THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POSITION
OF INDONESIA
IN ITS SOUTHEAST ASIAN SETTING

BY
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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of the Punjab, Lahore

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# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Social and Cultural Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>The Nature of Colonial Rule</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Genesis of the Struggle for Freedom</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>The Party Structure in Indonesia: A Background Study</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>The Parties based on Nationalism</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Parties Based on Religion</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Parties Based on Marxism</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Experiment in Parliamentary Government - I</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Experiment in Parliamentary Government - II</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>International Position of Indonesia</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>Problems and outlook on Foreign Policy</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Some Strengths and Weaknesses of Indonesian Politics</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

Quite a number of books and articles have been published on Indonesia mostly under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations by American or Dutch authors. The following is an attempt to analyse the political and social position of that country, particularly in its Southeast Asian setting. The problems that have been discussed in other works already are left out with the exception of a few that were found absolutely essential to be incorporated in this study. For instance, the struggle for independence in Indonesia has been mentioned only as far as it concerns the birth and growth of political parties. The cultural and social aspects have been dealt with only in respect of their political implications. The study is primarily meant to deal with the political and social problems. A brief reference has, however, been made in the last chapter to the economic problems facing the country. The failure of the parliamentary institution has also been analysed with the consequent setting into operation the Guide Democracy plan of President Soekarno.

I must express gratitude to a large number of persons in Indonesia, who during my stay in that country offered unqualified assistance in the preparation of this study. Firstly, I thank Dr. Mohammad Hatta, the former Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, who was kind enough to grant me interviews and clarify many points. Among the Indonesian leaders I may especially mention the names of Mr. Mohammad Natsir, Dr. Sjahri, Messrs. Idhan Chalid, Sartono, K.H. Abdul Cahab, S. Prawiranegara, apart from other political personalities in that country who granted interviews to me.

In Djakarta I got appreciable assistance from Mr. & Mrs. Ali Budiardjo, Prof. S. Taqdir Alisjahbana, Prof. Mohammad Yamin, Mr. A.K. Pringgodigdo, and Mr. Hussein of the Pakistan Embassy.

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At Surabaya the name of Prof. A.C. Pringgodigdo and at Padang of Prof. Abu Bakar Djar may be mentioned as particularly helpful in discussing some special constitutional problems. Mr. Abdul Khaliji and Haji Ibrahim Musa at Bukit Tinggi also gave me whatever assistance I sought.

At Singapore I am grateful to Sir Robert Scott, the British Commissioner General for Southeast Asia for discussing with me many points of interest pertaining to this study. Besides, Prof. C. Northcote Parpkison and Prof. Silcock of the University of Malaya gave me valuable advice.

I am also grateful to the Asia Foundation for providing me funds to enable me to spend about six months in Indonesia from July to December, 1956, to make an on-the-spot investigation of various problems. I was provided every facility by the Foundation that was needed by me. The representative of the Foundation at Djakarta, Mr. Bradley, and his assistant the late Bob Goford, who died during my stay in Indonesia were extremely cordial.

I wish also to record my thanks to Prof. Gerard M. Frters, Head of the Department of Political Science, University of the Panjab, Lahore, who had always been a source of inspiration to me and under whose supervision this thesis has been written. The submission of this thesis has been delayed due to his prolonged ailment and leave.

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INTRODUCTION

Of all the countries of Southeast Asia the position of Indonesia is particularly significant because of the vastness of her area, of the size of her population and her potential economic resources. Socially and politically she is inalienably linked to the other countries of Southeast Asia and for that reason any change there is likely to affect the corresponding position of the peoples in other countries of the region. To understand the political and social position of Indonesia in its Southeast Asian context, for which end this study is directed, the subject may be divided into four aspects: Firstly, rise of nationalism as a dynamic force; secondly, the attitude of foreign policy; thirdly, the scope and working of the parliamentary institutions and fourthly, an analysis of the process of decentralisation of the governmental authority in Indonesia.

The foremost political factor noticeable after the Second World War in Indonesia is the tremendous upsurge of nationalism. The nationalist feeling was accentuated also because of the militant struggle that the Indonesians had to carry on against their former colonial rulers. This opposition to the Dutch served as a cohesive force among the various sections of the Indonesian society. Indonesian nationalism is the result of the fusion of the Western culture with the existing Islamic and Hindu-cum-shintoist traditions of the local society.

The present form of nationalism in the country is the positive response of the Indonesians to the Western way of life presented to them mainly through the Dutch colonial power.1 The Western ideas did engender in the

minds of the people a sense of greater coherence and unity of outlook different from the one existing before. Besides, there has been also a deep impact on the Indonesian society of the growth of nationalist movements in various other countries of Asia early in the twentieth century.

To consider therefore the political and social position of Indonesia in its Southeast Asian setting it would be necessary to find out the extent of the infusion of the Asian and the Western cultures in the indigenous traditions of the Indonesian society. The socio-political traditions in Indonesia link that country with the rest of the Southeast Asian countries, and an attempt has been made to analyse this aspect in Chapter I of this study. The Indonesian belief in Pante Jasa or the five pillars of the state: belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy and social justice, also discussed here, is an attempt to synthesise the various cultural forces that had been at work in the country during the past several centuries.

The second factor is the peculiar outlook in Indonesia of foreign policy. The "active independent" foreign policy in the country is symptomatic of the dynamic nationalism as mentioned above. Like many other countries of Southeast Asia Indonesia had experienced a long era of colonial rule and shared with them a common problem of racial minorities of the Chinese and the Indians.

The third factor worth considering in the Indonesian society after the proclamation of independence has been the deep lying desire of the people to adopt the parliamentary form of government. During the period of the colonial rule very little attempts were made by the alien rulers to introduce the representative system of government in the country. Most of the leaders in the vanguard of the nationalist movement struggled to achieve more representation for the Indonesians in the existing parliamentary
institutions in the country of which the most important was the Volksraad (the Dutch controlled Legislative Assembly).

The lack of proper experience in the art of parliamentary government led to the multiplicity of political parties in the country that caused the weakening of the governmental authority. It is one of the reasons that the parliamentary government in Indonesia, ever since the achievement of independence has been run under the benevolent care and patronage of the strong personality of President Soekarno, who has served the country throughout the period since the time of independence "as the presiding political genius".

The existence of political parties is the prerequisite of parliamentary democracy. Political parties did exist in Indonesia during the period of the Dutch colonial rule. The first party based on nationalism named Boedi Otemo was formed in 1908. The various political parties served to some extent as a mirror of the public opinion in the country. After independence the political parties have formed themselves in an "irreversible groundswell of nationalism". The pattern of Indonesian nationalism, as in other countries of Southeast Asia, has been directed towards the parliamentary form of government. An experiment in parliamentary democracy in Indonesia is bound to reflect on the political patterns being experimented in various countries of Southeast Asia.

With the dawn of independence, Indonesia was faced with the immediate task of reconciling the Western-style institutions of Parliamentary democracy, and the indigenous socio-political environments.

The fourth factor to be taken notice of in the case of Indonesia is the rapidly growing trend among the provinces for decentralisation of the governmental
authority. In the early years of the achievement of independence, in view of various threats to the integrity of Indonesia, centralisation was necessary, but it is doubtful whether the Central Government will be in a position to stem the tide of the demand for more and more autonomy for the provinces. Thus the concept of parliamentary democracy needs also to be adopted to meet the demands of the provinces for more governmental powers, especially in the matter of financial control.
CHAPTER I

The Cultural Background

Since time immemorial, Indonesia has received waves of invasions and penetration of foreign cultural influences. Among the significant waves of immigrants were the Malays, who channelled through the present States of Thailand, Burma, Indo-China and Malaya and finally settled in the archipelago.¹

The Malays were followed by the Indians, whose contacts with Indonesia at the outset were mainly of commercial nature. During the first two centuries of the Christian era, the Indian seamen went in search of gold to such places as Survarnabhumi and Suvarnadipa (as the archipelago was then named) which literally mean places of gold. These seamen traversed the sea, on vessels as big as with a carrying capacity of 700 passengers.² These people were attracted mainly by the unlimited natural wealth of the archipelago. The period of cultural penetration came after the economic and political subjugation. The process of "Hinduisation" of the new land started, as a matter of fact, to preserve the colonies. The main motive was nevertheless the desire of importing gold, tin, spices and other products of the Indonesian soil.³ The Indian colonisers tried to win over the local chiefs by presents, and the common people


3. See J. Gonda: The Sanskrit in Indonesia, Den Haag, 1952, P.18. Mr. Gonda was the Professor of Sanskrit at Utrecht (Holland). The colonial character of Hinduism in Indonesia has been discussed in J. Gonda: op.cit., p.18. Also in R.C. Majumdar: Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East, Oca, 1937. n.70.
by distributing amulets and treating the sick. They further laid claim to royal birth by the display of spurious birth and sought the daughters of the local chiefs in marriage.4

The colonial and the caste-ridden character of the Hindu society in Indonesia soon led to the replacement of Hinduism by Buddhism, through the vigorous Buddhist missionary activities in a large part of the country. But even this replacement did leave behind some traits of the caste-system on the Indonesian society. The original Hindu customs became so interwoven with the new Buddhist environments that at a later stage it became somewhat difficult to differentiate the impact of one from the other. Even in the modern days one finds a wonderful mixture of Hindu-Buddhist traditions in the island of Bali, a predominantly Hindu place, where the functions of the Buddhist priests are sometimes little different from those of the Hindu priests. Both perform similar functions in the Balinese society. This fusion of the Hindu-Buddhist and the ancient animistic traditions in the archipelago led to the growth of a distinct Hindu-Javanese culture,5 which in some forms is still visible in the Indonesian society.

The Hindu-Javanese culture whose imprint on the minds of the people was in some ways superficial, was soon influenced by the impact of Islam. The advent of Islam in Indonesia was mostly through peaceful means6. The slow and spontaneous spread of Islam in the archipelago was due to a number of factors.

A very important factor that led to the spread of Islam in the archipelago was that this religion, on account of its classless nature and belief in the equality of human beings, had a particular appeal to the common man, who embraced Islam in order to get rid of caste-system. The orthodox Hindu and the Hinduised Mahayane Buddhism had divided the people into two divergent upper and lower strata with an appeal to the deification of kings and the ruling class. This class character of those religions soon led to their replacement by Islam.\[^7\]

The history of Islam's penetration in Indonesia before the 10th century A.D. is not fully known and it is understood that this religion entered the archipelago in the first century of Hajira through Arab traders, \[^3\] i.e., 7th century A.D. However it became a living political force in the country in the 14th century.\[^9\]

Most of the Muslims of Indonesia today belong to the Shafite school of thought and it is said that the Shafite tenets spread in these regions from the side of Coromondal and Malabar in the 14th Century A.D. The accounts of Ibn-i-Batuta also point out that Islam in


The Chinese contact with the Arabs also implied that many traders from China may have visited Indonesia and have cultural relations with that country and among them may have been many Muslims.

Also William Marsden: The History of Sumatra, London, 1811, pp.280-81.

\[^9\] B.H.M. Vlekke: Nusantara, Camb.(Mass) 1943, Ch.iv

the East Indies entered from Malabar coast of South India. The main occupation of the people of Malabar was trade which they might have been carrying on with East Indies those days. 11

The spread of Islam in Indonesia was also due to the efforts of the missionaries of Islam. It was due to missionary work that even prior to the ultimate downfall of Madja Pahit empire in the 15th century a number of rulers of some states in the archipelago had embraced Islam. 12 Juones, a notable preacher, propagated the message of Islam in the empire of Madja Pahit and succeeded in converting a large population of the state. He fought the Portuguese and succeeded in repelling their onslaught. People were so enamoured of him that they made him the ruler of Mamak in the year 1518. His father had defeated the last ruler of the state of Madja Pahit. 13

Besides the missionaries, there were the Malay and Javanese merchants coming to and from Malacca, a state that had already been converted to Islam, who brought the new religion to Java, first to the eastern and then to the middle and the western part of the island. 14 Prof. Schrize also supports this contention. He writes:

"In Malacca, the Hindu-Javanese traders wrenched out of their traditional environment came in contact with fanatically Muslim Generati, so that they were quickly won for Islam. There predominated (soon after conversion) in Malacca an intense Mohammedan fervour about whom the Hindu ruler of Java could still complain to Albuquerque in 1511." 15


Another factor leading to the spread of Islam in various parts of Indonesia was the weakening state of the empire of Majapahit. Among the factors attributed to the fall of this empire (founded in 1295) immediately after the death of its notable Prime Minister Gaja Mada in 1364, was pan-Indonesian policy with emphasis on the supremacy of the Hindu-Javanese culture. The various sections of the population who did not like this emphasis on Hindu culture revolted and naturally they fell to Islam which imbued a faith in human equality.

The empire of Majapahit was a loosely knit political entity that was being sustained on the idea of Hindu-Javanese Culture. Its fall is reminiscent of fitful character of the Hindu ideas in the mind of an average Indonesian.

The Muslim rule in Java and the surrounding islands was firmly established after the downfall of the Majapahit empire in the latter part of the 15th century. But the period of Muslim ascendancy was short-lived. As a matter of fact after the fall of Majapahit nothing as great could be achieved in the form of the Indonesian unity till the conquest of the archipelago by the Dutch.

The Muslim States continued their efforts to defeat the onslaughts of the European powers. Early in the 16th Century the Portuguese also made their advent as a major sea-faring nation claiming supremacy of trade through the Indian ocean. The Portuguese under the command of Albuquerque, succeeded in 1511.

16. For a brief account of the Majapahit see D.G.E. Hall, op.cit., pp.72-81.
to defeat Sultan Mahmud of Malacca.\textsuperscript{19} The Sultan did not accept the defeat and made Bintang in the straits of Singapore as his new headquarters. The Muslim State of Atjeh in Sumatra assisted the Sultan to regain his power but the combined Atjeh-Malacca efforts failed to defeat the Portuguese and finally Bintang fell to the Portuguese in 1526.\textsuperscript{20}

After 1526 the Atjehnese tried their utmost to liberate Malacca from the yoke of the Portuguese but were not successful. Ultimately in the year 1586, the Sultan of Atjeh, Ala Uddin Riyaet made a peace treaty with the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{21}

After the fall of the Empire of Malacca to the Portuguese, many factions of the ruling dynasty of Malacca continued their fight against the Portuguese imperialism from some of the small neighbouring Muslim states, but their efforts for independence could not materialise vis-a-vis the strongly-entrenched position of their enemies.

After the replacement of the Portuguese imperialism by the Dutch rule the Atjehnese continued their struggle against colonialism.

According to Prof. W.F. Wertheim, all struggles against any kind of colonialism were indebted to the Islamic doctrine of equality which had a deep imprint on the minds of the people. The Muslims could not reconcile with any kind of colonialism. It is with this spirit that the various Muslim States in the archipelago first fought against the Portuguese and then against the Dutch.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{19} D.G.E. Hall: \textit{op.cit.}, p.198.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} For a brief note regarding various attempts made against colonialism see Pre-Nationalist Struggle against Colonialism, \textit{Indonesian Review}, Djakarta, Feb.1951, p.134.
From the middle of the nineteenth century starts an unending course of Atjeh hostilities, mutual recriminations and occasional military clashes. The Dutch-Atjeh feud started in the year 1875 continued till 1904 with the ultimate fall of Atjeh to the Dutch. 24

The hostilities between the Dutch East Indies Government and the Atjeh forced the Dutch Government to reconsider its attitude towards the people of the archipelago, who were mostly Muslims. The reorientation in Dutch policy was advised by Prof. Snouck Hurgronje early in the 20th century. So far the Dutch had made little efforts to make a compromise with the indigenous customs, traditions and their social and political outlook. Prof. Hurgronje's idea was to understand the Islamic concepts of the people and to make them adjust slowly and steadily to the Dutch law and their socio-political temperament. He says: "The only safety for the Dutch colonies in the archipelago lies in the fact that the Western social concepts should be transplanted among the Muslims of these islands so that they may become like Westerners." 25

He further says: "The difference of ideology among the Protestants, Roman Catholics and the Jews did not prevent them from being called a homogenous Dutch nation and having a common culture. Similarly, the colouring of Javanese nobility on the Dutch lines should be undertaken through a process of education." 26 Professor Hurgronje thought that in this way an accord between the Dutch rulers and the indigenous population with their own cultural background shall be reached. 27

27. For the nature of the Dutch Rule see G.H. Bosquet: A French View of Netherland Indies, Ch.11
The impact of the Western rule over Indonesia led to the further consolidation of the Islamic faith in the hearts of the Muslim people. It was only the coherence in faith that could make the natives of Indonesia stand as a unified nationa vis-a-vis the ruling power. The attempts made by the colonial government in the East Indies to transplant Christianity in the archipelago were considered as means to perpetuate the foreign yoke. The people, therefore, took an easy recourse to the assimilation of teachings of Islam as in this way alone they could counter Christian penetration. It was only the religion of Islam, it was commonly felt, that gave a sense of individual worth to all human beings however humble they may be placed in social life. The people considered lower in the Hindu scale of life could very well find themselves in no way socially inferior to any person in the Islamic social structure. Moreover, the conversion to Islam had become easier because Islam in Indonesia was introduced in its real spirit at the early stage of its introduction by the pioneers of Islam in this country. The spirit of Islam could exist in the peculiar social traditions of a country unless they openly clashed with the spirit of religion. The early promoters of Islam in this part of the world had no political motive behind their efforts and so they did their best to introduce the spirit and let the outer organism of the society take its own natural course of development.

With the advent of Islam and during the short span of Muslim rule in Indonesia, the local customs and traits in so far as they did not conflict with the basic concepts of this religion, were left intact. As in many part of Indonesia, Hinduism prevailing prior to the advent of Islam.

W.F.  
could not altogether cast aside the impact of the prevailing Hindu-Javanese culture. Rather, Islam in the archipelago therefore was "sufficiently spiced with mystic Hindu elements to make it palatable." The advent of European further gave a set-back to the emergence of a purified and orthodox Islam and the "real characteristics remained vague for the uncritical Javanese mind." The princes of various states in Indonesia partly due to the influence of the propagation of the Muslim missionaries and partly, under the Portuguese threat, sought to intensify the Indonesian solidarity. The caste-ridden Hindu faith had lost ground and could hardly afford unity of outlook and purpose among the people. Moreover a large number of people in the coastal towns of Sumatra and other islands had already embraced Islam and this religion had become a veritable solidifying force among its adherents. Hence the princes could only find the Islamic faith "as a move to counter Christian penetration." The propaganda for the Muslim faith was, therefore, encouraged and Islam proved a cementing force for the various sections of the Indonesian people. Attempts had been made in the past during the Hindu rule, by various princes to unify the entire archipelago into a common bond of nationhood but it was left to Islam to foster ideological unity throughout Indonesia. The gradual subservience of the Hindu culture in the place of its origin (India) in the 18th and 19th centuries and with


32. The most formidable attempt in the Hindu period was undertaken by Gadjia Madja, but the conception of unity proved only transient in view of the dissident forces working against it. See Vlekke, op.cit., pp.53-4.
continually growing contacts of Indonesians with the Arabs brought about a renewed consciousness for the spirit of Islam. The Indian cultural influence on Indonesia steadily waned and the influence of the orthodox Arabs of Hadhramaut, who swarmed Indonesia towards the close of the 19th century, increased. 33

Moreover, there was also felt a sharp influence of the modernism through the Pan-Islamic movement of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, and the liberal writings of Mohammad Abdul Rashid Raza, Syed Ahmad Khan and lately of Dr. Mohamad Iqbal. 34 The influence of these notable liberals is manifest in the writings of Haji Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Mohammadiyya in Java. The continued friction of the Indonesian national sentiment against the Dutch imperialism lent a great incentive to the resurgence of the true spirit of Islam. The people of Indonesia were deeply perturbed by the Dutch attempts at compulsory Christianisation. 35 They felt that the Dutch were one of the most intolerant people. The only panacea for this affliction, they thought, was their participation in the Pan-Islamic movement. This sentiment till the dawn of this century was noticeable in Indonesia. The Pan-Islamic tendencies in Indonesia were strengthened due to hostility shown by the Dutch towards all those in Indonesia who took their faith quite seriously. The frequent pilgrimage to Mecca by many Indonesians further strengthened the bonds of union with the Muslim world. The figures of the number of the Indonesians who visited

34. Leslie H. Palmier, *op.cit.*
35. The view regarding the active assistance rendered by the Netherland Government to the promotion of Christianity in Indonesia has also been expressed by Amy Vandenbosch, see *The Dutch East Indies*, pp.39-50.
Mecca for annual pilgrimage indicates how strong the bond of union with the Muslim world may be developing in the country from the early part of this century.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Pilgrims from Indonesia</th>
<th>Total number of pilgrims from the whole Muslim world</th>
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<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>97,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Effect of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Very small again due to war conditions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-do-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>59,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>61,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pilgrimage to Mecca was viewed by the Indonesian Muslims as a matter of great honour. The Hadjis or the pilgrims were accorded special status in the society. The result of such sentiments was also hatred against the Dutch rule that was regarded as exclusively secular and anti-Islam. The Dutch always lent greater support to the less orthodox sections of the people. The religious orthodoxy, according to them, was bound to add incentive to the freedom movement. The result of this suppression was that even in the 19th century when the Dutch rule was already firmly established in Indonesia there had been numerous conversions to Islam in spite of the Dutch aversion to it. The anti-Islam attitude of the Government further increased the influence of the religious teachers on Indonesian society.  

36. These figures have been taken from G.H. Bosquet: Introduction, op. cit. p.186. In 1956 the total number of pilgrims from Indonesia was 12,347. See Times of Indonesia, Sept. 20, 1956.

had made a common cause with those religious teachers and on numerous occasions there had been popular risings against the Dutch where the cry of religion was an augmenting force. 38 For many an Indonesian Islam was to become the symbol of resistance to the colonial system, as previously it had been the symbol of resistance to the Hindu caste-system as well. 39

The resistance became stronger still when the Dutch sought to encourage the local sentiments by stressing the ‘adat’ or customary law. The religious-minded Muslims stressed the implementation of the Islamic law of inheritance and resisted the imposition of adat law. There were nevertheless people mainly in the Central Java, Celebes and in part of Borneo who besides showing some regard for religious traditions also showed attachment for a local customs which were largely Hindu-animistic. It were these people in contradistinction to the religious-minded ones whom the Dutch tried to encourage as they through Islam a threat to their rule. Indonesians had definitely taken the wind out of the sails of the Christian missions and to most of the people the struggle for independence and that for the revival of the glory of Islam were synonymous terms. But sceptics were also brought up in the Islamic environments and they dared not to profess against the popular creed. In the words of Snouck Hurgronje: "Every new period in the history of civilization obliges a religious community to undertake a general revision of the contents of its treasury." 40 Indeed the entire educated class among the Indonesians wanted a new look on religion.

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 55
40. C. Snouck Hurgronje: Mohammedanism, Lectures on its Origin, its religious and political growth and its present state, 1916, p. 33
W.F. Wertheim writes:

"The reason why the middle class Indonesian did not get over to Christianity but remained an Islamite, lay in the fact that he felt strong traditional emotional ties with Islam such as most Europeans feel with Christendom. Moreover, in a colonial country there was all the more need to distinguish oneself from the foreign overlords. What the Indonesian really needed was to be able to call himself an Islamite without having to feel ashamed of his faith in the presence of Westerners; to profess a faith, that is, which harmonised with the modern age and his own aspirations as a man of his time."\(^{41}\)

Another factor that led to the consolidation of religious ideas during the Dutch regime was the active help given by the colonial government to the encouragement of the Chinese and other "foreign orientals" to form a strong middle class as traders and handicraftsmen. In order to oppose this colonial class-structure special socio-religious weight was accorded to the Hadjis, Syeds and Kiais. The indigenous Muslim population in order to fight the Chinese merchant class accorded an additional scale of prestige to the small middle class based mostly on religious sentiments. It increased the hold of religion on the Indonesian mind.\(^{42}\)

As a result of increased contact with the Western culture through education and individual contacts the Indonesian youth and the leaders of thought realised the necessity of reorientation in their own concept of religion and religious life. This challenge was met by

\(^{41}\) W.F. Wertheim: op. cit. p. 59.

the Mohammadiyya Movement which sought to interpret Islam in a way more palatable to the modern educated mind. There was a stir in the mind of a section of the intellectual class of the country who regarded Islam as an asset against western imperialism and a great unifying force among the people. The growing indifference among the people of the younger ranks towards their religion alarmed them. Thus to rehabilitate Islam among the people it should be adapted to the modern world. The emergence of Mohammadiyyah in 1912 was to create a new outlook on Islam and to foster a sense of independent thinking among the educated youth on religious matters. This process of reorientation in Indonesia progressed in the virtually the same channel as in most of the other Islamic countries. Islam, it was held, never bound its adherents by invoking the authority of some theologians but it appealed to the human reason. The old conception of teaching in the elementary Islamic Schools, which stressed mumbling of the Quran without understanding, was dispensed with. And so was the education in the pesantrens, religious educational institutions run under the patronage of the Ulema. The teachings of Islam should be imbibed in the mind of the students in their own mother tongue and the Friday sermon should also be given in the language which the audience should well be able to understand.

The Mohammadiyya tried to bring reform in the educational system and in the Pondoks and Pesantrens, the voluntary educational institutions, the same subjects began to be taught as in the Government run institutions and religious teaching was imparted as a separate subject. It moreover took keen interest in various other social activities and established hospitals, libraries and organizing small committees in the localities of
In political field the Mohammadiyya aimed at fostering a Pan-Islamic sentiment among the people. That was more or less a reaction against the western cultural incursions and political stress and economic exploitation. This body, in early years, of its existence had taken lively interest in the various Islamic movements in the world. Under the auspices of this Organisation a "Majlis-i-Ulema" was organised and steps were taken to give incentive to the teachings of Islam through individual enterprise. The movement was essentially progressive and served as the main channel of communication with modern Islam in other countries. Its main objective was to foster a feeling of unity and cohesion in the minds of the Indonesian Muslims with their brethren in faith elsewhere.

This socio-religious organisation soon after its birth became a mass movement. Its influence in the field of religion went soon in the creation of an organization Sarikat-i-Islam, which started a movement for the freedom of the country basing its ideology on socio-religious foundation as the Mohammadiyya. An analysis of the activities of the Sarikat-i-Islam we leave to a following chapter. The Mohammadiyya ever-since has strived, through voluntary means, to impart religious education to the people and has displayed a remarkable spirit in raising the socio-religious level of Muslim society.

After the attainment of independence the programme of the Mohammadiyya has, in no way, diverted from the original channel. At a congress of this organisation held at Palembong in July 1956 the following outline of its policy and programme was given:

The Mohammadiyya is a Muslim social and educational organisation and shall not take part in political activities. The following was broadly outlined as the programme of the organisation.

43. Reported in the Times of Indonesia, Djakarta,
1. The formation of a true Islamic Community.
2. Questions relating to labour, property right, marriage regulations, activities of the women and youth organisations of Mohammadiyya and the boy scout movement of the organisation "Hizbul Watan".

During the session of the Congress, A.R. Sultan Mansur, General Chairman of the Mohammadiyya stated that "the Indonesian Muslims shall endeavour to build a Muslim community in which Islamic laws are in force. Justice and prosperity can only be achieved if the community is guided by the teachings of the true religion and not by those of artificial religions. Islam has in it the required basis for the community." 44

The Mohammadiyya, in its concepts, is co-operative to the Masjumi and the Nahadat Ulama — its political counterparts with the same objective as the setting up of a state based on the principles of Islam. The old concept of Pan-Islamism has given place to a nation state. A number of leaders of the Nahadat-Ulama and the Masjumi during the course of interviews with the author, stressed the role of a nation state that would interpret Islam in its own environment. The leaders stressed that they viewed Islam as a way of life capable of being adjusted to the varying needs of the Muslim communities in the modern world. These Muslim parties of Indonesia are desirous of maintaining friendly ties with the Islamic world.

Islam came into this region without any political coercion on the local people. The teaching of Islam was entirely voluntary and the adherents showed a remarkable zeal in practising the ideals of Islam in their daily lives. The spirit of Islam was a sure way to muster the diverse

44. Times of Indonesia, July 27, 1956.
social forces in the archipelago into a compact na-
ideal, Formerally the idea of a homogeneous Indo-
nesian state did exist, but there was the lack of a spiritual
force that could augment the seething ideal. The spread of
Islam through voluntary means is a proof of its great
appealing force. A look at a dictionary of the Indonesian
language (Bahasa Indonesia) reveals that a very large
number of words have been derived from the Arabic roots.
We find that the Sanskrit language earlier had also made
its impact, but its influence was confined to regional
languages and dialects of the archipelago and not on country-
wide basis. In the national language of today there are
far more Arabic and Persian words than Sanskrit ones.
Actually, nationalism in Indonesia is very much dependent
on the influence of Islam. True enough certain regions of
the archipelago the people have shown a lesser regard for
the religion and are more influenced by the Hindu-saminist
traditions, but looking at the corresponding state of affairs
in some parts of Northern India before partition, there
were also some local communities which, though they had
accepted Islam in theory, were all along influenced by
Hindu traditions and culture. Their personal names also
showed the admixture of Hindu and Muslim traditions and
religions. Nevertheless, the effect of Islam on the
Indonesian society was, on the whole, far greater than by any
wave of foreign cultural influence before.

In the case of Indonesia we may even admit that
the admixture and inter-action of various cultures is
far greater than in India, or in any other part of the
Muslim world. This encounter between various cultures has
brought forth new problems for Indonesia which are common
to a certain extent with the rest of the Muslim countries
but in a way they are altogether sui generis. In terms of
religious and cultural composition Indonesia shows a wide
living in Bali. There are also found the pantheistic and animistic elements in various parts of the Indonesian society.

The majority of the people retain some connection with the communal-religious pattern and there is a sense of attachment to the traditional village life. With the advent of the European influence, the communal-religious pattern, with its stress on village, has shown signs of disintegration, as there has developed a great tendency among the people for greater urbanisation. Earlier, due to the Islamic penetration, this pattern of society was not basically disturbed but Islam brought forth an amicable blend in its teachings and the indigenous structure of the Indonesian society. Wherever possible the traditional way of communal life was drastically overhauled to suit the Islamic way of life. In actual practice the spirit of Islam was not considered at variance with the communal pattern until the latter displayed a fundamental contradiction. All this has led to a liberal interpretation of the tenets of Islam. Even on important Muslim festivals we find that in various parts of Java, the Hindu rites are celebrated.

Nevertheless, the Indonesian society proclaims to be largely Islamic in character. There has all along been a demand on the part of a considerable section of the Muslim public opinion to set up a state which should be "based on Islamic principles." A large section of the

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The opening clause of the programme runs as under:-

"The efforts of the Masjumi shall be directed to materialise in the country the implementation of a
various internal and external policies has failed to reconcile the conflict between modernism and the existing traditional and religious value. To the intellectuals in this country the declaration of 'pantjasila' or the "five principles" as the basic philosophy of the state which implies the organisation of Free Indonesia on the basis of "Belief in God" is just confusing. To the advocates of this principle it implies mutual respect and toleration of other religions. But how far it should be declared as an object of the state is open to contention. Has an atheist no place in the Indonesian society? Is a pantheist or an animist (many such groups of people are found in Indonesia) to be considered a rightful citizen of the state? It is the advocates of Islam who want a renunciation of this principle and a clear-cut policy on this issue.

But the task is not as simple as it appears to be. The process of modernism has set in in Islam but not in accordance with the increasing tempo of modern life. The situation in Indonesia commands particular attention. This country has become a museum of divergent cultures, all stand face to face with each other. In the words of Professor S. Taqdir Alijahbana -

"Obviously, Indonesian culture today is more complicated than a mere recapit of the determining influences can indicate. The various phases did not succeed each other like separated acts in a historical pageant. The rate and proportion of admixture varies from place to place. In Bali, certain elements of Indian culture have endured and produced distinctive art forms. In Central Java the fusion of Islamic and Western cultures is marked. In Minahasa and Ambar the oldest pure Indonesian culture survived to come in direct contact with Western culture. Indonesia, as a whole, is a mosaic of different traits. You might say that we are living in 30 centuries all at once. In one moment we are in Stone age. The result

47. Pedoman Perdjanganan, Masjumi, op.cit.
is a number of intricate cultural problems.\footnote{48}

Continuing Dr. Alisjahbana states: "During the
passion of the revolution little attention was paid to
these conflicts and tensions. But we cannot escape them
now. As we begin to realize fully the extent of these
problems, they emerge not as uniquely Indonesia, but
as international ones. From the various courses of
West -- the countries of the present still draw creative
power and inspiration. In its struggle to build up a
new nation, Indonesia mirrors in miniature the problems
of the world at large in the creation of a world
community. We believe perhaps with the naiveté of a young
nation, this mutual confrontation of traits drawn from
the great cultures, stimulated by the urgency of quickly
reaching an equilibrium, may well lead Indonesia to
solutions for some of the many cultural problems of the
world.\footnote{48}

In an area of conflicting intermingling cultures,
like Indonesia, modern Islam must adjust itself and
bring forth co-ordination in Indonesian thought. The
various 'culture contacts' have to be synthesized. This
synthesis would certainly not be too much 'westernization'
but a healthy mixture of various cultural traditions in
the country with a super-impact of Islam.\footnote{49}

\footnote{48} S. Taqdir Alisjahbana: Some Intellectual Conflicts
in A Perspective of Indonesia, an Atlantic monthly
Supplement, New York, 1956, p.29. Also by the
same author see Traditional and Modern Values
in our Culture, reprinted from Cultural Freedom
in Asia. The proceedings of a Conference convened by
the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Society
for the Extension of Democratic Idealism, Rangoon,

\footnote{49} Ibid.

\footnote{50} C.A.O. Nieuwenhuijze, op.cit., pp.98-110
CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF COLONIAL RULE

After the downfall of the Muslim States in Indonesia starts the era of Western domination. The Westerners first came as traders and steadily acquired political hold over the country. The Portuguese were the first to capture Malacca in Malaya in the year 1511, after a brief battle against its Muslim rulers.¹

Due to the constant hostility of the local population, the Portuguese could not maintain their hold for long and had to give way to the Dutch. The latter got incentive by an action of King Philip of Spain, who, after acquiring control over the mainland of Portugal, in 1580 closed the doors of Spain and Portugal to the Dutch,² who had considerable trade interests in both the countries. Deprived of this, the Dutch wanted new markets.

Already aware of the route, the Dutch seaman Cornelis de Houtman, who had previous associations with the Portuguese, and for that reason was aware of the secrets of trade with the Indies, set out for Indonesia in 1595 with a small fleet. His party succeeded in establishing themselves at Bantam in Java and within a few years penetrated deeper in the archipelago.³

In the year 1602, a joint-stock trading company was formed in Holland with the purpose of trading with the newly acquired small Dutch Colony in Indonesia and administering the said territory. The company was named Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (The United East India Company) or V.O.C. It was delegated with wide powers by the Netherlands Government in monopolising

¹ B.H.M. Vlekke: op.cit., p.74
² Ibid, p.94.
and administering the Indonesian trade, waging war or making peace when the need arose, to collect army, recruit employees, to issue their own coins and to acquire more favourable conditions for the trade on these islands.  

After a brief struggle against the Portuguese the Dutch were able to extend their dominion to Ambon in East Indonesia, the Island of Tidore and a number of other places in Indonesia.  

The objective of the company in the beginning was simply to monopolise trade and not to indulge in a struggle for political dominance except only when it was desired to protect these interests. But it soon became clear that embroilment was necessary in view of many contending trade interests of other European nations and also to stabilise the Dutch position vis-a-vis the local population and other non-Indonesian Asian groups in the countries such as, Chinese and Arabs.  

When the rule of the company was firmly established the Government of the Netherlands sanctioned the appointment of a Governor General to work under the administration of the Company. The Governor General was assisted by an Advisory Council called Headwan Indie. Jan Pieterszoon Coen became the first Governor General. Coen reorganised the whole commercial system of the company. He intended to build an enormous Asiatic Commercial empire of the Netherlands, with its capital in Batavia, the city which he founded in 1619.  

During the 17th and the 18th Centuries the rule of the Company was extended over two-thirds of Java, the partly independent state of Mataram, Moluccas,

5. Ibid. Also B.H.M. Vlekke: op.cit., p.104.
6. Ibid.
7. B.H.M. Vlekke: op.cit., p.120
Bangka, Billiton, South Sumatra and parts of Celebes and Borneo. That meant, the Dutch had brought under their sway the entire archipelago and where the Netherlands Government did not rule directly it exercised indirect political and economic domination.8

During this period the Company strove to stabilise its commercial and political position through the extension of its territorial dominion and by establishing a network of factory - fortresses, where the government was largely in the hands of feudal aristocracy.9 These fortresses or colonial settlements were ruled according to the Dutch laws so far as the Dutch inhabitants were concerned. The Indonesian and Chinese populations were allowed to dwell in the areas surrounding these settlements and were ruled by their own Chiefs and according to their own customary laws. But these chieftains had to acknowledge the Dutch supremacy by paying them fief in the shape of Monopoly-grant in respect of trade in colonial products. These chieftains exercised very large and extensive powers over their subjects including forced labour and for a long time the V.O.C. did not bother for this state of affairs in their own interests.10

This attitude of the Dutch led to the strengthening of the authoritarian trend in the administration of social, economic and political affairs of the country. Moreover, this tendency led to the concentration of capital in fewer hands and an indirect rule through the medium of the Dutch and native aristocracy.11 The officials of the Company and local chieftains monopolised specified crops in

10. Ibid.
the country and extracted forced labour from the native population.

The indirect system of Government in Indonesia known as the Desse rule and implied the administration on local lines under apex of the Dutch authority. The Desse rule put three-fold duties on the local population.12

(a) Recognition of the Dutch trade monopoly;
(b) Compulsory delivery of some agricultural produce; and
(c) Compulsory cultivation.

It meant that the farmers were not allowed to cultivate the crops other than the ones required by the Government for the purpose of export. Through indirect rule and the monopoly in purchase, the Government was able to procure the crops at nominal rates and sell them at exorbitant prices in Europe.

The sharp criticism against the Desse rule, and because of bewildering chaos in administration led the Government finally to terminate the rule of the company and directly assume all powers of administration. But even after the termination of the rule of the company in 1798, the administration of Indonesia was made a direct responsibility of the crown, and Parliament had least say in the matter. The Dutch administration even never declared their intention to work for the good of the local population. There were occasional criticisms in Parliament against this attitude of the Government, but this criticism was intended more to discredit the administration which was not responsible to the parliament than to any well-being of the indigenous people of Indonesia. Their demand was that a policy of laissez faire should be adopted in the East Indies, which would entail the participation of a greater number of people in the Netherlands in the exploitation of its potential wealth.
the old features of forced labour deliveries in kind—feudalism and monopoly were restrained.\textsuperscript{13}

During the period immediately after the French Revolution the kingdom of Holland was placed in the French control under Louis Bonaparte, the younger brother of Napoleon Bonaparte. The new French regime in Holland appointed Marshal Herman William Dondels as the Governor General of Java with full powers to deal with the growing British influence there. The British, it may be mentioned, after the French revolution had occupied Melacca, Amboina, Banda, and some stations on the west coast of Sumatra, formerly held by the Dutch. The immediate task before the French regime under Dondels was to strengthen the French defensive position in Java to obstruct the path of the growing British influence in the archipelago. To achieve this end the French administration over the Indies sought to introduce some administrative reforms and improve the status of their army personnel, build new forts and develop military communication system.\textsuperscript{13A}

In the year 1811, the archipelago was occupied by the British and placed under the administrative control of Thomas Stamford Raffles, who was designated as Lieutenant Governor-General of Java. He was a sedate politician and an expert administrator. He introduced some reforms of economic in nature. For the compulsory feudal contributions and services as designed by the V.O.C., he substituted land revenue collected in cash (as distinct from levy in kind) through the village headman. The wide jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters accorded to the local Regents was taken away and given over to European magistrates.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} Amry Vandenbosch: \textit{op.cit.}, pp.54-55 and pp.88-93.
\textsuperscript{13A} D.G.E. Hall: \textit{op.cit.}, pp.296, 405-20.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp.102-105. Also P.J. Bliss: \textit{op.cit.}, Vol.V.
It was a step in the direction of restoring civil liberties to the native population against the unbridled oppression of their own rulers. The British regime encouraged private enterprise in the field of agriculture, which was a departure from the monopoly system in the period of the Dutch administration. For a few years after the expiry of the British rule, the policy of the Netherlands Government was indecisive about the monopoly-holding policy. However, the restored Dutch regime adopted the land revenue system of Raffles.

The demand for "popular exploitation" instead of monopoly exploitation led the Dutch administration in 1830 to adopt a new system, known as "Cultuur System" or new cultivation system which lasted till 1877. This system which retained the essential characteristics of the Desse rule of the company required that the local tillers had to surrender the produce of one-fifth of their land to the Government and they were obliged to till that one-fifth part according to the dictates of the Government (by planting new crops such as coffee, tea, etc.) Moreover the Dutch regime also recognised the role of the Chinese middle-men besides the local hereditary chieftains. According to the new policy land could be leased also to the Chinese for cultivation. The Government retained the old monopoly system, with an amended form in the teeth of opposition from the Dutch settlers, who demanded "free exploitation".

The key position, till before the advent of the British rule was held by the native aristocracy, but now the Chinese had also acquired the same status. The policy of the company was to give more and more privileges

to the Chinese. The first Governor of the Dutch East Indies following lapse of British rule J.R. Coen stated: "There is no people in the world, which serve us better than the Chinese; too many of them cannot be brought to Batavia." Retail trade in the country was mostly left to the Chinese. The system of monopoly control of trade and agriculture was known as Dessa Rule, i.e., administration through a large scale apenage system consisting of local chieftains and Chinese monopoly holders working under the Dutch hierarchy. This system led to better feelings among certain indigenous chieftains, and among the general population.

The system of paying land rent in cash was dispensed with theoretically although in practice the peasants continued paying the land tax besides the one-fifth share from their total meerveld land holdings. This thing brought a much greater income to the Government so much so that by 1877 the Government paid off a huge amount of debt owed to the V.O.C. Besides, an amount of 236,000,000 guilders was paid to defray the Netherland public debt and 115,000,000 for reduction of taxes at home and an equally huge amount went for development and fortification purposes.

The new system, in order to achieve results required the co-operation of the local chieftains including village headmen. For this purpose, the office of European magistrates was abolished and the old aristocratic institution of local regents was restored. These regents, whose office was now made hereditary, to give them an additional dignity, were also given more powers over the local farmers and had to work under

18. Furnivall: op.cit., p.123
the supervision of the District official known as Resident. All these factors contributed to the strengthening of the authoritarian trend in administration, which was resented by the local population.\textsuperscript{20}

The local misgivings were further strengthened by the extreme exploitation which resulted in a number of famines between 1843 to 1848 claiming the total loss of over half a million people.\textsuperscript{21} This system was also opposed by some people in the Netherlands, who had an humanitarian approach to this problem. Dowess Dekker, also known as Multatuli sharply criticised this form of Dutch rule in his novel Max Havelaar, published in 1860, wherein he publicised his doubts about the system. Multatuli was formerly an assistant resident in Indonesia and had a close experience of the colonial administration, which he very boldly criticised. He strongly advocated the cause of the Javanese people, who he said, should be humanly treated.\textsuperscript{22}

In the year 1851, the Netherlands Government had declared that henceforth the policy of the Government would be directed towards preserving the well-being of the local population but this declaration had hardly gone beyond a mere statement. The group of liberals in the Netherlands Parliament, through a struggle stretching over a number of decades, succeeded ultimately in the year 1864\textsuperscript{23} in settling that the group of ministers which were hitherto responsible to the crown would now be subservient to Parliament. Slowly and steadily they also triumphed in their demand for the free and unchecked exploitation of Indonesian resources.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{21} George McT Kehin: \textit{Nationalism and Revolution}, \textit{op.cit.}, p.12.

\textsuperscript{22} D.H. Meijer: \textit{op.cit.}, pp.62-63.

