THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC RATIONALISM
IN
THE SUBCONTINENT
WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
WALIULLĀH, SAYYID AHMAD KHĀN AND MUHAMMAD IQBAL

SAEEBA KHATOON

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ABSTRACT

The thesis is divided into four parts in addition to a prologue and an epilogue. In the first part "The Rationalistic Perspective", the history of the development of the idea of rationalism has been traced, as briefly and as precisely as possible. Starting with the definition of rationalism we have proceeded to give a short account of Greek, Medieval Muslim, Modern European and Indo Muslim rationalism in two chapters.

The second part entitled, 'The Organic Rationalism of Waliullāh', deals with Waliullāh's system in three chapters. The first chapter, 'The Concept of Being', takes into account Waliullāh's philosophical attitudes. In the next two chapters the manner of Waliullāh's application of his philosophical principles to religious and social spheres is examined.

Sayyid Ahmad Khān's 'Common Sense Rationalism', is the subject of the third part of our thesis. It consists of three chapters, dealing with Sayyid Ahmad Khān's main principles in 'The Philosophical Framework and the applied side of these theories is assessed in the other two chapters, 'Religion: A Half House of Rationalism', and 'Social and Moral Concepts'.

In our approach to 'Muhammad Iqbāl's Dynamic Rationalism', we have divided the contents of our evaluation into four chapters. These four chapters are, 'The
Philosophical Perspective', 'Knowledge and Reality', 'A New Rationale of Religion', and 'Man and Society'. The first of these chapters traces the development of Iqbal's ideas in the light of his education, circumstances, his first philosophical work 'The Development of Metaphysics in Persia', and his mature thought in 'The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam'. The second chapter is about his philosophical ideas, while the last two chapters consider his views about religious and socio-cultural issues.

The 'Epilogue' comprises the conclusions drawn from the assessment and evaluation of the rationalistic thought of Waliullah, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Iqbal.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my gratitude to my Supervisor, Professor Manzoor Ahmad, who extended full support and constructive guidance to me from the conception of this thesis to its completion. Not only did he read and evaluate what I wrote but also instructed me at every stage of the development of this thesis. Without his scientific guidance and sympathetic attitude this thesis would have been impossible. Nevertheless, I owe all the responsibility of the views expressed in this work.
**TRANSLITERATION TABLE**

Consonants: 'initial: unexpressed, medial and final':

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**Vowels, diphthongs, etc.**

short: ْ a; ُ i; ُ u.
long: ِ a; ى ى, and in Persian and Urdu also rendered ى i, and in Urdu also rendered by े; ے (in Urdu) ے
alif maassador: ُ a,
diphthongs: ُ ُ ay; ُ ُ aw
long with tasrid: ُ ُ ُ Iya;
 ُ ُ ُ uwa.
ta marbutah: ُ ُ ah; in ndafah: at.

This table has been prepared by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
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PROLOGUE

Indo Muslim thought is a neglected field of study. The works on Islamic Philosophy mostly confine themselves to medieval thinkers and end at Ibn-i-Rushd. Majid Fakhry's book, 'A History of Islamic Philosophy', though it does deal with the later development of Islamic thought, the treatment is a summary one. The subject indeed requires a more thorough attention. Though in the sub-continent itself many a book have been written on major thinkers, most of them deal with their philosophy in a very scanty fashion. There is hardly a book on Waliullah's philosophy which can be studied by a modern reader. On Sayyid Ahmad Khan Baljon's 'The Reform And Religious Ideas of Sayyid Ahmad Khan' is a good work but deals mainly with the religious side of the problem. On Iqbal indeed a few books like Ishrat Hussain's 'Metaphysics of Iqbal' and Jamila Khatoon's 'The Place of God, Man and universe in ThePhilosophic System of Iqbal' are available but they are too involved to give a clearer synoptic view of his philosophy as a whole.

The works on the philosophers under study have been consulted but since most of them do not bring out significant points with regard to their philosophical position, we have almost exclusively relied upon the original writings of Waliullah, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Iqbal.
The present thesis is an attempt to evaluate the philosophical attitudes of the three thinkers objectively and from a philosophical viewpoint rather than literary, theological or political, Waliullāh’s legal, mystic and theological position has been taken as a part of his system but it is not the theme of our work. In the like manner Sayyid Ahmad Khān and Iqbāl’s reformative and literary merits are not the focus of our assessment.

The present thesis does not and cannot claim to be an account of Indian Muslim philosophy. It only picks up the major trend running throughout Islamic thought i.e. rationalism. A further limitation is put on this thesis by choosing from the past two hundred and fifty years of the rational impetus that Muslim philosophy got at the hands of Waliullāh, Sayyid Ahmad Khān and Iqbāl. My reasons for choosing these three thinkers are as follows:

a) If the whole period is taken into consideration it would become unwieldy, though a mention of Fazal Haq Khāribādī’s contributions to logic is an omission; yet we feel that it deserves a special and full length treatment. The author of this thesis would like to take Fazal Haq’s work at some future time for a critical evaluation.

b) With Waliullāh there seems to start a significant deviation in the rationalistic explanation of religious principles in Islam. Waliullāh himself is an uneasy combination of classicism and modernity, whereas with Sayyid Ahmad Khān begins a
dis-satisfaction with classical approach and he makes a new start with what we have termed as 'common sense' approach towards religion, which he termed as rational. Iqbal is a philosopher of a totally different type. Here is a man who is aware of the modern western philosophy and knows what muslim philosophy has been. These three philosophers, in a manner, have set pace for future development in Islamic thought.

c) The impression seems to have been that the rationalistic impetus of Islam flowered and through the mutazila and the philosophers and reached its culminating point in Ibn-Rushd, after whom no significant improvement has been made in Islamic thought. This thesis at least dispels this impression and proves, that Islamic impetus has not died and is still flowering into new forms.
PART I

THE RATIONALISTIC PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER I

THE WESTERN TRADITIONS OF RATIONALISM

(1) The Background:

Reason is considered to be the distinctive faculty of man, and reasoning is the function of this faculty. Just as the psychological explanation of thinking says that, a problematic situation motivates thinking so is the case with reasoning, which can be called the active side of thinking. To reason out is to offer explanation of or to explain some thing. We offer reasons for our actions and thoughts in our daily life, as well as, against what is not acceptable or agreeable to us. This process of reasoning is also called rationalizing or rationalization, 'rational', being the term applied to what is reasonable and sensible.

The most common meanings of 'Rationalism' that one can easily find in standard lexicons are: 'the practice of accepting reason as the authority in determining one's opinions and course of action', 'a system of being regulated by reason not authority, a disposition to apply to religious doctrines the same critical methods as to science and history, and to attribute all phenomena to natural rather than miraculous causes'. Another explanation more in line with the history of philosophy is that 'it is the theory that reason is the foundation of certainty in knowledge'.
In addition to the common meanings of the word 'Rationalism', in philosophy it has assumed a special connotation. In a general sense, any explanation is a rational explanation, but, in particular, rationalism is an application of reason in answering questions about the ultimate nature of reality. 'Rationalism', then is the name of a methodology; a metaphysical position and a view of the reality. These observations about 'Rationalism' would become clear as we proceed further.

The history of systematic 'Rationalism' can be traced back to the Greeks, as that of philosophy itself. In the general sense rationalization began with the emergence of human society, when man started justifying, explaining, and analysing actions, ideas, and situations, his own and of others. But as a systematic approach reasoning began with the Greeks. When the Ionians and subsequent philosophers such as, Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Parmenides, offered explanations of the origin Composition and phenomena of the universe, they were rationalizing the stock of human knowledge, by ordering it in the form of a system, When the Sophists and Socrates offered explanations about man's actions such as 'Man is the measure of all things', and that 'knowledge is virtue', they were laying the foundation of a rationalistic thought in morality, and to a certain extent in religion. In the great conceptual systems of Plato and Aristotle Greek philosophy reached its zenith and so did Greek Rationalism, which was for them the highest form of 'Wisdom'.

1

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The term 'Rationalism' itself is a product of the European renaissance, applied particularly to the systems of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. But as man's effort to conceive the World as a coherent structure it is an essential and most important part of all metaphysical systems. Man rationalizes in his endeavour to take a vital part in the phenomena of the universe. Even when there has been a popular or intellectual reaction against the authority of reason, the process itself is based on a great deal of reasoning and subsequently, involve a greater and more richer concept of 'Reason'. In fact the lack of system and organization in what we sense, leads to a search for what is apparently missing. Therefore, rationalism takes a start from what appears to be irrational. Because of this inherent quality of reasoning, the term 'Rationalism' is applied to various divergent systems of thought. Besides, taking of the rationalism of Plato and Aristotle, and the seventeenth century renaissance rationalism, the eighteenth century philosophers of the 'enlightenment' like Voltaire and Montesquieu are also called rationalists. These varieties of strictly philosophical rationalism are, however, not the only forms of rationalism. Rationalization has been in practice among religious scholars and social reformers too, alongwith the philosophers and scientists. In life itself rationalism plays a vital role, its strength varying from time to time and place to place in accordance with the confidence and reliance of individuals and societies on
reason. Confidence and reliance are the result of experience in practical life, sometimes man loses confidence in his own capabilities and at others he gains the same. Just as human experience of the external world, of the society and of self varies from time to time rationalism also takes different forms, modifying itself in accordance with the situation faced. Rationalism offers solutions and explanations for thoughts and actions. The pre-Socratic Greek thinkers offered natural solutions and naturalistic explanations, the Sophists emphasised the importance of the human self, which had long remained in the background. Socrates thought that human beings must have knowledge, otherwise they cannot be good and useful. Henceforth human reason learned its dynamic role of acquiring knowledge and developing through it, realizing its innate capacities in the process. Socrates by determining the direction of reason on the path of knowledge endowed reason with a universal and dynamic role it plays, has played and will play in the development of human, social and intellectual life.³ Reason in the form of knowledge becomes a tool to be used in the manner required by the circumstances in view. But in spite of its innate qualities Greek rationalism was objective as well as contemplative.

The Roman view of life granted the voluntaristic attitude to intellectual activity which it had lacked so far. By a synthesis of thought and action reason became vital and practice oriented. Nevertheless, it became an instrument
for controlling life rather than a ruling agent. Morality and rationality both became parts of human nature, at this stage the dawn of Christianity, brought about a change in the intellectual attitude, and rationalism was subordinated to religious authority. For all the followers of revealed religions, Jews, Christians and Muslims, human life as well as the universe conveyed a purpose and meaning that, in turn revealed the presence of a Divine Plan.4

The emergence of Christianity apparently proved fatal for rationalistic activity as the clergy opposed the use of reason in religious matter, while including the whole of life in the field of religious authority. Since the concept of Divine providence portrayed the inability of human reason and rational insight. Only Divine revelation could disclose the plan of the world and hence the meaning of life could be understood only from the point of view of religion, never from the point of view of rational thought. How could reason deal with what depends on the Will of God asked the learned scholastics.5

But the Christian concept of God, though, it emphasised the supernatural meanings of life was not altogether irrational. The only difference was that reason was not allowed a free course, it was used only for explanation and justification of the dogma of religion. The great exponents of Christian theology such as Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham developed their
'supernatural voluntarism' with the constant application of reason. Their insistence on the authority of the scriptures, in course of time, in the hands of lessor and common minds, gave way to a general attitude of reliance on authority, whether it be religious or philosophical, therefore, restricting progress and development of the human mind and society. Since the renaissance the theological and philosophical systems of the middle ages signify the subordination of philosophy to theology. Though it is true to a certain extent, in case of the Jews and Christians, and to a lessor extent of the Muslims, it did not hinder the medieval philosophers from developing rational explanations of reality. These rationalizations of the middle ages form an integral part of philosophical rationalism for two important reasons. Firstly, in itself, these attempts are philosophically important, because they contain, if not more, at least, as much important thought elements as the systems of the Greek and Modern thinkers.

Secondly, in the historical and evolutionary sense the traditions of the Greek rationalists were transmitted to the renaissance thinkers through, and after being dealt with in several ways by these theistic rationalists, that is the Jews, Christians, and Muslim philosophers of the middle ages.

(2) The Greek Perspective:

Inquiry logically comes before explanation, the 'what' question comes before the 'how' and 'why'. Therefore,
in philosophy too, the earliest thinkers are important because they systematically faced the 'what' question. The pre-socratic Greek philosophy starting with the Ionians is important for raising and venturing to answer the 'what' question about the origin and nature of the universe. Setting aside the validity or falsity of the conclusions they reached, the attempts of these thinkers were important in two respects. Firstly, they furnished the foundations of the mental inquiry, that flourished into various forms in philosophy and science. Secondly, they started the method of generalization in what so ever rudimentary form it may be. The attempt was important and has rightly won them a place in the history of rationalistic thought. Thus rationalism in its philosophical sense started with the Ionian thinkers, that is Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes. The pythagoreans added to the work of the Ionians in the form of Mathematics and Theology. Russell rightly acknowledges the contribution of the Pythagoreans by saying:

"... the combination of mathematics and theology, which began with Pythagoras characterized religious philosophy in Greece, in the middle ages and in modern times down to Kant. Orphism before Pythagoras was analogous to Asiatic mystery religions. But in Plato, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz there is an intimate blending of religion and reasoning, of moral aspirations with logical admiration of what is timeless, which comes from Pythagoras..." 9

This early recourse to and assimilation of theology with reason tells upon the importance and the place of theology in philosophy. Heraclitus's dynamic doctrine of
change, and of fire as the basic element is based upon the concept of the eternity and everlasting nature of the world, so significant in subsequent theories of the eternity of matter. There are several other important aspect of Heraclitus's thought, such as his monism, the unity of the world combination of opposites, and the ultimate reality conceived as One.

There is, at one and the same time, a realization and expression of the unity and plurality, permanence and dynamism which had a considerable influence in shaping the thought of Plato and through him all subsequent philosophy. The central fire like the fire of the Zoroastrians never dies, though this element of permanence in the Heraclitean system is overshadowed by the emphasis on change in his own system and the logic of Parmenides and Zeno in regulation of change and motion. The doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno apparently an antithesis of the Heraclitean thesis is in fact a part of the same process. With these two concepts starts the process of continuous progress in rationalistic thought now emphasizing one aspect of reality now the other but evolving and developing, inspite of its age old hypothesis and principles. The Heraclitean emphasis on change diffused new blood into the spirit of philosophical inquiry. The philosophers started their anxious search for the permanent reality.

The first explanation of the permanent reality came from Parmenides, duly elaborated or rather explained by Zeno. This stress on constancy against change became
the basis of the concept of 'substance' so very important for subsequent developments. The doctrines of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus were steps in the search of truth if not of intrinsic value, definitely important for the process of rationalization and its two aspects the philosophical and the scientific. The concentration and focus on the universe and matter, was interrupted by Protagoras's stress on or attention to human affairs, necessitated by the environment, the Sophists learned, taught and developed the art of argument. Howsoever materialistic their aims may have been their place in philosophy is due to the change of emphasis from the universe to man himself. Their reliance on arguments, though in some cases leading to scepticism, was nevertheless a contribution to the value of reasoning and rationalization. The immediate reaction to the cross sensationalism of these earlier thinkers like Heraclitus, Parmenides, Democritus, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, was the ethical rationalism of Socrates.  

This phase of rationalistic thought apparently opposed in its basic principles to the preceding theories was the continuation of and to a certain extent a development of these theories. The Socratic combination of knowledge and virtue was only possible because the pythagoreans, the Eleatics and the Sophists had been before him. The pre-sophist philosophers stressed on material causes as has been noticed by Aristotle.
"Of the first philosophers, then, most thought the principles which were of the nature of matter were the only principles of all things." 11

In the same analysis of his predecessor’s ideas he observes of Socrates:-

"Socrates however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature but seeking the universal in the ethical matters and fixed thought for the first time on definitions." 12

These observations of Aristotle clearly portray the direction of the development of Greek Rationalism. The complete systematic conceptualization, of this thought process are the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. These systems, though the first and last in Greek thought, are the most effective and reverent systems in the history of thought. Plato’s theory of ideas and Aristotle’s 'universals' can be rightly termed the first and greatest triumphs of reason. In fact the word 'rationalism' can be appropriately applied to the Aristotalian system, more than any other system be it ancient, medieval or modern.

Plato inherited the concepts of his predecessors, but it was his intellect that gave these different aspects of reality, or the different expression about its nature a systematic form. He assimilated into his system Parmenides’s doctrine of the One, Heraclitus’s everlasting change, and Socrates’s emphasis on the ethical. Wisdom, learning, and philosophy are knitted together by the Platonic Socrates in the Republic.:

"... is not the love of learning the love of Wisdom which is Philosophy." 13
In the Socratic rational ethics therefore, Greek wisdom is defined as the love of learning. This is perhaps the expression of the Greek love of wisdom, as well as the foundation of philosophy of learning. This 'learning' of Socrates and Plato has the seeds of all the 'isms' of philosophy, including idealism, realism, intuitionism and rationalism.

Plato's theory of ideas is the distinctive mark of Plato's philosophy, which has survived in one form or the other in the system of various philosophers since Plato. This together with his theory of knowledge, and immortality are the most popular and important parts of what muslim thinkers inherited from the Greeks. Plato's theories in its neo-Platonic garb as well as the original, were attractive to the Muslims. Christians and the Jews alike for two reasons. Firstly, because it was intellectually assimilative, secondly, it could fit in without major changes, with any religious structure. Infact they explained their convictions in a rational manner with the help of Plato's theories.

The basic dualism of thought and perception, and knowledge and opinion has remained as a legacy of Plato throughout the history of philosophy. From the Socratic view of knowledge as recollection Plato developed his theory of forms or ideas. The perfect form of every particular thing exists in the supersensible world, while the particular things partake of its qualities or nature imperfectly.

We would later have occasion to notice the influence
of the Platonic theory of ideas on Muslim thinkers. The eclectic philosophy of Waliullah bear obvious signs of Platonic influence. Waliullah's world of concepts "Alam-i-Mithal", and 'Nalā-i-Allā' are Platonic in origin with neo-Platonic and medieval influences. Even in a liberal and independent thinker like Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the theory of knowledge is of Socratic Platonic origin. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's belief in man's inner capabilities is reminiscent of Plato's words:

"... the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already, and that just as if it were not possible to turn the eye from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only be the movement of the whole soul to be turned from the world of becoming to that of being."15

The complete triumph of Greek rationalism, however, is the philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotle's 'Topica' and 'Metaphysica', the 'Apriori and Posterior Analytics', and other works are the first ever systematic discussions on reasoning in philosophy. The 'Topica' starts with a definition of reasoning which, in spite of the difference with which the word is used now, is significant for the history of thought.

"Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them... "16

The three types of reasoning according to Aristotle are:

1) Demonstration: When reasoning start from premises that are primary and true, it is demonstration.
ii) Dialectical: Reasoning from generally accepted opinions is dialectical.

iii) Contentions: This is the form of reasoning in which the starting principles are seemingly generally accepted opinions but are not really such. 17

Aristotle's stress on first principles has been the general rule and custom for the majority of philosophers for ages and has its uses and abuses both. Among the medieval Muslim philosophers Aristotelian logic his stress on first principles, and his theory of the eternity of matter, have been the three important features of his tremendous influence. Even those who wrote to refute Aristotelian theories could not throw off the yoke of the first principles.

Aristotle clearly explains the nature of knowledge in the 'Metaphysica'. Wisdom or knowledge which Socrates had coupled with 'virtue' was evidently considered natural to man by Plato and Socrates but it was Aristotle who made it the starting principle of his rationale of knowledge. 18

Man's differentia from the general run of animals is his capacity for reasoning. Experience aided by the powers of memory, association and reproduction leads to sciences and arts of all kinds. The artist is considered superior to man of experience because they know the cause of what happens. In the same way the senses, though they give information and knowledge of particular things leave it to reason to deal with the relations and causes. 19
This is how the role of reason is fixed in Greek 'Wisdom' as explanation, or giving causes, or establishing principles, and this is what rationalization or reasoning, meant for them. This is what the Greek searched for or inquired after. For some it was one thing for some it was the other, but the common factor was their conscious reach for the cause or grounds for a belief in any thing. Aristotle defines this search of his predecessors and subsequent philosophers, when he says that:

"... all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things so that ... the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessor of any sense perceptions whatever, the artist wiser than the man of experience, the master workers than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive. Clearly than Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes." 20

Aristotle may be called the founder of Metaphysical theology, for he explains theological issues by the application of his metaphysical principles. God is the causeless cause and unmoved mover. 21 By the application of his theory of causes and first principles Aristotle develops a synthetic whole in place of Plato's mind-body and knowledge opinion dualism. He agrees that all appearance is not true, but he acknowledges the reality of change. He thinks that the changes that occur in things leave their mark, so that something of the past is always present. His is a position that reconcile the static reality of Parmenides with the perpetual change of Heraclitus, of which Plato had
shown an awareness, but which was overshadowed by his ethical and idealistic pre-occupations. Aristotle's is a middle of the road approach to the problem of reality that avoids the extremes of Materialism as well as Idealism.

The rationalistic thought of Greece which reached its zenith in the works of Aristotle, declined after him but continued in one form or the other till the rise of the Roman empire. The Roman influence though it could not and did not add much to the conceptual aspect of thought did unite philosophy with life by giving it a practice oriented attitude. Reason by means of this later development became an instrument in the control of life. (An attitude that was further strengthened by the revealed religions. With their comprehensive outlook). Nevertheless, the dominant Roman theory of the naturalness of the moral and rational insights has a base in Aristotelian thought. 22

The Epicureans, the Stoics and the Sceptics were mostly concerned with ethical issues. Therefore, an important element in the history of philosophy, these thinkers did not contribute much to the development of ideas. They concentrated more on individual and particular problems rather than the universal philosophical problems formulated by Plato and Aristotle. The Neo-Platonic philosophy was, however, a valuable and influential thought system, particularly in the form it was given by Plotinus.

The philosophical views of Plotinus are eclectic in one sense that is it has the Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Christian elements intermingled into a single system.
Nevertheless it has its own characteristics which are a product of the prevailing circumstances, and the reaction of the scholarly minds of its exponents to the changed situation. The most popular aspect of the theories of Plotinus is his basic thesis about the Divine origin of man. Man in his view is in some sense Divine and:

"... the object of philosophy is to understand this divinity and restore its proper relationship with the Divine. All and, in that All, to come to union with its transcendent source, the One or Good." 23

The three stages in the Plotinian scheme of things are: (a) hypostases which he calls substances or natures, the one, the intellect, (which becomes plural in the shape of the Platonic forms, which are themselves identified with the thinking mind), (b) The soul (which becomes plural by instantiation in all things, a view that involves Plotinus in extreme animism which had been suggested though not in fact accepted by the Stoics), (c) The relation between the hypostases is one of emanation. Plotinus often talks as if there were a fourth principle. Nature, the world that the soul makes living and which is the bridge between the soul and bare matter. Nature is the province of practice as opposed. to contemplation; for the latter is the responsibility of the intellect, and nature is too weak for contemplation and turns to practice which Plotinus regards as a weak copy of contemplation. 24

The Plotinian One is not personal. His nature is not knowable, and can be only described and explained by way of negation. But it is the goal of contemplation, and
and the aim of the mystic is identification with it. And on it the other hypostases depend.

The sensible world is a copy of the world of the intellect. The world of the intellect is perfect and not bound by time and extension. Plotinus suggests the forms of individuals which though developed from the Platonic views, were implicated by Plato.

The intellect is conceived as included in the One and the soul is included in the intellect. The world soul contains every thing including all those things that instantiate it and individual souls. Human being is:—

"... not just soul but partly intellect. It is the later which individuates us, and by it we are linked to the world of forms. The world soul as a whole orders the universe not by conscious planning, for the soul is below the stage where this is possible, but like a dancer dancing a dance. Soul is the source of time through movement. Thus if there were no soul there would be no time but eternity alone."

"Soul becomes united with, despite the fact that matter is the source of evil. But matter is so only negatively, in that it consists in the privation of all forms."25

These neo-Platonic were received by the muslims and formed the bulk of their hellenic heritage. The theory of emanation, the idea of world soul, and the knowledge of God were adopted by most of the medieval muslim thinkers as they so easily corresponded to the inherent qualities of Islam. The Mātāzilāites, the Ashārites, and the Sufis were influenced by one or the other aspect of the neo-Platonic philosophy. Even as late as Waliullah in the eighteenth century the influence of neo-Platonism is retained. Some of the contemporaries of Sayyid Ahmad Khān and Iqbal also
continues to hold these same views, by now adopted as a part of their Muslim heritage. But just as neo-Platonism inspite of its Platonic elements, in its entirety a system in its own right, so is the case with the medieval Muslim philosophy, which is inspite of the hellinic influence characteristically different for the purely Islamic and Asiatic elements are prominently there.

3. The Modern Perspective:

Just as the great rationalistic systems of Plato and Aristotle were preceded by the lesser ones of the presocratic philosophers, and the Muslim rationalist like Ibn Sina and Farabi, by Mātázilāism, Ashārāism and Mātrudāism, the rational thought of the modern European thinkers is preceded by the Christain and Jew scholastics like Aquinas, Maimonides and Saadia Goan.

Augustine the founder of Christain philosophy was interested in philosophy as a help in understanding theology. His principle of the immediate certainty of inner experience shows an awareness that earned him a place amongst the torchbeares of modern thought. But some centuries had to pass before modern thought took the lead from theology in Europe. Anselm, Abelard, John of Salisbury and others showing occasional rational leanings in the form their controversies about God's attributes, universals, and mind body dualism, the real transition towards rationalism began with Thomas Aquines.

The Jew thinkers Saadia Goan and Maimonides played a role in transmitting Greek and Muslim rationalism to
Christian Europe. Saadiah applied the rational method in his Biblical commentaries, while Maimonides sought to reconcile Mosaic teaching with Aristotelianism. At this stage the problem of the fundamental relations between theology became so pressing that it called for new solutions. Aquinas was to provide one such solution. In his theory of causation, he repudiates the extremes of Aristotelianism and occasionalism, by offering a synthesis.

"God graciously allows the creature to subsist on its own and to develop its life process freely, as part of the ultimate scheme of things conjoined by the dictates of His love and generosity." He further equates the perfection and order in the universe with the perfection of the Greater and criticises the attitude of undermining the worldly.

With the rationalistic attitudes of theologian like Aquinas there came about a gradual change from medieval to modern, from the age of authority to that of reason. But gradual as it is the process continued for centuries till Hobbes and Descartes struck the beginning of a new era. In this period of transition there are the signs of the new era but the characteristics of old are also retained. Aquinas and others continued to discuss the mind body dualism and, free will and determinism. In Machiavelli the roots of the renaissance or the birth of the new man is seen in the form of the 'how'-question. The 'how'-question is a stimulant for scientific research, and markedly different from the medieval 'why'. Thomas More added the
concern for the common man. The standard of human rights was carried further by the Humanist movement. While the scientific tradition vaguely, visible in Machiavelli and his contemporaries took firm root in the work of Galiléo and Francis Bacon.

It was the second half of the sixteenth century that the three great men of the renaissance, namely, Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes and Rene Descartes were born, who actually took the first steps towards the new world from three different directions. Bacon laid the foundation of the sciences anew by his method of inducing general axioms. Hobbes's materialistic and deterministic views took the notion of causal necessity to its logical end. But the most important characteristic of his theories is its stress on motion. From Galiléo's discoveries in physics Hobbes took the lead and applied the motion theory to metaphysics. Indeed the seventeenth century was the period of revolution in all spheres of knowledge scientific as well as philosophical. The period of transition was over. The age of reason had begun. The experimental and demonstrative systems of Galiléo and Newton, discovered new venues of development for science to work independently of philosophy. On the other hand the conceptual systems of Hobbes, Descartes, Locke and Spinoza provided philosophy with new spirit of civilization.30

Descartes's first rule of logic was not to accept any thing as true which was not clearly presented to the mind, so clearly that there could be no doubts about it.
The second rule was to divide the problem into parts. The third principle stressed on starting from the simplest and rise to the knowledge of the complex. The last was to make reviews and enumeration complete. Descartes's method remain deductive, though he treats deduction as a method of simplification rather than that of proof. He formulated his method of doubt in his search for the certainty of knowledge. Reaching the certainty of thinking or doubting self he explains the universe and God by inference from the mind. He retains the medieval mind body dualism and the traditional proofs of the existence of God, though he explains them with the help of his new method. Spinoza remained a determinist and panthiast in his rationalism, and his search is in fact a search for the intrinsically good. Therefore, in spite of his rationalism, in his own field he remained a solitary figure and contributed very little to the development and evolution of thought. Locke is the first thinker of modern period who reflected on the problem of knowledge. His 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', had an effect on the theoretical as well as practical side of affairs in his own time. Descartes found the answer to the question about knowledge in his intuition of the self, Locke sighted it in experience. For him there are no innate and apriori ideas, all knowledge comes from experience.

He distinguishes between innate and self evident ideas, denying the former only:

"Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or dis-agreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists."
Sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or dis-agreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without, the intervention of any others and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge."34

Demonstrative, or reasoned, and sensitive knowledge are founded on intuitive knowledge, which is the clearest and most certain of human knowledge.

Locke paved the way for Hume and others not only by his view of agreement and dis-agreement of ideas, but he also asserted the supremacy of experimental knowledge. Revelation is in his view only probable knowledge. Declaring that revelation which accorded with reason must be accepted, but in case of clash with reason, was to be rejected. He agrees that Divine revelation should be believed in, but to judge the Divinity of revelation, reason is the judge. Leibniz was convinced of the importance of the empirical, but critical of its exposition in the manner Locke had done. He pleads the cause of the mind and intellect against the labelling of it as a tabula rasa. He raises the question whether all truths depend on experience, and argues that we foresee things and events at times without proof from experience, which shows that part of our knowledge comes from within ourselves.

Leibniz gave his world view the new name 'Mondology'. The 'Monads' are simple substances indivisible, shapeless, indestructable. He denies any rational evidence about the coming in to being and the destruction of the monads. The relation between them is described as a 'pre-established harmony'. Every thing including the human soul and body are composed of 'Monads', the interaction, between them is due
to a pre-established harmony, the Monads themselves are ‘windowless’. The 'Monadology' is further extended to the Greater whom Leibniz calls the super Monad.

Truths for Leibniz are of two kinds and there are two principles of reasoning. The principle of contradiction differentiate between true and false, while the idea of sufficient reason produce a conviction in causation. Leibniz believes in the relativity of space and time like Kant after him, and rejects the ideas of absolute space and time.35

Berkely busied himself in establishing the case of idealism, and a Divine subjectivism, though with a different type of argument. He rejects the idea of a thing to exist by its own self independent of its relations with the perception of God. Expressed in terms of sufí simplism what he says amounts to this. What we perceive are qualities, qualities are ideas in mind: mind is a perception of God. Hence every thing is, so long as God is there for them to be.36

The eighteenth century philosophers were in a much more congenial atmosphere prepared by their seventeenth century predecessors, for developing their philosophical ideas.

David Hume divides the perception of the human mind into impressions and ideas. Impressions are livlier and stronger than the ideas. And to this class belongs sensations, passions and emotions. Ideas are a faint image of the impressions in thinking and reasoning. Impressions and ideas are simple perceptions. The complex perceptions are divisible into parts.37
Hume brings cause and effect to the level of experience:

"... cause and effects are relations of which we receive information from experience and not from any abstract reasoning or experience." 38

By basing reason on experience Hume synthesized the empirical with the rational, Descartes with Locke. In his view:

"All kinds of reasoning consist in but a comparison and a discovery of these relations, either consistent or inconsistent, where two or more objects bear to each other. This comparison we may make either when both the objects are presented to the senses, or when neither of them is present, or when one only." 39

The idea of causation is analyzed which leads to the theory of association of ideas. Causation is but an association of ideas formed through experience. Being the basis of reasoning the comparison of ideas can lead to certainty, in fact it is the only way to certainty. The association theory however, brings knowledge to the level of probability. Not only by his criticism of causation but also by his view of metaphysics, Hume thus paved the way for Kant.

Hume's respect for and adherence to reason remains supreme only he bases and derives it from experience. But reason he thinks should have its limits and boundaries. He acknowledges the importance of passions and impulses as part of human nature. Hume gives nature the place which others gave to reason or ideas, and rejects all that is against the law of nature.
Kant's is a rationalism that prescribe the limits to both rationalism and empiricism. Agreeing with the empiricists about the importance of experience in knowledge and with the rationalists as regards the importance of the intellect, Kant draws a limit to both.

"There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowing be awakened into action if the objects affecting our senses did not partly of themselves produce images, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into the knowledge of objects which is entitled experience. Therefore in order of time we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins."40

But beginning with experience is one thing and depending totally on experience another. Kant feels that even empirical knowledge has an element added by our knowing faculty, besides the impressions of sensible objects. Kant rejects the concept of apriori judgements, on the ground that it is independent of all experience. He distinguishes between the analytic and synthetic judgements.

Kant based his moral theory on the good will, rather than utility or consequences:

"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without a qualification except a good will."41

The most important aspect of Kant's rationalism is his analysis of reason, and its formulation or division into pure and practical reason. It was indeed made possible for him after the empirical explanations of knowledge by Locke and Hume which shook the yoke of Aristotelianism. In Kant's
view it is the practical use of reason which determines the will.

"... the theoretical use of reason might easily pass beyond its limits and be lost among unattainable objects or even contradictory concepts. It is quite different with the practical use of reason. In this enterprise reason is concerned with the grounds for determining the will, which is a faculty, either for producing objects corresponding to concepts, or for determining itself to the effecting of such objects, whether the physical power is sufficient or not; that is it is a faculty for determining its own causality. For here reason can get to the point determining the will and reason always has objective reality in so far as only the volition is in question."42

Kant gave four theorems or rules in his critique of pure reason which are known as the antinomies of pure reason. He criticised the traditional proofs of the existence of God, that is the ontological, cosmological and teleological proofs. For his part he gave no methodology for the knowledge of the ultimate Reality or God. He made God, along with immortality and free will the hypothesis of ethical conduct.

While on the continent Kant was busy in his criticisms of metaphysics and pure reason, in England the political and social circumstances had given rise to the utilitarian and moral sense schools of ethics. In these nothing was new, the teleological and deontological, or the utilitarian and intuitionistic aspects and divisions of ethics had existed since the Greeks. As John Stuart Mill rightly remarks:
"... in all ages of philosophy, one of its schools has been utilitarian, not only from the time of Epicurus, but long before."43

The most popular and important of the British moralists Jeremy Bentham stressed on the importance of the individual:

"The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what? The sum of the interests of its several members."44

James Mill's reasoning appeared in the form of his theory of the 'association of ideas', put forward in 'The Phenomena of Human Mind'. This theory is based on the psychological principle of contiguity.

The nineteenth century is the age of the triumph of reason in all fields. Philosophical explanations and rationalism as well as interpretation of all phenomena is now with reference to man as an individual, human society, and the different aspects of both. The principal among these being Psychology, Sociology, and Economics, even politics and religion are looked at from a scientific point of view.

At the time when 'Philosophical Radicalism' of Mill and Bentham was flourishing in England, French thought was dominated by the views of Saint Simon and his companions. It was Auguste Comte, a junior contemporary of Saint Simon who earned a prominent place in the domain of social sciences and philosophy. In his 'positivism', he attempted to replace theology by positive science and a 'Religion of humanity'. 
Similar to the dialectics of Fichte and Hegel is Comte’s view of the three stages of History. These are the theological, the metaphysical and the positive stages. Comte stressed on applying the inductive method in his sociological formulas. Comte’s organic view of society, is so much similar to Waliullah’s though set forth more scientifically.

The post Kantian Germany was a scene of real philosophical activity in the form of various idealistic theories. Fichte, forming the connecting link between Kant and Hegel asserts that:

"The conscious mind (self-consciousness) creates both the objects (the real) and the knowledge (the ideal) by which the objects become known."

Again he sees a definite purpose and organization in the world:

"The world is a rational unified system directed towards a purpose and therefore is not a mere machine controlled by definite causes. Reason is a real entity or power which performs purposeful acts, and which includes self consciousness as well as knowledge of the universe as a unified whole. Reason interprets the world by a dialectical method, a logical system for comprehending the universe as a rational unit."

Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology of Mind’ deals with the four stages in the philosophy of mind. The first is sense experience, the second is the discipline of culture, the next is mind’s expression in art, the fourth and final stage is the life of religion.

In its experience the mind realizes its own self in unity with the object of experience. This self consciousness in Hegel’s interpretation of it is again a basis for further analysis of experience. It is observed that:
"If we call the movement of knowledge conception, and knowledge, qua simple unity or Ego, the object, we see, not only for us (tracing the process), but likewise for knowledge itself, the object corresponds to the conception; if we put it in the other form and call conception what the object in itself, while applying the term object to what the object is qua object or for another, it is clear that being 'in itself' and being 'for another' are here the same."49

In his explanation of spirit Hegel first equates it with reason, after that proceeding to its other phases:

"Reason is spirit, when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to the level of truth, and reason is consciously aware of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself. Spirit is the self of the actual consciousness..."50

For Hegel reason is a stage of the mind. Revealed religion is not the last embodiment of spirit, that is Absolute knowledge. Absolute knowledge:

"... is spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit, it is knowledge which comprehends through notions. Truth is here not merely in itself absolutely identical with certainty, it has also the shape, the character of certainty of self; or in its existence i.e. for spirit knowing it is in the form of knowledge of itself."51

In Hegel's view religious as well as philosophical knowledge takes a start in perceptive knowledge but at a higher and final stage it is the spiritual truth that is important. At this stage the form of externality is replaced by the spiritual.

"We must know God in spirit and in truth, He is the Absolute and actual spirit."52
Hegel's method of dialectics, in addition to its application to history and politics, is important for its immense influence on subsequent philosophy. This is a dynamic logic which finds truth through a series of triads; thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

For Hegel reality is spirit, for Schopenhauer it is a blind, irational, Will and life is evil. We are aware of the world as a will, and:

"The Will, which is knowable to us through immediate awareness (intuition), is perfectly free in its action, but the phenomenal world of idea is not free but is governed by necessity and follows a prescribed course." 53

According to Schopenhauer there are four principles of sufficient reason, that is (a) Becoming, (b) Knowledge, (c) Being, and (d) Action. 54

Nineteenth century is important besides the great idealistic systems, for the emergence of new social sciences as basis of philosophical system. In addition to the psychological and sociological views of Mill and Comte, Biological and Economic theories played a part in the development of philosophy. The former emerged in the form of the evolution theories of Laemark, Darwin and:. Spencer, while the later in the dialectical materialism of Mar.., Engles and their followers.

As a result of Darwin's theory of evolution, religious and metaphysical issues required a reinterpretation, thus began a new era of controversy, and rationalization. Herbert Spencer, particularly, evolved a theory in which
religion, philosophy and evolution were all assimilated. His fundamental thesis being the development of the universe from simplicity to complexity.  

Friedrich Nietzsche is in favour of the natural state of things but in a different manner than Rousseau, he has a theory of the Will to power, different from the Will of Schopenhauer. He realizes and stress on the importance of history, but in a different manner than Hegel. The 'Superman' and the 'Will to power' are the most important aspects of his theory. Nietzsche believes in the instinctive basis of thought and reflection. The causal instinct is conditioned upon and excited by the feeling of fear.

Though Schopenhauer and Nietzsche developed their systems independently but as a reaction to Hegelianism nevertheless Hegel and Kant remained the dominant influences in later philosophy, a status never achieved by others except Plato and Aristotle. Neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism flourished till the middle of the twentieth century. The conservatives moulded Hegel's thought in accordance with Christianity, while the radicals evolved it into a materialism. The later became more and more influential gradually.

Marx applied the Hegelian dialectic to his Communist principles, the system emerging as 'Dialectical Materialism'. In Marx's view interpretation of the world was not enough, what is required is to bring about a practical change in its affairs. The basic thesis is that:
"... it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines the consciousness." 57

Thus making economic inequality the basis of all evils and suffering Marx evolved his theory of communism, extending to production, ownership and labour: etc. Philosophically what is important is that like the impact of Darwin's evolutionism on the creation theory of metaphysics and theology, Marxism effected contemporary thought of its followers and opponents both. It became a part of the challenge to conventional theological reasoning along with evolutionism, and Freud's psycho-analysis.

The German idealist tradition dominated the minds of most of the philosophers in the nineteenth century. Some emphasised one aspect some the other. In the Hegelian tradition of absolute idealism the most notable figure is F.H. Bradley, perhaps the first and most notable idealist of Britain. For Bradley philosophy was a means for intellectual satisfaction through the discovery of the Ultimate.

"If we take anything considered real, no matter what it is, we find in it two aspects. There are always two things that we can say about it, and if we cannot say both, we have not got reality. There is a 'what' and a 'that' an existence and a content, and the two are inseparable." 58

Thought, however, divides reality into 'what' and 'that' because thought is an ideal. There can be no thinking without an idea, and ideally lies in the separation of quality from being. The object of thinking is truth, and
truth qualify existence. Reality is one and its being consists in reality. Only the Absolute is really Real, because in all other things the existence and content can be separated.

There are certain remarks of Bradley that indicate what the new trends in philosophy are going to be, that is they point at the assimilation of the empirical and the ideal in a whole of reality. Such as:

"... every thing is experience, and experience is one." and "The real to be real must be felt."59

Bradley's French contemporary Bergson adopts a different line of thought. The important and dominant feature of Bergson's vitalism is its dynamism. It is essentially a philosophy of life. He objects to the application of the laws of physical sciences to life, for living things are governed by different laws. He stresses the inadequacy of the rational method of logic, mathematics and other sciences, in respect of life, as in his view rational activity can only give mechanistic and material explanation. Reality being always in a state of becoming cannot be interpreted by mechanistic and static laws. Evolutionary change in real duration being the essence of reality, which can only be grasped by intuition.

Three important concepts form the basis of Bergson's system. These are: (a) Elan vital, or life energy, (b) Duration and (c) Intuition.

The intellect cannot grasp life, because life is a continuous change, an urge, an energy.
There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find, these things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them."

"Our intelligence, as it leaves the hand of nature, has for its chief object the unorganized solid."

"Of the discontinuous alone does the intellect form a clear idea."

"Of immobility alone does the intellect form a clear idea."

"The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life." 60

In the new century with new problems, new dimensions, and new ways of looking at things, the old concept of philosophy began to be moulded into new shapes. The old division of thought, the approaches in the form of rationalism, empiricism, and idealism gave way to different approaches. Analysis of mind and matter, life and philosophy itself became the order of the day. The idealism of Hegel and Bradley took the form of personal idealism in theories of several thinkers such as Rashdall, Sorley, and Mactaggart.

Mactaggart retained the ancient and nineteenth century pluralism, and replaced the idea of the Super Person of God into an idea of the Absolute, as a unity of persons but without a personality. The self is in his view such that:

"If, 'I' can be known at all, it must be known by awareness, and that, if it cannot be known by awareness, we are not justified, in asserting any proposition in which the term 'I' occurs. Unless we take this extremely sceptical alternative we must admit that 'I' is known by awareness." 61

All experience is in Mactaggart's view personal
experience. About causation he takes the view that it is a relation of implication between existent realities. Metaphysics is defined as the systematic study of the nature of reality. While philosophy includes the study of ultimate nature or God. This function of metaphysics that is the interpretation of reality is what is rationalism. It is only in the case of object or end, and at times the nature of the study itself that philosophers or rationalist differ. That is the results derived or the interpretations offered of the nature of reality are different. In the twentieth century these differences have taken several forms, such as Pragmatism, Realism, Idealism, Logical Positivism and Existentialism. It is neither relevant nor possible to take even a very brief account of these various forms of rationalization.

In this age philosophy has to go hand in hand with science, in fact both are interdependent, and a part of one another's environment, rather basis. Science is to philosophy in the present time as religion was in medieval times. In the words of Whitehead:

"In one sense science and philosophy are merely different aspects of one great enterprise of human mind."

"Among living things on this planet, so far as direct evidence reaches, science and philosophy belong to man alone. They are both concerned with the understanding of individual facts as illustration of general principles. The principles are understood in the abstract and the facts are understood in respect to their embodiment of the principle."

62
Under the impact of science philosophy in twentieth century has become more analytic then ever, as well as becoming pre-occupied with precision. Science has given philosophy its urge for specialization in one or the other fields. Therefore, the new schools or 'isms' lay stress on their own points of view with scientific method.

According to Pierce 'the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action' and 'our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects.' For the Logical, Positivists: 'Philosophy is a logical syntax', and 'The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification.' Russel one of the leading scientific minds among philosophers thinks that besides other things:

"... as a result of the new control over the environment which scientific knowledge has conferred, a new philosophy is growing up involving a changed conception of man's place in the universe."63

But there is also the consciousness of the negative impact of science:

"The main point is that: scientific method by making society more organic, increases the extent to which an individual is a cog, if this is not to be an evil, ways must be found of preventing him from being a mere cog."64

All these tendencies indicate, that the process of rationalisation will continue in the times to come, though its nature might keep on changing with the turn of events in the world.
CHAPTER II

THE ISLAMIC TRADITION OF RATIONALISM

1. The Classical Perspective:

The Islamic perspective of rationalism need not detain us for long, the reason being, that part of it is dealt in a subsequent chapter on Iqbal, where we have seen it from his point of view. Nevertheless rationalism in Islam has had such a wide and everlasting influence that we can, even now find the Aristotelian argument, reformed and adopted to Islamic Theology in contemporary writers, such as Mufti Abduh, Ashraf Ali Thaenvi and Mohammed Ayyub. We shall be having a quick run through the main elements of Islamic rationalism to appreciate in a better way the later development of the same in the Indian sub-continent.

Though historically the mutazila and their qadariya predecessors are known as the precursors of Islamic rationalism, in fact its factual history go back to the very beginning of Islamic history. The Orientalists interested in the history of Muslim theology or Kalam traces its origin in so many different ways. Arberry, for example, feels that the discussions among the muslim doctors about legal matters could not have been possible without the knowledge of the method of Aristotelian logic. He sees the germs of rationalism in the Qur'an itself.

In the beginning of rationalistic attitudes or soon after it, muslim rationalistic theology began to be called Kalam or Ilm-ul-Kalam. The term literally means
speech and is used in:

"Arabic translations of the works of Greek philosophers as a rendering of the term 'Logos' in its various senses of 'word: reason', and argument."  

The same word is applied to special branches of learning. The experts are known as 'Mutakallimān' or single Mutakalim. Discussions of natural science are designated "physical kalām", (al-kalām al-tabī'ī) and so forth in case of other branches. The writers of original Arabic works began to the use the term taking it from the translaters. Shahrastani applys it to Greek thinkers, and so does Jevdah Halevi,

But more specifically the term 'Kalām' was applied to the early rationalistic theology of the muslims, which flourished before the rise of philosophy. The exponents of the 'Kalām' were called 'Mutakallimān' distinguishing them from the philosophers on the one hand and the orthodox ullama on the other. Ibn Khaldūn, Shahrastānī, and Maimonides all agree that the term was used before the mutazilites. The Māskaddimah of Ibn Khaldūn refers to the origination and usage of the term kalām. Welfson is in agreement with Arberry about the existence of the rationalistic method in the discussions of law (Fiqh).  

From the philosophical point of view, however, Muslim rationalism began with the discussion about free-will and determinism. Maṣbāb al Juhānī and Gilān al-Damashqī are considered the originaters of the doctrine of free will. It had always been characteristic of religious thought to concentrate on the issue of free will, and the
Christians and Jews had discussed the issue exhaustively before the Muslims. The origination of these discussions among the Muslims whether directly derived from others or inherently there is an undecided matter. Nevertheless, contact with adherents of other faiths and cultures brought it home to the Muslims that certain problems raised by these people could proved fatal to Islam. The Mu'tazila became the champions and defenders of Islam in face of alien ideas.

They learned and acquired the rational methods of their critics and used these as weapons in the defence of Islam. Wāsīl ibn 'Aṭṭā' and 'Amr ibn 'Ubaid were the first Mu'tazila thinkers who became prominent for their rationalistic views. Abu ʿAl-Hudail Ṭallaf, is reported to have written seventy treatise in the refutations of the critics of Islam. Forty thousand couplets are attributed to Bashīr ʿUmar Mu'tamir and eighty books to Jāhiz on the subject of rationalization of Islamic principles.5

The Mu'tazilites started the study of philosophy, particularly logic to use it as a hand maid of religion. But soon they began to study philosophy for its own sake and developed a taste for the rational method. This tendency gave way to the effort towards the accord between Islam and Greek thought.

The five essentials of the Mu'tazila creed were a) The unity of God, (b) Justice (of God), (c) Reward and punishment for deeds, (d) The state between belief
and disbelief, and (e) to order the doing of right and abstention from wrong. About reward and punishment the mutazilites firmly believe in God's promise of reward and punishment, on the day of judgement and discredit the common belief in the recommendation of and solvation by the help of the Prophet. They considered it incumbent upon every believer to order the doing of right acts and to forbid the wrong. According to these thinkers the person who committed a grave sin was neither a believer nor a non-believer. His was a state between the state of belief and non-belief. This doctrine was in the beginning the distinguishing mark of mutazilaism but was modified and reshaped by later thinkers, who considered this doctrines the projection of Islam as a golden mean. These thinkers called their own creed as a mean between the extremes of religion and philosophy and therefore true Islam.

The impact of Greek philosophy led the later mutazilites to purely metaphysical issues such as essence, substance, property, matter etc. Though there was not much originality in the views of the mutazilites, their main characteristic was the fact that they used all their skill to bring about an accord between Greek philosophy and Islam. For example, they saw that religion believed in a created universe created by God ex nihilo, on the other hand Aristotelian philosophy adhered to the eternity of matter, and termed creation ex nihilo as an impossibility. In order to bring about an accord between these two opposing views, the mutazila thinkers offered several
explanations and principles.

Some considered the world eternal but attributed movement to God's act of creation. Others thought that God could not destroy all existence but destroy parts of it. Still others talked about God's creating the universe, as bringing it out from the state of non existence to existence. And by ending it is meant putting it back in its original state. 6

The two most important characteristics of the mutazilite rationalization was their defence of God's Unity and Justice. The controversy in these matters arose when some of the orthodox muslims began to term the Qurān as eternal on the ground that God's speech must be eternal like Himself. The names of God mentioned in the Qurān were also taken as eternal, because each indicate one or the other attribute of God. Ahmad Ibn Hambal, one of the famous muslim justists was amongst the exponents of these views. The mutazilites thought that by attributing eternity to anything, even the names and attributes of God, is committing heresy, that is believing in more than one God. In this respect the 'Jahimīa' creed originated by Jaham also sided with the mutazila, though they were determinists and against the mutazila doctrine of free will.

Consistant with their theory about God's unity the mutazilites believed that all attributes of God are essentially His essence and not self existants. Abu Al- Hudaif Allāf said:
"God is the knower by knowledge and it is His essence. He is Omnipotent and His power is His essence. He is the living and His life is His essence."?

The 'Ash'arites' rose to defend the orthodox views in the face of mutazila rationalism. They opposed the mutazilite's reliance on reason but in fact they themselves adopted Greek logic and dialectics to refute the views of mutazilites. Just as the mutazilites had risen in defence of Islam against the critics of other religions, and learned the techniques of their opponents for rational combat with them, the asheraites challenge the mutazilites doctrine by the same method of rational argument of the mutazilites.

The main difference between the two was that the mutazilites rationalized and interpreted the dogma in terms of reason and logic, while the asherites stuck to the orthodox conclusions and used their rational skill to prove it.8

In the controversy about free will and determinism also the asherites held a middle position, allowing only acquisition to human beings but no freedom of will and action. This position was later moulded into determinism by Fakhruddin Rāzī and others.9

Al-Māturidi, the founder of Maturidi Kalām and a senior contemporary of Abu al-Hasan Ashari thought that there were three means of acquiring knowledge, that is sense organs, reports and reason. In his 'Kitāb al-Tauhīd' he severely criticised scepticism about knowledge.

