THE CONTEMPORARY CONCEPT OF MAN
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MARXISM
AND EXISTENTIALISM)

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and meaning, Sartre tries to assimilate the thought of Karl Marx into his own existential categories. Hence, the next step in the development of the thesis is to delineate the characteristics and the mode of the existence of the being of man as a being-in-the-world, having no essence but possessing freedom as its ontological structure. In this regard it is pointed out that man being the origin of dialectics in the world, is the maker of history which is the result of the dialectics between man and man, and man and nature.

Finally, the fourth chapter concentrates on the socio-political (Marcuse) and psychological (Fromm) aspects of the concept of man emerging from the marriage between the two philosophies. It is lastly concluded that man though is a free being finds his existence in a perverted form but he possesses the ability to overcome this disability by overcoming the conditions of this disability through his praxis.
ABSTRACT

Set in the philosophical perspectives of Marxism and Existentialism, with Hegel's philosophy in the background, a contemporary picture of man is aimed at.

The thesis begins with the social philosophy of Karl Marx. Concept of man as a "Species-being" is worked out. It is emphasized that man as a species-being has no essence. The theme is basically derived from the dialectical thought of Hegel.

Tracing the same theme among the existential philosophies is the next stage in the development of the thesis.

Taking Heidegger as representing the most profound existential philosophy, the ontological structure of man is now developed. Man is now found to be a being-in-the-world. A being cast in the world characterized by facticity, fallenness and project. The ultimate project being death. Man is shown to be a Temporal being possessing the choice to live authentically or inauthentically. In this choice is rooted man's freedom.

Carrying further the theme of freedom, in man, Sartre defines man as "condemned to freedom." In agreement with Heidegger's basic philosophy that man is an existing being having no essence and a being who is the author of all value
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INTRODUCTION

The elucidation of the concept of man has special significance in our age. Today's civilization being a complex one forces man to seek his true place in the expanding network of relations vis a viz the world and others.

History has its own ways of illuminating its emerging concepts. The contemporary concept of man takes its lead from Hegel's thought. A radical concept of man has emerged in Hegel's dialectical thought. The ancient Hellenistic thought may be called a philosophy of identity whereas, from Hegel onwards, philosophy tends to be characterised by Becoming, change and dynamism. Hegel not only determined the intellectual concepts of contemporary thought, but he also demonstrated the concepts of freedom and human agent, in the context of political philosophy.

The first difference between Hegel and traditional philosophy was Hegel's insistence on Becoming and the importance which he attached to this notion. Secondly, Hegel's identification of essence and existence had the most far-reaching consequences, it in fact, became the starting point of Existentialism. According to Hegel, essence and existence of a thing cannot be separated from each
other. (1) Finally Hegel's characterisation of human being (man) as a self-conscious being (2) laid the foundation of Existential thought (3).

Expanding on these three novel themes in Hegel, Kierkegaard, the founder of Existentialism maintained that an existent individual is in infinite relationships with himself and has an infinite interest in himself, and he always finds himself in Becoming with a task before him. Thus, Kierkegaard opposed himself to Hegel in two major respects: by the emphasis laid upon subjectivity and on the intensity of individual feeling. For Hegel, the world is a necessary unfolding of the eternal idea and truth lies in an objective idea which is open to universal reason. For Kierkegaard and his existentialist followers truth lies in subjectivity, rather than objectivity and true subjective existence is achieved by intensity of feeling.

1. While talking about essences in Encyclopedia (p. 229) H. holds, "... the chief feature of essence is shown in itself and intermediation. In itself... but Being in so far as it is intermediate by annulling the intermediation. And that Being is Existence." See Encyclopedia, (p. 215) In the same way, Identity as self-consciousness, i.e., what distinguishes man from nature...".

2. See Hegel's The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Sciences p. 179. Hegel here characterises man as being - for - itself with "reference to self".

3. Feuerbach extending Hegel's concept of man as self conscious being takes man not only to be a self conscious but also a species - conscious being.
Hegel's influence is immense on Existentialism and Marxism. Thus, working in Hegelian tradition, and taking Marxism and Existentialism as the leading ideologies of the age, explication of a contemporary concept of man is aimed at:

The present discussion is confined to the thought of Marx, Heidegger and Sartre. One chapter to each is devoted to expounding their positions. A chapter on Neo-Marxism is added with a view to blend traditional and contemporary Marxism with Existentialism. In this way a complete notion of man is arrived at which synthesises the leading strands in the social philosophy of today.

Hegel was a transcendentalist. The two major works of Hegel i.e., "Phenomenology of Spirit" and "Encyclopedia," both begin with what is immediately given in experience.

The Phenomenology starts with the certainty of sense experience and the "Encyclopedia" starts with the fact that the first principle must be self-supporting and self-related and such a being pertains only to the Spirit or Mind.

The Mind or the Absolute is self-sufficient in the sense that it does not need any support but not in the sense that it expresses the fullness of its own possibilities. The factual reality is in general the fulfilment of the
developing possibilities of the Mind which exists just in so far as it manifests itself. In the like manner, the human individual knows himself only through his own action. His nature (essence) is revealed in his activities. Whatever he does, is in accordance with his essence. In other words, the concrete human objectivity (human existence) is only a concrete manifestation of the essence.

In other words, Hegel seems interested in restoring man's autonomy against external authority. The image of a whole integrated life in which man was at one with himself and at one with each other in society is worked out. Hegel's central problem thus turns out to sketch the nature of human subjectivity and to state its relation to the world. It involves uniting two seemingly different images of man. The first is the Hellanistic notion. The Platonic order in human soul is inseparable from the rational order of Being. For Aristotle contemplation of this order constitutes the highest activity of man. The same notion is present among the Neo-Platonists and the medieval thinkers. In the modern thought man is defined in abstraction from any cosmic order. This is the second view of man. Descartes thus, doubted the existence of everything else except the "cogito." The situation is now reversed, self-presence now implied an awareness of what we are, and what we are doing. This shift towards a self defining subjectivity was bound up
with a sense of control over the world at first intellectual and then technological and it treated the world as an object of control. Thus, the Cartesian notion of man considered man as self-defining rather than being a fulfilment of cosmic order. It helped pave the way for contemporary thought.

Descartes and onwards, philosophy devoid things of any intrinsic meaning or a-priori patterns i.e., it objectified the world. It took man as a self-defining entity and thus subjectified man. This new theory of man centres more on the categories of expression rather than those of reason. It saw life as an expression or as the realisation of an idea. To talk of the realisation of self is to say that the adequate human life is not just to be an idea or a plan fixed independently of the subject who realizes it. Rather, that this life must have the added dimension that the subject can recognize it as its own, as having unfolded from within him. This self-related dimension is totally missing from the older view of man. Thus human life is both a fact and a meaningful expression. In being an expression it does not realise an idea outside it but the idea is one which is internally generated. That is, man is no longer a being whose essence is self-awareness but is self-realisation. This new theory of man made freedom a value of life.
The traditional views of freedom consisted in the independence of the self-defining subject from external control principally that of religion and state. The modern freedom consists in authentic self-realisation and is threatened not only by external factors but also by the self itself. Freedom in fact becomes synonymous with self-realisation or self-expression which becomes the ideal of each human being.

As constituted by spirit, man is a being who exists not only in himself but for himself and for others. The self, in-itself is not identical with self-for-itself or the self-for-others. This negativity thus becomes an essential determination of self as spirit. This negativity also motivates and makes possible the dialectic of individual development since by virtue of negativity the finite spirit is not just a self-identical substance but a dialectical unity and is hence different from the Greek notion of 'soul. Since spirit is always operative in human action, there remains no dichotomy between body and spirit or between man's animal nature and his intellect. In this way Hegel establishes a unity of subject and object without compromising the relevance of any one.

Thus, working in the Hegelian tradition, Marx attempts to delineate the organic structure of reality in dialectical
terms. It is shown in the chapter on Marx, how the all pervasive dialectic is present in the social existence. The social order is shown to be an organic whole of economic relations passing through definite stages of economic development. The ultimate possibility of human self-emancipation lying in the creation of the world by man himself.

Marx's humanism is shown to be a theory of human essence—essence being defined as an ensemble of social relations in terms of species-being: the significance of labor is pointed out as the basic economic and hence a social activity of man. It is shown how man objectifies himself in labor and how this consequently leads to the alienation of man in capitalist economy. Finally the chapter ends with showing how the overcoming of this alienation is possible in the socialist form of society.

The second chapter on Heidegger focusses on the being of man which Heidegger calls "Dasein." His analysis of the structure of Dasein as it actually is in relation to the world in the light of Being is explicated. The existentials of Dasein in terms of facticity, fallenness and project are shown to form the unitary structure of Care which reveals itself in Temporality. The facticity and the ultimate project of Death forms the finitude of the Dasein. This
temporarily finite Dasein expresses itself as free. This freedom consists in the choice for authentic existence. In authentic existence the Dasein projects in view of its radical thrownness with death before itself as the ultimate possibility. This authentic self is now distinguished from the Dasein's everyday self which he calls the "they self". In this way, the complete ontological picture of the existence of man is drawn.

The third chapter on Sartre tries to show how he works in the Heideggerian categories of Existence, Being, Dread, Ambiguity, and Freedom: The emphasis now shifts from general essences to concrete individual existence. The theme of freedom being most important, gets the prime importance and is found to be the defining character of the for-itself (man). From the theme of man as Absolute Freedom, Sartre takes a shift towards how man acts in the world amongst other men. The discovery of social and practical freedom in the context of Marxism takes the form of individual freedom situated in an oppressive social structure which limits and alienates his activities. The chapter shows how Sartre after defining man as absolute freedom works it up in the arena of history which is a field of necessity. The conflict between the for-itself and Being-for-others is worked out in terms of reciprocity and group activity. In this struggle Sartre is able to found 'dialectic' in human activity. It is shown
how Sartre justifies the Marxian dictum that man makes his own history but he does so on the basis of his previous circumstances.

After having shown the marriage between Existentialism and Marxism in Sartre, the final chapter deals with the development of the theme in the Neo-Marxists. Marcuse and Fromm are taken as representatives of the school and the resulting social, political and psychological aspects of the theme are worked out.

Beginning with the critique of the contemporary reality, Marcuse highlights Marxism as the school which successfully achieves this purpose. Marcuse's criticism of mass culture as 'one dimensional' and his suggestions for freeing man from the perils of such a culture are dealt with. The chapter by giving Marcuse's critique of both the Socialist and the Capitalist societies arrives at the notion of the essence of man.

The second part of the last chapter deals with the thought of Fromm. It shows how he blends together Marxism, Existentialism and Freudianism. Fromm's definition of man in terms of 'a freak of nature' is analysed. Lastly, freedom which is the most important character of man is shown to consist in self-realisation.
Thus, presenting the development of the idea of man in the various philosophers, a complete picture of the concept of contemporary man is drawn. The conclusion finally describes this concept of man as: A dialectical being having no essence but is destined to choose its own existence. Though, man possesses freedom by definition yet most of the thinkers are of the view that due to the historical conditions man is no longer free to develop his potentialities in a fitting manner. However, they agree in maintaining that the historical condition can be overcome by human effort and the freedom engrained in the ontology of man be achieved. Hence, man can achieve emancipation only in a free society. Such a free society will liberate man from all internal or external restraints and will make self-realisation possible.
CHAPTER 1

MARX: THE ESSENCE OF MAN AS SPECIES-BEING

MARX IN HEGELIAN PERSPECTIVE:
Marx accepts the formal structure of reality as delinated in Hegelian thought but rejects its unwarranted metaphysical content. For Hegel, reality is organic and subject to the dialectical processes of growth and development. The Hegelian dialectic is explained purely on metaphysical grounds. The creative activity of thought is simultaneously the creative activity of God's original creation. The activity of human thought which apprehends the inherent structure of thinking, thus brings God's thought to self-consciousness. Since the structure of dialectical thought is apprehended not by senses but by reason, the key to the structure of reality is not sensory observation but the necessary movement of thought. According to Marx the world has an organic structure which can be delinated neatly in a dialectical theory. A dialectical theory views its subject-matter through the stages of its concreteness and explains the systematic changes in this structure by the developmental tendencies inherent in it. The dialectical thinking thus mirrors the real world. (1) Since the

dialectical structure is all pervasive, it is reflected in the actuality of social existence. Society, for Marx, is an organic whole of economic relations passing through definite stages of historical development and is driven by basic tendencies to change. The antagonism between classes arising out of the basic economic relations constitute the dynamics of the society. (2)

Marx, unlike Hegel, analyses the nature of social activity on an empirical plane. According to him, the unity of social consciousness is a historical and a social fact and not a metaphysical assumption. Thus Marx does not, like Hegel, confine himself to the study of purely spirit/mind/consciousness but he, on the contrary begins his enquiry by an investigation of the social condition under which consciousness is discovered. The Hegelian philosophy which Marx calls a speculative expression of Christian Germanic dogma (3) views other forms of reality as a process of development of ideas in the realm of the logical and timeless order of necessity and does not delimitate it as a succession of temporal structures. Marx's radical departure from Hegel's philosophy of identity lies in the domain of

2. Ibid., p.215

thought and things and extends to the field of logic and metaphysics.

For Marx all thought is human, not absolute. It transforms but does not create. Instead of treating self-consciousness as self-consciousness of real man living in a real, objective world and conditioned by it, Hegel transforms man into an attribute of self-consciousness. He turns the world upside down. In place of human existence, Hegel puts Absolute knowledge, which is concerned only with self-consciousness. Hence Absolute knowledge is equated to self-consciousness which becomes the subject of humanity. (4)

This, Marx says, is catching the chord by the wrong end for man is the subject, and self-consciousness predicate of man and not vice versa, as in Hegel.

The concrete thought reflects the temporal succession of structures in the objective world. That is why the continuity of events which for Hegel is purely logical turns out to be socio-historical in the Marxian thought. The necessity of development is natural not logical. Thus the system which Marx analysed was a social system in motion and not Hegel's absolute system at rest. The logic of coordination in Hegel must be modified by logic of succession. (5)

4. Ibid., p. 32
5. Ibid., pp. 64-65
History does nothing. It is rather man, real living man who acts, possesses and fights in everything. It is by no means history which uses man to carry out its ends, rather history is nothing but the activity of man in pursuit of his ends.

Marx, however, seeks a causal explanation of historical activity in concrete human needs and in the conditions out of which these needs arise. Need, the practical expression of necessity brings human beings to consciousness, to class-consciousness, to revolution. History then can be explained rationally but is not made by reason. Human history, for Marx, is social history. Society is class society, history thus becomes a record of class struggle. class struggle centres round property (6).

If all history is history of class struggle then how and why do these struggles occur? Here instead of making chance, will or unconsciousness responsible for movement in history. Marx offers an empirical principle of determination i.e., the development of modes of production.

The Marxian theory of history thus assumes a different character, it is no more an extension of Hegelianism as Marcuse observes "... all philosophic concepts of the Marxian theory are social and economical categories, whereas

6. Ibid., p.39
Hegel's economical and social categories are all philosophical concepts."(7)

HUMANIZING NATURE

Marx, though explains history in socio-economic categories, is not oblivious of the truth that the living man needs and produces along with the web of production relations, and thus furnishes the dynamics of history. Since Marx's analysis seem to centre round the theory of man, the discussion of the actual human existence forms the basis for his entire thought. Marx's entire philosophy humanizes nature. "To Marx reality is always human reality, not in the sense that man exists within nature but in the sense that man shapes nature".(8)Marx's historical materialism is a distinctly dialectical theory of society and is permeated with humanism. It views social order as an organic whole of economic relations passing through definite stages of historical development and driven by basic tendencies to change. It understands the dynamics of these tendencies as the antagonism between classes arising out of the basi-


economic relations which constitute the society.

That is why Marx's materialism which he often terms naturalism is different from abstract materialism of natural science of 19th century. Marx's humanistic naturalism postulates that the ultimate possibility of human self-emancipation must be related to his philosophical premise about the initial creation of the world by man. Philosophically such a view is a secular version of the Hegelian notion that actuality is not an external, objective data but is shaped by consciousness; Marx extricates the activist element of Hegel's doctrine from its metaphysical setting and combines it with a materialist epistemology. (9)

The popular notion of Marx's historical materialism is that the main motive in man is to gain material comfort. Thus the key to understanding of history lies in material desires of man. But it is not to be taken to be a psychological theory of history. The theory in fact claims that the way man produces determines his thinking and his desires. economy here means an objective sociological factor. The only psychological premis in this theory is that man

needs food, shelter etc. hence, needs to produce depending on a number of objective factors.

The objectively given conditions which determine the mode of production and hence social organization determine man, his ideas and his interests. The passion for money and property according to Marx is just as much economically conditioned as the opposite position. Marx's interpretation of history could be called an anthropological interpretation, if one wishes to avoid the ambiguities of materialism or economism. It is the understanding of history on the fact that men are the authors and actors of their history (10) i.e., man gives birth to himself in history in the sense that man at the beginning of history is bound by nature but in the process of evolution he changes this relation between himself and nature and hence changes himself. (11)

Man relates himself to nature through activity and its labor which mediates between man and nature. Labor is the expression of human life and through labor, man's relationship to nature is changed. Hence, through labor, man changes himself.


Marx's theory of historical materialism may be summed up by saying that the social relations among human beings are determined not by their will but by the economic structure of the society which in turn is constituted by the various productive relations.

In short it is the relations of production on which the legal, political and ideological structures are built and not that the ideological structure is the foundation of the structure of the real society as held by Hegel. (12)

**HUMAN ESSENCE AS SPECIES-BEING**

The development of humanism in Marx is in a way a theory of human essence developed under the sway of Feuerbach and Hegel. (13) Hegel had made a distinction between essence and existence. The essence is realized in the process of existence and at the same time existing means a return to the essence in Hegel. But for Marx, "The world is an estranged and an untrue world as long as man does not destroy its dead objectivity and recognize himself and his own life behind the fixed form of things and laws. When

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he finally wins self-consciousness, he is on his way not only to the truth of himself but also of his world and with the recognition goes the doing. He will try to put this truth into action and make the world what it essentially is namely, the fulfilment of man's self-consciousness." (14)

The essence, the unity of being, the identity throughout change is, according to Hegel, a process in which everything copes with its inherent contradiction and unfolds itself as a result. The essence is thus as much historical as ontological. The essential potentialities of things realise themselves in the same comprehensive process that establishes their existence. The essence can achieve its existence when the potentialities of things have ripened in and throughout the conditions of reality. Hegel describes this process as a transition to actuality. (15)

Marx writes that human essence is an abstraction inherent in each single individual, in its reality it is an ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence is consequently compelled:

1) To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose

14. Fromm, E., Marx's Concept of Man, op. cit., p.22.
15. Ibid.
an abstract, isolated, human individual. (16)

2) Essence, therefore can be comprehended as genus, as an internal dumb generality which naturally writes the many individuals. (17)

Essence and existence are separate in him (man); his existence is a "means" to the realization of his essence, or in estrangement, his essence is a means to his mere physical existence. Following Feuerbach, Marx describes man as a "Gattungswesen", a term which can be translated as "Species-being" or "species essence".

For Marx the individual is a "social-being" and his essence is the "aggregate of social relations". Marx's view of the human essence is paralleled in the three main semantic dimensions of the German word "Wesen". Wesen can mean 'essence' or 'substance', it can mean a being or living thing, and it can signify a complex, a collection or a whole. (18)


17. Fromm, E., Marx's Concept of Man, op. cit., p. 29.

The notion of 'species-being' was first developed by Feuerbach in his "Essence of Christianity". For him, the essential difference between man and the brute lies in the fact that man is not only conscious of himself as an individual (as animals are) but also aware of himself as member of a species i.e., he is a species-being. Man is in fact at once I and thou; he can put himself in place of another for this reason, that to him his species, his essential nature, and not merely his individuality is an object of thought. (19). For this reason an atomised and competitive society in which the individual and the universal are in conflict is at odds with what is specifically human in man. (20)

According to Marx 'Individualism' reduced man to self-differentiating Hedonism. His image of man in his Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts is called "Gutungsgesen". This mode of human existence cannot be derived from man's existence as an atomic or individualistic creature but presupposes his reciprocal transsubjective activity and orientation.

According to Marx all human activity is social and other-

19. Ibid., p. 431-432.

20. Ibid. Comparison of Marx and Feuerbach's concept of man is given in brief.
oriented, it is either dependent upon or effecting other experiences, society and individual are not mutually exclusive entities. "It is above all necessary to avoid postulating 'society';... as an abstraction confronting the individual. The individual is the social being. The manifestation of his life—even when it does not appear directly in the form of a communal manifestation... is, therefore, a manifestation and affirmation of social life. Individual life and species life are not different things, even though the mode of existence of individual is necessarily either a more specific or a general mode of species-life..."(21)

The individual can meaningfully enter into a relation only in a context which acknowledges the sociability and other directedness of man. A Socialist or a Communist society is defined as the only society consummate with man's being a species-being. In such a society, the needs cannot be reduced to the means of physical existence. Such a society must recognize that man's need for his fellow beings is basic to his humanity. Surprisingly, Marx discovers this paradigm of the future in family or, to be more exact, in the relationship between the sexes. According to Marx, the unique pattern of these relations has a systematic

significance which makes it possible to project them as a general model for the structure of human relations in a socialist society. Sexual relations are at once necessary and spontaneous, they are the other oriented per excellence. Man's need for a partner in the sexual relation makes his own satisfaction depend upon the other's satisfaction. "By definition, sexual relations are reciprocal." (22)

Man's social existence gets its real significance within productive relations. Since production cannot be carried out single handedly, Marx deduces man's social, transsubjective nature from his quality as an object-creating being. When Marx uses the term 'species-being' he asserts the fact that man is a social being, but has a being that makes his own species his own object and behaves toward, is conscious of, or relates to himself as to the present living species. The term 'Species-being' is issued by Marx abstractly and is capable of several interpretations. Firstly, Marx refers to the fact that man not only belongs to human species but is also aware of being so and this awareness is distinctly a human characteristic. Further, because I am aware of myself in the context of a society and understand my mode of life essentially as a human one, I also understand myself, my individual self-conception (self-image or identity) both in

22. Ibid., p.89
terms of my place in society and in relation to my own conception of humanity. Finally, alienation is the separation or estrangement from species essence of individuals. "Thus, in the remark that man makes his own species its object, the term object seems to mean not only an 'object of awareness' but also to bear the sense of 'goal' or 'purpose'." (23)

A genuinely human life would be one in which man affirms, confirms his human essence. Since human essence is species essence man must affirm his species essence. Thus, I cannot truly actualize (affirm) myself without affirming the self of others. Part of the alienation of the Capitalist society consists in the fact that people serve the interests of others while pursuing only their own. "I have produced for myself and not for you....That is, our production is not production by man for man, i.e. not social production. Thus, neither of us, as man has relation of enjoyment to the product of the other. We are not present as human beings for our reciprocal production." (24)

According to Marx men are natural beings and are confronted by real, corporeal objects outside and alongside them and

24. Ibid., P22.
their very survival depends upon their relation to these objects. But it is not only the natural conditions of subsistence which makes human beings objective beings. By 'objective human beings' Marx means to say that a healthy human life is not one which turns inwards after the manner of a religious ascetic or philosophical contemplation but one which adopts to a natural world.

The objects of man's needs exist outside him as objects independent of him. But these objects are objects of his needs and objects indispensable for the exercise of his powers. The exercise of man's powers becomes at once the objectification, the establishment of an essential relation between human beings and the external objects of their needs. Thus, production which objectifies human needs constitute the human life process and involves a determinate way of expressing life. It is the species essence of man by which man relates not only to nature but to other human beings. Thus, where Feuerbach saw the unity of man and nature expressed by man's being a part of nature, Marx sees man as shaping nature and his being is in turn shaped by it.

For him the manipulation of the inorganic nature and the construction of the objective world confirms man as a conscious species-being who takes his entire species as his
own being. (25)

"In work upon the objective world man really proves himself as a species-being. This production constitutes his active species-life. Through it, nature appears as his world and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species ~ being." (26.)

Man is a species-being, not only because he in practice produces but also in theory he adopts the species as his object (his own as well as of other things), but this is not another way of expressing it, he also treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being. (27)

"If man can make the species of every being into his object, the general essence of every being can become objective for him: he can possess every being as that which it is its essence." (28)

It is for this reason that man can relate freely to every being; he is not limited to the particular state of being

27. Marcuse, H., From Luther To Marx, op. cit., p. 15.
28. Ibid.
and his immediate relation to it, but he takes the being as it is in its essence, he can grasp, recognize and exploit the possibilities contained in every being. (29)

Specifically human freedom has its roots in man's ability to relate to his own species; the self-realisation and self creation of man. The relation of man as a species-being to his objects is more closely defined by means of the concept of free labor. In his freedom man reproduces the whole of nature and through transformation and appropriation furthers it along with his own life even when this production does not satisfy an immediate need. Thus the history of human life is at the same time essentially history of man's objectification of the whole of nature. (30)

The objective world as the necessary objectivity of man through appropriation and supersession becomes a part of his essence and is produced and confirmed as a part of himself. But this same objective world can appear as a pre-condition of his being which does not belong to his being as beyond his control. The objectification can become reification and externalization alienation. It makes it possible for man completely to lose the object as part of essence and let it

29. Ibid., p.16.
30. Ibid., p.17.
become independent and overpowering. This possibility becomes a reality in estranged labor and private property.

(31)

LABOR: EXISTENTIAL ACTIVITY OF MAN:

Marx begins his philosophy with a fact that the concrete human existence is caught in the totality of economic relations, laws and institutions which make up a historical form within which men carry on their lives. The economic categories are viewed as the determining factors for human existence even if they denote objective economical facts. Far from being a mere economic activity, labor denotes an existential activity of man, his free conscious activity, not a means for maintaining his life but for developing his universal nature. Marx's examination of the economy is specifically carried out with the question in mind that to what extent economy realizes man as 'guttungusuosen'?

Marx built his theories on the assumption that the labor process determines the totality of human existence and thus gives to society its basic pattern. (32) Labor is a process between man and nature, a process in which man mediates.

31. Ibid., p.18.

regulates and controls the material relations between himself and nature by his own action. In this respect labor is basic to all form of society. The analysis of labor gives the definition of man as a natural and sensuous (objective) being, it shows how it is in labor that the distress and neediness (of man), universality and freedom becomes real.