\textsuperscript{23} P.J. Blok: \textit{op.cit.}
The success of the group of Liberals in Parliament did not solve the problem of the well-being of the Indonesians but was only meant as freedom for all Dutchmen to exploit. The Liberal policy was, however, a boon to the Indonesians, who were given a short relief from their age-old sufferings, by the transference of authority to the ministers responsible to the Parliament.

With the beginning of the liberal policy after the gradual withering away of the cultivation system sufficient incentive was given to the private capital especially in plantation-agriculture and mining. The effect of this were more markedly visible in Sumatra and in parts of Borneo and Celebes. In Java, where plantation-agriculture could not be developed owing to the pressure of population, the effects of the old system continued as late as the year 1919 and the pattern of economy changed very slowly. However, the ending of the forced cultivation system led also in Java to the disintegration of collective land ownership that was supplanted by individual ownership.

The rise of liberalism in Europe had also its impact in the countries of the East. In Africa and Asia in the late 19th and the early 20th Century, the colonising nations felt the rising tempo of national consciousness among the native population. The respect of the coloured races for the white considerably diminished and they felt deeply the exploitation of their national resources by their European masters.

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24. Due to the increased demand on land-holders under the cultivation system, the occupants of land were obliged to share their holdings with others. See Furnivall: op-cit., p.41. Also W.F. Wartheim. op-cit.

25. Ibid.

With the abolition of the cultivation system in 1877 and with the change in the concept of agrarian economy the hereditary aristocracy gave way to national leadership. Towards the beginning of the 20th century we notice the emergence of the indigenous elite, the majority of whom served as a political buffer between the Dutch authority and the peasantry.27

The existence of this indigenous aristocratic class led to class consciousness among the peasants. The Saminist movement that started in 1890 was a manifestation of unrest. The Dutch regime to adopt more enlightened policies to improve village conditions. The common man in a village viewed the existing political order as the one wherein the traditional aristocratic ruling class, whether indigenous or Chinese served only the interests of the ruling Dutch regime.29 It was out of this reaction that the national leadership was born.

As a result of this growing consciousness among the people the Dutch revised their entire policy towards the end of the 19th century. This policy known as the Ethical Policy was aimed at the well being of the population. In 1918, the Government abolished the system of forced cultivation of monopoly crops. The system of forced labour was also terminated in most parts of Indonesia. In Java, however, it finally came to an end in the year 1941 shortly before the advent of Japan, through the

27. George McT Kahin: Major Governments of Asia, N.Y. 1958, p.483

28. The movement/developed anarchistic tendencies and was a revolutionary method to redress economic grievances. See George McT Kahin: Nationalism and Revolution, op.cit., pp.43-44.

provision of a tax in lieu of such labour. 30

In the field of political relations a change also came in the beginning of the 20th century. The nationalist movements in various other countries of Asia had profound effect on the Indonesians who became more and more conscious of the malaise of the colonial rule. Among events in other Asian countries that influenced the growth of nationalist sentiments in Indonesia were the activities of the national liberation movement in India.

In 1898, Germany seized Kiang Chau in China and in the following year the Russians captured Port Arthur. There was a flame of hatred against the Europeans in China which grew more bitter by the British expedition to Tibet in the year 1904. 31 The Chinese became altered at these encroachment by foreigners and they became more nationally conscious. There was the Russo-Japanese war in the year 1904-5 which resulted in the defeat of Russia. The myth of the invincibility of the West by the people of the East was henceforth shattered.

In the year 1916, the Netherlands Government realising the popular uprisings against the colonial administration made a gesture of goodwill towards Indonesia through the introduction of some political and administrative reforms. The old system was familiar by excessive centralisation of power and the "Dutch Control of everything". 32 Every decision was made by the Central Government and indigenous population could not make her voice heard through any political body. The reforms of

30. Ibid.
1916 created a National Council or Volksraad. It was a legislative body and a bill passed by it and approved by the Governor General and the Dutch Parliament had the force of law. The total strength of the Volksraad was 60 members out of which 20 natives, 15 Dutch, 3 foreign orientals were to be elected members; 10 natives; 10 Dutch and 2 orientals were to be appointed by the Governor General out of a list presented to him by his Executive Council. All members of the Executive Council, it may be stated, were Dutch. This shows the entirely official character of this body and was far from being called a truly representative system of Government. These reforms did not satisfy the nationalists and contained "Seeds of trouble for the Dutch Government." The powers of the Volksraad were increased in 1925 and again in 1928 but the fundamental character of this body remained the same. The idea of Volksraad was conceived to guage public opinion as also out of consideration that "an opponent is less dangerous on the floor of a deliberative assembly than behind the scenes." It remained in essence an official body containing more nominated members.

The rising tide of the independence movements in Asia as also the spread of education in the country led to the development of nationalistic sentiments in the Dutch East Indies. No piece of legislation by the Netherlands Parliament, however, liberal it may be, could stem this tide. The Dutch did not learn a lesson from the British in India, who actually marched with time and showed a remarkable sense of political sagacity and prudence by granting more and more rights to the Indians. The finally marched out of the sub-continent leaving

33. Ibid., pp.63-69
34. Ibid., p.73.
35. D.G. Stibbe: Nederlands Indië, Land en Volk
behind considerable goodwill among the masses. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the contempt against the Dutch Colonial rule continued mounting and their ultimate departure from the archipelago was not accomplished in graceful manner, unlike the departure of the British from India and other dependencies.

The Dutch colonial rule showed a marked difference from the British rule in India where all along the Indians had been associated with the administration of their country far more closely than the Indonesians with the Dutch regime. The Dutch also kept the level of education in Indonesia at a level much lower than in India. The Dutch Government "always showed a reluctance to expand opportunities in western education for Indonesians."36 The Dutch rule led slowly to the elimination of the indigenous middle class in Indonesia. The bulk of the middle class came from the Chinese. The Indonesians were provided no experience in the art of self-government or parliamentary activity. "The most that the Netherlands Government was willing to countenance was a largely advisory people's council in which elected Indonesians as late as 1940 held only 19 out of 60 seats and which had no significant functions other than providing a sounding board heeded or disregarded at will by Dutch Colonial officials. 37

It was this repressive policy of the Dutch that nurtured the idea among the Indonesians that any foreign nation that liberated them from the clutches of the Dutch colonial rule would be their highest benefactor. It was this feeling that made Japan's occupation of Indonesia during the Second World War much easier.

36. George McT Kahin: Major Governments of Asia, op.cit., p.486. The opportunities of employment to the western educated Indonesians were too few.

37. Ibid., p.491.
Shortly after the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, the Netherlands Government, out of mere expediency, declared that "complete independence to Indonesia" was its final goal. The out-break of the World War II had given further impetus to this policy and the Royal Message on December 6, 1942, confirmed this policy of the Dutch Government. It was stated explicitly in the Royal Message that "It will be possible to reconstruct the kingdom on a solid foundation of complete partnership, which will mean the consummation of all that has been developed in the past."

The queen in her Message had announced her intention that "soon after the liberation of the Netherlands Kingdom, an occasion would be created for a joint consultation about the structure of the kingdom and its adaptation according to the changed circumstances. "I visualize", the Queen stated, "without anticipating the recommendations of the future conference, that they will be directed towards a commonwealth in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curaçao will participate with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with readiness to render mutual assistance."

The enunciation of this policy could not bring any radical change in the minds of the Indonesians, who had serious doubts as to the attitude of the Netherlands Government. The Dutch, on account of their failure to defend Indonesia in 1942 against the Japanese had lost their prestige among the local population and in that way the anti-European attitude among Indonesians grew stronger.

With the fall of Japan, three and a half years

38. The Message was considered a landmark in the colonial set up by the Dutch. The message only made vague and general promises about the future and both the parties interpreted the proclamation differently.
after their hold on the archipelago, the Dutch had prepared themselves for the recolonisation of the area they had abandoned before. A provisional government of the Indies was formed with its headquarters in Australia known as N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration). The Dutch considered themselves the rightful rulers of the archipelago. The Indonesians on the other hand maintained that the Netherlands Government had forfeited all her rights to rule over Indonesia as it could not defend in the first instance, against the Japanese aggression. After the termination of hostilities Japan had withdrawn from the scene, the Dutch had no claim whatsoever on Indonesia.39

After the termination of the Japanese rule over the archipelago, the Dutch had no armed forces left to materialise aim of the reoccupation of the land of which they thought, the Netherlands Government was the sovereign. As De jure sovereign, the N.I.C.A. in Australia, entered into an agreement with the British on August 29, 1945, in accordance with which the N.I.C.A. entrusted the task of reoccupation to the British troops. The Allied Commander of the S.E. Asia Command, Lord Mountbatten directed the British Military Occupation Forces under the command of General Christison, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Indoneisa to occupy the archipelago, hitherto held by the Japanese. Soon after their landing in Indonesia the British adopted a dual attitude towards the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic which was surprising to both. The British attitude towards the Republic was motivated by the fact that it was hardly two months old at that time and no foreign government could be sure of its stability which was so hardly needed in the days immediately following the World War II. Moreover, the British were conscious of the rising tempo of the national movement in the various countries of the East and they, from their own point of view also liked to see
the resurrection of a colonial empire in order to maintain their own possessions in the East.

In these circumstances the Dutch troops landed in Indonesia six weeks after the entry of the British troops. Native opinion at once turned anti-British on account of their support lent to the Dutch. The Dutch on the other hand accused the British of half-heartedness with which they were helping them. The Dutch maintained that the British were more mindful of the situation in Malaya, where they were concentrating greater energy than in Indonesia and that was because they wanted to take a lead in the international market of such commodities as tin and rubber and also to consolidate themselves in those areas that were formerly under the British rule.

With the meagre troops it was very difficult for the British at this stage to mitigate the bitter anti-Dutch feeling among the indigenous population who could not sustain the Dutch rule once again.

To appease the highly inflammable anti-Dutch feeling General Christison dramatically recognised the de facto republican Government showing that the British troops had no connection with the Dutch. In a broadcast speech delivered on September 29, 1945, the day the British troops landed in Indonesia, he stated that the object of the presence of the Allied Forces in Indonesia was to liberate the prisoners of War which had been held by the Japanese and also to disarm the Japanese forces and not at all connected with the reinstatement of

from foot-note on page 36.

policy of dihardism. As it had been said: "If independence was granted at the end of the war, the result would not be democracy but oligarchy. Some outside power must train the Indonesians for self-government....." See Lennox Mills: Some Problems of Post War Reconstruction, Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science.
of the Dutch regime. The real motive behind this declaration was to induce President Soekarno and the then Vice-President Dr. Mohammad Hatta, to collaborate with the British, in their task of "liberating the countries from the ravages of War", which co-operation they easily obtained.

Soon after the entry in Indonesia of the Dutch troops the much hated N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) also arrived from Australia after a long sojourn of three and a half years. Meanwhile quite against the Dutch expectations, the people of Indonesia had already on August 17, 1945 proclaimed their independence and formed the "Republic of Indonesia" immediately on their entry the Dutch, first of all, refused any talk with Soekarno and Hatta, whom they styled as "rebels". Later on, when they grasped the full significance of the situation and the Netherlands East Indies Government issued proposals on February 10, 1946, on the following lines:

Firstly, there shall be a Commonwealth of Indonesia, participant in the Kingdom composed of countries with a different degree of self-Government.

Secondly, Indonesian citizenship shall be instituted for all those born in Indonesia.

Thirdly, the home affairs of the Commonwealth


The first Provisional Government of the N.E.I. was formed in Australia by a majority of those fled from there fearing the Japanese onslaughts.

41. For text of these proposals see Fatta and Figures, Batavia, 1947, issued by the N.E.I., Information Office. For discussion see W.H.Van Helsingens: The Netherlands-Indonesia Agreement, Pacific Affairs, June, 1947.
of Indonesia shall be managed independently by the Commonwealth's own organisation, with a substantial Indonesian majority. A representative of the Crown was proposed to be the Head of this Commonwealth organisation.

Fourthly, the Netherlands Government shall promote an expeditious admission of the Commonwealth of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations.

The Republic rejected these proposals but agreed to continue negotiations. The British had, in the meantime been working for conciliation between the parties. They had by now fully realized that the Indonesian national movement was a genuine one and not a Japanese-inspired entity as the Dutch had tended to make them believe. The Republic, the British authorities maintained, had come to stay and any move to destroy it would lead to chaotic conditions in Southeast Asia which was detrimental to the British global policy. The United States Government also wanted security in the region and sought an amicable solution to this problem. The British and the United States Governments put concerted pressure on the Dutch and the latter agreed to negotiate with the Republic. 42

Finally on November 15, 1946, an agreement was signed between the Dutch and the Republic at Linggadjati near Cibaduyut, in Java. According to the terms of the agreement the Netherlands Government recognised the de facto authority of the Republic of Indonesia over

Java, Sumatra and Madura and agreed to withdraw forces from these areas. It was further agreed that by 1st January, 1949, a federal United States of Indonesia comprising the autonomous areas of the Republic Borneo and the Great East. With these constituent units a Netherlands-Indonesian Union shall come into existence under the Dutch Crown. In this Union the Netherlands along with her territories of Surinam and Curicao shall constitute a single Unit. It was further agreed upon that immediately after the formation of this Union a Constituent Assembly of the three Units (The Republic, Borneo and Great East and the Netherlands Government) of the federation shall meet to draw up the Constitution of the U.S.I.

The agreement was finally ratified by the Republican and the Netherlands Governments respectively on March 25, 1947, after which the Governments of India, the United States and Great Britain accorded de facto recognition to the Republic of Indonesia.

Soon after the ratification of this agreement the Netherlands Government gave a unilateral interpretation to certain clauses in the Agreement. It was maintained that the Republic of Indonesia had no independent status but was a single unit in the entire territories of Indonesia under the Netherlands Crown. The Republic of Indonesia, on the other hand, held that it was an equal

43. The term Great East denotes the areas situated between Borneo and New Guinea. It includes the island of Celebes. This name was however changed later to East Indonesia.

"partner" and not a subordinate to the Dutch authority.

The Netherlands Government insisted on the setting up of the federation in which the Republic shall be a single unit. Besides, in the area of the Great East, the Dutch tried to carve out numerous States to further reduce the voice of the Republic in the proposed federation.

The Netherlands Government refused to acknowledge the de jure sovereign status of the Republic over the area held by her. The Dutch insisted on this recognition and held the right to send their troops in that area. In pursuance of this right they launched a police action against the Republic on July 20, 1947. Soon after the "police action" (as the Dutch called it) the Dutch tried to break up the territory under their control into various "cultural units". The Republic accused the Dutch of belying the spirit of the Linggadjati Agreement.

Late in the month of July 1947, India and Australia brought Indonesia's case before the Security Council. On August 1, 1947, the Council issued cease-fire order to both the parties.

The appointment of a Committee of Good Offices was agreed upon between the Dutch and the Republic following a United States sponsored resolution that the Committee was to tender its good offices and both the disputants should select their nominees to form membership of the said Committee. 45

Under the auspices of this Committee an agreement was reached between the parties on January 17, 1948, on board the United States Naval Vessel S.S. Renville.

The Agreement known as the Renville Agreement provided for an immediate truce between the parties and also contained some essential features of the Linggadjati Agreement. A suitable period of six months to one year was to be agreed upon between the parties during which the vital points of dispute between the two parties were to be settled. After that a free plebiscite was to be held in the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura, to ascertain the people's will about their intention to join the proposed U.S.I. or the Republic. A constitutional convention representing all areas of the proposed federation was to be chosen to frame a constitution for the federation. The various states in the federation were to be represented according to population. As a result of this agreement the Dutch did not leave an inch of territory occupied by them after the cease-fire order.

The six additional proposals were also incorporated by the Committee in the Renville Agreement which nullified all that was considered favourable to the Republic in the Agreement. These proposals provided:

"The United States of Indonesia, when created will be a sovereign and independent state in equal partnership with the kingdom of Netherlands in the Netherlands-Indonesia Union at the head of which will be the Queen of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a state within the United States of Indonesia."


47. The cease-fire order by the United Nations Security Council was to be effective from August 4, 1947, but actually it was implemented with effect from November 20, upon the initiative by the Committee of Good Offices. During the period the Dutch continued their offensive and occupied a considerable part of the Republic's territory.
There was a feeling of general disillusionment in Indonesia after the Renville Agreement. Taking advantage of the problems created, the Dutch "police action" and the economic blockade against the Republic an attempt was made by the communists to forcibly seize power. They got support from some labour organizations and made the city of Madian in Java as the Centre of their rebellious activities. This revolt at Madian in September 1948 was crushed by the Republic's army within about two months' time.\textsuperscript{48}

Taking advantage of this situation the Dutch started another offensive against the Republic, but soon they realised the futility of such action which was harmful to their economic and commercial interests in the archipelago. Negotiations were therefore resumed with the Republic under the auspices of the United Nations Committee of Good Offices and the agreement on the following lines was reached on May 7, 1949 at the Hague.\textsuperscript{49}

Firstly, the Netherlands Government unconditionally agreed to transfer complete sovereignty to the interim Federal Government of the United States of Indonesia in accordance with the terms of the Renville Agreement.

Secondly, the status of the Republic vis-a-vis the Federal Government of the U.S.I. under the Netherlands crown shall be that of equal partnership with equal rights. That is to say, neither of the two constituents of the Federal Union shall transfer or concede any more rights than the other. The


concession of rights shall be on voluntary basis.

Thirdly, The Republic agreed to participate in the Hague Round Table Talks commencing on August, 1949 under the supervision of the Committee of Good Offices.

Fourthly, the Republican Government shall be restored on July 1, 1949, after the evacuation of the Residency of Bogdjakarta by the Dutch troops.

Fifthly, the final transfer of authority from the Dutch to the Republic shall take place before the end of the year 1949.

The negotiations at the Hague also started on August 1, 1949, as already scheduled and final transfer of sovereignty to the Republic was agreed upon. The final transfer of authority took place on December 27, 1949. A protocol was read on the occasion at the Hague, making it clear that the Netherlands Parliament had ratified the Hague Agreement resulting in the Draft Union Statute and financial, economic, cultural and defence agreements. 50

Indonesia finally set the seal on her struggle for independence on August 18, 1950, by proclaiming herself a single Unitary state in place of the Republik Indonesia Serikat (the United States of Indonesia), which was a 16-Unit federation brought into existence from December 27, 1949 following the transfer of sovereignty.

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CHAPTER III

THE GENESIS OF THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

The movement for independence was not a sudden outburst of events that made the Dutch finally quit Indonesia in 1949. Ever since the beginning of the Dutch rule early in the 17th century there had been sporadic revolts in different parts of the country against the colonial administration. The anti-Dutch feelings used to be inspired mostly by a section of the Indonesian aristocracy seeking to assert itself. These native aristocratic elite mostly invoked the authority of Islam in support of their fight against the infidels.

The dawn of the twentieth century saw the birth of a regular party in 1908 under the name of Boedi Oetoe with the avowed objective of seeking the social welfare of the people. This party founded by Wahidin Sudirhusodo also had some political objective and was composed mainly of the indigenous membership. It rapidly grew in strength among the young intellectuals and by 1909 its membership was stated to have risen to 10,000. This party had a pure nationalistic foundation and adopted a more or less indifferent attitude towards religion. The party mainly consisted of the Western educated people and had little contact with the general population.

1. The prominent among the leaders who inspired the freedom movement on various occasions, have been Prince Diponegoro, Tengku Umar and Imam Bondjol. Prince Diponegoro belonged to Djadjakarta and he carried out struggles against the Dutch in the years 1825-30. Tengku Umar and Imam Bondjol belonged to Sumatra. See "Pre-Nationalist struggle against Colonialism", Indonesian Review, Djakarta, Feb. 1951. Also Justus Van der Kroef: "Prince Diponegoro, Progenitor of Indonesian Revolution" Far Eastern Survey, August, 1949

Also B.H.M. Vlekke: op.cit., pp. 147-50
and not even with the indigenous middle class. It did, however, sufficient pioneering work in arousing the national consciousness among the people of Java.  

The strict Javanese character of this party and its indifference to religion led to its downfall very soon. The middle class group of people which mainly consisted of the Hadjies and Kiais having much control on the common people could hardly bear this callous attitude to religion. Islam, these groups maintained, in the past had contributed to the solidarity of the Indonesian people, could again be an asset in developing nationalism and satisfying the needs of the Modern times. The repeated stress, on the development of local traditions as against 'Islamization' by the western educated youth would lead nowhere but developing local tendencies among the people. The spirit of nationalism behind Boedi Otoemo was, however, never questioned.

Another factor that led to the early withering away of this party was its lack of popular appeal. The masses could be impressed by an easily understandable religious appeal rather than by a "too sophisticated" philosophical and cultural notion devoid of any connection with the general population. The party consisted mainly of civil servants and the politically conservative section of the Indonesian people. The short-lived nature of the Boedi Otoemo and the emergence of Serikat-i-Islam as a major nationalist party in 1914 is symptomatic of the deep influence that Islam carried. Any party based entirely on secular lines could not command a mass appeal.

4. For a brief account of the Boedi Otoemo, see L.M. Sitorus: Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia (History of the Movement of Nationalism
The first organised attempt to set up an organisation on national level was made with the foundation of the Serikat-i-Islam, as a purely religious body to safeguard the rights of the Muslim community throughout Indonesia. The leaders of this Movement brought home to their people that Christianity in the present age was western nations’ game of achieving dominance over the world. It also had a political programme which appealed to the majority of the Indonesians, and the party had soon to enter the field of political and declared the achievement of complete independence as its goal. Within a time of four years of its existence, this party is said to have commanded a strength of 360,000 members. Its leaders, however, pledged their co-operation and loyalty to the Netherlands in which, they said, would not detract them from walking their path to freedom in constitutional and lawful religious foundation of Serikat-i-Islam (S.I.) shows how great was the hold of religion in the early part of this century, as far as a political party deriving its strength from its religious appeal could command very strong influence among the masses. Another factor contributing to the spectacular success of the Serikat-i-Islam was the leadership the party afforded in raising the voice of Indonesian nationalism against a small but economically strong Chinese minority in Indonesia which had won concessions from the Dutch Government of the East Indies. The strong support lent to the Serikat-i-Islam by the Javanese werakets and the religious leaders as against the Chinese monopoly exploitation of the trade interests immensely contributed to the success of this movement. 

movement. It had a religious-cum-economic appeal and in the field of religion its programme was not very much different from the Mohammadiyya, a socio-religious organisation formed in 1912. (The increased contact of the Indonesian Muslims with Egypt and Mecca brought them in touch with the Modernist movement led in Egypt by Mohammad Abduh.) What the Serikat-i-Islam and Mohammadiyya did was to adapt those modernist principles to the conditions in Indonesia. (Nationalism and Islam were not considered incompatible.) Islamic Law, it was held, was the only means to bring unity in the diversity of adat law prevailing in the country and which the Dutch were trying to preserve.6

The ever-growing popularity of the Serikat-i-Islam alarmed the Dutch Government. The rise of a religious-cum-political organisation was a threat to the integrity of the Government. But a direct hit against the party would be politically inexpedient. The Dutch Government, therefore, tried to encourage local antagonisms in various branches of the party. It also tried to foster discord between the central and local leadership of the party by a process of infiltration within its ranks. Moreover, the Dutch were afraid of the religious trend in the ranks of the Serikat-i-Islam. It was this trend that had contributed to a spirit of solid indigenous nationalism in the past. They, therefore, imposed several restrictions on Serikat-i-Islam and encouraged secularism and were at times rather indifferent to the nationalist activities of those parties that had purely secular basis.

To impart a secular basis to Indonesian nationalism, to propagate the ideals of racial equality and to promote

genuine understanding and co-operation among the Eurasians and the Indonesians a party known as "Indische Partei" was formed in 1912 at Bandung. Its motto was: "The Indies for those who make their home there." At its inception, the Government of Netherland East Indies did not think this party a threat to its authority but it was soon found that the persons behind this movement were ardent nationalists who challenged the exploitation of Indies by the Dutch. They propagated the ideal of Indonesian-Eurasian Union against the Dutch.

The pioneers of this ideal of nationalism were Dr. Douwes Dekker and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. The party was actually founded by Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesumo. The nationalism preached by the "Indische Partai" was a compromise between those who called themselves Indonesians by virtue of their birth and those who felt that they belonged merely to the Indonesian group but in fact were not Indonesians in their outlook. This party intensified the propaganda campaign against the Dutch regime in a revolutionary manner. Its leaders brought home to their people the need of putting up a joint front to meet the aggressors, who were accused of having inflicted countless injustices on the native population through the past three centuries. (The Dutch Government of East Indies was soon enraged at this propaganda and exiled its three top-ranking leaders and banned the Nationale Indische Partai (National Indies Party).

The Indische was not based only on the support from any indigenous group of people but included besides Eurasians, some semi-Indonesian elements like Europeans other than of Dutch origin and some people from


other countries such as China, who lacked the fervour required for building up a common nationalistic heritage. The party members soon exhibited separatist tendencies. As a result of this non-homogeneity in outlook, the party could not gather sufficient support of the masses. Its principal backbone were a handful of educated men of the indigenous Indonesian section of the people, and a large section of the non-Indonesians. That was the main reason of this party losing ground soon after its creation in 1912.

The firm attitude adopted by the East Indies Government towards the "Big Three" of the Indische led, however, to the growth of the feelings of nationalism among the masses, on whom the deportation of the three leaders had a sentimental effect. There was a demand in various circles for an organisation which should be more broad-based than the Indische. Most of the old rank and file of the Indische then joined another party 'Insulinde'. This party which was also consisted of mostly the Europeans and the Eurasian could not command support among the Indonesian masses.

This movement of national independence under the auspices of the Insulinde, from the very beginning, under the influence of Douwes Dekker, was inclined towards Marxism. There were, however, a number of trade union organisations long before the regular foundation of the Insulinde or even the Indische. There was a trade union of the Railway Workers formed in 1905 by the name of S.S. Bond. Also in 1908, a militant trade union organisation of the railway workers known as VSTP (Verenigingen Van Spooran Tram Personnel). But these trade union organisations were far from being called nation-wide as they were too limited in their scope of activity.  


11. cf. De Partai Kommunis Indonesia, De Stem Van Moskou (The Communist Party of Indonesia, the mouthpiece of
The movement of Insulinde was just two years old in 1916 when this drift towards Marxism became more clearly manifest when from the Netherlands some staunch leaders of the Social Democratic Labour Party had arrived in Indonesia. They furnished a new and vigorous leadership to those who were in some way influenced by Marxism. Among the most prominent of these socialists were Hendrik Sneevlit, Brandsteder and N.W. Dekker. Sneevlit established a political organization known as Indische Social Democraatsche Vereening (East Indies Social Democratic Federation) or the V.I.S.B. in May 1914 at Semarang. This party brought the Indonesian and Dutch socialist revolutionary leaders together with the sole purpose of spreading Marxism among the workers in Indonesia.

The birth of trade union activity in Indonesia in the early 20th Century was due to the setting up of such industries as rubber, sugar, railways, etc. The impact of western ideas and the anti-colonial feelings led to the integration of working classes on a common platform. The new party did not confine its activities to trade union but also adopted the creed of nationalism in order to carry popular appeal.

Even the leadership by such persons as Sneevlit and Brandsteder could not turn the N.I.S.B.V. into a mass organization. Most of the leaders of this party were Dutch and could not win the support of Indonesians. The radical Marxists of the N.I.S.B.V., therefore, thought of the idea of infiltration into the ranks of the Jurahat or Islam which commanded a great influence among the masses. That again shows how strong was the hold of religion on the masses that even the Communists had to make a pact with a political-religious organization, as without a religious appeal they could not win any support.
The Dutch East Indies Government also seeks to have encouraged this as in this way a lively opposition to the Serikat-1-Islam would be formed within the organisation itself, nullifying its nationwide appeal of political emancipation. By 1917 most of the branches of the Serikat-1-Islam were controlled by the M.I.S.D.V. and their 'religion-cloaked' propaganda successfully penetrated the uncritical section of the Indonesian population. The October 1917 revolution in Russia emboldened the M.I.S.D.V. leaders in Indonesia to step up their activity and had to adopt themselves to the peculiar conditions, which did not exist in European countries. This 'peculiar condition' in Indonesia meant infiltration in a religious organization.

In 1917 the MISDV through some of its members who had joined the Serikat-1-Islam, with the sole object of forming an opposition party therein and to control the organization ultimately, became a direct threat to the solidarity of that party. The party-leaders, therefore, were forced to discard their old co-operative policy with the Dutch. The programme of the Serikat-1-Islam was now becoming increasingly socialist. In the Congress of the Serikat-1-Islam held at Djakarta in October 1918, an opposition to the general Serikat-1-Islam policies was led by the young MISDV leader Samoen, who later on became an important leader of the Communist party of Indonesia (C.P.I.). So strong was the opposition that the Right Wing of the Serikat-1-Islam had to take a very open stand against the Dutch Government. The then Chairman of the Serikat-1-Islam Tjokroaminoto demanded important social reforms in the country, which if not introduced by the Government, the S.I. would bring about itself. The MISDV

faction was not satisfied at this and wanted more radical undertaking by the Serikat-i-Islam. 15

Smaesen who led the left wing of the Serikat-i-Islam was soon popular among the workers and trade unions of the country. Smaesen's party from its very beginning worked on Marxian principles and attacked Serikat-i-Islam on account of its co-operative attitude towards the Dutch through its participation in the "Volksraad" or the Central Legislative Organisation working under the aegis of the Dutch administration.

As leader of the opposition, Smaesen soon established his position in the labour circles of Indonesia. He became leader of the Railway Labour Association (V.S.T.P) and won a number of followers whose policies corroborated with his own principles. The most prominent among his followers were Barsono and Alimin. On the one hand, they fought the Dutch Government on the lines of the teachings of Karl Marx and, on the other, they spared no efforts to undermine the authority of the Serikat-i-Islam in Indonesia. They always preached non-cooperation with the Dutch regime. 16


Party serves as a fertile ground for the spread of Communism. The disgruntled semi-intellectuals, the unemployed and distressed millions can easily fall prey to any promise of good living in the future. Indonesia, as such, after the World War I, was an ideal place for the growth of the Marxist ideology. With the peasantry and labour beginning under the tyranny and oppression of the Dutch, the archipelago was a clay ready for a Communist slogan to be given any shape. "Never before were the people so eager to follow a leader who promised them a life free from woe and fear." 17

15. See Mahan Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 1-10.
17. Ibid.
The MNSDV exploited this situation to the best of their ability and, on account of their influence in the ranks of the Serikat-i-Islam harnessed all their resources to spread the tenets of Marxism.

The Dutch Government took a very serious view of the Communist Movement in Indonesia and particularly after their heightened revolutionary activity in various parts of Europe. Smevliit was arrested in 1918 and forced to leave Indonesia and a similar fate befell Bekker and other Dutch Social Democratic leaders, working in Indonesia. The work of these leaders of Marxist thought in Indonesia, was continued by their Indonesian lieutenants, Smaoen, Alimin, Tan Malaka and Darsono. These leaders, seeing their ultimate failure in having a complete hold on all branches of the Serikat-i-Islam in Indonesia, which, of course, had tremendously grown strong in influence, decided to set up a Communist party of their own. The old deliteseent policy of M.I.S.D.V. was discarded and the party now came into open and styled itself as Perserikatan Komunis di Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia) or using the abbreviated form PKI, and Smaoen was elected its first Chairman, in a session of the party held at Semarang on 23rd May, 1920.19

The decision to withdraw from the Serikat-i-Islam altogether in 1921 was preceded once again by a solid attempt by the Communists to control the organisation. In the session of the Congress of the Serikat-i-Islam held in October 1921 Smaoen and Tan Malaka wanted the struggle of the party to be carried on class rather than on religious lines. Hadji Agus Salim took up the challenge and...

18. Kahint Nationalism and Revolution, op.cit., p.73.
supported the motion of Andul Moees that no member of the Serikat-i-Islam could hold simultaneously membership in another party. He further said that the Communists wanted the party to be run on the basis of class struggle and that the Holy Prophet of Islam had advocated a socialist pattern of economy long before the birth of Marxian economics. 20 His motion was carried and consequently all the Communist members decided for rupture with the Serikat-i-Islam.

The withdrawal of some Communist leaders of the Central Serikat-i-Islam did not in any way mean the suspension of Communist influence in the local branches of the party, a large number of which were still held under local Communist leadership. There was on many occasions a rift in the central and local leadership of the Serikat-i-Islam. In the centre, the influential leaders like Hadji Agus Salim were in favour of parliamentary tactics whereas the local branches were in favour of strikes and other revolutionary means. A purge of the organisation was undertaken and all undesirable left wings members were expelled from the party. A new party was formed in 1923 by dissolving the old S.I., and it was named P3IX (Partai Serikat-i-Islam, Indonesia). 21

The dissident leftist element also formed an other party known as Serikat Rakjat Merah (Red Organisation of the People). The cleavage was now evident. This new party of the Communists using frequently the name of Islam, made a common cause with the CPI whereas the P3IX had new a less troublesome road to traverse and had now a unified policy based on the principles of Islam. This Muslim

organisation continued to draw a good deal of mass support on account of its politico-religious appeal. The deep influence of Samacon among the Trade Unions served as a big asset to the Communists. The Railroad Employees Union and many other labour organizations worked at the behest of the Communist Party and the work was started on revolutionary lines. Since 1917, strikes had broken out time and again in all parts of Indonesia. There was a strike in the State's pawn shops in 1922 and in the subsequent year there was similar strike by the Transport Employees throughout Java. It was the first general uprising of the Communists motivated to capture power.

The Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies took stern measures against the insurgents similar to those adopted by the Government of India in the Rowlatt Act, Acts in the years 1919 to 1922. The East Indies Government restricted the rights of demonstration of public assemblies and of strikes. The ring-leader of the 1922 Communist disturbances - Samacon - was arrested and deported to Simeang Kupang. Similarly, many other Communist leaders were arrested and put behind bars. 22

The repression of the Communist party by the Dutch and the early deportation of the Dutch Communist leaders like Sneevlit from Indonesia brought the PKI into very high esteem among the people, who saw in this party a true nationalist sentiment personified. The matter did not end here. The post-war economic depression in the world had its repercussions in Indonesia. There was a wave of labour unrest from 1922 onwards. At the beginning of 1923 as a consequence of the curtailment in the number of personnel employed in various industries there arose.

a state of tension. The resistance spirit fanned by Communist leaders such as Samacen were more strongly noticeable with the Trade Union of Railways and Tram workers. After the arrest of Samacen in 1922, on account of participation in anti-government agitation of 1922, a revolt broke out in 1923 at Semarang, and a strike of railway workers which spread to Medan and Surabaya. In 1925 the peak of the strike movement was reached. At a conference in Djakarta in December 1924, the directives were proclaimed which had been decided upon in the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924 and also at the Congress in Canton in that year. The PKI got in touch with all the Communist revolutionary movements in Asia and several leaders went to the extent of saying that mere strikes were not sufficient and a regular revolutionary organisation should be set up which should be divided into groups of 10 persons each. This corresponded entirely with the opinions that were uttered at the Fifth Comintern Congress. An article published by Samacen, who had participated in that Congress, in the "Panda Merah" (The Red Leader) demanded that the point of view of Lenin that the struggle against capitalism must lead to popular revolt.

As a result of this policy violent clashes took place between the Communists and the Dutch administration. There was a general flare up in Java in the year 1926, and the uprising had to be quelled with the help of Dutch bayonets. The uprising spread to Sumatra and the Communist-inspired nationalists occupied several points in Java and Sumatra. It was in fact a nationalist uprising meant to put an end to foreign rule.

This movement was so severe in character that the


24. Ibid.
Netherlands Government had to confer special powers on the Governor-General to cope with the "opposing forces of rebellion". According to the new powers vested in him the Governor-General could put any person behind bars on mere suspicion. The system of summary trials was introduced and the Governor-General dealt out an iron hand to all those who, in his Government's view, were likely to endanger public peace and tranquility. According to the information furnished in the Dutch Government record, over 4,000 Communist workers sent to Upper Digul in New Guinea, as a mark of punishment. Some of them were even hanged.

The Communist leaders have admitted the failure of this movement and have attributed it to the dissensions within the party and to some basic ideological misunderstanding. D.N. Aidit the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Indonesia, says:

"The basic mistake of the CPI leaders at that time was that they had fallen prey to leftist slogans, that they did not endeavour to explain the situation, that they wanted to solve all problems at one blow—liquidate feudalism, free the country of the Dutch, small-all-imperialists, overthrow the reactionary Government, liquidate the rich peasants and liquidate the national bourgeoisie. Of course, the result of all this was that unity grew between the real enemies and they were aroused into opposing the party."

Due to its intense "left-wing activity" the party soon lost the tremendous influence that it wielded once among the working class people of Indonesia. Moreover,


the breach with the religious section of the S.I. had made this movement unpopular and the people branded instaneously as 'irreligious', 'ungodly' and 'un-Islamic' as compared to the main faction of the S.I. which now called itself as PSII. However, the early union of the Marxists with the S.I. in 1914 lent to the development of tradition among the Indonesian Communists in particular to adopt some religious basis for their propaganda. It was the inheritance of this early idea that in the last general election in 1955 in Indonesia the Communists had on many occasions "used the slogan of Islam" as a vote-catching tactic.

The failure of the June 1926 revolution was attributed by the Communists to the lack of unanimity and coordination among the party workers. D.N. Aidit states:

"Apart from this, there were also such people as Tan Malaka, at that time a leader of the C.P.I., who did not take resolute action prior to the revolt but condemned it after it had been broken out. More than that, he and his clique openly adopted Trotskyite practices by setting up a new party, the PAPAK (Indonesian Republican Party) in a situation when the CPI was faced with the white terror of the colonial Government and its lackeys. This split in the CPI made its work, already difficult as it was, even more difficult and helped the disruptive policies of the Dutch within the CPI and in the national independence movement in general." 29

28. Ibid.

Before Mr. Aidit, Alim and Musso had levelled the same charge against Tan Malaka. Tan Malaka, on the other hand, denied his part in the decision to specify the time for revolution. According to him, the date for revolution was most ill-timed and without any deep prior thought. Musso and Alim had decided the matter beforehand without consulting Tan Malaka. He even went to the extent of exerting his influence to dissuade the masses from taking part in the struggle. In his small booklet Massa Actie published in 1926 from Singapore before the revolution Tan Malaka expounded the reasons under which the time was not yet ripe for a struggle against the imperialism and capitalism in Indonesia. But Moscow's decision on the particular situation in Indonesia does not seem to have been communicated to the CPI Leaders in time. The decision for action had been taken by Muso and Alim in the line of the directive of the 5th Comintern Congress. But in any case there are far less reasons to conclude that there was absolutely no understanding existing between the Comintern leadership and the Communist leaders in Indonesia. There seems to be sound grounds to believe that both the leaders at Moscow and in Indonesia, instead of an open confession of their failure to understand the true nature of the state of affairs in Indonesia, have sought to put the entire blame of the failure on Tan Malaka.

Tan Malaka held that his view on revolution seemed to synchronise with that of the Comintern. The Comintern leadership is reported to have held according to the

31. Tan Malaka: op.cit. Professor Kahin concludes that the reaction of Moscow on the matter of the revolution in Indonesia was never made public. That further tends to strengthen the above conclusion. See George McT Kahin: Nationalism and Revolution, op.cit., p.83.
32. D.N. Aidit, op.cit., p.7
Communist documents published much later, that the CPI in collaboration with Partai Rakjat should try to win over the mass support otherwise it will reduce itself to the position of a sect and not a mass organisation. For the time being, according to Tan Malaka, as also according to Comintern the masses in Indonesia were not ready for the struggle. In the general report to the 5th CPI National Congress in March 1954 the causes of the failure of the revolution in 1926 have been attributed to the fact that:

"The party was still completely unaware of the need for uniting with national bourgeoisie, in which the party's slogan was 'socialism now', Indonesian Soviets and dictatorship of the proletariat. This 'left' deviation of the party was criticised exactly and correctly by J.V. Stalin in his speech before the students of the University of the Peoples of the East on May 18, 1925, in which he said that this left deviation contained within it the danger of isolating the party from the masses and converting it into a sect."33

The failure of the Communist sponsored revolution led to the channelisation of the Indonesian freedom movement in a different and moderate direction. On June 4, 1927, Soekarno founded at Bandung the Partai Nasional Indonesia, or the PNI. At its initial stages it was sponsored and supported by the members of the Bandung Study Club. Soekarno and his colleagues had the examples of the political parties in various Asian countries. This party was based on the principle of Free Indonesia. Among the aims and objects of this party was introduced the social and economic amelioration of the people of Indonesia besides the political struggle for independence. The party, as far as its membership was concerned increased in numbers and influence among the masses at its inception.
Soekarno strove to contact the intelligentsia of the country and the Indonesian student community abroad and carried on in this way relentless propaganda within and outside Indonesia. The young Soekarno was well aware of the fact that the social and economic uplift of the masses was as necessary as the political growth. There should be an equitable blending of all these factors in order to bring out an healthy society. The response accorded by the people was very favourable and especially the oratorical skill of Soekarno attracted a large following for this party, which within a very short time after its foundation became the largest political party in Indonesia. Gradually, members from other parties such as Boedi Otoemo, Serikat-i-Rajkat and the Study Club founded in 1924 joined the ranks of PNI.

A federation of various national organisations was undertaken and the combined party was given the name of PPPKI (Permusfakatan Perhimpovnan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia) or the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties. These federating national organizations were PNI, PSII (Partai Serikat-i-Islam, Indonesia) Boedi Otoemo, Pascendan, Sumatra Bond and the Surabaya Study Club. 34

At the early stage the Dutch East Indies Government seemed to be more tolerant towards the formation of this nationalist organization, but this toleration proved short-lived as the anti-Government tone of this party soon alarmed the administration and earned its disfavour. 35

The PPKI launched country-wide efforts to seek popular support of the people in the struggle for independence. Immediately on its birth it demanded the abolition

34. Blumberger: De Nationalische Beweging, op.cit., pp.206-44
of the concentration camp of Upper Digul which was brought into existence during the days of the Communist revolt in the year 1927.\(^{36}\)

The Government arrested the leader of the National Freedom Movement, Bung Karno, in the year 1929 and also some other leaders thinking that activities of the PPKI would come to a standstill and the national struggle for independence come to an end. A wave of arrests of all national minded people was followed and Bung Soekarno was interned for four years.\(^{37}\) The popular reaction against the Dutch high-handedness became more bitter, and pressed by the vehement popular disapproval of their action, the East Indies Government was compelled to release Soekarno after the expiry of only two years of his sentence.

The process of the merging together of various political elements into one compact political party PPKI led to the emergence of a dissident group which sought the re-emergence of the defunct PNI. This opposition group called itself 'Golongan Merdeka' (Independent group). The followers of this group formed a political party during the period of Soekarno's internment, known as Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia or the PNI taking the original abbreviation of the defunct Partai Nasional Indonesia. On his release Bung Soekarno condemned the efforts of some leaders to spread seeds of disunion among the ranks of the PPKI. The efforts of the Golongan Merdeka in fact led to the complete dissolution of the PPKI and the emergence of two new parties - PNI (Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia) as mentioned above and

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36. For a general discussion on the role of the parties at this period see Paul Kattenburg: Political Alignments in Indonesia, Far Eastern Survey, September 25, 1944. Also Kennedy Raymond: op. cit. May 29, 1945.

37. Arrest was made in December 1929, but trial took place much later in September 1930, and three years
the Partai Indonesia or better known as Partindo. On his release Soekarno noticed the urgency of joining one of the two groups and he preferred the latter. The Partindo, which had now Soekarno as its Chairman, soon grew rapidly in strength and within about two years, after existence had at least 20,000 members in 1933. 38

Meanwhile, Dr. Hatta who had all along been carrying on in the Netherlands an intense propaganda for the liberation of his country while he was there as a student, returned to his country in the year 1932 along with Sjahrir. Immediately on their return, Hatta and Sjahrir became associated with the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia and Hatta soon became its Chairman and Sjahrir as Secretary. Sjahrir at that time used to edit Daulat Rakjat, a periodical of independent nationalist views from Djakarta. Sultan Sjahri was also one of the most prominent leaders of the Federation of Trade Unions in Indonesia. Both these leaders considered the various problems dispassionately and had identical views on the task confronting the party. 39

The fundamental difference between the two groups was mainly one of practice rather than of ideology. Both had the same motive Merdeka or the liberation of Indonesia from the foreign yoke.

