Barker's comment is: 'Such attenuated "religious ideas as he retained seem to have become for him speculative hypotheses of greater or less probability rather than assured convictions. Ward himself is partly to blame for this view, for he nowhere gives a statement which is at all detailed of his 'final religious petition and his views of the meaning of faith are spread through his correspondence and his philosophic essays; and when he discusses faith in his more formal writings it is usually as the logical outcome of his system as a whole rather than from any personal stand-point. It is true, also, that a superficial reading of The Essay in Philosophy, without a careful consideration of The Realm of Ends and the concluding chapters of Naturalism and Agnosticism, might create the impression that faith remained for Ward but 'a spirit of hopeful adventure', never developing beyond the stage of 'intense trustfulness'.

More careful examination however, this is a misrepresentation of what was going on in Ward's mind and that his theory of faith and of the relation of faith to religion was not naturalistic, but allowed the divine element a place in experience. The letter from which Mr Barker quotes was written from Germany in 1873. In 1870 Ward had written: 'My position is wrong somewhere, for it threatens to exclude personal communication with God from the world altogether.' In 1872, after he had given up the ministry, he writes: 'All my doubts philosophical and historical notwithstanding, I am sure of this as a practical truth I have no doubt of God's infinite fatherly patience and

love: when I despair of myself I find new hope in what he is.¹ In 1873, when Ward is going through the worst of the crisis, he writes: 'The old faith is gone, where am I to find the new, or where will it find me?' Unfortunately, the extracts from Ward's letters given in the excellent Memoir after the time of his joining the University, do not give us much insight into his personal religious views and we are left to read between the lines of his more formal philosophic statements. Yet these tenor of all his later writings testify to the new 'faith' he found. They are the writings of the man who remarked, the day before his death: 'Lord, now latest thou thy servant depart in peace', and who agreed with Martineau in 1924: 'that Christianity, understood as the personal religion of Jesus Christ, stands clear of all perishable elements and realises the true relation between man and God'. Also in his philosophical system Ward makes a clear place for the object of faith or God-consciousness. And now what are we to say of religion? he asks. At first merely a vague sense of "something beyond", and a feeling of helpless dependence and this much is found among men everywhere at length religion culminates in the Christian's faith in an underlying presence as the source of a new life—an experience without any sense of vagueness or isolation. Here there is no mere spirit of hopeful adventure. It is the contents of the faith-state which is the source of power. "Love does not, nay cannot, spring from prudential motives, let them be what they may, writes Ward a few months before his death. Moreover, faith and love go together, and no one can trust God without loving Him, or love Him and not trust Him. As Iqbal says:

¹ Ibid.
I am slave set free
And love still leadeth me;
Love is my leader still
Mind bows to do my will.

(Psalms of Persia)

It has seemed worth while to ascertain Ward's personal position as regards faith in life because, firstly, on his own showing, philosophy and religion become indistinguishably intermingled with practical life in the sphere of daily experience, and secondly, because his philosophic system is so very much a part of his own life.

The value of Ward's view on the relation of science to faith lies in this, that he separated faith-knowledge from science, and in that he admits the influence of the knowledge of science on philosophy and even on religion. In this way he guarantees the purity of both the knowledge of science and of faith while yet his philosophy and his faith-knowledge do not escape too easily from brute facts of experience into the realms of a sickly a priorism. 'Religion must thus ever transcend science which can never prove it false nor yet shew it to be true', writes Ward. 'The infidelity of the present generation which tries to dethrone religion by science is the perfectly logical and natural outcome of the mistaken endeavours of the past generation to establish religion by appeals to science. In this way the apparent
contradiction between Ward's two criteria for a sound philosophy disappears. On the one hand he held that philosophy must stay close to experience; on the other hand it must be consistent. It is when philosophy builds on a careful scientific basis that it discovers that there is consistency inherent in experience, what ought to be being the key to what is, for faith contains the flawless ideals of the reason.

It is the merit of Ward to have seen that we can make place for the higher experiences in life by practising an honest positivism and that man does not shut himself out of the heaven of the theist by becoming a scientist. So far then psychologically and historically there is nothing unique in the faith of theism at all; 'writes Ward, 'it is only the full and final phase of an ascending series, beginning in an instinctive belief in the relatively better and ending in the rational belief in the absolutely good; with its corollaries, the existence of God and the life hereafter.

The gradual advance through impulse and desire to practical reason runs throughout on all fours with the advance through sensation and imagination to theoretical reason. At every stage the two form one experience, knowledge registering its progress and practical enterprise promoting it. Such enterprises imply faith, but we have this faith not solely on account of the very limited amount of our knowledge and the possible errors in it. In such enterprises our attitude is not cognitive but conative; we are not from want of knowledge on any subject coming to a particular conclusion on that subject. But as active beings striving for betterment we see that the way is not closed against us and so we try to advance: we do so
because such is our nature, and because our past experience justifies our faith. There cannot be a contradiction between a sane religion and a sane science for both are in and of the stuff of which the experience of man is woven. It is only when religion becomes dogmatic as philosophy was for many a generation when it adopts, like philosophy, the 'high a priori' methods of an effete rationalism that it he comes untrue to experience and contradicts science. And it is when science in retaliation forgets the humble limits imposed on it by its own method and the frailty of human nature, and goes off its beat, that it comes into conflict with other spheres of man's experience. This is Ward's conclusion, and it is in this that lies his value for the philosophy of the present day.

These are the two voices faith and knowledge writes Ward, how come they to put such different interpretations on the very same facts? Because knowledge is of things we see and seeks to interpret the world as if they were the whole; while faith is aware that now we see but in part, and is convinced that only provided the unseen satisfies our spiritual yearnings is the part we see intelligible what ought to be being the key to what is. On an ultimate analysis it is the satisfaction of man's spiritual yearnings, which is the mark of a sound philosophy, and this test is a positive test. It is the test of closeness to experience which is the same as consistency, that Ward uses for all philosophy and it is the mark of positivism; The test does not seem to involve an uncritically accepted pre-supposition or a prejudice. Positivism is a fact; it is the most elementary fact of experience. Without it we fall into scepticism which self-annihilation.
What then is the difference in the operation of the flawless ideal of the reason which leads to the final synthesis on Ward's philosophy and as the absolutist sees it? This, that for the absolutist the ideal is present and self-conscious in individual thought, and can be revealed by the self-examination of thought of itself; while for Ward the flawless ideal of reason operates not, in the first instance, in man's thought, but in his actions and in his life; it is present not as a fully self-conscious conclusion of thought, but-as an intuition dimly realised as yet; reason manifests itself increasingly not in thought only, for that is too immature to bear the full weight of the synthesis, but in activity. The flawless ideal of pure reason realises itself progressively in action and after it has realised itself in action it becomes self-conscious to that extent in thought—but only then.

The contradiction between the empirical and the speculative criteria of a sound philosophy is only apparent Ward is compelled, by his psychological or genetic theory of mind, to tread the path of empiricism; but mind itself and its power of transcendence is an empirical fact of which he finds increasing evidence as he goes farther on his way.

There is a lack both of volume and of profundity in Ward's treatment of religion and the problems of religious experience. Besides the purely psychological analysis of the faith-state in the Psychological Principles all he has to say on this realm of experience is contained in two essays one early and one late and in the two concluding chapters of The Realm of Ends. What he does say in these sections is said very clearly and forms a consistent part of his philosophy, yet he does not do much more than make place for
religious experience in his philosophy and to show that such experience need not be inconsistent with his empirical standpoint. He offers very little discussion of the problems connected with religious experience for the scientific mind; he barely mentions the inevitable anthropomorphic element in all religion. Nor does he offer any of the penetrating analysis which is found on nearly every page of the Psychological Principles, either of the faith-act or of the contents of the faith-state; the reader has to be content with a few slender indications of what might have been in his mind on this point.

As a result of this lack of developed statement Ward did not seem to realise that the implications of whatever view he may have had on the nature of religious experience or faith would have exercised a far-reaching influence on other parts of his philosophy. The philosophy of the man whose religion consists of an intellectual love of God cannot but differ fundamentally from that of the man who claims a mystic vision. At one time, indeed, and only once, Ward suggests that in the final religious experience the world view obtained would be a 'world intuition' of such a nature that thought would lose its discursive relational nature in the act of intuition. The point is, however, neither developed nor strengthened by reference to the mystics or religious writers.

At this point we again come across the unfortunate influence of Ward's failure to distinguish between the psychological and the philosophical formulation of a problem. As Ward was unable to realise the importance of the universal and transcending power of mind because of his naturalistic bias in genetic psychology, so here he did not seem to realise that if the faith-act developed into a God-
consciousness there was more in the faith-act than could be accounted for by its history or origin. Because Ward did not see the significance of the philosophical formulation of the problem of the faith-act, which is contained in this more, he did not realise that the philosophical analysis of the faith-act would have influenced his philosophy greatly. Here, as in the case of his master Lotze and as we have noticed elsewhere in his work, we again see the numbing finger of naturalism on his thought.

Now I come to discuss the religious thoughts of Iqbal. As he says that religious life may be divided into three periods. These may be described as the periods of Faith, Thought and Discovery. In the first period religious life appears as a form of discipline which the individual or a whole people must accept as an unconditional command without any rational understanding of the ultimate meaning and purpose of that command. This attitude may be of great consequence in the social and political history of a people, but is not of much consequence in so far as the individual's inner growth and expansion are concerned. Perfect submission to discipline is followed by a rational understanding of the discipline and the ultimate source of its authority. In this period religious life seeks its foundation in a kind of metaphysics a logically consistent view of the world with God as a part of that view. In the third period metaphysics is displaced by psychology and religious life develops the ambition to come into direct contact with the ultimate Reality. It is here that religion becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power; and the individual achieves a free personality, not by releasing
himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of his own consciousness.

As in the words of a Muslim. Sufi no understanding of the Holy Book is possible until it is actually revealed to the believer just as it was revealed to the Prophet. It is, then, in the sense of this last phase in the development of religious life that he uses the word religion in the question that he now proposes to raise. Religion in this sense is known by the unfortunately name of Mysticism, which is supposed to be a life denying fact avoiding attitude of mind directly opposed to the radically empirical outlook of our times. Yet higher religion, which is only a search for a larger life, is essentially experience and recognized the necessity of experience as its foundation long before science learnt to do so. It is a genuine effort to clarify human consciousness, and is, as such, as critical of its level of experience as Naturalism is of its own level.

As we all know, it was Kant who first raised the question: Is metaphysics possible? He answered this question in the negative; and his argument applies with equal force to the realities in which religion is especially interested. The manifold of sense, according to him, must fulfil certain formal conditions in order to constitute knowledge. The thing in itself is only a limiting idea. Its function is merely regulative. If there is some actuality corresponding to the idea it falls outside the boundaries of experience, and consequently its existence cannot be rationally demonstrated. This verdict of Kant cannot be easily accepted. It may fairly be urged that in view of the more recent developments of science, such as the nature of matter as 'bottled-up light waves,' the idea of the universe as an act of
thought, finiteness of space time and Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy in nature, the case for a system of rational theology is not so bad as Kant was led to think. But for our present purposes it is unnecessary to consider this point in detail. As to the thing in itself, which is inaccessible to pure reason because of its falling beyond the boundaries of experience, Kant's verdict can be accepted only if we start with the assumption that all experience other than the level of experience is impossible. The only question, therefore, is whether the normal level is the only level of knowledge-yielding experience.