The distinctive feature of human labor is delineated by Marx in Capital. He observes how, "A spider conducts operations which resemble those of a weaver, and a bee through the construction of its wax cells puts many a human architect to shame. But what above all distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that he has already built the cells in his head before it is built in wax. At the end of the labor process, a result comes about which was already present ideally in the representation of the labor at its beginning. He not only works a change in the form of something material, he at the same time actualizes in something natural his own purpose and he knows this purpose as determining the kind and mode of his action and as something to which he must subject his will. "(33) Unlike an animal man makes his life activity an object of his will and consciousness. Thus for Marx conscious life activity is the

human species character: it is what distinguishes humanity from animality.

To be able to realise himself, man needs to express himself through the pre-established objects with which he is confronted. His activity and self-affirmation, the affirmation, of the externality which confronts him is achieved through labor. In his labor, man supersedes the mere objectivity of objects and converts them to means of life. He impresses upon them the form of his being and makes them into his work and his reality.

When man works, he not only aims at the result to be achieved by his labor, but unlike any other animal this life activity itself is regarded as worthwhile. In Marx's words man relates to his species powers as objects. Human beings do this in two ways: They treat their own exercise of these powers as an end in itself in addition to the external ends achieved by it and they only develop their productive capacities regarding this expansion of themselves as something desirable over and above the new goods it procures them. "Because the human essential powers can be developed, exercised and actualized only and with a conscious awareness that this activity is meaningful and worthwhile, the actualisation of these powers can also be an act of self expression, of self assertion on the part of man and woman.
It is an act which has meaning for them partly because, through it, THEY AFFIRM both to themselves and to others their dignity as individuals and the worth of their lives and their humanity." (34)

Human beings stand in an essential relation to natural objects. They need these objects both for their physical subsistence and in order to maintain a healthy human lifestyle. The actualization of human essential powers thus involves their objectification.

This objectification is not only in the form of labor, which fixes itself in a tangible (handgreiflich) object. (35). All labor does however, display itself in an object if by object is meant any state of affairs in the external world which labor has brought about. Any labor which makes a genuine contribution to society does directly or indirectly contribute to the creating function of social labor and does in that sense participate in the objectification of man's species life. For Marx the objects in which men objectify themselves become other (alien) objects and human behaviour

34. Wood, Allen., *Karl Marx, op. cit.*, pp.34-35. It is interesting to note that the treatment of self-actualization in Marx appears Aristotelian though Marx holds a totally different view of human nature.

35. Ibid., p.39.
or relation to objects is the appropriation of the object (the making of it into property) is alienation.

Thus, in Marx objectification and appropriation are closely related. In the EPMS Marx writes "Man appropriates his all sided essence in an all sided way, as a total man. This appropriation of human reality, their approach to the object, is the confirmation of human reality. It is human effectiveness and human suffering, for suffering humanly conceived is an enjoyment of the self for man." (36)

The implication of this passage is that in the present society, we do not genuinely objectify ourselves or appropriate objects because alienation has cut us off from human existence. This can be confirmed by a critique of private property.

Thus, one of the characteristics of objectification is that it is essentially a social activity and objectification of man is basically socialising man. If the objective world is taken in reality as a social world, as the objective reality of human society and thus a human objectification, it follows that the product of labor (i.e., the objective reality) is also a historical reality.

History is the true natural history of man through human labor not only man emerges in history but his nature too in so far as it is not something external to and separated from the human essence. The totality of human essence as the unity of man and nature has been made concrete by the particular, social historical process of objectification which leads to the definition of man as a universal and free species-being. Thus, man's life activity (Labor) is not a determination with which he directly merges like an animal. it is a free activity. Since through labor man can distinguish himself from the immediate determination of his existence, make it into an object and transcend it.

ALIENATION OF LABOR:

Man whose being is categorized by objectifying himself and appropriating the object of his labor fails to realise himself in the present (Capitalist) society since he is deprived of the real form of human existence, as a result he experiences alienation.

Alienation is the negativity of production for Marx, the history of man is the history of the increasing development of man and at the same time is the history of increasing alienation. His concept of Socialism is the emancipation of alienation, the relation of man to himself, his self-realization.
There are various forms of alienation for Marx which are merely aspects of one form of alienation arising out of a single system based on the paradigm of alienation i.e., alienated labor. In unalienated work, man not only realises himself as an individual but also as a species-being. For Marx as Hegel, each individual represents the species i.e., humanity as a whole, the universality of man. The development of man leads to the unfolding of his whole humanity. In the process of work, he no longer reproduces himself merely intellectually as a consciousness but actively and in a real sense. Alienated labor not only takes away the object of labor from man but also his species life, his real objectivity as a species-being and changes the advantage of man over animals into a disadvantage. The alienated labor transforms free activity into a means so it transforms the species-life into a means of physical existence.

Alienation, for Marx, shows itself not only in the result but in the act of production, in the producing activity itself. How could the laborer come to stand over and against the product of his activity as something alien unless in the act of production he was alienating himself from himself? The product is only the result of the activity of production. If the product of labor is externalization, then production itself must be externalization of activity or the
activity of externalization. "Labor is, in the first place, a process in which both man and nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates and controls the material reactions between himself and Nature." (37). In this respect labor is basic to all forms of society.

Since man, unlike animals, produces even when he is free from physical need and indeed it is only then that he produces in the true sense, alienation of the worker dehumanizes the worker by making it impossible for him to produce in a specifically human manner. Work seems to him an alien occupation and he surrenders his human essence which is reduced to simply biological activities, labor, which is the life of the species become only a means to individual animalized life and the social essence of man becomes an instrument of individual existence.

Marx explains the alienation of labor as exemplified in first the relation of the worker to the product of his labor and second the relation of the worker to his own activity in a Capitalist society. (38)

Thus Capitalist society is one whose immediate producers own their labor power and no other productive force. It is the

economy of free labor, free from Serf or slave-like burden of means of production. Capitalist society is one in which production serves the accumulation of capital. The accumulation of production under Capitalism is to use exchange value and then to use the additional value to produce still more and so on. (39) The wealth of these societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as "an immense accumulation of commodities". (40)

The worker in the Capitalist society produces commodities, which require capital. The commodities are produced by independent entrepreneurs for the purpose of profit.

The worker labors for the capitalist to whom he surrenders through the wage-contract the product of his labor. The object produced by labor, becomes an alien entity, which becomes independent of its producer. The realization of labor is its objectification. This objectification appears as loss of the enslavement by the object and appropriation as alienation and expropriation. (41)


Appropriation of the object appears as alienation to such an extent that the more objects the worker produces, the less he possesses and the more he comes under the sway of the product or capital. (42) Even labor becomes a commodity instead of life activity. (43) The more the worker works hard the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects he produces to oppose him and the power he himself becomes...."

Marx shows this mechanism at work in the movement of wages.

In "Wage labor and Capital" Marx sums up how the laborer and his wages deteriorate necessarily in a Capitalist society.

"The more productive capital grows, the more the division of labor and the application of machinery expands. The more the division of labor and the application of machinery expands, the more competition among the workers expands, and the more their wages contract." (44)

For Marx, "Wages, are only a particular name for the price of labor power, commonly called the price of labor, for the price of labor of this peculiar commodity which has no other

42. Marx, K. EPMS, op.cit., p. 324.
43. Ibid., p. 326.
44. Marx, Karl. Wage Labour And Capital, in Karl Marx: Selected works, op.cit., p. 225. Also see Wage, Labour and Capital for a detailed analysis of how in capitalist conditions, wages will decrease and deprive the worker of his due.
repository than human flesh and blood." (45) The laborer sells his power of labor to the capitalist for wages so that he may survive. (46) "But the exercise of labor power... labor is the worker's life activity and the manifestation of his own life. And this life-activity he sells to another person in order to secure the necessary means of subsistence... the product of his activity is not the object of his activity. (47)

In other words, the worker is alienated from his product. The worker alienated from his product is at the same time alienated from himself. Labour in its true form is a medium for man's true self-fulfillment when the labor no longer remains his own but becomes the property of another (i.e., expropriation takes place), this touches the very essence of man. (48)

The capitalist labor cripples all human faculties and enjoins satisfaction, the worker instead of affirming, contradicts his essence, instead of developing his free mental and physical energies, he mortifies his flesh and ruins his soul.

45. Ibid., pp.203
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., pp.203-204
48. Ibid., pp.205
He is at home when he is not at work and not at home when he does work. His working is therefore not done willingly but under compulsion, it turns out to be forced labor. (49) "In consequence, man, the worker, feels himself acting freely only in his animal functions like eating, drinking and begetting... whereas in his human functions he is nothing but animal. The animal becomes the human and the human the animal." (50)

Labor separated from its object is not just alienation of worker to his product and himself but is also the alienation of man from man. The individuals are isolated and set against each other. They are linked in the commodities they exchange rather than in their persons. Thus, man's alienation from himself is simultaneously an estrangement from his fellow man. Estranged labor not only: (1) estranges nature form man and (2) estranges man from himself, from his own active action, from his vital activity; as a result, it also estranges man from his species. (51)

The"...productive life itself appears to man only as a means for the satisfaction of a need, the need to preserve physical existence. But productive life is species life. It

49. Marx, Karl. EPMS, op.cit., p. 326
50. Ibid., p. 327
51. Ibid., p. 328
is life-producing life. The whole character of a species, its species-character resides in the nature of its life activity and free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man. Life itself appears only as a means of life." (52) The estranged labor reduces spontaneous free activity to a means for his individual existence.

This alienation of the laborer has two explanations: Firstly, this alienation from man's essence is caused by the division of labor which is the consequence of the capitalist mode of production. Secondly, it is caused by the peculiar characteristic of the capitalist society which converts human relations into objective relations, a phenomenon called "fetishism".

Division of Labor forms the foundation of all production of commodities, ensures its typical form in manufacture. Marx writes: The mode in which manufacture arises is two fold: On the one hand it arises from the union of various independent handicrafts which become stripped of their independence and specialized to such an extent as to be reduced to mere supplementary partial processes in the production of one particular commodity. On the other hand it

52. Ibid., p. 238.
arises from the cooperation of artificers of one handicraft. It splits up one particular handicraft into its various detail operations, isolating and making these operations independent of one another up to the point where each becomes the exclusive function of a particular laborer. On the one hand, manufacture either introduces division of labor into a process of production of labor, or further develops that division. On the other hand, it unites together handicrafts that were formerly separate. But whatever may have been the particular starting-point, its final form is invariably the same... a productive mechanism whose parts are human beings." (53)

According to Marx, Capitalist society prospers when capital increases. Capital is accumulated labor which results in the emergence of the division of labor. (54)

The system of Capitalism relate men to each other through the commodities they exchange. The social status of individuals, their standard of living, their satisfaction of needs, their freedom and power are all determined by the value of their commodities. Even man's most human attributes


54. Marx. K. *EPMS*. *op.cit.* p.283 Also see Ibid., p. 285 Where M. gives the relation between division of labor and alienation in the following way.
become functions of money. Individuals participate in the social process only as owners of commodities. (55) Thus, Capitalist commodity production has the mystifying result that it transforms the social relations between individuals into qualities of things themselves and this transformation constitutes the nature of the commodity in capitalist production.

"In general, articles of utility become commodities when produced by labor of private individuals or groups who carry on their work independently of each other. Since the producers do not come into contact with each other until they exchange their products, the specific social character of each producer's labor does not show itself except in the act of exchange. The relations connecting the labor of one individual with the rest appear not as direct social relations among individuals at work, but as material relations between persons." (56) Thus in Capitalist societies human relations are converted into property relations.

According to Hegel property realizes human personality in determining itself through objectification in the external phenomenal world. For Hegel this externalization constitutes realization. Consequently, property is for Hegel, freedom of

56. Ibid., p. 280.
human being realizing itself in the phenomena and the lack of property prevents man from participation in the universality. (57)

Marx's discussion of property and alienation attempts to subvert the Hegelian identification of property and personality. For Marx property is not the realisation of personality but its negation. The possession of property by one person necessarily implies its non-possession by another, a dialectical relation is totally from Hegel. Consequently, the problem is not the assurance of property to all...to Marx an inherent impossibility and eminent contradiction but the abolition of all property relation as such.

Accumulation of money diminishes man's real capacity for externalisation and self expression. Since money saved is deferred consumption, the values inherent in money have been preserved in it as they have not been realised by man. (58)

Money's power of inversion derives from its capacity to invest its possessors with qualities missing in them. In


inverted world, man's faculties are determined by his money. His personal attributes become a function of his purchasing power and not of his eminent self. Since only the possession of money creates effective demand, he who possesses has effective needs. He who has no money has no objective reality. Property is, again not the realisation of personality but its negation.

The alienating aspects of Capitalism appear through capital in its historical emergence developing a kind of property free from all social limitations and considerations. Since capital divorces the producer from his means and tools of production, Capitalism also ends individual private property as traditionally conceived, as producer owning his own means of production. (59)

Thus, in Capitalist societies, the laborer is cut off from the means and instruments through which he might utilize his labor power for his own ends yet he is freed from all dependence on feudal lords and guild masters. He is free to sell his labor power to those who own the soil, the materials of labor and means of production. Labor power and means for its material realization become commodities possessed by different owners. Thus, two classes face each other: the beneficiaries of primary accumulation and the

59. Ibid., p.115.
impoverished masses deprived of their previous means of subsistence. (60)

The primary conditions of Capitalism are: free wage labor to be a necessary consequence of capital and private property (means of commodity production). And commodities are exchanged by the free will of their owners who enter the market free of all external conditions with full knowledge that commodities will be exchanged with the equivalents and that perfect justice will prevail. The exchange value of the commodities will be determined by labor time which is an impartial social standard. (61)

But labor power is a peculiar commodity, it is the only commodity whose use-value is a source not only of value but of more value than it has itself. This surplus value created by abstract general labor, hidden behind its concrete form falls to the buyer of labor power without any equivalent

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60. Marcuse, H. *Reason & Revolution, op. cit.*, p.305

61. Ibid., pp.296-297. Also see *History* by Cohen pp.297-305 where Cohen shows: "...the dominance of exchange value under capitalism generates a peculiar contradiction when capitalism is advanced. We present contemporary affluent capitalist society as the climax of the history of use value and exchange value, and as the regulator to the suppression of exchange value as regulatior of the social organism." p.297. Cohen applies Marx's theory of history to contemporary American Capitalist society.
because it does not appear as a separate commodity. The value of labor power sold to the capitalist is paid in terms of the time the laborer works, the rest of the laborer's time goes unpaid. The value paid is only a part of the actual value of labor power in use while the other part is appropriated by the capitalist without any renumeration. The labor contract thus necessarily involves exploitation. (62)

Capital, on the other hand requires that the surplus value be converted anew into capital. If the capitalist was to consume his surplus value, instead of reinvesting it, the latter would cease to yield him any profit and the incentive for commodity production would vanish. Now capitalist production on a progressively increasing scale is identical with exploitation developing on the same scale. Accumulation of capital means increase of the proletariat. With all these negative features, Capitalism develops the productive forces at a rapid pace. But technological advancement diminishes the quantity of timing labor (the subjective factor) into the quantity of means of production (objective factor). With the progress of production goes an increase in the mass of capital in the hands of the individual capitalist, the weaker is expropriated by the stronger in the competitive struggle and capital becomes centralized in an ever smaller

62. Ibid., p.308
circle of capitalists. On the other hand, the increasing organic composition of capital tends to decrease the value of capitalist profit. Since the utilization of labor power, the sole source of surplus value diminishes in ratio to the means of production employed. The danger of the falling rate of profit aggravates the competition, as well as the class-struggle, political methods of exploitation, supplement the economical ones which slowly reach their limit. The requirement that capital be utilised, that there be production for production's sake leads even under ideal conditions, to inevitable disproportion between the two spheres of production, and of production goods and that of consumption goods resulting in constant overproduction. The profitable investment of capital becomes increasingly difficult. The struggle for new markets plants the seed of constant international warfare.

Thus, we see that the implications of the free labor contract leads Marx to say that labor produces and perpetuates its own exploitation. The economic forces of Capitalism left to their devices create enslavement, poverty and intensity of class conflicts. The truth of this form of freedom is thus its negation.

We, hence, here touch upon the origin of Marx's social dialectics. In a dialectical theory, every fact is more than a mere fact. It is a negation and restoration of real
possibilities. Wage labor is a fact but at the same time it is a restraint on free work that might satisfy human needs. Private property is a negation of man's collective appropriation of nature.

Man's social practice embodies the negativity as well as its overcoming. The negativity of Capitalist society lies in its alienation of labor, the negation of this negativity will come with the abolition of alienated labor.

**ABOLITION OF LABOR:**

Alienation for Marx is not just a false consciousness as is religious alienation but is so real that we feel our lives as empty and meaningless because they really are so, because we live under conditions which make a fulfilled and worthwhile mode of life impossible for us.

For Hegel, the aim of speculative philosophy is to reconcile us with the world as it is and to show that it is rational. For Feuerbach, the society must be changed and made rational i.e., brought in accordance to human essence. Since men have false conceptions of their ideals they are alienated and philosophy will liberate them by giving right directions to their lives.

Marx agrees that alienated individuals are in dark about their goals but this is not the basic issue with him. The
basic issue is that the alienated individuals lack the practical power to take meaningful action whether individually or collectively to realise whatever ideals they may have. This is so because there are real extramental obstacles standing in their way. Before they decide how a truly human life ought to be constituted, they must first come to terms with these obstacles, understand their nature and then set about removing them.

Marx writes in the *German Ideology* while keeping in view the writings of Hegel and Feuerbach that it is only possible to achieve real liberation in the real world by employing real means, liberation is a historical and not a mental act, and it is brought about by historical conditions..(63)

In other words, since according to Marx the paradigm case of alienation is found in capitalist labor, the abolition of alienation will consist in the abolition of the capitalist form of labor.

Revolution alone will overthrow Capitalism. Thus, where Hegel attempts a passive acceptance of the existing social conditions of alienation as a necessary step to the objectification of the Spirit, Marx tries to give a

philosophy of active participation of the alienated individuals to overcome alienation. The phenomenon of overcoming alienation, according to Marx must involve a radical social change, for this goes in the analysis of the impending changes in society. Every particular social system, in order to change, must destroy itself simply because it must create the forces which produce the next historical period.

The fundamental forces which will destroy or transform Capitalism must, according to Marx, be searched for in the evolution of the material means of production. The economical laws of motion of the modern society are revealed in Capital.

Capitalism has the tendency towards an increase in the productivity of work connected with the technical improvements and with increasing accumulation of the means of production. In the realm of social relations, this tendency must lead to more and more wealth in fewer and fewer hands of the ruling class and misery in ruled (worker) class. The increasing tension between the two classes must lead to a social revolution and after the victory of workers over the bourgeoisie, there will be a classless society, a society without exploitation. This classless society Marx calls the
Thus, a close analysis of capitalism by Marx leads him to conclude that alienated capitalist labor will be abolished by the necessary historical process. As already mentioned, for Marx Capitalism thus Labors under inner contradictions that threaten to bring about its downfall.

Marx believes that capitalist competition forces the capitalists to accumulate capital. By doing so he works against his own long term economical interests. Since the accumulation of capital is liable to bring about a fall in profit, by working against his own personal interest, he works in interest of historical development (Socialism). This is because the accumulation of capital means: a) Increased productivity, increase and concentration of wealth in few hands. b) Increase of pauperism and misery; the workers are kept on subsistence wages mainly because the surplus of workers i.e., industrial reserve army keeps wages on the lowest possible level. The trade cycle prevents the absorption of the surplus of workers by the growing industry. This cannot be changed by the capitalist even if he wishes to, the falling rate of profit prevents the capitalist from taking any effective step in this regard.

Thus, capitalist accumulation becomes suicidal even though it forsters the sciences, economical and historical progress towards Socialism. (65)

As already mentioned the essential characteristic of Capitalism in Marx's eyes was its unlimited urge for multiplying exchange value. The capitalist fanatically bent on exchange value expansion itself ruthlessly forces humanity to produce for production's sake. He thus forces the development of the productive powers of society and creates those material conditions that alone conform to the real basis of a higher form of society based on the full and free development of every individual.

The same hunger for exchange value which degrades and impoverishes the working class is the cause of amazing technological advance of Capitalism.

The pressure to reduce cost-price to the minimum becomes the strongest lever for raising the social productiveness of labor, which however, is seen as a continual increase in the productiveness of capital. (66)

65. Ibid., p.167.

Technological progress is vital to Capitalism because the expansionist tendencies of capital obliges the capitalist to seek higher profits by reducing the labor time necessary to produce a commodity to a lower level than which is socially necessary. He then markets his commodity at the current price and in so doing makes a higher profit than the profit available at average technological conditions. Modern industry thus never looks upon and treats the existing form of a production process as final. Its technical basis is therefore revolutionary, while all earlier modes of production are conservative. For this reason, the capitalist mode of production presents itself historically as a necessary condition of the transformation of the labor process into a social process.

Capitalism in short, is a necessary condition of progress in technology and organization of labor and modern cooperative methods. Though this progress is attained at a heavy cost of suffering, exploitation, poverty and dehumanization.

As technology progresses and amount of constant capital increases, less work is necessary to produce the same amount of goods. The ratio of variable to constant capital decreases and so does the rate of profit. (67) The improved 

67. Kolakowski, L., Main Currents of Marxism, op. cit., p.297-301. For how the ratio between constant and variable capital determines the rate of profit.
technology and competition also tends to reduce profit rate. As a result exploitation increases by the capitalist paying the workers less and increasing the length of the working day. Workers' condition is worsened by the reserve army of labor which forces the laborer to compete with one another and decrease wages. The profit rate is also assisted by foreign trade. Yet the rate of profit still keeps falling which aggravates exploitation, and concentration of capital since as the small capitalists find it difficult to make both ends meet they are swallowed by the big ones. (68)

"Thus," says Marx in Capital I, Chap. XXXII, "along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who use up and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; and with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class ever increasing in numbers and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with it and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialisation of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This

68. Ibid. p.302-305. For how Capitalism collapses.
The integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." (69)

This inevitable collapse of capitalism raises the crucial problem of Marxian theory. If Capitalism is to transform itself into Socialism by a spontaneous explosion independent of human will, there is no need to do anything but wait until its contradictions reach their height and the system is choked by itself. In actual fact, however, Capitalism can only be abolished when the class consciousness of the proletariat is sufficiently developed, i.e., economic laws in themselves were sufficient to ensure the possibility of victory, but political initiative had its place as an autonomous factor in the historical process. We find here in a more specific form, a theme present in Marx's early writings. In the class consciousness of the proletariat, historical necessity coincides with freedom of action. The opposition between human will and 'objective' course of events cease to exist. The workers' task is not to invite economic disasters but to use them when they occur for revolutionary purposes. Thus, Capitalism creates the preconditions of a new society not only by revolutionising technology and evolving new forms of cooperation as in joint

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stock companies and cooperative factories. But also brings about political class consciousness and versatility in the workers brought about by division of labor and prepares them for bringing about a social revolution.

It is true that in its economic development private property advances towards its own dissolution, but it only does this through a development which is independent of itself, unconscious and achieved against its will solely because it produces the proletariat as a proletariat, poverty conscious of its physical and moral poverty, conscious of its degradation and for this reason trying to abolish itself. The proletariat carries out the existence which private property, by creating the proletariat poses upon itself, just as it carries out the sentence which wage labor by creating wealth for other and poverty for itself poses upon itself.

In the conditions of existence of the proletariat are found all the conditions of existence of the present day society. Man has lost himself, but he has not only acquired, at the same time, a theoretical consciousness of this loss, he has been forced by an imperious distress and by practical necessity... to revolt against this inhumanity. It is for these reasons that the proletariat can and must emancipate itself. But it can only emancipate itself by destroying its own conditions of existence... by destroying all the
inhuman conditions of the present day society, conditions which are epitomized in its situation". (70)

The proletariat is the negation not only of certain particular inhuman potentialities but also of man as such. All distinguishing marks by which men are differentiated lose their validity. Property, culture, religion, nationality etc. no longer differentiate men from each other. Each man lives in the society only as a bearer of labor power and is, therefore equal to another member of his class. His concern to exist is not a concern of a given group, class or nation but is truly universal and world-historical. The proletariat can thus exist only world-historically. The communist revolution, its movement is necessarily a world revolution. (71)

The abolition of the proletariat also amounts to abolition of labor as such. The question for Marx is not the liberation but abolition of labor because labor has already been made free and is an achievement of the Capitalist society. Communism can cure the ills of the bourgeoisism and the distress of proletariat by removing their cause i.e., labor. (72)


"It (the bourgeoisie) has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefensible chartered freedom has set up that single, inconceivable freedom... free trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted, naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation."

(73)

An association of free individuals is, according to Marx, a society where the material process of production no longer determines the entire pattern of human life. Marx's idea of a rational society implies an order in which it is not the universality of labor but universal satisfaction of all individual potentialities that constitute the principle of social organization. He contemplates a society that gives to each not according to his work but his needs. Mankind becomes free only when the material perpetuation of life is a function of the abilities and happiness of associated individuals. The concise statement of Marx's idea of Socialism is to create conditions in which men are in full

72. Ibid., p 292. Marx uses the term 'labor' to mean what capitalism actually understands by it i.e. that activity which creates surplus value in commodity production or which produces capital See, Reason and Revolution, p. 293.

control of their own labor process and its physical and spiritual product so that the results of their actions do not oppose them. Man rules over himself and is no longer subjected to the material forces of his own creation. Man identified with the social process overcoming the opposition between blind necessity and free action: are the aims of Socialism. Socialism does not aim at abolishing private property but in abolishing human alienation in the process by doing away with division of labor. (74)

The character of production in a socialist society must be governed purely by social needs and not by the desire to accumulate the maximum exchange value. This, of course, requires the social planning of production. By abolishing the capitalist form of production the length of the working day could be reduced to the necessary labor time. But even in that case the latter would extend its limits. On the one hand, because the notion of means of subsistence would considerably expand and the laborer would lay claim to an altogether different standard of life. On the other hand, because a part of what is now surplus labor would then count as necessary labor, i.e. the labor of forming a fund for reserve and accumulation.

