LORD CURZON AND THE INDIAN STATES, 1899-1905

by

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London 1963
ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with Curzon's policy towards the Princely States of India in its historical context. The background of previous Government policy and of Curzon's ideas are first examined. Then his own policy is examined with reference to specific problems such as: the imposition of restrictions on the general conduct and movement of the princes and Chiefs inside and outside India, the centralisation of political control, the educational problems and wants of the Indian ruling class, the employment of India's aristocracy in the Government's civil and military services, besides the ultimate settlement of the outstanding Berar issue. The historic occasions at London and Delhi connected with the Coronation of Edward VII are analysed with reference to the role of the Princes and Chiefs. The sanctions imposed including the deposition of some of the Princes and Chiefs are dealt with. An assessment has been attempted of the general problems concerning the States' internal administration and industrial development, and their share in Imperial defence.
This thesis on the Indian States is concerned with the 622 small and big Chiefships and principalities which at the end of the last century lay within the recognised boundaries of British India exclusive of Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the frontier (tribal) States. These States lay within the administrative frontiers of India, in other words, the area within which the Will of Her Majesty or that of the protected ruler of a Native State ran in ordinary course. Between that limit and the external frontiers of India, up to which the authority and responsibility of the British Government and its allies were recognised by International Law and were generally defined by Treaty stipulations, there was an interval filled up by various systems and degrees of control or influence.

I owe much concerning this thesis to the valuable suggestions of Prof. C. H. Philips, who was kind enough to suggest to me the main lines of work, together with the title itself. I am indebted by far in the matter of working on this thesis to the patient supervision and criticism of Dr. K. A. Ballhatchet whose grace (so far as one could modestly yet truthfully acknowledge) of the multifarious sources pertaining to the subject matter, has been a sure and steady check against many weaknesses. In acknowledging all that, I should add, that the responsibility all the same for the results remains mine.

Last but not least, for her constant co-operation and help at
all stages during the course of this work, my thanks are due to my wife, without whose diligence, sincerity and goodwill, it would have been extremely difficult to bear under the stress of circumstances connected with my failing health.
Abbreviations

(a) Sources

ACPLI  Abstracts of Confidential Political Letters India.
APLCI  Abstracts of Proceedings Legislative Council of India.
APQ  Answers to Parliamentary Questions.
B&FSP  British And Foreign State Papers.
BKC  Baron Kilbracken Collection.
ODHJ  Collection of Despatches Home Judicial.
OPP&PP  Central Provinces' Foreign and Political Proceedings.
CSLCA  Confidential Summary of Lord Curzon's Administration.
DNB  Dictionary of National Biography.
DOCI  Demi Official Correspondence India.
GSWP  George Stuart White Papers.
HA&RP  Hyderabad Agriculture And Revenue Proceedings.
HFP(NS)  Hyderabad Foreign Proceedings (Native States).
HHP  Hyderabad Home Proceedings.
HFWP  Hyderabad Public Works Proceedings.
IFCH(CE)  Indian Famine Charitable Relief (Central Executive).
IFP(Extl.)  India Foreign Proceedings (External).
IFP(Gnl.)  India Foreign Proceedings (General).
IFP(Intl.)  India Foreign Proceedings (Internal).
Sources (cont.)

**IMP**  
India Military Proceedings.

**Ind.Arch.Proc.**  
India Archaeological Proceedings.

**Ind.Pm.Proc.**  
India Pemmee Proceedings.

**IOL**  
India Office List.

**1PP(AAC)**  
Indian Political Practice (Addenda And Corrigenda).

**LAC**  
Lord Ampthill Collection.

**LCC**  
"Curzon"

**LGII(SS)**  
Lord Curzon In India (Select Speeches).

**LNC**  
Lord Northbrook Collection.

**Lnad.Ps.**  
Lansdowne Papers.

**LPR**  
Letters Patent Register.

**LQV**  
Letters of Queen Victoria.

**LTBIE(C.Ps.)**  
Letters Telegrams Received in England (Curzon Papers)

**Lyt.Ps.**  
Lytton Papers.

**MDI**  
Military Despatches to India.

**Mds.Pl.Proc.**  
Madras Political Proceedings.

**MICL**  
Minutes of India Council London.

**MMDI**  
Military and Maritime Despatches from India.

**MMPI**  
Moral Material Progress India.

**MM.Ps.**  
Morley Minto Papers.

**MQOD(HC)**  
Motions Questions Orders of Day (House of Commons).

**Parl.Dbs.**  
Parliamentary Debates.

**Parl.Ps.**  
Parliamentary Papers.

**PDFI**  
Public Despatches From India.

**PDM**  
Political Despatches Madras.
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<tr>
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<td>PPP(NS)</td>
<td>Punjab Foreign Proceedings (Native States)</td>
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<td>PLCH</td>
<td>Private Letters Curzon to Hamilton.</td>
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<td>Proceedings of Legislative Council, India.</td>
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<td>Private Letters Hamilton to Curzon.</td>
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<td>PLHE</td>
<td>Private Letters Hamilton to Elgin.</td>
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<td>PSDI</td>
<td>Political and Secret Despatches to India.</td>
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<td>PSHCI</td>
<td>Political and Secret Home Correspondence India.</td>
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<td>PSLM</td>
<td>Political and Secret Letters from Madras.</td>
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<td>RIOH</td>
<td>Register of Indian Orders Honours.</td>
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<td>RPQ</td>
<td>Register of Parliamentary Questions.</td>
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<td>RTC</td>
<td>Richard Temple Collection.</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Selection of Despatches to India.</td>
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<td>SLCK</td>
<td>Speeches of Lord Curzon of Kedleston.</td>
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<td>Secret Political Letters from Bombay.</td>
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<td>SPLI</td>
<td>Secret Political Letters from India.</td>
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<td>SVGGI</td>
<td>Speeches of Viceroy and Governor-General of India.</td>
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<td>SWFC</td>
<td>Sir William Foster Collection.</td>
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<td>ULUT</td>
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<td>UPPP</td>
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<td>VCG</td>
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<td>WLWC</td>
<td>William Lee-Warner Collection.</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>Apr.</td>
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<td>AGG</td>
<td>Agent to Governor-General</td>
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<td>Arch.</td>
<td>Archaeological</td>
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<td>Cent.</td>
<td>Century; Central.</td>
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<td>C.E.</td>
<td>Civil Engineers; Civil Engineering</td>
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<td>Ch.</td>
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<td>C-in-C.</td>
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<td>Gov.</td>
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<td>Hist.</td>
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<td>H.M.</td>
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<td>Intl.</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>India Political</td>
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The foundation of India's political framework in terms of the establishment of the British Government's internal and external control over the Native principalities, side by side with the growth of the British dominions in India, was laid more or less in a span of about 20 years culminating with the supremacy of British arms and resources under Lord Hastings. ¹ It was turned into a tangible political reality between 1799 and 1819 - between the death of Tipu Sultan who was regarded by many as a martyr to English aggression, and the political elimination of the Peshwas.² The period opens with the destruction of the Muslim Kingdom of Mysore and ends with the complete disintegration of the Maratha Confederacy into a series of separate Chieftaincies.³ These achievements which sealed once and for all the fate of the two inveterate enemies of the British power in India, gave the latter the control which took a most ominous yet dramatic turning during 1857-8 ending with the complete recognition of the Crown's Paramountcy over the vast bulk of the principalities under native rule.⁴


took over the Viceregal charge on 6 January 1899, the British power dominated the congeries of not less than 602 States of varying dimensions and resources under the aegis of the Imperial Crown. Of these, 174 States had political relations direct with the Government of India, 5 with the Government of Madras, 352 with the Presidency of Bombay, 30 with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 2 with the United North-Western Provinces and Oudh, 34 with the Punjab Government, 15 with the Central Provinces, 16 with the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and 54 with the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma.

By the opening of the 20th century, the territories under Native rule, excluding those of the frontier and tribal (border) States in India and Burma, may be said to have formed themselves into 5 main blocks. One of these had been constituted by the group of 20 States

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1 His period of Viceroyalty commenced from the date (6 January 1899) he took over the charge from Lord Elgin (whose period terminated on 5 January 1899) and not, as misunderstood by some writers, from the date of his State Entry into Calcutta on 3 January 1899. The official announcement of his appointment some months earlier in England had nothing to do with the date when he took charge. LFP (Int'l.) Jan. 1899, nos. 24-29, 5 Jan. 1899; Feb. 1899, no. 26, 24 Jan. 1899. PICH, 2/5 Jan. 1899, vol. xiii, pp. 6, 16, 17. Parl. Dbs. 1899, 'Lord Curzon', vide, The Times, (London), 7 Jan. 1899.


3 Parl. Ps. 1903(249)xlvi, NWP, pp. 22-23.
under the Rajputana Agency, with a population of about 9½ millions. It stretched from the Punjab on the north to the northern division of Bombay on the south, and from Sind on the west to the United Provinces on the east. The principalities that it covered had political and strategic importance in that it lay right across the line of communication between the sea base of Bombay and the North-west frontier. It was through the latter when throughout the past political history of the sub-continent, invaders from outside had for long continued threatening, the peace, the people and the Princes of India.

Adjoining the Rajput States on the south-east lay their hereditary foes, the Maratha States of Gwalior and Indore which together with some 146 States under the Central India Agency claimed more than 8½ millions. However, unlike the States in Rajputana, those in Central India had no general ethnological affinity. Their territories were, in many respects, neither compact nor continuous, consisting of a number of villages with a nucleus of some importance around the chief towns or cities. Also their relations to the Government of India and to one another presented many variations. Only a few of them, like the States of Gwalior, Indore, Bhopal, Dewas(Senior), Dewas(Junior), Dhar, Jaora, Orchha, Datia and Rewa, had direct treaty relations with the Government of India.

1. Ibid. 1OL, 1901, supra, p.349. Parl.Ps.1907(cmd.3724)xciv, Tabl 1, p.633.
2. Parl.Ps.1903(249) supra, p.23.
3. Ibid. LCC, supra, pp.3-11. Parl.Ps.1907(cmd.3724) supra.
4. IFP(Intl.) Mar.1902, no.94, encl.1, appendix A. Parl.Ps.1903(249) supra.
others were held simply under Sanads and deeds of fealty and obedience. Besides these, there were a multitude of mediatized States held by their rulers under the immediate guarantee of the Government but having feudal relations with some of the larger (overlord) 'Suzerain' States. The British districts of Jhansi and Lalitpur ran through the Agency dividing it into two main divisions - Bundhelkhand and Naghelkhand lying to the east, and Central India proper to the west.

Leaving a narrow strip of British jurisdiction to connect the Presidency of Bombay with the Central Provinces and Bengal beyond the lay the extensive dominions of the Nizam of Hyderabad. With the Madras Presidency on the south, the territories of his State stretch over 82,698 square miles comprising about 11 million of population. In the Southern Presidency, Mysore detached yet another expanse of 29,444 square miles with more than 5½ million people from the territories under the direct British rule in India. Finally Baroda, with the neighbouring group of more than 300 States in the Bombay Presidency covered block of territories comprising Kathiawar and several other subordinate Agencies. With its own variety of small and big States which covered one third of its total area, the Presidency had

1. Ibid. (Sir Henry Main defined the term 'Sanad' as "ordinary instrument of contract, grant or concession used by the Emperor of Hindustan". Sanads were "not necessarily unilateral" and could have the same effects as treaties and engagements in imposing obligations. However, in political parlance it consisted of a grant or recognition from the Crown (as after the Mutiny) to the ruler of the State. Par. Ps. 1929-9(cmd. 3502) vi, 'Report of the Indian States Committee', p. 1.
2. These were known as Mediatised States since their Chiefs were under agreements mediated by the British Government, between them and their overlord Chiefs.

3. IOL, 1901, supra, 'Central India Agency', p. 349.
5. Par. Ps. 1903 (249) lxxvi, supra, p. 23.
as much as 69,761 square miles of territories with a population of 6,906,648 under the native rule. 1

There were several other belts of smaller yet important and diversified areas under 97 states in the Punjab, United Provinces, Bengal, Assam and Central provinces. 2 On the whole as much as 675,267 square miles of states' territories comprising 62,288,244 persons, or about one-fourth of the total area of 1,097,901 square miles, and one-fifth of the total population of 232,072,832 of India lay under native rule. 3

By the close of the 19th century, schemes of annexation and ideas of extending the British Empire in India had ceased to exercise any influence on the Government's policy towards the Indian States. With the transference of authority under the terms of the Act for the Better Government of India (1858) from the Company to the Crown, the Indian Princes and Chiefs had experienced the dawn of a new era of peace and security. 4 The Queen's Proclamation of 2 September 1858 which was - as Curzon remarked - "the Magna Carta of India", and "the Golden guide to our conduct" in India had marked out the future course of Government's policy towards the Native States. 5

1. Parl. Pape. 1907 (Cmd. 5724) supra, 1905 (249) supra, pp. 23, 44. 1
2. Ibid. LCC, supra, pp. 34-41, 44-47.
5. Ibid. SLC, 1 Feb. 1900, vol.ii, p.190. (The Proclamation, though known after the queen, was yet never signed by her. The document submitted to the Privy Council was but a draft; concurrence had however been expressed by her Majesty in a letter of 15 Aug. 1858. SPL, 1905, no.672, 'Note by Ritchie', 30 June 1903. For the Queen's letter see: Sir T. Martin, Life of the Prince Consort, vol.4, pp.284, 355.)
Government had specifically stated: "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominion or our own rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others". "We shall respect it had added, "the rights, dignity and honour of the native Princes as our own". The Government meanwhile affirmed its own position with special reference to its paramountcy over the Indian States. Its claims had found fuller elaboration in such documents as that of 25 February 1876. "We think", the Government of India had quite unequivocally brought out, "it is in accordance with the language of numerous political documents and with that in ordinary use to speak of Her Majesty as the Sovereign of India and as the Paramount over Native principalities". and in the matter of defining the latter, it had included thereunder, "any Indian State which is under the protection or political control of Her Majesty as Sovereign of India or of which the Government has acknowledged the supremacy of the British Crown".

Curzon came to India not as a stranger to its people and princes. Indian problems were not presented to his mind for the first time when he landed at Bombay on 30 December 1898. He had served as Under-Secretary of State for India in 1891-2 and had in the meanwhile

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
made a careful and serious study of British policy in the East. He
had travelled far into different Asiatic Countries and States and
visited India four times. 1 In the course of what his friend Balfour
called, all "that globe-trotting," Curzon had undertaken investiga-
tions into the issues facing the East and West. 2 Apart from making personal
acquaintance with some of the rulers like Amir Abdur Rahman of
Afghanistan, he had undertaken careful enquiry on the spot into Asian
problems and Asia's situation which found expression in his various
articles and books on Central Asia, Russia and the Far East. 3
Having thus acquired a distinct reputation of his own, he did not belong
to that class of India's Viceroy's who, as John Bright had put it,
were accustomed to "begin, the moment they are appointed, to read
Mill's British India." 4 It was indeed since his school days and
still more since his last visit, that love and fascination of India
with its myriad states, princes and people, in short its history,
its government and absorbing mysteries of its civilization and its
life" had already not without "a sense of its overwhelming importance
dawned upon me." 5

1. DNB, (1922-50), 'Curzon, George Nathaniel', pp.221-225. D. G. Hogart
George Nathaniel Curzon, pp.2-9.


3. DGC, Lee-Warner to Sir Chas. Ollivant, 17 Apr. 1896, vol.12, p.84.
HCh. 29 Oct., 27 Dec., 9 Oct. 1901, vol.xviii, pp.205, 444; vol.xxi:
p.183. (The results of his enquiries were embodied in three books
of importance, Russia in Central Asia, (1889), Persia and the
The Persian Question, (1892), and Problems of the Far East, (1894).


Curzon's interest in Indian history was closely connected with his own political beliefs and Imperialist convictions. To him, India with its States was the "heart and centre", the "pivot" and the "vital interest", "the true fulcrum of dominion" and "the real touchstone of our imperial greatness or failure".¹ "I am one of those", he said just before leaving for India in November 1898, "that the Eastward trend of Empire will increase and not diminish. "Parliament will learn", he hoped, "to know Asia almost as well as it now knows Europe; and the time will come when Asiatic sympathies and knowledge will be, not a hobby of a few individuals, but the interest of the entire nation".²

Curzon's beliefs and ideas concerning the paramount importance of India and its States as a composite unit of the British Empire, did not come about as a mere oratorical flourish called forth by any emotional stress of the moment.³ Most of his basic convictions and the articles of his political faith, with the abiding influence on his mental make-up and Imperialist outlook of the self-righteous materialism of the Victorian bourgeoisie and intellectual rigidity as to the moral need, ethical basis and utility of the Empire, were absorbed before he left Eton in 1878.⁴ His was not a solitary voice;

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¹ SVGGI, 7 Nov; 2 Dec. 1898, pp. 11-12, 24-5. 'Lord Curzon in India', vide The Times (London), 8 Nov., 5 Dec. 1898.
² SLCK, 7 Nov. 1898, vol. 1, p. xiii. For his views on the importance of the British Indian Empire, see his lecture 'The Place of India in The Empire'.
be happened to be but the typical product of the current political ideology of his time, mostly given to conceive of the British Empire as first and foremost, a great historical, political and sociological phenomenon and then, as such, one of the guiding factors in the development of mankind.¹ "I am myself," he stated, "by instinct and by conviction an Imperialist – and I regard the British Empire not merely as a source of honourable pride to Englishmen, but as a blessing to the world".² The Empire, according to the existing political texture, was to him the dispensation of a high Power", indeed "a noble work which I firmly believe has been placed by the inscrutable decrees of a Providence upon the shoulders of the British race".³ It suggested to him nothing but "a call to duty, to personal as well as national duty, more inspiring than had ever before sounded in the ear of a dominant people". As he observed:⁴

"The cynics may scoff at Empire. The doctrinaires may denounce it from the benches of the House of Commons or elsewhere, and the rhapsodists may sometimes conspire almost to render it ridiculous. But it is with us. It is bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. We cannot get away from it. We cannot deny our own progeny. We cannot disown our own handiwork. The voyage which our predecessors commenced we have to continue; we have to answer our helm and it is an Imperial helm down all the tides of time".

Curzon came of a class, both by birth and tradition, with the spirit of a governing people in its veins. As heir to the British Barony, being the eldest son of the fourth Baron Scardeale, the

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sector of Kedleston in Derbyshire, he had had the best education that the world could give for the work he had to carry out as the last Viceroy of Queen Victoria. Eton, Oxford, Social pre-eminence, public life and the practical experience of meeting Asiatic Princes in their own homeland and States were no mean assets. Moreover, as a Parliamentarian he was a distinguished orator and an extraordinarily facile speaker in whom there was, as Hamilton the Secretary of State for India noticed, a rare combination and genius as a wizard of Parliamentary eloquence and effective style of expression. "With the exception of Gladstone", Hamilton recorded, "I have never met anybody with an equal flow of language and ideas". At the same time also the very style and atmosphere of even the Viceregal Lodge at Calcutta, which, unlike many others before him, he was to occupy for more than half a decade, was not unfamiliar to him. The official residence of the Viceroy in India, as built under Lord Wellesley, had been designed after the model of his family's home - Kedleston House - the masterpiece of Robert Adam.

2 1914.
3 DNB, supra, p. 224.
All that were bound more or less to help him take up, as he himself pointed out, with full confidence and earnestness, "in the spirit of courage but yet of humility, of high aspiration but still more of duty", a career of immense responsibilities in India which the Prime Minister Lord Salisbury held out to him even though Curzon had not yet passed his thirties and, to many, looked like a boy.\(^1\) Before him, there were only two Governor-Generals who had fallen into the same category of youngish but distinguished political heroes of the British dominions in India — namely Lord Wellesley and Lord Dalhousie both of them being 37 years of age when they landed in India.\(^2\) Notwithstanding some criticism in the Press at Home about the 'Choice experiment' of Lord Salisbury, the *Times* wrote with marked approval as to the suitability of Curzon for his Viceregal charge.\(^3\) With the yet undiminished lustre and unimpaired vigour of successful manhood at the age of 39, he seemed to be standing significantly halfway between that of Dalhousie, the strongest Governor-General of the Company and that of Mayo, the great conciliating Viceroy of India. In India itself where both in the English society and Indian politics his appointment had created great interest, it was generally expected likewise that he would appreciate the needs and problems of India and its States in the light of his practical concern for the socio-economic better-

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ment and political advancement of the Country. 1 And indeed when he actually arrived at its shore "to take up the dream of my life and to translate into fact my highest aspiration", his reception by both the people and princes was he told Hamilton - "one of extreme cordiality", "uniform goodwill and enthusiasm" and "extraordinary friendliness". 2

Ever since 1858, the Government had time and again reaffirmed its faith in the utility of strengthening the body politic of Indian States. 3 They had been turned into safety valves and breakwaters against any currents of internal strife and disaffection, and were regarded as a source of strength and stability for the Imperial organisation of India. 4 Ripon had summed up the Government's policy: "The safety of our rule is increased, not diminished by the maintenance of Native Chiefs". 5 Moreover British rule in India owed much to the loyalty of the Indian ruling houses, as Sir Richard Temple and also


3. For the policy and utility of maintaining the Indian States under the protection of the Government as viewed by some of the earlier statesmen, administrators and political writers on the subject including persons like Lord Salisbury (formerly Viscount Cranbourne) Lord Iddesleigh (formerly Sir Stafford Northcote) and Indian leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji, see: Parl. Dbs. 1867(C), 22 Feb.(185)039; 24 May(187) 1068-9, 1073. Parl.Pa. 1866(112)iii, The Maharaja of Mysore to Lord Canning, 23 Feb. 1861, para 6, p.2; 1867(271)L, Papers recorded by Sir Stafford Northcote, 2 May 1867, pp. 3-6; 1900(cmd.130)xxix, appendix E, paras 6-13, pp. 470-71. Major Evans Bell, Our Great Vassal Empire, p.70.


lord Salisbury had likewise maintained. "Next after our own national
process", the former had asseverated, "one of the main causes that
carried British power through the valley was the personal adhesion of
such princes as the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharaja of Kashmir, of
Ratia, Gwalior, the Rajas of Jhind, Rewa, the "khan" of Shhopal be-
sides the Rajput Princes".

Curzon's close affiliation with the political creed of the
Conservative party and the Government at Home which had been responsi-
ble for the rendition of Kysore on lines as earlier determined by Sir
Stafford Northcote in 1876 was indeed, as the Indian Press recognised,
sufficient to ensure rather than impair the rights and privileges of
the Indian Princes and Chiefs. There was, moreover, the proponder-
ating influence of the Queen herself, who having

in the manifold assurances held forth in the Proclamation (1858) was bound
to constitute a healthy restraint against any tendency towards encour-
agement. At the same time also the pressure of the political situatio-

1. BTG., supra, p. 10. U.L., S.N. Singh, 'The Council of India' (1858-191
p. 30.

2. The political creed as such had quite a distinct colour of its own
by the marked emphasis that the Conservative Party laid on bringing
out, side by side with its endeavour to ameliorate the condition of
the people, the utility of maintaining intact the institutions of
Country and upholding the Empire under the Crown. Norman Wilding,
Philip H. a. D., the Tory Policy of agour of Salisbury, pp. 154-

3. SPL, 1899, no. 224 (27 Feb.) para 475(1) vol. 112, p. 137. Parl. Ps. 186
(p. 271), supra, pp. 3-6. See, regarding the earlier opposition and disa-
rovel of the issue concerning the reversion of Kysore(under five successive administrations of Dalhousie, Canning, Elgin, Sir
William Denison, and Sir John Lawrence), Major Evans Hall, The
Kysore Reversion, pp. iii-iv; Our Great Vassal Empire, pp. 29-30, 32-
35. Reid, in the India, 'Native States', p. 80.

4. BRJ, 1905, no. 672, supra. M. FLACطن, Clemence Canning, Charles
John, 1st Earl Canning, pp. 224-5.
from both inside and outside India lay in the direction of decreasing instead of increasing the Government's paramount powers of interference in the internal administration of the Indian States. Restraint was needed to allay the suspicions, as to the intentions of the Government, consequent upon the latter's strong actions that had of late resulted in the deposition of princes like those of Naroda, Manipur, Kashmir and Jhalawar.  

Curzon was by no means oblivious of the rather dangerous storm that had been gathering strength on the political horizon of India in the form of the long-standing threat of the Russian incursion from without and militant nationalism from within. However, his own impressions in that direction which were strong enough to influence his policy towards the comity of Indian States were not one of fear but of caution. He ridiculed, for instance, the idea of a Russian conquest of India and its States, but did not underrate the danger of Russian invasion. He had already laid stress on the point that Russia wanted to invade India, not with the expectation of wresting the Imperial sceptre from the British Government, but with the intention of disabl

1. For the events connected with the deposition of the rulers, see: Parl. Ps. 1895 (cmd. 1251, 1271, 1272) lvi, pp. 519, 575, 731; 1890 (cmd. 607) lixiv, p. 329; 1896-97 (cmd. 6251, 6295, 6416, 3927) liix, pp. 261, 361, 379, 40; 1896 (254) lixi, p. 269.


3. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, p. 521.
than on the heights of eleven.¹

Whereas there was not much serious danger to the princes and chiefs as allies of the British Government in India from outside, there were nevertheless indications of a gravely disquieting situation inside the Country itself, touching their ultimate, if not immediate, prospects as a class in India. Within a year and a half Curzon fully realised that something more solid and substantial than the mere recognition and perpetuation of the Indian ruling houses was needed.² He was led to that crucial shift of emphasis in policy mainly in view of what he himself noticed of their condition.³

Since the days of Lord Lawrence but with a brief parenthesis during the period of Lord Mayo and Lord Ripon, the paramount power had desisted from pursuing in relation to its political obligations and contacts with the principalties under native rule a policy of steadfast reform and vigilance. As a result, by Curzon's own time the rising generation of the Indian princes and chiefs were generally more at home in a euro fest hotel than among their subjects; wielded a rascal more dexterously than the sceptre and were better connoisseurs of wine and its accompaniments than of statesmanship and its requirements having been left secure in their position since 1858 most of the Indian rulers had been attracted, as was repeatedly pointed out in the press in India itself, by almost everything that life could possibly offer except the sense of duty.⁴ The security provided to them under

1. Ibid.
the terms of the Queen's Proclamation had encouraged their steady decline in both personal conduct and public administration. Taken as a whole, they presented the sight of a hospital with numerous patients incurable but unaying; a host of decrepit and sickly administrations, many of them artificially propped up by the strength of the British Government. ¹

"Since I have been in India", Curzon wrote to the Secretary of State, "I have made a most careful study of the characters, dispositions and careers of the various native princes and of the circumstances of their state". And as such he found them, he informed Hamilton, "on the whole a disappointing study". ² In the light of his practical experience and dealings with the Indian States and their rulers, he found himself forced to a firm but inevitable conclusion that either the problematic future of the States in India should be seriously attended to by the Government or else they would have hardly any valid justification to exist at all. ³ Almost similar considerations and conclusions to reform or to destroy had been already as far back as the late sixties pressed upon the authorities both in England and India, though with little substantial effect on the policy of the Government. ⁴

¹ ibid.
⁴ Major Evans Bell, The Retrospect and Prospects of Indian Policy, pp.201-17.
in formulating the basic principles of his policy for the political and administrative regeneration of the Indian States' policy, Curzon had to take into account the serious implications of the existing situation and climate of public thought about the Princes and Chiefs as a class both in England and India. Apart from the general state of deterioration in their public and private conduct, there had been developing much confusion in public thought, especially during the last decade of the 19th century and even beyond it, regarding their status and the nature of their political relationship with the British Government. 1

The Queen's Proclamation, while providing for the proper maintenance and security of the native ruling dynasties and their States, had not yet laid down any precise principles whereby their position could be adequately determined. There was undoubtedly a subordination in their position, but it had been left to be understood and not explained. 2 And indeed long before Curzon, there had been growing up a general want of agreement among those qualified to speak or write on the subject of the Indian States. The confusion as to their rank and status had been made worse confounded because of differing interpretations and conflicting views amongst the authorities in England. 3

1. Ibid, 1904, no. 694, 20 Feb. 1904.
3. Ibid, 1904, no. 694, Sec. 1.
As J.B. Tupper, in the government's own official and confidential work Indian political practice, had earlier observed: "The extent and authority possessed by the Paramount power over the subordinate States is not defined". As a result, the Native rulers were, to some extent, practically independent sovereigns. To others, none of the Princes and Chiefs in India, except the ruler of Nepal (even though reduced to about half of its original extent under Lord Hastings) had succeeded in retaining any vestige of independence. Still some others like Travers twist and classify them as protectorate dependent principalities. And a few also some of them as funtitory and vassal States. Also they were compared, by some who were personally known to Curzon, with the mediatized principalities of Germany. At the same time, quite a lot of political writers and protagonists of the Indian Princes and Chiefs who had been busy finding fault with the British administration in India had also contributed their own share to the existing state of confussion. They could do so by supporting the claims, for instance, of deposed or semi-deposed rulers, and by dwelling at length on the virtues of native rule and also, what they construed, the abuses inherent in the British rule for having brought about a great fall in

1. ib., vol. 1, para 14, p. 17.
the royal rank and position royal of the Indian princes. In the meantime some eminent political theorists too have in a way increased rather than decreased the general business concerning the Indian princes and their states. Sir Henry Maine, for instance, in his minute of 13 March, 1864, on the Kathiawar states, laid emphasis on the divisibility of sovereign attributes and on that account recognised in the Indian Princes and Chiefs a special class of semi-sovereign heads of states. His notion concerning the 'restituted' semi-sovereignty of the states as such were equally stressed and still further complicated by some of the semi-official publications on the Indian States, such as that of Sir William Bird, who held that the Indian States and their rulers had little recognition in the unity of sovereign States as governed by the principles of international law.


3. For a more detailed account of the constitution of the Indian States and of their governors, see, ibid., pp. 100-101.

Exponents of the Austinian theory of the indivisibility of sovereignty maintained that no sovereign state or government could, with propriety and reason, be styled half sovereign or imperfectly supreme. ¹ Those who held this view, denied the designation of sovereignty to the Native States, though—as Curzon observed—"during the latter part of the last century the Government of India accepted and maintained the view that a limited or qualified sovereignty rested with the Native States". ²

Parliament had not adhered to any one precise definition concerning the nature of the States' relations with the Government of India. ³ In 1871, for instance, Parliament had used in the Royal Titles Act the expression, used also in 1861, "Princes and States in alliance with Her Majesty". But 15 years after that they were described along with the term India as meaning "British India and the States under the sovereignty of Her Majesty", implying their feudal subordination in place of alliance in equality as rulers of their States. ⁴ In the circumstances, it was not surprising that even Lord Ripon who had close and practical experience of understanding and working in line with the principles governing the Government's connections with the Indian


² Ibid., 1904, Confidential Minute, supra, para 10, p. 24.

³ Lee-Jarner, The Native States of India, p. x.
States could not give a precise definition of their position in relation to the Paramountcy of the Crown. Moreover, English public opinion was becoming more and more prone to conceive of the Indian Princes and Chiefs as mere "picturesque excrescences from the dull uniformity of Indian life" and as but "survivals of an obsolete era, without any practical utility, sunk in selfishness and lethargy".

On the other hand, the increasing strength and importance of the Indian educated class which obviously enough presented a sharp contrast with the decline in the conduct and administration of the Princes and Chiefs did not constitute a happy augury for the existing organisation of the Indian States. In the circumstances Curzon's policy towards the States took its main cue from the weakness of the Indian rulers themselves, the gravely disturbing political situation in British India. By the close of the century, India, as he observed it, was still passing through a period of latent yet growing intensity of social and political reawakening. With the increasing impact of Western thought

2. LCIT(SS), 20 July 1904, p.42.
and intellectual current, the Country had begun to bestir the imagination of many a group of people with new hopes and ideals: after the example unique in Asiatic history of Europeanised Asian Countries like Japan which had just caused the century "in patriotic hopefulness and protest aspirations."  "European ideas", as the Secretary of State wrote to Curzon, "have been pushed too fast on India, and any advance in that direction, however unpleasant may be the consequences, cannot be reversed."  Curzon, on his own part was fully conscious of the implications of the situation. "The spread of railways, the increase of education, the diffusion of the Press, the constitution of public works, the expansion of manufacturing and industrial undertakings," Curzon observed, "all of these bespeak not the placid reveries of the recumbent who is absorbed in abstract thought, or in numb contemplation of the past, but the eager yearnings of a fresh and modern life."

It was not difficult for him to detect a serious threat to the natives' existence in the increasing importance of the Indian middle class as a powerful element, penetrating business, commerce, industry and education, the Civil Service, and last but not least the political life of the country. ²⁴ At the constituted a challenge to the hereditarily chosen ruling class.  However, in the existing circum-

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stances, excepting only a few rulers like the Gaekwar of Baroda and the late Bahadur of Baroda, most of the Princes and Chiefs had been keeping themselves and their States apart from the Indian nationalists. 1

Curzon thought that the growth of a truly national government was impeded by the fact that "India must always remain a constellation rather than a Country, a congeries of races rather than a single nation". 2 While the aristocratic and semi-owning classes together with the Indian Princely community were still generally beyond the nationalists' hold, the vast bulk of the Indian people were, as Curzon noticed, too ignorant even to comprehend the simplest resolutions brought forward in the name of the whole Country and its interests. 3 Meanwhile, the nationalists on their part were usually cautious and circumspect in their attitude to the Prince. 4 Moreover, the extremists amongst them had disclosed their hostile intentions with a powerful move against the authority and rule of the staunchly loyal ruler of the Maratha principality of Kolhapur in the Bombay Presidency. 5 But for long afterwards - till 1907 - the Congress did not want, busy as it was with the inner conflict of politics with the Government in British India, to have a fight on two fronts. 6 It could not afford to do

1 Cirk, 20 July 1904, vol. iv, p. 36.
3 Earl. Dha., 1898(c) 11 July (340) 146.
5 Sir Valentine Chirol, The Indian Unrest, pp. 64-71.
6 J. B. Allen, The Integration of Indian States, pp. 21, 42-3. D. Pattabha,
that face it had not at its command and disposal, except for a few
sympathistic infiltrations of the extremists who had been finding some
some relief for them via outside British India in some of the Bombay
rural areas. The one notable exception, any organization worth mentioning in the
context of princely politics under native rule.
Ever since his arrival, Curzon had been giving serious thought to a scheme for the employment of Indians in the commissioned ranks of the British Army in India. Within a week after assuming the charge of his office, he thought of going through all the official papers on the subject that he could get from the India Office. As a result of that, he hoped to submit some definite proposal for the award of commissions in the British Army to at least a few select Indians. "I have an idea," he privately informed Hamilton, "...but will say no more about it until I have had time to work it out." 1

The idea had already been under serious consideration in the time of Lords Lytton and Dufferin. 2 But from then until Curzon's own period, the idea continued to meet with strong opposition based on political and racial considerations. 3 Lytton had thought of extending the principles underlying his Statutory Civil Service by the grant of commissions to the members of Indian aristocracy. The idea of commissions for Indians had suggested itself to him with particular reference to the frontier force 4.

Lytton's ideas were subsequently improved upon in a practical manner in an official despatch on the subject in 1885 from Dufferin. Keeping in view the difficulty of appointing any Indian Military Officer to a regiment officered by Europeans, the Government of India recom-

1. ILCH, 12 Jan. 1899, vol. xii, p. 28.
ended the formation of two special regiments with Indians in command, which something which Curzon also had in mind. The despatch also recommended that the pay and allowances of the officers could be fixed as in the statutory service at two-thirds of the rates allowed to the Europeans. However, with all its discriminatory provisions, the scheme did not obtain the approval of the home authority. Despite a considerable shift in the current military opinions in favour of the scheme, the government's policy remained much the same. The existing prejudices against the employment of Indians in the British Army and ideas of possible dangers to the safety of the Empire, still had their firm hold.

The criticism of the proposal maintained that since the Native Army was mercenary, such of the regiments as would be under direct Indian command might, in time of tension and trouble, turn against the Government. It was held to be based, as Sir Charles Bownas of the Bengal staff corps held, on a 'policy of sentimental adventure' — ignoring that 'we ought not to allow our emotions to blind us to the fact that a servant, however loyal, is never unwilling to become a master'. The scheme's many other opponents, like Sir Ashley Eden of the India Council, cynically observed that it could be adopted only if in the first instance the British government contemplated withdrawing from India. Similar views were subsequently further brought out by General Roberts the commander-in-chief. He did that, even though opposed by General

1. MML, 1889, no.47, 11. Lnr.
2. MLL, Ml.Dpt.notes (Confli.), Memo. 4 June 1889, para 6.
3. MML, 1896, Ml.Memos., 11, 18, 19, 22, 24 May, 20 July 1895, pt. I, pp. 48
4. MLL, Ml.Dpt.notes (Confli.), supra, paras 5, 7, 12.
5. Ml.Memos, 19, 22 May 1889, supra.
6. Ibid., 24 May 1885.
Secretary Military Department, held that the Queen's Proclamation had been systematically disregarded in that respect.

Roberts, on the other hand, emphasized: "It should never be forgotten, that the Native Army in India, loyal as it may be at the moment, is composed of mercenaries, and is therefore subject to those influences which affect soldiers who are serving alien masters."

It was almost a decade before Curzon's period, in 1887, that the scheme became practical politics. The Government of India suggested a modest scheme for raising the status of Indian officers by proposing to award them occasionally with the honorary military ranks of Captain or Major or Lieutenant-Colonel. As a matter of fact, the Government had already as far back as 1861 thought of this. And it had subsequently in 1864 proposed, for instance, to confer an Honorary military rank on the Nawab of Avadh. The essence of the scheme (to which also General Roberts lent his support), was to award ranks without command to those chosen, partly for past military services and partly for the political value of their employment. There were accordingly before Curzon as many as 10 members of the Indian ruling houses holding Honorary military ranks in the British Army. Out of them, one, the Maharaja of Kashmir, was Honorary Major-General; the Maharaja of Gwalior and Sir Feroz寿 Singh of Jodhpur, as honorary Colonels and the Maharaja of Kuch

1. IRC, memo, 6 June 1860, super, para 5.
2. IRC, 1887, vol. 163, no. 10, para 187. 1 apr. 1893.
3. IRC, 1887, no. 107, 11 Aug.
4. IRC, note for his excellency, 6 June 1900, vol. 163, pp. 1-3.
6. IMP, Nov. 1887, no. 1632.
Curzon's own proposals in 1899-1900 had been preceded by two moves on almost similar lines within the five preceding years. In 1894, Jackenbury, the military member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, thought of reviving the idea of granting commissions to some of the noble members of India's ruling families. However, he could not obtain the support of the Commander-in-Chief, General White, who held that owing to the existing prejudices in India, the presence of Indian officers in British regiments would be resented and not appreciated by the soldiers. Elgin, too, in view of some of the practical difficulties, could not approve of the suggestion of Blackenbury. He could not, even though the Secretary of State (Hamilton) had been looking for some support over the issue emanating from the Government of India. The proposal was discussed in Council on 27 September 1894 and was abandoned.

In turning his thoughts to the scheme for commissions in the British Army, Curzon was not that it was just before his own arrival in India that the issue had once again attracted the Government attention. Its reconsideration had taken place in 1897, after the request of the maharaja of Kutch Behar for his son to be admitted to the military academy, Sandhurst. However, the proposal, which was strongly opposed by the War Office, again met with defeat.

4. Ibid., July, supra, para 40.
5. L.G.C., Intro., 4 June 1900, supra, para 21.
even though the Political Committee (comprising Sir D. Stewart, Sir A. Milton, Sir R. Wall and Sir J. Gordon) recommended the occasional award of commissions for selected Indian Princes and aristocratic houses. 1  
It was held to be inadmissible because of objections against bracketing Indians with Europeans and fears of manifold complications and dangers arising out of the 'fusion' once a start had been made. 2  

The idea of granting commissions to Indians in the British Army for which the Queen and Hamilton had specifically instructed Curzon (while yet in London), was not of easy reach and any swift solution. The situation under Curzon was no less difficult than it had been, for instance, under Lytton at the time of the political and racial bitterness arising out of the Fuller case. 3  

Going to incidents between Indians and British soldiers, racial feelings had been of late steadily increasing in intensity, particularly since the brutal rape of a local woman by British soldiers in June 1899. Hostile feelings, moreover, of the Military Authorities in particular both in England and India were a standing difficulty that could not be easily overcome. As Hamilton observed, it was mainly owing to "the obstinate resistance" of the War Office and Admiralty, as well as of the Colonial Office, that so far nothing substantial had been done "to soften the racial bar".

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1 Bill, Dpt. Note: (causal), Enara, p. 6.  
4 Fuller had been charged with having assaulted his wife, and causing his death. The trial of the case by Mr. Leeds, the Joint-Magistrate of area in Nov. 1879, had ended with a fine of only Rs. 30. The trial as such, was however, disapproved of by both Lytton and Salisbury.  
That accounted for the "inauspicious" veto imposed upon all Indians, no matter what their lineage or qualifications, from obtaining commissions in the British Army. The War Office had specifically laid down that "the candidates for admission in the British Army must be of pure European descent, and also British-born or naturalised British subjects".

It was not until almost a year and a half after his arrival in India that Curzon's own ideas for the award of commissions to Indians began to take some definite shape. Meanwhile he had been reminded more than once both by Hamilton, as well as by the Queen herself, to formulate and submit some proposals on the subject. Some of the basic ideas concerning the grant of commissions emanated originally from London rather than from Calcutta. It was Hamilton himself who, after his visit to Osborne in January 1900, communicated to Curzon the Queen's ideas on the award of commissions to Indians. The Queen favoured the idea of encouraging the grant of commissions to those who had a sufficiently good English education and aristocratic background.

In conformity with the Queen's views, Hamilton suggested that it would be advisable "to make the experiment" of "commissions by nomination". Those so nominated were to be called the "Queen's cadets or some other name of that kind". Hamilton went further to suggest

2. Purbo, 1900 (c. 120), appendix G, Dadabhoy Naoroji to Haldane, Under-Secretary of State, War, 26 Dec. 1896, pp. 496-7.
3. LCC, Curzon to Hamilton, 16 May 1900, vol. 159.
5. LCC, 19 Jan. 1900, vol. 159.
that the cadets might even be recommended to enter Sandhurst, with a regular course of training in both England and India.  

Some six months or so after Hamilton's suggestion, Curzon felt the time sufficiently ripe to give some official turn to his ideas on the subject. The Princes and Chiefs had of late been offering help both in money and men for the military campaigns in South Africa and elsewhere. All that prompted Curzon to take up the issue, he himself pointed out:

"My main reason for taking up this question at the present moment is that, while the present war in South Africa still continues, and while the great outburst of loyalty among Indian Chiefs and Indians at large is still fresh in the public recollection, it would be a pity to lose so good an opportunity of doing something to gratify aspirations that will assuredly grow stronger and more pressing from year to year, and to draw closer the ties of good feeling between the Indian people and ourselves."

Curzon's interest in the matter having grown much by June 1900, he wanted to raise the issue without any further loss of time. He postponed in its favour, for some time, another equally important issue concerning the north-western frontier on which he had been keeping his eyes for a long time. So he circulated his proposals to the members of his Executive Council and tried to eliminate therefrom all such points as had in the past met with strong objection. His scheme did not postulate, for instance, a passage through Sandhurst, which he understood, had been one of the weak points of the latest proposals drawn up under Elgin. The scheme under Elgin had broken down on the

2. LCC, Curzon to Hamilton, 16 May 1900, vol. 159.
3. See (concerning the North-Western Frontier proposals), Chp. iv, pp. 105
5. MMDT, 1900, no. 103, 19 July, para 2.
account through "the inevitable hostility of the War Office", headed though it was by one of India's own Viceroys, namely Lord Lansdowne. ¹ The latter was influenced more or less by the views of General Roberts to whom, as he himself remarked, "I am so much attached".² In the circumstances Curzon naturally felt that something on different lines was needed. It was "no good coming up again with a facsimile of that scheme to be met by the same Minister in the same way".³

Unlike Curzon who had the support of his Executive Council over the issue, Hamilton had "great difficulty" with his officials at the India Office. Even before the scheme embodying Curzon's proposals reached them, they were all unanimous on one point; they held that the Indians to be selected for commissions would not be considered for any command other than over the Native troops. So Hamilton forewarned Curzon, also pointing out that "you will combine Anglo-Indian Officers against you as much as we have had British Officers against us in connection with the Sandhurst proposals".⁴

It was on 19 July 1900 that, as Curzon remarked, "the despatch upon which I have long been engaged for Commissions" was at last forwarded to the Secretary of State.⁵ "I will leave it to explain itself", Curzon wrote to Hamilton, "only saying that it has been received here by those who have been publicly or privately consulted in India, not

3. LCC, 20 June 1900, vol.159.
5. LNDI, 1900, no.103, 19 July. LCC, 18 July 1900, vol.159.
merely with a unanimity but with an enthusiasm that has taken me quite by surprise." The favourable reaction of the Military Authorities was all the more surprising in view of the background of incidents between British soldiers and Indians. However, the support from the Military Authorities in India was mainly due to Curzon's good relations with (the late) Sir William Lockhart, Extraordinary Member of the Executive Council. Curzon had similar support also from the latter's immediate successor, Sir Power Palmer, the Acting Commander-in-Chief. Curzon had at the same time also consulted and found equal support from some of the most experienced Political Authorities on the subject. The foremost among them were: Colonel Barr, the Resident Hyderabad; Colonel Robertson, the Resident Mysore; Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter, the Political Agent Kathiawar, and Lieutenant-Colonel Curzon Wyllie, the Agent to the Governor-General Rajputana. A memorandum on commissions had been confidentially sent to all of them. And in so doing the purpose was not to press them, they were specifically intimated, "for support or approbation, but for a brief and candid expression of their views".

The scheme propounded in Curzon's despatch of 19 July 1900 was experimental. It envisaged, as a tentative measure, the creation of an Imperial Cadet Corps comprising a strictly limited number of Indian

3. IPP (Genl.) Feb.1902, no.16, 13 Feb. PLCH, 18 July, 1900, supra.
6. IRR, 1900, no.103, paras, 4-7.
The Cadets were to come primarily from ruling and aristocratic families. They were to be selected, usually, from amongst those who had completed their education at any of the Chiefs' Colleges at Lahore, Ajmer, Rajkot and Indore.¹ A two-years' course of preliminary training, during which they were to be in attendance, from time to time, upon the Viceroy, was to be supplemented by a more rigorous military course for a year. This final course was meant only for those who survived the test of the first two years. The cadets were to have their training with the British Staff Corps in India.²

The idea of training, not through Sandhurst at Home, but through the Indian Sandhurst, had been supported by the Duke of Connaught who had already favoured commissions for Indians.³ Lord Kitchener, too, on his arrival in India, gave his full support to the idea. He supported it even though it was opposed to the sentiments of the Anglo-Indians.⁴

In his military despatch of 19 July 1900 Curzon suggested that the commissions to be held, having nothing but a tentative and experimental basis, should constitute an altogether independent and special category of their own. He recommended that the Officers to be selected under the scheme should be equal in rank, pay and prospects of promotion to the Regular British Officers. He specifically emphasised that on account of their very special nature the new commissions would not carry with them obligations of ordinary regimental service. He therefore suggested that the holders of these commissions should be eligible for the

2. MNDI, 1900, no.103, supra.
rank and status of a British Officer in extra-regimental and military employment.1

The Secretary of State's own personal opinion of the merits of the scheme was extremely gratifying to Curzon.2 He admitted that "after the exhibition of loyalty and martial ardour" shown by the native princes and "the fighting capacity" shown by the Indian regiments the proposed scheme was well timed. "It would be", he recognised, "unjust and impolitic" to deny the Indian aristocracy all prospect of military service except in inferior grades, not in keeping with their high status.3

Hamilton's approach to the issue was determined to a fairly large extent by the value of countering the growing bitterness and solidarity of Indian people against the alien (British) Government.4 He shared the views which earlier in 1885 had been more or less similarly expressed by a large number of Civil and Military Authorities in favour of the scheme for commissions.5 Amongst them persons like Sir Neville Chamberlain of the Bengal Army and Lieutenant-General Francis Loch of the Bombay Staff Corps had been quite pronounced in their views for the scheme. The former had supported it on grounds of justice and of policy, in furtherance of the views of General Chesney, maintaining that the Queen's Proclamation demanded that there should be no distinc-

tion on grounds of race or creed. And the other, namely, Francis Lock had further brought out that the appointment of the members of India's aristocracy, who were not attracted by Civil Service, would ensure their loyalty and make them realise the more manifold advantages to their class from British rule in India. Hamilton himself was not unconscious of the political, and also Imperial, values of the scheme concerning the commissions for Indians. "If we can keep the affection" he had maintained, "of the fighting races and higher orders of society in India, we can ignore the dislike and disaffection of the intellectual non-fighting classes, the baboos, students and pleaders."

In forwarding the despatch, Curzon hoped for an early approval of the scheme, by about September 1900. He was anxious to begin the scheme before proceeding on his forthcoming tour in October 1900. But in a telegram of 29 August 1900, Hamilton informed Curzon of the total impossibility of getting the scheme "quickly through Council". "Red tapeism", as the Queen herself observed, "is alas! our great misfortune and exists very strongly in the India Office". Moreover, apart from that and the likely opposition of the Council over the issue, the situation in England was not at all conducive to any early settlement of the matter. It was holiday season, the Military Departments in the meantime were very busy owing to the recent wars, and a General Election pending. Curzon still did not want a decision delayed beyond

2. Memo., 22 May, 1885, supra.
December 1900.

Why was Curzon so insistent in pressing for an early decision on the matter? He wanted to give a successful start to the scheme before his own term of five years was over. That would only be possible if he could launch it by at least January or February 1901. He felt that it would be quite likely to fall short of ultimate success, if he was to be responsible only for its initial stages and to hand over its development at the crisis of its existence to another. Hamilton substantially agreed with Curzon over the issue that "we should try and get it into state" and that "you should be able to nurse it during the remaining three years of your stay in India". However, before bringing the scheme under the consideration of the India Council, he made his own critical observations. He raised points concerning the proposed local and military training of the Cadets at Calcutta, besides the prospects of their military careers subsequent to the award of commissions.