Kant's view of the thing in itself and the thing as it appears to us very much determined the character of his question regarding the possibility of metaphysics. But what if the position, as understood by him, is reversed? The great Muslim Sufi philosopher, Muhyuddin Ibnul Arabi of Spain has made the acute observation that God is a percept; the world is a concept. Another Muslim Sufi thinker and poet, Iraqi, insists on the plurality of space-orders and time-orders and speaks of a Divine Time and a Divine Space. It may be that what we call the external world is only an intellectual construction, and that there are other levels of human experience capable of being systematized by other orders of space and time-levels in which concept and analysis do not play the same role as they do in the case of our normal experience. It may, however, be said that the level of experience to which concepts are inapplicable can not yield any knowledge of a universal character; for concepts alone are capable of being socialized. The standpoint of the man who relies on religious experience for capturing Reality must always remain individual and incommunicable. This objection has some force if it is
meant to insinuate that the mystic is wholly ruled by his traditional ways attitudes and expectations. Conservatism is as bad in religion as in any other department of human activity. It destroys the ego's creative freedom and closes up the paths of fresh spiritual enterprise. This is the main reason why our medieval mystic techniques can no longer produce original discoveries of ancient Truth. The fact, however, that religious experience is incommunicable does not mean that the religious man's pursuit is futile. Indeed, the incommunicability of religious experience gives us a clue to the ultimate nature of the ego. In our daily social intercourse we live and move in seclusion, as it were. We do not care to reach the inmost individuality of men. We treat them as mere functions, and approach them from those aspects of their identity, which are capable of conceptual treatment. The climax of religious life, however, is the discovery of the ego as an individual deeper than his conceptually describable habitual self-hood. It is in contact with the Most Real that the ego discovers its uniqueness, its metaphysical status, and the possibility of improvement in that status. Strictly speaking, the experience which leads to this discovery is not a conceptually manageable intellectual fact it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on an inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in the net of logical categories. It can embody itself only in a world-making or world-shaking act; and in this form alone the content of this timeless experience can diffuse itself in the time-movement, and make itself effectively visible to the eye of history. It seems that the method of dealing with Reality by means of concepts is not at all a serious way of dealing with it. Science does not care whether its
electron is a real entity or not. It may be a mere symbol, a mere convention. Religion which is essentially a mode of actual living, Is the only serious way of handling Reality. As a form of higher experience it is corrective of our concepts of philosophical theology or at least makes is suspicious of the purely rational process, which forms these concepts. Science can afford to ignore metaphysics altogether, and may even believe it to be a justified form of poetry as Lange defined it, or 'a legitimate play of grown-ups as Nietzsche described it. But the religious expert who seeks to discover his personal status in the constitution of things cannot, in view of the final aim of his struggle, be satisfied with what science may regard as a vital lie, a mere 'as-if' to regulate thought and conduct. In so far as the ultimate nature of Reality is concerned nothing is at stake, in the venture of science; in the religious venture the whole career of the ego as an assimilative personal centre of life and experience is at stake. Conduct, which involves a decision of the ultimate fate of the agent cannot be based on illusions. A wrong concept misleads the understanding; a wrong deed degrades the whole man and may eventually demolish the structure of the human ego. The mere concept affects life only partially; the deed is dynamically related to reality and issues from a generally constant attitude of the whole man towards reality. No doubt the deed, i.e. the control of psychological and physiological processes with a view to tune up the ego for an immediate contact with the ultimate Reality is, and cannot but be, individual in form and content; yet the deed, too, is liable to be socialized when others; begin to live through it with a view to discover for themselves its effectiveness as a method of approaching
the real. The evidence of religious experts in all ages and countries is that there are potential types of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness. If these types of consciousness open up possibilities of life-giving and knowledge-yielding experience the question of the possibility of religion as a form of higher experience is a perfectly legitimate one and demands our serious attention.

But apart from the legitimacy of the question, there are important reasons why it should be raised at the present moment of the history of modern culture. In the first place, the scientific interest of the question. It seems that every culture has a form of Naturalism peculiar to its own world feeling; and it further appears that every form of Naturalism ends in some sort of Atomism. We have Indian Atomism, Greek Atomism, Muslim Atomism, and Modern Atomism. Modern Atomism is, however, unique. Its amazing mathematics which sees the universe as an elaborate differential equation; and its physics which, following its own methods, has been led to smash some of the old gods of its own temple, have already brought us to the point of asking the question whether the causality-bound aspect of nature is the whole truth about it. Is not the ultimate Reality invading our consciousness from some other direction as well? Is the purely intellectual method of overcoming nature the only method? We have acknowledged says Professor Eddington, "that the entities of physics can from their very nature form only a partial aspect of the reality. How are we to deal with the other part? It cannot be said that that other part concerns us less than the physical entities. Feelings, purposes, values, make up our consciousness as much as sense-impressions. We follow up the sense-impressions and find that they
lead into an external world discussed by science; we follow up the
other elements of our being and find that they lead-not into a world of
space and time, but surely somewhere". ¹

In the second place we have to look to the great practical
importance of the question. The modern man with his philosophies of
criticism and scientific specialism finds himself in a strange
predicament. His Naturalism has given him an unprecedented
control over the forces of nature, but has robbed him of faith in his
own future. It is strange how the same idea affects different cultures
differently. The formulation of the theory of evolution in the world of
Islam brought into being Rumi’s tremendous enthusiasm for the
biological future of man. No cultured Muslim can read such passages
as the following without a thrill of joy:

Low in the earth
I lived in realms of ore and stone;
And then I smiled in many-tinted flowers;
Then roving with the wild and wandering hours,

Cf.¹ Allama Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction, p-186.
O'er earth and air and ocean's zone;
In a new birth,
I dived and flew,
And crept and ran,
And all the secret of my essence drew
Within a form that brought them all to view
And lo, a Man
And then my goal,
Beyond the clouds, beyond the sky,
In realms where none may change or die-
In angel form; and then away
Beyond the bounds of night and day,
And Life and Death, unseen or seen,
Where all that is hath ever been,
As One and Whole.

(Rumi: Thadani's Translation)¹

On the other hand, the formulation of the same view of evolution with far greater precision in Europe has led to the belief that there now appears to be no scientific basis for the idea that the present rich complexity of human endowment will ever be materially exceeded. That is how the modern man's secret despair hides itself behind the screen of scientific terminology. Nietzsche, although he thought that the idea of evolution did not justify the belief that man was unsurpassable, cannot be regarded as an exception in this respect. His enthusiasm for the future of man ended in the doctrine

Cf.¹ Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction, p-186-187.
of eternal recurrence—perhaps the most hopeless idea of immortality ever formed by man. This eternal repetition is not eternal 'becoming'; it is the same old idea of 'being' masquerading as 'becoming'.

Thus, wholly overshadowed by the results of his intellectual, activity, the modern man has ceased to live soulfully, i.e. from within. In the domain of thought he is living in open conflict with himself; and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflict with others. He finds himself unable to control his ruthless egoism and his infinite gold-hunger which is gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-weariness. Absorbed in the 'fact' that is to say, the optically present source of sensation, he is entirely cut off from the unplunged depths of his own being.

In the wake of his systematic materialism has at last come that paralysis of energy which Huxley apprehended and deplored. The condition of things in the East is no better. The technique of medieval mysticism by which religious life, in its higher manifestations, developed itself both in the East and in the West has now practically failed. And in the Muslim East it has, perhaps, done far greater havoc than anywhere else. Far from reintegrating the forces of the average man's inner life, and thus preparing him for participation in the march of history, it has taught him a false renunciation and made him perfectly contented with his ignorance and spiritual thraldom. No wonder then that the modern Muslim in Turkey, Egypt, and Persia is led to seek fresh sources of energy in the creation of: new loyalties, such as patriotism and nationalism which Nietzsche described as sickness and unreason, and the strongest force against culture.
Disappointed of a purely religious method of spiritual renewal which alone brings us into touch with the everlasting fountain of life and power by expanding our thought and emotion, the modern Muslim fondly hopes to unlock fresh sources of energy by narrowing down his thought and emotion.

Modern atheistic socialism, which possesses all the fervour of a new religion, has a broader outlook; but having received its philosophical basis from the Hegelians of the left wing, it rises in revolt against the very source which could have given it strength and purpose. Both nationalism and atheistic socialism, at least in the present state of human adjustments, must draw upon the psychological forces of hate, suspicion, and resentment which tend to impoverish the soul of man and close up his hidden sources of spiritual energy. Neither the technique of medieval mysticism nor nationalism nor atheistic socialism can cure the ills of a despairing humanity. Surely the present moment is one of great crisis in the history of modern culture. The modern world stands in need of Biological renewal. And religion, which in its higher manifestations is neither dogma, nor priesthood, nor ritual, can alone ethically prepare the modern man for the burden of the great responsibility which the advancement of modern science necessarily involves, and restore to him that attitude of faith which makes him capable of winning a personality here and retaining it hereafter. It is only by rising to a fresh vision of his origin and future, his whence and whither, that man will eventually triumph over a society motivated by an inhuman competition, and a civilization which has lost its spiritual amity by its inner conflict of religious and political values.
As he has indicated before, religion as a deliberate enterprise to seize the ultimate principle of value and thereby to reintegrate the forces of one's own personality, is a fact which cannot be denied. The whole religious literature of the world, including the records of specialists personal experiences, though perhaps expressed in the thought-forms of an out of date psychology, is a standing testimony to it. These experiences are perfectly natural, like our normal experiences. The evidence is that they possess a cognitive value for the recipient, and, what is much more important, a capacity to centralize the forces of the ego and thereby to endow him with a new personality. The view that such experiences are neurotic or mystical will not finally settle the question of their meaning or value. If an outlook beyond physics is possible, we must courageously face the possibility, even though it may disturb or tend to modify our normal ways of life and thought. The interests of truth require that we must abandon our present attitude. It does not matter in the least if the religious attitude is originally determined by some kind of physiological disorder. George Fox may be a neurotic; but who can deny his purifying power in England's religious life of his day? Mohammed, we are told, was a psychopath. Well, if a psychopath has the power to give a fresh direction to the course of human history it is a point of the highest psychological interest to search his original experience which has turned slaves into leaders of men, and has inspired the conduct and shaped the career of whole races of mankind. Judging from the various types of activity that emanated from the movement initiated by the Prophet of Islam, his spiritual tension and the kind of behaviour which issued from it, cannot be
regarded as a response to a mere fantasy inside his brain. It is impossible to understand it except as a response to an objective situation generative of new enthusiasms, new organizations, new starting-points. If we look at the matter from the standpoint of anthropology it appears that a psychopath is an important factor in the economy of humanity's social organization. His way is not to classify facts and discover causes: he thinks in terms of life and movement with a view to create new patterns of behaviour for mankind. No doubt he has his pitfalls and illusions just as the scientist who relies on sense-experience has his pitfalls and illusions. A careful study of his method, however, shows that he is not less alert than the scientist in the matter of eliminating the alloy of illusion from his experience.