74. Kolakowsky, L. Main Currents In Marxism, op.cit., p.306.
The liberation of humanity under Socialism does not simply mean the satisfaction of physical needs but a liberation of all latent human powers in human beings in the social context, that there are no social restrictions on the human creativity. The development of creative forces does not simply mean the increase of material wealth but." The realm of freedom actually begins only where labor which is determined by necessity and mundane consideration ceases, thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production... Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as a blind force of Nature and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to and worthy of their human nature. But it nevertheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite". (75)

The aim of Socialism is the "Abolition of property and the existing property relations under capitalist system of production, the wage laborer does not produce any property for himself, he only produces capital for the capitalist. But capital is not a personal rather, a social power, because it is a collective product produced by the united action of many members". (76) "Private property has made us so stupid that an object is ours when we have it when it exists for us as capital". (77) But in Communism the physical immediate possession of property is direct i.e. The category of worker i.e. the worker's state of not possessing the product (in capitalism) is not abolished but is extended to all humanity even to the capitalist."The supersession of private property is, therefore complete emancipation of all human senses and attribute; but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attribute have become human, subjectively as well as objectively". (78)

The human essence of nature exists only for social man. for only here does nature exist for him as the vital element of human reality and here it exists as the basis for his own human existence. Only here his natural existence become


77. Marx, K., EPMS, op. cit., p.351.

78. Ibid., p.352.
human existence. "Society is, therefore the perfected unity in essence of man with nature..." (79)

Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-estrangement and hence the true appropriation of human essence through and for man. It is a complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e., human being, a restoration which has become consciousness and which takes within the entire wealth or periods of developments. Thus, Communism as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man. (80)

In Short, what Marx's thought amounts to is:

1. Man can be defined in terms of an essence as a species-being, implying a real, corporeal being, existing in the social nexus. As against man having an essence to which he must conform his existence in order to achieve reality.

2. Labor is the existential activity of man which ensures

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79. Ibid., p. 349. (See German Ideology. (pp. 64-77) for a detailed discussion of division of labor under capitalist system) See communist Manifesto for how Capitalism develops into Socialism pp. 70-78. See EPMS pp. 358-375 for Marx's discussion on division of labor.

80. Ibid., p. 348.
his freedom and universality.

3. The freedom of man consists in self-affirmation i.e., self-expression.

4. The Capitalist form of society and its preceding historical stages of historical development of man present perverted human existence by denouncing this way, freedom of man.

5. Man can, however, achieve his lost freedom by replacing the Capitalist form of society with Socialist form of society whose seed lie in the very heart of Capitalism itself.

Thus, it can be seen that the philosophy of man is not just Scientific Materialism as is the common belief. The young Marx turns out to be a strong humanist. However, the latter Marx is not the death of the younger Marx. The same theme is worked out in a larger perspective. It is this theme of humanism which relates Marx to Existentialism.
CHAPTER 2

HEIDEGGER: THE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

The starting point of Heidegger's thought is the being of man which he calls "Dasein". Heidegger, according to Brock reaches the ontological problem of Being through regional ontology, a fundamental study of one kind of being viz: man. He analyses the structure of Dasein as it actually is in relation to the world in the light of Being. (1) In order to work out ontology phenomenologically his thought takes off from existence. Since the only form of being with which we are truly in contact is the being of man whose specific character is to exist, so through it alone can we arrive at the understanding of Being.

Beginning with the philosophy of man, Heidegger assumes a certain unique position as he wishes to work out an ontological structure of man rather than an ontic one, i.e., a partial picture. (2) Marx's Socio-economic


analysis of man, or Freud's psychological analysis, or Marcuse's socio-political analysis or Fromm's psycho-existential analysis of man, all provide partial views which excludes other aspects of man. Unlike such analysis, Heidegger wishes to elaborate on the ontological uniqueness of man by digging out the concept of man under which all other aspects such as economical, social, political, psychological and ethical can be subsumed. The ontological being the primal structure of man. In this sense the ontological dimension transcends all other dimensions.

Man for Heidegger possesses a mode of being which he calls "ex-sistence" (3). Heidegger aims at laying bare the basic (essential) modes of the Being of Dasein which are termed as existentialities (existentialism).

Dasein is fundamentally a being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) i.e., it is the nature of Dasein to be in the world in such a way that the world is of its essence. He wishes to convey the message that it is impossible to consider man as entirely separate from the world. The being-in-the-world of Dasein is a unitary phenomenon and it is basically in "in-


4. Ibid., p. 78,79.
being" that the existentiality, i.e., the distinctive character of Dasein is constituted. (5)

The in-being relation of what is present" (Worhanden) implies being present in something, a spatial relationship representing a place—relationship. This sort of the in—being relation is an ontological characteristic of categorical nature. This sense is different from which the Dasein is in-the-World. Thus, Heidegger makes a distinction between a categorical in—being and existential in—being.

The existential in—being of Dasein is derived from "to reside" or "to dwell". It does not imply the "side-by-sidedness" of the world with Dasein. "All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being..." (6)

Thus, for Heidegger, the in-being of Dasein consists in the phenomenon of human concern for things. Man is is the world as a body occupying space, but this spatial relation is not the specific human relation to things and others. It is rather a relation of intention, concern, meaning. This phenomenon of concern shows that the Dasein's world is a world of meaning radiating from the only kind of being capable of grasping, relating, using or willing things.

6. Ibid., p. 83.
Another fundamental trait of Dasein is its "Erschlossenheit", i.e., the "disclosed", "unveiled" or "discovered" state of Dasein. (7) According to Heidegger, Dasein is enlightened not by any other being but it is itself what it lights. In fact, it is this disclosed state of Dasein which is at the root of the existential nature of Dasein.

Among all other beings, Dasein's being is the only being which exists.

Since Dasein is not enclosed in its self-identity but exists outside itself, projecting itself and other beings along with it into possibilities of being as it understands them. Thinking, willing, imagining, perceiving, sensing, loving, all these specific attitudes and activities of Dasein which bares reference to the inward presence of other and are all intentional acts and are rooted in Dasein's existence.

Clarifying the notion of 'ex-sistence'. Heidegger in "letter on Humanism" maintains, "only man has this way to be. Existence so understood, is not only the basis of the possibility of reason, ratio, but ex-sistence is that

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wherein the essence of man preserves the source that determines him." (8).

Existence is actually a concern of Being. It is the clearing of Being. Dasein relates to beings, it goes beyond its own being, a projecting itself and in its concern. In this projection or concern the Dasein discloses other beings. Dasein realising itself in the project presupposes and understands (relates to) being, other than itself.

Man's Ex-sistence is not only the root of the disclosure of being, but also Being. It may here be pointed out that the Dasein, the clearing of Being, only discovers Being, it does not create Being. In this way, we can see the difference between Heidegger and Idealism, for an idealist man creates Being but for Heidegger man only clarifies being, in fact world possession and selfhood are correlative as outer and inner modes of man/Dasein/Exsistence. (9)

The fundamental trait of man i.e., Ex-sistence yields four different aspects which Heidegger calls existentialia which are:


a) Befindlichkeit
b) Understanding/verstehen
c) Language/Rede
d) Verfallen

are always found together.

BEFINDLICHLEIT:

The disclosedness to Dasein "that it is", i.e., the thrownness of Dasein into its there which manifests itself in mood is what is called beindlichliet by Heidegger. Though the Dasein is not aware of its "whence" and "wither". The state of thrownness suggests the "facticity" of its delivered over. Facticity is not the factuality of something present at hand but is an existentiale.

The disclosing of thrownness has three different moments: The Dasein is brought face to face with the "That", the fact of the there: The mood also discloses that the Dasein is a Being-in-the-world, concerned with the things and other persons of the world. Finally, it is also in the mood that the world can affect, impress and threaten the Dasein. (10)

UNDERSTANDING:

As thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being called 'projecting'. Dasein as a being-in is a potentiality for

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Being-in-the-world. Because of this Being-in-the-world, Dasein is "always" more than it factually "is". Though the Dasein is factually more than its facticality but not more than its factuality, its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially. The character of Dasein as a potentiality of Being lies in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand but is a possibility. Understanding discloses to Dasein what it is capable of. In short, "As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities."

In understanding, the "there" of the Dasein is disclosed in a way different from Befindlichkeit and it discloses to the Dasein "for the sake of what "Dasein exists and things, persons and Being-in-the-world viewed in the light of "for the sake of what". (11)

DISCOURSE/LANGUAGE:

Cooriginating with Befindlichkeit and Verstehen is Rede - the third existentiale of the in-Being of Dasein (12). Understanding arising in the "there" of Dasein expresses itself in speech-listening and silence remain potentialities together with speech. Speech is constituted of the characteristics of "what is spoken of", what is said as

11. Ibid., p.188.
12. Ibid., p.103.
such, communication and the information given. Speech may be understood as the way in which the world and Dasein itself are discovered.

Being-with belongs to Being-in-the-world, which in every case maintains itself in some definite way of concernful Being-with-one-another. Being-with-one-another is always discursive as always either demanding or communicating and as such articulates the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world. Discourse helps in the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world and in it Being with which until now already shares becomes now explicitly shares. Dasein while discursive expresses itself as a being-outside itself - a being which transcends itself.

FALLENNESS/VERFALLEN:

Dasein as a thrown Being-in-the-world, finds itself in the publicness of the "they." the average man does not live in the state of pure Befindlichkeit. He becomes so involved in the genuine search for bread and concern for what "they" say that he gets totally overwhelmed by "going-along with the crowd".

Verfallensein is that aspect of man which describes him as he immediately presents himself, involved in his daily preoccupations.
Dasein has been found to be a possibility of being capable of realising itself through its concernfull activity in the world. But Dasein's immediate existence is not the realisation of any possibility which is uniquely its own. In our day-to-day lives, we are hardly said to be projecting the world but we allow the world projected for us by the "they", what others do and feel and want us to feel as. The influence of society in the form of habit, custom, convention, taboo or ritual hamper our power to concieve and we simply follow what the crowd says or believes.

This everyday being of Dasein in its everyday-ness converts discourse into talk which does not express genuine understanding but only a wide range of accepted interpretations. Man's ability to shed light (disclose) on things is modified into "curiosity" an urge to see only what things look like. Similarly, genuine understanding is replaced by "Ambiguity".

Thus, this brief survey of the four aspects of the in-Being of Dasein discloses two modes of Dasein's standing-in, i.e., a) basic concern of Dasein when true to his essence which is constitutive of an involement of Dasein with the world of an intentional kind. When Dasein relates things in view of the whole structure of what he really is.
b) When Dasein is concerned with the daily errands of running the day-to-day life which marrs Dasein's true understanding of his possibilities but which views itself in the wishes and opinions of the "they". The first mode may be called the authentic mode and the second the inauthentic mode of Dasein's Being.

**CARE AS THE UNITARY STRUCTURE OF DASEIN:**

Before commenting further on these two modes of Dasein's standing-in, let us now see how the four existentials of Dasein are viewed as a structural whole to present a unitary picture of Dasein. Since the four existentials are not independent characteristics of Dasein but only aspects of the main act of standing-in.

The ontological enquiry into the Being of Dasein, the unity of the structural whole of Dasein is found in "Care". In preparation for the exposition of Care, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is carried out much in the fashion of Kierkegaard. For Heidegger, Dread is a fundamental Befindlichkeit which discloses Dasein to itself. The phenomenon of dread in contrast with that of fear, results from a non-entity, since what is dreaded is entirely indefinite, it is nothing and nowhere yet it is something which is the world as such. Thus, the dread discloses the Being-in-the-world. Similarly why the Dasein dreads is also not one specific potentiality
or a definite mode of being but is for the sake of its Being-in-the-world. Thus dread disclose to the Dasein its own innermost Being-in-the-world and opens up its own possibilities.

The structural wholeness of Dasein is disclosed to it in dread as Care. In Care the three aspects are united together:

1. Dasein is a Being which is concerned about its own Being (and it is free for its own innermost potentiality of authenticity or inauthenticity and is always in advance of itself.

2. This Being in advance of itself is thrown into the world and is left to its own devices and responsibilities.

3. However, the actual Existance of Dasein does not only consist in a thrown Being in advance of itself but it is actively concerned with beings that are Zuhanden. in this the Verfallen manifests itself.

Thus, the formula for the Being of Dasein may be expressed as: Already Being-in-the-world, in-advance of itself, as the Being-concerned with Beings-encountered in-the-world.

Thus Care does not only include the existentiality of Dasein but also its facticity and verfallen.
In Care, Dasein realises its own reality as projection of the world horizon and at the same time, as radical finitude — he realises himself as a unique source of meaning and his own nothingness as finite Being.

Thus, underlying the various modes of the Being of Dasein is found dynamic structure called Care or Sorge. The disclosure of Sorge is the disclosure of Dasein as a being always in advance of itself, a being which can project itself into a future which is not yet. Thus, Dasein always lives in a project of this and that. But what is the ultimate project? Heidegger answers that the ultimate project is death. Death is the end of Dasein whereby it becomes a whole.

Since, the structural whole of Dasein is already found in Care, death of Dasein is shown to have the same three aspects of Existentiality, Facticity, and Verfallen in the way similar to Care. Death is something towards which Dasein behaves. It is a potentiality which no Dasein can avoid. Besides, the possibility of death is not acquired by the Dasein at some occasion but whatever Dasein exists, it is essentially thrown into this potentiality. Finally, mostly, the Dasein conceals from itself that it is a Being-towards-death. Fleeing from it, Dasein occupies itself with the day-to-day life.
THE POSSIBILITY OF DEATH:

Heidegger while analyzing the phenomenon of death avoids all ontic analysis of biology, physiology or psychology but tries to present its ontological exposition. It is maintained that death is the sole prospect which a Dasein shares with all others.

Dasein’s end is at the same time absolutely unavoidable. However, much Dasein may replace one’s activity with another, no one can relieve another of one’s death. As long as the Dasein lasts it always and essentially is not yet, Death is its possibility to be not to be Dasein any more. This is the most extraordinary possibility/project of Dasein to be no more and to be finite.

Death represents to Heidegger the end of Dasein. But death is not the fulfilment nor the ceasing of Dasein. By death as the end of Dasein, Heidegger means that since death belongs to the Being of Dasein and it is a mode of its Being to which Dasein is exposed, therefore, death implies a “Being-towards-the-end.”

Dread which disclosed to man his Being as Care also discloses his Being as Being-towards-death which in turn reveals to man his own finitude. Dasein is forced to root itself authentically in its own freedom, his own finite self
The act of freedom forces Dasein in the responsibility of either accepting or rejecting the ultimate possibility of its activity, i.e., death.

He may choose to project himself authentically, i.e., in view of its Being-towards-death or he may choose inauthentically i.e., projecting himself in future with his eyes closed to what it actually will become.

Heidegger's notion of the authentic existence forms a kind of summit of the analysis of human existence (14). The inauthentic existence which characterises the everyday mode of Dasein in verfallen is the cause of self-estrangement in Heidegger. (15)

The full ontological significance of Serge (Care) is explicitly uncovered in Temporality. The unity of the three existential, ontological modes of the Being of Dasein is a temporal one. The three modes i.e., Befindlichkeit, Verstehen and Rede corresponds to an extasis (or dimension) of time, either in authentic or inauthentic form.

14. Ibid., p.34.
The Being-in-advance-of-itself of Care is rooted in "future". It enables the Dasein to be concerned about its own potentiality and to project itself. Thus, the inner meaning of the existentiality of Dasein is rooted in the "future" extasy of time. Similarly, "Already-Being-in-the-world", is rooted in past as it signifies its facticity (thronness). The Being along-side-the-enitites", which we encounter in the world is rooted in present, for it refers to the "rendering present". Thus in the structure of Care "The past" originates from the "future" so as to engender the "present" (16), and hence Heidegger can conclude that the explicit unity of Care lies in temporality.

Investigation into the problem of "Dasein and Temporality" is conducted with the aim of seeing Dasein as a whole and seeing or working out the authentic existence of Dasein. The authentic being of Dasein is taken as Being-towards-death. The running-forward in death reveals to Dasein that it is lost in the oneself and brings it face to face with the potentiality of being-itself in the passionate actual freedom-towards-Death, being certain of it and dreading it, yet being independent of the illusion of one like many. Thus, the authentic possibility (project) of the Being of Dasein i.e., self-Being is revealed to Dasein in

16. Ibid., p.54.
its Being-towards-death.

The 'authentic self' of the Dasein however, is distinguished by Heidegger from its everyday self which can be characterised by as the 'they-self.' (17) The mode of Dasein's everyday-existence is that of inauthenticity and is failure to understand one's self. Dasein is always a being-in-the-world, absorbed in the world of its concern, it means that the Dasein is also a being-with towards others. In one's concern for what one has taken hold of, one is always careful of how he differs or how he is in relation to others. This distansiality (18) which belongs to Being-with-one-another takes away Dasein's concern of its own Being and is replaced by the "other". The Being with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein into the Being of the "other". We (Dasein), take pleasure, we read, see and judge with the eyes of the "they".

The authentic Being-one's self is only an existential modification of the "they". (19) If for the most part I myself am not the who of the Dasein, the they-self is its 'who', then what constitutes the existential characteristic

18. Ibid., p.164-165. Distansiality is the characteristic of 'Being-with-one-another as being concerned above other's relationship to one's self.
19. Ibid., p. 168.
of the authentic Dasein? The answer lies in discovering the authentic potentiality-for-being of Dasein. With Dasein's loosing itself in the "they" the factual potentiality-for-Being (taboos, rules, standard, concerns), are all left and these possibilities no longer remain the possibilities of the Dasein but are taken over by the "they", which always remain indefinite.

"When Dasein thus brings itself back (...) from the "they"., the they-self is modified in an existentia|l manner so that it becomes authentic being-one's self. This, must be accomplished by making up for not choosing." (20) Since, the Dasein is lost in the "they", it must first find itself. Dasein's Being is already a potentiality for-Being-itsel|f which constitute its possible authenticity. But this authenticity now requires an attestation. It is in the voice of Conscience that this attestation is reached.

Though, the everyday Dasein mostly listens to the others in conducting its day-to-day life yet the call of conscience appeals to the self of Dasein to guide it back into authenticity. In other words conscience is the call of Care to Care. This call is neither willed, planned or carried by one's own expectations. The caller in conscience is the

20. Ibid., p. 313.
Dasein which dreads in its thrownness (Already-in-the-world) on behalf of its potentiality of Being. What is called upon is Dasein itself as a Being-in-advance-of-itself. The Dasein is appealed to out of the everydayness or Falleness. Conscience thus, discloses to the Dasein and makes it understand itself.

Understanding of Dasein however, reveals to Dasein its state of Being "guilty". Being the null ground (thrownness) of its null project (future) of taking over into its own responsible existence what it was thrown to be. Dasein is guided back out of its lost state in the 'they' by the call of Conscience which points both ahead and towards its origin and makes man aware that he is guilty.

The will to have Conscience is chosen by the self when it understands the call of Conscience, and so it becomes free for its own guilt.

To understand one's self existentially is to project one's self into an actual potentiality of Being in the world. This projecting of one's self (in silence) and in readiness for one's own Being-guilty is called Resolve.

Resolve is characterised as the authentic self-Being which implies a Dasein as a Being-in-the-world, not isolated from it.
Resoluteness is a specific mode of the openness of Dasein. It is a fight against the everyday inauthentic world and against the burdens of our own conditions which pull us towards inauthenticity. Facing the reality of his own Nothingness, Dasein must free himself resolutely for action based on recognition of the reality of his concrete situation. Resoluteness opens up the field for exercise of authentic freedom by projecting on the basis of essential existential situation. I am freed from the bondage of the "they". It is in this openness of the reality of Dasein to itself in resolution that the roots of truth lie.

In authentic existance, all projections of the Dasein are carried out in view of its radical thrownness with death before me as the ultimate conditioning possibility (21). Since the Dasein knows the course it is taking and resolutely wills it, the historical motion cannot be a passive undertaking but an "active letting itself happen" the free shouldering of a destiny.

The Dasein that does not shoulder the burden of his destiny either by ignoring the past or by ignoring his responsibility towards the future becomes a tool of fate and lives an inauthentic existence. What is real is what is

revealed by Dasein. Revelation of the real requires that I make present what has already been revealed, which I can do in view of future possibility.

Dasein's Being-a-whole maintains a connection. It is a whole between birth and death. This connectedness of life consists of a sequence of "Experiences" in Time. In this sequence each Experience is present at-hand only as the current now since in current now alone each Experience is actually real.

The Experiences which have passed away no longer are, and the future Experiences are not yet "actual". The Dasein hops through the sequence of 'nows' of its own time. Inspite of the changes in Experience the Dasein maintains throughout a self-sameness. The factual existence of Dasein implies both the ends: birth and death which "are". They are possible only as Dasein's Being as Care. Thrownness and being-towards-death which one either escapes or anticipates; and in this birth and death are connected, as Care. Dasein is the 'between'.

FINITUDE AND FREEDOM:

The Dasein does not exist as the sum of the momentary actualities: Experience in between birth and death. But it stretches itself so that its own Being is constituted as stretching along. The moment at which the Dasein stretches
itself along is called “historizing” (22). In historicailty of Dasein, it is shown that it is not temporal because it is in history but it exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being. This temporal and historical structure of Dasein existing between ends thus reveals itself as finite. Once the finitude of one’s existence is grasped, the endless multiplicities of possibilities such as those of comfortableness and taking things lightly are snatched away from the Dasein. It brings it into the simplicity of its fate. This constitutes Dasein’s primordial historising which lies in authentic resoluteness and in it Dasein chooses itself. If by anticipation the Dasein allows death to become powerful in itself as free for death, the power of its finite freedom, Dasein understands itself as its own power, so that in this freedom which consists only in having made such a choice, it can take over the powerlessness of aboundment of having done so and can understand the accidents of the situation that are disclosed. But if the fateful Dasein exists essentially not as a Being-in-the-world but as Being-with-others, its historising becomes co-historising and determines it as destiny. (23)

23. Ibid., p. 436.
The authentic Being-towards-death i.e., the finitude of temporality forms the hidden basis of Dasein's historicality.

Dasein thus as temporal and finite expresses itself as free. Its freedom consists in the choice of authentic existence. It (temporality) is the basis of the unity of existence, facticity and falling and hence is responsible for the totality of the structure of Care. Since Care is being-towards-death, since authentic Being towards its utter impossibility in "anticipatory resoluteness" Dasein exists as an authentically whole Being which is thrown into death.

Thus, it exists finitely. The finitude of Dasein does not amount primarily to a stopping but is a temporalisation itself. The primordial future hence being a future towards death, i.e., towards its own nothingness. This temporally hence finite Dasein now emerges as a historical Being. By the historicality of Dasein is not meant the "... connectedness of motions in the alterations of Objects; nor a free floating sequence of Experience which 'Subjects' have had." (24) on the other hand while the analysis of authentic potentiality for being-a-whole reveals that in Care is rooted the connectedness of death, guilt and conscience.

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24. Ibid., p. 440.
With this Heidegger completes his phenomenological analysis of Dasein.

In "Being and Time", Heidegger maintains that the Dasein, thrown into its "there", is factically submitted to a definite world of its concerns, at the same time, these factical projections are lost in the "they". Dasein by definition being a Being-in-the-world, is by its very nature found not only in the presence of the world and its objects but also among other fellow men. Dasein's lostness in the "they" though comprises the fallen or the inauthentic mode of human existence, yet this fallenness is not looked upon by Heidegger as moral degradation but only as a necessary existentiale of Dasein. (25) Whereas, fallenness provides a glimpse of Dasein's necessity for the other at the inauthentic level it does not imply that the authentic Dasein would be an isolated Dasein projecting itself in a "world" empty of others. On the other hand, for Heidegger even,"... this authentic disclosedness modifies with equal primordality both the way in which the "world" is discovered (...) and the way in which the Dasein— with Others is disclosed." (26) Both the world and others constitute the very framework of the Dasein's ontological structure.

25. Ibid., p.223 - 24. (The phenomenon of Fallenness is described.)

26. Ibid., p.344.
Whereas in Sartre, "the hell is the other," the other is always seen as a hinderence in the pursuance of my own freedom, the other becomes a part and parcel of my own being in Heidegger not hindering but in fact making possible my existence. Thus, though Sartre lays claim to a socialist social order, his claim turns out to be only verbal if viewed in the canvas of his social thought. Heidegger on the other hand when viewed and reflected upon carefully seems to justify a more social than individual existence for man. Thus, Heidegger's phenomenological, existential analysis of Dasein makes him affirm humanism of a high order which consists in:

a) Establishing man (Dasein) as the transcendental horizon of reality as against God or any other kind of Being.

b) Establishing man (Dasein) as the fundament of truth.

c) As against all Marxists including Lukács, Heidegger regards man as capable of possessing a complete understanding of reality and hence can hope to perform action free from risk. (Theoretical knowledge yields practical knowledge). For all Marxists since, all knowledge is positive, a progressive collection of data, knowledge by the
totality (Being) is not possible. (27) Here Heidegger seems to surpass the limitation imposed upon the human knowledge and he seems to cut through the net cast by and in which all Marxists seem to be caught.

d) Heidegger's existential analysis of man is not a philosophy of tragedy consisting in human suffering and pessimism. For Heidegger's analysis yields an optimistic philosophy of man consisting not of suffering but of assimilation and self-assertion, not of struggle and toil but of expression in acts of free choice.

CHAPTER 3

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE: MAN AS CONDEMNED TO FREEDOM

Sartre claims that his Existentialism is a radical humanism. He maintains that by Existentialism is meant a doctrine which makes human life possible and in addition declares that every truth and every action implies human setting and a human subjectivity, i.e., man is not closed in on himself but is always present in a human universe. This is what is implied by Existential humanism. (1) Its first principle being; man is nothing else but what he makes of himself (2).

Man is, what he is only by a mere fact of existence implying essence and god both are redundant. Thus, by a shift in the meaning of subjectivity under the sway of Husserl led Sartre to announce that in the case of man existence preceds essence. This view not only plunges Sartre headlong into atheism but also confirms his faith in the freedom as the defining quality of man.

According to radical Existentialism man is subjectivity but this subjectivity is not Cartesian since it is not closed in itself and determinable in terms of cogito. It is rather

2. Ibid., p.36.
characterised as dialectical. HusseHalian consciousness constantly proceeds to a human universe. Subjectivity, therefore, because of its intentional nature always moves away from itself towards the world.

The involvement of subjectivity with the world characterises it with freedom and responsibility at the same time. It goes to the world spontaneously, since it is free, it makes a mark on the world and modifies itself in the same note, hence it becomes responsible for itself.

The shift from Cartesian to HusseHalian concept of subjectivity has its implications. It results in the rejection of the view that self is a rational or speculative substance characterised by the defining property of thinking in terms of an essence. It is because of the essence that it becomes possible for humanity to have in general an identical nature. But in the absence of such an essence along with the absence of god, Existentialism makes man solely responsible for his deed. This responsibility arises from his act of choosing. This new existential/phenomenological concept of subjectivity involves instead of the concept of god and essence, the involvement with the world and the other human beings.

In this way Existentialism becomes humanism. To say that existence proceeds essence means first of all, exists, turns
up, appears on the scene and only afterwords defines himself. If man is indefinable for Existentialism that is because at first he is nothing. Man is not what he conceives himself to be but he is only what he wills to be. Man is nothing else but what he makes himself. Existentialism thus, consists in making"... every man aware of what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him. And when we say that a man is responsible for himself we do not only mean that he is responsible for his own individuality but that he is responsible for all men." (3).

