Elite Politics in Pakistan:

Going Beyond the 'Public Face'

By

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I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other degree.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Problem

In October 1999, Chief-of-the-Army-Staff in Pakistan took over the reigns of power, dismissing the Prime Minister, dissolving the Parliament and eventually introducing a large number of vital Amendments in the Constitution. The dismissed Prime Minister and the dissolved Parliament had come into being as a result of the 1997 general elections which, in turn, had been held because of dissolution, in 1996, of an assembly that had been elected in October 1993. The elections of 1993 were necessitated by circumstances arising out of dissolution of National Assembly in April of that year. The Assembly dissolved in 1993 had been elected in 1990, since the need for the elections arose out of yet another dissolution of National Assembly in August that year. The legislature and the executive that went out of office in 1990 had come to power as result of elections in 1988 eventuated by dissolution of the Assembly on May 29 of that year. In a period of a little more than a decade, five legislatures were dissolved, five times elected Prime Ministers (one elected on non-party basis) dismissed and three Heads of the State had to quit prematurely. Twice, Assemblies were dissolved and Prime Ministers dismissed by Chief-of-the-Army-Staff, and thrice by retired bureaucrats-turned-politicians. The period of 1988-1999 is unique in the sense that there was more rapid turn-over in terms of dismissals of Prime Ministers, dissolutions of Assemblies and forced abdication of Heads
of the State. Otherwise, it followed the pattern of politics that has endured during Pakistan’s history of around fifty-five years.

The country came into being after an Act of the British Parliament, known as the Indian Independence Act of July 1947. The Act was passed in view of a movement for a separate country for the Muslims of India. The movement had become very strong during the Second World War and their influential party—the All-India Muslim League (AIML)—argued that Muslims were a nation by any test of nationalism. At the same time, AIML mobilized the Muslim community on the basis of religio-cultural differences with the Hindus, demanding a separate country, popularly projected as Pakistan.

The British tried several proposals ranging from those envisaging a loose united India to one entailing independence with division of India into two separate countries. The latter was materialized through the Indian Independence Act, which set out a framework to run the governments of the two dominions adopting and adapting the Government of India Act, 1935 suitably amended to provide for democratic government in the tradition of Westminster model.

The Westminster model assumes a system of responsible government wherein the power of the executive is subject to limitations, enforced at the behest of public opinion, organized into political parties and deriving authority through parliament from the electorate. However, in practice democratic institutions did not work in the way they were envisaged. The first Prime Minister was assassinated, while the second one was dismissed. The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved and the second one produced the first Constitution in 1956, only to be abrogated in 1958. After five years of Martial
Law, a second Constitution was promulgated in 1962, but again to be abrogated by another Martial Law in 1969. In 1971, the country suffered dismemberment, with the East Pakistan emerging as a new country under the name of Bangladesh. The third Constitution produced in 1973 underwent drastic amendments at the hands of its framers and then under Martial Law of 1977.

Indeed, the political history of Pakistan has been one of continuous political fights, instability resulting in ministerial changes and premature termination of parliaments. Throughout Pakistan’s history three groups have played crucial role in politics; namely the civilian politicians, bureaucracy and military. Civilian elite came into political power as a result of the successful independence movement. The then president of the political party taking credit for the creation of Pakistan became the Governor General of the new independent Dominion. His right hand man became the Prime Minister of the country. The civilian elite manning the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan were given the power to frame a constitution, which would make the country a republic. However, from the very inception of the country the cabinet contained a bureaucrat who held the all-important portfolio of finance. Another bureaucrat acted as secretary general, an especially created post, to the government of Pakistan and exercised very vital decision-making powers. Within a few years of the country’s existence, the military began to assert itself. A major manifestation of its assertion was the case of ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy’ of 1951. The government stated that a group of military officers wanted to stage a coup, remove the government and take over power by force. Thence onward, there has been contest among the three groups: bureaucracy impeding the work of elected politicians, military supplanting the democratic governments, and the politicians trying to curtail bureaucracy as well as military. Competition and fights among these elite groups have almost become
a pattern in Pakistan’s politics; with people often acquiescing in to whichever group came into power.

Noting the crucial role of the three groups in the country’s political processes, the political history of Pakistan has been described as the history of its elite. This study seeks to understand how the competition among the elite groups takes place; how do elite compete for gaining, retaining and expanding power to prevail in decision-making and resource allocation; and how they try to achieve their ends and outmaneuver other elite groups for a desired course of action.

**Significance of the Study**

The present study is significant both from theoretical and practical perspectives. Theoretically, the study seeks a contextualization of elite theory by studying Pakistani elite groups against the backdrop of socio-cultural milieu and historical experiences of the country. It attempts to correlate practices and expressions of power exercise in the context of Pakistan’s historical experiences and socio-cultural settings with theoretical positions available that have emerged after considerable debate in the literature and are now available in elite theory. The study is also significant in that it tries to refine and sharpen certain concepts used in theoretical literature available on elite politics and introduce new concepts for a comprehensive appreciation of elite politics to achieve inter-cultural validity of the elite perspective.

The study also contributes to the theoretical literature available on issues related to governance, as it goes beyond the formal legal arrangements and institutions of the state and emphasizes the role of informal and extra-legal arrangements in exercise of power in
Pakistan. Moreover, the study attempts to demonstrate the usefulness and utility of interdisciplinary perspective in understanding politics as it largely benefits from the insights of political sociology.

Practically, the study informs policy formulations in matters of governance and politics. The reform agenda largely remains within the scope of making and amending laws and constitutions without any reference to informal arrangements and resources, which play important role in decision-making. A systematic study of all types of the resources—both legal and cultural used by the elite for achieving their desired course of action sheds light on the problems involved in reforming the system. Appreciating this, the study holds significance in that it attempts to provide insights to be used while suggesting policy guidelines for improvements to be introduced in the political system and administrative apparatus of the state. Such study may also suggest some more viable solutions to the perpetual problem of mal-governance attributed to various elite groups.

Review of Literature

There is a plethora of literature dealing with Pakistani politics using a variety of perspectives, but there is paucity of literature dealing with politics using insights of elite theory. The available literature ranges from anecdotal or popular literature to scholarly works grounded in rigorous academic traditions. In addition to work using elite perspective to explain Pakistani politics, a broad cross section of literature using perspective other than elite framework focusing on constitutional, political and historical developments has also been reviewed in order to have fuller comprehension and broader
picture of Pakistani politics. This appears helpful in arriving at a coherent review to build our framework of analysis.

The review starts with anecdotal and popular literature and goes down to the scholarly works in a chronological order with reference to the years of publication. The literature specifically using elite perspective on Pakistani politics has been treated chronologically towards the end of the review.

The major works in popular literature include Aqeel Abbas Jafri's *Pakistan ke Sivasi Waderay* (1994), Wakil Anjum's *Siyaasat ke Firaun* (n.d.) and *Siyaasatdanun ki Qalabaziyan* (1994), and Ahmad Salim and Muazzam Raza Tabassum's *Mamdot sey Watto Tak* (*Markaz Punjab Tanazia*) (1996). These works usually do not provide references to check the authenticity of their statements. This does not however mean that they do not contain facts. They are not careful while drawing inferences from some of the material they put before the reader. However, these books do provide accounts of social origins, ethnic affiliations and the role of the elite and elite groups in the country's politics. The accounts are also insightful with regard to the present study.

These works have contributed a good deal to the comprehension of the elite politics in Pakistan. These provide, sometimes, detailed accounts of various vital decision and political developments but employ polemical and deferential language while giving an account. These are important to help understand the context of a given decision or development. However, they usually fall short of criterion of scholarly treatment of material as they lack rigor of scientific methodologies for arriving at inferences. They
have not warranted a detailed review, as by their nature, they do not provide much help in arriving at a systematic framework for the present study.


Moreover, the personal accounts of people who were participants of decision-making process, or had been close to those directly involved in it provide behind-the-scenes explanations for a number of events. These works furnish with insights that go beyond the public face of politics and shed some light on the personal motives and vested interests of the elite for introducing policies, and laws, etc. At times, they provide some classified information, but may have some biases or be opinionated. These include, among others, Colonel Mohammad Ahmed’s *My Chief* (1960), Fazal Muqeeem Khan’s *The Story of Pakistan Army* (1963), Chaudhri Muhammad Ali’s *The Emergence of Pakistan* (1973), M. A. K. Chaudhary’s *Marshal La Ka Sivasi Andaz* (1988), M. B. Khalid’s *Aiwan-i-Sadr mein Sola Saal* (1988), Syed Shabbir Hussain’s *Ayub, Bhutto and Zia: How they fell*
victim to their own plans (2000) and K. M. Arif’s Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997 (2001). These works have not warranted a detailed review, as by their nature, they do not provide much help in arriving at a systematic framework for the present study.

Now we turn to the scholarly works dealing with Pakistani politics in general, which include works analyzing politics paying some attention to elite and elite groups as a part of their studies, and works exploring the role of a single elite group or an institution in the Pakistan’s polity such as the role of military, bureaucracy and political parties, etc. The works of the first kind include Keith Callard’s Pakistan—A Political Study (1957) which presents a lucid and cogent analysis of Pakistan during the first decade. Callard contends that owing to the bitter competition among the political leaders, the functioning of the state had passed into the hands of the Civil Service, backed by the Army. (p. 6) Moreover, these two institutions had carried on their colonial legacy to the post-independence era. But his analysis largely remains historical descriptive treating only formal legal aspects of Pakistani politics.

Khalid bin Sayeed’s work Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948 (1960) deals with the origins of Pakistan and the continuation of the viceroyal system in the country after independence. Its second part is focused on the functioning of the political system under Governor General M. A. Jinnah. It sheds light on his constitutional and political powers. The author contends that despite independence, Pakistan had not been able to dismantle the Viceroyal system of governance, which it had inherited from the colonial past. (p. 300) His analysis also explains the reasons for the failure of the parliamentary democracy in Pakistan.
Khalid bin Sayeed's other book, *Political System of Pakistan* (1967), presents a structural analysis of the political system in the country during the first two decades. He specifically deals with the relationship between the bureaucracy and military in the country's political system. He pertinently identifies three major actors in the political arena, namely, the Constituent Assembly, the civil service, and the army. As for the other forces such as landed interests and industrial-corporate concerns, he locates their representation in the above three institutions. (p. 78) His analysis remains confined to the formal-legal structures of the governance.

While exploring the reasons for the failure of evolving a constitution, Richard S. Wheeler in *The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest* (1970) identifies the controversies surrounding center-province relations and role of political parties, bureaucracy and army in the political and constitutional development of Pakistan till 1969. Major focus of the book remains on the role of domestic factors in constitutional issues. It misses out the role of international factors, which do seem to have bearing on legal and constitutional developments in Pakistan. Wheeler rightly infers that the history of Pakistan has been "tortuous and complicated maneuverings with the role of personalities often extremely important."(p. xii)

Lawrence Ziring's book *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (1980) puts Pakistani politics in proper perspective by taking into account the domestic as well as external affairs. Pakistan suffered weakness vis-à-vis India which, in Pakistan's thinking, posed the problem of survival as an independent country. India was successful in the initial years in flaunting resolutions of the Commonwealth and the United Nations with regard to issues close to the interest of Pakistan. In Ziring's words, Pakistan was
‘compelled’ to become “the United States’ most trusted ally in Asia.” (p. 223) In the process the United States came to have great influence on the socio-economic developments of the country. Ziring cites opinions held in Pakistan that “the United States was the real power behind the Ayub ‘putsch’.” (Ibid.)

In other chapters, Ziring discusses internal factors, personal as well as institutional, that profoundly affected the country’s politics. In a chapter titled ‘The Creators and Early Managers of Pakistan’, he lists important personalities and their pursuit of political power. In his view, Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, not proving himself a forceful personality, was unable to “maintain the integrity of his office.” (p. 73) This gave the Governor General’s position far more importance than was available in the parliamentary system. Liaquat’s successors indulged in petty infighting for political power and this gave the chance to bureaucracy to establish its presence in the decision-making process. In another chapter titled ‘Civil and Armed Bureaucrats’, Ziring discusses the military bureaucratic nexus, and notes that Army was not ready to take power in 1954 but by 1958 the military establishment had completed its modernization process; took over power but soldiers were sent back to barracks soon. Ayub led an alliance of civilian and military figures, which in Ziring’s view “resulted in the fabrication of a full blown administrative state.” (p. 81) To Ayub Khan, politics was demagogy and politicians were rabble-rousers, indulging in controversy, opportunism and corruption.

In yet another chapter titled ‘Political Movements and Political Parties’, Ziring notes how bureaucracy paid lip service to the Muslim League, remained dominant in decision-making and the Muslim League had to receive the criticism for unwarranted actions on the part of bureaucracy. “Mistrusted, intimidated, controlled by those possessing physical
power, political organizations were permitted to atrophy". (p. 195) Under a chapter meaningfully titled 'Incipient Constitutionalism', the author notes the lip service paid to constitutional enactments. In his view, "it is doubtful that many were serious about their commitment to such abstract, legal contrivances. Constitution-making and breaking was a game in which the players were confined almost exclusively to the power manipulators."

Ziring has dealt with most relevant themes to explain Pakistani politics, however, given the design of his book he has not gone into the specifics of 'infighting' which he rightly identifies among various groups.

Inamur Rehman's *Public Opinion and Political Development in Pakistan, 1947-1958* (1982) presents an analysis of public opinion and political developments in Pakistan's first eleven years of parliamentary democracy as influenced by the media. Rehman assumes first eleven years as 'parliamentary democracy,' (p. xiv) which appears unexamined as these years also witnessed authoritarian attitudes and role of army in the political decision making. He establishes that "[r]ulers and politicians wrangled and bumbled but with few exceptions, they did not interfere with the communication channels which remained open." (p. 242) He has explained the political manipulations and public opinion on important decisions such as dismissal of Khwaja Nazimudin, dissolution of Constituent Assembly, etc. The work is very insightful in that it provides a perspective on media as a resource to be used for political manipulations.

Veena Kukreja in her work *Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan* (1985) explains the phenomenon of military intervention in political arena with the help of three variables, namely the nature of the military establishment, the strength or weakness of the civilian political institutions, and the domestic socio-economic and
international environments. Discussing the first variable, Kukreja follows Luckham,\(^1\) and brings out the three kinds of resources, which the military may have: coercive and strategic, organizational and political. The political resources depend upon, inter alia, the extent of “socio-metric links of friendship, kinship, etc.” of the military with political power groups, as well as the extent of “diffuse political support it can generate for its social legitimacy, including its capacity to manipulate political symbols and create political organizations in order to win mass support for itself.” (pp. 37) However, while discussing the second variable, i.e., the strength or weakness of the political institutions, she does not take into count resources like lineage, kinship, etc., which an elite may favorably employ, and thus, impact upon the civil-military relations. Nonetheless, she acknowledges the role of the ‘social structure’, which is a constituent of domestic socio-economic environment, but does not elaborate it.

She infers that “[t]he elite composition of all the three resultant military regimes seems more or less similar: an oligarchic elite composed—initially—of the military, the bureaucracy, and the landed aristocracy.” (p. 185) However she does not appreciate the contest for power among these three categories at institutional level. Another problem is that civilian or political elites are taken as ‘landed aristocracy’ only. This does not stand against the test of evidence as military governments have been co-opting religious and mercantile classes. Zia regime largely co-opted religious elite as compared to landed aristocracy.

Hasan-Askari Rizvi’s *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86* (1986) discusses the military intervention in politics, and assesses the role and influence of the military under

various regimes, including the elected ones. Investigating the causes for the weakness of
democratic institutions in newly independent states, including Pakistan, Rizvi asserts that
the indigenous political culture is largely responsible for it, which has authoritarian
contents. "Ascriptive status, rural kinship system and the socialization process in the
family produce authoritarian norms. Such developments stand in the way of the ordinary
man's becoming a citizen of a nation-state." (p. 4) It is significant that the author
acknowledges the role of cultural factors in authoritarian political trends in the country in
order to explain civil military relations, though he does not elaborate them.

Furthermore, he argues that the political leaders aim at modernization, which also
requires the "institutionalization of operational political and social values, their
legitimacy in culture and the weakening, if not supplantment, of primordial allegiance." (p. 5) It may be pointed out here that in the political arena, these primordial allegiances
serve as resources, which are employed by the military, bureaucratic and political elite for
their political ends.

He theorizes the courses of actions that are available to the military regimes, which
include among others, the establishment of military's permanent legal and/or
constitutional role in government. (Ibid.) This pertinent observation merits a detailed
study of the strategies and maneuvers used by the military to carve out a permanent space
for itself in legal and constitutional framework in order to justify and extend legitimacy to
its role in political decision-making. Rizvi contends that "[o]nce the tradition of civilian
supremacy is eroded and the military assumes a direct political role, it cannot adopt an
apolitical posture." (Ibid.) However, the political elite make efforts to keep the military
out of political decision-making by taking almost all these steps which military takes to
stay in political arena.

Mohammad Waseem in *Politics and the State in Pakistan* (1989) presents an analysis of
the political system in Pakistan from a ‘historical-structural perspective’. While
discussing the structural dynamics of the Pakistani polity, the work largely focuses on the
principal institutions of the state, namely, the military and the bureaucracy within the
framework of the legal and constitutional authority. It also explores the patterns of
leadership under various regimes, role of political parties, institutional changes in the
higher bureaucracy and judiciary, and economic policies in the country; nevertheless, the
analysis remains largely confined to the structural aspects. It analyzes the institutionalized
relationship of the state with the society at both formal and informal levels. “The former
represented a high level of ‘objectification’ of law [sic] and bureaucratic authority while
the latter reflected the clientelistic relationships between the bureaucracy on the one hand
and the tribal and landed elite on the other.” (p. 463)

Though the work infers that the “state in Pakistan comprised both a formal institutional
apparatus and a vast network of patron-client relations performing an informal control
function” (p. 460), the assertion of informal, extra-constitutional and extra-legal elements
in the political, social and economic processes and developments remains under-treated.

Saeed Shafqat in *Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy: Essays in Interpretation*
(1989), which is a collection of essays on varied themes related to the country’s political
system, provides an overview of the developments in political system. Chapter II titled
“Political System of Pakistan 1947-89: A Brief Analysis” offers a theoretical and
conceptual explanation of the changes in the relationship among the ‘structural components’ of the country’s political system. These include the military, bureaucracy, industrial-merchant classes, political elites, and religious elites. (p. 24) Shafqat identifies a pattern in the mechanism of ruling coalition formation and structural changes in the political system in the country. He argues that four mechanisms, comprising of selective cooption, collateralization, containment and changes in international environment, have been employed by the successive regimes, to bring about structural change in the country’s political system. (p. 30) However, the essay tends to treat the political elite, military and bureaucracy as monolithic structures, and thus, overlooks the varied levels of interlocking of certain groups within the political elite, military and bureaucracy, and the interplay of informal structures in the ascendency of one group and decline of the other. The factors which determine the preference for these mechanisms vis-à-vis other groups have not been discussed. The essay tends to ignore that beneath the structural level, where these mechanisms are employed, there exist resources including a web of personal relationships, often based on ascribed identities, which influence the choice of the elite as to what strategy will be employed vis-à-vis whom.

Chapter IV titled “Bureaucracy, Military and Party Politics—1947-58” assesses the causes for the ascendency of the bureaucratic-military elite and the decline of party politics during the first decade of Pakistan’s history by reviewing the praetorian, ideological, Marxian and elite approaches. Employing elite approach, he tries to establish that “the dominance of the bureaucratic-military elites results not so much from their organizational superiority as from the pre-emption and monopolization of key governmental offices in the political system by the elite.” (p. 130) Pre-emption as a strategy by the bureaucratic-military elite to contain the political elite appears very
relevant in explaining elite interplay in Pakistan. However, in contrast to his position in Chapter II he treats bureaucratic-military elite relatively as a monolithic category vis-à-vis political elite. Furthermore, the informal political resources have not been systematically dealt with.

Ayesha Jalal’s The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (1991) offers an historical analysis of the first decade after independence, which witnessed shifts in the institutional balance of power between elected and non-elected institutions. (p. 3) The study brings out the interplay of international and regional political and economic factors, which influenced the dialectic between state construction and political processes. It challenges the argument that the most potent cause of military takeover in 1958 was the weakness of political parties. Instead, it argues that military had already established its hegemony in 1951. (pp. 3-4) The analysis is quite pertinent, but the variables are international linkages of the military and bureaucratic elite, which they skillfully manipulated to dominate the state structures.

Ayesha Jalal in Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and historical perspective (1995) investigates the causes of the apparent success of democracy in India and its apparent failure in Pakistan and Bangladesh by comparative analysis of the processes of state construction and consolidation in the three polities. The author challenges the traditional concepts of democracy and authoritarianism and their polarity, and argues that both democratic and authoritarian tendencies not only co-exist in various regimes, they also inform each other. (p. 3)
In the framework of state-society dialectics, the study discusses the interplay of distinctive regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious, sectarian, and caste identities with the state structures and socio-political processes. While referring to the formal/legal and informal/extra-legal dichotomy, Jalal argues that the British tried to establish their political control over South Asia through “rule-bound institutions based on Western concepts of contractual law and impersonalized sovereignty rather than on the personal patronage of rulers... A political unity conceived and constructed in cold-blooded fashion and frozen in the impersonal rationality of bureaucratic institutions could neither reflect, nor capture, the internal dynamics of a society accustomed to direct, personalized rule.” (p. 10) Similarly, at another place, Jalal mentions the “contradiction between a personalized Indian society and, in theory if not always in practice, an impersonalized colonial state apparatus”, (p. 11) which was later bequeathed by the governance structures and patterns in Pakistani polity. Despite explicitly mentioning the informal and personalized governance patterns and control mechanisms, which influence the social and political processes in the country, the author does not empirically substantiate this assertion, and the analysis largely remains confined to legal-rational structures and processes of governance.

Paula Newberg in *Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan* (1998) focuses on the history of judicial institutions and the status of constitutions from 1947 to 1993. Newberg explores the relationship between the state and civil society in context of judicial decisions and constitutional arrangements. She argues that as a result of incomplete constitution-making, state institutions such as military, bureaucracy and judiciary have come to play important role in constitutional interpretation and political change. (p. 2) Newberg asserts that “a constitution autocratically conceived cannot be
popularly legitimate or democratic." (p. 233) She refers to the tradition of constitution-making in Pakistan which has given way to judiciary for a greater role to play. Superior judiciary has played a mediating role between the state and society, and has overruled legislatures as well as executives.

She analyzes the issues of power within the scope of constitutionalism and judicial pronouncements, and explores the consequences for the formal organization of political power. (p. 2) The analysis remains confined within the parameters of formal-legal categories and tries to explain constitutional politics. However, in practice, politics or exercise of power does not remain confined within the legal and constitutional arrangements, rather constitutions are essentially considered a manifestation of political decisions wherein rules of the political game are set. Therefore, for a comprehensive analysis of constitutional politics, it appears promising to go beyond the public face and look into the pragmatic maneuvers for having a certain kind of rule of the game in place.

One of recent accounts of Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto, (1997) is an attempt to assess and evaluate the impact of military rule on the society, economy and political system of Pakistan. Shafqat also explores two contradictory tendencies of political developments in Pakistan: first, suppression of participatory politics and making the political parties, etc. subordinate to military hegemony, and secondly, subordination of the military-bureaucratic elites to civilian led party dominance. These two tendencies are reflected in the military-hegemonic political system (1958-1969 and 1977-1985) and the party-dominant political system (1971-1977 and 1985-1996). (p. 3)
While exploring the causes behind the hegemony of the military and the failure of the
democratic processes and institutions to sustain it, it discusses the interplay and the
relationship among the bureaucratic-military elites, political leadership, socio-economic
classes, feudal class, middle farmer class, peasants, tenants/sharecroppers, urban middle
class, industrial labour, financial-industrial groups, and the religious groups. The
conceptual framework focuses on the interaction between the military and the political
parties, and their impact on democratic processes and military hegemony.

Like earlier work, Shafqat treats bureaucratic-military elite as a homogenous and
monolithic category (p. 4) whereas the interests of the bureaucracy and military may not
always coincide. Furthermore, he invokes the concept of ‘political leadership’ vis-à-vis
bureaucratic-military elite, and argues that “the concept of political leadership can be
operationalized with greater precision as compared to that of political elite. The concept
of political elite involves some degree of consensus, cohesion, similarity of beliefs and
social origins. In Pakistan, political leadership is singularly non-cohesive, non-
consensual, and non-institutionalized, despite similarities of social origins, beliefs, values
and, to a certain degree, style.” (Ibid.) Here it may be pointed out that the concept of elite
is wider as compared to that of leadership, leadership usually used in the sense of
individual leader, who is placed on the top of a hierarchy of group. The usage of two
concepts of elite and political leadership for analyzing the civil-military relations is
inconsistent. Moreover, as maintained by Shafqat that the concept of elite presumes a
cohesive group, it may be argued that Mosca, one of the earliest elite theorists, had
delineated three essential characteristics of elite—consciousness, cohesion and conspiracy
(referred to as 3 Cs of Mosca), but later, he had revised his stance regarding elite cohesion
and consensus. Mosca not only sought to reconcile elitism with democracy, he confirmed
to the concept of elite pluralism, whereby elite in society have diverse and conflicting interests.

In Bhutto era (1971-1977), Shafqat points out some authoritarian tendencies (p. 11) but it may be added here that the authoritarian military regimes may also have democratic elements such as the Basic Democracies of Ayub Khan regime and the recent Devolution of Power by Musharraf Government, which may be labeled as controlled or guided democracy.

Hasan-Askari Rizvi’s work Military, State and Society in Pakistan (2000) studies the changing patterns of civil-military relations. Rizvi identifies four factors, which have caused the expansion of the role of the military: the dynamics of the polity; the institutional strengths and organizational resources of the military; interaction across the functional boundaries between the military and civil society, and the international factors and considerations. (pp. 21-26) While establishing the significance of societal factors in explaining the role of the military in the country’s politics, Rizvi maps a variety of factors like inarticulate middle class, and lack of voluntary organizations, etc. However, he does not bring out the role of informal networks and personal connections between the military and civilian elite as one of the important societal factors in the dynamics of civil-military relations.

Since the military has both directly and indirectly intervened in the political sphere, it has "enabled it to spread out so widely in the government, the economy and society at large that its clout no longer depends on controlling the levers of power. It is derived from its organizational strengths and its significant presence in all sectors of the government and
the society." (p. 2) Rizvi brings to forefront the new pattern of 'soft' or 'non-takeover' intervention of the military in political arena in the post-Zia era. The Army Chief, together with the President and the Prime Minister, constitutes the triangle of power or the Troika—"an extra-constitutional arrangement for civilian-military consensus-building on key domestic, foreign policy and security issues." (Ibid.) The perspective of extra-legal arrangement is quite helpful in appreciating the nature of civil-military relations. In addition, Rizvi has rightly pointed out the policy-decisions and strategies of the military governments in order to secure benefits for the military personnel in terms of civilian jobs and political rewards, (p. 233-36) but these strategies need to be systematically explored further.

M. Rafique Afzal’s Pakistan: History and Politics 1947-1971 (2001) provides a comprehensive account of developments taking place in Pakistan from 1947-71 in a historical framework. It provides a coherent mix of factors in shaping the course of history ranging from domestic political developments to foreign relations.

In addition to the above studies on the political system in the country, there are studies that have either exclusively focused on one or more of the state structures or have tried to explain the nature of political developments and their implications on the political system of Pakistan within the dominant frame of a single institution. Those studying the military exclusively include, for instance, Raymond A. Moore, Jr.’s Nation-building and the Pakistan Army, 1947-1969 (1979), which assesses the political and military role of the Pakistan army in nation-building, army’s support in developmental works, and the contributions of the army institutions in the fields of education, health, and welfare, etc. and Stephen P. Cohen on The Pakistan Army (1984) presents an organizational profile of
the Pakistan Army. Major General (Retd) Shaukat Riza's *The Pakistan Army 1947-49* (1989) covers the history of the activities and reconstitution of the Pakistan Army after the first two years of independence.

Other works which have focused on bureaucracy include, among others, Ralph Braibanti's works *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan* (1966), and *Evolution of Pakistan's Administrative System*, (n.d.), Henry Frank Goodnow, *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation* (1969), Mumtaz Ahmad's *Bureaucracy and Political Development in Pakistan* (1974) and Emajuddin Ahmed's *Bureaucratic Elites in Segmented Economic Growth: Pakistan and Bangladesh* (1980), Charles H. Kennedy's *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* (1987), and Musiafa Chowdhury's work *Pakistan—Its Politics and Bureaucracy* (1988). These works on bureaucracy give an overview of the functioning of the bureaucracy in Pakistan, its political role and contribution in development and various reforms introduced to change the role of bureaucracy.

Studies particularly focused on the political parties include, for instance, K. K. Aziz's work *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958*, (1976), M. Rafique Afzal's *Political Parties in Pakistan* (Vol. I 1976, Vol. II 1987, and Vol. III 1998) and Prof. Muhammad Usman and Masud Ashar's *Pakistan ki Sayasi Jamatain* (1988). All these works highlight the role of one or the other legal-rational structures in the political system of Pakistan, and their analysis remains confined to the formal level, largely at the expense of the informal level, where various primordial and indigenous social institutions play a crucial role in determining political action and decision-making.
Now we turn our attention to research works having reference to elite frameworks, and attempt to explain Pakistan's politics in elite perspective. One of major studies on Pakistani elite is undertaken by Robert LaPorte Jr. In the words of the author, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-making in Pakistan (1975) is an attempt to provide systematic information about who governs in Pakistan and about its decision-making processes. (pp. 1-2) While chronologically proceeding, the study explores the nature and dimensions of political power, influence and decision-making in the country under various regimes. A significant merit of the study is that it operationalizes the concepts of elite, elite group, non-elite group, influence, influential, influence structure, decision-making, and decision-making structures and processes in context of Pakistan. (p. 3)

LaPorte classifies the Pakistani elite in three major but overlapping categories—political, economic and social elite. (i) The political elites include the top-level military, central elite civil services, and other members of the large landowning families. By lumping together the three sub-categories of political elite, the analysis of politics among them gets blurred since the interests of the three sub-categories do not always coincide. (ii) The economic elite includes the industrialist class, whereas (iii) the third category is social elite, which overlap with the political elite. However, LaPorte's analysis only covers the first two kinds of elite in Pakistan. Furthermore, he assesses the change in factors that influence decision-making, but his assessment remains restricted to events of political import such as the regional and economic disparities, and the Indo-Pak War of 1971, etc. The analysis thus misses out on the personal factors, which influence the elite decision-making. The author predicts, “though present elite qualifications cluster around family background, social position, and wealth (especially land), political skills and ‘ability’ will become increasingly important in Pakistani society.” (pp. 179-80) It seems that he is
assuming 'ability' in terms of meritocracy and legal criterion to enter and excel in elite structure. But at the same time he also talks about political skills, which are essentially pragmatic steps within the scope of legal and normative arrangements. His blend of political skills and 'ability' seems to be unexamined. It may be pointed out that the elite in Pakistan as elsewhere always resort to political skills and abilities, in addition to the elite networking.

Asaf Hussain in *Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan* (1979) elaborates on the theme of political stratification and political elite in Pakistan. Discussing the political system of the country, the study suggests a continuity of the personalized nature of rule in contemporary Pakistan from the medieval times, and argues that the rule of the medieval Muslim Kings such as that of the Mughals was based on the personal loyalty. In fact, their political structures were indicative of "patrimonial relations". (p. 20) Nonetheless, the personalized rule in Pakistani polity has not been empirically substantiated in the book.

This elaborate work on Pakistani elite is one of its own kind, being the first detailed treatment of the elite phenomenon in the country within the dominant framework of ideological state, where political and economic developments take place along moral lines, whereas in non-ideological states, these developments take place along secular lines. (p. 33) He goes on to assert that western approaches do not explain the unique realities of Pakistan, which is an ideological state. For instance, while explaining military intervention in political arena, he argues that the term 'intervention' is misleading in that military is essentially the part of political system, and "apart from Islam the military was
the only other pillar of the ideological state and it provided alternative political leadership whenever there was a crisis." (p. 133)

The study classifies the Pakistani elite into various categories such as the landowning, bureaucratic, religious, industrial, professional and military elite. These categories are in fact over-lapping, but appear to be marred by simplistic explanation, which do not take into account the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the elite phenomenon. Furthermore, the study investigates two kinds of relationships in the political system, which are meant for mobilizing resources for exercising power or influence over others. The temporary relationships include horizontal and vertical alliances, which link elite groups with one another and with the masses respectively. The permanent relationships are the relationship of the political elite to their social structure, comprising of class and/or ethnic identities. (pp. 37-8.) Class and occupation can be altered but the ethnic identity is unchangeable. Hussain suggests that all political elite of the country identify themselves with any one of the six politically significant ethnic structures, which include the East Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis and Muhajirs. (pp. 38-42) He further states that greater the capacity to mobilize resources, more the sanctions that could be enforced. (p. 42.) He defines the term resources as "anything ranging from wealth, skills, ideologies, foreign aid, friendship, social status and religion to an ability for coercion (strikes, assassinations, etc.)." (Ibid.) The framework developed in first two chapters has tangentially operationalized the varied strategies and political resources employed by the elite in order to acquire power in succeeding chapters.

S.H. Hashmi's article The Concept of Elites and Its Relevance to Pakistan (1980) provides a cursory glance over the various categories of elite such as bureaucratic,
political, military, and business-industrial elite. He particularly highlights the shift of power from one elite group to the other. Hashmi's analysis partly focuses on the alliances among elite groups in formal-legal framework. (p. 26) He also points out that the role of the elite has been so much crucial in the country's political processes that its political history can be described as the history of its elites. (p. 31) The article only tries to establish the relevance of the concept of elite for analyzing the Pakistani politics.

Huma Naz's work *Bureaucratic Elites and Political Developments in Pakistan (1947-1958)* (1980) is particularly focused on the bureaucratic elite. She also discusses the relationship between the bureaucratic elite and the political leadership. Her analysis remains confined within the framework of formal-legal arrangements, and does not take cognizance of pragmatic steps using political resources by the bureaucratic elite to assert themselves vis-à-vis the political elite.

The literature reviewed points to the direct or indirect reference to elite politics in order to explain Pakistan's politics. Works of both popular and scholarly nature refer to elite politics in one way or the other. However, most of the works are descriptive and do not explain Pakistan's politics in a systematic manner.

**Organization of the Study**

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first introductory chapter, including a literature review, is followed by the second chapter, which presents a critique of the developments in the elite theory, sharpens some of the existing concepts and coins new concepts to create a contextualized framework of analysis, along with the methodology of the study.
Chapter three "Setting the Context: Pragmatics and the Making of the Public Face of Politics" places the argument in the larger historical context. Drawing on historical political sociology, it analyzes the elite politics in northern India during pre-colonial times with a contrasting analysis of the functioning of modern legal-rational structures during the British rule both of which go to make the major contours of 'public face' of Pakistan's politics. It also highlights the elite and elite groups as well as the legislative arrangements in colonial times.

Chapter four "Political Competition among Civilian Elite and the Emergence of Rival Elite" discusses the political competition among the civilian elite in early years after independence, with focus on their pragmatic strategies for outmaneuvering its members keeping the public face of politics in their major decisions. It also brings to the fore the gradual rise of the bureaucratic and military elite as rival elite in the body politic of Pakistan.

Chapter five "Dismissing a Civilian Prime Minister: Nazimuddin's Removal and its Pragmatics" studies the decision of Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin's dismissal (1953). It sheds light on the public face of his dismissal along with the pragmatic considerations behind it, and pragmatic gains accruing to the bureaucratic-military elite from it, which contributed to consolidating their position vis-à-vis the civilian elite.

Chapter six "Dissolution of Constituent Assembly and its Pragmatics" deals with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (1954) and explains how political actors may try to break the existing rules of political conduct for the sake of pragmatic gains, and
rere define the rules of political competition. Like the earlier chapter, it also highlights the public face and pragmatics of the decision of the Governor General in dissolving the Assembly.

The last chapter "Pragmatics of Bureaucratic-Military Coup" focuses on the pragmatic reasons of the coup of October 1958 by President Mirza. It also explores the dynamics of competition among the rival elite: military elite led by Ayub Khan and bureaucratic elite represented by President Mirza. In addition, it also reveals the pragmatic reasons of Mirza's ouster from power and the pragmatic gains accruing to the military elite from it. The chapter is followed by Summary and Conclusion.
Chapter 2

Framework of Analysis and Methodology

Our review of literature indicates pervasive competition among and within certain elite groups for gaining and maintaining power in the society. This is clear from books of popular nature, and biographies and autobiographies of political personages and account of persons who were participant in decision-making at important points of time in the country's history since its inception. Several research works have focused on the institutions of the country and have treated the role of elite in legal constitutional terms, usually emphasizing deviations from legal norms. Others have analyzed the political role of the bureaucracy and military as political elite groups, again in the framework of historical and legal perspective. Some attention has been paid to the socioeconomic origins of elite and elite groups, without any systematic treatment.

The present chapter attempts to develop a framework of analysis to explain elite politics in Pakistan in the light of the review of literature on elite theory. It also delimits its scope, provides methodology of the study and briefly comments on the sources used in the study.

Framework of Analysis

In the literature, elite has been used in a variety of ways ranging from merely to mean an 'influential person' to a complex and intricate concept for explaining power and politics
of an individual, group or a polity. The complexity of the concept of elite for any sociopolitical analysis is evident from the variety of phrases such as political class, ruling class, political elite, ruling elite, and power elite etc, denoting vital differences in approaches and methodologies to explain power and politics in the elite perspective. When used in serious analysis, elite has been understood in various meanings in different cultures probably because of varied sociopolitical realities of a given polity, making intercultural discourse difficult on the subject. There has also been debate regarding compatibilities and or incompatibilities between elite rule and democratic practices and then there have been efforts at the reconciliation of the two, all indicating the variety of meaning in the usage of the concept. Given the difficulties in conceptualizing and operationalizing the concept of elite there is a need to review the elite theory and work out a framework for analyzing Pakistan's politics.

Ever since late nineteenth century a plethora of literature has appeared on the subject of elite, though in the modern European thought, some of the basic ideas of the elite theory can be traced back to the writings of Machiavelli as well. However, it was the positive philosophy of August Comte which directly influenced the modern elite theorists—Gastano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, two Italian thinkers, with whom the classical elite theory or elitism systematically began. Later, another classical elite theorist, Robert Michels also substantially contributed to the elite studies. Thus, the term elite with its

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present connotations gained currency in late nineteenth century,\(^5\) when it began to be referred in sociological writings.

Gaetano Mosca, a late nineteenth and early twentieth century Italian social scientist, expounded his elite theory in *The Ruling Class* (1939). He presented a two-class analytical model of society contrary to the Marxian view that capitalist system would eventuate in 'classless' society.\(^6\) Mosca maintained that the phenomenon of social divisions was not only universal but also inevitable.\(^7\) There is, he explained, an 'organized minority', which rules over the 'unorganized majority'.\(^8\) The key to elite rule over the masses lies in the two advantageous characteristics of elite—better organization and better cohesion.\(^9\) However, Bottomore distinguished two distinct groups in the political class—the political elite and the courtier-elite. The former group actually exercises power, whereas the latter comprises those who aspire for positions of power, and includes opposition leaders, businessmen, intellectuals and trade union leaders, etc. representing the new social forces and interests.\(^10\) Mosca added a third category of sub-elite, which serves as an intermediary link between the elite and the lower stratum of society.\(^11\)

\(^5\) In fact, the elite theories of Mosca, Pareto and Michels appeared as a response to the Marxist theory, which idealized a classless society. Therefore, one of the major concerns of the early elite theories was to establish the universality and inevitability of elite in all societies—past, present and future. Olsen, *Power in Societies*, p. 108.

\(^6\) Writing in response to the Marxian ideal of a classless society based on the notion of power equality, Mosca divided the human society into two classes—a class that rules or 'the ruling class', as he calls it, and the other that is ruled. G. Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (Elementi di Scienza Politica), edited and revised by Arthur Livingston. Translated by Hannah D. Kahn, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 50.


\(^8\) Mosca, *The Ruling Elite*, 1939, p. 53.


\(^11\) Ibid., p. 11.
Mosca added that sometimes a single individual, or even a small oligarchy, becomes extremely influential and may hold a de facto position in a society. He also referred to the advantages of certain resources such as connections and kinships. He dubbed these resources as the "political forces"\(^\text{12}\), which play an instrumental role in contest for power. He wrote: "...candidates who are successful in democratic elections are almost always the ones who possess the political forces ... which are often hereditary."\(^\text{13}\)

Earlier, Mosca had stated that a parliamentary representative was in fact not elected by the people, rather it is his friends who got him elected.\(^\text{14}\) Probably here Mosca referred to the informal linkages between the influential people, which may affect the political choices and behaviour of the voters. Later, however, instead of being an organized cohesive minority, elite for him became a mosaic of organized minorities.\(^\text{15}\) He almost abandoned the three 'Cs' of elite consciousness, cohesiveness and conspiracy.\(^\text{16}\) The revised stance of Mosca was in conformity with the concept of elite pluralism—elite having diverse and conflicting interests represented in a political system.\(^\text{17}\) It may be noted that despite conflicting interests, the elite may forge alliances and establish networks to achieve their interests depending on the imperative of the situation.

\(^\text{13}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{15}\) It is important to note that the elite theory of Mosca underwent a revision. The two volumes of his work *Elements* appeared in 1896 and 1923, and this gap of 27 years witnessed a radical shift in his position regarding elitism and representative democracy. Earlier, he has denounced the representative democracy and its elective procedure. However, later, he reconciled elitism and liberal democracy.
\(^\text{16}\) Parry, *Political Elites*, p. 41.
\(^\text{17}\) Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism*, p. 16.
Mosca defines political equality in terms of the equality of political opportunity giving ample space to strife for rising to positions of power through competition. However, he acknowledged that the equality of political opportunity might be guaranteed legally, where opportunities of political participation are theoretically equal for all, but in practice, political forces such as connections and kinship place an individual in a better position in competition than other contestants.

Vilfredo Pareto is considered a proponent of Mosca’s elitism, and whose work *The Mind and Society* (1935) propounds his elite theory. However, unlike Mosca, Pareto believed in the “inequality of individual endowment in every sphere of social life”, and stated that individuals are physically, morally and intellectually different from each other. Thus, due to heterogeneity of human society, social divisions are inevitable and universal as well. However, Pareto misses the point that individuals are also unequal in terms of resources—including the strategies, which they employ to gain positions of power. These resources may include the prerogative of birth, lineage, blood / familial ties, or even contracted matrimonial alliances in informal sense, as well as constitutional and legal resources in formal sense.

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18 Ibid., pp. 14-6.
20 Pareto shared many of the ideas of Mosca about elite, but he presented a much wider and more comprehensive explanation of the elite phenomenon. For a brief critique of Pareto’s elite theory, see Vilfredo Pareto, *Sociological Writings* selected and introduced by S. E. Finer, Translated by Denick Minin, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976, pp. 77-81.
Defining governing elite/governing classes, Pareto held that elite consists of classes having the highest potentialities and achievements in their respective areas of activities.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, he evaluated elite on the basis of the “measurement of displayed achievement”.\textsuperscript{23} He redefined the elite as certain groups of people called ‘aristocracies’.\textsuperscript{24} Realizing the significance of certain social and psychological factors in the composition of the elite, he asserted that certain personality characteristics accompanied by certain social, economic and political prerogatives considerably affect the making of an elite.\textsuperscript{25} Pareto further argued that certain prerogatives such as wealth, family, or social connections are enjoyed by one social group.\textsuperscript{26} Pareto failed to mention the nature of social connections, which may be based on, as in case of Pakistan, certain primordial identities such as ethnic, linguistic, religious, sectarian, and regional/local affinities and affiliations, etc. Pareto further added that individuals with certain psychological traits or ‘residues’ also tend to rise to positions of power, especially if there exists a compatibility between their residues and the existing social, economic and political conditions.\textsuperscript{27}

Pareto discussed elite circulation from both within and without, i.e. intra-group circulation within elite and inter-group circulation between elite and non-elite.\textsuperscript{28} While he significantly elaborated the inter-group circulation, Pareto did not explain the intra-group circulation within elite. It may be added here that in case of Pakistan, certain political, economic as well as social prerogatives may play an important role in inter-group

\textsuperscript{22} For details see Finner’s Introduction to Pareto, Sociological Writings, p. 51, Bottomore, Elite and Society, 7.
\textsuperscript{23} Parry, Political Elites, pp. 45-6. Pareto’s governing elite is synonymous with Mosca’s political class. However, later Pareto abandoned this definition of elite owing to its impracticability for sociological studies. For details see p. 46.
\textsuperscript{24} Pareto, “Elite and Force”, in Olson, Power in Societies, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{25} Marvin E. Olsen, “Elitist Theory as a Response to Marx” in Ibid., p. 107.
circulation, but as for the intra-group circulation, it is largely the social prerogatives which play vital role as to who would go to the top of the various hierarchies of power.

A late nineteenth and early twentieth century classical elite theorist, Robert Michels presented his elite theory in his work *Political Parties* (1915). Like Mosca, he repudiated the Marxist notion of a classless society, and stressed the indispensability of elite existence in all human societies. According to Michels, leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life. He presented an organizational and sociological interpretation and explanation of elite that is best illustrated in his "Iron Law of Oligarchy". The crux of this law lies in his oft-quoted formula: "Who says organization, says oligarchy". He assumed that this law governs all social organizations, and hence, all organizations inevitably become oligarchic. Michels' argument may be classified in three categories: structural, operational and practical. Structurally, all organizations tend to have hierarchical structure in which power is exercised downward from the top. Operationally, leaders possess certain advantages like skills and experience over the masses, aided by influence and relationship they become indispensable for the organization. Moreover, owing to their better organization, they can check their rivals as well. Lastly, in practical terms, the majority of the masses does not possess any vigour, interest or desire for attaining power, and thus, submits to leaders to avoid responsibilities of leadership. It may be noted here that the lack of resources may also restrict the masses from aspiring to leadership. However, Michels is silent about the nature of

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29 His method of investigation has been considered the 'most rigidly scientific' of any of the classical elitists, and his findings are considered to be the most empirical and the most sociological in nature. Parry, Political Elites, p. 42, Olsen, "Elitist Theory as a Response to Marx", in Olsen, Power in Societies, p. 108.


influence and relationship, which help the elite in establishing their position operationally. It may be added here that in case of Pakistan, the elite also have the resources to check their rivals through varied means.

Michels saw political parties as one of various crucibles from which political elite arose.\textsuperscript{33} Interpreting the basic tenet of elitism that power breeds power, he maintained that control of party funds and channels of information by elite could be used for enhancing power.\textsuperscript{34} Here Michels appears to be dealing with the resources used by the elite for power, though tangentially. It may be added that in a political party those who are well-connected owing to multiple resources tend to rise to positions of power more often than others. Michels’ theory is based on the assumption that organizations inevitably become oligarchic. However, Michels does not treat the strategies, resources and the nature of maneuvers required to form oligarchies, and the means to perpetuate them.

The elite theories of classical elite theorists were followed by neo-classical elite theories, to which Lasswell, Burnham and Aron, and many others significantly contributed.

For explaining his elite theory, Harold D Lasswell invoked the concepts of exercise and distribution of power. He initially defined elite as “the few who get the most of any value”, but later, he explained the various categories of elite in terms of power distribution. He defined elite as “those with most power in a group; mid-elite, those with less power, the mass, least power”.\textsuperscript{35} In fact, he conceived politics as the sharing and shaping of power, while he defined power as the participation in decision-making within

\textsuperscript{34} Parry, Political Elites, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{35} Buehrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism, p. 67.
governmental framework.\textsuperscript{36} In view of Bachrach, Lasswell’s orientation to politics facilitates a realistic and functional interpretation of political elite.\textsuperscript{37}

Since he defined power within governmental framework, his political elite exercising the most of power in a community were directly involved in decision-making and power exertion by virtue of being a part of governmental machinery. He defined ‘political elites’ as “the power holders of a body politic.”\textsuperscript{38} He did not confine his concept of political elite to the leadership alone, and thus, included in it the ‘social formations’ from which leaders are usually recruited.\textsuperscript{39} However, he did not discuss the criterion on the basis of which elite is recruited—such as acquired skills or ascribed characteristics or both.

Lasswell contended that the stability of the elite domination lies in “manipulating symbols, controlling supplies, and applying violence”. Later, he emphasized more on manipulation of symbols by elite in order to perpetuate their power.\textsuperscript{40} However, he did not elaborate what types of symbol the elite bring into play, and how symbolic appeal in the longer run can help consolidate their power if not supplemented by other legal and utilitarian steps. It may be added here that in case of Pakistan, elite invoke symbols of formal-legal connotation such as political stability and rule of law, as well as informal/primordial, and normative symbols such as kinship, lineage, family, clan / braderi, as well as religious symbols to help stabilize their hold on their privileged position.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 57, 69.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 72.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. Lasswell had reintroduced the notion of social formations (the intermediary classes between the elite and the masses which he considered to be a recruiting ground for elites) in elitism, which was hitherto excluded from it by Pareto.
\textsuperscript{40} Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism, p. 66.
James Burnham, an American disciple of Mosca, attempted to synthesize Marxist and elitist theories, hitherto conceived as contradictory. He presented economic and materialistic interpretation of elite theory by defining elite as a group controlling the important means of production, and suggested that the state laws facilitate the elite in perpetuating its control over the means of production.\textsuperscript{41} Here it may be argued that the parameter of means of production in terms of resources is quite narrow, since elite also employ other resources like symbolic and coercive, etc. Nevertheless, Burnham has very pertinently highlighted that how state laws are formulated and used to strengthen and consolidate the position of elite. He seems to leave out the informal and normative resources, which also lend some degree of permanence to the elite’s privileged positions.

Raymond Aron, another elite theorist, defines elite as “all those who in diverse activities are high in the hierarchy, who occupy any important privileged positions, whether in terms of wealth or of prestige”.\textsuperscript{42} Limiting its scope, he defines ‘political class’ as a ‘narrow minority’ actually performing the political functions of government, while he places ‘ruling class’ between the elite and the political class. To him, the ruling class consists of privileged people who do not exercise actual political functions but influence the governing and the obeying people owing to their moral authority or economic power.\textsuperscript{43} However, the reasons for their influence as suggested by Aron are quite narrow and restricting, since in addition to moral authority and/or economic power, the ruling class may also influence others by virtue of its distinguished social position.

\textsuperscript{41} Parry, Political Elites, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
Aron also added that in modern societies, power has to be civilian, commanding public legitimacy. But power is only effective if the military establishment is subservient to it. Even many of the politicians enjoy moral authority and prestige owing to their military background.44

The ruling elite model with exercise of power as its major feature aroused lot of debate among a generation of American political and social scientists. C. Wright Mills undertook the first systematic study of American power structure from a national perspective with the ‘institutional’ approach in his The Power Elite (1956). His impact on the succeeding power studies has been profound. He began his thesis by attacking the then established concept of the ‘Ruling Class’. Class, he argued, was an economic term whereas rule had a political connotation. The phrase ‘Ruling Class’, thus, signified that an economic class politically ruled the society.45 He coined the term ‘power elite’ to explain a group which occupied the key position in strategic hierarchies of various institutions. Mills’ theory grounded power in organization and institutions. In his view, positions of power were attached to certain institutional roles in the society. These positions were not an attribute of individuals or classes. He maintained that

the elite is the product of the institutional landscape of the society. Power in modern society is institutionalized. Certain institutions occupy pivotal positions in the society and the uppermost ranks of the hierarchy in these institutions constitute the strategic, command posts of social structure.46

Studying the American power structure, he concluded that in the modern American society, the power in dominant institutions was concentrated in the hands of few institutional office holders. Neither the bureaucratic politicians dominated the decision-making processes, nor the military clique enjoyed power to the exclusion of other power

44 Ibid., p. 155.
46 Ibid., p. 4.
contending groups of society. He explained the American power structure in terms of the vertical and horizontal dimensions. The vertical dimension was comprised of an elite at the top, a middle level of special interest groups, and mass society at the base. The horizontal dimension of the power structure consisted of three groups at the top: politicians and bureaucrats, corporate executives and military leaders. These three groups formed an interlocking power elite, bound together by common interests. It may be argued that Mills tends to ignore the possibilities of conflict among the institutional elite whereby their interests might not converge. However, this interlocking relationship on the basis of common interests appears a plausible explanation of elite at individual level.

The three major institutional hierarchies of the American society included giant corporations, the executive branch of the federal government and the Pentagon. The top leaders of these institutions constituted the power elite. Mills, however, described elite in terms of their potential to exercise power instead of their actual exercise of power.

Mills noted that there existed close links between the institutional hierarchies, which, in fact, indicated the cohesiveness of the power elite. He contended that the "institutional proximity" would reach its zenith when the individuals would "interchange commanding roles at the top of one dominant institutional order with those in another". How easily a power elite used to interchange his role was indicative of the degree of elite cohesiveness. In his view, the power elite did not solely rest upon the correspondence of the institutional hierarchies, or upon the coincidence of their interests; it also rested upon the "similarity of its personnel, and their personal and official relations with one another, upon their

social and psychological affinities'. Mills traced a reciprocal attraction among the power elite. They know each other as personal friends. They not only had common social origin and educational background, which led to their easy mingling, they also mingled with each other in certain recreational, cultural or philanthropic activities. These activities took place at specific high prestige organizations like resorts, clubs, churches, schools, etc. This elite interaction gave them a certain integration. This kind of elite cohesiveness resulted in elite consciousness, which was manifested by a shared life-style and a sense of unity.

Mills was criticized for exaggerating the influence of the corporate elite and for blurring his analysis of class and class relations. In addition to it, William Kornhauser, a sociologist, saw the weakness of Mills' work in the insufficiently demonstrated interaction of the various cliques of the power elite. What seems missing in the Mills thesis is the role of personal relationships among the elite, which are based on the commonality of blood ties, lineage or ethnic/ clan origin, or even religious / sectarian orientations, which are one of the important determinants, if not the sole factor, in the Pakistani polity. In addition to it, Mills' theory also lacks in bringing to forefront the dynamics of these personal relationship among the elite, that how the elite manipulate and maneuver their networking strategies and resources in the struggle for power.

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50 Ibid., p. 278.
51 Ibid., p. 281.
52 Parry, Political Elites, p. 53.
53 Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics, p. 360.
Robert Dahl, an American political scientist, is considered one of the leading representatives of modern pluralistic approach in elite studies. His famous works on elitism include "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model" (1958) and *Who Governs?* (1961). These works critically review the earlier studies on political power from a national perspective and present a new pluralistic model of the elite.

To begin with, Dahl defines a political system as any "persistent pattern of human relationship that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule or authority". Thus, the concept of elite finds a significant place in his definition of political system. Dahl’s idea of political power is restricted to governmental decisions. So in Dahl’s view, political power is exercised in formal structures, whereas political power also manifests itself in decisions at informal levels.

Dahl defines his concept of ruling group as "a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in cases of differences in preferences on key political issues". In Domhoff’s opinion, Dahl’s definition stresses that a ruling group must prevail on key political issues. Moreover, his model implies that the same persons control a wide variety of issues in a society.

Critically reviewing the earlier elite theories, Dahl states that the earlier elite theorists have failed to define the scope of any group’s or individual’s area of influence. He argues that in modern societies, power has been dispersed owing to the diversification of

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58 Party, *Political Elites*, p. 120.
interest groups and 'political resources'. These 'political resources' or 'resources of influence' enable a person to influence the political behaviour of another person.\textsuperscript{59} It may be added here that in addition to an individual, the political behaviour of an institution and decision-making processes may also be influenced. Dahl fails to mention the nature of these resources and the way they are effectively used, whereby people influence others.

Dahl observes that the potential for control in any group does not necessarily correspond with its potential for unity. A group only becomes politically effective when it possesses both. However, in Dahl's opinion, the potential for unity is more important than the potential for control.\textsuperscript{60} However, Dahl does not enumerate strategies to develop unity among elite, nor does he discuss how the elite groups after achieving unity manipulate the resources to achieve and stay in power.


In his earlier studies on power structure in America, Domhoff attempted to synthesize the findings of C. Wright Mills, Paul Sweezy, E. Digby Baltzell and Robert A. Dahl. Domhoff began with redefining the concept of class. In addition to the meaning in which it is usually understood, class, in his view, could also be referred to a group of families

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. p. 66.

\textsuperscript{60} Dahl, A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," in Pizzorno, \textit{Political Sociology}, p. 129.
with similar aspirations and values, and those who perceive each other as equals, and freely intermarry.\textsuperscript{61}

After analyzing the class composition of the American society, he clearly marked out "an observable, differentiated, interacting social group with more or less definite boundaries, i.e., an identifiable social upper class."\textsuperscript{62} He found this social upper class overlapping in membership with a particular economic class made up of rich businessmen and their families. Despite various kind of antagonisms, he observed that this social upper class was closely knit by institutions such as stock ownership, trust funds, intermarriages, private schools, exclusive city clubs and summer resorts, debutante parties, foxhunts, charity drives, and corporation boards.\textsuperscript{63} It seems that the analysis of Domhoff has strong overtones of corporate and social indicators of elite. He does not treat political elite as an independent and separate category, and focuses more on the corporate elite and upper social classes, and their interlocking.

Domhoff’s findings ultimately led him to the conclusion that in the United States an upper class, i.e. a relatively unified corporate elite, which owned and controlled large corporations, ruled the country through a leadership group called the 'power elite', a term which he borrows from Mills.\textsuperscript{64} To show the cohesiveness of this group, he undertook empirical studies of small group settings like cultural, recreational and educational organizations, etc. The studies undertaken by Domhoff to demonstrate the strength of the corporate elite appear only relevant in case of developed and industrialized countries. They appear little relevant in case of developing countries, where nature of business is

\textsuperscript{61} Domhoff, \textit{Who Rules America?}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 156.
more along informal lines and emergence of corporate elite as organized group as a contestant of political power is emerging phenomena.

In summing up the discussion of elite theories, we observe centrality of the elite concept itself, the nature and exercise of power in society, and reference to political resources. All these are important to our development of framework of studying Pakistan’s politics. However, they need to be further contextualized with addition of certain concepts which appear either to be missing completely or are under emphasized in the available literature on elite theory.

We conceive elite as a role, defined in terms of authoritative allocation of values in societies. The dominant position and power of elite is reflected in significant decisions and decision-making. In this connection we may differentiate between political elite and other categories of elite such as civilian, bureaucratic military etc. Political elite is a role concerned with authoritative decision making for a society as a whole. Whereas civilian, bureaucratic and military elite denotes a background from which they may emerge and occupy the political role. The role is performed in the context of formal legal and/or cultural norms, which provide the public face of politics. This study further argues that for proper understanding of politics we need to take into account pragmatic/strategies employed by the elite in the mobilization and usage of diverse resources including the manipulation of formal legal rules and cultural norms in political competition for desired course of action. Important concepts of this argument are elaborated below.