The question for us outsiders is to find out an effective method of inquiry into the nature and significance of this extraordinary experience. The Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, who laid the foundations of modern scientific history, was the first to seriously approach this side of human psychology and reached what we now call the idea of the subliminal self. Later, Sir William Hamilton in England and Leibnitz in Germany interested themselves in some of the more unknown phenomena of the mind. Jung, however, is probably right in thinking that the essential nature of religion is beyond the province of analytic psychology. In his discussion of the relation of analytic psychology to poetic art he tells us that the process of artistic form alone can be the object of psychology. The essential nature of art, according to him, cannot be the object of a psychological method of approach. A similar distinction says Jung,
'must also be made in the realm of religion; there also a. psychological consideration is permissible only in respect of. the emotional and symbolical phenomena of a religion, wherein the essential nature of religion is in no way involved, as indeed it cannot be. For were this possible, not religion alone, but art also could be treated as a mere sub-division of psychology Yet Jung has violated his own principle more than once in his writings. The result of this procedure is that, instead of giving us a real insight into the essential nature of religion and its meaning for human personality, our modern psychology has given us quite a plethora of new theories which proceed on a complete misunderstanding of the nature of religion as revealed in its higher manifestations, and carry us in an entirely hopeless direction. The implication of these theories, on the whole, is that religion does not relate the human ego to any objective reality beyond himself; it is merely a kind of well-meaning biological device calculated to build barriers of ethical nature round human society in order to protect the social fabric against the otherwise unrestrainable instincts of the ego. That is why, according to this newer psychology, Christianity has already fulfilled its biological mission/and it is impossible for the modern man to understand its original significance. Jung concludes:

"Most certainly we should still understand it, had our customs even a breath of ancient brutality, for we can hardly realize in this way the whirlwinds of the unchained libido which roared through the ancient Rome of the Caesars. The civilized man of the present day seems very far removed from that. He has become merely neurotic. So for us the necessities which brought forth Christianity have
actually been lost, since we no longer understand their meaning. We do not know against what it had to protect us. For enlightened people the so-called religiousness has already approached very close to a neurosis. In the past two thousand years Christianity has done its work and erected barriers of repression which protect us from the sight of our own sinfulness”.

This is missing the whole point of higher religious life. Sexual self-restraint is only a preliminary stage in the ego Revolution. The ultimate purpose of religious life is to make this evolution move in a direction far more important to the destiny of the ego than the moral health of the social fabric which forms his present environment. The basic perception form which religious life moves forward is the present slender unity of the ego, his liability to dissolution, his amenability to re-formation and his capacity for an ampler freedom to create new situations in known and unknown, environments. In view of this fundamental perception higher religious life fixes its gaze on experiences symbolic of those subtle movements of reality which seriously affect the destiny of the ego as a possibly permanent element in the constitution of reality. If we look at the matter from this point of view modern psychology has not yet touched even the outer fringe of religious life, and is still far from the richness and variety of what is called religious experience. In order to give you an idea of its richness and variety, I quote here the substance of a passage from a great religious genius of the seventeenth century – Sheikh Ahmad of Sarhind - whose fearless analytical criticism of contemporary Sufism resulted in the development of a new technique. All the various

Cf. 1 Muhammad Iqbal ,The Reconstruction,p-192.
systems of Sufi technique in India came from Central Asia and Arabia; his is the only technique which crossed the Indian border and is still a living force in the Punjab, Afghanistan, and Asiatic Russia. He is afraid it is not possible for him to expound the real meaning of this passage in the language of modern psychology; for such language does not yet exist. Since, however, his object is simply to give you an idea of the infinite wealth of experience which the ego in his Divine quest has to sift and pass through, he does hope you will excuse him for the apparently outlandish terminology which possesses a real substance of meaning, but which was formed under the inspiration of a religious psychology developed in the atmosphere of a different culture. Coming now to the passage. The experience of one Abdul Momin was described to the Sheikh as follows:

Heavens and Earth and God's throne and Hell and Paradise have all ceased to exist for me. When I look round I find them nowhere. When I stand in the presence of somebody I see nobody before me: nay even my own being is lost to me. God is infinite. Nobody can encompass Him; and this is the extreme limit of spiritual experience. No saint has been able to go beyond this.

On this the Sheikh replied:

The experience which is described has its origin in the ever varying life of the Qalb; and it appears to me that the recipient of it has not yet passed even one-fourth of the innumerable 'Stations' of the Qalb. The remaining three-fourths must be passed through in order to finish the experiences of this first "Station" of spiritual life. Beyond this "Station" there are other "Stations' known as Ruh, Sirr-i-
Khafi, and Sirr-i-Akhfa, each of these "Stations" which together constitute what is technically called Alam-i-Amr has its own characteristic states and experiences. After having passed through these "Stations" the seeker of truth gradually receives the illuminations of "Divine Names" and "Divine Attributes", and finally the illuminations of the Divine Essence.' Whatever may be the psychological ground of the distinctions made in this passage it gives us at least some idea of a whole universe of inner experience as seen by a great reformer of Islamic Sufiism. According to him this Alam-i-Amr, i.e. the world of directive energy must be passed through before one reaches that unique experience which symbolizes the purely objective. This is the reason why I say that modern psychology has not yet, touched even the outer fringe of the subject. Personally, he does not at all feel hopeful of the present state of things in either biology or psychology. Mere analytical criticism with some understanding of the organic conditions of the imagery in which religious life has sometimes manifested itself is not lively to carry us to the living roots of human personality. Assuming that sex-imagery has played a role in the history of religion or that religion has furnished imaginative means of escape from, or adjustment to, an unpleasant reality, these ways of looking at the matter cannot, in the least, affect the ultimate aim of religious life, that is to say, the reconstruction of the finite ego by bringing him into contact with an eternal life-process, and thus giving him a metaphysical status of which we can have only a partial understanding in the half-choking atmosphere of our present environment. If, therefore, the science of psychology is ever likely to
possess a real significance for the life of mankind it must develop an independent method calculated to discover a new technique better suited to the temper of our times. Perhaps a psychopath endowed with a great intellect - the combination is not an impossibility - may give us a clue to such a technique. In modern Europe Nietzsche, whose life and activity for at least to us Easterns an exceedingly interesting problem in religious psychology, was endowed with some sort of a constitutional equipment for such an undertaking.

His mental history is not without a parallel in the history of Eastern Sufiism. That a really 'imperative' vision of the Divine in man did come to him cannot be denied. He calls his vision 'imperative' because it appears to have given him a kind of prophetic mentality which, by some kind of technique aims at turning its visions into permanent life forces. Yet Nietzsche was a failure; and his failure was mainly due to his intellectual progenitors such as Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Lange whose influence completely blinded him to the real significance of his vision. Instead of looking for a spiritual rule, which would develop the Divine even in plebeian and thus open up before him an infinite future Nietzsche was driven to seek the realization of his vision in such schemes as aristocratic radicalism. As he has said of him elsewhere:

The 'I am' which he seeketh,
Lieth beyond philosophy, beyond knowledge.
The plant that groweth only, from the invisible soil of the heart of man,
Thus failed a genius whose vision was solely determined by his internal forces, and remained unproductive for want of external guidance in his spiritual life. And the irony of fate is that this man, who appeared to his friends 'as if he had come from a country where no man. Lived, was fully conscious of his great spiritual need. He confronts alone' he says, 'an immense problem: it is as if he is lost in a forest, a primeval one. He needs help. He needs disciples: He needs a master. It would be so sweet to obey. And again: 'Why does he not find among, the living men who see higher than he does and has to look down on him? Is it only that he has made a poor search? And he has so great a longing for such.

The truth is that the religious and the scientific processes, though involving different methods, are identical in their final aim. Both aim at reaching the most real. In fact, religion, for reasons which he has mentioned before, is far more anxious to reach the ultimately real than science. And to both the way to pure objectivity lies through what may be called the purification of experience. In order to understand this we must make distinction between experience as a natural fact, significant of the normally observable behaviour of reality, and experience as significant of the inner nature of reality. As a natural fact it is explained in the light of its antecedents, psychological and physiological; as significant of the inner nature of reality we shall have to apply criteria of a different kind to clarify its meaning. In the domain of science we try to

understand its meanings in reference to the external behaviour of reality; in the domain of religion we take it as representative of some kind of reality and try to discover its meanings in reference mainly to the inner nature of that reality. The scientific and the religious processes are in a sense parallel to each other. Both are really descriptions of the same word with this difference only that in the scientific process the ego's standpoint is necessarily exclusive, whereas in the religious process the ego integrates its competing tendencies and develops a single inclusive attitude resulting in a kind of synthetic transfiguration of his experiences. A careful study of the nature and purpose of these really complementary processes shows that both of them are directed to the purification of experience in their respective spheres. An illustration will make my meaning clear. Hume's criticism of our notion of cause must be considered as a chapter in the history of science rather than that of philosophy. True to the spirit of scientific empiricism we are not entitled to work with any concept of a subjective nature. The point of Hume's criticism is to emancipate empirical science from the concept of force which, as he urges, has no foundation in sense-experience. This was the first attempt of the modern mind to purify the scientific process.

Einstein's mathematical view of the universe completes the process of purification started by Hume, and, true to the spirit of Hume's criticism, dispenses with the concept of force altogether. The passage he has quoted from the great Indian saint shows that the practical student of religious psychology has a similar purification in view. His sense of objectivity is as keen as that of the scientist in his own sphere of objectivity. He passes from experience to experience,
not as a mere spectator, but as a critical sifter of experience who, by the rules of a peculiar technique, suited to his sphere of inquiry, endeavours to eliminate all subjective- elements psychological or physiological, in the content of his experience with a view finally to reach what is absolutely objective. This final experience is the revelation of a new life-process-original, essential, spontaneous. The eternal secret of the ego is that the moment he reaches this final revelation, he recognizes it as the ultimate root of his being without the slightest, hesitation. Yet in the experience itself there is no mystery. Nor is there anything emotional in it. Indeed with a view to secure a wholly non-emotional experience the technique of Islamic Sufiism at least takes good care to forbid the use of music in worship, and to emphasize the necessity of daily congregational prayers in order to counteract the possible anti-social effects of solitary contemplation. Thus the experience reached is a perfectly natural experience and possesses a biological significance of the highest importance to the ego. It is the human ego rising higher than mere reflection, and mending its transiency by appropriating the eternal. The only danger to which the ego is exposed in this Divine quest is the possible relaxation of his activity caused by his enjoyment of and absorption in the experiences that precede the final experience. The history of Eastern Sufiism shows that this is a real danger. This was the whole point of the reform movement initiated by the great Indian saint from whose writings he has already quoted a passage. And the reason is obvious. The ultimate aim of the ego is not to see something but to be something. It is in the ego's effort to be something that he discovers his final opportunity to
sharpen his objectivity and acquire a more fundamental 'I am' which finds evidence of its reality not in the Cartesian 'I think' but in the Kantian 'I can'. The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is on the other hand, a more precise definition of it. The final act is not an intellectual act, but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and re-made by continuous action. It is a moment of supreme bliss and also a moment of the greatest trial for the ego as he says:
Art thou in the stage of 'life,' 'death or 'death-in-life'?
Invoke the aid of three witnesses to verify thy 'Station'.

The first witness is thine own consciousness—
See thyself, then, with thine own light.

The second witness is the consciousness of another ego—
See thyself, then, with the light of an ego other than thee.
The third witness is God's consciousness-
See thyself, then with God's light.
If thou standest unshaken in front of this light,
Consider thyself as living and eternal as He!
That man alone is real who dares-
Dares to see God face to face!
What is 'Ascension'? Only a search for a witness
Who may finally confirm thy reality-
A witness whose confirmation alone makes thee eternal.
No one can stand unshaken in His Presence
And he who can, verily, he is pure gold.
Art thou a mere particle of dust?
Tighten the knot of thy ego ;
And hold fast to thy tiny being!
How glorious to burnish one's ego
And to test its lustre in the presence of the Sun! .
Re-chisel, then, thine ancient frame;
And build up a new being.
Such being is real being.
Or eke thy ego is a mere ring of smoke ¹

(\textit{Javed Nama})

\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, P 198-199.}
I reached the conclusion from the above discussion that James Ward is as confused in his old age on the religious issues as confused in philosophy and psychology in his youth. He has always discussed Christianity and particularly the Christian dogma in the light of philosophy and psychology, therefore, confusion must be the only consequential out-put of the discussion. On the other hand Iqbal has discussed the religion in the light of Sufiism mostly based on the metaphysics. He judges philosophy in the light of religion whereas Ward tries to judge religion in the light of philosophy. Religion starts where philosophy ends. As he says, “Philosophy, no doubt, has jurisdiction to judge religion, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy except on its own terms. While sitting in judgement on religion, philosophy can not give religion an inferior place among its data. Religion is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of whole man. Thus, in the evolution of religion, philosophy must recognize the central position of religion and has no other alternative but to admit it as something focal in the process of reflective synthesis. Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other. The one grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality. The one is present enjoyment of the whole Reality; the other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for
exclusive observation. Iqbal's views are clear-cut on the religion. His message about religion and humanity is universal but particularly to the Muslims.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter IX

IQBAL AND JAMES WARD'S

CONCEPTION OF TIME AND SPACE

As I behold, or not, is aught, or naught;
Time, Space, within my mind audacious lie.