The partindo actually believed in getting mass support and to outright struggle against the Dutch. The P.N.I. leadership was mostly apprehensive of the designs of the Dutch Government and wanted the creation of a compact organisation of the Party. It required a longer process of educating the masses and/strong leadership in the struggle of independence. The very name of the PNI(Pendidkan)

Nasional Indonesia) indicated that it modelled its entire programme on education and a process of steady growth in the structure of its organisation. 40

The East Indies Government adopted repressive measures against all the nationalist movements. In the year 1934 the Government arrested the "Big Three" of the two Nationalist Movements, i.e., Soekarno, Hatta and Sjahrir, besides, a number of other leaders. The three leaders were exiled to the concentration camp at Digul in New Guinea. Later on, Hatta and Sjahrir were transferred to Boska island where they remained interned for several years and came only with the break of the war in the Far East in 1941.

The long term of imprisonment undergone by the leaders and the ruthless policy adopted by the Dutch towards the nationalist sentiments had given a great set-back to the struggle against Dutch imperialism, but the ideal of the fight for freedom could not be suppressed by any high-handedness.

Soon after the arrest of the nationalist leaders another party, the Perni (Indonesian Muslim Party) with almost the same views as the other nationalist parties grew in strength and very soon gained a great popular support. The Government, which was already alarmed, could not wait and see the activities of this party develop further. In the year 1935 its leaders, Iljas Yaqoob, Najj Duchtar Lutfi and others were arrested and sent to Digul. 41

In the same year, under the leadership of Dr. Soetomo, a party known as P.B.I. (Partai Bangsa Indonesia) soon came to be known called itself Panindra. 42 This party had Dr. Soetomo as Chairman and its line of action was the struggle for independence by working as a constitutional opposition to the Government. This group participated in.

40. Ibid.
the Volkeract, the Dutch Indies representative body.

There were at that time some people in Indonesia who held that to attain freedom through open rebellion was futile; hence they suggested the adoption of constitutional means to achieve their end. A party known as "Partai Indonesia Raja" was formed with this object. This again worked on the lines of the Panindra.

So much for the history of the national struggle prior to the outbreak of the Japanese war. The struggle was given a great boost with the emergence of Japan as a major Asiatic Power. The myth of the invincibility of the West was shattered, and fresh hopes had come for the people of Indonesia for their future. During the Dutch regime they were subjected to intense anti-European propaganda by Japan, and they were told that with the arrival of Japan their lost, brain-out miseries would instantaneously come to an end. This was the main reason why Indonesians lent unstinted support to Japan in the beginning.

The friendly attitude towards Japan in Indonesia developed mostly due to the Dutch colonial rule. A little before Indonesia was overrun by the Japanese, the leaders in Indonesia demanded a representative Government based on the will of the people. The persistent refusal of the Dutch to meet this spirit of the time led to the final collapse of their power in the Indies. This is how a Dutch scholar gives his impression:

"The (Dutch) Government as late as the outbreak of the Second World War, entertained not to the slightest notion of altering the basic subordinate position of a colony to mother country. These, to name but a few were the grievances, which no number of asphalt roads, tiled roofs, hygienic

43. G.H. Bosquet: op.cit., p.25.
services, or adat law codes could alleviate.\textsuperscript{44}

The Dutch refused to face the situation even during the course of the World War, when their authority was supplemented by the rule of Japan. They never could entertain the idea that their rule would terminate and held that after the defeat of Japan they would once again have their hold on Indonesia and restore their colonial rule. The Indonesian freedom movement did already exist before the Japanese overrun the archipelago. The Japanese had exploited the situation and created more bitterness in the Indonesian mind against the Dutch. But the seed of distrust and hatred was sown by the Dutch due to their miscalculation of the popular opinion in Indonesia and by their unwillingness to make any concessions.

The advent of Japan early in 1942 changed the whole political perspective in Indonesia. The weak and niggardly defence put up by the Dutch in World War II against Japan lowered their position considerably in the eyes of the Indonesians. The long nourished hatred against the Dutch led to a widespread jubilation among most of the Indonesians at the victory of an Asian power against an imperialist foe. The Japanese, in order to win the sympathies of the people, allowed the display of the red and white national flag of Indonesia and also the singing of the national anthem, Indonesia Raya, both of which were forbidden during the Dutch regime.

Prior to the World War II Japan had considerably progressed in the fields of trade and commerce and had also built herself strong militarily. Many Japanese had before the war used to come to Indonesia in pursuit of trade or for other minor vocations. This small group of Japanese indulged in ceaseless pro-Japanese propaganda a

\textsuperscript{44} Justus Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Revolution in Retrospect," \textit{World Politics}, April, 1951."
together with their anti-colonial and particularly anti-Dutch tone strived for the construction of a co-prosperity sphere in East Asia. They also preached the industrial and financial prowess of Japan underlying the idea of the Co-Prosperity Sphere and made out the notion that if the Indonesians accepted the sovereignty of Japan their condition would improve.\footnote{45}

March 5, 1942, was a momentous day, when the peace-loving Indonesians, who had not tasted the pangs of warfare for a long time past, heard the roar of the Japanese guns in the vicinity of their metropolis. Soon afterwards at about 11 in the morning the city of Batavia (now known as Djakarta) was declared an open city and the denizens of the town witnessed the entry of the Japanese soldiers, carrying banners with various slogans as \textit{Satu Warna} (one colour) Satu Bangsa (one people) and \textit{Hidup Asia Raja} (long live Great Asia) inscribed thereon. The Indonesians welcomed the victorious army. Under the stress of the intense pro-Japanese propaganda they had thought of the dawn of their day of independence. But it was just a mirage. Very soon the Indonesian realised the significance of the Japanese rule. The old slogan stressing common ties with Indonesia was dispensed with and instead the role of Japan as the leader of Asia began to be stressed. The \textit{modus operandi} of the Japanese administration was to introduce Japanese culture and to stress its superiority through the process of indoctrination among the Indonesian masses. The section of the Japanese police Kempeitai created a record of inflicting mental and physical tortures of all those for whom they entertained slight suspicion. The greatest consideration of the Japanese military administration was winning the war and all political and cultural requirements were made subordinate to this end.\footnote{46}

\footnote{W.H. Bilsborough: \textit{Japan's Role in South East Asian Nationalist Movement}, New York, 1953.}
Soon after the entry of Japan in 1942 strong anti-Japanese feelings developed. The youth particularly reacted very violently against this new mode of Japanese exploitation and there occurred small-scale riots against the new regime. The rapidly growing antipathy among the Indonesians against Japan alarmed the Government and they thought of making a compromise with the Indonesian national movement led by Soekarno and Hatta, whom the Japanese released from imprisonment soon after their arrival in the archipelago. This compromise they wanted to use to maintain their hold on Indonesia and to seek Indonesian assistance for the Japanese war efforts.\(^4\)\(^7\)

The Indonesian leaders were fully conscious of the strangulating effect of the Japanese occupation but they also faced hard realities. Any opposition to Japan would mean jeopardising the cause of struggle for independence as the tyrannical nature of this rule hardly tolerated any opposition. Japan wanted some compromise by giving some latitude to the nascent spirit of independence in return, for cooperation in war efforts. The Indonesian leaders accepted this compromise also under the feeling that the Dutch had kept Indonesia completely ignorant in the fields of administration, public finance, technical skill and other beneficent activities of the state and left to themselves they may not be able to run the administration properly. The path of compromise was better. The Japanese created an indigenous Indonesian army to assist them in their war efforts. This army known as Peta actually proved the forerunner for the Tentara Indonesia or the Indonesian Army of the Republic at a later stage.

For Indonesia, it was a new phase of struggle for independence. The three top leaders decided to work in close collaboration. Soekarno and Hatta were to work with the Japanese and remain above ground, whereas

\(^4\)\(^7\) Ibid, p.79.
Sjaehir would go underground and keep in touch with the underground nationalist movement led by Sjarifuddin and Mangankusumo. Soekarno and Hatta were to be in touch with the underground and keep them informed of what transpired in the Japanese camp. The Dutch and Russian propaganda during the war and after ascribed to Soekarno the charge of having acted as a close collaborator of the Axis powers. This charge also directly and indirectly contained hints against Hatta. Gradually this charge lost ground and was finally dropped. Dr. Van Hook, who was the Governor General of East Indies in 1948, stated about Soekarno: "From documents later discovered it is very clear that in all his objectionable activities, he was always governed by the objective of an independent Indonesia." All the available record indicates that Soekarno, like most of the other Indonesians, from the outset regarded the Japanese rule as brutal and fascist. But there was certainly a misjudgment on the part of Soekarno to realize that the end of the fascist powers especially of Japan, could be very clearly in sight.

On the other hand, as a staunch nationalist, he was sentimentally against the concept of western imperialism which he had tasted a bitter fruit in the sharp feeling of Colonialism. Obsessed by his anti-imperialist stand, he thought that the might of Japan may ultimately be victorious or at least may not be very easily the near future. He nevertheless fully realized the new Japanese colonialism but understood that nationalist colleagues thought it for the moment to compromise national independence.

-70-
Government and he never concealed his antipathy to the rule of Japan. He nevertheless also collaborated with Japan, as a measure of expediency, under the advice of his other colleagues, including Sjahrir, who was working underground. He had a firm realisation of the ultimate victory of the Allies. Being educated in Europe and having lived there for long, Hatta had a deeper academic understanding of the political and economic problems and his estimate of the situation became true ultimately. Thus Sjahrir says of him: "He acquitted himself of these tasks (entrusted to him by the liberal movement) capably and faithfully. He also received our reports and warned us when he heard something was brewing on the Japanese side." The Japanese, when they became aware of the fact at a later date that Hatta did have some connections with the underground at one time wanted also to arrest him. But this arrest did not take place under some expediency better known to the Japanese Headquarters in Tokyo.

In fact the Japanese wanted Indonesians' cooperation for their war efforts and to placate the nationalist opinion they announced the formation of a nation-wide organisation for political activities known as Bukan Tenaga Rakjat (Centre of People's power) or PUTERA. But these political activities were under the strict Japanese control and the nationalist cause was allowed to be propagated only as a corollary to the assistance to the war efforts of Japan by the people of Indonesia. A Japanese announcement in June, 1943 had stated that the formation of PUTERA was to be a prelude to the establishment of self-government by the Indonesians themselves, and the following were selected to form a board to head the PUTERA.

1. Soekarno Chairman.
2. Hatta Vice-Chairman.
3. Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, and

These leaders of PUTERA did help the Japanese in their war efforts, but, at the same time, they never forgot their objective to infuse into the mind of the people a strong sense of nationalism. In order to win their purpose and to please the Japanese the leaders had to make emotional appeals against western imperialism, which to most of the audience meant Dutch imperialism writ large. A strong anti-western feeling used to be instilled among the youth. Such speeches had the very important affect of uniting all elements on a common platform of nationalism. But politics and realities should go together. Emotional appeals are useful at a certain period of the history of a particular country when some object is to be achieved for which the creation of a strong sense of public opinion is essential but when the objective is achieved, a sense of realism should prevail. Especially in the field of politics this objective thinking is necessary. In the post-revolution period, among some sections of the people of Indonesia, we find the same sense of anti-western emotionalism, which to a considerable extent may be a legacy of this period.

Besides PUTERA the Japanese also organised various youth organisations to indoctrinate anti-west feelings among the masses and particularly among the lesser educated youth of the country. Mord often Soekarno, during the course of his anti-west tirades, used to express his feelings of nationalism in such a way that only the audience could understand that it was also directed against the Japanese. Such speeches generally passed over the heads of the Japanese heads of the Intelligence Department.52


Seeing that the PUTERA had gone farther in attaining the public sympathy than the Japanese had thought it should attain in order to assist the war effort they began to doubt its utility. This organisation was disbanded towards the end of 1943 under the orders of Japanese military administration. The Japanese now sought the support of the people on a religious basis. Muslim leaders became the object of special attention. A broad-based Muslim organisation was formed consisting of the Mohammadiyya, Mahadat al Ulama and many educated Muslims. This organisation was named Masjumi (The Majlis-i-Sjauro Muslimeen Indonesia), or the Indonesian Muslims Association. The purpose of this organisation was the same as of PUTERA, but the Muslim Leaders were conscious enough by their contact with the Japanese not to lend them a helping hand. In fact, the majority of them had already been outraged by the clumsy handling of the Mohammadan (Islamic) religion by the Japanese. The people being forced to bow towards Tokyo rather than Mecca and the exaltation of the Emperor on religious plane were particularly important in this respect. The antagonism towards the Japanese brought them to emphasise Indonesian independence above all else, and this was more frequently accompanied by anti-Japanese than anti-Allied overtones.53

During the brief period of Japanese rule in Indonesia all kind of political activity on the part of Indonesians was banned except in so far as it was imperative to promote the war efforts. All the organisations set up during this period were strictly controlled by the Japanese military administration in Indonesia. The politically conscious Indonesians had nothing left but to develop their activity through various underground channels. The compulsory enrolment of the Labour force known as "Romushas" and the

atrocities perpetrated against these labourers and particularly against women aroused deep antipathy against the rule of Japan. The largest of all the underground movements was the one led by Sutan Sjahrir, who was throughout optimistic about the final victory for the Allies against Japan. The other movement was led by Mohammad Natsir, an intelligent, shrewd and capable leader of the Majumi party. The part played by these leaders in the resistance movement against Japan contributed a good deal to arouse political consciousness among the people of Indonesia.54

The final defeat of Japan opened a new chapter in the Indonesia's struggle for freedom. In the following chapters we shall discuss the events after the fall of Japan, and following the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945.

54. Ibid., p. 108
CHAPTER IV
THE PARTY STRUCTURE IN INDONESIA
A BACKGROUND STUDY

With the dawn of independence, the new Indonesia was faced with the problem of implementing the principles of democracy in the framework of its constitution. The traditional outlook of the country, however, did not warrant a sudden shift from a highly centralized administration with no popular responsibility to constitutionalism implying a government responsible to the people. The task was still more difficult in view of the prevailing administrative chaos following the defeat of Japan. The peculiar political and economic situation following World War II had necessitated a strong and authoritarian arm of the Government, but the sudden shift from the colonial rule to independence led to a lacuna among the masses who had thought independence as being identical with a licence to do whatever they liked. The task for responsible Government was very difficult. The system of government that the Republic inherited from the Dutch left little scope for democracy. The leaders of the young Republic had therefore to adjust to an immense task of ideological reorientation.1

Hence when considering the party system in Indonesia, this background of political chaos must be taken into account. The primary stage of democratic evolution in the country as compared to the high degree in which the democratic principles are practised in countries like the United States of America and Great Britain implies that the parties of Indonesia have a different status as compared to those in some of the highly advanced democratic countries. However, in spite of this we find that the political parties in Indonesia were not based entirely on personalities ignoring all principles. The

1 of, "Crisis and Ideals", Indonesian Affairs, January, 1952.
The preparatory committee by the proclamation of a personality did count greatly as it was natural in the days of August 17, divided the whole of Indonesia into early days after the revolution, but it is an exaggeration to hold with Charles Wolf Jr., that there was no other appeal form, Middle Java (Java Tengah), East Java (Java Timur) but that of personalities.

With the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia (the Netherlands) and the Lesser Sunda Islands (Sunda Kelim), the foremost problem was the determination of the nature of the President immediately appointed governors for those of the new state. Free Indonesia had now come into existence and the political activity in the country was no longer to be controlled by a foreign power. The day of August 17, dissolved the Independence Preparatory constitutional of the Republic drawn up in a hurried way. In its place established National Committees towards the last months of the Japanese rule and Indonesia. The Central Indonesian National Committee was formed on August 31, 1945, guaranteed a republican form of government for the country. The KNPJ_P, as forerunner, stated: "The independence of Indonesia is consecrated in the constitution of the IndonesianRepublic, the sovereignty of which is vested in the people."

Before the constitution of the new Republic was adopted as Independence Preparatory Committee was set up on August 7, 1945, "to make preliminary arrangements for the coming into" of the republican administration. This committee consisted of the following members: (i) President, (ii) Vice-President and (iii) Secretary. The committee nominated Soekarno and Hatta as President and Vice-President respectively. It further nominated the Commission of seven members authorized to make necessary changes in the draft provisional constitution. Accordingly, with the recommendation of this committee, and after the approval of Soekarno, the first Cabinet was set up in accordance with the provisions of the newly drafted and revised constitution. This cabinet besides others contained Sunan Aji Bakti, Subardjo, and Soerjojo, of KNPJ (being nominated by the President), made the presidential cabinet.

The nature of the KNIP, consisting of 135 members, made it rather too unwieldy to function in its advisory capacity especially in administrative matters. It was, therefore, ordered by the President, in his decree of October 18, that a new representative body to the KNIP from its own members should be constituted which should remain in permanent session. This representative body shall be known as Badan Pekardja or the Working Committee responsible to its parent body KNIP. The Working Committee consisted of the leaders like Sjahrrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, who had worked actively for the revolution.6

This Working Committee membership was selected particularly with the motive of providing representation to those underground workers of the revolution, who could not otherwise be given their due share in administration. The early members of the Working Committee were socialist in outlook and wanted the reorientation of the society on these lines. They were mostly apprehensive of persons that according to them incidentally or otherwise had come to power. Sjahrrir says:

"Having made certain the true nature of our struggle (which is socialist) it is obvious that our revolution must be led by a democratic group with revolutionary ideas, and not by a nationalist clique which is for ever serving one or another faction, whether it is Dutch Colonial fascist or Japanese military fascism." 7

It may be seen by the nature of the revolution that the true representative form of Government based on popular elections and party-system could not be evolved. There was practically no party formed in the days of Japanese rule and whichever parties were in existence in the pre-Japanese days had no trace of them left except memories. There was nevertheless a seething spirit of independence among the people and the glow of it was visible in the success of the revolution. The independence was won not by any party

6. Ibid.
nor by any one leader single-handedly but it was personification of the combined will of the people. The leaders, Soekarno, Hatta and others, including members of the KNIP were successful engineers of revolution, and took over the reins of administration in the new republic, with no formal verdict of the people as a result of national elections. They were nevertheless the conscience-bearers of the nation, and the nation's will was behind them when they assumed power.

The Preparatory Committee, in its short period of existence tried to introduce the parliamentary form of Government and established the Partai Nasional Indonesia or the PKI. But such an attempt was bound to be interpreted by the people as the formulation of a political party under the aegis of the Government which would be tantamount to the party being dubbed as an official party. It was against the spirit of parliamentary democracy. The party was, therefore, dissolved within a few days of its existence.

The pattern of the KNIP and the Working Committee (Badan Pekerdja) under the triple-guidance of Soekarno, Hatta and Sjahrir provided a leadership that commanded prestige and respect among the people. This leadership was badly needed at a critical time when the authority of the Republic was face to face with a serious situation as a result of the Dutch attempts to strangle the Republic at its inception and, secondly, on account of the activities of the extreme leftist group of Communists led by Tan Malaka to remove Soekarno and Hatta and set up a Government of their own pattern.8

The Working Committee soon after coming into existence assumed a new constitutional role by recommending some checks on the almost unlimited powers of the President. The principles of parliamentary democracy were already recognised.

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8. See Kahini Nationalism and Revolution, op.cit., p. 148-152.
consisted of two groups: one of Amir Sjarifuddin known as PSI (Partai Socialis Indonesia) and the other of Sjahbir known as Partai Dahmat (Russia's Party). This united party had Dr. Sjahbir as its leader and equal control by PSI and Nasjirat. The contributions of Dinji in and Amir Sjarifuddin towards the struggle for the extension of the partai socialis popular one. The main strength for this party were mainly the young, but all ethnic, who had a wider outlook on national and international problems. Its programme was social reform, and like the two major parties PSI and Nasjirat, it considered the preservation of independence as its primary objective. There were also the Communists who formed an influential group within Parliament and outside.

This composite party structure continued with their representation in the unicameral parliament (KNIP) with the number of the members of each party varying from time to time till the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the federal state known as the R.U.S.I. (Republic of the United States of Indonesia) on December 27, 1949. The members of the parliament of the first Republic were nominated by the President through a decree and it was originally held that the single-chamber parliament of the Republic shall only be a provisional one pending general elections in the country. The machinery of election was not provided for in the constitution but the President through a decree in the middle of November 1945 had proclaimed that general elections shall be held as soon as possible and the machinery for that shall be provided by the interim KNIP or the House of Representatives.10

By 1949, the Badan Perekorda (the Working Committee of the KNIP) of the Republic had passed a law setting out a procedure of a system of elections based on the principle

of proportional representation and universal franchise—
All persons above 18 years of age shall be entitled to
vote. A central election office was also established. The
election-machinery, though provided in the legislation,
could not function on account of the prevailing insecurity
in the country and because of the struggle for survival
going on against the Dutch.\textsuperscript{11}

In the meantime, fresh developments were taking shape.
The Dutch had agreed to transfer authority to a federal
body known as the RUSI on December 27, 1949, in which the
Republic of Indonesia was to be a single unit besides 15
others, which were created by the Dutch to outbalance the
Republic with its headquarters at Jogjakarta. Whereas the
Republic originally had a single-chamber legislature,
the R.U.S.I. was to have a bicameral one.

The lower house of the new federal legislature
consisted of 150 members (50 from the Republic and the
other 100 were to be chosen by the remaining 15 states).
There was also a Senate consisting of 32 members taken on
the basis of two from each state. In this way the original
composition of the legislature was shaken up and with that
the membership of various parties in the legislature also
changed.\textsuperscript{12}

The unitary state for the whole of Indonesia came
into existence on August 17, 1950 in place of the federal,
one and with that the federal legislature also became
unicameral instead of the bicameral one. The Badan Pemerata
of the old Republic, including its legislature was no more,
nor was the original Parliament left anywhere except for a
few members may be noted that all the bodies were
appointed.\textsuperscript{13} In this new 
unitary
legislature the membership was derived.

\textsuperscript{11} Herbert Feith: "Towards Elections in Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, Sept., 1954.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} Roslan Abdulgamal op.cit (1955)
the following elements:

1. The members of the Working Committee of the KNIP of the Republic Indonesia.


3. The Parliament of the R.I.S.I.

4. The Senate of the R.U.S.I.

A new cabinet under Hatta was formed on December 16, 1949, which endured until September 6, 1950, and there was felt the extreme urgency of holding elections at the earliest to remove chaos in the political life of the country. The Hatta Cabinet, in accordance with the 1948 proposal of the Badan Pakerdja of the defunct Republican legislature, instituted a machinery for conducting elections and an ad hoc Commission was formulated and entrusted with the task of drawing up an election bill. But the bill could not be sent through Parliament during the period of Hatta's Prime Ministership and was sent to Parliament by Prime Minister Natsir of the Nasjumi after September 6, 1950. The Natsir Cabinet, that was a coalition of Nasjumi, PSI, PIR, Christian and Catholic Parties, democratic faction of the PSI, besides some non-party members, wanted the re-adoption of the 1948 Act as drafted by the Badan Pakerdja. This purpose of the bill, according to Natsir, should have been to elect members to the Constituent Assembly and not to the Parliament. From the membership of this Constituent Assembly should be elected a small working Parliament.14

The Natsir Government had achieved some spectacular results. In November 1950, it had ordered that as a measure of experiment regional elections for local councils be held in Minahassa in North Sulawesi. Later, early in 1951, an official was deputed by this Government to study the elections then being held in Australia. However, the Natsir Government working on these lines to solve the issue of elections fell on an election issue, as majority of the members were opposed to the system of indirect
elections proposed by Mr. Natsir.\textsuperscript{15}

Mr. Sukiman followed Natsir as Prime Minister as a result of a political deadlock among the asnumi and the P.H.I. The two parties of social representation in the cabinet with five members each. Some other groups were also given representation: as for instance, PIR got three seats, besides, the Christian-Catholic, Parindra and the Democratic faction and the Labour getting one each. There were two non-party members and one of them resigned a few months later in June 1951. This Cabinet also tried to present a bill on general elections on the basis of universal suffrage. The bill was discussed in a section of the parliament and encountered much criticism and objection from the members. On August 1, 1951,\textsuperscript{16} a joint report of this ad hoc Committee was submitted to Parliament. It stated that the draft Bill on elections presented by the Natsir Government was unacceptable because it provided indirect elections. Most of the members of Parliament were in favour of a direct rather than an indirect system of election.\textsuperscript{17}

The Sukiman Government did a number of things to speed up the process of elections. The regional councils for elections already set up in some areas during the period of Natsir Government were allowed to continue and both the direct and indirect systems of elections were given practical trial. In June 1951, regional elections were held in various parts of Minahasa on the basis of direct elections and the result was PNI victory. In the month of October, 1951, the indirect elections were held in the territory of Jogjakarta.

\textsuperscript{15} Problem of Elections, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Indonesian Affairs, April-May, 1951, Djakarta. These facts are mentioned in a statement of Policy by the Government before the Indonesian Parliament on May 9, 1952. The purpose of the statement was to give a sketch of the forthcoming general elections.
The result of these elections was victory for the Nasjumi Party. Finally, in February 1952, elections on the direct voting system were held at Jakassar in South Sulawesi. The PSI boycotted this election and the Nasjumi won a simple majority. All these elections were experiments to draw lessons as to the methods that should be adopted in the forthcoming elections for the Parliament. The Sukiman Government also sent a six-man team of observers to study the Indian elections. The Sukiman Government favoured the system of direct election but had not sent the election bill before the Parliament, that it fell in February, 1952, on an issue pertaining to foreign affairs.

After the fall of the Sukiman Government, the Wilopo Government was formed on March 30, 1952. One of the foremost tasks before this Government was also the realization of popular elections in the country. A great deal of experience in election-methods had been already obtained and consequently a bill for the registration of voters was prepared in July 1952 for consideration by Parliament for both regional and constituent Assembly elections. According to the Government's estimates the list of voters should have been prepared by the end of the year 1952, but then an incident took place that delayed the whole matter.

This incident is known as the October 17 affair. It was put forth on the floor of the Parliament that the Defence Minister Sultan Maendre Bawone; Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence, Ali Buaidjoe and Chief of Staff, Major-General Nasution were working for the PSI within the ranks of the army. It may be recalled that in a statement on October 7, Sjarifuddin demanded "Sweep Parliament Clean". It added to the doubts borne by the opposition.


19. Ibid.


A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia, Ithaca, University Department of Far Eastern Studies.
A motion to that effect was passed in Parliament, and this meant a virtual no-confidence motion against the Defence Minister. All this happened on October 16. The next day some 30,000 people staged a demonstration in front of the President's house demanding the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of general elections immediately. Earlier Sjahrir in a statement on October 7, had also demanded: "Sweep Parliament Clean".21

President Soekarno in a very cool manner addressed the audience and asked them to disperse. He, however, promised early elections. This was followed by a number of bloodless coups within the army in some territorial commands. The army also wanted the speedy end to the present Parliament through general elections.

The Government was face to face with a serious crisis. There were, moreover, a number of the members in the provisional Parliament, who considered any change in the status quo a threat to their being members. They wanted to delay elections as far as possible, to avoid the inevitable defeat. They tried to fan any fire in order that the people's attention should be diverted from the issue of elections.

In spite of all this the Bill concerning the election of Members of the Constituent Assembly and Members of the People's Representative Assembly was put on the Statute Book on April, 1953,22 and enforced on April 7, after the President had signed it.

The General Elections Act of 1953 provided that elections for both Parliament and the Constituent Assembly (C.A.) were to be held on a "general, free, secret and direct" basis. The basis for elections to the Constituent Assembly

was one member for every 150,000 citizens; whereas for Parliament it was one member for every 300,000 citizens. It may be noted that there had been no official census in Indonesia after 1931 and therefore only a broad estimate of the population could be made and the number of seats fixed accordingly both for the Parliament and the C.A. Thus the strength of the Parliament and the C.A. according to the Act, was to be 250 and 520 members respectively on the basis of the estimated population of the various Constituencies.

A peculiar feature of the Indonesian elections was the system of proportional representation, which means that a party obtains a number of seats in the Constituent Assembly or the Parliament, in proportion to the number of votes obtained in the general elections. The system very much corresponds to the system of "proportional representation" in the Netherlands with the only difference that in the Netherlands there is only one election district, i.e., the entire territory of the State, whereas Indonesia was divided into 16 territorial electoral constituencies. This system is quite opposite to the "majority system" in which the whole country is divided into as many constituencies as there are available seats. The latter system works in the United Kingdom. Thus every electoral district in Indonesia had an "electoral quotient" that determines the number of seats obtained by each party in proportion to the votes that the said party had received in the general elections. In this

23. Ibid. For the detailed account of the election district and the allotted number of seats in the Constituent Assembly area see Appendix.

24. A very elaborate explanation of the General Elections Act has been given by Sunan Makmur, formerly Chairman of the General Electoral Committee in a monographed article entitled: "The Coming General Elections in Indonesia". Mr. Makmur had also been working as the Information Minister for the Republic and also as Chairman of the Electoral Commission.

25. Ibid.
way, opportunity has been provided even to the parties of a local character to be able to send their representatives to the Parliament or the C.A., and have their voice heard, which would not have been possible if there were only one constituency for the whole country.

The election law indicated February 1, 1955, as the date for the voting for the Parliament and April 15, 1955, for the C.A. It was provided further that the voting was to be carried out six months after the period of the nomination of candidates. In actual practice, the elections for the Parliament could not take place before 29 September, 1955, and for the Constituent Assembly before December 15, 1956. Thus a period of more than 10 years lapsed after the original proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945, and the holding of the first nation-wide elections to a national legislative body.

Ever since its coming into being the Republic had been endeavouring to organise elections but due to many factors these efforts had failed. Firstly, it was due to the fact that the period from August 17, 1945 to December 27, 1949, when the final transfer of authority from the Dutch took place, was the period of the life and death struggle of the Republic for its survival and was hardly suitable for holding general elections in the country. Moreover, the elections were badly needed for a Constituent Assembly in order that the new Constitution should replace the provisional one. Moreover, a new elected Parliament was necessary as in the old Parliament the members had not been elected by the people but nominated by the President. At that period of life and death struggle the voice of the President was considered symbolic of the Public will as President Soekarno, in his own words, was neither an American nor a French President but "a President of the Indonesian revolution."26

After the transfer of sovereignty also there were many factors that led to the delay in the formulating of an election law. One of these factors was the procrastination of some members themselves, who could find little chance in their being elected in the general elections, either because of their unpopularity or because originally their nomination to the provisional Parliament was for some other consideration, as for instance, the way in which they managed to get into the Parliament of the Republic from the various Dutch-spressed states. In the words of Sultan Malikmurr:

"We must remember that the general elections are to be carried out in a territory extending as from the Netherlands to Turkey, covering so as a continent. This territory, if such an extent, is composed of hundreds, if not thousands of larger and smaller islands. Larger and smaller seas separate these islands. On the said islands there are large mountainous regions, mostly covered with jungle, bordered with inhabited villages. Such is the general condition in regions outside the island of Java, namely, in Kalimantan, Nusa Tenggara (formerly the Lemur Sanada Islando), Sulawesi, the Moluccas and Sumatra.

The holding of general elections in a territory as large as the Indonesian State meets with difficulties of communications on land as well as over sea. The number and quantity of roads very much influence the smooth conduct of general elections. Is it possible to hold general elections smoothly and rapidly in a village with a scattered population dwelling in houses separated by great distances from each other. It even occurs, as is the case in the interior of Kalimantan, that journeys have to be made by water, namely, by means of prows, due to lack of roads over land suitable for vehicles, or even by pedestrians." 28

Before the commencement of general elections in the country there were more than 150 political parties existing in the country and most of them being of no more than of a regional character. The elections resulted in most of these parties being completely wiped out even some having...


28. Sultan Malikmurr, op.cit. For a brief summary of the Election Law, see Jadachmihirishnan: The Elections in Indonesia, Foreign Affairs Reports, Delhi, Vol 1, No 6 June, 1936.
representation in the Provisional Parliament. The results of the elections brought forth the reduction in the multiple structure of the Parliament to the level of four major political factions, namely the PNI a Nationalist Organization, the Masjumi (Madjalis Juro Muslimoon Indonesia) Nahdultal Ulema (A Party of Muslim Scholars) and the PKI (Communist Party).²⁹

The structure of both the Provisional Parliament and the Constituent Assembly revealed the emergence of a multi-party system which was in accord with the psychology and 'Weltanschauung' or the basic Philosophy of the Indonesian Society, i.e. tolerance, urge to imitate and also at the same time to be different.³⁰

²⁹ Times of Indonesia, Djakarta, July 17, 1956. For strength of each political party after the elections in the C.I., see Appendix I infra.

³⁰ Muslim Abdulgani: Parties and Parliament, 1953, Djakarta (a mimeographed copy).
CHAPTER V
PARTIES BASED ON NATIONALISM.

The PNI forms the major political group in the Parliament with 57 seats in a house of 260 and commanding 8,434,653 votes as compared to 7,903,826 votes won by the Nasjuni - the second largest. A close scrutiny of the 1955 election results reveals that it had the largest number of votes in its favour in Central Java and captured 19 seats of the total of 57 seats meant for that region. Its rivals Nasjuni, M.U. and PKI could get 6, 11, and 15 seats, respectively, in that area.1 The remaining six seats were won by other smaller parties. No other region even in Java, the strongest stronghold of PNI, could equal the combined strength of the Nasjuni and Nahdatul-Ulama. Nevertheless, the traditional name of the PNI as the original party for national independence once formed by Soekarno in 1927 was still 'alive at the time of the revolution. The people considered it a semi-official political party with Soekarno and Natta behind it. The people's traditional love of authority and continuous and pending struggle against the Dutch engendered into this party a sense of compactness and mass appeal that could not be seen in any other political party because this party had an initial advantage to start with immediately after the revolution.

1 Soon after its birth this party could command a large following among the majority of the civil servants and a large number of non-communist intellectuals. Moreover, the PNI also attracted good following from among the middle class consisting of merchants and the old professional bureaucracy, as heritage from the Dutch administration. There also developed a left wing in the party having affinities with the Communists. However,

1. See Appendix IV infra.
the leadership of the party was entrusted to such leaders as Ali Sastroamidjojo Santoso, Said Djokosubroto, and others who had a notable record of service in the cause of national independence.

Besides PNI, a number of political parties that we find existing today were born in the last two months of the year 1945. However, in the early years of national existence more stress was laid on the national solidarity against the Dutch threat than on intra-party wranglings. Political parties continued to cluster around personalities and the common factor in the multiple party organisation was the consolidation of the newly won freedom.

The problems in the Indonesian national movement for the last hundred years or so had always been as to how to synthesize the varying cultural outlooks. The nature of the Indonesian society has furnished solid proof of the existence of Animistic, Hindu-Javanese, Islamic and Western cultural influence and the currents and under-currents in the social life of this country have been symptomatic of the multiple efforts to bring forth unity in the diversity of political, social and cultural life. The formation of PNI was a secular attempt to bring together the people holding divergent social and cultural traditions to common platform of nationalism. On the success or failure of the PNI depended the solution of the problem of synthesis. This party consisted of heterogeneous cultural, political, social and religious elements, which could more easily be kept together in the face of an existing danger, as for instance, the Dutch attempts to revive their political hold. With the lapse of that danger the party cannot go on for ever to derive its source of strength from appealing to its past achievements. It must have a clear programme of social consolidation. The disparity in outlook among the constituent elements of the PNI has been attributed
to the underlying sympathy of President Soekarno and the initial advantage of priority that it obtained after the attainment of independence. A considerable number of the KMP members were followers of PHI. Otherwise, the ideational basis of this organisation appeared to many intellectuals in the country as a true confusion and that lack of clear thinking led the PHI leaders on many an occasion to follow an inconsistent and vacuous policy on many internal and external problems.

However, in spite of all this, to many Indonesians PHI symbolises the national urge to freedom. During the last few years there had developed a left-wing within the PHI which had tended to mould its policies in favour of collectivism. The party has adopted "Marhaenism" (or proletarianism) as its basic creed. This creed is very much akin to Socialism and is often termed as socio-nationalism in accord with the principle of Batong Royong or active mutual assistance and collectivism. At the Annual Conference of this party held at Surabaya in July 1956, this principle was firmly adhered to.

The political principles of the party are:

1. Attainment of a "Marhaenism Society" based on a democratic system of Government. This means a society which recognises the existing social and economic structure as peculiar to Indonesia and seeks to transform it. Such a society would also recognise and encourage the interplay and inter-action of man upon society and society upon man.

2. Fight against capitalism, imperialism and dictatorship, in all forms and wherever it appears.


4. On the economic field PHI advocates socialist principles

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notably: (a) control by the state of the distribution of the principal foodstuffs; (b) wide scale industrialisation; and (c) the founding of labour and farmer unions directed towards a "Marhaenism Society". 4

The foreign policy of the PNI has been stated on the following lines:-

1) Annulment of the Dutch - Indonesian Union, (finally dissolved after the institution of the elected Parliament).

2) Maintenance of an independent active foreign policy in the interest of the world peace and of the nation.

3) Maintenance of good neighbour policy based on national interest.

4) Abolition of imperialism and racial discrimination, wherever and whenever they appear. 5

The subsequent development after the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 have tended to show signs of distrust and suspicion in the relationship of Indonesia and the western countries especially the United States. The oft-repeated co-operation of the PNI with the Communist Party has brought the former very much in line with the latter. There has been a permeation of the Communist influence within the ranks of the PNI and the simple Javanese mind has failed to understand the implications. Some PNI ranks, obsessed with the Communist propaganda, have fostered ill-will against America, ignoring, however, the possible imperialist designs of some other countries like China and India in Southeast Asia.

4. Ibid. The term "Marhaenism" - after the name of "Marhaen" an ordinary tiller of the soil, whom Soekarno met incidentally working in a field, generally symbolising the tiller of the soil.

5. Ibid.
The official nature of the support behind the PNI has contributed to be its mainstay especially in the villages where the common people owe allegiance to the traditional centres of power like village headman and the religious teacher. This party on account of the secular basis of its appeal could not win over the religious teachers.) As for headmen, it is doubtful, whether, in view of the transitional nature of the village society and difference in the outlook the old village hierarchy and the modern group of villagers, deeply influenced by revolution, the PNI can have that solid support of the village masses behind it as it used to draw before.

The concentration of PNI support in some sections of Java led to the development of rational differences in the country as also the loosening of cabinet control over the army. Economic factors have further led to the sharpening of these differences. Numerous attempts have been made by the army commanders to assert their political role. For instance, Colonel Kedijolam, the Commander in West Java, in August 1956 attempted to arrest Foreign Minister Roeslan Abdulgani on the alleged charges of corruption at a time when he was about to start for the International Conference on Suez. The attempts to set up an autonomous central Sumatra regime by Lt.Col. Ahmad Hussain, later in 1957 is an instance of the seething discontent of the outer provinces against the "Java Centric" policy of the Government.

The continuous stress on neutralism in foreign affairs

6. Soedjatmoko: The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia, a paper read at the Conference of Southeast Asia, Rangoon, October 25, 1955.

7. Ibid.


9. The PNI enunciation of foreign policy is in terms of active independent policy. It means to take no side in the cold war.
by the PNI which has often been a ruling party has
brought the country very much close to such countries as
India, China, and even to a considerable extent to the
U.S.S.R. How far this policy runs in accord with the other
powerful currents of political opinion in the country, only
time will show. But it appears the PNI leadership will face
a sharp crisis if these currents of thought are not account-
ed for in shaping the internal and foreign policies of the
state.

The PNI leaders seemed to be conscious of the official
nature of their support, which very much depended on the
persuasive ability of the officials concerned. Its appeal
was secular and not religious. Before 1953, it thought on
many occasions in entering a coalition with the Masjumi, but
was soon afraid that the latter, in view of its participa-
tion in the Government would become more popular among the
masses than the PNI on account of its religious. So in 1953,
the PNI dispensed altogether with the Masjumi and made a
pact with the Communist Party. The idea was to gain
popular support through the mass appeal of the PKI and to
let down the Masjumi in that way. That was the beginning
of the wide breach between the PNI and the Masjumi and the
former never thought seriously of compromising with the
latter as the Communists were ready to take advantage of the
situation any time. Even after elections in 1955, the tri-
partite alliance between the PNI, Masjumi and the NU, had
deprived the Masjumi of exerting a real pressure in the
Government. The reason being that the PNI always thought that
the long continuation in office of the Masjumi will add to the
latter's strength and popularity among the masses. In
Parliament, the PNI leadership has always been banking on
a coalition in the PKI once the Masjumi tried to exert its
influence. The compromise between the PNI and the PKI has

The Manchester Guardian, July 8, 1954.
also to some extent been ideological as the former also believes in socialism. Whereas among the Masajumi the tenets of Islam find no compromise possible with Communism, with the PNI based on secularism, nationalism and strong anti-west feelings, there is no bar in forming alliance with the Communists. Within Parliament and the Constituent Assembly, there are satellite parties to all the three main groups of parties referred to above. The ideologies of these smaller parties are to a very great extent akin to the major faction, the difference being more personal than ideological. In the nationalist group, many of the smaller parties that existed in the provisional parliament have been altogether wiped out in the post-election Parliament or their strength has been greatly reduced. On the other hand, many smaller parties in the religious group which had much lesser representation in the provisional parliament have commanded a larger number of seats in the new Parliament and in the Constituent Assembly. In the national group, PIR (Perseantuan Indonesia Raya) or the Greater Indonesian Union has been reduced from 22 members in the provisional parliament to only two in the new one and even these two belong to two different wings of Wongsonoegoro and Mas'udin, respectively. This party set up in 1942 as a right wing to the PNI and supported Dr. Hatta during the period of negotiations with the Dutch in affording certain concessions to the latter. The PNI at that time was firmly opposed to any such concessions. This group in the provisional parliament played a considerable role. Its leader Wongsonoegoro played a dominant role as a Cabinet formateur after the downfall of the Wilopo Cabinet in 1953 and became Vice-Premier, under Ali Sastroamidjojo. There was a split in the ranks of this party in November 1954 on the issue of support to the

10. The reason for anti-west feelings is also due to a long hostility against the Dutch. Many people during the period of Japanese rule were indoctrinated against the west which feeling still persists.
Sastra Medjojo Government. Wongsonegoro, on account of his ideological affinity with the PNI, wanted to continue his support, which was not liked by other members of the PIR. The party was divided into two factions led respectively by Wongsonegoro and Hazairin. In the new elections, the party could not give an affective programme in contradistinction to the PNI and lost ground. In the C.A. the two factions of this party each obtained two seats as compared to only one each in the Parliament.

Another nationalist party in the provisional parliament was Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raja) having six seats. The general elections had this group completely wiped out both from the Parliament and the Constituent Assembly.\(^{11}\) There is practically no difference between the PIR and Prindra as both drew their members from the government officials and bourgeoisie.\(^{12}\)

There are some other minor nationalist groups represented in the Parliament and the Constituent Assembly, but they may better be considered as appendages or very much skin in their ideology to the larger PNI than as independent political units. Some of these political groups were established a very short time before the general elections. For instance, IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Merdeka Indonesia) "the upholders of Indonesian independence group" came into existence only in the year 1955 and consists mostly of a number of ex-army officers. The same is true of GPPS (Gerakan Pembelaan Pantjasila) or the Pantjasila movement. A number of former PNI men like Gani and non-party figures like M. Yamin and B.M. Diah of the Daily Merdeka are its chief members.

The PRN (Partai Rakjat Indonesia) was born in 1950 as a result of a split within the ranks of the PNI. It is

\(^{11}\) For the other groups wiped out in the general elections see infra (Appendix )

further sub-divided into two groups, one led by Djody Gondokusumo and has two representatives in the Parliament and the other by Behsa Daenglalo.

The PRI (Partai Rakjat Indonesia) is led by ex-
guerilla hero Sutomo (Bung Tomo)

Baporki Badan Permusjawaratan Kesorga Negaran came into existence only in the year 1954 aiming at the realisation of the national ideal of Indonesia and to instil into the mind of every citizen a sense of patriotism. The real motive was to assimilate the Chinese and the people belonging to the other foreign groups into an homogenous Indonesian society.