If, e.g. I want to marry, to have children, I am involving all humanity in marrying, in creating a certain image of man of my own choosing. Thus, in choosing myself I choose man.

For an Existentialist, man is anguish, i.e., the man who involves himself and who realises that he is not only the person he choses to be but also a law maker, who is choosing all mankind, feels a deep responsibility.

Quoting Dostovesky, Sartre holds that, "if God does not exist then everthing is possible", and he takes this to be the starting point of Existentialism. As long as there is god, only that which is decreed by him is possible but if god is not there then everything is possible. There is no

3. Ibid., p. 36.
god to conceive human nature so there is no human nature to
determine him and consequently man becomes forlone as
neither within nor without him does he find any support to
cling to. If exisstance does precede essence than man cannot
be explained in terms of a fixed and given essence.

In other words, there is no place for determinism. Man is
hence free, man is freedom. Similarly, if god does not exist
there are no commands or values to turn to and he is left to
himself. Thus, man is condemned to be free. Condemned
because he did not create himself, (4) but once thrown in
the world, he is responsible for everything he does;
including his passion. Thus, man without any support is
condemned every moment to invent himself.

Given that men are free, Sartre adds, that he could not be
sure that after him men will complete his work to
perfection. Things will be as men would decide them to be.
Suppose I want to know, will Socialism ever come about?
Nobody knows the answer but all one knows is that I want it
to come and that I will do everything in my power to bring
it about. Beyond that I can't say anything. Thus, reality
pertains only to actions, maintains Sartre, "Man is nothing
but his plan, he exists only to the extent that he fulfils.

4. Ibid., pp. 36,41.
Himself; he is therefore nothing else than an ensemble of his acts..."(5)

Thus, Existentialism is not a philosophy of quiescence, nor is it pessimistic since man's destiny lies within himself. nor does it discourage man since it forbids him that his hope is in his action. Thus, Existentialism turns out to be an ethics of action and involvement.(6)

Though there is no universal human nature yet there is a universal human condition. By "Condition" is meant the a - priori limits which outlines man's fundamental situation in the universe.(7) Historical situations may vary, a man may be born in a country with a pagan society or as a feudal lord or as a proletariat. What does not vary is the necessity for him to exist, to be at work there, to be among other men. These limits are neither subjective nor objective but both objective because they are found every where, subjective because they are lived and are nothing if man does not live them. In this sense alone we can talk of the universality of man, but this universality is not given, it is perpetually being made, i.e., I build the universal in choosing myself.

6. Ibid., p. 50.

7. Ibid., p. 52.
Freedom of a man depends on the freedom of others and vice versa. Freedom though, as the definition of man does not depend on others but as soon as there is involvement, I am obliged to have others' freedom as my own. Freedom becomes a goal only if I take freedom of others in consideration as well. Thus, if in man existance preceeds, essence then he is a free being who in different circumstances want his freedom along with the freedom of others.

The Existentialism is the only theory which imparts dignity to man and does not reduce him to an object (materialism for instance, reduces man to an object). The human world possesses values distinct from material world.

ONTLOGY OF FREEDOM:

Sartre barrows the expression of For-itself to designate the being of man from Hegel and characterises it as fundamentally a free being. In order to work out the ontology of freedom, we will have to work out the ontology of For-itself.

Sartre initially works out a distinction between three modes of being:- Being-in-itself, Being-for-itself and Being-for-others. The being-in-itself is the simplest type of being Sartre characterises the being-in-itself as (1) being is
itself. (2) being is what it is. (3) being-in-itself is. (8)

Being-in-itself is opposed to consciousness or Being-for-itself. Being-in-itself has been defined as identity and plenitude and the in-itself being what it is, it must fall to the subject to establish contact with it.

What sort of a being will the subjective, consciousness or for-itself have to be? Consciousness has been shown to be a reference to being-in-itself, or is self-present. Consciousness is not only opposed to in-itself because of its different structure as for-itself but it constitutes a counterpart of being-in-itself qua being. In this sense for-itself is the opposite of being and hence nothingness.

Thus consciousness has four interpretations, unity of cogito and pre-reflective cogito, existence, for-itself and nothingness. One of the essential characteristics of the for-itself is that it is a lack. (9) It consists of a gap—a gap between consciousness and object of consciousness: Since consciousness is intentional, it must refer to an object and it also knows that it is aware of an object. We can say that consciousness knowingly places itself at a


9. Ibid., p. 147.
distance from its object. It distinguishes between itself and its objects and hence create a gap between itself and its object.

To explain further the meaning of lack, Sartre introduces the Heideggerian notion of possibility. (10) Consciousness lacks coincidence of itself with itself, i.e., consciousness strives for the self identity which is characteristic of another mode of being viz., in-itself. What I ceaselessly aim at is myself, that which I am not, my own possibilities. Human reality is both is and is not its own possibilities. In this sense consciousness is always referring forward, away from what is true just now.

The for-itself "ia", in the manner of a being which is not what it is and is what it is not. In other words it is a negation of its being-in-itself and is therefore incomplete (a lack). (11) and strives for a completeness to become a whole and hence transcend itself. E.g., Sartre notices that it is consciousness alone which experiences incompleteness of a crescent for instance as lacking something as compared to the moon. "Man supplements what is there by a complement

10. See: Being And Nothingness, op. cit., p. 155, for the Meaning of possibility.
11. This leads to the conclusion that consciousness is dynamic and reaches beyond itself to complete itself.
to make it a whole." (12). Sartre later considers desire, or hunger and thirst. Desire must itself be a lack otherwise there would be no connection between the desire and the desired. It is also due to this characteristic of consciousness as a lack that it can imagine, create and go forward towards future. What actually the for-itself lacks is itself, the missing in-itself is not the in-itself of facticity but the absent in-itself of the for-itself as the totality. As already stated consciousness as the opposite of in-itself qua being is nothingness.

The lack within consciousness is also constituted by nothingness which lies at the heart of for-itself. Here Sartre has taken over a crucial Hegelian concept - i.e., nothingness, though in a modified form. Nothingness is encountered in the world. It cannot however be attached to in-itself for it is pure passivity. nor can nothingness itself be its own ground since nothingness is not. It can proceed only from a being which maintains a nothingness and constitutes a unity with if in such a way that being is concerned for its nothingness i.e., a being which is its own nothingness (13). Such a being we have already shown is


that of for-itself. Hence for-itself becomes the ground of nothingness.

SARTRE'S CONCEPT OF NOTHINGNESS:

Sartre in developing his notion of nothingness diverts from Hegel in maintaining that it is not an abstraction but holds that it is an indeterminate being like the being of Being (14). In other words what Sartre finds objectionable in Hegel's notion of nothingness is the reduction of nothingness into a mere abstract notion and Hegel's inability to define the notion. Thus the Hegelian venture of reducing all to rational categories hopelessly fails.

What then is nothingness for Sartre? "When Hegel writes, "(Being and Nothingness) are empty abstractions and the one is as empty as the other," he forgets that emptiness is emptiness of something'. Being is empty of all other determination than identity with itself, but non-being is empty of being. In a word we must recall here against Hegel that being is and nothingness "is not" " (15) Nothingness is not an "original abyss" from which being can arise, it is not something in which being is suspended. Yet nothingness haunts being, i.e., nothingness was not there before the

14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 48.
world existed or the end of the being of the world is not the beginning of the "reign of non-being". Non-being exists only on the surface of being. (16) Nothingness of being is encountered only within the limits of being and it gets its being from being. Nothingness is neither before or after being nor outside being but lies coiled in the heart of being like a worm.

To nothingness the property of nihilating itself cannot be granted. (17) Any Being which can nihilate itself, in order to annihilate itself, it must be, but Nothingness is not. It must follow that there must exist a being of which the property is to nihilate Nothingness, to support it in its being and to sustain it in its very existence, a being by which nothingness comes to thing - such a thing is for-itself.

There exist numerous instances in human reality which imply a comprehension of nothingness: hate, regret, prohibitions etc. in desire, one is face to face with nothingness. Similarly, the various phenomena indicative of the Nothingness of for-itself are:-interrogation, destruction and ordinary negative judgments.

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16. Ibid., p. 49.
17. Ibid., p. 57.
Now the question arises: what is human reality in its in-most structure such that it generates non-being? Sartre tells us that this capacity to annihilate takes place not only in interrogation, destruction and negative judgement but also in all acts of knowledge. This specific activity of the for-itself is possible only if it is out of being-in-itself. If human reality was a massive being of in-itself then here would be no capacity of negation only what is not is able to understand what is.

Consequently, the for-itself is not being, it is its own non-being.

**THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM:**

To be outside of being, to escape being and to stay out of the causal order of being means to be free. Human reality is then free. Human reality makes itself and invents itself continuously. Hence, existence precedes essence. That is, man has no fixed essence which is manifested in individual men as existents. Sartre's freedom is absolute. No motive determines consciousness simply because consciousness carries nothing. It is a generating of the past by means of nothing. The relation between my past and present is not what I was, but is the foundation of what I am. The essential feature of freedom at this level is the disengagement of man from his own past. "Freedom, thus
refers us to an analysis of consciousness as its own ground". (18)

Man is essentially free not only to act as he chooses but to see the world as he may choose. Freedom is involved even in accepting the truth of things or in imagining things which are not true, the choice of end and means to satisfy these ends is also free. Even the attitudes of behavior of hopelessness or hopefullness are chosen freely by man himself.

However, the effects of contemplation of such freedom are far reaching. The realization of the responsibility of not only what man has done but also what one feels, what one believes, the burden of responsibility is felt, by him and as a result one becomes a victim of anxiety. Thus, anxiety or 'Anguish' is later taken to be the reflective mode of awareness of freedom. Anguish appears as something to be avoided, man seeks freedom which cause him anguish. This is the origin of dialectics which Sartre calls bad faith. (19) "...in Sartre's hands bad faith will prove a basic feature


19. Ibid. Also Refer Being And Nothingness, op. cit., pp. 96-98, where Sartre elaborates on two different kinds of bad faith.
of man, his ever present menace." (20) Bad faith consists in pretending to ourselves and others that things could not be otherwise, that we are bound in our way of life and that we could not escape it even if we wanted to. Appeals to duty, to belief, to custom and even social responsibility fall under the head of behavior under bad faith since in fact we choose to do these things though we need not do them at all.

Freedom, is thus built in within the concept of consciousness and refers to the ability to adopt an attitude in the world, to fill the gap within us which is the defining character of a for-itself. It is this gap which enables us to know things in the world and to fill ourselves with plans and projects. Freedom implies the nihilating ability since it involves the possibility of saying "no" to every solution of a question and of rejecting every plan of future. Anguish appears when I realise that there is inevitably a gap between myself and my possibilities.

Thus, Sartre reaches the famous dictum that Being-for-themselves have no fixed essences as they go along by choosing all the time to fill the gaps between themselves and their future. Men are stuck down to this world and they

20. Ibid., p. 53.
become whatever they choose by feeling and doing what they choose.

Sartre in his analysis of bad faith refers to the basic duality of human reality. (21) Man is facticity and transcendence, for him-self and for-others, past and future. Each dual aspect of man must be capable of valid coordination. bad faith on the other hand is an act of affirming their identity while preserving their difference. It thus makes possible warding off responsibility. For in bad faith I am not facticity but transcendence, I am beyond what I have done.

Similarly my transcendence can be subdued by my facticity. I could not help doing what I did. Similarly, I can view myself with my own perspective or from the point of view of others as the role I play for others and my attitude to it. Or I either want to be the one I was or disengage myself from my past:

Thus, bad faith constitutes a negative attitude with respect to oneself which is grounded in a duality of human subject. It is an immediate structure of consciousness. A negative attitude with respect to myself is possible because at any time I am, yet am not, or I would be an in-itself. Bad faith

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is not a "...special case but the immediate and constant menace of man's existential project." (22) The counterpart of bad faith i.e., sincerely involves the demand man ought to be for himself only what he is. It posits for man the ideal of the in-itself. The ideal calls for an opposite and the being posited by the ideal therefore does not apply to man. It is while elucidating bad faith that Sartre comes to Being-for-others. Other human beings may have an effect on for-itself which acts out a role casted for it by other people.

At the end of book II of Being and Nothingness Sartre says: "...the essential facts which I know concerning my own body come from the way in which others see it. Thus, the nature of my body refers me to the existence of others and to my being-for-others." (23) This Being-for-others is defined in two related ways; I am aware of my own bodily existence as something which is known to other people. And, I am aware of the bodies of other people therefore, of their existence in the world.

Sartre's treatment of the problem of the Other is influenced by Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger, all of whom tried to find

22. Ibid., p. 55.
out whether the structure of human reality did not necessarily involve the presence of the Other. According to Sartre in Husserl, the other person is on a par with my worldly ego "I" as a being dispose of object meanings implying others. For Sartre, this position does not show a connection between my transcendental subjectivity and such other subjectivities. In Hegel too, Sartre finds an implication relation between me and the other. But Hegel makes me depend on the other in my being. Heidegger, on the other hand makes the other as having the 'existentia' of being with, in the notion of human subject. The difficulty for Sartre is that this implication of others will not be a basis for a concrete encounter with others. (24)

According to Sartre man exhibits patterns of behaviour such as shame, fear and pride which imply the existence of other human subjects i.e., man counts on others and any description of man ignoring reference to others would be incomplete. The word ipso facto does not encompass the other person yet we are faced with the necessity of regarding another individual as a concrete individual. Another person occurs in the world but is not exhausted by being the object of a subject. Just as another person will not face us as a "Structure" but as a concrete individual, we too as

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24. Ibid., pp. 315-339.
subjects encountering another cannot be taken as a structure either. In either case, the reference to the other is not an external cognitive relation whereby the being or non-being of the other person does not effect my being. But there is an internal relation i.e., relation in terms of being, between me and the other. We in fact do not, for Sartre, come to the existence of the other by reflection. But we simply experience it i.e., the other is not a deduction from a higher reality (such as for-itself) but it has a relationship in terms of being between him and myself. the concrete other is accounted for. Thus Sartre tries to give a theory of the encounter with the other and in this way provides an ontological reference to the other.

ENCOUNTER WITH OTHER:

Granted that the Other is present to me. it remains an object, but the Other presents itself not merely as an object, having a body but also as a modification of my world. the objects of my world in the vicinity of the other will appear oriented towards him. When, e.g., the Other looks as a subject, the other-as-object disappears. I experience an essential modification of my own being and my world. I react with feelings like shame, pride, embarrassment, etc. Unlike other material objects which present themselves to us, the presentation of an encounter with another escapes us. the encounter with another is like
ordinary perception but with a 'hole' in it. The peculiarity of the relation between myself and the Other is that I am an object for him. Things which were my possibilities become alienated from me and I become thing like myself. For me, I was nothing but my plans and interests i.e., my free action. For the Others I am an object in his world and as a result I experience a sudden alienation of all my possibilities.

I am in the eyes of the Other not only an object of perception but also of appraisal. The Other is free to judge me and I am constantly in danger of being labelled and type-cast in some role not of my choosing. Though this labelling is reciprocal i.e., I can also type-cast the Other in a role not of his choosing, yet the labelling seem to restrict my free nature.

Now there is no obstacle more fatal to my projects than the freedom of Others. Thus, the Other is revealed to me not just as an object of perception but as that who is the source of 'the look' and hence as a free being.

However, Sartre tells us that the presence of the Other is primary and permanent though it is not a necessary characteristic of for-itself whose existence is logically independent of the existence of the Other. Yet the fact of for-itself not being the Other, of being thrown away from him, is an inner negation, constituting the for-itself.
There is a relation of internal negation which is a relation of reciprocity. The for-itself was already facing the in-itself with an internal relation. The Other is thus a "non-ego-non-object" which limits my own consciousness, I am the ego-object for the Other.

Now, according to Sartre it is actually my body which reveals my being-for-the-other. The body is however not merely for the Other, it is also for me and what it is for me is quite different from what it is for Other. I also know myself as a body-known-by-the-Others.

The presence of the Other induces certain attitudes in me. I may conquer the freedom of the Other through love or I may conquer his body through appropriation (desire) or through destruction (hate). But the Other is not an object but a subject. Any attempt to appropriate a subject is bound to lead to a failure for the other-subject can never be possessed. Every act is a conflict of freedoms. Even a gift is a humiliation (25). My mere existence is the limitation of the Others' existence. Hence, I shall always be one whose life has been for ever contaminated by the presence of the Other.

Hence, whereas, the life with the Other for Heidegger is a

25. Here Sartre sounds like Nietzsche.
"minein" (a co-relation) for Sartre it is that of conflict for Heidegger. Dasein is a being-in-the-world and is with the Other. For Sartre, the for-itself on the other hand concretely encounters the Other and the Other is not a part of the metaphysical structure of the for-itself.

The relation of the Other with my for-itself is always that of conflict. In fact, Sartre sees the Other as "Hell", he retorts in "No Exit", one of his plays; "Hell is other people", (26) So far, Sartre has been claiming that though the for-itself is freedom but when Sartre comes to the encounter of the for-itself with Other he is forced to maintain that the Other poses a threat to the freedom of the for-itself. Hence, Sartre is now faced with the traditional debate between free will and determinism.

This being the problem of freedom in Sartre's analysis of for-itself which can also be called the problem of the reconciliation between project and facticity, let us see how Sartre solves the issue. Sartre tackles the issue by turning to human action and asks the Kantian question "how is action possible?" action meaning doing things other than things happening to us. Action is possible only because it arises out of the human capacity to form negative

judgments, to deny and to see how things are not. Similarly bad faith is the result of our ability to deny and to rebel and this is identical to our being absolutely free. In "Situations" Sartre writes "For the secret of man is not his Oedipus complex or his inferiority complex, it is the limit of his freedom, his ability to resist torture and death." (27).

The for-itself which all the time aspires to be in-itself implies action (28) to act means the possibility of changing in one way or another the shape of things i.e., to bring about that which is not yet but which can be. This implies a possibility for consciousness to break off from its own past and reach towards what it is not yet but can be. This capacity of negation and positing a project implies Freedom.

Freedom cannot be defined but only described since it creates itself. Sartre's for-itself is a continuous escape to its possibles. Claims Sartre, human reality is free because it is "not what it is". According to Sartre choice is manifested not only in my reflective acts of will but also in my emotive reactions of fear, anger or other


passions, these are all reactions to aims which human reality chooses for itself. Man's freedom thus consists in being able to make his past in the light of his future. Sartre seems to agree with Freud that structure of the whole can be seen in a single act, but he claims that not the past but the future explains the present, i.e., it is my free choice which constitutes my being. I put my bag on the ground in order to rest a minute. I take a position in a tennis court in order to return the ball in such and such a way. (29) Hence, for Sartre free choice is inevitable or the for-itself would fall in the category of a massive being. A choice is however, always "fragile", always being absurd and unjustifiable, at any moment the instant of my conversion may emerge.

This absolute freedom of the for-itself is restricted by a set of obstacles which Sartre calls facticity and includes my place, my past, my surrounding, my fellow brothers and my death. Freedom for Sartre means to will by one's self, i.e., one's ability to determine one's own self, i.e., it implies autonomus choice. Now the point which Sartre wishes to emphasise is that though man is absolutely free yet, freedom is not its ground (30) i.e., man does not choose to

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29. Ibid., p. 268.
30. Ibid., p. 616.
be a free agent. "gewarfen."

My facticity which constitutes obstacles to my freedom however does not place a limit to freedom. In fact, for Sartre this facticity i.e., the contingent set of circumstances, appear to bind us to behave in one way rather than another or be A instead of B is a basis upon which we build our free choices or "...it is the material out of which our free choices are built." (31). Thus, though there may be things which we are physically incapable of doing still we are free to live with these restrictions in one way rather than another.

My Place: Practically the fact of occupying a place happens in view of an end. If my place is an obstacle to my freedom it is because I myself have freely chosen an end for which my place has become an obstacle. My Past: We can choose the future but not our past (once it has been chosen). Though I am unable to change my past yet I can freely decide about this past and give it a meaning and adapt an attitude towards it of my own thinking. I myself build up the past of my future. My Surrounding: Sartre's position about surrounding is the same as that of place i.e., it is my free choice which makes my surrounding an obstacle or an

instrument of help. My Fellow-brothers: The Other limits me through his presence, there is an existence-in-the-world-in-present-of-the-Other. I am an American, a New Yorker, a middle class person, all such branding places me in a situation not of my own choice. My freedom appears as an object to the Other and is thus alienated. But this alienation is unconscious. If it becomes conscious then I regain my freedom. My Death: Death for Heidegger is the ultimate possibility of Dasein par excellence. But for Sartre Death is not my possibility but the destruction of my possibilities. It is something completely absurd. For-itself, a lack, is a perpetual desire but death is the end of desire.

For Sartre human activity is an attempt to appropriate in one way or another the in-itself. This appropriation is a special form of being - it is a way of becoming in-itself. When an artist carves, a statue for instance, it is in order to possess it not just physically but also conceptually. Knowing is also a form of possession though it is not as exclusive as the possession of a piece of art since others may know the same thing as well. This Sartre finally claims that even play is a form of appropriation. Sartre demonstrates his point by describing the skiing sport.

The for-itself being precisely a lack, is a desire of
being (in-itself). Desire for being disguises itself for a desire for appropriation. The complete lack thus tries to complete itself through possession by identifying it-self with the object of possession. But obviously there is no real physical identification. The object belonging to me remain independent of me and confronts me as well. But because of possession I can project myself into the object or vice versa, yet the human dream of becoming a for-itself-in-itself shall never come true. Possession can give us only a "faint foretaste of this Utopia" (32). According to Deason, Sartre's ontology up to this point has shown that human reality is "a passion toward being" a longing toward identification with the in-itself with the hope of becoming God. (33) But this passion is useless and the divine dream is a contradiction" And this is the tragic finale of Sartre's ontology" (34).

The for-itself is a failure in its inner constitution since, Being what it is not and not being what it is, it is an unavoidable paradox. It is a failure towards its attitude


33. Ibid., p. 126.

34. Ibid.
towards others as well, love, sex are all illusions. The
hell is Other people. The for-itself is a failure in its
conquest of the world, it will never identify itself with
in-itself.

In short human being is a useless passion.

So far Sartre has been able to develop an ontology of man as
being characterised as for-itself, a region of Being
constituted by Nothingness and inspired by pure Being (in-
itself). What is up till now only implicit is made explicit
i.e., the true dialectical nature of man is now worked out.
Though the word "dialectic" has been first used by Hegel and
Marx but Sartre holds that the term acquires its true
meaning only in the context of the ontology of man worked
out by him. For Sartre neither Hegel nor Marx remained true
to their dialectical method. For both of them the dialectic
was converted into a dogmatism. (35) which was the result of
a sort of a reductionism. For Hegel it was the thought which
was dialectical and for Marx it was the material world which
was dialectical which was reflected in the dialectical
thought of the human beings. For Sartre on the other hand,
it is man who is a dialectical being, who originates

of Practical Ensembles, Translated by Alan Shariden
p.21.
dialectics in the world.

**DIALECTICAL NATURE OF MAN:**

Dialectic implies a negation which cannot occur in a single entity, both the philosophies of Hegel and Marx are termed by Sartre as philosophies of identity. Since for one reality pertains to idea and for the other to world. The for-itself however is a being characterised by Nothingness i.e., pure freedom and facticity (in-itself), hence it turns out to be the real dialectical being and the origin of all dialectic. Sartre now turns his attention from human freedom (one pole of dialectic), to necessity/history/facticity/ (the other pole of the dialectic). He attempts to work out as to how History, the product of the free praxis of man turning against its changing into an inhuman necessity making the object of the historical process (36) Thus, the ontological and the phenomenological analysis of man in "Being and Nothingness" is now seen in its historical and sociological implications. The implications which Sartre derives from his Existentialist interpretation of the individualisation of man ending with a pessimistic note is however quite startling. In Sartre we come across a

philosophy of social action and the birth of an Existential and a social man. Sartre's bent towards the philosophy of Marxism may be seen in this light as against viewing his philosophy as a conversion from Existentialism to Marxism. Thus it is spared of the objection of somewhat being contradictory in its application as Warnock observes. "But we have taken our leave of, and for all of the private, compelling myth of the free man, experiencing his freedom in anguish and faced with no necessity except that of choosing himself." (37) Sartre attempts to show that man is a wholly free subject, who by his very nature, resists every attempt to transform him into anything objective. His Existentialism proceeds in the new direction of liberating Marxism from the abstractionists who forced individuals and facts into prefabricated moulds and of re-binding it by a novel interpretation of the dialectical relations of individuals to society and history. Starting from individuals, Sartre shows how he and his equally isolated fellows" totalize" by entering into relations of different kinds i.e., those of "group in fusion" or an "organized group" developing towards socio-economic institution, movement, party or state.

Sartre begins his socialisation of the for-itself by giving an account of free human intervention in the world which he calls "praxis" in accordance to his existential/individualistic theme.

The human project remains central to Sartre's thought, he maintains that man is one material being among others yet he is not governed by any external law imposed upon him. Today Marxism has tried to maintain a "dialectic without men" and has thus led to the stagnation of Marxism. The only dialectical materialism which is sensible is historical materialism - a materialism viewed from inside the history of man's relation with matter, for Sartre. (38).

Man - a for-itself projects itself in the future. This he does by relating himself to matter and hence to the world.

But man would not be able to relate himself to the world had he himself been totally alien to matter. Sartre thus arrives at a definition of work. Praxis is human activity. The meaning of human work for Sartre, is the fact that man reduces himself to inorganic materiality in order to act materially upon matter and to change his material life. By transubstantiation, the project which by means of our body

is inscribed in the thing takes on the substantial characteristic of that thing without entirely losing its own original qualities.

The most fundamental characteristic of man as consciousness is his ability to go beyond his situation. He is never identical with it, but rather exists in relation to it.

Thus, he only determines how to live it and is not determined by it. At the same time he cannot exist except in a situation and his going beyond this situation must somehow include this situation as well. Thus, men make history by such continuous surpassing. There are no pre-established laws governing human praxis, praxis is any human activity which is meaningful in the sense of being purposeful. History, for Sartre can be called the story of how human praxis inscribes itself in the practico-inert.