Reports are the means of acquiring knowledge about
the past such as history, religious tradition and genealogy etc. Al-Māturīdī thinks that confining knowledge to the rational and discrediting sense perception is wrong but reason is nevertheless, the most important source of knowledge. Without the assistance of reason, he thinks, sense and report can give no real knowledge. Knowledge of metaphysical realities and moral principles is derived through reason. And it is reason which distinguishes man from animals. Māturīdī however, avoids thorough going rationalism.

All the human ways of acquiring knowledge including reason as well as the senses are limited. Divine revelation is the surest guide, the necessity of which in his view is not restricted to religious affairs only but its guidance is required in worldly affairs as well. ¹⁰

Side by side with the mutazila rationalism, and the Ashārites and Māturīdīs, there were the extremists who opposed the use of reason and interpretation in all religious matters. These included the Ḥaḍbalitās and the Ṣāhirītas. ¹¹

The later philosophers, however, did not restrict themselves to religious matters, they like their Greek predecessors set out to pursue their inquiry where ever reason and logic took them. This raised a critical question about the truth of revelations and philosophy.

The philosophers mostly adhered to the view that philosophical inquiry and Divine revelation reveal the same truths. Al-Kindī is the earliest among the muslim thinkers who is called a 'philosopher'. He is a thinker in the line of the mutazila. In fact he can be considered a connecting
link between the mutazilites and the philosophers. Most historians consider him a thorough going Aristotelian but recent researches have disclosed that he deviated from Aristotelian views on several issues. Most noteworthy is his contention that the truth of the Divine revelation received by Prophet Muhammad can be demonstrated syllogistically in a manner which only the ignorant will contest. He also defended the fundamental Islamic beliefs with the help of dialectics like the mutazilites before him. He strictly adhered to the orthodox view of creation ex nihlo. 12

In metaphysics Kindī followed the Aristotelian theory of causation, and the fourfold division of causes. Kindī divides philosophy on the basis of the different channels of human knowledge. The particular and material knowledge comes through the channel of sense perception, while the immaterial and universal is obtained through rational cognition. And hence corresponding to these are the sciences of physics and metaphysics. At other places the two fold division is that of science of Divine and created. The sciences are then divided into these two groups. Demonstration is the method of metaphysics, representation, consensus or sense perception of other sciences. Kindī stress the unity of God and make use of the teleological argument as proof of God's existence. He distinguishes four senses of the term reason like Aristotle, that is the active, the potential, the habitual, and the manifest. Al-Kindī also contributed a great deal to the development of philosophical terminology among the muslims. 13
Al-Fārābī maintained a middle position in the controversy about the superiority of reason and revelation. He is superior to all the Muslim philosophers in his knowledge of Aristotelian logic, and at the same time the first important exponent of neo-Platonism. Fārābī like Plato concentrated on the interpretation and expansion of the political and social in terms of metaphysics. But his adherence to Platonism is in its neo-Platonic garb as is evident from his 'opinions of the inhabitants of virtuous city' (Arā-ahī·al-madīnat·al-Fāḍila) which starts with the discussion about the One and the process of emanation. The One of Fārābī is conceived as self-sufficient, eternal, uncaused, and immaterial. It is Aristotle's first cause and God of religion combined together. The first is, however, not accessible to human reason.

Fārābī introduced the scheme of emanation of the neo-Platonists into Muslim philosophy, which was adopted with minor differences by most subsequent thinkers and Sufis.  

Fārābī's discussion about knowledge culminates in the concept of the unity of knowledge.

"... the idea of the philosopher, supreme ruler, prince, legislator, and imam is but a single idea.

No matter which one of these words you take, if you proceed to at what each of them signifies among the majority of those who speak our language you will find that they will finally agree by signifying one and the same idea."
Fārābī has a firm faith in logic:

"... the art of logic gives, in general the rules which, if followed, can correct the mind and direct man to the right way to truth away from the pitfalls of error."16

Fārābī is also probably the first of a long series of thinkers who upholds the genuine nature of the miracles of the prophets along with his firm adherence to necessary causation. Holding that miracles though supernatural do not contradict natural laws. The source of these laws is in the world of the spheres and its intelligences a celestial world from where the terrestrial world is managed. By means of spiritual powers prophets are associated with the agent intelligence. And hence this communication enables them to perform acts which are otherwise supernatural.17

Ibn Sīnā like Fārābī believed in the emanation of the world from God through the mediacy of the ten intelligences. Claiming that adherence to this view preserves the Unity of God, in fact adoption of this theory reconciles the peripetatic and Islamic views of creation and can best fulfill the means of a necessary causation. Fazlur-Rahmān rightly describes him as a citizen of two intellectual spiritual worlds, the hellenic and the Islamic.18 By the application of Ibn Sīnā's rationalistic skill the Greek concept of knowledge intermingled with the Islamic view of prophecy, ascribing an allegorical position to the latter. It is declared that:
"... the Qurānic revelation is by and large, if not all symbolic of truth, not the literal truth but that it remains the literal truth for the masses. Further that the law, although it must be observed by every one, is also partly symbolic and partly pedagogical and, therefore an essentially lower decipline than philosophical pursuits." 19

He also gives a psychological explanation of prophecy:

"By the quality of an exceptionally strong imagination, the Prophet's mind, by an impelling psychological necessity, transforms the purely intellectual truths and concepts into life like images and symbols so potent that one hears or read them, not only comes to believe in them but is impelled to action." 20

These are major deviations from the orthodox position which resulted in widespread condemnation of the orthodox in all times, but which proved intellectually so effective that subsequent philosophers and sufis adhered to them, though slightly modifying them to adjust with their own views.

Inspite of their deviations from the orthodox opinions Farābī and Sīnā were not thorough going rationalists. Rationalism was taken to its logical ends by Ibn al-Rāwandī, Al-Sarkhasī, and Zakārīyā Rāzī. Ibn al-Rāwandī and Sarkhasī carried the scepticism of later mutazilites further and denied the truths of revelation and miracles, Sarkhasī attacked the doctrine of prophecy. Ibn Rāwandī argued that human reason was sufficient to determine the knowledge of God and to choose between good and bad. Rāzī is the greatest non-conformist in muslim thought. He holds a view of the transmigration of the soul some what similar to
that of the Pythagoreans. Rāzī's central metaphysical doctrine is based on the five eternal concepts which shows the influence of Plato. These eternals are matter, space, time, the soul and the creator. He also firmly adheres to the view of the eternity of matter. His theory of space distinguishes between universal and particular space. Rāzī also distinguishes between particular or determinate and absolute or universal time. The former is conceived as infinite, the latter immeasurable and infinite.

The soul infatuated by matter was bound up with matter by God, but through reason it learns about and strives to achieve its true place in the intelligible world. Rāzī, however, offers no proof for the eternity of the Creator or the soul. His views of prophecy are the most drastic as he cut rightly rejected the concept of revelation, holding that reason is sufficient for the knowledge of truth.

The Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Saḥāb) considered the knowledge of the self as the first object in the search for truth. They acknowledged the limitations of human reason for understanding God's essence, or the universe as a whole. In such matters the only recourse is to the prophets and revelation. Philosophy and law should, however aim to obtaining as much as possible the knowledge of Divinity.

Miskawayh adhered to the emanationistic view of
creation with a little difference from the view of Ibn Sīnā and others. About the proofs of the existence of God he relies mostly on the Aristotelian arguments from motion. Synthesizing it with religion by laying stress on the guidance of scriptures and ascribing all perfection to the unmoved Mover. His main contribution is in the field of ethics. The 'Tahdhib-al-Akhlaq' and 'Al Fauz al-Aṣghar' are mostly the discussions and divisions of virtue in the Platonic Aristotelian manner.

In their controversy with the mutazilites the asharites had formulated a theory of atoms and accidents. This theory is used to justify the continuous nature of God's creative activity.

"... accidents cannot endure for two successive moments, but are continuously created by God who produce and annihilate them at will. Similarly the atoms in which these accidents are continually created by God and can only endure by virtue of the accident of duration created in them by God." 

Ghazālī's doubts about knowledge led him to the adoption of mystic methodology and his critical attitude is displayed best in his criticism of philosophy. But both these attitudes, pronounced against philosophy and rationalism, philosophically form a very important standpoint. Ghazālī criticizes the philosophers on twenty points and though these involve repetition and overlapping, they are nevertheless expressive of his rationalistic and dialectical skill. The most basic difference is that of the two world views, the Aristotelian view of the
philosophers, maintaining eternity of matter and the orthodox view of creation ex nihïlo held by Ghazâlî. In line with their world view the philosophers scheme of things leave no room for miracles, God's knowledge of the particulars, bodily resurrection etc. They firmly believe in the necessary law of causation which Ghazâlî repudiates:

"... in our view, the connection between what are believed as causes and effects is not necessary. Take any two things. This is not that, nor can what be this. The affirmation of one does not imply the affirmation of the other; nor does its denial imply the denial of the other ..."26

He strongly affirms that:

"We do not agree that the Principles (of Being) do not act by choice, or that God does not act by will."27

The world he maintains was created by God ex nihïlo at a particular time.

The error of the philosophers about God's knowledge is due to their applying the analogy of human knowledge to Divine knowledge. This applied also to the knowledge of God's attributes. The philosophers, Ghazâlî thinks, have failed in proving the existence of God for they base their proofs on the basis of the theory of causation and its logical necessity. Disagreeing with their methodology Ghazâlî charges them with heresy even in case of the issues where their conclusions are in conformity with orthodoxy. His main point of disagreement with the philosophers seems to be their reliance on reason as the
sole method of obtaining truth. This is in line with Ghazālī's epistomology set forth in the "Munqādha min al-dālāl".28

However, Ghazālī is not opposed to reason and sciences as such. He only objects to the application of reason in matters of religious law, which he thinks the philosophers have subjected to interpretation to bring them in accord with Greek Philosophy. In matters other than the essentials of religion he allows the use of reason. Though in his actual arguments particularly in the "Tahāfut" he breaks his own rule. At other places he is very critical of the fanatic orthodox. He equates both the philosophers and the dogmatists when he says of both:

"They (the dogmatists) always make the man the criterion of truth and not truth the criterion of the man; and that is erroneous in the extreme."

"We judge by actual text where there is a text and by our independent reasoning where there is no text."29

The system of Ibn Rushd though apparently an antithesis of Ghazālī's is in fact a progressive stage of the rationalising process, in which all the different opinions are rationalistically synthesized. He boldly asserts in his 'Fasā'ī al-Maqāl' that:

"If the traditional (al manqūl) is found to be contrary to the rational (al maqūl), it is to be interpreted in such a way as to bring it in to harmony with the rational."30

Thus he completes the rationalistic attitude started by Al-Kindī, which the whole array of the philosophers including Al-Fārābī, Ibn-Ḥusnā, Ibn-Al-Tufayl,
Ibn Bajjah and others believed in, is the identical nature of the philosophical and revelational truth. This tendency has its effects in subsequent Muslim thought as late as Sayyid Ahmad Khan in the nineteenth century. Ibn Rushd maintains the interdependence of reason and revelation. He goes further and tries to prove with reference to the Qur'an that, Islam directs the Muslims to use their reason, in fact they are obliged to do so.

In his *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, Ibn Rushd describes the denial of causation as scepticism.

"That the fate of knowledge is bound up with the fate of causality, he argues, is evident from the ultimate distinction between entities which are knowable in themselves and entities which are unknowable in themselves, resolves itself in the last analyses, in to the distinction between entities whose causes can be assigned and entities whose causes cannot." 31

In fact reason for Ibn Rushd is the knowledge of causes. The denial of causes amounts to the denial of sciences.

Ibn Rushd's theory of causation, his views about the accord of philosophy and science with religion, did not gain currency among the Muslims for a long time. But for the Europeans he was the source of the transmission of the peripetetic philosophy. His views influenced the Jewish philosophers Maimonides and Saadia Gaon and the Christian scholastics particularly, Thomas Aquinas, who was the progenitor of scientific philosophy in the west. The Muslim realised the importance of Ibn Rushd's philosophy very late. But in the nineteenth century when Islamic thought was rising under the impact and challenge of
modern science and society, the muslim thinkers had him to rely on for the historical basis of their rationalism. Shaikh Muhammad Ẓādūk, Sayyid Ahmad Khān, and Ameer Ali often argues in the Rushdian line.

In the age long debates of orthodoxy and philosophy human mind and the rational faculty had to find ways for expression and development in accord with time, so as to avoid persecution as well as stagnation. One such way of expression was mysticism or sūfīsm, which became the dominant thought system of the muslim from the sixth to the twelfth century hijri (13th to 17th A.D.). Mysticism has been a thought system or way of life among Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, Christians and Muslims, and naturally there are similarities in the various forms of Mysticism. What concerns us here is the fact that mystic metaphysics or sufism has also a rationalistic explanation of reality.

As a way of life sufism has existed among the muslims from the very beginning, and even the earliest of these pious muslims had their philosophy of life, such as Hasan of Baṣra. At this stage however, sufism had not taken the form of a movement and only individual pious men and women adhered to its way of life, that is the way of temperance and piety. At the next stage of the sufistic way of life ascetic tendencies developed into pantheistic trends, as in Hallāj and Bīstāmī. The third and philosophically important phase started with Ghazālī's systematization of sufi methodology. Deciding in favour of sufi methodology in
'al-Munqidā min ad dalāl' and criticising hellenistic philosophy in the 'Tahārat' al Ghazālī synthesise the two in the 'Mishkāt al-Anwār' developing a mystic metaphysics as a result. Ghazālī makes full use of the concept of light and illumination. As for the human powers of apprehension he contends that starting with sense they culminate in reason, which through inference and synthesis increases the scope of knowledge indefinately. But the prophets and saints have knowledge of things that are not comprehensible by reason through a higher faculty. The highest type of knowledge that is knowledge of God, His Attributes, and other higher reality is possible only through this faculty. Sufi metaphysics reached its zenith in Ibn al-'Arabī's doctrine of the unity of being. The 'Futūḥat al-Makkiyyah' and 'Fusūs al-Hikam' centre around the concept of the unity of being (Wahdat al-wujūd); The system of Ibn al-'Arabī evolves from his concept of logos according to which every prophet corresponds to a reality, which he calls a logos (Kalimah) and which is an aspect of the Divine unique Being. These start with Adam and culminate in Muḥammad. Reflected and manifested in these logoi, the Supreme Being is essentially undivided, eternal and immutable. In this scheme man is conceived as the embodiment of universal Reason and the being in whom all the attributes and perfections of God are reflected. Only man is capable of knowing God fully.33

Ibn al-'Arabī's doctrine of unity found expression in the works of sufi poets Ibn al-Farīd, Farīd al-Dīn Āṭṭār, and Jalāl al-Dīn Rumī, with minor differences. The doctrine
of the perfect man was further developed by ʿAbdul Karim al-Jīlī. The philosophy of illumination was expounded in the metaphysical manner by Shihāb al-Dīn Suharawardī (Maqtūl) and developed further by Ṣadr al-Dīn Shirāzī and others.34

Philosophy and theology are combined for the last time in medieval thought in the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Al Rāzī's methodology is rationalistic, showing evidence of Ibn Sīnā's influence, while in his views he opposes most of the doctrines of Sīnā. He is particularly critical of the doctrine of emanation and denial of God's knowledge of particulars.35

2. The Indo Muslim Perspective:

Muslim thought in the sub-continent originated in the shape of sufism and remained so till the seventeenth century. The Muslims and Hindus in spite of living together for centuries retained their exclusive identities in all spheres of life, though the interaction did involve mutual influence to some extent. The Sufi doctrines were effected by Hindu Monistic doctrines and in Hinduism itself new thought elements flourished under muslim influence.36

There were basic and fundamental differences which remained manifest, the Sufi thinking remained ethical and moral. The muslim identity crises became evident when emperor Akbar tried to bring about some unification in the Hindu and Muslim ideas and life. The idea of the emperor prompted by political expediency failed, with Hindus and Muslims alike. For the muslims this identity crises evoked
reaction in the thought of Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, which is a reaction to Hindu influences and monistic sufism. It is interesting to note that this first rationalistic effort of muslims developed contemporaneously with the Hindu reform movement. The later movement started with Bhakshara's criticism of Shankara's 'Maya' doctrine, while the former began with Sirhindī's criticism of Ibn-\(\text{il-}\)Arabī's doctrine of the unity of Being.  

Henceforth Indian muslims in their search for identity developed reform movements, and rationalistic doctrines more or less independently of their Hindu countrymen. Sirhindī's criticism of Ibn-\(\text{il-}\)Arabī is on several points. From the ethical point of view his objections pertain to the lack of clarity in case of evil. According to Sirhindī, Ibn-\(\text{il-}\)Arabī's doctrine of phenomenal reality as a shadow, and ideas as Names and Attributes of God, surmounting in the doctrine of the unity of Being, takes evil as relative, and denies evil in itself, which leads to laxity of morals, which gets encouragement from the continuous reference to God's Omnipotence and Man's helplessness. Hence cutting the very roots of moral conduct.  

This criticism hit the very base the sufistic spell of determinism, which was one of the elements responsible for the moral and practical stagnation of the muslims.

In opposition to Ibn \(\text{al-}\)Arabī's doctrine that the world exist only as reflection of Divine Attributes in Pure Being, Sirhindī thinks that:
"When the attributes come to exist in multiple manner in the mind of God, they generate their own opposites. Thus, e.g., knowledge stands over against an antithesis called ignorance, Power is opposed by its contradictory viz. Powerlessness, and so on. The sum total of these attributes and their specific antithesis constitutes both the Divine consciousness and the material of the universe. The essences of the contingents are rea dy the opposites of Divine Attributes, or 'non-beings' ( Adam ). But in these opposites or antithesis the positive Attributes cast their reflections. The essences of the contingents are thus these 'non-beings' plus the reflections that come to inhere in them of the positive Attributes."39

Sirhindī objects to Ibn al-'Arabī's view on the ground that the world exist as separate external entity, not only to God's mind but His Being. Its existence is imperfect and derivative but nevertheless it exists.

"God, in Sirhindī's view is beyond both being and non-being, and He cannot be known by an analogy to the human."40

He further objects to the Sufi view of placing sainthood above prophethood. In this respect he attempts a rational analysis of the mystic consciousness. He concludes that the mystic state of absorption is below the state of prophetic consciousness. The world henceforth despised by the Sufis is affirmed at the highest level. When the spiritual journey reaches the highest Divine Name that is Being, it requires the affirmation of its opposite the non-being or the world. The saints stop at this stage because they have renounced the world, only the prophet can have real ascent.
"The acquisition of these (highest) perfections is peculiar to the prophets, and their perfect followers too can, through the leadership and mediacy of the prophets share in them. Among the constituent elements of man it is the element of earth which is entitled most and primarily to these perfections. All the other elements... are here subject to the earth .... And since this element is peculiar to man, the qualities of man emerge inevitably superior to those of angels ... for what earth has attained nothing else has ...."41

This restoration of man's place in the universe and rationalization of the spiritual experience to the credit of the Sharifah, thus affecting a unity between the esoteric and exoteric aspects of religion is what earns Sirhindī the praise of Waliullāh and Iqbal and makes him their fore runner.

Rationalizing miracles Sirhindī rebukes those who despise 'the world' of causes and want to live in a world where anything can happen.

"These people do not know that in the annulment of causes is the annulment of reason and Wisdom..."42

God, works through external causes, the purpose of causal order is to grant man a chance to realize his own capacities and the meaning of God for the world. God has provided for man to act freely in the world of cause and effect.

With Sirhindī's as the only rationalistic effort in the muslim sub-continent, Waliullāh appeared as a revivalist assimilating all the important factors in Sirhindī's system. He carries ahead the task of conciliation and evolving into one whole, the different interpretations
of the Islamic path. Waliullāh's eclectism was manifold, and in addition to the reconciliation of orthodoxy and sufism he applied it to legal and social matters. Sirhindī, is also a precursor of the views of Waliullāh and Iqbal in the field of 'Ijtihād', and of Waliullāh and Sayyid Ahmad Khān in the Interpretation of miracles. Iqbal also approbates his analysis of the mystic experience.

Sirhindī is the originator of Islamic renaissance in the seventeenth century, when the West was at the peak of its rationalistic activity. Among the muslims the rationalistic movement, particularly in India, is taking a start. And the rationalists are in a position to benefit from the Greeks, medieval muslims, sufis and modern European thinkers.

But as will be seen later in the course of the present thesis, Waliullāh somehow or the other, developed his system, isolated from the later source. While in case of Sayyid Ahmad Khān Western influence is greatly exaggerated, in fact this influence upon him is incomplete and superfluous, due to his traditional education, and due to his peculiar position as a reformer. Seemingly, Muhammed Iqbal is the only Indian muslim rationalist, in a position, to have fully assimilated and learnt from all the sources both western and Islamic. None of these thinkers are 'thorough going rationalists though they are undoubtedly rationalists, in a factual effective sense. Again none of them are system builders in the sense in which Kant and Hegel are. They are not even analysts like Russel and Moore. But they nevertheless, have
their own systems in the broader sense of the term. They are analysts, interpreters, reformers and rationalists.

With this brief summary of rationalism we are now in a position to look into the nature of the contribution that the three Muslim thinkers of the recent past have made in rationalizing the Islamic thought. No doubt one would find echoes of the thought of many thinkers mentioned in the above survey. (and that is one of the justification of this survey) nevertheless they are not mere repetitions of the past. With Waliullah starts a subtle change in Islamic thought and then it swings drastically in the hands of Sayyid Ahmad Khan to a new position. In Iqbal the pendulum does not swing in the opposite direction but finds a new route henceforth unknown in the Islamic Philosophy. This whole process has the germs of trigerring off the thought into newer forms of expansion and hence its importance. We now turn to Waliullah the first on our list of rationalists.
PART II

WALĪULLĀH’S ORGANIC RATIONALISM

WALĪULLĀH

Name Qūṭb-ud-Dīn son of ‘Abdur Rahīm, generally known as Shāh Waliullāh, was born at Delhī in 1702 or 1703 and died in 1762, was an outstanding muslim thinker of the Sub-Continent. He is the first muslim thinker of the Sub-Continent who shows an awareness of the socio-Cultural problems. Born in a troubled and declining time of Mughal India, educated mainly by his father, ‘Abdur Rahīm in a traditional but distinguished manner, Waliullāh became the founder of the revivalistic and reformitive movements of muslim India. He tried to synthesize Sufism and Orthodoxy, and to purify both. In legal matters he developed an eclectic approach. His influence on subsequent thought has been tremendous. His work was carried on by many thinkers and scholars of the Sub-Continent, his family also contributed a lot to the development of Islamic thought in the Sub-Continent. One of his sons translated the Holy Qurān into Urdu for the first time. Waliullāh is the author of more than fifty books written in Persian and Arabic.
CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF BEING

1. Philosophical Background:

Waliu'llah forms the bridge between medieval and modern Islam in India and is the source of all latter thought systems of Muslim India, no matter how divergent their approaches may have been from one another. In fact after the fall of Spain (13th century) Waliu'llah's is the first comprehensive and coordinated, philosophical approach to Islam. The transcendental and universal viewpoint of Islam as a governing and all-embracing force in human life, which reached its climax in the system of Muhammad Iqbal, begins with Waliu'llah. If Waliu'llah's thought is given its due importance and its contents analysed and explained, he occupies the same position in the reawakening of Muslims, or, to be precise, in the reorientation of philosophy in Islam as that of Descartes in the modern European thought. His philosophy is eclectic in many ways. In Fiqh, in Jurisprudence, in Ethics, in the interpretation of Hadith and in the application of reason, he assimilates all the important contributions and viewpoints of his predecessors. Just as he embraces and enlivens all the four schools of law, in philosophy his system is indicative of the confluence of the philosophers, as well as of the sufis. At least in this one respect his mind is very scientific and eclectic. It is because of this comprehensive nature of his thought that modernists of the calibre of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, traditionalists of Deoband like
Nānotvī and Pan Islamists like Afghānī and Obaidullah Sindhi, inspite of the difference of their respective systems, are indebted to and own the influence of Walīullāh's creed. He is a unique figure in modern Islam, and occupies an important place in the history of muslim thought as a whole.

Walīullāh was a voluminous writer, and his works cover all aspects of science and philosophy, but the most important of these are his Metaphysical theology, Ethics, and Sociology, written in the manner of the classicists. They can hardly be categorised subject wise as:

"... one finds in his works a large quantity of material relating to other topics which are dealt with by him indirectly." 2

Of his works the small treatise 'Lamahāt' is the most important from the point of view of philosophy. In fact his main principles and basic concepts are illustrated in this work, which are applied to concrete and factual theological, religious and logical issues in other works like, 'Tafhīmāt-Allahā'ī', 'Tāwīl-al-Ahādīth' and Al-khair-al-Kathīr', works like 'Izālat-ul-Khīfā' and Fuyūz-al-Harmain' are of historical importance, 'Futūh-ar-Rahmān' is persian translation of the Qurān, 'Alfauz-al-Kabīr' throws light on the principles of understanding the Qurān. His sociological and Ethical philosophy is mainly contained in 'Hujjat-ullah-al-Balighah' and 'Al Budūr-al-Bāzīghah' .

Walīullāh's metaphysical views seem to be an echo of the views of Aristotelian philosophers of Islam, though to a certain extent modified, since his purpose is more
akin to the orthodoxy and fundamentalism of Ghazālī and others. In the sixty small discourses of the 'Lamahāt' he has propounded his metaphysical views in a brief, comprehensive, but in a terse suggestive and epigramic style. Starting with the nature and reality of Being, he has elaborated his views about God. Taking up all the important factors in the belief structure of Islam, he has made an attempt to rationalize or explain rationally all the elements of this structure. The essential beliefs of Islam, in addition to the belief in God, are beliefs in Prophets and prophethood, angels, the judgement day, the scriptures, and the life hereafter. These principle beliefs, in the course of time, being subjected to rationalizations, interpretations and explanations by the philosophers and theologians, and have, in the process of analysing ramified into several branches, which have eventually become an integral part of the philosophy of the Kalām. For example the belief in God, when dealt with philosophically has come to include as its essentials, the problems of the attributes of God, and the nature of creation etc. Just as prophethood, philosophically includes the nature of Revelation, the nature of miracles and the role and importance of prophets and prophethood, while the belief in angels has led the thinkers to discussions about the nature and function of angels. The Quranic verses about God, prophethood, angels, revelation, judgement day, reward and punishment, creation and administration, etc. have been interpreted again and again from all angles, since the time of the Mutazilites, Ashārites,
and Matrūdis.

In the course of time the development of Islamic thought indicates four main approaches to philosophy of religion (although there are individual and minor differences within the four). One is the approach of the philosophers or rationalists, which started with the Mātazilites and reached its zenith in the system of Ibn- Rushd where the ultimate criterion of every thing is reason, the second is the approach of the Ashārites, Mātrudis and Ghazālī which restricts the use of reason, though employing it for the sake of explanation, the third is the dogmatic, theological rather than philosophical approach popularised by the Ḥanbalites and Ibn Taymiya. The fourth line of thought is that of the sufis which is a combination of Neo-Platonic emanationism and mystical attitude. Wali-ul-ḥāshā's system seems to be a synthesis of all these trends, his attempt at rationalizing all the tenents of religion indicates the influence of the philosophers and mystics from whom he derives his ideas like, 'Al-Shakhs al-Akbar', 'Ḥasīrat al-Quds', 'Crystalline Sphere' and effects of heavenly bodies etc. His firm contention to the literal truth of the Qurānic verses about miracles, sight of God on Judgement day, God's coming down to the terrestrial heaven, 'Gābrīel's' appearance before Mary and the Fire in which Abraham was thrown etc., shows his affinity to Ibn Taymiya. His attempts at the coordination of revelation and reason, philosophy and religion and his analytic approach reveals the influence of Ghazālī.
It is difficult for a modern reader of philosophy to get through the terse and highly technical language that Waliullāh uses to expound his philosophical position. In addition to the brevity of his philosophical argument, it presupposes a certain amount of background knowledge to act as a perspective, against which his philosophical position can be understood. In summary, though at the cost of accuracy, his philosophical position can be described as basically Platonist, idealistic, organic with a sort of dualism and inter-actionistic explanations.

Waliullāh believes in the existence of two realms of reality. One is the realm of eternal, necessary, and in a sense more real world of ideas which is the basic form, or blue print of whatever exists in the other realm which is contingent and changing. Nothing in the later realm can exist without first both logically and temporally, having a form or an idea, in the realm of the eternal existences but there is always a reciprocal relation between these two worlds. Nothing can happen in the former without affecting the latter, and nothing can happen in the latter which can be explained fully without a reference to its counterpart in the realm of the ideas.

There is no doubt, Waliullāh believes, that the world around us which is a world of sense perception has a semi-independent status having its own laws of nature. To understand the working of this world, one has to understand the laws of nature and this constitutes a complete, though not a comprehensive system of reality. Every thing can, in
principle be explained in terms of cause and effect, though not in the quantitative sense in which Mill used these terms. For happenings, where a causal explanation fails, one can refer to the world of ideas, as part of the causal process since cause in such cases is supposedly hidden from ordinary eyes.

As is said earlier, this sensory world of ours is a complete system of cause and effect, yet it is not a total or a comprehensive system of all reality. A particular effect $E$, can be explained by particular cause $C$ in this world. But this total world of cause and effect has got to be accounted for and since nothing in this world of causes can count as sufficient explanation so we have to refer it to the world of ideas, and eventually to the idea of God himself as the ground for our ultimate explanation.

This is the sort of picture that Walizullah has in mind the details of which we will delineate later. An understanding of this picture may take two courses both of which have been used by the classicists including Walizullah. One can start with the essential, necessary, and self evident principle of a necessary existant being namely God and then through logical steps deduce the existence of the world of ideas and thence forth the world of sense perception. These steps of deduction have been used universally, though with variations, both in Greek thought and by Muslim philosophers and sufis for which such axioms like 'nothing can come out from nothing' and 'only one can come out of one' have been accepted as absolutely true. The
other way to understand this picture of reality is to start with the world around us, and finding it contingent, changing and not really real, go through a chain of causes to ideas, forms, and then ultimately to the cause of causes, idea of ideas, i.e. God. In a sense these two models are the expansion of the two arguments for the existence of God, i.e. the Cosmological and Ontological, expanded and applied to the whole gamut of existence.

For Waliu'llah between the world of sensory perception (the world of nature) and God, is the world of ideas or imagery, which plays an important part, in establishing a causal relation between the two. Unlike Cartesian interactionism or Spinoza's parallelism, the world of sense perception and God are two terminals of reality and the world of ideas partakes of both, influences both and in its turn gets influenced by both of them. The existence of this world of ideas is more real in comparison with the world of senses, and less real in comparison with God. Looked at from the highest point it is a descent from the real and looked at from the lower point it is an ascent towards the Real.

This is in sum Waliu'llah's world view and his metaphysical rationalism. It would be easier now to understand the nature of his argument and the rationale of his interpretation of particular events. The important works in which his philosophy and its application to particular events can easily be found are 'Lamhāt' and 'Tawil-al-Ahādīth' respectively.
2. Theory of Being:

Let us start with his arguments leading to the proofs of the existence of the Real, which he calls necessary Being. The argument has two steps:

"Every effect is originated, as its cause precedes it. Every originated is transformable, because, it is preceded by its originator, its transformer."7

The second part of the argument says:

"Every compound of two things is preceded by its parts; and every thing the actuality and the individuality of which are actualised is preceded by its actuality, the essence of which, is that species, and by its individuality, the essence of which is the individual."8

From these two premises he concludes:

"It is therefore necessary that the First and the Origin of all should not be an effect, nor an actualised one from any essence and any individual."9

This is an abridged argument based on certain assumptions, which have to be taken as true materially for the truth of the conclusion. The underlying assumptions are:

a) That what we encounter in the world are effects of some causes. (b) That what we see are not simple but compounds events. (c) That every thing that is, was not at one time. (d) And since nothing can be, which was not, so it must have been potentially present in the form of its essence, before it is actualised.

So far the argument is formal. But Waliullah is aware of the fact that from this formal argument, a formal first cause which is simple can only be validly deduced. But this simple could be an empty notion, a mere end of the chain
of causation. How can we be certain that this cause of causes is, or can be said to have the same attributes as, we think, God has. If we leave this argument here, we face Kantian criticism or end up with the 'whitazile' notion of a formal God. But for Waliullah, this causal argument, is not only a formal way for establishing an end stage of a causal process. Waliullah, through his argument would like to lead one to a Being, with qualities required for a personal God. This he does, though at some cost of the validity of the argument, as we shall see latter. He eventually slips from the concept of 'cause' to the concept of 'Being' which is the ground for all existence. The 'one', which is a cause, according to Waliullah, is related to others (other than one) as number one is related to other cardinal numbers:

"By that I mean, that one precedes two and is present in every number, till it becomes what it is."10

The last phrase, "till it becomes what it is" only shows that in ultimate analysis all numbers are reducible to one (i.e. 2=1+1 and 3=1+1+1 etc.). The presence of this number, in all numbers does not in any sense, vacate the meanings of other cardinal numbers and does not 'conflict' with 'one'. It may be compared with:

"The Waxed existence does not conflict with existences of the new pictures that could be made out of it or as the existence of the 'human' does not conflict with the existence of particular individuals, and the existence of a family does not conflict with the existence of the actions emanating from it."11
In other words, this 'one', does not become particularised by enlisting itself in particular forms, though 'one' may be used in many contexts with reference to these particular forms.

"Zaid, for example, as an individual is one, though with reference to its parts is multiple. The man in relation to his species is one, though in relation to individuals is multiple. Similarly, the animal in relation to the genus is one, though as a species in itself is multiple."12

But, then the question is, what is 'one' itself? Cannot the 'one', Waliullah is talking about, be a multiple of another 'one'. This question has already been answered by Waliullah through his causal argument. Nevertheless, the characteristics of 'one' that he is talking about are:

"The most deserving meaning of the one, if you divert the question from particular instances, is, that it should come into existence all at once from the word, 'Be', or should come into existence by one requirement and one power and be a shadow of one individual only."13

In other words understanding can reach only to that 'one', which is the first descent of the ultimate 'One', the 'One' we cannot know and cannot even say that He is One.

Waliullah reaches this concept of one through a second argument, much more akin to the principle of generalization used by inductive logicians. This is the process of abstraction. This route of going from the particular to general is similar to the one taken by Waliullah in his causal argument.

"... You see both 'Zaid' and 'Amar; you abstract man from them, and by doing so you prove the existence of man in both of them. And just as you see the man and the horse and abstract animal from them..."14
The same process is applicable to reach the Essence of essences:

"... you take notice of all the essences in general, and abstract Being from them." 15

This is the common argument of divesting particular qualities from existants, to arrive a universal. Waliullâh then abstracts the essence from universals as well to arrive at the Universal Being. In so far as the individuation of the particulars is concerned, they are individuated through their opposites. An object is because it is not the other. The principle, however, cannot be applied to the Universal Being. That is why, though:

"Being is in reality is the genus of the genera and the essence of the essences yet Being cannot be lost sight of in any cognition."

"Hence the Being of beings cannot be simply understood as an essence nor a genus, nor any other thing of that kind." 16

So long the arguments for the existence of Being have been purely formal. Waliullâh is aware of the formal nature of these arguments, and considers them to be inadequate for the purposes of 'faith in God'. He reverts, as he must, to the psychological argument, which, though superficially resembles the ontological argument for the existence of God is not in fact the same:

"Consciousness about God is innate in the minds of Human beings. The consciousness that emerges and develops out of the rudimentary consciousness that things cannot happen without a cause. A simple form of this consciousness or cause of a thing, or of a happening, is found among minds as well." 17
The above, in Walīullāh is not a simple causal argument, since he is not referring to an immediate precedent of the idea of God, that occurs in the consciousness. He, as a matter of fact, refers to the first emanation of the Great Person (al-Shakhs al-Akbar) whose first act of consciousness is cognition of the Absolute, or God; and since, this first emanation is present in subsequent particularizations (like number one is present in all other numbers), a particular individual, in a sense also inherits this consciousness of God. The cause of the presence of the idea of God in human mind, is thus traced through amplicated metaphysical steps to this great Person, and subsequently to the Absolute. Here Walīullāh, is not referring only to a feeling State of the mind or to a religious experience, as we find in William James or in Iqbāl. His reference is not even to the sufi idea of the presence or an encounter with God, but is directly related to a rational metaphysics, which, of course, the sufis had adopted.

These are thus, the three basic lines of argument which Walīullāh uses for establishing the existence of a necessary Being, though with occasional variation either in the argument or in the style. The arguments in 'Lamahāt' are concise, terse to a certain extent, repetitive and finer points delineated during the course of an argument. In Hujjatullāh al-Bālighah the argument is set with a mystical background and the Reality is presented not as argument, but as an immediate experience.
3. Theory of Becoming:

Once the existence of God is proved with no possible disputes, the second step, a natural one, as was with Descartes, is to prove the existence of the physical world. It means, one has to answer such questions relating to the existence of this world as:

a) How the world has come to be and (b) How real it is? Waliullah's theory of becoming is more complex than the classical Islamic theory in this respect. He picks points from the rationalists, emanationists and also from the realists in the classical thought. There are basically three distinct concepts, which are involved in the explanation of the coming into existence of the world, and a fourth, which runs through them as the *raison d'être* of the three. They are as follows:

1. Invention (*ibdaa*)
2. Creation (*khalq*)
3. Administration (*tadbîr*)
4. Emanation (*tadalli*)

These four concepts comprehensively describe the way through which we can understand the activity of God. The following is a brief description of each one of them:

(i) Invention means to bring out a thing from pure non-existence, *ex nihilo* into existence. This is a continuous activity of God. It is through this continuous process that the pure possibilities are realized in the world of existence. It is in a sense the unfolding of the scheme of creation into the realm of existence, a transition from the realms
of absolute necessity to the realms of pure possibility. It refers to a relation between God and pure possibility. (ii) By 'creation' is meant making a thing from a thing (as the making of Adam from dust). It is a relation between God and what passes from one state to another. The consequence (ether) that results from this process is the appearance of the celestial spheres, the elements and other species with their properties and effects. What necessitates it (the creation), is that the created thing should be preceded by the matter and a certain passage of time, and that the universal should be inclusive of all things.

(iii) 'Administration' refers to the presence of free activity in the universe, so that the happening there should in turn be in conformity with the universal plan. This refers to a relation between God and those things which are a place of multiplicity, like the species and the individuals, what necessitates it (the administration) is the intermixture of powers.

(iv) The 'emanation' to begin with, is (a) the appearance of the Real (God), and (b) is a function of an administrator in the world in the same manner as the human soul is the administrator of the human body. The first kind of appearance is between God and the human individuals, while the second kind of appearance is the source of administration in the world. The appearance of knowledge and guidance and the perfection of the selves (nūfūs) are the results of it. What necessitates it (emanation), is that the religions
may be prescribed for the people and their perfection may be achieved through a universal plan, which cannot become complete through the emanation. 19

This theory of the origination of the world though based on the hellenistic theory of creation, adopted by the muslim peripetatics, nevertheless throws light on Walūlāh's keenness to bring about a compromise between the theories of the philosophers, and the scholastics, on the one hand and to synthesise both of them with the sufistic view of God on the other. This eclectic approach though it seems to be a weakness from the point of view of systematic philosophy, is deemed to be a true systematization on the basis of Islam. Because Islam disclaims narrow and one sided approaches and the original structure of Islam contains the basis to which all these three attitudes can be applied without any contradiction. Walūlāh further expands this theory by explaining the relation of the four ways of the operation of God's work to God himself.

"Creation is the completion of invention, and administration is the completion of creation. It is so because, by creation is meant free action both in matter and form, which gives rise to the multiplicity of forms. All this is (primarily) included in the universal soul and the universal matter. When creation appeared, it was nothing save a mixture of powers (Qawā'īl) and an appearance of the contents of the universal soul and the universal matter." 20

All the characteristics of the created are poured in the first invention by the Creator. The species and individuals are granted universal nature through universal plan. In accordance with this view administration is not
continuous. It ends where the reflection and the manifestation of the Great Manifestation (مَلَکَةَ الْعَالَمِ) appears in the Holy Fold. Administration should not overpower creation and emanation should not have priority over administration and administration over emanation. The good and the evil forces exist side by side, without disappearance of either. Universal plan has an immense importance in the origination and existence of the universe. Things originate necessarily from the requirements of their causes. In Waliullah's opinion there is no contradiction in the affirmation of 'necessary intention' or 'required causation', both can be real.

The discussion of Being is further expanded to the world of multiplicity, the created and existant. A distinction is drawn between the genus and the species and essence and its essentials. Here the peripatetic muslim explanation of Being for further concordance with Islam are supplemented by the Platonic touch by introducing the 'similitudionary world'.

The actions of the First are definite and its relations are firm. The general rule about them is, that if these actions and relations are to refer to the invention, then the first emanation suffices all of them; because considering it as near to the first, its emanation is just the emanation of the whole universe itself. If they refer to creation, then the emanation of the Great Body invariably includes all.

"But if they refer to the Administration and the Emanation, then that would be under the conditions that they (actions and relations) have either been created by God, or that he has made manifestation through them."21
This explanation of the Being and its attributes is followed by the hellenistic principle of 'one from one', a vague explanation of relations between the realities of things in terms of lines and 'pictures'. This relationship also exists between the attributes and the Being:

"It is not proper, that this emanation may be exclusively attributed to somethings against others. But it is however, necessary that its reality should not conflict with other realities. Its relation to things is like the relation of black lines to the pictures of writing."  

In this delicate relationship of Being and essence, Walīullāh brings out another distinction. He thinks that even though essences are predicated by qualities, yet, they may not be taken as beings in themselves. In other words predication does not necessarily involve an existential judgement about that to which an attribution is made:

"Some times, we think of the essence of the Being, and at the same time we doubt the being of the essence itself or we deduce it (essence) as not being. Inspite of the predications are pronounced on it."  

The existence of particulars is said to be determined by the 'Similitudinary World' before material appearance. This ideational world exist before our knowledge of it, which comes later on as factual experience. This conception of ideational world as essence and factual existence is elaborated by several examples, throwing light, on the nature of substance and accident. The universal inspite of its particularisations, remains universal so the individuality of the particulars must be attributed to some other cause, which is:
"... the prime matter, which is just like the body for the spirit of the form or like the nest for the bird. The matter then is multiplied according to a chain of conditions because, every preceding condition is preparatory to the succeeding one."24

There is a step by step process from quiddity to quiddity; new quiddities comes to existence each time the common is particularised. The everyday happenings are dependent for its perfection on the 'Hold Fold', 'Sublime Assembly' and the 'Similitudinary World'.

"The whole universe is one body, always changing in its states, and is everlastingly moving with an ideal motion. It is so, because, even though the forms which particularise the bodily form, are the sub-stances themselves, they in all the states become separate qualities and states for some time in relation to the permanent reality. All the states are turning round. The time is included in the permanent and is its requirement, while the power which bears it is the universal Nature. It makes its requirement in the universal plan, only when it is regarded as the origin of the origin; and by this is meant Divine Providence."25

Universal Nature, the universal plan and the providence are the ultimate causes of all happening. The universe as one organic whole is called the Great Person or Body by Waliullah.

The whole theory of creation or origination, through the 'Similitudinary World', and the idea of a universal soul or entity totally inconsistent with the other views of Waliullah, as will be evident when his theories of prophet- hood, and miracles etc., are discussed. Meanwhile having established, the concepts of the 'Similitudinary World', the Holy Fold, the 'Sublime Assembly'; and the 'Great Person', he deduces all other details from these.
An important corollary of any theory of creation or invention is the concept of time and space. Creation involves these two notions and without a description of these the theory would remain incomplete. Waliāllāh, hence, has to put forward his views about them which he does, by saying:

"Time is the (name of) measure of motion and change, whether the motion be positional or ideal as the nature may predicate. The origin of time is this Body, capable of undergoing changes infinitely. Thus, he who says, that 'time' is a substance, you may deny it completely, and make this same Body as the (place of time). He who says, that 'space' (free from matter) is a substance, you should also deny that completely." 26

All this mechanism is permanent; God has originated a nature in the whole universe in which all the happenings come one after the other as pre-ordained.

The relation of the creation of the 'Great Person' by God, is not like that of a builder to his building because the universe in relation to its Creator is not like a building's relation to its builder. It is on the other hand the sort of relationship that exists between the Sun and that which is illuminated by its light. This act consists of three conceptual steps:

(a) creation of the Great Person. (b) actualization of the potentialities of the Great Person and (c) preservation of this whole gamut of Creation. It may be noted here that Waliāllāh makes no difference between the concept of 'Great Person' and the concept of first intellect ('Aql-i-Awāl) of the philosopher's hierarchy of emanation. The last conceptual
step has a basic resemblance with Berkeley's dictum *esse est percipi*; the world is real in so far as it exists in the perception of God.

Every existence is an overflow of an existence which is of a stage higher than itself. All existing objects and things are related to each other, intermingled in the chain of agent and patient, which are present but forms an existing entity only when there is a cause or an external condition for it. All the daily happenings have their complete causes, which are known partly, or as a whole. The wise have always been in search of the complete causes, by means of hypothesis, observation, and experience. So far Waliullāh seems to be talking of a world, though related with an internal relation to the world of ideas yet has a sort of interdependence and can be understood independently in terms of 'laws', 'causes' and 'nature'. Yet this is only a part of the story, in the sense, that though this knowledge is not of a mere illusion, yet it is not complete knowledge. To know the world of sensory experience fully one has to transcend the apparent (though not to deny it) and reach the transcendental causation that plays an active part in the world of perception. For instance the chain of causation in the world leads you to: the 'Celestial Spirits' which influence nature as our own mind influence our body. These celestial spirits are also responsible for the flow of history like:

"... the raising of the messengers, the nations, the appearances of miracles and the acceptance of prayers." 27

The efficacy of these heavenly powers in worldly
affairs is a very complex concept through which Waliullah wants to achieve three things all at the same time:
(a) he wants to retain the autonomy of the world of objects, (b) wants to establish a relationship between the world of objects and the world of ideas, and (c) wants to promote a mechanism for explaining the movement of history.

The relationship of the world of idea and the world of object is a dual relationship. It is not always the case that the former effects the latter, but the opposite can also happen. This interaction is possible only because nothing in the universe is simply a body or, a piece of matter without a concomittant spirit.

The term Holy Fold (Hazratul-Quda) is the spiritual plan which is the origin of happenings and occurrences. Just as individual existants have several qualities or points the universal soul has:

"So many points in front of every state which is to come upon is one day in life. One of its points is in front of the 'establishment' and the 'actuality'. This point is the very image of the 'Being' whose existence is necessary. It is its manifestation and its exact copy. This is the origin of the Holy Fold."28

The first appearance of the 'Holy Fold' is the imagination of the necessary existant by the celestial spheres. Its circle enlarged when the superior angels and the knowing minds came into existence. This 'Holy Fold', even though, has no particular place from the point of location, but the nearest imagery of it is that, it is the Benificent(Rahmân) sitting on His throne. The angels of the high rank are bearing that Throne and it is from here that the execution (Qadâ') proceeds.29
CHAPTER II

PROPHETHOOD AND THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

1. Prophethood:

Waliullah's views of Prophethood are like his views of Being a synthesis of his predecessor muslim thinkers, whether the fundamentalists or the rationalists. His theory has two sides, one is the conception of prophethood which has to be dealt with here, as a part of his metaphysical system, the other side from which Waliullah approaches prophethood and prophecy, is its position in religion on which is based his theory of social philosophy, ethics and politics.

In consistency with his organic approach, Waliullah synthesises two theories of prophethood (a) acquired and (b) inborn. He negates both points of view if they are taken separately and exclusively, as has been characteristic of muslim thinkers who start their works with statements and regulations of the two theories and develope the whole story as a one sided show.

"Prophecy (Nubuwat) is not some thing which could be acquired through bodily and spiritual gymnastics, nor is it inborn in the sense that the self of the prophet has been created in such a way that he is compelled to perform actions corresponding to purity. Prophethood is on the other hand, the highest degree conferred at an appointed time."

The prophets are messangers of God, send to guide a people, whose conditions are chaotic, in need of reformation and guidance. It is God's gift to his creatures to help them in acquiring the right path. The prophet is morally and
spiritually as well as practically superior to all others in his times:

"Their angelic faculties are very high. They are capable of knowing things that no body else can know. They receive revelation from above (Mala-i-Ala). Their nature and temperment is balanced, and their conduct well intended and well meant in the highest degree. They are just in dealing with people, and take care of public welfare. They do not harm anybody intentionally. All these qualities are evident from their expressions."2

Waliullah further states that the form of prophecy changes with the change of time. The prophet sometimes appears in the form of a king and a caliph, at times in the garb of a profound scholar and on certain other occasions in the shape of a hermit and a spiritual guide. Similarly there are different causes for the advent of the prophets, and their works and performances are also varied. Before Noah, the prophets appeared in the form of thinkers and philosophers.3

All the qualities found in prophets of different ages, were found in the Prophet Muhammad, who was the ruler and caliph, a scholar, hermit, and a spiritual guide, all in one person. There are certain qualities which might be a part of the personal qualities of prophets but which are not essential or required for prophethood, such as good looks, superior lineage, sweet voice, eloquence, wealth and bodily strength. God is particularly kind and benificient towards the prophets, and His mercy protects them from error in three ways.

(i) "He creates them with a sound nature (fitrat) free from weakness."
(ii) "He informs them by means of inspiration about the consequences of good and bad actions.

(iii) "At times, He puts obstructions between them and the evil actions through unseen powers, as it happened in the case of prophet Yusuf (Joseph) when he was being seduced by the wife of Aziz. His father Yaqub (Jacob) appeared to him when he was biting his finger."  

In the above manner he rationalizes and interprets the extraordinary factors in the Quranic and Biblical narations of the birth of Jesus, the swallowing of Juna by a fish etc.  

All the prophets had been given a certain law, which was appropriate to the time and circumstances. The difference in the systems of law is not the difference of the status of the prophets, these differences are the differences of their fixed prototypes (āyān thābita). The question of rank and superiority of the prophets depend upon their eternal perfection and is in proportion to the capabilities of their prototypes. Miracles, are at the most symbols, and symbols cannot be the essence of reality. Like Ibn-Sīnā, Fakhruddīn Rāzī, and other medieval thinkers Waliullah excludes the working of miracles from the nature of prophethood. In his opinion, for every change which is to take place, there ought to be a required capability in the prophet of that age and the people to whom he is being send.

"At times, a certain person by his very nature happens to be prepared for perfection, such as his taking notice of a Divine secret or keeping a continous connection with the Sublime Assembly (Mala-i-Ala) or getting dyed with a Divine dye. He acquires this according to his attainment of
maturity. The appearance of his perfection however goes by a known order (nizām), when he gets some freedom from the veils of nature, of custom and of the body and sometimes when he gains from these bonds, his connection (with the Sublime Assembly) this dye and these moments of freedom assume, in the senses or, in his dream, the form of a regular event. An interpretation of it is one of those things (namely, Divine secret, connection with the Sublime Assembly and getting dyed with a Divine dye). An example of it is as follows. The Holy Prophet Muhammad, in the very beginning of His life was found connected with the world of Divinity, learning resemblance to the Sublime Assembly and was free from every kind of impurity. At times His perfection was evident in the form of the splitting of the chest, at times, it appeared in the shape of the speech of the angel Gibrīl when he (Gibrīl) was sitting between the heaven and the earth. And at times he was weighed with the rest of the people and out weighed them all, and at times in the form of the Ascension (Mīrāj).”