After the coming into being of Parliament the members of the Permai (Perisatuan Rakjat Marhaen Indonesia) GPPS, PRM, Murba and Baporki, Gerinda, Acoma, Kong Tenggoro faction of the PRI, PNI (Partai Republik Indonesia Merdeka), Partai Buruh, PRI, Partai Rakjat Desa and IPKI including M. Sujono (an independent) have formed a progressive front within the Parliament. The inclusion of such organisations as Murba and the Partai Buruh within the orbit of this group indicates the leftist tendencies of this group.

This group is closely connected to the PNI in its task of socialisation and fully supports its "independent active foreign policy".

In the Parliamentary elections it has been found that not more than one third of the members of the provisional parliament have been returned. The PNI in view of its dominant position has managed to occupy the leading position because of the support of the above small groups and also due to the differences among the Maajumi and the NU. The Chairman of the new Parliament belongs to PNI. Among the 10 sections or Committees in Parliament as many as seven have a majority of PNI members and have their respective Chairman as PNI members.13

CHAPTER VI
PARTIES BASED ON RELIGION

Religion is a great dynamic force in many countries of Asia and has more often proved its unifying worth among the varying sections of their respective populations. In Indonesia where the impact of the modern industrial economy has upset the structure of the indigenous socio-economic pattern of society based on deep-seated system the unifying force of religion for the changing society seemed desirable. The result of the general elections in Indonesia reveals that the forces of nationalism have not proved sufficiently deep and so broad-based as to command obedience from all sections of the Indonesian Society. On the other hand, the politically minded youth, just having a superficial touch with religion, have in the garb of secularism been led to follow the path of communism. The need of retaining the religious pattern of society, therefore, has been considered essential for all political and social purposes.

The Masjumi, the largest party among the religious groups, is based on Islam. The election results put this party as second to the PNI with 7,903,886, giving a very slight margin of majority to the latter. Moreover, the PNI membership seems to be well consolidated in some section of Java and more particularly in the Central Java. It commands practically little or no support in regions other than the over-populated Java. The affiliation to Masjumi is wide-spread and even in the PNI majority areas, it combined with the other Islamic party, Nahadat-at-Ulema has drawn almost as many seats in the Parliament as the combined strength of the PNI and the Communist Party. In East, Central and the West Java areas the combined PNI-PKI strength of 28, 34, and 16 members is nearly balanced by the Masjumi, NU membership of 27, 16 and 18, respectively. The membership of Masjumi is nearly reponderant in the outer islands like Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. It shows that the votes of the Muslim religious groups are
evenly distributed in the country and the Masjumi, being the largest single Muslim religious group, "represents the unity of Indonesia".¹

The organisation of the Masjumi comprises the federation of as many as 20 Muslim social and political parties on a common political programme. Thus whereas this party is symbolic of the profession of a common faith by a majority of the Indonesians, 90% of whom are Muslims, it also consolidates them on a political basis.

Its objective, from the outset was to turn Indonesia by legal and parliamentary methods into a Muslim country. It was a confederation of Muslim religious groups which got a coherent form during the period of Japanese occupation and its first session was held on November 7, 1945, at Jogjakarta.²

From the very outset the Masjumi had an elaborate programme of social and economic legislation. In the year 1946, as a party of its social reforms programme, it established under its auspices the Indonesian Association of Islamic peasants (Serikat Tani Islam Indonesia) or STII. Through this organization, steps were taken for the money being collected from the village land owners and others, on voluntary basis, to be paid as Zakat, as an Islamic injunction, to be followed by every Muslim. The money realized as Zakat was to be utilized in helping the poor and landless peasants on the basis of a list of such deserving and landless peasants prepared by an ad hoc Committee of experts set up by the party. The money may further be spent on such other institutions, Islamic schools and mosques. The institution of Zakat is an obligation prescribed in Islam on all well-to-do in the type and extent of their property. The Masjumi

3. In Indonesia the Board of Ulemas made the assessment of Zakat on the following basis of yearly payment: 5% of the crop from irrigated land; 10% of the crop from unirrigated land; 1/40 or 2% of the yearly savings. Reserve See Dorothy Woodman: Op.cit. P.356.
organised this system and sought its expendin in an organised form. This step made this organisation extremaly popular among the religious-minded population of the Muslims. Serikat Dagang Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Commercial Organization) was set up to realize the Zakat money from the merchants. So popular were these movements right from the very beginning that, in spite of troubled days as a result of republican hostilities against the Dutch before the transfer of sovereignty, by the middle of 1948, the organisation worked in most of the area in the Republic at that time. The Muslims on voluntary basis paid the amount of Zakat to the Masjumi, besides, paying the other Government-prescribed taxes.

Under the auspices of the STII a very great programme of economic and social reforms was set in. The agrarian nature of the Indonesian economy and existence of small land-holders in the country without many feudal lords, it was considered desirable that co-operatives in the field of agriculture and industry should be encouraged. The object of the Masjumi was that all such organisations should work independently of any governmental interference in the details of their working. In this way, it was held the population would realise the fruits of freedom by entirely depending on self-help.

The institution of co-operatives on a voluntary basis was encouraged by the Masjumi and by October, 1956, it had spread to all parts of Indonesia. Co-operatives in the field of agriculture under the auspices of the STII has led to introduction of modern agriculture methods. Such a scheme has been put on an experimental stage near Tapanuli in Sumatra. By encouraging co-operatives among the farmers fertilisers have been purchased on cheap rates and provided to these co-operatives. In Central Sumatra these co-operatives have done a good job by

4. With the funds collected by this organisation a bank for the common welfare was established known as Bank Pambangunan Umum (Bank for the Reconstruction of Society). This bank advanced credits at low rates of interest.
organising growers of cloves (a tobacco used for cigarettes). Modern mechanised agricultural methods have also been introduced at Perjamin near Padang in Central Sumatra.

Padi, rubber, coffee co-operatives were introduced at Bankula in South Sumatra and at Solo, Jogjakarta and in some parts of East Java. New co-operatives were also established for tobacco production for the purpose of export.

Such co-operatives are working at small scale in South Sumatra, Sulawesi and a very few can be found also in small islands of Moluccas. A big plan of such co-operatives has been prepared for implementation in certain areas of Kalimantan around Banjermasin. Moreover, the existing fisheries co-operative at Medan is being expanded.

The co-operatives are showing flourishing signs under the able and coherent guidance of the central leadership of the STII. This writer met some villagers from Kalimantan who had come to Djakarta for the purpose of inducing the central leadership of STII to assist them in setting up some rubber co-operatives. They had also collected some money on a voluntary basis to bear all the initial expenses to be incurred in establishing such co-operatives under the auspices of the STII. It may be noted that the basic formula of all such co-operatives is the hold of common religious ties by the people and the fact that they like to work in any field of social activities under the guidance of a socio-religious and socio-political organisation like the Masjumi. The Chairman of the Masjumi, Mr. Sardjaran, a former minister of Agriculture in the Republic.

The organisation of the Masjumi, besides STII also contains such branches as SHII (Serikat Buruh Islam Indonesia) or the Muslim Labour Union (GPII - Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia) or the Muslim Youth Movement and the SMII or the Fisheries Co-operative organisation besides a number of other educational and social welfare organisations.
The Masjumi was too late in organising the labour on its own pattern as much ground was already covered by the Communists before this party undertook this task. Still, the various non-Communist organisations, including the Masjumi, control labour to an extent that the ratio has come to 70:30 between the Communists and non-Communists so far as their influence among the labour is concerned. The SEII undertakes the task of educating labour and making them realise their position in society.6

Through education it wants to consolidate its hold on the variety of labour unions. It even has allowed the institution of strikes to form part of its programme in realising labour demands.

The GPII is a youth movement and is at present under the immediate supervision of Anwar Marjono. It has a considerable hold on the youth especially on the student community.

At the annual conference of the Masjumi held in the year 1949 the various Muslim groups in Indonesia decided to set up all-Indonesia Organisation providing a common ground to all these groups, who, more or less, had the similar objectives of establishing a real Muslim Society in Indonesia. Accordingly the Buah Kongress Muslimeen Indonesia was set up at Djakarta in December 1949 consisting of all the Muslim groups in the country. The following being the main constituents:

1. Masjumi; H.M.I. (Himbunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia) a students' organisation; PII (Peladjar Islam Indonesia), a Muslim education group; GPII (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia) Aljamaat-al-Wasilija and Ittehadija


The doctrinal basis of the BKMI was set forth in the resolution adopted unanimously at the 1949 Conference, which runs as follows:

"We, the representatives of the Indonesian Muslim Organisations, which met in the All Indonesian Consultation Conference at Jogjakarta from the 20th to the 25th December, 1949, with all sincerity intend to work among the Indonesian Muslim Community, according to the specialised fields of each organisation." 8

This "sprawling confederacy"9 of the various Muslim parties continued for some years with more of a surface unity because of the inherent ideological conflict between the conservative and the western-educated Muslim intelligentsia. The unity in early years was further due to the fact that in view of the prevailing insecurity in the country and also because of the struggle against the Dutch, which in some ways was still going on, there was the consolidation of all the national energies against a common danger. The rift arose at a time when the internal situation had brought forth new problems.

The cleavage within the ranks of the Masjumi occurred in the Congress of the Party held in the year 1952 on the issue of the economic programme for the Party. The left-wing or the progressive Section of the Masjumi led by Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara wanted a state-directed economy with governmental control on the production and distribution in accordance with the precepts of Islam, and quite contrary to the Marxian concepts. Expounding this theory Sjafruddin Prawiranegara had earlier stated:

"Collectivism and individualism go side by side and supplement each other. To impose collectivism forcibly (as in Communism) would be fascism as it would mean the elimination of a group ...... this forcible imposition is forbidden in Islam ...... The ideology of religious

8. Ibid.

socialism is most suited to our Society and is in full accord with our Constitution. The means to achieve this socialism are quite different from those used in Marxian Socialism.10

The other group led by Dr. Sukiman opposed the principle of nationalisation advocated by Natsir and the other Western-educated members of the Masjumi. But the latter obtained control of the Executive Council and made the economic plan based on nationalisation the basis of the party's struggle. In the party congress of 1954 this difference between the two factions was patched up by Sukiman agreeing to the programme of the Natsir group. In 1954 whereas Natsir was elected Chairman of the Masjumi Council, Sukiman was taken as Vice-Chairman. The most conservative section of the party led by the Muslim scholars made a breach with the party in 1952 and formed another organization known as Nahdatul-Ulama (The organization of the Muslim scholars).

The political and economic programme of the Masjumi as drafted in 1952 has been confirmed in all the succeeding party conferences and is on the following lines:11

1. The State should be based on the principles of Islam which guarantee full individual and social justice in the individual and corporate aspects of human life.

2. Instead of the present parliamentary cabinet there should be a Presidential Cabinet, with the President being responsible to the Parliament.12

3. A bicameral legislature with a Senate and a Lower House, instead of the present unicameral one.


12. cf. Mr. Mohd Natsir's statement in the Indonesian Parliament on August 29, 1953. He said: "Indonesia was trying to establish a Western Parliamentary system but this could not function and would not be of any benefit if Indonesia did not follow the rule of the game. What we are witnessing is the game of tennis without the use of net and lines" -- Ichtiyar.
4. Freedom of religion and fundamental human rights should be guaranteed for all.

In the field of foreign relations (1) the party is opposed to every form of colonialism because it is against the spirit of Islam, (2) It believes in friendship with all the peace-loving nations believing in God and Democracy, (3) It tries to settle all international disputes in accordance with Charter of the United Nations and (4) To continue efforts for the integration of Irian (West New Guinea) to Indonesia.

In the economic field, the party had drawn up a programme of financial and economic urgency which is a move directed towards the achievement of a socialist pattern of society based on the ideals of Islam. The programme contains the following main points:-

1. The principal cause of inflation is to be eliminated by the composition of a sound national budget. This can only be materialized within a period of 1 - 3 years in order to be able to avoid adverse effects (mass dismissal of officials), by degrees the deficit on the budget is to be reduced to such an extent that - given its magnitude and nature - it will not generate inflation. The accent of the budget shall have to lie on the restoration of law and order and on education and training together with productive activities in the field of public utilities (irrigation, electricity, etc). Other Government activities must be performed within the limits of Government revenue. The tax burden should be eased as much as possible.

2. Simultaneously with the reorganisation of the budget, the economic policy should be radically changed.

From a chauvinistic economic policy, leaning on the strength of the autochthonous Indonesians - who were economically still weak - the new economic system should pursue the object of applying all potencies (labour and capital) available among the society irrespective of their origin and all the possibilities of foreign aid
(material as well as personal).

To make the new economic policy a success, the following measures will be necessary:

(a) All colonial regulations with regard to restrictions, quota, etc., which kill the working spirit among private enterprise, must be done away with or simplified. This will also greatly facilitate the task of the officials and eliminate red tape and corruption. The foreign exchange system and its measures should also be revised so as

1) to facilitate the administration for the officials of the Foreign Exchange Control Institute;

2) to facilitate the narrowing of the gap between official and free market rates of the rupiah against other foreign currencies.

(b) The question of the ground rights on behalf of foreign estates must quickly be settled in order to create new opportunities for foreign capital investments.

(c) Laws on mining regulating the exploitation of Indonesia's minerals are to be completed soon so that natural wealth can be availed of as quickly as possible to raise the country's prosperity and add to the national income. In this connection the position of the oil-wells in Northern Sumatra calls for an early solution.

(d) Regulations on foreign capital investments must be expedited. These should be really attractive to foreign capital and foreign experts.

(e) The reparations payment by Japan is to be settled at the earliest. This should not remain an obstruction to normal diplomatic and economic relations with Japan. Besides Japan, attempts should be made to come to a favourable economic co-operations with Indonesia's other neighbours.
The efforts of the present government to secure foreign loans on behalf of productive projects should be proceeded. In particular should efforts be made to contract loans from the World Bank for the financing of large projects, which need vast sums of money.

3. In enforcing regulations and taking measures in the interest of labour, the expenditure on wages and social provisions for employers' account should not be struck so high that the concerns have to close down. The chief protection for workers is the fact that the Government, in guarding the stability of the money value, simultaneously controls the purchasing power of the money. Rise in wages and financial improvement of social provisions are only effective when founded upon the stability of the money value. An increase in wages while inflation is raging only implies a rise on paper and constitutes no addition whatever to the actual income. In attempting to improve the labourers' position, the position of the civil servants should not be overlooked. As a matter of fact, skilled and expert officials should be better rewarded than is the case now. The Government should pay a premium to certified servants, e.g., doctors, midwives, engineers, customs officers, policemen, etc. The Government should not hesitate to dismiss officials not performing regular jobs and to place them on half-pay or on a pension. If the Government should adopt an economic policy as outlined above, the officials rendered jobless shall find alternative jobs very soon. In the field of foreign relations, as mentioned above, the Musjumi has advocated the maintaining of friendly relations with all countries believing in God and Democracy. But how does it differ from the almost

similar programmes of the other parties such as the PNI? According to the spokesman of the Masjumi, it would be in the way one interpret it. A party basing its ideology on nationalism may mean a close alliance with other neutralist countries and also with the Soviet Union. Whereas, the Masjumi, having its foundation on Islam, may interpret democracy and belief in God as testament to increased contacts with the West and a greater reliance on the principle of Muslim unity in the field of international relations.

As to the idea of an Islamic state, the Masjumi wants the principles of Islam to be incorporated in the Social and political life of the community. By an Islamic state is not meant a theocratic state, but a state having liberal view on all matters. Mohammad Natsir in an address stated:-

"On account of the Quranic precept the Muslim world has developed statehood and organised system of Government, adapted to the conditions of time and the people. It has in the course of its history developed autocracies and hereditary monarchies. But it never took the form of theocracy in the sense of ecclesiastical church or priestly rule. The Muslim world has never known the institution of a ruler by grace of God as an appointed one. Every Islamic ruler or chief of state, every Islamic government finds in the Quran pre-ordained constitution which they have to abide by ...... But this, I repeat, does not mean "church" or "priestly rule" both non-existent in Islam and an identification of church and state. Therefore, also there can be no reason for the so-called disestablishment or separation of church and state.

"What it does mean is that religion must live in every individual follower of the faith and thereby pervade the life of the community and find expression in statehood, in government and in legislation, never however, the fact being lost sight of that these are worldly concerns, on which the people must decide for themselves, in consultations, as is said in the Holy Quran and their affairs are decided in consultation amongst them."14

This it may be said that the concept of an Islamic

state leaves room for various interpretations. Such general statements also imply that the Islamic state and society shall be deeply affected by the spirit of modernism.\textsuperscript{15}

The extremist wing of the party, consisting of the various scholars, considered the socialist programme of the Masjumi as extreme modernism having little connection with the real Islam and broke away from the Masjumi in 1952. This defection was considered very seriously as it involved a breach within the ranks of the largest Muslim party. By independent observers it was considered less due to ideological factors than to a dispute on having a seat in the Wilopo Government.\textsuperscript{16}

The Nahdat-al-Ulama (NU) was formed in 1926 as a non-political organization against the modernist teachings of the P3II and even the Mohammadiyya. It continued its existence as such till the Second World War and almost ceased functioning during the Japanese period and was revived after that only as a part of the Masjumi. As a result of this breach before the general elections in 1955, the N.U. had two separate seats in the provisional parliament. After the elections, however, this party managed to secure 45 seats in the Parliament as against 57 each of the Masjumi and the PNI. It had the largest following in East Java, where it obtained 20 seats against 14, 7 and 14 to the PNI, Masjumi and the Communist party, respectively. In other areas of Java, South Kalimantan, Molucca and Tenggara it also did fairly well. In the cabinet formed as a result of the general elections this party got five seats in the cabinet at par with PNI and the Masjumi.

\textsuperscript{15} M. Natsir: \textit{Islam Sebagai Ideology} (Islam as an Ideology), Pustaka Aido, Djakarta.

\textsuperscript{16} The Nahdatul-Ulama, wanted that the Ministry of Religious Affairs should be given to a man of their choice. See \textit{Pepadon}, Djakarta, July 28, 1952.
The organisation of this party contains an executive committee (Boad Tanfizia) consisting of the chiefs of the following Departments:

1. Agriculture  
2. Information  
3. Education  
4. Social  
5. Youth  
6. Women  
7. Labour and  
8. Economy.

Besides, there is a board of Ulema, in an advisory capacity, to supervise and to see that the above departments function under the true Islamic spirit. This Board (the Medjlis-i-Sjuria) is a legislative body of the party. The following Ulema direct the activities of this party:

1. Kiaz Hadji Abdul Wahhab (President) of the Ulema or Sjuria Board.
2. Kiaz Bisi – Vice President of the Sjuria Board.

An expression of opinion by some of the leaders of the N.U. indicated that besides divergence of outlook in field of modernism with the Masjumi, there was also the factor that the modernist group had a virtual dominating position and the Ulema could not exert their separate voice.

This party generally lack expert political leadership, partly because of the one-sided religious approach of its leaders. Nevertheless, on account of its religious basis it has won the support of a considerable section among the masses. Like the Masjumi its main support comes from the Muslim Kiais and the religious teachers in the local village schools run by this party through Pendidik and the Pasantren system. The former is a residential institution, providing instruction to the village children in the Islamic way besides preparing them on the educational pattern of the Government. The Pasentrans are the day schools, run under private initiative. Some of these are recognized by the Government and others are not. The purpose of these institutions is to seek the predominance of religion in the education of the country.

To infuse the spirit of Talam in the youth this party has a youth organization affiliated to it known as
Gerakan Pemuda Ansor or the Ansor Youth Movement. The purpose of this body is to devote to the establishment of an Islamic society in both political and social fields and to promote the consciousness of the Muslim youth to practice Islamic ideology.¹⁷

In the field of foreign relations this party is markedly opposed to Communism and is in favour of alliance with the Western democracies. "An association between the two believers in God is better than an association with an unbeliever".¹⁸ That is how a prominent leader of the party depicted his attitude towards Communism and Soviet Russia and the idea of co-operation with the West.¹⁸

In contradistinction to the Masjumi-led B.K.M.I., the N.U. which had made alliance in 1952 with the PSII and Partai Islam (Perti), has in collaboration with these parties formed an All Indonesia Muslim League in the year 1952. The objectives of this league have been stated to be as follows:¹⁹

1. To draw up common plans for the spiritual and material benefit of the Indonesian Muslims;

2. To draw the various Muslim organisations together to work on the basis of a common plan;

3. To aid the development of the parties composing the Muslim League;

4. To carry out plans to promote co-operation between the Muslims of Indonesia and those of other countries.

The PSII comes from the old Serikat Dagang Islam set up in 1911 and the subsequent organisation led by the late Haji Agus Salim. After the general elections this party got eight seats in the Parliament and was provided two seats in the post-election coalition-cabinet of Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo.

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¹⁷ Suara Ansor, Djakarta, June 1956.

¹⁸ A personal interview. Also Bicara Politik Seriis Tafsir Asas, N.U., Djakarta.

¹⁹ Ibid. Also Mohdare Luhs: op.cit.
The main features of this party's programme are as follows:

1. To set up a Republic based on Qur'an and Sunnah;

2. Presidential form of Government to be introduced in the new Constitution;

3. Freedom of religion to all, and it is stated:

"to the minority group in the country adequate opportunity is given to exercise freely their religion and develop their culture." 20

This party further believes in non-alignment in the internal affairs of the country with the socialists and even with those of the Masjumi party who plead for socialism, which in other words according to this party implies the rejection of the basic Islamic prescription.

With regard to foreign policy the PSI believes in non-alignment with any of the power-bloc and more so with the communist bloc.

Almost similar views are held by the Partai Islam (Parti), another constituent of the Muslim League (B.K.M.S., which obtained one seat in the post-election Cabinet.

The difference among the various Muslim political parties mentioned above is in fact the difference between the old and new tendencies in the Muslim world. How far the Muslims reconcile themselves to the challenge of the modern world needs an answer. The modishist view is that in order to achieve progress Muslim people should adapt themselves to the modern trends of thought. This section commands a greater respect among the educated class of the Muslim community. Also it is due to the prejudice generally held in the educated Muslim mind against the orthodox school of thought. In fact there should be a genuine desire among those western educated people to try to bring others in line with their thinking. With the development of proper understanding between the modern and the older

20. Abikusno and Tjokrojono: Umat Islam Indonesia Menjalani Penelitian Ummat, Djakarta, 1953, p.28. Mr. Abikusno was appointed Chairman of the party in 1946.
minds these differences would tend to disappear automatically.

DARUL ISLAM MOVEMENT

The Darul Islam movement has posed a dilemma for the Republic of Indonesia in the field of administration. The movement, it is alleged, has become synonymous with turmoil, chaos, coercion, kidnap and murder, which its followers perpetrate in the name of the ideas of an Islamic State. The main difficulty for the Government in suppressing the movement has been that the ideal of the establishment of an Islamic State is also shared by the Masjumi and the other Islamic parties. The followers of the Darul Islam, however, consider the adoption of violent means to achieve their goal as justified.

The ideal of Islamic State has been so deeply entrenched in the popular mind that an army battalion in Java once refused to attack the Darul Islam rebels and the army had to deal with an insurrection within its own rank. 21

In the early days of the nationalist revolution in Indonesia, the people of different areas throughout the land banded together in spontaneous organisations to defend their newly proclaimed independence. In this way two fighting organisations arose, composed of adherents of the Moslem faith, and named Hizbullah and Sabillillah, which fought bravely side by side with the Indonesian National Army through all the battles with the Dutch forces up to the time of the signing of the Renville agreement in January, 1948.

It will be recalled that the Renville Agreement provided for the withdrawal of Republican forces from certain areas of West Java and of East Java. In order effect this agreement, and also in order to bring all fighting bodies into line under one general command, fighting organisations other than the Indonesian Na

Army were disbanded, including the Hizbullah and Sabillillah.

The Renville Agreement was negotiated and signed under the leadership of the Amir Sjarifuddin Cabinet, but many political parties, were extremely dissatisfied with its terms, including the powerful Moslem Party MASJUMI, the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) and the Indonesian Socialist Party. These troubles accentuated the growing party conflicts, which reached a climax in the Madiun rebellion after an about-face in the policy of the Indonesian Communist Party which formerly had been supporting the agreement.

The whole country was in a state of political discord, and the situation was rapidly deteriorating, especially so in West Java which had watched the men of the Republican forces withdrawing in obedience to the Government's order. Feeling deserted by the Republic in face of the depredations and oppressions of the Dutch Army, and believing they had been politically betrayed by the Renville agreement, the disbanded Möslem fighting organisations began to reform. Rejecting the Dutch-sponsored "Pasundan State", several Moslem leaders, backed by the re-forming fighting organisations, decided to set up a kind of administration of their own.

A conference was called in the village of Gunungtjupu near Tasikmalaya, which determined that, firstly, areas in West Java not controlled by the Dutch army (there were many) still lay beyond the responsibility of the Republic of Indonesia; secondly that a Möslem council be formed whose president be Möslem religious leader (Imam); and thirdly, that a military committee be established comprising members of the two Möslem fighting organisations, Hizbullah and Sabillillah. Neither private talks of that period nor this conference showed any inclination to the establishment of a separate Islam "State"; indeed, the leaders continued to recognise the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as the only legal government.

Early in March, 1948, a second conference was held in a village near Madjalengka in the Tasikmalaya region, which was attended by delegations from almost all MASJUMI branches and affiliated bodies in West Java. This conference decide
to press for continuation of the struggle with the Dutch army, and to form Moslem Leaders' Council (Dewan Imamah) all over the Dutch-occupied areas, especially in West Java. The Republic of Indonesia was still regarded as the only legitimate state in Indonesia.

The third conference, held shortly after the second, was presided over by the chief Imam himself. It resulted in the fusion of Sabillillah and Hezbollah into one body, known as the Indonesian Moslem Army, and led by a Division Commander. Wherever Moslem Councils had been formed previously, now Dewan Imamah were set up which functioned somewhat like a Cabinet. But the Republic of Indonesia was still considered to have rightful authority in Indonesia.

A fourth conference was held in August 1948 in Tjiawi near Tasikmalaya, also under the Chairmanship of the Imam Kartosuwirjo. During this conference a constitution was drafted, along very similar lines to that of the Republic, including tolerance towards all kinds of ideologies and political parties, provided only that these were not being used as Dutch tools. This provisional constitution was known as Dutch tools. This provisional constitution was known as the Constitution of the Islam State, the "Kanun Assay".

Thus guerilla activities were continued in West Java, a political organisation was consolidated, and a provisional guerilla government, called PADI (Pemangkinah Darul Islam; the Government of Darul Islam) founded. It was not at all the intention of PADI to compete with the Republic of Indonesia far less to oppose or eliminate it. It was simply a form of administration set up in an area which had come to lie outside the responsibility of the Republic when the Indonesian National Army had been withdrawn in line with the terms of the Renville Agreement. PADI came into existence in a vacuum period in order to organise and consolidate the spirit of struggle of the people, who were suffering considerable hardships under the raids and oppression of
Dutch patrols which perpetrated into those areas. It was entirely a reaction of the people in their desire to defend themselves from an aggressor.

With the second Dutch attack upon the Republic, Jogjakarta was occupied and the Republican leaders were captured, some were imprisoned and some exiled and the Indonesian National Army itself took up guerilla warfare. This resulted in greatly increased activity by Darul Islam, especially in guerilla tactics against the Dutch forces, and in stirring the people to open revolt.

When the Rum-van Royen Statements were made on 7th May, 1949, Darul Islam was unaffected, in spite of the fact that the Statements provided for the restoration of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta. Darul Islam took the attitude that these Statements comprised something like a public auction of the real Republic of Indonesia to the Dutch. It, therefore, openly opposed those Statements, and henceforth considered itself to be the only lawful and legitimate government and state in Indonesia.

An Islamic State in West Java was proclaimed by Darul Islam on 7th August, 1949, in a document signed by the Imam, and simultaneously the draft constitution "Kanun Asasy" covering 15 chapters and 34 articles was promulgated as law.

The proclamation of the Islamic State declares that it has arisen in a condition of war amidst the national revolution. Because of the tragedies of murder and arson continually being committed by the Dutch, the Moslem masses had been forced to resist with all their strength in legitimate self-defence. The proclamation also states that the nature of the Indonesian revolution had changed into a holy war (defined as a revolt of Islam) against Dutch colonial slavery and terrorism. One article of the constitution lays it down that Islamic Law in its entirety shall operate forthwith throughout the "Islamic State of Indonesia"; another article states that before the
provisions of this constitution can be effected, the Islamic State of Indonesia will function as an Islamic state at war: "Darul Islam El Wab All Harbi". The proclamation declares that the Indonesian struggle for independence, carried on for 4 years, had recently been mischievously obliterated, and makes a strong appeal to Muslims that now is the time for them to fulfill their Holy Duty to "extend the realisation of Allah's Paramount righteousness on earth".

Darul Islam also issued a political manifesto at this period to explain its attitude towards the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements, the Rum-van Royen Statements and towards the Round Table Conference.

This manifesto makes it clear that Darul Islam does not consider itself bound by any agreement concluded between the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch. The Round Table Conference, the manifesto comments, would result in transfer of sovereignty from the Republic of Indonesia to the Dutch; the sovereignty which the Dutch were promising to confer upon Indonesia, would be a mere Dutch present, and not the right to self-determination for which the Indonesian national strivs. Moreover, before such sovereignty was transferred, the position of the Republic would be that of a mere slave. Formation of the Republic of United Indonesia would be a lengthy process, the manifesto continues, during which time it would be only the former Netherlands Indies under another name; and when formed, it would be like a zoological garden, the gift of the Dutch Queen, under management of a director, the High Representative of the Netherlands Crown in Indonesia.

Two term Darul-Islam has been used by Muslims the world over to depict their ideals of the policy of a state: "Chalifah" and "Darul Islam". Chalifah is to be found in the Holy Koran, and was used by the first Muslim Empire. Darul Islam is a term which has arisen since then amongst Muslims themselves, and it has become very popular amongst Muslims during the political struggle in Indonesia. Both terms are used by Muslims for the one purpose, namely the realisation
of an Islamic State in the meaning of Islamic Law; but Chilafah refers more to the political leadership, whilst Darul Islam refers more to the economic and social structure. It will be seen that the two terms thus complement each other and depict the nature of an ideal Islamic State according to the Darul Islam.

After the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia, the original leaders of the Darul Islam, like Kartosowirjo, lost control over the organisation, which was bent on having a separate existence and had as its goal the establishment of the rule of Islam over the whole of Indonesia. They even sought to disrupt the Republic. The original organised nature of the movement took the shape of marauding bands not in touch with their original ideology, but more or less controlled by anti-Republic forces allegedly either remnants of Dutch imperialism, or Communists or even some professional robbers. The movement, which was originally confined to West Java, later on spread to other areas of Indonesia particularly, South Sulawesi and North Sumatra.

The Masjumi, on its part, has condemned the terrorist activities of the Darul Islam and during its rule spread leaflets showing the contrast between activities of Darul Islam and the real teachings of Islam. This attempt proved successful to a considerable extent.

The PNI circles, according to the Masjumi party, tried on various occasions to put Darul Islam label on the Masjumi. In August 1953, the then Defence Minister, Iwa Kuraswamtri, had the idea of giving arms to the Communist controlled organisation of ex-Guerrilla Fighters (PERBEPSI) to combat the activities of Darul Islam. This proposition was criticised.


24. Robert C. Bone: "The Future of Indonesian Political Parties", op.cit. The PNI led Government of Ali Sastrimidjioo seems to have abandoned the plan later, which was in fact never officially proclaimed.
vehemently by the Masjumi. Mr. Matar, the Masjumi leader, stated on the floor of the Parliament that such an attempt should be abandoned and any measures to re-establish security should be based on proper understanding of the local structure of the Indonesian community and of the psychology of the people.  

Besides the above-mentioned political parties based on Islam, a reference needs also be made to the Catholic party also based on religion. Whereas the political future of every other party is subject to rise and fall, the Catholic party seems to have a sustained future along with its stable past. It has the solid support of the members of the Catholic community, whereas, on account of the integrity and competence of some of its leaders, it also commands respect among many Muslims especially in East Java. The Darul-Islam are known for their religious tolerance, and the Catholic party can well expect a good continuous membership in the national parliament. In the provisional parliament the Catholic membership was eight in a house of 219 members just prior to the general elections whereas in the new elections it has got six. It has anti-Communist feelings and co-operated with the Masjumi on several occasions in this matter.  

An almost similar is the case with the Parkindo (The Protestant Party of Indonesia), which obtained four seats in the provisional parliament as against eight in the new one. But its organisation though based on the Christian religion, yet derives its support also from non-Christian elements. Its members have no homogeneous political outlook. Like the Catholic Party it obtained two seats in the Ali Sastroamidjojo's Cabinet established after the general elections of 1956.

CHAPTER VII

PARTIES BASED ON MARXISM

Dr. Sjahriar, the founder of the Partai Socialis Indonesia (P.S.I.) prior to the Medan insurrection in 1948, joined hands with the Communist leader, Amir Sjarifuddin. The breach occurred between the two associates on the issue of tactics to bring forth Socialism. Amir Sjarifuddin wanted a Moscow-brand Communism whereas Sjahriar was a nationalist who believed in democratic socialism on evolutionary lines. Sjahriar found the Socialist Party in the year 1945 with the object of building up a rank of intellectually convinced socialists who should work for the cause of Socialism through propaganda and appeal to the masses.\(^1\)

The P.S.I. is not a regular member of the Socialist International, whose Asian members meet occasionally in various Asian countries, but nevertheless maintains contact with the Socialist parties of other countries. It believes that at this time it is more important to build up its own strength than to work on an international level.

Sjahriar believes in an intellectual approach, which would imply a long-term policy for the achievement of Socialism. He criticizes the policy of the Indonesian Communist in their alignment with Moscow and usually his criticism is very sound. That is one reason that the Communist party very often goes to the extreme in its attack against Sjahriar and the Socialist Party.\(^2\)

The P.S.I. advocates a socialism based on Indonesian environment where desa or the village forms a

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1. Sjahriar's Socialism is not of a militant form but a creed based rather on Bernstein's concept of revisionism. Any Socialism should be in accord with the national environments. See Kahin, op. cit. p.320. Amir Sjarifuddin was also a close associate of Sjahriar during the World War, when both of them worked underground against the Japanese. See, p. supra.

distinct entity in the economic life of the country.

The existence of desa precludes the application of Marxism to Indonesian conditions. Sjafrir says:

"The people in the desa, or village, produce their own food, and do not have so many needs from the outside world. The desa has shown in the past that it can survive without money. In our national existence, then, it goes to make up a vast area where the tendency toward stability and order is at its greatest. Only in the regions where there are rebels and guerrillas operating is the desa in turmoil. Provided the areas of turbulence do not expand, the order and stability of the desa will prove the factor able to prevent the complete national chaos the Communists are so hoping for."

An unusual feature of the Indonesian Socialist Party is that, besides its own limited membership consisting of some well educated persons in all walks of life, it cuts across the other political organisations, like the Socialist groups with the Masjumi and the PNI. The prominent members of the party besides Sjafrir have been Hamid Algodrie, Soedjatmoko, Takdeer Alisjahbana, Subadis Sastrostoma and Djoohan Sjaroezah, all Western educated persons of the urban areas having little contact with masses at large, are unable to understand the intellectual appeal of the party.

The P.S.I. representation in the post-election Parliament is five members against 15 in the provisional one. The total numbers of P.S.I. voters has come to 753191 in a total of more than 43 million votes in the country. A little more than 30 per cent of the P.S.I. votes came from the island of Bali, which has neither a Muslim nor a Christian population. Neither its students' organization G.M.S. (Gerakan Mahasiswa Socialis) or the Socialist Youth Movement, is in any way very popular among the students. Nevertheless, the leader of the Party, Sutan Sjafrir,

regards this party as an avant garde charged with a mission to the heathen. But the facts mentioned above repudiate the claim of the party to represent the intelligensia of the country.

The differences existing among the P.S.I. and P.N.I. preclude the formation of an alliance in the near future. Apart from these differences, the varying outlooks of the two parties are as based on personal dislikes among Sjahrrir and some of the P.N.I. leaders. The success of the P.N.I., according to Dr. Sjahrrir, is mostly due to its being dubbed as "President's Party", and Sukarno has never repudiated this charge. The nationalist leaders, Dr. Sjahrrir further states, consider the P.S.I. as analytical, whereas, they consider themselves as synthetical in their approach to various problems and regard the Socialist ideology as something out of tune with the Indonesian masses.

The distinctive feature of the P.S.I. ideology is its plea for foreign aid in the sphere of industry and close alingment with the Western democracies. Dr. Sjahrrir maintains there is practically no indigenous middle class in this country as much as 40 per cent of the entire government receipts come from the foreign estates and industrial concerns. The big foreign concerns in the country are mainly owned by the Dutch, Americans and the British. To invite foreign capital is just the extension of the existing foreign investments. In this way there is enough ground of collaboration between the P.S.I. and the Masjumi.

There was also the P.K.I. (Partial Kommunis Indonesian), a strictly Moscow type branch of Communism, that was recreated after the revolution under the leadership of Mr. Mohammad Jusuf. The P.K.I., of which Mr. Jusuf


5. All these points are based on a personal interview with Dr. Sjahrrir.
became the leader, was actually sponsored by the Japanese during the last days of the war and prior to their defeat. The party under the leadership of Mr. Mohammad Jusuf could not make any headway and suffered a severe setback on account of its anti-Republican activities. The leadership of the party soon passed on to the veteran Communist leaders, Sardjono and Alimin, and it gained some popularity among the masses.

During the period of the revolution the political prestige of the Communist Party was high because of its persistent anti-Japanese activities and also because the Communist leaders had made a common cause with the nationalist leaders and shared the advantages of their popularity. Moreover, the Communists thought it the ideal time for permeating their influence through infiltration in the ranks of the other parties and to bring them into line with the Communist ideology. These parties which slowly merged into the P.K.I. were the Labour Party and the Pasindo. As a part of the Communist Party programme, it was stated:

"The army as the most important weapon of State power must receive special attention. Its cadres and members must be given special education in keeping with the tasks of the army as the most important apparatus to defend our national revolution which also means to defend the interests of the working people. The army must be led by progressive cadres. Obviously and above all among its cadres, the army must be cleansed of reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements."

Communism thrives on discontent and feelings of mass poverty. It was exactly the time, when the Communists in the Eastern countries like China, Indo-China and Malaya achieved initial success and were aspiring to capture the reins of the respective governments of their countries. A great impetus was given to the event by

6. On numerous occasions the PKI-sponsored gangs attacked republic police posts. This sort of activities were bound to make this party unpopular. Jusuf was finally arrested. See Kahin: op.cit., p.159.

7. A.C.P.I. conference resolution in August, 1948
D.N. Aidit: A Short History, op.cit., p.28-9
the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia by the USSR. The U.S.S.R. had also shown her willingness to exchange diplomatic relations with the Republic of Indonesia. The Republic took the Soviet attitude as a mere gesture of goodwill towards her and an action against the colonial powers.

The Republican Government called its representative in Prague, Dr. Suripno, home for consultations. Along with Suripno, who was himself a Communist, also returned Muso, a veteran Indonesian Communist leader, who had been exiled in the year 1925 by the Dutch regime in Indonesia. On his arrival in Indonesia Muso affiliated the Indonesian Communist Party with Amir Sjarifuddin's party. The Communists in this way gained a considerable support of various labour organisations in the country.

Sjarifuddin in collaboration with other Communist group set up a joint front for all the Communist organisations that was named FDR (Front Demokrasi Rakjat). The FDR consisted of the Labour Party, PKI and Pasindo.

FDR very vehemently attacked the policy of Dr. Hatta, the then Republican Prime Minister, in adopting the "Rationalisation Programme" of the army which meant a demobilisation of a large number of army personnel. Dr. Hatta had drawn up this programme in view of a too unwieldy nature of the Republican army because of economic stringency brought forth by the Dutch blockade against the Republic. According to the FDR the Government could not provide alternative jobs to the demobilised personnel of the army. Many of the army men, likely to be affected adversely by the "Rationalisation" scheme which got under way in March, 1948, became sentimentally attached to the FDR's appeal.

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8. ch. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, the Communist Revolt in Java, the Background, Far Eastern Survey, Nov. 17, 1948. The immediate causes of the revolt were the economic blockade of the Republican territory by the Dutch following the Dutch military action in July, 1947, and the unfettered activities of the radical elements.

9. Dr. Amir Sjarifuddin, the ex-Prime Minister, was (contd.
against the republic. Hatta's scheme was motivated solely by the consideration of bringing forth an economy which was so badly needed due to the enticement by the Dutch.

The FDR wanted the resignation of Hatta and the setting up of an all-party national government wherein the defence portfolio be given to Amir Sjarifuddin. The Communist felt that the policy of Dr. Hatta was to disband the Communist element in the army. On the refusal of the Communist proposal by Hatta, the FDR planned uprising against the Republic. It was stated in the party programme: "We will cut off all relations with the government and continue our struggle under our own leadership either as rebellion or as separate government." Beside, a long plan for the violent struggle was chalked out.

The FDR instigated some labour organisations to stage a coup. In the month of September, 1948, the labour union of the textile industry at Delanggu (Surakarta), backed by some farmers, arranged a strike demanding the increase in their pay and the dismissal of a number of leading persons of the Textile Board (DTN) who, in their opinion, were guilty of corruption. The strikers, led by Muso, also demanded the reshuffling of the Hatta Cabinet. As a result, this strike the situation in the country had become extremely critical.

The affairs could not be settled between the labourers and the leaders of the Textile Board. The Delanggu strike affairs were therefore discussed in the session of the executive body of the central Indonesia National Committee. In this Committee a resolution was adopted to make an inquiry into the situation of this Government-owned industry in order to bring about a settlement between the B.T.N. Leaders and the labourers.

\[\text{Footnote 10:} \text{Cited in Kain: Nationalism and Revolution, op.cit. p.271.}\]

11. \text{Ibid.} The attempted coup was the result of the shrunken economy of the Republic owing to the Dutch blockade then existing around the Republican territory. In spite of the sad economic condition prevailing in the Republic, the people, as a whole, showed a callous attitude to the Communist uprising. See International Spectator, "De Partei Kommunis Indonesia", Den Haag, July 11, 1951.
As for the political front, efforts were made in the months of June and July by Dr. Hatta to patch up difference with the People's Democratic Front (F.D.R.). All the political parties were approached to come forward with their proposal to solve the crises threatening the solidarity of the state. All the parties in the F.D.R. issued a joint statement assailing the Government to align with the Russian block and revise the present policy. Meanwhile the FDR led by Dr. Amir Sjarifuddin and P.K.I. (Indonesian Communist Party) were still demanding the cabinet reshuffling. The strike expanded to other places and the situation went from bad to worse.

At least the insurrection of the F.D.R. and P.K.I. led by Muso burst out on September 15, 1948, as an armed rebellion. President Soekarno, in his radio speech on September 19, considered the P.K.I. and F.D.R's action as a revolt against the Government that would put the country in great danger. The first attempt of the F.D.R. and P.K.I. to seize power through army insurrection at Surakarta failed owing to the timely action by the Republican troops in suppressing the uprising. However, the town of Madiun was conquered by the rebels and it is on account of this that rebellion was known as the "Madiun Insurrection."

