PAKISTAN'S POLICY
Towards
ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT
(1948-1973)

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to the memory of my (late) father whose vision shall always be the guiding star of my life.
ABSTRACT

The Palestinian Question is a centuries old problem which at different stages of history has involved different nations and civilizations. The strategic position of the territory of Palestine, and the location of Holy Shrines belonging to three principal religions of the world, namely Islam, Christianity and Judaism, have been the main factors responsible for the contention among the Christians, Muslims and Jews over the land of Palestine.

The Palestinian Problem in the modern sense starts with the capture of the territory by the British during the First World War and issuance of Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917 pledging to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Before that Palestine was under the suzerainty of Ottoman Empire but after the defeat of Turkey, the British were entrusted the control over Palestine under the Mandate system of the League of Nations. During the Mandate period (1922-1948) the British endeavoured to convert Palestine into a National Home for Jews as promised by them under the Balfour Declaration. For this purpose, they allowed large scale immigration of Jews into Palestine. This was opposed by the Palestinian Arabs who constituted more than two third majority of the population of Palestine, with the resultant outbreaks of Arab revolts against the
British rule over Palestine. The British crushed the revolts in a ruthless manner with the help of the Jews.

The atrocities perpetrated on the Palestinian Arabs provoked resentment and condemnation throughout the Arab and Muslim World including the Muslims of South Asia who were strongly linked with the land of Palestine on the basis of common religion, culture and history.

In 1948, Palestine was partitioned in accordance with a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, and the state of Israel was set up. The Western Powers, particularly the United States who had vital strategic and economic interests in the Middle East played crucial role in the establishment of Jewish state of Israel. The Western Powers continued to finance, arm and provide other assistance to the Israelis, as a result of which they were able to defeat the Arab armies in the First Arab-Israel War of 1948.

The principles on which Pakistan’s policy towards Arab-Israel Conflict is based have been formulated by such factors as geographical contiguity, common religion, traditional, cultural links and considerations of economic benefit and political support in her disputes with India.

These principles have largely remained unchanged, but there have been variations due to Pakistan’s security links with the Western Powers, especially the United States who have been principal supporters of Israel against the Arabs.
In mid-1950s, Pakistan allied herself with the Western Powers by joining SEATO and Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). It was the security pressure from India and Afghanistan which compelled Pakistan to join these military pacts, but the military alliance with the West led to a divergence of perception of the nature and implications of the Arab-Israel Conflict between Pakistan and the Arabs. This divergence sharpened during the 1956 Suez Crisis. As a result, Pakistan lost much of the Arab good will that she had earned in the earlier years by openly supporting the Arabs against Israel and her Western patrons. Thus, an important objective of Pakistan's policy towards the Arab-Israel Conflict, namely to win Arab political and moral support in disputes with India, suffered a serious set back.

In June, 1967 the third Arab-Israel War broke out. In this war Israel captured large territories belonging to Egypt, Jordan and Syria, including Jerusalem. The occupation of Arab territories and Jerusalem gave new dimension to the Palestinian Problem. The occupation and subsequent annexation of Jerusalem by Israel created great resentment and bitterness in the Muslim world. The firing incident at the Holy Mosque al-Aqsa caused further anguish among the Muslims throughout the world. These developments led to the holding First Islamic Summit at Rabat in September, 1969 which decided to mobilize world public opinion to force Israel to relinquish her occupation of Arab territories and Jerusalem. The Summit also decided to extend full support to
the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the legitimate and sole representative organization of the Palestinian people.

Pakistan extended full support to the Arab states attacked by Israel in the June, 1967 War. The Government of Pakistan even offered material assistance to Egypt, Syria and Jordan. On the question of occupied Arab territories, Jerusalem and al-Aqsa, the Government of Pakistan fully endorsed the Arab stand.

The convergence of perception of the Arab-Israel Conflict between Pakistan and the Arab states that grew during and after 1967 War, was due to the weakening of military pacts which, previously, put a constraint on Pakistan's foreign policy. But, a shift in the US foreign policy under Kennedy Administration, the development of Super-Power Détente and the attitude of the United States during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, compelled Pakistan to distance herself away from the military pacts like SEATO and CENTO. The growth of close and friendly relations between Pakistan and China, and improvement in bilateral relationships between Pakistan, and the Arab countries were the symbols of Pakistan’s independent and (practically) non-aligned foreign policy. Under this policy Pakistan was able to take more independent stand on the Palestinian Question as it is evident from Pakistan’s representative’s
performance at the United Nations and other international forums.

In October, 1973, the fourth war between the Arabs and Israel broke out. The war had become inevitable because of Israeli refusal to vacate the occupied Arab territories and Jerusalem. In this war the combined forces of Egypt and Syria achieved some important tactical victories in the initial phases of the war. But their military gains were thwarted by huge US arms airlift to Israel after two weeks of intense fighting. Angered by the American arms supply to Israel, the Arab countries resorted to an embargo on the oil supplies to the Western nations. Shah Faisal of Saudi Arabia played a leading role in the Oil Embargo which ultimately forced the Jewish State to enter into two disengagement of forces agreements with Egypt on the Canal front.

Pakistan expressed complete solidarity with the Arabs during 1973 October War. The Government of Pakistan provided not only material assistance to the Arabs, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Z. A. Bhutto toured a number of Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries to mobilize political and diplomatic support to the Arabs on a broadly based united front of the entire Muslim world.

Pakistan's policy during the 1973 October War was greatly appreciated by the Arab countries. This was evident from the speeches and statements of the Arab leaders, including the chairman of P.L.O, Mr. Yasser Arafat, who
participated in the Second (Lahore) Summit of Islamic countries held at Lahore in February, 1974.

Pakistan not only supported the Arab’s war against Israel, she also endorsed the use of oil weapon by the Arabs against the Western countries. The pursuit of such an independent policy by Pakistan was due to further weakening of country’s links with the western countries through military pacts, especially after the separation of East Pakistan which led to Pakista’s dissociation from SEATO.
PREFACE

At the very outset I thank All Mighty Allah who enabled me to undertake this study to a successful completion.

This is a critical study of Pakistan's policy towards the Arab-Israel Conflict during the 1948-1973 period. The principles underlying this policy have remained unchanged, however, there have been variations in their operationalization due to Pakistan's security links with the Western Powers, particularly the United States. Due to security pressure from India and Afghanistan, Pakistan entered into an alliance relationship with the United States under SEATO and Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) in mid-1950s. Since the United States and the Western Powers have been principal supporters of Israel, Pakistan's alliance relationship with the West caused variations in her traditional stand on the Arab-Israel Conflict.

The Study focuses mainly on Pakistan's policy towards the Arab-Israel Conflict but it also contains discussions on the strategic and economic importance of
the Middle East region. It is the strategic and economic value of the Middle East which has elevated the issue of the Arab-Israel Conflict to the status of a global problem. The United States and Western Powers have vital strategic and economic interests in the Middle East which further enhances the international relevance of the conflict between the Arabs and Israelis. It is in this context that Pakistan's policy towards the Arab-Israel Conflict is discussed and analyzed in the study that follows.

Pakistan cannot remain un-affected by the Arab-Israel Conflict in the Middle East because, apart from geographical contiguity, she has closely been linked with the countries of this region on the basis of common religion, culture and economic interests. These factors have shaped Pakistan's traditional stand on the Palestinian Question and the Arab-Israel Conflict.

This study endeavours to find how Pakistan's traditional stand on the Arab-Israel Conflict has been affected by her alliance relationship with the United States.
The Study could have been further improved had I not been refused access to the official records of the Government of Pakistan by the Foreign Office on the plea of secrecy. It is regrettable that the researchers, especially Pakistani's, are denied an access to the official records of the Government of Pakistan. There have been no practice of de-classifying official documents after a period of 30 years. It is only recently that the Government of Pakistan took a decision to de-classify some of the official documents falling under the 30 years limit.

But the lack of cooperation from official quarters has greatly been compensated by the help and encouragement which I was fortunate enough to get from my supervisor, Professor Dr. Munir-ud-Chughtai, the Vice-Chancellor of the Punjab University. He was kind enough to spare some time for my guidance out of his extremely heavy schedule. He helped me to identify sources, both primary and secondary, that enriched this study, and came to my rescue at the most critical moments. It would have been impossible to complete this work without his help and guidance.
My full thanks should also go to two of my colleagues, Professor Dr. Masasn Askari Rizvi and Dr. Hamid H. Kizilbash who rendered valuable advice on a number of occasions. Both went through some parts of original draft of the study and suggested useful adjustments.

My thanks are also due to my family, especially my wife who at every step shared the burden of hard and long hours of work.

Last but not least, I should express my deep thanks to M/S Fahad Computer Composers, Printers and Publishers, Urdu Bazar Lahore for bringing out this study in print. I am particularly indebted to Rana Mohammad Yousaf, Sheikh Mohammad Ejaz, Mohammed Sabir and Khalid Mahmoud for working day and night to print this work in record time.
INTRODUCTION

There are few international issues which equal the Arab-Israel conflict in persistence for defying a permanent solution or are potentially more dangerous for world peace and security.¹

The Arab-Israel Conflict has implications not only for the Middle East but for the rest of the world especially the Muslim states. The involvement of two super-powers has added to the complexity of the conflict, enhancing its international relevance. It is in this context that Pakistan’s policy toward the Arab-Israel conflict: 1948-1973 is discussed in the work that follows:

The Arab-Israel conflict occupies a prominent place in the foreign policy of Pakistan for a number of reasons, Firstly: It involves the land of Palestine which is very sacred to the people of Pakistan as it is for the Muslims all over the world. The Muslims of South Asia have always been concerned about the developments in Palestine. Like Muslims of pre-partition India, the people of Pakistan have always extended full and whole hearted support to the Arab cause on Palestine. Due to the fact that Jerusalem was declared the First Quibla for the Muslims and Palestine

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¹ Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan, first foreign minister of Pakistan and head of Pakistani delegation to the UN General Assembly’s Second Session which passed the Partition of Palestine Resolution in November, 1947, once remarked: "..... this problem of Palestine has plagued that unfortunate territory for 2000 years and will continue to plague that territory, it is possible, for another 2000 years. It will always be with us," Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), November 28, 1949.
formed a part of the Arab world for a period of about thirteen hundred years, the people of Pakistan strongly resented the foreign attempts aimed at what they perceive usurping the land of Palestine. The people of Pakistan have reacted very emotionally over the Palestinian Question, and it has been their earnest desire that the policy of the government of Pakistan should reflect their sentiments as expressed when the Palestinian Question exploded into open hostilities between the Arabs and Israel.

This study, therefore, tries to find out to what an extent Pakistan's policy has reflected the public feelings in Pakistan expressed through demands, demonstrations, resolutions and calls made during the active phases of the Arab-Israel Conflict. For this purpose, Pakistan's stand on the Arab-Israel wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 is discussed and analyzed along with public reaction toward these wars.

Secondly: the Arab-Israel Conflict is centered in Middle East. Geographically, Pakistan is situated so close to this region that some people regard Pakistan as a Middle Eastern country. Geographical contiguity, therefore, makes Pakistan an essential element in any strategic plan for the Middle East.

Thirdly, Middle East is the region where vital strategic and economic interests of the Western Powers, including the United States are located. Britain and France
have historically been associated with this region. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has actively been involved in the Middle Eastern affairs. The part played by the United States in the creation of Israel and subsequent American support to the Jewish States, is a prominent feature of US role in the Middle East.

Middle East is also situated close to the Soviet Union's southern borders. In mid-fifties, the Soviet Union started taking important steps in promoting her influence in the Middle East by siding with the Arabs in their conflict with Israel, and extending support to the forces of radical Arab nationalism against Western colonialism. The Soviet Union also provided economic, technical, and military assistance to the Arab States. The Arab-Israel conflict, therefore, did not remain merely on issue between the Arabs and Israel, the two super-powers also became deeply involved in it. The US-Soviet Cold War had its own impact on the Arab-Israel conflict.

During the height of Cold War i.e., in mid-fifties, Pakistan joined US sponsored military alliance system and became a member of Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). The Arab countries (except Iraq) were opposed to the Baghdad Pact, perceiving it to as attempt by the Western Powers to "freeze" the Arab-Israel dispute.
This study endeavours to see how Pakistan's alliance with the Western Powers affected Pakistan's traditional stand on the Arab-Israel Conflict.

Fourthly: One of the most cherished goals of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to strengthen and promote Muslim unity. This goal has so consistently been pursued that it has been enshrined in all the three constitutions of Pakistan i.e., 1956, 1962 and 1973 constitutions. In the pursuit of this goal, Pakistan assigned priority to its relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Since Arab-Israel conflict has been the most perplexing question of Middle East, it is to be seen how Pakistan's stand on this issue contributed to securing the goal of Muslim unity and Arab's good will and support for Pakistan on disputes with India.

The period under study is from 1948 to 1973. The main reason for selecting this period is that during it there were fought four wars between the Arabs and Israel. It was during these wars that Pakistan's policy towards this issue was expressed in more clear terms, making it possible to

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2. The relevant provisions in the three (1956, 1962, and 1973) constitutions of Pakistan are the following:

1956 Constitution: Art. 24, The State shall endeavour to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries .......

1962 Constitution, Principle No. 21 under Article 7 and 8 ch. 2.

The bonds of unity amongst Muslim countries should be preserved and strengthened ............

1973 Constitution Art. 40. The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim Countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of Asia, Africa and Latin America ..............

As already pointed out, Palestine has always been an important issue for the people of Pakistan and they have extended full support to the Arabs on this issue. This policy is a continuation of the stand taken by the Muslims of South Asia since the announcement of Balfour Declaration in 1917. As it has been correctly observed "...the struggle for Pakistan and the struggle of the Arabs in Palestine got intertwined." The Palestinian question and the stand taken by Pakistan on it, have, therefore been widely been written about and commented upon in the country. But this material mostly consists of articles (in the press or research journals) and chapters in the books dealing with the foreign policy of Pakistan. There has been no comprehensive work on Pakistan’s policy toward the Arab-Israel conflict which deals with the issue in the changing pattern of Pakistan’s foreign policy during the period 1948-1973. This study endeavours to discuss and analyze


4. The article by M. Aslam Qureshi (See n. 3) is an excellent exposition of the genesis and import of the Palestinian problem and a good account of Pakistan’s support to the Arabs on this issue. Some of other articles dealing with Pakistan and the Arab-Israel Conflict are. Dar, Saeed-ud-Din Ahmad, "The Suez Crisis (1956) and Public Opinion in Pakistan," Contemporary Affairs, Rawalpindi, Spring, 1969 and "Pakistan and Rannuz War, Pakistan Horizon, Second Quarter, vol. XXIX No. 2, 1976, Khalida Qureshi, "Pakistan and the Palestinian Cause," in Masuma Hasan (ed) Pakistan in Changing World (Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978)
Pakistan’s stand on the Arab-Israel conflict keeping in view the regional and international implications of the problem.

The study is divided into TEN chapters

CHAPTER I

This chapter focuses on the historical, religious and strategic importance of the land of Palestine, the conflicting claims of the Arabs and the Jews on this land, it also discusses the rise of Zionism and its relations with the objectives of European, especially British, colonialism. This chapter also contains a discussion on motives behind the British efforts for securing a League Mandate over Palestine. The British pledges made to the Arabs during the First World War under Hussain-MacMahon talks, Balfour Declaration and Sykes-Picot Pact are also discussed. The discussion on these developments is followed by a survey of the Palestinian Problem till it was finally presented to the United Nations in 1947. As the Palestinian Problem unfolds itself during this period, the reaction from the Muslims of South Asia is discussed.

CHAPTER II

This part of work includes the UN discussions on the Palestinian Problem leading to the partition of Palestine and the birth of the State of Israel. Also included in this chapter is a survey of Arab-Jewish clashes before the end of the British mandate in Palestine and circumstances leading to the outbreak of the First Arab-Israel War of 1948.
It also discusses the role of Pakistani delegation during the discussions on the Palestinian Problem in the UN General Assembly. Pakistan's reaction, both at the official and public level toward the partition of Palestine and the 1948 Arab-Israel War is also discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER III

This chapter discusses important developments taking place in the Middle East during the period from the end of the First Arab-Israel War 1948 to the outbreak of the Suez Crisis in 1956. These developments include the active US diplomatic role in the Middle East, the U.S. plan of setting up the Middle East Command, Revolution in Egypt and rise of Arab nationalism with its militant anti-colonial and anti-Zionist over tones, the formation of Baghdad Pact and Pakistan's accession to this pact. The Arab reaction toward the Baghdad Pact is also discussed in this Chapter. The impact of Pakistan's alliance with the United States and membership of Baghdad Pact on relations with the Is

Arab countries is also discussed here.

CHAPTER IV

It is an account of the developments that led to the nationalization of Suez Canal by Egypt in 1956 and the resultant hostilities between Egypt on the one hand and Israel, Britain and France on the other. There is a discussion on the international efforts for resolving the dispute over the nationalization of the Suez Canal symbolize
by the First and Second Suez Conference held in London. The chapter also contains a discussion on the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Suez Crisis.

It also deals with the official stand taken by the Government of Pakistan on the issue of Suez nationalization, Pakistan’s role during the London conferences on Suez and attitude toward British-French and Israeli invasion of Egypt in October-November 1956. The Arab and Pakistan’s people’s reaction toward Pakistan’s official stand on the Suez issue also forms a part of this chapter.

CHAPTER V

This part of the study discusses the June 1967 Arab-Israel War, the developments that led to it and its consequences. Also included is a discussion on the state of tension between Israel and her neighbours due to the unresolved position of the Palestinian Question, the struggle of the Palestinians to regain their homeland, Israel’s compulsions to expand her frontiers due to economic and strategic reasons and the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

Pakistan’s active response to this war is analyzed here in the back-drop of Pakistan’s disenchantment with military pacts and growth of independent trends in Pakistan’s foreign policy. This chapter also includes discussion on how Pakistan’s stand during the 1967 war led to an improvement in Pakistan’s relations with the Arab Countries.
CHAPTER VI AND VII

In these two chapters the issues of Palestinian Refugees, Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) and occupied Arab territories and Jerusalem are discussed. These issues are the products of Arab-Israel Conflict over Palestine. While discussing these issues it is endeavoured to find out how they became responsible for increased tension and open hostilities between the Arabs and Israel.

The stand taken by Pakistan on these issues both in the United Nations and outside it is also discussed, especially the role of Pakistan in the UN Security Council and General Assembly discussions on the Holy City of Jerusalem is highlighted.

CHAPTER VIII

Here the October 1973 (Ramadan) War between the Arabs and Israel and the circumstances leading to this war are discussed. These developments include the escalated tension between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States due to former's refusal to vacate Arab territories and Jerusalem captured in the 1967 war; the "War of Attrition" between Egypt and Israel, the failure of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the UN and US to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict, fire incident in Al-Aqsa and the significance of First Islamic Summit, the State of "no war and no peace" in the Middle East and finally Sadat's diplomatic efforts before the outbreak of war are discussed in this chapter.
Along with a brief account of the war events, the US airlift of arms to the Israel and Arab Oil Embargo, are also discussed in this chapter.

**CHAPTER IX**

It contains, discussion on Pakistan’s response to the 1973 Arab-Israel war. These discussions include an account of the diplomatic activities, material, support and political backing of the Government of Pakistan to the Arab side during and after the war. In this respect the significance of the Second Islamic (Lahore) Summit and Pakistan’s role in it, are especially discussed.

**CHAPTER X**

This chapter contains the concluding remarks on the study.
CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

The most contentious issue in the Arab-Israel conflict is the territory of Palestine. Sacred to the three leading religions of the world-Islam, Christianity and Judaism—the territory is claimed by the Palestinian Arabs and Jews. The Arab-Israel conflict in simplest terms, therefore is a struggle for supremacy in Palestine between the Zionists and the Arabs.¹

Palestine is the name of a land of the eastern Mediterranean, comprising parts of the existing states of Israel, Jordan and Egypt. Palestine was named after the Philistines who occupied the southern coastal part of the country in the 12th century B.C. The area, first called Philistia gave its name in the 2nd century A.D. to Syria Palestine, the southern portion of the Roman province of Syria. The name Palestine was revived as an official title when the British secured a mandate to govern the country after it was detached from the Ottoman Empire after First World War.²

¹ Hollingworth, Clare, The Arabs and the West, (London Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1952) p. 121.
² Encyclopaedia Britannica (1973, Vol. 17,) p. 155 According to the Encyclopaedia Americana, the name of Palestine was first used in the 5th century B.C. by the Greek historian Herodotus who spoke of "that part of Syria called Palestine". Prior to this designation, the Egyptians Tell-el-Amarna tablets (14th century B.C.) had referred to the region as Kinnani, and Canaan is the name most commonly used in the Old Testament. (The Encyclopaedia Americana, (1983 Ed, Vol. 21,) p. 198) Regardless of its origin and fluctuations in its boundaries, it is an agreed fact that the area, though being small, had carried throughout history, an immense strategic importance, because through it pass the main roads from Egypt to Syria and from the Mediterranean to the hills beyond Jordan. It is because of being situated strategically on the cross roads to three continents of the world--Asia, Africa and Europe—that "no comparable
Although Jews claim Palestine as their land on historical grounds, yet it is a known fact that Palestine was a land of the Jews for only a very short period. At the dawn of history when Palestine and Mesopotamia belonged to the same people, a very ancient culture in Palestine was known to the Babylonians and Egyptians as Amarru, during the third millennium B.C. It were the Amorites who built Jerusalem and called it Jerus, the city of Amorite God Uru. In the second millennium B.C., the Canaanites (Canaanite means merchant) known also as Phoenicians appeared on the scene and embarked on farming the valleys and trading with other peoples of the area. They were followed by Philistines who came from a highly advanced Mediterranean direction and gave the area the name of Palestine. Supplementary knowledge produced by the modern research about Palestine tells us that Arabs migrating from Yemen had settled in Palestine as early as 3500 B.C., while the Hebrews led by Moses came there 2000 years later. The first Hebrew kingdom was established by King David (circa 1010-970 B.C.) and the chief symbol of Hebrew culture and thought has always been the temple built by David's son, Solomon, in Jerusalem (circa 970-950 B.C.) Although at one point Hebrew rule extended as far as borders of Egypt and Assyria, before David and after Solomon no central government exercised

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undisputed dominion over Palestine (the kingdom of David and Solomon lasted only about 70 years). 4

Palestine and its city Jerusalem was the target of attack and destruction by a number of nations. In sixth century B.C., the Jews were exiled to Babylon. In 66-70 B.C. there was an abortive Jewish revolt against the Romans which culminated in the destruction of Jerusalem. After that till 1948 A.D. there was no independent Jewish rule in Palestine. For seven centuries Palestine remained a Roman then Byzantine province. From 64-A.D. until 1948, the country was wholly Arab in character, history and tradition. Palestine existed as part of the nation of Islam, and although it remained subject to the political control of the Ottoman Empire for over 600 years, it preserved and maintained its local character as an Arab country. 5 All Arab Palestinians, almost without exception, felt themselves to be part of the great Arab awakening stirring since the last years of nineteenth century. 6

After the destruction of Jerusalem at the Roman hands most of the Jews left Palestine to settle in other parts of the world, like Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria and across the Mediterranean in Greece. In 636 A.D. Jerusalem fell to the


5. Ibid, p. 609.

armies of Abu Ubaydah, the great commander of Hazrat Omer, the second Caliph of Prophet (peace be upon him). Although Muslim conquest pledged religious freedom to the Jews and some of their rituals were restored, another wave of Jewish emigration followed the Arab conquest and they resettled in North Africa and Iberia.

It is important to note that the Jews who lived in Arab ruled countries received far fairer treatment than those who lived in the Western world dominated by Christianity. In Arab countries they accepted assimilation into the Arab nation (As the late Prime Minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion conceded in an interviews with American newsmen in 1964, and yet preserved their religious affiliation. The Muslim Arabs practiced a degree of religious tolerance which was unmatched in the Western World until the advent of the French Revolution. Jews and Christians were permitted to practice their religious creeds while enjoying the civic, political and economic benefits of citizenship. In sharp contrast, an era of Christian persecution of the Jews followed the downfall of Muslim rule in Spain. Those persecution of the Jews followed the downfall of Muslim rule

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7. Before the Muslim conquest of Palestine, the Jews were barred from entering Jerusalem, under a long-established tradition vigorously carried out by the Christian patriarch, except on the 9th day of Ah(August) for the specific purpose of mourning by the Wailing Wall.

When Caliph Omer visited Jerusalem, he issued a pledge to grant the inhabitants of the city "security of their lives properties, churches and crosses". Although, on the insistence of the patriarch, the tradition of Jewish banishment from the city was included in the pledge, the Muslims did not keep that part of the pledge and the Jews were gradually allowed back into Jerusalem under Arab rule. (Kishtaiy op.cit. p.37)

in Spain. Jews who survived the Grand Inquisition without converting to Christianity either retreated to Arab North Africa or sought refuge in Central Europe.⁹

**RISE OF ZIONISM**

The French and American Revolutions brought a new era to the Western world in which intolerance and persecution on religious grounds was replaced by tolerance, respect for Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. During this period of Enlightenment, Jews and their religion began to live in safe conditions; but there were many parts of Europe where dark shadows of Middle Ages persisted. The Jews in Central Europe and Russia still faced persecution, even Massacres. In those lands of continued oppression, large scale emigration seemed to offer Jews their brightest hope. Accordingly huge majorities of migrating Jews turned to the West particularly Great Britain and the United States. However, some did return to Palestine; while there were some 12,000 Jews in that land in 1845, this number increased to 80,000 in 1914, the difference due in large part, to European immigration.¹⁰

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⁹ *Ibid.* p.610; The author of "The History of Jewish People", M. James Parkes says that Jews enjoyed great benefits under Islamic rule in Spain and they were permitted to join military and public services. The Jews who faced persecution in Christian Europe were being urged upon to migrate to the areas under Muslim rule. One such call was contained in a letter from a prominent Jew Issac Zarfati, an emigrant from Germany to Turkey, address-ed to the Jews in Central Europe asking them to abandon the lands where they suffered continued ill-treatment and join him under the Turkish Sultans where Jews were treated with every kind of favour. James Parkes, "History of the Jewish People" London: Veidenfeld and Nicolson 1962) pp.50-51, 102; see also pp. 40-45 and p.75; Kishonay Khalid op.cit pp. 50-51.

¹⁰ Bassioni and Fisher op. Cit p. 611 quoting from Royal Palestinian Commission Report (1937) at p.9
In the wake of the Industrial Revolution in most of the European countries during nineteenth century, the Jews who before that, monopolized and controlled the economies and finances of the European countries began to face intense competition from the newly emerged and enterprising middle classes of non-Jewish stock. This led to the spread and strengthening of Jewish nationalism, on the one hand, and a need of a new land for settlement—most preferably—Palestine.

The Jews who lived in comparatively less developed eastern European territories joined the nationalist movement of Jews-Zionism—because of their yearning for "a better, brighter future" in which Palestine was the goal.

Branches of a new nationalist movement, "Hoveve Zion" (Love of Zion)¹¹ began to appear in Eastern Europe during the late 1880s. This was the origin of Zionist Movement, which received wide notice and international attention when Theodor Herzl wrote his pamphlet, Der Juden Staat (The Jewish State) (published in 1894) contending that only a sovereign Jewish nation capable of dealing with other nations on a basis of equality could protect Jewish rights throughout the world.¹² Although as "a true political movement and as an international force, Zionism is

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¹¹ Zion, in the Old Testament, is a topographical designation of the eastern hill of the two hills of ancient Jerusalem, the site of the Jebusite city captured by David and established as his capital. Some scholars believe that name also belonged to the stronghold of "Zion taken by David which may have been the citadel of the city of Jerusalem (Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1973, Vol.23) p.974

¹² In his pamphlet Herzl wrote, "The idea which I have developed is an ancient one. It is the restoration of the Jewish state..." (Quoted Walter Laqueur "History of Zionism" (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p.84.)
considered the "creation and invention" of Herzl,\(^1\) he had precursors in Germany, Russia and in other countries whose writings reflected the longing of Jews for "ancient homeland".\(^2\)

Herzl's plan, as he himself put it, was simple in design but complicated in execution. It was of two parts: assumption of responsibility for Jewish national affairs by a political body to be called the Society of Jews; and management of both the exodus of the Jews and their resettlement by a technical body to be called Jewish Company. The first was to treat with governments, seek to obtain their consent to an assumption of Jewish Sovereignty "over a neutral piece of land" and then administer the territory as a provisional government. The second was to take the form of Chartered Company, established in London under English law. It was to be endowed with a large working capital and designed to assume responsibility for the liquidation of the migrants assets in their countries of origin and then provide land, housing and employment in the new country in exchange.\(^3\)

As to the land where 'Jewish State' was to be established, Herzl in his "Judensta'im had still left the

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14. According to Walter Laqueur, the term Zionism was first publicly used by Nathan Birnbaum at a discussion meeting in Vienna on the evening of 23 January, 1892, although it had already appeared in print on a few occasions in 1890/91 without, however, any clear political connotation. The history of political Zionism begins with the publication of Herzl's "Judensta'im four years later and the first Zionist Congress in 1897. Walter Laqueur, op.cit, preface.

15. Vital, David *The Origins of Zionism*, op.cit. p 263
question open whether it was to be Palestine or Argentina. Argentina, he wrote was one of the most fertile countries in the world, sparsely populated and with a temperate climate it would be in the highest interest of the Republic of Argentina to cede to the Jews a portion of its territory.

He had also kept Palestine as an option and for that purpose travelled to Constantinople with an offer that if the Sultan were to give Palestine to Jews, they would in turn, undertake the management of Turkey's finances and save the Sultan from chronic bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{16} Herzl, however, returned from Constantinople empty handed.

At first, Herzl's' ideas were not taken seriously and among the Jews who took it seriously there was a deep division. Majority thought it was a Chimera, a revival of medieval messianic; Gudeman, Vienas' chief rabbi, who had been close to Herzl, sharply attacked his ideas in a pamphlet in which he protested against "Kuckucksei" of Jewish nationalism, maintaining that the Jews were not a nation; that they had in common their belief in God, and that Zionism was in conflict with the teachings of Judaism.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} Laqueur, \textit{op.cit.} p.95.

\textsuperscript{17} Laqueur \textit{op.cit.} p.96. In fact, upto the rise of Nazism there were relatively few Jews who were attracted to the standard of Zionism (Endelman Todd. M., "Jews, Judaism and the Land of Israel: Historical perspective" in Harry S. Allen, Ivan Volgyes (ed), Israel, the Middle East and the U.S. Interests, (Praeger, 1983) p.13. Even now not all the Jews in Israel itself are Zionists. Neither is Zionism, in some sense or other, an integral or essential component of Judaism (many Orthodox Jews and several Hassadie sects still persist in their implacable hostility to Zionism which was for long also shared by the Reform Jews. Michael Selzer (ed) Zionism Revisited: The Rejection of Jewish Normalcy (Macmillan, 1970) p.xi (Introduction).
In 1897 the First Zionist Congress was held at Basle in Switzerland where a new World Zionist Organization was established with Herzl as its first international president. The Basle Congress approved and issued a programme known as Basle Declaration that called to "create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law".\textsuperscript{18}

One of the clauses of Basle Declaration consisted of "steps towards obtaining "government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism" which meant efforts for securing willingness and support of the leading powers of the world for the cause of "Jewish national home" in Palestine. The Zionists had tried to get approval of their plan from the Sultan of Turkey but failed. Before approaching Britain the Zionists had turned to Russia, Italy, Austria and Germany for the purpose of enlisting from these powers the support and sympathy for their design in Palestine. But none of these powers came out with an open support for the Jewish state in Palestine which was at that time under the suzerainty of Ottoman Empire.

**BRITISH COLONIALISM ZIONISM, AND STRATEGIC PALESTINE**

The Zionists, however, soon discovered that the most, and perhaps the only effective power among the European nations for lending a helping hand to the cause of Zionism was Britain. The world political scene, particularly the

\textsuperscript{18} For full text of Basle Declaration see Walter Laqueur The Israel-Arab Reader A Documentary History of the Middle East (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1968) p.6
situation in the Middle East, before the First World War justified the Zionist cause in Palestine. British role in promoting Zionist perception of British role in promoting Zionist cause in Palestine. Britain at that time was the leading power in the world, and in the Middle East exercised control over Egypt, Sudan, Aden and Trucial States of the Southern Arabian peninsula. Of all these possessions Egypt was the most important and its strategic value had further been enhanced with the opening of Suez Canal in 1869.  

The Zionist movement concentrated all their attention on seeking British support for securing their objective in Palestine, because they envisaged the establishment soon of British control over the area. Situated along the southern coast of the Mediterranean this area had always carried great strategic importance throughout history. Palestine, Sinai and Nile Delta had been strategically important because, as has already been stated these areas are situated on the cross-roads to three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. For Europe, these areas have been especially important because they provided the meeting point for the purposes of exchange in goods, ideas, culture and civilization. Due to its strategic location, it has been said that ".... whoever holds the eastern and southern

19. Napoleon whose campaign in Egypt in 1798 produced basic changes in the internal policies of area and the Middle Eastern states and in European diplomacy toward the Islamic countries is said to have told Sir Hudson Lowe, The Governor of St. Helena, "The great thing to remember is that Egypt is the most important country of the world". Giubb J.B. "The Middle East Situation" in Khadduri, Majidia Ed. The Arab-Israel Impasse, (Washington, 1968) p. 29 see also Hurwitz J.C., Diplomacy in the Near East, A Documentary Record 1535-1941. (D.Van Nostrand Co; Inc. Princeton N.J. 1955) pp. 61-62.
shores of the Mediterranean dominates Europe". Speaking of the strategic importance of Egypt Sir John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha) says:

"From Pharaohs to the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Ancient Persians, Alexander the Great, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, the Ottomans and even the British, there is a curious single factor which all these empires in history for 5000 years have shared, and that is every single one of them held Egypt.... because Egypt and the Middle East are the only passageway connecting Europe and the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean, India, the Far East, Indonesia and Australia".21

In 7th Century A.D., the Roman Empire included all the frontiers, all the shores of the Mediterranean and so many countries which are considered Oriental--such as Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco were, as Sir J.B. Glubb says, "until 7th century A.D. part of Europe. Their official languages were Greek and Latin and the inhabitants were Christians."22 From the middle of the 7th century the areas came under the sway of Moslem Arabs. In 1517 Ottoman rule over this area, including Palestine,


was established and, thus, for about thirteen centuries there was an uninterrupted Muslim dominance over Palestine during which its land, language, history, culture and destiny constituted an integral part of the Arab world. During this period the western powers made a number of attempts to recapture this area. Palestine was the 'Prize of Crusades'. The Arabs and after them the Ottomans frustrated all the attempts made by the western powers to regain a foothold in this area. The establishment of Ottoman predominance over the Mediterranean forced the West to find alternative trade route to the East. In search of alternative trade routes to the East, Columbus discovered America in 1492 and Vasco-de-Gama reached India in 1498.

**BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

In the beginning of nineteenth century the British began to take an active interest in establishing their influence in the Middle East primarily in response to two important developments: loss of their colonies in America, and French efforts to seek a predominant position in the Mediterranean and Egypt. With it there was inaugurated the 19th century phase of the "Ottoman Question" among the European powers and as regards their relations with the Muslim East, marked the transition in primary emphasis from commercial to political diplomacy.

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23. Kishainy Kahlid, *op.cit.* p.75
24. Hurewitz *op.cit.*, p.62
In full recognition of the strategic importance of Egypt and more so, with the opening of Suez Canal in 1869, Britain began to increase her influence in Egypt and in the last two decades of nineteenth century, she became the controlling power of the whole Nile Valley. Egypt came to occupy a highly important position in the British strategy for an area that extended from the eastern Mediterranean to India and beyond it, Australia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{25} British position in Egypt, as the First World War broke out, was "so firmly entrenched that it was a mere formality for her to proclaim, on December 18, 1914 that Egypt was a British protectorate".\textsuperscript{26}

Towards the end of the War, however, there emerged a rising wave of Egyptian nationalism; and the discontentment of the Egyptian people, caused by the British policies, became so intense that it took the form of serious anti-British riots in 1918-19. In November, 1918, Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the leader of the Egyptian nationalist movement,

The French plan, under Napoleon, was to build a base in Egypt, to hold command of the Mediterranean and to build a French fleet on the Red Sea. And Napoleon he reckoned that a French Fleet in the Red Sea, based on Egypt, would be able to snatch naval command of the Indian Ocean from British (Glubb J.B. \textit{op.cit.} p.29) For further comments and text of Napoleon's Proclamation to the Egyptians see Hurewitz, \textit{op.cit.} p. 62-63.

\textsuperscript{25} "But for India and domains of Australia and New Zealand, there would have been no British occupation of Egypt, no reconquest of Sudan. The fact that Egypt commands in Suez Canal the main artery of communications between England and India and Australia on the other is what took us to Egypt and keeps us there". (Chamberlain, Austin, Sir, K.G. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1924-29. "The Permanent Bases of British Foreign Policy" \textit{Foreign Affairs}, No. 4, Vol.9, July, 1931 pp. 542-43) See also Langer L. William, "Struggle for the Nile" \textit{Foreign Affairs}, No.2, Vol.14, January, 1936, p.260; Lybyer Howe. Albert "Britain's Restoration of Authority in Egypt" \textit{Current History}, January, 1925; Kinsche, John, \textit{The Second Arab Awakening} (New York, Holt Richard + Winston, 1970)) pp.79-60

\textsuperscript{26} Lenczowski, George \textit{The Middle East in World Affairs} 4th Ed. (Cornell Univ. Press 1980) p.501,
demanded from the British full independence for his country. British measures to curb the nationalist agitation did not succeed and she was forced to end the protectorate and proclaim Egypt’s’ independence, in 1922.

PALESTINE AND BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Egyptian nationalism which was a part of general Arab awakening and political consciousness produced in the wake of First World War, forced the British to think and plan in terms of acquiring another base from where not only the Canal could be defended but also the whole British Empire east of Suez could be controlled. The best territory for that objective could, of course, be Palestine from where southern shores of the Mediterranean and those of the Red Sea could be ‘protected.’ It is thought that by 1916, if not before, Palestine had emerged as an important factor in British strategy in every major assessment made by the Imperial General Staff. Its precise functions—whether as a buffer state between the French in Syria and the Suez Canal, as a fall back position in case of an enforced evacuation of Egypt, or as an additional means of protecting Britain’s vital connections with India and the Far East—were variously defined, according to changed circumstances, but the central position given to it remained constant.27 As the position of Britain in Egypt became gradually uncertain, the

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27. Kinch, John, op.cit. p.173
British interest in Palestine increased. In 1922, Sir Gilbert Clayton is reported to have told Dr. Chaim Veizman, president of World Zionist Organization, that British "imperial interest could be equally well protected from Palestine". In a note with a memorandum to the cabinet, he said:

"With Palestine under the British control, with the British position maintained in Sudan and on the Western littoral of the Red Sea and above all, with adequate British navel power in the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt becomes of minor importance, provided always that foreign intervention in her affairs is not permitted". 28

After the First World War, the British had, therefore, decided to establish an European buffer state in Palestine, in order to exert pressure on Egypt and guarantee British control over Suez. 29 The idea of establishing an European buffer state in Palestine was not of the British alone it was equally being emphasized by the policy-makers and statesmen of the United States which had began to take an increased interest in the Middle East affairs after the First World War. In 1918, President of the United States had before him for consideration a very strong recommendation, from the Intelligence Section of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, for the establishment of a separate state

28. Ibid P.174 See also pp. 53-55.
of Palestine with Britain as the mandatory.\textsuperscript{30} Dr. Montgomery, a member of the King--Crane Commission appointed by President Wilson to investigate into the Palestinian and Levant Affairs, had, in his report to the President of the Commission Dr. King, observed that there would be some advantage in having a non--Muslim block between Asia and Africa. it would show the Arabs of Syria that they could not expand in the direction of Egypt.\textsuperscript{31}

In the First World War, Britain and France fought against Germany as allies while Turkey joined the war on Germany's side in October, 1914. but much before Ottoman Empire became a war enemy, Britain had made up her mind to grab Mesopotamia and Palestine. The nineteenth century friendly relations between the British and Ottoman Empire had lasted only till there was a serious challenge from the french to the British colonial interests in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. In the beginning of twentieth century British and French colonialists had joined hands to oppose escalating German ambitions in the Near East and middle East. The British and French policies about Post--First World War Ottoman territories in the Middle East were outlined in draft agreement known as Sykes--Picot Agreement of 1916. This pact was also approved by Russia. We will discuss this and other pacts among the Allies for the division of Turkish territories later.

\textsuperscript{30} Howard Harry N. "The King--Crane Commission" (Beirut 1963) p. 11,12.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid. p. 16
HUSSAIN--MACMAHON CORRESPONDENCE,
BALFOUR DECLARATION AND BRITISH
MANDATE OVER PALESTINE.

During the War, the British had made certain promises
to the Arab states regarding the establishment of Arab
independence if they revolted against Turkey. These
commitments were contained in letters that were exchanged in
December of 1915 between Sherrif Hussain of Hejaz and Sir
Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner at Cairo. This
correspondence took place because the British urgently
needed Arab help in their plan to expel the Turks from
Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. 32
In this correspondence Britain through McMahon pledged to
"support the independence of Arab" on the north by the 37th
parallel (approximately the northern boundary of Syria), on
the east by the Iranian border down to the Persian Gulf
states. In exchange, the Sherrif Hussain of Hejaz was to
raise an Arab army to assist the British against Turkey
which he did. When Hussain demanded that the western
boundary be established at the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean, McMahon accepted the Red Sea border but
excluded from his pledge the coastal belt of Syria lying to
the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and
Aleppo. This meant that the Arab would be denied Lebanon and

32. For the text of correspondence see Iaconu, Walter (ed) "The Arab--Israel Reader" op.cit.
document No.6, P.15. See also Moore J.N. op. cit. Vol.I, p. 627-28; Fraser, T.G., The Middle
Labyrinth: The McMahon-Hussayen Correspondence and its Interpretation 1914-1939
(Cambridge University Press, 1976)
the Alawi country to the north. Although Palestine was not explicitly mentioned in these letters the Arabs have always contended that the region promised to them included Palestine. On the other hand, Winston Churchill declared, when Arab delegates presented their claim:

"This reservation (in the letters) has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the Vilayat of Beirut and the independent Sunjuk of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of Jordan was thus excluded".33

Mr. Anthony Nutting, former British Minister of State at the Foreign Office, (1951-54) has, however, maintained in his article published in mid-sixties that Britain did promise to Sherrif Hussain of Mecca that "all Palestine plus Iraq, Syria and Transjordan and the Arabian peninsula would be free and independent once Turkish rulers had been defeated".34

An examination of the text of correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and Sherrif Hussain of Mecca reveals that

33. Bassiouni & Fisher in Moore, J.N., op.cit. p.627.28. According to John Kinche, the McMahon-Sherrif Hussain agreement was deliberately left vague so as to allow any number of different interpretations in the light of changing military and political circumstances (Kinche, John, "The Second Arab Awakening" op.cit. p.51; see also George Lenczowski, op. cit. p. 76 (4th ed.). The details of territorial demands made by Sherrif Hussain of Mecca are given in Haim, G. Sylvia Arab Nationalism, (University of California, Press, Berkeley, 1962) p. 89-93.

It is to be noted that until 1870s and less enthusiastically up to World war I, successive British governments had maintained Canning's conviction that the danger of hostile power, controlling the Eastern Mediterranean and thus communication with India—as Napoleon's expedition had shown—was best prevented by showing up the crumbling ramparts of the Ottoman Empire. Sara Scarligh, The British in the Middle East (London, Veidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969) p.85

34. Nutting, Anthony "The Tragedy of Palestine: From the Balfour Declaration to the Present" in Majidiia Khadduri (ed) op.cit p.54.
the former, no where in his letter, mentions Palestine to be included in his reservations, meaning, therefore, clearly that Palestine must be held to have formed part of the territory accepted by Great Britain as the area of Arab independence.\textsuperscript{35} The contention held by Winston Churchill in 1922 (note 33) that the word 'districts' in McMahon's phrase was equivalent to "Villayat"; and that since the "Villayat of Damascus"--which lay to the east of Jordan, now known as Palestine--was one of the portions of the reserved territory in Sir Henry McMahon's' phrase, cannot stand the test of close examination in the light of prevalent facts and text of McMahon--Hussain correspondence.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{SYKES--PICOT PACT}

While the British government was negotiating with the Arabs, through Sir Henry McMahon about the terms of an agreement for an independent Arab State in exchange for Arab assistance against Turkey, Britain and France had already reached an accord, the Sykes--Picot Agreement, on the Middle

\textsuperscript{35} Antonius, George "The Arab Awakening" (Khayats, Beirut 1938) p.177. In a lengthy discussion on the controversy generated by different interpretations of McMahon--Hussain Correspondence, Antonius concludes that the British position on Palestine to have been excluded from an independent Arab State is untenable.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.} p.178; Commenting on Churchill's' argument, Antonius says: 'An examination of the text shows that the British Government's argument is untenable. In the first place, the word "districts" in Sir Henry McMahon's' phrase could not have been intended as the equivalent of Villayat, because there were not such things as the "Villayat of Damascus", "the Villayet of Homs and the Villayat of Hama". There was one single villayat of Syria of which Damascus was capital and two smaller administrative divisions of which Homs and Hama were the principal towns. Sir Henry McMahon's phrase can only make sense if we take his 'districts' as meaning districts in the current use of the word, that is to say, the regions adjacent to the four cities, and his reservation as applied to that part of Syria--roughly from Sidon to Alexandria which lies to the west of continuous line formed by those four cities and the districts immediately adjoining them'.
East. This Pact, concluded on May 16, 1916, provided that upon cessation of hostilities, France was to get the area known as Cilicia (Syria and Lebanon) Britain southern Mesopotamia (Iraq with Baghdad, and the ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine) while Palestine was, in general to be internationalized. The Sykes--Picot pact was kept secret because its provisions ran counter to the pledges made by the British to the Arabs. 37

**BALFOUR DECLARATION**

About eighteen months after Sykes--Picot Agreement and Sir Henry McMahon's pledges to Sherrif Hussain of Mecca, the

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37. Apart from Sykes--Picot Agreement which was reached between Britain and France, there were other secret agreements between allies during World War-I to partition Ottoman Empire. For example, The Constantinople Agreement (March 18, 1915) concluded between Russia on the one hand, and Great Britain and France, on the other. Under this agreement Russia was to annex Constantinople, the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles; southern Thrace as far as the Enoos--Midia line, the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the Sakaria and a point on the Gulf of Iskiald to be defined later; the islands in the Sea of Marmara and the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos. In return Russia recognized a number of claims made by Britain and France concerning Turkey and Iran. The Constantinople Agreement, writes Lencezowski formally marked the end of a century-old British policy. The capital of the once mighty Empire was to pass into the control of the Russians who were to enjoy free access to warm waters provided, of course, the war against Turkey was victorious (Lencezowski, George, *op. cit.* pp. 75-76) The other secret agreements were The Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) signed by Britain, France, Russia and Italy; and the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement (April 17, 1917) signed between France, Britain and Italy. This agreement gave Italy the right to annex a large tract of purely Turkish land in southwestern Anatolia (the vilayat and city of Smyrna, the Sanjiks of Menteshe, Adalia, Ithilli, and the greater part of the Vilayet of Kemal). In addition to this, Italy obtained a sphere of influence north of Smyrna; The Clemenxieu--Lloyd George Agreement (December, 1918) signed between France and Britain under which France agreed to the inclusion of Mosul (formerly in the French zone under Sykes--Picot Agreement) in Britain's sphere of influence. In return France was promised a share in the north-Mesopotamian oil deposits (Lencezowski, *op.cit.*, pp. 75-79).

For a detailed comment on the Sykes--Picot Agreement see 'Antounius, *op.cit.* Ch. xiii, pp. 243-270

"The Sykes--Picot Agreement is a shocking document. It is not only the product of greed at its worst, that is to say, of greed allied to suspicion and so leading to stupidity: it also stands out as a startling piece of double dealing" (Antounius, *op.cit.*, p.248)
British issued Balfour Declaration. The Zionists had for quite a long time tried to extract such a policy statement from Britain. Herzl had begun negotiations with the British government as early as 1902, and his successors continued talks with the British at intervals thereafter. During the period of 1916 through 1918 Great Britain maintained two primary objectives; to enlist the support of the Arab world against the Ottoman Empire, and to enlist Jewish support against both the Ottoman Turks and the Central Powers (Germany and Austro-Hungary). So far as the Zionists were concerned, at first, their sympathies lay with Germany and they "ardently hoped for Russia's defeat" at German hands because of their persecution, execution and pogroms in Tzarist Russia. However, as the war progressed they also began to enlist the support of Britain. In London the

38. Balfour Declaration is a pledge contained in a letter that British Foreign Secretary wrote, on behalf of the British Government, to Lord Rothschild on November 2, 1917. The relevant part of the letter is as follows:

"His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this objective, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."


40. Lenczowski, op.cit., p.82.

41. According to Walter Laqueur, during the War I, Zionists tried to enlist German help. The news about the talks between German representatives and Zionists was noted in London and Paris; so were the pro-Zionist articles in the German press. While Hantke, Blumenfeld and Lichtenheim (Zionist representatives) impressed on their Berlin contacts that England was about to make an important pro-Zionist declaration, Vizman used the reverse argument in his dealings with the British cabinet and Foreign Office; unless the British hurried the Central Powers would come out first and secure an important advantage. (Laqueur, op. cit., p. 177). Zionist contacts with Berlin were so known and significant that Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India who himself was a Jew, was convinced that Zionists were German agents. (Laqueur, p. 183)
leader of the Zionist activities was Chaim Weizman, a lecturer in Chemistry at Manchester University. He attracted the attention of British officials to Zionist aspirations as early as 1914. He had materially contributed to the British war effort by discovering a new method of producing acetone. In his Pro-Ally policy he was supported by two eminent European Zionists, Sokolov and Tschlenov, who arrived in London in November, 1914. The aim of the Zionists in Great Britain and in the United States was to obtain a guarantee from the Allies, that in the event of Turkey's defeat, Palestine would be recognized as a Jewish commonwealth, unrestricted open to immigration. To this end Weizman secured the sympathy and actual collaboration of a number of public figures in Britain. Among them were C.P. Scott and Herbert Sidebotham of the Manchester Guardian who helped in organizing the British Palestine Committee, such prominent British Jews as Sir Herbert Samuel and the Rothschilds; and finally, Lord A.J. Balfour, Britain's Foreign Secretary.42

It should also be noted that the task which the Zionists in England, led by Dr. Weizman, had set themselves, was no easy one. The majority of influential English Jews were opposed to Zionism or, more exactly, to the nationalistic idea inherent in political Zionism.43 However, he remained undaunted and always thought Britain could be induced by a combination of idealism and self interest to sponsor the

42. Lenczowski, *op.cit.*, p.83 According to Walter Laqueur Balfour cared for one thing only--Zionism--Laqueur, *op.cit.*, p.189

43. Antonius, *op.cit.*, p. 259
building up of a Jewish national home.  

Dr. Weizman had won the sympathy of Llyod George before he succeeded Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister. Mr. Herbert Samuel who was a member of the Asquith Government, had approached the Prime Minister and some of his colleagues with a proposal for annexation of Palestine by Great Britain, with a view to settling some three of four million Jews, but Asquith turned out to be unsympathetic, and it led to no positive result. It was only some two years later, when Mr. Lloyd George had succeeded Asquith as Prime Minister, with Balfour as his Foreign Secretary that negotiations for the first time opened between the Zionist leaders and an authorized representative of the Government.  

At the time the negotiations between the British Government and the representatives of Zionist movement began, the British Government had already made commitment to the Arabs and their allies in the war. The commitment to the Arabs was contained in McMahon-Hussain agreement of 1915 with a pledge to recognize and uphold an independent Arab State in an area from which, as discussed earlier, Palestine had not been excluded. The provisions of the Sykes-Picot

44. Laqueur, op.cit., p.188.

According to Walter Laqueur, Sir Ronald Graham, Head of the Eastern Department of British Foreign Office, wrote in a memorandum dated October 24, 1917 that the Zionists might be thrown into the arms of the Germans unless an assurance of sympathy was given to them. "The moment this assurance is granted, the Zionist Jews are prepared to start an active pro-allied propaganda throughout the world." -Laqueur, op.cit. p. 202, quoting from Gillon*, The Antecedents of Balfour Declaration, p.147.


46. Ibid., p.259.
Agreement envisaged the placing of the Holy Land under some form of international administration in the setting up of which not only France and Russia and other allies, but also the Sherrif of Mecca, were to have their say. In addition to these commitments there was another development that tied the hands of the British Government in their freedom of decision with regard to the future of Palestine. It was the hardening of the hostility of an influential section of Anglo-Jewry to the establishment of a Jewish state which the Zionists were advocating. They had declared their irrevocable opposition to it and a campaign had begun led by the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association—the two most representative bodies in English Jewry—of which the object was to dissuade the Government from acceding to the wishes of Zionists. The views voiced by those bodies had a spokesman in the British cabinet itself, in the person of Edwin Montagu, then Secretary of State for India.47

Undeterred, however, by those obstacles Mr. Lloyd George appointed Sir Mark Sykes to open negotiations with the Zionists and, as a result of these negotiations, Balfour Declaration was issued on November 2, 1917.

Much has been said about the motives and considerations which induced the British Government eventually to issue Balfour Declaration. One allegation says that the Jews used

47. Ibid. p.260; See also note no.44
their financial and political influence to bring the United States into the War on the side of the Entente and the Balfour Declaration was a reward for services actually rendered. George Antonius says that this allegation is disproved by all the published evidence. He also disagrees with the suggestion that the Balfour Declaration was issued in return for promises pledging large subscriptions from Jewish sources to war loan funds saying that the most substantial purchases of British war loan stock that can be traced to Jewish sources in 1917 and 1918 were made in the name of Jews who were opposed to the policy foreshadowed in the Balfour Declaration.48

However, Sir J.B. Glubb is of the opinion that the Balfour Declaration was issued in order to "get the United States into war before the British and the French were exhausted".49 Issa Nakhleh an influential writer on Middle East affairs quotes Samuel Landman, a London Solicitor and legal adviser to the World Zionist Organization, in support of his argument that the Balfour Declaration was a price the Zionist Jews demanded for using their influence to railroad the U.S. in World War I as Great Britain's ally:

Balfour Declaration" was .. the best and perhaps the only way" (which proved so to be) to induce the American President to come into the War, was to secure the cooperation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and

thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a quid pro quo contract basis.\textsuperscript{50}

Same view is offered by M. S. Anderson when he says that the frequently repeated allegations that it (Balfour Declaration) was a bid for the support of American Jewry at a critical moment in the War contain a good deal of truth.\textsuperscript{51}

According to Fraser, T.G., "the chief reasons for making the declaration are to be found in the hopes of using it to influence American and Russian Jews at a time when allied war prospects were bleak."\textsuperscript{52}

"...the Balfour Declaration had two main motives. There was no question that it had an ideal nature. The statesmen of that time, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George amongst them, primarily wanted to manifest a certain amount of restitution to the Jewish people for the contribution which the Jews have made in three thousands of years to the civilization of mankind. There was another set of motives

\[\text{50. Nakhleh, Issa, "The Liberation of Palestine is supported by International law and Justice" in Moore, J.N., \textit{op.cit.} p.567.}\]


\[\text{52. Fraser, T.G., \textit{The Middle East: 1914-1979} (New York St. Martins Press), 1980, p.2.}\]

An examination of the British cabinet discussions on support to Zionism (4 Oct. 1917 & 31 Oct. 1917) clearly shows that the enlistment of sympathy of American Jewry and American Government was very much in the minds of those members who were favouring declaration. For example, Mr. Balfour in arguing the case for Declaration told the Cabinet on 4 Oct.1917 that he knew the American President Wilson was extremely favourable to the (Zionist) Movement for a national home in Palestine On October 31, 1917 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Balfour told the Cabinet If we could make a Declaration favourable to such an ideal we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and American (From British Cabinet Discussions on support to Zionism October 4,1917 and October 31, 1917) Fraser \textit{Ibid} p.15-17
... it was thought that by this act of restitution—at any rate a form of declaration—this might serve the opinion of a powerful group of American Jewry".53

David Lloyd George the Prime Minister and Sir A.J. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain believed that the strong Jewish influence in the Russian revolutionary movement made a favourable response to Zionist aspirations essential. It was also deemed important to woo Jewish support in the United States where, before America’s entrance into the War, the sympathies of the principal Jewish leaders, all of German or Austrian background, lay with the Central Powers. Zionists also argued and many Britishers believed that an allied pronouncement in favour of Zionism might influence Austro--German Jewry and help to induce disaffection and disloyalty within the enemy states. During the talks that were held between Sir Mark Sykes and Nahum Sokolov, the Zionists insisted upon a British protectorate over Palestine, and although this would have constituted yet another contradictory pledge the British Government was not adverse to it.54

53. Ibid. p., 18, 19.
54. Bassiong and Fisher, op.cit., p.629. See also Lenzowski, op.cit., p.83; Fraser, op cit. p.2;

Maxime Rodinson in his book 'Israel: A Colonial Settler State' makes a detailed and informed commentary on the motives behind Balfour Declaration.

"The great motives behind the (Balfour) Declaration", writes Rodinson on the basis of available evidence, "lie in the desired propagandistic impact on the Jews of the Central Empires and Russia and the hope of developing a claim in the future liquidation of the Ottoman Empire ... One of the aims of the declaration was to support Kerensky (the leader of the Russian provisional government overthrown by Bolsheviks on November 7, 1917). Thought was also given to the Jews of the United States". (Rodinson Maxime, Israel: A Colonial Settler State, (New York, Monad Press, 1973) p.47 See also Anderson, op.cit., p.347.
Apart from political considerations, the British Government in issuing the Balfour Declaration was also moved by imperialist motive first propounded by Kitchner, of securing Palestine or a portion of it as a bulwark to the British position in Egypt and an overland link with the East. According to Antonius, this motive was dominant one, and "what--ever part other considerations--financial, political, religious or humanitarian--may have played, there is no doubt that it sufficed by itself to bring about the Balfour Declaration. And it may legitimately be assumed that had they not come to an agreement with Zionists, the British Government would have tried every means open to them of concluding such other bargains as would have ensured the reversion of Palestine to Great Britain.  

The significance of Palestine in the imperial scheme became much more clear as the war proceeded. Its importance lay in its proximity to Egypt, from which it was separated by the practically desert Sinai peninsula. It had been an axiom of military science, in the days before the war, that a desert bulwark was equivalent to a fortified frontier; and since the Turco--Egyptian boundary lay across the eastern extremity of Sinai, Egypt was safe enough. But the experience of the War had profoundly shaken that belief. In 1915, a sizeable and well equipped Turkish force had crossed the desert and reached the banks of Suez Canal. In the

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55. Antonius, *op. cit.*, p.261. According to Antonius the basis of *Balfour Declaration* was a formal assurance given by Zionists that they would, work for a British Protectorate over Palestine. (Antonius, p.263)
summer of the following year, Sir Archibald Murray had crossed Sinai with a large army and, laying a railway and pipeline as he advanced, had occupied Al-Arish and was about to attack Gaza. The old axiom was no longer true; modern science had conquered the desert, and the Suez Canal was demonstrably less so. Even, were Turkey to remain mistress of Palestine, there would be cause for concern. But now that France was claiming Syria as her preserve and had given her allies unmistakably to understand that Palestine was included in her claim, it became imperative for Britain, from the point of view of safety if from no other, to interpose a buffer between her position on the Suez Canal and the future French position in Syria ... Hence the Balfour Declaration. It prepared the ground for the claim which was afterwards to be preferred, in the fulness of victory, that, since England had given a solemn undertaking to the Zionists in regard to a national home in Palestine, it was only fitting that the task of governing Palestine for the fulfillment of that undertaking be assumed by England.  

It must also be noted that the American commission of inquiry, the King--Crane Commission had recommended a British mandate over Palestine on the very same grounds.  

56. Ibid. p.262, 263. "Great Britain decided to take over Palestine as a strategy base from which to defend the Suez Canal under the humanitarian umbrella of the Balfour Declaration". (Anthony Nutting in Khadduri, op.cit., p.54.) See also notes no.27-31 Felix Frankfurter a well known American Zionist, says "link Palestine serves between East and West was one of the factors to make Britain special sponsor of Jewish hopes (Frankfurter, 'The Palestine situation Re-stated' Foreign Affairs, April, 1931, pp.412-13.

57. Captain Yale, a member of the King--Crane Commission, in his report while recommending Britain as Mandatory power said "Not only because the Jews all desire the British because Great Britain is for many reasons more fitted for the task than any other power. As Great
Britain has a very large number of Moslem subjects. She will be obliged to see that the Moslems of Palestine are not treated with any part of the promises given to the Jews and (she) was better prepared and able to assist in executing the Zionist programme than any other country. (Hussey, "King-Crane Commission," op. cit., p. 206.)

In its final report the commission recommended inclusion of Palestine in a united Syrian State with the U.S., as mandatory, and if she refused Britain rather than France. (Ibid., p. 226-27). See also Lauen, "op. cit., p. 23-31.

In their negotiations with Great Britain, the Zionists insisted upon a British protectorate over Palestine as the best guarantee for the success of their programme. This involved the repudiation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which provided the internationalization of the Holy Land. This amounted to another contradictory pledge. The British Government was not aware of accepting this pledge. (Kaczynski, "op. cit., p. 84.)
After securing British support for their cause in the Balfour Declaration, the Zionists had no difficulty in winning the same from other major powers. France had declared her support to the Zionists even before the Balfour Declaration was announced and approved the Declaration on February 11, 1918 and Italy followed suit on February 23, 1918. Two days before Mudros armistice President Wilson gave his open support to the Declaration in a letter addressed to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise on October 29, 1918.

Thus the destinies of Zionism became closely linked with the Allied cause. The Zionists obtained a status of un-official allies. The British Foreign Office went so far as to grant them the privilege of British diplomatic punch. In return, the Zionists were expected to render valuable assistance in the prosecution of war and this they did. This is proved by a statement that Lloyd George made before Palestine Royal Commission in 1936.

"The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if they allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their work".58

THE ARAB REACTION

The reaction to the Balfour Declaration in the Arab world was one of "bewilderment and dismay".59 When the news of the Declaration reached King Hussain he asked for a

definition of the meaning and scope of Declaration. Upon his request the British sent Commander Hogarth, one of the heads of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, who assured King Hussain that "the Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab population." King Hussain had made it clear that under no circumstances the Arab sovereignty over Palestine would be surrendered. He told Hogarth that in so far as the aim of the Balfour Declaration was to provide a refuge to Jews from persecution, he would use all his influence to further that aim. Not only in Arabia but in other parts of the Arab World apprehensions were being expressed about the consequence of the Balfour Declaration. In order to allay the Arab fears and convince them that the Britain agreed to support—if not, indeed, specifically to protect and secure—the recognition and observance of the rights of the non-Jewish population of Palestine, British Government took two important steps. One was the creation of an Arab State of Transjordan in 1920 exempted from the terms of the Declaration. The second was the White Paper on Palestine which said in part:

60. Ibid., p. 268; Commenting on this message Antonius says that it represented a fundamental departure from the text of Balfour Declaration which purported to guarantee only the civil and religious rights of the Arab population. In that lay the difference between a peaceful and willing Arab-Jew cooperation in Palestine and the abominable duel (since 1917). For, it is beyond all reasonable doubt certain that, had the Balfour Declaration in fact safeguarded the political and economic freedom of the Arabs, as Hogarth solemnly assured King Hussain, there would have been no Arab opposition but indeed Arab welcome, to a humanitarian and judicious settlement of Jews in Palestine. (Antonius, Ibid., p. 268) See also Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 86. The strong Arab reaction of "uneasiness" to the Balfour Declaration was also noted by King-Crane Commission: (Horward, op. cit., p. 5)

61. Ibid., p. 268.
"Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine, that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English". His Majesty's Government ... have no such aim in view ... (T) he terms of the Declaration referred to, do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine".62

The Zionist leadership was itself at pains, at that stage, to explain that the Jewish National Home did not mean Jewish State. Dr. Weizman himself went to Egypt and held meetings with several Arab personalities in order to dispel their fears and bring them to a state of acquiescence in the idea of Zionist-Arab cooperation. Felix Frankfurter a leading Zionist wrote in 1931: "... authoritative Jewish demand is not for a Jewish state, it does not ask the right to govern others. Jews desire only the opportunity of national development within their ancestral land."63

In giving a definition of the conception of national home Frankfurter cites the British white paper of 1922 and calls it the "basic statement of Palestine Policy". In further elucidating the concept, Frankfurter quotes Norman Bentwich, Attorney-General of Palestine who says:

"A national home cannot be a territory in which a people, without receiving the rights of political sovereignty, has, nevertheless, a recognized legal position and receives the opportunity of developing its moral, social and intellectual ideas."64

Though the Arabs felt betrayed but still because of a touching faith in their erstwhile allies, they allowed

The White Paper further said; "When it is asked what is meant by the development of Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole." From the text of the statement of British Policy in Palestine, 5 June, 1922, Fraser, op. cit., p. 22.


64. Ibid., p. 417.
themselves to be mollified by a further series of pledges and assurances. The national home, they were assured, would not be allowed to become a national state and the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish community would be safeguarded. That became the basis of agreement between Emir Faisal and Dr. Weizman under which, the Zionists claim, Arab leader agreed to the Jewish National Home in Palestine.\(^65\)

As the War drew to an end, the Zionists were faced with the need to secure multilateral international confirmation of the Balfour Declaration and of ensuring its inclusion in the peace treaties after the defeat of Turkey. In this endeavour the Zionists first faced substantial opposition but ultimately with full support from Britain and the United States, they succeeded in incorporating the Balfour Declaration in the British Mandate over Palestine. In July, 1922, the League of Nations finally confirmed Great Britain

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65. Emir Faisal (1855-1933), the son of Hussain, the Sherif of Mecca, met various Jewish leaders and signed an agreement with Dr. Chaim Weizman (1877-1952), leader of Zionist Movement. He had also engaged in correspondence with Felix Frankfurter, the Zionist leader from America. Now where in the agreement did Emir Faisal agree to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. In fact side by side with the word "Arab State", the term "Palestine" for Jews is used which cannot be taken as meaning Jewish state. Moreover, a final proviso by Emir Faisal added to the agreement clearly shows that the Emir or any other Arab leader was never prepared to forsake their claim over Palestine as a part of an independent Arab State (See Bassiouni and Fisher, op. cit. p. 633-634; Anthony Nutting, op. cit., p. 54). According to Antonius, Emir Faisal while attending the Paris Peace Conference was under strict instructions from his father, King Hussain of Mecca, to accept nothing less than the fulfillment of the pledges made by Great Britain with regard to Arab independence. Antonius op. cit. p. 283.

In the course of Faisal-Weizman meeting, the former was assured by the latter that the Zionists had no intention of working for the establishment of a Jewish Government in Palestine, but all that they wished to do was to help in the development of the country so far as that would be possible without damage to legitimate Arab interests. (Antonius op. cit., P. 285).
as the Mandatory Power for Palestine. The Arab leaders were willing to accept the United States as Mandatory Power but since she was not a member of the League of Nations, the U.S. could not become a Mandatory Power. Thus the Arabs had no choice but to accept Britain in that role. On the other hand the Palestinian Arabs were demanding immediate independence.

The British Mandate over Palestine remained in force up to May 14, 1948 when Palestine was partitioned according to a UN plan and Israel's establishment was announced. During this period the Zionists laid the ground work for turning Palestine into a Jewish state through accelerated immigration, dispossessioning the Palestinian Arab peasants and landowners by purchasing their lands at cheap rates and settling at these places the immigrants from Europe. The Zionist pressure was so determined that the British Government felt itself weak to resist it. This weakness allowed the Jewish Agency to be established and to become a government within the Mandatory government of Palestine, while the Arabs were denied any effective say in the administration of their country whatsoever; a weakness which permitted the Zionist Agency to buy at knock down prices land owned by Syrian and Lebanese land owners who were cut

66. The mandates had been assigned, in fact, not by the League of Nations, but by a body—the Supreme Council composed of the representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy, each of whom had designs of her own on the former possessions of the Ottoman Empire. (Antonius, Op. cit., p. 350).
off from their properties by the international frontiers separating British from French, Mandated territories.

That weakness also permitted the Zionist Agency to evict thousands of Arab tenants and farm workers to make way for settlers from Europe. Compensating these tenants and workers at times with as little as ten dollars per family. In 1922 when the British mandate over Palestine commenced, the ratio of Jewish population to the total population of Palestine was 11 percent but in 1943, during 21 years of British mandatory rule, that ratio rose to 31.5 percent. This massive immigration had only been made possible because of British protection. It would have been inconceivable on such a large scale, and with the alarming claims it was making under an independent Arab State free from external pressure. The Zionist leaders in the Mandate period were all aware of this when they called for strengthening the regiment of British police and opposed the creation of any representative outburst might reduce, however, slightly the authority of the High Commissioner.

In providing protection to the Jews the British were carrying out what they had contemplated to do in Palestine before the War—the establishment of a Jewish state. after

67. Anthony Nutting, op. cit., p. 56.
68. Robinson, Maxine, op. cit., p. 56.
the Jews had responded to the opportunity afforded them and become the majority of the inhabitants. 69

Jewish immigration at an accelerated rate alarmed the Palestinians and the tension between the two communities heightened. Consequently there were occasional outbursts of riots, clashes and even attacks involving the Jews and Arabs. There were serious riots in 1920, 1921, 1929, 1933 and an open revolt by the Arabs in 1936-38.

At first the British kept their eyes closed to what the Zionists were doing in Palestine; they, in fact, enjoyed the British support in their plans. But in 1930 they (The British) appeared to recognize the need to protect the rights of the Arabs by a closer control of Jewish immigration by adopting a policy of giving protection to Arab peasants and tenant farmers. But the Zionist mounted

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69. Laqueur op. cit., p. 201-2 quoting Lloyd George. In order to change the situation in their favour the Jews opted for the strategy of increased immigration till 1939. Until the end of 1932 immigration rate was somewhat slow, as the table below would show but after 1932, it registered a sudden increase. The reason being the anti-Semitic campaigns of Nazism. In 1943, the Jewish Agency estimated that the Jews in Palestine numbered 539,000 out of total population of 1,676,571 - 31.5% (Rodinson, op. cit., p. 57-58).

Jewish Immigration in Palatine

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(Hollingworth, Clar, "The Arabs and the West, op. cit., p. 127).

The Palestinians out numbered Jews by eight to one in 1917 (Peter Buch in his introduction to Maxine Rodinson op. cit, p. 19). At the commencement of Mandate there were approximately 4,86000 Muslims, 84,000 Jews and 71,000 Christians in Palatine. J.N. Moore, Arab-Israel Conflict, Vol.1, op. cit., p. 6.
strong pressure against this policy and the British Prime Minister Ramsay Mac Donald had to reverse his position and revert to the policy of giving the Zionists a free hand in Palestine.

Another such British attempt to placate the Arab sentiments (proposing a legislative assembly to be elected by proportional representation which would give the Arabs a majority vote) was defeated by Zionist pressure tactics.\(^7\)

**THE ARAB REVOLTS**

When driven to desperation the Arabs decided that armed rebellion was the only way to assert their rights. From 1936 to 1939 the rebellion, led by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem continued. The Arabs lost far more heavily in human lives and treasure than either the Jews or the British. But they carried on the struggle.\(^7\) The Arab losses were greater because they were confronting more the power of the British than that of the Jews. According to a Jewish source.

"The 1936 events involved a confrontation between two national movements but the Arabs made the mistake of concentrating their attacks on the British Government and Army. This confrontation with the British (and not with the Jews) caused the destruction of Arab military strength in Palestine and was responsible for the partial elimination of Arab leadership in the country. After about three years of unequal warfare, Arab military power was destroyed, during the same period the Jews, protected by the British, succeeded in building up their own strength.

\(^7\) Anthony Nutting, *op. cit.*, p. 56. See also Elapan, Simha, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, (Croom Helm London) p. 29; Simba Elapan gives another view of the British policy in Palestine during the Mandate period by saying that the 1922 White Paper, restrictions on land purchases and immigration in 1930 and, finally, 1939 White Paper were all connected steps in the direction of reduced British commitment to the Balfour Declaration once they had secured mandate over Palestine (*Ibid*, p. 29).

\(^7\) Anthony Nutting, *op. at.*, p. 56.
British reprisals against the Arab armed groups and against the Arab population were much severer than those against Jewish clandestine organizations a few years later, the British frequently killed Arab civilians, hundreds of houses, orchards and vineyards were destroyed.  

In response to 1936 Arab revolt a Royal Commission was appointed chaired by Lord Peel. Finding the Arab and Jewish positions irreconcilable under the terms of the Mandate, it recommended the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. The Peel Commission report was opposed by the Arabs, and although the Jewish Agency approved the fundamental of partition, it opposed the particulars of Peel Plan.  

The plan, therefore, was not adopted. Following the failure of Peel Plan and London Conference of 1939 called to work out agreement between the parties, the British Government adopted a more restrictive policy towards Jewish immigration and announced its policy to be the creation of an independent Palestine State within 10 years. The Jewish community opposed the shift in British policy outlined in a White Paper of May, 1939.  


Palestinians, according to Peter Bunch, were defeated by the Jews in 1948 because they were weakened by the events of 1936-39 by British support to the Jews. The pivotal character of this defeat was acknowledged by the military correspondent of daily "Haaretz" a liberal Hebrew paper who wrote in its issue of April 15, 1966:  

"...with respect to the events of 1936, it seems to us that had they not happened in the manner and at the time in which they did in fact occur, it is doubtful that the Jewish community could have waged a war of independence eight years later. The Jewish community emerged from these dangerous 1936 events in a stronger position as a result of the strong support it received from the British government and army. (Rodinson, Maxime, op. cit., Int. p. 19).  


"An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow boundaries of one small country. About 1,880,000 Arabs are in strife open or latent, with some
the bi-national state of Palestine, the Arabs and Jews would be sharing in the government and insuring the essential interests of both communities, immigration was to continue for five years at a pre-determined rate of 15,000 a year after which any further immigration was to be by agreement with the Arabs. And the Arabs were to be protected against land purchase and land acquisition by Zionist Agency. The solution proposed in the 1939 White Paper according to Anthony Nutting was by far the best, the wisest and the fairest solution yet conceived and had the World War II not broken out a few months later it might have resolved the problem.  

The Jews put up a strong opposition to the British White Paper that was issued on May 17, 1939 because it placed limitation on immigration and land purchase; and because in the independent Palestine State after ten years, Jews would not constitute more than one third of the population.  

In order to defeat the British policy outlined in the 1939 White Paper, the Jews started terrorist activities against the British authorities in Palestine. Their extremist organizations such as Irgun or Ezzel and especially the Lehi or Stern groups were very active and

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400,000 Jews. There is no common ground between them. The Arab community is predominantly Asiatic in character, the Jewish Community predominantly European. They differ in religion and in language. Their cultural and social life, Their ways of thought and conduct, are as incompatible as their national aspirations.

From Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission, Fraser, op. cit., p. 21.

74. Anthony Nutting, op. cit., p. 57.

75. Robinson, op. cit., p. 58.
looked upon the British as colonial oppressors. These movements gradually became widespread and an increasing number of young Jews came to be mobilized in the semi-official army, the Haganah an, outgrowth of the self-defense groups. The Zionist leaders now decided that it was time to openly state their goals. On May 11, 1942, a meeting of the American Zionist Organization at the Hotel Biltmore in New York adopted a programme presented by David Ben Gurion, president of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency. This Biltmore programme called for the establishment of a Jewish state throughout all of Palestine, the creation of a Jewish army, the rejection of 1939 White Paper and unlimited immigration under the control of the Jewish Agency alone. On November 10, 1942 it was ratified by a special committee of the Zionist Organization in Jerusalem and thus became the official programme of Zionism.76

The Biltmore programme made an Arab-Jewish war inevitable a logical consequence of programme for a Jewish State. Mr. Judah L. Magnes, president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem was right when he wrote.77

"A Jewish state can only be obtained if it ever is, through war you can talk to an Arab about anything but you cannot talk to him about a Jewish state."

The situation created by outbreak of World War II and the terrorist activities carried out by the Jewish groups had convinced the British that the best thing would be to go

76. Ibid., p. 66.
77. Ibid, p. 68.
away and leave the Jews and Arabs face to face.\textsuperscript{78} In desperation the British Government handed back to the League of Nations successor, the United Nations, to do their worst, which is precisely what they did by partitioning Palestine into six areas, three for the Jews and three for the Arabs and in a manner which gave to the Jewish areas all the best of the land and left the Arabs with wildness of Judea and the hills of northern Galilee.\textsuperscript{79} The United Nations General Assembly passed the resolution on partitioning Palestine on November 29, 1947. On May 14, 1948 the British officially terminated their Mandate over Palestine, withdrawing their last forces from the country on the same day the National Council of Zionism at a session in Tel-Aviv proclaimed the Jewish state of Israel.\textsuperscript{80} Soon afterwards there broke out the First Arab-Israel War.