The views of Waliullāh on Prophethood and prophecy though not original, are novel in their synthetic nature. Like his other views, prophethood is conceived as a part of the whole system of creation; starting with Being or reality, the theory of prophethood is an important stage in the development of this system. In fact it is the nucleus around which Waliullāh arranges his moral, social and political views, in addition to the purely religious. Closely related to prophethood, in fact an integral part of it is revelation, so the proper course would be that we should now turn to examine Waliullāh’s concept of revelation and the nature of religious language.

Waliullāh’s view of revelation is a combination of the orthodox dogma and hellenistic rationalism of the philosophers. We can say that the premises and the conclusion are those of the orthodox, while the methodology or
argumentation is that of the philosophers. It is linked with his theory of Being, in fact deduced from it:

(i) "In case of revelation man's perceptive faculties are first subjugated by the faculties of the 'Sublime Assembly', and then starts the flow of knowledge towards the Holy Fold.

(ii) If the Divine grace dominates the capability of the recipient, then it is called revelation, which is given only to the prophets, and it aims at reformation of the people. If reverse be the case, then it is the inspiration which comes to the holy persons ('suliya').

(iii) Revelation is always free from ambiguity, and is extremely clear in its import of purpose. It is so because the intention of God is the good of the world and His intention admits of no change whatsoever. Thus the revelation of the prophet is a certain science, whether they received it through discernment (firāsat), dream or inspiration. In the case of 'suliya' there is however a possibility of doubt.

(iv) Revelation unlike inspiration is in no way the creation of the mind and the prophet alone can acquire a complete state of dis-appearance and his knowledge is of universal penetration."\textsuperscript{8}

The certainty of the prophet's revelation comes from the influence of the Divine administration on his intellect. Waliullāh compared this with the reflection of the Sun in a well polished mirror. The prophets are at a higher degree of perfection than other people. They are near to the angels in their piety, that is their angelic faculties have developed to perfection and over powered the bestial faculties. Their minds due to their perfection and purity are fit to receive the sciences through revelation.

The revelation comes to the prophets in their own language, because its purpose is the reformation of the people. God has no limitation in His communication and His
media are more than one. He, in view of the administration of the universe, has send the prophets to guide the people. When he reveals the guidance to the prophets, He chooses the media and the language according to the situation as a whole. Waliu'llah illustrates this view of his:

"Remember that God has various tongues, when He intended to teach Ibrahim the way of seeking His nearness through the sacrifice of an offering, He spoke to him by two tongues so that it may remain as a great event, signifying his sincerity and obedience to God, and in order that the ransom of the same sacrifice, according to that tongue may continue to remain a blessing worthy of thanks."9

Waliu'llah believes that in addition to the differences of age and contents, the Quran is also different from other revealed books in its very nature; the other revealed books he thinks are of the type of 'holy talk' (hadith qudsi).

"The flow of Divine grace towards the prophet takes place in two ways. One way is of establishing a shariah, the other way is of the speech and formal specification, as the Holy Qur'an is revealed to the Prophet. Now if the first way (namely, of the establishment of the law ) proceeds and hastens to assert itself then, hadith qudsi is revealed, but if the second one proceeds and is quickly accomplished, then it is likely, it will not take place. All the Divine books before the Holy Qur'an, were revealed after the type of hadith qudsi."10

At another place the nature of revelation is explained as:

"Revelation means, the breathing into the heart through a dream or by creating the necessary knowledge in it at the time when man concentrates upon the unseen. Or he may hear a well arranged speech from behind the veil, as if he hears it from outside but does not see the speaker. Or God may send a messenger, then an angel may appear to him in a certain form, often during his concentration upon the unseen when the senses are
suppressed, he hears a voice like that of
the chime of the bell just as a man, in a
state of swoon (caused for example, by a
severe blow on the head) he sees various
colours, such as red, and black."11

Just as the Holy Prophet is the most perfect of
human beings, the Qurān is the most perfect form of Divine
revelation. As to the purpose of its revelation, it is the
reformation of the people and since it is the last of the
revealed sciences, revealed to the Prophet of the prophets,
itself revelation ends the purpose or the universal plan of
revealed books.

"The pure intellect of the perfect prophet is
extremely effective, and is perpetually
strengthened by the great manifestation
(ta‘alluq-i-azam). The revelation of the Holy
Qurān is the result of the perfection
of his (prophet Muhammad's) self and also
the fulfillment of the right on the part
of the great manifestation itself."12

The fact that the earlier revealed books could not
remain safe and secure through the passage of time is, for
Waliullāh, an indication that they were not meant for all
ages and their status was not equal with the Qurān. For the
obvious reason that the shari'ah given to different prophets
is not different in nature, the difference is only in the
language, and the form, which is in accord with the situation.
He is so firm on this point that he maintains:

"A book which could not continue well preserved
and jealously guarded by its followers, cannot
be called a heavenly book; such a one is only
a scroll where in the followers of that religion
collected the knowledge and guidance of their
prophet. The status of that scroll is equal to
the status of Bukhari and Muslim with us."13
2. The Science of the Qurān

The discussion about prophecy and revelation takes us to a discussion about the Qurān, its interpretation, and its explanation. This science of the Qurān, is an integral part of the philosophical systems of all Muslim thinkers, Waliu'llah has also dealt with the science of the Qurān in several works.

He is credited with bringing about a revolutionary change in the manner of the study of the Quran in theory and practice. Besides his Persian translation of the Qurān, the ār-Rahman, his treatise, Al Fauz-al-Kabīr fi Fīl-al-Tafsīr, is an important contribution to understanding the revelational language, and lays down the criteria for determining the meanings of words which have no sensory correspondence with the world outside. He also undertook the task for providing a methodology for an understanding of religious language which, he says is the real science, and he uses the Quran as a prototype of such a language. He explains his principles in such a way that they have, as he says, a universal applicability and meet the requirements of his time and are always ready to respond to the call of all times to come.

His first principle is a simple one. Religious knowledge is not a paradox. It is basically for the guidance of the common man. Hence as far as possible (and the possibility is stretchable to a very great extent) take the literal, common sense meaning of the Qurān and refrain from interpretation. The people Waliu'llah says, have become so
interested and absorbed in interpretation, and in analysing
the allegories and similes of the Qurān, that the real
purpose of the language, i.e. of guidance, of reformation
and purification of individuals and society, is totally
overshadowed. Waliullāh noticed the dis-satisfaction and
doubts of the scholars in their methods of interpretation,
and teaching of the Qurān. As a teacher of the Qurān in
his father’s school, he practically experienced that the
intent of the language of the Qurān is lost sight of and
that people have become busy in a game of words and in
equivocations.

"You should know that the straight path in this
problem, and in the allegories such as the hand
and the face (of God) and the matters of the
future life is that man should not busy himself
in knowing the nature of existence. He should
generally believe that what God and His Prophet
have intended by them is there, and should not
say that God intended this and did not intend
that etc. It is, therefore, that you will never
find the Holy Prophet, his companions, and the
best of their followers having ever busied
themselves in anything of the kind. This kind
of business (namely, to know the allegorical)
came from the Mātazilites, who had borrowed it
from the philosophers. The sunnites afterwards
took it from the Mātazilites."15

Before Waliullāh, his father Abdur Rahim, in his
method of teaching the Qurān, deviated from the customary
manner. Waliullāh sensed the different and better effect of
this new approach, and thought that it might prove a
starting point for the formation of his method. That he gave
it importance is evident from the fact that he specifically
mentions it in his 'Anfās al-ʿArīfīn'.16 This method can be
called the direct method, in contrast with the customary
method of reliance on commentaries and interpretations. The
direct method of teaching and studying, besides bringing about
a direct communication between God and his servant, keeps the
mind intact from the conscious or unconscious following of
one or the other scholar, and keeps check upon the sectarian
differences in religious beliefs.

The treatise 'Al Fauz al-Kabir fi Guls al-Tafsir' has
five chapters, in which Waliullah has explained his principles
of understanding and interpreting the Quran. The first chapter
deals with the five branches of the science of the Quran, the
second with language, diction and grammatical forms of the
Qur'an, the third explains the exclusive diction of the Quran,
the fourth is about the art of interpretation and the last
deals with the context of the Quranic verses. The contents
of the Quran are classified into five different types, each
of which may have a different criterion of determining the
meaning of words used therein. These five types are:
i) Science of commandments (Ilm al-Ahkaam): These are the
commands of Allah for doing certain things and obtaining
from others, the importance and priorities relating to
matters of religion, practical and social life, including
politics and administration and political economy. The
explanation of this science is for the fuqaha' or scholars of
the shariah to undertake.

ii) The dialectics or discursive science (Ilm al-Mubahisa):
This knowledge deals with the controversies and arguments
with the four astrayed groups, the Jews, Christians,
infidels (mushrikeen) and pretenders (munafiqeen). This is the field of the 'Mutakalimeen' or scholastics.

iii) Science of the remembrance of God (Tadhkîr bi-Allâh): (That is the explanation of God's gifts and benicience) It deals with the creation of heaven and earth, the fulfillment of the needs of people, and the perfect Attributes of God.

iv) Science of the temporal happenings (Ilm-Tadhkîr bi Ayyām-Allah): This deals with the historical events narrated and referred to in the Qur'an, about the rewards of God to the righteous, and His punishment to sinners.

v) Eschatology (Ilm-Tadhkîr Maut): It is about the events after death, the judgement day, the rackenning, the balance, paradise and hell etc. The last two fields are for the preachers and reformers to explain.18

According to Waliullah while interpreting or explaining, certain characteristics, the style of the Qur'an must be kept in mind so that we may not project our own subjective visions while explaining the verses of the Book. As the language of the Qur'an is that of the ancient Arabs, in the verses pertaining to duties and obligations there is no systematisation, classification and conciseness, of the later experts. In the discursive verses, instead of the logical diction, a common sense style of similies and arguments is adopted for the sake of the public. There is no arrangement of priorities and arguments are not marked syllogistically. Due to these facts the interpreters have commonly associated the narratives of the Qur'an with
particular events, indirectly affecting its general and dynamic nature. At times only coincidence of an event in time or association of ideas have led the scholar to specific particularisation of the verses. While in fact there are very few verses which specifically and exclusively pertain to the events in the time of the Holy Prophet, and are for the sake of temporal expediency.

Waliu'llah feels that interpretation should be with reference to words and not to their meanings, because extension of interpretation to meanings leads to an extended and fortified inference (Tawil), which according to the Qur'an was the besetting sin of the Jews. Again the attribution of the qualities of God to humans or vice versa, is strictly forbidden by the Qur'an. But too much concentration on the rational interpretation of the Quranic verses can lead to this mistake as is evident from the mistakes in the views of the mutazilites and the philosophers about creation and other alike matters. The same application and association or interpretation of the Divine in terms of human led to the deification of saints and holy persons.

Since the Qur'an is for the reformation of humanity as a whole and not a particular nation or tribe, in the narration of God's benificence, the Qur'an's method encompass the knowledge of the whole humanity.

"The names and attributes of God are narrated in a way that is comprehensible by the natural intelligence of men in general. So that no metaphysics and Kalam is needed for its understanding." 19
The historical conditions of advent of Adam, and other prophets and nations are numerous in the Qurān, some are narrated many times, as the Qurān is not a book of history. In Waliullah's view:

"These stories are not narrated for providing knowledge of the past events, but to impress the badness of infidelity and sins upon the minds of people. So that they may understand that God punish the infidels and protect the righteous."²⁰

Again the narration of death and life after death is also for the purpose of moral and spiritual reform. To remind man of his status and his helplessness before God and His powers.

The language of the Quran is the natural and customary Arabic language; God's intention is that the Qurān should be understood as it is in its actuality. According to Waliullah's principles, the meaning of difficult words should be searched for in the works of those who were contemporaries of the Holy Prophet.²¹

Waliullah insists that the particular causes attributed to the Qurānic verses by the interpreters should not be taken as a rule and as far as possible unnecessary particularisation is to be avoided, to preserve the generalised and dynamic nature of the Qurān as a law. He deals at length with the meanings and use of the words of the Qurān, from the point of view of linguistics and the diction of the Qurān and also refers to its compilation and structure.

Theoratically he succeeded in establishing the basic
principle that the Qurān should be studied and understood directly on its own merits. Interpretation should be restricted to words and phrases, in which case the then customary language of the Arabs should be the judge and not the future developments. Above all the meaning of the Qurān should remain intact, without being meddled with by philosophy, literature or grammar. Any of these disciplines if at all applied in the case of the Qurān should be applied as methodologies or tools of analysis and not as judging principles. As the purpose of the Qurān is the expedient purpose of reformation and not philosophical system building, it should be understood with the help of the inherent principles contained in the Qurān itself, and not by other disciplines. 22

3. Miracles: Organic Naturalism:

Closely related to and linked with prophethood, revelation and the science of the Qurān, is the concept of miracles. Waliullah’s position about them is based on his concept of organic relationship between the matter and the mind, giving each of the two a certain amount of autonomy of a system of relations. But first he enunciates as to what can be counted as miraculous. The answer is that ‘miraculous’ is only ‘extra-ordinariness’. 23

"Some happenings take place sparingly, they are therefore named as extra-ordinary (khwāriq). As a matter of fact all that is named extra-ordinary is ordinary, but because their causes take place rarely, they appear rarely, people do not usually expect them and name them extra ordinary when they occur. At times even for the extraordinary thing there is an example
people are familiar with, whereas on other occasions, for a thing which is surprisingly extraordinary, people do not even notice it. When any extraordinary thing appeals them the most, they begin to wonder at it, talk about it often and write it in their history books. For example, when water turns into marble all of a sudden, they do not pay attention to it, but if it changes into somebody they are not expecting, nor such a thing has been ever heard of by them, they take it to be strange. But at the same time 'how many signs in the heaven and the earth do they pass by? Yet they turn (their faces) away from them.'

We associate things and events with each other in accordance with our experience, and when something contrary to that association takes place, even if it has a cause, or if it has only occurred in a new relation, we take it as some thing strange.

Waliullah's firm belief in miracles, and the conviction that they can be explained rationally, without denying necessary causation may be surprising at the first glance, but is well fitted in his theory of organic naturalism, and the concept of the autonomy of the two spheres. On the one hand he believes in the literal truth of the Jinn, for which he does not bother to reason out and takes their existence for granted, and refers to them in the same way as he does to any other existence. But on the other hand he tries to explain happenings in this world with the help of an implicater explicit causal chain. For example the approach he adopts to the miracle of splitting of the moon is as follows:

"Some scholars who possess the knowledge of the traditions and natural philosophy are of the view that the splitting of the moon is also one of such events, as it is an event which
happens rarely. God has made it as a sign for the nearness of the Resurrection, just as He made the swallowing up by the earth, the earth quakes and the great wars as signs for it, and has made it (splitting of the Moon) as a miracle of our Holy Prophet, when people asked him about its (Resurrection's) sign, he informed them that God will soon show them a sign, when the Moon split up, he showed it to them. These scholars are of the opinion that it is not necessary that the splitting of the Moon should have taken place in the very body of the Moon itself. It is rather possible that it should have been like the smoke, the falling of the stars, the eclipse of the Sun and Moon which appears to the eyes of people in the air. Then, for them, such words in the Arabic language were used which suited the substance of these things. It is, therefore, that the Quran, was revealed in the language of the Arabs. 25

In the 'Tawil al-Ahadith' Waliullah particularly deals with the Qur`anic narrations of the lives of the prophets, rationalizing and explaining them in accord with this approach and gives many arguments in favour of his contentions. The story of the fatherless birth of Jesus is one of the extraordinary things mentioned in the Quran. Commenting upon it Waliullah gives a description which is worth noting as an illustration of his dialectics in favour of the extra-ordinary:

"Mary menstruated during the days the spiritual powers penetrated that spot of land. When she became pure of menstruation, she withdrew to a place away from the people for taking the bath. The time she let the curtain down and put off her cloths, God sent Gibr`al to her in the form of a young, beautiful man, of complete make, full with bloom. Mary saw him, while she was also young and constitutionally strong. She, therefore, became afraid of corruption and sought the protection of God sincerely, so that He might protect her. Mary's condition at that time was rather wonderful.

As for her nature (tabi'ah), it acquired what is always acquired during the intercourse, namely, the excitation of the procreative powers, just as a mere look (at the fair and full grown) at times become the cause of seminal effusion. As regards her mind (nafs), it acquired protection
of God and refuge with Him, till it became filled with the state of protection, poured down from the unseen. As for the human form, it was, because of its association with Gibrāil, at the top of making appearance. When Gibrāil told her:

I am the messenger of your lord and have come to give you a male child", she became delighted, cheerful and pleased. Seeing her in that condition he (Gibrāil) puffed into her Vulva. The puffing caused a tickling in her womb with the result that she effused semen. As there was the potentiality of the semen of the male in her semen she became pregnant. Her seeking the protection of God, taking refuge with Him, her delight and her cheerfulness at the (presence of the) angelic state which dominated her, penetrated her embryo. Consequently, that state of her mind (nafs) including the power that shape the child in the womb of the mother and the one which procreates. This matter is like what the physicians have said, that he who desires to have a child should think of him during the sexual intercourse. Then the predication (hukm) of the Similaritutory World and the attributes of Gibrāil, through his puffing, penetrated the womb, as he was the cause of shaping the child. She (Mary) on that account, acquired in her nature a firm quality resembling that of Gibrāil. This is the meaning of God's strengthening him (Jesus) through the Holy Spirit (Gibrāil)."26

All this seems now too twisted a picture to tally with Walīullāh's principles of the interpretation of the Qurān. It seems easy for a common man to believe that Mary had the child from a man rather than to believe that she was a hermaphrodite, and procured a child without factual action of the sperms on the ova. Nevertheless, to Walīullāh, as to so many common men, a touch of miraculous with a near natural explanation is always more believable as a religious truth, than the merely natural.

Another repeated and significant story of the Quran is that of Moses and the Pharoah. This story of Moses is
like that of Mary stated above, subjected by Waliullah to the dialectic of his system. About the part of the narrative relating to the miracles of Moses, that is, the miracles of the rod and the white hand he says:

"The truth about the 'rod' and the 'white hand' is that the Similitudinary World, as it appears in respect of its existence is, independent, and is not connected with any material existence like fire. Similarly, when it sparingly appears in a material body, it (the material body) acquires its attribute. The similitudinary existence then prevails upon it with the result that the material turns into the non-material (Similitudinary) one, and its two ends become like the two heads of a snake. Similar is the case with the hand. There was a flutter of light in it which afterwards became life itself."27

Another important and opus repeated event is the fire of Ibrāhīm. The explanation offered here is:

"God, then, cast a cold effect (hai'at) upon the matter of fire at once by means of a wind, which coming from the firgid zone, carrying extremely strong coldness, blew over it, and changed it (the fire). From this mutual clash between the burning fire and the chilly wind, a fine and pleasant weather was produced."28

In this manner Waliullah in the 'Tâwil al-Ahādith' exclusively and in his other works here and there, explains the extraordinary events narrated by the Quran. Besides miracles and narrations of the past events, the Quran also has a particular terminology in explaining the hereafter, the life after death, and the judgement day. As it is an important subject in itself both ethically and theologically, the muslim thinkers have paid exclusive attention to it.
4. **Eschatology:**

Though according to Halepota:

"The eschatological descriptions have no direct relation to the so called theology which deals with belief in God and with the nature of His attributes and His essence, and still less with the practical theology dealing with God consciousness among common people, and with their practical knowledge of His attributes."29

Yet my reasons for including it as a part of his theology are two. Firstly, in addition to its psychological and sociological importance, the belief in the judgement day and the life hereafter is an essential part of the belief structure of Islam, along with God, prophets, angels and revelation. Secondly, if the clear cut division of science can possibly be applied to Islam, or Muslim philosophy, it will effect the very nature of religions in general and Islam in particular. In fact, in Islam belief and practice go side by side, just as Theology, Psychology Ethics and Politics all over lap and coalesce in the system of life as a whole. It is only for the sake of clarity and precision that thematic studies have been attempted, and in that process, the belief structure being the basis of the whole system has to be considered first and foremost. So with prophethood, revelation and miracles, eschatology too, is a part of religious belief, which in turn leads to its Psychological and Ethical importance. Waliullah considers belief in the hereafter as one of the most important articles of faith.30

The eschatology of Islam has several stages, such as the reckoning, the grave, the intermediary stage of
'barzakh', the resurrection, the judgement day, the balance, the bridge, the fountain, and paradise and hell etc.

Waliullah in consistency with his principles of the interpretations of the Qur'an, believe in the literal truth of the verses about the hereafter, though in respect of God's essence and attributes he deviates from his principle of literal truth. He explains Qur'anic eschatology with reference to human nature and psychic states, particularly the phenomena of dreams. He compares the life after death with a dream and calls it a dream which is never interrupted by the awakening. But at the same time he would like to maintain as much of naturalistic explanation as possible of the occurrences that are to take place before resurrection and after death. For example he takes the traditional literature of the appearance of the Antichrist, (da'ijāl) of Imām Mehdi, the descent of Jesus, the emergence of the beast of the earth (dabbat al-ard) and the coming of Gog and Magog, as true and looks for natural causes of the same. Though the word 'natural' and 'cause' should be understood here in the broadest possible sense. This is what he says about the events referred to above:

i) The earthly and heavenly causes will give rise to the widespread happenings, which will destroy many men and animals and much of the vegetables and the minerals, such as the swallowing up by the earth, the countless number of deaths, and the quarrels and strifes (among people).

ii) The corrupt aspects will rise from the earth, some
from the actions of the people performed intentionally
and some from such matters as they had no choice in them
whatsoever. The atmosphere will, thus, assume the form of
those corrupt aspects. Naturally, the generosity of God
will not descend but coloured with those corrupt aspects.
The world would then be prepared for the appearance of such
persons as, because their excesses and extravagance, will
be far removed from the limits God had fixed for the species
of man. Some of them will incline to bestiality. Thereafter
a disease will set in the species of man itself. Other
aspects more hateful and striking then these (first ones)
will arise. The generosity of God will descend coloured
with them. The world will be prepared for the appearance of
such men as will be far removed from the first state and so
on. A time would come when analogical deductions will go
wrong. No astrologer will be trusted in his astrology and
no physicist will be relied upon in physics. Goodness will
completely disappear and no one would be found in the earth
to remember God. Many events will happen or will be made
to take place on account of certain unexpected causes, such
as the prayers (made by people), spirits, etc. At that time,
it will become necessary to break the then existing order
(nazm).

iii) There is a hidden secret implied in the Divine wisdom
which cannot be questioned as to 'why' and 'how'; just as
it cannot be questioned as to why the fire is hot and dry
unlike water, and as to why the sun travels from east to
the west in its one kind of movement and from the west to
east in its other kind of movement. 31

About the events of the day of judgement Waliullah thinks that:

"... the people on that day will come to know of the actions which had stuck to the roots of their hearts, and will have the information of those good and bad actions which had become imprinted on them (their hearts). Besides, they will have the knowledge of the effects of every action which prepares man for punishment or reward. They will come to know of all these realities on that day, as the thick worldly curtains of darkness will be removed from them. The Reckoning is meant from God, it is always there and needs no renewal. However, when the time of Reckoning will come, the Divine grace will make it necessary that certain (similitudinary) bodies may appear in which the spirit of the Reckoning (mizaj) of the Great Man (Insan-i-Akbar) particularises in the person of a rabbit and that of anger in shape of the lion." 32

There is an intricate symbolism that occurs in the appearance of various forms, both in dreams and on the day of judgement. This symbolism has the rationale of being described earlier. The examples of the working or the application of this rational, quasi-causal structure of reality are as under:

'The actions will on the day of judgement be presented and they will assume a suitable substantial form bearing some kind of resemblance to the actions done. The Prophet has explained that a large scald headed snake will be put around the neck of a man who will not pay the poor tax (zakat), or he will be trodden by the camel with its feet, or he will be gored by the bull. Similarly he has explained what kind of punishment will be given to the
usurper and the defrauder. About the treacherous he has said that a banner will be hoisted by the side of his buttockes. God has said: "Their light will be running before them" or the actions will assume an accidental form like the whiteness and blackness of the faces and the tallness of the neck of the caller to prayer (mu'adhin) and so on.

In addition to that, there may be particular forms of symbolism for particular persons.

"It may be remembered that the human spirit so long as it is in the world, goes on progressing and enjoying a delicate life in many ways. All the human beings without exception are participating in those ways of enjoyment, such as to have delicious food, palatable drink, charming wife, splendid garments and place of residence. It is therefore, that the Holy Prophet is reported to have said that, God has created a brown red lipped girl for Jaafar, as he knew the liking of Jaafar for such a girl, similar are his saying in connection with the camel and the horse, etc. Every condition of ease and comfort which represent delight, Cheerfulness and satisfaction in our sleep will surely be the lot of the believer in the Paradise. And every state of difficulty and suffering which is represented by hatred, loneliness and the unsettlement of mind will be the lot of the unbelievers and the hypocrite in Hell fire."

At another place Waliullāh observes that:

"The Paradise is the manifestation of the amiable attributes of God, while Hell is the manifestation of His terrible attributes. The manifestation of His amiable attributes will be represented in the form of beautiful eyed damsals (hūr), stately palaces, delicious foods and drinks and splendid garments, while the manifestation of His terrible attributes will assume the shape of things contrary to them."

The Resurrection, as said earlier is an integral and important part of the belief structure of Islam. It is
its nature which has been debated by the Muslim philosophers for centuries. In his philosophical treatise the 'Lamhāt', he sums up his position which can be taken as the norm or standard of his explanations of all other non-sensory descriptions in the Qur'an. This explanation also sums up his position which we have described as organic naturalism, though at times we can see that he is ill at ease to maintain the autonomous position of the two worlds:

"A great emanation will appear for people on the day of Resurrection. They will see it as they used to see the Sun and Moon in the world. The reality of it is, that the light which we have already mentioned will appear in a form the (origin of) humanity will require. The reason is, that the humanity is a model and balance of all that is poured upon the individuals of the human species, and you will not find any individual going outside the balance. The belief of human individuals in their lord and the knowledge they have about him both have a limit for each one of them which they cannot cross.

On the day of Resurrection God will manifest Himself in their form of a limit. It will be a universal and general emanation, which when it appears to men, they will have no doubt in it. They, however, will differ in the identification of that very emanation. Thus every one will see it in a form corresponding to his particular belief." 36
CHAPTER III
MAN AND SOCIETY

1. Man: Mind and Body:

Before we proceed to Waliullah's more important and significant views, with regard to society and the principle of its growth (Ijtehad) we should like to refer in brief to his views on man and morality as a preamble of his views of society. As an organic rational structure his system is one indivisible whole, starting with the concept of being, developing into individual and social expressions in the world.

Man, since he is a part of a system, has a determined nature, the determinant being the source (Being) from which it emerges. Man has, a sort of conceptual necessity built into himself as the first and the last in the descending steps of being. Sufi metaphysics, to which Waliullah alludes and according to which the first descent is the 'Great Person' (macrocosp) is also symbolised by the last descent i.e. man, the microcosm. The universe, the macrocosm is a cognate of man, the microcosm. How, then the nature of man can further be delineated?

Firstly man has a fixed nature:

"It has come in the tradition that, if you hear the mountain having shifted away from its place, you may believe but if you hear of a man having changed his nature, believe it not, because every man returns back to his original nature. In this tradition the word 'khalq' (nature) means ability."†

Secondly, this nature is a psycho-somatic unity in which psycho and soma are bounded together by an internal
relationship and a sort of parallelism obtains between the two, though admitting an interaction at the same time. This interaction can be initiated from the body, though, in the normal course it is from the mind that an action starts and effects the body.

"In the body of man there are three vital members by means of which, all the acts and purposes which man's specific form requires are served. For example, the seat of perceptive faculties is the brain, the seat of anger, rashness, grief and joy is the heart, while the seat of things without which the body cannot survive, like eating, drinking and sleeping, etc., is the liver. But the sufis however assert that these vital members have internal powers, in addition to the external ones and they call them by the name of 'Lataif'. On that account these three members are well known by the names of 'Lataifat-al-Aql', 'Lataifat-al-Qalb', and 'Lataifat-al-Nafs'. When all the powers of 'Qalb', 'Aql' and 'Nafs' become a pivot for the complete functioning of the limbs of the body, or in other words, when all the activities of the 'Qalb', 'Aql' and 'Nafs' are absorbed in to the working of the limbs of the body, that state is called 'Latifikat-al-Jawarih'. The 'Aql' 'Qalb' and 'Nafs' or 'Tabiiah are common to all animals. These three form the basis of the disposition which develops in the individual."2

Waliullah believes that voluntary and deliberate acts have a lasting effect on the mind and the mental bent, disposition or nature is formed in this manner. The relation of motive and action is two fold, the motive initiates action, action on the other hand strengthens the motive for further actions. Repetition and practice establish and strengthen the mind and form the basis of its motive force. While inactivity loosens the grip of the mind on the actions neglected and weakens the mind as a whole. In his discussion concerning what he calls *lusūq al-ṣamal*
(adherence of actions), he says:

"... indeed the product of the actions that man performs consciously and with deliberate purpose ... although basically inspired by its original source (the human soul and its triads,) returns to the disposition adheres to it and adds to its substance and expands it." 3

Waliullāh believes that by conscious mental effort (tadhbīr al-film) a quality can be adopted and cultivated in practice, which will ultimately come into existence as a part of the disposition.

A perfect harmony of the two aspects of nature is the quality of the prophet and to a lessor degree of the holy persons and leaders of world affairs. The most perfect form is that of the Prophet Muhammad. Every particular individual, has a predestinal nature, in the 'Similitudinary World', but there is still some sort of freedom felt at the phenomenal level for the exercise of human Will:

"There is no doubt that man feels that he has a free will to choose one of the many alternative courses at his disposal. Though he seems to choose one particular course and discard the rest with freedom and without any external coercion or compulsion, in reality he has no freedom of will in making a particular choice.4

His choice is natural and essential consequence of a series of causes which lead the mind to decide on a particular course.5

Neither the series of causes that effect that particular choice nor the faculty of choice itself are subject to the control of man.6

They are all determined and created by God. A man cannot alter his own constitution or deprive himself of the faculty of will and consciousness of choice, so also he cannot choose an course different from what the circumstances and conditions have formulated for him in accordance
with what has been determined by the eternal scheme. It is, only in the phenomenal world and in relation to man's mind and the people around him that the presence of choice between the alternatives is felt."7

In Walīullāh's opinion the satisfaction of natural impulse brings pleasure and prostration of natural impulses and desires is painful. But the complexity of human nature makes it difficult to decide between pleasures and pains. Whether mental pleasures should give way to physical or vice versa. Pleasure and pain whether mental or physical leaves its effects on human nature. According to Walīullāh the effect of pain is subduing and weakening and even harmful in case of mental pains. But nevertheless a certain amount of pain to the physical or animal aspect might help in freeing and developing the angelic or intellectual aspect. The state of happiness (ṣaʿdah) faced by the harmonious functioning of the two aspects is an ideal human state, leading toward perfection.

2. The Phenomenology of Morality:

Walīullāh's moral philosophy is a rational development of his theory of micro-macrocosm, of the 'Great Person' and man. Basically speaking all morality is motivational and is relative to the will of man and a fortiori of the Great Person. He thinks that:

"External behaviour by itself can neither be virtuous nor vicious, unless its source lies in the psychic disposition and springs from it. Two similar forms of behaviour could be different from each other, one being vicious and the other virtuous, owing to their corresponding psychic sources."8
A significant corollary to this principle, which almost all traditional thinking in Islam has neglected to mention is admitting the plurality of criteria for a virtuous act. The standard of virtue therefore, differ from person to person, as well as in the case of the same person and same disposition. The nearer the standard of the disposition the lower the standing of the corresponding virtue:

"The standard of virtue and vice of normal dispositions are different from the standards of those which are virtually superior or supernatural dispositions."9

Though in view of the cosmic determination of psyche the motivational aspect of morality should hardly have moral significance. Nevertheless, as he has said earlier, the microcosm has a status in the scheme of reality, so has the motivational independence. Viewed from the point of view of macrocosm human motivation is as determined as any thing else, but viewed from the micro point of view, it has a status of its own.

Waliu'llah's rational explanation of morality is briefly as follows:

The basic triad of human nature give rise to seven virtues, in addition to four highly distinctive ones, which can be acquired by those who posses the former seven in a developed form. The seven, basically human virtues are, wisdom (Hikmah), bravery (Shuja'ah), chastity (Iffah), magnanimity (Samahah), truthfulness (Diyannah), eloquence (Fasahah) and harmony of character (Samt-al-Salih).
True to his organic attitude to philosophy Waliullāh, defines ethical conduct, as the conduct leading to happiness (ṣāda). Happiness or ṣāda is neither wholly physical nor wholly mental since human being is an organic whole of the body and mind both. The only prevelence of the mind and mental over physical and impulsive is to keep it in control, for the purpose of coordinated and harmonious behaviour. Human intellect in its developed form, the sense and purpose and higher qualities like the aesthetic sense are the peculiarities of human nature, as compared to the animal and the quality of acquiring perfection, requires the development of the higher spiritual potentialities (latāfir). The most important factor in the ethical views of Waliullāh is the conception of society as an organic whole, which synthesises his Ethics and Psychology on the one hand and Sociology and Politics on the other. He believes in the organic unity of human beings in the form of the 'Great Man' (Insān-i-Kabīr) and that of the universe in the form of the 'Great Person' (al-Sakhs-al-Akbar). It is the unity of being as a whole, comprising of all the seen and the unseen. The human individual is organically linked with the lower beings (animal world) by sharing the characteristic of life and physique with them, and with the Insān-al-Kabīr and Al-Shakhs-al-Akbar as a part of the organic whole and universal purpose and expediency.

According to Waliullāh's system the end of appropriate conduct is not only that the individual should fit in with his society and that he and his society should fit in with
humanity as a whole or with the manifold other societies of human beings that constitute the bulk of humanity, as good and useful parts, but also that the individual should attain such a universality (i.e. by transforming individuality or the animal aspect), with what he calls malā-i-alā, (the assembly of the higher beings) that moulds the destinies of humanity. He is all the time conscious of the fact of continuous evolution of all the universe and therefore, of existence of manifold stages and variations, through which everything passes in the cycle of its process and that universal law applies to ethics as much as to any other branch. The individual and his society, as well as humanity in the aggregate and human institutions and customs evolve through a particular order of progress. 10

Ethics is a science of 'nature' with Waliu'llah in the sense in which all beings behave and act in accordance with their specific nature (fitra). Normal and healthy human beings are naturally drawn to the fulfillment of their natural needs. Deficiency of natural qualities, such as weak, distorted or perverted dispositions or corrupt and harmful conditions and customs in society can effect their conduct adversely. Though apparently utilitarian Waliu'llah's Ethics if it must need be classificational by a name, may be called naturalistic but religious Ethics, as it transcends the phenomenal nature and is based on the universal transcendental concept of being and man. He is an orthodox muslim, upholding the principles of conduct of Islam and rationalizing them to the best of his abilities in order to make them
convincing and practicable for the scientific and critical minds. He is a determinist and a monist, holding views similar to those who are believers in theistic emanation, according to which the whole of the universe is a manifestation of a series of emanations from the ultimate and the only reality.11

The whole of the universe (al-ṣākhṣṭ-al-Akbar) as such, is governed by a universal scheme (al-Ḥaṣlaḫat al-Kullîyya) or the universal law, predetermined by God's eternal will and knowledge.12 Each of the smaller universe is governed by a particular law peculiar to that universe,13 which law is in turn, a part of the universal law. So the phenomenal world is governed by particular laws which also form a part of the universal scheme to which the laws of human conduct, freedom of will, law of evolution, law of progress and development of human societies including the mission of prophets and other agencies that contribute towards it, etc. are no exception.14

The principles of morality and conduct in the opinion of Waliullāh are universal, comprising, the whole of humanity, the Īnšān al-Kabīr, particularised as some sort of essential mode of conduct, which constitute righteous customs. Every society has its code of ethics based on righteous customs, which differs from people to people, and evolves with the change of times.Inspite of variations in details the ethical codes have certain identical basic principles (arkān), these are the needs of the individuals and society (ḥājāt) the fulfillment of which is essential for the survival and
development of humanity. These needs evolve with the evolution and development of society.

"In the beginning human needs are simple but with the advancement and development of society they become complex and multiple; though the complexity and multiplicity arise out of the development of the original simple needs." 15

These needs must be satisfied for the preservation, survival and development of the individual and society. With the development of society physical needs are joined with the social, cultural and intellectual ones, so that in a developed and civilised society, survival and preservation is not survival and preservation as such, but the complex purpose is the survival of the physical, social, cultural and intellectual aspects together. When the nature of needs and the way of realisation shapes into developed and complex form, several intermediate and proximate ends are devised for the best possible achievements. The four categories of the needs of civilized people are, spiritual, physical, biological and psychological. The particularised and proximate ends, the personal, domestic, social, cultural, political and economic needs.

The fulfilment of the spiritual needs is necessary for the awakening, survival and development of higher superior faculties (al-lātha'īf al-Bārīzas wal-kamīna). This however is not essential for the common people, as the higher intellectual development is acquired by a few chosen ones in the society. Thus ethical conduct in Waliullah's opinion is that conduct which provides an effective means
for the survival, preservation and welfare of society and its members, and is conducive to the progressive life that the human being is destined to attain.\textsuperscript{16} Waliullah's criteria of ethical conduct are besides the transcendental perfection, the fulfillment of the physical, psychological and socio-cultural needs, the behaviour of people with sound healthy dispositions, sound and healthy taste (al-dhaqal-salīm) moderation, high standard of living and progress.

There are four levels of the individual's ethical conduct, which Waliullah classifies as personal, domestic, economic and political. The principle of conduct at the four levels are based on the needs and requirement of each level or department.

The needs of a person are classified by Waliullah under four heads:

i) Needs for a person's physical survival, (a) Food, eating and drinking. (b) Protection, clothes (dress), dwelling place. (c) Accessory needs, cleanliness, sleep, help and treatment in illness.

ii) Aesthetic needs of adornment and decoration.

iii) Personal needs of association with one's own kind and members of species or social intercourse, in other words the needs of: (a) Moving amongst, meeting and treating other fellow beings. (b) Comradeship and exchange of ideas, and talking or holding conversation.

iv) Need of making and procreation of conjugal relationship.\textsuperscript{17}
"Appropriate conduct or ethical conduct of a person consists in that conduct which is highly efficient in satisfying his primary needs in conformity with the requirement of the seven virtues, with due regard to the universality of purpose and conformity with the ideas, experiences and attitudes acquired in the past history of society." 18

The next stage is the basic social unit, the domestic life for which Waliullah's criteria is that appropriate domestic life creates, preserves and prevents the link and unity that must necessarily exist between the members of a family in advanced society. 19 Unity, goodwill and mutual service is essential for reaching this goal. Wisdom or hikmah of domestic life consists in full regard for the seven virtues, the universal purpose and general rights and experience, in mutual relationship of the members of a family.

In his detailed explanation of a desirable domestic conduct Waliullah describes the required unity and appropriate conduct of husband and wife, parents and children, social contacts and rules governing marriage.

In his account of the economic conduct Waliullah first illustrate the importance of a standardised living. A higher standard of living and provision of amenities of life are a necessity for a progressive society, in which these are as important as the psychological, social and other ends. 20 Production of commodities and specialization in arts, crafts and industry are essential for higher standard of living; economic welfare depends on development in industry, trade and commerce.

"It is essential for the economic welfare of society that no one, so far as possible, should remain idle, making no contribution to the
welfare of society. The drain on the state treasury or on people's property caused by such people is detrimental to the state economy as well as to the welfare of society and is not only uneconomical but un-ethical."21

Closely linked with economic and domestic conduct is the political conduct of people, which Waliullah defines as:

"... appropriate conduct of the political state in society aims at the preservation of the unity of the society and promotion of its welfare (economic as well as general) against internal and external dangers."22

The state is required to control properly all the affairs for the welfare and preservation of peace and prosperity. It should encourage development in the economic and cultural spheres and look after the needs and welfare of citizens in all possible ways. The control of the state should be in the hands of honest and dedicated people, with sound dispositions.

3. The Phenomenology of Societies:

Human nature tends towards mutual living and inter-dependence, in fact the biological and psychological structure of man requires society for development, preservation and survival. Just as ethical and moral conduct is possible only in social life, so is survival of the species possible only collectively therefore, closely connected with the problems of the individual his psychological nature and his ethical conduct in the society and its administration. So that no philosophical or scientific system is possibly complete without due consideration of society, its formation, development and administration. Waliullah's system is basically a system oriented to society.
The sociological aspect of Waliullah's thought is more in line with the spirit of the age. His sociology is methodical, consistent and systematic, in spite of the medieval style of presentation. Like his psychology and ethics the basic principles are those of evolution and relativity. The evolutionary aspect of Waliullah's thought leads to his attitude of looking for the origin of human qualities in the animal world. Like his psychology, in sociology too, he starts the presentation of his sociological views with a reference to the life of the animals (abnā-al-jins). Sympathy, responsiveness in need (which in the case of man is perhaps a source of what is called responsibility, or the ability to respond) and mutual defence and co-operation, almost verging on altruism, according to Waliullah are writ large on the animal world. Man inherits all these along with other instincts innate in his basic triad, in addition to the emergent qualities of the specific triad or the qualities of rationality and intellect, namely the universality of purpose, the aesthetic quality and the quality of urge for development and perfection. This is the foundation upon which man builds - no doubt with the aid of his emergent power and faculty to conceive and rationalize and evolve new values, new modes and new purposes emerge.23

As mentioned earlier Waliullah's concept of society is organic. Society in his view is not an aggregate of units but a living organism, its various parts are interlinked, interdependent and their movement interactive. It is subject
to health and soundness, progress and advancement, weakness and regress and decay and death. Just as coordination and integration of the various faculties of human organism form better personality, effective and strong mind and strength to the individual as a whole, a strong centre. Coordination and integration are also the qualities of a healthy and sound social unit.

"What is habit to an individual becomes customs to a society. The individual's memory of customs gives rise to traditions of the society. As the individual evolves a will, so does the society or community."24

This organic nature is not peculiar to any particular society, it is common to all human society, in fact humanity as a whole (al-Insān al-Kabīr).

Just as there are four stages of individual life, that is childhood, adolescence, manhood and maturity, Walīullāh divides the society into four stages for the study of its process of development, these stages he names irtifāqāt. This division is neither final nor factual, as an organic whole cannot be divided into parts as such, it is ad division for the purpose of study. In fact all the stages are interlinked and overlap in their functions. The meaning of irtifāq as understood by its application and use by Walīullāh is collective or cooperative effort. It is derived from irfāq which means gentleness or the use of gentleness. It means that though the beneficent things abound in the world, they do not come to man for his use by their own accord, but he has to approach them with gentleness.25
i) The First Stage (irtifāq)

In the beginning man's needs are few, confined to the needs for food, clothes and shelter etc. Nature requires the fulfillment of these three essential needs, for the survival and preservation of life. These needs are instinctive and impulsive. In order to fulfill these needs be discovers and evolves means of producing and acquiring the needful, such as cultivation of land, digging of wells etc. for the satisfaction of hunger. Eventually he tames certain animals and prepares some sort of clothes for covering the body either from animal skins or tree trumps etc. For the protection from danger he builds shelters from straw or any other available material. Men keep women with themselves legally or illegally and protects them jalousy and carefully. An example of this first stage is the life of Adam. The evolution and development of society and his own nature and controlling the forces of nature is natural to man, because he has been created with a specific purpose by Allah.

"God's intention in creating Adam was that he should become his viceregent on earth and attain his specific perfection (kamal-i-naui). As regards his being prohibited from eating from the tree, the prompting by Satan of evil thoughts, his being reprimanded and finally, his expulsion from the Paradise, all this was a form of the cause according to the coming out gradually from the world of similitudes to that of mortals."26

The irtifāqāt are natural and in accordance with man's destiny. As he is created for the purpose of achieving a perfect state of his species. He gradually evolves from the
animal level as his intellect evolves and develops, his needs become complex and multiply, with additional needs additional effort is required for their fulfillment and satisfaction, so nature push man towards the next stage of development. In case of external or internal impediments, God sends messengers from within the human society which is confronted with the obstacles debarring its progress. These obstacles can be internal, as in the case of the majority lacking sound dispositions or external in the form of bad customs etc. These messengers are men who are by nature capable of a higher kind of perfection and acting as agents of God in bringing order and perfection to the society and curing it of the evils and obstacles. Their approach and the Divine law (Sharī'ah) imparted to them for the establishment of order in the society is different due to the differences in the situation. As mentioned earlier the advent of the prophet Adam was the time when humanity was at its earliest stage, with few and simple needs. So the sharī'ah of Adam was also simple and basic.

ii) The second stage (irtifāq):

When man strides from the first stage of his life and his basic needs are secure, that is he has evolved means of their fulfillment, his intellect evolves and develops, his love of beauty and elegance which is inherent in his aesthetic quality evolves and he looks to his surroundings not only from the point of view of his physical needs (as in the first stage) but also from aesthetic point of view. He develops taste in food and drink, he desires beautiful
and elegant dress and woman not only for the satisfaction of his sex instinct, but a woman of his choice, a house with some sort of proportion etc.

The second stage of life is complex as compared to the first, in which there is an ethical code, and some basic social institutions. Waliullah divides the life of this stage into five departments. This division corresponds to his division of ethical units (mentioned earlier) namely, personal life, domestic life, vacational life, business contracts and relations, the exchange of goods with others, the department of cooperation.27

This division indicates that division of labour, interdependent economic system, that is a rudimentary and basic organization comes into being. The society evolves into an organism. The city states of the ancient civilization and middle ages are an example of this stage in human development. While the tribal society before that was at the first stage of development.

iii) The third stage (irtifāq):

This stage is a natural development of the preceding two stages, as the institutions evolved in the second stage, develop further, they become complex, needs multiply, rights and duties change and increase. Organization of the institutions evolved become an issue to be tackled, the intellect advances further, now that the basic physical needs are taken care of, a certain degree of taste is developed in the process and acquisition of ways and means of fulfillment, the intellect is fit for further
progress to the goal of perfection. The third stage is the stage of nationalism, which is a concern about the administration of the social units, the cities and the towns. The tribe is replaced by the city in the second stage, in the third stage larger communities, composed of a number of cities and towns form a nation. This social unit, namely the nation has a large number of individuals in its composition, but as a result of development and progress of the intellect, this social unit works as a living organism.

"Accordingly if an individual feels some pain some where the whole nation feels it, as the whole body feels when a part of it is injured. At this stage the needs of man go beyond computation and he wants to excel in all the aspects of life. As it is not possible for him to fulfill all his needs in a better and reformed manner simply, he has to live and cooperate with others in social life. At this stage, though each one has a separate occupation their mutual cooperation and help is, however, necessary, which eventually result in the formation of a political order among them. This they badly need at this stage. For the maintainence of mutual transactions and dealings, they first need some kind of exchange system, which leads to the introduction of gold and silver coins. Eventually, on account of the multiplication and diversity of occupation every one is busy in trying to improve upon his art and profession and it is here that society become fully developed in the proper sense of the word."28

In 'Al-Budūr al-Bāzīgh', Waliullah gives an account of the formation of a stage.

"Indeed when men carry on these transactions with each other and different men specialise in different kind of work, produce and supply for each others needs etc., cooperation etc., come into being, it necessarily signifies that their exists a kind of link a unity between various groups of people like farmers, merchants, weavers etc."29
It is these groups of people that by reason of that unifying link form the body of the state in reality. The real state is not the name of the city walls, fortress and trading centre. If there are many towns in the vicinity of each other and people living in them carry on transactions with each other, we will call them a state.

From the point of view of the unifying link a state is just like a person or an organism, while every group of people and every member is like a link or a part of the body of that person. Unity is essential in a state, this unity must first of all be preserved, then improved and developed to yield its full benefits. The system (tadbir) of the government through which that object is attained is the real leader (imam) or governor of the state. The governor of the state is not, according to Waliullah, at all in the form of the human individual, except of course when a capable person of strong and powerful personality, the one who is absolutely suitable for the task, undertakes the task of the government of the state, he is the head of the state, though only outwardly and in appearance. 30

A standard government and advance level of the struggle for perfection is that which has efficient and effective means of fulfilling the requirements of good judiciary, executive, defence and public welfare. There are several different and conflicting views about the structure and functions of government. The best form of government in Waliullah's opinion is that which is in accordance with the
situation, the time and the requirements of the people concerned. An effective form suggested by him is that in which the responsibilities are distributed as necessary, since the capabilities of individuals are limited, but nevertheless, there should be sufficient centralization to prevent internal chaos and strife. Each department should have an executive head with sufficient power and responsibility to run that particular department. The head of the government of the state, should be the final authority and centre of all the departments, so that coordination and co-operation of the departments, as well as efficient and disciplined administration is secured.

The example of the second and third irtifāq is provided in the life of the Prophet Solomon.31

iv) The fourth stage (irtifāq):

As Waliullah believes in the essential and organic unity of humanity, the Ḥiṣn al-Kabir, his system of socio-political evolution, has its logical end in internationalism or a league of nations, which is the fourth stage (irtifāq) of society, desirable but not yet realised. With due increase of human population, just as at the national level, there are smaller units of administration with its own administration subservient to the central executive power, in the same way a higher level of human progress, development of relations between several nations are inevitable. Just as at the personal level the individual is in need of domestication and the families are in need of the city or town establishment, cities and towns
ultimately evolve into states and nations, the ultimate goal of human perfection is an international organisation. A stage comes when needs become so complex and numerous that interdependence of nations becomes necessary. Besides this social need of interdependence, Waliullah's transcendental aim and the evolutionary dynamic nature of his system of society necessitates the concept of internationalism. For real peace and tranquility an international communal organisation is a must, Waliullah is conscious of the non-existence of such a stage in the past and present, but nevertheless striving towards it is natural, desirable and inevitable.

Waliullah's philosophy is neither dogmatic nor stringent. The mixture of the sufistic with the orthodox, lends colour to the one and discipline to the other. He favours revolution. In fact he thinks that when the society goes corrupt to an extent that progress and development is debarred and reformation by evolution is not possible, it becomes necessary to bring about a revolution.

"A social institution under which a people are deprived of their primary needs of life, is like an abcess in the body which the sooner removed the better it would be. The persons who know wherein lies the general welfare feel it as their bounden duty to bring about revolution. But it should be kept in mind that the bringing of a revolution is a very distressful and hard job, as in addition to the sacrifice of life and property one has at times to part with his beloved country, such sacrifices can be made by those who are very sincere, self-confident and have the ability and courage to face the situations, however, series, with patience and endurance. For the working of such a revolution, sometimes, one has to struggle through protests, at times
through raising slogans, etc., and on
certain occasions he has to put up an
actual fight. Whatever sacrifice is
made in this direction is reckoned the
best of actions."32

Divine purpose is the ultimate cause of all
happenings, whether ordinary or extra ordinary, phenomenal
or human, revolutionary or evolutionary. The prophets
are Divine messengers for the purpose of guiding those
whose reformation is intended. Every prophet is given a
system of law (shari'ah) to establish order (nizam) among
the people concerned, in accordance with universal
purpose. Islam is the best and the most perfect religion,
its ultimate purpose is to establish the fourth stage of
human development.