Praxis or work according to Sartre is the effort to satisfy human needs in terms of our projects in the world which is essentially a world of scarcity. For Sartre declares in the "Critique" that the fundamental, existential structure of man is need."...need is the first totalising relation between the material being man, and the material ensemble of which he is a part. This relation is universal and of
interiority" (39) The need however, seeks possibilities of satisfaction in nature, and in this "totalisation" is revealed the passive totality, the material being as abundance or scarcity. Sartre adds: "Need as the negation of negation, (40) is the organism itself, living itself in the future, through present disorders, as its own possibility and consequently as the possibility of its own impossibility. Praxis in the first instance, is nothing but the relation of the organism, as exterior and future end, to the present organism as a totality under threat it is function exteriorized. Here Sartre tries to work out the dialectic which according to him is manifested all the time. For each man through his ordinary, daily experience of work, the dialectic is at work. The dialectical character of action consists in overcoming of negation by intervention in the material world, we conceive tasks by conceiving an end which is the overcoming of an obstacle. The world is regarded as a place in which we fulfill our ends and each end is a completion. Since, we experience the world as a series of needs, it experiences it negatively as consisting of things we do not have and in work/praxis we change the world to overcome this negation and hence also aim at "totalisation"


40. Ibid.
or "completion." (41)

In understanding Sartre, the apparent difficulty is that a dialectical approach consists in a synthetic totalisation concerned with man and nature and this seems to enter into a sharp opposition between nature and culture. (42). Nature which is brute matter or mere being in-itself, all knowledge of it is a construct of human mind. The dialectic is however totally human and specifically applies to human history as the intervention of human projects. The dialectic of nature is at best derivative of human culture and is also irrelevant to the understanding of human affairs. To justify this shift from man and nature to man and culture, a shift is necessitated by Sartre's analysis of dialectic. he begins from the "praxis of the organic individual." After individualising and personalising the for-itself, the dialectic is shown to be possible in the praxis of the individual which itself is dialectical. Individually men separated from one another are confronted by brute in-itself. The free, intentional praxis is thus stolen from them in ways which give rise to counter-finality. It is actually the appropriation of scarce matter by competing needy individuals which makes each man excessive for the

41. Warnock, M. Philosophy of Sartre, op. cit., p. 163.

other. In other words, scarce matter creates a lack defining competing needs in ways which make others de trop. Thus, this lack and excess generates antagonistic reciprocity of self and Other (violence itself is an interiorised scarcity). Thus scarcity is shown to be "... the ontological origin of class conflict in an institutional frame work" and in this way "Scarcity (turns) out to be "the basis of the possibility of history." (43).

History itself is defined by the fact that "something is happening to man". Scarcity is thus, the fundamental human relation between matter and between other men. At this point Mary Warnock makes an observation that the hostility which exists between men is caused by an inescapable psychological reason. Whereby the other was a threat to me in Being and Nothingness. But in the Critique men are at war only because of the contingency of scarcity and this war can thus be overcome by overcoming scarcity. (44)

Sartre, however, continues, after being a part of material order, and changing it as the result of praxis what happens to man is that be gets atomised. "Atomisation", is the name given to the human condition of separateness of one man from


44. Warnock, M. Philosophy of Sartre, op. cit., p. 166.
another and this plurality is expressed in the "collective."

Sartre introduces the concept of "collective" in opposition to that of a group and it implies that: in a "collective" men live side by side without a sense of participation in a common activity or, they are still individuals. Sartre brings in his other novel concept of a "series." Sartre gives here the example of a bus que which is simply a series of isolated individuals, combined together in a common activity of waiting and then riding a bus but each individual though aware of the other as his neighbour is not involved with him in any respect. (45) "... the collective is defined by its being, that is to say, in so far as all praxis is constituted by its being as mere existence...it is a amaterial, inorganic object in the practico-inert field in so far as a discrete multiplicity of active individuals is produced in it under the sign of the Other, as a real unity within Being, that is to say as a passive synthesis, and to the extent that the constituted object is posited as essential and that its inertia penetrates every individual praxis as its fundamental determination by passive unity, that is to say, by the pre-established and given interpenetration of every one as Others..." (46).

46. Ibid., p. 255.
The next dialectical movement comes into being with the origin of the group which is formed by the destruction of the collective and the inhuman conditions of isolation imposed by the serial relation between men. "The group is defined by its undertaking and by the constant movement of integration which tends to turn it into pure praxis by trying to eliminate all forms of inertia from it...." (47)

The group falls into two stages. The 'group in fusion' and 'the group.' 'Man's lapse into seriality at the level of the collective has been described by Sartre as man's fall. The emergence of the group is the struggle against this fall. Here Sartre quotes the historical example of the French Revolution. (48) Through its serial unity, the gathering (collective) furnishes the elementary conditions of the possibility that its members should constitute the group. the collective i.e., the inert gathering with its structure of seriality is the basic type of seriality but this priority of a collective over a group is not historical or temporal but only logical. History tells us that groups constitute themselves as determinations or negations of collectives, in other words they transcend and preserve collectives. Even if a collective results from the

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., pp. 351-363.
disintegration of the group, it preserves nothing of itselfs as a collective. The group on the other hand too can relapse into a collective. Besides history has shown that as a history of class struggle how the transition of oppressed classes form the state of being collective into a revolutionary group praxis. Sartre however, here takes a precaution and refrains from calling a class a group.

"... the group constitutes itself on the basis of a need or common danger and defines itself by the common objective which determines its common praxis. Yet neither common need, nor common praxis, nor common objectives can define a community unless it makes itself into a community by feeling individual need as common need, and by projecting itself in the internal unification of a common integration, towards objectives which it produces as common." (49). This is what Sartre calls vicious circle.

The fused group is thus defined in terms of common praxis but it does not tell us anything about the structural relations which hold between third parties in primary inferiority in so far as the group is the means of common action. The ontological relations of the members of a group

49. Ibid., p. 350.
cannot also be defined only in terms of common membership. Thus, Sartre has not said anything as yet about "History," and how it is a totalisation. The individual action representing the first dialectical synthesis, fused group also presents us with a simple totalisation. "A group is not (...) it constantly totalises itself and disappears either by fragmentisation or by ossification...." (50). The group is not an organic entity with a life and dynamic force of its own but is governed by the laws of development of the individual. "It is the communal structure of my act" Its reality is that of a general individual i.e., in it the individual is no longer atomised, isolated individual related with other individuals owing to antagonism created by need. Integration is a task to be done in so far as I am designated abstractly in my membership of the group and in so far as I am really unified by my praxis as common praxis but each individual finds his freedom in others who are now no longer obstacles to his liberty. Thus, for Sartre revolutionary power does not consist in the rising class but in the dynamic group of individuals.

Since a group is not a material, inorganic unity, it needs special force to maintain itself. This cohesive force is provided by the "Oath" or the "pledge" which is sanctioned

50. Ibid., p.407.
by "Terror", of common enemy and danger. (51) In the pledge, I recognize the right of everyone also over me to punish me in case of default. Yet terror is never able to curb the activities of an individual and it still leaves the possibility of individual action (i.e., of treason) open. This means that the group is negativity, there is a certain threshold above which the rupture may occur and these thresholds are variable (52). Yet the pledge defines everyone as a common individual not only it concerns his being-in-the-group but also because it is through the mediation of all, that it can take place in everyone. To explain the dialectics of a group, Sartre maintains that it is actually the praxis which is the real unity of the fused group. It is praxis which creates the group, maintains it and is also responsible for changing it. In the moment of praxis of organization and anticipation, the group guarantees that every separate action is a common action or the group as a reality produces the unity of common praxis. But Sartre also holds that far from being founded on our common humanity, the group itself is the beginning of humanity.

In a collective, since everyone is equally powerless to influence another or to perform a common praxis the question

51. Ibid., p. 444.
52. Ibid.
of sovereignty does not arise. However, the group acquires its sovereignty from every individual member of the group. Both the collective and the group are described in terms of individuals and the relations which they maintain towards others. Though in the group the individual identification however does not imply a passive unification with group. The unification, in other words "synthesis" is practical such that the individual act can be recognized in the common action. "In short, my integration, becomes a task to be done, in so far as I am designated abstractly in my membership of the group..." (53) After his action, the individual manifests himself to the group as a concrete moment of the past totality and hence as a common individual. But this common individual is historical and concrete to the extent that his action was unforseeable by the group. The individual act not only is performed by a person but also the class to which the person belongs. Though the class structure and the characteristics of a particular class depends upon the addition of individual praxis. Hence Sartre gives the example of a colored member of an air force ground crew. Now Sartre reluctantly acknowledges that man today possesses real freedom but man must posit for himself the ultimate ideal of a world in

53. Ibid., p. 408.
which all men work together in full consciousness to make their history in common where the individual praxis will give way to common praxis and there will emerge "the common Individual."

Hence what Sartre aims to achieve is a particular existing man within an environment of collective objects and other man, working in a social field in his social class with the help of dialectical totalisation. This Sartre achieves by defining men in terms of his acts, work, passion, need as well as the social and economic categories and placing man as the agent of history. (54) Man's definition in terms of his project - always going beyond himself and relating himself with other than himself and production of one's self in praxis reveals the actual human structure and is called existence. (55) Taking lead from Marx and Hegel in turn, Sartre aims at reaching the truth which must be developed and must be a totalisation. In other words "dialectic", is a developing unification. This unification is such that through the "group", individuals indicate themselves as necessary culmination of the totalising action but this operational indication never actually has any effect i.e., the individual is neither totally integrated into the group.

55. Ibid.
which has been revealed and actualised through praxis nor totally transcendent. (56) Neither the individual is a part of totality nor is there any other totality.

What Sartre aims at, is a development of Marxism which according to him is possible only when it is fused with Existentialism. The drawback of Marx’s Marxism consists in considering dialectic as a necessary principle of reality having no basis in human subjectivity but possessing an apriori status, thus keeping man in its sway. For Sartre dialectic is not an a-priori principle having origins in the human existence. It is in this sense that Sartre’s existential position beginning with the emphasis on man as the agent of social process takes over a Marxian form. Marx, however emphasised the social forces as governing human praxis whereas it is vice verse in Sartre. Sartre is able to do this by divesting dialectics from its a-priori status and ascribing it to man.

Sartre’s blending of Existentialism with Marxism takes place in the application of his ontology to social philosophy. Man—the for-itself being the basic mode of existence is characterised by lack/nothingness. Lack being the ontological character of for-itself can never be overcome.

It later finds its counterpart in the social nexus in the form of scarcity. Now what Sartre maintains at this point is that this scarcity can be overcome on the social level at the stage of totalisation. When individual man identifies himself with the society. In other words scarcity the cause of human distress and unfreedom can be done away with. It is at this point that one can observe an inconsistency in Sartre.

This inconsistency consists in what Sartre is at pains to prove, as the basic category of his ontology is compromised in his social philosophy where he attempts to blend Marxism with Existentialism.

Similarly, Sartre's original position of Absolute freedom is replaced by the 'Oath' where the individual surrenders his freedom to the general good in a society. Thus, again the metaphysical position of ontological freedom is compromised at the socio-historical level. At the sociological level the for-itself (absolute freedom) is found to be bound by socio-historical factors.

Hence what Sartre maintains ontologically is not able to justify sociologically.

The image of man for Sartre turns out to be as follows:
1. Man in principle is a conscious, acting and a creative being.

2. As an individual man, he is condemned to freedom.

3. As a free individual, man is capable of intervening in the world in praxis.

4. Praxis proceeds by means of dialectical struggle to replace present by foreseen future. As a result man emerges as the foundament of dialectics.

5. The confrontation of the free praxis of man with matter produces practico - inert (worked-over matter).

6. In the presence of practico - inert individuals are 'socialised' (related to each other by non-cooperative antagonistic reciprocity).

7. The perils of serialisation (atomisation) are overcome in a 'fused group' threatened by a common enemy and working towards a common goal.

8. History is the product of free praxis of individuals.

9. Consciousness and free praxis create meaning and value in the world.
CHAPTER 4

THE NEO-MARXISTS

PART - I

MARCUSE: MAN IN HIS SOCIO-POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

MARCUSE (1896-1979), was one of the most influential philosophers of the post-war period. His academic pursuits have left a deep imprint over the philosophical horizon of the late 20th century philosophy. Marcuse’s is highly critical of technological civilization, and takes it to be the basic cause of the ills of our times (1).

Marxism represented to Marcuse the only philosophical medium in which the critique of prevailing reality could find concrete embodiment. According to Marcuse, Marxism is not a body of empirical facts nor even a method as held by Lukács, but rather a "theory of the universal individual". (2).

As far as Marcuse’s interpretation of Marxism goes, Marcuse is generally considered as a member of the Frankfort school. Frankfort school is a term which covers the multifarious


domains of humanistic sciences. In opposition to Marx, this school, (the critical theorists) emphasizes the independence and autonomy of theory and opposes the idea of all-embracing praxis.

As a consequence Marxism being the theoretical basis of Frankfort School, is not accepted in its 'orthodox' form but is given a new interpretation. The Marxian idea of the rejection of the philosophy of identity and its replacement by the philosophy of dialectic is retained while the idea of dialectical materialism is refuted in Marcuse.

The essential function of philosophy in line with existential theory for Marcuse, is criticism of what exists. Philosophy is able to provide us with an account of thought in particular time and place because it also provides us with a standpoint which transcends the limitations of particular time and particular structures of thought. The essential structures which are revealed in historical events are not parts of a static, Platonic, timeless realm. The critical theory takes its name by critising, thus, what is in the light of what could be and identify what can be by knowledge of historical tendencies of what will be. (3) It is in this context of critical theory that we wish to

explicate Marcuse's thought. His achievement it seems is in the fact that he was able to give us an essence of man which is in conformity with the demands of contemporary society. Marcuse's dynamic notion of the essence of man is achieved by a critique of both the liberal and Marxist notions of man as viewed in their social perspectives.

In this regard a critique of modern society as outlined in "Soviet Marxism" and "One Dimensional Man." is implicit. But it would only be fitting to first go through Marcuse's interpretation of Hegel and Marx since, it seems consistent of his (Marcuse's) own views.

**INTERPRETATION OF HEGEL AND MARX**

In "Reason And Revolution" Marcuse interprets Hegel as the advocate of supra-historical reason and Marx is interpreted as a philosopher who transferred the categories of Hegelian Logic into the realm of politics and society. (4)

What actually makes Marcuse appreciative of Hegel is, glorification of the Greek dictum that truth is universal and necessary. He finds, that it always contradicts the ordinary experience of change and accident. It is this negative element of the ancient formula which catches

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Marcuse's eye who traces the same element in Hegel. Hegel's system is seen as bringing to a close the entire epoch in modern philosophy that had begun with Descartes and had embodied the basic idea (concept) of modern society. His (Hegel's) system brought philosophy to the threshold of negation and paved way for the development of a critical theory.

The merit of Marx lies for Marcuse in locating reason not only in the thinking subject but also in the sphere of material social conditions. Reason is realized in the rationalization of social conditions in accordance with the true concept or essence of humanity. By analysing the structure of Hegel's system, Marcuse elucidates those implications of Hegel's system, which identify them closely to later development of European thought, particularly with the Marxian theory, to demonstrate that no law can become universal. But Marcuse points out that if men did not succeed in creating unity and universality through autonomous reason even though in contradiction to facts, they would have had to surrender not only their intellectual but also their material existence. The problem was not just a philosophical one but was concerned with the historical destiny of man. Empiricism confined men within the limits of the given, within the existing order of things and events.
How could man get the right to go beyond. This is where lies Marcuse's greatness for he broke away the chains of the given which bound men. Placing Hegel in the socio-historical setting, Marcuse sees in Hegel the insight to interpret the French revolution in a revolutionary spirit. Hegel saw in the French revolution that man has set out to organize reality according to the demands of his free rational thinking instead of accommodating his thoughts to the existing order of values. Man's reason enables him to recognize his own potentialities and of the world, he is no longer at the mercy of facts but subject to these facts to a higher standard, i.e., reason. The French revolution showed that man's mode of labor and enjoyment do not depend on external authority but on his own free, rational activity. Hegel, thus emancipated man as a self-reliant master of his life. (5)

Marcuse asserts that the core of Hegel's philosophy is the structure of reality the concepts of which are freedom, subject, mind or notion which are all derived from the idea of Reason. Thought unites the manifold not only of the natural but also of the socio-historical world. The subject of thought

is one and the same in all men. Therefore, to say that the rationality of the thinking subject is the ultimate basis of the rational organization of society is to recognize the essential equality of all men. Moreover, the thinking subject as the creator of universal concepts is necessarily free and its freedom is the very essence of subjectivity. "The mark of this essential freedom is the fact that the thinking subject is not chained to the immediate forms of being but is capable of transcending them in line with his concepts. ... The idea of freedom implies freedom to act according to reason." (6). Marcuse claims that reason in Hegel is essentially a historical force. The life of reason appears in man's continuous struggle to comprehend what exists and to transform it in accordance to the truth comprehended.

Hegel's political doctrine, observes Marcuse, betrays his own thought since he surrenders society to nature, freedom to necessity, reason to caprice and in so doing it mirrors the destiny of social order that falls. "The dialectical analysis of civil society had concluded that society was not establishing reason and freedom of its own accord. Hegel therefore put forward a strong state to achieve this and tried to reconcile this state with the idea of freedom by

6. Ibid., p. 255.
giving a strong constitutional flavoring to monarchy." (7)

The coming of reason in the form of the development of culture (socio-political institutions) fosters the establishment/creation of laws with which man's freedom is forced to comply, surrendering his will to these socio-economic forms. Man forgets that his free development was the final goal. Man must always strive to perpetuate the established order and to transform it into its higher forms.

It is this negative element in the coming of reason which Marcuse appreciates in Hegel's philosophy. Marcuse accuses Hegel of being only partially aware of this whereas Marx is seen as the first to point to this negation.

The transition of philosophy to the domain of state and society has been an intrinsic part of Hegel's system. His (Hegel's) basic philosophical ideas (Reason & Spirit) have fulfilled themselves in the specific historical form. The demonstration of the role of labor and the process of its reunification and the process of its abolition is the greatest achievement of Hegel which was rightly borrowed by Marx. Marcuse glorifies Marx for having condemned Hegel for claiming that the process of reunification has already been overcome as the antagonisms of the civil society are set

7. Ibid. p. 218.
at rest in the monarchic state and that all contradictions are resolved in the realm of thought. This last being the most glaring mistake of Hegel which branded Hegel as an idealist. Marcuse here accuses Hegel of contradicting his own ideals of shifting the socio-political realm of human condition to that of the ideal world.

If Hegel was wrong in saying that reunification has not been abolished then who and how will this overcoming of reunification be overcome. Marcuse identifies two trends in post-Hegelian philosophy in this connection. One represented by Feuerback and Kierkegaard emphasis upon the isolated individual. The second represented by Marx which penetrates to the origin of the individual in the process of social labor and shows how labor is the basis of man's liberation.

Moreover, Hegel's philosophy rests upon a specific interpretation of the relation between subject and object. The antagonism between the subject and object is transformed into definite historical antagonism. The object first appears as an object of desire, something to be appropriated to satisfy a human want. In the course of appropriation the object becomes manifest as the otherness of man. Man is not with himself when he deals with the object of his desire and labor. Development beyond this point of relation between consciousness and objective world is a social process too.
Whereas, Hegel had at this point consummated the individual to the social whole, and reconciled the idea of freedom with state by giving a strong constitutional support to monarchy.

Marcuse however, contends that the critical employment of the dialectical method tends to disclose that individual freedom pre-supposes a free society and that true liberation cannot be acquired by individual isolated being as the Existentialists maintain. But true liberation requires liberation of the society. It is this element of the Marxian philosophy whereby the human acquires freedom not individually but collectively and that too not by yielding to the immediate socio-economic/historical situation but by transcending it by the employment of revolutionary consciousness which impresses Marcuse.

Thus, says Marcuse, "... all philosophical concepts of Marxian theory are social and economic categories whereas Hegel's social and economic categories are all philosophical concepts "(8). Marx's early writings express the negation of philosophy though not in a philosophical language. In Hegel all categories terminate in the existing order while in Marx they refer to the termination of this order. They aim at a new form of society even when describing its

8. Ibid, p. 258.
current form. Essentially they address themselves to a truth to be had only through the abolition of a civil society. Marx's theory is a critique in the sense, that all concepts are an indictment of the totality of existing order.

Marxism claims to pass from the state of ideology to reality, from philosophical interpretation to political action since the validity of reason (thought) in Marx is determined by the historical situation and the action of the proletariat. Marxism's deduction that if social relationships determine consciousness, then these very social relationships also color the form in which reality appears. Thus in Marxism even the metaphysical categories become sociological.

In his analysis of Marxism Vs. Hegel, Marcuse contends in the Introduction to "Soviet Marxism" that Marx has rejected the objectivity of the historical laws as implicative of Hegelian dialectic. However, it is attributed to Marx's thought the Hegelian position that reason sets up standards to which empirical reality must conform. Again Hegel's assertion that reality has, as a matter of fact met the requirements of reason because history is the actual progress of the idea is rejected by Marx who saw that here Hegel had falsified history. in contrast, Marx entrusts men
with the task of remaking the social order in accordance with the requirements of practical reason.

In interpreting Soviet Marxism and its theoretical origins, Marcuse is not only concerned with abstract dogmatic validity but also with the historical alternatives existing in the Soviet state. He views the development of Soviet Marxism from Leninism onwards as "anamalous constellations" in which a socialist society was to be built co-existent rather than subsequent to Capitalism. (14).

The study of "Soviet Marxism" by Marcuse leads to two conclusions which can be derived from his analysis:

1. What happened to Marxism when it was translated from ideology into practice in the Soviet Union was that the Soviet society conformed to the requirements of theoretical Marxism (requirement of Reason). But that Soviet Marxism has been increasingly adopted to fit in with the requirements of Soviet Reality. In other words, Soviet Marxism has changed the entire framework of Marxism.

2. The basic trends of the Soviet Marxism also imply that the specific conditions and objectives of industrialisation carried out in antagonistic competition with the Western World determined the theoretical features of Soviet Marxism.
And in some significant aspect the two antagonistic systems show a parallel tendency. Total industrialization led to the same patterns of political and ideological differences. Efficient businesslike management which is highly rationalized and centralized working on equally centralized and coordinated human and technical material, tends to promote political and cultural centralisation and coordination. In the West this trend has led to the corrosion of the humanistic, liberal ethics which was centered on the idea of an autonomous individual and his inalienable rights. In the Soviet state total industrialisation occurred under conditions incompatible with liberal ethics. Therefore, revolutionary state created its own system of values and indoctrinated the population accordingly. However, contemporary industrialization with specific techniques provide a common denominator which makes the abstract contrast between Soviet and Western ethics doubtful. (10).

CRITIQUE OF THE SOVIET AND WESTERN SOCIETY:

Marcuse, substantiates his cliche by: (1) pointing out the diversions in the doctrines of Karl Marx and Soviet Marxism as envisioned (formulated) by Lenin & Stalin, (2) By

pointing out the similarity of the foundation of the ethical systems of the West and Soviet state respectively.

Marcuse asserts that the emergence of Leninism as a new form of Marxism is characterized by two factors: (1) the attempt to draw the peasantry into the orbit of Marxian theory and strategy. 2) To attempt to redefine the prospects of Capitalism and revolutionary development in the imperialist era.

The dialectical historical structure of the Marxian theory implies that its concepts change with a change in basic class relationship at which they aim in such a way that a new content is obtained by unfolding the elements inherent in the original concepts. Thus preserving the theoretical continuity and identity of the concept. This also pertains to the revolutionary action of the industrial proletariat. The proletariat is the only force which can accomplish the transition to another stage. The Marxian conception maintains the identity of the historical agent (proletariat) prior to and after the revolution. If this class of the proletariat does not exist, i.e., does not act as a revolutionary agent then the socialist revolution does not exist (11).

11. Ibid., p. 29.
Since Marx is very unspecific about the details of transition from Capitalism to Socialism and how precisely would state power be exercised during this period of transition, Marcuse accuses Stalinism of completely misinterpreting Marx and his dialectics. Stalinism envisage the laws of dialectics as high level causal generalizations governing all change whether physical or social. Consequently, the transition to Socialism turns out to be law governed. History is seen as "operating independently, from consciousness and human beings, this is what makes Marcuse apprehensive of Soviet Marxism.

The second point which puts Soviet Marxism at odds with Marx's Marxism according to Marcuse is the shift in the revolutionary agent from the proletariat to the role of the peasantry as an ally of the proletariat under conditions where the proletariat fail to act as a revolutionary class. The proletariat may fail to act as a historical agent under two circumstances: (1) when the development of Capitalism shows a trend towards class collaboration rather than class struggle, towards national and international division rather than class solidarity. (12) this could happen as Engels had already warned the British proletariat under periods of stability and prosperity, is bound to come under the sway

12. Ibid., p.29. (Here, Marcuse develops the theme)
of Capitalist ideas and its immediate interests supercede its historic interests (13).

2. In the specific Soviet conditions where the Socialist revolution took root under conditions such that Capitalism had not revealed the level of organization as required for the awakening of the proletariat in order to accomplish the revolutionary consciousness. According to Soviet Marxism, in the transition from Capitalism to Socialism a basic change in the objective and subjective factors has taken place. To counteract the integration of a large sector of organized labor into the Capitalist system, the subjective factor of revolutionary strategy is monopolized by the party which assumes the character of a professional revolutionary organization directting the proletariat.

Finally, according to Marcuse, Soviet Marxism divests Marxism in its theory of state. In the Socialist state the beaurocracy has no separate economic base which gives it an extra power over the rest of the people. But Marcuse insists that the Soviet beaurocracy has developed a separate power based upon the control of the rationalized economy. (14)

Coming to the second part of his analysis of the Soviet doctrine, Marcuse maintains the common requirements of industrialisation make for a high degree of similarity between the values of Bourgeois and Soviet ethics. This similarity appears in work as well as sexual morality.

Soviet ethics recognizes this similarity by claiming that it stands for and promotes the very humanistic values for which potentialities exist in the Capitalist society. But due to the specific organisation of the society these values have been prevented from implementation. They claim that all cultural and material resources for implementing liberty, equality and development of human potentialities are many and since the prevailing social conditions nurture exploitation and repression, the existing system must be replaced by another system. The ideologies of bourgeois society may become a reality (in Soviet Socialist Society).

Marcuse, further claims that though the common requirements of industrialisation may define the affinity, the essentially different modes of industrialisation may generate the differences between the apparently identical values. In fact, Marcuse holds that the Soviet meanings of the terms Democracy, Peace, Freedom are very different from the West.
In the Soviet Society, the dissolution of the autonomous bourgeois individual corresponds to the latest stage of Capitalism where mass production and mass manipulation lead to the shrinking of the ego and to the administrative regulation of his material and intellectual needs. The coordination between public and private existence which at the post-liberal stage of Western Society takes place mostly unconsciously occurs in the Soviet society in the light of well-trained consciousness and as a publicised program.