Colonel Gatot Subroto was appointed the military governor of Surakarta, Semarang, Pati and Madiun and within six days Madiun was reconquered and with/nearly one month the whole rebellion was suppressed. The rebellion was the major Communist move to oust Mrs. Soekarno and Hatta and was part of the international Soviet strategy for expansion. But the prompt action by the Republic foiled the attempt. 12

The Madiun Insurrection was an attempt of the "frustrated Communists", who with the achievement of

Independence had seen that since the goal of the national struggle was achieved, there was now little scope for the emergence of the "rule of the proletariat". With the quelling of the war, the Communist influence in Indonesia was never altogether dead. On account of the past association of the Communist Party with the struggle for independence, and due to many other factors, the support to the Communist party in the country has been in existence but not always clearly manifest. Many sociological factors existing in the country do make Indonesia a fertile ground for the penetration of the Communist ideology and a challenge to the existing order. The main factors are:

(a) The shrunken economy of the country and the low standard of living among the masses.\(^{13}\)

(b) The "native Communists" existing among the rural communes throughout the archipelago does certainly give impetus to Communist propaganda. There is an increasing consciousness among the population for co-operation, communal ownership and production. The Dutch Government also tried to introduce the masses\(^{14}\) with the concept of "money economy" but the people insisted on their own adat laws and practised the old socialistic communal practices. The Communist Party of Indonesia has also frequently posed as a champion of the local tradition against the "disturbing influence of Dutch slave capitalism," manifested in the programme of estate production that had reduced the native population to "mere slaves".\(^{15}\)

The failure of the insurrection was attributed by the Communists to a lack of collaboration between the

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14. Ibid.
F.D.R. and the "anti-imperialist" world forces, i.e., there was not proper co-ordination between the F.D.R. and the directing body in the Soviet Union. It was "an ill-coordinated and poorly executed revolt against the Republican Government". But the immediate effect of the insurrection was the utter unpopularity of the Communist Party among the masses. The Republican Government, on its part, became alert and sought to remove Pro-PKI officers from the important posts in the army either through transfers or compulsory retirements.

From 1948 to about the middle of 1951, the P.K.I. remained very much on the defensive in view of her sunken prestige among the masses. An effort was then launched to gain power. The Communists tried to put the blame of the Madium Insurrection on the Masjumi and its leader Hatta and Sukiman. They also involved Hatta in what they termed as the "conspiracy" and "provocation" against the progressive forces of the Communist Party. But the statements of the Communist leaders mentioned above and the P.K.I.'s official pronouncements just prior to the insurrection and even after that do not give credence to this charge. All this had been taken by the responsible nationalist and Masjumi circles as sordid attempts to win back the lost prestige and the mass character of the Communist Party.

Two years after the Madium Insurrection the party made efforts to rebuild its position mostly by exploiting the worsening economic situation in the country and the

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18. Aidit: History, op.cit. pp.32-33. Also by the same author, the Road to People's Democracy, op.cit.p.39.
19. Ibid.
existing conflicts among the two major parties, the P.N.I., and the Masjumi. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.I., was held in January, 1951, during which the stock-taking was carried out for the purpose of rejuvenating the Communist Movement in Indonesia. At another Plenum of the Party held in April, 1951, a constitution for the Communist Party of Indonesia was drafted for the purpose of "giving an incentive for the development of the Party throughout Indonesia and for raising its level." The fundamental purpose of the C.P.I. at that time was stated by Aidit as two-fold: Firstly, to solve the problem of building a United National Front based on the alliance of workers and peasants. Secondly, the problem of building a bolshevised Communist Party of Indonesia, which is nation-wide in scale and has a broad mass character.

The problems for the P.K.I. were different indeed in view of the "Memories of Madiun". The opponents of the Communists like the Socialists and the Masjumi were persistently reminding the masses about the P.K.I.'s role in inciting the Madiun Insurrection which was tantamount to stabbing the Republic in the back when her very existence was in danger as a result of hostilities against the Dutch.

The broad technique of Communist propaganda consisted in attacking what they termed as Anglo-American imperialism and praising the peaceful role of the Soviet Russia and Chinese Republic. Their propaganda machinery got a further incentive in March, 1952, when the Masjumi Government of Dr. Sukiman had to resign on account of its pro-Western leanings. The succeeding P.N.I. Government led by Wilopo, although it had a small representation of

20. Ibid., p.39
21. Ibid.
Masjumi and P.S.I. members, was supported by the Communists, mainly for the purpose of the re-establishing their position. But along with their partial support the Communists also criticised it by exploiting the bad economic condition in the country which they ascribed to the Masjumi participation in the Wilopo Government. The Wilopo Government "wobbled through one crisis after another during its 14 months existence,"23 and ultimately resigned on June 3, 1953.

Another incident during the Wilopo regime exploited by the Communists is known as Oct. 17, 1952, affair. The background of this incident is that the then Defence Minister Sultan of Jogjakarta, Hamengku Buwono, sought the reorganisation of the army and its modernisation. It would have necessitated the displacement of a number of senior army officers. A group of these officers, some of whom were trained under the Japanese and were more sympathetic to the P.N.I., thought this policy of streamlining the army as an attempt directed against them. The P.N.I. leaders in the Parliament charged that the army was led by the leaders who were in line with the Socialist Party of Dr. Sjafrir. The P.N.I. on October 16, moved a resolution calling forth the reorganisation of the army leadership. This pronouncement was considered by the Defence Minister and his sympathisers as an insult against the army. The next day there were demonstrations in Djakarta and the crowd demanding the dissolution of the Parliament and challenged its authority, as a non-elected body to pass judgement on the army affairs.

There emerged after these demonstrations two groups within the army. The major group, belonging to the anti-demonstration side, condemned the October 17, incident.

and wanted reorganization in the army ranks not on the lines advocated by the Sultan of Djogjakarta and also inspired themselves against Sjahrin and his group. The P.K.I. thought it a golden opportunity to take the side of this major faction. It was the first time after the Medan insurrection that the P.K.I. and P.N.I., had formed an alliance. The Masjumi Party took the other side supporting the proposal of the Defence Minister.

The immediate cause of the fall of the Wilopo Cabinet was an attack on the Masjumi Minister of Home Affairs, Rum, in his dealing with the problem of land distribution in North Sumatra. The P.K.I. joined in this attack. North Sumatra had a good number of large Western owned agricultural enterprises which were given special concessions during the Dutch regime. These enterprises were a source of great revenue to the Government especially in the foreign exchange, as the bulk of the produce of these plantations was meant for export. There were complaints from the side of the leftist members in Parliament that good land had been leased out to the foreign owners whereas the indigenous population was left with insufficient poor land.\(^{24}\)

During the Japanese period and even in subsequent years many squatters had settled on these lands, and there was a demand from the foreign plantation owners for the immediate restoration of land to them. The Wilopo Government, in view of the desperate need of foreign exchange decided to remove these squatters from their illegally occupied land. The Communists at once exploited the situation. Most of the agricultural workers were at once drawn to the Communist propaganda. Besides, there was already living a large number of Chinese around these plantations, most of whom were Communists. Although the Wilopo Government drew up a scheme for the transfer of

these squatters to some other areas, where, besides land, they also offered some cash advance money by the Government, but the settlers defied the Government's orders to vacate the land they occupied already. Some demonstrations took place and as a result of police firing some persons were killed and wounded in March, 1953. The P.K.I. and P.N.I. put forth a common demand for the revision of the existing land distribution policy of the Government. This led to the resignation of the Wilopo Government early in June 3, 1953. The Communists gained some prestige in this way.

After the fall of the Wilopo Government, Wongsongoro, leader of the P.I.R. (Persatuan Indonesian Raja) was called upon to form a new coalition cabinet. The groups participating in the cabinet had a slender majority in Parliament and the main source of strength to this cabinet was President Soekarno himself, who did not want the chaos in parliamentary life to continue.

The Communist Party by this time had become sufficiently strong through the activities of the S.O.B.S.I., the biggest Indonesian trade Union organisation, run on the Communist technique. Its membership in Parliament, 16 in all, formed a considerable faction and was especially important because of the changing nature of the political alignments within the Parliament. It was by far the best organised political party in the country and the authorities were worried by the influx of Communist literature.

25. Ibid. The PNI on numerous occasions voted against the Wilopo Government and on many occasions sided with the leftist groups only to bring the downfall of the Masjumi Party, which participated in the Government.


27. The Statesman, New Delhi, March 11, 1953.
The uneasy period soon gave way to Ali Sastroamidjojo who formed his coalition cabinet in September, 1953. The Communists, in the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet emerged as a powerful group in the Parliament and one of their sympathisers also held the portfolio of defence. 28

Soon after the formation of the Ali Sastroamidjojo’s Coalition Government in September, 1953, a Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party was held in October, in preparation for the 5th Party Congress. At the Plenum amendments were introduced to improve the constitution drawn up in 1951. The 5th National Congress of the Communist Party was finally held in March, 1954, in which a general report concerning the political and organisation situation and a clarification of the programme of the party was furnished by the General Secretary of Party, D.N. Aidit. Apart from this the Congress adopted the General Election Manifesto. 29

The Congress also adopted the purposes and principles of the party with regard to the various internal and external problems facing Indonesia. Giving an outline of these, Mr. Aidit stated:-

"The Indonesian people should not be neutral on the question of peace and war. A neutral attitude benefits the warmongers and awakens the struggle for peace because, by adopting a neutral attitude, we cannot possibly mobilise the masses to oppose war and defend peace to the end." 30

The task of the Party in the sphere of foreign affairs was stated as follows:-

1. To continue the struggle for peace, for the prevention of a new world war and to struggle for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes by negotiation; to struggle for co-operation between Indonesia and all peace-loving countries with the object of preserving peace and preventing war.

28. The Defence Minister Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, belonged to what was known as the Progressive Group in the Parliament. He had spent two years in Moscow, 1925-26, teaching History. He was alleged to be responsible in 1946 for a coup detat to remove President Soekarno in Indonesia. The Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 8, 1954.

29. See the Report by D.N. Aidit: The Road to People’s Democracy for Indonesia, op.cit., pp.40-43.

30. Ibid.
2. To struggle for economic and cultural co-operation between Indonesia and all countries on the basis of mutual advantage and complete equality; to support all people's struggles for complete national independence.

3. To help consolidate the peace victory in Korea and to struggle for an armistice on the Viet Nam front like that already achieved in Korea; to oppose the survival of militarism in Japan and Germany and resist all provocations aimed at the outbreak of a new war in Germany.

4. To struggle so that the position of the United Nations complies with the United Nations Charter as an instrument of mankind for peace, to struggle for the Chinese People's Republic's acceptance as a member of U.N.O. and for the conclusion of a peace pact between the five great powers.

5. To struggle for the abrogation of all treaties and agreements now in force between Indonesia and other countries which jeopardise Indonesia's independence and disturb the peaceful atmosphere in Indonesia.

The Party Congress further outlined the programme on the following lines:-

"The (Communist-led) Government of a United National Front, formed on the basis of the alliance of workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class.

Taking into account the country's backwardness, the Communist Party of Indonesia considers that this Government must not be a government of the dictatorship of the proletariat but a government of the dictatorship of the people. The government will effect not Socialist but democratic reforms. It will be a government capable of uniting all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces, of transferring the land to the peasants without compensation, of ensuring democratic rights of the people; a government capable of defending national industry and trade against foreign competition, of improving the material conditions of workers and abolishing unemployment. In a word, it will be a people's government capable of securing the national independence of the country and its development along path of democracy and progress."

As a supporter of the coalition cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Communist Party tried to build up its prestige. Henceforth its line of propaganda was to work against what was termed as the tentacles of Western Imperialism. The party organised teams to work among the villagers and sufficient care was taken to avoid any

offence against the religious views of the population. The technique worked so well that the party in 1952 claimed membership to over 1,00,000 and expanded the party activities to the regions outside Java. In 1954 the party claimed 5,00,000 members and candidate-members, besides, membership in the front groups of 28,90,000 including more than 2 millions in labour and peasants' organisations. It had fully recovered from the 1948 blow.

The elections in 1955 witnessed the emergence of the P.K.I. as the fourth major political group in the Parliament having 39 seats as against 17 in the provisional Parliament. As regards the regional strength the P.K.I. obtained 14, 15, and 5 seats, respectively in East, Central and West Java, only one each in Djakarta, South Sumatra and Central Sumatra and two in North Sumatra (in the plantation areas). It shows the strictly Javanese nature of the Indonesian Communist Party. As a matter of fact the Communist Party in Indonesia obtained much of its present strength due to the political instability in the country. The Sastroamidjojo Cabinet which in December, 1954 won a vote of confidence mainly due to the Communist support, was termed by President Soekarno as "Progressive Government deserving full support." His further mentioning of Russia and China as models of progress gave much weight to the Communist propaganda.

About the Communist domination in Java the following account aptly describes the causes:—

"In densely populated Java, with its more than 50 millions souls, the complex processes

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33. Aidit: Report, op.cit., p.43


of proletarisation and Social dislocation have probably gone farthest. Here, the uprooted rural masses, having lost most traditional support of the village society and subjected to a swift process of secularisation, have tended to be more prone to accept radical nationalist and Communist ideologies. Rural indebtedness and absentee landlordism, accompanied by a desperate shortage of land, have driven thousands of Javanese to the already over crowded cities; fertile grounds for extreme agitation." 36

CHAPTER VII

EXPERIMENT IN PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT - I

During the period of Dutch rule very little attempts were made by the colonial government to introduce a system of representation in the country. The higher administrative jobs were filled mainly by the Dutch personnel and Indonesians were mostly recruited to the lower official positions. Even in the lower middle and the upper middle service positions the Indonesian representation never went higher than 60 and 38 per cent, respectively. Most of the important civil ranks even in these categories were held either by the Europeans (mostly Dutch) or by the Eurasians who were given a special status by the Dutch. In this way the Dutch tried to build up a colonial caste-system in the country.¹

Still more deplorable was the condition in the country's legislature where the predominance of Dutch representation was fully retained. A series of attempts were made by the Netherlands Government to introduce a system of partial indirect elections in the country, specially with the dawn of the 20th Century, mainly for the purpose of stemming the tide of nationalism sweeping the country.²

In the year 1916, the Dutch Government, after realising the popular uprising against the colonial administration suggested the formation of a representative body.

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¹ In 1938, about seven per cent Indonesians were recruited to the high administrative posts as against 92 per cent Dutch and a small number of Chinese. For an ordinary educated Indonesian there was no opening in any field except in the field of education and even that was restricted. In 1938 only 81 persons graduated from the only three professional colleges in the country. Of these 81 only 40 were Indonesians. See Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies, op.cit. p.215; Kahin: Nationalism and Revolution, op.cit.p.35. Also see W.F. Wethelm: "The Rise of Colonial Caste System" - The Effects of Western Civilisation, op.cit. p.21.

² cf. Chapter II Supra.
to serve as a focus of public opinion in the country. This body known as "Volkeraad" had to serve mainly as an advisory council to the Dutch Governor General in the Indies and had also to function as a legislative body in a very limited sphere. Only a small number of the representatives were elected from the people but these too under official pressure.  

Through the reforms of 1928, the Netherlands Indies Government provided certain administrative changes in the country. The whole of Netherlands Indies was divided into six administrative divisions as follows:

1. Java was divided into three divisions;
2. Sumatra and adjacent islands into one;
3. Borneo one; and
4. The rest of the areas known as "Great East" was combined into one administrative division.

All these administrative units were each under the administrative jurisdiction of a governor. Besides these six divisions, two special governors used to be appointed in the principalities of Solo and Jogjakarta.

This administrative structure continued to work till the advent of the Japanese rule during the World War II in 1942. The Dutch policy towards Indonesia was based on the

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3. D.G. Stibbe: Nederlands India, land en Volk, geschiedenis en bestuur, Amsterdam (1937). The idea of creating Volkeraad was conceived to gauge public opinion and also for the reason that an opponent was less dangerous on the floor of a deliberative assembly than working behind the scene "underground". Volkeraad was in reality an official body containing a majority of nominated members. Among the Indonesian members most of then were officials.

4. A French View of the Netherlands Indies, op.cit., pp.61-63. The powers of the Volkeraad, originally constituted in 1916, were increased in 1925 and 1928. The Dutch praised these reforms, but actually the natives obtained very little advantage.

5. Ibid.
maintenance of the monopoly on the export of certain crops. The following statement illustrates the whole frame of the Dutch policy:

"Still one often hears that it is only the maintenance of their economic interest the Dutch are striving at. In a way this is perfectly true. The Dutch are trying to preserve these interests for the good reason that they represent a considerable amount of invested capital, which otherwise would be a total loss. Furthermore, the world needs the raw material and the products of Indonesia. The country therefore badly needs rehabilitation and reorganization which the Republican Government of Indonesia has shown itself incapable of carrying out. In this respect the Dutch have not only a national but also an international responsibility. The world needs sugar. There is a great demand for cinchona bark, there is a world shortage of tea."

On August 15, 1945, Japan capitulated and her vast war-time empire collapsed. The Indonesian leaders had never expected such an early defeat of Nippon and they had to gear their entire resources and national stamina to cope with the sudden turn of events leading to the birth of free Indonesia. The leaders of all sections of popular opinion in the country joined hands together under the leadership of Soekarno and Hatta to end the bonds of centuries-old colonialism.

At the beginning of August, 1945, a "Committee for the Preparation of Independence" had been set up consisting of 21 members representing almost every section of political opinion in the country. This Committee appointed a sub-committee of seven members who in a meeting at Djackarta approved the draft provisional constitution of the country. The constitution inter alia provided the republican form of Government for the country, with the ultimate sovereignty residing in the people.

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7. Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. The Draft Constitution approved by the seven-member Sub-Committee was soon confirmed by the Preparatory Committee.
The constitution did not embody very clearly the principles of parliamentary Government as in vogue in many countries of Western Europe especially in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the presidential form of Government was adhered to; yet even the powers of the President, in most cases were left undefined. It was required because of the political emergency prevailing at that time. A strong head of the State was required, who like Soekarno, because of his all-prevailing personality, could command influence, prestige and foster unity among the people. In the early days of the Republic the foremost concern of the Indonesians was how to maintain the newly acquired freedom. The principles of parliamentary or presidential democracy were matters for later consideration.

The original intention of the constitution-makers was to establish a presidential form of Government on the pattern of the United States of America. But Soekarno because of his immense mass appeal could exercise powers far more than the President of the United States could do. He was also far more than a symbolic head. In the words of Soekarno himself he is neither like an American nor a French President but a "President of the Indonesian Revolution."

Moreover, the President himself, as a leader of the revolution, was anxious to interfere as little as possible with the routine business of the Government.

It would be further incorrect to say that the provisional constitution was entirely based on the American system of Government. The principle of parliamentary democracy was also kept in view though in considerably vague words. But to all intents and purposes it was maintained that the ultimate sovereignty lay with the people. The first five years of the Republic were the years of continuous warfare against the Dutch, and therefore, the

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full introduction of the principles of parliamentary government did hardly arise.

In these circumstances it would not be far from truth to say that at the dawn of independence the Indonesians had practically little or no experience in the art of government. There was no efficient indigenous civil service as most of the Indonesians held very minor posts as compared to the Dutch. With the advent of Japanese rule in 1942, it was found that many Indonesians who were petty officials in Dutch days were now holding top positions in administrative ranks as the Japanese did not have the much administrative potential to fill the vacuum created by the departure of the Dutch. The result of this sudden shift was virtual chaos in the administrative sphere both during the period of Japanese rule and immediately afterwards.

The Indonesians lacked training in self-government and for this reason it was thought desirable that a benevolent authoritarianism supported by the will of the people would be ideal in the period of transition from the colonialism to independence. Hence more powers were given in the Constitution to the President. He was the leader of the revolution and so commanded greater respect among the masses than any other leader in the country. He was considered a trustee of the will of the people and a veritable guide in the hard, dark and difficult days of the revolution.

The Preparatory Committee, for the first time, elected Drs. Soekarno and Hatta, as President and Vice-President, respectively, of the proposed Republic of Indonesia that was to come into existence after the Japanese withdrawal. The Committee also, in view of the emergency situation prevailing in the country, hastily framed the provisional constitution.

9 There was no precedent by which the election to the two offices could be held. Hence the method of nomination by the Preparatory Committee was adopted.

10 Charles Wolf Jr: op.cit. p.50.
of the Republic pending the final draft to be modelled by
the ad hoc Constituent Assembly to be convened later on at
an appropriate stage.

The Republic came into existence on August 17, 1945,
two days after the fall of Japan, when the President-
designate Soekarno proclaimed to the world:

"We the Indonesian people hereby declare our
independence. Acts concerning the transfer
of power, etc., will be executed, as soon as
possible. The struggle of Indonesian
independence has reached a stage of glory
in which the Indonesian people are led to
the gateway of an independent, united,
sovereign, just and prosperous Indonesian
State."

The proclamation draft was written by "Bung Karno" (as the President was called so, by his countrymen out of
love, as a comrade in the struggle for independence, who
also pledged his people's determination to stand by the
Charter of the United Nations, in defence of the high
ideals of freedom and equality.

The provisional constitution gave wide powers to one
man and a strong tendency towards authoritarianism was
visible. No general elections could be held at this stage
and it was held by the Preparatory Committee that pending
the general elections the functions of the elected re-
presentatives should be exercised by the President assisted
by a Central Indonesian National Committee, or the K.N.I.P.
(Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat). With this proclamation
on August 29, 1945, the Preparatory Committee was dissolved.
The function of K.N.I.P. was stated to be merely advisory
exercising no legislative powers.

The role of the President, in the early days of the
Republic, far exceeded that of the elected President of
any other State. Soon after the proclamation setting up
the K.N.I.P., President Soekarno appointed under a

12. The word "Bung" literally means brother and is
    informal title.
13. Kahin: Nationalism and Revolution, op.cit.,
p.139.
Presidential, decree 135 members representing various
religious, economic, social and ethnic groups in the
country, including all the members of the dissolved
Preparatory Committee, as members to the K.N.I.P. 14

The K.N.I.P., soon after coming into existence,
took a serious view of the wide powers given to the
President under the provincial constitution and wanted &
the exercise of some kind of legislative or popular control.
Some fifty members of the K.N.I.P. led by Sjarhirs on
Oct 7, 1945, handed in a petition to the President to
confer that body with some real legislative functions.
The Vice-President acting on behalf of the President
at once agreed and according to Act 8 of the Constitu-
tion issued a decree that pending the general elections
and coming into being of a popularly elected chamber,
the K.N.I.P. shall be given legislature powers and it
shall participate in determining the broad lines of
State policy. 15

In this way an orientation of the provisional
constitution from the Presidential to a Parliamentary
type of Government was discernable. Moreover, the K.N.I.P.
entrusted the normal exercise of its legislative and
supervisory powers to a working Committee (Badan Pekerdja)
consisting of 15 members, which soon became an important
organ of the Government. It was this Working Committee,
which, soon after its coming into being, advised the
President to establish political parties, responsible to
the K.N.I.P., for legislative purposes. Also it was
provided that Cabinet Ministers should be held responsible
to K.N.I.P. All these suggestions were approved by
the President and proclaimed in a Government degree. 16
The formation of political parties was agreed to by the

Also Halim: Menudju Ke Parlemen Sempurna (Towards a
Full-fledged Parliament), Resue Indonesia, Jogjakarta,
1946, p.12.
President subject to the restriction that these parties
shall strengthen the struggle for independence and "Guarantee
the security of the Society". 17

The system of parliamentary democracy instituted in
this way was far from being moulded on true parliamentary
form. The powers of the President were still large and
extensive. The deviation from the original presidential
pattern was made to furnish a system of parliamentary res-
ponsibility wherein the will of the masses should be
crystallised. President Soekarno in the beginning never
opposed the granting of maximum powers to him in the
constitution as the circumstances required his personal
initiative and attention at that phase of the struggle
for independence. But he always favoured the idea of the
devolution of power of administration to the cabinet,
whenever any such suggestion was made to him. Nevertheless
the powers of Soekarno as a President cannot be underestimated.
He has all along been a mighty force behind the constitution,
because of his immense social prestige. He has acted
far from being merely a symbolic head of the State.

The significance of the Presidential powers may be
realised by the part he played in various periods of
national, political and constitutional crises. No re-
construction of cabinets has taken place except that the
visible or invisible hand of the President has always been
there to play a significant role in behind the extensive
political activities. 18

Another example of the President's tremendous powers
may be seen in his decree of December 27, 1946 increasing
the membership of the K.N.I.P. from 200 to 550. This

17. Ibid.

18. See the role of the President (a) At the time of the
kidnapping of the then Prime Minister, Sjahrir in June,
1946; (b) During the period of Medium Insurrection in
1948 and (c) After the fall of Sjarif-ud-Din Cabinet,
when a new "Presidential Cabinet" under Hatta was
appointed. See Rupert Emerson: op. cit., p.25,

19. Presidential Decree No. 6, 1946.
initiative of the President was criticised by a majority of the members of the Working Committee and a bill was drafted to repeal the Presidential measure. On this criticism by the Working Committee the matter was referred to the K.N.I.P., which also appeared to back the Working Committee's decision. Vice-President Hatta pleaded that if the K.N.I.P. continued its support of the Working Committee's decision he and President Soekarno would be forced to resign. On this the Working Committee withdrew the repealing bill and the President's action was approved. President Soekarno during the course of his speech stated:

"In my opinion until we are able to leave the composition of the representative bodies to the electorate, it is the task of the President himself to nominate and appoint members because of the fact that the President himself is regarded as the representative of the whole people."

Thus the basis of the provisional constitution of the year 1945 had been fundamentally the consciousness among the people for a unified action to maintain independence under the leadership of Soekarno and Hatta. The Constitution, for this very reason, gave maximum powers to the President. He possessed the executive, legislative and judicial powers.

In the domain of executive he was vested with the function of Supreme Commander of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. He was the Chief Executive and in that capacity appointed diplomatic representatives and consuls to foreign countries.

20. Kahin: Nationalism and Revolution, op.cit. p.202. The President assumed that to increase the membership of the K.N.I.P. was the prerogative of the President; see Assaat: Hukum Tatanegara Republik Indonesia dalam masa peralihan (period of transition) Djakarta, 1947, pp.33-5. The expansion was carried out by the President with full discretion by including representatives of all shades of public opinion in the country, i.e., all parties regions including the Dutch occupied areas were fully represented. Peraturan Presiden (Presidential Decree) No. 6, 1945.
These powers were in no way nominal. The President, as leader of the revolution organised the defence forces of the country. On August 20, 1945, President Soekarno issued an order to form the "Peace Preservation Corps" (B.K.R), to be charged with the preservation of law and order in the Republic. Within a very short period local units were established throughout the Republic. A separate Minister of Security was appointed obviously under the orders of the President. On October 5, 1945, a Government decree announced the formation of the official army of the Republic and named it "Tentara Keamanan Rakyat" (People's Security Army) or T.K.R. On January 4th, 1946, the name T.K.R. was changed into Tentara Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Republican Army) or T.R.I. Again on June 3, 1947 the name of T.R.I. was changed to T.N.I. (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) or the Indonesian National Army. On June 27, President Soekarno in the capacity as Supreme Commander of the Republican armed forces administered the oath to top officers of the army command.21

Similarly, the Marine Corps and the Republican Air Force were established. The President as leader of the revolution had a considerable part to play in the organisation and administration of the defence forces of the country. At a later stage also, in view of the complex nature of the Indonesian Army, being formed of various regular and irregular organisations in the country, the position of the President was a stabilising force to the heterogeneous nature of the defence forces. During the Dutch regime in Indonesia very little attention was paid by the Government in training the administrative and especially the defence potential of the Indonesian population. The result was that when Indonesian army came into being it had no established traditions to follow. It was only the magnetic

social appeal of seeking that brought forth unity in the
diversity of outlook in the ranks of the defence forces.

As head of the country's executive, the President
at the initial stage of the Republic performed a tremen-
dous role. Before the inauguration of the K.N.I.P., the
Preparatory Committee in its decree on August 19, 1945
divided the whole Indonesian territory into eight daerahs
(provinces) namely: East Java, Middle Java, West Java,
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Maluku. The President
took the initiative in the appointment of governors to these
newly created provinces.

In the field of Legislature, the constitution of
1945 gave no less powers to the President. As a matter
of fact, the K.N.I.P., the Central Legislature body was
entirely nominated by Soekarno, and he on his part considered
that in the matter of nomination, he had the full confidence
of the people.

The constitution did not leave the President with
the absolute powers of law-making. The supreme legislature
power vested with the President in concurrence with
the House of Representatives. However, the President had
the power to enact ordinances. In 1948, and on the
occasion of the Dutch military action against the Republic,
the President, through an ordinance, declared a state of
siege throughout the Republic territory. But all such
ordinances must be ratified by the House of Representatives
in the next session. There is, however, no instance that
an ordinance enacted by the President was not ratified by
the Parliament.

In the domain of law-making, the President and the
House of Representatives had equal powers and the power
of initiative lay solely with the latter. The President
had the veto power and any bill vetoed by him could not be
resubmitted during the same session of the house.23

22. Art. 22.
The entire relationship between the President and the Parliament was based primarily on goodwill and understanding. The nature of the struggle that was going on against the Dutch colonial regime engendered a sense of national solidarity. Although the constitution did not have clear provision with regard to the limitations of the presidential powers and the parliamentary control over the executive, yet the matter went on smoothly because of the revolutionary leadership of Soekarno and Hatta.

Amongst the legislative powers of the President may also be mentioned the power of the proclamation of martial law, the conditions of which are mainly determined by him in collaboration with the Parliament.\(^\text{24}\)

In the judicial field the constitution stipulated a Supreme Court, wherein the judicial power was to be vested. Indonesia inherited a judicial system from the Dutch where all the high offices were manned by the non-Indonesians. Yet the President took the initiative in appointing suitable personnel to fill in these jobs. However, the President, in accordance with the constitution and like the President of the United States of America, was given the power to grant pardons and amnesties.\(^\text{25}\) But again for this purpose the precedent set forth parliamentary control over the powers of the President who exercises these powers at the initiative of the Ministry of Justice.

In the different spheres of governmental activity the constitution provided that the President shall be assisted by a Vice-President. Here again the contention of the original framers of the constitution was the principle of lively co-operation between the President and Vice-President, on the one hand, and President and Parliament on the other. Soekarno and Hatta, leaders of the revolution, were considered as symbolising the will of the

\(^{24}\) Art. 12.

\(^{25}\) Art. 14.
The powers of the Vice-President were not clearly provided in the constitution, except those stated above. Ever since the declaration of independence of Indonesia, the role of the Vice-President in the administration has been difficult to gauge by students of constitutional law. It is implied, however, that the powers of the Vice-President depend on the actual prestige of the incumbent of the office. A person like Wattu, because of his immense social prestige, may intervene in the administration and carry his point. In the year 1945, when the Linggadjati Agreement with the Dutch was to be approved by the K.N.I.P., the majority of the members of that body were not in favour of the agreement that gave wide concessions to the former colonial power. But the intervention of both the President and the Vice-President and their threat to resign if their suggestion of expanding the K.N.I.P. membership was not acceded to, led to the acceptance of their proposal.

The existence of the Working Committee as a permanent representative organ of Parliament and of the cabinet responsible to the Legislature created a strange dualism which meant a conflict between the executive and the legislature. The Working Committee sought to establish its control over the cabinet considering itself an executive body. The former held that it could even ask the cabinet or some of its members to resign. The cabinet held itself responsible to the main legislative body, i.e., the Parliament or the K.N.I.P. only. However, no such case arose at any time in the post-independence constitutional history of Indonesia.

To determine the relationship between the Working Committee and the Cabinet and their respective connections with the Parliament, it was held as an inference by the

27. Assaat: op.cit. p.34-36. Also see Supra, p.
Working Committee that if the Working Committee demanded the resignation of the Cabinet or any Minister, the Cabinet may either comply or failing this, the whole matter would go to Parliament. If Parliament endorsed the Working Committee's decision the Cabinet would go. If the decision of Parliament was contrary to that of the Working Committee a new Working Committee would be elected by Parliament.

A real conflict arose in 1947 on the occasion of the addition of new members to the K.N.I.P. The Working Committee held that the Presidential decree should not be enforced unless approved by that body and also it expressed itself against any expansion. Notwithstanding this clear opinion, the K.N.I.P. was expanded and that expanded body elected 47 new members to Working Committee and many of the old members were re-elected.

Nevertheless, the first Working Committee did perform some quite useful work in about two years of its existence and acted as an efficient Parliament. The Preparatory Committee, during the brief period of its existence, created eight provinces (or Daerahs) for administrative purposes, and the newly formed K.N.I.P. (Central Parliament) gave mandates to form local parliaments (Komite Nasional Indonesia) or K.N.I's for each of these provinces. The function of these legislative bodies was to assist the provincial governors. The regulations for the setting up of K.N.I's were framed by the K.N.I.P. The Working Committee of the K.N.I.P., on its part passed a measure with the approval of the President to the effect that each of these K.N.I.s, shall have their respective Chairman appointed by the Central Government. Moreover, it was provided that the K.N.Is. shall have their own provincial Working Committees duly elected by them. 29

During the period of its existence the Working Committ

29. Kohin: op.cit., p.154
played a conspicuous role in initiating some important
bills in the Parliament. The records of the first three
years of the Parliament are not available and seem to have
been destroyed due to disturbed conditions prevailing in
the country those days. According to unofficial estimates
out of 98 bills passed by the Parliament in its first three
years of existence, 15 were at the initiative of the
Working Committee. These bills covered very important
matters such as the bill relating to the organisation of
armed forces (No. 3, 1948) and the issue of the Republican
currency (No. 17, 1946). 30

According to the constitution of the House of Repre-
sentatives was to meet in session at least once in every
year. 31 This provision was, of course, fully adhered
to except that in the year 1948, when due to the Dutch
military action no session of the Parliament could be
held and the Working Committee (Badan Pekerja) was left
with the task of advising the President. 32

There were five important sessions of the Parliament
held from the period of proclamation of independence in
1945 to the transfer of sovereignty on 27th December,
1949. 33 The sessions were held as follows:-

1. October, 1945, Djakarta. The K.N.I.P., after
this session, became the regular law-making
body, whereas previously, it acted only in an
advisory capacity.

30. Purba Pratomo: Tiga Tahun Pekerjaan Legislatif Negara
(Three years of the working of State Legislature),
Mimbar Indonesia, Djakarta, No. 33, August 19, 1948.
32. The Working Committee consisted of the members selected
from the K.N.I.P. and because of the critical days of
revolution wielded considerable powers and influence
both in the political parties and the army. The Working
Committee, on account of its permanent tenure did some
very useful and important work in formulating a general
plan of action by the various Indonesian governments
during the period of transition. Mrs. Ali Budiardjo:
Evolution towards Parliamentary Government in Indonesia
(Unpublished thesis submitted in the University of
Cornell in 1955 for the degree of A.M.).
33. Ibid.
2. November, 1945, Djakarta: the Parliament endorsed the principle of a representative government in the country which implied ministerial responsibility. 34

2. August 1946, Solo: The Parliament discussed the negotiations that were being carried on with the Dutch and endorsed the reshuffled Sjahrrir Cabinet.

4. February, 1947, Malang: The Linggadjati Agreement was endorsed.

5. September, 1948, Jogjakarta: The Hague Round Table Agreement was endorsed.

As the constitution was hurriedly drafted, no marked changes could be introduced into the administrative system in vogue during the period of the Dutch rule. A revolutionary change in the structure of administration would have meant fresh troubles. Moreover, it was plain that the Dutch during the latter part of their rule had encouraged the regional tendencies among the people and tried to make out that it was only their colonial government that provided unity to the diversified Indonesia. The new Republic, in order to checkmate these artificial tendencies, adopted the American pattern of Government and administration so far as the powers of the President were concerned. In other matters a unitary form of Government was adhered to in order to develop the spirit of homogeneity among the people. 35 The unitary pattern was also practised by the Dutch during the long span of their rule over the archipelago.

34. The principle of ministerial responsibility implied that the ministers shall be required to have confidence of the Parliament.

No immediate change was made in the existing citizenship laws of the country beyond laying down general provisions providing for the competence of Parliament to enact such regulations. 36

FEDERAL VS. THE UNITARY STATE

During the period of colonial administration in Indonesia suggestions were made on many occasions by some Dutch administrators to transform the East Indies into a number of federating units in place of the then existing unitary type of constitution. In 1912, a former Dutch official in Java, S. Ritsema Van Eck proposed that the Kingdom of Netherlands be composed of various ethnic states and according to his plan Indonesia was to be divided into so many ethnic groups such as the Javanese, the Sudanese, the Malays and the Batak, etc. All these groups were to be provided autonomy in internal affairs and subordinate to a federal government for the whole country. This proposal, because of its "blatantly imperialistic" 37 nature was commonly recognised in the Netherlands as an absurd proposition.

Another such proposal was made in 1917 by Dr. Hendrick Colijn, who subsequently became Prime Minister of the Netherlands. Contrary to the Government proposal to set up a legislative body for the whole Indies (Volksraad), he planned a federal structure consisting of numerous islands grouped as provinces. He also mentioned that his plan would avoid the risk of what he termed as the Java domination over other areas in a unitary state. Again, this proposal was also rejected by Commission on Constitution reforms that had been set up by the Netherlands Government. 38

38. Ibid., p.16
Such proposals were repeated time and again in the Netherlands, which, on all occasions, would not find a ready support even in that country. The Vissman Commission on Constitutional Reforms (Commissie tot bestudeering van Staatsrechtelijke hervormingen) in 1941 stated in its report:

"The federation plan can only be realized far in the future. A long and difficult path of decentralization has to be trodden before decentralization and federation can be achieved practically." 39.

The colonial government, however, though not accepting the federation idea, had a policy to build autonomous units within the sphere of a unitary constitution. The matters changed after the World War II, when the Dutch, in order to counterbalance the newly set up Republic of Indonesia, thought it politically advisable to implement the dormant proposal of federation. Dr. Van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Indies, in the post-war days of 1945 stated:

"It perhaps will be best that the construction of Indonesia be a sort of Indonesian Commonwealth (Gemeenbest) or a United States of Indonesia, whereby the ultimate aim comes to the fore, namely, the creation of a self-governing land." 40.

The Republic of Indonesia, during the period of its negotiations with the Dutch, under the stress of circumstances agreed to the principle of federation. 41

The Constitution of the original Republic of Indonesia (in 1945) provided for a unitary type of constitution and was confined to a specified area beyond the Dutch control.

39. Ibid. p.18
40. Ibid. p.20
41. The Linggadjati Agreement between the Republic and the Dutch provided the ultimate objective as the formation of a sovereign democratic state on the basis of federation to be called the United States of Indonesia, with the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo and the Great East as the main constituents. For text of the treaty see: I. Chaudhry: The Indonesian Struggle, Lahore, 1947.
Through the Linggadjati Agreement, signed between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, on November 15, 1945, the Dutch had recognised the Republic as the de facto Government in Java, Sumatra, Madura, Borneo and the Great East, i.e., the islands between Celebes and New Guinea. According to the same agreement in order to settle political disputes, the Netherlands and the Republic voluntarily entered into an "equal and indissoluble partnership", under the Netherlands Crown, through the formation of the United States of Indonesia (known as R.U.S.I.), consisting of the Republic, Borneo and the Great East. The proposed federation as originally planned, was to come into force from January 1, 1949. 42

Subsequently, the Linggadjati Agreement was nullified by the mutual recrimination of the two parties blaming each other of displaying bad faith. Mitter occasional clashes occurred between the armed forces of the two sides and the matter was referred to the Security Council of the United Nations. Through the intervention of the "Committee of Good Offices", appointed by the Security Council, the two parties came to a settlement through negotiations. The representatives of the Republic and the Federal Constitutive Assembly representing the other units of the proposed federation agreed about the nature of the provisional constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia composed of 16 units (including the Republic), all forming part of the Netherlands Indonesian Union.43


43. The two delegations met at the Hague and the resultant agreement from these talks is known as Round Table Conference Agreement (R.T.C. Agreement). The Federal Constitution was jointly adopted. For text of R.T.C. Agreement: Ronde Tafel Conference, Feiten en Documenten, The Hague, 1949, pp. 136-139.
The federal republic was inaugurated on December 27, 1949, under a constitution that was quite a departure from any constitution hitherto adopted in Indonesia. The Republic of Indonesia, having the largest population, was a unit like other Dutch-sponsored states (Negaras).

The Federal Government was considered to be supreme over its constituent units, i.e., the Republican Government alone could not frame the constitution. A provision was made in the constitution for a regionally constituted legislature, with wide powers given to the President of the Union. A system of judicial review was also provided.

The constitution provided for a democratic federal system of Government, with a National Assembly of 150 members (out of which the Republic had to elect 50), and following the United States model, a Senate was also provided with two members from each of the federal Units. In the National Assembly, nine, six and three seats were reserved for the Chinese, European and Arab minorities, respectively.

It was also inter alia stated in the Constitution that within a year of the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, a Constituent Assembly shall meet to draft a permanent constitution for the country.

The proposed structure of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union was covered in the Statute of the Union between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. The relation which each of the two units maintained towards each other was also fully amplified in the Statute. The latter implied the concept of voluntary and lasting co-operation between the partners.44

The rapidly growing consciousness among the people of Indonesia for greater coherence and solidarity in their national ideals could not adjust itself to the disintegrating tendencies underlining the provisional federal

44. Art. 6 of the Statute of Union.
work properly. In the first four months of the R.U.S.I., the component states of East and West Java, as well as central Java, voluntarily merged themselves in the Republic with its capital at Jogjakarta. Soon a popular feeling grew in the other states (now one) in favour of union with some centralising state, i.e., they thought of joining hands together with the Republic in casting aside the artificial bonds of federalism, deemed by most of the Indonesians as hand-maid of Dutch colonialism and a pistol directed against their national aspirations. The pressure for a Unitary Republic was felt all around and an agreement was reached between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of United States of Indonesia with regard to the formation of the Unitary Republic for the country, which came into existence on August 17, 1950, following the Act on the transformation of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia into the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. 45

Following the signing of the Agreement on May 19, 1950, a joint communiqué was issued by both the federal and the governments of the component states, the Republic of Indonesia on July 12, 1950, that an overall agreement had been reached. The Agreement originally concluded on May 19, 1950, contains the following points:-

1. The Provisional House of Representatives of the Unitary Republic is to be formed with the amalgamation of the R.U.S.I. Houses of Representatives, the Senate, and of the Supreme Advisory Council. This new House will have a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman. It meant that the Legislature under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of

Indonesia was uni-cameral instead of the bi-cameral one in the R.U.S.I.

The Institution of the Senate was abrogated since in the unitary state there would be no component territories. The composition of the House of Representatives was to be in accordance with Section II of the Constitution of the unitary state under Article 56 to 77. The strength of the House was to be 232 members.

2. The Constituent Assembly will consist of members elected through popular elections on the basis of one member to every 3,000,000 inhabitants, with due consideration to minority representation. This proviso in the Charter of Agreement between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (R.U.S.I) and Republic of Indonesia (R.I) has been ignored by the latter in practice after the promulgation of the agreement, and it has now been provided that since the Constituent Assembly should have a wider range of representation, therefore, there should be one representative to every 150,000 inhabitants (Article 135 of the R.I. (1950) Constitution).

3. Pending codification and enactment of the laws of the Unitary State the existing laws and regulations shall remain in force. Whenever possible, the R.I. Constitution shall apply.

4. The Constitution of the unitary state shall come into being by amending the R.U.S.I. Constitution in such a way that to the essential parts of the constitution (1945) are added suitable parts of the R.U.S.I. Provisional Constitution.

5. The Council of Ministers will consist of Ministers who shall be responsible for the Government's policy; the Council shall be responsible individually for his ministry.

6. Prior to the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, the office of the Vice-President shall be
created. 46

7. It was also provided that the Unitary State of Indonesia shall consist of the following ten provinces:

a) Java and Madura to be divided into Provinces of West, Central and East Java.

b) Sumatra to be divided into the Provinces of North, Central and South Sumatra.

The Constitution contained in 167 articles inter-alia stated that:

c) East Indonesia to be divided into Provinces of the Lesser Sunda Islands; Celebes and the Moluccas.

d) Borneo.

As the result of the Agreement of May 19, 1950, and in accordance with the joint communiqué referred to above, the draft Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was finally approved by President Soekarno and Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta and was officially published by the Ministry of Justice.

46. For the first time the Vice-President Dr. Mohammad Hatta was appointed by Dr. Soekarno by nomination.
CHAPTER VIII

EXPERIMENT IN PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT — II

The Unitary Republic proclaimed on August 17, 1950, in place of the Federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (R.U.S.I.) inaugurated on December 27, 1949, was actually identical with the Republic of Indonesia that originally came into existence on the same date in 1945. 1

The provisional constitution of the R.U.S.I., was transformed into the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The original constitution of the year 1945 was actually modelled on the lines of the American Constitution, with maximum executive powers to the President. The function of the ministers was simply to assist the President and these ministers were to be appointed and discharged at the discretion of the President. 2 The Parliament had little control over the President, but, on the contrary, the latter exercised supervisory power over the legislature and possessed the power of veto in legislation. 3 At the most the legislature shared the legislative power with the President as a junior partner.