Curzon tried to explain his ideas to Hamilton with reference to the location and training of the Cadets at the Capital. He pointed out economic, administrative, social, political and even moral advantages in keeping the Cadets close to his own person and headquarters at Calcutta. As regards the training and occupation to be provided for the Cadets, Curzon had very carefully gone into the matter in framing the scheme. He explained to Hamilton that the Government would by

1. MMDI, no.105, 19 July,1900, supra.
3. MMDI, 1900, no.105, 19 July 1900, paras 9-10.
4. LCC, 10 Sept.1900, vol.159.
6. MMDI, 1900, no.105, 19 July, para 11.
no means limit their employment to riding about in a smart uniform like an Orderly Officer or A.D.C. If the Government found some young Chief with a taste for Engineering or Ordnance or Artillery, it would attach them, for the time being, to Officers and Departments where they could study their particular subjects. The Cadets might thus be passed from one situation to another.

As regards the total number of military appointments, Curzon had a special Note on the subject, in consultation with the Army Headquarters and Major-General Sir E.H. Colman, the Military Member of the Council. The actual calculations in that respect indicated that supernumerary appointments to the General Staff in India as contemplated under the scheme could be reckoned for quite a number of Officers. Putting aside the personal staffs of the Viceroy and of the Commander-in-Chief, there were four Lieut.-Generals, ten Generals (commanding districts) of the 1st class, twenty of the 2nd class and three Inspector-Generals of Cavalry, Artillery and Imperial Service Troops. Apart from that, with regard to other extra-regimental ranks, there were still further provisions for finding another thirty to forty-two posts. There being thirty Military Districts and twelve military stations under the Commands of Colonels, each of them could easily accommodate one additional officer on the District or Station Staff. Arrangements to that effect could be facilitated by the existing system of military selection for

1. LCC, 5 Sept. 1900, vol. 199.
2. ibid., Parl. Ps. 1905 (249) xlvi, MMDI, p. 25.
4. The establishment of the General Military Staff was quite incapable of further expansion. The maximum number, for instance, of the Lieut. Generals and Major-Generals had been fixed under the Royal Warrant, except during a period of war their strength could not be increased to more than 75 and 22 respectively. APQ, 1904, 17 May, p. 116; 1905, 8 Aug., p. 827.
5. Note on the Cadets' Employment, 10 Sept. 1900, supra, pp. 407-08.
high appointments and various commands. These appointments were regulated not by the War Office but by the Government of India itself, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief.¹

Curzon was confident that "there was to be no lack of opening for the activities of those whom we shall have trained".² He had the support of his Council over the matter and did not wish to unduly restrict the scope of their promotion, even though the Commander-in-Chief was rather inclined to limit it to the rank of Captain except in special cases.³ In the special Note on the subject which Curzon privately sent to Hamilton, it was specifically suggested that the rank of major or even lieutenant-Colonel would not be unsuitable for an extra staff officer of a 1st Class (Military) District.⁴ Restrictions of a similar sort concerning promotion had been equally prescribed under Royal Warrant of 5 November 1899 for the British Officers in the Indian Army. It had been, for instance, specifically laid down that from 1st January 1901, no promotion should be made to the rank of Major-General or Lieutenant-General (except by selection) to fill an appointment as a reward for distinguished service or seniority.⁵ Again similar was the situation also under a subsequent warrant which laid down, under some specific restrictions, the strength of the establishment of the General Military Staff in India at three Generals and five Lieutenant-Generals.⁶

¹. 11 l.d., 1903, (C) Dec. 115) 845; 1904, (C) 29 Feb. (130) 1225.
². LLF (33), 19 Nov. 1902, p. 562. 1FP (intL) Nov. 1902, 25 Jan., para 4.
⁴. Iegg, 12 Sept. 1900, encl., vol. xvii, supra.
⁵. Parliament, 1902, (C) 17 Nov. (114) 1120; 25, 27 Nov. (115) 380, 621.
⁶. Ibid., 1905, (C) 8 Aug. (151) 603-04.
Hamilton anticipated some trouble with certain Members of his Council, if not the majority, even though the appointments as suggested under this scheme were to be in extra regimental ranks elsewhere than at Army Headquarters. 1 "In their heart of hearts", Hamilton observed, they were all - with the single exception of Sir Alfred G. Lyall - opposed to the idea of conferring "a status equal" to that of the British Officers on Indians. 2 Their ideas were strengthened by the general attitude of many at the War Office, and the existing policy which had, of late, been more and more criticised by the Press in India. 3

At last, in October 1900, Hamilton thought of bringing the scheme before the Council. To Hamilton himself, the attitude of his Council as well as of War Office, seemed fallacious and unrealistic. 4 The opponents of the scheme had almost completely lost sight of its tentative character. It had been specifically provided that if the trainees did well and showed themselves to be competent and trustworthy, the experiment might be developed and extended, 5 but on the other hand, if they showed "qualities of the opposite tendency" then the scheme could "quietly die of inanition". In the circumstances, Hamilton thought that in the provisional character of the proposals lay a strong argument that could be effectively utilised in support of the scheme. 6

1. MMDI, 1900, no.103, 19 July 1900, paras 5-6. Note on the Cadets' Employment, 10 Sept. 1900, supra.
5. MMDI, 1900, no.103, 19 July, paras 5-6. PLHC, 8 Nov. 1900, supra.
Indeed from that point of view he hoped to be "able to make an impression upon its opponents". 1

The general opposition of the Authorities in England led Curzon to advance fresh arguments in support of his ideas. He emphasised that even if the scheme never eventuated in commissions at all, it would still be worth trying on its own account. 2 He described it as a "measure of finding honourable and popular employment" for the young Chiefs and Nobles at a "critical moment in their careers" after coming out of the Chiefs' Colleges. 3 His scheme was indeed intimately connected with his policy for improving upon and imparting some definite meaning and purpose to the system of Public School education in India. 4 There had been until then a total absence of anything like a career for the majority of their students. 5 Despite much popular clamour, the Government had not still provided any outlet for the fulfilment of their natural military aspirations. 6

In the present circumstances, those in the Chiefs' Colleges did not yet seem anxious for employment. That was because the various influences of caste feeling, pride of birth and racial custom had been still too strong. Anyhow, in due course of time, having been indoctrinated in the Colleges with a love for their country, they were likely to seek "public employment of some description or other". Though

1. LCC, 8 Nov. 1900, vol.150.
4. Memo on Commissions, 4 June 1900, supra, paras 34-5.
as yet prone only to turn into "idlers or spendthrifts", yet they were capable of turning into a positive danger to the stability of their own States and even the Government itself. "One day this class" Curzon observed with particular reference to them, "will be a danger to our rule". And he added: "I want to get hold of them while it is still comparatively small, to give them a field for their activity and to turn them into useful members of society".

In spite of Anglo-Indian objections, Hamilton himself had been feeling quite hopeful. He had been expecting to get the scheme through the Council before submitting it to the Cabinet. But by the middle of December he yet had not succeeded. "I can not send you", he told Curzon, "any answer as I had hoped, about your Cadet proposal". In the meantime, there had been "a considerable pressure" brought to bear on him to consult the field-marshal, Lord Roberts, for the War Office approval. The latter's influence with the authorities in England was due to his varied military experiences and services in India. He had served as Commander-in-Chief in India and had been at Army Headquarters from time to time under Canning, Elgin, Lawrence, Mayo, Northbrook, Lytton, Bufflein and Lansdowne. The Field-Marshal was originally, "the Lieutenant Roberts of 1857, who trained his gun at Delhi upon the breach in the wall, who met the dying Nicholson in his litter inside the Kashmir gate, who three times raised aloft the Regimental Colour on the turret of the Mess House at Lucknow, and who won his Victoria Cross along with the recaptured standards at the

1. LHC, Curzon to Hamilton, 18 Nov. 1900, vol.159.
Hamilton was not desirous of meeting Lord Roberts over the issue. Like the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, the Field-Marshal was generally believed to be opposed to the scheme. When in India he had been against any proposal of the kind. The situation might have been more favourable for the issue if Sir Donald Stewart, Hamilton's own military Adviser at the India Office, had been still alive. He was one of the most experienced members of the India Council and had died on 19 March 1900. Like Roberts, he "stood on a pedestal above all the Anglo-Indian British officers of his generation". On any military question, as Hamilton observed, he was "so sensible and carried such weight that if one had his approval, one could always give the go-by to less statesmanlike views".

Apart from the apathy of Roberts, of which Hamilton was ever more convinced, the Christmas break also further postponed any decision. However, Hamilton decided to take advantage of the holiday period to consider at length how best to deal with the situation.

The opposition to the scheme was strengthened owing to the death in January 1900, of Queen Victoria, who had been so staunch a supporter of the scheme. Even before that, by the end of 1900 objections had begun to emanate almost simultaneously from military and political authorities in London. There were, for instance, objections from the Admiralty on the grounds that any innovation of the sort could also...

1. H.R. Curzon, Subjects of the Day, p. 44.
2. M.O., Notes (Confidential), supra, paras 11-12.
equally encourage the lascar stokers to ask, as some had already done, to be accorded ranks in the British naval establishment. The Colonial Office similarly opposed the idea. Chamberlain, the secretary of state for colonies was quite clear about that. He held that a concession to the natives of India in terms of commissions in the British army might subject him to similar demands from coloured races in the colonies. In the circumstances the War Office was not inclined to budge from its stand against the scheme. The Military Authorities were still intensely hostile to the idea. As Hamilton noted, "they will put Tommy Atkins on a pedestal" and, on the other hand, "pretend that dire consequences will ensue if anyone who is coloured is ever given any position involving any authority over him". Besides them a majority of those in the Cabinet as well as the India Council, were equally inclined against the scheme. They maintained that there was no need for taking up the scheme if the Government did not wish to raise racial controversy. The Government, according to them, had got on well enough without any such concessions as contemplated under the scheme by Curzon.

The growing intensity of the opposition against his idea did not discourage Curzon. The objections did not strike him as of much substantial force and value. The objections against the scheme - apart from the issue as to the policy of trusting or distrusting Indians -

4. Ibid. MMDL, 1900, no.103, 19 July 1900.
loyalty - had their basis mainly on what Curzon described as departmental grounds. "I am lost in mystery" he privately recorded, "as to the process of ratiocination by which the Admiralty have managed to connect it with the supply of lascar stokers, or as to the bearing which the employment of Indian Princes can have upon the position or occupation of coloured races belonging to a very low stratum of society in our Australian Colonies". He could not help recalling one of the sayings of Lord Wellesley who had once remarked that the Secretaries of the Government combined the qualities of clerks with those of Statesmen. So Curzon, on his part, held that it was in the latter and not the former spirit that the issue ought to be handled - "from a wider point of view than that which prevails in Departments".

After having heard much disquieting news about the general reaction of the various Authorities in London, Curzon thought of contacting Lord Roberts directly on the subject. Curzon was not unconscious of the great influence which the Field-Marshal, if once convinced, could exert in favour of the scheme. Having also earlier approached the Queen in his letter of 28 November 1900, Curzon, at last on 10 January 1901, wrote a private letter on the issue to Roberts. In the letter Curzon acquainted the Field-Marshal with all the main reasons on which the proposals for the formation of the Imperial Corps had been formulated.

1. SPLI, 1:00, no.262(29 Jan.) para 100(iii) vol.120, p.141; no.374 (20 Feb.) para 195, vol.121, pp.265-6; no.829(9 July) para 518, vol.124, pp.676-7. PLCII, 17 Jan.1901, supra.
Sometime after Curzon had written to Roberts, Hamilton tried to bring the proposals to the notice and consideration of the Prime Minister. However, he was unwilling to have a personal discussion over the issue with the Prime Minister. But he felt, nonetheless, content in forwarding the papers on the subject to Salisbury. Soon afterwards, almost within a fortnight, the latter returned the papers approving of the scheme, during the week in February 1901. Salisbury also wrote "a very nice letter on the subject" stating that the scheme was undoubtedly the best he had yet heard of.

Salisbury's prompt action and support over the issue had some significance of its own. It presented a sharp contrast with the charge of racial arrogance which had been earlier levelled against him by the Indian nationalists and their supporters. However, in supporting Curzon's scheme, which was calculated to discourage any invidious distinction based on racial prejudices, Salisbury did not do anything novel or unexpected. He followed just the same equalitarian principle which, for instance, he had in 1877 maintained in dealing with the Fuller case under Lytton. Salisbury had been in favour of doing something for the Cadets' scheme in accord, moreover, with the ideas and sentiments of the late queen.

Salisbury's personal support was utilised by Hamilton in seeking the approval of the War Office. With the express permission of the

2. Parl. Pape. 1892, (C) 26 Mar. (5) 94. See also Dadabhai Naoroji, Lord Salisbury's "Blackman".
4. I&V 3rd series. 7 May 1900, vol. iii, p. 546. PLHC, 2 Feb. 15 June
Prime Minister himself, Hamilton appended the letter with the papers on the issue, which in the meantime Lord Roberts had called for at the War Office. Roberts felt somewhat doubtful as to whether the scheme would elicit from those who might be brought into its scope such qualities as would qualify them for military commissions; but he told Hamilton that taken as a whole the proposal was the best of its kind that had ever come to his notice. He also added that having thought over the issue, he had come to the conclusion that he could not oppose the scheme.¹

Having obtained such powerful support Curzon now hoped for official approval of the scheme before his Budget Speech in March 1901. He had some grounds for hoping that its early announcement in the Indian Legislative Council would be popular and opportune. He believed that the concession would present itself to the country as a becoming token of the recent accession besides demonstrating the Government’s own appreciation of Indian loyalty. The issue however still could not be expedited, for it was not until 1 April 1901 that Hamilton could find a chance to go to Windsor.²

Hamilton managed to have a “very long conversation on the subject” with the King with whom, since the demise of the Queen, he had not had an audience. The King seemed to be impressed by the objection of the orthodox military school. There was, as Hamilton noted, “a great change between the two Sovereigns in their respective views” on the matter. The King seemed to have some suspicions about the political

¹. HLRC, 26 Feb. 1901, vol. iii, p. 64.
scripts of the scheme.\(^1\) and quite unlike the late Queen and the Duke of Connaught, he had not moreover any special liking for it. He had some hesitation in assenting to any change which the average military man did not like; but he did not mean to oppose the scheme, in deference of course to the wishes of his late mother. He agreed that it should be given a fair trial.\(^2\)

After the king had given practical approval of the principles underlying the scheme, the latter hoped to be able to get it through both the Council and the Cabinet quickly. However he could not yet have the formal acceptance and approval of the scheme for another two to three months. The delay was mainly due to the opposition in the India Council itself. The older men such as Lyall, Stewart Bayley and Leille admitted the force of the arguments as raised in Curzon's despatch of July 1900, supported by the Secretary of State.\(^3\) But the soldiers and the younger men who felt the risk of embarking on a new venture preferred to do nothing at all.\(^4\)

The critics, as Hamilton noticed, would not realise that a permanently hostile attitude on the matter was more dangerous than a willingness to make some concessions. Already as far back as 1885, persons like Sir Robert Montgomery and Sir Peter Lumsden of the India Council had, on the other hand, tried to bring out the political merits of the scheme which neither Curzon nor Hamilton were slow to recognise and appreciate.\(^5\) 

"If the opponents of the present proposals take the

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1. PLGC, 2, 70 Apr. 1901, vol.iii, pp.108, 118.


3. PLGC, 1900, no.105, 19 July. PLGC, 2 Apr. 1901, supra.


5. PLGC, 1900, no.105, 19 July. supra.
argument of unfitness on the part of the Natives", the former had quite unhesitatingly declared, "history and common-sense are against them". He had also added: "If they take the argument of political danger, then admitting this to its fullest extent, it is a choice of evils, and the balance is on the whole in favour of a policy which justice and necessity alike demand". Moreover, as Sir Peter Lumsden had in a similar manner pointed out, the Mutiny had amply demonstrated that the presence of European Officers with Native troops was no guarantee of loyalty. The object being, as Curzon himself pointed out, "for the present at any rate, to satisfy political aspirations rather than to add to military strength", the scheme had essentially "a political rather than exclusively military complexion". Notwithstanding all that, the opposition at the India Office succeeded in forcing a division on an amendment which at /finalised the Council's ultimate approval of the scheme by the first week in June 1901. The amendment, which was not of any substantial consequence, laid down that the award of any regimental commission would not be made by the Government of India on its own authority as implied in the despatch of July 1900. Not unlike what had been already suggested in 1897, it directed that any commission with command in the British Army would need the sanction of the Home Authorities.

Curzon received the despatch bearing the modifications and approval of the Home Authorities on 3 July 1901. He had, as he himself

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   Ibid., 20 July, 1885.
4. Ibid., supra.
remarked, "every reason to be satisfied with its tone" which seemed to him "both wise and generous". Its contents relating to the principles of the scheme were duly communicated to Local Governments and administrations in February 1902. By then the scheme had practically started with the first formation of the Indian Cadet Corps and the establishment of Staff and Headquarters therewith at Meerut and Dehra Dun.

Curzon's interest in the scheme was not limited to the mere formation of the Corps. He had his eyes on the future, with particular reference to the award of commissions to which the Authorities had so long persistently objected. He made that point especially clear in the Legislative Council just a month before leaving for England in 1901. Curzon was determined, come what may, to carry through the scheme to ultimate success. One of the reasons for his resumption of office (which hardly any Viceroy before him ever retained for more than five years) had a direct bearing on the scheme for commissions. In taking up his charge of India again on 13 December 1904, he had been anxious

5. Curzon's resumption of Viceroyalty naturally exceeded his five year term of office (though there was nothing in law that limited the tenure to that period only). The period of his viceroyalty as such was nonetheless a departure from the existing traditions. Since Lord Dalhousie left in 1856, only three viceroys (Lawrence, Lansdowne and Elgin) had remained for their full term of five years and only one (Canning) had exceeded it by staying also for six years. The remainder - excluding Lord Elgin(i), and Lord Mayo who could not return alive, having died in the country - namely Northbrook, Lyttelton, Kipling and Dufferin, only remained for four years.
to complete, along with some other reforms, the commission scheme on which he had set his mind since the very start of his regime. 1

As a result of Curzon's keen interest in the matter, the award of commissions with the rank and status of British Military Officers did not remain an Indian dream. Before the year 1904 was out, it had been settled that the successful candidates, after the three years' course, should receive commissions for military employment under the scheme. 2
And in the following year four commissions were actually granted to four of the Cadets. They were Nawab Wali-ud-din Khan (son of the Nawab Sir Viquar-ul-Umra of Hyderabad), Aga Rasim Shah (nephew of His Highness the Aga Khan of Bombay), Kunwar Amwar Singh (son of Kunwar Serjim Singh of Jaipur) and Kunwar Sawaiw Singh of Bhavnagar. The first three were appointed as aides-de-Camp to the Officers Command-ing at Secunderabad, rooms and show. The fourth was to hold the command of the Bhavnagar Imperial Service Lancers as intended by the chief of the State himself. 3

Curzon's scheme for commissions to which his attention had been drawn from various quarters was indeed (as Sir Banerjee pointed out in parliament) the fulfilment of a worthy and much needed act of reform. The natural occupation of an Indian nobleman was that of valour, fighting and the exercise of the military arts. But curiously enough, of that interest the British Government had itself deprived him, with the result that — as Lytton had earlier observed — "Othello's occupation i

3. LHR, Feb. 1905, no. 1039, 4 Nov. 1904. IIP (Int'l.) Mar. 1902, no. 8,
infra, enc1,1ii, note xi; May 1902, no. 136, 25 Apr. 1902.
4. SMJ, 1905, no. 91, 11 July 1905. RM. Ps., cf. Rowto to Morley, 14 Ju
1902, vol. 15, p. 79.
5. Par. obs. 1901(C) 16 Aug. (99) 1220. LCC, sir J. Woodburn to Curzon,
There were on the other hand by the beginning of the present century, some 2,843 Indians of non-aristocratic origin holding Native commissioned ranks such as those of Risaldar and Subedar Majors in the army. There were, besides, also another 1,856 British Military Commissioned Officers. It meant that there had been no corresponding openings so far under the circumstances for the sons and scions of the Indian princes and Chiefs in general. No doubt there was nothing in the regulations debarring any of them from holding ranks (apparently of an inferior kind) with other Indians in the Native Army.

Anyhow, the fact remained that difficulties arising out of their considerations of high status as well as of colour be fitted them neither for the native ranks nor for commissions in the British Army. Curzon's scheme for the Cadet Corps' formation on that account was bound to have a great popular appeal of its own for India's aristocracy. In its popular effects and political import it secured value and esteem which Lord Lytton's scheme, on the other hand, for the Statutory Civil Service (which however failed the expectations anticipated from it) had been aiming to achieve.

"The project has taken on immensely", Curzon recorded about the corps, "and wherever I go, I receive applications to be permitted to join."
The Scheme for the Cadet Corps and Commissions was an outstanding landmark in the history and relations of the British Government with the Indian Princes and people. By his ingenious consummation of the scheme, Curzon had done more (as even the Anglo-Indian papers like the Englishman favourably commented) to consolidate the Empire than many of his predecessors since Sir John Lawrence. It was a vivid and practical proof of Curzon's policy of trust and confidence; and to that he did not hesitate to give practical expression even before and after the realisation of the Commissions' Scheme.

In the matter of reposing trust and confidence, Curzon's policy was influenced by the increasing dangers, throughout his period, of Russian strength and aggression. Both Hamilton and Curzon had been equally cognizant of the policy of Russia which had been quite liberal in providing military advancement to her Central Asian subjects by appointing scions of noble families (such as those of the Amir of Bokhara and of the Georgian and Caucasian princely houses) to the Imperial Guard. All that could not fail to affect the views, of even such as Lord Morley. There was "a strong feeling" in Morley's mind "that change in the military position of Russia ought to produce some changes in our military policy".

Curzon's Scheme demonstrated that the authorities both in England and India, were, on the whole, alive to the growing needs of the situation in India. It indicated that the Government had, as Hamilton

2. See pp. 353-6, 406-11.
observed, an "interest, other than that of merely drawing rupee". It
brought out that the Government will "to the best of their power conside
and give effect to legitimate aspirations and needs". The Queen
as well as the Government had recognised that the Native Army would
retain a mercenary character so long as it served merely for money and
was debarred from posts of trust and distinction. It was the hope
of attaining promotion with rank that fired a soldier's natural
ambitions. That alone could turn the profession of arms from the
cere vocation of a cut-throat into the pursuit of honour and chivalry;
making the soldiers' calling so noble and exciting. The project for
granting commissions, as envisaged under the scheme, was a far-sighted
measure of far-reaching effect and significance. It was a move
towards bringing about a gradual and healthy change in the character
of the Indian Army, so as to have a new Army instinct with real martial
spirit. It was also likely to make the Government of India to a
large extent independent of the vast and costly garrison of the British
troops in India. Their increase, whether in strength or cost, was
hardly ever appreciated by Curzon.

While opposing any increase in expenditure, or in the number of
troops stationed in India, Curzon favoured the elimination of invidious
distinctions between British and Native Army. He readily availed
himself on that account of the opportunity that was, for instance,

2. IAV, 3rd series, Curzon to Victoria, 11 Mar., 2 May, 28 Nov. 1900,
3. The total strength of the native forces was 2,24,371, while that of
the British troops was 73,928. That meant a proportion of almost
3 to 1, though the accepted and axiomatic proportion was 2 to 1.
1904, p.470.
provided by the Delhi Durbar 1903. It was then that he could make one of the most historical announcements regarding the creation of a compact and unified body of the Indian Army. It was indeed, as he stated, "my privilege to make the announcement to the officers of the army that hereafter the name of the Indian Staff Corps will cease to exist, and that they will belong to the single and homogeneous Indian Army of the Nine". The Cadets on that account gained substantially in rank and position after being invested with the commissions. It meant, as Minto subsequently observed, "a cadet, on being gazetted would be placed on an equal footing in every sense with a British Officer of an Indian regiment".

In breaking with the existing policy and prejudices against Indians in the matter of British Military Commissions, Curzon had to recognise the strength of the Anglo-Indian opposition to his ideas. The Anglo-Indians were still a power to be reckoned with; and that is why the Government could not ignore their sentiments outright. So, the commissions could not yet go beyond the limits of extra-regimental employment to anything in the nature of unrestricted and fully effective military command in the Indian Army. Curzon's policy and ideas.

1. JOC, 1 Jan. 1903, vol. iii, p. 97.
4. JIF, Lord Minto to Morley, 14 July 1908, vol. 15, p. 73.
5. JIF, Feb. 1903, no. 1559, supra.
however, did substantially affect the views of his immediate successor. As early as 1908, Minto could not help telling both Morley and Kitchener that "the time has come when we must do something to satisfy the military aspirations of Indian officers whether they come from the Cadet corps or elsewhere". And he specifically stressed that "it may be possible to work in the grant of commissions to Native officers with those given to Cadets". Minto was certainly inclined to share Curzon's views in the matter of extending the scope of awarding commissions to Indians in general. However that could not be effected till about the end of the First World War. It was then that the admission of Indians to the commissioned ranks in the Army in India began to be regulated in accordance with egalitarian notions, without strings and restrictions.

3. Ibid. IMP, Mar. 1908, no.5th, 2 Jan.
In dealing with the problem of the Indian States, Curzon intended when he came to India to cement the relations between the Indian rulers and the paramount power. He therefore looked for opportunities of meeting and speaking to them personally both inside and outside their states. As a result of his increasing contact and personal experience he quite naturally came to know much about them, particularly about the deterioration, pointed out by the Press in India, in their conduct and administration. He had accordingly to revise his earlier views that all they needed was a little personal courtesy and contact. He soon felt the need of speaking to them, as the Queen had advised him, directly and plainly in fair and quite unmistakable terms, as to the requisite conditions for their existence as a class in India. "Plain speaking combined with perfect courtesy" was, he realised, in keeping with the character of Indian setting. Indeed he found that an asset "the suspicions of the Indian public". "My plan with these chiefs", he wrote to the secretary of state Hamilton on 28 December 1899, "is, in the first place to win their confidence, and then to speak with firmness". And in that respect he was also much helped by what Hamilton described as his "singular facility of speech".


Curzon conveyed openly for the first time what he expected of the Princes and Chiefs in India during his address at the Aitchison College, Lahore, during April 1899. His speech there, only a couple of months after his arrival, was mainly a statement of plain facts regarding their future prospects as a class in India. "If you are to hold your own", he said, "by virtue of your position, and in the confidence of the people, you must come forth from your isolation, must grapple with the facts of life, and show that you are fitted by character and merit for the position which everyone is ready to concede to you". No doubt there was, he admitted, a certain "honourable pride" in high birth; but a man could have that pride rightfully on, he wanted them to realise, one condition only, if "inspired thereby to dutiful ambitions". He warned them that otherwise they were, before long, going to forfeit "first the confidence of your fellow-men, and finally the position itself".

There was one very noticeable feature about Curzon's opening speech at Lahore besides his other early meetings with the Princes and Chiefs. That was the absence therefrom of any direct reference to his marked distaste for their protracted foreign travels. For nearly a year Curzon meticulously refrained from introducing his views on the subject in either his speeches or personal meetings with them. He maintained a discreet silence on the issue even though the Indian Press and been growing more and more critical of the European manners and tour of the Princes and Chiefs. The most significant instance in

A respect was provided by his private interview in June 1899 with the Gaekwar of Baroda at Simla. 1 The frequent tours to Europe which the Gaekwar had had during the recent past (under, for instance, Sufferin and Elgin) were being criticised by the nationalist newspapers in India. 2 And it was expected that the Viceroy would speak plainly to the Gaekwar on the subject. But Curzon still did not raise the question, nor did he do that, though he had little reserve in disapproving of the Gaekwar’s affiliations with the Congress, animated as it was by “hostile feelings towards the Government”. 3 His direct references to the Gaekwar’s affinity with the Congress (regarding which Hamilton also shared similar views) indicated the growing frankness in Curzon’s attitude and policy. 4

It was not until almost the end of his first year that Curzon allowed his own strong opinions regarding the Indian rulers’ growing desire for travel abroad. 5 Indeed the change in that respect was not unexpected. By that time the various shortcomings of their conduct and administration had become more apparent during the impending economic situation. 6 Moreover, as early as February 1899 Curzon had acquainted the queen with his ideas pertaining to his policy of reform towards the Indian princes and chiefs. “He desires to impress upon

the native Princes", he had written to the Queen, "a proper sense of
the obligations of their high rank and assured position, and he could
not blink his eyes to so flagrant a disregard of that conception". 1

Curzon availed himself of the opportunity provided to him during
his autumn tour and inspection of the famine areas, to express his
views on the subject; and he did that in a most straightforward
speech at Gwalior on 19 November 1899. In contradistinction from his
earlier speeches and meetings, he openly criticised the frequent absence
of the Indian rulers from their states. He did not neglect to praise
them, even called them his own "colleagues and partners", besides rec-
ognising their equally important positions as integral factors in the
Imperial organisation. But he did not hesitate to warn them either.
His Government would not let any ruler, he told them, "remain vis-a-vis
of the Empire a loyal subject of Her Majesty the Queen Empress, and
vis-a-vis of his own people a frivolous and irresponsible despot". A
ruler's duty was intended to be, he pointed out, "not a divan of indul-
gence but the stern seat of duty". 2 As equally insisted upon by the
Indian Press itself, he did not hesitate to reiterate that a State's
revenues were meant not for the ruler's own selfish gratification but
for the good of the people. 3 And in that context, while enlarging
upon his concept of a ruler's duty towards his people, he added: 4

"His figure should not merely be known upon the polo-ground,
or on the race course, or in the European hotel. These
may be relaxations, and I do not say that they are not leg-
itimate relaxations; but his real work, his princely duty
lies among his own people. By this standard shall I, at
any rate, judge him. By this test will he in the long
run, as a political institution, perish or survive".

2. SWC, 19 Nov, 1899, pp. 159-60.
Carson's Gwalior speech, which found him almost universal support from the Press in India, was a prelude to the Leave Circular on the subject of foreign travels. It was some 7-8 months later that he had to issue that Circular as a matter of definite policy concerning the local government and Indian rulers. He had to do so, because despite the unequivocal statement of his views, there did not follow any perceptible change in the attitude of the local Governments or the rulers themselves in relation to foreign travel. Some of the rulers planned trips to Europe. They continued to seek and receive recommendation of the provincial authorities. The rulers, for instance, of Puddukottai, Tehri, Baroda and Kapurthala succeeded in securing the necessary sanction to go abroad on one or another plea, that of health or the Paris Exhibition (May 1900). Moreover, owing to the funds for expenditure abroad, it was quite a common occurrence when they had to resort to rapacious taxation. That was done to the extent of even the unmentionable sale (in Kapurthala) of some of the later's properties.

The occasion which brought the whole issue to a head arose in May 1900. It was provided by the Madras Government when, on its initiative and authority, it granted leave to the notorious Raja...
prompted Curzon to think about issuing explicit instructions on the subject for the guidance of all the Provincial Authorities. 1

The Leave Circular was issued just a week or so after the Naja of Suddanota had sailed from Bombay on route to London on 14 July 1900. 2 Like many other important documents of a controversial or political nature, the Circular, which had the full support of his Executive Council, was drafted by Curzon himself. 3 In the Circular Curzon drew the attention of the Provincial Governments and Local Political Authorities to the irregularities he had noticed creeping into the system of granting leave. It did not appear to have been recognised or laid down that the sanction of the Government of India in every instance essential for the requisite permission. 4

Curzon did not doubt or dispute the fact that in a number of cases a certain amount of positive good did result from a visit to scope for some at least of the outgoing Princes and Chiefs. He admitted that foreign travel on the part of some of them could be only represented as useful, "inspired by the pursuit of knowledge or a thirst for civilization"; and he also recognised that "the lessons acquired in the school of Western experience did widen the range of understanding of an intelligent rule." But he did not, on the other hand, ignore the adverse effects of a "change of environment and the temptations of European society" on the conduct of the Indian

rulers. \(^1\) He had before him the notorious characters and activities of Westernised rulers, like those of Jodhpur, Kapurthala, Puddukota and Kuch Lehar. \(^2\) Foreign travel had been usually found to have worked on the princes' character not as "incentives to duty or aspirations for reform" but as a source of sheer "restlessness and extravagance". And he did not hesitate to bring out the utter futility of European tours in unmistakable terms. The result of foreign travels, the Circular pointed out, was usually "a collection of expensive furniture in the Palace" and "questionable proclivities in the mind of the returned traveller". \(^3\)

As Curzon held, it was no defence to urge that the cost of the travel was borne by the private income of the individual and not from the State Treasury. \(^4\) In the States generally, the line of division between the two sources was extremely thin. In 1899 the Government had tried to devise some rules to regulate the expenditure of the princes and Chiefs during their sojourn abroad; but the rules had broken down in actual practice since the expenditure was always likely to have been incurred before the accounts were examined. Moreover a ruler's private outlay was often "synonymous with a public encumbrance". In the circumstances, the plea of personal expenditure could have little practical meaning and value. The personal revenues of any Prince were at any rate, "not of so sacrosanct a character as to be expended with-

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3. IPP(NS) Sept.1900, no.32, encl., 26 July, 1900, para 7.
4. IPP(Indl.) Sept.1900, no.89, 20 July.
cut a protest or upon objects inconsistent with the public responsibilities of the owner. 1

In the Circular Curzon tried not to prohibit but to regulate the foreign travel of Indian Princes. He brought out certain principles whereby the Local Authorities could deal fairly with the leave applications. He laid down that "the repeated absences from India of Native Chiefs should henceforth be regarded as a dereliction and not as a discharge of public duty". He emphasised that foreign travel should meet with encouragement only in cases where the Local Government was convinced that benefit would result "both to the Chief and his people". 2 It meant that "the criterion of compliance was to be "not private convenience but personal and public advantage". 3 Curzon also stressed that permission if granted at any time by the Government was to be construed as a reason against, rather than for, the early repetition of similar requests for leave. 4

The Leave Circular was not simply the outcome of Curzon's manifold observations as to the adverse effects of foreign travel on the general interests and administrations of Indian rulers. It had its roots in his views on centralisation in relation to the status of the presidencies; Governments which were reluctant to work in complete subordination to the Government of India. 5 Feeling as did Lord Lytton before him,

1. PFP(NS) Sept.1900, no.32, encl., supra, para 7.
2. Ibid.
3. JFP(A & C), no.74(A), p.7. PFP(NS) Sept.1900, no.32, supra
4. JFP(Intl) Sept.1900, no.89, 20 July.
Curzon had some bitter experience of his early relations with the
Presidencies of Bombay and Madras under Lord Sandhurst and Sir A.
Havelock. 1 The strong and rather independent outlook of the Presid-
ey Governors which Curzon, quite naturally could not but disapprove
of, had however some constitutional basis and recognition of its own.
It derived much strength from the constitutional fact that the Presi-
dency Governors, as also the Viceroy himself, were all appointed in
almost similar manner under the Royal Warrant and Sign Manual of the
Sovereign. 2

The control from the centre having of late become more and more
loose and flimsy, Curzon had been led as early as September 1899 to
think of the need of centralisation. 3 And indeed he also continued
urging - at repeated intervals - upon the Home Authorities, to place
the Presidencies in total subordination to the Centre. 4 For that
purpose he positively stood for reducing their status, as already
proposed under Lytton in 1880, to the level of other Provincial
Governments. 5

In the circumstances Curzon's Leave Circular had however the
effect of raising once again the suspicions of the Presidencies in
India. It touched in particular the feelings of Sir A. Havelock,

1. PPC, 16 Feb., 2 Mar., 17, 21 May 1899, vol.xiii, pp.87, 117,398-9,
345-8; 7, 14, 21, 28 June, 22 Aug., 6, 15 Sept. 1899, vol.xiv, pp.3-5,
p.63; 13 June, 12 Sept. 1900, vol.xxvii, pp.144, 387-9; 1 May 1901,
vol.xx, p.44; 29 Sept. 1901, vol.xxi, p.29; 28 May 1902, vol.xxiii,
5. PPCL, 13 Feb. 1900, I.P, vol.84, pp.58-9; MM.Pa., HM.DPT.COI, no.59
even though his term of office was coming to its close. Being directly involved in the issue regarding the granting of leave to the young Puddukota, he saw in it something of a personal affront; and so he tried to attract the attention of Hamilton himself—who somewhat liked him—in his own vindication.

The differences between Curzon and Havelock over the issue pertaining to the leave Circular were due to a misunderstanding which had already taken a firm root in the mind of the Presidency Governor. A month or so before the Circular, the Madras Government had recommended (in June 1900) the Conferment of the Honorary rank of Major on the young Naja of Puddukota. In view however of the disreputable and notorious character of the ruler as evident even from the frequent Press reports concerning him, Curzon could not but refuse to comply with the recommendation. Curzon did not want to cheapen the value and importance of the award of Honours and Titles; and as a matter of fact, he did not react differently in other cases of similar recommendations for awards. We could not, for instance, approve of the recommendation of Lord Northcote to give an Honorary Commission to Aga Shah Booch, the cousin of Sir Aga Khan. But Havelock—as Hamilton observed—though “otherwise pleasant” was yet essentially “pompous and

1. I.A.C., Amphil to Hamilton, 27 Dec. 1900, 5 Jan. 1901, vol. ii, pp. 12, 11. (The charge of his office was taken over from Havelock by Amphil on 28 Dec. 1900.)


3. I.F.P (Int.), July 1900, no. 296, G.H. Sec. Mds., to F.G.N. Sec. GOI, 14 June 1900.


hot-tempered." He felt much offended at that refusal, failing to realise that Curzon had sound reason to differ from him on a matter of both policy and principle.\(^2\)

Havelock flared up over the issue all the more because of Curzon's marked reluctance, also over the leave that the Madras Government had recently granted to the Raja of Puddukota. He had, on that account conveyed straightway to Curzon his impressions of what he regarded as the Government of India's inconsistencies in dealing with leave cases. Thinking fit to taunt Curzon on that score he referred to the permission for leave given to the rulers of Baroda, Kapurthala and Much Behar.\(^5\) As a matter of fact, Curzon, on the other hand, had also objected to their frequent absences from their respective States. Moreover, in the case of the Gaekwar of Baroda, the illness of the Maharani (who needed treatment abroad) had been the main basis both of the request and of compliance.\(^4\) Curzon had also imposed at the same time restrictions - little known to Havelock - limiting the chances of their future visits to the European Continent.\(^5\) To the ruler of Much Behar - who had been thinking of renewing contacts with a girl at the Gaiety Theatre, London - Curzon had even administered a polite yet strong rebuff.\(^6\)

5. SP\(\text{H},\) 1904, no.150(a), Louis W.Jane to Sir W.H.Curzon Myllic, 16 June, vol.204, p.2. PLC\(\text{G},\) 17 Sept.1900, supra.
Why did Curzon object to the leave originally granted by the Madras government to the Raja of Puddukota?

It was against the background of the account as to the conduct of the young Raja, as provided by the Madras Government itself, that the attitude of Havelock had been of late showing marked inconsistency. Notwithstanding his own earlier reports as to the unsound conduct and finances of the ruler, he had on his own sole authority allowed the Raja in February 1898 to go abroad for 8 months. 1 The Raja (who was received in London by the Queen) was allowed an expenditure of Rs.100,000, three-fourths of which had been borne by the State. 2 Curzon could not but feel astonished when suddenly once again, only some 18 months after the Raja’s expensive sojourn abroad, he had a telegram from Madras for still another tour. The telegram, much to his surprise, announced the Raja’s date of re-departure for England. However, Curzon replied advising that the recent facts of the Raja’s conduct and administration rendered it very doubtful if he should be allowed to revisit England. 3

Curzon’s answer touched Havelock’s emotions in a very sensitive spot. He was a person who, as even the Secretary of State had earlier observed “frets a little at the check he meets with”. 4 So under the circumstances, he would not mind contradicting his own earlier observations.

1. LAC, Curzon to Sir Arthur Godley, 4 June 1903, vol.18, p.3.
3. LAC (Intl.) Sept. 1900, no.81, 27 June, no.87, 4 July.
tions as to the personal disqualifications of the Raja. Soon, therefore, in another telegram he had plainly informed Curzon that "the Government of Madras are of the opinion that the Puddukota State is well administered". It was also added that "the character and conduct of the Raja are without blame". At that Curzon could not help recalling to the Madras Government its own recorded opinions which had been the basis of the Government of India's recent reluctance to confirm the sanction.

The Government of India did indeed, as it had informed the Presidency Government, "entertain very strong opinions about the absenteeism of Native Chiefs in general". Curzon however was not willing to ascend or humiliate Havelock. Curzon's differences with him over the issue were primarily in the nature of a conflict between principles rather than persons. So he had fully ratified the permission, even though his objections - as he clearly pointed out to Havelock in a telegram on 8 July 1900 - were not affected by considerations of urgency. He had given way to Havelock but upon an explicit condition it was simply to the effect that the Madras Government would specifically inform the young man after his return from England that he should stay for a number of years in his State and look after his people.

2. LAC, Curzon to Ampthill, 12 May 1900, vol. 18, p. 7. IFP(Intl.) Sept. 1900, no. 84, 4 July 1900.
3. IFP(Intl.) Sept. 1900, no. 84, 4 July 1900.
4. IFP(Intl.) Sept. 1900, no. 86, 8 July 1900. PLCH, 12 Sept. 1900, sup.
strong basis. They came to be substantiated still further during Curzon's autumn tour in November 1900. His own opinions were confirmed by what he personally saw and heard of the Raja, 'the fons et origo of the famous Resolution about the travel of princes'.

Curzon had an interview with the Raja of Luddukota, outside the State, at Trichinopoly on 23 November 1900. The occasion confirmed the soundness of all the earlier observations of Lansdowne, and even of Macfie himself. It showed that foreign travel was indeed likely to do more harm than good either to the Raja or to his State. He had hardly, Curzon observed, any Indian trait about him. According also to the local reports and opinions, the young man had but 'one ambition' — 'to be taken for an English gentleman and not an Indian Prince'. As for his administration, he had 'not the slightest interest in his State or in his people'. Even when outside his State, he was bent to spend six months of every year at a hill-station 'playing tennis and golf and dancing with European ladies'. Curzon could not remain unaware of 'the real reason of the European trip' of the ruler. The young man had been keeping, Curzon learnt, 'a white mistress' somewhere on the Continent'. It meant that the Raja's 'distaste for India' was but 'synonymous with a desire for her embraces'.

3 (Hamilton did not fully 'credit the story of a white mistress' for, as he rather humorously remarked, the Raja would 'get no little out of her', and 'whilst he was away she would have a good time with others'. HHC, 20 Dec. 1900, vol. ii, p. 452.
The Leave Circular had found a substantial support in the beginning from Hamilton. He had approved of the idea of restricting the foreign travel of the Indian Princes and Chiefs, even though he had "an instinctive dislike of drawing the reins too tight". Approving of the Circular's basic principles he had pointed out to Curzon: "I will willingly in this case subordinate my instinct (I rather say my instinct than my judgement) to your views". But the Circular was eventually issued by Curzon as an open manifesto of the Government's policy on the subject. It was published in a special supplement to the gazette of India on 29 August 1900.¹

Hamilton's own reaction to the Circular's open circulation was no different from that of others who thought that the end which Curzon had in view could have been equally attained without publicity. He found similar views shared more or less by the various Authorities at home including also the King Emperor who did subsequently express himself over the issue.² The latter pointed out that anything of the sort, if communicated in "a friendly spirit" would perhaps have a better effect than "any formal expression of disapproval" and "any hard and fast rule on the subject".³ The Circular, Hamilton frankly told Curzon "was too pedagogic", even though the fact remained that rulers such as those of Kapurthala and Kuch Behar "do undoubtedly visit Europe for purposes reprehensible".⁴ It was quite likely to impair, more-

1. IFP (Intl.) Sept. 1900, no. 92, 20 July 1900.
ever, the Viceroy's popularity with the Indian ruling class and bespoil
such of the earlier effects of the latter's famous speech at Gwalior. 1
6 Opinions were indeed shared by also a few of the nationalists' 
friends in India. 2 "I am afraid", he wrote, "the position in which
this Circular proposes to put them, which is really that of schoolboys,
will considerably offend them." 3 Even before the Circular could be
published, he had - though without disputing its value - still thought
just the same. "I don't dissent from your wish", he had written to
Curzon, "as headmaster to stop the excets of your pupils". "But it is
a funny method", he had also added, "of governing a big Empire" by
putting the government's relations with them upon the footing of "a
stake-father with a lot of feckless and half-idiotic children". 4

Apart from the question of publicity, Curzon on his part believed
in upholding rather than underrating the role of a preceptor for him-
self and his Government. "I do not at all deprecate the remark", he
asserted, "that to a large extent we act as their schoolmaster".
Indeed that was to a considerable extent "not only true but inevitable" 5
the majority of the Indian Princes and Chiefs were, as was agreed even
by the Indian Press itself, nothing but - as Curzon observed - "a set
of unruly, ignorant and rather undisciplined schoolboys". 6

1. JGGL, 29 Nov. 1899, pp. 159-60. SPLI, 1899, no. 1142 (11 Dec.) para 93
(i, iii, iv) vol. 118, pp. 754-6.
2. SPLI, 1900, no. 1373 (24 Dec.) para 946 (i) vol. 128, pp. 1103-04.
6. ibid. SPLI, 1899, no. 412 (6 mar) para 210, vol. 112, pp. 178-9;
no. 675 (5 June) para 580 (iii) vol. 114, pp. 440-41; no. 763 (3 July),
para 460, vol. 115, pp. 13-9; no. 760 (16 Oct) para 799 (vi) vol. 117,
p. 556; no. 1142 (11 Dec) para 934 (i, iii, iv) vol. 118, pp. 754-6.
they want", he emphatically maintained, "is to be schooled by a firm,
but not unkindly hand; to be passed through just the sort of discipline
that a boy goes through at a Public School in England, but which they
have never had out here; and to be weaned even by a grandmotherly inter-
ference from the frivolity and dissipations of their normal life. He
rather regretted that "it was just for want of a schoolmaster", "for
want of somebody to pull them up with timely but not austere severity"
that the Princes and Chiefs "have gone and are going to the dogs".1

There was no one other than the Government of India to act as the
ruler's guide and reformer.2 To Curzon the decline such as he, and the
Indian public in general, could see in the conduct and administration
of the Indian Princes was but a sad commentary upon the existing
situation.3 All that, he observed, was nothing but "a tragic spectacle,
discreditable, profoundly discreditable to ourselves and to our system".
And he felt that "a man could confer no more lasting service upon the
Princes themselves and upon India at large" than to bring to an end
the deteriorating situation by timely action and reform.4

Curzon did not dispute that the question of the Circular's publica-
tion - which also caught the notice of Parliament - was open to argu-
ment.5 Indeed there was a good deal that could be said upon both
sides. He had, however, no hesitation in saying that the course
adopted was the right one and that if I were once again placed in the

2 JBCR, 6 Nov. 1900, vol. ii, pp. 72-3; 23 Nov. 1902, 12 Dec. 1903, vol. iii
Nos. 69, 64-9; 24 July 1904, 4 Nov. 1905, vol. iv, pp. 15-6, 202-03.
3 Hill, 1900, no. 168 (6 Jan) para 39(ii) vol. 119, p. 52. LCC, Curzon
4 Ibid., 29 Aug. 1900, supra.
5 Parl. Deb. 1901, (C) 10 May (73) 1310.
same position I should do the same"). The Circular got into the
Press not, as Hamilton at first had thought, by mere accident. It
was published, Curzon unhappily affirmed, "after due deliberation"
and "I assume the full responsibility". 1

Curzon did not attach any particular importance to the unfavourable
criticism of many in England. Indeed there was little ground for him
to do so. He admitted that the natural inclination of anyone at Home
would be to regard the publication as injurious to the susceptibilities
of the Indian rulers. The fact however remained that the Jury, whose
verdict on the issue he had to consider, was not the English but the
Indian Jury. 2

So far as the Princes and Chiefs, as a class, were concerned,
there was no strong evidence of disapproval on their part such as many
at the India Office, including Hamilton, had anticipated. On the other
hand, letters of approbation, quite unsolicited, began pouring in, in
support of the Circular and its publicity from the direction of the
Princely community itself. One of the most important of such letters
was from the Maharaja of Jaipur. He highly commended the policy of
restraining the peregrinations of Indian rulers in foreign countries. 3
A copy of that letter Curzon felt tempted to send to the Queen, who,
even though she could not express herself as strongly as did her
successor (Edward VII), had yet a soft corner in her heart for the
Indian Princes. 4 The Maharaja of Jaipur's letter, because of his

2. Ibiu.
3. PLUC, 3,10 Oct. 1900, vol. xviii, pp. 120, 135-9, 143.
4. LCC, Queen to Viceroy, 3 Mar. 1899, 16 Feb., 13 Sept., 28 Oct. 1900,
vol. 155, pt. 1, pp. 5, 17, 27-8; Curzon to Queen, 30 Oct. 1900, vol. 155,
pt. ii, p. 60; His Majesty to Viceroy, 12 July 1901, vol. 136, pt. i,
p. 9.
widely known noble and strong character, was of no little value and
significance. As Hamilton, who much appreciated the personal integri
and conduct of the Rajput ruler, remarked, "there is no Native Prince
who occupies a higher position in the general respect of the Native
world than he does." ¹

Apart from Jaipur's letter, even a virtually deposed ruler like
the Maharaja of Kashmir, who had no particular cause for flattering
either the viceroy or the Government, heartily approved of the
Circular's publicity.² At the same time some of the most conservative
and high-minded rulers like those, for instance, of Cochin and Travan-
or similarly expressed approval of the measure. Rather than feeling
offended at having been included under the Circular along with the
absentee Chiefs, they felt gratified that it had been issued.³ Again
some others also felt the need for the application of still more
stringent and drastic measures involving even the deprivation of the
culprits' rulers from their ruling rights and powers.⁴

There were only a few rulers like those of Kuch Behar, Kapurthala,
Mangalore and Baroda, who, being in England at the time of the
Circular's publicity, were likely to feel hurt and aggrieved. But they,
like Curzon asserted, were "the class of men at whom the Circular was di-
nected". And so of them he could neither expect, nor desire, approval.