The ethical values lose their autonomous character in the Soviet state and this loss is not compensated by transcendental sanctions. Ethics as a philosophical and existential discipline in its own right disappears. Though the sanction may come from "res publica" transcendental agency or moral autonomy of the individual conscience, disappears.

However, Marcuse continues that the main impact of Soviet ethics is not that an external force operating from outside and against the individual imposes ethical values. In other words it is not the externalisation of ethical values which is questionable in Soviet Ethics. Neither is the fact that the Soviet values are different from their Western counterparts but it is basically the protest against the alienation of man which materialist or idealist philosophy
expresses. In both cases, the attack is directed against the political organisation of industry — not against industrialisation of Soviet doctrine as such. (15)

Marcuse’s tone while analysing the Western society is not less pessimistic. His analysis of the West yeild the conclusion that the power of “negative thinking,” is endangered. Since negative thinking is the sole source of creative social criticism, it is in fact the obliteration of creativity in social life which is put at stake.

**ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN:**

Marcuse’s thesis holds that technical progress extended to a whole system of domination and coordination creates forms of life which appear to reconcile the forces opposing the system and to suppress all protest in the name of historical prospects of freedom from toil and domination. Even thought has been subordinated so that it provides no source for the criticism of social life. (16).

"One Dimensional Man" vacillates between two contradictory hypotheses: (1) that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change (2) forces and tendencies

may exist which may break the containment and explode the society. Marcuse's analysis of the West begins with the justification of the hypothesis that the society is a static, one dimensional society, a society having no opposition. Its productivity is said to be destructive of the free development of human needs and faculties. This society conquers the forces of society by technology not by terror but on the dual basis of increasing efficacy and a higher standard of living. Technology loses its neutral character and becomes a new system of domination which operates in the concept and contribution of techniques. As a technological universe, the advanced industrial society becomes a political universe and technological rationality becomes political rationality.

The technological society is characterised as a totalitarianism and is not a terroristic political coordination of society through a particular form of government or party rule. But its totalitarianism is a non-terroristic economic, technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs of the people by vested interests.

As against this one dimensional society' Marcuse points towards the two-dimensional thought and consequently two dimensional society as the model. Marcuse traces the two-
dimensional character of thought right from ancient Greeks (17). Plato had first emphasized upon the form of cognition in which the object of thought appears as that which it really is and is in antagonistic relation to its immediate contingent situation. Citing the notion of the essence of man, as a perfect example, Marcuse continues, as man finds himself in the universe, he seems to possess certain faculties and powers which enable him to lead a good life i.e., a life which is as much as possible free from toil, dependence and ugliness. To attain such a life is to get the best life to live in accordance with the essence of man.

Dialectical thought understands the critical tension between 'is' and 'ought', first as an ontological condition pertaining to the structure of Being itself - the recognition of this state of Being, its theory, intends from the beginning a concrete practice seen in the light of truth. The facts in themselves appear as false and negative. Consequently, thought is led to translate and realise the truth in the words and deeds of man. Man as a social animal brings in a political content. Thus, the Socratic discourse is viewed by Marcuse as a political discourse in as much as it contradicts the established political institution. Since

mere thought has no power to bring this change unless it 
transcends itself into practice, the very disassociation 
from the material practice in which philosophy originates 
gives philosophical thought its abstract quality. By virtue 
of this quality, critical thought is abstract and 
transcendent.

Secondly, the object of dialectical logic is neither the 
abstract, general form of objectivity, nor the abstract 
general form of thought, nor the data of immediate 
experience. Dialectical knowledge undoes the abstraction of 
formal logic and transcendental philosophy but at the same 
time denies the concreteness of immediate experience as 
absolute. Empirical data attains its truth if it has freed 
itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the 
factors which are the facts i.e. if it understands its world 
as a historical universe in which the established facts are 
the work of historical practice of man. The practice 
(intellectual or physical) is the reality in data of 
experience. It also is the reality which dialectical logic 
comprehends.

In social reality, Marcuse points out that, despite all 
change, domination of man by man is still a historical 
process as it continues that links pre and post-
technological Reason. However, the society which undertakes
the transformation of nature alters the base of domination by gradually replacing personal dependence (of slave on the master) by dependence on objective order of things (of economic laws). Domination now generates a higher rationality; that of a society which sustains its hierarchic structure while distributing the benefits of this exploitation on a larger scale.

In the political sphere this trend of total mobilization manifests itself in a marked unification of opposites. The classical Marxian theory envisages the transition from Capitalism to Socialism as a political revolution. The proletariat destroys the political apparatus of Capitalization but retains the technological apparatus subjecting it to socialisation (continuity in revolution). The capacity to contain and manipulate subversive imagination and effort is an integral part of the technological society.

The laboring classes are undergoing a decisive transformation. Mechanisation is reducing the quantity and intensity of labor which alters Marx's concept of proletariat. (18) To Marx the worker is the manual laborer.

who expands and exhausts his physical energy under sub-human conditions for the private appropriation of inhuman and revolting aspect of exploitation. The laborer is now no longer exposed to this physical exploitation. Moreover, the comforts of the technological age overwhelm the worker and destroys or silences any note of dissent against the existing order.

Marcuse further holds that in the realm of culture the progress of technological rationality liquidates the operational and transcending elements. Marcuse points out that what the technological culture is suffering from is not that the higher culture has deteriorated into a mass culture but the culture is being refuted by reality. The reality surpasses its culture. Man today can perhaps do more than the cultural heros but he has also destroyed the hope and destroyed the truth which were presented in the sublimation of higher culture. Though the higher culture is always in contradiction with reality and only a privileged minority enjoys its blessings and represents its ideals yet the two antagonistic spheres of society (reality and culture) have always co-existed.

However, in the advanced technological society, the antagonism between culture and reality has disappeared. This has been done by the suppression of the transcendental
element which constituted the other dimension of culture. The one-dimensional culture promotes the rationality of the status quo. Art, asserta Marcuse, contains the rationality of negation it — is the "Great Refusal," the protest against the mode in which man and things have been made to appear, to sound and speak, are modes of refuting and recreating their factual existence. Paying tribute to the antagonistic forces in society. Separated from the sphere of labor where society reproduces itself the world of art remains an ideal.

The culture in which alienation from reality is celebrated has its own style and rites. The saloon, the concert, opera and theatre are designed to create and invoke another dimension of reality. Their attendance requires festive preparations which transcend everyday experience. This essential difference between art and everyday life kept alive in the artistic alienation, is progressively closed by the technological society. The other dimension is absorbed in the prevailing state of affairs.

Further, the total administrative aspect is enhanced by the ways of communication which expresses only the one-dimensional behavior. Language tends to promote the identification of fact and reason, essence and existence, a thing and its function, self-validating propositions appear which function like magic-ritual formulas (19). Beyond the
harmless sphere of merchandising the bourgeois language, propositions assume the form of a suggestive command, they become evocative rather than demonstrative. Constant repetition assume a false familiarity. The same familiarity is reached by using personalized language.

Use of the hyphenised abridgment, designating terms of different spheres are forced into a solid overpowering whole. This functionalised, abridged and unified language is the language of one-dimensional thought.

The technological rationality forces the quantification of nature in terms of mathematical structures and separates reality from inherent ends. Ethics or values may have a higher dignity (spiritual or moral) but since they are not real, they count less in the business of life. If the good, the beautiful, the peaceful and the just cannot be either derived from ontological or scientific rationality then they cannot claim universal validity. (20).

Having thus demonstrated the one-dimensional character of the advanced industrial society in the spheres of thought, culture, politics and communication. Marcuse is faced with the question: how can thus administered and dominated

19. Ibid., p. 88.
individuals liberate themselves from themselves as well as from their masters?

The people previously, the instruments of social change, become the instruments of social cohesion in the one-dimensional society through the redistribution of wealth and equalisation of classes.

"However", Marcuse insists that, "underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and out-siders, the exploited and prosecuted of the other races and colors, the unemployed the unemployable, their life is in the most immediate and real need of ending intolerant conditions. They exist outside the democratic process. Thus, their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system. When they get together, and go out into the streets without arms, without protection, in order to ask for the most primitive civil rights, they know that they face dogs, stones, bombs, jail, concentration camps, even death... The fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period." (21) Marcuse, further adds that though the economic and technical

capabilities of the present society are sufficiently vast to allow for adjustments and concessions to the under-dog, and their armed forces sufficiently trained and equipped to take care of any emergency. Yet proclaims Marcuse "that there is a chance, just a chance." of a revolution to overcome the miseries of this age.

In the perspective of this dialectical theory of society, Marcuse can only be found to justifying a dialectical theory of the essence of man. This is against the theory of the positive concept of the essence of man. The positive concept"... sustains all critical and polemical distinctions between essence and appearance as guiding principle and model, is rooted in this polemical structure. In terms of the positive concept of essence all categories that describe the given form as historically mutable become ironic; they contain their own negation." (22).

On the other hand the concepts of dialectical man transcend the given social reality in the direction of another historical structure which is present as a tendency in the given social reality, this is the dialectical concept of essence. In this way the concept of the essence of man

assumes primary importance such that man must be freed from real need and real misery to achieve the liberation of becoming himself. The essence of man is understood in terms of tendencies which have a new form of social life as their goal and which practice must realize. This theory of man demands a real fulfillment of everything that man desires to be when he understands himself in terms of his potentialities. Man himself plans and shapes the social process of his life. He does not leave to the arbitrariness, of competition or the blind necessities of economic relations (23). The dialectical concept of the essence of man envisages the difference between fact and essence as the transcendence of essence by facts as historical i.e., individual men are appearances (facts) whose essence lies in the context of particular historical tendencies aiming at a different form of social existence. Measured against their real potentialities, men reveal themselves to be the 'bad' perverted or alienated existence which must be superceded by a new form of social life.

In view of the above Marcuse concludes: "The characteristic of essence no longer need to be established in timeless eternal forms. The truth according to which particular interests are preserved in the universal... have

23. Ibid., pp.72-73.
to prove themselves in the practice of the associated individuals and no longer in an absolute consciousness discovered from practice." (24).

24. Ibid., p. 87

PART - II

FROMM: MAN IN HIS PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Fromm's radical revision of feudsonism gives his thought a Marxist complexion. The Capitalist society though enables man to become aware of individual dignity and responsibility yet generates loneliness, isolation and anxiety which have grown beyond measure. Fromm's consideration of such thanss lead him to Existentialism which pervades his entire gamat of thought.

Fromm had synthesised the psychology of Frued by emphasising that man is a social being with Marx's social thought. However, he never intended to give a mono-causal view of the development of psychic life. The economic base was not the only factor responsible for the future development of an individual of a society, (1) for Fromm.

The task of synthesising Marx and Freud led Fromm to a historic and an existential approach and to the problems of philosophical anthropology. (2)

It was precisely this interest in humanism which led Fromm to become a supporter of Marx. For Fromm human relationship can be explained in terms of history instead of simply in terms of instinctual history. Fromm regards Marx's ideas as a revolt against conditions in which man loses his humanity and is turned into a commodity. They are a voice not only to achieve freedom from poverty but also freedom to develop the creative powers. Fromm rejects the interpretation of historical materialism as signifying a view according to which men are always actuated by material interests but rather held Marx as propagating its direct opposite. Marx is shown to advocate the freedom of an individual from any form of dependence and to become a master of his own fate.

Fromm did much to advocate Marx as a humanist and was right in showing the crude interpretation of Marx as a materialist and a believer in despotism as incorrect. Fromm also believed that modern Communism of Communist totalitarianism was contrary to the ideals of 1844 Manuscripts. (3)

2. Ibid.
Fromm also disapproves of Freud's attempts to construct a science of human nature by objectifying experience, to measure and calculate it precisely. According to Fromm, Freud is guilty of reductionism since Freud coverts complex human experience into a few hypothetical components i.e., Ego and super-Ego and intelletstudies the interplay of these components in a structure he called the psyche. Such an understanding destroys Fromm's understanding of man as being in the world. Besides, Freud's attempt to use objective techniques to study man left many problems regarding man unsolved for Fromm. Freud's techniques led him to investigate man in his biological condition but ignored personal and social problems as pseudo problems.

Beginning with the Marxist (4) and Existential (5) position regarding human nature, Fromm maintains that "... we can no longer talk of a 'human nature' of an essence of man! Man is no longer rational; he becomes rational. He no longer is social; he becomes social. He no longer is religious, he

"Marx saw in history, a constant process of man making himself if as an individual and as a species"

5. (Ibid). According to existentialism "... we lack an essence, that we are in the first instance an existence, that is we are that which we make ourselves during the course as our life,"
becomes religious? And what about human nature can we still refer to it? (6)

Fromm adopts a position in between the two extremes i.e. that of a fixed and unchangeable human nature and of lacking any essence at all. Taking help from the mathematical ideas of constants and variables, Fromm discovers human nature to be constant in so far as all men are men yet there are a number of factors that enables man for novelty, creativity and progress. Fromm endorses this view of constants and variables of human nature from Marx saying that even Marx spoke of human nature in general and human nature as modified in each historical epoch. (7)

In other words even though man is not wholly definable yet we can get an approximate idea of what may be called human nature. (8)

THE HUMAN SITUATION:
Man with respect to his body physiology belongs to the animal kingdom. The functioning of an animal is determined by instincts. An animal is always a part of nature whose instincts are determined by nature and never transcends it.

6. Ibid., p.5-7
7. Ibid., p.7
8. Ibid., p.9
At a certain point of animal evolution, a unique break occurred similar to the first emergence of nature, first emergence of life and first emergence of animal kingdom. The new stage in evolution is characterized by the fact that the actions are now no longer determined by instincts. When animal transcends nature, when he becomes biologically the most helpless, man is born. At this stage of evolution life becomes aware of itself. The basic difference between man and animal is the absence in man of the instinctive regulation in the process of adaptation to the surrounding world.

With the ceasing of instinctive adaptation man emerges with new qualities which distinguish him from animals. His awareness of himself as a separate entity, his ability to remember the past and visualize future, to denote objects and acts by symbols, to understand the world through reason and to imagine. Man is the most helpless of all animals, but this very biological weakness is the basis of his strength.


This separation from animal existence makes man into a "Freak" of nature. (11)

But man's "...birth is essentially a negative one" (12) He loses his definite existence to an indefinite open and uncertain existence. There is certainty only about the past or future in so far as it is death - even death is a return to past - an inorganic state of matter. Hence human situation is different from those of all other animals.

What characterizes the human situation is the presence of constant and unavoidable dis-equilibrium. Man's life cannot be lived by repeating the patterns of its species. "The necessity of finding ever new solutions for the contradictions in his existence, to find ever higher forms of unity with nature, his fellow men and himself, is the source of all psychic forces which motivate man, of all his passions, affects and anxieties". (13)

Reason which man possesses enables man (the only animal) who finds his own existence as a problem, which he has to solve and from which he cannot escape. Cast into the world at accidentally, being self-aware, he realizes his own

12. Ibid., P.30-31.
13. Ibid., P.31.
powerlessness. He has to live even though he is aware of death as the ultimate eventuality. Man is a part of nature yet separate from it by virtue of his ability to transcend nature with the help of reason and imagination.

The birth of man is understood by Fromm to be the same as the birth of an individual. When man transcended a certain minimum threshold of instinctive adaptation, he ceased to be an animal but he was as helpless as an individual infant to cope with human situation. The human history is nothing but the history of birth of man.

Man's life is determined thus, by the inescapable alternative between a return to animal existence and arrival at human existence. Any attempt to return is painful. Every step forward is frightening until a certain point has been reached where fear, doubt have only minor significance. All humanely rooted cravings are determined by this polarity. (14)

These splits in man's nature are called existential (because they are rooted in the existence of man) dichotomies.

There are contradictions which man cannot avoid but to which he can react in a number of ways. The most fundamental

14. Ibid., PP. 33-34.
dichotomy is that of, between life and death. The fact that we have to die is unalterable and of which he is aware yet he wants to live. Man tries to overcome this dichotomy through ideologies (e.g., religious concept of life after death). (15)

Resulting from this dichotomy is the contradiction between what man can be and what he is. The individual wishes to realize his potentialities. Thus, the contradiction between what he could realize and what he does realize also constitutes a contradiction of which man is all the time aware. Here too ideology reconciles the contradiction by assuming that fulfillment of life takes place after death.

Besides these existential dichotomies, historical dichotomies also exist. These are contradictions existing at a certain historical period and disappear with the passage of time (16).

Man existing in the human situation experience the following needs:

16. Ibid., p. 52.
A. RELATEDNESS:

Man loses his primary union with nature. In order to cope with such a situation he seeks new ties with his fellow men which replace the old ties, negated by instinct. The necessity to unite with other human beings is an imperative need for man's sane existence. This need is behind all phenomenon which constitute the whole gamut of instinctual human relations.

There are several ways in which this union is sought. (a) by submission, to a person, group, institution, God. In this way he transcends his separateness by becoming a part of something/ somebody bigger than himself and experience his identity in connection with the power to whom he has submitted himself. (b) Domination. Man can also unite with the world by having power over it by making others a part of himself and hence transcending his loneliness and separateness. In both cases of domination and submission, a symbiotic relatedness is found. In both cases the persons lose their integrity and freedom and live on each other and from each other.

The passion which satisfies man's need for relatedness is love. Love unites the man with other men and with nature. "Love is union with somebody or something outside one's self
under the conditions of retaining the separateness and integrity of one's own self. It is an experience of sharing of communion which permits the full unfolding of one's own inner activity." (17) Love is an aspect of the "productive orientation", (18), the active and creative relatedness of man, of his fellow man, to his nature. Productive love implies a syndrome of attitudes; care, responsibility, respect and knowledge.

B. **TRANSCENDENCE:**

Though man himself is a creature like other creatures of nature, yet he is different from them since he can create as well. He needs to transcend his passive creature state, like any other creature man is thrown in this world and will be removed from it again without his knowledge. But being endowed with reason and imagination man is driven by the urge to transcend the passive role of a creature by himself becoming a creator.

Man can create life along with other living organism with the difference that he is aware of being created as an act of creating. Man can create life by giving birth to

children, by planting seeds or by producing material objects. In the act of creation man transcends himself as a creature, raises himself beyond accidentalness, into purposefulness and freedom. In man's need for transcendence lies one of the roots of love, art, religion and material production.

If man is not capable of creating, then he transcends himself by destruction.

C. **ROOTEDNESS:**

Man's birth represents the severance of his natural ties from nature. Now that man loses his natural roots, who is he and where is he. He can dispense with his natural roots only when he finds new human roots. There is thus a deep craving in man to fight against being torn away from nature, other, blood and soil. (19) Man in order to be born however, in order to progress, has to sever the umbilical chord, he has to overcome the craving to remain tied to the mother. There are two modes in which man tries to overcome this contradiction; (a) brotherlines or (b) incest. Nationalism or idolatry, e.g., are forms of incest. Patriotism e.g., puts one's nation above humanity, above the principles

of truth and justice. Just as love for individual which excludes the love for others is not love, so love of one's country exclusive of the love of humanity is not love. The idolatry of patriotism is manifested in a reaction to the violation of clan symbols. (20)

D. SENSE OF IDENTITY:

"Man, being torn away from nature, being endowed with reason and imagination, needs to form a concept of himself, needs to say and to feel: 'I am I'. Because he is not lived, but lives, because he has lost the original unity with nature, has to take decisions, is aware of himself and his neighbour" as different persons, he must be able to sense himself as the subject of his actions" (21)

The basis of the full experience of individuality lies in making the individual free politically and economically, by thinking for himself free from authorization pressure and to feel an 'I' in the sense that he is the centre and active subject of his powers.

Many substitutes for this true sense of identity are expressed in the worship of nation, religion, class and

20. Ibid., P.43.
21. Ibid., P.62.
one's occupation which may serve to provide a sense of identity. Hence, the need of identity is satisfied by a true sense of individuality as against identifying one's self with the herd/community. (22)

In Fromm's thought man in terms of the true individual is defined as Rationality. For Fromm man finds himself surrounded by many puzzling phenomena and having reason he has to make sense of them, has to put them in some context which he can understand and which permits him to deal with them in his thought. The more is his reason developed, the more it approximates reality. It takes a long process to look at the world objectively i.e. to see reality as it is in itself. Reason is man's instrument to arrive at truth to develop a right picture of the world and intelligence helps man to deal with the world successfully. Reason is purely human but intelligence is shared by animals.

Reason must penetrate knowledge of man, nature and society and must not be fragmentised.

The need for a frame of orientation exists regardless of whether it is true or false. One to be in touch with reality by reason. Various ideological or religious ideals which satisfy man's quest for orientation exist . These

22. Ibid., P.63.
ideological or religious symbols provide not only a thought system but also an object of devotion which would give meaning to their existence.

Thus far, we have seen what Fromm means by human nature and what specifically characterizes human existence, and what specific human needs are generated. One important aspect however which is specific to human existence is that of Freedom. for Fromm "From the beginning of his existence" says Fromm, "man is confronted with the choice between different courses of action. In the animal there is an untarrupted chain of reactions starting with a stimulus,..." (23) Man is born without the equipment for appropriate action which the animal possesses, he is dependent on his parents for a longer time. He suffers from all those fears and anxieties which this lack of instinctive equipment implies. Yet this biological weakness and helplessness of man is the condition of human freedom. the fact that man possesses freedom is, holds Fromm, first manifested in the Biblical myth of Adam committing the first act of disobedience. This act of disobediences, an act of freedom is the beginning of reason, it breaks away the harmony of man and nature, and he becomes an individual. In

this transcendence/ alienation from nature, emerges a feeling of loneliness and freedom. The newly earned freedom becomes a cause of fear, since by its virtue man has lost his sweet bondage with paradise, he is not free to govern himself and realize his individuality. (24) Thus freedom characterizes human existence and it is the result of man's emergence from his oneness with nature. Human nature is neither biologically determined nor is it a sum total of cultural patterns to which it adopts itself,"... but it also has certain inherent mechanisms and laws."(25) Thus there are certain factors in man's nature are fixed. In other words, man must fulfill his physiological needs, i.e. he must eat, drink and protect himself from enemies. But to do all this, he must work and produce. Work is not something abstract or instinctive (a bee works instinctively) it is always concrete i.e., it is always a specific work done in a specific economic system. A person e.g., may work in a feudal system or business man in Capitalist system. Different personality traits and different kind of relations to others are generated. When man is born, he has to eat and live and therefore work and he has to work under particular conditions and in ways in which he is born.

24. Ibid., P.50
25. Ibid., P.37.
Since the individual has to mould himself to the mode of life rooted in the system of production and distribution peculiar to any given society. The individual however does not passively adapt himself to the cultural patterns but rather human adaptation is a dynamic adaptation.

The more freedom, a man acquires (freedom in the sense of emerging from the original oneness with man and nature), the more he becomes an individual. (The growing process of the emergence of the individual from his original ties... may be called "individualization"). \(^{26}\) The more the child grows and to the extent the "primary" ties \(^{27}\) are cut off, the more it develops a quest for free and independence. The process of growing individualisation possesses a dialectical quality having two aspects: (1) As the child grows physically, emotionally and mentally, an organized, structure guided by the individual's reason and will develops in which the three faculties get more integrated. In other words, this integrated system may be called the self. Thus, one aspect of the process of individualization is the emergence of a self. (2) The other aspect of this

\(^{26}\) Ibid., PP.39-40.

\(^{27}\) See: Ibid., P 40. For the definition of "Primary, ties" which is in contrast with "secondary bonds" (P 163) implying one's reliance on others.
process of individualization is growing aloneness. The primary ties offer security and unity to the individual. Once the ties break, the individual becomes aware of being alone in a threatening world which is overwhelmingly big and powerful. He suffers from feelings of powerlessness, insecurity and anxiety.

Once the stage of complete individualization is reached, man is faced with a new problem: to orient and root himself in the world and to find security by relating himself to the world in ways over and above those of his preindividualisation stage.

Thus, faced with the urge to unite himself with the world, he proceeds to satisfy the urge by relating himself to the external world and to other men by spontaneity of love or productive love. In case, he is not able to relate himself by love or work he may be tempted to give up his individuality to overcome the feelings of anxiety, aloneness, insecurity and powerlessness. However, just as a child can never go back to his mother's womb, so the attempt to give up one's individuality will lead him to seek false ways of escaping from freedom.

**MECHANISM OF ESCAPE:**

Once the primary bonds which give security to the individual
are broken and he faces the world as a separate entity. He faces a state of unbearable powerlessness, and aloneness. Two courses of action are open to him. He may either gain "positive freedom", by relating himself to the world in spontaneous love and work by genuinely expressing his emotional and intellectual capabilities. In this case, one relates to the world yet he does not humiliate himself by surrendering the integrity and independence of his self. Or in the second alternative, the individual may try to overcome his aloneness which arises due to a gap between his individual self and the world by attempting to bridge the gap by merging himself to the world or to other men. Since the original unity can never be achieved, the second course fails to comply with the overcoming of loneliness and feelings of powerlessness and anxiety. (28). Since the second course of action adapted by the individual to gain the lost unity with nature cannot grant the relatedness sought by the individual but rather gives him a false sense of unity whereby the individual loses himself in the world. In an attempt in Fromm's view to free from the perils of freedom and its consequential feelings of powerlessness and anxiety.

28. Ibid., P.161.
While giving a psychological analysis of this escape mechanism Fromm lists three major forms of escape namely (a) Authoritarianism (b) Destructiveness and (c) Atomization.

A. **AUTHORITARIANISM**:

The tendency to give up the independence of the individual self and to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside of one's self in order to acquire the strength which the individual self is lacking. (29) or to seek secondary bonds as a substitute for primary bonds which have been lost.

This second definition of authoritarianism, may be pointed out, may not only be restricted to escape mechanism only since, even while pursuing spontaneous love and work one is trying to seek secondary ties as a substitute to primary ties.

The striving for domination and even submission among normal people express this diffusion of the individual in some external authority and are both forms of escape from unbearable aloneness (individualism).

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Submission which expresses itself in forms of masochistic strivings appear most in feelings of inferiority, powerlessness and individual insignificance. (30) Domination on the other hand appears in the sadistic attitudes expressed for instance in saying; "I rule over you because I know what is best for you." Or "I am so perfect that I have a right to expect everyone else become dependent upon me" or by striking first I am defending myself against the danger of being hurt.

Domination is the attitude to make one's self the absolute master over others seems to be the opposite of masochistic tendencies which consists in submitting one's self totally to some other person or authority. Yet the two attitudes stem from the same need springing from the inability to bear the isolation and weakness of one's own self. Both these attitudes are different manifestations of one's need for getting rid of the sense of isolation by restricting with the other and may be called 'Symbiosis' (30)

B. DESTRUCTIVENESS:

I can escape the unbearableness of my loneliness and powerlessness by destroying the world or the object which generate in me feelings of separateness and powerlessness.

