SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN
IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, MOST MERCIFUL, MOST COMPASSIONATE. ALL PRAISE BE TO ALLAH, LORDS OF THE WORLDS, BLESSINGS AND PEACE BE UPON THE SEAL i.e; THE LAST OF THE PROPHETS (PEACE BE UPON HIM).
SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

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DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF
Ph.D DEGREE IN HISTORY

BAHAUDDIN ZAKARIYA UNIVERSITY, MULTAN
1995
DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS

"MY LORD! BESTOW ON THEM

THY MERCY EVEN AS THEY

CHERISHED ME IN CHILDHOOD".
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I have not submitted this research work of mine entitled, "Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan and its impact on the security of Pakistan," leading to a degree of Ph.D in history to any other university within the country or outside Pakistan. I also promise not to submit the same thesis for a degree of Ph.D to any other university in future if I am awarded a doctorate in this regard. Research work on the same topic has never been submitted before by any one in any university to the best of my knowledge.

Muhammad Ali

Dated: \[6\text{-}6\text{-}1985\]

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Dated: \[7\text{-}6\text{-}96\]

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I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Doctor Ahmed Hasan Dani, Professor Emeritus, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad and Professor Doctor Ashiq Muhammad Khan Durrani, Chairman, Department of History and Pakistan Studies, Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan; without their most valuable guidance, advice and continuous encouragement, this research work would not have been possible. May Almighty Allah continue to give them continuous success, happinesses and supreme health.
SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

Abstract

The Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan in December 1979 sent shock waves throughout the world in general and the Muslim world in particular. Many observers were almost sure that it would not take the Soviet superior and overwhelming Military and Air Force power very long to control Afghanistan and to quell, what were described as localized pockets of resistance. But Afghan Mujahideens refused to be another Hungary or Czechoslovakia by proving a hard nut to crack. Latest tanks, modern aircraft, deadly helicopters, chemical weapons and best equipped soldiers of former USSR were unable to snuff out the flames of freedom and stifle the indomitable courage of poorly armed, poorly financed and poorly sheltered but brave Afghan Mujahideens. They remained determined to fight to the last man and to the last drop of their blood, plunged the invaders into deeper and deeper quagmire till their complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. They finally created history with golden words by forcing the Soviet bear to retrace its step and withdraw in shame in 1989. Pakistan, which decided to stand by the Afghabs, stood the test of time and faced a super power boldly in the face. She has certainly won sympathies and lasting friendship of
the Afghan people to the maximum benefit. Withdrawal of former \textit{USSR} forces ushered in another era of changed regional environments and major policy shifts. During the military presence of a super power across our borders and continuing influx of refugees with far reaching social, economic, political, ecological and military consequences, Pakistan was forced to change defence strategy according to the then military and geo-strategic situations. Pakistan was trapped in a situation where options left were limited in view of former \textit{USSR}s presence on one hand and Indian hegemony designs on the other hand. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has undermined the importance of Afghan issue at the international forums in particular and at the national level in general. Capturing key Afghan cities by the Mujahideens in the final phase of their struggle was not based on their realistic assessments.

Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan caused large-scale and continuing displacement of the Afghan population. Some six million Afghans, approximately one third of the country's 1978 population, were estimated to have fled Afghanistan during the 1980s or were stranded in various countries as refugees sur place, with half total finding refuge in Pakistan and the other half in Iran. Between 800,000 and one million were believed to have been internally displaced by the hostilities.
The final withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan was completed in February 1989. The immediate collapse of the Najibullah government did not take place. As early as mid-1989, however, there were reports of refugees returning spontaneously to Afghanistan to cultivate their fields and rebuild their homes. By the close of 1991, UNHCR estimated at least 300,000 Afghans had repatriated.

During the course of research work, an effort has been made to carry out an indepth study of the following major aspects:

* How did the former USSR cultivate its relations with Afghanistan in the backdrop of Afghan geography and history?

* What were the consequences of Russo - Afghan relationship?

* What were the overt and covert motives of former USSR to involve military troops in Afghanistan in December 1979?

* What was the pattern and strategy of deployment of Red Army in Afghanistan?

* What was the nature, scope, strength and role of Afghan resistance movement besides their major strengths and weaknesses?
What were the factors which led to the withdrawal of former USSR troops from Afghanistan?

What were the implications for Pakistan of the former USSR military presence in Afghanistan?

What were the options available for Pakistan during Afghan Crisis (1979-1989)?

What were the major impacts of former USSR military involvements in Afghanistan on the security of Pakistan?

What were the international relations specially with Afghanistan, USA, China, Iran, France, Saudi Arabia, India and some of the other countries of the world and their impact on the security of Pakistan?

What were the economic consequences of Afghan refugees and the role played by the Muslims and the Arab brotherly and friendly states besides donor countries?

What was the state and status of refugees and their impact on the security of Pakistan?

The research work draws heavily upon the wealth of information available in UN documents, official reports and statements, press reports, interviews, commentaries and above all scholarly works, which have mostly been duly cited and acknowledged. It is my hope that the conclusions, survey, analysis and perspectives offered by the research work will contribute to a better understanding of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan and its impact on the security of Pakistan.
### CHAPTER 1

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Note: (Maps and tables attached, where required).
CHAPTER 1
GEOGRAPHY
AND
HISTORY

Geographic Imperatives

"Modern Afghanistan is purely an accidental geographical unit which has been carved out of the heart of Central Asia by the sword of conquerors or the genius of individual statement".

Lord Curzon

"The practical requirements which underlie every historical judgment give to all history the character of contemporary history because, however remote in events thus recounted may seem to be, the history in reality refers to present needs and present situations wherein events vibrate".

1. In the words of Colonel G.B. Malleson:
"Afghanistan is a country of rocks and stones with an importance far beyond its territorial value— an importance so vast that, in the opinion of many, the safety of India depends upon the predominance of British influence in the lands immediately beyond the British frontier."

2. The country is bordered on the west by Iran, on the north by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, on the extreme northeast by China, on the east and on the south by Pakistan.

3. The country is generally about 3,000 feet above sea level and lies between 60 degrees and 30 minutes and 75 degrees East long. Its greatest length from the Soviet border, north of Herat,

to Pak Afghan border is about 600 miles while its greatest
breadth from north to south is over 500 miles. The boundaries of
today's Afghanistan have fluctuated back and forth with the rise
and fall of various Central Asian empires that has separated
Afghan from Pakistani Pushtuns since the end of the nineteenth
century is called the Durand line. According to Girilal Jain,
the Durand Line dividing the Pushtuns, was drawn by the
British for defensive-offensive purposes. No government in Kabul
has ever acknowledged its validity since 1947. Presently,
Afghanistan is divided into 31 provinces; two were added in

------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Muhammad Ali, Commercial Afghanistan, New Delhi, Frontier
University Press, 1980, pp.255-513, quoted in Thmos T Hammond,
Red Flag Over Afghanistan: the Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion
and the Consequences, Boulder and Colorado: West View Press,
1984, p.5. Also see. Gerard Chaliand, Report from Afghanistan,
3. Girilal Jain, The Statement, New Delhi, India, 8 October
4. The Hindukush mountain system forms a formidable and almost impenetrable barrier, reaching heights of 13,000 to 21,000 feet. In north east corner of the country the Hindukush gives way to Pamir mountains whose peaks are as high as 7500 meters, and these run through the Wakhan corridor touching both China and Soviet Union. The peaks and passes of the Hindu-kush have been the fulcrum by which ambitious powers have tried to lever an empire into their grasp for over two thousand years, has before, there was such a country as Afghanistan. The peaks and passes of the Hindu Kush had been the crossroads for the conquerors like Alexander the Great, Darius of Persia, the Arabs, the Mongols and the Mughals.

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2. *Afghanistan Republic Annual*, Published by Department of Publicity of Afghanistan, 1975, p. 367.
5. The country can easily be divided into the following physical regions:

a. The Mountainous Region. Located in the east and north and generally covered with forest, fruit orchards, wheat and cotton.

b. The Flat Open Desert. Located in the south west and is not productive land at all.

c. The Central High Lands of Hazarajat. Can be called as wind swept home of the Hazara tribe and no other land in Asia can be compared with this in this connection.

d. The Northern Plain. Are fairly rich in alluvial soil.

Climate

6. Afghanistan’s climate is characterized by severe winters and long hot summers. Rainfall is scanty over most of the country, averaging about 7 inches a year except in the even more arid region of south west. Most of the precipitation is between November and April and much of it is in the form of snow. Kabul is plagued by deep snow all winter and only the regions south of Kandahar are entirely free of snow. The cold of winter is more dreaded by the Afghans than the heat of summer. Temperatures drop to freezing point as icy north winds sweep over the land.

7. In winters the sun shines brightly and night and day temperature may vary by 30 degrees Fahrenheit (F). In the south the summer temperature reach 120 degrees F and discomfort is increased by dust laden winds. Seasonal changes are rather abrupt. By March spring sets in and by mid June the full heat of summer strikes and vegetation is burned away.

8. The country’s average annual rainfall is only 12 inches. It is because of this that irrigation remains to be the main source for the production of wheat, rice, barley, cotton and wide varieties of fruits and vegetables.

Area

9. It has an area of 647,500 square kilometres (250,000 square miles); 22% arable, 12% cultivated, 10% pasture, 75% desert, waste or urban and 3% forested.

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Population

10. It is 14825,013 (July 1989) with an average annual growth rate of 2.3%. According to the latest information after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the total population is 21,320,000, with the following breakdown:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>13 - 17 Years</th>
<th>18 - 22 Years</th>
<th>23 - 32 Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Men</td>
<td>1,240,300</td>
<td>1,049,000</td>
<td>1,625,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Women</td>
<td>1,193,400</td>
<td>1,005,900</td>
<td>1,552,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. The literacy rate is 12%.

3. Defence and Foreign Affairs Hand Book, op.cit, p.4. Also see Military Technology, op.cit, p.209.
12. In 1987 the population was estimated as 15.2 million. Kabul, which had a population of one million at the time of the Soviet military involvement, now has over 3 million. Only 25% of the village population is now outside the major towns.

Religion

13. General. The state religion is Islam. The populations is 74% Sunni Muslim, 25% Shia Muslim, 1% Hindu, Sikh and Jewish. Common political action based on religion has been obvious only when the Afghans have rallied to expel foreign invaders as infidels. A major factor that has hampered the spread of communism in Afghanistan is the fact that Islam is the faith of a fiercely independent group of individualistics. It is this individualism that provides the anti-thesis to communism rather than religious doctrine as such.

1. Statistical Year Book, UNESCO, 1989, p. 10: Also see Kabul Times, October 3, 1979; 1408 million according to Asia Year Book, 1989; 14.5 million according to World Defence Almanac, op.cit.
3. Defence and Foreign Affairs Hand Book, op.cit, p.4. About 80% of the population is Sunni and the remaining 20% are of Shia sect see Louis Dupree, op.cit. About 15% are Shia according to World Defence Almanac, op.cit.
5. John C. Griffiths, op.cit, p.110.
14. Religious Institutions. The Afghan people are die hard Muslims. A village mosque is the basis institution for the religious affairs. Adjacent to the mosque is a small school constructed usually on the self-help basis. Main subjects taught in the schools include learning of Arabic with reference to the Quran (not much attention is paid to the understanding and meaning of the Arabic language). The Afghan girls, upto the age of nine or ten get their basic education from their mosques. The mosques also serve as institutions for the elders where the "Imam Sahib" delivers sermons on various Islamic topics in the light of Quran and Hadees. Since the majority of the population is illiterate, these religious mosque leaders have great influence on the administration and the government.

Ethnic Groups

15. Heterogeneity of Afghan population reflects from the ethnic groups which inhabit present day Afghanistan. Ethnically, the people of Afghanistan are primarily of two different physical types, Indo-Europeans of a Mediterranean sort, which includes Pukhtun, Tajik, Nuristani and Baluchis. The other group represents Turco-Mongolians, which include Hazara, Turkoman, Uzbek, Aimaq and Khirgiza. A third group the Dravidian Brahuis, account for a very small fraction of the population.


2. Arnold Fletcher, op.cit, p.9 (This name was first explained in the writings of the 14 century, The Travels of Ibn Batuta, London, 1829.

Population of Ethnic Groups

16. Population of ethnic tribes in Afghanistan (1973) is as follows:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribes</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pushtuns</td>
<td>6.5 Million</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>Pushto</td>
<td>South &amp; East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajiks</td>
<td>3.5 &quot;</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Dari</td>
<td>North South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>1.0 &quot;</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazaras</td>
<td>870,000</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Hazaragi</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aimags</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Dari Turkic</td>
<td>West Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farsiwans</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Farsi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahiu</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>Brohi</td>
<td>South West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkomen</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>Turkic</td>
<td>North West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuristani</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>Nuristani</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluch</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>Baluchi</td>
<td>South West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moghuls</td>
<td>Several thousand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Kirgis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>Several thousand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. L. Duppre, "Afghanistan", op.cit, pp.59-64. Hammond op.cit, p.5. There are minor differences in figures of ethnic groups. See Anthony Hyman, op.cit.
Physical Division -- Ethnic Groups

17. The country in itself is not an ethnic units, but there is no uniformity in its national culture. Each tribe/class is linked to a particular ethnic group. Few of these ethnic groups can claim origin in the soil. These ethnic groups can be divided into three major physical types, as follows:

a. **Caucasoid**
   (1) Pushtun.
   (2) Tajik.
   (3) Balouch
   (4) Nuristani

b. **Mangoloid**
   (1) Hazara
   (2) Aimak
   (3) Turkoman
   (4) Uzbek
   (5) Kirghis

c. **Brahui**. They speak the Dravidian language and can claim to be called as sons of the soil, being the ancestors of one of the oldest civilizations of the world (the Indus civilization).

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Major Characteristics - Ethnic Groups

18. Major characteristics of various ethnic groups are as under:-

a. **Pashtun.** They are rugged and hardy people who adore the free mountain life. They speak Pashto dialect and follow the Hanfi school of thoughts.

b. **Tajik.** Mostly they are concentrated in the north eastern part of the country. They speak Dari with Tajiki dialects. Majority of them follow the Hanfi school of thought except few who are Ismailiya shia.

c. **Hazara.** Mainly they are of peasant class, are not the descendants of Genghis Khan's army as commonly believed. They speak Hazaravi language with Dari dialect. Few of them are Sunni while the majority is Shia.

d. **Uzbek.** They are mainly sedentary agriculturists and live in the northern Afghanistan. They are of Mongoloid origin and speak Uzbeki language with Turkic dialect. They are also followers of the Hanafi school of thought.

e. **Turkoman.** Though not very large in number, they form an important part of Afghan society. They are primarily semisedentary and seminomadic and inhabit the northern part of the country. They deal in the business of "qurakul " and rug industry. They speak Turki dialect and profess Hanafi school of thought.

Languages

19. In Afghanistan, more than a score of languages are spoken. Dari and Pashto are, however, spoken by an overwhelming majority and are taught in schools and were declared national languages
under the 1964 constitution. Some people like Loghari, Laghman, Maidam and Parwan are perfectly bilingual. The provinces of Afghanistan are classified by the Ministry of Education into two groups; those in which Pashto is the first language and teaching media, Dari the second obligatory language and vice versa. The distribution of languages and dialects follow clear patterns.

Health
20. Health have always been a dark aspect of the country’s social side. In modern times it has faced serious situation in the prevalence of such infectious diseases as malaria, trachoma, smallpox, tuber closes, cholera, typhoid fever and anthrax. Many a times international health organizations had to render great help to fight the diseases. In 1982 there were only 1215 doctors and 6875 hospital beds. Two third of doctors and half the beds are in Kabul.

Roads
21. The country has the worst road system in the world. It is only about 18 years back, that they woke up to the importance of good communications system in the modern machine age. So far, all arterial roads have been constructed with the cooperation and assistance of USA and former Soviet Union.

22. Following are the principle A type roads in Afghanistan.

   a. Torkhan-Jalalabad-Kabul - 230 Kilometres
   b. Kakul-Ghazni-Kandahar - 540 "
   c. Kandhar-Herat-Islam Qila - 709 "
   d. Kandahar-Herat-Torghundi - 680 "
   e. Kandahar-Chaman - 109 "
f. Kabul-Kunduz-Sher Khan- Bander
   - 390 "
g. Kabul-Pul-i-Khumir Mazar-e-Sharif
   - 407 "
h. Pul-i-Khumri-Mazar-e- Sharif-Seberghan (Jawzjan)
   - 321 "
j. Mazar-e-Sharif-Hairatan Port
   - 56 "
k. Kabul - Gardez - 122 "

23. The main highways are metalled and of A-1 specification, where as the others are partially metalled. There are numerous minor roads fit for occasional motor traffic in fair weather.

Waterways

24. Like the countries of the Central Asia, Afghanistan too is a close basin, having no outlet to the open sea. All the important rivers have their sources in the central mountainous regions and run towards the periphery of the country.

25. Major rivers include :-
   a. The Oxus in the north (discovered by Captain Wood in 1838) and drains into the Aral Sea.
   b. The Hari Rud in the west.

1. Also called as Amu River (Darya), forms from a distance of 600 miles, the frontier between Afghanistan and the former USSR in the east towards the Indus plain and in the south towards the desert of Baluchistan, see Arnold Fletcher, op.cit, p.3.
c. The Helmand in the south.

d. The Kabul in the east, which besides passing through the capital, flows into Pakistan and shed its waters into the Indus and Attock.

26. With the exception of the Amu Darya, the waterways have only limited potentials and are underdeveloped. They play no significant part in Afghanistan’s transport system, being used chiefly for local movement of agricultural produce by native craft. Important regular traffic on the Amu Darya between the Soviet rail served port of Termez/Qazil Qila and the Afghan ports of Kelefit, Tash Guzar, Hairatan and Sher Khan Bandar was carried out by vessels of the Soviet Central Asian Shipping Line. The three Afghan ports are equipped with concrete quays, cranes and storage facilities.

Air Communications

27. Afghanistan has its own airline known as "Ariana" founded in 1955. Four civil and military airfields fit for jet operations were constructed by the Soviets at Kabul, Shindand, Dehdadi and Bagram. An international airport, fit for all types of aircraft also exists at Kandahar. Kandhar, Jalalabad and Herat airfields fit for jet operations were also constructed by the US. Two civil airports of limited jet capability constructed by USA are located at Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz. There are two civil/military airfields of limited jet capacity at Maimana and Faizabad and one jet capable airfield at Matun. These were developed by the Afghans themselves. Maimana airport, built in 1957 suffers from infrequent use. Besides 11 landing grounds fit for light aircraft
exist at different places in Afghanistan. Ariana Airlines has regular international and domestic flights. Domestic flights go to Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Khost.

**Railway Communication**

28. Being land locked country, has no access to the sea. Has no railway except an eight miles line, extended from former USSR terminate at Khuskh post into Afghanistan for delivery of goods direct into the Afghan territory, in order to avoid unloading and reloading at the border during Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan (1979 to 1988). In the east and south, branch lines of Pakistan rail system terminate close to the border at Landi Kotal and Chaman, provide Afghanistan with rail head facilities and an outlet to the Indian Ocean.

29. Iran had declared her readiness to finance a 1800 kilometres railway in Afghanistan. The Afghan government had received the feasibility study carried out by a French firm. The main 1,200 kilometres section of this railway was to link Tehran, making a loop to the south. With 2600 kilometres lines, one to Quetta and the other to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, according to preliminary estimate, this railway was to cost at least 1 - 2.5 billion dollars. Materialization of this project is doubtful.

**Strategically Important Areas/Cities**

30. Fighting between the Soviet troops and the Afghan Mujahideens took place in almost all the provinces, with varying degree of magnitude of fire. As the most severe fighting took place in the Panjsher valley, around Qandahar, Herat, Jalalabad and Khost areas, therefore terrain analysis of these areas have
been summarized in the succeeding paragraphs while the other important places have also been described.

The Panjsher Valley

31. Terrain analysis of this area leads to the following conclusions:

a. Is about 100 kilometres along the Panjsher river on the north east of Kabul.

b. Can be covered within 24 hours by foot from Salang pass area.

c. Is about 70 kilometres long and on an average 15 kilometres wide at a height of about 2058 meters (7,000 feet), though it restricts the large scale military movements at places, due to narrow width.

d. Cross-country military movements are generally not possible. All motorized movements have to be on metal roads due to steep slopes.

e. Due to the layout of the ground, a lot of naturally located places are available for ambushes, raids and specially for road blocks.

f. Fertile land can be seen in the northern portion only, while the southern portion is dominated by barren mountains.

g. Cover and concealment from air threat is available only in the form of orchards.

h. Logistic supplies can be transported within about 3 days time period from Pakistani border to the valley by making use of mules/horses.
j. A total of about 80 to 120 villages, mostly of Tajik people exist with total number of inhabitants about 100,000.

k. Strategically important towns in the valley are Anawa (in the south) and Anjuman (in the north).

Khost

32. Terrain analysis of this area indicates the following characteristics:

a. Is the capital city of Paktia province.

b. Is about 25 kilometres west of Pak-Afghan border.

c. Is located on a plateau, which is 40 kilometres long and about 45 kilometres wide at a height of about 2050 meters.

d. Is surrounded by mountains ranging in height between 2500 meters to 3000 meters.

e. Important roads are road Gardez leading to Kabul and road Waziristan leading to NWFP (Pakistan).

f. Airfield at Khost can be threatened by long range artillery guns or high trajectory mortar guns from the high mountains around Khost air field.

g. Logistic support to Khost is possible only from road Ghardez - Kabul.

h. People of the area are dominantly Durrani Pustuns and numbered about 100,000.

Qandahar

33. Details are:

a. Has common border with Pakistan due to its location as the south - eastern part of Afghanistan.
b. The area is mostly wide open and deserted ground.

c. Capital of this province is also named as Kandahar, which is about 100 kilometres north-east of our area Chaman of Baluchistan.

d. The built up area is about 40 square kilometres and best suited for secret operations due to high buildings, narrow streets and less open areas in the town.

e. Has an airport, which is about 25 kilometres away on the road Kandahar – Kabul.

f. Multiple links to other places exist in the form of a highway leading to Kabul in the north-east, to the Pak-Afghan border in the south and to Herat in the north-west.

g. The Spin of Bolak is the most prominent range in the area.

h. Small villages turned into strongholds and fortified positions for launching operations by the Mujahideens.

i. It’s population amounted to 200,000, most of whom were Durrani Pushtuns (Barakzais) and few belonging to Baluchis and Hazaras tribes.

j. The area is irrigated by water impounded by the dams on the Helmand river and its tributary, the Arghanedab. The dams, reservoirs and canals already built or under construction will irrigate some 750,000 acres (303,525 hectares) of dry and unproductive land and will provide hydroelectric power for homes and industries.
Kunduz

34. Details of the province can be concluded as under :-
   a. Is located on the Russo - Afghan border.
   b. Line of communication from former USSR to Kabul runs from this province after entering from Termez border town of the Soviets.
   c. The area is completely mountaineous.
   d. The height of mountaineous area vary between 15,000 feet to 21,000 feet (about 5700 meters).
   e. Thick forest provide cover and concealment during movements besides providing good blocking positions.
   f. People are mostly of Tajik origin.

Herat

35. Major characteristic of this province are as follows :-
   a. Is located on the north -western border of Afghanistan, which is near to the Iranian border.
   b. Besides Shindand air base, it also provides infra-communications structure to the former USSR through Qandahar.
   c. Generally the area is open and flat specially area near Farah and Nimroz provinces.
   d. Mostly people are of Tajik, Uzbek and Aimek origin with small number of Dari speaking Pustuns.
   e. The city has several important mosques and shrines of the Timurid period besides famous for fruit and grains.
Kabul
1
36. Details include: -
   a. For centuries important towns have been situated in this locality, when the trade routes leading south ward from Central Asia cross the Hindukush and converge with major east - west counter.
   b. In the 1800’s, when the British and Russian empires tried to exploit the strategic value of the country, Kabul was twice taken by the British forces.
   c. The city, even today, has little contact in the remote valleys and mountains.

Jalalabad
3
37. Details are: -
   a. Is located on the highway between Kabul and Khyber pass into Pakistan.
   b. Is famous for the cultivations of fruits in the surrounding areas.
   c. Has a semi - tropical climate .

1. Encyclopedia Americana, see Afghanistan, p. 248.
Mazar - i - Sharif

38. Its salient features include:

1. Lies on a well watered plain, 2 kilometres south - east of the Soviet frontier.

2. Is an important trading centre for northern Afghanistan and for commerce with the former USSR.

1. Ibid, p. 248.
The Afghans

39. The Afghans are first referred to as a people in the tenth century A.D as the tribal inhabitants of certain parts of the country which, later on, came to be known as Afghanistan. Even as late as the nineteenth century, the Afghans themselves would have talked of their regions by the tribal names and any reference to the larger area could probably have been "Pushtuns". Pushtuns form the major linguistic group of Afghanistan - estimates range from 40% to over 50%. The Afghans have the characteristics of a typical peasant tribal society, i.e. high rate of illiteracy - 90%, linguistic diversity, basic food production as the major economic role of the populations, the kinship system, lack of mobility, inward-looking society and the lack of adolescence. Right from childhood an Afghan is given social, economic and

1. Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, London Macmillan and Co., in 1958, pp.14, 22, 42, 79-80, 112-113... There is no agreed view of the origin of Afghans and Pathans. Caroe believes the two had possibly the same origin. The word Afghan seems to be derived from "Abgan" which appears in the inscription of Chapter I of Persia about A.D 365: "Goundifer Abgan Rismand". Caroe says, "in looking for a prototype in the old recorded history bearing on this regions we hit on the ancestors of the Pakhtuns rather than on that of the Afghans." Also see Arnold Fletcher, op.cit, p.10.
political responsibilities. The tribes enjoy autonomy in the running of their own affairs, which elsewhere would be the responsibility of the government. The central/provincial governments in Afghanistan exercise very little authority except the facilities of communication and transport, and any planned economic assistance or financial allowance given to the tribal chiefs for maintaining law and order in their areas.

40. To the Afghans, their land and people have known violence, wars, invasions and frequently-changing fortunes of mighty empires all around them. On the one hand in their history of 2,000 years and more, in which the country was washed over by the sedimentary ethnic tides of invasion after invasion and during which it, or various parts of it, formed only provinces of extensive empires. (Sir Olaf Caroe lists no less that 25 dynasties ruling over all, or part, of what is now Afghanistan). On the other hand, there is the simultaneous expansion of the European powers in Asia and the growth - albeit gradual - of national consciousness in Afghanistan itself.

41. The Afghans are shrewd, brave and independent people. To maintain their independence, even if restricted to their mountain strongholds, they had to use tactics which have been described without due regard to their peculiar circumstances and quoted out of context as "treachery, brutality and intrigue". The rigorous

2. *Ibid*, p.6
of climate, terrain and the search for grazing grounds of their cattle force are such that most of the tribesmen take to the nomadic life. This pastoral pattern of life gives them added security against foreign intruders. They can easily withdraw to inaccessible areas, sometimes even beyond their borders, to avoid defeat. According to one estimate one-third of the population is still nomadic.

42. The Afghans are a proud and fiercely independent people, but this does not make them impervious to bargaining—a kind of shrewdness which has been put to good use in hard times.

Recording his experience of 1978, Colonel Malleson said:

"An Afghan will do a great deal for money but he adorns discipline and except in the excitement of battle, he does not care to be commanded by one whom he regards as an infidel".

43. Akbar the Great, the Moghul emperor of India, tried to subdue the Afghan tribes by violent methods and failed. His successors tried to buy them, with little success. The British too were only partly successful by generously using money to save much sweat and blood, but could not buy their lasting friendship by money alone. For instance, after the first Afghan war the British envoy’s offer to buy permanent rights of safe passage through the frontier passes was turned down as it meant the

giving-up of the rights of the tribes to control passage through these passes. The very survival of the tribesmen lies in their freedom of action, initiative and fighting well. In the words of Sykes: "It is impossible not to admire the martial qualities of these fierce mountaineers." Roos Kepple, the British political officer, was amused and impressed when in a jirga (meeting) with Zakkakhal Afridi (a tribe of the North-East Frontier Province), after a bloody battle between them and the government troops, he was asked by the tribesmen, "Sahib (Sir), did we put up a good fight". There has been little change since then in their attitude towards the art of fighting well.

44. Sir Henry Rawlinson in 1857 analyzed the basic causes of the lack of cohesion of Afghanistan governments in the following words :-

"The nation consists of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal power and with divergent habits, which are held together, more or less closely, according to the personal character of the chief, who rules them. The feeling of patriotism as known in Europe, cannot exist among the Afghans, for there is no common country. In its place is found a strong, turbulent love of individual liberty, which

1. Ibid, p. 390.

naturally rebels against authority, and would be equally impatient of control, whether exercised by English or Russians or Persians, or even Durranis".

Sociological Factors

45. Colonel J.P. Villiers - Stuart, a veteran officer described the Afghan hardihood in these words:-

"Very proud of their race and honor, they display extraordinary loyalty, yet are capable of extreme vindictiveness against a friend on account of even as imaginary wrong. Observant and intelligent, they can easily be worked up to fanaticism. Are at their best under the worst circumstances. Cheerful, sportsman like and frugal, but excitable and lacking in self-control. Overall a strange mixture. However, you size them up, their virtues and vices are at least virile and those of men."


Social-Psychological Characteristics - Afghan Society

46. Details are as under:

a. As devout Muslims, the Afghans have never submitted to a godless ideology. In fact Islam is the foundation of the Afghan way of life.

b. The country's major unifying factor has always been Islam, which transcends linguistic, tribal, ethnic, social, cultural and economic divisions.

c. The Afghans have served in the spread of Islam into the Indo - Pakistan sub continent and it is a historical fact that the Muslims of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are a result of tremendous sacrifices on the part of the Afghans for the spread of Islam.

d. Whenever endangered or threatened, Islam has a powerful capacity as a mobilizing force to defend the socio-religious values and political sovereignty of Afghanistan. During the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, Islam was the basis of Afghan national unity against the Soviets and their imposed regime till their withdrawal.

e. Afghanistan has neither the Shia religious hierarchy of Iran, nor been influenced by Russian orthodoxy as the Central Asian states have, nor witnessed the long-standing communal conflicts between the Muslims, and Hindu communities that ultimately culminated in the partition of the Indian subcontinent into Pakistan and India.

f. Dissension and feuds have occurred among various ethnic and sectarian groups, yet the elders of given areas have
sorted out their disputes through the local jirgas.

g. Since the reign of Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-83) many renowned Qazal-bash occupied important civilian and military positions, with the title of "Sardar" such as the Durrani, who were entitled to this dignity for their military status. Numerous Shia women married Sunni princes and chieftains, and as a result the inter-marriage process helped in promoting equality between the two sects.

h. No invader including the Soviets, has escaped tough resistance, and thus the sacrifices for keeping the freedom of their home land intact go very deep in Afghan social psychology. Shah Shuja, grandson of Ahmad Shah Durrani, was a Muslim as well as one of the contenders for the Afghan throne. In 1839, he came with the British Army intending to become the ruler of Afghanistan. He was considered no more than a foreign agent. As a result, he was not only rejected but also killed by the same people who held his grand father, Ahmad Shah - the Great, in high esteem.

j. The traditional Afghan communities in the rural areas are generally small, isolated, inward - looking and relatively self - governing.

k. The social units of actual cooperation are the tribes, down to the households, ethnic groups and religious sects.

l. Various kinship loyalties bear much of the burden of
social, economic and political affairs in local communities.

m. Influential leadership is acquired through possessing personal leadership traits and family background.

n. Afghan society is composed of major and minor tribal and ethnic communities living within political boundaries with no definite lines of demarcation.

47. Analysis of the feature of the Afghan society reveals:

a. The Afghan nation is consisted of a large number of tribes considerably divergent in their character with varying shades in ethnic, linguistic and physical character.

b. Basically the country is an area that is pre-dominantly Muslim, with the Afghans and Pathans who constitute the main elements of the populace.

c. Generally the major clans found in Afghanistan are Ghilzais in east, Yousafzais and Afridis on the Pak-Afghan border, the Durrans to the west and the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Aimaks who are of Mongolian origin, to the north and north west.

d. There is no direct access to the rich literatures of Afghan cultures, which leads the outside world to some generalization regarding the nature of the peasant tribal

societies prevalent in the country. The Afghan society, however, is mainly an inward society.

e. An Afghan usually follow the occupation of his father. A man is tied down to his clan where in he will either be a leader or the led, according to the status of his family. Socially, the men usually marry within their clan or the group. The clan or the tribe is dominated by the head or the chief and he is seldom refuted in his decisions and opinions. The people usually are non-cooperative outside their own clan, group or tribe.

f. The Afghan society is quite averse to and apprehensive about an outsider specially the foreigner. They, however, welcome the strangers with formalized hospitality.

Cultural Factors

48. Salient features of an Afghan’s life can also be summerized as under :-

a. Individual Character. Possesses an extra-ordinary feat of high sense of personal dignity and love for freedom. Is strong and hardy besides being as inborn warrior. Possesses a great deal of aesthetic sense and regard for artistic values. Is a hospitable host, peaceful house holder, passionate husband and a loving father.

b. Communal Life. The main cities of the country have been exposed to the modern life style, but in the rural areas the Afghans lead their lives in a peasant tribal society. Great importance is given to the tribal and traditional values rather than the individual families, which forms the bases of the social life. The elders enjoy enviable
respect and regard. Any digression from their hereditary or self imposed regularity is brought to the councils of elders who acting as a penal code decide the issue to the best of their judgment, which is taken as the last word. The effects of the exposure to the modernization of the rest of the world and the emergence of new educated class and the introduction of modern technologies in agriculture and industry, can however be clearly seen in the rural areas.

c. **Group Life.** The population of the country comprises a variety of ethnic and linguistic group and dwell on their history, tradition and ethnic values. About 3 million of the total population consist of nomadic tribes. Some of these have settled in the last few years in the plains north of HinduKush or in the Halm and valley. Numerous groups of these nomads called, "pawindhas" migrate across the borders with their herds towards the pasture lands in Pakistan. Approximately only 8 percent of the total population live in towns and cities. The remaining reside in the villages usually built in the form of small forts and a number of mud houses belonging to closely connected families who form a defensive community, always suspicious towards foreigners and strangers and hostile to intruders.


d. **Social Stratification.** The tribes have cordial relations amongst themselves, mainly due to common religion 'Islam'. By and large the social customs and culture followed by the groups are quite identical with few variations here and there.

e. **Collective Behaviour.** Generally the Afghans are averse to outsiders. This reflects their mental introversion and defensive attitudes. An outsider is received by the villagers and entertained. On sensing the nefarious designs of the outsider the formalized hospitality of the villager is immediately turned into hostility.

f. **Urban and Rural Social Conditions.** Details can be summarized, as under:

1. The cost of living in Urban areas tends to rise continually.

2. The general standard of the living can be rated among the lowest in the world.

3. There is a shortage of water and electricity besides poor sanitation and drainage system.

4. The urban areas have some amenities such as recreational places (picture houses, hotels, shops and bazaars) and basic facilities such as hospitals, schools and colleges.

5. The people of rural areas can earn their livelihood with comparatively greater ease than those living in the distant villages. The majority of these people are artisans, small traders or the government employees.
(6) The rural areas are as primitive as they were hundreds of years ago.

(7) The techniques used in agriculture and stock breeding are crude thus relatively inefficient, yielding much less than the hard work put in by the farmer.

g. Cultural Institutions. Following are some of the conclusions of Afghan cultural institutions:

(1) The Afghan cultural institutions were virtually destroyed during Genghis Khan's period of plunder and atrocity.

(2) The government sponsored archaeological researches have revived many works of fine arts of pre-Islamic and Islamic area.

(3) The Herat school of fifteenth century does inspire the new artistics in the art of painting. There is also a class of artists which are influenced by the western style.

(4) Some of the old movements of architectural values are being restored and redecorated through government initiatives.

(5) Drama and theatre have also found their places in the cultural revival. Initially the European classics were introduced in them but at present the trend favors the morally instructive themes from everyday life.

(6) Traditional folk songs and group dances are also
being given due attention. "Attan", an open air group dance has now been institutionalized as the national dance.

(7) The government is also sponsoring a number of literary societies to promote literature. These societies organize research in Afghan history and arrange for the publication of the writers. The Afghan historical societies also publish a bi-monthly magazine in Pashto and quarterly magazines in French and English. The government also runs a number of libraries for this purpose.

Democratic Factors

49. Kabul has seen several experiments towards democracy:

a. The first constitutional efforts in the twenties, introduced by King Amanullah, towards a modern up-to-date state.

b. The 1949 elected "Liberal Parliament " with Shah Mahmud as Prime Minister. About one third of its members were young and critical intellectuals, open to controversial discussions in a free press, even though low literacy and limited circulation meant a small number of readers only.

c. After the decade of Prime Minister Muhammad Daud i.e. after 1963, a very virulent period started with a new constitution prepared under Prime Minister Yousaf.

During 1963-1973, elections were held and there was much activity by politically involved students, who challenged all the seven governments including the first non-royal Prime Minister. This went on until 1973, when in July that year, Muhammad Daud seized power and declared Afghanistan a republic and himself its founder President and Prime Minister. As for ex-King Zahir Shah, after heading the state for forty years, he turned his holidays in Italy into exile.

d. In 1977 a National Assembly, a Loya Jirga, selected rather than elected, confirmed Daud’s power. Because Daud did not encourage the establishing of political parties not even the activity of "Khalq" and "Parcham", the political parties that had supported him, was one of the reasons, he was toppled and killed in a military coup backed by these parties in April 1978. Although the new rulers turned the country’s name into "Democratic People Republic of Afghanistan," by acting as a cruel communist dictatorship, they desecrated the word "democratic."

Educational Factors

50. **General.** Perhaps one of the worst damage to Afghan posterity is the educational set back received by today’s young generation.

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Sovietization Efforts Through Education

51. Some of the salient aspects in this context are:

a. A Polish report in 1984 said only 860 of the 3,700 grade schools from the pre-communist period were open during Soviet involvement period in Afghanistan.

b. In 1985 Kabul claimed that "In less than two years the number of Schools has increased from 959 to 1086.

c. More than half of Kabul university faculty members were estimated to have been imprisoned, killed or driven into exile.

d. By 1984 the Soviets were teaching 600 Afghans in six new technical and professional schools that they had started in Afghanistan.

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2. Kabul New Times, August 1, 1985, p.2


e. An agreement was signed in 1985 for the Soviets to open, between 1986 and 1990, ten more schools with places for 3,000 or more technical and professional students.

f. The greatest emphasis was placed on sending young Afghans to the former USSR for education, away from the war and from parental and cultural influences. Karmal said that by taking Afghan students the Soviets were "assisting our country in the training of cadres, national and patriotic expertise for the rapid socio-economic progress and development. Our youth study hard there and (are) being trained with patriotic spirit, (to) love the homeland, the toilers and internat-ionalism. No doubt they will form the future experts of their independent and revolutionary country".

g. A defector from the Afghan embassy in Moscow in 1983 estimated that more than 10,000 Afghans were in former USSR "training to be army officers, KGB men, watchdogs in industries and the civil services and so one".

h. By November 1984, there were around 7,500 Afghan students studying in the Soviet Union.

j. More than 800 Afghans were studying in Uzbek city's higher and secondary specialized institutions.

k. Western estimates of the total Afghans studying in former USSR between 1979 and 1984 ran from 12,000 to 20,000. In 1987 an estimated 15,000 students were receiving training in former USSR. since 1979 higher education had been disrupted by departure of many teaching staff from Afghanistan.


1. In the Autumn of 1984 nearly a thousand children between seven and ten years old mostly war orphans, were sent to the former USSR at the beginning of a program to give complete education under controlled Soviet conditions. Some were forced to eat pork in violation of their religion. Others were insulted, threatened, beaten even killed by the Soviets who wanted scapegoats for the Soviet army casualties in Afghanistan.

2. Part of the Soviet educational effort was intended to enhance the size, ideological dedication and managerial competence of the PDPA.

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o. The Soviets encouraged universal, compulsory education in the areas they controlled.

p. In the schools, the study of Islam and western languages was largely replaced by the study of Marxist ideology and the Russian language.

q. As many as one-third of Afghanistan's teachers and school administrators probably were the Soviets or bloc nationals, while most of the rest were PDPA members.

r. Returning Afghan students from the former USSR varied greatly in their loyalty to the Kabul regime or to the Soviets. With adults some times more hostile to the Marxists after a stay in the former USSR.

52. Educational Institutions. Details can be summerized, as follows :-

a. The schools and colleges are only restricted to cities and towns.

b. Girls and boys have equal opportunities of schooling. However, girls are more as compared to the boys in the schools. As a result, the number of educated girls are gradually increasing.

c. The professional colleges in the country are not very many and can only be found in bigger cities like Kabul and Kandhar.

d. In the villages, schools are scarce and villagers are almost non-existent. The rural schools are mostly up to the primary level, where as in some areas these are up to lower secondary level.

e. It was commendable for Afghanistan to provide free primary education which lasted throughout Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan.

f. Secondary education begins at age 15 and lasts for 4 years. The enrollment for secondary education fell from 29 percent to 15 percent in 1981.

**Historical Perspective**

53. The first penetration of the Arabs into Qandahar took place in 699/700 AD under governor Siestan (Persia), followed by Taimurid (821-873) with their capital at Nishapur (Persia) and the Samanids (819-1005) from Bokhara. It was, however, the Saffarid (867-1495) who finally defeated the Hindu Kingdom at Kabul. Many in Iran still regard western Afghanistan as a greater part of Khorasan. Subaktaqin over threw his master in 977 and founded the Ghazni dynasty. His son named Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni established the Ghaznavid empire. By 1030 he because the ruler of the entire country on either side of the Hindu Kush. Subaktaqin over threw his master in 977 and founded

the Ghazni Dynasty. His son named Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni established the Ghaznavid Empire. By 1030 he became the ruler of the entire country on either side of Hindu Kush.

54. Alauddin Ghorı ransacked Ghazni in 1150 and set an example of savagery when he forced the captives from Ghazni to carry lumps of earth of their backs and marched them to his native city where he had them butchered. Their blood was mixed with the soil they brought with them. The Ghoris were displaced by the Turkish ruler Khwarizm Shah, who extended his rule over most of the territory astride the Hindu Kush, in the beginning of the thirteenth century. Ghazni was again sacked in 1221 by Chengiz Khan. He ransacked the city, massacred the citizens, destroyed the crops and burnt their dwellings. The only legacy he and his soldiers could leave behind was the feature of the Hazara tribes which inhabit Central Afghanistan today.

55. Taimur came down from Samarkand in Central Asia and occupied Herat as a capital in 1379. His descendant Zahir-Uddin Babar subjugated Kabul and Ghazni in 1504. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, present day Afghanistan was divided between the Moghul and Persian Empires. Akbar captured Qandahar in 1594 and lost it. Humayun again occupied the city in 1638 but was retaken by the Persians ten years later. The Moghuls never captured it again.

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1. Ibid.

2. L. Dupree, op.cit; p. 319.
56. Nadir Shah ransacked upto Delhi and compelled Moghul Emperor Muhammad Shah to cede Trans-Indus tract to him in 1739. The country emerged into roughly its present position, in mid 18th century (1747), under Amir Ahmed Shah Durrani of Abduli tribe. After the break up of Moghul Empire, the whole area became a corridor of invasion and counter-stroke by Durranis and Sikhs: the areas passed over in ebb and flow. Earlier, Ahmed Shah had swep across the River Indus 8 times and when he died in 1773, besides modern Afghanistan, areas like Peshawar, Multan, Sind, Kohat, Baluchistan, Kashmir and Khorasan were included in his Kingdom.

2. Fraser-Tytler, op.cit, pp. 61-69, Also see Caroe, Op.Cit, pp.256-326. The details of the events are given by both the writers.
3. Caroe, op.cit, p.256.
57. Ahmed Shah's 'confederacy prospered through the use of plunder as a tactics for political unity....Such successes could ensure only a tenuous unity and when Ahmed Shah's son and grandsons proved incapable of continuing the profitable raids, the armies of the confederation disintegrated and the many claimants for his throne fell to fighting among themselves. Trans-Indus tracts remained under control of Durrani empire inspite of its decline till Ranjit Singh annexed Peshawar in 1834.

58. Meanwhile Napoleon had been defeated at Waterloo in 1815 and the European Colonial Powers were relieved of their anxiety for self-protection. These powers regained their freedom of action.


2. Fraser - Tytler, op.cit, pp. 70-73.
and a new era of colonial expansion commenced. Afghanistan gained importance on the world stage in the 19th century because of its geographical location. The Czarist Russians resumed their advance to annex territories and extent domination in Central Asia while the British conquered more and more of India, extending the area under their control steadily northward. This started "Great Game" between Czarist Russia and England, because this Central Asian Kingdom was precariously located at the cross-roads of competition and conflict between the two imperial powers.


4. Roy, *op.cit*, p.1
59. The British realized that the safety of India depends on the degree of control which the rulers of India can exert on the mountains of Hindu Kush and the Oxus valley beyond, for only thus the barbarian be kept at arm's length.

60. Dost Muhammad was the King (normally called Amir) of Kabul and he attempted to seek the British help against Sikhs and Persia in 1826, but the British did not respond positively. He made overtures to Russia and in 1828, Russia forced Persia to cede Transcaucasia by the Treaty of Turkmenchay. Russia began to extend its dominance in Central Asia to the east of the Caspian sea and had acquired influence over Persia.

61. The British acted to check the Russian influence in Persia to safeguard their interests in India. Under the influence of Russia, Persia besieged Herat from November 1837 to September 1838. Herat was successfully defended with the British

2. Ibid. p.2.
3. Fraser-Tytler, op.cit p.81.
assistance, but this event increased the British anxiety about the Russian ambitions in Asia because Herat was considered as one of the basins of the defence of India.

62. To counter the Russians, the British were impelled to interpose a friendly state between India and Russia; a buffer state, as well as to end Sikh-Afghan rivalry. Therefore, the Tripartite Treaty with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja was signed at Simla on June 25, 1838. Under Article 1 of this Treaty, Shuja was to surrender claim on many areas on both sides of River Indus. The British launched First Afghan War in December 1838 and in collaboration with Ranjit Singh and occupied Kabul in August 1839. Shah Shuja was installed as Amir of Kabul but he was not liked by the Afghans. The invasion ended disastrously for the British when in 1842 the British resident and Shah Shuja were killed by the Afghans. The turmoil of invasion only subsided

1. R.C Majumdar, Advanced History of India, Part III, Macmillan and Co Ltd, 1951, p.751, quoted in Ashraf, op.cit, p.55. There is a difference of opinion whether Herat was defended with the assistance of the British because First Afghan War was launched later than uplifting of siege. For details see Ghaus op.cit, p.2.


3. For details of areas given in the Treaty see Caroe, op.cit p.319.

4. Ghaus, op.cit, p.3.
when Dost Muhammad, who had been exiled to India, returned to Kabul and ascended the throne again.

63. After the return of Dost Muhammad, the Tripartite Treaty was annulled but Kabul had lost effectively Peshawar and Trans-Indus regions in 1843. The de-jure recognition of this territorial gain by force, did help in consolidating a de-facto position in due course, to be made final by the advent to the Frontier of English power. The British invasion, however, helped in uniting the country into a single political unit and established the Amir firmly.

64. After the first Afghan War, relations between Dost Muhammad and the British were satisfactory and there was revival of friendly relations between England and Russia as well. Emperor Nicholas 1 of Russia and Queen Victoria reached an understanding in respect of Central Asia that the Khanates of Bokhara, Khiva and Samarkand were to be left as neutral zone between the two empires in order to preserve them from a dangerous contact.

1. Ibid.

2. Caroe, op.cit, p.322.

3. Newell and Newell, op.cit, p.35.

4. Majumdar, op.cit, p.829, quoted in Ashraf, op.cit, p.56.
However in the wake of Crimean War (1853-56), Afghanistan became a victim of the struggle for supremacy between Russia and England. Since Britain had invaded the Russian territory in Europe during the war, Russia had the aim to strike at the British position in India, but none could conquer Afghanistan as each was determined that the other should not get it and none took any great interest for the sake of Afghanistan.

65. When the Russians were checked in south-eastern Europe, they resumed their forward policy in Central Asia. In 1863, scramble for power started amongst the sons of Dost Muhammad after his death and the Russians made their first move towards Central Asia in 1864, on the pretext that the wandering Asiatic tribes would start raiding and pillaging the people inside Russian territory and this state of affairs would compel the government to punish them and for the sake of security, to annex their territory. A new province, Russian Turkistan, was established in 1865 with headquarters at Tashkent. Bokhara was made dependency in 1867 while Samarkand was added to the Russian possession in 1868, followed by Khiva in 1873.

1. Roy, op.cit. p.4
2. Ghaus, op.cit, p.3
3. Majumdar, op.cit, p.381, quoted in Ashraf, op.cit, p.56.
When in 1868, Sher Ali got himself established in Kabul, the Russian influence had almost extended up to River Oxus. He sought the British help to stop the Russian advances. After protracted negotiations which started in 1869, the two powers signed the Russo-Afghan Agreement on Afghanistan in 1873. In this agreement, Russia accepted the exclusion of Afghanistan from its zone of influence and recognized a frontier between Afghanistan and its own future annexations in Central Asia. Sher Ali was informed in

1. Ashraf, op.cit, p.56.

2. Earlier on, the British had extracted an assurance from the Russians in 1969 that Afghanistan was not in its sphere of influence. This was Granville-Gorchakov Agreement which was reiterated in 1872, 73, 76 and 78. See Mazari, op.cit, p.35 and 49.

September 1873 that "the Russians had agreed to respect the northern boundaries of Afghanistan which followed the course of the Oxus from its source in the Pamirs to a point named Khwaja Salar and thence southward to the provinces of Balkh, Maimana and Herat, and the Russian government had agreed that territories of the Amir contained by this boundary were completely outside its sphere of influence".

67. Sher Ali was not satisfied and tried to cultivate relations with the Russians. On persuasion from Russia, he received its envoy but refused the entry of the British mission. This led to the forward policy of extending the frontiers of India and the Second Afghan War (1878-1880). Sher Ali retired to Turkistan and his son, Yaqub Khan, concluded the Treaty of Gandamak with the British in May 1979, in which the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi, and control of Khyber and Michini Passes were ceded to the British. The hostilities revived when the British mission was killed in September 1879. However, the British forces suffered defeat near Maiwand and shortly afterwards Kandahar was evacuated by them. The Amir was found unfit to rule whom Afghan people also

1. Fraser-Tytler, op.cit, p.135.
2. Roy, op.cit, p.5.
4. Fraser-Tytler, op.cit, pp 143-147.
despised. He was removed to India, leaving Lord Roberts as the virtual ruler of Afghanistan. Obviously, the Second Afghan War was the consequence of the rivalry of Russia and Britain to establish their influence in Afghanistan.

68. Abdur Rahman became the new Amir who in return for an annual subsidy, agreed to conduct his foreign policy under the control of the Government of India. The Russian forward policy received a setback because of the establishment of the British influence in Afghanistan. The 1873 Agreement had strengthened the idea of transforming Afghanistan into a buffer state in Central Asia between the British and Russian Empires. When Britain evacuated Afghanistan in 1880 and entrusted its destinies to Abdur Rehman, the buffer state concept was ready for implementation as the British considered.

69. However, inspite of the assurances given by Russia, it tried to push forward in Central Asia. In 1884, Merv was added to the Russian possessions and this evoked strong British protests.

1. A.B. Awan, "Great Game in Afghanistan", Globe, Karachi, Vol.I, No.4, August 1988, p.15. Lord Roberts, for all practical purposes was "Lord of Afghanistan", till December 1879 as stated by Lady Betty Balfour, The History of Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration 1876-1880, quoted in Mazzari, op.cit, p.35.
From Merv to Herat, distance is 200 miles and there was no natural barrier to form a frontier or check an advancing force. It was thought that near Herat, it is possible to pass from the Russian outposts to India without encountering any formidable altitude and this is possible nowhere else. After exchange of lengthy communication between the British and the Russian governments, Russia accepted a proposal to have Russo-Afghan boundaries demarcated. Lumsden arrived at the frontier of Russia but the Russian Commissioner failed to turn up. The situation reached the climax on 30th March 1885 when the Russians occupied Panjdeh and drove the Afghans out, inflicting heavy losses on them. One of Moscow's leading journals, Novosti, urged that Russia should go on and seize Herat in Afghanistan, to obtain a window to the southeast, from where it could advance towards the Indian Ocean and fulfill its historic destiny. This was the last step towards the north-west frontier area of British India that Russia could take.

3. *Ibid*.
5. *Ibid*.
7. *Ibid*. 
70. The final showdown between Russia and Britain seemed imminent, and this provided impetus to the delimitation and demarcation of boundaries of Afghanistan. The Amir wished to stabilize the situation so that Afghanistan is not caught between the two imperial powers lest the British troops, in case of war, move in his country. However, war was avoided because of the threat of Imperial Germany which was the common fear. Both the powers came to terms and a protocol was signed in July 1887, in which Russo-Afghan boundary was laid down from Oxus to Zulfiqar Pass remained with the Afghans. The demarcation of the boundary was completed by 1888. The last frontier dispute with Russia was settled in 1895 by the Pamir Agreement in which Afghan boundary between Lake Victoria and Tagdumbash (place on Russo-Afghan-Chinese border) was settled, and the long standing rivalry between British and Russia in Central Asia, came to an end.

1. Ibid.
2. Fraser-Tytler, op.cit, p.168.
3. Imperial Gazetteer of India, op.cit, p.19.
71. With this agreement to elements of a buffer state were, at last, in place in the view of the British; a strong Amir had been installed whose foreign policy was firmly under British control who would prevent spread of Russian influence, and northern border was formally recognized, violation of which would constitute breach of international law. The British decision to erect Afghanistan as a buffer and Russian desire to keep Britain away from its Asian frontiers had brought a kind of strategic stability through mutual vulnerability. The effectiveness of Afghanistan as buffer depended on the Russian compliance with that buffer arrangement although the geopolitical situation of Afghanistan destined it to become a buffer per excellence.

72. Dupree summed up that to prevent the inevitable armed conflict, the two imperialist powers drew the boundaries around what we today call Afghanistan. The British and the Russians cooperated, in a competitive way, in drawing the boundary to the north and making the final adjustments on the North West in 1986. Significantly final negotiation awards Wakhan Corridor and much of the Pamir mountains of Afghanistan, so that at no point British India would touch Czarist Russia.

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, pp.9-10.
3. Ibid, p.11.
73. Having settled the boundary with Russia, from Oxus to Zulfiqar Pass, Rahman requested the British to send a mission to negotiate boundaries and end the disturbance in Pushtun areas which was the aftermath of second Afghan War. Durand agreement of 1893, settled most of the boundaries between Afghanistan and India, and the demarcation of the new boundary took place between 1874 to 1896. Abdur Rehman stated that: "The short outcome of the conversation (between Durand and Abdur Rehman) was this that the boundary line as agreed upon from Chitral and Broghil Pass upto Peshawar, and thence upto Koh-i-Alik Sujah (the trijunction of Persia, Afghanistan and Baluchistan) in this way that Wakhan, Kaferistan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura and the portion of Wazirstan (Birmal) came under my rule and I renounced by claims from the railway station of New Chaman, Chagai, the rest of Azire, Biland Khel, Kurram, Afridi, Bajuar, Swat, Dir, Chilas and 2 Chitral".