³ PdH, 10 Oct., 28 Nov. 1900, vol. xviii, pp. 143-4, 330-2; 26 Aug. 1901,
vol. xxi, p. 327.
⁴ Ibid. SplI, 1899, no. 809 (17 July) para 512 (ii) vol. 115, p. 86.
⁵ LCC, Curzon to Hamilton, 10 Oct. 1900, vol. 159, pt. 11, i. 296.
As regards the Local Governments and Political Authorities in India best qualified to judge, they were inclined to applaud the step that had been taken with their consent. Before its publication the Circular had been sent round to them; and as Curzon observed "all here whom I consulted", had one and all "advocated publicity". As a matter of fact, the Circular was not published in either undue haste or ignorance of the reactions likely to be caused in those concerned with the issue. It was not until nearly a month after the Circular had been sent round to the Authorities in India that it was at last published on 23 August 1900.¹

A careful analysis of the opinions and arguments of the Indian press subsequently disclosed that the publicity, even though open to certain misconceptions and dangers, had yet been justified.² Not less than 80 to 85 per cent of the papers including such nationalist organs as the Hangavasi and Mitavadi—known conspicuously for "their inveterate hostility to Government"—were on the whole favourable. They had generally approved of both the principles of the Circular and the method adopted in publishing it. The remaining 15 to 20 per cent had approved of its underlying principles but had queried the method.³

The support from the Indian newspapers was all the more significant because of the character in general of journalism in India. In the examination of any arguments in the Native Press about Indian princes, as Curzon observed, "a liberal discount must always be made"

¹. "Int'l." Sept. 1900, nos. 90-2, supra.
For it having been subsidised by one or another of the Chiefs. That some thing recognised even by the Indian press. Curzon noticed that in particular in relation to their comments on the Circular and publicity. "It is very interesting", he privately recorded, and note how their entire agreement with the principles that I have laid down - an agreement which they do not affect to conceal - is, at the same time, affected by, and in their newspaper comments, jostles up against, their habitual practice of standing up for the native Chiefs, in any case where the Government of India and the latter are at issue.

Apart from the general support of the Press in India, many of the leading papers in England - like The Times (London) - included some of those opposed to Curzon on one or another issue, mainly supported his recent action regarding the Circular. Indeed he had never expected them to get so close to the Indian standpoint.

Hamilton was not impressed with the support Curzon had from the Press, in India itself. And that was largely due to, what he believed, the generally unreliable character and emotional tone of most of the nationalist organs. As he himself remarked, he had, moreover, been

1. LCC, 10 Oct. 1900, supra.
4. The Times (London) 25 Aug. 1900, 'Lord Curzon and Native Chiefs'.
6. The opinions of Hamilton as to the impulsiveness of the Native Press were equally shared by an Indian of the calibre of Sir Banerjee, the member of Parliament. Also Curzon himself could not think any differently from them. LAC, Hamilton to Ampthill, 30 Apr. 1903, vol. 6, pp. 89-106; Curzon to Ampthill, 19 July 1904, vol. 37, p. i, p. 88. PLCH, 25 July 1902, vol. xxiii, p. 576.
so much in the habit of being abused" by the native Press that he could not attach much weight to their comment and criticism. 1 The leave circular had however appealed to them because of their natural dislike — as had been quite recently evident during the trial of Bal Gangadhar Tilak—of the native Princes' visits to Europe. 2 On the other hand their usual attitude was to argue that the Princes were bullied by the Political Officers and that the Government was disposed to reduce them to the position of mere puppets. 3 "I expect you will find", he told Curzon, "that when the first gloss of your Circular is over, they will revert to the second position, and that its phraseology and tone will be permanently quoted as showing how little consideration or weight the Government of India attached to the status or authority of the native Princes of India". 4

The publicity of the circular was quite in keeping with Curzon's general policy. He had already issued public and severe strictures against, for instance, the Civil and Military Authorities who had tried to hush up the outrage (in June 1899) on a Burmese woman by some soldiers. 5 Curzon was not unmindful that the language of the circular was, as he himself admitted, "a little stilted" and apodictic. But

the publicity given to the Circular was essentially a question of Indian policy. He wanted to shake the Home Authorities out of their belief that foreign travel was indispensable to widen the range of knowledge and understanding of the rulers. He basically differed from "the theory" at home that an enlightened prince had to travel for "the improvement of his own mind and ultimate edification of his devoted and delighted subjects." Curzon, on the other hand, held that the subjects of an absentee prince were not much interested in his sojourns abroad. With a few honourable exceptions, what the Indian rulers went for was pleasure and amusement. The purpose, as Curzon summed it up, was to have some "interviews with European Royalty, to buy a number of expensive gee-gaws for palace, to accumulate a great stock of rifles and ammunition, and to have a costly flutter with the demi-monde of the Boulevards, or of Leicester Square". "Look for instance," Curzon pointed out to Hamilton, "at Kuch Behar, who has left a wife and children at Simla and who has, I believe, gone Home with one woman and is now living with another". "All this sort of thing", he added, "I mean, to the best of my ability, to stop".

The publicity of the Circular was designed to make the Princes realise that the fact had been issued and that the rule must be obeyed. In the circumstances, Curzon held it was of no use merely to address the Local Governments. He clearly pointed out to the Secretary of State

3. IPP(Intl.) Sept. 1900, no.69, 20 July 1900, para 6.
4. LCC, 18 July 1900, vol.159. op.cit.
that "the people whom I wanted to get at were the Princes and Chiefs themselves".¹

The issue circular was not an isolated measure but part of a general policy towards the states. At Gwalior in 1899 he had clearly stated that unlike "the good ones" from amongst the Princes and Chiefs "the bad ones should receive no encouragement in my time".² So while referring to the importance of the Circular, he stated: "This year I have singled out for reprobation, one form of lack of duty which, if it affects only a few, will at the same time act as a warning to the rest".³

Side by side with the Circular Curzon had "many other ideas ahead". Foremost amongst these was the project of extending Military Commissions in the British Army to the sons and scions of the Indian rulers and aristocratic houses.⁴ In fact he had already pushed it through its initial stages, though the project could not be officially implemented before October 1901.⁵ He had been at the same time looking for "the first opportunity that I can take of putting a big chief on to the Council".⁶ He also had been intending to increase the personal contacts between the Viceroy and the Indian rulers; and for that purpose he had already bought Hastings House Alipore, costing not less

¹ IHC, 17 Sept., 10 Oct 1900, vol.xviii, pp.6, 144.
² IHR, 1899, no.116/ (11 Dec) para 954(i-iiv) vol.118, pp.751-6; 1900, no.168 (6 Jan) para 59(iii-iv), vol.119, pp.52-3; 1900, no.267 (22 Jan) para 88(vi,ix) vol.120, pp.128-9. SWOGL, 27 Nov. 1899, pp.159-60.
³ IHC, 17 Sept. 1900, vol.159.
⁴ Ibid. See (for the Military Commissions' Scheme) Chapter 17.
⁶ IHC, 17 Sept. 1900, supra.
than Rs. 211,000. 1 There at the House he intended to entertain occasionally important Princes and Chiefs (as he did, for instance, the Nizam of Hyderabad in December 1900) as the guests of the Government of India. 2

Besides the Leave Circular, Curzon had his eyes also on some other problems, like the facilities for loans to Native States, the education of young Chiefs and the ratio in which their Civil List should stand to the State revenues. As he observed: 3

"In all this I am no light-hearted or impulsive enthusiast. I have a very definite policy and know exactly what I am looking at. There are thistles as well as roses in the path, and I shall be pricked by one while gathering the other. Wait till I go, and then decide by the attitude of the Princes themselves whether they regard me as a dangerous and irrelevant innovator, or as a patron and friend".

The Leave Circular was the first and foremost of the measures which the Government of India could adopt for the Indianisation and reform of the Princes and Chiefs. Curzon hoped to restrain their 'foreign' habits and proclivities towards Westernism which, despite the increasing criticism of the Indian Press, had been gaining more and more popularity with them. 4 "The Viceroy", Curzon affirmed, "has


3. LG, 17 Sept., 1900, supra.

known Chiefs openly to admit that they did not want to be Indians but to be Englishmen". "But as long as a man occupies an Indian gadi," Curzon wrote to the King, "this is not an attitude which he can possibly encourage".¹

Curzon's policy over the issue was not merely due to the popular distaste for European ways or to the heavy cost of the foreign trips.² He was looking to the future prospects of the Indian States and of the Indian ruling houses in general. "One of the problems", he had told the Queen, "that disturbs him most is, as he has before told your Majesty, that of the future of the native princes".³

The growing national consciousness and increasing political strength of the Indian middle class was a danger to their future security as a class. Some of the organs of the Indian press were not slow to forecast that the wayward trend amongst the young Indian rulers towards apeing foreign habits and extravagant ways would sooner or later deprive them of popular esteem.⁴ In the circumstances Curzon recognised that the Indian rulers would be able to hold the people's imagination and sympathy, not by virtue of the Government's support but because of their own worth.⁵ He believed that their value and existence as a highly useful and important class could be increased. And that could be, provided they must be "Indians", "true to their own beliefs, their own traditions, their own people". He wanted them to

2. IPP, Sept.1902, no.27, 23 July; Mar.1902, no.157, 15 Feb.
4. SBL, 1899m no.675(5 June) para 300(iii) vol.114, pp.440-41; no.763,
   (3 July) para 468(i) vol.115, pp.18-9; no.1142(11 Dec.) para 943(v).
   vol.118, p.756.
5. SVGGI, 1 Apr.1899, pp.121-22, LCC, Curzon to His Majesty, 19 June
realise that they should "typify all that is best in their national character". 1 "If the Native Chiefs", Curzon maintained, "are to become absenteeees, if they are to be infected with foreign tastes and vices, then in proportion as they have lost touch with their people, so will their people lose touch with them, and the institutions of Native principalities will be irretrievably doomed". 2

By restricting the scope of foreign travel, Curzon was reducing the Princes' relationships with white women. This tendency was not confined to merely young chiefs, such as, for instance, Puddukota or Bikinir (of whom Curzon had a feeling that he would soon be married "as the darling of London Society"). 3 Nor was what Curzon called "the woman aspect of the question" applicable only to notorious debauchees like, for instance, the Maharaja Holkar of Indore. 4 Even his own beast ideal of a Prince, the Maharaja Scindia had of late been developing some proclivities for a life of dissipation and indulgence. 5 "Like all the Marathas", Curzon wrote, "he is a little devil for women". In the course of various visits to Calcutta to superintend the despatch of his hospital ship to China, the Maharaja was believed to have "developed some tastes for white women", which "unless kept in check may do great

harm in the future". So just before the Maharaja's departure to
London for the forthcoming Coronation celebration (1902), Curzon called
Hamilton's attention to him. He specifically asked Hamilton "to keep
a sharp look-out" for "the nocturnal excursions" of the Maharaja.1 The
fact seemed to be that even some of the very best Princes like Soindia
who had a young and charming wife could not come back from Europe
without some taint of an undesirable kind.2 Still another best yet
notorious example of the Westernised rulers was the young Maharaja
Ganga Singh - who also had been to the Coronation - from Rajputana.3
"When I asked him", Curzon recorded, "what he liked best in his recent
visit to England, he made an unhesitating and characteristic reply that he liked the theatres and particularly the 'Gaiety' better than
anything else".4

Curzon's policy involved him in differences with the Home Author-
ities. Like the Queen, who would readily receive the visiting Indian
rulers in London, the Authorities had a soft corner for them.5 The
Queen's own son and successor shared similar views.6 Curzon however,
for his part, thought that the Authorities were becoming more and more
oblivious of the views and difficulties of the Government of India over

2. NM.P's., Minto to Morley, 8 Apr.1902, vol.14, pp.8-9. SPLT, 1899,
no.1142(11 Dec) para 934(v), vol.118, p.756. PLCH, 1 Oct.1902,
vol.xxiv, p.69.
3. IFP(Intl) Mar.1899, no.77, 30 Dec.1898. PLHC, 29 May, 12 June,
27 Aug., 11 Sept.1902, vol.iv, pp.198,214,318,333(a),341. PLCH,
vol.xxiv, p.86.
5. LQV,3rd series, 27 Oct.1900, vol.iii, pp.613-4. PLHC, 1, 22 Nov.1901
the latter. Lord Dufferin before him had also similarly observed that
"British society seems disposed to put everything Indian upon a
residual and young ladies appear ready to fall in love with Indians at
cr, while their sisters out here regard them with the greatest dis-
savour."

Carson held that the high airs and ideas which often got into the
heads of the outgoing Indian rulers reacted adversely on the political
situation in India. It made many of them, for instance, even the
petty chief of Indukota, as much as the Gaekwar of Baroda, feel re-
serve under the restraints of the Government on returning to India.

They acquired, apart from general restlessness, arrogance and conceit,
false but high notions of themselves as a sort of royalty in partibus
infidelium. That was but the natural corollary of their experiences
abroad. Outside India, even the Thakur (petty Chief) of Gondal could
assume considerable importance. During his visit to England in 1897,
he had been invited to the Coronation of Their Majesties the Emperor
and Empress of Russia. Similar was the situation in relation to the
visit abroad of the young Raja of Jodhpur whose activities in general


2. He rather insignificant and peculiar position which as a small
Chieflain he occupied was evident from the caste which the ruler of
Indukota headed and represented. He was, historically, the head
of a caste of thieves, and from that viewpoint, as was popularly
believed, he had to carry out every year a nominal theft by stealing
a rupee (from his secretary) which for that purpose was put upon his
dressing table. LAC; Hamilton to Ampthill, 25 Feb. 1907, vol. 4, p. 5

3. IFP (Int'l) Feb. 1901, no. 120, 26 Aug. 1900; Sept. 1900, no. 89, 20 July,

were high-lighted in the Press.  At that Curzon could not help expressing privately his feelings on the matter. "It disgusts me," he wrote, "to read in the papers of his flitting about in Vienna as the guest of the emperor, as though he was an Asiatic potentate of the highest character and distinction; and I begin to be sorely afraid that when he comes back here, we shall not find him any better for his journey, but that he will add one more to the list of young men to whom the intoxication of European travels has proved disastrous." ²

Curzon was quite seriously looking for means of making the authorities, particularly those at home, realise the existence of various anomalies and difficulties under the existing situation. He was by no means, however, interested in publicising forthwith his views over the issue. Despite his very pronounced views on the subject, the circular was not published until almost a month after it had been sent round to the Local Government. ³ He made his views open only realising during the period intervening (between the circular and its publicity) the want still of any serious appraisal by the Home Authorities of his views over the issue. In the meantime, some of the rulers like those, for instance, of Kuch Behar and Kapurthala were more or less, still being feted in England. ⁴ It was that attitude of little concern on the part of the authorities in London that apparently led Curzon to think of the desirability of bringing out his views on

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1. FPUCI, 1901, no. 2140, 25-6 July 1901. IFP(Inst) Sept. 1901, no. 64, 5 Feb., nos. 67-8. 19 Feb., 4 Mar., nos. 72-4, 15/23 Mar. no. 86, 30 May.
2. PPC, Curzon to Hamilton, 7 Aug. 1901, vol. 1901
the subject in the Press. Just before issuing the Circular he had tried to direct Hamilton's attention to the point. "Will you consider" Curzon asked him, "whether something must not be done at your end also in the disproportionate compliments that are paid to these dubious oriental potentates when they find themselves on European soil". The situation had "something both ridiculous in its character and unfortunate in its consequences" which he did not think it either reasonable or politic to be outright ignored by the Government any more. It needed, if not immediate change, at least serious attention and careful consideration. And so just a couple of days before sending the Circular, as yet privately, to the Local Governments, he had brought out to Hamilton's notice the effect of the attitude of those at Home. As he observed:

"It makes them too wild to put away from India - where their true disposition and status are known, - where a petty prince or loose character is treated with whatever indignity he deserves - and to go to Europe, where everyone who calls himself prince is regarded as a royalty, where a man who wears a turban with bad pearls in it is regarded as lineal descendant of Nebuchadnezzar or Tamerlane, and where an individual who is looked at advance at a second-rate British entertainment in India non-fuss and politeness at the courts of Emperors and Kings".

The underlying principles of Curzon's policy in the matter of restraining the scope of the Princes' foreign tours were in their nature and origin not altogether innovative and radical. Already, for instance in 1886, the authorities at the India Office itself had

2. The Circular was first sent out to the Local Governments and Administrations in India on 20/27 July 1900. IPP(Intl) Sept.1900, no.39-92 supra. PFP(33) Sept.1900, no.52, encl. 26 July 1900.
3. ibid., 18 July, 1900, supra.
been disposed to suggest the need for the imposition of some sort of
healthy check and restraint on the foreign travel of Indian Princes
and Chiefs.¹ The desirability of restricting the scope of their
foreign tours had been discussed in view of the scandalous behaviour
abroad of the Nawab of Bagoda, who had been to both Europe and America.²
The Home authorities had subsequently drawn the attention of the
Government of India to the increasing tendency of Indians in England to
proceed to further travel on the continent.³ Curzon's policy was thus
in accord with the India Office's own views. Even in the matter of
the Circular's publicity, Curzon had the full public approval and
support over the issue from Hamilton himself. Curzon sufficiently
scored that in answer to questions put to the latter by the hon.
M. MacNeill, to the effect that "discontent" had been caused in
India by the Circular, Hamilton unhesitatingly affirmed that he was
totally cognizant of the leave Circular and that he could not accept that
there had been such an unfavourable reaction. "It was", he said, "within
the competence of the Government of India to issue it; no sanction from
the home Government was requisite, and I am not aware that it has
caused discontent".⁴

² LCC(1895-6), Lee-Warner to Rev. Charles J. Hughes, 24 Dec. 1895, p.56.
³ IPP(Intl) July 1899, no.169, 6 July 1899.
⁴ LCC.obs.1901,(C) 10 May 1901.
POLITICAL CENTRALISATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE MULTIAR STATES

by the opening of the 20th century there were not less than 682 large and small states in India. These had a total population of 63,000,000 with an aggregate revenue reckoned at £15,300,000.1

of that number, about 170 states were directly controlled by the foreign2 and political department of the government of India under the sole charge of the viceroy.3 The political department had been divided, mainly at Hamilton's suggestion, into an external branch concerned mostly with relations with foreign powers, and an internal branch dealing with the Indian states. Political control over the states as a whole was exercised usually through the intermediacy of either the various agents4 to the governor-general, or the provincial governments. But in the case of Hyderabad, Mysore, Kashmir and


2. The term 'foreign' came to be much objected to, under Kinto, by some of the rulers like Scindia of Gwalior, on account of the States' intimate relations with the British Government. That led to the idea of having a separate department for dealing with the Indian states. The idea however was discarded in view of the duplication of the work and the expense that the changes in that direction would have necessarily involved. M&Ps. Kinto to Horley, 19 Dec. 1900, vol.9, p.71(b).


4. The posts of the various political agents to the Governor-General were quite different from that of the Agent to the Governor-General for the affairs of the late King of Oudh. The latter post came to be at last abolished in 1905. IPP(Int'l.) May 1905, no.80, 19 Apr. 1905. O&L, 16 May 1900, vol.xvii, pp.96-7.
Baroda, the political relations were managed by the Residents. Like the Agents to the Governor-General, they, the Residents, also had immediate connection with the Political Department of the Government of India itself.¹

Most of the States, especially those in the north and centre of the country, in their existing dimension, rank and position, were of more recent origin than the British Power in India. Their growth and number had been encouraged during the decadence of the Mughal Empire in the last half of the 18th century, and the downfall of Maratha rule in the early years of the 19th.²

The Princes and Chiefs in India were entitled to various salutes,³ according to their position, varying from 9 to 21 guns.⁴ A salute of 21 guns was a distinction of the highest order. That was limited to a few only of the select and most important Indian rulers (who had 'His/Her Highness' prefixed to their names and titles).⁵ While almost 100 of them had the right of personal access to the Viceroy, about half⁶ of them were also entitled to the kharitae or direct

1. 10L, 1902, pp. 356-6; Parl.Pa. 1903, (249)xlvi, MMPI, pp. 18, 23, 28, 33, 36, 44.
3. See appendicous.
4. IPP(Int.) Mar. 1901, no. 237, 7 Mar. 1901; May 1903, no.9, encl. 7 May 1902. IPP & IP, Mar. 1901, nos. 4/5, 11/27 Mar. 1901.
5. In England a Royal Salute also consisted of 21 guns except in St. James’s Park and at the Tower of London where, from old custom, it was 41 guns. Anyhow in India the King Emperor had 101 guns salute, members of the Royal Family, 31 guns, and independent Asiatic Sovereigns 21 guns. IPP(Int.), 1902, no. 1893, 12 Mar. 1902.
communications to and from the Viceroy. Below them the rank and position of the remainder shaded away by imperceptible degrees from the status of a chief, (entitled to a guard of honour), to that of a petty zemindar or a guaranteed holder of some estate.  

Out of the 166 Indian rulers entitled to gun salutes, not less than 54 were under the Government of India itself. At the same time there were 31 under the Bombay Government, 3 under each of the Bengal and Madras Governments, 2 under the North-Western Provinces and 12 under the Punjab Government. With the exceptions of the Governments of India and Bombay, none of the other Governments had any political department with specialised personnel for dealing exclusively with the States. In the circumstances, the political relations with most of the States under the Provincial Governments, were managed by civilians. Unlike the Government of India which had as many as 67 special appointments for political Officers, the Provincial Governments had hardly any Political Officers in the strict sense of the term. The political work of the provinces was general-

2. Ibid. IFPI(Intl.) Apr. 1902, no. 35, 5 Mar. 1902.  
6. Parli. rs. 1902(204)lxvi, rMPI, p. 39; 1904(186)lxii, rMPI, p. 182. rOL, 1899, pp. 32-4, 94-5.
ly carried on by such officers as Deputy Commissioners or Collectors; with their headquarters in the districts adjoining the states. Most of the states, for instance, in the Punjab were grouped under the five Commissioners of Delhi, Jullundur, Lahore, Keshawar and Derajat.

For more than a year or so immediately after his arrival in India, Curzon could not help turning his thoughts again and again to the problems of the Indian frontier and defence. He was convinced that there was little justification for leaving many of the important issues pertaining to the Indian States and frontier with the provincial authorities, such as the Punjab Government in particular. It was not until almost the end of 1900 that he found the opportunity to raise the subject. He did so in an effective manner as a side-issue to his proposal for the creation of a new province on the frontier of the Punjab. The frontier issue, however, had been virtually

1. Of them, the Commissioners of Keshawar and Derajat were in charge of only the frontier tribes bordering on the districts of their division. The Commissioner of Delhi held charge of Patiala, Moga, Amritsar, Talkeet, Kalsia and the hill states of Simla (placed under a Superintendent). The Commissioner of Jullundur had under him the States of Jalandhar, Kapurthala, Jaitoke and Faridkot. The Commissioner of Lahore had only one State of Chamba under him.


engaging his attention even before his appointment. So, in his important Minute of 27 August 1900 followed up by another one of 11 October 1900, he fully elaborated his views on the formation of a Scientific Frontier, with adequate control for the Government of India. In the Minutes he emphasised, (having already talked over the matter with Lord Elgin and with Sir Mackworth Young, the Lieutenant-Governor) the need for the centralisation of political control. He held that apart from the management of the frontier, the conduct of the Government's relations with the States under the Provincial charge could be adequately improved with the centralisation of political control. Curzon's ideas in that respect for political centralisation were mainly derived from some similar schemes that had been adumbrated in Lord Northbrook's Minute of 30 March 1876 and Lord Lytton's Minute of 22 April 1877.

Out of all the States in India, Curzon was hoping to substitute the Government of India's own control in only some of the important ones under the Punjab Government. Besides some two dozen or so of the Simla Hill States amid the mountain ranges of the


4. LCC, Curzon to Sir M. Young, 13 Oct. 1900, supra, p. 90.

5. Parl. Ps. 1878(India)1899)lviii, Minute by His Excellency Lord Northbrook, 30 Mar. 1876, para 14, p. 25; Minute by the Viceroy, 22 Apr. 1877, pp. 130-43; Lytton to Salisbury, 17 May 1877, Salisbury to Lytton, 29 Nov. 1877, pp. 150-54.

Punjab Himalayas, there were also quite a number of other bigger and more important states. Curzon however, had his eyes primarily on the Phulkian states of Jhabba, Jhind and Ratiala, mainly because of their political and strategic importance. The Phulkian states were the strong outposts of the British dominions in India. They owed their existence, as Curzon's successor observed, to "the support given to them by my ancestor Lord Mayo", and to the treaty signed with Ranjit Singh in 1809. They had been serving as a buffer between the British territories and Afghanistan. As Curzon remarked, "through all the vicissitudes of the past", they had covered an important flank of the frontier on the outlay.

Curzon had a substantial reason to pay special attention to the Phulkian states owing to the increasing dangers of Russian aggression. Apart, however, from the need of strengthening the frontier defences of India, Curzon was equally determined of building up the states' internal administration and economy, which had of late been steadily deteriorating. The leading Phulkian states had been for long in a

4. Such, 10 Nov. 1905, supra.
condition of almost utter administrative confusion and chaos. 1

The issue forced itself on Curzon's consideration by October 1900, it was just at that time that Curzon first came to know something, following upon his recent visit to the hill state of Chamba, about the scandalous and clandestine marriage of Raja Ranbir Singh of Shhind with Miss Olive, a 19 year old European girl of low origin. 2 The child bride, when the young Raja secretly married as her Highness Jaswant Kaur, was believed to have been the daughter of a Bombay barber named Cornerstone, however a professional aeronaut of either Dutch or German descent called van Ransells had successfully passed himself off as her father. The girl's mother had been for the past few years frequently travelling to the state accompanied by the girl as a paras-chutist to van Ransells. Their constant visits to Shhind had naturally brought the girl prominently before the Raja. After the marriage the Raja was known to have paid 3,50,000 to 40,000 to the aeronaut as a bonus or consideration for the affair. However both the aeronaut and the money-bags he was carrying; with him were detained by the Authorities at Ambala Railway Station. Curzon brought the whole affair to the personal notice of Hamilton. He did that since, as he observed, it brought to light a fresh and melancholy illustration of the rightness of my beliefs as to the need for instituting the Government of India's own direct control over the State. 3

1. Ibid. IIP(Intl.) Jan. 1902, no. 39, encl. i, 18 Sept. 1901, para 2.
after having for some time corresponded with Sir Mackworth

Curtin at last in October 1900 formally raised the issue for

centralisation of political control. 1 He proposed the appointment

of some properly trained political agent to the Shulkian States. In

general he doubted whether it was expedient that a Local Government

should be entrusted with the intermediary charge of political relation

with the Indian state, on he suggested that all such States should

be in a direct relations with the Government of India. 2

Mackworth was, argued that as the existing system had last-

ed since 1843 "it would take the strongest reasons to justify the

revocation of such a thing had endured so long." 3 However, Curtin

believed that a system based on mere tradition and historicity could

be dangerous to carry too far. It was fatal to a change of any sort

or description. 4 Moreover, the historical plea could be stretched

for rather than dispread the possibility of institution: the

government of India, own control over the States. The fact remai-

ing that before the annexation of the Punjab in 1849, the Shulkian States

had come for 50 years, more or less, in the hands of the Governor-

General. 5

Even though conceding the fullest measure of respect to the

convincing he offered to that on the grounds, Curtin could not yet find it

with whom to deal. Mackworth's plea on the issue, to differ-

ently, after the fundamental point raised by the Lieutenant-Governor,


2. Stewart, loc. cit., p. 111, 140.

3. See Correspondence re organisation, p. 111.


5. See, i.e. R. W. Baden-Powell, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 1, 29, 125.
"The smooth working," of the Punjab administrative system, as Sir Hackworth had put it, "evidently demands that the native States should be in political subordination to the Local Government". And he had further added that "to lengthen the chain of official communication will be most unavoidable". Indeed Curzon himself shared those views but with a singular difference. Holding by the argument of the Lieut.-Governor, Curzon maintained that to substitute a single political officer under the direction of the Government of India itself would be nothing substantially different. That was not going to lengthen but to shorten the chain by the elimination of the intervening links.  

Along with the various objections, Curzon, in his characteristic way, analysed also the prestige argument of Sir Hackworth: Young, while arguing for the maintenance of the status quo, the Lieut.-Governor had alluded to the loss of his personal prestige, if the 'Indian States were to be taken away from the provincial charge. A high notion of prestige is, Hamilton observed, was indeed a 'common fault' with many of the members of the Indian Civil Service to which Sir Hackworth himself originally belonged. Curzon did not think that it would be unnatural, on the part either of Sir Hackworth or any other Governor, to bring in an argument of that sort. However he did not find it possible to recognise the force and soundness of the plea. And in the minute that he appended to the despatch of

3. Ibid. The Confidential Memorandum, 29 Aug. 1900.  
January 1901, the firmly recorded his impressions to that effect. "I am not aware", he also added, "that Baroda thinks the worse of Bombay because it does not enjoy direct political relations with that government", and that was equally true in the case of the Punjab government. There was hardly anything in its own recent history that could have indicated that its prestige had been weakened owing to some similar changes effected in the province. It had not suffered any loss in importance in the province, even though (after the earlier views of Northbrook and Lytton) Kashmir had been at last removed from its charge in 1894.

Curzon's ideas on centralisation were not confined solely to either the Rajputana States or the 34 States all under the Punjab government. He had made a most careful analysis of the characters, dispositions and administrations of the Indian rulers in general whom on the whole he found "a disappointing study". But he did not mean his contemplated change in the existing system to be extended beyond the limits of the Rajputana States. His general impressions of the various Gun Chiefs under the Provincial Governments, however, provided some food for reflection, and that necessarily had some bearing on those who were in power or who equitably dealt with the administration of the land by one or more.

1. supra. Parl. Ps. 1890(cmd. 6072)13 GOI to the GOI, 26 Aug. 1901, p. 16.
2. supra. Parl. Ps. 1890 (271)(xlvi), (i), MIP, pt. 76-77; 1902 (240) (xlvi), lxxv, p. 23, 102, 1902, p. 356.
In Madras there were quite apart from the various petty chief-tains and titular rajas and maharajas—only five Indian rulers worthy of the name. They were the rulers of Ruddukota, Travancore, Cochin, Sainapalle, and Jandur, of whom only the first two were the important Gun Chiefs. The conduct of at least two of them was not beyond reproach. One of them, the nawab (Path Ali Khan) of Sainapalle was a hopeless ruler. In consequence of his continued mismanagement and utter disregard of repeated warnings, he had to be at last removed from the direct administration of the State.

The other important Chief, personally known to Curzon, was the 26 years old raja of Madur. He had acquired much notoriety owing to his fondness for foreign travel and amusements, his impatience of control, and his lack of interest in his own State and people. He was not much different from his grandfather who had adopted him for the succession. His grandfather whom the Government had at one time thought of reducing to the status of a zamindar) had been deprived of substantial powers due to unsatisfactory conduct and reckless extravagance. Almost exactly similar extravagance, heavy debts and

1. The important of the titular chief-tains were: the rajas of Kala-hasti, Kavathayar, Anagudi, Pithapuram, Alagada, Ramnad, Venkatadri, Kollemadu, Bobbili (was invited to the Coronation Durbar), Eralpad rajas of Calicut, Valiya rajas of Chirakthal, Arcot (Prince) Radhakrishna, Balasat, Saliyankand. LAC, Confidential Deposition 262, 4 Dec. 1903, vol.51, pp.71-72, 61-62; Hamilton to Amphill, 12 June 1902, vol.1, pp.90, 92; vol.22, pt.1, pp.153, 155, 165.

2. See Appendix.

3. Rarli. 19(1879)xxii, SPI, p.163.

4. See Chnl.


6. Rarli. 19(1879)xxiii, AIII, para 612, p.275; 1867(258)1, p.43.

Westernised outlook of the young Raddukota also had attracted, apart from the Government's own attention, the notice of the Indian newspapers.\(^1\) They were all the more critical of his European ways and 'Foreign' manners, recalling that his mother was a daughter of the famous Bengali reformer, Kesabha Chandra Sen.\(^2\)

Curzon's own observations as to the general conduct of the Raja of Raddukota were further confirmed, later on, also by Amphill, the most conscientious and level headed of the Governors.\(^3\) Keenly interested in marrying a white woman, the young Raja had, Amphill noted, an affair with one Mrs. Reid. The association of the couple was not confined simply to dining, but two or three times a week. They also took to staying together in a house called "The honeymoon bungalow" - some six miles from the hill-station of Locomanal - where the accommodation was known to be very restricted. Mrs. Reid lived with the Raja, moreover, for over a year also in a small co-habitation called "The Catholic" situated in the very compound of the Raja's residence at the hill-station.\(^4\)

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5. They were not rulers in the full sense of the term. It was only in 1852 that the Sec. of State had decided that the tributary States did not form part of British India. It had thereby become necessary to change the rules and procedures then in force, for the boundary of the tributary (Mahalat) System, settlement and collection of public revenues, support and administration of the police, and succession (Act XI of 1816). A new enactment known as Tributary Laws of Tributary Act (No.1) of 1853 was passed. Fresh sanads defining the status, power and position of the several Chiefs were issued in 1891, regulating the relations between the Chiefs and the British Government. In the administration of criminal justice, the Chiefs were restricted powers, but they had full latitude in civil matter.
In Bengal there were only three important Chiefs, besides sixteen to twenty-six unimportant tributaries whose status, powers, and position, until 1867, were very uncertain. Of the three Gun Chiefs of Tippera, Kuch Sehar and Sikkim, the conduct of two of them was far from satisfactory. The Maha of Sikkim had once been deprived of all power, and confined to British territory as a punishment for political intrigue and grave misconduct. It was only later that he had been given a very limited share of authority.¹ The Maharaja of Kuch Sehar, on account of his foreign travels and extravagant ways, had been, as Curzon observed, "too well known to need description".²

"He is in my judgement," Curzon recorded, "one of the most disappointing and least meritorious of the princes who have enjoyed a European education".³ His deplorable conduct and frivolous activities abroad, in which he was encouraged by his Indian wife, had further added to his indebtedness.⁴ Also Lord Hinto, who unlike Curzon had no soft corner even for rulers like the notorious Maha of Kapurthala and the Oolah of aroda, could not approve of the Maharaja's general tone and conduct.⁵

There were only two important States in the North-Western Provinces, namely Tehri Garhwal and Rampur. The Nawab of Rampur, as Curzon observed, was so "notorious for his debauchery and extravagance" that the question of appointing a Political Agent had been under the Government serious consideration. The Nawab had not been invested with full ruling powers till 1896, though his minority had ended some two years earlier. He was a person of extremely poor character. This was evident even from the local reports and news current about him at places like Rampur, Lucknow, Bareilly and Goradabad. The Nawab had shockingly low and perverted tastes. He was widely known for associating with prostitutes, laundas (catamites) and fortifying himself with kushtas (calcined metals used as aphrodisiacs). Apart from his manifold acts of wanton profligacy, the Nawab's name was also associated with the nude parasites of female attendants and others in the apartments of the palace.

The Jumjal, quite unlike the Central Provinces, which had hardly

4. SPLI, 1900, no.267(15 Jan.) para 62(ix), (22 Jan) para 88(vi-vii) (29 Jan) para 114, vol.120, pp.120-9,163; 1900, no.316(5 Feb) para 138(i vol.120, p.195.
6. In the Central Provinces there were no States worth mention, save the tributaries of Jumjal, Kalinga(Karond), Patna, Raiyakhol and Sonpur. The five States formerly were included among the States in the Chatigorah Agency. With the exception of Kalinga, Qubuliyats were executed in 1827 by these Chiefs, their revenues(payable to the Government) thereby fixed nominally for 5 years. anyhow under separate engagements at the same time the Chiefs were all bound to use right the judicial and police powers entrusted to them. Their powers in criminal cases were in practice limited to the infliction of seven years imprisonment. On 23rd Dec.1905, when the States were transferred from the Central Provinces to Bengal on the partition of the provinces, four bonds were granted to them, fixing their tr
any States of real importance, had some three dozen of big and small States. The most important of its Chiefs were those of Patiala, Sahasmarpur, Jhind, Nabha, Kapurthala, Mandi, Chamba, Nahan (Sirmur), Malerkotla, and Faridkot. The conduct of many of them, particularly of Kapurthala, Mandi, Solan, Patiala, Bashahr and Keonthal had been a subject of serious concern.

Of the six Muslim Chiefs of Patiala, Loharu, Mandot, Patiala, Malerkotla and Sahasmarpur under the Punjab Government, at least one half of them were of little outstanding worth and character. Amongst them, only the Nawab of Loharu had been a successful and accomplished administrator and had received due praise and appreciation from the government. He presented a sharp contrast with the Nawab of Patiala who had died in December 1897, and who had married practically out of the village a woman of low morals just a few months before his death.

Another, the Nawab of Mandot was hardly a ruler in the strict sense.

2. Act, 1871, no. 76 (1 July) para 49, vol. 111, p. 66; 1887, no. 809 (12 July) para 26(vi), vol. 111, pp. 118-9; 1892, no. 188 (- Jan) para 59(i), vol. 111, p. 18; 1896 (22 Jan) para 60(i) vol. 120, p. 129.
5. The title of wasi had been bestowed upon the family founder Islam Khan of Patiala on 6 December 1864 as a hereditary distinction for services during the 1st Sikh War. As a result, however, of the Nawab’s grossly oppressive conduct, much of the powers were taken away from him and the state managed by the district authorities of Patiala. Anyhow after due consideration it was decided to maintain the title and not to withhold either the title or the revenues from at least the Nawab’s brother who had taken no part in the oppressive measures exercised by the Nawab. Anyhow the police, the magisterial funcitons and the fiscal management continued to be retained in the hands of the officers of the Punjab Government. RTC Sir Richard Temple to Syllic, 16 Aug. 1867, vol. 79, p. 217. Var. 2, 1866(374)lii, MPPI, para 3, p. 70. FP(Intl.) Mar. 1902, no. 110, list of the Title-Holders corrected up to 9 Nov. 1901, p. 396.
of the term having been as far back as 1864-5 deprived of all substantial control over finance and administration.

The most important Muslim rulers under the Punjab Government were the two Gun Chiefs of Bahawalpur and Balerkotla. One of them, the Nawab of Bahawalpur, though still a minor and under the superintendship of Colonel Grey, was beginning to excite the adverse comments of the Indian Press. That was mainly because of the young Nawab's increasing fondness - like that of the rulers of Kuch Behar, Naroda and Rudukotla - for European living and Westernism in general. Curzon could not fail to recall the sad end of his father the late Nawab Sadiq. Since the death of his father in 1865, the Nawab Sadiq had fallen into bad hands and evil ways due to the negligence of the Provincial Government. After being partially ruined by a bad tutor and his early companions, the Nawab had been left to his own devices. The result had been that at the age of 33 he had died, as Curzon recounted, "with his mind enfeebled and his body wrecked by indulgence in chloral, opium and alcohol". Further, he had, just before his death, like the Nawab of Fataudi, married or attempted


4. He had advertised for an English lady, whereupon a Mrs. Skinner, exceedingly good looking but of shady character, left her husband with a view of joining him. JGC, Curzon to His Majesty, 15 Oct.1901 vol.136, pt.ii, p.104.
to marry "a European married woman of bad character". 1 He had, consequently, left behind him heavy debts amounting to Rs.325,359 due for articles of luxury and pleasure including such items as costly perfumes, scents, medicines, tonics, aphrodisiacs and jewellery. 2 But he did not shed the blood of his relatives as his father had most mercilessly done. 3

The Nawab of Malerkotla, another important Muslim Chief in the Punjab, was no better than the two Nawabs of Bahawalpur and Pat-audi. Just ten years after his accession, he had been deprived of all powers, and was, as Curzon observed, now "hopelessly insane". 4 His eldest son and heir-apparent, who before being invested with powers had been placed under the guidance of the Nawab of Loharu, too, gave a sort of surprise and anxiety to the Government. He had been a student at the Macnish College Lahore, and there, while approaching an age at which the Punjab Government contemplated entrusting him with some ruling power, he entered into clandestine intimacy with a girl, that splendidly ended in marriage. The Punjab Government


3. parl.Ps.1865(374)11i, HMPI, para 4, p.70 (Apart from harsh treatment of his relatives, his father had been responsible for the execution of his four uncles.)

no, however, specifically asked him to read his ways.  

as far as one's proposal for centralisation was directly  

In the latter case, we had taken notice of the  

and of the rulers of their rulers,  

hardly anyone  

- in their - with the exception of the sultan of J ama - who could  

certainly impress him as a ruler.  

To doubt the rulers of Kasurthala, like  

the late sauj of Sattara, of whom Lord Northbrook had quite a  

good opinion, was once a clever and promising youth.  

Due to the  

laxity and weakness in the political control exercised by the  

Provincial government, the sauj at the early age of 26 had, however,  

degenerated "into a selfish and worthless member of society".  

As was frequently pointed out in the provincial press, he had been spending  

immense sums of money on worthless women, European trips and  

absolute habits.  

It was, of whom Carson remarked, that "by his  

scandalous conduct abroad" he gave living publicity to "the failure  

of our system in half the cities of the European continent".  

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1. TF(III.) Sept.die, no.10, 4 sept.1901; Feb.1905, no.475, 2 Feb.  

1905, TF(II.) Feb.15th, no.1, 1905, Jan. 4th. The Viceroy's minute,  


2. Nov.190, vol.III., no.241-62; var.18, 3v69(vlvi)  

1901, 10; 24 Oct.1902, 1902(vlxxxvii), 1M1  


3 Oct.190, Carson to his Majesty, 21 Nov.190, vol.50., pt.ii., p.10  


Viceroy's minute, 11 Oct.190, supra., para. 1.  


6. Addition to notice, 2 Oct.190, vol.6., p.i. HM1, 1900, no.26  

7. HM(II.) part. (viii) vol.176, p.125; no.473(191.1 br.) para 265,  

vol.1, p.652; no.475(vii) para 351(iii) vol.422, p.491.  

8. The Viceroy's minute, supra.
ever, the Raja's conduct was but in keeping with the general tradition and family traits of his two immediate predecessors. One of them, his father Raja Kharak Singh was so weak a character that he had to be deprived of all voice in the affairs of State. The other, his grandfather Raja Kandhir Singh, known for his fondness for Europeans, had at last married a Eurasian woman and, in 1870, died while on his way to England. 1

Another important Sikh ruler not any better than the Raja of Kapurthala was the Maharaja of Patiala whom Lytton had personally installed on the gadi in 1876 when yet only five years old. 2 The Maharaja, who had of late become, as Curzon remarked "the prey of English jockeys and pimps", had taken a prominent part in the recent campaigns on the frontier. 3 He had, however, become somewhat hostile to the Government. 4 As Curzon observed, he had been "left alone" uncared for by the provincial authorities, and that had resulted in some adverse effects on his conduct. "With no adviser at the most critical period of his life", the Maharaja even though "yet in leading strings" had, nevertheless, drifted into "the society of stablemen, jockeys and panders of every description". He had also married the sister of a European groom. 5 due to excessive 6 intoxication and

1. ibid. part. ii. 1903(106)xliii, i. lpi, para 4, p.195; 1903(249)xlii, para 4, p.39.
2. ibid., Lytton to queen, 25 Dec. 1876 to Jan. 1877, vol.119/2, p.18, may 1900, no.267(22 Jan.) para 39(i) vol.120, p.79; 1900, no.267(22 Jan.) para 40 viii-vii ix) vol.120, p.129. IFF(Intl.) May 1900, no.79, 1901.
3. parl. ii. 1900(207)xliii, .lpi, p.109. LCC, Curzon to the king, 19 Ju
8. It was the death of Sir H. Young informed Curzon, "a favourite woman that had something to do with his recent excesses", LCC, 15 Nov. 1901.
insultence he could not long survive, and in October 1801 was succeeded by his young son, Coninder Singh. Referring to the Maharaja's untimely end hastened by "drink, extravagance and what not", Curzon could not but feel sorry for their misapent lives and early deaths. "Oh, it is a shocking thing," he wrote, "to see these mismanaged chiefs drop off before they have touched the age of 30." He the Maharaja's own father before him had met with a similar end. He had died neither from apoplexy and catalepsy, as was generally supposed, nor by any villainous poisoning plot, but through intemperance and indulgence.

There was still another living proof of the weakness of the existing system in the young Raja of Dhind. Though still only 21 years of age, he was already, Curzon observed, "in a fair way to become a second Patiala". Only three years ago the Punjab Government itself had specifically pointed out that "it would be little less than a crime to invest him with full powers."
Another Sikh ruler not much different from the others was the Maharaja Balbir Singh of Faridkot. He was 31 years of age. Apart from having been criticised in the Provincial newspapers, he had been on different occasions, as Curzon remarked, "advertised upon for drunkenness and licentiousness and cruelty". The young Raja like others of his type did not live long. He died in February 1906, and was succeeded by his nephew Brij Inder Singh.

The conduct and administration of the various Gun Chiefs under the political charge of the Provincial Government's confirmed Curzon's views on the whole subject. Of the numerous important rulers managed by the Governments other than those of Bombay and India, as Curzon observed, the character of no fewer than 55 per cent had been, or was still, the subject of gravest suspicion. At the same time, of the Gun Chiefs of the Punjab, an even larger proportion afforded, "a spectacle that can not be studied with complacency or without compunction". It was particularly in the Punjab States that the need for some improvement in their management was all the more apparent. The one thing in common with almost all the States there was invariably - as a leading Provincial organ remarked - not peace and order but "rank and riotous disorder".

2. Parl. Ps. 1907 (149) lix, WMP, p. 192.
Curzon maintained that many of the Princes and Chiefs, at least the younger ones as under the Punjab Government, might have been saved from "the sorrowful evolution" which had overtaken them, if some adequately trained and experienced officer of the Political Department had been attached to their Courts in time. They needed expert guidance and supervision all the more at the time they were left without their early guardians and promoted to the enjoyment of full powers. He wanted a clear line of distinction between civil and political work - which he held to be quite different from administrative work. The successful Political Officer was, he stated, "a man who had learned political work from an early period of his career", and "can grasp the idiosyncrasies of the Chief to whom he is accredited". Above all, the Officer was trained and expected to understand and "sympathise with the feelings of the Durbar".

Curzon did not claim that all the members of the Political Department of the Government of India possessed the requisite ability or discretion. But he maintained that there were within the ranks of the Department at least "a volume of experience, of training, and of judgement" which it would be but hopeless to look for outside.

2. IPP(Intl.) Sept. 1901, no. 37, 26 Apr. 1901, para 4.
"If evidence were needed", he recorded in the Minute of 11 October 1900, "of the extent to which even distinguished Civilians have failed when placed in political charge, it would be easy to produce a list that would not meet with challenge from a single well-informed authority". And indeed his views were substantiated in actual practice by the failure of some very distinguished officers of the Indian Civil Service when posted to political appointments in, for instance, States like Hyderabad, Cochin and Travancore. 2

Apart from administrative and political considerations, Curzon had, unlike Sir Macworth, his eyes equally on the interests and general feelings of the people of the States he wanted to take away from the provincial charge. As already evident from an almost similar reaction of those living in Berar, it was quite clear to him that the people would welcome rather than despise the Government of India's own direct control. 3 Moreover, also the people in the Punjab itself had, at the time of the creation of the Kashmir State, intensely disliked their dissociation from the British Administration.