We shall discuss the first Arab Israel War and the circumstances leading to it, including the UN partition of Palestine decision in a latter chapter. Presently we are going over to see how the events in Palestine especially since the Balfour Declaration, were being viewed by the Muslims of South Asia. As we shall see in the following part we Muslims of South Asia were themselves engaged in an arduous struggle for political rights and national independence during this period. The culmination of the

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Ibid}, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{79} Nutting, \textit{op. cit.},

\textsuperscript{80} Partition of Palestine and the birth of Israel took place almost nine months after the establishment of Pakistan.
struggle in the form of the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 almost synchronized with the partition of Palestine and birth of Israel a few months later. The events in Palestine produced a strong reaction among the Muslims of South Asia because they were bound to the Palestinians by a number of factors. In the following part these factors and form of their expression are being discussed.

As it has rightly been pointed, out the Arab-Israel conflict cannot be viewed merely as an issue between Israel and her immediate Arab neighbours. In reality the issue goes deeper and wider into a region stretched from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and inhabited by more than one hundred million people. It includes the whole of North Africa, the Arab Crescent comprising the area between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. The Muslims of India have from the very beginning formed an important component of this community which has very often taken a united stand on the problems affecting the rights and interests of their co-religionists in Asia and Africa.

A part from religion the affinity between the Muslims of South Asia and Arabia had been based on ancient trade commercial and cultural contacts. The coasts of Sind and Southern Arabia are geographically so contiguous as to make commercial relations between them inevitable. Since time immemorial spices and other articles of the Indies had been

in great demand in Egypt and other countries of southern Europe. The transit trade between these areas was mostly in the hands of Arabs who used to carry Indian merchandise from the Indian ports to the Yemen in Southern Arabia from where the goods were carried by land to the Syrian ports to be shipped again to Egypt and ?Europe. This trade continued after the Arabs had embraced Islam and the first major conflict between the peoples of the Indian sub-continent and Muslim Arabia arose out of developments connected with the Arab sailors plying in the Indian Ocean.\(^2\)

Sind was conquered by the Arabs in the year 712 A.D. under Ummuyyads. The Ummuyyads as the Caliphate of the Muslims were replaced by the Abbasids in 750 A.D. Not only during this period but even after 871 when Sind and Multan became independent of Baghdad very close contacts continued to exist between Sind and Arab countries. There was active

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The waters between Arabia and the Western coasts of India had been traversed by marines of various nations from pre-historic times. There were three great trade routes that connected India with the West. The easiest and probably the oldest of these was the Persian Gulf route which ran from the mouth of the Indus to Euphrates, and up the Euphrates to where the road branches off to Antioch and the Levantine ports. (Robinson, H.G., *India and the Western World*, (London Cambridge University Press, 1976) p.1. The Persian Gulf, an important Bay of Indian Ocean, had been used by the Assyrians, the Babylonians and Persians for trade between Mesopotamia, Southern Arabia, Horn of Africa and India. There is some evidence of trade having been carried on by the Phoenicians between the Indies and the Mediterranean via the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates valley. Marlowe, John. (*The Persian Gulf in Twentieth Century*, (London, 1962) p. 2. See also Mujib, M. “The Indian Muslims” (George Allen and Unwin, 1967) p. 27, Lane-Pool, Stanley “Medieval India” A.D. 712-1774, p. 7.

For relations between India and Arabia see Maulana Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, *Indo-Arab Relations*, An English rendering of *Arab O' Hint Ke Tauliquat* (Hyderabad, the Institute of Indo-Middle East Cultural Studies, India, 1962).
commerce between Sind and other parts of the Muslim World. In fact Sind had become so integrated with the Muslim Empire centered in Arabia that in the period after the recall of Muhammad Bin Qassim the Sindhi troops fought on behalf of Khalifah in distant countries, even as far as the Byzantine frontiers.

During the sultanate period (1205-1526) forty Muslim Sultans ruled over India and legally the Sultanate of Delhi was part of the eastern Caliphate. Even when the line of Baghdad caliphs came to an end, the fiction of allegiance to the Caliphs was kept alive. Shamas-ud-Din Altmash who succeeded Kutb-ud-Din Aybek as Sultan of Delhi in 1210 procured the robe of honour from the Caliph of Baghdad, an act which not only established the authority of the Caliphate on the Sultanate of Delhi but also meant the recognition of an authority outside the geographical limits of India. On coins issued by the Sultans, and possibly in the Khutaba (Friday sermon) also, the first real sovereign of India claimed no other higher honour than that of being the lieutenant of the Caliph, thus making India part of that brotherhood of Islam.

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83. Ibid., pp. 21,22.
84. Ibid., p. 21 (quoting from Elliot and Dowson History of India as Told by its Historians; Vol. I, p. 465) The earliest contact of the Islamized Arabs with the Malabar coast dates back to the reign of 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab, the Second Caliph, (634-644).
85. Malik, Hafiz: Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan, (Washington, Public Affairs Press 1963,) pp. 17, 18
During the heyday of Mughal power in India the influence of the Caliphate over royal power and legitimacy was insignificant. The situation changed radically after the death of Aurangzeb (1707). The Ottoman Turks in the eighteenth century revived their Caliphal claims and the Muslims of India once again accepted the existence of one Caliph for the entire Muslim world. One of the important impacts of Caliphate on the Muslims in India, from the rule of Muhammad Bin Qasim to that of the British was that they considered themselves part of the larger brotherhood of Islam.

It was this feeling of brotherhood due to which the Muslims of India became restive and at times, angry, and even rebellious against the British when the latter became involved as a major partner in European power's

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86. Ibid., p. 21, For relation between Turkey and Mughal Emperors see Sulaiman Nadvi “Khilafat Aur Hindustan” (Azam Garh 1340 A H.) pp. 52-76.

87. Ibid., p. 21.

According to Theodore P. Wright Jr., “Just as Jews have looked to Jerusalem and Catholics to Rome the Muslims of the Sub-continent as all over the world have prayed towards Mecca, read the Quran in ‘Arabic and gone on Haj to Arabia and Iraq ever since their religion penetrated Sind in the first century of Hijra”, Wright, Theodore Jr. “Indian Muslims and the Middle East”. Journal of South Asia and Middle East, Vol. VI, No., 1, Fall, 1982.

“The average Indian Muslim looked upon himself as a member of a universal religious brotherhood.....while his allegiance was to Queen Victoria, his political self-respect was satisfied by the existence of the Sultans at Constantinople and Fez and of the Shah and Khedive at Tehran and Cairo”.


“Muslims identify themselves with a universal brotherhood that supposedly draws people from distant corners of the globe into a single, unified community” --Ziring, Lawrence, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Westview, 1980) p. 25.
conspiratorial and aggressive...signs against the Turkish Empire, towards the end of nineteenth century.

THE EUROPEAN POWERS AND OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Since the dawn of history the West had carried on trade and other commercial relations with the East through the ports located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean but when the Ottoman Turks established their supremacy over the Mediterranean and came to occupy Levant, Palestine and Egypt in fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these links were severed.\textsuperscript{88} As a consequence, the European powers took to finding alternative trade routes to the East. These attempts led to the discovery of America by Columbus and voyage of Vasco-de-Gama to India via the Cape of Good Hope towards the end of fifteenth century. Till the middle of sixteenth century the power of the Ottoman Empire remained unchallenged but after the death of Sultan Suleyman it began to show signs of decline. The weakening of Turkish Empire coincided with the rise of rivalry among the European powers, namely France, Britain and Russia, to gain supremacy over the European continent. During this period, Britain followed a policy of balance of power and maintained cordial relations with the Ottoman Empire to check the Russian

\textsuperscript{88} The naval power of the Ottoman Empire during Sultan Suleyman (1520-65) extended over all the Mediterranean and greater part of North African coast. In 1516 Palestine was occupied by Sultan Salim, the father of Sultan Suleyman and in the same year he banned the famous Silk Route that ran from the East to West and accounted for most of its revenue in gold and silver. Winross, Lord "The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of Turkish Empire," (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 167.
advance towards the eastern Mediterranean. The British had begun to establish trade and commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the sixteenth century. An enterprising English merchant, Jenkinson procured from Sultan Suleyman freedom to trade throughout Ottoman Empire on the same grounds as the French and Venetians had done before them. In 1580, first capitulatory treaty was signed between England and Ottoman Empire which was ratified in 1603. 89 Till the end of nineteenth century the British relations with the Ottoman Empire remained cordial. This British policy was based on the conviction that the danger of hostile power controlling the eastern Mediterranean and thus communications with India as Napoleons Egyptian expedition had done was best prevented by shoring up the crumbling ramparts of the Ottoman Empire. 90

During the nineteenth century the European powers began to take an active interest in the Middle East, leading among them being of course, the British who established their control over Egypt in 1824 when it was under the suzerainty of Ottoman Empire. During this period the European powers were influenced primarily by the strategic importance of the Middle East across the path from Europe to the Far East and


In the sixteenth century merchants imported from the East, spices, Jewels, silks and other wares for which the demand was brisk. European merchants came to Ottoman commercial centers in the Eastern Mediterranean to purchase these items as well as goods originating in the Ottoman Empire, exporting them to Europe in European vessels.

90. Scaright, Sarah., The British in the Middle East op. cit., p. 85.
used a variety of pretexts to interfere in the internal affairs of the area, particularly Egypt and Levant.  

Towards the end of nineteenth century, the traditional British policy of supporting Turkey against Russia was given up in favour of allowing gradual disintegration of Ottoman Empire at the hands of European powers. This attitude of the British was manifest in the so called neutral stand that they took during and after the Crewman War. The relations between Britain and Turkey were far from cordial since this war broke out and Turkey was firmly convinced that the British sympathy lay not with Turkey but with those European powers who were out for depriving Turkey of its European possessions. Such developments as the Russian advance in Turkistan, French control over North Africa, British interference in Egypt, Persia and Afghanistan, Italian occupation of Tripoli all were seen by the Muslims as an unmistakable and deliberate plan by the European powers to destroy Islam in the world. The Muslims of India were

91. Ibid., p. 77.

For British policy toward the Ottoman Empire during the period between Crewman War and the outbreak of the First World War see Joseph Heller, British Policy Toward the Ottoman Empire: 1908-1914 (London, Frank Cass, 1983).

For an authoritative comment on the strategic value of the Middle East for European powers, see J.B. Glubb: 'The Middle East Situation' in Majidia Khadduri (Ed) Arab-Israel Impasse, op. cit., p. 26. For European Power's rivalries in the Middle East see George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, (Beirut, 1938); and Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, op. cit.


Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar was so overpowered by the grief and Turkish disaster in the Balkan wars that he even contemplated suicide.

greatly disappointed when the British, contrary to their expectations failed to come to Turkey's rescue in Turco-Italian conflict in Balkan Wars. 93

The most important factor for change in British policy towards Turkey was the rise of Germany and its attempts to increase its influence in the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Middle East. The traditional rivalry of 17th century between France, Britain and Russia to gain influence and domination in the Ottoman Empire began to be overshadowed at the dawn of twentieth century by a changed relation of forces resulting from German expansion. From the last decades of the nineteenth century until 1912, the export of German capital to the Ottoman Empire grew by nearly 500 million marks and together with the Ottoman outstanding debts German holdings totalled about 1000 million marks. The Germans were very active in railway construction and on November 25, 1899 obtained a preliminary concession from the Sultan of Turkey for the so-called Baghdad Railway which was to connect Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna with Baghdad and the Persian Gulf via Constantinople. The building of the railway also involved plans to exploit raw materials, mainly cotton as well as the oil of Mesopotamia. In 1990 Kaiser Wilhelmi


According to Joseph Heller, "The distinctive feature of Britain's Ottoman Policy during the period was one of gradual change; the attitude of friend-fines which was evident in Crewman War and the Eastern Crises of 1877-88, and which was associated with such statesmen as Palmerston, Stratford, Canning and Disraeli turned to coldness and occasional hostility, epitomized in the person of Gladstone. Enmity seemed to have reached at its peak level on the eve of the young Turk Revolution of 1908. Heller, Joseph, op. cit., p.1."
II made a pilgrimage to Palestine. He ended the pilgrimage age with a visit to Damascus where he declared that the world's 300 million Muslims could count on his friendship.  

Although Turkey joined War in October, 1914, there is evidence to suggest that the European powers especially Britain had long before that drawn up plans to grab Turkish territories in the Middle East. The return of such persons as Lloyd George P.M. Lord Milner and Lord Curzon to the British government signified the appearances in British policy of a New Imperialism which sought an extension of British power and influence throughout the globe.

The defeat of Central Powers which Turkey had joined in the First World War offered Britain a historic and long awaited opportunity to extend its power and influence in the Middle East. During the War, Britain had encouraged Arab nationalist forces to revolt against Turkey because, as T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) had thought there was no


For a detailed study of Baghdad Railway see E.M. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway (New York 1923).

Relations between Germany and Turkey began to develop in 1888 when Kaiser William became the ruler of Germany. the main reasons behind this development was economic The German industry which had registered phenomenal development after the middle of 19th century needed markets. Between 1886 and 1910 Germany jumped from 15th to second place in Ottoman Empire's foreign trade, outstripped only by England. The kaiser visited Turkey second time in 1898. The award of the contract of Baghdad Railway to Deutsche Bank intensified European rivalries in the Near and Middle East. (Hurewitz: 1535-1914 op. cit., p. 252).

possibility of a quick and in-expensive British victory over Turkey’s forces in the Middle East without the Arab help.96

Prior to the declaration of Arab revolt against Turkey, the British had reached an understanding with Sherif Hussein of Mecca that after the expulsion of Turkish forces from the Middle East an independent Arab State comprising these areas would be established. As discussed earlier, in this independent state Palestine was also to be included.97

INDIAN MUSLIMS AND OTTOMAN EMPIRE

For the Muslims of India the Ottoman Empire had a special significance. To the millions of them the Sultan of Turkey was the Khalifa the successor to the successors of Prophet (Peace Be upon’ Him). For them the word of Khalifa bore special significance. Its mere mention brought an immediate stimulus of affection for Turkey and its cause.98

The sympathy of Indian Muslims with Turkey was not a new development for it had been evident a long time ago. In the days of Crewman Wars, the Governor-General Dallhousie referred to it in his private correspondence. Considering

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According to T. E. Lawrence, Sherif Hussain of Mecca was made to side with Britain in the First World War partly due to the reason that Hejaz faced the eventuality of complete suspension of food imports from India since he "became technically the enemy" of British Empire with Turkey joining the German side and Hejaz produced no food of its own. (T. E. Lawrence: Seven Pillars of Wisdom, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1935) p.49

97. Sherif-Hussain -McMahon correspondence has been discussed in Part 1.


"The Turkish Empire" according to Ram Gopal, was the pride of the Muslim World. Gopal Ram; Indian Muslims, (Delhi, Asia Publishing House, 1959) p. 121).
that the Indian Muslims had special regard for the Sultan of Turkey, the British through their ambassador to Turkey had managed to secure from him a command asking the Indian Muslims to restrain from waging war upon the British. As the nineteenth century entered into its third decade and Turkey became a target of aggressive machinations of European powers, the Indian Muslims felt perturbed and expressed sympathy for Turkish cause. This happened when the Russians stood at the gates of Constantinople (1877) and the Italians invaded Tripoli (1911).  

Indian Muslim’s sympathy for Turkey grew with the strengthening of Pan-Islamist movement which originally inculcated religious and political reform but was transformed into an anti-imperialist movement after the middle of nineteenth century when the Muslim territories, especially Ottoman Empire came under attack from aggressive European powers. Pan Islam movement in India became anti-British movement, chiefly for two reasons. British attitude during Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars had convinced the Indian Muslims that the sympathies of Britain lay with the enemies of Turkey and not with Turkey.  

99. Ibid., p. 98.  
100. Ibid., p. 98 When the Italians attacked Tripoli in 1911, Turkey wanted to send its reinforcements through Egypt but the British authorities who were in control over Egypt at that time refused to let the Turkish forces pass through Egypt. According to Chaudhry Khaliquzzam, this caused great resentment amongst the students at Ali Garh University as it amounted to open support of the Italians by the British Government (Khaliquzzam, Ch. Pathway to Pakistan: Karachi Longmans, 1961) p. 17 In the British House of Commons there was shown pro-Italian attitude when an adjournment motion on Italian atrocities was introduced. Similarly during the Balkan Wars when anti-Turkish forces swept through Macedonia, and carried the battle to the very gates of Constantinople, the British
events coincided with the growth of discontentment among Indian Muslims against the British over the annulment of partition of Bengal and other matters. These developments stirred the more advanced Muslims to seek contact with the Turkish nationalist leaders. There was a dramatic change in the Indian Muslims disposition towards the British and the myth of his loyalty to the latter, long cherished and nourished by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, had come to an end. This changed situation was described by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan in an article in Comrade.

"....It is no exaggeration to say that the bombardment of Meshed by the Russians, the descent of Italy on Tripoli the onslaught of the Balkan allies on Turkey with all their attendant horrors have made the Muslims of India a changed people. They are not what they were two years ago."

Government adopted an attitude which was bluntly unfriendly to the Turks. The British Prime Minister Asquith supported Bulgarians when they attacked Thrace. The part played by the British Government was ill-conceived and artlessly executed shaking Muslim loyalty. (See Abdul Hamid n98, p. 99-100) The Balkan War broke out in October, 1912 when the four European powers, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece declared war against Turkey. The war ended with the treaty of London (May 30, 1913) as a result of which Turkey’s dominions in Europe were diminished.

101. Gopal, Ram, Indian Muslim, Delhi, 1959, p. 122. op. cit.


Pointing to the strains on Indian Muslim's loyalty to the British Government, Maulana Muhammad Ali, in one of the editorials of Comrade (Oct. 14, 1911) said:-

"......one of the ideals which the Indian Muhammadans have cherished for long is that the British Government which rules over the largest number of Mussalman subjects should be bound in an alliance with Muhammadan powers and Kingdoms so that their territorial loyalty and extra-territorial patriotism should work in the same direction". (R. A. Jafri Ibid. p. 250).

It must not, however, be inferred that the anti-British sentiments amongst the Indian Muslims date only from the end of the nineteenth century or were the result of developments in the early twentieth century alone. Opposition to the British rule had existed among the Muslims of India long before those events. The Jehad of Sayyed Ahmed Ahmad Shabid directed initially against the Sikhs but intended ultimately to be converted into a war against the British, was carried on intermittently for over twenty years after the annexation of Punjab. The activities of Daud Miyan the son of Maulana Shariatullah Founder of Faridi sect, acquired the character of a peasant struggle against oppression, Religious minded Muslims such as Maulana Ahmadullah Shah and Bakht Khan played leading role in the upheavals of 1857-58. After the
suppression of Jihād movement, the orthodox who honoured the tradition came again to the forefront during the First World War under the leadership of Maulana Mahmood-ul-Hassan (1851-1920) who explored the possibilities of cooperation between the Muslim powers to form a united front against British Imperialism, and was in consequence interned for three years in Malta along with a number of fellow workers. After his release in 1919 he joined the Khilafat Movement and Non-Cooperation Movement. See Mujib, M. Indian Muslims, (London, p. 400), See also the Indian Annual Register, 1936, Vol. I. P. 55.
As War broke out and Britain faced Turkey as an adversary, the British Government, conscious of the fact that the war with Turkey would have an adverse effect on the Indian Muslims, issued a number of statements giving the guarantees of fair treatment towards Turkey and assurances of due considerations of Muslim susceptibilities in framing the peace settlement. The last one of these pledges was contained in a speech made by Mr. Lloyd George on January 5, 1918 before the House of Commons in which the British Prime Minister repudiated all imperialistic ambitions and declared that his government would not pursue a vindictive policy towards Turkey. 104 Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India (1858-1944) had duly informed the Home Government about the sentiments of Indian Muslims on Turkish problem. 105 The British Government of India tried to hold public meetings aimed at condemning Turkey for joining Germany. In Lucknow one such meeting was held which Maulana Abdul Bari agreed to attend. In this meeting merely a resolution expressing loyalty to the Government was passed but no speeches condemning the Turks were allowed. 106

104. Hamid, A. Muslim Separatism in India, op. cit., p. 133. See also Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi "Ulama in Politics" (Karachi Maaref 1972) p. 161; Ram Gopal "Indian Muslims", op. cit., p. 136


"I hear from the North-West Frontier Province where practically the whole population is Mohammaden," he wrote to Lord Crewe (1858-1945), Secretary of State for India, "that the war between Italy and Turkey is the sole topic of discussion in the villages and among the tribes and the bazar version is that we have conspired with Italy to seize Tripoli", P. Hardy, ibid, p. 183.

The British Government knew fully well that the Indian Muslims had very sensitive feelings on the question of the areas known as Holy Lands of Islam and monuments and shrines which were sacred in the eyes of the Muslims. Soon after its declaration of war against Turkey, it gave a definite promise with regard to the Holy Places of Islam that their sanctity would be respected and no harm would be done to them. On the whole, the Muslims relied on them and thought the results of war would not be harmful to their interests.107

The Muslims of India had already demonstrated their keen interest in the Holy Places of Islam by sending a Medical Mission and financial assistance to the Ottoman Sultan during the Balkan war. Subsequently an organization to carry on agitation on this issue was set up under the title "Khuddam Kaaba". The initiative was taken by Maulana Abd-ul-Bari of Firingi Mahal, the Ali Brothers and Sheikh Mushir Hussain Kidwai.108

After the War, the Allies tried to dictate humiliating terms to Turkey. While the Turks signed the armistice on November 3, 1918 the British marched into Mosul, Constantinople was occupied officially by the Allies, but actually by the British. On May 15, 1919 Greece acting as the brutal nominee of Britain, marched her forces into the Turkish homeland of Smyrna to liquidate what was left of

107. Moinul Haq, op. cit, p. 208
108. Ibid., p. 209.
Turkey. The treatment that the Turks were getting at the hands of Allies greatly perturbed the Indian Muslims. The mounting evidence of Allied and particularly of British intentions to smash Turkey enraged all sections of Muslim opinion in India. The Muslim leaders reminded the British Government of its solemn promises and demanded that the Jazarat-ul-Arab, including Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine with all the holy places situated there in, must always remain under the direct suzerainty of the Khalifa.

It should be noted that the Arab public opinion was not necessarily in agreement with the demands of the Indian Muslims. Sherif Hussain of Mecca had rebelled against the Turks at the British instigation in exchange for an independent Arab State that included Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine. Even in Palestine Arab opinion was in favour of putting the territory under Syrian control as a separate and independent State. During the War, the Arabs had been promised that the principle of self-determination would be made the basis of nationalism. But the Indian Muslims were unable to understand this phenomenon. They continued to pin their hopes on the British Prime Minister’s promise. This


110. The policy that the British adopted towards Turkey after the victory of 1918 detonated an explosion of Islamic sentiment in India. The Treaty of Serves signed in August, 1920 deprived Turkey of all rights in Cyprus, Egypt and the Sudan, transferred the Arab areas of her empire to British and French Mandates, gave certain Aegean islands to Italy and allowed Greece to administer Izmir (Smyrna) for five years. Italy was to have development rights in southern Anatolia and Adalia and France in Cilicia and Western Kurdistan. (Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India, op. cit., p. 188)

111. See Howard N. Harry, "The King-Crane Commission, op. cit, P. 226-7.
confusion in the minds of Muslims is described by a well known writer on Muslim politics in South Asia.

"The Muslims of the Sub-Continent were unable to understand the action of the Arabs who had shown no respect to the institution of caliphate nor to the cause of Muslim solidarity. It was painful to think that a Muslim potentate should stab his suzerain in the back at a time when the entire future of Muslim political power was at stake. Could Arab purpose not be served by the achievement of autonomy within the Ottoman fold? The Muslims of the Sub-Continent were angry with Sherif but they were bitter against the British." 112

The Indian Muslim's bitterness against the British, no doubt, stemmed from the latter's policy towards Ottoman Empire but it was also caused by a number of other developments in India affecting their interests. For example, when partition of Bengal was cancelled the Muslims felt betrayed by the British. The repressive measures resorted to by the British authorities in the wake of protest against the Rowlatt Act had exacerbated public feelings throughout the country. In fact, India had begun to experience a new awakening with the dawn of twentieth century. This awakening was a world wide phenomenon. It was in the beginning of 20th century that the Boers fought against the British for their freedom, the newly awakened Japanese fighting the Russians for their existence and safety and the Russian masses fighting the all-powerful Tzar for their bread and liberty. It was also about this period, as Subhas Chandara Bose wrote, that the pride and haughtiness of the (British) rules reached its limit and signs of serious political unrest appeared in Bengal. 113

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112. Qureshi, Ishtiaq Hussain 'Ulama in Politics. (Karachi Ma'aref Ltd., 1972,) p. 256.

Jallianwala massacre in Punjab and the subsequent atrocities had a profound effect on the political climate of India and it became full of bitterness against the British to such an extent that it made a loyal person like, Gandhi to collect his forces for leading a revolt against the British Government. Although partition of Bengal had created a rift between Hindus and Muslims, anti-British feeling was as strong among the Muslims as it was among the Hindus. According to Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, there was a group of young Muslims in Bengal ready to take up revolutionary activities against the British despite Hindu-Muslim rift over Bengal partition. In 1905, for the first time, economic boycott was resorted to by the Indian people. The impact of the revolutionary movement on the political situation in India was so deep that it caused a split in the Indian National Congress dividing the organization into moderate and extremist factions in 1907. In the same year Seditious Meetings Act was passed to counter rising wave of revolutionary activities and in 1910, a new drastic press Act followed to stifle the voice of freedom. The intensity of anti-British political activities can be gauged from the fact that between 1906 and 1909, there were 550 political cases before the courts in Bengal alone.

\[114\] Ibid., p. 54.
\[116\] Dutt, Palme "India To-day (London, 1940) p. 33.
In the beginning, this agitation was carried on almost exclusively by Hindus, who were inspired by nationalism. But the events taking place in the Muslim world both before and after the First World War, drove the Muslims to join hands with the Hindus. The Khilafat Movement which was started in 1919 witnessed unprecedented sense of Hindu-Muslim unity. The Khilafat conference held in Delhi on November 23, 1919 was attended also by Gandhi who lent his complete support for the Muslim cause.\textsuperscript{117}

**KHILAFAT MOVEMENT**

Anti-British feelings amongst the Muslims ran unprecedentedly high during the Khilafat Movement. As Subhas C. Bose observes in his book,\textsuperscript{118} about the middle of 1920 anti-British feeling was stronger among the Muslims than among the rest of the Indian population. Even Mr. Montago was unable to placate them and, in disgust, had to resign from the cabinet, An astonishing wave of sympathy, Jawahar Lal Nehru wrote, "for Turkey roused the Indian Muslims. All India felt that sympathy and anxiety but in case of Muslims this was deeper and something personal.\textsuperscript{119} Portraying the state of Muslim mind, Sir Theodore Morison wrote.

\textit{"In India itself the whole of the Muslim community from Peshawar to Arcot is seething with passion on this subject. Women inside the zenan are weeping over it, Merchants who usually take no interest in public affairs are leaving their shops and counting houses to organize remonstrances and petitions, even the medieval theologians of Deoband and Nadwat-ul-Ulama, whose detachment from the modern world is proverbial are coming from their cloisters to protest against the destruction of...\textsuperscript{117}}

\textsuperscript{117} For a description of Hindu-Muslim Unity during Khilafat Movement, see Ram Gopal \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 136-51.

\textsuperscript{118} Bose C., \textit{Chaudara op. cit.}, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{119} Gopal, Ram \textit{op. cit.}, p. 123.
Islam. For Muslims this one pre-occupation has swallowed up all others, They can think and talk of nothing else. 120

The Muslims of India had observed on October 17, 1919 the Khilafat Day with the suspension of business, fasting and prayers. The official celebrations of Allied victory over Central Powers were boycotted both by the Hindus and the Muslims. The entire Muslim political activity at that time was centered around the Turkish and Khilafat question. Numerous political organizations, most of them mushroom growths sprang up in different regions of the sub-continent. All India Khilafat Committee led by Ali Brothers (Maulana Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali) and Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind was particularly active and in the forefront. Muslim anxiety and concern over Khilafat, Turkey and Holy places was not confined only to the religious leaders, their political leadership and common man was also deeply affected by the movement. It were not the cities alone but rural areas as well, which had become the centers of protest and agitation. It had created an unprecedented awakening among the Muslims, an awakening which they were prepared to pour into

120. Quoted in Hamid, Abdul op. cit. p. 134.

nationalism and into a struggle which would eventually
develop into a freedom movement.\footnote{Gopal, Ram op. cit., p. 141.}

**KIIILAFAT AND MUSLIM LEAGUE**

The All India Muslim League founded in 1906 was also
active on the Turkish and Khilafat issue from the very
beginning. As early as 1913 during the Balkan War, All India
Muslim League (AIML) at its 6th Session at Lucknow passed a
resolution deploiring the unjust war declared by the Allies
against the Turkish people and expressing dissatisfaction

\footnote{Zamindar (daily) edited by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan at Lahore (Punjab) was a great champion of Khilafat cause. Through editorials, numerous articles and news coverage it lent a great service to the movement. It also published reports about the protest meetings held in connection with Khilafat Movement in the far and wide areas of the country. One such meeting, which gives the indication of how deep the movement had affected the Muslims, was reported in an issue of the paper dated May 9, 1920. According to the report, a huge meeting attended by more than 3000 people consisting mainly of peasants and including about 1000 women as well, was held at a small village named Dhingo near Beria road in Sind. The participants in the meeting were so overwhelmed by emotions that about 200 poor peasants announced their decision to join “Hijrat” Movement (Zamindar, Lahore) May 9, 1920.

The issue of Khilafat had produced a feeling of regret and repentance in the ex-servicemen who fought on the British side against the Turks in Hejaz, Palestine and Iraq during the World War I. The functionaries of British Government in India were trying to assuage their feelings through officially organized public meetings i.e. darbars where retired and pensioned military officers and jawans were specially invited. One such meeting was reported to have been held at Khushab (Punjab) in a school enclosure. The meeting was addressed by the Deputy Commissioner and the audience included numberdars, zamindars and retired army officers and soldiers. The Deputy Commissioner spoke on the Khilafat issue and tried to justify seizure of Palestine and Iraq by Britain. At the conclusion of his address, the Deputy Commissioner invited questions from the audience. A retired resaldar named Mian Rukunnudin got up and said:

“Sahib! We have heard your speech and also understood what it meant. Our hearts are wounded but respect (for authority) and loyalty does not permit us to say what we want to say. We feel helpless. In the beginning of the war, we were promised that the Holy Places will not be captured or seized, but ..........”

The Deputy Commissioner interrupted and said no such promise was ever made. After that, according to report, a heated discussion went on for some time Zamindar, (Lahore) June 1, 1920.}
over British policy towards Turkey. In the same session, Mian Muhammad Shafi in his Presidential Address had observed:

"The rapid succession of disastrous events in the Muslim world has very naturally produced a profound effect on Muslim opinion and sentiment in India. Our sympathy has gone out, spontaneously and unstinctedly to our suffering brethren in the Near East and the South of Russia."

In 1921 at its 14th (Ahmadabad) session the AIML passed a strong resolution in favour of Khilafat Movement. In his Presidential Address Maulana Hasrat Mohani declared.

"I want to warn that the claims of the Mussalmans of India are founded more on religious than political principles. So long as the Jazirat-ul-Arab (including Palestine) and Mesopotamia are not absolutely freed from non-Muslim influence, and so long as the political and military power of the Khilafat is not fully restored, the Mussalmans of India cannot suspend their activities and efforts."

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had also from the very beginning supported and worked for the Turkish cause during the Balkan War and after the armistice was signed between the Allies and Turkey in October, 1918. In 1912, at the time


123. Ibid. p. 274.


The All India Muslim League had extended support to Turkey at its 6th session, 1913, Eighth Session, 1915, Eleventh Session, 1918 Twelfth Session, 1919 and Thirteenth Session 1920. During these sessions and on other numerous occasions resolutions were passed and statements issued in support of Khilafat Movement, criticizing British policy and expressing the solidarity of Indian Muslims with their Turkish brethren (For details see P.S.S. op. cit. Vol. I pp. 274-7, 347, 434-35, 475-6, 508, 521, 545, 562.)
of Balkan War he expressed his strong concern about the fate of Turkey and had even helped in organizing relief supplies to Ottoman sufferers. Later during the World War I, he had highlighted Muslim feelings on the question of Khilafat. At Lucknow in December, 1916 in particular, he had urged the government to have regard for their (Muslims) dearest and most sacred religious feelings and under no circumstances interfere with the question of the future of Khilafat.¹²⁵

The Indian Muslim’s protest movement and agitation against the British was aimed at the preservation of Turkish Empire which also included Palestine. Khilafat Movement, therefore, was also a movement for keeping Palestine safe from the control and occupation of non-Muslim forces.

Although Khilafat Movement failed to secure its declared objectives, it made significant contributions in two important respects. Firstly, it helped in mobilizing the already discontented Muslims of India on a broader scale with an unprecedented level of political consciousness that ultimately led to movement for national independence.¹²⁶ Secondly, Khilafat Movement enabled the Muslims of India to understand more clearly that the British policy towards Turkey was just a part of a bigger strategic design in which not only the Middle East but all British possessions in the


¹²⁶ Minault, Gail, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York), Columbia Univ. Press, 1982, p. 239. Also see Moinul Haq op. cit., p. 239.
east of Suez were included as important components. The sole objective of the British policies in the Middle East was to safeguard the vital lines of communications linking British colonial territories and the Middle East as the nerve centre. In other words, it had now dawned upon the Indian Muslims that the freedom of the Muslim world was linked with their own freedom from the British. It was this perception of Palestine problem which determined the nature and content of Muslim reaction towards the developments in Palestine after the First World War.

Palestine as an Arab-Jewish problem had begun to attract the attention of Muslims in India almost immediately after the Balfour Declaration 1917. When in November, 1917 British forces which included a number of Indian armymen entered Palestine and defeated the Turkish forces to reach Jerusalem a Muslim paper in India reported the event by saying that since the British Government had from early days of war promised to respect and protect the Holy Places of unjustified to expect that Jerusalem or Bait-ul-Maqdas will be considered such places. 127 A few months later in February, 1918, the same paper wrote that although there is a great resistance (from the Arab population of Palestine) with British efforts and Jewish money the establishment of a Jewish colony in Palestine cannot be ruled out. 128

It means that with regard to Palestine, the demands of the Indian Muslims were similar to the ones they put forward for other parts of Ottoman Empire like Arabia and Mesopotamia. The pledges given by the British government to the Muslims of India regarding Turkey were believed by them to also cover the territory of Palestine. In other words it meant that Palestine will remain an Arab territory and part of Ottoman Empire even if it was captured by the British forces during the War. But after the War, the British not only severed Palestine from Syria (of which it was a part under Ottoman Empire) they also facilitated the Jewish immigration into Palestine with a clear intention to fulfil the promise made to World Zionist Organization under Balfour Declaration. There was an immediate and widespread protest movement launched by the Muslims of India at various levels. The leading Muslim newspapers, important political leaders of the Muslims and political parties of the Muslims, wrote editorials and articles, issued statements and passed resolutions deploring and condemning the British policies and actions in Palestine. Zamindar (daily) published in Lahore, edited by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan wrote a lengthy editorial which fully reflected the sentiments of the Indian Muslims. The editorial said:

In course of war (the Muslims of India) were repeatedly assured that the European War was only a political war in which British has taken part only to save the weak nations of the world from German usurpation. It was because of these declarations that the Indian Muslims came to regard Germany as a dangerous enemy of their Empire and contributed to the (British) war effort with more than their means and capacity would have permitted them. The Muslims of India firmly believed that after the war their feelings regarding the Ottoman Empire and Holy Places would be respected by the British. But the foolish and imbecile (Indian Muslims) did not know that the war in which they fought
against the Sultan of Turkey was not a political war but purely a crusade, as is indicated in a statement by the British Prime Minister Mr. Lloyd George (the statement of Lloyd Geroge follows).

"The name of General Allenby will always remain famous as a daring and successful commander who won victory in the last and the most glorious campaign of Crusades. It was ordained to go to the credit of General Allenby that he with his wisdom and skill, should take to a successful and glorious end an expedition on which Europe had to expend for centuries its valour and energy. We forget that for many generations, the military might of Europe had failed to achieve this objective. The British Army under General Allenby accomplished this goal and completed the task."

"These words made it amply clear that Europe and particularly Britain had for long waiting for this opportunity to claim before the world that by conquering Bait-ul-Maqdas they have defeated the Muslims so that they are not able to rise again." 129

Another influential Muslim daily Paisa Akhbar warned Britain against the policy of converting Palestine into a National Home for Jews. The paper demanded editorially that Palestine which for centuries had been the land of Arabs must remain as such because Muslim Arabs form an overwhelming majority of population in the territory. 130

As already discussed earlier from 1936 to 1939, the Palestinian Arabs staged a series of uprisings against the rising tide of Jewish colonization actively supported by the British authorities. The Arabs had to face not only a better organized and better armed Jewish force, they had also to bear the repressive and retaliatory actions of the British army. The Arab revolt of 1936-39 collapsed due to the combined onslaught of Zionists and the British. During this

129. Zamindar (Lahore) May 9, 1920.

The English translation of the Editorial as well as that of the statement by British PM. Mr. Lloyd George quoted in the editorial is rendered by the author from Urdu text of the editorial published in the Zamindar May 9, 1920.

130. Paisa Akhbar (Lahore) July 1, 1922.

There was a series of articles and editorial comments published by Paisa Akhbar on Palestine as the conditions there took a turn for the worst during 1922. In these articles the atrocities perpetrated by the Jews against the Arabs were strongly deplored and the British authorities criticized for their connivance. See for example, Paisa Akhbar dated July 8, 1922, July 9, 1922; July 12, 1922 and July 21, 1922.
struggle the Arabs suffered tremendous losses. Their villages were destroyed, men, women and children were massacred and hundreds of their houses orchards and vineyard were destroyed during British reprisals against the Arabs. It was an unequal warfare. Arab military power was destroyed during this period and Jews, protected by the British succeeded in building up their strength. 131

During the Khilafat Movement, the Muslims of the Sub-Continent became apprehensive about Zionist designs in regard to Palestine. Meetings and demonstrations were held to denounce Zionist and British intrigues for turning Arab territory and a land holy to the Muslims into a homeland for Jews. The leading Muslim leaders during the Khilafat Movement came out against the League of Nations Mandate system for Palestine and demanded that Palestine should remain under the rule of the Arabs. An appeal was made to the Muslims of India not to join British armies which were fighting against the Arabs. The support extended by the Sub-Continents Muslims to the cause of the Palestinian Arabs was not entirely without effect on the British Government. 132

MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PALESTINE

The All India Muslim League began to take note of the serious situation in Palestine from the time the territory was seized by the British from the Turks in 1918. From 1918 until 1947, at every Muslim League session, at Council and Working Committee meetings of the party and elsewhere, Muslim League leaders spoke on Palestine, held discussions, and passed numerous resolutions on the issue.133

In December 1918, at the Muslim League's eleventh annual session at Delhi (30-31 December) a resolution was passed strongly protesting against the occupation of Jerusalem and other Holy Places by the British forces. It was also decided at the session that copies of the resolutions adopted should be wired to the Paris Peace Conference.134 Maulana Hasrat Mohani who presided over the 14th (Ahmadabad) session in 1921, delivered a hard hitting speech against the British decision to keep under its occupation Palestine and warned that the Muslims of India will continue their protest movement against the seizure.135

The Quaid-i-Azam as we have already noted had been expressing his concern over the issue of Balkan wars and Khilafat.136 As the British connived with the Zionists to change the demographic complexion of Palestine and repress

135. See note 124.
136. See note 125.
the Arab resistance movement in 1937, the Quaid-i-Azam condemned the British attitude and her plan for the partition of Palestine. In his Presidential Address at the Lucknow session in October 1937, he warned that British would be digging their own grave if they fail to honour their original proclamation, promises and intentions which were so unequivocally expressed to the Arabs and the world at large. He also said that the Muslims of the Sub-Continent will stand solid and will help the Arabs in every way they can in the brave and just struggle that they were carrying on against all odds. The same session passed a resolution which stated that if the British Government failed to alter its present pro-Jewish policy in Palestine the Mussalmans of India in consonance with the rest of the Islamic world will look upon Britain as the enemy of Islam and shall be forced to adopt all necessary measures to the dictates of their faith.

The resolutions condemning pro-Jewish British policies in Palestine, plans for the partition of Palestine and demanding independence for Palestine had also been passed at the earlier sessions of the Muslim league. In these resolutions Britain was asked to redress the grievances of the Palestinians. These resolutions protested against the


threat of British use of force in Palestine and demanded that Indian troops should not be sent to any Muslim lands. A demand was also made to boycott the British goods and concern was expressed at Jewish immigrations (supported by Britain and later also by the United States) into Palestine. A strong protest was made against the terrorization of the Palestinian Arabs and the gross injustices against them. Through these resolutions the European powers were also warned against carrying out of zones of influence in the region; support and sympathy for the Palestinian’s struggle for self-determination was expressed and an assurance of all help by the Muslims of India was given. The resolutions also contained an appeal to all the Muslims of the world to save Palestine. The U.S Government’s unscrupulous anti Arab policy in the Middle East was also condemned.\footnote{Khalida Quercashi, op. cit., pp. 211, 12.}

In early 1930, the situation in Palestine had become quite grave owing to the British policy of allowing more and more Jews to enter the territory. The Arab resentment and anger was taking the shape of resistance which the British

\footnote{For texts of Muslim League resolutions speeches and statements of Muslim League leaders made of League Commercial and Working Committee meetings, annual sessions, and elsewhere see 5.5. Pirzada (ed.), Foundations of Pakistan. All India Muslim league Documents: 1906-1947, Vols I and II., G.A. Allan, Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents; M. Rafique Azfal (ed.), Selected speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1911-34 and 1947-48), Lahore Research Society of Pakistan, 1966); Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, Only If they Knew (I, Karachi, International Press, 1965), M. Rafique Azfal (ed.) Speeches and statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaqat ali Khan, 1941-1951. (Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1949), Basic Document Series; A collection of Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam on Foreign Relations (October 1937-August, 1948). (Islamabad Research Branch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February, 1969.) All these quotations are taken from Khalida Quercashi, Ibid, Note No. 9 at p. 212.}
sought to repress with force. This aroused strong indignation among the Muslims of India. Their sentiments were reflected in the resolution passed at the 23rd annual session of the Muslim League at Delhi in 1933. The resolution said.

"This session of the All India Muslim League places on record its emphatic protest against the policy of the British Government in trying to make Palestine the National Home of the Jews, and request H.E. the Viceroy to represent to His Majesty's Government the feeling of the Muslims of India that the Balfour Declaration be immediately with drawn as it is Opposed to the fundamental rights of the people entrusted to their control."\(^{140}\)

These events had a great impact on the Indian Muslims. Jewish atrocities as well as British actions were widely condemned. The Muslims of India observed Palestine Day on 26 August, 1938. On November 6, 1936 Zamindar brought out a special edition of the paper on Palestine, known as Palestine Number. In this issue Palestinian problem was discussed in all its aspects and injustice done to the Arabs was highlighted. In Delhi and Canpore, Palestine Conferences were held.

All India Muslim league which had by then emerged under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam as the authentic voice of Indian Muslims was very active and quite vocal in extending support to the Arab cause in Palestine.

We have already mentioned the Muslim League resolution Passed at its 1937. Annual Session.\(^{141}\) In 1938 the Muslim League Council approved a resolution which was moved by the

\(^{140}\) Basic Document Series, Appendix I, p. 27, Khalida Querashi, Ibid. p. 212.

Quaid-i-Azam to observe Palestine Day on August 26, 1936 and also appointed a Committee to consider the question of sending an influential deputation abroad specially to Palestine and England and directed the Committee to consider ways and means by which effective pressure could be brought to bear on the British Government and also to advise the Council regarding the question of boycott of British goods.\footnote{142}

Earlier in September, 1937 a Conference on Palestine problem was held at Calcutta. The Quaid-i-Azam sent a message to the conference affirming full support to the brave struggle carried on by the Arabs of Palestine for the independence and freedom of their country. The resolutions passed by the conference were endorsed by the All India Muslim League at its Lucknow Session in October, 1937.\footnote{143} In October, 1938 an international conference on Palestine was held in Cairo. The Muslim League decided to send a delegation to the conference consisting of A.R. Siddiqui Ch. Khaliguzzaman, Raja Mahmoodabad and Maulana Hasrat Mohani.\footnote{144} In October, 1938 while addressing the Sind Muslim

\footnote{142. Ibid. p. 8. About 50,000 Muslims attended Delhi Conference on Palestine and some Muslims were arrested at Campore in connection with Palestimian question (See Iqbal’s letter to Miss Farqharson dated Sept. 6, 1917 Shalam p. 218-19.

The members of Palestine Committee appointed by the League council were: Maulana Shaukat Ali, Mr. Aziz Ahmad Khan (convener, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Mr. Abdur Rehman Siddiqui, Maulana Qutub-uddin, Abdul Wali, Maulana Hasrat Mohani and Maulana Mazaharuddin. (Text of the resolution).

143. Ibid. pp. 1-2. see also note no. 142.

144. Ibid. p. 15.

The committee appointed by AIMI. Council in July, 1938 had come out with strong recommendations in its report on Palestine. It recommended to send a delegation to the}
League conference at Karachi, the Quaid-i-Azam said, I am sure that there will be no peace in the Near East unless they give an honest and square deal to the Arabs in Palestine.\textsuperscript{145} At the 26th Session of AIML held in December, 1938 at Patna, a resolution was passed declaring that the problem of Palestine is the problem of the Muslims of the whole world. The resolution expressed Indian Muslim's resolve to make any sacrifices for Palestinian cause.\textsuperscript{146} Earlier on During the Palestine Day which was observed on August 26, 1938 during which, as thousands and thousands of meetings were held all over India.\textsuperscript{147} The Working Committee of AIML at its meeting in Bombay during July 2-3, 1939 decided to open a Palestine Fund for the relief of dependents of those who lost their lives or suffered during the Arab struggle for Palestinian Independence 1936-1939.\textsuperscript{148} In November, 1939 when the Second World War had already broken out and the British forces on the European and Middle East Fronts were being reinforced from India, the Quaid-i-Azam sent a letter to Lord Linlithgow the Viceroy of India,

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid. p. 23
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid. p. 44.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid. pp. 20-22.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid. p. 89.

The members of the Committee were Sir Abdoola Haroon, Mr. M.R. Siddiqui, Haji Abdul Sattar, haji Esak Seth, Sir Currimbhoy Ibrahim and Ch. Khaliquzzaman (Convener).
asking that the British Government should meet all reasonable demands of Arabs in Palestine and that Indian troops will not be used outside India against any Muslim power and country. In the historic session of AIML at Lahore in 1940 the Quaid-i-Azam again spoke on Palestine and asked the British Government to meet in fact and actually, the demands of the Arabs in Palestine. In 1946, in an interview with a United Press correspondent, he demanded that all Anglo-American influence be with drawn from Palestine as the first step towards a solution of the Palestine problem and urged "that not only should Jewish immigration cease but those Jews already in Palestine should emigrate to Australia Canada or elsewhere where There is room for them or one day their fate will be worse than it was under Hitler. It is quite clear he said that Jews want to reconquer Palestine with the help of America, and England. In this interview the Quaid-i-Azam denounced America, because of its role in Palestine as having no conscience or any regard for fair play or justice".  

149. Ibid. p. 95 See also Zamindar (lahore) September 25, 1938.

150. Ibid. p. 102. At the Lahore Session (22-24 march, 1940) which also adopted demand for Pakistan resolution, resolution on Palestine moved by Abdur Rehman Siddiqui was adopted which stated inter alia "its considered opinion, in clear and unequivocal language, that no arrangements of a piecemeal character will be made in Palestine which are contrary in spirit and opposed to the pledges given to the Muslims of India, to secure their active assistance in the war of 1914-1918. "(S.S Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, Vol II, p. 346; Basic Documents Series, p. 36.

151. Ibid. p. 140. When London Conference on Palestine was convened in 1946, the All India Muslim league sent a telegram to the British Prime Minister and in Secretary of State in which the British Government was urged upon to give sympathetic consideration to the Arab demands. Through this telegram the All India Muslim league demanded that it be allowed to send a representative to participate in the London Conference. The telegram also informed the British Government that the Muslim feelings throughout India were intense warned and
Muslim India felt greatly indignant at the Anglo American plans for Palestine. When the partition plan was put before the United Nations, the Quaid-i-Azam sent Ch. Muhammad Zafarullah Khan as head of Pakistan delegation to oppose the plan and support the Arab cause in Palestine. During the same period when the partition plan was under discussion in the United Nations, the Quaid-i-Azam gave an interview to Reuters Correspondent, Duncan Hooper on October 25, 1947 in which the Pakistan's policy on Palestine problem and relations with the Arab World were clearly defined.

In reply to question what were his views on the latest development regarding Palestine and what would be the attitude of Pakistan if the partition plan resulted in a conflict between the Arabs and Jews, the Quaid said.

"If the partition plan is accepted by the UN there is bound to be the gravest disaster and unprecedented conflict not only between the Arabs and the authority that would undertake to enforce the partition plan, but the entire Muslim world will revolt against such a decision which cannot be supported historically, politically or morally. In such a case Pakistan will have no other course but to give its fullest support to the Arabs and will do what-ever lies

the if the conference failed to find a solution to the Palestinian question the results would be disastrous throughout the Muslim World. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, (Islamabad, National Archives), File No. 1090, p. 98.
in its power to prevent that is, in my opinion, an outrage.\textsuperscript{152}

The demonstration of solidarity by the Indian Muslims with their Turkish brethren during the Khilafat Movement and with Arab co-believers on Palestinian problem was no doubt, an expression of their strong and solid feelings of pan-Islamism but it had also a very strong anti-British element. The reason being that long before Britain had started its machinations against Ottoman Empire and direct encroachments upon the Arab world, the Indian Muslims had themselves been deprived of political power and subjugated by the British. The issues of Khilafat and Palestine were, therefore, used by the Indian Muslims to air their own resentment and opposition to the British Imperialism. They regarded the struggle of the Turkish people their own struggle because Turkish people and the Indian Muslims were the victims of the same imperialist power. As already discussed, establishment of British control over Palestine under the League of Nations Mandate System and the move made during this period for the creation of Jewish National Home were clearly seen by the Indian Muslims as a strategic move to ensure the safety and security of its vast colonial possessions that lay in ar eas east of Suez.\textsuperscript{153} The movement

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., pp. 151-2. In one of this statements, Quaid-i-Azam said; “It has been the greatest difficulty with us during the last few months to solid the Muslims of India from openly revolting (on Palestine)” Quaid-i-Azam Papers, File No. 1247, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{153} In one of his letters (dated July 20, 1937) to Miss Farquharson giving his view on Palestine Commission's Report, 1937, Allama Iqbal said that the Report gave the impression “that Zionism as a movement was deliberately created not for the purpose of giving a national
of the Indian Muslims for national independence and the Arab struggle in Palestine were interlinked and had common objective i.e., freedom from British Imperialism. Both Arabs and the Muslims of India came to regard Britain as their common enemy. The Muslim league and Quaid-i-Azam supported Arab nationalist movement not only in Palestine but in other Arab and Muslim territories as well. This support was based not only on common religion, historical, and cultural bonds but also their shared perception of colonialism and imperialism represented by Britain.

The Muslims of India also condemned the United State’s attitude on Palestine which completely disregarded the interests of the Arabs and openly supported the Zionists. This is evident from the resolution passed at various sessions and the meetings of the All India Muslim League reflecting popular sentiments of the Indian Muslims. For instance, at its 30th annual (April, 1943) session at Delhi the Muslim League Viewed with great concern and alarm the new Zionist propaganda move in USA which is putting pressure on the USA Government for exercising its influence with the British Government firstly to remove all present restrictions on Jewish immigration in Palestine and secondly to adopt the policy of converting Palestine into a Jewish

Home to the Jews but mainly for the purpose of giving a home to the British Imperialism on the Mediterranean littoral". (See Shamshu) pp. 213-15)

In a lengthy editorial Maulana Zafar Ali Khan wrote in Zamindar that “Britain is eager for a mandatory control over Palestine because the territory is the base from where it can secure the security of its Empire” which includes Egypt, Aden India, Iraq, Australia and Hong Kong. (See Zamindar) November 8, 1935 “the Independence of Palestine is the guarantee of India’s Independence” Zamindar Palestine Number November 8, 1936.
state and warned against any step or move which may prove detrimental to Arab national interests" and declared that such a policy will be bitterly resented by the whole Arab and Islamic world as an outrage on democracy and justice and inalienable Arab rights to their homelands.\textsuperscript{154}

The Muslim League working Committee on 26 July, 1945 condemned the British US and Zionist actions and policies in Palestine and declared that the Muslim of the Sub-Continent will extend all support and cooperate with the Palestinians and the Arabs in securing the freedom of the Holy Land from the clutches of the British and in resisting and putting up a stop to the onslaught of the Jewry backed by the United States of America.\textsuperscript{155}

In a further demonstration of Muslim Indias solidarity with the Palestinians the Muslim League set up a Palestine Fund in 1939, Palestinian leaders such as Mufti Azam Amin-ul-Hussaini the grand Mufti of Palestine also visited the Sub-Continent and met Muslim league leaders.\textsuperscript{156} The President of All-India Muslim League, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah issued instructions to all provincial District and Primary Muslim League organizations to hold public meetings on February 8, 1946 for demonstrating solidarity

\textsuperscript{154} Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhry, op. cit. pp. 22-23 cited in Khalida Qureshi, op. cit., p. 215.


\textsuperscript{156} Khalida Qureshi, op. cit. pp. 216-17.
with the Palestinian Arabs on the eve of London Conference on Palestine. 157

The Muslims of India therefore were quite aware of the Palestinian problem much before the establishment of Pakistan and had expressed complete solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs. No wonder when Pakistan emerged as an independent state and the Palestinian problem took a new turn into an armed conflict between the Arabs and Israel, the people and the Government of Pakistan true to their long tradition of supporting the Arab cause, again showed complete solidarity with the Arabs and the Palestinians as the next chapter demonstrates.

CHAPTER 2

PAKISTAN AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT:
PARTITION OF PALESTINE AND WAR OF 1948

In the previous chapter, we have seen that being unable to reconcile the opposing stands taken by the Arabs and Jews on the future of Palestine the British Government decided to take the issue to the United Nations. In the following chapter a survey of the UN discussions on the Palestinian question, the partition plan of the UN and the role of Pakistan during these discussions would be made. Also included in this chapter would be a discussion on the circumstances leading to the first Arab–Israel War and the reaction of the government and the people of Pakistan to this War.

PAKISTAN AND ARAB–ISRAEL CONFLICT:
PARTITION OF PALESTINE AND WAR OF 1948

The United Nations took up the question of Palestine in February 1947. By this time all countries in the Middle East formerly under mandate were independent.¹ The only exception was Palestine. the British Government’s decision to place the Palestine question before United Nations was followed by

¹. Iraq achieved independence in 1932, Jordan in 1946, and Syria in 1946. Like the people of other mandated territories, the Palestinians also demanded independence for their country. But the British Government which had committed herself to the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine under Balfour Declaration referred the issue to United Nations and requested a special session of the General Assembly to consider the appointment of a special committee to make recommendations concerning the future government of Palestine.
several weeks of examining the various alternatives and the
difficulties they entailed. For the Security Council to take
up the issue could involve the veto. Another appropriate
forum was the Trusteeship Council, but this would require a
Trusteeship agreement with Great Britain in a role similar
to that she was trying to shed. The eventual decision was to
move the question in the General Assembly.²

The first Special Session of the UN General Assembly to
discuss the question of Palestine was convened on 8 April
1947. Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria had
launched a concerted effort to obtain a substantive debate
on the issue of independence for Palestine by addressing
identical requests that the Assembly place on its agenda an
additional item reading the termination of the mandate over
Palestine and "The declaration of its independence."³ The
Secretariat had also received request from the Jewish Agency
in Palestine, as well as other Zionist and Jewish
Organizations, requesting to be heard by the Assembly. Both
matters were taken up by the General Committee. In the
General Committee, the delegates of the Arab countries


³ Official Records of the General Assembly (hereafter referred as ORGA) Documents A/287 to
A/291 quoted in the Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, ibid p.4

The relevant provision of the Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations under which
Palestine was declared a mandated territory reads as follows:

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of
development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized
subject to the rendering to administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time
as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal
consideration in the selection of the Mandatory."
presented forceful arguments in support of their request. Their arguments were based on the grounds that the League of Nations having recognized the provisional independence of class "A" mandates, the United Nations could not avoid the issue of independence for Palestine. The entire history of mandated Palestine was recounted, the Balfour Declaration and the Covenant of the League of Nations analyzed and the various Commission reports cited. The Lebanese delegate declared;

"Moreover, if you do not envisage independence now as a possibility, do you not really prejudice it yourself? Are you not really saying in effect that the United Nations itself—not a certain Power, but the United Nations—is really so afraid of envisaging the ultimate possibility of independence for Palestine that it is not even willing to discuss it in plenary session in this Assembly? I think that is far more prejudicial fore-judgment of the ultimate issue of this case than if we simply said at the present moment that we shall discuss this question with that ultimate end in view and bring forth all arguments concerning it."

"Surely the United Nations is above any one particular government or two, or even a combination of Governments. Surely it is so detached and so far above particular Governments as to be able, in its own detachment to envisage and discuss every possibility, including the possibility of independence."4

The Arab countries' request to include in the agenda of General Assembly an additional item was not supported by the majority of members and it became evident that their request would not be accepted. The Arab request was rejected in the General Committee. The British request was inscribed in the agenda for the special session

4. ibid p.32.
The second important issue before the General Committee was to decide upon the Jewish Agency's request to be heard. This request was based on the ground that while the Arab States were advocates for the Palestinian case, the Jewish case was unrepresented. This request was pressed in the strongest terms by Poland claiming a special interest since almost half the Jewish immigrants in Palestine were from Poland and other East European states. The General Assembly directed the First Committee to accept the Jewish Agency's request to present its case. When the Palestinian Arabs also made a request to the General Assembly to be heard, their request was referred to the First Committee instead of being acceded to directly by the General Assembly. Upon this decision of the General Assembly, the Arab Higher Committee lodged a strong protest which said, "our request which was submitted on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine, who constitute the great majority of the population of the country was sent with other requests to the First Committee for decision, while the request of the Jewish Agency, which represents an alien and imposed minority was accepted directly by the General Assembly. This is not in keeping with the position and rights of the Arabs of Palestine nor with the principles of justice and democracy." The Arab Higher Committee, as a protest, decided to withdraw its request. The Arab states also protested and the matter was

5. United Nation ORGA First Special Session plenary meetings, General Committee Vol II 31st meeting pp. 81-82 quoted Ibid p.4
6. Ibid p.5
settled by the First Committee which accepted the Arab Higher Committee request to be heard. The Arab Higher Committee then decided to appear before the First Committee.

There were two complex questions facing the First Committee. They were the composition of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) and its terms of reference, with markedly differing approaches reflected in the two major draft resolutions.

The first, from Argentina, proposed a Special Committee of 11 members, consisting of the permanent members of Security Council, an Arab State and five other states chosen by lot to ensure representation of all regions. The Committee would hear British, Arab and Jewish representatives, and would have the widest powers both to record facts and to make recommendations. The second, from the United States proposed a Special Committee of seven "neutral" states, the permanent members of the Security Council as well as the Arab states being excluded.

The US draft (somewhat amended) was approved after the Argentinian draft was withdrawn, and the mission of UNSCOP was approved in broad terms. According to these terms it was decided that "The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the problem of Palestine".

8. Ibid, 50th meeting p.252
Despite the opposition of the Arab states, the General Committee authorised UNSCOP to conduct investigations anywhere it considered necessary, thus assuring an indirect linkage of the European Jewish refugee issue to the future of Palestine. Similarly, the Arab demand to include a reference to an independent Palestinian state in the terms of reference of UNSCOP was also rejected by the General Committee.

The cause for the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, had fared badly in the First Special Session of General Assembly on Palestine. UNSCOP's charter contained no reference to the termination of the mandate and independence for Palestine. The issue of Jewish European refugees had been linked with Palestine.⁹

THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP)

UNSCOP held preliminary meetings in New York and reached Palestine in mid-June, 1947. The Arab League's Secretary General had indicated that the League would cooperate but the Palestinian leadership in the Arab Higher Committee refused to participate as a protest against the failure of the United Nations to include in the terms of reference of the Special Committee the termination of mandate, independence for Palestine and the recognition of nature rights of the Palestinian people.

⁹ United Nation: the Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem. p.9
Jewish organizations on the other hand extended full cooperation, submitting over a hundred documents, compared to two brief papers presented by the Arab states. The Jewish Agency appointed two liaison officers with UNSCOP on the latter's request. The Jewish case was presented by numerous representations over several hearings Mr. David Ben Gurion and Dr. Weizman personally appeared before the Committee.

UNSCOP again urged Palestinian and Arab spokesmen to present their case. The Arab Higher Committee of Palestine repeated its refusal to appear before UNSCOP, commenting that it would present the Palestinian case to the General Assembly. The Arab League states agreed to meet UNSCOP in Lebanon, the only exception being Transjordorn which would meet UNSCOP only in Amman.

The main points of the presentation of the Arab case are summarized in these words:

.... the question of creation of a Jewish state cannot be taken with out two other connected problems; that is the question of immigration and that of foreign subsidies. A Jewish state would, of course, be master of immigration into Palestine. It might decide that immigration would be without limits and the economic argument, which would be that it is impossible for a very large number of people to live in a very small territory would become void if the Jewish state can still reckon with foreign financial support. Therefore, with the doors of the country wide open to immigration, and financial support from outside, the Jewish state would become extremely populated .... since it would not depend on its own economy or its own production .... as soon as it goes beyond a certain limit in numbers, it is no longer a state where Jews can come and feel safe but it becomes a bridgehead against the Arab world, this is what we absolutely want to avoid."

"Zionism has no rightful claim on Palestine. In the implementation of their program, they have exclusively relied on the support of a foreign power regime conducting
itself arbitrarily and unjustly. Their forces have been forces of repression".\textsuperscript{10}

A subcommittee of UNSCOP also went to make investigations in refugee camps in Germany and Austria. The Jewish Agency had carried out propaganda in these camps on a "considerable" scale with the object of inducing Jews to immigrate into Palestine".\textsuperscript{11}

The Special Committee on Palestine concluded three month investigations by August, 1947. It was however, unable to agree on recommendations. A majority of members (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay) recommended the partition of Palestine into two states that would be politically separate and independent but would administer a unified economy. Jerusalem would be an international city. The minority (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) proposed an independent Palestine as a federated state with Jerusalem as its capital. (Australia did not support either proposal).\textsuperscript{12}

The only unanimous agreement was the termination of the Mandate, the principle of independence and a United Nations role.

The justification for the majority plan of partition with economic union was presented as follows.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid p. 12.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid p. 13.

"The basic premise underlying the partition proposal is that the claims to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both possessing validity, are irreconcilable, and that among all of the solutions advanced, partition will provide the most realistic and practicable settlement and is most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting in part the claims and national aspirations of both parties."

"Partition is the only means available by which political and economic responsibility can be placed squarely on both Arab and Jews, with the prospective result that confronted with responsibility for bearing fully the consequences of their own actions, a new and important element of political amelioration would be introduced in the proposed federal-state solution, this factor would be lacking."

The justifications for the minority recommendation of a federal independent state were;

"It is recognized that Palestine is the common country of both indigenous Arabs and Jews, that both these peoples have had an historic association with it and that both play vital roles in the economic and cultural life of the country."

This being so, the objective is a dynamic solution which will ensure equal rights for both Arabs and Jews in their common State and which will maintain that economic unity which is indispensable to the life and development of the country."

"While the problem of Jewish immigration is ... closely related to the solution of the Palestine question it cannot be contemplated that Palestine is to be considered in any sense as a means of solving the problem of world Jewry. In direct and effective opposition to any such suggestion are the twin factors of limited area and resources and vigorous and persistent opposition of the Arab people, who constitute the majority population of the country."

"For these reasons no claim to a right of unlimited immigration of Jews into Palestine, irrespective of time, can be entertained. It follows therefore that no basis could exist for any anticipation that the Jews now in Palestine might increase their numbers by means of free mass immigration to such extent that they would become the majority population in Palestine."

The Special Committee presented these two plans to the General Assembly when it met in September, 1947 for its Second Annual Session. It constituted itself as an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with the Palestine question while considering in its normal session the other items on its agenda.

While the Zionist Organizations and Jewish Agency approved the partition resolution it was bitterly criticized and opposed by the Arab Higher Committee, the Arab States and a number of other states including Pakistan.

13. *Ibid* p.16-17
While presenting the report of the UNSCOP, the Chairman Mr. Sandstorm (Sweden) said in his communication:

"The Palestinian Question was a legacy from the past ...... (its) tragedy ...... lay in the fact that the claims of both sides were legitimate which made it necessary to reach settlement." 14

Earlier, the representative of the United Kingdom Mr. Creech-Jones, while addressing the Committee, had declared that the United Kingdom Government was ready to assume the responsibility for giving effect to any plan on which agreement was reached by the Arabs and Jews. If the Assembly were to recommend a policy which was not acceptable to the Jews and the Arabs, the United Kingdom Government would not feel able to implement it. It would thus be necessary to provide for some other alternative authority to implement it. 15

The Ad Hoc Committee discussed the report of UNSCOP from 10 September to 25 November, 1947. Several states took part in these discussions and made their views known on the majority proposal on Palestine. The United Kingdom which had been the mandatory power in Palestine supported the plan for the partition of Palestine when its representative stated that there was no conflict between the Special Committees' general recommendations and the broad objectives of British


15. Ibid. p.3
foreign policy...... The representative of the Soviet Union Mr. Tsarapkin also supported the plan for creating a separate State for Jews, who, he claimed, were entitled to the right of self-determination like the Arabs of Palestine. The representative of the United States Mr. Johnson had earlier given full support to the basic principles of recommendations of UNSCOP contained in Chapters V and VI which provided for partition and immigration.

The Jewish case was presented before the Ad Hoc Committee by a well known American Zionist leader, Dr. Silver, who said;

"Palestine owed its very identity to the Jews, losing it with the Jewish dispersion and resuming its role in history only at the time of the Mandate which had given it distinct place along with the Arab world. Dr. Silver recalled that President Wilson had declared on 3 March, 1919 that he was persuaded that the Allied nations were agreed that in Palestine should be laid the foundation of a Jewish Common wealth. Dr. Silver considered that the Mandate by recognizing "the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine" had done no more than acknowledge a universally admitted fact. The recognition of Jewish

16. Ibid. p.3.
17. Ibid. 12th meeting p.70
18. Ibid. 11th meeting p.63.
19. Ibid. 4th meeting p.12-13
National Home which Field Marshall Smuts (of South Africa) had called one of the greatest acts of history, reaffirmed the fact that for the Jews, Palestine was the home of their exiled people, the land of their national deity and that throughout centuries of persecution and wandering they had never abandoned their efforts to return to it."²⁰

Earlier, the Arab stand was expressed by a forceful speech made by the representative of Arab Higher Committee, Mr. Husseini in the third meeting. He said that the case of the Arabs of Palestine was based on the principles of international justice. It was that of a people which desired to live in undisturbed possession of the country where providence and history had put it.²¹

Mr. Husseini disputed three claims of world Jewry. The claim to Palestine based on historical association was a movement on the part of Ashkenazim whose forefathers had no connection with Palestine. The Sephardim, the main descendants of Israel, had mostly denounced Zionism. Secondly, the religious connection of Zionists with Palestine which he noted was shared by Muslims and Christians gave them no secure claim to the country. Thirdly, the Zionists claimed the establishment of Jewish National Home by virtue of Balfour Declaration. But the British Government had no right to dispose of Palestine which it had occupied in the name of Allies as a liberator

²¹ Ibid, 3rd meeting p.6
and not as a conqueror. The Balfour Declaration was in contradiction with the Covenant of the League of Nations and was an immoral, unjust and illegal promise.\textsuperscript{22}

In support of the representative of the Arab Higher Committee, the representative of Lebanon Mr. Chamoun told the Ad Hoc Committee that for two thousand years, the Jews had no connection with Palestine and that country had been inhabited exclusively by the Arabs. Regarding the majority plan for the partition of Palestine into two states he considered that the Committee should first decide whether under the principles of Charter it had the right to deny the will of the overwhelming majority of the citizens of a country and to alienate a territory which belonged undeniably to that majority. In his view the majority plan failed to recognize the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Chamoun compared the procedure adopted by the United Nations with "decision made at Munich in 1938".\textsuperscript{23}

Mr. Mohammad Fawzy Bey, the representative of Egypt also denied that the United Nations had any right to partition Palestine or any other country. The General Assembly, he said could do no more than make recommendations to governments and the latter could dispose only of what belonged to them. "Did Palestine belong to any member"? he asked, and further said that neither the General Assembly

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid}, p.6-7

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid}, 5th meeting p.20-22.
nor any organ of the United Nations could dispose of Palestine or any part of it.\textsuperscript{24}

The representative of Iraq, General Naury As-Said criticized British policies in Palestine and said that during its twenty five years of stewardship, Britain had not even attempted to give Palestine a measure of autonomy and to assist its people to obtain full independence. Instead, it had directed its efforts to establishing the Jewish National Home.\textsuperscript{25} The representative of Saudi Arabia Amir Faisal told the Ad Hoc Committee that the only solution was to declare Palestine independent and to establish a democratic government. The will of the minority in Palestine should not be allowed to hamper that independence.\textsuperscript{26}

PAKISTAN IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE

The session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine was first opportunity for Pakistan to participate in the United Nations deliberations. Sir. Mohammad Zafarullah Khan was the leader of Pakistan delegation which represented Pakistan in the Ad Hoc Committee. Sir Zafarullah had especially been directed by the Quaid-e-Azam to lead the Pakistani delegation to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{27} The Quaid-e-Azam was

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 12th meeting p.75
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 6th meeting p.27
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 15th meeting p.95.
\textsuperscript{27} Khan Zafarullah, \textit{Tehdih-e- Nimat} (Urdu) (Dacca Benevolent Association, 1971) p.518-19

The other members of Pakistan delegation to the United Nations were M.A.H. Ispahani, Mir Liaq Ali, Pirzada Abdus Sattar, Begum Salma Tassadaq Hussain and Mohammad Ayub (Secretary).
particularly interested in the UN debate on the Palestinian Question and wished to extend full support to the Arab cause. When the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly took up the question of Palestine he had sent a long statement of support to the Arab delegation in which he opposed Jewish immigration and condemned the pro-Zionist elements in Britain and the United States.\footnote{28}

Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan delivered his speech in the seventh meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee. In his speech he made a historical survey of the Palestinian question, tracing the history of events from the entrance of Turkey into the First World War on the side of Germany, the negotiations between Britain and Sherif Hussein known MacMahom Sherif Hussain talks under which Britain had promised to establish an independent Arab state in which Palestine was included after the areas were freed from Turkish domination.\footnote{29}

In view of the commitments which Britain had made to the Arabs to seek their support against Turkey, the Balfour Declaration which had followed, Sir Zafarullah said, was invalid, since it had been issued without reference to King Hussein and was contrary to the Arab independence. When the Balfour Declaration was issued King Hussein had made protests to the British Government. He had made it plain

\footnote{28} *Nam-e-Waqt* (Lahore), April 29, 1947

\footnote{29} United Nations ORGA, Second Session Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question op.cit, 7th meeting, p.33, 34. See also chapter 1
that there could be no question of surrendering the Arab claim of sovereignty. He referred to Commander Hogarth mission sent by the British Government to King Hussein to reassure him of British intention to fulfil pledges made to him. He also mentioned the Anglo-French secret agreement known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, and the Declaration to the Seven under which the British Government had pledged itself to seek freedom and independence for the Arab population of Palestine and government based on the consent of the governed. In 1918 General Allenby had informed the Emir Faisal that the Allies were honourbound to find a solution in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned and had urged him to have trust in Allied good faith. Sir Zafarullah said that the history of the previous twenty years bore eloquent testimony to the way in which that honour had been upheld. The Anglo-French Declaration which had followed, and which had been broadcast throughout Syria and Palestine, had promised the complete and final emancipation of the Arabs and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

Sir Zafarullah further said that a study of the documents left no room for doubt that the British Government had made a clear pledge to King Hussein, and through him to the Arab peoples, that the Arabs, including the Arabs of Palestine would obtain their freedom and independence after
the war and that the governments should be established in those countries in accordance with the consent and freely expressed wishes of the indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{30}

With regard to the majority plan for the partition contained in chapter VI of the Special Committee's Report, Sir Zafarullah considered that it would not succeed in creating two viable States. Physically and geographically, it was a monstrosity, since it entailed dividing the area of 10,000 square miles into seven portions. From other points of view the plan was an iniquity. He went on to develop his argument that partition could not be a solution. According to the partition plan, the Jewish State would have a total population of 905,000 persons, of whom 4,96,000 would be Jews and 407,000 would be the Arabs. But the Special Committee had appeared to ignore the population of 90,000 Bedouins in the Beersheba region. Those Bedouins live permanently within the area of Palestine. If those figures were included, it would be seen that the Arab population would equal the Jewish population in the Jewish State.

Pointing out other glaring inequities in the majority plan such as the inclusion of the principal Arab ports of Jaffa and Haifa in the proposed Jewish State together with the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, Sir Zafarullah said that certain predominantly Arab areas in the vicinity

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid}, p.35-36
of Lake Tiberias had also been excluded from the proposed Arab State.

The effect of the partition, he said, would be to force the entire Arab population of the Jewish State to migrate into the neighbouring Arab States. All scope for expansion had been included in the Jewish State. The Pakistani delegate, therefore, correctly predicted the Palestinian exodus that took place in 1948.

Discussing the intentions of Zionism, Sir Zafarullah said that if the Jewish Agency was prepared to accept the majority plan it was probably because it considered it as the thin end of the wedge and not as the final and irrevocable culmination of Jewish hopes and ideals. Partition would lay the foundation for fresh strife rather than alley the conflict with which the Committee was faced, he said that the sole duty of the United Nations was to apply the principles of the Atlantic Charter as embodied in the United Nations Charter to the problem of Palestine, and a modification of those principles by the Committee would not lead to a solution.

He said that the first duty of the United Nations was to explore the possibility of bringing Arabs and Jews together and arriving at an agreed solution. Failing such a solution, the Committee should strive to find a solution which would be in accord with the freely expressed wishes of

31. Ibid, p.38-39
the people concerned, based on the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they wished to live. Such action would be in conformity with Article I of the Charter. 32

The speech made by the Pakistan delegation in the Ad Hoc Committee was an exhaustive and convincing espousal of the Palestinian cause. The Zionist claims to Palestine were repudiated on historical and legal grounds. The Arab delegates were particularly impressed by the line of arguments and contents of the speech. Mr. Arslan, the Syrian delegate described Sir Zafarullah’s speech as "brilliant" and said that he had dealt so ably with the important factors in the Palestine dispute as to render it unnecessary for the Syrian delegation to discuss the history of the question. 33

Describing the reaction to his first speech on the Palestinian question in the United Nations, Sir Zafarullah himself says.

"When I started my speech from Pakistani side for the first time, the Arab delegations were not sure of its tone and direction. Pakistan had become the member of the United Nations only two or three days ago. The Arab delegations would not care much about us and their attitude was that of indifference. The first part of my speech covered the facts

32. Ibid, p.40
33. Ibid, 9th meeting p.47
and events of history, certain parts of which were not known even to some of the Arab delegations. When I analyzed the partition (of Palestine) plan and began to explain the injustice contained in its every proposal, the Arab delegations became attentive. When I ended my speech, the Arab delegations were jubilant. After that the defence of Arab cause in this case was left to Pakistan as her duty.”

In the second speech on Palestine in the Ad Hoc Committee the Pakistan delegation further celebrated on the points made in his earlier speech. He said that the attempt to forcibly establish a Jewish State in Palestine against the consent of the Arabs was a "violation of the spirit of the Mandate". Replying to the statement of Guatemala representative, Mr. Garcia Granados in which he had tried to construct an argument on the analogy of the frontiers of Pakistan, Sir Zafarullah said that Pakistan covered an area of more than 250,000 square miles and included on the east and on the west, two compact blocks. Moreover, the point of prime importance was that the decisions concerning the territory of Pakistan had been adopted with the consent of the peoples concerned. If such consent existed in the case of Palestine, any solution would be acceptable, whether it were partition, the establishment of a unitary State or division of the territory in several parts.