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66 Norms are generally taken as cultural rules of conduct of an individual or group. It therefore, might appear unconventional to use a prefix before norms as ‘cultural’ or ‘socio-cultural’. But it appears necessary to avoid a confusion which might occur as this study uses the word norms for legal and constitutional norms too.
In a political system there may exist several institutions. The system encapsulates smaller institutions. For example, military and bureaucracy are part of the larger encapsulating political system of parliamentary democracy. Given their status as institutions within the system, the elite can take recourse to the use of military and bureaucracy as resources in aid of their actions. However, if the recourse to the resources of civil and military institutions becomes too frequent, the latter may emerge as rivals for political power. An opposition political party or civilian elite, waiting to assume power after winning the elections does not constitute a rival elite but a counter elite in the system. Similarly, a would-be dictator waiting for a chance to usurp the reigns of the government after murdering the sitting dictator does not constitute a rival elite since he contests power within the same dictatorial system. However, if a military leader waiting to overthrow an elected civilian regime in order to institute his own version of democratic set up does constitute a rival elite within the context of the parliamentary democratic system.

The members of the elite groups, despite having a certain degree of interlocking at individual level, might have conflicting interests at group level. Mosca does point out that elite have diverse and conflicting interests represented in a political system, but he fails to mention that despite conflicting interests at group level, the elite may forge alliances and establish networks at personal level in order to achieve their interests. On the contrary, C. Wright Mills, while highlighting elite's interlocking relationship on the basis of common interests, tends to ignore the possibilities of contest among the elites where

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68 Ibid., p. 13.
69 Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism, p. 16.
70 Mills talks about the informal relations of friendship, associations like schools, clubs, churches, and resorts, tend to forge a social cohesiveness among them. Mills, The Power Elite, passim.
their interests do not converge. However, the interlocking relationship among the members of elite groups at personal level on the basis of common interests despite their conflict at group level appears a plausible explanation. Domhoff also emphasized that social networks could include institutions as well as individuals. He incorporated two kinds of social relationships in his network analysis, personal relationships and collective relationships.

Role is a basic unit of social analysis, in that any social system could be dissected into specific role and sets of roles. In Etzioni's view, since "single items of behavior having proven too small as the basic unit for most analytic purposes, cluster of behaviors are used instead and are referred to as roles." Individual persons play such roles. Theoretically, the idea of role means "a functionally defined position in a social system." When people occupy social positions, their behavior is determined mainly by what is expected of that position, rather than by their own individual characteristics; Johnson seems to put it comprehensively: "A player of a role may understand his role simply as a series of obligations and rights which are socially recognized and which, being so recognized, allow him to determine his own behavior and to orient himself to behaviors of others." Such behavior is envisaged to be rational and facilitated by role

However, following Mills, in the 1970s, new explorations were made by social scientists while studying elite networks. Such analysis is referred to as 'network analysis'. With the introduction of this tradition in power studies, the network of people and institutions came to be recognized as the foundation of all power structures. Nonetheless, C. William Domhoff, a network analyst, after critically reviewing the approaches of the pluralists, structural Marxists, and state autonomy theorists, observed that they had reduced power to mere influence or decision-making or limited its scope only to political economy or politics. Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State, pp. xviii.

71 Ibid.
differentiation wherein society is organized along legal rational principles without concentration of multiple formal roles in a single individual. The idea is that non-differentiation of roles will generate role conflict—a situation when an actor has to perform a role, which is guided by two conflicting norms, coming from different sources of political values, ideologies and ethical standards.\(^7\)

Organically related to roles are norms. In sociological analysis, they are taken as rules of behavior, appropriate to a particular role. Rules of performance of roles i.e. norms may either be codified and made legally explicit, or remain implicit in social interaction. As such there may be specific sanctions attached to non-performance. Norms originate from values,\(^7\) which in Johnson's words are the general moral and definitional symbols. When shared, they establish 'the conscious solidarity that characterizes men joined together in a moral community.'\(^7\)

Such legal and constitutional norms and socio-cultural values together provide 'public face' of politics. The public face represents legal and constitutional rules as well as the

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\(^5\) Bailey argues that an individual may have to play more than one role; for instance, a village headman may also be a father, a brother, a farmer, a priest in the temple, and a part-time trader, etc. All these roles not only compete for his time and energy, they directly influence the political behaviour of an individual: 'as when the headman uses his official position to further his trading, or the voter accepts his priest's directive on how to vote, or a candidate for office mobilizes his kinsmen to campaign for him in the election... The environment both provides resources for political use and puts constraints upon political behaviour.' Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils, p. 10.

\(^7\) For instance, 'freedom of expression' is a value. It may be given normative expression by specific rules that would indicate the kind of social transactions and events that should be sanctioned in order to realize that value.

\(^{77}\) Johnson, Revolutionary Change, p. 42.
socially approved norms and values. Public face\textsuperscript{78} expresses publicly pronounced values and norms and provide basis for justification of a course of conduct, setting broad limits to possible actions. Political actors seek to justify their actions with reference to public face, though it does not mean that they necessarily comply with it all the time. This means, though that they may find it expedient to manipulate it and that would represent acting behind the public face. Expedient manipulative actions of the political actors fall within the broad category of what Bailey describes as 'pragmatic rules'.\textsuperscript{79}

Pragmatics, in literal terms, is taken as handling matters in a realistic way in order to achieve results. Philosophically, it is related to Pragmatisms in American thought, particularly theory of knowledge\textsuperscript{80} focusing on the knowledge status of beliefs. There were two broad divisions in American pragmatist movement. One broad division, experimentalism, identified with Johan Dewey\textsuperscript{81} held that we might take our beliefs as working hypothesis, as judgments to be freely modified by the test of common experience. The other division, voluntarism, identified with William James\textsuperscript{82} pleads the "right of active self to reach out for a positive metaphysics." That is, one may adopt a belief in God, not because there is conclusive evidence for it, but because it appears to him to add to the meaning of life, to dispel pessimism or to encourage morality, he is so far as a pragmatist. He has not reasoned his belief out, he has chosen it.\textsuperscript{83} The pragmatic

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\textsuperscript{78} Bailey, \textit{Stratagems and Snobs}, pp. 5-6. Bailey has also dealt with the issues related to public face describing it in normative terms.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., pp. 4-7.


\textsuperscript{83} William Ernest Hocking, \textit{Types of Philosophy}, (Revised edn), New York: Carles Scribner's Sons, 1939, p. 144. For details see pp. 142-44.
political conduct or the pragmatics of politics\textsuperscript{84} are effective actions and strategies to prevail in a political competition but without going against the public face or at least not to be seen going against the public face. Pragmatics may operate within the limits of the public face: or they may not. They range from counsel on how to win a competition without actually cheating to advise on how to win by cheating but without being disqualified from the competition.\textsuperscript{85} Counsels on such conduct actually can be traced back to classical writings such as Machiavelli’s work on politics in his The Prince. He advised the ruler to be seen as religious person even if he was not practicing religion or even going against religious norms.\textsuperscript{86} A more modern thought in that vein, of course, is the pragmatist movement in the United States. Despite some differences\textsuperscript{87} among various writers on certain issues “pragmatists talk about truths in the plural, about their utility and satisfactoriness, about the success with which they work…”\textsuperscript{88} Pragmatics of politics would thus consist in effective strategies and tactics maneuvers/counter-maneuvers in a political competition.\textsuperscript{89} Behind the public face, the elite make pragmatic use of diverse resources by employing different strategies, tactics and maneuvers for their preferred course of action.

Such pragmatism as would combine effective actions with respect for the public face is found in a “mature” statement by James. According to him, “a pragmatist would select

\begin{footnotes}
\item[84] The concept of pragmatics is being used as effective maneuvers in this study rather than to mean distrust of general theories as found in the literature on political philosophy.
\item[85] Bailey, Strategies and Spoils, p. 6. He has given several examples of pragmatics while explaining his view of ‘pragmatic rules’. For details see pp. 3-7.
\item[87] For details of difference, see Philip P. Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism, Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1969.
\item[89] Pragmatics is also used in literature on political science as a pejorative term for certain political conduct.
\end{footnotes}
the way that [a belief] fits in with our momentary interest...and select the way that will work." Our thinking should fit "the momentary purpose in hand." But James continues to says that pragmatist should

use our theoretical as well as our practical faculties to get the world into a better shape, and all with a good conscience. The only restriction is that the world resists some lines of attack on our part and opens herself to others, so that we must go with the grain of her willingness, to play fairly.60

Dewey91 also has similar ideas, i.e. effective action but also respecting the public face. Lancaster, commenting on Dewey's instrumentalist ideas, says that such ideas were best illustrated in the works of realist writers who differentiated between official government and the actual government. The official was for honorific purposes and was the "concern of statesmen"; the actual one was target of opprobrium and was the "concern of politicians."92

The central goal of all such pragmatic actions, strategies, tactics and maneuvers is to gain and retain power. Power and its analysis as a concept in modern political discourse goes back to Max Weber,93 who viewed it in terms of probability that a person in a social relationship will be able to carry out his own will in pursuit of his goals regardless of resistance. Many famous studies were written in this tradition. All of them94 adopted the essentially similar conception of power in that they looked at the success of decision

makers employing whatever tangible resources in the situation. Such a conception of power was contested on the grounds that some issues are prevented from becoming public issues, i.e. potential issues are prevented from becoming actual decisions and they characterize this situation as 'non-decision making.' Power in such a case would seem to be powerlessness, but nevertheless, power.

This view of power underestimates the significance of ideology, the imposition of beliefs and manipulation of values in securing stability and the absence of conflicts. This points to the critical importance of mobilization of multiple and varied recourses in decision making ranging from compliance with the laid down rational legal procedures or public face, to a situation where a decision is taken on the basis of pragmatics of politics.

Power essentially resides in interacting patterns and networks of relationships. It can be exercised by any actor in an interactive process by aptly mobilizing available resources to his advantage, aptly because resources provide both opportunities for, and constraints on exercise of power. Etzioni speaks of such mobilization in terms of "the conversion of assets into power", generating "a variety of sanctions rewards and instruments to penalize those who resist, to reward those who assist, to remove those who block, and to provide facilities for those who implement a collectively set course of action." It appears that Etzioni assumes a 'course of action' set by the society collectively through dialogue, negotiations and bargain over values and resources. It is quite possible that an individual or a group of people set 'course of action' for others without entering into such processes.

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96 Ibid., p. 151.
97 Olsen, Power in Societies, pp. 2-10.
98 Etzioni, The Active Society, p. 357.
However, Etzioni's view that power is generated from assets which are either coercive, utilitarian or persuasive appears very relevant to our discussion. In coercive assets, he includes weapons, installation, the military, police or similar agencies. Utilitarian assets include economic possessions, technical and administrative capabilities, etc. Persuasive assets include symbols, ideologies, values, etc. These three types of assets convert into respective categories of power, i.e. to coercive, utilitarian and persuasive powers whereby one actor uses such powers in aid of his preferred course of action.

Etzioni's categories of assets however do not appear to be exhaustive and tend to largely remain within the domain of formal legal arrangements. Informal aspects of the use of formal legal assets/resources is altogether missing. Elite may use formal assets/resources like police, manpower, institutions etc without strictly lawful reasons for a pragmatic gain in a political competition and may justify such use in terms of public face. Therefore, it appears relevant to differentiate between coercive power of the state institutions and use of such power by the elite for advancement of their desired course of action or personal gain.

Similarly, material resources may be used as economic dispensations in terms of financial rewards. In utilitarian terms, certain offices/roles in formal legal institutions/

99 Ansari also arrived at similar classification of power while theorizing the political practices on the basis of empirical studies of Ghana and Pakistan. His study of Ghana concerned with behavior of members of the Convention Peoples Party who had supported Nkrumah when he could distribute favors but deserted him after his removal from the office of president by the military coup of 1965. The Pakistan study was a replication of the Ghanaian study and brought out the importance of symbolic power of religious appeals during initial years of Pakistan's existence, and that of coercion during periods of Martial Laws. S. H. Ansari, "Expressions of Power: A Comparative Study of Pakistan and Ghana", Unpublished Paper prepared at Department of Political Science, University of Keele, 1976.

100 Etzioni, The Active Society, pp. 357-58.
organizations may be given to a person for pragmatic consideration of politics by contravening a legal rule, or making unwarranted use of some lacunae in the rules.

In persuasive power Etzioni tends to largely focus on formal channels of persuasion like propaganda etc., whereas it may be done on a very personal or interpersonal level using channels of kinship, family and primordial identities etc. Trust based relation also play significant role even within the formal legal institutions. Given the multiplicity and complexity of roles many may depend more on trust based relations than formality of decision making. Instead of looking at informality as only referring to small talk, tacit behavior or gossiping, it can be understood as a form of interaction among partners enjoying relative freedom in interpretation of their role’s requirements.101

Resources are not only available in the society or a political system but also externally in the international environment. A large number of societal resources have been mentioned above. Resources in the international environment could also exist along similar patterns including international lobbies, foreign aid, and interpersonal connection, etc. Competing elite in their struggle to outmaneuver one another can pick and choose from among this large variety of resources, pragmatically assessing the effectiveness of such resources, individual resources or a mix of them for gaining, retaining and or expanding power.

Given the review of elite theory and preceding discussion we may state a framework for our study as follows:

Elite is conceived as a role defined in terms of authoritative allocation of values for a whole society reflected in significant decision-making, or power. The role is performed

with reference to publicly pronounced laws and procedures (relating to the performance of the role) along with societal norms, the two together providing the public face of politics. Elite competing for gaining, retaining, and expanding their power aptly mobilize/use diverse resources located in the polity and international environment. The elite make pragmatic use of resources assessing their relevance for effectiveness but keeping the public face of politics. They deploy a variety of strategies and tactics, including coercive power, utilitarian dispensations, and symbolic persuasion, or a mix of these to outmaneuver and prevail in a political competition. It is this framework, which is elaborated below for studying Pakistan’s politics.

The State of Pakistan came into existence as a result of the Indian Independence Act 1947, providing the constitutional basis envisaged on the pattern of the British parliamentary institutions and traditions. This also provided a framework for political conduct based on modern, formal and rational-legal rules and impersonal and codified laws. In addition to its legal and constitutional basis, the society has its cultural norms grounded in its historical experiences, which not only inform the conduct of political actors but also appraise the same. The role of cultural norms became more important during the movement for Pakistan, which had religious overtones. All this taken together represents the public face of politics in Pakistan.

The Pakistani elite would utilize the relevant contours of public face as resources in their political competition, either in upholding or in not being seen tarnishing and violating the public face. The elite initially coming into power and occupying a role in the parliamentary democratic decision-making setup consisted of civilians who successfully spearheaded the Pakistan Movement. The parliamentary structures representing dominant
political norms contained bureaucracy and military as part of the overall legal-rational set up and were considered a resource in aid of the civilian elite occupying parliamentary and political roles.

The use of bureaucracy and military in the exercise of power gradually gave prominence to certain individual bureaucrats but they were still led by the civilian elite. The use in aid of civil authority provided opportunity to bureaucracy and military to eventually emerge as rival elites. Graduating from a resource in aid to civilian elite to rival elite, soon bureaucracy and military would become contestant in political competition. Pragmatic use of resources would bring them to dominant positions and play decisive role in significant decision making, including dismissals of cabinets and prime ministers, dissolution of legislatures, abrogation of constitution, dissolution and replacement of civilian and military governments respectively, etc. This has been the pattern throughout the political history of Pakistan.

Scope and Methodology

Our framework emphasizing the elite role reflected in significant decision-making or power wherein elite mobilize and pragmatically use diverse resources deploying various strategies and tactics to outmaneuver one another in a political competition, usefully applies to a proper understanding of Pakistan's politics. However, this study limits itself to the period 1947 to 1958 to illustrate our approach and framework. This period was initially dominated by the civilian elite but gradually gave way to a prominent role by the bureaucracy and military that emerged as rival elite and by 1958 displaced the civilian elite. During this period significant decisions were made by the civilian elite on their own, civilian elite aided by the bureaucratic and then both aided by the military, eventually by
the military itself. Some of such decisions included dismissal of chief ministers, dissolution of provincial assemblies, dismissal of prime ministers, dissolution of federal constituent assembly, abrogation of a constitution, in addition to a myriad of other significant decisions affecting the whole polity. The study will concentrate on decisions such as inclusion of section 92-A in the Constitution (1948), promulgation of Public Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (1949), dismissal of a civilian Prime Minister (1953), dissolution of first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1954) and bureaucratic-military coup (1958) also paying attention to related minor decisions forming part of such decisions.

The elite theorists who have studied the exercise of power by the elite have employed a diverse range of approaches and methods. The approaches of various elite theorists have been described as ‘organizational’ approach which is credited with Mosca and Michel, ‘psychological’ approach attributed to Pareto, whereas Burnham is credited with using ‘economic’ approach, and ‘institutional’ approach is ascribed to Mills. However, all the studies of these theorists were directly focused on elite. In addition, the elite studies have also benefited from literature, which indirectly dealt with elite, but was directly linked to elite-related concepts such as power and decision-making, etc.

It is pertinent here to refer to Pareto who indirectly recognized the significance of decisions in the exercise of power in a polity, since role in decision-making is an important indicator or manifestation of an elite’s potential. Pareto held that elite consists of classes having the highest potentialities and achievements in their respective areas of

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102 Pauly, Political Elites, pp. 35, 45, 50, 52.
activities. This indicator seems pertinent in case of Pakistan for the evaluation of elite in terms of their 'displayed achievement' such as important political decisions, key appointments and Constitutional Amendments aimed at containing the rival political elite and extended leverage for resource allocation. Robert Laporte Jr. has employed decision-making approach for studying the decision-making by the elite in Pakistan.

Thus, the present study will use a synthesized approach by integrating Mills' institutional approach and Robert Dahl's decision-making approach. In addition, the concept of pragmatic rule used by Bailey seems relevant for the present study, since it enables to search for the pragmatics of the decisions made by the elite groups beyond their public face and explore 'behind-the-scenes' factors which influence decision-making. Bailey's methodology is useful in a sense that it directs attention to the use of resources pragmatically deployed to gain, retain and expand political power.

In context of Pakistan, the institutions of parliament (elected institution of parliamentary democracy), military and bureaucracy have been identified to analyze the political conduct and political competition among their respective elite. The making and changing constitution, rules and decisions provide an insight into the contest for power among the military, bureaucratic and civilian elite, whereby one group tried to contain the powers of the other.

105 For details see Finer in Introduction to Pareto, Sociological Writings, p. 51, Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 7.
106 Pareto, Political Elites, pp. 45-6. Pareto's governing elite is synonymous with Mosca's political class. However, later Pareto abandoned this definition of elite owing to its impracticability for sociological studies. For details see ibid., p. 46.
While discussing methodological and data collection considerations in studying elite and decision-making, LaPorte discusses the problem of the ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ strategies. He points out the differences between the view-points of the insiders, who take part in the decision-making process as participants, and the outsiders, who do not share the classified or unclassified information, being non-participants in the decision-making. The former group argues that an insider alone can know the truth about decisions. In context of Pakistan, LaPorte cites the example of Mohammad Ayub Khan’s political autobiography, Friends Not Masters, which presents a case of ‘insider’ view. On the contrary, the outsiders contend that the insiders distort historical facts.\(^{106}\) LaPorte’s study itself presents an outsider’s view.

LaPorte admits that a satisfactory resolution to these competing strategies does not exist. While undertaking his own study, LaPorte himself tried to overcome the problem in his study by using source material, which he derived from people who were in direct contact with the elite, who made important decisions, or had actually made inputs into decisions. For this purpose, he not only consulted the relevant published and unpublished source material, but also conducted interviews with a number of influential people, having contacts with the elite involved in the decision-making, as well as the non-elite.\(^{107}\)

Regarding the ‘direct interview technique’, it is important to bring out here that directly interviewing the elite involved in the decision-making may prove counter-productive. LaPorte informs that in some community power studies, the technique of directly

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\(^{106}\) See Appendix A: Methodological and Data Collection Considerations in Studying Elite and Decision-Making in \(\text{Id.}\), pp. 185-6.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., p. 189.
interviewing the elite generated misleading information in contrast to the otherwise collected gathered information.\textsuperscript{138}

As for the resource material for the present study, it has benefit from a variety of sources. The written and published sources have been consulted in order to substantiate the evidence. These include primary sources such as Gazette Notifications, Constitutions and Constitutional Amendments, legal pronouncements of the Courts, National Assembly debates, and relevant secondary sources. In addition, a mass of political folklore has also been explored to bring out relevant data. Non-structured interviews with selected personages have also been conducted. The interviewed individuals include ‘insiders’ such as some of the military, bureaucratic and civilian elite, as well as ‘outsiders’, i.e., influential people who are close to the decision-making elite, and some non-elite having some understanding of the decision-making.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p. 137.
Chapter 3

Setting the Context:

Pragmatics and the Making of the Public Face of Politics

A basic aspect of our analytical framework is the concept of public face, based on shared moral and definitional symbols in a society, and envisaged to represent legal and constitutional rules as well as socially approved norms and values. Political actors utilizing diverse resources in the domestic and international environment, adopt pragmatic strategies to outmaneuver their political competitors, but at the same time they may seek to justify their expedient actions and that they would do with reference to the public face.

In attempting to understand elite politics in Pakistan the study of public face, therefore, becomes important. Before analyzing Pakistan’s elite politics we have to look at ‘making of the public face’, that is, we have to undertake an historical treatment as to how the public face of Pakistan’s politics came to be evolved. In such evolution three themes seem to be important: First, largely trust-based patterns of elite politics in pre-colonial South Asia can be discerned, which were mainly located in the Muslim rule in the subcontinent. Secondly, colonial patterns of governance, continuing some of the pre-colonial practices for pragmatic considerations of achieving stability of the rule, also introduced, from the beginning, rule-based legal rational style of bureaucratic and military
administration. The latter along with intermittent reforms eventuated in the establishment of democratic governance based on British parliamentary traditions. Lastly, the creation of Pakistan resulted by virtue of a movement claiming that Muslims possessed a culture different from that of Hindus and were, therefore, entitled to a status of nationhood and a separate country. The movement, thereby, gave a fillip to an extensive spread and articulation of cultural norms among Muslims.

The present chapter appreciates various patterns of elite politics and their pragmatic strategies in a historical manner starting from pre-colonial India, reviewing the colonial period and coming down to the termination of the colonial era. It focuses on the making of the public face of politics and the emergence and consolidation of elite groups.

**Elite Politics in Pre-Colonial India: Public Face and Pragmatics**

The rich and complex cultural heritage and political traditions of South Asia are more than five millennia old. Amid the processes of continuity and change, though these traditions have accommodated and adjusted themselves as a result of challenges from social and cultural environment, they still seem to inform the contemporary politics. These traditions, informed by various ideologies, include patterns of governance and modalities of power exertion, which are deeply entrenched in the South Asian politics and political culture, and are clearly discernible in the contemporary governance patterns and the exercise of power. These governance patterns and authority structures in South Asia play a crucial role in politics, notwithstanding the establishment of formal-legal governance institutions of Western provenance, as a result of over a century-long colonial rule under the British. Thus, the two sets of authority patterns and governance institutions
operate and function side by side, at times negotiating and at times overriding and prevailing upon each other.

The politics and decision-making of elite in the pre-colonial era was characterized by trust-based relationship between the ruler and elite, i.e. the core nobility. In the words of Peter Hardy: "The idiom of authority, and of the acceptance of authority... is the idiom of personal allegiance and loyalty between a grantor and a receiver of favours and of boons." Since authority was founded on trust or loyalty at personal level, whenever a new ruler assumed his kingly office, members of the political and religious elite acclaimed his rule by paying personal homage to the new king and by presenting him symbolic gifts of submission. In a reciprocal act, the new monarch used to bestow robes of honour, titles, grants, money, promotion in ranks, horses, bejeweled weapons and other such gifts to the elite.

The elite or the nobles, who constituted the political elite in the pre-colonial polities, were the confidants of the rulers, in the loyalty and allegiance of whom the latter had profound trust. The institutions of power and authority were thus built on the foundations of these interpersonal relationships, which were based on either kinship and familial relationships, or patron-client relationship between the royalty and nobility. These relationships were at times also strengthened and consolidated by contracting matrimonial alliances, which ensured increased loyalty of the nobles towards the royalty. Thus, recruitment and promotion of an individual depended on the apt use of any one or two sets of resources: ascribed and achieved. The 'ascribed' resource of an individual was the one endowed to

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1 Peter Hardy, "The Authority of Muslim Kings in Mediaeval South Asia", Purusarthha, 9, 1986, p. 46.
him by his racial, ethnic, caste, clan or tribal affiliation, which was unalterable being ascribed by birth. The 'achieved' resource was the one enjoyed by an individual owing to his one or more of personal achievements and qualities such as bravery, courage, skill, vision, intelligence and political acumen, or matrimonial relationship with the royalty, nobility or the higher officers of the state. The status of an individual was a resource too, which he employed in political competition in order to get greater share in decision-making and resource allocation.

Notwithstanding mutual rivalries of the royalty and nobility in some cases, a trust-based relationship existed between the king and the provincial governors and higher officers who constituted the provincial administrative organization. These governors and officers had in turn appointed personnel in whom they had reposed their trust. These employees generally had ascribed status and/or achieved status, which had enabled them to be recruited in the administrative hierarchy. In other words, those individuals who were in a better position to deploy these resources were more likely to gain, retain or expand their power. More profound the trust of the employer in them, greater the opportunities for rising to prominent positions of authority for the employees. Thus, a personal relationship existed in the whole chain of command down to the grassroots levels of administrative hierarchy. These trust-based relations, which had rendered the nature of rule and authority personalized, were the hallmark of many ancient and medieval polities in South Asia. From the times of Gupta in ancient India to the Muslim dynasties of Turkish Sultanate and Mughal rule in north India, the exercise of kingly power has relied considerably on the ties of kinship, personal trust and clientelism.\(^3\)

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In ancient and medieval India, the acquisition, retention and expansion of power and authority of kings depended upon the pragmatic use of these resources. The rulers who commanded the allegiance and personal loyalty of powerful groups and clans were able to pursue expansionist policies and thus, subjugate neighboring territories, since high positions in military and bureaucracy were mainly offered to them.\(^4\)

In medieval India, at times of political crises, these loyalties of the nobles based on kinship, matrimonial affinities and clientship were tested, who were then accordingly rewarded or punished. After assumption of power by a certain group or clan in a kingdom in the wake of a political contest over succession, political offices and symbolic titles were distributed as 'rewards'\(^5\) to those who had supported him and exhibited unflinching allegiance towards the king in times of crises. Thus, mutual trust underpinning the interlinked webs of personal relationships among the elite was pervasive in the whole system of governance and among the major determinants of political decisions, resource allocation and ensuing with highly important assignments. Contrarily, those who had resisted the assumption of power by the new king were eliminated, and those who had betrayed the trust of the king were severely punished.

In a political field, there exists a consensus over some values among the political actors. Some happenings or situations are always considered desirable and preferred, some

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\(^4\) For instance, Chandra-Gupta's marriage in an influential clan considerably helped him in winning over the loyalty of the clan and expanding his Empire. In 320 A.D., twelve years after his marriage, he was crowned as 'Maharajadhiraj', (the King of Kings), and thus became the founder of Gupta Empire (320-467 A.D.) Historians have considered the marriage to be an event of the highest political importance in the history of Ancient India. Waryam Singh and Sant Singh, History of India (Ancient and Medieval), Lahore: Mafinara Brothers, 1932, pp. 241-57.

\(^5\) For this reason, Sultan Qutbuddin had his own Qubli amirs or nobles, Shamsuddin Iltumish had Shamsi amirs, Jalauddin Khalji his Jalali amirs, Alauddin his Alai amirs and Afghan rulers their own Afghan amirs. Rekha Pandit, Succession in the Delhi Sultanate, New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 1990, p. 186.
situations have to be avoided at all costs. In almost all political orders, for instance, peaceful conditions are preferred over violence, and thus, confusion, chaos and anarchy are to be averted. Elite plays an important role in terms of providing direction and guidance to the whole society to avoid such situations. At times, there may arise a need, which may require deploying various strategies and resources such as coercive use of power, economic dispensation, symbolic persuasion, or creating new rules in a given situation.

For instance, during the reign of Ruknuddin Firuz, who had ascended the throne after the death of Iltutmish in 1236 A.D., the state affairs were being neglected and discontent had spread in the empire. For this reason, the nobles of Delhi placed Sultana Raziya (rgn. 1236-40 A.D.), the daughter of late Sultan Iltutmish on the throne. She was the first and the only Muslim queen to sit on the throne of Delhi. In her appointment, both her ascribed and achieved resources had undeniably mattered, since she was a Turkish princess, who belonged to the royal family, and had astuteness as well as political acumen, but her gender was a weakness given the inferior status of women in those days. The comment of a medieval historian, Minhaj-us-Siraj, amply explains the attitude. He writes that Raziya was “endowed with all admirable attributes and qualifications necessary for kings; but, as she did not attain the destiny, in her creation, of being computed among men, of what advantages were all these excellent qualifications unto her?” The discontent of some of the disgruntled nobles over the rule of a woman may well be understood against the backdrop of the political ethos of the age. Nonetheless, the rules that governed the political system of the Delhi Sultans had to give way to an exemption. Under the

circumstances, acceptance of any other contender for throne other than Raziya was unwelcome to all.

In addition to the achieved and ascribed resources of a political actor, whereby his strengths and resources help him to acquire a position of power or a political favour, sometimes a weakness of an actor may become a strength and qualification for it. In other words, a constraint may become a resource for a political actor in a given situation. It is evident, for instance, from the case of an Abyssinian slave, Jamaluddin Yaqut, who was appointed as amir-i-akhur ('master of the horse' / in-charge of royal stables) by Sultana Raziya in order to counter the hegemony of the Turkish nobility, since the office-holder enjoyed great privilege and power, and usually the Turks filled that office. Upon his appointment, the Turks and Tajiks, the two rival groups of nobility, joined hands against the Abyssinian ascendancy. They showed a common hostility to Yaqut owing to their shared distrust of all non-Central Asians. Yaqut's ascribed resource, being a non-Turk slave, was a constraint for him according to generally agreed rules of the polity, but it became a resource, whereby he was selected by the queen for a high post. It shows that a minority identity of a political actor may at times prove to be a qualification and criterion for sharing spoils of politics, instead of becoming ineligibility for it. Therefore, a resource may become an asset or a constraint depending on the context of political situation and the capacity of an actor to use it in a political competition.

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9 Irfan Habib, "Foundation of the Sultanate Ruling Class of the Thirteenth Century", in Irfan Habib (ed.), Medieval India I: Researches in the History of India (1200-1750), Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 20
The medieval kings also tried to influence and alter the rules of the political competition among actors by pragmatically barriring the use of some strategies. For instance, amid shifting loyalties of the political actors, the matrimonial alliances were regarded as a strategy, which ensured one’s loyalty and trust, therefore, efforts were made to change these rules. Sultan Alauddin Khalji (rgn. 1296-1316 A.D.) after assuming power banned the marriages among the nobility, as these were the most important causes of intrigues and seditions.

In medieval politics, marriages or matrimonial alliances were pragmatic strategies to strengthen the bonds of clientship between two individuals or families. Marriages of the Delhi Sultans and the Mughal Emperors and princes with the women of the Rajput ruling families symbolized political submission of the latter to the authority of the former. For this reason, sometimes the subjugated political opponents were persuaded or even coerced into accepting such marriages. Ghazi Malik, a Turk noble (who later became Sultan with the title Ghiasuddin Tughluq) married his brother Rajab to the daughter of Rana Mall Bhatti of Abohar in 1313 A.D. The Rana was however, forced into accepting it. Firoz Shah Tughluq (rgn. 1351-88 A.D.), who later became the Sultan of Delhi, was the son of Rajab born from the Bhatti princess. By this marriage Ghazi Malik “perhaps wanted to

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10 However, if the nobles needed so, they had have to take permission from the Sultan prior to the marriage, Kishori Saran Lal, History of the Khalis A.D. 1290-1320, Karachi: Union Book Stall, n. d., pp. 173-4.
11 In South Asia “the affinal relationship provided a code in which to make political statements. As in much of north India the wife-taker was culturally defined as being superior to the wife-giver, and a person could acknowledge someone publicly as his master by giving him his sister or daughter in marriage.” However, among Turks, it seems that it did not matter much who was the wife-giver and who was the wife-taker, as the status of the two contracting parties generally remained equal, and the marriage did not seem to grant the taker any superior status in the relationship with the former. Saberwal, Roots of Crisis, pp. 85-6.
remove the causes of friction [between the Hindus and the Muslims] alienating one
people from the other. The idea underlying this marriage was to remove from Muslim
rule the stigma of foreign rule. The favour he showed to his new sister-in-law Bibi Naila
or Kadbanu—an honorific conferred upon her by Ghazi Malik Tughluq—is highly
significant. This marriage had profound effect as Firoz, the son of Rajab and Bibi
Naila, was more favoured by his uncle, the Sultan, and thus, the little prince was brought
up with special care and attention. The next Sultan, Muhammad bin Tughluq (rgn.
1325-51) even over-looked the seniority of Firoz’s two elder brothers while nominating
Firoz as his heir-apparent. Thus, the Turkish rulers had admitted the necessity of
indigenisation of the ruling house, which was a desired course of action for the elite in
Indian context, for which they even went to the extent of coercive marriages.

The Sultans of Delhi owed allegiance to the Abbaside Caliphs in Baghdad and later
Egypt, being their legal representatives in India theoretically. This nominal allegiance to
the Abbasides provided a public face to the Sultans, though the caliphs in Baghdad could
not practically interfere in the affairs of the Sultanate. In addition to symbolic submission
to the Caliph, Sharia also provided a normative basis to the conduct of a Muslim ruler.
The kings showed a remarkable respect for the sharia, and they could not openly go
against its rules. Khutba or the Friday congregational sermon in mosque, which was the
formulaic expression of political authority, was read in a monarch’s name. The
continuous reading of Khutba in his name was symbolic of the assent of the Muslim
populace of the kingdom to the political authority of the king. According to Richards,

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 I. H. Qureshi, The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi, Karachi: Pakistan Historical
Society, 1944, p. 32.
before the establishment of Muslim rule in the Indian Sub-continent, many of the
elementary political problems regarding royal authority and legitimacy had been resolved
in the classical writings of the Muslim political theorists. He states:

The source of the ultimate authority, the codification of the Sharia, the
relationship of the ulama to the ruler, the expedients adopted with the Khalifa’s
loss of temporal power, the definition of specific duties for the ruler had all been
determined in a generally accepted normative structures for Sunni kings.  

As regards the structure of political relationships, both Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal
Empire were extended patriarchal and thus patronial systems. Weber in his work
*Economy and Society* referred to the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal India as patronial
states. Weber stated: “Patronialism and, in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise
whenever traditional domination develops and administration and a military force which
are purely personal instruments of the master.” In patronialism, authority is regarded
as a personal right, and a patronial state is considered to be based on the personal
authority of the ruler. Historians suggest that though the Mughal Empire was a
household-dominated patronial-bureaucratic empire, it was not a highly structured
bureaucratically administered state. Stephen Blake argues:

> In its description of the emperor as a divinely-aided patriarch, the household as the
central element in government, members of the army as dependent on the
emperor, the administration as a loosely structured group of men controlled by the
Imperial household, the travel as a significant part of the emperor’s activities, the
Ain-i Akbari supports the suggestion that Akbar’s state was a patronial-
bureaucratic empire.

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18 Richards, *Kingship and Authority in South Asia*, p. 8.
19 Conermann suggests that prior to the establishment of Mughal rule, the Delhi Sultanate under
some Sultans had acquired nearly all the features of a patronial type of governance. Stephan
Conermann, *Patronialism in Pre-Mughal Muslim India: A Case Study* (Unpublished Paper) it is
argued that the Mughal’s borrowed heavily from the traditions and practices evolved by the
Turkish Sultans of Delhi. Also see Irfidan Alam Khan, *The Turk-Mongol Theory of Kingship, in
22 Blake has attempted to evaluate the validity of Max Weber’s theory of patronial state in the
context of Mughal state. Stephen P. Blake, “The Patronial-Bureaucratic Empire of the
Mughals”, quoted in Ibid., p. 38.
From the times of Emperor Akbar in the late 1500s, a structure of power was built around a complicated and sophisticated system referred to as Mansabdari system. A remarkable feat of Akbar's statesmanship, it was based on multiplicity of roles concentrated in a single individual. It envisaged an efficient executive, military and revenue administration system. The Mansabdari system was a graded bureaucratic system, divided into a number of ranks or mansabs, through which Akbar tried to systematize bureaucracy. The Mansabdari system formed a pool of core nobility of Mughal India, as the mansabdars constituted the governing class of the Empire.\(^{23}\) They served as "provincial governors and diwans, field and fortress commanders, faujddars, amins, and other officers posted throughout the provinces of empire."\(^{24}\) Through it, Akbar "converted the old type of empire with its loosely knit feudatories dominated by a powerful personality at the center into a bureaucracy working to rule and by decree, and operated by a salaried and graded officer corps."\(^{25}\)

Personal loyalty to the Emperor was the cornerstone of the whole system. Recruitment to the system was diplomatic or having political overtones. Mansabs (ranks) were generally bestowed upon the nobles by the Emperor on the basis of their personal loyalty rather than on the basis of military prowess. Thus, the greater the loyalty, the higher the number of men under the command of nobles.\(^{26}\) In the opinion of Spear, "[t]he whole system was ingeniously devised to cloak differences of obligation and the realities of service beneath dignified titles. It was a way of reconciling family and tribal aristocratic pride with the

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\(^{25}\) Spear, "The Mughal Mansabdari System", in Leach and Mukherji, Elites in South Asia, p. 2.

discipline of a bureaucratic system.”27 In addition to the administrative purposes, the system functioned as an ingenious way of winning over the political adversaries and rivals of the empire, such as the Rajputs. A significant pillar of the Mughal policy towards the Rajputs was matrimonial alliances. Since Hindu Rajas of many Rajput States in Rajputana had submitted to Akbar, their clientelism was further consolidated by matrimonial alliances between them.

The mansabdari system has been regarded by some as the culmination of pre-modern state administration in India.28 Athar Ali locates the Mughal state in Indian history between advanced traditional and early modern statehood. According to Athar Ali, the Mughul Empire was “essentially the ‘perfection’ of a medieval polity” and the entire system was that of “a centralized quasi-modern state”.29 Thus, the Mughul state was marked by traditional but highly developed and rationalized elements in authority. Burton Stein opines that the “centralized administration” of the Mughual state was later bequeathed to the colonial state.30

However despite efforts for systematization and formalization of rules, and centralization of power, the Mughul political system remained personalized in essence. The emergence of such a system could not diminish the personalized nature of the rule. In the words of Peter Hardy:

*Not even Mughal success in creating their cadre of mansabdars (appointment holders) with regularized ranks, terms of service, duties and emoluments dulled the sense of a personal relationship between the Mughal emperor as a person and each mansabdar—a sense kept alive by the ability of mansabdars individually to*

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28 Kuıke, *The State in India*, p. 32.
approach their master no matter their status within the mansabdari hierarchy. Of course, the personal bond could have several strands—kinship with the ruler through marriage, a sentiment that service to the emperor conferred honour upon oneself as well as, no doubt, a calculation of where one’s interests lay.\(^{31}\)

In fact, for its survival, the system itself benefited much from the age-old traditions of socio-political practices of the Indian society. In medieval India, the age-old political tradition of sub-sovereignities or multi-layered sovereignties remained intact. In medieval India, “sovereignty was shared by different layers of kingly authority”\(^{32}\), which meant that there existed multi-layered hierarchically arranged authority patterns. In pre-colonial times, the sovereignty was non-singular and divisible, and the sources of legitimacy were subjective. The Kings used to rule directly as well as indirectly.\(^{33}\) The practice, which was born out of political expediency owing to the difficulties involved in directly ruling the far-flung areas, also allowed a large degree of independence and self-government to the tributary states and kingdoms in their politico-administrative and socio-cultural matters.\(^{34}\)

The policy was dictated by the realities on the grounds, since the existing means of communication and the socio-economic conditions necessitated a center with loosely controlled administrative units.\(^{35}\) Such arrangements were made possible by the fluidity of legal codes, since there was no highly structured and sophisticated legislative apparatus. There was an absence of elaborate legal machinery of the modern type; rather the legal arrangements were fluid, and unwritten like the customary law, which allowed greater flexibility in terms of interpretation and application.

\(^{31}\) Hardy, “The Authority of Muslim Kings in Medieval South Asia”, p. 46.


\(^{33}\) The indirect rule was through tributary chiefs or rajas. Peter Hardy, “Growth of Authority Over a Conquered Political Elite: Early Delhi Sultans as a Possible Case Study”, in Richards, Kingship and Authority in South Asia, p. 230.

\(^{34}\) For this reason, Alauddin Khalji, who assumed the title of Alexander II owing to his large-scale military conquests in South India, decided to indirectly rule the far-flung areas of Deccan. For details see Lal, History of the Khaljis, pp. 233-42.

In the opinion of Ernest Gellner, the local indigenous communities in the pre-modern traditional politics enjoyed considerable freedom, autonomy and self-administration. Some of these communities even enjoyed independence from any center of control despite the existence of monarchical systems. The local forms of socio-political organization in pre-modern India guaranteed considerable autonomy and independence to various social segments. The caste panchayats, sabhas, samitis, paryas and tribal jirgas performed political and juridical functions in rural India. These socio-political organizations were the hallmarks of self-government at grassroots level. Even with the establishment of Muslim rule in north India, these socio-political organizations remain unaffected, and these were allowed to carry on their traditional functions. Vorys too contends that the image of the political system was “not one of impersonal institutions, but rather a highly subjective ruler/subject relationship. Such was the tradition of the Moghul emperors and such was the practice of the colonial period.” The transition to the colonial rule in India appears a very unique episode in the history of South Asia as the Europeans brought their ideas as well as institutions for governing a colony.

Colonial Politics: Public Face and Pragmatics

In 1857 the colonial rule of the British over South Asia was established after which rational-legal institutions of the western provenance were gradually cloned in South Asia. These rational-legal institutions were superimposed on the existing traditional authority patterns and social structures, despite the fact that there were considerable differences and disparity between the two sets of institutions having a logic of their own.

The crystallization of modern rational-legal structures in South Asia was the result of a gradual process. The administrative structures including the bureaucracy were premised on legal-rational foundations relatively early, whereas legal rationalization of political and representative institutions took some time. In fact, the colonial state introduced the representative political institutions quite slowly and hesitantly. Once established, these institutions began to operate along legal-rational lines. The tradition and historically rooted political and social structures of South Asia, which were primarily founded on primordial identities, personal loyalties and trust-based rules began to be replaced with legal procedures and codified rules. Nevertheless, this absolute ‘replacement’ is only acceptable in theory, since in practice the traditional structures or the ‘extra-legal’ resources continued to play an important role in the colonial governance. Therefore, despite divergences and discrepancies between the two sets of institutions, the British carved out a negotiating space, whereby these institutions of the western importation accommodated in the local context. Thus, the accrual of two sets of structures in South Asian context initiated a process of negotiation and renegotiation between them, which was harnessed by the colonial administrators to their advantage. At times, they made good use of the traditional social allegiances and racial/ethnic identities at the utter disregard of the underlying principles of the modern legal-rational institutions, which demand impersonalization, bureaucratization, meritocracy, rule of universal law and a greater degree of structural differentiation.

**Incongruence of the Legal-rational and Traditional Structures**

A considerable body of literature has come to the fore arguing for the incongruence of the modern legal-rational institutions of governance, and the traditional-indigenous political
and social structures. It is maintained that the legal-rational institutions have been conceived and historically evolved/developed in the West, upon a quite different social and cultural base from that of India. Representative institutions, based on free elections, and universal adult franchise are considered incompatible with the local indigenous social structure of South Asia. This dichotomy between representative governance structures and indigenous values is underscored by the two contrasting value systems, which underlie them.

Saberwal argues that in India there exist two sets of traditions and institutions, western and the Indian/indigenous, with considerable incongruence between their social logics.\(^{38}\) He maintains that “Indian society settled early on into the separative logic of the caste order: a cellular, segmented arrangement—which could accommodate differences of religion also in the name of the same logic. Each ‘cell’ in this society was largely on its own, regulating its own internal social space by its own lights.”\(^{39}\) He goes on to argue that in medieval European society, in contrast to the medieval Indian society, the course of historical events followed a different trajectory. Two institutions—the Roman Catholic Church and the institutionalization of laws and legal/legislative arrangements played crucial role in obliterating the cultural differences among European inhabitants. Moreover, institutions such as bureaucracy, universities and business firms were institutionalized.\(^{40}\)

Furer-Haimendorf takes a similar position that the system of government conceived and developed in the West and introduced by the Colonial state in South Asia, was “basically

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\(^{38}\) Saberwal, *Roots of Crisis*, passim.


\(^{40}\) Ibid.
inconsistent with the traditional indigenous social order.” Ayesha Jalal too recognizes the incongruity stemming from the “co-existence of rationalistic colonial laws and the customs of Indian society.” She contends that the “contradiction between a personalized Indian society and, in theory if not always in practice, an impersonalized colonial state apparatus became more acute after the introduction of the elective principle.”

Interplay of the Two Sets of Structures

After establishing their political domination over South Asia, the British put in place political and administrative structures that interacted with the local traditional structures in the environment, and indeed the latter facilitated their governance and consolidated their political control. The Colonial administrators even consciously resorted to those traditional mechanisms and strategies in order to rule effectively, which principally stood in direct contrast to the western ideology of rule by law and rational procedures. Moreover, in the process of interlocking of the two sets of structures, the new methods had to be accommodated and adjusted in order to guarantee their successful functioning without any friction. It was not possible without considerably molding them at the anvil of political expediency and even at times compromising their fundamental axiological underpinnings.

Sabrewal states that when the British created the colonial state structures in South Asia, they “did not work on a clean slate. Their spectacular success was due, rather to their skill

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43 Ibid., p. 11.
Ayesha Jalal, while acknowledging the “discrepancies between colonial theory and practice”\(^{45}\), goes on to argue that “[a]lthough the very character of Indian society forced a dilution of the purely rule-based logic of colonial institutions, constitutional control over them remained a primary objective of nationalist ambitions.”\(^{46}\) A majority of the Indians did not want to revert to monarchical forms of governing institutions rooted in the traditional indigenous political culture, but demanded to retain the constitutional type of government with elaborate and written legal-rational codes of conduct.

With the setting up of political government, the Colonial regime began institution-building in South Asia along the lines of the notion of legal-rationality. Rule-bound institutions of political and administrative nature were created, which were conceptually rooted in the notions of impersonalized sovereignty. The sphere of economy and society too was not left unattended and untouched, where fundamental and drastic changes were introduced.

Introduction and application of English law in India were marred by inconsistencies. Gilmartin argues that the “law in British India as a whole reflected paradoxes that were inherent in the nature of the colonial state.”\(^{47}\) He quotes David Washbrook, who maintains that the “Anglo-Indian legal system was distinctively Janus-faced and rested on

\(^{44}\) Saberwal, *Wages of Segregation*, p. 139.

\(^{45}\) Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*, p. 11.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.

two contradictory principles with different social implications.” Gilmartin goes on to assert: “Whereas the ‘public’ side of the law encouraged the emergence of free market relations, personal law under the British encouraged the preservation of ascribed, ‘traditional’ status.”

Before the British, the rule of Muslim kings had depended upon the support of local notables, and the British turned to these notables in a similar manner. A number of studies have brought to the fore the mutually advantageous relationships between the British and the powerful local groups. Bernard Cohn argues that after 1857, a “theory of authority became codified, based on ideas and assumptions about the proper ordering of groups in Indian society, and their relationship to their British rulers.” In order to firm up its political control, the colonial state needed an indigenous political base, which was provided by a group of ‘intermediary elite’ created by the British. For this purpose, the local tribal leaders were selectively co-opted by the Colonial regime, and were given land in lieu of their allegiance. This is because traditionally holding of land is considered to be socially prestigious in local / indigenous culture. These ‘intermediary elite’ became the support base of the British, and their privileged position was strongly tied up with the persistence of colonial rule. Thus, granting of land to the local tribal leaders helped the British incorporate the former into the administrative structure. It led to the emergence of


new classes of big landowners. Soon they emerged as local political elite of the regime, which was elected, albeit gradually, through the representative institutions. Since they largely came from landed aristocracy, they used the traditional support base for getting into the modern political representative institutions. It established an alliance between the two elite, i.e. the governing elite (the British) and the local. Later, these landed interests ultimately came to play a crucial role in the Pakistani politics of the post-colonial era.

David Gilmartin while studying the history of the Punjab under Colonial rule argues that in Punjab the British attempted to preserve and keep intact the tribal structure, which "became, in effect, a central principle of and a justification for imperial rule."\textsuperscript{52} C. L. Tupper, a colonial administrator of late nineteenth century, wrote that by "maintaining the tribal system the colonisation of the Punjab wastes would be rendered easier."\textsuperscript{53} Tupper further writes that the "maintenance of the tribe, the village, and the clan would not impede, but further the sort of progress that is most wanted in this part of India...A tribe in the chains of its own customs, unrelaxed and unrefined, may stand still for centuries, but a tribe recognised and lifted into the system of British administration has, in the guardianship of the governing body, the best possible chance of disusing savagery and learning the wisdom of civilized men."\textsuperscript{54}

The indigenous tribal idiom was preserved by the British in the Punjab for political and administrative purposes. These tribal bonds served well the purposes of the Colonial

\textsuperscript{52} Gilmartin, \textit{Empire and Jilam}, p. 16.  
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}
administrators. Through the zaildari system\textsuperscript{35} (administrative system in rural Punjab whereby villages were amalgamated for administrative purposes), local leadership was created. This tribal leadership, who were the zaildars in the administrative hierarchy, served as intermediary elite, linking the colonial state with the local populace. In the words of Gilmartin, "by the opening of the twentieth century British policy had produced a class of rural leaders, tied closely to the administration, exercising its authority in a 'tribal' idiom."\textsuperscript{36}

However, as a result of the interplay of the colonial as well as local indigenous patterns of authority, the tribal structures were, too, adapted by the British to suit the needs of the administrative system. The zaildars (local notables appointed to the charge of a zail), who in many cases were the tribal leaders, were granted tracts of land. This is because in the Punjabi society, land ownership is culturally defined to be an asset, which earns social prestige and power for the holder. Thus, the British "cemented the association of tribal and landed influence."\textsuperscript{37} The landed estates not only strengthened their loyalties towards the British government, possession of land by them considerably helped in extending their authority and influence in local sphere.

The Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1906\textsuperscript{38} not only polarized the Punjabis along rural and urban lines, it also reinforced the traditional tribal / ethnic / caste-based loyalties and

\textsuperscript{36} Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. p. 24.
social allegiances of the people.\textsuperscript{59} Similarly, the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 envisaged separate electorates for urban and rural constituencies.\textsuperscript{60} The system of election also sharpened the cleavages of ethnic nature, giving birth to a ‘politics of ethnicity / heradri’ in elections of the local representatives, who had a recourse to the ethnic identities as well as communal / ideological symbols to be maneuvered for winning the elections. It contributed towards the multiplicity of resources, particularly primordial identities for a political competition.

Scholars have brought out the ‘politics of collaboration’, whereby the colonial rulers made economic dispensations and bargains with the indigenous elite in order to establish imperial control, and thus, control vast sections of population.\textsuperscript{61} R. E. Robinson stressed the role of the relationships that the colonial rulers pragmatically forged with the local elite in the colonies.\textsuperscript{62}

The ethnic composition of the army during the colonial era also shows that some ‘races’ or ethnic groups were selectively co-opted by the British. This selective co-option was made on the basis on the ‘Theory of Martial Race’, and according to the British criterion ‘martial races’ such as Pathan tribes of the North West Frontier, Punjabi Muslims, Sikhs,

\textsuperscript{59} The encouragement of traditional identities and cleavages are evident from the mushrooming of various organizations in the province along their lines, such as Jatta Pagri Sanhvaat, Arain Association and Kashmiri Association, etc.

\textsuperscript{60} The Reforms of 1919 debarred the non-agricultural tribes / castes, as defined by the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, from contesting elections for the rural constituencies. Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 85.

\textsuperscript{61} Sarah F. D. Ansari has shown how the British system of political control in Sindh was based on patronage of the local elite and the public distribution of honour. The British negotiated their system of imperial control with the Sindh religious elite, particularly with the pirs, who later came to occupy a privileged position under the Colonial regime. Sarah F. D. Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843-1947, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 8.

Gurkhas, Rajputs from Central and Upper India, and Marathas from the south were recruited in the army. These recruits represented less than one per cent population of the Indian Subcontinent. In this way, the ethnic distinctiveness of the Indians was further reinforced. Moreover, in the command structure of the army, trust played an important role as recruitment was trust-based.

In addition to army, another colossal structure that was instituted by the British was bureaucracy, which was theoretically organized along the lines of legal-rational procedures. However, for practical purposes, elements from the local traditions too came to play an important role in its functioning, composition, recruitment and rules and regulations. The hierarchy of administrative authority constructed by the British was based on the structures and social organization of Indian society. Regarding the interplay of the two sets of structures, Ayesha Jalal contends that "[f]or the vast majority of Indians, local bureaucrats such as the district collector—a quintessential creation of the British administrative system—disbursed a personalized form of patronage and judicial arbitration within the overall context of rule-bound, indirect and impersonalized institutional structure." Thus, the impersonal rationality of bureaucratic institutions was compromised to political patronage, uncharacteristic of the impersonalized functioning of bureaucracy.

In addition, bureaucracy became a locus of power in the overall set up of British structures. Considerable power was concentrated in its hands. This colonial legacy was

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65 For details see Pasha, Colonial Political Economy, p. 143.
66 Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, p. 10.
later on bequeathed to the Pakistani bureaucracy, which has a strong tendency of
bureaucratic authoritarianism. In the opinion of Waseem: “Within the government, however, the rule of law contributed to self-legitimization and thus to assumption of an essentially autocratic attitude. It increasingly put all power in the hands of bureaucracy.”

Furer-Haimendorf maintains that politically conscious middle class, who was educated at educational institutions founded by the English, accepted the ideal of parliamentary democracy, which in turn facilitated the gradual establishment of legal-rational political institutions of western origin. This class of people “associated the ideals of freedom and national independence not with a return to the indigenous forms of government”, and idealized western democratic political institutions.

But there was an urge among this class as well as in general masses to reestablish their traditional cultural values, which was expressed in adopting and promoting indigenous forms of dress, cultural activities, etc. In the words of Furer-Haimendorf,

“Just as the Indian intellectual had become used to move in his professional life within the realms of western traditions and values, while confirming in his private and family life to values rooted in Hindu or Muslim tradition, so political leaders accepted wholeheartedly western ideas of democracy and parliamentary rule, without being fully conscious of their inevitable inconsistency with some of the basic principles of the traditional social system. Others, who were aware of this inconsistency, evinced a certain lack of realism in assuming that with the coming of freedom and democracy, caste loyalties and discrimination based on caste would soon lose all importance as political forces.”

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69 Ibid., pp. 52-3.
In view of Furer-Haimendorf, however, the assumption proved erroneous. In the post-colonial era, however, these loyalties and primordial identities came to occupy an important place in political competition, serving as ascribed resources at the disposal of various elite and elite groups.

**Elite Groups in Colonial Era**

During the colonial era, the rules of the political competition were laid down by the British. The Indians including the Muslims and the Hindus struggled for their independence by largely remaining within the framework of these rules and regulations. Representative political institutions were gradually established in India, and the inclusion of Indians in these institutions was progressively carried out.

During the British era, the Indian civilian elite were not independent in running the administrative affairs of the country. In particular, they did not enjoy decision-making powers, which were largely vested in the British administrators. Thus, they had little practical experience of working and decision-making in the representative institutions. Moreover, it has been asserted that in pre-independence days, the politicians used to oppose and protest to the policies of the British government, and it was considered to be an act of patriotism.\(^\text{70}\) It contributed towards making their political conduct 'agitational'.

As the movement for liberation from the yoke of the colonial rule gained momentum, the need to find an idiom appealing to all the Indian Muslims was clearly felt.\(^\text{71}\) Since these

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\(^\text{71}\) This need was primarily felt as result of the working of Congress Ministries in five provinces of India formed in 1937. For details see K. K. Aziz, *Muslims Under Congress Rule 1937-1939*. —A
Muslims came from diverse backgrounds having multiple identities in terms of language and culture, the demand for a separate homeland was articulated by the elite in religious terms, as religion provided a common thread binding all the Muslims of India together. The ideological identity of the Muslims and the normative symbols having religious overtones were a resource, whereby the masses were mobilized to pursue a desired course of action, i.e. freedom from the colonial rule. The Muslim elite using variety of resources such as symbolic appeals outmaneuvered the Hindu and the British elite.

In terms of administrative machinery, Pakistan inherited an “overdeveloped state apparatus” along with its “institutionalized practices.” The two institutions of military and bureaucracy retained their ‘colonial’ and secular orientation after the independence.

Theoretically or in legal-rational terms, bureaucracy is subordinate to the political institutions. On the contrary, after independence, bureaucratic elite emerged as power contenders. The colonial legacy remained an influential factor in the ascendancy of bureaucracy. The British political system was designed to suit the needs of the colonial regime. Since its was meant to govern a ‘subject’ people, the colonial bureaucracy served as an important instrument of control. The colonial bureaucracy enjoyed extensive discretionary powers. Serving the British government, they were not responsible to the Indians, which made them least responsive to local demands. In fact, they had never shared power and authority with the popular representatives of the country. The bureaucracy as an institution had a highly organized and coherent system, which was

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divided into hierarchies. It was due to its coherence that Lloyd George had termed bureaucracy as the “steel frame of the British Empire.”

The salient characteristics of the administrative system inherited by Pakistan include the “highly complex patterns of organization, well-established forms of socialization for its members, and a remarkable degree of institutional autonomy.” These characteristics of the bureaucracy hindered the parallel development of alternative political institutions in the post-colonial era, since the bureaucratic elite viewed these institutions as a potential threat to their own power and authority.

Like bureaucracy, all-powerful institution of the army was largely a continuity of colonial traditions. The British Indian Army served as a powerful and effective instrument of control and domination. The stability of the British Raj depended on the military, which was heavily used for suppressing rebellions and curbing resistance to the policies of the regime. In addition to external and internal security-related matters, the military was involved in administrative affairs as well, such as in maintenance of law and order. As a matter of fact, military officers were also inducted in the civil services.