2. Ibid.
3. SPL, 1869, no.1048 (30 Oct.) para 327(i), vol.118, p.624.
4. RTC, Richard Temple to Wyllie, 16 Aug.1867, vol.79, p.307. (When the territories of Kashmir were chopped off from the Punjab and incorporated in the State, the people going over to the new State did not like the change. Numbers of them (mostly traders and manufacturers of Kashmir shawls), left the State, settling at Sialkot, Amritsar, Lahore, Jhelum and going, subsequently, as far away as Ludhiana. Seeing the swift flow of emigration to territories outside, the State was obliged to take stringent measures.)
"If anyone is doubtful," he affirmed, "as to what may be the feelings of the native inhabitants of a State which after being subjected to a local Government, has passed under the control of the Government of India, let him go to Kashmir and invite a plebiscite of the people as to whether they would wish to revert to the older order of things." And he emphatically added: "I should be surprised to encounter a simple affirmative vote." 1

In deference however to Sir Mackworth Young's views, Curzon wrote that the Political Agent, Khalijan States, would remain under the immediate control of the Punjab Government itself. 2 He proposed at the same time to crown Bahawalpur (which had no Political Officer) with the Khalijan States for purposes of political control and supervision. 3 As a matter of fact all of these States in their political relation to the local government were in a similar position. The subject was the past, in the circumstances to be made by the lieut. governor himself, but, however, to remain subject to the ultimate control and direction of the Government of India. If the Province had no suitable officer, the Government of India itself was to select an officer from its Political Department and to place him temporarily under the Punjab Government. 4

Soon after his return of 11 October 1900, Curzon's views on political centralization gained further strength during his autumn

1. The Viceroy's Minute, 11 Oct. 1900, supra, para 17.
tour. And that was considerably due to what he personally saw of political management under the Presidency Governments. It was, for instance, a new and surprising experience for him to find that, apart from the States under the Madras Government which had no special branch of the Political Service, the Bombay States were no better managed. There were about 350 States (with only 18 important ones), under the Bombay Presidency. And all of these were managed by a Political Department which as Curzon observed, was manned by a small and narrow Political Service, almost entirely recruited from young and stupid Subalterns in the Army. They had hardly anything of special political importance to busy themselves about except a few important States mostly in the Kathiawar Agency. They were far from possessing the requisite calibre and political experi-


2. Apart from the 82 States classified with varying degrees of jurisdiction into 7 classes, there were some 308 Civil Stations and Thana Circles with non-jurisdictional talukas. Jurisdiction in the States - varying from that over Europeans only in the most important First Class States to full plenary jurisdiction in Thana Circles - was exercised by the Government (as delegated under a subsequent notification of 16 May 1902, to the Governor of Bombay - in - Council).

3. The important States as such were: Cutch, Palanpur, Radhanpur, Jodar, Junagadh, Navanagar, Bhavnagar, Porbandar, Dhrangadhra, Morvi, Gondal, Cambay, Rajppla, Janjira, Savantvadi, Kolhapur, Sangli and Khairpur.

4. (Nearly half the States' total territories - with an area of about 51,450 square miles - were covered by the seven First Class States in the Kathiawar Agency together with Cutch, Khairpur, Sangli and Bhor).

ence. They had no such general principles or traditions concerning "Political Practice" to guide them such as the Political Department of the Government of India had developed. The result was that they interfered - as the Presidency newspapers time and again pointed out - in every sort of way with those under their political charge.

In spite of what Curzon noticed about the management of the States under the Residencies, he still did not intend to extend the scope of his proposal to any States other than those under the Punjab Government. "Of course it is not to be thought", he reassured George Hamilton, "that Kathiawar should be taken away from Bombay, or rather I would say that the interests concerned are probably too strong to render the attempt worth making". The fact remained that he did not want to disengage his attention from the proposal regarding the Rajkilian States - the more so because of the lack of support from the Lieut.-Governor.

After waiting for even a month or so, Curzon did not find any marked change in the existing attitude which was more or less of

1. Ind.Lps.1903(249) supra; 1904(186) supra; 1906(175)Ixxxii, EMPI, pp.54(iii), 186. IndP(Intl.) June 1899, no.66, 22 June 1899. (Apart from having been grouped together under some 19 Political Agencies the states were looked after - under the revised arrangements in June 1899 - by the Collectors of the Districts within the limits of which they were situated).


unconcern on the part of the Provincial Government. He did not, for instance, hear a word concerning the fiasco regarding Jhind. Indeed the Punjab Government was not prepared to regard that as an affair which concerned the Government of India at all. In the case also of the recent death in November 1900 of the Maharaja Rajendra Singh of Patiala and the succession arrangements connected therewith, Curzon did not find any better result. Regarding succession there involving the issue as to the law of primogeniture (recognisable among the Sikh Sardars of the Cis-Sutlej), the Government of India was left in the dark. The Government had nothing but impenetrable silence from the Provincial Authorities, which was somehow broken in December 1902. All that supplied a certain force to Curzon's convictions. In a private letter to Hamilton, Curzon emphatically stated:

"I say plainly that I think this system is utterly vicious and rotten, and that whereas it may be, and I think would be, unwise to take away the Native States of Madras, because of their distance from the headquarters, or to take away the Native States of Bombay, because they would add so immensely to our labours, there is no excuse for leaving to Local Governments the Native Chiefs and States whom they constantly mismanage and who, under this plan, drift altogether away from the Imperial system".

1PLCH, 9, 18 Nov. 1900, vol. xviii, pp. 256, 292. See (regarding the fiasco as such p. 108)


5PLCH, 18 Nov. 1900, vol. xviii, p. 292.
Curzon's proposal was not bound to win undivided support from the India Council in London. The Council was mostly dominated by the retired Anglo-Indian civilians. At least five\(^1\) out of its twelve members had held civilian appointments in India, varying from those of Resident and Political Agents to Chief Commissioners and Lieutenant-Governors or Governors. They had therefore, as Hamilton forewarned Curzon, "got in their heads the idea that you are concentrating too much all the power of the Government into your own hands".\(^2\)

The proposal was liable to be seriously combated in London also because of the Council's own constitutional power and influence.\(^3\) Unlike some of his predecessors such as Salisbury and Randolph Churchill, Hamilton was not prepared to ignore either the power or the value of the Council as a healthy check on the Government.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) The five members were:— Sir James Braithwaite Peile, Sir Alfred Calthorne Lyall, Sir Charles Crosswaite, Sir Stewart Colvin Barley and Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick. The last of them was, more than anybody else, out to uphold the views of Sir Hesketh Young who had in fact found in him a vehement and most outspoken supporter even over the issue concerning the new Frontier Province. Parl. Pk. 1890-91(127)lxix, India Council Members' Returns, pp. 3-5. PLHC, 18 Apr. 1901, vol. iii, p. 127; 14, 23 Jan., 5 Mar. 1903, vol. v, pp. 8-9, 15, 67.

\(^2\) The number of members of the India Council had been originally fixed at 15. Under the Act 53 & 54 Vict. c65 it had been provided that its strength could be gradually reduced to 10. And by the exercise of those powers, it had of late been reduced to 12 at which figure it stood under Curzon. Parl. Dbs. 1898, (C), 9 May (57) 587; 1902, (C) 14 July (111) 108; 1904, (C), 12, 13, 15 Aug. (140) 476, 490, 556.

\(^3\) PLHC, 13 Dec. 1900, vol. ii, p. 443.

It was not before January 1901 that Curzon found it possible to forward to the India Office the scheme brought out in his Minute of 17 October on the Phulkian States. However, in forwarding the despatch on political centralisation, Curzon tried to reassure the Home Authorities as to the scope of his scheme. He did not propose to take up, as anticipated by Hamilton, the question of the relations of the Madras and Bombay or any other Provincial Governments with their Chiefs and States. "I have quite enough on hand", he pointed out, "which is really of first class political importance at present, not to put my hands into a hornet's nest". Moreover, he preferred "rather to wait and see" what the Home Authorities had to say in reply to the long correspondence about the Phulkian States.

The scheme when it came to be discussed in the India Council during March and April 1901, could not go through without being criticised on the charge of its centralising features. The Council's critical attitude concerning the issue was, however, not much different from what Lord Lytton had earlier also experienced in his dealings with the India Office.

1. FP(1ntl.) Sept.1901, no.37, 26 Apr.1901, op.cit. paras 1,3. PPCH, 10 Jan.1901, vol.xix, p.15.
4. Ibid.
The scepticism in general of the India Council which was inclined towards upholding, as did even Hamilton himself, the authority of the local governments brought about some further modifications of the scheme. Hamilton was not basically averse to it. He was, however, somewhat sceptical on account of the adverse effects of one of his own recent suggestions for frontier appointments in the recent past. An suggestion concerned the selection of some picked men from local personnel for the management of political relations with the tribes on the frontier. It had been so intensely disliked by the central government that there did not seem much reason why the government of India should have recourse to it elsewhere. Over the issue of the appointment of the proposed political Agent, Hamilton decided in favour of a substantial compromise between the views of the local and central governments. His directions while satisfying the scruples of the India Council in favour of the prestige and authority of the local governments did not contravene the principles underlying the scheme. He stated that whilst the government of India should have a voice in the selection of the agents to be taken from the local service, there should be a division of issues affecting the Governments. Matters relating purely to revenue and other issues of the sort affecting local interests were to be referred to the provincial authorities. Others pertaining, in a broad sense, to matters of policy were to be sent to the government of India.

2. Obid. to JUIC, 30 Apr. 1901, supra, para 2.
The official despatch on the subject, reached the Government of India not earlier than the 2nd week of May 1901. The decision on the issue of centralisation was not much different from that which had been done already with special reference to Sir Lewis Pelly's appointment as the Resident at Baroda. There was not much in the despatch to which Curzon could have had strong objections.

A separate Political Agency for the Khulkian States was brought into being in the same year (1901) soon after the approval of the Home authorities. The State of Bahawalpur was also brought under the Agency in April 1903 when the Agent officially took over the new charge. The Agency had its headquarters for some time outside the States at Ambala Cantonment. Subsequently, it was located permanently, as the Punjab Government suggested, at Patiala during the cold weather, and at Chail hill-station in Patiala territory close to Simla in the hot weather. The total expenditure of the Agency on buildings, appointments and local allowances etc., was to be treated as a charge against the Imperial revenue of the Government.

2. The P.M. Sec. G.O.I. to the I.S. Sec. Emby, No. 2563, 25 Nov. 1874 vide Parl Ps. 1875 (emq. 1251) lvi, p. 87. L.P.S., Lytton to Salisbury, 18 May 1876, vol. iv/1, p. 162. (Except in certain matters in which Sir Lewis Pelly was instructed to have direct correspondence with the Government of India, he was further instructed to communicate in all other matters with the Punjab Government in the same manner as Col. Hayre — whom he replaced — had been accustomed to do in relation to the affairs of the Baroda State.)
Just before Curzon left in 1905, the Punjab States had been redistributed under the additional charge of the new Political Agency for the Thullia and Kanawalpur States. To similar changes were directed elsewhere in the management of the States under the Provincial Governments. Curzon did not press any further in that direction, although in September 1905 Lord Amandil thought that he intended to do so.

Curzon's policy was concerned not only with the general reform of the States, but also with the Government's foreign relations, as thought of building up Indian frontier defences. His policy in relation to the Thullia States was in line with the policy pursued by the Government of India in 1900 and put into practice by the permanent appointment of a Resident at the Court of Jammu and Kashmir on the northern frontier of India.

1. cere.18.1900(17th), II, ii, p. 157, 1907(15th) IX, ii, p. 127.
2. cere.18.1900(17th), II, ii, p. 157, 1907(15th) IX, ii, p. 127.
4. cere.18.1900, no. 328 (4 Sept.) para 663, vol. 11, p. 504.
6. Before 1900, the Resident 'as an officer on special duty', stayed only for a part of the year in the State, yet early in 1900 it had been decided not to appoint a political officer (residing permanently) at the Maharaja's court. In 1901, the Government recommended the appointment of a whole-time Resident. So did Lyttelton (in view of the Maharaja's reluctance) 18th July 1900, note, 29 May 1903, para 4.
Curzon was convinced of the increasing need for expert vigilance and alert supervision for the political regeneration of the Indian state. In July 1891, he took also particular note, in that connection, of the unchecked activities of Russian agents. They were found to have crossed the eastern frontier almost unnoticed in the vicinity of the states under the provincial charge. He brought that to the notice of Salisbury and the Viceroy, Governor of Bengal. The latter, quite unlike Mackworth, shared Curzon's views as to the utility in the system of control exercised by the Provincial Authorities.

Here was, as Curzon observed, "not another Country or Government in the world which enacted a system so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most important sphere of activity the barrier not of a subordinate official but of a subordinate Government." As the Viceroy of India, he and he alone was ultimately responsible for the conduct of all the States and Chiefs under the Provincial Authorities, as such, he could not, as he himself pointed out, "throw on to the shoulders of the local government the misdeemours for which the Government of India may have had no initial responsibility, but for which it will not at the har of public opinion escape the final blame."}

Curzon asserted that he had no particular fondness for centralisation. He had, as he privately wrote to Salisbury, "not the least

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1. EC, extracts from Major Daly's note (on the proposed reorganisation of the Political Department), 4 Mar. 1902, paras 22-23, 32, vol 49, pp 4-6.
desire in the world to centralise". ¹ No doubt in certain cases for
instance, in those of education and archaeology he wanted, as he himself
admitted, "to recover for the Supreme Government the independence of
authority and control which it had falsely abdicated". ²

Most of the provincial Governments had been, he maintained,
growing more and more accustomed to centralise powers in their own
hands even in important political matters requiring the attention of
the Government of India itself. ³ The existing system had resulted
in what he called "centralisation of the pettiest and most exasperating
description". ⁴ All that he stood for was systematization and co-
ordination rather than centralisation. ⁵ "I would point out", he
said in a speech in the Legislative Council on 30 March, 1904, "that
efficiency of administrative control is not centralisation, though
it is often mistaken for it". "Centralisation", he further added,
"is the absorption by a central body of powers or privileges hitherto
enjoyed, or capable if created, of being exercised, by subordinate
bodies". and he firmly added: "I acknowledge no such tendency". ⁶

The same facts he also put before Hamilton who, even
though not differing from Curzon over the issue, was

¹ PLCH, 3 Jan.1901, vol.xix, p.3.
⁴ PLCH, 3 Jan.1901, supra, p.4.
⁵ SLCH, 30 Sept.1905, vol.iv, p.159. PLCH, 28 June, 16 Aug. 1899,
vol.xvi, pp.176-7; 12 Sept. 1900, vol.xvii, pp.388-9; 16 June 1901,
vol.xx, p.179.
⁶ LCII(sS), 30 Mar.1904, p.134.
prone to share the scepticism of the members of the India Council on the subject of centralisation. "If I find", he told Hamilton, "that the control of Local Governments involves bad administration while the supervision or interference of the Supreme Government involves good, then I have no hesitation in recommending the supervision of the former by the latter". And he concluded: "But for centralisation per se I have no intrinsic affection".

1. CLII, (33), 30 Mar. 1904, p. 734.
THE EDUCATIONAL NEEDS AND PROBLEMS
OF THE INDIAN PRINCES AND CHIEFS

In dealing with the educational needs of the Princes and Chiefs Cur-
sen had an essentially conservative attitude. He had little intention of
departing from the Government's existing policy of refraining from any
interference with the States' own educational systems. He was, however,
concerned with the special facilities for the education of the young
Princes and Chiefs in the Chiefs' Colleges in different parts of India.

There were a comparatively limited number of States which could be
readily integrated with the Government's own institutions for the general
purpose of (educational) reviews and reports. These were the States of San-
tur, Cambay, Cutch, Kathiawar, Mahi Kantha, Palanpur, Rewa Kantha, Surat
Agency, Janjira, Jawahar, Savantvadi, Akalkot, Savamur, Bhor, Khundesh Agency,
Dera, Kolhapur, Khairpur (Sindh), Orissa Tributary Mahals, Manipur, Baster
Kanker, Mandgaon, Khairgarh, Makrai, Chindadan, Kawardha, Sakti and Raigarh.

Most of the important States which had, besides various educational institu-
tions, also not less than 16 colleges affiliated to the Provincial Universi-
ties, had their own system of control and inspection. However, many States

2Parl. Ps.1909(cmd.4635) lxiii,Education of Chiefs and Nobles, pp.247-51
3Parl. Ps.1909(cmd.4635) lxiii,Education of Chiefs and Nobles, pp.247-51
4Parl. Ps.1909(cmd.4635) lxiii,Education of Chiefs and Nobles, pp.247-51
5Parl. Ps.1909(cmd.4635) lxiii,Education of Chiefs and Nobles, pp.247-51
for instance, Junagarh and Chavnavar in Kathiawar and Kolhapur in the Bombay Presidency, utilised the inspecting agencies of adjacent provinces. As a result of that, there were at the opening of the present century as many as 9,616 educational institutions which, though maintained by the states, were under government inspection. Of that number, 2,400 with over 164,000 students belonged to the Bombay States; 599 with 33,400 students to the Central Provinces’ states and about 674 with 18,000 students to the states in Orissa and Bengal. The inspection officers of such minor states as those in the Kathiawar area and the Central Provinces were directly responsible to the political agent.1

Apart from the general educational institutions, there were quite a number of special schools, for the education of the children of India’s territorial aristocracy and magnates.2 Besides serving more or less as feeders to the chiefs’ colleges they had their own distinct existence which Curzon did not mean should be either merged with or confused with the latter.3 Though Curzon did not intend to underrate the importance of the nobles’ schools and other institutions of the sort, he was far more interested in attending to the needs of the Chiefs and their Colleges. He was primarily concerned in speeding up the progress and development of the Chiefs’ Colleges which he kept strictly distinct from such other ancillary institutions as the

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1. Parl. Rs. 1904 (Cmd. 169) xv, Fourth quinquennial review, paras 127-30
In India, namely, the Maharajah College, Rajkot; Mayo College, Ajmer; Lady College, Indore and McLeish College, Lahore. It was comparatively recent origin, having been, as Curzon remarked, "the growth entirely of the last thirty years".

Curzon’s keen interest in the Chiefs’ Colleges was considerably due to the fact that he was himself a product of the English Public school system upon which the former were modelled in India. The Chiefs’ Colleges were founded mainly on principles similar to those underlying the public schools in England. The colleges were, as he observed, intended to give to the rising generation of the young princes and chiefs "an education that shall enable them to hold their own in a world of constant change and ever-increasing competition". Their main and primary object was "to fit the young Chiefs and Princes of India, physically, morally and intellectually for the responsibilities that lie before them" — i.e., "nearly, honourable and cultured servants of society, worthy of the high station that awaited them".

Despite his keen interest in educational policy, Curzon could not achieve much during the first two years of his administration. Many of his policies were interrupted by the outbreak of the South African war and the natural calamities of famine and pestilence. Even though imposed, Curzon made some progress during these two years. As early as 4 November 1903, he arranged for the publication of his views in...
In the resolution, he included some positive directions for the Local Governments on the need of enquiring into the principles underlying the relation between private enterprise and State expenditure. The resolution was a pointer towards greater uniformity in the courses of study up to the level of secondary education. The Chiefs' Colleges did not fare any better than the other secondary schools, displaying sharp and wide disparity in their prescribed texts and courses of study. In the circumstances, the resolution was an indication, as Curzon remarked, "on one sincere desire to secure local unity of action". The use of decisive action indicating the Government's own authority to local educational bodies was reiterated in still another resolution of 8 February 1900. However, apart from such resolutions, Curzon, in the meantime, also spoke his mind on the scope and nature of the duties and responsibilities entrusted to the Chiefs through the Chiefs' Colleges. He dealt at length on none of his ideas concerning the Chiefs' Colleges during the course of his visits to the Aitchison College in April 1900 and the Rajkumar College Rajkot, in November 1900.
It was not until the onslaughts of plague and famine had somewhat subsided that Curzon found it possible to convene an educational conference at Simla in the first week of September 1901.\(^1\) One of the regular features of the conference at Simla was that it did not, of deliberate purpose, deal with the problems of the chiefs' Colleges.\(^2\) The conference served as the opening and, as Curzon himself remarked, the first act in the real campaign for educational reforms in India.\(^3\) Even omitted from its discussions the problems of Public School education in India, it paved the way for a special and separate conference on the chiefs' Colleges.\(^4\)

Curzon's specific interest in the Chiefs' Colleges had gained force since the sanction in July 1901 for the formation of the Indian Civil Service.\(^5\) As the cadets were to be recruited mainly from the Chiefs' Colleges, he had, before the corps' formation in December 1901, initiated a close enquiry into the existing system and condition of the Colleges.\(^6\) Apart from the enquiry, his own personal visits in the meanwhile to some of the Chiefs' Colleges had exposed their shortcomings which were already being pointed out by the press in India.\(^7\)

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...the circumstances the manifold weaknesses of their existing system of education had come to be at large, as Curzon remarked, "recognised and deplored" by the different authorities on the subject. 1

While intending to carry out the original policy and purpose for which the Chisel Colleges had been founded, Curzon had no exaggerated notions of educational reform. It would be, he held, "a futile and arrogant boast" if somebody was to claim that the educational systems in social institutions could be corrected straightway. Education, whether pertaining to the people or the princes, as he understood it, was something that could hardly admit of any last and ultimate reform in the literal sense of the term. 2 "There is equal scope", he pointed out in his last Educational Conference on 20 September 1905, "for educational reformers, now, tomorrow, next day and always". And he tactfully added: "Education is never reformed. It may advance, or retreat stationarily, or recede. It may also advance on right lines or on wrong lines". All that he proposed to do was to save it from, he said, "the wrong track" and instead to give it "a fresh start" in line with the requirements of the time. 3

Some of the most essential elements for the harmonious development of a society, which characterised the the English Public Schools

1. Ibid., 31 Jan., 1905, p. 49.
2. Ibid., 20 Sept., 1905, p. 559.
3. Ibid., vol. iv, pp. 31-2.
for instance, a student at any of the Public Schools was under educational influences from morning till night. His house-master, who was a person really responsible for his upbringing, taught him not merely by tasks and lessons, but by watching and training his combined moral and intellectual growth. In England, it was the house-master rather than the class-teacher who was, as a rule, responsible for the final case in which a boy was ultimately turned out. In the case however of the Chiefs' Colleges in India, just the reverse plan was normally the case. The student's career in the College, Curzon observed, was narrower and circumscribed, having been divided into watertight compartments for stated intervals of the day or night. The student was brought into contact with the teachers during only the few hours of class teaching. The total number of hours varied from as little as 23 hours per week at the Colleges in Lahore, Indore, and Rajput to a maximum of 65 at the Mayo College Ajmer. For the rest of the time the boy was left to his own devices in the boarding-house with persons who were generally not members of the teaching staff. In the circumstances there was, as Curzon remarked, a complete loss of all "the higher advantages that result from a simple existence with an undivided aim."

The Chiefs' Colleges, which were all military, had some peculiar features of their own, relating chiefly to their boarding-house, that distinguished them from other educational institutions. The relatively high rank and larger means of the boys caused the

2. Ibid.,(33), 27 Jan. 1902, p.255.
resentment house life in the Chieftain Colleges to differ from other educational institutions in many respects. The boys had, for instance, apart from their richly furnished rooms, their own personal guardians and tutors, besides an establishment of servants with horses and carriages. However, it was more than anything else, the arrangement in regard to the employment of private tutors and guardians that presented the most striking contrast with the English Public Schools.

The arrangements for private supervision and tuition, of which Carson evidently disapproved, had a peculiar character at the Ajikot College in particular. At the college in Ajikot there were no private tutors, they being, for all practical purposes, replaced by musahibs who accompanied each boy to the college. The musahibs were often some relatives (usually the boys' maternal uncles) or some retainer of the nizam. They were somewhat different from the retainer, who, as in the Sagar College, had some connection with the staff (which had at least two of them) as resident managers of the boarding houses. At the Ajikumar College, the musahibs were generally attached to the boys' own rooms, where they were required to be present when the boys were not in their classes or playgrounds. They were for the most part responsible for the establishment and economy of the boys to whom they were attached. However, apart from them, no private tutors were allowed in the Ajikumar College except with the special recommendation of the principal. In the Daly College there was similarly little provision for resident tutors, which only the ruling which were allowed to have. However most of the boys could have non-resident tutors who were allowed in during the morning and

\[1\] Expl. Int. 1904 (edn. 1st) supra, paras 566, 570, pp. 185, 192.
evening, to help them in their studies. 1

Along with the methods and courses of study at the Chiefs' Colleges, Curzon also took note of their general administrative system and discipline. Unlike the public schools, the admission to the Colleges was too easy, being determined mostly as a matter of right based on rank and position rather than basic fitness for the purpose. 2 Even in the case of their most highly reputed College at Ajmer which attracted boys from all over India, there were no educational tests for those intending to enter. It took its students mainly from such institutions as the nobles' Schools of Jodhpur, Kota, Alwar and Bikaner.

Apart from the want of any standardisation of tests for admission there was also a glaring lack of uniformity in the duration of the courses at the different Colleges. In the Mayo College at Ajmer, the curriculum extended over 6 years; in the Aitchison College 8 to 10 years; in the Dalm College about 9 years, while at the Rajkot College 6 to 7 years. Again, the average age of boys entering the Colleges was not uniform. 3 The average age of boys entering the Mayo College had been 12½ years, while that of leaving 17½ years. In the Aitchison College, boys of any age were received. However, the average age of boys on entering the College there was about 11 years, and 15 to 20 years for the completion of their studies. At Rajkot the average age on entry was about 10 years and on leaving about 18 years. At the Dalm College Indore, boys entered at any age from 10 to 17 years and left at between 20 and 23. Until recently in some

1. Parl. Ps. 1904, supra, paras 566, 567.
4. Ibid.
cases, the boys did not, as a rule, join the college before the age
of 10. And again in many cases there was almost invariably the pros-
pect of their being taken away at the age of 15 (when they attained
majority) for purposes of either succession or share in the states' 
amministration.\footnote{1}

Due to the want of necessary interest and co-operation on the
part of Indian princes and chiefs, there was a relative paucity of
students in the colleges. The number of students fluctuated and the attitude of Indian princes and chiefs had, of late
years, however, been severely affected adversely by the outbreak of natural calamities.
The recent waves of famine and pestilence sweeping through their
territories had strained the resources of the states.\footnote{3}

Though they received some government help, the colleges were dependent upon their
resources and private endowments. The cost of board and lodging
in the colleges entailed heavy expenditure. The situation, as
seen above, was by no means such as to tempt the Indian rulers and
chiefs to send their children to the colleges in any large numbers.\footnote{4}

In the Mayo college the annual cost of maintenance and education
was about Rs. 3,350 for a ruling chief or heir-apparent, Rs. 2,040 for
a king's son, and Rs. 700 for a boy with a horse. The cost of
board in the Aligarh college Lahore varied according to the mode of
living, especially in the case of Hindu boys who dined separately or
individually.\footnote{5}

The total average cost annually for a Mohammedan was
Rs. 301, and for a Hindu boy not less than Rs. 1,300. In the case of
\footnote{1} \cite{Parl.1904, end p.164, Fourth Quinquennial Review, para 502, p.111.}
\footnote{2} \cite{Jahangir, 1900, vol.ii, p.411.}
\footnote{3} \cite{Parl.1904, op.cit., paras 562, 76.}
\footnote{4} \cite{Parl.1904, 27 Jan. 1902, no.101, op.cit.}
\footnote{5} \cite{Parl.1904, end p.164, Fourth Quinquennial Review, pp.164, 188, 111.}
wards of Government studying at the Rajkot College, the cost of board and tuition including all the charges for term times and holiday varied from Rs.2,200 to Rs.5,000. At Indore, the average cost for boys living in the college was about Rs.2,250.

The general attitude of indifference and hesitation among the princes and Chiefs in respect of the education of their sons in the colleges had serious repercussions. By the beginning of 1902, the Nalgo College after thirty years of its existence had only about 60 students, though it had accommodation for 140 boys. The maximum number ever admitted there had not been more than 70, while the total number on the other hand of princely and noble families in Rajputana was not less than 375. Similar was the situation at the Rajkumar College at Rajkot, which had produced, however, that prince of Cricketers, Shri Ranjit Singhji. Even though its area of recruitment, as Curzon observed, comprised the whole of Bombay, Presidency, with nearly 350 separate states, the college had yet only 40 pupils on its roll. The situation was not very different at the Daly College, Indore. That college, which had absorbed the neighbouring institution at Howgong, and was meant for some hundreds of Chiefs in the Central India Agency, had still only 16 students in all.

4. IFF (intt) June 1899, no. 22, 10 Nov. 1898; June 1899, no. 1, 23 Oct 1898; July 1901, no. 58; 3 July 1901; Nov. 1902, no. 101, op.cit. 27. Jan 1902, para i, see (for the principal houses in the Agency), C.E. Board, The ruling Families and Persons in the Central India Agency.
which, though founded in 1857 had a history going as far back as 1647, was still not in a condition any better than that of other kindred institutions. From the year of its foundation to the beginning of the century it had not, despite a vast number of ruling and aristocratic families in the Punjab, received more than 230 boys in all. And even though capable of accommodating about as many as 150, it had yet, as Curzon noticed, a paltry total of only 70 boys.  

With a small number of boys in the colleges which, unlike the four principal Public Schools in England having a total strength of nearly 2,500 boys, had not even as much as 200 students, it was hardly possible to have, Curzon remarked, “that perpetual play of one character upon another that follows from participation in a crowded society” while the pupils therein were too few to compete among themselves, also the institutions were too small to compete with each other. The result was that they had been lacking “the vitalising influences that produce esprit de corps and that give fibre to character for which the English Public Schools were so renowned.”

Curzon took a practical step towards effecting what he described as “a great and notable reform” by convening a conference on the Chieftain Colleges at Calcutta on 27 January 1902. 

1. Originating as a school at Ambala, it was at that time meant only for wards of court, as such it contained the germs for its subsequent development as the chiefs’ College, Lahore.
2. C. H. Beeley, a Record of the Mitchison College, pp.1-2, 4-5, see (for the chief and notable families of the Punjab) C. H. Griffith, the Punjab Chiefs, P. W. H. Hamilton, Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab.
3. HR(Intl.) Nov. 1900, no.101, op. cit., p.4.
4. HR(Intl.) Nov. 1902, supra, pp.171, 179, HR(Intl.) Nov. 1902, nos.103-105, parts 1-iii.
and its sittings for four days. It was attended by numerous authorities and experts—the Government's own officials and also non-officials from almost all over India.¹ The Conference, which was the first of its kind and was followed two years afterwards by another at Ajmer, had Curzon himself as its President.² While presiding over it, Curzon tried to settle the main lines of its proceedings, which were formulated mainly in accord with his suggestions in his inaugural address.³

Curzon did not think it desirable to democratise the Chiefs' Colleges by enlarging their scope of admission. He did not propose to imitate the ideals of English Public Schools like Eton which in spite of its aristocratic character was organised on a distinctly democratic basis. There was nothing in such institutions to prevent the sons of the sons of parvenus from mixing with the scions of the land's nobility on a footing of social equality. The reproduction of such democratic features was still not possible in a conservative country like India.⁴ Class distinctions in India, as Curzon observed, were "much sharper and more stubborn" than in the West. These had been ingrained in the traditions of the people and indurated by prescriptions of religion and race, with feelings whose roots were intertwined in the depths of human nature. So he did not want to liberalise the Chiefs' Colleges which he preferred to "keep firmly to their original object" as "seminaries for aristocratic classes".⁵ He emphatically pointed that out in the

² LAC, GGIC to the SOST, 13 July 1905, para 27, vol. />, pp. 10, 11.
Conferences at Calcutta when he stated:

"I would frankly admit that a Rajkumar College rests, as its name implies, upon class distinction, and if anyone is found to deprecate such a basis, I would reply that it is neither an ignoble nor a strange distinction, that it is familiar in all countries, that it is founded upon sentiment inherent in human nature, that it is congenial to the East, and that it is compatible with the finest fruits of enlightenment and civilisation." 1

Curzon laid special stress on a rigid distinction between the courses of the Chief's Colleges and those of the Provincial Education Department and Universities. 2 The colleges and their courses of study were meant not to turn out great scholars, but to encourage the young Princes to acquire and develop healthy and manly habits befitting their position. 3 So he wanted them to have their own distinct system of education rather than follow the tendencies of the Provincial education systems which had of late much influenced their courses and curricula. 4

Curzon recognised the need for improving their curricula and staff. 5 He frankly admitted that in almost every college, so far, too much had been spent upon bricks and mortar and too little on the quality of tuition. 6 The main object that he had in his view was, as he earlier pointed out, first in a speech at Gwalior, to provide what he called "business-like and practical" education conforming with the

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2 ibid. IPP(Int. Nov. 1902, no. 101, supra, para 2, p.5; Nov. 1902, no. 103, 'Notes taken at the Conference', nos. 29-32; Aug. 1903, no. 82, G31C the SOSI, 16 July 1903, para 3(vi), p.4.
7 IPP(Int.) Aug. 1903, no.73, encl.I, para 2, pp. 6-7; no.82, 16 July 1903.
needs and characters of the students as well as of the institutions. He wanted the young ruler to have an education necessarily different from that of petty chiefs, thakors and jagirdars studying in the colleges.\(^1\) He wanted to provide him with an "all-round education" in subjects like history, geography, mathematics, political economy, to save him from "degenerating into either a dilettante or a sluggard". Similarly he wanted rich land-owners and zamindars, to set out on their future careers with an education suited to their needs.\(^2\)

In the discussions that followed, Curzon set the pace for a thorough analysis of the needs of the Chiefs' Colleges.\(^3\) Possible improvements were introduced by him in no less than 43 separate heads for discussion. The items for discussion were further enlarged into about 155 points in terms of different suggestions and queries covering exhaustively the needs and wants of the entire system.\(^4\) In the circumstances the Conference, as Curzon himself subsequently remarked, "threshed out pretty well every suggestion great and small", concerning Public School education in India.\(^5\)

In view of the diminution in both the general standard and strength of the Daly College at Indore, the Conference resolved to reduce the status of the College to that of a feeder school.\(^6\) It also stressed

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2. UCII(SS), 17 Jan. 1902, p.255.
3. IPP(Intl.) Nov. 1902, nos.102-03, \textit{op.cit.}, Aug. 1903, no.82, 16 July 1903.
5. LCII(SS) 19 Nov. 1902, p.260.
6. SBI, SOSI to GGIC, 20 Nov. 1903, Pl.no.107, para 3, vol. 64, p.551. IPP(Intl.) Nov. 1902, no.103, \textit{supra}, pt.1, no.41, p.29; Aug.1903, no.82, 16 July 1903, paras 1, 11.
the need for an adequate and suitably paid European and Indian staff for colleges. It recommended the employment, in all, of 13 European officers in the Indian educational service at an average expenditure of about Rs.11,000 a month, and 22 Indians costing a little over Rs.5,000 per month. It also decided on the abolition of dual control in the system of management such as had been existing in the Mayo College and Hutchison College. It encouraged the idea that management should not be divorced from tuition, and that in the case of each college there should be a single head or principal with, if needed, a vice-principal. It also encouraged the employment of European members of the teaching staff in charge of the boarding-houses and the elimination of private agencies like musabibis and matamidas. The Conference encouraged the formation of a distinct system of examining bodies and inspecting authorities. It recommended some changes in curricula keeping in view the prospects of the students' future vocations and employment which until then had been vague and limited. The changes were deemed essential, for, as Curzon himself pointed out, it was no use turning out from the colleges "precisely the same type of educational product... manufactured by the thousand elsewhere". The improvements

1. In accordance with the principles laid down for the judicial and executive branches of the civil service in India, the education department had a division of service called the Indian education Service. It was a superior kind of service, made up of persons appointed in England under the powers vested in the Secretary of State for India. It was distinct from the provincial education service which comprised persons appointed in India under powers vested in the local governments. The educational service had its basis in the Governor of India's resolution dated 25 July 1896, Parl.Ps.1899 (cmd.9190) by op.cit., paras 17, 20, 29, pp.10-3, 52-8.


4. IPR(intl) 19 Nov.1902, p.262. IPR(intl) Nov.1902, no.106, supra.

5. IPR(intl) Nov.1902, no.105, op.cit., pt.i, nos.5,42, pp.6,30.

processes in the courses of study at the Chiefs' Colleges were to be aimed exclusively to fit in with the requirements of prospective students and careers for state, administration, estate management, military employment in and outside the cadet corps, civil posts, and political service. 1

Apart from the approval of the above authorities, Curzon also had the added support from the local governments and administrations. 2

The details of the conference were sent round to various important religious authorities in India, in the government of India's circular letter of 2 October 1902. 3 The consensus of opinion resulted in delaying the projected reforms of the colleges. It was, for instance, generally felt that whereas the potash could be dispensed with in the case of certain students, yet they could not be eliminated in the case of others, etc. They were deemed indispensable for the Hindus to conduct their requirements for their daily puja (holy bath) and ann (water). In view of the opinions received, Curzon also dropped the condition of a uniform scale of fees in all the colleges. 4

In almost all other essential respects there was fundamental unity on the part of all sides, including the appointment of European house-masters, the exclusion of lecturers and a common system of examinations. 5

The real importance in that connection was the idea of appointing as the inspector of colleges, an officer holding the substantive appointment of director of public instruction, aided by a local inspector.

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... decisions were to be visited, it was decided, by the same Inspector as previously had the appointment should be retained, if possible, for an individual for at least 3 years. It was he who was to be consulted by the Government of India concerning the common curriculum, examination, etc., for the colleges. He was to confer with the governing bodies and officials of the colleges.

The conference at Calcutta was followed a couple of years after by another one at Agra in March 1905. That Conference could be attended by Curzon (who was shortly to leave for England) but was of a more representative character than the earlier Conference in respect of the strength of its delegates from the States. Besides official officers and other educational experts, it had as many as 11 representatives of ruling princes and chiefs from Central India, Madura, Assy and the Nizam. The rulers were those of Wadiar, Uprachha, Bikaner, Chunar, Burair, Balrampur, Kotah, Cutch, Gondal and Shamlapore. I had also on it the viceroy of Agra, but the seer of Naroda, who had been invited to attend, could not do so on account of other preoccupations.

The Conference at Agra, presided over by Mr. H. B. Hartindale, the then Governor-General, Rajputana, carried Curzon's ideas and

Resolutions approving of the Government's latest measures, one of its important decisions had regard to changes in the constitution of the Mayo College, Ajmer. The changes that it envisaged were designed to ensure, along with the Government's centralised control, the interest and co-operation of the princes and chiefs in matters educational.

The Conference decided to include in the General Council of the College members from States outside Rajputana. With the Viceroy still as its president, the Council was to comprise the two agents to the governor-General in Rajputana and Central India, three political officers each from the two agencies nominated by the agents, the Commissioner of Ajmer and the principal of the College, besides such other officers as the Viceroy might see fit to nominate. Apart from having also the 17 rulers of Rajputana, there was to be ample provision for the exercise of the viceroy's power of nomination to include Chiefs from other provinces. He was to have the power to nominate such Chiefs from places other than the Bombay presidency, the Punjab and the North-Western Frontier Province before being nominated to the Council the rulers as such were expected to have qualified themselves for membership, by having contributed a sum of not less than Rs. 10,000 to the Mayo or Daly College, besides having sent also a child or ward to the college at Ajmer.

apart from encouraging the direct participation of the ruling Chiefs in the administration of the colleges, the Conference at Ajmer.

1. Ibid. EFF & FP, June 1904, no. 5, 28 Apr. 1904, para 2. Parl. vs. 1904 (CDS. 463) supra, pp. 367-8.
2. Parl. vs. 1909 (CDS. 463) supra, para 759. IFP(Intl.) July 1904, no. 51, 5 Apr. 1904, paras 7-10.
3. EFF & FP, June 1904, no. 5, 28 Apr. 1904, para 2. IFP(Intl.) July 1904, 5 Apr. 1904, supra.
4. Ibid. Ibid. May 1904, nos. 452-3, 29 Mar. 1904. IFP(Intl.)
laid stress on the need for building up closer integration and unity amongst the alumni of the institutions with a sense of common attachments and achievements. That could be promoted not merely through the boarding-houses, with their codes of discipline based on the care and choice of their house-masters and Native assistants. There was also the need, the Conference brought out, for instituting together with a common curriculum and uniformity of instruction and inspection some officially recognised diplomas and distinctions for the students. The progress of students for that purpose could be tested, the Conference resolved, annually in March or April, under the superintendence of the Inspector of Chiefs' Colleges. Their annual tests were to comprise an oral and practical as well as a written examination. The Conference, whose various recommendations and findings were soon afterwards accepted by the Government, adhered rather too closely to Curzon's own ideas on the issue. It laid particular stress on the fact that the diplomas were to be issued under the authority of the Government of India itself. However it recommended that application should be made by the Government of India to the Universities to recognise its diplomas as equivalent to the Matriculation examination. In the circumstances, the Government's proposal, submitted soon afterwards, for the recognition of its own academic awards for the colleges came to be accepted by almost all the Universities in India.

The Conference resolved to reduce the paraphernalia of personal servants and attendants. It also decided that while the minimum

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age of a boy at entry should be 8, that for leaving should ordinarily be 16, varying up to 21 according to the individual's attainments. However it was to be only in very special cases that a boy might be allowed to remain till he was 21. This was related to Curzon's policy for the formation of the Imperial Cadet Corps. The Cadets had their preliminary training ordinarily at the Chiefs' Colleges each with his own mounted corps. And it was normally at the age of 10, after the completion of their basic studies, that the most promising ones from amongst them were enrolled for 2-3 years in the Cadet Corps. The limitations on the age of the boys in the Chiefs' Colleges provided a strong support for Curzon's ideas for raising the age of the majority in the case of Indian rules from 18 to 21.

One of the most striking results of the Ajmer Conference was the decision to retain the institution at Indore intact as a Chiefs' College. The Resolution met with widespread and enthusiastic support from the Princes and Chiefs of Central India. They promised handsome donations and undertook to send their boys there after its re-constitution on the lines of other Chiefs' Colleges. Within about a couple of years, since the earlier Conference had recommended its dissolution they raised a sum amounting to not less than Rs.1,103,650 giving it a

1. IPP(Int'l.) July 1904, no.56 of 1904, op.cit., paras 14-23.
2. IPP(Int'l.) Aug.1905, no.52, 16 July 1905, para 5(xvii).
7. IPP(Int'l.)Nov.1902, no.103, op.cit., Pt.1, no.2, pp.4-6, no.107, 23 Oct.1902, Aug.1902, no.82, 16 July 1902, para 2; July 1905, no.86;
new lease of life. In the circumstances it was proposed to rebuild the college on an altogether new site presented by the Indore Nawab at an estimated cost of Rs. 700,000 providing for about 150 boys. Out of its endowment fund, Rs. 250,000 were set aside towards the cost of the new buildings, the balance of Rs. 450,000 being met from imperial revenues. The remainder of the endowment was to be invested so as to produce an income of Rs. 35,000 a year; while the balance of its annual estimated expenditure of Rs. 75,000 was to be met from imperial subvention. The scheme had the full support of Curzon who, only a few months before his final departure from India, had the satisfaction of seeing the foundation stone of the college at Indore laid on 4 November 1905.

Curzon recognised the need for financial help from the Government of India for the proper maintenance of the chiefs' colleges in India. He admitted that if "additional machinery or readjustment of the existing mechanism" was really essential the Government of India could be reasonably expected to contribute to the outlay. He undertook to provide an additional sum of Rs. 100,000 a year to improve their organisation and system of education. This was in line with Curzon's general policy of providing handsome educational grants throughout the provinces at large. Since March 1901 he had, for instance, arranged

1. ibid. 361 to 410, 6 Sept. 1905, Pl. no. 57, vol. 68, pp. 449-50. Par. 51, 100, 103, 106. Supra, para 762.


3. NEI (111.) Nov. 1904, no. 105, op. cit., Question 37, p. 27; no. 106, para 5. Par. 51, 101, 102, 103, 106. Supra, 26 Nov. 1902, p. 218.


provide rents amounting annually to Rs.4,000,000 or nearly 270,000, in addition to the ordinary educational assignments in the provincial settlements. 1 He had been rather inclined to believe that any increased contribution of the sort had its own popular appeal, far more impressive than could ever be secured even by some reduction of taxation. "Any increased sum for education", he wrote, "from Rs. 30-40 or 50 lakhs upwards...would be received with an enthusiasm in the country greater than that which would be excited by any reduction...however sweeping". 2 Educational reforms were moreover, as he understood, "mainly a matter of money". He explained the Government's liberal policy in relation to his own long-range views regarding educational expenditure during one of his speeches in the Legislative Council on 30 March 1904. He would like, he stated, "to go further and to provide for a serious and sustained expenditure upon educational improvements extending over a series of years". 3 And accordingly during his own period the total amount of increased expenditure on education was calculated to exceed Rs.20,000,000 or £1,400,000. 4

In both their origin and constitution, the Chiefs' Colleges, though aided by the Government were yet anything but the Government's own educational institutions as the Government Schools. Each of the Chiefs' Colleges had its own funds and endowments, subscribed mainly by the rulers and partly by the Government with subventions from the Imperial revenues. The Mayo College, had, for instance, its own endowment fund of Rs.754,200, while the Aitchison College had similar

provision from a fund yielding an annual interest of about Rs. 9,000.¹
Again the Rajkumar College at Rajkot had equally generous and handsome
contributions from the rulers with a general endowment fund of Rs. 300,000.
Similarly with the recent reconstitution and reorganisation of the Daly
College, its original reserve fund of about Rs. 24,000 had been raised and
built up into a sum amounting to about Rs. 1,200,000.² The fund for its
maintenance which Curzon personally much appreciated was contributed chiefly
by some of the rich rulers in Central India like those of Gwalior, Rewa
and Indore.³

Curzon's policy concerning the Chiefs' Colleges was related to
emphasis on building up the character and importance of the Indian ruling
class. He maintained that the Chiefs' Colleges were by no means intended
to Anglicise the rising generation of the young Princes and Chiefs. The
Anglicised Indian, or "sham-Englishman", as he called him, was no more at-
tractive to him than the Indianised Englishman. For both, as he himself re-
fured to his own impressions, were "hybrides of an unnatural type".⁴ The
students were, of course, expected and helped to learn the English language,
and to become sufficiently familiar with English customs, literature, scient
modes of thought, standards of truth and honour.⁵ However the Government has
little desire to emancipate students from old fashioned prejudices or
superstitions at the cost of denationalisation. The main purpose

³Ibid. GWGI, 5 Nov. 1900, p.337. IP1(Intl.) July 1905, no.96, 24 Apr. 1905, paras 3-4.
⁴LG11(55), supra, p.245. LCC, Curzon to His Majesty, 19 June 1901.
⁵Ibid. Parl.1904(cmd.2181) op. cit., para 569, p.187.
of their English education was to enable them, Curzon rather poignantly emphasised, "to hold their own in the world in which their lot will be cast, without appearing to be dullard or clowns". ¹

All that the Government expected of them was to give their States and people the benefit of enlightened and pure administration. The Government had no intention to press them to go beyond that. "Though educated in western curriculum", Curzon affirmed, "they should still remain Indians, true to their own beliefs, their own traditions and their people". He fully recognised that it was not by imitation of English models but by "adaptation of eastern prescriptions to the western standards" that their education would help them to succeed and survive. ² Moreover he maintained that in order to be a really good Indian ruler, the latter must learn about his own people, "know them, move in and out among them, and typify all that is best in their national character and traditions". A successful ruler had "to combine the merits of the East and West in a single blend" of his personality, so as to be at the same time "a liberal and conservative, each in the best sense of the term". ³ "You will be remembered in history", he pointed out to them in his famous speech in a Durbar at Sialkot, "if you earn remembrance, not because you copied the habits of an alien country, but because you benefited the inhabitants of your own". ⁴ "The Indians are", he had also quite earlier pointed out (with special reference to his States' policy as a whole) "becoming educated and will not tolerate a wide abyss between British administr

¹. SVOGI, 5 Nov.1900, p.559.
⁴. rLCH, 6 Nov.1900, vol.ii, p.407. SVOGI, supra, 5 Nov.1900.
tion and native administration. 1

Curzon did not encourage Indian rulers to send their boys to English public schools. 2 apart from entailing heavy expenditure with adverse financial and political implications, their foreign stay and education was impairing, rather than improving, their national tone and conduct. 3 Deterioration of this sort was shown in the recent past by the low standards of moral and academic achievement of the boys, for instance, from States like Rampur, Kuch Behar and Baroda. 4 However, Curzon was careful in not unduly interfering with the desire of chiefs, like those of Cutch, Kapurthala, Shahpura, Bariya, Udrangadra, to send their boys abroad. 5 He followed the same principle in refraining, on the other hand, to press them to send their sons to the chiefs' colleges. 6 Still he had at any rate by 1904, his own views and policy in support of the educational facilities and institutions in India itself - all brought out specifically in a demi-official letter on the issue. 7 And he found substantial support in actual

5. I.P. (Int.), Jan. 1903, no. 9, 21 Jan. 1903; Nov. 1903, 3 Nov. 1903.
practice from his successor Lord Ampthill who described himself "in full personal agreement with Lord Curzon in this matter". 1 "Although I started my life with different opinions", Ampthill wrote to Lord Lamington, 2 the Governor of Bombay, "I have learnt from experience that the sojourn of Indian Princes and noblemen in England is attended by more evil than good results". 3 The same opinions were entertained equally by even the King himself who "fully enters into the Viceroy's views that the visit to Europe of these Princes are too frequent and prolonged and in consequence they neglect their duties in the States over which they rule". 4 However, the ruler of Kapurthala, who was keen nonetheless on going to England, managed to secure, during Curzon's absence, the recommendation of the Local Government to take his sons to English Public Schools. 5

The Native Press which had of late been fulminating against the Westernising of the young Princes and Chiefs was bound to support Curzon's policy, with its stress on their national calibre and Indian character. 6 But apart from that, his policy made a deep and effective impression on even some of the rulers who were the veritable champions of education at the Public Schools of England. 7

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1 LAC. Ampthill to Lamington, 21 May, 27 June 1904, vol. 36/1(i), pp. 36, 86.
2 He was rather inclined to think, mainly on the analogy of English parents and Public Schools at Home, that the Government's policy and practice as such would be a sort of 'unwarrantable' check upon the discretion of the individuals concerned. LAC, Lamington to Ampthill, 30 May 1904, vol. 36/1(i) p. 64.
3 LAC, Ampthill to Lamington, supra.
5 LAC, 21 May, 27 June 1904, supra.
Leaving aside the notorious Sikh ruler of Kapurthala who continued as usual with his ideas and plans for foreign trips, the Maharaja of Kuch Behar was the first to have, as Curzon observed, "announced his surrender". In May 1903, he asked that his eldest son (who had been at Eton and Oxford besides having been also in the Yeomanry and "a young buck about town") be enrolled in the Cadet Corps. The Maharaja at the same time further asked that another of his sons who also had been to Eton, be admitted to the Mayo College, Ajmer (whose President was Curzon himself). Curzon agreed to all that. "I am yielding to both the requests", Curzon wrote to Hamilton, "because I think it is in the interest both of the boys themselves and of the state, that they should be converted into healthy, manly and well-disciplined young Indians, if it is not too late, instead of being mere Anglicised copies of their father". Again on similar grounds Curzon consented as well to the Backwar's proposal for having the latter's son in the Cadet Corps along with others from the Chiefs' Colleges.