74. Before the delimitation of boundaries with Russia and British India, it was clearly understood by the British that were to be the main influence in the buffer between their empire and Russia. The problem was defining of the borders of Afghanistan. "It can be safely affirmed that modern Afghanistan owes its independence to its peculiar geographical position which makes it

1. For details of Durand Agreement, see Caroe, op.cit, pp.463-466. Also see Imperial Gazetteer of India, op.cit, p.20.
2. Caroe, op.cit, p.381.
the glacis of the fortress of Hindustan. Had it not been for the
fact that the British in India recognized th importance of a
friendly and semi-independent buffer state between them and the
Russians in Central Asia, in all probability Russia would have
advanced beyond the Oxus and the British would have adopted the
Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line as their frontiers of resistance'.
Afghanistan's geo-political situation necessarily determined the
Afghan ruler's foreign policy. Abdur Rehman knew that the powers
that agreed to a buffer between their territories could also
agree to divide the country; the existence of an independent
buffer was desirable at that time, but not vital to his
neighbours. Abdur Rehman had fully understood the precarious
grographical situation of his country and he had realised that
external security of Afghanistan depended upon a delicate
balancing act, exploiting British and Russian rivalry so as to
ensure integrity of his country. Abdur Rehman noted that; "On
both sides of Afghanistan, there are powerful neighbours, namely
England and Russia. Though these neighbours are the cause of much
anxiety to Afghanistan, yet as they are pulling against each
other, they are no less an advantage and potential for
Afghanistan than a danger. Indeed great deal to the safety of

1 Davies, op.cit, p.153.
2 Ghaus, op.cit, p.12
3 Ibid.
these neighbours, cannot bear to allow the other to annex an inch of Afghan territory".

75. Durand line did not solve the British problems in the frontier region, because tribal unrest continued. Like all other Afghan rulers, Abdur Rehman considered the Pushtun tribes one of the bulwarks of Afghanistan. He often used the tribes to pressurise the British or relieve pressure from them. However, he was able to suppress all overt opposition and to bring substantial progress towards achievement of central control. With the British assistance, he suppressed all internal opposition. Unity was established primarily through political measures i.e keeping of hostages from subdued tribes and forced migration of stubborn Pushtuns to uninhabited regions. Despite stigma of Durand Line, the Amir succeeded in building a united Afghanistan.

76. The Great Game in Central Asia came to an end and so far as Afghanistan was concerned, with the acquisition of the status of a buffer, it slipped slowly into oblivion.


4. Ghaus, op.cit, p.16.

5. Ibid, p.11.
77. Habib Ullah succeeded the throne in 1901 and his weak rule tempted both Russia and Britain to resume forward policy. His attitude was one of hostility towards the British and the accession caused a wave of unrest along the frontier regions. The Russains attempted to capitalize upon the Amir's hostility towards the British and made one more bid to gain control over Afghanistan. In February 1901, there was announcement from the Russains to the effect that "the re-establishment of direct relations between Russia and Afghanistan with regard to matters concerning frontier administration is indispensible. To counter the Russians, the British declared North West Frontier Province same year as forward policy of Lord Curzon. This caused unrest in tribal belt which ended when Dane Mission concluded a treaty in March 1905. It was renewal of 1893 Agreement i.e Durand Line as an international Frontier reaffirmed by Afghanistan.

78. Both the imperial powers did not want war. Russia had been defeated by Japan and had internal political agitation, it, therefore, agreed to settle differences with Britain. Anglo-Russian negotiations produced a convention which was signed on 13 August 1907 at Petersburg and the Russains recognized that

2. Davies, op.cit, p.104.
Afghanistan was outside their sphere of influence. Both the powers finally recognized Afghanistan as buffer state and guaranteed its integrity. The Russains agreed to conduct their relations with Afghanistan through the British and the British was not to occupy any territory of Afghanistan or to interfere in country's internal affairs. With the conclusion of this convention, the Great Game between the two powers was finally over.

79. Habib Ullah refused to recognize the convention because he was not a party to it. But how did his objection matter when both; Russia and Britain, said that they would honour the agreement. The sovereignty rights of the Amir had been flouted by the heavy-handed fashion in which the two colonial powers regulated matters pertaining to Afghanistan without even consulting him. However, the Amir visited India same year and promised that at no time will Kabul Pass from the friendship of India; so long as the Indian Empire desires to keep her


3. Roy, op.cit, p.5.


friendship, so long will Afghanistan and British remain friends. 1

80. Habib Ullah came under pressure to declare his support for
the Central Powers especially when Turkey entered the war
against the Allies but he believed that imperatives of survival
necessitated the maintenance of a balance and made neutrality the
natural choice. Neutrality in First World War was declared and
confirmed by the Amir on 3 October 1941. It was to his credit
that he kept his promise with the British inspite of his pro-
Turkish feelings. His reign was an added tribute to the sagacity
of Abdur Rehman, and the able manner in which he preserved Afghan
neutrality during first World War.

81. Russia fell to Communism and the Bolsheviks seized power in
1917. The short-lived alliance between Britain and Russia
collapsed. The two countries once again assumed their mutual
hostile stance in Asia. Lenin and his allies were particularly
eager to incite revolutions in British colonies because Britain
was the main instigator to destroy Bolshevik regime. Leon Trotsky
put it, "the road to Paris and London lies through the towns of
Afghanistan, the Punjab and Bengal". Lenin chose Afghanistan to

1. Davies, op.cit, p.39.
2. Ghaus, op.cit, p.25.
3. Adamac, op.cit, p.86. Also see Fraser-Tytler, op.cit, pp.179
and 194.
5. Ghaus, op.cit, p.29.
7. Ibid.
be one of the first countries to project his unique Marxist
strategic thinking on world politics.

82. Aman Ullah became Amir of Kabul in February 1919 and his
first act was to proclaim Afghanistan's independence and to
request Britain to negotiate a new treaty of friendship on the
basis of equality. Since the British were reluctant to agree to
this request, he decided to use the one divide the British feared
most; a tribal uprising. The frontier was alive with call for
"Jihad" and situation in NWFP became fluid. He announced that
Afghanistan regarded itself free from the British control and
repudiated the Anglo-Russion Convention of 1907 and declared war
on British India in May 1919, and employed Afghan troops in
Waziristan. However, he withdrew his forces soon, for their poor
performance, and the British accepted armistice on 20 May 1919,
ending Third Afghan War, which lasted for a month.

83. On 8 August 1919, a treaty was signed at Rawalpindi. The war
weary (first World War) and wiser Britain accorded full
independence to Afghanistan, by releasing from it all the
limitations on its freedom of action in foreign affairs that had
been imposed in the past. Under this treaty the British

1. Roy, op.cit, p.6.
3. Fraser-Tytler, op.cit, p.198. This was interim treaty which
was made permanent later on.
recognized Afghanistan as a fully sovereign state but Aman Ullah had to pay the price for Afghan independence as he had to recognize the Durand Line; the frontier between Afghanistan and India.

84. The Amir was aware of Communist dangers but for their militant anti-British stance, he wanted to use Russia as leverage against the British. In April 1919, he sent a mission to Soviet Russia to establish friendly relations. Incidentally, on March 27, 1919, the Russia Soviet Federative Socialist Republic became the first in the world to recognize Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty. Lenin warmly welcomed overture of Aman Ullah and stated that "the Soviet government from the first day that they received power have heralded to the whole world their desire


2. Ghaus, op.cit, p.31.

3. Editorial Board, op.cit, p.114. Also see Ghaus, op.cit, p.27, who says that Germany was the first country to recognize Afghan independence not Soviet Russia in 1919.
not merely to recognize the right of self determination of all 1 people, both great and small, but to render assistance". For the first time diplomatic relations were established between Soviet Union and Afghanistan in October 1919. Lenin hoped to have offensive-defensive alliance with Afghanistan to use Afghanistan as stepping stone towards India and ward off the British from Afghanistan to invade Russia respectively. He declared that, "Our policy in the East in not aggressive; it is a policy of peace and friendship". The Soviet Afghan relations developed in a spirit of cooperation and were based on economic, political, cultural and military interests.

85. Afghanistan was no more under control of the British and the Soviets could easily establish their influence over it. The shattering of the international system by First World War, provided Afghanistan with a new set of opportunities. Russia was no longer Czarist and Bolsheviks guaranteed Russian assistance against the British in return of negotiations on status of Panjdeh. The Bolsheviks were eager to draw Afghanistan away from

Britain and gain an ally who would support them in consolidation of their power in the East. On the other hand, tenous Anglo-Afghan relations dissuaded the Afghans from breaking off negotiations with the Russians. Kabul signed a Treaty of Friendship with Moscow on February 22, 1992. The Soviets gave Aman Ullah several small monetary grants and gifts of weapons which partially offset the British influence. However, the interim treaty of 1919 was made permanent after further negotiations and Anglo-Afghan Treaty was signed in Kabul in 1921, where by Afghan government accepted Anglo-Afghan Frontier i.e Durrand Line.

In 1924, Aman Ullah was faced by a rebellion of the Afghans who opposed his internal reforms, and the Soviets came to his rescue with war planes, which bombarded the rebels into submission. In 1926, a treaty of Non-Aggression and Neutrality

1. Adamec, op.cit, p.147.
2. Ghaus, op.cit, p.36.
4. Louis Dupree, "Red Flag Over the Hindu Kush, Part I, Leftist Movement in Afghanistan", Handover, N.Y.; American Field Staff Reports, Asia, No 44, 1979, p.2. Also see Bahadar at al, op.cit, p.13, in which quantity is given as one million gold roubles and 5000 rifles with ammunition.
6. Afghanistan, op.cit, p.448. This treaty is known as Paghman Treaty.
was signed between Soviet Union and Afghanistan. It also re-affirmed equality and respect in their mutual relations. This pact was described as a powerful factor in consolidating Soviet-Afghan friendship and promoting peace in Central Asia. In the same year, a new clause was added in this treaty regarding the peaceful settlement of any dispute that might arise between the countries.

87. Aman Ullah had intensified his efforts to modernize Afghanistan on European style, but tribals and religious leaders revolted against him. The British favoured to remove him, capitalizing on the popular uprising against him. He abdicated on 14 January 1929, and the Soviets tried to help him by sending an expeditionary force but it could not re-install the King. The collapse of the central government in Aman Ullah’s time was the first such crisis the country had faced, and for 9 months Kabul was governed by Bacha Saqao, while much of the rest of the country lapsed into anarchy. The British who had intrigued to overthrow Aman Ullah were afraid of the Russian intervention and wanted to stabilize the turbulent situation created by Bacha Saqao. Muhammad Nadir Shah was found to be suitable as Amir of

2. Rehman and Qureshi, op.cit, p.20.
3. Poullada, op.cit, p.158.
Kabul by the British who became King of Kabul on October 17, 1929, with the British assistance.

88. Nadir Shah and his successor succeeded in rebuilding the control over all the areas of the country late 1930s with the help of the British and the German advisers while the Soviets had been aliensted. The Russians came into Afghanistan across river Oxus in June 1930 in pursuit of Basmachi guerillas who were driven back next year by the Afghan forces for the fear of the Russians and the latter were able to crush the insurgency. Another treaty with the Russians was concluded on June 24, 1931 which was intended to get the Afghan government’s commitment not to allow its territory to be used for anti-Soviet purpose and thereafter Nadir Shah refused to allow northern Afghanistan to be used as base against the Soviets.

89. Nadir Shah was assassinated and his son Zahir Shah ascended the throne in 1933. Prime Minister Hashim Khan ran the affairs of the country for 13 years who followed the policy of neutrality between Soviet Union and Britain, and kept both at distance. He established relations with number of countries including USA,

7. Ghaus, op.cit, p.51. The other countries were France, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other Islamic countries.
with whom Treaty of Friendship was concluded in 1936. In order to balance Afghanistan’s relations with its powerful neighbours, he got aid from Germany, Italy, and Japan. After the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Afghanistan proclaimed its neutrality in the conflict. Second World War had presented a severe challenge to the government because both the British and the Soviet insisted on the interment of the German and Italian advisers. However, throughout the war the Kabul government managed to maintain a precarious independence tied to neutrality. When Britain and Soviet Union became allies, it became easy for the Afghan government to manage neutrality.

90. The Amirs of Afghanistan received the British military and economic help in return for acquiescence in the exclusion of Russia or other third power from relations with the country, for almost a century, while the renowned Great Game between the Russians and the British enabled them consolidation of their empires and have hegemony in Asia. The British assumed their greatest pressure on Afghanistan in developing north western defence of India and in screening out the Russian influence till First World War. The Amirs accepted help and interference in

1. Ibid, pp.56-57.
2. Ibid, p.51.
5. Ghaus, op.cit, p.62.
6. Gregorian, op.cit, p.117.
return for means to defeat their rivals and subdue the tribes and communities who resisted their control. All this gave immense importance to Afghanistan during 19th till mid 20th century because of other powers but throughout this period, there was a power vacuum in the country which was exploited by those power.

91. Prior to the communist revolution period, there were significant changes in the world order after Second World War. On one hand, the European colonialism received severe set back while on the other, USA and USSR emerged as super powers. Both the super powers got busy in Europe after the World War and Afghanistan 1 figured low in its goe-political importance, for some time. At the same time, USA looked upon Afghanistan as the Finland of Asia being contiguous to Soviet Union and made no efforts to establish dominant influence.

92. The departure of the British from India in 1947, left behind independent Pakistan and India, and created a power vacuum in the countries south of Soviet Union. The political situation in the region underwent a fundamental change. Afghanistan found an opportunity and the raised question of Pakhtoonistan, which was strongly supported by Daud, who was Defence Minister. At UN General Assembly Session in 1947, the Afghan diplomat said: "We

2. Ibid.
cannot recognize the people of North West Frontier Province have not been given the opportunity, free from any kind of influence, to become part of Pakistan". The Durand Agreement which was reaffirmed by the subsequent Afghan rulers has an important bearing on the Pakhtoonistan issue. Kabul advanced an argument that the Durand Line cannot be represented as an international frontier and lapsed with the transfer of power in 1947. In 1949, the Afghan parliament declared that it did not recognize the Durand Line or any similar line and in the same year backed a so-called Pakhtoonistan government established by Faqir of Ipi. In 1950, the Afghan King and Prime Minister made anti-Pakistan speeches at JASHAN celebration in Kabul and Pakhtoonistan flag was hoisted. After border clashes, Pakistan closed the frontiers in 1950 and same Soviet Union signed a trade agreement with Afghanistan. When Pakistan halted the transit movement of goods to Afghanistan, Soviet Union offered free transit rights.

93. USA and USSR were locked up in cold war, after Second World

2. Caroe, op.cit, p.382. The argument is not valid. For details see Mazari, op.cit, pp.41-43.
War dividing the allies into two antagonistic camps, with their territorial interests, global interests, ideological rivalries and desire to dominate the world. With Khruschev's rise to power in 1953, Soviet Union began to count the Third World countries and compete with USA in economic aid programmes. The nations chose up sides in cold war, particularly in the days of John Foster Dulles. USA and USSR involved many nations in regional military alliances and bilateral military pacts. Pakistan entered into alliances like SEATO in 1954 and Baghdad pact (later CENTO) in 1955 which were designed to contain Soviet Union and the later got antagonized with Pakistan. At the same time Pakistan joined RCD amongst Iran, Pakistan and Turkey with the US backing while Afghanistan failed to obtain military aid from US. Pakistan's joining the military alliances brought the cold war at Afghanistan's door-steps. USA did not arm Afghanistan because of

5. Ibid.
the following reasons:

a. Few in Pentagon thought that Russians would be in position to arm or even want to arm the land-locked country.

b. Afghans wanted a definite commitment of American support if arms antagonized the Russians.

c. The Americans did not want to antagonize Pakistan; the new ally.

94. The Americans thought Soviet Union will not enter in competition with it because of devastation caused in second World War and therefore Afghanistan loomed low in US plans, but Khruschev articulated that 'the ultimate victory of world communism through peaceful economic competition with capitalist countries in the developing world is the answer, and the Soviet people must accept sacrifices to achieve this goal. Before Daud came to power in 1953, Afghanistan was reaping a rich harvest of economic aid from the East as well as the West; USA, West Germany, Italy, Japan and Soviet Union but he tilted towards the Russians, at least, in the matter of defence. After the joining of military pacts by Pakistan, Khrushev and Bulganin visited

1. Inside Afghanistan, op.cit, p.67. In fact, USA was not willing to give military aid to non-aligned Afghanistan. For details see Roy, op.cit, p.10.


3. Awan, op.cit, p.16.
Afghanistan in December 1955 and supported Afghanistan on Pakhtoonistan issue. When Pak-Afghan border was closed because of Pakhtoonistan issue, second time in 1955 the Soviets once again had the opportunity of extending transit facilities to Afghanistan. Daud turned to Soviet Union for aid and an economic agreement was signed between the two countries on January 28, 1956 and he got $100 million aid against $ 3.5 million in 1954. Same year another agreement was signed with Moscow for arms deal worth $ 25 million to modernize armed forces. Afghanistan’s ‘big gamble’ had started with the introduction of massive Soviet assistance. About the economic aid given to Afghanistan when questioned, Khruschev said. "... It is my strong feeling that the capital which we have invested in Afghanistan has not been wasted. We have earned the Afghan trust in Friendship, and it has not hook baited with American money". In fact it was because of Pakistan’s joining of western alliances that Soviet Union aided Afghanistan to counter USA influence.

1. Wilber, op.cit, pp.184-185.
5. Ibid.
95. US bilateral commitments to Pakistan in 1959 disturbed Soviet Union as well as Afghanistan, and when in 1921, border situation worsened between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Soviet Union declared that it could not remain indifferent. The closure of Pak-Afghan border in September 1961, because of Pakhtoonistan issue, brought down fall of Saud and he resigned in 1963. Until border opened in May 1963, the Afghans had increasingly to depend on over land transit route through USSR and many Afghans feared that the Soviet would entrap Afghanistan through default. However, there was a great competition in building roads from south to north, Soviet Union north to south and the roads obviously had to link up. The Afghan dependence on USSR had risen from almost nothing in 1950 to 100% for arms supply in 1960. Daud brought about rapid changes in social and economic institutions but political growth stagnated.

96. After the exit of Daud from power, the Afghan government played down the Pakhtoonistan issue. Daud had himself realized, towards the end of his rule that the Soviet interests in Afghanistan had lowered because it tried to improve relations,

1. Anthony, op.cit, p.35.

2. Inside Afghanistan, op.cit, p.70.

3. Ibid, p.70. Infact, both countries were having cooperation rather competing in giving economic aid to Afghanistan. For details, see Afghanistan, op.cit, pp.526-530.

changing its policy on Pakhtoonistan issue and offering economic aid to Pakistan. The economic aid started falling and when Afghanistan needed more foreign investment, its flow diminished considerably. Detente was gradually taking the place of cold war in the relations of super-powers. The original race between them to gain influence in Afghanistan through economic aid, transferred into a tacit partnership. Soviet investment dropped from $ 28.4 million in 1967-68 to $ 30.5 million in 1968-69 and to $ 28.4 million in 1969-70. It is, however, significant that by 1967, the armed forces of Afghanistan became totally dependent on Soviet Union including logistic system and the latter had a long measure of control over Afghan military operations.

97. While Daud’s regime continued generally oppressive style of rule adopted by Hashim Khan in 1930s, there was some development in the political field when Daud left. In the wake of new constitution in 1964, limited rights were granted to people. The first foundation congress of the Peoples Democratic Party of

Afghanistan (PDPA) was held on January 1, 1965 and committee of seven members was formed including Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. The PDPA programme declared that the final goal of socialism in Afghanistan. In 1967, PDPA split in several factions, the two important being Khaliq headed by Taraki and Parcham headed by Karmal. Taraki favoured Leninist-type party based on the working class while Karmal wanted to form a broad national democratic front.

Meanwhile Soviet Union noticed with concern the Afghanistan’s cold attitude towards its Asian Collective Security Scheme and could not permit Kabul to adopt an independent neutral posture in international affairs. In early 1970s, there was again a change in Afghanistan when Daud came in power after a bloodless coup on July 17, 1973. He owed his return to Parcham wing of PDPA and he committed himself to the social programme and pro-Soviet posture of the Marxists. He suspended 1964 constitution and

1. Bahadar et al, op.cit, p.22. Also see Hyman, op.cit, p.54.
2. Bahadar et al, op.cit, p.22. Also see Hyman, op.cit, pp.58-59.
3. Hammond, op.cit, p.32. Also see Hyman, op.cit, pp.58-59, who mentions two more groups i.e. Shula-i-Jawed and Setem-i-Milli which were pro-Peking.
4. It was in 1969 that this scheme was floated by Soviet Union for the first time.
5. Alvi, op.cit, p.33.
formed a committee to run the government whose members were mostly leftists. He started hostility towards Pakistan and said in his speech on 17 July 1973, "Pakistan is the only country with which we have a political difference, the question of Pakhtoonistan. Our constant efforts to find a solution will continue". In 1974, he gave his endorsement to the Soviet Union's plan for Asian Collective Security Scheme, indicated hostility towards Iran and supported the dissident Pashtuns and Baluch in Pakistan.

99. Afghanistan's dependence on Moscow for economic and industrial development increased during 1973-78. Since the period of Daud's first regime till 1974, Moscow offered $900 million worth of aid to Kabul, although actual utilization over the same period was $600 million. In 1975, the value of Afghanistan's trade with the Soviet Union was $162.84 million. In military aid, Afghanistan was supplied with 350 tanks, over 400 guns and 189 mortars, along with combat aircrafts and infantry combat vehicles.

100. United States had realized that Afghanistan had to maintain good relations with Soviet Union but wanted it to be truly independent and also wanted to keep Pakistan out of unnecessary

problems and did not wish it to be dismembered by Pushtuns and 1 Baluch. So, Shah of Iran promised to provide $2 million in economic aid over a period of 15 years to replace USSR, and under 2 Daud to develop friendly relations with Pakistan. 101. In the last year of rule, Daud made following moves that indicated his growing independence and may have annoyed the Soviets:—

a. His playing down of Pukhtoonistan issue.

b. Sending of Afghan military personnel for training in India and Egypt and increased number sent to USA, although majority still went to Soviet Union.

c. His steps taken to strengthen his ties with truly non-aligned members, questioning Cuba regarding its neutrality.

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1. Ibid, p.39.
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
d. His visits to India, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, Turkey and Yugoslavia in early spring 1978, later in April to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt, and projected visit to USA.

e. Signing of protocol with China on March 21, 1978 for increase of trade and 100 million Yuan aid for industry.

f. His talks with Brezhnev in Moscow in April 1977 to be more independent in foreign relations.

g. Agreement with Pakistan in March 1978 to expel the Pushtun and Baluchi insurgents operating from Afghan territory, in the wake of raids across the border in summer 1975 since he was convinced that he could not


3. Hussain and Rizvi, op.cit, p.61. Also see Ghaus, op.cit, pp.179-181.

play with fire because Pakistan’s military capabilities were substantial.

n. In 1975, Daud had begun to purge the Parcham leaders.

j. Finally, he had asked for the right of self determination of the people of Ogaden to resolve conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia during his visit to Saudi Arabia in April 1978.

102. The two factions of PDPA; Khlaq and Parcham had come together and a united PDPA had emerged in July 1977, While there was political vacuum growing around Daud which was accompanied by a change in his foreign policy. He had also resorted to persecute the religious conservatives; Ikhwan-i-Musalamin. Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbaddin Hekmatyar had fled to Pakistan and had set up resistance organizations against Daud. His atrocities had infused a new life into the movement himself; he held 6 cabinet posts at one time, and reliance on few figures alienated many.

1. Newell and Newell, op.cit, p.47. He dealt with Parchamis as well Khlaqis cynically. See Hyman, op.cit, p.66.


3. Bahadar er al, p.25. Also see Hyman, op.cit, p.70.


In spite of overwhelming dependence on Russia, Kabul maintained a non-aligned foreign policy and had secured friendly relations with both the Soviet and the Western bloc without undertaking alliance commitments to either but this non-alignment did not work because the Soviets had disapproved Daud. He was soon to be removed by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan; the communists had been getting active and organized for the last decade and re-united in 1977 after 10 years of bickering.

103. The struggle to maintain power while relaxing authority, was to dominate the political scene for a quarter of a century, until monarchy lost control over the process in 1973 but Daud's republic did not survive to solve the problems, rather he had become more authoritative. The Marxists seized power in April 1978 who stepped into a vacuum created by the earlier conditions because multiplying problems of change, unity and national independence had not been coped with and resolved.

104. Nur Muhammad Taraki seized power through a bloody coup in Kabul. The new PDPA regime in its first public statement on 7 May 1978 said that the revolution guidelines were Afghan nationalism, respect for Islam, social and economic justice, bilateral non-alignment in foreign affairs and respect for all agreements by previous regime with other countries, and Afghans

1. Newell and Newell, op.cit, p.52.
3. Ibid, p.34. Also see Bahadar et al, op.cit, p.25, for instability of Daud's regime.
cheered the change. A just and egalitarian system that the regime was reformist, constructive and the love for Islam. However, soon there were indications that the coup was proletarian and Kabul was aligned towards Soviet Union, such as renaming Afghanistan as Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on 9 May 1978, changing of flag to red, signing of treaty with USSR and party organized on the Soviet lines.

105. The Soviet influence increased because numerous economic treaties were signed with USSR. On December 5, 1978 the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation, committing them to strengthen and broaden their cooperation in many fields incuding military. This treaty reaffirmed earlier treaties of 1921 and 1931 and went far beyound in its terms and significance. USA had moderate policy towards the new regime and aid remained in the tune of $ 20 million inspite of Taraki revolution.

1. Insides Afghanistan, op.cit, p.76. Also see Hammond, op.cit, pp.59-60 and Wakman, op.cit, p.107.
3. Hammond, op.cit, pp.61-62. Also see Newell and Newell, op.cit, p,85.
4. Hammond, op.cit, p.61
6. Noorani, op.cit, p.48. Also see Wakman, op.cit, pp.11-114.
106. By summer 1978, the precarious Parcham - Khalq unity fell apart and their strike became open hostility, each trying to annihilate the other. The struggle for power started as well and on 15 September 1979, Hafiz Ullah Amin ousted Taraki. Amin was found repressive and an agent of CIA by the Soviet, and Karmal was installed towards end of December 1979 as Brezhnev had decided to intervene to save future of communism and Soviet interests in Afghanistan.

107. The historical perspective are attached as Map I.

2. Ibid. Also see Murtaza, op.cit, p.57.
4. Ghaous, op.cit, p.207. Karmal has been named as Shah Shuja of 20th century but there was no suitable King to replace him. See Awan, op.cit, p.18.
5. Murtaza, op.cit, p.57.
CHAPTER 2

THE RESISTANCE

General

108. In the winter of 1978, opposition of a serious nature began in remote provinces where central authority had never been strong. Hazarjat, Badakhshan and the Nuristan track of Kunar were regions in which large areas had become virtually independent of the Kabul government. By spring 1979, by locally organized resistance which had little or nothing to do with any of the exile parties based in Peshawar, from which they were in any case remote.

109. The Nuristani risings were inspired by Mohammad Anwar Amin, a 36 year-old Nuristani from Kunar. Anwar Amin rallied several thousand Nuristanis against the new regime, which in Kunar, as in many other regions, was identified early on as anti-religious repression and too close to the Russians to be good nationalists. Although the Nuristani front set up by Amin had merely a few old rifles (303 and Mausers), it took police posts with the use of armour and controlled much of the Kunar valley by the spring of 1979.

110. In the central Afghanistan (Hazarajat) risings began at Behsud in the South and Yakawlang in the North. There was no one leader to unite Hazaras over a much wider area than the Kunar valley, but local tribal leadership proved strong and effective in the wild terrain of the Hindukush mountains. There were few police posts or army garrisons, except at the extreme edges of

the Hazarajat region. Bamiyan, strategically the most significant of these, changed hands three times over the next year, with fierce fighting in the ravines and passes leading to it.

111. The mountainous province of Badakhshan, in the remote northeast, was a region well suited to residence, with existing ultra-left groups of Shula-i-Jawed (Eternal flame) and Setem-i-Milli (against national oppression). Well trained in sabotage, small groups of Tajiks struck at the lines of military communications, blowing up bridges to cut off by road, isolated garrisons of the army. Also active were the Muslim fundamentalists, connected to but independent of the Jamiat-i-Islami in Peshawar in important respects the difficulty in communications and the winter snows effectively ending contacts for some four months. The two main garrisons of the army were at Faizabad, the provincial capital and at Ishkamish, close to the frontier with Tajikistan - where the Wakhan corridor juts out some 200 miles across frozen glaciers to touch Chinese territory in the little Pamirs. Badakhshan and Hazarajat were the most isolated centre of resistance of all the Afghan regions, along with Nuristan, with a mere trickle of arms, ammunition or indeed supplies of any description coming in from other regions or from outside.

112. Nigrahhar and Pakhtya bordered directly onto tribal territories of NWFP of Pakistan, with close links between tribes, ease of communication and an open border. These Pashtun lands are well irrigated, producing rich crops, while smuggling routes controlled by the tribes have long made them able to afford to buy rifles and lay in ammunition in large-quantities.
113. The tribal challenge to strong military garrisons in the southern provinces grew gradually from spring 1979, remaining localized and disunited within small areas and even within tribes. By October, fighting had broken out in villages of the south and south-east, resulting in refugees, taking what many imagined would be temporary shelter across the Pakistani borders—mainly in Waziristan, where almost 10,000 had come from Pakhtya to Miran Shah and further North, from Nigrahar and Kunar to Mohmand and Bajaur agencies.

114. The inevitably, the fragmented resistance movement was divided along regional, ethnic and sectarian lines. Local groups, coordinated their activities, only within the limits of distinct regional or linguistic communities. Most important in these respect were the Nuristanis, Badakhshaniis, Hazaras, and the numerous Pushtun tribes.

115. Since 1978, at least ten resistance organizations established headquarters in Pakistan. Their leadership and ideological programs represented a wide spectrum of Afghan society of political ideology. From the very beginning they found it difficult to cooperate with each other or to give effective support to the groups fighting inside the country.

116. Although more than dozen resistance groups established their offices in Peshawar, the Chief Islamic groups headquartered and recognized by Pakistan were seven in number (they were basically more or less the same once that attacked the Khalqí regimes of Taraki and Amin.

1. Ibid. p. 15
117. All these groups/parties had their distinct identities and strategies, and except for one common objective of defeating the Soviets they had little to do with each other. The resistance has manifested itself as local opposition under local leaders to government, rather than as coordinated or a national movement.

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118. In fact, when the communists took over control of Afghanistan in 1978, the introduction of communism-based reforms proved to be the main catalysts in fuelling the Afghan resistance movement. These reforms came as a rude shock to the people, seen as aimed at destroying the very integrity of the social and economic traditions. The reforms came to be regarded as symbols of atheism and were bitterly resented throughout the country. Starting in some of the more remote regions of Afghanistan, clusters of resistance began to emerge under the leadership of local chiefs and religious leaders.

119. When Soviet Union involved military in Afghanistan, the character of the resistance also changed. The civil war became a national liberation movement and the resistance spread throughout the length and breadth of the country with roots in some 36,000 villages encompassing all 31 provinces and all of Afghanistan's ethno-linguistic, tribal and socio-cultural groups.

120. The resistance groups (Table A) which were based in Pakistan and recognised by Pakistan besides aid giving agencies and Iran based groups/parties have been summerized in the proceeding paragraphs.

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Hizb-e-Islami (Gulbadin Hikmatyar)

121. Major characteristic of this group were:-

   a. Was the strongest and most effective political grouping in the resistance alliance against the Kabul regime.

   b. Gulbadin claimed to have 50,000 follower but there was a fair amount of exaggeration in this figure. His organized cadres numbered not more than 30,000, approximately 4,000 of whom were full time fighters.

   c. Was inclined towards the Jamiat-e-Islami, Pakistan and other countries specially Saudi Arabia for financial support.

   d. Established the first and the only clandestine radio broadcasting station operating from inside Afghanistan with the financial support of various friendly/Islamic countries.

   e. The late President Zia gave the maximum support for his

1. Data Compiled by Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, October 1988; Also see Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crises, Institute of PHA
leader was fiercely anti-Soviet and strong enough to continue the Jihad due to better battle field organising ability, discipline and integrity.

f. Was largely consisted of Pashtuns of north eastern and eastern Afghanistan. They also operated around Kabul (Paghman Hill) and Qandahar.

g. Was well organized, better disciplined and extremely effective of all other resistance groups.

h. His leader was appointed foreign minister in the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) but he left the AIG calling it defunct and non-existent as it had not been able to move into Afghanistan besides his differences with other Afghan leaders, which were deep-rooted and mostly irreconcilable.

j. Insisted that the future Government in Afghanistan must be 100% Islamic.

k. Engineer Gulbudin was former engineering student who completed his studies at Kabul university. He was amongst the first group to leave Afghanistan.

**Hizb-e-Islami Maulvi Yunus Khalis**

122. Details were as under:

a. Maulvi Younis Khalis established it in 1979 after breaking away from Hikmatyar. He called the struggle for independence a war between Islam and "Kufr" (atheism).

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b. Were the first recipient of the American Stringer 1 missile. In one of the encounters on the front line, the party base was attacked by helicopter gunships. Three men were killed and Maulvi Yunus narrowly escaped death.

c. Were never prepared to compromise on the following basic objectives of the "Jehad".

(1) Complete elimination of the PDPA.

(2) Establishment of an Islamic state in accordance with the Quran, Sunnah and the Shariah.

d. Maulvi Khalis did not accept the modern concept of elections and term it to be un-Islamic and not practical in the present circumstances where all factions were armed. In October 1987, Maulvi Khalis was elected President of the Islamic unity of Afghan Mujahideens.

e. Fighting strength was about 10,000. Main operational

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areas were in the province of Nangarhar, Paktia and Kunar. Maulvi Khalis participated along with others around Jalalabad and Kabul.

f. The Hizb was supported by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

g. Another significant aspect of this organization was the presence of Afghan army defectors in its active fighting cadres.

Jamiat-e-Islami (Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani)

123. Details were as under:-

   a. Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani founded the party in 1967 and was selected its leader in 1972. His party represented the third major alliance of the Mujahideens.

   b. The leader achieved a lot of support for his party from the students and succeeded in building a strong base for himself in early seventies. Because of his orthodox views, his comparatively less rigid attitude and a more humane approach to the members of his group, he was able to attract a large number of defectors from other parties.

   c. The Jamiat had been conducting guerrilla operations inside Afghanistan since 1974. Its main target was Panjsher valley.

   d. The party is religiously oriented and wanted a strictly Islamic state in Afghanistan.

   e. The strength of the Jamiat was around 20,000.

   f. They were well organised and a strong base but did not have much support among the rural masses. They were more moderate and willing to cooperate with other groups.


Attehad-e-Islami (Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf)

124. Details were as under:-

a. Generally it is said that the group was inclined towards Saudi Arabia and followed the Wahabi sect of Islam.

b. Sayyaf acted as Prime Minister of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in February 1989.

c. The group remained inclined towards Hizbe-e-Islami and the Jamiat in implementation of policies.

d. Claimed a strength of about 20,000 Mujahideens mostly in the Paghman province near Kabul.

Harakat-e-Inqilabi (Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi)

125. Salient features were:-

a. In 1978, it was founded in Quetta, Baluchistan.

b. Strength of group was estimated at about 20,000 and operated mainly in Ghazni, Kabul and Herat.

c. Initially the group was fairly strong in the eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan but later on the group was less effective due to shortage of weapons as compared to availability of weapons with other groups.

d. Remained cooperaed with all other resistance groups to

1. Ibid, p.25.

2. Authenticity is not confirmed from any source except as claimed by party leader.
oust the Najib government but never favoured military conflict in Afghanistan after withdrawal of Soviet troops.

e. Prefer a "Loya Jirgah" (unelected grand assembly of tribal elders) over an elected parliament type of government.

Mahaz-e-Milli Islami Afghanistan (Pir Sayyed Ahmad Effendi Gailani)

126. Major characteristics of this group were as under:-

a. In December 1978, it was formed with headquarters in Peshawar.

b. Had a strength of about 18,000 and operated mainly from Paktia province along the Pak-Afghan border.

c. Did not receive the military support needed to influence the unfolding events in Afghanistan.

d. Active field commanders included Amin Wardak (operated around Kabul and Ghazni) and Syed Naim (operated around Kabul).

e. It was more active in the early stages of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan than in later days.


127. Salient aspects included:—

a. In December 1978 it was formed, as stated by Mojedddidi himself.

b. Operated mostly from Qandahar, Farah and Baghlan.

c. Toed the lines of Zahir Shah and always used the royal emblem for his Afghan National Front.

d. Favoured the acceptance of non-communist elements in Afghan regime provided elections were held under the supervision of the UN.

e. Advocated one party over existing seven political parties based in Pakistan.

f. Estimated strength was about 18,000.

g. Had also the support of Muslim intellectuals from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states.


3. Nancy Newell, op.cit, p.93
Nine Parties Alliance — Based in Iran

128. The alliance included the following parties:

a. Shura-e-Ittfaq - Islami (Ali Behishti)
b. Dawat-e-Ittehad-Islami (Mahaqqiq)
c. Sazman - Nayroye - Islami (Qaher Mohaqqaq)
d. Shohdan - Jehad - Islami
e. Nuzhat - e - Islami (Akhlagi)
f. Harakat - e - Islami (Javed)
g. Nasr (Khalili)
h. Hizb-ullah (Zamani)
129. It may be pointed out that most of the Iranian political parties except those mentioned above appeared only on papers. All the political parties, however, had the singular aim of freeing Afghanistan from the Soviets. They remained in the parameters of Iranian foreign policy of neither East nor West. They were not under any major obligations of super powers as they were not given enough weapons and equipment. Their decisions were free from any global political pressures. They normally received central guidance and directions and followed easily as the political parties were having mostly united Shia people unlike Peshawar based political parties.

Shura-i-Engelab-Ettafaq-e-Islami (Syed Ali Behishti)

130. Details were as under :-

a. In 1979 it was formed in Hazarajat area, but offices remained in Pakistan and Iran.

b. Well organized Shia party with own political, social and military branches.

c. Fighting strength was between 4000 to 8000.

d. It controlled 60 percent of the population by 1983 only, but it did not appear in nine constituent parties of the Islamic Unity Party formed in July 1990.

e. Was effective only in the Central and Northern provinces of Afghanistan.

Sazman-e-Nasr (Mir Hoseyn Sadiequi/Abdul Karim Khalili)

131. Details of this group were:-

a. It was formed in 1980.
b. Its strength included 1500 fighters and about 4,000 supporters. Majority of these fighters and supporters were Shia from Hazarajat.

c. While controlling at least 25% of the Hazarajat population, main areas of operation were Helmand and Bomiyan.

Harakat - e- Islami (Mohammad Asif Mohseni)

132. It was led by Mohammad Asif Mohseni in the early years, but during 1990, the party chief was Ismail Javed.

The strength of the Afghan Mujahideens stemmed from a number of characteristics, some of them were:

a. The struggle was a widely popular uprising well grounded in most parts of the country, including Kabul, Herat and Kandahar, the three main cities. Its popularity could be judged by the fact that the two main tribes, the Jajji and Mengal, buried a centuries-long feud to join force. Even those who justify Soviet intervention felt a little ashamed that it had to happen. This provided just enough support for the desperate opposition groups to carry on.

b. The Mujahideens had popular support and high morale because they were the population itself. On this basis Afghan commanders also raised resources by the taxes collected from peasants in the jurisdiction of their liberated areas. In addition, people working in the offices and factories provided them with funds. The Mujahideens received substantial revenues from the Takhar salt mines and the Badakhshan and Punjsher emerald mines. The motivation for the funds collection could be imagine from the fact that often the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and Iran, donated towards the Mujahideen funds from their subsistence allowance.

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c. Morale of the Mujahideens remained high because many Afghans were convinced that they would eventually win because Allah was on their side during their Jehad. Tales of miracle also abounded in Peshawar; gas was said to have blown back on the Soviets by a change in the wind, birds used to give a group of guerrillas warning of Russian approach, besides scorpions attacked Russian billets at night.

d. The terrain of Afghanistan favoured the Mujahideens. It is mountainous, rugged, extremely difficult and devoid of communication. In such a terrain no mechanized force, as the Soviet Army was, could operate with ease but to the Afghans this terrain was a friend and they exploited it with great ease.

e. Afghan did suffer heavy losses but on the other hand arms, ammunition and manpower supplies were reaching them through large scale defections from the Afghan Army.

134. As the resistance grew stronger and the Soviet presence more visible, Afghan army units were increasingly inclined to join the Mujahideens groups. In many cases arms and equipment were sold to the fighters for cash and a promise that the supplying units would be exempted from attacks. The Afghan army proved even less effective against the resistance was the fact of deserting regiments. The defectors brought with them their weapons and ammunition. The Soviets tried to halt this flow of modern weapons to the resistance by confiscating all of Kabul army’s anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. They even stripped the Afghan armoured division of their tanks. Some Afghan army personnel acted as "fifth column", and supplied the Mujahideens with the weapons. Their was strong evidence that collusion with the resistance became more widespread in the ill-disciplined Afghan army. Muhammad Sulaiman, an army Colonel who commanded a regiment size unit in Kunar province, now in Pakistan, claimed that he supplied Mujahideens in his region with millions of rounds of small arms and ammunition.

135. The Soviet grossly under-estimated the depth and the intensity of the Afghan resistance, out of 29 provinces (now 31

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provinces) there were 17 where the resistance remained at its fiercest intensity. These were Kandhar, Herat, Zabul, Ghazni, Paktya, Haydan, Gamyen, Kabul, Nangarhar, Konar, Badakhshan, Baghlan, Tayhar, Maydan, Kuna and Gamyen. Mujahideens tried to create strong centres in cities like Panchsher, Mazar-e-Sharif, Badakhshan etc. Particularly in Panchsher, the Mujahideens under the command of Shah Masoud gave enormous resistance to the Soviet combat troops. The dynamic revolutionary leadership of young Shah Masoud made him a popular leader among the Mujahideens group fighting inside Afghanistan. The combat effectiveness of Masoud and his armed group in the Panchsher valley illustrated the ever increasing capability of the resistance to pursue a successful war of attrition against the Soviet backed Kabul authorities.

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136. Divisions within the Afghan population fell traditionally into the following three categories:
   a. Linguistic, between those who speak Dari and those who speak Pushtu.
   b. Religious, the Sunni majority and Shiites,
   c. Ethnic between Pushtuns and other minorities.

137. None of these conflicts were ever entirely resolved since the Soviet military involvement to date. Afghanistan's tribal traditions make unity elusive for either side in conflict. One of the undercurrents of the fighting was a fundamental conflict between these political groups that were seeking to extend their authority throughout the country and individual tribes that were deeply suspicious of outsiders. And while it was the political parties with their spokesmen in Peshawar and their links to arm suppliers that learnt to promote their interests in world press, most of the active fighting groups inside Afghanistan were organized like most of Afghan life itself, along tribal and feudal lines. As for the political parties based in Peshawar and elsewhere, they had no authority, no tradition and no laws. The Afghan tribes have existed for centuries. Keeping in mind tribal background, differences among political leaders and their divergent interests and techniques, one can conclude that the resistance groups were not posed for any major victory, unless they decided to unite and adopt a common objective.
### MUJAHIDEEN ALLIANCES/COMPOSITION

138. **Seven Party Alliance Based in Pakistan.** Formed on 16 April 1985. It was predominantly Sunni:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Hizb-e-Islami</td>
<td>Gulbadin Hixmatyar</td>
<td>30,000 to 40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Hizb-e-Islami</td>
<td>Maulvi Younis Khalis</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Khalis)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Ittehad-e-Islami</td>
<td>Abdul Rasul Saif</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Jamiat-e-Islami</td>
<td>Burhanudin Rabbani</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Harkat-e-Inqilab</td>
<td>Maulvi Muhammad Nabi</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Jaba Nijat-e-Milli</td>
<td>Sibghat Ullah Mujadadi</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Mahaz-e-Milli</td>
<td>Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani (Agha Effendi)</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

139. **Nine Party Alliance Based in Iran.** Formed on 16 September 1987. Was predominantly Shia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Nasar Movement</td>
<td>Muhammad Karim Khalili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Harkat-e-Islami</td>
<td>Muhammad Ali Javed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Pasdaran-e-Jehad</td>
<td>Murad Ali Asani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Nizhat-e-Islami</td>
<td>Ishaq Ikhlasi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Hizbullah-e-Afghanistan</td>
<td>Muhammad Zahir Zamani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Jibha Muttahid</td>
<td>Ismat Ullah Irfani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Dawa-e-Islami</td>
<td>Ramzan Ali Mohaqeq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Neru-i-Islami</td>
<td>Hassan Hashmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Giroh-e-Itifaw</td>
<td>Mehdi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

140. Prominent Independent Groups/Field Commanders. All based in Afghanistan:

b. Bashir Dawlatzai in Baghlan.
c. Mullah Malang in Kandhar
d. Mullah Nasim in Helmand.
e. Captain Ismail in Herat.
f. Syed Jaglan in Ghazni.
g. Farid in Kapisa.
h. Mullah Jalaluddin Haqqani in Paktia.
j. Bashir Khalid in Bada.

141. For "Afghanistan and Surrounding Areas", "Durrani Empire", "Afghan Political Parties" and "Afghan Ethnic Divisions", Please see Annexes A to D.
DURRANI EMPIRE (1747 - 1763)
AFGHANISTAN - ETHNIC DIVISIONS

SOURCE: ASIA STUDY CENTRE, ISMAILIAD
CHAPTER 3

SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN (1979 - 1988)

Major Causes

"And fight in the way of God with those who fight with you, but aggress not: Allah loves not the aggressors. And slay them whenever you come upon them, and expel them for where they expelled you; persecution is more grievous than slaying"

"And those who are slain in the way of Allah, He will not send their works astray. He will guide them, and dispose their minds aright, and He will admit them to Paradise, that He has made known to them."

"My spirit will remain in Afghanistan, though my soul will go to Allah. My last words to you, my son and successor are: Never trust the Russians." 

142. The Soviet move into Afghanistan was initially interpreted by most analysts as part of a grand design aimed at world domination. Over the years however, many analysts have begun to doubt this and instead tried and explained the Soviet invasion in largely "defensive" terms. The principle arguments of both camps are analyzed in subsequent paragraphs. However, it is worth keeping in mind that, as in all such complex situations, the Soviets probably involved their forces in Afghanistan for not one but a variety of reasons. Brezhnev himself was quoted by Pravda as saying, "it was no simple decision."

143. The former Soviet Union's military involvement in a defenceless, poorly equipped and trained country, sent shock waves to the entire world, as 80,000 Soviet troops in Hindu Kush changed the balance of power in the region. Geo-strategic situation was badly effected as large number of aircraft of former USSR were present only at a distance of 480 Kilometres from the Gulf. There could be many causes of pushing such a large military and airforce power into Afghanistan, but detailed anaysis of the Afghan war unfold a number of causes, which have been summerized in the following paragraphs.

**Quest for a Warm Water Port**

144. Although the USSR, like Tsarist Russia, is the predominant resident power on the Eurasian Continent, geography has been very "cruel" to her in the sense that it has left her virtually landlocked. In the north, her access to the world is frozen in winter. In the west, Europe blocks her entry into the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. In the south, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan deny her a passage to the Arabian Sea. Lastly, in the east, China and Korea separate her from the South China Sea, while Vladivostok, her sole warm water port, is "neutralized" by South Korean and Japanese domination of the strait of Tsushima. Her problems today are uncomfortably accentuated by the fact that her principal adversary is the world's dominant sea power. Russian strategists have, over the last two hundred years, sought to remedy this through a steady, but relentless drive to the seas. In this respect they seem to have drawn upon the advice

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and thinking of two of their great strategists, Peter the Great - and Prince Gorchakov.

145. Peter the Great's Legacy. Fifty-one years prior to the birth of the United States Peter the Great died, leaving behind his celebrated will in which he advised his subjects to

...approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Consequently, excite continual wars, not only in Turkey, but in Persia . . . . And, in the decadence of Persia, Penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf . . . . . advance 1 as far as India.

(In today's world, "India" ought to be read as "Pakistan")

146. Prince Gorchakov. While Czar Peter outlined the "Grand Design," Prince Gorchakov seems to have articulated the "operational strategy " by stating;

The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which are brought into contact with half savage nomad populations. . . . In such cases it always happens that the more civilized state is forced, in the interest of the security of its frontiers . . . . . . . . to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their

turbulence and unsettled character made most undesirable neighbors . . . . . the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to the state of more or less perfect submission. This result, once obtained, these tribes take to more peaceful habits, but are in turn exposed to attacks of more distant tribes.

147. This would seem to imply the necessity for yet further conquests to protect their earlier conquests! (see Figure 1.) History shows that Tashkent was conquered in 1865, Samarkand in 1868, Khiva in 1873, Bukhara in 1876, Ashkhabad and Mary in 1886 till finally, subjugation of Panjdeh in 1885 brought Russia onto the borders of Afghanistan. This finally woke up Britain to the potential danger to her Indian Empire and began what Rudyard Kipling romanticized as "The Great Game." The end result, after much conflict, including two disastrous British invasions of Afghanistan, was the institutionalizing of Afghanistan as a buffer between the two empires.

148. By 1880 the Soviets had moved up to the Afghan border after taking control of the Central Asian Khanates of Khiva, Samarkand and Bokhara. The Tsars of Russia had always their eyes on the warm water ports in the south to control the world economy. The Soviets having naval supremacy in Indian Ocean had since long enough of naval ships facilities and number of ships in these water. Warm water ports were made available by Ethiopia and South Yemen in the west and Kam Rahn Bay in the east to cherish their long term desired to capture the warm waters with ease. Latest technology, long range nuclear missile had also reduced the dependance on large distance bases. This historical compulsion of the Russians was, however no longer valid. With the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan in May 1989, not only they were humiliated in front of the entire world but also disintegration of USSR took place resulting into creation of Central Asian States.

Brezhnev doctrine

149. On one point, at least, there is controversy, i.e., defense of communism was certainly amongst the principal reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Ever since the success of their gamble in invading Hungary in 1956, the Soviets have staunchly maintained their "right" to intervene whenever a communist regime is threatened with "counterrevo-lution," particularly on their borders. This long time policy was turned into an "ideological principle" by the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine justifying the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the case of Afghanistan, a monarchy under King Zahir Shah or a republic under President Daoud could be "tolerated" as a neighbour without the
Kremlin feeling the necessity to mount an invasion to save its government. However, once a communist regime was established in Afghanistan, Soviet prestige was considered to be on the line. If the people of Afghanistan were allowed to oust their communist leaders, this could prove to be a dangerous precedent for Eastern Europe. Thus Brezhnev put it as bluntly as it could be said by declaring, "The revolutionary process in Afghanistan is irreversible". There would be no more Chiles, certainly not on the borders of the Soviet Union! The question here, however, is whether this was their only reason for involvement in Afghanistan.

The Bolsheviks

150. The First Forty Years. In the summer of 1919 Leon Trotsky, the articulate communist strategist stated that agitation in Asia needed to be stepped up because "the international situation is evidently shaping up in such a way that the road to Paris and London lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab and Bengal." Two years later, in 1921, the Soviets forced a Treaty of Friendship onto Iran, giving themselves the right to send troops into that country should a third party intervene militarily or use Iranian territory as a base for attacking the USSR. (Interestingly the Soviets have refused to acknowledge the Shah’s unilateral abrogation of this treaty and continue to consider it as still being in force). Later, in November 1940, while discussing the future division of the postwar world with Hitler, the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov stated that "the area south of Batum and Baku, in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." The USSR thus clearly aimed not only to control the region’s vast oil resources, but also to gain access to the warm waters of the Gulf and sought a presence in the Middle East. Zbigniew Brzezinski, writing in Game Plan, analyzes that:

2. Brzazinski, op.cit, p.36.
"It was the scope of these demands as well as the proposed strategic flanking of Germany in Scandinavia and in the Balkans, that convinced Hitler that a permanent accommodation with Stalin was not possible, and three weeks later he issued his famous Directive Number 21-Operation Barnarossa".

151. For its part the USSR occupied Northern Iran in 1941 and, in December 1945, suddenly declared that "revolutionary forces" had set up autonomous republics in Iranian Azerbaijan and Gilan. It was only strong U.S. backing for Iran’s territorial integrity, which included allusions to the existence of nuclear weapons (that) brought about a Soviet pullback in early 1946. This crises was the first major skirmish between the two superpowers. It could well be considered as the start of the cold War.

152. Post World War II. The USSR moved quickly to improve its position in Afghanistan by taking advantage of Britain’s withdrawal from India. It is interesting to note that amongst its first major development projects in Afghanistan were improvements of airfields and the building of a giant circular highway. In his memoirs, Khrushchev wrote:

"The Afghans asked us to help them build several hundred kilometers of road near the Iranian border. It cost us a nothing, because Afghanistan didn’t have railroads, such a lifeblood of the

1. Ibid, p. 38.
2. Ibid, p. 43.
country. The road also had great strategic significance because it would have allowed us to transport troops and supplies in the event of war with either Pakistan or Iran.

It was therefore;

"probably no accident that the roads and bridges built by the Russians in the 1950's were strong and wide enough to sustain the Soviet tanks that invaded Afghanistan two decades later. Or that the Salang Tunnel and a chain of oil and grain depots had been constructed astride the main invasion route. Nor that the Soviets built airfields at Shindand and Bagram served as important landing sites for the Russian airborne troops that were flown into Afghanistan in December 1979. Thus the

Soviets used their aid program (in the 1950's and 1960's) to prepare the way for their subsequent conquest of Afghanistan.

153. From the above we find that Tsarist and Soviet statesmen share a common perception of their country’s geostrategic needs. As can be seen, both have displayed remarkable consistency in their quest for securing a warm water port, linked by a land route to Russia. In Brzezinski’s words:

"both have, by unremitting expansionism, persistently sought certain key strategic goals designed to alter decisively their country’s geographical situation.......... suspicions but of historical record".


2. Brzezinski, op.cit, p. 31.
Fear of Islamic Fundamentalism

Over Throw of Communist Regime

154. Another oft quoted argument in support of the "defensive" nature of Soviet involvement, revolves around the USSR's desire to sanitize its Asian republics against the dangers of rising Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Although this argument may have important implications in the future, there is hardly any evidence to suggest that this played any part in the Kremlin's decision to involve in Afghanistan. In fact the USSR's use of its Muslims as administrative assistants to bolster up the Afghan government soon after the communist took over in April 1978, and the disproportionately higher percentage of Muslim troops amongst the initial invasion force, belied the validity of this argument. The fact that the Soviets felt compelled to pull out their Muslim personnel from Afghanistan in early 1980 was the result of what had happened after the invasion and will no doubt serve as an important lesson for the future.

155. The Soviets were quite worried of the Islamization process of the late Gen Zia in Pakistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran and thought that the Islamic revivalism might lead into Afghanistan resulting into over throw of communist regime in Afghanistan. The Soviets never desired to have an anti Soviet country on their southern border. The possibility of this fear can not be ruled out due to the fact that the entire world in general and the countries of our region in particular were

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1. Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, pp.112-114.
analysing the situation. The Russians never wished to love any Islamic government unfavourable to their short or long term interests in Afghanistan.

156. It can be concluded that even after withdrawal of Russian forces from Afghanistan, the communist government headed by Dr Najib lasted for a very long time despite lot of international and national pressures on him. The communism was undoubtedly at the verge of collapse and had the Soviets not moved into Afghanistan, there would have been no communism in Afghanistan in 1980’s.

157. A purpose of the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan was to replace Amin’s regime with a more flexible one. It did not mean that Amin was regarded as more dangerous than the Mujahideens. After the invasion, Amin was killed by Soviet troops and was regularly dubbed a CIA agent both by the Soviet and Kabul propaganda. Most probably communist regime could bear the brunt of a fight against the Mujahideens.

Intervening in the Internal Affairs

158. The Soviets did not mind direct intervening in the internal affairs of Afghanistan like the US move into Grenada, Nicaragua and Panama; Indian move in the former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) or Russian old history of move into Czechoslovakia, Hungary or East Germany.

Soviet Paranoia

159. A growing number in academia rationalized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in terms of its "defensive" paranoia born

out of the traumas suffered in numerous, rapacious invasions of -
their country throughout their history, most recently in 1941.
It is said that Soviet leaders had been worrying about the
possibility of U.S. bases in Afghanistan for many years prior to
their invasion in 1979. Khrushchev in 1955 stated:

"In its desire to encircle us with military bases,
America threw itself all over a country like
Afghanistan......... It was clear the Americans were
penetrating Afghanistan with the obvious intent of
setting up a military base there....... the amount of
money we spent in gratituous assistance to Afghanistan
is a drop in the ocean compared to the price we would
have to pay in order to counter the threat of an
American military base on Afghan territory".