\textit{(Psalms of Persia)}^{1}

The problem of space and time has drawn the attention of philosophers throughout the history of thought. The men of learning have always found this problem challenging enough, and each one of them has tried in his own way to find out a solution of this perplexing problem. However, space and time seem directly self-revealing realities, and to the ordinary man the necessity of having theories about them is difficult to appreciate. Nevertheless, there are indeed puzzling psychological and philosophical questions concerning them, but these all seem, when we reflect on them, to concern wholly and solely our knowledge, and the mistakes and illusions which may rise in regard to our knowledge. This fact makes it all the more necessary that theories about space and time be formulated, as the primary function of philosophy is the critical

\footnote{Cf. \textsuperscript{1} B.A.Dar, Tr. Psalm of Persia, (part-1), p-38.}
appreciation and clarification of the concepts provided by the physical science.

Every philosopher starts his reflections on various philosophical problems from the standpoint of his world-view. The world-view is an imaginative background of his thoughts, his reflections borrow their shape and draw their content from it, revolve round it and always return to reform it. In the case of Iqbal, the imaginative background of his thoughts is largely coloured by the spirit of the Quranic teachings. Iqbal was deeply impressed by the empirical spirit of the Quran, which was revealed in an age which renounced the visible as of no value in man's search after God.

Amongst various philosophical problems discussed by Iqbal in his celebrated "lectures" as well as poetry, he also gives considerable attention to the problem of space and time. This seems to be due partly to the fact that according to the Quran, the alternation of day and night is one of the greatest signs of God, and partly to the Prophets; identification of God with Dahr (time) in a well-known tradition. Indeed, some of the greatest Muslim sufis believed in the mystic properties of the word Dahr. According to Muhyuddin Ibn-ul-Arabi Dahr is one of the beautiful names of God, and Razi tells us in his commentary on the Quran that some of the Muslim saints had taught him to repeat the word Dahr.

Iqbal fully agrees with Kant that time and space are not objective. There is no self-existing void in which things are situated, nor self-existing time, given as a line on which we move. Space and time are for him, as they are for Kant, purely subjective; they are the forms of perception which the mind possesses as pure a priori
cognitions. But from the subjectivity of space and time Kant concluded that all our knowledge is only of phenomena, i.e. of things as they appear to us. Iqbal, however, parts company with Kant with regard to the possibility of the knowledge of noumena, i.e., of the things in themselves, or as they actually are. Kant's view of the thing-in-itself and the thing as it appears to us, very much determined the character of his question regarding the possibility of metaphysics. Kant is right so far as the normal level of experience is concerned. But the question is that whether the normal level is the only level of knowledge-yielding experience. Iqbal maintains that it is not the only level.

For the import of time and space varies according to the varying grades of beings. Time and space are not fixed and unvarying modes, as Kant would have them, into which all our knowledge is moulded and determined. These are interpretations, which thought put on the creative activity of God. These are not independent realities existing per se, but only intellectual modes which themselves admit of new meanings in relation to beings higher and lower than ourselves, and consequently, there may be a grade of experience in which there is neither space nor time. Here it would not be improper to quote a stanza from Rumi, who says:


Iqbal says:

The intellect built space upon the void
And girt it self with Time as if it were a sacred thread.

*(Garden of the Modern Secret)*

No philosopher throughout the history of philosophy can claim absolute originality with regard to his view; and, so, neither does Iqbal. Sometimes Iqbal directly states his views about some problem, but at times when this is not possible, he starts criticising the views held by others about the same problem, and in the process formulating his own views; for his negative is always a preface to the positive. Iqbal starts with the refutation of Zeno's paradoxes. Is space an independent void in which things are situated and which would remain intact if all things were withdrawn? Zeno approached the problem of space through the question of movement in space. Zeno took space to be infinitely divisible, and, on this account argued that movement in space is impossible. Before the moving body can reach them point of its destination, it must pass through half the space intervening between the point of start and the point of destination; and before it can pass through that half, it must travel through half of the half, and on to infinity. We cannot move from one point of space to another without passing through an infinite number of points in the intervening space. But it is impossible to pass through an infinity of
points in a finite time. Hence the flying arrow does not move; because at any moment during the course of its flight it is at rest at some point in space. Thus, Zeno held that movement was only a deceptive Appearance, and that Reality was one and immutable. The unreality of movement means the unreality of an independent space.

The Asharites did not believe in the infinite divisibility of space and time. With them space and time consist of points and instants which cannot be further sub-divided. Thus they proved the possibility of motion on the supposition that infinitesimals do exist; for if the divisibility of space is limited, then movement from one point to another point in space is possible in a finite time. But this notion of infinitesimals was rejected by Ibn-i-Hazm and modern mathematics. However, modern thinkers, including Bergson and Russell, try to refute Zeno's position from different angles. To Bergson, movement is the fundamental reality, and the paradox of Zeno is due to a wrong apprehension of space and time which are regarded by Bergson only as intellectual views of movement. Russell bases his argument on Cantor's theory of mathematical continuity according to which space and time are continuous. Between any two points in space there is an infinite number of points, and in an infinite series no two points are next to one another. There are no infinitesimals which make the movement impossible. It is right that the arrow is at rest at every moment of its flight. But it does not mean that the arrow does not move. There is always a one-one correspondence between the infinite series of positions and infinite series of instants. When the arrow is said to be moving we mean that we observe it at a number of positions at a number of instants. At one instant it is observed at
one point at a neighbouring instant it is observed at the neighbouring point and so on. To any given instant of time corresponds a position of the body, and to any given position of body corresponds an instant of time. This correspondence between the sequence of instants and the sequence of points is called movement. According to Iqbal, the one-one correspondence between an infinite multiplicity of instants in a finite interval of time, and an infinite multiplicity of points, in a finite portion of space, does not solve the difficulty arising from divisibility. This conception of continuity does not apply to the movement but to the picture of the movement as viewed from outside. The flight of the arrow as a passage pace is divisible, but its flight regarded as an act, it from its realization in space, is one and incapable of partition into multiplicity. In partition lies Instruction.

Neither our images nor concept of space and time identical with anything spatial which we perceive. It is from this incongruence of percepts and concepts race and time that the psychological problems in regard to them arise. Iqbal agrees with Bergson that whole difficulty arises due to the lack of the psychological approach. The Asharites as well as the moderns look at the problem from a purely objective point of view which cannot carry us far. Time according to Asharites, is a succession of individual "nows"; from which it obviously follows that between every two individual "nows" or moments of time there is an unoccupied movement of time, that; say, a void of time. The absurdity of this conclusion is due to the fact that they took no lesson from the history of Greek thought, which had adopted the same point of view and had reached results. Newton, in our own time, describes time as something which in itself, and from
its own nature, flows equally. But if flow or passage is the last word as to the nature of time, there must be another time to time the movement of the first time, and another time which times the second time, and so on to infinity. Thus the notion of time as something wholly objective is beset with difficulties. It must, however, be admitted that the practical Arab mind could not regard time as something unreal like the Greeks. However, later Muslim theologians fully realised these difficulties. Mulla Jalal-ud-Din Dawani tells us that if we take time to be a kind of span which makes possible the appearance of events as a moving procession and conceive this span to be a unity, then we cannot but describe it as an original state of Divine activity, encompassing all the succeeding states of that activity. But Mulla Dawani takes good care to add that a deeper insight into the nature of succession reveals its relativity, so that it disappears in the case of God to whom all events are present in a single act of perception.

"The sufi poet Iraqi conceives of infinite varieties of time, relative to the various grades of being, intervening between materiality and pure spirituality. The time of gross bodies, which arises from the revolution of the heaven is divisible into past, present and future. The time of immaterial beings is also serial in character. Rising higher and higher in the scale of immaterial being, we reach Divine Time - time which is absolutely free from the quality of passage, and consequently does not admit of divisibility, sequence and change. It is above eternity and has neither beginning nor end. God is all in one indivisible act of perception. The priority of God is not due to the priority of time; on the other hand, the priority of time is
due to God's priority. Thus Divine Time is what Quran describes as the "Mother of Books" in which the whole of history, freed from the net of causal sequence, is gathered up in a super-eternal "now". From the above discussion Iqbal reaches the conclusion that purely objective point of view is only partially helpful in understanding the nature of time. Hence, the right course is a careful psychological analysis of our conscious experience which alone reveals the true nature of time. In this regard, Iqbal draws distinction between the two aspects of the self, appreciative and efficient. The appreciative self lives in pure duration, i.e., change without succession. The life of the self consists in its movement from appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect, and atomic time, which is serial in character, is born out of this movement. Thus the nature of our conscious experience reconciles in itself the opposition of permanence and change, of time regarded as change without succession and time regarded as atomic".¹

It was not Iqbal the philosopher, who became conscious of the importance of time. On the contrary, it was the poet that forced the philosopher look for the immediate fact of experience. Iqbal as a young poet had a vision of the devastating aspect of time. This vision was later broadened, and the poet saw in time not only an agent of destruction but also a principal factor for the creation of novelty and uniqueness. In Khizr-i-Rah, the last poem of Bang-i-Dara, the concept of time as a ceaseless duration emerges. Life is not measurable in serial time, it is ever-flowing, eternal and evergreen. Asrar-i-Khudi represents Iqbal's formative period as a philosopher,

¹ Cf. Dr. Muhammad Maruf, Contributions to Iqbal's Thought, p. 163-164.
and in this poem the reference to time is not direct; it is implied in his philosophy of activity. In *Payam-i-Mashriq*, his concept of time as the ultimate principle is given the best poetic expression. It is in his poem *Nawa-i-Waqt* that time is presented as the "clothing of man and the garment of God and destiny as mere spell of time. This poem describes the devastating as well as the creative aspect of time. In *Javaid Nama* Iqbal makes a clear distinction between space, time and duration. For him it is duration which is real, time and space being derivations from this duration. He regards space and time as modes of life. It is only when vision is deflected from the immediately present reality, that the succession of today and tomorrow is produced. In Masjid-i-Qirtabah in the collection *Bal-i-Jabril*, time is linked with history, and the history is presented as a continuous process of the achievements of the dynamic individuals, the heroes of history, who by their constant endeavour and ceaseless activity realise values and are able to transcend the transience of the successive time. In this poem, time appears to be a continuous series of happenings, a process of becoming, a pure duration without succession of day and night.

Divine life is in touch with the whole universe on the analogy of the souls contact with the body. The soul is neither inside nor outside the body; yet its contact with every atom of the body is real. But it is impossible to conceive this contact except by positing some kind of space which befits the subtleness of the soul. Therefore, the existence of space in relation the life of God cannot be denied; only we should carefully define the kind of space which may be predicated of the Absoluteness of God. For Iraqi, there are three
kinds of space - the space of material bodies, the space of immaterial beings, and the space of God. The space of material bodies is further divided into three kinds. Firstly, the space of gross bodies of which we predicate roominess. In this space movement takes time and bodies occupy their respective place and resist displacement. Secondly, the space of subtle bodies, e.g., air and sound. In air space, too, bodies resist each other and, their movement is measurable in time, however this time is different from the time of gross bodies. Thirdly, we have the space of light. The light of a candle spreads in all directions in a room without displacing the air in the room; and this shows that the space of light is more subtle than the space of air.