The submission of the two most outspoken critics of Curzon's views and policy concerning the Chiefs' Colleges was a compliment which Curzon had never expected. This was a clear testimony to the appreciable success, which his ideas and policy met with in India.

1. IFF(Intl.) Mar. 1905, no. 156, 7 Nov. 1904, no. 157, 12 Dec. 1904.
4. Ibid. IFF(Intl.) July 1904, no. 4, 20 June 1903.
5. IFF, 7 May 1903, supra, p. 136.
6. Ibid. LAC, Amthill to the King-Emperor, 16 June 1904, vol. 32(ii) p. 5. On account of his ill-health and heart disease (which necessitated consultation with a specialist in London) he was subsequently deemed not fit to join the Corps.
from the Princes and Chiefs in general. In the circumstances there was also a sharp and steady rise in the total number of boys attending the Chiefs' Colleges.\textsuperscript{1} That was particularly noticeable in the institutions at Ajmer, Indore and Lahore.\textsuperscript{2} By the end of Curzon's regime in India, the total strength of the students at the Mayo College rose to over 90 showing an increase of nearly 45 per cent.\textsuperscript{3} At the end of the academic session for 1906, there were as many as 143 boys on its rolls as against 60 at the beginning of 1902. Similarly at the Daly College Indore, the number of boys attending the college between 1905-6 rose from 33 to 50, while that at the Punjab's Aitchison College Lahore from 64 to 83.\textsuperscript{4}

The reformation in the educational organisation and system of the Chiefs' Colleges, for which he had the full support of Hamilton in particular, was essentially a practical measure for the political regeneration of the Indian ruling class.\textsuperscript{5} Their period of stay and education in the College was, Curzon held, "only one stage - though not the least important - in a life of public industry and usefulness".\textsuperscript{6} That was meant to make "better citizens and public servants" of those, who by virtue of their aristocratic rank seemed to him "both by birth and inheritance the natural pillars of the State".\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{1}LCC, Curzon to His Majesty, 9 Mar. 1904, vol. 136, pt. 11, p.114.
\textsuperscript{2}Parl.Pa. 1909(cmd.4635) supra, paras 762-5.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., LCII(SS) 17 Jan. 1903, p.253.
\textsuperscript{5}SDI, SOSI to GJC, 20 Nov. 1903, Pl.no.107, paras 2-4, vol. 64, pp. 531-32
\textsuperscript{6}LCII(SS), 19 Nov. 1902, p.262.
\textsuperscript{7}SULL, 1 Apr. 1899, p.121. SLCK, 19 Nov.1902, vol.iii, p.52, 54.
The Indian ruling class had little chance to aspire to any prominent share in the public and political life of the country so long as they were not prepared and equipped for the role.\(^1\) Some of the Indian rulers when appointed to high office with nothing but high birth to commend them had been dismal failures.\(^2\) Examples of such failures had been mentioned during the debates on the Indian Councils Act of 1892 which Curzon himself steered through Parliament. A very select member of the Indian ruling community, when brought into the Imperial Legislative Council had not been able to exert any influence save to expose the general unfitness of the class to which he belonged. Despite his distinguished position, he was found to be unable to either speak or even to understand a word of English.\(^3\) After the meeting a relative had asked the honourable member how he got on in the Council. "At first I found it very difficult", the latter had rather innocently disclosed, "but then there was the Governor-General who elected me; when he raised his hand I raised mine and when he put his hand down, I put down mine".\(^4\) A state of affairs like that which Hamilton understood, was but a sad commentary on the Indian ruling class, could not be overcome without intensive efforts for educational reform.\(^5\)

Curzon thought that the Indian princes and chiefs were capable of a leading part in the future of India as they had not lost their

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4. Parl.Dbs. 1892, (C) 28 Mar. op.cit., (The Maharaja had been selected from the United Provinces, then called the North Western Province).
popularity. To stabilise their position and rule as a class he wanted them to reach "alongside of knowledge instead of toiling helplessly and feebly behind it". He emphasised that quite unequivocally in the Conference on the Chiefs' Colleges as he unhesitatingly observed:

"The days are gone for ever when the ignorant and backward can sit in the seat of authority. The passionate cry of the 20th century, which is re-echoing through the Western world, is that it will not suffer dunces gladly. The prophets of the day are all inviting us to be strenuous and efficient. What is good for Europe is equally good for Asia, and what is preached in England will not suffer by being preached here".  

2. IFP (Intl.) Nov. 1902, no. 101, supra, para 5, p. 6.
territories of Berar. These differences had gradually developed into a controversy which found very prominent expression in the press both in India and England. This controversy, which also engaged the attention of Parliament, lasted from 1859 to 1926 with occasional breaks and revivals. Of its various underlying causes the most important ones were those related to the treaties of 1853 and 1860, besides the agreement of Berar concluded under Curzon in November 1902.

The year 1899 was a very momentous and significant one in the history of British relations with Hyderabad. It was during this year that valuable portions of the Nizam's dominions, which during the 18th century had been incorporated in the Mughal Empire under Berar, were lost to the State. The territories generally known as the assigned districts, slipped from the Nizam's hands into the vast


In the possession of Berar and the neighbouring districts of Nagpur, the British Government, it deserves to be remembered, has secured the finest cotton tracts which are known to exist in all the Continer of India, and thus has opened up a great additional channel of supply through which to make good a felt deficiency in the staple of one great branch of its manufacturing industry. Lord Dalhousie's Minute (reviewing his administration in India from Jan. 1848 to March 1850) 26 Feb. 1856, vide Parl. Papers 1856 (245) xliv, p. 9. Hyderabad Affairs, op. cit., p. 200.
expanses of the British possessions in India. It was the Treaty of 1853 that brought about the territorial change, under some circumstances of force and pressure which Hamilton thought had the colour of "a very questionable performance". The Nizam (Nasir-ud-Daulah), mainly on account of his heavy debts and inability to pay for the Hyderabad Contingent, agreed to assign a portion of his territories to the British Government. Accordingly, certain districts, including the territories of Berar in the north and south of his State, were handed over to the exclusive management of the British Resident. The British Government, for its part, undertook to maintain out of the revenue of the Assigned Districts the Contingent at a specified strength for the defence and protection of the Nizam's dominion. It also agreed to hand over to the Nizam any surplus revenue after defraying the cost of the Administration.

The treaty of 1853 was followed by another one in 1860. It resulted in the restoration of the southern districts to the State, and an outright cancellation of the outstanding debts of about Re. 500,000 in appreciation of the remarkable loyalty which the Hyderabad Governor had manifested during the Indian Mutiny. However, the Government of

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3. See (regarding the ceded territory and the Nizam's liquidation of debts) *Parl. Ps.*, 1894 (4918) xlvi, p. 263.


India still continued to retain some portion of the Assigned Districts. It kept so much of the Berar territories as would suffice to yield a gross revenue of Rs.3,200,000 in trust for the payment of the Contingent and some other miscellaneous expenses.\(^1\) The Nizam Afzal-ud-Daulah, the son and successor of Nasir-ud-Daulah improved upon the existing Treaty in favour of the British Government. He agreed that he would not ask for any accounts regarding the income and expenditure of the Assigned Districts with reference to the Surplus payable to the State. The Sovereignty over the territories, however, was acknowledged to be still resting with the Nizam, and any surplus was to be paid to him.\(^2\)

The controversy over the possession of Berar had arisen at quite an early date after the Treaty of 1853. The Hyderabad State had soon begun to press for the return of the territories. Between 1853 and 1860, it had made no less than six attempts towards securing a complete retrocession of the Assigned Districts, which were alleged to have been handed over by the Nizam quite unwillingly. The Districts were generally supposed to have been secured by Dalhousie under the force (as Cuthbert Davidson, the Asst. Resident observed) of "objurgations and threats".\(^3\)

By 1866 the tone and attitude of the Nizam's Minister Sir Salar Jung became bold, stiff and even aggressive. He no longer spoke, as

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\(^2\) Parl.Ps.,1867(338) *op.cit.*, Lord Canning to Sir Charles Wood, 5 Jan 1861, paras 2,5,9-10,12, pp.11-12.

on previous occasions, with bated breath in tones of whispering humility. He now put an entirely different emphasis on the issue by standing out to press, rather than request, for the restoration of the territories. Now, referring to the voluminous official papers and statements on the subject, he began to assert the Sivazam's 'rights' and claims over the districts.¹

The Government of India rejected the Minister's arguments.² Despite that, still more letters proceeded from him.³ However Sir Salar Jung was disposed to be rather headstrong and to adopt a very rigid attitude in relation to the Berar issue. In pressing for the Assigned Districts he was prepared to risk anything. "It appears to me", Sir Salar wrote to Lord Northbrook, "that there are three courses before me - either I must recover Berar, or I must be convinced of the justice of the reasons for withholding Berar or I must die".⁴

The controversy reached its climax in 1876 soon after the visit of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to India. Following the Royal tour, much to the surprise of many individuals connected with high official circles in India, Sir Salar found an opportunity of going to England. He availed himself of an invitation extended to him by the Prince of Wales.⁵

Sir Salar Jung's presence in England, where he had had the rare distinction of receiving the Freedom of the City of London, aroused much interest and attention. He met Lord Salisbury, and as a result of that, he secured permission, much to the annoyance of the authorities in India, to re-submit his case on returning to Hyderabad. The case was duly transmitted, by the Government of India under Lytton to Lord Salisbury, in 1877.

Despite Lord Salisbury's sympathetic response and interest, the problem could not yet be finally solved. The issue still dragged on. It was not until March 1878, that, just before leaving for his new charge of the Foreign Office, Salisbury at last recorded his decision in his terse despatch on the Serar issue, he thought (like Lords Northbrook and Lytton) that it would be advisable to postpone any settlement until the young Nizam (Mubbur Ali Khan) had come of age.


5. His father Afzal-ud-Daulah had died on 16 Feb. 1869, leaving his infant son Mubbur, hardly thirty months old, to succeed him with Nawabs Salar Jung and Shams-ul-Umara as co-Regents.

SECTION II

Salisbury's deputation of 1878 had not settled the problem of Berar once and for all. The issue was left open for subsequent discussion under the terms of the existing Treaties. 1 Hartington, as Secretary of State for India, clarified that point in Parliament in 1881. 2 But it was not until the appointment of Curzon that the Government at last felt inclined to reopen it. 3 In the very first year of his Viceroyalty he turned his attention to the problem of Berar, which had once again become prominent in the Indian Press. In that respect he differed from Lord Lytton. The latter had been keen anxious, as at the time of Imperial Assemblage, to avoid the problem. 4 There were many who, like Russell, the Hyderabad Resident, and Lytton, seemed to be "bitten by the notion" of surrendering the Assigned Districts. 5 Curzon himself was inclined to surrender some portions of the territories for the settlement of the issue. 6

Curzon and Hamilton had similar views about the character of British Administration in Berar. They both realised that enormous expenditure, in certain respects quite unjustifiable, was being incurred on the civil and military establishments of the Assigned Districts. The resulting financial pressure had been detrimental

5. IGC, Memo. of Berar, 25 Sept.1901, vol.245, p.7; Supplementary Note 20 Oct.1899, para II.
not only to the Berar Administration itself, but also to the interests
financial and political of both the Hyderabad State and the Govern-
ment of India. It was, nonetheless, essential to make the administrati
in Berar efficient. That, as Curzon realised, could be effect-
ively secured by a revision of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860. The
existing Treaties had, he found, saddled the districts with a top
heavy, and extremely expensive administration. 1

We know that a certain intransigence shown by previous Nizams
had stood in the way of improving the economy and administration of
Berar. 2 That did not mean that there was no ground left on which to
seek a reasonably fair and equitable settlement of the issue. 3 He
brought out his conviction on the point in one of his speeches char-
acterised, as Hamilton remarked, by "courage, prescience and caution"
"There was no problem", Curzon asseverated, "which it is not in the
power of statesmanship to solve", 4 He felt fully confident of the
feasibility of settling the issue on terms equally advantageous to
both parties. 5 This confidence itself was the outcome however of the
encouragement which he received, both from the Prime Minister, Lord
Salisbury, and also from Hamilton. The latter held very strong views

1. Parl.Ps., 1902, (cmd.1521) 13 Nov.1902, supra; Sosi to GIC, 11 May,
1899, pp.6-8.

2. Parl.Ps., 1867(356), 1 C. Davidson to GOI, 12 Aug. 1860, paras 12-5,


on the wrong and injustice that had been done to the Nizam in 1853. 1

Hamilton, like Curzon, looked upon Dalhousie as "incomparably the
greatest administrator ever charged with the destinies of India". But
he could not help thinking of the seizure of Berar as "rather a
questionable transaction". 2 "Dalhousie", Hamilton observed, "had
his merits; but no Jewish money-lender drove a harder bargain with his
victims than did Dalhousie with the princes whose territories he in-
corporated". 3

Curzon did not proceed with the matter without feeling sure that
the Nizam was also equally desirous of settling the issue. 4 Already
during the last decade or so the Hyderabad Government had been looking
forward to the time for reopening the problem. Anyhow it was, as
Curzon observed, on account of "the numerous rebuffs sustained by Sir
Salar" that the Nizam had never again "dared to open his lips". 5 The
various newspapers, however, in and around Hyderabad, had been persist-
ently urging the settlement of the issue. As the unofficial spokes-
men of the Hyderabad Government, they had been giving voice to the
Nizam's point of view. 6 Because of his own meticulous sense of
prestige, honour, self-respect and also pride, the Nizam was too
hesitant a person to broach the problem himself. Being "too proud

   vol. iv, pp. 111, 121, 155, 137, 161.
2. C. N. Curzon, Subjects of the Day, p. 31. PLHC, 28 Apr. 1899, vol. i,
6. SPNC, 1899, no. 1060 (16 Oct.) para 779 (i-iii), vol. 117, pp. 554-5;
   no. 1179 (18 Dec.) para 981 (iii), vol. 118, p. 784. The Mulk-e Millat
   (Hyderabad), 14 Oct. 1899.
to invite another rebuff", he had, unlike Sir Salar, little desire to re-open the discussion. He shrewdly preferred to leave the initiative to others, and in the circumstances Curzon himself took over the matter. 1

In December 1899 Curzon invited the Nizam and his Minister to Calcutta as the guests of the Government. The Nizam stayed there from 21 Dec. 1899 to 1 Jan. 1900. 2 Despite his intention to re-open the talks during the Nizam's visit, Curzon still refrained from sounding the latter on the subject of Berar. 3 He had not yet any understanding of the Nizam's character. 4 So he postponed the discussion for the time being, as advised by the Secretary of State. 5 Indeed by the end of 1899, the time was not yet suitably ripe for undertaking forthwith any re-consideration of the issue with the Nizam himself at Calcutta. There had, of late, developed acute differences resulting


4. There is much to show that when meeting the Nizam for the first time Curzon could not rightly evaluate his personal qualities and character as a ruler. He took him to be a weak and irresponsible ruler, "a little cringing mortal" who seemed to be "quite incapable of understanding the Berar question and would probably go into a fit if it were raised". PLHC, 20 Dec. 1899, vol. xvi, p. 407. Curzon, however, afterwards changed his opinion of him, on account of more intimate and practical knowledge of his manifold attributes and remarkable power of judgement and decision. He recognised in the Nizam (as did also Ripon, Hinton and Hardinge) a wise and shrewd ruler of men. Pari., 1926-9 (cmd. 2499) xxii, Note of Confd. Interview, 30 Mar. 1902, para 5, p. 49. LCC, Viceroy to His Majesty, 10 Apr. 1902, vol. 150, pt. II, p. 43. A.C. Campbell, op. cit., pp. 16-19. A.Kadivelu, The Ruling Chiefs, pp. 17, 11. Similarly one of the most highly reputed and experienced of the Political Department, Col. W.D.K. Barr, the Hyd. Distt., described the Nizam as "by far the shrewdest and most capable man". LAC, Barr to Ampthill, 17 May 1904, vol. 56/1, pt. I, pp. 38-9.

in strained relations between the Resident, Sir R.C. Flowden, and the
Hyderabad Court, and also between the Nizam and his Minister Sir Viqar-
ul-Umara. 1

Curzon not long afterwards noticed a steady deterioration in the
attitude towards him of the India Council. 2 The situation there bore
a sharp contrast with that obtaining in the Viceroy's own Executive
Council, which constitutionally was not as powerful as was the India
Council. 3 No doubt the Executive Council itself could be - as Lord
Amphill noticed - equally difficult in its dealings with the Viceroy,
but Curzon was still (as he himself told his friend Balfour), able to
manage with them. 4 His relations however with the India Council were
of an entirely different character and affected the speed of negotiation
over the issue.

The India Council included amongst its members some ex-Residents,
like Sir Alfred Lyall, Sir Stuart Bayley and Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick. 5
They entertained serious doubts, which were shared by others in the
Council, that the Hyderabad Government would agree to any proposals
that fell short of the full retrocession of the Assigned Districts. 6

1. Parl.Dbs. 1895 (C) 47 Har. 1895 (10) 146; LCG, 4 Jan. 11 Apr. 1900,
vol. xvi, pp. 4, 59. MIH, 10, 17 May 1900, vol. ii, pp. 159, 169. LCG,
2. LCG, Curzon's memo. on a proposed Amendment of the Govt. of India
p. 27; Brodrick to Amphill, 10 June 1904, vol. 37, pt. i, p. 30;
Amphill to James Thompson, 16 July 1904, vol. 36/1, pt. i, p. 155.
7.
Lyall, as Hamilton observed, was "not a man of action" being in possession of a mind "too subtle and critical to induce him to run risks". Hamilton still had the greatest possible regard for Lyall's views. That was due to Lyall's own reputation with other Departments and Anglo-Indians besides "his knowledge, sagacity and breadth", which all "render him at times an invaluable aid". Sir Stuart Bayley, too, was equally "sensible and cautious". However, one of Curzon's most outspoken and severe, if not hostile critics, was Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick. He also opposed Curzon, even over the issue of the North-West Frontier Province. As an out and out "Irishman, quick, uncertain, but in his particular line, capable and fair-minded", he had "a thorough Celtic mind". He was "generally prepared on some rambling side-issue to contravene any practical straightforward course".

After his meeting with the Nizam at Calcutta, Curzon dropped the talks for two years until January 1902. The delay in resuming the negotiations was further increased by the outbreak of famine. That diverted the attention of the Government of India and Hyderabad to relief work in order to cope with the situation.

It was in September 1901 that Curzon found time to prepare a comprehensive memorandum on the problem of Sarar for the Secretary of State-in-Council. Therein be dealt with the whole issue from every

6. FP(Intl) May 1902, no. 89, 29 May 1901.
angle, having taken, as he stated, much pains to develop a sound workable scheme. Nevertheless, the memorandum still evoked criticism. The terms proposed for the lease did not seem to Hamilton to hold any sufficient inducement or any prospect of a monetary gain for the Nizam at least in the next sixteen years. It was necessary, he felt, to provide the Nizam with some more tangible and readily available benefits (as the Government of India accordingly did). The members of the political committee, especially the three ex-Residents, favoured the maintenance of the status quo. They were, Hamilton told Curzon, "charity of commencing operations by proposing to revise existing Treaties". Taken as a whole, however, the terms proposed by Curzon were commonly recognised to have been based on the very best of intentions. As such it was a matter, of - as he himself communicated to the king - great satisfaction to observe that leaving aside rather small points, the Council had at least "no valid objections to the main scheme itself".

The terms of the proposed Agreement were formally communicated to the Nizam at the Chowmahal (Palace) on 27 January 1902. The proposals were to the following effect:

(a) The perpetual lease of herar on a fixed annual rent of Rs. 29 lakhs to be paid by the Government to the Nizam, with due recognition of his sovereignty over the territories.

(b) The annuity to be utilised by the Nizam for the repayment of the two famine loans of Rs. 341 lakhs which the State had recently obtained from the Government on account of famine in Hyderabad and the Assigned Districts.

(c) The redistribution and reduction on economic and administrative grounds in the specified strength of the Hyderabad Contingent:

(i) The Hyderabad Contingent to be abolished as a separate auxiliary force and to be amalgamated with the Indian Army;

(ii) The Government of India to maintain, in future, a reduced number of troops, say 4,500 to 5,000, at a required number of stations in Hyderabad, in place of 6,800, the existing strength of the Contingent,

(iii) And in return for the reduction of Indian troops, the Nizam also to make a corresponding reduction in the existing strength of his 19,500 irregular troops (costing nearly Rs. 500,000) to 12,000 or even 10,000 men.

1. LGC, Fign.Dept.Notes, no.5, supra, vol.245, p.9
SECTION III

The reaction of the Nizam to the proposed terms revealed that he was not a rash and impulsively sentimental, but a highly discreet and reasonable individual, possessing maturity of thought and foresight. He did not show any hot-headed disgust and temper as had been, for instance, earlier shown by his father and grandfather in 1860 and 1853. He took the terms, as Curzon informed Hamilton, "exceedingly well" in a calm and calculated manner.

The Nizam asked the Resident in an entirely amicable yet reasonable manner to clarify certain points. The Nizam's councillors and nobles, unlike him, showed a marked reaction against the proposed terms. But their attitude was not different from that displayed by their counterparts in Oudh in Lytton's time. The Talukadars of Oudh, just like the Nizam's nobles, had in their own self-interest, almost under similar circumstances, tried to oppose the Government's move for the amalgamation of Oudh with the North Western Provinces. The idea of perpetual lease of the Assigned Districts, was likewise linked up with the territories' ultimate amalgamation, as suggested under the proposed terms, with the adjoining British administration. After

2. Var. Rsdt 1567(256) 1. Fgn.Sec. 601, to the Resdt. 5 Sept. 1860, paras 4-5, p.20; Resdt. 5 Sept. 1860, para. 4, p.20; Sir Charles Wood to the 601, 10 June 1861, para 3, p.42.
6. IPP (Int'l.) Feb. 1904, no.88, encl. 1, 26 Sept. 1903. LCC, 16 Jan, 1902, supra.
Some deliberation and a rather long, disquieting silence, they at last, in March 1902, decided against the proposed lease. They decline to regard the idea of a perpetual lease as an acceptable one. The Nizam, however, would undoubtedly have accepted the Government's proposal for the lease, had the matter been entirely in his hands. That was the opinion of the Resident.  

The attitude of opposition on the part of the Nizam's councillors and nobles, who were generally big and powerful jagirdars, had some significant basis. Their opposition was connected with their peculiar scruples, and, in a way, vested interests, arising out of the feudal basis and pattern of the State itself. The Hyderabad State had continued to exhibit, in its myriad feudal nobles and their holdings, "the most perfect survival of antiquated landlordism". The State's administration was still, in many essential respects, conducted on the old feudal principles. The State's territories were, to a considerable extent, parcelled out into jagirs or fiefs held on a variety of military and other tenures. Hyderabad under the circumstances, as Lord Morley subsequently observed, disclosed the picture of "the India that one reads about in Macaulay's essays on Hastings and Clive".

The position of the ryots, under such an antiquated system as was in vogue in Hyderabad in the jagir lands, had been very precarious.

3. The Times (London), 6 Oct., 1902, "The Hyderabad State".
Their rights as against those of the jagirdars, could neither be effectively asserted nor even defined.\(^1\) The whole situation bore but a sharp contrast with not only the revenue system of the Assigned Districts as improved upon in 1897, but of India's own agricultural policy which Curzon brought out most specifically in his famous Resolution on land revenue assessment.\(^2\) Leaving aside the Presidency system (which Curzon time and again criticised), the Government of India itself was all in favour of reducing and maintaining a lower and reasonable rate of assessment.\(^3\) In opposing the perpetual lease of Berar the Nizam's councillors and nobles were actuated by their own interests and scruples peculiar to their position of power in their jagirs. It was natural for them in the circumstances to press for the retrocession of the Assigned Districts, hoping to effect, thereby the restoration of their own powers and holdings. Their feudal interests were otherwise quite liable to be held more and more in check, even if not affectively reduced altogether, by the Berar administration that had of late acquired, apart from its means and measures for the adequate protection of peasants and agriculturalists, immense powers under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894.\(^4\) It was not unreasonable for them to anticipate the extension of also manifold other restraints under various measures of similarly strong nature if the districts escaped from their own grip.\(^5\)

The Nizam’s councillors and nobles were supported by the vakils (lawyers), the seths (bankers and capitalists) and the zemindars. Each of the three classes had, like the jagirdars, their own apparent economic and political interests in seeking the retrocession of the Assigned Districts. It was not unnatural for them to throw their lot against the proposed Agreement. They had a strength of their own on account of their constitutional importance and recognition in the State. They had a recognised place in the State’s unicameral legislature which the Nizam had recently brought into being under a new constitution inaugurated in 1893. Since the franchise in Hyderabad was extremely limited, they stood more or less as a strong non-official opposition in the legislature.

The membership of the legislature (official and non-official) was limited to 17. Of all the people in the State, the three classes alone had a right to return from amongst their respective interests an equal number of representatives. Apart from the President, the Vice-President, three ex-officio Members and six others to be nominated from amongst the officials, the three classes had therein two zemindars, two pleaders and two non-official members of the mercantile community. The Nizam’s Prime Minister at the same time was allowed, as President the Council, to nominate not more than two persons from amongst the non-official classes. It was thus clear that their opposition, even constitutionally speaking, though founded on non-official majority in

the Legislative Council did not yet represent the ordinary citizens of the State. Likewise the Nizam’s Cabinet Council which was limited in its membership to only three powerful nobles had been anything but a representative body of the common people. The opposition, as such, was indicative of the economic and political interests of the jagirdars and zamindars, and of the legal and mercantile communities. “Everyone in Hyderabad is”, as the Resident, Colonel Barr observed, “for a party and very few (I could count them on my fingers) are for the State”.

SECTION IV

After the breakdown of the Resident’s preliminary negotiation for the settlement of the issue, the most momentous and significant event was Curzon’s own visit to the State. Indeed he had been anxious to go. And so, despite the ominous forebodings of the Members of India Council and also additional words of caution and restraint in almost similar strain from Hamilton himself, Curzon did set off. He reached Hyderabad on 29 March 1902.

Why did Curzon go in person to Hyderabad when the terms proposed by the Government of India had been already rejected?

Curzon arrived at Hyderabad neither in any emotional heat, nor with a view to exercising the authority and influence of his position. Indeed he had been quite specifically and explicitly warned by Hamilton himself against anything of the sort. Curzon came to Hyderabad some.

1. Previous to the new constitution as enforced under the terms of the Nizam’s yanuncha-i-Mubarak, the legislative Council was not separate from the Executive Council which combined both the dual functions of capacities. Fathullah Khan, A History of Administrative Reforms in Hyderabad, Appendix n, pp. 149-56.

2. LGC, Note on Hyderabad Affairs, 26 Mar. 1902, vol. 245, p. 3.


two months after the commencement of negotiations, and that also at the clear invitation of the Nizam himself.¹ His visit to the State had been arranged long before the recent failure of the talks. A year or so before the negotiation, the Nizam had invited Curzon to visit the State during the spring season. The matter had been, accordingly, arranged since October 1901.²

Curzon went to Hyderabad perfectly cognizant of the increasing delicacy and critical nature of the situation pertaining to the settlement of the issue. He was, at the same time, fully conscious that his refusal, at the eleventh hour, to visit Hyderabad, would have been derogatory to the personal prestige and honour of the Nizam. Moreover, it would have involved a fatal risk for the success of any present or future agreement over the issue.³ Curzon, more than anybody else, was in a position to know the nature and background of the different lights in which the issue was being viewed by the Hyderabad Government and the authorities in London and India. Having fairly withstood the objections of those at the India Office, Curzon had found hardly any difficulty over the issue with his colleagues in India.⁴ Moreover the British Government itself had been, Curzon observed, inclined towards an equitable settlement "both generous to the Nizam and profitable to ourselves".⁵ Curzon had little desire under the circumstance:

to mar the situation. He was instead hoping to make use of the advantage that was there in the existing combination of persons and circumstances.

The Nizam's sense of friendliness towards the Viceroy and the British Government had, on more than one occasion in the recent past, found eloquent expression, in both words and action. Curzon as a friend, likewise did not want to see the negotiations fail. He sincerely believed that neither the Nizam nor his successors were likely to get a better deal at the hands of any subsequent Government, whether in England or India. "It will be a great pity", he wrote just before leaving for Hyderabad, "if the present attempt to settle the matter falls through, partly because such a favourable opportunity is not likely to recur, and still more because it is certain that the British Government will never give better terms than it is now offering".

In spite of the recent refusal on the part of the Hyderabad Government to accept the terms, the Nizam though somewhat suspicious of the Government's intentions, was nonetheless still keeping an open mind. He did not regard the matter as closed. On reaching Hyderabad Curzon observed that the Nizam was "keenly anticipating that I would talk to him" regarding the proposed Agreement.

1. Parl. Ps. 1902 (cmd. 1521) lxxi, Pgn. Sec. GOL to SOSI, 13 Nov. 1902, supra.
3. LkV, 3rd series, Nizam Sir Mahbub Ali Khan to the Queen, 4 Sept. 18,
4. Parl Ps. 1902-3, (cmd. 2433) xxi, note of Interview, p. 47.
5. LCC, 20 Mar. 1902, supra.
The nizam's predisposition to resume the negotiations in his own person with the Viceroy was jeopardised by another recent decision of the nobles had taken in the matter. Just before Curzon's meeting with the nizam they had met together in the Council with a view to modifying their previous decision for the complete retrocession of the Districts. They had now decided that it would be more advisable to make some simple request for the territories rather than to oppose the terms proposed for the lease. So a letter had been drafted bearing not any specific arguments but a request for some favours.¹

There was also, at the same time, an unofficial letter brought out by one Mr. Seymour Keay (who claimed to have a true and accurate understanding of the Berar issue and drafted most of the letters of Sir Jalar on the subject) for the full territorial retrocession.² The request was to the effect that Berar should be given back by the British Government to the nizam as a mark of gracious favour towards a faithful ally. The nobles at the same time had been equally conscious of the need for binding, as it were, the nizam's own hands over the issue in support of their latest move and decision. So it had been settled that the nizam himself should deliver the letter to the Viceroy personally during the forthcoming interview.³

The letter bearing the 'request' was neither novel nor unexpected. It was almost exactly what had been done by Sir Jalar and also by the nizam's grandfather in 1895.⁴ The nizam Masir-ud-Daulah had, for

instance, entreated the British Resident to endeavour to persuade
the Governor-General Lord Dalhousie to give up ("as a personal favour"
the scheme regarding the territorial assignment.\footnote{Parl. Ps. 1854 (446) xlvii, app. to the Pgm. Dpt. GOI, 4 May 1854, para 19, p.150.}

The idea of requesting the return of the territories had apparently
appealed to the imagination of the Nizam's councillors and nobles
not without some special reasons of their own. It was not unreasonable
for them to have fully realised that any claim for the retro-
cession, even if put in the name of the people of Berar themselves,
would be equally baseless and ineffective. Such claims were always
likely to be rejected outright, as had been done in the past.\footnote{Parl. Ps. 1912-13 (359, 359) SOC1 to GOI, 26 Mar. 1912, p.84.}

The British Administration in Berar had succeeded in bringing
security and prosperity to the territories, as was apparent even from
the increased resources of the districts.\footnote{The provincial transactions for the year 1891-1900 showed a revenue of 2,977,000 with a balance of 5210,000 at the beginning of the year 4. IFP (Int'l.) Feb. 1901, no.61, 17 Nov. 1892, para 7. Parl's.1901(207) xlix, 1912, p.190.}

The total revenues of Berar by the close of the 19th century had more than doubled in less
than fifty years.\footnote{Indian policy and English justice, op.cit., p.8-9.}

No doubt the reformatory measures of Sir Salar
had provided an impetus to the people to improve the quality of the
crops and increase the fertility of the soil.\footnote{Parl's.1901(207) xlix, 1912, p.190.}

The British Administration, however, as early as the sixties of the last century, had been
improving the situation. It had, for instance, opened up, along with
the network of railway lines, the navigation of the River Godaveri to

Berar. All that helped the gradual transformation of dreary wastelands.
into fertile and rich areas.\textsuperscript{1} Within a few years after the transfer of the territories to the British administration, the total resources therein had been showing an increase of about 93 per cent some time before 1867. Its total resources had risen from £320,000 to £620,000. It was, moreover, with the commencement of the British administration that the constant emigration from Berar which had been going on since about 1840 gradually ceased.\textsuperscript{3}

The British administration had, quite evidently, succeeded in securing, along with the increasing fertility and resources of the land, an enduring place in the hearts of the people. The situation there was in sharp contrast with that obtaining under the feudal overlords of the Hyderabad State. The oppression, for instance, of the ryots at the hands of the state's officials had, as late as 1884, attracted criticism and attention in parliament.\textsuperscript{4} Moreover, the bigoted intolerance of the state officials and their maltreatment of the shiah in Hyderabad itself, had of late still further worked against the popularity of the state's administration.\textsuperscript{5} The people of Berar in these circumstances were quite reasonably disinclined, even a couple of decades later, to be placed under any authority other than that of the British Administration.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1} See Parl. Res. 1857 (63 - sess. 2) xxix, p. 401; 1859 (234 - sess. 1) xix p. 323; 1862 (55) xl, p. 117; 1862 (453) xl, p. 61; 1864 (248) xlii, p. 479; 1867-68 (201) 1, p. 353; 1867-68 (415) 1, p. 699; 1868-69 (289) xlv, p. 597.


\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., pp. 309-11.

\textsuperscript{4} Parl. Obs. 1884, (C) 8 May (287) 1674.


\textsuperscript{6} Parl. Ps. 1924-25 (cand. 2439) xxi, Lord Reading to the Nizam Mir Ome Ali Khan, 11 Mar. 1925, para 9, 15, 18, pp. 87, 89-90.
It was quite natural, in view of the general opposition of the people in Berar that the idea of requesting rather than arguing the issue had struck the Nizam's councillors as a more suitable procedure. A free gift or favour in reward to the retrocession of the territories was quite likely to obviate the popular opposition against the reimposition of their rule and authority on the Assigned Districts. The position of the Nizam, however, was quite singular. Indeed it was bound to be different on account of his inherent status. He had the very willing respect which the people were always ready to give him, for instance, during even the period of recent communal disturbances at Hyderabad.¹ There was no question of opposition to his Sovereign authority whether inside or outside the Assigned Districts. His position was quite unchallengeable, being protected by the Treaties, respected by his subjects, and further guaranteed by the Government itself.

The scheme which the Nizam's councillors had envisaged, was almost exclusively their own. From the death of Sir Salur in 1883 to the recent dismissal of Sir Vaqar-ul-Umara in 1901, the Nizam's authority had continued to be bypassed. It had been flouted almost continuously by successive factions of intriguing Ministers, nobles and courtiers. As a result the Nizam had, as the Resident observed, "sulked and held aloof from the administration and was in fact nothing more that a discontented figurehead".² Ever since the recent purge which the Nizam had so successfully carried out, he had been quite naturally suspicious

of the intentions of his intriguing nobles and councillors. He was not necessarily bound to be a party to the view of his nobles even under the terms of the constitution of the State's Cabinet Council which he had himself recently set up. In the circumstances he was not disposed to look upon the nobles' latest decisions as a matter of constitutional routine deserving outright support and approval.

The interview between the Nizam and Curzon took place on 30 March 1902. It was held in the Hyderabad Residency. The Nizam himself came to the Residency unaccompanied by either his Minister or anyone of his nobles. He differed in that respect from his grandfather who had wanted some of his ministers by his side to help him in discussion with the Resident over the treaty of 1853. The general bearing and attitude of the Nizam on the occasion was an index of his self-assurance, courage and confidence. In meeting with the Viceroy, self-confidence was something which, as Hamilton noticed, even some of the very highest officials and governors lacked. The interview was private, exclusive and confidential. The native newspapers were generally in favour of the private character of interviews between the Viceroy and any of the Indian Princes and Chiefs. The only

2. LAC, supra.
4. Ibid., Parli. Res. 1924-25 (cmd.2459) xlii, 'Note of Interview', to the Viceroy, GOI, 4 May 1899, paras 4, x, 14, 15-16, 24-26, pp.118-22.
other person present on the occasion was the Resident Colonel Barr, who acted as the interpreter. 1

There was a very frank and hearty exchange of views between the Nizam and Curzon during the interview which lasted for nearly half an hour. In the course of their conversation, they discussed various aspects of the issue in the light of the main implications of the proposed terms. 2

The Nizam did not mean to insist upon a full restitution of the Assigned Districts as the only condition of settlement. However, he quite naturally and reasonably talked of the earnestness with which he and his ancestors had wanted the retrocession of Berar. 3

Considering the cession of Berar under the existing circumstances as something quite impossible, the Nizam wanted to ascertain the future intentions of the Government. 4 He asked Curzon quite plainly whether it would not be at all possible for the Government, even at any future time, to give back the Assigned Districts. 5 The Nizam revealed, on that account also, his great differences from the policy and earlier traditions of Sir Lavar. The latter had wanted to effect the settlement, not in the light of the Government's present and future intentions but in that of past events and records. 6

5. Parl. Ps. 1924-25 (cmd. 2499)xxi, 'Note of Interview', p. 45.
Curzon did not want to keep the Nizam in the dark as to the present and any subsequent policy of the British Government regarding the retention of the assigned Districts. As a matter of fact the Nizam himself, as Curzon observed, "believed that it never would be returned". Still the Nizam wanted to hear it "from my lips". "If I could tell him", Curzon recorded privately, "that the chances were so remote as to be unworthy of serious consideration, then he would not only accept my proposal with pleasure, but he was grateful for the generosity of its terms".  

Curzon told the Nizam that the British Government was quite content to maintain the status quo if the proposed terms did not suit the State's interests. Curzon did not hesitate to disclose to the Nizam that in the matter of retaining the territories there was "continuity of policy between successive administrations, whether they were Conservative or Liberal". He also pointed out that it would be "in the highest degree unlikely that any succeeding Viceroy would open the question again or that any British Government would court a fresh rebuff".  

There was no fixed limit to the period of assignment and the Government's powers under the existing Treaties.  

The personal talks with the Viceroy conveyed to the Nizam also the implications of the financial proposals. Curzon was anxious to elaborate and improve upon these propositions in the interests of the

1. Ibid.  
Nizam no less than of the State's economy and resources. Under the terms newly proposed by Curzon, the Nizam was to have a sum of Rs. 61/2 lakhs per annum during the next twenty years, besides another Rs. 161 lakhs during the subsequent years. The Nizam was to have, in that way during the next thirty years, a total sum of Rs. 295 lakhs over and above Rs. 341 lakhs in liquidation of the Berar and Hyderabad famine loans.  

As a result of the very frank and hearty exchange of views over the issue, the interview brought about a singular unanimity of thought in favour of the proposed agreement. The Nizam verbally gave his full consent to the perpetual lease of Berar, although his decision could not yet be disclosed officially.  

The negotiations had evidently succeeded, though owing to the scepticism of the India Council, apart from the latest move of the Nizam's own nobles, the chances of success had been held in serious doubt. However, before finalising the matter with the Nizam, Curzon tried to reassure himself as well as the Nizam that the Government of India had no intention of forcing the issue on the State he frankly told the Nizam that he had no desire whatsoever of taking advantage of the occasion to lead him to something to which the latter  

1. The annual rent of Rs. 25 lakhs was to be distributed as follows:— (a) To the Nizam, Rs. 61/2 lakhs for 20 years; 161/2 lakhs from the 21st year till the full payment of the loans; Rs. 25 lakhs thereafter. (b) Towards the Berar loan, 10 lakhs for about 20 years; (c) Towards the Hyderabad loan, 31/2 lakhs (apart from the 5 lakhs which the Nizam had undertaken to provide on his own), until the full payment of the loan. Parl. Rs. 1902 (Cmd. 1521) Ixxi, Fgn. Sec. G.O.I to the Resdt. Hydb. Apr. 1902, para 5, p. 12. 
2. parl. Rs. 1902 (Cmd. 2459) xxvi, 'Note of Interview', 1 Apr. 1902, p. 4 
might not be a willing party. Accordingly he asked his highness to be sure that he was not yielding under any pressure. "I would sooner even now", Curzon told the nizam, "abandon the scheme altogether than that it should be thought, or said, that his highness had entered into it either to please me or the Government of India, or from any sense of constraint arising out of what had been said".  

Having already fully considered the nature of the terms, the nizam did not feel any doubts as to the intentions of the Government. The nizam, as Curzon privately told hamilton, "yielded in deference to my arguments, and because he is firmly convinced that I am a friend to him and to his state". 2 The nizam confirmed his consent, even though Curzon, in unambiguous terms, gave him still a clear option that if he had any doubts or misgivings it would be better for him to withdraw. 3 The nizam still held to his decision and did not even once refer, directly or indirectly, to the alternative proposal recently prescribed by his nobles.

In accepting to the idea of perpetual lease the Nizam had fully realised that it would be highly impolitic and injudicious on his part not to accept the terms. As a discreet and shrewd person it was not difficult for him to understand that with every year that passed - in case the terms were rejected - the chances of the issue being reopened would become not greater but less. Moreover, the indecisive and un-

1. It was subsequently on 1 Jan. 1916 that the special title of His Exalted Highness was granted to the nizam of Hyderabad. C.U. Aitchison op.cit., vol. ix, p. 19.
profitable position which had already lasted for half a century could as easily last for another, with no apparent advantage either to him or to his state and people.\(^1\) During, for instance, the last forty years the steadily decreasing and fluctuating amount of the annual surplus had stood at the average amount of Rs.9 lakhs and at times even at no surplus at all.\(^2\) On the other hand, the proposed terms, as the resident had already explained to him, were in conflict neither with the state's economic interests nor with the Nizam's own sense of prestige and dignity. The Nizam therefore told Curzon that he had fully considered "every aspect of the case", and that the consent he had given was in the "best interests of his state".\(^3\)

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In dissociating himself from the viewpoint of his councillors the Nizam was led by his own thinking, which differed from that of Sir Salar. During Sir Salar's life the Nizam's own view over the issue of Berar had not found full expression. That was mainly owing to the fact that, as the Resident, Colonel Barr, observed, Sir Salar had "maintained the rule of a dictator even after the Nizam was invested with ruling powers". However, the Nizam's discreet silence over the matter had been not unnatural. He felt a genuine respect and attachment towards the Minister-Regent, even though in 1867 his father had come to the point of breaking away from and turning Sir Salar out of office. However, the Nizam had of late come to differ from him. Shortly before Sir Salar's death in 1883, his removal from office was, in a way, the natural outcome of his own strong views and conflicts with the Authorities in India on the subject of Berar. Moreover, already during the Nizam's minority, Sir Salar's own colleague and co-Regent, the Ameer-i-Kabeer had, quite strongly, declined to join hands with the Minister-Regent in pressing for the Assigned Districts.

3. Syed H. Silgrami, a Memoir of Sir Salar, pp.52-64.
The differences over Berar had been bound up with the growing radicalism in the thought and policy of Sir Salar. While looking for the total restoration of Berar as the mission of his life, he was suspected by many, including Lord Lytton, of actively hostile intentions against the British Government. He was suspected of wanting to assert the 'Sovereign' and independent position of the State, even though that did not fit in with the traditional loyalty and policy of the Hyderabad State and its rulers. Also he was supposed to have entered into confidential correspondence with some South Indian rulers like Holkar of Indore for the Reishwaship of the Deccan. He was understood to have been thinking of establishing at any rate his own premiership over the Deccan States. He was presumed to be harbouring designs for the early downfall of the British power in India. At the same time he was equally keen to secure, for the realization of his ambitious projects, any possible help from the English press, the English money-market and the British Parliament. In the circumstances, Sir Salar's policy was apparently, as Lytton observed, "quite incompatible with satisfactory relations between the paramount and sub-ordinate governments".

1. Lord Lytton persistently suspected Sir Salar of hostile 'moves', and he spoke of him more baldly as 'the most dangerous man in India', 'like a mouse, on a woman that has turned once vicious, though unsavable'. Lytton to Salisbury, 2 July, 1877, vol.514/2, p.559.

2. The role of the Munshi (Tokeji Holkar) during the Indian Mutiny had been gravely suspected by the Government of India. He was also believed to have taken an active part in the Government of India. Lord Lytton to Northbrook, 6 Sept. 1877, vol.18, p.182.


The ideas of the Nizam's councillors, too, had little appeal for the Nizam, mainly because they thought only of the retrocession of the districts. They were unwilling to compromise. But the Nizam, as less than Curzon himself, had been looking towards some compromise as a solution of the problem. Before Curzon's viceroyalty, the Nizam had already begun to tackle the issue in his own calm and calculating way, and realised the desirability of some modification of the extremities of his minister-regent. He gave no serious thought to Sir Salar's visit and had no wish to take him to England. Sir Salar had planned the visit ostensibly with a view to press the British Government for the retrocession of the territories, but never since his investigation had the Nizam even once thought it either proper or useful to pay a visit to England.

The support of English public opinion, which Sir Salar had abundantly secured both in India and England, had its effect. But it worked in the direction of strengthening instead of weakening the Nizam's policy, for he could see that the force of public opinion had failed altogether to produce any favourable impact on British policy towards Iran, which had remained just the same, and he not realised at the same time, the intentions and also practical difficulties of the British Government, the Nizam would have hardly reconciled himself to the idea of a perpetual lease. As Curzon observed, he was a strong-minded absolutist person, particularly when dealing with the

1. With a view to get popular support abroad, Sir Salar had spent a huge sum amounting to not less than £700,000 in addition to a large quantity of extremely valuable state jewels. Lyt. Ps., Lytton to the Queen and Cabinet, 30 Aug. 1876, vol. 570/1, pp. 405, 409.
Government of India on any issue touching his 'Sovereign' status and
dignity.\(^1\) His differences with his councillors and his remarkable
equanimity over the issue of Berar were the outcome of his own cal-
culations as to the policy and intentions of the British Government.\(^2\)

Why did he not give his consent at an earlier date than that of
the Viceroy's visit to Hyderabad, if he was not opposed to the idea
of a lease in perpetuity? No doubt Curzon, as much as the Nizam
himself did not believe in the practicability of any outright restitu-
tion of the Assigned Districts. So long, however, as one could still
think that the state had a chance of getting back Berar, the Nizam
was quite inclined to explore the possibility of doing so by personal
discussion with the Viceroy. Moreover, at the same time he was, as
Curzon himself observed, "more affected by considerations of personal
prestige than by anything else".\(^3\) Outright compliance on his part
might have seemed nothing short of subservience. And it would not
have secured him so much prestige as an attitude of deliberate reserve,
reasonable assertion and personal negotiation with the Viceroy. As
Curzon put it, that illustrated "the familiar attitude of the Oriental
who declines in advance in order to be able, with a superior grace,
to give way later on".\(^4\)

The Nizam's calculated reserve on the earlier occasion in face

1. PLGH, 9, 16 May 1900, vol.xvii, pp.81,95.
2. Parl.Ps.1924-5 (cmd.2459) xxii, 'Note of Interview', 30 Mar.1902,
Ps.1926 (cmd.2621) xxii, Viceroy to the Nizam, 27 Mar.1926, para 8,
of the decision of his councillors against the proposed terms was not
born of any sense of weakness or fear. It had instead its origin
in more than one factor - his own sense of constitutionalism, his
extremely cautious outlook, as well as his doubts and misgivings as
to the exercise of sole discretionary powers for the settlement of a
highly vexed problem. Side by side with his respect for the State's
constitution, which he had of late himself introduced, he had also
an intensely cautious and even timid, yet equally sceptical bent of
mind, and as such, it was not unreasonable for him to feel some-
what doubtful regarding his personal rights and powers in the matter
of improving upon the State's existing Treaties with the British
Government.

To doubt the treaties of 1855 and 1860 had specifically recognised
the Nizam's own exclusive powers in relation to the State's existing
Treaties with the British Government. The personal nature of the
relationship between the contracting parties had been equally recog-
nised in actual practice by Lord Salisbury, in having, for instance,
deferred the settlement of the issue in 1878 only in view of the
Nizam's own minority. But the fast changing social and political
conditions had created a very solid basis for the Nizam's scepticism.