The constitution of the Unitary Republic incorporated the essentials of the two constitutions and added new provisions that should fit in the new environments and conditions. The R.U.S.I. constitution was comparatively more elaborate than the hastily drawn up constitution of the Republic in 1945. Hence many provisions of the former were incorporated in the new provisional constitution of the Republic, whereas the spirit of the original republican constitution was also fully preserved. The provisional

1. The Charter of Agreement between the Republic and the R.U.S.I. provided: "We agree to implement in co-operation the formation of a unitarian State as a materialisation of the concept of the Republic of Indonesia aimed at in the Proclamation of the 17th August, 1945". See Kahin: op.cit., p. 461.


3. Art. 21
constitution of the unitary state had duly incorporated the provisions of the Charter of Agreement concluded between the R.U.S.I. and the R.I. Governments on May 19, 1950.4

Professor Soepomo, the then Minister of Justice in the R.U.S.I. Government, clarified the nature of the new constitution in an official elucidation in the following lines:5

(a) The principles which in effect were recognised by the R.U.S.I. as well as by the R.I., but which were not adequately elucidated either in R.U.S.I. Provisional Constitution or in the R.I. (1945) Constitution, are clarified in the Provisional Constitution of the unitary state, proclaimed on August 17, 1950.

(b) Analogous principles in the R.U.S.I., and R.I. which, being differently worded, might give rise to difference of opinion, are given a uniform wording.

(c) Wording and nomenclature, in particular those which are open to misinterpretation, have been improved.

(d) Wherever necessary, technical improvements have been made.

The Indonesian provisional constitution of 1950 was, like the two previous ones after the proclamation of independence, modelled on the Western pattern. Since the struggle for independence had been led by western educated elites, it was natural that while framing the constitution of an independent Indonesia they would turn to western Europe and the United States to draw inspiration. The original intention of the constitution-makers


5. Ibid.
to introduce the presidential type of administration underwent a change and some features of parliamentary democracy were also introduced in 1945, only a few months after the declaration of independence. But the pattern of representative institutions so introduced also underwent a change to suit the Indonesian environment and tended to "develop particular attributes of their own which will differentiate them sharply from their prototypes" in the Western hemisphere.

The new constitution of 1950 embraced the principles of presidential and parliamentary democracy, but both these forms of administration were changed to be adjusted to the peculiar conditions of Indonesia. All constitutions are man-made and are not free from some defects. There is nothing so sacred as in a particular type of constitution that it should be drafted in the same way everywhere. So while framing the Indonesian constitution, the westernised elites of the new state, though turning towards the West for political and constitutional experience were at the same time thinking in their own nationalistic line.

The preamble of the constitution provided the basis of the State and its objective. Indonesians, who thought that their country experienced one of the worst types of colonialism in the past few centuries now expressed their clear intentions to work for the eradication of any form of colonialism in any part of the world.

The State was proclaimed as unitary as against a federal one. The basis of State policy or its Weltanschauung was provided as Pancasila, or the five principles recognizing National Consciousness or Nationalism, Humanity, 6. Rupert Emerson: op. cit., p.6.
Democracy, Social Justice and Omnipotence. Expounding these as directive principles of the State policy, Soekarno once stated:

"I like symbolism, also the symbolism of numbers. The rites of Islam are five in number. Our fingers are five on each hand. We have five sense. What also is five in number? The Pandavas were also five in number. The principles —— Nationalism, Internationalism, Democracy, Social Justice and Belief in God are also five in number."

The Pantja Sila or the five principles are the philosophy of the Indonesian State as advocated by Soekarno himself. All these principles, according to him are ultimately reducible to one, when this Pantja Sila becomes Akasila or one principle, i.e., Gotong Royong (Mutual Co-operation), the principle of mutual co-operation "means toiling hard together, sweating hard together —— a joint struggle of help-me-to-help-you. The work of all for the interest of all. Come-on-null-together for the interest of all! That is Gotong Royong."

This phenomenon of reducing these five factors of Pantja Sila into one has been described by Soekarno by stating that all these principles are inter-dependent and emerge from a common root, i.e., Gotong Royong.

The purpose of the Pantja Sila was stated:

"In order that we may enjoy happiness, prosperity, peace and freedom in society and in the completely sovereign, constitutional state of Free Indonesia."

7. Characters in the Hindu epic Mahabharata, symbolising the struggle of a few against the heavy odds, in the course of righteousness.

8. The speech of Soekarno before Badan Penelididek Usaha Persatuan Kemerdekaan, June 1, 1945.

9. Ibid.


11. The preamble of the constitution.
The whole constitution is divided into six chapters and each chapter is further sub-divided into a number of sections. Chapter one deals with the nature of the state and sovereignty, defines the territory of the state and guarantees fundamental human rights.

Articles 18 and 43 of Chapter I, are sufficiently explicit in laying down the recognition of the freedom of religion and are in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The constitution has defined the various organs of the State that are five in number:

1. The President and the Vice-President;
2. The Ministers;
3. The House of Representatives;
4. The Supreme Court, and
5. The General Audit Department.

The provisional constitution of 1950 practically left unaltered the powers and functions of the President and Vice-President except that these powers, which were more or less unspecified in the previous Republican Constitution of 1945, were now more clearly amplified. The original constitution, on the American pattern, had provided for the posts of Ministers, whose job would be no more than rendering assistance to the President. Where ministers were to be appointed by the President and were to remain in office at his discretion. This stipulation was changed a few months after the proclamation of independence, when the K.N.I.P. was entrusted with some real legislative powers beyond acting in an advisory capacity to the President. Following the conferment of responsible Government based on the agreement between the President and the Budan-Pekerdja on Nov. 11, 1945, the ministers continued to

12. See Article 2, which states that the Republic of Indonesia comprises the whole territory of Indonesia.
14. Article 44.
be appointed by the President but they had to be mindful of their position in the Parliament. As long as they commanded majority in the Parliament they were safe in their tenure.

After the enactment of the unitary constitution of 1950, the position of the President was little changed. He acted as a real "behind the scenes" force and the fact that after the resignation of the Iloilo Cabinet in 1953, the succeeding Government was termed as "President's Cabinet", signifies how tremendous was the influence of the President in matters of cabinet formation. 16

Nevertheless, the ministers, under the new constitution are individually and jointly responsible to the Parliament, i.e., the principle of cabinet responsibility is recognised 17

According to the constitution the powers of the President can be classified into three categories, viz., executive, legislative and judicial. These powers are almost the same as those provided in the constitution of the year 1945. The President obtained the power of dissolving the House of Representatives but these powers were restricted by the provision that after announcing the dissolution, he shall be required to order the elections of the new House of Representatives within 30 days 18

Since in a country like Indonesia the conduct of elections is a very difficult job and the dissolution of the legislature would mean the assumption of all powers by the President, it would have made him a dictator. Hence these powers were never exercised. This power of dissolution was not clearly provided for in the 1945 constitution although the presumption was that he could do so. 19

The powers of the President were further restricted by the provision that all decrees of the President including those concerning his authority over the armed forces,

16. Article 50 provides that the President forms the Ministers.
17. Art.83.
18. Art.84.
19. Assaat: op.cit., p.27.
shall be countersigned by the Minister or Ministers concerned, except when he or they exercised the function to select the person who in his opinion shall be able to form Cabinet. The President further appoints the Ministers at the recommendation of the Cabinet formateur. The appointment of ministers is countersigned by the Cabinet formateur or the new Prime Minister.

Although the provisional constitution had placed considerable limitations on the powers of the President, yet the authority of Soekarno remained dominant for a number of reasons: firstly, his position as a leader of the revolution; secondly, the non-elected nature of the Parliament had tended to undermine its significance as a law-making body. The composition of the House of Representatives included a considerable number of members from the various Dutch-sponsored federal states and also some selected ones from the Republican K.N.I.P. The Party strength in the Parliament was also on the basis of recruitment made earlier by means of guess-work mostly at the initiative of Soekarno. No party was sure enough to obtain as much strength if the House were elected through general elections. Hence in such an uncertain atmosphere the role of a President like Soekarno was bound to be very conspicuous.

In the executive sphere although some restrictions were imposed on the powers of the President, in fact he remained supreme and assumed far greater control over the administration than even the Cabinet. The Administrative Act of 1948 provided that the governor of every province should be proposed by the provincial legislature (in a panel of two to four names) submitted to the President who will make the final selection. In actual practice the governors of the provinces (excluding época #1; the other prerogatives of the President are to appoint a Vice-President recommended by the House of Representatives.

of Jogjakarta) are all appointed by the President - the proposal comes through the Ministry of the Interior after being discussed in the Cabinet.\textsuperscript{22} In 1951, the House of Representatives of West Java (Duma Barat) proposed two persons in a panel, one of whom was to be appointed by the President under Article 18 of the 1945 Act. Both of these nominees happened to belong to the Nasjuni party. The President refused to concur to this proposal and appointed Sanci Harjoawinata of the P.N.I., at the recommendation of the Ministry of the Interior. The recommendation now does not invaribly come from the respective legislature. It is mainly the work of the Ministry of Interior, on which the President exercises considerable influence.

The constitution provided the President as Head of the State and executive. In the exercise of his duties the President is to be assisted by a Vice-President. There is no provision in the constitution about the role of the Vice-President. Although he is to act in his capacity as an assistant to the President but in the early years of the independence, the significance of a Vice-President like Hatta was abound to be great. His personal influence contributed to a sort of amollient in the inter-party bickerings in Parliament. He is a great stabilising force in constitution. After the 1948 rebellion the Vice-President performed a very important role in restoring confidence in the Government which the rebellion had tended to shatter.

The true assessment of the role of the Vice-President is possible only after a deeper insight into the routine administration of the Government. The Vice-President Hatta, however, had often expressed the futility of the office of Vice-President. As long as Hatta

\textsuperscript{22} Even the Sultan of Jogjakarta is to be appointed by the President but under a different mandate. His name is not to be proposed by provincial House of Representatives nor by the Cabinet.

\textsuperscript{23} Article 46, sub.4.
occupied that position he was bound to exercise some influence. But it is doubtful if this office continues to command the same prestige as it did in the years immediately after the revolution. Vice-President Hatta actually submitted his resignation in July, 1956, expressing his desire to serve the nation as a private individual. But the persistent public demand precludes him from doing so. It is very likely that in the new constitution either the post of Vice-President may be altogether abolished or some concrete powers may be given to him. Vice-President Hatta resigned in December, 1956, on a difference of opinion with the President. After that no incumbent to that office has been appointed.

The constitution of 1945 had vested the legislative authority in the Government and in Parliament, known as the House of Representatives. The basis of representation was provided as one representative to every 300,000 Indonesian citizens. Besides, the Chinese, European and Arab minority groups shall have a representation in the Parliament by at least 9,6 and 3 members respectively.\textsuperscript{25}

The 1950 constitution was a provisional one and the basis of representation was altogether different than the one just mentioned. In the nature of its composition it reflected the geographical and political divisions of Indonesia at the dawn of independence. In the matter of selection a very liberal choice was made by the President in 1945 by taking into consideration the strength each political party was supposed to have in the country. But this assessment was mostly a matter of guess-work. In 1950 an altogether different structure of Parliament emerged. The following table illustrates the composition in the provisional parliament that came into existence in 1950 in place of the old K.N.I.P. of the Republic

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid
of 1945. This table also illustrates the strength of the various political parties in the Parliament towards the end of 1954, i.e., almost on the eve of general elections in the country.26

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Total: 107 105 106 100 19 14 232 219

26. Figures obtained from the Ministry of Information.
This party structure was based on the principle of
selection and placed the President in a very pow-
and sometimes decisive position especially in the matter
of Cabinet formation. The principle of the Presidential
form of government implies the process of impeachment,
but the constitution of 1950 did not place any such check
on the President beyond a general provision that in the
event of death, removal or inability to exercise the duties
of his office, the President is succeeded by the Vice-
President. The legislature is thus in far less privileg-
ed position than in any other country having a presidential
form of government. Moreover, the system of Cabinet
responsibility, although provided for, has not been fully
adhered to, in view of the tremendous social appeal of
President Soekarno. "There are four major political parties
after the general elections in 1955, i.e., the P.N.I.,
Masjumi, M.U., and the P.K.I." said an Indonesian observer,
"but there is the fifth party that carries a decisive
role and that is the President himself." That is, in
brief the nature of the Parliamentary responsibility as
practised in Indonesia after independence in 1945.

Nevertheless, the legislature fulfills certain very
important functions, i.e., it exercises some supervision
of the administration, it engages in law-making, provides
a focus for public opinion, and a forum for the ventila-
tion of grievances and an experimental field for parliamen-
tary democracy. In all this in a country where a long era of
foreign economic and political domination had virtually
sapped the national stamina for any form of a responsible
government and had fostered a tradition of authoritarianism
in public affairs.

In the field of law-making the P.N.I.P., could not
make a very serious attempt in view of the dangerous
political situation existing at that time. Only a few

27. Art. 48.
were passed and the important ones have been mentioned above. Thus very few precedents were set in the legislative work. As regards the capacity of a Parliament as a focus of public opinion and a forum for the expression of general grievances, the K.N.I.P. could hardly fulfill any of these obligations as only a very few sessions were held from the time of its inception to the transfer of sovereignty in December, 1949.

The R.U.S.I. Federal constitution of 1949 also failed to establish any specific traditions in the exercise of parliamentary control over the Government in view of the short tenure. Soon after the establishment of the Federal Government in December 27, 1949, a demand grew among the various federating units for their fusion into Negara Republik Indonesia, with its headquarters at Djojjakarta. The Federal Government enacted a law on March 8, 1950, enabling the federating Negaras to merge with the Republic if they so liked. This merger was to be decided by plebiscite in respective areas wishing to integrate or by the representative assemblies of the Negaras themselves. The method of plebiscite was nowhere adopted but it were the assemblies that decided the issue.

After the merger the units retained their limited self-government and in most cases the Republic accepted the local adat laws as were in force at that time. The President of the Republic Indonesia, through a decree on May 13, 1950, placed Djakarta Raya under the administration of a mayor. Djakarta Raya does not form part of the province of West Java. The post-war regulations of this area have been mostly retained by the Republic through a law in 1948.

29. See P.145 Supra.
30. A.A. Schiller: op.cit., p.338.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
Recognising this need of retaining the traditional regional laws and autonomy existing at the time of the transfer of powers or merger, this act safeguarded the position of the specially administered territories which during the Dutch days enjoyed some traditional powers viz., the specially administered territory of Djogjakarta. It was clearly provided in this law that the Daerah Istimewa (Special Regions) governors were not to be appointed under this law but according to the traditions of the respective regions.

Through another law of the central Parliament princesdoms of Djogjakarta and of Paku Alaman were placed in a common Daerah Istimewa of Djogjakarta. The status of this region was the same as that of any other province. The only exception here was that whereas the governors for other areas were to be appointed at the discretion of the President through the Ministry of the Interior, after being discussed in the Cabinet, the governor of this specially administered territory would be the Sultan of Djogjakarta under the customary law existing at the time.

With the enforcement of the constitution of the unitary Republic from August 17, 1950, legislative activity was stepped up. The period from 1945 to 1950 was a period of struggle to attain independence fought against overwhelming odds. From 1950 onwards a new period of struggle for the stabilization of independence began.

In the early years following the proclamation of independence the legislative activity was virtually non-existent. On a few occasions when Parliament was summoned by the President, its main sphere of activity was


34. Bill No. 3, 1950. As regards the autonomy for provinces other than Daerah Istimewa, Djogjakarta, some provisions have been made in Bill No. 44, 1950.
the consideration of draft-agreements which the Republican leaders had made with the Dutch, for approval or disapproval. In 1947, at the time of the consideration of the Draft Agreement of Linggadjati, it showed disfavour, but in view of the moral pressure exercised by the President and the Vice-President it had no alternative but to endorse the Cabinet or for that matter the Presidential action. In practically all other cases Parliament invariably approved the action of the executive.

The true nature of parliamentary control had not been established before 1950. It was left to the new Parliament of 1950 to take the initiative in that direction and to develop some traditions of parliamentary life in the country.

The process of the legislative work of the Parliament is governed under Section II, Chapter III of the constitution. The legislative power is exercised by the Government, i.e., the President and the Cabinet together with the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{35} It involves that no bill can become law simply on its being adopted by the Parliament. The said bill must be signed by the President. The constitution mentions the name of the Pemerintah (Government) as the ratifying authority, which includes the President.\textsuperscript{36} Since President is the head of the executive it is, therefore the President who signs on behalf of the Government. The ratification of the bills must come from the Government within one month after their passage through the Parliament. If the Government does not give notice of any objections against a particular bill within that specified time, it is considered to have been adopted.\textsuperscript{37}

The legislation in Parliament has been divided.

\textsuperscript{35} Art. 89.

\textsuperscript{36} Art. 94.

\textsuperscript{37} Art. 94.
into the following four categories:

1. Ordinary legislation;
2. Emergency legislation;
3. Legislation at the initiative of the Parliament; and
4. Budget.

The ordinary legislation is governed under the standing orders 36 to 61. The whole procedure of ordinary law-making is mentioned in the various articles of these standing orders.

For any such ordinary bill to become law, it must pass through five stages. It may be mentioned that due to the complex party nature in the Indonesian Parliament it is well near impossible for an individual member to initiate legislation unless with the support of a party. But the constitution does not forbid an individual member in Parliament to submit a draft bill for approval. Most of the bills are initiated by the Government and the Government parties because it is the Government that is in control of the majority on the floor of the House.

Any Government-sponsored bill submitted to the Speaker must be endorsed by a Presidential Message, i.e., the approval of the Government is necessary for the introduction of an ordinary bill. This approval is invariably granted. After that the draft bill is directed by the steering Committee of the Parliament to one or more of the six Standing Committees or the Divisions for scrutiny. If the bill is proposed by the Government, the minister or ministers concerned may be called upon for further clarification before the Division. There is no restriction on a minister appearing in person before the Division. He may, moreover, explain his position through correspondence. In any case it is a matter between the Minister and

38. Art. 90 of the constitution.
the Division concerned. The Division may also authorise a
Minister to send his representative to explain the issue.
All the Divisions concerned after a preliminary examination
submit a joint report about the bills they have considered
for initiation in the House. Many bills are in danger of
undergoing a natural death especially if they are by private
members and having no support in the Standing Committee.
In 1952, Parliament modified this practice and provided
that instead of a joint report every Division could send its
own report to the Government to expeditate the matter. 39

After the Division report the real debate in
Parliament starts and the whole procedure of this debate
is specified in Standing orders. 40 This consideration
or debate is of two-fold nature:

- 1. General consideration of the Bill.

- 2. A clause by clause consideration. At this
stage any amendments during the course of the
debate may also be considered and discussed.

Like the Parliamentary practice in any other country
of the world, where the representative form of Government
exists, a minister is allowed to speak as many times as
he likes during the course of the debate. Usually a
minister explains the Government's point of view at the
end of the general discussion. 41 His speech known as
Djawaban Pemerintah (the Government's reply) is also
termed as the closing speech. Even after the Government's
reply to the criticism on the floor of the House, which
ordinarily means the closing of all discussion, a fresh
series of debates may be called for. It may be in the
form of a proposal that the bill may be referred to a
Select Committee appointed for the purpose by the House.
This reference to the Select Committee may be either decided

39. This procedure that is now being followed as
approved by the Parliament in its decision
No. 3/8/1952.

40. Standing Order, Articles 76-82.

41. Ibid., Article 64.
by the House itself or the Steering Committee, on its own
initiative, may submit such a proposal either before the
first general discussion or immediately after. If it is
done before, then ordinarily only one discussion takes
place and, if afterwards then after the bill comes back
to the House from the Select Committee a fresh series of
discussion starts. Ordinarily all technical bills like
those proposing fresh taxation are referred to the select
committees before their presentation to the House. Howev-
er, in the case of some controversial bills like the election
bill of 1954, which was referred to the Select Committee
twice, a second series of discussion may be called forth.

The Standing orders empower the Select Committees
to send the bill directly to the House after considera-
tion. But as a matter of parliamentary practice the Select
Committees sent the considered bill to the Steering
Committee, which on its part presented it to the House for
further action in the form of fresh debates on the issue.
During the course of the debates of the plenary session
any member may propose amendments, but the parliamentary
practice has grown that on any matter referred to as
important by the Speaker, the amendments should be proposed
by at least five members.42 The Government through Article
94 of the Constitution reserves the right either to withdraw
any measure that it initiated before its final passage in
order to make alterations or even not to demand the desired
legislation. As a matter of practice, it is not the privi-
lege only of the Select Committees to suggest any amendmen-
Parliament during the course of the debate, has also the
right to make any amendment to the draft bill or may also
send its proposal of amendment for consideration to the
Select Committee concerned.

The unstable party alliances in Parliament have

42. Standing orders, Articles 117-123.
resulted in delay in the passage of the bills. A parliamentary practice has developed that all outstanding bills of the previous government are referred to the new Government by the President for reconsideration. After the resignation of the Sukiman cabinet in 1952, 47 outstanding bills were referred by the President to the new Government of Wilopo. Of these 47 bills the Wilopo Government introduced only 31 bills and the remaining 16, which had already been introduced by the previous governments, were not re-introduced. When the Ali Sastroamidjojo Government assumed office in August 1953, it found 50 outstanding bills, which were originally presented by previous governments.

From the above discussion it follows that the process of ordinary law-making in the Indonesian Parliament the following procedure is observed:

1. Introduction by Presidential message;

2. Consideration by Steering Committee and determining the priority;

3. Scrutiny in the Standing Committees;

4. Debate in the whole House and the final adoption or rejection of the measure;

5. Approval or rejection by the Government which means approval or rejection by the President and then countersignature by the respective minister. The countersignature by the minister is essential because it is ultimately he who is to execute the

43. Vide letter No. 941/52/P, dated 20/3/52 from the President to the Speaker of the Parliament, obtained through the courtesy of Mr. A.K. Fringgoiggo.
44. Laporan Singkat (A Short Survey), Sidang, 111, 1953, pp. 234-35.
46. Like the Calender system in the United States Congress.
47. According to Standing orders, articles 81-88 at the end of the debate, a motion of closure is moved by the Speaker and the whole proposed is submitted before the House. The method of ascertaining the vote is the same as in any other parliament, i.e., through proclamations or by division.
law and is responsible for it. The President under article 83 of the constitution can do no wrong. In actual practice, sometimes the President refuses to sign as he did in the case of the Bill on the Abrogation of the Statute of Union with the Dutch in February 28, 1956. The method of ascertaining the votes is the same as in any other Parliamentary form of Government, i.e., through proclaiming Ayes or Nays or by division.

**EMERGENCY LEGISLATION**

In view of the unstable political situation existing at the time of the enactment of the provisional constitution in 1950, special consideration was given to the emergency legislation. The constitution gave wide emergency legislation powers to the executive. The Government possessed the right to enact emergency laws for matters which demanded immediate action. But a check was imposed on this governmental privilege in as much as such legislation must be presented for Parliamentary endorsement at the latest in the next session. The Parliament has the right to approve or disapprove the executive action taken in the matter of enactment of emergency or of Government ordinances.\(^4^9\)

The history of parliamentary activity in Indonesia in the period after 1950 reveals that the Government made wide use of this power. Moreover, quite contrary to the spirit of the constitution, it often failed to present such legislation for parliamentary endorsement within the specified time and in some cases did not present it at all. One such example is the bill relating to the abolition of the federal system of Government in the post-Kenneville Agreement period in 1950, which was not presented to the Parliament.

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48. The Bill proposed by the Burhanuddin Cabinet for the renunciation of the Round Table Conference Agreement with the Dutch in 1949. The President refused to sign it. The Bill was again initiated by the Ali Cabinet after the general elections. The confirmation from the President came forthwith.

49. Articles 96, 97 and 98.
for approval at all.\textsuperscript{50}

In the following cases also the emergency legislation
framed by the Government was not presented to the
Parliament for approval:

1. Bill on Immigration Fees.\textsuperscript{51} (1950)

2. Bill on the Fee on Immigration Papers (1950)

3. A number of taxation laws.

4. Emergency Legislation No.1, 1951, January 13, 1951,
relating to the organisation of the courts.\textsuperscript{52}

A bill regarding giving compensation to the Senate
members of the old Federal Parliament was presented two
years after the abolition of the Federal Legislature
in 1950.\textsuperscript{53}

The frequent use of the emergency legislation by
the Government did not mean that the Parliament accepted
it with equanimity. There used to be criticism on the
floor of the House of this action of the Government. As
a result of the good-will existing between both, the executive
and the legislature there has been an increase in the
number of ordinary legislative measures adopted by
Parliament in the years following 1950 and a relative
decline in the Emergency Regulations and Bills. The
following table makes the situation clear:--\textsuperscript{54}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ordinary Legislation</th>
<th>Emergency Bills</th>
<th>Regulations (Ordinances)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51. Lembaran Negara No. 82/1950.
52. Ibid., No. 84/1950.
53. No.1, 1951, January, 1951. The Government has restored
to such action because there is no clear provision
in the Constitution itself against the breach of the
above regulation.
54. Emergency Law No.30/150 (Lembaran Negara, 1950, No.57)
Also Laporan Singat, Sidang I, 1954, p.126.
55. Speech by the Speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Sartono,
It shows the trend towards increased parliamentary activity and more and more executive responsibility to the legislature. The number of ordinary statutes passed by Parliament steadily increased, and in 1956 only one emergency law was enacted authorising the Government to take effective steps against those persons illegally occupying the large foreign owned industrial concerns and agricultural estates.

**LEGISLATION AT THE INITIATIVE OF PARLIAMENT**

The party structure existing in Parliament leaves very little scope for a private or a non-party member to think of playing some definite role in law-making. There is no instance of any private member initiating a bill in Parliament. Unless a bill has some form of party support there is very little hope of its getting through. However, the standing orders do make provision for a private member to introduce a bill, provided the required motion is endorsed and supported by nine members both before presenting the draft bill as well as on the floor of the House. After this elucidation before the plenary session of the House, the House through a simple majority vote must either approve or disapprove the contents of the bill. In the case of approval, the draft bill goes to the Steering Committee and then passes through the same stage as an ordinary Government-sponsored bill.

Just like the Government bills, the private or Parliamentary Bills must be presented to the Government for ratification in a similar way. That is to say, the Government has to ratify or reject within a specified period of one month. In the way of any amendments during the course of legislation, the procedure is also alike in both.

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57. The procedure of these private bills or the bills at the initiative of the Parliament, as they are also called, is outlined in Standing Orders No. 92-100.
cases. The amendments can be introduced in the Committee stage or even at the plenary session.

**B U D G E T**

In any parliamentary system of Government the Budget is primarily to be approved by the legislature on being presented to it by the Cabinet. The specific article in the Constitution of 1950 provides that the bills for the determination of the budget shall be introduced by the Government before the commencement of the period in which the receipts and expenditure, as approved by the legislature, shall take effect. There is, however, a dubious clause that the period shall not be longer than two years. The Government has interpreted the clause in a way that it is not essential that the budget must be introduced in Parliament and approved by it.

As a matter of practice, Parliament has never exercised his right to pass the Budget. The budgets in all years have been in heavily deficit, and the Government found difficulty as to how to overcome the huge desparity between the receipts and expenditure. The Budget could never be presented in time, i.e., long after the start of the financial year for which the approval was sought. The budget of 1950-51 was presented in February, 1951; 1952-53 in December, 1952; 1954-55 in June, 1954; 1955-56 in September, 1955 and 1956-57 was not presented till November 1956.

The full initiative in budgetary control has from the period of declaration of independence in 1945 and also according to the constitution of 1950, been lying with the Cabinet, which has practically not considered itself responsible to the legislature at all for this purpose. The non-representative nature of Parliament, in view of its members being nominated rather than elected, gave the entire initiative to the Cabinet. The Cabinet, moreover, while imposing fresh taxes, in majority of cases, did not
refer the proposals to the legislature but adopted the course of emergency laws and regulations.

PARLIAMENT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CONTROL

In spite of the tremendous influence over it of the President and the Cabinet, both directly and indirectly, the Parliament performs certain important functions. The original constitution of 1945 had left the exercise of the entire legislative and executive powers in the hands of the President. He was supreme over the ministers, and the K.N.I.P. was incorporated merely in an advisory capacity. Things changed later on, when at the initiative and demand of the K.N.I.P., some more concrete powers were given to this body. From the time of its inception, Parliament has been getting more and more influence in the task of legislation and in functioning as an instrument of control over the executive. This control is exercised in various ways such as:

1. The institution of Committees and Sections;
2. Questions;
3. Interpellations;
4. Inquiries and
5. Motions.

The Committees, in the Indonesian Parliament are divided into the following categories:

1. Steering Committee;
2. Standing Committees or Division;
3. Sections (Seksi), and
4. House Committee (Panitia Rumah Tangga) to control the budget and administration of the House of Representatives.

The Steering Committee looks after parliamentary procedure, i.e., initiative of legislation in Parliament.

59. Standing Orders, Art. 28, 29, 37-44.
60. Standing Orders Art. 29.
It looks after the time schedule, order of business and such other matters. It is more or less a procedural committee and the scope of its activities is almost confined to Parliament. It works in close collaboration with the Speaker of Parliament, who is considered to be the "Master of the House".

The Standing Committees or Divisions are six in number and are exclusively concerned with the preliminary examination of bills. Since practically all the bills are Government bills, the Divisions exercise considerable influence on the policy of the Government in an indirect way. A favourable report by the relevant Division is essential before a bill can be introduced in Parliament.6

The Sections are the specialised departments of Parliament, charged with the supervision of the activities of the Government. These are the permanent groups in Parliament and to them are referred all bills where a more careful scrutiny is considered essential. These sections as constituted in 1950 were as follows:

1. Economics;
2. Finance;
3. Agriculture;
4. Public Works; Power and Transport;
5. Education, Culture, Religion and Health Affairs;
6. Labour; Civil Service and Social Affairs;
7. Internal Affairs and Information;
8. Justice and Internal Security;
9. Defence;
10. Foreign Affairs.

The supervisory function of these Sections is of vital significance in the matter of legislative control over the executive. Besides discussing the provisions of bill submitted for scrutiny, the Sections members can at their own initiative or under order from Parliament.

6. Ibid.
comment on the policy of the Government. In this way
the Sections have to keep in close contact with the
administrative machinery of the Government, including
the Cabinet itself. As a matter of public policy, the
Sections are authorised to hear complaints and petitions
from the public in writing, delivered to them personally
on the basis of public opinion expressed in the form of
newspapers, reports, public speeches, etc.

The membership of these Sections ordinarily varies
from 13 to 30 members and is occasionally renewed by
Parliament. The procedure of the activities of these
sections has been laid down by Parliament. A quorum
of half the members is required for the validity of any
meeting of the Section, whereas a decision is valid only
if two third of the members agree on a point.

The Sections are part of Parliament and the
supervisory powers are given to them by the latter. It
means that their findings, recommendations and decisions
are not binding on its parent organization, i.e. Parliament.
Nevertheless, the Sections perform very important functions
in the political and administrative life of the country.

The second method of exercising legislative control
over Government are the questions put on the floor of the
House to the Government or to an individual minister.

In the provisional constitution of 1945, Parliament,
besides the law-making functions also did exercise the use
of interpellations, i.e., putting questions by the members
to the ministers. This power was not clearly provided
for in the constitution, yet the system emerged as practical
way and there were frequent interpellations in Parliament.

62. Standing Orders Article 27.
63. Ibid.
64. Maklumat Pemerintah: Kepartain dan Parliamentaria

Indonesia (An official publication), Djakarta, 1954,
p.993.
65. Ibid.
This system went a considerable way in infusing a sense of responsibility in the Government. A member of the Parliament could in this way supervise the activities of the Government.

However, in the provisional constitution of 1950 the right of interpellation by members of the Parliament has been guaranteed. Like any other Parliament in the world, such questions put by individual members do not ordinarily lead to a general debate in the House. If the member seeking interpellation desires a general discussion on the issue he must refer the issue to the Steering Committee, and the request must be supported by the four members. The Steering Committee refers the matter to a Select Committee or a Section. The Steering Committee has also the right to send the request directly to the plenary session for a vote on the issue. If it is done through the Section or the Select Committee, these bodies send in their own comments to Parliament. In any case it is Parliament that is to determine whether a discussion on the question should be undertaken or not.

If the questions concerned are to be discussed in the House a general vote may follow on the motion at the end at the request of the sponsor. But it is not essential. Any dissatisfaction expressed by the House against the Government's reply does not mean a vote of censure against the Government or the minister. But the questions serve a good purpose in arousing public interest in a issue. More often this device serves as a good means of the expression of public opinion both inside as well as outside Parliament.

The third method of exercising control is the right of inquiry possessed by the Parliament under Art. 70 of the Constitution. Legislation for the implementation

66. Art. 69.
of this draft came into force on January 20, 1954, under which Parliament could inquire into the public conduct of any official of the Republic of Indonesia. An inquiry Committee was set up in January, 1955, to inquire into the conduct of the Ministry of Economics.

The Fourth method of control is the Parliament's right to pass motions. This device is the expression of Parliament's dissatisfaction with the Government's policy. The procedure to initiate a motion in the House is provided for in the Standing Orders. At least five members may move any such motion in the House. Such a move is referred to the Steering Committee, which fixes a time for discussion in the House. In the history of parliamentary activity of the Indonesian Parliament after 1950, two cabinets have resigned as a result of motions (which were no-confidence). The first Government to be defeated was the Natsir Cabinet in March, 1951, as a result of Hadikusumo's motion on the issue of provisional regional Houses of Representatives.67

Mr. Natsir was to give his policy statement in the House on the issue. But the required quorum was not obtained in the House. Mr. Natsir took this motion as a vote of non-confidence and resigned.

The second motion was moved against the Wilopo Government in 1953 by Manai Sophian, on the issue of the reorganisation of armed forces. Mr. Hadikusumo moved a motion to abrogate this ordinance.

The provisional constitution of 1950 contained the principle of parliamentary government and the text was worded in a way that gave ample room to meet any eventuality that may arise. It was pointed out by the then Minister of Justice that the Cabinet held responsible to Parliament.

67. Ordinance 39, 1950. Before the proclamation of unitary Republic this ordinance was enacted.
may again become presidential when it may be required to do so. In ordinary circumstances, the House of Representa-
tives could at any time compel the Cabinet or individual ministers to resign, i.e., the original presidential pattern of Government steadily gave place to a parliamentary form of Government. In actual practice, the President continued to wield tremendous power over the Government and the administration of the country. Moreover the unstable party position in the provisional legislature made the President a strong force in the country's political life.

The unitary nature of the constitution further helped the President to be considered as the virtual centre of authority in the country. The President, immediately after the proclamation of independence in 1945, had appointed incumbents to the posts of governors in the eight provinces into which the country was then divided. With the enforcement of the unitary constitution of 1950 this number had risen to ten. An act of parliament in 1948 provided that it would be the provincial legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) that shall nominate Governors for their respective areas for the final approval of the President. In actual practice, however, the President has never consulted the legislature concerned for even an advice in the matter. All the appointments have been made by the Government, i.e., by the President at the proposal initiated by the Ministry of Interior. It means that the Government at the centre has full control over the provincial administration. Since all Indonesian Governments have been harnessed on account of inter-party rivalry and of the inexperience of the legislators, the President could always have a greater say in provincial matters through his influence which has in most cases been exercised behind the scene.

68. The Official elucidation by the Minister of Justice, Mr Sosomo, Indonesian Review, February/March, 1951.
69. In September, 1936, the creation of the province of Irian (West New Guinea) raised the number to 11.
70. Act 22, 1948.
The Act 22 of 1948 provided the broad nature of provincial autonomy, i.e. how the House of Representatives of each Daerah (province) was to function and how its executive powers of the Government should be exercised. The powers of the provincial governors as also of the Daerah Istimewa of Djogjakarta, were also mentioned in the Act. The autonomy of each province varied according to the practical nature of its respective problems. But the control exercised by the central government over the appointment of governors and the civil servants made the provincial autonomy entirely dependent on the centre.

The Act of 1948 mentioned four kinds of administrative units in the country: (a) Province; (b) Residency; (c) Kabupaten or District and (d) Katjamatan or sub-district. Below the district lies the village administration.

The Governor is the head of the provincial administration. The legislative power vests in the provincial legislature, which elects its own chairman and vice-chairman. No special powers have been given to the provincial government except concurrent powers which are the following:

1. Public Works.
2. General Administration.
3. Road and Buildings.
5. Information.
6. Health and
7. Trade and Commerce.

All these powers are also held by the Centre. Therefore, the powers given to the provinces depend mainly on central Government’s discretion.

72. The Powers of the Governors of an ordinary province and of the Daerah Istimewa were alike.
THE PROSPECTS OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

The above discussion briefly outlines the general nature of the central parliamentary control exercised over all scales of administration in the country. Although the parliamentary form of Government is provided for in the country, still we find an authoritarian hierarchy existing in all branches of administration. The parliamentary institutions have been handicapped in Indonesia for a number of factors:

Firstly, the absence of a strong indigenous economic middle class in the country. In all countries of Southeast Asia as also in Indonesia this class of middle-men is mostly provided by the Chinese. For the development of true parliamentary traditions and democracy it is essential that the “native bourgeoisie” should expand. There is a need for a class of politicians to emerge from the population and it is always this middle class that furnishes this leadership.

Rupert Emerson elucidating this point says:

"The situation is beginning slowly to change as domestic and international development projects come into operation; but it seems all too clear that the movement toward a modernisation of economic systems and a significant raising the standards of living will be a long and difficult one. In the interval, the native middle class will continue to be a thin layer of men representing rather the professions and government service than the independent or quasi-independent business groups which has been its mainstay in the West in the past."

Besides, the indigenous middle class is also required from social and economic considerations. A community consisting mainly of lower income groups will not be a healthy sign for the growth of parliamentary institutions. A commentator pointed out recently:

"The Indonesian has been forced into a double-sense into a passive position in commercial matters. He produces the goods destined for consumption, for refining or for export. But it is not the Indonesian, who sells these goods to the consumer, the factory or the exporter. The so-called collecting trader...

forms the intermediary. The collecting
trade carried out a useful and necessary
economic function, but there is practically
speaking no Indonesian middle class partici-
pating in it. It is by-passed in these
activities."  

Any solution to the improvement of economic and
social backwardness of the people and any step for the
emergence of a strong indigenous middle class will
naturally quicken the development of parliamentary
institutions in Indonesia.

Secondly, a handicap to parliamentary institutions
in Indonesia is the lack of working experience among the
people in parliamentary institutions of the western type.
The long era of colonial rule kept the masses ignorant of
the representative system of government. Little time has
been taken to implement the broad principles of a para
tlementary government in Indonesia, whereas in the West this type
of government is centuries old with distinct national
traditions. In Indonesia, as also in any other country or
the East, it will take some time to approximate that level.

A brief experiment of parliamentary form of Government
in Indonesia has brought to the fore certain important
considerations. The unstable nature of the law and order
situation in certain parts of the country and persistent
demands by the regions for more and more autonomy has put
forth a challenge to the idea of parliamentary democracy -
whether these institutions should be retained or a new
authoritarianism takes its place. A new pattern of
central-local relationship is necessary.

Attempts have been made during the past few years
to put the centre versus regional relationship on a new
basis by giving the provinces more autonomy. The central

75. Dr. Khou Buan Tie: The Development of a Middle Class
in Indonesia. A paper read at the 25th Study Session
of the International Institute of Differing Civiliza-

76. Mustafa Sulaiman: Undang Otonomi Daerah in Suara
Masjumi, Djakarta, September 20, 1956.
government has shown its intention to carve out new administrative units of Atjeh in Sumatra and the South and West Kalimantan (Borneo) besides the existing eleven provinces; the eleventh being the province of West Irian created by an ordinary statutory enactment in September, 1956. The province now contains only a few islands near the Dutch-held New Guinea.

The move for the setting up of new provinces is the result of unrest among the outlying regions as a result of insufficient allocation of budgetary provisions for provinces outside Java. This fear of Java-centrism is a cause of major trouble. The people of Atjeh, for instance, deeply conscious of their dominant role in carrying out incessant wars against the Dutch and also due to their fanatical attachment to Islam, have been able to put up a strong case to be considered a distinct unit in the Republic.

Besides, there was another factor behind this demand of the Atjeh people. The Netherlands Government always tried to isolate the Atjeh people from the rest of the Indonesian community, for fear of the spread of fanatical nationalism strengthened by religious appeal.

In practice, the Dutch always considered the Atjeh as a distinct unit. The complete merger into the larger province of North Sumatra after independence annoyed the Atjehnese. It was one of the major factors leading to mass discontent and demonstrations against the Republic.

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78. In the National Conference held in Djakarta from the 10th to 15th September, 1957, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Djunanda Kartawidjaja, the Prime Minister of Indonesia, efforts were made to restore the normal relations between the Central Government and the outlying regions. The Agenda of the Conference included such items as (a) The question of autonomy for provinces; (b) The financial equilibrium between the Central Government and the provinces. Addressing the Conference, Dr. Hatta expressed the opinion that the main cause of the problem was "psychological conflict" in the regions. See the Report on the National Conference, by the Minister of Information, Djakarta.
The Atjehnesse have resented the order of the P.N.I. led Government which for long denied them the provincial status. A number of people from Atjeh expressed their deep adherence to the unity of Indonesia. What they wanted was the proper budgetary allocation from the central exchequer and getting rid of the domination by one single group of people.

During the long era of colonial rule a feeling of separateness and isolation grew among the Atjehnesse. After the proclamation of independence, this feeling has continued and has been heightened because of the Atjehnesse fear of Java-centrism and their sufferance at the hands of a Government indifferent to religion.

Almost similar is the basis of the demand for new provinces. There is hardly any disintegrating tendency visible in any group. All regions are deeply conscious of preserving national unity, but they demand a reorientation in the outlook of the Central Government. The fact that during the period of the two Masjumi-led governments of Natsir and Sukiman, the disturbances in the country considerably subsided in some regions, is a proof that if due consideration is given to the feelings of the people outside Java, a considerable and speedy improvement in the situation can be expected.

All these factors would necessitate that the experience gained during the years after independence should be kept in view while framing the permanent structure of the Republic. The primary question for consideration is whether the new constitution should be unitary or federal in character. The trend in the years immediately after independence had been towards political unification and concurrently to eliminate the influence of the federal R.U.S.I., which engendered the feeling of separatism in the various regions of the country. The various insurrections after August 17, 1950, when the unitary Republic was proclaimed, indicate that the
process of unification did lead to opposition. However, in this opposition the hand of the Dutch-led movements cannot be ignored. But the net outcome was the experience that whereas the unification of the country is of vital importance, the needs of the regions other than Java cannot be ignored. In the early years the efforts for unification mostly at the expense of the regional autonomy were due to the underlying fear of the Dutch-led incursions. But now a good deal of self-reliance is visible among the Republic leaders. A considerable section of these leaders consider that intense unification will not solve the problems of the various ethnic, religions, insular and social groups within the country.

The rise of a federalist sentiment in the country, was mainly due to the Dutch strategy to discredit the young Republic and to re-establish their rule. But the events after that proved its artificial basis. All the various puppet-federal states looked to the Republic for leadership. The sporadic incidents of Dar-ul-Islam rebel movement in various parts of Indonesia are not against the unified Indonesian nationalism but against too much powers being vested in the central government. The cultural needs of the people can be satisfied if besides retaining the national unity, the regional requirements should be realistically considered.

The various provinces have in theory been given a sort of autonomy, but in practice there is a general belief that in the matter of financial allocations, they have to beg additional grants from the central

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79. The major part of the political instability in the country finds manifestation in the conflict between the central government and the regions. The conflict has been caused by "The slow progress of regional development". See W.F. Wertheim: Indonesian Economic Structure Must be Changed Radically, a lecture before the students of Padang and Bukittinggi (Central Sumatra). A copy of the brief sketch of the lecture was made available through the courtesy of the Indonesian Information Office, Karachi.
government. A practice has grown that the provinces retain about five per cent of the provincial revenue for local expenditure. But this is not considered sufficient. It is contended that a more liberal view in this matter should be taken and the provinces be helped to attain a spirit of great self-reliance in financial and administrative fields and that their powers and jurisdiction in these spheres need further specification.