Dewey suggests that the symbiotic relationship between the recruiting grounds and the influence of the institution of army later came to play an important role in hegemony of the military elite in Pakistan after independence. The privileges of the army officers attracted recruits from rural backgrounds, and consequently, there developed a strong

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bond that "most-martial families" and tribes identify their honour— their izzat—with the honour of the regiments in which they serve."

The army officers were stationed in the cantonments, which were originally constructed for its British officers. Thus, they were kept "physically and culturally distanced from the civilian sectors of the country." An important feature of the British Indian Army was its high degree of professionalism, due to which it remained aloof from politics, indeed subservient to civilian authority in London. As for its relationship with the civilian authority in India, the British army was more like an 'equal partner'. Therefore, in the post-independence era, it was psychologically difficult for the institution of army to become subordinate to the national civilian authorities.

As an institution, the Pakistan Army has inherited a number of characteristics from the colonial times such as being westernized, organized and disciplined, centralized, hierarchical, cohesive and self-conscious of its strength and unique position. Moreover, it has a national outlook as well as possession of instruments of control and coercion, which give it an edge over many other institutions.

**Legislative Arrangements in Colonial Era**

After the victory in the battle-field of Plassey in 1757, Bengal virtually went under the political control of the English East India Company. For regulating the activities of the

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East India Company, the British Government introduced a number of legislative schemes.\textsuperscript{82}

In post-1857 era, Government of India Act of 1858 was passed, through which the British Parliament assumed sovereign power over India. Thus, the sovereignty was passed on to the British Crown. It was followed by the introduction of a series of Acts or 'constitutional reforms', including the Act of 1869, the Indian Councils Act of 1861, the Indian Councils Act of 1870, the Act of 1874, the Indian Councils Act of 1892, the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909, the Government of India Act 1919 or the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, the Government of India Act 1935 and the India Independence Act of 1947.

The British gradually introduced responsible and representative institutions of parliamentary democracy in India. An important step in this direction was the introduction of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms or the Government of India Act, 1919, whereby dyarchy was established at the provincial level. Under this system, the Indian ministers, who were appointed by the Provincial Governors, were answerable to the elected legislature in respect to the 'transferred departments', whereas the Governors could appoint certain persons to look after what were called the 'reserved subjects' (e.g. finance), and such persons were responsible only to the Governor and not to the provincial legislature.\textsuperscript{83} The transferred subjects included, \textit{inter alia}, local self-government, public health, Indian educational institutions, public works, agriculture and development of industries, etc, whereas the reserved subjects, which fell under the

\textsuperscript{82} These included Regulating Act of 1773, The Amending Act of 1781, Pitt’s India Act of 1784, and a number of Charter Acts during 1813-1853.

\textsuperscript{83} For details see A. B. Keith, A Constitutional History of India 1600-1925, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969 (first published 1926), pp. 253-55.
jurisdiction of the Governors, included, among others, water supplies, irrigation, land revenue administration, administration of justice, labour welfare, development of mineral resources, electricity, police, control of newspapers, prisons, treasure-trove, and elections, etc.

As for the civil services, the Act of 1919 asserted civilian supremacy over it by declaring the civil servants to be subservient to the Indian legislatures though in a minor degree. The Act contained guarantees for the civil servants, and laid down that the civil servants held office at pleasure.\(^4\) All matters related to defense were under the central legislative and executive control.\(^5\) Thus, the civil and defense services were made subservient to the civilian authorities under the Act of 1919.

The Government of India Act, 1935 was an improvement upon the old unitary form of government envisaged in the Act of 1919. For the first time in the history of the Sub-continent, the provinces were recognized as distinct legal entities. They were relatively free from the control of the Center, they exercised wide executive and legislative powers.\(^6\)

At least in constitutional theory, the Act of 1935 introduced federal form of government in India. In terms of practice, it envisaged discretionary powers for the Governor General as well as the provincial Governors. For instance, they could appoint or dismiss ministers at their discretion. They had powers to give or deny assent to any bill, as well as declare a state of emergency in case of failure of functioning of constitutional machinery.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 270.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 263.

Moreover, the Governor General was not bound to accept the advice of his ministers in many spheres, where he was solely responsible to the British Parliament through the Secretary of the State for India.\textsuperscript{87}

The Act of 1935, like the Act of 1919, declared the bureaucracy to be subservient to the executive and legislative authority. It gave guarantees to the civil servants, though it laid down that the civil servants would hold their office at the pleasure of the Crown.\textsuperscript{88} The Act of 1935 kept defense as a reserve subject, falling under the jurisdiction of the Governor General, subject to the Secretary of State and the Home Government in Britain. Moreover, the use of military forces for civil needs was under the control of the Governor General as an ultimate resort.\textsuperscript{89} Thus, the British Indian Army was a resource in aid of civilian authority for effective execution of the decisions of the civil authority.

After the mounting pressure of the freedom movement, the British were forced to quit India and terminate their colonial rule. Freedom to the Indian sub-continent was granted through an Act of Parliament. Thus, the inception of Pakistan had taken place within the framework of the existing constitutional arrangements. The India Act of Independence, 1947 declared India and Pakistan to be two dominions until they enacted their own constitutions, whereby both would cease to be dominions. The Act also provided for legislative powers to the Constituent Assembly. Under Section 8, sub-section (2), the Dominions and all the Provinces were to be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 8 also curtailed the

\textsuperscript{87} Justice Masud Ahmad, Pakistan—A Study of its Constitutional History (1937-1945), Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1978, pp. 10-12. For details of the Act, also see Keith, A Constitutional History of India, pp. 332-36.

\textsuperscript{88} Keith, A Constitutional History of India, pp. 414-16.

\textsuperscript{89} For details see ibid., pp. 399-400.
discretionary powers of the Governor General. Section 9 of the Act empowered the Governor General to issue orders in order to make omissions, adaptations and modifications to the Act of 1935 till March 31, 1948.\textsuperscript{90}

According to the powers granted under section 9 of the Act of 1935, on August 14, 1947, The Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947 was promulgated by Governor General Mountbatten.\textsuperscript{91} It's Section 3, sub-section (3)(2) read: “The following expression shall be omitted wherever they occur, namely, “in his discretion,” “acting in his discretion” and “exercising his individual judgment.”\textsuperscript{92}

Thus, the constitutional heritage of Pakistan came to substantially rest on two legislative schemes—the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947. The former envisaged a strong centralized rule. It was intended to rule a dominion, with a strong and powerful Governor General representing the British Crown. The latter, nonetheless, envisioned parliamentary democracy, and envisaged the Assembly as the prime locus of power, which was entrusted with the dual task of legislation and constitution-making.\textsuperscript{93} The differences between the two Acts later impacted upon the relationship between the executive and the legislature. In the words of Wheeler: “Parliamentary democracy was engrafted onto the British Indian viceroyal tradition in 1947 in the interim constitution order defined by the Government of India Act of 1935


\textsuperscript{91} The Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, (Governor General’s Order No. 22), Constitutional Documents (Pakistan), Vol. IV-B, Karachi: Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs (Law Division), Government of Pakistan, 1964, pp. 1051-54.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., p. 1053.

\textsuperscript{93} Paula Newberg, Judging the State, Courts and the Constitutional Politics in Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 36.
and the Independence Act of 1947. The result was a curious amalgam of federal, unitary, parliamentary, and viceregal principles.\textsuperscript{94}

The Act of 1947 entrusted the Assembly with the dual task of legislation and constitution-making. Therefore, it was the Constituent Assembly as well as the Federal Legislature simultaneously. However, to differentiate between its functions, both were summoned separately; the former by its President and the latter by the Governor General. In addition, there were different rules of procedure for them.\textsuperscript{95} The status of these two bodies was different and unequal. The Constituent Assembly responsible for constitution-making was superior to the Legislature, as the former presumably possessed sovereign authority. It was summoned and prorogued by its President, and not by the Governor General. It was also asserted that the Constituent Assembly could be dissolved through the votes of its members.\textsuperscript{96}

The office of the Governor General, barring the emergency and transitional powers, was envisaged to function in the British Parliamentary traditions and, therefore, in the Provisional Constitution of Pakistan 1947, to be ceremonious and formal. When Jinnah was reminded by Mountbatten that the Governor General’s role was symbolic with no real power attached to it, his reply was: “In Pakistan I will be Governor-General and the Prime Minister will do what I tell him to do.”\textsuperscript{97} The circumstances were such that Governor General Jinnah came to occupy a prominent position in the country, which was comparable to the position of the Governor General in British India in many ways. Keith


\textsuperscript{95} Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan, p. 23.


Callard observes: "It has been characteristic of the constitution of the British model that powers which appear strong on paper may in practice remain unused."\(^{98}\) However, the Governor General in Pakistan concentrated powers in his hands for all practical purposes, and used these powers in an arbitrary fashion, as his role was vaguely defined in the country's constitutional arrangement. The Governor General not only dissolved the provincial governments, a central ministry and the first Constituent Assembly were also dissolved by him.

Summing up, it may be said that the political conduct in Pakistan is largely informed by multiple sets of values, i.e. Islam, local Muslim traditions, and the modern legal-rational values bequeathed by the Colonial rule.\(^{99}\) These diverse values provide resources and make the public face of politics.

The colonial rule has bequeathed a definite set of political structures to the successor states of Pakistan and India. These political structures and the local patterns of social behaviour and the values enshrined in religion have a symbiotic relationship. In the opinion of David Apter, "[p]olitical institutions transfer, involving secular parliamentary structures, requires and in fact achieves disruption of traditional societies and is in fact composed of elements some of which are dysfunctional to the maintenance of traditional systems."\(^{100}\) It may be further added that the transfer of institutions not only disrupt the traditional societies, but may also necessitate some adjustments in the secular

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parliamentary institutions / structures, which may result in discrepancies between the theory and the practice of political modernization and parliamentary democracy.

A number of scholars did opine that representative institutions based on free elections, which were established by the British, might not survive in South Asia. Furer-Haimendorf noted early in the existence of India that the system of government was being modified or influenced by the values and principles inherent in the traditional social order, and such an influence is manifested in “the manipulation of the prevailing system of government…”

The multiple sets of values provide a public face to politics, and the political actors belonging to various competing groups pragmatically deploy a number of resources available in these sets of values. For instance, kinship networks in Pakistan are one of the major bases of an individual’s loyalty, wherein individuals are bound and have mutual obligations to each other. The political actors may use these ties as a resource in order to build their support, protect themselves and forge alliances with other groups, in the opinion of Kochanek, having strong loyalty towards kin.

building modern associations in Pakistan became very difficult because individuals felt no real commitment or loyalty to the organization and were either apathetic or engaged in bitter struggles for dominance... Formal rules and procedures when they existed were distorted, ignored or manipulated... Allegiance remained focus on small primary units of family, clan, tribe, or religious sect and modern association had difficulty in developing the discipline, mechanisms, and procedures for defining collective goals and decision-making systems based on bargaining and consensus.

Similarly, in view of Vorys, “[t]o the vast majority of its population national interest is rather hazy and remote concept. Identification with fellow citizens in distant regions is

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102 Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development, p. 34.
most tenuous. Certainly a willingness to subordinate personal and parochial advantages to 'national interest' is rare.\textsuperscript{103} Nonetheless, the political realities of Pakistan as of now present a mosaic of both traditional identities and values and modern institutions and formal-legal rules, which provide a variety of resources to elite to be employed to prevail in a political competition.

\textsuperscript{103} Vorys, \textit{Political Development in Pakistan}, p. 25.
Chapter 4

Political Competition among Civilian Elite

and the Emergence of Rival Elite

After the inception of Pakistan, the country had to face a host of administrative as well as security problems. Not only were there problems pertaining to the refugee rehabilitation, lack of experienced and trained personnel, lack of resources for setting up of administrative network in the country, the hostile neighbour India too posed threats to its security. In order to address these and many other problems, the civilian elite heavily depended upon the bureaucratic and military elite. In the beginning the bureaucratic and military elite were ‘resources’ in aid of the civilian authorities, but gradually the political scenario in the country came to be dominated by three main groups of political actors: the civilian, bureaucratic and military elite with the emergence of the latter two as the rival elite.

In addition to the initial difficulties confronted by the country, the aggressive political competition among the civilian elite also facilitated the role transformation of the bureaucratic and military elite. The factional tussles, regional rivalries and personal antagonism among the civilian elite played a critical role in the bureaucratic-military interference in the political arena. Immediately after independence, the bureaucratic elite filled important political offices, and came to occupy a dominant position in the decision-making at the center. As for the military elite, apart from their role in the
defense of the country, they frequently assisted the civilian administration in discharge of their duties, particularly in times of crises such as natural calamities, and in restoration of law and order during civil unrest. All these developments helped graduate the bureaucratic and military elite into rival elite.

The present chapter is an attempt to explore the dynamics of political competition among the civilian elite, and the gradual emergence of the bureaucratic and military elite as rival elite in a historical perspective. It investigates how the civilian elite created legal resources in political competition in order to counter-maneuver and outweigh each other. These resources include, among others, the inclusion of Section 92-A in the Constitution through Governor General’s Order (1948), and the promulgation of PRODA (1949). Their public face and the pragmatic considerations behind them have particularly been brought to the fore. It also discusses how the bureaucratic and military elite strengthened and consolidated their positions vis-à-vis the civilian elite. While doing so, it discerns the relative strengths of the two non-elected state institutions, and the various political developments taking place in the country, which contributed to their ascendency.

**Political Competition among the Civilian Elite**

Before its final adoption after independence, the Government of India Act, 1935 was amended under Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947. Among other changes and modifications introduced in the Act of 1935, the discretionary powers of the Governor General and Governors were curtailed, and it was understood that they would follow the British parliamentary conventions with regard to aid and advice in the

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performance of their functions. According to the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Constituent Assembly was given two separate functions: first, to prepare a constitution; and secondly, to act as a Federal Legislative Assembly. Acting as the Constituent Assembly, it could amend the Act of 1935.²

Regarding the potential and capability of the civilian elite to independently run the affairs of the country, conflicting views have been expressed. Some argue that the civilian elite or politicians of Pakistan had little experience of political affairs. In the Colonial era, though self-government was gradually introduced by British Government, the experience of politicians was negligible.³ In the words of Lawrence Ziring: "Pakistan was fitted into a design of parliamentary experience, but the people who suddenly found themselves parliamentarians had neither the training nor the requisite sense of social responsibility, and perhaps no less important, a questionable aptitude."⁴

After independence, Quaid-i-Azam M.A. Jinnah, who had spearheaded the freedom movement, preferred to become the first Governor General of Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan⁵—his right hand man—became the Prime Minister. Since he had been deputy leader of All India Muslim League in the Central Legislative Assembly, he was selected by the Muslim League Council as the Prime Minister.

Jinnah wielded enormous powers owing to the prestige and respect he commanded.

These were Jinnah's resources, which he had, in addition to other resources, skillfully

³ Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 4.
⁵ An Aligarh graduate, Liaquat Ali Khan served as the FM from 1947 till his assassination in 1951. He also remained the President of Pakistan Muslim League in 1950-51.
employed during the freedom movement, both against the British as well as the Congress leaders. Keith Callard writes about Jinnah: "There was no one else, he was Pakistan; and wherever he went he was received by vast crowds with adulation amounting almost to worship." In other words, he was "the personification of the state." Callard further writes:

As a consequence of this decision [to become Governor General] the normal conventions of cabinet government had no chance to develop.... The members of his council of ministers felt themselves to be his lieutenants. They were prepared to execute his orders or to be overruled by him on any point, either individually or as a group. The possibility of instructions proceeding from the cabinet to the Governor-General did not arise; it was, in fact, unthinkable. From the beginning it was assumed that the normal conventions of the office of Governor-General could never apply to Mr. Jinnah.8

Jinnah was the real head of the central government, whether he wished to be or not. He used to preside over the cabinet meetings and make top-level decisions.9 However, it was the cabinet that had decided a few months after independence that it could be overruled by the 'Quaid-i-Azam', being their 'greatest leader' and not owing to his office of the Governor General. "It was not an amendment of the constitution but a voluntary surrender of power on the part of the cabinet..."10 It clearly demonstrates that he enjoyed a predominant position in the country.

In this regard, Callard also quotes the public opinion and the mood of the country as such:

However, the constitutional powers of the Governor-General of a Dominion may nominally be, in Quaid-i-Azam's case no legal or formal limitations can apply. His people will not be content to have him as merely the titular head of the government, they would wish him to be their friend, philosopher, guide and

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6 Callard, Pakistan—A Political Study, p. 19.
7 Ibid., p. 20.
8 Ibid., p. 132.
ruler, irrespective of what the constitution of a Dominion of the British Commonwealth may contain.\textsuperscript{11}

In a similar vein, The Times wrote on the death of Jinnah that “as the ‘father of the nation’ his prerogatives were enlarged by popular acclaim far beyond the limits laid down in the Constitution.”\textsuperscript{12} All such statements testify that people had profound trust in Jinnah, and for this reason, in popular perception, his privileges and power were not confined by legal and constitutional bounds.

The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was comprised of members indirectly elected by members of the Provincial Assemblies. It had been elected in 1946 with a limited franchise of about 14%.\textsuperscript{13} Its members were not directly elected by the people on the basis of universal adult franchise. Moreover, when the Provincial Assemblies were elected, the issue at hand was the creation of Pakistan, and not the framing of the constitution.

Governor General Jinnah had promised to give a constitution in eighteen months,\textsuperscript{14} but he lived only thirteen months after independence. After his death on September 11, 1948, he was succeeded by Khwaja Nazimuddin, a civilian elite from East Pakistan, as the next Governor General on September 14.

In the initial years after independence, the code regulating the political conduct of the political actors and the rules of political competition were evolved. The All-India

\textsuperscript{11} Dawn (Karachi), July 13, 1947 as cited in Callard, Pakistan—A Political Study, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{12} The Times (London), September 12, 1948.
Muslim League, which changed its nomenclature to Pakistan Muslim League (PML) after independence, found itself to be the ruling party being heir of the British political power after their departure. The PML ministries were established in the four provinces in the two wings of the country. In West Pakistan, the League had faced formidable resistance in pre-partition days, as a number of the local civilian elite had been opposed to the idea of creation of Pakistan. Many of them hailed from feudal backgrounds, and thus had a strong local power base. Though many of them joined PML later on, they remained engaged in politics based on regional and personal issues. These intra-civilian elite rivalries and conflicts not only substantially undermined the strength and prestige of PML, it also destabilized the provincial governments, often provoking the central authority to some action. Moreover, these conflicts contributed to the delay in constitution-making.

The year 1949 is marked by a mushroom growth of political parties in the country having diverse orientations and representing varied aspirations. The civilian elite, being a non-homogenous category, were polarized on ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious and sectarian bases. There existed bitter controversies among them over a number of issues such as political representation in federal legislature, distribution of powers between the center and provinces, national language and the role of religion in Pakistani polity, etc. In particular, the Punjabi-Bengali tussle for political ascendency had started becoming quite acute.

\[^{15}\text{It has been argued that the so-called Bengali-Punjabi tussle was not ethnic in nature. The Bengali group included non-Bengalis like Sardar Nishtar, Abdul Sattar Pirzada, and Dr. Mahmud Husain, and the Punjabi group had non Punjabis such as General Ayub Khan and Iskander Mirza. M. Rafique Aftab, \textit{Pakistani History and Politics, 1947-1971}, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 95.}\]
The first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, is said to have fell victim to those conflicts, as he was assassinated on October 16, 1951. Upon Liaquat’s death, Governor General Nazimuddin left his office, and assumed Prime Ministership on October 19, 1951, whereas Malik Ghulam Muhammad, the Finance Minister, assumed the office of Governor General on October 17, 1951. Ghulam Muhammad’s place was taken by Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, the then secretary general to the government. Thus, two political offices of the Governor General and Finance Minister came to be occupied by bureaucrats. In the words of a critic, a “bureaucratic dark horse had outwitted the feuding and confused political war horses of Pakistan.”

Nazimuddin’s decision to resign from the office of Governor General and become Prime Minister was based on his pragmatic choice, since he had seen that Liaquat Ali Khan as Prime Minister had wielded enormous powers. Moreover, after Jinnah’s death, the office of Governor General had become quite ceremonial, as the Prime Minister like Liaquat commanded a lot of respect, prestige and authority. Nazimuddin and the pro-Nazimuddin group assumed that the new Governor General would be a mere pawn. Nevertheless, Nazimuddin forgot that his “authority over his colleagues and over the country had to depend not upon accumulated prestige but on the current performance and force of personality.” Conversely, the new Governor General Ghulam Muhammad proved more assertive and authoritative than Nazimuddin, as after almost one and a half years, Nazimuddin was dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad.

16 For details see Ahmad Salim and Muazzam Raza Tabassum, Mamdot sey Watto tak (Markaz Paujab Tanazz), Lahore: Gora Publishers, 1996, pp. 29-30.
19 Callard, Pakistan—A Political Study, p. 22.
As for Khwaja Nazimuddin, he was nominated as the Prime Minister by Cabinet colleagues of the then assassinated Liaquat. It is important to point out that according to the conventions of parliamentary democracy, with the death of the Prime Minister, cabinet stands dissolved. Since Nazimuddin was nominated by Liaquat’s defunct Cabinet, it was unconventional and unconstitutional. The Prime Minister should have been elected democratically by the Constituent Assembly. Moreover, when Nazimuddin was made the Prime Minister, he was neither the member of Constituent Assembly, nor an ordinary member of PML—the ruling party. His nomination by the defunct Cabinet was made without approval of the Constituent Assembly, and PML. But interestingly, no one was critical of his method of nomination. Soon he won a seat in the Constituent Assembly, and became its member. He also won a vote of confidence from the PML Parliamentary Party, thus becoming its leader, as well as the President of the party.

There was a lack of national political leadership in the country after Liaquat Ali Khan. There were few civilian elite of national stature, most of them representing regional and provincial aspirations. Many had formed their own political parties having provincial power bases, or emerged as the leaders of the provincial factions of PML. Gradually, the credibility and legitimacy of PML, which it had enjoyed ever since the creation of Pakistan, began declining. Its climax reached when it suffered a crushing defeat in East Pakistan in the elections of 1954 at the hands of the newly-formed United Front.

As the regional differences and cleavages among the civilian elite became more acute, compromises were worked out by the civilian elite. As for the Bengali-Punjabi tussle, a

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20 Afzal, *Pakistan: History and Politics*, p. 95.
formula of power-sharing between the two wings of the country was evolved. After Liaquat Ali Khan's death in 1951, Khwaja Nazimuddin was appointed the Prime Minister since he belonged to East Pakistan, while Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat from Punjab, was made Governor General. This arrangement was made to ensure power-sharing between the East and West Pakistan.

In addition to the Bengali-Punjabi tussle, there were sharp differences between the refugee and indigenous leaderships. The refugee and indigenous leaders were the 'products of two very different political cultures.' The refugee leaders were generally modernist Muslims, who believed that Islamic principles could be interpreted to provide basis of a progressive society and market-oriented economic system. On the contrary, most of the indigenous leadership wanted to establish an Islamic state and believed in state-managed economy.\(^{21}\) The clash between them was manifested in reorganizing the PML after independence as well as in constitution making in the country.

The attitude of the civilian elite after independence may also be explained against the backdrop of their pre-independence experiences. The very nature of Muslim politics in Colonial India was 'agitational', when government-bashing was encouraged. Nonetheless, after independence, dissident voices against the policies of the government were not tolerated. Liaquat in a speech had referred to the prevalent "epidemic of party-forming" and dubbed their leaders as enemies and traitors of Pakistan, when they raised voice.\(^{22}\) In order to curb and suppress these voices, various mechanisms and strategies


were used by the ruling elite, which reminded one of the Colonial era. These strategies particularly included enhancement of legal resources, which were especially created for regulating the political competition.

Creating New Legal Resources for Political Competition

In the backdrop of intra-civilian elite political competition, the ruling elite created new legal resources in order to curb the civilian elite. However, given below are case studies of two such resources, which include the insertion of section 92-A through Governor General's Order (1948) and promulgation of the Public Representative Offices Disqualification Act of 1949 (PRODA) by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan.

1. Inclusion of Section 92-A in Constitution and its Pragmatics

An important decision made on the orders of Governor General M. A. Jinnah was the inclusion of section 92-A in the adapted Constitution of 1935 through Governor General's Order, which was notified on July 10, 1948. Section 92-A(1) read:

> If at any time the Governor General is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the peace or security of Pakistan or any part thereof is threatened, or that a situation has arisen in which the government of a province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Act, he may by proclamation direct the Governor of a province to assume on behalf of the Governor General all or any of the powers vested in or exercised by any provincial body or authority. Any such proclamation may contain such identical and consequential provisions as may appear to the Governor General to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the proclamation including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Act relating to any provincial body or authority...23

It empowered the Governor General to dismiss any provincial government and place the province under Governor's rule. On face of it, the Order was aimed at handling a situation of 'grave emergency' when peace or security seems threatened.

23 The Pakistan Provisional Constitution (Third Amendment) Order, 1948, (Governor General's Order No. 13 of 1948). Also see Constitutional Documents (Pakistan), Vol. IV-B, p. 1129-49.
Prior to inclusion of section 92-A in the Constitution, two provincial governments were dismissed under section 51(5) of the amended Government of India Act, 1935. It reads:

In the exercise of his functions under this section with respect to the choosing and summoning and the dismissal of ministers the Governor shall be under the general control of, and comply with such particular directions, if any, as may from time to time, be given to him by the Governor General.  

Invoking it, the Congress Ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib in NWFP was dismissed in July 1947. Next year, Muhammad Ayub Khurshid, the Chief Minister of Sindh was dismissed by Governor General Jinnah in April 1948 on charges of corruption and maladministration.

Under section 51(5) of the Government of India Act, 1935 the dismissal of a provincial ministry fell under the jurisdiction of the provincial Governor. Since in 1948 during the lifetime of Jinnah, the provincial governors of the Punjab, NWFP and East Pakistan were British, therefore, in July 1948 a new Governor General’s Order was issued, whereby a new section 92-A was inserted in the Constitution in order to empower the Governor General to dismiss any provincial government on account of emergency and put the province under Governor’s rule. Nonetheless, Governor General Jinnah never invoked it.

Section 92-A was in fact a modified version of section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under section 93, the Provincial Governor in his discretion could assume to himself all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any Provincial body or authority. It also laid down that “no Proclamation shall be made by a Governor under

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this section without the concurrence of the Governor-General in his discretion." It was revived as section 92-A in the Adapted Constitution with some modification through Governor General's Order. Under modified section 92-A, the power to declare emergency in a province was vested in the Governor General instead of the Governor.

In this way, the powers of Governor General were enhanced through an Order, though Jinnah never invoked these powers. After Jinnah, exercising the powers granted under 92-A, a number of provincial governments were dissolved and Chief Ministers were dismissed by the Governor General. For instance, the Government of Nawab of Mumdot in Punjab was dismissed in January 1949, and the administration of the province was taken over by Governor Sir Francis Mudie. It is important to note that Governor General Khwaja Nazimuddin had dismissed Mumdot's Government at the behest of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Similarly, the Chief Minister of East Pakistan A. K. Fazlul Haq of United Front was dismissed in May 1954 by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad, and Governor's rule was imposed in the province. In June 1954, Iskandar Mirza was sent to East Pakistan as Governor. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra vowed to revive the democratic set up in the province as soon as the law and order were restored in the province. However, after six months of the issuance of Bogra's statement, Mirza declared:

One thing is certain—the Center will never allow this province to again incur the danger of disintegration. The well-being and happiness of the masses, as always, will be the paramount consideration. There are many schemes to be completed and I am convinced that the 92A Administration can still do more solid work for the people and further tone up the basic administration."

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28 Dawn (Karachi), November 18, 1954, as cited in ibid.
The statement of Mirza indicating the necessity to prolong Governor's rule in the Province was justified in terms to threat of disintegration, promotion of well-being and happiness of the masses and continuation of development work. All this provided a public face to the pragmatics of Governor's rule in East Pakistan.

Later, in October 1955, a Constitutional Amendment was made in the Provisional Government of India Act, 1935 in order to repeal section 92-A and insert 93-A in its place. The Bill was moved by I. I. Chundrigar. The Statement of Objects and Reasons included the following:

...Under the proposed section the Governor will not be able to assume the powers of the Provincial Legislature. These powers will become exercisable either by the Federal Legislature or by the Governor-General under the authority of the Federal Legislature. In that Legislature representatives from the Provinces concerned would be present and will have voice in the administration of the Province and in the legislation intended for it.

The Constitutional Amendment was aimed at reviving the power of the provincial legislature and curtailing the Governor.

2. Promulgation of PRODA (1949)

The promulgation of Public Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act of 1949 (PRODA), which was passed by the Constituent Assembly on January 14, 1949, makes an excellent case of making a rule of political competition by the ruling civilian elite. It presents good example that how a law as a resource reflects politics among various groups, and how they use the coercive power to prevail in a political competition for pursuing their desired course of action by deploying strategies ranging from intimidation to actual use of force of law.

30 Ibid., p. 546.
Public Face of PRODA

The promulgation of PRODA makes an excellent case of making a rule of political game. The Bill was moved by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, and was passed by the Constituent Assembly on January 14, 1949. The law proved short-lived, as it was repealed in 1954; in these five years, only five persons were disqualified under PRODA.

The Act was sub-titled: “An Act to provide for the debarring from public life for a suitable period of persons judicially found guilty of misconduct in any public office or representative capacity or in any matter relating thereto.” Its statement of objects and reasons is as follows:

Since it is the general opinion that measures should be taken to prevent abuse of official power and position and that it is necessary in the interests of public probity to provide means for debarring from public life for a suitable period any person judicially found guilty of misconduct in any public office of representative capacity or in any matter relating thereto, this Bill is being brought forward to introduce those measures and establish those interests.

Its section 3(3) defined misconduct as including:

bribery, corruption, jobbery, favouritism, nepotism, willful maladministration, willful misapplication or diversion of public moneys, or moneys collected, whether by public subscription or otherwise, by or at the instance of persons holding honorary or stipendiary office under the Central Government or a Provincial Government, and any other abuse of official power or position or attempt thereof; 33

Pragmatics of PRODA

PRODA was essentially a legal resource put at the disposal of the ruling civilian elite.

Its selective invocation was a pragmatic strategy to avoid contest with certain political actors by legally disqualifying them from participation in political competition. It was

32 Ibid., p. 69.
33 Ibid., p. 68.
devised by the Government of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1949 in view of the growing opposition to the PML, the ruling political party, and the conflicts within provincial Muslim Leagues. The popular support of the government had considerably been undermined owing to the policies of Liaquat’s Government such as his decision to accept cease-fire in Kashmir in the wake of Indo-Pak disturbances of October 1947. The general public and politicians expressed their displeasure and resentment, as the decision did not enjoy popular support. The discontent over cease-fire was expressed in dissidence within the army too in March 1951, which is commonly known as the ‘Rawalpindi Conspiracy.’ The conspiracy was led by Major-General Akbar Khan, the Chief of the General staff, who had earned considerable acclaim for his services in the Kashmir War of 1948.

In addition, the hold of the government had been weakened owing to divisive and conflict-ridden politics, which was manifested in the Central Cabinet and the Constituent Assembly. Controversies over issues related to constitution-making were being hotly debated, particularly in the wake of the passage of Objectives Resolution (March 1949) and the appointment of Basic Principles Committee. Moreover, the internal cohesion and organization of PML was being eroded owing to emerging provincial factions within the League. Moreover, there were demands to hold elections to Constituent and provincial Assemblies, and before holding any election, it was essential to consolidate and strengthen Muslim League civilian elite vis-à-vis the civilian elite belonging to dissident factions. The power politics among the civilian elite was reflected, in general, in the tussle between two groups representing the West and East Wings, and particularly between the Punjabis and the Bengalis. The West wing was

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represented by Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad, a Punjabi, whereas the representative of Bengali group was Fazlur Rahman, Minister for commerce and education.

In these circumstances, PRODA was promulgated, which served as a control mechanism at the disposal of the elite, who at a particular time has the capacity to influence the formal apparatus of law of the state, to curb any dissident voices within the government and teach a lesson to the assertive politicians. Through it, the Governor-General was given the powers to disqualify any minister or member of the central and provincial legislatures and parliamentary secretaries from public offices for a specific number of years. The allegations of corruption, maladministration, misconduct or abuse of official position provided cover to the pragmatic use of the law, whereby it became an effective tool of curtailing any opposition to the mainstream PML—the ruling party.

In view of K. K. Aziz, the Act “enabled the Government to deal adequately with persons who had abused public office but who, on technical grounds, could not be proceeded against in the court of law.” Enactments such as PRODA also indicate the problems in effective management of situations, which cannot be handled with available rational-legal rules. Such legislation point to the inadequacy of the formal-legal rules, which can be circumvented through manipulation. Therefore, PRODA acted as a tool in the hands of the ruling clique, whereby it pragmatically sought to penalize those who had managed to circumvent the law, or could not come within the ambit of legal rules despite violating them. According to section 3(1) of the said Act, an inquiry could be initiated at the order of the Governor General or a Governor. In addition, a Tribunal

specifically set up for this purpose could also initiate inquiry about any minister, deputy minister or parliamentary secretary of the Federal Government or a Provincial Government, or a member of the Constituent Assembly. Those guilty of the above-mentioned violations were tried by the Federal Court or a High Court or a tribunal of Federal or High Court judges, which were established by the government specifically for this purpose.

Another important provision of the Act was that according to its section 6, "Any order of the Governor-General under section 3 shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court." In this way, the regulating law debarred those accused under it to approach judiciary in order to challenge it on legal grounds. The ruling elite not only created a legal resource by promulgation PRODA, but also ensured that it could not be circumvented by the dissident civilian elite.

**Pragmatic Exercise of PRODA**

Under PRODA, a number of civilian elite were disqualified from holding public office for a specific period. The first civilian elite to be disqualified under it was Muhammad Ayub Khurto of Muslim League, (Chief Minister of Sindh, 1947-48), who was dismissed in April, 1948. He was replaced by Pir Ilahi Bakhsh, a landlord belonging to Muslim League, the ruling party. Nevertheless, he too was dismissed next year in 1949, to be replaced by yet another Leagueer Yusuf Abdullah Haroon. Next year in 1950, Haroon was replaced by Kazi Fazlullah of Muslim League, but he could also continue for merely one year, when he was dismissed under PRODA in 1951 and disqualified.

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from holding public office for six years in January 1953. Nevertheless, surprisingly, Ayub Khurho was again made Chief Minister Sindh in 1951 for some time when his case under PRODA was pending with the tribunal. In December 1951, Governor's rule was imposed on Sindh and Khurho was once again dismissed. Later after withdrawal of PRODA case against Khurho by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad in October 1954, a few days before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, Khurho again became Chief Minister Sindh in November 1954, and continued till 1955. (infra) Later, he became member Constituent Assembly, 1955, Revenue Minister, West Pakistan, 1955, Defense Minister, Government of Pakistan, April-Oct 1958. Interestingly, during his political career, he was made Chief Minister Sindh for three times within less than a decade.

The cases of both Khurho (Chief Minister of Sindh, 1947-48, 1951) and Fazlullah (Chief Minister of Sindh, 1950-51) were decided in January 1953. The case against Khurho had been initiated in April 1948. The delay in deciding the cases of the civilian elite / politicians also speak of the pragmatic considerations by the bureaucratic elite.

Others disqualified under PRODA included Agha Ghulam Nabi Pathan of Sindh (member Sindh Cabinet) and Hamidul Haq Choudhury, an East Bengali landlord, (Member Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 1947, 1953, Minister, Federal Government, 1955-56, Sept-Oct 1958) Nonetheless, it is significant to note that despite evidence, Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, a Sindh landlord and member Sindh Cabinet was not awarded any

\[^{37}\text{Dawn (Karachi), January 27, 1953.}\]
\[^{38}\text{Ibid.}\]
punishment, and he was allowed to go scot-free. Later, Talpur became Minister Government of Pakistan, 1954-55, and 1956-58, and remained member of Muhammad Ali Bogra’s second Central Cabinet, known as ‘Cabinet of Talents’, and Central Cabinets of H. S. Suhrawardy, I. I. Chundrigar and Firoz Khan Noon. He also remained the Speaker of the Sindh Legislative Assembly in 1955.

The cases of Mamdot and Daultana remained undecided. In the case of Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot, Chief Minister, Punjab, 1947-49, consensus among the tribunal members could not be reached, whereas the case against Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Chief Minister of Punjab 1951-53, remained inconclusive. Later, after the repeal of PRODA in 1954, he could become Minister, Federal Government, Oct-Dec 1957.

The invoking of PRODA against public office holders reveals the regional and provincial discrimination as two Sindhi Chief Ministers were tried and disqualified, whereas in contrast, two Punjabi Chief Ministers were tried under PRODA, but never penalized. Similarly, Bengali members were too disqualified. The main opposition to the regime was directed from Sindh and Bengal, where displeased and annoyed politicians within and without Muslim League were criticizing the government policies. For instance, Ayub Khuhro had founded Sind Muslim League (Khuhro Group), whereas another faction within Muslim League was headed by Kazi Fazlullah. Moreover, it is also important to note that the civilian elite, who had a local base and constituency, were tried and disqualified. One reason could be to strengthen the position of those who were migrants since they had no constituencies.

40 Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, p. 22.
It is worthy of mention that PRODA was selectively used in order to punish the recalcitrant civilian elite, whereas some were allowed to go scot-free without instituting inquiries against them. For instance, in 1952, the application filed against Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan under PRODA was turned down by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. Not only that, according to legal rule, the security worth rupees five thousand was also forfeited.\footnote{1}

Later, when Ghulam Muhammad became the Governor General in 1951, he used it to get the support of the members of the Constituent Assembly for two schemes—One Unit Scheme and the zonal sub-federation scheme of Malik Feraz Khan Noon. Those who opposed the schemes were threatened with the exercise of PRODA.\footnote{2} One example in point is the case of Abdul Sattar Pirzada, Chief Minister Sindh, May 1953-November 1954, who was dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad in November 1954. So he remained Chief Minister after Khurko’s second dismissal and before Khurko’s third appointment as Chief Minister Sindh. Pirzada’s ministry was dismissed on ground of “maladministration”, and he was tried under PRODA. However, Pirzada protested and alleged that he had been victimized by the Governor General for having opposed the One-unit scheme.\footnote{3} Later, after dismissal, he was taken in Chaudhri Muhammad Ali’s Central Cabinet (formed in August 1955) on March 17, 1956. Pirzada was a Muslim Leaguer, and had vast experience of federal ministries, as he had been member central cabinet under Liaquat Ali Khan and Khwaja Nazimuddin and had served as food minister from 1947-53.

\footnote{1} Dawn (Karachi), December 14, 1952.
\footnote{2} Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, p. 145.
\footnote{3} Dawn (Karachi), November 9, 1954.
It is worthy of mention that PRODA had become a bargaining chip for the Governor General. There is evidence that cases under PRODA were withdrawn when Ghulam Muhammad wanted to win the support of the politicians or civilian elite. For instance, on Oct 21, 1954 (just three days before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly), the Governor General withdrew the disqualification of Khuhro, Kazi Fazlullah and Hamidul Haq Chaudhary convicted under PRODA.\textsuperscript{44} Proceedings against Daulatana were also withdrawn. Thus, "after striking this bargain with the former chief ministers of Punjab and Sindh, Ghulam Muhammad declared on 24 Oct a state of emergency", and dissolved the Constituent Assembly.\textsuperscript{45} Interestingly, next month Khurho was again made Chief Minister of Sindh for the third time in November 1954, and he continued till 1955. It is important to note that in October 1954, Sindh Legislative Assembly had opposed the one-unit scheme, whereby West Pakistan was to be integrated.\textsuperscript{46} However, one and a half month later, under Khurho, the same Assembly voted in favour of one-unit by 100 votes to 40.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, with one move, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad had not only removed Pirzada, who had opposed one-unit scheme, but also planted Khurho, who used his influence in the Assembly to get the same thing done, which Pirzada did not.

Ever since its promulgation, the members of Constituent Assembly had been trying to repeal it. In 1951, Hashim Gazdar from Karachi had tabled a Bill in the Assembly for this purpose. Owing to lack of support, Gazdar—the mover of the Bill—did not pursue

\textsuperscript{44} Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, p. 345.


\textsuperscript{46} Out of 110 members, 74 had opposed the scheme according to a signed statement presented to Pirzada. Dawn (Karachi), October 24, 1954.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., Dawn (Karachi), December 12, 1954.
it any further. Nevertheless, it remained on the agenda. Eventually, the Act was repealed on September 20, 1954 by the Constituent Assembly. (details infra)

**Emergence of Rival Elite Groups**

As a post-colonial state, Pakistan inherited an “overdeveloped state apparatus” along with its “institutionalized practices.” Bureaucracy, together with the military, retained its ‘colonial’ orientation after the independence. After independence, the political neutrality and professionalism of the two non-elected institutions—military and bureaucracy—were soon compromised by their elite by unduly interfering in politics of the country.

Quaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah had a clear preference for the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. His statements evidently set out his belief in civilian supremacy over the institutions of bureaucracy and military. As laid down in the Act of 1935, the bureaucracy and military were resources in aid of the civilian government. Owing to a number of actors including that of situational imperative immediately after independence, both these institutions considerably expanded their role in the political arena at the expanse of the civilian elite, who were the legitimate heirs of the constitutional and parliamentary system. Not only the hostility, maneuvers and counter-maneuvers of the civilian elite facilitated the emergence of bureaucracy and military as rival elite in the political arena, they also deliberately undermined the position and credibility of the former, and thus, preempted the growth and consolidation of the

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civilian elite. Soon they challenged the supremacy of the civilian elites by hegemonizing the decision-making.

As early as 1953, bureaucratic elite had emerged as strong rival elite, establishing their hegemony over representative political institutions, whereas the role of the military elite remained covert. In few years, the military was able to establish its autonomous and assertive position in the power echelons at par with the bureaucracy. The intervention of the military in politics, however, became direct and overt in October 1958, when President Mirza was forced to resign by Ayub Khan, the Chief Martial Law Administrator.

1. Bureaucratic Elite and their Emergence as Rival Elite

After the inception of Pakistan, everything had to be created out of scratch. The administrative structures were not in place, and there was lack of trained and experienced personnel in the country as well. For this reason, a number of political positions such as in the Federal Cabinet came to be filled by the bureaucrats, as the bureaucracy was the only organized structure to cope with the difficulties. Such decisions were taken on pragmatic consideration or on the basis of political expediencies.

The initial problems of Pakistan and a number of political developments in the early years also significantly contributed to the bureaucratic ascendancy, which led to the gradual displacement of the civilian elite in important political portfolios by the bureaucratic elite both at the center and the provinces. The bureaucratic elite started establishing its highly centralized rule in the country during the lifetime of Governor
General M.A. Jinnah, as being old and ailing, he could not personally attend a number of important matters. Capitalizing on the circumstances, the bureaucratic elite including Malik Ghulam Muhammad,\textsuperscript{49} Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, Iskandar Mirza\textsuperscript{50} and Colonel A.S.B. Shah at the center and the provincial chief secretaries issued orders and made decisions in the name of Jinnah.\textsuperscript{51} All decisions of political importance were made by few bureaucrats and bureaucrats-turned-politicians, which reflected a "cabalistic\textsuperscript{52} mode of governance. They had a clear bias for an "administration-oriented rather than politics-based system."\textsuperscript{53}

Since under the Government of India Act, 1935 the executive—both central and provincial—had a dominant position, Jinnah was quite conscious of this colonial legacy. He advised the civil servants to remain apolitical, and refrain from taking sides in political matters:

You have to do your duty as servants; you are not concerned with this political or that political party; that is not your business... It is a business of politicians to fight out their cause under the present constitution or the future constitution that may be framed. You, therefore, have nothing to do with this or that party. You are civil servants.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{49} Malik Ghulam Muhammad was a Kakayzai Pathan, whose family had settled in District Jullundar, Punjab. He was born in Lahore. He shared the Alligerah educational background with Liaquat and Ayub Khan. He had served in the Indian Audits and Account Services before partition. As Governor General, he served from October 1951 to August 1955.

\textsuperscript{50} Iskandar Mirza was born in Murshidabad (Bengal) in 1899. Before partition, he had served first in the Indian army, and then joined Indian Political Department in 1926. Iskandar Mirza had a rank of honorary Major-General as well. For details see Hurayun Mirza, \textit{From Plassey to Pakistan: The Family History of Iskandar Mirza, The First President of Pakistan}, Lantam: University Press of America, 1999. Also see Zaghlul Abbas, "Iskandar Mirza: A Political Study", Unpublished M. Phil Thesis, Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2000.

\textsuperscript{51} Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, pp. 94-5.

\textsuperscript{52} Tazseem Ahmad Siádíqui, \textit{Towards Good Governance}, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 34.


\textsuperscript{54} Jamal-ud-Din Ahmad, \textit{Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah}, Vol. II, Lahore, 1964 (2\textsuperscript{nd} edn.), Jinnah's informal talk to civil servants in Peshawar, April 14, 1948, p. 502.
Though Jinnah could not reform the bureaucratic order bequeathed by the colonial state, he emphatically urged that the bureaucracy must change its attitude, since he knew well the mental makeup of bureaucracy during the colonial era.\(^{55}\) Probably, Jinnah had no time to attend to this crucial problem systematically as he died after thirteenth months of the creation of Pakistan. Nevertheless, the colonial tradition cast its shadow on the post-colonial era, and the ‘steel frame’ of colonial bureaucracy remained almost intact after independence. The first few years immediately after independence were marked by the ascendancy of bureaucracy. In view of Ziring:

> The labours of the bureaucracy, however, were hardly substitutes for a successful political experience. None the less, the strength, the discipline, the dedication, and the expertise of the administrators stood in sharp contrast to the country’s politicians, who demonstrated few, if any, of these traits or abilities. In official parlance, Pakistan emerged as a parliamentary entity, but in reality it was a virtual administrative state, less a representative expression and more the reenactment of a familiar but palatable, if not benign, authoritarianism.\(^{56}\)

As for the regional representation of the bureaucrats, there were acute imbalances among them, as the East Bengalis were under-represented in the bureaucracy. In 1954, Dr. Mahmud Husain, a Bengali Central Cabinet Minister, declared in the Constituent Assembly that there was not a single Bengali Secretary in the East Bengal Provincial Secretariat.\(^{57}\) Not only there were imbalances between the eastern and western wings of the country, they existed within West Pakistan as well. For instance, only 5% of the total number of the elite cadre of civil services were from Sindh, whereas those from NWFP and Balochistan constituted only 7%, as compared to the Punjabis who formed 35% of the elite cadre.\(^{58}\) As the Punjabis dominated the bureaucratic elite, some of the Punjabi bureaucratic-turned-civilian elite were nominated as members of the central cabinet. For


\(^{56}\) Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, p. 99.

\(^{57}\) Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan, Debates, Official Report, Vol. 1, July 17, 1954.

this reason, the rift between the center and provinces was “identified with the conflict between bureaucracy and politicians,” the former representing the Punjabis while the latter representing provincial civilian elite, including the Bengalis.

Owing to their lack of experience and mutual antagonism among the civilian elite, the bureaucratic-turned-civilian elite came to dominate the decision-making processes within the cabinet. In case when the cabinets and the legislatures failed to make decisions, which were then taken by the bureaucratic elite by default. Thus, most of the policy decisions, including the budget, were made by the provincial and central secretariats.

The bureaucratic hegemony became obvious during the prime ministership of Liaquat Ali Khan, a migrant civilian elite, who had no constituency of his own in the areas comprising Pakistan. His position had become weak particularly owing to criticism over his decision to announce cease-fire in Kashmir, which soon expressed in a mutiny within army, known as Rawalpindi Conspiracy. The provincial governors, many of whom were bureaucrats, used to send him secret reports on the chief ministers and cabinet members. Thus, his precarious position at the center forced him to rely on bureaucracy in order to counter provincial dissidence.

The assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 heralded an era marked by an overt bureaucratic hegemony under the facade of civilian rule. The hegemony of bureaucratic

59 Wasem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, p. 97.
elite in the initial years can be assessed from the fact that even the political positions of Governor General and Prime Minister were occupied by the ex-civil servants. Upon Liaquat’s death, Governor General Khwaja Nazimuddin became the Prime Minister, whereas a bureaucratic-turned-civilian elite and member of central cabinet, Ghulam Muhammad became Governor General. The secretary finance, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, took the position of Ghulam Muhammad as the Finance Minister. Consequently, in the post-1951 era, the bureaucratic elite was drawn in an overt power struggle vis-à-vis the civilian elite, in which the former were able to outmaneuver the civilian elite, and thus concentrate decision-making powers in their hands.

Malik Ghulam Muhammad was appointed Finance Minister in 1947 after independence, and served till 1951, when he was made the third Governor General of Pakistan after Jinnah and Nazimuddin. Ghulam Muhammad has been described as a “product of the Indian Civil Service with all its traditions of vigorous executive action, especially in times of crises or the failure of political leadership.”

Chaudhary Muhammad Ali was appointed the Secretary General of the Government of Pakistan in 1947 and served till 1951. During these years, he exercised considerable influence as all the decisions of the Government passed through him, and all policies were finalized by him. His authority became so pronounced that he came to be described as “power behind the throne” and “the Deputy Prime Minister.” In fact, “his word acquired almost the force of law. No one in the Secretariat or the Cabinet dared to cross his path if he wished a plan or proposal too pass through. More often than not, they

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would consult him to sound his reaction before making a formal submission of the case." After Ghulam Muhammad’s assumption of the office of Governor General in 1951, he became the Finance Minister (1951-54). Thus, he came to occupy a political office, though he was not a public representative or member of the Constituent Assembly. Later, he also served as the Prime Minister of Pakistan (1955-56). Chaudhary Muhammad Ali shared distrust for democracy with the Governor General. He believed that the elections, if held, would not be fair and free, and would "dig the grave of democracy in this country."

Nonetheless, the two daggers in a scabbard could not pull along well. Mutual hostilities over distribution of power between Ghulam Muhammad and Chaudhary Muhammad Ali brought the military in the political arena, when the former secured the support of the military establishment. The bureaucratic elite forged an alliance with the military elite, and they jointly started exercising tremendous power in the name of the civilian elite. Soon Chaudhary Muhammad Ali receded to the background.

The relationship of the bureaucracy and the army too influenced the politics in Pakistan. The army used to assist the bureaucracy in difficult emergency situations. The bureaucratic and military elite were not only friends in need, they were also allied by tradition, as in British India, the two institutions worked in cooperation. They both were Western-oriented and had a similar educational background. Moreover, their recruits came from almost similar upper and middle class families. In addition, they generally

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64 Ibid.
65 Dawn (Karachi), March 3, 1958.
67 Goodnow, The Civil Service in Pakistan, p. 108.
shared a mistrust of the civilian elite and democratic institutions. These factors brought them closer to each other.

This coterie including Ghulam Muhammad and General Ayub Khan, which wielded enormous powers, was later joined by Iskander Mirza, Defense Secretary, who also played a crucial role in the first decade of Pakistan’s history. Mirza had military career to his credit before he joined bureaucracy in pre-independence days. Therefore, he was ideally placed to play “the role of a middle man between the government and the armed forces.”\(^{68}\) He remained the Secretary, Ministry of Defense from 1947-1954. After serving as the Governor of East Bengal in 1954 for few months, he was made Minister for Interior Affairs in the same year. Next year in 1955, he became the fourth Governor General of Pakistan and served till 1956, when under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1956 he declared himself the first President of Pakistan. He had close relations with Ayub Khan,\(^{69}\) and they jointly took over the country in 1958, imposing Martial Law and abrogating the Constitution. Thus, military too teamed up with the bureaucracy.

During 1950s, the bureaucratic-military elite consisting of Ghulam Muhammad along with Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan monopolized political decision-making, and outweighed the civilian elite in the political competition. The bureaucratic and military elite trusted each other, and shared their distrust for the civilian elite.\(^{70}\) It not only led to the marriage of convenience between the bureaucratic and military elite, they collaborated to deliberately keep the civilian elite marginalized in the political arena.

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\(^{68}\) Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, p. 144.

\(^{69}\) It was because of this close relationship between the two that Ayub Khan could not immediately take over the Presidency from him in 1958. Moreover, they not only shared military background, they both were educated at Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

\(^{70}\) For instance see the statement of Iskander Mirza about the ignorant and uneducated masses: “They elect are crooks and scallywags. The scallywags make a mess of everything and then I have to clean up the mess.” Reporter, Jan 27, 1955, p. 22.
Together, they dismissed a civilian Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin in 1953, and after that, the office of prime minister came to be filled by their nominee till 1958.

The bureaucratic elite had consolidated their position by capitalizing upon the early problems of the country. Nevertheless, in the post-1954 era, they clearly emerged as rival elite hegemonizing the political system of the country.71 During 1955-58 when the political institutions were quite fragile, and the Central and provincial governments were made and broken frequently, the bureaucratic elite enjoyed stability. Moreover, they had "considerable administrative experience; were connected through service affiliations to a wide network of administrators and institutions; and commanded a high degree of institutional loyalty from subordinates. Most importantly, however, Secretaries controlled access to information."72 Thus, the bureaucratic elite controlled resources such as information, which the civilian elite lacked.

In short, the heavy dependence on bureaucracy during the initial years of Pakistan's history set the precedent for bureaucratic interference in decision-making during the successive regimes. Moreover, the bureaucratic elite started perceiving the development of political institutions in the country as an "inherent challenge to their authority."73 Whenever the political competition among the civilian elite in any province got intense, resulting in a deadlock, the bureaucratic and military elite at the center would interfere through the Governor General or the provincial Governor. This intervention always

72 Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, p. 13.
73 Ibid., p. 4.
increased the power of the bureaucratic elite. In this way, the ex-bureaucrats serving in political offices maneuvered the political situation in their own favour.

Regarding the influence of bureaucracy in shaping the governmental policies, Charles Kennedy asserts that

...as an institution the civil bureaucracy is a natural ally of a secular vision of the Pakistan polity. Both the selection process of new recruits and the socialization process of probationers are conducive to this outcome. Indeed, the civil bureaucracy constitutes the most westernized sector of the elite in Pakistan. Consequently, the civil bureaucracy served to counter the more extreme proponents of an Islamic state in the early fifties...

In this way, the bureaucratic and bureaucratic-turned-civilian elite pursued their desired course of action, and directly influenced the decision-making processes in the country. Consequently, they emerged as rival elite in the political arena, and in due course of time routed the civilian elite in political competition.

2. Rise of the Military Elite as Rival Elite

At the time of independence, the British wanted India and Pakistan to have joint army, as they feared that having separate armies for the two countries would weaken the defense of the Sub-continent, particularly against the USSR. The British proposal was however rejected by Jinnah, who wanted to have a separate and independent army of Pakistan. Upon this, Jinnah was told by the British that in such a case, all British officers would resign and go back to their country. Moreover, the British felt that even in they decided to stay in the two separate armies, it would not be possible for them to give their loyal service, owing to their lack of conviction that the military arrangements

74 Goodnow, The Civil Service in Pakistan, p. 95.
75 Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, p. 4.
were based on firm grounds. Another consideration might be the fact that the British Indian Army was socially and institutionally a coherent and unified group, which could not be bifurcated into two separate armies viewing each other as hostile enemy. In particular, the British officers could not be expected to fight against each other.

During the colonial era, the British Indian Army was subordinate to the civilian supremacy, but during the initial years of the British Raj, India had been ruled by military proconsuls. Governor General M. A. Jinnah was conscious of the 'proconsulate tradition', and he tried to ensure that Pakistan Army did not assume that role. On August 14, 1947, when a young Pakistani officer complained over the appointment of British officers as heads of three fighting services, Jinnah reminded him that the armed forces were the "servants of the people", and said it unequivocal terms that "you not make national policy, it is we, the civilian, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out those tasks with which you are entrusted." According to other sources, the officer was Akbar Khan, who complained to Jinnah, who snubbed him and warned him: "Look here, you are a soldier. You have no business to criticize the government. You must concentrate on your profession." It is worthy of mention that it was General Akbar Khan who would later play the key role in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, 1951.

Nevertheless, the civilian supremacy over military came to a test in October 1947 when Indian Army invaded Srinagar. Governor General Jinnah order the C-in-C, Pakistan Army, General Sir Douglas Gracey to send troops to Kashmir. But Jinnah was

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persuaded by the C-in-C to retract his orders. In this way, the norm of civilian supremacy over military was set aside by the military elite.

At the time of partition, the Pakistan army had only 4 lieutenant colonels, 42 majors, and 114 captains, but being organized and cohesive, the army was able to carve out a position for itself in the political sphere. Soon the military elite started playing more assertive role in the political arena. During the first decade of Pakistan’s history, from among the military elite, the name of Ayub Khan figures prominently.

The first Commander-in-Chief ‘General Ayub’ Khan was promoted to the rank of general from lieutenant colonel in less than four years. On September 6, 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan appointed him as the first C-in-C of the Pakistan army after the retirement of the British General Sir Douglas D. Gracey. Iskander Mirza had played an important role in his appointment. Ayub was appointed by superseding many senior officers in the army, as he was “neither senior most nor most distinct so far as his actual achievements were concerned.” According to Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan, an insider being an associate of Ayub Khan, those who were the most likely contenders, Major General Iftikhar Khan and Brigadier Sher Khan, had both died in an air crash in 1949. Jahan Dad further informs that Ayub’s role as representative of East Pakistan in the Boundary Commission

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81 Shafiqal, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 24.
82 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 33.
83 Afzal, Pakistan: History and Politics, p. 216.
84 M. H. Bhatti, The Saviour of Pakistan, Lahore: Star Book Depot, 1960, p. 42. It is important to note that Ayub Khan had not participated in the Indo-Pak War over Kashmir in 1947-48.
had been subjected to criticism by the civilian authorities. For this reason, "it was likely that, had Fikrul and Sher Khan been alive, he would no have been made the C-in-C."\textsuperscript{56}

An important factor in his appointment was Ayub Khan's Aligarh background,\textsuperscript{57} which Liaquat Ali Khan shared with him. Nevertheless, Ayub's appointment by Liaquat Ali Khan seems to be a pragmatic choice of the latter, as in the wake of inconclusive termination of the Kashmir War with India, there was considerable resentment among the army. Since Ayub Khan had served in East Pakistan, he had been away from the capital, and thus, away from the 'conspirators', who were planning to resume war with India and remove the Prime Minister.

Six months after assuming the new office, Ayub Khan was called to suppress the dissidence within army against the policies of the government of Liaquat Ali Khan on Kashmir issue in 1951 (referred to as Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case). He not made himself conspicuous and earned credibility by curbing the conspiracy, it also brought him closer to the American establishment as the 'conspirators' planning to stage the coup had socialist orientation. It was later revealed by the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in a speech in the Constituent Assembly, when he said that the conspirators were planning to resort to force with the support of Communist and revolutionary elements, making use of such members of the armed forces as they could tamper with... The country was to be brought under a military dictatorship, when the existing authorities, both civil and military, had been eliminated. The Government was thereafter to be patterned on the Communist model, but under military...