"To become the greatest international power
in the world, which could stand the challenge
of time. It is therefore, the sacred duty of
all muslims throughout the world to work hard
and spare no pains for the establishment of the
Islamic international organization which could
successfully face the combined opposition of
evil forces. The completion of favour (wa
Atmamth 'Alaikum Ni'mat) takes practicle
shape only when such great force is created."33

\(\text{\textcopyright Ijtihad:}\)

The philosophy of the irtifadat presupposes a principle
of change and growth in society. Previously this principle
was applied through persons, who had creative insight and
were named as prophets and messengers of Allah and who
sensing the necessity of change, made amendments in the rules
of conduct of human beings. Since the time of the last
Prophet Muhammad this has become the collective responsibility
of the 'Ummah' or the followers of the prophet, which they
perform through a principle called *ijtihād*. The word literally means to exert, while in Muslim law it is a concept that stands for independent judgement.

Waliullah's synergetic thought embraces all that is 'good', good here means ethically and morally good but in a broad sense and not in a narrow utilitarian manner. It means natural and rational, relevant and vital. Just as the psychological and social values of man are natural so is the *Shari'ah*. Men, form societies because societies are natural to them. Societies require law and politics naturally, and the same evolve. *Shari'ah* is a natural law of man:

"... is the result of his species itself. When the human species reaches a particular degree of development, it demands a particular kind of *Shari'ah*. It is not been thrust upon man against his will but has been given to him at his request. His good lies in obeying it, and through it he attains perfection and reaches his destined goal. The difference that at times appear in the laws of the various prophets, is also the result of man's specific capability. Religion (din) is originally one and it is the same religion that all the prophets have called upon to follow."

This view about the common basis of all religions is deduced from the Qur'an. A number of Muslim philosophers had the same idea about religion, but in Waliullah this idea is very important for two reasons. Firstly it lends a support and adds to the comprehensive spirit of his thought. Secondly, it is the starting point, and the basis on which Sayyid Ahmad Khan and other reformers built their whole systems. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's doctrine of nature, or religious truths, his efforts for understanding between
adherents of different religions (particularly muslims and christains) and above all his distinction between the essential and supporting injunctions of religion. Though in Sayyid Ahmad Khān these views take a different and dévitiatory course, they are nevertheless one way or the other traceable to Waliullāh. About the essentials of religion he said:

"The essentials of a religion which does not suffer change by the change of time and which are enshrined in the teachings of all the prophets are beliefs in the unity of God, that He is one, has no equal and worship is due to Him only, that the judgement day will come and man would be made to account for his actions. These are the fundamental principles of religion (din) and they go by the name of Islam. Islam is not the name of any particular group or section. Any man irrespective of his birth, caste and creed, if he believes in God, His Apostles, has faith in the life to come and does good works, is certainly within the bounds of Islam."37

Waliullāh traces a continual historical development and evolution of the sharī‘ah, with the historical movement of humanity itself. In the narrations of the prophets of the Qurān, he gives an account of social evolvement with reference to the Sharī‘ah:

"The conditions of the world are changing from time to time, hence they cannot be comprised by one sharī‘ah. Apart from this, the mind of man is slowly and steadily developing and this development is the main cause of the change in the Sharī‘ah. From Adam down to the prophet Idrīs (Enoch), humanity was passing through its initial stages and its development was restricted to the first irtīfāq (rustic life) and the people were not obliged to believe in angels and the hereafter. Then followed the age of the prophet Noah, where in people were stout and strong in their physique. Accordingly they were given a sharī‘ah suitable for crushing their animal vitality."38
In the same manner society advanced, the age of Noah was followed by that of the prophets Hud and Salih, gradually humanity advanced.

"Then came the prophet Ibrahim who was very much inclined towards Fitrat (nature). He rose up to end the worship of stars, fire and idol. He proclaimed the unity of God and laid the foundation of His worship. He completely changed the outlook of his people. The human heart now became the manifestation of Divinity and the seat of its sciences, and this was known as Hanafiat (true religion), the speciality of his age. He was followed by the prophets Lot, Yousuf, Ayyub, Shaib, Daud and Sulaiman in succession. The prophet Daud was skilled in state administration and in the rule of the country. He fixed the limits of religion, waged war against the unbelievers and was an expert in solving difficult problems. But all these prophets were, however, wanting in caliphate." 39

This distinction of the dual role of the prophet as spiritual guide and statesman or caliph, in Waliullah's system is also a point later emphasised and made use of by Sayyid Ahmad Khan and other thinkers.

"Moses was the first of the prophets who was partially a caliph too. The shariah of Moses, however, included terrible punishments for disobedience, which were relaxed by Jesus. And then partly came the Prophet Muhammad, who was, however, distinguished from the rest by virtue of his being both the perfect prophet and the perfect caliph. The Shariah brought by him is unique in as much as it is exceedingly clear, well grounded, unambiguous and simple, very easy to profess and practice and absolutely free from any confusion. It is so clear in its arguments that the question of any further clearness does not arise. Besides, it is the only shariah in which the limits of payment of Zakat (property tax) are fixed. It is superior to all other religions as it does not consist only what the other prophets brought individually but some thing more as well. The verse;

"Today we have perfected your religion for you and have completed our favour on you", had never been revealed to any prophet before nor was its
revelation proper for any but the Holy Prophet Muhammad, as he has not kept concealed any philosophy, any item of guidance, any knowledge and any secret, but has given it out clearly or allusively. After him there is none so perfect, as to tell what he has not told."40

This evolutionary and natural conception of the shari'ah is characterised by the idea of change and movement in the field of law. About the principle of ijtihād specifically, Waliullah has given his views in his short treatise the ḍa'd al-īd, which he wrote in answer to the questains raised about ijtihād and taqlīd. He has besides his own views given the opinions of other great scholars like Ghazali and Shafai. About the concept of ijtihād he says:

"Knowledge of the opinions of the experts is essential for the purpose of ijtihād, but not conformity with their opinions."41

Along with this attitude Waliullah expresses dis-agreement with the view that ijtihād is not allowed by any one but the first three generations of the Prophet's companions. It seems that inherently he is seeking recogni-nition for himself as a Mujtāhid. But this view also portray his doctrine of expediency and his eagerness for Islam's pragmatic utility, at all times and places. About the requirements of ijtihād too, his view is much more moderate and rational than the dogmatic and scholastic. He does not consider knowledge of Theology (kalām) and Jurisprudence (Fiqah) essential for a mujtahid. He agrees with the 'ulama' on the other requirements, such as the knowledge of Qurān and tradition (sunnah), about the limits of ijmā' and analogy (qīās) knowledge of Arabic language, and about the cancelled and non cancelled (nāsikh wa mansookh).42
PART III

SAYYID AHMAD KHĀN'S COMMON SENSE RATIONALISM

SAYYID AHMAD KHĀN

Born on 17th October, 1817 at Delhi and died on 24th March, 1898 at Aligarh, Sayyid Ahmad Khān served the East India Company from 1838 to 1869, later he devoted full time to writing, organizing educational institutions and editing journals. He started his literary activities very early in life, bringing out a magazine in collaboration with his brother. While in the Company's service he took interest in the educational and social problems of the places he was posted in. He started his educational mission from establishing small schools in Ghazīpur and Murādābād, which culminated in the establishment of the Anglo Muhammadan College at Aligarh, which ultimately became the Muslim University Aligarh. He was also the founder of the Scientific Society and Muslim Educational Conference. He developed a group of talented and enthusiastic authors including Shibli, Hālī, Muhsin-ul-Mulk, Waqār-ul-Mulk, Chirāgh Alī and Zākaullah, who gave a great impetus to his activities. His influence on the subsequent thought of Sub-Continent is very great. He wrote about six books and innumerable essays.
CHAPTER I
THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAME WORK

1. The Problem:

Sayyid Ahmad Khān is a unique figure in the history of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. No other single person can be credited with such achievements as his. The constructive reformatory movement starting with Sirhindi, in the 17th century, developed in a comprehensive manner by Waliullāh in the 18th century became an all embracing practical struggle by the efforts of Sayyid Ahmad Khān. Just as the Marhatta wars¹ and the sack of Delhi by Nādir Shāh² proved a turning point for the highly constructive potential of Waliullāh, for Sayyid Ahmad Khān the War of Independence or the mutiny of 1857³ provided the motivational force. The thought systems of the muslim philosophers and thinkers, are, on the whole, more encompassing and, as a result less systematic than the western philosophers. This is a direct outcome of the belief in the comprehensive nature of Islam which is said to provide guidance for everything in life. Sayyid Ahmad Khān inherited this quality of the all embracing nature of thought from his predecessors and adopted it practically. For him all aspects of life and thought e.g., the dogmatic and the academic, the theoretical and practical, the religious and scientific, the spiritual and material, revolve round the betterment of humanity, which is a logical implication of his all inclusive concept of 'nature'. The revivalistic reformatory movement of
Waliullah was adopted and practically applied by Sayyid Ahmad Khan to the situation pertaining in the sub-continent, in two directions: (a) against internal decay and (b) against external threat or domination. 4

Sayyid Ahmad Khan became the forebearer of the rationalistic and progressive elements of Waliullah's revivalism, while its traditional side was developed by the seminaries of Dyvband, Khayrābād and Lucknow. 5 Sayyid Ahmad Khan's struggle was a struggle not only for a purified Islam but a purified Muslim society. For him, it is also, through the later, that one may know as to what Islam is. In other words, the meaning of Islam, can best be understood by the behaviour of the believers and not independent of it. This is rather a profound philosophical point, the importance of which has become evident after the advent of analytical philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. For Sayyid Ahmad Khan theoretical condemnation of ideas, values and actions is not enough. What is needed is guidance, practical and dynamic. That is why the basic aim of his life revolve around education. The organic unity of deed and idea so remarkably portrayed later in the dynamic thought system of Muhammad Iqbal, was practically initiated by Sayyid Ahmad Khan. In the medieval Islamic thought the dualism of the real and the ideal had commonly prevailed, as a followup of Greek thought. As a result the withdrawal of the philosophers to academics had left the masses in the hands of the sufiis on the one hand and the 'uliama' and dogmatists on the other. With the masses the sufiis proved effective, because their
guidance was sympathetic and practical rather than dogmatic. But the elite and the empire decayed constantly and gradually. Sufism also suffered decay due to the presence of non-committed and ambitious people in its fold. The political and moral decay, prejudice and bias and blind worship of the masses, and all forms of corruption of the upper classes was a motivational force for muslim reformers since the 16th/17th century.6

In India Sayyid Ahmad Khān's two predecessors, Sirhindī and Waliullāh made an effort to reform the religious and social attitudes of their nation. The former tried to purify sufism, for the guidance of the 'umma', the later struggled to evolve a comprehensive system by synthesizing the useful and truthful in orthodoxy and sufism. In the 19th century India the problems were more complex. Brought up around the decaying Mughal empire, Sayyid Ahmad Khan in his early life, like every enthusiastic muslim, sought to escape reality by having recourse to dreams of the golden age when the Islamic civilization flourished in India. Characteristic of this state of mind are the most important works produced in this period: (1) The Athār-al-Sanādīd, (1847), (2) revision of Aʿlān-i-Ikbarī (1856), etc. The events of the mutiny had a startling effect on his mind, as Hali rightly observes:

"... as the level of some stretch of water is heightened by the warmth of the sun, so by the heat of the mutiny the temperature of his blood was raised above its normal level."9

Like Waliullāh and many other thoughtfull muslims before him, at this time in his despair Sayyid Ahmad Khān thought of migrating to Egypt. But gave up the idea to devout his life to the reform of his country and nation.10
Though Sayyid Ahmad Khan's reformative movement was socio-ethical and educational, he fully realised that the reformation of Muslim India required a change in the religious attitudes of the people. To this end he directed his efforts. The situation was complex, since he realized that:

"Apart from the political problem that faced him from 1859 onwards, there was also the intellectual problem of a better evaluation of western civilization and the theological problems of the basic data of faith, which were bound to be challenged by the findings of new sciences."

In such circumstances Sayyid Ahmad Khan's comprehensive and encompassing mind applied itself to the manifold task of religious, social, educational, moral, cultural and scientific revival, reformation and awakening of the Muslims of the sub-continent. His works deal with innumerable topics, e.g., from the etiquette of meeting and dining to the attributes of God. He has dealt with every topic with his attitude of robust common sense which he terms as naturalism and rationalism alternatively. If we have to give his position a name, we can call it 'commonsense rationalism', and can classify it into (a) philosophical attitudes (b) theological or religious implications and (c) socio-cultural, ethical and educational ideas.

2. Reason and Rationalism:

Most of the works written so far on Sayyid Ahmad Khan, deal with his religious thought and only tangentially with his analytic outlook in philosophy, he is more often than
there can be no certainty without knowledge. (d) We are certain that our faith i.e. Islam is the true faith. (e) Hence our faith must be based on knowledge. (f) And knowledge can be acquired through reason only.  

In delineating the above argument Sayyid Ahmad Khan makes a significant deviation from the position of the classical Islamic philosophers with regard to the concept of reason, which he conceive as a function rather than a faculty of mind. It is something that gets perfected through use. It is not a substantiave entity but a way in which we do certain types of things. Sayyid Ahmad Khan writes:

"Then I thought about the certainty and infallibility of reason. I acknowledge that in fact, there can be no certainty in it. But when reason is constantly used, the error of one person is remedied by the reason of another and the errors of an age by the future age. If knowledge, certainty or faith is not based on reason it can never be reached."  

Reason therefore, for Sayyid Ahmad Khan is not the name of a fixed faculty but rather a way of doing things in a particular manner. This fact is elaborated upon in bold relief at another place where he treats the concept of 'understanding' (samajh). He uses this concept in an almost synonymous way with the term 'reason' or 'intellect' (aql) which he uses at other places. For him 'understanding' is an acquired quality that enables man to differentiate between right and wrong, good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate. This concept is more or less akin, if one wants to draw parallels, with the concept of practical wisdom found in
not characterised as a neo-mutazilite by scholars and has hardly been attributed with any originality in his philosophical thinking.\textsuperscript{12} This seems to be a gross injustice to him and though he cannot be said to be the originator of a particular school of thought, yet in the light of his contemporary scientific development he shows a keen philosophical insight and may be said to be a fore runner of that analytic thinking in religion, which became more evident only in the second half of the twentieth century with the growing influence of Wittgenstein on the Anglo-saxon philosophy.\textsuperscript{13}

For want of a better name, we have named Sayyid Ahmad Khān's attitude in philosophy as common sense rationalism. Rationalism it is, but, mixed with the analytical thinking it does not presuppose a grandiose system like that of Hegel or Spinoza. Sayyid Ahmad Khān himself brings out the inevitability of rational thinking (or reasonableness if one wants to use a less metaphysically laden term) in religious matters, in an article which he wrote after the style of Ghazali's confessions, and Descartes's discourse\textsuperscript{14} and in which he describes his mental journey before he could reach the conclusion that;

"... the common idea that reason has nothing to do with faith is erroneous."\textsuperscript{15}

The steps through which he reaches this conclusion are as follows:

(a) Man is bestowed with reason (to overcome the difficulties in living). (b) This he does by acquiring knowledge through reason. (c) Knowledge needs certainty and
Greek and Islamic thought, though it is definately more than practical wisdom. For Sayyid Ahmad Khân, knowledge is virtue only when it is in the form of practical wisdom or understanding.

"Without understanding knowledge and reason are useless. Good is mistaken for the bad. Inspite of man's excellent qualities, without understanding these cannot be applied correctly, therefore leading to serious losses. Understanding enables man to use his own capabilities, also giving him access to the qualities of others. An intelligent man or a man of understanding converses with every one according to his level of understanding. If we observe the gathering of human social groups, we will realize that neither the wisest nor the strongest person dominate the discussions and conversation, but the person who has understanding of the people of the group, of what is said and left unsaid. A man who has a lot of knowledge but is without understanding is like a physically strong man who is blind, so that he cannot use his strength. Even if a man has all other perfections but lacks understanding he is good for nothing. On the other hand a person who has perfect understanding can do anything in life even if his other qualities are just average."18

There is no doubt that Sayyid Ahmad Khân, talks of two terms, i.e., reason or intellect and understanding, and gives an impression that he believes in two different sort of things; one being an inborn natural faculty through which knowledge is acquired and the other is understanding or exercising the faculty of reason and applying it to the knowledge acquired. But at no place has he given any criterion for identifying 'reason'/intellect qua intellect or 'reason' except in terms of its application. This confusion in terminology seems to be a hangover of the classical Islamic thought with which he was fully convers-
sent and that is why an occasions he calls 'understanding' a 'perfection' of 'reason':

"Understanding is endowed with the insight to see a long way ahead in future, like an eye with perfect vision that sees a lot of things clearly ... With the acquisition of understanding man's power of deliberation, his freedom and confidence increases. It is the perfection of reason and guide in our actions."19

But immediately after this, he again identifies understanding with reason:

"Some writers call it (understanding) reason others wisdom, that is, the power of discrimination by which the good and bad are sorted out."20

This view of 'reason' is corroborated by Sayyid Ahmad Khān by way of a genetic description that he gives of 'reason' and or 'understanding'. He is of the view that:

"... the Almighty has created all the creatures with a specific nature. Man like other animals has his inborn and natural qualities, that help him in the fulfillment of his needs. All animals have the powers to get and achieve what they need. The difference between man and other animals is that animals go about their life instinctively. While man has the power to see and identify his ends and means. Both have fellow feelings but man's distinction is that he can identify his own social and communal needs and can plan and work for their achievement. Animals remain what they are. There faculties are static. While man's faculties have the capacity to be modified, reshaped and developed by man himself. Man is capable of improving upon his inborn qualities. Therefore, men as persons and as community by their efforts bring about changes. This power is man's distinctive faculty through which he participates in the work of God."21

It all goes to show that the concept of reason in Sayyid Ahmad Khān is very significantly different from the concepts discernible in classical Islamic thought, especially in WaliulTāh.22 It seems to have a strong resemblance to the
type of concept that developed in the hands of analytical philosophers of the twentieth century. 23

There is also a close affinity of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view of reason with Muhammad Iqbal's view of the same. 24 Sayyid Ahmad Khan clearly acknowledges the limitations of man's intellect or reason. Though he is not aware of Kant's treatment of the matter. 25

This has its logical outcome on the treatment of religious concepts in the hands of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, as well as his philosophy of naturalism, which has been wrongly understood by his critics as metaphysical naturalism of the Spencerian type. 26

We will find that he treats the terms 'nature', 'natural', 'naturalism', 'naturalistic', etc., in the same analytical fashion, as he treats the term 'understanding'. These terms always refer to a universe of discourse, a principle which he accepts for interpretation of the Quran also. Any transfer of the use of a term from one universe to another without looking in to the criteria of its former use would be to commit a category mistake. 27

Incidentally, both the interpreters and critics of Sayyid Ahmad Khan committed the same mistake when they branded him as a 'naturalist' or an atheist. They failed to take the context into account in which a particular term was used by Sayyid Ahmad Khan.

3. Nature and Naturalism:

Seen in this light, 'naturalism' in Sayyid Ahmad Khan
acquires a new meaning. He is not a systematic naturalist philosopher in the ordinary sense of the word 'naturalist'. As a matter of fact the word 'naturalist' was used against him as an accusation and as a cognate of atheist. A letter written to him by Qāsim Nānotvī, the founder of the Dyvband school sought clarification on certain points of his religious beliefs. The letter demands of him to make explicit his attitude towards certain religious concepts, rather than expounding his philosophy of naturalism, so that he (Sayyid Ahmad Khān) may be judged from a religious point of view whether he should be called an atheist or a muslim. Sayyid Ahmad Khān made explicit his opinions on concepts like the existence of God, His word, i.e. revelation and status of Prophet etc. with his underlying philosophy which was termed 'naturalism' at that time (probably for want of a more accurate term).\(^\text{28}\)

If one looks at his 'naturalism' closely the following can be delineated as to what constitutes his particular brand of 'naturalism':

1) Though Sayyid Ahmad Khān uses the term 'naturalism' he, as a matter of fact does not mean the philosophy of 'naturalism' but only the deliberation of 'natural sciences'.

In an article entitled, 'Physicists, Naturalists .........' (Tabiyun, Naivyaryun) he says:

"People are highly mistaken in considering natural science and religion as opposing or contradicting each other. The subjects of natural science and religion are different. Therefore, they can not be contradictory or opposite to each other."\(^\text{29}\)
Here he talks about natural science, rather than fundamental principles of natural science. The only principle of natural sciences that he refers to is the law of causation:

"The object of natural science is to explain the nature of existing things, e.g., how did water come in to being, and how are the clouds formed. While the object of religion is to explain about the creation of these things, such as who created matter and its attributes. How erroneous it is to call two totally different things opposite or contradictory to each other. Natural science does not discuss things which are the issues of religion." 30

ii) It appears that 'naturalism' is synonymous with the law of causation in Sayyid Ahmad Khān's view. This seems to be a limited view of the philosophy of naturalism, but is enough for his purposes. He is not prepared to accept the logical outcome of this philosophy as will be evident later. Causation, which he uses more often than not as interchangeable to naturalism is, according to him:

"... and this principle that cause and effect are inseparable is wholly true and in accordance with nature. Where there is the cause there is the effect and vice versa. Ghazali’s criticism of this principle dabbing it as against religion and Ibn-Taymia’s objection to its validity are both wrong." 31

iii) For Sayyid Ahmad Khān the existence of God is a logical implication of the law of causation and if you accept the former, which you must, the later follows. Hence it is a perfect form of 'Naturalism' to start with God, as the cause of all causes, and to follow the course of natural
causation. He says:

"The 'Naturalists' or 'Metaphysicians' say that the attributes and qualities of matter are the work and creation of the eternal and infinite Creator, whom we call God and rationalists prove His existence. From the necessary principles of natural science the non-creativity of God, that is the eternity of matter is not proved. In fact from these principles the existence of an effective or creative God necessarily follows."32

At another place Sayyid Ahmad Khan observes:

"They (naturalists) say that about the cause of all causes that is God Almighty there are three ways of arguing. One is from His existence, that He exists. Secondly, from His eternity, that is from the present to the infinite past, as far back as you may think of, His origin is not in time, and He has existed all along. Thirdly, from His immortality or infinite future existence (abadiyat). So the 'Naturalists' believe in God as Absolute, Eternal, Infinite."33

Sayyid Ahmad Khan seems to be aware of the conceptual distinction between an ordinary cause of an effect and the 'cause of causes' qua cause, though he misses the relevant points of distinction brought out by Kant on the one hand and the logic of science on the other. He says:

"There is a lot of difference between a cause and the 'cause of all causes', cause is effective in the things present directly or indirectly or through other causes of which it is an effect. While the cause of all causes' is the cause of the thing's very existence and the existence of the thing depends on the cause of all causes and all the causes and effects that take place are effects of this cause of all causes. Therefore, the cause of all causes can not be separated from its direct or indirect effects. It is its cause all the time and if it is separates from it the thing will be reduced to nothing and the whole chain of causation will cease to exist. This is
what is meant by 'encompassing' (Ihatat),
when God says "And He it is, that
encompasses all things."34

(We shall discuss this point later i.e. cause and
God as cause)

Sayyid Ahmad Khan, as a matter of fact, considers
the law of causation as a law of nature and defines it in
a way which transcends the definition of causation as
strictly warranted by science. In an article 'He, the
Existant', (Huwal-Maujood) he elaborates this points:

"A thing that exists is an effect of same
cause and that cause an effect of another
cause and this chain continues. Such a
chain must, in accordance with nature end
at some cause of all causes, the proof of
which is in the laws of nature itself and the
laws of nature are:

1) In the existence of cause and effect
there must be a relation of priority
and posterity, that is the cause is
before the effect.

ii) The effect cannot be without the cause.

iii) As long as the cause is not actively
existant the effect cannot be actively
existant.

iv) The chain of cause and effect exist in
time, so that cause and effect can be
termed as first and last, before and
after, mentally or externally.

v) Since the chain of causation is infinite,
it needs an infinite time span for its
existence.

vi) The infinite cannot exist in the finite.

(All these are laws of nature that have been related)

From these the existence of an Absolute Being
is necessarily proved. When we call the world
of existents, we confine time to the present
time. Therefore, if at that moment we say that
the chain of causation is infinite, it will
be talking against the law of nature, for the infinite cannot exist in the finite.™

Sayyid Ahmad Khan is however conscious of the theological difficulty in adherence to the law of causation. He refers to it in an article named 'Altalāzam bain al 'illat wal Malūl'. He refers to the views of Ibn Sina and other muslim philosophers about necessary causation, which he says lead to the view of the eternity of the world. He further mentions the criticism of this view by Ghazālī in his Mungidh min ad-dalāl, and Ibn Taymīya in Al-'Aql wašl-Naqī. He thinks that Ghazālī and Ibn Taymīya confused the views of the philosophers and the materialists. He attributes this confusion to the undeveloped state of natural science. The modern development in the field of natural science, in his view proves the validity of the law of causation. Reflection on the existent objects reveal that there is a cause of all causes. This cause and effect series exist in the course of time goes through a constant process of change. The causes effecting other causes and effects becoming cause of other things. He illustrates this further by the example of the growth of a tree from a seed, with the help of water, sunlight, and other factors. This process he thinks is not opposed to the view of creation as Ibn Taymīya thinks it to be. Sayyid Ahmad Khān criticize the atomic theory though he agrees that the phenomena come into existence from matter and its atoms, but this matter he says is not eternal. Here his religious self take possession of him and after stating the muslim belief about the creation of matter, he proceed to explain this belief rationally. He questions the materialistic view of
a self subsisting universal phenomena of causation on the one hand and the orthodox belief in the supernatural and miraculous outside the law of causation on the other. 36

That God is the cause of all causes and that he could in a sense be identified with the working of nature, is the logical conclusion of this line of thinking.

"We see the universe as actively existent and according to the law of nature its ultimate cause must be actively/dynamically existent and causeless. Because if it had another cause, which cause was the effect of a non-existent, it itself could not be active existent (bil fail). So this first cause at which the chain of cause and effect stops, we call the cause of all causes, and this same entity is God Almighty and Absolute Being, briefly called Jevoh, Allah, Khudâ and God." 37

4. Objectivity of Values

The age long question of Plato's Euthyphro

"... is what is holy because the gods approve it or do they approve it because it is holy?" 38 re-emerges in Sayyid Ahmad Khan but with a difference. His discussion on the objectivity of values is not a pure conceptual discussion, but is a part of his naturalism, which seems to have developed an axiological character. In an article 'Al Islâm Hua al Fitrat Hi al Islâm' he explains his position, "A bad thing is bad, because it is so by nature and a good thing is good, because it is good by nature." 39

It is not very clear whether he considers nature intrinsically good and values relative to human actions or whether there is a distinction within nature between good and bad, right and wrong. Whatever may be the case, he sides, in practical implications, with the mutazilla 40 thinkers,
that nothing becomes good. It is good and God's action only recognize it to be so. The difficulty becomes more prominent when the question is asked thus; is there something bad intrinsically? If there is, then how its relationship can be explained vis-a-vis God? Sayyid Ahmad Khān just glosses over the difficulty, but seems to make values at least relative to man. At one place while making distinction between modern and ancient approaches to religion and affirming his support for the former he says:

"The ancient principal is that man is born for religion. The modern principle is this, that religion is created/made for man." 41

5. Denial of Platonic Idealism and Philosophical and Sufi Metaphysics of Emanation:

This denial is part of the implication of his common sense rationalism and naturalism, though he has not been able to produce any clear arguments against it. It is only his robust common sense that compels him to proceed from a word of caution to a total denial of the 'world of ideas'. In all there are two articles in which Sayyid Ahmad Khān deals with this problem directly. In the first (ʿAlam Mithāl Ṭā Māla-i-Alā) he reproduces a portion of the Arabic translation of Aristotle's (sic). Theologia (?) 42 done by Abdul Masih bin Abdullah bin Naīmah Hamīd and corrected by Yākub b. Isḥāq Al-Kindī and leaves the whole question of the acceptability of the world of ideas with a certain amount of doubt. While doubting the existence (or subsistance) of the world of ideas, he makes a significant distinction between 'God's knowledge' and the 'world of
ideas' (or imagery) and considers the later a product of the philosophical influence of Greek Philosophers on Islamic thought.

"Muslim scholars and particularly the sufis opine that besides the phenomenal existent world there is a 'world of ideas/images', of which the world of perception is a shadow. The mystics and sufis concentrate and depend on this 'world of ideas'.

One has to definitely believe that what has happened in this 'world of perception phenomena', is happening and will happen, is in the knowledge of God, the nature and essence of which is above human reason. But the 'world of ideas', of the muslim scholars and sufis seems to be something different.

The pre-Islamic Greek philosophers e.g., Plato and Aristotle also adhered to this view of the existence of a 'world of ideas'. How this view came to be accepted by the Muslim scholars and sufis? Whether its origin had been in anyway effected by the Quran and Prophetic tradition? Research on such questions is needed, because for our present purposes of an evaluation of religious ideas in the light of modern sciences, the uncertainty about such issues is a hinderance."43

In the second article (Namīdānam, Namīdānam ... )

I do not know he is more positive and declares that a belief in the existence of such a world (the world of ideas) is irrational. In his characteristic common sense approach he argues:

"Greek philosophers and the scholars and sufis of our religion believe in the hidden world, and have given it several names i.e. Māla-ī- Ālā, Ālam-ī-Mīthāl, Ālam-ī-Quds, Ālam-ī-Aql, Ālam-ī-Mālkut, Ālam-ī-Arwāh, Ālam-ī-Rubūbiyat, Ālam-ī-Amr, Ālam-ī-Jabroot, Ālam-ī-Abadiyat, etc. Whatever name is given to it, all of them consider it to be an immaterial world. The honourable scholars and sufis give such
detailed description of this hidden world, which is surprising. One does not know where these come from. People say they are known through mystic vision (Kashf). We have had no such vision. God grant us this vision so that we may know all these things. Till now we know this much that, what they say, know or believe are their own ideas produced in their own imagination."44

Though, apparently, Sayyid Ahmad Khan leaves the existence of the world of ideas as an open ended question, yet in between ... , in a rhetorical way, he rejects the Platonic philosophy, with the argument, that knowledge of such a world is not a common public knowledge. Thus, here he goes against the metaphysical approach of sufis, in the understanding of the world of perception. He, on the other hand, considers this world as real and not as shadowy or phenomenon.

6. Inductive Reasoning:

Sayyid Ahmad Khan's stress on the objectivity of knowledge and his common sense approach to the problem of knowledge leads him to a view almost similar to J.S. Mill's experimental method.45 Though his terminology and manner of argument are medieval. In one of his articles 'Argument and conclusive evidence' (Addalil-w-al-burhan) he deals with the problem of reasoning in detail. Elaborating upon the meaning of argument and evidence, he gives the views of the medieval scholars about the division of arguments into, from effect to cause (annâl) and from cause to effect (limâl), but he calls it just a verbal division. For in his view the separation of cause and effect is impossible. He conceded that arguments
and evidences are based on certain first principles (auliyat). The real issue warranting discussion is the nature and character of these first principles. He gives nine of such basic or first principles of an argument or reasoning:

(i) Experience: Our continuous and repetitive experience of events in a particular manner and order leads us to confirmation of that particular manner of events or things. But the basis of certitude or confirmation depends on the existence of a causal relation, e.g. the burning of wood in fire is the effect and fire its cause. For determining cause and effect three things are necessary, (a) When the cause is there the effect is also there and \textit{vice-versa}. (b) The opposite is also true, that is the absence of cause or effect warrant the absence of the other. (c) Variation in the cause leads to a variation in its effect. (These principles governing our experience of the world are based on the fact that there is no change in the law of nature. Apart from the testimony of great scholars the Quran also testifies to it by saying 'there is no change in the 'habit' of Allah'.)

(ii) Permanence/constancy: That is of a thing or event remaining the same until and unless another thing/event takes place. Such as the
rising of the Sun and Moon at a particular
time, which always happens in the same order
and the cause of which is known.

(iii) Induction from Cause to effect: When there
is a causal argument for induction, as our
saying men, elephants, lions, horses and
other such animals cannot move their upper
jaws, though we have not seen all members of
these species. Still we believe that every
member, covered by a name has a particular
structure.

(iv) Analogy: To generalise from particular
instances of a kind, about the whole of
its kind e.g., our saying that all things
that are heavier than water sink in water or
that wood burns in fire.

(v) Pure Induction: In cases where no evidence is
produced against a statement about perceptibles
and existants, that statement is to be treated
as true. For in the domain of perceptibles
possibility of their negation is not enough
to declare any statement about them as untrue.

(vi) Repeated Observation: Evidence through observation
is itself an argument for confirming a fact. If
we keep on seeing a thing or event in the same
way all the time, we naturally accept it as such.

(vii) Instrumental evidence: Besides perceiving through
our senses, we also perceive through invented
instruments such as binoculars and telescopes etc. These instruments are invented and constructed according to certain principles which we all accept. Therefore, what we observe through these instruments is also certain and acceptable.

(viii) Human Nature: Man by his very nature believe in the coincidence or mutual correspondence of certain events or things. His very nature or temperament deduces one from the other. For example from the phenomena of nature we argue for the existence of its Creator.

(ix) Al-Fitrî: The correct translation of 'Fitrat' is 'nature'. For Sayyid Ahmad Khân the term 'Fitrat' is the sum total of the principles he has enunciated so that whatever is proved by the research and progress of natural sciences becomes part of the first principles (aulyat), governing our knowledge. This is so because all such deliverances of sciences are a result of one, or more than one, of such processes, i.e. of enumeration, analogy, instrumental evidence or experiment. 46

This is in summation the philosophical attitude of Sayyid Ahmad Khân against which we may view some of his opinions about religious and social concepts. We shall discuss them in our next chapters.
CHAPTER II

RELIGION AND THEOLOGY A HALF HOUSE OF NATURALISM

1. Religion:

Sayyid Ahmad Khan realized that the reformation of the Indian Muslims necessitated a change in their religious attitudes. He laid more emphasis and stress on the practical and pragmatic aspect of religion than the transcendental. In his view religion is concerned with conduct:

"Religion is the name of that differentiation which relates to the conduct of human beings. In the light of which human actions are judged right or wrong or neither right nor wrong. Without the judgement of human action there can be no religion, what people call religion is man's inborn nature, so there was not person without it, nor is, nor will be." 1

Consistent with his common sense rationalism he believes in religion as natural to man or a part of his inborn nature. The idea of religion is not learned or acquired; it is inherent.

"The idea called religion is born in the heart without any external causes, experience or examination or without any rational proof. The heart is its base and the belief in it is more certain than in objects perceived." 2

Though his belief in the inherent and inborn nature of religion, inspite of criticism remains tolerable for the orthodox, his belief in the separate spheres of religious and temporal matters, shocked the Muslims who believes in the all embracing nature of Islam. Sayyid Ahmad Khan expressed his view by such utterances as:
"The basis of human misfortune is the mixing of temporal issues with the eternal and unchangeable religious issues." 3

In Europe after renaissance and particularly in the 19th century religion had began to be limited to personal and private matters, and this was incidently the time of the general progress and scientific, political and cultural development for the west in general and England in particular. Sayyid Ahmad Khan without going deep into the causes of renaissance and the scientific progress of the west, accepts a superficial model for his own notions. He thought, that a separation of the religious from the worldly or scientific affairs is a sufficient cause for social and scientific progress of the Indian muslims, who were in his opinion bounded with too much of religious superstitions.

"People think that the inclusion of useful and good social conduct in religion might strengthen and regularise their effect. But they are mistaken in their views. The nature of religious principles is different from the worldly. Religious directives that pertain to spiritual conduct are permanent and final. Because the spirit of man as created by God, does not change in its nature during man's existence on earth. While the social and cultural values keep on changing. Therefore, these cannot be included in the permanent religious values. To include them in religious principles is destructive." 4

He goes even further and apply this theory to the Qur'an.

"Every word of the Quran is not a religious injunction." 5

This attitude about religion is in fact a part of
his effort to differentiate between what he thinks to be real from the historical or temporal elements in Islam. He thinks that whatever seems to be against science is either a later addition to Islamic religion or a misconceived interpretation of the text of the Qurān. In his view the Qurān and the proven traditions of the Prophet are the only infalliable truths and they must be in accordance with nature. In his view the original and pure Islam, that is the Qurān (the word of God) and the authentic traditions of the Prophet are also, in fact fully in accord with the laws of nature. A reformation and correction is needed in the field of certain interpretations and certain other ideas, that have crept into the religious matrix at various occasions, due to the confluence of Islamic culture with other cultures. These elements are not God given and are man made artifice the utility and validity of which may change with the change of time and circumstances. They can be remodeled, changed or retained as and when required. The touchstone of their truth is their 'accord with nature'.

"The contemporaneous religions corpus includes principles and directives of two types. Those that were directly given to the law giver (Prophet) himself, which are known as the scriptural directives. Then there are those that are deduced and inferred by the scholars and jurists, (by using their reason) from the scriptures directly or symbolically. These second type of injunctions are only the views of men liable to fallacies and mistakes."6

His objectives become clear when he says,

"If Islam is not interpreted in accordance with reason, it will lose its influence on the scientific mind." and ". . . no science be it logic, philosophy or natural science, whatsoever its name, is against religion."7
This is, in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view a naturalistic view of religion. He does not use naturalism to explain the genesis of religion. He only seems to be saying that religion, is 'natural' as it is understood by common sense.

2. God or the Greater:

Belief in God's unity, omnipotence and omniscience are the most important basic principles of Islam. As far as the belief is concerned its common to all Muslims, infact all theists. The differences of opinion are about the nature of God's Attributes. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's views in this respect are also motivated in removing the twofold doubts and misunderstandings i.e. from within and from without the fold of Islam.

In this respect the first difference of Sayyid Ahmad Khan with the traditionalists was the difference of methodology. Due to their pre-occupation with hellenistic or Aristotelian thought systems the deductive method was the only method for the majority of Muslim scholars. Even a thinker of the calibres of Waliullah, who was aware of the inherent difficulty of the deductive method stuck to it, with only slight modifications. 8

Sayyid Ahmad Khan with his criterion of 'nature' and 'reason' changes to the inductive method. Unaware of consistent logical methodology and with his characteristic commonsense approach he remarks:

"No body has known God by any other means but through nature." 9

About the nature of the Attributes of God his views are a synthesis of the views of the philosophers and the
The *mūtazilites* believed that God's attributes are identical with his essence, so does Sayyid Ahmad Khan. But he also agrees with the philosophers that God is the first causeless cause.

"The attributes of God are His essence".
"God is the first causeless cause of the universe."\(^{10}\)

Like Hume\(^{11}\) he points out that human reason is not capable of knowing the nature of God's Attributes;

"... to know the essence of a thing is beyond reason. Man can only know the properties of the objects sensed by him. The faculties created in man by God are capable of knowing the properties of objects of sense and affirm or negate the existence of those beyond sensation through these. That is why man is capable of having faith in God's existence and Attributes and has no knowledge of the nature of His existence, life, power, knowledge, truth, mercy, i.e. His Attributes."\(^{12}\)

Sayyid Ahmad Khān elaborates upon his view about the knowledge of God's attributes in detail at another place. He clearly states:

"To know the fact that something exist is different than knowing why it is and how it is. Ignorance about the later does not necessarily imply the ignorance of the former. The existence of a thing can be inferred from its effects or impressions (akhar), while the later pertains to the nature of the originater of these impressions. If we know the one it does not follow that we know the other too. The clear knowledge that human reason can have is that God is the one, self existing, and His Attributes are His very essence."\(^{13}\)

He believes that God calls himself the first cause in the Qurān:

"God talks of himself as the ultimate cause in the Qurān."\(^{14}\)
Here he fails to appreciate the fact that Qurān's description of God either as Creator, or the First (Awwal) is not intended as philosophical causal argument for His existence. Sayyid Ahmad Khān here succumbs to the powerful and intensive literature of Islamic thought, in which concepts in Qurān are used in a philosophical context, rather than as concepts used for common sense persuasion in religion. However, Sayyid Ahmad Khān's concept of the unity of God and the nature of His Attributes, though often criticised, is not considered as controversial as his doctrines of Prophecy, Revelation, and above all Miracles or the super natural, e.g. angels and the hereafter.

3. Prophethood and Prophecy:

Consistent with his common sense rationalism, and naturalism Sayyid Ahmad Khān conceives, prophets as having a specific inborn nature, qualitatively different from ordinary human beings. Just as the human species has a particular nature, peculiar to it and different and above that of other animals, the prophets are the best and highest of human species by their very nature. In answer to the questions put to him by Qāsim Nānī about his beliefs, his answer about the Prophet was:

"The Prophet is the best and highest after God. The speech of God and His chosen apostle are infallible and never against the factual and the concrete. No human being except the Holy Prophet is infallible. Nobody's word or action is binding without the authority of the Prophet. The believe differently is in my opinion Prophetic idolatry (Shirk bi Nabūtāt)."15

This doctrine of inborn prophetic nature is
apparently different from the doctrine of Waliullah and majority of the Ulama'. In Waliullah's views as considered earlier, prophethood is conferred on the best and most suitable person in a given society for the reformation and guidance for which he is chosen. 16

About the nature of Prophecy Sayyid Ahmad Khan says,

"I consider prophecy a natural thing. A prophet is a prophet even when he is in his mother's Womb. He is born a prophet, lives a prophet and dies a prophet.

"The Quran calls every human recipient of Divine revelation a prophet. Prophecy is a natural thing. The Prophets are endowed with it, like other human faculties. Whosoever has this faculty is a Prophet, whosoever is a Prophet, has this faculty.

"A person who is a physician of spiritual diseases and whom God has endowed with the quality of guiding and morally educating humanity, is a prophet. When these faculties grow and fully mature, then they start functioning, which we commonly call, the call to prophethood." 17

Close analyses will reveal that like many other aspects of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religious and social thought, this theory of Prophethood also has its basis in the system of Waliullah. Waliullah's doctrine of evolution of created beings from the lower to the higher, the specific nature of different species and the evolution of human society, contains the germs of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view. 18 What is manifest and inherent in Waliullah's thought is taken to its consistant limits by Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Waliullah seems to be aware of the idea of 'nature' and 'natural' but cannot or would not break up totally from the traditional neo-Platonic muslim outlook; while Sayyid Ahmad Khan is least
bothered by this tradition. Waliullah's doctrine of prophecy though he specifically states that prophethood is neither by birth nor by nature, does not, in itself, amount to its merely being the gift of God. 19

The basic and most important deviation from the general view about prophecy by Sayyid Ahmad Khan is about the nature of prophecy or revelation and the manner of its coming to the prophet. Since he does not believe in the independent existence of angels and denies the popular and general concept of Gabriel's role in revelation.

"Between God and the Prophet there is no messenger except that prophetic faculty which is called Namus-i-Akbar and Gabrial in the language of the Shariat. The heart of the Prophet is the mirror that portrays the Divine light. His heart is the messenger, that bring the message of God and takes his message to God. He himself is the thing from which the speech of Allah comes in sounds. He himself is the ears from which he hears the soundless speech of God. The revelation gushes out from the fountain of his heart, and is revealed to him. Its shadow falls on his heart, he himself names it revelation. Nobody makes him speak, he speaks himself and says himself (nor does he say of his own desire) it is no less than inspiration sent down to him. All that happens to the prophet, the experience he undergoes is in accordance with human nature and the law of nature." 20

The prophet receives the word of God directly from God and with the help of it guides humanity. The prophets are infallible and perfect human beings and the Prophet of the Prophets, the Prophet Muhammad is the greatest of men and therefore, the last of the Prophets. Prophets have no supernatural powers; in fact the supernatural for Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not exist. Every thing and event is natural. He goes on so far in using his touchstone of nature that
he says:

"God himself is a 'Naturalist', when people disregarded natural laws he sent prophets. Whenever a prophet came he guided people to the path of nature, they had deviated from. What was destroyed was rebuilt by them. When a 'Naturalist' of the calibre of Moses was called psychic, what of us; we can be called any thing."21

Sayyid Ahmad Khan further stresses on the two fold status of the Prophet, as a man and as a prophet. For him even in the behavioral norm (Sunnah) of the prophet, only that part is incumbent upon muslims which deals with religious matters.

"In religious matters its binding on us to follow the tradition of the prophet, in temporal issues there is no compulsion. Here by tradition I mean religious directives.

Scriptural injunctions (Ahkām-i-Mansusa) are certainly religious laws other issues are derived and inferred."22

But besides the religious injunctions, for worldly affairs even the sunnah of the prophet has to be tested by the verdict of nature. Here the contradiction between this view and his view of the infallibility of the Prophet is evident. One can infer two explanations in the light of his works. (a) His belief that all the traditions are not genuinely from the prophets and that there are several innovation. (b) That at times the prophet gave opinions that were not from his Prophetic self but just as temporary observations and their utility was for that specific time only.

But these does not clear the confusion as a whole, which is there though he himself seems to be unaware of it.
He observes that:

"What the Prophet directed and did in religious matters was based on revelation and these are binding on us. About the temporal matters the Prophet himself said that, what I say in worldly matters is my opinion only as a human being. And this is what I believe in."23

Prophet have a natural and inherent capability for the task before them. The difference between a scholar/philosopher and a prophet is in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's opinion difference of nature. For the prophet the capability of spiritual guidance is in his nature, infact, is his nature, while the scholar has learned and acquired his through study and observation. So practically and pragmatically the scholar is not capable of the task of the Prophet even if he has the knowledge.

"... the first person (scholar) cannot convey his aims in accordance with the reason and ideas of the common people and is not in a position to be a universal guide for all. The latter (Prophet) conveys and communicates about the difficult problems in accordance with the ideas of the common people, so that all are satisfied. This is a second reason for the necessity of prophets who have the inherent and natural faculty of guiding and educating people. What we have said is not confined to moral guidance, but is true of all guides and reformers. God endows a person with a certain kind of knowledge which others cannot even acquire in years of hardwork. The only difference is that these other people are experts of arts and sciences and the prophets are teachers of morality and spirituality."24

Prophethood for the masses is like belief in God-head accompanied by reverence and if not total at least partial supernaturalness is ascribed to the prophets too, even to holymen. The difference between supernatural powers ascribed to them whether qualitative or quantitative is a headache of religious scholars, but the belief itself is common to
the majority. Philosophers, whether Christians, Muslims or Jews mostly deny the authenticity of miracles as supernatural happenings. The reason for this denial is basically due to their concept of necessary causation or something closely related to it. The manner and tone of expression differ from thinker to thinker and time to time. Sayyid Ahmad Khan denies the supernatural on the basis of his naturalism. But he is not a consistent naturalist philosopher. He, whenever he finds convenient, falls back on the classical view of God's bestowing a 'capability', a piece of knowledge that others cannot normally acquire, etc. This seems to make that 'capability' or that particular piece of knowledge, definitely extranatural, if not supernatural.

4. The supernatural (Miracles and Eschatology):

Sayyid Ahmad Khan is conscious of the fact that categorical denial of miracles would be challenged by the 'ulama as well as the masses, therefore in his essays as well as his Qur'anic exegesis, he refers to the denial of miracles by Waliullah.

He refers to Waliullah's Hujjatullah al-Balighah and Tafhimat-Illahla respectively.

"Shah Waliullah in his Hujjatullah al-Balighah first of all opines that on whatever nature God creates things, that nature does not change. But after this he says that God in course of his administration grants favours to his people in the form of 'Qab'd', 'Bas', 'Ihata', and Ilham (closeness, openness, coverage, and Inspiration)."25

"He illustrates the four respectively by citing examples of the inability of Antichrist to kill a believer inspite of necessary conditions being there (qab'd), the emergence of a water, fountain as a cure for Job's ailment openness (Bas'), the changing of the fire to fresh air when Abraham was put into it coverage (Ihata) and the killing of a boy, breaking of a boat and building a wall
as described in the story of Khidr and Moses as inspiration (ilham).”

In the same vogue he quotes the whole argument from Waliullah, with the verses of the Quran quoted by the later. In his Tafsir (Vol. III) he quotes the same sort of argument from the ‘Tafhimat-i-Ilahia’, in which Waliullah has refuted the attribution of the word miracle to the splitting of the moon by Prophet Muhammad. Sayyid Ahmad Khan agrees with Waliullah that in fact due to the limitations of our faculties our knowledge of the laws of nature is not complete, because of which events and things appear to be supernatural or extra natural, while in fact they are not so. Sayyid Ahmad Khan however, is firm in his conviction that what is against reason is not to be believed in. He is all the time aware of the criticism of orientalists and modernists on Islam that, according to them, it is opposed to reason. The younger generation also has doubts, Sayyid Ahmad Khan says, about religion and the masses are prejudiced thinking, Islam is a hindrance to progress. He resolved to prove that Islam is the best of all religions, that it is in accordance with nature and reason, that the beliefs and teachings of Islam are compatible with reason and modern science, after citing the examples of Waliullah and the philosophers in general about the denial of miracles he says,

“What ever be the reason behind the denial of miracles by the philosophers and scholars our denial is solely due to its being opposed to reason. Therefore, they must be refuted, in fact our denial is because of the fact that the Quran does not testify to the nature of miracles as some thing against natural order, composition or creation. So it can be briefly
asserted that nothing happens against the law of nature, therefore, we refute the supernatural entity of miracles. If it is said that they are in accordance with the law of nature, then the whole discussion is verbal, some call it miracles but we do not give it this name."27

Sayyid Ahmad Khān does not confine his denial, refutation or reinterpretation of the supernatural to miracles, he applies his touchstone of natural laws and reason to whatever belief or practice that is prevalent and moulds the whole system in accordance with his own viewpoint. He is least bothered about evoking criticism and opposition. Though he himself refers to Ghazalli and Waliullah before him who held certain views but did not express them in popular language. He himself denies the existence of angels and the Devil as actual personal beings, as well as the supernatural happenings after death, on judgement day, the physical nature of the prophet's journey to the heaven (Mairaj) the appearance of the Antichrist, the virgin birth of Jesus, the Jinn, the Fountain, the Tablet, the Pen, the Heaven and Hell. In short whatever does not fit in to his scheme of things is reinterpreted accordingly. But this is not a categorical denial, he as a true Muslim believes in God, His prophets, His Books, the Holy Qur'an and authentic traditions of the Prophet. Only when some verse or tradition is verbally indicating something opposed to natural law and reason he interprets it to bring it in accordance with nature which is the work of God and the word of God must be in accordance with His word. In ultimate analysis his views about all the above mentioned things and events are a part of his views on the nature of religious
language or in particular of the exegesis of Qurān.

As in so many other fields of religious knowledge in his views about the principles of Tafsīr Waliullah is the torch bearer and predecessor of all subsequent Indian thinkers. Though Waliullah was critical of all the previous exegetical literature, inspite of his significant insistence about reliance on the text, and independence from blind following of the previous interpreters he could not deviate in a revolutionary manner in his views of exegesis. Sayyid Ahmad Khān's case is a little different. Starting with his criticism of authority (taqlid) as early as 1850, his thought processes led him, unlike Waliullah to more revolutionary criterions. He interpreted the Qurān in accordance with the touchstone of nature and reason. He believed that the Qurān as the word of God, and every thing contained in it must be congruous with nature and reason. Though the criticism of the Western scholars was one of the motivational factors in the formation of his views, it was not the only factor as some writers in their attempt at generalization attribute to him. It is not the case that in all the new theories that Sayyid Ahmad Khān advanced about the Quran and its contents, he has continually in his mind,

"... the concieted, smiling European scholar looking in great disdain upon those bigoted muslims with their naive notions and that queer Holy Book of their's."26

In addition to the European scholars he had in his mind the dogmatism of the muslim scholars, who were hindering the progress of the community and the mid-nineteen century Indian youth who was exposed to Western scientific
development and civilization, the static moulvi and the chaotic socio-economic and political conditions, all at the same time. He wanted to save the future of his community from extremes of materialism and secularism, as well as static idealistic dogmatism. He wanted them to be educated, civilized, progressive but as Muslims. He sincerely believed that Islam and Quran were not opposed to reason and for that he gave a new interpretation to the nature of religious language.