1. On account of his firm and strong conduct the Nizam's presence, any-
where among his people and nobles, "inspired awe and respect". (PLHC,
17 May 1906, vol.II, p.169). And as Curzon himself observed the
Nizam who was "far from wanting in shrewdness or even character", had
a reputation for courage and determination. The fact remained that
"all his own people in Hyderabad tremble at the turn of his head".
3. Parl.Ps.1867/350 1, supra, pp.22-3; 1924-5(cmd.28439) supra., pp.62,
4. Parl.Ps.1902 (cmd.1921) lxxi, 305/I to GGOI, 28 Mar.1878, para 10,
p.6.
in view of the attitude of his nobles and councillors. Curzon’s interview, which was held with the Nizam himself alone dispelled the confusion. The occasion brought out the Nizam’s personal discretionary rights, without any further possibility of doubt or dispute, in the matter of improving upon the Treaties.¹

SECTION II

The differences between the Nizam and his councillors became much more pronounced after the Nizam’s interview and consent. The result was that there elapsed between his consent and the actual ratification of the Agreement a further period of not less than six months.² The delay thus caused had much to do with the intrigues and obstructive tactics of the Nizam’s councillors and nobles. Those hostile to the Agreement endeavoured during that period to persuade the Nizam to escape from it even though he had personally given his consent to the Viceroy. The Nizam on his part tried to bring them round to his own views in order to secure their unanimous approval.³ Just as he had done even before Curzon’s arrival at Hyderabad the Nizam was earnestly desirous of carrying them with him in the matter.⁴

¹ The principle of the maintenance of personal elements in treaty relationships was equally supported by Curzon on still another important occasion. We did that during his negotiations for renewing the Agreement of friendship with Afghanistan after the death of Amir Shir Ali Khan on 13 Sept. 1901. P.C.I., 9, 16 Oct., 11 Nov. 1901, vol. xxi, pp. 195, 196.

² V.R. 1902 (cam. 1921) xxxi, P.M.S. Gurn to the SASI, 15 Nov. 1902, paras. 6, 7, pp. 6, 7, 8; annexure 3, memorandum of the Agreement, pp. 23-4.


why did the nizam seek the support and co-operation of his councillors and nobles if he was himself sure as to the soundness of his decision? Moreover, how did he succeed in bringing them round to his own views?

As the reputed author of the famous Laxma, which ushered in a new era of constitutional reform for the state in 1893, the nizam had, quite naturally, a great preference for constitutional practice. It was for the first time in the annals of Hyderabad that besides the separation of executive from legislature under him, the non-official element had been allowed a voice in the government and administration of the state. 1 The nizam's powers of setting aside the decisions of his council were limited. The council was not a consultative body. 2 It was not the nizam but the prime minister who, as the president of the council, had the right of overriding any majority decision, subject, of course, to the nizam's ultimate consent. 3 The nizam did not at any time, either before or after curzon's arrival at Hyderabad, want to deflect the bitterness of his councillors over the issue. 4 Moreover, there was at that time the influence also of his early training and education. Persons, for instance, of the calibre of Captain John Clarke, squerry to his royal highness, the duke of Edinburgh, had been selected for the nizam's early tuition. The queen herself had shown a great personal interest in the matter. 5

3. ibid., Rallipat Khan, a history of Administrative Reforms in Hyderabad, pp. 78-81.
The Nizam could hardly have afforded to ignore the strength of the opposition against the agreement without danger to the internal peace and progress of the state. Apart from the vast hordes of foreign mercenaries, the total strength of the unruly yet armed body of the nobles' feudal retainers was roughly estimated as equal to that of the state's own regular forces. The 19,500 irregulars in the state constituted for the nobles and jagirdars a very substantial power.¹ Despite the pressure of advice from the British Government itself since the time of Dalhousie, none of the Nizams had either dared or agreed to reduce the irregulars' strength.² The Hyderabad government, for instance, once in 1866 having touched some feudal privileges by a new system of duties levied on internal trade, had found itself face to face with the danger of serious internal strife.³ And it was on account of such dangers, that the Contingent had been further strengthened by the maintenance of the Subsidiary Force.⁴

In doubt, on account of the general guarantee of British protection to the Indian states at large, the Nizam had nothing much to worry about in face of the strength of his feudal nobles and jagirdars but his reaction against their power and opposition was not that of fear but of caution. The lurking danger of revolt consequent upon the preponderance of the aristocratic mercenaries and foreigners in the

¹. Hart.P., 1925-6 (col. 24) supra., paras. 4, 5, p. 40.
³. Hart.Ps. 1866, (574) lli, 19PI., para 11, 77, pp. 70-1.
State had not yet completely died out. It was, for instance, quite a problem for the authorities to deal strongly and effectively even with the minor groups of freebooters and brigands abounding in the state. The latter and quite convenient protection and security in the conclave of the quasi foreign territory of the various feudal overlords that lay outside the direct authority of the State. The dangers associated with an antiquated system of administration had thus resulted mainly in adding to the strength and power of the state's powerful nobles and jagirdars.

Alexander and atrife of one sort or another had nearly always been going on amongst the different factions of the Rizam's nobles and courtiers. and as a result Hyderabad had gradually turned into nothing short of "a hotbed of intrigue". No doubt the history of many other native courts at that time was equally replete with horrible instances of corruption and crime, perfidy and treachery, besides murder and death by poisoning and danger. But the Rizam's court was among the very worst of the type. It was, as Lord George Hamilton observed, "not or less in the nature of 'a sink of iniquity'". It had the taint and ill-name of dragging into its meshes of intrigue and corruption the names and reputations of many of the officers of

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6. LCC, 10 May 1900, vol. 159, pt. i, p. 106.
the Government of India. The Resident, Colonel Barr, could not
help representing it to Curzon as " a nest of every sort of villainy
and corruption".

The atmosphere of general corruption and intrigue at Hyderabad
had of late worsened considerably, owing to the undesirable presence
there of some notorious foreign money-lenders, brokers and bankers.
Some of them endeavoured to make capital out of the situation. At
least one of them tried, though with little success, to make a deal
with the Hyderabad Government over the issue of Berar. With a
view to getting some sort of bribe, reward or solatium from the State,
he professed to being in possession of some special knowledge which
would facilitate the restitution of Berar. At the same time, in case
his hopes failed to materialise, he was prepared to encourage the
opposition at Hyderabad with a view to ruining the chances of any
ultimate ratification of the agreement.

1. Parl.Dbs.1881 (C) 11, 15 Aug. (264) 1526-8; 1881, (C) 25 Aug
(265) 875; 1882, (C) 25 Feb. (266) 1572-3; 1882 (L), 21 July (272)
1173-4; 1883 (L) 12 Mar. (277) 155-8; 1888, (C) 29 Nov. (331) 493; 1893
(C) 30 Mar. (10) 1494-5; 1893, (C) 14 Aug. (16) 115; 1893, (C) 17 Nov.
(18) 1147-8.


3. He was Seymour Keay, a Radical Member of Parliament, who had set up
his business as a banker and money-lender at Hyderabad. He could
not find any encouragement from the Nizam. His activities were
notorious to the extent that in 1904 the Government at last contemplated expelling him from the State.

4. LAC, Sir David W.K. Barr to Ampthill, 5, 19 June 1904, vol. 36/1, pt.i,
pp. 69-70, pt.ii, p. 68. Parl.Dbs.1892, (C) 28 Mar. (3) 104-11. PLHC,

5. LAC, Seymour Keay to Curzon, 17 Feb. 1902, para 1, vol. 245, p. 1. He
was believed to have asked from the Nizam Rs. 5 lakhs for settling the
whole affair.

Apart from the situation at Hyderabad itself, the increasing intensity of the Indian nationalist movement had some bearing on the issue in relation to the Nizam's conciliatory attitude towards his nobles and councillors. The Nizam's attempt at conciliation with them was the outcome of his having apparently realised that any un-toward clash with them was likely to be exploited by the Indian nationalists. The Nizam had no wish to see the state's own nobles and jagirdars fall, as it were willingly, in the hands of the nationalists.\(^1\) Already as far back as 1892, the Indian nationalists were believed to have volunteered assistance to persons having grievances against the Government. They were ready to bring any such grievances to the notice of the Press and Parliament through the medium of the British Committee of the Indian Congress.\(^2\) And indeed, some persons connected with the scheme were known to have visited, apart from Hyderabad itself, Gwalior, Bhow and Indore, among other places.\(^3\) Moreover the nationalists had already in 1897 also managed to have their annual Congress in the Nizam's dominions at Berar itself.\(^4\) If the existing rift between the Nizam and his nobles were to become either wide or open, the nationalists were most likely to support the opposition. That in its turn would have meant reverting once again to a state of political deadlock over the issue which the Nizam had at length resolved with Curzon.\(^5\)

2. SPLI, 1896, no. 572, 23 May 1899.
3. SPLI, 1899, no. 576, enc.; C.S. Rayley to Lee-warner, 23 May 1899.
The Nizam was naturally anxious to see that his State was not turned into a centre of political strife and commotion. It had, for instance, been suspected that Indian revolutionaries and political murderers like Chapekar had some substantial support from persons in Hyderabad. But the Nizam, influenced by the traditional loyalty of his house towards the British Government, was seriously opposed to the nationalist ideology. He had, for instance, unlike the Lysore Government (which gave financial support to the nationalists) contributed a huge sum against the Congress campaigns in India.

The Nizam's policy of seeking the support of his nobles was evidence not of any weakness but of his solicitude to maintain the State's own political stability. His nobles and councillors were likely to find, in their opposition to the proposed Agreement, support both from inside and outside the State. The Nizam's own position, on the other hand, was not so strong. It might seem that he could call on the support of the Government of India itself under article 3 of the Treaty of 1855. But as an interested party directly connected with the settlement, the British Government had hardly any reasonable ground and justification to intervene. The relations between the Nizam and his councillors lay entirely outside British purview. The Nizam therefore tried to win the support of his councillors by proposing, on their advice, some specific suggestions.

concerning the settlement.

He promised to submit the suggestions, provided only that Curzon himself approved of their form and tenor, and further promised to plead for them with the home Government. The Nizam accordingly wrote a letter in which he suggested a full and free gift of the Assigned Districts and Hyderabad Contingent to the British Government. He promised to present all that for His Majesty’s gracious acceptance at the auspicious occasion of the King Emperor’s forthcoming coronation in June 1902. He also added, he looked forward to the feasibility of a grant to him of a portion of territories, whether in Berar or elsewhere, yielding a net annual income of Rs. 25 lakhs. That annuity he hoped to utilise, as had been already proposed by the Government of India itself, for the liquidation of the debts.

The idea of some territorial exchange was not altogether new. It was in conformity with what Curzon himself had had under consideration at the time of the Nizam’s own visit to Calcutta. Moreover, the idea had already found practical expression in the case of more than one State with almost similar claims. In 1884, for instance, the fort of Mangalore had been returned to the Mysore Government in return for lands incorporated in the Civil and Military Station there.

2. Ibid. IPP (Intl.) Mar. 1902, no. 131, 14 Feb. 1902.
Territorial exchanges had, moreover, taken place between the British Government and the Government of Hyderabad under the Treaties of 1860 and 1866. 1 And so in putting forth these suggestions the Nizam specifically stated: "I have not the least desire to back out of my agreement in any manner whatever". "It has never been my habit to depart from my pledged word", which, he emphatically added, "will stand, come what may". 2 Indeed, even apart from the finality and permanence of his decision, his general integrity and seriousness in keeping himself to his word, were fully known to both Curzon and the Resident, Colonel Barr. 3

The Nizam’s suggestions, as was evident from their very form and nature, were aimed at vindicating and possibly enhancing his prestige among the Indian Princes and Chiefs. Moreover, his suggestions were calculated to give him, he pointed out in the letter, an assurance that he had given a practical proof of his respect for the memories and sentiments of his ancestors who had wanted the complete restitution of the Assigned Districts. 4 The Nizam, as Hamilton rightly observed, had little desire to pick a quarrel over the issue by any unbecoming reputation. 5 His suggestions had the form and nature of a personal and private letter and not of a formal petition. The letter was addressed in an unassuming, friendly and not official

manner, to the Resident, with whom the Nizam had a close and intimate friendship. It was, as a matter of fact, nothing more than an informal query between friends which also finished outright on such. It was not pressed forward at any stage either by the Nizam personally or by his councillors officially for any serious consideration of the Government of India. The Nizam scrupulously refrained from that, even though the Resident asked him to submit a formal application to that effect.

The Nizam's letter was a very convenient yet subtle device for taking the sting out of the opposition of his nobles and councillors. The suggestions that it bore were only apparently, but not actually in line with their ideas and hopes for the restitution of the Assigned Districts. His suggestions revolved round the idea of preference for an absolute territorial cession in perpetuity rather than towards a desire (as cherished by his councillors) for the retrocession of the districts. He had merely suggested that he would prefer receiving, if possible, the annual rental of Rs.25 lakhs in the shape of some territory anywhere else instead of the net cash or even of the Assigned Districts. He was quite ready, not merely to abide by his earlier decision in respect of the Agreement. More than that he was also equally ready to go to the extent of suggesting a total withdrawal of his own sovereign authority from the territories of Hera.

As an intelligent and shrewd person the Nizam had fully realised that the strength of the opposition would be effectively curbed, not by the application of force and authority but rather with patience, tact and forbearance. The result was that the Nizam could not formally conclude the agreement immediately after the interview at Hyderabad. But the delay turned out to the advantage of the State. It enabled the Nizam to secure not only the approval of his councillors, but also still better terms, as Curzon remarked, with 'liberality even greater than we had anticipated' for the ultimate ratification of the agreement. In the matter of ratifying and also improving upon the terms, the Nizam as well as Curzon showed a similar spirit of mutual goodwill and frankness which had earlier characterised their meeting at Hyderabad.

Before the formal conclusion of the Agreement there were a few points which the Hyderabad Government brought to the notice of the Government of India. Those points were not raised as either conditions or objections to the agreement but simply as considerations for the notice and ultimate decision of the Government of India itself.

With almost all of those Curzon himself fully agreed.

of the annuity of Rs.29 lakhs and the payments to be made to the Nizam were spread more evenly over the next thirty years. The total amount was now to be distributed as follows: (a) Rs.10 lakhs to the Nizam, (b) Rs.7 lakhs towards the Berar Famine Loan of Rs.14,095,000 and (c) Rs.8 lakhs towards the Hyderabad Famine Loan of Rs.20,000,000. It was further agreed that the Nizam's Government should be absolved from all future responsibility, financial or otherwise, if ever unhappily any famine occurred in the assigned Districts. At the same time it was concluded that if the Hyderabad Contingent be incorporated in the Indian Army, all free amnaha (i.e., free lands and quarters) hitherto granted to the troops should revert to the State's Government. 2

With the ratification of the terms to the satisfaction of the contracting parties, the Agreement of Berar was at last formally concluded on 5 November 1902. 3 It was only a short time before the Durbar at Delhi that, after a little more delay, the agreement was published in the Gazette of India. 4 It carried with it all the necessary, relevant official correspondence for public information concerning what the King, quite succinctly observed, "a satisfactory agreement with the Nizam." 5

1. The balance of the principal sums outstanding at the time of the agreement was Rs.18,500,000 for the Berar and Hyderabad Famine loans respectively.


5. SCG, His Majesty to Curzon, 6 Nov. 1902, vol.136, p.28.
SECTION III

Why was Curzon so interested in the settlement of Berar? Curzon’s interest in the agreement with his various practical measures and doctrines concerning efficiency and economy. That had also much to do with his own singular sense of fairness and justice as a pressing and urgent moral obligation in conformity with his own conception of imperialism, and because of that ethical element in his political thought he felt that the nizam had been almost bled white under the terms of the existing Treaties. He realised that all the more so on account of the heavy cost of the expensive British Administration in Berar.

So doubt article 4 of the Treaty of 1860 had itself specifically laid down that the account spent on the administration of Berar was to be entirely at the discretion of the British Government. But while not overlooking the latitude under the Treaty, Curzon nonetheless felt differently. He held that the Government should not disregard the obligations, morally imposed on it, to secure as large a surplus for the nizam as possible. The Berar Administration, though free

5. Parl. Ps. 1867 (556) 1, Sir Charles Wood to CGL, 18 June 1867, para 10.
from reproach on technical grounds, was yet not altogether blameless. It was, certainly "open to criticism, on grounds both of equity and economy" in that it had not been managed with the same financial care as would have been insisted upon if it had been British territory.1 In the circumstances, he suggested reducing the expenditure without violating, as the Home Authority had impressed upon him, the fundamental principles of the existing Treaties. The terms of the Agreement were accordingly formulated by him in such a way as to provide the only effective and sure way of providing adequate savings for the payment of a greater surplus to the Nizam.2

In the opinion of some of the Authorities in India, there were two methods by which the Government of India might obtain better results and secure some substantialSurplus for the Nizam. It was contemplated that apart from the reduction of sinecure offices, the Government of India should supply the local administration with both a stimulus and a check. That might have been done by reserving for payment to the Nizam, a fixed sum to be revised periodically by leaving the remaining revenue to the Resident for the civil as well as military expenditure of Berar.3 In other words, the idea was to Provincialise all the civil and military expenditure, subject to the payment to the Nizam in ordinary years of a fixed Surplus.4 It was suggested that should the idea be approved, the same to be reserved would be

2. Part. En., 1902 (Cont. 2459) supra, 601, En., to the J.S.I., 13 Nov. 1902 paras 5-8, pp. 2-5.
fixed at not less than Rs.13½ lakhs a year. That amount, as a matter of fact, was the equivalent sum for the average surplus as paid to the Nizam in the twenty years previous to 1892-3. ¹

The scheme for laying aside a specified amount out of the Berar revenue and leaving all the rest with the Resident did not seem likely to provide any final settlement of the issue. It had some apparent defects. It did not conform, either with the spirit of the existing Treaties, or with the object of securing sufficient and sure relief for the finances of the Government of Hyderabad and India. The Nizam was entitled to the whole, and not, as suggested, some part of the Surplus available. ² Periodic revisions of the financial arrangements, or terminable lease, were, moreover, quite likely to result in complicating and postponing rather than facilitating any final settlement of the issue. ³ There was, also, no surety that the Berar revenues, which were already at a point of maximum saturation, would yield any further income for the enlarged annuity to the Nizam. ⁴ Besides, the Berar Administration had been for some time running under a considerable deficit. It had, for instance, even drawn upon its own reserve while impairing also the meagre and fluctuating Surplus

3. Ibid. LCC, Memo on the Berar Question, 25 Sept.1901, vol.245, pp.6;
4. Its revenues had shown an increase from Rs.32 lakhs in 1860 to Rs.78 lakhs in 1898. Anyway it was estimated that by the time the new settlements in progress were completed, the land revenues would stand at Rs.93 lakhs. IPP(Intl.) Feb.1900, no.32, 17 Nov.1899, encl.ii, Memo. supra, para 7; Feb.1901, no.109, 3 Oct.1900, paras 1-4.
payable to the Nizam. Moreover, calculations had abundantly brought out that for 20 to 30 years from 1906, (when the general revision of settlements then in progress was completed), the revenue would remain almost stationary.

With a view to effect economy in the interests of both the Nizam and the British Administration in Berar, there was an equally sound and convenient alternative. That Curzon succeeded in working out following the Nizam’s consent to the agreement, he could do so by dispensing with the separate establishment of the Berar Administration which had been so long maintained under the Treaties of 1853 and 1860. The Treaties had specifically laid down that the Berar Administration was to have an exclusive character and existence of its own under the control of the British Resident at Hyderabad.

Curzon wanted Berar to become part of the adjoining Central Provinces under a strong and unified system. That would, he held, promote efficiency and economy without violating either the spirit of the existing Treaties or the interests of the contracting parties to the perpetual lease of Berar.
In October 1903 the Berar Administration was, as expected by most of the people in the area, transferred to the Central Provinces. The amalgamation of the two administrations, however, differed much from that of Oudh with the North-Western Province which had been effected under Lytton after the Imperial Assemblage Delhi. On the earlier occasion in 1877 the Chief Commissioner of Oudh had been made the Lieut.-Governor of the United Provinces. The new Administration of the Central Provinces and Berar however continued to be under the Chief Commissioner. Curzon himself did not doubt or dispute that the Central Provinces ultimately "will and ought to develop by sundry of these accretions into a Lieut.-Governorship."

Despite the amalgamation, and "permanent addition to the British Empire in India" of 4,750,000 persons, the new administration could not yet be given any higher status. Any change of the kind necessitating a Lieut.-Governor, as the head of the new Province, required not simply administrative union, but specific legislation. Moreover, a change of the sort would have conflicted with the Nizam's Sovereign rights over the Assigned Districts. The Nizam's Sovereignty, as explicitly reaffirmed in the agreement itself, was by no means impaired by the perpetual lease.

local legislature. The Acts of the Indian Legislative Council could not apply \textit{pro proprio vigore} to the new Administration which was still not legally a part of British India. They could however be, as was the case of British possession of Quetta, made applicable to it by Executive Order of the Governor-General-in-Council.\textsuperscript{1}

Being undoubtedly a convenient means for reducing the cost and interlacing of the two contiguous Administrations, the amalgamation was hailed by the Press as the obviously right and reasonable move. Even though many of the nationalist newspapers could not appreciate the nature and purpose of the perpetual lease, yet the act of amalgamation did not excite any strong or adverse criticism.\textsuperscript{2} The idea of administrative union was, however, not altogether a recent one. Already as far back as 1860 the Government of India had contemplated a similar move with a view to reducing the expenses incurred on the administrative system of Berar. It had, for instance, tried to prevail upon the Nizam's father Afzal-ud-Daulah to allow the Assigned District to be placed under the Commissioner of Nagpur for similar purposes of economy and administrative efficiency.\textsuperscript{3}

The main source of increase in the total expenditure of the Berar Administration had been caused by the heavier military establishments connected with the Hyderabad Contingent.\textsuperscript{4} The Contingent had its headquarters at Nolarum, with six military stations at Hingoli.

4. ITP(Intl.) Feb.1901, no.160, 19 Feb.1900; no.162, 19 Aug.1900. PLC\textsuperscript{es.}, to the Nizam's Minister, 7 May 1902, para 5(i)
Jalna, Raichur, Ellichpur, Aurangabad and Nominabad. The stations involved a cost of about Rs. 1,075,563 annually for the pay and allowances of the six infantry regiments. At the same time all the buildings and military works at the various stations were paid for out of serar revenues.

By Curzon's time the increased strength and reorganisation of the Contingent had raised its expenditure from about Rs. 24 lakhs in 1861-2 to Rs. 4,232,000 in 1898-9. The total annual cost of the Contingent during the last ten years (1892-93 to 1902-03) had not been in any year less than Rs. 37 lakhs. At the same time the total military charges of the serar administration had also steadily increased. Whereas the military expenditure taken as a whole stood at Rs. 3,784,243 in 1891-92, it had just a year before Curzon's arrival in India increased by 16 per cent and amounted to Rs. 4,391,415. All that presented a sharp contrast with the situation in 1893. Under the Treaty of 1855, the total military charges had been limited to an amount of Rs. 30.5 lakhs, with only Rs. 2,675,000 for the cost of Contingent, and Rs. 575,000 for miscellaneous expenditure.

1. (Br. off. 1899, no. Thos. GORC to the SOSI, 27 Apr. 1899, encl. Confidential.)
2. JFP. Jan. 1901, no. 61, The serar Sec., to the Fgn. Sec., GOI, 19 Feb. 1900, encl. 1, 3 Feb. 1900.
4. JFP. Jan. 1900, no. 81, the SOSI to the GOIC, 7 May 1899, encl. 1, 19 Mar. 1899.
No doubt the increased price of grain and famine conditions even before Curzon's own period, besides the reorganisation consequent upon the Contingent's employment in the Burmese campaign had necessarily added to the heavy burden of the military expenditure on the Administration.\(^1\) The increased expenditure was, however, the outcome mainly of the existing military system in the assigned Districts. The resident had vague and undefined powers in relation to military expenditure, almost without any check or control. Under the terms of the treaties of 1855 and 1860 he was not subject to any restraint from above in the matter of military costs.\(^2\) That meant that he had little check or restraint even from the Government of India itself.\(^3\) The Treaty of 1855 had itself specifically laid down that the contingent was to be "controlled by the British Government through its representative the Resident at Hyderabad".\(^4\)

The existing military system of the Government of India was not conducive to vigorous and strict control over the military expenditure and personnel in India. The military as such had a hold and strength of its own even in the executive council of the viceroy which, unlike the British Cabinet, had two seats for the 'military party'.

regards the Indian military expenditure, even the India Council itself was, similarly, as Sir Henry Fowler observed, "absolutely shut out from any advice or any interference with that". Evidently all that contrasted strongly with the authority of the Secretary of State who was not "allowed a five pound note without having a majority of the Council concurring". 

Curzon was by no means ready to yield to the Military Authorities in the matter of incurring any wasteful expenditure. He was anxious to effect savings in the military expenditure throughout India. Indeed he tried to do that in more than one way, having little hesitation, for that purpose even in opposing, on occasion, the Military Authorities both in India and London. In the circumstances he was naturally inclined to reduce the expenditure also in relation to the total military cost of the British Administration in Berar.

The reduction in the expenditure of Berar which the Government of India under Curzon had been, of late, endeavouring to secure, was an acute need of the hour. It was bound to be so because of considerations of a practical nature arising out of the terms of the perpetual lease and Berar's own limited financial resources. The total financial means of Berar Administration were, according to the latest calculations, deemed to be incapable of yielding at any time an income beyond the maximum amount of Rs. 103^{\frac{1}{2}} lakhs. However all

1. varl.jobs.1899, (C) 14 Feb. (55) 554.
2. See (regarding Curzon's differences with the Military Authorities.) varl.jobs.1900, (257)xlvi, p.549.
3. loc. cit. Curzon's lease on Berar, supra, pp.4-5.
that income was still far below the total (civil, military and political) expenditure of about Rs. 15,069,000.1 There was thus an absolute necessity for the Nizam Administration to effect some substantial reduction in the cost of the Contingent and military establishments in the State.

To reduce the military expenditure the Resident had proposed to have the number of six existing regiments cut down to four. The proposed reduction of a regiment, even though not possible under the terms of the Treaties, was yet not likely to yield a saving of more than Rs. 1,356,000 per annum.2 That seemed too meagre a sum when compared with the total military expenditure or even with the much needed sum of Rs. 45 lakhs to be paid as annuity to the Nizam. In the circumstances Curzon realised that the economy for securing adequate savings as surplus would not be served by occasional reductions carried out in the administrative hierarchy.3 All that was needed could be effectively secured in actual practice only by the redistribution, apart from any reduction, of the Hyderabad Contingent as a whole.4 Curzon accordingly planned under the terms of the Agreement to reduce the military charges by bringing about the incorporation of the contingent with the Indian Army.5 This was done in April 1903.6

1. The total amount in such comprised the expenditure as follows:
   Rs. 4,793,236 (Civil), Rs. 4,307,651 (Military), Rs. 2,500,000 (Political)


3. JF II (Int'l) Aug. 1899, no. 211, to the GOC, 5 Oct. 1899; no. 212, GOC II to the JOSI, 17 Aug. 1899.


6. Parl. Rs. 1903 (249) xlvi, MMPI, p. 302. 1904 (186) xliii; MMPI, p. 188; 190 (180) lvii; MMPI, p. 192; 190-195 (175) lxxiii, MMPI, pp. 190, 196-7.
Curzon's keen interest in bringing about the settlement was an index of his own convictions as to the feasibility of improving the Treaties to the mutual advantage of the parties. As Curzon told the Nizam, the agreement was a serious and honest attempt towards effecting some improvements. It was meant neither to deprive the Nizam of his sovereign rights over the districts, nor to impair the economic interests of the Hyderabad State. The Government did not mean to violate any of the existing obligations which the Treaties of 1853 and 1860 had imposed on it concerning the payment of surplus and the defence and security of the state. As Curzon himself privately recorded, the terms for the perpetual lease of Berar were designed as "supplementing and amending rather than superseding the Treaties".

Curzon wanted to enable the Government of India, under the agreement of Berar, to provide substantial relief against the heavy expenditure in the assigned districts. He hoped to secure that by undertaking a revision of the existing Treaties with a view to a convenient and economical redistribution of the administrative and military arrangements. The purpose, quite evidently, was to help the Hyderabad State build up its faltering economy. And that could be best ensured by providing the Nizam, in the first instance, with an

increased surplus. The amount of the surplus under the terms of the agreement was accordingly increased. It was to be almost three times more than the average income of the Nizam during the four previous decades. ¹

The Agreement of Verar was basically an instrument of reform. It was meant not merely to invigorate the weak political economy of the state and stop any further controversy over the issue of Verar. ² It was also in the nature of a move towards helping the state to improve its social structure. The most important step in that direction was the deliberate and well-calculated reduction of the state's irregular troops. ³ They were, as the swadimitram (Madras) aptly observed, nothing but "idlers" and parasites, a standing danger to the internal peace and security of the state. ⁴ Indeed the dangerous increase in their total strength in the state had, since the time of Dalhousie, engaged the attention of the Government of India. ⁵ Having at last agreed to their reduction, the Nizam was the first in the history of his dynasty who turned his thought in the direction of

⁴ SPDI, 1900, no.267, 22 Jan, para 88(i) vol.120, p.127. LCC, Rsdt's Confidential Home., 6 Aug.1900, vol.245, p.7.
⁵ Parl.Ps.1854 (413) xlvii, Dalhousie's Minute, op.cit., para 24, p.105.
dealing with this long-standing menace. They were the main prop of the great power and influence of the feudal jagirdars in the State. Besides sapping the vitality of the State and its resources they as much as their overlords were an obstacle to the material and moral progress of its people. A reduction in strength of the Nizam’s irregulars was therefore a social benefit. The Agreement of Sear, with its own sociological and economic values, consequently turned out to be a permanent and final settlement of the issue. No succeeding Government, despite the reshuffling in the Party politics at home could either doubt its fairness, or improve upon its equitable terms as concluded under Curzon. The settlement made as such in 1902 successfully withstood the tests and challenges of time long after him

2. SPLR, 1900, no. 267, 15 Jan. para 62 (iv) vol. 120, p. 89.
In dissociating himself from the viewpoint of his councillors, the Nizam was led by his own thinking, which differed from that of Sir Salar. During Sir Salar's life the Nizam’s own view over the issue of Berar had not found full expression. That was mainly owing to the fact that, as the Resident, Colonel Barr, observed, Sir Salar had "maintained the rule of a dictator even after the Nizam was invested with ruling powers". However, the Nizam's discreet silence over the matter had been not unnatural. He felt a genuine respect and attachment towards the Minister-Regent, even though in 1867 his father had come to the point of breaking away from and turning Sir Salar out of office. However, the Nizam had of late come to differ from him. So shortly before Sir Salar’s death in 1883, his removal from office was, in a way, the natural outcome of his own strong views and conflicts with the Authorities in India on the subject of Berar. Moreover, already during the Nizam’s minority, Sir Salar’s own colleague and co-Regent, the Ameer-i-kabir had, quite strongly, declined to join hands with the Minister-Regent in pressing for the Assigned Districts.

3. Syed H. Bilgrami, A Memoir of Sir Salar, pp.52-64.
The differences over Berar had been bound up with the growing radicalism in the thought and policy of Sir Salar. While looking for the total restoration of Berar as the mission of his life, he was suspected by many, including Lord Lytton, of actively hostile intentions against the British Government. He was suspected of wanting to assert the 'Sovereign' and independent position of the State, even though that did not fit in with the traditional loyalty and policy of the Hyderabad state and its rulers. Also, he was supposed to have entered into confidential correspondence with some South Indian rulers like Holkar of Indore for the Peishwaship of the Deccan. He was understood to have been thinking of establishing at any rate his own premiership over the Deccan States. He was presumed to be harbouring designs for the early downfall of the British power in India. At the same time he was equally keen to secure, for the realisation of his ambitious projects, any possible help from the English press, the English money-market and the English Parliament.

In the circumstances, Sir Salar's policy was apparently, as Lytton observed, "quite incompatible with satisfactory relations between the Paramount and sub-ordinate governments".

1. Lord Lytton persistently suspected Sir Salar of hostile 'moves', and he spoke of him to Lord Salisbury as 'the most dangerous man in India', 'like a horse, or a woman that has turned once vicious, though irreclaimable'. Lytton to Salisbury, 2 July, 1877, vol. 516/2, p. 559.

2. The role of the Chamaraj (Tokaj Holkar) during the Indian Mutiny had been gravely suspected by the Government of India. He was also believed to have been as was evident from his views during the Russian-Turkish war-in favour of any Eastern Scuffle against the Europeans. Lytton, Sir Wally to Northbrook, 3 Sept., 1877, vol. 18, p. 182.


4. Ibid., Lytton to Northbrook, 7 Nov., 1877, vol. 18, p. 250.

The ideas of the nizam's councillors, too, had little appeal for the nizam, mainly because they thought only of the retrocession of the districts. They were unwilling to compromise. But the Nizam no less than Curzon himself had been looking towards some compromise as a solution of the problem. Before Curzon's viceroyalty, the Nizam had already begun to tackle the issue in his own calm and calculating way. He realized the desirability of some modification of the extremity of his minister-regent. He gave no serious thought to Sir Salar's latest and last wish to take him to England. Sir Salar had planned the visit ostensibly with a view to press the British Government for the retrocession of the territories, but never since his investiture had the Nizam even once thought it either proper or useful to pay a visit to England.

The support of English public opinion, which Sir Salar had abundantly secured both in India and England, had its effect. But it worked in the direction of strengthening instead of weakening the nizam's policy, for he could see that the force of public opinion had failed altogether to produce any favourable impact on British policy towards Secur, which had remained just the same, and he not realized at the same time, the intentions and also practical difficulties of the British Government, the nizam would have hardly reconciled himself to the idea of a perpetual lease. As Curzon observed, he was a strong-willed, autocratic person, particularly when dealing with the

1. with a view to raise popular support abroad, Sir Salar had spent a huge sum amounting to not less than £700,000 in addition to a large quantity of extremely valuable state jewels. Lt.Ps., Lytton to the Queen and Cabinet, 26 Aug. 1900, vol. 310/1, pp. 403, 409.
Government of India on any issue touching his 'Sovereign' status and dignity. His differences with his councillors and his remarkable equanimity over the issue of Berar were the outcome of his own calculations as to the policy and intentions of the British Government. Why did he not give his consent at an earlier date than that of the Viceroy's visit to Hyderabad, if he was not opposed to the idea of a lease in perpetuity? No doubt Curzon, as much as the Nizam himself did not believe in the practicability of any outright restitution of the Assigned Districts. So long, however, as one could still think that the state had a chance of getting back Berar, the Nizam was quite inclined to explore the possibility of doing so by personal discussion with the Viceroy. Moreover, at the same time he was, as Curzon himself observed, "more affected by considerations of personal prestige than by anything else". Outright compliance on his part might have seemed nothing short of subservience. And it would not have secured him so much prestige as an attitude of deliberate reserve, reasonable assertion and personal negotiation with the Viceroy. As Curzon put it, that illustrated "the familiar attitude of the Oriental who declines in advance in order to be able, with a superior grace, to give way later on".

The Nizam's calculated reserve on the earlier occasion in face

1. PLCH, 9, 16 May 1900, vol.xvii, pp.81,95.
of the decision of his councillors against the proposed terms was not
dborn of any sense of weakness or fear. It had instead its origin
in more than one factor - his own sense of constitutionalism, his
extremely cautious outlook, as well as his doubts and misgivings as
to the exercise of sole discretionary powers for the settlement of a
highly vexed problem. Side by side with his respect for the State's
constitution, which he had of late himself introduced, he had also
an intensely cautious and even timid, yet equally sceptical bent of
mind. And as such, it was not unreasonable for him to feel some-
what doubtful regarding his personal rights and powers in the matter
of improving upon the State's existing Treaties with the British
Government.

He doubt the Treaties of 1855 and 1860 had specifically recognised
the Nizam's own exclusive powers in relation to the State's existing
Treaties with the British Government. The personal nature of the
relationship between the contracting parties had been equally recog-
nised in actual practice by Lord Salisbury, in having, for instance,
deferred the settlement of the issue in 1873 only in view of the
Nizam's own minority. But the fast changing social and political
conditions had created a very solid basis for the Nizam's scepticism

1. On account of his firm and strong conduct the Nizam's presence, any-
where among his people and nobles, "inspired awe and respect". (PLNC,
17 May 1906, vol.ii, p.189). And as Curzon himself observed the
Nizam who was "far from wanting in shrewdness or even character", had
a reputation for courage and determination. The fact remained that
"all his own people in hyderabad tremble at the turn of his head".


3. Parli. Prs. 1867(356) 1, supra, pp.26-3; 1924-5(cmd.2439) supra., pp.62,

4. Parli. Prs. 1902 (cmd.1521) lxxi, Sosi to GGOI, 28 Mar. 1878, para 10,
p.6.
in view of the attitude of his nobles and councilors. Curzon's interview, which was held with the Nizam himself alone dispelled the confusion. The occasion brought out the Nizam's personal discretionary rights, without any further possibility of doubt or dispute, in the matter of improving upon the Treaties. ¹

SECTION II

The differences between the Nizam and his councillors became much more pronounced after the Nizam's interview and consent. The result was that there elapsed between his consent and the actual ratification of the Agreement a further period of not less than six months. ² The delay thus caused had much to do with the intrigues and obstructive tactics of the Nizam's councillors and nobles. Those hostile to the Agreement endeavoured during that period to persuade the Nizam to escape from it even though he had personally given his consent to the Viceroy. The Nizam on his part tried to bring them round to his own views in order to secure their unanimous approval. ³ Just as he had done even before Curzon's arrival at Hyderabad the Nizam was earnestly desirous of carrying them with him in the matter. ⁴

¹ The principle a. to the maintenance of personal elements in treaty relationships was equally supported by Curzon on still another important occasion. He did that during his negotiations for renewing the Agreement of Friendship with Afghanistan after the death of Amir Amir Bahman on 30 Sept. 1901. PRAI, 9, 16 Oct., 11 Nov. 1901, vol. xxxi pp. 97, 197, 199.

² var. 1902 ( Misc. 1902) lxxi, P.M. Sec. GOI to the SSSI, 15 Nov. 1902, pp. 17, 2, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4; addendum to memorandum of the agreement, pp. 23-4


...why did the Nizam seek the support and co-operation of his councillors and nobles if he was himself sure as to the soundness of his decision? Moreover, how did he succeed in bringing them round to his own views?

As the reputed author of the famous *Janache*, which ushered in a new era of constitutional reform for the state in 1893, the Nizam had, quite naturally, a great preference for constitutional practice. It was for the first time in the annals of Hyderabad that besides the separation of executive from legislature under him, the non-official element had even achieved a voice in the government and administration of the state. The Nizam's powers of setting aside the decisions of his council were limited. The council was not a consultative body. It was not the Nizam but the Prime Minister who, as the president of the council, and the right of overriding any majority decision, subject, of course, to the Nizam's ultimate consent. The Nizam did not at any stage, either before or after Curzon's arrival at Hyderabad, want to defy the utterance of his councillors over the issue. Moreover, there was on him the influence also of his early training and education. Persons, for instance, of the calibre of Captain John Clarke, squerry to his royal highness the Duke of Edinburgh, had been selected for the Nizam's early tuition. The Queen herself had shown a great personal interest in the matter.

2. Ibid., Note on Hyderabad Affairs, 26 Mar. 1902, vol. 245, p. 3.
3. Ibid., Rashidul Khan, a History of Administrative Reforms in Hyderabad, pp. 74-61.
The nizams could hardly have afforded to ignore the strength of the opposition against the agreement without danger to the internal peace and progress of the state. Apart from the vast hordes of foreign mercenaries, the total strength of the unruly yet armed body of the nobles' feudal retainers was roughly estimated as equal to that of the state's own regular forces. The 19,500 irregulars in the state constituted for the nobles and jagirdars a very substantial power.\(^1\) Despite the pressure of advice from the British Government itself since the time of Dalhousie, none of the Nizams had either dared or agreed to reduce the irregulars' strength.\(^2\) The Hyderabad Government, for instance, once in 1865 having touched some feudal privileges by a new system of duties levied on internal trade, had found itself face to face with the danger of serious internal strife.\(^3\) And it was on account of such dangers, that the Contingent had been further strengthened by the maintenance of the Subsidiary Force.\(^4\)

In doubt, on account of the general guarantee of British protection to the Indian states at large, the Nizams had nothing much to worry about in face of the strength of his feudal nobles and jagirdars but his reaction against their power and opposition was not that of fear but of caution. The lurking danger of revolt consequent upon the preponderance of the Indian mercenaries and foreigners in the

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State had not yet completely died out. It was, for instance, quite a problem for the authorities to deal strongly and effectively even with the minor groups of freebooters and brigands abounding in the state. The latter had quite convenient protection and security in the conclaves of the foreign territory of the various feudal overlords that lay outside the direct authority of the State. The dangers associated with an antiquated system of administration had thus resulted mainly in adding to the strength and power of the state's powerful nobles and jagirdars.

Dissension and strife of one sort or another had nearly always been going on amongst the different factions of the Nizam's nobles and courtiers. And as a result Hyderabad had gradually turned into nothing short of 'a hotbed of intrigue'. So doubt the history of many other native courts at that time was equally replete with horrible instances of corruption and crime, perfidy and treachery, besides murder and death by poisoning and danger. But the Nizam's court was among the very worst of the type. It was, as Lord George Hamilton observed, more or less in the nature of 'a sink of iniquity'. It had the trappings and all the ill humour of dragging into its meshes of intrigue and corruption the names and reputations of many of the officers of
the Government of India. The Resident, Colonel Barr, could not help representing it to Curzon as "a nest of every sort of villainy and corruption".

The atmosphere of general corruption and intrigue at Hyderabad had of late worsened considerably, owing to the undesirable presence there of some notorious foreign money-lenders, brokers and bankers. Some of them endeavoured to make capital out of the situation. At least one of them tried, though with little success, to make a deal with the Hyderabad Government over the issue of Berar. With a view to getting some sort of bribe, reward or solatium from the state, he professed to being in possession of some special knowledge which would facilitate the restitution of Berar. At the same time, in case his hopes failed to materialise, he was prepared to encourage the opposition at Hyderabad with a view to ruining the chances of any ultimate ratification of the Agreement.

1. Parl. Dbs. 1881 (C) 11, 15 Aug. (264) 1526-8; 1916-17; 1881, (C) 25 Aug. (265) 375; 1882, (C) 25 Aug. (266) 1372-3; 1882 (L), 21 July (272) 1175-4; 1883 (L) 14 Nov. (277) 155-8; 1888, (C) 29 Nov. (331) 493; 1893 (C) 50 Mar. (10) 1494-5; 1893, (C) 14 Aug. (16) 115; 1893, (C) 17 Nov. (18) 1147-8.


3. He was Seymour Key, a Radical Member of Parliament, who had set up his business as a banker and money-lender at Hyderabad. He could not find any encouragement from the Nizam. His activities were notorious to the extent that in 1904 the Government at last contemplated expelling him from the state.


5. LAC, Seymour Key to Curzon, 17 Feb. 1902, para 1, vol. 245, p. 1. He was believed to have asked from the Nizam Rs. 5 lakhs for settling the whole affair.

Apart from the situation at Hyderabad itself, the increasing intensity of the Indian nationalist movement had some bearing on the issue in relation to the Nizam’s conciliatory attitude towards his nobles and councillors. The Nizam’s attempt at conciliation with them was the outcome of his having apparently realised that any untoward clash with them was likely to be exploited by the Indian nationalists. The Nizam had no wish to see the State’s own nobles and jagirdars fall, as it were willingly, in the hands of the nationalists. Already as far back as 1892, the Indian nationalists were believed to have volunteered assistance to persons having grievances against the Government. They were ready to bring any such grievances to the notice of the Press and Parliament through the medium of the British Committee of the Indian Congress. And indeed, some persons connected with the scheme were known to have visited, apart from Hyderabad itself, Cawalior, Bhow and Indore, among other places. Moreover the nationalists had already in 1897 also managed to have their annual Congress in the Nizam’s dominions at Berar itself. If the existing rift between the Nizam and his nobles were to become either wide or open, the nationalists were most likely to support the opposition. That in its turn would have meant reverting once again to a state of political deadlock over the issue which the Nizam had at length resolved with Curzon.

2. SPH, 1899, no. 972, 23 May 1899.
3. SPH, 1899, no. 972, enc1., C. S. Wayley to Lee-warner, 23 May 1899.
The Nizam was naturally anxious to see that his State was not turned into a centre of political strife and commotion. It had, for instance, been suspected that Indian revolutionaries and political murderers like Chapekar had some substantial support from persons in Hyderabad. But the Nizam, influenced by the traditional loyalty of his house towards the British Government, was seriously opposed to the nationalist ideology. He had, for instance, unlike the Nysore Government (which gave financial support to the nationalists) contributed a huge sum against the congress campaigns in India.

The Nizam's policy of seeking the support of his nobles was evidence not of any weakness but of his solicitude to maintain the State's own political stability. His nobles and councillors were likely to find, in their opposition to the proposed Agreement, support both from inside and outside the State. The Nizam's own position, on the other hand, was not so strong. It might seem that he could call on the support of the Government of India itself under article 3 of the Treaty of 1855. But as an interested party directly connected with the settlement, the British Government had hardly any reasonable ground and justification to intervene. The relations between the Nizam and his councillors lay entirely outside British purview. The Nizam therefore tried to win the support of his councillors by proposing, on their advice, some specific suggestions.

concerning the settlement.

He promised to submit the suggestions, provided only that Curzon himself approved of their form and tenor, and further promised to plead for them with the home Government. The Nizam accordingly wrote a letter in which he suggested a full and free gift of the Assigned Districts and Hyderabad Contingent to the British Government. He promised to present all that for His Majesty's gracious acceptance at the auspicious occasion of the King Emperor's forthcoming coronation in June 1902. He also added, he looked forward to the feasibility of a regrant to him of a portion of territories, whether in Berar or elsewhere, yielding a net annual income of Rs. 25 lakhs. That annuity he hoped to utilise, as had been already proposed by the Government of India itself, for the liquidation of the debts.

The idea of some territorial exchange was not altogether new. It was in conformity with what Curzon himself had had under consideration at the time of the Nizam's own visit to Calcutta. Moreover, the idea had already found practical expression in the case of more than one State with almost similar claims. In 1884, for instance, the Fort of Bangalore had been returned to the Mysore Government in return for lands incorporated in the Civil and Military Station there.

2. Ibid. IPP (Int'l) Mar.1902, no. 131, 14 Feb. 1902.
Territorial exchanges had, moreover, taken place between the British Government and the Government of Hyderabad under the Treaties of 1800 and 1860. 1 And so in putting forth these suggestions the Nizam specifically stated: "I have not the least desire to back out of my agreement in any manner whatever". "It has never been my habit to depart from my pledged word", which, he emphatically added, "will stand, come what may". 2 Indeed, even apart from the finality and permanence of his decision, his general integrity and seriousness in keeping himself to his word, were fully known to both Curzon and the Resident, Colonel Barr. 3

The Nizam's suggestions, as was evident from their very form and nature, were aimed at vindicating and possibly enhancing his prestige among the Indian Princes and Chiefs. Moreover, his suggestions were calculated to give him, he pointed out in the letter, an assurance that he had given a practical proof of his respect for the memories and sentiments of his ancestors who had wanted the complete restitution of the Assigned Districts. 4 The Nizam, as Hamilton rightly observed, had little desire to pick a quarrel over the issue by any unbecoming repudiation. 5 His suggestions had the form and nature of a personal and private letter and not of a formal petition. The letter was addressed in an unassuming, friendly and not official

manner, to the Resident, with whom the Nizam had a close and intimate friendship. It was, as a matter of fact, nothing more than an informal query between friends which also finished outright on such. It was not pressed forward at any stage either by the Nizam personally or by his councillors officially for any serious consideration of the Government of India. The Nizam scrupulously refrained from that, even though the Resident asked him to submit a formal application to that effect.

The Nizam's letter was a very convenient yet subtle device for taking the sting out of the opposition of his nobles and councillors. The suggestions that it bore were only apparently, but not actually in line with their ideas and hopes for the restitution of the Assigned Districts. His suggestions revolved round the idea of preference for an absolute territorial cession in perpetuity rather than towards a desire (as cherished by his councillors) for the retrocession of the districts. He had merely suggested that he would prefer receiving, if possible, the annual rental of Rs.75 lakhs in the shape of some territory anywhere else instead of the net cash or even of the Assigned Districts. He was quite ready, not merely to abide by his earlier decision in respect of the Agreement. More than that he was also equally ready to go to the extent of suggesting a total withdrawal of his own sovereign authority from the territories of Bera.


As an intelligent and shrewd person the Nizam had fully realised that the strength of the opposition would be effectively curbed, not by the application of force and authority but rather with patience, tact and forbearance. The result was that the Nizam could not formally conclude the agreement immediately after the interview at Hyderabad. But the delay turned out to the advantage of the State. It enabled the Nizam to secure not only the approval of his councillors, but also still better terms, as Curzon remarked, with "liberality even greater than we had anticipated" for the ultimate ratification of the agreement. In the matter of ratifying and also improving upon the terms, the Nizam as well as Curzon showed a similar spirit of mutual goodwill and frankness which had earlier characterised their meeting at Hyderabad.

Before the formal conclusion of the Agreement there were a few points which the Hyderabad government brought to the notice of the Government of India. Those points were not raised as either conditions or objections to the agreement but simply as considerations for the notice and ultimate decision of the Government of India itself. With almost all of these Curzon himself fully agreed.