In destroying the object I still remain alone but this loneliness is not accompanied by the fear of being crushed by it. Since I have by destroying it removed it, its threat is no longer there. Destruction is the most desperate attempt of an individual to save oneself from being destroyed by it.

Though sadistic tendencies are also destructive yet the two are quite different. Sadism is a form of symbiosis in which the individual aims at incorporating the object whereas destruction does not aim at active or passive symbiosis but at the elimination of the object. (31)

**AUTOMATION - CONFORMITY:**

This is what majority of us accept as a mechanism of escape. Here the individual adopts entirely the personality offered to him by cultural patterns and becomes exactly what others expect him to be. The discrepancy between the "I" and the world disappears and with it the consciousness of isolation and powerlessness but at a high price of losing one's self. This mechanism Fromm compares with the protective coloring some animals assume. (32)

31. Ibid., p. 202
32. Ibid., P. 209.
The atomization of the individual in modern society has also increased the helplessness and insecurity of an average individual.

In this chapter, I shall now concentrate on the relation between individual and society, the nature of the relation between individual and society in the modern age and finally some comments about future as found in Fromm.

At this point Fromm is led to wonder if freedom yields to isolation and fear then is not freedom negative or if positive then how can one break the vicious circle of the emergence of freedom and its resulting into unbearable feelings of anxiety, fear, helplessness and isolation which makes one surrender one's freedom and independence. Is there positive freedom in which no negative feelings are generated but in which the individual exists as an independent being yet is not isolated but unified with the world, nature and other men?

Such a freedom can be acquired claims Fromm by being one's self, through the process of self realization. However, self-realization is not just the development of intellectual insight as is the standpoint of the idealists. Self realization means the development of one's total potentialities and by the actual expression of intellectual as well as emotional potentialities present in the
individual. These potentialities become real to the extent they are expressed. Thus, positive freedom consists in the spontaneous activity of the total integrated personality such as the activity of an artist. (33) Spontaneous activity is however, best expressed in love which is an experience characterized by polarity in the sense that not only one wishes to retain one's own identity but one seeks union with the other so as to overcome separateness but at the same time the individual self is preserved. In this way history of mankind maintains Fromm, is a history of growing freedom - individualization. The quest for freedom is not a metaphysical force but a necessary result of individualization process and the growth of culture. (34)

The modern democratic society holds Fromm, initiates large scale atomization - an escape from atomization - an escape from freedom. This atomization though widespread today all over the world cannot do away with the basic condition that makes for the quest for freedom.

In modern democracy it is true that man is free from all external restraints and he is free from a number of natural and political forces and has thus increased the urge for

34. Ibid., p. 264.
freedom. Yet unfortunately, Fromm maintains the society is not an ideal society in which complete freedom prevails. True freedom is not 'freedom from' but also 'freedom to'. Though the 'freedom from' has been achieved by the modern man yet he is notable to freely develop his self and establish his individuality. (35)

The modern society whether Capitalist or Socialist generates the tendency to conform. The tendency to conform is first inculcated in the early years of child rearing when e.g., the child is imparted emotional training, when he is taught, not to express, the growth of mass culture too leads to conformist tendencies. The mass culture promotes the feelings that the problems of the society are too complicated for an average individual to be tackled and thus discourages him to think on his own. (36)

In order to understand any culture, one must understand its ideas as presented in social, political and religious thought. The point which Fromm wishes to make here is not that the culture of a time is determined by the ideology but what he intends to say is that any given period of history can be explained in terms of its social character. Before

35. Ibid., p. 266.
36. Ibid., pp. 275-764.
defining social character, we would first define character as understood by Fromm. Character in the dynamic sense is the specific form in which human energy is shaped by the dynamic adaptation of human needs to particular modes of existence of a given society. Character in its turn determines the thinking, feeling and acting of individuals (37). Different societies and classes have different social character on the basis of which different ideas develop and become powerful. The history of the development of Christian doctrines or even the history of the development of the monotheistic religion (38) shows that their ideas were powerful forces because they appealed to the needs and anxieties of the people of that period. The idea of work and success appeals to a tribe in the olden days because man feels isolated and unrelated to the world and he thinks that work can re-relate him to nature and society. Character not only guides the individual in acting in accordance with what is necessary for him from the practical stand point but to give him satisfaction from him activity as well.

What is wrong with the modern society is that people are well fed, well-clad, have their wishes satisfied and having

37. Ibid., p. 307.

38. Fromm, Erich. You Shall Be As Gods, op cit., For the development of religious history as held by Fromm.
no wishes which cannot be satisfied the modern man has become an automaton. He does not think, does not reason and does not love. He continues to live, he is not forced to live in any particular manner by any particular force or leader. He follows without force and he is guided without a leader. He can make machines which act like machines. The intelligence of man has risen but not his power of reason. The modern man thus has made the dangerous gap between the abundance of material power but no knowledge or wisdom to use it.

In fact, the modern man asserts Fromm, is an alienated man. The alienation of today's man is the result of atomization. In fact alienation confronts the modern man with the danger that men may become robots.

The only way out of this situation suggests Fromm is that "We must take the responsibility for the life of all men..., a relative sharing of wealth and a new and more just division of economic resources." (39). International cooperation and planning and complete disarmament to abolish the threat of war. We must retain the industrial method feels Fromm.

39.  Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, op cit., p. 313. for an explanation of the idea. Also see pp.294-297.
The present social and political systems must be replaced by humanistic communitarianism. (40) The problem of today is not the legal problem of property ownership as is considered to be in the controversy between Capitalism and Socialism, but that of sharing work and experience. Income must be equalized to the extent of giving everybody the material basis for a dignified life. But the main goal must be to give man (and not some ideal as that of economic egalitarianism) its lost place, i.e. to become an end in himself. However, no change must be brought about by force. And any change must be a simultaneous change in the political, economic and cultural spheres. Change in one sphere may destroy change in other. The ancient man was helpless before the forces of nature but today's man is helpless before the idols created by himself. The idols (41) are not just divine but democracy, institution, ideology, nation, country, culture — these are all modern idols which man worships.

To create a society of positively free beings man will have to destroy the idols by "... creating a Sane Society, which conforms to the needs of man needs which are rooted in

40. Ibid., pp.279-294. for an explanation of the concept.

41. See: "You Shall Be As Gods", by Fromm for an explanation of idols and idolatory. pp.36-40.
the very condition of his existence.

SUMMARY

Thus, working out the philosophy of man in his socio-political aspect in the Marxian existentialist tradition, Marcuse develops a dialectically dynamic view of man. For him, the nature of man can no longer be conceived in terms of external immutables essences spelling out the potentialities of existing particular man. For Marcuse, man is a historical being existing in a social environment and possessing potentialities to develop into a being capable of meeting all his needs as arising from him. This can be done only by social transformation and hence Marcuse suggests a concept of an actively participating man in the social dynamics. His critical analysis of the modern man shows how man's behavior is one-dimensional mainly caused by massification of all forms of social existence. It also contains a hope of liberating man as dialectical through praxis by social transformation.

While analysing the psychological factors is shaping the concept of today's man characterises him to be a "Freak of nature". As a victim of a number of existential

42. Fromm, Erich. The Sane Society, op cit., p.314.
dichotomies, he tries to escape freedom given to him due to the lack of instinctive equipment to deal with nature. However, man possesses the potentiality to acquire freedom through positive love. That is, man can become free by spontaneous activity of his total integrated personality.
CONCLUSION

Marxism and Existentialism are the two prevalent ideologies of the age. Though apparently, Existentialism seems to be a negation of Marxism yet, we attempt to harmonise them as has been done by Sartre, Marcuse and Fromm. The existential theme of humanism is traced in Marxism.

It is realized that both Existentialism and Marxism subscribe to the doctrine of humanism i.e., both aim at man/humanity as the nucleus of their thought. However, it seems as if both rest on different premises and arrive at similar conclusions. Man is governed by material forces according to Marxism whereas he is determined by his own choice & decisions according to Existentialism. Whether Marxism and Existentialism are compatible with each other or not is the point at issue. We wish to develop the view that the humanism involved in both the doctrines is not only compatible but has in fact, developed into a much richer doctrine. The contemporary concept is richer because it no longer is constitutive of a single static and unchangeable essence. But man is now characterised by existence whose specific feature lies in being dialectical, dynamic, and trying to be what it is not but what it can be (possibility). Hence existence of man since deprived of essence emerges as a non-determined and a free being. This free being is found to be free not in a void but his
facticity is found to be the ground of this freedom. Sheding off the metaphysical aspect, man is now seen as a free being operating in a social field, interacting with other men and indulging in praxis so as to develop and materialize his possibilities.

Lukács, in "Existentialism vs Marxism", maintains that the criteria for any "epoch-making" philosophy is that the new philosophy should be able to reflect reality and later shows how Existentialism has been able to remain popular under the changed circumstances by giving the notion of freedom a central place since freedom is no more a myth in today's world. (1)

To a certain extent Sartre himself was aware of the contradiction between Existentialism and Marxism and he wrote, "We were at the same time persuaded that historical materialism provided the only correct interpretation of history and that Existentialism remains the only concrete approach to reality. I do not intend to deny the contradiction inherent in this position." (2) but since


Marxism is said to be retarded in its own development, in order to work out the dialectics of personal freedom and the necessities of responsibilities resulting from social determinism which constitute the subject matters of Existentialism and Marxism respectively the two need to be reconciled with each other so as to understand the individual socially and as socially conditioned. The incompatibility of Existentialism with Marxism arises because of the seeming contradictions between the fundamental aims of the two philosophies viz:

a) Historical materialism understands human action and motives as socially conditioned and

b) Existentialism seeks the true source of social phenomena in the autonomous free individual. Though both the systems maintain that man is the architect of his own destiny and he creates his own environment. It is by synthesizing the two systems that one can arrive at a radical notion of man which can be said to be the contemporary notion of man implicit in the activities of man interacting with his social, physical and natural world. What is maintained is the view that not all the basic tenets or doctrines of the two can be synthesized (which perhaps may not be the case as well), but that the two philosophies put together, generate a new concept of man. A few basic tenets
which cannot be reconciled are listed below:

1) For Existentialism, the universe is irrational; for Marxism it is lawful. (3). Social structures are rational and necessary for Marxism but absurd and contingent for Existentialism. Though social structures may become untenable at some stage of economic development and hence become inaccessible and absurd to human mind for Marxism, they remain inherently absurd for the Existentialist.

2) For the Existentialist, ambiguity prevails over existence since the social system lacks rationale. The Marxist, on the other hand believes that the ambiguity can be overcome by human effort and is an important factor in development and progress.

3) For the Marxist, Nature and society are prior to the individual on the contrary, the category of men, is central for the Existentialist.

4) Existentialism being a philosophy of despair aims at transcendence of any externally imposed condition of life. This attitude is contrary to the militant attitude of Marxism.

In order to work out the contemporary concept of man, a survey of the dominant themes of the two philosophies regarding man seems necessary:

The classical thought subscribes to the view that man is definable in terms of a fixed nature or human essence. However, the advent of Hegel changed the traditional view. The historical approach of Hegel showed that it would be a folly to hold that all men possess a fixed and a common essence. On the contrary, man is now seen as a being constantly making himself (creating himself) as an individual and as a social being in the process of history.

Contrary to the essentialistic theory of man, the Existentialist theory emerged with its seeds in the philosophy of Hegel. It develops a theory of essence different from an unchanging, necessary, transcendental and potential concept. The notion of a stable and Absolute essence was replaced by the dynamic concept of essence in the Hegelian dialectic.

Consequently, the concept of man emerging from this new philosophy turned out to be existentialistic according to which human existence is no more subject to an essence already laid down somewhere in the heavens, determining man's behaviour in this world. Since man is not subject to a
static, self-identical essence, he is now seen as an existing being who in the process of becoming creates his own essence. Thus, a new concept of a becoming, temporal and historical man emerges. Though in viewing man as a being-for-self, Hegel departed from the classical view yet he remains within the confines of abstract logical thought. Being-for-self is, for Hegel consciousness and by consciousness he means Absolute consciousness which manifests itself in different ways i.e., in individual man. Hence man is only a moment in the unfolding of the Absolute. The Being-for-self which is characterised as reference to itself is found to be pure immediacy and with reference to negativity, the for-itself is found to be a "self-subistence, the one." this unit without distinction in itself excludes the other from itself. (4)"As simple Being, the One is simple self reference; as modified Being it is determination; but the determinateness is not a finite determinateness. is not in this case a finite determination... but infinite...."(5) "The readiest instance of Being for self is found in the 'I'.... Man it may be said, is distinguished from the animal world...by


5. Ibid.
knowing himself as "I." "(6) Finally, the Being-for-self is also characterized as ideality "Again, Being-for-self may be described as ideality." (7) Thus man being a Being-for-self is indeterminate, infinite and ideality. Because it is Ideality, for-itself is hence a characterisation of the Absolute consciousness of which various individual men are multifarious examples.

In the "Phenomenology of Mind" Hegel explains how consciousness (Absolute) tries to overcome the objectivity and in fact, takes his reader to the self-identification of subjectivity with objectivity. Hegel thus tries to overcome the dualism between subjectivity and objectivity yet he remains within the bounds of traditional Aristotelian categories of abstract/concrete, subject/object. However, the Being-for-self or Absolute consciousness is not a perfect being which is self identical like the Form or essence of traditional philosophy or the Cogito of Descartes. Nor is it a windowless Monad of Leibniz. But it is only in the activity of the individuals, the various manifestations of for-itself that the Absolute acquires concretion.

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
Though it may seem that Hegel is here finally able to cut away the bond between the individual, active, existing, concrete Being-for-self from the Perfect Absolute, but Hegel holds: "The renunciation of individuality as self is the moment (phase) through which self-consciousness makes the transition to the universal will, the transition to positive freedom." (8) Thus, for Hegel man remains only a phase in the development of the Absolute, having no reality or value of his own but owing its value and reality to the Absolute.

Whatever may be the affiliations of Hegel to traditional philosophy, his radicalism in the concept of man is found in discovering the identification of essence and existence, subject and object, abstract and concrete and developing the concept of man not as static, perfect and closed being but as an active and a progressive Being.

That which is formal in Hegel becomes real and historical in the philosophy of Karl Marx.

Marx saw in history a constant process of man making himself as an individual and as a species. if man constructs or makes himself by changing and modifying himself in time.

then man becomes a historical and a temporal being and the talk about the essence of man becomes superfluous.

The human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations (Thesis on Feuerbach vi). Man is thus understood only in the context of social relationships who engage themselves in production through labor.

Man in his labor not only makes himself but he also objectifies (creates products). And in objectifying labor as such he subjectivises nature. Borrowing Feuerback's conception of man as a "species-being," Marx distinguishes men from animals as possessing free conscious activity by exteriorsation of his powers in objects. What is implicit in Marx is made explicit in the Existentialist thought. For Marx human nature consists in man making himself in history, for Heidegger and his successors man by definition lacks an essence, he is in fact an "existence first and foremost", hence the famous existential dictum "existence precedes essence." i.e., we are what we make ourselves. Thus Marx's emphasis on the efficacy of human action upon historical forces alone is not found to be sufficient for the Existentialists. Taking human existence as prior to essence altogether man is found to be efficacious not only in history but making his own essence as well.
Whereas Marx spoke of man as a species-being possessing a social and historical character, the existential man emerges as an isolated individual, projecting and choosing his own being and hence the being of society, history and the world. As a consequence, bestowing meaning and value to them. Thus in Marx, value is imparted not to the concrete individual but to an abstract social being who is the result of historical forces, whereas in Existentialism the concrete individual is found to be the fountain head of all values, truth and meaning. Though the concepts of dynamism, activity and dialectics originate in the philosophy of Hegel, they remain abstract and general. They acquire historicity in Marx and are now found to be totally concrete, individual and human in the existential philosophy of Heidegger, Sartre and their followers.

Marx in his enthusiasm for showing man as the architect of history left him as determined by the forces of dialectic and history and man is finally made to loose his individuality and is made a social being. The Existentialists on the other hand while emphasizing the isolated individual led to the problem of integrating this individual into a society. This integration is found in Heideggerian concept of Dasein as not only a Being-in-the-world but as a "Being-with-others" and in Sartre's concept of for-itself as a Being also characterised as a "Being-for-
others" Thus, it would be wrong to regard the theories of Existentialism as totally individualistic, though the emphasis is on concrete individual yet the social character of man is never lost sight of. Rather, is it is maintained that the sociability of man i.e., interaction of man among themselves is not a matter of chance but is due to the very structure of the Being of man.

In contemporary philosophy the traditional notion of essence has undergone a radical transformation. Man has essence according to Aristotelian thought. But in the contemporary thought though he can be characterised in a number of ways. The way man is characterised cannot be put in the categories of actuality and potentiality, but it (essence) acquires a purely descriptive character.

For Hegel essence and its appearance (manifestation, concretisation, objectivisation of the Absolute) are two modes of the same Absolute Being which bare a reciprocal relation with each other such that the existence of appearance presupposes the essence. The existence becomes what the essence is. Thus, for Hegel essence is a process in which it has a history. This Hegelian notion in later philosophy of essence finds meaning in history not in ideal forms and proceeds from unmediated Being of essence to the mediated being of existence. However, It is interesting to
note that for Hegel it is not man but the Absolute that becomes and regains essence through existence. Man participates in this process only as the subject of cognition since he himself is a rational Being. In later philosophy man, however, is not only an abstract participant in the development of essence but is in fact the architect of essence, Hegel’s concept of man already contained all the dynamism and historicity in the concept of man developed in later philosophy though in an ineffective and metaphysical sense. Essence is a movement but a movement within itself, hence man is characterised by activity but this activity or movement is not for the sake of man himself but for the essence. Hegel transcends the distinction between what could be (essence) and what is (existence) since an essence must exist by its very nature, yet his theory remains, abstract and metaphysical.

However, the philosophy of existence while radically breaking from the classical philosophies is no longer in search of an immutable, eternal, substantial and self-identical essence. But Hegel’s insistence on Becoming marks him off from those of his predecessors. The Hegelian idea that to understand man involves an understanding of a larger totality. For existential thought, to consider man as a part of a whole is simply to negate man. Man is in inflate relation with himself, and his destiny lites in a process of
becoming. Assigning a new meaning to the concept of transcendence marks a new development in the (philosophy of Existence). Man does not transcend towards a God, a Spirit, Idea or a Being other than himself. But man transcends towards the world, the future and towards other peoples. Thus, only man is capable of transcendence as it is immanent in his own being. This transcendence leads to the concretisation of man, the being of man.

The concretisation of man is further endorsed by the fact that man possesses not just abstract possibilities for his future but he possesses real concrete possibilities embedded in the specific socio-historical conditions. The individual being an individual in the world, is in relation not only with the natural physical world but also with other people. Thus, though there is an emphasis on the concrete individual, the existential philosophy is not merely subjective but it combines subjectivity with objectivity by showing that the subject man is always in a socio-historical world.

But this involvement of the for-itself with its socio-historical setting does not convert man into a massive being. Sartre here stressed the point by accusing Heidegger on this issue, since the Heideggerian ontology of Dasein does not lead to it. Sartre is not fair in making a sharp
distinction between care and consciousness and feeling. Dasein as blind in-itself. The Dasein as "mineness" implies a concernful subjectivity which involves the potentiality of comprehending its possibilities.

The Sartrean for-itself seems a more potential concept as compared to Heidegger's concept of existence. Since it is found to be the origin and source of non-Being in the universe and it is nothing in the world or beyond the world but constitutes the unique structure of man. Hence it is not a fact but an act of consciousness, it is not Nothingness but nihilation. For this reason the world is distinguished by Sartre from the for-itself and is found to be an in-itself, but for Heidegger the world, without being subjectivised is found to be a dimension of Dasein, since the Dasein is not a subject (consciousness) but "openness" of the world. Similarly Sartre's being-for-others is contrary to Heidegger's being-with-others. Whereas for Heidegger the interpersonal relationships are based on coexistence, in Sartre they are those of struggle. What the fundamental difference between Heidegger and Sartre is that Sartre is on the plane where there are only men but Heidegger is on the plane where there is only Being.(9) For Sartre, being.

time, nothingness are all productions of subjectivity; for Heidegger man is not the source or origin of being but he is an answer to or he is the best manifestation of being.

Sartre's view of man as the subject of all being led to the development of the social theory that man is the subject or creator of history. The objectification of human activities is compared with man's inherent possibilities and man is taken to be the producer of all his historical life forms.

Thus, Sartre's Existentialism extends Marx's dialectical materialism as a method and it tries to determine the sector of being to which it is applicable. Sartre discovers this sector in the region of being called being-for-itself. With the intention of preventing the dialectic from becoming a divine or a metaphysical law, he showed how the individual is the source of dialectic as against any supra-individual ensemble. Thus, the dialectic now looses all meaning unless it is seen as based in an individual, grasped in the totality of his conditions and relations as a totalisation. Sartre, however, emphasizes on the individual simply because if the intelligibility of history is to be shown, it must be shown to be understood by an individual.

According to Sartre, if the individual is explicable through the society but not vice versa i.e., the forces of history
are impersonal and immune to individual praxis then Socialism as the socialization of man will never constitute humanization of man. History must be shown to be the resultant of individual praxis. Thus, Marxism which has so far been a social theory now steps into an academic sphere and seeks to answer not the traditional Marxian question as to how to seize power and revolution but also raises the question of how to guarantee the revolutionary freedom or thought retreating into the free and rich world of culture.

Now the task of man has become a rational organization of society to be achieved by practice by changing the present form of society. The materialist theory is now imparted a new meaning for it now aims at transcending the given state of fact to a potentiality proceeding from the essence of man. The essence of man generally appears in a bad perverted from called "alienation". This perverted form can be overcome and hence negated in history by that which could be. Thus, society is found to possess an antagonistic character in terms of the bad perverted form to be replaceable by that which could be i.e., the essence. This, antagonistic state of society ensues a dialectical relation in the being of man as having both an essence, as well as a factual, perverted being. Thus, the radical break with Hegelian concept of essence is once again witnessed. Hegel conceives of essence as a process in which mediated being is
posed through the overcoming of unmediated being, essence has a history but now when we say that man has an essence we mean that he is not in reality what he shows himself to be, that his immediate existence does not correspond to what he is in himself. But rather as existential Being it is the overcoming of its own mediacy and therefore mediates itself with itself. For Hegel, it is not man who recollects essence, he only participates as the subject of cognition in the realization of essence in existence. The new transcendence leading from facts to essence is historical. Through it given facts are understood as existents whose essence can be apprehended only in the context of particular historical tendencies. Thus, in place of a static, epistemological relationship of essence to existence (Hegel) now emerges a critical and dynamic relation of essence and existence as dialectical parts of a historical process.

On the basis of this theory of the essence of man, man must be freed from real need and real misery to achieve the liberation of becoming himself since the new social theory points the way from the bad current state of society (alienation) to a humanity that disposes off the goods available to it in such a way that they are distributed in accordance with the true needs of community, where men would themselves take on the planning and shaping of the social process and are not led by the blind necessity of
competition or any other form of reified socio-economic relation. Labor is shown to be used in the service of life and life would not be used in service of labor.

Thus, Marcuse seeks an insight into the nature of Marxism, the means and ends of revolutionary Marxism, involves himself in an investigation into the philosophical/ontological basis of Marxism, nature of revolutionary subject, obstacles hindering the emergence of authentic existence. (10) However, the central concern of Marcuse's thought retains the Heideggerian truth namely, the raising of the question of the possibility and nature of authentic existence. For Marcuse, Heidegger failed to see the basic economic division of society, consequently. Heidegger was unable to visualise the emancipatory role of the proletariat and wrongly believed that isolated individual can overcome the menace of the current society (11).

Marcuse's adoption of Freudian categories represents a further development of the Marxian concept of human essence. While he believes that 'primary drives' are subject to modifications in history he also believed that men possess a


11. Ibid., p. 6
"common instinctual character". (12).

The two common instincts shown by all humanity are the life instinct (Eros) and death instinct (Thanatos) whereby Eros becomes the ultimate source of civilization.

Thus, we see in Marcuse a marriage of Heideggarian and Marxian concept of man with a flavour of Freud's psychoanalysis. In Marxian thought what Marcuse finds objectionable is the nature of the revolutionary subject or the Marxian concept of proletariat. For Marcuse, a process of constant conceptual refinement must take place where by any concept which fails to adequately interpret the current society must be discarded. Observing and experiencing a growth in living standards, he believed that a high living standard must be distinguished from authentic existence which is quite different from satisfied enslavement of a consumer society as shown is the "One Dimensional Man." He thus found Marxism as incapable of envisaging the development of Capitalism in such a manner. Thus, a theoretical discussion into the causes of why men remain deprived (alienated) yet happy in advanced industrial society is opened. The agency of revolution i.e., the proletariat is abandoned and a new hope for true liberation

12. Ibid., p. 51
is worked out for the achievement of a free, creative subject who is capable and willing to develop fully all forces of existence repelled by current reality. (13).

Hence, Marcuse's theory abandons the scientific work of Marx on the basis as Marx's labor theory and his account of repression seeks to resolve the problem of "happy proletariat" by incorporating the theory of Freud. For Freud too, society was founded on repression just as Marx's theory of alienated man is based on the repressive class societies. However, for Freud the society remains forever repressed since this repression is based on the inevitable human nature. Whereas for Marx and Marcuse both, the possibility of a non-repressive civilized society founded upon the potential wonders which true liberation will bring (for Marcuse), or by proletariat revolution for Marx, is possible.

Hence Marcuse's version of human society is a revision of Marxism in which he develops his own theory of Freud's "Metapsychological categories." For both Marx and Freud history of civilization is a history of human repression and for both man becomes a determinate reality in the external

world which results in false consciousness, or reification. For both theories are critical since the concepts employed by the two transcend the description of phenomena.

Since Marcuse believed that political and psychological theory in the present era have become one. (14). Therefore he attempted a reconciliation of Marx and Freud.

What Marcuse is suggesting is not a total refutation of Marx since for Marcuse Capitalist society has brought about a tremendous increase in the productive forces and hence laid the foundation of Socialism. Though he believes with Marx that the contradiction between forces and relations of production are also manifest in the capitalist system. Marcuse believes that since the capitalist has gained a consciousness of the 'laws' governing his systems, therefore he manipulates these laws in his interest such that the third factor of Marx's political theory of revolution has altered since the historic agent of change has disappeared. Marcuse's pessimistic version of Marxism, finds some hope where he believes that change can be brought about not by the proletariat but by the suppressed minorities. At this juncture Marcuse seems to be diverting from Marx's position for according to Marx manipulation and consciousness of the

laws cannot alter the movement of history from Capitalist to the Socialist stage. The current stage of Capitalist development, however, in the affluent society in which the needs and desires of individuals are manipulated through social control and the private life is totally hidden by the public life. The suppression of this private life transforms that society into a "closed society" as the available images, discretion and language usage does not allow different forms of action to emerge.