5. The Natural of Religious Language:

For Sayyid Ahmad Khan, religious language is like any other common language grown out of sensory experience. It can be understood and be used as a vehicle of communication only on the basis of public criteria of verification. To find the meaning of a word, we look into its essential referent, that we can easily find in the world around and only then we can understand its derivations, which are nothing but an extended use of the word. Hence Sayyid Ahmad Khan denied any esoteric meanings to the verses of Quran and emphasized that the language of the Quran is 'ordinary' language.

However, whatever is written, as a content in the Quran, can at best be understood in, (a) its contextual sense and (b) as referring to the contemporary social and epistemological situation at that time. These two points need a little elaboration. In so far as contextual meaning of the language is concerned the contents of the Quran may be divided into a few broad categories i.e. (1) Verses relating to metaphorical concepts (ii) Verses relating to historical
and pre-historical events. (iii) Verses relating to ideas of
sense perception and science. (iv) Verses relating to moral
principles.

This categorisation is neither meant to be compre-
hensive nor conclusive. It is only aimed at understanding
what Sayyid Ahmad Khan was trying to say in his principles
of exegesis. Similar categorizations and the use of the
concept of 'context' (Shān-e-nuzūl) has been used earlier
by different classical writers, but with a different pur-
pose. The classical exegesis assimilated all these categories
together and then subjected them to the Aristotelian logio
of either/or. For them contentions in all such verses could
be classified as true or false and they treated propositions
of all categories as belonging to the same logical class,
in so far as their truth and falsehood is concerned. When
they found that such a treatment leads either to metaphysical
puzzles or paradoxes, as they Occurred in the 'controversies
of Mītazila and Ashāfī; some of them like Ibn-‘Arabī
resorted to esoteric meanings of certain verses or least took
refuge in one of the verse of the Quran, which declares that
there are certain verses (ayāt) in the Quran which are clear
(Muhkamât) whereas certain others are vague (Mutashābihāt).
They thought that metaphysical and all such other contents
of the Qurān that are related to extra sensory world are of the
nature of Mutashābihāt, but nevertheless their truth can be
vouchsafed exactly in the same manner as we vouchsafe the
truth of a sensory proposition. Modern logic has pointed out
that all propositions are not of the subject predicate type
and hence we cannot treat them, while determining their truth and falsehood, in the same manner. 'Rise and read', is a commandment which is neither true nor false, except in the sense whether someone did make a commandment or not or whether it was obeyed or not.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan, though unaware of this advancement of modern logic, seems to be much nearer to it, than any other exegete in the past, except perhaps Ibn-e-Rushd. He clearly delineates various types of contents of the Qur'an and applies the criteria, applicable in the relevant field for determining the meaning and truth or falsehood of each and every content. Thus historical material is treated as a piece of ordinary history whereas information relating to the sensory world is subjected to ordinary laws of sense perception. Whatever judgement can be passed by the criteria of relevant context is taken to be true and contentious, otherwise rejected.

The second principle i.e. referring a verse to contemporary social and epistemological situations is as a matter of fact a supplementary principle to the contextual interpretation theory. Any piece of knowledge given in the Qur'an should be seen in the context of the knowledge at that time. The prophet could not possibly have mentioned things in the Qur'an, which were to happen in future as arguments then, and yet be intelligible to his contemporaries. Though, as a matter of fact, there is hardly any data in the Qur'an, which has been repudiated clearly by modern science, yet the interpretation of some of the verses has to be changed to suit the contemporary scene. The theory of evolution is an example of the type.
Sayyid Ahmad Khān subsumes the twentieth century insight in philosophy in his principles of exegesis which, if seen in the background of the foregoing lines, would lose very significantly. The principles of exegesis he gives are as follows:

1) There is one true God, the Qurān is His word, true and real. No knowledge that is true can deny it, rather it throws light on its truth.

2) There are two things before us (a) Work of God, that is nature, (b) Word of God that is the Qurān. There can be no contradiction between the two. If eventually any difference is there, then the work of God exist, therefore it cannot be denied, so God forbid the word would have to be rejected. Therefore the unity of both is a must. (c) Work of God as the law of nature is a practical promise of God and His word is a verbal promise, the two cannot be against each other. But to think that such a contention can effect the Omnipotence of God, is a mistake. (d) Whether 'man is made for religion or religion is made for man, in both cases some capability is required in man above other animals and it is reason. Any religion that is beyond or above human reason can not be practiced by man.

To defend Islam and the Qurān as natural and rational, and compatible with all times, Sayyid Ahmad Khān continues his effort in the face of all opposition, replying to Mohsin al-Mulk's objections to his interpretations he says:

"Don't make fairy tales of Islam, or it will lose the superiority it has over false religions and will not be acceptable to human reason. The ignorant might accept the supernatural on the authority of some one revered, because he
does not know any thing else. But those possessing reason, even a small bit of it will not believe any thing that is beyond human reason."33

As an application of his theory of exegesis Sayyid Ahmad Khān had to refute the belief in the existence of the supernatural, whether it was the Devil or the angels, the Antichrist or the miracles of the prophets. This included the fountain and the pen, the balance, heaven and hell. In his 'Qurānic Tafsīr' and essays on the subject he tries to 'desupernaturalize' the apparently supernatural contained in the Quranic text.

We can describe only a few cases of interpretation, where Sayyid Ahmad Khān applies his principles. Others may be treated as cognates. Once these cases are understood, his principles become evident. No doubt, the application of the principles bring out certain weaknesses of his arguments as well. As for instance his very extended use of the meaning of certain words in the Quran. It is obvious, that he occasionally, picks up in an arbitrary fashion, certain meanings of words to suit his purpose and the arguments he gives in his favour look forced and after thoughts. We shall point out such cases, as we proceed with his examples.

The Qurān talks about angels at innumerable places (88 times in all). The question is what are they? and what is their nature? The common belief is that they are invisible and are incapable of disobeying God. It is further believed that for various types of work specific angels are nominated by God. This belief has a history in Arab paganism and Semitic religions before the advent of Islam. Part of the belief has
permeated, into Islamic belief structure. The reality is that:

"The Qur'an talks about angels, so belief in them is binding on a Muslim. The existence of angels as creatures, is certain, but what is discussed is the nature of their existence.

"We don't have any reason to believe or disbelieve in the existence of creatures with bodies and forms yet invisible. So we may that may be such beings are there. But we do not proclaim their being or accept the actions associated with them. The material bodily existence of such beings cannot be proved from the Qur'an." 34

He is, nevertheless, fully aware of the Qur'anic words about angels so he rationalizes to meet both ends.

"This much can be ascertained that the ancient Arabs as well as contemporaries of the Prophet used the word Malā'ika (angels) for those powers (Quwwā) which accomplished the ends of natural laws."

"The appearance of God's super favours, and the powers he created in his creatures, are called Malak or Malā'ika One of them is the Devil or 'Iblis."

"... all researchers agree that the human powers called Nafs-i-Amūmâr or Quwâ-i-Bahimâ (demonic faculties) are the Devil." 35

He further elaborates upon the origination of the names of the angels, such as 'Gibrâ'il' and 'Mikâl', tracing it to the Hebrew terminology of the Torah. He opines that the Quran mentions these names in the context of Jewish belief. He meted out the same treatment to all the supernatural entities.

About the Jinn, (mentioned at 40 places in the Quran) he explains that the pre-Islamic Arabs used the word Jinn for uncivilized men, against Ans (human) for civilized. The Quran Sayyid Ahmad Khan observes has used the current word
in the same meaning that were prevalent. At some places the word Jinn has been used as a substitute for 'Devil', while five times it has been used in the sense the Arabs used it. But this is to refute their belief. It can however not be proved that the Quran refers to these creatures as existent beings. In these five places Jinn is the Jinn believed in by the Arabs. It is the narration of their beliefs. While at all other places the word Jinn in the Quran means uncivilized and unsettled men. The history of the word can be traced back to the poetry of the pre-Islamic Arabs, as well as the Torah. The Hebrew word used in the Torah is Shuda which means uncivilized or inhabitants of the desert.\(^{36}\)

In the same matter of the fact way Sayyid Ahmad Khan interprets the Qur'anic verses about ressurrection and life after death. The promise of reward and punishment in heaven and hell is not literally meant. What is meant is to create an image of the highest degree of pleasure and pain in a manner the human mind is capable of understanding. The reason behind all these is that the human mind is not capable of understanding any thing above sensation. About the facts that are not in the sphere of sensation, man is only capable of knowing their existence and is not capable of knowing anything more about it. This is true of the soul too, which is immaterial.\(^{37}\)

Sayyid Ahmad Khan gives a naturalistic and rationalistic interpretation of the extra ordinary and miraculous events associated with the prophets. He argues that the Quranic narratives about Jesus, Abraham, Moses, Junah and others do not attribute anything extra-ordinary, Jesus he argues was the
son of Joseph and Mary by their marriage, Moses was only informed that there was passage in the river. The Qur'anic verse about Jonah does not mean being swallowed by a fish but only mean being touched by the mouth. All these interpretations he justifies on the ground that:

"... the Qur'an being the word of God, not a single word in it is opposed to reality. The apparent opposition of some verses, to existing facts and happenings, is due to two factors (a) either we have misunderstood the meaning of these or (b) We are mistaken in the identification of facts and happenings."38

Sayyid Ahmad Khan's opinion about the Qur'an as the word of God is nearly the same as the common orthodox view. The Quran is adverbium the word of God.

"The Quran was revealed to the Prophet adverbium, and that is revelation, whether it be as the majority of muslim scholars think through the angel Gibrail or through the prophetic power called Rooh al-Amīn, as is my particular believe. The end product and result of both these processes is the same, so there is no need of discussion on it. I do not agree that only the substance was revealed and the words are of the prophet, though Shah Waliullah seems in agreement with this point of view. It is against the nature of idea. Think of your own mind, no subject can be there devoid of words. The concept and image is in words. Thought without language is rationally impossible."39

If one studies the Arabic verses, and the way they have been understood throughout the history of Islam, with the exception of the esoterics, it becomes evident that what Sayyid Ahmad Khan says, cannot become, nor was it ever before, a belief of the Muslims. Angels, Jinn and life hereafter, though these can be interpreted in the manner suggested by him, yet it would be coercing the language of the Quran to lend only one meaning to these concepts. The other alternative
may be to suggest that various minds may understand these concepts in different ways and since they do not belong to specific moral commandments, a difference of opinion does not alter the status of a believer.

Those who are in a position to judge Sayyid Ahmad Khan's views objectively and intellectually can easily realise, that the denial of angels etc., by him is neither categorical nor total. Only his non-conformity is true and categorical. His rejection of authority is not a rejection of personalities or schools. It is total. He is true to his conviction of compatibility with reason and natural law. Only three of his Muslim predecessors that he quotes with reverence are Ghazâlî, Ibn-Rushd and Waliullâh. But even in respect to these his attitude is rational, he pertinently or occasionally impertinently uses them to support his own views. He agrees with them as far as it serves his own ends. His agreement with Waliullâh in case of miracles (quoted earlier) is an example. His attitude towards Ghazâlî and Ibn-Rushd is the same. He disagrees with Ghazâlî's criticism of reason as well as his concept of the soul. He also disagrees with that part of Ghazâlî's work where he ascribes literal interpretation to the Quranic description of the path (Sirât), the balance (Mizân) and other happenings on the day of judgement. He states Ghazâlî's views on these issues and follows it up by those of the contemporary metaphysicians (without mentioning names) who say that the Sirât is factual and true but the description attributed to it is neither proved from the Qur'an nor from the authentic traditions. Sirât does not indicate any existent object but the righteous path. By balance or Mizân
they understand the evaluation of deeds or actions. God will on the day of judgement judge the actions of men by his own eternal Attribute of justice. That very Attribute is named at times 'Balance' and weight of actions. 40

Sayyid Ahmad Khan quotes Ibn-Rushd often for his rational approach and in support of his own views:

"Ibn-Rushd has established a really rational and non-extremist principle. He says that we certainly believe that what is proven on rational grounds and the apparent laws of Shariah is opposed to it, an interpretation (ta'wil) in accordance with the rules of Arabic grammar is required."41

This principle is in fact the same as Sayyid Ahmad Khan's. He firmly sticks to his reliance on the word of Allah, and its rational character. His views about the Shariah, traditions and ijtehad are closely related to his exegetical principles and are a logical result of the same.
1. Man's Problems and Qualities:

Unlike philosophers Sayyid Ahmad Khan's practical implications do not flow from his philosophy. On the other hand he orders his philosophical outlook to suit his practical and pragmatic considerations. In a sense, then, his philosophy can also be described as a relative pragmatism i.e. relative to the society and the time in which he was living. A degenerate Muslim society, devoid of power, pomp and culture, was the social reality that Sayyid Ahmad Khan faced. His question, then was not, which philosophy of Islam is true, in abstract; but which philosophical outlook will help the Muslims of the sub-continent to come out of the state of their decadence. This is the same sort of consideration which later led Iqbal to his dynamic rationalism. In both these two philosophers, unlike Waliullah, pragmatic considerations, rather than purely rational ones, run supreme. They are always prepared to sacrifice consistency, if necessary, to save plausibility, and their aim, is to provide a sufficient initiative for the take off to progress of the Muslim society. Hence, in a sense, Sayyid Ahmad Khan's real concern, and main philosophy, is his social and cultural thought.

Man and his capabilities are not only respectable, but also the centre of all the universe for Sayyid Ahmad Khan. His thought is an effort for the solution of human problems, particularly those of his own society and community. For him religion is for the benefit of man, so are science and
philosophy. Sayyid Ahmad Khān is prepared to reject any or all the systems of knowledge if they did not prove effective and useful for man. Religion is important because it is natural to man, because it helps man, reform him, if it does not serve this purpose it cannot be true. So is science and philosophy. Science is helping in man's progress, so Sayyid Ahmad Khān accepts it, not only accepts it but is prepared to defend it. Once a thing is proved beneficial to man, it deserves respect. Human reason is good because it is that part of human nature which is man's differentia from animals. Man has a right to judge for himself, so what he chooses by his reason is right. Society is natural to man just as reason and religion are. Islam is superior than all other religions because it is beneficial to man, in accordance with his reason and vital for his society. Man is the end, man is the nucleus of the universe. So Sayyid Ahmad Khān's thought revolves around man and his problems. As a social unit, a community of men, the Indian muslims are confronted with several problems. He deems it his duty to attend to their problems, to identify their problems, to identify the internal and external causes of their degeneration and to lead them to the way of progress. These problems are mainly social and cultural in nature. The society was in need of reform, reform was impossible without education. The Indian Muslims were in immense need of education. Their literature, their customs, their religious modes must be reformed, resolved, Sayyid Ahmad Khān. He wished to lead them to progress with the help of their own capabilities and their own internal capacities. These capabilities are several but reason is
the core of all these. It is by the use of and through reason that these are evolved, developed and mobilized. So the Indian Muslim should learn to use his reason and should know as to how it is utilized for the achievement of his aim of progress and development.

1) Man - A Rational Animal:

Reason, understanding and free will are the main capabilities, potentialities or talents of man in the view of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. In this field his ideas underwent very little change. His respect for reason and understanding remained constant throughout his life. One thing that is very evident in this venue of Sayyid Ahmad Khān's thought is his deep and thorough religious orientation. Whatever he says of man, of his reason, of his potentialities, of his capacity to learn is one way or the other at times referred to, at times deduced from or based on the Quran. It seems that in spite of his insistence on the separate spheres of the spiritual and temporal, religious and worldly, he consciously or unconsciously relies on an organic unity between the two, which is characteristic of many modern muslim thinkers, later also emphasized by Iqbal.1 Sayyid Ahmad Khān observes about reason's inevitability:

"Thinking that man has much more to do than all animals, I thought the Great Creater who created man more helpless than even animals, with such a lot of difficulties in his way, must have given him something to overcome all these difficulties. My heart named it "Reason"(aql).

"This made me thoughtful, for I realized that reason is not capable of doing all this, but all this cannot be done without reason either. Reason is a tool towards obtaining other ends,
Just as gold and silver cannot satisfy our hunger but get us the required things for the satisfaction of hunger."

"After a lot of thinking, and meditation about what it is that is acquired by reason. I got the idea that it is knowledge which means cognition. At this stage I understood that what I have to do above all other animals is to know the reality of all things. I realised that knowledge and certainty/belief (Yaqeen) are necessary for each other. When I have knowledge of something I can be certain about it. And what I am certain of is known to me. So I decided that there can be no certainty without knowledge and no knowledge without certainty. I also thought that knowledge (ilm) and certainty (Yaqeen) which are necessary for faith should be of the same category as the relation between ten and three. So that it is permanent since if it is temporary and passing it can not be realy knowledge or certainty. It would be just a mirage. These thoughts confused me and I looked in all directions for the method of arriving at certainty or faith. I saw innumerable men believing in so many difficulties? The better course would be to enquire from these people as to how they reached certainty in their faith."

"The jew said I believe in one God because Moses said so. The Christain said that no this is wrong, Gods are three. My belief is firm because Saint John said so, I became more and more confused. If knowledge and faith in things are so at variance with each other they cannot be certain. Then what is the reason of their certainty. My thought led me to the fact that their belief is not a belief in one God or the Trinity,they only believe that Moses and St. John said so. The jews said Moses conversed with Allah, and turned a rod into a serpent, so what he said cannot be doubted. The Chrhistains said Jesus rose the dead, he did not die when put to death, he even left the grave for heaven. So what can be the doubt in his being God."

"At first the proofs appealed to me as good. Then I thought that, what they believe in is the conversation of Moses with Allah and his turning the rod in to a serpent, and Jesus's rising the dead, and his re-birth, not in the unity or Trinity of God."

"All these discourses led me to the fact that knowledge,certainty or faith can be acquired only by reason. Reason is the way to these and a useful guide."
But Sayyid Ahmad Khān's common sense and naturalistic approach does not lead to a categorical certainty in the ultimate truth of all that is acquired by reason. He realises its short comings and offer the solution that the error of one person is liable to be remedied by another and of an age by another age. Reliance on reason, however, is needed and required, for there is no other resource at our disposal. His rationalism and naturalism does not allow recourse to mysticism, as Ghazālī's. Though the doubt is raised in his mind about the scope of reason, and he explored the possibility of another method, as he observes,

"A doubt was raised in my mind about the reason of my belief in the guidance of reason. Is it not possible that there be an other higher guide than reason. That can defeat reason. But our not knowing of such a faculty is a clear proof of its non-existence. Even if we think of the existence of such another guide, it cannot serve our purpose. For the enquiry in to its existence we need certain knowledge. Without it reason is the only guide. I thought of dreams. When we dream, in our sleep we consider what we see to be real and true without raising any doubt. While in fact it is just a dream. So what is certain about our perceptions in waking life that they are really or truly existent? May be all this is true in relation to our present conditions. May be another state is possible, which has the same relation to our waking life as this life has with dreams. Then we might realise that our awakeness was like a dream."

"Then I realised that just an idea of such a state is not sufficient for certainty. There is a lot of difference between possibility and certainty, so again there is no capacity but reason. I did think about the possibility of a faculty superior to reason but without experience of it, it cannot be certified. Whatever way our thoughts turn, reason is the basis of certitude knowledge and faith.

"All these thoughts convinced me that the common idea that reason has nothing to do with faith is baseless and erroneous. When I found Islam in full conformity with reason, I was convinced."
Referring to the common definition of man as rational animal and reason as a distinctive quality of man Sayyid Ahmad Khan thinks that if reason be defined as a faculty that enables the fulfillment of needs, even animals have that faculty. About the degrees of this quality he rightly says that:

"Perfect or imperfect, more or less are relative terms."6

If we pride over man's apprehension of universal and particulars, there is no distinction in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view, because man needs this knowledge animals do not, the net results are the same. That is all animals including man are endowed by the Almighty with faculties in accordance with the needs and requirements of the species. Even worship is not confined to human species, because all creatures do what they are created for. The animals also have community or fellow feelings. Sayyid Ahmad Khan in his discussion of the distinctive faculty of the human species arrives at the conclusion that;

"Man has one quality, that animals lack, that is besides national and communal feelings, he is capable of solving national problems."7

11) Freewill:

Sayyid Ahmad Khan believes in the identification of means and ends as a necessity for progress. Utility and usefulness of a line of action or a thing is of course important but:

"... the meaning of utility should not be limited, the most useful thing for man is to decide what he should do and what he should not do."8
This brings us to his concept of free will. When he talks about free will, his discussion neither pertain to the traditional scholastic discussion of free will and determinism, nor the modern scientific and psycho-ethical nature of it. Though his views here and there refer to, or assimilate both the above mentioned aspects, but in fact his views are a common sense interpretation and discussion of free will and its place in social life. He is however very clear in his conception of objective realities. Every individual has the right of the freedom of expression. The rightness or wrongness of opinion, however, does not depend on the number of its adherents. A right view or opinion has to be proved right, who so ever be its holder. Man is liable to error but abilities should be developed and used properly people should express their opinions only in the areas they know of. Freedom of expression does not in any way mean that every body's opinion about every thing is worthy of consideration. Nevertheless, difference of opinion he thinks, is a must for a healthy society, Since it is natural that people differ in views, the expression of the natural is healthy, and its suppression harmful. However toleration and elasticity must be there,in any social intercourse, whether religious or temporal.9

iii) Understanding:

The core of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's views about human capabilities however is his concept of 'understanding'. Reason is important, but it is already there as man's inborn natural faculty, knowledge of course is acquired by man but what is important to know is how to exercise the faculty of reason,
to apply the knowledge acquired. This practical and applied form of reason is what Sayyid Ahmad Khan deems important. This is what he thinks his nation lack and this is what is needed most for their development and reform. Quite naturally and consistantly this practical rational quality is not opposed to feelings or emotions or instincts, because they together form the whole of human nature. Though Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not spell it out as Iqbal did, but the organic unity of thought, and feelings is manifestly there in his concepts of 'nature' and understanding. Wisdom and understanding/reason are at times used synonymously. The opposite of wisdom/understanding is not feeling or impulses it is hypocrisy or pretentiousness. A man of understanding hates hypocrisy.

"Just as understanding or wisdom is distinctive perfection, hypocrisy is the greatest evil. The climax of goodness is understanding and the climax of evil is hypocrisy."10

The development or progress of which man is capable has its material and spiritual or immaterial sides. Man's acquisition and development of the immaterial and spiritual side of his natural capacities is his morality or religion. Morality is natural to man. Man is capable of acquiring moral calibre through the exercise of his inborn qualities and his own efforts. Man's change in all sphere is conscious change. With the help of 'understanding' man is capable of acquiring better personal/moral and social/communal qualities.

2. Ethica and Morals;

While ear-marking the issues and spheres in which the Indian muslims must improve and progress, he gives twenty nine
issues. Of these, at least thirteen related to man's personal
culture or morality. These are:

1) Freedom of the will,

ii) Selfishness,

iii) Honour and dignity,

iv) Punctuality,

v) Morality,

vi) Truthfulness,

vii) Dealing with friends,

viii) Speech,

ix) Tone,

x) Living habits,

xi) Cleanliness,

xii) Dress, and

xiii) Dining habits.

i) The minds of muslims with their continuance adherence to
authority (Taqlid) and customs have become so low and their
power of volition and ideation has worsened to such an extent
that no movement for their progress can lead to success.
Therefore the first and foremost thing is that freedom of
opinion should originate in them. Till then no civilization
can come.

ii) The greatest vice that is the first cause of national
degradation, is lack of fellow feelings, which is necessary
and essential for the betterment of all of us.

iii) Honour and dignity are linked. Both are lost to the
present day muslims. Because real honour and dignity are moral
principles. Civilized people do right and dignified things,
to add to their personal honour and dignity and not out of fear of God or hell-fire.

iv) Lack of punctuality and discipline is very harmful to national culture and civilization. It is essential to be punctual in all matters.

v) Our social intercourse should be natural, dignified and respectful. Hypocrisy and pretence is immoral.

vi) Truth should be considered honourable. There should be mutual trust and each others' words should be believed.

vii) Our social relations should be rational and according to etiquette.

viii) Our conversational and speaking habits should also be civilized. The words, the manner, the tone, should be cultured.

ix) We should attend to the tone of our speech, because blunt and rude tone is un-civilized.

x) Our living habits should be reformed, at present these are very degrading.

xi) Cleanliness of body, home and clothes is a part of culture and civilization.

xii) The right cut and symmetry of dress is an important part of personal culture. With the advance in civilization the dress changes accordingly.

xiii) Without prejudice we should modify and reshape our dining habits on the model of the nations whose habits are better.

This division and classification is certainly neither comprehensive nor scientific, besides the overlapping. Yet it seems to be based on a distinction between what is permanent or absolute and what is changing or relative in the field of
morality and culture, in our Islamic society. Sayyid Ahmad Khan seems to be of the view that even those ways of behaviour which are essentially changable have been made absolute by the contempory muslim society. Once this distinction is obliterated, a wrng emphasis on certain modes of behaviour makes them static and then degenerates it into a more formal structure of religious commandments with no room for reason or commonsense. Once this attitude is established it over-reaches to other important spheres and the society as a whole looses its urge to grow and develop.

It is to be kept in mind that there is a difference between the moral theories of a philosopher and a reformer. The philosopher's concern is the nature of morality, virtue and vice etc. The reformer as far as ideas and speculation goes comply with the philosopher's aim, but he can not go all the way, because his thought has a purposive element of reform to which he has to return. For him the factual is important but more so in its concrete existent form. Therefore his concepts and priorities differ from those of the philosophers. For instance for the philosopher truth in itself may be more important then truthfulness, while with the reformer it may be the other way round. The reformer may give more importance to the elimination of prejudice, hypocrisy, pretence and vanity as vices and establishment of self respect, proper pride, national love etc, as virtues. While these might be side issues for the philosopher who is thinking of the highest good, the ultimate reality and cardinal virtues. Reformers can either be practical or theoretical. Though theory and practice may be interdependent and co-related, priorities make a difference in a system. For a theoretical
reformer a change in attitude, a reform in the ideas and thought are important. The practical reformer cannot avoid this either but he attends more to the practice, unless and until an idea is proven good when testified and practical in experience, it cannot be desirable for him.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan is not a disinterested moralist but a reformer first and foremost. His reformative zeal is the starting point. He experienced, observed and saw the circumstances of his own nation, realized the need for reform and civilization of the nation and identified the areas where they were required. This took him to the realm of philosophers, educationists, political theorists and experts in all fields. He observed their works and their practical implication wherever he could, he drew upon the resources of his own history of thought and with the help of these two he formulated his views. This with a definite aim to return to where he started, that is from his reform movement and make use of what he acquired in the process. All this process was not in a logical before and after. The whole proceeded together. So when he talks of morals, it is in the context of practice. When he talks of virtue and vice it is factual concrete virtue and vice. His basic moral concept is that, right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice are objective in nature, whereas habits, customs and cultural expressions change from age to age and place to place:

"The people who deliberate on the art of living, culture and civilization have difficulty in judging the customs and culture of a country or nation as good or bad. Every nation prefers its own ways and is happy with it. For the things we get used to from our childhood are liked by us. But reliance on this would mean that
good and bad have no objective entity and all depends on habits, whatever is prevalent is good and whatever is not prevalent is bad. This however is wrong, good and bad are objective entities. Custom and habit only make things acceptable or unacceptable."

Freedom of the will, expression and opinion is an important part of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view of morals. He agrees with an unknown writer that;

"... freedom to do what one feels like doing in the right of all men as long as it does not harm the interests of others."

Apparently it seems to be an adherence to the popular argument in favour of democracy.

On the whole what we can deduce from Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view of the nature of morality is that, moral values are of intrinsic nature. Man has his inborn nature, society is natural to man so is morality. A healthy society is that in which the natural capabilities of man develop and progress. Man is endowed with the power to choose from amongst things and actions which are good or bad objectively. This power he is endowed with is his faculty of reason, like all animals, infact all creatures man has been given the capacity to survive and fulfill his needs.

The difference between men and animals are two. Firstly, what is instinctive in animals is conscious in man. That is man is conscious of what he needs and his will and intentions, his desires are all conscious. He has the power of discrimination; Secondly, his inherent capabilities are full of possibilities. They have the capacity of constant development, modification and reform. Though animals to a certain extent have the capability of adoption to environment it is different in man. Because it is a conscious deliberating faculty which he operates and
exercise for his self. What is instinctive in animals is cognitive in man. His capacity for development and progress is tremendous, its limits are yet to be seen. So far there has been no upper limits.

Mobilization of the natural capabilities is the way to develop them. Reason enables man to acquire knowledge. But knowledge and reason are morally good only in their practical form of understanding, intelligence or wisdom. Knowledge as virtue in the Socratic form is not the developed form, for Sayyid Ahmad Khan, it has to be applied, and testified to become virtue. This power of discrimination between right and wrong good and bad, is the function of understanding and is a basic virtue in his view. But the nature of moral action is to an extent subjective as it involves deliberation of a trained and cultured mind. One should not confuse subjectivity here with utilitarianism, nor with Shaftesbury's and Hutchison's view of it. Conscience, for Sayyid Ahmad Khan is a state of the human mind, acquired, but, with the exercise of one's innate faculties. It is a form or part of practical wisdom or understanding which delineates between what is objective and unchanging in a moral action and that which is subjective and relative.

For the development of man's so called spiritual qualities Sayyid Ahmad Khan at times uses religion and morality synonymously. Here of course religion is not meant in the form of any system of beliefs or a particular established form of Worship. It only means the spiritual or immaterial qualities of man in their acquired form.

"The proper development of the spiritual side of human nature enables him to judge rightly. The thinking and speculative faculties when associated with things immaterial, can only be based on
the law of nature. Contemplation about and on the law of nature shows that like all other things man's morality and religion are also determined by this law of nature. So man can get to the righteous conduct through his study of nature."15

Had it been a simple naturalistic philosophy, laws of nature should have been sufficient for an explanation of morality and religion. But Sayyid Ahmad Khan includes the necessity of prophethood for the guidance and proper development of these natural qualities. It does not effect or harm his own brand of 'naturalism' the prophetic faculty is a specific 'natural' faculty, qualitatively different from ordinary human nature. We can infer that he means the prophets to be higher than ordinary human being in the scale of evolution, so are the scholars and thinkers etc., though they in turn are, perhaps, below the prophets. He is of the view that:

"... all men cannot reach the status from where they can judge for themselves. Those who can reach such levels are only few. The few also do not get to this realm in their life but through several generations and centuries, The Almighty now and then send guides who are born with the capacity by which they can explain rightful principles of conduct. This person who is by nature capable of spiritual guidance is different from those who acquire the same knowledge."16

This knowledge of righteous conduct can also be acquired through the study of nature, only tremendous effort is required. But since in this form it is neither inborn nor natural, it cannot be communicated and used for the benefit of humanity. Only the person himself can gain by it, that too not perfectly, because it is acquired and not natural.

3. Virtues and Vices:

Reason/intelligence or understanding is the basic
virtue and hypocrisy basic evil for Sayyid Ahmad Khán. He seems to be advocating the moral rule of the golden mean, or the Ḥājī ʿAbbās of the Greco-Muslim tradition. Freedom of will and expression is a virtue but its unnecessary application and carrying it beyond limits is vice. Proper pride, self respect, honour and dignity are virtues but vanity, selfishness and excess of self importance are vices. Having one's own independent views is good but unnecessary opposition and criticism of others is bad. Self help or self reliance are virtues but self centredness is bad. Learning from others with an open mind is good but blind following is harmful. Love, mercy, sympathy are good within the limits of decency and propriety but beyond it they are unhealthy.

Self analysis and self evaluation are in Sayyid Ahmad Khán's view necessary for the maintainance of proper conduct. We should avoid total adherence to our desires and feelings, for they can mislead us. In fact:

"... a rational man should be conscious about actions based on sentiments other than reason. He should have his doubts about such actions because there might be some vice concealed in it."?7

As righteous conduct is not a passive mood, one has to make an effort towards it. Therefore, lethargy, sluggishness, and laziness are vices, whether they be mental or physical. With our own effort we become resourceful and mould the circumstances for our own purposes. There is no such thing as lack of resources, it's only a lame excuse of the lazy amongst men.

Flattery is another social vice which corrupts many. It is the product of the inactivity of the inner powers and a lack of knowledge. It leads to decay and decline because if leads the flatter and the flattered both to lies, pretence and hypocrisy.
Honour is a virtue which is a reward of truthfulness and righteous conduct. Even outward and apparent qualities can be respected but such an honour is inferior to the honour acquired through righteous conduct. It involves conformity and accord of the inner and outward self.

"For a human being truthfulness and piety in all actions is needed."18

Self respect and proper pride is dignified and honourable, but vanity and self praise are disastrous for our morals. In this respect Sayyid Ahmad Khan express accord with the well known maxim that;

"... the clear sign of decadence is the thought of our perfection."19

All this is true of nations as well as persons. There are no limits to moral progress but the idea that a limit is reached paralyses further efforts. When efforts are discontinued decline is an essential outcome, because progress is continuous achievement and dynamic not static.

The list of virtues and vices referred to severally by Sayyid Ahmad Khan is lengthy and exhaustive. Even naming all will take us to unnecessary details. But a few more examples can be mentioned. On the social side of virtuous conduct, fellow feelings, benevolence, unity and mutual love and respect are good but to expect and give uncalled for sympathies is harmful to both sides. National love and sympathy is opposed to selfishness. Selfishness is an evil which is common to those who lack understanding and value the superfluous and apparent pleasures above real happiness. Sayyid Ahmad Khan is critical of those who do virtuous things for selfish ends, like reward and punishment in the hereafter or worldly fame and applause.
Love is another of the commendable virtues in men.
Besides general feeling of human sympathy and affection even love of our near and dear ones is one of the most natural and therefore perfect feelings. But social progress is most important and can be achieved through unity:

"The present development of the civilized nations and educated world is all due to the strength of unity."20

Like morality society is also natural to man, in fact one of the first development of the human species is its community organization, which is if at all present in some of the animals is in a very rudimentary form. Again there is the distinction that animal community remains the same in its organization for ever. If there are changes they are due to biological, instinctive or geographical reasons. In man individually and socially there is a dynamic capacity of change through his own striving. It is a conscious change. Morality develops in society. And social development is a part of man's moral development. Therefore, Sayyid Ahmad Khân aims at the moralization and progress of the community. Individual and social issues are so interdependent and inter-linked that, sociology, ethics, history, politics and education are all basically social concepts, which cannot view individual in exclusion from the society.

4. Culture and Civilization:

In 1867 Sayyid Ahmad Khân formulated and pointed at the problem of culture when he said, of culture, which he faced vis-à-vis Indian and in particular the muslims of India:
"What are the ways through which the development and training of the inhabitants of India can be achieved. So that like the inhabitants of other countries they also achieve a distinction and pride in their own country."21

With this end in view he strives, formulating practical plans, and struggles theoretically for clarification of ideas relating to progress. He believes that what Indians lack is culture, that is to say their innate capabilities and their natural endowments are not fully developed. They have not acquired what is needed in the present circumstances and what they would need in the future. Clarifying his position about what he means by culture, he observes that, habits and customs based on the geographical conditions and circumstances of a people are not in question.

"By culture, I mean those creative and practical values which are intrinsically and objectively good when judged in the light of the laws of nature. They are objective realities and are not a characteristic of a country or religion, so when we seek the development of culture we should set aside all prejudice and do our duty towards all our brethren."22

Human development, individual and social is a constant dynamic process; to remain static is suicidal. The Hindus and the Muslims had all possible distinctions in the past, but when they ceased their efforts, the rest of the world went ahead. Time is a constant flow, if an individual or a community loose grip on it, it leaves them behind. This is what happened to the Indians and most of the Asian nations. So that at present they are behind the world in nearly all matters. Though their past was great and they can be proud of it but harping on this tune will not help them. Here Sayyid Ahmad Khān differs from his friends and contemporaries specially Shibli Nuamanī, who advocated a revival of the past.23 But the difference is only
the difference of approach. In the earlier mentioned article
(Ahl-i-Mulk aur Tarraghi-Tarbiyat), 24 My Countrymen and the
Development of Training written in 1867 and several other essays
on these issues, he related at length the perfections and
achievements of the Hindus and Muslims in the past ending it
by saying that;

"... the greatest honour that a nation can have
the Muslims achieved, that is the whole of
Europe acquired arts, sciences and civilization
from them." 25

All this ascertained, Sayyid Ahmad Khan thinks it
irrational to do nothing one's self and just take pride in what
the ancestors did:

"Whatever our ancestors were they were, we are
not. They were the inventors of several
complicated sciences while we cannot even
understand them. We should be sorry for our
selves instead of being proud of our ancestors." 26

This leads to the second point which is the most
important principle of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's social thought. That
is the idea of some people or even reformers that development
and progress was lost on us because we deviated from the path
our ancestors were treading on. So the solution lies in the
re-orientation of the arts and sciences of our ancestors.
Sayyid Ahmad Khan put his foot down, very firmly and
decisively. He says this is nonsense.

"This idea is very mis-leading. Our ancestors
also had their ancestors. But they with their
efforts achieved more than their ancestors before
them. They strived and put hard work, researched
and discovered many treasures of knowledge on
their own. They modified and developed what they
discovered and made their treasures beautiful
and attractive. If those people were still alive
or we who are their inheriters, were busy in
developing their arts and sciences, we would have
taken their knowledge and culture to a very high
level. We would have discovered many new treasures from this deep ocean of knowledge. But we have done nothing. We have lost their possessions also. So that when we are awake again and attend to our progress and development, first of all we should find out what other people have done when we were in our slumbers of ignorance. What levels have been reached in the development of knowledge and culture. Whateoever nation is the master and possessor of the wealth of knowledge, we should extend our hand towards it."

The model of a cultured society that Sayyid Ahmad Khan had in view was that of the British nation. Since the Indians had an access to it, they could learn from them easily. He is not advocating a complete adaptation of that culture ipso facto and his critics are not justified in blaming him for that. He earmarks the issues in which the Indians could benefit from the superior culture. Of these issues four are about religious attitudes and five about social problems and customs. The rest being about personal culture and education, realising that progress in culture is closely related to religious attitudes of the Indian muslims. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's categorisation is an assimilation of the religious and social modes of behaviour:

The four religious attitudes mentioned are;

1) Righteous religious beliefs,

2) Religious ideas and conduct,

3) Interpretation of certain religious issues,

4) Research about certain religious issues.

1) The faith and beliefs of the Indian muslims as prevalent among them are contrary to what is in their authentic religious sources. They have adulterated their religion with thousands of irreligious attitudes. That is why their beliefs must be purified and brought into accord with the Sunnah of Islam. Belief in the original Islam is the basis of all culture and civilization.
11) Hundreds of wrong ideas and prejudices have become the basis of the religious conduct of Indian muslims. These have no basis in Islam. These are either innovations or the customs of others. A correction of these is urgently required.

111) Some religious ideas are right in themselves but are wrongly interpreted or narrated, so that they appear to be contrary to reason and sciences and are opposed to culture and civilization. So we should modify our ways of interpretation and explanation.

iv) We do not doubt that our earlier scholars were mistaken in some of their religious views. We should discuss and identify these views to guard ourselves against a repetition of mistakes. (I have included the religious factors in culture and civilization because religion has a lot of influence on the culture of a nation. Hence any mis-conceived notions of religion in any nation would adversely effect its culture.)

The other five points are related to customs but are closely linked with religion in the minds of the masses. They are:

1) Status of women,
11) Polygamy,
111) Slavery,
iv) Marriage customs,
v) Customs of condolences.

1) Though other nations have grossly mis-understood the status of our women still a change and improvement is required in this sphere.

11) Though polygamy is not very common in Indian muslims, still it is there. It is against the commands of God and His prophet. It should be modified because it is earning a bad reputation for muslims.

111) Though slavery is eliminated in India as a result of the British rule. It should be done away with, once for all, because it is totally contrary to Islam.
iv) The prevalent customs of marriage among Muslims are not at all Islamic. These are so uncivilized that nothing can be worse. So their modification is essential.

v) Our customs of condolence are again totally uncivilized and un-Islamic. Inspite of the most valuable services of Maulvi Muhammad Ismail for its modifications there are still a great many that need to be reformed.30

The style in which Sayyid Ahmad Khan has innumerable these factors of individual and social life, in which civilization and change for good is required are certainly the sort of common problems which, an educated and enlightened (with western orientation) person faced. Nevertheless it helps in the understanding of the working of his mind, his pragmatic approach, his basic concern with the living issues of his time and his marked idealization of the modes of living of the English with whom he came in contact. His subjective mode of argument seems to be, since the English have power and prosperity and they are ascending in their progress they must have a valid social philosophy. But he gives an impression of naivette when he imply that the decline of the Indians and the glory of the English must have its basis in their living habits, like dressing, dining, speaking and customs like polygamy, slavery, and status of women etc.

In social matters, customs and mores are basic and important, Sayyid Ahmad Khan's views of customs though not original are nevertheless, progressive and worthy of consideration. Custom he thinks is something which has gone on for
ages and we follow it in the same way without looking into its
cause or utility.

"The English writers have defined customs more
clearly. They say that by doing something conti-
nuously for a long time or acting on a line in
the manner of law for a time, is custom. Its
an un-written law, on which people are united
for ages, so that it becomes established as
laws." 31

 Customs become a prevalent mode in practical life. Habits
and customs are minutely different but complementary to each
other. Habits springs from our inner self and custom is
adopted from without. But just as action becomes habit in
due course, Custom also take the form of habit after its
continuous adoption. Custom might take the form of law in due
course, because it effects the thinking modes of the people
among whom it is prevalent, including the planners and law-
givers. But;

"... to become a law a custom must be so old
that people have forgotten when it was not
there." 32

In Sayyid Ahmad Khan's opinion some customs are origi-
nated in religion, some in geographical, social and cultural
conditions. In course of time a custom may cease to be useful.
Too much reliance on customs is harmful, and against the
dynamic law of nature. Its one of the causes of the decline
of nations. Knowledge and education are capable of enlarging
the outlook and bringing elasticity to the mind which is
essential to progress. The realisation of the universal and
objective nature of good and bad is very useful for a
community, which can rid itself of some of its prejudices. A
study and observation of the origin and adaptation of customs
and mores among nations of the world lead us to a grasp of
the law of nature according to which the customs are a part of the preservation of human species. But change and adaptation too is necessary for the same purpose. The realization that permanence and change are complimentary, and that both are natural, can lead us to a balanced way of life. Customs are good as far as they are natural and essential. But a particular custom may give way to another. In fact without this natural process civilization and culture die their natural death:

"The customs that prevail upon the status of a nation's progress or decline are the signs of its honour and dishonour. Here the words progress and decline are used in a broad sense including all areas of life. Whether it be morality, arts and sciences or culture and living modes or wealth and power." 33

Blind adherence to customs and mores is harmful. The more a nation sticks to old ways irrationally the deeper its decline. Nor blind adherence leads to inactivity of the mental capabilities of people. They stop exercising their discriminative faculties, which is a hinderance in the way of knowledge and progress. As muslims we should and would judge all customs and modes whether they are contrary or in accord with our faith. If they be opposed to faith they should be discarded. The same should apply to what we already have and what we are going to adopt now. 34 On the level of customs Sayyid Ahmad Khan thinks that the Indian Muslims can improve their household standards, educate their children, improve the status of their women, promote trade and commerce, art and culture, learn to be punctual, develop national pride, love and dignity and discard outdated and prejudicial modes.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan ponders on the question of what civilization is, whether it is man made or natural in man. What
is its meaning? Whether it is a philosophical concept or something that is concerned with things the meanings of which are hidden in the law of nature?

"To decide this question man's conditions are to be observed. If civilization is natural to man, it would be equally true of the inhabitants of deserts and cities. Though its form may appear different, the basis would be the same." 35

Sayyid Ahmad Khan's answer to the above questions develops his theory of inborn and natural faculties, modified or acquired by human beings themselves. Man's powers to choose and his inclinations of likes and dislikes are part of his inborn nature. Then there is the tendency of judging things as good and bad on the basis of likes and dislikes. Which in turn creates the desire and motivation to change the bad to good, mould things in accordance with one's liking. This he says us:

"... the root of civilization which is present in all human groups and individuals. This process of bringing about change goes by the name of culture or civilization. There is no doubt that this tendency and desire is natural and inborn in man. These are then two principles which develop man's tendency to civilization. That is to say his realization that certain things are good and certain things are bad. A change from bad to good is culture. It is admitted that there are certain regional and social factors that determine the development of likes and dislikes, good and bad in a given society. That is why nations differ; what is considered civilized by one nation can be uncivilized, according to the standards of another. But this difference is at the level of nations and not individuals. Because the needs and modes of a social group living together are similar if not identical. So that their ideas of good and bad are more or less the same. Thus the tendency to change and reshape, i.e., the act of civilization is common to all." 36

Civilization involves the modification of the outward form of behaviour besides its inner goodness. In Sayyid Ahmad
Khan's views the non-intentional aspect of morality is also important. The inward is represented in the outward, so the outward must be civilized too. That is why he included modes of dining, dressing and speaking etc., in the list of the spheres of social life needing reform. Even virtue proper should have a civilized form. Un-civilized goodness looses its importance. Being un-civilized is being ignorant and knowledge being a virtue ignorance is a vice. Therefore, a good action if performed in an uncivilized manner looses a certain amount of goodness by being mixed with vice.

What is true of morality is true of civilization. Both are interlinked. Man has his personal conduct but conduct is always in a social group or society. The society has its customs and culture but it is the product of its individual members. Civilization as a change for the better is natural to all, but due to the interdependence of group life it is a collective phenomena. The basic nature is common to the whole human species and so are the basic needs, i.e. food, dress, shelter, domesticity, and social life. Civilization also like ethics has its universal aspects. But in its developed form due to the impact and importance of circumstances geographical and other, needs differ from nation to nation, and society to society, or group to group. With the difference in needs, approaches and modes of living also differ. It can be said that just as in the individual there is a personal side and a social side, in the group or society also there are some universal factors common to all nations or groups and also some factors that are peculiar to particular groups or nations. About the universal side Sayyid Ahmad Khan observes:
"Civilization or say the change from bad to good, be it moral or material is common to all and is universally true of humanity. All have an equal tendency to avoid pain and acquire comfort. Arts and the desire for their promotion and progress is also common to all nations." 37

Sayyid Ahmad Khan thinks it natural and essential that the un-civilized nations follow the example of and learn from the civilized nations in matters that are common to all:

"Just as the tendency towards change is natural to all human beings, whether this change is rational or material, what ever can possibly develop from bad to good, from low to high is a part of civilization. So civilization is to maintain a balance between the impulsive and voluntry in man. This attitude of balance is required in all possible development of morality, conduct, social and economic standards, arts and sciences. The result is spiritual contentment, material reward, real satisfaction, dignity, self respect and honour. In fact the last mentioned is the distinction of humanity." 38

Sayyid Ahmad Khan traces the history of civilization, particularly European to prove that it is a dynamic process and all nations learn from others at the time they are emerging from their backward position. He seems to be advocating the case that most modernists of muslim renaissance after him did, that when the Greeks learned from the Egyptians, the Muslims from Greeks, and eventually the European from the Muslims, what harm if the modern muslims learn from Europe or Britain. The most important ingradient required for progress and civilization is knowledge, so knowledge should be acquired from all possible sources. First and foremost being education.

5. Education:

Sayyid Ahmad Khan is basically known as an educationist and the living monument of his efforts is the Aligarh University, which was established through his tireless efforts, originally as Anglo Muhammad College. But from the philosophical point of
view we hardly come across any philosophy of education in his numinous speeches and essays on the subject. Most of these deliberations pertain to the form, medium, syllabi and administrative structure in the educational institutions or persuasive arguments in favour of education, particularly higher education. Nevertheless in between the lines we can sense his awareness of the problems of knowledge and education, a scientific formation of it, however, was not prompted by his situation and role as a reformer. But his concept of knowledge can be seen through his percept of education. Knowledge of objects, is value neutral and sui generis but to know is valuable and it is more fruit-full to know what is valuable for mankind. Knowledge once obtained can become obsolete and at times harmful. In such cases it ought to be foresaken and new window of knowledge should be opened and sought. No man whatsoever his greatness may be is the final word about any piece of knowledge. All these principles can be easily discerned from his insistance on borrowing from the west, his insistance to reject what cannot be explained with the help of natural laws, and from his eagerness to change with times.  

It is a significant philosophical point, which has assumed relevance at this point of our times. His views seems to be that there is nothing like Islamic system of education, or Islamic education as such. The latter concept may be used in a limited way to mean knowledge of the Qurān, Ahādīth, Fiqh etc., but to talk about Islamic system of education is vacuous. One can talk about education for muslims, as he did, but with the meaning that the muslims should be educated, not only in their creed, but also in all the modern branches of
knowledge. The Aligarh College was in no way different from any college or university of England in its model. Religion was added to the corpus of knowledge that was imparted in that institution. Sayyid Ahmad Khan does not talk about any ideology of education, nor any Islamization of modern sciences. The law of thermodynamics is neither Muslim nor Christian, neither good nor bad. It is a law of nature, that should be acquired by the modern man. The only consideration, which could be called religious in education, is his concern to achieve high standards in religious understanding and in worldly sciences. The twenty-nine issues that he earmarks, as to where modification and reform is needed, includes four on education. These are:

1) Education of Children: After religion the most important factor in national life is education. We should with our eyes on the past and present establish such a system of education that can lead us to a high standard of both religious and worldly education.

2) Resources for education: Besides a system of education we should also acquire and mobilize means for promoting and establishing education.

3) Education of Women: For the cultural uplift of a nation female education is a must. So we should arrange for education and training of girls in handicrafts and home economic.

4) Arts and Crafts: The promotion of all kinds of arts, crafts and commercial activity in the country is necessary for civilization.