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
domination. For this purpose economic and constitution-making missions were to be invited from a certain foreign country.\(^88\)

It is worthy of mention that Ayub Khan remained C-in-C till 1958 before proclaiming himself Chief Martial Law Administrator. Though the tenure of the office of C-in-C is 3 to 5 years, the formal rule was circumvented by the elite to keep Ayub Khan in place. This relative stability of the military establishment stood in sharp contrast to that of the political institutions: from 1951 to 1958, when Pakistan had only one Commander-in-Chief, it had seven Prime Ministers.\(^90\) In fact, in collaboration with the bureaucratic elite, the military elite were able to dominate the political decision-making.

Right from the beginning, circumstantial factors also contributed to the need for having a strong army, which led to huge defense spending. Continuing security threat from India was one of the most important factors that led to the instantaneous growth of Pakistan army. Important developments such as Indian army’s military action in Junagarh in 1947, subjugation of Hyderabad in 1948, Indo-Pak war in Kashmir in 1948, and the concentration of Indian army on Punjab border in 1950-1 necessitated a strong army institution. In April 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan announced to increase the budget for the Armed Forces to 75% of the total budget.\(^90\) Between 1948 and 1956, an average of almost 60% of the country’s total budget was allocated to defense.\(^91\) During the first decade of independence, the military elite used various symbols in order to maximize their power and curb any public debate on the defense spending, taking lion’s share of

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\(^88\) See Liaquat’s speech on March 21, 1951 in Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan, Debates, Official Report, 1951, Vol I, p. 34.


\(^90\) Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s address to the officers and ratings of HMPS “Qasim” in Karachi on April 15, 1948 in Aftai, Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan, p. 139.

\(^91\) For details see Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 44.
the budget. In the words of an insider: "...the card of 'national security' has generally been overused by successive civil and military administrations to hide their own misdeeds on the pretext of keeping away public discussion and debate on military affairs."92 Thus, the military elite ensured continuous allocation of huge budget to their institution, which modernized it both technically as well as socially.

In addition to its role in external defense, military is often called to contribute to various construction projects by the civilian government, such as that of highways and dams, etc.93 Janowitz argues:

Changing technology creates new patterns of combat and thereby modifies organizational behaviour in the military. The more complex the technology of warfare, the more narrow are the differences between military and non-military establishments, because more officers have managerial and technical skills applicable to civilian enterprise.94

Moreover, in crisis situations such as social unrest and natural calamities, the military is called in to assist the civilian authorities. This kind of military support significantly contributes to its public image building, winning it the prestige and credibility of being a savior. The role of military in maintaining law and order in society not only exposes the weakness of a civilian government, it gives experience of working in political arena to the military.

The first meeting of Pakistan Defense Council held on September 5-6, 1947 under the chairmanship of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Liaquat Ali Khan defined the

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role of the Pakistan Army in both internal and external defense. Internal Defense was defined as such:

(1) In support of the civil Government and the police to maintain law and order within the boundaries and territorial waters of West and East Pakistan.
(2) In support of the Political authorities in fulfilling their responsibility within the tribal areas and in preventing raids from tribal territory.95

For this reason, on a number of occasions involving crises and civic disturbances, army was called in by the civil administrators to restore law and order, thus enhancing the role of the military in political arena as well as earning it a credibility and acclaim among the public. These include riots in Karachi (1949) and Dacca (1950), language riots in East Pak (1950), Anti-Ahmadiyya riots in Punjab, which ultimately led to the imposition of Martial Law in Lahore (1953), and labour unrest in East Pak (1954).96 In addition, during the initial years of the establishment of Pakistan, army remained heavily involved in helping the civilian authorities in natural calamities such as anti-locust measures (1951, 1952 and 1954), floods (1947, 1948, 1950 in West Pakistan and 1954 and 1955 in East Pakistan), and ‘Operation Jute’ to stop jute smuggling in East Pakistan (1952-53), etc.97 In the words of an army officer:

His [Jinnah’s] successors had neither the inclination nor the ability to prepare themselves for policy decisions in respect of national defence. They were too involved in appropriating power. The army was allowed to go its own way, or was repeatedly drawn into ‘aiding the civil power.’98

This role of the military in non-military affairs such as maintenance of law and order, and combating natural calamities, etc. not only won public acclaim for the military and contributed to its image-building, it also exposed the weaknesses and incompetence of the civil government. This participation of the military in the civilian affairs was though

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96 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 60.
97 For details of all these measures and operations see Major General Fazal Mugeem Khan, S. Q. A., The Story of Pakistan Army, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 161-70.
98 Riza, The Pakistan Army, p. 304
limited in scope, it was continued and frequent. Consequently, over-use of this resource helped transform the resource into a power contender. The military elite came to play a dominating role in the decision making process at the national level. “From a position of oblivion in 1947, by mid fifties it acquired a position of pre-eminence.” 99 Thus, from being a resource at the disposal of the political authorities, the military elite assumed the role of rival elite in the political competition. The relegation of professionalism in army was the result of being frequently drawn into aiding civilian power.

The imposition of Martial Law in Lahore in 1953 in the wake of anti-Ahmadiyya movement is considered to be a “forerunner of the military adventures or misadventures in the years that followed.” 100 The movement launched was by the religiously oriented political parties and groups, including the Ahlars, and as a result, there was widespread unrest in the Punjab. In view of deteriorating law and order situation, Martial Law was imposed in Lahore in April 1953. The army immediately restored order in the city. Thus, the decision of the imposition of Martial Law was welcomed by the people at large, since the political authorities were unable to handle the situation. In the words of K. M. Arif, an insider: “This public response might have given ideas to the top military leaders that a repetition of martial law in the future would not provoke a negative reaction from the masses.” 101 Therefore, it brought home to the military establishment that there was enough room for its role in the political arena, and the successful imposition of Martial Law had earned some legitimacy for its interference in politics. In

100 Arif, Khatibi Shadows, p. 12.
101 Ibid., p. 11.
addition, the services of Major-General Azam Khan were lauded by the C-in-C of the army, General Ayub Khan, the local Martial Law Administrator.\textsuperscript{102}

Army used this opportunity for its image-building. General Arif informs that Major-General Muhammad Azam Khan

cleverly launched a media campaign to publicize the jawans and to display his own authority. The military tasted the heady effects of publicity when its performance in civil affairs was reported widely in the print media in superlative adjectives. The Lahore martial law enhanced the image of the military and inflated the ego of its top brass.... The slogans of 'Pakistan Army Zindabad' in the streets of Lahore, and the pro-army publicity in the state-controlled and state-influenced media was a high potency tonic to the military.\textsuperscript{103}

It has been argued that Pakistan's initial problems after its birth including the scarcity of administrative expertise and defense of the country against India gave rise to an expanded role, initially, of bureaucratic and then of military elite. Intra-civilian elite conflicts led to creation of more and more legal resources to outmaneuver each other but such resources eventually came to be utilized by the bureaucratic and military elite to successfully confront the civilian elite.

Capitalizing on crises and disturbances and intra-civilian elite conflict, the bureaucratic and military elite strengthened their position and image, eroding that of the civilian elite. For instance, the food crisis in the West Pakistan in 1953 was exaggerated by the military-bureaucratic elite,\textsuperscript{104} which undermined the position of the civilian elite. Though the military and bureaucracy had enjoyed considerable power in decision-making during the period under study, it was the year 1953 when the military started

\textsuperscript{102} Not only Ayub praised him publicly, Azam Khan was soon elevated to the rank of a lieutenant-general. Later, he was also included in Ayub’s kitchen cabinet formed after the imposition of Martial Law in 1958, and was later made Governor of East Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{103} Arif, Khaki Shadows, pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{104} Shafiq, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 32.
emerging as a rival elite in the political competition, particularly after the dismissal of Prime Minister Nazimuddin. This topic is treated in detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 5

Dismissing a Civilian Prime Minister; Nazimuddin’s Removal and its Pragmatics

On April 17, 1953, the Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin was dismissed along with his Cabinet by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. The decision had been taken under section 10 of the adapted version of Government of India Act, which stated that Ministers held office during the pleasure of the Governor General. Muhammad Ali Bogra was appointed the new Prime Minister, and a new cabinet was formed.

The present chapter is an attempt to study the decision of Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin’s dismissal. It brings to forefront the public face of his dismissal along with the pragmatic considerations behind it, and its pragmatic gains, which served the purpose of the bureaucratic and military elite. The public face is largely borne by the statements and proclamation of Governor General Ghulam Muhammad, which attempted to justify his action in terms of formal-legal and constitutional provisions. While doing so, the immediate developments leading to the dismissal have also been explored. In addition, by going beyond the public face, attempt has been made to investigate the pragmatic explanations of the decision, which seem to have guided the action of the Governor General. Further, pragmatic gains accruing to the bureaucratic-military elite have been discussed, which contributed to consolidating their position vis-à-vis the civilian elite.
Public Face of Nazimuddin's Dismissal

Nazimuddin's Government was apparently dissolved owing to multiple reasons, such as the inability of the government to overcome the food crisis coupled with deteriorating law and order situation, which provide the public face of politics. However, this public face needs to be critically examined in the backdrop of the pragmatic considerations of political competition among various elite groups.

The Proclamation of Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dismissing Nazimuddin stated:

I have watched with growing uneasiness the exceedingly difficult conditions with which Pakistan is faced. There is the very grave food situation. The general economic outlook presents several features which must be dealt with vigorously. The law and order situation needs firm handling. There has been a most serious criticism of government measures and even more of lack of measures to meet the situation...I have been driven to the conclusion that the Cabinet of Khawaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country.1

Along with the use of legal constitutional norms, the bureaucratic elite emphasized the bleak food situation, economic difficulties and deteriorating law and order situation as the major reasons for taking the action. While concluding the proclamation, Ghulam Muhammad asked the people to see "that their needs are adequately served through government which fully enjoys the confidence of the country."2 Apparently, there were a number of factors behind it.

The most important reason assigned to the failure of Nazimuddin's Ministry was its inability to handle the deteriorating economic situation coupled with the food crisis in the West Pakistan in 1952-53. The crops in Sindh and Punjab were damaged by scanty rainfall and drought. To add fuel to fire, hoarding of wheat by the Punjabi and Sindhi

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1 Governor-General’s Press Communiqué dated April 17, 1953. Dawn (Karachi), April 18, 1953.
2 Ibid.
landlords owing to imminent land reforms caused further shortage. Nevertheless, it is astonishing to note that the Governor General in a public speech only a week before dismissing the ministry had assured the people that the economic situation was basically sound, and the government would soon overcome the difficulties including the problem of food shortage. He asked the people to shun the habit of irresponsible and destructive criticism. He reminded: “Pakistan is their own country; that their own chosen people are now in their government—a government which derives authority from the people.”

This statement of the Governor General not only contradicts his later proclamation, it also calls for searching the pragmatic reasons of Nazimuddin’s dismissal beyond its public face.

The discontent and deteriorating law and order situation in the wake of food crisis was exacerbated by the religious controversies caused by the anti-Ahmadiyya Movement in the Punjab. The Movement was started in February-March 1953 by the Majlis-i-Amal (Working Committee) of the All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention, which included the Jamaat-i-Islami, Majlis-i-Ahrar (Ahrar Party), Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan and others. It raised three demands before the government: (i) Qadianis / Ahmadis to be declared a non-Muslim entity; (ii) removal of Zafarullah Khan, the Foreign Minister, who happened to be a Qadiani, and (iii) all Qadianis to be removed from key-posts in the country. Upon Khwaja Nazimuddin’s refusal to dismiss Zafarullah Khan, the ulama demanded the resignation of Nazimuddin, and also threatened the government with direct action if their demands were not met. The agitation, which

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2 Governor General Ghulam Muhammad’s speech at Karachi Rotary Club, Dawn (Karachi), April 9, 1953.
4 Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, p. 130.
started in Karachi, was later directed towards Lahore, which became the center of the country-wide movement.\(^6\)

Mian Mumtaz Mulhammad Khan Daultana, the Chief Minister of Punjab is said to have played a crucial role in the movement. Daultana and Prime Minister Nazimuddin had developed differences over the Report of Basic Principles Committee was presented in the Constituent Assembly in December 1952. The clash of ideas between Daultana and Nazimuddin, with the former representing the interests of the Punjab and the latter as the representative of the Bengalis, took the form of personal antagonism.\(^7\) Daultana used the disturbances created in the wake of the movement to his own advantage. On March 6, 1953 he issued a statement whereby he assured the religious leaders that his government was prepared to negotiate with them. It was taken by the masses as conceding to the demands of the religious leaders, which led to civic unrest and street violence. Upon this, Daultana reneged his statement on March 10.\(^8\) In fact, the intelligence agencies had warned Daultana of the deteriorating situation.\(^9\) Daultana did not take note of it, and let the storm rise for his political gains, whereas Nazimuddin had clearly instructed him to sternly control the situation. It clearly establishes that the intra-civilian elite rivalry facilitated the strengthening of the position of the bureaucratic and military elite, who capitalized on it.


\(^7\) Salim and Tabassum, *Mamdot sey Warta Tak*, pp. 46-7.

\(^8\) For details of the statement see Ibid., pp. 33-4.

The situation nevertheless became out of control, and soon assumed violent proportion and riots broke out in the province.\textsuperscript{10} When the civilian authorities were unable to curb the riots, Martial Law was imposed in Lahore in April 1953, and Daultana's government was dismissed. This Martial Law, which was the first aid of its kind to the civilian authorities, is considered to be a 'rehearsal' for frequent army interventions in political sphere. As for the decision to impose the Martial Law was concerned, it was largely impelled by the civil service. Khwaja Nazimuddin sent Secretary Defense Iskander Mirza to Lahore for handling the situation. It was Mirza's decision to impose Martial Law, which he had taken in consultation with General Azam Khan.\textsuperscript{11} It shows that the Prime Minister reposed his trust in Mirza, a military-turned-bureaucratic elite, but the latter was more concerned with the institutional interests of the military and bureaucracy. The lifting of Martial Law was followed by the Nazimuddin's dismissal by the Governor General, as he used the public face provided by the demands of the ulema to remove the Prime Minister.

Another important factor that created the law and order situation in East Pakistan was the language controversy. The Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee had declared that Urdu should be the national language.\textsuperscript{12} Later, it was challenged by the Bengali leaders. The Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin, despite being a Bengali himself, supported Urdu in February 1952, which resulted in violent riots in Dacca.\textsuperscript{13} A full-fledged linguistic movement was launched by the students, which soon became widespread and violent. Four students of Dacca University were killed by the police firing.

\textsuperscript{11} Khan, Pakistan—Leadership Challenges, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{13} Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, p. 90.
on the protesters on February 21, 1952, which has come to be commemorated as ‘martyrs day’ ever since.\textsuperscript{14}

These reasons largely provided public face for the decision of Nazimuddin’s dismissal by the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. Nonetheless, the pragmatic reasons may be sought in factors like Nazimuddin’s foreign policy, and his ideological orientation, etc.

**Pragmatics of Dismissal**

The ‘coup’ was a pragmatic decision of the Governor General to dismiss the Prime Minister. The charges of lack of handling food crisis and drought were leveled against Nazimuddin Ministry, but the gravity of the situation was not as intense and severe that the Prime Minister could be removed on its basis. It has been argued that it was ‘real as well as artificial’. The artificial food shortage was meant to discredit the government. In 1952, the Nazimuddin Government had to spend huge sum of money to import wheat, causing a heavy drain on the economy. Nonetheless, in 1953 the economy started showing signs of improvement, and by early 1953, the food problem had largely been controlled.\textsuperscript{15}

1. US Disapproval of Nazimuddin’s Foreign Policy

It has been asserted that Nazimuddin’s refusal to tilt the foreign policy of the country in favour of the US was an important reason behind his dismissal. Pak-US relations did not have a warm start. In fall 1947, Pakistan’s request for loan to the US was turned down, though in subsequent years, weapons were provided by the US to Pakistan. In October


\textsuperscript{15} For details see Afzal, *Pakistan: History and Politics*, pp. 107-8.
1948, US Embassy in Pakistan sent a diplomatic note to the State Department stating: “In a period of emergency, Pakistan can form a base both for military and air operations.”

In summer 1949, Defense Secretary, Iskander Mirza visited Washington. It was to be followed by Liaquat’s visit to the US. Liaquat was planning to visit USSR as well, but he was pressurized by the pro-West cabinet members, such as Ghulam Muhammad, to visit the US before visiting the USSR. Despite Liaquat’s visit to the US, Pakistan still had relatively independent foreign policy. Nonetheless, Liaquat’s plan to visit the USSR could not materialize. On the other hand, the US interest in Pakistan continued to develop. The US Policy Statements on Pakistan declared that the principal objective of the its relation with Pakistan is the orientation of its government and people towards the US and other countries of the West. Soon Pakistan became the first South Asian country to sign an agreement with the US to purchase its military supplies and equipments.

During Nazimuddin’s reign as Prime Minister, Pakistan had an independent foreign policy. Nazimuddin Government did not favour joining any US-sponsored defense organization. He thought that signing any defence pact with the US would align Pakistan with the Western bloc. His Government’s support to the entry of China into the United Nations in December 1952 and disapproval of Eisenhower’s declaration to block the Chinese coast in February 1953 are ample testimony of his independent stance in foreign

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16 Diplomatic Note from Pakistan Embassy to State Department, October 19, 1948, 845F.00/10-1948 DSR, NA as cited in Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenlightened Allies, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 44.

17 Ibid. p. 32.


19 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan was signed on December 15, 1950. See Ibid., p. 57.
affairs. Nevertheless, these caused the displeasure of the American establishment as well as the pro-US military and bureaucratic elite in Pakistan.

The opinions of American diplomats about Nazimuddin too reflect their reservations about him. Dennis Kux records the opinion of US diplomat Thomas W. Simons, Sr. about Khwaja Nazimuddin, when the latter was serving as Chief Minister East Bengal after 1947. Nazimuddin was “accepted by all as good and honest man, but one who lacks intellectual capacity to grasp the essentials and the will to execute policies that are needed.” Furthermore, when Nazimuddin became Prime Minister and Ghulam Muhammad assumed Governor Generalship, the US State Department found the appointments “reassuring” as both were perceived as pro-Western and ‘men of moderation’, though there were some reservations about the former.

During Nazimuddin’s tenure, though Pakistan received aid from the US, the former had better negotiating position vis-à-vis the latter. It is evident from the almost rejection by Nazimuddin of the US aid worth $10 million for Pakistan as compared to an aid of $54 million for India, but the pro-US military and bureaucratic elite, headed by Ghulam Muhammad accepted the offer. Thus, the bureaucratic-turned-civilian elite could effectively influence the decision-making in favour of their desired course of action of cultivating relationship with America.

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20 Afzal, *Pakistan: History and Politics*, p. 112.
21 Embassy Karachi dispatch to State Department, March 6, 1948, 845F.00/3-648, DSR, NA as cited in Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, p. 19.
22 For details see *Memorandum for the President from Dean Acheson*, October 22, 1951, PSF, Pakistan, HSTL in *ibid.*, p. 40.
As for the food crisis in West Pakistan in 1952-53, media was used for the purpose, which blew up the drought situation caused by crop failure in the country. A week after the removal of Nazimuddin, America announced to send wheat to Pakistan, which reached Pakistan after a year, when new crop in the county had already been reaped. It seems that the bureaucratic-military elite exaggerated the 1953 food crisis to create a political environment which would portray the US as a friend that was willing to bail out Pakistan. It becomes clear that the propaganda on wheat scarcity was carried out by the military-bureaucratic elite for two purposes: for undermining the credibility of Khwaja Nazimuddin, and for portraying the US as a friend of Pakistan. The persuasive power was effectively deployed by the military-bureaucratic elite to convince masses of the gravity of the situation and incapacity of the civilian elite to handle it. Thus, they could neutralize and outmaneuver the potential resources a civilian elite can deploy, i.e. peoples’ support—power dispersed in streets.

It is significant to note that immediately after his dismissal, Nazimuddin tried to call the Queen in Buckingham Palace, he found that the telephone was out of operation. Nazimuddin’s telegram was, too, not transmitted to the Queen by the British High Commissioner. Moreover, Prime Minister’s house was under armed guard. Later, when the legality of the decision was questioned whether a Governor General could dismiss a Prime Minister without reference to the legislature, the Governor General’s action was declared legally justified by the Commonwealth Relations Office in London. However,

25 Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations, p. 32.
27 Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, p. 21. It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan remained a dominion of the British Empire till 1856, when it became a sovereign republic after promulgating its own constitution.
some of the members of the Constituent Assembly were not happy with the response of the British Government.

The unreceptive attitude of the British High Commissioner and the reply of the Commonwealth Relations Office, confirming the action of the Governor General, show that Nazimuddin did not have international resources like his rival elite.

The response of the English press was also in favor of Governor General’s action. For instance, The Times on April 20, 1953, while welcoming the change, wrote that by his action, Ghulam Muhammad had curtailed the “political intrigues of which public life has recently been far too full.” Similarly, on May 9, 1953, the Economist acclaimed the “courageous, timely and dramatic” decision of removing Nazimuddin by making “a realistic appreciation of the situation and, by acting with at least some semblance of constitutional legality, has prevented a possible coup d’etat.”

2. Assertion of Hegemony by the ‘Pro-US’ Bureaucratic and Military Elite

Contrary to Nazimuddin’s position on the foreign policy issues, the military and bureaucratic elite were pro-US. The Governor General Ghulam Muhammad, Zafarullah Khan, the Foreign Minister, the C-in-C of the Army General Ayub Khan and Defense Secretary Iskander Mirza had pro-US inclination, which Nazimuddin did not share with them. That is why, in early fifties, Pakistan’s foreign policy was not as much tilted in favour of the US as in mid-fifties after the removal of Nazimuddin.

23 As cited in Ibid., p. 11 fn.
It is significant to recall that as early as in 1951, General Ayub Khan, the C-in-C the Pakistan Army, had personally conducted negotiations with the American government without consulting the government. Ayub Khan was then on a personal visit to the US, which provided a public face to it. It may be questioned in what capacity had he conducted these negotiations? It was a blatant violation of the legal-rational principles and democratic traditions of decision-making, as the C-in-C should have taken the government into confidence. Moreover, these negotiations were carried out without the approval of the Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin and the Foreign Minister, Chaudhary Zafarullah Khan. An important reason was Nazimuddin’s disapproval of military alliance with the West, therefore, Ayub Khan thought it pragmatic to proceed independently of the civilian elite in pursuit of his desired course of action.

It has been revealed that in the “bureaucratic-military coup”, Ghulam Muhammad was in league with the bureaucracy and military, particularly with Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan. The coup was the result of the combined efforts of these three persons as leading members of the two services. Even army was posted at important positions on the day of Nazimuddin’s dismissal. Kux reports that some days after Nazimuddin’s dismissal, the Karachi Embassy informed that the action was “planned and accomplished” by Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan. Welcoming the dismissal, Ayub had told American Consul General in Lahore, Raleigh Gibson, that it was “God-given”, and “he had worked hard to have something along this line accomplished.”

29 Shafiq, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 31.
31 American Consulate General Lahore dispatch to State Department, April 28, 1953, 790D.00/4-2853, DSR, NA as cited in Kux, The United States and Pakistan, pp. 53-4.
In the words of a critic, "the crisis laid the foundations of an institutional collaboration between bureaucratic and military elites." Thus, personal interlocking among the three led to a new institutional group relationship among their respective institutions, wherein the military and bureaucratic elite could pool a variety of resources in order to outmaneuver the civilian elite from the decision-making processes.

It is also important to note that before his dismissal, the 1953-54 Annual Budget passed by the Legislature had reduced the defense budget, which must have created resentment among the military elite. According to available figures, the total budget allocated for army in 1952-53 was 725.7 million rupees, which makes 56.68%, whereas in 1953-54, it was 633.2 million rupees, i.e., 58.7%. Though it was an increase in terms of percentages, the amount allocated to defense was reduced, as the overall budget had decreased in 1953-54. Thus, a little cut in the total amount of allocated budget to the Armed Forces might be an important pragmatic reason behind the C-in-C’s ‘hard’ work for dismissal of Nazimuddin. It also establishes the fact that Nazimuddin enjoyed support of the Constituent Assembly, as the Assembly had recently passed the annual budget. In democratic traditions, the approval of the finance bill indicates full confidence of the members in the cabinet. Therefore, the dismissal was a clear defiance of the democratic ethos.

One tends to think that since Nazimuddin enjoyed the confidence of the Assembly, the Governor General would not have dismissed the Prime Minister had he not the backing of

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32 Shafqat, Civi-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 39.
33 According to Yusuf, the budget had demanded a cut in the defense expenditure by one-third. Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments 1947-97, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1999, p. 54 fn. However, the assertion is not supported by facts.
34 See Table VI in Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 43.
the members of the ruling party—Muslim League, in the Assembly. Before taking the
decision of Nazimuddin’s dismissal and appointment of Bogra, the Governor General
must have ensured that the new Prime Minister would be accepted by the Assembly;
otherwise, the Governor General’s position would have become awkward.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, it
is also intriguing to note that six members of the Nazimuddin Cabinet also joined Bogra’s
Cabinet.

The ousted Prime Minister, Nazimuddin, protested against the Governor General’s
decision to dismiss him. He intended to challenge the decision in court of law, but he was
persuaded that as a result “even the thin veil of democracy would be torn off.”\textsuperscript{36} The
persuasive power was used by the Governor General coupled with symbolic appeal,
where Nazimuddin was convinced in the name of democracy not to retaliate as it might
result in taking over by the military in formal sense. It also shows that the Governor
General considered army as a resource at his disposal, which he could deploy whenever
he wanted to. In fact, at that time, the military elite had started to assume the role of rival
elite, and the bureaucratic and the bureaucrats turned-civilian elite provided a cover to the
military interference in political arena, which became direct and overt after 1958 coup by
the military.

3. Ideological Orientation of Nazimuddin

In addition to the foreign policy issues, religious and ideological factors too played some
role in Nazimuddin’s removal. Personally, Khwaja Nazimuddin was a staunch Muslim.
He was an ardent advocate of Islamic State. While refuting the allegations regarding the

\textsuperscript{36} Mohsin Mian’s speech in the Pakistan Observer, July 6, 1964 as cited in Afzal, Pakistan: History
and Politics, p. 114.
character of the constitution, he had assured that the constitution would be based on Islamic principles.\textsuperscript{37} The second Report of the Basic Principles Committee presented in December 1952 contained substantial Islamic provisions and concessions to the viewpoint of the ulema. Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin declared that these Islamic provisions provide for “building up a truly Islamic democracy conscious of its great mission of interpreting the progressive nature of Islam... The interests of true religion have been properly safeguarded and religion had itself been given the fullest scope for its beneficent activities.”\textsuperscript{38} He was sympathetic to the ulema and religious leaders, but he had rejected the demands of the ulema, who were heading the anti-Ahmadiyya Movement in the Punjab in 1952-53.\textsuperscript{39} It is important to note that Zahirullah Khan, the Foreign Minister, was the main target of this movement, who happened to be an Ahmadi.

4. Curtailing the Power of the Civilian Elite and the Muslim League

The explanation for Nazimuddin’s dismissal have been sought in the personal ambitions of Malik Ghulam Muhammad, who wanted to assert himself vis-à-vis the civilian elite. Syed Nur Ahmad writes:

\begin{quote}
By nature, the Malik was not a man who would be content with the constitutional status of his office. He tried to assume the real powers of government and his endeavors soon created a situation in which an inner cabinet of the governor-general was formed within the cabinet of the prime minister. The inner cabinet had direct contacts with senior bureaucrats. Under his patronage a coterie of like-minded officials gradually changed the entire system of government. In effect, decision making came under the governor general rather than under the parliamentary cabinet.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{37} Dawn (Karachi), November 23, 1952.
\textsuperscript{38} Nazimuddin’s speech in the Constituent Assembly, Dawn (Karachi), December 23, 1952.
\textsuperscript{39} Salim and Tabassum, Mame	extsuperscript{36}i say Wat\textsuperscript{36}i tak, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{40} Ahmad, From Mar	extsuperscript{36}ial Law to Mar	extsuperscript{36}ial Law, pp. 317-18.
It shows the Governor General had cultivated trust-based personal relations with the cabinet members. There members owed allegiance to him instead of the Prime Minister, which was a legal and moral demand of their role.

It is important to note that Nazimuddin enjoyed popular support, despite discontent over food crisis and economic problems. Being the President of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, he was able to get his nominee elected as leader of the Muslim League Party of the Punjab Assembly. It is worthy of mention that he was dismissed the day he was about to start a tour of Sindh as part of election campaign.

By dismissing Nazimuddin, the Governor General had sought to reduce the power of Muslim League as an independent force in the politics. For this reason, the decision of the Governor General was condemned by the Muslim League leaders in East Pakistan such as Maulana Mohammad Akram Khan, who was the then President of the Provincial Muslim League, Masihur Rahman and Imran Ali Sarkar, General Secretaries of the Rangpur and Rajshahi District Muslim Leagues. They termed the action as illegal and unconstitutional, and an attempt to ruthlessly crush the power of the Muslim League.\(^{41}\)

Another important factor behind the move of the Governor General was the upheaval caused by the Punjab’s rejection of the Basic Principles Committee Report, which threatened to create a rift between the two wings of the country.\(^{42}\) Such a rift could potentially threaten the position of the Governor General. By dismissing Nazimuddin and planting his hand-picked Prime Minister, Ghulam Muhammad considerably strengthened

\(^{41}\) For statements see Morning News (Dacca), April 19 and 26, 1957.
his position vis-à-vis the politicians. In fact, the Governor General, who was preventing his own ouster from power, had dismissed the Central government

Pragmatic Gains of the Dismissal

With the dismissal of Khwaja Nazimuddin, there accrued a number of pragmatic gains to the bureaucratic and military elite. These include the following:

I. Bogra’s Appointment as New Prime Minister

Nazimuddin was replaced by Muhammad Ali Bogra. From 1947-49, he had served as ambassador in Burma, then as High Commissioner in Canada in 1949. Later, he was sent as ambassador to the US in 1951, where he served till 1953. In April 1953, he had reached Pakistan four days before Nazimuddin’s dismissal on an apparently ‘private visit’.

After Nazimuddin’s removal, Bogra was nominated new Prime Minister.

It is interesting to note that Bogra was not member of Constituent Assembly. His appointment to the office of Prime Minister was unconventional, as he was not the leader of the majority party, nor he was nominated by it. However, within a month, he was elected President of the Muslim League, and thus, his appointment was regularized. Bogra’s appointment was a pragmatic decision of the Governor General, which violated democratic norms and traditions. However, maneuvers and tactics using a variety of resources were deployed to get him elected as the President of the Muslim League in order to provide a public face to justify his appointment as the Prime Minister. In addition, it was a pragmatic gain for the Governor General as well, as now he could use

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the Muslim League as a resource in aid of his desired actions. Now he was able to directly influence the Muslim League affairs though Bogra, who was his hand-picked appointee.

**Pragmatic Reasons for Bogra’s Appointment**

The following pragmatic reasons can be discerned behind Bogra’s appointment as Prime Minister.

1. **Power Sharing between East and West Pakistan:**

Khwaja Nazimuddin was replaced by Muhammad Ali Bogra, a civilian elite from East Bengal. By having a civilian elite from East Pakistan, the military-bureaucratic elite could maintain the public face of power sharing between the East and West Pakistan in a formal sense. In fact, after Governor General Jinnah’s death, a tradition had emerged whereby the occupants of the two offices of the Governor General and the Prime Minister belonged to the different wings of the country for power sharing. Though the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad was a Pakhtun ethnically, he was closely identified with the Punjabi group. On the other hand, Khwaja Nazimuddin was a Bengali and a representative of the Eastern wing of the country. Therefore, it was pragmatic for the Governor General to replace a Bengali with another Bengali.

2. **Civilian Façade:**

Moreover, a civilian façade was also retained by the government by appointing a civilian Prime Minister, who provided a public face to the hegemony of the military-bureaucratic elite in the country. Though Ayub Khan and Iskandar Mirza were inducted in Bogra’s second cabinet and they both wielded enormous power, military did not formally takeover, and preferred to influence the decision-making retaining a normative cover
closer to the parliamentary democracy at face value. Beyond this public face of civilian facade, it was essentially the military-bureaucratic group, which determined the decision-making in accordance with their desired course of action.

3. Weakness of Bogra:

Resources available to a political actor lay in polity or the international environment. It is important how he employs the strategies to make use of these diverse resources in a political competition, as these resources may also be available to other actors in the competition. These resources provide both opportunities for and constraints on possible range of maneuvers and counter-maneuvers in the competition. In the case of Bogra, he had weak domestic resources like political following in his own province, though his ethnicity and Bengali identity were ascribed resources or assets in context of the situation. As for the West Pakistan, his name was not familiar to the masses. Before appointment to the office of the Prime Minister, he had served at various ambassadorial positions. He had no experience of holding a political office after independence, though he had occupied important political offices in pre-independence days.

In these circumstances, Bogra was a natural choice for Ghulam Muhammad, on whom the latter could trust and on whose weakness he could capitalize. “With the gun permanently positioned against his temple, Bogra in many respects was a more tragic figure than Nazimuddin. He was a civilian presiding over a country where the military had assumed power without formally acknowledging it.”

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4. Bogra’s Strength: Pro-West Orientation:

An important achieved resource and asset for Bogra was his American connections, and the relationship of trust he enjoyed with the American establishment. Bogra had served as ambassador to the US (1951-53) before assuming the Prime Ministership, and had developed cordial relationship with the Americans. Kux points out that one of the main assets of Bogra was his ‘friendly relations with America’.45 The change in the Prime Minister was welcomed by the US, as according to an internal State Department memorandum, Bogra was “progressive-minded”.46 Jalal informs that after becoming the Prime Minister, he was “more concerned about promoting American interests than those of his own province.”47 It implies that an elite not only have various resources within a system, he can at times also make use of resources available in international environment to gain a position of power.

5. Bogra’s Secular Orientation:

As for the ideological factor behind Bogra’s accession, it is worthy of mention that he was perceived as a liberal person with secularist tendencies. After Bogra’s take-over as the Prime Minister, there was open expression in favour of secularism. Public statements were given by a number of civilian and military-bureaucratic elite.48 Bogra tried to introduce an interim constitution at the behest of the Governor General, which did not include the controversial Islamic provisions of the BPC Report. Nonetheless, the plan could not be materialized owing to opposition to it.49

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45 Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*, p. 53.
46 Memorandum from State Department: Pakistan Desk Officer Lee Metcalf to South Asian Affairs Office Director Don Kennedy, April 21, 1953, Pakistan 1953 folder, SOA Office Files, DSR, NA as cited in ibid, p. 54.
48 For details see Afzal, *Pakistan: History and Politics*, p. 119 fn3.
The US circles were happy at what had happened: the Karachi Embassy sent a dispatch to the State Department stating that Nazimuddin's removal "represents a victory [for] those elements rejecting reactionary religious influence and desiring strong assertive and more effective central government" and a "welcome gain as far as U.S. interests are concerned."\(^{50}\) The US State Department survey stated that Bogra's Cabinet was more friendly towards the US as compared to the previous one. Nazimuddin was dubbed as 'vacillating and mullah-bound', whereas Bogra was described as having 'real friendliness with the US.'\(^{51}\)

As pointed out in the framework of analysis, an elite role is concerned with the direction and guidance of society as a whole, and one concerned with authoritative allocation of values in society. Here the word value is defined in a broader sense not only as an allocation of economic resources, but also social values. In case of the military-bureaucratic elite and Bogra, they started directing and guiding the society towards secular values. For instance, Mirza believed that religion and politics should be separated, otherwise there would be chaos.\(^{52}\) Almost same views were held by General Ayub Khan and other bureaucratic and military elite.

Promotion of secular values was a contested concept within the legal, constitutional and political discourse in Pakistan. Nonetheless, it brought some pragmatic gains for those pursuing it. It helped the military-bureaucratic elite link up with an international resource, reinforcing their strength and relationship with the West, particularly the US. At the home

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\(^{50}\) Karachi Embassy telegrams to State Department, April 18 and 26, 1953, 790D.00/4-1853 and 790D.00/4-2053, DSR, NA as cited in Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 54.


\(^{52}\) Dawn (Karachi), October 31, 1954.
front, it considerably influenced constitution-making processes, de-emphasizing the role of religion in it. Thus, it was an attempt to outmaneuver or defuse the strong religious appeals by using persuasive power deploying state resources. They were not successful in pursuing their desired course of action.\textsuperscript{53}

II. Appointment of New Cabinet and its Pragmaties

Prime Minister Bogra had no say in the appointment of his Cabinet. It is worthy of mention that 6 out of 11 members of Nazimuddin’s defunct Cabinet were included in Bogra cabinet, which consisted of 10 members. (infra) According to the Governor General’s Proclamation, the Nazimuddin Cabinet was not functioning properly, and that was why it was dissolved. Later, more than half of the members of Nazimuddin Cabinet were included in the new Cabinet. In the British parliamentary democratic traditions, cabinet is jointly held responsible for its actions and decisions. However, in Bogra’s case, retaining the majority of the cabinet members after sacking the Prime Minister appears a clear contravention of the rule/norm of the parliamentary democracy as enshrined and practiced in the British tradition.

In Bogra’s cabinet, six members of Nazimuddin’s cabinet were retained, which constitute its majority, whereas four new members were included. The new entrants in the cabinet included the following:

(i) A. K. Brohi\textsuperscript{54},

\textsuperscript{53} See Afzal, Pakistan: History and Politics, p. 139.

\textsuperscript{54} Brohi was a middle-class lawyer, who was serving as Advocate General, Sindh (1951-53), and had proved himself as a successful constitutional lawyer. As Cabinet member during Bogra’s Ministry, he held a number of portfolios, i.e., Minister for Law, Parliamentary Affairs, and Minority Affairs, and was temporarily made in-charge of Finance, Economic Affairs, Education, Labour, Health and Public Works.
(ii) Abdul Qayyum Khan: Ghulam Muhammad feared opposition from Abdul Qayyum Khan to Nazimuddin's dismissal. For this reason, he was made member of the central cabinet. "It was an offer Qayyum Khan could not resist as he had ambitions of becoming prime minister." (iii) Shoaib Qureshi, and (iv) Tafazzal Ali. Those retained from the previous cabinet include (i) Chaudhri Zafarullah Khan (ii) Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani (iii) Dr. I.H. Qureshi (iv) A.M. Malik (v) Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and (iv) Sardar Bahadur Khan.

The cabinet members dropped from the previous cabinet included the following: (i) Nazimuddin (ii) Fazlur Rahman (iii) Abdul Sattar Pirzada. Though he was ousted from the Central Cabinet, he was accommodated and made Chief Minister of Sindh next

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55 Qayyum Khan was a middle class politician and lawyer, who had served as Chief Minister NWFP 1947-53. He was made Federal Minister for Food, Agriculture and Industries in 1953, and he served till 1954.
56 Mazari, A Journey to Dissillusionment, p. 62.
57 Tafazzal Ali was a Bengali politician, who remained Minister 1953-54.
58 Chaudhri Zafarullah Khan (Foreign Minister 1947-54) a politician and lawyer. He had been the target of anti-Ahmadiyya movement, yet the government was able to retain him, as he was pro-US and supporter of secularism.
59 Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani was a politician of Aligarh background. He served as the Minister for Interior 1951-54. For details see Pir Bokhsh, "Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani: A Political Biography", Unpublished M. Phil Thesis, Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2002.
60 Dr. I.H. Qureshi was a Western educated intellectual, who had played an instrumental role in preparation of the Objectives Resolution (1949).
61 A.M. Malik was a Bengali politician, who served as the Minister Government of Pakistan, 1949-55.
62 Sardar Bahadur Khan was a middle class politician of Aligarh background, who had remained Minister Federal Government 1949-54. He had served in Liaquat's Cabinet as well. It is worthy of mention that he was the elder brother of Ayub Khan. Nur Ahmad writes: "Brothers on opposite sides of the political fence is not a rare situation in Pakistan. In 1962, Ayub Khan was president and his brother, Sardar Bahadur Khan, was leader of the opposition in the National Assembly."
63 Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, p. 336 n49. Ayub writes about him in his autobiography that before the take-over of 1958, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was "going around the country spitting fire and preaching civil war... He found eloquent associates in my own brother Sardar Bahadur Khan..." Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 57.
64 Fazlur Rahman was a Bengali middle class politician-lawyer, who remained Federal Minister 1947-53. He was a representative of Bengali group in the Central Cabinet, and an ardent advocate of interests of Bengal.
65 Pirzada was a Sindhi politician, who had remained the Food Minister (1947-53).
month in May 1953. (iv) Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar\textsuperscript{65} and (v) Dr. Mahmud Husain.\textsuperscript{66} Jalal aptly remarks that the new cabinet “included all except those branded the most corrupt or rabidly religious of Nazimuddin’s ministers.”\textsuperscript{67}

III. Pro-US tilt in Pakistan’s Policy

Thus, after Nazimuddin’s removal, the obstacle to forge US-sponsored military pacts with the West was removed. One of the most pragmatic gains of Nazimuddin’s dismissal was the initiation of formal negotiations for these pacts between Pakistan and America in September 1953. The pro-US foreign policy of Bogra brought the two countries together, and paved the way for securing American interests. It is evident from the pace of events, which followed after Bogra’s accession. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Pakistan in May 1953.

It is important to note that personal friendships and trust also played important role in bringing Pakistan closer to America diplomatically. Ayub Khan had developed “good personal relations” with Dulles when the latter was on a visit to Pakistan. Though Dulles met Ghulam Muhammad and Bogra as well, the “really important talks were held with General Ayub Khan, which reflected American recognition of where the real power lay.”\textsuperscript{68} The opinions of the Americans about Ayub Khan deserve to be mentioned here. The Americans had found in Ayub Khan the “strongest individual in Pakistan” and the

\textsuperscript{65} Nishtar was a middle class politician-lawyer having Aligarh background, who had remained Federal Minister 1951-53) was considered to be an ardent advocate of an Islamic State, who was considered to be a representative of the official support to the ulama and religious scholars. Ghulam Muhammad, who was opposed to an Islamic constitution, and stood for secularism, was not comfortable with him.

\textsuperscript{66} Mahmud Husain was a Western educated intellectual.


\textsuperscript{68} Bajwa, Pakistan and the West, p. 58.
“person to talk to.” Later, in recognition of the services of Ayub Khan, he was awarded the American Legion of Merit.\(^\text{26}\)

Dulles was accompanied by the new US ambassador in Pakistan, Horace Hildreth (a professor at Temple University Philadelphia). It is interesting to note that the American establishment not only had close formal relations with the Pakistani elite, these relations were quite personal as well. Mirza had too developed personal relations with the US Ambassador in Pakistan, Horace Hildreth. These personal relations culminated in the marriage of Mirza’s son, Humayun, to Hildreth’s daughter Dodie in October 1954\(^\text{27}\) soon after the dissolution of Constituent Assembly, thus bringing the Pakistani elite closer to the American establishment.

Marriage is considered to be one of the most important contractual relations, which not only establishes a relation based on trust between two families, but also has profound bearing on decision-making. Marriage acquires more political significance when it is contracted between two elite or elite families. This opens up a whole arena of informal exchanges of information and decisions among elite. In this context, it is assumed that the marriage between Humayun Mirza and Hildreth’s daughter must have greatly contributed towards establishing a relationship of trust between Iskander Mirza and the American establishment through their ambassador.

\(^{26}\) Hildreth to Dulles, telegram no. 230, 15 September 1953, NND, 842430, RG 84, Box 40, File 320-Pak-US, NA, as cited in Jalal, _The State of Martial Rule_, p. 185.

\(^{27}\) Initially, they had considered awarding him in 1951, but it was postponed after the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. Ibid., fn.

\(^{71}\) Kux, _The United States and Pakistan_, p. 75.
The trip of Dulles in May 1953 was followed by the visit of Ayub Khan to the US in September. Originally, the trip was scheduled for nine days, but was extended to over a month. In October, Ghulam Muhammad also left for the US, where he was joined by Zafarullah Khan in November. The visit was meant to negotiate procurement for arms for Pakistan in lieu of allowing the US to construct new or use the existing air bases in Pakistan. Astonishingly, Bogra, who had now assumed a political office, was not involved in the negotiations. Next month in December, the American Vice President Richard Nixon visited Pakistan. In February 1954, President Eisenhower announced to provide military aid to Pakistan, and on May 1, 1954, Pakistan and the US signed a Mutual Assistance Pact, which formally inducted Pakistan into the Western bloc.

In September 1954, Pakistan signed the SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization). Interestingly, the Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan signed the pact without any approval from the Government of Pakistan. Such an act was not only a clear violation of the rules of parliamentary democracy, wherein the cabinet is responsible for taking such decisions. Entering into international accords without formal and lawful approval of the concerned ministry points to the bureaucratic-military excesses in decision-making in pursuit of a desired course of action. Next year, Pakistan signed the Baghdad Pact / SEATO (Central Treaty Organization). Ayub Khan writes in his autobiography that after signing the pacts, Pakistan had become America's "most allied ally in Asia" as it was "the only Asian country to join both SEATO and CENTO."74

74 Khan, Friends not Masters, p. 120.
Responses to Dismissal

After dismissing Nazimuddin’s Ministry, the civilian elite responded to the action of the Governor General in different ways. Leaders of Muslim League in East Pakistan condemned it, whereas Muslim League leaders in the Punjab supported the decision. The support from the latter was essentially a pragmatic decision, since Nazimuddin had fallen out with the Punjab Muslim League. In fact, in the wake of anti-Ahmadiyya Movement in the Punjab, Nazimuddin had replaced Chief Minister Mian Mumtaz Daultana with Firoz Khan Noon in April 1953. That is why, his removal was appreciated by the Muslim League leaders in the Punjab. For instance, the Secretary, Punjab Muslim League, stated that the action of the Governor General “echoed the will of the rejoicing millions of people; it would go down in history as the most courageous and sublime act ever dictated by a deep sense of patriotism.”75 Malik Firoz Khan Noon too corroborated with the Governor General, terming his decision as a bold and time move, which had been taken in a constitutional manner.76

Another important factor could be that of ethnicity. Nazimuddin was a Bengali, and the Bengalis opposed his dismissal. Moreover, owing to the Punjabi-Bengali tussle for political supremacy among the civilian elite, the Punjabis defended the decision of the Governor General, who was associated with the Punjabi group despite being a Pathan.

Another important decision of the Governor General and the new Prime Minister was that the Constituent Assembly was hastily prorogued, and it was not allowed to meet until September.77 The pragmatic decision was made in order to prevent the Assembly from

75 Statement by Enayetullah, Secretary, Punjab Muslim League, Pakistan Times, April 29, 1953.
76 Dawn (Karachi), April 19, 1953.
77 Callard, Pakistan—A Political Study, p. 23.
expressing its view about the dissolution of Nazimuddin’s Ministry. Moreover, it was allowed to hold its session only when Bogra’s Government had been well-established in office.

**Legal Repercussions of Nazimuddin’s Dismissal**

Commenting on the dismissal, Keith Callard observes:

> The price of the Governor-General’s coup was high. Three major conventions of cabinet government had been destroyed or gravely weakened. First, the tradition of the impartiality of the governor-general had been demolished. Second, the convention of cabinet and party solidarity had been disregarded. Thirdly, the role of the Legislature as the maker and sustainer of government had been impugned.\(^{78}\)

Nazimuddin’s dismissal has been described as a “civilian coup”.\(^{79}\) In the traditions of parliamentary democracy, the Governor-General did not have the right to dismiss the Prime Minister. It was quite later, however, in 1972 that the Supreme Court of Pakistan gave its verdict declaring it illegal and unconstitutional. It stated that it was the “first constitutional mishap of Pakistan as Governor-General Mr. Ghulam Muhammad was only a Constitutional Head... he had no legal authority to dismiss the Prime Minister and assume to himself the role of sovereign.”\(^{80}\)

Being alarmed of the growing arbitrariness of the Governor General in the wake of dismissal of Nazimuddin’s government in 1953, the members of the Constituent Assembly tried to curtail the powers of Governor General through constitutional amendment. They had the support of Prime Minister Bogra as well, since Ghulam Muhammad had developed differences with him. In July 1954, the Constituent Assembly

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\(^{78}\) Ibid., p. 137.


\(^{80}\) Miss Asma Jilani v. the Government of the Punjab and others, *All Pakistan Legal Decisions* (PLD), 1972, SC 139.
amended the Government of India Act, 1935 to empower every High Court to issue prerogative writs. Next month, in September, the Constitution was again amended to make the Governor General bound to appoint the Prime Minister from among the members of the Federal Legislature and also bound by the advice of the Ministers. Governor General Ghulam Muhammad resisted these changes, and after a month, he dissolved the first Constituent Assembly on October 24, 1954. After dissolving the Assembly, Ghulam Muhammad again invited Bogra to formulate a new government. It is a blatant violation of the rules of parliamentary democracy that the Prime Minister is not sacked along with the Assembly. Its pragmatic reason could be the fact that Bogra, having a pro-West and secular orientation, was a trusted person for the American.

Bogra’s second government was constituted the same day on October 24, 1954. On August 6, 1955, Ghulam Muhammad, being seriously ill, went on a leave, and Mirza became the acting Governor General. As Bogra had opposed Mirza’s selection as acting Governor General, the former did not have cordial relations with the latter. Mirza used his influence among the Muslim League members of Constituent Assembly from West Pakistan to undermine the position of Bogra. Prime Minister Bogra’s ministry worked till August 11, 1955, less than a year, when the PML Parliamentary Party elected Chaudhari Muhammad Ali as the new Prime Minister.

It is important to note that Bogra had a relationship of trust with Mirza and Ayub as well as with the American establishment. Unlike Nazimuddin, when he was removed from Prime Ministership, Bogra was allowed to return to the US as ambassador, where he served till 1958. It was owing to the international resources that Bogra was not completely politically marginalized. Later, owing to his relationship of trust with the
military elite and again his trust with the Americans, Ayub Khan included him in his kitchen cabinet, and made him Minister of Foreign Affairs (1962-1963).

After two months, when Ghulam Muhammad's leave was expired on September 19, 1955, Mirza formally assumed the office of Governor General after the resignation of the former. Malik Ghulam Muhammad died next year in 1956.

Resignation of Prime Ministers after Nazimuddin

The dismissal of Nazimuddin set a new precedent in the political and constitutional history of the country. In the words of a critic, the "Prime Minister's office became a game of musical chairs for which the tunes were played by the head of the state." Nonetheless, after Nazimuddin's removal in April 1953 till promulgation of Martial Law and the termination of democratic process in October 1958, five Prime Ministers assumed the office, but they were not dismissed. Their position in the hung parliament remained precarious, and Iskander Mirza did use his influence among the members Constituent Assembly and National Assembly for undermining their positions. As a result of losing the support from the Assembly, they themselves resigned from their offices.

After the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954, elections to the new Assembly were held in June 1955. Next month, on July 7, its first session was held, and then without instituting a new central, it was adjourned for a month. The next session was scheduled for August 8. Meanwhile, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad had fell seriously ill. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was a very close friend of the ailing Governor.

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General. It was the former who persuaded the latter to take a two-months leave. Upon getting his signatures, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali presented the leave to the Cabinet. After Queen’s approval had been sought, Mirza assumed the position of acting Governor General on August 6, 1955. In lieu of his ‘services’, Mirza wanted to return the favour to Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, who was offered to become the next Prime Minister.\(^8^2\) Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was reluctant to assume the office, but Mirza persuaded him to accept his proposal. Thus, after Bogra’s resignation, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, the leader of the PML Parliamentary Party, became the next Prime Minister.

Chaudhri Muhammad Ali belonged to East Punjab, and had been a bureaucrat before partition. After one year, he had to resign from his office in September 1956, as he lost support of his party. He had also resigned from the PML membership. In his statement of resignation, he said: “I consider it a point of honour, however, that having decided to resign from Muslim League, I must resign also from the Prime Ministership.”\(^8^3\) An important achievement of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was consensus-building for constitution-making and the framing of the Constitution of 1956.

Iskandar Mirza, who had assumed the office of Acting Governor General during Chulam Muhammad’s two-months leave, became the next Governor General after the expiry of the leave. Later, Mirza was elected as President under the Constitution of 1956. The Constitution of 1956 laid down that the Prime Minister would hold office during the pleasure of the President. Its Article 37(6) empowered the President to dismiss the Prime Minister if the latter loses the confidence of the majority of the members of the National

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\(^8^2\) Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, pp. 349-50.
\(^8^3\) Pakistan Times, (Lahore), September 8, 1956.
Assembly. It was a powerful lever in the hands of the President to assert his power on the Prime Minister, though after the promulgation of new Constitution till its abrogation, it was never invoked.

An important development which took place during the Prime Ministership of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was the formation of the Republican Party, which was founded by Dr. Khan Sahib in April 1956. It was a crucial resource created by the military-bureaucratic elite, which was pragmatically used against the civilian elite. Both Khan Sahib and Mirza were old friends. Trust played an important role in the formation of the party. It has been suggested that it was formed at the behest of President Iskander Mirza and Nawab Mushtaq Gurnani, the then Governor of West Pakistan. Aziz remarks that it "came into office before coming into existence, and its leader was appointed Chief Minister of a province which was yet to be created." It emerged as a king's party or a palace party, and played a central role in making and breaking of central ministries after 1956.

Upon the resignation of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, President Mirza invited Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy to form his government at the center. While doing so the unwritten convention of the selection process of a Prime Minister was not conformed, according to which the Head of the State and the Prime Minister should not belong to the same wing (either Western or Eastern wings of the country). The new Prime Minister Suhrawardy (Sept 1956-Oct 1957), who had founded Awami League in 1950, formed a precarious coalition government at the center with the support of the Republican Party, which had

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85 Pakistan Times, (Lahore), November 29 and 30, and December 13 and 14, 1960.
the backing of President Mirza. Suhrawardy was also Minister of Defense, Rehabilitation, States and Frontier Regions, Kashmir and Minority Affairs. These ministries were important resources for the Prime Minister, which he could deploy in times of need as economic dispensation to get civilian elite at his side.

The most burning issue of his Premiership remained the question of separate / joint electorates, and he supported joint electorates. Another important issue was that of One Unit, and Suhrawardy was pro-One Unit. However, the West Pakistan Legislature passed a Bill in October 1957 recommending the dissolution of One Unit and restoration of the earlier administrative arrangement in the Western wing of the country. It became a major reason for the fall of Suhrawardy. The Republicans, the single largest party in the Assembly, having President Mirza's patronage, withdrew their support to him. Suhrawardy, still confident of his position in the Assembly, requested Mirza to call its meeting. Mirza declined the offer. Telling Suhrawardy that he had lost the confidence of the Assembly, Mirza gave him two options: either give his resignation or accept dismissal by the President. Suhrwardy had to accept the first option in order to save his public face. He resigned from his office on October 11, 1957.

Ibrahim Ismail Chaudhriar (Oct 1957-Dec 1957) became the new Prime Minister after forging the PML-Republican alliance. Chaudhriar, the leader of PML Parliamentary Party and Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, was a friend of Mirza. Mushtaq Ahmad observes about him that he was preoccupied with "legalities", and had little idea of the "sordid realities of power." It appears that Chaudhriar was too much smitten with

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83 Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, p. 95.
89 Dawn (Karachi), (Karachi), October 31, 1957.
90 Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, p. 67.
the public face that he was unable to follow the pragmatics of political competition. He revived the controversial question of electorates, which was pragmatically avoided by his predecessor. The same controversy became one of the major factors of the fall of his government. After remaining in office for a little less than two months, Chundrigar lost the support of the Republican partners, and he decided to step down in December 1957. Though the President accepted his resignation, he again invited Chundrigar to make a new government. Probably an important motivating factor behind it was that of personal trust, which the former had in the latter being his close friend. Nonetheless, he could not succeed in getting the support of any major group at the center to form his government. Eventually, he once again resigned on December 14, 1957.

Upon Chundrigar’s resignation, President Micza asked Fizroo Khan Noon to form his government. Noon, who was the Republican Parliamentary leader, formed a coalition government at the center with the help of Krishak Sramik Party (KSP), Awami League (AL), and National Awami Party, etc. though some of these parties did not share power in Noon’s government. It was the seventh government formed at the center since independence (Dec 1957-Oct 1958). Noon’s position was quite weak from the very beginning. Therefore, Noon had to make compromises, and strike balance among the various rival groups of the civilian elite. He was forced to expand his cabinet in order to accommodate more and more groups, till its members were increased from 14 to 26. It was the largest cabinet formed at the center ever since the independence. It has been argued that a coalition ministry requires more ministers than a ministry that enjoys the support of the Parliament, because “places have to be found for a large number of

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91 Ibid., p. 69.
92 Dawn (Karachi), December 14, 1957.
aspirants to public office.”

In fact, ministries are resources or ‘economic dispensation’ at the disposal of the Prime Minister, which he uses to win over or appease the political opponents. It was for this reason that Prime Minister Noon held the portfolios for Foreign Affairs, Commonwealth Relations, the Interior, States and Frontier Regions and Kashmir. Nevertheless, the intra-civilian elite conflict proved unending. Prime Minister Noon was already apprehensive of the future of parliamentary democracy in the country, as he had the idea that in case of loss of support of his ministry, the President would declare Martial Law in the country. Eventually, the government came to an end with the abrogation of the Constitution and imposition of Martial Law by President Mirza in October 1958.

It has been suggested that Mirza could not outgrow his former role of Political Agent in the North-West Frontier. “His training and experience had been such that he knew only one way of achieving his objects, namely, the old Frontier game of setting one tribe against another.” Under the 1956 Constitution, the conflict between the President and the Prime Minister was quite obvious, and President Mirza made and broke ministries quite frequently by playing one civilian elite against the other.

In dismissing Prime Minister Nazimuddin and his cabinet, the Governor General had acted in contravention of the conventions of representative and parliamentary form of government. After Nazimuddin, though several Prime Ministers were forced to resign from their offices by the Governor General and later the President, they were not

94 Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan*, pp. 76.
dismissed in the legal and constitutional sense. Thus, a public face was maintained, and the Prime Ministers were coerced into offering their resignation. The cases of the resignation as opposed to Nazimuddin's dismissal involved the same pragmatics as well as use of resources.

While discussing the scope of the study, some vital decisions of bureaucratic-military elite were selected to illustrate the argument that in Pakistan's politics, the elite made pragmatic decisions but they largely used the public face in order to justify their otherwise dubious decisions. In the present chapter, the decision of the dismissal of Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin was taken up in detail, along with some attention to the coerced decisions of resignations of successive civilian Prime Ministers/members of civilian elite. The other vital decision of far-reaching importance, politically as well as constitutionally, is represented by the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1954. This decision has been taken up in the next chapter.
Chapter 6

Dissolution of Constituent Assembly and its Pragmatics

The decision of the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in October 1954 merits detailed comments, since it was a major decision made during the early years of Pakistan's history, which profoundly affected the future course of politics by setting a precedent. Moreover, from the perspective of the present study, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly explains how political actors may try to break the existing rules of political conduct for the sake of pragmatic gains, and redefine the rules of political competition. Like the earlier chapter, it also sheds light on the public face and pragmatics, as well as the pragmatic gains of the dissolution.