The amazing thing is that these thoughts were expressed at
a time when the American view of Afghanistan being the " Asian
Finland" were well known. However, Brezhnev was quoted by
Pravda as having stated that;

"a real threat that Afghanistan would lose its
independence and be turned into an imperialist military
bridgehead on our southern border .......... The time
came when we no longer could fail to respond to the
request of the government of friendly Afghanistan".

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1. Khrushchev, op.cit, pp.298-300.
160. This of course belies the question, did Hafizullah Amin, invite in the Soviets to have himself killed and replaced by Babrak Karmal? Also as things stood in December 1979, the "imperialist ring " around the USSR's southern border had already collapsed. CENTO had been dissolved in early 1979, the United States hostage crisis in Tehran was a month old and US Pakistani relations were at their lowest ebb since 1947. It therefore appears that Khrushchev in 1955 and Brezhnev in 1980, were more likely trying to justify their country's attempts to fulfil the Tsarist legacy of winning "The Great Game."

161. Richard Pipes, in his article on "Militarism and the Soviet State" write:

"It is true of-course that, during their thousand year old history, the Russians have suffered three especially devastating invasions--by the Mongol-Tartars in the 13th Century, by the French and Prussians in 1812 and by the Nazis in 1941. But are the people, who trot out these facts, aware of the numbers of times that Russians have invaded and inflicted comparable traumas on their neighbours? After all a country does not become the largest state in the world, as Russia has been since the 17th century, merely by absorbing or repelling foreign invasions".

126. In much the same vein, Thomas T. Hammond in "Red Flag over Afghanistan" states that "the invasion of Afghanistan was not merely a defense of communism but also a continuation of the centuries old tradition of Russian imperialism". He highlights the startling similarity between Tsarist and Soviet expansionism by pointing out:

"Tsarist armies conquered Central Asia and the Caucasus in the 18th and 19th centuries and the Red Army conquered them again after the revolution. The Tsarist regime imposed protectorates over outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva and the Soviets imitated it in 1921. Russian tsars invaded and annexed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Russian communists repeated the move in 1940. In addition, during and after World War II, the Soviets continued the imperialist traditions by annexing territories from Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Germany and Japan".

163. As we have seen, the Soviets have also made an unsuccessful bid to do the same in Iran. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, whereas Tsarists ambitions had been checkmated by British imperialism, the Soviets have used the British pullout from South Asia to their advantage. "Thus the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can be viewed as just the latest step in the centuries old process of Russian expansion."  

1. Hammond, op.cit, p.137.
Desire of Unity of Socialist Nations

164. The Soviets according to the Brezhnev doctrine desired to keep Afghanistan under the complete control of Russian influence. On the other hand, the western nations particularly the US never desired to let the communism spread in the world. The then Afghan government wanted to go out of the Russian sphere and the Russians wanted to keep her in their own orbit.

Invitation for Help

165. According to the Russians, "the Central Committee of the PDPA and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) made a request to the Soviet Union and they decided to grant the request". It is also stated that at least more than nineteen requests were made in this context to the Russians for necessary military help in Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, the Afghans, made requests for provision of military equipment and technical assistance and not for military occupation of their country. The Afghan government is reported to have requested the Soviets to assist in suppressing the mutiny in Herat in March 1979. It can be calculated that invitation for military help could be extended by

1. Brezhnev doctrine of 1968 states that once a country becomes socialist, it was then the duty of all Socialist countries to ensure that it does not fall back to any other system, even if it meant the use of force to stop her.


other's pressure and it does not have any legal authority in the international law. Small countries are normally trapped through such kinds of nets by a big power to show justice to the world for their interference in other's affairs.

Expansionist Designs

166. Russian expansionist designs can be understood from the following quotations:

a. "Need for secure frontiers dictated further southward expansion".

Prince Alexander Gorchakov,
Foreign Minister of Tsar Alexander II
(1850-1870)

b. "The road to Paris and London leads through Afghanistan".

Leon Trotsky

1. Heritage Foundation Background, Washington DC, USA, No 274,1 July 1983.

c. "Seizing upon targets of opportunity to extend the 13 Soviet reach as a global power".

Adam B. Ullam,
Harvard Historian of
Soviet Foreign Policy

d. "If at all there was a plan to go further south, the Soviets after two months were thinking of not where to go next but how to get out and go home 2 without losing face".

Joseph C. Hard

The strength and deployment pattern of the Soviet forces never proved that they wanted to expand their territory. This conclusion is based on the comparative strength of Russian forces

sent to Czechoslovakia in 1968 and to Afghanistan in 1979 which is 22 divisions and six divisions, respectively.

Politico-Economic Compulsions

167. The economic realities of the second half of the 20th century have added a new dimension to Russia's age old quest for a warm water port in the gulf i.e., oil. Today, more than half of the oil involved in international trade comes from here, including 13 percent of US imports, 50 percent of West European and 75 percent of Japanese imports. In the words of former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, "the consequences of a cutoff of Persian Gulf oil, for us in the west, are too catastrophic to ignore". A Soviet naval base in Iranian Chah Bahar or Pakistani Gwadar would carry a message of its own to the entire Indian Ocean littoral. It would give the Soviets the means to lean particularly hard of those states that supply strategic minerals to the West and Japan. This could give Moscow the potential for coercing Western Europe and Japan into trading oil for advanced technology. Keeping in view the large differential in their relative dependence on Gulf oil, such a policy could be used to drive a wedge between the United States and her closest allies. By this reckoning the политико-economic stakes in the Gulf are nothing less than global in nature.

1. Hammond, op.cit, p. 201.
168. It was generally believed that the Soviet forces moved into Afghanistan with the ultimate motive of capturing oil of the Persian Gulf. Major factors supporting this school of thought were as under :-

a. Physical occupation of the Shindad air field brought the Soviets only at a distance of 480 kilometers of the Straits of Hormuz.

b. Flying time of the high technology Russian aircraft from Shindad air field to Straits of Hormuz was not more than 15 minutes.

c. From Transcaucasia area (close to Turkey, Ethiopia and South Yemen) the oil lanes could be attacked.

d. Russian’s self sufficiency in oil production (12 million barrels of oil per day and about 150 billion barrels of oil reserve) would not bring any pressure in case of unsuccessful operation while making effort to control the oil sources.

e. It is the colonialists who are attracted by the smell of oil.

f. Possession of high technology nuclear weapons by the former USSR indicating preparation for all out war with the United States besides interdiction of the oil supply to the West.


It may be concluded that it is still not clear whether the Russians moved to Afghanistan to control oil or not. But one thing could be concluded than it must not be their main aim.

**Importance of the Indian Ocean**

170. A Soviet naval base in the Gulf region, linked by a land route to the USSR, in conjunction with her bases in Aden and Ethiopia would contribute greatly to the build up of her Indian Ocean Fleet (which today is 8,000 kilometers from its nearest home port). In the event of a protracted naval confrontation, a strengthened Indian Ocean Fleet would be strategically well located to support the operations of the Soviet Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. This could have a serious adverse effect on Western and Japanese sea lines of communications (SLOCs). As things stand today, these fleets are too far apart to be of much help to each other.

171. Through pincer movement by inducting forces in Afghanistan and coordinating movement from these axis on one side and from Ethiopia and South Yemen on other side to completely circle the Persian oil fields. This movement, though seemed ideal, but did

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not sound balanced due to the presence of a large number of independent states in between besides American vital interest in the Persian oil fields. Any attempt to such large pincher movement definately would have led to an all out war between the US and the former USSR.

Base for Further Advances

172. After havig consolidated its position in Afghanistan, the possibilities of Russian further advances were not ruled out. Likely movements could had been in the following directions:-

a. To support any secessionist movement in Baluchistan or Sind.

b. To conduct hot pursuit of the anti-revolutionary elements operating across the Durand Line.

c. To capture Gwadar.

d. Resistance faced by the Russians in Afghanistan was so much that they had to finally even withdraw from Afghanistan in view of international pressure and domestic problems.

Pre-emption Against the US Movement

173. It was probabaly mis-thought out by the Russians that the US would like to establish her in Iran to rescue th American hostages held at that time by Ayatullah Khomeni. Moscow had a right to intervene in Iran only if it was occupied by a third party or was being used as a base for anti Russian activities due to a treaty between Iran and Moscow.

174. It is sure that the Americans never gave any solid indication that would entre in Iran. At the same time, the Russians
preparations also were not so excellent to ensure any move in Iran during Khomeni era.

**Grand Strategy in South Asia**

175. It was thought that by invading Afghanistan the Soviets would also like to convert Iran and Pakistan besides Afghanistan into separate ethnic states. This expression was also highlighted in the US press. It was also thought that the Soviets might like to use the Afghans, the Pathans and the Baluchis as proxy forces to form a surrogate army for direct confrontation with the US by avoiding own Russian troops.

**Soviets's Miscalculation and Faulty Military Strategy**

176. The Russians assessed that it would take only few days to complete the consolidation in Kabul and its surrounding areas. After establishing the pro-Soviet government in Kabul, the Red Army troops would be happily back in their own country with success and honour. However this Soviet might was completely bogged down against a strong resistance and finally after a long time was pushed back in 1989 without any gains. Entire Soviet calculations went wrong and the worse scenario of their appreciation of situation came true.

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1. Article VI of Soviet Treaty of 1921 with Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey.

The Soviet View of Military Involvement

177. Details were as under:

a. Soviet military forces moved into Afghanistan to repel armed intervention from outside.

b. Official Soviet statement of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Supreme Soviet of USSR announced the following major reasons for sending the Soviet troops to Afghanistan:

(1) To support a pro-Marxist government.
(2) Fear of the US gaining a strong position in Afghanistan.
(3) To secure her southern border from USSR security perspective.
(4) To save the fall of the PDPA regime.
(5) To accede to a request made by the Afghanistan government and in full accord with the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978 and the UN charter.

1. Oleg Troyanovsky, a Soviet delegate stated on 11 January 1980 at the UN, while representing his country. This is quoted in, Facts on File, Vol 40, No 20-45, 18 January 1980, p.25.

HERBLOnS CARTOON

"WE HAD TO GO INTO AFGHANISTAN TO PROTECT OUR SOUTHERN BORDER. NOW, TO PROTECT AFGHANISTAN'S BORDERS—"

FIGURE 1. Herblock's View of the Soviet Invasion. "We had to go into Afghanistan to protect our southern border. Now to protect Afghanistan's borders—." From Herblock on all Fronts (New American Library, 1980).
Immediate Causes of the Russian Military Involvement

178. The foremost cause of the Russian’s decision to move their troops to Afghanistan appeared to be the threat to Amin’s regime. Due to the widespread resistance against his government and his control being restricted to cities only, he was forced to rely on the Russian support, while, at the same time he had lost their confidence. The Russians were unhappy with the way Amin was handling the situation in Afghanistan. Their patience grew thin when, on 6 October, 1979, his Foreign Minister, Shah Wali, complained to an eastern-bloc ambassador that the Russians had backed Taraki’s attempt to remove Amin from power. This was followed up by the change of the Russian ambassador, presumably at the request of the Afghan government.

179. A Soviet correspondent, writing on the eve of the second anniversary of the April revolution and long after the Russian invasion, justified the Russian action by praising the April revolution and condemning Amin as a traitor and an agent of CIA who, according to him, reached a secret understanding with the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan", to carry out a coup, after which the slogans of the April revolution were to be renounced and the People’s Democratic Party was dissolved. He further said that:

"those whose political, economic and ideological domination was shattered under the blows of the April Revolution, the propertied strata, united their efforts and went from acts of unsubordination and sabotage of the new power to organising diversions and terrorist actions against the revolutionary forces. It goes without saying that the people of Afghanistan could have coped with the forces of counter revolution... but it was confronted by gross outside interference in its internal affairs".

180. This explanation, however, cannot hide the fact that the Soviets were greatly worried about the grave threat which the counter-revolution in Afghanistan itself posed to the Russian interests. They wanted to take direct charge of the situation by having a more dependable puppet at their beck-and-call, under the umbrella of the Soviet forces.

Pavlosky’s Report and the Soviets Action

181. The Soviet Deputy Defence Minister, General Ivan Pavlosky, was sent to Afghanistan to assess the situation there soon after Amin’s succession. He submitted a pessimistic report to the Kremlin, expressing the view that the chances of Amin’s survival were dim and that the Soviet army would be required inside Afghanistan to restore order.

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182. This, together with Amin's troubles with the rebels as well as the Russians, led to the Kremlin's decision to move in. A steady build-up of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan had been visible since the autumn of 1979. The US State Department had been issuing warnings since September 1979, but no precise reports had been made. The US protested, on 14 December, when the Soviets moved between 400 to 800 combat troops to Kabul. By 18 December there were 5,000 military personnel, including 1,000 combat troops, fanning to occupy key positions. On 24 December, 1,500 troops - equal to an airborne regiment - were airlifted to Kabul, when around 30,000 troops were poised for a move on Kabul/Herat on the Soviet border. On 27 December an additional 5,000 troops with armoured vehicles, tanks and other equipment were airlifted to Kabul.

183. Meanwhile, disagreement with Amin on the location of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had turned into violence. On 19 December, 1979, Amin vacated the Presidential Palace near the centre of Kabul and took up his position at Darul Aman Palace outside Kabul. General Victor S. Paputin, a senior Soviet police official, was deputed to either obtain Amin's agreement for military intervention by the Russians, or remove him from power. According

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to some sources, he was mortally wounded in a shoot-out between him and Amin's head of Afghan police, Asas Ullah Amin, nephew and son-in-law of Hafeez Ullah Amin. This obviously led to the alternative solution of Hafeez Ullah Amin by force. The Russian troops present at Kabul on 27 December, 1979, assaulted Amin's palace and killed him. The same day, six Soviet divisions, assembled for the purpose on the northern border of Afghanistan, moved across to Kabul and Herat–Kandahar. Within four days they were in control of the major cities, roads, airports and military bases.

Military Situation Before Soviet Military Involvement in Afghanistan

184. Military situation before the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan can be summarized as under:

a. The Mujahideens were not a threat to the major cities of Afghanistan.

b. The Mujahideens were poorly organized under traditional leaders at the local level only.

c. In 1979, the Mujahideen commanders, who were to gain such prominence in future were still confined to remote mountain regions.

d. The road linking the Soviet border to Kabul, Kandahar and Herat and the road Kabul-Jalalabad were still opened.

e. The Mujahideens were lightly armed with old British Lee Enfield rifles and a few AK-47s captured from government troops, thus unable to stop government bases except in cases of local complicity.

f. The Mujahideens in exile lacked the political means to challenge the legitimacy of the Kabul government and the Mujahideens at home were isolated from the outside world.

g. The Kabul regime army was on defensive, unable to regain on the "liberated" areas.

h. From February 1979, Nuristan remained outside government control and by September 1979 the central

1. Olivier Roy, op.cit, p.16.
mountains of Hazara also became uncontrolled.

j. In October 1979, an entire armoured column was routed by tribesmen in Paktia.

k. Since early 1979, desertion and mutinies remained on increase.

l. On 5 August 1979, Bala Hissar Fort (a most important garrison in Kabul) rose against the regime and was subdued (probably with direct Soviet support).

m. In October 1979, 5 Brigade of 9 Afghan Division located at Kunar, mutinied and killed communist activists and Soviet advisers. The regime remained threatened more by internal collapse than by the Mujahideens.

Reasons for the Soviet Failures in Offensive Operations (1984-86)

185. Following could be termed as the major reasons of the Soviet failures in offensive operations:-

a. Firstly, the war of attrition though costly to the population, was not systematically waged. The Mujahideens retained sufficient popular support to sustain between 150,000 and 200,000 armed Mujahideens throughout the conflict.

b. Secondly, the borders were never effectively sealed, nor was Pakistan coaxed into compromise before the Soviet eventually withdrew. Thus, the key to Mujahideens resilience was foreign support, which reached its peak in 1986, by which time Gorbachev had already made the decision to withdraw.

c. Thirdly, the pacification and penetration of the
Mujahideens did not achieve any significant results.

d. Fourthly, the Soviet Army relied on indiscriminate air bombing and the artillery shelling of civilians to deter them from supporting the Mujahideens. This was sufficient to protect Soviet bases from direct attacks, but did not enable Kabul to extend the territories under its control. Even big cities like Kandahar and Herat came under direct attack throughout the war and the Kabul government lost hold of their suburbs.

Most Likely Aim - Soviet Military Involvement in Afghanistan

186. There seems little doubt that the USSR’s initial objective was to back up the Afghan government with a show of military power and to assist the Afghan military to establish superiority over the Mujahideen resistance. The regime of Hafizullah Amin was in danger of collapsing in the face of anti-communist resistance and the Soviet Union would not have welcomed a neighbouring state turning from communism. The alternative could have had a destabilising effect on the many Muslims in the southern areas of the USSR. Therefore, one can conclude that the probable aim was to preserve the PDPA government without getting too greatly involved militarily and to replace Amin by Babrak Karmal.

187. *Visit - Head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces.* The Soviet politburo probably began to consider the possibility of military intervention and the necessary contingency plans in the *Spring* of 1979. In April 1979, General Alexei A Epishev, Head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces, made an inspection tour of Afghanistan. Possibly more significantly, General Ivan G Pavlovskii accompanied by a large staff of 63 officers including 11 generals visited the country from August 1979 to October 1979. Pavlovskii was Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet ground forces and Deputy Minister of Defence and he had made a similar trip to Czechoslovakia in 1968 prior to the invasion of that country which he led. There is no doubt that Pavlovskii knew that military intervention was a strong possibility and he began to make detailed plans.

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The Soviet Military Preparations

188. Following were the major events undertaken by the Soviets during this preparatory stage:-

   a. The final Soviet decision to intervene was taken at the 26th November 1979 meeting of the politburo.

   b. On 29 November 1979, units of 105th Guard Airborne Division began to arrive at Fergana in the Soviet Central Asian Republic of Uzbekistan.

   c. By 6 December 1979, there were three battalions concentrated at Fergana.

   d. By 10 December 1979, a 600 strong armoured unit was also at Fergana and soon afterwards, the 103rd Airborne Division at Vitebsk, Byelorussia and the 104th at Kirovabad, Azerbaijan were placed on alert. Simultaneously a number of transport aircraft were ordered readiness.

   e. By mid December 1979, the call up of reservists in the Military Districts (MD) bordering Afghanistan was in full swing, primarily for the Central Asian and Turkestan MDs. In less than two weeks, an estimated 100,000 troops were concentrated at two key crossing points on the border, Termez and Kushka, both of which had railheads with good links to the north and were on the main routes to Afghanistan.

   f. In retrospect, the preparatory phase for the Soviet invasion consisted of a steady increase in the stream of

1. Ibid, pp.67-68.
Soviet "advisers" into Afghanistan. In December 1978 there were 1,000, many of them assisting the Afghan Air Force (AAF) to maintain MiG-21 FISHBED, Su-7 FITTER and Mi-24 HIND aircraft. By September 1979 the numbers had swollen to between 3,500 and 4,000 and integral Soviet military units increasingly made their appearance, including HIND units.

g. The 201st Motor Rifle Division (MRD) was moved from Dushanbe to join the 66th MRD at Termez and 66th MRD moved to Kushka to join the 346th MRD (also referred to as the 357th). This four division ground force was supplemented by an airborne task force composed of the 105th Guards Air Assault Division (from Fergana, Turkestan VO) plus a regiment each from the 103rd and 104th Guards. One of these regiments was flown into Bagram near Kabul early in December and it rapidly moved to the north to secure the Salang Pass and the vital road tunnel through the Hindu Kush mountains. The second regiment, with three battalions landed at Bagram on 21-23 December and secured the airfields in Kabul area.

h. At the political level "Pravda" published the following editorial on the day before the invasion began:

\[\text{Pravda, 23 December 1979.}\]
"Recently the western and especially the American media have been intentionally spreading deceptive rumours about the "interference" of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. They have been asserted that Soviet "combat troops" have been moved into Afghan territory. All this, of course, is pure fabrication.... It is well known that relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan are based on a solid foundation of good neighbourly relations (and) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another..... Speaking recently....... Prime Minister H Amin stated; "The Soviet Union has always demonstrated deep respect for our independence and our national sovereignty..... It never has, and never will, violate our sovereignty and national independence".

j. Many Afghan units were sent out into the hills away from major cities and airheads and others were issued with blank ammunition for supposed forth coming exercises.

k. Communications between the Afghan High Command and its units were disrupted as were the links between government authorities

l. Soviet advisors called in tank and artillery ammunition
was for "inventory checks". They even collected the batteries from tanks on the pretext of winterisation (in late December).

m. Of course, it was Christmas and although the original plans may not have involved a Christmas operation, there is little doubt that as the end of the year approached, the advantages of beginning the invasion when the west might be off guard became clear and very attractive.

Headquarters of Offensive/Assaulting Ground Forces

189. Details of ground forces location just prior to taking offensive actions in Afghanistan were as under:-

a. **Main Headquarters.** It was located at Tashkent.

b. **Southern Theatre of Military Operations.** Headquarters of this theatre of operation was located at Termez and commanded by Marshal Sergei Sokolov, First Deputy Defence Minister. It was divided into the following army groups:-

(1) **Turkestan Military District.** It was commanded by Colonel General Yuri Maksimov.

(2) **Central Asian District.** It was commanded by Colonel General Pyotr Lushev.

(3) **40th Army Headquarters.** It was located in Termez.

Assembly of Soviet Military Forces

190. Details of assembly of Soviet forces were as under:

a. **Forces in Central Asia.** Full mobilization of the Soviet troops in Central Asia was ordered in September 1979.

b. **Soviet Military Advisors.** The number increased from only 700 to 4,000 by November 1979.

c. **105 Guards Air Borne Division.** It completed its move by air from Farghana to Bagram air base in Afghanistan.

d. **Three Infantry Battalions and a Tank Unit.** It moved and took control of Bagram air base area at Bagram.

e. **Transport Planes.** A large number of Soviet transport planes arrived at Central Asian region in the second week of December 1979.

f. **Concentration of Air Force Near Border Area.** Tactical aircraft capable of deep strike capabilities were shifted from various bases located deep inside the former USSR to new air bases which were extremely close to the Russo-Afghan border areas.

g. **103 Airborne Division.** It was placed on alert at Beloyrussia.

h. **104 Airborne Division.** It was placed on alert at Azerbaijan.

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j. Securing of Highway at Salang Pass. Salang Pass was located at strategic position and all impending movement was designed to use it. It was necessary for the Soviets to keep the pass open, therefore, the Russian forces moved from Bagram area to this pass.

h. A Brigade of 105 Air Assault Division. A commando type brigade which was part of 105 Air Assault Division took control of Kabul on 24 December 1979.

Arrival of Advance Echelons in Kabul

191. On 5 December 1978 the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation was signed between the former USSR and Afghanistan for getting legal action for their mass military movement into Afghanistan.

192. By early 1979, about 700 Soviet military advisers reported in Afghanistan's capital city and joined various responsibilities down up to a company level in Afghan Army.

193. By August, the total number of Soviet military and civilian advisors was much more and accounted about 5,000. According to the estimate of the then US Ambassador HE Arthur Watson, the total number of Soviet advisors (both military and civilian) in Afghanistan were about 1500.

The Start - Soviet Military Mass Involvement

194. Details were:-

3. Air Commmorde R M Austin, *op.cit*, p.70.
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a. At 2300 hours on Christmas Eve 1979, the involvement began and over the next three days, 280-300 transport sorties were flown into airfields near Kabul with troops, munitions and equipment.

b. Following types of aircraft carried the majority of the loads within 2-3 days:

(1) The An-12 CUB, roughly comparable with the C-130, which could carry about 44,000 Ibs.

(2) The much larger An-22 COCK, which could carry 160,000 Ibs.

(3) The 11-76 CANDID turbofan powered, which could carry 90,000 Ibs.

c. Some of the CANDIDS bore Aeroflot markings and a small number of aircraft bearing the insignia of interflag, the East German airline, were seen.

Soviet Plan of Attack

195. The plan was formulated in the following order:

a. Phase I

(1) **Aim.** To secure airfields at Kabul and Bagram.

(2) **Troops.** The same as already sent for the government’s help in Afghanistan.

b. Phase II

(1) **Aim.** To control key positions in Kabul.

(2) **Troops.** 1x Regiment 103 Air Assault Division located at Beylojrussia. 1x Regiment of 104 Air Assault Division located at Azerbaijan.

(3) **Equipment.** 150x military transport plane
c. **Phase III**

1. **Aim.** To provide security from any air threat during the movement of troops into Afghanistan.
2. **Troops.** 2xMotorised Infantry Division. Some armour for anti-aircraft purposes.

**Strategic Targets**

196. Following were the major strategic targets of the Soviet military forces:

a. Main military bases (against raids by the rebels).

b. Safety of main lines of communication specially the Salang high way.

c. Defending of main economic centres.

d. Holding off the "extremists" till the Afghan army was reorganised, re-equipped and capable of defending itself.

**Axis of Movement**

197. Details were as under:

a. Movement of two Motorized Rifle Divisions from Kushka to Herat and finally arriving at Kandahar.

b. Movement of two Motorized Rifle Divisions from Kunduz to Bulkh city of Mazar-e-Sharif and arriving at Kabul.

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2. *Institute of Oriental Studies (IOS)*, Moscow as quoted by Lt Gen (Retd) Matinuddin, *op.cit*, p.95.

198. Details were as under:-

a. At about 1100 hours on 24 December 1979, a total of about 5000 troops consisted of 1xregiment of 103 Guards Air Assault Division and 1x regiment of 104 Guards Air Assault Division besides 105 Division.

b. At about 1600 hours on 24 December 1979, Soviet troops were at full control of Kabul airport and were helping the arrival of the Soviet troops at Kabul.

c. 200 flights brought in 10,000 Soviet troops into Afghanistan on 24 December 1979.

d. On 26 December 1979, following movements took place:-

(1) A total of about 25,000 Soviet troops of 357 Motor Rifle Division and 66 Motor Rifle Division reached at Qandahar via road Herat - Qandar.

(2) Some of the left over troops of 105 Air Borne Division reported at Kabul airport.

(3) 360 Motor Rifle Division and 201 Motor Rifle Division entered Termez after crossing Amu Darya and headed for Kabul along road Kunduz - Mazar-e-Sharif-Kabul, under the Soviet airforce protection.

(4) At 1215 hours Babrak appeared on Afghan television screen as President and announced;

1. Ibid, p.114.


"Afghanistan had been subjected to intolerable violence and torture by the bloody apparatus of Hafizullah Amin. The chain of imperialism facism and dictatorship, in the heart of Asia has been broken".

(5) At about 1440 hours Karmal announced his following appointments:-

(a) President Revolutionary Council.
(b) Prime Minister of Afghanistan.
(c) Secretary General PDPA.
(d) Commander Armed Forces.

e. On 27 December 1979, following major events took place:-

(1) By about 1600 hours Units of 105 Airborne Division occupied strategic locations inside Afghanistan.

(2) Headquarters of Afghan Internal Police Communication Centre and other focal positions were captured by the Soviet military forces.

(3) Kabul telephonic system was knocked out by an explosion.

(4) At about 1945 hours, a fake radio announced the taking over of Babrak Karmal while for about one and a half hour the actual Radio Kabul did not announce any such information.

(5) At about 2230 hours, the Russians took over the complete control of Kabul Radio station.
(6) Two battalions of 105 Soviet Division with ASU - 85 guns assaulted the Darul Aman Palace (the Ministry of Defence).

(7) At mid night 27-28 December 1979, President Amin and his family members were assassinated inside Tajbeg Palace which was located inside Darul Aman complex by specially trained KGB assault units.

f. On 28 December 1979 worth mentioning incident was that Babrak Karmal flew into Kabul from Eastern Europe (there is yet another school which claimed that Babrak Karmal flew in Kabul from Tashkent).

g. On 31 December 1979, Soviet military took complete control of Afghansians major cities, strategically important locations and all communication structures.

Operations in Panisher Valley

199. Details were as under:-

a. Hit and run tactics by selecting manageable objective (s) like government outposts and police stations. They resorted to guerilla warfare tactics.

b. Properly organized, well trained and disciplined fighting force headed by respectable, learned and competent commander was divided into "Mutaharrics" 1 (mobile elements) and "Sabt" (steadfast) under the

leadership of Ahmad Shah Masud. Total force was estimated to be only 3,000 Mujahideens during 1982.

c. Major targets of "Mutaharrics" included destruction of bridges, military installation and depots besides government posts. Most of this wing remained on offensive operation.

d. The "Sabt" remained on "defensive" operation duties like protection of ammunition depots, supply stores and various headquarters. They were grouped between 50 to 100 persons at one vital point and used light equipment including anti-aircraft guns for aerial protection against the Soviet air threats.

e. The "Mutaharrics" were organised like any standard army pattern into various sub-units/units/companies. A platoon was consisted of about 30 men, and two or three platoons were equipment to one company.

f. Forces were provided free food, clothing, weapons and medical facilities.

g. Equipment was consisted of the following major weapons:-

(1) Soviet - made AK-47 rifles.

(2) Mortar launchers.

(3) ZPU-2 double barrelled anti-aircraft guns.

(4) Rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPGL).

(5) Heavy machine guns.

h. Targets achieved included successful small scale operations resulting into death of Kabul regime and
and bulldozer besides routine security patrol were also used. During the clashes between the Mujahideens, about 300 to 400 Russians, 1,000 Afghan Army personals and 100 Mujahideens were killed.

n. In August 1982, the Soviets launched another major offensive against Masud's forces to eliminate them once for all. Heliborne troops landed on the villages commanding vulnerable points was coordinated well, resulting into the Mujahideens move to their hide outs once again. Afghan Army burnt all the crops and destroyed houses to teach the Mujahideeds a lesson not to do the same again. A number of refugees arrived in Pakistan from this valley in view of aerial bombardments and atrocities of the Soviet forces. Temporary ceasefire took place between the government forces and the Mujahideens for the ultimate covert strategy of achieving stability in the valley for restart of logistic support by the locals to the Mujahideens.

o. After a temporary ceasefire for a years, re-equipped, rested and regrouped/re-organized Mujahideens started their blockade and ambush activities again near the Salang tunnel in April 1984. A lot of convays were delayed resulting into heavy casualties.

p. On 21 April 1985, another Soviet major offensive tooks place in the valley, in which Soviet 108 Motor Rifle Division and Afghan 8 Division, 20 Division and 37
Commando Brigade and a battalion each from Jalalabad, Ghazin and Kabul participated (the total strength of the attacking force was 10,000 Soviet and 5,000 Afghan troops). This offensive due to very heavy Soviet forces inflict resulted into Mujjahideen's move once again to their hide-outs in the valley. The entire Panjisher valley was again in governmet hands. About 200 Soviet and Afghan personals were killed besides 150 Mujahideens. But the Soviet object of keeping the road open to Kabul was not completely achieved as still the convoys were disrupted/attacked by the Mujahideens from their hide outs.

q. On 15 June 1985, Masud attacked Pechguatr Fort located in the middle of the valley by surprise and achieved complet success. About 100 Officers/NCOs and 350 enlisted men of Afghan army were captured besides capturing of huge arms and ammunition. One Soviet Motor Rifle and Battalion and two Battalions of the Afghan Army from 8 Infantry Division in Kabul carried out counter actions against the Mujahideens to free the captured persons of the Afghan Army. These resulted into even deaths of all the captives by the Mujahideens. Statement continued from 1985 to 1988 due to no major Soviet offensive in the valley.

r. It can be concluded that commander Masud specially played a pivotal role in Panjisher valley along with his force of Mujahideens, who played excellent game and
kept the Soviets and the Afghan Army personals disturbed through out their military involvement in Afghanistan. Area near Salang tunnel was always hard to cross by the Soviets and the Afghan Army mobile convoys. A large number of Soviet equipment was destroyed. Ambush actions were always effective against this super power force, resulting into heavy loss of their men and material. Stalemate continued in the valley till the with-drawal of the Soviet forces from the valley. Had Masad not been in Panjsher valley with his brave force, it would have been easy for the Soviets to launch major offensive easily else-where with complete safe logistic support upto Kabul.

Operations in Khost Sector

200. Details were as under:-

a. A large number of Afghan troops with Headquarters 25 Afghan Division and 2 Afghan Border Brigade remained present in Khost area of Paktia province. There never were any Soviet forces in Khost. The Mujahideens mostly remained in their strong holds.

b. Zhawar Mujahideen base was composed of six well built covers each about two average size bedrooms from the Pakistani border. It remained open over looking supply routes to the Khost garrison.

c. Khost remained under seige since 1983 due to heavily blocked of communication leading to Khost by the Mujahideens. Supply remained possible by air which
even according to a Soviet pilot was difficult at Khost due to the presence of large number of burnt out aircraft.

d. The Mujahideens operated under the command of Jalaluddin Haqqani of Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis). Offensive launched by about 10,000 Mujahideens in July 1985 failed resulting into counter offensive by the Afghan army on 28 August 85 which was successfully resisted by the Mujahideens near Zhawar post.

e. Equipment used by the Mujahideens in this sector included captured tanks, anti-aircraft guns and surface to air missiles.

f. On 3 April 1986, about 12000 men of Soviet Afghan forces launched a major offensive in Zhawar base. According to the Mujahideens over 200 commandos including 47 officers were taken prisoners. The Soviets at air strip SU 25s dropped laser guided bombs.

g. On 20 April 1986, the Afghan troops reached the Zhawar Base and on 24 April 1986 captured it after cleaning entire resistance. This base remained under Afghan Army for about 8 years when it was re-captured by the Mujahideens in March 1991.

h. It could be concluded that fighting in Khost area remained between the Afghan army and the Mujahideens for the initial few years when finally by the use of Soviet large scale men and latest technology, the important Zhawar Base was captured despite heavy loses
of men and material by the Soviet Afghan army till re-
captured by the Mujahideens in March 1991.

Operations in Qandahar

201. Details were as under:-

a. Headquarters II Afghan corps comprising 15 Infantry
Division and 7 Armoured Brigade were located in
Qandahar while Afghan 17 infantry Division was located
in Herat.

b. Soviet 346 Motorised Rifle Division was located in
Qandahar

c. Shindand air force base was located only 160 Kilometres
west of Qandahar for air massive support for
Soviet/Kabul forces in Afghanistan.

d. Defence of Qandahar city was organized in three circles
having 60 security posts as under:-

(1) Inner circle of forces was inside the city.

(2) The outer circle of forces linked the out skirts
of the city on all round defence and was manned
by 75 to 100 men.

(3) The outer most circle was about 10 to 15
kilometres away from the outer circle and was
composed of various security posts having 75 to
100 persons on each post.

(4) Soviet Afghan Army deployed/laid tanks and mine-
fields around the city to stop any offensive
movements by the Afghan Mujahideens towards
Qandahar.
(5) The city of Kandahar was required open by both the opposing forces thus it was besieged by the Soviet's and the Mujahideens at one time or the other to ensure a safe passage along the highways. The Soviets levelled all villages and orchards within 50 yards on either side of the roads leading into Kandahar to get clear and long range fields of fire.

e. Afghan Mujahideens remained confined to the following objectives:-

(1) Interdicting of the Soviet supplies and reinforcement to Kandahar through their strong holds hide outs.

(2) Harassing of the Afghan forces through their strong points.

(3) Heavy anti-artillery bombardment on the constructed areas/military forces to weaken their will to defend the city.

(4) Conduct of continuous roads and ambushes where possible to keep the Soviets and the Afghan army activities at low profile besides de-stablizing their present status.

(5) Attack by long range artillery pieces and Multi Ballistic Rockets on Kandahar air port with a view to built maximum possible air craft and helicopter.

fired by the Mujahideens into Kandahar. Most of
the Mujahideens operated from Shah Wali, Kota

(6) BM -12 Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers were also
1
Mianwand Arghandeb and Panj Wai districts.
the Mujahideens had upper hand in the Mohallajat
villages just out side Kandahar city.

f. During November 1987 a major offensive was launched by
about 1000 Mujahideens on the government manned
security posts in the out skirts of the Kandahar
resulting into reduction of security posts.

202. It could be concluded that throughout the Soviet inv-
olvement in Kandahar, the Mujahideens remained in less number,
poorly equiped and less coordinated against the presence of a
highly equiped Red and Afghan Army soldiers. The Mujahideens
were not able to capture Kandahar in the twelve years of Soviet
occupation and even if they would have succeeded, the Soviets
would have got it liberted due to air supremacy, high technology
and endless military resources. The Mujahideens continued their
guerrilla like activities in this sector and kept on bombing,
firing and resorting to sabotage, espionage and subversive
activities to put their pressure to wekeen the moral courage of
the Soviet and Afghan army persons. They resorted to laying of
mine-fields, burning of shops and destruction of houses and
military installations to create harrament.

1. Afghanistan Report, No 35, October 1986, ISS, Islamabad,
p.5.
Operations in Herat

203. Details were as under:-

a. Ismael Khan of Jamiat - e - Islami was the commander of the Mujahideens in the north western border of Afghanistan close to Iranian border. Afghan 17 Infantry Division besides three brigades were located in this area.

b. The Mujahideens heavily depended on the mobile operations due to open desert/terrain. They resorted to night operations instead of day attacks. They even executed sixty PDPA officials in January 1982. As a result of this, the Soviet and Afghan Army launched an offensive and killed about 2200 rebels.

c. Total strength of Afghan forces was 20,000 during the initial years of the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, but later on it was reduced to about 5000 persons. Total strength under command of Ismail was approximately 12,000 men by 1984.

d. In June 1985 a major explosion took place at the Shindand air base destroying 15 to 20 air craft. Claims and counter claims of this destruction were made by Ismail's men and dissatisfied Afghan soldiers. Heavy fighting between the Mujahideens and the Soviet and Afghan forces continued throughout 1985.

e. In January 1986, Kabul forces launched another major offensive against the Mujahideens in and around Herat. Elements of the regular army were supported by border troops and revolution defence groups against the Mujahideens. This proved to be a failure in eliminating the Mujahideens mainly due to their super underground tactics of hide outs.

Operations In Kunduz

204. Details were as under:-

   a. It was occupied by the Soviet 201 Motor Rifle Division, an Afghan brigade and some elements of para military force amounting to a total of about 10,000 troops.

   b. The Mujahideens kept their pressure on the government by adhering to minor tactical operations such as raiding mobile column, plundering and looting government small establishments and attacking security posts.

   c. On 18 April 1984, the Mujahideens captured 12 Soviet soldiers and later on killed them. This was followed by the Soviet attack on Gor Tapa district of Kunduz resulting into deaths of about 130 Mujahideens and 250 civilians.

   d. On 7 August 1988, the Mujahideens taking advantage of Russian withdrawal launched a major offensive on Kunduz resulting into lose of 30 Mujahideens and 130

1. Urbin, op.cit, p.143.
civilians at the cost of capturing the Kunduz garrison. The Mujahideens also captured about 63 heavy machine guns and 1,600 light weapons besides seeing a large number of Afghan defections from their Army units. This was the fall of first provincial capital falling in the hands of the Mujahideens after the Soviet withdrawal began in the same year. However, a well planned Afghan counter-offensive by 20 Infantry Division and 18 Infantry Division supported by the Soviet air craft was followed. It resulted in mass scale killings and looking by the civilian population, which was denounced by the foreign media.

Soviet Re-Organization of Troops-1981

205. The Soviets re-organized their troops in 1981 as follows:

a. 40 Army increased to between six and seven Motor Rifle and one Airborne Division and Independent Motor Rifle Brigade with a total of about 115,000 men. Two of these divisions probably moved to border areas of Kushka and Termez.

b. Air power was made up of 13 fighter-bomber or transport squadons and 21 helicopter squadons (including 11 equipped with the Mi-24).

Operations in Afghanistan - 1980-84

3

206. Details were as under:-

3. Ibid.
a. The Soviet waged classic large scale armoured warfare operations until 1982, as if they did not expect any resistance to gain momentum.

b. Approximately twice a year, huge, well planned offensives were launched by deploying motor rifle divisions and keeping air borne units in reserve. These offensives were preceded by heavy artillery guns fire. Example were in Kunar 1980, in Panjsher valley in September 1980 and in Lowgar in December 1980.

c. The motor rifle units never held captured territory for more than a week’s duration.

d. Due to heavy artillery and aerial bombardments, no surprise and deception was given to the Mujahideens by the Soviet offensives.

e. Major thrust of the Soviet well prepared offensives remained mostly in Panjsher, Paktia, Lowgar, Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Mazar-i- Shrif areas.

f. The Soviet forces remained away from Pakistani border areas by concentrating themselves along main communication cities and lines. Jalalabad was, however, an exception to this.

g. From 1982, the Soviets made few changes in tactics and weapons. Some of these included:

(1) Mi-24 combat helicopters became the main anti-guerrilla weapon.

(2) Su-25 fighter bombers were inducted in March 1984.

(3) From 1982, the offensive operations were consisted
of aerial and artillery bombardments against the targets before launching ground offensives. It was followed by direct drive of the Soviet motorized forces. The heliborne Soviet troops used to land behind the Mujahideens bases to stop their retreat/withdrawal until 1984, the heliborne soldiers were generally not paratroopers but members of a specially trained company or battalion of a Motor Rifle Division (these changes succeeded only in raising the costs of the war on both sides in human and material terms without allowing the Soviets to bleed the Mujahideens to cut their communication lines or regain lost territories).

h. Soviet military failures and the death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982 persuaded the Soviets to try more subtle tactics.

j. In January 1983, Masud signed a cease fire for a duration of one year directly with the Soviets, involving Kabul regime, as a result no major offensive took place during the year. This resulted in the beginning of stalemate and the prospects for either an escalation or negotiation of the conflict.

Operations in Afghanistan - 1984-86

207. Details of Soviet strategy/tactics during these years could be summerized as under:-

   a. The former USSR continued military escalation during
1984-86. High armoured columns played a lesser role. Airborne units launched major offensives, which were kept in defensive role in the past.

b. Night ambushes became more common and the mobility of the Soviet Army increased.

c. Logistics were improved besides increase in welfare of the Soviet troops.

d. Specialized training was given to elite troops in USSR besides re-organizational changes to improve the ability to wage counter insurgency warfare.

e. A large scale offensive was launched in Panjshir valley in April 1984 by means of high altitude bombing by Tu-16 bombers. Though the Soviets were able to control two third of the valley, but gave way to well-entrenched government bases which had no mobility (Masud’s troops were not destroyed).

f. Another Soviet offensive took place around Herat in June 1984, in which the Soviet troops destroyed all suburbs and villages within 20 kilometres west of the city.

g. In northern Afghanistan the Soviets took control of the passes dominating the northern plain and established a security belt around the city of Mazar-i-Sharif.

h. The number of casualties during 1984 were double, as compared to 1983 (2060 killed as compared to 1057 killed)

j. In the summer of 1985, Soviet and Afghan regime troops
succeeding in sealing Herat with four security belts to a depth of 20 kilometres.

k. In April 1986, a combined Soviet Afghan regime troops offensive was launched to over-run Zhawar Mujahideen base in Paktia (as usual the government forces soon withdrew and the Mujahideens re-occupied the huge under ground complex of bases)

l. From 1984 onwards, the weapon system of the Mujahideens improved in quality and in quantity due to increase in the US support. Automatic AK-47s replaced the old Lee Enfield rifles. Recoiless guns, heavy machine guns and rockets were flown in from Pakistan.

m. The first shelling of Kabul with surface-to-surface rockets began in early 1985. In July 1985 Masud also successfully overran a government base of battalion strength at Pushghur in Panjshir.

n. Despite the growing Soviet ability to wage counter-insurgency operations and an increase in the fighting spirit of the government troops, the short term military results were dis-appointed for no territory was permanently regained.

o. The Kabul regime army started slow re-built around a hard core of professional troops headed by communist party officers, trained in the former USSR. The number of local militias recruited by the Kabul government along traditional tribal lines increased significant.

p. Stepped up military activities and fear of air
reprisals and destruction by artillery encouraged many of the villages close to the main roads and cities to strike deals with Kabul.

q. Early in 1986, the morale of the Mujahideens was clearly lower and the civilian population, which had resisted remarkably well was becoming exhausted by the conflict and exodus of millions of people.

Operations in Afghanistan -1986

208. Details of offensive and counter offensive actions during the year 1986 could be summerized, as follows:-

a. The Mujahideens were equiped with surface-to-surface 120 mm rockets to latest mortars, radio equipment and more sophisticated weapons such as the surface-to-air Stinger missiles. Hundreds of truck loads of material in the south and thousands of horses in the north (including Tennessee mules airlifted from the US to Pakistan), permitted a continuous flow of weapons into Afghanistan.

b. The Mujahideens first used "Stingers" in autumn 1986, although the effects were not felt until early 1987. After incurring heavy aircraft losses in the spring of 1987, Soviet air superiority was over as by the summer, half of the Afghan airspace was free of Soviet aircraft. The Mujahideens secured areas of sanctuary in which their main bases and ordnance were safe from the Soviet army and air force. Moreover, communication lines from Pakistan became safer and more
than 90% of the increasing flood of weapons and ammunitions was able to reach its destination.

c. In the summer of 1986, the Mujahideens commander Ismail Khan destroyed three of the four security belts around Herat where as Masud carried out offensive in the North, as usual, resulting into capturing of a dozen strategic government bases including the divisional headquarters at Narin in November 1986, Farkhar in August 1987 and Koranomunjan in October 1987. The few offensives waged by the Soviet troops in 1987 (such as around Kandahar in May and June) were mainly intended to give breathing space to the big cities. The Soviets, however, made no attempts to regain lost territories in the north east.

Air Operations

The Afghan Air Force (AAF)

209. In an analysis of air operations in support of the ground forces in Afghanistan, it is impossible to distinguish between the Soviet and Afghan Air Forces. Before the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, there were many hundreds of Soviets "advisers" working with the AAF and they might well had flown in aircraft bearing Afghan markings. The AAF performed well in Afghanistan mainly due to the following reasons:-

a. Airforce personals were consisted of more technically oriented urban proletariat persons as compared to inefficient and unreliable army personals.

b. Probably air force personals were more sympathetic to
the communist regime and less associated with the rural peasants and nomads.

c. Many of them were trained either in the Soviet Union or in Afghanistan by the Soviet Air Force instructors and this led to a greater rapport with Soviet personnel.

210. It may be mentioned that AAF pilots appeared to have had few reservations about attacking the Mujahideens and they seemed to have made most if not all of the attacks against targets in Pakistan, but they bulked at some of the more indiscriminate operations against urban areas in Afghanistan.

Afghan Air Force-Combat Effectiveness

211. The pilots did not have any operational training and experience and received only 3-5 hours of flying per month with an average of 60 hours a year. They also lost a large number of experienced pilots due to purges resulting from the successive coups. The morale remained very low because of continued operational demands, restraints on spares and shortage of skilled technicians. Afghan Air Force was only defence oriented with no worth while operational standards.

1. Air Commandor R M Austin, op.cit, p.72.
## Air Crafts

212. Details were as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Number of Aircrafts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fighters</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. MIGs 15/17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. MIGs-21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. SU-7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. SU-17/22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. IL-28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. AN-12/26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. MI-8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. MI-17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. MI-24</td>
<td>2 1/2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. MI-25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. MI-35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30 1/2</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Afghan Air Fields

213. The ground infrastructure consisted of eight jet capable and 28 other minor airfields as given below. Deployment of the Afghan Air Force remained South, East and West Afghanistan (1979-1988).

## Jet Bases

214. Following were worth mentioning:

- a. Mazar-e-Sharif (Dehdadi)
- b. Bagram.
c. Jalalabad.
d. Kabul.
e. Matun.
f. Kandahar.
g. Shindand.
h. Herat.

Other Airfields

215. Following were worth mentioning:-

a. Sharana.
b. Faizabad.
c. Jurm.
d. Bangi.
e. Kunduz.
f. Hairatan.
g. Mazar-e-Sharif (Civil)
h. Samagan.
i. Shebergham.
j. Daultabad.
k. Asadabad.
m. Maimana.
n. Bamyan.
o. Islam Qila.
p. Gardez.
q. Ghazni.
r. Chakcharan.
s. Urgun.
t. Mukur.
u. Janda.
v. Tarinkot.
w. Khair Kot.
x. Kalat.
y. Farah.
z. Bander-i-Kamal
aa. Lashkargah.
bb. Ajerstan.
cc. Zaranj.

Air Defence Force

216. It was comprised of the following elements:-
   a. Air Def once Op-erational Centre - Kabul.
   b. 2xRKT Brigades.
   c. 2xAnti-aircraft Brigade (2xHeavy Anti-Aircraft and
      4xMedium Anti-Aircraft (AA) Regiments.
   d. 5xIndependent LAA Regiment.
   e. 8xSurface to Air Missiles-2 and 10 x SAMS -3 Batteries
   f. 25 x Radar Units (129 x Radars).
   g. Air Defence Alert Section.

The Strategic Benefits of Afghan Air-Fields

217. Following could be summerized as some of the benefits:-
   a. Many improvements were made at Kabul, Bagram, Shindand,
      Farah, Kandahar and Jalalabad airfields to gain maximum
      strategic and tactical advantages.
   b. Most Soviet military encampments were built around
      airfields and two of the more significant locations
      were at Begram, 25 notical miles north of Kabul and
Shindand in the east near the Iranian border.

c. Bagram was the local headquarters of the Soviet Air Force in Afghanistan and was the hub of its communication system.

d. At Shindand, the Afghan Air Force installations were completely isolated and no Afghan was permitted in the Soviet areas because they had installed there support and maintenance equipment for the Il-38 MAY Naval Aviation reconnaissance aircraft.

e. Electronic warfare aircraft such as the Il-18 COOT A and the An-12 CUBB might have operated from this base which was no more than 500 nautical miles from the straits of Hormuz and the north coast of the Indian Ocean.

**Role of Soviet Helicopters**

218. The Soviet helicopters were used in the following invaluable roles:

a. Ferrying troops into battle.

b. Close air support of ground forces in combat.

c. Attacking villages or isolated bands of the Mujahideens.

d. Air assault operations usually of company or battalion strength, were most successful when combined with motorized rifle unit operations.

e. Operated usually in groups, from two to six; often were flown close to the ground for protection.

**Air Weapons**

219. The principle air-delivered weapons were machine guns,
cannon, 57 mm and 240 mm rockets and a variety of High Explosive and cluster bombs. Napalm was also used as air delivered anti-personnel mines. A number of reports referred to the unusual use of anti-personnel mines camouflaged as toys watches, ball points pens and even books. Firm evidences of actual samples were not easy to find but it was difficult to discover an alternative explanation for the stories. "Fire Storm" weapons were having at least 500 kilogram (Kg) Fuel Air Explosive (FAE) air-dropped munition. Besides this, the USSR used other weapons in Afghanistan including 275 kg RBK-250 and 500 kg incendiary bombs, which proved particularly successful in destroying the Mujahideens villages and crops and some even continued burning.

The Strategies

Soviet Strategy

220. Principles. The Soviets handling of the war was not aimed at outright victory on the battle-field but at undermining and dividing the Mujahideens through an indirect long range strategy based of the following three principles:

a. A war of attrition and reprisals.

b. The sealing of the borders against the Mujahideens supply routes.

c. The direct application on Pakistan through bombings and terrorist actions.

d. The penetration of the resistance movement.

Soviet Propaganda Techniques

221. Details included:-

a. Like the Germans in World War II, the Soviets in Afghanistan undertook propaganda measures at a large scale.

b. The radio broadcasted speeches of puppet government officials and leaflet were dropped designed not only to subvert the Afghan nationalists but also to create fear, panic and widespread confusion amongst the masses.

c. The Soviets aimed at paralysing the minds of the people, particularly of the patriots.

The Soviet Strategy

222. Details were:-

a. Due to whole sale desertions of the Afghan army and the doubtful loyalty and efficiency of those who remained, the Soviet Union decided to relegate the Afghans to garrison duties and both armies were placed under a unified command.

b. Much of military equipment which the Soviet Army had brought with them for military involvement in Afghanistan was superfluous to the task, hence a number of units were sent home in 1980. These included the 40th Army’s SA-4 Brigades, a tank regiment and several FROG battalions, a total of about 5,000 men.

1. Oliver Roy, Adelphi Papers, No 259, op.cit, p.20.

c. Some 40% of the invasion force, drawn from the Turkestan and Central Asian Military Districts were of Muslim origin. Their reliability was questionable and reports of fraternization with the Afghans caused concern among Soviet commanders. A further 5,000 men withdrew in mid 1980 to give the occupation force a more reliable ethnic mix.

d. The USSR most probably began their campaign in Afghanistan with the following in mind:

(1) To push the Mujahideens out of strategic valleys such as the Panjshir and the Kunar from which many of their attacks were made, thus denying them the food and shelter afforded by local villages.

(2) To patrol Afghanistan's borders with its Muslim neighbours to prevent the influx of supplies.

223. The Soviet involved their forces in Afghanistan on the same tactical lines as that of their invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The operation was even carried to seize Kabul and important strategic positions as a prelude to replace the Amin government and to establish a government of their own likings without direct Soviet military involvement.

224. Beginning in 1984, Kabul government and the Soviet troops launched night ambushes with infra-red devices. These night ambushes were directed at supply mobile convoys (due to border belt of 1500 kilometres with Pakistan and lack of man power to man out posts on major roads, the Mujahideens continued crossing the border with relative impunity).
225. Scorched villages executed hostages massive bombings and even chemical warfare were inflicted by the Soviet Union on to the people, who simply did not wish to be governed by the communists. The Soviets inflicted Nazi like brutality. The fear of mines was such among Soviet soldiers that almost all of them preferred to ride on top of their armoured vehicles when on convoys.

226. Soviet tactics against the Mujahideens also included:


a. Controlling of the towns and roads.
b. Establishing of large camps outside the main towns to overawe the inhabitants.
c. Protection of roads through smaller bases.
d. Guarding of bridges and other key points by sub-units of tanks and mechanised infantry.
e. Employment of flank guards along the crests of the ridges to prevent ambushes.
f. Tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) usually formed the main operational bodies with artillery pieces on covering fire role.
g. Execution of "scorched earth" policy of destroying villages and crops with a hope to starve the Mujahideens into submission.
h. Use of irritant gases such as tear gas to clear the Mujahideens out of their hide out.
j. Moving of tanks and armoured vehicles at night in the cities.

227. Following strategic movements are also worth mentioning:-

a. For more effective managements, the Soviets divided Afghanistan into seven military districts and introduced organizational changes in their ground forces. Probably the most important organizational change was the development of there reinforced rifle battalions containing anti air and artillery support and

a tank company. These additions provided the battalion with great striking and sustaining power.

b. An organizational development was the creation of the 40th Army with its headquarters in Tashkent and Uzbekistan to command the Afghanistan theater of operations.

c. Although initially Soviet operations were directed primarily against the Mujahideens once the Soviet realized the popular support for the resistance movement, they deliberately turned to a terrorist strategy of "migratory genocide" and "rubblization".

d. Intensification of tempo of Soviet operations specially in 1984 and even in 1985 after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power.

e. Fighter bombers and medium bombers hit targets deep inside guerrilla territory, seeking to destroy the village infrastructure supporting the Mujahideens.


f. "Free-Fire" zones were created along the main roads and extended back to the hills behind them and the villages within these zones were "virtually obliterated" besides bombing the field crops, food storage facilities and the irrigational system of the country.

g. Deliberate air attacks by the Soviet aircraft on civilian caravans coming into or leaving the country causing many casualties among women and children.

h. Use of small bombs shaped as toys or other attractive objectives with the intention to maim children and these caused many live stock casualties.

j. Exploding of large enhanced blast bombs in mid air for sending out lethal shock waves.

k. In each major offensive, the Soviets prevailed after hard fighting, then withdrew, thus failing to achieve decisive success.

US Covert Operations

228. Both Presidents Carter and Reagan instructed the CIA to arm the Mujahideens covertly based on the following principles:-

a. To avoid any direct interference in arms distribution/Mujahideens domestic policy.

b. To allow the government of Pakistan (ISI) to identify aid beneficiaries and handle the Mujahideens domestic policy.

c. To deliver to the Mujahideens only Soviet made or designed weapons, in order to deny any direct involvement.

d. Not to supply weapons beyond a level that might trigger Soviet retaliation into Pakistan.

229. This policy was changed on the congressional pressure in 1985 and the American arms including "Stinger" missiles were provided to the Mujahideens for the first time in view of the following:-

a. The weapons were not being delivered to the most effective Mujahideens.

b. The weapons were being stockpiled for an eventual settling of accounts among the Mujahideens following a Soviet withdrawal.

c. At one time these weapons were being sold to drug dealers, Sikh separatists, Pathan (Pakistani Pushtun) besides ethnic and political groups.