These issues as pointed out, helps in understanding Sayyid Ahmad Khan's view of education. Firstly, he thinks education to be necessary for progress and thus for national survival. Besides
the realisation of the necessity of education, a system has to be evolved in accordance with national needs. But besides the theory, in practice education can be implemented and promoted only when there are sufficient resources. Resources should be mobilized by the nation itself, without reliance on government or other agencies.\(^\text{41}\) Education is to be for all male and female. There is also a hint at a little difference in the line of education for females. He seems to be aware of the need of technical and specialized education as well. In practice however, not expressly pronounced in theory. Sayyid Ahmad Khan believed in two distinct forms of education for the selected and the masses.\(^\text{42}\)

In this respect, he is a platonist in his approach. For him higher education is prerogative of the selected few. For them he advocated an education on the British lines, of Cambridge and Oxford. For the masses he thinks that small vernacular schools and centres of arts and crafts in the length and breadth of the country can be easily opened by the local people with the help of the government. The Aligarh College and institutions of its kind are to train the leaders of society.\(^\text{43}\)

Besides education through the media of educational institutions, he lays great importance on the education and training of the people through the mass media e.g. the press.\(^\text{44}\) He modelled his journal Tahdhib al-Ikhlaq after the Tehran and Spectator of Addison and Steele.\(^\text{45}\) This journal became the vehicle of his social reform movement and besides the education of public opinion, brought about steady and significant reforms in the fields of Urdu literature and Journalistic in India.
PART IV

MUHAMMAD IQBAL'S DYNAMIC RATIONALISM

MUHAMMAD IQBAL

Born at Sialkot on the 9th of November, 1877 and died at Lahore on 21st April, 1938. Iqbal was educated through a modern western system of education and read philosophy and literature at the Government College, Lahore and later on took his Ph.D. in Islamic thought from Munich. He also spent some time at Trinity College Cambridge. He obtained his Bar-at-Law from Britain. For some time he taught in Lahore but his main pre-occupation was law and poetry. He is known as one of the greatest poet-philosophers among the Muslims. He mainly wrote in Urdu and Persian, except his two philosophical works which are in English. He was by far the most competent philosopher among modern Muslims who spoke with equal amount of confidence on Islamic as well as Western Philosophy. To his credit he has about ten collections of poetry and three books in prose.
CHAPTER I

PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

1. Background:

Iqbal is the thinker of an age when the intellectual science had become truly international for the first time. Islamic thought, philosophy, theology and rationalism like all other branches of knowledge had discovered new dimensions, and Iqbal was in a better position than Waliullah and Sayyid Ahmad Khan to study, to observe and to take an account of this international philosophical perspective. Born and brought up in the traditional eastern atmosphere, Iqbal assimilated and acquired a taste for literature (particularly Persian) from his teacher Moulvi Syed Mir Hasan, of whom he was a student in his home town Sialkot. Persian literature and his natural inclinations (which he often attributed to his Brahman origin) led him to philosophy and mysticism. He took philosophy as one of his elective subjects for his bachelor's degree in Government College Lahore. Here once again he found a true guide for the path of mysticism and philosophy in the person of Professor Arnold. His study of philosophy as a subject for his bachelor and master's degree opened the venue of Western thought for him. As he was studying Arabic and Persian side by side with philosophy (Arnold himself was an orientalist), Iqbal started acquiring the knowledge of, and developing a taste for western and eastern thought systems almost simultaneously. This was the beginning of a future, which was perhaps the most harmonious combination of the western and eastern elements of philosophy in the Islamic tradition. We know
very little about Iqbal's trends and inclinations in philosophy at this formative stage, for the letters and poems of this period do not throw light on any philosophical issues.

Iqbal started teaching at Government College Lahore after finishing his education in 1901. His poetry developed and popularised during this period but the development of his philosophical genius began in 1905, when he proceeded to Cambridge for higher studies. Here he came in direct contact with the contemporary European, particularly British philosophy. He studied and discussed philosophical issues with Mettaggert, Brown, Sorley, Ward and Nicholson. The Europe that Iqbal came in contact with was a post Kantian, post Hegelian Europe. Philosophy had learned to criticise the certainty of rationalistic as well as idealistic though systems. The platonic Aristotalian crust which had encircled all branches of philosophy for ages, in the east as well as in the west was breaking. After Kant, Schopenhaufer, and Nietzche the philosophical scene was ripe for the emergence of the systems of Bergson, Samuel Alexander, Mettaggert, James Ward and William James. These thinkers had formed their respective viewpoints, when Iqbal was exposed to the contemporary thought in Europe or the later was exposed to him. Iqbal learned, acquired and assimilated, a lot at this period, to which reference will be made later. Before discussing Iqbal's thought at this stage, it is essential to know as far as possible, his own mental trends at the time he developed this perspective. For this purpose we can derive some points from his educational background and the only available philosophical writing at this period (before he went to Cambridge). From his early contact
with Persian literature, influence of his teacher Mir Hasan, his family background, and his contact with an orientalist like Arnold (who was particularly interested in mysticism) as well as his being a poet himself, mysticism was the most probable field, which could interest Iqbal. This is what actually did happen, can be ascertained from the above mentioned article which is entitled. 'The Doctrine of Absolute unity as expounded by Abdul Karim al-Jilani' (Sic) starting with the complaint that the European scholars have investigated ancient Hindu philosophy with enthusiasm, but have, generally, looked upon muslim philosophy as a by product of Aristalatian and Platonic thought, Iqbal agrees with the orientalists about the superiority of the Hindu's philosophical acumen, yet he thinks, that the muslims have also made some considerable original contribution to philosophy. As an illustration of this claim he turns to mysticism, Iqbal observes:

"... mysticism is but metaphysics hidden under the veil of religious phraseology and that the superstructure of mysticism is impossible without a system of metaphysics serving as its foundation. It is in our opinion essentially a system of verification - a spiritual method by which the ego realises as fact what intellect has understood as theory. We know much in theory and our belief in this kind of knowledge depends on the force and the number of arguments advanced in its support. The detection of some logical flaw in our argument, or the force of the arguments in favour of the opposite view may at once induce us to abandon our theory but if the ego has realized the theory, if the theory in question has been a spiritual experience on our part, no argument, however forcible, no logical flaw, can dispose us to abandon our position. Hence mysticism appeals to a standard higher than intellect itself. This standard, waiving the question of its objective existence is, according to the mystic, or heart..."5

This statement of the mystic position shows that Iqbal
was already critical of the Aristotelian logic and sole reliance on reason. In addition to this it throws light on the later development of his philosophical ideas like intuition, religious experience and his whole theory of knowledge. At Cambridge his mystic inclinations must have been strengthened by his association with Metaggart, Brown, and Nicholson. Iqbal has mentioned a letter of Metaggart in his article on "Metaggart's philosophy" in which the later had referred to Iqbal's mystical inclinations during his stay at Cambridge, this letter of 1919 recalls the past trends, of Iqbal while commenting on the then, published translation of his 'Qsrār-i-Khud' (Secrets of the self) by Nicholson:

"Have you not changed your position very much? Surely in the days when we used to talk philosophy together you were much more of a panthiest and mystic."

It was surely this inclination towards mysticism which led to Iqbal's choice of the topic of Persian metaphysics for his doctoral thesis.

When he started his research for the thesis in Cambridge and later on in Germany, Iqbal was at once fully exposed to the thought systems of the Muslims and the Europeans. This was the time of real mental and intellectual growth, when he could, not only learn and be influenced by these systems, but also evaluate and put to test the merits and demerits of its rationalistic, idealistic and realistic aspects, in the light of his own thought. He was eventually to form his own views, which are a synthesis of rationalism and spiritualism. He assimilated into his system. What was best (according to his own view) in the Muslim and European
thought systems. He accomplished the task with an uncommon insight and zeal, but the complexity and maturity, as well as lack of systematization of his thought has led to different and at times contradictory interpretations of his views. As a result, the rationalistic character of his thought has been neglected and he is often branched as an anti relationist, a champion of the passions and impulses, or at least a sort of intellectual who builds his philosophy on faith rather than on reason or facts.

"The tension between Westernism and Islamic fundamentalism in Indian Islam has produced one outstanding figure, that of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the most serious muslim philosophical thinker of modern times. Iqbal (1877-1938), the content of his philosophy apart is a synthetic figure in his mental veneer and basic spiritual intellectual character, a serious intellectual and genuinely perceptive mind, he denounced intellectualism and reason as hollow and useless and insisted on faith as the sole guide."

What we are concerned with, here, is the philosophy of Iqbal, which however synthetic, is rational and dynamic. Our view of the matter as against Rahmān is that, he does not denounce reason or intellect though, 'intellectualism' of a sort he does criticize. He does insist on faith as a guide but faith is not the opposite of reason, it has on the other hand a deeply rational character. In Iqbal's view faith has a cognitive aspect:

"... it cannot be denied that faith is more than mere feeling. It has something like a cognitive content and the existence of rival parties scholastics and mystics in the history of religion shows that idea is a vital element in religion."

It is mere feeling as well as mere reason that Iqbal denounces. His 'rationalism' is an attempt to assimilate the
different aspects of reality into a meaningful whole. That is the intution, reason and passions of man, into a total 'self' 'the ideal and the concrete of experience into a 'reality' as a whole; the past, the present and the future of history into a continuous process. Iqbal outrightly denounces one thing only, and that is 'stagnation' in all its various forms, whether social or individual, cultural or historical, philosophical or legal. Therefore the most outstanding character of his thought is its 'dynamism'. But its dynamism is closely knit with its rationalism. He rationalizes dynamism, and also activates rationalism. He is definately critical of and opposed to authoritarianism in all fields, and opposition of authority is the sina-qua non of rationalistic and dynamic thought. His metaphysical, ethical and socio-cultural ideas all bear the mark of this rationalism and dynamism.

2. Formation of Ideas:

Iqbal's doctoral thesis on 'The Development of Metaphysics in Persia' published in 1908, is the first exposition of his philosophy. In the introduction Iqbal observes:

"Original thought cannot be expected in a review, the object of which is purely historical, yet I venture to claim some consideration for the following two points:

a) I have endeavoured to trace the logical continuity of Persian thought, which I have tried to interpret in the language of modern philosophy. This as far as I know, has not yet been done.

b) I have discussed the subject of sufism in a more scientific manner, and have attempted to bring out the intellectual conditions which necessitated such a phenomenon. In opposition therefore, to the generally accepted view I have tried to maintain that sufism is a necessary product of the play of various intellectual and moral forces which would necessarily awaken the slumbering soul to a higher ideal of life."

10
Tracing the intellectual history of Persia, Iqbal starts with a review of Zoraster's views. It becomes evident at the start of the book that Iqbal believes in the inter-relation of philosophy and religion and of both having its bases in the prevailing socio-cultural conditions of a people. The Iranians, were the first branch of the Aryan race who settled down to an agricultural life. With this event the differentiating factors started developing as a part of their culture and religion. In Iqbal's view this was the beginning of an individualizing process. At the religious level the differentiation became evident in the Iranians having their own deities the Ahuras instead of the Indian Devas. The ancient Iranians believed in two powers, the power of good and the power of evil. This was the background into which Zoraster was born, a time at which the Greeks were unawaringly taking a start in philosophy and natural science, in the form of the reflections of the Ionian thinkers. In Iqbals opinion Zoraster had contemplated upon the sacred trinity of philosophy, God, man and religion, which earns him a place in the history of metaphysics besides his religious position as the founder of a religion.

The metaphysics of Zoraster takes a start in the Aryan view of the presence of law and conflict in nature. Like all religious thinkers Zoraster had to explain the presence of evil in the world and reconcile it with the eternal goodness of God. He began by reducing the plurality of good and evil spirits into two unified principles of good and bad, the Ahuramazda and Druj-Ahriman respectively. His tendency towards monotheism carried him further and he proclaimed that these two principles
were in fact two aspects of the same primary being. This mixing up of the theological with the metaphysical in Zoraster's system, Iqbal points out led to an inherent weakness in the system. As according to Zoraster's system the good and evil are in constant struggle against each other, but his hypothesis of both being aspects of the Primary Being amounts to the Primary Being or God struggling against its own self. Among Zoraster's followers some believed in the independence of the spirits of good and evil, others maintained their unity. The Zendikes, the Magians, the Zarvanions and the Kiyumardhiyya were the several groups, who in the course of their speculations offered different explanation of the nature of the two original principles. 11

Iqbal assigns a place of importance to Zoraster, as a philosopher because:

"... from a metaphysical standpoint, he has made a profound suggestion in regard to the ultimate nature of reality."

"As a thinker he is worthy of great respect not only because he approached the problem of objective multiplicity in a philosophical spirit, but also because he endeavoured, having been led to metaphysical dualism, to reduce his primary Duality to higher unit."12

In Zoraster's conception of the universe as comprising of two departments of reality and non-reality, the former being the sum of good created by the beneficial spirit and the later springing from the hostile or evil spirit, as a result of which there is a consistent struggle between the two categories of existence, each trying to overcome the other, Iqbal sees the basis of his ethics. Man being a part of this struggle in the universe should struggle against darkness or
evil as it is light or goodness which will prevail in the end. The soul in Zorâster's view can attain to everlasting life by fighting against evil. The soul is also credited with freedom to choose between good and evil. Leaving out the details of Zorâster's views of the soul's nature, faculties and functions, we can sum up Iqbal's evaluation of him in the following points:

1) Zorâster tried to unite the ancient Iranian principles of good and evil or light and darkness into two basic principles, which are aspects of the same reality. This is an important metaphysical explanation of the presence of opposing tendencies.

2) The doctrine of the conflict and struggle of good against evil, initiated by Zorâster, had a far reaching effect on subsequent philosophy.

3) Assigning freedom of choice to the soul in its actions portrays Zorâster's ethical and psychological insight.

Iqbal himself was an advocate of man's ascent towards ethical perfection by his own effort and free will, earning immortality for his soul as a result.

Iqbal starts the 'Metaphysics of Persia' with Zorâster, as the basic tendencies in Zorâster's system have, in Iqbal's view, the germs of later Persian thought, rationalism as well as sufism. According to his analysis the only other important individual figures of pre-Islamic Persian though were Mañî and Mazdak. Mañî is a thinker of the third century A.D., about seven or eight hundred years after Zorâster. His system is an assertive attempt of the persian struggle for individualisation, against
the on coming influences of Buddhists from the east and Christians from the West. But in this process Mānī's system assimilated something of the Christian doctrine of redemption and the Buddhist 'Nirvāṇa'. The two principle of light and darkness in Zorastrian thought are maintained but as independent from each other Mānī also recognizes the eternity of space and earth. Darkness is the feminine principal in nature, in which the principles of evil were bidden, from which in the course of time the Devil or the principle of factivity emerged. This evil spirit of darkness attacks the kingdom of light and goodness, to ward of this attack the king of light created the primal man. In the conflict of the devil and primal man the later was completely venquished, and the triumphant evil mixed the elements of darkness and light. The universe was constructed from this mixture by the angels on the orders of the ruler of the domain of light. Mānī attributes the start of activity to darkness or evil. The cosmology of Mānī in Iqbāl's view show clear influence of the Christian doctrine of redemption as well as Kapila's account of the production of the universe by the hypothesis of three gunas, Sattwa (goodness), Tamas (darkness), and Rajas (motion or passions). In Iqbāl's opinion the important factor in Mānī system was:

"... Mānī was the first to venture the suggestion that the universe is due to the activity of the Devil, and hence essentially evil- a proposition which seems to me to be the only logical justification of a system which preaches renunciation as the guiding principles of life. In our own time Schopenhauer has been led to the same conclusion; though unlike Mānī, he supposes the principle of objectification or individuation: the 'sinful bent' of the will to life- to exist in the very nature of the Primal will and not independent of it."15

The third important step in the development of Persian
thought Iqbal thinks, was the philosophy of Mazdak in the
6th century A.D., that is immediately before the advent of
Islam. Mazdak was a materialist like his predecessors, but
he differed in two important aspects. Firstly in his view
the mixture of the good and evil or light and darkness as well
as their separation is accidental, and there is no choice
involved in it. Secondly, Mazdak believed in the equality of
all men.16

Iqbal’s view of the pre-Islamic Persian thought as a
whole is that it is an objective intellectual pursuit, in
his view:

"Nations as well as individuals in their intellec-
tual history, begin with the objective. Although
the moral fervour of Zoraster gave a spiritual
tone to his theory of the origin of things, yet the
net result of this period of Persian speculation
is nothing more than a materialistic dualism. The
principle of unity as a philosophical ground of
all that exists, is but dimly perceived at this
stage of intellectual evolution in Persia. The
controversy among the followers of Zoraster
indicates that the movement towards a monistic
conception of the universe had begun; but we
have, unfortunately, no evidence to make a positive
statement concerning the pantheistic tendencies of
pre-Islamic Persian thought."17

But Iqbal’s summation of the pre-Islamic Persian
thought indicates that he believes, that the basis of Panthe-
ism is manifestly there in the materialistic dualism of
Zoraster, Mani and Mazdak. Just as in the passage quoted ear-
lier, from his article on Al-Jilî’s views of the perfect man
and in his theory of knowledge expounded in the ‘Reconstruction
of Religious Thought in Islam’, (which will be discussed later)
Iqbal believed in the triad of knowledge yielding faculties
as well as of the process of intellectual development. At the
individual level learning starts with sense perception, next
comes reason, intellect or thought, while the final stage is that of intuition. At the group, communal, or national level too, the intellectual pursuits begin in objectivism and materialism, at a later stage when confidence or reliance on sense perception and materialistic explanation is shaken, rationalism and scepticism are the most popular thought systems. At the third stage come mysticism. Just as perception, intellect, and intuition are the three forms of knowledge yielding experiences, so are materialism, rationalism and mysticism three aspects of metaphysics. There is no logical or factual before and after in these aspects or manners of approaching reality, all three can flourish, simultaneously, or any one can dominate at a particular period of the cultural history of a people. However at this formative stage of his own thought and because of the nature of the work as a research rather than a creative contribution, Iqbal only analyses the important periods, philosophies, and attitude of important philosophers of Persia. In the course of which his earlier tendency towards mysticism becomes evident, but as will be seen, his leaning is towards mystic methodology and not mystic metaphysics.

3. Islamic Thought Through Persian Mind

After his short evaluation of the three main thinkers of pre-Islamic Persia (Zoraster, Mani, and Mazdak) Iqbal points out the possible confluence of the Persian, Greek, and Indian thought in the sixth and seventh century. But in his view the next important stage of Persian intellectual development is its exposure to the Muslim religion and Greek philosophy after the Arab conquest of Persia. From the very beginning of
the development of Islamic thought, however, the Persians are the forebearers in thought attitudes, as the Aryan mind is naturally more intellectualistic than the Semitic. The thesis that Iqbal develops from this point onwards is that, what developed as Islamic thought from the Mutasilites to the sufis is a continuous process of a nation's intellectual search and inquiry, which is essentially Persian, just as Christian scholasticism is Hellenic.

"... the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely semiticised, quietly converts Islam to his own Aryan habits of thought. In the west the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic religion — Christianity, and the result of the interpretation in both cases are strikingly similar. In each case the aim of the interpreting intellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed on the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to internalise the external."18

The process of regeneration of Persian thought however, according to Iqbal started under the impact of Greek thought introduced to it through Persian translations of Greek Philosophical works, and the early Muslim philosophers who with the exception of Al-Kindî (and Al-Fârābî), Arab and Turk respectively were mostly Iranians. Iqbal selects Ibn-Miskawaih and Ibn Sînâ as the notable examples of the hellenic trend of Islamic Persian thought. He does refer to their ignorance of philosophies of Aristotle and Plato, which is a well established historical fact now and agree to the presence of the neo-Platonic factors in their thought, but he thinks that they did have their share of original and creative contributions.

"It would, however, be unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their speculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of absurdities that
careless translators of Greek philosophy had introduced. They had largely to rethink the philosophers of Aristotle and Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at discovery, not exposition."19

But this effort at discovery though it intensified their philosophical insight, hindered the progress of creative thought, which however, started after a few centuries of intellectual labour in discriminating the true and false of the Hellinico as well as indigenous thought. Iqbal briefly explains the main factors in the thought systems of Ibn Miskawaih and Ibn Sina, bringing out the curious mixture of the Muslim dogma and Greek philosophy. This neo-Platonic Muslim thought, however, in Iqbal's view developed more or less independently from the purely Iranian.

"The old Iranian idea of the dualism of light and darkness does not act as a determining factor in the progress of Neo-Platonic ideas in Persia, which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They are therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the church of Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the theological controversies of Islam, burst out with redoubled force in later times to extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual achievements of the land of its birth."20

When a people become aware of their identity in the course of its exposure to foreign cultures, it asserts itself, and the assertion of identity comes in the form of subjectivism. This is what Iqbal attributes to be the basis of the emergence of Mu'tazila rationalism and scepticism, in philosophy and the Shuhaba and other related movements in literature of the Persian people. The Mu'tazila doctrine
of God's unity in the form of the identity of essence and attributes, Iqbal thinks, is a point shared by them with later pantheism. In fact in his view starting with rationalism, proceeding through the controversy of the rationalists and their opponents, the Asharites, and culminating in Pantheism, the Persian mind is going through a continuous process of internalising the rigid externality of absolute law. Rationalism breeds scepticism in one form or the other so did the Muta'azila rationalism, and it was the scepticism of the later Muta'azilites which prepared the ground for the emergence of sufism. The third form into which the assertive subjectivity of Persian thought evolved was, in Iqbal's view Ismailism, and the Ikhwan al-Isaf.

Ismailism was a curious blend of rationalism and authoritarianism, as it advocated the absolute authority of an infallible Imam as well as allowing free development of thought. Ismailian philosophical doctrines are in Iqbal's view a synthesis of all the contemporary thought systems, which they amalgamate with the Persian view of universe. They were the originators of stress on the allegorical interpretation of the Quran, which was later assimilated in the Sufi doctrines. But in between the Rationalistic and the purely dogmatic religious philosophy was the position of the Asharites, that developed as a reaction to rationalism, but bore the stamp of rationalism. The difference was only the difference of emphasis, the rationalists defended philosophy and reason, the Asharites defended religion, while the weapon of defence was the same on both sides, that is the dialectical method.
"The orthodox reaction led by the Asharites then was, in reality, nothing more than the transfer of dialectic method to the defence of the authority of Divine Revelation."23

Another attempt at the harmonizing of reason and revelation was made by the Māturīdīs, in the course of all these efforts, developed metaphysical systems like the Asharite Atomism, and the systems of Baqillānī and Ghazālī. In Ghazālī's thought:

"... sufi Pantheism and the Asharite dogma of personality appear to harmonise together..."24

The purely intellectual contribution of the Asharite philosophy particularly Ghazālī's, had in Iqbal's view two important aspects:

1) "It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy..."

2) "In the beginning of the 10th century, when the Asharite had almost completely demolished the stronghold of rationalism, we see a tendency towards what may be called Persian positivism. Al-Bīrūnī (d. 1048) and Ibn Haitham (d. 1038) who anticipated modern psychology in Recognising what is called reaction time gave up all inquiry concerning the nature of the supersensual, and maintained a prudent silence about religious matters. Such a state could have existed, but could not have been logically justified before Al-Ashārī."

These remarks of Iqbal indicate a view of the history of muslim thought, which is different from that commonly taken by the orientalists. What the European historians calls Islamic thought i.e. from the Mutazilites to Ghazali and Ibn Rushd is in Iqbal's view only a phase of muslim thought, an important but a formative stage of its development. Iqbal takes an account of its later development, namely the controversy between Idealism and Realism. According to the Asharite idealists, existence is relative to the perciever, while their
opponents, whom Iqbal calls the Realist, maintain the objective view of existence. Iqbal explains the Realist's position in the light of Al-Katibi's 'Hikmat al-Ain', comparing it to the Asharite position, his own remarks on the controversy are, however, what are important for our purpose here.

"The truth is that both sides are far from a true theory of knowledge. The agnostic realist who holds that behind the phenomenal qualities of a thing, there is an essence operating as their cause is guilty of a glaring contradiction. He holds that underlying the thing there is an 'unknowable' essence or substratum which is known to exist. The Asharite idealist, on the other hand, misunderstood the process of knowledge. He ignores the mental activity involved in the act of knowledge; and looks upon perceptions as mere presentations which are determined as he says, by God. But if the order of presentations requires a cause to account for it, why should not that cause be sought in the original constitution of matter as Locke did. Moreover, the theory that knowledge is a mere passive perception or awareness of what is presented leads to certain inadmissible conclusions which the Asharite never thought of:

a) They did not see that their purely subjective conception of knowledge swept away all possibility of error. If the existence of a thing is merely the fact of its being presented, there is no reason why it should be cognised as different from what it actually is.

b) They did not see that on their theory of knowledge our fellow beings, like other elements of physical order, would have no higher reality than mere states of my consciousness.

c) If knowledge is a mere receptivity of presentations, God, who, as cause of presentations, is active in regard to the act of our knowledge, must not be aware of our presentations. From the Asharite point of view this conclusion is fatal to their whole position. They cannot say that presentations, on their causing to be my presentations, continue to be presentations to God's consciousness." 26

It is, however, in his exposition of the origin and development of sufism that Iqbal's own thought attitudes and his analytical genius is fully portrayed. He starts by
criticising the attribution of generalised principles of
influence to thought systems. Inspite of the historical value
of comparative and interdiciplinary research, Iqbal observes:

"... the human mind possesses an independent
individuality, and acting on its own initia-
tive, can gradually evolve out of itself, truth
which may have been anticipated by other minds
ages ago. No idea can seize a people's soul
unless, in some sense, it is the people's own.
External influences may wake it from its deep
unconscious slumber; but they cannot so to speak
create it out of nothing." 27

In Iqbal's view the prevailing conditions in the then
Islamic world (2nd and 3rd century A.H./ 8th and 9th century
A.D.) were the cause of the emergence of sufism. These
circumstances are categorised by him as:

i) "Political unrest.

ii) The sceptical tendencies of Islamic Rationalism.

iii) The unemotional piety of the various schools
of Islamic law or jurisprudence.

iv) The religious discussions among the representa-
tives of various creeds, particularly the
bitter controversy between the Asharite and
the Rationalists.

v) The gradual softening of religious fervency
and the rapid growth of wealth which tended
to produce moral laxity and indifference to
religious life.

vi) The presence of Christainity as a working
ideal." 28

4. The Sufi Alternative:

The complete unworldliness of the early Islamic
saints is in Iqbal's view an influence of the life of
christain hermits, which he thinks to be completely un-Islamic.
These factors, especially the last, one led to a desire of
the restatement of Islam, as the neo-Platonists had done in
case of Christainity. Christainity survived and over powered the neo-Platonic thought, because the later was more metaphysical and had no message for the masses. The case with Islamic mysticism or sufism was different because of its appeal to the masses, it survived all political and theological opposition. What seems to appeal most to Iqbal is the all embracing character of the sufi methodology. The semetics he explain, stress on the transformation of will, it is action that is important, the Aryan give more importance to thought, stressing on the transformation of understanding. The sufi takes up the whole of will and understanding, thought and action, into his concept of feeling. They synthesise the Aryan and the Semetic in their doctrine of love.

"Semetic religion is a code of strict rules of conduct; the indian vedanta, on the other hand, is a cold system of thought. Sufism avoids their incomplete psychology, and attempts to synthesise both the Semetic and Aryan formulas in the higher category of love. On the one hand it assimilates the Buddhist idea of Nirvana (Punah annihilation), and seeks to build a metaphysical system in the light of this idea, on the other hand it does not disconnect itself from Islam, and finds the justification of its views of the universe in the Quran. Like the geographical position of its home, it stands midway between the Semetic and the Aryan, assimilate ideas from both sides, and giving them the stamp of its own individuality which, on the whole, is more Aryan than Semetic in character. It would, therefore, be evident that the secret of the vitality of Sufism is the complete view of human nature upon which it is based. It has survived orthodox persecutions and political revolutions, because it appeals to human nature in its entirety, and while it concentrates its interest chiefly in a life of self denial, it allows free play to the speculative tendency as well."

Iqbal further explains the various aspects of sufi metaphysics. In the early Semitic phase of the time of Shaqiq Balkhi, Ibrahim Adham, and Rabia the ultimate reality
is conceived as 'Will'. This kind of sufism however, has an unworldly and pious life as its ideal and not a philosophical explanation of Reality. In the second phase which starts with Mārūf Karkhā's definition of sufism as "apprehension of Divine realities", sufism move from faith toward knowledge. At this stage reality is conceived as Beauty, which is the cause of all creation and the first creation is love. This view of the universe is held by prominent thinkers like Jalāl-al-dīn Rumī, Bayazīd of Bistām, Mansūr Hallaj and Nasafī. There are three basic ideas in this mode of thought, (a) the knowability of the ultimate reality through a supersensational state of consciousness; (b) the impersonal nature of ultimate reality, (c) and its uniqueness. The poet philosopher Ṭāhir Khayyām, the great scholastic Ibn Taimīya and the pluralist Wahīd Mahmood reacted to this mode of sufism. The pluralism of Wahīd Mahmood interests and involves Iqbal's attention as much as the sufi doctrine of love, as the two were to become a part of his own system in its final form, as we shall see later. The pluralism of Iqbal which is often compared to Leibniz's doctrine of the monads must have had the influence of Wahīd Mahmood.

"Long before Leibniz he taught that the universe is a combination of what he called 'Afrad'-essential units, or simple atoms which have existed free from all eternity, and are endowed with life. The law of the universe is an ascending perfection of elemental matter, continually passing from lower to higher forms determined by the kind of food which the fundamental units assimilate. Each period of his cosmogony comprises 8,000 years, and after eight such periods the world is decomposed, and the units recombine to construct a new universe."30

While the pluralism of Wahīd Mahmood interests Iqbal, the final and full exposition of his theories and the sect he
formed must have been less attractive and far from convincing, as Iqbal contends that the poet Hafiz of Shiraz belonged to this sect, and in his introduction to his poetical work Asrar-i-Khudi he severely criticized the adverse effects of the thought and literature of the type of Hafiz. In the third aspect of sufI metaphysics, that conceives reality as light or thought, Iqbal brings out the salient features of the systems of Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi, better known as Al-Ishraqi and Abdul Karim al-Jili. What Iqbal deems important in Ishraqi is his criticism of Aristotelian logic, adherence to which was the weakest point in Muslim thought.

"That a system of thoroughly Persian character might be possible, the destruction of foreign thought, or rather the weakening of its hold on the mind, was indispensable. The Asharite and other defenders of Islamic Dogma completed the destruction; Al-Ishraqi the child of emancipation came forward to build a new edifice of thought, though in his process of reconstruction, he did not entirely repudiate the older material. His is the genuine Persian brain which, undaunted by the threats of narrow minded authority asserts its right of free independent speculation. In his philosophy, the old Iranian tradition, which had found only a partial expression in the writings of the physician Al-Razi, Al-Ghazali and the Ismailia sect, endeavours to come to a final understanding with the philosophy of his predecessors and the theology of Islam."31

In al-Jili's system in which reality is conceived as thought, the idea of the perfect Man must have interested Iqbal. While exposing the doctrine of al-Jili, in reference to his 'Insan-al-Kamil' Iqbal recounts the author's conception of the three stages in the development of the pure Being, and corresponding to these the stages of the development of the Perfect man. Al-Jili defines knowledge as relation and on the basis of this he denies the knowledge of the essence of
God or Pure thought. The intellect in its urge to grasp pure thought passes through his names and attributes but fails to grasp the essence. The three stages that the Pure Being undergo are (a) Oneness, (b) He-ness (c) and I-ness:

"In the first stage there is an absence of all attributes and relations, yet it is called one, and therefore one-ness marks one step away from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is set free from all manifestations, while the third stage, I-ness, is nothing but an external manifestation of He-ness, or, as Hegel would say, it is the self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name Allah; here the darkness of Pure Being has become conscious. He says further that the name Allah is the stuff of all the perfections of the different phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure Being, all that is the result of Divine self diremption was potentially contained with the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third stage of the development, objectified itself, become a mirror in which God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the gloom of the Absolute Being."

"In correspondence with these three stages of the Absolutes, development, the Perfect Man has three stages of spiritual training. But in his case the process of development must be the reverse; because his is the process of ascent, while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is scaled; in the second stage he steps into the sphere of the attribute, and in the third stage enters the sphere of the Essence. It is here that he becomes the Perfect Man; his eye becomes the eye of God, his word the word of God, and his life the life of God—participates in the general life of Nature and 'sees into the life of things'. "32

It may be noticed here that Iqbāl's concept of the perfect Man is similar to al-Mālikī's only in the ultimate objective of becoming the God-Man, or viceregent of God, in details of the process of ascent; however the two thinkers differ (as will be seen later).
With al-Jīli Iqābal ends the account of the medieval Persian thought, and in his account of 'Later Persian Thought' he refers to the Persian Aristotelians Dastur Isfahāni, Hār Bud, Munir and Kāmrān travelling in India, and from this reference he skips over to the Persian Philosophical renaissance in the seventeenth century, with the appearance of Mullā Sadrā. Mullā Sadrā advocated the identity of the subject and object for true knowledge. Iqābal call this:

"...the final step which the Persian intellect took towards complete monism. It is, moreover, the philosophy of Sadrā which is the source of the metaphysics of early Bubism."33

In the philosophy of the eighteenth century thinker Mullā Hadī of Sabzawār the fundamental concepts are (i) the absolute unity of the Real as 'light', (ii) the idea of evolution (iii) and the idea of medium between the Absolute real and the not real.34

In Iqābal's view the Iranian intellect by its very nature drifted towards Platonism, from neo-Platonism, as the Platonic was more akin to their own subtle minds, as against the Spanish Arabs who preferred Aristotalianism, which was best suited to the practical semantic temperment. By this observation Iqābal is delineating his earlier position, i.e. of thought developing as a peculiarity of a particular people and their socio-cultural situation and by implication pointing out the fact, that it is necessary for Islamic culture to stick to one metaphysical or conceptual system for its justification. This is a very significant realization which has come into bold relief for the first time in Islamic thought.
Iqbal ends his account of the metaphysics of Persia with the religious movements of Bubism and Bahaism. In the metaphysics of these movements there is no distinction of substance and attribute in reality. For 'Ali Muhammad Bab:

"The first bounty of self-expansion of the ultimate Essence, he says, is existence."

"Existence" is the "Known", the "Known" is the essence of "Knowledge"; "Knowledge" is "Will", and "Will" is "Love"35

Bahauallah goes further:

"The Absolute Reality, according to him, is not a person; it is an eternal living Essence, to which we apply the epithets Truth and Love only because these are the highest conception known to us."36

We have seen how Iqbal starting with the pre-Islamic thought carries his thesis along the neo-Platonic Islamic thought of Persia and the controversies of Rationalism and Asharites, to sufism as a natural intellectual development of a people along with all sorts of external influences. Islam replaces the ancient Zoroastrian Dualism by a Monism, while the study of Greek thought introduces the analytic spirit in to it, which it lacked. This external influence awoke the subjectivity of the Persian mind, and eventually it developed its original Persian character. This becomes latent in the Ishraqi Philosophy in which the Greek dualism of God and matter is replaced by the Zoroastrian dualism of Darkness and Light, which is however in a spiritualistic form as compared to its earlier materialism. The philosophies of later times develope in a Platonic form. But the Persian objectivity and materialism asserts itself once more in Bubism. The basis of Iqbal's later criticism of sufi meta-
physics and otherworldliness can be seen in his concluding sentence about Bubism. In his view:

"The unmystic character and the practical tone of Bubism may have been a remote cause of the progress of recent political reform in Persia." 37

Although in the developing stage of Iqbal's thought he seems to have a leaning towards mysticism, as discussed earlier, this as will be seen, was an appreciation of the mystic methodology and not their metaphysics. His criticism of mysticism soon take the form of a continuous movement against it. When he realizes its harmfulness for human society. This is evident from the letters of the period after his return from Europe, and his next publication the 'Isrār-i-Khudā'. In his letter to Aslam Meerajpurī, dated the 17th of May 1979 he says:

"If mysticism (taṣawwuf) is taken as meaning sincerity of action, no muslim can object to it. In fact that was what it meant in its first phase. Though, when under Persian influence mysticism takes to discussing the phenomena of the universe and God, and tries to become a philosophy, my soul revolts against it." 38

In another letter addressed to Akbar Allāhābādī, dated 11th June 1918 it is observed:

"... I have expressed dis-satisfaction with their (Muḥiuddin Ibn al'Arabī and Mānsūr Ḥallāj) beliefs and ideas, if this is called materialism, then by God Almighty there can be no greater materialism than mine." 39

In his letter to Dr. Nicholson, after the later's publication of the translation of 'Isrār-i-Khudā' (Secrets of the Self) dated 24th January 1921, Iqbal opposes mysticism as a danger to man's individuality and his quest for immortality.
"... I look upon immortality as the highest aspiration of man on which he should focus all his energies, and consequently I recognize the need for all forms of activity, including conflict, which tend to make the human person more and more stable. And for the same consideration, I condemn speculative mysticism...""40

On the other hand Iqbāl is also dis-satisfied with Aristotelian rationalism. Both rationalism and mysticism seems to be partial views of reality which in his view is a whole to be understood by all manners of experience, including perception, reason, and the mystic experience or intuition. His criticism of speculative mysticism and Aristotalian Rationalism takes us to his later and final philosophical attitudes, scattered thorough his poetical works and expressed here and there in his letters, but systematically contained in the seven lectures, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.

5. Reconstruction of Thought:

In his systematic philosophical work, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Iqbāl emerges as a theistic pluralist, a spiritualist, and a rationalist. Iqbal's own contention that negation of opposing views comes before the emergence of any original or genuine thought system, is attempted at by him in the lectures of the Reconstruction. He negates platonic idealism and Aristotalian rationalism as well as neo-Platonic and mystical metaphysics and ethics, before the emergence of his own synthetic and dynamic rationalism. He agrees with idealism and mysticism about the spiritual nature of reality, but the spiritual nature of reality is not affirmed at the expense of the material. Instead of negating the material and the perceptual he affirms it, makes it a
necessary condition for the realisation of the spiritual, in a sense he spiritualizes it. Sense perception is as much a part of human knowledge as thought and reason; in fact it is the basic and starting point of human consciousness. The Platonic distrust of appearance which survived in various forms in medieval and modern thought is, in Iqbal's view, ungrounded. The Qur'anic teaching is much consistent with human experience, that is why the method of the Qur'an is inductive and fact oriented. Nothing in the universe, however insignificant it may be, should be undermined from the point of view of knowledge. And, in view of this importance of perceptive knowledge he criticizes platonic idealism and speculative mysticism. While he holds no grudge against the early religious form of sufism, which was in his view a necessary outcome of the circumstances, that is of political unrest and theological controversies. Of the later developed form of sufism he says:

"On its speculative side, which developed later, sufism is a form of free thought and in alliance with Rationalism. The emphasis that it laid on the distinction of 'Zahir' and 'Batin' (Appearance and Reality) created an attitude of indifference to all that applies to appearance and not to reality."44

Iqbal's realization of the importance of the material and the phenomenal as an essential part of reality leads him to the criticism of idealism and mysticism, but he is also critical of 'Materialism' as such. Traditional Materialism which has in Iqbal's view received a severe blow from Einstein's theory of relativity, is a false view of reality.

"The scientific view of nature as pure materiality is associated with the Newtonian view of space as an absolute void in which things are situated. This attitude of science has, no doubt, ensured its speedy progress; but
the bifurcation of a total experience into
two opposite domains of mind and matter has
today forced it, in view of its own domestic
difficulties, to consider, the problems which,
in the beginning of its career, it completely
ignored. The criticism of the foundations of
the mathematical sciences has fully disclosed
that the hypothesis of a pure materially,^2
as an endorsing stuff situated in an
absolute space, is unworkable."^3

Iqbal's criticism of Idealism and Materialism
reveals his rationalistic tendencies, but it is not an analy-
tical rationalism that Iqbal's philosophy portrays. He is
highly critical of it:

"Rationalism is essentially analysis and
consequently threatens to disintegrate
the communal thesis achieved by the force
of a religious idea."^4

These criticism of various views of reality reveals
Iqbal's total disagreement with, what he terms as 'hellanic
spirit' and its by products in Muslim and modern philosophy.
In its own spirit and methodology Iqbal's thought is
especially modern, in fact it has a stamp of the twentieth
century. Iqbal has his dis-agreements and agreements with
modern thinkers, which would be referred to in the course of
the exposition of the various aspects of his thought. But his
dis-agreement with Greek philosophers and their Muslim
adherents is total. In a sweeping manner he surveys and
rejects it as a whole.

The healthy effects of Greek philosophy on the deve-
lopment of Muslim thought and science is in Iqbal's view
totally over shadowed by the enormous hurdles it created in
the way of a Qur'anic oriented methodology. The philosophical
attitudes of the Greek thinkers were half truths at times
emphasizing one aspect and at times another. Socrates's
concentration on the human ignoring the rest of nature, Plato's restricting knowledge to the conceptual and the ideal are all explanations of reality very different from the Qurānic.

"... which regards 'hearing' and 'sight' as the most valuable Divine gifts and declares them to be accountable to God for their activity in this world."45

The Greek influence aroused a taste for discursive and conceptual thought due to which the early muslim thinkers undermined the importance of the concrete and factual basis of knowledge.

"It took them 200 years to perceive—though not clearly—that the spirit of the Qurān was essentially anti-classical, and the result of this perception was a kind of intellectual revolt the full significance of which has not been realised even to the present day."46

This revolt and criticism of hellenic thought took to extremes like the scepticism of Ghazālī, Iqbāl thinks that scepticism is neither helpful nor in accord with Islam, as religion being a code for practical life, needs a sounder methodology. But he is more critical of Ibn-Rushd's philosophy of the immortality of the active intellect which, he thinks, strikes the very foundation of religion.

Iqbāl is equally critical of the Mutaţalîtes and the Asharites, rationalists and fundamentalists, because he is opposed to reliance on the dialectical method which is common in all the early muslim thinkers.

"The Mutaţila conceiving religion merely as a body of doctrine and ignoring it as a vital fact, took no notice of non-conceptual modes of approaching Reality and reduced religion to a mere system of logical concepts ending in a purely negative attitude. They failed to see that in the domain of knowledge-scientific or religious-complete independence of thought from concrete experience is not possible."47
CHAPTER II

KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

1. Analysis of Experience:

Iqbal starts his first lecture in the 'Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam' entitled 'Knowledge and Religious Experience,' with questions about the structure of the universe, the presence of a permanent elements in it, and man's relation to and place in the universe. These questions about reality are the hypothesis of Metaphysics, which is concerned with Reality as a whole and not this or that aspect of reality. In Iqbal's view scientific inquiry is more precise and concrete and less controversial than the metaphysical because it deals with particular aspects of Reality. But inspite of its controversies and obscurities which having become much more explicit with the development of the sciences, metaphysics still remains to be a field of interest and inquiry. For it is the only subject that deals with reality scientifically and as a whole. Religion and higher poetry also approach reality as a whole, but this approach is not an approach of free inquiry, therefore, un-scientific as compared to metaphysics.

"The spirit of philosophy is that of free inquiry. It suspects all authority. Its function is to trace the uncritical assumptions of human thought to its hiding places and in this pursuit it may finally end in denial or frank admission of the incapacity of pure reason to reach the ultimate reality."

On this view Philosophy is an inquiry, a methodology, it has no specific subject matter, like the sciences. In this specific form as an inquiry into reality, philosophy is neither
alien to nor contrary to science or religion, or any other subject. In fact it helps in the interpretation of reality in its various aspect. But the method of philosophical inquiry is neither essentially rationalistic nor idealistic. A misconception of philosophy as purely rationalistic has led many to think that it is opposed to religion. Iqbal rejects this thesis, firstly, because philosophy though it is rationalistic is not confined to mere reason. Secondly, religion though it is based on faith is not opposed to reason. In fact:

"... faith is more than mere feeling, it has something like a cognitive content..."2

Philosophy adheres to the realities beyond the material and the physical, but that does not make it alien to science, both have their own fields of inquiry, the philosophical inquiry however, assimilate, though it does not elaborate, the scientific aspects of reality.

In a true spirit of its free inquiry philosophy should utilize all the various means of knowledge yielding experience including sense perception, reason and intuition. Epistemology or theory of knowledge is therefore, the most basic element of philosophy, and this is where Iqbal begins the exposition of his philosophical viewpoint in the 'Reconstruction'.

Man is endowed with the capacity to learn, and through his own effort mould the world and his own lot for the better. The basis of this effort is knowledge, man is obliged to take the initiative and:

"If he does not take the initiative, if he does not evolve the inner richness of his being, if he fails to see the onward push of advancing life, then the spirit within him hardens into stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter. But his life and the onward march of his spirit depend
on the establishment of connection with the reality that confronts him. It is knowledge that establishes these connexions, and knowledge is sense perception elaborated by understanding."

Observation, reflection, and conceptualization are the mutually inclusive and interdependent parts of man's knowledge experience. The Qurānic story of Adam points out at the basic nature of concepts and knowledge for man, it is said that Adam was taught the names of all things meaning thereby that man was endowed with the faculty of knowing through conceptualizing, Iqbal affirms the Quranic view of knowledge, distinguishing it from the Greek view of knowledge by its obvious and clear reference to perceptual observation.

"Thus the character of man's knowledge is conceptual, and it is with the weapon of this conceptual knowledge that man approaches the observable aspects of reality. The one noteworthy feature of the Quran is the emphasis that it lays on this observable aspect of reality."4

Sense perception is the starting and first step of knowledge, rational understanding, interpretation or analysis is the next. Without rational interpretation sense perception would be meaningless. But the rational or the intellectual is not the only way of knowing and interpreting reality. Philosophy, therefore, in its capacity as rational methodology can be applied to all truths for the sake of judgement, the truths of religion included. But the rational is only one of the methods of obtaining knowledge, not the sole and only method. Reason is a part of man's capacity not the whole. Besides sense-perception and reason, intuition or religious experience is also a knowledge yielding and apprehending faculty. It is a normal experience of the human mind, which
though not purely rational, has its rational aspect, and is in no way opposed or contradictory to rational knowledge.

"Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring from the same root and complement each other. The one grasps reality piecemeal, the other grasp it in its wideness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspects of Reality. The one is present enjoyment of the whole of Reality, the other aims at transversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive observation. Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life. In fact, intuition, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect."5

Bergson, in his 'Creative Evolution' gives an evolutionary description of intuition. The basic animal instinct, and its developed form in man's reflex and involuntary action, that is biological or physiological intuition is in his view, not the only form of intuition. There can be an ultra intellectual intuition. Refering to the symbolic nature of science in Kant's 'Critique of Pure reason', with appreciation, Bergson disagree with Kant about the sensuous intuition being the only kind of intuition.6 He argues that:

"... this would have to be admitted, indeed, if our sciences presented in all its parts an equal objectivity. But suppose, on the contrary, that science is less and less objective, more and more symbolical, as it goes from the physical to psychical, passing through the vital; then as it is indeed necessary to perceive a thing some how in order to symbolize it, there would be an intuition of the psychical, and: more generally of the vital, which the intellect would transfuse and translate, no doubt, but which would none the less transcend the intellect. There would be, in other words, a supra intellectual intuition. If this intuition exists, a taking position of the spirit itself is possible, and no longer only a knowledge that is external and phenomenal. What is more, if we have an intuition of this kind (I mean an ultra intellectual intuition) then sense intuition
is likely to be in continuity with it through certain intermediaries, as the infra red is continuous with the ultra violet. Sensous intution itself, therefore is promoted. It will no longer attain only the phantom of an unattainable thing-in-itself. It is (provided we bring to it certain indispensible correction) into the absolute itself that it will introduce us."

This conception of intution introduce new and limit-less dimensions for human knowledge, and it could not fail to attract Iqbal’s appreciation. Infact it is so much akin to his own view of knowledge, and the dynamic spirit of his thought that as far as theory of intution is concerned there is very little difference between Iqbal's and Bergson's. But the systems it is applied to are different. Iqbal makes it the faculty of religious or direct knowledge, and the basis of his metaphysical theology and ethics, while Bergson's metaphysics is oriented in natural science, particularly Physiology and Biology. It is the vitality and dynamism of Bergson's theories that appeal to Iqbal, since these are the characteristics of his own thought.

2. Intuitive Experience:

Iqbal's intution is in its cognative and immediate aspects similar to the mystic experience, but it is different in the sense that in Iqbal's view though not very common, this level of knowledge is attainable by all. He is also opposed to the affirmation of the mystical or intutional at the expense of the rational. In his view Ghazali's criticism of philosophy and his marking out of mystic experience as the only certain venue of knowledge, if adhered to is a hindrence to the development of knowledge, since mystic experience (on
this view) is beyond the reach of everybody except a few, Iqbal's own view of knowledge yielding faculties is more comprehensive, as it assimilate the rational and the mystical, the scientific and the philosophic in an organic manner. Referring to Ghazali he observes:

"He failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that thought must necessarily stimulate finitude and inconclusive- ness because of its alliance with serial time. The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge. It is the inadequacy of the logical understanding which finds a multi- plicity of mutually repellent individualities with no prospect of their ultimate reduction to a unity that makes us sceptical about the conclusiveness of thought in fact the logical understanding is incapable of seeing this multiplicity as a coherent universe. Its only method is generalization based on resemblances, but its generalizations are only fictitious unities which do not effect the realities of concrete thing. In its deeper movement, however, thought is capable of reaching an immanent infinite in whose, self unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments. In its essential nature, then thought is not static, it is dynamic and unfolds its internal infinitude in time like the seed which, from the very beginning carries within itself the organic unity of the tree as a present fact. Thought is, therefore, the whole in its dynamic self expression, appearing to the temporal vision as a series of definable specifications which cannot be understood except by a reciprocal reference. Their meaning lies not in their self identity, but in the larger whole of which they are the specific aspects."8

Although he did recognize the limitations of human reason, Iqbal had full confidence in human thought which could transgress its limits in his view. For this reason he is critical of both Ghazali and Kant, who though justified in criticizing sole reliance on reason, were mistaken in their conclusions. The larger whole of human thought is, Iqbal continues:
"... to use a Qur'anic metaphor, a kind of
'Preserved tablet', which holds up the
entire undermined possibilities of knowledge
as a present reality, revealing itself in
serial time as a succession of finite concepts
appearing to reach unity which is already
present in them. It is in fact the presence of
a total infinite in the movement of knowledge
that makes finite thinking possible. Both Kant
and Ghazali failed to see that thought, in the
very act of knowledge, passes beyond its own
finitude. The finitudes of Nature are recipro-
cally exclusive. Not so the finitude of thought
which is, in its essential nature, incapable of
limitations and cannot remain imprisoned
in the narrow circuit of its own individuality.
In the wide world beyond itself nothing is alien
to it. It is in its progressive participation
in the life of the apparently alien that thought
demolishes the walls of its finitude and enjoy
a potential infinitude. Its movement becomes
possible only because of the implicit presence in
its finite individuality of the infinite, which
keeps alive within it the flame of aspiration
and sustains it in its endless pursuit. It is a
mistake to regard thought as inconclusive, for
it too, in its own way, is a greeting of the
finite with the infinite."

Thus Iqbal's rationalization of knowledge assim-
lates the empirical, the psychological, the evolutionary, and
the religious aspects of the functions of the human mind.
'Religious experience' or 'Ultra intellectual intuition' to
use Bergson's terminology is in Iqbal's view a normal attain-
able level of experience, which has both its feeling and
cognitive aspects. Both these aspects are equally important,
the negligence of either results in piecemeal knowledge.
Religion based on faith is not alien to philosophy, but the
priorities are different.

The 'heart' or 'Qalb' which the Qur'an refers to, is
in Iqbal's view, a different faculty of grasping Reality, it
combines the immediacy and directness of senseperception
with the insight of the intellect, thereby becoming more
reliable than the other two. It aims at grasping reality as
a whole, while sense perception and reason both obtain
knowledge through parts of reality. Iqbal disagree with William
James and others that the 'religious experience' or 'intuition'
of reality is not at par with other levels of experience,
it is mystical and emotional rather than factual. For him:

"The facts of religious experience are facts
among other facts of human experience and, in
the capacity of yielding knowledge by inter-
pretation one fact is as good as another.
Nor is there any thing irreverent in critically
examining this level of experience."10

In Iqbal's view all the various aspects of knowledge
are different levels of human experience. Sense perception,
reason, and intuition are all normal ways of obtaining
knowledge. The psychic experiences are also experiences and
deserves consideration in an inquiry of the functions of the
human mind. Emphasizing the natural, and factual nature of
the mystic experience Iqbal innumerates five characteristics
of it.
a) Like other human experiences religious experience supply
data for knowledge. It is immediate as is characteristic of
all experience. Just as perception gives us immediate knowledge
of the external world mystic experience gives immediate
knowledge of God.
b) Next to its immediacy, the second characteristic of mystic
experience is its unanalysible wholeness. Unlike sense
perception and concepts, it cannot be split into parts. It is
a direct contact with reality in which the distinction of
subject and object obliterates.
c) The mystic state is a state of intimate association with a unique other self in which the private personality of the subject is transcended. Inspite of this transcendental element it is an objective state. It is passive in so far as the perceptive faculties are not involved. It is like the knowledge of the self.

d) The mystic experience cannot be communicated, as it is more like feeling than thought. The prophet or mystic can convey its interpretation to others but cannot transmit the contents.

e) The mystic state is only a momentary dissociation with the phenomenal world but it is not a total discontinuation with normal experience. It soon fades away bringing the subject back to the normal level of experience.  