34. Tehdith-e-Nimāt, op. cit. pp.520-21
35. UN ORGA, Second Session Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question op. cit. pp71-73.
Summing up Pakistan's stand on the Palestinian Question
Sir, Mohammad Zafarullah Khan stated that the Arabs considered that Palestine was included in the area covered by the British pledges and those pledges, because they had been made earlier, rendered the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate invalid. Even if the Balfour Declaration had any validity; it was in any case subject to previous obligation.

"If there were still any doubts regarding the alleged exclusion, an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice should be sought. If the Court decided the Palestine had been excluded, the Palestine problem should be solved in conformity with the principles of the Charter, the right peoples to self-determination and the free consent of the inhabitants of Palestine." "Pakistan," Sir Zafarullah said, "was utterly and uncompromisingly opposed to partition (of Palestine) but if partition must take place, the injustice done to the Arabs would be somewhat reduced if the predominantly Arab areas within the proposed boundaries of the Jewish state were excluded from that state. The number of Arabs in the Jewish state should be approximately equal to that of Jews in the Arab State".36

Pakistani delegation emphatically supported unanimous recommendation VI contained in the report of the Special Committee. Sir Zafarullah told the Ad Hoc Committee that if agreement was reached on that point, and if that problem was

36. Ibid, p.73.
solved, the Palestine question would lose the complication and urgency introduced into it by the pitiful flight of the displaced persons. He told the Committee that a simpler solution than that proposed by the majority of the Special Committee would then be possible.  

At the conclusion of the general debate, Mr. Shertok, the representative of Jewish Agency got an opportunity to reiterate the Jewish cause for Palestine and answer the points raised by Pakistani delegate in the seventh meeting. He said that the primary purpose of the Balfour Declaration incorporated in Mandate was the establishment of Jewish National Home. He emphasized that Palestine was the only country in which the Jewish people could hope to attain a secure home and a national status equal with that of other independent nations. Mr. Shertok claimed that both King Hussein of Mecca and Emir Faisal had agreed to the Jewish immigration into Palestine and said that the Jews were entitled to have a National Home in Palestine on the basis of Balfour Declaration the Palestinian Mandate and their cooperation with the Allies in the First and Second World Wars.  


Mr. Sculok was referring to Hussein McMahon Agreement and Faisal-Weizman understanding. See ch.1.
Dr. Weizman, former Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine also addressed the Ad Hoc Committee and claimed that the purpose of the Mandate was to give the Jewish people a National Home. He said that the partition of Palestine was the only solution to the problem because Jews would not agree to the establishment of a unitary state. Giving the example of Pakistan which came into existence as a result of separation of India, he said unity cannot be brought about without consent. He said that the establishment of a Jewish state was not a new idea; it arose out of the Mandate. Nevertheless, as the USSR representative had said historical and legal considerations were secondary as compared with immediate realities.

"The creation of a Jewish State", Dr. Weizman said," would be a great event in history and a practical demonstration of liberal and humanitarian thought. A persecuted people would achieve recognition of its national sovereignty; desert soil would be redeemed for cultivation, progressive social ideas would flourish in an area that had fallen behind the modern standards of life and an ancient culture would be revived". At the end of the debate on UNSCOP report two Sub-Committees were appointed to report on the two sets of proposal's before the Ad Hoc Committee. A third Sub-Committee with an informal status was also appointed to try to promote conciliation between the Arab and Jewish views. The Syrian representative proposed an

39. Ibid, pp.123-126
other Sub-Committee composed of jurists to deal with the question of the competence of the General Assembly to take and enforce a decision, and with the legal aspect of the Mandate. The Syrian representative proposed that in case the Sub-Committee's report were unsatisfactory, then the question of the reference of whole matter to the International Court of Justice be discussed. The Chairman, however, disallowed it. 40 Following was the composition of two sub-committees.

Sub-Committee No. 1

Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Poland, South Africa, USSR, USA, Hungary, Venezuela.

Sub-Committee No. 2

Afghanistan, Columbia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen.

Sir Zafarullah was the Chairman of Sub-Committee No. 2. Its function was to work out detailed plan for the future government of Palestine in accordance with the principles set forth in the proposal of Saudi Arabia and Iraq endorsed in the draft resolution of Syria.

It considered three issues i.e., the legal aspects of the question, the question of Jewish displaced persons and refugees and establishment of a unitary state in accordance with the proposal of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

40. Ibid 19th meeting p.139
Sub-Committee No.1 was to prepare its report in accordance with the majority plan of UNSCOP and in the light of various suggestions for modifications in that plan.

The two Sub-Committees presented their reports to the Ad Hoc Committee on November 24, 1947 in a highly charged atmosphere. The report of Sub-Committee 2 (voted on before the report of the Sub-Committee 1) detailed arguments for a unified Palestine, addressing the legal question of the competence of the UN to partition the country. In its report the Sub-Committee 2 said.

"A study of Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter leaves no room for doubt that..... neither the General Assembly nor any other organ of the United Nations is competent to entertain, still less to recommend or enforce, any solution with regard to a mandated territory."

"..... the General Assembly is not competent to recommend still less to enforce any solution other than the recognition of the independence of Palestine, and that the settlement of the future government of Palestine is a matter solely for the people of Palestine to decide."

".....partition involves the alienation of territory and the destruction of the integrity of the state of Palestine. The United Nations cannot make a disposition or alienation of territory nor can it deprive the majority of
the people of their territory and transfer it to the
exclusive use of a minority in the country.41

The Sub-Committee-2 proposed the establishment of an
independent unified Palestine, but this proposal was
rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee. Similarly, its questioning
of legal power of the General Assembly to partition
Palestine was also rejected.

The report of the Sub-Committee No.1 in substance the
amended UNSCOP majority recommendations for the partition of
Palestine was then voted upon on November 25, 1947. The vote
was 25 votes to 13 with 17 abstentions.42

Since a two thirds majority was not required in the
Assembly sitting as Ad Hoc Committee, the proposal to
partition Palestine was approved and recommended to the
General Assembly.

41. Ibid pp.276-279
42. Votes for: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile,
Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia Valcia Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Iceland, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Union of South Africa, USSR, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Afghanistan, Cuba Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Siam,
Syria, Turkey and Yemen.

Abstaining: Argentina, Belgium, China, Columbia, El Salvador Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti
Honduras, Liberia, Luxembourg.

Absent: Paraguay, Philippines.
THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE

The General Assembly began to discuss the plan for the partition of Palestine on November 26, 1947. It had already approved the plan as AD HOC Committee. To validate that decision in the plenary, however, a two third majority was essential. As the crucial decision approached the contending spokesmen took the last opportunity to press their arguments. Every vote being critical particularly in view of the relatively large number of abstentions in the final vote in the AD HOC Committee (for voting in the Ad Committee see note no. 42).

In presenting the Committee's report recommending partition, the Rapporteur noted that the informal conciliation group had produced no results since:

"Both parties (Arabs and Jews) were confident as to the success of their case before the General Assembly and therefore conciliation and agreement between the parties could not be reached." 43

During the discussion in the General Assembly a number of delegations spoke on the partition plan mostly re-stating their positions.

Mr. Johnson the representative of the United States demanded the termination of Mandate at the earliest

practical date and said that independence (for Palestine) should be attained at the earliest practical date.44

The representative of United Kingdom reiterated British policy that she will not be responsible for enforcing decisions arising out of the deliberations of General Assembly which are not accepted by both parties in Palestine.45

The representative of Belgium who had abstained during the final vote in the AD HOC Committee said.

The Palestinian question is the most difficult with which the United Nations had yet been faced."46

earlier in 124th meeting the representative of Philippines who was absent in the AD HOC Committee vote supported the inalienable right of the Palestinian to decide their future.

"Whatever the weight", he said, "We might choose to assign to the arguments of one side or the other it is clear to the Philippine Government that the rights conferred by the Mandatory power even if subsequently confirmed by an international agreement do not vitiate the primordial right of a people to determine the political future and to preserve the territorial integrity of its native land."47

45. Ibid, 124th meeting, pp.1323-24
46. Ibid. 125th meeting, P. 1364
47. Ibid. 124th meeting, PP. 1313-14
On the other hand, the Soviet representative Mr. Gromyko maintained that the Jews who were entering Palestine from other parts of the world were entitled to the right of self-determination. 48

From the speeches delivered in the General Assembly on the Palestinian Question if was clever that the USA and USSR were in complete agreement for the creation of Jewish State, while Britain in view of her high strategic and economic states in the Middle East, adopted a cautious attitude. In final voting on the partition of Palestine Plan in the General Assembly, Britain abstained the representative of Palestine Sir. Mohammad Zafarullah Khan addressed the General Assembly in 126th meeting on November 28, 1947 pointing out the importance of the issue and the role of the United Nations. He said.

This is a solemn moment; solemn in the history of the world, in the history of this great Organization. The United Nations is today on trial."

"The world is watching and will see how it acquits itself."

Reminding the world community of the tolerant and generous attitude towards the Jews he said. "When English Kings and barons indulged in the pastime of extracting the teeth of Jewish merchants as a gentle way of persuading them to cooperate in bolstering their feudal economy a sort of

48. Ibid. 125 the meeting, P.1358
medieval one way lend-lease Arab Spain provided a shelter, a refuge and a haven for the Jews."

"Today it is said: only the poor persecuted European Jew is without a home. True. And it is further said: why then let Arab Palestine provide him, as Arab Spain did, not only with a shelter, a refuge but also with a state so that he shall rule over the Arab. How generous! How humanitarian! Drawing a sharp contrast between the objectives for which the UN was established and the Palestine Plan put before the General Assembly, he said: "How is Palestine to be independent? what sort of independence? What is the solution that we are invited to endorse and to attempt to carry through. In effect the proposal before the United Nations General Assembly says that we shall decide not the people of Palestine with no provision for self determination, no provision for the consent of the governed what type of independence Palestine shall have? We shall call Palestine independent and sovereign but Palestine shall belong to us and shall be, not the apple of our many and in different direction looking eyes but shall become the apple of discord between East and West, perchance, the unity which our name so wistfully proclaims may have a chance to establish itself."

Asserting that the partition of Palestine plan will bad to disintegration and obliteration of the Palestinian entity, he said: "We shall first Cut the body of Palestine into three parts of a Jewish state and three parts of an
Arab State. We shall then have the Jaffa enclose and Palestine's heart Jerusalem shall forever be an international city. That is the beginning of the shape Palestine shall have."

In his long speech, Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan analyzed threadbare all aspects of the partition plan placed before the General Assembly and quoting from various sources held that the United Nations had no legal and constitutional authority to partition Palestine into two separate states. He cautioned that if the General Assembly went ahead with the plan to partition Palestine, it will have grave regional and international implications. "Where is the authority to do what the General Assembly is invited to do here?" he asked and said that the two states planned to be created will not be viable economically as well as geographically.

"Let us come to practical problems. What will be the situation with regard to the viability of the two States? Take the Arab State. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine itself admitted that the Arab State by itself would not be viable and therefore provided for the joint economic board. I invited the attention of the AD HOC Committee to the pronouncement of that eminent, highly intellectual and highly respected Jew, dr. Judah Magnes the president of the Hebrew University..... who has stated: "Your economic union without political union is a flop from the beginning and will never work. What a hope," he says, "that economic unity could be brought about without
political unity. If the Arabs do not cooperate as they will not even the Jewish state will not be viable. It will be under a great and continual strain, financial as well as economic and extending also to the field of personnel. How are you going to make it viable? Again, who is going to provide and continue to provide the finances."

After pointing out various faults in the partition plan for Palestine relating to the distribution of population demarcation of boundaries and division of cultivated and cultivable land between the Jewish State and the Arab State, Sir Zafarullah said:

"Let us pause and consider before we launch the United Nations upon a course which commits it to carrying through a scheme which lacks moral justification, is beyond the legal and juridical authority of the United Nations and is impossible of achievement. In making this futile, this fatal attempt, you set at nought the wishes of the sixty six per cent of the people of Palestine. You destroy the faith and trust of all the surrounding and neighbouring States in the fairness and impartiality of the United Nations particularly having regard to what has been happening during the last three or four days—all the manoeuvres, even with regard to the meetings of the General Assembly, that great and honourable nations are descending to. "Sir Zafarullah in his speech told the General Assembly that the partition of Palestine will lead to great resentment and anti-West
feelings among the Asian countries, particularly the Muslim countries.

"In the hearts of the populations of all countries from North African Atlantic Coast to the steppes of Central Asia you sow doubt and mistrust of the designs and motives of the Western powers. You take the gravest risk of impairing beyond the possibility of repair any chance of real cooperation between East and West by, thus, forcibly driving what in effect amounts to a Western wedge into the heart of the middle East."

Pleading for a delay on partition plan Sir. Zafarullah addressing the members of General Assembly said.

Do not close a door that may not be opened again. The United Nations must find a solution which is not only just and fair but which has the best chance for success as regards the largest number of Jews and Arabs in Palestine.49

The representative of Iraq in his statement sounded the same warning and said:

Palestine is the heart of the Arab World. The Arab World through the League is trying to achieve unity and regional organization in accordance with the Chapter VIII of the Charter A. Jewish State breaks that unity and endangers the peace and security of the Arab states. The Arab states cannot tolerate the break in their unity and thus menace their political and economic life. Therefore, they oppose

49. Ibid. 128th meeting, PP 1366-1379
the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine now or at any future date.\textsuperscript{50}

Thirteen delegations namely, Columbia Cuba, Egypt, Greece, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, spoke against the AD HOC Committees, report while eleven delegations had declared their support for the partition plan. They were Belgium, Brazil, Canada Guatemala, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden USSR, USA and Uruguay.

The contending parties had presented their case forcefully to the Assembly Quoting from relevant documents citing historical facts and dwelling on legal and political implications of the case both pro and anti-partition elements had done their best to win majority of Assembly members to their side. It was, however, the impression of independent and impartial observers that the partition plan might not get two third majority of the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{51}

This view was stared by the representative of Columbia who said: "The plan for partition was adopted by the AD HOC Committee by twenty five votes to thirteen with seventeen abstentions. We fear and we read that the same vote in the General Assembly would be one short of the two thirds majority required by our rules. However in our View, there is no mistaking the fact that the plan has failed to find

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. 126th meeting, PP 1392-93

\textsuperscript{51} The Pakistan Times (Lahore) November 27, 1947 (quoting the foreign news agencies)
the support of thirty two delegations. In other words as it stands, it is really a minority proposal. \(^{52}\)

It was in view of this situation that a lot of maneuvering were resorted to in the Assembly. These included the postponing of Assembly vote for two days; so that during the intervening period pressure could be brought to bear upon members to vote for partition plan. The delegations of Denmark and Liberia explicitly told the Pakistani delegation that they were being pressurized by the United State to say yes for the partition proposal. \(^{53}\)

After last minute efforts by states opposing the plan to adjourn the Assembly or refer the question to the International Court of Justice failed, the partition plan was finally voted upon on 29 November 1947. It received thirty votes in favour and 17 against with 9 abstentions. \(^{54}\)

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52. U N, ORGA, Second Session. op.cit, 127th meeting PP. 1396-99
53. For details See Zafarullah Khan, Tehdith-i-Nimat op. cit, pp 522-25
   For more details on how the votes of Liberia, Haiti, Philippines and Ethiopia were secured in favour of partition plan, see Dan Kurzman, Genesis, (New American Library, 1972) pp.38-40
54. UN, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestinian Problem, part II, op.cit, P. 35.

Votes for: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherland, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic USSR, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen.

Abstained: Argentina, Chile, China, Columbia, El-Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom, Yugaslavia.

In the Ad Hoc Committee Belgium, France, Haiti, Liberia had abstained while Philippines was absent but in General Assembly they voted for the partition plan.
It is a common knowledge that the United Nations General Assembly's vote in favour of partition was secured by Zionist pressures and power politico. Several days before the vote was taken it appeared that the partition plan might not obtain the necessary two thirds majority of those voting but several postponements gave Zionists and their sympathizers among United States officialdom opportunity to put pressure on China, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti Liberia and the Philippines, all of which intended to vote against partition. Greece alone withstood the pressure. President Truman used his personal and official influence to secure a UN vote in favour of partition. The Truman Administration turned the full political heat of its international power to the task of swaying the vote in favour of the Zionist cause. In addition, the Zionist only pulled out all stops in the final drive to line up the needed number of votes in the General Assembly. Truman's presidential papers of the period document what is described as "a high pressure being exerted by Jewish Agencies." There have been indications of bribes and threats by these groups. In the case of Liberia certain groups informed the Liberian delegation that if they did not go along, the (US economic aid) pact with Liberia will be cancelled.


According to Pitman B. Potter, "The United States came close to exercising undue influence to get the partition plan adopted." Dr Stephen B. L. Penrose, President of the American University of Beirut has criticized the American pressure which was used to secure adoption of the partition resolution in the following terms.

"The political momentum which led to the final acceptance of the United Nations General Assembly of the majority report of UNSCOP provides one of the blacker pages in the history of America's international politics. There can be no question but that it was American pressure which brought about the acceptance of the recommendations for partition of Palestine with economic Union voted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. It was this effective American pressure for partition which is largely responsible for the terrific drop which American prestige took in all parts of the Arab and Muslim world."  

How the pressure tactics were employed at the UN to secure the approval of partition of Palestine plan is described by Harvard Historian Dr. J. Bowyer Bell in the following words.

"At five in the afternoon with speeches still to come the General Assembly decided to recess until Friday because


58. Ibid, P.27 (quoting from Stephen B. L. Penrose, The Palestinian Problem. Retrospect and Prospect, (New York American Friends of the Middle East) P.10
Thursday was Thanksgiving day. For forty eight hours with the help of the Americans and their other friends, the Zionists shored up their position. Antonio Viez of Haiti who had spoken eloquently against partition received instructions to vote for it. Pressure was turned on Liberia and Greece. General Carlos Romulo of the Philippines suddenly departed on an Atlantic voyage and his replacement agreed to abide by the wishes of the Ambassador Elizalde in Washington and vote for yes. Belgium, the Netherlands and New Zealand instead of abstaining reluctantly agreed to vote yes. Paraguay finally received instructions to vote yes. The new revolutionary regime in Thailand renounced its old ambassador. Thailand did not vote. France remained uncertain. Ambassador Alexander Parodi on Friday requested a further delay of 24 hours. Apparently Paris wanted to show her Islamic colonies that every avenue was being explored but this gave no due to the ultimate intention of France. Washington had indicated further aid cut might depend on her vote.\textsuperscript{59}

According to Sir Zafarullah Khan the United States pressurized the Scandinavian countries to vote for the partition plan in the General Assembly who were convinced that the plan was unjust and injurious for the Arab interests. The voting was deliberately delayed with a view to providing the pro-partition elements enough time to win necessary strength for two thirds majority. "There is no

\textsuperscript{59} Levins, Hoag \textit{op.cit} PP. 73,74
doubt" he writes, "that the President of (General Assembly
and the Secretary General of the United Nations were both in
support of the Zionists under American pressure or their own
inclinations. When it became obvious from the speeches that
the partition proposal did not have the support of two third
majority both joined the plan for postponing the session of
the Assembly till Friday so that Zionists could secure
through President Truman the support of those three or four
countries who were still opposed to the partition plan.⁶⁰

American support to Zionist aims and objectives in
Palestine has been forthcoming since President Wilson but
the policy of Truman Administration marked the real
beginning of serious.⁶¹ United States involvement in the
Palestinian Question Britain promoted the Zionist ideal of a
Jewish National Home in Palestine first under the Balfour
Declaration and then through the exercise of mandatory
powers in Palestine but when under Arab resentment she
attempted to limit Jewish immigration into Palestine, the
United States stepped in and gave much more effective
support to the Jewish demands. In February 1947 Jews
appealed to President Truman to intervene in the Palestinian
affairs because the British measures to check illegal Jewish

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⁶⁰ Zafarullah Khan, Tehdith i-Nimat op.cit. P.523

"The resolution of November 29, 1947 would have been entirely different if the Vote had taken
place three days earlier or somewhere else than in New York or else a year later" Zafarullah
Khan while speaking in 133rd meeting of the First Committee General Assembly II Session,
UNORGA Session II, 8 First Committee 133rd meeting, Summary Records of meetings, vol.
II,16, April-14 May, 1947, PP, 187, 188.

⁶¹ Johnson, Joseph, E. "Arab Vs. Israel A Persistent Challenge to Americans" Middle East
Journal Vol. 18 Winter 1947 Number 1, P.1
immigration into Palestine was precipitating, as they said, "a major disaster threatening not only the Jewish people but also the integrity of established American world policy." Britain could hardly be found to successfully resisting American pressure to accommodate Jewish demands in Palestine; rather American involvement in the Palestinian affair was a welcome development for her. Some people hold the view that the British decision to refer the Palestinian problem to the United Nations in this issue. As a political commentator noted in 1947.

"Referring Palestine to the United Nations Organization in the first place involved the United State more closely in Palestine affair. No one could be more interested in Palestine as a bastion on the oil route than Truman. Moreover if Palestine was important as a strategic point in the Middle East then this was as much American concern as British. Any thing that would bring America into the game was, therefore, to be welcomed. Britain had nothing to lose. For, the economic interests and the strategic concerns were already shared."^62

The creation of Jewish state through the UN Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, therefore, was the result of joint efforts of Britain and the United States. Britain in total disregard to the promises with the Arabs, facilitated the establishment of Jewish power and influence

62. A Tory view reported from London by Special Correspondent of *The Pakistan Times*. *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore) February 9, 1947
in Palestine under cover of Mandate and the United States used her newly found post World War II political and economic power to get the UN Assembly approve the partition plan. As sir Mohammad Zafarullah observed.

"The foundation of the United Nations was laid on justice, equality and right of self-determination but all those three principles were sacrificed in case of Palestine. In the Charter of the United Nations, emphasis laid on the observances of international commitments, but Britain clearly violated the commitments she made to king Hussain of Mecca on Palestine. It is true that Britain abstained during the voting on partition plan but Britain had laid down the foundation of Israel under Balfour Declaration Palestinian issue began with the announcement of Balfour Declaration Whatever, has already happened in Palestine and whatever is going to happen in future, the catastrophe that is going to hit the world peace due to Palestine the destruction and the miseries that is going to fall on a major portion of humanity will be the total responsibility in the first place of Britain and Mr. Balfour and after that of the United States especially President Harry, S. truman.63

The UN resolution on the partition of Palestine in Henry Cattan's view was one of the great injustice to the original inheriter of the country both in respect of the

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63. Zafarullah, Tehillah-i-Nimat op cit, P. 525
principle of partition and in the manner of division.\textsuperscript{64} To quote Sir. Mohammad Zafarullah again:

"The maneuverings that went on behind the scene and the way the decision (on Partition of Palestine) was secured have convinced the eastern countries that they still cannot hope to get a fair deal in international matters uninfluenced by extraneous considerations."\textsuperscript{65}

**ARAB AND MUSLIM REACTION**

Hitherto, the Arabs regarded Britain as the chief villain in the Palestinian tragedy but after the vote in the United Nations it became clear to them that the United States was going to be the main supporter of Zionists in Palestine. This is why the spontaneous Arab protest after the UN resolution was directed against the United States and other major powers who were held responsible for getting the partition plan approved by the General Assembly. The decision to partition Palestine into two states by the United Nations confirmed Arab fears and seemed to presage the establishment of an alien and hostile image in their minds."\textsuperscript{66}

Immediately after the passing of the UN resolution on Palestine there arose a strong wave of anger and protest in whole of the Arab and Islamic world, December 2, 1947 was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Cattan, \textit{op. cit.}, P. 27
\item \textsuperscript{65} Press Statement in Karachi on December 5, 1947 \textit{The Pakistan Times} (Lahore) December 6, 1947
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ovendale, Ritchie, \textit{The Origin of Arab-Israel Wars}, (Longman, 1984) P.11
\end{itemize}
the first day of Arab strike involving widespread violence in different parts of Palestine particularly in Jerusalem. British troops and police had to use armoured cars and tear gas to disperse the mobs. Curfew was imposed in the Arab area of the city. In Tel Aviv at least eight Jews including a Haganah commander and six Arabs were killed and others injured. The foreign news agencies reported that there was widespread violence in Jerusalem and many parts of Palestine during the protest strike called by the Arabs against United Nations decision to partition Palestine.

In the Arab countries there were large protest demonstrations which grew violent while protesting against the United Nations decision on Palestine.

In Egypt Cairo and Alexandria were the scene of large student demonstrations. The demonstrations stoned American University in Cairo, trams were overturned and burnt. In Zagazig, a British Institute and a Library were burnt down. In Iraq United State, Information Service (USIS) office was wrecked. The demonstrators marched on American Embassy but were blocked by the police. British Institute and a school in the city were wrecked. In Syria large crowds stoned British and American legations. The demonstrators tore down and insulted the American flag. Since the Soviet Union had supported the partition of Palestine plan the demonstrating crowds attacked the Communist Headquarters in Damascus.

67. Keesings Contemporary Archives vol. VI 1946-1948 P. 8979
68. The Pakistan Times (Lahore) December 3, 1947
During this attack there was a serious clash between the demonstrators who were mostly the students and the members of the Communist Party. A number of people on both sides were killed. In Amman, the capital of Transjordan there were violent anti-American and anti-Jewish demonstrations. The demonstrators attacked and burnt the office of Transjordanian pipeline company which was a subsidy of the Arabian American Oil Company.

There were widespread disorders in the port city of Aden (South Yemen). Clashes took place between the Arab and Jewish Communities.

It was reported that in Palestine alone rioting between December 2, 1947 and December 5, 1947 resulted in III deaths (34 Arabs 75 Jews and 2 Indians) and several hundred injured. Due to deterioration in the law and order situation Britain rushed naval and air-borne reinforcements to restore order. 69

What scene Palestine presented after the passing of UN resolution on Palestine is described by the New York Times in the following words.

"Fear and grief are both growing in Palestine as Zionists and Arabs kill each other in a struggle that hardly can be dignified with the name of war because it is more like a great vendetta."

Murder reprisal and counter reprisal gain momentum daily while grief for the dead and fear of future horrors put a mark on more and more of the population."

"The Zionists on their side still have Haganah the members who bear arms. When possible they avoid meeting police and have their arms confiscated. The police seize some of the arms of Haganah members but also wink at others bearing them."

"The question what lies behind animosity is apparently simple but really complex. It looks simple because both the Zionists and the Arabs want Palestine. It is complex because of the opposing factions inability to reach any compromise an inability that arises partly from fanatical determination by both parties not to yield and partly from the Zionists conviction that the great powers are on their side."70

On January 7, 1947, 18 persons including 15 Arabs were killed and 41 wounded in double bombing carried out by members of Irgun Zvai Leumi.71

In Arab countries the movement of protest against the partition continued with ever increasing intensity. On January 24 while celebrating the birth day of Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be upon Him) large crowds of demonstrators thronged the streets of Damascus shouting against the UN decision According to the New York times fiery political

71. The New York Times, January 8, 1947 P. 1
speeches were made in the mosques on this occasion and a campaign was launched to collect funds to fight Jehad in Palestine throughout the Arab world.

Students, boy scouts and soldiers paraded through Damascus and then began selling buttons reading Rescue Palestine. In the speeches the United States was attacked as the prime villain behind partition.  

JEWISH-ARAB CLASHES

The Jewish Arab clashes that proliferated after the UN resolution on partition of Palestine was passed had in fact been going on for the last one year. By the beginning of 1947 all of Palestine was a riot of mayhem and murder. In this gory drama, Jewish European bomb squads particularly under the personal direction of terrorist leader Menachen Begin became notorious in their ability to engineer innovative killing tools from the most mundane materials which, when placed in the middle of crowded bazars cut through the crowds of Muslim women and children like a buzz saw of shrapnel scattering several legs and upper torses here and there about the stones.

Jewish paramilitary forces were operating more freely as British forces started their withdrawal. Sabotage attacks on military installations and the capture of British arms by

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73.  Leviins Hoag op. cit P. 72
these groups became a major feature of the Palestinian scene, along with a proliferation of Jewish Arab clashes.\textsuperscript{74}

The chronology of events in Palestine during the six months that preceded the end of the mandate reads like a sequence of horrors. The Arabs were determined to resist the partition of their country. The Jews were equally determined to create a Jewish state in Palestine. The Palestine Commission appointed by the several Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947 to implement the partition plan had reported on the steadily deteriorating situation in Palestine. The Security Council considered the situation between February 24 and April 1, 1948 without any concrete results.\textsuperscript{75} The Jews and Arabs lodged their complaints with the United Nations accusing each other of resorting to armed attacks and terrorism. In a memorandum dated February 2, 1948 together with a supplementary memorandum dated March 13, 1948 to the UN Secretary General, the Jewish Agency for Palestine accused the Arabs of committing "acts of aggression to alter by force the settlement of the future Government of Palestine". The memorandum said that "the serious situation had arisen because of attempts made by the Arab League states and the Arab Higher committee" and appealed for a UN action under chapter VII of the Charter.\textsuperscript{76}

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\textsuperscript{74} UN, The Origins and Development of Palestine Problem, op. cit. P. 39

\textsuperscript{75} Cattan, op.cit P. 31

\textsuperscript{76} UN, Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for June, 1948 P. 22
The Palestine Higher Committee in a memorandum dated March 12, 1948 accused the Jews of committing "most dastardly outrages in Palestine." The memorandum said.

"Since 1939 the most dastardly outrages have been committed in Palestine by the Jewish illegal organizations. These outrages were not sporadic or the acts of excited mobs but the result of premeditated malice, design and coldblooded planning. Although the perpetrators of these crimes are so called terrorist organizations, they are directed supervised and financed by Jewish Agency or its subsidiary organs or collaborator the organization responsible for these outrages are Irugn, Haganah, Iruhn Zvai Leumi and Stern Gang."77

On March 19, 1948 Mr. Warren R. Austin the US representative at the UN asked the Security Council to suspend action on the partition plan and to call a special session of the General Assembly at once to work on a new solution. He advocated a temporary trusteeship for Palestine under the Trusteeship Council until the establishment of a government approved by Arabs and Jews. On March 30, he presented to Security Council a resolution asking that that the General Assembly be convened "to consider further the question of future government of Palestine. On April 16, 1948 a second special session of the General Assembly was convened to consider further the question of Palestine.

77. Ibid, P. 57, 58.
Discussions both at the Security Council and at the second special session of the General Assembly was convened to discuss Palestine. Discussion of the General Assembly was convened to discuss Palestine. Discussion of the General Assembly revealed that some governments questioned the wisdom of the partition plan. The United Kingdom, as the retiring Mandatory power declared that it was not prepared to participate in the enforcement of a settlement which was not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews and further asserted that lack of cooperation on its part sprang from the fact that the partition plan had not been impartially conceived. The Jews opposed any reversal of attitude concerning partition. The suggestion made by the United States government for the establishment of a temporary UN trusteeship over Palestine was attacked by the Jews as a shocking reversal of the United States position. Eventually the idea of a trusteeship was abandoned and the General Assembly ended its Second Special Session on May 14, 1948 with a resolution appointing a mediator to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future of Palestine. The United Nations were thus unable to prevent the explosion of the Palestine conflict which had been brewing since the adoption of the partition resolution.  

Prior to the termination of the Mandate, fighting between Jews and Arabs occurred in four areas—Jaffa which was surrendered by the Arabs to Jews after a truce had been arranged by the British authorities, following a renewed
Jewish offensive on the port in northern Galilee where Haganah captured the town of Safad from the Arab Liberation Army; the hilly country west of Jerusalem where the Jews fought to keep Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road open in face of constant Arab attempts to cut it; and for a short period in Jerusalem itself where, however, a truce was agreed to after the British authority's intervention.\(^79\)

The Jewish forces had built up their offensive against the Arabs to such an extent that the British had to send reinforcements from Malta and Cyprus to the British garrison in the country (estimated 20,000). An announcement by the British military headquarters in Jerusalem on May 2, 1948 said that the situation in Palestine had seriously deteriorated owing to the unwarranted aggression on the part of Irgun Zvai Leumi in Jaffa.\(^80\)

**THE END OF THE BRITISH MANDATE**

The British Mandate over Palestine ended on May 15, 1948. On the eve of the Mandate termination the British Foreign and Colonial Office issued a statement in which it was said that from 1920 to 1948, 400,000 Jews entered into Palestine. The total Jewish population in Palestine rose from 84,000 in 1922 to 640,000 in May 1948.

Regarding the casualties in the violence in Palestine Mr. Rees Williams Under Secretary for Colonies stated in the

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80. *Ibid.* pp. 9274-75
House of Common on May 5, 1948 that between May 1, 1947 and April 24, 1948 the number of British subjects killed in Palestine was 201 (137 armed forces 53 police, 11 civilians). As far as was known to the authorities 1300 Arabs had been killed 2500 wounded, 1000 Jews killed 2000 wounded between October 1, 1947 and April 24, 1948.  

For the conflict that erupted in Palestine Jews and Arabs according to Henry Cattan were differently and unevenly prepared.

Politically the Jews had more cohesion than the Arabs. Financially they possessed much more greater resources. Militarily, they were prepared and equipped for an armed conflict. For several years they had enforced a compulsory military training of all Jews able to carry arms. Most Jewish immigrants were already militarily trained since they came from countries which applied military service. The Jews could also rely upon the experience of the Jewish Military Brigade which had been formed during the Second World War and upon the supernumerary police force which was set up trained and armed by the Government of Palestine during the mandate. During the Second World War 20,000 members of the

81. Ibid. P. 9344
82. Cattan, op. cit P. 32
83. Dr Chaim Weizman, Chairman, Jewish Agency offered the British in early years of the Second World War to raise on entire Jewish division of ten to twelve thousand men for service in the British Army Thousand of Ronald W. Davies, which could be obtained from Palestine. "Jewish Military Recruitment in Palestine", Journal of Palestine studies Vol. VII, No. 2, Winter, 1979, issue No. 30, P. 56
Yishu served with the Allied forces and were available afterwards in Palestine. By April, 1948, the Zionists had almost 30,000 men under arms, 10,000 others for local defence with another 25000 in homeguard service. There were also 2000 experienced terrorists in the Irgun by November 1945 and 800 in the Stern Gang. 84

_Haganah, Irgun Zvai Leumi and Steron Gang_ were three Jewish organizations which had illegally been created during the Mandate. The Haganah had a membership of 60,000 to 80,000 while Irgun, Zvai Leumi had a membership of about 500 to 10,000 together with several thousand sympathizers.

According to the British Government statement on Violence

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According to Chaim Herzog, the wartime experience acquired by 30,000 Jewish volunteers in all arms of the British forces later proved to be invaluable in the creation of Israel's Defence Forces (I D F), Chaim Herzog, *The Arab Israeli Wars* (New York, Random House, 1982) P.18

84. Not only militarily but in the economic and technical fields as well, Palestinians link to the British defence effort benefited the Jews. Jews were employed in the industries and enterprises which produced antitank mines weapons parts, tank engines and treads machine tools, uniforms, army boots, guns, ships, and machinery were repaired and light naval crafts were built. The articles also included specialized scientific apparatus optical instruments medical supplies and vaccines pharmaceuticals etc. By 1943,63 percent of the total Jewish work force were in occupations directly connected with defence needs.

Jewish identification with Britain's cause assumed other tangible forms. In the first month of war Palestine Jewish National Council announced the registration of volunteers for national services. Within five days 136,043 men and women enrolled. Their motivation was not simply an understandable desire for battle against the Nazis but the expectation that an armed and active Jewish force would obligate Britain to reconsider the Zionist cause. They were similarly aware that military skills acquired during the War could be put to a good use later. It was their hope meanwhile to organize their troops as a Jewish division or brigade under Jewish flag something akin to the Jewish a Legion of World War I. Howard Sacher *Europe Leaves the Middle East 1936-1954*. (New York, Alfred A. Knoff, 1972) PP.255-6.

When Rommel threatened British position in Egypt, Britain against the advice of the Mandatory British government in Palestine decided to train and help arm Haganah. The Haganah members were trained in the use of mines explosives and artillery and were used by the British against Italians, Germans and opposition Arabs. The British even gave the Haganah three small ships which could theoretically raid the Lebanon and Italian costs and thereby laid the ground work for the future Israeli navy. Amos Perlmutter, *Israel. The Partitioned State. A Political History since 1900*, (New York Charles Scribner's sons 1985) P.90.

84 Ovendale, Ritchie, _op. cit._ PP. 119, 120
(1946) these three organizations worked in cooperation. Towards the end of the Mandate the Jews decreed the total mobilization of Jewish Manpower and converted the Haganah from an underground force into a regular army. Between December 8, 1947 and March 9, 1948 the Haganah had registered and called to active service all Palestine Jews between the ages of 17 and 25. Moreover, no Jew was permitted by the Zionist authorities to leave the country without an exemption from military service issued by the Haganah and a receipt for taxes paid for military financing. In addition to possessing a trained combatant force the Jews possessed considerable stocks of light arms, some of these arms had been given to them by the Palestine Government for defence of their settlements; the large part, however, was smuggled during the Mandate. Some arms including tanks were even bought by the Haganah. From British forces upon their evacuation of Palestine.

MOVING TOWARD THE FIRST ARAB-ISRAEL WAR

The preparations for the first Arab-Israel War which broke out on May, 14-15, 1948 had been made long before that by both sides as they were convinced could that only force could enable the to achieve their objective.

The Jewish Agency had ordered a partial mobilization of Jewish manpower as early as November, 1947 and a complete mobilization on May 2, 1948. Haganah made up to 60,000 to 70,000 trained members became the backbone of the Israeli Army. Some 20,000 to 25,000 had shared in various western military forces during the World War II. The extremist Irgun and Stern maintained several thousand armed fighters of their own who operated independently of Haganah.\(^{86}\)

Between December 1947 and May 1948 Palestine gradually and imperceptibly divided itself into Arab and Jewish enclaves as snipping and terrorism escalated into street fighting and guerilla warfare.\(^{87}\)

While the Jewish forces in Palestine were highly trained, better armed and fully mobilized the Palestine Arabs possessed no military organization or training. Their military potential depended exclusively upon certain groups of volunteers from among them with little or no military training. These groups were not even centrally organized. The largest group of volunteers was called the Arab liberation Army and had an estimated strength of 6000 to 7000 men. Unlike the Jews the bulk of the Palestine Arab population was not mobilized nor did it possess any military training. Accordingly the Palestine Arab combatant force

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never matched in numbers or organization the Jewish combatant forces.\footnote{88}

Other factors also operated against the Palestine Arabs and greatly diminished their chances in any armed conflict with the Jews. By reason of their opposition to the British Mandate and to the establishment of Jewish National Home in Palestine such opposition having on several occasions led to violent disturbance, riots and even rebellions against the British Government—the latter had followed the policy of systematically Disarming the Arab population. Thus, between 1935 and 1947 over 7000 rifles were confiscated by the Palestine Government from the Arabs while only 135 rifles were confiscated from the Jews. Meanwhile, special emergency legislation was enacted to deal with the possession or carrying of fire arms and courts were established in order to punish this severely even with death. Thousands of Palestine Arabs were tried and sentenced by military courts for such offences.\footnote{89}
On May 14, 1948, the British Mandate over Palestine came to an end and her High Commissioner departed from Palestine. On the same day the establishment of the state of Israel was announced. At mid-night April 14-15, Nokrashy Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minster, declared; "Orders have been given to the Egyptian Armed. Forces to enter Palestine with the object of restoring security and order in that country and putting an end to massacre perpetrated by terrorist Zionist gangs against the Arabs and humanity".  

On May 15, the Egyptian Government while informing the Governments of Britain USA, France, Belgium, Poland and China of her decision to intervene made it clear that it was not directed against the Jews of Palestine but against Zionist terrorist bands and has no other object than the re-establishment of order, peace and security in that country until a just and equitable solution is found.

The member states of the Arab League had before the termination of the Mandate decided in various conferences that King Abdullah of Transjordan should be the supreme commander of Arab forces on all three fronts; that he would be advised by a War Council on which the staffs of the Arab armies would be represented. The War Council had the


91. Ibid. P. 9276 According to Mahmoud Riad, a former Foreign Minister of Egypt, the Egyptian Government had previously decided not to engage in military operation outside Egyptian territories and Nokrashy Pasha, the Prime Minister of Egypt informed an Arab League meeting in October, 1947, accordingly. King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia aware of the weaknesses of Arab armies was of the same opinion maintaining instead that Arab countries should confine their support to extending all possible help to the Palestinians to enable them to resist with their own strength the attacks of Jewish military forces. Mahmoud Riad: The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London, Quartet Books, 1981) P. 3.
responsibility of coordinating operations on these fronts. It had been agreed that the Syrian Lebanese forces should operate under Unified Command on the northern front and the eastern front would be the responsibility of Iraq and Trans Jordan. It had also been decided that the Saudis, Egyptians and Yemenites would operate in the southern front. 92

According to Henry Cattan, the Arab armies which then moved into Palestine in fact were token forces, a total of about 20,000 men. 93

The war can be divided into the following phases:

1st Phase. From 29th November 1947 until May 14th, 1948 which was the end of the Mandate during which occurred a period of semi-underground fighting.

2nd Phase. From May 14th until June 11th during which occurred the invasion of the regular armies of the Arab states.

3rd Phase. From June 11th until July 9th which was the period of the first truce.

4th Phase. From July 9th until July 18th, popularly referred to as the "Ten Days Offensive".

5th Phase. From July 18th until October which was the period of the second truce.

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92. Ibid. P. 9276
93. Cattan op. cit. P. 34
6th Phase. The October fighting which covers the renewal of the Israeli-Egyptian fighting in the south, and the Galilee Campaign against Maukji.  

As to the Arab gains in the war, the only appreciable one, and that also at the end of three days fighting was the capture of Gaza and Beersheba at the hands of the Egyptian forces. The Transjordanian Arab Legion had entered into the Old Jerusalem making the Jewish condition critical but the Lebanese, Syrians and Iraqi forces had made no advance. In the north the Jews occupied Arab port of Acre. A state of emergency was proclaimed in the new state of Israel. On May 16, the Egyptian Air Force planes bombed Tel Aviv. On May 17, a communiqué in Tel Aviv announced that Jewish forces operating in the northern Palestine had killed 200 Arabs of a Lebanese force and a Jewish commando unit had penetrated 10 miles deep into Lebanon. On May 21, the Egyptian Military Command reported that its troops in Southern Palestine had reached points 4 miles from Bethlehem. The Israeli air force was active in bombing the Egyptian position in Gaza. There was heavy fighting in Jerusalem where Arab Legion forces were attacking "the Jewish Quarter" in the Old City.

95. *Keesings Contemporary Archives op. cit.* p. 9281
The Security Council took up the issue of fighting in Palestine on May 17. The US delegate, Mr. Warren Austin presented a resolution declaring that a breach of peace existed within the meaning of article 39 of the UN Charter and calling on the warring parties to cease fire within 36 hours. The delegate of Belgium and Ukraine supported the US resolution but the Syrian delegate while strongly protesting against US recognition of Israel opposed US move in the Security Council. British delegate Sir Alexander Cadogan questioned the wisdom of invoking article 39 of the Charter. He proposed instead an amended resolution to call on both Jews and Arabs to cease fire within 36 hours. In arguing against the invocation of Art. 39, the British delegate said that the juridical status of the "geographical entity known as Palestine" was obscure; that whilst some maintained that Palestine as a whole had attained independence after the termination of the mandate, others held that Palestine was divided into two on the strength of General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947; and that the proclamation of the Jewish state was a unilateral act not based strictly on the act of the UN Palestine Commission. Thus, he maintained that if the Jews claimed to set up a state covering Jewish areas as defined in the UN resolution, whilst, on the other hand the Arabs claimed to set up a state covering the whole of Palestine, there was legally nothing to choose between them". 97 The Security Council did

97. Ibid P. 9282
not agree to invoke article 39 as proposed by the US delegate but on May 22 called on all the Governments and Parties concerned ~~~~to abstain from military actions in Palestine and to issue cease-fire orders to their military forces effective within 36 hours after mid-night. On May 20, Count Folke Bernadotte was nominated UN mediator in Palestine.

Due to the success of the Arab Legion forces in Jerusalem, anti-British feeling had arisen in the US Jewish circles alleging that the British arms were being used against the Jewish forces in Palestine. There were demands to lift US arms embargo in favour of Israel.

On May 29, 1948, the Security Council called for a truce for a period of four weeks during which the Governments were required to refrain from introducing into their countries men of military age or war material. By the time resolution was passed Jewish forces had consolidated their occupation of Palestinian territory beyond that allotted to Israel by the partition plan.

The Truce lasted from June 11, 1948 to July 7, 1948. The Israelis disregarded their undertaking not to import war material during the Truce and took ample advantage of that respite to rectify their almost total lack of combat air craft, artillery and heavy armoured vehicles. On the expiry

98. Ibid. P. 9282
99. Ibid. P. 9301
100. Origin and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part 11; 1947-1977 op. cit P. 48
of the Truce, hostilities were resumed. The Israelis not only occupied the areas allotted by the partition resolution to the Jewish state in the northern and central parts of the country but also seized the whole of Western Galilee as well as Lydda, Ramleh and large part of central Palestine which the Arab Legion of Transjordan had evacuated. All of these areas had been allocated by the partition resolution to the Arab State. This time the fighting lasted only ten days for, on July 15, 1948 the Security Council ordered the parties to desist from further military action. The second Truce came into force on July 18, 1948 and this time it was not subject to a time limit. The resolution stated that the Truce should remain in force until a peaceful adjustment of the future of Palestine was reached and charged Count Bernadotte, the UN Mediator, to supervise its observance.¹⁰¹

Count Bernadotte was unable to pursue his efforts to secure a peaceful settlement between the parties, for he was assassinated with the United Nations Observer Colonel Andre Serot at Jerusalem on September 17, 1948 by Jewish terrorists. However, one day prior to his assassination he had submitted his findings to the United Nations in which he had said.

"......the Jewish attitude had stiffened in the interval between the two Truces, that Jewish demands in the settlement would probably be more ambitious, and that Jewish

¹⁰¹ Cattan op. cit. P. 34,35
opinion was less receptive to mediation. A feeling of greater confidence and independence had grown out of Jewish military efforts during the interval between the two Truces.102

The Israelis were not to be contained within any territorial limits by the Truce ordered by the Security Council on July 15, 1948. They found pretexts to expand in breach of the truce and they undertook severe offensives during which they seized more territory. On October 15, 1948 the Israelis in breach of the Truce, launched a general offensive against the Egyptians on the southern front. The Israelis now enjoying for the first time a superiority in the air, made substantial gains of territory, capturing Beersheba on the 21st, Bait Hanun (only five miles north of Gaza) on the 22nd, and Bait Jibrin (in the direction of Hebron) soon afterwards.103

The parties accepted a cease-fire with effect from October 22, 1948 but on October 31 the Israelis defied a warning by the UN Chief and launched an attack on the Lebanese front and occupied fifteen villages situated within Lebanese territory. Also, in November, they moved forward in the Negev in the direction of the Gulf of Aqba.


On December 22, 1948 the Israelis launched another offensive in the south; occupied the area of Anja and made substantial penetration into Sinai.

This was not their last violation of the truce. On March 10, 1949 in breach of their Armistice Agreement with Egypt dated February 24, 1949, the Israelis again moved further south until they reached the gulf of Aqba and occupied the Palestine police post of Umm Reshrash which they afterwards named Eilat.\textsuperscript{104}

The Palestine War of 1948 was concluded by four Armistice Agreements signed by Israel with Egypt on February 24, 1949, with Lebanon on March 23, 1949, with Jordan on April 3, 1949 and with Syria on July 20, 1949. "It was a short war", Commander Hutchison has observed", marked by outside intervention, Arab disunity and unlimited aid to Israel from the West in addition to timely and substantial shipment of arms from the East European countries, primarily from Czechoslovakia. This aid sent in against the orders of the United Nations, was sufficient to turn the tide of battle and to grant Israel considerable land gains.\textsuperscript{105}

An examination of the course of events in Palestine in 1948 reveals three significant facts which have been blurred by Zionist propaganda.

\textsuperscript{104} Cattan \textit{Ibid} P. 36
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid} P. 36 \textit{quoting E.H. Hutchison, Violent Truce} New York, Devin Adair Company, 1956) P. 95
First, before the end of the mandate and, therefore, before any possible intervention by the Arab states the Jews taking advantage of their superior military preparation and organization, had occupied a number of Arab cities and seized a considerable part of territory of Palestine. The chronology of events in Palestine during the six months preceding the end of the mandate shows that Jewish forces had seized and occupied most of the Arab cities of Palestine before May 15, 1948. Tiberias was occupied on April 19, 1948, Haifa on April 22, Jaffa on April 28, the Arab quarters in the New city of Jerusalem on April 30, Beisan on May 8, Safad on May 10 and Acre on May 14, 1948.\(^{106}\)

Secondly, the Jews showed no respect either before or after May 15, 1948 for the territorial boundaries fixed by the previous UN resolutions for the proposed Arab and Jewish states. They not only occupied the territory of the proposed Jewish state but also seized a substantial portion of the territory reserved for the proposed Arab state. The areas seized by the Jewish forces before and after May 15, 1948 in excess of the territorial limits of the Jewish state as fixed by the partition resolution included Western Galilee the New city of Jerusalem the area west of Jaffa Acre, Lydda and Ramleh and several hundred Arab villages. The total area which the Israelis seized in 1948 and 1949 amounted to 20,850 square Kilometers out of 26,323 square kilometer representing the total area of Palestine. This meant that

\(^{106}\) Cattan *Ibid.* P. 36
Israel increased the territory of the Jewish state as proposed by the United Nations from 14,500 square kilometers to 20,850 square kilometers and by the same act decreased the territory of the proposed Arab state from 11,800 square kilometer to about 5,400 square kilometers. The total area which thus fell under Israeli control amounted to almost 80 percent of the territory of the country. This is in striking contrast with the 6 percent Jewish land ownership in the whole of Palestine.  

The Arabs on their part were left with one fifth of the original territory of their country. And what remained to them was the bone. It has been remarked that 3,000 out of the 8,000 square kilometers in Arab control after 1948 in central Palestine were mountainous desert. The remaining 5,000 square kilometers with the exception of some land around Nablus and Jericho are among the most infertile in the whole of Palestine outside the Negev.  

In contrast, the Palestine Arabs did not seize any of the territories reserved for the Jewish state under the Partition Resolution. Even when the Arab states did intervene militarily on May 15, 1948 an express restriction


From writings of Zionist leaders it is evident that Zionist policy was to occupy, during the period of the British withdrawal as much territory as possible (including the West Bank) beyond the boundaries assigned to the Jewish State by the partition resolution. See UN, *The Origins and Development of Palestine Problem* part II op. cit. PP. 39-42; Musa Khouri *The Arab Cause* (Damascus, 1966) PP. 60, 61, Al Hakam Darwazah, *A Short Survey of the Palestine Problem* (Beirut, Research Centre-Palestine Liberation Organization, 1966) P. 24.

was imposed on one of their armies in this regard. The Arab Legion of Transjordan was under orders from its British Command not to move into territory awarded to the Jews by the United Nations partition plan, Sir John Glubb also known as Glubb Pasha, the Commander of the Arab Legion states that Jordanians did not enter territory allotted by the United Nations to Israel but defended the area allotted to the Arabs.

Thirdly, the Israelis have pretended that they did not respect the territorial limits set by the resolution of November 29, 1947 because of the Arab refusal to accept partition. In actual fact writes Henry Cattan, they themselves largely contributed to the defeat of the partition resolution by occupying by force and even before the end of the Mandate the major part of the territories allocated to the Palestine Arabs by the resolution.

The result of the Palestine conflict of 1948 was summed up by the American Chairman of the Israeli-Jordan Armistice Commission in the following terms.

"The brief, official Palestine war of 1948-49 is now a part of history it settled none of the basic issues of Arab Israeli contention. The major powers of the West and the


"... no Jewish settlement, however, remote, was entered or seized by the Arabs while the Haganah..... captured many Arab positions and liberated Tiberias and Haifa, Jafa and Safad.... So, on the day of the destiny, that part of Palestine where the Haganah could operate was almost clear of the Arabs." -Ben-Gurion, *David Rebirth and Destiny of Israel* (New York, the Philosophical Library, 1954) P. 292; See also *The Hashmite Arab Army op. cit.* PP. 243-259
East losing sight of the true value of a friendly Arab World in the switling cloud of Zionist propaganda overran the rights of the indigenous population of Palestine the Arabs. Every step in the establishment of a Zionist state had been a challenge to justice.  

Analyzing the causes of Arab failures in the war of 1948 a study says.

"The Arab League entered the war on a wave of false euphoria, generated by an emotional and unreal assessment of the defence potentialities of the embryonic Jewish state. Arab heads of state, political leaders and the Arab League dismissed the Jews as a nation of shopkeepers who with the minimum of effort would be swept into the Mediterranean. Judging from the historical evidence available the manner of conduct of military operations ostensibly to annihilate the Jewish state indicates an abysmal lack of political intelligence and of military appreciation on the part of the Arab League."

According to Edgar O Ballance there are certain landmarks that stand out concerning the Palestine war of 1948. One of them was the failure of the Arabs to join together in a Holy War against infidel. For centuries they had been divided amongst themselves by rivalries and feuds but it was

110. Cattan, ibid. P.38 quoting Commander Hitechison, op. cit, P. 95.

111. Edroos, A. (Brigadier), The Hashmite Arab Army, 1908-1979 op. cit, P. 275.
expected that the call of Islam would unite them against Israel. But this did not happen.\footnote{O, Ballance, Edgar, \textit{op. cit.}, P. 208.}

The first Arab Israel war of 1948 not only failed to solve the already existing issues that led to its outbreak it resulted in the creation of new ones with greater potentialities for explosion into conflict. One of the new factors that was added to the Arab-Israel conflict after 1948 was the expulsion of vast number of Arab Palestinians from their homes at the hands of Jews during the hostilities. The Palestinian Arab Refugees became a new factor in the Arab Israel tangle. The issue of the Palestinian refugees is discussed in a separate chapter.)
PAKISTAN AND THE 1948 WAR.

We have seen in the previous chapter how, during the United Nations discussions on the partition plan for Palestine, the delegate of Pakistan championed the cause of the Palestinians. As stated by Sir Zafarullah Khan himself after his first speech in the UN General Assemblies debate on Palestine, the Arab countries assigned to Pakistan the main responsibility for defending the Arab stand on the Palestinian issue.\textsuperscript{113} Pakistan’s support to the Palestinian cause also won the praise of Arab circles. In a statement on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee, Mr. Azizuddin Shadabe, the Chief of Palestinian Arabs Political Mission in Britain said in a press conference in London, on October 18, 1947, that the Arabs were very happy over Pakistan’s support to the demands of the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{114} It is not that the speeches made by Arab delegates were lacking in support to the Palestinian cause; some of the Arab delegates spoke with sound and effective arguments but most of the Arab speeches contained rhetoric and sentimentalism. The Pakistani delegate dealt with the Palestinian question not only in the historical perspective but also in the light of existing facts some of which were not even known to the Arab delegates.\textsuperscript{115} As for instance, when Sir Zafarullah Khan pointed out in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations General Assembly that the partition map which was given to

\textsuperscript{113} Khan, Zafarullah: Tehdid-i-Nimat op. cit. P. 521.

\textsuperscript{114} Nawa-e-Waqt (Lahore) October 19, 1947

\textsuperscript{115} Khan Zafarullah op. cit. p. 521
the delegates showed the whole of the Negev area of southern Palestine in a separate section and drawn to a scale four times than the rest of the plan, it caused a "stir" because, as he said it gave an entirely erroneous impression of the relative size of the Negev to the rest of Palestine. Under the partition plan, most of the Negev was to go to the Jews.\footnote{Statement by Sir Zaffarullah Khan, \textit{The Pakistan Times} (Lahore) November 23, 1947}

The Pakistan delegation to the UN, particularly its chief Sir Mohammed Zaffarullah Khan was a source of great help to the Arabs. Sir Zaffarullah participated in the United Nations General Assembly debates held on the partition proposal in 1947 and again when it took up the issue in February-May, 1948 to consider the deteriorating situation in Palestine. During all this time the Arab side continued to benefit from his diplomatic skill and forceful advocacy of the case. Hence when, in the second week of May, 1948, he left Lake Success for his country, there was a unanimous feeling among the diplomatic circles that with his departure the Arabs had been deprived of a highly valuable assistance that he provided to them on Palestine He was seen off at the airport by all the Arab delegates accredited to the UN. It showed how great an esteem he was held in by the Arab circles at Lake Success. According to a news agency report it was not merely a formality, but a symbol of gratitude for their benefactor. "The Arabs will be deprived of his help, but they are highly grateful to his help in those critical
days. With mandate (over Palestine) coming to an end, they are more conscious of the importance of his help during the current session," a news comment said.\textsuperscript{117}

Pakistani's support to the Palestinian cause at the United Nations was backed by a clearly defined policy of the Government of Pakistan and massive show of public support and sympathy. It has been mentioned in the preceding Chapter that the Muslim masses of united India, the Muslim League and the Quaid-e-Azam had through meetings, resolutions and statements, supported the Palestinian cause and condemned the Zionist, the British and the American machinations against the Arabs. When the United Nations took up the Palestinian issue at its First Special Session on Palestine in April, 1947, the Quaid-e-Azam sent a detailed message to the Arab delegates at the UN expressing his opposition to the Jewish immigration into Palestine and condemning the pro-Zionist American and British elements working against the Arabs.\textsuperscript{118} Quaid-e-Azam's stand on Palestine expressed during an interview with Reuters correspondent on October 23, 1947 had evoked admiration and commendation for Pakistan in the Arab circles abroad. Commenting on the statement made by the Quaid in which he had said that in case there was conflict between the Arabs and Jews as a result of the enforcing of partition plan Pakistan would "give its fullest support to the Arabs ----" The Chairman of the Political Committee of Palestine, Sheikh Azizuddin Shadab had said in

\textsuperscript{117} Nawai-e-Waqt (Lahore) May 11, 1948
London in November, 1947 that it was a heartening statement, reinforcing the determination of the Arabs. 119

On December 8, 1947, when the UN General Assembly had already passed the partition of Palestine resolution and the United States, particularly President Harry S. Truman was over-enthusiastically trying to help the Jewish cause in Palestine, the Quaid-e-Azam sent a telegram to the American President July expressing the sentiments of the Pakistani people. The telegram read:

1. At this hour when the Muslim world has received a terrible shock owing to the most unfortunate decision of the UNO to enforce partition of Palestine I would like to address to you Mr. President, this personal appeal.

2. The decision is ultra vires of the United Nations Charter and basically wrong and invalid in Law.

3. Morally it is untenable. Politically, historically, geographically and practically it would be impossible to enforce partition against the united resistance of the Arabs who have the full sympathy and support of over 300 million Mussalmans and many non-Muslim countries and not only those who voted against the UNO decision.

4. In the long run it will and must fail. The very people for whose benefit this decision is taken--the Jews, who have already suffered terribly from Nazi persecution--will, I greatly fear, suffer most if this unjust course is
pursued. Moreover, the decision presents a great danger to world peace.

5. May I, therefore, at this eleventh hour appeal to you, and through you to the great and powerful American nation, which has always stood for justice, to uphold the rights of Arab race. The government and the people of America can yet save this dangerous situation by giving a correct lead and thus avoid the gravest consequences and repercussions.

6. May I, Mr. President, with your permission, release this telegram to the press. 120

M. A. Jinnah
Governor General of Pakistan

PUBLIC PROTEST IN PAKISTAN

The feeling of shock and indignation on the UN decision on Palestine expressed by the Quaid-e-Azam in his various statements and interviews were equally and fully shared by the people of Pakistan who denounced the UN vote as a conspiracy by big powers against the Muslim World. In all over Pakistan, there was protest and condemnation of partition decision expressed through statements, strikes, demonstrations and speeches made and resolutions passed at numerous public meetings. In a press statement issued on December 2, 1947 in Lahore. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar Pakistan’s Minister for Communications expressed the sentiments of the people of Pakistan on the Palestinian
issue when he said that the partition was not only a challenge to the Arabs and the Muslim world, but to all the smaller countries because it has created a very bad precedent for big powers to partition small countries and establish therein the states of their choice."..........

Similar statement was issued by Raja Ghazenfar Ali Khan, the Minister for Refugees and Rehabilitation in Lahore on December 2, 1947. He said,

"Pakistan will not be a silent spectator of the unjust and mischievous partition of Palestine but shall fight shoulder to shoulder with its Arab brethren for the defence of the Holy Land..........

As a part of a countrywide movement of protest and denunciation of the United Nations decision to partition Palestine, complete strike was observed in all colleges and schools of Rawalpindi on December 5, 1947. A procession of about 5000 students marched through the main streets of the city raising slogans against the United Nations and partition plan. At the end of the procession a meeting was held where resolutions condemning the UN were passed. Those who were present at the public meeting assured the Arabs, through a resolution, that the students of Pakistan would shed the last drop of their blood to save the Holy Land from partition"..........

The protest demonstration and public meetings were also held in other important cities and towns of Pakistan. See *Nawa-e-Waqf* December 7, 1947.
The developments in Palestine following the passing of partition plan by the UN were closely and keenly watched by the political leaders, press and general public in Pakistan. The newspapers carried number of articles giving the nature and origin of the Palestinian problem. It symbolized the concern felt by the people of Pakistan about the fate of a land where their first Quibla" was located. This concern was fully expressed by an editorial of an influential Urdu daily from Lahore, *Nawa-i-Waqt* on December 5, 1947. The editorial said:

"What had been feared has at last happened. The General Assembly of the United Nations has given its final verdict in favour of partition of Palestine. The decision is a challenge not only to the Arabs but to the whole of the Islamic World; and, God willing, it will be met bravely. After a lapse of seven hundred years, Europe has once again challenged Islam and Muslims in the Holy Land. The world would once again be a witness to the scene of Crusades. The history would once again repeat the story of Arab chivalry against the infidels in the Holy Land. This opportunity must not be allowed to slip away..."

Because of complete solidarity shown by the Government and people of Pakistan with the Arab cause in Palestine, the Arab countries who were envisaging an armed clash with the Jewish forces in Palestine counted Pakistan as a source of not only solid political and moral support but also as a military ally against anti-Arab forces in the Holy Land. At a stage when the Palestinian problem was still under discussion in the Second Session of the General Assembly, there had appeared in international press, reports about Arab plans to recruit an international brigade and for the formation of an Eastern Bloc consisting of Arab States, Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan to defend Arab

interests. It was hoped that the establishment of such a bloc would assist Near and Middle Eastern countries to stand firm against any aggressive move from any quarter, greater or small. When the tension in the Middle East escalated because of continuing and widening of Arab Jewish clashes in Palestine and surrounding areas following General Assemblies resolution on the partition of Palestine, the Arab League began to look for alternative sources for arms and weapons as the prospects of obtaining arms from the US and Britain were practically non-existent, Arab League listed Pakistan as one of the countries from where arms could be bought.

The indignant mood of the Pakistani people turned into open hatred and denunciation when the first Arab - Israel War broke out on May 14-150, 1948. Fully sharing the sentiments of the people of Pakistan an important meeting of Pakistan Muslim League Parliamentary Party was held in Karachi under the presidency of Prime Minister Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan. The meeting adopted a resolution moved by Mr. Abual Qassam which condemned the United States, New Zealand and Sweden for according recognition to the newly born state of Israel. The resolution termed the action of these countries as unjust and against the interests of the world.

125. The Pakistan Times (Lahore) November 18, 1947.
126. The Pakistan Times (Lahore) December 10, 1947

In a memorandum to the UN Secretary General dated February 2, 1948, the Jewish Agency for Palestine had while quoting from a report in the New York Times (dated December 8, 1947) alleged that "senior military officers of four Arab States Force left Cairo on a mission to purchase arms and ammunitions as a part of the Arab League plan to prevent the inception of the Jewish State in Palestine. The mission officers from Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon ... plan to visit Pakistan, India, France, Switzerland, Spain and Cechoslovakia."
as well as the whole world. It called upon the Government of Pakistan to provide every assistance to the Arabs in that holy war. The resolution also appealed to the people of Pakistan to render every kind of help to the Arabs in their brave struggle.

The meeting decided to form a sub-committee consisting of Malik Feroze Khan Noon, Mr. Abual Qassem, Mr. Hashim Sardar, Sardar Mohammed Khan Jogezaι and Sardar Bahadur Khan as convener, to mobilize resources and consider other matters on assistance to the Arabs. 127

The Sub-Committee prepared a detailed scheme under which it was decided to send armed volunteers and medical mission to help the Palestinian Arabs. The scheme also recommended to provide financial assistance to the Palestinian Arabs. It was decided that the representatives of the Muslim League be sent to the Arab countries to enquire what kind of help was needed by them; Muslim League should set up aid Palestine Committees at the provincial level, it was recommended. 128

The Central Palestine Aid Committee with Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan its Chairman and Maulvi Taimizzud din Khan as Secretary was set up to organize help of every kind for the

128. Idqilah, May 20, 1948

This decision of the Sub-Committee of the Muslim League parliamentary Party was published by the New York Times in its issue dated may 27, 1948 outing Associated Press that Pakistan would send fighters to help the Arabs in Palestine and its representatives would contact the Arab League to find how best Pakistan could help the Arabs. The New York Time May, 27, 1948, P. 4.
Palestinian Arabs. In its meeting held on June 30, 1948 at Karachi under the chairmanship of Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, the Committee decided to raise a corps of fully trained and well equipped volunteers to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Arabs in the battle for the liberation of Palestine. According to the statement issued by the Secretary of the Committee, Maulvi Tamizzuddin Khan, the Committee heard the report of Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi who was deputed by it to contact Arab leaders to find out from them how the Committee could best participate in the liberation of Palestine. Having visited Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and having contacted Arab leaders, he gave a full report of his impressions to the Committee after having considered his report, the Committee decided to raise a corps of fully trained and well equipped volunteers to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Arabs. The Committee was to bear all the expenses of these volunteers and also equip a medical unit to be attached to the corps. The Committee also resolved to send further units of medical personnel.

Mr. Siddique Ali Khan of the Mujahiddin Committee and formerly Salar-i-Ala of the Muslim League National Guards was requested to draw up a scheme and estimate for recruiting, equipping and sending volunteers to Palestine. It was further decided that prayers for the success of Arab armies be offered in all the mosques on the first Friday of Ramzan throughout Pakistan. This opportunity should be utilized to explain the issue to the congregations and to
extort them to contribute generously to the Palestinian Fund. 129

The Quaid-e-Azam was particularly grieved over the tragedy of Palestine and, at a time when Pakistan was itself faced with grieve financial problems, he sent a sum of Rs. one thousand each to King Farouk of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan as token money to help the children of the Palestinian soldiers who gave their lives for a just cause. In his message to the two Arab Kings, the Quaid said "that the money sent was a mark of respect for the noble and just cause for which the Governments and peoples of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other members of Arab League are fighting together, "pray for your success" he concluded. 130 On August 6,1948, in his Id message the Quaid said,"

"My message to our brother Muslim States is one of friendship and goodwill. We are all passing through perilous times,"

"The drama of power politics that is being staged in Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir should serve as eye opener to us. It is only by putting up a united front that we can make our voice felt in the corridors of the world. 131"

The Palestinian war had great impact on the ordinary citizen of Pakistan. According to newspaper reports the whole population of Lahore was moved by the Palestinian war. People flocked to all mosques of the city in an unusually

129. The Pakistan Times July 2, 1948.

A report to this effect was also published by the New York Times in its issue of July 6, 1948 which said; " tamizuddin Ahmad Deputy President of Pakistan's Constituent Assembly, Said that ...... well trained and fully equipped Pakistan crusaders will soon be sent to the Palestine front to fight the Zionist aggressors. He appealed for large sums of money saying that our volunteers must be provided adequate arms and all other essential equipment" The New York Times, July6, 1948 P.2


131. Dawn, (Karachi), August 7, 1947 see also The Pakistan Times
large number where they prayed for the success of Islamic armies. The huge crowds of people, gathered in bazars to eagerly listen to the news from war front, presented the same scene which was witnessed during the Second World War. There a great rush of people in hotels and shops where there was radios fitted and every person was anxious to hear the latest news about Palestine. "The public eagerness in this connection can be judged from the fact that even the people from the suburban areas of Lahore made it to reach in time where radios are available for news," A news paper reported. It further said," Every Muslim is of firm belief that the Jews would suffer ignominious defeat even if the United States and all others come to their help. Even the illiterate Muslims firmly believe that Zionism will for ever be buried in the Holy Land of Palestine. "\textsuperscript{132}

In another report the same paper said that "the people of Pakistan are greatly agitated in every part of the country. Especially, the people of North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP) are deeply moved by it." Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani received a telegram from Mardan (NWFP) in which it had been stated that the first unit of volunteers to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Palestinian Arabs was ready to leave for the war front. In the telegram Maulana who headed Palestine-Aid-Committee, was requested to arrange for the departure of volunteers to Palestine.... \textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Inqilab}, Lahore May 19, 1948

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Inqilab}, (Lahore) May 23, 1948.
On May 21, 1948, "Palestine Week" was observed in Karachi. A procession under the auspices of Jamiatul-Muhajrin was taken out which violently demonstrated in front of the American Embassy. After the demonstration the processionists held a public meeting where speakers supported the Arab cause and, in a resolution called on the Government of Pakistan to condemn the United States and the Soviet Union for rendering help to the Jews. In another resolution an appeal was made to boycott the American and Jewish goods. 

On May 29, there was another big protest procession in Karachi consisting of camels, horse carts and motor trucks. At the head of the procession there was a camel rider dressed in Arabic robes, Islamic flag in his hand. This procession marched through all the main streets of Karachi with an aim to demonstrate before the American Embassy but could not do so because of the intervention by authorities. The processionists raised slogans against the US, Soviet Union and the Jews. A mock funeral of Israel was taken out which was later trampled upon under foot. At the end of the procession a public meeting was held where speeches were made condemning those powers who sponsored the creation of Israel and calling on the Government of Pakistan to fully support the Arabs in their struggle. A resolution was also

approved by the public meeting in which a call for the boycott of American and Jewish goods was given. 

Commenting upon the country-wide protest movement on the Palestinian issue, the daily Nawa-e-Waqt wrote in an editorial.

"The Palestinian problem does not concern the Arabs only, it is a problem of the whole Muslim world, and all the Muslims should confront the Jews through a united front after fully realizing and studying the situation. As far as the Arab countries are concerned, they have displayed wonderful solidarity and a unity that is worth emulating. There is no need to mention the outburst of enthusiastic support by the people of Pakistan on this issue. Because of the love for the first qibla and for the sake of its security, the Muslims of Pakistan are perhaps more enthusiastic than the Arabs."

There was a general realization in Pakistan that although Arabs exceeded the Jews in number, they were far behind them in military organization, training and the quality and quantity of arms that they possessed. Moreover, it was in the common knowledge of the Pakistani people that the great powers, particularly the United States was fully at the back of the Jews politically as well as financially and militarily. Hence, the public opinion in Pakistan, which condemned the United States support and assistance to the Jews, also at the same time demanded more concrete and practical measures, including the dispatch of combat troops, by the Muslim countries of the region, particularly by Pakistan. This demand and feeling was repeatedly and unequivocally expressed during the processions and demonstrations and the public meetings held to protest against the injustice and aggression perpetrated on the Arabs by alien elements and powers who backed them. Echoing

the sentiments of the Pakistani people, the editorial of Nawa-i-Waqt further said:

"...even Pakistan has not yet taken any practical step to aid the Palestinians. There is no doubt that a reasonable amount of financial contribution has been sent to Palestine from Pakistan, but merely this aid is not only insufficient it is not worthy of a country like Pakistan. The defence of the freedom and honour of Palestine is incumbent on Pakistan as it is on the Arabs, now when the world Jewry has declared war against the Arabs; and the Arabs after accepting this challenge have come out to wage a Holy War Pakistan should not contend itself only with financial contribution. The Arabs have won the Palestinian war on the UN front under the leadership of Pakistan, now Pakistan should not keep behind on the military front rather it should fight shoulder to shoulder with the Arabs. The Muslim League Parliamentary Party has decided to aid the Arabs. This Party is a functionary of the Government. We demand that Pakistan's support to the Palestinian Arabs should not remain confined to contribution of money medicines blankets and doctors only. The regular army of Pakistan along with the units of Iraq and Iran should enter Palestine and should fight alongside the Arabs in this holy war, We realize fully the needs and difficulties of Pakistan, but, in our opinion it is a duty of Pakistan that despite all its limitations, it must send some of its regular army to Palestine, Pakistan must not be left deprived of the sacred honour of participating in the holy war for the defence of the first quibla."......

As the war in Palestine did not stop despite some temporary truces and cease fires until January 7, 1949 when an armistice agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel, the efforts continued to be made at various levels in Pakistan to render whatever help could be possible to the Palestinian Arabs. It is to be noted that in these efforts the functionaries of the Government and citizens were equally active.

Towards the end of August, 1948 Maulvi Tamizud din Khan, Secretary, Pakistan Central Palestine-Aid-Committee issued a lengthy statement through the press. "May I," he said," invite the attention of my brothers and sisters in Pakistan to the duties towards the Holy Land of Palestine now in distress. The temporary cease-fire order now in force there should not make us complacent. The situation is as

menacing as ever and the danger of widespread resumption of hostilities should on no account be overlooked or minimized.

"Over and above the task of liberating Palestine, the Arabs are faced with another serious problem of housing, feeding and clothing lakhs of refugees driven from their hearths and homes in Palestine owing to Zionist aggression,"

"As citizens of the largest Muslim State in the world, our obligations in this respect are heavy indeed. No doubt we are ourselves in travail. We are determined not to allow our own troubles, however great, to make us unmindful to the lot of our brothers and sisters in distress in other lands. So let all concerned in making collection for the Pakistan-Palestine Fund redouble their efforts and let every Pakistani fellow citizen who has not yet made his or her contribution do so as early as possible,"........ 137

On September 10, 1948 a huge public meeting of the citizens of Karachi was held at Jahangir Park which was presided over by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and addressed by Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan and Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan.

In his speech Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan who had participated in the UN debate on Palestine as head of the Pakistani delegation reiterated Pakistani determination to render all possible help to the Palestinian Arabs. He said that if Palestine was lost Medina and even Haramain

Sharifain would not be safe from the Jews. He told the audience that Palestine was not an isolated problem. "We are faced with enemies all over the world from Morocco right up to Indonesia Explaining the issue in a broader perspective the Foreign Minister said.

"Palestine is an international as well as pan-Islamic question. Nay, it marks the tussle between the East and the West. If Palestine goes out of the hands of the Muslims, they as well as all the Eastern countries will always remain exposed to the aggressive designs of the West But with Palestine in hand the East can be safe from future attacks both naval and aerial."

Dilating upon the significance of Palestine for the Muslim World Sir Zafarullah said that the issue of Palestine had other aspects to it also but for the Muslims the religious side was the most important. Palestine was 14 century old problem and the Muslims had fought for Palestine for 200 years. Palestine was an amanant(trust) in the hands of the Muslims.

Speaking on the role of Pakistan in the struggle for Palestine Foreign Minister said that the whole of Islamic world looked up to Pakistan for guidance and had high hopes that Pakistan would come to their rescue in their hour of need. The Muslims of Pakistan had to come up to their expectations even though it entailed great sacrifices.

Even more emphatic was the Prime Minister Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan in proclaiming country's total support to the Palestinian cause. Addressing the meeting he said that if hostilities again broke out in Palestine, Palestine Aid-Committee of which he was the chairman would organize
volunteers to join the Jehad side by side with their Arab brothers.

On Pakistan's position in the Muslim world he said that as the largest Muslim state of the world Pakistan's responsibility did not end with preserving its own freedom. It had to safeguard the freedom of smaller Muslim states as well.

Alluding to the pan-Islamist passion of the Indian Muslims the Prime Minister said that the Muslims of Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent were famous for bleeding their heart on the slightest troubles of their brethren anywhere in the world. Would you give up this age old tradition now that you are free? he asked the audience.

Further elaborating the central role that Pakistan was according to him, to play in the destinies of Muslim countries liagat Ali Khan said.

"Since the establishment of Pakistan the expectations of the Muslim world had increased and had added considerably to the responsibility of Pakistan - the largest Muslim State in the world. All the Muslim countries looked up towards Pakistan in their hour of need and Pakistani Muslims must rise to their expectations. The establishment of the so called state of Israel in Palestine would plunge a sword right into the heart of the Muslims world and the Muslim of the world must rise up to avert this catastrophe."
Reflecting the true spirit of early Muslims, the Prime Minister said.

"We know our difficulties are enormous but like true Muslims we will have to forget our own miseries and help our brethren. Give all that you can to the Palestine Fund."