230. On 16 February 1989, the Langley Based Afghan Task Force of the CIA was dissolved, developing follow up activity to the CIA
post in Islamabad, whose work might had been too closely tied up with the ISI. The CIA definitely not only failed to clearly identify the Mujahideens with pro-American views but also could not assess how much domestic and regional factors had changed after the Soviet withdrawal.

Mujahideens Strategy

231. Major fields of coordinated effort to force the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan required:

a. Increasing the effectiveness of the Afghan Mujahideens.

b. Decreasing the immediate dependence of the Mujahideens on outside sources of supplies by developing small ammunition producing units inside Afghanistan (this would have also shorten logistic lines).

c. Increasing western support for Pakistan to help it resist Soviet pressures.

d. Organizing the Mujahideens so as to increase their combat and political effectiveness, creating a form of unity by reducing economic disparities and diversity of logistic among different parties.

1. Oliver Roy, Adelphi Papers, op.cit pp.35-36.

e. Countering the enormous Soviet efforts to bribe the Afghan population with cash, food, weapons or other incentives, into support of a Soviet puppet regime or at least neutrality between the regime and the resistance.

f. Organizing the vehicles for a propaganda offensive based on religious, ethnic, cultural and nationalistic appeals to the Soviet population and launched from Europe as well as Afghanistan.

232. The Mujahideens adopted the following general pattern of strategy:

1. The initial Mujahideens resistance was based on traditional Afghan warfare, with few signs of any methodical approach to the problems of fighting a modern army. Tribal groups fought en mass in set battles with no specialized functions allocated to particular soldiers.

2. Throughout the struggle with the Soviets, the Mujahideens kept their morale high, showed great courage, proved daring and displayed remarkable stamina.

3. Several provinces were having a military commander who divided them into sector commands. The sectors were further sub-divided into fighting units of twenty five


to thirty five men including specialists assigned to handle mortars, rocket launchers or heavy machine guns. For example, Ahmad Shah Masud developed a well organized military political, structure featuring representative political financial and other committees besides coordinating military operations with other commanders of Northern and Central Afghanistan.

d. Tactically, while guerrilla operations of hundreds of men were launched occasionally, small units of thirty to forty men were more frequently used.

e. The Mujahideens preferred to set ambushes by bridges or defiles, to destroy the bridges or block the roads and then to fire from the concealed positions, where they were already ready for action. If the Soviets had a strong advance guard, it was allowed to pass before the main element was hit. After the engagement, the Mujahideens quickly withdrew.

f. Despite the material qualities and intimate knowledge of the terrain, the Mujahideens operated under severe handicaps including shortages of arms, medicine and food. And inspite of the Afghan's reputed prowess in guerrilla warfare, many accounts cite poor tactical planning and a lack of weapons training.

g. The more distant the location was from Pakistan, the more difficult it was to supply arms and supplies.

Mujahideens Tactics

233. The mobility of Soviet combat troops was restricted due to their limitations regarding the terrain of Afghanistan. Afghan Mujahideens tactics conformed to the classic requirements of guerrilla warfare. They adopted the technique of small group actions using the cover of night. A great part of this included making their presence known through assassinations, attacks on outposts and installations, blocking of roads, sudden appearances in towns and villages to recruit men and collect supplies. These techniques have been extended to include the arranging of strikes in the cities and inducement of Afghan military units to desert and mutiny. Defections were the government's principal curse. Before the 1978 coup, Afghan army strength stood at 100,000. That figure dropped to 50,000 to 70,000 by the time Moscow interfered in Afghanistan in 1979 and installed the regime of Babrak Karmal in December 1979. It even came down to about 30,000 men.

234. The Afghan Mujahideen's tactics was to rely on easy access from Pakistan and Iran into the border territories of Afghanistan. There were countless tracks, which small groups of Mujahideens crossed and recrossed at will. The ability of resistance groups to mount sustained attacks on Soviet and Afghan army garrisons in the important western organised operations linking local Mujahideen groups within the North West Frontier

Provinces were especially crucial because they gave access to the most populous and most vital Afghan provinces. These border lands are generally controlled by tribes rather than police or any military units. These tribes have been of great help to the Mujahideens.

235. Terror inevitably became a tactic of the resistance groups. Assassination of government officials, Marxists and their families became standard practice. Their homes were identified and systematically destroyed. The Mujahideens tactics of terror also extended to the Soviets, all of whom, civilians as well as soldiers were considered to be legitimate targets. The Mujahideen’s groups took no prisoners apart from the logistical problems that prisoners would present, they were seen as infidel intruders, unworthy of mercy. Summary execution of the Soviets had an inhibiting effect on Soviet tactics. Their attacks tended to be tightly massed under heavy mechanized protection. To some extent their operations were hindered by their unwillingness to send out small patrols that would make easy targets.

236. The Mujahideens also made Soviet lines of communications as their targets. The Mujahideens could prevent some of the food supplies reaching Kabul. They occasionally did interrupt electricity transmission to the cities but they could not successfully mount a siege of the main urban centres.


237. There was clearly a technological gap between the Mujahideens with their hand held weapons, and the Soviet reliance on helicopters, rocket attacks and tank shells. There is evidence that the Soviet forces used chemical warfare, including irritants, incapacitants and lethal agents such as nerve gas, in trying to flush the Mujahideen groups from caves. Against the Soviet modern weapons and tactics, the Mujahideens used their difficult country side, their experience with tight weapons, the cover of night, the support of the population, their own incredible hardiness and stamina, they controlled most of the country side.

238. Sabotage tactics was also used to prove that the government in Kabul is not in control of the country. Ambush was the most common form of sabotage used by the Mujahideens. They blew up a bridge or created an avalanche, and then opened fire from high terrain. If a strong military column was passing, they let the reconnaissance and advance units through, then they opened fire suddenly and with closed aim and scattered quickly. They also mined roads and then set up rifle and machine-gun cover of the mined areas. Another mean used to draw troops to a particular area was to lay a siege to a post or a small garrison and then to ambush reinforcements which were handicapped by the absence of any alternate means of communication in the rugged mountains. Yet another favourite target of the Mujahideens ambushes was the supply columns which usually moved out of Kabul in various

directions to supply not only their military garrisons but also the civil population. They also ambushed tanks by blocking the roads in difficult defiles by causing rock slides. Muhahideens also tried to counter the Soviet helicopter gunships with ambush tactics. What they did was that they divided themselves into two groups along the expected path of the helicopter in a valley. One group with automatic weapons sitting itself with strong protection with the task of drawing the helicopter. The other group positioned itself about 2300 metres higher than the first group, opened fire at the maximum range to drop the pilot's attention. The helicopter also engaged it and came close to it for recognition and effective fire. As the helicopter gunship came in line with the lower group and engaged it from close quarters, the group sitting above and waiting finding the helicopter at the right distance opened fire from more advantageous position. They fired both automatic weapons as well as rocket launchers. There was a lot of risk involved but this was the best they could do with what they possessed against helicopter gunships.

239. To increase pressure on the government, public utilities drew the Mujahideen's attention. Their road blocking tactics was simple but effective. They covered the road by stones, dislodged from a cliff, mined or strewn with disabled vehicles. The stopped traffic would then be snipped at or capture depending on the

1. Imtiaz H. Bokhari, *op.cit*, p.27.
strength of the units defending the road. Captured drivers and passengers had various fates. Frequently they were robbed and let go; some suspected of working for or being associated with the government were kidnapped or killed. Most civilians particularly bus passengers, were released and allowed to proceed. Some were forced to join the resistance. Such harsh treatment and the hijacking of vehicles and supplies gave the Soviet government a basis for branding the Mujahideens in general as 'bandits' but the effectiveness of their interruption of traffic dramatized the failure of the Soviets' attempt to impose control. It was a major factor in their decision to reconsider their pacification strategy.

240. The list of targets also included cutting of telephone lines, carrying away of food grains from the towns, both to add to the governments problem as well as for own use, looting of cash from the banks and destruction or damage to power houses to disrupt electricity supply. The same were the analysis of the Economist, "in Kabul, power supplies have been restored after several days of blackouts caused by the destruction of pylons which brought electricity to the capital from a hydro-electric power station".

241. Assassination and arson was another Mujahideens technique to alienate support to the government at Kabul. The targets for such operation were so chosen that their effects increased the Mujahideens authority and alienated people from lending support to the government for fear of reprisals. According to Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell, "assassination of government officials, Marxists school teachers and their families became standard practice. Their houses were identified and systematically destroyed. As a result the Parcham government was effectively denied contact (except by force) with the population nearly everywhere". In another incident a family was awarded a shop in Kabul for declaring their support to Karmal regime on T.V. After a week that shop was burnt by the Mujahideens and whole family was assassinated. Such acts produced the effect that the government was not capable of protecting those who supported it and this slowly eroded the support base.

242. Propaganda was another tactics used by the Mujahideens. Shab Namah (the night letter) proved most effective tool. It spreaded the achievements of the Mujahideens and weaknesses of Soviet and Afghan forces. These letters also encouraged the reluctant minds to join the resistance for "jehad" against the aethiest forces. According to Kuldip Nayyar, the letters said, "Help us by going on strike, join the demonstrtrions and civil disobedience to overthrow the fascist regime of Moscow communists", "the Revolutionary Council of Youth congratulated the fighting the Muslim nation of Afghanistan and the bereaved families of the

martyred young heroes", "in the name of God the merciful and
Compassionate polar bears get out of our sacred soil", "today
99.95 percent of the people are with the Mujahideens" and "the
freedom fighters are willing to face the powerful and well equipped
enemy with empty hands to become martyrs".

243. The Mujahideens propaganda not only caused defections but
also kept the rate of recruitment so low that the Afghan army
almost ceased to exist as a fighting force of much significance.
Those forced into conscription defected at the first available
opportunity along with their weapons.

244. Some of the other tactics techniques used by the Mujahideens
2 included:-

a. "Hit and run" was the most practiced tactics of the
Mujahideens, due to the favourable and well acquainted
mountainous terrain. This tactics was employed very
successfully.

b. Mining of roads and destruction of bridges. The mines
were improvised by filling iron cooking pots with
locally fabricated explosives. The Molotov cocktails
were also being used.

c. Raids and ambushes on military posts, convoys and
reinforcement was a common practice.

d. The destruction or damage to power houses, government
buildings and other utility services were carried out.

2. Zalmay Khalizada, "Soviet Occupied Afghanistan", Problems of
Communism, USA, November 1990, p.38.
e. Blocking of roads and defiles by causing rock slides and then carry out ambushes of the tanks and vehicles.

f. Learnt the use of short range anti-tank weapons and anti-tank mines.

g. The targets of assassination and kidnapping were government officials, party workers, military officials both Soviet and Afghan and all those who helped or sympathized with the Kabul regime.

**Border Violations**

1

245. Details were:-

a. Violations of the Pakistani border by Kabul regime and possibly Soviet aircraft and artillery escalated in 1985 as there were more than 200 Afghan/Soviet violations of Pakistani airspace and more than 25 instances of shelling Pakistani territory.

b. Incidents on the Iranian/Afghan border also occurred.

c. Cross border strikes generally were related to combat taking place near the border inside Afghanistan.

d. Bomb attacks took place on Teri Mangal in 1984.

e. Violations were especially numerous around Arandu, opposite Barikot and all along the tribal areas bordering Paktia province.

f. On 31 May 1985, Soviet/Afghan aircraft bombed and rocketed Swir, a village in northern Pakistan, about 20 miles from the border where 11 civilians died and 32 were wounded.

g. A total of 2,819 air and ground violations took place between 1984 to 1989.

h. Out of the total violations, 642 violations took place between 15 May 1988 and 1 January 1989 alone.

j. 14xSoviet/Afghan aircraft were brought down in eight years by Pakistan Air Force.

k. On 2 July 1989, a total of 3 Skud missiles were dropped at Kurram Agency in Pakistan’s territory. 1xScud also landed near POF at Wah on 10 January 1990.

Logistic System

246. Afghan armed forces logistics was not highly developed. There was almost total dependence on the Soviet Union for all supplies, including weapons and equipment, spare parts, fuel and ammunitions. The absence of rail, roads and the inadequate road network further complicated the supply system. Except for Russia, that too through Salang tunnel, it was incapable of undertaking a sustained war effort.

Military Advantages Gained by the Soviet Forces

247. Following were the major military advantages gained by the Soviet forces:-

a. Battlefield experience of fighting in mountaineous terrain.

b. Battle inoculation experience of about one million Russian soldiers.

c. Battle worthiness of a modern high technology weapons and ammunition was carried out.

d. New military doctrines were tried out in fighting against guerilla warfare.

e. Armoured infantry operations supported by heliborne troops were conducted with success.

f. Mobile air assault regiments were tested under the live fire of the Mujahideens.

g. Mine laying and clearance operations were carried out and new equipment and techniques in mine warfare were introduced.

h. Drills for safe passage of military convoys by the establishment of security check posts were organised and perfected.

j. Existing military training manuals (technical, non-technical and administrative) regarding operations of war would be revised by the Soviet Armed Forces in the light of experience gained in Afghanistan, which would prove helpful for such like operations else-where in the world.

Results - Soviet Military Involvement

248. Following could be regarded as the major outcome of the 1 Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan:-

1. Lt Gen Matin, op.cit, pp.175-176.
a. The Soviets were forced to withdraw their "limited contingent".

b. 80% to 90% of the countryside remained under the control of the Mujahideens.

c. Several provincial capitals fell into the hands of the Mujahideens.

d. A large number of Afghan soldiers defected or were killed, reducing the fighting strength of the Afghan army from 100,000 to about 30,000.

e. Changes occurred on the socio-political plane due to the Mujahideens "victory".

f. The Najib government became willing to share power with the opposition.

g. The military pressure applied by the Muslim revolutionaries on the communist government in Kabul made them rescind many of the steps taken to convert Afghanistan into a communist state.

h. The name of the country which had been earlier changed to "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" was changed back to the "Republic of Afghanistan".

i. The original, black, red and green tricolour in national flag was brought back.

k. Greater emphasis was again given to religious rituals.

l. At least on the face of it Afghanistan got back some of its Islamic character mainly due to the military pressure of the Mujahideens.

m. The success of the Afghan Mujahideens against the
Soviets in Afghanistan encouraged several other countries to throw off the yoke of communism.

n. The traditional role of the Maliks, Khans and religious leaders diminished as the young Mujahideens gained importance in their respective areas.

o. The ethnic division did get diluted some what when fighting against a common enemy but persisted after the main cause of the struggle had been removed.

Mujahideen Weaponry

1. Analysis of the weaponry revealed:-

a. Until 1986, the Mujahideens used almost exclusively Soviet designed weapons either captured from government troops or delivered by Pakistan Army in the latter case, mainly Chinese made weapons brought by the CIA.

b. From 1986, some new weapons namely the "Stingers", the French anti-tank rocket "Milan", Spanish 120 mm mortars, infra-red aiming devices, "lightfoot" anti-mine devices and radi"equipment were introduced. However these weapons (apart from Stinger) did not have a significant effect in the field because these were introduced on political military considerations.

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Soviet Weaponry

250. Analysis of the Soviet weaponry revealed:-

a. The Soviets generally used less sophisticated weapons such as 5.45mm ammunition introduced only in 1982, infra-red devices around 1984, direction anti-personnel mines in 1985, fuel air explosives in 1986, and laser guided bombs in 1988.

b. Mi-24 combat helicopters were very effective but were not initially intended for guerrilla warfare and proved to be vulnerable to Stinger missiles, more so than the fighter bombers which can rely on speed and high altitude.

c. Some new weapons were introduced like RPG-16 (or 19) individual rocket launcher, the Automatic Grenade Launcher AGS - 17 in 1981, AK-74 assault rifle in 1982, which did not effect heavy losses.

d. The battle tanks committed were the old fashioned T-62 and T-64, because none of the armoured divisions equipped with the new T-72 were engaged in Afghanistan.

e. BTR-60 and BMP-1 were the standard combat vehicles for the motorized troops; the latter’s use was improved by replacing its 73 mm gun with a heavy machine gun. The soldiers also introduced some tactical changes such as keeping the hatches open in operation to reduce the effects of mines and RPG fire.

f. The air force, mainly the helicopter units, played a

1. Ibid, p.53.
major role in Afghanistan. Two aircraft proved particularly effective, i.e. the Mi-24 combat helicopter and the Su-25 low flying bomber. Besides airborne soldiers, Mi-24 pilots became the real heroes of the war and the old Tsarist rank of praporshchik, introduced into the Soviet Army in 1972, was bestowed mainly on helicopter pilots.

g. Although there were consistent reports about the use of chemical weapons by the Soviets in 1980 and 1982, there were no scientific evidence of this.

h. The Soviets also used decoys such as infra-red flares and heat deflectors and contrived tactics to counter the Stingers.

**Soviet/Afghan Ground Forces**

251. Details were as under:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>In addition one Corps &quot;Northern Zone Corps&quot; has also been raised with Headquarters in Balkh province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Armoured Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6 and 60 (Nangahar), 40 (Bagram), 53 (Jauzjan), 54 (Kunduz), 80 (Baghlan), 93 (Helmand).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Mechanized Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>Artillery Division</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>Transport Division</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>Commando Brigades</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>Para</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j.</td>
<td>Special Guards</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k.</td>
<td>Striking</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l.</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m.</td>
<td>Scud</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o.</td>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p.</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q.</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r.</td>
<td>Logistic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Equipped with latest equipment, raised at Kabul, (approximate strength 10,000).

95 SCUD Brigade raised at Jalalabad, (50-60 Missiles 4-5 Launchers).
252. **Orbat Second Line Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formations</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. National Divisions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. National Brigade</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Border</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Guard</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Militia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Volunteers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Police</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

253. **Local Militia Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formations</th>
<th>Tribe/Province</th>
<th>Stringt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Sulemanzai Militia</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Barakzai Militia</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Kakuzai Militia</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Nurzai Militia</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Asmat Muslim</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Mulla Nizam Militia</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade(Burzai Tribe)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Abdul Bari Militia Battalion</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghan Army Equipment State

254. Equipment detail is as under:

a. It is not possible to list how ground forces equipment has been divided between the different factions. The list below represents weapons known to be in the country in April 1992.

b. **Main Battle Tank.** 1,200, T-54/55, T-62.

c. **Light Tanks.** 60 PT - 76.

d. **Recce.** 250 BRDM - 1/-2.

e. **AIFV.** 550 BMP-1/-2.

f. **Armoured Personal Cars.** 1,100 BTR -40/-60/-70/-80/-152.

g. **Towed Arty.** 2,000+: 76mm: M-1938, M-1942; 85mm: D-48; 100mm: M1944; 122mm: M-30, D-30; 130mm: M-46, 152mm: D-1, D-20, M-1937 (ML-20)

h. **Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher.** 122mm: BM-21; 140mm: BM-14; 220mm: BM-22.

i. **Surface to Surface Missile.** 30: Scud, FROG-7 launchers.

j. **Anti-Tank Guided Weapons.** AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger.

l. **Rocket Launcher.** 73mm SPG-9; 82mm: B-10.

m. **Air Defence Guns.** 600+14.5mm: 23mm: ZU-23, 20 ZSU-23=4 SP; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60; 85mm: KS-12, 100mm: KS-19.

n. **Surface to Air Missile.** SA-7/-13.

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2. Following the fall of the Najibullah government in April 1992 the bulk of the Northern Corps retaining its structure, the rest appear to have transferred their allegiance to their local Mujahideen groups.
Afghan Air Force

255. Air Force organisation and loyalty following the fall of the Najib government is uncertain. The majority are controlled either by the Defence Minister Ahmed Shah Masud or by General Dostam. The inventory shows aircraft in service in April 1992. Serviceability is doubtful. Other equipment details include:-

a. FGA 30 MiG-23, 80 Su-7/17/-22.
b. Fighter. 80 MiG -21F.
c. Armoured Helicopters. 25 Mi-8, 35 Mi-17, 20 Mi-25.
d. Transport Air Craft. 2 II-18 D; 50 An-12, An-26, An-32.
e. Transport Helicopters. 12 Mi-4
g. Surface to Air Missile. 115 SA-2, 110 SA-3, guns 37mm, 85mm, 100mm.

Soviet Military Weaknesses

256. Following could be termed as major Soviet weaknesses:-

a. Inexperience in guerrilla warfare by junior officers besides lack of timely and accurate decisions by junior officers.

b. Out-dated field communications which made it difficult for higher headquarters to command from the rear.

c. A number of the Central Asian soldiers appeared to have little appetite to fight their ethnic Muslim brethren.

d. Lack of physical fitness and initiative by the Soviet generals.

e. Lack of sufficient training and low moral of the replacements sent to Afghanistan.

f. Greater reliance on the elite Slavic commandos and paratroopers who were adept at small unit operations.

Strength of the Mujahideens

257. The Mujahideens had the following strength to face a super power challenge due to which they emerged as victorious in the analysis of the Afghan conflict:-


b. Courage, determination and will power in the battle-field against a large enemy in quantum and superior in weaponry.

c. Afghan national character based on steadfastness, manhood, persistence, defence of honour of home land, women and property.

d. Non-subjugation to a foreigner or interference by any outsider in their area of jurisdiction/ control.

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Weakness of the Mujahideens

258. Following weaknesses were surfaced during the Afghan crisis:-

a. Internal rivalry between the Afghan political leaders/parties and between the field commanders.

b. Lack of command and control amongst the Mujahideen leaders and the commanders in various theatre of operations.

c. The Mujahideens were never imparted proper training in organized schools/colleges of military instructions/training. Had they been trained in regular military academies/schools/colleges, the situation would have been different in less time with less loss of men and material.

d. The Mujahideens were not organized into conventional army (Units/Brigades/Divisions/Corps/Army Groups) lines rather they were irregular and wide spread in the entire country with no central command structure.

e. The Mujahideens were grouped into places of their own choice they preferred to defend the area(s), which suited them most over the area(s) which required their attention. Mostly they defended and kept their activities alive in their own villages/towns.

f. At the initial stages of the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, the Mujahideens were running short of arms and ammunition. Later on, this shortage overcame but its distribution amongst various groups was not based on equality resulting into cropping up of
more differences between various political parties.

g. Maximum casualties of the Mujahideens occurred due to effective Soviet air attacks and the Mujahideens did not have any counter measures to avoid these aerial attacks till they received Stringers (made in USA), Blow pipes (made in UK), Milans (made in France) and long range missiles (made in China), which proved successful against aerial and tank attacks.

h. Communication infrastructure was extremely poor for transportation of weapons and ammunitions to various strongholds inside Afghanistan. At times weapons were available but not at an appropriate time and at a required place due to lack of mobility. At places it took few days to deliver ammunitions to a particular place.

j. The military operations were reduced to a minimum during winter seasons due to severe cold and acute problems of transportation of equipment through difficult terrain routes. As compared to this, the Soviets and the Kabul regime forces were at an advantageous position and used to improve their logistic support in the form of storage of necessary supplies and material during the winter seasons.
Causes-Soviet Military Failure

259. Following were the major causes of the Soviet military failure:

a. The Soviets under estimation of the strength and fighting spirit of the Mujahideens.
b. Lack of mountaineous training and equipment by the Soviet armoured forces.
c. Effectiveness of guerrilla actions by the Afghan layout of terrain.
d. Ineffectiveness of tanks and guns due to Afghan mountaineous terrain and lack of plains.
e. Lack of motivational force in the Soviet soldiers as compared to Afghan soldiers who were totally motivated by the spirit of "jehad".
f. Little support of depleted and defection ridden army by the Soviets in the initial stages of their arrival in Afghanistan.
g. Lack of popular support to the Soviets in Afghanistan as majority of the Afghans hated Soviets troops on their soil.
h. Receipt of modern high technology weapons and ammunition by the Mujahideens in the course of time.
j. Strategic depth to the Mujahideens in Pakistan and Iran, hence the Soviets could not engage the Afghans in these countries by fire etc.

1. Lt Gen Matin, op.cit, p.170.
k. Lack of induction of more Soviet forces in Afghanistan though realising that the then present Soviet strength was inadequate to quell the guerrilla activities of the Mujahideens.

l. Lack of initiative due to central command by the Soviet young/junior officers in Afghanistan.

The Lessons

Direct Confrontation Between Islam and Communism

260. Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan resulted into direct confrontation between Islam and communism. Contemporary military Islam has little in common with the Muslim tribal upheavals of the colonial period, although tribalism did pay a major role in the latter day resistance. Majority of the Mujahideens were true Muslims and followers of those leaders who were also true Muslims and well knitted with their tribal system of Afghanistan society. The Mujahideens fought a battle of "jehad" for liberating their country from the godless people.

Ethnic and Tribal Rivalry

261. The Mujahideens have a long history of ethnic and tribal rivalry. Due to the arrival of the Soviet military forces in Afghanistan, it was superseded through a unity of Islamic bond but it again surfaced soon after the Soviet withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. If "qaum" affiliation is the rule of the political game at gross-roots level, ethnicity and not the confrontation between Islam and secularism remains the dominating theme in the power contest in Kabul.

1. Adelphi Papers, No 259, *op.cit*, p.3.
Lack of Soviet Preparations

262. The Soviet troops were unprepared to fight a war and the tactics employed was similar to those used in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The military units carried along their full equipment, including anti-tank weaponry, anti-aircraft batteries and NBC units, but none of these were very useful for counter insurgency warfare.

263. The Soviets used their best units (105 Airborne Division) to topple the Amin regime and occupation of the strategic axis with reserve divisions manned by the Soviet Muslims indicated that they were not prepared to face resistance by the Mujahideens. They did not deploy their troops to fight out resistance instead they sent ordinary motor rifle units in support of the government army.

264. Despite the arrival of about 115,000 Soviet troops on the Afghan ground, the Soviets did not launch any major successful offensive against the Mujahideens in the first four years of the war.

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265. Except for large air bases like Shindand and Bagram, troops quarters and barracks remained vulnerable for years. Probably the Soviets assessed that the Karmal regime would make an effective control of the situation. But thousands of officers and soldiers of the Afghan Army defected and joined hands with the Mujahideens. In the aftermath of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the Mujahideens were able to seize hundreds of government out-posts in most cases after the defections of the garrisons. For example, in spring 1980 the entire Panjsher valley fell into the hands of Ahmad Shah Masud, who until the invasion had been confined to its upper regions.

Strategical Mistake

266. The Soviets immediately on arrival occupied the Shindand base in the south west of Afghanistan which was of no use to fight the insurgency but constituted an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" close to the Persion Gulf. Threats and even military force (bombing aerial violations of borders) were levelled against Iran and Pakistan. It can be concluded that the Soviets started the game on broader offensive strategy but had to face insurgency warfare for which they were not even prepared.

End of Pushtunistan Issue

267. Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan suppressed the burning issue of Pushtunistan which was gaining momentum day by day. Afghan Mujahideens were always given few and old weapons by various governments of Pakistan to weaken the Kabul regime to discourage it from reviving the Pushtunistan issue and not to

overthrow Kabul regime.

Failure of Soviet Army's Decisive Blow

268. Despite regular offensives, daily aerial bombardment and artillery shelling and hundreds of thousands of casualties (mainly Afghan civilians), the Soviet army failed to strike any decisive blows even locally against the Mujahideens. None of the prominent Mujahideen commanders were taken prisoners or killed in the wake of the Soviet offensives.

Successful Defence and Establishment of Security Belts

269. The Soviets only successes were defensive which consisted of security belts around the large cities and bases. No significant ground was re-captured from the Mujahideens.

Lack of Knowledge-Guerrilla Warfare

270. The basic requirements of such warfare which was never met by the Soviets included the immediate exploitation of intelligence, search and destroy operations, an understanding of the local society, the destruction of enemy supply and communication lines and the integration of military and political tactics. As early as 1980, they correctly identified the main problems to include lack of adequate training, excessive centralized control, lack of initiative and mobility and the irrelevancy of the military doctrine, but there was no effort to reshape 40 Army into a counter-insurgency force.

Miscalculations of Strength/Capabilities

271. The Soviets over-estimated the ability of the Kabul regime and under estimated both the strength of the Mujahideens, the determination of General Zia and the US role to support them. The
Soviets knew that their own army would not perform well but mistakenly assumed that they would never be involved in direct combat, much less a protracted guerrilla war. The Soviet offensives in Afghanistan were always aimed at "teaching a lesson" and gaining some breathing space, never at destroying the enemy.

**Borrowed Tactics of European Theatre**

272. Soviet tactics was initially borrowed from the European theatre, relying on heavy artillery and air bombings before attacking in huge columns thus forfeiting the element of surprise, although there was a real effort to devise new tactics better adapted to guerrilla warfare. Even when airborne troops played a larger role (from 1984 onwards) they were usually unable to hold the ground or to fight for more than two days without the direct support of an armoured column. Generally the centralization of command made it very difficult for isolated units to adopt to changing battle situations.

**Poor Logistic Support**

273. Logistics were very poor till 1984. They improved afterwards, but this also explains why the Soviets could not escalate. The morale of the ordinary troops was low where as the use of drugs and recourse to the black market was quite common. The paratroopers, who were also conscripts, showed more determination and efficiency, but were never trained in real search and destroy actions.

**Lack of Political Tactics**

274. The Soviet army lacked the political background, training
and structures that were essential to any counter guerilla force. If the Soviet Army had political officers directed towards its own members, it never introduced those, whose function was to make contact with the local population, deal with Mujahideens and prepare intelligence reports. Persian or Pushtun-speaking Soviet officers were appointed at the divisional level not on the field. The coordination between the army in the field and the intelligence units seemed to have been rather poor, hampering the army's ability to react quickly to events on the basis of intelligence data.

Role of Intelligence - Early Information

Following incidents indicates that the world knew about the impending Russian threat to the security of Afghanistan:-

a. On 22 December 1979, US State Department briefed the reporters in Washington DC about the Soviets build up

b. In May 1979, the Defence Intelligence Agency of USA had also assessed that there was a high probability that the Soviets would invade Afghanistan.

c. Few months before the invasion, an important American editor was quoted saying "the Soviets are not going to invade Afghanistan. Afghanistan is of absolutely no importance to any one. The Soviets donot want it and if they do they can have it nobody cares".

1. Lt Gen Matin, op.cit, pp.93-94.
d. A Pakistan diplomate is believed to have warned the Americans about the impending invasion three weeks before it actually came.

1. The Afghan intelligence agency is known as KHAD or "State Information Services". It remained busy in collection of information about the Mujahideens activities. It also conducted some military actions of short term duration.

f. KHAD used to recruit former Mujahideens through manipulation of traditional patterns of segmentation and turning them against their own former allies. For example, the assassination of the Jamiat leader of the north Zabiullah, a Tajik, by an Uzbek who had been prominent in the Harakat-i-Engelab.

g. From 1986 onwards the disaffected Mujahideens proved very efficient not for attacking but for protecting areas from from the Mujahideens encroachment

h. KHAD tried to use the independently minded Pushtun tribes on the Pakistani side of the border to disrupt the Mujahideens rear supply lines. For example, in Kurram, the Turi shia tribe and the Orakzays regularly fought against the Mujahideens, while in 1985 and 1986 the Kukikheyl clan (South of Khyber Pass), opposed the construction of a road that could have been used by the Mujahideens (Pakistan kept the situation under control and never let the Soviets/KHAD agents play their game.

---

1. It was headed by Najibullah until 1986 and later on by General Yaqubi.
openly.

j. From July to November 1987, indiscriminate acts of terrorism killed about 300 persons in the main cities of Pakistan. KHAD greatest success was the bombing of a huge ammunition dump at Ojare Camp, Rawalpindi on 10 April, 1988.

Soviet Deceptive Actions - Inside Afghanistan

276. A large number of Soviet military advisors were already inside Afghanistan on the plea of Amin's help in suppressing the resistance. Their major actions to supppport the then incoming Afghan main military forces were as under:-

a. Removal of batteries of various equipments for maintenance and better storage purposes.

b. Locking up of ammunition.

c. Inviting of Afghan officers on a reception and not permitted on leave on exact dates and time of mass military involvement in Afghanistan.

d. At about 1430 hours on 27 December 1979, Soviet Minister of Communication met President Amin and assured him about the normalicy of conditions in Afghanistan.

Electronic Warfare

277. Afghanistan is a benign electronic environment in that the guerillas made little use of radios and they did not attempt to

disrupt the Soviet C, other than by making physical attacks on elements of the system, but the Soviets authorities took advantage of their territorial gains to install long range radars and electronic surveillance equipment which watched over parts of Pakistan, Iran, China and the Persian Gulf states.

Conditions of the Soviet Veterans

278. The Soviet veterans of the war in Afghanistan returned to a society that neither understood nor appreciated the war they fought. The Afghan veterans or "Afghantsi" as they are called in the Soviet Union are not recognized for their sacrifices. The

1. C3, is a military terminology which means command, control and communication and is internationally used abbreviation in military communication.

2. Air Commodore R M Austin, op.cit, p.04.
Afghantsi are a large group, given that between 500,000 and 1 million soldiers rotated through Afghanistan during the years of the war. Many Afghantsi are experiencing problems reintegrating into society and often cannot find housing or employment. Many suffer from post combat stress disorders and other psychological problems.

279. Some of the more disillusioned Soviet soldiers have become part of the restless youth, underground of punks, heavy materials and other informal groups. Others have become hard liners and set up veterans organizations dedicated to the military-political education of the youth or to violence against what they see as the punks and heavy materials. Some Afghantsi were elected as deputies to the Supreme Soviet and have been able to articulate their concerns before that body.

280. For the officer "Afghantsi", service in Afghanistan often meant promotions upon their return. For example, the highly visible so called last soldier to leave Afghanistan Boris Gromov, 1. Marshall Sergei Akhромеев cited a figure of 500,000 speaking in the Supreme Soviet on 2 October, 1989. However, other estimates are as high as 1 million. On the average during more than nine years, there were 100,000 to 150,000 Soviet soldiers deployed in Afghanistan. Most of the enlisted personnel served one-and-a-half years and officers served one year, often more. With these relations it is likely that 1 million men saw action in Afghanistan as cited by Daria Fane, "After Afghanistan: The Decline of Soviet Military Prestige", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1990, p.6.
Commander of the Fortieth Army in Afghanistan after three tours of duty, was promoted to Commander of the Kiev Military District upon his return. Military manpower cut backs initiated by Gorbachev included a reduction in the officer ranks of 10,000. When officers are selected out, the "Afghantsi" usually are chosen to remain because of their valuable battle experience.

Drugs By the Soviet Soldiers

281. Afghanistan is the world's largest opium grower, according to the UN, produced an estimated 2,000 tons in 1992. This was a concern not only for the west, but also at home, where it was estimated that 15% of all adult Afghan males age 15-30 were addicted to hard drugs.

282. Poll conducted by the Russian Ministry of Defence revealed a crisis situation of deep unhappiness among Soviet officers and non-commissioned officers. Low pay, inferior living conditions, drug use and alcoholism are mentioned frequently as problems. Drugs have emerged as a special problem in the wake of Afghanistan. During the war, many Soviet soldiers used drugs on a regular basis, especially hashish and opium. There have been cases of marijuana cultivation inside military bases.

Disapproval of Soviet Masses

283. The Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan was viewed with disenchantment by the Soviet public, in general. According to the impressions gathered in Russia by Jack Anderson of Washington Post, this action was forced upon the aging Soviet

leader Leonid Brezhnev, who was too weak to resist the rigid politburo. Neither Brezhnev personally nor the masses in general approved the barbaric aggression.

**Soviet Analysis**

284. Official Soviet analysts have drawn three main lessons from Afghanistan, as under:-

a. It is very difficult if not impossible to establish a stable "Socialist" or "Socialist Oriented" state in a "backward" country by imposing the rule of a militarized Marxist Leninist party.

b. The failure of a overwhelming force to subdue such a seemingly weak, disorganized opposition has provided a sober lesson in the limits of military power that powers become powerless.

c. Soviet commentators assert that foreign policy decision making must be opened up to wider participation. Contrary to the claims made since 1980 that the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was made "with unanimity" after broad discussion, the party now claims that the decision was made in haste and secrecy
by only five people. This group supposedly did not consult academic institutions, the Central Committee Staff or the Embassy in Kabul before making the decision.

Failure of Communism

285. The Kabul regime did not get stable environment to implement communism. Kabul failed to establish firm power base and implement a communist transformation of the economy and society because of forces under appreciated by the Soviet experts, which proved to be stronger than any other components of the society such as religion, the peasantry and segmentation.

Mis-judgement - Strength of Islam

286. The strength of Islam amongst the Mujahideens was a complete surprise for the Soviet experts, who viewed religion as a vehicle for expressing social-economic aspirations for which there was no other political outlet. Situation in Iran during Iranian Revolution and resistance faced due to the spirited Afghan Muslims which forced the Soviets to believe Islam as a global/motivating force and not mere disguise for socio-economic aspirations.

1. These included Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov, Gromyko and Shcherbitsky.

Mobility of the Mujahideens

287. The Mujahideens were rarely obliged to walk at night, instead they travelled in huge convoys, journeying safely for hundreds of miles. The Mujahideens were even provided the Tennessee mules (dually airlifted from the USA to Pakistan for Afghan Mujahideens). But their determination to fight out against the Soviet forces was beyond any doubt. They suffered from lack of mobility but still did the best, keeping in view the limited means available for mobility.

Lack of Systematic Policy—Displacement of Population

288. There was no systematic policy of displacing the population or of creating "strategic helmets" or refugees. Infact, the population was free to move from place to place with the exception of Afghan youths, who were drafted. Propaganda was kept to the minimum with little effort was made to win hearts and minds. Exodus resulted mainly due to the following:—

a. Transformation of populated areas into battlefields (For example, the lower Panjshir valley, west of Herat and the Paghman valley, east of Kabul)

b. Extensive use of artillery and aerial bombardment by the Soviet troops on hundred of square kilometres around the cities.

c. Launching indiscriminate reprisals after isolated the Mujahideens attacks.

d. Protest emigration, fullled by the simple announcement of the war.
Failure of Soviet Strategy of Indirect Involvement

289. Soviet military involvements in Afghanistan was a complete counter to the Soviet strategy of indirect involvement mainly for the following reasons:

a. Instead of proxies, Soviet troops were used.

b. Instead of attempting to win the hearts of the population through indirectly aiding the intelligensia, uniformed troops were used in direct suppression, an act of enmity that fans nationalism.

c. Conditions in Afghanistan were unsuitable for Soviet style communism. There is no substantial working class in the country and most of the population is peasantry.

Criticism By the Home Front

290. Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan was criticized in USSR. Some of the aspects in this regard were:

a. Public demonstrations against service in Afghanistan took place in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and other republics.

b. Draft evasion increased, prompting the Soviet authorities to issue new laws punishing those failing to register.

c. "Samizdat" criticism (privately circulated dissident manuscripts) expanded, including both negative reports

1. Abdul Rashid, op.cit, p.32.

from Afghanistan veterans and open expressions of sympathy for the Mujahdeens by Crimean Tartar leaders.

d. Complaints about the war became more frequent and open and were implicitly acknowledged by courage in the Soviet press.

e. Unofficial polls conducted by human rights activists showed a decline in support for the war.

291. To generate more support, the Soviet media expanded their courage of fighting. Combat fatalities were reported more frequently. Decorations for heroism were played up and special features on men fighting in Afghanistan were carried out in their hometown newspapers.

**Air Force**

292. The Soviets fought with total air superiority against comparatively unsophisticated anti-aircraft opposition. The development of combined arms of command have been a success as of close air support with ground forces. From 1979 to 1988 considerable numbers of Soviet Air Force crews gained experience of battle conditions in new operational environment and the total capability of the force must have improved. Apart from the operational training benefits, the experience of flying in mountainous terrain would have a considerable advantage as the Soviet Federation is remarkably flat. Most of the western half of their country is below 50 feet above mean sea level and even the Siberian plateau, which rises in one part to 5,000 feet, is relatively level. Operating into Kabul, which is 5,870 feet above mean sea level and has a 15,000 feet mountain within 20 nautical
mile, must have been a new and valuable experience for the majority of transport crews.
PANJSHER VALLEY - MAY, 1982

MAP 4

HELIICOPTER LANDING

AERIAL BOMBINGS

SOVIET/KABUL TROOPS

TO SALANG PASS

TO KABUL, 80 KM
Afghan Casualties

293. General. In the decade since April 1978 when a coup d'état established a communist regime in Afghanistan, the Afghans have suffered a trauma. By the end of 1987, approximately 9 percent of the population were killed by war, a figure that ranks among the highest in recent history surpassing even the 8.6 percent death rate suffered by the Soviet Union during World War II.

Phases of Casualties

294. The Afghan war had four major phases of intensity. Interestingly these phases correlate closely with changes in the top leadership of the Soviet Union which were as follows:


(1) It is characterized by a large exodus from Afghanistan but relatively few war related deaths.

(2) This period does not include Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan but only those of the civil war duration.

(3) About 40,000 deaths in 1978 and 80,000 in 1979 occurred.

(4) Because the population of Afghanistan before the war was 12 to 15 million, this means the Afghan deaths number 3 per thousand in 1978 and 6 per thousand in 1979.

b. Soviet Military Involvement (Period upto Brezhnev Era).


During this period the rate of war related deaths increased to 7 per thousand and stayed there throughout the Brezhnev era.

c. The Andropov – Chernenko Period

(1) This period saw the war mount in scale.

(2) Deaths related to the war reached 11 per thousand Afghans during the tenure of Andropov and 16 per thousand during the short interregnum of Chernenko.

d. Gorbachev Period. The scale of the war initially continued at a very high level of 13 deaths per thousand. The number of military engagements fought increased, but the proportion of deaths seemed to be noticeably lower, about 9 war related deaths per thousand Afghans (the better equipped Mujahideens effectively protected the civilian population mainly due to the presence of anti-aircraft weapons).

Analysis - Rate of Casualties

295. A detailed study of the rate of casualties reveals the following major conclusions:-

a. Afghan women generally stayed near the houses occupied with the education of children and agricultural activities. Afghan houses built of hard packed clay probably offered good protection against small calibre


projectiles. This could be a reason as to why the probability of deaths increased with the frequent trips outside their homes.

b. The rate of casualties reduced with the arrival of anti-aircraft weapons.

c. In precarious hygienic conditions without medical assistance, even less serious injuries might have caused death by infections.

d. The exact number of injured could not be ascertained due to the fact that when injuries turned to be temporary, the Afghans became accustomed to extremely hard conditions of life and did not report sick.

e. Most victims of aerial bombings belonged to the non-belligerent population they were women, boys (under 15 years of age) and men (over 50 years of age).

f. Close to 35% of all refugee women ever married have been widowed, three fifths by the war.

g. The mortality rate for infants under one year was slightly higher within Pakistan after the initial "hijrat" from Afghanistan. This could have been due to the intense and unhealthy concentration of population in the refugee camps besides difference of climate. Mortality among Afghan children in Pakistan steeply declined after the large scale vaccination campaigns
which began in 1984.

h. The northern provinces of Afghanistan areas like Samangan, Kunduz, Baghlan and probably Badakshan suffered the highest war casualties with more than 16 percent of the population killed or incapacitated clearly, the Mujahideens's capacity for defence was limited by the region's distance from sources of supply and its proximity to the Soviet's sources of supply. Also the land in the north is steppe which provided few natural shelters against aircraft attacks.

j. The sheer length of the refugee route to the Pakistani border also increased the number of victims from northern provinces. Infact not many inhabitants of the north western and central parts of Afghanistan were among the initial refugees who came mainly from the provinces bordering Pakistan. However, with the passage of time a large number of refugees arrived from distant regions.

296. Refer to casualties related data on Table A to N attached.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Killed</th>
<th>Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1484</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1298</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1446</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2343</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1333</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,833</td>
<td>1,979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing/Captured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9102</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>4165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>10207</td>
<td>1342</td>
<td>2331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4005</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>1768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3110</td>
<td>2113</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>5121</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>1230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4780</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3562</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2037</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>4181</td>
<td>2407</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>9052</td>
<td>5183</td>
<td>1660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55,157</td>
<td>17,065</td>
<td>16,304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Kabul Regime Forces Casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Captured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>9051</td>
<td>10081</td>
<td>3187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3303</td>
<td>8323</td>
<td>2341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2885</td>
<td>7819</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3408</td>
<td>9242</td>
<td>1327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>3353</td>
<td>9011</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3690</td>
<td>8898</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>5772</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>6229</td>
<td>12786</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>10127</td>
<td>16529</td>
<td>3809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>11133</td>
<td>22018</td>
<td>2945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**: 58,951  116,589  17,245

---

### Table D

**War Deaths and Year of Maximum Hijrat**

(by province and region)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistani Border Region Provinces</th>
<th>War Related Deaths as a Percent of Local Population</th>
<th>Year of Maximum Hijrat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nargarhar</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktika</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region I taken as a whole</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### II. USSR Border Region Provinces

| Badakshan                        | (NA)                                                | (NA)                   |
| Badghis                          | (NA)                                                | (NA)                   |
| Baghlan                          | 11.3                                                | 1983                   |
| Balkh                            | 9.8                                                 | 1986                   |
| Faryab                           | 13.5                                                | 1986                   |
| Jozjan                           | 10.8                                                | 1986                   |
| Kunduz                           | 15.1                                                | 1986                   |
| Samangan                         | 14.1                                                | 1983                   |
| Takhar                           | 3                                                   | (NA)                   |
| Region II taken as a whole       |                                                     |                        |
### III. Iran Border Region
Provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimroz</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region III taken as a whole</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. Central Region
Provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bamian</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urozgan</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IV taken as a whole</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
<td>(NA)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### V. Kabul Region
Provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapissa (Panchir)</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region V taken as a whole</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan taken as a whole</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. From April of the given year to April of the following year.
3. NA means Data are not available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-10</th>
<th>11-20</th>
<th>21-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-60</th>
<th>Over 60</th>
<th>All ages</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Table F

BOMBING VICTIMS AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL CASUALTIES
(by sex and age)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-10</th>
<th>11-20</th>
<th>21-30</th>
<th>31-40</th>
<th>41-50</th>
<th>51-60</th>
<th>Over 60</th>
<th>All Ages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both sexes</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHILDHOOD DEATHS AMONG AFGHANS BORN 1972-1987

(in percent, by country of residence and age at death)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Effective Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Under 1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>+5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>+3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>+3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>+10.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table H

**AFGHAN POPULATION (1979)**

**AFGHAN REFUGEE POPULATION IN PAKISTAN (1987)**

(by age and sex, in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AFGHANISTAN 1979</th>
<th></th>
<th>PAKISTAN 1987</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 0-10</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 10-20</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 21-30</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 31-40</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 41-50</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 51-60</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 61-70</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 71-80</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Over 80</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ratio:

Males/Females 1.062

|            | 0.992 |

---

Table J


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pathans</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tajiks</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hazaras</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Uzbecks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Z signifies an ethnic representation under 1 percent. The ethnic composition of the Afghan refugee population in Iran is assumed to be similar to the ethnic structure of Afghanistan in 1978.
Table K

FATE OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION, 1977-1987

(in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculturalists</th>
<th>Uranites</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Displaced persons within Afghanistan</th>
<th>Refugees outside Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77-78</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78-79</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79-80</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-81</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-82</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-83</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83-84</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84-85</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-86</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86-87</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-Oct 87</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 4

AFGHAN REFUGEES

General

300. Out of total 12 million refugees in the world, Pakistan is playing host to nearly one third, constituting the single largest refugee concentration anywhere in the world today. Embittered by the persisting civil strife and shattered by the Soviet military intervention in 70s, these hapless Afghans chose their safe haven in Pakistan because of their existing traditional linkages and centuries old religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties with the tribal people of Pakistan. Imbibed with humanitarian spirit and in fulfilment of Islamic obligations, Pakistan has admirably braved the burden of such a massive influx of refugees for over 12 years, despite her slender resources and a multitude of persisting difficulties. In providing them shelter and succour, Pakistan has been aided by the generous external humanitarian assistance.

301. The Afghan refugees influx which was always considered a temporary strain, has since prolonged because of desultory and inconclusive civil war that continues to mire Afghanistan even after the Soviet exit, eluding peace and prospects of return of refugees to their former homesteads.

302. The ominous and protracted refugee presence of the size that exists in Pakistan, besides creating demographic imbalance, ecological damages and economic implications, has brought with it numerous psycho-social, political and security complexities for

Pakistan. Destabilization of local economies, employment competitions, drug trafficking, Klashinkov culture, subversive projections, growing lawlessness and widespread use of narcotics are some of the imports primarily associated with the Afghan refugees that gravely affect the fragile national fabric of Pakistan. Further perpetuation of the refugee presence, particularly in view of the fading external interest/assistance, has the potential to exacerbate the existing complexities of Pakistan.

Causes and Nature of Refugee Influx

303. Historical Perspective. Historically Pak-Afghan border has remained fluid with nomadic Pashtuns seasonally crossing back and forth from the mountains of Afghanistan to the warm Indus plains of Pakistan. Years before the beginning of the current refugee influx, approximately 75,000 Afghans crossed the border yearly. It had also been customary for the Afghans to seek political asylum in Pakistan. Expectedly therefore, when trouble began in Afghanistan in the 1970s, the Afghans looked towards Pakistan as a safe haven.

304. Current Influx. There were three distinct stages of refugee influx into Pakistan; each corresponding to traumatic political events in Afghanistan with Soviet armed intervention acting as the prime catalyst:-

2. Figures obtained from Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, Islamabad.
251

a. The first refugees began to migrate after July 1973, when Sardar Daud overthrew King Zahir Shah. Approximately 1500 royal loyalists, political dissidents and religious leaders fled to Peshawar.

b. The second phase of exodus began when Noor Muhammad Tarakai toppled Sardar Daud in April 1978. By June 1979, more than one lac dissidents including intellectuals, professors, bureaucrats and religious leaders fled to Pakistan to escape persecution by the Soviet instituted Marxist regime.

c. Third and largest refugees outflow started with the Soviet invasion in December 1979 and continued unabated till their numbers soared to 3 million in 1985. Escalation in refugee influx directly corresponded to the increase in country wide insurgency, inviting scorched earth policy by the Soviet forces to depopulate Afghanistan. The figures of registered and unregistered refugees today stand at 3.24 million and an estimated half a million respectively. Year wise flow and break up of registered/unregistered refugees in Pakistan are reflected at the end

Composition and Patterns of Afghan Migration

305. General. As composition and pattern of refugees migration

1. These figures exclude approximately 1.5 million Afghan refugees who migrated to Iran, thus totalling over 5 million out of total 15 million Afghan population in 1979 forced/displaced out of the country.
affect their impact on the host country and the probability of their return, its brief analysis is given in succeeding paras.

306. **Geographic Distribution.** The refugees migrated from all over Afghanistan including the provinces bordering the Soviet Union which at least initially had not been seriously affected by the war. Therefore, the impression that the evictions had been forced on Afghans by the combat, appears only partially true. Many refugees left Afghanistan for a combination of additional reasons: political, economic, ideological, panic/hysteria, fear of conscription etc. However, as reflected by the percentage of refugees originating from each province, the bulk migrated from central and eastern provinces adjoining Pakistan which had been worst affected by the Soviet intervention. Bordering areas of NWFP and Baluchistan had been selected for settlement by the refugees. As a consequence, these two provinces primarily bear their physical impact. Today every sixth person in NWFP, every fifth person in Baluchistan and every third person in the Tribal Areas is an Afghan refugee. A large number of Afghan families, mostly unregistered, have settled in urban centres not only in Baluchistan and NWFP but also in Punjab and Sindh. Refugee population in major density areas such as Kurram, North Waziristan, Bajaur, Kohat, Chagai and Pishin have even exceeded the local population.

307. **Ethno-Linguistic and Sectarian Composition.** A comparison of the province wise tribal grouping of the Afghans and percentage of refugees originating from each province with the details of their settlements in Pakistan reveals:

a. Pashtuns account for 94% of the Afghan refugees.

b. Areas selected for migration by the refugees bear ethno linguistic similarity. Given the tribal character of both the refugees and their hosts, this has greatly contributed to the smoothness and tranquility in the settlement of Afghan refugees.

c. Except for a small proportion of Shia Hazaras, some Tajiks and Pashtun Turis, bulk of the refugees comprise the Sunni Sect. In areas such as Kurram Agency, Sunni refugees outnumber the locals.

d. Ethno linguistic and sectarian grouping of refugees has the potential of disturbing the existing balance in certain areas and could be exploited if manipulated politically.

308. Demographic Composition

a. **Age and Sex Distribution.** Percentage of men, women and children under 15 years age among the refugees is 23%, 27% and 50% respectively. A further breakdown of adult population indicates that increase in age drastically changes the sex ratio in favour of females, except in the age group of over 45 where the ration transforms in favour of males. Bulk of the refugee population is therefore, either children and women or men of ages over 45 years. This implies:

2. Figures provided by Commissioner Afghan Refugees, Islamabad.
(1) High dependency ratios and comparative limited overall work potential of refugees which necessitates large set up to administer them and involves a colossal strain on our economy.

(2) Imbalance in the female ratio is susceptible to exploitation, affecting fragile social composition.

(3) Dwindling nostalgia in large refugee population of children, as they grow in Pakistan, affecting their inclination to return.

(4) Out of a total of about 3 million in Pakistan, more than 50% are women.

b. Categories of Refugees. The estimated three million Afghan exiles could be broadly divided into four categories, as under:-

(1) The loyalists or monarchists who left immediately after the abolition of monarchy.

(2) Those orthodox Muslims who crossed the border after the communist takeover of April 1978 and subsequently introduction of reform measures that they regarded as detrimental to their traditional way of life and their devoutly held religious convictions.

(3) Those who fled from Afghanistan after the initiation of agrarian and land reform programmes


coupled with the introduction of increased governmental control over commercial activities.

(4) Those Afghans who were in some way forced to leave their homeland because of the Soviet involvement and the intensified civil war accompanied by excesses and brutalities committed by both Soviet and Afghan troops (the largest single group of refugees belonged to the last category).

c. **Class Composition and Patterns of Settlement.**

Approximately 80% of the male working refugees either belonged to rural agriculturist or labour class while the rest belonged to the category of urban politicians, bureaucrats, professionals, doctors, religious teachers, businessmen and students etc. Patterns of settlement of these refugee classes in Pakistan are as under:-

(1) Member of politically prominent/rich families who had personal/business connections as well as some assets outside Afghanistan, either eventually left for Europe/America or got settled in big cities like Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta etc.

(2) Those who could bring along some movable assets i.e. funds, transport etc or had trade/business connections in Pakistan either did not join refugee camps or subsequently left for major towns at their own arrangements. This category is now well settled in Pakistan.
(3) Most of those refugees in teaching profession or in government/private service in Afghanistan have been assigned responsibilities in and around Afghan refugees camps.

(4) Refugees who had managed to bring household goods and herds of livestock were better off than those who came empty handed but had soon realised that it was not sufficient. Most of them now work as labourers, run petty business or earn on their domestitic animals in and around the refugee camps.

(5) Almost 65% of the refugees belong to poor and disabled class. They continue to be based in refugee camps and earn their living either as labour or rely on the donor assistance.

309. **Political Grouping.** Essentially, ethnic and tribal affiliations are stronger than political groupings amongst the refugees. As a sequel to the Afghan resistance movement however, seven different parties formed by the Mujahideens have predominated their political scene. Also, a number of field commanders of the resistance movement inside Afghanistan have since gained prominence and wield tangible influence over refugees through tribal/ethnic linkages. Allegiance to a particular political group/section is routed through tribal leader and is to a large extent decided in favour of those who exercise greater influence in ensuring reliable supplies to

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them. A common refugee has no clear perception of the conceptual differences between the moderates and the fundamentalists. It therefore, suggests that like in Afghanistan, the refugees continue to exist in their heterogeneous tribal groupings independent of national confines and their political loyalties are changeable. The tribal head can swing the balance either way.

Refugee Policy and Relief Organisations in Pakistan

310. Existing Policy. Despite Pakistan not being a contracting state to either the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol, it has followed a liberal refugee policy that far exceeds even the provisions of these instruments. There are in practice no restrictions on refugees as permissible under various articles of the two instruments. Even legal demands such as official registration, prohibition to carry weapons, purchase of property, infringements and migrations outside their allocated villages are neither pursued nor strictly abided by the refugees.