In William James's view to which Iqbal has referred in his exposition of the characteristics of mystic experience, the four qualities of mysticism are, Ineffability, Noetic quality, Transiency, and passivity.  

The most important factor of Iqbal's thought is his view of all reality as dynamic. Therefore, he is in agreement with Bergson that a constantly changing or becoming reality cannot be grasped by the static means of sense perception and reason. Both of them opine that ways of knowledge should depend on reality rather than making reality dependent on methodology. The greatest error of the Western thinkers have been their stress on methodology as prior to reality and facts. Bergson in his 'Introduction to Metaphysics' observes:

"The inherent difficulties of Metaphysics, the antinomies which it gives rise to and the contradictions into which it falls, the division into antagonistic schools, and the
irreducible opposition between systems are largely the result of our applying, to the disinterested knowledge of the real, processes which we generally employ for practical ends. They arise from the fact that we place ourselves in the immobile in order to lie in wait for the moving thing as it passes, instead of replacing ourselves in the moving thing itself, in order to traverse with its immobile position."

While the errors of the west are considered to be an outcome of too much reliance on methodology, which leads to piecemeal and one sided interpretation, the eastern monistic methods lack dynamism. Iqbal appreciates and assimilate the eastern view of intuition, because of its capability to grasp reality as a whole, but he is highly critical of the static nature of eastern thought systems. His own thought is aimed at enlarging the capabilities of the human mind, and clearing it of stagnation on the one hand, and dependence on authority and apriori principles on the other. He aims at synthesizing the factual and concrete oriented eastern spirit with the Western urge for inquiry and scientific observation. In his view the method of the Qur'an has all these qualities which can provide the human mind with infinite and unlimited horizons. The Western dependence on Greek logic and its apriori principles lead to scepticism about the knowledge of the ultra intellectual realities like self, God, and the universe. Bergson's theory of intuition (quoted earlier) is a revolutionary idea, which according to Iqbal if rightly elaborated can lead to enlarging the human vision. But this theory while it remains ultra or extra intellectual in Bergson's evolutionary system, is in Iqbal's mind knitted into one whole with the rational intellect, feelings and cognition, passions and reason, all as parts of the larger whole of human experience.
Reason is needed to interpret and understand the nature of things, feelings and passions are needed to activate and motivate action. Action must be preceded by feelings, feelings that necessarily have a cognitive insight, otherwise, they fail to motivate action. Rational interpretation helps the vision of reality, while on the other hand rational interpretation is mere theory without feelings giving it the initiative:

"In all knowledge there is an element of passion, and the object of knowledge gains or loses objectivity with the rise and fall in the intensity of passion." 14

Iqbal's stress on the importance of the passions has led many to the illusion that he is antirational, which is a totally false interpretation of Iqbal. He does indicate the limits of pure reason, but his views remain rationalistic and intellectualistic. One obvious example of this is his criticism of Ghazali's scepticism about the knowledge yielding capacity of reason, mentioned earlier. In his view there are three main levels of experience, that is matter, life and consciousness, which are the subject matter of Physics, Biology, and Psychology. All the three levels are interdependent, sense perception as human experience is an interpretation of the evidence of the senses, therefore, it cannot be wholly material. For this reason the theories of physics often lead to and deal with ultra perceptual principles. The interdependence of these levels of experience lead to the fact that human being are organic wholes, therefore, mechanistic interpretations of human experience cannot explain its nature. Science cannot provide an adequate information about reality as a whole because of its mechanistic methods and specific fields.
"There is no doubt that the theories of science constitute trustworthy knowledge because they are verifiable and enable us to predict and control the events of Nature. But we must not forget that what is called science is not a single systematic view of Reality. It is a mass of sectional views of Reality—fragments of a total experience which do not seem to fit together. Natural science deals with matter, with life, and with mind; but the moment you ask the question how matter, life, and mind are mutually related, you begin to see the sectional character of the various sciences that deal with them and the inability of these sciences, taken singly, to furnish a complete answer to your question, infat the various natural sciences are like so many vultures falling on the deadbody of Nature, and each running away with a piece of its flesh. Nature as the subject of science is a highly artificial affair, and this artificiality is the result of that selective process to which sciences must subject her in their interests of precision. The moment you put the subject of science in the total human experience it begins to disclose a different character."

"Science seeks to establish uniformities of experience, i.e. the laws of mechanical repetition. Life with its intense feeling of spontaneity constitutes a centre of indetermination, and those fall outside the domain of necessity. Hence science cannot apprehend life."16

Inspite of this critical attitude towards science, Iqbal does not agree with the totally irrational view of reality like Bergson's. Bergson denies the purposive character of reality, while Iqbal's system remains teleological inspite of its creativity and vitality.

"... the vitalism of Bergson ends in an unsumountable dualism of will and thought. This is really due to the partial view of intelligence that he takes. Intelligence according to him, is a spatializing activity, it is shaped on matter alone, and has only mechanical categories at its disposal. But thought has a deeper movement also. While it appears to break up reality into static fragments, its real function is to synthesize the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to the various levels which experience presents. It is as much organic as life. The movement of life,
as an organic growth, involves a progressive synthesis of its various stages. Without this synthesis it will cease to be organic growth. It is determined by ends, and the presence of ends means that it is permeated by intelligence. Nor is the activity of intelligence possible without the presence of end. In conscious experience life and thought permeate each other. They form a unity. Thought therefore, in its true nature, is identical with life."17

Conscious experience is in Iqbal's view a creative dynamic flow, but unlike Bergson's 'Elan' it is throughout purposive.

"Life is only a series of acts of attention and an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious or unconscious. Even our acts of perceptions are determined by our immediate needs and purposes."

"... to live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them. Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands. We become by ceasing to be what we are, life is a passage through a series of deaths. But there is a system in the continuity of this passage. Its various stages, inspite of the apparently abrupt changes in our evaluation of things, are organically related to one another."18

In Iqbal's view than, knowledge is obtained through experience. All experience is real. The whole of our experience include perception, reason, and intuition. While these are the three levels of experience in which the faculties of sense perception, reason, and intuition are directed. Normally we acquire knowledge through sense perception and reason, but besides these two faculties there is a third faculty of intuition or religious experience.
This is less common than the other two, but as natural as them, and organically related to both. It is immediate like sense perception, cognitive and personal like reason. It has a cognitive as well as a feeling aspect. Due to the presence of feelings in its contents it is capable of leading to practical ends, which is beyond mere reason. Will and initiative are required for action, and what leads to will and initiative involves feelings or passion. The inner experience or man is an organic whole. And:

"... this inner experience is a source of knowledge according to the Quran, along with History and Nature."19

This being the theory of knowledge, the view of the nature of reality that Iqbal thinks is reached by inner experience and is spiritualistic and individualistic. It is as Iqbal describes it 'a rationally directed creative life'.20

3. The Nature of Reality:

Before putting forward his own theory of the nature of the Reality, Iqbal criticizes the traditional scholastic arguments for the existence of God. Iqbal argues that the religious experience, though it cannot be communicated, can be put to an intellectual test and by the intellectual test he means a:

"... critical interpretation, without any presuppositions of human experience, generally with a view to discover whether our interpretation leads us ultimately to a reality of the same character as is revealed by religious experience."21

Iqbal has two objections to the cosmological argument. a) It reaches the infinite by negating the finite and an infinite reached by negating the finite is a false infinite.
The true infinite does not exclude the finite.

"... it embraces the finite without effecting its finitude and explain and justifies its being." 22

b) To end the series of causation at a certain state, is negation of the law of causation and logically illegitimate. A law of necessary causation should have no particular point of termination.

The teleological argument is equally unsatisfactory to Iqbal. In an effort to know the cause from the effect, and arrive at the power and intelligence of God from the organizational and purposive characteristic of nature this argument arrive at:

"... a skillful external contriver working on a pre-existing dead and intractable material the elements of which are, by their own nature incapable of orderly structures and combinations." 23

The creative and administrative powers of God does not operate like human beings. He is a Being qualitatively and totally different, therefore, the teleological argument is considered un plausible by Iqbal.

To the ontological argument in its Cartesian form Iqbal objects because:

a) firstly the idea of a thing does not prove its existence. There is a wide gulp between the idea of a perfect Being in ones mind and the objective reality of that Being, which cannot be explained through this argument.

b) secondly, the ontological argument takes for granted the transition from the logical to the real. 25

Iqbal thinks that these arguments of the existence of God namely, the cosmological, the teleological and the onto-
logical arguments, fails because they take an external view of reality, in his view a more positive approach towards reality is:

"... to take thought not as a principle which organize and integrate its material from outside, but as a potency which is formative of the very being of its material. Thus regarded thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the essence of their being, infusing itself in them from the very beginning of their career and inspiring their onward march to a self-determined end."26

He agrees that in practical life the dualism of thought and being is inevitable. Our act of knowledge requires the splitting of its data into parts. For understanding the significance of the ontological and teleological arguments Iqbal considers a careful interpretation of experience necessary. Our experience, as mentioned earlier is unfolded at three levels, that is matter, life and mind. Through these levels of our experience we have the knowledge of reality, and these lead us to the same reality which we know through intuition.

"Intuition reveals life as a centralizing ego. This knowledge, however imperfect as giving us only a point of departure, is a direct revelation of the ultimate nature of Reality. Thus the facts of experience justify the inference that the ultimate nature of Reality is spiritual, and must be conceived as an ego."27

The mistake of the philosophers is that they apply concepts of one level of experience to other levels of experience. The concept of causation belongs to the level and sphere of the physical science, but the history of thought shows how often it has been applied to other aspects of reality, metaphysical as well as psychological. The researches of modern sciences, particularly, Physics and Biology has revealed that
the living organism is different than the material in its basic nature, so that the concepts of physical sciences, such as causation are not applicable to life and mind.

"The action of living organisms, initiated and planned in view of an end, is totally different to causal action. The subject matter of our inquiry, therefore, demands the concepts of 'end' and 'purpose', which act from within unlike the concept of cause which is external to the effect and acts from without. No doubt, there are aspects of the activity of a living organism which it shares with other objects of Nature. In the observation of these aspects the concepts of Physics and Chemistry would be needed, but the behaviour of the organism is essentially a matter of inheritance and incapable of sufficient explanations in the terms of molecular Physics." 28

Life is organically and factually a whole, the very nature of which is different from a machine. The reality of life in Iqbal's view can be explained only with reference to the phenomena of time. Like Bergson Iqbal lays a lot of importance on the reality and nature of time for the explanation of the phenomena of life. 29 We shall examine the social significance of this concept later. In relation to the revelation of one's own existence, and consequently of the nature of reality the concept of time, in Iqbal, plays a significant role. He arrives at this concept through the process of the knowledge of the self. Just as Descartes's search for certainty of knowledge led him to personal or human mind. 30 Iqbal's theory of the reality of inner knowledge leads him to the realiability of self consciousness.

"Now my perception of things that confront me is superficial and external; but my perception of my own self is internal, intimate and profound. It follows, therefore, that conscious experience is that privilaged case of existence in which we are in absolute contact with Reality, and an analysis
of this privileged case is likely to throw a flood of light on the ultimate meaning of existence."31

Conscious experience reveal the dynamic nature of the self and reality. Iqbal agrees with Bergson that inner life reveals a constantly changing reality.32 It reveals the importance of time:

"... there is noting static in my life; all is a consistent mobility, an unceasing flux of states, a perpetual flow in which there is no halt or resting place. Constant change however is unthinkable without time. On the analogy of our inner experience, then, conscious existence means life in time."33

The movement of the self is an outward movement from its centre. The essential features of the self are:

a) It has two sides the efficient and the appreciative.
b) The efficient side of the self is at work in and related to space. It is the side of the self that acts in practical daily life and is the object of the study of associationist psychology. It is the external side of the self, which is revealed in the successive states of life.
c) Accordingly, the efficient self lives in serial time, the time that is split into hours and days.
d) The appreciative side of the self is known only in the moments of profound meditation. At such a time dis-regarding the activity of the efficient self we sink in to the inner self.
e) The unity and wholeness of the appreciative self reveal the time, which is an eternal 'now'.

"... which the efficient self in its traffic with the world of space pulverizes into series of 'nows' like pearl bead in a thread. Here is then, pure duration unadulterated by space."34
Iqbal's conception of 'Time' will be discussed in
detail later on, here the point to emphasize is that movement
and change of the appreciative self or the ego is relevaht to
real time or 'Duration' and not to the spatialized time of the
efficient self. This pure 'Duration' is experienced through the
agency of the inner experience, which can hardly be explained
in time, however, one thing is definately certain about it,
and that is its essential organic unity, as the self that
experiences it. But Iqbal disagrees with Bergson's view of
'Duration' as prior to the self. In Iqbal's opinion the self
is the basic Reality, time is an inner possibility of the ego
or self. And this is how he reconcile the Qur'anic view of
destiny, and his own telological view with free movement of life,
and pure 'Duration':

"Time regarded as destiny forms the very essence
of things. As the Quran says: 'God created all
things and assigned to each its destiny.' The
destiny of a thing then is not an unrelenting
fate working from without like a task master; it
is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable
possibilities which lie within the depth of its
nature, and serially actualize themselves without
any feeling of external compulsion."35

The reality of time gives impetus and importance to
every moment in the life of Reality. Every single movement is
unique and original. Iqbal shows that the reality of time is
the reality of God's creation:

"Every day doth some new work employ Him,'
says the Quran. To exist in real time is not
to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but
to create it from moment to moment and to be
absolutely free and original in creation. In
fact all creative activity is free activity.
Creation is opposed to repetition which is
characteristic of mechanical action. That is why
it is impossible to explain the creative activity
of life in terms of mechanism."36
Thus Iqbal establishes the case of destiny as an open possibility of the self, and the activity of the self is conceived as free and teleological. With this different meaning of destiny the ego is free inspite of destiny. And in this freedom of activity the direction of its actions are shaped and reshaped. So on this view, our conscious experience reveal the nature of reality as a free creative movement. About the dynamism and vitalism of Reality, Iqbal agrees with Bergson, but this movement which in Bergson's view is without purpose or end, only the present carrying the past with it towards an unknown future, in Iqbal's view of the movement of Reality is onward looking. Iqbal faces the question of the nature of a thing, and defines it as an act.

"On the analogy of our conscious experience, then the universe is a free creative movement. But how can we conceive a movement independent of a concrete thing that moves? The answer is that the motion of 'thing' is derivative. We cannot derive movement from immobile things. If, for instance, we suppose material atoms, such as the atoms of Democritus, to be the original Reality, we must import movement into them from the outside as something alien to their nature. Whereas if we take movement as original, static things may be derived from it. In fact, physical science has reduced all things to movement. The essential nature of the atom in modern science is electricity and not something electrified. Apart from this, things are not given in immediate experience as things already possessing definite contours; for immediate experience is a continuity of Nature which thought spatializes and thus regards as mutually isolated for purpose of action. The universe that seems to us to be a collection of things is not a solid stuff occupying a void. It is not a thing but an act." 37

Conceiving things as acts, and conscious experience as teleological, Iqbal arrives at his essential point of the conneption of the ultimate Reality as a self. This self is prior to and basic to all existences.
"Neither pure space nor pure time can hold together the multiplicity of objects and events. It is the appreciative act of an enduring self only which can seize the multiplicity of duration-broken up into an infinity of instants—and transform it in to the organic wholeness of a synthesis. To exist in pure duration is to be a self, and to be a self is to be able to say 'I am', only that truly exists which can say 'I am'. It is the degree of 'I am ness' that determines the place of a thing in the scale of being."38

There is a rising note of 'I am ness' in beings. Man's 'I am ness' is not perfect as it is dependent on its relative position in the universe. God is the ultimate who is completely self subsisting. There is no confronting other to God's self. Nature which is a confronting other to us is organic to the ultimate self.

"Nature is to the Divine self as character is to the human self. In the picturesque phrase of the Quran it is the habit of Allah. From the human point of view it is an interpretation which, in our present situation, we put on the creative activity of the Absolute Ego."39

In this manner Iqbal spiritualizes and up-grades the material instead of despising it. The finite and material world is consequently due to its organic relation with its creator,
a) Liable to increase,
b) and boundless potentially, though factually finite.
c) therefore, "Nature, then, must be understood as a living organism whose growth has no final and external limits. Its only limit is external, i.e. the immanent self which animates and sustains the whole."

"In our observation of Nature we are virtually seeking a kind of intimacy with the Absolute Ego; and this is only another form of worship."

Conceiving the ultimate Reality as a self and an Ego, and referring to selfhood as a matter of degrees of 'I am ness'
that is individuality, and the further assimilating nature of the universe as organically related to the ultimate self, Iqbal synthesizes the whole gamut of existence into his spiritual conception of Reality, the most important and basic characteristic of which is selfhood, egohood or individuality.

"The more important regions of experience, examined with an eye on a synthetic view reveal, as the ultimate ground of all experience, a rationally directed creative will which we have found reasons to describe as an Ego." 41

Like the ultimate Reality the world of creation as proceeding from the free creative activity of the Ultimate Ego is also a colony of egos, which varies in the degree of individuality.

"I have conceived the ultimate Reality as an Ego; and I must add now that from the ultimate Ego only egos proceed." 42

The whole of the world from the lowest and simplest being to the complicated human mind is all a revelation of the ultimate Ego. There is a gradual rising note of egohood in the whole universe, which reaches a limited perfection in the human beings. Man's superiority to other beings in self consciousness or egohood signify his nearness to the Ultimate Ego.

The Ego is by nature,

a) Self centred,
b) Has a private centre of individuality,
c) Man's higher degree in the scale of egohood, has made him capable of participating in the creative life of the Ultimate Ego.
d) His creative capacity makes it possible for him to:
"... imagine a better world and to mould what is into what ought to be, the ego in him aspires, in the interests of an increasingly unique and comprehensive individuality, to exploit all the various environments on which he may be called upon to operate during the course of an endless career."43

This is Iqbal's conception of the nature of reality, in the light of which we can understand his philosophy of religion and society. We have seen that Iqbal's philosophy is a dynamic rationalism, he rationalizes the reality of the universe, human life, and sees a system in it which he attributes to the creative agency of the Ultimate Ego or God. In his rationalization he affirms the material and the multiple, but spiritualize it, and assimilates it in to a system,What are the qualities of the different grades of being? What are the Attributes of the Ultimate Ego? and what is the relation of man to the Ultimate Ego and his own functions and attributes? These are questains the answer to which forms Iqbal's philosophy of religion and society.
CHAPTER III
A NEW RATIONALE OF RELIGION

1. Religion:
Iq-bal's rationale of religion is essentially a philosophy of the relation of man to the ultimate Reality or God. It is a dynamic view of man's yearning for the Ultimate Reality. In line with his theory of knowledge, which is an organic whole of perception, reason and intuition, religious life is also divided into three periods, namely, faith, thought and discovery. These are the three periods or levels of the religious life of individuals or society. Man's aim being the realization of his age as an integral part of the Ultimate Reality which is possible only by achieving a free personality. Iqbal's adoption of the mystic experience or method and at the same time his criticism of the mystic metaphysics becomes clear. The mystic experience is possible only when man reaches the third phase of religious life, which of course is a conceptual phase rather than a temporal one. The three phases of religious life are delineated in the following manner:

a) The first phase or period of religious life appears as a form of discipline which a person accepts unconditionally. This is a period of dogmatic assertion and uncritical acceptance. Reflection on the nature of religion does not enter into this period. It is, in this period an 'unconditional command' without any rational understanding of the ultimate meaning and purpose of the command.

b) The second stage is of rational understanding of religion,
its principles, laws, and sources. This is a phase of the
development of metaphysics of religion.

c) Finally metaphysics is replaced by psychology, when an
urge to have a direct contact with reality is developed. This
is a stage of strengthening personality through religion. The
laws of religion become internalised in the depths of
consciousness.¹

This experience is named religions by Iqbal, and this
is in his view the form of experience which is above Kant's
criticism of the impossibility of metaphysics, which is
based on the assumption that the intellectual or the conceptual
is the only knowledge yielding experience. But for Iqbal the
mystic or the religious experience is an intuition of Reality
and is an experience similar to the perceptual and the
intellectual experiences. The error of Kant, according to Iqbal
is that he confines experience to the normal level of experience.
The mystic philosophers on the other hand observe that, God is
a percept and the world is a concept. This as well as the
view of the plurality of space-orders and time-orders, suggest
a possibility of forms of experience of Reality other than the
intellectual and the conceptual. The scientific mind, however,
due to its reliance on the existent and concrete may not accept
the validity of non-conceptual knowledge. Iqbal agrees that the
mystic experience is individual, personal and not communicable,
but this incommunicability does not harm its status as
experience for him.

He believes that the conservative and traditional
manner of the exposition of their views by the mystics has
harmed the real import of their theories. They (the mystics)
have tried to interpret their vital experience in a static manner, which has robbed it of its real import. Religion, in his view, needs to be supplanted by rational interpretation. The mystic's claim of the special and non-expressable nature of the religious experience leads to stagnation and scepticism. SirhindI, had subjected the mystic intellect to a psychological analysis, and this in Iqbal's view is essential for the purification of the religious and spiritual knowledge.

"No doubt the deed, i.e. the control of psychological and physiological processes with a view to tune up the ego for an immediate contact with the Ultimate Reality is, and cannot but be, individual in form and content, yet the deed, too, is liable to be socialized when others begin to live through it with a view to discover for themselves its effectiveness as a method of approaching the real. The evidence of religious experts in all ages and countries is that there are potential types of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness. If these types of consciousness open up possibilities of life-giving and knowledge yielding experience the question of the possibility of religion as a form of higher experience is a perfectly legitimate one and demands our serious attention."

Iqbal thinks that the modern man is facing a three fold dilemma and crises. The scientific and material progress of the west has instead of granting satisfaction to the minds of people, created a despair and hopelessness for the future. The people of the east have reached a hopeless state of affairs due to the impact of medieval mysticism, which by its doctrines of renunciation and resignation, stagnated the material and spiritual progress of the people. Atheistic socialism, which perhaps originated as a device to overcome the above two forms of despair, though broader in outlook than the other two approaches is, at the same time, a partial view of reality. All
the above mentioned approaches to reality are piecemeal and therefore, cannot fulfill the needs of man.

"Neither the technique of medieval mysticism nor nationalism nor atheistic socialism can cure the ills of a despairing humanity, surely the present moment is one of great crises in the history of modern culture. The modern world stands in need of biological renewal. And religion, which in its higher manifestation is neither dogma, nor priesthood, nor ritual, can alone ethically prepare the modern man for the burden of the great responsibility which the advancement of modern science necessarily involves, and restore to him that attitude of faith which makes him capable of winning a personality here and retaining it hereafter. It is only by rising to a fresh vision of his origin and future, his whence and whither, that man will eventually triumph over a society motivated by an inhuman competition, and a civilization which has lost its spiritual unity by its inner conflict of religious and political values."4

Iqbal's philosophy aims at the realization of man's personality the perfection of his ego. This aim can be achieved by obtaining a full view of reality, which is for him spiritual in nature. This spiritual nature of reality cannot be grasped by the intellectual or conceptual method of knowledge. Because the conceptual and the intellectual deals with bifurcated parts of reality and not reality as a whole. The spiritual and dynamic totality of reality can be realized by an ultra-intellectual religious experience or intuition. This process of religious experience starts with self affirmation and not self negation as the medieval mystic would have it. The aim of both science and religion is to reach an objective knowledge of reality. Iqbal is however, dis-satisfied with the existing attitudes of both, which lack objectivity. Science due to its undue reliance on first principles i.e. necessity of causal connections etc., and religion due to the mystic's attitude of negligence of the material world.
"... to both the way to pure objectivity lies through what may be called the purification of experience. In order to understand this we must make distinction between experience as a natural fact, significant of the normally observable behaviour of reality, and experience as significant of the inner nature of reality. As a natural fact it is explained in the light of its antecedents, psychological and physiological, as significant of the inner nature of reality we shall have to apply criteria of a different kind to clarify its meaning. In the domain of science we try to understand its meanings in reference to the external behaviour of reality, in the domain of religion we take it as representative of some kind of reality and try to discover its meanings in reference mainly to the inner nature of that reality. The scientific and the religious processes are in a sense parallel to each other. Both are really descriptions of the same world with this difference only that in the scientific process the ego's standpoint is necessarily exclusive, whereas in the religious process the ego integrates its competing tendencies and develops a single inclusive attitude resulting in a kind of synthetic transfiguration of his experiences. A careful study of the nature and purpose of these realy complementary processes shows that both of them are directed to the purification of experience in their respective spheres."

As instances of the attempts at purification of experience Iqbal includes Hume's criticism of causation and Einstein's mathematical view of the universe, as purifying the scientific process by relieving it from the concept of force which had so far been responsible for lack of objectivity in it. In the sphere of religious psychology Sirhindi's has been a considerable attempt at clarification. About the attitude of the practical student of religious psychology (of which Sirhindi is an example) Iqbal says:

"His sense of objectivity is as keen as that of the scientist in his own sphere of objectivity. He passes from experience to experience, not as a mere spectator, but as a critical sifter of experience who by the rules of peculiar technique, suited to his sphere of inquiry, endeavours to eliminate all subjective elements, psychological or physiological, in the content of his experience with a view finally to reach what is absolutely objective."
This final experience is the revelation of a new life-process—original, essential, spontaneous. The eternal secret of the ego is that the moment he reaches this final revelation he recognizes it as the ultimate root of his being without the slightest hesitation. Yet in the experience itself there is no mystery. Nor is there anything emotional in it. 6

But in the ego's quest of the eternal Iqbal realizes that there is the danger of involvement in the preceding experience and hence hinderance of progress towards the final experience. This is where the saints differ from the prophets, This danger was what led to the renunciation and resignation of the mystics, which in its turn became a factor in the decay of a whole society. This was the situation which prompted the reform movement of Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, which Iqbal notes with a probation repeatedly. Iqbal's synthetic and organic views prompt his desire for men well versed in the worldly and the spiritual disciplines, who alone can direct humanity to the right path. This view however is a part of Iqbal's social philosophy, but at the moment, the point to note is, that his philosophy makes religion a spiritual need for man. His dynamic approach to the problems of humanity diagnoses that the human ego proceed to and aims at being something, rather than seeing. He views the Kantian 'I can' as more fundamental for the ego, than the Cartesian 'I think', but he does not separate the two. In his system the 'I think' and the 'I am' are parts of the same process, or levels of the same experience. Neither of the two is the final stage however, the 'I can' is not to be confined to the ethical sphere, it is to be a continuous dynamic process. The ego's progress is a continuous dynamic movement which assimilates the different aspects, and stages,
without negating any. The perceptive and the intellectual, thought and emotions, ideas and deeds are all integrated into the final aim of the ego.

"The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of personality, it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it. The final act is not an 'intellectual act', but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made or remade by continuous action. It is a moment of supreme bliss and also a moment of greatest trial for the ego." 7

The Ultimate Reality or God, which is the final aim of the ego's quest, has to be known through the religious experience not through conceptual proofs, but as the directive and creative power beyond the whole universe.

2. Conception of God:

With the contention that religious truth can be intellectually verified, and the idea of God as the Ultimate Ego, and as a creative directive force, Iqbal faces the problems of the Attributes of God. In his view the basic Attribute of God is individuality, the other attributes are Creativeness, Knowledge, Omnipotence and Eternity.

The ego or self being the nucleus of Iqbal's thought system, and individuality being the basic quality of the ego, he agrees with Bergson's view of individuality, that:

"While the tendency to individuate is everywhere present in the organized world, it is always opposed by the tendency towards reproduction. For the individuality to be perfect, it would be necessary that no detached part of the organism could live separately. But then reproduction would be impossible. For what is reproduction but the building up of a new organism with a detached fragment of the old? Individuality, therefore, harbours its own enemy at home." 8
Iqbal goes further than Bergson, starting from the same thesis of the tendency to individuate, he conceives of God as the perfect 'Individual', while the rest of the egos including human ego are striving towards individuality, which reaches relative perfection in human beings. God is the perfect individual, who in the words of the Qur'an:

" 1. Say: He is Allah the One!

2. Allah, the eternally be sought of all,

3. He begotteth not nor was begotten,

4. And there is none comparable to Him.”

In Iqbal's view the tendency to escape from individualistic conception of God, in religious thought is due to the narrow view of 'Individuality' on the analogy of the human and finite individuality. In order to overcome the difficulty arising from the association of finitude with individuality, religious scholars tend towards a non-individualistic view of God. In fact it is our conception of finitude that needs to be changed. Our being used to view finitude and infinity in the context of space-time. With the change of the conception of space and time with the advance of science, which defines 'nature' as a 'structure of interrelated events', it has become easier to understand the nature of God's infinity as something different than the spatial temporal infinity we conceive of ordinarily. In Iqbal's view:

"Space and time are the possibilities of the Ego, only partially realized in the shape of our mathematical space and time. Beyond Him and apart from His creative activity, there is neither time nor space to close Him off in reference to other egos. The infinity of the Ultimate Ego consists in infinite inner possibilities of His creative
activity of which the universe, as known to us, is only a partial expression. In one word, God's infinity is intensive, not extensive. It involves an infinite series, but is not that series. 10

God's other attributes such as Creativeness, knowledge, Omnipotence and Eternity are inter-related and closely linked to His individuality. Iqbal's views seem to be based on two basic and important ideas:

a) that God's attributes should not be conceived on the analogy of our own imperfect qualities,

b) all the attributes form an organic whole in the Person of God, and are mutually interdependent.

If these two points are kept in view, it would be easy to escape from the conception of God's Creation and knowledge as something like the creation and knowledge of finite minds. The creations and inventions of the finite human minds, once created have no organic relation with the minds that created it, but Divine Creation is different. The universe does not exist as independent other. God's Creation, that is the universe is an integral part of the creative energy of God. God's creative act and His knowledge are organically related. He knows the things He creates, and Creates when He knows. Concerning the universe as a separate entity with reference to time, space, and matter is only an intellectual interpretation of reality and not the reality itself. It was by confusing these interpretations with reality itself that the Aristotalian philosophers amongst the muslims, in Iqbal's view, were led to the co-eternity of matter with God. Iqbal prefers the Asharite atomism to the static hellenic
view of the universe, because it is more dynamic and in line with the Qur'anic conception. But though a step in the right direction, the Ash'arite atomism for Iqbal falls short of a true Qur'anic view of Reality, because their system retained the purely objective nature of Greek thought. Due to their purely objective attitude, they were held back from reaching a dynamic view of time, therefore falling back on materialism, because of their incorrect view of time. In Iqbal's view:

"It is obvious that motion is inconcievable without time. And since time comes from Psychic life, the latter is more fundamental than motion. No psychic life no time: no time, no motion." 11

Closely knit with God's attribute of Creativity is His attribute of knowledge. In this respect too difficulties arises when on the analogy of our own knowledge, we limit this concept to discursive knowledge. Discursive knowledge involve the duality of the knower and the known. God's knowledge cannot be understood as knowledge of this kind because:

"In this sense knowledge, even if we extend it to the point of Omniscience, must always remain relative to its confronting 'other' and cannot, therefore, be predicated, of the Ultimate Ego who, being all inclusive, cannot be conceived as having a perspective like the finite ego. The universe, as we have seen before, is not an 'other' existing per se in opposition to God. It is only when we look at the act of creation as a specific event in the life-history of God that the universe appears as an independent 'other'. From the stand point of the all-inclusive Ego there is no 'other'. In Him thought and deed, the act of knowing and the act of creating, are identical." 12

Iqbal thinks that the difficulty about grasping the Ultimate Reality as an ego is due to our reliance on logical principles, which leads us to the presence of a non ego as a necessity for an ego's existence. He argues that positive
concepts should be based on experience and not logical principles. And:

"Our criticism of experience reveals the Ultimate Reality to be a rationally directed life which, in view of our experience of life, cannot be conceived except as an organic whole, as something closely knit together and possessing a central point of reference." 13

On this view the only possible explanation of the Ultimate life is as an ego. The Ultimate Ego's Attribute of Knowledge cannot be discursive knowledge because in His self the knower and the known cannot be bifurcated. We call it knowledge because we do not possess a suitable term to apply to it. And for want of a better term, Divine knowledge is called Omniscience, which signifies its unity and immediacy. Discursive knowledge and Omniscience are the two conceptions of knowledge, which are criticised by Iqbal. Just as discursive knowledge cannot be applicable to God, because it involves a subject-object relationship, he has his objection to the concept of Omniscience too. He agrees to its containing more truth than the notion of discursive knowledge, but it lacks dynamism and leads to a deterministic world view, which is not acceptable to Iqbal.

"Divine knowledge must be conceived as a living creative activity to which the objects that appear to exist in their own right are organically related. But conceiving God's knowledge as a kind of reflecting mirror, we no doubt save his fore-knowledge of future events, but at the expense of His freedom. The future certainly pre-exists as an open possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines." 14

The idea of freedom takes us to God's Attribute of Omnipotence, a point which has been exhaustively discussed in the age long theological controversies. The most important
point about God's Omnipotence is the relation of human free will with it. Iqbal upheld both God's Omnipotence and human freewill.

"No doubt, the emergence of egos endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a limitation on the freedom of the all inclusive Ego. But this limitation is not externally imposed. It is born out of His own creative freedom whereby He has chosen finite egos to be participators of His life, power, and freedom."15

3. Free Will:

Iqbal elaborates upon his concept of free will by rationalizing the Quranic narration of the birth of Adam. Iqbal sees in this narration the rise of man from a primitive state to the status of self conscious being possessing free will.

"... the Quranic legend of the fall has nothing to do with the first appearance of man on this planet. Its purpose is rather to indicate man's rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and disobedience. The 'Fall' does not mean any moral depravity, it is man's transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of self-consciousness, a kind of waking from the dream of nature with a throb of personal causality in one's own being."16

In disobeying God, Adam excersized his free will which signified man's capability to choose his course of action. In Iqbal's view goodness means choosing the right course of action. Free will is essential for the moral judgement, but it can lead to the bad or wrong action as much as the good one. This is the characteristic of man, who has been created:

"... of the 'goodliest fibre' and then 'brought down to be the lowest of the low'. As the Quran says: 'And for trial will We test you with evil and with good (21:36). Good and evil, therefore,
though opposites must fall within the same whole. There is no such thing as an isolated fact; for facts are systematic wholes the elements of which must be understood by mutual reference. Logical judgement separates the elements of a fact only to reveal their interdependence."17

Thus Iqbal\textquotesingle assimilates in his concept of free will, God\textquotesingle s Omnipotence, man\textquotesingle s capability to choose and decide, and the existence of evil. His account of man\textquotesingle s will to choose between good and evil is reminiscent of Kant\textquotesingle s, differenciation between \textquoteleft goodwill\textquoteright and \textquoteleft holy will\textquoteright 18 and his accomodative approach towards evil brings to mind Liebniz\textquotesingle s \textquoteleft necessary evil\textquoteright 19, but in fact his position is much different on these issues. The origin of his organic and dynamic approach is rather oriented in Muslim thought, particularly Ahmad Sirhind\textquotesingle s position about the existence of evil.20

As God\textquotesingle s Attributes of Omnipotence, Creativity, and Knowledge are organically related, so is man\textquotesingle s attribute of free will, closely akin to his quest for knowledge. Man\textquotesingle s creation or emergence from a primitive stage besides resulting in his free will, involves the capacity and the urge for knowledge. This, Iqbal illustrates by reference to the Quranic story of Adam. Knowledge and self multiplication are portrayed as man\textquotesingle s two basic desires in the Quranic narration.

\textquoteleft The first episode in the Quranic legend relates to man\textquotesingle s desire for knowledge, the second to his desire for self multiplication and power.\textquoteright 21

As to the fact of Adam being forbidden to taste the fruit of the tree of knowledge, Iqbal explains that:
"... his finitude as a self, his sense-equipment, and his intellectual faculties were, on the whole, attuned to a different type of knowledge, i.e. the type of knowledge that necessitates the toil of patient observation and admits only of slow accumulation. Satan, however, persuaded him to eat the forbidden fruit of occult knowledge and Adam yielded, not because he was elementally wicked, but because being 'hasty' (ajul) by nature he sought the short cut to knowledge. The only way to correct this tendency was to place him in an environment which, however painful, was better suited to the unfolding of his intellectual faculties. Thus Adam's insertion into a painful physical environment was not meant as a punishment; it was meant rather to defeat the object of Satan who, as an enemy of man, diplomatically tried to keep him ignorant of the joy of perpetual growth and expansion. But the life of a finite ego in an abstraining environment depends on the perpetual expansion of knowledge based on actual experience. And the experience of a finite ego to whom several possibilities are open expands only by method of trial and error. Therefore, error which may be described as a kind of intellectual evil is an indispensable factor in the building up of experience."22

These observations of Iqbal reveal that free will and urge for knowledge are natural to man. God's Omnipotence and man's freedom of the will do not conflict, because God has created man after His own image, and endowed him with a free will to choose. He has chosen that man should be participant of His 'life, power, and freedom'.

Iqbal, is so firm about man's free will, and its basic nature for personality that he observes:

"God himself cannot feel, judge and choose for me when more than one course of action are open to me."23

Free will is essential to the concept Iqbal has of man's place in the universe and his relation with the Ultimate Ego the universe, and his own society. It is the basic component
of the organic whole of the individuality of the human ego. Islam creates in man a sense of responsibility, endowed with a personality, that is capable of changing its own self, as well as the environment around. Man's freedom is his initial power to adopt and perform his responsibility.

"The truth is that Islam looks upon the universe as a reality and consequently recognises as reality all that is in it. Sin, pain, sorrow, struggle are certainly real, but Islam teaches that evil is not essential to the universe, the universe can be reformed, the elements of sin and evil can be gradually eliminated. All that is in the universe is God's and the seemingly destructive forces of nature become sources of life, if properly controlled by man, who is endowed with the power to understand and control them." 24

This being the nature of Islamic view of reality, man has to overcome the fear of the forces of nature, and all that is alien to his personality. Which in turn is only possible if he has the power to will and act freely. In Iqbal's view the world views of other religions recognize only part of the reality of universe and man. Buddhism stress on pain in nature, and the evil side of man so as to prepare the way of escape and ascetism against active social life, Christianity burdens man with the original sin, while Zorastrianism recognizes the struggle between the forces of good and evil as the basic reality. Islam recognizes all these factors as parts of a larger whole, in which God's Omnipotence is supplemented by man's free will, granted by or created by God Himself, so as to enable man to achieve his moral spiritual ideal through his own effort. Man's ignorance give rise to fear, but a knowledge of his own free nature, and God's Omnipotence leads to the assertion of his personality
and individuality, so as to enable him to strive, and exercise his power and energy.

"The central proposition which regulates the structure of Islam, then, is that there is fear in nature, and the object of Islam is to free man from fear. This view of the universe indicates also the Islamic view of the metaphysical nature of man. If fear is the force which dominates man and counteracts his ethical progress, man must be regarded as a unit of force, an energy, a will, a germ of infinite power, the gradual unfoldment of which must be the object of all human activity. The essential nature of man, then, consists in will, not intellect or understanding." 25

Iqbal's philosophy is essentially the philosophy of the self, which is dynamic, and vital, for its dynamism, freedom is essential. For will precedes the act, and particularly when the act is a 'free creative act', which is Iqbal's conception of it, as against the mechanical or impulsive flow of energy, of the materialists and Bergson. He conceives human actions as moral actions, interweaving the metaphysical and the ethical parts of human nature into one organic and dynamic whole. The dynamic view of man's nature and actions, so forcefully and vitally present in the spirit of modern culture, was first profounded by Islam. Islam made man a free responsible agent.

"... Islam, so to speak, transmutes the moral values of the ancient world, and declares the preservation, intensification of the sense of human personality to be the ultimate ground of all ethical activity. Man is a free responsible being, he is the maker of his destiny, his salvation is his own business. There is no mediator between God and man. God is the birthright of every man." 26
This view of Man's position in the universe and his direct relation with God or the Ultimate Ego, is impossible without man's freedom of the will. So freewill, individuality, and immortality, are the basic characteristics of the human self or ego. A consideration of Iqbal's view of the human ego, and society, however, takes us to the sphere of his social thought, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
MAN AND SOCIETY

1. Self or Ego, The Basis of Society:

Society in Iqbal is conceived as a Colony of ego's each ego enjoying a degree of freedom commensurate to its perfection. Hence an understanding of the nature of the ego, or self is a sine qua non for an understanding of the nature of society and the principles of its growth.

Man and self or ego is the central figure in Iqbal's philosophy. In fact the purpose of philosophy and religion both, is in Iqbal's view, to deliberate on man's position in relation to God and other human beings. The first important thing about 'Man' in Iqbal is explained in the light of the Quranic story of man, the central figure in the world of creation, subordinate only to God Himself. Man is endowed with personality, he is the chosen one of God, His representative on earth, and the trustee of a free personality. Islam has emphasized the reality and importance of man's self. Muslim philosophy under the impact of Greek thought payed scarcely any attention to this important aspect. Man's uniqueness and individuality is portrayed by Iqbal in his concept of the ego or the self. And the basis of the knowledge of the ego is experience.

Since ego is the fundamental concept of the view of society that Iqbal has expounded, an account of the nature of the ego is essential even at the cost of some repetition. The ego's characteristics, as real finite centre of experience (even though their reality is too profound to be intellectualized), are as follows:
a) Unity,
b) Individuality
c) Freedom,
d) Immorality.

a) Unity!

The discussion about the concept of the ego's unity, is faintly reminiscent of Waliullâh's discussion on the same subject.¹ The nature of the argument, here is discursive. By applying the rationalistic methodology, Iqâbâl reaches the underlying unique concept of unity which can be grasped through an act of understanding, which may be termed as intellectual intution.

Let us now see how Iqâbâl conceive the concept of the unity of consciousness, which is one of the most important aspect of the philosophy of Iqâbâl.

i) Experience show that the ego is a unity of mental states.
ii) These mental states are not isolated, but involve each other in the complete whole, the mind.
iii) The unity of the mental states is organic and unique. The parts of which cannot exist isolated from each other.
iv) The ego's unity is private, and every ego is unique in itself.

These aspects of the ego's unity are expressed:

"... by the word 'I', and it is here that the great problem of psychology begins to appear. What is the nature of the 'I'?"²

We have seen earlier that God's basic Attribute is His individuality,³ so is the case with man. Psychology by applying the method of scientific analysis does realize that the 'mind' or 'self' is a unity and privacy, but the nature of
this unity cannot be known through the intellectual analytical methods, Iqbal believes that the nature of the 'self' or the 'I' is known through inner experience, that is through intuition, since an organic unity cannot be understood by splitting it into parts:

"We cannot say that one of my belief is situated on the right or left of my other belief. Nor is it possible to say that my appreciation of the beauty of the Taj varies with my distance from Agra. My thought of space is not spatially related to space." 5

Iqbal thinks that the ego can think of more than one space orders and the immediate example of this fact according to him are the space consciousness of dreams and of waking consciousness which are not mutually related nor do they interfere with each other. Iqbal concludes then that:

"The ego, therefore, is not space bound in the sense in which the body is space bound." 6

The same is true with time, with the difference that for Iqbal true time or duration belong to the ego alone and this true time has nothing to do with the perceptual time, that we notice in the events of the physical world.

"Again mental and physical events are both in time, but the time-space of the ego is fundamentally different to the time-space of the physical event. The duration of the physical event is stretched out in space as a present fact; the ego's duration is concentrated within it and linked with its present and future in a unique manner. The formation of a physical event discloses certain marks which shows that it has passed through time duration;not time duration itself. True time duration belongs to the ego alone." 7

While discussing the concept of the unity of the ego, Iqbal takes notice of the nearly available and much talked
about theory of William James, of the 'stream of consciousness' which supposedly provides the basis of the unity of thought which Íqbal seems to be propounding. For James there are five characteristics of thought:

1) Every thought tends to be a part of a personal consciousness.

ii) Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.

iii) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.

iv) It always appears to deal with objects independently of itself.

v) It is interested in some parts of those objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects—chooses from among them, in a word—all the whole. 8

Elaborating upon and explaining the third of the five characteristics, that is the continuity of taught James draws the conclusion that:

"Consciousness, then does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it present itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is naturally described. In talking of it here after, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness or of subjective life." 9

May be with this much Íqbal could agree, but James goes further and says:

"But now there appears, even within the limits of the same self, and between thoughts of all of which alike have this same sense of belonging together, a kind of joining and separateness among the parts of which this statement seems to take no account." 10

James takes an account of these thoughts by adding:

"Let us call the resting places, the 'substantive parts', and the places of flight 'transitive parts',
of the stream of thought. It then appears that the main end of our thinking is at all times the attainment of some other substantive part than the one from which we have just been dislodged. And we may say that the main use of the transitive parts is to lead us from one substantive conclusion to another."11

In line with the conception of the unity of the self as an organic unity, of a special kind, Iqbal naturally disagreed with James stream of consciousness. In his view, we know or are conscious of the self, in fact we intute the self. About James's view he observes:

"This description of our mental life is extremely ingenious; but not, I venture to think, true to consciousness as we find it in ourselves. Consciousness is something single, presupposed in all mental life and not bits of consciousness, mutually reporting to one another. This view of consciousness, far from giving us any clue to the ego, entirely ignores the relatively permanent element in experience."12

B) Individuality:

The relatively permanent element in experience is the second point of Iqbal's characterization of the ego, that is to say the individuality of the ego. The concepts of unity and individuality of the ego, though at first sight seems contrary to each other. But for Iqbal, unity is not conceived in terms of monistic or pantheistic visions of reality. The unity is a deeper unity and in it is discernible the individuality of units comprising this unity. The ego is a unique personal whole.

The individuality of the ego does not transcend the multiplicity of experience, it is immanent in it Iqbal clarifies his position in this respect.

"I do not mean to say that the ego is over and above the mutually penetrating multiplicity we call experience. Inner experience is the ego at work. We appreciate the ego itself in the act of
percieving, judging and willing. The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environments and the environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as a directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience."13

This tension is very characteristic of the ego. In fact the ego's individuality is dynamic, it has to be preserved the ego itself, and this keeps the ego in constant tension. This tension is the very life of the ego. But unlike Bergson's 'Elan vital' the ego's tension is not blind impulse. It is cognitive and directive. For Iqbal the ego strives towards a future assimilating its past and present. Life is a unity for both Bergson and Iqbal, but Bergson's life impetus does not look forward to any thing.

"... the unity of life is to be found solely in the impetus that pushes it along the road of time, the unity is not in front but behind. The unity is derived from a vis a tergo; it is given at the start as an impulsion, not placed at the end as an attraction."14

Iqbal agrees with Bergson about the unity and dynamism of the self and the criticism of radical finalism and mechanism. But for him the unity is neither in the beginning nor at the end, it is within the ego itself. The activity of the ego is purposive.

"It is not the origin of thing that matters it is the capacity, the significance and the final reach of the emergent that matter."15

c) Freedom:

From here emerges the third characteristic of the ego, i.e. freedom. The ego's freedom for Iqbal is not perfected or final in its form. It is self organized and self disciplined.
It is not determined by causality nor is it totally self determined. It is free to a certain extent, but it is determined by its own capacity. But its reach and its possibilities are so high that the capacity is hardly ever exhausted. There is always possibility to go ahead. The ego is confronted by obstacles in its environment, but these obstacles neither direct, nor determine its activity. In fact:

"... the causal chain where in we try to find a place for the ego is itself an artificial construction of the ego for its own purposes. The ego is called upon to live in a complex environment, and he cannot maintain his life in it without reducing it to a system which would give his some kind of an assurance as to the behaviour of things around him. The view of the environment as a system of cause and effect is thus an indispensible instrument of the ego, and not a final expression of the nature of Reality. Indeed in interpreting nature in this way the ego understands and masters the environment and thereby acquires and amplifies its freedom."16

Bergson also believes in life's acting upon matter.

Life in Bergson's view, just as in Iqbal's is not pre-determined. There is a continuous dynamic activity of the ego which creates fresh ends for itself. But the freedom of life is not complete in Bergson's view of it, it is determined by the capacity of the original impetus. The choice of deliberation is rudimentary, because the actions are of the nature of contingency. Iqbal also believe in the unfixed nature of freedom. But the life impetus of Bergson seems to be something other than the self, some thing outside. Iqbal believes in an inner capacity to achieve freedom. For possession and mastery of the world, Iqbal argues, there are two ways the intellectual and the vital. The vital way emphasized by the Qur'an in the form of faith (imām)
is an experience, though a rare one. Through this experience the ego is capable of superseding its own capacity. Thus the freedom of the ego is created and evolved by the ego itself. In this process the will plays an important role. It is the ability of the ego to will that enables the ego to attain and assert its freedom. The will in its turn is evolved from desire. In the life of constant tension the ego creates fresh ends for itself through its desires and urges. In his Persian Makhmali, 'Iṣrār-i-Khudā' (the Secrets of the Self) Iqbal says:

"Life is latent in seeking,
It origin is hidden in desire,
Keep desire alive in thy heart,
Lest thy little dust becomes a tomb,
Desire is the soul of this world of hue and scent,
The nature of every thing is faithful to desire
Desire sets the heart dancing in the breast,
And by its glow the breast is made a bright mirror,
It gives the earth the power of souring,
It is a Khizr to the Moses of perception,
From the flame of desire the heart takes life,
And when it takes life, all dies that is not true."

The reality of the self is a fact, but all the interpretations of the self as will, activity etc., are inferences, they constitute part of the self. The unity of the self can be known through experience only. The intuition of the self is not a pouring gift from above, or any thing to be had by right. Iqbal's dynamism is consistent. The intuition of the self is to be had by an effort. We realise and know the self by decisiveness, action and deep feeling. But as characteristic of intuitive experience, the intuition of the self is difficult to be described fully and accurately. It is only imperfectly described by enumerating and having recourse to its activities. The characteristics of the ego, as far as they can be defined are
put forward in several of Iqбал's works. In the 'Secrets of the Self', these characteristics are explained and described chapter wise.

"1) The organisation of the world is from the ego. The continuation and strength of life is dependent on the ego.

ii) The life of the ego is from the creation and emergence of kinds.

iii) The self is further strengthened by love and deep feeling.

iv) Begging or asking from others weakens the self.

v) The self is strengthened by love and deep feelings conquer the latent and manifest forces of the phenomenal world.

vi) The self is disciplined and trained by going through three stages. The first stage is that of obedience, the second self control and the third is becoming God's vicregent." 19

These characteristics portray the ego as a life sustaining, dynamic whole, which is strengthened through one's own efforts. The ego creates its own ends, and strives towards achieving these ends, thereby fortifying its freedom. In this process desires and intentions make a headway. Desires are strongly felt in love (ishq), therefore, love strengthen the ego. 'Love' in Iqбал's view is a broad based concept, it's not mere affection, nor mere desire, it's a constant effort, and striving. 'Love' is a desire to assimilate and absorb the desired. The objective world is a reality, for the ego's subsistence and fortification, an environment is required for the ego to act in and act upon. The objective reality includes the mundane phenomenal world looked down by Plato and other 'Idealists'. Iqбал's pluralistic theism acknowledges the reality of the material world but unlike the materialists he spiritualises the material instead of materializing the spiritual. Every
thing that is, exist, and has a self or an ego, there is a
ggradation of the ego's in the world. Every ego is confronted
by a non-ego, which give impetus to the ego's activity. In
mastering the environment the ego's freedom is evident. In
directing and guiding its own activity the ego is a free agent.
In this manner the free ego, becomes a co-worker with the
Creator, that is the Ultimate Ego.