4. All that was subsequently appreciated by the Government quite surprisingly, with the award of the high distinction of the Order of Grand Cross of Bath to the Nizam on the occasion of the Durbar at Delhi. LCC, 31 Dec, 1902, vol. 206, pt. 11, p. 87; 17 Nov, 1905, vol. 211, pt. 11, p. 116.
of the annuity of Rs.25 lakhs and the payments to be made to the Nizam were spread more evenly over the next thirty years. The total amount was now to be distributed as follows: (a) Rs.10 lakhs to the Nizam, (b) Rs.7 lakhs towards the Berar Famine Loan of Rs. 14,095,608 and (c) Rs.8 lakhs towards the Hyderabad Famine Loan of Rs.20,000,000. It was further agreed that the Nizam's Government should be absolved from all future responsibility, financial or otherwise, if ever unhappily any famine occurred in the assigned Districts. At the same time it was concluded that if the Hyderabad Contingent be incorporated in the Indian Army, all free kaumahs (i.e., free lands and quarters) hitherto granted to the troops should revert to the State's Government. 2

With the ratification of the terms to the satisfaction of the contracting parties, the Agreement of Berar was at last formally concluded on 5 November 1902. 3 It was only a short time before the Durbar at Delhi that, after a little more delay, the agreement was published in the Gazette of India. 4 It carried with it all the necessary, relevant official correspondence for public information concerning what the king, quite succinctly observed, "a satisfactory agreement with the Nizam". 5

1. The balance of the principal sums outstanding at the time of the Agreement was Rs.1,95,000 and Rs.18,500,000 for the Berar and Hyderabad Famine Loans respectively.
5. LCC, His Majesty to Curzon, 6 Nov.1902, vol.136, p.28.
SECTION III

Why was Curzon so interested in the settlement of Berar? Curzon's interest in the agreement had a connection with his various practical measures and doctrines concerning efficiency and economy.¹ That had also much to do with his own singular sense of fairness and justice as a pressing and urgent moral obligation in conformity with his own conception of Imperialism.² And because of that ethical element in his political thought he felt that the nizam had been almost bled white under the terms of the existing Treaties.³ He realised that all the more so on account of the heavy cost of the expensive British Administration in Berar.⁴

So doubt article 4 of the Treaty of 1860 had itself specifically laid down that the amount spent on the administration of Berar was to be entirely at the discretion of the British Government.⁵ But while not overlooking the latitude under the Treaty, Curzon nonetheless felt differently.⁶ He held that the Government should not disregard the obligations, morally imposed on it, to secure as large a surplus for the nizam as possible. The Berar Administration, though free

2. LCC, memo. on theBerar question, 25 Sept. 1901, vol. 245, paras 1, 3, pp. 1, 3.
5. Parl. Ps. 1867 (557) 1, Sir Charles Wood to GIL, 18 June 1661, para 1c, p. 1.
from reproach on technical grounds, was yet not altogether blameless.
It was, certainly "open to criticism, on grounds both of equity and
economy" in that it had not been managed with the same financial care
as would have been insisted upon if it had been British territory. 1
In the circumstances, he suggested reducing the expenditure without
violating, as the Home authority had impressed upon him, the fundamental
principles of the existing Treaties. The terms of the Agreement were
accordingly formulated by him in such a way as to provide the only
effective and sure way of providing adequate savings for the payment
of a greater surplus to the Nizam. 2

In the opinion of some of the authorities in India, there were
two methods by which the government of India might obtain better
results and secure some substantial surplus for the Nizam. It was
contemplated that apart from the reduction of sinecure offices, the
government of India should supply the local administration with both
a stimulus and a check. That might have been done by reserving for
payment to the Nizam, a fixed sum to be revised periodically by leaving
the remaining revenue to the resident for the civil as well as military
expenditure of Berar. 3 In other words, the idea was to provincialise
all the civil and military expenditure, subject to the payment to the
the Nizam in ordinary years of a fixed surplus. 4 It was suggested
that should the idea be approved, the same to be reserved would be

2. Parl. Pr. 1902 (Cmd. 2452) supra, 601, Exn., to the Jot, 19 Nov. 1902
paras 5-9, pp. 7-8.
3. LCC, Curzon's memo. on Berar, 25 Sept. 1901, vol. 245, p. 6; Note on
the memo., supra, pp. 4-5.
fixed at not less than Rs.13½ lakhs a year. That amount, as a matter of fact, was the equivalent sum for the average surplus as paid to the Nizam in the twenty years previous to 1892-3.¹

The scheme for laying aside a specified amount out of the Berar revenue and leaving all the rest with the resident did not seem likely to provide any final settlement of the issue. It had some apparent defects. It did not conform, either with the spirit of the existing Treaties, or with the object of securing sufficient and sure relief for the finances of the Government of Hyderabad and India. The Nizam was entitled to the whole, and not, as suggested, some part of the Surplus available.² Periodic revisions of the financial arrangements, or terminable lease, were, moreover, quite likely to result in complicating and postponing rather than facilitating any final settlement of the issue.³ There was, also, no surety that the Berar revenues, which were already at a point of maximum saturation, would yield any further income for the enlarged annuity to the Nizam.⁴ Besides, the Berar Administration had been for some time running under a considerable deficit. It had, for instance, even drawn upon its own reserve while impairing also the meagre and fluctuating Surplus.

⁴. Its revenue had shown an increase from Rs. 52 lakhs in 1860 to Rs. 78 lakhs in 1898. Anyhow it was estimated that by the time the new settlements in progress were completed, the land revenues would stand at Rs. 83 lakhs. IPP(Int.) Feb. 1900, no. 52, 3 Nov. 1899, encl. ii, Memo. supra, para 7; Feb. 1901, no. 165, 6 Oct. 1900, paras 1-4.
payable to the Nizam. Moreover, calculations had abundantly brought out that for 20 to 30 years from 1906, (when the general revision of settlements then in progress was completed), the revenue would remain almost stationary.

With a view to effect economy in the interests of both the Nizam and the British Administration in Berar, there was an equally sound and convenient alternative. That Curzon succeeded in working out following the Nizam's consent to the agreement, he could do so by dispensing with the separate establishment of the Berar Administration which had been so long maintained under the treaties of 1853 and 1860. The treaties had specifically laid down that the Berar Administration was to have an exclusive character and existence of its own under the control of the British Resident at Hyderabad.

Curzon wanted Berar to become part of the adjoining Central Provinces under a strong and unified system. That would, he held, promote efficiency and economy without violating either the spirit of the existing treaties or the interests of the contracting parties to the perpetual lease of Berar.
In October 1903 the Derar Administration was, as expected by most of the people in the area, transferred to the Central Provinces. The amalgamation of the two administrations, however, differed much from that of Oudh with the North-Western Province which had been effected under Lytton after the Imperial Assembly met in Delhi. On the earlier occasion in 1877 the Chief Commissioner of Oudh had been made the Lieut.-Governor of the United Provinces. The new Administration of the Central Provinces and Derar however continued to be under the Chief Commissioner. Curzon himself did not doubt or dispute that the Central Provinces ultimately "will and ought to develop by sundry of these accretions into a Lieut.-Governorship".

Despite the amalgamation, and "permanent addition to the British empire in India" of 2,750,000 persons, the new administration could not yet be given any higher status. Any change of the kind necessitating a Lieut.-Governor, as the head of the new Province, required not simply administrative union, but specific legislation. Moreover, a change of the sort would have conflicted with the Nizam's Sovereign rights over the Assigned Districts. The Nizam's Sovereignty, as explicitly reaffirmed in the agreement itself, was by no means impaired by the perpetual lease.

1. IPP(int'l.) Feb. 1904, no.80, supra, SPLI, 1903, no.1252 supra.
local legislature. The Acts of the Indian Legislative Council could not apply proprex vigore to the new Administration which was still not legally a part of British India. They could however be, as was the case of British possession of Quetta, made applicable to it by Executive Order of the Governor-General-in-Council. 1

Being undoubtedly a convenient means for reducing the cost and interlacing of the two contiguous administrations, the amalgamation was hailed by the press as the obviously right and reasonable move. Even though many of the nationalist newspapers could not appreciate the nature and purpose of the perpetual lease, yet the act of amalgamation did not excite any strong or adverse criticism. 2 The idea of administrative union was, however, not altogether a recent one. Already as far back as 1860 the Government of India had contemplated a similar move with a view to reducing the expenses incurred on the administrative system of Berar. It had, for instance, tried to prevail upon the Nizam's father Afzal-ud-Daulah to allow the Assigned District to be placed under the Commissioner of Nagpur for similar purposes of economy and administrative efficiency. 3

The main source of increase in the total expenditure of the Berar Administration had been caused by the heavier military establishments connected with the Hyderabad Contingent. 4 The Contingent had its headquarters at Lolarum, with six military stations at Nigoli,

4. IFT (Int'l.) Feb. 1901, no. 160, 19 Feb. 1900; no. 162, 18 Aug. 1900. PLC end. The Rastt., Hydb., to the Nizam's Minister, 7 May 1902, para 5(i)
Jalna, Raichur, Ellichpur, Aurangabad and Nominabad. The stations involved a cost of about Rs. 1,075,583 annually for the pay and allowances of the six infantry regiments. At the same time all the buildings and military works at the various stations were paid for out of serar revenues.

By Curzon's time the increased strength and reorganisation of the Contingent had raised its expenditure from about Rs. 24 lakhs in 1861-2 to Rs. 4,232,000 in 1898-9. The total annual cost of the Contingent during the last ten years (1892-93 to 1902-03) had not been in any year less than Rs. 37 lakhs. At the same time the total military charges of the Serar Administration had also steadily increased whereas the military expenditure taken as a whole stood at Rs. 3,784,243 in 1891-92, it had just a year before Curzon's arrival in India increased by 16 per cent and amounted to Rs. 4,391,436. All that presented a sharp contrast with the situation in 1853. Under the Treaty of 1853, the total military charges had been limited to an amount of Rs. 30.1 lakhs, with only Rs. 2,675,000 for the cost of Contingent, and Rs. 575,000 for miscellaneous expenditure.

4. JFP( Intl.) Feb. 1900, no. 21, the SIS to the GSSIC, 11 May 1899, encl. 1, 19 Mar. 1899.
No doubt the increased price of grain and famine conditions even before Curzon's own period, besides the reorganisation consequent upon the Contingent's employment in the Burmese Campaign had necessarily added to the heavy burden of the military expenditure on the Administration.¹ The increased expenditure was, however, the outcome mainly of the existing military system in the assigned Districts. The resident had vague and undefined powers in relation to military expenditure, almost without any check or control. Under the terms of the treaties of 1855 and 1860 he was not subject to any restraint from above in the matter of military costs.² That meant that he had little check or restraint even from the Government of India itself.³ The Treaty of 1855 had itself specifically laid down that the Contingent was to be "controlled by the British Government through its representative the Resident at Hyderabad".⁴

The existing military system of the Government of India was not conducive to vigorous and strict control over the military expenditure and personnel in India. The military as such had a hold and strength of its own even in the executive council of the viceroy which, unlike the British Cabinet, had two seats for the 'military party'.

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regards the Indian military expenditure, even the India Council itself
was, similarly, as Sir Henry Fowler observed, "absolutely shut out
from any advice or any interference with that". Evidently all that
contrasted strongly with the authority of the Secretary of State who
was not "allowed a five pound note without having a majority of the
Council concurring". 1

Curzon was by no means ready to yield to the Military Authorities
in the matter of incurring any wasteful expenditure. He was anxious
to effect savings in the military expenditure throughout India. Indeed
he tried to do that in more than one way, having little hesitation,
for that purpose even in opposing, on occasion, the Military Author-
ities both in India and London. 2 In the circumstances he was natu-
urally inclined to reduce the expenditure also in relation to the total
military cost of the British Administration in Berar. 3

The reduction in the expenditure of Berar which the Government
of India under Curzon had been, of late, endeavouring to secure, was
an acute need of the hour. 4 It was bound to be so because of con-
siderations of a practical nature arising out of the terms of the
perpetual lease and Berar's own limited financial resources. The
total financial means of Berar Administration were, according to the
latest calculations, deemed to be incapable of yielding at any time
an income beyond the maximum amount of Rs.105 1/2 lakhs. 5 However all

1. V.C. J.B.1899, (C) 14 Feb. (53) 554.
2. See (regarding Curzon's differences with the Military Authorities.)
V.C. J.B. 1905, (257) xiv, p. 545.
3. L.G., Curzon's letter on Berar, supra, pp. 4-5.
that income was still far below the total (civil, military and political) expenditure of about Rs. 15,669,719. There was thus an absolute necessity for the Nizam Administration to effect some substantial reduction in the cost of the Contingent and military establishments in the State.

To reduce the military expenditure the Resident had proposed to have the number of six existing regiments cut down to four. The proposed reduction of a regiment, even though not possible under the terms of the Treaties, was yet not likely to yield a saving of more than Rs. 1,356,000 per annum. That seemed too meagre a sum when compared with the total military expenditure or even with the much needed sum of Rs. 96 lakhs to be paid as annuity to the Nizam. In the circumstances Curzon realised that the economy for securing adequate savings as surplus would not be served by occasional reductions carried out in the administrative hierarchy. All that was needed could be effectively secured in actual practice only by the redistribution, apart from any reduction, of the Hyderabad Contingent as a whole. Curzon accordingly planned under the terms of the Agreement to reduce the military charges by bringing about the incorporation of the Contingent with the Indian Army. This was done in April 1905.

1. The total amount, such comprised the expenditure as follows: Rs. 1,356,000 (civil), Rs. 96,491 (military), Rs. 2,500,000 (political, Rs. 1,000,000 (revenue).


6. Parl. Ps. 1905 (249) xlvi, MMPI, p. 302; 1904 (186) lxxiii; MMPI, p. 188; 190 (180) lxxii, MMPI, p. 192; 1906 (175) lxxiii, MMPI, pp. 190, 196-7.
Curzon's keen interest in bringing about the settlement was an index of his own convictions as to the feasibility of improving the Treaties to the mutual advantage of the parties.¹ As Curzon told the Nizam, the agreement was a serious and honest attempt towards effecting some improvements. It was meant neither to deprive the Nizam of his sovereign rights over the Districts nor to impair the economic interests of the Hyderabad State.² The Government did not mean to violate any of the existing obligations which the Treaties of 1853 and 1860 had imposed on it concerning the payment of surplus and the defence and security of the State.³ As Curzon himself privately recorded, the terms for the perpetual lease of Berar were designed as "supplementing and amending rather than superseding the Treaties".⁴

Curzon wanted to enable the Government of India, under the agreement of Berar, to provide substantial relief against the heavy expenditure in the assigned Districts. He hoped to secure that by undertaking a revision of the existing Treaties with a view to a convenient and economical redistribution of the administrative and military arrangements. The purpose, quite evidently, was to help the Hyderabad State build up its faltering economy.⁵ And that could be best ensured by providing the Nizam, in the first instance, with an

¹. ... vol. xxix, p. 361. Parl. res. 1924-25 (cmd. 2439) xxi appendix n, para. 4-7, pp. 35-4.
³. ... (cmd. 1221) xxi, annexure 2, pp. 23-4.
⁴. ... vol. 161, pt. ii, p. 27.
increased surplus. The amount of the surplus under the terms of the agreement was accordingly increased. It was to be almost three times more than the average income of the Nizam during the four previous decades. 1

The agreement of Gerar was basically an instrument of reform. It was meant not merely to invigorate the weak political economy of the state and stop any further controversy over the issue of Gerar, 2 it was also in the nature of a move towards helping the state to improve its social structure. The most important step in that direction was the deliberate and well-calculated reduction of the state's irregular troops. 3 They were, as the Swadimitram (Madras) aptly observed, nothing but "idlers" and parasites, a standing danger to the internal peace and security of the state. 4 Indeed the dangerous increase in their total strength in the state had, since the time of Dalhousie, engaged the attention of the Government of India. 5 Having at last agreed to their reduction, the Nizam was the first in the history of his dynasty who turned his thought in the direction of

dealing with this long-standing menace. They were the main prop of the great power and influence of the feudal jagirdars in the State. Besides sapping the vitality of the State and its resources they as much as their overlords were an obstacle to the material and moral progress of its people. A reduction in strength of the Nizam's irregulars was therefore a social benefit. The Agreement of varur, with its own sociological and economic values, consequently turned out to be a permanent and final settlement of the issue. No succeeding Government, despite the reshuffling in the Party politics at Home could either doubt its fairness, or improve upon its equitable terms as concluded under Curzon. The settlement made as such in 1902 successfully withstood the tests and challenges of time long after him


2. SPLI, 1900, no. 267, 15 Jan. para 62 (iv) vol. 120, p. 89.
THE IMPERIAL DURBAR DELHI

Of all the Viceroys of India before Gurzon it was Lytton who had the singular distinction of having held the Imperial Assemblage with a definite political objective. 1 The assumption of the Imperial title by the Crown, though it was believed to be the product of Lytton's and Disraeli's political imagination and foresight, had been first officially sponsored by Lord Northbrook in February 1876. 2 The idea had been forced upon the Government in relation to the pressure of the political situation as a counter move against Russia's eastward expansion. The steady approach of the Russian Empire to the outposts and frontiers of the British Empire in India had rendered it necessary for the Government to do what Germany had also likewise done. (Before the assumption of the imperial title by the Queen, the Emperor of Germany had his own Imperial rank and position fully recognised by his feudatories.) 3 Disraeli's own ideas, though these raised much opposition against the Conservatives and the Government at home, were carried out with much eclat and effect at Delhi in 1877. 4

With the proclamation of the Queen as the 5Qaiser-i-Hind at the

5. The idea of the title though initiated by the Government of India under Lord Northbrook, was not definitely settled before Lytton. The author of the vernacular translation for the Queen's Empress was Sir Alliunn Muir (Member of Lord Lytton's Executive Council). Lyt. Ps., Lytton to Salisbury, 2 May, 30 July, 12 Oct. 1876, vol. 518/1, pp. 1321, 322, 539-40; Lytton to the Queen, 10.
Assemblage, the Government of India under Lytton had set a precedent of undoubtedly immense political value and Imperial significance. The occasion had provided, as Curzon remarked, an effectively colourful and profound political situation that was "characterised both by statesmanship and imagination". With the death of the Queen on 22 January 1901, Curzon thought of holding an Imperial Durbar in India, though on lines considerably different from those of the Assemblage.

The Durbar, as he conceived of it, was to be much more than a mere official recognition of the fact that one monarch had died and another succeeded. The life and vigour of any people or country could be more or less summed up, Curzon held, before the world in the person of its Sovereign, being both the representative as well as the figurehead of his people, a monarch was but naturally most qualified to be taken as the symbol of unity. A Durbar in India would have special value in the participation of, Curzon realised, the great majority of the Indian princes and chiefs. He intended to enable also those who had not been to the Coronation at London to take part in the Durbar. A Durbar was, as Curzon observed, in perfect keeping with and "part of the invariable tradition" and "ceremonies immortally consecrated in Asia".

1. SCK; 5 Sept. 1902, vol.iii, p.20.
2. Home department proceedings, sept. 1902, no.54, supra, paras 1-3.
3. Curzon, subjects of the day, pp.44-5. ICLI(35), 5 Sept. 1902, p.29.
Almost a year after the death of the Queen the Government's intention to hold the Durbar in India was made public. Under a proclamation issued on 14 February 1902, it was announced that an imperial Durbar for celebrating the Coronation would be held at Delhi in January 1903. However, there was much criticism in the Indian Press. Curzon noticed in the newspapers' comments a dexterous mixture of "independent fabrications", "grotesque exaggerations" and even "lies" to belittle its value. Much of the attack was directed towards showing that the Durbar would entail a reckless waste of public money on mere ostentation and display of an ephemeral nature. It was presumed that the expenditure would amount to a huge sum varying from £400,000 to £1,000,000 with a heavy burden on the shoulders of the Indian tax-payers. Such criticism on similar grounds of economy had also been levelled at the royal tour preceding the Assemblage. However, it was not difficult for Curzon, having himself taken meticulous care against any possible waste of money, to expose the exaggerations of the various estimates. His own estimated expenditure for the occasion, he disclosed in the Legislative Council, was some 75 per cent lower than the lowest calculations quoted in the press.

1. L.I., 1903, no.665, encl.2, notification no.663, i.a. parl. res. 1903 (cmd.1644)xvi, vol.1 to the 30th, 1903, para. 2, p.5.
The total expenditure was provisionally fixed at a sum of about £176,000.1 The burden of cost was calculated to be about one penny for every ten inhabitants of the country, with little hardship on either the princes or the people of India.2

Curzon had planned to hold, while still at Delhi, two days after the Durbar itself, a Chapter of Orders for the investiture of Honours and Titles to the Indian rulers and others.3 Apart from the various awards the function was to be honoured by the presence of the Duke of Connaught whom the King had selected to represent the Royal Family at the Durbar.4 The King's selection of the Duke who had served with much distinction and credit in India and Ireland was much to the satisfaction of Curzon, though he had no hand in the choice. That postponed (as Curzon had been rather insisting in view of the difficulties of protocol and political situation in India) the long projected visit of the Prince of Wales.5 Similarly the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall who were equally keen to visit India were dissuaded by the King himself, mainly on grounds of health.6

The most significant aspect of the function which the newspapers severely criticised pertained to the ceremony of investiture itself. During the proceedings at the ceremony both the viceroy and the Duke were to have their respective trains two pages from the sons and scions of the Indian rulers.¹ This was an adaptation of English practice, for example when the Prince of Wales had been conducted to his seat in the Abbey at the recent ceremony of Coronation. With his train borne by two pages and his Coronet by the Comptroller and Treasurer, there had followed after him Maharaj-Kumar Daulat Singh of Idar along with the Equerries.² Again in 1897 at Aton, the two sons of the Maharaja of Kuch Lehar with the sons of the Prince of Gondal and the Minister of Hzam, had welcomed the Queen dressed as heralds.³ Moreover, Lytton had also a similar ceremony for investiture at the Assemblies, wearing full robes on the occasion, he was followed by the pages, not only at the investiture but also at the inauguration of the Assemblies.⁴ However, Carson dispensed with the attendance of the pages at the Durbar. The reaction of the Princes and Chiefs was on the whole totally different from that of the nationalist press.⁵ They were already competing among themselves to secure for their sons the honour and distinction at the forthcoming chapter of orders. That however was described by the nationalists as nothing short of an insult to what they pointedly called the royal blood of th

¹See (for the ceremony in the Abbey).
³Lyttot Minute on the Durbar, op. cit., para 21.
Indian ruling families. 1

Indian Press criticism had little effect in that it, as Curzon observed, "represents nothing but the microscopic minority which feels it its duty to carp and cavil at every demonstration of imperial sentiment, and indeed at everything that the Government of India may say or do". 2 Even if there had been no sultan at all, the criticism would have been no less different. The very critics, whose artillery of rage and wrath remained practically unheard in the far distant field at home, would have advanced just the same. They would have again come forward "overflowed with bitterness at the indignity to India of leaving her out in the cold and at...departing from the wise example of Lord Lytton". "I venture to assert", Curzon wrote to Hamilton, "that, apart from the captious and sour-minded, who attack whatever is done by government, there is no intelligent person in this country who doubts the wisdom or propriety of having such a function".

The proceedings were to be opened by the State Entry of the viceroy and the Duke of Connaught at Delhi on 29 December 1902 with an elephant procession and the spectacular accompaniment of the Indian Princes and Chiefs themselves. 4 The procession was to be formed just outside the railway station. Arriving there half an hour before noon, the viceroy, the vicereine, the Duke and the Duchess were to be received in the station...by the princes and chiefs. Then and there they were to have their first formal official introductions. Soon

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after that, about 50 to 60 of the Indian rulers who could afford to have elephants were to move in formation for the state entry into the historic city. The rest of the princes and Chiefs were to be meanwhile led by the political officers through the queen's gardens to the central point at Chandni Chowk. There they were to have a panoramic view of the state procession as a whole, in a grand stand resembling that which had been provided for those attending the coronation in London.

The idea of an elephant procession was subjected to much criticism, but Lord Northbrook, before both Curzon and Lytton, had had a similar state entry into the city of Delhi for a durbar held there on 23 March 1875. In planning for the state entry with the elephant procession, Curzon was influenced more by the earlier precedent of Northbrook than that of Lytton. Curzon, unlike Lytton, was bent on providing a prominent position for the Indian princes and Chiefs along with the various British officers in the procession. In 1877 the princes and Chiefs had been kept waiting outside the station on their elephants till the viceroy had passed by them in a procession formed exclusively of Europeans. Curzon however did away with this invidious distinction. The result was that even the headstrong Gaekwar, known for

4. L.C., Northbrook to the Queen, 25 Mar.1875, vol.8, pp.47-8. He was followed in the procession besides British officials like Sir Henry Davies (the Lieut. Gov. of the Punjab) by the Indian rulers like those of Patiala, Nawabpur, Gind, Naga and some other Chiefs of the Rajputana and the Punjab States.
self-assertion and differences with the Government, came forward to take part in the State Entry, though he had been for a time inclined to argue that it would be derogatory to his rank to fall in with others in the procession. Still he could not take part in the procession in mourning for one of the Naroda Maharajis who died just a few days earlier.

It was in arranging the Order of Advance for the procession that Curzon tried to convey, what he called, "the greatest possible compliment" to the rank and dignity of the rulers. Having mounted in the courtyard at the Station, the Viceroy and the Duke accompanied by Lady Curzon and the Duchess were to move through the line of elephants They were to be at the head of the procession, immediately before the Indian Princes and Chiefs. The personal staffs of the Viceroy and the Duke were not to be interposed anywhere near or in front of the Indian rulers, who had objected to any arrangement that might impair their own proximity with the Viceroy and the Duke.

Curzon was not unconscious that in the East successions and coronations were generally looked upon as occasions for the grant of privileges and the removal of disabilities. The Queen's Proclamation

1. In his own characteristic way the Cacharwar, for instance, in April 1902 had brought out a book or a printed report regarding his family administration. In that book, while describing the lamentable state of his administration, he had not hesitated to cast some aspersions on the system of British administration on the other hand, he had the audacity to send a copy of it as a compliment to Curzon himself.


5. S.D.I., 1903, no.605, encl.iii, op.cit., pp.4,5.

(1858), the expansion of the Legislative Council, Indians' share in
the Civil Service, were all different yet basically similar expression
and recognition of the same fact. 1 Princes and people, he felt, still
underrate any such function as remained limited merely to festivities
and plausible speeches without any concrete favour. 2 In thinking
about possible boons, Curzon reviewed some of the earlier schemes and
ideas of Lytton. 3 Lytton, Salisbury and Disraeli had thought of
the creation of India's own Peerage. 4 At the Assemblage, Lytton had
conferred upon the Peers silken banners after the European model. The
banners, embroidered with the armorial bearings of the recipients, had
escutcheons, bearing the coat of arms, with mottoes in heraldic style. 5
The scheme, however, could neither find nor develop any enduring
character and soon died out. The banners, as Curzon observed, "re-
pended in the Durbar-rooms of Treasuries of the Chiefs, where I have
sometimes come across them during my tours, dusty, faded and torn" 6.
Curzon did not think that Indian nawabs and maharajas would be either
any better or happier for being converted into barons, viscounts, earl

1. See (for the measures respecting the constitution of the Councils in
India) Parl. Ps. 1861(162)liii, p.279; 1861(162)lii, p.141; 1890(197)
p.471; 1892(125)liii, p.65. Also see (for the Indians' share in the
Civil Service) Parl. Ps. 1875(315)liv, p.451; 1876(cmd.1446)lv, p.277
1876(293)lv, p.608; 1876-9(cmd.2276)lv, p.299.
3. MLI, 1903, no.318, 601 to the J031, 26 Mar. 1903, concl.i, pp.14-16.
4. MLI, 1903, Lytton to Disraeli, 50 Apr. 1876, vol.518/1, pp.122-4; Lytt
to Salisbury, 20 July, 15 Nov. 1876, vol.518/1, pp.518-9,606. Lytton
the Queen, 15 Nov. 1876, vol.518/1, pp.610-11. MLI, 1903, no.318,
26 Mar. 1903, vol.xii, pp.22-1.
larqueins and dukes. In view of the singularity and popularity of their own traditions in their own environments in India, he did not expect them to be attracted to ideas imported from abroad. 7

Curzon also considered Lytton's ingenious idea of a Council of Empire and Indian Privy Council inside India itself. 2 The Council was to be composed partly of high European officers, partly of selected Indian rulers. 3 with a total membership limited to 26 in number, Lytton had put not less than 3 rulers on it. 4 Known as the Council of the empress, they were to be also the honorary members of the Legislative Council, bearing the title of Most Honourable, they were to have a salute of 15 guns in their individual capacity as the members of the Privy Council in India. Lytton had also proposed the setting up of similar Councils in each of the Residencies and Provinces of India. 5

Though not differing basically from Lytton's ideas regarding the formation and utility of the Council, Curzon thought that the proposed body was too limited in its own scope with no real powers and could have little practical value. 6 with a very narrow basis and no strong appeal to the Indian rulers in general, the Council had consequently died of inanition, having hardly ever met after Lytton. It had few collective deliberations and meetings, even though it had been envis-

1. ibid., 661 to the 1061, 26. (ar.1902, excl.1, para. 62-3, 66.
2. Parl. Pa. 1895, (C) 19 aug. 1901, (p39) 1321-3; 1364-6, 5. 20 oct. (113) 225.
5. The 8 rulers were of Kashmir, Gwalior, Indore, Jaipur, Jhind, Kamla Bundi and Travancore.
6. MLL, 1909, no. 43, of 1903, supra.
aged that its occasional consultations might strengthen the Government
before Curzon and Audley, their predecessors, Lord Lansdowne and
Lord Cross too had been equally disappointed with the scheme.2 Lansdowne
had, for instance, taken special notice of the vague character and the
"ostentatious and unreal" features of the whole experiment, which was
"more or less of a sham".2 Though "to my mind somewhat of a lot of
claptrap", it had - as Lord Cross observed - still served as "a handle
for agitation in India".3 And so also Curzon could not but fundament-
ally differ from Lytton's scheme for the council. "It would probably
not have succeeded", he firmly recorded, "from a Viceroy who had been
for a longer period in the country".5

While not much influenced by Lytton's specific acts at the
Assemblage, Curzon did nevertheless strive to achieve similar objec-
tives in his own way. He availed himself of the occasion to put forwar-
ding some of his ideas for constitutional reforms pertaining to the Central
Legislature,6 he envisaged some further additions to his Legislative
Council, even though a proposal to that effect had already been thrown
out and discarded under Lansdowne.7 However, Curzon's ideas on the
matter bore some affinity with those of Sufferin.8 As early as 1888

1. ibid. 1869, (C) 12 aug. (399)1322; 1905, (C) 21 June (147)1295-6.
3. ibid., Lansdowne to Cross, 8 Sept. 1889, vol. ix/i, pt. ii, pp. 151-
11/1, pt. ii, pp. 83, 87, 89.
5. The Viceroy's Minute, 11 May 1889, supra.
7. VCC, Lansdowne to Cross, 12 July 1889, vol. 27/ii, p. 16. Inad. Ps.,
9 July 1299, 'Reform of Provincial Legislative Council', confd. iv,
Dufferin had also proposed to provide adequate place and recognition for the interests of the Indian ruling class, though in separate Chambers and on merely provincial levels.²

"I should like from time to time, if not habitually", Curzon wrote to Hamilton on 10 September 1902, "to place one or two Indian Princes upon the Imperial Legislative Council". He proposed to do that, "both as compliments to them and because I think they might derive some advantage from taking part in the proceedings of Government"³. The idea was to provide them with some encouragement to promote democratic institutions and constitutional practices in the States. Already some of the nationalist leaders had been giving serious thought to the political and administrative framework of the States.⁴ Moreover some of the States like Hyderabad and Travancore had taken positive steps for the formation of legislative councils in their own dominions.⁵ The first session, however, of the popular Travancore Assembly, 90 per cent of whose members were to be returned on elective system, could not be held earlier than October 1904.⁶ In the meantime Mysore with its advanced system of administration and finances, had formed a substantial network of municipalities besides a

² Dufferin had a plan for a bicameral legislature, comprising two parts—a First Division and a Second Division. The representatives of the hereditary nobility or the Indian Princes and Chiefs together with those of the landed classes were to have place in the 1st Division. They were to be elected independent of popular election which was to be, on the other hand, indirect, through municipalities etc., as electoral colleges.

³ VCC, Dufferin to Cross, 8 Oct. 1888, vol. 25, pp. 90, 102-6; 20 Oct. 1888 pp. 120, 120(b), encl. i, paras 7-9, encl. ii, paras 11-3, 75-6, 19-21; 29 Oct. 1888, p. 125(b); 11 Nov. 1888, pp. 174(b), 175-82.


⁵ Parl. rs. 1900 (cd. 130) xxix, Nadha Bhai Nagroji to Lord Welby, 21 Mar. 1896, appendix E, para 28.

representative Assembly on elective principles.  

On account of the rather uncertain parliamentary situation at home, Hamilton had his eyes on the increasing "danger of a series of gross misstatements" and charges against the Conservative Government. Curzon himself was also equally conscious of the likely risk over the issue. He knew if the question of Indian Legislative Council was reopened, Parliament might try to move amendments advocating "all sorts of extensions of an impossible character." That had been the situation already, for instance, during the enactment of the Councils Act of 1892, which under Lord Croke he had himself steered through Parliament. Controversial issues on points big and small had been effectively raised which had yet not exhausted the rage of criticism against the Conservatives. However a far more challenging issue was that concerning the elective system as a basis for representation.

The system of open election had not yet been tried even though it had

1. The Mysore representative Assembly dated from the year 1881, though the elective system was introduced in 1891. The Assembly had a total strength of 227 members had right of interpellation, though it had no power to record a decision on any subject of discussion.
been partly recommended by Dufferin as early as 1888. ¹

Curzon was cautious enough to avoid imitating Dufferin’s scheme for the representation of the princes and Chiefs in the legislature by a partly elective system. ² He tried to keep his proposal in line with the views of the Conservatives in general and of Lord Cross and Lord Salisbury in particular. ³ Like them ⁴ he did not think that the


2. Dufferin had specifically mentioned that in providing for the popular election of members on the council regard be paid so far as possible to the principle of election. VCC, Dufferin to Cross, 20 Oct. 1888, encl. II, p. 189(b), 178. He was apparently influenced in that respect, apart from his own experiences of the Egyptian constitution, by the Indian nationalists. VCC, Dufferin to Cross, May 1886, vol. 22/11, p. 259.

3. Dufferin to Kimberley, May 1886, vol. 22, p. 277. While threatening to use their powers to enact another mutiny in India, they had at that time, submitted some suggestions which (they were told by Dufferin) had been incorporated in the government of India’s own despatch on the subject. All that having naturally encouraged the nationalists in their ideas and demands, brought Dufferin under severe criticism of the authorities in London. Lnsd. Ps., Cross to Lansdowne, 22 Jan., 12 Apr. 1889, vol. IX/I, pt. i, pp. 29, 34; 2 Apr. 1890, vol. IX/2, pt. i, p. 24. VCC, Dufferin to Cross, 25 June 1888, encl. III, vol. 24/14, pp. 14-5, 18-9; 3 Dec. 1888, vol. 25, pp. 195(b), 197, 205-69. Parl. Doc. 1888, (C) 4. 6 Dec. (31) 1077-A, 1247-9; 1889, (C), 4. ar. (335) 825-27; 1890, (C) 15 Apr. (335) 482-3; 1890, (L) 28 Nov. (343).

4. Viscount Cross, A Political Diary, pp. 120-1.


country was yet ripe for the elective system. He had also his eyes on the attitude of Hamilton himself. The latter though not averse to constitutional reforms - which in the recent cases of the Punjab and Burma, he had himself vigorously advocated - was yet thoughtfully hesitant. He had of late developed, as Curzon observed, "a great dislike to legislation of any kind upon Indian matters" requiring parliamentary sanction. However, Curzon at the same time did not lose sight of the occasion at Delhi as a justification for some little change. "The concession that I speak of", he assured Hamilton, "might be given and accepted in connection with the Delhi Durbar as a privilege dissociated from the constitution and composition of the Legislative Council as a whole".

Curzon had some very clear and specific ideas on the subject of providing adequate recognition to the interests of the Indian ruling class in his Council. He wanted to have some of its representatives (not more than three) in the Council on an altogether new basis, with a definite constitutional recognition for their own distinct interests as a class. The idea was to have them there together with, and yet apart from, other popular interests, as already covered under the provisions of the Act of 1892. So he proposed to call them extraordinary members of the Legislative Council, on the analogy of the extraordinary member of the viceroy's Executive Council.

The differences between the extraordinary and ordinary additional members of the imperial legislative council were to be quite sharp and well-marked. The latter were, as heretofore under the existing provisions of the act, entitled to two years' stay in the council. Unlike them, the representatives of the Indian ruling class were to be called specifically for only one year. In their extraordinary position, being also the rulers of the states, they were not expected to absent themselves from their principalities for any longer period.

Curzon's proposals concerning the imperial legislative council were based on its existing constitution. During the period, for instance, of 26 years from 1862 to 1888, not more than five rulers had been appointed members of the council. Despite that, still (under the act of 1862) the Viceroy's powers of appointing additional members to the council had not been much extended. As a result, it was not possible for the Viceroy to accommodate the Indian princes and chiefs without interfering with the representation of other interests and classes in the council.

Curzon's proposals concerning the council were in line with his policy of recognizing the political importance of the Indian states, and of integrating their interests with those of British India.
Lytton's ideas with their emphasis on political expediency contrasted rather than conformed with the high moral values Curzon associated with the concept and character of the Empire and its obligations. However, Curzon's proposals were in conformity with the repeatedly declared policy of the British Government itself. It was, for instance as far back as June 1891, that Sir Charles Wood had admitted the value of association, in the Government's own select chambers, of Indians of high rank and birth. The same himself had even contemplated accommodating Indian rulers in the House of Lords. Again, at the Jubilee celebration in 1897, her ideas and suggestions had been revived under Elgin, though with little effect.

Curzon's proposal, despite its essentially moderate and constitutional character, with particular reference to recting the drawbacks of the Act of 1891, could not make any headway. It could not, though Hamilton was not unconscious of the need for breaking the force of Indian political radicalism, he was quite near to

1. Lytton had a shrewd idea of utilising the Council as a practical expedient device (more or less on the lines into subsequently thought of) to counteract Indian radicalism. "The proposed Council," he wrote to Salisbury, "will enable the Viceroy, whilst making parade of consulting native opinion, to sway the native members and still secure the prestige of their presence and assent; for the biggest natives in such a consultation (properly prepared beforehand) would always acquiesce in the decision of the Vicerey and the chief representative of the British power..." Lytton, 30 July 1876, Vol. 50, 1876, pp. 315-16.
3. Earl. 1876, 1980(C) 1 Rec. (377) 1797-98; 1817(C) 14 June (559) 1321B; 1817(C) 16 June (123) 1817; 1819(C) 21 June (170) 1819.
4. Earl. 1876, 1980(C) 5 June 669.
6. P.C., 10 Sept., 24 Oct. 1893, p.s. 189, P.L.O., 31 Oct. 1894, Vol. iv, p. 367. (It was not till the Act of 1879 in which Curzon had his hands that a provision was made for the appointment of a ruling chief to both central and provincial Legislative Councils. vide Act of 1919, s. 23 (c), 3, 2(5).
Curzon's own thoughts, in that rather than creating any artificial device as a political counterpoise he wanted to break the force of radical nationalism from within.¹ However, owing to mainly parliamentary difficulties (which had earlier forced Lytton to drop some of his suggestions) not much could be done.² Having been submitted only a few months before the Durbar, it was not possible to pass them through parliament in such a short time.³ Moreover in the meanwhile Curzon had been having one of his bitterest struggles against the India Council in London, estraining relations with some of his friends in the cabinet itself.⁴ Apart however from that, the Indian Princes and Chiefs were not strong enough to appreciate the benefits to their class arising out of their inclusion in the council.⁵ Even for some time after Curzon, they felt it rather derogatory to be bracketed in the council with India's middle class politicians and others of the sort.⁶

Apart from constitutional and political issues, Curzon turned his thought seriously to carrying through another proposal which long before the Durbar had been in his mind. He suggested to Hamilton

¹. If we could break the educated Hindu party", Hamilton maintained, "into two sections holding widely differing views, we should by such a division strengthen our position against the subtle and continued attack which the spread of education must make upon our system of government". ¹PHLC, 20 Sept. 1899, vol. ii, p. 325.


⁴. See (for his struggle against the India Council) Ch. VIII


⁶. The Reform Proposals (full text of the government's Despatch) p. 3

some means of providing financial relief for both the princes and people of India.\(^1\) His government having already a large accumulated surplus available for the purpose, Curzon suggested reducing the burden of at least some of the taxes.\(^2\) He proposed to reduce, apart from the income tax (then levied on an income of Rs.500 and upwards) the salt tax which affected everyone in India and its states.\(^3\) That was what he had already proposed to do a year before, though with little effect.\(^4\) Curzon also wanted the practice of suspending revenues and similar arrears as a principle of financial relief for the people to be extended also to the Indian rulers and their states.\(^5\) He accordingly suggested remission of about three years' interest (charged usually at not less than 3 per cent) on all the famine loans advanced to them under the guarantee of government.\(^6\) Out of a total sum amounting to not less than Rs.40,000,000, so far only Rs.1,853,107 had been paid back by the various states during 1899-1902.\(^7\)

The India Office could not fully appreciate the idea of providing financial relief for the princes and people of India on the occasion at Delhi.\(^8\) No doubt the suggestions were, Hamilton admitted, in

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accord with Oriental ideas and traditions. However he did not think it would be appropriate to associate the king's name with the remission of taxation which had hardly anything to do with the Crown. To bring the king's name in and let it be believed that he could, as an act of grace or bounty, reduce taxation was to create a precedent contrary to the principles upon which the Government was founded. That would give, Hamilton felt, a wrong impression of the Crown's position in relation to matters of state finance and economy. 1

Curzon himself realised that the taxes were imposed and reduced only in the interests of the public and not the reigning sovereign. He had no desire to contest constitutional convention and authority. 2 however he maintained that in the political situation of India, even apart from its own traditions and customs, there were solid grounds for some concessions. He laid stress on financial relief in view of the fact that there was nothing else in terms of political boons which the Government could yet afford to give to the country. 3 The Indian people, "even the most advanced" were from the point of view of political advancement and acumen "still in the nursery"; "no worse fate could befall them than to be mistaken for grown-up men". 4 In so far as the political situation was yet not ripe enough for further experimentation on the lines desired by the Indian nationalists, there was he held, substantial justification for the proposed remissions. 5

1. ibid. IAC, Hamilton to Ampthill, 19 Feb. 1900, vol. 6, p. 22.
"Whereas the political effect of declaring our bounty at the time of the Burbar", he told Hamilton, "would be almost incalculable, the political unwisdom of refraining on academic grounds from associating relief with the Coronation would be deplorable in the extreme".  

The differences over the issue of remissions, simple as they seemed, had yet some immediate repercussions in straining the relation between Curzon and the Home Authorities.  

However, the increasing coolness coupled with stiffness in the situation was not altogether unexpected. Curzon had already noticed more and more of, what he called, the increasing scepticism of the India Office in relation to his own and his government's views over some or another issue.  

Even Balfour was, subsequently in 1904, led to suggest to Curzon for a constitutional scheme to set some positive limits to the exercise of power by the India Council in London, in view more or less of the latter's incongruous, if not altogether unharmonious, relations with the Government of India.  

The differences took a serious turn when on 13 November 1902, after all his arguments for remissions concerning which he had also written to Balfour, Curzon had a reply from Hamilton.  

The Secretary of State formally informed Curzon that it would not be possible to sanction any direct association of the King's name with any remission of taxation at the Burbar.  

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the Cabinet itself. Curzon, who had the full support of his Executive Council over the issue, naturally felt irritated by the reply: "Well, I say frankly", he wrote back to Hamilton, "I would sooner not hold the office at all than hold it under the conditions which you desire to prescribe for me." He was prepared to, he even himself informed the King, resign rather than submit himself as the Sovereign's representative to a situation incompatible with the Crown's dignity and the environment of the country. "I am unwilling to place him in a position", he declared, referring to the King, "which would ensure if all India flocked to hear his message to his people, and is then set away with a few idle platitudes and virtuous aspirations". And so he firmly concluded: "I say therefore with the utmost respect, but with emphasis, that I can not accept the position which you desire to assign to me, and I urge once again that you accept my advice (which has not, on a single important occasion, led you astray)."

In insisting on financial relief for the princes and people of India Curzon remained essentially true to his repeatedly declared policy for India's fair and generous treatment. The Surplus he had at his disposal, he felt, untapped, was likely to be frittered away on some of the war expenses related to the war already fought against. His stand in the situation was not marked by a spirit of defiance, which
he positively disclaimed, but one of due respect for the claims of
India and its states on the Government. He had already referred
to that unequivocally and openly in the Legislative Council itself,
"We do not go upon our knees and supplicate for favours in return", he had stated; "but we be," he had added, "that the part played
by India in the imperial system, and the services rendered by us in
times of trouble, may not be forgotten by the British nation, and that
they may find in it, when the occasion arises, good grounds for recip-
rocals generosity and help".

In view of the apparent disapproval of the proposals on constitu-
tional and other grounds as raised by Hamilton, Curzon referred the
issue directly to the King himself. That step on his part was much
criticized and resented by many of his critics and also friends, includ-
ing Hamilton. They saw therein the danger of precedent created
by an appeal to the King, though Curzon himself did not share their
scruples and fears. However, apart from that, Curzon's own firm stan
on the issue was only taken after serious thought and calculation. Al-
ready more than once during the last six months he had felt compelled
during this period of increasing conflict with the India Council,
to think of resignation. However, due to the moderating influence
of Balfour, apart from that of the King himself, Curzon was not yet

1. LCC, 27 Nov. 1902, supra, vol. 136, pt. ii, p. 69. PLCH, 21 May, 6 July
1902, vol. 136, pt. i, p. 29; Curzon to Knollys, 12, 15, 17 Nov. 1902,
vol. 136, pt. ii, pp. 64-63.
vol. xxiv, pp. 312-4, 350, 394-5.
driven to the extremity of actually tendering his resignation. Before the Durbar, means were found of bridging the gulf. In a telegram on 17 December 1902, Hamilton informed Curzon that the Cabinet had at last with some slight modification accepted the Government of India's views on the proposed remissions.

It was agreed that the Viceroy would hold out on the occasion some hopes of financial relief, apart from the remission of interest on the States' famine loans, for the forthcoming Budget. This however was to be conveyed in the Viceroy's own Durbar speech, as distinct from the Emperor's message (to his feudatories and subjects) even though drafted by Curzon himself. The idea underlying that was not to link up, in any way in the popular image of the Princes and people of India, the name of the Sovereign with the concept of remissions. So the concessions were to be held over and not implemented, as Curzon had basically agreed to do, till after the Budget announcement in March 1903.

The programme at Delhi commenced officially on 29 December 1902, with the spectacular elephant procession for the State entry into the historic city. The day marked the first public appearance of the Indian rulers, along with the high ranking European Officers of the Government, in the imperial cavalcade and retinue of the Viceroy and

and the duke. In its own exquisite frame, the product of Curzon's own vivid imagination, the procession (stretching to a length of over three miles) unfolded a superb variety of colour and brilliance. In the eyes of some of the artists like Dorothy and Hortense Menpes, the procession in its formation and movement presented the sight of "a spangled serpent glimmering through zones of light and shadow into the opalescent distance scumbled with dust".

Proceeding ahead of the viceroy's cortège, with 51 Indian rulers about him, there appeared first the Dragoon Guards and the horse artillery. After them the heralds, picturesque figures with their silver trumpets and mediaeval dresses. Then the viceroy's own stalwart bodyguard riding on fine bay Wallers. Next came the Imperial Cadets, comprising sons and scions of India's own ruling houses. The Cadets rode past on chargers with snow leopard saddle-cloths, attired in the gorgeous blue and white uniforms which Curzon had himself selected for them. They were headed by the dashing Maharaja Sir Partab Singh of Idar, the honorary commandant of the princely detachment, and one of the heroes of Indian Frontier campaigns. Soon after the imposing appearance of the impressing and smart contingent of personal staffs came the viceroy and the duke, in splendid formation, with the spectacular

tcherie of the Indian Princes and Chiefs. 1

In a variety of jewelled and profusely decorated costumes, rustling in shimmering silk and brocade, the Indian rulers gave a kaleidoscopic effect to the procession. Advancing on their richly caparisoned elephants steeped in the glowing splendour and brilliance of bristling ornament and jewellery, each had a wholly new scheme of colour. The figures seemed to be moving in a blaze of resplendent hues bursting on the thought and vision of onlookers like a dream of the Arabian nights suddenly come to life. 2 So deep were their singular effects that to the eyes uninitiated to behold the sight and grandeur of colour and brilliance, it was almost like looking at the sun—cast changing colours of bright and sharp intensity burned in and out of every single instant which carried with it its own spell of glories and beauty. 3

Though its success and utility had earlier been much doubted, yet the procession with its immaculate precision of effects and impressions was its own justification. It was generally acclaimed, as Hamilton observed, "really a masterpiece of management", due to the personal care, direction and lead of Curzon himself. 4 It played the complete gamut of human thoughts and emotions with a deep impressiveness of its own as the Indian rulers followed by the high city and military officers slowly moved on. 5 The avenues of the high city through

1. Viceroy's Minute, 11 May 1902, no. 12, July 1902, pp. 1321-2, 1328. Earl. Ps. 1903 (cm. 1644) xlvii, GOI to the SOT.
2. Hamilton Menpes, op. cit., p. 35.
out had been lined by troops on either side drawn up for the occasion. All that gave to the famous city and seat of the Great Moguls, once more, a majestic glow of pomp and magnificence with Imperial dignity as the procession, under a cloudy sky, moved towards the encampments. The occasion set the tableau, in a frame of historic environments and impressive settings, for the State rituals of the Durbar, arranged for Thursday, 1 January, 1905.  