311. Organisations in Pakistan

a. Refugee Settlements. Registered refugees are accommodated and administered in 335 Refugee Tentage Villages (RTV) in all the four provinces of Pakistan.

b. Administrative Machinery. An elaborate relief organisation under State and Frontier Regions Division (SAFRON) of the Federal Government administers the


Afghan refugees. Details of this set-up and tasks of various agencies involved in the management of refugees is attached.

c. **Relief Assistance.** During the first two years of the refugee influx en-masse, Pakistan bore the burden of refugees practically single handed and was later assisted by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), friendly/Islamic countries, European Community, and voluntary non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Daily financial burden of Afghan refugees during all these years has been to the tune of 1 to 1.5 million US dollars per day. Pakistan bore nearly 50% of this burden while the remaining amount was provided by the external sources. The quantum of assistance required and provided upto 1990 by various countries/agencies are attached. Humanitarian assistance from UNHCR, WFP and bilateral aid by the friendly countries has sharply declined since 1990 because of diversion of aid to Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union by the donor countries. UNHCR's assistance during the current fiscal year is about 6 million dollars less than 1990 and a further cut of 25-30% is expected during 1992. Since assistance from friendly countries is also drying up, Pakistan in future will again have to bear the economic

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burden of managing these refugees single handed.

d. **Rehabilitation Assistance.** After Geneva Accord in 1988, the UN sponsored Operation Salam for voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees was planned by the UNHCR which carried a bill of $1.6 billion for the first phase (1989-90) spread over a period of 18 months and an estimated cost of 839.6 million dollars for the projected period of reconstruction beyond the first 18 months. For the first phase the donor countries had pledged $800 million but most of it was not received and the operation has almost verged on bankruptcy.

e. **Subsidies, Social Services and Vocational Schemes**

(1) **Humanitarian Assistance.** Since 1990 only wheat, edible oil and kerosene oil at reduced scale are being provided while the remaining items have been slashed because of squeeze in aid programmes.

(2) **Health and Educational Facilities.** Details are given at the table attached.

(3) **Vocational Schemes.** To enable the refugees become self sustaining, number of vocational schemes have been launched. Because of meagre attendance and indifferent attitude however, these have not borne the desired results.

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Impact of Afghan Refugees on Pakistan

Economic Implications

312. Visible and Invisible Expenditures. Visible fiscal expenditures on Afghan refugees by Pakistan have already been highlighted under Relief Assistance. Invisible expenditures such as deterioration of public facilities, damage to forests, increase in import bill due to extra consumptions and other indirect expenditures are the hidden drags whose impact is difficult to forecast accurately. An estimate of total approximate costs indicate that there are more than 18 countries in the world who’s GNP is lesser than the amount being spent by Pakistan on Afghan refugees. A study conducted on the subject concludes that fiscal costs on Afghan refugees during the 6th Five Year Plan alone could suffice for 85% of the projected cost of Kalabagh Dam or could enable us to develop an indigenous nuclear capability alongwith a credible medium range delivery system. These details clearly highlight the additional burden on our already meagre economic pie.

313. Impact on Local Economy. As tenants and consumers, Afghan refugees have given impetus to local economy. A large number of

1. According to conservative estimates the indirect costs are equal to direct financial costs.


them however, are visibly engaged in different economic pursuits both legal and illegal. The following loci of impact are identified as more sensitive areas responding to refugees presence/involvement:-

a. **Illegal Business and Monopoly in Trade.** Proliferation in the trade of arms and drugs, and mushrooming of markets dealing in smuggled goods has become noticeable since the arrival of refugees. This has led to the emergence of a parallel economy alongside formal economy with related implications. Drug business alone is estimated between $3 to 6 billion a year. Also, refugee traders have managed to outwit local traders and have secured markets in many areas as they aim at short term profits and can afford to work on smaller margins because unlike local traders they do not have tax obligations. Trucking business in particular is monopolised by the refugees in areas of NWFP and Baluchistan. Their circuit of influence has also affected carpet, tailoring, general merchant and cloth businesses. These effects are however, localised.

b. **Prices.** Inflation and deflation in prices of certain commodities is a phenomenon associated with the refugees. Relief goods finding their way in general market and better purchasing power of some of the more

affluent refugees are the influencing factors. In both cases the local economy gets destabilized and standards of living of the local population tend to be adversely affected. Exaltation in prices of the real estate has been a case in point.

314. Despite Pakistan having to share only 50% of the total fiscal burden so far, the continuing presence of Afghan refugees has already caused her growing economic strains. Now that the financial input by external community for refugees has also been reduced and the chances of its revival are slight, Pakistan government has started feeling the pressures. Considering that Pakistan is already faced with economic slump and is striving hard to restructure its weak economy, the prospects of bearing the costs on refugees exclusively and the adverse influences of their presence on the local economies, are fraught with grave economic dangers.

Ecological Effects

315. Continued presence of Afghan refugees has posed serious pressures on ecological resources of NWFP and Baluchistan, causing undesirable environmental damages. Influx of such large number of refugees was accompanied by approximately 25 million domestic animals, posing a threat to already scarce grazing lands.
and water resources. Faced with inadequate supplies of kerosene oil (14 litres per family per month), the Afghans have virtually denuded large tracts of forests to obtain firewood for cooking and heating. Ecological experts have predicated that affected area being already underdeveloped, may never recover from this devastation. For example, on an average every refugee family utilizes some 4 tons of firewood a year. Pakistan already consume some 13 million tons of firewood a year and two million tons used by the refugees comes to 15% extra which we cannot afford when our current reforestation programmes can only provide for 20% of the actual need.

316. The additional degradation of our forestry resources especially in NWFP, will lead to soil erosion, flash flooding and eventually affect our agricultural land and weather cycle, which has already shifted towards delayed rains.

Psycho Social Implications

317. Psychosocial imbalances take time to show but when set in, are difficult to restore. Prognosis of its impact is therefore given in succeeding paras.


4. Ibid.
318. Changes in Demography and Sectarian/Ethnic Balance. This is one pronounced dimension of the social implications of the refugees presence. Tribal areas of NWFP and Baluchistan are scantily populated with traditions, customs and rituals operating distinct to respective tribes and ethnic groups living therein. As Afghan refugees themselves are highly sensitive to their tribal and ethnic identities, the areas which the refugees inhabit in large numbers or where the refugee population has outnumbered the locals, the demographic and sectarian/ethnic imbalances created are bound to cause resentment/conflicts. Exacerbated ethnic tensions in Baluchistan where the influx of refugees has brought Pashtun strength almost at par with Baluch to threaten their identity or the Kurram Agency where the precarious balance has tilted from Shia locals to Sunni refugees resulting in sectarian tensions, are the cases in point.

319. Impact on Civic Amenities and Law and Order. Parks flooded with sleeping Afghans, encroachments on roads, camps set up close and inside the cities, overcrowding in hospitals, cramping in railway coaches, huge trucks plying on tiny roads, unauthorised use of electricity etc are some of those tarnishing aspects which have taken a toll of our already limited civic amenities. Fixed seats in professional institutions, concessions for higher studies, infringements on grazing areas, competitions over scarce employment and domination in certain trades etc have provoked resentment amongst the locals. Afghan refugees have also been carriers of new diseases. Their level of immunization is poor, implying that in case of an epidemic, the situation could get
serious. There are also complaints of refugees participating in crimes including thefts, abductions, robberies and harbouring of absconders in refugee camps. If economic help being provided to the refugees is further slashed, it could cause their greater indulgence in law breaking activities.

320. Smuggling and Drug Menace. Smuggling of contraband items and drug pedalling have increased to dangerous proportions since the arrival of Afghans. A more worrying aspect of the drug trade is that it has abruptly increased the cases of heroin addiction to more than half a million within Pakistan.

321. Kalashnikov Culture. Spread of weapons is another gift of Afghans which has led to unprecedented deterioration of social order in the country. The technology of Afghan War has become the technology of death and decay in Pakistan. Rocket launchers, guns, mortars, kalashnikovs, pistols etc are freely floating around. These weapons have created havoc in rural Sindh while petty criminals plague the cities. Karachi and Hyderabad have nearly been turned upside down by the recurring displays of anarchy in arms.

Political Ramifications

322. Impact on Local Politics. Continued presence of Afghan refugees has implications for the local politics of Pakistan. Traditionally, Pushtun groups in Baluchistan have been dominated by the Baluch. Gaining strength from refugees, Pashtuns however, have started airing feelings of political injustice and neglect. Their complaints are that they are allocated only 12 seats in the

1. Ibid.
provincial assembly of 45 and their representation in cabinet is below their percentage (40%) of population, only 2 of the 6 divisions are Pushtun, of the 20 districts of the province only 5 are Pushtun and that Baluch constituencies rest on a population of 50,000 whereas Pushtun constituencies are based on a population of 100,000. Pushtun refugee factor has thus abetted the emergence of Pushtun nationalism and identity in Baluchistan during the last decade. Refugee population in Quetta Division almost equals local population while in Pishin District they out number the locals. Active involvement of these refugees makes them a force in local politics. Viewing their indulgence, a number of Baluch leaders have accused the refugees for upsetting the balance between the Baluch and Pathans. Since the Baluch sense of separate identity is threatened, their ethnic nostalgia has been further reinforced. This has in turn nurtured a stronger Pushtun demand for a separate province within Baluchistan. In NWFP the Afghan refugees have threatened to upset the existing provincial political order and deepen the antagonism that already existed between the left and right wing forces, balance tilting more heavily in favour of the latter. In Kurram Agency a similar situation has been created causing ethnic tensions. The Shias had been in majority but with the influx of

1. Illustrated Weekly of Indian, October 1-7, 1989, p 45.
nearly 40,000 Sunni Afghan refugees, the balance has tilted in favour of Sunnis.

323. **Cultivation of Support by National/Religious Parties.** The Afghan political groups are largely religious/conservative and affiliate themselves more closely with the like minded political parties of Pakistan. Jammat-i-Islami has made sufficient inroads into refugee camps by arranging relief supplies through its allied groups in NWFP and Baluchistan. The goodwill thus created can have political ramifications if the refugees stay in Pakistan over a long period. During political campaigns/elections they can be a useful asset, especially when given the level of corruption and bribery in our society, it will not be difficult to obtain national identity cards or domicile for the cultivated refugees. This will put other political parties in a disadvantageous position. It also adds to the clout of Jammat-i-Islami to play a more effective role in the internal politics of the country and exercise a greater influence on the government towards the ultimate solution of Afghanistan issue according to its individualistic perceptions, which may not conform to the government policy.

324. **Domestic Politics of Refugees and its Impact on Pakistan**

a. This aspect of Afghan refugees is rather enigmatic. If domestic politics of Afghan groups had aimed at a common objective, perhaps their prolonged miseries could have been curtailed. Their only collective stance has been to "fight and continue fighting". Following facts about domestic politics of Afghan refugees are
note worthy :-

(1) Besides a seven party alliance in Pakistan and an eight party alliance based in Iran, there are minor and major independent groups numbering more than seventy. Though most of these groups are not even known, their affiliation with political parties in future will greatly affect power balance in Afghanistan.

(2) Refugees based in Iran are mostly Shias. Because of their differing sectarian affinity and separate standing, their views rarely converge, affecting harmony with their counterparts in Pakistan.

(3) The seven parties alliance based in Pakistan formed an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in February 1989. Many local refugee leaders rejected AIG while the others declared establishment of their own interim government. Even the component parties of AIG do not hold unanimity of views. The efficacy of AIG was thus in jeopardy since its inception.

(4) Some member parties of the seven party alliance comprise Sunnis and are supported by Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. These parties owe their allegiance to their benefactors abroad even with regard to the final settlement of Afghanistan issue.

1. Ibid, p.51.
(5) Afghan field commanders controlling some of the strategic areas inside Afghanistan maintain separate standing and have overshadowed the internal cohesion of various Afghan groups.

(7) KHAD has managed to penetrate some of the refugee groups. Insidious operations by its agents have frequently caused clashes between different refugees/Muhahideen groups.

b. Domestic politics of Afghan refugees has following serious implications:

(1) Lack of unity/absence of cooperation amongst various groups has evaded the solution of Afghan issue for such a long time.

(2) Results achieved on ground by the Afghan refugees/Mujahideen leaders fail to match their influence on the political plane.

(3) Pakistan does not enjoy liberty of action/choice to help solve the Afghan issue.

(4) The credence and credibility of Afghan refugee leadership is in serious jeopardy.

Impact on Security

325. National Integration. Pakistan though created as an ideological state is still threatened from within. Separatist movements in NWFP, Sindh and Baluchistan have made expression since its founding. Whereas the presence of Afghan refugees has had a positive effect on secessionist/fissiparous tendencies in NWFP (Pushtoonistan stunt), it has aided Pushtun nationalism in
Baluchistan thus widening the gap between Pushtuns and Baluch. A prolonged or permanent stay of refugees is fraught with dangers to national integration because it could give birth to a new Pushtun nation within Pakistan and/or alienate the Baluchis from Pakistan.

326. **Effects on Internal Security**

a. **Externally Inspired Subversion.** Certain elements (though in minority) in NWFP and Baluchistan have drawn consistent inspiration and support from ruling Afghan elite and their former communist masters. Also, the refugee population provides, to the forces inimical to Pakistan, a readily available hot bed for intelligence gathering and active subversion. Instances of proven subversive activities carried out by such agents amply demonstrate this threat to internal security of Pakistan. Discontentment in Sindh opens up additional opportunities which can be readily exploited to add to the magnitude of the existing threat.

b. **Sabotage and Terrorism.** So long as Afghan refugees remain on our soil, India will continue making efforts to destabilize us through sabotage and terrorism. According to UN Human Rights Commission Report-1987, Kabul had been attempting to stir up tribal conflicts in Pakistan through acts of terrorism. A

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number of KHAD and RAW agents assigned on sabotage
1 testimony that bomb blasts/ other sabotage acts which
missios were arrested during the recent years, bearing
keep raking Pakistan invariably involve collective
efforts of KHAD and RAW.
c. **Threat From Armed Refugees.** A refugee driven away from
his hearth and home cannot help developing a desperate
and extremist psyche. This is more true of Afghan
refugees who are fierce, armed and generally more
religious minded. Given the conditions like stoppage of
humanitarian assistance/supply of arms and ammunition,
imposition of restrictions on free movement/permanent
settlement etc, such a refugee population is quite
capable of enacting a Lebanon type situation which can
be well exploited by our main adversary (India).
d. **Unrest In Tribal Belt.** Scarcity of resources and
amenities of life in the tribal belt have created
tension between refugees and locals. Continued presence
of refugees may generate further discontentment.
Development of such feelings can have serious
implications for our security, resulting in sporadic
violence or a perpetual state of civil strife as
prevailing in Afghanistan. Security implications of
these activities are too evident to require elaboration.

272
e. Law And Order Problems. All refugees are not an ideologically committed lot who left their homes to protect their liberty and to stand for their principles. For some it has been a change for the good as they are getting better economic deal in refugee camps. Some habitual criminals have also found their way to Pakistan. Increasing instances proving involvement of such elements in law breaking activities are therefore suggestive of the impending problems, should their stay be prolonged in Pakistan.

327. Effects On Security Against External Threats. Most of the apprehensions in this context have considerably mellowed down. With pulverized USSR, immediate external threat from the west to the sovereignty of Pakistan has almost disappeared. It has thus helped Pakistan to enhance its security against external threat from the east. In fact, in case of any external threat Pakistan can even rely upon the huge trained manpower potential of Afghan Muhahideens. Prolongation of internal quagmire in Afghanistan however, engenders the potential of Balkanisation of Afghanistan regenerating our security concerns for the western borders.

Repatriation Prospects and Options Available

Preconditions for Repatriation

328. Majority of the refugees are likely to refrain from voluntary repatriation unless preconditions enunciated in succeeding paras are met.

329. Political Settlement. Only a political settlement as per wishes and aspirations of the Afghan people will provide the
needed incentive for repatriation.

330. **Local Safety and Security.** The political settlement must be followed by an earliest cessation of hostilities inside Afghanistan, allowing the refugees to return to their homes in safety and security. However, keeping in view the tribal character of Afghan society, one can safely conjecture that it will take some time before the infighting amongst various Afghan factions completely dies down.

331. **Rehabilitation and Reconstruction.** Even though a political settlement has taken place, refugees are unlikely to return en masse to a land which has been turned desolate by the Soviet weaponry. For quite some time they are likely to maintain their linkage in Pakistan till they secure reasonable means of living as a result of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts launched with the assistance of world community. Therefore, reconstruction and rehabilitation inside Afghanistan remains pivotal for repatriation of the refugees.

**Impediments to Repatriation**

332. **Infighting/Lack of Unity.** Leaders of Peshawar and Iran based alliances have all along displayed lack of unity. In fact infighting between and within various parties increases as and when the solution is in sight.

333. **Inability to Force a Military Decision.** Despite Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Mujahideen's field commanders were not able to even force a military decision on ex-Najib government in time. All out support by Pakistan in this regard also failed to bring about results for quite long time.
The Mujahideens, however, stood some chance only when external support to ex-Najib government completely dries up.

334. Inability to Offer a Viable Alternative. Afghan refugee leaders have maintained an intransigent attitude towards the peace efforts. They did not participate in Geneva talks and also refused to negotiate with Kabul government. All this while they have neither undertaken any political initiative at their own nor made use of the UN peace proposals.

Probability of Repatriation of Various Categories of Refugees

335. While assessing the repatriation prospects, there is a need to understand one historical fact about the Afghan nation. In the past, the Afghans came to the subcontinent as conquerors. Memories of these conquests reinforce their pride and torment them in their present plight as refugees. This creates in them an urge and determination to return to their homes and restore the old order. Therefore, given the preconditions and removal of aforementioned impediments, the probability of return of various categories of refugees is assessed as follows:–

a. Refugees Living in Camps. Being mostly labour, peasants and small land owner class, in all probability well over 90% of them will return to their homes. This runs counter to the common view that the Afghans in refugee camps have never had it so good and therefore do not want to return. Such reasoning ignores the fact that with dwindling international support, the charms of refugee camps would soon disappear. 75% of the refugees comprise women and children who cannot
contribute to the family's social and economic being while living in camps. An overwhelming majority of these rurally oriented refugees would therefore, want to return home to resume productive lives.

b. Shop Keepers, Entrepreneurs and Businessmen. Out of these, some may remain in Pakistan but most will probably return to the towns and cities they came from. Majority of them are however, likely to retain their investments in Pakistan so as to maintain an economic foothold in both countries thus enhancing their dual economies.

c. Professionals, Intellectuals and Technocrats. Patriotic loyalty of these refugees to help reconstruct Afghanistan will have positive effect even on other refugees to return.

336. Overall Estimate of Refugees Repatriation. There are conflicting estimates about the prospects of Afghan refugees voluntary repatriation. However, based on a reasonable consensus it has been forecast that 25-35% will return home within 6 months of the cessation of hostilities, another 50% within 7 to 10 months, another 15-20% after 18 months and 5% will not return at all.

Refugee Policy Options

337. Open Policy. The government of Pakistan can continue to adopt open policy as here-to-fore whereby Afghan refugees are allowed to work anywhere in the country and engage in any labour, 

1. Ibid.
trade or vocation so that they can supplement the scarce relief aid being provided to them. This policy is most suitable to meet the material and psychological needs of the refugees as well as to reduce the economic burden on the government. However, it is likely to invite severe criticism if the refugees stay for a prolonged period in Pakistan as it will diminish the chances of their repatriation besides compounding existing psycho-social effects.

338. **Restrictive Policy.** It would mean restricting refugees to their camps and imposition of stringent control on their movements within the country. Adoption of this policy though may not be a preferred choice but may be forced on the government by certain external or internal factors like public reaction or safety of Afghan refugees themselves. Whatever be the case, the refugees will have to be provided with all the needs inside the camps. It will thus require a far greater assistance than being arranged at present. Additionally, the enforcement of this policy will not be in consonance with the independent nature of the refugees and may invite strong reaction. Implementation of this policy may therefore, prove counter productive.

**Repatriation Options**

339. **Voluntary Repatriation.** As a matter of policy the government may ask the refugees to voluntarily go back to Afghanistan. Though the government has not officially exercised this option but has been encouraging voluntary repatriation in the past and has extended full cooperation to the UN sponsored Operation Salam. However, this option seemed practicable only once the
PDPA leadership stepped down, a broad based government having majority consensus was installed and a reasonable state of internal stability was achieved. Such a condition when created could have ensured repatriation of up to 80-90% refugees as analysed earlier.

340. **Negotiated Repatriation.** Failing to achieve the earlier enunciated conditions for voluntary repatriation and in case of stoppage of aid for the refugees, Pakistan government is forced to resort to a negotiated repatriation of the refugees. It involves convincing refugee leaders about the necessity of repatriation and predicaments faced by their host for the last twelve years. Thus based on a dialogue, a negotiated formula could be worked out for repatriation at least to those areas which are presently under the stable control of the Mujahideens. Such a negotiated settlement could result in repatriation for up to 50-60 percent refugees.

341. **Forced Repatriation.** In the exercise of this option either compulsory return of refugees under an announced programme or else stringent measures like control of supplies and economic assistance could be applied to induce the refugees to return. However, Pakistan stands committed with a well defined policy and any immediate volte face may neither be prudent nor possible. Such a repatriation if imposed on refugees could prove counter productive to our long term interests and would provoke strong reactions, endangering internal security. It will erode the goodwill that Pakistan today enjoys in the hearts and minds of Afghan people and may even reinstitute threat to our western
borders.

Measures For Settlement of Afghan Issue

342. Political Settlement

a. Pakistan should continue with the peace process under the aegis of UN Secretary General. Direct dialogue with the Soviets must be pursued and endeavours be made to involve Central Asian republics bordering Afghanistan to help solve the issue.

b. To expedite settlement/avail opportunity provided by the conducive prevailing geopolitical environments, Pakistan must:

(1) Exert necessary pressure on Mujahideen leaders to initiate intra Afghan dialogue and offer something more substantial to Kabul regime than they have done so far. Unless Kabul is reassured that there will be no blood bath, expecting the regime to surrender all its negotiating positions will be unrealistic.

(2) Pressurise Mujahideen political leaders for achieving a consensus, by suggesting that Pakistan will also implement negative symmetry and persuade both Iran and Saudi Arabia to do alike. Those aboard a negotiated settlement will be supported and those rejecting it will be denied the support.

343. Change in Policy. Pakistan's role is central in the
political settlement of Afghan refugees. Our policy so far is based on the perception that latter cannot take place unless the former is achieved. The political angle is however, complicated because with weak Muhahideens government in Kabul, low level/local military activity is bound to continue by the Mujahideens which would in turn impede any political dialogue. Also, the type of funds required for reconstruction and rehabilitation may not be available if the repatriation is unduly delayed. These factors and the prevailing geo-political situation favour a change in our existing Afghan policy. It would be wise to work for the political settlement, reconstruction and repatriation simultaneously. In fact reconstruction and rehabilitation work should be encouraged more actively as it will ensure speedy return of the refugees soon as a settlement is reached.

Measures to Ensure Optimal Repatriation

344. Unregistered Refugees. About half a million Afghan refugees are unregistered, mostly settled in urban areas under their own arrangements. There is a need to trace such elements systematically, complete their registration and bring them back to refugee camps. The refugees trying for their permanent settlement should be pressurized through their leadership to desist. Whenever such an inducement fails, strict action be taken against the concerned refugees and the locals who assist them in making such arrangements. Refugees removed from cities/permanent settlements established outside the refugee camps should be forced to stay in makeshift shelters which should preferably be
away from habitation. They should be organised in such habitants on the basis of their tribes. As a minimum, identification and recording of the particulars of refugees by the police stations where these refugees have settled, must be ensured.

345. Purchase of Immovable Property. As stated earlier, contrary to the directive issued by the Ministry of Interior, Afghan refugees have bought or constructed houses and acquired shops in the cities. To ensure maximum repatriation, such permanent dwellings must be denied and the law on purchase of immovable property be strictly enforced. Also, declaration of assets by the refugees should be demanded and a strict accountability of their swelling properties be ensured.

Measures to Reduce Economic Burden

346. Foreign Assistance. Mujahideen/refugee leaderships should be encouraged to move around the world and secure assistance for themselves. Pakistan should also mobilise diplomatic effort in the Muslim world to seek greater assistance for refugees on religious and humanitarian grounds.

347. Income Generating Schemes. With the assistance of donor agencies, well to do refugees should be encouraged to set up small industries or other income generating schemes. Those not financially well off should be made to work in these industrial establishments. However, care needs to be taken that all this activity should not result in affluence or a standard far higher that the one available in Afghanistan.

348. Tax Payment. Refugees indulging in any economic activity should be made to pay government taxes like any other citizen of
Pakistan such as trader tax, vehicle registration and driving licence fee etc.

349. Aid Management. Pakistan has been receiving aid from a number of countries, however, it has not been managed properly resulting in pilferage and leakage of aid items to local markets, creating instability in the prices. This mismanagement can also be attributed to a number of independent national and international organisations having their own charters. It is recommended that all aid must be coordinated and organised under the directions of Afghan Refugees Organisation established by SAFRON.

Measures to Reduce External Security Threats

350. Externally Inspired Subversion. The policy of increasing the pace of development in Baluchistan and NWFP should be vigorously pursued. It will ameliorate the local populace which has suffered for such a long time because of Afghan refugees. Democratically elected provincial governments, charged with the responsibility of strictly dealing with any refugee found indulging in subversive activity, can reduce this threat to insignificance.

351. Consensus with Iran. Pakistan needs to strive for a consensus with Iran on Afghanistan issue. It will not only hasten the settlement process but also enhance our security against other external threats.

Measures to Reduce Internal Security Threats

352. Polarisation. To minimise polarisation between locals and refugees, added attention may be given to improving basic amenities of life to local population. Presence of international
organisations in these areas be exploited by advertising/publicising adverse effects of refugees on these areas in order to attract more foreign aid for undoing the damage caused. Along with rehabilitation plans for the refugees, plans incorporating UN aid to help the locals must also be made. Also, efforts be made to co-opt tribal elders in the management of refugee population. Civil/military officers who belong to tribal areas should be assigned to the organisations controlling refugees in the areas to which they belong.

353. Armed Refugees Threat. Pakistan should continue all moral and material support in consonance with international norms to assist Afghan refugees in sustaining themselves. These measures would help obviate refugees turning against us. However, vigilance will have to be maintained. Strict actions against those refugees and locals who are found guilty of violating law of the land particularly in and around refugee infested areas should be taken.

354. Indulgence of Refugees in Crimes. Barring a few incidents the state of discipline amongst refugees has been commendable. Gradual increase in refugee involved crimes however, warrants caution. There is a need to co-opt refugee leadership in ensuring that crime prone refugees are surveilled and their movements controlled by issue of permits etc.

355. Accountability of Weapons. Weapons held by the refugees be registered and those holding unregistered weapons/ammunition should be dealt with severely. Arms/ammunition shops run by the refugees be ruthlessly eliminated.
Measures To Reduce Adverse Political Fallouts

356. Contacts With Local Political Parties. Since the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan the concept of Afghan "Jihad" has also ended. There is therefore, a need to delink the refugees from local political parties. Necessary laws should be enacted forbidding cultivation of contacts and attendance of public or private meetings of various local political parties by the refugees.

357. Identity Cards/Domiciles. Restrictions should be imposed on the issue of identity cards/domiciles to Afghan refugees. Punishments should be awarded to the refugees found in illegal possession of these documents and to those who help them obtain these.

358. Refugee Inspired Political Demands. Any demands having political, linguistic, ethnic or religious connotations/implications put forward by the local populace on the basis of direct or indirect refugee support should be rejected outrightly. In fact, government should come down with a heavy hand on the sponsors of such demands. Dissident elements having vested interest in stirring up political sensitivities should be severely punished. Any compromise in this regard will be at the peril of national cohesion/integration.

Measures to Reduce Psycho-Social Effects

359. Drugs Trafficking/Gun Running/Smuggling. Gun running and drug trafficking need tackling as top priority national issues. Laws enacted for recovery of illegal arms need to be enforced more actively. As the bases and routes for gun running are well
known, measures be taken to effectively check and deny these. A joint body should be activated directly under the Prime Minister's Secretariat to formulate and enforce necessary policy in this regard. Besides thorough crackdown on drug mafia, narcotic dealers, smugglers and their supporters, more effective coordination among services involved in drug control efforts must be ensured. Also controls on psychotropic substances and precursors used to manufacture/export drugs should be made more stringent. Punitive laws against the refugees however, need to be made in consultaion with AIG.

360. Motivation of Local Population. Concerted efforts are needed to convince the local population that the refugees will not stay in Pakistan a day longer than what is necessary for their return with honour and dignity. People should also be made aware of their religious obligations towards the refugees. Some of the political parties which support government's Afghan policy can help in this regard.

361. Uplift of Affected Essential Services. 71% and 25% of the registered refugees living in NWFP and Baluchistan respectively, have caused lot of strain on civic facilities. As done in case of reforestation, the government should approach the UN, World Bank and other international organisations for monetary allocations to uplift affected essential services in these provinces.

362. Compensation. According to UNHCR rules, compensation for the land on which refugee camps are established is the responsibility of the host country. In ordinary cases this policy may be fair but when the stay of refugees prolongs, burden on the government
and local population increases manifold. The government should therefore take up a case with the UN for amendments in the rules to seek compensation for at least those refugee camps which are established on private lands so that the same is paid to the land owners. This will help in reducing tension between the locals and the refugees.

Repatriation

363. The government and people of Pakistan have extended remarkable hospitality to the Afghan refugees. The contribution of international community, especially Muslim states, UNHCR, and WFP is no less significant. However, the relief measures being undertaken since 1978 can, and do, provide a temporary solution only. From the long term perspective there is a need for an early political settlement of Afghanistan issue facilitating the return of refugees to their original abodes because their continued displacement is increasingly taxing Pakistan’s limited resources.

364. The prolonged presence of refugees has serious ramifications for the political and economic system of Pakistan. Psycho-social complications involved have already made grave impact on the country. Bulk of the related problems, though still of a potential nature, are too grievous to be ignored. An indefinite stay of the Afghans may exacerbate ethnic tensions, stir up nationalism in the provinces and pose serious challenges to the internal security of Pakistan. There is a probability that if the Afghans do not soon return to Afghanistan, they may take on
semipermanent status.

365. For repatriation to Afghanistan from Pakistan, Iran, voluntary repatriation report and 1994 expenditure on voluntary repatriation, refer to Tables M, N, O and Prespectively.

366. Please refer to Tables A to R (attached) for various informations regarding Afghan refugees, the details of which have already been mentioned.

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<tr>
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<th>REGISTERED POPULATION</th>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>Upto December 1979</td>
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<td>May 1981</td>
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<td>December 1988</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>December 1990</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>May 1991</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>15 June 1991</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>15 August 1991</td>
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Chief Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees, Islamabad.
## Table C

**Areas of High Density Afghan Refugees Population**

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<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Refugee Population</th>
<th>Local Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kurram</td>
<td>347936</td>
<td>289000</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Waziristan</td>
<td>185507</td>
<td>235000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>198691</td>
<td>287000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohat</td>
<td>232414</td>
<td>538000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chagai</td>
<td>172116</td>
<td>120000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pishin</td>
<td>371056</td>
<td>80000</td>
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</table>

1. Chief Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees, Islamabad.
2. Every sixth person in NWFP and every fifth person in Baluchistan is an Afghan refugee.
3. In the Tribal Areas every third person is an Afghan refugee.
# Table D

## Afghan Refugees Population in Pakistan

### AS ON 15-8-91

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Name of Camps</th>
<th>No of Camps</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Families</th>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Bannu</td>
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<td>South Waziristan</td>
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<td>58012</td>
<td>12500</td>
<td>14765</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Swat</td>
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<td>13692</td>
<td>2349</td>
<td>4122</td>
<td>7221</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>527557</td>
<td>600370</td>
<td>1128227</td>
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### Baluchistan

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Name of Camps</th>
<th>No of Camps</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Chagai</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>163518</td>
<td>37609</td>
<td>44150</td>
<td>81759</td>
<td>26710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Gulistan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>175234</td>
<td>40304</td>
<td>47313</td>
<td>87617</td>
<td>26523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Loralai</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>101409</td>
<td>23324</td>
<td>27380</td>
<td>50705</td>
<td>16086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Pishin 12 150938 36641 43013 79654 23902
5. Quetta 6 114386 26309 30884 57193 18556
6. Zhob 5 54440 12544 14691 27205 8884
7. Chaman 5 36544 8398 9859 18257 5276

Sub div

Total 60 801779 185099 217290 402390 125937

Punjab
1. Kot 16 168880 26262 37395 105163 28773
   Chandana

Sind
1. Karachi 1 18671 4481 5229 8964 2927

G.Total 335 3248427 743399 860284 1644744 518681

Note. Tribe wise settlements of refugees are generally as follows:-
   a. Hazaras are mainly found around quetta and theri small pockets are in NWFP.
   b. Baluch have migrated mostly to chagai and Loralia Districts.
   c. Naristains are confined to Chital area.
   d. Tajiks though in small numbers are concenorted in Bajaur Agency.
   e. Turkmen and Kirghiz settled in NWFP and Gilgit, have partially shifted to Turkey. (about 4500 Turkish speaking factions were accepted by Turkey).

### 1. Planning
Stateg and frontier 2. Provision of Funds and relief by *Govt of the Feder Government*
Reagions Division (SAFRDN) 3. Interaction/coodination with the *UN International agencies.*

### 1. Coordination and supervision of all relief operations.
2. Render advise to SAFRON on policy planning.
3. Deal with international agencies on behalf of and/or with the De-ission the SAFRON/Federal Government.

### 1. Exercise administrative control over provincial commissioners.
2. Implementation, coordination and supervision of relief work.
3. Provide feedback on relief work to Baluchistan and Punjab.

### 1. Coordination of relief work within their district/agency.
2. Coordination and supervision of relief work in 5 refugee camps.

### 1. Daily administration of camp.
2. Distribution of relief goods and cash allowance.
3. Registration and record of refugees.
5. Submission of reports and demands for relief supply to higher authorities.
## Table F.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>REQUIREMENT</th>
<th>PROVIDED</th>
<th>SHORTFALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td>245,556</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>47,511,369</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td>78,498,998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td>46,705,514</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td>59,570,954</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>70 Million</td>
<td>52,589,594</td>
<td>17,410,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>41,253,392</td>
<td>33,746,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42,922,926</td>
<td>7,077,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46,100,000</td>
<td>3,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43,500,000</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>31,100,000</td>
<td>14,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30,935,000</td>
<td>24,065,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Chief Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees, Islamabad.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount $</th>
<th>Amount Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KUWAIT</td>
<td>2,968,792.00</td>
<td>36,021,766.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOREA</td>
<td>1,824,018.00</td>
<td>22,237,303.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAYSIA</td>
<td>2,264.00</td>
<td>26,650.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW ZEALAND</td>
<td>4,417.00</td>
<td>69,362.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAN</td>
<td>60,811.00</td>
<td>602,010.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAUDI ARABIA</td>
<td>32,884,505.00</td>
<td>470,821,858.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>930,470.00</td>
<td>9,265,102.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWITZERLAND</td>
<td>327,856.00</td>
<td>3,256,898.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUNISIA</td>
<td>15,826.00</td>
<td>156,680.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>874,009.00</td>
<td>8,729,482.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>1,762,742.00</td>
<td>17,451,144.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.E</td>
<td>14,186.00</td>
<td>140,453.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A</td>
<td>8,176,736.00</td>
<td>93,129,373.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>788,433.00</td>
<td>8,033,837.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUGOSLAVIA</td>
<td>61,620.00</td>
<td>610,040.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>1,409,315.00</td>
<td>15,736,536.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>140,594.00</td>
<td>1,696,920.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANADA</td>
<td>51,345.00</td>
<td>833,582.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>1,941,996.00</td>
<td>31,152,952.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUBAI</td>
<td>131,682.00</td>
<td>1,375,597.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>621,396.00</td>
<td>321,161.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGYPT</td>
<td>373,447.00</td>
<td>4,588,968.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.E.C</td>
<td>46,409.00</td>
<td>728,632.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>$ Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>39,751.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>1,278.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>1,590,001.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>HONG KONG</td>
<td>1,818.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>HOLLAND</td>
<td>8,147.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>13,812,965.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>4,981,913.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. UNHCR office, Islamabad.
1. **Cash Allowance** Rs 50 per head per month to the maximum limit of Rs 350 per family per month.

2. **Shelter** One tent per family (1-7 persons). Some construction material for building a room or hut.

3. **Food** average caloric value of 2000 per head per day:

   - Wheat - 50 grams
   - Edible Oil - 30 "
   - Powdered Milk - 20 "
   - Sugar - 20 "
   - Tea - 3 "
   - Water - 25 litres

   (Where not available) Some supplementary high protein diet for those recommended ofr this diet.

4. **Clothing** Cloth 8 metres per head at appropriate intervals. Foot Wear: one pair per head.
5. Cooking Goods - One set of pots and pans per family.

Cooking stove one per family.

Kerosene oil 20 litres per family per month.

1. In the beginning the cash subsidy was Rs 120 per person.

With the increase in the quota of food, clothing, shelter material and other related good, the cash allowance was reduced to Rs 50.

2. Since 1990, the food items usply has been reduced to only edible oil and wheat. Also, kerosene oil scale is now 14.
MEDICAL FACILITIES

Table J

1. Established for the Refugees

1. Basic Unit (Despensaries) 127
2. Basic Health and Sanitation Units 89
3. Hospital Beds Exclusively for the Refugees 2171
4. Hospital Beds Available in Pakistani Hospitals 500
5. Doctors 290
6. Para Medical Staff 2176

EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS/FACILITIES FOR THE REFUGEES

1. Primary, Middle and High Schools 763
2. Number of Boy Students 127188
3. Girls Schools 95
4. Number of Girl Students 8934
5. School Teachers 3646
6. Number of Stipends for Refugee Students in Professional Disciplines 250

VOCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS

1. Textile Units 15
2. Mechanical Trade Units 6
3. Carpet Weaving Centres 3
4. Tailoring/Shoe Making Units 1
5. Pottery and Embroidery Centres 4
6. Miscellaneous Vocational Units 7

1. Chief Commissionerate of Afghan Refugees, Islamabad.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMME COMPONENTS</th>
<th>BUDGET</th>
<th>EXPENDITURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Protection</td>
<td>808,950</td>
<td>776,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Direct Pre-Return Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Repatriation from Pakistan</td>
<td>9,360,043</td>
<td>5,112,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Repatriation from Iran</td>
<td>17,298,349</td>
<td>12,827,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Transportation Assistance</td>
<td>6,066,864</td>
<td>3,760,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Assistance to Returnee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities</td>
<td>8,269,892</td>
<td>6,214,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support (HQ)</td>
<td>4,230,226</td>
<td>2,858,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46,034,324</td>
<td>31,549,481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE L

VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION TO AFGHANISTAN
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON 1
1994 EXPENDITURES/OBLIGATIONS
(in US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMME COMPONENTS</th>
<th>BUDGET</th>
<th>EXPENDITURE (30 September 1994)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pre-Return Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Repatriation from Pakistan</td>
<td>5,060,000</td>
<td>2,500,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Repatriation from Iran</td>
<td>14,190,000</td>
<td>6,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assistance to Returnee Communities in Afghanistan</td>
<td>9,650,000</td>
<td>4,600,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Programme Support (HQ)</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Total</td>
<td>30,500,000</td>
<td>14,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Budget projections were based on a total return of 400,000 individuals. Actual return through August 1994 has been much lower than anticipated although funds shown above have been obligated for possible increased return from Iran during the third quarter of 1994.

2. These figures are preliminary amounts which have been obligated by the programme and include expenditures, commitments and obligations under existing agreements. All are subject to correction based on final expenditures when projects are closed.

Table M

AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN:
November 30, 1979 - March 31, 1981
(Monthly increases denoted within parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Increase in Parentheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Nov 79</td>
<td>314,578</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 79</td>
<td>402,100 (87,522)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 80</td>
<td>487,789 (85,689)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Feb 80</td>
<td>577,955 (90,166)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 80</td>
<td>693,517 (102,681)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 80</td>
<td>778,624 (85,307)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 80</td>
<td>867,711 (89,087)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 80</td>
<td>953,875 (86,164)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 80</td>
<td>1,021,678 (67,803)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 80</td>
<td>1,087,650 (65,970)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sep 80</td>
<td>1,177,133 (89,483)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 80</td>
<td>1,250,437 (73,304)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Nov 80</td>
<td>1,331,186 (74,949)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 80</td>
<td>1,417,897 (88,711)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 81</td>
<td>1,541,183 (123,286)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Feb 81</td>
<td>1,647,664 (106,481)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mar 81</td>
<td>1,827,836 (179,572)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNHCR / WFP

REPATRIATION GRANT PROJECT
Total Encashments by Provinces

NWFP

Baluchistan

Punjab

Deregistration Figures by Encashment Centers/
Pakistan Provinces as of 29 December 1994
RGP3.CH3
UNHCR / WFP
REPATRIATION GRANT PROJECT
Destinations by Provinces in Afghanistan

Percentage Breakdown of 290323 Returned Families as of 29-12-94
RGP2.CH3

* Others Include
Farah   Takhar
Ghazni  Kapisa
Paktika  Samangan
Parwan  Balkh
Urozgan  Badakhshan
Wardak
# Repatriation to Afghanistan from Pakistan

## Return to Date and Numbers Remaining

(In Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province of Return</th>
<th>Return As of 31.03.94</th>
<th>Total Outflow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samangan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takhar</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawzjan</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagman</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktika</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>174</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangaran</td>
<td>338</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>317</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information on the provincial origin of refugees used in this chart was taken from UNHCR's 1988 origin survey. Estimates on return are extrapolated from the origin survey, the repatriation grant program and the 1992-93 border monitoring reports.

REPATRIATION TO AFGHANISTAN FROM IRAN

(In Thousands)

Province of Return

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Return Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>9.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>3.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktika</td>
<td>3.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>3.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>3.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>6.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapisa</td>
<td>0.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badakhsha</td>
<td>0.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>0.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>0.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samangan</td>
<td>0.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>0.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>0.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawzjan</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruzgan</td>
<td>1.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>1.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takhar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>2.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>2.787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faryab</td>
<td>2.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>3.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>3.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimroz</td>
<td>9.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>15.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>17.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>65.703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>213.479</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Return To Date

(As of 30.04.94 through Milak and 02.06.94 through Dogharun, Mile 73 and Yazdan)
* Figures are of returnees receiving the repatriation assistance package at Border Exit Stations (B.E.S)

CHAPTER 5

THE

AFGHAN

ECONOMY

General

367. Afghanistan, one of the poorest and least developed of countries and with large tracts of barely accessible terrain, has never been noted for the reliability or accuracy of its statistical data. Even before the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, data were frequently incomplete, conflicting or contradictory. Official sources of statistics all but dried up in the years after Soviet military involvement began. On occasion, local newspaper reports and radio broadcasts would provide some statistics concerning for example, economic growth, foreign trade or good production, but all these rarely be taken at face value, The Kabul regime’s aim was to portray a situation of normality. The statistics issued cited impressive economic growth rates, crop output levels which were no lower than before the occupation, expansion of factories and the like. Mostly such claims were wholly unrealistic.
Statistical Data

368. Important statistical data include:

a. **GDP**: $3.1 billion (1981); $220 per capita (1986).

b. **GNP**: $3 billion (1985); real growth rate about 2.5%; $160 per capita (1984).


d. **Budget**: $477 million, capital expenditures $215 million (FY 82). Expenditure $646.7 million (FY 87). Defence budget $286.56 million.

e. **Fiscal Year**: 21 March - 20 March.

f. **Monetary Conversion Rate**: US $1 equals 50.60 Afghani; 1 Afghani equals US $0.019 (as of Dec 1986).

g. **Aid. Economic** from USSR and Eastern Europe.

h. **Major Trade Partners**: USSR and Eastern Block.

i. **Major Imports**: Transportation equipment, non-metallic minerals, tea, sugar and petroleum.

j. **Major Exports**: Fresh and dried fruits, hides and skins, natural gas, cotton, carpets, rugs and wool.

k. **Major Industries**: Cottage industries, food processing, textiles, cement and coal mines.

---


m. **Agriculture:** Main crops are wheat and other grains, cotton, fruits, nuts; agriculture and animal husbandry account for over 50% of GNP and employ 80% of labour force.

n. **Railways:** 9.6 Km (5.96 miles) single track; government owned spur of Soviet line.

o. **Roads:** 18.752 Km (11.626 miles); 2,960 km (1,850 miles) paved, 3,910 km (2,444 miles) gravel, remainder improved or unimproved earth.

p. **Civil Air:** 5 major transport aircraft.

q. **Airfields:** 41 total, 35 usable; 12 with permanent-surface run-ways; 8 with runways over 2,438 meters (8,000 ft).

r. **Telecommunications:** Limited services; 35,000 telephones; 823,000 radio receivers; 12,000 televisions.

s. **Inflation:** 42% in 1990 and 57% in 1991.

t. **Growth:** 23% in 1988 and 0% in 1989.

u. **Debt:** $30 billion in 1986.

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Currency

369. The currency is the Afghani (Af), which is divided into 100 pulas. By agreement with IMF, it was decided in March 1963 to simplify the complex system of multiple exchange rates and to introduce an official rate of Af 45: $1. The rate stood at Af 50.60 : $1 from mid-1981 until the collapse of the Najib government in April 1992. During the six months from March 1992 the bazar rate fluctuated between Af 320: $1 and Af 2,900: $1 but by end-October it was hovering around Af 1,000: $1.

1. IMF means International Monetary Fund.
311

Soviet Involvement in Afghan Economy

370. The subsectors of the economy receiving most attention during the years of fighting were those from whose development the USSR had benefited, such as natural gas exploitation and mining and government services (which included defence).

371. After the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan in December 1979, the Afghan economy became more closely tied to that of the USSR. The USSR took the bulk of the Afghanistan's exports (mainly natural gas) and provided most of its imports. A revealing insight into the extent of Soviet economic assistance was provided during August 1985 in a radio broadcast. An official of the State Planning Committee was reported as saying that more than 200 industrial projects had been built, or were under construction, with Soviet assistance. And, according to the report, "the volume of production by the enterprises built with Soviet economic and technical cooperation forms 60% of the total production of the enterprises of the country and 75% of the industrial production in the state sector". In a report on external assistance expected during the 1986-91 plan period, the Kabul New Times revealed that total assistance from the USSR (evidently excluding military expenditure) in the five years prior to 1986 amounted to Af 26.7 bn ($528 million), nearly three quarters, it was reported, of all external assistance. OECD figures suggest that the share of Afghanistan total external debt owed to the Soviet Union rose steadily to around 90% of the total in 1990.
312
Soviet Exploitation of Afghanistan's Natural Resources

372. Soviet talk least frankly about their coming bind on resources, but that bind is implicit in other things they have to say. Economic growth may slow considerably, oil production may drop, leaving less for export to their East European satellites, and putting more strain on their economies which may affect political relationship with Moscow. The Soviet's sharp reaction to American suggestions that the Soviet Union is stock piling strategic materials for high technology or energy production, suggests that the speculation is not far from truth. The Soviets had indeed stepped up purchases of vital materials and had reduced mineral exports.

373. There is a growing evidence that one of the main Soviet objectives for involvement in Afghanistan in December 1979 was to assure control of its large natural resources which include natural gas, oil, copper, iron, ore, chrome, and uranium. These resources were being exploited to satisfy Soviet requirements.

374. The Soviet Union's output for many essential materials in the 1980s is likely to fall below its needs. Reserves in Siberia are difficult to exploit and much more expensive than to import from foreign countries. This is a fact, that long before 1979, the Soviet leaders were well aware that Afghanistan was a useful source of minerals. The Soviet experts had done most of the surveying and prospecting during the 15 years. From 1967, natural

2. Ibid, p.4.
gas was being piped to Soviet Central Asia from a field at Shibargah in northern Afghanistan. A World Bank report published in 1978, based mainly on the work of Soviet geologists, said that there were good prospects for oil, copper, iron, ore, chrome, and many other minerals. All that is needed to dig it out and cart it away and this is exactly what the Soviets mainly did in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

375. These facts clearly illustrate that the Soviet military action was not a desperate gamble, rather it was a well planned and calculated move. The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan proved to be a grave, political and military embarrassment. There was a gross exploitation of the Afghan resources, which were diverted to the Soviet Union at well below the current world prices. According to private sources, the situation is even worse with the Afghans being deprived of priceless art treasurers and vast quantities of precious resources.

Afghan Economic Ties With the Soviets

276. Economic ties between Afghanistan and Soviet Union were strengthened after the World War II. Geo-strategic location of Afghanistan suited the Soviet plan to penetrate into Afghan economy. Afghanistan suits all conditions for economic penetration, and in addition has a common boundary with the USSR facilitating commerce and communication.

277. The first Soviet effort was initiated in July 1954, with a technical aid and credit agreement of $1.2 million for construction of gas pipeline across the Amu Darya from the USSR. In August, 1954, the USSR agreed to finance the paving of Kabul's streets, a project that the United States Import Export Bank had rejected a year earlier. The USSR advanced $2 million credit to be used in the project.

278. The Soviet Union remained the main trading partner of Afghanistan since World War II. In 1955 and again in 1961, when Pakistan and Afghanistan broke off diplomatic relations, the traditional transist route for Afghan goods via Karachi port was cut off. The Soviet Union then became the alternate route. At this time Soviet Union offered loans and credits totalling $450 million for Afghanistan's second five year plan. That was

1. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, op.cit, p.518.

2. Arnold Anthony, op. cit, p.34.

3. Louis Dupree, op.cit, p.497.

proximately the amount needed to finance the plan, the generous offer was turned down by the Afghans.

379. In the decade of 1960, when the Vietnam issue came to dominate the international scene, Afghanistan's importance as an area relevant to the East-West struggle diminished. Years after years the Soviet economic investment in Afghanistan was cut back from $44.7 million in 1967-68 to $30.5 million in 1968-69 to $28.4 million in 1969-70.

380. By the end of the 1960s cumulative Soviet aid to Afghanistan stood at $600 million, which comprised almost 70 percent of the total aid received by Afghanistan from all sources. And if one has to trace the total Soviet economic assistance during 1954-76 the period shows a sum of $1,251 million. The level of Soviet assistance to Afghanistan has been more than any other external source.

381. After the Saur revolution of 1978 aid from the western countries have come to an end. Soviet Union has been providing economic aid and loans for the development of Afghanistan. Although Soviet Union has always been the major supplier of external assistance, recent political events brought its participation to a total dominance. In addition to its military involvement in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union made

2. Shirin Tahir Kheli, op.cit, p.89.
considerable economic investments. The sectoral and geographical
distribution of economic investment, of the economic and social
plan of 1959 suggests that they were based on a long term strategy
for the economy of Afghanistan. The salient features of the plan
refer to two particularly significant aspects of these projected
targets. Firstly, there was a great emphasis on the development of
the country’s natural resources, notably for export to the Soviet
Union; a pattern which resembles the economic development of many
colonies in the past. Secondly, it cornered the geographical
distribution of the Soviet financed projects. Interestingly most
of the important Soviet development projects are situated in the

1. Robin and Michelle Pulton, "Prospects for Afghanistan’s
north of the country, in the region bordering Afghanistan's frontier with the Soviet Union. This was a terrain less favourable to the guerilla fighting than the other regions of Afghanistan. The agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan provided the furnishing of assistance of Afghanistan in the completion of 147 projects, 73 of which were commissioned and another 60 were under construction. The Soviet Union made an important contribution to the solution of the transport problem of this mountainous land locked country, which virtually has no railways. The Soviet Afghan technological, economic and trade collaboration acquired a steady and long term character. This relationship may have far reaching repercussions for Afghan society which is gradually moving towards the Soviet style of economic development.

1. Ibid, p.84.
2. I. Shchedrow, op.cit, p.16.
Soviet Economic Warfare

383. The Soviet stick and carrot approach involved the following.

a. Curtailing of food production in areas known to be centres of guerrilla activities by the Soviets.

b. Destruction of crops outright by napalming the farmers' fields and sowing anti-personnel mines to discourage the farmers from reclaiming them.

c. Smashing the primitive but vital irrigation systems of Afghanistan.

d. Buying surplus food from peasants at prices higher than those prevailing at the market.

e. Lavishing upon peasants in government-controlled areas as abundance of fertilizers and seeds and farm implements designed to win their allegiance and lure others down from the hills to join them.

f. Crushing national resistance movements through Soviet economic warfare and famine policy for the Afghans.

384. As a result of these policies, agricultural production fell to 20-30 percent of pre-1979 level, prices rose six to ten fold and near famine conditions started prevailing in many areas.

US Aid to the Mujahideens

385. Details of military aid provided by the US is :-

a. From FY 1980 to FY 1984 - $50 million/year
b. During FY 1984 - $122 million
   1

c. During FY 1986 - $470 million

d. During FY 1987 - $630 million
   2

e. US Aid Programme FY 1985-88 - $40 million


Economic Penetration.

Salients include:

a. The Afghan desire for modernization and economic development in Afghanistan to accept Soviet influence as early as 1953. The monarchy and educated elite were lured by the Soviet Union through substantial long-term financing of successive five year plans beginning in 1956.

b. The Soviet objectives were to shift Afghanistan's trade to the Soviet-bloc countries, to create public monopolies and to superimpose a modern sector in traditional economic sector (most Soviet programmes were also designed to serve Soviet long-term political and military objectives).

c. Beginning in 1953, Soviet aid was massive as Afghanistan received the highest per capita aid of any third world nation.

d. From 1953 to 1978 before the establishment of a Marxist government, Afghanistan received the highest per capita aid of any third world nation.

e. From 1953 to 1978, before the establishment of a Marxist government, Afghanistan received more than $31 billion in Soviet aid, including some 120 projects.

f. Afghan roads and airports were designed for future Soviet military use. In fact, the hospitals built by the Soviet Union in the 1950’s and 1960’s were used in the 1980’s by the Soviet military in Kabul.

g. Natural gas, minerals, fruits and other resources were exported to the Soviet Union at prices substantially below international prices.

h. The Soviet penetration of the Afghan economy and the Soviet efforts to pre-empt western competition included a favourable exchange rate and programme aid rather than project aid. Under programme aid large budgets were approved for financing several projects without the necessity of justifying each project.

j. Soviet tactics also included:

1. Free transit through the Soviet territory.
2. Visible and popular programmes.
3. Underbidding on projects.
4. Low interest rates.
5. Liberal rescheduling of loans.
6. Substantial grace period.
7. Soviet technicians to complete the programme.
8. Provision for generous scholarships.
10. Specific job related technical training for the Afghans in Soviet Union.

k. Trade with the Soviet Union went from 7 percent in 1921 to over 70 percent in 1985.

Economic Support

Details were:

a. Initially the entire cost of the resistance was borne by the Afghans.

b. Pakistan and Iran provided critical sanctuary for over 5 million Afghans, who settled their families in refugee camps and rotated in the battlefield.

c. A large part of the cost (around $2 million per day) was borne by Pakistan and Iran only.

d. Saudi Arabia, China, US and other Islamic countries provided covert and overt aid, reaching about $400 million in 1985.


2. Los Angeles Times, 23 November 1985, p.22; Also see The Time, 9 December 1985.
Soviet Oil Threat Factor

388. The Soviet Union is the world's largest producer of oil and coal and it ranks only second in natural gas production. It produces 18 percent of the world's oil and exports 27 percent of its production. It is the second largest exporter and consumer. Oil is the Soviet Union's most significant export, representing 28 percent of the value of total exports, and it accounts for 45 percent of her hard currency earnings. The Soviet Union is one of the few industrial states that are self-sufficient in energy, and its rather late industrialization has prevented the early depletion of energy resources.