Explaining the strategic relation between Pakistan and the Muslim world the Prime Minister said that "with Pakistan was linked the independence of the entire Muslim World. If Pakistan is lost, all the Muslim world will lose its freedom. We have to save Pakistan to save the Muslim world."138

THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN PAKISTAN

It must be noted that although there was such a great public and official reaction against the establishment of Jewish state of Israel there are no confirmed reports that the Jewish Community in Pakistan was subjected to public wrath or harassment. There is, however, evidence to suggest that they did not remain unaffected by the developments in Palestine which led Arab Jewish hostilities and creation of Israel. In early December, 1947, it was reported that Jewish families living and doing business in the Peshawar city of North-Western Frontier Province of Pakistan, had been gradually leaving the city. The report attributed their departure to the troubles in Palestine which was accelerated by the UN partition decision. This report also said that a

Jewish family in Peshawar was attacked by a rival Jewish party on December, 3 and that this incident which consisted of certain private and personal quarrels was being misrepresented as reaction to the partition plan. 139 In March 1948 there were certain allegations levelled by the Jewish Agency that Jews in Pakistan were being maltreated. Replying to these allegations Pakistan Foreign Minister Sir Zafarullah Khan told the United Nations Economic and Social Council in writing that Mr. Simon A. Renben President Jewish Community Karachi had stated on March 8, 1948 that his community was quite happy and relations between Muslim and Jews were quite cordial Mr. Renben had also stated that there was no justification for Jews to migrate to India in view of the official assurances that there would be no discrimination against minorities in Pakistan. 140 About 250 Jewish families living in Pakistan, however, left and reached Bombay (India) in May 1948. They requested the Directorate of Immigration Government of India to arrange for their stay in a camp at a suitable place. 141 The movement of Jews from Pakistan must be seen in the context of Jewish immigration into Palestine from all over the world. It could not be established that they were discriminated in Pakistan on political or religious grounds. The Interior Minister of Pakistan Khawaja Shahabuddin had

made it quite clear that although it is a common knowledge that on war in Palestine Pakistan's sympathies lay with the Arabs, yet the loyal Jewish citizens of Pakistan should fear no harassment or victimization. Pakistan is opposed only to Zionism because it is an imperialist movement aimed at creating an independent Jewish state in a purely Arab country. 142

Pakistan is support to the Arab cause in Palestine right from the presentation of Palestinian question before the United Nations to the out-break of the First Arab-Israel War of 1948 won the praise and admiration of Arab masses and governments. The Palestinian Arabs were particularly indebted to Pakistan for its unqualified and valued support. In October, 1948 two representatives of the Grand Mufti of Palestine and delegates of the Arab Higher Committee Mr. Abdullah Ghoshe and Salim Hussaini came to Pakistan. They met Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and chaudhry Khaliguzzaman, Organizer Pakistan Muslim league in Karachi on October 24, 1948.

After expressing gratitude for Pakistan's support for the Palestinian cause they told the Pakistani leaders that Palestine needed money and armaments more than volunteers since there were enough of men in Palestine and in the neighbouring countries to continue Jehad for the time. They told the Pakistani leaders that they were short of money and

armaments and expected Pakistan and other Muslim countries to send as much to Palestine as they could spare. 143

When Pakistan came into being the problem of Palestine had already reached a critical stage and was being discussed by the United Nations on being referred to it by Britain who had held the country as mandate since 1922. Inspite of being confronted with immediate and gigantic problems of national reconstruction and dealing with the influx of refugees from India

The Quaid-e-Azam lost no time to send a high powered delegation led by Sir Zafarullah Khan to represent Pakistan at the United Nations and participate in the debate on Palestine. The able and brilliant advocacy of the Palestinian case by the Pakistani delegates not only startled the Arab side into jubilant satisfaction but it also impressed the other non European delegates to such an extent that but for American pressure tactics to secure additional votes in favour of partition resolution the recommendation of the Ad-Hoc Committee to create a separate Jewish state seemed difficult to get the required two thirds majority.

The out-break of war in Palestine between the Arab countries and Israel in 1948 only proved true what had so emphatically been said by the Pakistani delegate and Arab representatives during the course of the UN debate on

Palestine warning that the Partition of Palestine would result into an unprecedented conflagration.

The notable features of Pakistan's policy toward the Arab Jewish conflict up to the outbreak of the first Arab-Israel War were Pakistan completely identified herself with the Arab cause without any reservations. In this connection it not only opposed the creation of Jewish state it bitterly criticized the big powers like the US Britain and Russia without any fear of incurring their disfavour. It was, as one writer has pointed out, an independent foreign policy by keeping away from both the power blocs that enabled Pakistan to take an independent stand on a number of international issues, like Palestine.144

باب سی

سر تیزکاری کے ۱۵۱۸ء سے پہلے
تیسرا باب

сьیرت نگارکی کے 18 اے سے پہلے

تاریخی اور نگاری کے ساتھ، معاشرہ اور اثرات مرتبت ہو کر ان کی حالات میں ان کے سرتے معاشرہ اور شعبہ میں بہت حاصل ہوئے۔ یہ کہا جاتا ہے کہ اس کا تاریخی اور نگارکی کے 18 اے سے پہلے کے طور پر اثرات مرتبت ہو کر ان کی حالات میں ان کے سرتے معاشرہ اور شعبہ میں ان کے سرتے معاشرہ اور شعبہ میں ان کے سرتے معاشرہ اور شعبہ میں ان کے سرتے معاشرہ اور شعبہ میں ان کے سرتے معاشرہ اور شعبہ میں ان کے سرتے معاشرہ اور شعبہ میں ان کے سرنگ ہو گئے تھے۔

1. آبادی، (م. 1310) کو مشترکہ اور اس کی بہترین سمجح اپنے ہمراہ منصوبہ بنا گئے۔

2. میاں نواز شریف (م. 1385) کی "اسلامیہ" کی اسلامیہ کا حکمت محسوس کہ ہوئے۔

3. خواجہ نظام شاہ (م. 1313) کی "میرزہ" کی خطابات اور میناکے میں ہوئے۔

4. خواجہ نظام شاہ (م. 1313) کی "میرزہ" کی خطابات اور میناکے میں ہوئے۔

5. خواجہ نظام شاہ (م. 1313) کی "میرزہ" کی خطابات اور میناکے میں ہوئے۔

6. خواجہ نظام شاہ (م. 1313) کی "میرزہ" کی خطابات اور میناکے میں ہوئے۔
قابل ہے اور آسانی سے نہیں حاضر ہوئے کی اسے انتہائی کہ اور سارے کوچھ بھی "و حاضر نہیں محتوی ہے اور سرلیک" جملہ کا ترتیب پڑ ہوئے کی رحلت سازی کا ناء کم شکر کیا جانا۔ اور

یہاں اسی بات کی حاضری پر اور اس کا ترتیب پڑ ہوئے کی رحلت سازی کا ناء کم شکر کیا جانا۔

"بیڈ ہے اور آسانی سے نہیں حاضر ہوئے کی اسے انتہائی کہ اور سارے کوچھ بھی "و حاضر نہیں محتوی ہے اور سرلیک" جملہ کا ترتیب پڑ ہوئے کی رحلت سازی کا ناء کم شکر کیا جانا۔

"بیڈ ہے اور آسانی سے نہیں حاضر ہوئے کی اسے انتہائی کہ اور سارے کوچھ بھی "و حاضر نہیں محتوی ہے اور سرلیک" جملہ کا ترتیب پڑ ہوئے کی رحلت سازی کا ناء کم شکر کیا جانا۔

"بیڈ ہے اور آسانی سے نہیں حاضر ہوئے کی اسے انتہائی کہ اور سارے کوچھ بھی "و حاضر نہیں محتوی ہے اور سرلیک" جملہ کا ترتیب پڑ ہوئے کی رحلت سازی کا ناء کم شکر کیا جانا۔
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
اس لوبویہ طالبین

(5) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(6) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(7) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(8) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(9) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(10) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(11) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(12) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(13) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(14) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(15) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(16) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(17) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں۔

(18) اس کے بعد بچوں کی تعلیم کی معاشرت و وکالت کا معاشرت کے ساتھ درجہ پائیں।
دستین دیگر الامان کے بھابھ کو بھی بیدا کی نقش کچھیوں راونتی کی کے لیے تھا سے اس میں سے بھپلوں سے شریف کے متعلق

جو آپ کے اور کے سبب لوڈ ہو جاتا ہے۔ بھابھ کے چھوٹے بھائیوں کے سے بھپلوں سے نظر ہو جاتا ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابھ کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے۔ بھابbh کے کو کہ ہو جاتی ہے।
(ب) محمد باقر آقازاده روایت کتاب "جستجو در شب" (دو جلدی، پرچم) نظریه صورت می‌ماند به‌طوری که صفحه‌س نقل را که به‌طور کلی صفحه‌س حرشقو که جوانان در جنوب، پر نماید.

1. می‌دانیم (نامه‌ای که نگار) (دکتر)ک

2. می‌دانیم (نامه‌ای نتیجه‌زا که نگار) (دکتر)

3. می‌دانیم (نامه‌ای که نتیجه‌زا که نگار) (دکتر)

4. چگونه می‌توان (نامه‌ای که نتیجه‌زا که نگار) (دکتر)

5. ارام (نامه‌ای که نتیجه‌زا که نگار) (دکتر)

6. راست چال (نامه‌ای که نتیجه‌زا که نگار) (دکتر)

7. کریم دهیان (نامه‌ای که نتیجه‌ز

8. می‌دانیم (نامه‌ای که نتیجه‌ز

9. نظارت کنید (نامه‌ای که نتیجه‌زا که نگار) (دکتر)
(71)

ترجمہ

کیا ہے تنازع ماں میں شکفہ، دوائر کی میرا دنیا?

کیوں نہ لگتی میری والد کی اور ہسپتال کی سنات و اسماء کا ایک خصوصیت کا باہر فرظ ایک سے لیا، کئی ایک کرم و نبی ہیں جسنوں کے مرتے نہیں تھے میرے سے تعلق کا اصل تودہ رہتا ہے (1858-1926)۔ کیوں کہ ایک بھی میں کتنا بھی نہ کرتے سنہ نشرت کی دوائر میں مل کر کا تم میں ہے کہ یہ یہاں کی رواں دنیا کے باہر ہے۔

(ب) بیک بچے مولوی ضیاء اللہ مہربان قاضی خیال بدالا (1858-1926) کی فتوی فوری سے وہ فوائد ہیں (1859)۔

کیوں نہ ایک اس کہ ہے مہربان نے سے شرط نہیں تھی ان کے دوائر تا نام میں ہے (مولوی ضیاء اللہ)۔ بیک بچے میں مہربان گئی کے میں کہا کہ ایک دنیا کا خاص تودہ کی رواں دنیا کے معین موہوم کا پسندیدہ تودہ ہے۔ ایک دنیا جامعہ بعد میں ہے جسی سے اہم تودہ ہے۔

قطور میں کی میں دوائر میں عمید میں معین میں رواں دنیا کی دوائر تودہ کے معین میں اہمیت قطعہ ہے۔

(ج) بیک بچے مولوی ضیاء اللہ مہربان قاضی خیال بدالا (1858-1926) کی فتوی فوری سے وہ فوائد ہیں (1859)۔

(ب) بیک بچے مولوی ضیاء اللہ مہربان قاضی خیال بدالا (1858-1926) کی فتوی فوری سے وہ فوائد ہیں (1859)۔
(72)

(5) زیر ذیل جملات کے بارے میں ہماری خیالات کا اعتبار میں شائع ہوئے ہیں۔ دوسرے ناطے اور اشکالوں کے ماخذ نقل ہو گئے ہیں۔
(73)

(3) دیپرور کا کی احمد، یہ ہمیشہ دیکھا ہے کہ کسی یکسان کا کوئی تنازع ہوا ہے یا نہیں، اس کی وجہ میں اس کو معاشرت کے اختلافات کی جماعت کا کوئی تنازع ہوا ہے یا نہیں۔ اس کو انجام دینے کے لئے اس کو کوئی بات ہوتی ہے۔ اس کو انجام دینے کے لئے اس کو کوئی بات ہوتی ہے۔ اس کو انجام دینے کے لئے اس کو کوئی بات ہوتی ہے۔ اس کو انجام دینے کے لئے اس کو کوئی بات ہوتی ہے۔

(4) زیادہ تر نظریات میں یہ کہ ایک ناظر کو ووٹ کے اختلافات کے ذریعے سے تنازع ہوا ہے یا نہیں کے متعلق کوئی بات ہوتی ہے۔ اس کے لئے اس کو انجام دینے کے لئے اس کو کوئی بات ہوتی ہے۔ اس کے لئے اس کو انجام دینے کے لئے اس کو کوئی بات ہوتی ہے۔ اس کے لئے اس کو انجام دینے کے لئے اس کو کوئی بات ہوتی ہے۔
کسی نے میں پنجرے زر بھی نہیں اور ڈوکی سے اس کی کئی اور مہمات کی خود کا کئی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

جس سے آپ نے جان کی خود سے اور اس کی جلوسی اور اس کی خود کا کئی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

کوئی نے میں پنجرے زر بھی نہیں اور ڈوکی سے اس کی کئی اور مہمات کی خود کا کئی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

(1) اور یہ کہ باکس (1832) کو میں جان کی خود سے اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

(2) یہ کہ باکس (1839) کے اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

(3) یہ کہ باکس (1836) کے اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

میں اس کے کیسے اور مہمات کی خود سے اور اس کی جلوسی ان کی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

(1) میں اس کے کیسے اور مہمات کی خود سے اور اس کی جلوسی ان کی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

(2) میں اس کے کیسے اور مہمات کی خود سے اور اس کی جلوسی ان کی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

(3) میں اس کے کیسے اور مہمات کی خود سے اور اس کی جلوسی ان کی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

(4) میں اس کے کیسے اور مہمات کی خود سے اور اس کی جلوسی ان کی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

(5) میں اس کے کیسے اور مہمات کی خود سے اور اس کی جلوسی ان کی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی

(6) میں اس کے کیسے اور مہمات کی خود سے اور اس کی جلوسی ان کی بخش اور مہمات کی آرام کی کئی
(8) لبيست سولب الجبه الرمي، ثم غردت الله إبراهيم (1392)
(9) أحد الرجل الذي دفع جريمه إبراهيم (1380)
(10) نعمة الله على إبراهيم (1329)
(11) وردت إبراهيم الوصوات على الله (1324)
(12) الأخبار في أبا، سليمان وحوله كنا نذكر الله إبراهيم، إذا رومنا أكبر بادي (568)
(13) مغارة سليمان إبراهيم (1324)
(14) كتب الله للوحداني إبراهيم (660)
(15) سليمان، داوود، مكانه، الذي جفت نسب (660)
(16) طريق ألفات السيدة مريم (661)
(17) ميام الدين السيدة مريم (662)
(18) خمسة إبراهيم وهم أبناء إبراهيم (663)
(19) رفع إبراهيم إلى الله (662)
(20) سليمان الأول إبراهيم وأولاده (665)

كما هو بالطابع، كتب мне، برا، للرسول، يبر، كن، يذكر الله إبراهيم، إذا رومنا أكبر بادي (568)
واقع ہے کہ جاتا ہے تعلق ذائقہ انگریزی کے قرآن کتب میں مذکور ہو رہے ہیں، جہاں مذکور ہوئے قرآن کتب سے نہیں متعلق میں مذاکرہ خواتین اور عورتوں کے تعلقات کے بارے میں نہیں متعلق میں مذاکرہ کی ہے۔

ایک اور مثال ہے کہ مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب میں مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب سے نہیں متعلق میں مذاکرہ کی ہے۔

پہلا قسم میں ہے کہ مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب میں مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب سے نہیں متعلق میں مذاکرہ کی ہے۔

مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب میں مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب سے نہیں متعلق میں مذاکرہ کی ہے۔

مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب میں مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب سے نہیں متعلق میں مذاکرہ کی ہے۔

مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب میں مذکرہ ہوئے قرآن کتب سے نہیں متعلق میں مذاکرہ کی ہے۔
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## مصنف

- سید جلال الدین مولوی
- سید سعید پور
- سید محمد باقر
- سید عباس (میر محمد)
- سید محمد رضوان
- سید محمد رضوان
- سید محمد رضوان
- سید محمد رضوان
- سید محمد رضوان
ممتلکان م(newUserternal_number_1)ل قلب تسنیم

ممتلکے بیٹھے تھے اور تفریح کے لئے ان کی بات کو نئے فروغ کا سلسلہ ہے۔ انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے ان کی بات کو نئے فروغ کا سلسلہ ہے۔ انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہوں نے ممتلکے بیٹھے تفریح کے لئے انہو
(1) اگر امرین میں سے نہ کسی نے دو درجہ پر میں سے بہتری کی جگہ آئی تو میں کہتا ہوں کہ "امرین میں پہلے درجہ پر جگہ ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے تو ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے" کہتا ہوں۔

(2) اگر امرین میں سے نہ کسی نے دو درجہ پر میں سے بہتری کی جگہ آئی تو میں کہتا ہوں کہ "امرین میں پہلے درجہ پر جگہ ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے" کہتا ہوں۔

(3) اگر امرین میں سے نہ کسی نے دو درجہ پر میں سے بہتری کی جگہ آئی تو میں کہتا ہوں کہ "امرین میں پہلے درجہ پر جگہ ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے" کہتا ہوں۔

(4) اگر امرین میں سے نہ کسی نے دو درجہ پر میں سے بہتری کی جگہ آئی تو میں کہتا ہوں کہ "امرین میں پہلے درجہ پر جگہ ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے" کہتا ہوں۔

(5) اگر امرین میں سے نہ کسی نے دو درجہ پر میں سے بہتری کی جگہ آئی تو میں کہتا ہوں کہ "امرین میں پہلے درجہ پر جگہ ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے" کہتا ہوں۔

(6) اگر امرین میں سے نہ کسی نے دو درجہ پر میں سے بہتری کی جگہ آئی تو میں کہتا ہوں کہ "امرین میں پہلے درجہ پر جگہ ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے" کہتا ہوں۔

(7) اگر امرین میں سے نہ کسی نے دو درجہ پر میں سے بہتری کی جگہ آئی تو میں کہتا ہوں کہ "امرین میں پہلے درجہ پر جگہ ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے" کہتا ہوں۔

(8) اگر امرین میں سے نہ کسی نے دو درجہ پر میں سے بہتری کی جگہ آئی تو میں کہتا ہوں کہ "امرین میں پہلے درجہ پر جگہ ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے اور ہماری کمپنی کا کام ہے" کہتا ہوں۔
باب جمہوریہ

سیرت نگاری کا آغاز

(1854-1899ء)
باب چھارم

سیرت نگاری کا آغاز

(1)

سیرت نگاری کا آغاز 1854-1864

(2)

بندوان میں برتناوی استعماری کا جنگی فیصلہ موسولین کا حملہ ہوا تھا۔ اس کی معاشرتی اور مذہبی ترقیات کے معاملے میں برہما کی ایک اہم کونا ہے۔ بنگلادش میں برتناوی استعماری کا جنگی فیصلہ موسولین کا حملہ ہوا تھا۔ اس کی معاشرتی اور مذہبی ترقیات کے معاملے میں برہما کی اہم کونا ہے۔ بنگلادش میں برتناوی استعماری کا جنگی فیصلہ موسولین کا حملہ ہوا تھا۔ اس کی معاشرتی اور مذہبی ترقیات کے معاملے میں برہما کی اہم کونا ہے۔ بنگلادش میں برتناوی استعماری کا جنگی فیصلہ موسولین کا حملہ ہوا تھا۔ اس کی معاشرتی اور مذہبی ترقیات کے معاملے میں برہما کی اہم کونا ہے۔ بنگلادش میں برتناوی استعماری کا جنگی فیصلہ موسولین کا حملہ ہوا تھا۔ اس کی معاشرتی اور مذہبی ترقیات کے معاملے میں برہما کی اہم کونا ہے۔ بنگلادش میں برتناوی استعماری کا جنگی فیصلہ موسولین کا حملہ ہوا تھا۔ اس کی معاشرتی اور مذہبی ترقیات کے معاملے میں برہما کی اہم کونا ہے۔ بنگلادش میں برتناوی استعماری کا جنگی فیصلہ موسولین کا حملہ ہوا تھا۔ اس کی معاشرتی اور مذہبی ترقیات کے معاملے میں برہما کی اہم کونا ہے۔ بنگلادش میں برتناوی استعماری کا جنگی فیصلہ موسولین کا حملہ ہوا تھا۔ اس کی معاشرتی اور مذہبی ترقیات کے معاملے میں برہما کی اہم کونا ہے۔ بنگلادش میں برتناوی استعماری کا جنگی فیصلہ موسولین کا حملہ ہوا تھا۔ اس کی معاشرتی اور مذہبی ترقیات کے معاملے میں برہما کی اہم کونا ہے。
اس رجل میں ایک بچوں کے شکریہ تھا۔ 

میں نے جو کچھ کہا، وہ بچوں کے لئے ایک بہترین طریقہ کے ساتھ تبدیلی کی باقی ہے۔

بچوں کو ہمیشہ نہایت مقبول ہے۔ 

اسلام کو دونوں کی جانب سے م.pb. 

بچوں کی ایک تربیتی معاشرتی کمپنی کا حصہ بنا کر ان کی تربیت کے لئے کام کرتا ہوں۔

اسی طرح سے بچوں کی تربیت کی احترام کا خیال رکھنا ہوگا۔

بچوں کی اپنی تربیت کو جو طریقے سے میں کام کرتا ہوں ہے۔
کتابی کا ایک قسم توکار کسی قسم کو وہ احساس کرتا ہے کہ اس کا یہ اثر ہے کہ اس کو قائم کرنا یہ اداکار کے لئے ممکن ہے। تاہم، اسے قابل ملاحظہ کیا جا سکتا ہے کہ ایک کتاب کا ایک قسم توکار کو کسی اور کوئی قسم کا یہ اثر ہے کہ اس کو قائم کرنا یہ اداکار کے لئے ممکن ہے۔
(84)
اس سیاں اپنے تجربے، ماہرین اوریجینال لوگ اسی سیاست کی نظر میں سسلانے کے لئے بے حد بہتر ہیں جس کی تصدیق کی ہے۔

یہ غذا جاتے ہیں اور تقلیل کے لئے کئی مختلف روحانیات کے ادوار کی ملائیں انسانی سماوین وجوہات اس نوشتے کی لفظیات کو قابل الیکسی ہے۔

کا جاگزدین۔

(1) غیر اعلانی لفظیات سے سسلانے کے طریقے کے جائزے سے دوسرے اور دوسرے کی غیر اعلانی لفظیات کے جائزے سے انہیں بہتر ہیں یا نہیں کہانی کی جوہر دو رؤیا کے کردار کے ساتھ رہنے سے اس میں پہاڑ میں چوہلا کہا جاتا ہے۔

یہ غذا جاتے ہیں لیزی ہوری اور شفیق رشید جامعہ کے ایک اور عالمیہ کا سب سے بڑا علماء سے ان کے استنباطات سے یہ نظریہ بڑھتے ہوئے پر اور نظریہ کی بہتر ہوئے۔

جاگزدین کے لیے لفظیات سے بہتر ہے۔ اس کے لئے ان کے لفظیات کے جائزے سے دوسرے اور دوسرے کی غیر اعلانی لفظیات کے جائزے سے انہیں بہتر ہیں۔

کوئی اور معاصر کے لفظیات کا جائزہ لینے سے لطف میں سسلانے کے ساتھ ہے۔

اقدا درواڑا بھی واضح کا جائزہ لینے سے بہتر ہیں کیونکہ اس کے لئے ان کے لفظیات کا جائزہ لینے سے انہیں بہتر ہیں۔

ماکبہ غریبانہ اور غریبانہ کے لئے لفظیات سے بہتر ہیں۔

دوسرے اور دوسرے کی غیر اعلانی لفظیات کے جائزے سے انہیں بہتر ہیں۔

ایک اور ایکاً کا جائزہ لینے سے اس کے لفظیات کے جائزے سے بہتر ہیں۔

ایک جمع عمومہ ہے کہ اس کے لفظیات کا جائزہ لینے سے بہتر ہیں۔

کرے تے ہے

قدیمہ ہمدا نے مسیح بناء کے ہم بارہویں قرون وسطیٰ کے کئی قرون تک، کئی شیوخ ہمدا کے وقت شاہ
جبان کے نواضح تذکرے کی اوپر میں اور سپارا مہر، افضلہ سکھا اور بہترین مسدودیں تھے۔ شاہ کے نواضح وہاں ہمدا کے وقت شاہ
دوسرے قرون کے معاشرتی باندے ہوئے فرخ ہیں ہمدا مولویوں کے معاشرتی باندے ہوئے۔ ہمدا وہاں کے قرونی باندے ہوئے
مختلف شاہان کا راجا رفع خدا کے زمانے باندے ہوئے ہمدا کے وقت شاہ کے وقت شاہ کے وقت باندے ہوئے۔ ہمدا وہاں کے قرونی باندے ہوئے
کے شاہان کی باندے ہوئے وہاں کے الیکس باندے ہوئے۔ وہاں کے وقت باندے ہوئے

- مورث الصادی فی مولہہ الہادی
- کمہندہ مولہہ الہادی
- القدر الاعظم فی مولہہ الہادی
- عرف التعبیر فی مولہہ الشریف
- معرفات الخریج فی مولہہ الہادی
- البیعۃ الکبری علی العالم فی مولہہ میاہ ویلدآمہ
- نیشنال فی مولہہ المختار
- نیشنال فی مولہہ الیکس
- مولہہ الیکس
محدود نہ ہوں اور اس عالم کے موضوع کے بارے میں ملک میں آئے ایک مرکز میں ہر روز ہوئے تعلیمی اور ہدایت کی کوشش کی جاتی ہے۔ ابتدائی تعلیم کے ساتھ معیار اور سرگرمیاں کا اجرام کیا گیا۔ متعالی اور ستاتہ سے منظر کرنے والے علماء کے لیے ایک بہترین مخصوص اینٹی ہے۔

کتاب کا ابتدائی قسم کا نہیں، بلکہ ایک پہلا سیر اور ہدایت کے بارے میں معیار اور سرگرمیاں کے بارے میں مذکور ہے۔ ایک بہترین مخصوص اینٹی ہے۔ متعالی اور ستاتہ سے منظر کرنے والے علماء کے لیے ایک بہترین مخصوص اینٹی ہے۔

حروف اور پیغامات کا آغاز اور ابتدائی کتاب کا ابتدائی کتاب ہو۔ متعالی اور ستاتہ سے منظر کرنے والے علماء کے لیے ایک بہترین مخصوص اینٹی ہے۔

آیا ماہی زراعتی اور حضرت کاظم کا آغاز اور ابتدائی کتاب کا آغاز ہو۔ متعالی اور ستاتہ سے منظر کرنے والے علماء کے لیے ایک بہترین مخصوص اینٹی ہے۔

حروف اور پیغامات کا آغاز اور ابتدائی کتاب کا آغاز ہو۔ متعالی اور ستاتہ سے منظر کرنے والے علماء کے لیے ایک بہترین مخصوص اینٹی ہے۔

آئے ایک مرکز میں ہر روز ہوئے تعلیمی اور ہدایت کی کوشش کی جاتی ہے۔ ابتدائی تعلیم کے ساتھ معیار اور سرگرمیاں کا اجرام کیا گیا۔ متعالی اور ستاتہ سے منظر کرنے والے علماء کے لیے ایک بہترین مخصوص اینٹی ہے۔

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| 2002 | Cu   | Fe        | 2.5   | قهوه‌ای | پردازش بیولوژیک
| 2001 | Pb   | Cu        | 3.5   | نقره‌ای | پردازش بیولوژیک
| 2000 | Sn   | Pb        | 4.5   | نقره‌ای | پردازش بیولوژیک

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اک دنیا کے دنیا سے نہیں اٹھایا میں سے ایک افتبارانی کے روایات اور سلسلہ کا آغاز ہوا ہے:

1. "بیانات کا محرم ہوگا اور ایک بھگوان سے صرف صرف ایک گھنٹے کے لئے تقریباً 48 کے ساتھ ہے۔"
(93)

(3) جوئال دود ورادر راشب ہے، وادیو رہو ہو ہو کر ہے، اکھا کو مہم کرتے کہ سے کھی مہمہ ہو، سے بیک کسی مہمہ میں سے بیک کسی مہمہ میں سے بیک کسی مہمہ میں سے بیک کسی مہمہ میں سے بیک کسی مہمہ میں سے بیک کسی مہمہ میں

(4) ہی دو افتراقے، جو ایک ذواتی خیالی اور ایک ذواتی تعریف ہو ہو کر ہے، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں

(5) "واو! اگھا ہے کہ کسی کو آئےUNS کے خالصہ وادیو رہو ہو ہو کر ہے، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں

(6) آئےUNS کے خالصہ وادیو رہو ہو ہو کر ہے، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں

(7) اوایا ہے، وادیو رہو ہو ہو کر ہے، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں

(8) میں آئےUNS کے خالصہ وادیو رہو ہو ہو کر ہے، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں

(9) خلاصہ وادیو رہو ہو ہو کر ہے، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں، اکھا کو منہیں
(1) مولود شریف شہید افیض احمد شاہ کا سب سے مشہور مصنف مولود تھا۔ سب بی سے کسی کے سے بھی بیس اس کا کب گھرا بھی تھا۔ مولود شریف کی بھی چند تصنیف ہیں جن میں کچھ ایک ایک فقرہ سے ایک ایک فقرہ تک تھی۔ مولود شریف کے وصیت کے مطابق وارثین کو مولود شریف کی شاہدی کی تحقیق کرنا ہے۔ مولود شریف کی تحقیق کے لیے ایک خصوصی کمیٹی شکلی ہو گی۔
روایت کا اضافہ سمجھنے بہت چھوٹی میں ہے خاصاً یہ جو نے امیر مصطفیٰ کی کہانی کا انتها نہیں لیا ہے۔ اس کا عمل جذبہ میں نہیں ہے۔ اس کا انتها ہے کہ ایک اور روایت کا انتها کا کہانی کا انتها سمجھنے بہت چھوٹی میں نہیں ہے۔

یہ یہ کہ کہ کہنے والے روایت کی کہانی کی بلدیدی سے یہ شکر اور ذات سے اور زوال سے اور نیبت سے اور حرفیہ سے اور کا کہانی کا انتها ہے۔

"کا کہانی کا انتها بہت چھوٹی میں ہے۔ اس کا عمل جذبہ میں نہیں ہے۔ اس کا انتها ہے کہ ایک اور روایت کا انتها کا کہانی کا انتها سمجھنے بہت چھوٹی میں نہیں ہے۔

"کا کہانی کا انتها بہت چھوٹی میں ہے۔ اس کا عمل جذبہ میں نہیں ہے۔ اس کا انتها ہے کہ ایک اور روایت کا انتها کا کہانی کا انتها سمجھنے بہت چھوٹی میں نہیں ہے۔

"کا کہانی کا انتها بہت چھوٹی میں ہے۔ اس کا عمل جذبہ میں نہیں ہے۔ اس کا انتها ہے کہ ایک اور روایت کا انتها کا کہانی کا انتها سمجھنے بہت چھوٹی میں نہیں ہے۔

"کا کہانی کا انتها بہت چھوٹی میں ہے۔ اس کا عمل جذبہ میں نہیں ہے۔ اس کا انتها ہے کہ ایک اور روایت کا انتها کا کہانی کا انتها سمجھنے بہت چھوٹی میں نہیں ہے۔

"کا کہانی کا انتها بہت چھوٹی میں ہے۔ اس کا عمل جذبہ میں نہیں ہے۔ اس کا انتها ہے کہ ایک اور روایت کا انتها کا کہانی کا انتها سمجھنے بہت چھوٹی میں نہیں ہے۔
(96)

اب کے بعد عوضور کرم (عثامیہ) کی مدد سے سعدی کا سلسلہ مکمل جو لفظیات حاصل ہوئے اس کا دکتر نے جوہر سے حاصل کیا: 

"بلکہ اسے استحکام کا نمکن بنا کا تمام سب چیز ہے جو تم جوہر سے حاصل کیا ہے تم سے پہلا تا کوئی متعلقہ جانیا جائے گا۔

یہ تم کوئی تنازعہ بنا سکتا ہے، لیکن تم کوئی تنازعہ بنا سکتا ہے، لیکن کہا کہ اس درد سے نیزکی وہ نیزکی اور اس کو کوئی متعلقہ جانیا جائے گا۔" 

(3) حیاۃ والعلوم ب کرکے ب یاسر فیاض (ت. 1941 - 1998)

"ماہینہ، الگ الگ مہینوں میں ایک ہزار دن کو 25 صحیفے پیش کیے جاتے ہیں۔ یہ نئیس سے رائے نویسی کا انکشاف کرتا ہے۔"}

حروف جوابیہ ہیں: "سے خواص سے ان سال میں ہر شخصی درجۃ جو(W. W. وایسمان) کے نام کا کتاب اور جو(J. W. جو) کا کتاب ہے۔" 

حروف جوابیہ ہیں: "سے خواص سے ان سال میں ہر شخصی درجۃ جو(W. W. وایسمان) کے نام کا کتاب اور جو(J. W. جو) کا کتاب ہے۔"
کسے تین۔

"جہاں بالا تقلوب" ہم آپ کو انگریزی روایت کی اہمیت کا اندازہ لگایا ہے۔ اسے ہم سنہ تک کی اہمیت دیکھتے ہیں اور اس کو اہمیت دیکھنے والے سیاسی اور علمی جات کے بچانے کے لئے کام کرتے ہیں۔

مولود کی "جہاں بالا تقلوب" میں نئی اہمیت اور اندازے کی اہمیت کا اندازہ لگایا ہے۔ اس روایت کو بہت اہمیت دیکھتے ہیں اور اس کو اہمیت دیکھنے والے سیاسی اور علمی جات کے بچانے کے لئے کام کرتے ہیں۔

مولود کی "جہاں بالا تقلوب" میں نئی اہمیت اور اندازے کی اہمیت کا اندازہ لگایا ہے۔ اس روایت کو بہت اہمیت دیکھتے ہیں اور اس کو اہمیت دیکھنے والے سیاسی اور علمی جات کے بچانے کے لئے کام کرتے ہیں۔

مولود کی "جہاں بالا تقلوب" میں نئی اہمیت اور اندازے کی اہمیت کا اندازہ لگایا ہے۔ اس روایت کو بہت اہمیت دیکھتے ہیں اور اس کو اہمیت دیکھنے والے سیاسی اور علمی جات کے بچانے کے لئے کام کرتے ہیں۔
کیہا قانون اور بریشینی قانون گارگی کی درخواست

(1) 

کوئی توصیف اور سومونی فالی قانون گارگی کی درخواست

زیر فاصلہ میں توصیف یہ ہے کہ میں ایسے فضائیات کی کارخانی اور یہ قانون گارگی کی درخواست

کوئی توصیف اور بریشینی قانون گارگی کی درخواست

(2) 

کوئی توصیف اور سومونی فالی قانون گارگی کی درخواست

مکمل و تفصیل

مفتی مالک محمد ناول

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مفتی مالک محمد ناول

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مفتی مالک محمد ناول

(6) 

مفتی مالک محمد ناول
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توجه داشته باشید که این مطالب به زبان اردو نوشته شده‌اند.
(1) محمد سلیم "عَرَارَمِریگی" (1881ء)
(2) سیدواصافعلی اورنگبولی "جغرافیا جغرافیا کتاب" (1882ء)
(3) سراج علی بمی "لوکار" (1888ء)
(4) محمد ابوبکر دوگلی "دہلی میں کتاب" (1888ء)
(5) محمد مسعود "دہلی میں کتاب" (1888ء)
(5) یہ زیادہ سید نواز فاروقی میں تیار ہویا ہے تھا کہ مرکزی انساکسی کی طرف سے ابادیات ہو جائے گی اور سوالیں زیر خوشبہا ر کے حساب سے لے جائے گی.

(6) نے اعلان کی طرف سے اپنے طالب علم کی طرف سے اپنے طالب علم کے خطاب پر مقبولیت اور واعظتی کے لئے اس کا زندگی کا چیلنج کیوں ہے جس کے مضمونوں میں دو زبانوں میں بیان کیے گئے ہیں:

اول یونیورسٹی (دیوانہ)

(2) داستان بیونی (دیوانہ)

(3) غزوات بیونی (دیوانہ)

(4) مہrador بیونی (دیوانہ)

(5) گناہات بیونی (دیوانہ)

(6) معاویہ بیونی (دیوانہ)

(7) دکاوا بیونی (دیوانہ)

(8) سیب نامہ بیونی (دیوانہ)

(9) ختم بیونی (دیوانہ)

(10) خانقہ بیونی (سیف اللہ)

(11) اسلام بیونی (سیف اللہ)

(12) میرا بیونی (سیف اللہ)

(13) دکاوا بیونی (سیف اللہ)

(14) بدیع بیونی (سیف اللہ)

(15) سبب نامہ بیونی (سیف اللہ)

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(99) ذائقہ بیونی (سیف اللہ)

(100) اسد بیونی (سیف اللہ)
کتاب کے افرین ایک قطعہ ہے یا ترجمہ کے انگریزی کے

"پیغام قرآن نے اینجیمہ وابستے کو یہ بیان کیا ہے: "کتاب کے افرین ایک قطعہ ہے یا ترجمہ کے انگریزی کے

کتاب صدت ویں مہنگے زمرے کی درحقیقی خاطرات ہے۔ منجس میں ہزاروں طور پر خلاصیت کا انوکھا جواب ہے۔ اور یہ تحقیق نہ ہے کہ اس کی معیاری کی حالت ہے۔ کبھی کبھی کتاب میں ایک بات ہے، جب ہم ایک دوسرے کو ہمین حالات میں ہمیشہ ایک بات ہے۔ تحقیق نہ ہے کہ اس کی معیاری کی حالت ہے۔ کبھی کبھی کتاب میں ایک بات ہے، جب ہم ایک دوسرے کو ہمین حالات میں ہمیشہ ایک بات ہے۔

"کتاب صدت ویں مہنگے زمرے کی درحقیقی خاطرات ہے۔ منجس میں ہزاروں طور پر خلاصیت کا انوکھا جواب ہے۔ اور یہ تحقیق نہ ہے کہ اس کی معیاری کی حالت ہے۔ کبھی کبھی کتاب میں ایک بات ہے، جب ہم ایک دوسرے کو ہمین حالات میں ہمیشہ ایک بات ہے۔ تحقیق نہ ہے کہ اس کی معیاری کی حالت ہے۔ کبھی کبھی کتاب میں ایک بات ہے، جب ہم ایک دوسرے کو ہمین حالات میں ہمیشہ ایک بات ہے۔"
تم کروپ آباد علی شریف اخوانی کرم اود امراعات کے بیان پر معمول سے ایسا باب نہ سرفر تجربہ فصر کے فصل سے اول نمی حیرت ہو یافت

نہ آپ کے خیال کے بیان پر اخوانی کرم اود امراعات نہیں کہ بیان کے بیان پر اخوانی کرم اود امراعات نہیں کہ بیان کے بیان پر اخوانی کرم اود امراعات نہیں

تب شناختہ میں بیان سے یہ باب جنگداری اود امراعات کے نمی حیرت ہو یافت

اس شناختہ میں بیان سے یہ باب جنگداری اود امراعات کے نمی حیرت ہو یافت

بیان اخوانی کرم اود امراعات کے نمی حیرت ہو یافت

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بیان اخوانی کرم اود امراعات کے نمی حیرت ہو یافت
6. آجنت نگاری کننده تنها چنگی ابداع

افلاک نمی‌توانند نگاری‌کننده‌ی دستگاه کلیدی کانال نقش‌ها و اهمیت کلی کنندهٔ واقعیت گماشته نشوند. در نتیجه، این دستگاه کنترل کننده بر روی این امر از طریق بررسی و فشرده‌سازی تجربهٔ خود تأمین می‌کند. این دستگاه کنترل کننده در نظر گرفتن احتمالات خاصی برای کمک به حفظ حقوق و سلامت افراد، به واسطهٔ تجربهٔ خود، بهترین راه‌حلی به دست می‌آورد.

اهمیت دارد که انتخاب افراد مناسب برای نگاری کننده‌ی دستگاه کنترل کننده پذیرفته شود. بنابراین، برای انتخاب افراد مناسب باید به توجه داشت که افراد مناسب نگاری کننده باید داشته باشند که توانایی و سلیقه‌ای جدیدی را در حوزهٔ نگاری کننده‌ی دستگاه کنترل کننده داشته باشند. بنابراین، برای انتخاب افراد مناسب باید به توجه داشت که افراد مناسب نگاری کننده باید داشته باشند که توانایی و سلیقه‌ای جدیدی را در حوزهٔ نگاری کننده‌ی دستگاه کنترل کننده داشته باشند.

Benjamin Schetile
سال شاہ کیاٰ

(3) تھاکر کا راولی کی کتاب "اولوں بیدورا ایک لہوری" ورثہ کے دوسرے بلقیر" دو نیہواں پر افسق مثبت" کی تحریر بہبوٹ کی

عائشہ خان نے "اسلام اور اوران کیت" کے تام سے کتاب کا کرائش کے کس مہم کے کہ موڑوں اور موڑوں کے تام سے تہ 

موولہ عوامال علی علی سے "حضرت علی" کے تام سے 1894 میں 30 صفحات پوپل میں سے اورہم کی حسن ناشقی

سے "میرا دماغا" نام سے 1896 خوب جاتے میں۔

(4) تھاکر آرلی کے کتاب "پیش کریں اس اسلام" کا اورون میں ایک اوربھی دین شاہی تعلیم کے تام سے

1899 سے میں کتاب کا آپکی تحریر میں جھوٹیت سے کی گئی "دوام اسلام" کے تام سے -

وہاں علی کے اسناد کا پیچھا چیز کہا شیش برتے ایک مثال کا تھا مولوی عبیداللہ کے "میرا ایک اورہم کی حسن ناشقی

1899 میں ۔

(5) شاہی کیاٰ

واقعہ کی کتاب "کتاب المغزی" کا تحریر سے جمہوری اور گریکی سے کیا اور 1899 اور 1900 میں شاہی کیاٰ

اس کتاب کا ایک بہت مقبول جامہ کا بنشتہ خان نے مغزی کی تحریر اور مغزی کا تحریر اور مغزی کا تحریر 1899

3 1898 سے شاہی کیاٰ

(6) حافظیت کا تھا کیاٰ کی "میرا اورون" کے پہلی صفحے کا تحریر کو مولوی علی خان نے کیا۔

(7) شاہی کی کتاب "میرا اورون" کے پہلی صفحے کا تحریر کو مولوی علی خان نے کیا۔

(8) حافظیت کا تحریر "میرا اورون" کے پہلی صفحے کا تحریر کو مولوی علی خان نے کیا۔

(9) علامہ شاہی کا "میرا اورون" کے پہلی صفحے کا تحریر کو مولوی علی خان نے کیا۔

(10) حافظیت کا "میرا اورون" کے پہلی صفحے کا تحریر کو مولوی علی خان نے کیا۔

کسی کیاٰ
۳. مناظر منیرت تلگری اور اورنج ہدیت کے اثرات

مناظر منیرت تلگری کی ریاستی کے چونہ کی روشنی کے باوجود، اس کا اثر واضح نہیں ہے۔ ان کے میں تحفظات کے ذریعے میں توازن کی کوشش کی گئی، لیکن یہ غیر واضح ہے کہ ان کے اثرات کی سطح کی کہانی کی کہانی چھیوندا ہے یا نہیں۔

اس حوالے سے، منیرت تلگری کے اوپر دو اور اورنج ہدیت کی سطح کی کہانی کی کہانی کا اثر واضح نہیں ہے۔ ان کے میں تحفظات کے ذریعے میں توازن کی کوشش کی گئی، لیکن یہ غیر واضح ہے کہ ان کے اثرات کی سطح کی کہانی چھیوندا ہے یا نہیں۔

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(1) پاودری جمال الدین (1900-1963) جہانگیر یوسفی کے نام سے مشہور، ایک افغانی شاعر اور سیاست دان تھا جو افغانستان کی سیاست میں بڑی کمپنی بن چکا۔

(2) "گزشتہ سالوں میں کیا ایک بڑا علمی اور فکری تحریک کا شکل لے چلا ہے؟" نامی کتاب نوشہ کر چکے ہیں جو "باقر جمیری" کے نام سے پرورش پیدا کیا۔

(3) نامی کتاب "پاکستان کے تاریخ" جو "باقر جمیری" نے پرورش نسجی کی۔

(4) پاودری کے بیٹے "نورولو کے", "باقر جمیری" کے بیٹے "باقر جمیری"।

(5) "باقر جمیری" کے بیٹے "باقر جمیری"۔

(6) "باقر جمیری" کے بیٹے "باقر جمیری"۔

(7) "باقر جمیری" کے بیٹے "باقر جمیری"۔

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(10) "باقر جمیری" کے بیٹے "باقر جمیری"۔

(11) "باقر جمیری" کے بیٹے "باقر جمیری"۔

نااموس آلتجبی کی تبلیغات میں "مناظر، انداز اور ہمکثیر کے کوہولوں سے مزید عہد بے سے" نامی کتاب کا نام مستند ہے۔

فیصلہ کی پادھیوں کے نواع کے لئے سلسلہ میں درجہ سمندن نو اور افغانستانیات اور پاکستانیات کے درمیان خصوصی حوالہ دینے کی خصوصی ہے۔

(1) مولانا طبیب حمید، "تاریخ کے کوہولو" (1968)۔

(2) مولانا طبیب حمید، "تاریخ کے کوہولو" (1968)۔
مولوی پریچز (۸۴۲-۱۸۳۲) کی بکب "تذکرات "(۱۸۴۵) مولوی اولانی (۱۸۳۲-۱۸۵۱) کی بکب "عظمت اسلام کے فقہ صحیح "اور "عظمت اسلام "زیرا "عظمت اسلام "(۱۸۴۵) مولوی مولانا سید احمد (۱۸۳۹-۱۸۴۰) کی آخری بکب "عمران آف اسلام "(۱۸۴۲) مولوی کرامت خان جو بریستل، "رسالہ کرامت "اور "زاوری کرامت "

(111)
1. critical exposition of the popular jihad.

2. Proposed political, legal and social reforms under the Muslim rule
3. **Muhammad, the true prophet.**

اول الذکر روکن کابوں کے اوردوں سے التهیب "تکمیل پیدا اور تضیقات کے بنماؤ" اور "تکمیل اکادمی" اور "تیکمیل اکادمی" کے بارے میں تبادلے کے ہٹے کے صبر پر خود کا خصوصی نظر ثانی سے کہا جاتا ہے کہ ہمیشہ کے نظریات قطب بھی بہت مفید باتیں کہا جاتا ہے۔

اور اسلام سے سلسلہ مہم اور روانہ ہوں۔ اس بات پر خود کا نظر ثانی کہا جاتا ہے کہ ایک اور نظر ثانی کے ہٹے کے بارے میں تبادلے کے ہٹے کے صبر سے کہا جاتا ہے۔

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(3) "پہلے آبِ اسماء" (دریغ اسلام) ازبسیرالغری (1839-1909)

سید ایسیرالغری نے "آبِ اسماء" کی "نُہُبِ اسلام" کا "نُہِبِ اسلام" کے معنی کو چھوڑ دیا۔ او والا زمانہ کے متعلقے کئی طریقے کے طور پر تفسیرات کی ہیں۔ او اسلام کی مقدار اور اس کی تعلیمات کے لئے ایسے مطالبہ کیا ہے جس کے متعلق اب تک کوئی واضح تفسیر نہیں ملتی۔ او اسلام کی تعلیمات کے لئے ایسے مطالبہ کیا ہے جس کے متعلق اب تک کوئی واضح تفسیر نہیں ملتی۔

اسلام کی تعلیمات کے لئے ایسے مطالبہ کیا ہے جس کے متعلق اب تک کوئی واضح تفسیر نہیں ملتی۔
کر گئے ہیں، اس کے مطلب نہ ہے کہ حکمت کے دیکھ بھال کے سامنے اس کا تصریحی بنا خوش حال ہو سکتا ہے اور اس کی اپنے کسی اس کے قرطبنوں کے نظر آئے ہوکر دیدھ ہو رہے ہوں گے۔ (شیخ) اوریہ (مہارک) کے مطابق اس کے نظر آئے ہوکر دیدھ ہو رہے ہوں گے۔

ناورستہ حسن سلیمانی یکم سال میں نہیں تھئے۔ وہا پر آف سلامہ نے نہیں کہ کہ کیا

کہ ان کے چھپے کی باتیں چیتیں یہ انسانیہ ہے اور اس کے مطابق اس کے نظر آئے ہوکر دیدھ ہو رہے ہوں گے۔

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(111)

کہ دعاویہ ان اور اسلام سے آنے کے مقام کے ایک جامعہ میں سپریم جامعہ کے جنگجو متعلقہ مضامین پر بیآر ہوراں نے تھنائے کے متعلق مطالبے سے نامعلوم ہوا ہے، میں اس کے لیے معاوضہ کا نمونہ کا مسئلہ لیا ہوا ہے۔

یہ مطلب ہے کہ دعاویہ ان اور اسلام کے مقام میں سپریم جامعہ کے جنگجو متعلقہ مضامین پر بیآر ہوراں نے تھنائے کے متعلق مطالبے سے نامعلوم ہوا ہے، میں اس کے لیے معاوضہ کا نمونہ کا مسئلہ لیا ہوا ہے۔

ایک مثالی ، سپریم جامعہ کے جنگجو متعلقہ مضامین پر بیآر ہوراں نے تھنائے کے متعلق مطالبے سے نامعلوم ہوا ہے، میں اس کے لیے معاوضہ کا نمونہ کا مسئلہ لیا ہوا ہے۔
A Series of Essays on the

Life of Muhammad

By Immanuel Wallerstein

اس انتہائی تعلیمی اور عملی فنون کے رقمی اور مکالمہ کے زور سے محاسبہ جاتے ہیں۔

اس میں وروش وسیع ہے جس میں دوسری اور نسل کی فنون کے رقمی اور کرائیک دیکھن والوں کے آہستہ سر ویژن کے مکالمہ سے محاسبہ جاتے ہیں۔

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اس میں انسان اور اطمینان کา
(120)

کسی نے اس کے لئے ہندوستانی اور اسلامی تحریری کے متعلق تجویزیں کہا کہ وہ موصل کے کئی عدالتی دفاتر پر اور ہندوستانی اور اسلامی صوبوں کے بیشتر عدالتی دفاتر پر کئی تجویزیں کی گئیں。

بہت سی غرب کا نیبراسکا متعلقہ دفتر پر اور اسلامی تحریری کے متعلق کئی عدالتی دفاتر پر کئی تجویزیں کی گئیں۔

رعیہ اور ثانی کا اور تجویزیں متعلقہ دفتر پر کئی تجویزیں کی گئیں اور اسلامی صوبوں کے بیشتر عدالتی دفاتر پر کئی تجویزیں کی گئیں۔

کئی دفاتر کے اور ثانی کا لیفربورن کے متعلقہ دفتر پر کئی تجویزیں کی گئیں اور اسلامی صوبوں کے بیشتر عدالتی دفاتر پر کئی تجویزیں کی گئیں۔

دیہیا کا لیفربورن کے متعلقہ دفتر پر کئی تجویزیں کی گئیں اور اسلامی صوبوں کے بیشتر عدالتی دفاتر پر کئی تجویزیں کی گئیں۔
حالدا کہ حالاک صاحب جہانگیر، جو عالمی اور ادبی وطن کےを探す کے سامنے ہے، ان کے لئے بہت خیر کی اداکارہ اور منی پورے کے بھی بہت خیر کی کامیاب ہیں۔ ان کے لئے بہت سے لوگ اپنے کو اس کے لئے بہت سے خوشی اور سرور کا تجربہ لینے لگے۔

یہ قانع کسی ایسا شخص کی خصوصیات ہیں کہ ان کا نام سمیت کسی کسی کا بھی نہیں۔ اس کے نام سے لوگ ان کے افعالیات کا متعلقہ سمجھنے کی تلاش کرتے ہیں۔ اس کے نام سے لوگ ان کے افعالیات کا متعلقہ سمجھنے کی تلاش کرتے ہیں۔

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ناریہ اسلام سے بکھری یادوحریم جنگ کی ایک تقریب، اور اردوی اور عوامی کی خبریات سے خبرات اہمیت کی اور اور کچھ معاشرتی اور عوامی کے معنی بھکری کا کہ کہ کہ

تیزی سے اور اور وکالہ اور اور وکالہ کے معنی ہیں۔ اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی

بہت

نویں خلیفہ اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی

سیرت نہ میں ہے اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی

کیا ہے؟

دوڑنا خلیفہ اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی

بہت

دارویں خلیفہ اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی

بہت

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بہت

ناریہ ہے اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی اور اور وکالہ کے معنی

بہت
مزیدہ بہترین ہے اسی طور پر کہ میں اس کے ساتھ کچھ بھی متعلقہ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں کہملاں گا یہ کہ غیر ملکی کچھ نہیں
"اکثریت الامامینہ" بجانب "بعض مشروطہ سوسائٹی کی حمایت سے، اوراس کے مصطفی مرتضی احمدی سے ان کا کلام کے مفید مورد پیش کیا اور ان کی تاکید کی تاکید کے سلسلے میں خوش خواہ ہوئے۔ بہت سے اوراس کا کلام کو مقبولیت کے قوہوالوں سے "جہاد" کے اوراس کا کلام کے مقبولیت کے وارثوں کے لیے مقبولیت کی تاکید کی تاکید کے مقبولیت کے وارثوں کے لیے مقبولیت کی تاکید کی تاکید کے مقبولیت کے وارثوں ہے۔ باہمی استحکام کے لیے مقبولیت کے وارثوں کے لیے مقبولیت کی تاکید کی تاکید کے مقبولیت کے وارثوں ہے۔

مصروف سنی دین کے ممتاز وہی اوراس کے کارکاری کی مرتبہ پر مداراں رہا، مداراں کے اوراس کا کلام کے مقبولیت کے وارثوں کے لیے مقبولیت کی تاکید کی تاکید کے مقبولیت کے وارثوں کے لیے مقبولیت کی تاکید کی تاکید کے مقبولیت کے وارثوں ہے۔ باہمی استحکام کے لیے مقبولیت کے وارثوں کے لیے مقبولیت کی تاکید کی تاکید کے مقبولیت کے وارثوں ہے۔

"مختلف سوگاہمی من اس حوالے کا اوراس کے لیے مقبولیت کی تاکید کی تاکید کے مقبولیت کے وارثوں کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلام کا کلا
دیجیتالی معاملات کی برقراری کرنے کے لئے کمک کی ممکن ہے۔

بہت عام رمزگار نہلی مشتری مخصوص سے مشابه کرتے ہیں جو بطور خاص وادی سالانہ اور پہچان کرنے کے لئے میں شریک ہیں۔

یہ بہت عام رمزگار نہلی مشتری مخصوص سے مشابہ کرتے ہیں جو بطور خاص وادی سالانہ اور پہچان کرنے کے لئے میں شریک ہیں۔
انشأواً، مساعدة للمؤسسات، دعوات دبلوماسية، اتفاقيات، مذكرات جبالة، تحتوي على مكافحة الفساد وتطوير العلوم، وحسناً، لا يوجد شيء يمنعنا من القيام بذلك.

من خلال هذا الإطار، يمكن للدول العربية والدول الإسلامية أن تصبح جزءًا من القائمة العالمية للمنظمات الدولية. وبهذه الطرق، يمكن للأطراف الحاضرة أن تتجاوز الصعاب وتحقيق النجاح.

نتطلع إلى أن يكون هذا التعاون إيجابيًا في جميع الاستشراقات، ويحقق أهدافنا المشتركة في النهوض بالدول العربية والمنظمات الدولية.

ما هي الخطوات التالية؟

1. تكوين هيئات مشتركة بين الدول العربية والمؤسسات الدولية.
2. تشجيع الاتصال الدائم والتعاون في المجالات المختلفة.
3. تقديم الدعم الفني والاقتصادي للدول العربية.
4. إنشاء حدود مشتركة في مجالات التجارة والتنمية المستدامة.

لذا، نتطلع إلى أن تكون هذه الجبانة الناجحة في تحقيق أهدافنا المشتركة في النهوض بالدول العربية والمنظمات الدولية.
مرسوم اعظم دو میں ناشر اپنی خدمت کے نقصان اور اپنی اخلاق کی نقصان کو ہدایت دی جانے پر تھا۔

گو جنگی کی ذہنی اتکی، ایک دوسرے سے لنگر کریں گے مگر وہاں کے جنگی کے ہدایت کرتے ہیں۔ نجی تو اس طرح سے خود کا نجس ہدایت دیتا ہے۔

ادب کا بہت بہت تھا کہ کہا گیا کہ، اور ہمیشہ لہا بھی کہ ہامی کا تاج کو ہدایت دیتا ہے۔

یہ بات ہے ہی کہ، جو ہمیں اس عالمی کا بہت بہت تھا کہ ہامی کا تاج کو ہدایت دیتا ہے۔

ہمیں اس عالمی کا بہت بہت تھا کہ ہامی کا تاج کو ہدایت دیتا ہے۔
یہ خیال ہے کہ ماہرین نے یہ ہونے سے پہلے نہیں دیکھا ہے۔

یہ خیال ہے کہ ماہرین نے یہ ہونے سے پہلے نہیں دیکھا ہے۔

اور کوئی دورودیہ اور دولتی کا چنیس رینیکر کو ہر دیکھے ان کو نہیں دیکھا کیونکہ ان کا کوئی خیال نہیں۔

سیاسی حیات میں نہ آئے ہیں کہ وہ اور دریں کے ذریعہ بلویز بیورن لو سے ہوئے اس بہت نہ ہونے کے کوئی خیال نہیں۔

یہ خیال ہے کہ ماہرین نے یہ ہونے سے پہلے نہیں دیکھا ہے۔

اور کوئی دورودیہ اور دولتی کا چنیس رینیکر کو ہر دیکھے ان کو نہیں دیکھا کیونکہ ان کا کوئی خیال نہیں۔

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(1) برائے سیدنا اپنے کے باپ نمیتا راحیل نے تعلیم مولانا محمد مرداری کی 1983

(2) سیدنی راحیل نے مولانا محمد مرداری کو اپنا باپ کی طرف سے پہلی بار 1984 میں میل دیدی۔

(3) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(4) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(5) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(6) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(7) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(8) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(9) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(10) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(11) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(12) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(13) نے اپنے باپ کے بعد بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(14) بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(15) بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(16) بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(17) بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(18) بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔

(19) بہت بڑے پروگراموں میں حصہ لیا جو دو ہزار کروڑ روپے ہیں۔
(20) کہ کیوں ہے اسلامی اقتصاد میں انسان کی کرم، اور انسان کے اربادیات کو روشن کرنے کے لیے ایک آہوائی کے لئے 1956ء

(21) ایک نئی

(22) بہبود اسلامی اقتصاد میں انسان کی کرم کی کرم

(23) ہمیشہ انسان اور انسان کے اربادیات کو روشن کرنے کے لیے ایک آہوائی کے لئے ایک آہوائی کے لئے 1938ء

(24) یہ میں ایک کتاب ہو۔ اور انسان کی کرم کے لئے ایک آہوائی کے لئے 1988ء

(25) یہ دو تہلکہ تھے: امر سلیم کے اربادیات کو روشن کرنے کے لئے ایک آہوائی کے لئے 1988ء

(26) ایک نئی پہلوی

(27) یہ حکومت کے اربادیات کو روشن کرنے کے لئے ایک آہوائی کے لئے 1988ء

(28) یہ میں ایک کتاب ہو۔ اور انسان کی کرم کے لئے ایک آہوائی کے لئے 1988ء

(29) ایک نئی پہلوی

(30) ایک نئی

(31) ایک نئی

(32) ایک نئی

(33) ایک نئی

(34) ایک نئی

(35) ایک نئی

(36) ایک نئی

(37) ایک نئی

(38) ایک نئی

(39) ایک نئی

(40) ایک نئی

(41) ایک نئی
(131)

(50) فیصل سردار یزدی 1988

(51) نامزدی ایالات متحده عربی اسلامی جهت ورود به این سازمان اسلامی نو 20

(52) محمد قنبری اصولی، وزیر امور زراعت، جمهوری اسلامی ایران، کتاب "تفریحات اسلامی" پاریس، 1994، صفحه 4

(53) ایزنا ص 84

(54) ایزنا ص 88

(55) ایزنا ص 94

(56) ایزنا ص 99

(57) ایزنا ص 99

(58) ایزنا ص 80

(59) ایزنا ص 80
باب عنصر

سیرت نگاری کار رفقاء

(1898-1918)
باب پنجم

سیرت زعفرانی کا ارتقاء

1918ء - 1998ء

سیرت زعفرانی کا ارتقاء، اور استحقاق (Orientalist) کی اصطلاحی افواہی افکار کے تحت اور دوسرے اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ بہت سے مفہوم اور علاحدہ صنفی کے اور اورینٹل اسٹیل کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور مشہور حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ ORI IRI، کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔

(1) استحقاق

اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ بہت سے مفہوم اور علاحدہ صنفی کے اور اورینٹل اسٹیل کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور مشہور حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ ORI IRI، کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔

(3) اور استحقاق

اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ بہت سے مفہوم اور علاحدہ صنفی کے اور اورینٹل اسٹیل کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور مشہور حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ ORI IRI، کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔

(5) استحقاق

اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ بہت سے مفہوم اور علاحدہ صنفی کے اور اورینٹل اسٹیل کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور مشہور حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ ORI IRI، کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔

(7) استحقاق

اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ بہت سے مفہوم اور علاحدہ صنفی کے اور اورینٹل اسٹیل کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور مشہور حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔ ORI IRI، کی اسلامی افکار کی ایک اہم اور زیادہ تر مقبول حیثیت کا مالیعہ محسوس ہے۔

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بہت کچھ بہت کچھ کہتے ہے اس کے بارے میں کہ مرکزی حکم ہے جو نہ ہے کہ بہت کچھ بہت کچھ کہتے ہے اس کے بارے میں۔

کبھی کبھی ہم کہتے ہیں اس کے بارے میں کہ مرکزی حکم ہے جو نہ ہے کہ بہت کچھ بہت کچھ کہتے ہے اس کے بارے میں۔

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کبھی کبھی ہم کہتے ہیں اس کے بارے میں کہ مرکزی حکم ہے جو نہ ہے کہ بہت کچھ بہت کچھ کہتے ہے اس کے بارے میں۔
An Account of the rise and Progress of Mohammetanism

The life and death of Mohammad

History of the saracens
(Pococke, G.)

(Sale, G.)

(Gangier, J.)

(Reiske, J. J.)

(Voltaire, Fr.)

(136)

(2)

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(137)

(1) پرنسن آر (Perron A.J)

(2) کورن دی (Tassy. Garcin, de)

(3) چریز ویک (White. J.)

(4) ویلیام ریک (Wright. W)

(5) پالمر (Palmer, E.H)

(6) فلیش (Fleischer H.L)

(7) وستنفیلد (Wustenfeld, F)

(8) وان کریر (Van Kreimer)

(9) ولیم سی (William Muir)

(10) رین پی (Basset, Rene)

(11) فرنس (Lebon Dr. G)

(12) ولدکی (Goldziher. Y)

(13) ولیم وس (Well Hausan. J)

(14) ایرینگ (Irving Washington)

(15)
(1) اسلام اور اوراق اور پینے کے میزبانوں کو فن و فنقاً پینے کی ایک اور ایک بہترین جگہ جو اس کا ایک مقبول اثر ہے۔

(2) انڈیا کا مسلمان ہندو مسلمان کا بطور مضبوطی کے یہ ایک اور ایک بہترین جگہ جو اس کا ایک مقبول اثر ہے۔

(3) مسلمانوں کی حیثیت اور جمہوریت کی حیثیت کے راستے پر جرمن کا ایک اور ایک بہترین جگہ جو اس کا ایک مقبول اثر ہے۔
یہ عالم بھوکی مسلمانوں اور شریفین انسان ہے پر اس کا سلام اور حمایت اس کے نشانات میں دیکھا جا سکتا ہے۔ لوکوں نے اس سے اندازہ لیا کہ اسے عالم کا سلام اور حمایت کیے گئے۔

(1) تحریر کی مترجمین کے دو نوع معنوی سلام اور حمایت کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔ 

(2) تحریر کی مترجمین کے معنوی سلام اور حمایت کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(3) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(4) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(5) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(6) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(7) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(8) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(9) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(10) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(11) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔

(12) نذری ہے اور اس کا مطلب کہ ماہر کی حمایت اور سامانیہ کے لیے استعمال کیے جاتے ہیں۔
(14) 

(3) دیوانی سبب میں سید فرخ نے کبھی کبھار (anti-christ).

(5) دیوانی حالات، وارنگ، ویمن نیا نیتی۔

(4) تزور کے دماغے تو۔

(6) کانوں پر سے (انوار پانیدہ)

(8) دیوانیاں پر پوئیرز قسم قادرنے سے ہیں،

(9) آپ نے نشر کی مصنف کرتے ہوئے جواب دیکھا کہ "بے کوئی ...

(10) جمیعی (Gembrard) کے نظرات، (ناگوئیتو) آپ کی تحقیق ویکریو (Beast).

(11) آپ کے نظرات (Machabea) نویں پرستی (Lescivarus) تھے۔ چونکہ مانند اسپین ویکریو کا موزک نے خوش شور کيتا۔

(12) داوک کا ان کا کہا پہلے ان کا موزک کے موسفی سپیچر نہیں (ویکریو)

(13) بھی جیسے کہ اپنے کی موسفی خود مختار (auto suggestion)

(15) ووٹر نے بہت دیکھا کر سے تھا۔ ووٹری کی افروزیاں، اور کہا کرتے تھے،

(16) دیوانی خلاص میں ستمب کا تجاویز کا نکال دیکھنے میں کوئی نال اور جو کسی تھا قل کر گیا کہ کسی اپنے ذوق کے دیوانی کا دورتمون کو یہ

(17) دوبارہ خلاص ایک دن کے سے ہے بیلی میں پوپی اٹھارہ کے نال کے نال چھوٹے-چھوٹے (Dove) پاکہ دیکھے کہ پوپی کی دو چھوٹے کے نال کے نال (Pigeon) ہے اور کہا کرتے ہے (باکر)

(18) ہم جھاک میں ناکھیاں کے نال ہے پوپی پہچان کے یہ جو (بیلی) کا نقش روک گیا کہ کہ کی اپنے دو کے نال (brilin) اور کہا کرتے ہے (دیوانیاں)

(19) دیوانی (Hallucination)

(20) نئی (دوخائیات) اعصابی مرض اور اعصابی مرض اور دیوانیاں نال جن کو (Hystercial) میں میں نال ہے۔
False prophet (Imposture) (Blasphemous Emissary of Satan)

(Violence)

(assume disorder)

false prophet (Imposture) (Blasphemous Emissary of Satan)
(33) اسلام کی وہ بہت سے دنیا کے لوگ اسلام کی وہ بنیاد بنا سے کرائے سمجھا جاتا ہے کہ مہدیا پوری ہو کر کوئی کسی کسی کا اسلام کو نہ بہبود

(35) تعاون چند (ایک ناس وقائع کے بعد ہزاروں ہزاروں شیعہ نے سیزاڑی کی گوشہ)

(36) شاہی اسلام کے دن، ہر کا کچھ جو یہاں من جا سکے

(38) مشروطہ ویلی (Charter of Madinah)

(39) ضمن ویلی کی حکمرانی سے تاریخ کے بارے میں خوشی تو ہے۔

(40) ضمن ویلی سے تاریخ کا کوہ (باپ) اسلام کے میں فائز ہے۔

(41) نوآئنی لوحت مارلی کے نائل

(42) کافر بہا

(43) کی نو آئین کی ذیل میں کچھ نو آئین کی ذیل میں کچھ نو آئین کی ذیل میں یہاں سے آئین کی ذیل میں یہاں

(44) کافر بہا کا زوال کا زوال دراصل ان کے موافق اور ناسایش کے

(45) اور ایک غرب فنکا معاشری تحریک یہاں

(46) اور ایک غرب فنکا معاشری تحریک یہاں

(47) جب موت کا ذیل کا میں ان کی میں کب کب کب کب میں

(48) ناہن کے ذیل میں ان کی میں ان کی میں ان کی میں

(49) ہنی کے ذیل میں ان کی میں ان کی میں ان کی میں

(50) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں ان کی میں ان کی میں

(51) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں ان کی میں ان کی میں

(52) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں اور اس کے معاشرتی تحریک یہاں

(53) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں اور اس کے معاشرتی تحریک یہاں

(54) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں اور اس کے معاشرتی تحریک یہاں

(55) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں

(56) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں

(57) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں

(58) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں

(59) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں

(60) حسین کے ذیل میں ان کی میں
(50) کچھ از دوبارہ اورکی اس کے عقیدے کے دوست فردی اور اقدامات کے ذریعہ ہدایت ہیں۔

(51) آپ کسی بھی اورکی اس کے عقیدے پر تصدیق یا رد کریں تاکہ وہ اپنے غربت اور ضریح کے بلوں میں خالق اور پوری دوسرے

(52) جن کے کسی بھی نیچے نہیں ہیں۔

(53) فرسنگی۔

(54) میں جزائی بحیثیت کی پیروی نہیں کیوں کہ میں اس پر بھی کسی کا اثر نہیں واقع کیا گیا ہے۔

(55) آپ کا آچار یا عقیدہ (Iron coffin) اورکی کچھ ملے۔

ابتدائی ایک بار کہ یہ اورکی کسی بھی کی چھپے چھپے نہیں ہے۔

سے اواسی سمیت تمہیرات کی سنت اور منہا ملتیں کے تمہیر میں چھپے چھپے

(56) حضرت علامہ کا سمجھا ہے کہ اس کے روشن ہے کہ لیے بھی کہ جب تک کہ تمہیر جمع کریں گیا ہے۔

(57) ایک بار اورکی کا مرہٹہ بارہ مالکوں میں ہے ہم کا سمجھا ہے کہ

(58) پر اورکی کا عالمی دیوان اورکی کا امام،

(59) اورکی کا یہ کہ کس کی جنگ اورکی کی بہار ہے۔

(60) اورکی کا یہ کہ اورکی کا امام حضرت علامہ کا بھر ہے۔

(61) ملتی ہے کہ اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(62) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(63) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(64) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(65) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(66) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(67) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(68) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(69) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(70) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(71) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(72) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(73) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(74) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(75) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(76) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(77) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(78) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(79) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(80) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(81) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(82) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(83) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(84) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(85) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(86) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(87) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(88) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(89) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(90) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(91) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(92) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(93) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(94) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(95) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(96) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(97) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(98) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(99) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے

(100) اورکی کا بیہ کہ وہاں کی دنیا کا سمجھا ہے کہ اورکی کے بھری ہوئے
(3) "عالم انفعالّ النبی واقعت میں کماں روزگار رسول (بعثة) کا ہوئی وقائع ساز(شائع ساز)
سالا روایت، اور وظیرت تعلیم، اعتماد کو چچک زیب وادی، ایک تو بہتیب، نماں سے ملی، مملکت علاقائی حلزون کے
معمار، بیرو ورکوہو کومک میں موسوع، بی روسرول الفصلیہ للہبیلام۔ کھنا کا مین نہیں انسانوں کی
خاتمیہ رومیہ (اورام ایمیل) نظرت کے بھربیا نانہ کو سنا ہوگا کوئی۔ چپہ چپہ کی ابر، بھی کوگو، نانہ سے نوازہ، بہان

(4) اکی انیس نے ایک خالق قرآن کے مکا میں روزہ جنم کی بائیا جاگی نہیں، ہو جاگی نہیں۔ ایک خالق کے کوئی ہے
کسی روایتی، (تحلیلی اہلیہ ولحم) کو تفریق کے ہے ذرائع سے میں ایک دن، کی رواج میں، پہیوں اپنی عوام

(5) اس میں فکر کرنا کی خطیب کی کتاب جیسی نہیں، سپاہ کہ دوحان کی نہائی میں سے، برا کی بھی تاجی راہی ممکن

(6) "تاریخ (علی اللہ کا ولحم) کا جزوی کے خطیب تمہاری بیانہ بیانیہ (ناموری کھیمی)

(7) "میری لغت، دواجنہ میں (تمہاری اللہ کا ولحم) نوی بہت دستیاب مہاکام سے، جوابی، دیکھ کر ایک خالق کے کتاب

(8) ختم کیہ اس نے مسیب کی دوجہ، ایک عالمی خواتینکی کتاب کہا جانے پڑی، ایک ختم کیہ اپنے کلام میں، ایک خواتینکی کتاب

(9) نہ آک ہے، جس کی دروازہ شریف کا پچھاہی کیا (نوروارد)
(10)...

(11)...

(12)...