Now coming to the space of immaterial beings, e.g., angels, it should be marked that element of distance is not entirely absent from their space; for immaterial beings, while they can easily pass through the stone walls, cannot altogether dispense with motion. The human soul is, however, spatially free. It is neither at rest nor in motion. Lastly, the space of God is free from all dimensions, and is the meeting point of all the infinities. According to Iqbal, Iraqi is really trying to reach the concept of space as a dynamic appearance. His mind was vaguely struggling with the concept of space as an infinite continuum: yet he was unable to see the full implications of his thought, partly because he was not a mathematician, and partly because of his natural prejudice in favour of the traditional Aristotelian idea of a fixed universe. Iraqi’s mind, no doubt, moved in the right direction; but his Aristotelian prejudices plus lack of a psychological analysis blocked his progress. With his view that
Divine Time is utterly devoid of change - a view obviously based on an inadequate analysis of the conscious experience - it was not possible for him to discover the relation between Divine Time and serial time, and to reach, through this discovery, the essentially Islamic idea of continuous creation, which means a growing universe.

Iqbal is a great admirer of Einstein, who with his theory of relativity, totally revolutionised the nineteenth century scientific views about space and time. The theory of relativity by merging time into “space-time” damaged the traditional notion of matter more than all the arguments of the philosophers. Matter has become, instead of something which persists in time and moves in space, a system interrelated events. With Einstein space is real but relative to the observer. He rejects the concepts absolute time and absolute space as Iqbal says:

Its time and space are relative
And so also its earth below, its sky above.

(Garden of the Modern Secret)

The object observed is variable and is relative to the observer its mass, shape and size change as the observer's position and speed change. Movement and rest too are relative to the observer. There is, hence, no such thing as a self-subsisting materialism of classical physics. It is true that according to the theory of relativity
the shapes, sizes and durations phenomena are not absolute. But the space-time frame does not depend on the observer's mind, it depends on the point of the material universe to which his body is attached. For Iqbal, the philosophical value of the theory is twofold. Firstly, it destroys, not the objectivity of nature, but the view of the substance as simple location in space a view which led to materialism in classical physics. Secondly, the theory makes space dependent on matter. The universe, according to Einstein, is not a kind of island in an infinite space; it is finite but boundless; beyond it there is no empty space. In the absence of matter the universe would shrink to a point. However, Einstein's theory of relativity presents one great difficulty, i.e., the unreality of time. A theory which takes time to be a kind of fourth dimension of space must regard the future as something already given, as fixed as the past. Time as a free creative movement has no meaning for the theory. This theory also neglects certain characteristics of the time as experienced by us. It is not possible to say that the nature of time is exhausted by the characteristics, which the theory does note and which only can be mathematically treated. Nor is it possible for us laymen to understand what is the real nature of Einstein's time. A modern Russian writer, Ouspensky, in his book Tertium Organum conceives the fourth dimension of space to be the movement of a three-dimensional figure in a direction not contained in itself. And since time is the distance separating events in order of succession and binding them in different wholes, it is obviously a distance lying in a direction not contained in the three-dimensional space. As a new dimension this distance, separating events in order of succession, is
incommensurable with the dimension of three-dimensional space, as a year is incommensurable with St. Petersburg. Ouspensky also described our time sense as a misty space-sense and argues, on the basis of our psychic constitution, that to one, two or three-dimensional beings the higher dimension must always appear as succession in time. In other words, time is not a creative movement; and what we call as future events are not fresh happenings but things already given and located in an unknown space.

Iqbal disagrees with Einstein and Ouspensky, who reduce time to a fourth dimension of space. For him time is more fundamental than space; it is related to space as soul is to body. It is the mind of space. Iqbal views time as pure duration unadulterated by space. It is, however, impossible to express the inner experience of pure duration in words, for language is shaped on the serial time of our daily efficient self. Iqbal cites an example to clarify this point. According to the physical science the cause of our sensation of red colour is the rapidity of wave motion the frequency of which is 400 billions per second. If one could observe this tremendous frequency from the outside, and count it at the rate of 2,000 per second, which is the limit of the perceptibility of light, it will take more than 6,000 years to finish the enumeration. Yet in the single momentary mental act of perception one holds together a frequency of wave motion which is practically incalculable. That is how the mental act transforms succession into duration. The appreciative self acts as corrective of the efficient self in so far as it synthesizes all "heres" and "nows".

Pure time, is not a string of separate instants, it is an organic whole in which the past is not left behind, but is moving along with,
and operating in, the present. And the future is given to it not as lying before, yet to be traversed; it is given in the sense that it is present in its nature as an open possibility. It is time regarded as an organic whole that the Quran describes as Taqdir or destiny. Destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities. It is time freed from the net of causal sequence. In one word, it is time as felt and not as thought and calculated. Time regarded as destiny forms the very essence of things. As written in the Holy Quran, "God created all things and assigned to each its destiny." If, then, time is real, and not a mere repetition of homogeneous moments which make conscious experience a delusion, then every moment is original, giving birth to what is absolutely novel and unforeseeable.

The problem of time is the central theme of Iqbal's famous book, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Iqbal's interest in the concept of time is not merely speculative. It has, according to him, immense practical value. He holds that the problem of time is a matter of life and death for a historically conscious and growing community. The practical implications of Iqbal's belief in the reality of time are very clear. If time is an illusion, the march of history is insignificant. If the course of evolution is predetermined, then the future becomes a meaningless term. If past, which is irrevocable determines the entire present and the future, then, no individual or community can be optimistic about future; it has already become a fact. But for Iqbal, time is essentially creative and unpredictable, whose true nature can be grasped only through inner experience. Therefore, history is not a mere unfolding of the static divine will. Its course is always open with unlimited
possibilities. The future is not predetermined by the past; it is an open challenge and can only be met by creative spirits free from the self-created bondage and slavery of serial time.

Iqbal exclaims at this self-created bondage and slavery:

Look, O Thou enthralled by Yesterday and Tomorrow
Behold another world in thine own heart
Thou hast sown the seed of darkness in the clay
Thou hast imagined Time as a line
Thy thought measures length of Time
With the measure of night and day
Thou hast extended Time, like space
And distinguished Yesterday from Tomorrow
Thou hast fled, like a scent, from thine own garden
Thou hast made thy prison with thine own hands

(Seeds of Ego)

It is not easy to solve the mystery of time. Augustine's profound words are as true today as they were when they were uttered; if no one questions me of time, I know it; if I have to explain it to a
questioner, I know it not. Not only logic abhors time, but systematic theology is also an enemy of time. It has not received better treatment from the mystics, as mystic experience has invariably been associated with eternity; and time is opposed to eternity. God has always been described as outside space and time, but it is obvious that space and time cannot be considered outside God, in the same sense in which God is supposed to be outside space and time. The inescapable conclusion is that such terms do not correspond to anything real. But time is undoubtedly a fact of experience, but it comes into conflict with another fact of experience, i.e., religious consciousness, which always tends to transcend time and time-relations. It is a matter of grave importance for a religiously inclined thinker to reconcile these two divergent claims. This is precisely the problem that Iqbal is facing i.e., how to reconcile eternity with change; because, the spiritual basis of all life as conceived by Islam is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. Since the source of these eternal principles is revelation, the reconciliation is a challenging task. To achieve this end, Iqbal rebels against the classical spirit of Muslim theology, imbibing the best elements of the anticlassical and romantic movements of the twentieth century and synthesizing them with the romantic traditions of Sufism.

The reality of time cannot be reconciled with a rigid, logical and intellectual frame of mind. Assertion about time generates an attitude of mind which, if not anti-intellectual, is suspicious of the total claims of intellect. As only serial time can be grasped by intellect and not pure duration, hence there must be some other source of knowledge, which does not negate scientific method, but rises above it and is
capable of giving a deeper understanding of the nature of reality, including pure duration. For Iqbal, as for Bergson, this source of knowledge is intuition, by which one can "feel" time. Iqbal does not entirely agree with any contemporary philosopher of time, although in varying degrees he is influenced by all of them. Bergson, of course, exercised the major influence on Iqbal, but the Muslim thinker is by no means alone in his indebtedness to the French philosopher. Whitehead has, on more than one occasion, admitted that Bergson was an important influence in the development of his philosophy of time and organism.

Iqbal was a thoroughly committed Muslim, and his philosophy of space and time displays a marked mystic trend. For Iqbal, God is infinite, and infinity demands that He must be above time and the relations of time. He is the beginning and the end. One can think of time in God, but one cannot think of God in time. Iqbal, in his poem in *Payam-e-Mashriq* "La ilaha ill-Allah" says:

خود نآوری چ به زمان و مکان کی نازار

شکی نزین شیکان لایللاد" (Rizwan-ul-Islam)

Creation of intellect
Which must dissect.
James Ward says that the phenomenal world then we compare, as Lotze has done, to a continuous texture or fabric consisting entirely of the joint effects produced, the overt deeds done, by innumerable things per se or agents. The pattern of this texture is what we call filled time, and the process of filling-in is, as we know ever going forward. So far as we are merely cognitive, we are confined to observation, past and present, of this process and to such more or less probable inferences concerning the future as these suggest. As a matter of fact our inductions frequently turn out right, and they prove to be more reliable the more methodically we proceed. It is so; but there is no necessity, either logical or real, about it. Kant himself allows that phenomena might possibly be such that the understanding would not find them conformable. All might be in such confusion that nothing would be found in the succession of phenomena which could supply a rule of synthesis corresponding to the category of cause and effect, so that this category would, therefore, be altogether null and void and meaningless. Thus it is simply to the ideal of a ‘rule’ of succession, which the weaving of the phenomenal texture de facto suggests, that we apply the concept called by Kant causality of nature.

Entirely distinct from this phenomenal or empirical causality is that which Kant calls ‘casuality of freedom’—intelligible or noumenal casuality. So different are the two that positive science fights shy of the terms, ‘cause and effect’, because of their association with this efficient or noumenal casuality, the existence of which positive

science ignores and naturalism dogmatically denies altogether. But to the ground for assuming its existence we need not now return. At all events, as the very causality that produces the pattern in 'the context of nature—Kant's phrase by the way—this noumenal causality obviously cannot be identified with the phenomenal causality—so-called—that the pattern itself displays. The essential characteristic of the latter is objective time-order according to universal law: the essential characteristic of the former is subjective initiation. Since it freely inserts those 'links in the chain of nature' it cannot, he says, be a part of the 'time-order that if makes. As compared with the phenomenal solidarity or continuity that they jointly produce, these independent, real, causes may then be said to be out of time. Their acts are not 'events' that seem to come out of (evenire), or to follow from, what has preceded in the time-process: they are rather interventions that appear in this process and constitute its further evolution. Accordingly in reference to them and them only 'ought' has a meaning; for, as Kant truly says that if we look merely at the course of nature, 'ought' has no meaning whatever. It expresses a possible action, the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept, cannot be a phenomenon. (This concept, as we should say now, is the teleological concept of worth or of the good, whereby the realm of ends in which it obtains is still further differentiated from the realm of nature in which it is meaningless. In the one, events appear as determined by preceding events; in the other, actions are initiated to secure future ends.