On the whole Indonesia has taken a definite stride towards parliamentary democracy. The central government is tending to retain some of the most vital powers and its control over the provincial administration is likely to continue as it is. The powers of the President were originally far in excess of the powers of any elected head of state having the presidential form of government. But with the lapse of time, the powers were curtailed as a result of definite parliamentary practice. The new constitution, it appears, would, besides keeping the powers of the President limited may also confer on him some powers in the event of emergency or insecurity, in the matter of cabinet formation, etc.

The question of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia was discussed by Dr. Mohammad Hatta who stated:

"The Western form of parliamentary democracy is a result of political struggle inspired by a complex of factors, of which the chief were political in origin. It is the political product of a political evolution. As layer after layer of society acquired economic strength, it has been brought into the field of political struggle and has won and has been given the right of parliamentary representation. To some extent we can say that parliamentary representation has been the political reward for having achieved economic strength, since those who were economically strong have sought to protect that strength by political means.

"Our people are economically weak and need protection. They were politically weak and have
successfully struggled for political strength. They have achieved a parliamentary system, which is precious to them. But that parliamentary system, in my view, is but a step towards the aim of parliamentary democracy, in which economic democracy is no less important than political democracy."  

In line with the above declaration, the task of economic development requires that the provinces be enabled to have financial resources at their disposal and utilize the products produced within the provinces. The real difficulty for the provinces is the lack of experts who can manage the vast responsibilities conferred on them with this process of financial and administrative power devolution. In the meantime the central government may act as a benevolent guardian of provincial autonomy by providing experts to carry the burden of new responsibilities in the transitory stage. The lack of experts should not in any way be considered an excuse to put obstacles in the process towards provincial autonomy.


CHAPTER IX

INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF INDONESIA

After the proclamation of the Republic in August, 1945, till the formal transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949, as a result of the Hague Round Table Conference in 1949, between the Dutch and the Republican delegates, the young Republic had to struggle hard to maintain her independent position. The R.T.C. Agreement had stipulated sixteen constituent states forming part of a federal Indonesia in which the Republic, in spite of having comparatively much larger population and area under its control as compared to the other units, was treated as a single unit at par with every other Negera (state). The task before the Republic, therefore, in this brief period was two-fold: firstly internal consolidation and secondly, to win as much international support to its cause as possible.

Nevertheless, in the years of turmoil since the proclamation of independence till the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the Republic was conscious of her independent existence. In a statement issued on September 2, 1948, the following main line of foreign policy of the Republic was declared:

"The Government is of the opinion that we must not become an object in the international political clash. We must remain an entity with the right to decide on our own attitude, to achieve our own aim: a free independent Indonesia."

This statement of policy by the Republic of Indonesia was necessitated, when in the midst of the struggle against the Dutch, the Communists, through an insurrection tried to push the country in the direction of the Soviet bloc. The independent policy as outlined above, was based on the principles of Pancasila, which in the words of President Soekarno was the "psychological foundation of free Indonesia,

1. The Historical and Philosophical Background of Indonesia's Independent Policy, Bulletin issued by the Ministry of Information, Djakarta, Sept. 21, 1954.
a philosophy with deep thought and spirit on which to erect the building of free Indonesia, stable and eternal. 2

This ideal of independence has all along been the corner-stone of Indonesia's foreign policy. But the need of a definite conduct in foreign affairs arose after the formal transfer of sovereignty on December 21, 1949. In the field of internal affairs the country was passing through a period of near chaos. Even before the transfer of sovereignty, the Republic had successfully quelled the Communist insurrection at Madiun in 1948. After 1949 a fresh problem arose in the form of the Darul-Islam Movement. There was a similar chaos in the field of economics. The entire external trade in exports and imports was at a virtual stand-still. Lack of technical skill in all spheres of administration and industry provided another problem.

Another problem to deal with, besides the above, were the Netherlands-Indonesian relations. The Round Table Conference Agreement of 1949 had provided for a Netherlands-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown in which both the Netherlands and Indonesia shall co-operate with each other as two sovereign states in the field of economics, defence and political relations. But these points of co-operation provided in the Union Statute hardly went beyond mere lip-service statements. The Union Statute was finally abrogated on August 10, 1956, since it was considered absolutely unworkable and meaningless. The abrogation was also due to the fact that whereas Holland had become a member of N.A.T.O., Indonesia retained its independent foreign policy. According to Indonesian official circles Holland had joined as a party in the "cold war", therefore, Indonesia was free to leave the Union. 3

The Indonesian attitude to the Round Table Conference Agreement may be realised from a joint statement of the three Indonesian delegates at the time of negotiations on the dissolution of Union held at the Hague in June, 1954.

2. Ibid. 3. Dorothy Woodman: op. cit. p. 404.
The statement issued just on the eve of the delegates' departure to the Hague outlined the basis of Indonesia's demand for the dissolution of the Union and abrogating all Round Table Conference Agreements. The statement runs:  

"According to history and the Republic's constitution, West Irian (West New Guinea) forms an integral part of the Indonesian Republic and at the transfer of sovereignty it was stated that the transfer was to be complete, unconditional and irrevocable. The incorporation of the West Irian is a gross violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and the perpetuation of the Dutch colonialism over the Indonesian soil.

Furthermore, in the past five years the Indonesian people have felt the consequences of the Round Table Conference Agreements and the Indonesian-Netherlands Union which are a restoration of Dutch colonialism. Dutch imperialism apparently with other imperialism and its agents in this country have succeeded in utilising these agreements to strengthen its position in various fields in Indonesia."

The Agreement of Union was, therefore, dissolved, but the financial obligations were not abrogated by Indonesia at that time. It was left for some future date. Ultimately in August, 1956, the Indonesian Government took a firm stand and abrogated the financial part of the Agreement, under which Indonesian Government was to pay its Dutch counterpart, the entire sum of money expended by the latter during the course of their military actions against the Republic after the Second World War.

The Republic entered the field of international relations in 1950 with practically nothing on its records. The entire conduct of foreign relations was to be based primarily on the interests of Indonesia itself and "on a realistic recognition of her internal problems and nationalism principles."

4. In this delegation the representatives of 32 political parties in the country were included. The above statement was read out by Mr. Hussain Kartasasmita, as the spokesman for 32 political parties. The whole delegation was led by the Foreign Minister Sunario. The copy of the statement has been furnished by the Information Service of Indonesia.

In these circumstances, Indonesia was required to devise its foreign policy. The basic problem before the new state was that of reconstruction and to work for the realisation of national ideals. No longer was the foreign policy of the country meant to serve foreign interests, but had to play an independent role as a faithful member of the United Nations. A few months after the transfer of sovereignty, in May, 1950, Hadji Agus Salim, the then Foreign Minister of Indonesia, outlined his country's policy, thus:

"We refuse to accept the idea that we must take sides in the Cold War. The West has been thinking we must take one of two ways. But after 300 years of subjugation, we want to show that we will follow the way of the East. We must take a third way - our own way - and we hope the United States will help us."

Torn asunder during and in consequence of the Second World War, the new Indonesia was engrossed in domestic problems mainly of an economic character which had impelled her to adopt a policy of "positive neutrality" towards the inter-bloc conflict. Dr. Subardjo, Indonesia's Foreign Minister in the Masjumi Cabinet of Dr. Sukarno, in 1951, outlined his country's policy thus:

"It is to our interest and that of our neighbours that we refuse to take sides with this or that nation or group of nations except in the interest of international peace and understanding and keep ourselves clear of all entangling alliances directed against third parties." 7A.

But this policy of neutrality did not imply an isolationist or even an indifferent attitude towards the nations living in the neighbourhood of Indonesia and to the leading powers of the two blocs. The common denominator of the country was mainly economic reconstruction for which she had to frame her foreign policy. Immediately on the achievement of independence, Indonesia had to count heavily on American aid to reconstruct her shattered economy, which

7A. Dr. Soebardjo: "Indonesia in World Politics", Indonesian Review, Djakarta, Feb., 1951.
naturally implied a comparatively greater leaning - though with caution - towards the Western world. Yet steps had also been taken to maintain cautious friendly relations with the Soviet Union and that in spite of the latter's clear attitude of hostility at the time of the transfer of sovereignty in December, 1949. Soviet commentators, it may be recalled, had termed the Draft Union Statute, implying a Dutch-Indonesian Union, as a "British-Can-American supported Dutch colonialism".8

The restrained attitude of friendship towards the United States of America in the early years was motivated by the following factors:-

Firstly, the reluctance of the United States Government to concede that the Republican regime in Indonesia would serve as a stabilising force in the South-east Asia and a bulwark against Communist expansion.9

Secondly, a fairly common neurosis of Indonesians about the worst foreign economic exploitation by the Dutch, who were strongly linked to the United States. The co-operation with the United States, it was maintained, would imply concessions to the Dutch.

The equally restrained aloofness from the Soviet Union was governed by the following reasons:-

Firstly, the popular feeling that coming into the Soviet orbit would necessarily entail a "negativist antagonism to the existing order."10 Through the course of long historical process, Indonesia has developed a pattern of society bound by local traditions, which even the Dutch did not care to abolish. The adoption of the Marxist.

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8. cf. Leon Poitier: Indonesia Today, New Times, Moscow, Dec. 12, 1951. The Soviet bloc on Dec. 7, 1949, also voted against a congratulatory resolution of the General Assembly. Russia had always regarded the creation of the United States of Indonesia and subsequently the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, as a "stage managed by the United States' State Department". See also The United States in World Affairs, New York, 1949, p.444.


ideology would mean a departure from the traditional order, which would cut at the roots of the Indonesian society.

Secondly, friendship with Russia will necessarily be followed by close co-operation with China. The Chinese living in Indonesia had been firmly rooted in the country's economic life, and were much feared on account of their intensive hold on the country's economic life. They also quite naturally turn to China as an expression of their loyalty. Thus the probability of "future expansionism" by China was a stumbling block in the development of more friendly relations with Russia.

This reserved friendly outlook of the Indonesian Government towards the United States and the Soviet Union continued till March 1952, when efforts were made by some leaders in the country to foster defence alliance with the United States. Dr. Subardjo, the Foreign Minister in the Sukiman Cabinet, signed an agreement in February 1952 with the United States accepting aid under the Mutual Security Agency's (M.S.A.) programme. Under a clause in the original M.S.A. legislation, it was provided that any nation accepting aid must contribute "to the defensive strength of the free world". Mr. Subardjo signed the agreement and as a result of mutual consent between the United States Ambassador to Indonesia, H. Merle Cochran, and Mr. Subardjo, the above clause was deleted and in its place the alternative clause was inserted which implied that Indonesia by signing the Agreement shall "contribute to the strength of independent and sovereign nations." Mr. Subardjo was under fire in Parliament and the members held that the agreement was a breach of Indonesia's independent policy which would bring Indonesia into the cold war. Subardjo had to resign and with him the whole Cabinet of Dr. Sukiman.

The Government of Sukiman was followed by the P.N.I.-led Government of Wilopo, which tried to keep Indonesia out of all international entanglements. But the deteriorated economy of the country demanded assistance from abroad. The new Government of Wilopo was to see which plan of foreign assistance, besides solving her economic difficulties would keep Indonesia out of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. With this objective in view, Indonesia became a participant in the Colombo Plan along with Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan in June, 1952.13

Outlining his country's foreign policy, Mr. Sunarjo, the Foreign Minister in the Wilopo Government stated that "Indonesia would continue to carry out an independent policy".14 This statement implied that during the course of international relations, Indonesia would not ignore her good regard for all countries of the world and respect for their ways of life. With the formation of the Wilopo Government it was felt that besides diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, trade relations with that country shall also be established. This trend was emphasized in a statement of a member of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, Dr. Mulia, who declared that the time had now come for "taking new steps, among which would be conclusion of trade agreement with Russia". According to Dr. Mulia, the diplomatic relations "will pave the way towards establishment of trade relations with Soviet Russia".15

Trade and cultural relations were also established with various East European countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and East Germany. These agreements were followed by the establishment of trade relations with the U.S.S.R.

The Government of Wilopo fell in June, 1953, on a purely domestic issue. The foundation of a new foreign policy laid by it was followed by all subsequent governments. This policy centred round the nucleus of the Indonesian way of life, the philosophy of Pantja Sila.

The foreign policy broadly laid down by the Wilopo Government served as a basis for international relations during the regime of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo from August, 1953, onwards. This policy was outlined by the Foreign Minister Sunarjo immediately after his assumption of office. Mr. Sunarjo declared that he would foster closer relations between Indonesia and Asian, Arab, and North African States, for the interest of all. He said he did not underestimate the importance of good relations with the neighbouring countries adding that steps should be taken to implement the existing treaties of friendship while new treaties should be entered into, for example with Thailand. He preferred a bi-lateral peace and reparations agreement with Japan to the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September, 1951. The question of fishing should also be finalised in an agreement between Indonesia and Japan. He hoped trade embargo on China would be lifted and he noted with satisfaction the trend among British to have the embargo lifted as soon as possible.

The new Foreign Minister advocated earliest dissolution of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union adding that he hoped measures to that end would be taken shortly. He believed that after the return of West-Irian (West New Guinea) to Indonesia and dissolution of the Union, the Indonesia-Netherlands relations would be harmonious and much better than they were at that time.

Mr. Sunarjo did not object to the Indonesian acceptance of an external aid, so long as it is necessary and beneficial, the possibility of payment by Indonesia, and not binding Indonesia - politically and economically.

He would welcome foreign military missions to help to train the Indonesian armed forces, he said, but would not
accept such missions coming from colonial or ex-colonial countries. Mr. Sunarjo preferred technical experts coming from such bodies as the United Nations while the acceptance of Colombo and I.C.A. aids should be often reviewed as to whether they are really beneficial. He agreed to the foreign investment in Indonesia, but he added "we should be careful".

The policy was further described by the Foreign Minister during the course of his speech before the 1954 session of the United Nations General Assembly. He stated:

"Indonesian Government reiterated in its parliamentary declaration the continuance of an independent active foreign policy. This is not a policy of passive neutrality or neutral passivity. It is logical that we cannot but pursue the active independent policy in the world affairs. It is activity not imposed by one of the two opposing parties, but activity wholly independent from any of them, aimed at seeking a solution acceptable for both the parties, thus avoiding conflicts with all unwanted consequences and creating an atmosphere so badly needed for realizing the ideals and aims laid down in the United Nations Charter." 17.

Indonesia strove hard to restore peace in the Far East that was so much jeopardized by the Korean War. This country's effort had been to strive for an efficacious machinery of the United Nations such as the setting up of a United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Moreover, Indonesia voted for the creation of a sub-committee by the United Nations for the purpose of the settlement of differences between the Western and Eastern blocs respectively with regard to Korean independence. During the course of the United Nations discussion on the events in Korea, Indonesia refused to accept the plea of branding China as an aggressor in the Korean War, which would have meant enforcement of embargo against the Republic of China.


In Indonesia's view her attitude to the events in Korea was based entirely on an independent approach to the problem and was aimed at bringing forth speedy settlement of the dispute, through ceasefire and negotiations.

A salient feature of this active and independent foreign policy has been to fight against colonialism. Explaining this, the Foreign Minister Sunarjo stated:

"Colonial problems are dangerous spectres of conflict raised by continued domination of one people and another. Indonesia stands firm in defending the rights of all small dependent and oppressed people."

In pursuance of this policy which was the outcome of an anti-colonial feeling developed as a result of more than three centuries of colonial rule, Indonesia supported the cause of the people of Tunisia and Morocco for independence. Further, she supported the case of a former Italian colony - Eritrea - to be included in the Ethiopian federation. The case for the independence of Libya, in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 1949, sponsored by many Arab states, got a ready support from Indonesia. In 1952, her representative in the United Nations General Assembly, invited other Asian-African countries to support him in introducing the Tunisian question on the agenda of the United Nations.

The question of Tunisia and Morocco was again brought forth before the United Nations General Assembly by the Foreign Minister Sunarjo. During the course of his speech he declared:

"Indonesia, which in common with other Asian-African nations, feels the increasing common responsibility and burden in common work of peace has brought for the second straight time to the General Assembly's attention, the question of Tunisia and Morocco in a belief that the

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18. For a brief discussion see Dr. J.H. Van Der Kroef: Indonesia in the Modern World, Vol. II, pp. 360-64.
fulfilment of the aspiration of these peoples will not only enable them to achieve their ideals but will ease world tension and prevent untold sufferings. It can be said that there has been steady worsening and deterioration of conditions in the two areas since this organization last considered their case. My Delegation is confident that the United Nations will not fail to act decisively with deeds as well as words. On the other hand we have not as yet given up all hope that France will heed the irresistible tide of history and meet fully the national aspirations of Tunisia and Morocco peoples."

Indonesia's active independent policy was emphasised by the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Sunarjo, in the 9th session of the United Nations General Assembly. He stated:

"Indonesia has her positive good neighbour policy vis-a-vis all her neighbours, her equally positive Afro-Asian policy inside and outside the United Nations, strengthened by the conclusion of several treaties of friendship and also with her participation in the Colombo Plan.

"Thus maintaining an active independent - not merely neutral - foreign policy, taking no sides in the "cold war", we believe that we are able to develop and complete our independence and sovereignty more effectively and also to discharge our responsibilities in terms of the basic principles of the United Nations."

Continuing Mr. Sunarjo stated:

"Peaceful co-existence is not a negative term implying passive acquiescence to the policies practised by others. It means rather a positive effort to recognize the value and worth under which the peoples determine their own ways of life so long as they do not impinge others."

Indonesia membership of the Colombo Plan has also been directed to promote the idea of the "active independent" policy outlined above. On the occasion of a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Colombo Powers, held in Colombo on 28th April, 1954, Indonesia, along with other participants welcomed the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. It was resolved at the Conference that peace in Indo-China should be restored by negotiations and not by recourse to forceful means.

22. Ibid.
Immediately after the Geneva Conference in May, 1954, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo in a statement to the Press endorsed the decisions of the Colombo meeting, which, he said, "were in conformity with Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy". He further disclosed that the Colombo Powers' Prime Ministers had supported in principle the proposal to hold an Afro-Asian Conference in the near future. As for the joint statement, issued after the Conference, the Indonesian Prime Minister stated that it did not only represent mere words but also a joint political view, that will play its role in the international political arena.23

Soon after the conclusion of the Colombo Conference the Indonesian Government regretted the Ceylon Government's attitude in allowing United States Globemaster planes carrying French parachutists to fly over Ceylon's territory on their way to the Indo-China battlefront. The Indonesian Government's view on this matter was "to try at this moment to eliminate everything which may lessen the possibility of reaching a truce in Indo-China war as soon as possible."24 The Indonesian Government held on this issue that any aid of whatever nature and from whichever side should not be despatched to battlefront in Indo-China.

In pursuance of the Colombo Powers' declaration to convene a conference of the Asian-African nations, five premiers of the Colombo Powers, namely, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, met at

23. Statement of the Prime Minister, Merdeka, May 4, 1954. Indonesian Government's attitude in realising the Asian-African unity was hailed in the Indonesian Press. The whole press unanimously held that with the realisation of this unity Western Colonialism would soon come to an end.

24. The statement of Mr. Rondonio, Chairman of the Indonesian Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Section (Released by Indonesian Information Section, Karachi).
Bogor on December 28, 1954, to chalk out plans for such a conference. The three items decided at Bogor were the date and the countries which were to be invited to this conference of the African and Asian countries. This conference was of special significance to Indonesia, particularly in view of her active independent foreign policy. The then Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Sunarjo expressed gratification over the Bogor talks and stated—

“We know how great was the influence of Colombo discussions than on the Geneva Conference, so that it not only affected the participating five nations but also the countries of Asia and Africa and even accelerated the peace efforts of the world.”

At the end of the Conference a joint communique was issued by the Prime Ministers of the five Colombo Powers that an Asian-African Conference be held under the joint sponsorship of the five Colombo Powers. The purpose of the conference would be—

(a) to promote goodwill and co-operation among the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual friendliness and neighbourly relations;
(b) To consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of countries represented;
(c) To consider problems of special interest to Asian and African people; and
(d) To view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world today and the contribution they can make to the formation of world peace and co-operation.

A decision to invite 25 Asian-African countries to the conference at Bandung was also arrived at in the Prime Ministers’ Conference.

The proposal to hold the conference was motivated by the consideration and desire that the countries of

25. Statement of Mr. Sunarjo to the Press. See Merdeka, December 20, 1954.
Asia and Africa should have a voice in international affairs and through united action on agreed matters they should try to become a force not to be neglected by Western powers. Another matter for concern was the increased tension between the United States of America and China. The purpose of the conference was to provide an opportunity whereby increased contacts between China and various countries of Asia and Africa and especially those in "Southeast Asia peripheral to China", should be established. According to the sponsors, this understanding shall tend to promote goodwill among China and the United States and decrease world tension. Moreover, China, shall gradually start thinking her alliance with Russia more of a liability when increased contacts in other countries are available to her. The purpose of the Conference, according to some countries, was to take such diplomatic steps as to contain Chinese and Viet-Minh military power. 27

The Indonesian interest in the conference was dictated by the financial help that the Communists in their country were alleged to be receiving through the Chinese Embassy. Moreover, the Burmese Premier's disclosure that in the conference of World Federation of Trade Unions at Peking in 1949, a leading member of the Communist regime in China had described Nehru and Soekarno and Nehru as imperialist stooges, was of considerable significance to Indonesian leaders. The Indonesian delegation, like Indian and Burmese delegations was interested in the containment of Chinese influence. 28

During the course of the Bandung conference from 18th to 24th April, 1955, the Indonesian delegation strongly supported the Egyptian resolution on North

28. Ibid., pp.7-8.
"In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persistent denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right of self determination and independence the Asian-African conference declares its support of the rights of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia to self-determination and independence, and urges the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of this issue without delay." 29.

The Indonesian delegation approved Mr. Nehru’s proposal for the abandonment of all military alliances, which would lead to disturb peace in the world. A few months before the conference the then Indonesian Ambassador to India, Mr. L.J. Palat stated:

"We who think in terms of peace are convinced that we will be able to influence those participants that felt compelled to join military alliances." 30.

The attitude of Mr. Nehru in the conference over military alliances was sharply refuted by many delegates. The delegate from the Philippines Mr. Romulo reminded Mr. Nehru of the vast expenditure, almost more than a half of the total budget, that India was spending every year on defense. Why then, he stops others from joining military alliances. The principle of "respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the charter of the United Nations" was accepted by the conference after long discussion at last. 31

During the course of his inaugural address before the conference President Soekarno stated: 32

"As Asia and Africa can prosper only when they are united and that even the safety of the world at large cannot be safeguarded without a United Asia-Africa. I hope that this conference will give guidance to mankind, will point out to mankind the way which it must take to attain safety and peace."

29. Ibid., p.17
Concluding the President remarked: "Let us remember that for the sake of all we Asians and Africans must be united."

The Asian-African Conference considered the problems of common interest and concern to the countries of Asia and Africa. At the end of these deliberations a final communiqué was issued dealing with the following items:

a) Asian-African Economic Co-operation;
b) Cultural Co-operation;
c) Human Rights and Self-Determination;
d) Problems of dependent peoples and Colonialism and evil arising from the subjugation of peoples to alien domination and exploitation;
e) Other problems and
f) Promotion of world peace and co-operation.

The conference expressed its attitude on abolition of colonialism and supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian (West New Guinea) and urged the Government of Netherlands to reopen negotiations with Indonesia, to implement their obligations under the existing agreements between the two countries. The conference expressed earnest hope that the United Nations would assist the parties concerned in finding a peaceful solution of the dispute.

For the settlement of international disputes the conference expressed that peaceful means should be adopted such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement. As a matter of fact the conference gave much thought to the consideration of the problems of the dependent people but practically no concern was expressed if a stronger nation in Asia were to usurp the rights of the weaker nations and were guilty of exercising

34. Ibid.
subjugation, domination and exploitation of other countries.

The spirit with which the conference was convened was indeed laudable. But the seeds of disharmony were there even from its very inception. In principle the conference did express respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly and collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. That meant any nation could enter into defence pacts with other nations. But the very existence of divergent policies in this regard did represent a fundamental breach in the outlooks on foreign relations. Some countries like the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Iran, etc., were members of the defence pacts and were receiving economic and military help from the United States. India, on the other hand, mostly because of its size and strategic importance, was receiving more economic aid from the West as well as from the Russian bloc, in spite of its keeping a neutral attitude. Countries like Indonesia felt themselves in a different situation. An independent policy for them meant virtually nothing but following the lines of India without enjoying the benefits of neutrality as India was enjoying because of her own special circumstances.

In all the years after independence the foreign relations of Indonesia have been conducted closely to the lines adopted by Indian foreign policy. The personality of Jawaharlal Nehru has all along been far more popular in Indonesia than any other leader from

35. There was, however, another clause in the communiqué providing "abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers." The countries opposing the existing defence pacts expressed that their demand has been met in this clause. Here then was a point of breach between the nations that had assembled at Bandung.
Asia or the West. The reason for this may not be very
difficult to find. India was the first country to raise
the question of Indonesia's independence in two ad hoc
Asian Relations Conferences, summoned in New Delhi in
1947 and 1949. Again the reason for India-Indonesia
accord has also been due to similarity in the international
outlook of the two states. Both the countries pledged
themselves to keep aloof of inter-bloc entanglements in
the sense that Nehru calls his country's foreign policy
"positive neutrality" whereas Indonesia has named it an
"active independent" one.

But there is one difference. Nehru has his own
outlook on independent policy. India remains an important
member of the British Commonwealth and is receiving much
greater assistance from the West than any other nation
in Asia. She has also received considerable aid from the
Soviet bloc. She is building her military machine with
a tempo far greater than any country in Asia. Her
objection against the military alignments like Baghdad
Pact and S.W.A.T.O. is also based on her own interests.
If these military pacts are objectionable, other similar
pacts should also be considered in the same way. But Nehru
is not against N.A.T.O., which, according to him, is
mainly a European organisation. The following account of
an interview with Nehru amplifies the above statement:

"In speaking with me recently in New Delhi,
Prime Minister Nehru showed his well-known
distaste for Western mixing in Asian affairs.
He avoided criticising N.A.T.O. He seemed to
recognise that it deserved credit for saving
Western Europe from possible Communist en-
croachment at a critical moment. But Europe
was not Asia. Further the West European

36. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Neutrality - Varying

38. According to Mr. Armstrong the main Indian
objection to the Baghdad Pact and S.W.A.T.O. is
because India does not like Pakistan to receive
any military assistance.
countries in most cases had a common
background and possessed intrinsic strength
which needed only encouragement and material
help from the United States to become effec-
tive. N.A.T.O. united them. The Baghdad
Pact and S.E.A.T.O., however, divide the
countries of the Middle East and Asia and
upset the military balance within each of
the areas in question."

India also has quite a different outlook on the
question of Asian-African unity. She was one of the
first countries to recognise the State of Israel, but
Indonesia, like so many other states of Asia, has not
so far done.

At the beginning of the Suez crisis many responsible
leaders in India had expressed their desire to leave the
British Commonwealth, if Britain invaded Egypt on the
canal issue. Britain did invade Egypt and the public
opinion in Indonesia and some other countries of Asia
expected the breach between India and Great Britain. But
to all such demands Mr. Nehru stated:—37

"It would be an act of strong reaction.
I am a very strong member of the Common-
wealth."

There was a strong reaction in Indonesia to these
remarks. The Indonesian public could not understand
the two-pronged policy of Nehru. "Times of Indonesia",
in an editorial, strongly criticised this and remarked: 38

"We in Indonesia have for very long kept parallel
with India in the field of foreign affairs but the
time has come to ask ourselves with the
utmost seriousness if we can continue to do so
indefinitely after Mr. Nehru's confession that
he did not sense what every Indonesian felt
'that strong angry reaction'. Let us go a
little further, even to the verge of the
improvable. Great Britain has quite an
economic interest in Indonesia and let us say
that at one stage, feeling vital interests
threatened and necessitating protection, the
British attacked us—a mild police action
from their bases in Singapore. Are we to
assume that Mr. Nehru will then feel that
'strong angry action' he now cannot muster
when Egypt is the victim of barbaric aggression
by three countries. The answer is an obvious
'no' and we in Indonesia should do some serious
thinking about it."

37. A United Press report from Calcutta dated Nov. 9,
1956, reported in Times of Indonesia, Djakarta,
Nov. 12, 1956.
38. Times of Indonesia, Nov. 12, 1956.
In view of the existing international tension between two power-blocs the weaker nations are tending to be in great danger if they do not assume the responsibilities to defend themselves. Here stress on Asian-African unity will not go a long way in fulfilling all the national economic, political and military needs. The most that this unity can do is to express the common desire among the nations of Asia and Africa to maintain their self-determination and to achieve their respective ideals. But the attitude are bound to differ when face to face with some tangible problems.

The immediate effect of the Asian-African Conference was felt on the Indonesian-Chinese relations. A treaty was signed on April 22, 1955, at Bandung concerning the determination of the nationality of the Chinese living in Indonesia. Soon after the close of the Asian-African Conference a joint statement was issued by the two Prime Ministers of Indonesia and China on April 28. The statement affirmed the principle of good neighbour policy, mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-aggression, etc.

Both premiers expressed satisfaction over the conclusion of the treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and China over the question of dual nationality and considered it a good example of settling the complicated and difficult problems by means of friendly negotiations.

This joint statement was later on proved insufficient and the Government of Indonesia was constrained to introduce a bill in Parliament in August, 1956, defining the scope of Indonesian nationality. doubts regarding Chinese expansionist danger still prevail.

The Bandung conference is a Landmark in Indonesia's conduct of foreign relations. The main achievement of


40. 1518.
this conference was the expression of a common voice of
all Asian-African nations in their opposition to colonial-
ism and their firm desire to support and maintain peace.
To most of these participating nations colonialism was
not a thing of the distant past. They had experienced it
and in the case of Indonesia a period of over three
centuries of colonizer rule was sufficient in engendering
in her a strong anti-colonial feeling. The decisions of
the Asian-African conference were henceforth adopted by
Indonesia as cardinal principles of her foreign policy. 41

A very important feature in Indonesia's political
life till the end of 1955 had been the fact that elections
to the national legislature and also for the Constituent
Assembly had not yet taken place. The existing legisla-
ture was a provisional one consisting entirely of nomina-
ted legislators. Elections were at last held in September,
1955, and the final results of these elections were declared
several months later. Just on the eve of elections,
the Government of Ali Sastroamidjaja was replaced by
the Nasjumi-led cabinet of Burhanuddin Harahap
which remained in office till the coming into being of
the elected chamber in April, 1956.

During this brief period of the Nasjumi Government
officially no major changes were brought forth in the
foreign policy of Indonesia. In December, 1955, a
cultural agreement with India was concluded providing
measures for cultural and intellectual co-operation. 42

Besides, the Nasjumi Government expressed its
desire to forge closer ties and understanding with the
West. As for the defence pacts with the West undertaken

41. So strong was the Indonesian enthusiasm for this
Conference, that the name of a thoroughfare at
Bandung, where the major part of the Asian-African
Conference activities took place, has been changed
into Djialan Asia-Africa (Asia-Africa Road).

42. For text see Foreign Affairs Records (a bulletin of
the External Publicity Division of the Government
of India), December, 1955.
by various Asian-African countries, the Masjumi Government had a more lenient view in the matter than its predecessor. In an interview Mr. Arhamuddin stated:

"Muslim parties in Indonesia, perfectly understand Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis the West, and we appreciate your Islamic aspirations because we feel the same way." 43

As far as Indonesia was concerned, Mr. Harahap stated that she would not join the Western bloc to get American help, and hoped America showing a friendlier approach to her problems. Moreover, he opined that it was in the interest of both countries that their relations should improve. 44 As for specific relations with Great Britain, the Masjumi Government also laid emphasis on a closer co-operation with that country as a member of the Colombo Plan. During the visit to Great Britain of the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Mr. Anak Agung, some part of the Press in that country even went to the extent mentioning a speculation among some circles there that Great Britain may favour the idea of establishing Commonwealth links with Indonesia. Nothing, however, was mentioned to this effect in Indonesia. Rather there were misgivings in that country over Indonesian-British relations. 45

On the other hand, some responsible leaders of the Masjumi Party expressed their intention to move for an alliance of Muslim countries on the pattern of the British Commonwealth if their party comes to power after the general elections. Dr. Mohammad Roes and a former Foreign Minister in the Masjumi Government of Mr. Natsir, stated in an interview that Masjumi Party was anxious to discuss such an alliance, that it was a necessity, and must be

44. Ibid.
possible time. He stated: "If there can be a British Commonwealth, I see no reason why there should be no Commonwealth of the Muslim nations. The Muslim countries stretching from the shores of the Atlantic to the Pacific must forge a united front to protect their interests." 46

After the general elections it was found that none of the political parties was strong enough to form a single-party Government. A three-party coalition of the Nationalist-Masjumi-Nah/datul Ulama was brought into being. On the issue of various internal and external problems each party has tended to make some concessions on its avowed principles in order to make the state a working concern. In foreign policy, the Masjumi Party conceded to the P.N.I. the continuation of the foreign policy of the pre-elections Government of Ali Sastroamidjojo that was based on the following principles: 47

1. To pursue an "independent and active" foreign policy under the guidance of its first elected Government;

2. To protect national business and industry against foreign competition;

3. To realise the programme of the abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and to mobilise "anti-colonial" forces for the realisation of the "de facto" authority over West Irian.

4. To consider the possibility of another Asian African Conference "to be held at the right moment and in keeping with the international climate and atmosphere".

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47. These principles of foreign policy were outlined by the then Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo during the course of a Press Conference on April 9, 1956 at Djakarta: The Times of Indonesia, Djakarta, April 10, 1956.
CHAPTER 7

PROBLEMS AND OUTLOOK ON FOREIGN POLICY

Of all the countries of Southeast Asia, the political and social conditions of Indonesia are particularly significant from the point of view of the study of international relations. The special interest in the Indonesian affairs is aroused because of the vastness of its area and the comparatively much larger population than any other country of Southeast Asia. Being situated on the junction of four main roads of international traffic and on account of its raw-material potentialities, this country, since the end of the World War II has been considered of considerable importance by the Western world and as an important target by the Communist forces. 1 Her "insular" position 2 has invited pressure and enticements to effect an alignment with one or the other of the two power-blocs led respectively by the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

The social and political attitudes of a country, including its foreign policy, are very much determined by its peculiar geographical conditions. Indonesia is inextricably linked with the various countries of Southeast Asia in her social political and economic environments and conditions. Her relations with India and Burma are cultural and with Pakistan they are also religious. She has very close racial, cultural and ethnic ties with Malaya and the Philippines. Her relations with Thailand are also of considerable historic and cultural importance.

Of the countries mentioned above, Pakistan, Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines are very closely linked with the Western world through multilateral defence-pacts. The neutral policy adopted by Indonesia seems to be a hinderance

1. The Madiun Insurrection of 1948 was a Communist attempt to control the state through forceful-revolutionary means.

in the development of more fraternal ties with these countries. On the other hand closer bonds with the Western world may be followed by closer ties with her nearest neighbours, Malaya and the Philippines.

The present neutralist foreign policy has brought Indonesia in line with India. The accord between the respective attitudes on foreign policy of India and Indonesia was clearly observed through the speeches delivered by the delegates of the two countries to the Asian African Conference at Bandung in 1955. Both these countries expressed their desire to steer clear of the conflict between the two power-blocks led by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. The Indonesian leaders have not shown sufficient acumen to understand the significance of the third block of the neutralist powers that India sought to set up after the Asian African Conference. The political and social conditions in India have so far permitted that country to keep aloof from the two power-blocks and even to "flirt" with the two. She has been closely associated with Great Britain through her membership of the British Commonwealth. Her relations with the Soviet Union are also very cordial as can be observed by the wide support that India has been giving to that country on various problems discussed in the United Nations. Moreover, India has also been on quite friendly terms with the United States. She has been receiving a considerable amount of assistance from the United States as well as under the Colombo Plan. Her neutral policy has provided her with an opportunity to bargain with the two power-blocks.

The condition of Indonesia is different. Her weak economic condition after the World War II, along with


China's action in Tibet and her threat to India's Northern Borders in 1959 has posed a problem for India. China had accepted the Bandung Conference decisions and a large section of the Indian popular opinion consider this action by China as a gross violation of the Bandung principles of Asian solidarity. It is a challenge to India's neutral position.
the political instability in the country has made it difficult for her to resist the realities of world politics which have drawn the weaker nations closer to one or the other of the major world powers. In adopting a neutralist policy Indonesia has brought herself in close identity with India, whose interest in Indonesia's politics is likely to grow. Moreover the existence of a sizeable section of the Indian population in the archipelago may give further incentive to Indian attempts to bring Indonesia in her sphere of influence.

India has also some special interests in Southeast Asia, which are likely to be fulfilled better if Indonesia continues to follow the neutralist way and consequently remain militarily and economically weak. India's special interests may be realised from the remarks by her well-known diplomat, K.M. Panikker, who has advocated that a vigorous policy should be pursued by his country in Southeast Asia. He says:

"It is on the control of the narrow seas guarding entrances that naval power has ultimately rested. The two narrow seas that are of vital interests to us are the Babel Mende and the Straits of Malacca. These are now controlled by Britain and the security of India is not threatened. But it is conceivable that in a future war in which Britain herself is engaged she may have to withdraw her forces into areas more vital to her defence, or for the commerce. In such a case the entire defence of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal will fall on India and it is against this contingency that India has to organise her navy in the immediate future."

K.M. Panikker further writes:

"It is obvious that India must have both a long term and a short term policy in regard to naval matters. The long term policy can easily be laid. Its object would be to develop India as a naval power capable by herself of defending her interests in the seas vital to her and of maintaining supremacy in the Indian Ocean areas."


The Indian minority is found in nearly all countries of Southeast Asia. In mid-1954, there were about 1,240,000 Indians in Southeast Asia. In 1941 the Indian population in Malaya was 7,44,000.


The strongly entrenched Indian position in the Indian ocean areas is bound to lead to far-flung repercussions on Indonesia. The neutral policy adopted by Indonesia as at present may leave India virtually free to extend her influence to the entire Southeast Asia region, particularly should in any eventuality British defence arrangements with Malaya and her hold on Singapore be weakened, India may then emerge as a successor to the British naval supremacy in the region which may cause concern to Indonesia.

The neutralist policy may also present a grave threat to Indonesia's internal security because of the existence in the country of a economically and politically strong Chinese minority, who may move for a closer bond between Indonesia and China. The powerful Communist party in the country, which is believed to be depending for her financial requirements on the Chinese embassy may be another cause of alarm. The fact that there had been an attempt by the Indonesian Communists in 1948 to organise an insurrection, may provide them with another opportunity to dominate the country. Any communist victory in the country is bound to be advantageous to China.

The danger to Indonesia from China is not a new one. The Chinese were colonists who in the first stage of their conquest in Indonesia occupied some islands on the coast of Borneo and made frequent incursions against the Srivijaya empire in Java before the thirteenth century of Christian era. In the middle of the thirteenth century we learn of numerous Chinese expeditions against the countries situated to the South. During the period of Majau Pahit rule the Javanese fleet was used frequently against the activities of the Chinese pirates.7

Similarly, there have been many such occasions at various periods of history when Indonesia felt the brunt of attack from the north. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, there had not been much political contact between China and Indonesia. However, with the advent of the Dutch rule in the 17th Century, the Chinese began to be favourably treated by the colonial government as compared with the indigenous population. The Dutch considered the Chinese as useful to the economy of the country but the authorities were fearful of the possible threat of "Chinese Imperialism".

After the achievement of independence, the Chinese have not adapted themselves to the changed conditions. The Chinese in Indonesia, many Indonesians feel, due to their traditional loyalties with China, may encourage their country to pursue her expansionist aim. Moreover the deep hold on the Indonesian economy which the Chinese have, may cause alarm among the indigenous population. For these reasons the pursuance of a "neutralist" policy by Indonesia may bring her into such close relations to China which may not be of any advantage to her.

The problem of the Chinese after the proclamation of independence by Indonesia was complicated by the fact that all the Chinese Governments had upheld dual citizenship, i.e. recognising persons of the Chinese race as Chinese citizens even when they happened to be nationals of another country at the same time.

At the time of the Hague Agreement of December, 1949, it was decided that the inhabitants of Indonesia of European or Chinese stock would have two years in which to decide whether they wish to belong to Indonesia, China or the Netherlands.

8. Ibid., pp. 49, 50 and 70.
10. Ibid., p. 122, also New York Times, Nov. 6, 1951.
For the Chinese the situation was further complicated by the fact that the only way Chinese citizenship could be manifested was by registration with a consulate of the Peking (People’s Republic) Government - which was not very much desired by all Chinese in Indonesia.

After the expiry of the specified period of two years, a majority of the Chinese in Indonesia had rejected Indonesian nationality, whereas a majority of the people of Eurasian and Arab Stocks applied for Indonesian Nationality. This showed clearly the actual natural affiliations towards China. Their main motive in Indonesia, as in any other country of Southeast Asia, was to earn fabulous wealth at the cost of the local population. This fact was very much resented by the people of Indonesia.

Towards the end of the Dutch regime, the support lent by the Chinese in Indonesia to the Netherlands Indies Government against the resurgence of nationalist movement provides a reasonable argument against these foreign nationals, whose loyalty to any national regime in Indonesia was henceforth likely to be subject to doubt.

The people of Indonesia, as history proves, have shown a remarkable sense of assimilation of foreign cultural influence. It can be safely assumed that if the Chinese population turn their back to the mainland of China and think themselves as part and parcel of Indonesian soil, their problem would be instantaneously solved and they would become really useful to the economy of the archipelago. Though many of the Chinese in Indonesia are not Communists as some Indonesians feel, the very fact of their being non-Indonesians may make them

the friends of a particular regime against Indonesia, as has already been proved during the Dutch regime.

Most of the Chinese in Indonesia, as in every other country of the Southeast Asia, have continued to retain the consciousness of Chinese nationalism in spite of their living for long in these countries. At the early stages, these Chinese, and in most cases their forefathers, had left their country of origin where they had experienced many, economic, political and social disabilities. In Indonesia they found a haven of relative security and prosperity. The memory of the hardships, misery and injustice, which their forefathers suffered in their own country, gradually faded away. But they continued to maintain a feeling of aloofness from the local problems and did not assimilate themselves in the local environments. The result was that "Chinese nationalism became an obsession which hampered their outlook and hindered their political advancement at every step. It enmeshed them in a web of contradictions, causing friction and suspicion everywhere. It became a barrier to the very political emancipation they had set their heart to, for because of its separatist nature it made impossible whatever grant or privilege the territorial sovereign might have been otherwise pleased to bestow on them." 13

It was this dual nationalism which the Indonesian Government sought to remove and the Chinese population was, soon after independence, face to face with the problem either to become full-fledged Indonesians or say clearly that they were Chinese.


A treaty was signed on April 22, 1955, at Jakarta, between the People's Republic of China and the Government of Indonesia to the effect that those Chinese in Indonesia who failed to signify whether they wanted to remain Chinese citizens or the citizens of Indonesia, will be considered Chinese if their fathers were of Chinese origin.\(^{14}\)

The treaty vaguely worded as it was did not solve the problem as it did not exclusively mention birth as the sole criterion for the grant of nationality. What it actually meant was that those of the Chinese who wanted to adopt Indonesian nationality were free to do so.

Again, the treaty provided a fresh problem for Indonesia. Those of the Chinese who may adopt Indonesian nationality may still continue to look towards China and get protection against any anti-alien laws in the country. They can, if they hold Chinese ancestry, acquire Chinese nationality against by a simple process of "redintegration", either by going out of Indonesia to China or even to any other country. It may be quite safe to conclude that the Chinese, in the last analysis may be "subject to the push and pull of Peking",\(^{15}\) even though they may acquire Indonesian nationality.