Iqbal derives the freedom of the finite ego from the
verses of the Qur'an that stress on the importance of the 'will'
and responsibility of the person in deciding the course of his
action. This conception of the ego confronted by non-egos
reminds of Bergson's description of life as well as Fichte's
conception of the ego.

Fichte ascribes a definite purpose to the world process.
Reason interprets the world by its own dialectical method. But
the fundamental 'deed act' is self consciousness. Which is a
means of searching for the Absolute. The philosopher's task
also starts with the analysis of self consciousness. There are
obstruction in the way of rational interpretation of the world.
Reason continues its process by solving and overcoming these
obstacles, and creating new ones. Thus the dialectics of
reason has three principles, that is thesis, antithesis and
synthesis.

"The thesis is the ego, the antithesis is the
non-ego; and the synthesis is the ego and the
non-ego united. But the dialectical process like
moral progress, is endless, for each synthesis in
turn becomes a new thesis which join its corres-
ponding non-ego in a new synthesis to repeat the
never ending process. The original thesis( the
starting point) is the person and his own conscious-
ness (the ego); the antithesis is the object of his
consciousness, that is the unification of these two
opposites in to subject-object(ego and non-ego).
This dialectical process continues until the Abso-
lute, the Universal Ego, has been attained." 20
Fichte views reality as dynamic, just as Iqbal does. The alienation of the environment to the human ego is only apparent for both. Activity and dynamism shapes our own life and our own environment.

Iqbal disagrees with the mystic view of freedom from the alien environment, which he thinks is harmful to the growth of individuality, in his view the intellect's role in the ego's control of the environment is essential and indispensable. The self's freedom is reached through acknowledging the world of appearances, and moulding it through the exercise of the intellect. But the highest form of contemplation is action. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche also stress on the importance of action.

In his description of the will Schopenhauer observes:

"... not merely willing and purposing in the narrowest sense, but also all striving, wishing, shunning, hoping, fearing, loving, hating, in short all that directly constitutes our own weal and woe, desire and aversion, is clearly only affection of the will, is an excitation, a modification of willing and non-willing is just that which, if it takes outward effect, exhibits itself as an act of will proper." 21

For Iqbal like Schopenhauer the will is manifested in a life of desires, urges, longing, and absorbing. In the 'Secrets of the Self' it is expressed as:

"What is the source of our wakeful eye?
our delight in seeing has taken visible shape.
The patridge's leg is derived from the elegence of its gait.
The night-angâle, beak from its endeavour to sing.
Nose, hand, brain, eye and ear.
Thought imagination, feeling, memory and understanding,
all these are weapons derived by life for self preservation
in its ceaseles struggle." 22
d) Immortality:

In addition to its unity, individuality, and freedom the ego also strives to become immortal. Immortality, in Iqbal's view is not only personal, but also acquired by the ego's effort. The problem of immortality has been tackled by philosophers of all ages in different manner. For the Muslims belief in immortality is an essential part of their faith, but as far as the form of immortality there have been various viewpoints. Some believe in personal immortality for instance Ghazali, while Ibn Rushd believed in the immortality of the active intellect collectively.

In modern philosophy Kant was the first to affirm personal immortality. For him it is not a metaphysical issue, but one of the three necessary postulates of morality. Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence is a positive view of immortality. But based as it is on the everlasting nature of energy, Nietzsche's eternal recurrence is a mechanical doctrine in which the phenomena of the world appears and reappears as a fixed process. Zarathustra is made to say:

"Everything has returned; Sirius and the Spider, thy thought at this moment and this last thought that every thing will return. Fellow-men! your whole life, like a sand glass, will always be renewed, and will ever run out again. This ring in which you are but a grain will glitter afresh forever."

Iqbal views immortality as personal but it is not something restored or destined for the ego, it is to be achieved. According to this conception there are:

"... no pleasure giving and pain giving acts; there are only ego sustaining acts. It is the deed that prepares the ego for dissolution, or disciplines him for future career. The principal of the ego sustaining deed is respect for the ego
in myself as well as in others. Personal immortality, then is not ours by right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it. The most depressing error of Materialism is the supposition that finite consciousness exhausts its object. Philosophy and science are only one way of approach open to us; and death if present action has sufficiently fortified the ego against the shock that physical dissolution brings, is only a kind of passage to what the Quran describes as 'Barzakh'. The records of sufistic experience indicate that Barzakh is a state of consciousness characterized by a change in the ego's attitude towards time and space. 27

Thus immortality and the life after death in Iqbal's conception is probable not certain. To change its probability to certainty man has to make an effort. Without effort the ego cannot be strengthened nor can there be immortality.

The world is conceived as a colony of sub-egos which are graded in accordance with their consciousness of or nearness to the ultimate or Absolute Ego. The human ego is superior to all other egos and the nearest and most similar to the Absolute. Like the Absolute it is creative too, though its creativity is limited by its subordination to the Ultimate Ego. But in its dynamic striving towards freedom and immortality it cultivates the qualities of the Ultimate Ego and becomes a co-worker with the Almighty, such qualities are the aim of every true ego. Those who acquire these godly qualities Iqbal call 'Mard-i-Momin' or 'Mard-i-Hur', synonymously.

2. The Perfect Man:

The 'Mard-i-Momin', (true man) or the 'Mard-i-Hur' (free man), is a representative of God on earth, and he is striving towards becoming the perfect Man, the Insan-i-Kamil. 28

The Quran innumerates the qualities of the Insan-i-Kamil, as a God like man, and these qualities are realizable
by man. A living example of the *Insān-i-Kāmil* is the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him), who inspite of his excellent qualities is a man. He himself and the Quran, Continuously stress, that he is a Man, but the best amongst men.

The *Insān-i-Kāmil* of Iqbal is similar to Nietzsche's 'superman' in certain respects. Both Iqbal and Nietzsche condemn what they call slave morality. Power is a necessary characteristic of both the *Insān-i-Kāmil* and the superman. Iqbal's *Mard-i-Mōmin* is not otherworldly or selfless in the mystical sense. Iqbal has his own conception of *faqr* or selflessness. Its an attitude of courageous disinterestedness, in the mundane material gains. The *Mard-i-Mōmin* never looses hope, he is strong and hopeful. For hopelessness and lack of desire is poisonous for life. In the *Rumūz-i-Bākhudī* he says that:

"To be disconnected with "Desire" Would mean to be prepared For Death, Because the real source Of strength for life is "Hope"!

Since a "Hope" can be maintained By a perpetual "Desire", Despair is a deadly poison For life?29

In his urdu verse the qualities of the *Mard-i-Mōmin* are elaborated repeatedly. He is described as 'silk soft' amongst friends and 'solid metal' in the struggle of righteous and evil. He is at war with heavens, and inspite of being made of mud he is not earth rooted. Birds of prey are not the aim of his eye's hunt, he is the hunter of Gibrīl and Sarāfīl.30

"He is hot tempered and merciful, beneficial and powerful, these four elements comprise a muslim."31

Though powerful the power of Iqbāl's *Mard-i-Mōmin* is
not unlimited or boundless like Nietzsche's superman. The superman has power as its ruling instinct. He despises pity, humanity, gentleness, helplessness and self indulgence. The *Mard-i-Mōmin* is powerful, but power is not his aim and purpose. The power that is synonymous with truth is not mere physical strength. It is a synthetic whole of the spiritual and the physical. The ideal is to reach the ego's perfection. The criterion of value is the ego, its not power as in Nietzsche, nor life as in Darwin and Spencer. The power of the *Mard-i-Mōmin* is within the limits of his faith.

At one place in the *Zarb-i-Kaleem*, he has beautifully summed up his philosophy of the self with reference to Spinoza and Plato.

"Spinoza: The wiseman keeps his eye on life, what is life? presence, pleasure, light, and existence.

Plate: The wiseman keeps his eye on death, life is only the appearance of fire in dark night.

Life and death are not worthy of attention, only the self is the purpose of the ego."\(^{32}\)

So the ego alone is the object of the ego. It is this continuous stress on the ego and egohood that has gained for Iqāl's philosophy the name of 'the philosophy of the self'. Nietzsche's views about valour resembles Iqbal's in many ways. Zarthustra says:

"I love the valient; but it is not enough to wield a broadsword, one must also know against whom. And often there is more valour when one refrains and passes by, inorder to save ones self for the worthier enemy."\(^{33}\)

But the superman desired by Nietzsche is above other man, while Iqbal's *Mard-i-Mōmin* believes in equality, and
all men by striving can reach the status of the 'Mard-i-Momín'.

Nietzsche despises the commonman. He says;

"I have the overman at heart, that is my first and only concern and not man; not the, neighbour, not the poorest, not the most ailing, nor the best." 34

Iqbal's 'Mard-i-Momín' belongs to a fraternal community of man.

"All the muslims are brothers and freedom is the wealth of water and garden. Refrain from the toils of differenciations, your essence is in 'equality'.

According to the Qurán master and servant are one, the mate, the Chair, and the highest chair are the same. The servant of a muslim is equal to his kings, the blood of the king is not redder than the mason." 35

Both the superman and the 'Mard-i-Momín' are courageous, and their courage is likened to hermits and eagles.

"Do you have courage, O my brothers? Are you brave? Not courage before witnesses, but the courage of hermits and eagles, which is no longer watched over by a god. Cold soul, mules, the blind, and the drunken I do not call brave. Brave is he who knows fear but conquers fear, who sees the abyss but with pride. Who sees the abyss but with the eye of an eagle that man has courage." 36

Iqbal prefers the 'Qalandar' to the 'súfi', and 'Ráhib', for the qualities of selfless courage, as Nietzsche's hermit.

The 'Qalandar' is:

"The assessor of the sun, moon and stars!
He is not made for but the maker of days." 37

He is the director and innitiater of his fate, the sun, the Moon, the stars and the change of days and nights are within his vision. The Eagle is the favourite simili with Iqbal as with Nietzsche, for he has the qualities of courage, activism, simple living, and vision. He is like the hermit, who
is active and above petty gains. His most characteristic quality is that like the 'mard-i-momin' his world is limitless, not confined by spatial and temporal barriers.38

The main difference between the 'mard-i-momin' and Nietzsche's 'superman' is that for Nietzsche the traditional code of Christian morality is a burden. The 'superman' is free to use his powers even for evil ends, for what is achieved by power is virtue. The 'mard-i-momin' is to work within the limits of the laws of Islam, in obedience with God. But the law for the 'mard-i-momin' ceases to be a burden. He adopts the qualities of freedom and immortality, thus upgrading his ego, he becomes a co-worker with God. But to start with the first step for him is to subordinate his mind and body, will and action to God. This frees him of the numinous material bondages:

"Endeavour to obey, O heedless one!  
Liberty is the fruit of compulsion.  
By obedience, the man of no worth is made worthy;  
By disobedience his fire is turned to ashes.  
Who so would master the sun and starts,  
Let him make himself a prisoner of law!  
The wind is enthralled by the fragrant rose;  
The perfume is confined in the naval of the musk-deer  
The stars moves towards its goal with head bowed in surrender to law.  
Do not complain of the hardness of the law,  
Do not transgress the statutes of Muhammad."39

The second step in the ego's ascending to perfection is the central of passions and impulses. It might seem strange from a thinker like Iqbal who advocates a life of love, desire and striving. But this is where Iqbal's differences with the antirationalists becomes clear. He aims at rationalizing and spiritualizing the impulses and the
passions. Blind power can lead to disaster, therefore the activity of the ego though initiated by love and desire, should not be merely impulsive. The impulses should be controlled and made purpose oriented. Negation comes before affirmation. Before acquiring the higher qualities, ideas, and objectives, the selfish and mean sides of the self are to be schooled. The 'mard-i-momin' breaks the bonds of family, race, and state, etc., he says nay to all these so that he may be in a position to say yes to the higher realities. The higher attitudes and realities when affirmed in turn assimilate and absorb the negated material affection. Its not the impulse, desires, and bounds that are despised or negated, they are only subordinated, and assimilated in to a larger whole of reality, and become a positive feature in the ego's activity.

"Thy soul cares only for itself, like the Camel; It is self-conceited, self-governed, and self-willed. Be a man, get its halter into thine hand, That though mayst become a pearl albeit though art a potter's vessel. He that does not command himself Becomes a receiver of commands from others."40

Having taken these two steps the ego or the self of man becomes worthy of God's viceregency. This is what is the aim of creation. Iqbal welcomes and looks forward to the advent of the 'mard-i-momin', who is addressed as the master of destiny.

"Appear, 0 rider of Destiny !
Appear, 0 light of the dark realm of change !
Illumine the scene of existence,
Dwell in the blackness of our eyes !
Silence the noise of the nations,
Imparadise our ears with thy music !
Arise and time the harp of brotherhood,
Give us back the cup of the wine of love !
Bring once more days of peace to the world,
Give a message of peace to them that seek battle !
Mankind are the cornfield and thou the harvest,
Though are the goal of life's Carvan."41
Before turning to the relation of man to his society, it is essential to glance at Iqbal's view of change, movement, and destiny, as without these, the conceptions of the self and society are meaning less.

3. The Phenomenology of Social Change:

Dynamism is the warf and woof of Iqbal's rationalism. It plays a vital role in all the different aspects of his thought. At the metaphysical level it appears in the form of his concept of "Duration". At the ethical level he conceives dynamism as a means of arriving at the highest level of moral perfection.

The fundamental principal of social change or in other words his philosophy of history rests on his concepts of 'Time' and 'Duration'. That is the basic mechanism behind every action and movement in the universe, and that is the fundamental principle which becomes apparent in the conscious self of an individual, a community of whom comprise a society. What, then is, the nature of time and how the ego or the self of an individual is related to it? To explain the nature of time in the universe Iqbal uses the analogy of body and mind. Time is called the mind of space. For further clarification of his view of 'Duration', using the analogy of the self, and dividing the self into the 'efficient' and 'appreciative':

"A keener insight into the nature of conscious experience, however, reveals that the self in its inner life moves from the centre onwards. It has, so to speak, two sides which may be described as appreciative and efficient." 42

Both these sides or aspects of the self has different perspectives for their activity. The efficient or practical
self deals with the external world, that is the world of space. This side of the self comprises of mutual isolated states of consciousness. So that the corresponding time that it acts in is:

"... the time of which we can predicate long and short, It is hardly distinctive from space. We can conceive it only as a straight line composed of spatial points which are external to one another like so many stages in a Journey."43

But this 'Time' is not real time or real 'Duration'. There is another side of the self, the appreciative self, of which we commonly take no notice.

"It is only in moments of profound meditation, when the efficient self is in abeyance, that we seek into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience. In the life process of this ego the states of consciousness melt into each other."44

The experience of the appreciative self reveals the unity of the self, in the totality or organic unity of the ego, where there is change and movement, but it is not of a successive and quantitatively measurable nature. So that the time of the appreciative self, unlike the time of the efficient self, is a single indivisible entity. This is real time which, the efficient self, for its practical purposes in the material universe divides into successive and serial units of time. Iqbal calls this real 'Duration', a true 'Time', or Divine time and alludes to the Qur’anic and Biblical verses about the creation of the world in six days. These six days of which every day is equal to a 1000 years are:

"From another point of view the process of creation lasting through thousands of years, is a single indivisible act. It is, however, impossible to express the inner experience of pure duration in words, for language is shaped on the serial time of our daily efficient self."45
In pure time there is no organic difference of past and future. The past, present and future are knit together in one single whole. Iqbal's approach here is once again synthetic. He recognizes the freedom, dynamism, and vitality of 'Duration' or real time. But he disagrees with Bergson's conception of this dynamic movement without an end or purpose in view. On the other hand he acknowledges the purposive character of time, but rejects all kinds of determinism commonly associated with teleological theories. Here Iqbal's different conception of 'Taqdir' or destiny is set forth as:

"Pure time, then, as revealed by a deeper analysis of our conscious experience, is not a string of separate, reversible instants; it is an organic whole in which the past is not left behind, but is moving along with, and operating in, the present. And the future is given to it not as lying before, yet to be traversed, it is given only in the sense that it is present in its nature as an open possibility. It is time regarded as an organic whole that the Quran describe as 'Taqdir' or the destiny—a word which has been so much misunderstood both in and outside the world of Islam. Destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities. It is time freed from the net of causal sequence the diagrammatic character which the logical understanding imposes on it. In one word, it is time as felt and not as thought and calculated."

"Time regarded as destiny forms the very essence of things. As the Quran says: 'God created all things and assigned to each its destiny'. The destiny of a thing then is not an unrelenting fate working from without like a task master; it is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion."46

On this view then each thing is created with a specific capacity, which is within its reach. Within the limit of this 'inward reach', 'destiny' or 'open possibility' every ego or self is free to act, and its movement is a movement in real
duration which is pulverized by the efficient self in its adjustment in the special world. The ego or the self is the basic reality, the ultimate Ego or God is the Most Real, while in the world of creation there is a rising note of egohood from the lower scale of evolution that is matter to life and from life to mind. Change make things more real and more perfect. Matter is lifeless, while plants, due to their living nature have more movement and change than matter, the constant rise of egohood from plant to animal and animals to human beings is evident from the tendency towards change. Man in whom the ego reaches relative perfection has due to his self consciousness capable of change and movement from within. And this change is change in time. So time is next in the scale of reality only to the self or ego.

The time or duration of the Ultimate Ego is real time, while the time of human egos is nearer to the Divine, and so more real then the time of lower animals and so on. Iqbal agrees with Irāqī's 47 view of grades of time. With Bergson Iqbāl's disagreement is, besides on the teleological nature of reality, on the former's conception of duration as the basic reality, while for Iqbāl its the self that is basic. Iqbāl feels that a totally objective view of time can be misleading and half truth, so is the case with the totally subjective view like Kant's. The Greeks and the Muslim Aristotolian philosophers were misled by their stress on objectivity. In his view time is an objective reality, but to understand its nature one has to rely on subjective or psychic life. Because self is the more real of the two:
"It is obvious that motion is inconceivable without time. And since time comes from psychic life, the latter is more fundamental than motion. No psychic life, no time; no time, no motion. Thus it is really what the Asharite call the accident which is responsible for the continuity of atom as such. The atom becomes or rather looks spatialized when it receives the quality of existence. Regarded as a phase of Divine energy, it is essentially spiritual. The 'Nafs' is the pure act, the body is only the act become visible and hence measurable. Infact the Asharite vaguely anticipated the modern notion of point instants, but they failed rightly to see the nature of the mutual relation between the point and the instant. The instant is more fundamental of the two, but the point is inseparable from the instant as being a necessary mode of its manifestation. The point is not a thing it is only a sort of looking at the instant."48

In Iqbal's view the real nature of time can be known only through a careful psychological analysis of our conscious experience.

"The life of the self consists in its movement from appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect, and atomic time is born out of this movement. Thus the character of our conscious experience - or point of departure in our knowledge - gives us a clue to the concept which reconciles the opposition of permanence of eternity, and time regarded as atomic. If then we accept the guidance of our conscious experience, and conceive to the life to the all inclusive Ego on the analogy of the finite ego, the time of the ultimate Ego is revealed as change without succession, i.e. an organic whole which appears atomic because of the creative movement of the ego."

"On the one hand the ego lives in eternity, by which term I mean non-successional changes; on the other, it lives in serial time, which I conceive as organically related to eternity in the sense that it is a measure of non-successional change."49

This in sum is Iqbal's philosophy of society. He has tried to show that in its adjustment in the universe the human ego by exercising its freedom creates its own society
and this society is the platform in which its inner possibilities are unfolded.

4. Society and its Perfection:

Society is the sine-qua-non in which the ego realizes its freedom and strives towards perfection. As we have seen, Iqbal does not think freedom and immortality to be the ego's by right; but the ego has to make an effort for it, and this effort is not possible without society. In the 'Rumuz-i- Baikhud', Iqbal describes the essential principles of a healthy society. In his opinion society comes into being through the social intercourse of human individuals. This society is trained and perfected through Prophethood. The Islamic society is Iqbal's model for the explanation of his views, and this Islamic society has two basic essential principles. They are the unity of God and Prophethood.

"His nature is found of Individuality and Peerlessness, but his personality can be safe only in the society!

Infact, it is the Fire of the Battlefield of life which keeps him energetic in the way of life."50

Individuality is strengthened by association with ones fellow beings. But the perfection of the human society is not possible without the institution of 'Prophethood'.

"A prophet may be defined as a type of mystic consciousness in which 'unitary experience' tends to overflow its boundaries and seek opportunities of redirecting or refashioning the forces of collective life. In his personality the finite centre of life sinks into his own infinite depths only to spring up again, with fresh vigour, to destroy the old, and to disclose the new directions of life."51
In the dynamic process of the onward march of society towards completion and perfection, there are times of stagnation. Just as the individual has his moments of inactivity, the society, which in Iqbal's view is a process of the interaction of individual egos, suffer setbacks of stagnation. In such moments the prophets are an economizing agency or factor in the life of the community. But this process cannot go on for ever, like individuals, human society also has a certain limit, to be reached for its maturity. Once that maturity is reached there is no longer any need of further spiritual guidance through the agency of the prophets. The finality of Muhammad as a prophet has an immense meanings from Iqbal's point of view.

In the beginning, or minority of mankind, when individuals were not capable of judgement of their own, guidance was provided through prophets. But as man's inner self developed and the rational critical faculty rose to a level where ready made solutions and judgements were not required any more, prophethood came to an end. The birth of inductive reason is a mature stage in the evolution of mankind. This level of humanity was reached with the birth of Islam. So that:

"Looking at the matter from this point of view then, the Prophet of Islam seems to stand between the ancient and the modern world. In so far as the source of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the spirit of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the modern world. In him life discovers other sources of knowledge suitable to its new direction."

52
Two points are indicative here as the salient features of Iqbal's view of prophethood.

i) That the prophetic experience has social significance as compared with a purely religious or mystic experience, in the sense that the prophet returns to normalcy, as an active agent of social change but enriched by a new experience which enables him to direct the forces of life and reshape ends and purposes of collective and individual life.

The mystic considers 'unitary experience' as an end in itself, and, therefore, his return to normalcy is meaningless for human society.

ii) The finality of Prophethood means the maturity of mankind, and the birth of inductive reason, to be used as aids to the principle of movement and change.

"The birth of Islam ... is the birth of inductive intellect. In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot for ever be kept in leading strings; that in order to achieve full self-consciousness man must finally be thrown back on his own resources. The abolition of priesthood and hereditary kingship in Islam, the constant appeal to reason and experience in the Quran, and the emphasis that it lays on Nature and History as sources of knowledge, are all different aspects of the same idea of finality."53

This view of finality shows a departure from the static view of universe to a constantly increasing universe. It is an advance to the scientific and dynamic viewpoint from the fixed universe of Aristotelian logic and deterministic approach of the ancient religions. Iqbal clearly states that the finality of prophethood does not mean the abolition of the religious or mystic experience, or a
fixed destiny and role for man.

"... the Qurān regards both 'Anfās' (self) and 'Āfāq' (world) as sources of knowledge. God reveals His signs in inner as well as outer experience and it is the duty of man to judge the knowledge yielding capacity of all aspects of experience. The idea of finality, therefore, should not be taken to suggest that the ultimate fate of life is complete displacement of emotion by reason. Such a thing is neither possible nor desirable. The intellectual value of the idea is that it tends to create an independent critical attitude towards mystic experience by generating that belief that all personal authority, claiming a supernatural origin, has come to an end in the history of man. The function of the idea is to open up fresh vistas of knowledge in the domain of man's inner experience. Just as the first half of the formula of Islam has created and fostered the spirit of a critical observation of man's outer experience by divesting the forces of nature of that divine character with which earlier cultures had clothed them."54

The birth of Islam, therefore, generates in man a confidence in his own self which is only possible by the beliefs in the unity of God, and finality of Prophethood.

The beliefs in the unity of God and finality of Muhammad's Prophethood are necessarily accompanied by a belief in freedom, equality and brotherhood of humanity and the nation that believes in equality, and fraternity has no roots in space and time. It leaves beyond the limitations of space and time. The identity of the nation is neither the country, nor the period of time, it is adherence to the law of Islam. The community, society or nation must have a law, and that law is more binding on it, and more, and more essential to it than the frontiers of a country or the limits of time. Its eternal and infinite like its Lord and Creator.
5. Law and Society:

But if the law is eternal like its Creator, how can it cope with the changing requirements of a society? The society that Iqbal has in view had declared, by and large, that the law has already been given and now no change in it was required. In the classical terminology the door of individual 'effort' (ijtihād) in law was closed. Iqbal considers this closer of the door of change as a short term device of a society for its survival. Too much openness and too much individual effort in changing the pattern of society may also lead to disintegration specially when the social decay sets in.

"... When the Almanic of life seems to be expired A nation can be stable Only by following its "Traditions"!

Now tread the Path Of your Ancestors For it can ensure unity of the Muslims! The real meaning of "Taqlid" is To be faithful To the National Traditions!" 55

The scholar's opinion in favour of authority (taqlid) at the expense of 'effort' (ijtihād) was in Iqbal's view the outcome of several factors, the prominent of these were:

i) The interest in and development of Greek rationalism,

ii) The rise and growth of ascetic sufism,

iii) Political decay, particularly the fall of the Central Caliphate of Baghdad.

Iqbal agrees to the expediency of the attitude of the scholars in those circumstances, but feels strongly that such a position is harmful for the progress of the nation:
"Their leading idea was social order, and there is no doubt that they were partly right, because organisation does to a certain extent counteract the forces of decay. But they did not see and our Ullama do not see, that the ultimate fate of a people does not depend so much on organization as on the worth and power of individual men. In an over-organised society the individual is altogether crushed out of existence. He gains the whole wealth of social thought around him and loses his own soul. Thus a false reverence for past history and its artificial resurrection constitute no remedy for a people's decay."\[56

Iqbal thinks that a decaying nation can be saved only by the efforts of individuals, who has an insight into the depth of life. Only such people can guide a nation on the right path. Therefore, too much stress on accord with the past, which hinders the development of ideas is harmful.

"The tendency to over-organisation by a false reverence of the past, as manifested in the fourteenth century and later, was contrary to the inner impulse of Islam.\[57

But Iqbal's conviction is that such restrictions cannot prevail because they are contrary to human nature and the spirit of Muslim culture. He sees in Ibn-i-Taimiya's movement a reaction against the finality of the schools, which though apparently conservative due to its stress on the first and original principles of Islam, but in fact modern because of his claim of 'ijtihad' for himself and rejection of the finality of the schools. Iqbal saw the same spirit in the first modern movement in the Islamic World namely, the Wahabi movement\[58 in Arabia in the seventeenth century. He calls it:

"... the first throb of life in modern Islam.\[59

Iqbal sees a bright future for Islam in re-awakening of the spirit of 'ijtihad', particularly in Turkey. Although
he disagrees with some of the secular trends in the
renaissance of Turkey, particularly the trends towards the
separation of religion and politics or state and church,
but he prefers it to blind adherence and conformity. He
rationalizes the position of the Turkish revolution about
the abolition of 'khilāfat' and introduction of prayer calls
in the Turkish language, with reference to Islamic History.
But Iqbal warns against the abuses of liberalism:

"Liberalism has a tendency to act as a
force of disintegration, and the rate-idea
which appears to be working in modern Islam
with greater force than ever may ultimately
wipe out the broad human outlook which muslim
people have imbued from their religion.
Further, our religious and political reformers
in their zeal for liberation may overstep the
proper limits of reform in the absence of a
check on their youthful fervour."60

Iqbal feels that the outlook of the Qurān is dynamic,
and the muslim law, or any muslim institution cannot be truely
Islamic unless it imbibes this spirit of the Qurān. But
the conservative tendencies are also natural to human beings
and cannot be totally overlooked.

"... we should not forget that life is not
change, pure and simple. It has within it
elements of conservation also. While enjoying
his creative activity, and always focusing his
energy on the discovery of new vistas of life,
man has a feeling of uneasiness in the presence
of his own unfoldment. In his forward movement
he cannot help looking back to his past and
faces his own inward expansion with a certain
amount of fear. The spirit of man in its forward
movement is restricted by forces which seem to
be working in the opposite direction. This is
only another way of saying that life moves
with the weight of its own past on its back,
and that in any view of social change the
value and function of the forces of conser-
vatism cannot be lost sight of ... No people
can afford to reject their past entirely; for
it is their past that has made their personal
identity."61
But within the limits of human nature ijtihād is the basic right of a people. The founders of the Islamic legal systems never claimed finality for themselves. Iqbal feels that without exertion or ijtihād a nation can not be independent. Therefore he observes:

"The claim of the present generation of Muslim liberals to re-interpret the foundational legal principles, in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern life is, in my opinion perfectly justified. The teachings of the Quran that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhindered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems."62

Iqbal notes with appreciation the views of Shāh Waliullāh in respect of movement and change in Shariah, and on similar grounds rejects the idea of the closing of the doors of 'ijtihād'. He agrees with the idea of transfer of the right of ijtihād from individuals to a legislative assembly on the grounds of expediency and need of the time.

"The closing of the door of ijtihād is pure fiction suggested partly by the crystallization of legal thought in Islam and partly by that intellectual laziness which, especially in the period of spiritual decay, turns great thinkers into idoles. If some of the later doctors have upheld this fiction, modern Islam is not bound by this voluntary surrender of intellectual independence."63

Iqbal claims the rights of ijtihād for modern Muslims, and conceives it to be the basic need for the revival of the political, moral, and spiritual values of the Muslims. He sees in the tenet of the finality of prophethood of the Muslim faith the ground of the exercise of judgement for the Muslims. The Muslim in his view is:
"... in possession of these ultimate ideas on the basis of a revelation, which, speaking from the inmost depths of life, internalizes its own apparent externality. With him the spiritual basis of life is a matter of conviction for which even the last enlightened man among us can lay down his life; and in view of the basic idea of Islam that there can be no further revelation binding on man, we ought to be spiritually one of the most emancipated people on earth. Early Muslims emerging out of the spiritual slavery of pre-Islamic Asia were not in a position to realize the true significance of this basic idea. Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principle, and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed purposes of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam."
EPILOGUE
EPilogue

We have named the three positions i.e. of Waliullah Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Iqbal respectively as 'Organic', 'Common Sense' and Dynamic Rationalism', which is indicative of the way these three have treated the subject. All three are rationalists no doubt, but of a different kind.

Waliullah has tried to blend the three main trends of classical thought, i.e. philosophy, ʿilm-ul-kalām and sufism. But his rationalism does not consist in his eclecticism and revivalism alone, although these are important parts of his thought. In addition to his efforts towards the purification and unification of the religious sciences such as theology (kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh) and mysticism (taṣawwaf), Waliullah's rationalism is characterised by an awareness of the practical problems of his time. This awareness however, does not contribute much to the originality of his metaphysics. His Philosophy remains within the four walls of classical scholastic thought. One of the reasons for his attachment to medieval scholasticism may be his total unawareness of what had been happening in the world of thought outside the pale of Islam. He seems to have no knowledge of the contributions of Descartes, Hobbes, Bacon and others. This unawareness of modern development in epistemology and metaphysics, hinders the development of original ideas in these spheres. In the sphere of social thought, however, his awareness of the problems is evident. He has flashes of modern thought while treating social
problems, like the importance of social justice, equitable distribution of wealth, unemployment, trade, industry etc. Probably it is due to the fact that social situation can be observed, while philosophical insights are transmitted by an enlightened elite.

Nevertheless, his contribution to philosophical thought is very significant and is not wholly dependent on classical thinking. We can mark a few areas in which his thinking has not only shown an ingenuity but has also opened ways for future development of thought.

We can, firstly, refer to his rationalistic urge which inspite of his classical training and traditional attitudes with respect to religion, produces extra ordinary accounting and justification of supra rational phenomenon commonly referred to as miracles. He seems to be aware of the fact that contemporary mind is not fully satisfied with the kind of explanation that is offered by traditional theologians. He knows that in addition to the belief in the Omnipotence of God, men do seek some sort of causal connection between the events occurring in nature, and wherever this causal connection is not evident they would like to believe in a cause not yet known but at least knowable in nature. This is what Waliullah tried to provide in his Tawil-al-Ahādith fi-Ramūz-i-Qisas-al-Abiyā. Though one can see evidence of the strains that he is working under i.e. between the rationality of a wholly causal explanation and the necessity of a belief in God as the cause of every thing that happens. In an effort to be consistent with the idea of
rationality and also with the belief in God, he has to conceive a cognate structure of a causal world over and above the world of nature having possibilities of interaction with the physical world. This type of explanation, though can be found in the classical Islamic thought, yet Waliullah's significance in this matter is to give equal metaphysical status to the two systems of causation.

Waliullah's second contribution is the direct outcome of the point mentioned in the above paragraph. He for the first time establishes a relationship between mind and body recognizing both of them as equally important units of reality. His ideas in this connection are reminiscent of the French interactionists like Descartes and Malebranche. This important contribution did not become as significant as that of Descartes because of the difference in the conditions obtaining during the time of the two thinkers. Descartes's thought did give an impetus to the development of scientific thought, independent of religion and of the interference of soul in the explanation of physical events. The same idea did develop in Sayyid Ahmad Khan but science by now was naturally in an already developed stage.

There is no doubt that much of his philosophical discussions are over burdened by the classical type of argumentations used by Mutakallimun, in which the Aristotelian axioms of logic have been taken for granted. He does not at all make an attempt to provide a new conceptual frame work of reality which he could possibly have, as is evident by his conceptual distinctions in the treatment of
individual subjects under discussion. An example of these distinctions is found in his signal work on the principles of exegesis of the 'Qurān' namely Al-Fauz-al-Kabir-fi-Wul-al-Tafsīr. Here he seems to be aiming at a conceptual classification of the verses of the 'Qurān' and suggesting that each of the category of verses may have a distinct logical universe, and each universe may be understood by a distinct set of criterion which may not be applicable to other categories. For example it may not be possible for us to say for a sentence occurring in the 'Qurān' that it is true or false in the absolute sense of the word 'true' or 'false' though all of them may be said to be true in the particular context in which they occur. Other exegetes have tried to solve the same problem by interpreting the verses and by reducing them to one universe of discourse only either physical or supra natural or allegoric.

Last but not the least is the significance of Waliullāh's social philosophy. Extending the organic view to society Waliullāh comes very close to Comte's theory of the organic nature of society. The most remarkable contribution of Waliullah is his rational and scientific treatment of social issues. His theory of Irtifāqāt, and his awareness of the economic and psychological factors in society are important from the point of view of sociology and philosophy of history. Had he not been held back by his metaphysics, he could have developed these more thoroughly. He does establish a precedence for the interaction of
metaphysics with social sciences like sociology, history, politics and economics, among the modern Muslims.

The question whether Waliullah was modern or classical has pedantic overtones. Nevertheless, seeing the atmosphere in which he worked and the points of references he has had for his theories, he did definitely open new roads for philosophising in Islam. These insights were used, though not fully by subsequent thinkers on the subcontinent. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, for one, was such a thinker.

Sayyid Ahmad Khan was encouraged by Waliullah specially in his a naturalistic approach to problems and brings the efforts of causal explanation of Waliullah to their logical conclusion. He rejects the concept of 'Similitudinary World' (alam-i-mithal) and considers it to be a fantasy. The hidden causes, if any, are to be looked for in the world of nature and not anywhere else. Waliullah's contribution and influence, in this respect was similar to that of Descartes, but since the two mileus, i.e. that of Descartes and of Waliullah were different, the same consequences could not follow. However, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, was able to create a sort of liberal atmosphere and scientific attitude which did go a long way to liberate muslim mind from excessive authoritarianism peculiar to the subcontinent.

Though Sayyid Ahmad Khan's awareness of modern western thought was tangential yet he was able steer his rational impulse much in the same way as Hume and Mill did. His knowledge of western philosophy must have come mainly through J.S. Mill who was at that time at the India Office
in London. In any case, he saw his way clear off the classical discussions of \textit{m\textsuperscript{u}tazila} and \textit{Ash\textsuperscript{a}ira} and in no sense can be termed as a new-\textit{m\textsuperscript{u}tazilita}. He seems to have made a clear distinction between faith on the one hand and science on the other. His use of reason is just an application of robust common sense, to which faith and revelation should conform, in order to be understood. This becomes more than evident in his attitude towards his treatment of the supernatural or extra natural.

Sayyid Ahmad Kh\ä‘n also took the Cue from Waliuull\ä‘h in the principles of the explanation of revelation and admits of a plurality of criteria for verses, conceptually different from one another. True or false, for instance, may not be applied for a story mentioned in the 'Quran' qua the facts of the story because they are not real facts, conceptually speaking. This line of thought has a further scope of development, and a practical consequence of such an approach must result in a better understanding of the various schools of thought of the Islamic dogma.

Sayyid Ahmad Kh\ä‘n's influence has been more persuasive in the sub-continent than of any other thinker. He has been misunderstood more often than not, yet with him arose in the subcontinent a spate of thinkers who could think critically and could break new ways for themselves.

Sayyid Ahmad Kh\ä‘n's is basically an anticlassical spirit. The only argument that he uses for the existence of God, which has a semblance of Aristotelian argument is the
causal one. But in fact this argument is also not the logical argument advanced by the classicist. His argument has all the flavour of the scientific spirit of the age.

Through Sayyid Ahmad Khān, the subcontinental thinkers found the window to Western thought, from which they were isolated so far. This was a new phenomenon in an area which has been too traditional, too conservative and too authoritarian in thought. Naturally he generated an immediate reaction amongst the classicist like Ashraf Ali Thānvi. Even Jamāluddīn Afghānī misunderstood his naturalism as some sort of political support of the British raj in India. Nevertheless, as we have said above, he opened the way for a critical approach to Islamic thought and with him started an attempt to assimilate the modern western thought with Islamic thinking.

Iqbāl has had the qualifications to do the same. He is more likely to provide a start for a new age of Islamic thought similar in approach though different in content, to that of the classical philosophers who assimilated Platonic, new Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy.

The anticlassical spirit is complete with Iqbal. He fully realizes that a monistic, deterministic and idealistic system does not explain the true spirit of Islamic thought. As with Waliullah and Sayyid Ahmad Khān, Iqbāl also works under two strains. One is practical i.e. the liberation of the Muslims from political and cultural domination of the West and the other theoretical, i.e. that his system must seem to conform with the Islamic teachings. Hence his
philosophy takes the shape of a dynamic system. Anti-intellec-
tual but deeply rational and pluralistic with open possibi-
lities for the future. He rejects the block universe concept
of new-idealists and motivates persons as units of egos
to action and admits the possibility of egos influencing
each other. It admits the principle of Waliullah of the
natural affecting the 'Similitudinary World' but considers
the two world as qualitatively the same, and different in
terms of degrees only. The world and God are one in their
nature, the difference is only a difference of development.
One is on the first step of the ladder and the other is on
the last, and they appear to be totally different yet, on a
more closer inspection all of them turn out to be egos —
the spiritual units of reality.

The writers on the above three thinkers have alluded
to the influences of each one on the subsequent thinkers, but
have not shown clearly as or how the basic philosophical
stands have been moulded and changed into new ones by the
subsequent thinkers. Looked at in the perspective that we
have developed in this thesis, a significant thought pattern
emerges. Subsequent thought is now never going to be the
same as the classical was. New influences from the modern
developments of philosophy are finding their way into
muslim thought. It definitely goes to the credit of these
three thinkers.
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12. Ibid., 987b, pp. 700-1.
17. Ibid.
18. See Aristotle's Metaphysics, 980g, p.689.
27. For a discussion see Windlebland's *History of Philosophy*.
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39. Ibid., p. 56
41. Ibid., p. 140, Metaphysics of Morals.
42. Ibid., p. 209, Introduction to The Critique of Pure Practical Reason.
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46. See Op. cit., Part II, Ch. III.
48. Ibid., p. 181.
50. Ibid., pp. 272-73.
51. Ibid., pp. 797-98.
54. See Op. cit., Part IV, Ch. III and IV.
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    Ray H. Dotterer, 'Early Philosophies of Evolution, pp. 365-75.
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60. Bergson, H., Creative Evolution, tr. Mitchell, Arthur, pp. 44-6, also see Introduction to Metaphysics.
65. Ibid., pp. 77-8.
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7. Ibid., p. 146.


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11. For a discussion of these early trends in Islamic thought see Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, and Farīd al-Rahmān, Islam.


13. See Al-Kindī, Rasa'il.


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20. Ibid., p.500
27. Ibid., p.142.
34. See Op. cit., Part IV, Ch.I.
35. For a good discussion see Shibli Noamanī's *Tdm al-Kalām*.
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39. Ibid., 'Introduction'; p.36.
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42. Ibid., p.63.
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WALIULLĀH'S ORGANIC ROTATIONISM
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THE CONCEPT OF BEING

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Jamāl ud Din Afghānī, eminent muslim scholar, political thinker, founder of Pan Islamism. His famous works include, Tatma al-Bayān fi Tārīkh al-Afghān and Radd-1-Nechariyat.
Ubaidullah Sindhi, a scholar in the line of Dyuvband, a political thinkers, writer of several works on Waliullāh e.g. Shāh Waliullāh aur unka Falsafa, and Sharh-1-Hujjat ullah al-Bālighah.

3. See Waliullāh, Lamhāt.
8. Ibid., p.1.
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10. Ibid., Lamha 4, p.4.
11. Ibid., Lamha 6, p.5.
12. Ibid., p.5.
13. Ibid., Lamha 7, p.6.
15. Ibid., Lamha 8, pp. 7-8.
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17. Walīullāh, Hujaṭullāh al-Bālīghah, Ch. 5/40, p. 63.
20. Ibid., Lamha 5, p. 5.
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5. Ibid. pp.69-74.
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9. Taḏwill al-Aḥādīth, p.27.
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11. Ibid. Sat.38, pp.55-6.
13. Ibid. Sat. 22, p.34.
18. Ibid. pp.11-12.
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21. E.g. see Shūṭī's al-İtkān.


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3. Ibid., pp.150-1.
5. Al-Budur-al-Bazighah, p.32.
7. Hujjatullah al-Balighah, Ch.6/41, p.67.
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22. Hujjatullah al-Balighah, Ch.8/25, p.45.
23. See Hujjatullah al-Balighah, Ch.9, pp.25-7.
24. Hujjatullah al-Balighah, Ch.10/27, p.47.
29. Hujjatullāh al-Bālighah, Ch.6/23, pp.43-44.
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33. Ibid., Ch.9/26, pp.46-7.
34. Ibid., Ch.2/76, pp.134-5.
35. Ibid., Ch.19/72, pp.127-8.
42. Ibid., pp 9-10.
PART III
SAYYID AHMAD KHĀN'S COMMON SENSE RATIONALISM
CHAPTER I
THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAME WORK


2. The Iranian Emperor Nādir Shah Afshār invaded India and sacked Delhi in 1732, see Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV, pp. 358-65.


4. Vide Smith, W.C., Islam in Modern History, p. 52.

5. Seminaries established by religious scholars in these places, in the 19th century, to impart religious education to Muslims in India. They are named Dār-al-Ulūm, and the education imparted is not strictly religious, as it include linguistics, logic and several other branches of knowledge, in the traditional Medieval Islamic manner.


11. Ibid., Vol.II, pp.133-34.

12. See for example, Baljon's The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Syed Ahmad Khān and B.A. Dar, Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khān.


16. Ibid., pp.251-6.

17. Ibid., p.254, emphasize mine.

18. Ibid., 'Samajh', pp.245-6.

19. Ibid., p.246.

20. Ibid., p.247.


23. Vide., Ryle, e.g., The Concept of Mind specially Ch. IX and Ch. Ch. IX: 'The Intellect', pp.264-300.


27. See Ryle, The Concept of Mind.


30. Ibid., p. 282.


32. Ibid., p. 281.

33. Ibid., Hua al-Maujud, p. 302.

34. Ibid., 'Kiā Nechar ke Mannaē sé Khudā Matal ho jata haē', p. 284.

35. Ibid., 'Hua al-Maujud', pp. 303-4.

36. Ibid., pp. 239-47, 'Al-Talāzim bāin al 'Illat Wal Mālūl'.

37. Ibid., 'Hua al-Maujud', pp. 304-5.

38. Plato, Euthyphroo, 10.


40. See e.g. Al-Khayāt, Kitāb al-Intisār.


42. The Theologia, Porphyry's commentary of Aristotle's text, mistaken by the Arabs as a genuine Aristotelian work. Sayyid Ahmad Khān, ignorant of the philosophical text, borrows the same mistake from Muslim Classicists. See Al-Nadīm, Al-Fihrist, p. 367.


44. Ibid., 'NamIdānam, NamIdānam... ', pp. 184-5.

45. Mill, J. S., A System of Logic, Book III, Ch. VIII, pp. 253-64.

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2. Ibid., p.251.

3. Ibid., Vol.V., 'Mazhab aur Māshrat ', pp.5-6.

4. Ibid., p.6.

5. Ibid., p.8.


7. Ibid., Vol.XII, 'Maujuda Ta'īlīm', pp.260-1.

8. Op cit., Part II, Ch.II.


10. Ibid., 'Dāfī-al-Buhtān', p.25.

11."... When reasonable men treat these subjects the question can never be concerning the being but only the nature of the deity. The former truth as you well observe is unquestionable and self evident."See Walheim, R., ed. Hume on Religion, p.144.


13. Ibid., 'Zat wa Sifāt Tāla Shanā', pp.259-61.


16. Vide, Waliullāh., Tawīl al-Ahādīth, see also part II, Ch.II, of the present thesis.


24. Ibid., p. 8.

25. *Qabd*, *Bast*, *Ihata* and *Ilham* are terms of spiritual language. *Qabd* means spiritual suffocation, depicting a state when a man is not capable of receiving inspiration. *Bast* is the openness and is the opposite of *Qabd*, that is spiritual reception. *Ihata* is encompassing and *Ilham* is Divine inspiration.


29. See, specially Wittgenstein's, *Philosophical Investigations*, Part-I where a more or less similar philosophy of language is developed.

30. See e.g. Waliullah's *Al-Fauz al-Kabir*, and Suyuti's *Al-Itqan*.


33. Ibid., pp. 207-8.


40. Ibid., Vol. III, "Imam Ghazali ke Khayalat Sirat aur Mizan ke Bare min", pp. 81-6.
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL AND MORAL CONCEPTS


4. The similarity to Ghazal Is position in Al-Mungidh Min ad-Dalal is easily visible.


6. Ibid., 'Insan aur Haiwan', p.45.


8. Ibid., p.150, 'Azm Jazm'.


10. Ibid., Samajh, p.245.


12. Ibid., 'Rasum Wa Aadat', p.13.

13. Ibid., p.130.


15. Ibid., pp.6-7.


17. Ibid., 'Conscience', p.2.

18. Ibid., p.4.


22. 19th century eminent Indian writer, Scholar, Poet and Reformer.


24. See Maqalat-I-Shiuli, and 'Ilm al-Kalam.


26. Ibid., pp.26-7. Though acquiring knowledge from the developed
nations might be a sound advise to Indians, Sayyid Ahmad Khan is rather simplistic in his explanations, as to why Indians lost touch with the advancement in knowledge. Renaissance in the West has been a more complex phenomena, socially and historically, than Sayyid Ahmad Khan was led to believe.

27. Ibid., Vol.XII, 'Ahl-i-Mulk aur Tarraqi-i-Tarbiat', pp.26-7.
29. Ibid., pp.317.
30. Ibid., Maulvi Muhammad Ismail was a grandson of Waliullah, social and religious reformer and leader of the puritan movement and the holy war against Sikhs in the Punjab and North West Frontier, in the first half of the nineteenth century. Sayyid Ahmad Khan also adhered to similar views in his youth.
31. Ibid., Vol.XII, 'Rasm wa Rawaj ka Falsafa aur is min Islah ki Zarurat', p.80.
32. Ibid., p.82.
33. Ibid., Vol.V 'Rasum wa Aadat', p.17.
34. Ibid.
36. Ibid., pp.2-3.
37. Ibid., p.3.
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41. Ibid., Vol.XII, 'Qaumi Talim, Qaumi Hamdardi aur Bahmi Bhalai', pp.140-5.
42. Ibid., 'Maujudat Talim', pp. 254-64.

43. Ibid., pp. 254-64.

   'Parcha Tehdhib al-Ikhlāq aur iske Aghrāz wa Maqāsid', pp. 33-52.

45. Sir Richard Steele brought out the Tetrar in 1709, with the help of Mr. Addison, for the purpose of Socio-cultural reforms. The Tetrar was stopped after two years of publication. The same writers collaborated in bringing out the Spectator late on. Sayyid Ahmad Khān derived the idea of his Tehdhib al-Ikhlaq from these two papers.
PART IV
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2. Thomas Arnold, eminent orientalist, Professor at Aligarh University and Government College Lahore. Writer of several books on Islam. Iqbal's teacher and friend.

3. British Philosophers of early twentieth century, with whom Iqbal came into contact in his stay at Cambridge.

4. In this article of Iqbal, which was published in the Indian Antiquity, Bombay, September, 1900, pp.237-46, and is reprinted in Latif Ahmad Sherwani's Speeches and Writings of Iqbal, pp.69-84, Al-Jilil's name is written wrongly, that is Al-Jilani, whether it is a misprint or a mistake on the author's part is an unknown fact.


7. Ibid., p.145.


11. Ibid., pp.3-6.

12. Ibid., pp.6-7.

13. Ibid., pp.7-12.
14. Ibid., pp.7-12.
15. Ibid., p.15.
16. Ibid., pp.16-7.
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21. Ibid., p.42.
22. Ibid., pp.46-52.
23. Ibid., p.54.
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25. Ibid., pp.63-4.
26. Ibid., pp.70-1.
27. Ibid., p.76.
28. Ibid., pp.77-81.
29. Ibid., p.83.
30. Ibid., pp.93-4.
31. Ibid., pp.95-6.
32. Ibid., pp.118-9.
33. Ibid., p.135.
34. Ibid., p.135.
35. Ibid., p.144.
36. Ibid., p.145.
37. Ibid., p.149.

42. This seems to be a misprint, it should be materiality and not materially.


45. Ibid., p.4.

46. Ibid., pp.4-5.
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KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY


6. See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.


34. Ibid., p. 48.
35. Ibid., p. 50.
36. Ibid., p. 50.
37. Ibid., p. 51.
38. Ibid., pp. 55-6.
39. Ibid., p. 57.
40. Ibid., pp. 56, 57.
41. Ibid., p. 62.
42. Ibid., p. 71.
43. Ibid., p. 72.
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A NEW RATIONALE OF RELIGION


3. Reconstruction, p.185.

4. Ibid., p.189.

5. Ibid., pp.195-6.

6. Ibid., p.197.

7. Ibid., p.198.


10. Reconstruction, p.64.

11. Ibid., p.70.

12. Ibid., p.77.

13. Ibid., p.78.


15. Ibid., pp.79-80.


17. Ibid., p.86.

18. See, Kant, I., Metaphysical Foundations of Morals.

19. See Leibniz, Monadology, eng. tr. Latta.

22. Ibid., pp. 86-7.
23. Ibid., p. 100.
24. Vahid, S.A., ed. Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p. 34.
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25. Ibid., p. 35.
26. Ibid., p. 38.
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9. Ibid., p. 239.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 243.


13. Ibid., p. 102.


15. Reconstruction, p. 106.

16. Ibid., p. 108.

17. Reference to the Qurânic narration of Khizr and Moses, in which Moses took guidance from Khizr.


The Secrets of the self, pp. 23-4.


28. Op cit., Part IV, Ch. I.

30. Names of two archangels.


32. Ibid., p.68.


34. Ibid., p.400.


58. For history of Wahābī Movement see Smith, W.C., *Islam in Modern History*.
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