But can we then say that the realm of ends is out of time? Certainly not, as he has already maintained, in the sense that it is, like Plato's
world of ideas, an eternal world of immutable essences, a logical world but not a real world at all. In tending to equate 'intelligible character' to mere essentia+existentia, as Schopenhauer expressly did, Kant's procedure is indefensible as well as inconsistent. But what is the time, beyond which, so to say, free agents are said to exist? It is that time which Kant conceived as yielding an exact science of chronometry, the pendant, of geometry the exact science of space. It is time as a continuous quantity of one dimension, and so far comparable to a line, save that its points or parts are not simultaneous but successive. Succession in this time is conceived as constant; in other words this time is regarded as homogeneous and so as measurable, divisible into intervals of equal length. In a word it is the abstract time of science in which we imagine the successive states of the whole phenomenal world to be plotted out, suggesting, as Bergson has admirably put it, the substitution for the complete world of experience of a set of kinematographic pictures. What then left out of this abstract or empty time? Paradoxical though it appear, what is left out, we shall find, are the mutually implicated facts of duration and change. An interval of time is not the same as the experience of duration, and the two different states situated at its extremes are no equivalent for the experience of change. But these problems of time which we have here broached are far too complex for discussion now. The only farther elucidation he can offer is to raise one more question and content himself with a very summery answer. How do we come by this schema of time? We come by it solely because our experience involves both duration and change; and thus, as has been well said, “time is in us though we are not in
time”. But for experience duration is not something objective, is not a homogeneous linear quantity that is abstracted from a multiplicity of presentation. What the term duration ultimately represents is our immediate subjective experience as actively striving and wearing on: it implies the actual living, which only is actual in so far as it is not homogeneous and empty but full of changes endured or wrought. And change again as experienced is not merely a temporal succession, a, b, c---, where a is not when b is, and c is not till b is no more. Such a Schema would never yield experience: it answers exactly to that zero limit of experience that, as already mentioned, Leibniz ascribed to bodies, when he said omne corpus mens momentanea est. But experience yields that schema; and empirical psychology affords us a fairly complete analysis of its constituents and a fairly probable account of their genetic synthesis. Experience however yields that schema only because experience, as living, is the natura naturans that leaves behind it, as it were, the natura naturata to which the schema entirely belong. Between the intemporal world of ideas and the temporal world of phenomena free agents then have their place. The Necessitarian’s position is not then, we seem entitled to conclude, empirically warranted. As an argument from experience it rests on the assumption that phenomena are the whole; that there is, in other words, nothing but filled time: whence and how time is filled, it does not inquire. Once this foundation is found faulty, all the empirical arguments that rest upon it may be overturned. Nor, with one exception, are the supposed a priori arguments more satisfactory. That every event must have a cause we may allow to be axiomatic,
but not that the same cause---the same efficient cause, that is—must always produce the same effect. Again to identify such a cause with an essence, to equate it, as it were, to a reason was the mistake of rationalism, which Kant completely exposed in his important pre-critical paper on Negative Quantities.

"But if we start from theism the case is quite otherwise: then indeed the necessitarian position appears to be axiomatic. It is, he thinks, generally allowed that in the long theological controversies, which for centuries have raged round our problem, logic has been on the side of those who, like Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin and Edwards, have maintained the doctrine of divine predestination, the doctrine that God orders all events, and the volitions of moral agents amongst others, by such a decisive disposal, that the events are infallibly connected with his disposal; or otherwise put, that second causes in nature are incompatible with the admission that there is only one cause, the First Cause. What however does this start from theism imply? It implies a supposed knowledge of God that is independent of experience—partly as innate, partly as revealed. It implies further that knowing what God is apart from the world we infer what any world that he creates must be. The absolute omniscience and omnipotence of God are regarded as beyond question; and from these follow as a corollary the absolute and eternal decrees. As Jonathan Edwards concisely put it: All things are perfectly and equally in his view from eternity; hence it will follow that his designs or purposes are not things formed anew, founded on any new views
or appearances, but are all eternal purposes."¹ But there is another corollary equally evident from which those intent on theism at any cost seek in vain to escape. There is - as already said - no room left for other causes, other purposes, no room for a real world with such a God at all. As a Scottish professor of divinity has said If God is thus the real cause of all that is, the universe would seem to be merely God evolving himself, and there has been no true creation, no bringing into being of wills separate from his own. In a word, starting from the One there is no arriving at the Many. If we attempt to conceive of God apart from the world there is nothing to lead us on to the idea of creation. On the other hand, if we start from the Many, it has, he trusts, become more and more clear as we have advanced, that we find there no justification for the notion of a 'block universe'—as Professor James called it—a universe, that is, in which every detail is decreed in which real initiative, evolution as we understand it, is impossible. But, in fact, we have to 'start from the Many, and accordingly always do—this too he trusts has been made clear. Moreover, if thoroughgoing determinism were true, we should, it has seemed equally clear, never attain to the idea of a Creator at all. For if ourselves devoid of all originality what meaning could that idea have for us?

The doctrine of predestination has been for theologians a hopeless and insoluble problem as well as a source of bitter strife largely because of this opposition between a priori speculation and actual experience. "That in the actual passage of events something should actually come to pass, something new which previously was

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not; that history should be something more than a translation into time of the eternally complete content of an ordered world----this,” said Lotze, “Is a deep and irresistible demand of our spirit, under the influence of which we act in life. Without its satisfaction the world would be, not indeed unthinkable and self-contradictory, but unmeaning and incredible.”

The philosopher Reid says that memory of the past is the memory of what was once both future and contingent, the fact remembered remains contingent though it is future no more. But Hamilton says that the past that is to say is necessary: if then God’s prescience resembles our memory, it is only because the past and the future are both alike to him: as the past is not contingent so neither is the future. But notwithstanding his exposure, Hamilton still sides with Reid. And this brings to our notice another attempt to save the Divine Sovereignty, as it is called, without surrendering the freedom of man; and that is the simple declaration that the problem is transcendent. The conciliation of divine foreknowledge and human freedom is, said Hamilton, "one of the things to be believed, not understood": all "attempts to harmonize these antilogies by human reasoning to human understanding" are to be rejected as "futile vain wisdom all and false philosophy." But what if antilogy is only a euphemism for contradiction, and what of the logical cogency of the

predestinarian view, about which, however repulsive, there is nothing obscure or inconceivable? He does not think Jonathan Edwards overstated his case, when he said, ‘There is no geometrical theorem whatsoever, more capable of strict demonstration than that God's certain Prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a contingency of these events, as is without all Necessity.

The pluralist then, it would seem, has no alternative but either to deny the complete prescience of the One or to abandon the self-determination of the Many, and thus wholly surrender his own position. There is however still an old attempt at conciliation, recently set forth anew by a former Gifford Lecturer, which we perhaps ought not to pass altogether without notice. ‘Foreknowledge in time, says Professor Royce, ‘is possible only of the general and of the causally predetermined, and not of the unique and the free. Hence neither God nor man can perfectly foreknow, at any temporal moment, what a free-will agent is yet to do. On the other hand, the Absolute possesses a perfect knowledge at one glance of the whole of tire temporal order, present, past and future. This knowledge is ill-called foreknowledge. It is eternal knowledge." But he fears that even eternity will not afford, a secure refuge from the difficulty. It is noteworthy that, while it is of God that Professor Royce denies perfect foreknowledge; it is of the Absolute that he asserts eternal knowledge. There is here more than an accidental difference of expression. Professor Royce in fact, like only too many theists, is guilty of that vacillation between God and the Absolute which Mr. Bradley we found quaintly comparing to the futile attempts of a dog to follow two masters. The Absolute must be in every respect all-
inclusive, but God, if his creatures are free, is so far not all-inclusive. As he has already said the Creator together with his creatures may be called the Absolute; but unless the creatures - said to be made out of nothing - verily remain themselves but nothing, God is, no longer at any rate, the Absolute. To God we may attribute personality and therefore experience and knowledge; since for him the world is a Not-self, although his own creation. But we cannot attribute personality to the Absolute, for there the duality of Self and Not-self is necessarily transcended. We cannot then speak of the Absolute as knowing; but since it is all-inclusive we may perhaps say that it possesses knowledge - a vague phrase that will mean too little to help us much.

Royce distinguishes two senses of present, an exclusive as when we hear or apprehend a musical air note by note, where each note exclude the rest from coexistence with itself and an inclusive as when we take in or comprehend the melody as a whole and appreciate it. In this latter case the whole melody is present, included at once in what he has called a time perspective. The range of such inclusive present, or time-span, is for us extremely limited, but within such limits we experience a sort of temporal ubiquity. His analogy is such because Hegel supposed, the world’s evolution is for it merely a rehearsal after the symphony is composed"1. But all is not decreed the world is not created like a symphony:

He observed from the above discussion that Iqbal believed the problem of space and time to be a question of life and death for the Muslims. It is most unfortunate that his failing health prevented him

from elaborating and elucidating this vital point, viz the spatio-temporal relationship of the human individual and the Ultimate Ego. This would have given us a deep and revealing insight into the thorny question of free will or predestination. In the absence of an authoritative presentation of the subject by him, we had to console ourselves with the few paragraphs in his lectures, and scattered verses in the poetical verses in the poetical works, to see how he interpreted the Divine Teachings revealed to the Holy Prophet. For example he referred to Iraqi who insisted on the plurality of space-orders and time-orders and spoke of a Divine Time and a Divine Space. It might be that what we called the external world was only an intellectual construction, and that there were other levels of human experience capable of being systemized by other orders of space and time levels in which concept and analysis did not play the same role as they did in the case of our normal experience. James Ward was simply a philosopher-psychologist and his thinking was mostly pluralistic about the universe so he discussed the issue of time and space according to his pluralistic thoughts.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter X

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

IQBAL AND WARD

There are following important issues on which I make a comparison between Iqbal and Ward:

1-The issue of the existence of God.
2-The issue of Ego.
3-The issue of Pluralism and Singularism.
4-The issue of Creation.
5-The issue of Freedom of Fate.
6-The issue of Evolution.
7-The issue of Religion.
8-The issue of Space and Time.

Brief discussion on the two philosopher's position on the subjects stated above as follows:

Regarding the existence of God when we compare Iqbal and James Ward, we find that like the Neo-Idealists, both start from the individual procedure. Both seem nothing wrong with the procedure. The danger of viewing everything anthropomorphically is a pitfall and James Ward has fallen into it. Nevertheless it is clear that what reality is as a whole must forever remain hidden from the finite self, for how can the part with all its limitations comprehend the whole, which essentially goes for beyond its range. Iqbal's conception of God is a corollary of his view of the nature of Ultimate Reality because he identifies God with the Ultimate Reality. But he is a theist
and not a monist of any of the different types or a pantheist. God is
the perfect Ego, the perfect self, the perfect Individual; for all created
egos. He derives his conception of God from the holy Quran. God,
the Ultimate Ego, is infinite but His infiniteness is not temporal or
spatial but consists in the infinite inner possibilities of His creative
activities. God's infinity is intensive not extensive. James Ward
regards God as eternal but fails to explain because he has no idea of
time as non-serial whereas Iqbal takes his clue from a saying of the
prophet of Islam in which time is identified with God. I, therefore,
conclude that Iqbal's conception of God is better and clearer, more
realistic and more impressive than James Ward.

Iqbal was pantheistic and mystic in the beginning as
McTaggart wrote to him as under:

"I am writing to tell you with how much pleasure I have been
reading your poems. Have you not changed your position very
much? Surely in the days when we used to talk philosophy together
you were much more of a pantheistic and mystic". But later he had
changed his views and became a pluralist. He was very much
impressed by the thoughts of James Ward but he differed from him
not on philosophical points but on religion because he derived all his
thoughts from the Holy Quran. He was not only a philosopher but
also a staunch Muslim. His psyche is quite different from James
Ward. No doubt he is an advocate of pluralistic views but he did
never left his spiritualistic approach, therefore, I can't say that he was
a pluralistic like James Ward. In the last days of his life he again

concentrated on the singularism. So he was quite different from James Ward.