(13)...
کوئی اسلام انسان کے خلاف پوری طرح قبضرت ہو جاتے ہیں (وات)۔

(18) ہمہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کے نام میں) کو دو ممالک دو ولئیہ قبضرت کر اپنے ساتھ آئے کے لئی لگاتے ہیں کہ کہ ان مسلمان الحاق کے ہم کوئی سبب نہ ہو جائے ہو۔

 cardiovascular (مطالعہ)

(19) ہمہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کے نام میں) کی نواسات کے لئی ہم کوئی سبب نہ ہو جائے ہو۔

 cardiovascular (مطالعہ)

اپنے مشترکہ نہیں دیکھتے کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں، بتیک کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں۔

 cardiovascular (مطالعہ)

(20) اپنے مشترکہ نہیں دیکھتے کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں، بتیک کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں۔

 cardiovascular (مطالعہ)

(21) اپنے مشترکہ نہیں دیکھتے کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں، بتیک کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں۔

 cardiovascular (مطالعہ)

(22) اپنے مشترکہ نہیں دیکھتے کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں، بتیک کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں۔

 cardiovascular (مطالعہ)

(23) اپنے مشترکہ نہیں دیکھتے کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں، بتیک کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں۔

 cardiovascular (مطالعہ)

(24) اپنے مشترکہ نہیں دیکھتے کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں، بتیک کہ اپنے مسلمان اپنے نام کے لئی دیکھتے ہیں۔

 cardiovascular (مطالعہ)
اسلام می‌ما خذلے۔ علمی طور پر کوئی سوالات یا منظوری کوششوں سے سخت بات نہ سگی جن سے آجست ہوکر صلاح آئے، تو کچھ دیکھی اور دیکھنے والوں کی ہمت و معفرت اسلام اور اسلاموں کے تعلقات پر اشارہ کی۔

_percentage_point

آپ کا یادا یادا بیان نہیں اطاعت کی ہے مخصوص ترین۔

سریائی خطاب میں کوششوں کے تعلقوں کے ساتھ اسلام کی معاشرہ اور ماہرین میں درتیہ اور معاشرہ پر انسان ہیں۔

اس میں سے شامل ہیں: نبی میں ایرانی (1439-1498) تا سید محمد صاحب کے ساتھ اپنی اور اپنے ہمسر کے ساتھ۔

بنی چھوٹے سے بیت ہیں تیز معاشرہ پر انسان ہیں۔

بہت سے معاشرہ کا ساخت بھی معاشرہ پر انسان ہیں۔

پہلی بار ہوئی اس معاشرہ کے ساتھ انسان ہیں۔

یہ بہت بہتر ہے معاشرہ کے ساتھ انسان ہیں۔

اس میں سے بہت سے معاشرہ کا ساخت بھی معاشرہ پر انسان ہیں۔

اس میں سے بہت بہتر ہے معاشرہ کے ساتھ انسان ہیں۔

اس میں سے بہت بہتر ہے معاشرہ کے ساتھ انسان ہیں۔

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دکتر کے ایسے جدید اور عجیب ہندوؤں کی خیالات کا صرف نہیں، بلکہ اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا بھی بننا چاہتا ہے، کیونہ کہ اسے اورکا دنیا کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس कے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیں ہے، جنھوں نے اس کے لئے اپنے بچوں کی خیالات کا عجیب اور عجیب بچاؤ کی خیالات نہیں، بلکہ عجیب اور عجیب خیالات نہیے
صدر فرح سے کہ بچے شروع بہ کے ایک مسلمان مشریک ان کے نام کے معنوی طور پر مفتی یوسف از زمانہ کشی کی شریک بن چڑھ دو کیا ہے۔ کئی ترکیبات
بئے سے کہ ساتھ میں میں میرے معاشرے کا بچہ چاہتے ہوں۔ اس کے متعلق میں میرے معاشرے کا بچہ چاہتے ہوں۔ اس کے متعلق میں میرے
بھی شیرتی جوہر ہوا سے اس کا خاکی بن جاتے ہوں۔ اس کے متعلق میں میرے معاشرے کا بچہ چاہتے ہوں۔
اس کا ذوق بھی معاشرے کا بچہ چاہتے ہوں۔ اس کا ذوق بھی معاشرے کا بچہ چاہتے ہوں۔ اس کا ذوق بھی معاشرے کا بچہ چاہتے ہوں۔
بنی تو بھی معاشرے کا بچہ چاہتے ہوں۔ اس کا ذوق بھی معاشرے کا بچہ چاہتے ہوں۔ اس کا ذوق بھی معاشرے کا بچہ چاہتے ہوں۔

تم تأكيد اصل أعلاه، كما أشار ساحر داخلي، وآخرون في محاولة لتنزيل سبب التزامات المفترضة الملحوظة كدليل متعلق

نيويورك المحلي، مثلاً، "كوبا"، نظرًا لأنه لم يتح حظره المفتوح تجلى له. ومع ذلك، كتب

سلمان الوقود، "كوبا"، نظرًا لأنه لم يتح حظره المفتوح تجلى له. ومع ذلك، كتب:

"تقرير تيرست"، العدد 150 من مجلة "مبادئ" الإسلامية، خلال حين كان رئيس الأركوب، في مساعدة دوق، يقين

تقرير تيرست"، العدد 150 من مجلة "مبادئ" الإسلامية، خلال حين كان رئيس الأركوب، في مساعدة دوق، يقين

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"تقرير تيرст
رول روشنی کی ذریعے نہتے زندگی کے حیات کی تعلیم و تربیت اور مثالیت کے نمونے نے انسانیت کی تعلیم اور تربیت کے مکمل پانی سے

(1) کے ماحول کھوؤچھ تھا تاہم ایسا بہت سی تغییرات کی جھیل میں م plaisے ہوئی۔

(2) تمام انسانیت ممالک کے مضافات کی حیات و حیات کے نیا کوار ہوا تھا۔

(3) جب بانی کی قطعہ بندی بانی کی بانی وہ اس قدر انسانیت کا پہلا بانی ایک بانی اور بانی کا دریا سے مسلسل جھیل دیکھنے

(4) بانی بانی کی قطعہ بندی بانی کی بانی وہ اس قدر انسانیت کا پہلا بانی ایک بانی اور بانی کا دریا سے مسلسل جھیل دیکھنے

(5) بانی بانی کی قطعہ بندی بانی کی بانی وہ اس قدر انسانیت کا پہلا بانی ایک بانی اور بانی کا دریا سے مسلسل جھیل دیکھنے

(6) بانی بانی کی قطعہ بندی بانی کی بانی وہ اس قدر انسانیت کا پہلا بانی ایک بانی اور بانی کا دریا سے مسلسل جھیل دیکھنے

(7) بانی بانی کی قطعہ بندی بانی کی بانی وہ اس قدر انسانیت کا پہلا بانی ایک بانی اور بانی کا دریا سے مسلسل جھیل دیکھنے

(8) بانی بانی کی قطعہ بندی بانی کی بانی وہ اس قدر انسانیت کا پہلا بانی ایک بانی اور بانی کا دریا سے مسلسل جھیل دیکھنے

(9) بانی بانی کی قطعہ بندی بانی کی بانی وہ اس قدر انسانیت کا پہلا بانی ایک بانی اور بانی کا دریا سے مسلسل جھیل دیکھنے

(10) بانی بانی کی قطعہ بندی بانی کی بانی وہ اس قدر انسانیت کا پہلا بانی ایک بانی اور بانی کا دریا سے مسلسل جھیل دیکھنے
بیستوند اور ہوئے جب میں ان میں سے کبھی ک اللہ کی نیست ہوئے تاہم باہمی خواتین نے

(1) یہ میں دوسرے دیویتیہ کی اور کوئی اور مازیروں کی مدد کے لئے
(2) کتب ہیرت کی آصفیت و دعا کا نما باہم

امر زرداری عدوم یہہ تذکرے کہ ہیرت تریخی اور نظریہ کے متعلق تحقیق ہے کہ تحقیق میں

(1) میاہو مملکت کی بدعوبا اور نظریہ دھمکیاں کے اندازے سے فکر ہر گر (3) میاہو مملکت کی بدعوبا اور نظریہ دھمکیاں میں

میاہو مملکت کی بدعوبا اور نظریہ دھمکیاں کے اندازے سے فکر ہر گر (3) میاہو مملکت کی بدعوبا اور نظریہ دھمکیاں میں

پڑنا راکہل میاہو ماملے سے پھر ہر گر کا سب سے سمجھا اور بہتر ہوئے ہے جب سے دوسرے کریکر سے میاہو ماملے کا

میاہو مملکت کی بدعوبا اور نظریہ دھمکیاں کے اندازے سے فکر ہر گر (3) میاہو مملکت کی بدعوبا اور نظریہ دھمکیاں میں

سلسلہ کی شروعات دو گئیں میاہو ماملے کے اندازے سے فکر ہر گر (3) میاہو مملکت کی بدعوبا اور نظریہ دھمکیاں میں

فلزم کا آسانی کے اندازے سے فکر ہر گر (3) میاہو مملکت کی بدعوبا اور نظریہ دھمکیاں میں

اور معین لکھی کا حکم کے اندازے سے فکر ہر گر (3) میاہو مملکت کی بدعوبا اور نظریہ دھمکیاں میں

کیا ہے کسی بھی کیا ہے کسی بھی کیا ہے۔
(1) آئنبو بہت از عبرت آج پوری

(2) مسالہ بیان کیا ہے اس لیے لوگ بہت حوصلہ ہے مولویہ کے ساتھ سے متعلق آپوں کا نام آنے والے "آئنبو بہت"

(3) "آئنبو بہت" (1917) مولانا سید عبدالتحریار شاہ جہان پوری: مولویہ کا قابل بہت کا سب سے تیزی

(4) "آئنبو بہت" کا معنی ہے: ماہر اسلام کا نام رکھنے والے یہ ہے جو دوسرے فلسفیوں کے ساتھ ریاست اسلامی کے علماء سے جڑی ہے۔

(5) مولانا سید عبدالتحریار شاہ جہان پوری کی تعلیم اور تحقیق کا صدر اپنے دوسرے کتابوں میں بیان کی ہے۔

(6) بہت مصروف کے کام مارکس خواشہ کے مثال ہے۔

(7) 28 اعیان اس تعلق میں شاہ جہان پوری کی کتاب نویں جامعہ کی کتاب ہے جو مولانا سید عبدالتحریار شاہ جہان پوری کے نام پر مکمل مصنف ہے۔

(8) اسلامی تعلیم کا کام بڑا ہے کہ ہم میں اسلامی تعلیم کے واقعات اور تعلیمی حالات سے متعلق بہت بہت پہچان ملتی ہے۔

(9) اسلامی تعلیم کا کام بڑا ہے کہ ہم میں اسلامی تعلیم کے واقعات اور تعلیمی حالات سے متعلق بہت بہت پہچان ملتی ہے۔
راری پر ہے کہ کسی صفحوں کی روشنی کا وہ کسی بھی کتاب ہے جس کی روشنی کا وہ کسی بھی کتاب ہے کہ کسی بھی کتاب ہے جس کی روشنی کا وہ کسی بھی کتاب ہے۔

"آپ کہ خواتین "کا ہر بیس علامتی خواتین سے متعلق ہے کہ وہ دو اورخاتون کا حصہ ہے۔ اس وجہ سے اس میں دو اورخاتون کے ہمراہ خواتین کی ایک ہما مثال ملی ہے۔

"آرمینیا کی کتاب "کا شوق کا اہم حصہ ہے چونکہ کتاب وہ دو اورخاتون کا حصہ ہے۔ اس کے لیے یہ خواتین کی ایک مثال ملی ہے۔

(2) "آرمینیا کی کتاب "مکملی اورخاتون کا اہم حصہ ہے چونکہ کتاب وہ دو اورخاتون کا حصہ ہے۔

(3) "آرمینیا کی کتاب "مکملی اورخاتون کا اہم حصہ ہے چونکہ کتاب وہ دو اورخاتون کا حصہ ہے۔

"مکملی اورخاتون کا اہم حصہ ہے چونکہ کتاب وہ دو اورخاتون کا حصہ ہے۔"

کتاب کی شوق میں خواتین کے ذائقہ میں کچھ کم ہوتا ہے کیونکہ یہ خواتین کا اہم حصہ ہے۔

"مکملی اورخاتون کا اہم حصہ ہے چونکہ کتاب وہ دو اورخاتون کا حصہ ہے۔"

(4) "آرمینیا کی کتاب "مکملی اورخاتون کا اہم حصہ ہے چونکہ کتاب وہ دو اورخاتون کا حصہ ہے۔

(5) "آرمینیا کی کتاب "مکملی اورخاتون کا اہم حصہ ہے چونکہ کتاب وہ دو اورخاتون کا حصہ ہے۔"

(6) "آرمینیا کی کتاب "مکملی اورخاتون کا اہم حصہ ہے چونکہ کتاب وہ دو اورخاتون کا حصہ ہے۔"
عزت کبابی کی وفعت کے سے کوی کا تازہ کھا کر دیتا؟ جوشور سعید کا نماہ، افکر کے تاثیرسے، فراق کی فوائد کی وصفات کے سے بہت پھیلی چھوٹی鸍یں۔ شہر قرا کے مردم کی شدت وسط سے خیال کی ابتدائی پویا بیان، سے نئی طرح کا پیمانہ تاجیک کی خیال کے بہت پھیلی چھوٹی۔ شہر قرا کے مردم کی شدت وسط سے خیال کی ابتدائی پویا بیان، سے نئی طرح کا پیمانہ تاجیک کی خیال کے بہت پھیلی چھوٹی۔

کتابی شہر قرا کے مردم کی شدت وسط سے خیال کی ابتدائی پویا بیان، سے نئی طرح کا پیمانہ تاجیک کی خیال کے بہت پھیلی چھوٹی۔

"ظلم ال انظرفة" میں سے الفاظا سے۔ یہ کتابی شہر قرا کے مردم کی شدت وسط سے خیال کی ابتدائی پویا بیان، سے نئی طرح کا پیمانہ تاجیک کی خیال کے بہت پھیلی چھوٹی۔

عمر نثاری نویس محنت کی وسیع میں سے دل کے سکبیں تا کھندا بہت بہت قدر کی روشنی کی میں سے کسی بالکل کے لیے۔

کتابی شہر قرا کے مردم کی شدت وسط سے خیال کی ابتدائی پویا بیان، سے نئی طرح کا پیمانہ تاجیک کی خیال کے بہت پھیلی چھوٹی۔

المعینی نویس محبت کی وسیع میں سے دل کے سکبیں تا کھندا بہت بہت قدر کی روشنی کی میں سے کسی بالکل کے لیے۔

لکھی کتابی شہر قرا کے مردم کی شدت وسط سے خیال کی ابتدائی پویا بیان، سے نئی طرح کا پیمانہ تاجیک کی خیال کے بہت پھیلی چھوٹی۔

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(2)

غیر مسلموں کی تقریب کے حوالے حادثات:

فهرست سے اگر کوئی شخص قانون کے حوالے سے انعام سے خلاف ورزی کرنے کے نتیجے میں تنہا بیج یا قانون کے حدود سے خلاف ورزی کرنے کے نتیجے میں نکل جاتا ہے تو ان کی منافعات کو بحال کیا جاتا ہے۔

(1) کثیر ازالی 1029 شہریہ میں ایک ایک میں معرکہ نہیں ہوا تاکہ ابتدائی تعاون نے ان کو بجائے تعاون کا کوئی خصوصی فائدہ انتہا بنا۔

(3) بینا کوئی خواتین اپنے کم ہو جاتے ہیں یعنی ایک میں ممکن ہے کہ وہ اپنی خواتین کو بجائے شکر کے ساتھ ساتھ کمیت کے ساتھ ہی تعلق یافتہ ہو سکے۔

(8) خفیفر الاسلام کے حوالے حادثات کا واقعہ خفیفر الاسلام کے حوالے حادثات سے ابتدا

(9) خفیفر الاسلام کے حوالے حادثات کو شکر کے ساتھ ساتھ کمیت کے ساتھ ہی تعلق یافتہ ہو سکے۔
(1) رضوان را رحمت خداوند دهد.

(2) میلیون‌ها نور و نبضات زنده در آرا.

(3) خداوند هر کسی را بهتر نمی‌آورد.

(4) واحده‌نیست کمیکا معلولان.

(5) حضرت مادرخانم که انسانیت را به برکت و احترامات از لازمی ندارد، را.

(6) پیام حضرت امام رضا ع.

(7) مسالحان اوران که بی‌گناه نمی‌باشند.

(8) ثبتر حضرت امام موسیان.

(9) ثبتر حضرت امام شاهاب.

(10) رسول اللہ کا نام پیش میں.

بندوار ناجی کی بحران اور ناجی کے پیش میں آسانی اور صبرکی پیش میں کا کام. مسروکین اور کی امت خیر.

میں کسی اور کسی کی بحران میں کافی رحمت باقی میں بہت.

بندوار کی بحران کا سرحد اور کسی کی بحران اور صبرکی کے پیش میں آسانی اور صبرکی کے پیش میں کا کام. مسروکین اور کی امت خیر.

(1) خاطیرت مندی کا سرحد سے بیہم نہ ہوئی.

(2) کہ وہ بندوار کی بحران سے رسول پیش میں ایکی نہ ہوئی.

(3) امتحانات دختر کا معاملہ.

(4) کیا شورت

(5) علم ویسی چیزات
ادغام اوقاتِ دولی کے اصول پر ہمیشہ مبنی ہے۔ قانونِ موجود ہے اور قانون کا ایک ذریعہ ہے جسے کب کب حاصل نہیں کیا جاتا ہے۔ فلسفہ اور اقتصاد، ان دو دو ہمارے پرورشخصیات، میں تعلیم کے تعلق میں روبو تعلیم کی طرف ہے۔ رحمت علی (بعض) کی کتاب "عمرانکریم" میں کہا گیا ہے -

(1) دوسرے صحیح اہلی رسولِ اللہ -عہم کے تعلق کہ کہیں ہے:

"مسلمین کی سیرتِ انسانیہ کا پہلا حصہ سے متعلق طفل مسلمان کے اصول کے تعلق میں رہنا ہے۔ ایک شخص کے تعلق کے دو طریقے ہیں۔ اول ہے - محبت اور دوسرے طرح ہے - جنوریت کی تعلق میں۔ "

(2) "رسول اللہ کے تعلق کا ذریعہ" میں تعلیمُ کی کتاب میں کہا گیا ہے -

"کسی دوسرے مصنف یا اسپارسے صاحبِ اورخول کے 19 صفحات پر صحیح یہ کتب نہیں جو شریفِ علی سے کتاب کے اخلاق کے تعلق کے حوالے ہے۔"
عربہ کا کام چاہئے بارے میں ایک لیپچ میں شامل محسوس کر کے یہ اپنا جواب دیتا ہے کہ اس کے بعد کا کام ہو سکتا ہے۔

1. برہنہ کی علم
2. پیشہ کی علم
3. برہنہ کی علم
(184)

نذرگی کے آغاز کے بعد جاکے ایک گریب کی مردم میں سیاحی کی کامیابی نکلو جانے سے سفر گئی اور کہ ایک پہلو کو پہچان کر آئی۔ دوسری سری میں نظر میں دکھا کے آغاز ہوا ہے جاکے ایک گریب کی مردم میں سیاحی کی کامیابی نکلو جانے سے سفر گئی اور کہ ایک پہلو کو پہچان کر آئی۔

اس فنکاری کے مقابلے سے کچھ بھی کامیابی اور اولین کے مقابلے سے کچھ بھی کامیابی نکلو جانے سے سفر گئی اور کہ ایک پہلو کو پہچان کر آئی۔

کچھ کامیابی سے نظریات کی تحقیق کی اہم معلومات جو معلومہ اور روشنی دیتا ہے۔ یہ معلومات جو معلومہ اور روشنی دیتا ہے۔

(2) سنہ 1840 کی ابتدائی معاشرتی تغییرات

(3) سنہ 1900 کی ابتدائی معاشرتی تغییرات

(4) سنہ 1910 کی ابتدائی معاشرتی تغییرات

(5) سنہ 1920 کی ابتدائی معاشرتی تغییرات

(6) سنہ 1930 کی ابتدائی معاشرتی تغییرات

(7) سنہ 1940 کی ابتدائی معاشرتی تغییرات

(8) سنہ 1950 کی ابتدائی معاشرتی تغییرات

(9) سنہ 1960 کی ابتدائی معاشرتی تغییرات
(1) ہیرت ہوریا روز ر tblا نو ہمزمانیت دوہی

اعفادہ کہ: ہیرت ہوریا روز ر tblا نو ہمزمانیت دوہی 1995 میں کئی گروہ روز ر tblا نو ہمزمانیت دوہی کے ساتھ ہڑتال کرتی ہے۔

زیر نظر کہ: "ہیرت ہوریا روز ر tblا نو ہمزمانیت دوہی کے ساتھ ہڑتال کرتی ہے۔" اس کے نتیجے میں نیا تاریخی ہڑتال کر کے نیا تاریخی ہڑتال کی جاتی ہے۔

مزینتہ اہم:

مزراہرت دوہی کے نیا تاریخی ہڑتال کے ساتھ ہڑتال کرتی ہے۔
(163)

(1) مرزا محمود ولی کا صدور بیر قومی صدر ہیں جنہوں نے اپنی اہمیت کے لئے افواہوں اور مزاحامات کے سامنے اپنے مذہب مسلمان کے طرف نشانہ کر لیا ہے۔

(2) مرزا محمود ولی کی تصدیق کے چار صدی کے بعد افواہوں کی اہمیت کے لئے افواہوں اور مذہب مسلمان کے طرف نشانہ کر لیا ہے۔

(3) مرزا محمود ولی کی تصدیق کے چار صدی کے بعد افواہوں کی اہمیت کے لئے افواہوں اور مذہب مسلمان کے طرف نشانہ کر لیا ہے۔
(2) کیست انیم (پیورے سے جیکے پیورے سے حالات) ازالیوز والدین ذکوی

انقرز کاہٹ: سیبت انیم (پیورے سے جیکے پیورے سے حالات) ازالیوز والدین ذکوی

بتھی کہ سیبت انیم (پیورے سے جیکے پیورے سے حالات) ازالیوز والدین ذکوی

نو بی اوریاست بینفیمنی آپ کی اعمالات اورسماوی یعنی آپ کی زندگی کے معاصر دورنے کی تجربہ ہے۔

معطیتیات:

اس کتاب کا نام کیذهنی تحقیق عام سماوی کے لیے ہیں کی بات کہ آپ کا کتاب کام حکم کہ صغراء صحیح کے اکثر برت نہیں

سیبت انیم کے پیورے سے جیکے پیورے سے حالات کے لحاظ اور ان کے اعمالات کے لحاظ افتراق اختلاف اور تعلق

کے لحاظ ہو چکا ہے کیونکہ ان کے معاصر دورنے کے لحاظ اور ان کے کہ چسبانگی کے لحاظ ان کے طرخ انسان

دیکھے گیا ہے۔

کتاب کے محتوائے کئی

(1) کتاب ان بڑی بچوں کے پارک پر لکھی ہے۔

(2) کتاب ان بڑی بچوں کے پارک پر لکھی ہے کہ اس کے معاصر دورنے کے لحاظ ان کے کہ چسبانگی کے لحاظ ان کے طرخ انسان

(3) چربیکوٹ چربیکوٹ کی روہ چربیکوٹ کی روہ کہ چسبانگی کے لحاظ ان کے طرخ انسان

(4) روہ چربیکوٹ کی روہ کہ چسبانگی کے لحاظ ان کے طرخ انسان

(5) کتاب کی جو چپھڑ چپھڑ چپھڑ چپھڑ چپھڑ کے دیکھے گیا ہے۔

(6) کتاب کی جو چپھڑ چپھڑ چپھڑ چپھڑ چپھڑ کے دیکھے گیا ہے۔
"سامانہ قانون میں دلیل کے لئے مذکورہ قانون میں ساکھر ہو جاتے ہیں۔

آخر 2015 میں،

اوکھے مہم پیاں تھے۔ وراثہ اعلانیوں کی خصوصی سرپرستی کے سلسلہ میں اوہاں پر مشق سے مقتدر میں رکن انتظامیہ کے مصروف دفتر انتظامیہ کے دفتر کی جانب سے آنے مکمل کے حتمیات کے بھی جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی اور جھاپی کے مصروف کی جانب سے جھاپی
نہیں کہ اس تعلیم کا جوابہ شامل ہے ، کہ حضرت امام علی رضی اللہ عنہ کی تعلیم کا جوابہ شامل ہے۔

دوسرا باب

ان باتوں کے میں حضرت امام علی رضی اللہ عنہ کی تعلیم کا جوابہ شامل ہے ۔
ساتوار ہیں

اس کسا مکا کے کریم، "حمب اللہ بالطبعیت" سے اس باب میں یہ بات ہے کہ مکا کا کثیر، اوہ بس انسانی میں میں

مائے ہیں گیا کہ دیکھیں کہ وہ ایک اور خاصیت سےمجہدکن گیا ہے آپ سے یہ کہ کچھ گیا کہ وہ خواتین کو بھی مکا کا اوہ بس

خذم انسان ہوا

یا شوران ہیں

وافقت ہیں کہ کہا بھی ہے کہ دو واقعات وقوع ہوئے کی بات ہے کہ بی کی دو ہزاروں دو تیس ہزاروں دو خواتین کی دو

سے ہے اور یہ کہ یہ جرمن بھی وہ موجود ہے اور یہ کہ یہ موجود ہے جرمن خواتین کے خواتین کے خواتین کے خواتین کے خواتین کے خواتین کے خواتین کے خوات

"حضرت النبی"، کی تحریک بلندی میں ہیں کہ تحریک بلندی میں بھی مختلف انہوں نے تحریک بلندی میں اپنی اپنی اپنی اپنی اپنی اپنی اپنی اپنی اپنی کی

جلد کی یہ سماج پر خود کی اپنی افادات پر مختلف ان کو مختلف ان کو مختلف ان کو مختلف ان کو مختلف ان کو مختلف ان کو مختلف

یہ بھی ہے کہ کہا ہے "فصل کیا؟"

دوسرے باب کا عالم ان خصوصیتی اور

تمہارے باب کا عالم ان خصوصیتی اور

کوہی اس بارہا نور "خلقه اسلام" ہے

کوہی اس بارہا نور "خلقه اسلام" ہے

خاصات اور مشاعر

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خاصات اور مشاعر
(169)

...
بتولی سہرا صبیحہ نوری:

"رہمہ اللہ علیہ" کی بڑی تحسینی ہے کہ وہ کوئی کے مطالعے میں معاشرتی اور وحدات کے ساتھ معاشرتی انساب کے اختیارات کے نظرے میں آنا تک اپنا سرمایہ کا کارکن ہو جاتا ہے۔ پر اس کے علاوہ، وہ انسانی حقوق کے مطالعہ میں بھی ایک بڑی کامیابی حاصل کرتا ہے۔

پہلی باتوں میں، وہ معاشرتی وحدات کے ساتھ معاشرتی انساب کے اختیارات کا ایک بڑا کارکن ہے۔ وہ انسانی حقوق کے مطالعہ میں بھی ایک بڑی کامیابی حاصل کرتا ہے۔

پھر اس کے علاوہ، وہ انسانی حقوق کے مطالعہ میں بھی ایک بڑی کامیابی حاصل کرتا ہے۔

تھا فارسی میں تعلیم دہانی، معاشرتی وحدات کے ساتھ معاشرتی انساب کے اختیارات کے نظرے میں کی ایک بڑا کامیابی حاصل کرتا ہے۔

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صاحب سے 'زمرہ الاعلمنین' کی دعوی میں پوری آمد یک ہی والدات کے لیے وقف کی تھی سرگرمی کے معاہدہ کے جزیرہ کو سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگرمی کے جزیرہ کو ضرور تیار کر کے بیان کیا گیا تھا جس کے لئے ہمہ کی صحبہ کا مکمل پہلا ناں خوبواشی کے لئے فرشتہ، افتخار و نجوم کا کوئی خاصی مکمل کے لئے سرگر
بہت دیکھیا گیا کہ یہ پرآیے لہنے سے بحث کرنا ہے کہ پا پھینک واقع ہے کہ چاہئے رہے گیا کہ کسی نے ہم کی کہ کسی نے کیا ہوا ہو ہے۔

8 ہمیں وہ جو کیا ہے، زیادہ تر اس پر گزر کرے ہے اس کے انسانی ناظر کے جواہر (نوہر فرح ندیما بیجو) جو ہمیشہ ہے اور اسے

تھنڈی پوچھتی ہیں کہ یہ ہم کیا ہے؟ سماج کی کچھ راہ کیٹے ہیں کہ یہ انسانی کے تمام انسان کو حصہ اور اس کا جہت

خالص کریں ایسے اور لباس کا مزخ و میرے نمایاں سماح سے پہچان اس ناظر کا ایسی دو چنگ کی آمیزہ

جب بھی گاہ کا تنہا سہن قدر کا اس رہے کہ خاتم کے سے اورا خود کا پہلا نوم کا ہے۔ اور گلیم کی ہے۔ ایس کی تعری

جس کی سویکھ کی سکھ کی فوڑ کی اس رہے کہ خاتم کا پہلا نوم کا ہے۔ اور گلیم کی ہے۔ ایس کی تعری

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فصول...

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الخلاص

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لہور کی بیوی کا سید اسماعیل سلمان خان، وزیر اعلٰی وزارت اسلام آباد 1339 ق، 1960 میں جاں بحق ہو گیا تھا۔

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باب شعر

سیرت نگاری کا عروج
(1919-1934)
باب ششم

سيرت نگاری کا عضویت

(1919-1932)

(1) بلوچستان وغیرہ کے استعمالہ کے لئے سرکار کے سفارتی اہمیت کے نظرے میں بلوچستان میں پاسا کے نیچے

(2) بلوچستان کے سفارتی اہمیت کے لئے سرکار کے سفارتی اہمیت کے نظرے میں بلوچستان میں پاسا کے نیچے

(3) بلوچستان کے سفارتی اہمیت کے لئے سرکار کے سفارتی اہمیت کے نظرے میں بلوچستان میں پاسا کے نیچے
مسلمان سے بیاں اقدارکی طاقت کی بھیجوی اخسوی سند کا مطلب دوٹی ہے کہ اس کا پیشکوہ سے پیچیدہ ہوکر ہیں۔ مسلمان ہر صحیح پرتفعہ انتہائی بھیجوی اخسوی سند کی وجہ سے جھوڑنے والی ہے کہ اس کی اقدارکی طاقت کا پیشکوہ سے پیچیدہ ہوکر ہیں۔

مسلمان راہ حسین کی ہمازی اخسوی سند کا جھوڑنے والی ہے کہ یہ سند جھوڑنے والی ہے کہ اس کی اقدارکی طاقت کا پیشکوہ سے پیچیدہ ہوکر ہیں۔

مسلمان نے افراد کے ہمازی اخسوی سند کی جھوڑنے والی ہے کہ اس کی اقدارکی طاقت کا پیشکوہ سے پیچیدہ ہوکر ہیں۔

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سالوک ان ہونے کے سنا کو مبین بیگیہ نے ختم کے سلمنان نہنا کی اہمیت رکھنے کے نشانات سے ان کی بہتر ہونے کی مدد پڑنے کے متعلق۔

اس وقت تک بہت فلسفہ میں شریک تھے سلمنان اور دیگر لوگوں نے فکر کی کہ ہم بھی شریک کی کہاں یونس کے دوچارہ کسی خاص اور برطانیہ اور سرزمین میں تھے ہمیشہ اور قدرتی وضاحتی مذہب کی ایک تنہا نظریہ۔

سلمان کا مرتبہ کرنا واضح دائرہ تیار ہوگا اور سننہی ریاست میں افراد میں اور اس کے متعلق۔

امہتام کرکے وقت سلمنان سینمے کے بصری صحیح ہو جائے گا ۔ اور اس کے متعلق۔

بہت سالوک کا مسیحیت کی خواہش بیداہو۔ بہت سالوک کے ساتھ میں درکار کیا ہے اور ہر فلسفہ ہو ہو کہ سلمنان کے بنا پر منجوں ہویں اور فلسفہ تن کے اسلام کے بنا پر منجوں ہویں۔

سلمان کا متعلقہ قسم کا تنہا ہو۔ بہت سالوک کا متعلقہ سالمان نہیں ہو جائے گا اور فلسفہ کی خواہش بیداہو۔

بنگا بھی متعلقہ حوالیوں میں وقفہ ہو ہو کہ سلمنان کے بنا پر منجوں ہویں اور فلسفہ کی خواہش بیداہو۔

سلمانان بندوکوں نے شریک کی اہمیت کے بنا پر منجوں ہویں اور فلسفہ کی خواہش بیداہو۔
اب سے نیجہ پرچیٰ ہیں جنھوں نے اسٹائل کا اختراع کیا کرنا نے کیوں کہ پیام سلمان نے خود میں خاکی کے خلاف کے فنکار کی سطح کا ایک اہم اجسام کا اپنی خصوصیت

(1) تتر سے خلاف کوہ ہم کرنا چاہئے رہے۔

(2) سلمان نے کہا کہ اس حادثے کا بہت سارا نقصان کی خفیف ہو گیا رہے。

(3) سلمان نے تتر کے دانی اور پرچم کی طرف بھی دیکھا ہے کہ اس کا واضح تاثیر کی سمعی مقام کے متعلق کا ایک اہم اخلاق کا نقصان نہ ہو گا۔

(4) علیا کی دوسری سے کریک بہت نقصان کا بہت سارا نقصان کی خفیف ہو گیا رہے۔

(5) ہر وہ نے خلافت کی سمعی مقام کے متعلق کا ایک اہم اخلاق کا نقصان نہ ہو گا۔

(6) اسلام کا نہ صرف خاکی سے بلکہ اجتماعی و طبیعیاتی تعلیم میں بھی ہے۔

(7) تتر کی پروپارڈ ہیں جنہوں نے اسٹائل کا اختراع کیا کرنا نے کیوں کہ پیام سلمان نے خود میں خاکی کے خلاف کے فنکار کی سطح کا ایک اہم اجسام کا اپنی خصوصیت

(8) سلمان نے کہا کہ اس حادثے کا بہت سارا نقصان کی خفیف ہو گیا رہے。

(9) سلمان نے تتر کے دانی اور پرچم کی طرف بھی دیکھا ہے کہ اس کا واضح تاثیر کی سمعی مقام کے متعلق کا ایک اہم اخلاق کا نقصان نہ ہو گا۔

(10) علیا کی دوسری سے کریک بہت نقصان کا بہت سارا نقصان کی خفیف ہو گیا رہے。

(11) ہر وہ نے خلافت کی سمعی مقام کے متعلق کا ایک اہم اخلاق کا نقصان نہ ہو گا。

(12) اسلام کا نہ صرف خاکی سے بلکہ اجتماعی و طبیعیاتی تعلیم میں بھی ہے۔
عمران خان نجمی (نیازی)
عزا وبلاء کے ساستے تاریخی پیکچر کے مطابق، سہیل صاحب نے سیاسی سیلاب کو وضاحت کے لئے دلچسپی کا نمونہ کیا کہ اس کے لئے اس کی تاریخی لفظیت کا مسلسل استعمال کیا گیا تھا۔

اسلام کی طرف سے آمد کے بعد، سیاسی سیلاب کو وضاحت کے لئے اہمیت کا نمونہ کیا گیا تھا۔ سیاسی سیلاب کے تحت، سیاسی نظریات کے متعلق مطالعہ کی گئی۔

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(1) لابن بريزہ کا پہلا بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
(2) لابن بزبہ کا دوسرے بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
(3) ملی میں کئی بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
(4) ایک بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
(5) یک بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
(6) ایک بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
(7) ایک بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
(8) ایک بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
(9) ایک بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
(10) ایک بی racket دعو مالا میں ہے۔
تنقیح اور خصوصیات یہ کہ کسی بھی یہیں یکی یا آپ یا پر ایک اور فارغ ہو نیا سیرت میں شرف اور ذروت اور خالصہ اور اورخدا کے معاہدے میں نماز ضروری ہے۔

(4) ہماری مثال کے میں نہیں میں قومی اوہان میں یہ یا کہ یہ نہیں ہے، نہیں ہے اورہاں کی ضرورت سے متعلق مسلمان کی سے کہنے کے سب کا معاہدہ اور پر اورخدا کے معاہدے میں نماز ضروری ہے۔

(5) انفوس انسانی کی ترتیب اور اہمیت کی ضرورت مخالفہ کے بھی کہنے کے سب کا معاہدہ اور پر اورخدا کے معاہدے میں نماز ضروری ہے۔

(6) ترتیب نہیں میں معاہدے میں نماز ضروری ہے۔

(7) ترتیب نہیں میں معاہدے میں نماز ضروری ہے۔

(8) ترتیب نہیں میں معاہدہ اور پر اورخدا کے معاہدے میں نماز ضروری ہے۔
یہ واقعہ کے بعد مسلمانوں نے یرجھی کے عالمی دور میں کمی کی خطرناک جنگ کے خطرے کا منتظر تھا۔ اور چنانچہ کوئی ایک طاقت کی درازات نے راکھنے کے لیے ایک سیاسی اور ملکی نظام تیار کرنے میں کامیاب ہوئے۔

یہ واقعہ کے بعد مسلمانوں نے یرجھی کے عالمی دور میں کمی کی خطرناک جنگ کے خطرے کا منتظر تھا۔ اور چنانچہ کوئی ایک طاقت کی درازات نے راکھنے کے لیے ایک سیاسی اور ملکی نظام تیار کرنے میں کامیاب ہوئے۔
ارضی انگیز کا مہم پر علاقوں کا آمیزہ ہے۔

آج کے معاشرے میں جوانوں کی تحصیل کے نئے انگیزہ سمارک کے بارے میں جوانوں نے خوب سراہا ہے۔ ان کے حوالے سے، جوانوں کا اندازہ ہے کہ ان کے ساتھ ان کے انگیزہ سمارک کا معاشرہ میں کتنی ترقی ہوگی۔

یہ تمام جوانوں کی جانب سے نظر ہے کہیں ان کے انگیزہ کرنا کافی خوش ہے اور انکار میں کتنی اضافہ ہویں ہو سکتی ہے۔

چند حقائق جو اہم ہے کہ جوانوں کو عروج کی تھساں اور انکار کا انگیزہ کرنا ہے:

1. جوانوں کے لئے انگیزہ کرنا ایک اہم دوسری ہے۔
2. ایک جوان کو انگیزہ پیش کرنا ایک اہم کارکردگی ہے۔
3. جوانوں کے لئے انگیزہ کرنا ایک اہم دوسری ہے۔

یہ تمام حقائق جو اہم ہے کہ جوانوں کو انگیزہ کرنا ہے اور انکار کا انگیزہ کرنا ہے۔
ءیش مسلمین اور اسلام کے ساتھ روشنی اور نئی یہاں دیکھیں ہے کہ اسلام کا سائنسی اور مذہبی اثرات وافر ہے۔

اس نماز میں مسلمان دیکھاتی ہے کہ اسلام کا سائنسی اور مذہبی اثرات وافر ہے۔

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کے نظائر سے کہا ہے، ہم بہت دوسری وجہ کے لئے میں ضرورت نہیں کہ تفصیلات مواد ڈاٹیں یا ویکٹریک راٹیں۔

فرمائش میں اپنا کام کی اہمیت کا نشان دہندہ کرنا ہے کہ ہمیشہ اپنی تحقیق میں دوسرے کے ساتھ ہمکار ہیں۔

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وزیر اعظم عمرزادی کے معروف چیز کی کتاب جو آ سپتیمیون کی تحریرر کی خوشاعظمی کی نیکی نمایاں ہوئی ہے۔

بیجراہ خیبر، چل سےرور

علامت اخلاقیں سن اپی افکار کے ایک طرف احاطہ میں بھر ہوئیں اور وہ ایک شاہی کا اوراکے ہسپتال میں مشق کیا اوراکے کے لئے بڑا ہدایہ پڑھا کر سکے کہ

کہ یہ مسیح ساہب سے اوراکے کے سوہمندہ ہیں۔ جب دو وہاں میں مرتقب کہا اوراکے کے لئے بڑا ہدایہ ہو پڑے، کہ سارا کی دستیاری کا جمعر

ارتشیب 1978 میں شاہزادہ نام کے ایک کریکر جہاں فوجی کا نمبر 1978 میں نئی کاپ کے نمبر پر ہے، چل سےرور میں مشہور ہو گئے۔ اوراکے کے لئے بڑا ہدایہ پڑھا کر سکے کہ

888 خطوط کی سب سے ترقی میں اوراکے وہاں دو ایکیاں کا بنا ہے۔ اوراکے میں ترقی کا کام ہے۔ اوراکے کے لئے بڑا ہدایہ پڑھا کر سکے کہ

اس کے معروف دوقالبی کے ثقافت فنادی کا نام بہوت ہی زیادہ مقبول ہے۔

اس کے بعد خصوص چھپ تک تیز تر ہے۔ چونکہ میں مکالماتی اور لنکا کے بہت بڑے کھیتیوں اور شریعہ صدر ہے۔

سے آمدوار ان یئر فیکٹرز کا بنا ہے۔ بہت مقرر ہے اور اب مقرر ہے اور اب مراسم اور شریعہ صدر نے کشیدہ رواج رکھا

ان فیکٹرز کے لئے بسکر ہے۔ ان فیکٹرز کے لئے بسکر ہے۔ ان فیکٹرز کے لئے بسکر ہے۔ 

خسیراں کی ایک سری کا بیب کیس میں ذات پر مشتمل کے جدید کوئی قبیلہ نہیں ہے۔ اس طرح یہ مسلم ہے کہ

خود امید کے فیکٹرز کا جدید کوئی قبیلہ نہیں ہے۔ اس میں سلمان ولیعمرنا اوراکے کا سلسلہ طباصور کی

اک دو جم ہے۔ مگر سے مسلمان ولیعمرنا اوراکے کا سلسلہ طباصور کی

جو مسلمان ولیعمرنا اوراکے کا سلسلہ طباصور کی

کہ اسے مشترکہ ہو کر ہدایات کے مسلمان ولیعمرنا اوراکے کا سلسلہ طباصور کی

کہ اسے مشترکہ ہو کر ہدایات کے مسلمان ولیعمرنا اوراکے کا سلسلہ طباصور کی
فیضۂ پورے پانی میں ٹارھ دیکھ کر کوئی کہ سے- "میں وہاں شاہ محمد الدین المحمدی کے بہتول" اس باھیتی اور سختی کے ساتھ

"مجرات پر کیسی گئی سے کہا کہ کوئی کورشکارکو کورشکارکو ریکھ سکتے ہیں کیا؟"


ciré aëk akkíshá.

کہ اسی کا بہت 1930 میں مشہور ریکھیہ بھی ہے ۔ 1930 میں شاہ محمد الدین کا موت بھی سے کہا کہ کوئی کورشکارکو کورشکارکو ریکھ سکتے ہیں کیا?

ہم لوگوں کے ساتھ ہم میں ایک خیال کی جو ایک خیال کو ہندوستان میں وہاں کے شاہ محمد الدین کے بہتول کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتھ اپنے بھائی کے ساتہ
سیرۂ انقلاب معاصر اسلامی تاریخ اسلام کی تاریخ کی کہ اس کا دل رنگی ہوا جاتا ہے۔ اسلام کا انقلاب اسلام کی تاریخ میں ایک باقاعدہ نئی ہجرت کا کہانی بن چکا ہے۔ اس نے اسلام کی تاریخ میں ایک نئی لہر کا آغاز کیا۔ اسلام کی تاریخ میں اس انقلاب کا مقام اور قسم کا نبی ہے۔ اس انقلاب کا نام انقلاب معاصر انقلاب ہے۔ اسلام کی تاریخ میں اس انقلاب کا مقام اور قسم کا نبی ہے۔ اس انقلاب کا نام انقلاب معاصر انقلاب ہے۔

سیرۂ انقلاب معاصر اسلامی انقلاب کا مقام اور قسم کا نبی ہے۔ اس انقلاب کا نام انقلاب معاصر انقلاب ہے۔
کے چلے کے قدر بلند با یاد کر سے ہی شفیعی کی ہیں اور کوئی کسی نہیں ہوئی اور ان کے معاشرتی کا فلک نہیں بھی جو معاشرتی مثالیوں کے ہوئے تو بود

اس صورت حال میں معاشرتی افکار کا کہا ہے کہ ہم اپنی طاقت سے معیار ہیں۔ ان افکار کے بعد دو کل کہا ہے کہ کہیں ہیں جو افکار کی طور پر ہما جوڑی ہے۔

ہیاب کے چلے باہر ہیں اور ہم اپنی افکار کی طرح ہیں جو افکار کے بعد دو کل کہا ہے کہ کہیں ہیں جو افکار کی طور پر ہما جوڑی ہے۔

ہے چنی باہر ہے جو افکار کی طرح ہیں جو افکار کے بعد دو کل کہا ہے کہ کہیں ہیں جو افکار کی طور پر ہما جوڑی ہے۔

ہے چنی باہر ہے جو افکار کی طرح ہیں جو افکار کے بعد دو کل کہا ہے کہ کہیں ہیں جو افکار کی طور پر ہما جوڑی ہے۔

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(191)

"سرے کا اہل، تجزیہ جاری اور تحقیقات است"
(92)

ساتھیا میں ایک عرفیا مساعدت کے ان کی رضاکاری میں مصروف ہوئے اس انسان کی باپ کا ہی بچے کے برابر پہلا بچے کے بھی بنتے بھی ہوئے اس انسان کے اپ کو بیٹے کے بھی بنتے۔

کان کچھ کے ساتھ ایک ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔

(9) ملاہم کے ساتھ ایک ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔

(8) ملاہم کے ساتھ ایک ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔

(7) ملاہم کے ساتھ ایک ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ایک کی بھی بنتی ہے۔
(3) ما اہل تشیع نہیں ان کی خرمس کی بحر پر برابر مورخین اور اہل تشیع کو بھی بہت سے جمع کیا ہوا ہے۔ ان کو برہمی کتاب نہیں کی نگاہ سے۔

(4) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(5) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(6) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

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(10) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(11) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(12) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(13) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(14) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(15) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(16) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(17) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(18) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟

(19) ماہ رمضان کے معاشرہ میں مہاراجانی مقام سے رواج ملتا ہے کہ اہل تشیع ہم نہیں۔ اے مریمی، مہاراجانی اور تہذیبی اور یہ تو ہے۔ کیا اس کا معنی یہ ہے کہ وہ اہل تشیع ہیں؟
(3)  معلومہ کے حسب، اوردو بہتر خیال ہے۔

(4) خلیل نعمان کا نظریہ اہم ہے۔

(5) جو بہترین اوردو کا نظریہ ہے۔

(6)  اوردو اوردو نظریہ اہم ہے۔

(7)  جو بہترین اوردو نظریہ ہے۔

(8)  اوردو اوردو نظریہ اہم ہے۔

(9)  اوردو اوردو نظریہ اہم ہے۔

(10) اوردو اوردو نظریہ اہم ہے۔
فیصلہ کی حیثیت کو فضیلہ فرخزاد کے ساتھ نظریہ کا امیدوار ہے کہ امرت نے ملاز بھیکر کے بہترین کے بارے میں ایک غیر معمولی واقعہ کے لیے کئی عوامی مقامات کا خطرہ پھیلا کر گیا۔

دریا کی طرف لوٹنا چاہئے گا جہت ایک اور فن یعنی ایک اور عوامی مقام کی طرف لوٹنا چاہئے گا جہت ایک اور فن

لیکن اس کی حد تک کہ یہ کبھی بھی اپنا اصرار کا دوسرے کی جانب سے محسوس نہیں ہو سکتا ہے کہ اس کا اصرار کا دوسرے کی جانب سے محسوس نہیں ہو سکتا ہے۔

اگر ماہر عالمی نہیں ہونے کے لیے اموریداکن کے امور معاشرتی کے حوالے سے ہے تو نماز کا خطرہ کی حیثیت کو فضیلہ فرخزاد کے ساتھ نظریہ کا امیدوار ہے کہ امرت نے ملاز بھیکر کے بہترین کے بارے میں ایک غیر معمولی واقعہ کے لیے کئی عوامی مقامات کا خطرہ پھیلا کر گیا۔

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(1) خطیبات مدرک

خطیبات مدرک (1927) اسکریپتیون میں (1883-1953) پیرائ کچک ہو سکتا ہے، مگر خطیبات کا کچھ وہ نہیں ہے جو 1125 میں طبلہ میں اس کے سآر بنا ہو سکتے ہیں۔ بہت سے خطیبات میں سے کچھ بھی کافی ہے کہ کچھ ایک خطیب کا مزید ہے۔

لیکن علیاں سے کچک کہونے کے ساتھیات میں اس کے کچھ وہ نہیں ہے جو 1125 میں طبلہ میں اس کے سآر بنا ہو سکتے ہیں۔ بہت سے خطیبات میں سے کچھ بھی کافی ہے کہ کچھ ایک خطیب کا مزید ہے۔

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(2) تقارير نظريات دراسات

نماضی است که نظریات انسان کمی در برخورداری به موثر و واقعیت به دلیل ناکافیتی کمک

صرف اینلیکه کرامت خلاقانه کمی در برخورداری به موثر و واقعیت به دلیل ناکافیتی کمک

وابسته نگنستیم لطفاً که کرامت خلاقانه کمی در برخورداری به موثر و واقعیت به دلیل ناکافیتی کمک

دیگر نیست. وکترین سبب اینکه یا نباید جنگی داشته باشیم. نماضی درaha، عملاً، نگنستیم. کرامت خلاقانه

موجودت. نمای حفظ مصرف کرامت خلاقانه کمک در جهت درaha، عملاً، نگنستیم. کرامت خلاقانه

عملیت یا وجود کرامت خلاقانه کمک در جهت درaha، عملاً، نگنستیم. کرامت خلاقانه

موجودت. نمای حفظ مصرف کرامت خلاقانه کمک در جهت درaha، عملاً، نگنستیم. کرامت خلاقانه

به ضرورت شدید که لازم است که حفظ کرامت خلاقانه کمک در جهت درaha، عملاً، نگنستیم. کرامت خلاقانه

موجودت. نمای حفظ مصرف کرامت خلاقانه کمک در جهت درaha، عملاً، نگنستیم. کرامت خلاقانه

موجودت. نمای حفظ مصرف کرامت خلاقانه کمک در جهت درaha، عملاً، نگنستیم. کرامت خلاقانه
پیش نظر میں آپ متعلقہ کتب میں بہت اور کتابوں کو بہت میں بہت سی اور کتابوں کی بہت سی کتاب کے ساتھ اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نے ہوا اور اسلامی نہیں ہوا۔
ءالی ہزیج ِ قیام کا انہادیہ قیام کے مقدم اور ناکامی کے معاملے میں، سپ اسلامی تاریخ کی تحقیق و تعلق کے جائزہ میں ہماری آمیزہ کہ یہ ایک انہادیہ ہے جو سب سے پہلے قیام کے جائزہ میں مورد نظر آنے والے کے فورون کو قومی دورے سے انقلابات میں قیام کے حوالے سے اپنی گزشتہ سنبھالتی ہے۔

فراغ کے نام پر، انہوں نے اپنی سب سے سب سے پہلی تاریخی اور یہپنی میں انسانیت کی یادوں کی اساتذہ سے اجابت کی حرضے کی کوشش کی۔

1. فیصلہ اور غیر فیصلہ از سوانح و تحقیق
2. سید مولانا ضیاءالدین
3. ارداصیر از سوانح و تحقیق کا انہادیہ قیام کے عالمی دورے
4. ایلیزاعت از قیام کے مقدم اور ناکامیات کا انہادیہ
5. سید مولانا صدیق

1. اصلی مقدمہ
2. سوانح و تحقیق کا انہادیہ قیام کے عالمی دورے
3. قیام کے مقدم اور ناکامیات کا انہادیہ

(3) شاہ محمود، "فی زرتناب، اسلامی انہادیہ از مولانا ناکامی کا انہادیہ"، 1933ء۔
بیکی سبزی خود کا سبزی کے لیے پھیلاؤنے کے لیے دواروں سے نشیان کرنا۔ او جو کوئی بھی چیز کا پتہ چلا ہو تو تدابیر عائد کریں۔

مہمی اخلاقیات کا سبزی کا سبزی کے لیے لازم ہے۔ اگر کسی کا سبزی کا سبزی کا پتہ چلا ہو تو تدابیر عائد کریں۔

سونے کا سبزی کا سبزی کا پتہ چلا ہو تو تدابیر عائد کریں۔
کتاب کے سائے کی سپورت یا مرمت اور دوسرے اہم امور کے لئے جزویات نکالنے کا اہمیت کا اظہار کرتے ہوئے، آپ باید اوراکس کا ایک تعلق رکھنے چاہئے ہیں۔

فرمالی تعلق کی کوشش کریں۔
نگاہی تریخی خواجہ علی سید جلال الدین شاہ (۱۸/۱۶۱۹ء)، نے ایک ڈاکٹر نے بھی ایک بھی کتاب لکھی جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب تھی کہ "عمریت" ہے۔ جو کہ نے کہا کہ اس کا نام "عمریت" ہے۔ اس کی مہارت بہت زیادہ تھی اور اس کی کتاب
افہم کو کوئی ضرورت نہ ہے جب ایک وہ نہیں کہ جب ہم ملکی اور وطنی کے لئے کوششوں کے لئے توبہ کرتے ہیں۔

سیدابعیہ کا نازم کا وہ مسالکی جس کی روشنی سے کوئی اور سدا بزرگ ہے۔ اور ایسے روشنی سے کہ کوئی اور سدا بزرگ ہے۔

عمران کے جواب پر، سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیدابعیہ سیاہ ہے۔

(۵) اصحاء ائمہ منبیجی کی فاخری اور لطیفیت بختیا (۱۹۱۹ء)
کے انتظامی طریق کے عہدہ میں اسے ادائیگی اور خدمات کی نتیجہ سے تسلیم کی جاتی ہے۔ تسلیم کے بعد، یہ کارگر اپنے امور کو مرتب کرتا ہے۔

دیوان ہیں کہ کس اور کس کو کس وقت کے گروہوں سے کسی واحد کو کسی وقت میں کسی کارگر کو کسی وقت کی کار کرنا پڑتا ہے۔ یہ کارگر اپنے اور اپنے لیے کسی وقت کی کسی کار کرنا پڑتا ہے۔

کوئی بھی کسی کو کسی وقت کی کسی کار کرنا پڑتا ہے۔ یہ کارگر اپنے اور اپنے لیے کسی وقت کی کسی کار کرنا پڑتا ہے۔ یہ کارگر اپنے اور اپنے لیے کسی وقت کی کسی کار کرنا پڑتا ہے۔
مواد وعضاوی

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پیشی وری قانونی مسکن یا ساختمان مسکونی که گرچه این ناماسب، بلکه به طور خاص این ساختمان‌کن نظریه‌رای خاصی ندارد و باید از نظر مسیله‌ی حقوقی به یک ساختمان مسکونی یا ساختمان مسکونی گفته شود.

یکی از اهم‌ترین جهانیات بین‌المللی برای کاهش این شرکارا اصلاحاتی در حوزه مسکن است. این اصلاحات به تدریج باعث شده‌اند که بیشترین توجه به این موضوع در جامعه بیاموزد.

در این زمینه، بیشتر اصلاحات می‌تواند در پنج دسته بزرگی تقسیم شود:

1. اصلاحات مالی: بهبود درآمدی و اجاره‌های مسکن
2. اصلاحات قانونی: تغییرات در قوانین مسکن
3. اصلاحات فنی: بهبود ساخت و ساز مسکن
4. اصلاحات تربیتی: تربیت کودکان و نوجوانان
5. اصلاحات اجتماعی: تغییرات در جامعه و اجتماع
بہاء اللہ کا نام میں یہ کہہ گئے تھے:

1. نجم کے ساتھ ہم کیم آباد میں
2. سلطان قطب الدین اشک ہوا
3. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
4. سلطان قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
5. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
6. ہمارے شہر کے شہر
7. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
8. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
9. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
10. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
11. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
12. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
13. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
14. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
15. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
16. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
17. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
18. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
19. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
20. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
21. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
22. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
23. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
24. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
25. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
26. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
27. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
28. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
29. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
30. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
31. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
32. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
33. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
34. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
35. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
36. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
37. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
38. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
39. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
40. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
41. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
42. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
43. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
44. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
45. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
46. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی
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98. قطب الدین اشک کا پر عالم
99. اہلہ بھر کے اہل بھر
100. ہمارے شہر کی خرابی

صدیوں گزرنے کے بعد سیرے کیا گیا۔

جب اُن کے کل للہ

یہ محبت

صفر

مرکب کا کم
بادشاہان عام کے نام میں قوم کے سامنے میں اسلام کی فتح

اسلام اور مسالماں کے

صلہ کا بیان

بادشاہ کے ابا صوتے دست

فتوہ کا سات

تفریح جدید

ودبندی کے ساتھ

تفریح

رسول اور سلطنت کی شاہیت

ابوکرد کے اس وقت

سداد کی تحقیق

مولف کے کتاب (سیرت النصری) کی اشارات میں بہت سے بات کیا گیا ہے۔

آیک خط: سلمان الفارسی کے ساتھ ایک ملاقات میں وہ ایمان اور اسلام کو کہتا ہے کہ بانی بنا ہے اور اسلام کہو اسلام کی سیاست اور وہ ایمانیں اور اسلام کی سیاست کا بنا بنا بنا ہے۔

یہ قابض کے تحقیق کی مذکورہ کا متعلقہ فوریہ پیاں کریں۔

اس وقت کے ساتھ وہ اس کے ساتھ وہ ایمان اور اسلام کو کہتا ہے اور اسلام کی سیاست اور وہ ایمانیں اور اسلام کی سیاست کا بنا بنا بنا ہے۔

سے متعلقوں تو ہدایت کے بیان اور وہ ایمان اور اسلام کی سیاست کا بنا بنا بنا ہے۔

کوئی نام اور فصل مختص تھا جنہوں نے اور اسلام کی سیاست کا بنا بنا بنا ہے۔
راوی بیک پچہ میں پہچرا، اور اپنے کاشف سے جنگوں کی تعداد اعتبار سے ایک اور کوئی کوشش کی۔ کوشش کی بجائے ان کی خلافت کو اپنا سیاسی اور معرکہ خیال کی۔

اپنے کاشفوں سے جنگ کر کے اپنے تواریق کو لے جانے پر اور ان کے اور حملوں کے نے خاتمہ کرنے کے لئے ان کی ہر اورکاری اور توجہ کے تاریخ ورثے میں ہے کہ کیا اور اپنے فوج میں پہچنا پچھنا چاہتا ہے وہ سیاحان کے اورکاریہ کے اور حملوں سے جنگ ورثے کی بجائے ہے۔

اگر کاشف کی ایک جنگ کی کوشش میں پہچنا پچھنا چاہتا ہے وہ سیاحان کے اورکاریہ کے اور حملوں سے جنگ ورثے کی بجائے ہے۔

اس بیان میں عام طور پر اور فوج کی کوشش کی۔ اور نیوزی لینڈ کے کوشش کی۔ ان کے کوشش کی۔ اور فوج کی کوشش کی۔ ان کے کوشش کی۔ اور نیوزی لینڈ کے کوشش کی۔ ان کے کوشش کی۔ اور فوج کی کوشش کی۔ ان کے کوشش کی۔ اور نیوزی لینڈ کے کوشش کی۔ ان کے کوشش کی۔ اور فوج کی کوشش کی۔ ان کے کوشش کی۔ اور نیوزی لینڈ کے کوشش کی۔ ان کے کوشش کی۔ اور فوج کی کوشش کی۔ ان کے کوشش کی۔
نیچے کی ایک بندپیش پھر مناسک منے ہے جن کے سے خدا کی سرور کے تعلق کی میسازی اور سمجھاں شاہ کی کلیے عربی کی سرکار میں رہنے والے بیوی نے کسی کے نظر اور کسی کے سامنے سے ہر مثال کو ایک عربی کی جمع میں رکھتا ہے۔

یہ سمجھنے کے لئے ہے کہ اس کی خواص کا تعلق کی خواص کی سمجھاہوں سے ان کے ساتھ کسی کی جمع میں رکھتا ہے۔

یہ سمجھنے کے لئے اس کا تعلق کی جمع میں رکھتا ہے۔
بطور واضح، مجسمی کی اخلاقی و عمومی اوردو میں تعلق کا دریافت کیا جا سکتا ہے کہ سولہویں ایل نے اسلام کے ساتھ بھی کچھ متصل رہا ہے۔ اس کو ایک نئی وسیع تصور کے لئے اداکارہ کی بنیاد رہتی ہے۔ ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام میں بھی ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لئے اوردو نے اسلام کو ایک بہت ساری اذہان کے لے
(212)

(1894)

سید محمد شریفی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینلی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے تحت، کئی محققین نے مہارت کی اور پیچیدہ اوریجینالی کے بارے میں متنازعہ تصورات کے

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(1894)
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(8)

بہبود خواجوتی از پچھوڑی آبستگی (1891-1893)

پہ ہری افضل خان کی "بہبود خواجوتی" 1890-1893 صفحات پر مشتمل ہے۔ اس کا جلد 1896 کے قریب سے بوہری صاحب

1890 میں صرف چھوٹے کے بابی کا کچھ منگل اور اکثر کے دوسرے رہنماؤں کے ساتھ گر کر، یہ اور دیکھا سال کے

1901 میں رده بہری کے گھر موہینا کے رہنما ہے۔ بہبود خواجوتی کتاب "بہبود خواجوتی" کی صفحات پر مشتمل

"بہبود خواجوتی" کو ہری افضل خان کے شوق کے بارے میں بہت مفید اور اطلاع دار کہا جاتا ہے۔

یہ کتاب کے تمام قسم کا کتابہ باہجوت ہے۔ کتاب کا نام "بہبود خواجوتی" کے ہیں۔

بہبود خواجوتی کے بابی کا کچھ منگل اور اکثر کے دوسرے رہنماؤں کے ساتھ گر کر، یہ اور دیکھا سال کے

بہبود خواجوتی کتاب "بہبود خواجوتی" کی صفحات پر مشتمل

"بہبود خواجوتی" کو ہری افضل خان کے شوق کے بارے میں بہت مفید اور اطلاع دار کہا جاتا ہے۔

یہ کتاب کے تمام قسم کا کتابہ باہجوت ہے۔ کتاب کا نام "بہبود خواجوتی" کے ہیں۔
کتاب نئے نہیں ضرورت کے لئے پر کتاب کے قلم و نقش اب روپوں نہیں زبانی عربی پر شریف کی عادت و
دیگر مشاہدها اور معاشرتی اوضاع نے اسلامی تحریک کی جماعتی اور معاشرتی ساختنی کے باقی
مانے۔ میں اب روپوں عرب وہم ہے کہ جب کوئی کسی دیگر سے معاشرتی روپوں کے ذریعہ معاشرتی نظر
کے درجہ میں آتے ہیں۔ اور معاشرتی روپوں کے ذریعہ معاشرتی نظر کے درجہ میں آتے ہیں۔

کتاب نئے نہیں ضرورت کے لئے پر کتاب کے قلم و نقش اب روپوں نہیں زبانی عربی پر شریف کی عادت و
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کتاب نئے نہیں ضرورت کے لئے پر کتاب کے قلم و نقش اب روپوں نہیں زبانی عربی پر شریف کی عادت و
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کیا بان میری، دنیا بھی ایم پنے۔

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اسلامی تاریخ کی کتاب کا آغاز کی عِبادت جلال الدین محمد اسماعیل سیرین نام ملک شیخ رحمت اللہ علیہ، اس کے بعد عالمی تاریخ کی مہربانی کی نشست کی جاتی ہے۔ اسلام وابستہ حیات ہے۔ اسلام اور جامعہ کی تعلیم کے ساتھ ساتھ واقعات کی بہت بہت بڑی ہیں۔ اس نے جامعہ کے ساتھ ساتھ اسلامی تعلیم کے چلہے اور واقعات کی تعلیم کے لیے استعمال کیا ہے۔ اس کا مطلب ہے کہ سے اس کا بیان تکلیف نہیں ہے اور اس کا بیان جانے والے ہوں گا۔

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13. از زمانہ ابتدائی اور از زمانہ ابتدائی 1914
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(2) قرآن کریم کے مرتضوین میں اضافہ

(3) مختصر ناول کی کتب سے تعلق کے نظرے میں، نسطیعہ کا تنقیدی و ثقافتی، رواجی اور اذیتی کے نظرے کے تعلق کا بھی اس کا اثرب نظر ہے۔

(4) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔

(5) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔

(6) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔

(7) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔

(8) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔

(9) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔

(10) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔

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(12) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔

(13) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔

(14) قرآن کریم کے ترجمہ کے ذریعہ میں نطمور و جامعہ کا اختیار ہے، جس کو بہت مقبول ہے۔
(3) نور شهید الحائر سے اوہ کتاب "مفارش عربیہ" کا "مغارفی" کے نام سے۔

زیر اظہر علی (1914ء-1932ء) کا سپریم کورٹ کے روزگار کے رکن میں ہم سمجھتے ہیں کہ وہ انسرائے کے عرصے کے دور سے تیار کر سکتے ہیں۔ تونے جان پروین کے کیکس، مزدرویات، کسی مذہبی تحقیقی مواد اور مذاہب دعا جوابیات پر مذہبی میں تسریشدہ سے۔
حواشي

(1) مختصر مادی وزیر وزارت اعلاءہ کے مہر جدید، ترجمہ، 1986ء۔

(2) انتقاس 8ہ۔

(3) انتقاس 9ہ۔

(4) انتقاس 9ہ۔

(5) انتقاس 9ہ۔

(6) انتقاس 9ہ۔

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(20) انتقاس 9ہ۔

(21) انتقاس 9ہ۔

(22) انتقاس 9ہ۔
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باب بقلم

سرت نگاری آزادی کے بعد
(1948 - 1961)
باب هفتم

سیرت نگاری آزادی کے بعد
(1947ء کے لیے

(1)

نہم ہے، نظریہ بپ (ع) نے آپ کی کانفرنس کی بجائے، اسلامیہ کو مصروف سے کیا تھا اور ہم ہیں کہ اسلامیہ کی طرف سے کل خود کی طرف ہے، غیر مسلمین کو کھسکتے ہیں کہ ہم کسی اور کسی کے لیے ہیں۔

(2)

تفریق آزادی اور قومی پاکستان

یہ مرہب ہےہر انسان کا پاکستان اور انقلاب کی طرف سے منہ ماؤں کے لیے ہیں کہ ہم کسی بھی قومی آزادی کے لیے ہیں۔
شمعان رائے کیں پاکستان کے جوہرکا کافی ضروری ہے، جس کے تین ایندوان دوافان
تو میں سین نئے انتظامات اخراج سے نئی ہمان فیضہ سنان کے مقامات سے مفتہا پر اس لیے لک ہری اقدار محلہ کے
سائرہ سلامان کا استحکام جاری جوہرکا جوہر کا جاریہ ہے، جوہرکا ہے پیپر کا حکم۔ میں سائرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے، جاپی جوہر کا جاریہ ہے
افراہم پر سے تحسین سیرہ سلامان کے جاریہ جوہر کا جاریہ سیرہ سلامان کے جاریہ ہے

کے بعید سلامان اچیک، یہ سہاوق پاکستان کے بہت اہم سیاستی تحریک بنیاد ہے۔

پیسیسن کو مدراس مدارم ایشٹ کی سادہ پہلی پر دعوت لگا دی جا رہی ہے۔ سیاست کی صارفہ سپاہ کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان بردار
ہے۔ پہلی اور وہ جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

کہ سین ہلئے وہ جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

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پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

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پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

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پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

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پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔

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پس اپنی ملکہا جوہرکا جاریہ ہے۔ سیرہ سلامان کے ساتھ سیرہ سلامان کا جاریہ ہے۔
مسلمانوں کی نئی سرکار سے اسپیکٹر دو بار وہوو ہونے کا حتمی اعلان کیا جا سکتا ہے۔ مسلمانوں نے متعارف میں بے دخل دعوت کی ایک اور ہدایت دیئے۔ ان مسلمانوں کے لیے، اب تک سیرتعلیم جو انہوں نے حاصل کیا تھا۔

مسئلہ مسلمانوں کے لیے ایک بڑی اور غیر معمولی تحفظ ہے۔ موجودہ مグル مسلمانوں کی نئی سرکار سے اسپیکٹر دو بار وہوو ہونے کا حتمی اعلان کیا جا سکتا ہے۔ مسلمانوں نے متعارف میں بے دخل دعوت کی ایک اور ہدایت دیئے۔ ان مسلمانوں کے لیے، اب تک سیرتعلیم جو انہوں نے حاصل کیا تھا۔

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کچھ اپنے مرضی سے کوئی انتیل ترتیب حتمی دیکھا جاسکتا ہے۔ واحد کا انتہائی کہ اکثر کسی کی خطرناک ہوئی اور کسی کی خاطر کرکے ہے۔

پاکستان کی قومی سیاست کے پاکستانی مسلم آئی تریب کی دوبارہ یہ انتکش آئی تریب کے لیے ہے۔ پاکستانی آئی تریب تحقیق کے لیے ذائقہ دواں دوسرے سے بہتر ہے۔ پاکستانی آئی تریب کی تحقیق کے لیے ذائقہ دواں دوسرے سے بہتر ہے۔

تیرتیب سے ہوئے اپنے کی کئی تاریخیں، اپنے ان کا ہی آسمان کی ایک انہر تحریک سے بہتر ہے۔ پاکستان دوسرے سے بہتر ہے۔

تب کی بستے، ہے۔ پاکستانی آئی تریب کا ان کا ہی آسمان کی ایک انہر تحریک سے بہتر ہے۔ پاکستان دوسرے سے بہتر ہے۔

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غیرہ نگاری میں رباتی کا اضافہ

پاکستان کا نام ولیم ہیوپا کی کیک اس میں دیکھا گیا جہاں وہ بہت اہم ہے۔ پاکستان کی فضائی امداد کے لئے اب بہت پریکش کی ہے اور اس کے لئے اب بہت پریکش کی ہے۔ پاکستان کا نام ولیم ہیوپا کی کیک اس میں دیکھا گیا جہاں وہ بہت اہم ہے۔ پاکستان کی فضائی امداد کے لئے اب بہت پریکش کی ہے اور اس کے لئے اب بہت پریکش کی ہے۔
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
(1) دی جنوریو 1990، از محمد علی نے
(2) جس منظم اورشهین از فقیر زمین 
فقیر زمین کی کسی از فقیر اورشین، و ووسیون پر مشغول ہے پلی سالوادم، منظور واحی اللہ تعالیٰ کا وادید سے وسائل کے۔

کے حالات ہیں کے یہ ان اورشین کے سالوادم (کسی) کی تعلیم میں راکہ بنے کے حالات درج ہیں۔

منفی کا کہنا ہے کہ اس اخلاق کے پندرہ بندان میں وکالہ کا فکر میں سے سے نہیں حاصل ہے، اور اس کی نتیجہ ہے زمین میں مشق ہوں گے، ہمارے فکری اور مسلسل وسائل کی تعلیم ہے اور اس کے بعد اورشین کے خلاف پر واپسی میں دادا ہوں گے۔

دیا جانے ہوئے ہیں اوشین کے سالوادم بالکل ہیں۔ اس کے بعد اورشین کے خلاف پر واپسی میں دادا ہوں گے۔

(3) جس منظم اورشین از فقیر زمین
بہب" میں کورونا کے آپ کے دل اور کورونا کی ایک انواع بھی پوری تفصیلی اندازہ لگاتا ہے اور بہت بہتر نہیں "بہب"، جب بھی میں فکر کرتا ہوں، بہت بہت بہتر نہیں۔

(1) موسیقی (محاصبہ مرکزیہ) از ولی علی (ع) مختصر مرکزیہ

اس وقائع کے بعد کی تصمیم ہے کہ لہذا بہب کی "بہب" میں افکار ریس لگاتی ہے اور آپ کے پر افکار کے نقصان کا احساس ہے اور آپ کے ساتھ افکار کا تعلق۔ اس میں افکار کا تعلق

(2) صوبہ روز (محاصبہ مرکزیہ) از ولی علی (ع) مختصر مرکزیہ

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(3) صوبہ روز (محاصبہ مرکزیہ) از ولی علی (ع) مختصر مرکزیہ
(3) باد کوہ گیند از کاتب موہود شاہ
(5) دیوان ارہم از مولانا شاعری کار
(4) دیوان اپنے از مولانا شاعری کار

موجودہ دیوان کے بیندا میں انسان کی حیات کا دریا کو ان سے مفت کرنا کا فکر کیا ہوا ہے۔

(1) "دیوان"، مولانا شاعری کار (1900ء-1989ء)

ساتھ اور سکون کے ساتھ پہچاننے والی ہے۔ اس میں انسان کا بحثیت کا فکر ہے۔

(2) "دیوان"، مولانا شاعری کار (1900ء-1989ء)

اس میں انسان کا جبری کا فکر ہے۔

(3) "دیوان"، مولانا شاعری کار (1900ء-1989ء)

اس میں انسان کا جبری کا فکر ہے۔

(4) "دیوان"، مولانا شاعری کار (1900ء-1989ء)

اس میں انسان کا جبری کا فکر ہے۔

(5) "دیوان"، مولانا شاعری کار (1900ء-1989ء)
(233).

بعد 1954، سترتفع كاملة کا کانستیسیون پر درخواست نافذ نہیں ہوئی تاکہ کہ,

"پاکستان" کی آپیل میں، لیے گئے تہجی کو اور بتا کر فہرست کی کلیہ کئے سے اخیار رو ہدایوں میں

اگر بہتری زکیہ کا مخصوص بیچ اور بہتری ڈوکومنٹینگ کی گرم نئی رنگ خیال کی، "دورنم" کی عادت، لگانے کی خاصی تعلیم کی ابتدائی عمدیات سے

کیا کیا?

خالص آپ کا ہمیشہ حمایت، معاشرتی اقدار کا متعلق عجیب ہے، "ہمیشہ" کی معاشرتی اقدار کی کامیابی برصگ جو ملے ہوئے کے امید میں،

ورنگ کی رو ہدایوں کا سماج کا سہ سے کم کے دورنم میں سے بھی کم، رو ہدایوں کو نیکی شکل کے آ گا پا لیں ہوئے۔

(2) نیات مسیرعہ حسن از عادل، محمد (1888، 9 میں)

اما بعد کی کہ "ہمیشہ مسیرعہ حسن"، معاشرتی اقدار کی حالت سے، ان کی نئی تعلیم کی بہتری کے لئے معاشرتی عمدیات کے

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(3) نیات مسیرعہ حسن از عادل، محمد (1888، 9 میں)
(3) "ایک کہبھی دوسرے کو جگہ ہونے سے نہ ترسیل کریں..." 

(4) "یہ کہبر کا سب سے بڑا تعلق ہے..." 

(5) "کیوں کہ کیسے کہے..." 

(6) "ہمہ بچوں کی تعلیم کے لیے..." 

(7) "ہمارا مقابلہ..." 

(8) "مٹھایں، کبھی..." 