The difference between 'is' and 'ought' disappears and the society thus becomes "One Dimensional". What Marcuse's analysis of Capitalism lacks is that he does not give any reason as to how the new factors pointed out by him such as those of high income and rise of middle class can abolish the central contradiction of Capitalism i.e., how can affluent Capitalism resist the contradiction of "repressed Capitalism and hence avoid social change. (15).

Marcuse's application of the Freudian categories to the nature of man encouraged Fromm to give a complete psychological analysis of the contemporary man. While developing the Marxian concept of man Fromm admits "... my disagreements with Marx's thinking... are few as far as his

15. Ibid., p.96.
humanist existentialism is concerned" (16). Though Fromm disagrees as far as sociological and economical theories are concerned.

For Fromm Marx failed to see the degree to which Capitalism was able to modify itself and satisfy the need of industrialized nations. Similarly Marx was unable to visualise the dangers of bureaucratization and centralization and the authoritarian system which resulted as alternatives. (17)

In line with Freud's thought, who has characterised human nature or essence in terms of the conflicting tendencies of the ego and id or life and death instinct, Fromm also defines the essence of man in terms of certain contradictions. Man being an animal, is a 'freak of nature', being in nature and at the same time transcending it, the conflict creating a disequilibrium which man must try to balance. Since the inner contradictions in man seek for an equilibrium, man cannot live statically. He maintains that the most powerful forces motivating man's behaviour are rooted in the condition of his existence, i.e., the human situation.


17. Ibid., p. IX
Fromm feels that though the rise of democracy has set man free politically yet it gave birth to a society in which man feels alienated and dehumanised. The causes of this are to be found in the minds of men themselves and Fromm employs the method of psychoanalysis in further probing these problems. While affirming the validity of humanistic ethics and using psychoanalysis he comes to the conclusion that value judgments determine our actions and upon their validity depends man's mental health and happiness. These norms have their roots in human nature itself and hence their violation results in mental and emotional disequilibrium. Hence developing 'humanistic psychoanalysis'. Fromm's concern like that of Marx is with the condition of man in our economic stage of development, a stage where man has been alienated from the world he has created himself, his fellow men, the things he uses and consumes, from his government and himself.

As the concept of man develops in the two schools of Marxism and Existentialism as an existent, dialectical, active being, the underlying characteristic which emerges as necessary implication of this typical ontological structure of man is Freedom.

Hegel, to begin with takes freedom to be the essence of spirit. Spirit for Hegel, "...may be defined as that which
has its centre in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself...
Now this is Freedom exactly." (18)

This self-contained existence of spirit is equated with self-consciousness. The individual self (finite spirit) makes the transition to the universal self i.e., the universal will at that very moment makes a transition to positive freedom. (19)

Freedom, however develops itself in the world by "conducting" the finite spirit to the phenomena of History. His freedom exists in renunciating himself in the whole. This is achieved by surrendering oneself to the state and abiding by the law and morality. It is in line with Hegelien metaphysics. Since the state is the realization of moral principles and concrete freedom Encyclopedia see p.257=)
For Hegel the state represents the Absolute and imparts to man whatever value he possesses. Real is Rational, claims, Hegel. Marx attacks it since it is not the case, whatever is finite is never totally real nor reasonable. According to Hegel, the Mind is truly real and


totally reasonable. At this metaphysical stage where the Mind is both real and rational the gap between the actual and ideal is filled. It can be shown only on the metaphysical plane. The gap is immanent at the socio-political plane. Thus Marx suggests a radical transformation of Hegel's thought. He wants it to be inverted and predicate and subject of the idealistic thought must be interchanged with each other. Thus, by turning Hegel upside down and starting with the concrete man, man can be liberated from the subservience of the abstract categories of the Absolute and its representation in state according to Marx. This transformation takes place in the philosophy of praxis. Marx's Humanism leads to the rejection of Capitalism, since it, compromises human freedom. According to him man is essentially a social being who can develop only in and through society. For Marx the isolated individual is an abstraction, all human activities like those of tool-making, speech, thought even art are products of his collective activity.

Whereas for Hegel freedom consists in self determination implying that the self is determined by nothing other than itself. In other words the difference between subject and object is overcome and the object (of consciousness) is reduced to consciousness (subject) itself. This for Hegel can happen when consciousness transforms the objective world
(nature) into itself.

For Marx on the other hand, freedom is not just a quality of the Absolute as self-determined, but is the quality of man. Though a superficial reading of Marx may give the impression that freedom is the quality of a class i.e., the proletariat as against the capitalist class since it is the proletariat which fights for freedom. But it must be pointed out that the proletariat does not wish to attain freedom for itself as a class but for each member of the class so as to provide opportunity for self-development of each individual man. Though for Marx too, freedom consists in transforming nature and hence bridging the gap between subject and object. The object, both for Marx and Hegel is the same i.e., nature but Hegel’s subject, Absolute/Mind is replaced by Marxian man. In other words freedom is expressed in labor, thus, what is common to the two thinkers is the fact that freedom consist in the subject objectifying itself through activity of labor.

Labor to Marx is neither wage-earning property of man nor a commodity. Labor is life. For Marx, Hegel is right when he asserts that man creates himself in labor but Marx criticises Hegel in seeing labor only as thought process. Marx replaces mental with practical labor of man. Secondly, for Hegel struggle for freedom is carried out by individual
labor whereas for Marx labor is always social (20). No struggle for freedom can be carried out by an individual but is always a class struggle.

However, an individual man remains an abstraction for Marx, till the alienation is overcome and the historical agent remains the class. The Existentialists maintain that freedom in order to be real implies the category of a concrete, real and corporeal being. Thus, freedom among the Existentialists becomes the category of an individual, active man against the category of society.

For the non-existentialists the possibilities pre-exist, and freedom consists only in choosing, one or the other. But for the Existentialists freedom is truly creative for it creates ontologically that which it chooses. Freedom thus becomes the truth of that which it creates. Since for Heidegger, it is the essence of Dasein to be open, because only then can the Dasein accomplish its dissolution to possibility. For Heidegger, freedom is not a determination of human will but freedom reveals itself as the "letting be" of what is (21). For Heidegger freedom is not a random


ability to do as we please, nor is freedom a mere readiness to do something requisite and necessary but freedom is participation in the revealment of what is as such. The revealment of this is itself guaranteed in the existential participation whereby the overtness of the overt i.e., the "There" (Das) of it is what it is (22). Here freedom though have become an ontological category of Dasein it remains metaphysical and it falls short of being real. It is found incapable of showing how this freedom is manifested in the social field.

For Heidegger freedom is a predicate exclusive of human will, the term is in fact a development of the notion of openness. Freedom is constitutive of Dasein as a being essentially open to things. If Dasein encounters things, as its essence is in "openness", it discovers its criterion of conduct in things because all human actions involve a reference to another.

Freedom for Heidegger is not a property of man rather, man belongs to freedom as its creature in the sense that freedom is the essence of truth (23) and truth is rooted in the

22. Ibid., p. 334-335.
23. Ibid., p.337.
being of man. By truth is meant openness. Just as man belongs to the area of openness which he is but which is not at his disposal. Thus, freedom in Heidegger introduces the notion of obligation for freedom is to be bound by the beings which he encounters. Hence in accordance with his notion of Dasein as a being-in-the-world, Heidegger believes that freedom is not arbitrary or subjective but an obligation to be a being which has no being of its own but must realize itself in a continuous conjunction with other beings. The notion of freedom as an obligation in Heidegger can be compared with the notion of freedom in Kant. For Kant freedom is a postulate of thought that explains moral actions of human beings since obligation can have no sense when applied to the action of natural phenomena which is causally determined. For both Heidegger and Kant freedom is a necessary presupposition and bound up with obligation and is the background of self-realization. But whereas for Kant freedom is the presupposition only of moral acts, for Heidegger it is a presupposition of all actions and is a condition in which man is thrown. For Heidegger man's freedom is determined by his world whereas for Kant the source of obligation is the faculty of reason in man. For Heidegger it is the being of man as an area of openness which is the source of obligation. Hence, for Heidegger freedom is rooted in human existence as "being there". In
short for Heidegger to exist is to be free (24). Man as
characterised by possibility and project for Heidegger, is
characterised by his projects that have an end in the sense
of death putting an end to all possibilities.

Heidegger's notion of death appears to be against his
notion of freedom. Thus, the idea of boundless freedom ends
in failure. In view of death, we can exercise our freedom by
saying 'yes' to our fate to live as beings limited by death.
Hence freedom is overcome by a feeling of necessity.

Though Heidegger roots man in freedom in the quest for
making freedom a real, concrete category of man, his attempt
fails since freedom as portrayed by him still remains
abstract in the sense that Dasein, a being-in-the-world
though free, yet is limited by its facticity and death and
hence dominated by necessity. There is also a struggle
against this necessity in the sense that Dasein is a finite
Being limited by death on one hand and one's past and
situation on the other.

In "Being And Nothingness", Sartre works the case for
absolute human freedom which belongs to individual for-
itself as an atemporal absolute responsible for time and not

24. Deason, W., The Tragic Finale: An Essay on the
Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Harper And Row, New
York, 1960, p.105-106
produced by it. Maintaining this absolute freedom he tried to show as contrary to Marx how an individual in a society is efficacious (as against a class) and history is man made. Thus, he showed how the dialectic of necessity and freedom implied by Marxian thesis that men make history but they do so on the basis of previous circumstances, is at work.

Deason in his book; "Tragic Finale" summarizes Sartre's argument for establishing freedom in the following manner: "To be," for human reality is "to act," the act must be autonomous and is directed towards an end. The end must be choosen. Thus free choice is inevitable (25). This choice is always absurd since it it not determined by any determinent. Though the for-itself is absolutely free, yet its freedom faces a few obstacles which Sartre gives the name of facticity including my place, my past, my surrounding my fellow brothers, my-death (26). Sartre reconciles this position that man's freedom is hindered by facticity by maintaining that facticity provides the ground in which freedom is practiced. (26). Sartre goes a step further and maintains that freedom is rooted in the ontological structure of the for-itself, in its


consciousness as a pure nothingness. In fact, for Sartre, the for-itself cannot choose to be not free.

Freedom of the for-itself then is a nothingness, free from outside determination i.e., the church, state, religion or any other form of external authority. Freedom is in fact a flight into the future, towards value, an idealized Being and is a nihilation of what is, of positing a situation which is not yet.

This freedom is individualized and is situated in facticity.

Since the activity of the for-itself is free, in other words since praxis is free, History too is free. Now, according to Sartre solitary praxis is an abstraction both on the theoretical and practical level. But praxis is basically a group activity based on reciprocity. By praxis man unifies the material world.

Matter through the unity which it receives from man serves to unite men in relationships of reciprocity. History is thus man-made though it is not created by men acting individually in isolation but by men acting together form the basis of the unity they find in practico-insert and in the totalised groups.
Finally, it can be pointed out that though Sartre talks of absolute individual freedom of the for-itself, his later concepts of the Totalisation of man in the fused group led him to the surrendering of this individual freedom in the "Oath" to social phenomena and hence though Sartre first aimed at maintaining the individual concreteness of freedom ended up in somewhat the Marxian notion of freedom where it becomes the category of the social (whole class) and not of an individual.

Interpreting the concept of freedom strictly on historical and political level, Marcuse rejects Hegelian notion that progress in freedom is a historical necessity (27). Marcuse tells us that since the beginning of recorded history "...the liberty of some have always been based on the servitude of others..." (28). That man has never been historically free, the only freedom which man has even known in the worst of all condition is internal freedom practicable even in prison. Marcuse likens this freedom with the type of freedom which Sartre maintains for the for-itself. (29).


28. Ibid., p.212

Freedom of thought which must always find expression has always been restricted throughout history. Man's freedom consisting in his ability to determine his own life without depriving others of this ability has never been a historical reality as well. Freedom for Marcuse is neither a transcendental nor a historical fact but it is a faculty and activity of men "synthesizing" the data of experience so that they reveal their own (objective) negativity, i.e., the degree to which they are a data of domination. This critical synthesis of experience occurs in the light of possible reduction of pain and unhappiness. (30).

Thus, the essence of human freedom lies in the theoretical and practical syntheses which constitutes the universe of experience. These syntheses are never individual activities but the work of a supers individual historical subjectivity in the individual (31). Freedom thus originates in the mind of man, in his ability to comprehend his world and this comprehension is praxis in as much as it establishes a specific organization of facts-data of experience. Interpreting Marx's concept of freedom in negative terms, Marcuse holds that for Marx liberation of mankind consists

31. Ibid., p.217.
in: the development of productive forces, would perpetually increase destruction and repression and this repression would be broken by the praxis of a class whose vital need would be the abolition of the established society. Thus, for Marcuse practical, political freedom means freedom from domination. Domination is in effect whenever the individual's goals and purposes and the means for striving for and maintaining them are prescribed to him and performed by him as something prescribed (32). Domination can be domination by men, by nature, by things or by one's own self. In this sense complete freedom is impossible and man can be partially free and the degree of freedom can be determined historically under optimal conditions. Domination is reduced to a rational division of labor, happiness and freedom coincide and individual satisfaction is subordinated to social needs. A society is domineering if the interests of individuals are dominated by the ruling class. Freedom in civilization has its internal limit in the necessity of maintaining labor power in the organism (society) of transforming him from subject-object of pleasure into a subject-object of work. (33)


33. Ibid., p.5.
Erich Fromm, in line with Marcuse believes that man has gained freedom in history by overthrowing the domination of nature, church and state. This abolition of external domination is considered a sufficient condition to attain the human goal of individual freedom (34). According to him the principles of economic liberalism, political democracy, religious autonomy and individualism in personal life are expressions of the human longing for freedom. With the intention of stressing the role of psychological factors in the social process and the unconscious forces in man’s character influenced by the external factors, Fromm works out the psychology of freedom. For him too, "... freedom characterises human existence as such..." (35) Though its meaning has changed according to the degree of man’s awareness and conception of himself as an independent and separate being. Both Existentialism and Marxism recognize that men have been dehumanised by the alienation they suffer in contemporary life. Alienation refers to the fact that man becomes victim of his own cultural existence. The victims of this servitude become stripped of the qualities of self-determinism which raise them above animal level.

35. Ibid., p.39.
Hegelian theory of alienation according to Marx is a product of double alienation of consciousness of real man to Absolute consciousness and of real man in consciousness. In Hegel's logic, it is the essence of the Absolute Idea to manifest itself in distinct, limited forms and then to return to itself. Self-comprehension is the form in which it returns to itself. It is in this manifestation of the Absolute in limited, distinct form that the alienation of the Absolute is constituted. The same process is observed in Hegel's philosophy of finite spirit. The alienation of man consists in the unhappy consciousness. The alienated soul (man) is demonstrated in dualism of master and slave, is concentrated into one consciousness. The unhappy consciousness aspires to be independent of the material world, to resemble God, to be eternal and spiritual yet its physical pains and desires are real and unescapable. What the unhappy consciousness does not realise is that the spiritual qualities of God which it worships are in fact qualities of its own self. It is in this sense that the unhappy consciousness is alienated, it has projected its own essential nature into something out of its reach and makes the real world miserable and insignificant.

Whereas alienation is a necessary phenomena in the concretisation of the Absolute and is basically mental, in Marx alienation sheds all abstraction and becomes a
necessary social and historical phenomenon which appears most clearly in the historical stage of Capitalism due to the specific mode of production. Alienation in Marx is real and not just mental or ideal. Marx accuses Hegel of mystifying the concept of alienation.

Marx though believes in the complete freedom of man yet mankind does not for him, exist in freedom. He points out the various constraints which prevent the realization of man's species nature. He in fact tells us how man develops in alienation i.e., as to how he is alienated from his natural powers. Alienation does not refer to only one structure of human existence but there are three structures of alienated existence, alienation of labor from its product, alienation of man from man, alienation of man from himself and his life activity i.e., labor itself. (36). It is only because man is a species-being that he is a conscious being i.e., his own life is an object for him and his activity is free activity. Alienation reverses this, making his life activity forced labor. In other words, the distinction between man and animal consists in the fact that man realizes his powers through objectification. But in a class society man labors not for species but for dominant

36. Marx, K., _Economic And Philosophical Manuscripts_ (op. cit.), p. 328.
groups of that species. It follows thus, that within this system of alien labor it is not the interests of mankind that are real but the particularised interests of the ruling class. The various forms in which class rule comes into being are only the different manners of alienation.

Thus, Marx ends up with a materialist and historical analysis of alienation. For him, alienation is peculiar to civilization and is based not on man's subjection to nature but to his subjection by another man through the exploitation of labor. It originates in a highly developed division of labor and the division of society into classes.

The laborer before participating in production surrenders his labor power to the capitalist in return for wages and at the end of the industrial process, the product no longer belongs to its producer (the laborer).

Imparting alienation not just a historical but a metaphysical status are the Existentialists. For Heidegger though, the freedom of the Dasein is the existential of the authentic existence yet this Dasein is capable of losing itself in the concerns of the world and hence acts as if "one like many". Thus, he makes a distinction between "one" (man) the domain of our being whereby we are replaceable by any other human being and the other which occurs only when
we live in the face of our ultimate possibility of death. The first is the inauthentic existence and the later is the authentic existence. The inauthentic existence offers an appeasing existence in which one overcomes dread of death. But this appeasement drives the Dasein to restless activity, brings Dasein into a state of self-extrangement in which its innermost of being becomes concealed. (37). The Dasein is lost in its world preoccupied by it and concerned about the things it encounters in the world about itself and is thus in a way becomes an impersonal one (Das Man). Here we allow the world of habit, custom, convention. The inauthentic existence is the indifferent daily routine life of the Dasein and is referred to as; "Fallenness" by Heidegger though it does not constitute the decadence of man.

For Sartre however, alienation belongs to a mode of being whose structural foundation is such that it includes the constant possibility of losing its own being. It is for Sartre that alienation is a phenomenon pertaining to existence and not to Being (38). For Heidegger the feeling of estrangement is not due to the loss of Dasein but is considered as a normal feature of Dasein's "verfallen".


For Marx it is the division of labor which forms the historical basis for alienation. This self-alienation finds expression in Sartre's concept of bad faith. In alienation for Marx man loses his freedom, becomes object-like, his social relations are converted into production relations, a human being no longer remains a man but he is either a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, a doctor, a farmer etc. etc. Similarly man loses freedom in bad faith holds Sartre, and man becomes object-like. But, whereas in Marx this loss of freedom is due to the conditions of the society and the individual is forced to give up his freedom. In Sartre this loss of freedom is conscious and self-choosen. Man in the face of anxiety and dread experienced as the result of the responsibility of freedom assumes the life of bad faith and becomes an object of social determination.

Sartre however develops his theory of alienation with the help of the introduction of "series" these "series" are taken to be the ground for social alienation. Individuals find themselves in a system of practico-inert relations which result in "Massification" (39) i.e., the individual stands in relationship in which he as a person is inessential, the individual is "any one" and appears as

39. Massification includes objectification and depersonalization of an individual.
"who ever." A series is actually the coexistence of a plurality of individuals separated from one another in a social field full of exigencies. Thus, alienation is constituted in the structural movements of relations that bind one individual to others and the given of the practico-inert. Hence alterity, powerlessness, recurrence are moments of alienation. These social structures find concrete determinations in means of transportation (bus), the market etc. The phenomenon of alienation is further characterised by counter-finality. Actions of individuals objectify themselves in terms of their results. These objectifications becomes ground for modifications that are not perceived in the planning of the act. This modification of purpose is also termed as alienation.

Whereas in Marx, man is alienated from his object of labor when appropriated by the entrepreneur, in Sartre man is alienated in his praxis when he confronts the practico-inert. The praxis of the individual is taken away and turned against him by the material world by means of the power I have given to it. Hence praxis is alienated by matter. What Sartre further adds is that it is not matter as such which alienates praxis but matter worked by praxis of others as well as myself. Thus, Sartre maintains the principle of 'Being And Nothingness' that only freedom can limit freedom. Alienation in this sense for Sartre is not an alienation
from some ideal being (may it be the Hegelian Absolute or Marx’s species-being) but an observable process. Human societies in so far as they are considered as organized groups are objectified and alienated by practico-inert, have reobjectified and have re-alienated themselves.

Whereas for Marx alienation is economic for Sartre it is not just economic but it extends to the entire social nexus. Marcuse develops this concept of social alienation and shows how it is a feature of the contemporary Capitalist society. Marcuse departs from Marx. The affluent Capitalist society has overcome the distinction between public and private spheres as life and men have become total objects of administration. The abundance of commodities have led to immediate gratification of needs. Such a gratification fails to produce free individuals since the needs are no longer freely choosen but are imposed by the productive system. Thus no matter how abundant a Capitalist society is, it remains repressed. Here we see that though Marcuse does not refer to the term "alienation" yet he assumes that man is alienated in a Capitalist society and this alienation consists in man loosing his freedom to the "public opinion" or what Heidegger would call the "anonymous they". Marcuse with reference to Marx maintains that labor itself constitutes alienation of man and this alienation can be overcome when labor is converted into play.
Erich Fromm understands by alienation the phenomenon by virtue of which man experiences himself as an alien and does not experience himself as the creator of his own acts. His acts and the world has become his masters and an alienated person remains out of touch from other men and he experiences them as things. Fromm regards Marx and Hegel as implying "a state of insanity" by alienation (40). But for Fromm himself any act of "submissive worship" is alienation; may it be to an idol, to a beloved, to state, to economy, to authority, to machine or any other force, one can worship even one's own self. One worships one's own self by worshipping one's irrational passions. He defines alienation as the process in which "...man does not experience himself as the active bearer of his own powers and richness but as an impoverished `thing' dependent on powers outside of himself, unto whom he had projected his living substance". (41). He believes that alienation in the contemporary world is "almost total: it pervades the relationship of man to his work, to the things he consumes, to the state, to his fellow men, and to himself." (42) The contemporary concept of man thus considers today's man as

41. Ibid., p.114.
42. Ibid., p.114-115.
alienated in one form or another. However, the concept entails an optimism as well, maintaining that man though is alienated yet he can overcome this alienation. For Marx one can get rid of his exploitative present by revolutionising the social structure. Thus liberating man from alienation by concentrating economic, political and cultural power in the hands of ruling majority through the socialist revolution.

"Communism is the positive supercession of private property as human self-estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through and for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e., human, being... it is the positive resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man,..., between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species,..." (43) Material property being the "material expression of estranged human life" therefore superceeding of estrangement of life entails supercession of private property and hence the return of man from religion, state, family etc. (44)

For Marx the process of dealienation is the necessary consequence of the phenomenon of alienation and taken place


44. Ibid., p. 348-349.
(temporarily) after the emergence of alienation. However, when Heidegger speaks of authenticity and inauthenticity he does not intend to imply a superiority of authenticity over inauthenticity. They are both metaphysical categories and hence possess equal importance. It is here that one finds difficulty in defending Heidegger's position; since one necessarily tends to take authentic existence as the one more desirable and ethically valuable existence than the other. We see in Heidegger that the Dasein is constantly fluctuating between the two modes of existence namely those of authentic and inauthentic, the overcoming of the undesirable state of unfreedom by the more desirable state of freedom. What distinguishes Heidegger from Marx is that for Marx dealienation is a social phenomena resulting from the liberation of the entire society whereas for Heidegger alienation as well as dealienation are individual phenomena having significance only for the Dasein.

However, for Sartre dealienation like alienation is a social phenomenon and occurs in social praxis when one 'totalises the group' in praxis. The seeds of the depassing of serial praxis lie in series themselves. Each individual can totalise the series in free praxis (when for instance the series is confronted by a common threat or danger). In such circumstances the free praxis is merged with the group prosis and hence the praxis which was first alienated now
becomes free. The group acts through the mediation of each individual separately and each individual acts on the external environment through the mediation of the group. Here Sartre in fact mentions that this group praxis converts the individual into a "common individual". Now it can be pointed out that when man becomes a common individual in the process of dealienation, does he still not remain a victim of alienation as he faces a loss of his individuality to the common individual and does not Sartre here seem to be giving up his earlier position of "Being and Nothingness" where he emerges as the herald of individual freedom?

Marcuse believes that a society free of alienation (domination) is possible. This can be done by removing the forces of domination and as a result men would live peacefully in freedom. "One Dimensional Man" though a pessimistic book portraying the repressive nature of the contemporary society ends with an optimistic note. It holds promise of a society free of domination. Such a society is possible and will result as a consequence to the protests and efforts of the outcastes and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and unemployable who most urgently wish to end intolerable conditions and institutions since they hit the systems from out, their opposition is not deflected. They support all demonstrations by the victims of law and order,
"the fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period" (45)

Fromm, believing in "almost total" alienation of today, may it be a man in a Socialist or a Capitalist society maintains that this alienation can be overcome in "Humanistic Communitarian Socialism". Such a kind of society will liberate man from "robotism" and "atomization". The first step in the birth of such a society is to take the responsibility of all men and develop on an international scale, a relative sharing of all wealth and a just division of all economic resources. Thus leading to international economic cooperation and planning to form a world government and to complete disarmament (46). The aim of this society would be to create a work situation in which man gives his life time and energy to something which has meaning for him and in which he knows what he is doing and feels wanted with his fellow men.

Hence, the concept of man emerging from an analysis of the above philosophies is a humanistic one. The humanism implied


in this radical concept subscribes to:

1. the priority of human agent over and above any other force, power or entity in the universe. The priority enjoyed by man means that he alone is the author of his destiny and it is he who imparts value and meaning to this world through his creativeness. The man which is the author of all meaning and value is not an abstract metaphysical being existing in some metaphysical realm but he is the one we ourselves are i.e., concrete, individual existing and interacting and acting in this material and social world.

2. The concept of existing individual man entails freedom as the essential feature of man. Freedom, though imparted a different meaning by each philosophy under study, implies freedom to develop and progress, consisting in self-realization. (Though self-realization may also have its various interpretations.)

3. Though freedom is the essential feature yet historical conditions of man are such that his existence turns out to be in bad perverted form. All philosophines agree to this historical perverted existence and call it alienation.
4. Though human situation is contrary to what it ought to be, all philosophies promise a return to the fundamentally primary state of freedom by praxis. However, all philosophies vary in the manner in which this overcoming of alienation is accomplished.
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