James Ward always tries to prove the Ultimate Reality by way of logical deduction whereas Iqbal's way of thinking is different because he tries to search out God through 'ecstasy' or rapport which is the only authentic way to know about the Ultimate Reality. He agrees with Bergson on this point and denies the incompatible logical deduction of Ward. Iqbal believes in the inductive way of thinking. James Ward's belief in God is antagonistic and beyond the idea of perfection but Iqbal touches the point of perfection by his strong faith based on 'ecstasy' and 'love'. Thus he seems to get closer to the true knowledge of God.

Discussing mystic experience Allama Muhammad Iqbal says, "Modern psychology has only recently begun to realize the importance of a careful study of the contents of mystic consciousness, and we are not yet in possession of a really effective scientific method to analyse the contents of non-rational modes of consciousness. With the time at my disposal it is not possible to undertake an extensive inquiry into the history and the various degrees of mystic consciousness in point of richness and vividness. All that I can do is to offer a few general observations only on the main characteristics of mystic experience.

1- The first point to note is the immediacy of this experience. In this respect it dose not differ from other levels of human experience which supply data for knowledge. All experience is immediate. As regions of normal experience are subject to interpretation of sense-data for our knowledge of the external
world, so the region of mystic experience is subject to interpretation for our knowledge of God. The immediacy of mystic experience simply means that we know God just as we know other objects. God is not a mathematical entity or a system of concepts mutually related to one another and having no reference to experience.

2- The second point is the un-analysable wholeness of mystic experience. When I experience the table before me innumerable data of experience merge into the single experience of the table. Out of this wealth of data I select those that fall into a certain order of space and time and round them off in reference to the table. In the mystic state, however vivid and rich it may be, thought is reduced to a minimum and such an analysis is not possible. But this difference of the mystic state from the ordinary rational consciousness does not mean discontinuance with the normal consciousness, as Prof. William James erroneously thought. In either case it is the same Reality which is operating on us. The ordinary rational consciousness, in view of our practical need of adaptation to our environment, takes that Reality piecemeal, selecting successively isolated sets of stimuli for response. The mystic state brings us into contact with the total passage of reality in which all the diverse stimuli merge into one another and from a single un-analysable unity in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object does not exist.

3- The third point to note is that to the mystic, the mystic state is a moment of intimate association with a unique other
Self, transcending, encompassing, and momentarily suppressing the private personality of the subject of experience. Considering its content the mystic state is highly objective and cannot be regarded as a mere into the mists of pure subjectivity. But you will ask me how immediate experience of God, as an Independent Other Self, is at all possible. The mere fact that the mystic state is passive does not finally prove the veritable ‘otherness’ of the Self experienced. This question arises in the mind because we assume, without criticism, that our knowledge of the type of all knowledge. If this were so, we could never be sure of the reality of our own self. However, in reply to it I suggest the analogy of our daily social experience. How do we know other minds in our own self and nature by inner reflection and sense-perception respectively. We possess no sense for the experience of other minds. The only ground of my knowledge of a conscious being before me is the physical movements similar to my own from which I infer the presence of another conscious being. Or we may say, after Prof. Royace, that our fellows are known to be real because they respond to our signals and thus constantly supply the necessary supplement to our own fragmentary meanings. Response is, no doubt, the best of the presence of a conscious-self, and the Quran also takes the same:

‘And your Lord saidth, call Me and I respond to your call’.(40:62)
‘And when My servants ask thee concerning Me, then I am nigh unto them and answer the cry of him that crieth unto Me’.(2:182)

It is clear that whether we apply the physical criterion or the non-physical and more adequate criterion of Royace, in either case our knowledge of other minds remains something like inferential only.
Yet we feel that our experience of other minds is immediate and never entertain any doubt as to the reality of our social experience. I do not, however, mean, at the present stage of our inquiry, to build on the implications of our knowledge of other minds, an idealistic argument in favour of the reality of a comprehensive self. All that I mean to suggest is that the immediacy of our experience in the mystic state is not without a parallel. It has some sort of resemblance to our normal experience and probably belongs to the same category.

4-Since the quality of mystic experience is to be directly experienced, it is obvious that it cannot be communicated. Mystic states are more like feeling than thought. The interpretation which the mystic or the prophet puts on the content of his religious consciousness can be conveyed to others in the form of preposition, but the content itself cannot be so transmitted. Thus in the following verses of the Quran it is the psychology and not the content of the experience that is given:

‘It is not for man that God should speak with him, but by vision or from behind a veil: or He sendeth a messenger to reveal by His permission what He will: for He is exalted, wise’. (4 2:51)

The incommunicability of mystic experience is due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive intellect. It must, however, be noted that mystic feeling, like all feeling, has a cognitive element also; and it is, I believe, because of this cognitive element that it lends itself to the form of idea. In fact it is the nature of feeling to seek expression in thought. It would seem that the two—feeling and idea—are the non-temporal and temporal
aspects of the same unit of the inner experience. But on the point I
cannot do better than quote Prof. Hocking who has made a
remarkable keen study of feeling in justification of an intellectual view
of the content of the religious consciousness: ‘what is that other-than-
feeling in which feeling may end? I answer, consciousness of an
object. Feeling is instability of an entire conscious self: and that which
will restore the stability of this self lies, not within its own border, but
beyond it. Feeling is outward-pushing, as idea is outward-
reporting: and no feeling is so blind as to have no idea of its own
object. As a feeling possesses the mind, there also possesses the
mind, as an integral part of that feeling, some idea of the kind of thing
which will bring it to rest. A feeling without a direction is as impossible
as an activity without a direction: and a direction implies some
objective. There are vague states of consciousness in which we
seem to be wholly without direction; but in such cases it is remarkable
that feeling is likewise in abeyance. For example, I may be dazed by
a blow, neither realizing what has happened, nor suffering any
pain, and yet quite conscious that something has occurred: the
experience waits an instant in the vestibule of consciousness, not as
feeling but purely as fact, until idea has touched it and defined a
course of response. At the same moment, it is felt as painful. If we are
right, feeling is quite as much an objective consciousness as is idea: it
refers always to something beyond the present self and has no
existence save in directing the self towards that subject in whose
presence its own career must end!’ Thus you will see that it is
because of this essential, it has never, in its history, taken itself as a
matter of feeling alone and has constantly striven after metaphysics.
The mystic’s condemnation of intellect as an organ of knowledge does not really find any justification in the history of religion. But Prof. Hocking’s passage just quoted has a wider scope than mere justification of idea in religion. The organic relation of feeling and idea throws light on the old theological controversy about verbal revelation which once gave so much trouble to Muslim religious thinkers. Inarticulate feeling seek to fulfill its destiny in idea which, in its turn, tends to develop out of itself its own visible garment. It is no mere metaphor to say that idea and word both simultaneously emerge out of the womb of feeling, though logical understanding cannot but take them in a temporal order and thus create its own difficulty by regarding them as mutually isolated. There is a sense in which the word is also revealed.

5-The mystic’s intimate association with the eternal which gives him a sense of the unreality of serial time does not mean a complete break with serial time. The mystic state in respect of its uniqueness remains in some way related to common experience. This is clear from the fact that the mystic state soon fades away, though it leaves a deep sense of authority after it has passed away. Both the mystic and the prophet return to the normal levels of experience; but with this difference that the return of the prophet, as I will show latter, may be fraught with infinite meaning for mankind. For the purpose of knowledge, then, the region of mystic experience and cannot be ignored merely because it cannot be traced back to sense-perception. Nor is it possible to undo the spiritual value of the mystic state by specifying the organic conditions which appear to determine it. Even if the postulate of modern psychology as to the interrelation
of body and mind is assumed to be true, it is illogical to discredit the value of the mystic state as a revelation of truth. Psychologically speaking, or non-religious, are organically determined. The scientific form of mind is as much organically determined as the religious. Our judgement as to the creations of genius is not at all determined or even remotely affected by what our psychologists may say regarding its organic conditions. A certain kind of temperament may be a necessary condition for a certain kind of receptivity, but the antecedent condition cannot be regarded as the whole truth about the character of what is received. The truth is that the organic causation of our mental states has nothing to do with the criteria by which we judge them to be superior or inferior in point of value. ‘Among the visions and messages,’ says Prof. William James, ‘some have always been too patently silly, among the trances and convulsive seizures some have been too fruitless for conduct and character to pass themselves off as significant, still less as Divine. In the history of Christian mysticism the problem how to discriminate between such messages and experiences as were really Divine miracles, and such others as the demon in his malice was able to counterfeit, thus making the religion person twofold more the child of hell he was before, has always been a difficult one to solve, needing all the sagacity and experience of the best directors of conscience. In the end it had come to our empiricist criterion: by their fruit ye shall know them and not by their roots’. The problem of Christian mysticism alluded to by prof. James has been in fact the problem of all mysticism. The demon in his malice does counterfeit experiences
which creep into the circuit of the mystic state. As we read in the Holy Quran:

‘we have not sent any Apostle or prophet before thee among whose desires Satan injected not some wrong desire, but God shall bring to naught that which Satan had suggested. Thus shall God affirm His revelations, for God is Knowing and Wise’.

And it is in the elimination of the satanic from the Divine that the followers of Freud have done inestimable service to religion; though I cannot help saying that the main theory of this newer psychology does not appear to me to be supported by any adequate evidence. If our vagrant impulses assert themselves in our dreams, or at other times we are not strictly ourselves, it does not follow that they remain imprisoned in a kind of lumber room behind the normal self. The occasional invasion of these suppressed impulses on the region of our normal self tends more to show the temporary disruption of our habitual system of response rather than their perpetual presence in some dark corner of mind. However, the theory is this. During the process of our adjustment to our environment, we are exposed to all sort of stimuli gradually fall into a relatively fixed system, constantly growing in complexity by absorbing some and rejecting other impulses which do not fit in with our permanent system of responses. The rejected impulses recede into what is called the ‘unconscious region’ of mind, and there wait for a suitable opportunity to assert themselves and take their revenge on the focal self. They may disturb our plans of action, distort our thought, build our dreams and phantasies, or carry us back to forms of primitive behaviour which the revolutionary process has left far behind. Religion, it is said
is a pure fiction created by these repudiated impulses of mankind with a view to find a kind of fairy land for free unobstructed movement. Religious beliefs and dogmas, according to theory, are no more than merely primitive theories of nature, whereby mankind have tried to redeem Reality from its elemental ugliness and to show it off as something nearer to the heart’s desire than the facts of life warrant. That there are religions and forms of art, which provide a kind of cowardly escape from the facts of life, I do not deny. All that I contend is that this is not true of all religion. Not doubt, religious belief and dogmas have a metaphysical significance; but it is obvious that they are not interpretations of those data of experience which are the subject of the sciences of nature. Religion is not physics or chemistry seeking an explanation of nature in terms of causation; it really aims at interpreting a totally different region of human experience—religious experience—the data of which cannot be reduced to the data of any other science. In fact, it must be said in justice to religion that it insisted on the necessity of concrete experience in religious life long before science learnt to do so. The conflict between the two is due not to the fact that the one is, and the is not, based on concrete experience. Both seek concrete experience as a point of departure. Their conflict is due to the misapprehension that both interpret the same data of experience. We forget that religion aims at reaching the real significance of a special variety of human experience.