On October 24, 1954, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly through a Proclamation. Nevertheless, there was no explicit mention of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, since there was no such provision in the adapted Act of 1935. It is surprising to note that the proclamation nowhere indicated a specific legal provision under which the action was undertaken. It is also surprising that day after the proclamation on October 25, 1954, the Constituent Assembly met and the final draft of the constitution was approved. Two days later, on October 27, the Assembly was

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actually dissolved and its members were prevented by the police from entering the Assembly building.\textsuperscript{2}

**Public Face of Dissolution**

A number of pretexts provided public face to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Apparently, he dissolved the Assembly to put an end to what he described as “parliamentary bickering.”\textsuperscript{3} The explanations for the action include the following:

1. **Unrepresentative Character of the Constituent Assembly**

The **Proclamation of Emergency** issued by the Governor General on October 24, 1954 stated that the Constituent Assembly is no more a representative institution, and has failed to realize its objective of constitution-making. The Proclamation read:

The Governor General having considered the political crisis with which the country is faced has, with deep regret, come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery has broken down. He, therefore, has decided to declare a **State of Emergency** throughout Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function. The ultimate authority vests in the people who will decide all issues including constitutional issues through their representatives to be elected afresh. Elections will be held as early as possible.

Until such time as elections are held, the administration of the country will be carried on by a reconstituted Cabinet. He has called upon the Prime Minister to reform the Cabinet with a view to giving a vigorous and stable administration. The invitation has been accepted.

The security and stability of the country are of paramount importance. All personal, sectional and provincial interests must be subordinated to the supreme national interest.\textsuperscript{4}

It had been argued that in the wake of 1954 elections, in which the United Front had a landslide victory and the Muslim League—the majority party at the center, had been

\textsuperscript{2} Yusuf, *Pakistan*, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{4} *Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary)*, 24 October, 1954, p. 1919. Also see *Constitutional Documents (Pakistan)*, Vol. IV-B, p. 1837.
completely routed in East Pakistan, the resultant composition of the Assembly had become unrepresentative. If the Assembly had been dissolved immediately after the holding of elections, the action of the Governor General could be justified. But the Assembly had been dissolved after seven months indicating that the decision of its dissolution was not motivated by its unrepresentative character; rather it was due to the pragmatic considerations of politics.

The Assembly's unrepresentative character had been contested on the grounds that the Assembly had been elected with a limited franchise of almost 14% of the total population based on property and education. Moreover, the Assembly had been indirectly elected from the provincial legislatures in 1945-46, when it was not entrusted with the task of constitution-making.

The Constituent Assembly had not gradually become unrepresentative. It had 'unrepresentative' character from its very inception, being indirectly elected on the basis of limited franchise.

2. Popular Demands to dissolve the Assembly

The public face of the decision to dissolve the Constituent Assembly was also provided by the popular demands. As far back as March 1949, General Secretary of Pakistan Socialist Party, Mohamud Yusuf had demanded the same. Decca University Students and Azad Pakistan Party had demanded the same in 1950. Moreover, the same demand was being echoed in the press as well.

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7 Rehman, Public Opinion and Political Development in Pakistan, p. 155n.
In February 1950, on the occasion of launching All-Pakistan Awami Muslim League, its President and Chief Organizer, Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy had demanded holding of fresh elections on adult franchise basis. Later, towards the end of the year, Suhrawardy demanded to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. In various press statements, Suhrawardy stated that if there was a desperate need for change and reform, and constitutional methods were barred, "the thoughts of people turn to unconstitutional methods", but he preferred a method that would cause less harm.

In the wake of 1954 elections and the landslide victory of United Front in East Pakistan, Suhrawardy launched a campaign against the central government. He called upon the Prime Minister Bogra to resign, who had refused to accept that PML's defeat had made the Assembly unrepresentative. Bogra argued that there was no theoretical or practical ground to do so. He referred to the examples of Australia, Canada and the USA where different parties were in power at the center and in the provinces.

Suhrawardy also urged the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad to use his powers and dissolve the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Suhrawardy, who was in Europe for treatment the time of dissolution issued a statement, which he sent through a prominent journalist, Z. A. Sulri to be published in press. The letter stated that the present Constituent Assembly had ceased to be a representative body. Democracy demanded that

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9 Pakistan Times (Lahore), October 27, 1953.
10 Rehman, Public Opinion and Political Development in Pakistan, p. 139. Pir Iliahi Bakhsh and Maulana Asadul Qadri (Nazim-i-Ala of JUI) too demanded the same in 1953.
11 Shamil, "Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy in Pakistan's Politics", p. 47.
12 Rehman, Public Opinion and Political Development in Pakistan, p. 143.
it be dissolved and a new assembly elected. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly had been demanded since 1949, but it was a pragmatic strategy of the Governor General to transform a latent issue into a public issue at a critical time for his desired course of action keeping a public face.

Ghulam Muhammad got the pretext from the public demands of its dissolution, and dissolved the Assembly, and also promised to hold elections at the earliest. The action of the Governor General was welcomed by Suhrawardy. Nevertheless, before dissolving the Assembly, the Governor General wanted to secure the support of some of the important civilian elite. Therefore, he used legal resources and withdrew cases under PRODA as bait to win their support. On October 21, 1954, just three days before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Governor General withdrew the disqualification of Khuhro and others convicted under PRODA. Proceedings against Daultana were also withdrawn. In this way, Ghulam Muhammad struck a “bargain with the former chief ministers of Punjab and Sindhi” before dissolving the Constituent Assembly. Thus, an existing law served as a resource to muster support in order to prevail in a political competition.

After dissolution of Constituent Assembly and the Central Cabinet, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra was asked to reconstitute his Cabinet. It is significant to bring to forefront that Bogra was not dismissed along with the Constituent Assembly and the Cabinet. According to the rules of parliamentary democracy as enshrined in the British tradition, Prime Minister is considered the head of the treasury in a parliament, and he is jointly responsible for its actions and decisions along with his cabinet. However, in this case, the Prime Minister, who had been undemocratically nominated for his office, and

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was unrepresentative, was retained. On the contrary, the Constituent Assembly, which was at least partially representative and democratically elected, was dissolved to establish a firm control over decision-making by the ruling clique. Moreover, the retention of three members of the previous cabinet in the new cabinet, which is another rule violation, signifies the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of bureaucratic-military elite.

The President of the Constituent Assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan filed a writ petition in the Chief Court of Sindh under section 223-A of the Government of India Act, 1935 challenging the decision of the Governor General, which ushered in an era of legal battles in the history of Pakistan.\(^\text{13}\) The section 223-A had been included in the Constitution by the Government of India (Amendment) Act of 1954, which was passed by the Constituent Assembly on July 16, 1954. The three-member bench of the Chief Court in Sindh, presided over by the Chief Justice, George Constantine, gave the verdict in favour of Tamizuddin Khan declaring the Governor General’s decision of dissolution of Constituent Assembly unconstitutional and illegal.\(^\text{13}\) Thereupon, the Governor General filed a petition in the Federal Court. The Federal Court under the Chief Justice, Muhammad Munir, did not discuss the constitutionality of the decision; rather it remained preoccupied with the validity of Section 223-A, which was passed by the Constituent Assembly. Thus, it gave no ruling on the vital issue whether the Governor General could legally and constitutionally dissolve the Assembly.\(^\text{17}\) Instead, it argued that Section 223-A, under which the Chief Court of Sindh had issued the writ, had not received the assent

\(^{13}\) For a detailed discussion see Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, pp. 136-65.

\(^{16}\) Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan v. Federation of Pakistan, All Pakistan Legal Decisions (P.L.D), 1955 Sind 96. For details see Ahmad, Pakistan—A Study of its Constitutional History, pp. 235-67. Also see Nasim Hasan Shah (Dr. Justice), Memoirs and Reflections, Islamabad: Alhamra, 2002, pp. 52-62.

\(^{17}\) For details see Federal Court of Pakistan (special Reference No. 1 of 1955 in Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan, pp. 259-349.
of the Governor General. Thus, with dissenting notes of Justice J. Cornelius and Mohammad Sharif, Chief Justice Muhammad Munir validated the decision of the Governor General. The judgment was more political and pragmatic than legal or constitutional. It had a “taint of political colour.” Justice Munir remained defensive and apologetic about the verdict he gave in Tamizuddin Khan’s case. In Munir’s own words: “The mental anguish caused to the judges by these cases is beyond description and I repeat that no judiciary anywhere in the world had to pass through what may be described as a judicial torture.”

Jalal writes: “Assured of support from the Punjabi chief justice of Pakistan, Muhammad Munir, the government took the matter to the supreme court. Backed by the civil bureaucracy and the government controlled media, the governor-general and his associates succeeded in getting a favourable hearing from the supreme court and winning popular compliance with the final verdict.” It has been pointed out that since Ghulam Muhammad and Muhammad Munir shared ethnic/tribal identity and were both friends, their ascribed and achieved status played an important role in deciding the case in favour of the former by the latter. When Tamizuddin’s appeal was pending in the court, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad not only exchanged coded messages with Justice Munir, the former also went to see the latter at his residence.

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19 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p. 141.
21 Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, p. 52.
22 Both Ghulam Muhammad and Muhammad Munir were Kakkayzai Pathans, though ‘Punjabized.’ The Kakkayzai is a well-knit tribe, and its members have held important official positions in the country’s history. Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, pp. 140, 164 n8.
It appears that some resources like trust, ethnicity and symbolic appeals were deployed in order to get the judicial decision in favour of the action taken by the bureaucratic-military elite. However, the role of the judiciary falls out of the scope of the present study.

Pragmatics of Dissolution

Though a number of explanations were offered for dissolving the Assembly in order to provide a public face of politics, it was essentially a pragmatic decision made by the bureaucratic and military elite. The following pragmatic considerations may be discerned behind the dissolution.

1. Attempts to Curtail the Powers of the Governor General

The dissolution of the Assembly when it had tried to curb the ‘undemocratic and arbitrary’ powers of Governor General indicates that the real motive in dissolving the House was “personal rather than from any regard for democratic principles or traditions.”

In fact, as early as 1950, attempts were made to curtail the powers of the Governor General by the Constituent Assembly. One such attempt was made by the Assembly acting as the Federal Legislature on February 1, 1950. According to Gledhill, by amending the Constitution, the Governor General’s power to make Ordinances was brought within the control of the federal legislature.

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27 Gledhill, Pakistan: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, p. 78.
The dismissal of Nazimuddin’s Government in 1953 had brought home to many the growing arbitrary exercise of power by the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. The civilian elite resisted to the ascendency of the bureaucratic elite, and attempted to curtail the powers of the Governor General. Therefore, in order to mitigate the arbitrariness of the exercise of power by the Governor General, the Constituent Assembly decided to amend the Constitution. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra, who was hand-picked by Ghulam Muhammad, wanted to assert himself. So he backed the Bengali civilian elite such as Fazlur Rahman, (former Federal Minister), and Khwaja Nazimuddin (former Prime Minister). Bengalis elicited the support of others like Abdur Rab Nishtar, Yusuf Haroon, Abdul Qayyum Khan, Muhammad Hashim Gazder, member Constituent Assembly, and Abdu Sattar Pirzada, Chief Minister Sindh. The latter two, Gazder and Pirzada, were the heads of Sindhi group. In fact, it was primarily an alliance of the Bengalis and Sindhis against the Punjabis, who dominated the Centre.

1.1 Issuance of Prerogative Writs by High Courts

In order to counter the maneuvers of the Governor General, the members of the Constituent Assembly planned to create a new legal resource. It was achieved by amending the Provisional Constitution, adopted after adapting the Government of India Act, 1935. For this purpose, a Bill tabled by A. K. Brohi was passed on July 16, 1954 in the Constituent Assembly. A new Section 223-A was inserted empowering every High Court to issue prerogative writs. It empowered individuals to challenge the state through the courts. Like earlier laws, the amendment was not sent to the Governor General for assent. 28

The section 223-A read:

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28 For details see Newberg, Judging the State, pp. 40-1.
Every High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases any government within those territories writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them.\(^\text{29}\)

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the constitutional amendment stated:

The High Courts in Pakistan do not possess at present any power to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. Numerous rights of the individuals and duties of the public authorities cannot be enforced expeditiously because these powers are not available with the High Courts... The present amendment seeks to give the same power to the High Courts in Pakistan which the High Court of Judicature in England enjoys under the English Common Law in respect of issuing the high prerogative writs.\(^\text{30}\)

This amendment was aimed at curbing the coercive power of the state, which had been used time and again by the elite to further their own interests. By giving rights to individuals to approach the higher judiciary in case of excesses of the state authorities, or unlawful omissions and commissions, which were the instruments of control and coercion at the disposal of the bureaucratic-military elite, a new legal resource was created. This legal resource could be deployed by the civilian elite in a political competition in order to effectively outmaneuver their rival elite.

1.2 Power of Creating or Redistributing a Province's Territory

Another attempt to check the powers of the Governor General was made through the Third Amendment in the Government of India Act, 1935. Under its section 290, the Governor General was vested with the powers of creating a province, or redistribution of areas of a province. It put tremendous powers in the hand of the Governor General. M. H. Gazdar moved a bill in the Assembly on July 17, 1954 to amend the section in order to


\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 529.
check the powers of the Governor General. The public face given under the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment appears quite interesting. It read:

This section gives powers to the Governor General to create by a mere order a new province, increase or diminish the area of any province, and alter the boundaries of any province. Further this section authorizes the Governor General to vary the representation in the Federal Legislature of any province or unit or vary the composition of the Provincial Legislatures and authorizes him to make appointment and adjustment of assets and liabilities. These powers were given at the time of partition when an emergency existed and when everything had to be done hurriedly in setting up Pakistan. But now these fundamental powers in a democratic State should be exercised only by the Federal Legislature and not by the Governor-General.

We have already seen how the people of Baluchistan States are being handed over to one autocratic authority or another like sheep and goats without a referendum amongst the people concerned or sanction of the Federal legislature, and how the people of Karachi Federal area were handed over to a Chief Commissioner, who is not responsible to anyone, by a mere order of the Governor-General and without consulting the Federal Legislature when it was actually in session. The same treatment is meted out to the people of Baluchistan. This state of affairs should now cease.31

With this public face, section 290 was amended and the powers of the Governor General were transferred to the Federal Legislature. This legal combat signifies the competition between the civilian and bureaucratic-military elite, wherein the civilians effected a change in the legal resource, which was providing strength to the Governor General. Furthermore, it was an attempt to check the possible maneuvers and tactics of the bureaucratic-military elite in the political processes at the provincial level, which was a recruiting base for the civilian elite to enter into the federal legislature given the indirect mode of elections.

1.3 Repeal of PRODA

There was discontent among the civilian elite over the promulgation of PRODA. As early as 1951, Hashim Gazder from Karachi had tabled a bill in the Constituent Assembly in

order to repeal it. Gazder—the mover of the Bill—did not pursue it any further for lack of support. Nevertheless, it remained on the agenda. Again the Bill was discussed on September 17, 1954 in a meeting of the Muslim League Assembly Party. Those who supported the bill included a Central Cabinet member, who must have the support of the Prime Minister Bogra. Three Bengali civilian elite / politicians, Nurul Amin, Nazimuddin and Fazlur Rabman, had elicited the support of Bogra.

Eventually, on September 20, 1954, the Constituent Assembly discussed the repeal Bill of PRODA on the motion of M. H. Gazder, Deputy President of the Assembly, so that the Governor-General could not penalize and disqualify the politicians on political grounds. Initially, the Gazder’s Bill had called for a retroactive repeal of PRODA, which meant that all cases and disqualifications previously awarded under the Act such as that of Khurho were to be removed. In the meanwhile, a Hindu member of Constituent Assembly, introduced an amendment to the repeal Bill in order to abrogate all previous penalties awarded under PRODA. It indicated that the Assembly members thought that the punishments awarded under PRODA were essentially politically motivated, and hence, unjust. However, the Amendment Bill was defeated by 26 votes to 9.

In fact, at that time, a number of cases were pending including that of Daultana. The political opponents of Khurho and Daultana—Abdus Sattar Pirzada and Malik Firoz Khan Noon opposed the Bill. At last, after debate it was decided that the repeal should not have retrospective effect. Therefore, Section 4 of the repeal Bill provided that the references pending before any court or tribunal on or before September 1, 1954 would not

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12 Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, pp. 342-43,
32 Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, p. 22 fn.
34 Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, p. 343.
be affected. As a result, the case against Mian Daultana, Chief Minister of Punjab 1951-53, continued. The dividing line of September 1 was cautiously drawn by the civilian elite, who wanted the case against Daultana to continue.

Muslim League had approved the bill on September 18, and on September 20, it was introduced in the Constituent Assembly. It is worthy of mention that the Bill of Repeal was introduced in the Assembly and passed by it the same day, September 20. The public face as reflected in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Repeal Act is as follows:

This Act was passed in 1949 and it was given a retrospective effect from the fifteenth day of August, 1947. This was done presumably to cover the case of Mr. M. A. Khuhro, the then ex-Chief Minister of Sind.

So far only three cases have been proceeded with under this Act against three ex-Ministers, namely Mr. M. A. Khurshid (Sind), Khan Ifkhide Hussain of Mardot (Punjab) and Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhry (East Bengal). In spite of expenditure of several lakhs of rupees in each case from the public treasury of each Province, the result in two cases has brought no good to anyone and the report of the Tribunal in the third case is now before the Governor-General pending orders under section 3 of the Act.

It is not only waste of public money but it involves criminal waste of much useful time of Judges of High Court and hundreds of witnesses many of whom are officers of Government. I understand in Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhry's enquiry alone 1,500 witnesses were examined and the enquiry lasted over a year.

Further, all those officers who give evidence against a Minister in such an enquiry are put into a very embarrassing position if the accused Minister again comes into power. Many of them have to seek premature retirement, thus depriving the State of their useful services.

It is understood that no such Act exists in the Statute Books of any democratic country. In every democratic country it is the public opinion which compels a Minister to resign his office and seek oblivion if he is accused of any act of misconduct as defined in sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act.

In a democratic country where there is a Party Government, it is the duty of the party Executive or its Parliamentary Board to remove a Minister for misconduct without going through all the elaborate, expensive, useless and harmful procedure so essential under a Tribunal enquiry under the Act. After all, PRODA empowers the Governor-General only to disqualify a person. The worst is that the Tribunal’s report cannot be disclosed to the public who remain completely ignorant about the

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35 Section 4 read: "This repeal shall not affect any penalty, forfeiture, disqualification or punishment already incurred or awarded under the said Act or any reference pending before any Court or Tribunal on or before the 1st September, 1954." The Public and Representative Officers (Disqualification) (Repeal) Act, 1954. Constitutional Documents (Pakistan), Vol. III, p. 89.
report and findings of the Tribunal, which are produced at so much expense of
tax-payers’ money, energy and time.
Further, under our present Constitutional Act, Governor and Governor-General
can dismiss any Minister, if they are convinced of the undesirability of continuing
him in office any further.\textsuperscript{36}

It is worthy of mention that the Bill passed all the stages of legislation within 18 hours,
and on the same day, at 9 pm copies of an extraordinary gazette containing the draft of the
bill were distributed to the press.\textsuperscript{37} PRODA was hastily repealed on September 20, as the
Assembly debates reveal that there was a rumour that General Iskander Mirza, the
Governor of East Pakistan, was preparing substantial charges against the former public
office holders of the province.\textsuperscript{38}

G. W. Choudhury comments that PRODA’s “hasty repeal by the first Constituent
Assembly was unfortunate and considerably lowered the prestige of the Assembly in the
estimation of the people. There was suggestion in some quarters that the repeal had been
effected in order to favour some members of the Constituent Assembly.”\textsuperscript{39} Whatever the
reasons were, PRODA as a coercive resource at the disposal of the civilian as well as the
bureaucratic elite was instituted and later repealed under political expediency.

1.4 From Convention to Law: Revoking the Governor General’s Prerogatives

Around September 1954, Bogra and his supporters in the Assembly were expecting that
the Governor General would dismiss the Prime Minister, and institute a new Cabinet.\textsuperscript{40}
Governor General had invoked Section 10 of the Constitution, when Nazimuddin’s
Government was dissolved two years ago. Therefore, it was decided that Sections 9, 10,

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 89-90.
\textsuperscript{37} Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, p. 343.
\textsuperscript{38} These charges were prepared against some 22 people, which included those who were
instrumental in moving the repeal Bill. McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy, p.
123.
\textsuperscript{39} Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{40} Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 87.
10-A, 10-B and 17 of the Constitution would be amended, so that the excessive and discretionary powers of Governor-General could be curtailed.

Encouraged by the successful repeal of PRODA, the civilian elite planned to introduce further Constitutional Amendments the next day. Ayub Khan records in his autobiography that the resolution, which was printed in the middle of the night (between 20/21 September), was placed in the pigeon-holes of the Members of the Constituent Assembly. Next morning, the Assembly met as a Constitution-making body, an hour before the scheduled time for revoking the above-stated sections.\textsuperscript{41}

It is astonishing to note that the meeting of the Assembly on September 21 began at 9 am, one hour before the scheduled time, when the quorum was barely present. The Bill was moved by Gazder, who completed three readings of the Bill in mere half an hour, and the motions were passed by voice vote. Interestingly, the Bill was moved and passed within thirty minutes, and the three readings were too successfully completed. At 9:30 am, Maulvi Tamizuddin, the President of the Assembly, affixed his signature, and sent it to the press to be printed in the Gazette.\textsuperscript{42} Interestingly, at that time, several Assembly members, who were still at home, did not know that an Amendment had been made in the Constitution. The hastily passed bill had the following provisions: (i) The Governor General shall appoint as Prime Minister from amongst the members of the Federal Legislature, a person who commands the confidence of the majority of the members, (ii) Ministers shall be appointed from amongst the Legislative members, (iii) The Cabinet

\textsuperscript{41} Khan, \textit{Friends Not Masters}, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{42} Ahmad, \textit{From Martial Law to Martial Law}, p. 341.
shall be collectively responsible to the Assembly, and (iv) The Governor General would
be bound by the advice of the Ministers.\footnote{The Government of India (Fifth Amedment) Act, 1954, Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary), 1954, p. 1764. Also see Constitutional Documents (Pakistan), pp. 535-38.}

Its ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’, which provided a public face of the amendment, read:

*The Bill is designed with a view to give legislative sanction to certain accepted principles and conventions connected with the formation and working of Government in Parliamentary system of Government. Therefore, it is necessary to amend sections 9, 10, 10A, 10B and 17 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in certain respects. The principles underlying the Bill have already been accepted by the Constituent Assembly for being incorporated in future Constitution of Pakistan. Certain drafting changes have also been proposed in the Bill.*\footnote{Ibid., p. 338.}

It is worthy of mention that according to the procedures of law-making in the Assembly, a prior notice of three days to the Assembly President is required for moving a Bill. Throwing light on the pragmatics of the decision to introduce an amendment, Nur Ahmad writes:

Tamimuddin probably thought that as the governor general had imposed an
*autocracy* under the garb of democracy by taking advantage of the constitution, it
was fair for him to use his special powers in order to restore the honor and
prestige of the assembly. He was the custodian of the rights of the assembly and if
there was a tussle between the governor general and the assembly the correct thing
for him was to use the rules and regulations of the assembly to the hilt to
safeguard the rights of the assembly. In any event, it was not possible to make this
surprise attack without his backing and approval.\footnote{Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, p. 344.}

The Bill was passed without informing the Governor General, who was then in
Abbottabad. Moreover, it was published in the Gazette on the same day. It was done in
order to make it a law, since according to the rules of the Constituent Assembly, an
enactment becomes a law as soon as it is published in the official Gazette.\footnote{Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, p. 23.} G.W. Choudhury comments: “It could be described as an important step towards the growth of
parliamentary democracy in Pakistan, but the amendment was made in such haste that it could be termed a ‘constitutional coup’. A newspaper alleged that it was Fazlur Rahman, a Bengali civilian elite, who was responsible for introducing these constitutional amendments. It commented that he “had indeed succeeded in compassing the entire sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly into the few votes of the coterie that he controls.”

J. D. Murray, the acting British High Commissioner, noted that ‘one result’ of the constitutional changes was to ‘bring a step nearer the possibility that the Army and the higher Civil Service ... may one day come to the conclusion that the politicians have made such a mess that it is necessary for non-political forces to take over.’

The Governor General’s action was an “extreme measure to abrogate the Constituent Assembly was a nervous reaction to the attempt by its members to change the rules of the game in their own favour.” After a month of the passage of the constitutional amendments, the Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly. In this way, the Governor-General preempted any move by the Assembly members to reduce or contain his powers.

It is interesting to note that Gazder, the vice president of the Assembly, who had played an instrumental role in repealing PRODA and making Constitutional Amendments, was immediately rewarded for his services. On September 21, the Assembly had begun its

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47 Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, p. 83.
50 Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, p. 135.
functions as Constituent Assembly, and repealed PRODA and amended the Constitution. After few hours, it converted itself into Parliament, and passed a bill of remuneration of Gazder, whereby he was entitled to get house allowance in addition to his salary. This Bill was placed by Ghiyasuddin Pathan of East Bengal. Later, two more amendments were passed proposing increase in the allowances of Gazder. All these developments indicate that a particular political conduct, i.e. curtailing the powers of the Governor General through constitutional amendments, was rewarded through economic dispensation, which was also an expression of the exercise of power.

2. Aborting the Draft Constitution

Another pragmatic and plausible explanation for the dissolution of the Assembly could be that it was done when the draft of a constitution was about to be presented in the Assembly. It is pertinent to recall that the Objectives Resolution of March 1949, which was a statement of purpose set forth by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, was an attempt to accommodate conflicting demands of the political parties, social and religious groups, etc. In the view of S. M. Zafar: "The generality of its terminology was in reality an attempt to accommodate Islamic modernists and traditionalists alike." Thus, it appeased the varied groups of civilian elite, including the religiously-oriented civilian elite and those having modernist orientation, including the Westernized military and bureaucratic elite, and a consensus was forged among them over constitution-making. Nonetheless, according to the critics, the Resolution deliberately left the role of Islam in the polity ambiguous, vague and undefined in legal terms. It had an emotional appeal, a powerful rhetoric, but least practicality and clarity. Thus, it "proved to be an effective

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51 For details see Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, p. 345.
52 S. M. Zafar, "Constitutional Development" in Malik, Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities, p. 52.
weapon in the hands of the ruling elite to create rifts in the national polity to the effect of prolongation of their ignominious rule.\textsuperscript{53} The Islamic idiom and symbols were used as a normative cover to the vested interests of the elite groups, keeping the public face of politics. The Resolution proved to be a pragmatic strategy to safeguard these interests.

In the wake of the passage of the Objectives Resolution, a Basic Principles Committee was formulated in 1949, in order to propose recommendations for the constitution.\textsuperscript{54} Its interim report was presented to the Constituent Assembly by Liaquat Ali Khan in September 1950. However, it was rejected by the ulama for its inadequacy of Islamic provisions, and by the Bengalis because its recommendations for their political underrepresentation. In addition, the report was criticized on the ground that it had vested the emergency power in the head of the state, which included the power to suspend the Constitution in whole or in part.\textsuperscript{55} Owing to the criticism, the Report was deferred. The recommendations put forward by the second Basic Principles Committee Report in 1952 were too rejected like the earlier report. In particular, its recommendations on issues of political representation, provincial autonomy and language were criticized by the Bengalis.

Another attempt was made to outline the constitution of the country. In September 1954, the recommendations of the Basic Principles Committee Report were approved by the Constituent Assembly as a prelude to a constitution. The proposed constitution had an Islamic character. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bögra declared that the constitution

\textsuperscript{53} Maluka, The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{54} It consisted of 25 members, and was formulated under Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the President of the first Constituent Assembly.
\textsuperscript{55} For details see Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. VII (1956), pp. 13-30.
would go into effect on December 25, 1954. In a similar statement in response to opposition’s demand for the dissolution of the Assembly, Bogra had stated that the Assembly had already finished three-fourths of its assigned task. According to the Draft Constitution of 1954, the President could not dissolve the Assembly, and was bound by the advice of the Cabinet. In addition, the Constitution was declared to be the supreme law. Nonetheless, when the Assembly was about to introduce its draft constitution, it was dissolved by the Governor General. The approved draft constitution was against the secular institutional character of bureaucracy and military. Moreover, it adversely affected the scope and range of powers of bureaucratic-military elite, as under the draft constitution, the powers of the President were drastically cut. In political competition, both the civilian elite and the bureaucratic-military elite had been countering each other’s maneuvers through various instruments and strategies, such as constitutional amendments, making and repealing of laws, economic dispensation and persuasion, etc.

Since the bureaucratic-military elite had at their disposal the resources of the state, they had also been using coercive powers for their desired course of action. In this regard, they had dissolved various cabinets, dismissed a civilian Prime Minister, and effectively influencing the constitution-making process in their own favour. But when the civilian elite managed to approve a constitution curtailing their powers, putting in place new constitutional arrangements aimed at ensuring democratic norms, the Assembly was dissolved as a last resort, whereby the draft constitution was aborted. Therefore, the bureaucratic-military elite prevented the creation of a new legal and constitutional

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36 Yusuf, Pakistan, p. 57.
37 Dawn (Karachi), March 21, 1954.
resource envisaged to be at the disposal of the civilian elite, whereby the latter could effectively contain the rival elite from taking part in the political competition.

3. Postponement of Elections

Muslim League had been completely routed in the elections in East Pakistan in March 1954, and United Front had emerged victorious. Thereupon, the United Front demanded the resignation of the then sitting Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly. However, these members had the support of West Pakistan Muslim League. K.K. Aziz writes:

If the United Front demand was met and the East Pakistan legislature was asked to send fresh representatives to the Assembly, they might vote the Assembly's dissolution. This would entail elections in West Pakistan, and the Muslim League knew very well that such elections would most probably prove as deadly to them as had those in the eastern wing. In the face of this unpalatable prospect the Muslim League united with the defeated Bengali members in arguing in favour of the latter's right to continue as members of the Assembly.59

In addition, there were demands to hold elections for the Constituent Assembly as well. Though many civilian elite had advised the Governor General to dissolve the Constituent Assembly, as it had become totally unrepresentative, they also suggested holding fresh elections from amongst the existing legislatures. The Governor General selectively used the normative cover of popular demands and dissolved the Assembly, but never held elections.

In fact, delay in constitution-making was used as a pretext to delay the holding of general elections in the country till 1970. Thus, it took Pakistan twenty-four years to hold first general elections on the basis of universal adult franchise. One plausible explanation for this could be the fact that the ruling elite, most of whom were migrants and belonged to

regions that were not included in Pakistan, had no constituencies of their own. Thus, the chances of their winning the elections were quite meager.

In Pakistan, the migrant civilian elite avoided elections, as they were not natives. Election is a test of the skills and maneuvering of traditional social allegiances by a political actor, wherein a candidate enjoys ‘ascribed’ support generally based on primordial identities and indigenous resources. To the voters, a preferred candidate is the one who is a native or a local person, since such a person is known, and is connected to his voters by ties of caste, beradris, loyalty, kinship, friendship, and possibly business. To a candidate, these ties are resources, which he beneficially employs in time of need. A candidate uses these ties to win over voters.

In context of elections in Pakistan, there was no bar on the migrants to contest elections in principle. Having no local resource base, it was a pragmatic choice of the migrant elite not to hold elections, and thus keep their positions of influence secure and protected.

4. Opposition to One Unit in West Pakistan

It can also be argued that in addition to the above, the Governor General wanted to materialize the One Unit Scheme, whereby one unified province of West Pakistan was to be established. However, when the scheme was presented in the Assembly, the members of Constituent Assembly rejected it. Those who particularly opposed it include Abdus Sattar Pirzada (Chief Minister, Sindh), Abdul Qayyum Khan (Chief Minister, NWFP), Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Pir of Manki Sharif, Mian Muhammad Iftikharuddin and

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60 For detailed discussion on voters’ relationship with a candidate, see F. G. Hailey, “Politics and Society in Contemporary Orissa” in Philip, Politics and Society in India, pp. 102-4.
Sheikh Mujibur-Rahman. Even AbduSattar Pirzada had obtained the signatures of 74 out of 110 members of the Sindh Assembly in opposition to it before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954. All these developments and opposition was resented by the Governor General and the bureaucratic-military elite, who were bent upon implementing the scheme.

At that time, there were rumours that PRODA might be used as a tool against those who disagree with the two schemes. Fearing this, PRODA was hastily repealed in September 1954. In addition, the Constituent Assembly had also stripped the Governor General of his powers to dissolve the Federal Ministry by amending the Provisional Constitution. It is important to recall that it was the same power under which Ghulam Muhammad had dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin. Therefore, the Assembly was dissolved and eventually replaced by a new Assembly, which approved the One Unit scheme. It was, in October 1955, that the Western wing of Pakistan was integrated and made one province by amalgamating the four provinces. It was a ‘prelude’ to the framing of constitution.

The One Unit Scheme was a desired course of action for the bureaucratic-military elite, occupying the role at the center. In order to pursue it, strategies such as threat or intimidation to use PRODA against the dissenting civilian elite was pragmatically deployed.

The idea of One Unit figured prominently among reform measures suggested by Ayub Khan. In 1954, he prepared a note titled “A Short Appreciation of Present and Future

51 For details of the opposition to the One Unit Scheme, see Rizwan Malik, Politics of One Unit 1955-1958, Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, 1988, pp. 43-64.
52 Ibid., p. 53.
Problems of Pakistan”. He presented the note in October 1954 to Americans in a meeting, when he was on a tour to the States. It envisaged amalgamation of the provinces and princely states of the West Pakistan in a single administrative unit. This was to be done by abolishing provincial ministries and legislatures in West Pakistan. The two Legislative Assemblies of East and West Pakistan were to be indirectly elected. In addition, the note envisaged Presidential form of government. The two provincial Governors were to be nominated by the President instead of the Legislatures.

5. Asserting Bureaucratic and Military Hegemony over Political Institutions

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in October 1954 has been termed as a ‘civilian coup’. It was evident that the Governor General had taken the action with the help of the bureaucratic elite, dominated by the Punjabis, and the military elite. Three years later, the Dawn aptly remarked on it:

There have indeed been times—such as that October night in 1954—when, with a General to the right of him and a General to the left of him, a half-mad Governor-General imposed upon a captured Prime Minister the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the virtual setting up of a semi-dictatorial Executive.

Before dissolving the Assembly, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad had taken Iskander Mirza, Defense Secretary, into confidence in order to ensure the support of the Pakistan Army. Ghulam Muhammad called Bogra, who was on a tour to the UK and USA, to come back. Jalal informs that on October 23, one day before the dissolution, when Bogra arrived at Karachi airport, he was hustled into a car by some generals, and taken to the Governor General’s house. Bogra was also threatened with imposition of

53 For the text of the Memorandum written by General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Defense Minister of Pakistan, October 4, 1954, “A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan”, see Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, pp. 299-306.
55 Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics, p. 73.
57 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 75.
Martial Law.\textsuperscript{68} The threat of Martial Law was a resource used by Ghulam Muhammad in order to get the consent of the Prime Minister for pursuing his desired course of action of dissolving the Assembly. It is important to recall that Nazimuddin was also threatened with imposition of Martial Law when he tried to take a legal recourse against his dismissal.

Moreover, before proclaiming the dissolution of the Assembly, the troops were moved from outside Karachi to the city in readiness for disorders "beyond the power of the police to control."\textsuperscript{69} Thus, fearing a public reaction on the day of the dissolution, the government had deployed army in the then capital. Time magazine commented on the dissolution in the following words: "Bloodlessly, Pakistan changed from an unstable pro-Western democracy to a more stable pro-Western military dictatorship."\textsuperscript{70}

The dissolution of the Assembly clearly establishes that the bureaucratic elite were in league with the military elite to outmaneuver the civilian elite for pursuing their desired course of action in domestic affairs and foreign policy. From October 1954 onwards after the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly, the role of military elite became more pronounced. In the post-October 1954 period, all succeeding governments were supported by the military.

Pragmatic Gains of Dissolution

The dissolution of the Assembly brought the following pragmatic gains to the bureaucratic and military elite.

\textsuperscript{68} Jalal, \textit{The State of Martial Rule}, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{69} Murray to secretary of state [CRD], 10 December 1954, DO35/5406, PRO, as cited in Jalal, \textit{The State of Martial Rule}, p. 192 fn.

\textsuperscript{70} Time, November 8, 1954 in Kux, \textit{The United States and Pakistan}, p. 75.
1. Reshuffling of Bogra's Cabinet and its Pragmatics

Despite the fact that the constitutional amendments were made in connivance with Bogra, he was retained as the Prime Minister as he enjoyed the trust of the Americans. It was on the advice of Iskander Mirza that Bogra was not fired, and retained as Prime Minister. The new cabinet formed by Bogra was claimed to be a “Cabinet of Talents”. It was the first non-party government that was formed in the country. Like the earlier cabinet, the Prime Minister did not have any say in its selection. It is significant to recall that when Nazimuddin was dismissed, almost half of the members of his cabinet were retained in Bogra’s first cabinet. Similarly, Bogra’s second cabinet again retained half of the members of the previous cabinet.

Some of those who were dropped from the Cabinet were compensated by economic dispensation. These included the following: Sardar Bahadur Khan was the brother of Ayub Khan. In 1954, he was made agent to the Governor General in Baluchistan, where he served till 1955. Zafarullah Khan had already been elected to the International Court of Justice. M. A. Gurmiani was made Governor of the Punjab in 1954, and he remained so till 1955. Shoaib Qureshi was again appointed on a diplomatic position. Tafazzaal Ali was sent as Ambassador to Egypt in 1954. On the contrary, some of the members dropped from the previous cabinet were not compensated. These include I. H. Qureshi, A. K. Brohi and Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan.

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71 Ibid.
73 From July-October 1955, he remained Chief Minister NWFP. From 1956 to 1958, he remained leader of the opposition, West Pakistan Legislative Assembly.
74 Gurmiani also served as Governor of West Pakistan, 1955-57, member Constituent Assembly, 1955-57. Later Gurmiani later claimed that he was offered it but he refused to become Cabinet member. Pakistan Times (Lahore), February 21, 1961.
Those retained in the second cabinet included Chaudhri Muhammad, a bureaucratic-
turned-civilian elite, who served as Finance Minister 1951-54, and had been quite
influential; Dr. A. M. Malik, a Bengali civilian elite, who served as Minister Government
of Pakistan from 1949 to 1955; and Ghayasuddin Pathan, a civilian elite of East Bengal,
who had been Deputy Minister in Nazimuddin’s Cabinet, and served as Minister (1954-
55).

It is worthy of mention that Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and A.M. Malik had been members
of the Nazimuddin Cabinet, but they both, along with few other members, had been
retained, and thus inducted in the first cabinet of Bogra. The two had survived their
cabinet membership twice.

In addition, some new members were inducted in Bogra’s second cabinet. These included
the following: M. A. H. Ispahani, a Bengali businessman, and former Ambassador to the
US and UK, Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, a Sindhi civilian elite, Dr. Khan Sahib, the brother
of Abdul Ghaффar Khan and a close friend of Iskander Mirza. He was inducted in the
Cabinet to help implement the One Unit Scheme, as his influence was used to neutralize:
the opposition of his brother to the scheme.\(^{75}\) Thus, kia also served as an important
resource in politics. In addition, General Ayub Khan and Iskander Mirza were also
included in the cabinet.

It is significant to note that the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, was
included in the Cabinet as Defense Minister. On his demand, he retained the post of the
commander-in-Chief as well. It was another violation of legal rules. However, the

\(^{75}\) Afzal, Pakistan: History and Politics, p. 137.
inclusion of Ayub Khan in Cabinet “formally inducted Ayub into national politics on his own terms.” Hitherto, the military elite were playing a covert role in the political competition, but with this induction, their role as rival elite was further consolidated. Ayub Khan occupied a central position in decision-making in a formal sense, as he was consulted by the Central Government in every issue of vital import. Ayub Khan himself stated that he had accepted the offer in order “to act as a buffer between the politicians and the armed forces”. Appointing the Army Chief as defense minister was an unprecedented event. This role concentration of two important offices in a single individual was a blatant violation of legal-rational and democratic norms.

In addition, Iskander Mirza was offered Interior Ministry, who acted as a double-edged sword as he was the spokesman of the institutional interests of both the bureaucracy and the military. A few days after assuming the portfolio of Interior Minister, he stated: “You cannot have the old British System of administration [and] at the same time allow politicians to meddle with the civil service. In the British System the District Magistrate was the kingpin of administration. His authority was unquestioned. We have to restore that.” Thus, including Mirza, who had an honorary rank of Major General, two military generals assumed political offices. Both Ayub and Mirza shared their contempt for the civilian elite. Moreover, both had secular orientation as well. Mirza declared that religion would be kept out of politics.

78 Khan, Friends not Masters, p. 53.
79 Dawn (Karachi), October 31, 1954.
These new entrants had never been elected to any public office, whereas the Constituent Assembly was dissolved on the pretext that it had become 'unrepresentative.' Their selection was in clear contradiction to the legal-rational norms, and disregardful of the democratic principles. These members were selected by the bureaucratic-military elite on the basis of personal trust and loyalty. This reflects the civilian and bureaucratic-military elite interlocking at the personal level, whereas their interests were conflicting at institutional and group level.

Wheeler opines that the government bore similarity to the pre-partition governance pattern, with the Governor General presiding over the council, the C-in-C as Defense Minister, and lacking in responsibility to the legislature. This shows that the political conduct was not influenced by the constitutional norms or the essence of democracy, but the elite always tried to justify their actions using the public face of democracy and/or national interest without subjecting their actions to the democratic traditions. Without renouncing the democratic ideals at face value, they used all resources and strategies for pragmatic gains in political competition.

Later, the Bogra Cabinet was expanded to include five more ministers, which include the following: Suhrawardy, a Bengali civilian elite and the leader of Awami League, had demanded the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and had urged Bogra to resign. Nevertheless, Bogra was retained as Prime Minister by the Governor General. Ghulam Muhammad offered Suhrawardy to join Bogra’s Cabinet as the Federal Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, which he accepted. It is important to note that previously, Suhrawardy was an opponent of one unit, but his inclusion in the central cabinet ensured

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his support to the one unit. It has been suggested by some writers that Ghulam Muhammad had assured Suhrawardy that he would be the next Prime Minister after Bogra. Later, Bogra grew differences with the Governor General. Many people expected that Bogra would be replaced by Suhrawardy, but when the new PML President, Choudhary Muhammad Ali was taken as the new Prime Minister after Bogra's resignation, Suhrawardy resigned from the Cabinet on August 11, 1955.

In addition to Suhrawardy, Abu Husain Sarkar of Krishak Sramik Party, who was Fazlul Haq's right-hand man as well as his nominee, was taken in Cabinet in order to counter the influence of Suhrawardy. Other new entrants in the cabinet included Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola, Col. (Hon.) Sayyid Abid Husain, and Sardar Mumtaz Ali Khan. These latter two members were Punjabi landlords.

2. Establishment of One Unit by the New Constituent Assembly

The second Constituent Assembly and the new Cabinet of Bogra took up the issue of One Unit. Almost a month after the dissolution of the Assembly, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra announced the One Unit Scheme on November 22, 1954. A few days after, he also called a meeting of the Central Cabinet, all the Chief Ministers of the provinces of West Pakistan on November 26, and the participants were urged to approve the scheme. The main opposition came from the three provinces of West Pakistan, but it was silenced by using all possible methods of power exertion ranging from persuasion and coercion to symbolic appeals and economic dispensation by the government.

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82 Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, p. 66.
85 Rahimtoola, a lawyer and businessman, had served as Ambassador in France soon after the partition. In addition, he had also served as Governor of the Punjab in 1954.
Chief Minister Abdur Rashid Khan in NWFP had resigned under pressure to be replaced by Sardar Bahadur Khan in July 1955 as the former had opposed the One Unit scheme. Pir of Manki led the opposition to the scheme. In November 1954, Habib Ibrahimb Rahimtoola, Governor of the Punjab, was replaced by Nawab Mushiq Khan Gurmani, as the former was taken in Bogra's Cabinet. Gurmani was not only pro-One Unit, he persuaded others to approve it as well. Similarly, Abdul Sattar Pirzada, Chief Minister Sindh, who opposed One Unit Scheme was dismissed by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad in November 1954. He was replaced by Khurho, who initially did not support the scheme, later managed to get the approval of One Unit from his ministers. On December 11, 1954, the Sindh Assembly passed a resolution in its favour with an overwhelming majority of 100 against 4 votes. It is astonishing to note that on October 23, 1954, the same Assembly had produced a signed document rejecting the scheme, but the new Chief Minister forced a consensus on it.

On September 30, 1955, the second Constituent Assembly passed the Bill when 43 members voted for and 13 against the One-Unit Scheme. Hence, the Western wing of the country was amalgamated and made one province. As a result of the establishment of One Unit in West Pakistan, the center's hold on both wings of the country was strengthened. Not only the civilian elite in the West Pakistan came under the direct control of the center, the arrangement also effectively neutralized the demands of the East Pakistani civilian elite for greater provincial autonomy.

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87 Dawn (Karachi), December 12, 1954.

During the first decade of independence from the colonial rule, no consensus on rules of the political conduct and political competition could evolve among the civilian elite in particular, and among various elite groups in general. This lack of consensus was one of the reasons for delay in constitution-making. The country could have its own constitution nine years after independence. Amid political upheavals, the first Constitution was promulgated in 1956. The task was complicated and arduous.

Prime Minister Chaudhari Muhammad Ali is credited with giving the country its first Constitution of 1956. He had a bureaucratic background, and had replaced Muhammad Ali Bogra on August 11, 1955. Meanwhile, Iskander Mirza had replaced Ghulam Muhammad as Governor General on August 6, 1955, thus bringing to the job "the full bag of tricks." Chaudhari Muhammad Ali brought about a consensus among the varied disparate groups of political actors and elite groups for the framing of the Constitution of 1956. The Constitution was passed by the Second Constituent Assembly, having heterogeneous composition. It had members of the United Front, Awami League, Congress, Scheduled Caste Federation, United Progressive Party and the Muslim League.

The Constitution of 1956 was enforced on March 25, 1956 and Pakistan was declared an Islamic Republic. It is significant to note that Governor General Iskander Mirza had given his assent to the Constitution on the condition that he would be elected as President under the new arrangement. Moreover, General Ayub Khan also supported Mirza's efforts to

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90 Yusuf, Pakistan, p. 64. The consent of Governor General was required following the Federal Court's verdict in Tanizuddin Khan's Case.
become the President.\textsuperscript{91} Through this bargain, before allowing the creation of a legal and constitutional resource, he could secure a role for himself to play in the future decision making. It was promising for him as he was now provided with a public face and also had access to resources of bureaucracy and military for political competition.

The army also took keen interest in the formulation of the Constitution. It was informally approved by Ayub Khan as well.\textsuperscript{92} It is worthy of mention that Ayub Khan was playing two roles—one as a Cabinet member and the other as the C-in-C. Therefore, his approval meant the consent of the army as an institution.

The Constitution of 1956 had heavily borrowed from the draft constitution of 1954, which had been rejected in October 1954 as coming from an Assembly 'unrepresentative of the people'.\textsuperscript{93} It provided for a federal parliamentary system, with federation consisting of two provinces: East and West Pakistan. Retaining the scheme of parity of representation between the two provinces, the members of East and West Pakistan were equally represented in the unicameral legislature.\textsuperscript{94}

According to the Constitution of 1956, the designation of Governor General was replaced by President (Head of the State), and he was given powers over the elected Prime Minister (Head of the Executive). The President could dismiss a Prime Minister in case the latter failed to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly. Article 37(6) stated that the "Prime Minister shall hold office during

\textsuperscript{91} Mustafa Chowdhury, Pakistan—Its Politics and Bureaucracy, New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1988, p. 132.

\textsuperscript{92} Ijazul, The State of Martial Rule, p. 196.

\textsuperscript{93} Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, p. 96.

\textsuperscript{94} The National Assembly was consisted of 100 members, 150 from each province. There were additional 10 seats for women, five from each province.
the pleasure of the President, but the President shall not exercise his powers under this clause unless he is satisfied that the Prime Minister does not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly."95 This Article epitomizes an effort to reconcile the British traditions of parliamentary democracy with the local practices of political competition. Such efforts also point to a gap between the normative legal positions and formal rules of political conduct, and the pragmatics of politics. This arrangement was meant to bridge this gap by putting formal limits on the discretionary powers of the President, which are otherwise to be used in good faith and keeping in view the political circumstances. However, in case of Pakistan, such conventions were frequently used as a resource for a pragmatic gain in a political competition violating the purport of such conventions.

Similarly, the powers of Provincial Governors were enhanced too, and they were vested with discretionary power to appoint the provincial chief ministers. This division of power was not necessarily detrimental to democratic norms in principle, but given the dominant role of the bureaucracy or the executive backed by the military establishment with emergency powers at its disposal, the arrangement could, and consequently did undermine the powers of the legislature, its subordinated parliament or the civilian elite to the military and bureaucratic elite. The Centre retained the control of the provincial executives. Under Article 192, the provisions for the declaration of emergency, which were enshrined in the Act of 1935, were retained in the Constitution of 1956.96 Under Article 193, the President was empowered to dismiss the provincial government and

96 Ibid., p. 136.
impose direct rule in the province in case of failure of constitutional machinery in the province.\footnote{Ibid., p. 136-9.}

Under the new Constitution, Iskander Mirza managed to get himself elected as the first President of Pakistan. He made full use of the formal-legal resources provided in the Constitution, and as we saw in the preceding chapter, he was able to coerce several Prime Ministers into resigning their posts. No general elections had been held since the inception of Pakistan, but now holding of such elections had become a pressing public demand. Some tentative dates were set for elections. As the elections drew closer, there seems to have emerged a consensus among the civilian elite to get rid of President Mirza. Owing to such threats to his position, he along with General Ayub Khan, who represented the military elite, abrogated the Constitution, the Constitution he himself had sworn to defend and protect. These pragmatic considerations along with the public face used by the bureaucratic-military elite are the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 7

Pragmatics of Bureaucratic-Military Coup

On October 7, 1958, Iskandar Mirza abrogated the Constitution of 1956, proclaimed Martial Law in the country, and appointed General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator.¹ Three days later, on October 10, the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1 of 1958 was proclaimed by Ayub Khan, which, apart from confirming the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956, allowed the country to be ruled as nearly as possible by the defunct Constitution for administrative purposes.² Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts was restored, though the fundamental rights remained suspended. In this way, the legal vacuum was filled, and it also put resources, giving enormous legal powers, at the disposal of the bureaucratic-military elite. It further enhanced their capability to manipulate the laws while keeping to the public face, at the same time.

Two weeks after the issuance of Continuance Order, President Mirza announced his new Cabinet with General Ayub Khan as the new Prime Minister on October 24, 1958. It is important to note that the decision to appoint a C-in-C as Prime Minister heading a

¹ Proclamation by the President of Pakistan, October 7, 1958. Government of Pakistan Notification No. 977/58 dtd 7 October 1958. See Gazette of Pakistan [Extraordinary], October 31, 1958, p. 419.
Cabinet had no parliamentary basis. Probably knowing this, Mirza had referred to the Cabinet “in the accepted sense of the word.”

The present chapter deals with the pragmatics of the bureaucratic-military coup of 1958, which was jointly staged by the bureaucratic and military elite. While highlighting the pragmatic considerations behind the coup, the chapter explores the dynamics of competition among the rival elite: military elite led by Ayub Khan and bureaucratic elite represented by President Mirza. It also includes the pragmatic reasons of latter’s ouster from power and the pragmatic gains accruing to the military elite from it.

**Public Face of the Coup**

A number of explanations were offered by Mirza and later Ayub Khan for the military take-over. Their proclamations and public speeches provide the ‘public face’ of the decision, which are as follows:

Iskander Mirza in his proclamation on October 7, 1958 pointed out the normative reasons for the military take-over. It read:

> For the last two years, I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety, the ruthless struggle for power, corruption, the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of decorum, and the prostitution of Islam for political ends.... These despicable activities have led to a dictatorship of the lowest order...  

Furthermore, Mirza’s contempt and disdain for the elections is clearly visible in the proclamation. It stated:

> The mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable Government capable of dealing with the

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innumerable and complex problems facing us today. We cannot get men from the Moon. The same group of people who have brought Pakistan on the verge of ruination will rig the elections for their own ends... The elections will be contested, mainly, on personal, regional and sectarian basis....I am convinced, judging by shifting loyalties and the ceaseless and unscrupulous scramble for office, that elections will be neither free nor fair. They will not solve our difficulties. On the contrary, they are likely to create greater unhappiness and disappointment leading ultimately to a really bloody revolution.5

Mirza believed that "a vast majority of the people no longer have any confidence in the present system of government..." Since Mirza announced the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution through this proclamation, he said that the Constitution was 'unworkable' and "full of dangerous compromises." He further added: "It is said that the Constitution is sacred. But more sacred than the Constitution or anything else is the country and the welfare and happiness of its people." Concluding his proclamation, Mirza once again reminded that he had taken the decision "in the interests of the country and the masses." The proclamation by President Mirza is reflective of the perceptions of the 'military-turned-bureaucratic-turned-political elite' about the civilian elite and political parties.

In order to present public face of his decision, President Mirza referred to almost all possible range of resources and their abuse including religious values, cultural ethos, democratic principle, national interest. He categorically stated that the Constitution was unworkable and fraught with dangerous compromises. It was Mirza himself who had given his assent to it. After the promulgation of the Constitution, Mirza had addressed the National Assembly on March 24, 1956, and had congratulated the Assembly on “accomplishing the great task of framing the Constitution.” Furthermore, he had stated that the "Constitution provides for a democratic dynamic and progressive polity and will,

5 Ibid.
I am sure, promote national unity and the progress of Pakistan." On the same occasion, he had pledged to defend the Constitution and faithfully discharge his duties. Nevertheless, it was he who had abrogated it.

It is important to note that the President's proclamation was not considered adequate to provide justification for and proper public face of the coup. The C-in-C of the Army too thought it necessary to address the nation. Next day on October 8, 1958, Ayub Khan, while addressing the nation said:

This is a drastic and extreme step taken with great reluctance, but with the fullest conviction that there was no alternative to it except the disintegration and complete ruination of the country. History would never have forgiven us if the present chaotic conditions were allowed to go any further.  

Next Ayub Khan blamed that "the chaotic conditions...have been brought about by self-seekers who, in the garb of political leaders, have ravaged the country or tried to barter it away for personal gains." Furthermore, he said that after the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, "politicians started a free-for-all type of fighting in which no holds were barred. They waged ceaseless and bitter war against each other... There has been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation. Having nothing constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian, religious and social differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani." As a result of it, Ayub Khan continued, all ideals and the high sense of values inherent in our religion and culture have been destroyed. The result is total administrative, economic, political and moral chaos in the country, which cannot be tolerated in these dangerous times. Pakistan certainly cannot afford this luxury. 

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7 General Ayub Khan's first broadcast to the Nation, October 8, 1958, in Appendix C, Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 275.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 276.
Clearly stating his aim, Ayub said: "...our ultimate aim is to restore democracy but of the type that people can understand and work." He maintained that the Armed Forces were "fully aware that internal stability is absolutely essential if they are to successfully repel aggression from outside."¹⁰ Like Mirza, Ayub too concluded the address saying the "extreme step has been taken in your interest and in the interest of the stability of Pakistan."¹¹

Justifying the decision of military take-over, he blamed the politicians for having made the state of affairs so 'intolerable' that declaration of Martial rule became inevitable. As he put it later in his autobiography: "It was the last bid to save the country."¹² Furthermore, he stated: "All the politicians had been tried and found wanting; there was no one else left on the civil side."¹³

The address of the C-in-C is important on two scores: first, it presented a public face of the coup as it tried to establish that it was undertaken to save the country. Ayub Khan also referred to the complete degeneration of religious and cultural values by the civilian elite. By using such symbols and normative positions, he tried to persuade and convince people of the necessity of the Martial Law as a last resort. Secondly, he tried to articulate the shortcomings of parliamentary democratic system by arguing that it needed to be reworked in Pakistani context. Perhaps he had in his mind the idea to altogether change the rules of the political competition by introducing controlled democracy.¹⁴

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 277.
¹¹ Ibid., p. 278.
¹² Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 70.
¹³ Ibid., p. 75.
Both Ayub and Mirza portrayed the coup as a 'revolution.' Mirza labeled the coup as a "peaceful revolution", whereas Ayub Khan calls it a 'revolution' in his autobiography.\textsuperscript{15} By using the word revolution, they portrayed their own image as saviours of the country and reformers. It also provided a public face to their action of imposing Martial Law and abrogating the Constitution. In the words of Cohen: "Setting things right, of course, is the preferred model of intervention, and the generals would like to see their involvement in politics as a glorified 'aid to the civil' operation."\textsuperscript{16} Mirza's son records that Ayub, after overthrowing Mirza, ordered to change the syllabus in Pakistani schools in order to portray himself as the saviour of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, Ayub Khan used persuasive power through propaganda for his image-building as a saviour of the country.

It has been argued that the Martial Law of 1958, which was termed revolutionary by its supporters, did not change things radically. "There was no break with the past, juridically, administratively or ideologically. It was no more than the formalization of a situation which had existed almost since the partition of the sub-continent. In contrast to a revolution, the coup was undertaken by a group that was already a participant in the existing political process and possessed institutional bases of power within that system."\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} Proclamation by President Iskander Mirza on Oct 7, 1958 and Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{16} Cohen, The Pakistan Army, p. 119.
\textsuperscript{17} Mirza, From Plassey to Pakistan, p. xiv.
\textsuperscript{18} Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics, p. 72.
The Immediate Pretexts for Take-over providing Public Face

Following are the major developments taking place some days before the coup, which were used as public face by the bureaucratic-military elite for their act of dissolving the Assembly and abrogating the Constitution.

a) Khan of Qalat’s Revolt:

An immediate happening, which provided a public face and a pretext for the take-over was the engineered revolt of the Khan of Qalat, who had revolted against the government decision to build military bases in Baluchistan. Apparently, it prompted Mirza to impose Martial Law. On October 6, just a day before the coup, the Khan of Qalat was arrested by the army on charges of conspiracy, as he had planned to secede his state from Pakistan. The Khan had refused to visit the capital, and had hoisted the flag of former State of Qalat. Nonetheless, he was not arrested by the police but by the army. It shows that the action must have got the approval of the C-in-C, Ayub Khan. Later Ayub Khan in his autobiography stated: "It was seriously suggested at that time that he was encouraged by Iskander Mirza, who was setting the stage for his final action."19 Nevertheless, the statement by Ayub Khan appears to be an attempt to exonerate himself from the blame of imposing Martial Law and abrogating the Constitution.