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389. Despite its energy endowments, the Soviet Union has been experiencing serious energy problems. But because of geographical factors it has benefitted the Soviet Union to import quantities of oil from Iran and of gas from Afghanistan and Iran, and thus to export more of its own product in to European markets. This import policy has, however, placed strains on the Soviet economy. Coal production has slowed down since 1967. The oil production target for every year during the period 1976-80 was not met, even though the targets were consistently lowered. The original target for 1980 was 640 million metric tons, whereas 603 million metric tons were actually produced. As a consequence of energy deficiencies industrial growth has suffered. Industrial growth had been projected at 6.3 percent for 1976-80 but only 4.7 percent was achieved. Soviet oil output is encountering new problems. The CIA once predicted that Soviet oil output would peak at around 12 million barrels a day by the mid 1980s and then begin a long term decline. Given predicted continuing increase in Soviet demand, and in that of the Eastern European countries reliant on Soviet oil, this would necessitate the USSR becoming a substantial oil importer, either for its own requirements or for the concerned countries. Some analysts disagree on particulars of

1. Ibid.
the CIA's predictions, most agree that the Soviet Union will have real difficulties in meeting its domestic petroleum requirements and its foreign commitments to deliver oil by the middle of the 1 next decade.

390. The Soviet Union's petroleum industry face serious problems complicated by depressed output since World War II, the Soviet oil production centered around the region west of Volga river and in the Canicas Republics. Reserves are greater in Siberia, but to shift the production westward is costly. Industries and main population centres are far to the west. Unfavourable weather and long distances add to the costs of transporting fuel and of importing and maintaining workers in an area deficient in housing and goods. Huge quantities of pipe are also necessary for fuel transport, Soviet Union has experienced a chronic shortage in this regard.

391. The Soviet options for dealing with these problems are not attractive due to the following:-

   a. Firstly, they can shift exploration eastward to the west Siberian fields in Tyumen Oblast, especially on the Ob 2 river. These fields may continue to expand their output

1. Fred Halliday, op.cit, p.54.
but it is unlikely that growth there alone will compensate for declining production in west and south, and it is possible that even these fields will peak by the 1980s and begin to decline thereafter because of continued water encroachment. New production in Siberia, especially along its perimeter in the Arctic of Sakhalin regions, requires large capital outlays for exploration, production and transportation. Large diameter pipe has long been a basic item in the Soviet import bills, and it is doubtful that the Soviet can acquire pipe and make it operational soon enough to compensate for declining production in established oil fields.

b. Secondly, the Soviet Union can import equipment and press exploration while trying to hold production in existing fields, but they will require foreign exchange, to which Soviet access is largely under serious pressure.

c. Thirdly, conservation can be pressed but it will require the reversal of habits that have developed throughout the past fifty years of forced-peace, quantity over-quality economic growth based on cheap energy and labour and, therefore, will not be easy furthermore, changes in national habits of this magnitude will bring about head rolling, especially along generational lines, as new planners and managers will replace those who acquired their responsibility in
times when gross indicators made careers and when efficiency and cost-effectiveness were not rewarded.

392. Declining oil production, or even steady production against increasing domestic requirements, will make Soviet against increasing domestic requirements, will make Soviet export commitments to Western Europe and to its common partners more difficult and further strain hard currency earnings. This may well be the most immediate and most serious implication of the petroleum production around the 1980s. While the oil sector had once been a source of hard currency, it will almost certainly become a drain on hard currency in the next decade. Thus, Soviet capacity to obtain hard currency imports will possibly come under dual pressures: the need to increase importation of western technology for the exploration, drilling and transportation of oil, and the need to compete on world markets.

393. In case the Soviets are unable to surmount their energy problems, economic necessity may face her to act aggressively in the Middle East to secure an adequate supply of oil. The Soviet Union would not want to endure the austerity produced by an energy deficiency, and it would have difficulty acquiring sufficient hard currency to pay for extensive oil imports. Because Moscow would also want to maintain political leverage by sustaining the oil flow to Eastern Europe, cutting such exports would not be a viable option. Several analysts, therefore, believe that the seizure of Middle Eastern oil fields would be

1. Ibid, p.48.
the solution to a Soviet energy crisis. The Soviets intervention in Afghanistan was also interpreted as a step in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and eventual Soviet moves into Iran were never ruled out.

394. Rather than seize oil for their own use, the Soviets could try to weaken the west by interfering with oil transport in the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean. In his 1980 State of the Union address, Carter emphasised this aspect of perceived Soviet intentions and accused them of attempting to consolidate a strategic position that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

395. The Persian Gulf is a bay of the Indian Ocean. The Gulf was never a politically, strategically self contained area; it was a place of constant outward and inward movements, coming from the valley of the sulphurates or entering from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Hormuz. Since times immemorial, the Gulf has been a trade route, and attractive to the Suez route, from the Mediterranean lands.

396. The economic and strategic significance of the Gulf rose sky-high when it became the world’s principal source of petroleum. This petroleum is no less significant to both the industrial and agricultural economics of all non oil producing countries. About 60 percent of the world’s oil reserves lie under the waters and around the Persian Gulf. More than a quarter of the world’s used oil originates in and around the Gulf, and most

1. Ibid, p.50.
of it is being shipped out into the Indian Ocean and
to distributions in Europe, Japan and United States, as 1
well as to other countries. About 90 percent of Japan’s
oil arrives across the ocean from the Gulf. The same is
ture for 50 percent of European oil. It is calculated
that by the 1980s, 35 percent of the oil needed in the
United States will have to come from the Gulf unless 2
other sources of energy are tapped. Soviet oil
statistics (1965-80) are attached as Table A.

1. Ferne A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, London,
2. Ibid, p.112.
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet oil production</td>
<td>242.90</td>
<td>353.00</td>
<td>491.00</td>
<td>620.00</td>
<td>640.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Million of metric tons</td>
<td>242.90</td>
<td>353.00</td>
<td>491.00</td>
<td>620.00</td>
<td>640.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millions of barrels ay</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>9.82</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet oil requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millions of metric tons</td>
<td>180.40</td>
<td>261.80</td>
<td>368.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>478.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet oil exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Millions of metric tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To communist countries</td>
<td>28.90</td>
<td>50.40</td>
<td>77.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Eastern Europe</td>
<td>22.40</td>
<td>40.30</td>
<td>63.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>To Non-Communist Countries</td>
<td>35.50</td>
<td>45.50</td>
<td>52.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Western Europe</td>
<td>22.70</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>44.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet oil imports</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millions of metric tons</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>7.60</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

External Payments and Debt

397. Afghanistan’s external public debt is estimated to have stood at $5 billion in 1990, the bulk of it owed to the USSR, and all but a marginal amount on concessional terms. Since the Soviet military involvement in December 1979, only very limited funds have come from sources outside Eastern and Central Europe.

Development Plans

398. On the eve of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, the new Kabul regime decided to replace the seven year programme with a five-year plan to run from 1978/79. Preliminary details released in August 1979 indicated an expenditure of Af 105 bn, with over 50% earmarked for industrial development, 25% for agriculture and 15% for health, education and other social services. There was no subsequent indication that the objectives of the plan had been altered, but clearly it was not put into effect since the plan quickly lost any relationship with reality.

399. The 1977-78 and 1978-79 annual plans provided for higher expenditure than was suggested in the seven year plan itself, and the sectoral allocations in both years were also at odds with the proportions intended to be released over the entire plan, mainly as a result of heavy emphasis on industrialisation at the expense of transportation projects.

400. Details of 1978-79 annual plan included:

a. Total earmarked - Af 20,510 million.

b. Agriculture and irrigation - 279%.

c. Industry, mines and - 42.8%
energy

d. Transport and communication  - 12.3%

(Actual government capital expenditure in the years covered by the revised five-year plan (1979-80 to 1983-84) totalled not more than Af 26.6 billion, only a fraction of the amount originally projected).

401. A new five-year plan covering the period from 1986-87 to 1990-91 was announced but not published, and details of its provisions were most, fragmentary and sometimes contradictory. Some indications of growth and sectoral targets emerged from press and radio reports, although there were no details of the manner in which the government sought to achieve its targets. Available information indicated that total planned expenditure in the five-year period amounted to Af 114.5 bn. Of this, AF 89.5 bn was allocated to state development projects with domestic resources planned to contribute AF 50 bn. Central funds were to account for Af 113 bn of the total outlay with the private sector contributing just Af 1.5 bn. Sectoral allocations, which were made public were: -

a. Natural gas  -  Af 13 bn
b. Electricity  -  Af 9 bn
c. Education  -  Af 1.7 bn
d. Light industry  -  Af 5 bn
e. Agriculture  -  Af 11 bn

402. Growth in GNP was planned to be 25% over the five year period, against claimed growth of 16% between 1981-82 and 1985-403. Agriculture was planned to grow by 15%, against 6% in the
earlier period and industrial output by 38%, against 26%. For sources of foreign assistance to Afghanistan's development up to 1977, see Table B attached.
### SOURCES OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT UPTO 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>517.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>397.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Other bilateral aid</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Other multilateral aid</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transport and Communications

404. There are approximately 18,000 kilometres of roads, of which 2,800 kilometres are paved. Much damage has been caused by the Afghan war. About 2,000 kilometres of asphalted roads (or close to the pre-war total) and 3,000 kilometres of secondary, partly paved roads have been damaged and nearly 300 bridges have been destroyed, according to a report of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan.

405. In 1978 there were 26,000 registered passenger cars and 26,700 commercial vehicles which constitute the backbone of the distribution system. The total was scheduled to rise to 82,800 (45,500 trucks) by 1982. In 1981-82, 450 trucks and 200 buses were to be imported from the USSR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Under an aid accord concluded with the USSR in August 1989 the Soviets agreed to provided an additional 5,000 vehicles, including 500 Kamaz trucks for convoys carrying goods from the Soviet border to Kabul.

406. There are no railways although the 1976-77 to 1982-83 seven-year plan included an ambitious project to construct the 1,800 kilometres Trans-Afghan railway financed by Iran. Work did start and on a link between Kabul and the Soviet border.

407. Being a land locked country, Afghanistan is dependent on transit through neighbouring nations, Much of foreign trade was traditionally conducted through Pakistan, by truck to or from Peshawar and from there by rail to Karachi, this being the shortest and least costly route to the sea. But use of the

1. Does not have any coastal line.
Karachi route has declined substantially in favour of the overland route by truck and rail via the former USSR, which became crucially important following the Iranian revolution and the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan. Cross-border facilities were enhanced by the construction of bridges across the Amu river and by expansion of the river’s ports.

408. There are modern airports at Kabul and Kandahar, and several smaller provincial airports including those at Herat, Jalalabad and Mazar - e - Sharif. Afghanistan’s international and domestic carriers were merged in 1986 to form Bakhtar Afghan Air Lines. It has a fleet of ten aircraft, mostly of Soviet origin, including three Antonov An-26s.

409. In 1974 there were 14 daily and 11 other newspapers with a total estimated circulation of 4,99,000, reflecting the high illiteracy rate. There was a subsequent contraction of the press through censorship and only six newspapers were reported to be appearing in 1988. Television was introduced in 1978 and there are about 30,000 receivers. In 1978 there were 35,000 telephones, the majority in Kabul. Automatic equipment is in use in Kabul and in many of the provincial towns. The five year plan included provision for an increase to 40,000 telephones by 1983-80.

Finance

410. Tax collection, never very effective in tribal Afghanistan, was one of the very first functions to be affected by the fighting and the exodus of the refugees. The share of taxes in current revenue fell from the pre-war peak of 70% in 1974-75 to

1. Defence and Foreign Affairs Hand Book, op.cit, p.5.
30% in 1981-82, the gap being made up by "non-taxes", most of which were probably from the Soviet aid.

411. Until 1977-78 development budgets were financed largely by borrowing by the Bank of Afghanistan and foreign aid. The USSR (providing over 60%), the US, West Germany and the World Bank were traditionally the main aid suppliers by other sources of assistance emerged in the mid-1970s, with Iran committing $700 million for infrastructure and industrial projects and Saudi Arabia a further $425 million.

412. The situation changed after the revolution in Iran and Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan. International aid bodies as well as individual donors postponed further aid disbursement. They were replaced by increased Soviet and comecon assistance. Since 1978-79 official data have not revealed how the government has covered its deficits. Soviet assistance has undoubtedly played a part, but the rapid growth of money as the deficit widened suggests that the authorities also resorted to money creation.

413. Following the Geneva Accord of May 1988, the UN set up a trust fund for the rehabilitation of the economy, with a target of $2 billion, to be disbursed over an 18-month period. As of August 1989, $716 million had been pledged to the fund, the major commitment ($615 million) having come from the Soviet Union. For Central government finance, see Table C attached.
### Table C

**Central Government Finance**

(Af m)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Revenue</td>
<td>10,250</td>
<td>26,295</td>
<td>29,978</td>
<td>33,624</td>
<td>34,744</td>
<td>47,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>7.166</td>
<td>9,926</td>
<td>9,041</td>
<td>10,803</td>
<td>13,952</td>
<td>17,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Taxes</td>
<td>3,084</td>
<td>16,369</td>
<td>20,937</td>
<td>22,821</td>
<td>20,792</td>
<td>20,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Expenditure</td>
<td>6.244</td>
<td>19,575</td>
<td>26,831</td>
<td>30,064</td>
<td>37,760</td>
<td>43,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Balance</td>
<td>4.006</td>
<td>6,720</td>
<td>3,147</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>3,016</td>
<td>5,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Expenditure</td>
<td>6,498</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>5,579</td>
<td>5,262</td>
<td>5,433</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Bal Financing</td>
<td>2,492</td>
<td>1,742</td>
<td>2,432</td>
<td>1,702</td>
<td>8,449</td>
<td>13,562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Borrowing</td>
<td>-592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Borrowing</td>
<td>1,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Cash Balance</td>
<td>-410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries.
Trade

414. Another characteristics of Afghan economy is that total annual imports from foreign countries consistently exceed exports resulting in adverse balance of trade. Roughly one third of Afghanistan’s exports go to the Soviet Union and 26% go to India and Pakistan, next comes West Germany, UK, Switzerland and the United States. For principal trading partners, see Table D attached.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>%Age</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>%Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Energy

315. After the Soviet military involvement, the proposition of gas production exported to the USSR increased markedly, making Afghanistan a net exporter of energy. Natural gas being the country’s main energy resource have been estimated at 100-150 bn cubic meters. Extraction from fields in Jozjan and Faryab provinces in the north near the then Soviet border reached 3 bn cubic metres in 1988. A large proportion of output was exported to the USSR via a pipeline constructed in 1967 and, as from 1980, this supply was expanded following the completion by the USSR of the Jarkuduk gas installation, 50 kilometers from the border, which has a capacity of between 1.5 bn and 2 bn cubic metres per year (and 15,000 tons of condensate).

316. Earnings from natural gas according to Tass, amounted to $200 million in 1979. By 1984 they had risen to $314.3 million, 50% of the total export earnings. Gas deliveries to the USSR amounted to 2.3 bn cubic metres in 1981 and 1982 and 2.4 bn cubic metres in 1983. Kabul radio reported in 1985 that natural gas production totalled 15.4 bn cubic metres in the period 1978-84. In February 1989, when the last Soviet troop withdrew, the northern gas fields were capped to prevent their sabotage by the Mujahideens, thus depriving Afghanistan of its chief source of export earnings.

417. Electricity output grew at an average rate of 4% a year between 1970-79 and 1987-88. Despite this growth in output, Afghanistan imported 42m Kwh of electricity in 1988-89 and supplied free of cost from the USSR.
Uranium

418. One of the top priorities for the Soviet engineers in Afghanistan is the search for uranium deposits. They found such a deposit at Khakraz in Kandhar province. There were evidence that the Soviets took huge quantities of uranium ore from the Kandhar province.

419. The Soviet engineers have also discovered iron ore deposits in Bamiyan province. These deposits are said to be the world's largest. Emeralds and copper deposits are also of great significance for Soviet geologists. They are making full use of their total control of Afghan affairs. By paralyzing Afghan economic activity, and through rapid integration of Afghanistan into Soviet economic networks, Soviet Union has virtually subjugated the country.

---

Natural Gas

420. The first of occupation have been the Soviet exploitation of Afghanistan's natural gas. Many years ago the Soviets built a natural gas pipeline from the huge deposits at Shibarghan, in northern Afghanistan across Amu Darya (river) into the Soviet Union. Since 1967, natural gas has been furnishing the energy requirements of more and more areas of Soviet Central Asia. Today 3.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas is flowing into Soviet plant. This is in fact the entire Afghan production. The Soviets are paying $70 per 1000 cubic meters as against the price of $100 cubic meter which the Soviets are charging from West Germany for their own gas exports. There was little surprise, therefore, in Moscow's announced plan to double Afghan's natural gas production, especially since Iranian natural gas which the Soviets used to receive, had been cut off for more than five years. The Iranian revolution increased dramatically the importance for the Soviet Union of the Afghans gas reserves. A dispute over price led to Iran turning off the gas taps late in 1979, and the winter of 1979-80 was bitterly cold for thousands of the Soviet citizens deprived of their heating supply.

421. An interesting point to note is the Soviet refusal to pay in cash for their gas purchases from Afghanistan. Instead it deducts the gas's estimated value from the increasingly heavy debit owned by Afghanistan to the Soviet Union. This debt essentially represents the costs of the Soviet Union's own military

2. Robin and Michalle Roulton, op.cit, p.185.
occupation which is charged to the Kabul government. This debt now amounts to about $3 billion. Even if this debt were no longer increased, it would take Afghanistan a decade to discharge it according to the preset flow of its gas to the Soviet Union. In other words, the Afghans are condemned to pay back a debt, subject to constant inflation, with a natural resource whose price is constantly controlled and deflated by the creditor itself.

Petroleum

422. Soviet technicians have also discovered petroleum in north, and south-west of Afghanistan. The petroleum obviously increases considerably the economic potential of this region. Soviet agreement with the Afghan government to build a refinery at Jaradug to exploit the small oil reserve, as described by the Soviets, raised doubts and suspicions about the actual oil reserves. Afghan oil may be a valuable source for the Soviet oil requirements. For energy balance 1991, Commercial primary energy consumption and energy production, refer to Table E, F and G attached respectively.

### Energy Balance, 1991

(m tons oil equivalent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oil</th>
<th>Gas</th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary supply</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Transformation</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Consumption</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Data compiled by Energy Data Associates.
2. Expressed as input equivalents on an assumed generating efficiency of 33 percent.
3. Transformation input and output, plus energy industry fuel and losses.
4. Output basis.
Table F

Commercial Primary Energy Consumption
(000 tons coal equivalent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Solid fuel</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Liquid fuel</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Natural gas</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>1,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Primary &amp; imported electricity</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>2,544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. UN Energy Statistics YearBook.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal (.000 tons)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas (petajoules)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity (m kwh)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.109</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>1,170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries; UNCTAD, Country Presentation by the Government of Afghanistan.
Natural Resources

423. Afghanistan is rich in all the useful minerals such as coal, natural gas, uranium, lead, gold, zinc, copper, iron, sulphur and salt. Soviet Union has sunk more than $5 billion in economic and military aid to the Karmal government and much of it is going to improve the uranium, gas and oil facilities along the Soviet border. The Soviets are making heavy economic investments in Afghanistan. And certainly this will yield drastic changes in the economic development of Afghanistan and would bring significant improvements in the standard of living of the Afghan masses. Time is running in favour of the Soviets. It is generally feared that with the passage of time the Afghan masses may show their approval of Soviet military involvement and attendant acceleration of economic development in Afghanistan.

1. Illustrated Weekly of Indian, op.cit, p.19.
Mining

424. Minerals known to exist include coal, uranium, salt, chrome, silver, gold, sulphur, barytes, iron, zinc, tin, fluorite, talc, magnesium, mica, copper and lapis lazuli, while surveys have revealed potentially useful deposits of asbestos, mercury, bauxite, nickel, lead, wolfram, lithium and rubies. But only coal, salt and chrome are exploited on any significant commercial scale because of transportation problems and shortages of capital.

425. The former USSR’s main economic interest in Afghanistan rested in the country’s mineral resources, and she carried out several unpublished geological surveys. Apart from natural gas, Moscow was developing the Aynak Copper Mine, which is already productive and has estimated deposits of 3.5 million tons. It was also reported that the Soviets extracted uranium from Koh Mir Daoud, between Herat and Shindand and in the Khakriz area of Kandahar province. Newly discovered deposits north of Kabul also reportedly under development. Two gold mines in Badakshan province surveyed by the Soviets geologists are described as particularly promising.

Foreign Trade

426. Merchandise trade showed deficit throughout the 1980s, after the unusual surplus recorded in 1979-80. The deficit has risen exports fell from 1984 - 85 onwards while imports recorded overall growth with wide fluctuations throughout the decade. The Soviets decision in February 1989 to cap the northern gas fields seriously widened the trade deficit in 1989-90. Gas had earned
upto $ 300 million a year in foreign exchange and at 1984 peak had accounted for 56% of all earnings.

427. Afghanistan's main export items have been fruits, nuts and vegetables, which go chiefly to India and Pakistan, natural gas to the former USSR, Karakul to the fur markets of Europe and carpets and cotton.

428. After the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan at the end of 1979, the integration of the Afghan economy with that of the USSR, was speeded up. In the period 1989-91, the Soviets share of Afghanistan's trade reached its peak, at 72% of exports and 57% of imports. For Afghan exports (1975-76), foreign trade and main commodities traded, refer to Tables H, J and K attached respectively.
Table H

AFGHAN EXPORTS (1975-76)
(value in m dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Export Items</th>
<th>2 Percentage</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Dry Fruit</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Natural Gas</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Fresh Fruit</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Rugs</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Caracul Sheep Skin</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. In 1975-76 imports were 30% greater than exports.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td></td>
<td>566.8</td>
<td>551.9</td>
<td>511.9</td>
<td>394.7</td>
<td>235.9</td>
<td>235.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>1,194.2</td>
<td>(-)1,403.5</td>
<td>(-)995.9</td>
<td>(-)900.3</td>
<td>(-)821.7</td>
<td>(-)936.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>627.4</td>
<td>(-)851.6</td>
<td>(-)484.0</td>
<td>(-)505.6</td>
<td>(-)585.8</td>
<td>(-)701.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas</td>
<td>233.1</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>124.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpets</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>89.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fresh Fruit</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried Fruit</td>
<td>169.4</td>
<td>103.4</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karakul Skins</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Tyres</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Total incl</td>
<td>394.6</td>
<td>551.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total incl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>705.2</td>
<td>394.2</td>
<td>235.9</td>
<td>235.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agriculture

329. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, accounting for over 50% of GDP and the bulk of exports. About 14 years of fighting and accompanying displacement of large sections of the rural population have much reduced agricultural activity.

330. Wheat is the principal crop, covering a quarter of the cultivated area. Sugar cane and sugar beet are grown, but the sugar derived from these crops is insufficient to meet domestic requirements and has been supplemented by imports, mainly from the former USSR. Fruits, nuts, vegetables, wool, cotton and hides and skins, especially Karakul, are the major agricultural export items.

331. The livestock population, estimated at 6.5 million Karakul sheep, 15 million ordinary sheep, 3.7 million cattle, 3.2 million goats and 500,000 horses in the late 1970s, were also hard hit with losses and mass slaughtering, reducing numbers by as much as a third. In 1980-81 the government claimed that there were around 19.2 million sheep and 3.8 million cattle, but FAO estimates show much lower levels in the late 1980s.

332. Crop targets for 1981-82, on the strength greatly expanded fertiliser improved seed and pesticide inputs supplied by the USSR, included 100,000 tons of cotton, 34,000 tons of sugar beet, 850,000 tons of vegetables, 910,000 tons of fruit and 4.5 million tons of cereals. The extent to which these were achieved is not known. Both planting and harvesting have been severely hampered by fighting, and the scorched earth policy pursued in some rural areas by the Soviet forces reinforced the difficulties. These is
also a major drift from the land as the population sought refuge in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran and in the relative safety of the country's towns and cities. There is much evidence of persistent food shortages despite the diminished population and some alleviation of the problems by imports from the USSR, at the rate of some 250,000 tons a year.

433. The conditions which have prevailed in Afghanistan in recent years have made extremely difficult any accurate assessment of the state of agriculture. It is clear only that it has been severely damaged and that the picture painted by official statistics in wholly misleading. A land reform programme was started is 1976 by the Daud government and accelerated after 1979. But the arbitrary way in which confiscation and redistribution of land was implemented generated widespread resistance and in mid-1981 the government was forced to exempt religious and tribal leaders and army officers from the scheme. The land reform process was accompanied by the establishment of state farms and farming cooperatives. From 1987, however, the regime downplayed the programme and officials frequently admitted that its implementation had involved mistakes.

434. The agricultural lands varies widely in different regions but certain things have been constant throughout the country. Large land holdings are extremely high. A rich peasant owns about 10 hectares of irrigated land, a more modest peasant owns 2 to 4 hectares, and a poor peasant owns little or nothing. Afghan

society is not divided into big land owners and landless peasants. Most of the Afghan peasants are independent land owners with small holdings. Agricultural land has no value, unless it is irrigated, land is less scarce than water. Whosoever cultivates unirrigated land, is entitled to the harvest. For production of principal crops, agricultural production, live stock population and land holdings, refer to Tables L, M, N and O attached respectively.
### Table L

#### Production of Principal Crops (000 tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>2,813</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>2,306</td>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>2,081</td>
<td>1,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>304</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Production of Principal Crops (000 tons)

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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>746</td>
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#### Industrial Crops

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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarbeet</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar cane</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oilseeds</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table M

Agricultural Production (000 tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>1,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed Cotton</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesame Seed</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linseed</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarbeet</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar cane</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. **FAQ, Production YearBook, All figures are either FAQ estimates or derived from unofficial sources.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cattle</strong></td>
<td>3,723</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>3,830</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sheep</strong></td>
<td>18,667</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goats</strong></td>
<td>2,878</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>2,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chickens (m)</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

1. **FAO, Production YearBook. All figures from 1985 onwards are FAO estimates**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (hectares)</th>
<th>% Age of All land Owners</th>
<th>% Age of Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 or more</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Revenues and Loans

435. The domestic revenues are usually exceeded by expenditures incorporated in national plans of development. The difference is covered through deficit financing. In addition large amounts are invested in the economy by loans and grants. Foreign assistance plays a vital role in stabilising the economy. The main contributors of foreign assistance have been the Soviet Union, USA, West Germany and China. The pace of development has been considerably accelerated with the contribution of the foreign and US assistance has amounted to over 400 million. Afghanistan before the Soviet military involvement, had received loans and grants of over $500 million. After the Soviet military involvement, Afghanistan received enormous economic assistance from Soviet Union. Afghanistan has also received substantial bilateral assistance from West Germany, UK, China, United Nations, IDA, IBRD. These were the major sources of providing multilateral economic assistance.

436. States of donor countries during 1993 and 1994 are attached as Tables P and Q respectively.

---------------------------------
2. Ibid, p.23.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>1993 - (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Canada</td>
<td>3,877.357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Denmark</td>
<td>1,610,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Germany</td>
<td>233,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Ireland</td>
<td>56,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Japan</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Netherlands</td>
<td>2,604,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Norway</td>
<td>1,156,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Switzerland</td>
<td>349,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. United Kingdom</td>
<td>4,477,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. USA</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. European Union</td>
<td>6,382,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Private(Japan)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Private(Pakistan)</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>29,271,836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor 1994 - (US$)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o. Denmark</td>
<td>805,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. France</td>
<td>564,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. Norway</td>
<td>102,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r. Sweden</td>
<td>1,909,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s. United Kingdom</td>
<td>2,698,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t. USA</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u. UN</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,280,426</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Money.

437. The Bank of Afghanistan performs both central and commercial banking functions. Other banks operating in Afghanistan are the Bank Milli, the Pakistani Tejarati Bank, the Construction Bank, the Industrial Credit Fund and the Agriculture Bank. Throughout the 1980s money was rising at rates far in excess of any growth in the real economy, as the government apparently used money creation as a means of financing the budget deficit. For data on Afghan money and credit, refer to Table R attached.
Money and Credit

(Af bn; end-period)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Credit</td>
<td>83.08</td>
<td>103.96</td>
<td>155.28</td>
<td>210.07</td>
<td>301.07</td>
<td>447.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims on Central</td>
<td>55.69</td>
<td>69.44</td>
<td>126.23</td>
<td>187.48</td>
<td>274.24</td>
<td>414.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Claims on Local</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Claims on Non-Financial Public Enterprises</td>
<td>18.96</td>
<td>23.42</td>
<td>14.14</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>4.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Claims On Other Financial</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions Net Foreign Assets</td>
<td>22.72</td>
<td>17.92</td>
<td>25.26</td>
<td>26.13</td>
<td>20.57</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Manufacturing

438. Among the larger producing units are several cotton mills, rayon woolen textile and sugar mills and chemical plants. Chemical fertilizers are produced from natural gas at Mazar-i-Sharif. According to Soviet foreign trade journal, USSR assisted ventures in Afghanistan contributed 36% of the value of the nation's industrial output (estimated at some $415) in 1979 and 60% of all state sector output.

439. Prominent among those Soviet-assisted projects were the Shibarghan gasfields, the Mazar-i-Sharif nitrogenous fertilizer works and Jangalak engineering factory, which in 1979-80 produced goods (mainly spares for Soviet vehicles and machinery valued at Af 171.7 million. For data on output of selected industrial items, refer to Table S attached.
# Table S

## Output of Selected Industrial Items

("000 tons unless otherwise indicated")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cement</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fertiliser (urea)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sugar (refined)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Wheat Flour</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Vegetable Oil</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cotton Textiles (million m)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ginned Cotton</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rayon Textiles (million m)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Woollen Textiles (&quot;000 m&quot;)</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Dried Fruits</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Casing (&quot;000 coil&quot;)</td>
<td>2,246</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>1,413</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>1,552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Five Year Development Plan (1979/80-1983/84); ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries.
Prices

440. There is a considerable discrepancy between the pronouncements of the previous government on prices and the views of exiled Afghan economists. Whereas the former had claimed that consumer price increases were being restrained by controls, subsidies and growing supplies in state and cooperative shops, unofficial sources asserted that inflation was rampant, forcing substantial increases in wages and salaries and that the government was printing money on a large scale.

441. An IMF series for consumer prices show prices rising at an average annual rate of over 41% between 1984 and 1991 but with wide variations including in 1986 a fall in the price level. For data on consumer price indices, refer to Table T attached.
Table 1

Consumer Price Indices

(1985=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>115.9</td>
<td>138.7</td>
<td>242.9</td>
<td>334.7</td>
<td>540.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Accounts

442. The 1976-77 to 1982-83 seven-year plan targeted annual GNP growth over its duration at 6.3%. It's successor, the five-year plan for 1978-79 to 1982-83, forecast an annual growth rate over the period of 4.5% to 5%.

443. It seems likely that the level of economic activity has fallen considerably since the beginning of the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan at the end of 1979. The economy, which even before that time was very weak, was devastated by the war. It is thus not surprising that the more reliable figures made available since the Soviet military involvement suggest a major drop in national income.

444. In March 1985, Radio Kabul announced that in the year to March GNP had increased by 7% and reported Babrak Karmal as saying that since 1978 GDP had grown at a rate of 4.7% a year. Subsequently, in relation to the 1985-86 to 1990-91 plan, GDP was said to have grown by 14% between 1981 and 1985 with agriculture registering 6% growth and the industrial sector 26%. For data on sectoral origin of gross domestic product, gross domestic product and growth in gross domestic product by sector, refer to Table U, V and W attached respectively.
### Sectoral Origin of Gross Domestic Product

*(factor cost; constant 1978/79 prices)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984/85 (Af bn)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>1989/90 (Af bn)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Construction</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Trade</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport &amp; Communication</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other Service</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. GDP</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>124.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ADB, Key Indicator of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries.
## Gross Domestic Product (facto cost)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Total Af bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At constant</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>150.4</td>
<td>154.9</td>
<td>139.0</td>
<td>127.5</td>
<td>124.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1978/79) Prices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. % change</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-10.3</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Per head (Af)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At constant</td>
<td>10,446</td>
<td>10,273</td>
<td>10,275</td>
<td>9.133</td>
<td>8,221</td>
<td>7,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1978/79) prices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. % change</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

----

1. ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific countries.
Table W

Growth In Gross Domestic Product By Sector
(\% annual real change; base year-1978/79)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-19.0</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, Manufacturing &amp; Utilities</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-12.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Communications</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>-27.1</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other service</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP at factor cost</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-10.3</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific countries.
Employment

445. Various estimates of the working population have appeared in the last two decades, but none can be relied on. The 1976-77 to 1982-83 seven year development plan estimated that the total labour force in 1976 was 5.6 million, of whom 72% were engaged in agricultural pursuits. In contrast, the World Bank published estimates for 1979, based on a population of 13.05 million, which give a work force of 3.94 million indicating a 30.2% participation rate, including 4.9% of the female population and 7.4% of the population under 15.

446. Since 1979 Afghanistan does not appear to have reported data to the International Labour Office (ILO). Official statistics show a sharp decline in the labour force in the early years of the Afghan conflict from 4.95 million in 1979-80 to 3.73 million in 1980-81 after which it began a recovery which strengthened in the mid-1980s and brought the level to 6 million by 1989-90. This apparent expansion of the labour force is inexplicable since Afghanistan’s population went on declining during this period as the refugees exodus continued the massive return of refugees in 1992, undoubtedly have pushed up numbers. For data on estimated employment and estimated structure of labour force 1979, refer to Table X and Y attached respectively.
### Table X

**Estimated Employment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984/85</th>
<th>1989/90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'000</td>
<td>% of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Manufacturing &amp; mining</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Non-Productive</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unemployed</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. ADB Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries.

2. Including other.

3. Education and health, government departments and public services. "Total does not add in source."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No</th>
<th>Items</th>
<th>'000</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Agriculture, hunting, forestry &amp; Fishing</td>
<td>2,369</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mining &amp; Quarrying</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>10.7</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Electricity, Gas &amp; Water</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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End Notes

447. All statistical and other economic pronouncements emanating from the Afghan government need to be treated with caution. At mid 1981-82, for example, the Kabul regime was claiming that state income from internal sources was soaring in excess of the planned budget, only a little later the Prime Minister bemoaned the nation’s precarious financial position in the face of rising expenditure and falling revenues and the officially given outcome for the year was a deficit of Af 2.4 bn.

448. Major economic conclusions are based on the economic information gathered from, "Country Profile - Afghanistan (1992-93)"*, the Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU), 40 Duke Street, London W1A IDM, UK, pp.56 to 77.

449. Pakistan and Afghan sources of information are based on the following:—


d. Annual Economic Survey (annual), Ministry of Finance, Islamabad.

e. Energy Data Associates, I Regent Street, London, SW1Y 4NR


k. Five Year Development Plan (1979-80 to 1983-84), Ministry of Planning, Kabul.
CHAPTER 6
THE GENEVA ACCORDS
AND
WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES
FROM
AFGHANISTAN
Chapter 6
The Geneva Accords
and
Withdrawal of Soviet Force
From
Afghanistan

General
450. The blatant act of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was condemned by all nations of the world. Since January 1980, the UN General Assembly had voted nine times condemning the Soviet act and demanding a complete withdrawal of her forces from Afghanistan. Soon, negotiations started under the UN auspices to settle the issue which led to the initiation of political process at Geneva in April 1981. The indirect proximity talks commenced in June 1982 and underwent a difficult and lengthy process of negotiations. The Accord was finally signed on 14 April 1988.
Reasons for Political Solution

451. Major reasons for the political solution included:

a. The Soviet Union reiterated time and again, at the highest level, that a limited military contingent was introduced into Afghanistan on a temporary basis and would be withdrawn as soon as the external intervention ends.

b. Pakistan remained committed in good faith to extend all the guarantees within its physical power on the question of such alleged interference.

c. Pakistan remained opposed to any attempts being made to link the Afghan problem with the US-Soviet relation — but the emplacement of tactical nuclear weapons in Afghanistan would inevitably transform it into a cold war issue.

d. Pakistan genuinely favoured the arrival of detente on a global basis and favoured its extension to every region of the world.

e. Pakistan condemned the view that the Soviet Union should remain mired in Afghanistan and continue to bleed. Pakistan did never like any further influx of refugees.

f. Pakistan's security interests lied in remaining faithful to genuine non-alignment. It refuses bases and similar facilities to foreign powers. It's interests were opposed to any kind of "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union. Such a consensus could also be directed against the Muslim countries of the region by Israel.

g. The recognition of South West Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality should allay the strategic and security concerns of the Soviet Union.

h. The Soviet Union was not insensitive to world public opinion, especially of the countries of the third world which had been rudely shaken by the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.

j. The Soviet Union also could not be indifferent to socialist world opinion and the opinion of a number of communist parties was calling for the withdrawal of the Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

k. Termination of Soviet military intervention would revive detente, promote a vast improvement of Sino-Soviet relations and even the climate of East-West relations. International tensions would abate and the Soviet Union's image in the third world would be refurbished.

l. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan would result in observance of great respect for the rules of
international law and state behavior and thereby discourage future aggressions, military interventions or recourse to other forms of force, overt and covert. The UN would become more effective instrument of international peace and security.

m. A policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and the neighbouring states would emerge only after an honourable solution of the Afghan crisis by Kabul and other countries of the world.

n. Historically, the people of Afghanistan have always over thrown rulers imposed on them by foreign interventions.

o. The Mujahideen’s struggle would never over come, no matter what the odds and however long the bitter conflict lasts.

p. The Soviets miscalculated their adventure in Afghanistan. They had planned on a quick victory before world conscience would be aroused. As years draged on, it started to hurt the Soviets both internally and in their external relations.

q. Ability of Mujahideens to continue and increase their military opposition improved dramatically in 1987. Military aid increased form $300 million in 1986 to $600 million in 1987. More sophisticated weapons such as Stingers, 120 milimeter Mortars and Rockets enhanced

their offensive potential.

r. Better weapons made it costly for the Soviets to attack strong holds of the Mujahideens. Even routine operations were becoming more and more difficult.

s. Soviet High Command feared domestic troubles by employing their best combat units in a protracted war. They were thus left with limited options - escalate or negotiate.

t. At home, Gorbachev wanted more attention for his Prestroika and Glasnost, and to rejuvenate the socialist structure. Economically, the Soviets could not continue to support a failing cause.

u. Miscalculation of their adventure in Afghanistan by planning quick victory in shortest possible time frame before the rise of international diplomatic pressure.

v. Failure of the Soviets to build effective counter insurgency military formations/units.

w. Strong resistance of the Mujahideens which continued to increase specially during 1986-87 due to huge military equipment supplies.

x. Gorbachev was keen to give maximum attention to Perestroika and and Glasnost and with mass military involvement in Afghanistan, it was not possible to proceed ahead. Economic conditions of the Soviets were deteriorating at home day by day with no sign of

1. Ibid, p.11.

stability in foreseeable future.

y. Failure of Najib's government's offer of concessions to the Mujahideens, which included restoration of property, return of seized financial assets and provision of material assistance for re-settlement of refugees.

Geneva I (16 - 24 June 1982)

452. Major developments were:-

a. It helped in expanding the annotations already agreed under the four agenda items, but stopped short of evolving a structure and text of a settlement.

b. For Pakistan, the return of refugees was linked to Soviet withdrawal, while the Afghan position linked withdrawal to stoppage of outside (non Soviet) interference. Pakistan absolutely insisted on the inclusion of the time frame for withdrawal and its modalities in the text of the comprehensive settlement. Under modalities, Pakistan tentatively suggested the ideas of phasing the withdrawal by territorial sectors with a view to facilitating refugees return and a commitment that the troops would not re-entre following withdrawal. Also, according to Pakistan, "foreign troops" had to be interpreted in a generic sense to apply equally to Soviet military advisors. The Afghan side maintained the withdrawal to

be an exclusively bilateral matter with Moscow.

c. Pakistan accepted commitment to the principle of non-interference and such assurances as would not imply that interference was taking place. By the same token, Pakistan rejected any linkage between non-interference and withdrawal. The assurances, in Pakistani perception, had a future orientation and, by virtue of reciprocity, would had been a source of constant friction in Pak - Afghan relations in the past. The Pakistani side also formally proposed that the assurance should provide for inviolability of frontiers, euphemism for implicit recognition of the Durand Line by Afghanistan. For the Afghan side, interference was starting point of the entire issue and cessation of interference the key to normalization of relations, as well as to a decision to withdrawal. The Afghan foreign minister dwelt at length on alleged instances of Pakistani sponsored activities to overthrow the Kabul regime with the complicity of the US, China and others.

d. The concept of international guarantees remained ambiguous, almost undefined. The Pakistani side wanted to know what the Afghans had in mind.

e. The position of the Pakistani side was based on discussions that had already taken place during the shuttle preceding this Geneva round. It emphasized:

(1) The conditions to be offered by Kabul for
voluntary return of refugees.

(2) Practical plans for repatriation of the refugees so that proper arrangements existed on the other side on their return.

(3) UN-sponsored consultations with the refugees, which in Pakistan’s view provided an opening for the involvement of the refugees leadership with the negotiating process.

f. Among the possible formats of the political settlement at Geneva I were a Security Council resolution consecrating various understandings, declarations and agreements, to be integrated, for example, in a secretary general’s report. The Pakistani side was concerned, however, that the format for the settlement or for each of its components should be legally binding and command equal legal status.

453. Following considerations dominated Pakistani perceptions:

a. Desire for an equitable settlement; the settlement must avoid pointing a finger at any of the parties or endorsing either side’s point of view, implicitly or explicitly. The sequential relationship implied in Kabul’s demand for stoppage of interference as a precondition for withdrawal was, therefore, unacceptable to Pakistan.

b. Fear of Pakistan that Moscow might use the negotiations or a settlement as a tactic to confuse and weaken the Afghan resistance as well as international opinion. It
was felt that once the assurances of non-interference came into force and a settlement was enunciated, there would be an automatic diminution of the Afghan resistance.

454. The international environment and the situation on the ground in Afghanistan offered little encouragement for an early settlement. In Afghanistan, the Soviets had finally decided to throw their weight behind Babrak Karmal. Their military operations contined without let up throughout the northern, northeastern and southern provinces. There were reports that the Soviets were constructing and expanding six airfields in southwestern Afghanistan. Soviet statements should little change; in public at the UN General Assembly and privately with Yaqub Khan, Gramyko insisted on prior cessation of interference as a condition for withdrawal. A new issue of the use of chemical weapons figured at the debates, injecting extra bitterness. In September 1982 the UN Secretary General publicity cited the "failure" of the UN to obtain Soviet withdrawal as one of the failures of the organization. Islamabad and Kabul had their own


reasons to support the UN - sponsored negotiations. Occasionally, 1 Moscow paid lip service to process. However the Soviet position remained firmly rooted in the precept of "irreversibility" of the Saur Revolution and the terms of the 14 May 1980 and 24 August 1981 proposals for a settlement.

Geneva II (11-22 April and 12-24 June 1983)

455. The brief interregnum under Brezhnev's successor, Yuri Andropov, was marked by heightened optimism and a fresh impetus to the negotiations of the second round of Geneva talks (Geneva II), conducted in two sessions held successively in April and June 1983. The developments and status period were:

a. The first draft provided by Cordovez was divided into four sections, corresponding to the four agenda items and a preamble setting out the objective and principles of "the comprehensive settlement". Structurally, section 1 on interrelationships and withdrawal represented the heart of the comprehensive settlement. This section spelled out the following:

(1) The integrated nature of the settlement.
(2) A distinction between the data of the comprehen-

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sive settlement (either the data of enunciation or of signature, depending on the form) and the date on which withdrawal and return of refugees would begin and commitments on non-interference and declarations of guarantee would entre into force.

(3) A condition to complete all steps required towards fulfilling the provisions of the comprehensive settlement by a certain data.

(4) Provision for consultations to deal with questions arising during the course of implementation of the settlement.

b. During Geneva II, the Soviets sent to Geneva a special representative, Ambassador Stanislav Gavrilov, something that Cordovez regarded as a proof of Soviet sincerity in seeking a political settlement.

c. Two parallel sets of discussions and exchanges developed at Geneva II, as under:

(1) Formal discussions on section II and the remaining text.

(2) Informal, off the record exchanges involving Cordovez, his principal interlocutors and Soviet representative Gavrilov.

d. The text of Section II proposed by Cordovez posed several problems to the two interlocutors. The Pakistani side asked for restoration of the phrase "existing internationally recognized boundaries". The Afghan side on the other hand, demanded deletion of the
reference to "the international borders" from the text and rejected Cordovez's plea that the reference, appearing as it did as part of a general principle would not imply the Durand Line.

e. At those resumed Geneva II negotiations, 12-24 June 1983, the exchanges soon lapsed into a stalemate. The Afghan side started by demanding direct talks. Pakistan complained that there was virtually no progress on the with drawal question or on resolving other outstanding issues. For the followwoing main reasons, Pakistan insisted on text of guarantees :-

(1) Firstly, such guarantees would ensure that the Soviets would make a commitmen on withdrawal, not only to Pakistan but to other powers as well.

(2) Secondly, the limited scope of guarantees, if agreed by Pakistan, would drive a wedge between Pakistan and the US.

(3) Thirdly, on a point of principle, the text held to be balanced and equitable and not implicate either of the parties.

(4) Fourthly, in purely textual terms, the Pakistani side reduced its requirement for the scope of guarantees to a minimum and only asked for a provision underlining the "support and commitment" of the guarantors to the "principles and provis- ions of the comprehensive settlement."

f. The resumed session turned out to be inconclusive. It
was tense, and it raised more questions than it settled. Cordovez felt that an opportunity to clinch a settlement was lost between the two split sessions of Geneva II. Later on, some journalists also picked up this theme. Skeptics who could not credit Pakistan with independence of action described it to "the hidden US hand" restraining Pakistan. The truth was that the elusive opportunity had disappeared before it had matured. Undoubtedly, the hard-liners in Pakistan and the US had little interest in promoting a settlement from materializing in 1983, had the situation come to a head. The Gromyko-Yaqub Khan meeting demonstrated that the Soviet position had hardened before the resumption of Geneva II.

Geneva III (24-30 August -1984)

456. After the June session, the negotiating process shifted into slow gear. Only after a gap of more than one year was this next round. Cordovez used the intervening period between Geneva II and this round to consolidate understandings already developed and to make adequate preparations for the next step. Some of the features of this Geneva round included:

a. It was comparatively short with an inauspicious start but ended up providing an important impetus in the negotiations. For two successive days between 18 and 20 August 1984, Afghan artillery and aircraft shelled the Pakistani border area in Kurran Agency, killing 34 persons and wounding many more. The shelling resulted in a slow start for Geneva III as the Pakistani side had to go through the motions of protect. The Pakistani delegation had been contemplating an important initiative, but put it off for a few days so that it did not appear to be acting under intimation.

b. Pakistan did not envisage a time frame longer than six months. The Afghans were not prepared to sign the draft comprehensive settlement. Pakistan could not become a party to an agreement on withdrawal. Similarly, in the Afghan view, the US was an important party only in so far as interference was concerned, but it could not


2. Riaz M. Khan, op.cit, pp.130-133.
be involved with the settlement.

c. Lack of response from the Afghan side to Pakistan's move obliged Cordovez to terminate Geneva III. This was followed by a hiatus in the negotiations until the death of Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985, which marked the end of the lingering crisis of succession in Moscow. Cordovez ascribed this predicament to deterioration in East-West relations. Inside Afghanistan, the Soviet war effort had seen new escalation. A long term programme of Sovietization of Afghanistan appeared to have been set in motion. Air raids along the Pakistani borders were intensified. At the same time the end of 1984 was a turning point to the Afghan resistance.

1. FBIS, op.cit.
2. Riaz M. Khan, op.cit, pp.130-133.
Geneva IV, V, and VI (1985)

457. The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev following the death of Chernenko on 10 March 1985 generated upbeat expectations that the dynamic new Soviet leader would bring about a movement in the stagnant Soviet policies identified with the erstwhile aging Soviet leadership. Gorbachev's early initiative on arms control and his swift moves on the domestic political and economic front began to have a favourable impact in the West.

458. At the fourth Geneva round of proximity talks (Geneva IV) convened on 20-25 June 1985, Cordovez presented four separate instruments, with texts based on the four sections of the draft comprehensive settlement. Geneva IV began with the usual overture; Pakistan stressing discussion on time frame, Cordovez pushing for the finalization of the text and the Afghans and the Soviets refusing to deal with the issue of withdrawal in a manner that would to deal with the issue of withdrawal in a manner that would legally appear to commit them to Pakistan or the US. By the end of Geneva IV, the following issues stood out clearly.

1. Riaz M. Khan, op.cit, pp.133-146. 2. On 8 and 17 April, 1985, Gorbachev proposed a moratorium on further development and testing of nuclear weapons, FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union, 18 April 1985, AA2, D1-2.
4. The first Reagan-Gorbachev summit was announced on 27 July 1985.
5. Riaz M. Khan, op.cit, p 137.
a. In Instrument I, the bilateral agreement on non-interference, the Afghan side reviewed its objection to the reference to "existing internationally recognized boundaries" that they had previously agreed under Section II. According to the Afghan agreement, since Section II had been converted into a bilateral agreement, retention of the phrase in the new context would accord recognition to the Durand line.

b. In Instrument II on international guarantees, the Afghan and the Soviets objected to the paragraph introduced by Cordovez at the behest of Pakistan towards the end of Geneva III, that referred to "commitment and support" to the comprehensive settlement. Instrument II, in fact, became a major focus of discussion at Geneva IV.

c. In Instrument III on the voluntary return of refugees, Pakistan had one major demand and one textual difficulty. It continued to emphasize the requirements of consultation with the refugees to "ascertain" whether the arrangements and conditions incorporated in the text for voluntary return were acceptable to them.

d. Instrument IV was wide open. The Afghan side refused to consider either the text or the format and instead demanded vigorously that this instrument could be discussed with Pakistan only through direct talks.

459. Geneva IV, on 27-30 August 1985 and Geneva VI on 16-19 December 1985, remained pre-occupied with the issue of direct
talks and the related question of procedures and understandings needed to initiate discussions on Instrument IV.


460. Describing Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound", Gorbachev stated:-

"We would like in the nearest future to bring the Soviet forces - situated in Afghanistan at the request of its government - back to their home land. The schedule has been worked out with the Afghan side for a step - by - step withdrawal, as soon as a political settlement has been achieved which will provide for a real end to, and reliably guarantee a non-renewal of, the outside armed interference in the internal affairs of the DRA.

461. Gorbachev’s above statement, Kabul’s consent to drop its demand for direct talks, rumours of impending change in Kabul that materialized just before the start of Geneva VII, and Cordovez’s assertion that the seventh round would be the last proximity talks to complete the texts, all strengthened the belief that the Soviets were serious in seeking a settlement and could be expected to put forward a time frame. The Americans also expected the Soviet to make a move.

462. Geneva VII A was the single longest round, lasting from 5 to 23 May 1986. It was spent mostly on cleaning up the text of Instrument IV and various auxiliary issues, while waiting for a

1. Pravda, 26 February 1886.
time frame offer from the Soviet - Afghan side.

463. During the August 1986 round, Geneva VII B, Cordovez claimed that Kosyrev had bureaucratic problems and that Pakistan's insistence on a UN monitoring role was responsible for preventing the real time frame from coming through. To push the negotiation forward, Cordovez even turned up the pressure on Pakistan to draw out its minimum position on time frame.

Geneva VII C (25 February to 9 March 1987)

464. The Geneva round started with routine posturing. The Afghan side demanded a "realistic" Pakistani position, arguing that the Afghan side had already shown flexibility by climbing down from four years to three years, while Pakistan had remained adamant on the three - to four - month figure. The Pakistani delegation, on the other hand, described "haggling - style" negotiations, stressed objective criteria for settling the time frame issue and asked Cordovez to press the Afghan side to give a reasonable time frame.

465. The Soviet - Afghan position taken at Geneva VII C was clearly consistent with the stand taken by Shevardnadze during the Moscow meetings linking time frame with the issue of national reconciliation. At the same time, the review of the inconclusive Geneva round gave rise to the following two diverse sets of options in Pakistan : -

a. The first argued that if the Soviet were indeed pushing for an internal settlement prior to withdrawal, then the whole issue of time frame would lose its relevance. Once the government of reconciliation acceptable to the
Afghans had been formed, it would be of little consequence whether the Soviet troops left within a shorter or longer time.

b. The second view was based on the fear that the Afghan and the Soviets would stall after every concession on time frame to let public pressure work on the Pakistani government, pushing the latter's tolerance to the limit before finally striking a compromise.

Geneva VII D 9 (7 September 1987)

466. The sudden convening of the Geneva talks sharply raised expectations, specially because it was being convened at the initiative of Kabul following its refusal since May 87 to agree to any dates.

467. Geneva VII D proved an anticlimax. Instead of placing the expected offer on the table and thus putting Pakistan on the defensive, the Afghan side started by asking Cordovez to obtain a fresh offer of time frame from Pakistan. The Afghans offered 16 months, while Pakistan suggested a maximum of 8 months.

468. There were considerable speculation about why the Afghans called for Geneva VII D with such urgency and, having done so, failed to offer a time frame of one year, as almost universally expected. An outlandish postulate attributed it to lack of coordination with the DRA army command, which wanted to avoid a withdrawal period coinciding with winter months. Kabul had also convened the Geneva round as part of its wide-ranging diplomatic campaign to win support for the regime’s initiatives and favourably influence international opinion prior to the
General Assembly vote on Afghanistan. The counter moves by Pakistan had essentially focused on reiteration of its readiness to go to Geneva at any time and accept a settlement on the basis of a short time frame.

Geneva Accords - 1988

Gorbachev moved to bring the Geneva process to a head by setting dates and cutting through the confusion surrounding a precise time frame and terminal date for withdrawal. In a statement telecast from Moscow on 8 February, Gorbachev offered to withdraw Soviet troops beginning 15 May 1988 and ending ten months later, provided a Geneva settlement was concluded on 15 March 1988. The time frame was without any pre-condition of national reconciliation. Front loading was agreed in principle and the offer of disengagement reiterated, while preserving the right of the withdrawing troops to act in self-defence.

When the Soviet deadline of 15 March expired, Pakistan merely urged the need for symmetry and made it clear that the interim government was no longer a prerequisite to signature and that Pakistan would not let it become a cause of deadlock. The Junejo government did not want to risk the collapse of Geneva. In order to maintain maximum pressure on Pakistan to sign the Geneva Accords by 15 March, the Soviets and the Afghans avoided engaging them-selves in any negotiations on future government prior to that deadline. They refused to consider a draft statement that

Cordovaez prepared in an attempt to meet the various concerns raised by Pakistan.

471. Addressing the annual opening of the Parliament on 7 April 1988, Zia- ul - Haq stated that "all of Pakistan's doubts have been removed and the Geneva Accords has reached a stage that it can be signed at any time. The principal factor accelerating the pace towards the Geneva settlement in the first week of April 1988 was the Soviet resolve to pull out of Afghanistan without further delay. Shevardnadze reiterated publicly in Sofia and then on his arrival in Kabul on 4 April what Soviet spokesman Vadim Perfilyev had stated on expiry of the Soviet deadline and what Vorontsov had conveyed to Zia ul Haq six weeks earlier, that the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan whether agreement was reached at the UN talks in Geneva or not.

1. Muslim, Islamabad, 8 April 1988; Also see Reuter, Islamabad, 7 April 1988, 0845 GMT.

472. On 14 April 1988 in Geneva after nearly 6 years of indirect negotiations, representatives of Pakistan and Afghanistan signed three bilateral agreements with a view to end war in Afghanistan. An additional "Declaration on International Guarantors" was signed by the US and the USSR as states - guarantors. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze also signed one of the three bilateral agreements as witnesses. These documents collectively called as the Geneva Accords " led the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.

473. The signing ceremony was a grand occasion for the UN. The arrangements for the signing ceremony were meticulous, timed to the minute, with a brief welcome by the secretary general and equally brief concluding remarks. The actual signing proceeded in sombre silence, made palpable by camera clicks and flash lamps and the overpowering gold and ink frescoes dominating the walls of the historic Council Chamber of the Palais des Nations. There were no smiles and little celebration.

474. On the political front, the steadfast support of the world community, mobilized by Pakistan and the Islamic countries through the UN and sustained over eight years by the General Assembly inflicted such diplomatic damage on Soviet Union's international standing and prestige that it finally found it to be unacceptable.