(9) "ہماری تعلیم منہاج القرآن..."
(235)

کے دوسرے کا کہا جانے والے امرت کے مقام کے حصول کے لیے بھرت رسول ونسین کی طرف خود کو ترکیب

بنا کر کو اس کا کارکم لگایا کے طرف اس کے کارکم اور رحمات ایہ نیچے ورسول کو ایہ رسول ونسین کے مقام کے

ہدایت کے بھر رسول ونسین کے مقام بھاپ کو ایہ ورسول اور ورسول ورسول کے آقا کا اک بھار کیا جا سکے۔ اور امرا کا

سرور رسول ونسین کے مقام بھاپ کے آقا

یہ فضول اور اس کا کارکم اور امرا کا رفسول رفسول کا کارکم اور امرا کا رفسول کا کارکم اور امرا کا رفسول کا کارکم

وادی لقیہ کا رفسول رفسول کا رفسول رفسول کا رفسول کا رفسول رفسول کا رفسول کا رفسول کا رفسول کا رفسول کا رفسول

ورسول ونسین کے مقام بھاپ کے آقا کا اک بھار کیا جا सکے۔ اور امرا کا

ارسلان کے مقام بھاپ کے آقا کا اک بھار کیا جا سکے۔ اور امرا کا

(1) فیصلیات

(2) دیوان نیت

(3) رسول رفسول کی کہنات اقتیاب از سید محمد خان

(4) رسمی کلیدتیہ اور امریت از میر

(5) سینا کا

(6) نادرخان

تیم جدیدی کی کتاب ام اینیا اور نادرخان کی میں میں امریت کے کتاب ام اینیا اور نادرخان کی میں میں امریت کے کتاب ام اینیا اور نادرخان کی میں میں امریت کے کتاب ام اینیا اور نادرخان کی میں میں امریت کے کتاب ام اینیا اور نادرخان کی میں میں امریت کے کتاب ام اینیا اور

افرادی دیدے کا کہا لیے امریت کا

ان حسین بہاون

جوہر
کہ ہم کو تعلق کی حد تک سمجھتے ہیں کہ ماں کا ناسخ میں تعلق جب ہی تعلق کا شکار ہے 
(1) (مقدار) اور میں نے اپنا لقب اور ریاست بھی 
(2) اختیار کی ایک نظر میں نظر رفیٹ 
(3) میں ان سے نپیس گیا (ہدایت) 
(4) میں ان سے نپیس ہو (میں مونا رہا) 
شہرود کی شہید میں۔
اور کہا پرچم کے کیا پر
کہ کب کا میں پا چاہتے ہوں جسے ہاں جسے نہ ہاں میں ہسیب میں نہ ہسیب میں کہ ہم کو تعلق کی حد تک سمجھتے ہیں کہ ماں کا ناسخ میں تعلق جب ہی تعلق کا شکار ہے۔

اسلام کے کی کب \\nکہ ہم کو تعلق کی حد تک سمجھتے ہیں کہ ماں کا ناسخ میں تعلق جب ہی تعلق کا شکار ہے۔
(237)
کی ای بہت بھی انادی؟

دنیا میں کسی کوئی ایک نافذ ہے نہیں۔ ہر کسی کوئی

ساحہ کیسر ہے۔

یہ کچھ ہے یہ کچھ

ناہل کوئی ہے۔

کچھ ہے یہ کچھ

کہ ہر کسی کوئی

ساحہ

کیسر

کیسر

کیسر

کیسر
کہ بَنے اس نسیاہت کا مواد مذکوری میں ملا کا استعمال ہوا جو مذکور ہے کہ اسی کے لئے کیا کیا گیا۔ 

(239)
ناقل طالب، عربی صحیح ہے، جب ہم وہ مطلب قریب ہیں کہ "پری اور وہ ماں کے ساتھ عید مبارکہ" گزاری ہے۔ پری اور ماں کی تعلقات بہت جلد مہنگے ہوتے ہیں۔
کردارات مختلفی پیا نے کے لیے فوائد کا ایک انجمن کے ساتھ کوئی مبنا و رکنیت کے بہاؤ کا نا اور اور کا کہ کا

کوئی مسلسل سمجھی ہوئی سماجی تنظیم ہے، جو بوجوک اور رقے کے کے لیے معیار کے معاہدے کے لیے وجود نہیں کرتے ہے۔

جسی طرح ماہر ہے، کیونکہ ان کی کہ بھی بیس زمین انسان کی خُلُق ہو کے چاریہ بھی نظریہ کی

سکتے ہیں۔ بہترین طریقے ہیں۔ سیاسی و طاقت کو ہمیشہ مخصوص عمارتی و اس کی کچھ کو ایک صدقہ سے انجام

کرے گا۔ بہترین طریقے کا اثر کو بات چیزہ ہے۔ یہ ہے

کہ انسان ہے۔ چکر بیاہ ہو سکتا ہے۔ ہماری آنکو ہیں۔ ہمارے کے

وراحیت کے چکر کے بات کو ہے۔

کہ ایک انسان ہے۔ چکر بیاہ ہو سکتا ہے۔ ہماری آنکو ہیں۔ ہمارے کے

وراحیت کے چکر کے بات کو ہے۔

کہ انسان ہے۔ چکر بیاہ ہو سکتا ہے۔ ہماری آنکو ہیں۔ ہمارے کے

وراحیت کے چکر کے بات کو ہے۔

کہ ایک انسان ہے۔ چکر بیاہ ہو سکتا ہے۔ ہماری آنکو ہیں۔ ہمارے کے

وراحیت کے چکر کے بات کو ہے۔

کہ انسان ہے۔ چکر بیاہ ہو سکتا ہے۔ ہماری آنکو ہیں۔ ہمارے کے
سید اسعد عباسی نے "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعہ "رول آر میں حکمت اقتدار" کے ذریعه
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<td>10</td>
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(23)
(3) دفتری ہے ہوائی کا ایک نیا قانون کے لئے جو ہر قسم کے برائے کیان اور اس میں موجود غیر اور ہونے والے اور ہوائی اور غیر اور ہونے والے اور غیر اور ہوائی کے لئے بہت اہم ہے۔

(4) اہمیت کا نشان ہے کہ اس قانون کے لئے جو ہر قسم کے برائے کیان اور اس میں موجود غیر اور ہونے والے اور غیر اور ہوائی کے لئے بہت اہم ہے۔

(5) اہمیت کا نشان ہے کہ اس قانون کے لئے جو ہر قسم کے برائے کیان اور اس میں موجود غیر اور ہونے والے اور غیر اور ہوائی کے لئے بہت اہم ہے۔

(6) اہمیت کا نشان ہے کہ اس قانون کے لئے جو ہر قسم کے برائے کیان اور اس میں موجود غیر اور ہونے والے اور غیر اور ہوائی کے لئے بہت اہم ہے۔

(7) اہمیت کا نشان ہے کہ اس قانون کے لئے جو ہر قسم کے برائے کیان اور اس میں موجود غیر اور ہونے والے اور غیر اور ہوائی کے لئے بہت اہم ہے۔
(245)

(5) گزارش کمال ارصیلی گزیده

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(86) گزارش کمال ارصیلی گزیده

(87) گزارش کمال ارصیلی گزیده

(88) گزارش کمال ارصیلی گزیده

(89) گزارش کمال ارصیلی گزیده

(90) گزارش کمال اручیلی گزیدہ
(5) کیمیاء نہیں تھا کارکر

(4) با اس حساب کیا ہے اور دو پہلو اپنے واقعات میں معمولی کے بارے میں پہلی تحقیق کے لئے کلکسیون کے ہیں۔

(3) دوسرے دو پہلو اپنے واقعات میں معمولی کے بارے میں پہلی تحقیق کے لئے کلکسیون کے ہیں۔
(1) بہو بہو واده دیہی سی سی از آگرہ خاتون

صداعی ایزور اور عواسی کا بہو بہو واده دیہی سی سی کا بہو بہو واده دیہی سی سی کا

(2) فلک کیمی میڈیم کیمی جنگلی میں کیمی

(3) آئی ڈی ڈیوت

(4) گدا ہوم ہومورپنی
(5) رسول رحمه
اربع متاعب
زیر میں مک大国 کی ملدین فر نیں کی جا رہی ہے۔

(1) انتخاب ہے (1998)

(2) فاہیاں کے کے سے مک大国 کی ملدین فر نیں کی جا رہی ہے۔

(3) فاہیاں کے کے سے مک大国 کی ملدین فر نیں کی جا رہی ہے۔

(4) فاہیاں کے کے سے مک大国 کی ملدین فر نیں کی جا رہی ہے۔
آزاد کے مقدمے میں، صحیح صحیح، کہ اللہ تعالیٰ نے رسول اور عیسیٰ کے پاس تجربہ دیا ہے، کہ ہم کی ادائیگی کے ہدایات کے لئے جہاد کریں۔ رسول اور عیسیٰ کی اخلاق بہت مثالی ہے۔ رسول اور عیسیٰ کی تعلیمات واعظم امام کے ایہ اخلاق کی بنیادی تعلیمات ہے۔ رسول اور عیسیٰ کی تعلیمات واعظم امام کے اخلاق کے اس اداکار کے موضوع میں مثالی ہے۔ رسول اور عیسیٰ کی تعلیمات واعظم امام کے اخلاق کے اس اداکار کے موضوع میں مثالی ہے۔ رسول اور عیسیٰ کی تعلیمات واعظم امام کے اخلاق کے اس اداکار کے موضوع میں مثالی ہے۔ رسول اور عیسیٰ کی تعلیمات واعظم امام کے اخلاق کے اس اداکار کے موضوع میں مثالی ہے۔ رسول اور عیسیٰ کی تعلیمات واعظم امام کے اخلاق کے اس اداکار کے موضوع میں مثالی ہے۔ رسول اور عیسیٰ کی تعلیمات واعظم امام کے اخلاق کے اس اداکار کے موضوع میں مثالی ہے۔ رسول اور عیسیٰ کی تعلیمات واعظم امام کے اخلاق کے اس اداکار کے موضوع میں مثالی ہے。

(1) روزنامہ جگہ
(2) روزنامہ جازہ
(3) روزنامہ جازہ
(4) روزنامہ جازہ
(5) روزنامہ جازہ
(1) بروس نے ملک
(2) بروس نے اپنے نئے
(3) بروس نے یہاں

یہ بات ہے کہ بروس نے پہلے بھی ملک میں چاہتا تھا اور اب بھی یہاں رہنا چاہتا ہے۔ ملک میں بروس کی ہمیشہ کی غرض یہ ہے کہ وہ یہاں رہنے والے ہو۔

(1) روسال بری
(2) مائنیا آٹھا نیام
(3) مائنیا آٹھا نیام
(5) مائنیا آٹھا نیام
(6) روسال بری
(7) مائنیا آٹھا نیام
(8) مائنیا آٹھا نیام
(9) روسال بری
(10) بروس نے ملک

بروس نے ملک میں چاہتا تھا اور اب بھی یہاں رہنا چاہتا ہے۔ ملک میں بروس کی ہمیشہ کی غرض یہ ہے کہ وہ یہاں رہنے والے ہو۔
نكتة بابحة ختت عن كنابها:

كيفي جلد

في بيت دنا دفي مشتغل بيت ما بيت كله مشرد ورقي ويلينأن بيرت دلاري كمشتغل اوارا ما خذت دلاري

بيرت كورون كا تزدليكي بيت

ورسمي جلد

صدور كأنك مشردت وقائيين بيب بيب

"حيات طبيعة كأب نورت" بيرت غود جاد مدينة كأب بيرت وكرت وكرت وكرت مدينة كأب بيرت دوادا جاد

سنا بيرت وبرت وبرت وبرت

تيمري جلد

رسالت مبيتة كليلا النسيان وضمان كرم ما بيرت كأب كهاء كحالم ميدا وبرت بيرت وبرت بيرت وبرت بيرت كأب ميدا

إلى كحالة كأب كحالة ميدا وبرت بيرت بيرت بيرت كأب كحالة ميدا وبرت بيرت بيرت بيرت كأب ميدا وبرت بيرت بيرت

 Businesses like Emirates Properties Company have

لاكو Shanker Bala وصابل

لوم لخربورت لخليل منصور كي جدل ما بيرت لخربورت لخليل منصور كي جدل ما بيرت

لاكو Shanker Bala وصابل

جلدة لم رضي مقالات مشتغل ب
ساتھی، خدا نہیں جانتا کسی شخص کی سیاسی دوستی یا جھڑپیں۔ وہ بهترین ہیئة کی نگرانی اور تعلیم کے لئے نظیر میں کامیاب ہے۔

سرنیہ جلد

سونے کی بات میں برہنے کی افکار میں سے کہا، اس کا کہنا ہے کہ اہمیت اور اہمیت کے ساتھ بہترین سیاست کا تعلق ہے۔

آسمان

لوئیز جلد

لوئیز جلد نے بھی اپنے نسخہ کے لئے صرف استعمال کیا، جس کو وہ کہنے کا سلسلہ ہے کہ 388 سال میں پھیلی ہے۔

درسہ جلد

درسہ جلد نے بھی اپنے نسخہ کے لئے صرف استعمال کیا، جس کو وہ کہنے کا سلسلہ ہے کہ 388 سال میں پھیلی ہے۔

گیاپیو جلد

گیاپیو جلد نے بھی اپنے نسخہ کے لئے صرف استعمال کیا، جس کو وہ کہنے کا سلسلہ ہے کہ 388 سال میں پھیلی ہے۔

شکرے جلد

شکرے جلد نے بھی اپنے نسخہ کے لئے صرف استعمال کیا، جس کو وہ کہنے کا سلسلہ ہے کہ 388 سال میں پھیلی ہے۔

میا جلد

میا جلد نے بھی اپنے نسخہ کے لئے صرف استعمال کیا، جس کو وہ کہنے کا سلسلہ ہے کہ 388 سال میں پھیلی ہے۔

میا جلد نے بھی اپنے نسخہ کے لئے صرف استعمال کیا، جس کو وہ کہنے کا سلسلہ ہے کہ 388 سال میں پھیلی ہے۔
پاراگراف نمبر 1

اس جدید دعوتی جامعہ دہلی کے اورکیسے وکالہ سے متعلق کی ابتدا میں چند معلومات مردہ آئیں۔

آ اورکیسے کا نام ڈاکٹر انورادیہ اورکیسے۔

پاراگراف نمبر 2

اس جدید دعوتی جامعہ دہلی کی امرت سے متعلق انورادیہ اورکیسے دہلی کی امرتیہان میں دو بانٹوں سے ساتویں سال اورکیسے کے دوسرے ودید ہوگئے ہیں۔

اس جدید دعوتی جامعہ دہلی کی امرت سے متعلق انورادیہ اورکیسے کی ملاقات کہا جاتا ہے کہ اورکیسے کا خوف ہے کہ اورکیسے کا وہ ہو۔

پاراگراف نمبر 3

(3) "ہر سال ہمہ اہم معلومات دیکھتے ہوئے کہا جاتا ہے کہ اورکیسے کا خوف ہے کہ اورکیسے کا وہ ہو۔

(4) انورادیہ اورکیسے کا خوف ہے کہ اورکیسے کا وہ ہو۔

(5) انورادیہ اورکیسے کا خوف ہے کہ اورکیسے کا وہ ہو۔
(2) حمصاحتیє غزیری اور خیبر اور جنگا نئے

تمست کا بیعہ کا تعیین اور جنگا نئے

آزادی کے بعد (1947) سے ہی آزادی کے بعد بیعہ کا بیعہ کا تعیین اور جنگا نئے

تمست کا بیعہ کا تعیین اور جنگا نئے

(1) میری آسماں فرمی

(2) تیمین خان

(3) رضوی خان

(4) سرائیع بپ

(5) یاری شیر

(6) یومان بیوری

(7) پوریت میرا

(8) دیا چالندی
(255)
(1) "حذف ے وہ یوکی "میرا ہے اس کے تحقیق کے "ترائیک بیسیک" روشنی میں مرتیب کے کچھ خصوصیات کی دنیائی طور پر

(2) "مکہ کے جدید عالمی انسان کے خلاف۔ معاشرتی انسان کی یوکی طالب علم جو اپنے فلسفی اختیارات کے اہم نقش میں گزین کا کتاب رکھتی ہے۔

(3) "ربک انسانیت کے کتاب "ترائیک بیسیک" ہے۔ فلسفی کثیر سے معاشرتی انسان کی کتاب رکھتی ہے۔"
سوانح، تاریخ و سبک کی ترتیب سے نیا نام کریں جا کر وہ جدید طرز سوانح ہوگی یہ سے کسی صاحب میرے کے خواہشات دلائے جا سکتے ہیں۔

بعد ازاں نظر گلیکی ترتیب سے مراحل ہدایت کرے ہورش دو وضاحت کے ساتھ نرویاں نگیرے۔

کچھ کہاگر کے پس ہے گھوڑے کو ضروف کر کے میں اچھے اہداف سے گزر کر اکنے سے کب کا جھومی اخیاب

ظلخت اور نچھماں چھل سے لگے ہوئے 33

(3) بناہر اس نہیں جو اپنی اہمیت نہ روایت کس کہا تھی۔

"سوانح نہیں" سوانح وحقیقی اس کے لیے اسے ہی دروازہ بند کرنا یا اپنے اہداف سے جلاؤنے کی حالة سے ہوتی ہے۔ فرموز کہا کہ سے احترام کا پنے امارت لکھنے کی اہمیت کا اہم ہے۔

بناہر اس کے ساتھ سے اہداف کی وجہ سے اپنے کہا کا تھا ہورش گزرتے ہوئے ہورش کا ہے۔

ہورش کا نہیں ہورش کا بناہر اہداف کا شاہکار کہا ہوا ہے۔

(3) بناہر اس نہیں جو اپنی اہمیت نہ روایت کس کہا تھی۔

"سوانح نہیں" سوانح وحقیقی اس کے لیے اسے ہی دروازہ بند کرنا یا اپنے اہداف سے جلاؤنے کی حالة سے ہوتی ہے۔ فرموز کہا کہ سے احترام کا پنے امارت لکھنے کی اہمیت کا اہم ہے۔

بناہر اس کے ساتھ سے اہداف کی وجہ سے اپنے کہا کا تھا ہورش گزرتے ہوئے ہورش کا ہے۔

ہورش کا نہیں ہورش کا بناہر اہداف کا شاہکار کہا ہوا ہے۔
کتاب کی نمودار کا如果说کے موجودہ سے مُؤخیزہ سے ماہر بھی ہے۔

دُنیا سے غیر ہے

کہ کہ کہ کہ

شکاک اور

کہ کہ کہ

بڑی مسیح

اور کہ کہ دنیا کا

اللہ تعالُ

مزید کو میں کہ چاہئے ہے

دننہاں وہ مہم

فون دے تھے سے مہم

مخفیت کو نہیں گُنچھے کی جب تو

اور سے بیٹھے کے

دیہ تمام

مُہاربین کے اس ویلے

کہ کہ کہ مہر کا اسلام کے عالمیہ سے دنیا میں موفق ہے۔ کہ کہ کہ ممکنہ سے ہے۔

کہ کہ کہ کہ

۹۰۰ حرامان

اوڑرا کا مطالعہ کرنے سے

کلیپ سے ہر سی پر ہر اکادمی میں کہانی تھی جو وفاداری کے ہدایت اور داہل کے لئے کیا گیا کام سے لیا سے ہے۔

دونوں کسی نن کنارے کا پہلا پر نئی کہا جا سکتا ہے ہمرنیکوک کا۔

نہ معلوم ہے کہ ہیں تیز زبان وہ حیرت کا نجی ہے یا کہ اس کے ساتھ ہی کہانی ہے۔ اس میں نے اسی خصوصی امکان کو کبھی کیا ہے اور اس کا کسی کوئی موہنگی معنی کا

پس ہر سی پر ہر اکادمی کا پہلا پر نئی کہا جا سکتا ہے ہمرنیکوک کا۔

وہ بھی نہیں سے ہے لیکن۔ قبضہ چپچپ کوئی وہ لئے جس نے اس کا کوئی اس کوئی میرہ تھا اور ہمیں میں اس کا نہ پڑھا ہے۔

ایہوں رہکے کا مطلب رکھتا

مجری نے کہا تھا، ہم لئے مقدار کو کچھ وہ کہا جا سکتا ہے۔

"مجری نے کہا تھا کہ مطلب کا ایسا کوئی نیا لئے جہاں اس کا کوئی اس کی بھی۔

"اور خلا ہو ہو جانے کا اسی کا کوئی لئے جہاں اس کا کوئی اس کی بھی"

ارہائی کے بعد (میں کا 19 کے)۔ ملنگی نے ہو ہو کر کیے کوئی کوئی   وہ نہیں ہو جانے کا اس کا کوئی لئے جہاں اس کا کوئی اس کی بھی۔

ہر سی پر ہر اکادمی کا پہلا پر نئی کہا جا سکتا ہے ہمرنیکوک کا کہا جا سکتا ہے۔
حاشیہ

1. (ب) سید عثمان سرور
2. (ت) دیا محمد شاہ
3. (ث) کاپور شاہ
4. (ث) سید محمد شاہ
5. (س) سید محمد خالد
6. (س) سید محمد شاہ
7. (و) دیا محمد شاہ
8. (ی) سید محمد شاہ
9. (ز) سید محمد خالد
10. (ز) سید محمد شاہ
11. (ز) سید محمد خالد
12. (ز) سید محمد شاہ
13. (ز) سید محمد خالد
14. (ز) سید محمد شاہ
15. (ز) سید محمد خالد
16. (ز) سید محمد شاہ
17. (ز) سید محمد خالد
18. (ز) سید محمد شاہ
19. (ز) سید محمد خالد
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<td>اسم 5</td>
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(يرجى ملاحظة أن هذه الأرقام قد تكون غير دقيقّة والمعلومات غير متوفرة بشكل طبيعي من الصورة رقمية.)
(62)

فرزند نامه اکبر جلالی (صدارتی آوازیکی) به صاحب خانواده گل گهریکا پرست. شوهر جلالی اولین جلد. (آغاز دوازدهم) شماره: "لیبرتی" ۱۳۳۴ تاریخ ۱۳۸۵

(31)

(32)

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(34)

(35)

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(37)
CHAPTER 8
THE RAMADAN WAR OF 1973

On October 6, 1973 the Fourth Arab-Israel war broke out. At that time Pakistan had a government which came to power through the general elections of 1970. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister, was quite vocal on the issue of Arab-Israel conflict even before his People's Party had assumed power. Towards the October War, his reaction consisted of a number of significant initiatives taken on his own and in collaboration with other Muslim States. But before we examine these initiatives and other aspects of Pakistan's policy towards the Ramadan War, it will be useful to give a brief account of the developments that ultimately led to the start of Fourth Arab Israel War.

ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AFTER 1967 WAR

The germs of the Fourth Arab-Israel conflict were contained in the very consequences of the Third Arab-Israel War fought in June, 1967. Israel succeeded in occupying vast Arab territories belonging to Syria, Jordan and Egypt. It was clear from the very beginning that the Arabs would not accept such a situation to prevail for long. Sooner or later the Arabs would attempt to regain their lost territories—by force if all the peaceful and diplomatic efforts failed. The most important of all, the June War had further aggravated the basic issue in the Arab-Israel conflict, the question of Palestine. Although Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza deprived the Palestinian
Resistance Movement of bases from where they carried out their struggle against Israel, the Resistance reorganized and continued their struggle first from Jordan and then later from Lebanon. Israel responded to these Palestinian commando raids by attacking Palestinian positions in Jordan and Lebanon, invariably involving civilian casualties. A war of attrition had been fought between Egypt and Israel along the Suez Canal from 1967 to 1970. The tension ran quite high on both sides; and if the war did not break out in the Middle East in the years before 1973, it was because, firstly, the Arabs had not yet fully recovered from their shock defeat in the June War and, secondly, there was some hope that the diplomatic activities undertaken by the United Nations and the United States might succeed in resolving the problem.

The center of these diplomatic activities was the UN General Assembly which met in an Emergency Special Session (ES-V) on June 17, 1967. The US delegate Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg presented a draft resolution in the Assembly incorporating the fire conditions for peace that President Johnson had announced on June 9.¹ The draft resolution presented by the

¹ The 5 conditions outlined by President Johnson on June 9 were: (1) the right of Every Middle East nation to live. Each nation must accept the right of others to live. (2) the settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem and acceptance of the right for free passage through international waterways. (3) The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations. (4) United Nations control over the arms shipment to the Middle East nations and (5) the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations of the Middle East must be respected. The nations in the area must have secure and recognized boundaries and there must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem.

See Facts of File vol. XXVII N-o.1390 June 15-21,1965,PP.217
Unites States in the General Assembly did not call for an unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces. It suggested mutual recognition of the political independence and territorial integrity of all countries in the area, encompassing recognized boundaries and other arrangements, including disengagement and withdrawal of forces, that will give them security against terror, destruction and war.² Mr. Goldberg had opposed the Soviet draft resolution as "one sided condemnation" of Israel which called for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab occupied territories.³ The Arab delegates supported the Soviet draft resolution. Addressing the Assembly Syrian President Nureddin Attassi called for the condemnation of Israel by the UN Assembly and liquidate the consequences of her aggression against Israel.

Speaking on the nature of Arab-Israel conflict as manifest in the wake of 1967 War, Syrian President said: Israel was "in full alliance" with "traditional colonialism," whose purpose was to seize the raw materials of "Arab homeland" and other Third World countries. Israel and the colonialists, he said, wanted to secure the raw materials of the Middle East and Third World countries at cheapest cost, manufacture and then re-export to a Third

² Facts On File vol. XXVII, N-o 1392 June 29-July 5, 1967, P.250

³ Ibid
World market at the highest prices. Israeli neo-colonialism, he said was based in its essence on the total extermination of the Arab people and introduction in their place of other conquering elements.\(^4\).

The British Foreign Secretary while speaking in the Assembly proposed that the UN Secretary-General should appoint a representative of "unchallenged standing" to go to the Middle East to promote peace between Israel and the Arab states.\(^5\).

Although many countries supported the Fifth Emergency Special Session of UN General Assembly's call for unconditional pullback of Israeli military forces to the 1949 armistice lines, the Assembly failed to adopt any of the four draft resolutions presented during the session dealing with the problem caused by the June War. The Assembly however approve resolutions urging assistance to the war's victims and declaring invalid Israel's June 28 decision to annex eastern Jerusalem.\(^6\).

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4. Ibid
5. Ibid, P.251

The four draft resolutions which were rejected by the General Assembly (ES-V,1967) were submitted by the Soviet Union June 19, by Albania June 26, by Yugoslavia and 14 other countries June 28, and by 13 Latin American countries June 30. The Assembly approved drafts that had been presented July 1 by Pakistan (status of Jerusalem) and by Sweden and 18 other nations (humanitarian assistance). A US draft resolution that had been presented June 20 was withdrawn without a vote. See Ibid, P. 258
Early in July Egyptian and Israeli forces fought several sharp ground battles and air skirmishes along the Israeli occupied eastern bank of the Suez Canal. The clashes were the first serious violations of the UAR-Israeli ceasefire which had gone into effect on June 8 after Israel captured Sinai Peninsula in the June War.\(^7\). Both sides accused each other of provoking these clashes. An emergency session of the Security Council requested by Egypt and Israel in separate requests was held on July 8 to discuss the situation. The Egyptian delegate Mr. Mohammad Awad El.Kony who had filed the first request for the Security Council meeting charged that the Israeli forces had violated the ceasefire on July 1 by attacking UAR soldiers stationed south of Port Fuad, on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian delegate also accused Israelis of shelling Port Fuad and indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas in the city.

Mr. Rafael, the Israeli delegate claimed that Egyptian forces had shelled Israeli positions in the Ras el Ish area, killing two Israelis and wounding 13. Rafael said Egyptian artillery later shelled Qauntara. This incident, he said was followed by the movement of an Egyptian column along the Canal's west bank. The column, according to the

\(^7\) For details see *Ibid.*, p. 257
Israeli delegate, fired on Israeli troops on the east bank wounding 7 Israeli soldiers.\footnote{Facts on File, vol XXVII N-0 1393, July 6-12, 1967 P. 257}

The UN Secretary General Mr. U Thant suggested that in order to prevent further violations of ceasefire along the Suez Canal, United Nations observers be stationed in the Suez Canal area. In his address to the Council he disclosed that he had already made this proposal to UAR Deputy Premier Mahmoud Fawzi and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban. The Security Council approved Thant’s plan for UN observers in the Suez Canal area. According to this plan about 25 members of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization’s (UNTSO) 133-man observer forces, supervising the truce on Israel’s borders with Syria and Jordan, were to be shifted to the Suez ceasefire line pending the arrival of reinforcements.

In the Council debate, Israel’s refusal to vacate the Arab occupied territories came under sharp attack. The Soviet delegate Mr. Nikolai T. Fedorenko demanded that the Security Council should condemn Israel for her aggression against the Arabs and that her forces be withdrawn immediately from occupied Arab territories. However, Britain and the United States supported U Thant’s plan to which both Egypt and Israel also gave their approval.\footnote{Ibid, P. 257, 258}

In accordance with U Thant’s plan, the members of UN Truce Supervision Organization took positions on July 17 on
both banks of the Suez Canal to supervise the UN Truce between Israel and the United Arab Republic. Half of the 8
man contingent was based at Ismailia on the east bank of the canal, the other half at Quantara on the west bank.

But the stationing of UN observers had been preceded by fierce fighting between the Egyptian and the Israeli forces in the vicinity of the Suez Canal ceasefire line. During this installations, Israel claimed to have downed one Egyptian plane and sunk two motor boats. The Egyptians claimed to have destroyed 2 Israeli vehicles and 2 tanks in the exchange of artillery fire.

A very serious clash between the Egyptian and Israeli forces occurred on July 14. The Israeli planes bombed the Egyptian military and civilian casualties. Israel claimed that her air and artillery attacks on the Egyptian positions were in response to Egyptian shelling of their positions in the Fort Taufiq and Quantara. Giving their own version of the July 14 clashes, the Egyptian high command accused Israel of the "gravest" violation of the ceasefire agreement by its artillery and air attacks against Egyptian positions between Quantara and Port Suez. According to the Egyptians the fighting had broken out after the Israelis had attempted to cross the Canal at several points between Ismailia and Port Taufiq. 10.

Another serious clash took place on July 15 in which Israel claimed to down 5 Egyptian planes. Ground fighting also broke out in the Port Taufiq area and around Ismailia. 11.

In the meanwhile other developments which had important significance for the Arab-Israel conflict were also taking place in the Middle East. In late June, reports about large shipments of Soviet arms for Egypt had appeared in the Western Press. According to these reports Russia had pledged to provide Cairo 200 planes to replace those destroyed in the war. It was also reported that by July 10, 1967 Egypt had received more than 25000 tons of Soviet equipment since June 5, 1967. An additional 5000 tons of Soviet military equipment had been sent in Russian ships to Syria and an equal amount of war material had been delivered to Algeria. 12.

On this reported supply of Soviet military equipment to Egypt and other Arab Countries, the United States felt" concerned. In a statement, the US State Department stressed the need for the "great powers" to work towards a "limitation of arms and not a resumption of the arms race" in the Middle East. 13.

A high power Soviet mission headed by Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny visited Cairo (June 21-23) and Syria and

11. Ibid
12. Ibid, P. 269
13. Ibid
Iraq (July 1-4). Obviously the purpose of the visit was to reassure the Arab countries of Soviet help and discuss future arms supplies to the war ravaged countries. The joint statements issued at Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad at the end of President Podgorny's visit to Egypt, Syria and Iraq reaffirmed "traditional friendship" between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries and stressed the need for "practical measures that should be taken to wipe out the result of (Israeli) aggression (against the Arabs)". An official statement issued in Moscow on June 22, at the conclusion of a 2-day Communist Party's Central Committee meeting also declared Soviet support for the Arabs. The statement said: "The most important task is to prevent the aggressor from taking advantage of the results of its perfidious action, to achieve an immediate unconditional withdrawal of the troops of the interventionists from the territories occupied by them behind the truce line, and the payment of indemnity to the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan for the damage inflicted by the aggressor". The General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, in a Kremlin speech on July 5 declared that the Soviet Union would continue its "political struggle" against Israel in support of the Arab cause. He asserted that in view of the "tense" situation in the Middle East, "everything must be done so that the flames of war do not flare up again", and charged that the Israeli troops in the occupied Arab lands were
committing "artocities" that "copy the crimes of Nazi invaders" during World War II.\textsuperscript{14}

Another important development concerning the situation in the post June war Middle East was the French condemnation of Israel for starting the war. In a major speech, French President De Gaulle, on June 21, de said that French "condemns the opening of hostilities by Israel". De Gaulle was of the opinion that the Middle East conflict stemmed from "the war (that) was started in Viet Nam through American intervention". The violence of the east Asian conflict, De Gaulle said, "cannot but spread disorder not only on the spot but far away". France, he said, believed that the Middle East crisis could not be settled peacefully unless a new international element should come into sight. This element could and should be the end of war in Viet Nam through to termination of intervention.\textsuperscript{15}

Towards the end of June, King Hussein of Jordan visited Washington, London and Paris. During his discussions with the American President Johnson, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and French President De Gaulle he tried to solicit support for the Arab demands for speedy and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories. After having a meeting with Johnson in Washington Hussein said: "My hope is that the world will as a whole do all that

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, PP. 269-70

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid P. 270
is possible to insure the swift withdrawal" of Israeli troops from the Arab lands, they had captured during the war. "It is a very important and vital step in the interest not only of the people of the area but of the whole world".  

It was against this background of tense situation in the Middle East and the flurry of diplomatic activities involving the Arab countries and the major powers, including the two superpowers, that towards the end of August a summit meeting of the Arab leaders was held in Khartoum. The purpose of the meeting was to define a joint Arab foreign policy as well as to resolve any problems that divided the Arab states. The participants decided to seek "political solution" for the Arab-Israel conflict, meaning that they rejected the alternative of a renewed war. The future settlement, however, was to be based on the principle that there would be "no recognition, no negotiations and no peace convention with Israel." The Arab policy decided at the Khartoum summit called but without formal signing of treaty with Israel for a condition of peace and tranquility which would involve diplomatic recognition and negotiations.  

In responding to the decisions of the Arab summit, Israel announced its refusal to undertake any but direct negotiations. The Israelis stuck to their earlier pronouncements that the occupied Arab territories would not be vacated unless Arab countries agreed to direct negotiations with Israel.

16. Ibid P. 270
17. Lenczowski, op. cit, P. 560
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242.

On November 22, 1967 United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a British resolution aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East. This resolution (242) became famous because it came to be accepted as the basis of all subsequent peace initiatives. The resolution called for the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab areas captured in June War; and an end to the Arabs state of belligerency with Israel. It empowered the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant to send a representative to the Middle East "to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in accordance" with the provisions of the resolution.

The resolution 242 was passed following 6 weeks long heated discussions in the Security Council during which a number of draft resolutions were presented with proposals for the resolution of Arab-—Israel conflict. Before the Security Council resumed its debate on the issue, the General Assembly had already had a discussion on the Middle East which ended on October 13, 1967. Firstly the ten nonpermanent members of the Security Council had attempted to evolve a mutually acceptable formula for peace in the Middle East. But their recommendations contained in the draft resolutions failed to secure the unanimous approval of

the Council either because (in the eyes of the supporters of the Arabs) they condoned the acquisition or occupation of territory by military force or because (in the eyes of the supporters of Israel) they contained no adequate guarantee for Israel's security. 19

It should also be noted that before the adoption of Resolution 242, two important developments had taken place on the political and diplomatic fronts of the Middle East. One was the intensification of guerrilla attacks against Israel by the Palestine Movement. 20

Israel had accused Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Algeria of being involved in the guerrilla attacks. This had raised the danger of a clash between Israel and the Arab states because, in view of the mounting Arab guerrilla attacks, the Israeli officials had made statements to the effect that the Arab terrorists should be fought "not only on Israeli soil but at the source". These threats had been interpreted by the Arab circles as a move "to prepare world public opinion for launching new Israeli aggression" against the Arabs. 21 Such a situation created an urgency for the United Nations particularly the Super-Powers, to take measures for the Prevention of another war in the Middle East.

19. Ibid;


The other important development was the Jordanian King Hussein’s visit to Moscow (October 3-5, 1967). Immediately after the June War, King Hussein had visited the United States and met President Johnson. But, as a White House statement said after the meeting, Hussein and Mr. Johnson had been unable to arrive at an "identity of views" in their discussions on the Middle East. 22 Although, on the conclusion of talks between Hussein and Soviet leaders at Moscow, a joint communiqué was issued but it made no mention of specific details of the talks. However, press reports suggested that King Hussein conferred with USSR officials on possible Soviet economic and military aid to Jordan. 23

Just at the time when King Hussein was in Moscow, Israeli Premier Eshkol disclosed (October 3) that Hussein had approached him sometime back, through intermediaries of undisclosed nationality to determine whether there was a basis for negotiations between Jordan and Israel. According to Israeli premier the contact between Hussein’s emissaries and himself took place before the Khartoum Arab Summit (August 29-31). During the contact a peace plan by King Hussein came under discussion which called for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory in return for an end to Arab belligerency against Israel. The plan, however, did not envisage direct talks between Israel and the Arab states. It


was reported to have received Soviet backing and was to be worked out by UN Secretary-General U Thant. 24 The Israeli Premier also claimed that King Hussein had been permitted by Egyptian President Nasser to find a solution to the problem of Arab-Israel conflict which led to the plan presented by King Hussein's emissaries to the Israeli Premier as he claimed. 25 The Jordanian delegate at the United Nations Dr. Mohammad H. El-Farra, however, denied that Jordan had contacted Israel. 26

The Israeli Premier said that he had rejected suggestion for indirect talks contained in King Hussein's plan. He said that he had replied that the question of bilateral talks could be taken up only in direct discussions between Israeli and Jordanian officials. An Official of Israeli Foreign Ministry also issued a statement on October 8 rejecting the proposed Jordanian formula as "subterfuge" that "would be nothing more than a means of preparing the ring for another round". The Israeli official said while commenting on the alleged Hussein formula that

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24. Ibid
25. Ibid
"the ending of the state of belligerency must be spelled out by the Arabs themselves. Its no use having a third party do it for them and give them the opportunity later to renege on it. 27

27. Ibid
Early in November, 1967 King Hussein made an important statement which did a great deal to pave the way for the adoption of Resolution 242 by the Security Council. He said on November 5 that the Arabs had changed their position on Israel and would recognize its right to exist but only as part of an overall Middle East peace settlement preceded by the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories they had occupied in the June War. On November 6 King Hussein said that his views reflected those of Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser.28

King Hussein had made this statement in New York in an interview on the CBS--TV program "Face the Nation". He had arrived in the United States on November 2 for talks with US Government officials after completing a series of diplomatic contacts in late October with leaders in Egypt, Algeria, France, West Germany and Britain.

Hussein declared that the Arab's "offer would mean that we recognize the right of all to live in peace and security and this represents a very vast and tremendous change from earlier positions. Asserting that President Nasser shared his views King Hussein said that Egypt was ready to grant Israeli ships free passage in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, "if the right conditions were reached"in a general solution of the Middle East political impasse.

As regards the Israeli insistence on direct Arab-Israel negotiations, King Hussein said that the Arab would not permit Israel "to dictate terms" of a peace settlement "from the position they have acquired" through military conquest. "As long as our territories are occupied," King Hussein said, "we will try to limit our action and concentrate in fact arriving at a way out through the (UN) Security Council" rather than through direct talks with Israel. "What was the most essential was the Israeli pull back from the Arab occupied territories because such a pull back, as Hussein said, could be "linked" to other problems, such as Israel's shipping rights and the question of Palestinian refugees. 29

He made it clear that the Arab States could not enter into direct talks with Israel "for the time being" as a "matter of principle." "While our territory is occupied we cannot accept the dictates of those who occupy it," he said.

The change in the Arab attitude towards conflict with Israel was further explained by King Hussein in an address at George own University in Washington on November 6. The Arabs he said, must accept the proposition "that Israel is a present fact of life. We may not like it, and we may choose not to recognize it just as we choose not to recognize Red China." But he said an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories must precede any Arab-Israel talks. 30

29. Ibid

30. Ibid. This was not the first time that King Hussein had shown 'realism' in his attitude towards the Arab-Israel conflict after the June War. On June 19, 1967 he had appealed for the adoption of a realistic policy and accept the defeat by Israel as "a turning point for the better"
In this address Hussain claimed that while Arabs were seeking peace with Israel, the Government of Israel was doing everything to obstruct the conclusion of peace between the Arabs and Israel. In this connection he specifically referred to the Israeli refusal to permit the Arabs displaced by June war from returning to their homes. He said: Israel's "purpose is clear to colonize the new territory with foreigners". He referred to the Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol's October 28 speech in which he issued a worldwide call for Jews abroad—Americans, Europeans and Asians—to come to Israel and live on the land from which the refugees had been driven out. King Hussain charged that under the influence of a strong, dominant military expansionist element" Israel" far from being a small, peaceful, religious state, has proved to be a powerful military one with ambitions far beyond its borders".  

Hussain held out the hope that there would be peace in the Middle East if developments "would one day lead to de-Zionization of Israel". Asserting that there would "always be a place for Jews in the Arab world", King Hussain appealed to Israel"to communicate with us on the level of culture and civility and not on the level of war planes and tanks".

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for Arabs. Speaking at a news conference in Amman he had said, "We would like this to be a turning point in our lives, in our thinking, in our planning ......." He also opposed attempts by some Arab leaders to turn Arab-Israeli conflict into an East-West confrontation.


32. Ibid
In a further development indicating a change in the Arab attitude on the Middle East issue both Jordan and Egypt dropped their charges that the US and British warplanes had assisted Israel in the fighting at the start of the Arab-Israel war on June 5. In this connection Hussain said: "We made a mistake in accusing the US and Britain of helping Israel militarily during the June War." We regretted this mistake. We have admitted it to the (US) embassy. 33

The peace overtures given by King Hussain during his US tour were also supported by Egypt and Algeria. The Chief Spokesman of the Egyptian Government Mr. Mohammad el-Zayat issued a statement on November 8 that Egypt agreed with King Hussain of Jordan that Israel had a right to exist. This acceptance, Zayat said, was embodied in article On of the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement of February 24, 1949 which stated: "The right of each party to security and freedom from fear of attack shall be fully respected." This document, he said, "would guarantee the right of Israel to exist which is self-evident. We do know Israel exists. We have signed a piece of paper. We did not sign it with shadows", and Cairo had never denounced the pact. Ziyyat

33. Ibid

The Egyptian statement dropping the charges of US military involvement in June War came in the form of an article in Al Ahram by Mohammad Hassanian Heykal in which he assessed the reasons for Arab defeat in the June War. In a series of articles Heykal attributed Egypt’s defeat in the war to its own weakness and errors not to superior Israeli strength or outside foreign assistance to Israel. See Ibid, p. 467.
insisted, however, he made it clear that his statement did not imply" a recognition of Israel".\textsuperscript{34}

Another Arab state which had pursued a militant anti-Israel policy was Algeria. In the aftermath of the announcement of King Hussain's peace proposals Algeria was reported to have informed Egyptian officials on November 9 that it would not denounce the Cairo regime if it arrived at a peace settlement with Israel.\textsuperscript{35}

Syria, however, stood opposed to Hussain formula for peace with Israel. The Government of Syria informed the Jordanian Ambassador to Damascus that Syria did not agree with King Hussain's assertion that he made in New York that he spoke for all Arabs when he said that Israel was" a fact of life". The Jordanian Ambassador was informed that the Syrian Government" had not authorized anyone to speak in its name, particularly about questions which bear on the destiny of Arab nation".\textsuperscript{36}

At the same time a Syrian Foreign Ministry announcement was issued on November 10 which said that the Syrian position on the Middle East crisis had been made clear in a manifesto that had been issued at Syria's ruling Ba'ath Party convention in Damascus(September 4-6,1967). The manifesto had said that"armed struggle", remained the only

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid
means for elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression and the liberation of Palestine.37

It was against this background of events that Resolution 242 was adopted by the Security Council on November 22. Prior to the adoption of this resolution, three draft resolutions--US, Indian and the Soviet--were presented. All these three resolutions were essentially alike. They all called for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories, an end to the state of belligerency, the right of all Middle Eastern states to a guarantee of their territorial inviolability and political independence, the right of all states to innocent passage through international waterways and a resolution of the Arab refugee problem. The Soviet resolution differed from India's and the US in suggesting that Israeli troops be withdrawn "without delay". The Soviet resolution also did not propose a United Nations Envoy to the Middle East.38

Syria and Iraq rejected the resolution 242 while Egypt and Jordan demanded Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in the 1967 War as a pre-condition. Speaking in the UN Security Council debate, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad asserted that the Council had "the duty to suppress the Israeli aggression and to force the Israeli aggressive forces to return to the positions they had before June 5".39

37. Ibid
39. Ibid
Although Egypt did not reject the Resolution, it was described as "insufficient and "unclear". President Nasser in his reaction to the Resolution said: "The British resolution is not enough for a settlement of the Middle East crisis". He took issue with the British call for "freedom of navigation through international waterways" in the Middle East and pledged that UAR would continue to bar Israeli ships from the Suez Canal" no matter what the cost. He made it clear that the Arab policy remained no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no armistice and no "liquidation of the Palestine question".40

The Syrian response to the Resolution 242 was contained in a statement made by President Nuruddin al-Attassi. In this statement the Syrian president charged that the British initiated UN Security Council resolution "rewards Israel for her aggression".41

THE JARRING MISSION

In accordance with the Resolution 242, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Jarring of Sweden as Special Representative to negotiate a Middle East settlement. But the situation in the Middle East was fast deteriorating even before Mr. Jarring could undertake his mission at the end of 1967. During the first half of 1968 there were increasingly frequent breaches of the ceasefire

40. Ibid
41. Ibid
along the Suez Canal while Palestinian guerrilla raids led to heavy Israeli reprisal actions in the Jordan valley. After the first anniversary of June War and while Dr. Jarring was patiently pursuing his contacts with both sides, the trend towards violence accelerated. In July, 1968 the guerrillas of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine carried out the first hijack operation in the Middle East, diverting an Israeli airliner to Algiers. President Nasser in the same month warned that another explosion in the area was inevitable if a stalemate which left Israel in occupation of territory belonging to Egypt, Syria and Jordan was allowed to continue indefinitely. In the course of artillery duel across the Suez Canal, the towns of Suez and Ismailia were virtually destroyed by the Israelis and their population had to be evacuated into the interior of Egypt. 42

When in September 1968 the UN General Assembly met, Israel put forward a nine point plan for a Middle East settlement which was largely a reiteration of earlier Israeli position, insisting on direct negotiations with Arab states. These proposals made no mention of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab occupied territories and spoke only of "a boundary settlement compatible with the security of Israel and honour of the Arab states". This produced no response from the Arab Governments. But the Arabs were shocked when President Johnson at the height of American election campaign announced that the United States was

42. *Europa*, *op. cit.*, P.38.
considering the sale of Phantom aircraft to Israel. A month later Richard Nixon was elected as President Johnson's successor and sent Governor William Scranton on a fact finding mission to the Middle East. Mr. Scranton was reported as saying that the United States should adopt "a more even-handed policy in the Middle East," but the sale of fifty phantoms to Israel was confirmed at the end of December and marked an important stage in the escalation of arms race in the Middle East. 43

Dr. Jarring conducted negotiations with two sides (Arabs and Israel) to the Middle East conflict from 1967 to 1970. But his attempts to promote agreements on the basis of Resolution 242 did not succeed. The failure of the Jarring Mission can be explained due to the following reasons:

(a) The Jarring negotiations were conducted on the basis of Resolution 242. This resolution, however, "did not explicitly mention Palestine." 44

Further on the territorial plane Resolution 242, by calling on Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 war borders, implicitly endorsed Israel's jurisdiction over the territory occupied by Israel in the 1948 War beyond the lines laid down by the partition resolution. The Jarring Mission, therefore, could not and did not address the

43. Ibid
fundamental issue of the Palestinian national identity which underlay the conflict in the Middle East.45

FOUR POWER TALKS

After the failure of Jarring Mission, Middle East problem became a subject of consultations among the four permanent members (Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States) of the Security Council. These consultations were held at the proposal of the Soviet Union and their purpose was to obtain agreement between the major powers over the implementation of Resolution 242. At first, the prospects of these talks seemed encouraging; because President Nixon seemed anxious to register an initial success in the field of foreign affairs.

There was also a general agreement that Middle East situation was dragging to war and it constituted a dangerous threat to world peace. At the beginning of 1969, President Nasser declared his willingness to enter into direct negotiations once Israel had withdrawn from Arab territory. Mr. Eshkol, the Prime Minister of Israel, stated his readiness to meet President Nasser and declared that Israel was prepared to be flexible about all the occupied territories except Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (captured from Syria in 1967). But as the year wore on, spasmodic fighting continued along both the Suez Canal and the Jordan fronts, until in July 1969, President Nasser publicly gave up

45. Ibid, PP.56,57
hope of a peaceful settlement, forecasting that a long "war of attrition" would be necessary to dislodge Israel from the occupied territories.  

ROGERS PLAN

In June, 1970 the United States launched a peace initiative known as Rogers Plan aimed at obtaining a ceasefire and reactivating Jarring talks. The compulsions for the Roger's plan were provided by the rapidly escalating fighting between Egypt and Israel along the Suez Canal.

In a letter to Egypt's Foreign Minister Mr. Mahmoud Riad, US Secretary of State, William Rogers suggested that the Arabs and Israel "begin to work out under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the detailed steps necessary to carry out Security council Resolution 242." 

For the consideration of UAR, he put forward the proposal that both Egypt and Israel subscribe to a restoration of the ceasefire for at least a limited period. He also proposed that Egypt, Jordan and Israel subscribe to the following statement which would be in the form of a report from Ambassador Jarring to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. U Thant.

The UAR, Israel and Jordan agree (a) that having and indicated their willingness to carry out Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will designate representatives to

46. Europa, op. cit. P.38

discussions under (Mr Roger's) auspices according to such procedure and at such places and times as (Mr. Roger) may recommend taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties.

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgement by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with Resolution 242.

(c) that to facilitate (Mr. Roger's) task of promoting agreement as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe effective July 1 until at least October 1, the ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council. 48

These proposals were based on the simple formula of "stop shooting and start talking." As to the response of the parties to the proposals, Israel's immediate reaction was to reject the proposal. Egypt's answer was not forth coming until after Nasser's visit to Moscow. Jordan could not afford to risk a unilateral acceptance of the appeal, particularly in the light of presence and strength of the Palestinian commandos in Jordan. On July 22, 1970 President Nasser accepted the Rogers proposal. On July 26, Jordan followed.

48. Ibid
suit. A combination of US pressure and promises of more military hardware enticed Israel to accept the initiative on July 31. The ceasefire took effect on August 7, 1970.

An interesting aspect of the Rogers initiative was the inclusion of Jordan, particularly since Israel and Jordan still formally respected the 1967 cease-fire. It is likely that the United States wanted to ensure that both Jordan and Egypt would be committed to controlling the Palestinian fedayeen who were expected to oppose any political settlement based on the Roger Plan or Resolution 242.

The initiative taken by Mr. Rogers succeeded not only in achieving a ceasefire agreement between Egypt and Israel it also succeeded in containing the Palestinian fedayeen activities. Following the acceptance of Roger's plan by Egypt, Israel and Jordan, the fedayeen were attacked by the Jordanian army inflicting a defeat in a devastating 10 day war that lasted from 17 to 26 September, 1970. This crackdown by the Jordanian Army against the Palestinian fedayeen led to the killing of thousands of Palestinians, weakening of Palestinian armed struggle against Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza and an immense loss to the fedayeen power and prestige in the Arab world.  

49. Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians op. cit, P.93
developments, however, frustrated the movement towards an overall settlement. After a single meeting with Dr. Jaring in New York Israeli representative was recalled to Jerusalem and the Israeli Government protested that the ceasefire had been violated by the movement of Soviet missiles behind the Egyptian lines. The other development was the outbreak of civil in Jordan between Shah Hussain Army and the Palestinian fedayeen.  

50. See the preceding chapter.
SOVIET ARMS FOR UAR AND SYRIA

Israel had immediately after the 1967 June War accused UAR and Syria of arms build up with the Soviet help. In October, 1967 Israeli Premier Eshkol had claimed that the Soviet Union had replaced 80% of the planes, tanks and artillery that the Egyptian armed forces had lost in the war with Israel in June. He also asserted, on the basis of Israeli intelligence sources, that the new Soviet equipment received by Syria had brought Damascus weapons strength to nearly its pre-war level. In Washington, the US intelligence sources also reported large Soviet arms supplies to Egypt; but considering the level of supplies, it was considered that the increase in supplies would not contribute a threat to the Middle East peace. 51

In 1970 Egypt and the Soviet Union struck a $750 million arms agreement under which the former was provided advance SA-2 and SA-3, surface to-air missiles (previously deployed in the USSR and Eastern Europe) and 7,500 soldiers


There was disagreement between the civilian and defense officials of the United States over the amount of Soviet military equipment received by Cairo since the end of June War. Civilian officials in Washington estimated that Moscow had given UAR 180 200 jets and about 200 tanks. The plane shipments replaced about 2/3 of the UAR planes destroyed in the war, the tanks about 1/3 the losses (US intelligence sources had estimated about six weeks previously that the UAR had received 150 Soviet planes, later estimates placed the figure at 160-190). US Defense Department officials estimated that the UAR had received 225-240 Soviet jets since the end of the conflict. See Ibid, P.427. For an earlier report, see Facts on File vol. XXVII, No. 1394, July 13-19, 1967, P.269.
to man them. This deployment was the first important example of the Soviet providing combat units to operate modern equipment in Third World countries.52

The Jordanian crisis was linked to the question of a political settlement between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Jordan on the other. The Palestinian Resistance Movement whose declared objective was the reconstitution in Palestine of a democratic state open to Jews and Arabs alike, opposed the idea of a political settlement with Israel, since this would involve the recognition and the perpetuation of Zionist State. King Hussein had followed the lead of President Nasser in accepting the Roger’s Plan and was thus committed to the principle of a political settlement involving the recognition of Israel. So long as political settlement was not in prospect it had been possible for the King and the guerillas to pursue their diverse objectives without coming into open conflict.

The Black September as the Jordanian crisis is known, seriously undermined the prospects of an Arab-Israel political settlement which looked quite promising in August, 1970. The ceasefire along the Suez Canal


The first shipment of Soviet arms after the June War, arrived on June 23, 1967. After that the arms build-up proceeded at a fast pace. In early November the Soviet Chief-Of-Staff M. V. Zakharov said to Nasser, 'Mr. President, I think Egypt can now stand up to anything Israel can deliver ......... The (Egyptian) defences are perfectly all right. See Dilip Hiro, Inside the Middle East (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982) P.255.
endured, though precariously, but the negotiations through Dr. Jarring were not renewed and until President Nasser's successor had had time to consolidate his position, it seemed unlikely that they would be. Jordan was faced with the task of overcoming the effects of an inconclusive civil war.

**NASSERS DEATH**

Shortly after he managed to arrange a ceasefire in Jordan and a meeting at Cairo between King Hussain and PLO Chief Yasser Arafat, President Nasser died of heart attack. His sudden death put the whole process of political settlement in the Middle East in doldrums and, in fact, it could not survive his death. Nasser was succeeded by Sadat, who, to the great satisfaction of those wishing to see peace prevail in the Middle East, agreed to renew the ceasefire for further 90 days. After intensive consultation's between Israel and Americans and the extension to Israel of American credits worth $300 million, Israel agreed to return to the Jarring talks.

Preliminary discussions took place in New York, and in January 1971 Dr. Jarring visited Israel and Egypt where both sides restated their positions to him on all the points at issue. When the ceasefire agreement was again coming to an end on February 5, 1971, President Sadat once more agreed to renew it, this time for 30 days, adding the proposal that Israel should withdraw its forces from the east bank of the Canal, in which case Egypt would be able to clear the canal for navigation.
During his talks with the Egyptian and Israeli authorities, Dr. Jarring proposed a political settlement in line with Resolution 242. Israel, Dr. Jarring suggested, should agree on certain stated condition (providing guarantees) for security and freedom of navigation, to withdraw to the international boundary between Egypt and Palestine of British Mandate. He also suggested that Egypt should give a parallel undertaking to conclude a peace agreement explicitly ending the state of belligerency and recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace and security.

The Egyptian reply gave the undertaking called for by Dr. Jarring, provided that Israel did the same and agreed to withdraw its forces to the international border. The Israeli reply stated firmly that while Israel would be prepared to withdraw its forces to "secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement," it would in no circumstances withdraw to the pre-June 1967 lines. 53

Dr. Jarring's mission, due to negative response from Israel, lost momentum at the end of February 1971. This mission was the last stage of efforts initiated in 1969 to search for a comprehensive political solution of the Middle East problem.

53. *Europa, op. cit, p.40*
After the failure of the final round of Jarring Mission, attention turned to another approach—an interim step toward peace in the form of an agreement for reopening the Suez Canal, and a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops. As stated by President Nixon in his report to the Congress, the idea of partial withdrawal had been suggested publicity by both Israeli and Egyptian officials.  

With a view to exploring the possibility of a breakthrough the US Secretary of State visited the Middle East in May, 1971. Earlier, in a press conference on March 16, 1971 he had urged the Israelis to accept international guarantees in place of territorial gains, adding that security did not "necessarily require additions of territory" and that in the America view" the 1967 boundary should be boundary between Israel and Egypt".  

When this, too, met with an Israeli refusal, the American Government took up instead President Sadat's suggestions of an Israeli withdrawal for some distance in Sinai to allow the re-opening of the Suez Canal. But the attempt failed because of disagreement over the extent of withdrawal and


whether this withdrawal should be seen as the first step in a complete withdrawal or not. The arguments dragged on through most of the year 1971 until the proposal was finally dropped by the American in November, 1971.  

The year 1971 ended without progress in the political settlement of the Middle East conflict. Only in the United Nations, General Assembly there was passed a resolution which reaffirmed the "in admissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and called for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. But this resolution had no impact on the Jewish state and the Middle East entered into a deadlock. The position of President Sadat was considerably weakened. He had taken considerable risks in going so far in pursuit of a political settlement and had promised the Egyptian people that 1971 would be the "year of decision". In a broadcast to the nation on September 9, 1971, President

56. Ibid,

57. Ibid, Sadat had repeatedly pledged to his countrymen that 1971 would have to be the "year of decision" and as time went on without any decision in sight, he grew increasingly embarrassed at being unable to deliver on his promises. After the year went by and nothing happened he pathetically explained that the Indo-Pakistan war (December 1971) had undone his plans and even great and genius Nasser would have to had to submit to such new circumstances. Raphael Israeli (Ed). The Public Diary of President Sadat, Part 1 (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1978) P.105.

On June 10, 1971, Sadat denounced the US for military and financial aid to Israel and declared that "we have to resist and fight... in the battle first, the battle second and the battle last." On July 26, 1971 while addressing the National Congress of ASU, Sadat said "...both political and military moves were essential before the end of 1971 to eliminate Israeli occupation of Arab territories. During a visit to Egyptian frontline troops on November 20-21, 1971, he said "Our decision is to fight" and maintained that he had given up hope of a peaceful settlement. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. XVIII 1971-72 P.25031.
Sadat declared: "1971 will be the year of Decision towards war or peace. This is a problem that cannot be postponed any longer. We have prepared ourselves from within and we ought to be ready for the task lying ahead." 58

Earlier, he had told the Canadian Ambassador to Cairo that "Egypt has resolutely and without hesitation determined that 1971 will be the crucial year in the Middle East conflict due to (the fact) that four years have already elapsed since the Zionist occupation of Arab lands." 59 In his address to the academic faculty of Cairo University delivered on October 9, President Sadat said: "The year of 1971 must be decisive either to peace or war. I have said this following a long consideration and study of our problem. For if we let this year go by, 1972 will be election year in America when the American Administration will be concerned with question how to give more and more aid to Israel." 60

**SADAT BLAMES THE US**

For the lack of progress in the Middle East, Sadat blamed the American "political maneuvering". The United States, according to Sadat had gone not only very far in giving military, economic and diplomatic support to Israel,

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58. *Sadat, Ibid, P.109*
59. *Ibid, P.106*
60. *Ibid, P.120*
she had "immobilized" a number of initiatives for finding a solution to the Middle East problem. In his address to the National Convention of Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in February, 1972, Sadat observed:

"As we had expected, the US had without justification, gone very far in adopting Israel's point of view, and in disregarding the Arab views, despite the fact that our rights are obvious and need no justification.... The US has immobilized the Security Council Resolutions, which would have served as a reasonable basis for solving the Middle East Conflict by peaceful means.... She immobilized the UN Secretary General and his Special Envoy (Jarring's) mission.... neutralized the endeavours of the Big Four who are permanent members of the Security Council.... and disrupted all initiatives which were likely to open avenues for settlement. Moreover, the US has attempted to sabotage the efforts made by the Organization of African Unity...."  

THE MIDDLE EAST AND 1971 INDO--PAKISTAN WAR

Another reason given by President Sadat for his failure to make the 1971 year, a year of Decision was the outbreak of Pakistan--India War of December, 1971. Explaining this, he said:

"At the end of 1971, the Indo--Pakistan War broke out. This was a gigantic international crisis from many respects; the struggling forces, directly or indirectly involved; the violence of hostilities and the acuteness of the problem still at hand; the implications of the present situation in Asia, now and in the days to come. This is a kind of development we could not possibly overlook in our consideration.... Other factors that we had to consider were: the balance of forces in the Indian Sub-Continent, our ideological affiliation with (non-aligned) India (on the one hand) and our spiritual links with (Islamic) Pakistan (on the other hand) and the fact that the USSR who supports us in the Middle East, was totally implicated in the struggle in the sub-continent". Giving the reasons for postponing his plans for the year 1971, Sadat said while alluding to 1971 Indo--Pakistan War that "the world cannot endure two serious crisis at one and the same time, and due to the mammoth population of that Sub-Continent, that conflict was bound to overshadow the relatively minor one in the Middle East... The US, viewed the developments in the sub-continent as a defeat for herself, and therefore she stupidly let herself be drawn into the crisis of another area of the world."  

The other reasons that President Sadat listed for his postponement of 1971 as the year of Decision were: (a) America's supply of Phantom and Skyhawk jets to Israel which resulted in the reinforcement of Israel's air power by one third and (b) the establishment of US naval base in the port of Piraeus (Greece) which Sadat Sadat was "directed against us".63

In July, 1972 President Sadat called for the withdrawal from Egypt of the large contingent of Soviet advisers engaged on the re-organization of Egypt's defence system.

63. Ibid, PP.158,159
This was totally an unexpected move. After the 1967 War Egypt had greatly depended upon not only the supply of Soviet arms but also on the advice of Russians how best to re-organize Egyptian armed forces. Though reports of discord between Egypt and the Soviet Union had kept appearing in the months before July, 1972, none ever suggested that Sadat would take such a drastic decision.\textsuperscript{64}

The decision "gravely damaged Egypt's defensive capability" and "was interpreted as a final appeal to the American Government to bring pressure to bear on Israel to accept a settlement involving an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai".\textsuperscript{65} If this was the intention of Sadat's move it failed to produce the desired results; because 1972 was the election year and no American Administration at such occasion could advocate a course of action so unwelcome to Zionist opinion in the United States. The expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in July, 1972 did not create any impact on American policy in the Middle East; it was not enough to lead to a major re-assessment of American policy."\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{64} For a discussion on the development of differences between Sadat and the Russians, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, \textit{Red Star Over the Nile} (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977) Ch. VI p.p 168-211.

\textsuperscript{65} Michael Adams, \textit{Europa}, op. cit, P.41

As a matter of fact the American attitude towards the Middle East was characterized by "indifference" right from the year 1971. There were a number of reasons for it. As William Quandt writes "With the continuation of a ceasefire along the Suez Canal, the restoration of King Hussein's authority in Jordan, and the death of Egypt's President Nasser, the situation in the Middle East appeared to American policy makers less dangerous and more manageable than at any time since the 1967 War. The danger of US-Soviet confrontation had passed. United States interests had survived intact through a difficult period and less urgency was now attached to new American diplomatic initiatives".67

**NO WAR NO PEACE**

Between the Jordanian crisis and the October War of 1973, Middle East had been relegated to an area of low priority in the American foreign policy. The war in Viet Nam was the main pre-occupation. Nixon Administration directed all its efforts and energies to bring this war to an end. In May 1971 Kissinger began a series of secret talks with top level North VietNamese representatives to try to reach a negotiated settlement. In a parallel development Nixon and Kissinger were planning to establish relations with China, Symbolized by Kissinger's secret visit to Peking (Beijing) in July, 1971. It was also during this period that serious negotiation between the US and the Soviet Union were taking

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67. *Ibid*, P.128
place which finally led to the signing of historic SALT-I agreement in May, 1972.68

President Sadat was troubled by the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit of May, 1972 which in the Egyptian perception was characterized by "the low-key call for political settlement (in the Middle East); the lack of immediacy and the neglect of the Palestinians. The editor of Al-Ahram Mr. Husnein Heykal charged that like the United States, the Soviet Union also wanted to maintain a "no war, no peace" situation in the Middle East, Heykal likened the Middle East to a minefield that both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to traverse unscathed while proceeding to their detente.69

After the conclusion of agreement on the strategic weapons (SALT-I) in May, 1972, the US-Soviet relations entered into an especially warm period. As Henry Kissinger observes. "In the spring of 1973 Soviet-American relations were unusually free of tension. (After the Moscow Summit in May, 1972) a second summit between Nixon and Brezhnev on American soil was due to take place in June, 1973".70 In 1973 both the Super-Powers were pre-occupied with the

68. Ibid, P.129
69. Rubinstein, Red Star Over Nile, op. cit, PP.184-5
70. Kissinger, Henry, Years of Upheaval, (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1982) P.228


According to Kissinger, the Soviet leader during his US tour offered to conclude a secret Super-Power agreement on the Middle East based on a total Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders in return for an end to the state of belligerency. This agreement was not to be publicly declared. See Ibid, PP.297-8.
concerns other than the Middle East. The United States was pre-occupied with VietNam while the Soviet Union was interested more in pushing the process of detente further ahead. So far as the Middle East was concerned both the Soviet Union and the United States were content to "let sleeping dogs lie" for their own diverse reasons, neither wanted a war in that region, and neither saw Arab--Israel conflict as a detonator of World War III.\footnote{Edgar O'Ballance, "The Impact of the October War", \textit{International Symposium on October, 1973 War, Cairo, October 28-31, 1975} (Islamabad National Book Foundation, Pakistan) P.202.} This attitude on the part of the Super-Powers greatly perturbed the Arabs, particularly President Sadat of Egypt. It was not only the Soviet Union which wanted to keep the Middle East problem in cold storage, the United States also indulged in a kind of diplomacy which continued to aim at what Kissinger was later to term the "complete frustration " of the Arabs, a policy which he admitted was short sighted and may have contributed to the October War of 1973.\footnote{Cited in Quandt, \textit{Decades of Decisions, op.cit.}, P, 129.} Thus, as William Quandt says, the period from 1971 to 1973 seems to have been one of lost opportunities to prevent war and move toward settlement.

**US ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL**

While the United States showed "insensitivities " to the Arab urgings for a political settlement in the Middle East based on Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 War borders and end of Arab belligerency against Israel, US military and economic assistance to Israel continued to increase. The
increase was phenomenal, anal during the period of 1971-1973. After the Jordanian crisis of September, 1970. US-Israeli military relations were brought to an unprecedented high level. Military credits increased nearly ten fold. American arms were arriving in Israel in large quantities, and Washington for the first time agreed to the transfer of military technology to Israel.\textsuperscript{73} In October 1970 President Nixon approved an arms package of $ 90 millions for Israel. It consisted of anti-tank weapons, reconnaissance aircraft, and other minor arms. In addition, the Nixon Administration decided to seek $ 500 million supplemental appropriation for Israel in the current fiscal year to cover arms expenditures.\textsuperscript{.} Israel was particularly anxious to receive a guarantee for the supply of high performance aircraft in 1971 and had requested 54 F-4s and 120 A-4s. The Israelis were also pressing for long term military agreements that would prevent the periodic supply disruptions and quarrels that had marked the previous two years. \textsuperscript{74} In February, 1972, the US and Israel signed another memorandum of understanding whereby the United States agreed to sell Israel forty two F-4s, and eighty two A 4s, over the coming years. \textsuperscript{75} While the Arabs were greatly disillusioned with the United States for her policy of indifference to the Middle East problem, US-Israel relations were exceptionally

\textsuperscript{73} Christer Janeson, \textit{op.cit}, P. 173.

\textsuperscript{74} Quandt, \textit{op.cit}. P. 131.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid}, P. 147.
warm. In 1972, US-Israeli relations were stronger than ever. Throughout 1972, Nixon was able to portray his administrations as a firm supporter of Israel. The United States policy consisted of little more than open support for Israel. 76.

76. Ibid.
RISE OF ARAB-ISRAEL TENSION

From the Super-Power's point of view, the period from 1971 to 1973 was a non-crisis period. But so far as the clashes and confrontation between the Arabs and Israel was concerned, it was not a peaceful period. We have already seen how an intensified Palestinian resistance movement brought in retaliation savage and murderous Israeli air and ground attacks against the civilian targets and refugee camps in the neighbouring countries.

After 1967 War, Israel had not only declared not to return to pre-June War borders with Syria, Jordan and Egypt, it had deliberately begun to pursue a policy of making certain areas of occupied territories as permanent part of Israel. The policy of establishing Jewish settlements on the occupied territories also contributed to the increase in Arab-Israel tension. The establishment of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Golan Heights, Gaza and Sinai was preceded by large scale Jewish immigration for which the Israel Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had issued a world wide call. Most of the immigrant Jews came from Europe and the United States, thus, strengthening the nature of Israel as settler state representing the European cultural influence. The overwhelming victory scored by Israel over

77. The annexation of eastern Jerusalem immediately after the June War is a case in point.

78. According to Mr. Nakhleh, the Palestinian Arab representative speaking in the Special Committee of the UN General Assembly, (quoting Israeli official sources) in 1967, 10647 Jews came from outside to settle in Israel. Of them, 43 per cent came from Asia, 6 per cent from Africa, 40.5 per cent from Europe (11.5 per cent from United Kingdom and 5.7 per cent from France) and 48.6 per cent from America including 31.8 per cent from the United States.
the Arabs in June 1967 War had strengthened the rightist-conservative hard-line influence in Israel. The national religious party and the orthodox religious establishment which had been quite dovish before the June War became one of the mainstay of the annexationist camp. In these circles, the militarization of Joshua became much more popular than the pacifism of Israel. At the end of October 1967 Sefardic Chief Rabbi, Yizhak Nissim pronounced a religious ruling that no religious or secular authorities, including the Government of Israel had the right to yield a single inch of Land of Israel which was the heritage of Jews.79

Israel’s refusal to withdraw her forces from the Arab occupied territories beyond pre-1967 War boundaries had led to an escalation in tension in the Middle East and intensification of violent clashes involving Israel, Palestinians guerrillas and the neighbouring Arab countries. What kind of situation prevailed in the Middle East in early 1970 is described by a statement issued by a conference of

In 1968, 11, 147 arrived; 4.3 per cent from Asia, 5.5 per cent from Africa, 31.7 per cent from Europe, 58 per cent from America including 45.9 per cent from the United States.

Statement by Mr. Nukhleh, the Palestinian Arab Representative in Special Political Committee of the General Assembly at 688th meeting held on November 19, 1969, 24th Session.

UN, ORGA, 24th Session, Special Political Committee Summary Records of Meetings 16 September-10 December, 1969, P.128

In a speech at the opening session of B’nai B’rith Israel Commission in Jerusalem on October 28, 1967, Israeli Prime Minister stressed the need for more Jewish immigration from abroad to settle in what he called a “greater Israel” that would include the Arab areas occupied by Israel. In his speech he expressed his concern about the demographic complexion of Israel according to which 36% of Israel’s total population still consisted of non-Jews. The Jewish population according to him was 64 per cent, a ratio which he desired to increase, saying that “we need Jews”. See Facts On File, vol. XXVII No. 1411, November 9-November 15, 1967, P.468.

parliamentarians from 55 countries of Asia, Africa, Europe and two Americas which met in Cairo from 2 to 5 February, 1970.

The statement said:

"The situation in the Middle East is grave and deteriorating day by day, on account of Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories which she seized by force in the June, 1967 War and the escalation of her military action against Arab countries especially the increasing bombardment of their areas. Apart from the loss to human life and property in the area directly involved, serious damage has been caused to the commerce and economy of a large number of countries other than those of the Middle East". 80

During the 1971-1973 period the violence between Israel and the Arabs further increased; especially in the second half of 1972. The Arab-Israel conflict was taken out of the Middle East and a number of "terrorist" attacks were committed both by Israel and the Arabs in various parts of the world. In July and August, 1972, a number of Palestinian leaders were killed or seriously injured by explosive devices sent to them in Beirut allegedly by the Israeli intelligence. The Palestinians retaliated by capturing a

80. "Declaration of the International Conference of Parliamentarians on the Middle East Crisis, Cairo February 5, 1970". 

*International Documents on Palestine 1970*, P.31

On June 21, 1972 Israel carried out an air attack against alleged guerrilla bases in Fatah land (Lebanon) during which 14 civilians were killed and 25 wounded. The Israeli Deputy Prime Minister admitted during his speech in the Parliament Knesset on June 27 that the Israeli air force had intentionally carried out this attack against the Druze village.

number of Israeli athletes during Munich Olympics in September, 1972 and demanded the release of Palestinians held in Israel. When the West German police, after promising the Palestinians safe conduct out of Germany, opened fire on them at Munich airport, the guerrillas killed the hostages and were themselves killed or captured. (The three Palestinians who survived were later released when a West German airliner was hijacked and flown, with the guerrillas on board, to Libya).

After the Munich incident, Israel resorted to heavy ground and air raids into Lebanon where the Palestinian refugee camps, after their expulsion to Jordan, were located. These raids took a heavy toll of civilian lives, including women and children, in the refugee camps.

One such Israeli attack against the Palestinians in Lebanon took place on September 8, 1972. The air attacks which involved scores of Israeli war planes were directed against seven "guerrilla bases in Syria and Lebanese coasts within six kilometers of Damascus and extending as far north as the areas of Latakia, Hama and Homs in Syria. In Syria, it was claimed that the Israeli raids, caused 200 dead and wounded while the Lebanese sources said 18 were killed and 31 wounded. The Palestinian guerrillas admitted that more than 60 of their members were killed and 200 wounded in the raids in both the countries apart from casualties among civilians."
On September 15, 1972 Israeli armed forces penetrated 15 miles deep into the areas of southern Lebanon in what was described as "the biggest search and destroy operation---yet carried out" against the "Palestinian guerrillas in response to the killing of two Israeli soldiers by Arab guerrillas. The Israelis claimed that during this operation which lasted for two days, they searched 16 villages destroying 150 houses and bunkers and two bridges over the Litani River. The invading Israeli forces also clashed with the Lebanese army which tried to defend the Lebanese territory. In these clashes Lebanese army suffered 61 killed, wounded and missing. The Lebanese authorities claimed that 18 Israeli soldiers were killed during these clashes but Israel admitted that only three of her soldiers were killed and a number of them were arrested.³¹

Between 1972 and mid-1973 a number of Israelis and Arabs were shot dead in various European capitals and other European cities. Some of the incidents are listed as

-Rome: Mr. Abdul Wael Zuwaiter, a Palestinian employed at the Libyan Embassy in Rome killed on October 17, 1972.

-Paris: Mr. Mohammad Hamachari, the Paris representative of PLO died on January 9, 1973 in a Paris hospital, a month after he received injuries in a bomb explosion at his home.


Paris: Dr. Bassel Rauf el Kaubaissi, an Iraqi Professor of American University of Beirut and a leading member of PFLP killed in Paris on April 6, 1973.


Washington: The air attack of Israeli embassy Colonel Yosef Alon shot dead while coming to home from an embassy function.

In the beginning of 1973, there was some important diplomatic activity to find a way to the solution of the Middle East problem. In rapid succession Mr. Hafez Ismail (President Sadat's political adviser), King Hussein of Jordan and Mrs. Neir visited Washington for talks with President Nixon. But the frail hopes aroused by this diplomatic activity were dashed when, in February, 1973, a heavy Israeli attack on guerrilla installations in a refugee camp in North Lebanon was followed immediately by the shooting down by Israeli fighters of a Libyan airliner whose French captain had strayed over occupied Sinai in a sand-storm. The two incidents caused the death of 150 people—almost all of them civilians within twenty four hours and provoked an unprecedented wave of criticism of the Israelis on the eve of Mrs. Neir's arrival in Washington. The Palestinians retaliated by attacking the Saudi Arabian Embassy in
Khartoum where they held hostage and eventually murdered the American Ambassador and two other diplomats, one American and the other Belgian. A month later, following an abortive Palestinian attack on Israeli Embassy in Nicosia, Israelis commandos mounted an attack in Beirut penetrating into a residential area in the heart of the Lebanese capital and killing among a number of other people, three leading members of PLO.

In the autumn of 1973, the Arab-Israel conflict appeared to be farther than ever from solution. The Israelis confident that their military supremacy over the Arabs had if anything increased, remained in the control of all the territories they had occupied in 1967 war and had established in these territories some fifty civilian and paramilitary settlements.82

Although Egypt and Jordan had modified their positions, Israel did not respond positively to the peace plan of King Hussein. A similar effort announced by President Bourguiba in July to open direct Arab-Israel negotiations for a political settlement on the basis of 1947 UN resolution failed.83

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82. Michael Adams, op. cit., P.41

For Israel's policy of establishing Jewish settlements in the Arab occupied territories see Statement to the Knesset by Minister without Portfolio Galilee of Israel discussing the reasons for and the progress of establishment of settlements in the occupied territories.


SADAT'S INITIATIVE

As the Arab-Israel conflict entered into a stalemate in the autumn of 1973 producing a "dangerous mood of frustration in the Middle East", President Sadat launched his diplomatic initiatives in the Arab world to secure greater Arab cooperation for a joint strategy on the Middle East issue. Towards the end of August he signed an accord in Cairo on the merger of Egypt and Libya into a "new unified Arab State". After the signing of the accord on August 29, 1973, Cairo Radio called on other Arab countries to join the new state. The announcement said the merger was a "step toward liberating Arab land, regaining Palestine and toward economic development, and building a modern Arab State".85

A day earlier Sadat had returned to Cairo from a five day visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Syria. The visit, as Cairo Radio had described, aimed at coordinating Arab efforts in using their oil resources as a political weapon against Israel.86

Important talks took place (September 10-11, 1973) among Sadat, Assad and King Hussein in Cairo for greater coordination of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian positions on the Middle East issue. The Cairo talks were important for the fact that they produced reconciliation between Egypt and Jordan on the one hand and Jordan and Syria on the other. At

84. Michael Adams, op. cit., P.42
86. Ibid
the Cairo Summit which was criticized by Libya, Iraq and PLO Chief Yasser Arafat, the three frontline Arab States, according to Cairo Radio, discussed general Arab situation, coordination and possibilities of a common Arab plan of action on the Middle East problem to ensure the realization of Arab aims. 87

Egypt resumed diplomatic relations with Jordan immediately after the Cairo Summit (September 12) while Syria restored her relations with Jordan on October 4, 1973. According to another report one of the two principal topics discussed included the reactivations of the eastern front (consisting of the forces of Syria, Jordan and Iraq) against Israel and return of some Palestinian guerrillas to Jordan. 88

An important result of the Cairo reconciliation talks was the decision by Jordan to grant amnesty for about 1,500 political prisoners, including 754 Palestinian commandos imprisoned after fighting with Jordanian forces in 1970 and in 1971. Under this declaration a total of 347 guerrillas were let out of the Amman Jail on September 19 and another 400 were released on September 20. Among those freed on September 19 was Abu Daud, whose imprisonment had spurred two commando missions aimed at forcing his release. One was the


*Egypt had broken relations with Jordan in April 1972 in protest against Hussein's proposal for a federation of the occupied West Bank and Jordan--Syria had severed ties with Amman following a border clash linked to Jordan's suppression of the commandos in September, 1970.*

attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum (March 1, 1973) and the other was the assault on the Saudi Embassy in Paris (September 5, 1973). King Hussein had said that his amnesty covered all convicts, detainees, and wanted people within and outside the Kingdom who had committed political crimes against state security with the exception of murder and espionage. He said that the move was taken in the interest of national unity "now that life has returned to stability and normalcy" in Jordan. 89

Although, initially PLO Chief Yasser Arafat and PFLP had denounced Cairo reconciliation talks, towards the last week of September, 1973, a meeting of the executive committee of PLO took place in Beirut which approved the reconciliation of Egypt and Syria with Jordan. The statement issued after the conclusion of the committee also called for the re-opening of a "fighting eastern front" along the Jordan River against Israel. The statement said that the commandos would not accept reconciliation with King Hussein unless he permitted the guerrillas to carry out fighting against Israel. King Hussein, however, refused to grant such permission. 90

THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING

On October 6, 1973 at 12.15 gmt, a military communique was issued by the Egyptian Government which said:

At 1.30 p.m [11.30 gmt] today the enemy attacked our forces in the al-Zaafarana and al-Sukna areas in the Gulf of Suez with several formations of air forces; some of the enemy’s gun-boats were approaching the western coast of Gulf. Our forces are now resisting the raiding forces.

Almost an hour after the first communique, the second communique was issued which said: "In reply to the treacherous aggression launched by the enemy against our forces in Egypt and Syria, some of our air formations are at present bombing enemy bases and military targets in the occupied territories".

Almost at the same time the Government of Syria issued a similar military communique which said:

At 14.00 hours today enemy forces started to attack our advance positions along with ceasefire line. Our forces are at present replying to the sources of fire and silencing them. Groups of enemy aircraft also tried to penetrate our airspace in the northern sector of the front. Our fighters resisted them and an air battle is now in progress between our planes and enemy aircraft. 91

This is how the world—much to its surprise—came to know that a new war had broken out in the Middle East. It was the fourth war between the Arabs and Israel since 1948, which, although lasted only three weeks, proved a watershed in world politics.

The war began with a simultaneous and surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on the Israeli positions and fortifications in the Sinai and Golan Heights. The Egyptians launched the attack with 150 planes and 1000 artillery gun barrage along the entire front. Under the shadow of attacking warplanes and hitting artillery shells, thousands of infantrymen crossed the Suez Canal in boats, established themselves on the opposite bank, and rapidly erected Soviet—

barrage along the entire front. Under the shadow of attacking warplanes and hitting artillery shells, thousands of infantrymen crossed the Suez Canal in boats, established themselves on the opposite bank, and rapidly erected Soviet-supplied pantoon bridges for bringing heavy equipment across the Canal. To the north, Syrian forces carried out a massive assault on Israeli fortifications in the Golan Heights. Within 24 hours of the on-slaught Egypt had established three large bridgeheads on the east bank of the Suez Canal, sustaining only minimal casualties.  