Nor is it possible to explain away the contents of religious consciousness by attributing the whole thing to the working of the sex-impulse. The two forms of conscious—sexual and religious—are
often hostile or, at any rate, completely different to each other in point of their character, their aim, and the kind of conduct they generate. The truth is that in a state of religious passion we know a factual reality in some sense outside the narrow circuit of our personality. To the psychologist religious passion necessarily appears as the work of the subconscious because of the intensity with which it shakes up the depth of our being. In all knowledge there is an element of passion, and the object of knowledge gains or loses in objectivity with the rise and fall in the intensity of passion. That is most real to us which stirs up the entire fabric of our personality. As Prof. Hocking pointedly puts it: ‘If ever upon the stupid day-length time-span of any self or saint either, some vision breaks to roll his life and ours into new channels, it can only be because that vision admits into his soul some trooping invasion of the concrete fullness of eternity. Such vision doubtless means subconscious readiness resonance too; but the expansion of the unused air-cells does not argue that we have ceased to breathe the outer air: the very opposite.’ A purely psychological method, therefore, cannot explain religious passion as a form of knowledge. It is bound to fail in the case of our newer psychologists as it did fail in the case of Locke and Hume. The forgoing discussion, however, is sure to raise an important question in your mind. Religious experience, I have tried to maintain, is essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive aspect, the content of which cannot be communicated to others, except in the form of a judgement. Now when a judgement which claims to be the interpretation of a certain region of human experience, not accessible to me, is placed before me for my assent, I am entitled to ask, what is
the guarantee of its truth? Are we in possession of a test which would reveal its validity? If personal experience had been the only ground for acceptance of a judgement of this kind, religion would have been the possession of test which do not differ from those applicable to others forms of knowledge. These I call the intellectual test and the pragmatic test. By the intellectual test I mean critical interpretation, without any presupposition of human experience, generally with a view to discover whether our interpretation leads us ultimately to a reality of the same character as is revealed by religious experience. The pragmatic test judge it by its fruits. The former is applied by the philosopher, the latter by the prophet. In the lecture that follows, I will apply the intellectual test."¹

Iqbal did not regard himself as a disciple of J. Ward because he goes beyond his conception of God. Ward regards God as eternal but fails to explain His eternity because he has no idea of time as non-serial whereas Iqbal takes his clue from a saying of the Prophet of Islam in which time is identified with God. Iqbal's idea of perfection is not the same as that of Ward. It is partly his own and partly of Bergson.

Regarding ego, James Ward concentrates on the material world and he always insists on the point that every living or non-living beings resist for their existence and try to repulse the force which tries to diminish their existence. He calls it ego. His canvas of thinking is very narrow but Iqbal takes ego in the wide sense and applies this sentiment not to the individuals only but to the societies, countries and nations. According to his point of view no individual or

society or country or nation can survive without the notion of ego. So I conclude that the conception of Iqbal about ego is more superior than James Ward. Although Iqbal gets the idea of ego from the philosophical views of James Ward, Nietzsche and Fichte, he differs from J.Ward, as he goes on, and follows Maulana Jalal-ud-Din Rumi, his spiritual guide, to solve the problem of ego. He derives the real concept of ego from the Holy Quran, as he says.

\begin{quote}
\textit{The Secrets of the self are hidden in words, No God but He alone}
\textit{The self is just a dull-edged sword, No God but He, the grinding stone.}
\end{quote}

\textit{(The Rod of Mosses)}

James Ward admits that he can never understand the creative process and finally surrenders; for what is the use of a hypothesis that can never be verified. As he says:

"How God creates the world and thereby limits Himself we can never understand. Even if the idea of creation be valid, we must necessarily fail to understand the process, just because that can not fall within our experience; on the other hand any process that we could understand could not be the creative process, because it
Iqbal steps forward and says, "God created all things and assigned to each its destiny; the destiny of a thing then is not an unrelenting fate working from without like a task master; it is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion. He further says that Creation is opposed to repetition which is a characteristic of mechanical action. That is why it is impossible to explain the creative activity of life in terms of mechanism. Hence science cannot comprehend life. On the analogy of our conscious experience, then the universe is a free creative movement". Iqbal does not surrender like James Ward but explains more clearly the conception of creation and has a realistic approach to the subject. The notion of creation is obviously expressed in architecture, literature and music but these external expressions are actually the reflection of the internal impressions. Ward ignores the process of expressionism but Iqbal takes it seriously, discusses the matter in detail and highlights the point.

James Ward is a pluralist, so his point of view about fate is that the sole ground of there being a world to evolve but God has not determined, before the foundation of the world, every thing that shall ever be done in it: for then nothing would verily be done in it at all. But it was not till deeds were done that man talked of fate; then falsely projecting the fixity of the past in to the future, they deny the

very source of idea of fate by denying real freedom. No doubt that Iqbal and Ward are pluralists and Iqbal agrees with the point that the plurality is the sole ground to start philosophical discussion on the perfection of the world or the Ultimate Reality but it produces alienation or strangeness which is an unhappy result to a philosopher. In other words, every individual is different from others and this concept of differentiation is a great hurdle in the way to achieve the goal. But Iqbal artistically removes this hurdle by creating coordination between the concept of 'self' and 'not self'.

But Iqbal has different view as he says that the things are created by God, but it is taking place according to the characteristics, the capabilities and nature of things themselves. The nature of a thing is eternal and unchangeable. It is not created, because it already exists from eternity, therefore, the man is considered a free agent, so he is responsible for his acts. This is qadar (freedom). Although every thing is created by God, and to this extent, it is determined, still its external realization (creation) and its actions are taking place according to its external. Iqbal's view is stronger, more effective, more realistic and more appealing than James Ward. In connection of evolution, Iqbal agrees with James Ward's pluralistic theory and calls it essential to solve the problem of perfect and complete evolution but he adds that the process of evolution is not only for an individual but all the world is under process of evolution because the world evolution is resulting a globalization in which every one is coming close to each other and alieness and strangeness are, slowly and steadily, disappearing and it is hopped that all the world would once come to a central point which is
certainly 'Islam', which has a great value in the history of the world evolution. Iqbal's thinking is international on the subject whereas James Ward is close-fisted. As far as the concept of evolution is concerned, Iqbal widens its scope from the individuality to the whole. He goes beyond the limits of Ward and derives a new concept of evolution. According to him, the whole universe is under evolution and the world is coming nearer day by day to its nucleus due to evolution; and that nucleus or centre is 'Islam'.

In connection of religion, Iqbal is clear minded whereas James Ward is confused. He was as confused in his old age on the religious issues as confused in philosophy and psychology in his youth. He has always discussed Christianity and particularly the Christian dogma in the light of philosophy and psychology, therefore, confusion must be the only consequential out-put of the discussion. On the other hand Iqbal has discussed the religion in the light of Sufiism mostly based on the metaphysics. He judges philosophy in the light of religion whereas Ward tries to judge religion in the light of philosophy. Religion starts where philosophy ends. Iqbal's views are clear-cut on religion.

Regarding the issue of Religion, James Ward was a strong advocate of the Christian Dogma whereas Iqbal was a true lover of Islam, and always proved it a true religion and condemned the concept of Trinity.

James Ward discussed Time and Space in the light of different scientific and philosophical theories but reached nowhere whereas Iqbal had offered a clear cut solution of the problem through poetical and spiritual ways as he said:
Its time and space are relative
And so also its earth below, its sky above
Creations of the intellect
Which must dissect
The intellect built space upon the void
And girt itself with time as if it were a sacred thread.

(Garden of the Modern Secret)
I have concluded from the discussions undertaken in various chapters of this dissertation that God is perfect throughout His creative progress as both Iqbal and James Ward philosophically agree on the following points:

i. God's Will functions through the will of the finite egos.

ii. Reason can prove the necessity of faith, but cannot turn faith into knowledge.

iii. Belief in God is ultimately a matter of faith, though of a rational faith, and that conviction or complete certitude about Him comes not from reason but from living, that direct communion with Him is gained only through love for Him, and that immortality can be achieved by a finite self.

iv. God is eternal

v. A plurality of egos exists.

I think that Iqbal's idea of perfection is not the same as that of Ward. It is partly Bergsonian and partly his own. He appreciates McTaggart's conception of personal immortality. He also began to see an identity between the theistic pluralism of Ward and the metaphysical position of Rumi, and soon became a theistic pluralist. He seems more prominent than James Ward because Ward tries to prove the existence of God through rationalism whereas Iqbal believes that intuition or "Ishq" is the only way to know about God as is the view also of Bergson and Rumi.
It is further concluded that both are pluralists. Iqbal thinks that the pluralistic activity is a must to create hustle and bustle; and an active striving in life, though it has a negative aspect of alieness and strangeness. That every individual is different from the other; and stranger to the other is the secret of individuality. It is their differentiation, however, which is dangerous, to some extent, to the society, particularly in regard to the achievement of a great collective goal.

On this point, I think, Iqbal differs from James Ward and looks towards William James. He deduces his thought from him. He tried to eliminate the alieness between different individual egos, and between the world and God. For this purpose, he artistically creates coordination between the ego and the non-ego.

The pluralists insist upon three points.

1. The appearance of uniformity and regularity is compatible with the spontaneity of living agents.
2. The uniformity and order which the physicist ascertains avowedly pertain to matter as phenomenal, i.e., as appearance which Leibniz referred to as confused perception.
3. There must exist some adequate grounds for this appearance.

A pluralist believes in a universal tendency towards perfection as the very principle of life. His view of the world leads him to regard progress as consisting in the advance towards a 'higher unity'. All things, in the long run, work together for good not for evil. The pluralistic goal is clear in itself that a pluralist, at least, seeks the good and, therefore, tends to replace an initial state of comparative isolation and conflict by progressively higher form of unity and
cooperation whereas the singularist inflicts upon himself a static world and finds no way to progress. He reaches, in the end, a unity, which is called the Absolute. Pluralism has a wider canvas than singularism. Leibniz's monadology is the first modern pluralistic philosophy in the West.

In chapter IV, "Iqbal and Ward's conception of creation", the idea of creation has been discussed in detail and we came to the conclusion that the idea of creation, like the idea of God, is altogether transcendent. The pluralists admit that they can never understand the creative process and finally surrender. They halt, at the many and interaction between them. The idea of creation is rationally justified by them generally but Iqbal justifies the idea of creation and the idea of God by 'ecstasy' and 'rapport'.

Regarding the conception of evolution, I concluded that the Many are becoming more and more and the lower depends on the higher. According to pluralism, there is no fixed environment anywhere; so the process of evolution is going on everywhere. The creation and modification are part of life process, life depends on movement or evolution. The whole Universe is under an unending evolution and this evolution is pluralistic. Iqbal and James Ward agree about the pluralistic nature of reality.

I concluded from the conception of ego that the Greatest Reality is the Greatest Ego. God is the Greatest Ego: He creates innumerable subordinate egos for the demonstration of His Ego. Every thing of the world, even a tinny particle, has ego; always struggle against outer forces for its 'existence; and remains active to impress its identity and presence on others. Iqbal's conception is
supposed to be derived partially from Ward and other European philosophers and partially from mystical thoughts of the Muslim 'sufia' and other oriental philosophers.

In connection of freedom of fate, I come to the conclusion that all is not decreed, nor are all possibilities left open; the Many have not unlimited freedom. The pluralists maintain that God's creatures are creators, their 'nature' is partly His doing, partly their own; He assigns the talents; they use or misuse them. God, for wise purpose, has chosen to open a source of contingency in the voluntary action of His creatures, to which no pre-science can possibly extend. Iqbal's conviction regarding destiny or fate is more 'Quranic' than philosophical.

Regarding the issue of Religion, James Ward was a strong advocate of the Christian Dogma whereas Iqbal was a true lover of Islam, and always proved it a true religion and condemned the concept of Trinity.

James Ward discussed Time and Space in the light of different scientific and philosophical theories but reached nowhere whereas Iqbal had offered a clear-cut solution of the problem through poetical and spiritual ways.

Iqbal's message is particularly to the Muslim Ummah, no doubt, but also Universal in the sense whereas James Ward's religious thoughts are specifically concerned to the Christendom and his philosophical thoughts are confused with psychology and lack of Universality.
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