475. The contribution to the conclusion of the Geneva Accords by Gorbachev must be duly acknowledged. He courageously admitted the soviet intervention to have been a mistake and took the necessary political decision to withdraw his forces from Afghanistan, finally proposing on acceptable time-frame for the process. And when the conclusion of the Geneva settlement was at an impasse because of US-Soviet disagreement on the question of continued arms supplies to the antagonistic Afghan sides, Gorbachev intervened decisively to remove this last obstacle. His leadership made a difference.

476. The Geneva Accords did not deal directly with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan per se. This was consistent with the insistence of both the Soviet Union and its Kabul client that the Soviet-installed regime is the lawful government of Afghanistan and that any Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is a purely internal matter to be determined by that government on the basis of bilateral arrangements between two sovereign states.

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Salient Features of the Geneva Accord

477. Besides declaration that the Soviet Union would start pulling out its forces with effect from 15 May 1985 and complete the withdrawal by 15 February 1989, the salient features were:

a. A total of three instruments were signed:
   (1) Bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the principles of mutual relations, non-interference and non-intervention.
   (2) Bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the voluntary return of refugees.
   (3) Declaration on international guarantees signed between United States of America and the Soviet Union.

b. By virtue of the Accord, both Pakistan and Afghanistan committed to abide by following acts with regard to victory and Geneva Accord offered hardly any advantage either to Pakistan or the Mujahideens because of the following reasons:
   (1) Its clauses effectively closed all options whereby Pakistan could assist the Mujahideens or could permits its territory to be used by them.
   (2) The Accord envisaged return of the refugees to be completed in 18 months but made no provision for creating suitable conditions for their safe return to their homeland. The refugees could not return and have continued to remain a burden on Pakistan.
   (3) The continuing flow of arms under the arrangements
of "positive symmetry" retarded the process of peaceful settlement of the conflict.

(4) Iran and Afghan Mujahideens, who formed an important element of the resistance were kept out of the talks and consequently were non-signatories to the Accords.

(5) By signing the agreement with the Soviet-installed Kabul regime, a long sought legitimacy was granted to it.

(6) Establishment of independent interim government acceptable to all was prevented before the Accords, whereas Pakistan had all along insisted on such an agreement.

Analysis - Geneva Accords

478. A detailed analytical study of the Geneva Accords in the historical prospective of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan reveals the following:-

a. This accord was not meant to convert Afghanistan into a republic, or to stop the bloodboth, but it was mainly to all the Soviet military forces to withdraw to the former USSR.

b. Its detailed clauses effectively close off every means by which Pakistan could assist or could permit its territory to be used to assist the Mujahideens.

c. It did not specifically mention in any way the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan or indeed any form of Soviet involvement.
d. It was a major victory of the US achieved through the then PM of our country Muhammad Khan Junejo.

e. The accord did not make any provision for the refugees who may close not to return to their home land under prevalent or those conditions that may emerge.

f. The continuing of arms under the arrangements of "positive symmetry" made the peace settlement without assuring peace in Afghanistan. This symmetry was mainly as a result of lack of trust.

g. The Mujahideens and government of Iran were kept out of the Geneva negotiations despite their key importance in the Afghan crisis and conduct of the situation.

h. The negotiations proceeded on a different agenda proposed by Kabul regime in 1981 where as these talks should have been in pursuance of the General Assembly Resolution of November 1991, which listed the following four essentials, none of which were guaranteed in the accords :-

(1) The preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan.

(2) The right of the people to determine their own form of government.

(3) Immediate withdrawal of foreign troops.

(4) Creation of conditions necessary for voluntary return of refugees.

j. Establishment of independent interim government
acceptable to all, was prevented before the accords, whereas Pakistan had all along insisted on such an arrangement.

k. The accord did not say what the Soviets could give to its own forces before withdrawal. They could supply enough of weapons and equipment and leave behind enough before asking the US to adopt a "negative symmetry" by claiming to have voluntarily ceased supplying the Afghan Army.

Post - Geneva Developments

479. General. Signing of the Geneva Accords was hailed by many in the hope that it would bring peace in Afghanistan and the refugees would return in honour. Unfortunately it did not happen. The withdrawal of Russian troops changed the geopolitical scenario of the region and as a natural consequence was a setback to the Mujahideens because Soviet backed Kabul regime continued to rule Afghanistan. Pakistan has continued to support the Mujahideens and to some degree violated the clauses of the agreement.

480. The Bahawalpur crash in August 1988 resulted in the death of General Zia which caused a temporary loss of direction on Afghan policy at a critical juncture when an opportunity for the settlement of Afghan crisis presented itself after Soviet withdrawal. The new government failed to take over from where General Zia had left and coming under domestic pressure sent wrong messages to the world besides clipping the wings of Inter Services Intelligence whom Afghan Mujahideens had learned to
trust. Cumulatively, these developments deprived the freedom movement of its momentum.

481. **Formation of AIG.** In October 1988 Professor Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani, Chief of Seven Parties Afghan Alliance announced the convening of an Afghan Assoora in order to form an interim government. The Afghan Interim Government (AIG) was finally elected in 1 February 1989 as under:

a. President - Sibghatullah Mujaddadi
b. Prime Minister - Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf
c. Foreign Minister - Gulbadin Hikmatyar

482. This government was believed to take over power after the envisaged fall of Najib government, but it faced the following major problems right at the outset:

a. It could not produce an election plan acceptable to all groups.

b. Iran-based groups, which had the following demands, were unacceptable to AIG:

(1) Right of vote for women.
(2) 25% representation in Afghan government.
(3) Participation in election commission.
(4) Rearrangements of constituencies on the basis of population instead of district boundaries.

c. The election formula presented by election commissioner, Pir Syed Ahamd Gaillani in May 1990 was rejected by Iran based groups. Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbadin Hikmatyar and some other smaller groups.

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d. The AIG did not truly represent the full spectrum of Afghan people and was not given the desired direction and cohesion to Afghan resistance.

483. **Mujahideen Failures/Weaknesses.** Immediately after Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahideens launched a major offensive on 6 March 1989 to capture Jalalabad in order to establish the AIG on Afghan soil to seek world wide recognition. The offensive failed resulting in low moral and deep rooted division among various groups of the Mujahideens. Other major failures/ weaknesses are summarised below :-

a. They suffered from lack of unified command. Hundreds of commanders were operating independently inside Afghanistan without a central command to organize them into a cohesive and potent force.

b. The Mujahideens were fighting a large and well equipped Afghan army.

c. They were also plagued with rift and in-fighting. Three hundred Mujahideens died in clashes between Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami. Another three hundred Mujahideens including thirteen commanders of Hizb-e-Islami were stoned to death after cutting their hands and feet. Likewise, there were pitched battles between Harkat-e-Islami and Itehad-e-Islami Party.

d. The divide and rule strategy of Najibullah did not take its toll. The lure of material benefits caused a few Mujahideen groups fall to Najib’s peace overtures. Promotion and appointment to high civil/military positions was an additional lure for the Mujahideens to switch sides.

e. Najib also exploited the tribal structure and the multi-sect/ethnic nature of the Mujahideens groups by widening the cracks between Iran-based Shia groups and Pakistan-based Sunni groups.

f. Mujahideen’s treatment of captured Afghan soldiers was not good. Looting and acts of pilfrage by Mujahideens also lessened their credibility and tarnished their image.

g. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops the main source of motivation to fight the infidels gradually diminished and deprived the resistance of its principle cause.

h. By and large, the Mujahideens lack the political and strategic foresight and are inclined towards politics of money and arms. They have adopted an extremely rigid stance against any negotiations with the PDPA. Their insistance on a broad based interim government excluding the PDPA is the main hurdle towards a political settlement.

j. **Failure of Afghan Interim Government**

(1) The AIG failed to win wider support on international level. There still remain strong
dissentions amongst them. Iran-based leaders have refused to join in as they demand 25% share on the basis of Shia population.

(2) The AIG also failed to present a credible alternative to the PDPA unpopular regime. Their inability to articulate a social and political programme spreaded disgust against a prolonged "jehad". Moreover, they have offered no positive vision and their Islamic polity did not materialise in the liberated areas in time.

(3) The Afghan Mujahideen field commanders wielded greater political power than the AIG.

(4) The AIG did not represent the full spectrum of Afghan people and a number of key commanders and influential groups were kept out of it.

**Definition - Withdrawal**

484. "Withdrawal" can be defined as,

"A manoeuvre, where by a force disengages from an enemy force as per the will of the commander".

485. "Withdrawal through a rearward position" can be defined as,

"An operation in which a unit effecting withdrawal passes through the sector of a unit

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occupying a rearward defensive position".

Soviet Withdrawal Indicators

486. Following can be termed as withdrawal indicators:-

a. In November 1985, a meeting was held between the then President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Gorbachev in which the General Secretary informed the US President about his working for a political solution to the Afghan problem stressing that the Soviet force will not like to stay in Afghanistan for an indefinite time.

b. On 25 February 1986, Gorbachev informed the 27th CPSU Party Congress about the possibility of withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

c. In May 1986, Gorbachev replaced Babrak Karmal to placate the resistance against the Kabul regime.

d. In March 1987, Gorbachev emphasised the need for a lasting peace to improve the economy of the USSR, while speaking to the Western journalists in a farm at Moscow.

c. In July 1987 Gorbachev explained in detail to Najibullah regarding definite time table for the de-indication of the Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

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3. Ibid.
f. In September 1987, Edward Shevardnadze admitted that the Soviet military forces would leave Afghanistan during the Reagan office tenure as the US President.

g. Yuli Voronstov, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, informed Micheal Armacost, the US Under Secretary of State that the Soviets would no longer hold the withdrawal of their military forces from Afghanistan to the guaranteed survival of the PDPA.

h. Around the middle of 1983, during the brief rule of Yuri Andropov, hopes of a Soviet pull out were aroused by the UN mediator’s claim that an Afghanistan settlement was about 95% completed and that only blanks in a withdrawal time table had to be filled in for which, negotiations would be held in the next Geneva round is June 1983.

Announcement - Withdrawal Plan

487. On 8 February 1988, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal plan. Sallent features of the plan included:

a. 15 May 1988 was fixed as the date for the commencement of the withdrawal and to be completed by 15 February 1989.

b. On 7 April 1988, the plan was finalized between Gorbachev and Dr Najib at Tashket and a week later it was signed at Geneva.

c. Instrument 4 of the Geneva Accord (regarding the Soviet withdrawal of their forces from Afghanistan) was endorsed by the Afghans and the Russians governments.

d. The decided type of withdrawal was declared as front loaded viz half of the Soviet military contingent to leave within initial three months for the safety of the Soviet troops besides arms and ammunition to achieve clean break and to ensure certain inevitability to the withdrawal plan.

Causes of the Withdrawal

488. The Soviet history reveals that the Soviets did not withdraw from the countries they occupied except in exceptional retreat cases such as Austria in 1956, Azerbaijan in 1945-46 and Porkkala Base of Finland in 1955-56. Some of the major causes of the Soviet withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan included:

a. Unpopularity in USSR. Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan was gaining un-popularity. The masses condemned the idea of retaining their military muscles in Afghanistan with no major break through despite huge investments in the form of their men and material.

b. Bravery of the Afghan Nationals. There is no denying the fact that courage, consistent hard work, sacrifices, will power and determination and sincerest efforts of the Afghan Mujahideens against a super power proved most effective and forced the Red Army to retrace their foot back to the former USSR.

c. Foreign Policy of Pakistan. Foreign policy of our government played an important role in forcing the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. General Zia-Ul-Haq played a leading, most effective and powerful role in dictating it’s diplomatic movements not only at home but also abroad to throw the Russians back from Afghanistan. Pakistan faced boldly a lot of internal pressure (in the form of bomb blasts, economic burden of refugees and in various other forms) and external pressure (of the former USSR and other countries) but continued it’s support for the Afghan Mujahideens.

d. High Rate of Russian Casualties. A total of about 13,000 Russian troops died in Afghanistan between 1979 to 1988. During such a long war, the number of casualties might not be very high, but it’s effects on the Soviet army were very dangerous and no Soviet soldier was willing to continue to fight with no clear success/objective(s). The Soviet troops and their families were neither having any specific informations about the total number of deaths in Afghanistan nor did
they believe their government controlled communication systems.

e. **Soviet Economy.** Soviet economy started declining day by day. Some of the factors showing decline were:-

1. $130 million reduction in defence budget due to scarcity of funds/resources.
2. A lot of existing resources were being used for logistic support of their forces abroad.
3. Basic needs of a common Soviet citizen were being neglected.
4. Perestroika initiated by Gorbachev demanded resources which were mainly directly proportionate to the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Eastern Europe and Afghanistan.
5. Reduction in production of Soviet nuclear and conventional weapons.
6. Russian goods were not finding any market in the world especially in the Middle East due to their economic embargo on the Russian goods.
7. Moscow was spending about 1 million roubles a day (1.7 million at official exchange rate in 1987).

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f. **Role of Gorbachev.** Gorbachev wanted economic stability in the country. His perceptions were clear than previous Soviet leaders. He wanted to make the life of a common man better with all possible facilities. This was only possible with the help of correct/optimum utilization of resources in hand. He decided to cut down the defence expenditure for the betterment of ever deteriorating Soviet economy.

g. **Diplomatic Pressure.** In order to improve relations with the US, China, Middle Eastern Islamic and Arabic countries etc, it was the basic requirement of the former USSR to withdrawal her troops from Afghanistan, without which it was never possible to continue cordial international relations with the countries abroad (It was only after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan that Gorbachev visited China in the last 30 years). Diplomatic pressure of the UNO could not be ignored, as a number of UN Resolutions were being passed with high number of votes in favour of Afghanistan.

**Conduct—Withdrawal of the Soviet Forces**

489. Details were as under:-

a. The first Soviet units to withdraw were from Jalalabad area. About 1000 Soviet troops moved out on mobile echelons to the former USSR.

b. The Mujahideens continued their raids, ambushes and attacks where possible on the retreating Russian forces
with a view to inflect maximum Russian casualties of men and material.

c. A lot of time scheduled disturbance took place in the exact determined frame work of the Soviet withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. For example the second phase of the Russian withdrawal was suspended (due to begin after 15 August 1988) due to the number of factors such as:

(1) Demanding of additional concessions from UN, USA, China and Pakistan etc.

(2) Establishing of security posts for safety of journay back to their home hand.

(3) Strengthening of Najib's government.

(4) Arranging of systematic arms and ammunition for talking along and for handing to the Kabul regime.

(5) Ensuring over precautionary measures to save the lines of the Russians.

(6) Inflicting maximum casualties with the help of latest Soviet deadly weapons on to the Mujahideens.

(7) Stopping the Soviets to provide their weapons to Kabul regime by the Mujahideens.

d. Perez d' Cuellar, Yuli Voronstov, Valadimir Petrovsky, Edward Shevardnadze, ex King Zahir Shah besides the leadership in Pakistan carried out a number of political parleys to resolve the issue to re-start the withdrawal of the Soviet forces and to end panic.
amongst the people in Afghanistan and abroad.

e. Most of the airports/air bases and Salang Highway remained under attack by the Mujahideens to stop arrival of Russian logistics support in Afghanistan during withdrawal period.

f. Afghan army personals defected from their units and joined the Mujahideens. The morale of the Afghan army remained very low due to uncertainty in military future strategy.

g. The Mujahideens started indiscriminate killing, looting of places and plundering during the Soviet withdrawal period specially in Kundar and Kunar provinces.

h. At 0810 hours (Soviet time) on 19 February 1989 all Soviet troops completed withdrawal and reached back to their home land.

Soviet Prisoners

490. After a successful withdrawal completion, the most important Russian strategy was to bring their prisoners alive from the hands of the Mujahideens. In persuance of this objective, the Russian team of 'Peoples Committee for Release of Soviet Prisoners of War" headed by Andropov came to Pakistan in the month of October 1989 with a view to demand the release of 313 Soviet prisoners from Afghan Mujahideen leaders. Two prisoners were only released by the Mujahideens as a gesture of good will on the special request of Pakistan. The Mujahideens wanted to get their colleagues released from the Najib's government in exchange of Russian prisoners. The Afghan Interim Government (AIG)
claimed that about 40,000 Mujahideens were in Kabul jails where
as Kabul government announced having only 4200 Mujahideens locked
up in various jails in Afghanistan.

491. In August 1991, one Soviet soldier was handed over to his
father by the Mujahideens. Some of the Soviets adopted Islam as
their religion and refused to go back. According to Iona Androp,
25 Pakistanis, 40 Afghans and 73 prisoners were in Afghan captive
but no confirmation was made by anyother sources.

492. Some of the details mentioned by the UN regarding prisoners
were as under:

   a. In the early years of the conflict, few prisoners were
taken by either side. There was, however, no evidence
of major detention centres for the Mujahideens. Continued press
reports of limited actual or planned prisoner exchanges suggest that Kabul and the Soviets
did hold some Mujahideens.

   b. A few Soviets defected to the Mujahideens; some even
fought alongside the Mujahideens.

   c. Soviet defectors often converted to Islam and changed
their names into Muslim names.

   d. Some defectors, in trouble before they left Soviet
lines, remained with the Mujahideens rather than facing
severe punishment, perhaps death, should they return.

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1. Muslim, Islamabad, 26 October 1989.

2. UN Special Report, No 135, by UN Department of State
e. Various resistance groups held Soviet prisoners, generally in secure base areas inside Afghanistan.

f. In 1985, no Soviet soldiers were released through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

493. For UN General Assembly Voting Pattern on resolution on Afghanistan, Evolution of texts on Geneva Accords on Afghanistan and Chronology of events leading to the signing of Geneva Accords, please see Tables A, B and C attached respectively.
### United Nations General Assembly

#### Voting Pattern

**On the Resolution of Afghanistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>For</th>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>111</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>23 November, 1983</td>
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<td>123</td>
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<td>4 November, 1988</td>
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Consensus on a joint resolution put up by Pakistan and the USSR.

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<td>7 November, 1990</td>
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1. *Keesings Contemporary Archives*; also see Riaz M. Khan, *op.cit*, p.40.

2. Emergency Special Session.

3. Regular Session.

4. Belize and Vanuatu could not participate in the vote, but later conveyed that they would have cast a positive vote.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>Consideration of withdrawal in terms of interrelationships with measures under other items.</td>
<td>Section I.  Interrelationships elaborated as coincidence of dates for implementation of various elements; a blank for timeframe for withdrawal; definition of component parts of the comprehensive settlement.</td>
<td>Instrument IV.  Discussed and finalized in 1986 on the basis of text of Section I, legal format and UN monitoring were the last issues to be resolved, leaving timeframe to be settled later.</td>
<td>Agreement on interrelationships for settlement of situation relating to Afghanistan (includes timeframe for withdrawal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noninterference</td>
<td>Consideration of &quot;measures&quot; to ensure principles of nonintervention and noninterference.</td>
<td>Section II.  Obligations drawn from 1981 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States. (At Geneva III, a draft bilateral agreement based on Section II was proposed to supplement the draft settlement.)</td>
<td>Instrument I.  Draft bilateral agreement on noninterference and nonintervention; Kabul's reservation on &quot;border formulation&quot; revived.</td>
<td>Bilateral Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Noninterference and Nonintervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Guarantees</td>
<td>Discussion on guarantees and identification of guarantors.</td>
<td>Section III.  Undertakings to respect provisions of Section II; Later scope was broadened by adding expression of support for the settlement.</td>
<td>Instrument II.  Draft declaration of guarantees, text finalized and agreed upon in 1985.</td>
<td>Declaration on International Guarantees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Return of Refugees</td>
<td>Discussion on conditions and modalities of voluntary return of refugees.</td>
<td>Section IV.  Conditions for voluntary return; modalities for UN High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) role, etc.</td>
<td>Instrument III.  Draft bilateral agreement on voluntary return of refugees. The issue of consultation with the refugees remained unresolved until it was dropped in late 1986.</td>
<td>Bilateral Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chronology of events leading to the signing of Geneva Accords

April 27, 1978: A military coup overthrows Mohammed Daud and installs an "Armed Forces Revolutionary Council". Nur Muhammad Taraki is named as head of state. Islamic resistance begins.

September 16, 1979: Mr. Taraki is overthrown and killed in a coup. He is replaced by Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin.

December 27, 1979: Soviet troops roll into Afghanistan, saying they were invited by the government to counter-provocation by the country’s external enemies. Mr. Amin is killed and replaced by former Premier Babrak Karmal.

January 14, 1980: The United Nations condemns the Soviet intervention and demands the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country. The world body renewes the plea every year after.

January 27, 1980: Several Afghan resistance groups unite to create the Islamic alliance.

April 23-28, 1982: The resistance launches a sweeping offensive near the garrison town of Khosht in Pakhtia province about 100 kilometers southeast of Kabul.

June 16-25, 1982: The first round of indirect talks under UN auspices is held in Geneva.

October 30, 1982: An explosion in the Salang tunnel north of Kabul kills more than 1,000 people, including 700 Soviet troops. Moscow calls it an accident while the resistance claims responsibility for the attack.

1983-84-85: Soviet and Afghan forces launch major offensives in the Panjshir valley in northeastern Afghanistan, Kunar in the east and Herat in the northwest.

May 4, 1986: Mr. Karmal is replaced by Najibullah as Afghan chief of state.

September 1986: The United States begins to supply the resistance with radio guided "Stinger" missiles, which inflict heavy losses among Soviet aircraft.

October 15-31, 1986: Moscow withdraws six regiments, or about 8,000 men, part of an initiative announced in July of that year by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

January 12, 1987: The seven main Mujahideen parties meeting in Peshawar form the high council of the Mujahideen alliance.

January 15, 1987: Mr. Najibullah proclaims a six month unilateral ceasefire, but the move is rejected by the resistance.

February 25-March 9, 1987: Progress is reported during the ninth round of Geneva talks, with the main stumbling block the timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

March-April 1987: First incursions by Afghan rebels on Soviet territory.

July 6-9, 1987: The Mujahideen carry out an offensive in Nangarhar province which they claim as their biggest success in years. A week later, a Soviet spokesman reports mounting casualties among his country's troops and says the resistance has the upper hand for the moment.

November 30, 1987: Mr. Najibullah proposes an international conference on Afghanistan as well as a 12 month timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

December 1987: Fierce fighting rages around Khost with an estimated 40,000 Soviet and Afghan soldiers involved in the biggest battle of the war to date.

February 8, 1988: Moscow and Kabul set May 15 as the date for the start of the Soviet pullout and offer a ten month withdrawal period—on condition that an accord is signed in Geneva.

March 2, 1988: A new round of UN sponsored talks, described as a "make or break effort" to resolve the conflict, opens in Geneva. Despite hopes for a quick settlement, the negotiations bog down over various issues, including formation of an interim government in Kabul.

March 17, 1988: Moscow says it will withdraw its troops even without an agreement in Geneva.


April 7, 1988: Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Najibullah meet at Tashkent, the capital of the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan, and say that the remaining obstacles to an accord have been surmounted.

April 8, 1988: UN mediator Diego Cordovez says an accord has been reached.

April 14, 1988: Geneva accords signed.
IMPACT ON THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN

CHAPTER 7
CHAPTER 7

Impact on the Security of Pakistan

General

494. The international political and security environment emerging after the monumental changes of recent years, represents a complex and uncertain situation. The forces which shaped the 20th century have run their course. Bipolarity has ended. The ideological conflict between capitalism and communism is over. The steady pace of decolonisation based on the right of self determination has swelled the membership of United Nations which is seeking to define a new role for itself to deal with the unprecedented challenges. The balance of power which existed for over 45 years after the Second World War gave the world a superficial strategy of alliances and packs. Super power rivalry could be exhibited in the form of third world conventional conflicts to promote regional instability and interests. Weaker countries perforce had to align themselves within alliances temporarily to suit their geo-strategic compulsions.

495. The end of the cold war and the dissolution of first the Soviet Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union itself, have left the United States as the sole super power in the world. Washington has sought to utilise this "Unipolar Movement" to advance its policy goals and to establish its pre-eminence in its relations with both former allies as well as adversaries. However, instead of the emergence of the "new world order", we are witnessing the dissolution of the old order. The emergence of the first signs of chaos in international relations was the
direct result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union which had an all pervasive threat to global stability. The conflicts prevalence in the former Yugoslavia particularly the genocide in Bosnia Herzegovina, as well as other areas such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Ossetia, Monravia, Russia and Tajikistan are old symptoms of the strained relations which remained bottle up for decades and even centuries by colonial and imperial domination.

496. In the past, South Asian security revolved around the nature of Indo-Pakistan and Sino-Indian conflict relations, the effects of super power intrusions into the South Asian region and the resulting conventional and nuclear arms races there. Concerns about these issues now appear out of date as changes in the global and regional political situations have affected both the nature of the threats in South Asia and the responses needed to manage them.

497. The transformation of world politics brought about by the end of the cold war produced sudden and profound effects in South Asia. Some of the basic internal and external security problems of the region remain the same, but they now operate under different global constraints. The policies of the great powers on issues such as Kashmir, nuclear proliferation and human rights violations have changed substantially since the turn of the decade, compelling the countries of South Asia to re-examine and readjust their traditional positions.

498. Pakistan played a pivotal role in ending of the cold war. Pakistan’s support for the Afghan resistance was indispensable
for preventing Soviet military success in Afghanistan, and even
degrad ing the morale of the Red Army. Pakistan's preeminent geo-
strategic position found favour with US interests and this
relationship helped her to offset though temporarily her security
concerns vis-a-vis India. However, after the Soviet withdrawal and
the backlash which Pakistan faced by the continued Afghan
struggle, two events propelled the erstwhile allies into two
divergent directions; in January 1990 the people of Kashmir, held
in bondage by India for 40 years rose in open revolt and
secondly, the Gulf War which not only polarised Pakistan from
within but alienated the US and the Arabs to an extent that all
economic and military assistance was terminated. Pakistan was
placed on the blacklist of potential terrorist states in order
to blackmail and coerce her to give up her support to the
Kashmiri and Sikh uprisings in India.

499. These stark realities forced Pakistan to re-examine a
strategic consensus between Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and the
Central Asian Republic. Thereby shifting the focus of her
security concerns to Central and West Asia and including the vast
untapped potential from the Central Asian Republics in the north.
Whereas, this may appeal to some as an ideal way out of the
general impasse created by the new world order, it remains to be
seen whether collective interests of these countries would best
be served by individual initiatives alone because of the various
constraints and pulls in this very unstable region.

Definitions

500. Threat. Threat is mainly based on the perception of a
situation. It can be interpreted in different ways depending upon the analyst of the situation. By an intervention threat we mean any conditional promise to use combat forces at a future time, whether or not this is made explicitly or implicitly, verbally or through some physical action like a troop alert. Verbal threats may be categorised according to two separate criteria based on their vividness or their precision.

501. An example of threat perception against Pakistan could be:
   a. Aggression by Afghanistan forces only (in this case Russia and India do not collaborate).
   b. Proxy war by the Soviet (in this situation offensive may be launched on two fronts by India and Afghanistan supported by Soviet forces).
   c. All out invasion by the Soviets (in this case India may also collaborate).

502. There is also a need for perspective in assessing threats. Threats are not assessed in a vacuum but in the context of a particular situation, national or international. This implies that in assessing threats, an adversary’s recent action together with his long term objectives, his expressed statements coupled with his actual policies (past and present) must be taken into consideration. Therefore, when various threats to Pakistan’s security are assessed, the relativity of both capabilities and


503. Perception. Literally speaking, perception
the dependency of intentions must be kept in mind. implies the confining of sensations into a recognition of an object perception which is one of the first steps in cognitive processing and decision making. An individual usually perceives a problem or situation and then goes about appraising the situation, collecting and organizing more information, forming decision rules, formulating a set of alternatives, and deciding on one.

504. De Rivera (1968) citing the transnational school of perception defines perception as a choice or guess about the real nature of the stimulus. Perception has many dimensions, among which are cognitive, affective and action oriented components, and is usually viewed as an initial step in cognitive processing.

505. Security. Dr Huge Mcmillen, in his 'Concluding Thoughts' on essays on International Security, notes, "there was a common belief (amongst the authors) that the security should be seen in its broader dimensions, that is beyond the rather narrow military only focus. Socio-economic and cultural aspect, problems of development/modernisation and national integration and issues of interdependence/modernisation were deemed important considerations as well. In other words, besides strictly military security threats and perceptions, it is necessary to identify -

3. Pakistan's Threat Perception, World Islamic Times, 8 January 1984, p.29
other areas of insecurity and vulnerability".

Geo-Political Compulsions and Threat Perception

506. An interesting development propagated by a section of American scholars is the idea that Pakistan now has the option of moving strategically into a new emerging North-West Asian region comprising Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). This scheme aims at delinking Pakistan from South Asia and Iran at the regional strategic level. Since Pakistan's security parameters in terms of threat perception are defined primarily by South Asia, this concept will not bring about a viable security environment since it is geopolitically isolated from ground realities.

507. The new global realities have led to a new politico-military Indo US relationship with increasing military cooperation between the two states. At the same time, the growing divide between Pakistani and American perceptions and the escalating nuclear issue makes the Pak-US alliance untenable, Pakistan needs to seek a regional alternative, as such while the threat perception remains focused on India, in term of security options, Pakistan's parameters are oriented towards West Asia primarily Iran. Given the US interests in the Gulf and Iranian fear there is a need for Iran to seek alternative regional allies. The axis of Iran-Pakistan-China is a logical and realistic axis to follow since China has shown interest in widening her regional interaction in view of the changing global scenario. Expansion of this axis towards Afghanistan and CARs will help in a unified stand to reduce the growing influence of
the US and the European Economic Community (EEC) in this region. Extension of rail/road communications will bring about a unified economic system which on becoming inter-dependent will hold the viability on political fronts as well.

508. The political-strategic climate of the region remains in a state of profound flux. In the very recent past some developments of great significance have taken place which have altered the regional balance. These are:-

a. The Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan and then withdrawal.

b. Islamic Revolution in Iran.

c. Iran - Iraq War which lasted eight years.

d. Collapse of the USSR and its fallout on the regional politico-strategic environment.

Military Geography

509. Located at the confluence of Middle East, West and South Asia, Pakistan’s borders rest upon Iran, Afghanistan, China and India. A common border of 3403 kilometres with hostile India nearly three times the size and nine times in population stretches in the east, with unnatural boundaries and no physical features for defence. All major rivers emanate from Indian Held Kashmir and her ability to regulate the flow of water endows her with a distinct advantage.

510. Geographically, the whole of Pakistan can be described as a narrow strip of land astride the Indus River. This has its own peculiar implications of lack of depth and difficulty in defence. Major core areas, major industries and main arteries of
communication lie perilously close to the border. With a vulnerable coastline open to the Indian Navy, we are prone to be blockaded due to single port of Karachi.

Domestic Environment

511. The internal scene in Pakistan has been gradually deteriorating. The situation has been further compounded by political instability, price escalation, sectarian polarisation, ethnic rivalries, breakdown of law and order, growing corruption, unplanned population growth, illiteracy and a fast deteriorating economic situation. The frequent turn over of governments and administrations has compounded the problem with dangerous consequences for the countries internal peace, stability and survival.

Nature and Magnitude of Threat

512. Eastern Borders

a. A modernised Indian war machine, a well developed indigenous defence production capacity and an aggressive diplomatic posture continue to pose a serious threat to Pakistan’s security.

b. India is deliberately attempting to internationally isolate and internally destabilise Pakistan. Relatively improved Indo-US relations, at a time when Pakistan-US relations are under visible strain, may facilitate realisation of her designs.

c. Her strong logistic base and well established indigenous defence industry will enable her to wage a war beyond Pakistan’s logistic stamina. The Indian Army
has the ability to make sizeable territorial gains in our sensitive areas. The Indian Navy may be employed to enforce a naval blockade, carry out disruption of sea lines of communication and destruction of our limited port facilities. Similarly, the Indian Air Force has a distinct qualitative and quantitative edge.

d. The Indians are engaged in developing chemical and biological weapons and possess nuclear weapons and their delivery systems including surface to surface long and intermediate range rockets. Therefore Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) threat is real and potent.

e. India’s internal problems, economic difficulties, scarcity of spares and international environment restrict her ability to use the military instrument against Pakistan in the short term. However, should India decide to use force for the furtherance of her designs, the Indian military aim would be to capture sensitive strategic objectives, choke sea lines of communication and inflict maximum possible damage to the military and economic power potential of Pakistan with the aim of breaking her political will to sustain war.

f. By virtue of its aversion to Pakistan, Israel possibly in collusion with Indian, may attempt to destroy our sensitive nuclear installations.
513. **Indian Weaknesses**

a. **Formulation of Foreign Policy.** Unlike the past where there was a certain consistency and predictability in her policies, today Indian policy lacks the style, sophistication and substance of the Jawaharlal era. This could lead to confrontational situations, involvement in Sri Lanka, Maldives, insurgency in Kashmir, Punjab and Assam and the emergency during 1 Exercise Brass Tacks are cases in point.

b. **Decision Making.** India's present style of adhoc decision making does not lend itself to the formulation of a coherent national security policy in all its dimensions. Though in the process of modernizing its armed forces but it has not been able to evolve a matching modernised decision making apparatus, at the highest level.

c. **Higher Defence Organization.** There are three major areas of weakness; excessive bureaucratic control, lack of professional coordination and outmoded financial management. There is excessive polarization between these three elements and the three services.

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d. **Sense of Beleagueredness.** There is in India a pervasive concern for its integrity as a nation state and a clear sense of beleagueredness, which may lie at the roots of its military build up.

e. **Re-learning History.** There is another lesson that Indian policy makers have to learn, military muscle does not guarantee political influence. Economic giants can be militarily weak, and military strength may not be able to obscure economic weakness. Countries can exert political influence (with reference to Pakistan) even when they have neither military nor economic strength.

f. **Sensitivity to Loss of Territory.** While India has great strategic depth, its politically sensitive areas of Kashmir and East Punjab lie close to our borders. This makes the Indian's sensitive to loss of territory in this region.

514. **Western Borders.** Given Pakistan's vital role in Afghan 'jehad', Afghanistan will not pose any military threat or engage in any subversive activities. She may in fact extend strong moral, political and limited material support to Pakistan. Similarly Iran will provide Pakistan with the relief zone and limited material support in the event of war with India.

515. **Subversion.** The highly restive, unstable and tense internal climate and the growing frustration and estrangement of the masses with national institutions as well as rapid erosion of mutual tolerance, sense of accommodation and the urge for unity and its value is gradually being eroded. In such an environment, the threat of subversion is real and may be applied independently or in conjunction with the military instrument by India.

**Options and Possibilities**

516. At the policy planning level, Pakistan should not permit the regional balance of power to be so disturbed that we might be left at the mercy of our adversary – India. Our resource constraints should also dictate to us a continuous reappraisal of our military system to gradually move towards a less expensive system with larger national participation in the defence effort.

517. If despite our best efforts a serious military balance develops in the region, it is bound to affect the sovereignty of Pakistan. Under such a situation we will need to seek collective security in coalition with other like minded states. A common defence understanding with Iran and Turkey may be difficult under the present circumstances but cooperation in military fields must continue. A future stable government in Afghanistan is a necessity for opening up vistas of opportunities with Central Asia. Friendship with China must also continue which obviously will require greater statesmanship by our foreign office in view of the Sinco-Indian rapprochement.

518. Efforts must continue to reduce the threat level by normalisation of relations with India, without permitting her a
stature which could ultimately pose a threat to our integrity. For that, upgradation of deterrence is needed. Deterrence requires capability which is projected by the size and strength of the military instrument and credibility which is a derivative of the political will of the nation and its leadership to use that instrument if its vital interests are threatened. The enemy must know the issues on which we will be prepared to go to war, and he must also be convinced that in case of war we will be able to cause him harm to a level unacceptable to him.

519. At the employment of military strategy, Pakistan does not possess the relative strength superiority necessary for adoption of a strategically offensive posture against India. On the other hand, remaining on the strategically and tactically on defensive will be disastrous due to lack of strategic depth. The same lack of depth precludes a protracted struggle. A combination of offensive and defensive, with the offensive strong enough to create strategic effects coupled with sizeable reserves would be the best option.

520. The introduction of nuclear deterrence in the sub-continent is likely to act as an effective mutual deterrent for both India and Pakistan, to prevent war. However, if it occurs both sides would try to achieve their aims through conventional means. This will keep the conflict limited with either side trying not to cross the adversary's threshold by being pushed into a desperate situation. Under such environment isolated conflicts like Siachen or perpetuation and support of insurgency in Kashmir could be a preferred military strategy. Deterrence and indirect
approach appear to be a useful combination for Pakistan under foreseeable future.

521. The expansion of ECO with the six Central Asian States should be the prime focus of our politico-economic thrust to develop into a viable trade zone, before any development in defence can take place. Eventually Pakistan's role as North-South transit link with Central Asia could well be extended to an East-West axis once political relationships normalise in South West Asia.

522. Security of a nation can never be fully assured without economic prosperity. In the ultimate analysis, economic dependence neutralises political, diplomatic and military assets of a nation. Unless we put our economic house in order the security of Pakistan will never be assured.

523. Equally vital is the development of our human resources. A nation cannot aspire to greatness without a disciplined and an enlightened population. Our social indicators are shamefully low and contribute little to the contribution and prosperity of our nation.

524. Finally nations cannot reach their full potential without a democratic system of government. Despite its many imperfections, it is irreplaceable.

Operating Realities in South Asia

525. Details could be summerized as under:-

a. With the demise of bipolarity, South Asia has been largely freed from the dynamics of super power strategic rivalry. Having been spared the tensions generated
by the cold war the sense of security which derived from pre cold-war alliances has been eroded. The certainties of bipolarity have disappeared.

b. South Asia is potentially the most volatile region in the world. Fundamental disputes which have remained unresolved for decades are beginning to acquire an ominous dimension. A brittle security environment is being eroded by serious imbalances in defensive capabilities. The enforcement of the Pressler Amendment continues to feed this imbalance.

c. India the militarily stronger power has proven nuclear capability. Its nuclear explosion in 1974 should leave no doubt on this score.

d. One of the regional powers has unrealistic global ambitions generating grave hegemonistic tendencies in the region. This aspiration has created a serious distortion in the regional security environment. Since its creation India has pursued a conscious policy of expansionism and hegemony in South Asia.

e. The security environment is further aggravated by the fact that India, the militarily stronger power in South Asia, is also in serious breach of international law and the charter of the UN. Its forcible occupation of Jammu and Kashmir has imparted an ominous dimension to an already fragile environment.

f. The uncertainty prevailing in Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics further compounds the already tense and
murky environment which clouds this region.

g. The region apart from the most populous is amongst the poorest in the world. The average per capita income is less than US $ 400 which speaks of conditions of unacceptable poverty and deprivation.

National and Military Strategies

526. General. Having analysed the global and regional environments prevailing in the aftermath of the collapse of Soviet Union and its withdrawal from Afghanistan and the security implications and threat response as suggested for Pakistan we can now look at the need to redefine our National and Military Strategies where applicable.

Defence Policy Guidelines

527. The threat to Pakistan’s security essentially stems from the Indian ambitions of expansionism and hegemony which run counter to Pakistan’s fundamental requirement of preserving its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Indian design to perpetuate its illegal control over the better part of Jammu and Kashmir is a major obstacle to any effort at normalising relations with her. Pakistan, in its genuine pursuit for peace, cannot compromise on its vital national interests.

528. Safeguarding its security and territorial integrity, Pakistan needs to pursue a defence policy which is in conformity with the prevailing strategic environment and measures up to the requirements of its national aims and aspirations. For its success, the role of other instruments of state policy ie, the economic, diplomatic and psycho-social elements, should be
integrated, mobilized and concerted so as to ensure full participation and contribution by the entire nation in the defence of the country.

529. Basic Defence Policy Assumptions. The defence policy is based upon the following assumptions:

   a. Pakistan's security environment is not likely to change in the next few years. Indain threat is likely to persist and Kashmir is expected to remain the main flash point between the two countries. Iran is likely to provide us the relief zone in case of a blockade at sea.

   b. Adequate warning of the impending war will be available, however, for a sneak raid on sensitive installations, warning may be almost negligible.

   c. Existing force levels and military systems are not likely to materially change in the immediate time frame.

   d. Pakistan will have to defend itself on its own although moral, political and limited material support from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and China may be forthcoming.

   e. Besides military targets, installations at Karachi, industrial complexes, road/rail/aerial communications between Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar may be targeted by Indian Air Force and missiles.

   f. Small as well as large scale operations in Azad Kashmir due to viable nature of line of control and ongoing freedom struggle are expected.
g. Pakistan's economy is likely to follow the existing growth rate in the next five years time frame and defence allocation will be maintained at existing ratio between national and defence budget. This implies that the Armed Forces should be ready to go to war with existing imbalances.

h. In the hour of crisis it is expected that the nation would rise above petty differences to put up a solid front.

530. Duration and Nature of War

a. War may be preceded by a pre-hostilities period characterised by rapid deterioration of political climate and quarantine at sea. Enemy is likely to resort/sustain subversion and sabotage both during pre-hostilities period as well as during war.

b. In any future war both India and Pakistan will strive to achieve their politico-military objectives in the shortest possible time. However, India with her capacity can fight a prolonged war and may extend the war beyond Pakistan's logistic stamina.

c. With perceived development of nuclear capability, both sides may deliberately avoid to evoke a desperate response, therefore conventional war under the veiled threat of use of nuclear weapons is expected.

d. Pakistan may endeavour to avoid war and prefer a low intensity insurgency in Kashmir instead. However if Indian aggression is imminent, we may consider
pre-emption for early gains, and be prepared to secure the liberation of Kashmir at an opportune time.

e. While keeping in view the adversary's resource potential and numerical superiority, we must be mindful of our limited geographic depth and the people's sensitivity to loss of territory.

f. While maintaining an overall strategic defensive posture and tactically offensive, while defending our vital core areas, be ready to undertake an offensive in the form of a pre-emption, riposte or a counter offensive to terminate the war on a favourable note.

g. When directed, covert measures against the aggressor may be undertaken to counter sabotage and subversion operations to wrest initiative and to systematically erode and undermine his offensive potential.

531. **Diplomatic Manoeuvre.** Should include the following:

a. Pakistan's primary foreign policy goal should be to restore relations with the US; a mature relationship based upon post cold war realities which override the current difficulties created by Pressler Amendment.

b. Maintain and further consolidate existing friendly relations with China with the thrust on political support for Kashmir and on rapid transfer of military technology.

c. Work towards a practical politico-military cooperation with Iran and undertake projects commensurate with the relief zone envisaged during blockade.
d. Expand the economic bindings of the ECO by creating the atmosphere and infrastructure for rapid economic growth of the CARs, Afghanistan and Turkey. Include the potential of the Soviets for the future.

e. Strive to maintain balance of power in South Asia through concerted efforts and bilateral ties with countries in South/West Asia.

f. Remove the mistrust and commitment of Pakistan for the Ummah, by striving to prove its moderate religious nature and leanings towards the Gulf countries and CARs in particular.

g. While countering Indian efforts to attain political, military and psychological ascendancy, work for normalisation of relations on the the basis of equality without compromising on principle and national interests including Kahsmir.

**Military System and Capability**

532. The present military system based on standing armed forces, backed by second line forces and reserves, is time tested and has served our interest well, shall therefore continue. However in the face of limited resource potential, there is a need for a reappraisal for eventual transformation to a military system whereby maintenance expenditure of the armed forces is reduced without adversely affecting their efficiency.

533. The overall policy is the balanced development of the three services ie, Army, Navy and Airforce in keeping with their assigned role. In the short term perspective these services
should try to address the existing imbalance in the critical areas and assist in establishing a sound base for indigenous production. In the long term perspective following guidelines are given:

a. Army should improve the offensive capability of its strike formations and air defence capability. Tactical mobility of infantry formations in strike role to be enhanced.

b. Pakistan Navy should continue to develop capability and flexibility to ensure defence of maritime assets and protection of our vital sea lines of communications.

c. Pakistan Air Force must continue to effectively enhance its air defence and deep strike capability in keeping with strategic environment. PAF must maintain its edge in ADGE and electronic spectrum.

d. Accepting the value and power of technology in modern concept of warfare within resource constraints, selective modernisation and induction of state of the art weapon systems must receive emphasis according to a prioritised Joint Services strategy.

534. It can be concluded that the stark realities in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the emerging geopolitical contours, coloured by the dominance of the world under the new world order; have yet to be crystalized. The emerging new centres of power in Europe, Japan and China have yet to clash with the uni-polar doctrine being preferred by the sole super power. The world balance of power being disturbed is seeking to
redress this imbalance not by military means, but by economic coercion and exploitation. The fallout in South and Central Asia in the face of the emerging Central Asian Republics, instability in Iran and Afghanistan and the perpetual threat of war between Pakistan and India make it one of the most explosive regions in the world.

535. Commonality of interests emanate from a consensus when there is a common threat perception. Despite the fact that the rapidly changing geo-strategic environment is forcing Pakistan to seek strategic consensus between Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics; no doubt how attractive such a design may be, ground realities do not permit such a consensus emerging in the near time frame. It remains to be seen whether collective interests of these countries would best be served by individual initiatives since the common factor in all cases does not remain ‘India’ any more.

536. At the policy planning level, we should not permit the regional balance of power to be so disturbed in favour of our adversary India. Efforts must continue for the upgradation of our deterrence both in conventional and nuclear capability while adopting a combination of offensive and defensive postures at the military strategy level. The expansion of the ECO with the CARs should primarily focus on the politico – economic thrust before any meaningful defence cooperation pact can be realistically contemplated. Security of Pakistan can never be fully assured without economic prosperity and the development of our human resources so that the population can contribute rather than
degrade our potential for development. Despite its many imperfections, nations can never reach their full potential without a democratic system of government. Pakistan therefore, must persist in maturing itself into a formidable democratic, political social order which can absorb the many setbacks in its march towards a brighter future.

**Negative Repercussions of Afghan Crisis**

537. Following were some of the negative repercussions of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan:

1. **Refugee Problem**
   
   (1) From 400,000 in November 1979, the number of refugees in Pakistan rose to over one million by July 1980.

   (2) About one million were added in the next eighteen months raising the total to nearly 3 million by early 1982.

2. **Threat From Western Border**

   Presence of about 10,000 Red Army on the western border was a direct, wide ranging and immediate threat from a side which was buffer zone in the past. Opportunities for hot pursuit, limited intrusions, border violations and subversive activities had certainly opened up.

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2. Pakistan recorded more than 100 border violations from December 1979 to April 1982. See *International Herald Tribune*, 14 April 1982.
Chances of KGB and GRD working against Pakistan could never be ruled out. It was visualized that these would make endeavours to destabilise General Zia’s Government. Presence of Red Army despite any assurance of not attacking Pakistan, was certainly an extremely uncomfortable situation.

Positive Repercussions of Afghan Refugees

538. Following were some of the positive repercussions of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan:

a. Renewed Pak - US Relations

(1) Pakistan’s security was ensured by the US.

(2) The US arms embargo against Pakistan was lifted.


(4) Pakistan’s $ 5.1 billion debt was re-scheduled.

(5) No fingers were raised on any violation of human rights in Pakistan, which in the past were common routine.

(6) Provision of latest military equipment such as F-16.

(7) Economic and military aid to Pakistan.

b. Chinese and Saudi Support. Chinese, being adversaries of former USSR, supported Pakistan whole heartedly on one side and Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries supported the cause of Afghan Mujahideens on the other hand. This combination played a vital role in the security of Pakistan.
Emerging Security Scenarios in Afghanistan

539. Despite formation of Mujahideen government in Kabul, peace still eludes in Afghanistan. The Afghan masses have lost confidence in the present Afghan leadership and are looking for alternative leaders who could pull out the country from the present quagmire. Pakistan in cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Iran, worked for the conclusion of Peshawar and Islamabad Accords for establishment of a broad based government in Kabul. However, these accords failed to restore peace in Afghanistan. The rapidly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan warrants a critical appraisal so as to identify the emerging trends particularly viz-a-viz their impact on Pakistan.

Scenario - 1

540. Broad Based Government. While ensuring integrity of Afghanistan, Mujahideen leaders continue the process initiated by them for formation of broad based government in Kabul, catering for due representation to all factions and groups including Ahmed Shah Masood, General Dostam and General Ismail.

541. Prospects of emergence of this scenario is difficult due to:-

a. Afghan Mujahideen parties have not honoured earlier accords, which has earned them a bad name. Their future stance is equally unpredictable.

b. Due to their deep rooted differences/ rivalries, unity at this stage appears to be difficult, if not impossible.
Scenario - II

542. Government of Neutral Personalities Supported by Zahir Shah. A government by neutral personalities from all Muhahideen parties supported by ex-King Zahir Shah as well as Jumbish-e-Milli and some former Watan Party activities for interim period of one year and after conducting elections, transfer power to popular government. The implications of this scenario are:

a. Hardline radicals like Hikmatyar, Sayyaf and Khalis may decide to stay outside the power and oppose the government.

b. Ahmed Shah Masood or General Dostam may create hurdles for the transition government, if the personalities selected are not to their liking.

c. Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan may encourage the radicals for resistance against the new regime, thus involve Pakistan into foray.

Scenario - III

543. Coalition Government of Moderates. A coalition government is formed by moderate like Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masood, Ismail and Dostam alongwith second stronger Pashtun leaders while hardliner Hikmatyar and like minded are kept outside the corridor of power. It has bleak prospects due to:

a. Hikmatyar, Sayyaf, Yunus Khalis and Mazari would be isolated, hence will try to under mine the strength and unity of the coalition government.

b. Instablity will prevail in the region and access to Central Asian state may not materialize.
Scenario - IV

544. **Coalition Government of Conservatives Along with Hikmatyar, Ismail and Doshtam.** A coalition government is formed in Afghanistan, led by conservatives like Hikmatyar, Khalis, Sayyaf, Pir Gaillani, Nabi Muhammadi and Mazari ultimately joined by General Dostam and General Ismail. Its implications are:

   a. Partial peace will prevail in Afghanistan. However Durand line and the high ways in the West and adjoining Pakistan will remain relatively safe.

   b. Will open avenues for Pakistan to reach Central Asia through Herat/Torghundi and Hairatan.

   c. Limited economic support to Afghanistan for repatriation, reconstruction and rehabilitation will be available as USA and the West may not support the government.

   f. Neglect of Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood would alienate them, which may plunge Afghanistan into civil war in north/north east of Afghanistan and cause another exodus of population for safe places in Pakistan. The government's writ may not prevail in North Eastern portion of Afghanistan.

545. **Accelerating Peace Process.** Pakistan should take the following steps to accelerate the peace process and to ensure early return of the refugees in safety and honour:

   a. Work strenuously to forge a government in Afghanistan comprising those Mujahideen leaders and good Muslims
from Kabul regime who do not have any ambitions for a role in a future Afghanistan and who can quietly disappear from the scene once elections are over. This will enhance the chances for progress in the intra-Afghan dialogue (The real stumbling block to this arrangement could be Gulbadin Hikmatyar who should be persuaded by Pakistan to play a positive role in the Afghan end game).

b. Until Mujahideen get united, there will be no peace in Afghanistan, no stability and no return of five million refugees to their homeland. Pakistan in close coordination with Iran, must put all its weight behind a diplomatic and conciliatory process to unite various Afghan groups and drive home to them that this may be the last chance to secure an orderly transition in Kabul.

c. The future of Afghanistan will depend on and will be shaped largely by the intra-Afghan dialogue and inter-Afghan harmony. A grand national reconciliation is the only way to insulate the country against foreign interference and ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, Mujahideen have to be persuaded to agree to negotiate with Najib's representative on the condition that he be a "good Muslim."

d. The proposal to bring ex-King Zahir Shah to head the Afghan government may be seriously examined by the Mujahideen groups. His being pro-India will not harm our interests in a democratic Afghanistan.

e. The Prisoners of War (POWs) issue (both Soviet and Mujahideen) should be amicably resolved as a goodwill gesture to accelerate the peace process. Pakistan should use its good offices in this regard and cash on the opportunity to cultivate good relations with the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

f. Elections should be held in accordance with the tribal traditions of the Afghan society.

g. Following steps should be taken for the return and rehabilitation of the refugees:-

(1) The war has caused widespread destruction to dwellings, public buildings, roads, irrigation system and waterways. The rehabilitation programme must attach considerable importance to shelter and related facilities such as water, electricity, communications and public facilities for the returning refugees and displaced population.

(2) Funds should be generated by international community for development of agriculture and industry.

(3) Afghanistan should emerge with a democratically elected government having respect for human rights to be able to attract greater foreign assistance.

(4) Outside assistance should promote self reliance
instead of dependency.

(5) Afghan society at this stage is not only fragmented but also very fragile and sensitive. Traditional, tribal and ethnic values of the past which have been the main structure for socio-economic matters should be restored for reconstruction process.

546. **Fostering Existing Goodwill.** Pakistan has every reason to expect a friendly government in Kabul after having rendered unparalleled sacrifices for the Afghan people. It would also expect its western borders to be no longer hostile as in the past so that it does not face the scenario of a two-front war. Pakistan has by now, enough goodwill in Afghanistan even on the rival side because almost every Afghan family has sent its members to take refuge here. Dr Najibullah's brother Siddiqullah sought refuge in Pakistan, and so have the fleeing Khalqis and Parchamis. Pakistan, however, must tread carefully so that it is not seen to be overbearing while dealing with the Afghans. In a future Afghanistan, political parties would largely be viewed in the context of their pro and anti-Pakistan policies. Islamabad's economic interests too are now more closely linked with Afghanistan and its consume goods have almost a monopoly in Afghan markets. A situation where pro-Pakistan parties may lose elections in Afghanistan, as is the case in Bangladesh where the pro-Indian Awami League is unable to win, must not be allowed to develop. We must, therefore foster the prevailing goodwill for Pakistan among the Afghans.
Introduction

547. For centuries, Afghanistan has been a vital strategic area, the fulcrum upon which power in Asia has revolved. It connects Central Asia to the Indian subcontinent and China, which in geostrategic terms makes it susceptible to the Russian sphere of influence. The Russian interest in Afghanistan dates back to the Czarist days. The British ruling the subcontinent checked the Russian expansionist designs southwards by trying to gain control of Afghanistan. Having failed to annex Afghanistan despite three wars, the British tried to establish it as a buffer state between Russia and the subcontinent. A neutral Afghanistan thus became an important factor in global affairs. After the withdrawal of British from the subcontinent, the Soviets started making political and economic ingress into Afghanistan and gradually began to consolidate their hold over the country resulting in the 1979 invasion.

548. Many observers were of the opinion that given the Soviets overwhelming military might, they would be able to control the country and to overcome what were described as loaclised pockets of resistance. The Afghan Mujahideens armed with religious fervour, patriotism, undaunted courage and extreme aversion for communism, however, believed all speculations of military analysts about the outcome of Afghan war. Determined to fight to the last man, the Mujahideens plunged the invaders into deeper and
deeper quagmire with every passing day and finally forced them to withdraw in shame in 1989.

549. The Afghan tragedy, however, continues unabated. Fighting between the new Afghan regime troops and some of the Mujahideen groups continues in various parts of Afghanistan even today, although with the passage of time its tempo has been somewhat reduced. Millions of refugees continue to languish in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, and regrettably, all efforts for a political solution to the civil war have not produced any tangible results so far. Pakistan cannot afford to make any mistakes and has to take care that where as no opportunity for a just and peaceful solution of Afghan problem is lost, policy makers take due cognizance of our distant national interests and that the Mujahideens are not left at this critical juncture at the mercy of great powers.

Pakistan's Role in the Conflict

550. Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan is prompted by certain internal and geo-strategic considerations. Russia and India have played upon the "Pakhtoonistan issue" for over three decades. Pakistan, the so-called usurper of Pakhtoon rights had become the sanctuary of the Pakhtoon's rights and honour. With people bitterly opposed to communism, Pakistan saw an opportunity to wean away the Pashto-speaking people on the Pak-Afghan border from the demand of Pakhtoonistan. Pakistan was always looking for a friendly Afghanistan in view of her precarious geographic

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1. Kuldip Nayyar, op.cit.
configuration. An opportunity came and Pakistani leaders were quick to grasp it. What motivated Pakistan to stand up to a super power can be traced back to the history of Islamist movement in Afghanistan in 1958. The movement was launched by religious intellectuals who were, totally against Pakhtoon nationalism and they opposed those who wanted to establish an independent Pakhtoonistan. They also protested against foreign influence in Afghanistan both from the Soviet Union and the West and were also bitterly opposed to communism.