The 1973 October War took the world by surprise, because, although, the preceding thought had witnessed mounting tension in the Middle East, no body through that the War was imminent. This belief stemmed largely from the overwhelming military superiority that Israel enjoyed over the Arabs. As recently as February, 1973, 


Some of the accounts dealing with the Fourth Arab-Israeli War (October, 1973) are as follows:

the US State and Defence Departments had assessed Israel as the "Strongest power in the Middle East". The United States Government had come to the conclusion that despite the moves for closer military cooperation between Egypt and other Arab countries, the possibility of an Arab attack on Israel was remote, because, as the US State Department concluded: "In the event that Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Libya merged their air forces and launched an attack, they would not be expected to defeat Israel even with a 3-1 edge in combat planes". Equipped with longer range aircraft and better pilots, the Israelis could, in American view, quickly destroy the neighbouring airfields from which such strikes would have to be mounted". 93

The plan of Operation Badr (October War) was kept secret so well and so truly that when the attack was launched it was not only the Israelis who were taken completely by surprise, but also the Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammad Hassan el Zayyat, who had met Dr. Henry Kissinger, the day before and had no inkling of the contemplated Egyptian attack. 94

The Israelis were caught so unaware that according to Walter Lacqueur who quotes General Bar Lev, a former Israeli Chief of Staff, Israeli soldiers on the front line were doing

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93. *Facts On File*, vol. 33, No. 1485, February 11-17, 1973, P. 122. Kissinger says that before the October War, Israeli Premier Golda Meir considered that the Arab's had no military option and that militarily Israel was impregnable. See Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit, PP. 220-21.

their laundry and wearing slippers; some were playing football. 95

According to Henry Kissinger, the "Egyptian-Syrian attack was a classic of strategic tactical surprise". "But," he says, "the surprise of the October War is not explained fully by either background noise or deception. It resulted from the misinterpretation of facts available for all to see, unclouded by any conflicting information". 96

Although President Sadat was threatening to go to war every year since 1971, his threats were dismissed as bluff in Israel as well as in the US. The Israelis and the Americans believed that the Arabs lacked the will and capability to attack Israel, and if ever the Arab armies decided to attack they (Israelis) thought that they would have sufficient warning time to mobilize. As President Sadat told the Sunday Times Inside Team, "The West thought we were

95. Walter Laqueur, Confrontation, op. cit, P.76.

Walter Laqueur also quotes General Elazar, the Israeli Chief of Staff during October War, who sharply dissenting, says that so far as regular army was concerned the alert had begun 10 days earlier and reached its peak on Friday morning. The entire army says General Elazar, was put on full alert at 11 a.m. On Friday October 5, General Elazar admitted, however, that there were serious failures in observing the orders for full alert. According to him some reserve units were insufficiently equipped when moved into battle.


Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir also claimed that the Israelis were not taken by surprise by the Arab attack even though they (the Israelis) were engaged in fasting and prayers in observance of that holy day. In a nationwide address to rally her people, Premier Golda Meir said that Israeli intelligence had known for several days that Syrian and Egyptian forces were massing on Israeli lines for a combined attack.

In a statement Moshe Dayan, the Defence Minister said on October 7 that although Israel was aware of the Arab build up, his country had deliberately decided against a pre-emptive strike in order "to have the political advantage--or whatever you want to call it--of being the side that is attacked." Facts On File, vol. 33, No.1719, October 7-13, 1973, P.833.

96. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, op. cit, P.459.
poor soldiers without good generals. The Israelis thought they could never be surprised".97

Sadat's repeated postponements of the "Year of Decision" had lured the West as well as the Israelis to believe that Egypt would not attack or at least did not have the capacity to launch the attack. When the Egyptian leader expelled the Russians from his country in July, 1972, the entire world, as Sadat himself says, including Egypt had interpreted this move "as an indication that I wasn't going to fight".98

For the Israelis an effective guarantee against the renewal of war in the Middle East was their military superiority over Egypt and Syria; and they (the Israelis) believed that they would retain this superiority for a long time to come.99 As Henry Kissinger observed:

"Every Israeli (and American) analysis before October 1973 agreed that Egypt and Syria lacked the military capability to regain their territory by force of arms; hence there would be no war. The Arab armies must lose hence they would not attack. The premises were correct. The conclusion were not".100


99.  In an interview in January, 1968, the former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Forces. Gen Rabin told the questioner that for the next ten years Arabs would not be able to achieve military superiority over Israel. *International Documents on Palestine, 1968*, P.2.

100.  *Kissager, Years of Upheaval, op. cit*, P.459.
Yet the preparations for war were going on seriously and secretly in Egypt for quite a long time. As President Hosni Mubarak (then Vice-President) said in 1975 both Arabs and the Israelis were engaged in the preparations for a new war immediately after 1967 War. As for as the Arabs were concerned, "it was illogical" for them "to remain silent to the occupation of their lands or for the Palestinians to forget their national rights which have been assented to by the resolutions of the United Nations". 101

Speaking on the inevitability of a new war in the Middle East President Sadat himself said: "The war has been going on since the First Zionist Congress of 1897, aiming at a greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates. They have been implementing their scheme, while on the Arab side, there has been no counter-planning to meet their plan. They have been pursuing it since the Balfour Declaration, the establishment of Israel in 1948, and the wars of 1956 and 1967. More wars will follow, as I have told the Americans, for I can imagine that even if we should reach an agreement now, I have to expect another war launched by Israel in five years because their plan is being carried out step by step".  

The planning for the October War had been underway for quite a long time before its actual eruption in October 1973. As Heikal notes in his book The Road to Ramadan, this planning had "started a long time ago—in one form or another from the immediate aftermath of 1967 defeat "It had", he says, "inevitably, taken different forms according to the partner or partners with whom Egypt was expecting to cooperate and this had only finally been determined with the setting up of the unified command of Egypt and Syria on 31 January, 1973. Before that Libya had been an active partner in the planning but when it became clear that President Ghadaffi of Libya had a fundamentally different concept from

that of Egypt and Syria of the lines along which the attack should be conducted, the other two decided to continue their operations without him." 103

The strategy adopted in this planning was, of course, based on making the enemy the victim of its own assumptions. As Kissinger remarked: "Sadat, in fact, paralysed his opponents with their own pre-conceptions. "He had been threatening to go to war every year since 1971. One year after another had been loudly proclaimed as the "year of decision". No threat had ever come close to being implemented. Now threats of war were, therefore, dismissed as bluff". 104

During the summer of 1973, the Israelis were of the firm belief that the Egyptians were incapable of launching an offensive against Israel. Despite ominous and apparent warning signs, indicative of an unusual Arab build up on the Suez and Golan Fronts, the Director of Israel’s Military Intelligence, Major-General Elihan Zeira believed that Sadat’s aggressive posture was mere bluff, an exercise in brinkmanship. In May, 1973, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan did issue a directive to the General Staff, enjoining them to "prepare for war in the light of Egyptian and Syrian


104. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, op. cit. P.460
threats" and that," a renewal of war in the second half of summer 1973 must be taken into account". 105

But the policy directive lacked urgency and clarity. It was not until 3 October, 1973 that the Israeli cabinet finally took serious cognizance of the implied threat in the confirmed and massive forward concentrations of Arab forces on the borders of Israel. Even so, the "Kitchen Cabinet" meeting held under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, and attended by Israel Galili, Moshe Dayan, David Elazar and the officiating Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier-General Arye Shale, summarily and with deep conviction dismissed the Arab threat of war as a remote possibility. The news of the Arab offensive was received by the Israeli authorities during a cabinet meeting on October 6, 1973 at 13.35 hours (Israel standard time). This meeting was considering the possibility of ordering the mobilization of 100,000 reservists and the feasibility of launching a pre-emptive strike against Syria at 11.00 hours that day as recommended by the Chief of Staff, David Elazer. 106 The Prime Minister and Moshe Dayan had vetoed the pre-emptive strike but had agreed, in principle, to order

105. Israel's Defence Minister Moshe Dayan believed as far back as in 1968 that Egypt would be forced to use force "to secure our withdrawal from the Canal", if "political methods did not succeed. See Dayan's interview to Israeli daily Haaretz, (Tel Aviv) January 19, 1968, International Documents on Palestine, 1968, P.89. But he did not think that Egypt could attack in October, 1973 that is why in his autobiography The Story of my Life, he admits that the "Egyptian and Syrian attack on Yom Kippur came as a surprise, although it was not unexpected." Moshe Dayan, The Story of My Life, (London, Sphere Books Ltd, 1976) P.469.

106. See also Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, op. cit, P.477
partial mobilization at the insistence of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Israel Tal. At this time news of the simultaneous Egyptian and Syrian attack was brought in by Brigadier-General Israel Leoer, the Prime Minister's Military Secretary. By a queer twist of history, the pre-empters were pre-empted.  

The October War lasted for three weeks (despite a United Nations ceasefire on October 22nd).  

What the picture emerged at the end of the fighting was that the Israelis had driven the Syrians back beyond the old ceasefire lines and Israeli forces counter-attacking on the Suez front effected a westward crossing of the Canal, to establish a wide bridgehead on the edge of the Nile Delta. At the end of the war, the military advantage lay with the Israelis, who had occupied a further area of Syrian territory and were threatening Damascus, while their units were west of the Canal and had isolated an Egyptian army in Sinai, cutting its communication with Cairo. However, political advantage by with the Arabs. The initial shock that Israel


*International Documents on Palestine, 1973*; William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, op. cit, ch. V, PP. 128-209 According to Prime Minister Golda Meir she received the information of the impending Arab attack at 4 a.m. on Saturday, October 6, 1973. A meeting attended by the Premier, Defence Minister and COS, was held at eight O'clock. The COS recommended pre-emptive air strike but Golda Meir did not agree. See Golda Meir, *My Life*, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975) PP. 358-59.

received and early tactical gains secured by the Arabs, decisively altered the whole context of Arab-Israel confrontation.\textsuperscript{109}

The October War is regarded as a watershed in the long and bitter history of Arab-Israel conflict due to a number of reasons:

Firstly, it shattered the legend of Israel's invincibility. Making detailed, meticulous and extremely careful preparations for war, the Egyptians and the Syrians secured spectacular achievements against the Israelis. The Arab forces moved swiftly against the Israelis. On the Suez front, the Egyptian forces were able to cross the Canal within fifteen minutes after opening a massive barrage of artillery and air bombardment on the Israeli positions. In less than an hour of the start of the attack the Egyptian forces captured the first fortress of the Bar-Lev Line.\textsuperscript{110}

The other fortifications fell rapidly. With the help of the engineers using water canons, the attacking Egyptian forces broke down the sand remparts on the eastern bank of

\textsuperscript{109} Michael Adams, op. cit, P.41


\textsuperscript{110} Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, op. cit, P.287

The Bar-Lev Line consisted of a series of trenches, gun emplacements, command points, observation posts-lesss loose held together by field telephones, but not in any way resembling a "line" like the "Magen Line". See Keesings Contemporary Archives vol. XIX, November 5-11, 1973, P.26173.
the Canal and in four and half hours had breached it at eighty places. At 17.10 on October 6 (the attack began at 14.05 hours) the first officer prisoners were taken by units of the Second Division north of Ismailia. By 19.30 hours the first formation of the two Egyptian armies were established on the eastern bank of the Canal along a front of 170 Kilometers. Eighty thousand men in twelve waves had penetrated Sinai to a depth of three to four kilometers and were well dug in inside the Bar-Lev fortified area.111

The Egyptian forces demonstrated such an efficiency and fighting skill that within 24 hours they succeeded in bringing more than 400 tanks across the Suez Canal on pontoon bridges, overrunning the "Bar-Lev Line". By nightfall on October 7 strong Egyptian infantry and armoured reinforcements had crossed the Canal and Egyptians, fighting with great elan and determination were pushing eastward into the Sinai desert.112

Secondly, The Yom Kippur War betrayed the Israeli over-confidence and exaggerated belief in the superiority of their military strength. Avraham (Bren) Adan, an Israeli general who commanded an armoured division on the Egyptian front, while alluding to Israeli mis-conceptions about the Egyptians and themselves says: "The Egyptians deserve much praise for the secrecy, meticulous planning and deception

111. Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, op. cit, P.207
112. Keesings Contemporary Archives, op.cit
that helped them achieve surprise at the start of the Yom Kippur War. But their success in surprising the Israeli Defence Forces was due less to Egyptian planning than to the attitude within the Israeli Defence Forces, under estimating the enemy and discounting his declarations and actions. Most of all the surprise of IDF was a result of our exaggerated overconfidence which had been building up over a long period".113

Another Israeli general, General Uzi Narkiss wrote: "The shock of being, taken by surprise undermined the nation's confidence in the intelligence services and their exalted reputation".

"The poor start (by the Israelis) multiplied the confusion inherent in wartime, casting doubts upon Zahal's reputed invincibility"

"The Arab Command planned the war with admirable strategy both tactically and logistically and especially from the point of view of camouflage".

"Israel was frightened and its self-confidence shaken".114

Thirdly, it was not only the element of surprise that shocked the Israelis, the losses that she suffered during the initial phase of the was jolted the whole Jewish nation.


On the first day of the war, the Israelis lost 51 planes, more than 10 per cent of entire Israeli air force. The number of Israeli tanks lost was 840 or more than 49 percent of their entire 1700 strong tank corpse. The Israeli losses in the initial phase of the war were so massive that the Defence Minister Moshe Dayan was reported to have considered about conditions for surrender. Prime Minister Golda Meir had indicated that she would commit suicide rather than surrender.115

Writing about the plight of Israel during the early period of war, Moshe Dayan says: "In the first twenty four hours following the outbreak of war, we were left with only a fraction of our original armoured strength on the Egyptian front. With the line of the Canal strongholds broken at several points, Egyptian forces poured through in mass, with an overwhelming weight of armaments".116

According to Dayan, the Prime Minister Golda Meir and other ministers in the Israeli Government were shocked by the Arab attack. Differentiating between the October War and previous Arab-Israeli wars, he observed:

"The principal difference between this war and its predecessors lay in Arab strength. It was much greater and much powerful than anything the Arabs had shown in the past. This increased our casualties and demanded the most determined combat effort from our men. The strength of the Arab armies in men and weapons were roughly three times what it had been in the Six Day War; 1,000,000 troops against their earlier 300,000, more than 5000 tanks as compared with 1,700 and more than 1000 planes to 350 and more than 4,800 field guns as against 1350 in 1967". 117

115. Hoag, Levins, The Arab Reach, op. cit, P. 49-50
116. Moshe Dayan, The Story of My Life, op. cit, P. 499
117. Ibid, PP. 512-13
The Yom Kippur War, in broad strategic terms, can be divided into the following phases:

**OCTOBER 6-14**

During this phase the Arab Offensive, particularly Egyptian, had continued. So far as the northern front of the Golan Heights was concerned, the Syrian offensive, viewed in broad strategic terms, lasted for about 42 hours from midday of October 6 to the morning of October 8, when the Israelis launched their hastily prepared and disjointed counter attacks in the Golan. After October 8, the Israelis went on offensive and the momentum and impetus of the main Syrian thrust had petered out, enabling the Israelis to switch from a tactical containment action to a two-stage counter offensive.118

During their offensive the Syrians had penetrated 10 miles inside the Golan Heights claiming to retake all their positions lost to Israel in 1967 War. But on October 8 Israel claimed that the Syrians had been thrown back.119

The Israeli offensive against Syria included massive air attacks against Syrian cities. In an air raid on Damascus on October 9, Israeli planes caused 200 civilian deaths including foreign diplomats.120

The Israeli air force also attacked Syrian oil refineries, fuel tanks, and other industrial structures throughout the country. The oil port of Banias was devastated. And, although Lebanon had remained neutral, the Israeli air force bombed a radar station there on the 9th of October.121

On the Suez front, with the complete destruction of Bar-Lev Line, the Egyptian High Command's eight bridgehead divisions retained the strategic initiative with no undue effort until the morning of 14 October. In reality the Egyptian offensive had lasted from 6 to 8 October, by which date the 2nd and 3rd armies were fully deployed in the extended bridgehead where after they "prematurely" adopted the posture of tactical defence in an attempt to entice the Israelis into launching futile and attritive armoured counter-attacks against their human mass of ATGM-equipped infantry formations.122

This was the most critical phase for the Israelis. Writing about it, Prime Minister Golda Meir says in her autobiography:

According to the Syrian authorities in the October 9. Israeli air raid on Damascus, three Norwegian, an Indian and a member of the UN. Truce Supervisory Organization and his wife and daughter were also killed. See Facts On File, op. cit, P.835. There was also a report (later disputed) that 30 Soviet citizens were killed in the raid. See Facts On File, Ibid, P.836.

121. William Polk, The Arab World, op. cit, P.266

122. The Hashmite Arab Army: 1908-1979 op. cit, P.504
The circumstances could not possibly have been worse. In the first two or three days of the war, only a thin line of brave young men stood between us and disaster. And no words of mine can ever express the indebtedness of the people of Israel to those boys on the Canal and on the Golan Heights. They fought, and fell, like lions, but at the start, they had no choice.

"What those days were like for me, I shall not even try to describe. It is enough, I think, to say that I could not even cry when I was alone". 123

During this phase a number of attempts were made to secure a cease-fire. For this purpose the Security Council held special sessions on October 8-9 and 11 but adjourned without passing a resolution. The first session was requested by the United States whose representative John A. Scali while speaking in the Council on October 8 urged the Council to act to end the hostilities and to restore the cease-fire lines existing before the renewed fighting began.

Scali was rebuked by the Chinese representative, Huang Hua who said" it was " preposterous" for the US to ask Egypt and Syria to withdraw to the 1967 ceasefire lines. It was " perfectly just ", Huang asserted, for the Arab countries to" rise in resistance to the invading enemies of their own sacred territories".

Soviet Ambassador Yakov A. Malik also expressed support for Egypt and Syria, and criticized the Council for meeting at all.

123. Golda Meir, My Life, op. cit, P.360.

The Israeli position in the initial phase of the war deteriorated to such a desperate stage that, according to the TIME magazine, "Israel's 13 atomic bombs were hastily assembled at a secret underground tunnel during a 78 hour period at the start of the war. At this time, the Egyptians had repulsed the first Israeli counter attack along the Suez Canal, causing heavy casualties; the Israeli forces on the Golan Heights were retreating in the face of Syrian tank assault.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyat said that the Arabs were not interested in a UN ceasefire resolution, but would welcome support from non-aligned nations for Arab efforts to have the General Assembly depart from its agenda and take up the Middle East question immediately after the end of its general debate next week.124

The last Israeli stronghold on the Bar-Lev Line along the Canal surrendered to Egyptian forces on October 13. A Cairo military spokesman had claimed that since the start of war on the Sinai front, Egypt had destroyed 269 Israeli planes, 15 helicopters and 492 tanks. On October 14, the Israeli armed forces announced that Israel had suffered 656 casualties.

The dead included Major-General Avraham Mendler, commander of an armoured division, who had been killed in the Sinai on October 13, when his half-track was struck by an Egyptian shell.125

**OCTOBER 15-22**

This phase of the October War is characterised by three important developments which had not only an important impact on the course of the war itself; they changed the whole complexion of the Arab-Israel conflict, putting it


125. *Facts On File*, vol. 33, No. 1720, October 14-20, 1973, P.858

Israeli casualties in the Six Day War in 1967 had totalled 780 dead and 2,563 wounded, in the 1956 Suez campaign 172 were killed *Ibid.*
into an entirely new perspective. These developments were: US airlift of arms to Israel, the Oil Embargo and the worldwide alert of US forces in response to a reported Soviet move to send her troops into the Middle East.

On October 15, the United States announced that it had launched a "massive airlift" of arms to Israel. This announcement came after a day when the "airlift" had already commenced. While making the announcement, the US State Department Spokesman explained that the equipment which was being sent by the United States would replace the heavy losses suffered by Israel in the war thus far. The airlift was also justified in view of the alleged stepped up Soviet arms supplied to Syria and Egypt.126

According to the US Government sources, the arms being sent to Israel were to include 150 M-60 tanks, 25 F-4 Phantom jets and about 50 A-4 Sky-hawk light attack bombers. In a week after the start of the war, Israel was reported to had lost 20-25 F-4s and about 50 or more A-4s planes, some Mirage jets out of its 300 plane force.127

126. *Ibid*, p.859

The US State Department Spokesman Robert J. Mc Closkey charged that the Soviet air lift of arms to Egypt and Syria had begun on October 10 and involved about 280 flights that delivered 4000 tons of military supplies to her two Arab allies. *Ibid*, p.859, Henry Kissinger writes in *Years of Upheaval* that on October 11 ten new Soviet flights to Syria were detected "...... indeed, the Soviet airlift now included flights to Egypt even Iraq" Kissinger er, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit, p.507.

127. *Ibid*
The American planes sent to Israel were flown by pilots of the US Air Force across the Atlantic and the Mediterranean with refueling stops at a US Air Force base in the Portuguese Azores. It was not disclosed by the US quarters if the American pilots also took part in Combat operations or not; however, the Soviet Union charged that in addition to sending large quantities of weapons the United states was "even providing Israel with American pilots."

In the first two days of airlift, the United States was reported to have supplied Israel about 500 tons of military equipment in about 30 flights. More arms and weapons were being sent in by ships which included air-to-air sidewinder missiles, television guided Welsey missiles used against ground targets and strike missiles which could be used against soviet-supplied surface to air missiles.

What was more, the US airlift was backed by a statement by President Nixon pledging strong support to Israel with an implied threat to even repeat the US military action or threat of it like in Lebanon in 1958 and Jordan in 1970.

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128. Ibid

Earlier, Egypt's Middle East News Agency had charged on October 11 that US Phantom jets from aircraft based in the Mediterranean had joined Israeli jets in attacking Egyptian positions. The US State Department denied the charge as a "mischievous lie". Facts On File vol. 33, No. 1719 P.835.

129. Ibid

130. Ibid

President Nixon in a statement on October 15 had said that his Administration's current stance was "like the policy we followed in 1958 when Lebanon was involved: it is like the policy we followed in 1970 when Jordan was involved" in fighting the Palestinian commandos. In both
cases, Nixon said, US military action was used or threatened. The state Department spokesman Mc Closkey later explained that Nixon did not mean the US was contemplating direct intervention in the "current" crisis but was expressing a "broad policy objective". Ibid.
With a view to supplying Israel with urgently needed arms and weapons, the United States established an air bridge capable of delivering nearly one thousand tons of war material per day, consisting of four to five flights of C-5s and twelve to fifteen flights of C-14s. El Al (The Israeli airline) planes also continued to carry military supplies to Israel. In addition twelve C-130 transport planes were flown to Israel and were turned over to the Israeli air force.131

Kissinger himself describes the airlift in the following words:

"Our airlift was proceeding in a stunning fashion. Once over its stumbling thoughts, our Defense Department put on the sort of performance no country can match. Flights of C-5's began at a rate of four per day then rose higher. The total of all aircraft—C-5s, C-130s and C-141s—was twenty flights a day, carrying an average of 1000 tons of equipment daily, or about 50 tons each hour. In the first full day of the airlift we had more than matched what the Soviet Union had put into all the Arab countries (Egypt, Syria and Iraq) combined in all the four previous days. We were bound inexorably to pull ahead of the Soviet re-supply effort. Eighteen hundred tons had already landed, three thousand tons more were on the way."132

According to one account from October 14 until the October 25 cease-fire, the United states re-supply effort

131. Quandt, Decade of Decisions op. cit, p. 185.
132. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval op. cit, p. 525
delivered approximately 11,000 tons of equipment, forty F-4 Phantoms, thirty six A-4 Skyhawks, and twelve C-130 transports, included were only four tanks on the early C-130 flights, and fewer than twenty were sent during the entire airlift. From October 26 until the airlift ended on November 15, another 11,000 tons of equipment was delivered. In all, 147 sorties were flown by C-5s, with 10,800 tons aboard, and 421 sorties by C-141s with 11,500 tons. During the same period, El Al aircraft carried about 11,000 tons of military supplies to Israel in over 200 sorties. By November 15, the first ships were beginning to reach Israel with resupplies, and the airlift became superfluous.\(^{133}\)

The American arms and weapons sent to Israel greatly bolstered the strength and morale of the Jewish armed forces. After achieving success against the long awaited Egyptian offensive \(^{134}\) launched on October 14, an Israeli task force crossed to the west bank of the Canal on October 15. The crossing was made by large and pontoon bridges north of the Great Bitter Lake just south of the Canal to cut off

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133. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, op. cit., p. 185 (footnote No. 46). According to William Polk, the US Air Force airlifted 22,300 tons of equipment in 33 days to Israeli forces see William Polk, The Arab World, op. cit., p. 263.

134. For detail see Hashmite Arab Army, op. cit., p. 508.
a possible Egyptian retreat from the East Bank.\textsuperscript{135} after crossing the Israeli forces enlarged their foothold and by October 23 were reported to have cut off Egypt's 20,000 man III corps on the southern end of the east Bank of the Suez Canal. The Israeli thrust placed them about 30 miles from Cairo. In addition to the isolated Egyptian salient, another Egyptian force estimated at about 60,000 men, was on the east bank to the north and was cut off from the Third Army.\textsuperscript{136}

**OIL EMBARGO**

As the Israeli forces re-supplied by massive amount of American arms and weapons threatened to take the Suez City after encircling the Third Army, the Arabs brought in for use their formidable weapon -oil- to thwart the Western backed Israeli offensive against the Egyptians. On October 17, a meeting of the Persian Gulf members of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (O P E C ) was held in Kuwait. At this meeting which was chaired by the representative of Iran, the participants discussed their reaction to the Middle East crisis. While Iran was certainly not in favour of any form of boycott, it urged a dramatic rise in price and managed to reach immediate accord with its Arab neighbours on this point. Minus the Iranian chairman, who them left then meeting, the Arab delegates voted to


Suspend oil shipments until security Council Resolution 242 was implemented.\textsuperscript{137}

On October 20, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia who had unsuccessfully tried to restrain the US from rendering military supplies to Israel, suspended all oil shipments to the United States.

Oil as a weapon in confrontation with Israel had been used by the Arab States since 1948. There has been a total ban on the supply of Arab oil to the Jewish State. In 1956 Suez crisis, Syria blew up oil pipelines passing through her territory and Egypt blocked the Suez route of oil supply to Europe and Western Hemisphere.

The Arab States had also resorted to oil embargo in 1967 War. In this war Britain and the United States were accused to had militarily helping Israel. In retaliation, therefore, Kuwait and Iraq announced on June 6, the suspension of all oil shipments to the United States and Britain. Algeria followed suite and announced a halt in the oil supplies to the US and Britain while at the same time putting all American and British oil companies under state control.

These measures were taken following the decision of the Baghdad meeting of officials from 11 Arab nations held on June 4-5, 1967.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{137} William Polk, \textit{The Arab World}, \textit{op. cit}, p. 262

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Facts On File}, XXVII, No. 1388, June 1-7, 1967, P. 197
The suspension of oil supplies in the 1967 War did create a crisis situation in the West, including the United States. The United States Interior Department declared a state of Oil emergency on June 10. Announcing this, Assistant Interior Secretary J. Cordell had to admit that this emergency was caused by the disruption of oil supplies from the Middle East "particularly the non-availability of tanker capacity".  

This "oil embargo" however, did not prove very effective and both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were soon to resume oil supplies to the Western market.  

The first petroleum boycott of the West resorted to by the Arab countries "was a complete failure", according to Hoag Levins, for two reasons.  

Firstly, the Muslim oil states did not have physical control of their oil or its shipment whereas the Western oil companies exercised considerable control over these two aspects of oil industry. Secondly, despite the rapid shifts  

In 1967, about 75% of British oil supplies came from the Arab countries Facts On File vol. XXVII, No. 1390 June 1-7, 1967, P. 197. 

Direct American imports of Arab oil were although, only 5% of its domestic needs, the US petroleum requirements in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific were, however, met by supplies from the Persia Gulf to the tune of 65% of its total consumption of 120 million barrels per annum. See Facts On File, vol. XXVII, No 1390, June 15-21, 1967, P. 221  

140. Kuwait resumed oil supplies on June 86 except to Britain and the United States" On June 15, Saudi Arabia announced that it was resuming oil exports but not to6 countries which backed Israel." See Fact On File Ibid, P. 219.  
141. Levins, Hoag, The Arab Reach, op. cit, P. 85
of consumption-and-supply patterns throughout the decade, the West could still supply itself with oil from its own fields to meet its own needs in an emergency, and the American-dominated oil consortia could rewire oil supplies from other regions of the global oil-supply grid. Because of these surplus supply sources, the West could circumvent the Arab supply lines.  

In 1973, the situation was markedly different. In a sustained manner, the Arab oil producing countries had taken over the control of their oil wealth to a considerable extent, both in terms of level of production and fixation of prices. Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal and Libya’s Col. Gadhafi were the prime movers of this process.

The role of King Faisal was particularly significant. Before the summer of 1973 he was the follower of a strong pro-West policy and had ever long refused to be swayed by arguments of militant Arab leaders that Arab oil resources should be used as an instrument in the pursuit of Arab national objectives.  

By the summer of 1973 he had become concerned with two issues: the excessive exploitation of Saudi oil reserves and

142. *Ibid* In 1967 the United States announced plans for adding 35 tankers to the already existing fleet of 25, to get the supply of oil from non-Middle East sources, See Facts On File vol. XXVII, No 1390, June 15-21, 1967, P. 221

143. Stookey, Robert W., *America and the Arab States*, op. cit, P. 240
declining value of foreign currency balances (Saudi Arabia had already lost several hundred million dollars in currency devaluation). He now warned that Saudi oil production must be held to a level realistic in terms of Saudi economy and, furthermore, that Saudi Arabia would find it difficult to continue cooperation in the petroleum field with the United States unless the latter toward towhead a more balanced policy in the Middle East. The United States, however, took these warnings lightly. In their statements, the Government of the United States declared, rather, airily that oil considerations would not affect American opinion was little moved; the sentiment was widespread that embargoes and boycotts did not work, and the Arab oil producers were as dependent on the United States as the latter was on them.¹⁴⁴

Libya’s Gaddafi, after coming to power in September 1969, first limited production and then demanded higher royalties. With considerably increased importance for Libyan oil for the Western countries in the wake of Suez Canal closure due to 1967 War, the oil companies had to bow before Colonel Gaddafi’s demands. His victory put a new life and vigour in the OPEC. Towards the end of 1970 the producers consolidated new tax demands and began to act more stridently as a single group. In the first three years

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¹⁴⁴  Ibid PP. 240-41
beginning with the decade of 1970s taxes were raised from 80 cents per barrel to 1.25 dollar, with provisions for further annual increases to around 1.80-dollars in 1975.\textsuperscript{145}

In addition to the enhancement of taxes and royalties, the OPEC members also began to ask for participation in producing and selling their oil. The late Shah of Iran led the campaign for an increase in the prices and immediate transfer of control into domestic hands.\textsuperscript{146}

The oil producing countries, in 1970, entered into new agreements with oil companies, replacing the two decades old arrangements under which the profits attributed to crude oil production were, at least nominally, shared equally between governments and companies by way of a 50 percent income tax, and forced increases in both tax rates and tax prices. In 1971, they forced the companies further to increase tax prices, but signed a five year price agreement with them. In 1972, they obtained an agreement providing for equity participation in the crude oil producing subsidiaries of the international companies. In 1973, they not only took over the complete control of pricing but made it clear that they intended to extend their ownership and control more widely. In these four years, thus, the oil exporting countries of

\textsuperscript{145} Hamid, Akhtar Khan, "Us: Facing a Crisis",\textit{Pakistan Economist}, (Karachi,August 4-10,1973) P. 21,22.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid
the Middle East brought about irreversible changes in the institutions governing the industry and in the price of oil. In October, 1973, therefore, the Arab countries were in a better position to hit the American and European interest through an embargo on oil supplies; because the oil producers had not only secured the physical control over their wealth, the West's dependence on the Middle East oil had increased substantially making them dangerously vulnerable to cut off in supplies.

The first move in the oil boycott of those countries who, in the Arab eyes, supported Israel, came from Iraq. On October 8, 1973 Baghdad announced the nationalization of two major American oil firms—Mobil and Exxon. Syria and Lebanon suspended oil shipment on October 8.


According to Alan L. Madian, the prices of oil were kept artificially low. In the late 1960s oil was priced at under $2 a barrel. This had "turned the industrialized countries into petroleum junkies". See Alan L. Madian, "Oil is Still Too Cheap", *Foreign Policy*, (Summer, 1979) p. 173.


Both these companies had 23.75% share in the Iraqi oil production. See Riad N. El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, op. cit., p. 68. Robert W. Stookey thinks that a general understanding between Egypt and Saudi Arabia was probably reached toward the end of August, 1973 when President Sadat visited Riyadh; and it is plausible that King Faisal raised the issue with the Ruler of Kuwait who came to Saudi Arabia on a State visit the following week. Stookey, op. cit, p. 255.

150. *Ibid*, p. 837
The United States was warned by King Faisal during the Ramadan War that if the US moved to re-supply Israel with arms and weapons, Saudi Arabia would resort to an oil cut off. On October 9 Egypt urged Saudi Arabia to stop oil production at US-run wells if the American re-supply of arms to Israel took place.\footnote{150} When reports of American supply of weapons to Israel became known in the Arab countries, Egypt stepped up pressure on Saudi Arabia (October 13, 1973) to use his "oil weapon".\footnote{151} On October 17 at a ministerial meeting held in Kuwait, 11 nations of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) agreed on a coordinated programme of oil production and export cut. Saudi Arabia, the largest producer, announced on October 18 that she was slashing her oil production by 10\% and would cut off all shipments to the US, if it continued to supply arms to Israel and refused to modify its pro-Israel policy.\footnote{152}

While announcing the decision to effect a 10\% reduction on October 18, Saudi Arabia "let it be known that the reduction would continue until November 30, after which further reductions were to be announced. The Saudi action was followed by Abu Dhabi and other Arab States, who in

\footnote{151}{Ramazani, R. K, \textit{Beyond the Arab-Israel Settlement: New Directions for US Policy in the Middle East} (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. Foreign Policy Report, 1977) P. 8}

\footnote{152}{\textit{Facts On File} vol. 33, No. 1720, October 14-20, 1973 P. 861}
accordance with the decisions reached in Kuwait on October 17 stopped oil shipments to the United States and those states who supported Israel.

At Kuwait meeting it was decided that each country would reduce production by 5% each month over the previous month until Israel withdrew from the territories occupied during the 1967 War and agreed to respect the right of the Palestinians.

At the time when embargo was announced the Arab countries were producing 19.6 million barrels a day which constituted about 40% of oil production in non-Communist countries.\textsuperscript{153}

### Major Oil Producing Middle East Countries (1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proved oil reserves (in barrels)</th>
<th>1973 daily production (in barrels)</th>
<th>annual Revenues</th>
<th>Daily Production after planned increases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>145 billion</td>
<td>8 million</td>
<td>4.4 million</td>
<td>10 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>30 billion</td>
<td>2.3 million</td>
<td>$2.1 billion</td>
<td>2.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>65 billion</td>
<td>5.9 million</td>
<td>$3.4 billion</td>
<td>8.00 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>29 billion</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>$1.3 billion</td>
<td>3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>65 billion</td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>21 billion</td>
<td>1.3 million</td>
<td>$934 million</td>
<td>2.7 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Saudi Arabia had been exporting over 500,000 barrels of crude oil a day to the United States. The initial 10% cut, combined with the cessation of Abu Dhabi's daily US

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid
shipments of 180,000 barrels caused an immediate loss to the US of over 230,000 barrels, about 1.3% of consumption. The fuel position in the United States was already tight because the domestic production had fallen and dependence on the Middle East shipments were projected to considerably increase.154

But the most seriously affected were, of course, Europe and Japan. On hearing the reported Arab move for oil boycott, Mr.M.A.H. Luns, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) said on October 14 that a halt in Arab shipment of oil would "come very close to a hostile act". The Japanese also, as reported by the New York Times on October 17 felt very bitter at the Arab moves to stop oil shipments.155

On October 17, the six largest Persian Gulf oil producing countries also announced in Kuwait a 17% increase in the prices of their crude oil and a 70% increase in taxes to be paid by oil companies on oil produced and sold by the companies. The new prices were set at $3.65 per barrel for light crude, up from $3.12.156

154. Ibid

The energy situation in the US in 1973 must be seen in the light of American extravagance in the usage of energy. According to one account, the Americans who constituted only 6 per cent of the world's population, consumed 33 per cent of the world's output of energy. Per capita Energy use in America was 55 times as much as in India, 22 times as much as in China, 3 times as much as in Japan and France. See Akhtar Hamid Khan, op. cit, P. 20


156. Ibid

The six Persian Gulf states were Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. Together they accounted for over one half of non-Communist countries oil export.
On October 19, Libya ordered a complete halt to shipments of crude oil and petroleum products to the United States and also raised the prices of its oil for other imports from $.4.90 to $8.25 a barrel. Libyan exports to the United States at that time totaled about 142,000 barrels a day of crude oil and indirectly 100,000 barrels of petroleum products, or about 1.4% of total US consumption. The Arab boycott of US markets became total when Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and Dubai announced cut off of their supplies on October 21, 1973. Apart from the United States, the country which was a special target of Arab oil embargo was the Netherlands. On October 21 Iraq nationalized the Dutch share of the Basra Oil Company.

When Libya announced on October 30 that it was suspending oil deliveries to the Netherlands, it became the seventh Arab country to do so. This action led to a two-thirds reduction of Dutch crude petroleum imports. She, in 1972, imported 179 million tons of crude oil, but re-exported 116 million tons, mostly as refined products, to Belgium, West Germany and the Scandinavian countries. Thus, when the Dutch imports of crude oil fell due to the Arab boycott, it was not only the energy position of the Netherlands which suffered gravely, the position of other European countries was also affected very adversely.

158. *Ibid*
The Arabs had blamed the Netherlands for pursuing a pro-Israel policy by aiding in the transit of Soviet Jewish emigrants to Israel. The Dutch Government was also accused of supporting Israel on its policy of retaining the Arab territories occupied in 1967 War.\textsuperscript{160}

An important aspect of the oil embargo was that in adopting and intensifying the action, the Arab oil-producing nations showed an unexpectedly determined sense of solidarity.\textsuperscript{161}. That is why the embargo proved an effective weapon.

How effective these measures i.e. oil embargo and price hike, were is described by Martin Shultz in his book The Politics of Oil:

"The effect of those changes was staggering. The world political order was transformed practically overnight. The events of October, 1973 upset the whole international balance of power as dramatically as the Russian Revolution had done fifty six years earlier. Economically, the upheaval could be compared to the effects of a massive earth-quake. The combination of embargo and price rise threw the world into panic before there was even a hint of a shortage of oil. Fearful car owners in many countries began to hoard petrol and there were growing reports of petrol thefts. Mile-long queues formed outside petrol stations and when pumps ran dry,

\begin{footnotesize}
161. Michael Adams, op. cit, P. 43
\end{footnotesize}
many motorists became angry. Black-markets in petroleum flourished and a new crime was created-road tanker hijacking.\(^{162}\)

The Arab oil embargo was imposed in response to the US resupply of arms to Israel during the October War.\(^{163}\) It was applied to other countries as well, notably the Netherlands and Denmark and remained in force for five months. When the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger helped to produce a "disengagement, of forces" agreement on January 18, 1974 and the agreement, called Sinai I Agreement, began to be implemented by Israel, only then, the oil embargo was relaxed. President Sadat himself toward the Arab capitals after concluding Sinai I agreement with Israel and is said to have canvassed for the resumption of oil supplies to West.\(^{164}\)


\(^{163}\) Ramazani, *op. cit.*, P. 8

\(^{164}\) Stookey, *op. cit.*, PP. 255-6.

*The Sinai I Agreement*, called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to a line about twenty miles away from the positions they were holding east of the Suez Canal and for a limited Egyptian force to occupy the east bank of the Canal, with a UN truce force to be stationed in between. It also put an end to the encirclement by the Israelis of the Egyptian Third Army which was allowed to regain Egyptian lines.

*Sinai II* was signed by Egypt and Israel on September 4, 1975. It provided for the Egyptian advance to the Israeli line and Israeli with drawl to the east of the Milta and Gidi passes, a neutral zone in which a UN force was to be stationed, operation of radar warning systems in Milta and Gidi passes by American technicians, Egypt's, agreement to permit the passage of non-military cargoes bound for Israel through the Suez Canal. See Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs, op. cit.* P. 567

For the US step-by-step diplomacy and Egypt-Israeli disengagement agreements, See William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions, op. cit.*, Ch, VII.
THE US WORLD-WIDE ALERT OF FORCE

Although, UN Security Council had approved a cease-fire resolution on October 22 which was accepted both by Egypt and Israel, fighting—at times heavy—again broke out almost immediately on the Suez front, each side accusing the other of responsibility. As a result, the Security Council again met in emergency session on October 23 at the request of the Soviet Union and the United States and urged the two sides to stop fighting and return to October 22 positions. Israel, however, failed to abide by the call contained in the second UN Security Council resolution (No.339).

Egypt, thereupon, requested another meeting of the Security Council (October 24-25) to take up its renewed charges of Israeli truce violations. The Council approved a resolution on October 25 establishing a UN peace keeping force to insure implementation of the cease-fire in the Middle East. Meanwhile, when the Israeli violation did not stop, Egypt sent a request to the Council that it send US and Soviet troops to the Middle East to compel Israel to withdraw its forces to the Sinai positions it had occupied on October 22 when the first truce went into effect.166

President Sadat also contacted the Soviet Union and the United States following "unmanly violations of cease-fire by

Israel"."Please come in", he asked them", I am willing to have your forces land on Egyptian territory to ensure that the Israelis pull back to the October 22 lines---".167

The United States, however, rejected the Egyptian suggestion. At a news-conference on October 25, Kissinger said that he did not favour and would not approve the sending of joint US-Soviet forces into the Middle East. "---it was not conceivable", he said," that we should transplant the great-power rivalry", into the Middle East or "impose a military condominium by the United States and the Soviet Union. Keeping in mind that the Soviet Union might use Sadat's proposal as justification for sending Soviet forces into the Middle East he, at the same conference, said that the US was "even more opposed to the unilateral introduction by a great power, especially a nuclear power, of military forces into the Middle East in whatever guise those forces should be introduced".168

On hearing that President Sadat has publicly appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to send forces to the Middle East the White House had also immediately issued a statement rejecting the idea of forces from the super powers being sent to the area. After this statement, there was also a meeting between Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to Washington Mr. Dobrynin. In this meeting the convening of a peace conference was discussed and agreement

167.  Sadat, In Search of Identity, op. cit, P. 266
was reached that Geneva would serve as its venue. The Soviet Ambassador denied that the Soviets were interested in sending a joint US-Soviet forces to the Middle East in response to Sadat's appeal. 169

Till October 24, although Israel was being accused by Egypt of grave cease-fire violations, 170 there was no indications that the two super-powers were heading towards a serious confrontation.

On October 25, however, American military forces were placed on a "precautionary alert" at key bases in the United States and abroad. The placing of US forces on alert was said to be in response to information received by the American authorities that the Soviets were contemplating to unilaterally send their forces into the Middle East. 171

The first indication of Soviet intention was received by Washington through the Soviet Ambassador who called Kissinger on October 25 to tell him that the Soviets considered the sending of joint Soviet-American forces to the Middle East with favour if it was requested by the non-aligned members of the United Nations. The Soviet Ambassador

169. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions op. cit, P. 195

The Soviet delegate at the UN, Yakov A. Malik had, however, declared during the Security Council meeting on October 24 that Cairo's, request for (US-Soviet), troops was justified but he had refused to commit his government


170. An Egyptian statement issued on October 24 had alleged that Israelis had taken advantage of the October 22 and 24 cease-fires to spread southwards under cover of darkness from the bridgehead areas north of the Great Bitter Lake Ibid, P. 880

171. See Facts On File Ibid, P. 877 Keatings Contemporary Archives, op. cit, 26198-26201
also told him that the Soviets were considering to introduce such a resolution. This caused concern in Washington but did not provoke any United States reaction.\textsuperscript{172} The United States was alarmed when Kissinger through the Soviets Ambassador received Brezhneve’s message accusing Israel of cease-fire violations and inviting the US to join the Soviet Union "to compel observance of the cease-fire without delay". The message also contained the threat: "I will say it straight, that if you find it impossible to act with us in this matter, we should be forced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. Israel cannot be permitted to get away with the violations."\textsuperscript{173} Kissinger quickly relayed the message to Nixon who reportedly empowered him to order a military alert if necessary. After that the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger convened an ad hoc session of the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{174}

In the American perception Brezhnev’s message created a dangerous situation but letting the question open as to what were the Soviet intentions except that the Russians were determined not to allow the destruction of Egyptian Third Army take place at the Israeli hands. The United States also knew that whatever their intentions the Soviets did possess the capability to intervene if they decided to do so.

\textsuperscript{172} Quandt, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 196
\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Ibid}
According to American sources, the Soviet Union had put on alert at least seven air borne divisions on a high state of alert. There were two amphibious landing crafts in the eastern Mediterranean with the Soviet squadron.175

Apprehensions were felt in the American quarters that the Russians might resort to impressive displays of military power that could have explosive political, and perhaps, even military, consequences. The Soviets might, the Americans thought, attempt to deliver supplies to the entrapped Third Army Corps of Egypt through a small "peace keeping" contingent. If this contingent came under fire from the Israelis then the Soviets might feel compelled to react on a larger scale. If the Soviet attempt to supply the Third Army is not obstructed, then the Soviet prestige, according to American apprehensions, would have gained a significant boost, precisely at a critical moment in US-Arab relations.176 Kissinger and other participants in the National Security Council meeting reached two conclusions. The Soviet Union, which had seemingly not taken serious United States warning about the introduction of their forces into the area, must be under no illusion that the United States did not have the will and the ability to react to any move they might make. To underline this, United States military forces would be placed on a DEF CON 3 alert, which meant that leaves would be cancelled and an enhanced state

175. Ibid, PP. 196-97
176. Ibid, P. 197
of readiness would be observed. The Strategic Air Command would be on a higher state of alert tamps the normal Def Con.4 No change would be needed for the Sixth Fleet which was already on a stage 3 alert.

At the same time President Nixon sent a message to Brezhnev saying that the sending of Soviet troops to the Middle East would be considered a violation of article II of the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war of June 22, 1973.177 In his letter US President had told the Soviet leader:

"You must know, however, that we could in no event accept unilateral action. This would be in violation of our understandings of the agreed Principles we signed in Moscow in 1972 and the Article II of the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War. As I stated above, such action would produce incalculable consequences which would be in the interest of neither of our countries and which would end all we have striven so hard to achieve". 178

While, on the one hand, the US moved to ward off any unilateral action of the Soviets in the Middle East by ordering a world-wide alert of forces, on the other, Kissinger tried to check Israeli advance on the Egyptian front. The Israelis were told in no uncertain terms that the United States would not permit the destruction of Third Army Corps.179 On October 29 the Third Army began to receive relief supplies with Israeli permission. The first 20 to 125 trucks carrying food, water and medical supplies

177. Ibid
178. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, op. cit, P. 591
179. William B. Quandt, op. cit, PP. 197-98.
were driven by UN personnel from Cairo to Suez city, and from there the cargo was transshipped across the waterway on Egyptian boats and barrages.  

The Israelis had agreed to permit the supplies to the Third Army under US pressure. For this purpose, the US Secretary of State had prepared the plan and had made direct contacts on October 26 "with the governments involved including Israel, Egypt and the Soviet Union". The Israeli officials had admitted that they were reluctant to alleviate the plight of Third Army but agreed only after heavy diplomatic pressure by the United States. The American authorities had told the Israelis that unless Egyptian soldiers were given relief, the Soviet Union might intervene militarily to rescue the force.

The orders for putting the US forces on alert had been approved by the President. The Soviet reaction was eagerly awaited with a watchful eye. According to US sources, Soviets were making moves that suggested that a confrontation with the United States was imminent. It was


181. Ibid

When the Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan faced criticism in the Israeli Parliament as to why Egyptian Third Army was permitted to be resupplied without insisting that Cairo agree first to an exchange of prisoners, he said that his government's agreement to permit food and water to be sent to the Egyptian soldiers was not a humanitarian gesture. "Israel, he said, had yielded under a threat of losing vital US arms supplies.....the alternatives to allowing food convoy were much worse." "We had no choice," he said Ibid, P. 897.

See also Theodore Draper, "The United States and Israel Tilt in the Middle East," Commentary 59, No 4 (April, 1975), and the exchange of letters in Commentary 60, No 3 (September, 1975), Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan in Story of My Life (New York, William Morrow, 1976) p. 544 says that the Americans' "more or less" gave Israel an ultimatum to allow supplies through to the Third Army ..... (cited in Quandt, op. cit, P. 198, foot note no. 71)
feared that Soviets had sent a ship to Egypt with nuclear weapons on board. Several other Soviets ships including the amphibious landing crafts were steaming toward Egypt. The Americans also received a "fragmentary piece of intelligence" that the arrival of Soviet troops in Cairo was imminent. In view of these reports the US Government became convinced that the Soviets were moving towards confrontation. President Nixon, therefore, ordered Kissinger to develop a plan for sending United States troops to the Middle East in case the Soviets did intervene.\textsuperscript{182}

On October 25 Kissinger addressed a press conference where he explained that the US had called the military alert as a "precautionary step" in response to evidence that the Soviet Union may have intended to intervene unilaterally in the Middle East. Kissinger told the press conference that the "ambiguity" of certain Soviet "actions and communications and certain readiness measures that were observed "led the President to decide to" make clear our attitude toward unilateral steps".\textsuperscript{183}

Although Kissinger, at his press conference, denied that the military alert was designed with domestic political considerations,\textsuperscript{184} several major American newspapers and newsmagazines reported public suspicion that the US military alert had been influenced by the political" fire storm" of

\textsuperscript{182} Quandt, \textit{op. cit}, P. 198

\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Facts On File}, vol 33, No 21-27, October P. 877

\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Ibid}, P. 878
reaction resulting from the widening Water Gate Scandal. Newsweek in its issue of November 5 suggested that the President's "flourish of " crisis diplomacy" was a device to divert attention from his domestic political troubles. According to Newsweek, an unnamed Administration aide said that "we had a problem and we decided to make the most out of it".

Time's November 5 issue questioned "whether the alert scare (was) necessary". After citing the doubts of "some military experts" that Soviet actions toward the Middle East warranted the military response ordered by the President, Time concluded that "perhaps some less dramatic action might have ended the crisis".

The Wall Street Journal concluded on October 26 that the crisis was "real", but it noted that a "few Nixon foes-grown so cynical about presidential actions because of past duplicity -may claim that yesterday's exercise was nearly a calculated ploy by a man in deep political trouble".
On October 26, the Washington Post reported that there was bipartisan support for the President's warning to the Soviet "despite" privately expressed reservations and an "undercurrent of suspicion that President might have escalated the crisis.....to.... take people's minds off his domestic problems.\textsuperscript{185}

On October 26, President Nixon, at a press conference, described the reasons behind the military alert and how the crisis was defused. Prior to the Security Council resolution of October 25,\textsuperscript{186} the President said, a "potentially explosive crisis" had arisen as a result of information which had "led us to believe that the Soviet Union was planning to send a very substantial force" into the Middle East. As a result of this information, said the President, he had ordered a precautionary alert of American military forces throughout the world, its purpose being "to indicate to the Soviet Union that we could not accept any unilateral move on their part to move military forces into the Middle East". The President said that the crisis was "defused" as a result of messages which he had exchanged with Mr. Brezhnev, with the result that both countries gave their joint support to the Security Council resolution, for the despatch of a UN


\textsuperscript{186} The Security Council resolution of October 25 approved the establishment of a UN Peacekeeping Force to insure implementation of the cease-fire in the Middle East. The resolution also repeated two earlier resolutions for a cease-fire adopted by the Council since October 22. For text of the resolution see \textit{Facts On File}, vol. 33, No 1721, October 21-27, 1973, P. 878
Force to the Middle East which would exclude troops of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

During succeeding days the US world alert, which had included nuclear forces, was gradually phased down, and on October 31, the Pentagon cancelled the military alert for all US troops remaining on that it status, at the same time the Pentagon said that if appeared that an alert of some 50,000 Russian paratroops in the USSR and Eastern Europe had also ended. In an earlier statement on October 26, the US Defence Secretary, James Schlesinger, had given three main reasons for President Nixon's decision to order a precautionary alert. These reasons were: (1) the alerting of Soviet paratroops in Eastern Europe; (2) the doubling in size of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean to over 60 ships; and (3) the apparent preparation of Soviet aircraft, including large transport planes, for troops transport. 187

CONCLUSION

The Fourth Arab-Israeli War was different from the previous Arab-Israeli wars in many respects. Firstly, it was a war in which both sides made use of highly sophisticated weapons and electronic devices which had great impact on the course of war. The Soviet-supplied surface-to-air and wire-guided anti-tank missiles were very effectively used by the Egyptians against the Israeli air force and armour. Similarly, American supplied TV-guided rockets and satellite

information, helped Israel to turn the tide of war in her favour after initial reverses. The Egyptian President Anwar Sadat records that October War was" the first electronic warfare in which missiles were brilliantly used. "He also admits that the"modern technological devices"that Israel acquired from the United States had enabled Israel to get an edge over the Arab armies in the later days of war. 188

In the second place, the 1973 War restored Arab confidence and dignity. In 1967 the Arabs had suffered a humiliating defeat. The speed and the ease with which Israel had achieved victory over the Arabs had made the rest of the world to believe that the Arabs would never be able to fight the Israelis. But the 1973 War belied their assertions. The Arabs planned their attack with such precision and minuteness that it not only took the Israelis by surprise, it led to high Israeli casualties and minimum Arab loses during the early phase of the war. For example, Egyptian forces, according to Heikal, had been prepared for 26,000 casualties in the initial assault but the casualties suffered by them were only 180 dead. 189

As the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief put it the 1973 War "was a great and scientific piece of work of the first order. When our documents are all laid out for historical study this work will certainly earn its full due of

188. Sadat, In Search of Identity, op. cit, P. 256
189. Quoted in David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat(faber and faber, 1981) P. 27
appreciation and will enter the scientific history of war as a model of minute precision and genuine research".  

It is true that war ended with Israel having military edge over the Egyptian and Syrian forces, but politically it was disaster for Israel. So far as the military position of the Arabs was concerned, the Arabs never went in for a total victory over Israel or complete liberation of the occupied territories. In strategic terms the military aim was limited. The military strategic aim was specified as to defeat the main groupings of the Israeli army and liberate such territories of strategic importance that could create favourable conditions for the full liberation of occupied territories by military force if necessary, shaping at the same time an element of pressure to impose a political solution to the problem.  

In that sense the Arabs succeeded in achieving their aim. The deadlock over the Middle East problem was broken. The world awoke to the seriousness of the problem when the Arabs resorted to the use of oil weapon. It brought home a message to every country of the world how greatly international peace and security depended upon a stable Middle East which could not be created without removing the Arab grievances. The world-wide alert of American forces ordered by President Nixon, demonstrated the fact that the Arab-Israel conflict could trigger a Third World War. A

190. Ibid, P.23
greater urgency, therefore, was felt to remove the root-cause of this dispute, the problem of Palestine.

Thirdly, the October War resulted in near complete isolation of Israel and greater support and sympathy for the Palestinian cause both inside and outside the United Nations. A number of African countries with whom Israel had developed close military, political and economic relations in 1960s, broke diplomatic ties with Israel.\textsuperscript{192}

The Afro-Asian countries declared their support for the Arab cause which was translated into the United Nations recognition of PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The 1973 war confirmed the transformation of the Palestinian issue from a mere refugee problem into an important one involving the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland and to national self-determination.

During the October War, the European public opinion was anti-Israel and pro-Arab. This situation sharply contrasted with the one during 1967 War.\textsuperscript{193}

Most of the NATO countries refused to permit the use of their territories or airspace for US shipment of military supplies to Israel.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{192} By 1961 Israel had entered into trade-and-aid as well as cultural cooperation agreements with over thirty five African and Asian states. See Lenczowski, \textit{op. cit} P. 436. See also Samuel Decalo, "Israeli Foreign Policy and the Third World," \textit{Orbis}, vol. XI, Fall 1967, No., 3, PP. 724-745.

\textsuperscript{193} See Sadat, \textit{op. cit}, p. 266

\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Facts On File}, vol 33, No. 1722, October 28-November 3, 1973, P. 900
The member countries of EEC called for an end to the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and supported the Palestinian's right to self-determination.

Fourthly, the 1973 War exhibited greater inter-Arab cooperation. During the previous wars disunity and mutual rivalries stalked the Arab ranks. The Arab world was divided into two hostile camps i.e., radicals and conservatives. The death of Nasser in 1969, however, brought this divide to an end. Before 1973 War the Arabs had reached a complete consensus on the Palestinian problem and Saudi Arabia's King Faisal was playing a leading role. The 1967 War had led to the creation of new Arab perception of their conflict with Israel. It was no longer viewed in the narrow confines of Arab nationalism; on the contrary, especially after First Islamic Summit of 1969, confrontation with Israel was being pursued within the framework of Islamic unity.195

The result was that not only Arab states were one during the 1973 War, the whole Islamic world extended full support to the Arab cause. The Rabat Summit of Islamic countries had laid the basis for the grand alliances of the

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195. See Hoag Levins, The Arab Reach, op. cit, PP. 92-93
Muslim countries; and the Lahore Summit of 1974 was a logical corollary to the aims and objectives outlined at the first summit. Inter-Arab coordination and the rallying around them of the Muslim and the Third World countries had a profound impact on the super-power, especially the United States, diplomacy in the Middle East.
CHAPTER 9
PAKISTAN AND RAMADAN WAR

When the Fourth Arab-Israel War broke out on October 6, 1973, the reaction in Pakistan, both at the official and public level was spontaneous and whole-hearted support to the Arabs. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called a meeting of Arab envoys stationed in Islamabad on October 7 and expressed Pakistan’s profound sympathy and complete solidarity with the Arab cause. At the same time Bhutto sent messages of sympathy and solidarity to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria. He also sent a message to the United Nations Secretary-General expressing Pakistan’s deep concern over the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East.

In the message sent to the Egyptian and Syrian Heads of State, Pakistan Prime Minister said:

"I am following with close personal attention the heroic struggle of the Arab Armed Forces in the renewed battle for the liberation of Arab territories."

"I wish to assure your excellency of the solidarity of the government and people of Pakistan with you and your people in this grave hour. We earnestly pray that the just cause of the Arab people will triumph in the end."

The message sent to the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim read:

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1. The meeting was attended by the ambassadors from Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Sudan and United Arab Emirates. See the Pakistan Times Lahore October 8, 1973.


The state of no war, no peace which has been allowed to prevail in the Middle East has failed to prevent a renewal of hostilities. It has plunged the region into yet another armed conflict. The United Nations Security Council should no longer evade its grave responsibility for the restoration of peace. It would not be enough to call for a cease-fire. The Security Council must take immediate measures to have occupied Arab territories vacated without further delay. It must implement its Resolution of 1967. Failure to do so is fraught with serious and threatening consequence for the whole world. A similar message was sent to the US President Nixon, who was prevailed upon to review American policy in the Middle East.

On October 9, the Prime Minister convened an important cabinet meeting under his chairmanship where the Middle East situation was discussed "threadbare". At the end of the meeting a statement was issued in which Pakistan's full support to and solidarity with the Arab cause was expressed.

In yet another important move Prime Minister Bhutto called a meeting of chiefs of three forces, army, air force and navy, on October 10. Addressing the services chiefs the Prime Minister said:

"We would do whatever we can with our limited resources to be of assistance to the just cause of the Arab people which we uphold dearly and consider to be a part of our own struggle."

He further said:

"We are not opposed to any people or any country but we believe that settlement of international disputes can only come on the basis of principles. And we uphold those principles no matter what the consequences, no matter which g rant power may be in support of them or against them. This is an independent position which the Government of Pakistan had taken during our tenure of office, and I hope that as long as we are in office, we will continue to maintain this position."

The Prime Minister further told the three chiefs of staff of Pakistan's Armed Forces that he had "taken certain
other steps also on the diplomatic front on the political front and on the home front, but now, he said, "I thought that I will also hold consultations with our Chiefs of Staff of Army, Navy and Air Force to discuss the present Middle East situation and what we can do within our limited resources to be of assistance to the just cause of the Arab peoples which we uphold dearly and consider to be a part of our own struggle. This is why I have called the meeting".  

It was clear that the reaction of the Government of Pakistan to the 1973 Arab-Israel War was definitely more profound, enthusiastic and open under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He certainly went further than were reiteration of Pakistan's traditional support to the Palestinian cause. When the war broke out, the Prime Minister was out of the country but hearing about the outbreak of hostilities, he rushed back and took important measures on the homefront which led to, as the Prime Minister himself described "tangible" and "more than political" support to the Arab countries.  

During the period that the war continued to be waged between the two sides, the Prime Minister publicly repeated that Pakistan had made a "tangible response" to requests for assistance. He declined, however, to specify the nature of

8. Ibid.
the contribution, except to announce the dispatch at mid-month of two mobile surgical teams, consisting of eight doctors, and twenty two technical personnel. In fact Pakistan's material aid was also military. Elements of a squadron of Pakistani piloted aircraft, stationed in Syria saw combat. The experienced Pakistani pilots were believed to have destroyed at least one Israeli Mirage. The Pakistani pilots would have taken more tally of the Israeli fighter planes but they were under instructions from the Government of Pakistan to assume defensive position and to restrict their flights to Syrian airspace. It is said that the two battalions of Pakistan's combat troops were placed on alert for transfer from Pakistan in the event that Israel launched a land attack on Damascus.11

The material assistance given by Pakistan to the Arabs during the 1973 War was not significant as compared to the


In his statement in the National Assembly on December 17,1973 discussing Pakistan's foreign policy, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmad also mentioned his governments support to the Arab cause during the 1973 war. "We gave the Arabs----" he said", what ever support we possibly could--whether it was diplomatic or political or in terms of material assistance. See The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates vol. III, No. 1, 17th December, 1973, P.7 According to Maulana Kausar Niazi who had been a Federal Minister for Information in Bhutto's cabinet, Pakistan had sent army and air-force personnel to assist the Arab's in the 1973 War. See Kausar Niazi, Ayr line Kat Gai (Lahore. Jung Publishers, 1987) PP. 74,75. According to Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan (Retd) Chief of Staff, Pakistan Air Force (1974-1978) Pakistan sent 15 to 20 trained pilots, to Syria and Egypt during 1973 War within 24 hours of President Sadat and President Asad's request. (A talk with Air Marshal (Retd) Zulfiqar Ali Khan). The statement of Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan is corroborated by Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhry (Retd.) Chief of Staff of Pakistan Air Force (1972-1974) According to Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhry, Pakistan sent 14-16 pilots to Egypt and Syria during 1973 War who remained there even after the end of hostilities (A talk with Air Marshal (Retd) Zafar Chaudhry.
political and diplomatic support.\textsuperscript{12} The reason for insufficient material assistance was that firstly, Pakistan herself at that time faced serious economic difficulties and other problems. The summer of 1973 had seen devastating floods in the vast areas of Punjab and Sindh. Although the issue of Prisoners of War had been settled with India, the effects of 1971 War and severance of eastern wing of the country had not yet completely been lost.

However, on the political and diplomatic front, Pakistan lent wholehearted and enthusiastic support. At the outbreak of war, Maulana Kausar Niazi Federal Information Minister while condemning Israel, labeled an attack on the Arabs on an attack as Pakistan.\textsuperscript{13} The Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed Israel for initiating aggression against the Arab countries and referred to the "barbaric action" and the "indiscriminate bombings of cities" by the Israelis.\textsuperscript{14}

With war entering into the tenth day, Prime Minister Bhutto undertook an important diplomatic mission. He visited Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia where he held talks with Shah

\textsuperscript{12} Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani a prominent Opposition leader criticized the government of Pakistan in his speech during the National Assembly discussion on foreign policy for giving insufficient assistance to the Arabs. The Prime Minister, he said, did, it is true call a meeting of the Arab Ambassadors and assured them of Pakistan's support. But so far as the (material) assistance was concerned, he said, it consisted of only four or six doctors or four to six nurses, 12 men in total.


of Iran, Turkish Premier and Shah Faisal of Saudi Arabia. At Tehran, Mr. Bhutto addressed a press conference where he said that "from the beginning of the Palestinian conflict in 1948, we have expressed our solidarity with the Arab position."

"Pakistan", he said, "came into existence only one year before the Palestinian conflict arose. Since the inception of Pakistan we have", he further said, "taken a constant and historical position on this conflict in conformity with the universally recognized international principles." ¹⁵ At Ankara, Prime Minister Bhutto met the heads of Arab missions stationed in the Turkish capital and assured them of Pakistan's support during the war. ¹⁶

However, the most significant and fruitful part of Mr. Bhutto's mission was his visit to Saudi Arabia and his parleys with Shah Faisal. The Saudi monarch had, after the humiliating Arab defeat of 1967 and loss of Al-Quds, emerged as the leading voice in the Arab world for the restoration of lost Arab territories and Jerusalem to the Arabs. The loss of Jerusalem had particularly angered Faisal. The Al-Aqsa fire incident had made him further angry. ¹⁷ The death


16. *Ibid*

17. Eye witness accounts of King Faisal's behaviour during this period, according to Hoag Levins, indicate that he was personally so distraught by the seizure of the Old City of Jerusalem by Israel that when the subject came up in his court, the normally poised and aloof keeper of the Holy Cities of Islam was unable to talk coherently and, at times, displayed physical reactions so intense they rendered him speechless. Scg Hoag Levins, *op. cit*, P.86.

of Nasser in 1969 and wealth from oil revenues further increased the influence of Shah Faisal in the Arab world.

Faisal was in favour of creating a broad based framework of Islamic unity within which the full weight of the entire Muslim world could be thrown behind the Palestinian cause. The Arab-Israel conflict was to be taken out of the narrow confines of Arab Nationalism. With his emergence as a pre-eminent political as well as spiritual figure, the anti-Western Arab Nationalism had given way to a de-radicalized assertion of economic power and a new emphasis on Islamic unity.\(^\text{18}\)

In the meeting with King Faisal at Jeddah, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Bhutto not only apprised him of his talks held earlier with the Iranian and Turkish leaders in Tehran and Ankara respectively, but discussed with him how the Arab cause over Palestine could be supported more effectively and a just and a permanent solution to the Middle East conflict could be found.

One immediate result of Bhutto’s mission was that Turkey which had traditionally been having closer relations with Israel, expressed views identical with those of

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This change in the Arab outlook had, in fact, begun to appear immediately after the 1967 war. As Mohammad H. Heikal notes it down. "After the 1967 war, many of us in Egypt felt the urgent need for a new alignment of forces in the Middle East which should not only put an end to the inter-Arab rivalries but should rally the support of all Muslim states in the area". One outcome of the new thinking was the restoration of diplomatic relations, between Egypt and Iran before Nasser’s death in 1970. Mohammad Heikal, *The Return of the Ayatollah: The Iranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Khomeini*, (Andre Deutsch, 1981) p.10
Pakistan on the Middle East issue. The statements issued at the end of Mr. Bhutto's visit to Ankara indicated that Turkey shared Pakistan’s perception on the Middle East and finding a just and permanent solution to the Middle East problem.

On his return from the Middle East tour, Prime Minister Bhutto addressed a press conference in Karachi on October 20, 1973. At this conference he expressed Pakistan’s point of view on a number of questions relating to the Middle East issue, such as the October War, the Palestinian issue, the nature of Pakistan’s assistance and a long term, unified approach towards finding a just and permanent solution to the Arab-Israel conflict.

Making general observations on the Middle East War at the outset of his press conference, Mr. Bhutto had said that the whole of the Muslim world was on trial and it was not a test for the Arabs only but for all the Muslim nations. He said that that was a struggle for justice and equity, and, therefore, was "as much our struggle as it was of the Arab's". Analyzing further, he said that the outbreak of hostilities had shown that imposed solutions unacceptable to the people could not endure and that they would lead to

20. The Joint Communiqué issued in Ankara on October 18, 1973 at the conclusion of Prime Minister Bhutto's visit disclosed the reaching of agreement between Pakistan and Turkey to devote their best efforts to bringing about a cease-fire accompanied by steps towards a permanent honourable and peaceful settlement of Middle East question in conformity with the principles of justice and equity". See Dawn, October 19, 1973.
further strife. This war, the Prime Minister said, also proved that the big Powers could not, working in concert or in conflict, in harmony and in discord, prevent a "just war and just struggle of a people". The October War, Mr. Bhutto further said, had clearly demonstrated that a state of "no war, no peace" was highly detrimental to international order; that vital international disputes could not be frozen and a diplomatic stalemate was not the answer to world peace and security".  

Explaining the purpose of his mission to Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia Mr. Bhutto said that it was to forge a united and positive approach towards the Middle East crisis. Explaining further he said that "the positive approach" to the Middle East problem was "to reconcile the different attitudes of the concerned parties and to help arrive at "common position". He said that he took initiative to co-ordinate diplomatic efforts during and after the war so as to forge "a united approach to the Middle East crisis".  

At his press conference Mr. Bhutto also spoke about the nature, scope and purpose of Pakistan's "aid" to the Arabs in the October War. In addition to the reiteration of Pakistan's traditional and historical policy of support to the Palestinians, Mr. Bhutto, as his statements in answers to questions from the correspondents at the press conference showed, also hinted that Pakistan was providing important


material assistance to the Arabs. However, despite being repeatedly asked, he did not disclose the nature and scope of such assistance. What he said was that it was a "tangible" support and "more than political". As to the nature and scope of this support he could not tell, as he claimed, for reasons of critical exigencies of war and in public interest.23

Speaking further about Pakistan's role, Mr. Bhutto said that Pakistan had constantly been in touch with the Arabs as well as with other states in its efforts to find a "just and honourable peace" in the Middle East. For this purpose, he said, Pakistan had a definite idea which, as the Prime Minister himself admitted, was "embryonic" at that stage but had, as he claimed, further progressed as a result of his discussions with the Shah of Iran and Government leaders of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. What was the idea or plan, he did not deem it necessary to tell at that press conference. However, he declared that the plan would be presented at an "appropriate time".24

However, at the press conference Mr. Bhutto made a number of observations which provided some clues as to what was in his mind. In the first place, as he indicated at the press conference, Pakistan wanted to give the Arabs "a sustained, organized and effective support". He made it clear that Pakistan did not want to "sensationalize things

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
to gain petty political advantages at home". His government, the Prime Minister said, liked to give support to the Arabs in a "systematic, proper and civilized manner" and not to dramatize things to "draw some petty political advantage".

Referring to the past practice in Pakistan of appealing for and collection of funds for the victims of the previous Arab-Israeli Wars, the Prime Minister said such things were not in his mind because, firstly, the Pakistani people had only recently made generous contributions to help the flood affected people and secondly, as he said, funds "have posed no problem" for the Arabs. "In fact" Mr. Bhutto said, "the Arab funds are overflowing in the Western Europe and USA".

What was, then, in his mind about the nature and level of help for the Arabs. It soon became clear when it was announced that the Second Islamic Summit would be held in Lahore in February, 1974.

The Lahore Islamic Summit was the culmination of diplomatic efforts made since the assumption of power in December 1971 by the Government of Pakistan led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in creating a broad based united front of the Muslim countries to back the Arab and the Palestinian cause. It would, therefore, be pertinent to discuss these efforts before we take up the Lahore Islamic Summit. Furthermore, these efforts need also to be seen in the context of important and radical developments that had taken place at the regional and international level since December, 1971.
Change of focus.

When Mr. Bhutto assumed power in Pakistan, the eastern wing of the country had already separated to become independent state of Bangladesh. The separation of East Pakistan had highly important implications for the foreign policy of Pakistan. The focus of her attention shifted from the east to west—from South-east Asia to the South-West Asia—a region to which what constituted Pakistan after 1971 was geographically contiguous. The change was emphasized by Prime Minister Bhutto himself. In the speech that he delivered in the National Assembly on April 14, 1972 he said.

"The severance of our Eastern link by force has significantly altered our geographic focus. This will naturally affect our geo-political perspective. The geographical distance between us and the nations of South East Asia has grown. This does not mean that we have lost interest in the welfare of their peoples. Nevertheless, at the moment, as we stand, it is within the ambit of South and Western Asia. It is here that our primary concern must hereforth lie".  

The reorientation of Pakistan’s foreign policy caused by the separation of East Pakistan was again pointed out by Bhutto shortly before his departure for the second tour of the Middle Eastern countries in May–June, 1972. At a press conference in Islamabad on May 7, 1972 he said.

"The events of the last year have altered the focus of Pakistan. Though the people of Southeast Asia remain of deep concern to us, we are for the moment removed from that area and our prime interest must inevitably lie in the region west of Pakistan, in West Asia".

It was, therefore, not surprising that the Muslim countries of West Asia, Middle East and North Africa were first among those which Mr. Bhutto visited immediately after

assuming power in Pakistan. Within three weeks after taking over as President of Pakistan he visited Kabul, the first capital to which he went as the country’s chief executive. This was followed in the same month—January, 1972—by what was described as "the journey of renaissance"—a 10,000 miles odyssey of good will, visiting Iran, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Syria. Only a few months later in May-June, 1972, Mr. Bhutto travelled to twelve other countries including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Guinea and Mauritius. The primary aim of this whirlwind tour was officially described as the establishment of "direct personal contacts at the highest level with the leaders of the Muslim World securing the support vitally needed to enable Pakistan to find its feet after the cataclysm of 1971".  

Many new factors had been brought in to bear upon the mind of Pakistan's new leadership to concentrate on the countries of the Middle East and Africa. Chief among them was the situation arising out of the 1971 Pak - India war. Pakistan was broken up and it had raised a big question mark regarding its continued existence.  

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During these two tours (President) Bhutto visited 20 countries. Iran and Turkey were visited twice.

28. "Pakistan's Relations with the Islamic World: A Review", _op. cit_
assurance from its friends in the Middle East as well as in other parts of the world. As Weinbaum and Gautam Sen put it, "With the loss of the East Wing and with India’s ascendance on the sub-continent an acknowledged if unstated fact, Pakistan’s policy makers hoped to recoup some esteem by gaining influence on a larger Middle Eastern and Third World stage". 29

The reasons for initially concentrating on the countries of the Middle East and Africa, as stated by Mr. Agha Shahi a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, were that these countries had stood by Pakistan during the 1971 crisis. Pakistan needed a re-affirmation of their support because that would bolster Pakistan’s prestige abroad and strengthen her negotiating position in seeking an honourable settlement in the sub-continent. 30

Mr. Bhutto had himself before embarking on his second four to the Middle East in May, 1972, declared at a press conference in Islamabad on May 7, 1972. "We can never forget that these Muslim nations bound to us by the imperishable link of Islam magnificently stood by us in our hour of crisis". The purpose of his second visit he said, was "exactly the same as his earlier tour (January-February,

Shah of Iran’s interview with Sulzberger in which ‘the Shah expressed his apprehensions about the “disintegration” of West Pakistan must also be seen in this context. See Dawn, May 10, 1973.

29. M.G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, op. cit, P.86.

1972)—"to express our gratitude to the leaders and people of these countries for the unstinted support they gave to a fellow Muslim state in our just and righteous cause both within and outside the United Nations, to explain further to them the complex situation and problems we face and seek their continued understanding".  

The situation in which Pakistan at that time was placed was very critical. It had suffered defeat in war with India. India occupied more than 5000 square miles of Pakistani territory and held 90,000 prisoners of war in its captivity. East Pakistan had been declared an independent state of Bangladesh and its leader Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman who had been released by the Government of Pakistan was threatening to put POWs on trial for the alleged crimes committed during the disturbances in East Pakistan. What remained of Pakistan was not only shaken psychologically but was also affected very badly economically. All this necessitated to talk to the Muslim friendly nations of West Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

INDIA AS A FACTOR.

It was clear that the problems that Pakistan faced with India and over Bangladesh were a major consideration in the renewed relationship between Pakistan and the Middle Eastern countries. Over the years India had secured a strong

fothold in the Middle East, especially in Egypt and Iraq. In order to strengthen her bargaining position with India, Pakistan was trying to mobilize support from the Muslim countries. Thus India became quite an important factor in Pakistan's initiatives to strengthen relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East.

It was confirmed by Mr. Bhutto himself. Before leaving for Tehran on his first tour to the Middle Eastern countries in January, 1972 he stated at the Karachi airport that his visit to the Middle East and North Africa was "to mobilize support for Pakistan in its conflict with India".