According to Ayub Khan, who has given an insider’s view, the revolt of the Khan of Qalat was a conspiracy by President Mirza, who wanted to use it as public face for the imposition of Martial Law. Therefore, a conspiracy may also provide a resource to have a public face of politics.

19 Khan, Friends not Masters, p. 37.
b) Fear of Clash with PML National Guards:

After becoming PML President in March 1958, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan launched a campaign to remove President Mirza, as the former thought that the latter was the root cause of political instability in the country. He also revived the PML National Guards—a para-military organization of the party with uniformed recruits. In a countermaneuver, on September 20, 1958, President Mirza issued an ordinance banning all military or semi-military organizations in the country. Reacting to the ordinance, Abdul Qayyum Khan declared that “the Muslim League would not take lying down the challenge thrown by the Central Government” by banning all semi-military organizations, which included Muslim League National Guards as well. He further added that he intended to recruit at least one million guards in order to confront the governmental attacks. Thus, there was a clear message of defiance from the Muslim League to the Government.

On September 23, Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon stated that if political parties were allowed to have a private army of their own, there would be little chance of free and fair elections. On the same day, Abdul Qayyum Khan reached Karachi, and the Guards defied the prohibitory orders, on which they were tear-gased and baton-charged at the Railway Station. Despite that, the workers of the party demanded from the PML Working Committee to allow them to resort to direct action. They also threatened that if the party high command did not allow it, they would start a civil disobedience movement against the government till the withdrawal of the said ordinance. Nevertheless, gauging the potentially adverse implications of direct action, the PML Working Committee directed the National Guards not to march or parade in military fashion, or wear uniform

10 Public Order (Political Uniforms) Ordinance, 1958.
11 Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, p. 76.
12 Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 57.
13 Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, p. 238.
till any further orders. But the Committee declared to observe October 10 as a “Protest Day”. On that day, public meetings were to be organized and resolutions condemning the ordinance were to be passed. The Working Committee also adopted a resolution, which concluded,

If the change of power within a democratic State is not allowed to be brought about by constitutional means the people and their political organizations will have no option but to resort to other methods of throwing the despotic Government out of power. 24

The Resolution of the PML Working Committee was referred to the Muslim League Council, but before the Council could meet and decide further action, Martial Law had been imposed and the Constitution abrogated. The authorities feared violent clash with the PML workers on the Protest Day on October 10, and taking it as one of the excuses, imposed Martial Law three days prior to it. Though it was used as a public face, it may be argued that the unrest was not country-wide, and in order to control the law and order situation, Martial Law could have been imposed only in Karachi or other trouble-prone areas, if necessary. Moreover, it did not provide any excuse or justification for abrogating the Constitution.

c) Resignation of Awami League’s Cabinet Members:

Firoz Khan Noon, the Republican Parliamentary leader, became the Prime Minister in December 1957. He formed a coalition government at the center with the help of various parties, though some of these parties like Awami League did not share power in Noon’s government. Being a coalition government, Noon tried to strike balance among various conflicting parties. Later, owing to pressures, in August 1958, Hamidul Haq Chaudhary of Krishak Sramik Party (KSP) was inducted in Cabinet. As a result, ministers from

24 See text of PML Working Committee Resolution in Pakistan Times (Lahore), September 29, 1958 in Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, p. 76.
Suhrawardy’s Awami League, which was a rival party of KSP, were too to be included in
the Cabinet by Noon, thus raising the number of Cabinet members from 14 to 26.
Nevertheless, the Cabinet continued to expand. On October 7, 1958, three ministers and
four ministers of state of Awami League, who had sworn in just five days ago on October
2, resigned from Noon’s Cabinet. Apparently, they were dissatisfied with the portfolios
offered to them. On the same day of their resignation, the Noon’s Government came to an
end with the abrogation of the Constitution and imposition of Martial Law by President
Mirza.

Expansion of the number of ministries from 14 to 26 by Noon signifies that the
government created new resources in terms of ministries to be distributed among the
Assembly members. This strategy of economic dispensation was aimed at mustering
support to retain and perpetuate power.

In these acts of political bargain, Suhrawardy tried to help Noon’s ministry. Noon writes
in his autobiography that Suhrawardy was quite assured of his success in the forth-coming
elections. Therefore, he did not want political situation to deteriorate, as it might
give President Mirza the chance to postpone elections. Noon even writes: “The truth was
that Suhrawardy knew that if my ministry also went through a lack of majority, Iskandar
Mirza would declare Martial Law and assume dictatorial powers.”25 It clearly shows that
the civilian elite were already apprehensive of Mirza’s designs and potential maneuvers to
outweigh them in the political competition.

25 Noon, From Memory, p. 295.
Pragmatic Reasons for the Coup

Nonetheless, despite this public face, a number of pragmatic reasons can be discerned by going beyond the public scene, and exploring the pragmatic reason for the coup.

1. Approaching General Elections

Under the Constitution of 1956, general elections were initially scheduled for November 1958, but they were postponed to February 15, 1959. Mirza, the President of Pakistan, was quite apprehensive about the results of the elections, which might jeopardize his position. In particular, he was worried about the Awami League as he was anticipating its success. Moreover, he feared the growing power of politicians having communist / socialist orientation, particularly in the Eastern Wing. Just a few days after the take-over, President Mirza stated that he was quite certain that the elections scheduled for February 1959 would never be fair and honest.26 He was averse to democracy, and has been termed as the “personification of an autocrat”27 who had distaste for “legislative process and politicians.”28 Once he had declared that Pakistan was not ripe for the practice of democracy as understood in Britain or America. He also urged the need to prevent flagrant abuses.29 After becoming the Governor General and later the President, he promoted individuals who were known for their aversion to democracy and had also opposed Pakistan.30

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30 Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations, p. 33.
In January 1958, President Mirza received a message from Washington that the "sooner elections [could] be held...the better." Not only did Mirza refuse to assure the American establishment of the elections, he reacted and stated that the U.S Government "must as a matter of principle avoid any semblance [of] tutelage of [the] Pakistani leadership." The response of Mirza clearly establishes that he had no intention of holding elections in the country, which were yet more than one year away.

Ayub was also worried about the elections, as he wrote in his diary on May 22, 1958:

The elections, of course, are drawing near. The politicians...are trying to get back into power by hook or by crook. And having got there they know that they will have nothing to show for themselves except working for the disruption of the country further...

.... I am now certain that if the country is left to them we should expect nothing but ruin.32

These personal views of Ayub Khan not only reveal his distrust of politicians but also his reservations about the Constitution and democratic form of government. In order to prevent the elections, the Martial Law was declared by the bureaucratic and military elite as the last resort. Up till 1956, elections were delayed since there was no Constitution. Now when the new Constitution had been framed after eight years, it provided for elections, and there was no justification for delaying the elections any more. This perception of the military and bureaucratic elite was shared by the members of judiciary as well. The Constitution Commission under Justice Muhammad Shahabuddin too had doubts that even if general elections had been held as scheduled, the "right type of leadership" would not have emerged.33

31 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 97.
32 Selection from the diary of Ayub Khan (May 22) in Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 61.
There was considerable public pressure for the holding of elections, which provided a public face to the bureaucratic and military elite. It is important to note that many politicians and civilian elite were also apprehensive about the elections, as they suspected that the President might postpone them on one pretext or the other. During the Prime Ministership of I. I. Chundrigar (Oct 1957-Dec 1957), when the opposition demanded restoration of separate electorates and dismemberment of One Unit in West Pakistan, Suhrawardy argued that reopening of these issues might delay elections.

Hamza Alavi has pointed out that the coup of 1958 was not a ‘seizure’ of power, since all power had already been concentrated in the hands of President Iskander Mirza and C-in-C Ayub Khan. "It was rather a dismissal of the politicians who had provided a facade of parliamentary government and a dismantling of the constitutional apparatus on the eve of the first general elections." It reveals that the bureaucratic-military elite were too avoiding the holding of elections, in addition to the migrant or newly emerged civilian elite, who were perceived as delaying the elections as they had no local resource base or political following. The holding of elections was postponed owing to the potential threat the elections posed to the powers of the bureaucratic-military elite. Having representative civilian elite in political offices, the bargaining position of the bureaucratic-military elite vis-à-vis them over a desired course of action would have weakened, thus tilting the power balance heavily in favour of the latter.

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34 Shamal, "Hussain Shabheed Suhrawardy in Pakistan’s Politics", p. 35.
35 Times of Karachi (Karachi), November 11, 1957.
2. Attempts to Revive Pakistan Muslim League

Another important but related concern of the ruling elite was the attempts to revive Muslim League in 1958. It was quite alarming for Mirza and Ayub in context of the approaching general elections. Ever since the establishment of Pakistan, Muslim League remained in power for seven years in all the four provinces as well as the center. The party enjoyed majority in the first Constituent Assembly as well as in all the Provincial Legislatures. Moreover, when Provincial Chief Ministers belonging to Muslim League were dismissed, such as Nawab Mamdot in the Punjab and Ayub Khurho in Sindh, they were replaced by Leaguers. It had won provincial elections in the Punjab, the NWFP and Sindh. Nevertheless, it had suffered humiliating defeat in East Pakistan elections in 1954, where United Front had routed it. It was followed by criticism on the party, party leaders and its policies.

Nevertheless, the party got an opportunity to form the government at the center. After the resignation of Awami League’s Ministry under Suhrawardy at the center in October 1957, Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar was invited to become the new Prime Minister. Chundrigar was the leader of PML Parliamentary Party and Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly. It is believed that he was a friend of Mirza, and owing to this trust-based relation, he was able to forge the PML-Republican alliance in order to form his government at the center. After remaining in office for a little less than two months, Chundrigar lost the support of the Republican partners, and he decided to step down in December 1957. The party was again pushed to the opposition benches.

In these circumstances, attempts were made to revive Muslim League. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, the President of PML, though being a towering figure, was unable to provide
effective leadership owing to his serious illness. Despite that, he could not be removed from the office as he commanded respect and following. Nevertheless, in January 1958, an unsuccessful attempt had been made at the meeting of PML Working Committee to appoint his successor. After three days, Nishtar died, and thus, the way to appoint a successor was open. In March 1958, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was unanimously elected President of PML by its Council. Upon assuming the office, he tried to infuse a new life and vigour in the party. He also tried to reorganize the Muslim League National Guards, and declared: “Let us put Muslim League machinery on a war footing. Let us battle against those who do not believe in the ideology of Pakistan. Let us march forward without national flag, united in thought and united in deed.” He also criticized the current state of affairs in the country and its governance patterns by pointing out that the Assemblies and Ministers had been made responsible to one individual. Naturally, he was pointing the finger towards President Mirza, who had concentrated power in his hands, and had been running a ‘one-man show’ in the country. In his public meetings, Abdul Qayyum Khan vehemently attacked the President and his Republican Party saying “President Mirza along with his fellow travellers is responsible for sabotaging the Muslim League and giving birth to the Republican Party, which thrives on political fraud.”

He also launched a campaign to remove Mirza from presidency. He leveled four charges against him: (a) Mirza was destroying the Muslim League despite the fact that he had been elected to the Constituent Assembly on PML ticket, and later he had been chosen the Provisional President of Pakistan on PML platform; (b) He had formed Republican Party, and was taking active part in politics; (c) He had enforced joint electorates, and thus, had

37 Dawn (Karachi), May 7, 1958.
38 Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, p. 75.
39 Pakistan Times (Lahore), March 31, 1958.
undermined the ideology of Pakistan; and (d) By skillful manipulation, he was serving his own ends by offering Premiership to weak political actors at the center and in the West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{40} Abdul Qayyum Khan argued that President Mirza had violated the trust of thousands by trying to undermine Muslim League, on whose ticket he had been elected. Trust is a very dear value, and its violation is considered condemnable. According to the democratic principles, Mirza had defected from the Muslim League, as he had established his own political party—the Republican Party. Moreover, being President, his role demanded to remain aloof from political activities. Qayyum Khan also deployed resources having symbolic and ideological underpinnings, and alleged that the President had tried to erode the ideological foundations of the country by implementing joint electorates. Thus, Abdul Qayyum Khan deployed a variety of resources to outmaneuver Mirza in the political competition for high political offices.

Nevertheless, Abdul Qayyum Khan’s fiery speeches at public meetings and his vehement attacks on President Mirza and Republicans contributed to his popularity. He was given a historic welcome in Gujrat when he visited the city while running the election campaign.\textsuperscript{41} His activities did cause some commotion in the stagnant life of the party, and his policy “did infuse a certain excitement into public meetings the party held in West Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{42} In his autobiography, Ayub Khan had blamed Abdul Qayyum Khan for the imposition of Martial Law. He writes that he had even started making contacts with certain military elite in order to isolate them from the rest by spreading rumours.\textsuperscript{43} Military elite resented Qayyum Khan’s alleged attempts at persuading some military elite,

\textsuperscript{40} Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, Vol. 1, pp. 216-7.
\textsuperscript{42} Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan, Vol. 1, p. 217.
\textsuperscript{43} Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 57.
thereby undermining the institutional solidarity of the Armed Forces. These reasons contributed to the public face of the decision of taking over the country.

3. Punjabi-Bengali Alliance and Threat to Mirza’s Presidency

The Punjabi Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon, who belonged to Republican Party, and was a nominee of Mirza, used his Punjabi ethnic card to muster the support of other Punjabi politicians against the President. In addition, President Mirza suspected Noon to have forged an alliance with Suhrawardy of Awami League, which means an alliance between the major groups of East and West Pakistan. It was believed that Suhrawardy had assured Noon that after general elections in February 1959, the former would support latter’s candidacy for presidency.\(^{44}\) By doing so, in fact, Suhrawardy was making efforts to forge alliance between Awami League and Punjabi Groups; in other words, between the East and West Pakistan. This possible alliance between the politicians of two wings of the country threatened Mirza’s position.

Moreover, by that time, almost all civilian elite were convinced that Mirza’s removal was necessary for political stability. In fact, nobody wanted Mirza as President. Suhrawardy could use the widespread feelings against President Mirza as a resource in his election campaign, which might facilitate him in winning the forth-coming elections as well. Thus, it was feared that he could make the issue of the removal of the President a ‘public issue’ in order to reach a high political office, as Suhrawardy might become the next Prime Minister, and Noon might succeed him as the President. Thus, it was evident to Mirza that he would not be re-elected as the President.\(^{45}\)

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\(^{44}\) Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, p. 107

\(^{45}\) Ibid., p. 108.
Mirza’s policy towards the civilian elite was that of ‘divide and rule’, whereby he played one against the other and thus ensured so that they did not jointly access all the resources available in the polity or the international environment to their advantage.

4. Attempts to Curtail the Powers of the Army

Another important pragmatic reason for the bureaucratic-military coup of 1958 was that the Prime Minister Noon wanted to curtail the powers of the army. In fact, in the East Pakistan, smuggling had become widespread, which had created food shortage. Before his resignation, Noon’s predecessor, Prime Minister Chundrigar, had promulgated in December 1957 the Prevention of Smuggling (Special Powers) Ordinance, which empowered the army to undertake a military operation to check smuggling. When Noon succeeded Chundrigar in December 1957, it proved quite difficult and embarrassing for Noon’s Government to reverse the Ordinance. It shows that once a resource is created, it is difficult to revoke it.

The Pakistan Army along with Naval and Air Forces launched a successful anti-smuggling operation in the East Pakistan under Major-General Umrao Khan, General-Officer-Commanding (G.O.C.), East Pakistan. On December 31, 1957, the Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon along with some of his cabinet members toured the border areas of Lalmanir Hat, Sylhet and Comilla to see the operation as well as the response of the masses about it. He was warmly received by crowds of people, who were happy over army’s performance. Fazal Muqueem argues that Noon’s Cabinet members and the supporters of Awami League persuaded him to curtail the powers of the army, as the successful anti-smuggling operation had considerably enhanced the prestige of the army.

in the eyes of the public. Thereupon, the GOC sent a message to the C-in-C, but being on holiday, President Mirza showed Ayub Khan the message. Soon it leaked out to the press, and henceforth, to the public. On January 9, 1958, Noon’s Government withdrew the Ordinance. This attempt created a friction between Noon and the bureaucratic-military elite.

5. Assertion of the Power of the President

In his autobiography, Ayub Khan has portrayed Iskander Mirza as solely responsible for the military take over. However, there is conclusive evidence that they both were in league. Mirza had been in consultation with Ayub Khan, and it seems that Mirza had taken the decision of imposing Martial Law at least a week before the imposition, but they did it in a clandestine manner, taking into confidence the likeminded military elite, who were part of the whole plan.

It is significant to recall that the Martial Law imposed in Lahore in April 1953 in the wake of Anti-Ahmadyya Movement, which was the first aid of its kind to the civilian authorities, is considered to be a ‘rehearsal’ for frequent army interventions in political sphere. As for the decision to impose the Martial Law was concerned, it was largely impelled by the civil service. Jahan Dad Khan informs that Iskander Mirza, the then Secretary Defense, was sent to Lahore by Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin, in order to handle the situation. It was Mirza, who after consultation with General Azam Khan (GOC

48 Ibid., pp. 176-7.
49 Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, pp. 73, 82.
50 Hussain, Ayub, Bhutto and Zia, p. 45.
51 These included, among others, three officers of the General Staff, Brigadiers Yahya Khan, Abdul Hamid Khan and Sher Bahadar.
52 Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 32.
10 Division) recommended the imposition of Martial Law. The Martial Law of 1958 was also imposed by President Iskander Mirza, when he was on "the pinnacle of power" where he had reached through a "combination of brilliance and intrigue."  

Mirza had ousted the ailing Governor General Ghulam Muhammad to become the Governor General in August-September 1955. Later, Mirza was elected as the first President of Pakistan under the 1956 Constitution, which enshrined a parliamentary form of government. Prime Minister Chaudhary Muhammad Ali had played an instrumental role in framing the Constitution. Under the 1956 Constitution, the President was not only to be elected by the National and two Provincial Assemblies, he was to rule through a Prime Minister. Mirza, after assuming presidency under the Constitution, was not quite satisfied with his powers, whereby the chief executive was the Prime Minister, and most of the powers were vested in him.  

6. Assertion of the Hegemony of the Military Elite  

In October 1954, Ayub Khan claimed that he had been offered to take over the affairs of the country by Governor General but he refused to do so. The normative reason for this that he firmly believed in political neutrality of the armed forces. At that time, it was necessary to have a civilian regime, which could negotiate defense pacts with the American government for fear of disapproval of the pacts by the masses in general.  

Altal Gauhar, a close associate of Ayub, writes that Ayub's refusal to take over when invited by Ghulam Muhammad was a sort of strategy, "One should accept his statement  

53 Khan, Pakistan—Leadership Challenges, p. 34.  
55 Khan, Pakistan—Leadership Challenges, p. 37.  
56 Pakistan Times (Lahore), October 9, 1954.  
that he declined the invitation because he hoped that patriotic politicians might yet come to rescue the country; another reason could be that Ayub, unsure of public reaction, waited for the right moment to strike."\textsuperscript{58} However, the right moment arrived four years later, when Ayub took over in October 1958.

Three officers of the General Staff, Brigadiers Yahya Khan, Abdul Hamid Khan and Sher Bahadur had participated in the preparation of ‘Operation Overlord’, which was skilfully prepared by them. All paramilitary organizations including the National Guards of PML were banned. As a result, the PML supporters staged massive protests in the capital Karachi. These demonstrations provided the government the opportunity to complete the necessary arrangements and preparations for the final military take-over.\textsuperscript{59} It clearly shows that the military elite were in league with Mirza long before the coup, and Ayub and Mirza were jointly responsible for it. Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan, a close associate of Ayub, has tried to acquit him of the charge. He writes that when Mirza called Ayub Khan to Karachi on October 5, 1958 and informed him about his decision not to hold elections, Ayub Khan replied: “it is unfortunate, but if the situation is desperate and action is required to save the country, then go ahead.”\textsuperscript{60} By this assertion, it seems that Ayub was informed of the coup only two days before it. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that Ayub knew it; rather he was part of the whole scheme.

Major-General Fazal Miqueem writes that the Chief of the General Staff (C. G. S.) received the orders from the C-in-C, Ayub Khan to prepare a plan to take over the country by imposition of Martial Law. He prepared a broad tactical outline, which Ayub

\textsuperscript{58} Hussain, Ayub, Bhutto and Zia, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{59} Aftab, Pakistan: History and Politics, p. 217.

\textsuperscript{60} Khan, Pakistan—Leadership Challenges, p. 37.
Khan approved on September 30. On October 3, the C. G. S. came to Karachi and set up his nucleus headquarters in the Military Transit Camp. Moreover, Muqeeem informs that it was left to the C-in-C Ayub Khan to decide the day on which the operation had have to be undertaken.\(^{61}\)

Ayub writes in his autobiography that very little preparation was made for the so-called ‘revolution,’ which was "handled as a military operation". For precaution, an extra Brigade from Quetta to Jungshahi outside Karachi had been moved. All the Commanders-in-Chief and local Commanders were given instructions.\(^{62}\)

Ayub did not conceal his contempt for politicians and civilian elite, whom he considered responsible for the chaotic conditions in the country. As pointed out earlier, Ayub was convinced that civilian elite would bring only disaster to the country. In addition, he also believed that democracy was not a suitable system for Pakistan, at least for some time. His disapproval for parliamentary form of government is evident from a number of statements. For instance, he wrote in his diary in May 1958:

> It seems that we shall have to have a system of government for a generation or so which prepares the country for democracy and solves some of our major problems. Under the present Constitution no one seems to have any power except to destroy discipline and to do harm.\(^{63}\)

It is important to note that in June 1958, a few months before the coup, Ayub’s tenure of C-in-C was extended for another two years. The then Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon sent a telegram to Ayub congratulating him on it. Noon stated that “Pakistan at this

\(^{61}\) Khan, *The Story of Pakistan Army*, p. 194.


juncture cannot afford to lose your services and I am confident that the defences of his country are safe in your hands as they have been in the past."

Use of International Resources

It is significant to note that in closing months of the democratic government in Pakistan, the country had become close to the US. The pro-US tilt in Pakistan's foreign policy is clearly evident from the statement issued by the National Security Council in America, which declared that the "Government of Pakistan, has developed policies essentially pro-West in outlook and generally pro-United States in implementation." Moreover, the interference of the US had considerably increased in internal affairs of the country. Even the meetings of the Federal Cabinet were attended by the American Ambassador Hildreth, who was dubbed as the real Prime Minister of Pakistan. A civilian elite from East Pakistan, Ataur Rahman alleged the government on August 8, 1958: "American representatives are putting their hands in our affairs...[and]...the central government is tolerating such interference."

Many civilian elite were critical of pro-West foreign policy of Pakistan. Even they started demanding a radical shift in foreign policy of the country, as reflected in the National Assembly debates. The civilian elite made it a popular slogan, and had even started making contacts with the anti-West leaders of the Muslim world. For instance, the NAP Chief Abdul Hamid Bhashani met President Nasser in Cairo in 1958, which was resented.

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64 Ibid., p. 62.
by President Mirza. In these circumstances, elections might result in the ascendency of the civilian elite, who were demanding a revision in the foreign policy. Therefore, in order to ensure the continuity of pro-Western tilt of Pakistan's foreign policy, elections had been delayed by the military and bureaucratic elite time and again.

Since the bureaucratic-military elite had a proclaimed pro-West, and particularly, pro-US tilt, it was pragmatic for the civilian elite to approach the anti-West and anti-US international resources, such as the Muslim world and the Communist bloc.

Jalal informs that the decision to take over was communicated to the US between May and September 1958, and both Mirza and Ayub Khan had informed the American establishment that only dictatorship suited in Pakistan. Nonetheless, the final decision to proclaim Martial law was communicated to the US Ambassador Langley on October 4, when President Mirza told him that Martial Law would be proclaimed within a week. It is worthy of mention that the American establishment desired the Martial Law to be proclaimed by a non-military elite, and for this reason, President Mirza and not the C-in-C of the Armed Forces declared it. The American wanted democracy to be terminated at the hands of a 'civilian', in order to exonerate the military elite from the blame of imposing Martial Law, as it might tarnish the image of the institution.

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60 Embassy Karachi telegram to State Department, October 4, 1958 as cited in Kux, The United States and Pakistan, p. 99.
61 For details see Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, p. 275.
**Competition among Rival Elite: Mirza vs. Ayub**

Two weeks later, on the night of Oct 27, 1958 Ayub Khan demanded resignation from Iskander Mirza, who had no choice but to submit. Thus, the “confusion of authority in the dual executive was then terminated with the formal abolition of the office of prime minister.”\(^2\) Thereafter, the office of the Prime Minister was abolished,\(^3\) and Ayub Khan proclaimed himself the President of Pakistan. In place of Ayub Khan, General Mohammad Musa was appointed as the C-in-C of the Armed Forces.\(^4\)

In the wake of declaration of Martial Law, the relations between Mirza and Ayub progressively got strained, and the element of trust withered away. Ayub wanted to assert himself instead of becoming a mere puppet in the hands of the President, whereas Mirza was not ready to share power and authority with Ayub—the C-in-C. According to K.M. Arif, President Mirza had already planned to remove Ayub Khan within three months of the imposition of Martial Law in October 1958.\(^5\) However, events hastened the fall of Mirza himself.

Mirza planned with some senior army officers, including Air Commodore Rabb, for removing Ayub Khan.\(^6\) K. M. Arif, an insider, reports that Mirza wanted to oust Ayub

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\(^4\) On the same day, the Supreme Court of Pakistan had already given its judgment in favour of the regime. In the light of the doctrine of the law of necessity, the action of the President was accepted by the Supreme Court in Dossa Case. The Court held that "a victorious revolution was an internationally recognized legal method of changing a Constitution and that after a change of that character has taken place the National Legal Order must, for its validity, depend upon the new law-creating organ." Dossa and another v. the State and Others, *All Pakistan Legal Decisions* (PLD), 1958, SC 533.


\(^6\) Khan, *Pakistan—Leadership Challenges*, p. 38.
and bring in Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash\(^{77}\) as the Prime Minister.\(^{78}\) When Ayub confronted Mirza, he denied it altogether. It is significant to note that Qizilbash was a Punjabi Shia. Though a Bengali, Mirza was associated with the Punjabi group, and was a Shia too. They both shared their ethnic and sectarian identities, which bound them in a relationship of trust. The need for a trustworthy associate increases particularly in situation when a political actor conspires to get a pragmatic gain.

Ayub Khan himself writes in his autobiography that soon after the imposition of Martial Law, Ayub asked Mirza to put down in writing that the former would administer the Martial Law, though the same had been verbally stated and announced by the latter in his proclamation of October 7. Despite that, Mirza was not keen to give the letter of authority to Ayub Khan. "He hummed and hawed but finally agreed to give me the letter after two or three days."\(^{79}\)

When Ayub Khan visited East Pakistan after few days, where he was warmly welcomed by the public at large, Mirza got apprehensive of the popular support Ayub enjoyed. Ayub also warned Mirza of any intrigue. In order to pre-empt his own ouster, Mirza soon gave orders to arrest three Generals, but the orders were not carried out. Ayub writes that he was urged to do away with the President Mirza, as after the imposition of Martial Law, his office had become redundant. Nonetheless, Ayub was reluctant. He writes: "We had been good friends. I told myself that unless he did anything overtly wrong, it would be disloyal on my part to act against him." But few days later, the Army officers approached

\(^{77}\) Qizilbash of Republican Party had served in the Central Cabinet of Prime Minister I. I. Chundrigar (Oct-Dec 1957) and Firoz Khan Noon (Dec 1957-Mar 1958), and then as Chief Minister West Pakistan (Mar-Jul 1958).

\(^{78}\) Arif, Working With Zia, p. 19. Arif reports that Muhammad Ayub Khuzro had told this to General Zia in the presence of the author in August 1977.

\(^{79}\) Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 71.
Ayub Khan and told him that Mirza had become unbearable for them, as he had been inciting people against Ayub Khan. Finding Ayub Khan still reluctant to act, they said: "Your difficulty seems to be that you don't want to go and tell a friend that he is being thoroughly disloyal. But this is something bigger than your personal friendship and we sincerely advise you, we beg of you, to understand that we cannot carry him with us any longer." The situation can be termed as a dilemma of trust between two individuals having interlocking relationship at the personal level. However, the group pressure compelled Ayub Khan to oust Mirza. For this maneuver he used the public face of legal-rational principles governing modern institutions and working for the public good.

Thereupon, on the night between 27 and 28 October, Ayub Khan sent three Lt. Generals—Burki, Azam, and Khalid Sheikh—to the President Mirza to ask him to resign. A typed resignation letter had already been prepared. Mirza resisted the move, but General Azam 'pulled his pistol', upon which Mirza—the President—had to sign his resignation after consultation with his wife, Nahid Mirza. Thus, by doing so, Ayub, in fact, pre-empted his own ouster from power. After outmaneuvering the civilian elite to play a role in the political competition, the rival elite themselves fell out with each other. President Mirza tried to out weigh Ayub Khan, but maneuvers of the former were effectively countered by the latter. In this competition between two rival elite, Ayub Khan being a military elite had more resources in the form of institutional support from the army as well as possession of coercive instruments. On the contrary, Mirza was no more available with political resources such as military elite, who had stood by his side hitherto. Now the resource of the support from the military elite had become a constraint for Mirza. In addition, he had lost his public face as his public image had been tarnished.

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80 Ibid., pp. 73-5.
81 Khan, Pakistan—Leadership Challenges, p. 38.
Nonetheless, he had enjoyed personal friendship with diplomats. Major-General Cawthorn, Australian High Commissioner, was an old of friend of Mirza. He was apprehensive about his fate after ouster from power, but he was assured by Ayub Khan that Mirza was not a treated like a 'prisoner'.

Mirza's son, Humayun, records that after Ayub Khan had taken over by ousting Iskander Mirza, he ordered the latter's personal papers and diaries to be confiscated and burned. Both Mirza and Ayub had enjoyed a relationship of profound trust, but after their breakup, it was a pragmatic move of the latter to eliminate all evidence of their past and future actions and plans.

Regarding the causal explanations of Mirza's ouster, Humayun Mirza points out that many people in Pakistan believed that if Iskander Mirza had not married Nahid Afghamy, he would not have lost his presidency to Ayub Khan, a military dictator. Nahid Afghamy was the wife of an Iranian military attaché in Pakistan. In the words of Humayun, his father's liaison with the wife of a foreign diplomat violated the code of conduct of the armed forces which he himself had established and vigorously enforced when he was Pakistan's powerful Secretary of Defence. He thus lost the respect of the younger officers and indeed that of the rank and file of the armed forces. General Ayub capitalized on this to engineer the military coup d'état against Pakistan's first civilian president.

It establishes that any resource may be an asset in a given situation, but may transform into a constraint for an actor. Marriage is generally considered an asset, as in case of Humayun Mirza’s marriage with the daughter of the US Ambassador, Hildreth, but it

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82 Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 75
83 Minza, From Plassy to Pakistan, p. xiv.
84 Ibid., pp. xv-xvi. It is important to note that Humayun’s mother was not Nahid but Rifaat Begum, the first wife of Iskander Mirza. Mirza had married Nahid in 1953. Rifaat was not divorced afterwards, she died in 1967. For details see chapter on Nahid Khanum in M. B. Khalid, Aiwan-i-Sadr meja Sala Sala, Lahore: Deed Shuneed Publications, 1988, pp. 104-11.
became a constraint in case of Iskander Mirza, which adversely affected his military resources.

**Pragmatic Gains of Mirza’s Ouster and Ayub’s Take-over**

Ayub Khan got a host of pragmatic gains from Mirza’s ouster and his assumption of power. After the exit of Iskander Mirza, the way was clear for Ayub Khan to assume the office of president. Assumption of presidency was an imperative as it provided a public face to Ayub Khan, though he had a more powerful position of a CMLA by virtue of being the C-in-C. Thus, he had concentrated three roles in him. Wheeler writes: “Ministers thereafter were appointed to advise the President in the discharge of his functions and were responsible solely to him. This arrangement was roughly comparable to the position of the viceroy and his council before 1946, although the latter always had to deal with a legislature while the martial-law regime did not.”

The following were the pragmatic gains of Ayub Khan’s take-over:

1. Consolidation of Military Elite at the expense of Civilian Elite

Ayub Khan soon dismissed Aziz Ahmad, the civilian Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, and he was replaced by three Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force as Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators. These included General Muhammad Musa, Vice-Admiral H.M. Siddique Choudhury and Air Vice-Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan respectively. It is important to recall that all these members of the military elite had participated in the ‘Operation Overlord’, which ousted President Mirza from power.

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86 Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan*, Vol. II, p. 2. These three military elite exercised considerable influence in decision-making. The entire country was divided into three zones for administrative purposes by the Martial Law administration. Zone A (Karachi Federal Area excluding Malir) was under the charge of Maj. Gen. Sher Bahadur, Zone B (West Pakistan excluding Zone A) was under Lt.-Gen. Azam Khan, and Zone C (East Pakistan) was put under Maj.-Gen. Umroo Khan.
Therefore, in reward of their services, they were given influential positions in administrative sphere.

There were more than 272 military officers in various departments of the civil administration.87 Between October 1958 and March 1959, many senior officers in the forces were promoted. In 1959, Ayub Khan declared himself Field Marshal and Supreme Commander of the Forces, whereas 8 top level promotions were made in the Air Force and Navy.88 The military expanded its role in industrial projects as well, such as Fauji Foundation was established in 1953 for the welfare of ex-servicemen. By 1970, the Foundation had tremendously expanded its industrial and corporate concerns.

In addition, the Ayub regime sought to broaden the base of the Pakistan Army by effecting some changes in its ethnic composition. In 1959, the government altered the physical standards for recruitment in the army in order to allow more Bengalis to join military services.89 In this way, the military elite tried to win support for the Pakistan Army in East Bengal through economic dispensation.

In the words of Laporte, "In effect, Ayub formalized the 'garrison state' nature of the Pakistani system. He made manifest what had already been implicit during the 1950s—the dominant roles of the military and civilian bureaucracies in Pakistan."90 Previously, the military elite had played a covert role, without taking over in formal sense. The bureaucratic-military coup of 1958 was in fact the culmination of a process initiated long.

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88 Shafqat, Civil-Military, p. 33.
89 The standard for height, i.e. 5 feet 6 inches was reduced to 5 feet and 4 inches. However, no tangible efforts were made by the government to follow it up. Ahmed, *Bureaucratic Elites in Segmented Economic Growth*, p. 88n.
90 Laporte, *Power and Privilege*, p. 64.
before the coup. It nevertheless set the precedent for direct military interventions in politics in future.

2. Curtailment of Civilian Elite

Ayub being in saddle had now the power to change the rules of the political conduct and political competition. "This change of regime meant defining new rules, and shifting emphasis on the relationship of various structural components. The military ventured to alter the balance of power, both at the ruling coalition and structural level." On one hand, the military elite tried to curtail the power of the civilian elite, whom they despised and distrusted. On the other hand, they sought to enhance the powers of the military and bureaucratic elite, though the excessive powers of the latter were too curbed.

Ayub Khan adopted various strategies and tactics to curb the power of the civilian elite ranging from coercion to intimidations. A large number of civilian elite were arrested and were tried under security laws or Martial Law Regulations (MLRs). The national and provincial leaders of National Awami Part (NAP) were detained. Their detention was a pragmatic decision of the regime since they posed a threat to it. The leaders of NAP were charged with subversive and anti-state activities. These charges provided a public face to the regime. In addition, all political parties were banned by the regime in July 1962 under the Political Parties Act of 1962. On Jan 7, 1963 an Ordinance was issued by the

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91 Shafqat, Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy, p. 29.
92 These included Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani and Major Muhammad Ishaq of central NAP, Prince Abdul Karim, Muhammad Husain Unq and Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai of Balochistan NAP, G. M. Syed, Ishaq Kashmiri and Aziz Ahmad of Sind and Karachi NAPs, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Abdul Wali Khan and Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil of Frontier NAP, and C.R. Aslam of the Punjab NAP. Those of other parties such as the Republican Party were tried on charges of corruption and misuse of powers, whereas leaders of Awami League and Krishak Sramik Party faced charges of corruption. Aziz, Political Parties in Pakistan, Vol. II, pp. 112.
President, which amended the Political Parties Act, 1962 in order to redefine a political party. It broadened the scope of the law since a political party was defined as "a group or combination of persons who are operating for the purpose of propagating any political opinion or indulging in any other political activity."\(^{94}\) Banning of political parties was a new legal resource created by Ayub Khan in order to deprive the civilian elite of an important resource—their political parties.

Like PRODA, Ayub Khan promulgated the Public Offices (Disqualification) Order, 1959 (PODO), whereby the civilian elite who had held any public office could be tried on charges of ‘misconduct.’ Those found guilty could be disqualified from holding public office for a period not exceeding 15 years.\(^{95}\) Since it was restrictive in scope, it was replaced by Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959 (EBDO),\(^{96}\) which was promulgated on August 7, 1959 in order to serve the purposes of the regime. It was more extensive in scope as compared to PODO. One Central Public (Misconduct) Inquiry Committee, and two provincial inquiry committees were set up, which were dominated by the bureaucrats. Similarly, three tribunals, comprising of judges, bureaucratic and military elite, were also set up.\(^{97}\) Those found guilty under EBDO were disqualified from the membership of any elective body until Dec 31, 1966. This regulatory law adversely affected 6000 to 7000 civilian elite.\(^{98}\) Both PODO and EBDO, which were legal resources, served as coercive instruments, which were at the disposal of the military elite.

\(^{94}\) Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary), Jan 7, 1963.
\(^{95}\) Public Offices (Disqualification) Order, 1959.
\(^{96}\) Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959.
\(^{98}\) Shafqat, Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy, p. 30.
3. Limiting the Powers of Bureaucratic Elite

Rizvi argues that the institutions of military and bureaucracy develop as ‘marriage of convenience’ as they need each other. Since the military lacks expertise and skilled personnel required to run the administration, it makes a compromise with the bureaucracy, and relies on its support for this purpose. On the other hand, the bureaucracy accommodates itself quickly, since it cannot be critical to the regime and its policies.99 The bureaucracy and military had developed a rapport since early 1950s, as the members of both institutions shared their views regarding the civilian elite, the powers of whom they both tried to curtail as well. Nonetheless, once the military elite were in power, the relationship between the military and bureaucratic elite underwent a shift. The role of bureaucracy during Ayub’s regime was that of “effective neutrality”, and though bureaucracy had worked out its relationship with the government, “it was not a personal, individualized arrangement but an institutional one.”100

Bureaucracy acted as a junior partner throughout the military regime. Decision-making power at the top level was shared by some bureaucratic elite with the military elite. Apparently, from the very beginning, the bureaucratic elite seemed to have attained an influential position; nonetheless, the real power was not in the hands of the bureaucratic elite, as the military elite served as the ‘brain’ and the former as the ‘hands’ of the new regime.101 The bureaucratic elite played a key role in the functioning of the Basic Democracy System, in which they enjoyed considerable powers at local level.102

100 Laporte, Power and Privilege, p. 72.
101 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 78.
102 For details of the role and powers of the bureaucrats under the Basic Democracy System, see Chowdhury, Pakistan— Its Politics and Bureaucracy, pp. 198-207.
The regime “socialized the bureaucracy to descend from coequal to collateral relationship.” It also tried to limit the powers of the bureaucratic elite. In a bid to do so, 31 civil servants were dismissed from civil services, foreign services and police services on charges of corruption and inefficiency. 1662 bureaucrats of central and provincial services were also removed. All this was done while keeping intact a public face, as the regime sought to enforce bureaucratic efficiency for the purpose of economic development of the country. These measures were meant to redefine the relationship between the military and bureaucracy. Shafqat has aptly remarked: “By 1968, the regime had changed its relationship with the bureaucracy from one that was supported by the military to one that was controlled by the military.”

However, the powers of the bureaucratic elite were not easy to be curtailed. For instance, in August 1959, the military regime appointed a Pay and Service Commission under the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, A. R. Cornelius, but the recommendations of the Commission’s report could never be implemented as Ayub Khan was convinced by some senior bureaucratic elite not to implement them. It has suggested “a thorough overhaul of the bureaucratic system inherited from the British” and called for drastic cut in the privileges of the bureaucracy.

In the changed circumstances, the bureaucratic elite sought to realign themselves. They responded to the challenge using the ‘mixed tactics of appeasement and resistance’. The

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103 Shafqat, Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy, p. 31.
104 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, p. 85. See Table IX for details (The officials against whom punitive action was taken).
105 Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations, p. 37.
106 A. R. Cornelius had joined the Indian Civil Service in 1926. Later, he was transferred to the judicial service.
108 Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, p. 55. Interestingly, the report of the commission was not made public by the government.
bureaucracy allowed the entry of 5 military officers to civil services in 1960. Till 1963, eight out of the fourteen military officers, who joined civil services, had close ties with the military elite.\(^\text{109}\) Two important bureaucratic elite Aziz Ahmad and Fida Hasan remained Deputy CMLA and Deputy MLA of West Pakistan respectively. The regime had a civilian advisory council of CMLA and advisory committees of the provincial governors.\(^\text{110}\) The share of the bureaucratic elite can be assessed from the fact that when the first 11-member Cabinet was appointed by Ayub Khan, it had three military elite (Lieutenant-Generals) and an equal number of bureaucratic elite.\(^\text{111}\) In addition, the civilians also actively participated in the deliberations of thirty-three major inquiry commissions instituted by the regime. 280 members of these commissions included government officials, non-official experts, or leading citizens.\(^\text{112}\) The dominance of the bureaucratic elite in these commissions can be assessed from the fact that almost 60% membership of these commissions was drawn from the bureaucracy, and 52% of them were members of the elite CSP cadre.\(^\text{113}\) Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the inquiry committees set up to try the civilian elite under PODO and EBDO were comprised of bureaucratic elite. Therefore, the military elite tried to limit the powers of the bureaucratic elite, but used them selectively as well to serve the purposes of the regime.

\(^{109}\) Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations, p. 38.
\(^{110}\) For instance, the Advisory Committee in West Pakistan, which acted as a Cabinet, consisted of three eminent bureaucrats: Fida Hasan, A. H. Qureshi and M. M. Ahmad, who were appointed Chief Secretary, Additional Chief Secretary and Finance Secretary respectively.
\(^{111}\) For details see Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era, pp. 2-3.
\(^{112}\) Brahant, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, p. 319.
\(^{113}\) Ibid., p. 313. Only four commissions were chaired by military personnel and one by a politician I. I. Chundrigar. The rest were chaired by the civil servants. For details see ibid., Table 9 following p. 310, and pp. 310-29.

Ayub Khan was convinced that democracy did not suit the genius of the people of Pakistan. That is why, he had introduced a diluted version of democracy, which he referred to as ‘controlled democracy’ or ‘Islamic democracy.’ Nonetheless, he used the idiom of democracy and Islam in order to provide a public face to a centralized and authoritarian political order he envisaged. In fact, it had been a desired course of action for Ayub for long.

Now being the C-in-C, the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator in one, he had the authority to translate his ‘ideals’ into practice. In 1959, Ayub Khan introduced the scheme of Basic Democracies (BD). The Dec 1959 and Nov-Dec 1964 elections of 80,000 and 1,20,000 basic democrats respectively were contested on non-party basis. These BD members were to become the part of four-tiered structure of a local government. In February 1960, the 80,000 BD members were elected, 40,000 from each province. It was aimed at altering the traditional power structure in the country, particularly at the grassroots level. These BD members formed an electoral college, which was to elect the President. Thus, the President was indirectly elected on the basis of limited franchise through a referendum in Feb 1960. It was a pragmatic strategy of

117 It is significant to note that these BD members were asked: “Have you confidence in the President Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, Hilal-i-Pakistan, Hilal-i-Jurat?” 95.6% voted for Ayub Khan, who was sworn in as the ‘first elected President of Pakistan.’ Yousuf, Pakistan, p. 73.
Ayub Khan to be ‘elected’ as president through referendum in order to provide a public face of popular legitimacy to the regime.

Various groups of elite play out their differences in a number of spheres involving decision-making. Constitution is one such arena where these political conflicts and contests are visibly played out. Constitution-making process is not a juridical task alone—it has tremendous political underpinnings as well. It not only outlines the principles or ideals, which are to be realized through governance in a country, it also enshrines a legal code that lays down the rules of political conduct of the actors involved in political competition. President Ayub Khan introduced a new Constitution in 1962, which envisaged a strong Presidential system. His belief in the Presidential system can be assessed from his views, which he expressed as early as October 1954:

The President should be made the final custodian of power on the country’s behalf and should be able to put things right both in the provinces and the center should they go wrong. Laws should be operative only if certified by the President.... No change in constitution should be made unless agreed to by the President. 118

Under the Constitution, the executive authority was vested in the president. He had the power to appoint important office-bearers, e.g. the central ministers, governors of the two provinces, and Judges of the Supreme Court and the two High Courts. In addition, he could appoint chairmen and members of the Election Commission, Federal Public Service Commission, Advisory Council on Islamic Ideology, National Finance Commission, and National Economic Council. Moreover, the President was the Supreme Commander of...

the Defense Services, and thus, empowered to appoint chief commanders of the Defense Services.\footnote{119}

Under the 1962 Constitution, another significant provision was that besides being the head of the executive authority, the President was an integral part of the legislature as well. He could summon and prorogue the National Assembly. It was a gross violation of the principle of separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. In case of emergency, the President was to assume more powers of legislation. In view of a critic, the Constitution of 1962 bore more similarity with the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 than with the Constitution of 1956 or any other constitutional report prepared ever since 1947.\footnote{120} Ayub Khan concentrated all powers in his hands by introducing a ‘quasi-constitutional civil regime,’\footnote{121} as it provided a public face to his policies and decisions. Ayub himself declared: “The new Constitution—a pragmatic rather than a dogmatic scheme—is designed to fulfill this objective of inducing a sane and balanced political life in the country.”\footnote{122}

To sum up, the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 was justified on the ground of its ‘unworkability’ by the very President, who had given its assent to it and had vowed to protect it. The Constitution was abrogated and Martial Law was proclaimed seemingly on the initiative of the bureaucrat-turned-civilian elite, with the C-in-C as the CMLA. It can be inferred that the pragmatic gain of the coup went in favour of the military elite, and not the President, who had proclaimed it. By Ayub Khan’s assumption of the position of

\footnote{120} Afzal, \textit{Political Parties in Pakistan}, Vol. II, p. 27.
\footnote{122} \textit{My Manifesto}, published broadcast by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, March 21, 1962, Karachi: Government of Pakistan, p. 3.
CMLA, the role of the military elite becomes overt in the polity, which had hitherto remained covert.

There was yet another contest to take place, and this was among the rival elite—the bureaucratic and military elite. The occasion was the distribution of the spoils of the defeat of the civilian elite: who would wield and exercise more power, the President or the CMLA? In this contest for power, the military elite emerged victorious, as Ayub Khan, being the C-in-C and CMLA, had more resources, including the coercive instruments, at his disposal than Mirza. On the contrary, Mirza had exhausted almost all his resources like the support of the civilian elite and the trust of the military elite. Mirza's resources had dwindled in that the civilian elite had been defeated; in fact, he himself had dismissed the ministry of Republicans under Prime Minister Noon, thereby losing all support of the civilian elite. Also Mirza's attempt to use the Navy against the army was an inapt decision, which undermined the trust between Ayub and Mirza, who had otherwise been longtime friends. After erosion of trust between the two, the quasi-civilian façade, which was retained for years, was now overthrown, followed by complete take-over of military elite. While retaining a public face, Ayub Khan ousted President Mirza arguing that, under the new arrangement, the position of a 'non-military' president had become redundant. After assuming power, Ayub Khan resorted to enhancing the same legal resources, against both the civilian and the bureaucratic elite, that had been once used by the bureaucratic elite against the civilian elite.
Summary and Conclusion

At its inception, Pakistan inherited the British system of responsible government wherein the power of the executive is subject to limitations, enforced at the behest of public opinion, organized into political parties and deriving authority through parliament from the electorate. However, in practice democratic institutions did not work in Pakistan the way they had been envisaged. The first Prime Minister was assassinated, while the second one was dismissed. The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved and the second one produced the first Constitution in 1956, only to be dissolved along with abrogation of the Constitution in 1958. After five years of Martial Law, a second Constitution was promulgated in 1962, but again to be abrogated by another Martial Law in 1969. In 1971, the country suffered dismemberment, with the East Pakistani emerging as a new country under the name of Bangladesh. The third Constitution produced in 1973 underwent drastic amendments at the hands of its framer and then under Martial Law of 1977. The heavily changed Constitution was revived, at the end of 1985, by the person who had ruled as the Chief Martial Law Administrator for about eight years, then affected his self-selection as President in a dubious referendum just before 1985. Partyless elections brought a civilianized government into office. It, nevertheless, dared to assert to run the government as nearly as possible on the British parliamentary lines, with Prime Minister wielding the powers of the Chief Executive. Such assertive government was done away with in 1988 by dissolving the National Assembly. Then onward, elected legislatures and governments were disbanded in 1990, 1993, 1997 and 1999, all by military or military-backed persons.
from bureaucracy. Indeed, the political history of Pakistan has been one of political instability resulting in ministerial changes, premature demise of democratically elected legislatures at the hands of President/Executive, supplantment of civilian governments by military regimes, writing of three full-fledged Constitutions and several Provisional Constitutional Orders (PCOs) and Legal Framework Orders (LFOs), not to speak of amendments, ordinances and announcements having the effect of changing one set of rules of political conduct with another set.

Most of the literature produced to understand Pakistan’s politics has emphasized the crucial role of civilian politicians, the bureaucracy and the military. Noting the crucial role of the three groups in the country’s political processes, the political history of Pakistan has been characterized as the history of its elite. This study reiterates the relevance of the elite perspective in understanding Pakistan’s politics, but contends that elite theory needs to be amplified in certain important aspects and contextualized for its use in studying Pakistan’s politics. Reviewing the elite theory, whether classical authors like Mosca, Pareto and Michels, or neo-classical ones like Lasswell, Burnham, Mills, Dahl or Domhoff, this study observes the centrality of the elite concept itself, the nature and exercise of power in society and reference to political resources. Taking all these as important for our framework in the elite perspective, we argue that there is need to sharpen these concepts and contextualize them for better understanding of Pakistan’s politics.

We use the concept of elite to mean the performance of a role—the political role of making significant and authoritative decisions for the society as a whole, the role being performed according to certain norms or public face of politics. We differentiate between
political elite and other categories of elite such as civilian, bureaucratic and military elite. Political elite is a role concerned with authoritative decision-making for society as a whole, whereas civilian, bureaucratic and military elite denote a background from which they may emerge and occupy the political role. The study further argues that for proper understanding of politics we need to take into account pragmatics / strategies deployed by the elite in the mobilization and usage of diverse resources including the manipulation of formal-legal rules and cultural norms in political competition for desired course of action.

As compared to the state of elite theory in general, we add the concept of pragmatics, the apt use of diverse resources available in the domestic / international environment to effectively counter other political actors and ensure one's own, or one's group's, success. Apt use will also mean assessment of resources so that use in one way may not prove to be a constraint in another way. Pragmatics may go beyond the public face of politics, but as a rule, not against it.

Public face of Pakistan's politics evolved over several historical periods, particularly the pre-colonial period of Muslim rule and the colonial period of British rule. In pre-colonial South Asia, largely trust-based patterns of elite politics can be discerned during the Muslim rule, where decision-making positions were given to trustworthy persons—close relatives, personal friends and dependents, etc. Colonial patterns of governance, continuing some of the pre-colonial practices for pragmatic considerations of achieving stability of the rule, also introduced, from the beginning, rule-based legal rational style of bureaucratic and military administration, which, at the time of independence eventuated in the establishment of democratic governance based on British parliamentary traditions. Further, contours to the public face of Pakistan politics were added from the fact that
creation of Pakistan resulted by virtue of a movement claiming that Muslims possessed a culture different from that of Hindus. The different culture, in their view, entitled them to a status of nationhood and a separate country. The Pakistan movement, thereby, gave a fillip to an extensive spread and articulation of Islamic cultural norms among Muslims.

In studying Pakistan's politics it is important to take these multiple sets of values into account. They provide a public face to politics, whereby the political actors, individually and/or collectively belonging to any group pragmatically deployed a number of diverse resources (including the manipulation of public face) available to them in the domestic and international environment to outmaneuver one another in political competition.

With the political system of Pakistan in place in August 1947, it was the civilian elite who had successfully participated in the movement for independence who came to man the positions of power. But after its inception, the country had to face a host of administrative as well as security problems. Not only were there problems pertaining to the refugee rehabilitation, lack of experienced and trained personnel, lack of resources for setting up of administrative network in the country, the hostile neighbor India posed threats to its security. In order to address these and many other problems, the civilian elite heavily depended upon the bureaucratic and military elite. Under the circumstances, the bureaucratic and military elite were to serve as 'resources' in aid of the civilian authorities, but gradually the political scenario in the country came to be dominated by three main groups of political actors: the civilian, bureaucratic and military elite with the emergence of the latter two as the rival elite.
The situation was further complicated by the aggressive political competition among the civilian elite, which facilitated the role transformation of the bureaucratic and military elite. The factional tussles, regional rivalries based often on misunderstanding and mistrust and personal antagonism among the civilian elite facilitated the rise of bureaucratic-military elite in the political arena. The bureaucratic elite filled important political offices immediately after independence, and came to occupy a dominant position in the decision-making at the center. As for the military elite, apart from their role in the defense of the country, they frequently assisted the civilian administration in discharge of their duties, particularly in times of crises such as natural calamities, and in restoration of law and order during civil unrest. All these developments helped graduate the bureaucratic and military elite into rival elite. Intra-civilian elite conflicts led to creation of more and more legal resources like the PRODA to outmaneuver each other but such resources eventually came to be utilized by the bureaucratic and military elite to successfully confront the civilian elite.

Capitalizing on crises and disturbances and intra-civilian elite conflict, the bureaucratic and military elite strengthened their position and image, working to erode that of the civilian elite. (Witness the food crisis in the West Pakistan in 1953 exaggerated by the military-bureaucratic elite, which undermined the position of the civilian elite) Though the military and bureaucracy had enjoyed considerable power in decision-making almost from the beginning, it was in the year 1953 that the military started emerging as a rival elite in the political composition. This was particularly true after the dismissal of Prime Minister Nazimuddin.
The public face of dismissal was largely borne by the statements and proclamation of Governor General, which attempted to justify his action in terms of formal-legal and constitutional provisions, though the Governor General acted in contravention of conventions of the British parliamentary form of government espoused by the adoption of the interim constitution under the Indian Independence Act of July 1947. After Nazimuddin, though several Prime Ministers were forced by the Governor General and later by the President to resign from their offices, they were not dismissed in the legal and constitutional sense. Thus, a public face was usually maintained, and the Prime Ministers were coerced into offering their resignations. The cases of resignation involved the same pragmatics as well as use of resources, as was done in the case of Nazimuddin.

The other vital decision of far-reaching importance, politically as well as constitutionally, is represented by the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1954. The dissolution is interesting in that it represented the climax of the power of the bureaucratic elite as well as visible induction of the military elite in the country’s politics. On the face of it, several reasons could be adduced in favour of the dissolution but it is more interesting to go beyond the public face and see how the bureaucratic-military elite had outmaneuvered the civilian elite in their desired course of action.

The dissolution was justified mainly on the basis of unrepresentative character of the Constituent Assembly with popular demand for dissolution from some vocal quarters. The assembly had taken almost seven years to produce a constitution and it was contended that as then constituted it had lost the confidence of the people. Members of the assembly originally belonged mainly to the Muslim League, which by now had suffered a rout in East Pakistan. Ultimate authority, it was said, vested in the people and there was need to
elect their representatives afresh. The public at large was exhorted by the Governor General to subordinate their personal, sectional and provincial interests to the supreme national interests of security and stability. The Governor General promised to hold election at the earliest.

Behind this public face of representative democracy could be discerned a large number of pragmatic reasons and important gains from the dissolution. For one thing, the constitution assembly had curtailed the powers of the Governor General by putting precise definition on those powers. The assembly passed legislation whereby advice from the prime minister was made binding on the governor general who could not dismiss the prime minister as the latter was responsible to the legislature. Furthermore, the assembly gave the High Courts right to hear writ petitions against executive actions including those of the Governor General. The assembly also repealed an earlier legislation namely PRODA which had placed enormous legal powers at the disposal of the Governor General to initiate cases against public representative, usually the civilian elite.

The civilian elite in passing such legislation had made pragmatic use of the legal resources available to them. They had mobilized resources in the shape of their legal powers but which they had telescoped giving minimal time to presentation of bills in the legislature and time required for readings thereof. It is said that one of the bills passed all required stages in ten minutes and became an Act of legislature by instant publication in the Gazette of Pakistan.

The amount, the content, the consequences of legislation and the hasty legislative activity—all sent the Governor General tuming. But he did not take a hasty decision. He
assessed his resources—formal as well as informal, domestic as well as international—and seems to have planned his decision meticulously. He revoked the disqualification orders, under PRODA, against Ayub Khurhu, a highly prominent civil elite and one time chief minister of the Sindh province. He revoked disqualification order against other affected civilian elite who had not sought such revocation. Case under PRODA against Mumtaz Duttana, former Chief Minister of the Punjab was still in process and the Governor General ordered it to be withdrawn. He procured potential support of all such civilian elite against the assembly. He enlisted the support of Fazalul Haq, a veteran civilian elite from East Pakistan and leader of the United Front, which had routed the Muslim League in the 1954 provincial elections. Dr. Khan Sahib, brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan of NWFP, was won over through the good offices of Iskander Mirza. Support of Ayub Khan, C-n-C of Pakistan army, had been secured before he went to the United States and, by October 21, had been able to procure military aid from that country. On that day US also announced economic aid for Pakistan.

On October 24, the Governor General dissolved the Constituent Assembly, the pragmatic gains of the dissolution included the eventual ineffectiveness of legislation that had sought the curtailment of powers of the Governor General, aborting of draft constitution of 1954 and paving the way for the one unit scheme. This scheme had sought the merger of various provincial entities in the Western wing into one Province of West Pakistan. The dissolution also meant postponement of provincial elections in the western wing, which might have created difficulties for the one unit scheme. The bureaucratic elite in collusion with the military established their hegemony and were able, eventually, to lay down new rules of politics in the form of 1956 Constitution. Iskandar Mirza a military turned bureaucratic elite made apt use of his position as the last Governor
General before a new constitution making Pakistan a republic would go into effect. He made his approval to the new constitution conditional upon his election by the assembly as the first president of the country. Making use of lacunae in the Constitution owing to reliance on the British parliamentary conventions breach of which is not enforceable in courts, Mirza made and unmade several ministries, coercing prime ministers to resign to save themselves from the humiliations of dismissals.