551. Some of the active leaders of the movement had at some stage been in Pakistan or associated with parties. Many had received formal education in Pakistan. Their active support to Pakistan can be traced back to 1973-74, when Afghanistan raised the bogey of Pakhtoonistan on ethnic grounds. Ever since, these organisations have been receiving covert support from Pakistan. Fundamentalist opposition led by Islami Party had grown steadily across the border in Pakistan where it was receiving considerable financial support. Armed resistance groups were being launched by fundamentalists from Pakistan since 1973.

552. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan had always followed an uneven course in the past, but Sardar Daud realised the importance of good relations with Pakistan. He visited Pakistan in 1976 and said, "Both countries need peace and tranquility for their economic development". He later met General Zia-Ul-Haq and the two leaders established excellent rapport.

1. Abdul Samad Ghaus, op.cit.
Events moved fast and an agreement between the two countries was almost reached. Daud made an unexpectedly surprising statement about Pakhtoonistan issue when he said, "The future of the Pakhtoon and Baluch people was entirely their own. Afghanistan abided by their decision". He further added, "There were countries who viewed with displeasure the thaw that has begun in 1 Pak-Afghan relations". Daoud had to pay for this with his life.

553. The Soviets had invested heavily in Afghanistan, but so had Pakistan waited patiently for a break through. Removal of Daoud was a setback but Pakistan was not ready to give in so easily. Pakistan provided active support to the Mujahideens and accepted the refugees on humanitarian grounds. The long term objectives were clear - to fight the communists, establish Islamic order and win over a friendly Afghanistan for the future.

554. The support provided to the Mujahideens was futuristic and in line with our geo-strategic compulsions to improve Pakistan’s security needs. Even at the risk of her own security and integrity, Pakistan extended moral, material and political support to the Mujahideens. In fact Pakistan played a pivotal role throughout the Afghan crisis. Had Pakistan not provided assistance in harbouring the refugees, training the Mujahideens and acting as a conduit for weapons and other warlike material, the outcome of Afghan struggle would have been totally different.

Military Dimensions - Afghan Crisis

555. Some of the aspects of Pakistan’s role (in military dimensions) have been summerized as follows :-

1. Ibid.
a. Pakistan remained directly and most intimately involved in the military dimension of the Afghan conflict under the leadership of dedicated and professional military commander General Zia - ul - Haq, who explained Afghan "jehad" not only to the Afghan leaders but to the world leaders in a most befitting manner.

b. Refugee tented villages near the border area were the Mujahideens bases for launching attacks in side Afghanistan.

c. Training on latest weapons and ammunition were arranged in various training camps in the country.

d. Role of ISI in the planning of major offensives by the Mujahideens cannot be denied though there is no evidence of Pakistan's physical/direct involvement in the Afghan offensive.

e. Weapons and ammunition meant for the Mujahideens was kept in areas like Ojhri camp in Rawalpindi or ammunition store house in Chitral etc at the cost of security risk in the civil populated areas for sole objective of forcing the Soviets to withdraw her troops from Afghanistan by the Mujahideens.

f. Pakistan suffered in the form of rocket attacks, bomb blasts, the Ojhri camp disaster, the frequent air raids, Chitral disaster, the artillery bombardments and missile attacks besides heavy economic burden, in support of Afghan "Jehad".
Pakistan's Existing Afghan Policy

556. Initial Policy. Eversince the Afghan crisis began in 1979, efforts to solve it politically remained stalled for a long time. This reflected the desire of successive governments both in Kabul and Islamabad to win or at least create an impression to that effect. For all practical purposes, an agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan had no significance unless approved by the Soviet Union and USA. Pakistan could at best delay an agreement.

557. US Influence on Pakistan. The Zia government delayed the Geneva Accords for five years. The US pressure coupled with the desire of the Junejo government to achieve something in international relations forced the then President to stop opposing the Accords. A perusal of the events following the Accords brings home the fact that nothing was changed. All the initiatives on Afghan issue either came from United States or the Soviet Union. Pakistan being an important party to the conflict never put forward something that could be called the Pakistan initiative. The progress made in achieving a political settlement in Afghanistan owes itself to the active diplomacy of the two super powers, especially the Soviet Union.

558. Policy at Geneva Proximity Talks. At the time of signing the Geneva Accords, the Soviets insisted on the interim government arrangements for repatriation of the refugees before the

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timetable for withdrawal could be mutually decided. However, USA and Pakistan demanded the Soviet withdrawal first, which in retrospect, turned out to be a major diplomatic error. The crucial factor which our policy makers failed to perceive was the diminishing resistance struggle and increasing PDPA sphere of influence. Having withdrawn from Afghanistan, the Soviets had no interest in solving Pakistan’s refugee problems. Mr Gorbachev while addressing a 40 nations conference on disarmament in 1989 said it very clearly, "It is none of our business to decide the nature and character of the (Afghan) coalition government." The onus thus rested entirely on Pakistan and the Mujahideen leaders.

USA

559. The 1979 Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan gave the Soviets capabilities to threaten US interests in the Gulf region, which they did not have had earlier. It put large portions of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean directly in the range of Soviet tactical airpower. This enhanced the importance of Pakistan’s territory as an adjoining area of Persian Gulf region whose status, according to a US official, was elevated after the Soviet intervention to that of Western Europe and the Far East, where Washington was prepared to risk a conflict to contain Soviet influence.

Soviet military involvement not only marked an end to

2. Tahir Kheli, *op.cit*, p.98.
Afghanistan's buffer status for few years but also extended the Soviet power to within 350 miles of the West's "Jugular Vein" - the Persian Gulf oil route. The United States and its allies, especially the Western Europe and Japan, were heavily dependent for their oil needs on this region. 33 percent of the oil imported by the United States came through this route. Corresponding figures for Western Europe and Japan were 66 percent and 75 percent, respectively.

560. Both the United States and Pakistan viewed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan with concern. Like US officials, President Zia regarded it as an act of blatant, open and naked aggression. The United States perceived the Soviet involvement as a dangerous challenge to its interests.

561. On the Afghanistan issue Carter expressed that he could be tough. On December 27, 1979, he used the "hot line" to convey his opposition to the Soviet action in Afghanistan and warned of serious consequences in the US-Soviet relations. The general


feelings in the United States also suggested that the American inaction on Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan could send a dangerous signal to Moscow, encouraging it to go for more ventures. Therefore, the United States was left with no choice but to take "several steps" to redress the situation. It wanted to make the Soviets to pay a heavy price for their action. Some of the important US steps against the USSR were:-

a. Stoppage of delivery of 17 million metric tons of US grain ordered by the former USSR.

b. Placeing of restrictions on future credits to Moscow.


d. Cut of sales of high technology computers and aid drilling equipment.

e. Cut back in Soviet flights to USA.

f. Provision of aids to the insurgents.

g. Recalling of the US charge d’ affaires in Kabul for consultations.

h. Stopping of work on under construction Russian consulate building at New York.

j. Expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the US.

k. Curtailment of Soviet fishing rights in Alaskan waters.

l. Despatching of three coast guard cutters to Alaskan waters to ensure implementation of the restrictions placed on Soviet fishing vessels.

m. Increasing US presence in the Indian Ocean.

n. Considering the use of facilities being offered by Somalia, Kenya and Oman.

o. Provision of military and economic aid to Pakistan.

p. Negotiations on the finalization of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) were postponed.

q. Establishing of close relations with China.

r. Condemning of the Soviet Union for its direct military involvement in a purely indigenous uprising in Afghanistan against a Soviet supported unpopular regime at Kakul.

562. It is worth noting that although the Soviet withdrew by May 1989, but the above mentioned US actions were not very effective except few.

563. Explaining U.S. policy and security concerns in South Asia and the Persian Gulf region, Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, observed,

"the political, military and naval strategy of the United States in South Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean is designed to contain what it views is Soviet expansionism and in particular, to deny the Soviets opportunity to gain control of vital sea-lanes, from the Gulf to Western Europe, Japan and a large number of other countries. If the Soviets were able to do so, then even without the actual interruption

of supplies, it would so exercise its power as to cause a collapse of the political will of the highly industrialized countries of the Western alliance and bring about the United States, the disintegration of the Western alliance and bring about the political and military isolation of the United States—achieving all these strategic objectives without firing a shot".

564. In the words of President Zia-Ul-Haq, Pakistan and Afghanistan constituted backyard to the Gulf. The 450 miles coastline of Pakistan oversees the Straits of Hormuz which had been described as "chokepoint of the world" and key to the "Persian Gulf" through which an oil tanker passes every fifteen 2 minutes carrying about 75% of the world's oil imports.

565. Carter Administration had indeed warned the Soviet Union of serious consequences if they went into Afghanistan. After knowing about Carter's offer of military aid to Pakistan, Indian government officially conveyed to the United States its concern through the American Ambassador to India, Robert Goheen. Discussing Goheen's concern about the effect of US military aid on Indo-US relations, Kuldip Nayer wrote:

2. Rashid Ahmed Khan, op.cit, p.150.
3. Nayar, op.cit, p.46.
"He (Goheen) did not want Indo-US relationship, which has stabilised after many years of acrimony and suspicion, imperiled. He must have been able to convince his superiors, for the USA became less enthusiastic after Goheen's visit".

566. Carter Administration "reaffirmed America's commitments to Pakistan about its security" and offered $400 million military and economic aid to Pakistan. General Zia-Ul-Haq who had thought in terms of billions, rejected this offer as "peanuts."

567. General Zia described the amount of aid package as "terribly disappointing". He and Foreign Minister Agha Shahi held that the American offer of military aid was not commensurate with the magnitude of the threat Pakistan was facing. Zia said that the US offer did not ensure "security". Instead, it gave you "greater

1. Ibid, op. cit, p 66.

2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 16, 1980; Also see Facts on File YearBook 1980, p.27. The co-operation and understanding of India was also simultaneously sought. Also see New York Times, January 1 and 6, 1980.


5. The Muslim, May 20 and 26, 1981.
animosity, particularly of another country, and a superpower, \(^1\)
which now happens to be our neighbour".

568. Within only twenty four hours of his being informed of
Carter's "peanuts" offer, General Zia announced that the Soviet
Union and Pakistan were going to hold talks. He said, "We want to
acquire great harmony and understanding with our neighbour, the
\(^2\)Soviet Union". He added that the Soviets involvement in
Afghanistan had "brought the Soviet Union to our doorstep", and
that, in the absence of "active participation" by the United
States, Pakistan may have to adopt itself to the new realities.

569. Zia's efforts did have some effect on Carter administra-
tion. Carter responded by sending Brezezinski to Pakistan.
Brezezinski assured Zia that the $400 million aid offer was only
for a start and that other countries were prepared to provide
assistance in order to make package sizeable.

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1. Hafeez Malik, "The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and
Its Impacts on Pakistan's Foreign Policy", Malik (ed), \textit{op.cit},
p.133. Also see K. Arif (ed.) \textit{America - Pakistan Relations:}
570. Pakistan wanted the US Administration to submit the agreement to Congress and have it passed by the necessary two-thirds votes, but the State Department officials felt it to be a totally inappropriate request on Zia's part.

571. Pakistan also insisted that the help from Washington should not be linked with any requirement about Pakistan's internal politics and nuclear program and that it should be given arms without being asked for any assurance that they would not be used against India.

572. Before the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, the U.S.-Pakistan relations were at their lowest ebb due to differences on nuclear issue and American priorities elsewhere. The degree to which these relations deteriorated became apparent

2. Ibid
when Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, served notice
to Pakistan that President Carter was not concerned with the past
ties between the two countries and that in future U.S-Pakistan
relations would hinge upon Pakistan’s willingness to cease and
desist from its nuclear fuel cycle. The Soviet military
involvement in Afghanistan, however, abruptly, changed nuclear
programme policy. In the changed circumstances, Pakistan’s
importance increased significantly. Explaining the changing
attitude of the Carter Administration towards Pakistan, Agha
Shahi wrote;-

"The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the
end of 1979, and Pakistan’s instant reaction
to it calling for immediate and
unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet forces
from that country, at once transformed the
Carter Administration’s cold attitude.
Pakistan at once emerged in the US view as a
front line state in the path of a Soviet
southward drive and third central strategic
zone of potential super power
confrontation".

1. Agha Shahi, "Pakistan’s Relations with the United States",
Malik (ed) op.cit, p.167.

2. The Muslim, January 17, 1980.

573. As Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, put it, "Pakistan was a key stone of the Carter Doctrine for the defence of Middle East and South Asia". Jack C. Miklos, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, readily agreed, as to him, Pakistan "in a geographical sense is a pivot between the states of Indian sub-continent and the oil-rich states of Western Asia".

574. After Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the United States began to implement its plan for building a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to protect Western oil supply lanes. For RDF, the United States was keeping facilities in a number of countries, including Somalia, Kenya and Oman. Pakistan could serve as a very important entrepot for an RDF movement into Persian Gulf from the east, e.g. from Diego Garcia. There was also the possibility that Pakistan's army could serve as a proxy force fighting in Persian Gulf. Referring to this strategic value of Pakistan and other regional states, the US Under Secretary Defence, Robert Komer, in his February 1980 testimony before Congress confessed:--

3. Islamabad was reported to be working out an agreement whereby it would station a division in Saudi Arabia. New York Times, August 20, 1980.
"The United States would be hard pressed to defend its interests in the (Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf) region if regional forces are not able or inclined to participate in their defence. Accordingly, we would hope to have a direct military support from regional states which are at risk".

575. Brezezinki assured him that US military forces would come to Pakistan’s defence in case of a large scale Soviet or Soviet inspired attack threatening Pakistan’s independence and security. In a joint statement on the occasion, the two sides agreed that "the Soviet Armed intervention in Afghanistan and the aggression against the Muslim people of that country is flagrant violation in international covenants and forms a serious threat to the peace and security of Pakistan".

576. By 1988, US contributions for Afghan refugees in Pakistan surpassed $600 million. During the same period, US government grants totalling $16.1 million supported the refugee assistance efforts of the International Rescue Committee, the Salvation Army, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, the Save


2. Nayer, op.cit, p.71; Also see Facts on File YearBook -1980, p.83.

the Children Federation, the Experiment International Living, and the Council for International Development. The US authorities provided funds to transport Afghan patients to the United States for medical treatment.

577. The United States shared Pakistan's belief that the influx of refugees coming from Afghanistan into Pakistan as a result of the Afghanistan crisis constituted a great burden on Pakistan's scarce resources and that the international community should share that burden. Appreciating Pakistan's concerns on the issue, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Harold H. Saunders stated:

"Pakistan is to be commended for its humanitarian services over the past many months in providing food, clothing and shelter to these Afghan refugees.... It is clear now, however, that the financial burdens of this generosity are unfairly taxing Pakistan's limited resources, and the international community should offer its help.... We have encouraged UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for


Refugees) to plan and implement a program as soon as possible and are prepared to contribute our fair share if additional funds are required".

578. As a start, the UNHCR announced, in 1979, an interim emergency program of $190,000 to provide shelter and blankets for the refugees. US Congressmen also adopted a very sympathetic attitude towards these refugees. Some of them visited the refugee camps in Pakistan.

579. The zeal with which President Zia continued to welcome Afghan refugees in Pakistan was one of the factor that softened to some extent the attitude of American Congressmen towards his personal policies. During one of his interviews with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, he said that there was no limit to the sacrifices Pakistan was prepared to make because, in his views;

"If there was limit then we would have reached that point many years ago. Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, there was nothing here. Pakistan was carved out from the Indian subcontinent as a home land for the Muslims so we feel that Pakistan must be the home of any Muslim anywhere in this world. If 3,000,000 refugees have come from Afghanistan we feel it is our

moral, religious and national duty to look after at least 3,000,000 Afghans if they want to come to Pakistan".

580. Describing the effects of refugees' presence on Pakistani economy, an American official said:-

"The herds of goats, camels and sheep that the refugees bring with them destroy, through over grazing, land in the already economically depressed areas of NWFP and Baluchistan. Also the refugees compete with the local population for a limited number of jobs.....Pakistan has extended, an impressive and continuing welcome to the Afghans. The refugees are subject to few restrictions and are allowed to travel freely, hold jobs, and establish businesses".

581. The emerging Indo-US military ties in the early 1990s were in sharp contrast to those of the cold war period. After cutting off all military and economic aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment in 1990, the US also threatened to brand Pakistan a "terrorist sponsoring" state if assistance to Kashmiri freedom fighters was not terminated. The Indian political shift towards the US was triggered by a rude awakening: the disastrous performance of Iraq's Soviet military equipment versus the

spectacular success of high tech western weapon systems. India's military machine similar to that of Iraqs was reliant on Soviet military supplies which faded with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the US, India was perceived as a large and mainly democratic state with a political and professional military establishment.

582. The US diplomatic shuffle, seen as a "betrayal" by Pakistan, in South Asia was provoked partly by Pakistan's continuing efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and partly because of the growing Islamic threat in the Muslim bloc formed in West and 1 Central Asia. However US policy in South Asia is more balanced towards India and Pakistan than this may suggest. Questions are being asked as to the purpose of Indo-US military cooperation, especially since neither side have identified a common enemy. If the US were not prepared to support India against Pakistan or China, what would be the purpose of such a military collaboration?

583. In general, US policy in South Asia has not been a "zero sum game", in which efforts to establish closer diplomatic - military ties with India produces a compulsion in Washington to reduce 2 ties with Pakistan. Except for the complications caused by the Pressler Amendment, India has been "added" to US strategic planning while Pakistan has not yet been "subtracted". Unless


1. Ibid, p.11.
Pakistan rejects continuing American defence overtures because of its ties with Indian, the US may be expected to pursue closer military ties with Islamabad, at least within constraints of the Pressler Amendment. The imbalance in US policy towards India and Pakistan was also partly due to the operational nature of the US military command structure. Pakistan falls under CENTCOM while India falls under PACOM, each command has different strategies, concerns and priorities.

584. None of the above policies towards India and Pakistan has yet been translated into a significant arms transfer policy to either state. While arms supplies to Pakistan have been cut off, no major weapon systems have been promised to India either. Except for some military exercises, the Indain military seems to be moving faster than Indian politicians, as in turn the US State Department and White House seem to be moving more rapidly than the Pentagon would have wished.

585. US concerns, regarding Pak-Iran cooperation no matter how small are considered highly sensitive to Pak- US relations. Joint defence production of tanks and missiles is not being received favourably and all cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy is being seriously discouraged. US is concerned about the purchase by Iran of submarines and their use during a future

1. Thomas. Raju, op. cit., p.11.

2. Ibid.
military conflict in the Gulf. Given Pakistani technical expertise their upkeep and maintenance would logically be done at Pakistani ports. This US concern is being translated into veiled threats and pressures with her options kept open for dialogue and a hope of further military cooperation bypassing Pressler Amendment. Pakistan’s strategy of a lukewarm response towards Iran has forced the Iranians to look at India for assistance and cooperation. The design of a West Asian security grouping as visualised by Pakistan is presently not being translated into concrete measures unless serious decisions are made.

586. US concerns with the export of Islamic Fundamentalism to the newly emerged Central Asian Republics from Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan is also being viewed seriously. Pakistan’s predicament of being a moderate state with great Islamic ambitions is a conflicting paradox when viewed in the regional context with the hard line policies of Iran. As such, US being skeptical of future developments in Central Asia may not want an early settlement to the war in Afghanistan, thus once again putting the West/Central Asian security scheme to the backburner.

India

587. Indian and Pakistan have always been regional contestants and enemies and their terms have always constituted a tense relationship. Indian hostility towards Pakistan stems from her desire to "play an increasing international role (to this end she seems to be the strongest country in the sub-continent,"
and will attempt to prevent the emergence of a major power in the Indian Ocean of South East Asia.

588. "Our (Pakistan/India) relationships have been characterised by the tension that exists between two opposing concepts of "sovering equlity" and "hegemony". Pakistan occupies a pivotal position in Indian regional policy as she is the only hurdle left in Indian desire of complete regional dominance. The Indians are seriously concerned over Pakistani "inroads" into smaller states of South Asian such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. They fear a "ganging up" of these countries against India". A constant and continuous effort is being launched to weaken Pakistan internally, economically and politically. A weak and isolated Pakistan totally dependent on India is the ultimate objective of Indian Foreign Policy.

589. India will remain Pakistan's main adversary in the foreseeable future. Her designs are to politically destabilize Pakistan in the short term as a prelude to waging full scale war to emasculate her militarily, and thereafter, subject her to political domination in the long term. She will try to isolate Pakistan diplomatically by capitalizing on our nuclear programme.


and will try to prevent us from getting military aid from all Western sources. She will continue to expand her sphere of influence into the Gulf by capturing new markets and countering Pakistan against Indian threats are a source of confidence to the regional states and lend a measure of balance in the regional political scene.

590. India was perhaps the only country, which neither condemned nor condoned the intervention, New Dehli was unhappy but did not want to do anything to annoy Moscow. For the ordinary Afghan the Indian action was a stab in the back. As one Afghan official said, "Why did India have to white wash the Russian oppression here. There were reports that some 600 Indian advisors were in Afghanistan. What was their role is only a matter of guess. After the Soviets decided to withdraw, India jumped into the picture when their Minister of State Mr Natwar Singh met ex-King Zahir Shah in Rome. Later Najib was invited to India. The Mujahideens felt that India must stop supporting the puppet regime. However following are worthy mentioning :-

a. Russian now wants India as a military counter weight and wished India to play an even greater role in Afghanistan and emerge with the Soviet assistance as a major power broker in Afghanistan and the region.

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
b. Establishment of a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul will not only create serious complications for India, but will also dangerously disturb the post 1971 balance of forces in the region. It is certain to become an issue of conflict between Pakistan and India.

591. The Indian government policy goals in the Southwest Asia region can be summed up as follows:-

a. Continued close relations with former USSR to neutralize US-China-Japan axis.

b. Keep Pakistan politically and militarily weak and vulnerable, reduced to state of a satellite.

c. Close commercial, political and strategic cooperation with Afghanistan to exert pressure on Pakistan's western borders.

d. Although she is not yet powerful enough to dominate, solely, the Indian Ocean around her own periphery, she is determined, at all costs, to share this supremacy with the super powers.

e. India meets 60% of her oil need through imports from Persian Gulf. She would make all endeavours to ensure this supply. Besides oil, she has other economic interests in the area. A large number of skilled and unskilled labour and a of business concerns are

actively participating in the construction boom of the
Gulf. India is getting handsome foreign exchange
remittances. She is also interested in the enormous
Arab wealth, to be invested in India. Her policy,
therefore, is directed towards earning good-will of
Gulf States.

592. Indian stance on Afghan crisis was undoubtedly pro-Soviet and
also supported the Soviets in UNO besides criticising certain
unidentified nations for arming, training and encouraging
subversive elements. Indians never doubted the Soveits claim that
its troops moved into Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan
government.

593. On 17 June, 1980, Narsimah Rao, the Indian Minister for
External Affairs stated in the Indian Parliament that; "It was
time to ask ourselves this Afghanistan has not become or is not
likely to become, a pretext for those who wish to create further
instability in that country".

594. In June 1985, Rajiv Gandhi, during his visit to USA insisted
that the Soviets were invited into Afghanistan. Indira Gandhi, on
becoming the Prime Minister of India, accepted the Soviets
assurance that they would withdraw from Afghanistan and condemned
outside powers for giving aid to the rebels.

1. Misra, op.cit, p. 78
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p. 80
595. Former Prime Minister Morarji Desai disclosed to the world that when he was Prime Minister, the Soviet Premier then visiting India had requested him to put Pakistan under military pressure to compensate for the onslaught of the Afghan Mujahideens against the Tarakki-Hafizullah Amin regime but he had refused, saying Kabul should first put its own house in order instead of heaping blame on Pakistan for its troubles. Morarji Desai also indicated the Indian leadership for trying to build up in India a war psychosis directed against Pakistan.

596. The fallout of regional developments would largely depend on how the resurgent forces in Central Asia coordinate within the Muslim world and in what manner they are exploited by various regional blocks. However given the external Islamic factor like the inspiration drawn by the Kashmiris from Iranian Revolutions, the Palestinian Intifada and successful liberation struggle of the Afghan Mujahideens, the emergence of the Central Asian States have added a new dimension to Indian Security concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan. As a result of Pakistani efforts to promote Islamic solidarity on the basis of the Ummah and confronting a much

larger Hindu-dominant India, she sought to counter Pakistani moves by pursuing ties with CARs on the basis of secularism and pursuing her vast economic potential to attract these markets into her fold.

597. India is severely affected by the recent changes in the Soviet Union in its political, strategic and economic calculation. Having spent upto 70% of its arms budget on Soviet military equipment, its arrangements including the supply of urgently needed spare parts are now in jeopardy. Defence production is bound to be affected by the present crisis and India may have to deal with different autonomous bodies of independent republics. India cannot count on the effectiveness of the Soviet political support in view of the changed situation in case of a conflict with China, hence the signs of convergence with the US and Chinese interests. The Indian action of providing covert refuelling facilities to US planes during the Gulf crisis was an indication of her predilections.

598. Indo-US ties have been strengthened by tacit recognition of India as a regional power in South Asia. US no longer supports the demands for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir and India has not been brought within the preview of the Presssler Amendment despite her advances in nuclear technology and missile development programmes. The Chinese shift towards a

3. Ibid, p.50.
reconciliation with India on the vexed border question also follows the changed security pattern in the region. India's reiteration of China's position over Tibet was geared towards a reciprocal response by China over the Kashmir issue, however this did not materialise. By shedding her earlier prejudices, now no longer deemed profitable it has embarked upon the process of strengthening and further developing its ties with western countries to overcome its difficulties and thereby consolidate its perceived role in the regional and global affairs. The extent to which India would succeed in realising its long standing ambitions for regional hegemony in the context of the new world order, is yet to be seen.

599. Pakistan is perceived as a major stumbling block in the attainment of its objectives and continues to work for a weak, fragile and subservient vassal state. The Kashmir dispute is the core issue of discord and potential flash point. Keeping in mind the deep-rooted mutual distrust, India is likely to continue striving for a politico-military intimidation of Pakistan and relations between the two countries will remain highly tense and fragile.

600. However her long term ambition of regional status will clash with US, if she perceives her goals to eliminate Pakistan as a bye-product towards her march towards extra regional status.

Soviet Federation

601. South Asia and South West Asia have always occupied prominence in Soviet foreign policy, and the former Soviet Union has always pursued a long term strategic design for enhancing its
power and influence over the countries of these regions. In view of their proximity to the former Soviet Union and their economic potential, the former Soviet Union has been intermittently involved either directly or through India in exercising her influence. However, in its relationship with Pakistan, the former Soviet Union has always maintained a distance, relegating our status to one of secondary importance. Supporting the Mujahideens during war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tenacity in upholding the Mujahideen’s cause inspite of external and internal threats, Islamic resurgence in Pakistan; Pakistan’s close relation with China and her continued opposition to Indian hegemonic designs in the region (under Russian sponsorship) are some of the main causes of tension between Pakistan and former Soviet Union. Soviet Federation has made it clear on a number of occasions that she is not ready to grant a status of equality to Pakistan vis-a-vis India.

602. Former Soviet Union remained overtly hostile till Pakistan agreed to an Afghanistan settlement. In the regional context, Pakistan is expected by the Soviet Union to reconcile with the leadership of India under Soviet sponsorship. Efforts by Pakistan to improve relations with former Soviet Union may be encouraged in near future by bi-lateral trade and limited economic aid, but without drastic immediate shift in Soviet stands on Indo-Pakistan disputes including Kahsmir. A weak Pakistan having lukewarm relations with USA and moderately friendly relations with China, remaining under the hegemonic influence of Indian, would be the Soviet perception of Pakistan’s profile in the region.
603. The disintegration of Soviet Union and the end of the cold war has been the single most important external cause of change in South Asia. The collapse ended the Indo-Soviet treaty signed in 1971, and there appears to have been a significant Russian diplomatic shift away from India on various issues. Russia supported Pakistan's proposal to establish a nuclear free zone in South Asia against the wishes of India. The policies of other states of former Soviet Union remain ambivalent.

604. The disintegration and final conceding of freedom to her former Republics itself posed a danger to the territorial integrity of multi-ethnic states within India. Once the strongest supporter of India on the Kashmir issue, it is now less inclined to renew that stand. The highly favourable trade agreement with India now replaced a practical hard currency oriented agreement much to India's disadvantage. The old military clauses from the treaty were removed and India hard to pay hard currency for the spares of vast quantity of Soviet held equipment which dominated her armed services. She now has to have agreements with all the breakaway Soviet Republics separately with added delay and expenses in foreign exchange.

605. The early draft of the new Indo-Russian Treaty was based on the premise that a special relationship no longer existed and the clause on promotion of peace and stability in Asia were omitted. The new treaty revolved around a relationship based upon a market economy and democratic reforms. However a new vigour may emerge


in Indo-Russian relations if Indo-US ties begin to deteriorate. Common concerns with regard to potential problems in Central Asia of inroads by Islamic fundamentalists sponsored by Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan may give India and Russia a cause to share common dangers and goals.

606. The Soviet Armed Forces still a cohesive force under a centralised control in wary of Afghan Mujahideens attempting to support Islamic opposition parties fighting the communist government in Tajikistan and has retaliated promptly to any military incursions. This attempt by Afghanistan will surely run against the desire of a strategic consensus in the region because of the Islamic threat, as still being perceived by these Republics due to their innumerable internal problems; economic.

607. Response of USSR circles against government decisions could also be noted from the following :-

a. Objecting of sending of forces to Afghanistan by Marshal Nikolai Gargkov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of USSR.

b. Critising the secretly taken decision of politburo members of sending troops by Andrei D. Sakharov, a renowned Russian intellectual and scholar.

c. "A Brezhnev, who has connived at the ruin of his own

2. News Week, 11 February, 1980; Also see New Times, Moscow, February 1980, p. 22
people in the interest of foreign adventure had no Russian heart," was stated by Alexander Solzhenitsy, a famous Soviet author.

608. Brezhnev's two successors, Yuri Andropov and Chernenko failed to break the inertia of Brezhnev years either in regard to Afghanistan or overall nature of Soviet relations in the region. This was however shaken off by Gorbachov, who has proved more dynamic leader than his predecessors. In order to push for more important domestic objectives like Perestroika of the Soviet society. The Gorbachov leadership seemed to have settled for the minimalist objectives. The issues of Glasnost, overall East-West relations, arms control efforts and withdraw from Afghanistan all seem to be geared towards the new priorities of reforming the Soviet economy and rejuvenating the socialist system. While USSR can never wash its hands off Afghanistan in view of the ethnic character of its Central Asian Republics, which are witnessing a resurgence of sufis-oriented fundamentalism and militancy, the Soviet strategy is clear, they want to keep each side off balance and have a government of their own interest. Anything against the policies of the Russians could also result in Balkanisation of Afghanistan. Russia would like to keep the northern province under its firm control to act as a buffer against Central Asian States and for the economic wealth that the region contains.

2. Ibid.
Iran

609. Iran occupies a special place for Pakistan because of its geostrategic location and the bonds of faith, history and culture that link the two countries. Iran provides strategic depth to Pakistan against India and can act as a relief zone in the event of a blockade of Pakistan’s ports. Despite supporting Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir and the plight of Muslims in India, it is seeking to embark upon mutually beneficial cooperation with India to rebuild its war torn economy and infrastructure. Iran is expected to extend moral and limited material support to Pakistan in the event of an armed conflict with India.

610. Pakistan’s friendship with Iran is one of the variables of her foreign policy. It is based on shared perception of the regional issues. However, after the Revolution and the subsequent Iran - Iraq war, the relations between the two countries have suffered some setbacks due to Pakistan’s stance of neutrality. Pakistan also projects reservations regarding mutual conflicts on various issues between the Arab States and Iran, including differences on the proposed settlement of the Afghan issue. In spite of the differences, our relations with Iran are improving due to a commonality of perception on Kashmir. In the regional context, Iran had so far not opposed Indian hegemonic designs but her position may now turn in our favour and proceed towards better understanding and cooperation. Our friendship with Iran can be further fostered and channelised through creative diplomacy to ensure her active moral and material support against India in our future conflict. If development of infrastructure is
accorded necessary priority, she will serve as a reliable relief zone.

611. Iran is second major country capable of contesting Indian hegemonic design. Pakistan should not view emergence of strong Iran as incompatible to her national interests. She can actively participate in bridging the gap between Iran and Arab countries for peace and tranquility in the region. Fostering of common perceptions and world views with Iran may lead to the shaping of a strategic consensus amongst Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan with the larger aim of countering mutual security threats.
612. The government of Iran felt that the Soviets had taken advantage of the dispute between Iran and the US and accused the former USSR of committing an act of aggression. They expressed full support to the Afghan Mujahideens against the invasion of their country by the Soviets. President Hasan Bani Sadar claimed that the Soviet invasion was part of a plan by Moscow to split Iran and move South towards the Indian Ocean.

613. The treaty between the Soviet Union and Republic of Iran, signed in Moscow on February 26, 1921, reaffirmed the independence and sovereignty of Iran, abrogated the agreements signed by Czarist Russia to Persia’s detriment, and established normal diplomatic relations between the two states. It is important from Tehran’s perspective, to contrast Soviet capability with Soviet intentions. The dissolution of the Tudeh party and expulsion of 18 Soviet diplomats also gave rise to the increasing tensions between Iran and Soviet Union.

2. Ibid.
614. Strategically speaking, the occupation of Afghanistan greatly enhanced the Soviet capacity of intervention in Iran, since the north-western parts of Afghanistan offered advantages as an invasion route. With Iran, the Soviet Union wanted to achieve both access to the warm water ports in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf states and control of oil and gas resources as well as the strategic position to project her influence into other Persian Gulf states. If the oil problem of Russia is taken as valid, then the Soviet Union would surely increase her interest even now in Iran.

China

615. South Asia and South West Asia is a zone which is of vital interest to China, and hence occupies considerable importance in her foreign policy. In the region, China has pursued a policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and has resisted the natural propensity of hegemonism and expansionism. Her effort in the region has been directed towards economic cooperation and contesting other power's efforts aimed at unilateral expansion of influence. For Pakistan, China has always proved to be a dependable neighbour and has played a crucial role in helping Pakistan's struggle to survive as an independent sovereign state. China has a complete identity of views with Pakistan on issues pertaining to South Asia and South West Asia. Pakistan views improvement of Sino-Soviet relations as a positive development which could help to neutralise Soviet hostility towards Pakistan. In a future Indo-Pakistan war, short of risking direct confrontation with India, China can be expected to
provide full diplomatic as well as material support to Pakistan. 616. While China's assertion that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is part of Soviet master plan for world hegemony and encirclement of China may seem rhetorical, but it cannot be waved off as a mere noisy and empty anti-Soviet slogan. China did feel a danger to her vital link with Pakistan through Karakoram by a destabilized Pakistan. For China, Pakistan assumed a greater geo-strategic importance. China supported the Mujahideens and proved a valuable ally to Pakistan and the US. Presently for China the best counter against Soviet influence in the long run is building up the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to match that of former Soviet Union. Beijing is making efforts to that end the present Chinese leadership will be committed to a policy of improving relations with the west, especially the US. At the same time China would like to see Pakistan grow into a more formidable obstacle and more valuable military ally of China. So long China is weak it would like to see US support for Pakistan. 617. The Chinese policies are also designed to counter Soviet "hegemony" in the area. China seems to have convinced most of the nations of third world that it poses no threat to their nationalism but is a protector of their sovereignty and national aspiration.

618. Beijing condemned the Soviet military involvement in

3. Dr. K.F Yousaf (Miss), Towards Tripoliter World, Lahore, Tariq Publishing House, 1975, p. 139.
Afghanistan by stating, "it is a stepping stone to all Southeast Asia". JS Sheherbakov the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing was summoned in Chinese Foreign Affairs office and conveyed her government demand of stopping of aggression besides withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

619. The Chinese also considered the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan as part of an encirclement plan being pursued by the Soviet Union against China. Therefore this move was termed as part of the encirclement plan in the sense that in addition to Russia, outer Mangolia and Vietnam are the countries on the border of China, both of them under the influence of the Soviet Union. During the occupation of Afghanistan, Russia's capability against China obviously increased.

620. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed on 16th June 1981, the treaty in which the whole of Wakhan has been handed over to the Soviets. The Soviets bordering directly with Pakistan gained control of all the passes that once linked China and Afghanistan. By annexing the Wakhan strip, the Soviets could block the Chinese moves towards Afghanistan and could use these passes against China during the days of their presence in Afghanistan.

621. The Chinese fully realized that if Pakistan is strangulated by Russia in her next move, then the geopolitical threat to Peking would acquire dangerous and more threatening proportions.

1. Economist, 5 January, 1980
3. The Muslim, Islamabad, September 27, 1982.
By having possession of Wakhan strip, the Soviets could influence the Indus Valley road, thus in a position to effect the interest of China towards Indian Ocean. Meaning China would be cut off from the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

622. Chinese border with Afghanistan in Wakhan corridor is only 28 Kilometers long. It is at an altitude of 18000 feet. It does not pose a serious military threat to China. But it is of great geo-political importance to China. The China, of course, do realise that if ever the Soviets pushed into Pakistan, the situation would be transformed into a major threat.

623. According to General Walker, "....because Afghanistan is China’s neighbour and they share a 60 miles mountainous border, China regards the Soviet armed involvement of Afghanistan, as a threat to her security"

624. If Pakistan and Iran through overt or covert use of force are disintegrated, the Soviets would ultimately succeed in imposing a collective security scheme on Asia, encircling China, complete China’s neighbours and they share a 60 miles mountainous border, China regards the Soviet armed involvement of Afghan.

625. China also feared that if the former Soviet Union were to succeed in subduing Afghanistan, followed by Pakistan and Iran, they would be in a position to sever parts of Central Asia from their political ties with Peking and then set up an independent Republic of Eastern Turkestan.


626. Soviet Union and China are both socialist states, but their role in international politics represents divergent interests. Although, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of 1950 has not been abrogated, it is doubtful that all provision, such as the agreement to consult on all important matters of common concern in international affairs are being executed.

627. Soviet Union has always shown its readiness in arming Asian countries on bilateral basis, to contain China. The Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan put an end to the Sino-Soviet inter-government dialogue which began in 1979 following a Chinese initiative announced on the occasion of the formal ending of the long defunct Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950. The Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan caused the Chinese to postpone the next meeting. The Chinese diplomacy suggests a persistent concern with the Soviet threat and the need to establish a common purpose with an effective countervailing power.

628. A Soviet controlled Afghanistan was certainly of dangerous consequence to China in the light of pro-Soviet Vietnamese hold on Kampuchea and the tensions in the South-East Asian countries as a result of the Vietnamese occupation. China have clashed

numerous times along their long border. In the four districts bordering on China, the Soviets have deployed at least forty three army divisions out of a total of 168 divisions strong army as a whole.

629. The impact of the Central Asian developments spilling over into China would be no less significant. Greater freedom and independence for Soviet Muslims will have an immense impact upon Chinese Turkistan (Xinkiang), an integral part of Central Asia and Beijing will not be able to ignore the already developing interaction across its borders. China is not likely to watch with equanimity the growth of Iranian, Saudi, Pakistani and even Turkish influence in the region. Pakistan should therefore respect Chinese sensitivities to Islamic revivalism and ethnic unrest in Sinkiang.

630. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China is no longer important former to US to contain the USSR. In a bipolar world the US and USSR were manageable entities for China which could participate in a triangular power game on an equal or semi-equal footing. With the US emerging as the military leader, Japan and EEC as economic leaders, China has been left marginalised from international decision making in geo-political and economic matters. This compulsion and economic constraints have forced China to take a new look at her security concerns. Improvements

of ties with Iran, India and Saudi Arabia are steps in this direction.

631. Despite overtures to India, China will continue to support Pakistan's stand on Kashmir issue and the Nuclear Free Zone proposal. Despite persistent pressures from India regionally and from Super Powers globally, China's consistent political support and readiness to assist Pakistan has been a great source of strength for Pakistan Indo-Chinese improvement in relations would not be detrimental to Pakistan. In the event of hostilities with India, China may be expected to extend moral and some material support to Pakistan but might adopt a more cautious attitude and a lower profile than in the past.

West Germany / France / Turkey

632. The West Germany looked at the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan by stating, "an extremely serious matter that raised basic question of international relations". France and Turkey showed their "Concern". Turkey is pro-Islamic National Salvation Party, urged their government to send military aid to the Mujahideens.

Egypt

633. President Sadat said to NBC news, "US sent me airplane and told me please open your stores for us so that we can give the Afghans the armaments, they need to fight and I gave them the armaments". Grand Mufti of Al-Azhar University vigoursly condemned Soviet invasion and urged all the Muslims to throw their weight behind the Muslims insurgents in Afghanistan.

Central Asian Republics

634. The Central Asian Republics are undergoing a delicate transformation in which intra-regional, ethnic and ideological tensions continue to remain a source of instability and prevent them from asserting their independence from the old order in any meaningful way. Their primary concern remains focussed on achieving political and economic stability and in this they exhibit a particular wariness for manifestations of Ismailic "fundamentalism" within their societies and from abroad. The ECO would have a long gestation period. But, if mutually beneficial cooperation can be established, this grouping could emerge as a significant political factor in international relations.

Turkey.

635. Turkey is being projected as a "secular role model" by the western world as the ideal model for the Central Asian Republics to emulate in the face of Islamic resurgence from Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. With western backed economic clout and being the founding member of the Caspian States Organisation it is likely to play a pivotal role in the reconstruction of the CARs and thereby draw away the same potential which Iran and Pakistan enjoy in the ECO. Turkey's support to Pakistan would be constrained by the US attitude and limited to moral and political support in the face of an Indo-Pak conflict. Covert material support in limited numbers of critical items may be made available.

SAARC

636. This regional cooperation forum has been considered as the first step towards realisation of peaceful and economically strong South Asian region. "For the present, the scope of cooperation is limited and its goals modest; however potential for growth exists. The growth of cooperation is dependent on the will of the members...... but so far this will is weak, partly due to mutual suspicions and partly due to Indian designs". India has tried to use this forum as an extension of her influence in the region but so far has been well contested by Pakistan. The sheer weight of India generates apprehension of

domination whereas India fears that the other member states might "gang up" to contain what Indian considers her rightful place in the region. In the immediate future, this cooperation does not seem to progress beyond economic collaboration in a limited sense. However, given time, it may well develop into a regional alliance bringing in stability and prosperity in the region.

637. SAARC is a regional cooperation for economic uplift of the member countries. However, "any Indian effort to convert it into a security arrangement should be evaluated in the light of Indian hegemonistic aspirations and hence tactfully repelled". Thus it is a good forum for Pakistan to create an atmosphere of regionalism. However, potential for growth into a viable regional organisation can only be fulfilled if it provides a forum for airing and resolving regional conflicts, thus allowing Pakistan to capitalize on Indian dissensions with her neighbours. Pakistan can also use this body to neutralize Indian hegemony by cultivating confidence and mutual dependence amongst the member countries.

Bangladesh

638. Pakistan’s relationship with Bangladesh has progressed since 1974. From an attitude of mutual recrimination / suspicion, the relations have now developed into one of warmth and friendship. The principle reasons for this is mutual fear of India, who is an equal threat to Bangladesh’s security. Through the forum of SAARC, this relationship has grown but more ground has been covered on bilateral basis. India views this friendship with

suspicion as it has the potential of a wider military cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is also in the interest of Pakistan to develop this friendship into a wide ranging alliance for effectively countering Indian influence in the region.

639. Pakistan - Bangladesh, with mutual cooperation and understanding, can play a major role in neutralizing Indian threat of dominance in South Asia. With deliberate efforts by Pakistan, our friendship can grow into active military collaboration aimed at restricting Indian freedom of action in a future Indo - Pakistan war.

Japan and the West European Countries

640. With the recent developments in Europe, economic resources of the western world are likely to be directed towards the uplift of Eastern European countries. The ensuing thaw with the Soviet Union may also effect European perception of Afghanistan. However, Pakistan expected to get their full support against a Soviet threat through Afghanistan. In our regional context, West European powers (France, Germany, UK) and Japan, are likely to follow an equitable policy with regard to Pakistan and India. Investments of capital in Pakistan from these countries will be dependent on our political stability and economic growth. In case of Indo - Pakistan war, these countries are likely to continue the critical supplies to both Pakistan and India.
CONCLUSIONS

1. Afghanistan is bordered on the west by Iran, on the north by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on the extreme north-east by China, on the east and the south by Pakistan. The Afghan people are die hard Muslims. A village mosque is the basic institution for the religious affairs. The country in itself is not ethnic units, but there is no uniformity in its national culture. With the exception of the Amu Darya (Amu River), the water ways have only limited potentials. Being land locked country, has no access to the sea. Fighting between the Kabul and the Soviet troops and the Afghan Mujahideen took place in almost all the provinces, with varying degree of magnitude of fire. However, the most severe fighting took place in the Panjsher valley, around Qandahar, Herat, Jalalabad and Khost areas.

2. The Afghans have the characteristics of a typical peasant tribal society i.e. high rate of illiteracy 90%, linguistic diversity, basic food production as the major economic role of the population, the kinship system, lack of mobility, inward looking society and the lack of adolescence. Right from childhood an Afghan is given social economic and political responsibilities. However, the Afghans are shrewed, brave and
independent people.

3. Akbar the Great, the Moghul emperor of India, tried to subdue the Afghan tribes by violent methods and failed. His successors tried to buy them, with little success. The British too were only partly successful by generously using money to save much sweat and blood, but could not buy their lasting friendship by money alone. Whenever endangered or threatened, Islam has a powerful capacity as a mobilizing force to defend the socio-religious values and political sovereignty of Afghanistan. No invader including the Soviets, has escaped tough Afghan resistance and thus the sacrifices for keeping the freedom of their homeland intact go very deep in Afghan social psychology.

4. Perhaps one of the worst damage to Afghan posterity is the educational set back received by today’s young Afghan generation. The Kabul regime set great emphasis on sending young Afghans to the former USSR for education, away from the war and from parental and cultural influences. Some were forced to eat porks in violation of their religion. Others were insulted, threatened, beaten even killed by the Soviets who wanted scapegoats for the Soviet army casualties in Afghanistan. Part of the Soviet educational effort was intended to enhance the size, ideological dedication and managerial competence of the PDPA.
5. The first penetration of the Arabs into Qandahar took place in 695/700 AD under governor Siest (Persia), followed by Taimurid (821/873) with their capital at Nishapur (Persia) and the Samonids (819-1005) from Bokhara. It was, however, Saffarid (867-1495) who finally defeated the Hindu kingdom at Kabul. Alauddin Ghori ransacked Ghazni in 1150. Taimur came down from Samarkand in Central Asia and occupied Herat as a capital in 1379. His descendant Zahir-uddin-Babur subjugated Kabul and Ghazni in 1504. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, present day Afghanistan was divided between the Moghul and Persian empires. Akbar captured Qandahar in 1594 and lost it. Humayun again occupied the city in 1638 but was retaken by the Persians ten years later. The Mughals never captured it again.

6. The country emerged into roughly its present position in mid 18th century, under Amir Ahmed Shah Durrani of Abduli tribe. After the break of Moghal Empire, the whole area became a corridor of invasion and counter-stroke by Durranis and Sikhs: the area passed over in ebb and flow. To prevent the inevitable armed conflict, the two imperialist powers drew the boundaries around what is today called as Afghanistan.

7. Afghanistan’s dependance on Moscow for economic and industrial development specially increased during 1973-78. The PDPA emerged in July 1977. The Soviet influence was increased
because numerous economic treaties were signed with the former USSR. By summer 1978, the precarious Parcham-Khalq unity fell apart and their strike became open hostility each trying to annihilate the other. The struggle for power started as well and on 15 September 1979, Hafizullah Amin ousted Taraki. Amin was found repressive and an agent of CIA by Soviet, and Karmal was installed towards end of December 1979 as Breznev had decided to intervene to save future of communism and Soviet interests in Afghanistan.

8. When the communists took over control of Afghanistan in 1978, the introduction of communism-based reforms proved to be the main catalysts in fuelling the Afghan resistance movement. When the formal USSR involved her military forces in Afghanistan, the character of the resistance also changed. The civil war became a national liberation movement and the resistance spread throughout the length and breadth of the country with roots in some 36000 villages encompassing all 31 provinces in all of Afghanistan’s ethno-linguistic, tribal and socio-cultural groups. As the resistance grew stronger and the Soviet presence more visible, Afghan army units were increasingly inclined to join the Mujahideen groups. In many cases, arms and equipment were sold to the Mujahideens for cash. The defectors brought with them their
weapons and ammunition. The Soviet tried to halt this flow of modern weapons to the resistance by confiscating all of Kabul army's anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. They even stripped the Afghan armoured division of their tanks. Some Afghan army personals acted as "fifth column" and supplied the Mujahideens with information and weapons. The Soviets grossly under estimated the depth and the intensity of the Afghan resistance.

9. The Soviets move into Afghanistan was initially interpreted by most analysts as part of a grand design aimed at world dominance. Over the years, however, many analysts began to doubt this and instead tried and explained the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in largely "defensive" terms. However, the Soviets involved their forces in Afghanistan for not one but a varity of reasons. Some of them were :-

a. Quest for a warm water port.
b. Peter-the Greats legacy.
c. Operational strategy of Prince Gorchakov.
d. Brezhnev doctrine of defence of communism.
e. Fear of Islamic fundamentalism-over throw of communist regime.
f. Intervening in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
g. Soviet paranoid.
h. Desire of unity of Soviet nations
j. Invitation for help by Afghan government.
k. Soviet expansionist designs.

l. Politico-economic compulsions.

m. Importance of the Indian Ocean.

n. Base for further advances.

o. Pre-emption against the U.S. movement.


q. Soviet miscalculations and faulty military strategy.

10. The probable aim of the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan was to preserve the PDPA government in Afghanistan without getting too greatly involved militarily and to replace Amin by Babrak Karmal. Pavlovskii knew that military intervention in Afghanistan was a strong possibility yet he began to make detailed plans. However, the final decision to intervene was taken at the 26th November 1979 meeting of the politburo.

11. By early 1979, about 700 Soviet military advisors reported in Afghanistan. By August, the total number of Soviet military and civilian advisers was much more and accounted about 5000. At about 1100 hours on 24 December 1979, a total of about 5000 troops arrived and by 1600 hours they were at full control of Kabul Airport. Axis of Soviet movements included Kushka, Herat, Qandahar, Ghazni and Kabul besides Termiz to Kabul for the main movements of the Soviet major offensive forces. Major Soviet
operations took place in Panjsher valley, Khost, Qandahar, Herat and Kunduz. It remained difficult to distinguish between the Soviet and Afghan air forces. The Mujahideens and the Afghan-Soviet army followed their own tactics and strategies throughout the Afghan crisis. Their were clearly a technological gape between the Mujahideens with their hand held weapons and the Soviet reliance on latest helicopters, rocket attacks and tank shells. "Hit and run" was the most practiced tactics of the Mujahideens due to favourable and well aquainted mountainous terrain besides sabotage, subversion, espionage and various such like activities. Afghan army logistics was not highly developed. There was almost total dependance on the former USSR for all supplies including weapons and equipment, spare part, fuel and ammunations etc. The absence of rail, good roads and the inadequate communication system further complicated their logistic supply system. Except for the Soviets, that too through Salang tunnel, it was incapable of undertaking a sustained war efforts.

12. From 1986, some new weapons namely the "Stingers", the French anti-tank rockets "Milan", Spanish 120 mm. mortars, infra-red aming devices, "light foot" anti-mine devices and radio equipment were introduced by the Mujahideens, which started changing the tilt in Mujahideens favour. Soviet's main weaknesses
included lack of experience of guerrilla warfare, outdated field communications, lack of physical fitness and initiative by the Soviet generals, low morale, lack of sufficient training and over reliance on Slavic commandos and paratroopers etc.

13. Major lessons of the Afghan crisis include:-

   a. Direct confrontation between Islam and Communism.
   b. Ethnic and tribal rivalry amongst the Mujahideens.
   c. Lack of Soviet preparation.
   d. Strategic mistakes by the Soviets as they started the game on broader offensive strategy but had to face guerrilla warfare for which they were not prepared.
   e. End of Pushtunistan issue.
   f. Failure of Soviet’s army decisive blow.
   g. Successful Soviet mobile defence and establishment of security belts around the large cities and bases.
   h. Lack of knowledge of guerrilla warfare by the Soviets.
   i. Miscalculation of Afghan strength/capabilities by the Soviet advisors.
   j. Fear of high rate of casualties by the Soviets.
   k. Use of borrowed tactics of European theatre, relying on heavy artillery and air bombings—though there was a re effort required to devise new strategy better adopted to guerrilla warfare.
m. Poor system of logistics by the Soviets-Afghan army.

n. Lack of political tactics and support by the Soviet army.

o. Poor performance of Soviet intelligence system.

p. Use of drugs by the Soviet soldiers.

q. Disapproval of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan by the Soviet masses.

r. Mis-judgement by the Soviets regarding the strength of Islam.

s. Total failure of communism in Afghanistan.

t. Lack of systematic policy-displacement of population.

14. Out of a total of 12 million refugees in the world, Pakistan is playing host to nearly one third, constituting the single largest refugees concentration anywhere in the world today. Embittered by the persisting civil strife and shattered by the Soviet military interventions in 70s, these hapless Afghans chose their safe heavens in Pakistan mainly because of their existing traditional linkages and centuries old religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties with the tribal people of Pakistan. Imbued with humanitarian spirit and in fulfilment of Islamic obligations, Pakistan has admirably braved the burden of such a massive influx of refugees for over 12 years, despite her slender resources and a multitude of persisting difficulties. In providing
shelter and basic necessities of life, Pakistan has been aided by the generous external humanitarian assistance. Various organizations and agencies set up their offices and camps in the country to help the Afghan refugees. Refugees impact on local economy included illegal business and monopoly in trade, high prices and labour displacement etc. Their effects on internal security included externally inspired subversion, sabotage and terrorism, threat from armed refugees, unrest in tribal areas and law and order problems throughout the country. Various measures for a peaceful settlement of Afghan issue, to ensure optimal repatriation, to reduce economic burden, to reduce internal and external security threats and to reduce psycho-social effects were taken from time to time by the government of Pakistan.

15. Economically speaking, Afghanistan has never been noted for the reliability or accuracy of its statistical data. Even before the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan, economic data were frequently incomplete, conflicting or contradictory. Official sources of statistics all but dried up in the years after Soviet military involvement began. On occasion, local newspapers and radio broadcasts would provide some statistical, but all these rarely be taken at face value. The Kabul regime aim remained to portrate a situation of normality. Mostly such claims were wholly unrealistic. However one thing is for sure that the
Soviets and the Afghans suffered very heavily during Afghan crisis from 1979 to 1989 which ultimately resulted in Soviet withdrawal of her forces from Afghanistan.

16. The blatant act of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan was condemned by all nations of the world. Since January 1980, the UN General Assembly voted nine times condemning the Soviet act and demanding a complete withdrawal of her forces from Afghanistan. Soon negotiations started under the UN auspices to settle the issue which led to the initiation of political process at Geneva in April 1981. The indirect proximity talks commenced in June 1982 and underwent a different and lengthy process of negotiations. The Accord was finally signed on 14 April 1988. Some of the major causes of Soviet withdrawal included :-

a. Unpopularity in former USSR.
b. Bravery of the Afghan nationals.
c. Successful diplomatic/foreign policy of Pakistan.
d. High rate of Soviet casualties.
e. Poor state of Soviet economy.
f. Leading role of Gorbachev.
g. International diplomatic pressure on former USSR.
17. Negative repercussion of Afghan crisis included refugees problems and threat from western border. Positive repercussion included renewed Pak-US relations and Chinese and Saudi supports. Various security scenarios were analysis after the withdrawal of soviet forces keeping in view the wishes of the Afghans. Some of them included establishment of broad based government in Afghanistan by the Mujahideens; government of neutral personalities supported by ex-King Zahir Shah; coalition government of moderates; coalition government of conservatives along with Hikmatyar, Ismail and Doshtam.
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