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32. As it became known in April, 1976 the Soviet Union had supplied arms to India in planes overflying Egypt. An article in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram published on March 12, 1976 had disclosed that Egypt despite its dire need of Soviet arms to confront the Zionists allowed arms laden Soviet planes which had already landed in Egyptian airports being diverted to India to help its war effort in Bangladesh. The Egyptian Government, however, denied that the soil of Egypt was used for this purpose. However it was admitted that the Soviet planes carrying arms for India had used the Egyptian airspace which it could not control. The Egyptian Ambassador in Pakistan also denied that Cairo had allowed arms laden Soviet planes after they had landed in Egypt, to be diverted to India to help her in the 1971 war against Pakistan. In his statement he had said that the planes used Egyptian airspace, as they did the airspace of other countries, on way to India and Egypt could not stop them. See Dawn, April 16, 1976.

In Iraq, India had established military presence through the stationing of a group of military instructors who imparted training to the Iraqi Air Force pilots. See Dawn, June 24, 1873.

What Pakistan needed at that time was not only the Muslim country's support to get back from India its territory and POWs but also a postponement of theses country's recognition of Bangladesh before the issue arising out of 1971 war could be settled with India in accordance with UN resolutions of December 7 and 21, 1971 respectively. The talks that Mr. Bhutto held with the leaders of the countries he visited were dominated by discussions on the situation in the sub-continent. It was evident from the joint communiques issued at the end of each visit. For instance, the Joint Communique issued on January 25 at the end of Mr. Bhutto's visit to Morocco stated that President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto explained to the Moroccan King the existing "Situation in the Sub-Continent and the necessity to reach a peaceful settlement based on justice and respect for international commitments so that peace may prevail in the area and that millions of human beings may lead a dignified and respectable life". Pakistan won Morocco's agreement that in order to re-establish peace and stability in the Sub-Continent, it was "necessary to

34. The resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, No. 2793 (XXVI) dated December 7, 1971 had called on Pakistan and India to cease hostilities and withdraw their forces to their own territories.


The Security Council resolution No. 307 (1971) had, among other things demanded that a cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict remain in effect until withdrawals took place, as soon as practicable, of all armed forces to their respective territories and to positions which fully respected the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir supervised by United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The resolution also called upon all nations to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation. Ibid, P. 156. For the text of the resolution see Ibid, P. 161.
implement and respect the Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations dated December 7, 1971 and of the Security Council dated December 21, 1971". Similar views were expressed in the Joint Communique with the Algerian President Mr. Houari Boumediene. The Communique called for the implementation of UN resolutions on the 1971 war in the Sub-Continent and Algeria supported Pakistan's view that international recognition of Bangladesh should be with held until the elected leaders of Pakistan and Bangladesh hold negotiations" in their search for a solution of the problems with which Pakistan is confronted at present". The Government of Tunisia also took the same position and supported Pakistan's stand.

The support expressed by Libya was quite forthright and explicit. In the Joint Communique issued at the end of Mr. Bhutto's visit to Libya, Colonel Qaddafi supported Pakistan's view that India must withdraw her forces from the Pakistani territories, including in Jammu and Kashmir, POWs should be repatriated without delay. In the Joint Communique the two sides agreed that the "future relationship between the two wings of Pakistan should be worked out through negotiation between their elected leaders. In this regard, they emphasized the need for avoiding any precipitate steps on the part of other states that would further complicate

36. Ibid, P.114.
37. Ibid, P.118.
the present situation. They also agreed that, in order to ensure a successful outcome, these negotiations should be conducted without foreign intervention or military occupation."\textsuperscript{38}

Thus, as the Joint Communiqué showed Libya fully endorsed the Pakistani position on Bangladesh. She had demanded that the POWs must be treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions and repatriated without delay. Libya also supported Pakistan's suggestion that elected leaders of Pakistan and Bangladesh should talk to each other to decide on the future relationship between the two countries and it should be done without any foreign intervention or military occupation, clearly implying the non-recognition of Bangladesh.

In Egypt also, Pakistan's problem as reviewed by Mr. Bhutto, found "complete understanding" by President Sadat.\textsuperscript{39}

During his January visit to the Middle East Mr. Bhutto had also gone to Syria. In the Security Council debate on Pakistan–India war of 1971. Syria had lent her full support to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{40} It was for this "firm and principled support" extended by Syria to Pakistan that President Bhutto during

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, PP. 121,122

\textsuperscript{39} See Joint Communiqué issued at the end of Bhutto's visit to Egypt 27 January, 1972, Ibid, P.125.

\textsuperscript{40} See Year Book of the United Nations, 1971, op. cit, P.157.
visit to Damascus conveyed to President Hafez Al-Assad "his deep appreciation and gratitude".41

When Mr. Bhutto departed for his second visit to the Middle Eastern and North African capitals (May-June, 1972) announcement had already been made that Pakistan and India would hold a summit meeting to discuss the issues arising out of 1971 war. The most pressing issues were the recovery of Pakistani territory lost to India in the war and release of Pakisani prisoners held in India.42 At this juncture as well, Pakistan needed the support of its friends. Mr. Bhutto himself indicated it. Before his departure on the tour he, while talking to the newsmen at Islamabad airport on May 29, said that his trip to the Middle Eastern and North African countries was in preparation for the forthcoming summit meeting with Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi.43 Earlier, speaking at his press conference in Islamabad on May 7, 1972 he had underlined the same purpose of his visit. "Our national crisis", Mr. Bhutto had said", is of such magnitude that it can only be successfully surmounted by inter-related domestic and international action. It is with this in mind that I am undertaking my mission to the Muslim countries to the West of Pakistan".44

41. *Joint Communiqués*, op. cit, P.127.

42. Pak-India summit at Simla (28th) June to 2nd July, 1972) was agreed upon by the emissaries of Pakistan and India during their meetings in Murree and Rawalpindi in April, 1972.


The first countries that Mr. Bhutto visited on his 13 day whirlwind tour of 14 countries in May, 1972 was Abu Dhabi and Kuwait. The situation and the future course of development in the SUBCONTINENT were discussed during the talks that he held with the leaders of these countries. Similar discussions were held with the leaders of Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. All these countries assured Mr. Bhutto that the recognition of Bangladesh would not be precipitated.

The joint statements issued at the end of Mr. Bhutto’s visit to the countries of the Middle East and Africa, expressed a complete identity of views on the problems in the Middle East and the Sub-Continent. Pakistan reiterated her traditional and long-standing policy of supporting the Arab cause against Israel while the Arab countries endorsed Pakistan’s position on the SUBCONTINENT, calling for the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Pakistani territories and early repatriation of Prisoners of War.

For example, the Joint Communiqué issued at the end of Mr. Bhutto’s visit to the United Arab Emirates reiterated the position of Pakistan and UAE as enunciated in the Joint Communiqué issued on May 29, 1972, at the conclusion of the

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45. Reports about Bhutto’s visit had indicated that the significance of President Bhutto’s tour was greater than it was at that time commonly understood. It was officially stated that the object of the mission was more than to express gratitude to the countries he was visiting. During this visit President Bhutto intended not only to discuss the situation in the Sub-Continent but also to seek the cooperation from these countries for an equitable and just settlement with India. See Dawn, May 30, 1972.

visit of UAE President Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyen to Pakistan. In this Communique Pakistan and UAE had jointly called for an early withdrawal of the troops of India and Pakistan to their own side of the border and in Jammu and Kashmir and urged that the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of December 7, 1971 and the Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971 be respected and implemented. The two countries also appealed for repatriation without further delay of the prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.47 Similar calls were made in the joint communiques issued at the end of Mr. Bhutto’s visit to Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

Like Syria, Saudi Arabia had also strongly supported Pakistan during the Security Council debate on the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. On December 16, 1971 the representative of Saudi Arabia while taking part in the deliberations of the Council lamented about the ineffectiveness of the United Nation in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 due to the policies of the great powers. Owing to the policies of the great powers, he said, which paid no lead to the cause of peace and justice, the United Nations had been reduced to a shadow and consultations in the Council to a farce. He also refused to recognize the independence of Bangladesh and said that secession brought through intervention from outside was not self-

47. Joint Communiques, op. cit, P.145.
determination. He also called for negotiations in another Asian country between Pakistan and India as well as talks between East and West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{48}

From Pakistan's point of view, therefore, Mr. Bhutto's visit to Saudi Arabia was especially significant. Mr. Bhutto was warmly received in Saudi Arabia. The ground for this cordiality had already been prepared by Maulana Kausar Niazi's visit to the Saudi Kingdom According to Maulana Kausar Niazi, Shah Faisal held Mr. Bhutto in high esteem and regarded him a "true son of Islam\textsuperscript{49}" In a statement made in Karachi on his return from Saudi Arabia, Maulana Kausar Niazi said that Saudi Arabia considered Indian occupation of East Pakistan as occupation of Saudi territory itself.\textsuperscript{50}

The Joint Communiqué issued at the end of Mr. Bhutto's visit to Saudi Arabia was a true reflection of love and affection existing between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In the Joint Communiqué King Faisal was mentioned as "brother" of Mr. Bhutto on whose invitation the latter paid a State Visit to the Kingdom. As it was stated in the Joint Communiqué, "The President and his party were given a warm State and popular reception demonstrating the love and affection of the people of Saudi Arabia and its leaders for the brotherly people of Pakistan and its leaders, and the love and brotherhood and the deep spiritual and cultural ties which

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Year Book of the United Nations, 1971, op. cit. P.156.}

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{The Pakistan Times} (Lahore) February 4, 1972.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{The Pakistan Times} (Lahore) February 5, 1972.
bind the two fraternal peoples together. "The Pakistan and Saudi sides held consultations with each other on all matters which concerned the two countries in particular and the Islamic and Arab World in general. The atmosphere in which these talks were held was described as "cordial and marked by sincerity and complete understanding". 51

Although, January and May tours to the Middle East were undertaken by Mr. Bhutto with a view to mobilizing the Arab countries support for Pakistan in dealing with India after the 1971 war, Pakistan lost no opportunity in reaffirming its support to Arab brethren in their struggle against the Zionists. In the joint communiques issued at the end of the visit to each Arab country reference was made to "the Arab people in their struggle to liberate their territories and to the struggle of the Palestinian people to liberate their usurped rights". 52

In fact, Mr. Bhutto had underlined Pakistan's policy of extending support to the Arab cause before embarking upon his second tour of the Middle East. Giving an interview to the correspondent of Kuwait Times Mr. Mehtab A. Najmi on May 26, 1972 he had said:

"Pakistan has always backed the Arab cause in Palestine. That is a cause in which all freedom loving people, all Muslims believe. The Arab world and the people of Palestine will always have Pakistan's unswerving support in every forum, at every step". 53

51. Joint Communiques, op. cit, P.169.
52. Ibid, P.172.
When asked by the correspondent of Kuwait Times how would he evaluate relations between Pakistan and the Arab countries from the experience of the past years, and what opportunities for their enhancement on a more practical level could be initiated in future, Mr. Bhutto had said:

"We enjoy close and fraternal relations with the countries of the Arab World, relations firmly rooted in a common history, religion and culture. The people of Pakistan can never forget the support their Arab brethren gave at the most crucial point of their history. We are already working in close cooperation with many Arab countries in the economic and technical fields. I believe that there are great possibilities for further enrichment of these relations, for the broadening of horizons, so it were. We can also increase opportunities for consultations on political matters and forge a coordinated approach to issues of joint concern. I have great hopes for closer relations and Pakistan would certainly like to play its part in promoting the resurgence of the countries of the Muslim world that extend all the way up to the Atlantic Ocean".

Mr. Bhutto viewed Arab-Israel conflict as a matter of concern not only for the Arabs but also for all the Muslim countries especially for Pakistan. Going by the past record of Pakistan's perception of the Arab-Israel conflict, this will not be seen as a new development. The leaders of Pakistan have always regarded the Middle Eastern security as linked with the security of Pakistan. That is why Pakistan expressed her concern at the outbreak of every war between the Arabs and Israel. When Mr. Bhutto assumed power in Pakistan there was a deadlock in the Middle East—a state of "no war, no peace". Israel had perpetrated a great injustice on the Arabs by keeping vested Arab territories including Jerusalem under its occupation. What Mr. Bhutto visualized was that this deadlock or stalemate was impermissible because it went against the interests of the Arab countries and, as such, against the interests of Pakistan. In an

54. Ibid.
interview with Mr. Hasnain Heykal, Editor-in-Chief of Al-
Ahram on March 2, 1973, he said that Pakistan was vitally
interested in what had happened in the Middle East. The
deadlock there affected Pakistan directly. The (present)
stalemate of no war no peace was to be broken. Whether that
was done, he said, through direct negotiations or indirect
negotiations because that will eat into the very vitals of
the Arabs.55

What Mr. Bhutto meant by this was that an unresolved
Arab-Israel dispute had the potential of engulfing the whole
region, including the Sub-Continent with a new and more
serious crisis. The situation in the Middle East, he said,
had a strong bearing on Pakistan. If the problem in the
Middle East was not resolved, there could be convulsions in
the Sub-Continent also.56

Emphasizing the moral aspect of Pakistan's policy of
extending support to the Arab cause Mr. Bhutto also said
that Pakistan supported the Arab cause on Palestine on merit
and for objective considerations, not simply because the
Arabs were Muslims. Their's was a just cause. Pakistan, Mr.
Bhutto said, had suffered a lot for her support to the
Arabs. Israel had actually masterminded dismemberment
campaign against Pakistan and was still active. But,

56. Ibid.
Pakistan would back up the Arab cause to the bitter end, come what may.\textsuperscript{57}

An important objective of Mr. Bhutto's policy toward the Arab-Israel conflict was to convince the Arabs that the Arabs and the Pakistanis had common adversaries. In this regard he had said that Israel's hostility was directed not only against the Arab countries but also against Pakistan. Pakistan was as much a target of Zionist aggression as the Arab countries because of the steadfastness in standing behind the Palestinian cause. Likewise, he had urged that the Arab countries must also realize that India posed threat not only to Pakistan but to the Muslim countries as well. "India had used", he said, "the same arguments as Israel for justifying her aggression. Their techniques are similar. Both treat with contempt world opinion as expressed through the United Nations. Each claims right to impose her will upon neighbours by armed forces. This similarity in the behaviour of India and Israel represents a concerted attempt to weaken Islamic countries and to suppress our resurgence as a cohesive force following the end of colonial era".\textsuperscript{58}

Mr. Bhutto had therefore, pleaded for making the defeat of the "aims of our adverse aries to divide and sow dissensions among us", a common cause of the Arab as well as non-Arab Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57} Ib\textit{id}.

\textsuperscript{58} The Pakistan Times, (Lahore) January 6, 1972.

\textsuperscript{59} Ib\textit{id}.
Pakistan, as Mr. Bhutto tried to project, faced the same problem viz-a-viz India as did the Arabs with Israel. In the case of the Arabs, Israel had committed aggression against them in 1967 and occupied large Arab territories. In terms of modus operandi and ultimate objectives there was, as Mr. Bhutto argued, close similarity between Indian and Israeli treatment of their neighbours. Both resorted to superior military forces, in complete disregard to the world public opinion, to physically occupy the territory of their neighbour's. The objective of both Israel and India was to prevent their neighbouring Muslim states from emerging as a resurgent force on the basis of their common faith and vast human and natural resources.

"The similarity in the behaviour of India and Israel", Mr. Bhutto said in his message to Colonel Qaddafi, "represents a concerted attempt to weaken Islamic countries and to suppress our resurgence as a cohesive force following the end of colonial era". That is why he urged upon the Arab countries to perceive Indian military intervention in East Pakistan as a threat not only to Pakistan but also to the Arabs. "Our Arab brothers", he said in the message to Qaddafi, "have a stake in ensuring the vacation of Indian aggression from East Pakistan. If India succeeds in retaining fruits of military aggression Israel can hardly be forced to vacate Arab lands".

60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE

Apart from Indian factor—as it presented itself after 1971 War—Pakistan's perspective on the Arab-Israel Conflict under Bhutto also included emphasis on the third world aspect of the issue. Reference has already been made to a statement of Mr. Bhutto in which he had said that Pakistan supported the Arab cause on Palestine on merit and for objective reasons not merely because the Arabs were Muslim.62 The Palestinian cause was a just cause and it must be projected as such deserving international concern on moral humanistic and political grounds and not as a parochial issue of little interest to the non-Muslim World.63 In other words, Palestinians were fighting a war for their national independence against Israel which represented the last vestiges of Western colonialism in the Middle East. By linking the Palestinian's struggle with the anti-colonial movement of African and Asian peoples, Pakistan helped in raising this issue to a higher plane where the Palestinians began to receive support from a greater number of countries, including the non-Muslim ones. This perception of the Palestinian issue in a wider perspective also helped Pakistan in maintaining equally cordial relations that Pakistan sought to establish on bilateral basis, with the Arab and non-Arab Countries of the Middle East. It should be remembered that Pakistan's

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62. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Interviews to the Press Interview to Hassain Heykal, op-cit, P. 212. See n. 55

relations with most of the Arab countries, especially Egypt, were spoiled when Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact in mid-1950s. But Pakistan’s retention of CENTO’S membership after 1971 - even the attempts of its re-activation-did not have an adverse effect on Pakistan’s relations with the Arab countries One reason might be that the Arab countries had given up their hostility toward the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) after the Iraqi withdrawal from it in 1958. But it is equally true that Pakistan after 1971 succeeded in removing most of the misgivings associated with her membership of CENTO. Although both in its Foundation Papers and Manifesto for the Elections, 1970, Pakistan People’s Party had pledged, if returned to power, to withdraw Pakistan from the defence pacts i.e, SEATO and CENTO, the first government of Pakistan People’s Party not only retained the membership of CENTO, it sought to reactivate it. The reversal of the attitude toward CENTO was justified in the name of developments that had taken place in the subcontinent after 1970. This was clearly started by Mr. Bhutto while he was on a visit to Turkey in January, 1972. In reply to a question during his press conference in Ankara he had said that the Indo-Soviet treaty of August, 1971 had introduced a new factor in the subcontinent and in the light of it Pakistan might have to review its attitude toward the CENTO and other collective security arrangements.64 Mr. Bhutto held

64. The Pakistan Times, January 25, 1972. Consequently, Pakistan, after a lapse of seven years, participated in the CENTO Council meeting which was held in London on June 1, 1972. Mr. Hafiz Pirzada, the Federal Education Minister who represented Pakistan in the meeting had
discussions on the moves to re-activate CENTO with the Turkish and Iranian leaders during his visit to Ankara and Tehran in early June, 1972. Various reports about these discussions indicated that Pakistan’s objective was not to revive the Yahya regime’s policy of confrontation but to create a nucleus so as to get assistance for meeting its basic defence requirements.  

65 Pakistani delegation at the London Ministerial Council’s meeting of the pact had already made an "impassioned plea" to the CENTO partners that they must ensure for Pakistan justice and security by urging on India to implement UN resolution of December 21, 1971.  

66 It is important to note that Pakistan won pledges for support to her territorial integrity and independence in the context of Pak-India tension after 1971 from both CENTO allies (Iran and Turkey) and the Arab countries who had previously been opposing Baghdad Pact. This achievement was due to Pakistan’s new approach in the foreign policy under which due recognition was accorded to the differing perceptions of the Middle Eastern States of the issues relating to self-security and super-power conflicts of interests.  

67 The process of reorientation in the foreign policy of Pakistan had in fact, started from mid-1960s when the government demonstrate its capability to take independent decisions, while on his way to London stated that Pakistan was again taking active part in CENTO because "Time had changed, we have lost half of the country" and the pact became "relevant to us" See Dawn, May 30, 1972.

67. Maulana Kausar Niazi, op.cit, p.11
such as moving closer to China. Pakistan also took concerted steps to establish friendly relations with Arab countries as with Egypt. As a result of this re-orientation, there were encouraging responses from Arab countries. A large number of them endorsed Pakistan's demand for the self-determination for Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan's membership of military pacts and close alliance with the United States had created doubts among the Arab countries. Inspite of the fact that Pakistan had stuck to support the Arab cause on Palestine, the Arab countries remained skeptical of the purposes of Pakistan's international affairs till mid-1960s. But when Pakistan supported Islamic cause including the Palestinian cause in the context of the cause of Asia, Africa and Latin America, there was an enlargement of Pakistan's influence as an advocate of Muslim interests. It was as a result of this changed position that Pakistan was enabled to play a prominent role during its membership of the Security Council in 1967-69 on the Arab-Israel issue and the status of holy city of Jerusalem, in particular.69

It should be noted that this process of orientation began with Pakistan's disenchantment with the defence pacts and as in Mr. Bhutto's words, "Pakistan's relations with the United States slipped from 'one crisis to another'. 69 Pakistan's alliance relationship with the United States had come under heavy strains due to a change in the latter's

68. "Pakistan's Relating with the Muslim World: A review", op.cit.
policy toward the Sub-Continent during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. While the United States who had been Pakistan's ally in SEATO, placed embargo on arms supply to Pakistan during the 1965 Pakistan-India War, China, against whom the pact was constructed, demonstrated its sympathy and support for Pakistan. Thus a process had been started, whereby, Pakistan, with its alliance policy torn to shreds was compelled to explore new avenues to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity. The preference shown by the Democratic Administration of President Kennedy toward India over Pakistan had already put into doubt the usefulness of the military pacts, the 1965 War shattered the faith in the policy of reliance on the United States as an ally. The attitude of United States during the 1965 War between Pakistan and India showed that Washington had no interest in the South Asian affairs. As it has been remarked by Shirin Tahir Kheli in her book, "The War 1965 War marked the end of the Johnson Administration's concern with Pakistan". A further blow to the United States-Pakistan relationship was dealt when on April 12, 1967, it was announced that the arms supplies to Pakistan and India which had been suspended in September, 1965, will not be resumed by the United States. The United States also closed down its Military Assistance Advisory Group in Pakistan and expressed willingness to supply only spare

70. *Ibid*, P. 86

parts on case by case basis.\textsuperscript{72} In its reaction to the decision, Pakistan expressed disappointment and termed it more to the disadvantage of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{73} This reaction of Pakistan stemmed from the fact that as compared to India, Pakistan was much more heavily dependent upon the United States for military supplies.

The US decision of April 12, 1967 was significant for Pakistan in the sense that the special relationship between Pakistan and the United States established under the military alliance system in mid-1950s did no longer exist. As a Special Correspondent on the US decision,"(It) marks an important turning point in America-Pakistan relations. Though some lip service may continue to be paid to the alliance relationship between the two countries, there is no doubt that the US has decided to put it its with allied Pakistan on the same footing with non-aligned India". Citing the Washington Post which quoted a US official, the correspondent wrote that "The United States is at least now turning to draw back from its earlier posture by ending what amounted to a special relationship with Pakistan".\textsuperscript{74} It was clear that so far as military pacts were concerned, they had lost their relevance for Pakistan-US relations. It is true that formally they continued to exist and even there was, however meek, an insistence upon them by the United States

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Dawn}, (Karachi) April 13, 1967

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Dawn}, (Karachi) April 14, 1967.

\textsuperscript{74} Ejaz Hussain "Special Ties with US over", \textit{Dawn}, (Karachi) April 14, 1967.
but few among the US circles thought after 1967 that the US and Pakistan were bound by "the so called alliance relationship anymore in reality". Pakistan's act to boycott SEATO's Ministerial Council meeting held in Washington on April 14, 1967, therefore, was a clear pointer to this fact. Pakistan's attitude toward the military pacts had undergone a complete change. This was confirmed by a statement made by the official spokesman while commenting on the April 12, decision of the United States not to resume arms supply to Pakistan. It was stated that Pakistan's attitude toward SEATO and CENTO was that the basic assumptions for the creation of the military pacts had been eroded. For example the purpose behind the CENTO alliance was the containment of Russian Communism but when the US itself began to talk in terms of detente in its confrontation with the Soviet Union, how could the attitude of Pakistan toward the military pacts as the official spokesman implied remain unchanged.

BHUTTO CRITICIZES THE US

No wonder the military pacts and the policy of reliance on the United States were the principal targets of criticism unleashed by Bhutto before he rose to power in the wake of popular movement against President Ayub Khan and Pakistan-India War of 1965.

75. *Dawn*, (Karachi) April 15, 1967
76. *Ibid*
In his criticism of Pakistan's foreign policy Mr. Bhutto asserted that before he become foreign minister of the country, its foreign policy was not independent resulting in the straining of Pakistan's relations with most of the countries, including the Islamic world. Pakistan could not take independent stand on important international issues; rather we had put all our eggs in one basket. In one of his speeches at a public meeting at Lahore during campaign for 1970 general elections he said:

"You know how harmful and incorrect a foreign policy Pakistan had before I became Foreign Minister. We had been completely isolated from the rest of the world. Pakistan's foreign policy had chained the people. We had no free will to go anywhere. We had to obey what the US ordered us to do. Our relations with Russia, China and Afghanistan and many Asian, Latin American and East European countries we were bad. Our policies were those of SEATO and CENTO. The US Ambassador could keep Pakistan policy in line with Washington. If he wished Pakistan's foreign policy to toe a particular line during the Suez War, Pakistan obliged him. However, Pakistan's foreign policy became independent when I became Foreign Minister."

Pakistanis foreign policy was a recurrent theme in all the speeches that Mr. Bhutto made during his campaign for the 1970 elections. He severely criticized reliance on military pacts and advocated a policy of improving Pakistanis relations with both the super powers and the Third World countries. This is what he claimed he tried to do when he became Foreign Minister (1963-1966). During this period he claimed that the foreign policy of Pakistan achieved important successes which included improvement of Pakistanis relations with both the super powers, China and the Arab countries. Mr. Bhutto took credit for openly

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supporting the Arab cause which, according to him led to the rise of Pakistan’s prestige in the Arab World.

"The way I advocated the cause of the Middle East in the Security Council and other international forums has been widely appreciated by the Arabs of the Middle East." 79

79. Public Speech at Rohri April 25, 1970, Ibid P.76
It was with this world view that Government of Pakistan approached the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On assuming power Mr. Bhutto had made it clear that Pakistan would pursue an independent foreign policy. Friendly relations with all the great powers would be maintained but the country would not tie itself up with the interests of a particular super-power. In his address to the National Assembly on April 14, 1972 he had asserted that such a policy could be pursued. "The question may be asked," said, "whether it is possible to have food relations with all the Great Powers and yet, maintain basic national interests? I say, yes, as I maintained some years ago when I was Foreign Minister. Yes, it is possible, if an ethical foreign policy based on fundamental national principles is pursued without taking a partisan approach to the Great Power differences, if can be achieved by pursuing a bilateral foreign policy of which, I can say with pride, I was author when I held office as Foreign Minister".  

83. Bilateralism freed Pakistan from the constraints of multilateralism to take an independent and more active stand on the issues relating to the Arab-Israel conflict. This we have seen in the form of response of the Government of Pakistan during the Ramadan War. We have seen that although Pakistan retained the membership of CENTO and there was improvement in US-Pakistan relations, the Government of Pakistan was not deterred from openly supporting the Arabs

against Israel and endorsing the use of oil weapon against those Western Powers who supported Israel. Pakistan was not officially a nonaligned country. She was the member of a military pact CENTO and was still bound to the United States through the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and Agreement of Cooperation of 1959. But, inspite of these pacts, strong trends of an independent and had emerged non-aligned nature in the foreign policy of Pakistan in early 1970S. These were the trends that ultimately drove Pakistan to join the Non Aligned Movement in 1979.84

It is a fact that Pakistan had been inclined towards joining the Non-Aligned Movement since 1960s. In January, 1968 when Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia visited Pakistan, he was reported to have offered to help Pakistan become a member of the Non-aligned group. In 1969 Pakistan made a formal bid to join NAM. The matter was discussed in Ambassador's Conference of NAM at Belgrade between July 8 and 12, 1969. Pakistan's request for membership was supported by Tunis, Jordan, Nepal, Ghana, Senegal and Ethiopia. However, India opposed Pakistan's application on the grounds that Pakistan was still a member of military pacts-SEATO and CENTO.85

Hence one could say that for all practical purposes, the foreign policy of Pakistan had become non-aligned except

84. Shah, Munir Ahmad, Pakistan and Non-Aligned Movement M.A. Dissertation (unpublished), (Lahore,Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, 1981-83), P.64.
85. Ibid, PP.79-80.
that it was still formally linked with the military pacts of SEATO and CENTO. In 1972 Pakistan dissociated from SEATO but remained a member of CENTO. However, CENTO membership was retained, as pointed out earlier due to the situation arising out of Pak-India War of 1971. It was motivated not by the object of serving the strategic interests of the United States but by a desire to forge stronger bilateral relationship with Turkey and Iran who had supported Pakistan's during the 1971 War. Explaining the reasons why Pakistan was still in CENTO in 1972, when Pakistan People's Party had in its election manifesto called for withdrawal from this pact, Bhutto had, in an interview with Mr. Karanjia, Editor-in-Charge of the Blitz (Bombay) on October 31, 1972 said that there were three considerations for Pakistan to remain in CENTO: Firstly, the dismemberment of Pakistan, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August, 1971 and the interest shown by Turkey and Iran for Pakistan's presence in the pact. In the same interview Mr. Bhutto had made it clear that Pakistan's presence in CENTO would not be permanent. "We have not said that we will permanently remain in CENTO. But once we have resolved some of our more pressing problems we are likely to review our position in CENTO and our general foreign policy".\footnote{Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, Speeches and Statements, October 1, 1972-December 31, 1972 op. cit, P.62.} Obviously what Bhutto meant was that once the problems of POWs and vacation of Pakistani territory occupied by India in the 1971 War were resolved, Pakistan would review its position towards CENTO.
CENTO AND ARAB UNITY

But, also in the same interview, Mr. Bhutto made it clear that even if Pakistan continued to remain in CENTO, the pact will not be allowed to be used to disrupt Arab unity and resistance. As far as Pakistan was concerned, it would not be involved. "We will never come in the way of any movement to strengthen Arab unity and Arab resistance", he said in reply to a question from Mr. Karanjia that America through CENTO might use non-Arab countries to disrupt Arab unity and Arab resistance.87 "We can review our position with the passage of time. But, we would not like to get involved in any new pacts with super-powers and great powers", Mr. Bhutto had told Mr. Karanjia and added, "you ask Pakistanis what they think of pacts. What it means to be in pacts with super-powers and great powers. It is an unequal relationship, and finally in the unequal relationship, you will find that you can't outsmart the super-powers. So we are wary of these arrangements".88

Not only Pakistan's membership of CENTO but also the relationship between the United States and Pakistan that evolved after the Pak-India War of 1971, should be seen in the context of Pakistan's changed world view. If Pakistan's perception of CENTO had been changed, so had there been laid a new basis for US-Pakistan relations after 1971. As the decade of 1970s started, the attitude of both Pakistan and

87. Ibid, PP.62,63.
88. Ibid, P.70.
the United States toward each other had considerably been modified. When Bhutto was out of power, he was as has already been mentioned highly critical of Pakistan's policy of reliance on the US and military pacts. He had argued the futility of relying on the United States for support, because Washington always hoped for a change in Indian policy and was loath to annoy Indian leaders. In 1972 Bhutto recognized the role played by the United States in saving West Pakistan in the 1971 war. Likewise the United States also appreciated Pakistan's role in bringing about Sino-American rapprochement. Since Bhutto was considered by Henry Kissinger as 'the architect of Pakistan's friendship with China', Pakistan under his rule was of a considerable value for the United States in view of growing cooperation between the United States and China. Moreover, Pakistan was situated close to the strategically important Persian Gulf region where, due to oil, the stakes of the industrial west and the United States were rising high. In early 1970s the whole region from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean had become one of crucial importance to the Big Powers including the United States which had been trying 'frantically to construct a new' constellation of power' in that region. Apart from strengthening bilateral relations with Iran,

89. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States-Pakistan Relations*, op. cit, P.54.

This refers to the much talked about 'tilt' ordered by President Nixon in Pakistan's favour during the 1971 war. (For its discussion see Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *Ibid*, PP.41-47).


91. Eqbal Ahmad a well known Pakistani academician and intellectual based in the United States, in a statement in *Pakistan, Dawn*, June 1, 1972.
Pakistan, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Spain the United States was also moving to augment its military presence in the area by developing a huge military and communication base at Diego Garcia. After 1971, the United States also took steps to increase its Middle East Force and send more regular and more frequent naval visits to the Indian Ocean area. The American military build up in the Indian Ocean was not opposed by Mr. Bhutto because Pakistan considered that a US presence served as a thorn in the side of the Indians and was a potential restraint on their future policy. Bhutto is also said to have offered the US a naval base at Gwadar on the Baluchistan coast.

Bhutto visited the United States in September, 1973. During this visit he urged the U. S. to end the arms embargo against Pakistan which had been imposed in the 1971 War. He managed to have the total arms embargo lifted in February, 1975. Before that the United States had in March, 1973 decided to partially lift arms embargo and permit Pakistan to purchase about $ 1.2 million in spare parts, parachutes and re-conditioned aircraft engines ordered before the embargo went into effect. Pakistan was also to be allowed to buy 300 armoured personnel carries worth $ 13 million under


94. Ibid, P.56.
a 1970 contract for which it had made a down payment. The easing of embargo, therefore, involved no fresh purchases.\(^{95}\) Although a favourable climate had been created in relations between Pakistan and the United States as a result of Mr. Bhutto’s first visit to the United States in September, 1973, the situation had not reverted back to 1950s, despite the fact that Bhutto had emphasized the importance of CENTO, and Pakistan-Us security and cooperation agreements of 1954 and 1959 still stood intact.\(^{96}\) In fact some of the overtures made by Bhutto, like the Gwadar offer, to move Pakistan militarily close to the United States were received in US official circles with suspicion in view of “his known dislike of the American alliance network.”\(^{97}\) The main thrust of the foreign policy of Pakistan was, therefore, towards independence, non-alignment and open support to the Third World causes. Pakistan, in fact, claimed that its foreign policy was more independent than some of the countries who claimed to be non-aligned. Thus when Pakistan was not invited to attend NAM conference at Algiers in 1973, Bhutto expressed his regrets. In a statement at Peshawar on September 10, 1973, he said that there was no justification for keeping Pakistan out of NAM simply because it had

\(^{95}\) Facts on File, Vol. XXIII, No. 1389, March 11-March, 17, 1973, PP. 203-4

\(^{96}\) According to the Joint Communiqué issued at the end of Bhutto’s first official visit to the United States (September 18-24, 1973) “President Nixon assured Prime Minister Bhutto of strong US support for Pakistan’s independence and territorial integrity, which he considered guiding principle of American foreign policy”.

Joint Communiques, op.cit, P. 248

\(^{97}\) Shirin Tahir-Kheli, op. cit, p. 56.
(military) pacts. Pakistan's role in the Third World, he said, was well known. It had been an independent and a leading role supporting people's struggle in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Pakistan's attitude toward the Arab-Israel conflict, during 1973, therefore, fell within the general framework of this policy. Under this policy the Arab-Israel conflict was seen not merely as an issue between the Arabs and Jews but as a matter of concern for all the countries of the Third World, including Muslim countries. The Government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, therefore, approached the Arab-Israel conflict from a wider perspective—a Third World perspective. The Arab-Israel conflict was seen as a contest between the oppressors and oppressed. The powers of oppression were being represented by Israel, while it were not the Palestinians who were being oppressed. The principles of justice, self-determination and fairplay were being violated. The Palestinian struggle against Zionism was, therefore, a part of the Third World's struggle against the forces of domination, exploitation and intervention. This is why Mr. Bhutto said in an interview with Hasnein Hasnein Heykal that Pakistan supported the cause of the Palestinians not because they were Muslims, Pakistan's stand on the Arab-Israel conflict was based on merit and objective considerations. Pakistan supported the Palestinian cause because, as M. Bhutto said, it was a just and right cause.

99 Mr. Bhutto believed that the Muslim World had entered

into an era of "great renaissance." This renaissance was presented by the heroic Palestinian. The Palestinian because they were Muslims. Pakistan's stand on the Arab-Israel conflict was based on merit and objective considerations. Pakistan supported the Palestinian cause because, as Mr. Bhutto said, it was a "just and right cause." 99 Mr. Bhutto believed that the Muslim World had entered into an era of "great renaissance." This renaissance was represented by the heroic Palestinian struggle bringing about unity and solidarity among the Muslim countries. Pakistan, he said, "will always be in the vanguard of this great renaissance." He was of the view that after the June, 1967 Arab-Israel War, the concept of Islamic solidarity had gained momentum. Through an accelerated pace of cooperation between the Muslim countries, such as holding of the regular meetings of the Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference and the establishment of Islamic Secretariat, "a concrete shape", according to him, "was being given to the aspirations of the Muslim Countries." 100 The Islamic Conference was, therefore, an effective platform to express the aspirations of the Muslim World. It was this belief which guided Mr. Bhutto in his diplomatic efforts during and immediately after the Ramadan War leading to the convening of the Second Islamic Summit at Lahore in February, 1974.


100. Interview to Mahboob A. Najmi of the Kuwait Times, May 26, 1972

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Interview to the Press op. cit. PP. 96-97
LAHORE ISLAMIC SUMMIT

The Lahore Summit (February 22-25, 1974) of the Islamic countries was held as a result of the October 1973 Arab-Israel War. Just as the first Summit at Rabat dealt with the consequences of June 1967 Arab-Israel War and, more immediately, the situation arising out of Al-Aqsa fire, the Second Islamic Summit was meant primarily to deal with the Arab-Israel conflict as it stood after the Ramadan War. Pakistan played important role both in planning and convening of the conference. It is claimed that the idea for this Summit was presented by Mr. Bhutto to the Muslim leaders whom he visited the Middle Eastern countries immediately after during his tour of the October War. He is said to have talked on this issue to the Shah of Iran whom he met on October 18 in Tehran, but Shah’s response was not encouraging. After holding talks with the Iranian and Turkish leaders, Mr. Bhutto reached Riyadh where he won the approval of Shah Faisal to hold the Summit at Lahore under joint sponsorship of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It is said that the Saudi Monarch agreed to Lahore being the venue of the Summit in view of strong and steadfast support that

101. A talk with Brigadier (Retired) Hamid Nawaz Khan, the then Pakistani Ambassador in Iran.

Subsequently, the Shah of Iran did not participate in the Summit although, as the then Pakistani Ambassador to Iran, tells, half a dozen messages from the Pakistani government were handed over to him requesting his presence at the Lahore Summit. In addition to that two influential cabinet colleagues of Mr. Bhutto, Mr. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi were also sent to Tehran with the same objective. As pointed out by Mr. Agha Shahi, Pakistan made a move to hold Islamic Conference in order to unite all the Muslims and pool their resources for the liberation of Holy Jerusalem and to stand by the side of their Arab brethren for the liberation of their occupied territories. Agha Shahi, op. cit, P. 35.
Pakistan had always extended to the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. On Pakistan’s part, the selection of Lahore being the place where the largest gathering of Muslim Heads of State and Government was to be held also bore special significance. Mr. Bhutto had called Lahore the “heart of Pakistan”. Lahore had played leading role in the movement for Pakistan and has always been the nerve centre of the country’s politics. By collecting the leaders of the Muslim world at Lahore he wanted to demonstrate how close to their heart the people of Pakistan held the cause of the Muslim unity and how closely the urges of the Pakistanis were identified with the aspirations of the Muslims the world over. Pointing to the relationship between Pakistani nationalism and the Palestinian struggle, Mr. Bhutto, in his opening address to the Summit said:

“It is an act of no small significance that the same session of the Muslim League which adopted Pakistan Resolution (at Lahore on March 23, 1940) also adopted unanimously a resolution on Palestine.”

Addressing the conference, he further said:

“Pakistan’s support for the just cause of the Muslim World is organically related to its own national vocation. It has never suffered a severance between its national impulse and the urges of the Muslim emancipation. When the partition of Palestine was decided a demonstration was held at Lahore at which Iqbal was present. On that occasion he emphasized that the problem of Palestine (I quote his words) does not concern the Palestine alone but will have wide repercussions in the entire Muslim World.”

In making this statement Mr. Bhutto was asserting that there was no contradiction between the Muslim nationalism of


and equity. In his address, Mr. Bhutto said:

Pakistan and the two Arab countries, who had

in the past struggled hard against the forces of colonialism

and imperialism for their national independence. The

underlying theme of Mr. Bhutto’s address was that

Israel who occupied vast Arab territories including the Holy

City of Jerusalem, and enjoyed support of the United States,

must be confronted with a united front comprising not only

the Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries but also the entire

Third World nations who faced similar problems of defending

their independence and sovereignty. The Palestinian question

was, however, to be at the core of the problem. It was to be

exploitation and domination.

The struggle of the Third World countries against the forces of
The situation in the Middle East is an outgrowth of the problem of Palestine and the core of the problem, viewed both historically and concretely is Al-Quds or Jerusalem. Fifty years ago there was no Palestinian problem, there was only a country named Palestine: only the right arrogated to itself by western colonialism enabled one western nation to promise to a section of another people, namely the Jews, the country of a third, of the Arabs. It needs to be reiterated that it is this fundamental injustice, this uprooting of a people from their homeland and the planting of an alien population on it, that evokes the resentment of the entire Muslim world. The malady consists of a cancerous outgrowth of colonialism, the establishment of settler regime and the imposition of immigrant minority rule. The root cause of the conflict is not an innate animosity between the Muslims and Jews or even between the Arabs and Jews. As Muslims we entertain no hostility against any human community.  

The Arabs also, as has been discussed in an earlier chapter regarded Zionism as an extension of European colonialism in the Middle East and Israel an outpost of imperialism to serve the strategic and economic interests of the west in the area. In the past the leadership of Pakistan being more dependent upon alliance system could not denounce the western powers for their support to Israel or perceive Israeli aggression against the Arabs as a manifestation of colonialism in the Middle East. But the situation in Bhutto’s time was different Pakistan’s faith in the alliance system had been shaken.

The foreign policy of the country had become independent of its allies and Mr. Bhutto who looked at the issues in historical perspective, linked the issue of the Arab-Israel conflict with the of on-going struggle between the peoples of the Third World and colonialism.

This struggle, as Mr. Bhutto said in his opening address to the Summit, had entered into a decisive stage after the October War in the Middle East. The successes of the Arab armies against Israel and the use of oil weapon had demonstrated the power of the Arab countries which was a source of strength for not only all the Muslim countries but gave a new impetus to the struggle of the Third World countries for securing their rights.

"The war of last October ‘has said’, however, precipitated a chain of events and created an environment in which the developing countries can at last hope to secure the establishment of a more equitable economic order. Some far reaching possibilities have been opened by the demonstrated
ability of the oil producing countries to concert their policies and determine the price of their resources. This may well be a watershed in history. It may well presage the end of a deranged world order. 106

Speaking about the successful bargaining of the oil producing countries on the question of oil prices, Mr. Bhutto said:

"With the recent dramatic improvement in the terms of trade of the oil producing countries, which will lead to a rapid increase in their financial resources, an unprecedented shift will occur in the global monetary and financial balance of power. The Third World can now participate in the economic and financial councils of the world on an equal footing with the developed countries and will be able to acquire a due measure of influence and control in international economic and financial institutions. Indeed for the first time, the Third World is potentially in a position to use its own resources for financing its development through cooperative effort. It can now forge its own financial institutions for bringing about rapid development of the less developed countries." 107

At the Lahore Summit, Pakistan reiterated its long standing and traditional support to the Arab cause in Palestine, demanding the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories and restoration of Jerusalem to the Arabs. It can be said that it has been the standard policy of Pakistan from the very beginning. Then what was new in Pakistan’s policy in during and after 1973 War. The difference lay in the contention of Mr. Bhutto in his speech to the Islamic Summit that the Arab cause must be defended through the united effort of all the Muslim countries. With the Palestinian question as a core, he considered the Middle East problem a much wider issue in which the vital interests of the Third World countries were also involved. The struggle of the Arab and non-Arab countries was inseparable from the struggle of the Third World countries; the successes achieved by the Muslim countries, especially by

106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
the Arab countries over oil issue, could make positive contribution to serving the cause of the Third World. Was thought by Mr. Bhutto.

"The Muslim countries are now so placed as to be able to play a most constructive and rewarding role for cooperation among themselves and with other countries of the Third World. Not only are they possessed of a common heritage and outlook but also their economies are such as to enable them to supplement one another's development effort. It is time that we translate the sentiments of Islamic unity into concrete measures of cooperation and mutual benefit. It will bring us strength in spirit and substance, let not posterity say that we were presented with an historic possibility unrepeatable opportunity to release ourselves from the injustices inflicted upon us for many centuries and we proved unequal to it." 108

This was a clear reference to the newly acquired oil-wealth of the Arab countries. What Mr. Bhutto aimed at was that this wealth should be used to develop and strengthen the Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries through cooperative efforts. Mr. Bhutto was not alone in the Summit to call for such a programme. President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria in his a address to the Summit had also expressed the same opinion. Stressing economic cooperation among Muslim countries, especially between oil producing and non-oil producing countries he said that human experience had established in many parts of the world that only religious links whether of Islam or Christianity, did not prove strong enough under the blow of poverty and ignorance. Men can not live without food", he said. 109

Similar views were expressed by the Secretary-General of the Islamic Secretariat Mr. Hasan el-Tohamy, Mr. Hasan el-Tohamy prior to the opening of the Summit. In a statement

in Islamabad on January 20, 1974 he said, "In a few years the Islamic group of nations will be the richest group of nations on earth. It is very essential to start thinking from now and planning to use our increased income of oil resources and to establish a system of cooperation and consolidation of this group of nations in a way to use their increasing income and increasing funds for the Muslims rather than letting them in foreign banks and being used by them". In another statement that he made in Lahore during his pre-Summit visit to Pakistan Dr. Hasanel Tohamy said that he was glad that the Middle East crisis was being considered as a problem of the entire Muslim world. Mr. Tohamy saw the Islamic Summit at Lahore as the manifestation of enhanced power of the Muslim countries which had not hitherto "interfered in world affairs as a group of Muslim nations; but from now on Muslim nations in defending and standing against any new offensive from our enemies".

The Lahore Islamic Summit as has already been mentioned, was held basically to deal with the Middle East situation as it emerged after the October War between the Arabs and Israel. Since Pakistan played leading role in convening this Conference, its deliberations in the form of its Declaration issued and resolutions passed at the end reflect Pakistan's policy adopted on the eve of 1973 War.

110. The Pakistan Times (Lahore) January 21, 1974.
111. The Pakistan Times (Lahore) January 22, 1974.
The Declaration of the Lahore Islamic Summit, after identifying the Arab struggle with the joint struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for social and economic progress and prosperity of all nations of the world stated:

1. The Arab cause is the cause of all countries which oppose aggression and will not suffer the use of force to be rewarded by territory or other gains.

2. Full and effective support should be given to the Arab countries to recover by all means available, all their occupied lands.

3. The cause of the people of Palestine is the cause of those who believe in the right of a people to determine its own destiny by itself and by its free will.

4. The restitution of the full national rights of the Palestinian people in their homeland is the essential and fundamental condition for a solution to the Middle East problem and establishment of a lasting peace on the basis of justice.

5. The international community particularly those states which sponsored the partition of Palestine in 1947 bear the heavy responsibility to redress the injustice perpetrated on the Palestinian people. 112

112. From the text published in the Pakistan Times (Lahore) February 26, 1974.
The Declaration spelled out a broader view of the Arab-Israel conflict. It was no longer considered a conflict merely between the Arabs and Zionists or between the Muslim and the Jews. It was, rather, identified with the Afro-Asian and Latin American people's struggle against aggression, exploitation and injustice. The objective behind this line was that the Palestinian struggle may not get isolated. It should win the support of all the countries of the Third World. This view was identical with the one expressed by Pakistan's Government.

Among the resolutions passed by the Summit, two i.e. one on Palestine and the other on Jerusalem, merit special consideration. These two resolutions also fully reflected the views of the Government of Pakistan on the Arab-Israel conflict so clearly expressed during the 1973 War. In the Resolution on the Middle East and Palestine, the Summit decided:

(a) to give full and effective support to Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle for recovering all their occupied lands by all means.

(b) to take action in all fields to force Israel to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from all Arab territories occupied since June, 1967 and undertakes to adopt every adequate measure to bring about that withdrawal.
Under this resolution the Summit described Israel as racist and settler's colonial state. It called upon all states to support the struggle of the Palestinian people for the restoration of their rights and reaffirmed that Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was the "sole legitimate representative of Palestinian nation in its struggle". The Summit also requested member states where no PLO Office existed as yet to provide all facilities towards that end in conformity with the resolutions of previous Islamic Conference. In addition to condemning Israel continued occupation of Jerusalem and for violation of human's rights in the Arab occupied territories, the resolution also condemned all those states that "provide Israel with military, economic and human assistance" and requested them "to put an end to this practice immediately".

In recognition of solidarity between the Palestinian and the African people, the Islamic Summit in its resolution, hailed the "constructive initiatives of sister African countries, member states of OAU as well as other friendly countries in supporting the Arab rights and severing diplomatic relations with Israel". On its own part, the Summit, in a show of solidarity with the African people's struggle called upon the "member states of the Islamic conference to continue their support of African causes and their struggles against colonialism, and racist regimes particularly in Rhodesia South Africa and the Portuguese colonies and to put to end all forms of
cooperation and dealings with these regimes, in particular to stop shipment of oil and prevent any derogation of that rule. The resolution also called upon member states which "still have relations with Israel to save here relations in all fields, thus supporting Islamic solidarity".  

Similarly the resolution on Jerusalem underlined the grave concern felt by the Muslim world over continued occupation of the holy city by Israel and over her efforts to "change the religious and historical character of Jerusalem". The resolution forcefully called for the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the holy city and declared that its restoration to Arab sovereignty was "a paramount and unchangeable pre-requisite" for any solution of the Middle East problem. The Lahore Summit of the Islamic countries opposed the internationalization of Jerusalem, rejected any effort to make it the "object of any bargaining concessions" and vowed to continue the struggle for its liberation."  
The Lahore Islamic Summit was culminating point of Pakistan's bold policy of rendering effective support to the Arab cause as it presented itself to the Islamic world during the Ramadan War. As it has already been mentioned Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had, during the war, declared that what he believed in was to give the Arabs "a sustained, organized and effective

113. From the text published in the Pakistan Times, February 24, 1974.
114. From the text Pakistan Times, February 24, 1974.
support”. He had also made it clear that the Arab-Israel conflict was not a matter of concern for the Arabs only; “the whole of the Muslim world was on trial and it was not a test for the Arabs only but for all the Muslim nations”. In line with this policy Pakistan mobilized the Islamic world to express solidarity with the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. The Lahore Summit was very much relevant to the support that the Arabs needed as a result of their latest war with Israel because when the Summit was held the situation in the Middle East was still critical and resumption of hostilities could not be ruled out. The convening of the Summit was a part of contribution made by Pakistan for the struggle of the Arab people whose high point was the 1973 War. It opened the way for the Muslim world especially Pakistan to play an effective role in any future conflict between the Arabs and Israel. As Prime Minister declared at his press conference held at the end of Summit, that in future conflict Pakistan would give total support to the Arab countries. In reply to a question by a foreign correspondent asking the Prime Minister to indicate the nature of the support, he said that in the past Pakistan had given tangible support but in future it would be much more than that. In reply to another question he had said that Pakistan’s support during any future Arab-Israel
conflict would not exclude the presence of Pakistan personnel in the Arab countries.\footnote{115}

During the 1973 October War, Pakistan's policy was that of outright support, and solidarity with the Arab cause. Compared with the previous Arab-Israel conflicts i.e. 1948, 1956 and 1967, the October War invoked more open, unrestrained and effective response from Pakistan. This was so because in 1973, the foreign policy of Pakistan was free from the constraints of alliance relationship with the United States and West. Inspite of the fact that Pakistan was member of CENTO and retained the membership of 1954 and 1959 security and cooperation treaties with the United States, the foreign policy of Pakistan was practically non-aligned. It was this independent and non-aligned foreign policy which made it possible for Pakistan to side with her Arab brethren more openly and firmly.

As survey of Pakistan's policy during the 1973 Arab-Israel War shows that the Government and the people had similar views and feelings. The stand taken by the Government of Pakistan fully reflected the sentiments of the people. There was therefore, a near complete public endorsement of the attitude and measures taken by the government. The opposition leaders, however, as is evident from the discussion on foreign policy in the National Assembly, were

\footnote{115. \textit{The Pakistan Times} (Lahore) February 25, 1974. According to H.K. Burki, \textit{Pakistan Times}, special correspondent what Mr. Bhutto meant (in his reply was that in any future Arab-Israel War) Pakistan would even send forces in support of the Arabs. See the \textit{Pakistan Times}, (Lahore) February 26, 1974.}
not fully satisfied with what the government had done to help the Arab governments in their war against Israel.\textsuperscript{116} With reference to Pakistan's policy during the 1973 Arab-Israel War, the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was even criticized for promoting friendship with Iran when she had continued to supply oil to Israel during the October War. The government of Pakistan was also castigated by a prominent Opposition leader for keeping mum over air lift of thousands of tons of arms for Israel during the War.\textsuperscript{117}

But on the whole Pakistan's response to the October War was appreciated at home as well as in the Arab quarters. Whatever Pakistan did in helping the Arab side during the Ramadan War was "more than expected" keeping in view Pakistan's membership of defence pacts like CENTO. "The Arab countries are grateful to Pakistan", said Mufit Mahmood on the floor of the National Assembly of Pakistan, "for whatever help was given to them during the war because being

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} "I say a country which provided Israel any help during the Arab-Israel War cannot be our friend. Iran had maintained oil supply to Israel even during the war. The supply of oil (to Israel) against the Muslims is such a big crime, that we cannot be proud of our friendship with Iran". \textit{Ibid, P.28.}
\item The Prime Minister, during his press conference in Karachi after his return from Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, was a question whether he condemned American asked arms supply (to Israel). In reply he said he did not condemn (the US). On the one side the Arabs were assured of (over) help and it was said that the Arab's war is our own war, while, on the other, why is this attitude of impartiality". \textit{Ibid, P.27.}
\end{itemize}
member of the (US sponsored) defence pacts, this help from Pakistan was beyond their expectation".  

Pakistan's approach toward the Arab-Israel conflict from a Third World perspective won wide support among the Arab countries because they themselves had taken the question of Arab-Israel conflict out from the narrow confines of Arab nationalism. To term the Palestinian problem as a matter of concern not only for the Arabs but for whole of the Muslim world broadened the support base of the Palestinian cause; and to declare it as a part of Afro-Asian and Latin American people's struggle against aggression and exploitation was tantamount to defending the Palestinian cause from still a wider front of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist forces. The Lahore Summit of the Islamic countries was a corollary to the diplomatic initiatives taken by Pakistan to provide a sustained and effective help to the Arab cause through the creation of a wider framework of the entire Muslim World. The Declaration and the resolutions of the Summit endorsed the Pakistani perception of the Arab-Israel conflict.

CONCLUSION

Pakistan's policy toward the Arab-Israel Conflict, right from the beginning, has been based on total endorsement of Arab cause on Palestine and unconditional moral, political, diplomatic and even material support to the Palestinian's struggle for self determination. Under this policy Pakistan sided with the Arabs in rejecting the Balfour Declaration and opposing the plan for the partition of Palestine in the United Nations. Pakistan opposed the creation of Israel on moral legal and political grounds and when the first Arab-Israel war broke out in 1948, the people and Government of Pakistan declared open and total support to the Arabs. Public meetings and demonstration were held all over the country which condemned the Zionist aggression, expressed solidarity with the Palestinians and demanded the protection of the holy places in Jerusalem.

The Government of Pakistan equally shared the sentiments of the people and came out with open declaration of sympathy and support for the Palestinians and the Arab countries who were locked in a fierce struggle with the Zionist force in Palestine. Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan issued statements in which Pakistan's full support to the Palestinian cause was expressed.

This policy was in line with the traditional stand taken by the Muslims of South Asia on post-World War I developments in the Balkans and Middle East.
The traditional stand maintained by the Muslims of South Asia on Palestine had been that even if British force were allowed to enter Palestine under the British - Arab alliance against Turkey, no attempt should be made to convert it into a Jewish State. They were also very much concerned about the safety of Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem.

When the Palestinian Arabs rose in revolt against the British authorities in Palestine for allowing large scale Jewish immigration into Palestine the Muslims of South Asia extended their full support to the Palestinian Arabs. The struggle of the Palestinian Arabs was perceived by the Muslims of South Asia as part of their own struggle. They held the view that without the liberation of Palestine, it was not possible to secure the independence of India, because Britain was keeping a tight control over her empire extending from Egypt to India from the strategic Palestine.

Britain occupied Palestine because the land carried strategic value for the defence of the Suez Canal and British empire in the East. The Zionists who had declared (1897) the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine as their political objective and cooperated with the Allies, particularly with Britain during the First World War. In return they got a pledge from Britain, in the form of Balfour Declaration, to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The decision by the League of Nations to appoint Britain as the Mandatory Power in Palestine was also a part
of the conscious efforts by the Allied powers to pave the way for the establishment of Jewish State in Palestine. The United States fully endorsed the Balfour Declaration and became a great champion of Jewish cause in Palestine. The British during their Mandate over Palestine (1922-1948) permitted the Jewish immigration into Palestine at an accelerated rate and allowed them to purchase land and establish settlements. The result was that when the Second World War broke out the Jewish power in Palestine had already grown to a considerable extent.

After the Second World War, when the British power and influence in the Middle EAST declined, the United States which had acquired substantial economic and strategic interests in the region, replaced Britain as the principal supporter of Jewish cause in Palestine. President Truman persuaded Britain to allow the movement of more Jews in Palestine and it was the United states whose arms twisting tactics got the United Nations General Assembly pass the Resolution for the partition of Palestine on November 29, 1947.

At this critical moment, Pakistan fully sided with the Palestinians and the Arab countries. The Leader of Pakistani delegation to the U.N. General Assembly Sir Zafar Ullah Khan questioned the validity of the Balfour Declaration and competence of the General Assembly to partition Palestine. His arguments were supported by historical facts and rules of international law and justice. But the problem of
Palestine was not a legal issue, it was a political matter. Sir Zafar Ullah tried to fight for the Palestinian cause on legal grounds, but the political expediencies of big powers, particularly those of the United States overcame prevailed eventually.

However, his convincing arguments impressed even some non-Arab members of the United Nations General Assembly. The Arabs were extremely happy and satisfied over the performance of Pakistani delegate in the United Nations. The strong advocacy of the Palestinian cause by Pakistan earned a great deal of Arab good-will for Pakistan. Pakistan was held in high esteem not only by the Arab regimes but also by the Arab masses as a result of former's Palestinian stand.

This stand was based on the strong religious, cultural and historical ties with which the Muslims of South Asia were bound with the Arab World, especially Palestine where the holy city of Jerusalem - their first Qibla was located. As it has been pointed out earlier, when the British occupied Palestine and Jerusalem, the Muslim statesmen and political leaders expressed their apprehension; with the establishment of Israel backed by the Western Powers, the memories of Crusades were again invoked. The Muslims of South Asia like their Arab brethren perceived Zionism as an imperialist movement whose objective was to create a wedge in the heart of the Muslim World in the form of Israel. The support that the Zionism was receiving from the Western countries was perceived as an effort to avenge the defeat
that the Western Powers suffered during the Crusades. The religious factor, therefore, was the dominant factor in shaping Pakistan’s policy toward the Arab-Israel conflict during the earlier period.

But religion has not been the only factor in determining the attitude of Pakistan toward this question. There have been strategic, economic and political considerations as well. The keenness with which the Western Powers supported Jewish claim over Palestine led Pakistan to perceive the Arab-Israel Conflict in the broader perspective of East-West confrontation. In years immediately following the establishment of Israel and during the First Arab-Israel War there was not only complete agreement between the Government and the people of Pakistan over the nature of the Arab-Israel Conflict, there was also a shared perception of the Palestinian question between Pakistan and the Arab countries. The result was that the people and Government of Pakistan spoke with one voice on the issue and the Arab considered Pakistan as their ally against their common enemy-Zionism.

Such a situation was possible because Pakistan had not yet allied herself with Western Powers through military alliances and followed an independent foreign policy. Since Pakistan had herself secured independence through struggle against British colonialism, she lent her support to the Palestinian Arabs who besides being fellow Muslim brothers
were also struggling against the forces of Western Colonialism represented by Israel.

The Armistice Agreements signed between Israel on the one side and Egypt, Jordan and Syria on the other, following the 1948 war, halted hostilities between the Arabs and Israel but they did not put an end to the conflict in the Middle East. Rather, new issues were added to an already volatile situation. These issues were: the occupation by Israel of Palestinian territory beyond the partition line approved by the UN general Assembly Resolution, a large number of Palestinians were expelled from their homes.

While the Arab states considered the States of Israel as illegitimate and refused to recognize it, Israel was also equally adamant on its refusal to return to UN fixed boundaries and allow the Palestinian Arabs to return to their homes. This created a state of high tension between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries with frequent outbreak of clashes across the borders.

The Arabs were bitter over their defeat in 1948. They held the Western Powers who supported Israel, and their own governments responsible for this debacle. As a result Arab nationalism became more radicalized and public resentment against the incompetent Arab regimes rose high. The overthrow of Egypt’s King Farouk by military in 1952 was in a way the result of Egyptians frustration with conduct of 1948 War. In other Arab states, too, like in Jordan, the Pro-West
regimes were threatened with popular agitation and prospects of overthrow.

Seeing that such a situation was potentially dangerous for the strategic and economic interests of the West in the Middle East region, the United States of America initiated a number of plans for the setting up of security arrangements in the region. One of them was the proposals for the Middle East Command, put forward in 1951 with Egypt occupying central position and Turkey, France, Britain and United States as the sponsoring states. But the Egyptian refusal to participate killed the plan in its infancy. Egypt and other Arab States rejected the proposals for the Middle East Command because they perceived it to be aimed at freezing the Arab-Israel dispute in a condition which was unacceptable to the Arabs. After being disappointed with the Arab countries, the United States turned toward the countries of northern tier, namely Turkey, Iran and Pakistan forming the Baghdad Pact having Britain and Iraq as the additional members but itself without assuming the full membership.

The Baghdad Pact was denounced by leading Arab countries as an attempt to weaken Arab unity and divert the attention of the Middle Eastern countries from the Palestinian problem. Pakistan which had concluded a military assistance agreement with the United States and joined SEATO before becoming the member of Turco-Iraq (Baghdad) Pact, also earned the wrath of the anti-Baghdad Pact Arab circles.
Although Pakistan did not change its position on Palestinian question, its membership of Baghdad Pact created suspicions in the minds of Arabs. As a member of the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan was seen in league with those powers who were responsible for the creation Israel and were extending military, political and diplomatic assistance to the Jewish State. The result was that the goodwill that Pakistan earned in earlier years in the Arab world was reduced to a considerable extent. The emphasis by Pakistan on pan-Islamism was also viewed with suspicion by several Arab countries, especially Egypt, which thought that Pakistan was aspiring for leadership of the Muslim World. Egypt perceived it as a challenge to its own leadership in the Arab world. This perception was reinforced by the projection of Pakistan by the Western Power as a counter-weight to Egypt under Nasser who had taken a militant stand against Israel and the US sponsored military alliance in the Middle East.

Although Pakistan became a member of Baghdad Pact, its stance on the Palestinian issue did not change. Pakistan continued to refuse to recognize Israel. It also maintained its position of strong support to the Palestinian’s right to return to their homes. However, because of her alliance with the West, Pakistan became critical of neutralist trends in the Middle East. Due to the policy of the alignment, Pakistan’s perception of peace and security in the Middle East became common with that of the West. This further alienated the leading Arab countries, particularly Egypt.
from Pakistan who considered Israel, instead of Soviet Communism, as main danger to the peace and security of the Middle East. The divergence of perception of peace and security between Pakistan and the Arab countries surfaced openly during the Suez Crisis. Under the influence of her Western Allies, particularly the United States, Pakistan did not endorse Egyptian position on the nationalization of Suez Canal at the First Suez Conference in London. When the Suez invasion took place, Pakistan condemned the Israeli attack as an aggression but did not use the same language for Britain and France who, in collusion with Israel, had attacked Egypt with land, air and naval forces. Pakistan’s performance during the First Suez Conference came under sharp criticism from the public opinion at home. As a result the Government of Pakistan had to change their position during the Second Suez Conference and did not join Suez Canal Users Association despite American urgings. It was the force of the public opinion which compelled the government of Pakistan to take into account susceptibilities of Egyptians on the Suez issue. The Egyptians were visibly pleased. But certain statement made by Prime Minister Suhrwardy offended the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser. The critical remarks made by Suhrwardy stemmed from two factors; growing friendship between Egypt and India and Pakistan’s desire not to offend her allies Britain, France and the United States.
Thus, in spite of the fact that Pakistan’s stand on the Palestinian issue remained the same, Pakistan lost good-will in the Arab World. The main reason for this state of affairs was Pakistan’s entry into the Baghdad Pact. The Arabs called this act of Pakistan as "defection". On the other side, India which had from the very beginning been trying to increase her influence in the Middle East followed a non-aligned foreign policy. For this reason, the Arab countries moved closer to India, and Pakistan stood isolated in the Arab World. The relations between Pakistan and the Arab countries stood at the lowest ebb in 1950s due to Pakistan policy of alignment with the West. As a result, one of the objectives of Pakistan policy toward Arab-Israel conflict, namely the winning of Arab goodwill and support to her was adversely affected. Under the influence of military alliance Pakistan began to see the Arab-Israel dispute as separate from the Middle East problem. The Arab countries thought that in Palestine they were face to face with not merely Zionist Power but the 'Western Imperialism' which aimed at perpetuating their hold over the economic resources of the region. The dominant opinion of the Arab World was that the threat from Israel could be faced and the Palestinian issue solved only through the unity among the Arab ranks.

According to the Arab perception, the Baghdad Pact was an attempt to break the Arab unity by including Iraq into the Pact. It was primarily Iraq’s breakaway from the Arab
ranks to join Western sponsored Baghdad Pact which was the main basis of Arab hostility towards the alliance.

In July, 1958 there was a revolution in Iraq resulting in the ouster of pro-west regime of Nuri-as-Said. Following this revolution Iraq dissociated herself from the Baghdad Pact. The Pact was re-named as CENTO consisting of Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. In October, 1958 a military government took over in Pakistan. The head of this military government General Ayub Khan had strong pro-west leanings but realizing the importance of the friendly relations between Pakistan and the Arab countries, he took initiative to improve relations with Egypt. It was in this context that President Nasser visited Pakistan in April, 1960. Although Nasser’s visit did not produce a unanimity of views between Pakistan and Egypt, the way was paved for important developments in the direction of an improved relationship between the two countries. This became possible because of Iraq’s withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.

In the beginning of 1960s, there was a change in the US foreign policy under the Democratic administration of President Kennedy. The previous administration of the Republican Party, especially President Eizenhower’s Secretary of State J.F. Dulles was a staunch supporter of military alliances. SEATO and Baghdad Pact were the products of his initiatives. Being fiercely anti-Communist, he strongly despised neutralism. But President Kennedy had a different perception of both military alliances and
neutralism. He was less enthusiastic about the military alliances in the Third World and began to cultivate close and friendly relations with Egypt and India—the two leading countries in the neutralist bloc. As a member of Baghdad Pact, Pakistan was disturbed over this shift in the US Policy. She had incurred the displeasure of Arab countries by joining Baghdad Pact, so that full guarantee of US help could be secured to counter India with whom she had the outstanding dispute over the Kashmir and which was perceived by Pakistan as the principal threat to her security.
Pakistan was further disappointed when the Western Powers led by the United States rushed arms to India during Sino-Indian border war of 1962 without consulting her. The United States by supplying huge quantities of arms and weapons to India had ignored the security interests of her ally—Pakistan. With it began Pakistan's disillusionment with the defence pacts. The disenchantment was complete when the United States failed to come to Pakistan's help during her September, 1965 was with India. Both SEATO and CENTO proved useless so far as Pakistan's conflict with India was concerned. A process of erosion of the military pacts had begun. Although Pakistan retained the formal membership of these pacts, she opted more and more for Bilateral diplomacy. Bilateral approach in the foreign policy led to improved relations with the Arab countries and, once again, there was created considerable good-will for Pakistan in Arab World. This was evident on the eve of September, 1965 war with India. The Arab countries viewed Pakistan's position with much more sympathy than it would have been possible in mid-fifties when Pakistan adhered to alliance based diplomacy in dealing with the Middle Eastern nations.

In the decade of 1960s, a process of weakening of military pacts which bound Pakistan in alliance with the Western Powers had set in. Both SEATO and CENTO had failed to achieve the objectives for which they were set up. Besides Pakistan, other member countries had also begun to lose their interest in these pacts. CENTO had failed to
solve the security problem of the Middle East and SEATO could not check the expansion of communist influence in Southeast Asia. As a result, the member countries began to exercise other options in their foreign policy to enhance their sense of security. Iran took initiative in establishing normal relations with the Soviet Union, while Pakistan strengthened her friendship with China.

It was because of Pakistan's weakening link with military pacts that, when the Third Arab-Israel War broke out in June, 1967, Pakistan openly and unequivocally sided with the Arab countries. President Ayub Khan immediately sent messages of support to the heads of State of Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Pakistan held Israel responsible for the outbreak of hostilities and condemned the Jewish State for her "aggression" against the Arab countries. Pakistan even offered to send material help to the Arabs and, in fact, her pilots stationed in Jordan as a part of Military Advisory Group, took part in actual combat.

In June, 1967 War, Israel captured vast territories belonging to Syria, Jordan and Egypt including the Holy City of Jerusalem. Pakistan, like the Arabs and, of course, all the Muslims of the world, was shocked at the Arab defeat and loss of Jerusalem. After this war, Pakistan raised her full voice at every international forum in favour of restoration of captured territories and City of Jerusalem to the Arabia. At the United Nations, the delegate of Pakistan strongly pleaded the Arab case. Pakistan sponsored a number of
resolutions in the General Assembly and the Security Council which called on Israel to vacate the captured Arab territories and refrain from steps which aimed at altering the status of Jerusalem. The performance of Pakistan at the UN Security Council was especially note-worthy. During the Security Council debate on Jerusalem in April-May, 1968, the delegate of Pakistan made such a hard hitting speech against the Israeli actions in the occupied territories and in the City of Jerusalem that the memories of 1947 UN Session on Palestine were revived. Pakistan was emphatic in rejecting the Israeli claims to Jerusalem and made a strong appeal for the restoration of pre-1967 War status of Holy City.
Pakistan took active part in mobilizing world public opinion on Al-Quds. She played important role in the First Islamic (Rabat) Summit which was held in the wake of fire incident at Al-Aqsa in August, 1969. What is noteworthy is that during and after 1967, the policy of the Government of Pakistan on the various issues of the Arab-Israel conflict fully reflected the sentiments of people of Pakistan. Not only that people of Pakistan were fully satisfied over the attitude taken by the Government of Pakistan toward the Arab-Israel conflict, Pakistan’s stand of firm and open support to the Arabs on the issues of occupied territories, Jerusalem and Ak-Aqsa was equally appreciated in the Arab countries. The goodwill that Pakistan enjoyed in the Arab world during the pre-1954 period was restored due to her policy of completely identifying herself with the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. It is true that Pakistan did not, and could not, due to her limited resources, make substantial material contribution to the Arab war effort against Israel, either in 1948 or again in 1967 and even in 1973, the moral, diplomatic and political support extended by Pakistan to the Arab side was of considerable help to the Arabs in a number of ways. It was a support which came from the largest(before 1971) Muslim State. Pakistan’s identification with the Arab cause greatly helped in dispelling the impression that the Arab-Israel conflict was just a territorial dispute between the Jews and the Palestinians or an issue which concerned only Israel and the
Arabs. Pakistan's consistent position was that it was an issue which concerned not only the Muslims of world, apart from the Arabs, but the entire world, particularly the newly emerged nations of the Third World.

In one way, Pakistan did make material contribution to the Arabs war effort. Pakistan sent personnel of army and air force to train the armed forces of Jordan, Syria, Libya and other Arab countries. The contribution made by these military advisers to the training, planning and preparedness of the Arab armies was recognized by the respective Arab countries in highly commendable terms. Pakistani military advisers played important role in Syria and Jordan. In addition to it, Pakistan provided military training facilities to the personnel of the armed forces from a number of Arab and Muslim countries including the Palestinians, in her military training institutions and academies.

In 1971, Pakistan was faced with one of the gravest hour of her history. There was a separatist movement in East Pakistan supported by India. In December, 1971, war broke out between Pakistan and India leading to direct Indian military intervention in East Pakistan and birth of Bangla Desh as an independent country. Pakistan was also faced with the capture of about 5000 square miles of her territory and holding of 90,000 POWS by India. Most Arab countries supported Pakistan on these issues and refrained from according recognition to Bangla Desh till these issues were
settled to the satisfaction of Pakistan under the Simla Agreement of July, 1972. The Arab endorsement of Pakistan's position that there should be no recognition of Bangladesh, before the issues resulting from Pak-India 1971 War could be justly settled was a big achievement for Pakistan. Bangla Desh was also an Islamic country and India had considerable influence in the Arab countries. That the Arab countries chose to support Pakistan despite the pressure from Bangla Desh and her friends was a befitting tribute to Pakistan's steadfast and consistent support to the Arabs in their conflict with Israel. This gesture from our brother Arab countries was in recognition of Pakistan's steadfast and open support to the Arabs on the Palestinian and other issues. The efforts made by Pakistan to establish close and friendly relations on the basis of bilateralism had borne fruit, first in 1965 and then in 1971. In 1950, it was Pakistan which complained to the Arab countries for not supporting Pakistan in her disputes with India, while in 1965 India protested that the Arabs did not extend their support to India in her war with Pakistan. All this was possible because Pakistan adopted bilateralism as the basis of her foreign policy to establish friendship and understanding with the Arab Countries in 1960s, especially when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the foreign minister (1963-1966).

The all out support to the Arabs that came from Pakistan during the Fourth Arab-Israel War of 1973 was a
reflection of our deep commitment to support the Palestinian and Arab cause. When war broke out Prime Minister Bhutto lost no time in sending messages of open and all out support to the heads of States of Egypt and Syria. He immediately convened a meeting of Arab ambassadors accredited to Islamabad and assured his government's full support. He sent in for all the three chiefs of armed forces of Pakistan for consultations on the ways and means through which Pakistan could provide effective help and assistance to the Arabs. After the War, Mr. Bhutto undertook a visit to the Middle Eastern countries including Iran and Turkey, for consultations on formation of a broader front to support the Arabs in any future war with Israel.

In the year the Fourth Arab-Israel War took place, Pakistan (Because of the separation of East Pakistan) was no longer a member of SEATO but the 1954 and 1959 security pacts with the United States were intact and Pakistan also retained the membership of CENTO In the formal sense, Pakistan was still an ally of the United States, but for all practical purposes the foreign policy of Pakistan had become non-aligned. The economic assistance and the arms supply—the two main components of Pakistan's alliance relationship with the United States—had almost ceased. On a number of international issues, particularly relating to the Third World, Pakistan's perception was at variance with that of the United States. The Government of Pakistan viewed the Arab-Israel conflict in the global context. For Pakistan the
Palestinian issue which was the core issue of the Middle East problem did not concern the Arabs or the Muslims alone but was a matter of concern for all the peoples’ of the Third World. Pakistan, therefore, urged upon the Arabs to plan their future strategy in a future conflict with Israel on the basis of the wider premises.

These views found full echo at the Second Islamic Summit held at Lahore during February, 1974. This summit was convened in the aftermath of Fourth Arab-Israel (October, 1973) War and a successful oil embargo by the Arab States against Western nations who supported Israel’s war effort. The successes achieved by the Arab armies in the initial stages of the war against Israel and successful working of the oil embargo revealed new power of the Arab World. Mr. Bhutto termed this development as a turning point in the history of the Muslim World. With this new-found power the Arab World, according to Bhutto, could be used for bettering the lot of poor and backward countries of the Third World, including Pakistan.

Pakistan’s open and full support to the Arabs on the question of Palestine and the efforts of Mr. Bhutto to form a united front of all the Muslim States on this issue as symbolized by the holding of Second Islamic Summit in Pakistan, enormously increased the prestige of Pakistan in the Arab World. Pakistan, once again, came to be regarded as a great friend of Arabs. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was especially appreciative of Pakistan’s role during and after
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1. Mr. A. A. Sheikh, Pakistan's, former ambassador to Syria and Jordan.

2. Mr. Agha Shai, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan

3. Mian Arshad Hussain, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

4. Brigadier (Retd) Hamid Nawaz Khan, former Additional Foreign Secretary and Pakistan's Ambassador to Iran.

5. (Late) Mr. Qudarat Ullah Shahab, former Principal Secretary to the Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad and President Mohammad Ayub Khan.

6. Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Zulfikar Ali Khan, a former Chief of Air Staff, Pakistan Air Force.

7. Air Marshal (Retd) Zafar Chaudhry, former Chief of the Air Staff, Pakistan Air Force.

8. Air Commodore, M. Aklar, a senior officer of Pakistan Air Force.

9. Mr. Sajjad Hyder, a former ambassador of Pakistan to U.S.S.R.