On October 7, 1958, Iskandar Mirza abrogated the very Constitution, to which he himself had given his assent and vowed to defend and protect. Not only that, Martial Law was proclaimed in the country, and the C-in-C, General Ayub Khan was appointed as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. With the abrogation of the Constitution, a legal vacuum had been created. On October 10, the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order I of 1958 was proclaimed by Ayub Khan. The order confirmed the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956, but the country was declared to be ruled as nearly as possible by the defunct Constitution for administrative purposes. With the continuance of laws, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts was restored, though the fundamental rights remained suspended. So, not only was the legal vacuum filled, the Order also put resources at the disposal of the bureaucratic-military elite. These resources giving enormous legal powers to them further enhanced their capability to manipulate the laws in their own favour, while at the same time retaining a public face.

The Constitution of 1956 was abrogated by President Mirza, who argued that it had become ‘unworkable’. One wonders what drastic changes had taken place during the last two years, which had made it unworkable. The decision of the abrogation of Constitution and imposition of the Martial Law was seemingly taken on the initiative of the
bureaucrat-turned-civilian elite, along with the C-in-C, who represented the military elite. The pragmatic gain of the coup went in favour of the military elite, and not the President, who had proclaimed it. With Ayub Khan now the CMLA, the real power fell into the hands of the military elite. Till 1958, they had influenced policies and decision-making at the center, but with Ayub Khan in the driving seat, the military intervention in politics became overt in the country, which had hitherto remained covert.

With the assertion of the bureaucratic-military elite, the political competition did not come to an end. There was yet another contest to take place among the rival elite—the bureaucracy and the military. Both came to develop differences over the distribution of the spoils of the defeat of the civilian elite: who would wield and exercise more power, the President or the CMLA? In this competition, the latter emerged victorious, resulting in the complete take over by the military elite.

Actually, Ayub Khan commanded more resources than President Mirza, whose resources had fast diminished in the wake of the defeat of the civilian elite. With the dismissal of the Ministry of Republicans, on whom he had relied substantially, President Mirza lost all support of the civilian elite. Moreover, Mirza's attempt to use the Navy against the army undermined the trust between Ayub and Mirza, who had otherwise been longtime friends. Ayub, being the C-in-C and CMLA, commanded more resources than Mirza, as the former had at his disposal all the coercive instruments of state, including the legal and constitutional resources. Later, Ayub Khan used the same resources both against the bureaucratic and civilian elite during his regime.
This study has attempted to see the relevance of elite perspective for a proper understanding of politics, particularly of countries like Pakistan, which have been initiated into modern formal legal and constitutional arrangements but at the same were steeped in the consciousness of historical experiences and traditional values.

Appreciating this, we have tried to explore aspects where the existing concepts could be amplified and refined and new concepts could be developed to understand practice of power in Pakistani context. In particular, we have concentrated on the concepts of elite, public face, pragmatic strategies and resources available in the polity and international environment. We look at elite in terms of roles—the role of making authoritative and significant decisions, or exercise of power in the society as a whole. The role is performed with reference to publicly known formal legal procedures and socio-cultural norms and values, the two together providing the public face of politics. The concept of public face represents the modern legal-rational as well as traditional socio-cultural norms of a polity.

Elite competing for gaining, retaining and expanding their power aptly mobilize / use diverse resources located in the polity and international environment. The elite make pragmatic use of resources assessing their relevance for effectiveness but keeping the public face of politics. They deploy a variety of strategies and tactics to outmaneuver and prevail in a political competition.

This framework has been useful in understanding Pakistan’s politics during the period 1947-58 in which certain important developments took place. They included making of oppressive laws such as PRODA in 1949, dismissal in 1953 of an elected Prime Minister, who had successfully steered the passage of annual budget and therefore, warranted no such action against him; coercive resignations of Prime Ministers during the period; the
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly thought to be a supreme body for making the constitution, and abrogation of Constitution in 1958 along with dissolution of democratically elected National Assembly and a government responsible to that Assembly. All these major political events have been explained in terms of the concepts amplified and refined from the elite perspective, and other concepts developed in the spirit of that perspective.

The framework can be usefully employed to study other periods in Pakistan's political history. For example, Ayub Khan's rule under the Constitution of 1962 could also be usefully appreciated in this framework. Oppressive laws similar to those in the late 1940s were enacted by Ayub Khan. He made drastic amendments in the Constitution, which he himself had promulgated, sometimes violating the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Very soon Ayub Khan had to enlist support of bureaucracy to run his government. The bureaucracy, therefore, again began to participate in decision-making processes and vital decisions. Bureaucracy was employed to put curbs on the political expressions by civilian elite. Several other decisions by Ayub Khan could also be explained and understood using this framework of analysis.

Our framework of analysis seems amply useful to study the more recent developments in political competition among the rival elite groups. The military elite that ousted the civilian elite in 1999 aptly mobilized their resources. Better planning and military power facilitated the initial take-over. They brought into play the judicial system whose favourable verdict went a long way in providing public face to the military take-over. The new regime further invoked the existing laws against terrorism that had been earlier enacted by the now ousted civilian elite and had the potential to be used against political
opponents. Invocation of such laws help the military regime in out-maneuvering the rival civilian elite.

The framework is relevant to the study of various periods as well as major and minor decisions within a particular period in the politics of a country. With regard to Pakistan, three decisions, namely, dismissal of the Prime Minister, dissolution of the Legislature, and imposition of the Martial Law, represent a hallmark of politics in the history of the country in the context of the parliamentary democracy. These decisions occurred during the first parliamentary period 1947-58, which has been the subject of this study. Making of such decisions have been a recurrent feature of the political history of Pakistan. It is the study of such decisions in tandem with subsidiary decisions that our framework has dealt with in detail. The period of Pakistan's politics studied in the framework offers a useful illustration of the potential for wider application of the framework.
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• **X-linked Non-syndromic Hearing Impairment**

X-linked non-syndromic deafness may be present from birth or early childhood (prelingual), or may occur later in childhood or adolescence, after the development of speech (postlingual). The hearing loss may be stable or may become more severe over time. Most forms of X-linked non-syndromic deafness are sensorineural. Among the prelingual hearing loss X-linked non-syndromic hearing impairment accounts for about 1-5% (Petersen, 2002; Smith and Hone, 2003).

• **Mitochondrial Non-syndromic Hearing Impairment**

Maternally inherited mitochondrial mutations give rise to non-syndromic hearing impairment in some patients. However, for some mutations, patients have been found with additional symptoms accompanying the hearing impairment.

**Genes and Auditory System**

Hereditary deafness is genetically a highly heterogeneous disease with many different genes responsible for auditory dysfunction. Of the 30,000-50,000 human genes, 1%, i.e., 300-500 genes are estimated to be necessary for hearing (Friedman and Griffith, 2003). Today approximately 80 for syndromic and 41 for non-syndromic hereditary hearing impaired genes have been identified, which is about one third of the total (Nance, 2003).

The cochlea is the most complicated organ in the auditory system as it is composed of different cell types and specialized organs and hence it is no wonder to expect a number of genes and encoded proteins to express within the cochlea. The classification of the known genes associated with etiological deafness and hearing impairment into functional categories can help us in a better understanding of the role of these genes in the process of hearing and hence provide basis for a more accurate diagnosis and genetic counseling. The genes associated with the etiological hearing impairments can be classified into following broad classes.

1. **Structural proteins**

A number of structural proteins are present in different parts of the auditory system, which are responsible for smooth conduction of the sound waves to the brain after conversion into electrical signals. Biochemical and molecular investigations have identified a number of proteins involved in the maintenance of proper structure and
thus precise function of the inner ear. The intricate nature of the sensory epithelium and its highly organized stereocilia necessitates that a precise structure be maintained to ensure proper function. This is supported by the number of deafness-associated mutations in genes encoding structural proteins found in hair cells.

a) Motor Molecules

Motor proteins facilitate movement of cell components. In eukaryotes there are several types of molecular motors including myosins (Sellers, 2000), kinesins (Kull and Endow, 2002), dyneins (Dejardin and Vallee, 2002), and presin (Dallos and Fakler, 2002). Myosins bind cytoskeletal actin and hydrolyze adenosine triphosphate (ATP) to produce power for sliding actin filaments or unidirectional movement along them. Myosin genes are members of a large superfamily of genes that encode proteins that exert mechanical forces. They have many functions, including transport of intracellular organelles, phagocytosis, secretion, muscular contraction, and cellular movement (Cheney et al., 1993; Mooseker and Cheney, 1995). Myosins in the ear may use actin filaments as tracks to transport intracellular vesicles in the hair cells.

Different myosins are classified by the degree of sequence similarity of the conserved catalytic motor (head) domain (Thompson and Langford, 2002). The myosin family includes conventional class II muscle contractile myosins, which are also found in nonmuscle cells, and several classes of unconventional myosins (classes I, III–XVIII) (Mooseker and Cheney, 1995; Thompson and Langford, 2002). Mutations of MYO6, MYO7A, and MYO1A can cause deafness in humans. These motor proteins are individually necessary for inner ear hair cell stereocilia integrity. More recently, MYH9 and MYO3A were implicated in the function of the auditory system (Lalwani et al., 2000; Walsh et al., 2002). Similarly multiple heterozygous mutation in MYO1A were identified in unrelated Italian patients, suggesting that this gene may play an important role in autosomal dominant hearing impairment (Donaudy et al., 2003).

ACTG1

This gene was mapped to chromosome 17q25-ter and encodes for gamma actin-1. The gene was considered an attractive candidate gene, because actins are important structural elements of the inner hair cells (Wijk van et al., 2003). Mutation in this gene like the Thr278Ile are responsible for DFNA20/26 and predicted to impair actin polymerization.
STRC

This gene was mapped to chromosome 15q21-22 and contains 29 exons, which encompass approximately 19kb. STRC encodes for stereocilin, a protein made up of 1809 amino acids and contains a putative signal peptide and several hydrophobic segments. It is only expressed in the sensory hair cells and is associated with the stiff microvilli forming structure for mechanoreception of sound stimuli (Verpy et al., 2001). Mutation in this gene cause DFNB16, characterized by autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss.

WHRN

This gene was mapped to chromosome 9q32-34. This gene encodes for a PDZ-domain containing protein called whirlin, which is involved in the elongation and maintenance of stereocilia in both inner and outer hair cells. Mutations in this gene cause DFNB31 (Mburu et al., 2003).

b) Extracellular Matrix Component

Extra-cellular matrices serve a critical role in the peripheral auditory system, where their biomechanical properties have evolved to optimize the propagation and detection of sound within the cochlea. These properties are especially important for the tectorial membrane and the basilar membrane, because these are the two main soft tissue structures that move as auditory stimuli are transmitted along the cochlear duct. It has long been known that mutations in genes encoding extracellular matrix components can cause hearing loss because sensorineural hearing loss is a manifestation of some hereditary connective tissue disorders such as Marshall syndrome and Stickler syndrome (Griffith et al., 2000; Szymko-Bennett et al., 2001).

COLLAGENS (COL2A1, COL11A2)

COL2A1 gene encodes the alpha-1 chain of type II collagen, a fibrillar collagen found in cartilage and the vitreous humor of the eye. Mutations in this gene are associated with achondrogenesis, chondrodysplasia, early onset familial osteoarthritis and Stickler syndrome type I. COL11A2 gene encodes one of the two alpha chains of type XI collagen, a minor fibrillar collagen. This gene has been mapped to chromosome 6p21. Type XI collagen is a heterotrimer but the third alpha chain is a post-translationally modified alpha 1 type II chain. The vast Type 3 Stickler syndrome
(SL13) and some allelic connective tissue diseases are caused by mutations in COL11A2 (Viklund et al., 1995; McGuint et al., 1999).

**DSPP**

This gene also known as dentin sialo-phospho-protein (DSP?) gene, was mapped to chromosome 4q21.3 and encodes for two major noncollagenous dentin matrix protein. Mutation in this gene cause inherited dentin defects, associated with bilateral progressive high frequency NSHL (Kim et al., 2004). A study on two Chinese families showed that mutations in this gene also cause DFNA39, characterized by progressive, high frequency NSHL (Xiao et al., 2001).

**TECTA**

Alpha-tectorin is a major noncollagenous glycoprotein component of the tectorial membrane, the acellular matrix overlying the cochlear neuroepithelium. Mutations in the α-tectorin gene on chromosome 11q have been found in families with both autosomal dominant (at the DFNA8 and DFNA12 loci) and autosomal recessive (at the DFNB21 locus) prelingual hearing loss (Verhoeven et al., 1997). The α-tectorin gene encodes a cochlea-specific protein (Legan et al., 1997) that interacts with β-tectorin. The two proteins constitute approximately 50 percent of the total protein content of the tectorial membrane of the organ of Corti.

**HARMONIN AND USHERIN**

Harmonin is another important protein present in stereocilia and is known to underlie Usher syndrome type 1 C (Verpy et al., 2000). Disruption of usherin, a laminin homologue and part of the extracellular matrix in the cochlea and Buchs membrane of the eye, results in Usher syndrome type 2A (Eudy et al., 1998).

**CADHERIN (CDH23)**

This gene is a member of the cadherin superfamily, encoding calcium dependent cell-cell adhesion glycoproteins (Nagafuchi, 2001). The protein encoded by this gene is a large, single-pass transmembrane protein composed of an extracellular domain containing 27 repeats that show significant homology to the cadherin ectodomain. It is expressed in the neurosensory epithelium, the protein is thought to be involved in stereocilia organization and hair bundle formation. The gene is located in a region containing the human deafness loci DFNB12 and USH1D. The emerging model from
a combination of studies is that cadherin 23 interacts with harmonin, which associates with myosin VIIA and is involved in the organization of hair cell stereocilia (Boeda et al., 2002; Siemens et al., 2002).

**PCDH15**

This gene has been mapped to 10q21-22 and encodes for protocadherin-15. Protocadherin-15 has 11 ectodomains at least one transmembrane domain, and a cytoplasmic carboxy domain (Ahmed et al., 2003). Protocadherin-15 is widely expressed in inner and outer hair cells and in many other tissues from development through adulthood (Murcia and Woychik, 2001). Mutation in the PCDH15 gene causes DFNB23.

**OTOANCORIN (OTOA)**

This gene has been mapped to chromosome 16p12.2 and encodes for the glycocyclophosphatidylinositol anchored protein otoancorin. Otoancorin is made up of 1088 amino acids and is located at the interface between the apical surface of the inner ear sensory epithelia and their overlying acellular gels. In Palestine family the splice site mutation in the OTOA gene was detected as the cause of DFNB22 (Zwaenepoel et al., 2002).

**OTOGELEN (OTOG)**

Otogelin, a glycoprotein, is a critical component of the extracellular matrices overlying the sensory neuroepithelia of the inner ear. The otoconial membranes of the saccule and utricle and the cupulae of the semicircular canals become detached from their underlying sensory epithelia in mice.

**COCH**

The COCH gene on chromosome 14q11-13 is frequently implicated in an autosomal dominant non-syndromic form of hearing loss (DFNA9) characterized by postlingual progressive hearing impairment starting in the high frequencies, with variable vestibular involvement, including vertigo and Meniere-like symptoms (Khetarpal et al., 1991; Fransen et al., 1999; Lemaire et al., 2003). This gene encodes for cochlin, a major constituent of the inner ear extracellular matrix (Grabski et al., 2003; Robertson et al., 2003).
OTOFERLIN (*OTOF*)

A gene at the DFNB9 locus on chromosome 2p is called the otoferlin gene, because its product shows homology to dysferlin, a protein that is defective in some myopathies. It consists of 48 exons (Mirghomizadeh *et al.*, 2002b). The otoferlin gene is expressed in the inner hair cells, the utriculus, and the sacculus. It is probably involved in the transport of membrane vesicles to the plasma membrane. Mutations in this gene are a cause of neurosensory non-syndromic recessive deafness, DFNB9.

**TMCI**

This gene is considered as a member of a gene family predicted to encode transmembrane proteins. The specific function of this gene is unknown; however, it is known to be required for normal function of cochlear hair cells. Mutations in this gene have been associated with progressive postlingual hearing loss and profound prelingual deafness. Kurima *et al.* (2002) identified eight different mutations in a novel gene, transmembrane channel-like gene 1 (*TMCI*), in the DFNA36 family and 11 of large families segregating DFNB7/B11 deafness, including the original DFNB7 family ( Jain *et al.*, 1995).

**TMIE**

*TMIE* (transmembrane inner ear), which is predicted to encode a transmembrane protein with no similarity to other known proteins. *TMIE* mRNA is detectable by RT-PCR analysis in various tissues, including the cochlea. Naz *et al.* (2002) cloned the human *TMIE* ortholog and identified five different *TMIE* mutations co-segregating with DFNB6 deafness in five consanguineous families.

c) Cytoskeletal Proteins

**DIAPHANOUS (*DIAPH1*)**

One of the important structural proteins of hair cells is the diaphanous. This gene is involved in the regulation of actin polymerization in hair cells of the inner ear. It may also be necessary for establishing the rigid structure of the actin core of stereocilia (Lynch *et al.*, 1997). The first locus for autosomal dominant NSHL (DFNA1) was mapped to chromosome 5q31 in extended Costa Rican kindred with progressive, positive, low frequency hearing loss (Petersen, 2002).
EPSN

The gene has been recently mapped to chromosome 1p36.3 and encodes for a calcium-insensitive actin binding protein called epsin (Naz et al., 2004). Epsin is newly identified and essential cytoskeletal protein of stereocilia. It is an actin binding protein reported to be depleted in the deaf mouse mutant (Zheng et al., 2000). The two frame shift mutations 1988delAGAG and 2469delGTCA co-segregate with DFNB36.

2. Transcription Factors and Activators

Cell signaling pathways, involved in regulating the cellular physiology in response to both extra-cellular and intracellular messages, terminate at transcription factors to trigger the downstream inhibition or activation of transcription of particular genes. A number of transcription factors have been identified as a critical component of normal physiology of hearing. Four transcription factor genes have been identified: POU3F4, POU4F3, EYA4, and TFCP2L3.

POU Transcription-Factor Genes (POU3F4 & POU4F3)

Two members of the POU-domain transcription factor gene, i.e., POU3F4 and POU4F3 are involved in hearing disorders. The POU3F4 gene is expressed in the mesenchyma of the inner and middle ear whereas, the POU4F3 gene is expressed only in hair cells, in which it is responsible for the regulation of transcription of target genes that are important for the survival of cells in the organ of Corti (Rosenfeld, 1991). Mutation in transcription factor gene POU3F4 is responsible for X-linked mixed deafness (DFN3) (DeKok et al., 1995). POU4F3 is associated with autosomal dominant hearing loss. Vahava et al. (1998) mapped an autosomal dominant form of progressive hearing loss (DFNA15) to 5q31 and identified an 8 bp deletion in POU4F3 gene. A truncated POU4F3 protein impairs high-affinity binding of this transcription factor in a dominant negative fashion, leading to progressive hearing loss.

PAX

This gene is a member of the paired box family of transcription factors. Members of the PAX family typically contain a paired box domain and a paired-type homeodomain. These genes play critical roles during fetal development. Mutations in
paired box gene 3 are associated with Waardenburg syndrome, craniofacial-deafness-hand syndrome etc.

**SOX10 and MITF**

SOX10 interacts with other important transcription factors, viz., MITF, PAX to stimulate or inhibit the downstream regulators. MITF (Microphthalmia-associated transcription factor) mutation leads to abnormal melanocyte development, which results in abrupt pigmentation as well as hearing dysfunction (Tachibana et al., 1996). SOX10 and PAX3 synergistically transactivate MITF and that pathogenic mutations in SOX10 or PAX3 disrupt their binding to the MITF promoter (Bondurand et al., 2000; Potter et al., 2000).

**EYA**

Another family of transcription factors, the EYA genes, is critical in embryonic development. This gene encodes a member of the eyes absent (EYA) family of proteins. The encoded protein may act as a transcriptional activator and be important for continued function of the mature organ of Corti. Mutations in this gene are associated with postlingual, progressive, autosomal dominant hearing loss at the deafness, autosomal dominant non-syndromic sensorineural DFNA10 locus (Wayre et al., 2001).

**TFCP2L3**

TFCP2L3 is a member of the Transcription Factor Cellular Promoter 2-related (TFCP2) family that has a novel DNA-binding domain and is related to Drosophila grainyhead (Peters et al., 2002). Dominant mutant alleles of TFCP2L3 associated with progressive hearing loss, and their expression may be necessary for life-long maintenance of the adult auditory system.

### 3. Gap Junction Proteins

The primary organization of compartmentalization and ionic balance of fluids in the ear has been highlighted by the number of gap junctions and ion channels found to control critical transport of different molecules. Gap junctions are clusters of intercellular channels (connexons) that couple the cytoplasmic compartments of adjacent cells. If the channels or the pumps that allow passage of the ions in and out of the hair cells are defective, the endolymph homeostasis is disrupted and sound
waves cannot be converted into electrical stimuli ultimately not reaches the brain. Maintaining ion homeostasis within the cochlear duct, especially the high potassium (K⁺) concentration in the endolymph, is of extreme importance for signal transduction involved in the hearing process. There are different genes which control the function of these gap junctions for smooth conduction of sound waves.

**CONNEXINS**

Connexins are membrane proteins that are involved in the formation of channels through the plasma membrane of many cells. Six connexin subunits assemble into a half-channel that dock with its counterpart from an adjacent cell to form an intercellular channel. A cluster of these channels forms a gap junction, which allows intercellular exchange of small molecules and has an important role in intercellular communication (Bruzzone et al., 1996; Kumar and Gilula, 1996). Connexin 26 (GJB2) protein is a member of the connexin protein family and can interact with connexin 32, 46 and 50 to form a hexamic of homotypic or heterotypic half channel (connexon) of gap junctions. Besides GJB2, genes for other gap junction proteins have been found to be associated with hearing loss including GJB3 (connexin 31) which is also expressed in the cochlea and has been evaluated as a candidate gene for various forms of hereditary deafness (Xia et al., 1998), GJB6 (connexin 30) (Griffa et al., 1999), GJA1 (connexin 43) (Liu et al., 2001).

**KCNQ**

The KCNQ4 gene is a member of a superfamily of genes encoding potassium channels. This superfamily includes the KCNQ1 and KCNE1 genes, mutations of which also cause hearing loss. The potassium channels encoded by these three genes contribute to potassium homeostasis in the cochlea by mediating repolarization and resetting the electrical potential of the hair cells. Defects in KCNQ4 are a cause of non-syndromic sensorineural deafness type 2 (DFNA2), an autosomal dominant form of progressive hearing loss.

**CLDN14**

Tight junctions represent one mode of cell-to-cell adhesion in epithelial or endothelial cell sheets, forming continuous seals around cells and serve as a physical barrier to prevent solutes and water from passing freely through the paracellular space. Defects in this gene are the cause of an autosomal recessive form of non-syndromic...
sensorineural deafness. The discovery of pathogenic mutations in *CLDN14* in DFNB29 identified a tight junction protein involved in compartmentalization of endolymph (Wilcox *et al*., 2001).

**SLC26A4 and SLC2A2**

Pendred syndrome and non-syndromic deafness DFNB4 are allelic disorders caused by mutations of the *SLC26A4* (PDS) gene on chromosome 7q22-31.1 (Everett *et al*., 1997; Li *et al*., 1998). It is highly homologous to the *SLC26A3* gene; they have similar genomic structures and this gene is located 3' of the *SLC26A3* gene. The encoded protein has homology to sulfate transporters. *SLC26A4* mutations may account for as much as 10% of hereditary deafness in diverse populations (Park *et al*., 2003).

**Modifiers Genes**

The identification of 'disease genes' and the mutations within them have greatly enhanced our understanding of normal function in the ear. Single gene disorders undergo segregation in autosomal recessive or dominant fashion and in most cases exhibit a strong correlation between the single gene mutation in the candidate gene and the disease phenotype. However, sometimes the background genes can modify the age of onset, rate of progressive or severity of these diseases. Phenotypic variation individuals with the same disease alleles may be attributable to the genotype at another locus, which is referred to as a modifier gene (Friedman *et al*., 2000). The effect can be enhancing, leading to a more severe mutant phenotype, or suppressive, reducing the mutant phenotype even to the extent of completely restoring the normal condition. Identification of modifier genes may lead to new treatments either by providing additional information about genetic contributions to the phenotype for which treatment may already be available or by pointing to additional steps in a biological pathway that may be more amenable to treatment (Haider *et al*., 2002). Modifier genes can also alter the pleiotropy of a given disease, resulting in different combinations of traits. In addition, for any given disorder, multiple modifier genes may act in combination to create a final, cumulative effect on the expression of a phenotype.

The examples of modifier genes in human studies are not copious, many genetic modifiers affecting phenotypic presentation of hearing disorders in mice have been
reported (Friedman et al., 2000). Molecular analysis of the auditory system has already yielded a number of genes in mice and humans that influence the expression or function of other genes. Studies of these genes are certain to provide insight into the interaction of their gene products. Notable among the mouse genes are tub (tubby) and moth1 (modifier of tubby hearing) (Ikeda et al., 1999) and dfw (defawaddler) and mdsw (modifier of deaf waddler) (Noben-Trauth et al., 1997). A genetic modifier of tubby hearing, moth1 can worsen or prevent the tubby hearing impairment, depending on the type of moth1 allele and whether one or both copies of the alleles are present (Ikeda et al., 2002). Recently the gene encoding microtubule-associated protein 1a (Mtap 1a) has been cloned and appears to play its role in neurodegeneration and may regulate synaptic signaling (Ikeda et al., 2002). Deaf waddler mice are homozygous for an autosomal recessive mutation and exhibit unbalanced and uncontrolled movements. The dominant mdsw allele protects dfw heterozygotes from hearing loss, whereas the recessive mdsw allele permits hearing loss in the dfw heterozygotes (Noben-Trauth et al., 1997).

Large consanguineous families are powerful resource for mapping and identifying additional deafness loci and genes that modify deafness phenotypes. Recently, two human modifiers of hearing have been reported. The DFNM1 locus completely suppresses hearing loss among individuals homozygous for a DFNB26 mutation (Riazuddin et al., 2000). The family size was sufficiently large to allow the investigators to map a single suppressive locus to chromosome 1q24. Identification of these two genes (DFNB26 and DFNM1) will lead to an understanding of the interaction of their gene products and facilitate elucidation of pathway that leads to the DFNB26 phenotype. It is interesting to note that DFNM1 maps with in the 22 centimorgan interval containing the DFNA7 locus for dominant, non-syndromic hearing loss (Fagerheim et al., 1996). Another hearing loss modifier gene MDM1 (Mitochondrial deafness modifier gene), located on chromosome 8, was identified by (Bykhovskaya et al., 2000) provide another example in which a locus on chromosome 8, near marker D8S277, modifies maternally inherited deafness associated with a mutation (A1555G) in the mitochondrial 12S ribosomal RNA. Modifiers can also control the severity of mutation. Recently reported novel dominant low frequency myosin VIIA (MYO7A) auditory mutation, the severity with which this mutation
manifests in the auditory system appears to be influenced by a genetic modifier (Street et al., 2004).

**Different Models for understanding hearing impairment**

The confluence of two rapidly emerging research arenas—development of mouse models of human deafness and inner ear drug therapy for treatment and prevention of hearing loss—provides an opportunity for unprecedented approaches to study and treat deafness. In the field of hearing research, recent advances using the mouse as a model for human hearing loss have brought exciting insights into the molecular pathways that lead to normal hearing, and into the mechanisms that are disrupted once a mutation occurs in one of the critical genes.

Mouse has always been considered a strong and clear organism for the study of hearing loss in human. This is because of the similarities between the mouse and human genomes and between the physiology and morphology of their auditory systems, as striking. The mouse has an advantage as an experimental model for genetic studies due to short gestation time, ease of selective matings, and similarity of the genome and inner ear to humans, is truly a remarkable resource (Avraham, 2003). These models for human deafness have not only proven instrumental in the identification of genes for hereditary hearing loss, but are excellent model systems in which to examine gene function as well as the resulting pathophysiology (Drury and Keats, 2003). There are three major forms of mouse mutants spontaneous, radiation or chemical induced, and transgenics or knock-outs used in the experiments (Avraham, 2003).

The human genes associated with Waardenburg syndrome types 1 and 2 were identified by their homology with the mouse *sp* and *mi* genes, respectively (Tassabehji et al., 1992, 1994). The discovery of a null mutation in myosin VI in Snell's waltzer (*sv*) mice has reinforced the vital role of cytoskeletal protein in the hair cells of the inner ear, since *sv* mice are congenitally deaf and exhibit the characteristic waltzing and circling behavior of inner ear mutant (Steel and Brown, 1994). The *shaker-1* (*sh1*) mouse has been shown to be a homologue of DFNB2, DFNA11 and usher syndrome type I (Gibson et al., 1995). The clinical variability of *MYO7A* mutations may come from the study of mouse models. Welk et al. (1995) pointed out that the lack of retinal degeneration of sh1 mouse resembles the normal
retinal phenotype associated with human non-syndromic deafness DFNB2 and DFNA11. The shaker-2 mouse has been shown to be a murine homologue of DFNB3 (Probst et al., 1998). There is generally good agreement between the two species in the pathology, despite the differences in the mutational events in the two populations. The mutations in the myosin VII gene cause deafness and vestibular dysfunctions in both species, but retinitis pigmentosa only in humans. The gene may be involved in long-term maintenance of the retina, and require longer than the normal lifespan of a mouse to show an effect in a mutant (Liang et al., 1999). Hundreds of additional mouse models for hearing and vestibular defects will emerge in the next few years as a result of systematic efforts to introduce mutations at random into sperm at high rates. After mutagenesis, the progeny will be screened for auditory and vestibular abnormalities (Probst and Camper, 1999).

In spite of significant advances in the understanding of the molecular basis of hearing impairment, precise genetic or non-genetic causes cannot be directly pointed out due to their extreme molecular heterogeneity, despite the fact that for family history studies like physical examination, clinical approaches and DNA test are available for the diagnoses of hearing impairment. Many individuals and their families want to know the causes of their impairment and especially whether it has a genetic cause. Genetic diagnosis allows more accurate genetic counseling and may provide essential information about environmental risk factors. Precise diagnosis may also be important for planning and assessing the therapies.

The present study addresses population of Pakistan, hypothesizing that human population of Pakistan has a distinctive genetic composition, consanguinity, mutation rates and selection pressures. As true for other human population, there has been random mutation at different loci in Pakistani population at different epochs. Thus there is an immense possibility of isolating new gene loci and/or mutations at the well known loci through scanning of the families exhibiting phenotypes associated with hearing loss. This process can be easily extended to understand the human genome and may further assist in the better understanding of the physiological and genetic basis of hearing in human beings.

Presently large number of Pakistani kindred has been segregated for non-syndromic autosomal recessive congenital hearing impairment. It appears that the most of the members of affected families have inherited the hearing loss due to consanguineous.
marriages suggesting a possibility of homozygosity for the same gene defect. The
search for linkage is facilitated owing to high degree of inbreeding in those kindred.
MATERIALS AND METHODS

FAMILY HISTORY
Ten families here designated as A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I and J showing non-syndromic recessive hereditary hearing impairment inhabiting different regions of Pakistan have been studied. The families were ascertained by identifying probands during the field visits. These families were then visited at their places of residence. In general all the affected members were in good physical and mental condition. Both males and females were affected showing autosomal recessive form of hereditary hearing loss. The elders and relatives of the families were interviewed to obtain information about the hearing loss and other relevant matters. The case history was obtained by properly designed questionnaire comprising number of affected individuals, number of generation involved, the associated defects if any and onset of the hearing loss were cautiously documented. All the information obtained was crosschecked by interviewing different persons.

PEDIGREE ANALYSIS
For genetic implication an extensive pedigree was constructed for each family by the standard methods described by Bennett et al. (1995). The pattern of inheritance of hereditary hearing impairment was worked out by observing the segregation or transmission of the hearing loss within family. The exact genealogical relationships for all the affected individuals were obtained through extensive personal interviews of elders of the families. Males were symbolized by squares and females by circles. The normal individuals were designated with unfilled symbols while the affected individuals by filled symbols. Each generation was indicated by Roman numeral. The individuals within a generation were designated by Arabic numerals. A number enclosed within a symbol indicates the number of sibs males or females, as the case may be. Audiometry was performed on selected individuals to detect the level of hearing loss.

BLOOD SAMPLING
Blood samples from both affected and normal members of the family were collected using 10 ml syringes (0.7 X 40 mm, 22 G X 1 1/2) and vacutainer tubes containing potassium EDTA. The blood samples collected were immediately dispatched to
Molecular Genetics laboratory, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad for further processing and analysis.

**EXTRACTION AND PURIFICATION OF GENOMIC DNA FROM BLOOD**

Four methods were used for the extraction and purification of the genomic DNA from blood samples:

- Inorganic preparation using 50 ml conical tubes.
- Inorganic preparation using 15 ml conical tubes.
- Organic preparation using 1.5 ml microcentrifuge tubes.
- Genomic DNA preparation by commercially available Kit

**Inorganic preparation using 50 ml conical tubes**

Genomic DNA was purified from blood collected in EDTA tubes according to standard SDS-Proteinase K extraction method. Eight to ten milliliters of blood collected in a 50 ml conical tube was raised to 45 ml by the addition of solution A and was stored in ice for 30 minutes. After chilling, the centrifugation was carried out at 6000 rpm for 30 minutes at 4°C to separate the white blood cells. The supernatant was discarded and the pellet was resuspended in 3 ml of solution B and incubated overnight at 37°C by adding 100 μl 20% SDS and 0.5 ml Proteinase K (2 mg/ml). On the following day, the tube was vigorously shaken for 15 seconds after the addition of 1.625 ml of saturated solution of sodium chloride (approximately 6 M). The tube was centrifuged twice at 6,000 rpm to obtain supernatant containing genomic DNA. The supernatant was transferred to a new conical tube and DNA was precipitated by the addition of two volumes of absolute (100%) ethanol. The precipitated DNA was fished out and placed in a microcentrifuge tube containing 70% ethanol for washing. After evaporation of residual ethanol, DNA was dissolved in appropriate amount of Tris-EDTA (TE) buffer and stored at 4°C.
Composition of solutions

**Solution A**  
0.32 M sucrose  
10 mM Tris (pH 7.5)  
5 mM MgCl₂  
1% (v/v) Triton X-100

**Solution B**  
10 mM Tris (pH 7.5)  
400 mM NaCl  
2 mM EDTA (pH 8.0)

**DNA Dissolving Buffer**  
10 mM Tris (pH 8.0)  
0.1 mM EDTA or  
Autoclaved, distilled water

Inorganic preparation using 15 ml conical tubes

Two and a half millilitre of fresh blood was taken in a 15 ml conical tube with 7.5 ml lysis buffer. After mixing the contents by inversion, the tubes were placed on ice for 15 minutes. The tubes were then centrifuged for 15 minutes at 2000 rpm. Supernatant was discarded and the nuclear pellet was washed with 5 ml of lysis buffer. The nuclear pellet was digested overnight in nuclear lysis solution containing 85 µl 20% SDS and 8 µl Proteinase K (50 mg/ml). The protein contaminants were then salted out by centrifugation at 4,000 rpm for 30 minutes after adding 0.83 µl of sodium chloride (6 M). Equal volume of isopropanol was added to the supernatant to precipitate out the DNA. The precipitated DNA was fished out and placed in a microcentrifuge tube containing 70% ethanol for washing. After evaporation of residual ethanol, DNA was dissolved in appropriate amount of Tris-EDTA (TE) buffer and stored at 4 °C.

Composition of solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lysis buffer</th>
<th>Nuclear lysis buffer</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>155 mM Ammonium chloride</td>
<td>10 mM Tris-Cl (pH 8.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 mM Potassium hydrogen carbonate</td>
<td>400 mM NaCl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 mM EDTA</td>
<td>2 mM EDTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autoclaved distilled water</td>
<td>Autoclaved distilled water</td>
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<tr>
<td>pH 7.4</td>
<td>pH 8.2</td>
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Organic preparation using 1.5 ml microcentrifuge tubes

Genomic DNA was also prepared by using phenol/Chloroform method. Almost 0.75 ml of blood was taken in a microcentrifuge tube along with 0.75 ml solution A and was kept at room temperature for 5-10 minutes after mixing the contents. The tube
was then centrifuged for 1 minute at 13,000 rpm and after discarding the supernatant
the pellet was resuspended in 400 μl of solution A. Centrifugation was repeated and
after discarding the supernatant the nuclear pellet was resuspended in 400 μl of
solution B, 12 μl of SDS and 25 μl of proteinase K and incubated at 37 °C over night.
On the following day 0.5 ml of a fresh mixture of equal volume of solution C and
solution D was added in sample, mixed and centrifuged for 10 minutes at 13,000 rpm.
The aqueous phase (upper layer) was collected in a new tube and equal quantity of
solution D was added. Centrifugation was then carried out again at 13,000 rpm for 10
minutes. The aqueous phase was placed in a new tube and after adding 55 μl of 3 M
sodium acetate (pH 5) and equal volume of isopropanol. Tubes were then inverted
several times to precipitate DNA. The DNA pellet was washed with 70% ethanol and
dried in the incubator at 37 °C. After evaporation of residual ethanol, DNA was
dissolved in appropriate amount of DNA dissolving buffer.

Composition of solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution A</th>
<th>Solution B</th>
<th>Solution C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.32 M sucrose</td>
<td>10 mM Tris (pH 7.5)</td>
<td>400 μl phenol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 mM Tris (pH 7.5)</td>
<td>400 mM NaCl</td>
<td>30 mM Tris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 mM MgCl2</td>
<td>2 mM EDTA (pH 8.0)</td>
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<td>1 % (v/v) Triton X-100</td>
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<th>Solution D</th>
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<td>Autoclaved, distilled water</td>
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Genomic DNA preparation by commercially available Kit

DNA extraction was also carried out using Genomics isolation Kit (Sigma Chemical
Co. USA).

One hundred and fifty microlitre of blood was taken in a 1.5 ml microcentrifuge tube
along with 250 μl of lysis solution A; mixed by inversion, incubate at 65 °C for 6
minutes. Clear aqueous phase was transferred to a new 1.5 ml microcentrifuge tube
after adding 100 µl of precipitation solution B and centrifugation at 14,000 rpm for 5-10 minutes. DNA was then precipitated by adding 500 µl of 100% ethanol. Ethanol was removed after centrifugation at maximum speed for 2 minutes, and then washed with 70% ethanol. After evaporation of residual ethanol DNA was dissolved in appropriate amount of Tris-EDTA (TE) buffer by incubation at 65 °C for 5 minutes.

DNA DILUTION AND MICROPIPETTING
The stock DNA was diluted to 40-50 ng/µl for PCR amplification. Micropipetting was carried out using adjustable micropipettors with disposable tips ranging from 10 µl to 1000 µl of upper volume limit.

POLYMERASE CHAIN REACTION (PCR)
Pommerase chain reaction was performed in 0.2 ml tubes (Axygen USA) containing 25 µl total reaction mixture. The reaction mixture was prepared by adding 1µl sample DNA dilution, 2.5 µl 10X PCR buffer (100 mM Tris-HCl, pH 8.3, 500 mM KCl, 1.5 mM MgCl₂), 0.5 µl dNTPs (10 mM), 0.3 µl of each forward and reverse primer (1.0 µM) and 0.3 µl Taq DNA polymerase (1 unit) (MBI Fermentas, UK) in 20.1 µl PCR water. The reaction mixture was centrifuged for few seconds for thorough mixing.

The reaction mixture was taken through thermocycling conditions consisting 5 minutes of 90°C for template denaturation followed by 40 cycles of amplification each consisting of 3 steps; one minute at 90 °C for DNA denaturation into single strands; one minute at 55-57 °C for primers to hybridize or "anneal" to their complementary sequences on either side of the target sequence; and one minute at 72 °C for extension of complementary DNA strand from each primer. Final 10 minutes at 72 °C for Taq polymerase to synthesize any unextended strands left. PCR was performed using Gene Amp PCR system 2700 and T3 thermocycler Biometra Germany (Perkin Elmer, USA).

AGAROSE GEL ELECTROPHORESIS
Amplified PCR products were analyzed on 1-2% agarose gel, which was prepared by melting 1-2 grams of agarose in 100 ml 1X TBE buffer (0.89 M Tris, 0.025 M Borate, EDTA pH 8.3), in a microwave oven for few minutes. Ethidium bromide (final concentration 0.5 µg/ml) was added to the gel to facilitate visualization of DNA after electrophoresis. PCR reaction products were mixed with Bromophenol Blue dye (0.25% Bromophenol Blue in 40% sucrose solution) and loaded into the wells.
Electrophoresis was performed at 100 volts for half an hour in 1X TBE buffer. Amplified products were detected by placing the gel on UV Transilluminator (Life Technology, USA).

POLYACRYLAMIDE GEL ELECTROPHORESIS

The amplified PCR products were resolved on 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel. Reagents were mixed in a flask and polyacrylamide gel solution was poured between two glass plates held apart by spacers of 1.5 mm thickness. After inserting the comb, gel was allowed to polymerize for 20-30 minutes at room temperature. Amplified products were mixed with loading dye containing 0.25% bromophenol blue prepared in 40% sucrose solution and loaded into the wells. Electrophoresis was carried out at 100 volts for 90 minutes and the gel was stained with ethidium bromide (10 mg/ml) solution for visualization on UV Transilluminator. Gel was photographed by using Digital camera DC 120 (Kodak, USA).

Composition of 8% Polyacrylamide Gel

13.5 ml 30% Acrylamide solution (29 g acrylamide, 1g N, N Methylene-bis-acrylamide), 5 ml 10X TBE; 0.35 ml 10% Ammonium persulphate; 17.5 µl TEMED; 31.13 ml distilled water.

GENOTYPING AND PRIMER DATABASE ANALYSIS

PCR amplification of polymorphic microsatellite markers was performed by using 40 ng of genomic DNA and resolved on 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gels as described above. Microsatellite markers were visualized by placing the ethidium bromide stained gel on UV transilluminator and genotypes were assigned by visual assessment. Microsatellite markers mapped by Cooperative Human Linkage Center (CHLC) were obtained from Research Genetics, Inc. USA. The number of tri and tetra nucleotide repeat sequence polymorphic markers used in the current study was approximately 94%. Average heterozygosity for each marker was above 70%, implying that these markers were highly informative for allele typing pedigree members. Information about the cytogenetic location of the markers and size of the PCR amplified products was obtained from genome data base (http://www.gdb.org) and Marshfield Medical Center (http://research.marshfieldclinic.org/genetics/).
Linkage studies

a. Linkage to DFNB1 locus (Connexin 26)
Mutations in GJB2 (Connexin 26) gene at the DFNB1 locus on chromosome 13q12 account for up to 50% of non-syndromic recessive deafness in some populations. Therefore, the following two approaches were used to ascertain if hearing loss in the twelve families presented here was due to mutations in GJB2 gene.

1. Linkage of the families to DFNB1 locus was investigated by typing microsatellite markers (D13S143, D13S175, D13S292 and D13S787) mapped in the genetic interval of the locus.

2. Genomic DNA of the affected individual from the family was screened for mutations in the GJB2 gene. Second exon of GJB2, encoding the entire open reading frame, was amplified by PCR from genomic DNA with a set of primers (Table 2.2) designed from intronic sequences of the gene.

b. Linkage to known deafness loci
To elucidate the gene defect in the ten families presented here, an initial search for linkage was carried out by using polymorphic markers mapped within 55 autosomal recessive non-syndromic deafness loci listed on the Hereditary Hearing Loss Homepage (http://dnalab-www.uia.ac.be/dnalab/hhh). Table 2.1 shows the list of microsatellite markers used to test linkage to known DFNB loci, these markers were used as first pass analysis for genetic linkage in families with non-syndromic recessive deafness. Genotyping of these markers was performed as described above.

c. Genome-wide search
A Genome-wide search was performed at the Centre for Inherited Disease Research (CIDR). A panel of 399 fluorescently labeled simple tandem repeat (STRP) markers were used to generate genotypes in families A, B and C. These markers were spaced ~10 cM apart on the 22 autosomes and the X and Y chromosomes. The subjects of families A, B and C were genotyped for additional markers from the linked region by the method described above.

d. Lod score calculations
Linkage of deafness to genetic markers was assessed using the computer program MLINK of the FASTLINK package (Cottingham et al., 1993) and multipoint analysis
was performed using ALLEGRO (Grimberg et al., 1989). Since the kindreds studied here were highly inbred, one might expect these analyses would be sensitive to assumptions concerning frequencies of the deafness and marker alleles. To guard against inflated positive or negative LOD scores, equal marker allele frequencies were assumed. The markers allele frequencies were estimated from the data by means of both observed and reconstructed genotypes of founders within these pedigrees. Recombination frequencies were assumed to be equal for both males and females. For the analysis an autosomal recessive mode of inheritance with complete penetrance and a disease allele frequency of 0.001 was assumed. Support for linkage in various intervals of the linkage map for different chromosomes was evaluated by multipoint linkage analysis, which was performed by GENEHUNTER utilizing map distances from the Marshfield genetic map (Kruglyak et al., 1996; Broman et al., 1998). For the analysis using GENEHUNTER, pedigrees were split into halves. LOD scores calculated for each half was combined to obtain the total LOD score for the pedigree.

e. Mutation identification in TMIE and MYO15A genes
To screen for mutation in the TMIE and MYO15A genes, all exons and splice junctions were PCR amplified from genomic DNA using primers shown in tables 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. Amplification was carried out on 100 ng of genomic DNA in a 30 cycle PCR, in which initial 5-min denaturation of template DNA at 95 °C was followed by 30 cycles of 95 °C for 1-min, 55-60 °C for 1 min and 72 °C for 1 min in a volume of 50 μl containing 10 mM Tris-HCl, pH 8.3, 50 mM KCl, 0.2 mM of each dNTP, 1.5 mM MgCl₂, 0.5 mM of each primer and 1.0 units of Taq polymerase. PCR products were analyzed on 2% agarose gel and were purified with Marligen to remove the unincorporated primers and nucleotides. The purified PCR products were subjected to cycle sequencing using big dye terminator V 3.0 ready reaction mix and sequencing buffer (PE Applied Biosystems, Foster city, CA, USA). The sequencing products were purified to remove unincorporated nucleotides and primers with CentrilllexTM Gel Filtration Cartridges (Edge Biosystems, Gaithersburg, MD, USA). These purified products were resuspended in 10 μl of TSR (Template Suppression Reagent) and were placed in 0.5 ml septa tubes to be directly sequenced in an ABI Prism 310 Automated DNA Sequencer (PE Applied Biosystems, Foster city, CA, USA). Chromatograms from normal and affected individuals were compared with the corresponding control gene sequences from NCBI (National Center for Biotechnology
Information) database to identify the aberrant nucleotide base-pair change (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/).
Table 2.1. A list of microsatellite markers used to test linkage to known DFNB loci.

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<td>DFN46</td>
<td>D18S481</td>
<td>6.94</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>D1S404</td>
<td>273.46</td>
<td></td>
<td>D18S1370</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D1S1609</td>
<td>274.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D1S423</td>
<td>277.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D1S2836</td>
<td>285.75</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DFN47</td>
<td>D2S281</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>DFN48</td>
<td>D15S1005</td>
<td>73.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D2S2164</td>
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<td></td>
<td>D2S1400</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DFN49</td>
<td>D5S2500</td>
<td>69.23</td>
<td>DFN55</td>
<td>D6S1679</td>
<td>111.17</td>
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Localization of non-syndromic hereditary hearing impairment genes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locus</th>
<th>CMLocation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D5S647</td>
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<tr>
<td>D5S629</td>
<td>75.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>D6S1563</td>
<td>113.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6S401</td>
<td>121.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>D6S1040</td>
<td>128.93</td>
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*cM= centiMorgan
Table 2.2. Genomic primer pairs used for PCR amplification of GJB2 Gene Exon 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exon 2 (GJB2 Gene)</th>
<th>5' → 3'</th>
<th>Amp. Length *(bp)</th>
<th>Annealing Temp (°C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forward</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTAAGAGTTGGTTTTGCTC</td>
<td></td>
<td>576</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reverse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATGACCCTGGAAAGATGC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*bp = base pair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| CAGCTCATCTGGGTCCAC | GAGTTGACCTGAGGCCTAC | 600 | 63 |

Table 2.3. Genomic primer pairs used for PCR amplification of TMIE exons

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Exon No.</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon 1</td>
<td>ATGATCTCCTGTGACCTACG</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TGGATCTCTGAGGCAAGAGA6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon 2</td>
<td>AGGGTTTTGATTGGCATGCTACG</td>
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<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TGCTGTGAGGACGAGGTGC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 3</td>
<td>TTAGGAAAGCCACCTGGTC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CGAATTTCAGTGCTGTGGTC</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon 4</td>
<td>AGGCCAGATGTAGGAAGGTTG</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GAGCTCAGAGTCCACCATGAC</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*bp = base pair
Table 2.4. Genomic primer pairs used for PCR amplification of MYO15A exons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exon No.</th>
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<th>Forward</th>
<th>Reverse</th>
<th>Amp. Length (bp)</th>
<th>Annealing Temp (°C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exon 3</td>
<td>TCTGTAATGAGGACAGCTGC</td>
<td>ACACCTCATGACTGAGGCCCTG</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon 4</td>
<td>A1CTGATCAAGGACAGCTGC</td>
<td>AGTTCCTAGGGCTCTGGCATT</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon 29</td>
<td>GAGGACATGAGAGGAGTGCC</td>
<td>GTCTGACTCTGGCGCTGAC</td>
<td>380</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 30</td>
<td>GCTTTTCAGACTAGGCTC</td>
<td>AGACTCCAGCTGGGTCTGCC</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon 39</td>
<td>ATCGGCTTCTCCAGAAAAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 40</td>
<td>CGAGGCAAGTTCTACTGTC</td>
<td>GTAGCTGGTTTCTGAAGGATC</td>
<td>227</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 43</td>
<td>AAGAGGCCTGCCAGACACAGC</td>
<td>CACACAGCGCCCTGCTGAGTTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 44</td>
<td>CAGCTTACAGATAGCCCTCAC</td>
<td>AGAGCAAGGAGGACACATGTC</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>55</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*bp= base pair
Table 2.4. Genomic primer pairs used for PCR amplification of MYO15A exons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exon No.</th>
<th>5' → 3'</th>
<th>Forward</th>
<th>Reverse</th>
<th>Amp. Length (bp)</th>
<th>Annealing Temp (°C)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exon 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>TCTGTAATGAGGAGAGGACG</td>
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<td>319</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 4</td>
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<td>ATCTGATGCAAAGGACTTGAC</td>
<td>AGGTCAGAGCCTGCGCATTC</td>
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<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>GAGGGACATGAGAGGGAAGGC</td>
<td>GATCTGACCTCTGUCCTGAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 39</td>
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<td>ATCAAGGCTTTCGAGAAAGCC</td>
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<td>391</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 40</td>
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<td>GAGGCGAGTTTTCCTACTGTC</td>
<td>GTAGCTGGTTTCTGAGGATC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 44</td>
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<td>CAGCTACAGATGACCCTACG</td>
<td>AGAGCAAGGAGAGGACATGTC</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>55</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*bp = base pair
RESULTS

Families and Pedigree Analysis

Present study is based on ten families (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J) with non-syndromic hereditary hearing impairment. These families were selected from the populations with frequent consanguineous marriages due to the socio-ethnic reasons and thus considered suitable for locating the defective genes with genetic linkage studies.

Family A

Family A inhabits Larkhana, district in the Sind province. The family members are engaged in regular farming and cattle herding. They prefer to marry within their tribes due to their strict social background and as a result consanguineous marriages are very extensive.

Six individuals including three males and three females were found affected by prelingual non-syndromic hearing loss. Analysis of the pedigree strongly suggests an autosomal recessive mode of inheritance, and consanguineous loops accounted for all the affected persons being homozygous for the mutant allele (Figure 3.1). The affected persons are present in generation V of the pedigree, i.e., three males (V-4, V-5 and V-7) and three females (V-1, V-2 and V-8). All the affected individuals use sign language for communication. Physical examinations were carried out to exclude the syndromic deafness and no external ear abnormalities were observed in any of the affected individuals. Affected individuals ranged in age from 10 to 18 years at the time of study.

Peripheral blood samples were collected from the six affected (V-1, V-2, V-4, V-5, V-7 and V-8) and four normal individuals (III-5, IV-1, IV-2, and V-3) and processed for genomic DNA extraction.

Family B

Family B lives in Rahim Yar Khan, district in the Punjab province. The family members are engaged in subsistence farming and laboring. They follow the local tradition of marrying within the family, resulting in a high rate of consanguineous marriages. The four generation pedigree (Figure 3.2) comprises of six affected individuals out of which three are males (II-3, III-7 and IV-4) and three females (IV-
3, IV-6 and IV-7). Analysis of the pedigree strongly suggests an autosomal recessive mode of inheritance. The affected individuals are present in generations II, III and IV of the pedigree. All the affected individuals exhibited prelingual, bilateral, severe to profound non-syndromic hearing loss and use sign language for communication. Affected individuals ranged in age from 7 to 45 years at the time of study.

After obtaining the informed consent blood samples were collected from 6 members of the family, including four affected (II-3, III-7, IV-3 and IV-7) and two normal individuals (III-1 and IV-5). The affected individual IV-4 was not available at the time of study.

Family C

Family C resides in a remote village near Taj Garh in the Punjab province. The family members are mostly engaged in farming and local trade. Due to strict social customs, traditionally they marry within the family. The five-generation consanguineous pedigree (Figure 3.3) comprises of four affected individuals of which one is male (IV-2) and three females (IV-1, V-4 and V-8). Analysis of the pedigree suggests an autosomal recessive mode of inheritance. All affected persons have prelingual, severe to profound hearing loss. The clinical history of the affected individuals was carefully recorded to exclude the syndromic hearing loss. The ages of the affected individuals varied from 9 to 30 years at the time of study.

After obtaining the informed consent, blood samples were collected from 12 family members including four affected (IV-1, IV-2, V-4 and V-8) and eight normal (III-1, IV-3, IV-5, IV-6, IV-7, IV-8, V-2, V-7) individuals.

Family D

The family D resides in Rahim Yar Khan city. These people are engaged in farming and trade, they rarely marry outside the family and consequently consanguineous marriages are very common. The family contains four generations comprising 28 members (Figure 3.4) of which five were found affected (IV-3, IV-7, IV-8, IV-9 and IV-11). All the affected individuals have prelingual non-syndromic hearing loss. Clinical examination of the affected individuals performed at the local hospital did not reveal the presence of any associated abnormality. The ages of the affected individuals varied from 8 to 20 years.
After obtaining the informed consent, blood samples were collected from 10 family members, including five affected (IV-3, IV-7, IV-8, IV-9 and IV-11) and five normal (III-1, III-2, III-3, IV-1 and IV-10) individuals.

Family E

Family E lives in Rahim Yar Khan district in the Punjab province. The family members are engaged in subsistence farming and trade. They follow the local tradition of marrying within the family, resulting in a high rate of consanguineous marriages. The four-generation pedigree (Figure 3.5) comprises five affected individuals all present in generation IV out of which two are males (IV-3 and IV-4) and three females (IV-2, IV-5 and IV-6). Parents (III-1 and III-2) of the affected individuals are normal. Analysis of the pedigree strongly suggests an autosomal recessive mode of inheritance. All the affected individuals exhibited prelingual, bilateral, severe to profound non-syndromic hearing loss and use sign language for communication. Affected individuals ranged in age from 12 to 20 years at the time of study.

After obtaining the informed consent, blood samples were collected from 7 members of the family, including four affected (IV-2, IV-3, IV-4, IV-5 and IV-6) and three normal individuals (III-1, III-2 and IV-7). The affected individual IV-6 was not available at the time of study.

Family F

Family F lives in Mianwali district in the Punjab province. The family members are engaged in subsistence farming and local market business. Traditionally, they are engaged in marrying within their tribes, as a result there is a high rate of consanguineous marriages. The pedigree comprises of four generations (Figure 3.6) with four affected members in generation I and II, out of which two are males (I-1 and IV-1) and two are females (IV-2 and IV-3). Analysis of the pedigree suggests an autosomal recessive mode of inheritance, and consanguineous loops accounted for all the affected persons being homozygous for the mutant allele. Parents III-1 and III-2 were normal but resulted in one affected male (IV-1) and two affected females (IV-2 and IV-3). All the affected individuals show signs of prelingual, bilateral, severe to profound non-syndromic hearing loss and use sign language for communication. Affected individuals ranged in age from 12 to 43 years at the time of study.
After obtaining the informed consent, blood samples were collected from 6 members of the family, including three affected (IV-1, IV-2 and IV-3) and three normal individuals (III-2, IV-4 and IV-5).

Family G

Family G resides in Mianwali, district in the Punjab province. The family members are engaged in farming and local market business. Pedigree of this consanguineous family is shown in Figure 3.7. Analysis of the pedigree is strongly suggestive of an autosomal recessive mode of inheritance. The pedigree comprises 6 affected and 39 normal individuals. The affected persons are present in generations IV and V of the pedigree. In generation IV, one female (IV-2) and in generation V, five males (V-4, V-5, V-6, V-7 and V-8) are affected. The affected individual IV-2 is deceased. A complete medical history of the affected individuals was obtained to document the age of onset of hearing loss and to exclude the possibility of any syndromic feature associated with hearing loss. The ages of the affected individual varied from 9 to 35 years.

For linkage studies, blood samples were obtained from 12 relatives, including 5 affected (V-4, V-5, V-6, V-7 and V-8) and seven normal (IV-3, IV-5, IV-6, V-1, V-2, V-3 and V-9) individuals. Informed consent was obtained from all individuals prior to blood collection.

Family H

The family H inhabits Vehari area in Punjab district. These people are engaged in farming and cattle herding. Mostly they marry within their families and consequently consanguineous marriages are very common. The family contains 38 members (Figure 3.8) of which seven are affected (IV-2, IV-5, IV-7, IV-10, IV-12, IV-14 and V-1). The normal parent III-10 and III-11 have three affected children (IV-10, IV-12 and IV-14). Similarly, normal parents III-5 and III-6 have two affected individuals (IV-5 and IV-7). All the affected individuals had prelingual non-syndromic hearing loss. Clinical examination of the affected individuals at the local hospital did not reveal the presence of any associated abnormality. The ages of the affected individuals varied from 6 to 35 years.
After obtaining the informed consent, blood samples were collected from 12 family members, including seven affected (IV-2, IV-5, IV-7, IV-10, IV-12, IV-14 and V-1) and five normal (III-5, III-6, III-10, III-11, IV-3) individuals.