The question of the status of over two million Chinese nationals domiciled in Indonesia is an explosive domestic political problem and is one of the controversial issues on which some parties in the country, not very friendly towards Peking, have been campaigning.

There are altogether more than two million Chinese in Indonesia who along with the Dutch settlers dominate the country's economic life. Of these nearly 600,000 have already acquired Indonesian nationality but

\(^{14}\) The word fathers connoted ancestors and the ancestry may even extend to many generations.

continue to enjoy Chinese citizenship as well. The remaining more than 1,200,000 are Chinese citizens with Chinese passports, who along with other overseas Chinese, exercise voting rights to elect their representative to the National People’s Congress in Peking and are under the political and administrative supervision of the Central People’s Government’s Overseas Chinese Commission. A small section of them owe allegiance to the Chiang Kai-shek regime but the great majority supports the Peking Government.

Under the above mentioned agreement the 800,000 Chinese who have already acquired Indonesian nationality were given the option to decide within one year either for Indonesian or for Chinese nationality. The other 1,200,000 will be treated as aliens and subjected to the laws and regulations applicable to foreigners in Indonesia. In other words, they will be forbidden political activity and will be liable to deportation if they interfere in Indonesia’s internal affairs. If any of them wishes to become an Indonesian national he must agree to give up his Chinese nationality and also go through the process of naturalisation laid down by the Indonesian Nationality Act which, among other things, stipulates that the applicant must be well versed in the Indonesian language and history and that would be determined by an appropriate test.16

The problem of dual Chinese nationality was not solved by the above mentioned treaty. The apprehension that the Chinese in Indonesia may continue to be a threat to the country’s social and economic solidarity continued. The Government of Indonesia introduced a bill in Parliament regulating the problem of dual nationality. The draft bill adopted in August, 1956,

aimed at the proper fixation of rules and regulations under which the Chinese in Indonesia are no longer a threat to the country.

Another basis, besides the geographical factors mentioned above, for the determination of the foreign policy of a country are the social conditions of its people. The bulk of the population of Indonesia are Muslims who are deeply concerned about events in the Muslim world and are hostile to the Communist ideology. The result of the 1955 general elections reveal a sharp lead to the Muslim parties against Communism and Hindu-animistic traditions. 16A It was only the lack of coherence among the major Muslim political parties that has led to an uneasy alliance between them and the nationalist groups without the Parliament.

The Muslim sentiment in the country demands a greater reliance on Muslim solidarity throughout the world. The leaders of the Muslim parties are conscious of the imperialist threat particularly from China in the North. They, however, feel that in following an independent foreign policy, with slight orientation towards the West, any such threat to Indonesia's sovereignty can be met.

Besides, the social and cultural factor of Islam mentioned above there is another visible socio-geographical reality, i.e., the unity of the Malay race. History records the deep cultural, linguistic and religious ties existing between the archipelago and the Malay Peninsula. The Malay origin of the Indonesian language has fostered a unity between the people of Indonesia and the mainland of Malaya and the cry for unity between the two is often heard. 17

16A. See pp. 74-77.

17. Inche Ibrahim Yaquib: Nusa dan Bengsa Malaya (The Island and People of Malaya), Bandung, 1951.
The problem of Malaya and Indonesia are almost similar as both these countries are confronted with the delicate and pressing problem of the Chinese minority. History records ample evidence to show the similarity of political interests existing between the mainland of Malaya and the Indonesian archipelago in the past. The straits of Malacca have always served as a link between the archipelago and the countries lying west including India. Hindu influence originally came through the straits from the Coromandel Coast of India. The straits actually became a part of the famous Srivijaya empire in the twelfth century. The Portuguese in the early 16th century strove to capture this strategic point with a view to extend their sway to the archipelago and to stop the diffusion of the message of Islam carried over to Southeast Asia by the Arab merchants. The ruler of Malacca Sultan Mahmood fought against the Portuguese and was assisted by the forces of Atjeh, Sultan Mahmood was ultimately defeated and forced to shift his headquarters to Borneo (N. Borneo). The Atjehnese continued their attempts to capture Malacca with assistance of the other states of Java like Japara. That shows how much value was attached to the Straits of Malacca by the Indonesian rulers as well as by foreign powers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The history of the Portuguese rule is replete with instances of combined Indonesian-Malacca attempts to ward off the attacks of the foreign invaders and foster a spirit of unity among themselves.

The state of Atjeh went to the extreme extent in helping the Malacca's fight against the Portuguese. A part of the reason for this help may be the Atjeh desire to have a dominance over the Malaccas, but the cultural affinity also played a considerable role. The Portuguese were afraid of the rising power of the Atjeh.

18. Hall: op. cit., p.38
invasion. The Sultan of Aceh allied with the Malacca against the Portuguese and the Javanese and went to the extent of seeking aid like gunners, gun and ammunition from Turkey. 20 The Malacca strength was ultimately broken by the Portuguese in 1568. 21

This then is the historical basis of the unity of the Malay people. Any hostile power occupying the straits of Malacca can be a direct threat to Indonesia's security. With the advent of independence, Indonesia has to see that no hostile state occupied this strip of water and the adjoining territorial stretches. A more pro-Chinese or pro-India attitude adopted by the Republic of Indonesia may strengthen the hands of the Chinese in Malaya which in turn may have deep and far-reaching repercussions in Indonesia itself in view of the presence of a strong Chinese minority there. With the achievement of independence by Malaya one of the main problems before that country is how to detach its Chinese population from looking towards China as a source of inspiration. The Malayan independence has given new impetus to the freedom movement in Singapore. The political implications of this movement are certainly great for Indonesia. It would be a matter of direct concern to her that the mainland of Malaya and the crown colony of Singapore do not fall in undesirable hands. Indonesia's interest in Malaya and the great cultural and linguistic affinity between the two countries, would put Indonesia on a different state of relationship both with China and India. The powerful minority of Indians and a very large Chinese population in Malaya are direct threats to the problem of Malayan unity.

The concept of Malayan unity was made manifest by 20. D.G.E. Hall: op. cit., p. 284.
21. Ibid.
the visit of an Indonesian delegation to the conference in Johore on Malayan language and culture held in October, 1956. The Indonesia delegation offered its advice and a present of 4000 books to add to the small output of literary and cultural works in Malaya. This event, it was hoped, would keep alive in the people of both the countries a sense of fellow-feeling. A prominent British newspaper described this conference as having "great political implications". The newspaper acknowledged the existence of a sentiment of a greater Indonesia on both sides of the straits of Malacca.²²

Indonesian leaders have been specially interested in promoting the bonds of friendship with the Asian countries. These bonds have been cultural in the case of Burma and India and with Pakistan these are religious too.²³ With the Philippines the bonds are still closer, and there is a consciousness in both the countries of racial affinity. During the State visit to the Philippines by President Soekarno, early in 1950, an English daily at Manila, welcomed the distinguished guest in the following words:

"We are also Indonesians. Only we call ourselves English-speaking Filipinos, through the exigencies of history." ²⁴

The Filipinos, besides racial affinity also have affinity of culture and language. The Malay


２３. That the relations between Indonesia and Pakistan were of the "friendliest nature" was emphasised by Dr. Mohammad Roem, Indonesia's Foreign Minister in the Masjumi cabinet of Premier Mohammad Natsir, who passed through Karachi on his way to Djakarta from Holland on September 20, 1950. He said "That we are part of Asia nobody would deny and who can deny that we are Muslims? We are genuinely proud of being Muslims. We know that there is a bigger world beyond Asia also, we cannot cut ourselves off from our brethren outside Asia." (Reported in the Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, September 21,1950).

people in the mainland of Malaya, Indonesia and the
Philippines are conscious of these common bonds and have
on some occasions sought to develop the concept of greater
Malaya. There does exist even now some pan-Malayaism in the
Philippines and some of the younger people want to realise
the unity among the people of all these lands, which
formerly were in part included in the Srivijaya, Majapahit
and the Sailendra empires. This concept is at
present termed as Indonesia Raya. In 1929, many of the
Malay leaders tried to realise the Persatuan Nasional
Indonesia (Greater Indonesia). At the time of the
Indonesian's proclamation of independence in 1945 a
Malayan Congress was held in Malaya in which decisions
were made for the further struggle of independence which
would be complete only when unity with Indonesia is
realised.  

25 In spite of the bonds of Malayan unity, Indonesia's
relations with the Philippines, have not been as cordial
since 1952 as compared to the early years of Indonesian
independence. The reason mainly lies in the divergent
foreign policies adopted by both the Governments. Besides
there exists what has been called, the Indonesian squatters
problem in the Islands of Mindanao, in the Southern part
of the Philippines. The facts of the case are that about
7000 Indonesians mostly originating from Sangir and Laut
Islands in Indonesia have been living in the above
Islands from just before the Second World War. Their
occupation is mainly agriculture, and they are on extreme-
ly good relations with their Muslim neighbours in those
islands. These people had gone over to the islands of
Mindanao for better living and through irregular means
i.e., without regular permits. Their status has for the

last few years been brought into question by the Philippines Government, apparently at the initiative of the local Christian population, who desire that the land occupied by these "foreigners" be distributed to them.

The matter took a serious turn when a Manila daily "Evening News" published a report in April, 1954, that there were some active Communists amongst these "illegal immigrants". A few days later, the same newspaper published another report to the effect that a high official of a "foreign embassy", in the Philippines was suspected of being an "active Communist". Although the name of the embassy was not mentioned, it was not difficult to understand that the said embassy was the Indonesian one.

The Indonesian Government felt strongly on this and her Foreign Minister, Mr. Sunarjo, in a statement suggested that such reports should be considered in their proper perspective, as they were in contrast to the friendly attitude between the two countries. Negotiations for the settlement of the squatters problem are going apace between the two Governments but it is still a source of bitterness. Looking closely into the matter it appears, that the anti-communist feeling in the Philippines leads many people there to conclude that Indonesia, in view of her independent policy, is shielding the Communist element. This feeling has aggravated the situation.

THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

One of the major problems of foreign policy faced by the Dutch before the Second World War was to safeguard the East Indies against the expansionist policy of Japan. After the first World War there had been the invasion of the Indonesian marked by Japanese products. The Dutch authorities in Indonesia were particularly alarmed when the imports from the mother country suffered a steep drop. The trade balance with Japan was most unfavourable to

26—Statement of the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Sunarjo.
Besides, Japan had never concealed her ambitions. She had become a self-styled "champion" of the rights of the nations of Asia, which, it was maintained, were inferior to the Japanese culture. The Japanese wanted to bring the whole of Southeast Asia including Indonesia into their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which actually meant the imposition of the Japanese colonial rule replacing Western imperialism.28

A brief Japanese interlude in Indonesia during the Second World War had made the Indonesians realise that imperialism, whether of European or of Asian denomination, is equally reprehensible. The Japanese during the early period of their conquest were accorded at some places in Indonesia, as in every other country of Southeast Asia, rousing reception. The basic cause of this pro-Japanese attitude was the anti-Western feeling of the local population, which the Japanese exploited to their benefit. Soon after the occupation, it was found that the Japanese had failed to identify their interests with those of the Southeast Asian countries. Willard H. Elsbree gives an account of this failure:

"There are many reasons which can be given for this failure - two of the most obvious are the cruelty meted out to the local population, and the privation due to economic dislocations which accompanied the war .............. There never developed, however, a real unity of interests between the two parties, there was no overwhelming despair on the part of the Asians at Japan's defeat, no feeling that they must have Japanese support to stand on their feet." 29

The anti-Japanese feeling was made clear by the countries of Southeast Asia in the attitude they had adopted in the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference held at San Francisco in September, 1951. The United States and


29. Ibid., p.164.
the British Governments sent invitations to fifty-five nations to participate in the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference with Japan. The important item to be discussed in the Conference was the determination of the amount of reparations payable by Japan to those of the victorious powers in the Second World War which had suffered at the hands of Japan. India, Burma and Yugoslavia turned down the offer and sought separate bilateral agreements with Japan. Indonesia also expressed the same desire to conclude a separate treaty, but also sent her Foreign Minister, Dr. Subardjo, to attend the Conference as an observer. Dr. Subardjo later on, signed the Peace Treaty, along with other delegations. It was symptomatic of a vacillating policy and was annoying even to India and Burma, which started looking on Indonesia as an "undependable ally". 30 The signing of this treaty was considered by the neutralist allies as an effect of the American pressure, which was against the avowed Indonesian policy of neutrality. This apprehension was strengthened when soon after this Dr. Subardjo signed Mutual Security Agency (M.S.A.) agreement with the United States.

There was a great public clamour against the signing of peace treaty with Japan. Soon after, the Sukiman Government had to resign due to M.S.A. agreement. Besides, the signing of Japanese Peace Treaty had also provided some additional reason for the resignation. The Indonesian Parliament, refused to ratify the peace treaty. The reason for this non-ratification was given by Dr. Darmasetiawan, leader of the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly session in 1951, on the following lines: 31

"Indonesia will not ratify the Japanese Peace

31. Interview with the Associated Press of Pakistan at Karachi, Dec. 5, 1951. A similar government pronouncement was seeking a separate bilateral agreement with Japan providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas between the surrounding Islands". See Indonesian Affairs, Djakarta, Oct.-Nov. '51.
Treaty unless a satisfactory bilateral agreement between Indonesia and Japan with particular regards to war reparations and the question of fisheries on high seas and territorial waters was possible.

Ever since negotiations between Japan and Indonesia on the determination of an exact amount of reparation were held on various occasions. In January 1958 a peace treaty with Japan was signed which was followed by an agreement on economic co-operation between the two countries. According to the peace treaty Japan agreed to pay reparation to the total value of £30,396,800,000 equivalent to $223,080,000 within the period of twelve years. The agreed reparation has to be paid through the Japanese product.32

This agreement opened the way of friendship with Japan. Through the exchange of notes between the two respective governments of Japan and Indonesia it was decided that Commercial loans and investments shall be provided by the governments and the nationals of Japan towards the economic development of Indonesia. It was further decided that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia reserved the rights to determine the fields of investment and the various industries for which the loans may be contracted as well as the criteria governing the eligibility of Indonesian private firms or nationals deserving such loans.

**THE NETHERLANDS - INDONESIAN RELATIONS**

Another major problem of Indonesia's foreign policy is her worsening relationship with the Netherlands. The Netherlands-Indonesian Union formed under the terms of the Round Table Conference Agreement in 1949, was dissolved in 1954. However, the financial and economic

32. For a text of the Separation Agreement with Japan along with the diplomatic exchange of notes between the two governments mentioned above - see Prawarta Kamal, January 1958.
aspects of the Union, which conferred on the Dutch some economic rights and privileges, were retained after the abrogation of the Union. These obligations too were unilaterally abrogated by Indonesia in August, 1956.

The continued deterioration in the Netherlands-Indonesian relations since the transfer of sovereignty has been due mainly to three reasons:

1. The Indonesians' bitter memory of the era of Dutch colonialism along with the fight which they had to carry on against the Dutch when the latter tried to reimpose their rule on the Indonesian archipelago after the Second World War.

2. Divergence of the respective outlooks on foreign affairs by the Netherlands and Indonesia. The Netherlands is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation whereas Indonesia maintains a neutral foreign policy. This divergence in the foreign policies of the two countries was an important cause that led to the breakdown of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

3. Sharp differences over the West New Guinea (West Irian) problem.

The problem of the future status of West New Guinea attained great importance following the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic on December 27, 1949. Under the Charter of the Union of 1949, 'complete sovereignty' was to be transferred to the Republic but the status of West New Guinea was to be decided within a year through negotiations. The two parties had agreed to the appointment of a bilateral commission consisting of three representatives each. In accordance with this decision the commission started functioning early in the year 1950 at the Hague.

32A. Article 20 of the Statute of the Union provided "co-operation" between the two partners in the Union. This co-operation, many Indonesians felt, was made very difficult in view of the differing attitudes on foreign policy by the Republic and the Netherlands.

33. The geographical name used by the United Nations is West New Guinea; the Dutch call it Netherlands New Guinea, and the Indonesians, West Irian.

34. Indonesian Affairs, Djakarta, November 1951, pp.27-8. (An official publication).
The basis of the dispute lies in the conflicting interpretations of the Hague Agreement by the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch consider that the Agreement treats West New Guinea as a separate problem. The Government of the Netherlands invoke the authority of Article 73 (e) of the Charter of the United Nations, according to which they got the authority to administer the Non-Self Governing Territory of West New Guinea and are required to submit annual reports on the Territory.35

Moreover, the Dutch maintain the position that socially and politically West New Guinea may be considered as quite different from Indonesia and that it would be detrimental to the interests of the native population if this area were transferred to Indonesia.36

The Indonesians also cite Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations in their defence and hold that in the past West New Guinea had always been recognised as a part of Indonesia. In the period of Dutch rule the word "East Indies" signified all the areas now comprising the Republic of Indonesia as well as the West New Guinea.37

The Dutch and Indonesian members of this Commission submitted their separate reports in August, 1950. The Dutch members of the Commission, in their report, advocated their belief in the non-transference of the territory to the Republic of Indonesia on the following lines:38

Firstly, it would practically destroy the right of self determination of the native population, who were ethnically quite different from the Indonesians.

Secondly, it would considerably decrease the number of guarantees given to the population by the Charter of the United Nations, as a non-self-governing people.


37. Ibid.

Thirdly, Indonesia, which is itself an undeveloped country tackling the great problem of her own reconstruction, would not be able to finance the development of New Guinea.

Fourthly, Indonesia not only lacks experienced people to carry on the administration, but is also unable to find doctors and other scientific experts so that the transfer would mean total disorganisation of administrative and medical services.

Fifthly, as education in the Dutch New Guinea is largely in the hands of missionaries, it is doubtful whether such a predominantly Muslim country as Indonesia would be able to support such work to the extent it has been aided by the Netherlands.

Sixthly, serious disturbances would be likely under a transfer as there was a very strong movement against the Indonesian Republic.

Seventhly, the population has expressed itself as appreciative of the Dutch administration and its ability to continue to give the island special treatment.

The Dutch report concluded: "As continuation of the Dutch Administration hold definite promises of progress and elevation for the country, and the world offers guarantees that this country and its population will become part of world trade and traffic and will occupy a worthy position in that traffic, the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia would necessarily lead to a rapid deterioration of all that has been built there in 50 years". 39

All Indonesian political parties have expressed their unflinching desire to amalgamate New Guinea in the Republic at any cost. They unanimously desire to solve this imbroglio without saber-rattling and in a peaceful manner. The Indonesian members of the Joint Dutch-Indonesian Commission in their report accused the Netherlands of having a colonial policy and of having neglected its duty to ameliorate the condition of the local population of New Guinea. The Indonesian members also rejected the idea of placing Dutch New Guinea

39. Ibid.
under a condominium or international trusteeship. It was also pointed out by the members that in striving for inclusion of Dutch New Guinea in the Indonesian Republic, they were pursuing a policy of freeing the area of colonial ties with the Netherlands. This policy, in fact, was to the best interests of the people of New Guinea.40

The report submitted by the Indonesian delegates further stated that the inclusion of Dutch New Guinea in Indonesia would mean politically the same as the merger of West and East Germany, or of North and South Korea. It claimed that the proclamation of independence by President Soekarno and Prime Minister Hatta, in August, 1945, was meant to include the whole of the Dutch East Indies and never exempted New Guinea. The people of New Guinea as well desire their union with Indonesia rather than that they should live under Dutch colonial rule.41

After the failure of the Joint Netherlands-Indonesian Commission on West New Guinea to evolve a settlement of the dispute, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia introduced the West Irian case in the United Nations General Assembly. The case has continued to be introduced in the United Nations every year since 1954. In the tenth session of the General Assembly in 1955 the question was reintroduced with the well-publicised support of the Bandung Conference. A new debate was forestalled by a joint statement by Indonesia and the Netherlands to resume negotiations on the issue.

40. The Civil & Military Gazette, August 27, 1950. The Indonesian delegation to the United Nations described as "lie" the Dutch statement that a vast majority of the local population in the West Irian was pro-Dutch.
The Assembly passed a resolution expressing hope for the success of the talks. The negotiations broke down in February 1956.42

The case was again introduced in the United Nations General Assembly for the third time in 1956 and again in 1957 and on each occasion Indonesia failed to obtain the necessary majority. The failure of this case in the United Nations has led to further deterioration of relations between the two countries very adversely the Dutch economic and commercial interests in Indonesia.

However, it does not seem unreasonable to think that the Western New Guinea issue continues to remain a milestone around the neck of Indonesia in evolving a sound policy in international affairs for some time to come. The failure to evolve a settlement of the dispute may have also a considerable impact on the relations between Australia and Indonesia and may have far-reaching effects on the whole security position in Southeast Asia.43

The frequent support lent by the Soviet Union and the Republic of China to the Indonesian claim over the West Irian issue may bring this issue within the cold-war between the Western democracies and the countries in the Soviet bloc and may steadily draw the Republic of Indonesia closer to the Republic of China and other communist countries.


43. Australia has from the beginning of the dispute on Irian opposed the inclusion of this territory in the Republic of Indonesia. It was made clear in the attitude which the Australian delegation adopted in 1951 session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. For Australia's case over Irian see Charles Gamba, "Western New Guinea and Australia", *Eastern World*, London, July, 1950.


CHAPTER XII

The Strength and Weaknesses of Indonesian Politics.

The most fundamental fact about Indonesia as may be viewed from the preceding analysis of her political conditions is that the proclamation of independence after the World War II has not brought to an end the course of revolution in that country. She, along with other countries of Southeast Asia has still to march ahead to adapt herself to the political and social conditions of the modern world. Her previous inexperience in parliamentary government would not inspire us to place too high expectations in the working of representative institutions. The "too-powerful" personality of President Soekarno may have been a cause of both strength and weakness. It gave momentum to the struggle for independence from the former colonial rule. But it is doubtful if that strong personality would ultimately arrest the dis-integrating process that has already set in following the adoption of neutralist foreign policy.

The neutralist foreign policy has practically isolated her from the rest of the countries of Southeast Asia. With Pakistan, Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines lying in the Western orbit it is doubtful whether Indonesia situated at the cross-roads of the two oceans - Indian and the Pacific, can in any way contribute to her own defensive position or even play a dominant role in the defence of the whole region should a danger arise from any quarter. Socially her too much dependence on India and China may lead, to a conflict of opinion in the country and such areas where the Islamic feelings run high may ultimately decide to join hands with such of the neighbouring countries where their religious sentiments are not in any way impaired.

Her disputes with the Netherlands especially
over the problem of West Irian also needs a detached consideration. Her affiliation with China and dependence on India may not bring for her helpful associations in the sphere of international politics and only lead to her virtual isolation.

The failure of the Central authority in Jakarta to allay the growing dissatisfaction of the regions outside Java accentuated the bitterness among the political parties and between the two great leaders - Soekarno and Natta. It further led to the cabinet's loosening control over military leaders. Some army officers were aspiring to play important role in country's affairs. An attempt was made by Col. Kawilarang, Area Commander of the West Java, to arrest Foreign Minister Roeslan Abdulgani, on charges of corruption at the time when he was just about to depart to attend the London Conference on Suez in August 1956.  

Another instance of the army acting independently of the central government came to light in July 1956 when the regional commanders in Celebes and North Sumatra entered into illegal barter trade in Copra and Rubber in order to earn foreign exchange so badly needed to provide funds to disburse the salaries to their men, who had not been paid for several months as also to provide them with adequate food and clothings.  

The continuing instability in the government led Soekarno to criticise the concept of parliamentary government in Indonesia. On November 10, 1956, in his opening address to the Constituent Assembly at Bandung he stated: "The freedom to set up political parties does not constitute the only means to keep the democratic...

2. Ibid., July 29, 1956.
system going". The President pleaded for a unique system of democracy for Indonesia which he stated should be "guided democracy" which meant the association of all major political groups including the Communist, in the government of the country.  

Soekarno's insistence on the inclusion of the Communists in the Government led to the widening of his differences with Hatta, who ultimately resigned as Vice-President on December 1, 1956. Hatta's resignation accentuated the discontent of the outer regions with the governmental authority at Djakarta. A number of coups were attempted by army commanders in North, Central and South Sumatra. The central government was able to regain power in North Sumatra but could not oust the rebel regimes in central and South Sumatra, led respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Achmad Hussain and Lieutenant Colonel Barben. 

The dissatisfaction in the outer islands was growing and President Soekarno became increasingly conscious of the impracticability of the parliamentary form of Government in Indonesia. In his address on February 21, 1957, he declared:-

"I have come to the conclusion that the cause (of continuous crises in government) lies in our specific requirements, in our indiscriminate adoption of every feature of the system known as Western democracy. ....... By accepting this concept we have come to link in a manner that is alien to the Indonesian way of life."

Soekarno suggested that a new cabinet should be formed in which the ministers should be drawn from all major parties in the Parliament including the Communists. In addition he proposed the setting up of a National Council representing all sections of the people in the country including the chiefs of the armed forces, police, the Attorney General and some cabinet ministers holding key

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4. Ibid.
portfolios. The functions of this Council under the Chairmanship of Soekarno will be to advise and submit recommendations to the Cabinet with or without the request of the latter. The purpose of this Council would further be to provide a bridge between the parliament and the "dynamic forces of society".

Soekarno's proposals were accepted by the P.N.I. and the Communist party. Nahdutul Ulama also reluctantly agreed. The Masjumi rejected it altogether. The Masjumi opposed the proposed inclusion of the Communists in the Cabinet as it would not promote political solidarity and shall make it difficult for Indonesia to pursue independent foreign policy. 5

Hatta also opposed Soekarno's proposal to set up a National Council as it would just be a duplication of the Parliament. He suggested the formation of a presidential cabinet under Soekarno with the President exercising supreme power.

The rejection of these proposals by the Masjumi and Hatta dissatisfaction in the outer islands was accentuated and coups were attempted by military commanders in Celebes and Borneo. The cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo on March 14, had signed an emergency decree proclaiming promptly after that. This lad President Soekarno to assume supreme power in the state with the active assistance provided to him by the army. The support lent by the army also made the President less dependent on the strength of political parties within the Parliament.

After obtaining the support of the army the President gave a mandate to Suwirjo, Chairman of the P.N.I. to form a coalition cabinet consisting of the major political groups and also to establish a National

5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
Council. Surwirjo failed to form a Cabinet on the question of the inclusion of the Communists in the Cabinet. Upon his failure Soekarno on April 8, 1957, at his own initiative as "Citizen Soekarno" appointed "an emergency extra-parliamentary Cabinet of experts" under Dr. Djuanda Karta Wijdaja, a non-party man. This new Cabinet of 23 ministers had no Masjumi and no Masjumi and no communist member. The Masjumi openly declared it unconstitutional. The Communist party offered its unqualified support in the Parliament in spite of its having no representation in the Cabinet.7

After the inauguration of this Cabinet Soekarno went ahead with his plan to set up a National Council. An emergency decree was signed by him and the new Prime Minister on May 6, 1957, establishing the National Council which was formally installed on July 12. The position of this Council was explained by Soekarno who stated: "The Cabinet continues to be responsible to Parliament and its position is exactly the same as in the past. The Council should not impair the position of the Cabinet."8

All these efforts failed to inspire confidence and a sense of unity in the minds of the military leaders outside Java. These commanders held that a rapprochement between Soekarno and Natta was essential and that the latter should be given a conspicuous position in the cabinet.9 This was unacceptable to Soekarno. The gulf between the President and the Masjumi on the one hand and division within the army on the other continued to widen.

7. In this Cabinet two ministers, one of Agriculture and the other of Mobilisation of National Strength for Reconstruction were considered to have some connections with the Communist party. Mr. Mohammad Natsir declared this move of President Soekarno as unconstitutional. See the Times of Indonesia, April 9, 1957.


To bring forth this much needed reconciliation a National Conference was held in September 1957 mainly through the efforts of Prime Minister Djuanda. Hatta was specially requested to attend this Conference and with Soekarno work for the solution of the problems facing the nation. No rapprochement could be made mainly on the question of the inclusion of the Communists in the proposed new Cabinet and the role that Hatta should play in it. An important feature of this Conference was the setting up a Committee of seven consisting of Soekarno, Hatta, Djuanda, Dr. Johannes Leimena, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Dr. Aziz Saleh and General Nasution. But soon after its setting up the Committee ceased to function without bringing forth any settlement.

In November 1957, the United Nations General Assembly refused to endorse Indonesia’s petition requesting the U.N. to call upon the Netherlands to negotiate over the status of West Irian. As a reaction against this there were large-scale seizure of Dutch properties and a mass campaign demanding the Dutch nationals (about 46,000 in numbers) in Indonesia to leave. This move was apparently hinted at earlier by Soekarno but initiative taken in by the Communist-backed labour Unions to seize the Dutch concerns indicated a complete lack of planning which resulted in a great decrease in the efficiency of these concerns. The effect was very sharply visible on the Inter-island shipping that was mainly in Dutch hands and there was almost complete disruption as the Dutch had very promptly withdrawn their ships from the Indonesian waters.

10. For a text of the resolution sponsored by Indonesia and other 18 countries failed to get the required two-third majority in the General Assembly. The resolution if accepted, the Secretary General would have “invited both parties to pursue their endeavours to find a solution of the dispute.” Pakistan Times, Lahore, November 28, 1957.
The Masjumi took a very clear stand against this move. The anti-Masjumi groups particularly the Communists exploited this and accused the Masjumi of being pro-Dutch. Fearful of popular disclaimers in Djakarta the top-Masjumi leaders including Natsir, Sjafruddin and Burhanuddin Harahap moved to Padang, in Central Sumatra where the almost autonomous regime under Lieutenant Colonel Achmed Hussein was already working.

Soon after the arrival of these leaders in Padang a new revolutionary government was set up on February 15, 1958 under Sjafruddin Prawirangera was proclaimed to serve as a nucleus for dissident groups in outer-islands and to weaken Soekarno’s position in that way. The Central Government at Djakarta took vigorous action against these insurgent groups. By the middle of the year 1958 the rebellion had spread from Central Sumatra to North Sumatra and the Island of Celebes and the Djundu Government affirmed intentions to follow the policy of continuing military operations against the insurgents and also to consolidate schemes in the field of finance and economy.¹¹

By the end of the year 1958, the situation in Indonesia’s outer islands remained confused. Through the greater influence of the army on the policy-making in the country some improvement was noticed in the overall security situation in the beginning of the year 1959. The main difficulty still lies in finding a solution to the hard core of differences existing between the regime at Djakarta and the out-lying islands. The Central Government must confront herself with the numerous problems which prevented (in the past) any single, all-embracing state from developing.¹²


For 12 years Indonesians have been searching for a system of government to suit political, social and economic needs. President Soekarno had devised the scheme of Guided Democracy to overcome the crisis facing the nation. He submitted this plan to the Indonesian Parliament early in July 1959, and appealed for the restoration of 1945 Constitution, but the Parliament refused to agree. Soon after this refusal the President dissolved the Parliament by a decree and proclaimed the new regime that gave him virtually dictatorial powers. He also decreed the creation of a People's Consultative Council which was to replace the Parliament but would not be its substitute.

Announcing this change-over the President said: "Without concealing anything we have made a complete divorce from Western democracy, which is free from liberalism. On the other hand, since ancient times we have flatly rejected dictatorship." The introduction of the President Soekarno's Guided Democracy Plan, which means another version of 1945 Constitution provides for representation by functional groups from all sections of Indonesia's diverse and scattered population but leaves sole executive control in President's hands. In theory everyone can advise or criticise but no one can impede the vital task of national reconstruction.

This new arrangement rests on uneasy alliance between the President and the Army, as is evident by the possession of some key portfolios in the Cabinet by some army generals. The generals have, on occasions, not concealed their dislike for some of President's policies. An example of this disagreement may be found in Soekarno's bid to introduce a

14. Ibid.
15. The Defence Portfolio is held by the Army Chief of Staff Lt. General Abdul Harris Nasution, besides General Djatikusuma a Deputy Minister.
member of the Communist Party to the new cabinet formed after the introduction of the Guided Democracy Plan in August 1959. The Army Chief of Staff refused to agree to this proposal and the President had to back down. 16

More worrying than the confused political situation in the country is the deteriorating economic condition. With the dawn of Independence, the pattern of Indonesia's economy has changed. The Western rulers were dictated by the conditions at home. 17 The problems faced by new Indonesia have been entirely different and any economic policy must commensurate with the national requirements and aspirations. The new Government under Article 38 of the 1945 Constitution had pledged to build a national economy on co-operative basis. 18

After the transfer of sovereignty, in 1949 the Republic assumed responsibility for debts to Holland amounting to about £ 200 m. and it had to co-operate with Holland in matters of finance and fiscal policy. Moreover, she had recognised the rights and concessions of the Dutch business enterprises, and plantation estates which they enjoyed during the colonial rule. 19 These enterprises mainly in the form of agricultural plantations, tin mines, oil wells, shipping transport and public utilities did not yield much utility to the new regime as few of these concerns were in running order due to Japanese occupation and the disturbed political situation in the country as a result of the Dutch military action in 1948. 20

16. James Moseman: op. cit. Another instance of the Army imposing its decision on the country is the introduction of a ban on political parties in July, 1959, by the Army Chief of Staff.

17. The nature of the Dutch rule particularly in its economic and political aspects has been mentioned in Chapter II of this study.


20. Dorothy Woodman: op. cit.
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia was faced with the problem of stabilising the national economy and to devise a long-term policy to this effect. The emphasis at this early stage was laid on building the co-operatives. The main obstacle in this way was the non-availability of sufficient capital. However, the Government succeeded in obtaining a substantial loan from the United States, Export and Import Bank and the process of reconstruction was set afoot.21

During the Colonial Rule the "authoritarian" methods had been adopted in any economic planning. The tillers of soil had been left with no alternative but to work under "forced levies of produce and manpower, proscribed cultivation, etc."22 The new Government of the Republic was advised to follow the same authoritarian practice by Dr. Schacht, a well-known German economic wizard. The report submitted in Oct. 1951 to the Indonesian Government covers all aspects of Indonesia's economy. It says that in conditions when order had given place to semi-anarchy it was fruitless to push through the matters in tardy process of legislation through assemblies. "Only one body", he said, "can give orders".23

Due to the Japanese rule in World War II, the finances of Indonesia suffered large deficits during the early years after independence. It resulted in inflationary pressure in the national budget of these years. In 1946 the deficit in the exchequer was equal to four-fifth of the total.


23. For a summary of Dr. Schacht's report see Far Eastern Survey, April 2, 1952. For a brief review see The Pakistan Times, Lahore, March 17, 1952. Also Indonesian Affairs, Djakarta, Nov. 1951. Dr. Schacht was invited by the Indonesian Government to advise them on economic problems.
expenditure. In 1949 however, the deficit was reduced to two-thirds of the total expenditure. These deficits were financed by credits with the Java Bank and through the issue of currency notes.24

The following was the state of indebtedness of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia on May 31, 1950.25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Millions of Rupiahs.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debts with Java Bank:</td>
<td>1,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency Notes</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Currency Notes</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchequer Bills</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc. Debts</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,788</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The problem of inflation had perplexed the Republican Government and drastic steps were taken in March 1950, when the value of the currency notes was reduced by one half and the other half was deposited with the Government, as a compulsory loan with three per cent annual interest.26 The result of this austerity measure was that in 1951-52 budget there was a surplus of Rp.1.2 billion.27 During 1952-53 due to the extravagant spendings by the various ministries the year ended with a substantial deficit of Rp. 4.3 billion. Upto this time no annual budget had ever been presented to the Parliament for approval by the Cabinet and each ministry worked almost

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25. Figures based on the statistics furnished by the Java Bank. Information obtained through the Indonesian Information Service.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.
on independent lines. During this year a "freeze" was imposed on the various ministries to control their expenses. It meant a budgetary control by the Ministry of Finance over various ministries. In actual fact the control has throughout been very ineffectively exercised and is mainly responsible for a lag in Indonesia's financial position.\(^{28}\)

On April 10, 1953, the Indonesian Parliament passed legislation establishing a new Central Bank, the Bank of Indonesia, to replace the Java Bank. The law became effective on July 1, 1953. The Bank of Indonesia became the sole Bank of Issue in the Republic of Indonesia and was meant to stabilise the fiscal conditions in the country.

Since the year 1952 the Government has been facing the problem of balancing the annual budget which has been attributed by the Government as due to the short term price fluctuations in export markets which very adversely affect such raw-material producing countries as Indonesia.

The second cause of the unstable character of the economy is related to the problem of economic development. There is a desire among the people for greater prosperity or a higher standard of living which leads to higher foreign currency spendings. It results in a constant pressure on foreign exchange earnings of the country which leads to higher deficits in the annual budgets.\(^{29}\) These deficits can be met by stepping up productions and improving the over-all security position in the country.

Indonesia is essentially an agricultural country and her economy is also mainly agricultural.\(^{30}\) The archipelago possesses extensive fertile lands producing besides food-stuffs (rice, maize, cassava, etc.) tea, coffee, tobacco, spices and important industrial material in Cinchona,

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30- Justus van der Kroef: *op.cit.*
rubber, fibreplants and timber. Further she contains important raw minerals such as, petroleum, coal, tin, bauxite, iron etc. Indonesia has almost the monopoly of Cinchona, pepper and capox. 31

With such vast resources of raw material, Indonesia, if the resources are properly tapped, is destined to play a very important role in world economy.

The following is the Balance of Trade Position of Indonesia in various years in U.S. Million dollars. 32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>+ 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>+ 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>+ 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>+ 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>+ 114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It shows an over-all improvement in the balance of payment position but in the sector of public finance there has been a steady deterioration in the position due to increased spendings in various sectors. In the years 1956 and 1957 the following provisional results were obtained. 33

Budgets 1956 and 1957 and provisional results (Rp. Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Expenditure</td>
<td>17,083</td>
<td>18,826</td>
<td>15,276</td>
<td>17,424</td>
<td>-1807</td>
<td>-1402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Revenue</td>
<td>17,273</td>
<td>22,173</td>
<td>15,733</td>
<td>16,873</td>
<td>-1540</td>
<td>-520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>+ 190</td>
<td>+2,347</td>
<td>+ 457</td>
<td>+ 551</td>
<td>-267</td>
<td>+38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To meet the ever-increasing menace of inflation

31. Ibid.
the Government through a decree on August 24, 1959, devalued 500 and 1000 Rupiah notes to a tenth of their original value and froze bank accounts over 25000 Rupiahs. A new trading system was also adopted and the Government imposed a duty of 20 per cent on the sale price of exports and taxes on imports varying according to the categories of imports. President Soekarno also proposed other measures some of which were as follows: 34

1. Cuts in State expenditure to keep the national Budget sound,
2. Intensifying of national development activities,
3. Increase in State revenue in the form of taxes which would not affect the lower income earners, and
4. Compulsory saving by Government servants and workers and other groups.

The President also announced that the Government would give compensation for savings in the form of attractive rewards. This announcement by the President was made in quick succession in the wake of the dramatic monetary reforms. 35

These measures resulted in a financial crisis. Almost the entire business was paralysed. The worst-hit persons were salaried class of people who could not even get their salaries immediately after the reforms were introduced. They blamed the Government for this state of affairs. The Governor of the Bank of Indonesia joined this popular criticism and resigned apparently in protest. In his annual report of the Bank he stated that the current inflation in the country did not have an economic or conjectural character, but originated from the large expenditure made by the Government particularly in connection with the military operations since the outbreak of rebellion in 1957. It may be recalled that of the 1958-59 budget 35.31 million rupiah or 48 per cent of the total budget was spent for security operations, while 45 per cent of the foreign exchange was also used for the same purpose.

34. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, August 27, 1959.
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APPENDIX I

The general elections of September 1955, reveal the party strength of the various parties in the Parliament as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Party</th>
<th>Total votes cast in Genl. Elections. (1)</th>
<th>Strength in Parliament (2)</th>
<th>Strength in Provl. Parliament (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNI (Partai Indonesia)</td>
<td>8,434,653</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjuki</td>
<td>7,903,886</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahadatul Ulema (M.U.)</td>
<td>6,955,141</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI (Partai Indonesia)</td>
<td>6,176,914</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSII (Partai Serikat-1-Islam, Indonesia)</td>
<td>1,091,160</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkindo (Protestant Christian)</td>
<td>1,003,325</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katholik (Catholic Party)</td>
<td>770,440</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI (Partai Indonesia)</td>
<td>753,191</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perti (Pergerakan Terbaya Islamia)</td>
<td>483,014</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP (Pantjasila Party)</td>
<td>219,935</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHN (People's National Party - Partai Rakjat Nasional)</td>
<td>242,125</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPRI (Police Association)</td>
<td>200,419</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murba (Trotskylites)</td>
<td>199,518</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buruh (Partai Buruh)</td>
<td>224,167</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI (Partai Hakjoot, Indonesia)</td>
<td>206,261</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIM (Partai Republik Indonesia Merdeka)</td>
<td>72,523</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKUI (Communist Youth)</td>
<td>81,454</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKOMA (Communist Faction)</td>
<td>64,514</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTI (Islamic Group)</td>
<td>85,131</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD (Peasants Front)</td>
<td>77,919</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIR (Partai Indonesia Raya)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II

The concentration of the relative strength of each of these parties is shown in the index below based on their composition in the Parliament:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral District</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No of seats in Parliament</th>
<th>NNI</th>
<th>Masjumi</th>
<th>NU</th>
<th>PKI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>17,950,818</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>17,602,101</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Java</td>
<td>14,419,993</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djakarta Raya</td>
<td>1,664,640</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Sumatra</td>
<td>3,155,898</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Sumatra</td>
<td>3,360,548</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Sumatra</td>
<td>4,894,787</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Kalimantan</td>
<td>1,108,923</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Kalimantan</td>
<td>1,629,298</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.E. Kalimantan</td>
<td>353,979</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Sulawesi</td>
<td>1,605,850</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Sulawesi</td>
<td>4,459,295</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakka</td>
<td>685,754</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>2,183,545</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Nusa Tenggara</td>
<td>2,579,107</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Irian</td>
<td>333,337</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX III

**Division of Seats in Constituent Assembly**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Valid Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. FNI</td>
<td>9,070,218</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nasjumi</td>
<td>7,789,519</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. N.U.</td>
<td>6,989,333</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. P.K.I</td>
<td>6,232,512</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. PSII</td>
<td>1,059,922</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Parkindo</td>
<td>988,810</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. F. Katolik</td>
<td>748,591</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. P.S.I.</td>
<td>695,932</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Pertu</td>
<td>465,359</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. IFKI</td>
<td>544,803</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. C.P.P.</td>
<td>152,892</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. P.H.N.</td>
<td>220,652</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. PEMI</td>
<td>179,346</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Murba</td>
<td>248,633</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. P. Buruh</td>
<td>332,047</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. F.K.I.</td>
<td>134,011</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. P.K.I.M.</td>
<td>143,907</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. I.K.U.I.</td>
<td>84,862</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Acama</td>
<td>55,844</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. P.T.MI</td>
<td>74,913</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. P. Rakjat Desa</td>
<td>39,278</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. K. Sudjono</td>
<td>38,356</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. F.I.R. (W)</td>
<td>162,420</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. F.I.R. (H)</td>
<td>101,509</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Permai</td>
<td>164,986</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Baperki</td>
<td>160,456</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Gerinda</td>
<td>157,976</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. P. &quot;Dayang&quot;</td>
<td>169,222</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. C.P. Sunda</td>
<td>35,035</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. P.T.I.</td>
<td>30,060</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. R. Keprabonan</td>
<td>33,660</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. G. Banten R.I.</td>
<td>39,374</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. F.I.R. (Musan ing)</td>
<td>33,323</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. L.M. Idrus Eff.</td>
<td>31,983</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX IV

The following parties in the Provisional Parliament were completely wiped out in the general elections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength in Provisional Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Democrat or the Federalist Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Parindra (Greater Indonesian Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SKI (People's Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. BTJ (Peasants Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Progressif (Moderate Progressive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. SOHIS (Trade Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. GTI (Peasants Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Independents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Among the parties that emerged successful after the general elections in 1955 only four major groups were significant. The others were just in name. The entire party life in the country was suspended under an order by the Army Chief of Staff, General Nasution in July 1959 and with that the entire parliamentary activity apparently also stood suspended.