**Family I**

Family I resides in Larkhana, district in the Sind province. The family members are engaged in subsistence farming and herding cattle. They prefer to marry within their families resulting in consanguineous marriages. The six generation pedigree of this consanguineous family is shown in Figure 3.9. The pedigree comprises of 8 affected individuals. The affected persons are present in generations V and VI of the pedigree. In generation V, two females (V-3 and V-6) two males (V-4 and V-10), in generation VI, two males (VI-3 and VI-6) and two females (VI-8 and VI-10) are affected. An affected individual V-4 is deceased. The pedigree analysis strongly shows an autosomal recessive mode of inheritance. A complete medical history of the affected individuals was obtained to document the age of onset of hearing loss and to exclude the possibility of any syndromic feature associated with hearing loss. The affected individuals have prelingual hearing loss, which is probably not caused by any environmental factors. The ages of the affected individual varied from 12 to 35 years.

For linkage analysis, blood samples were obtained from 11 relatives, including 5 affected (IV-4, V-5, V-7, V-10 and V-13) and 6 normal (IV-5, IV-8, IV-9, V-4, V-8 and V-11) individuals. Informed consent was obtained from all individuals prior to blood collection.

**Family J**

Family J, a small family, inhabits the Paboki area district in the Punjab province. The family members are engaged in subsistence farming and trade. They have mostly intermarriages. The four generation pedigree (Figure 3.10) comprises three affected individuals, all present in generation IV and nine normal individuals. Out of three affected individuals two are males (IV-2 and IV-3) and one female (IV-4). In generation four, IV-1 normal and IV-2 affected individuals were twins. The normal parent III-1 and III-2 have three affected children suggesting an autosomal recessive mode of inheritance. All the affected individuals have prelingual, bilateral and severe to profound non-syndromic hearing loss and used sign language for communication. Affected individuals ranged in age from 10 to 15 years at the time of study.
After obtaining the informed consent, blood samples were collected from 6 members of the family, including three affected (IV-2, IV-3, IV-4) and three normal individuals (III-1, III-2 and IV-1).

Linkage Studies

Linkage to known loci

Genetic linkage studies in different forms of hereditary hearing loss exemplifies, that some candidate regions must be tested first for either linkage or exclusion prior to go for genome-wide searching. DNA samples of both affected and normal individuals from all the ten families, presented here, were screened first for linkage to DFN1 locus. Three microsatellite markers D13S143, D13S175 and D13S292 from DFN1 linkage interval were used to test the linkage. From the results obtained (not shown), it was instantaneously clear that the affected individuals only in family E showed homozygous pattern of the allele thus suggesting linkage to DFN1 locus. In nine other families, (A, B, C, D, F, G, H, I, J) the heterozygous pattern of different combinations of parental alleles in the affected individuals rapidly and confidently excluded the linkage to DFN1 locus. In order to verify the results obtained with DFN1 linked markers, GJB2 gene (Kelsell et al., 1997), implicated earlier in causing deafness at this locus, was sequenced in two affected individuals from each of the ten families. Sequencing data further supported the exclusion of GJB2 as causative gene for deafness in families A, B, C, D, F, G, H, I and J. In family E, a compound heterozygous mutation was detected in the affected individuals as described later in this section.

Other families, viz., A, B, C, D, F, G, H, I and J were then tested for the linkage to 38 known deafness loci by using two to three polymorphic markers tightly linked to the known loci (http://dnalab-www.uia.ac.be/dnalab/hhh). Linkage to these known loci was conclusively excluded in families A, B and C by the detection of heterozygotes for the microsatellite markers in the affected individuals.

Six families (D, F, G, H, I, J) showed linkage to establish known deafness loci. In family D all the affected individuals (IV-3, IV-7, IV-8, IV-9, IV-11) were homozygous at marker D3S3647 at 68.47 cM thus establishing linkage to DFN6 locus on chromosome 3p14-p21 (Figure 3.11). Another marker D3S2319 at 67.94 cM linked to DFN6 locus was heterozygous only in one of the affected individual (IV-
Since the mutations in TMIE gene, mapped on chromosome 3p21 (Fukushima et al., 1995), has been shown earlier as a causative gene for deafness at this locus (Naz et al., 2002), therefore, it was screened for the mutation identification as illustrated later in this section.

The affected individuals (I-1, IV-1, IV-2, IV-3) in family F were homozygous at marker D17S953 at 43.01 cM (Figure 3.13) and D17S2196 at 44 cM (Figure 3.14) thus showing linkage to DFNB3 locus on chromosome 17p11.2. Since the mutations in MYO15A gene, mapped on chromosome 17p11.2, has been shown earlier as a causative gene for deafness (Friedman et al., 1995), therefore, exons with reported mutations were screened in family F as described later in the chapter.

In family G, linkage was found with markers in the region of DFNB2 locus on chromosome 11q13.5. Affected individuals (IV-2, V-4, V-5, V-6, V-7, V-8) were homozygous with the markers D11S2002 at 85.48 cM (Figure 3.15) and D11S917 at 96.85 cM (Figure 3.16).

In family H, all the affected individuals (IV-2, IV-3, IV-7, IV-10, IV-12, IV-14, V-1) were homozygous with markers D7S650 at 126.75 cM, thus establishing linkage to DFNB17 locus on chromosome 7q31 (Figure 3.17). Another marker D7S490 at 127.82 cM was heterozygous only in one of the affected individual (IV-2) (Figure 3.18).

In family I, affected individuals (V-3, V-4, V-6, V-10, VI-3, VI-6, VI-8, VI-10) showed homozygous pattern of alleles with markers D2S1360 at 38.33 cM (Figure 3.19) and D2S405 at 47.49 cM (Figure 3.20), therefore, mapping this family to DFNB9 locus on chromosome 2p22-p23.

In family J the affected members (IV-2, IV-3, IV-4) were homozygous at markers D14S1280 at 25.87 cM (Figure 3.21) and D14S306 at 44.66 cM (Figure 3.22) while normal individuals were heterozygous for different combinations of the parental alleles thus linking family J to DFNB5 locus on chromosome 14q12.

**Genome-wide search**

Families A, B and C were excluded from the linkage to known deafness loci thus indicating the involvement of novel loci responsible for hearing loss in these families. Therefore, these families were subjected to genome-wide search to identify the Localization of non-syndromic hereditary hearing impairment gene.
disease causing loci. A panel of 390 fluorescently labeled simple tandem repeat (STRP) markers was used to generate genotypes in families A, B and C.

In family A, an initial genome wide scan was conducted on the DNA of the six affected (V-1, V-2, V-4, V-5, V-7, V-8) and four normal (III-5, IV-1, IV-2, and V-3) individuals of the pedigree (Figure 3.1). In the course of screening a marker D19S586 at 32.94 cM on chromosome 19 was found to be homozygous in all the six affected members of the family. This marker D19S586 at 32.94 cM generated significant two-point LOD score of 3.63 indicating linkage to chromosome 19.

For fine mapping of the region identified in family A, twenty six additional markers were selected from the Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998). Ten of these markers, D19S894 (Figure 3.23), D19S216 (Figure 3.24), D19S1034 (Figure 3.25), D19S869, D19S905 (Figure 3.26), D19S922, D19S884, D19S391 (Figure 3.27), D19S916, D19S865 (Figure 3.28) were proximal and sixteen D19S584 (Figure 3.30), D19S558, D19S840 (Figure 3.31), D19S929 (Figure 3.32), D19S432 (Figure 3.33), D19S714, D19S588, D19S252 (Figure 3.34), D19S917 (Figure 3.35), D19S199 (Figure 3.36), D19S899 (Figure 3.37), D19S895 (Figure 3.38), D19S931 (Figure 3.39), D19S918 (Figure 3.40), D19S433 (Figure 3.41), D19S396 (Figure 3.42) distal to D19S586. All 10 family members were genotyped for these markers. Probably due to the high degree of consanguinity, seven markers D19S869, D19S922, D19S884, D19S916, D19S558, D19S714 and D19S588 were found to be non-informative. By MLINK package, a maximum two-point LOD score of 3.28 at recombination fraction zero was obtained for marker D19S586 at 32.94 cM (Table 3.1). Multipoint linkage analysis by using ALLEGRO resulted in a maximum LOD score of 4.58 with several markers in this region (Table 3.2).

Haplotypes were then constructed to determine the critical recombination events in the family (Figure 3.43). The centromeric boundary of this interval was defined by a recombination between markers D19S1034 and D19S905 in individual V-7. The telomeric boundary of this interval corresponds to a recombination event between markers D19S199 and D19S917, which was also observed in individual V-7. Therefore, the maximal interval of linkage identified for the disease locus is bordered by D19S1034 and D19S199, in a region estimated to be 23.68 cM according to Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998) on the chromosome 19p13.3-13.11
(Figure 3.44). This region corresponds to physical map distance of 10.76 Mb (International Human Sequence Consortium 2001 http://genome.ucsc.edu/cgi-bin/hgGateway). This novel disease locus was designated as DFNB68.

In family B genome wide search was performed on the DNA samples of four affected (II-3, III-7, IV-3, IV-7) and two normal (III-1 and IV-5) individuals (Figure 3.2). In the course of screening, a marker PAH at 109.47 cM (Figure 3.51) on chromosome 12q23.1-23.3 was found homozygous in the affected subjects generating two-point LOD score of 1.43. This region was further saturated with 20 additional markers selected from Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998). Twelve of these markers, D12S1345 (Figure 3.45), D12S327 (Figure 3.46), D12S362, D12S101 (Figure 3.47), D12S1716, D12S1051 (Figure 3.48), D12S1300, D12S1063 (Figure 3.49), D12S1588 (Figure 3.50), D12S1641, D12S1600, D12S1727 were proximal to PAH whereas, eight markers, D12S78, D12S815, D12S317 (Figure 3.52), D12S1597 (Figure 3.53), D12S353 (Figure 3.54), D12S1342 (Figure 3.55), D12S2070 (Figure 3.56), D12S2082 (Figure 3.57) were located distal to PAH. Probably, due to the high degree of consanguinity, eight markers D12S362, D12S1716, D12S1300, D12S1641, D12S1600, D12S1727, D12S78 and D12S815 were found to be non-informative. Two-point and multipoint LOD scores were calculated. The marker PAH generated maximum two point and multipoint LOD scores of 1.43 and 1.82, respectively (Table 3.3 & 3.4).

Haplotypes were then constructed to determine the critical recombination events in the family (Figure 3.58). The centromeric boundary of this interval was defined by a recombination between markers D12S1063 and D12S1588 in individual IV-3. The telomeric boundary of this interval corresponds to a recombination event between markers D12S353 and D12S1597. Therefore, the maximal interval for the disease locus is bordered by D12S1063 and D12S353, in a region estimated to be 10.55 cM according to Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998) on chromosome 12q23.1-23.3 (Figure 3.59). This region corresponds to physical map distance of 9.33 Mb (International Human Sequence Consortium 2001 http://genome.ucsc.edu/cgi-bin/hgGateway).

In family C genome wide screen was performed on the DNA samples of four affected (IV-1, IV-2, V-4, V-6) and eight normal (III-1, IV-3, IV-5, IV-6, IV-7, IV-8, V-2, V-4).

Localization of non-syndromic hereditary hearing impairment gene
7) individuals (Figure 3.3). In the course of screening two markers ATA78D02 on chromosome 17 and D9S1120 on chromosome 9 generated LOD scores of 2.05 and 1.48, respectively. The region for ATA78D02 was saturated with 17 additional markers (D17S1308, D17S1840, D17S831, D17S829, D17S1298, D17S1810, D17S1832, D17S906, D17S1791, D17S974, D17S1303, D17S676, D17S947, D17S1856, D17S921, D17S2196, D17S1871) located on chromosome 17 while region for D9S1120 was saturated with 17 markers (D9S1678, D9S104, D9S1853, D9S319, D9S772, D9S1118, D9S1817, D9S50, D9S1874, D9S773, D9S758, D9S1862, D9S301, D9S1876, D9S175, D9S922, D9S910) on chromosome 9, selected from Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998). All the family members were genotyped with these markers. However, the two-point and multipoint linkage analysis failed to generate significant LOD score with any of these markers (Table 3.5 & 3.6).

Mutation Screening

In family D linkage was established with DFNB6 locus harboring TMIE gene. All the 4 exons of TMIE gene were PCR amplified using the primer sets shown in Table 2.2. PCR products were sequenced directly in an ABI Prism 310 automated DNA sequencer. A novel variant (c.92A>G) was identified in exon 1 of the TMIE gene, resulting in the substitution of glutamic acid to glycine (p.E31G) (Figure 3.60).

Table 3.7 illustrates summary of mutations known so far in TMIE gene.

In family E, linkage was detected with DFNB1 locus harboring GJB2 gene. Sequence analysis of the coding exon of the gene revealed a compound heterozygote mutation in the affected individual (Figure 3.61). These individuals carried a paternally derived G-to-A transition at nucleotide position 380 (c.380G>A), resulting in arginine to histidine (p.R127H) (Figure 3.61 C) and a maternally derived G-to-A transition at nucleotide position 457 (c.457G>A), resulting in a missense mutation of valine to isoleucine (p.V153I) (Figure 3.61 D).

Table 3.8 shows sequence variations in GJB2 (connexin-26) gene among the hearing-impaired individuals in different world populations.

In family F, linkage was established with DFNB3 locus harboring MYO15A gene on chromosome 17p11.2. This gene contains 48 exons. Therefore, due to large size of gene and limited sequencing facility available, only exons with known mutations were
sequenced. Nine exons (3, 4, 28, 29, 30, 39, 40, 43, 44) and splice junction sites of MYO15A gene were PCR amplified using the primer sets shown in Table 2.3. PCR products were sequenced directly in an ABI Prism 310 automated DNA sequencer. Mutation screening of nine exons of MYO15A gene showed the absence of any known or novel pathogenic allelic variants.

Table 3.9 shows the summary of mutations known so far in different exons of MYO15A gene.

To ensure that the missense mutations identified in families D and E do not represent neutral polymorphisms in this population, a panel of 100 unrelated unaffected individuals (200 chromosomes) of Pakistani origin was screened for the mutation using PCR followed by sequencing. The mutations were not identified in any individual outside the families.
Figure 3.1. Pedigree of the family A segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals.
Figure 3.2. Pedigree of the family B segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals.
Figure 3.3. Pedigree of the family C segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals.
Figure 3.4. Pedigree of the family D segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals.
Figure 3.5. Pedigree of the family E segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals.
Figure 3.6. Pedigree of the family segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals.
Figure 3.7. Pedigree of the family G segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals.
Figure 3.8. Pedigree of the family H segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals.
Figure 3.9. Pedigree of the family I segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals.
**Figure 3.10.** Pedigree of the family segregating autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss. Circles represent females, squares represent males. Filled squares and circles represent affected individuals. Individuals IV-1 and IV-2 are twins.
Figure 3.11. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D3S3647 at 68.47 cM on chromosome 3. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (IV-3, IV-7, IV-8, IV-9, IV-11) of family D. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Figure 3.12. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D3S2319 at 67.94 cM on chromosome 3. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individuals (IV-3, IV-7, IV-8, IV-9) of family D. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Figure 3.13. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D17S953 at 43.01 cM on chromosome 17. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (IV-3, IV-2, IV-1) of family F. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Figure 3.14. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D17S2196 at 44 cM on chromosome 17. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (IV-3, IV-2, IV-1) of family F. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Figure 3.15. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D11S2002 at 85.48 cM on chromosome 11. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individuals (V-4, V-5, V-6, V-7) of family G. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Figure 3.16. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D11S917 at 96.85 cM on chromosome 11. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individuals (V-4, V-5, V-6, V-7, V-8) of family G. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Figure 3.17. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D7S650 at 126.75 cM on chromosome 7. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, IV-2, IV-5, IV-7, IV-10, IV-14, IV-12) of family H. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Figure 3.18. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D7S490 at 127.82 cM on chromosome 7. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individuals (V-1, IV-5, IV-7, IV-10, IV-14, IV-12) of family H. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Family I
Lane 1 - VI-6
Lane 2 - V-10
Lane 3 - VI-10
Lane 4 - VI-8
Lane 5 - VI-7
Lane 6 - VI-4
Lane 7 - VI-11
Lane 8 - V-8
Lane 9 - VI-3
Lane 10 - VI-1
Lane 11 - V-5
Lane 12 - V-6
Lane 13 - V-15
Lane 14 - V-12
Lane 15 - IV-2
Lane 16 - IV-1
Lane 17 - V-14

Figure 3.19. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D2S1360 at 38.33 cM on chromosome 2. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individuals (VI-6, V-10, VI-10, VI-8, VI-3, V-6) of family I. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family I
Lane 1 - VI-6
Lane 2 - V-10
Lane 3 - VI-10
Lane 4 - VI-8
Lane 5 - VI-7
Lane 6 - VI-4
Lane 7 - VI-11
Lane 8 - V-8
Lane 9 - VI-3
Lane 10 - VI-1
Lane 11 - V-5
Lane 12 - V-6
Lane 13 - V-15
Lane 14 - V-12
Lane 15 - IV-2
Lane 16 - IV-1
Lane 17 - V-14

Figure 3.20. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D2S405 at 47.49 cM on chromosome 2. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individuals (VI-6, V-10, VI-10, VI-8, VI-3, V-6) of family I. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
**Family J**

Lane 1 - IV-2  
Lane 2 - IV-3  
Lane 3 - IV-4  
Lane 4 - III-2  
Lane 5 - IV-1  
Lane 6 - III-1

**Figure 3.21.** Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D14S1280 at 25.87 cM on chromosome 14. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (IV-2, IV-3, IV-4) of family J. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

**Family J**

Lane 1 - IV-2  
Lane 2 - IV-3  
Lane 3 - IV-4  
Lane 4 - III-2  
Lane 5 - IV-1  
Lane 6 - III-1

**Figure 3.22.** Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D14S306 at 44.06 cM on chromosome 14. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (IV-3, IV-4) of family J. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Figure 3.23. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S894 at 15.55 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is heterozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-4) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1
Lane 2 - V-1
Lane 3 - V-2
Lane 4 - V-8
Lane 5 - V-4
Lane 6 - V-5
Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 8 - III-5
Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 10 - IV-2

Figure 3.24. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S216 at 20.01 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is heterozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1
Lane 2 - V-1
Lane 3 - V-2
Lane 4 - V-8
Lane 5 - V-4
Lane 6 - V-5
Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 8 - III-5
Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 10 - IV-2
Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1
Lane 2 - V-1
Lane 3 - V-2
Lane 4 - V-8

Lane 5 - V-4
Lane 6 - V-5
Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 8 - III-5

Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 10 - IV-2

Figure 3.25. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S1034 at 20.75 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is heterozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1
Lane 2 - V-1
Lane 3 - V-2
Lane 4 - V-8

Lane 5 - V-4
Lane 6 - V-5
Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 8 - III-5

Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 10 - IV-2

Figure 3.26. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S905 at 25.17 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5, V-7,) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1
Lane 2 - V-1
Lane 3 - V-2
Lane 4 - V-8
Lane 5 - V-4
Lane 6 - V-5
Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 8 - III-5
Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 10 - IV-2

Figure 3.29. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S586 at 32.94 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1
Lane 2 - V-1
Lane 3 - V-2
Lane 4 - V-8
Lane 5 - V-4
Lane 6 - V-5
Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 8 - III-5
Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 10 - IV-2

Figure 3.30. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S584 at 34.25 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Figure 3.31. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S840 at 37.94 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Figure 3.32. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S929 at 42.00 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Figure 3.33. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S432 at 42.28 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Figure 3.34. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S252 at 42.28 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1
Lane 2 - V-1
Lane 3 - V-2
Lane 4 - V-8
Lane 5 - V-4
Lane 6 - V-5
Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 8 - III-5
Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 10 - IV-2

Figure 3.35. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S917 at 43.34 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1
Lane 2 - V-1
Lane 3 - V-2
Lane 4 - V-8
Lane 5 - V-4
Lane 6 - V-5
Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 8 - III-5
Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 10 - IV-2

Figure 3.36. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S199 at 44.14 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-5) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Figure 3.37. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S899 at 45.48 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Figure 3.38. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S895 at 47.31 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-4, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1  Lane 5 - V-4  Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 2 - V-1  Lane 6 - V-5  Lane 10 - IV-2
Lane 3 - V-2  Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 4 - V-8  Lane 8 - III-5

Figure 3.39. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S931 at 49.75 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family A
Lane 1 - IV-1  Lane 5 - V-4  Lane 9 - V-3
Lane 2 - V-1  Lane 6 - V-5  Lane 10 - IV-2
Lane 3 - V-2  Lane 7 - V-7
Lane 4 - V-8  Lane 8 - III-5

Figure 3.40. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S919 at 50.81 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-8, V-4, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Figure 3.41. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S433 at 51.00 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-2, V-4, V-5, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Figure 3.42. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D19S396 at 51.88 cM on chromosome 19. The marker is homozygous in the affected individuals (V-1, V-4, V-7) of family A. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Table 3.1. Two point LOD scores for linkage of the DFNB68 locus identified in family A to chromosome 19p13.3-13.11 markers.

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<th>Genetic Map (b)</th>
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<td>D19S396</td>
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</tbody>
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(a) Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998)
(b) Rutgers combined linkage genetic map (Kong et al., 2004)
(c) Rutgers combined linkage physical map (Kong et al., 2004)
Table 3.2. Multipoint LOD scores for linkage of the DFNB68 locus identified in family A to chromosome 19p13.3-13.11 markers.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>MARKER</th>
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<th>RUTGERS MAP</th>
<th>BUILD 34</th>
<th>LOD SCORE</th>
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</table>

*Localization of non-syndromic hereditary hearing impairment genes*
Figure 3.43. Pedigree of family A showing hearing loss associated haplotypes.
Haplotypes for the most closely linked STRPs are shown below each symbol. The genetic map distances in centimorgans (cM) according to the Marshfield genetic map are shown in parenthesis next to the marker name. Arrows adjacent to the haplotypes of the corresponding individuals indicate key recombination events. The alleles are denoted 1-2 according to their sizes.
Figure 3.44. Idiogram of the human chromosome 19 showing the candidate linkage interval of DFNB68 identified in the family A. Two other deafness loci DFNB15 (Chen et al., 1997) and DFNA4 (Chen et al., 1995) were also mapped previously on the same chromosome.
**Family B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lane 1 - III-7</th>
<th>Lane 4 - IV-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lane 2 - IV-7</td>
<td>Lane 5 - III-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane 3 - II-3</td>
<td>Lane 6 - IV-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.45.** Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S1345 at 96.09 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individuals (IV-7, IV-3) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

---

**Family B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lane 1 - III-7</th>
<th>Lane 4 - IV-3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lane 2 - IV-7</td>
<td>Lane 5 - III-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane 3 - II-3</td>
<td>Lane 6 - IV-5</td>
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</table>

**Figure 3.46.** Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S327 at 97.98 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individual (II-3) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Family B
Lane 1 - III-7  
Lane 2 - IV-7  
Lane 3 - II-3  
Lane 4 - IV-3  
Lane 5 - III-1  
Lane 6 - IV-5

**Figure 3.47.** Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S1051 at 100.92 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individual (II-3) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family B
Lane 1 - III-7  
Lane 2 - IV-7  
Lane 3 - II-3  
Lane 4 - IV-3  
Lane 5 - III-1  
Lane 6 - IV-5

**Figure 3.48.** Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S1051 at 101.98 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is heterozygous in all the individuals (III-7, IV-7, II-3, IV-3, III-1, IV-5) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Family B
Lane 1 - III-7  Lane 4 - IV-3
Lane 2 - IV-7   Lane 5 - III-1
Lane 3 - II-3   Lane 6 - IV-5

Figure 3.49. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S1063 at 104.63 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individual (IV-7) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family B
Lane 1 - III-7  Lane 4 - IV-3
Lane 2 - IV-7   Lane 5 - III-1
Lane 3 - II-3   Lane 6 - IV-5

Figure 3.50. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S1588 at 105.18 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous in all affected individuals (III-7, IV-7, II-3, IV-3) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Family B
Lane 1 - III-7            Lane 4 - IV-3
Lane 2 - IV-7            Lane 5 - III-1
Lane 3 - II-3            Lane 6 - IV-5

Figure 3.51. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker PAH at 109.47 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (III-7, IV-7, II-3, IV-3) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family B
Lane 1 - III-7            Lane 4 - IV-3
Lane 2 - IV-7            Lane 5 - III-1
Lane 3 - II-3            Lane 6 - IV-5

Figure 3.52. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S317 at 114.28 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (III-7, IV-7, II-3, IV-3) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Family B
Lane 1 - III-7
Lane 2 - IV-7
Lane 3 - II-3
Lane 4 - IV-3
Lane 5 - III-1
Lane 6 - IV-5

Figure 3.53. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S1597 at 114.28 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous in all the affected individuals (III-7, IV-7, II-3, IV-3) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Family B
Lane 1 - III-7
Lane 2 - IV-7
Lane 3 - II-3
Lane 4 - IV-3
Lane 5 - III-1
Lane 6 - IV-5

Figure 3.54. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S353 at 115.18 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individual (II-3) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Figure 3.55. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S1342 at 116.08 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individual (III-7) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.

Figure 3.56. Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S2070 at 125.31 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individuals (III-7, IV-7) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
**Family B**

Lane 1 - III-7  
Lane 2 - IV-7  
Lane 3 - II-3  
Lane 4 - IV-3  
Lane 5 - III-1  
Lane 6 - IV-5

**Figure 3.57.** Electropherogram of ethidium bromide stained 8% non-denaturing polyacrylamide gel for marker D12S2082 at 130.94 cM on chromosome 12. The marker is homozygous only in the affected individuals (IV-7, IV-3) of family B. The Roman numerals indicate the generation number of the individuals within a pedigree while Arabic numerals indicate their position within a generation.
Table 3.3. Two point LOD scores of region identified in family B to chromosome 12q23.1-q23.3 markers.

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<th>Genetic Map</th>
<th>LOD SCORE at 0 =</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>D12S1064</td>
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<td>D12S1345</td>
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<tr>
<td>D12S327</td>
<td>97.78</td>
<td>Inf</td>
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<tr>
<td>D12S101</td>
<td>100.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>D12S1051</td>
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<td>D12S1063</td>
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<td>D12S1588</td>
<td>105.18</td>
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<td>PAH</td>
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<td>1.43</td>
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<td>D12S317</td>
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<tr>
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(a) Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998)
Table 3.4. Multipoint LOD scores of region identified in family B to chromosome 12q23.1-q23.3 markers.

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<tr>
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(a) Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998)
Figure 3.38. Pedigree of family B showing hearing loss associated haplotypes. Haplotypes for the most closely linked STRPs are shown below each symbol. The genetic map distances in centimorgans (cM) according to the Marshfield genetic map are shown in parenthesis next to the marker name. Arrows adjacent to the haplotypes of the corresponding individuals indicate key recombination events. The alleles are denoted 1-2 according to their sizes.
Figure 3.59. Idiogram of the human chromosome 12 showing the candidate linkage interval identified in the family B. Other deafness loci DFNA25 (Greene et al., 2001), DFNA48 (D'Adamo et al., 2003) and DFNA41 (Blanton et al., 2002) were mapped previously on the same chromosome.
Table 3.5. Two point LOD scores calculated in family C to chromosome 17 markers.

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<td>D17S831</td>
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<td>D17S829</td>
<td>10.02</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

(a) Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998)
Table 3.6. Two point LOD scores calculated in family C to chromosome 9 markers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MARKER</th>
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<th>0.05</th>
<th>LOD SCORE at θ =</th>
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<td>D9S1118</td>
<td>58.26</td>
<td>-4.3825</td>
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<tr>
<td>D9S1817</td>
<td>59.34</td>
<td>-inf</td>
<td>1.1782</td>
<td>-0.6835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9S50</td>
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<td>2.1695</td>
<td>-0.3452</td>
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<tr>
<td>D9S1874</td>
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<tr>
<td>D9S301</td>
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<td>D9S1876</td>
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<td>-0.0457</td>
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<td>D9S175</td>
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<tr>
<td>D9S922</td>
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<td>D9S1120</td>
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<td>D9S910</td>
<td>104.48</td>
<td>-inf</td>
<td>-0.661</td>
<td>-0.3885</td>
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</table>

(a) Marshfield genetic map (Broman et al., 1998)
Figure 3.60. Representative chromatograms generated by Big Dye Terminator sequencing of exon 1 of TMIE gene in family D. A) DNA sequence of carrier mother (III-3) B) DNA sequence of affected individual (IV-7) showing a novel missense mutation c.92A>G (p.E31G). Arrow indicates the site for the nucleotide change.
**Table 3.7. Mutations reported in *TMIE* gene so far**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exon</th>
<th>Nucleotide Change</th>
<th>Amino Acid Change</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intron 1</td>
<td>IVS1delAGCCCCAinsC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>Naz <em>et al.</em> (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon 2</td>
<td>125insGCC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Naz <em>et al.</em> (2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exon 3</td>
<td>250C&gt;T</td>
<td>R84W</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Naz <em>et al.</em> (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon 1</td>
<td>92A&gt;G</td>
<td>E31G</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>Present study</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3.6L Representative chromatograms generated by Big Dye Terminator sequencing of coding exon of GJB2, gene in family E. A) DNA sequence of carrier father (III-1). B) DNA sequence of carrier mother (III-2). C and D) DNA sequence of an affected individual showing compound heterozygous missense mutation: c.380G>A (p.R127H) on the paternal allele and c.457G>A (p.V153I) on the maternal allele. Arrows indicate the site for the nucleotide change.
Table 3.8. Sequence variations in *GJB2* (connexin-26) gene among the hearing-impaired individuals in different world populations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Common Mutations</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>35delG, 167delT</td>
<td>Sobe et al. (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>35delG</td>
<td>Mustapha et al. (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>35delG</td>
<td>Medjej-Hashim et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>35delG</td>
<td>Najmabadi et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>427C&gt;T (R143W)</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>35delG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>35delG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>South America</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>35delG</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>East Asia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>235delC</td>
<td>Abe et al. (2000)</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td><strong>Indian subcontinent</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>British Asian</td>
<td>231G&gt;A (W77X)</td>
<td>Rickard et al. (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>71G&gt;A (W24X)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>71G&gt;A (W24X)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>71G&gt;A (W24X)</td>
<td>Aasar (2004)</td>
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<td>231G&gt;A (W77X)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>457G&gt;A (V153I)</td>
<td>Present Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>380G&gt;A (R127H)</td>
<td>Present Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exon</td>
<td>Nucleotide Change</td>
<td>Amino Acid Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intron 4</td>
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<td>Exon 28</td>
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<td>Exon 28</td>
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<td>I892F</td>
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<td>Q1229X</td>
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<td>3898A&gt;T</td>
<td>K2601X</td>
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<td>Exon 44</td>
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<tr>
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DISCUSSION

Hearing impairment is the most common sensory disorder worldwide. Tremendous progress has been made in our understanding of the molecular basis of hearing loss. Through recent advances, we have begun to understand the fascinating biology of the auditory system and unveiled new molecular mechanisms of hearing impairment. More than 100 loci have been mapped, and 40 of the nuclear genes responsible for non-syndromic deafness have been identified. Autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing loss (ARNSHL) is genetically extremely heterogeneous. Considering the complexity of the auditory system, which requires interaction of a diversity of proteins including ion channels, extracellular matrix, cytoskeletal proteins, and transcription factors, this is not surprising.

To date 68 autosomal recessive non-syndromic hearing impairment loci (DFNB1-DFNB68) have been mapped and 21 corresponding genes have been cloned, which encode variety of proteins. Despite the high degree of heterogeneity, the phenotype in ARNSHL families is remarkably similar. It is typically characterized by congenital, profound sensorineural hearing loss. However, there are exceptions, DFNB8, which maps to chromosomal region 21q22, is characterized by late-onset hearing loss beginning at 10 to 12 years of age and progressing by age of 14 to 16 to profound hearing loss (Veske et al., 1998). Other is the DFNB13, where affected persons have prelingual hearing loss that is moderately severe and then becomes severe to profound or profound during the second to third decades (Mustapha et al., 1998).

To identify the genes underlying the ARNSHL phenotype, in the families presented here, a classical linkage analysis approach called "Homozygosity Mapping" was followed. Lander and Botstein (1987) reasoned that a recessive gene could be mapped using the offspring of consanguineous unions in an approach they called "Homozygosity Mapping". The homozygosity mapping revolves around the underlying principle that fraction of genome of consanguineous matings would be expected to be homozygous in the offspring because of an expected identity by descent. It can be predicted that approximately 1/16th of the genome of offspring of first cousin matings could be predicted to be homozygous. The region of homozygosity has to be randomly distributed between different offsprings of such
matings, except at common disease locus shared by the affected offspring (Sheffield et al., 1995).

In the present study, ten highly consanguineous families (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J), demonstrating autosomal recessive form of non-syndromic hearing loss, were ascertained from diverse population living in remote areas of Pakistan. The affected individuals in the families had prelingual severe to profound hearing loss. The clinical history of the affected individuals excludes the syndromic and other acquired forms of hearing loss. The affected individuals from various age groups showed the same level of severe hearing loss implying that deafness was not progressive in any of the families studied.

Genetic linkage in the ten families, presented here, was initially searched by using polymorphic microsatellite markers located in the linkage intervals of 38 known autosomal recessive non-syndromic deafness loci. Two to three markers per locus were used to genotype affected individuals in each family. Seven families (D, E, F, G, H, I, J) showed linkage to establish known deafness loci. Family D linked to DFNB6 locus on chromosome 3p14-p2. In family E, linkage was established to DFNB1 locus on chromosome 13q12, family F showed linkage to DFNB3 locus on chromosome 17p11.2, family G, linked to DFNB2 locus on chromosome 11q13.5, family H linked to DFNB17 locus on chromosome 7q31, family I mapped to DFNB9 locus on chromosome 2p22-p23 and family I showed linkage to DFNB5 locus on chromosome 14q12. In the other three families (A, B, C) linkage to known loci was conclusively excluded, thus indicating the involvement of novel loci responsible for deafness in these families. Genome-wide search was then undertaken in these three families to identify the disease loci.

The initial genome-wide search with fluorescently labeled simple tandem repeat (STRP) markers spaced approximately at ~10 cM intervals was conducted by use of the DNA from both affected and normal individuals in each of the three families. Screening of these markers in family A revealed the genetic linkage between a novel hearing loss locus DFNB68 and markers on chromosome 19p13.3-13.11. Significant evidence of linkage to this chromosomal region was found with two-point LOD score of > 3.0 with markers D19S865 and D19S586 (Table 3.1). Haplotype analysis located the DFNB68 locus in a 23.66 cM genetic interval between the markers D19S1034 and D19S199. Two other deafness loci DFNB15 (Chen et al., 1997) and DFNA4 (Chen et


al., 1995) were also mapped previously on the same chromosome (Figure 3.44). The novel deafness locus DFNB68 identified in family A is telomeric to autosomal dominant DFNA4 locus (Fig. 3.44). The other locus (DFNB15) was mapped to two regions, 3q21.3-q25.2 and 19p13.3-p13.1 (Chen et al., 1997). However, it has not been established which one of these regions actually holds the causative hearing impairment gene, or if there is digenic inheritance for the family involved. One caveat was that the maximum LOD score that could ever be derived for the DFNB15 family was less than 3.0, and analyses of both regions on chromosomes 3 and 19 resulted in a LOD score of 2.8. The new locus DFNB68 is contained within the DFNB15 interval on chromosome 19. In family A there is no evidence of linkage to chromosome 3q or to any other chromosome, discounting any possibility of digenic inheritance. Nevertheless, this does not bolster or refute the hypothesis that a hearing impairment gene in the 19p13 region caused the hearing impairment in the DFNB15 family. Due to the lack of evidence that the hearing impairment locus is the same as DFNB15, this novel locus on 19p13.3-p13.11 was assigned as DFNB68.

Several candidates appear to be highly interesting in the DFNB68 interval. Among the well characterized genes that mapped in the region include KEAP1 (MIM 606016), CTL2 (MIM 606106), ZNF121 (MIM 194628), DNMT1 (MIM 126375), ICAM1 (MIM 147840), SMARCA4 (MIM 603254), RAB3D (MIM 604350), ZNF136 (MIM 604078), DHPS (MIM 600944), CALR (MIM 109091), RPS28 (MIM 603685), HNRPM (MIM 160994), MYO1F (MIM 601480), DNAJ1B1 (MIM 604572), ILVBL (MIM 605770), NOTCH3 (MIM 600276). KEAP1 (Kelch-like Ech associated protein 1) is a functional repressor of transcription factor NRF2 (MIM 600492), which is a regulator of detoxifying and antioxidant genes. It was discovered that the Kelch repeat domain of the KEAP1 protein associates with the SH3 domain of MYO7A in specialized adhesion junctions in the testis (Velichkova et al., 2002). Moreover, both KEAP1 and MYO7A are expressed in cell bodies of cochlear inner hair cells, and it was proposed that KEAP1 facilitates the association of MYO7A with the actin cytoskeleton of hair cell stereocilia, thus promoting cell adhesion that is important for stereocilia bundle organization. The CTL2 (choline-transporter like protein 2) gene encodes a highly conserved transmembrane protein which is the target of antibody-mediated hair cell loss (Nair et al., 2004). The protein is expressed in cochlear and vestibular supporting cells, and is purported to function in these cells for as a choline
transporter. MYO1F is also known in this region, which is actin-based motor molecules with ATPase activity. Unconventional myosins serve in intracellular movements. Their highly divergent tails are presumed to bind to membranous compartments, which would be moved relative to actin filaments. There is a need to sequence these genes to find out the functional sequence variants.

In family B genome scan revealed a potential autosomal recessive deafness locus on chromosome 12q23.1-q23.3. Two-point and multipoint analysis generated LOD scores of 1.43 and 1.82, respectively (Table 3.3 and 3.4). Expected LOD score that could be obtained in this family was 2.05. Haplotype analysis placed the region in a 10.55 cM genetic interval between the markers D12S1063 and D12S353. Further support of linkage to this recessive deafness region can be obtained by identifying and mapping additional families at this region.

Previously, three deafness loci including DFNA25 (Greene et al., 2001), DFNA41 (Blanton et al., 2002) and DFNA48 (D'Adamo et al., 2003) were mapped on the same chromosome 12. The potential deafness genetic region identified in family B overlaps with the autosomal dominant non-syndromic hearing impairment locus DFNA25 (Greene et al., 2001). The DFNA25 locus maps between markers D12S327 (97.78 cM) and D12S84 (117.81 cM) and thus the genetic interval for the family B lies within the genetic interval for DFNA25. There are two possible explanations for this finding. Firstly, the two deafness disorders could be caused by mutations in the same gene which would map within the overlapping interval of the two loci. On the other hand, the possibility of two deafness-related genes lying close to each other on 12q21-q24 cannot be ruled out. Instances of both phenomena have been reported in previous studies. It has been observed that different mutations in the same gene can cause both autosomal dominant and recessive non-syndromic hearing impairment (e.g. GJB2, MYO7A, TECTA and TMC1) (Van Camp and Smith, 2005). Mutations of Cx26 gene can cause non-syndromic recessive (DFNB1) and dominant deafness (DFNA3) (Kelsell et al., 1997; Denoyelle et al., 1998). On the other hand, two distinct genes, Cx26 and Cx30, account for deafness segregating with both DFNB1 and DFNA3 locus (Kelsell et al., 1997; del Casillo et al., 2002). So, only the isolation of genes in this region is expected to elucidate the relationship between the two disorders. Moreover, several non-syndromic deafness genes have been shown to be responsible for isolated and syndromic forms of deafness (Hereditary Hearing loss Home page
URL: http://dnalab-www.uia.ac.be/dnalab/hhh/). This has been the case for the MYO7A gene. Mutations of MYO7A can cause both non-syndromic hearing impairment (DFNB2 and DFNA11) and syndromic deafness (USH1B) (Weil et al., 1995; Weil et al., 1997; Liu et al., 1997b).

Database searches revealed numerous genes in the likely deafness region identified in family B. Among the well characterized genes mapped to this interval are SLC25A3 (MIM 600370), APAF1 (MIM 602233), SPIC (MIM 608781), ARL1 (MIM 603425), SLC5A8 (MIM 608044), IGF1 (MIM 147440), ARK5 (MIM 608130) (Human Genome Browser Gateway http://genome.ucsc.edu/cgi-bin/hgGateway). SLC25A3 (solute carrier family 25 member 3 isoform a) encodes protein which catalyzes the transport of phosphate into the mitochondrial matrix, either by proton co-transport or in exchange for hydroxyl ions. It is integral membrane protein present in mitochondrial inner membrane. Huizing et al. (1998) studied the human tissue distribution of mitochondrial transmembrane metabolite carriers by Northern and Western blot analyses and found the high expression of SLC25A3 gene in heart, skeletal muscle. APAF1 (apoptotic protease activating factor isoform a) encodes a cytoplasmic protein that initiates apoptosis. Soengas et al. (2001) showed that APAF1 is inactivated in metastatic melanomas, leading to defects in the execution of apoptotic cell death. SPIC (Spi-C transcription factor) a probable transcription factor that binds to the PU-box, a purine-rich DNA sequence that can act as a lymphoid-specific enhancer. It is preferentially detected in fetal and adult spleen, lymph nodes and at lower levels in bone marrow and fetal liver. ARL1 (ADP-ribosylation factor-like 1) encodes protein, belongs to the ARL (ADP-ribosylation factor-like) family of proteins, which are structurally related to ADP-ribosylation factors (ARFs). ARFs, described as activators of cholera toxin (CT) ADP-ribosyltransferase activity, regulate intracellular vesicular membrane trafficking, and stimulate a phospholipase D (PLD) isoform (Hong et al., 1998). SLC5A8 (solute carrier family 5, iodide transporter) expressed in normal colon mucosa, kidney, lung, esophagus, small bowel, stomach, thyroid, and uterus. SLC5A8 plays a role in the active renal reabsorption of lactate (Gopal et al., 2004). IGF1 (insulin-like growth factor 1 (somatomedin C) isolated from plasma, are structurally and functionally related to insulin but have a much higher growth-promoting activity. IGF1 deficiency is an autosomal recessive disorder characterized by growth retardation, sensorineural deafness and mental retardation.
(Woods et al., 1996; Bonapace et al., 2003). ARK5 (AMPK-related protein kinase 5) encodes protein involved in tolerance to glucose starvation. It is expressed at high levels in heart and brain.

In family C, the linkage data obtained from genome scan and further saturation of the two chromosomal regions (ATA78D02 and D9S1120) with additional markers failed to define a region harboring a causative gene for deafness. However, it has been planned that for future studies clinical status of all the normal and affected individuals of the family will be checked again and genome scan will be performed with microsatellite markers spaced at 5 cM intervals.

In family D, linkage was detected with markers linked to DFNB6 locus on chromosome 3p14-p21. The entire coding region of TMIE gene, responsible for hearing loss at this locus (Fukushima et al., 1995), was sequenced for a possible mutation. Sequence analysis of exon 1 of the gene discovered A to G transition at nucleotide position 92, resulting in a glutamic acid to lysine amino acid substitution (p.E31G) (Figure 3.60). The amino acid change is predicted to occur at the extracellular region and is conserved in the mouse Tmie protein but not in Tmie-like proteins of Drosophila melanogaster and Caenorhabditis elegans (Santos et al., 2006).

The importance of the TMIE gene as a cause of hearing impairment cannot be known until other populations are studied. Although, the function of TMIE in the inner ear remains unknown, there are indications that the protein may have a role in both stereocilia maturation and auditory nerve function. The deaf Tmie-mutant spinner mouse was shown to have progressive hair cell degeneration with irregular apical surfaces of hair cells and extra rows of maturing stereocilia in inner hair cells (Mitchem et al., 2002). Also, the absence of auditory brainstem response in spinner mice correlates with spiral ganglion degeneration (Deol and Robins, 1962; Mitchem et al., 2002). In another mouse model called circling, the mapped locus also includes the Tmie gene (Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2002; Cho et al., 2003), and the circling mouse also exhibited hair cell axonal and spiral ganglion degeneration (Lee et al., 2001). There is a similar pattern of histologic features in Cdh23+/ Pedh15+ and Ush1C+/+ mice (Johnson et al., 2003; Zheng et al., 2005). Additionally, the CDH23, PCDH15, and USH1C proteins have been identified as stereocilia bundling proteins. However, it is difficult to surmise whether the hair cell
and spiral ganglion loss in the Tmie mouse mutants were due to primary stereocilia defects or to secondary responses to another type of inner ear malfunction.

The occurrence of putatively functional sequence variant in the extracellular domain of the TMIE protein may indicate the importance of this segment to cochlear function, but the lack of protein structures that are similar to TMIE inhibits prediction of how these sequence variants may cause hearing impairment. More information on related protein structures should help in building a good model for the pathophysiologic role of TMIE in the inner ear.

In family E, sequencing of the single coding exon of GJB2 (MIM 121011) gene revealed a compound heterozygous mutation in the affected individuals. These individuals carried a paternally derived (R127H) (Figure 3.61 C) and a maternally derived (V153I) missense mutation (Figure 3.61 D).

Mutations in the GJB2, coding for gap junction protein connexin 26 (Cx26), are responsible for more than 50% cases of prelingual non-syndromic hearing loss in many populations (Rabionet et al., 2000; Kelsell et al., 2001). The topology of connexins is highly conserved, consisting of four transmembrane domains (M1-M4), two extracellular domains (E1-E2) and three cytoplasmic regions. Connexins are gap junction proteins, which constitute a major system of intercellular communication important in the exchange of electrolytes, second messengers and metabolites (White et al., 1998). In the inner ear, connexin 26 is expressed in the supporting cells, stria vascularis, basement membrane, limbus and the spiral prominence of the cochlea (Lautermann et al., 1998). The sensory hair cells of cochlea allow potassium ions to pass through during the mechanosensory transduction process of normal hearing. These potassium ions are recycled across the supporting cells and fibrocytes at the base of hair cells through the gap junctions of the stria vascularis and back to the K-rich endolymph. Mutations in the GJB2 gene would result in complete or partial loss of function of the Cx26 protein, interfering with recycling of potassium ions and thus hampering the normal process of hearing. Some GJB2 mutations have high prevalence rates in specific populations, namely: 35delG among people of European descent, 167delT in the Ashkenazim, 235delC among East Asians, and 427C>T(R143W) in the Ghanaian population (Gasparini et al., 2000; Lerer et al., 2000; Hamelmann et al., 2001; Yan et al., 2003).
The spectrum of GJB2 variants in Pakistan may reflect shared origins of hearing impairment alleles within the Indian subcontinent. For example, the Slovak Romanies who migrated from India demonstrated a similar pattern of GJB2 allele distribution, with the 71G>A(W24X) and 380G>A(R127H) variants as most common (Minarik et al., 2003). Although there was similarity in the GJB2 variants that were observed in Pakistanis and Indians, absolute frequencies were not similar. The allele frequency of GJB2 sequence variants is two times higher in India than in Pakistan (Roux et al., 2004). For putatively functional variants, the prevalence rate in India is three times higher than in Pakistan. Notably, the 71G>A(W24X) variant is seven times more common in India than in Pakistan whereas 231G>A(W77X) comprised a bigger proportion of GJB2 alleles among Pakistanis (Maheshwari et al., 2003; Roux et al., 2004). It could be hypothesized that the elevated consanguinity rates in Pakistan vs the rest of the subcontinent have depressed the GJB2 prevalence in this country. It is hypothesized that the increased GJB2 frequency in some countries is due to assortative mating among the deaf (Nance and Kearsey, 2004). Notably, consanguinity is about twice as frequent in Pakistan than in India, which lends further support to the idea that the lower GJB2 prevalence in Pakistan compared to India may be due to a higher consanguinity rate. Additionally, random genetic drift may explain the difference in GJB2 prevalence between India and Pakistan (Santos et al., 2003).

Family F showed linkage to DFNB3 locus on chromosome 17p11.2. MYO15A gene has been shown earlier as a causative gene for deafness at this locus (Friedman et al., 1995). Sequence analysis of nine exons, with known mutations, in the affected individuals of family F failed to detect any sequence variant, suggesting the presence of a novel mutation in the un-sequenced exons or the regulatory sequences of the gene.

Myosins are molecular motors that bind actin and use ATP to generate force for movement along actin (Baker and Titus, 1997; Sellers, 2000). Four motor protein genes encoding myosin VI, myosin VIIA, myosin XVA, and nonmuscle myosin IIA (MYH9) are essential for normal auditory function. Mutant alleles of these four myosin genes are associated with hearing loss (Avraham et al., 1995; Friedman et al., 1999; Lalwani et al., 2000).

Mutations in MYO15A have been associated with profound, congenital, neurosensory, non-syndromic deafness. Mutations of myosin MYO15A are therefore, responsible for
at least 5% of recessively inherited, profound hearing loss in Pakistan (Liburd et al., 2001). Wang et al. (1998) identified the human MYO15A gene by combining functional and positional cloning approaches. They showed that MYO15A gene has at least 50 exons spanning 36 kb. Sequence analysis of these exons in affected individuals from 3 unrelated DFNB families revealed 2 missense and 1 nonsense mutations that co-segregated with congenital recessive deafness. Liburd et al. (2001) found novel mutations in the MYO15A gene associated with profound congenital hearing loss, including Q1229X, IVS4+1G-T and Q2716H in families from Pakistan and India. Belyantseva et al. (2005) concluded that the interaction of MYO15A with whirlin is a key event in hair bundle morphogenesis. The extent to which mutations of MYO15A contribute to hereditary hearing loss in other populations remains to be determined.

Family G linked to DFNB2 locus on chromosome 11q13.5. MYO7A gene known at this locus reported to be responsible for both syndromic and non-syndromic deafness (Liu et al., 1997a; Weil et al., 1997). Myosin 7A, consists of 49 exons spanning approximately 114 Kb of genomic DNA and produced a 7.5 Kb message (Levy et al., 1997). Unconventional myosins participate in various functions that include endocytosis, regulation of ion channels, localization of calmodulin, movement of vestibules and particles in the cytoplasm and anchoring inner ear cell stereocilia. In situ hybridization experiments have shown that it expresses in both the cochlear and vestibular neuroepithelia as well as retinal pigment epithelia (Weil et al., 1996). The observations gathered seem to be in line with the hypothesis that many of the recessive mutations in MYO7A are pathogenic by loss of function. Presently, 88 pathological MYO7A mutations have been published. The distribution has been collectively mapped to each myosin structural region (GeneClinics, www.geneclinics.com). Although, the majority of these mutations were discovered in ethnically diverse Usher IB patients, four MYO7A mutations were reported in three autosomal recessive deafness (DFNB2) families (one Tunisian, two Chinese) and one MYO7A mutation was reported in a Japanese family presenting autosomal dominant non-syndromic deafness (DFNA11) (Liu et al., 1997a,b; Weil et al., 1997).

Family H showed linkage to DFNB17 locus on chromosome 7q31. Nineteen known genes and over 20 other cDNAs have been identified in this region (Guo et al., 2004). Among the well characterized genes five cochlear expressed genes are present in this
region, which includes ion transport SLC26A3 (MIM 126650) (Hogland et al., 2001; Van Camp and Smith, 2003) and SLC26A4 (MIM 605646) (Everett et al., 1997; Malaka et al., 2002), transcription regulation (HBPI) (MIM 191290) (Bidart et al., 2000), extracellular matrix function (LAMB1) (MIM 150240) (Lesage et al., 1994) and neural vesicle transport (SYPL) (Leube, 1994; Pikkarainen et al., 1994).

SLC26A3 (Solute carrier family 26 member 3) encodes protein, which is a transmembrane glycoprotein that functions as a sulfate transporter. It is localized to the mucosa of the lower intestinal tract, particularly to the apical membrane of columnar epithelium and some goblet cells. Mutations in this gene have been associated with congenital chloride diarrhea. SLC26A4 (Solute carrier family 26 member 4) encodes integral membrane protein. It is highly homologous to the SLC26A3 gene; they have similar genomic structures and this gene is located 3' of the SLC26A3 gene. The encoded protein has homology to sulfate transporters. It shows high expression in adult thyroid, lower expression in adult and fetal kidney and fetal brain. Mutations in SLC26A4 gene are associated with Pendred syndrome, the most common form of syndromic deafness, an autosomal-recessive disease (Everett et al., 1997). Defects in SLC26A4 are also the cause of autosomal recessive neurosensory deafness DFNB4.

Family I mapped to DFNB9 locus on chromosome 2p22-p23. Otoferlin (OTOF), the causative gene for this locus, consists of 48 exons spanning approximately ~90 Kb of genomic DNA (Mirmohamizadeh et al., 2002a). Knowledge of the tissue specific expression of otoferlin is currently limited to results, primarily from mouse, based on in situ hybridization, northern analysis and RT-PCR studies (Yasunaga et al., 2000). The otoferlin gene is expressed in the inner hair cells, the utricle, and the sacculus. It is probably involved in the transport of membrane vesicles to the plasma membrane. Analysis of the primary structure of the otoferlin gene identifies two domain types that offer an indication of what otoferlin might be doing and what other molecules might interact with it. It has six C2 motifs (Ca^{2+} binding domains) and a transmembrane domain at its C terminus. Because of the presumed role of otoferlin's orthologue, the Caenorhabditis elegans fer-1 gene in membrane fusion (Achaanzer and Ward, 1997) and the sequence similarity of its C2 domains to synaptotagmin I, it is likely that otoferlin plays a role in membrane trafficking activated by increased local Ca^{2+} concentration.
Different mutations of OTOF gene have been identified in various families. Yasunaga et al. (1999) identified a nonsense mutation (p.Y730X) in Lebanese families. By sequencing the 48 exons of the OTOF gene in Indian families a splice site mutation has been identified in intron 8 (Yasunaga et al., 2000). These studies demonstrated that long ototulin isoforms are required for inner ear function. Adato et al. (2000) studied the molecular basis of hearing impairment in 4 Druze families and identified a mutation in exon 5 of the gene in one of the family. Migliosi et al. (2002) determined that Q829X mutation in OTOF gene was responsible for 4.4% of recessive familial or sporadic cases of deafness in the Spanish population. Varga et al. (2003) identified a frame shift mutation (1778delG) two missense mutations (p.Q48R and p.P50R) and a splice site mutation (IVS39+1G>C) in different families.

Family J showed linkage to DFNB5 locus on chromosome 14q12. Several genes are present in this region viz., COCH (MIM 603196), STXBP6 (MIM 607958), NOVA1 (MIM 602157), AP4S1 (MIM 607243), AKAP6 (MIM 604691) (Human Genome Browser Gateway http://genome.ucsc.edu/cgi-bin/hgGateway). COCH (Cochlin precursor) associated with the extra-cellular matrix. It is expressed in inner ear structures; the cochlea and the vestibule. Defects in COCH are the cause of autosomal dominant non-syndromic sensorineural deafness type 9 (DFNA9) (MIM 601369) (Manolis et al., 1996). Affected individuals have mucopolysaccharide depositions in the channels of the cochlear and vestibular nerves. STXBP6 (Syntaxin-Binding Protein 6) is cytoplasmic, and peripheral membrane protein. It is detected at low levels in brain, and at very low levels in heart, adrenal gland, testis, liver and kidney (Scales et al., 2002). NOVA1 (Neuro-oncologic Ventral Antigen 1) gene encodes a neuron-specific RNA-binding protein, a member of the Nova family of paraneoplastic disease antigens that is recognized and inhibited by paraneoplastic antibodies (Buckanovich et al., 1993). These antibodies are found in the sera of patients with paraneoplastic opsoclonus-ataxia, breast cancer, and small cell lung cancer. AP4S1 (Adaptor-Related Protein Complex 4, Sigma-1 Subunit) subunit of novel type of clathrin- or non-clathrin- associated protein coat, involved in targeting proteins from the trans-Golgi network (TGN) to the endosomal-lysosomal system. It is a heterotetramer composed of two large chains (epsilon/AP4E1 and beta/AP4B1), a medium chain (mu/AP4M1) and a small chain (sigma/AP4S1) associated with the trans-Golgi network. It is widely expressed (Dell'Angelica et al., 1999). AKAP6 (A-
Kinase Anchor Protein 6) are a group of structurally diverse proteins, which have the common function of binding to the regulatory subunit of protein kinase A (PKA) and confining the holoenzyme to discrete locations within the cell. This gene encodes a member of the AKAP family. The encoded protein is highly expressed in various brain regions and cardiac and skeletal muscle. It is specifically localized to the sarcoplasmic reticulum and nuclear membrane, and is involved in anchoring PKA to the nuclear membrane or sarcoplasmic reticulum (McCarty et al., 1995).

There has been a rapid progress in the field of hereditary hearing loss. Several genes have been identified. These genes belong to a wide variety of protein classes: from myosins and other cytoskeletal proteins, over channel and gap junction components, to transcription factors, extracellular matrix proteins and genes with an unknown function. The identification of several deafness genes has enabled geneticists to offer DNA diagnostic tests for some types of non-syndromic hearing loss. Moreover, it holds the promise to significantly improve the molecular knowledge on the auditory and vestibular organs and on the pathological mechanisms leading to hearing loss. This opens perspectives for future therapeutic and preventive measures for hearing loss. The function of some of these genes is still mystery but valuable clues to the function of other have come from establishing the type of protein that they encode and their expression patterns. Understanding the function of these genes has not only provided us with insight into the molecular basis of deafness but also of normal auditory function. Consequently, we now have a better understanding of the genetic control of inner ear development, melanocytes development, hair cell maintenance and survival, and potassium movement during auditory transduction.

The past decade has witnessed impressive advancements in auditory research. With both the human and mouse genomes sequenced to near completion and the advent of gene chip technology, gene discovery and functional genomics in the auditory system will continue at a rapid pace. To this end, we are ever closer to an enhanced understanding of the hearing process, which will lead to increased availability of diagnostic and presymptomatic genetic testing options, early intervention, and disease-based treatments. Functional studies of non-syndromic deafness genes will elucidate the complex functional and homeostatic mechanisms in the inner ear. Ultimately, availability of gene therapy for the affected patients will bring to closure the circle of detection, identification, and correction of the disease. In the coming
years, further deafness genes are sure to be identified, and mouse models for the human disease will be constructed as a start in the long process of understanding the pathological processes involved in deafness. The rate of discovery of deafness genes by positional cloning in human will be accelerated by the freely available human genome sequence and by a catalogue of ESTs (expressed sequence tags) within genetic intervals known to contain locus for human hereditary hearing loss. Although the dissection of the genetic complexity of the human auditory system presents formidable challenges, with the aid of mouse functional genomic approaches we can look forward to an increasingly deep insight into the multiple pathways that are required for hearing. There are many surprises still ahead of us.
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Electronic-Database Information

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