The day fixed for the Durbar, which was undoubtedly one of great historical significance, had its own association with the Queen's assumption of the Imperial title on 1 January 1877. The Durbar was fully representative of all the various elements in terms of the wealth, rank and power of the Imperial dominions comprising India and its states. All those elements and the Indian Empire that day seemed to be more or less coalesced and absorbed in the U-shaped amphitheatre of the Durbar. Gathered together on the occasion were not less than 160 rulers of Native States, whose territories extended over 55 degrees of longitude, comprising a population of not less than 60,000,000.

1. *Parl.Ps.* 1903 (cmd. 1644) xliv, 601 to the Sosi, 7 May 1904, supra.
3. ibid. (for the same reasons, subsequently also the Proclamation for the reforms of 1909-10, was made public on 1 January 1909 rather than on 1 November 1902, the opening day of Parliament.) *MM.Ps.* Kintosh to Horley, 19 Aug., 29 Sept. 1901, vol. 16, pp. 29, 94-5.
The imposing structure of the amphitheatre in white, blue and gold, had been erected on the site of the assemblage. It was designed exclusively in the indo-saracenic or nolug style, every detail, as under the direction of Curzon, having been copied accurately from historical buildings at Delhi and Agra.¹

Indian rulers with their jewels and costumes seemed to be a mosaic, set within a vast human tapestry inside the barabar. The amphitheatre was a solid mass, impressive and imposing, representative of one-fifth of humanity, the glory and pride of the empire.² In front of the hall, with its gold embroidered carpet, there stretched out a long and impressive line of ruling heads of the Indian States adding colour and dignity to the resultant shape of majesty which the imperial occasion so effectively symbolised. By his imagination and grasp of detail, Curzon had, as Hamilton commented, produced a "scene almost unique in its historic picturesqueness".³ "The fabric of our rule that day," Hamilton had earlier pointed out in Parliament itself, "was going to be supported by a pomp and magnificence which will be worthy of the great organism which it represents".⁴

The proceedings at the barabar commenced at about midnight with the flourish of trumpets, English and Indian, who rode on richly

¹. JPP (July) 1894, no. 39, 14 Nov. 1891, encl. i, p. 1, "by pl. t. gen. (Curzon)."
². JPP (Feb.) 1894, no. 39, 14 Nov. 1891, encl. i, p. 1, "by pl. t. gen. (Curzon)."
³. Ibid. The Hindustan Times, 1 Jan. 1902. The Indian Nation (India), 1 Jan. 1902.
⁴. JPP (July) 1894, no. 39, 14 Nov. 1891, encl. i, p. 1, "by pl. t. gen. (Curzon)."
considered black horses. There were about 2,000 men before them, massed in the arena of the Durbar, playing stirring music to beguile the hours ere the much awaited arrival of the Duke and the Viceroy. A wave of excitement spread through the great concourse when, soon after midday, there entered the mutiny veterans, bearing with their badges the memories of the scars and struggles of the arduous days of 1857. Their historic entry synchronised more or less with a long continuous rattle of musketry, that heralded the arrival of the Sovereign's own brother who, as also the Indian Princes and Chiefs, led specific roles for the occasion. The Duke, wearing the uniform of a Field Marshal, entered just before the Viceroy in an atmosphere of silence for the slowly rising tune of the National Anthem. Accompanied by the bachees, he was escorted by a British squadron of the 9th Lancers. Soon there was a flash of scarlet as the Viceroy's own bodyguard, their colours quite obvious, strode in with fixed bayonets lining up before the throne. With them there was also the detachment of the princely cavaliers as the viceroy's crack corps, resplendent in their colours of blue and silver, mounted on jet black chargers, and the Viceroy on the veld VINCE the audience the Viceroy, the entire audience in the arena, including the Indian Princes and Chiefs rose in their seats.
Curzon opened the Durbar in an atmosphere of majesty and high imperial traditions. He had his seat on the dais in a Chair of State upholstered in red velvet, and ornamented with a golden crown and silver lotus leaves. There was first and foremost the ceremony of Proclamation. That opened in an impressive style as the herald, Major Maxwell, riding on a steed close to the dais saluted the Viceroy who commanded him to read out the Proclamation. Soon after, a flourish of music, and the solemn pronouncement as to the Coronation of the King-Emperor of India, there was the unfurling of the Royal Standard. An effective finish of the opening scene came with the resounding notes of the fanfare and the booming thunder of 101 guns firing imperial salutes for the charful dignity and honour of the occasion. Then there followed, with no less impressive a trance of imperial peace and serenity, the Viceroy's own Durbar speech, interspersed with the Royal message for the princes and people of India.

Curzon's own Durbar speech was far more elaborate and definite in its contents than the formal and perfunctory character of the King's message. But the message, though little noticed by the critics in India, has been prepared by Curzon himself. To all my liegemen and subjects, the King's message reassuringly concluded, I reach the assurance of my regard for their liberties, of respect for their dignities and rights, of interest in their advancement, and

1. Ibid.
of devotion to their welfare which are the supreme aim and object of my rule," however, Curzon in his own speech intercalated the government's decision for remissions with a further possibility of reductions in taxation as a financial relief for the princes and people. The announcements, though highly satisfying for the princes and others, had a chilly reception from the Indian nationalists. None of them, however, realized that even the very little concessions Curzon announced had been secured only after a tough struggle with the conservative government at home.

The most enlivening of the proceedings that highlighted and concluded the official ceremonies with great colour and dignity was the presentation of the Indian princes and chiefs. Following soon after the cartoon speech, both the viceroy and the viceroy moved forward for the ceremony at the main and stood side by side near the steps leading to the chair of state. In front of them there had been extended a terrace or platform. It was connected on either side by an easy ramp, with the broad staircase running entirely round the arena and close to the lowest tiers of seats.

In quick succession, as the presentation started, each Indian ruler, about a hundred of them, ascended the ramp, either singly, or supported (in the case of only those having a more than 15 guns salute) by a son or minister, while that day wore for a time to its old

1. ibid.,1903, vol.1, p.59.
2. ibid., parl. Deb., 1903 (C) 1st Feb., (115), 170. secs. pl. proc., Jan. 1903, no. 54, 1st Feb., 1903.
3. ibid., 1893, no. 66, p. 59 to the 30th, 3rd May 1903, parl. Deb. 1903 (C) 17th Mar., (115), 370, 1903 (C) 6 Jan., (119), 55.
4. ibid., 1903, no. 190, excl. 6, no. 141, 25 Jan., 1903, vol. v, p. 43.
5. ibid., 1903, no. 190, excl. 6, no. 141, 25 Jan., 1903, vol. vi, p. 9.
7. ibid., 1903, vol. xxiv, p. 590, 1903, curzon to his majesty, 1 Jan., 1903, vol. xvi, p. 177.
significant imperial past as it looked once again at the heart to the
asymmetry it had already met with struggle through the crashes of
mighty revolutions. It was here that the idea of Empire had ger-
minated fast under both Hindu and Muslim rulers who had proclaimed them-
selves emperors, but had failed to weld India into a harmonious whole.
however, under the hereditary crown, the Indian princes and
princes together with others present on this occasion seemed to have
realised, one and all, the force of unity in diversity. They were
no longer, as Curzon observed, "scattered atoms in a heterogeneous and
heterogeneous mass but co-ordinate units in a harmonious and majestic
whole." That was effectively demonstrated by the immaculate and
uniform way the different princes and chiefs advanced, one by one, to
present themselves to the duke and the viceroy.

Each one of the princes and chiefs was received at the do's by
the duke and the viceroy, both of whom shook hands with all of them.
the Indian rulers, each and everyone in their respective turn, con-
cveyed their feeling in appropriate words of respect and homage,
distinct and aloud before returning in the same way and style as they
had advanced, and in so doing almost everyone of them left behind
one deep impression. In the situation it was not unnatural that

1 Parl.Las. 1927 (end. 1929), GOL, Hm. Dpt. to the Marquess of Crewe,
22 Aug. 1911, para 6, p.3.
4 Parl. Lbs. 1905 (end. 1941), (Lxvi), GOL to the SOJ, May 1905, p.9.
5 Ibid. SPL, 1902, no.513, encr. 2, op.cit., para 30, pp.6-7. PCLH,
emotion by the awe and majesty of the occasion. In the circumstances select phrases melted into simple but heartfelt and sincere expression. There could have been hardly any studied oration more eloquent of the sentiments than the following words of the aged Raja Sir Bira Singh of Nabha who had been sent to attend in person upon the Duke. "I am ready to die in peace," said the old Raja. "Now I can die in peace," he said, "as I have discharged the three duties of a true Sikh: I have lived according to the precepts of the Guru, I have aided the state with my sword, and I now have paid my personal homage to my sovereign."

During the fortnight of the festivities at Delhi Curzon saw that the Indian rulers and their states received more than an ordinary share of recognition and took active parts in the various functions. They, indeed, found that recognition at the Indian Arts Exhibition, State Receptions, Awards of Honours and Medals, the State Ball, the Grand Chapter of India Orders besides other informal meetings with the vicerey, forever connected with the impressive display of steam and steel and the military review, their states also had their part and prominence at the Khalsa's review on 7 January 1903. The Khalsa's review induced a wide circle of quaint spectacles which gave one the feeling of being set into the "turbouque old world."

and fabulous part of the states' colourful history.¹ One saw on the occasion squadrons of horsemen in chain-armour, mail-clad warriors on camels, colourfully tattooed cavalry and desert-soldiers in huge quilted coats. There were beside them in dreadful shapes and weird forms, fighting men on stilts for attacking war-elephants, with many others in green and mauve velvet in grinning dragon masks.² That revealed along with the diversified character and strength of the imperial organisation, the barbaric splendour and might that was fast giving way before the new times and changes. Designed mainly on Curzon's own imaginative conceptions, the review was presented with the cooperation of some 50 states.³ The occasion witnessed the glowing but almost the final cultural of an India of mailed warriors, with its rich trappings and sandstorm medley of the states' past colour and grandeur.

¹ JPL, 1903, no.435, 7 May 1903, para 6, p.9; encl.I, pp.1-3.
² JPL, op.cit., vol.26, 1903, p.75-93.
³ JPL, 1903, no.425, Jnu.apt.601, 7 May 1903, para 9, hertmer nopes; op.cit., pp.75-83.
DEPOSITIONS AND ABDICATIONS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CASE OF MHARAJA HOLKAR

Curzon's Viceroyalty witnessed a number of depositions and abdications arising out of rulers' incompetence or criminal conduct. Poisoning and assassination were common features of dynastic quarrels and family feuds in the States of India. ¹ "I do not hesitate to say that a good deal of both", Curzon wrote, "still goes on in quite a way in the courts of the Native Princes". ² Even a ruler like the Raja of Nabha of whose integrity and character Curzon had a relatively high opinion, was thought to have resorted to poison to secure his succession to the gadi. ³ A notorious case was the murder of the Chief of Chhuikadan State, and also of his second son, occuring just sometime before Curzon's own arrival in India. In addition to the two victims, as many as five other persons were also poisoned, and narrowly escaped death. ⁴ The plot was carried out quite effectively and no one was found responsible except some of its agents. Only two of the family cooks, Udo Wuss and Trebini Dass were charged with intent to murder, having mixed arsenic with the milk which was consumed by the victims. They were both found guilty and condemned. ⁵

An outstanding case, which involved a ruling prince and attracted Curzon’s personal attention, concerned the Maharaja Ram Singh of Bharatpur. The Maharaja, though a young man of little over 20 years, had already earned much notoriety through his wild character and low habits. Even his father, who had knowledge of his son’s depraved conduct and grave moral lapses, had, before his death in 1873, tried in vain to exclude him from the succession. However, in consequence as Curzon remarked, of the young man’s “incurable addiction to drink and other weaknesses” both natural and unnatural, the Government had restricted his ruling powers.

The incident which implicated the Maharaja in a serious criminal charge occurred outside his State while he was staying at Mount Abu. The crime with which he was charged had much to do with his association with a young (boy) servant named Nanga whom he had been keeping with him at the hill station. However, the young boy, having presumably in some way offended the Maharaja, and fearful of the consequences, had run away from him. Whereupon one of the Maharaja’s own servants named Kiddu attempted to intercede with his master on behalf of the boy. His fateful meeting with the Maharaja on 2 June 1900 brought about a terrible altercation between them.

3. IFP(Intl.) Aug.1900, no.297, GOI to the JOSI, 16 Aug.1900; no. Offg.AGO to the Func.Sec.GOI, 14 June 1900.
exchange of angry and offensive terms between them, the Maharaja in a fit of rage, seized a double-barrelled gun from his bedroom and shot the servant dead. In the circumstances, it could not for long remain unknown to Curzon that the Maharaja had unnatural and clandestine relations with the young boy. Soon afterwards, in August 1900, after the enquiry and trial, the Maharaja was found guilty of culpable homicide without pre-meditation. He was deposed and interned in one of his country retreats at Sewar. There he was placed under strict surveillance and confinement, with a maintenance allowance of about Rs. 3,000 per month, for the rest of his life. His Banias, except the mother of his infant son and successor, had the option of living with him at Sewar.

A year or so after the Bharatpur outrage there occurred another such case. Criminal charges were brought by the political authorities against the eldest son of the Chief of Sanjeli. He was accused of having poisoned and murdered two of his wives, one after the other, both of whom belonged to the Rajgarh house, in order to marry into a better and richer family at Jodhpur. The crimes imputed to him, however, could not be adequately substantiated owing to the inefficient

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1The servant Hiddu was alleged to have offensively abused the Maharaja, saying, with particular reference to the Maharaja's association with the boy: "Ham ne aise bis bharve dekhe; kisi ne saza ham ko aakin dilaya", i.e. "We have seen a score of cataract patients like him none of whom has ever been able to get us chastisement". IPP(Intl.) Aug. 1900, no. 285, Sub. encl.ii.


handling of the case by the prosecution in the early stages of the enquiry. But in view of his disreputable character and various other fraudulent practices, the government of India did not completely excuse him. Soon after the settlement of the case in July 1902, as the chief of Sanjeli died, the government deprived the Rumar of his right to the succession. That was tantamount to an act of deposition. Like the rulers of Bharatpur, he was interned under strict surveillance at Godhra, while his younger brother was recognised as heir to the state, but the Rumar managed to escape in February 1903, and having procured some firearms, murdered the widow of his deceased father. He was again duly put on trial before the additional Political Agent, Rewa Kantha, and sentenced to transportation for life. However, as a result of a subsequent appeal from Bai Jaiba, his wife, he was found to be insane. The government consequently confined him, with due provision for his maintenance, in the Colaba lunatic asylum.

Of the criminal cases against members of the Indian ruling community, the one that attracted much more attention both in India and England was that concerning the Maharaja Madho Singh of Banna.
The case against the latter rested on a plot, which he was alleged to have engineered, leading to the death in mysterious circumstances of his uncle Rao Raja Khuman Singh. The plot had its origin in a romantic attachment of the Maharaja, who had succeeded to the Gadi only recently after the death of his father in 1899. It was connected with the Maharaja’s infatuation with a young teenage girl of low origin called Haidri Jan alias Kahanri Kamal Kaur. The latter (on account of her youth also known as nanhe garchar) had of late become pregnant, so that in April 1901 there had developed in the State a difficult and intriguing situation. The Rao Raja who was the senior male member of the family and the heir to the State had been opposed, apparently on ground of caste and religion, to the Maharaja’s marriage with the girl. However, on the Maharaja’s own invitation, he came from Rani Bagh to Panja, staying at the State Mandir Palace. And there, suddenly, after a meal on 24 June 1901, he fell seriously ill and died the next day.

Owing to the suspicious circumstances attending the death of Rao Raja, Curzon followed up the preliminary official enquiry into the case by appointing a special Commission for the trial. The Commission comprised two senior officers of the Government of India including a Judicial Commissioner. The proceedings which lasted for about two months, revealed, as Curzon observed, “shocking revelations” of crime.

and corruption that went on "almost unchecked at Native Courts". In order however to be fair to the accused, a liberal allowance of about Rs. 30,000 was sanctioned, at the recommendation of the Commission, so as to enable the Maharaja to arrange for his legal defence. He secured the services of some of the best advocates whom money could procure. The trial, which resulted in the ruler's deposition and confinement besides a death sentence for his Private Secretary Achhe Lal (who was found to have been privy to the whole plot), ended with his acquittal. However, the cumulative effect of the evidence against the Maharaja, though insufficient to justify the verdict of guilty against him, had been such as to find him guilty of connivance in the plot. Curzon having himself gone through the Panna papers which however were not made open and the findings of the court, had little doubt as to the complicity and guilt of the Maharaja. "It is impossible for anyone", he wrote, "to rise from a perusal of the case without feeling certain that he was at the bottom of the whole conspiracy, and that deposition and confinement are a light rather than a heavy sentence". However, the deposition of the Maharaja, as the King approvingly remarked, was but "evidently inevitable".

2. Parl. Qs. 1903, (C) 30 Apr. (121) 940-1; 1903, (C) 16 May (122) 1771-72; 1905, (C) 10 Aug. (151) 946-7.
5. APP, 1902, no. 266, 6 May 1902.
Cases of deposition such as Curzon had to deal with from time to time raised naturally issues of profound political and constitutional import. It was especially with reference to the succession of the young cousin of the deposed Maharaja of Banna that the situation seemed to arouse the sympathy of those supporting the independent rights of Indian rulers. Lotwithstanding the apparent guilt of the Maharaja, the native Princs endeavoured to prove that the former had been but a wronged and 'greatly ill-used man' apart from that, some questions were also raised subsequently in August 1904, at home in parliament. The new Secretary of State St. John Sadberk was called upon to explain that the competence of the Government of India to deal with cases involving the rights and succession of Indian rulers derived from its position as the Paramount Power.

The case which Curzon found most baffling was that regarding the eccentric Maharaja Shivaji Rao Holkar of Indore. The case against the Maharaja developed mainly from the eccentricities of his complex behaviour, characterised by cruel and wild yet basically childish and whimsical disposition. So seemed to have developed, as Curzon observed, "a streak of real madness in his composition".

For a number of years before Curzon's arrival in India, the Maharaja had continued in a course of action marked with caprice and misdemeanour, insolence and wildness. It came increasingly to the

notice of both the Government and the public. At last under Curzon's immediate predecessor Elgin, Holkar's maladministration, besides his wayward conduct and arbitrary ways, forced the Government to take firm action. The situation came to a head in 1898 following the death of a British Indian subject Govind Rao Bolia, who was alleged to have been murdered by officers of the Indore State. Tension was further increased as Holkar availed himself of the occasion to throw into prison, quite arbitrarily, some of his adversaries on the charge of the alleged murder. He also showed marked obstinacy in taking a stand against the demand of the Government of India for an enquiry into the whole affair.

The situation in some respects resembled that in 1866-7, when the Government held an enquiry into charges of murder against the ruler of Nabha. But in view of the maharaja's overstrung and temperamental character, Curzon had little desire for an open enquiry into the case. The Agent to the Governor-General, Col. Barr, was instructed to carry out a secret investigation, either at Indore, or somewhere in the neighbourhood, into the circumstances attending the death of Bolia. The report of the enquiries by March 1899 made it amply clear that Bolia had not been poisoned and that he had died a natural death.

2. I.P.(A & C) para 65 (b), pp. 5-6.
4. The Naja had been accused as having caused the death by poison of the late ruler of Nabha, but the latter had died, as the investigations disclosed, a natural death. Parl. Ps. 1897 (250) 1, WP, p. 38.
death. The investigations disclosed to Curzon that the charge of murder was nothing but an after-thought of Hollkar himself, who had been ingenious enough to utilise that against the accused persons. Prominent amongst the latter whom Hollkar had put behind bars was a person named Ganpat. Against him the Maharaja - the report added - bore a deep personal grudge. As a result of that he had been sentenced to death, though he had not been executed, and had been in the State's prison since October 14th.¹

Soon after the conclusion of the investigation, and having fully satisfied himself as to the main facts concerning the situation at Indore, Curzon made his own views known to Hollkar.² He called upon Hollkar to release Ganpat and others or else to state the reasons for which they had been held guilty and were under confinement.³ Curzon further asked him for the restitution of the property which the latter had also arbitrarily seized, and the cancellation of the relevant official notification.⁴ The Maharaja's response was one of complete unconcern, which in a way confirmed the prevalent opinions as to the peculiarities of his conduct.⁵ He refused to carry out what Curzon had advised him to do and continued torturing the

unfortunate victims of his wrath in the prison.\(^1\) At the same time, in his characteristic manner he also tried to humiliate and embarrass Col. Barr (against whom he entertained the most deadly hatred) with a show of insulting behaviour.\(^2\) Instead of effecting a reconciliation as Curzon advised, he sent a flippant apology almost worse than the original insults, to Barr, who was about to go on leave. Further, acting — as Curzon observed — "like a petulant child" Holkar had at the same time "thrown out a half suggestion of abdication".\(^3\)

With the departure from Indore of Col. Barr whose place was taken up by Curzon—Jyllie, the Viceroy expected improvement in the general conduct of Holkar.\(^4\) Already in 1874 the Government had managed to effect a desirable change, in an almost similar situation, at Saroda by having replaced Col. Hayre by Sir L. Felly as agent to the Governor General.\(^5\) However Curzon's hopes, for some healthy turn and improvement in the situation at Indore during the time Barr was to be "off the scene", turned out to be but partially realised.\(^6\) After a long.

1. SPLI, 1899, no. 910 (25 Feb.) para 157 (iii) vol. 120, p. 216. LCC, Godley to Curzon, 22 May 1899, vol. 158, p. 62(c).
5. rarl. ps. 25 Nov. 1874, para 3, p. 86; 1875 (cmd. 1251) vol. I, GOI Fgn. Sec. to the V. Sec. GOB, no. 2563, para 8-9, p. 4.
interview and protracted arguments with the new Agent, Holkar agreed to release the prisoners, who were accordingly set free. But the Maharaja still did not show any readiness to restore their property. On the contrary, he ordered forthwith also the expulsion of four of them from the state. Their expulsion was, however, not altogether unexpected, being in character with his usual practice. Already, for instance, he had followed the same course in having expelled, soon after his installation, even some of his close relatives like his uncle Sir G. Rao Bahadur. The latter had been looked upon by the court ladies, including Holkar's own mother (who was believed to have held him until for succession) as their natural protector against the Maharaja.

In trying to by-pass the right of his subjects and also the authority of the government of India, Holkar was not content with only the orders of expulsion. He also issued two most important notifications apart from those that he had been advised by Curzon to cancel. Curzon-syllie thereupon advised, and also twice called upon the Maharaja to cancel the orders and to withdraw the notifications. Holkar on his part, refused outright to do anything of the sort. And moreover, in doing so, he again made use of his curzon printed in a private letter, "most improper and disrespectful terms."

1. ibid. 3rd, 1599, no. 541, viceroy to the com. 16, ay 15, p. 10.
It was by July 1899 that Curzon felt constrained to refer the state of affairs at Indore to his Executive Council. By that time the Government of India had also several memorials and complaints before it, one after the other, by the State's own people complaining of Holkar's various acts of oppression. The memorialists had one and all been oppressed and in one way or another, as subsequently Holkar's senior Rani Varanasi pointed out, "wronged by His Highness". However there was still little chance for any enquiry into the alleged misdoings. But any action for an enquiry was hardly possible, as Curzon observed, without "long sustained pressure under circumstances which tend to lower the dignity and authority of our agent at Indore".

Holkar's case was discussed in the Viceroy's Council in the light of the Rani's numerous misdeeds ranging over some twenty years. In taking a long and connected view of his past and present conduct, the Council obtained a full perspective of his character and environment. The main object of the Council was that of devising some essentially reformative measure in order to improve and correct, rather than to punish and depose him outright. Curzon, on his own part, wished to refrain from any move towards the adoption of extreme measures involving deposition. He was not unconscious of the

3. SPLI, 1899, no.224, Viceroy to the JGG, 8 July 1899, para 3.
adverse effects likely to arise from any radical action for the ignominious removal of the Maharaaja. 1 Curzon preferred instead to restrict the Maharaaja's despotic power. 2 And he tried to proceed on lines not different from those which had of late been prescribed in dealing with somewhat similar circumstances elsewhere in, for instance, States like Butlam, Hanswara and Baroda. 3 Curzon proposed to appoint a Resident at Indore and to remove the Agent to the Governor-General to show or elsewhere. 4 These arrangements were calculated, as Curzon observed, not only to "curtail the Maharaaja's opportunities for mischief" but also "to extricate our Agent from an undignified position." 5

Before Curzon's proposed course of action, the Queen had become acquainted with the situation at Indore through Hamilton and Lord Salisbury. 6 However, nolcar, feeling confident of the general goodwill of the Queen towards the members of Indian ruling class, and having contacted her directly in a recent telegram on her birthday, was likely to bank on her sympathies in his favour. 7 Already in 1891

2. sPLI, 1899, no.736, viceroy to the Governor-General, supra.
4. ibid. Parl. Rs. 1895(180)lviii, MPV, p.185.
5. sPLI, Viceroy to the Governor-General, 4 July 1899. supra.
she had been averse to approve of the severity of sentence in the case of the rebellious ruler of Manipur, notwithstanding the latter's complicity in the murder of several British Officers. Hamilton however passed the decision regarding Nolkar to the Queen for her comments. Meanwhile Curzon also acquainted the Queen with the situation. Not long afterwards she gave her assent to the measures proposed, but added that it would be advisable to have a military officer rather than a civilian as the resident at Indore.

It was on 6 July 1899, soon after the Queen's assent, that Hamilton sent a telegram formally approving the terms proposed for Nolkar. Restrictions were imposed on the Maharaja's power to appoint and dismiss any ministers of his State without the government's consent. He was to be guided by the resident, whom he was to consult on all important matters, including any sentences of capital punishment requiring the confirmation of the Government of India. There was nothing out of the ordinary about these restrictions, particularly that relating to capital punishment which required similar confirmation in the case of local administrations and Government.

Already for instance, rulers like those of Kapurthala and Sudderkota had been equally placed under specific restrictions in the matter of passing


2. IQV, 3rd Series, Curzon to Victoria, 5 July, 1899, vol. iii, p. 386.


4. iil, 1899, no. 746, SOSI to the viceroy, 6 July 1899, p. 9.

5. IQV (Int'l.) Sept. 1902, no. 7, 19 June 1902; Feb. 1900, no. 55, SOSI to the SOSI, obit.
death sentences on their States' subjects. Moreover there were a number of rulers including that of a State like Kashmir, who had not been authorised to wield full ruling powers. It was, however, generally on account of either their incapacity or minority that the Government had to take over their powers. There were many other rulers whose powers had to be restricted on occasion until the Government was satisfied of their capacities. There were among them rulers of both big and small states such as Jammu, Jhind, Bahawalpur, Keonthal, Baoni, Kalahandi, Nandgaon, Ramdug, Nyasora, Savantvadi, Jath, Akalkot, Balsinor, Alwar, Ali Rajpur, Jaora and Bijawar.

The Government's specific instructions regarding the impending appointment of a Resident at Indore were communicated to Holkar by the Agent to the Governor-General on 15 July 1899. That produced an immediate reaction from Holkar, not very different from that in 1884 of Maharaja Partab Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, who considered the presence of Resident at the court as derogatory to his prestige. He sent a telegram, calling upon the Viceroy to refrain from implement-

1. IPP(Intl.) Nov.1900, no.140, 14 Nov.1900; Oct.1902, no.103, 24 Sept 1902; July 1903, no.249, 25 May 1903.


6. Parl.Ps.1890(cmd.6072)liv, GOI to the SOSI, 19 Oct.1885, pp.5, 6; recommendation to the Viceroy, 18 Sept.1885, no.1, 2.
ing the decision, followed also by a letter to similar effect, with
a request for a personal meeting with the Viceroy at Indore. ¹

Replying to Holkar with some firmness but quite politely, Curzon
pointed out that it would not be possible either to depart from the
decision of the Government or to visit the State. He further told him
that the extent to which what the Maharaja called his humiliation was
to become widely known would be dependent upon the former's own
conduct. Curzon also advised him to accept the orders of the Govern-
ment with composure. In that case there was no reason, he assured
Holkar, why publicity should be given to any fact save that a Resident
had been appointed to his court as in many other states. ² Curzon
at the same time indicated the possibility of the disclosure of all
the disgraceful facts as to the conduct of the Maharaja. In communi-
cating that, Curzon followed more or less the method which had been
earlier employed in dealing with the Maharaja's no less eccentric
father Tukoji Rao Holkar. ³ The latter's role during the fateful
days of the Mutiny had not been above suspicion, even though subse-
quently he had protested against the ⁴ anti-British charges against

2. Karl. Ps. 1898(16)lxiv, op. cit., p. 511. PLCH, 16 July, 9 Aug. 1899,
vol. xiv, pp. 182, 244.
3. Ibid. PLME, 22 Nov. 1895, vol. i, p. 100. PLIC, 12 May 1899, vol. i,
p. 123.
4. Sir Henry Daly, one of the most distinguished officers of the Poli-
tical Department recounted the talk that the Maharaja had had with
Sir Vinkar Rao, with special reference to the scare of the Russian
advance on India. "Well D.R.," said his highness, "when will the
Russians be in India?" "Not in our time", answered Sir Vinkar,
"Perhaps not; but the time is nigh", rejoined the Maharaja thought-
fully. "Why do you wish", asked the Minister, "for Russia?
"Do you think", Sir Vinkar also added, "that such a power would trust
you and the native States with consideration now given?" "Perhaps
not", answered the Maharaja, "but when a man has been sleeping on
one side, he turns over for a change... long in one position

"An. 6 Oct. 1877. vol. 18. p. 182."
his name. In an official note dated 23 November 1870, it had been pointed out that there were "awkward revelations of Holkar's conduct during the first four days after the outbreak at Indore". The note had clearly intimated, as did also Curzon, the possibility of open disclosure of all the facts which, it was specifically pointed out, the Government might make public "if Holkar begins to agitate".

Curzon's letter to Holkar had its intended effect. Holkar accepted the appointment of Col. Jennings as the Resident at his court. It was more than anything else Holkar's inward fears, his knowledge of the sins of omission and commission which he did not want disclosed, that brought him to bay. Though some of the Members of the Political Committee at the India Office could not fully appreciate the subtle impact of an open disclosure on Holkar, yet the implied threat of publicity had force. It was suited to the character of Holkar, who was essentially a cowardly person. He was, moreover, one of those persons who, as Curzon observed, had to be told "in the frankest and apparently most uncompromising way exactly what he thought of him and what he had to do". The Maharaja was wont to accept "this sort of rebuff with decent grace". But on the other hand, "show him the least consideration, relax your hold for a moment, give him the smallest inch of rope, and he will take advantage of you."

1. Evans Bell, Holkar's Appeal, p. 7.
to be offensive and insolent. 1

With the appointment of Jennings who had, as both Curzon and Hamilton knew, personal attributes suitable for dealing with the difficult situation at Indore, Holkar behaved better. 2 However not long afterwards, the Maharaja was "off on the rampage again". Holkar saw a chance to making bare and open the overstrung elements of his whimsical disposition, with the impending famine situation when the Viceroy proceeded on his autumn tour. 3 Seeing that the Viceroy would be passing without visiting Indore, Holkar, suddenly in November 1899, announced his decision to proceed on a tour outside the territories of his State. The Maharaja undertook the tour, as Curzon noted, "nominally on the plea of ill-health, really in order to be absent from Indore when I visit the neighbouring states". The object, obviously enough, was to create the impression that the Maharaja himself was not desirous of meeting or receiving the Viceroy in the State. 4 To achieve that end, he did not wait for any formal permission as was usually deemed necessary for the tour in India from the Political Authorities. 5 Holkar, as Curzon observed, straightway went ahead with his programme, "took French leave", and ordered a special train for his retinue of about a hundred persons. 6 Before Curzon reached the neighbourhood of Indore, the Maharaja was reported to be

5. Ibid. PSLM, 1899, no.1443, 27 July 1899, encl.conf.11 no.464, 14 July 1899, paras 2-3.
ahead of the Viceregal "starring somewhere near the north-western
Provinces". "I have no doubt," Curzon wrote, "that he thinks he has
done a very smart thing by giving us the stiff. That was however,
ample illustration of "the petty insubordination and whimsical wrong-
doing" for which the Maharaja had a peculiar taste.¹

In proceeding on tour outside the territories of his state, Holkar
showed little regard, either for the orders of the Government or even
for the prevailing conditions of famine and plague. Despite the
criticism of the areas in India for his reckless movements through
some of the worst areas of suffering and affliction, he had no inten-
tion to stop.² He continued to make his progress through the afflicted
areas, followed the Viceregal round to Ajmer, Ahmedabad and Bombay.
These were the places to which Curzon, in view of the growing intensity
of the situation there, was bound to take exception.³ On that account
even though Curzon himself had his own travelling party reduced to
three Europeans and a few personal servants, Holkar had yet no mind
to discontinue his tour.⁴ "For what did he think it advisable to reduce
the strength of his own retinue? He did not, even though such jour-
neys on the part of some of the Indian princes and Chiefs outside their
States with a large number of followers had been officially discour-
aged as far back as 1863,"⁵ but Holkar showed some ingenuity in filing

¹ Ibid., SPLI, 1800, no. 70 (9 July) para 477(i), vol.119, p.31; 1900
no. 316 (12 February) para 157(iii), vol.120, p.246. LCC, 16 Nov. 1899.
² Ibid., 1900, no. 267 (15 Jan.) para 62(v, vi), vol.120, p.189.
³ Ibid., 1899, vol.xiv, pp.309, 315; 30 Sept., 16, 26
Nov. 1899, vol.xv, pp.320, 321, 321. LCC, 26 Sept. 1899, vol.i,
⁵ Earl. J., 1867(258), vol.1, p.43. Hts.11, Proc., July 1899, no.464,
14 July 1899.
Curzon's attempt to checkmate his advance. Curzon's own instructions to the Railway Companies not to give the Maharaja special trains anywhere were rendered futile by Holkar, bent on continuing his tour. Though he was annoyed, Curzon's keen sense of humour was tickled by the Maharaja's dexterity. The Maharaja, as Curzon observed, "scores off me by taking 100 tickets, and travelling in an ordinary train!" "What on earth is one to do with such a man?" Curzon queried, equally amazed and amused. "It is these acts of petty insolence", Curzon wryly commented, "that render it almost impossible for anyone permanently to get on with him."

Holkar's acts of insubordination and affronts against the government were at times found to be seriously unsettling and impairing the working of the administration in the state. The extent to which his fitful activities and idiosyncracies could work to the utter disadvantage of the state's administration and people was amply shown by his actions in dealing with the famine situation at Indore.

Though Holkar was quite stingy and niggardly, yet he was not altogether without impulses of generosity which on occasion found some positive expression at his hands. He was known to have helped, for instance, save thousands of cattle by bringing them from the worst areas of Kathiawar. Again he also offered the Government of India blankets for the soldiers serving in the South African War. However,

5. JFP, Nov. 1900, vol. xiv, p. 258.
in relation to the need for some liberality in relief expenditure to cope with the situation at Indore, his arbitrary and whimsical disposition as usual got the better of him. And so to paralyse the efforts of Jennings and others connected with the famine administration, he refused to recognise the State's obligations for relief according to the principles laid down by the government. The Maharaja had also declined, the Agent added, to sanction any suspension and remission of revenues, which naturally added much to the difficulties and suffering of the afflicted and helpless people. In the circumstances Curzon had no alternative but to authorise the State Council, which had of late been constituted, to ignore outright Holkar's orders on the issue. He also empowered the Council to make the requisite use of funds from the State's treasury after consultation with the Agent. He further informed them that if they found difficulty in getting to the funds, they would be helped by the troops from the adjoining military station of Khow.

Realising the serious character of the government's peremptory action against his latest acts of obduracy, Holkar forthwith gave way.

3. Ibid. Parl.Ps.1902(180)lxiii, lMFl, p. 194; 1903(249)xlvi, NMPI, p. 37.
4. SPLI, 1900, no. 267 (15 Jan.) para 62(v) vol. 120, p. 89. IPP(Intl.) no. 94, encl. 1, 26 Aug. 1901, section iv, para 22(h).
5. PLGH, 8 Feb. 1900, vol. xvi, p. 102.
6. SPLI, 1900, no. 346 (12 Feb.) para 157(iii), vol. 120, p. 226; no. 512 (16 Apr.) para 323, vol. 122, p. 435.
that instantaneous change of attitude, in face of the imminent of possible danger, was however typical of his character. He was, as Hamilton had known for a long time, more or less given to "exasperating the Government of India beyond endurance" and then suddenly turning "objectively civil". But his eccentricities combined with his irresponsible attitude in dealing with the famine situation resulted in strengthening instead of weakening the powers of the State Council. However, rather than exposing his infirmities by arranging, as many newspapers suggested, an official enquiry into the deplorable situation at Indore, Curzon exercised discretion. He preferred to abide by the precedent which had of late been set up under Lord Cawse in dealing with the equally infamous case of the ruler of Bhullawar. As a result of the latter's gross misrule and incompetence, the Secretary of State had approved of the Government's measures for leaving the administration of the State with the State Council and the Political Superintendent.

Holkar's acts of caprice and wanton cruelty were not confined merely towards his own officials and subjects of the State. His relations with his own family, as borne out by none of his closest relatives, were of an equally irresponsible and grotesque complexion.

His conduct towards them was generally far more capricious and repulsive than that of, for instance, Maharaja Partab Singh of Jammu and Srinagar, who also had been known to be unkind and cruel. However, the attitude of the latter, like that of many other rulers, even though harsh and rough, was not—as was Nolkar's own fantastic character—of an uncouth and unnatural kind. Nolkar on the other hand was disposed, as Curzon learnt from private accounts, to persist in carrying out his course and cruel actions to the extent of extreme depravity and perversion.

Why was Curzon so tolerant of the vicious practices and misdeeds of Nolkar, who on account of his various aberrations, could have been with justice, set aside from the gadi? Successive Agents to the Governor-General before Curzon's time had already left on record impressions as to the total unfitness of the Maharaja; as a ruling head of a State. Indeed, as Curzon himself observed, "also every Viceroy before him who had had to deal with Nolkar had been "on the verge of deposing him". Even Lord Lansdowne, who took a rather compassionate and lenient view of Nolkar's manifold acts and abnormalities, had serious doubts as to his general fitness. But the firm actions of previous Governors-General, for instance, against Gaekwar Mulhar Rao, Partab Singh of Kashmir and Zalim Singh of Jhullawar had aroused the fears of

2. Parl.Ps.1890(cmd.6072) supra.
Indian rulers and their protagonists. In the circumstances, the Government had to be discreet and cautious and not to embark upon a course of action likely, as Hamilton remarked, "to frighten all the princes of India".

Curzon was fully conscious that any strong action against Holkar was likely to involve the exposure of the scandalous incidents in the Maharaja's past and present conduct, which would do more harm than good to the interests and prestige of the Indian Princes and Chiefs as a class in India. To publicise the Maharaja's misdeeds, Curzon maintained, would constitute "one of the most damning stories of native incapacity and misrule that have ever been given to the world."

In face of the peculiar character of Holkar there was no alternative for Curzon except to aim at securing improvements in the State's administration rather than in the Maharaja's conduct. As a result, the State Council with its recently enhanced powers, was able to carry through a number of reforms within a couple of years.

After a period of comparative peace, with substantial progress in the administration at Indore, Curzon thought of paying a visit to the State during his autumn tour of 1902. by visiting the state

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5. SPLI, 1900, no. 512 (16 Apr.) para 323, vol. 122, p. 433. IFP (Int'l.) July 1901, no. 9, 26 June 1901; Feb. 1902, no. 35, 22 May 1902; June 1902, no. 9, 12 May 1902.

Curzon apparently intended to assess in a practical way the work of the State Council under its efficient Minister Nanak Chand. The visit was to be moreover in accord with the earlier desire of Holkar who had wished to meet the Viceroy in his own State capital of Indore. Curzon as a matter of fact did not like to inflict upon the Maharaja "the public slur of passing within a few miles of his capital and not halting there". However, Holkar once again disturbed the peace of a situation which had been growing smooth and quiet. "He appears", Curzon remarked, "to be in one of his mad fits". The Maharaja, obviously in that state, wrote a foolish and impudent letter to the Political Officer Youngusband. In that letter, while generally threatening trouble, Holkar indicated his complete indifference as to whether the Viceroy visited the State or not.

On hearing of Holkar's latest reaction to the projected Viceregal visit to Indore, Curzon had him plainly informed that the Viceroy had no desire to come except in the Maharaja's own interests. The Viceroy, it was added, would readily abandon the visit, if the Maharaja was reluctant to receive him and was unable to comport himself with becoming dignity and grace. In the latter situation the Viceroy would have, Holkar was informed, no alternative but to show a similar indifference and reluctance to see or meet the Maharaja on the occasion of the Delhi Durbar. Holkar therewith resorted to his usual practice and as on previous occasions threatened to abdicate.

1. JFR (Int'l) Feb. 1902, no. 56, encl. ii, 15 Oct. 1901; July 1902, no. 128 encl. i, 26 June 1902, para 4(b, 0, ii).  
3. Ibid.  
5. IPLI, 1902, no. 370, 20 Feb. 1903, encl. i, 2 Sept. 1902, pp. 1-4, 10.  
In doing so he was obviously under the impression that, owing to
lateest depositions such as those in Sanjeli, Sharatpur and Sena, the
Government would hesitate to add to their number, leaving him secure
in his position. 1

In response to Holkar's communication, much to the surprise and
amazement of the Maharaja, Curzon expressed entire agreement with the
former's idea of abdication. Curzon's decision to that effect was
followed up by a letter to Holkar which was personally handed over to
the Maharaja by Colonel Hayley, on 13 October 1902. 2

In at last meeting Holkar with the instantaneous and unexpected
acceptance of the Maharaja's own suggestion for abdication, which
the King consented upon as "a happy solution of a difficult and dis-
agreeable matter", Curzon had hardly any other alternative. 3 It was
after years of long endurance that he found himself virtually forced
to what he had ultimately decided to do. "No Viceroy in the world
with a sense of duty", Curzon wrote, "could possibly have abstained
from accepting the offer". 4

In order to facilitate the consummation of the Government's
decision, Curzon did not desire to give any provocation to Holkar,
which might retard the settlement. 5 However the Maharaja tried, as
was not unexpected of him, to back out in a manner unbecoming to any

1. ibid. IPP(A&C) para 653; IPP(Intl.)Nov. 1900, no. 159, 25.
1902, no. 117/6, 21 Apr. 1902. Parl. Deb. 1902 (6) 6 May (10/7) 301;
7 July (110) 81-6.
2. SPLL. 1903, no. 676, encl. vi, 10 Oct. 1902, encl. vii, 5 Nov. 1902. PPC
3. LCC, Curzon to His Majesty, 24 Sept. 1902, vol. 156, pt. 11, p. 53; His
Majesty to Viceroy, 6 Nov. 1902, p. 28.
5. SPLL. 1903, no. 570. encl. vi, supra. PLCC, 1 Oct. 1902, supra.
person of rank. He exposed the servility of his character as he abjectly "fell on the ground" and "touched the feet" of Bayley and Younghusband. While doing so he tried to convince them that he had not meant his offer of retirement to be taken seriously. In that respect, he did not differ much from the ruler of Manipur who in 1890 had tried similarly to go back on his words after having himself offered to abdicate. However, unlike the latter, Holkar ceased to protest after the futility of his abject demonstration was brought home to him. He stopped entreating when told that he had, by his own free act and will, irretrievably committed himself, and that in the circumstances the Government's decision was irrevocable. So he confined his efforts now to securing the best possible terms for abdication.

With that end in view, he begged to be allowed to have a personal meeting with Curzon. Though it was only a few weeks ago when he had expressed his complete indifference to the Viceroy's intended visit to Indore, yet Curzon agreed to see him in the State.

Curzon had a meeting with Holkar at Indore on 1 November 1902. "I shall never forget the interview", Curzon subsequently wrote, recollecting his impressions of the occasion. There was something grotesque and also "something tragic about the whole performance". The Maharaja, "a man of enormous size, weighing something like 24 stone", "sank down on the ground and touched my feet with his head."

4. SPLI, 1903, no. 320, encl. vii, AGS Central India to the Fgn. Sec. 301, 5 Nov. 1902, paras 2-4. IGC, 22 Oct. 1902, supra.
Curzon however tried to restrain Holkar's movements of obeisance and to keep him sitting in his seat, but Holkar did not regain self-confidence and poise for quite a time. "Streams of perspiration poured from his face and dropped in big beads from his chin over his hands", while his words sounded like those of a person with an "unhinged mind".

After Curzon had succeeded in comforting and inducing Holkar "to resume his seat and to conduct himself with the dignity of a ruler and a Prince", the Maharaja at last grew calm and composed. However, as on an earlier occasion in his meeting with Hayley and Younghusband, he now bargained for advantageous terms for his retirement.

Holkar asked Curzon for an annual maintenance allowance of Rs.500,000. He also asked for permission to reside in future within the confines of the State in a country house at Narwal, where he had been used to live on occasions during the past years. He further hoped, having also intimated the same to the Agent to the Governor-General, for a personal invitation to attend the forthcoming Durbar at Delhi. The invitation to Delhi also meant the postponement, till the Durbar, of the Maharaja's formal act of abdication which had been tentatively suggested would take effect from 15 November 1902.
Curzon found little difficulty in arriving at a suitable arrangement on the first two points. As to the third, he consented provisionally on two conditions both of which Holkar readily accepted. The conditions were to: the effect that the Maharaja should comport himself on the occasion at Delhi with propriety and decorum, and that he should not divulge the news of his forthcoming abdication. Curzon, on his part, was willing to take the risk of relying on Holkar, though Hamilton and even the King would not approve of allowing the Maharaja to attend the Durbar. However, Curzon held it was better still to trust to the Maharaja's sense of loyalty and self-respect in both matters. Holkar fully justified Curzon's assurance to the Home Authorities as to his presence on the Durbar at Delhi. He was present on all the occasions "with perfect propriety" and "wreathed in smiles".

The final act of abdication for which Holkar had decided to hold a Durbar after his return from Delhi was consummated on 18 January 1903. Once again on that occasion Curzon was daring enough to rely on Holkar, having allowed the Maharaja to prepare his own speech for the occasion. The Maharaja was allowed to do so, though the Agent to the Governor-General and even Curzon himself - in view of Holkar's various acts of eccentricity in the past - had many anxious moments.

"It was not without some anxiety", Curzon afterwards recorded, "that I awaited a report of the speech". However Holkar again acted with becoming dignity.

The Maharaja entered the durbar with his eldest son, who was still but a minor of about 12 years of age, accompanied by many of the nobles and officials of his State. There was present on the occasion along with a number of British Officers, the Agent to the Governor-General, who received the Maharaja on his entry into the durbar hall for the momentous proceedings, Holkar, for the first and the last time, stood before the audience in a tense yet exciting setting, with a dignity and charm that he had never before displayed during his whole career as a ruler. He wore the rhinestone and star of Star of India Order, when, speaking in an atmosphere of high tension and emotion, he announced his retirement. Then moving towards his young successor Hala Sahib Tukoji Rao who had the seat of State left vacant by Holkar, the Maharaja delivered his last words as ruler.

Having delivered — as Curzon remarked — "quite an admirable and dignified allocution", Holkar had the dramatic moments of his ultimate exit. He silently stalked down the durbar hall without another

1. Curzon, op.cit., p.44.
3. The term 'durbar' as defined by Curzon himself, as early as 1891 (when he was Under-Secretary) had a specific meaning. "There is nothing precisely analogous to a durbar in this country", Curzon pointed out in Parliament. "It is not a levee; it is not a public entertainment; it is not even a council or conference; but a durbar is an open court, convened by the paramount power, presided over by the Officer representing the paramount power, representing the Vicroy of the Queen". Parl.Dbs.1891, (6) 16 June(354)578.
5. Ibid. PLCH, 5 Feb.1903, vol.xxv, p.79.
word of either pent up emotional strain or wonderment, solemnly entered his carriage, and drove away, no longer a ruler, into private life. Those present on the occasion, who watched him and his son, as the latter amidst the thunder of roaring guns, was proclaimed heir to the vacated rudi, were unanimous in their feelings. They were all one in their general impressions of Holkar's serenity and poise coupled with Princely grace and dignity. It was felt by all that, during the tense and touching moments of the ceremony, Holkar throughout comported himself in a manner that won him back much esteem, even if not popularity, that he had lost. Curzon himself admitted "that nothing in his official life became the prince so well as his manner of leaving it, and that by the dignified character of the exit, he went far to redeem the undisciplined errors of his earlier career."

The abdication of Holkar was a significant incident in the history of British relations with the Indian States. Already before Curzon, the government of India had enunciated its rights, resting on Parmountcy, in dealing with diverse cases involving similar principles of action. Apart from a despatch from Lord Coss, dated 24 July 1891, the government of India had effectively demonstrated the reality of its own rights and obligations in a public notification on 22 August 1891. Besides that notification under the Manipur case, the

1 He was permitted to retain the personal title of Maharaja.
3. Lovat Fraser, op. cit., p. 220.
5. Earl. Rs., 1891(392)lix, JOSI to the GFC, 4 July 1891, pp. 21-2.
Government still earlier had enlarged and extended its policy concerning the appointment of British Residents as a matter of principle. And that principle had been positively recognised and enforced, in relation to almost similar actions with reference to the States' internal affairs, in 1882 and 1890.¹

With the appointment of the Residents and the control as exercised by the Political Authorities, the Government of India had no intention of meddling with the routine of administration. "It is altogether against the wishes and policy of the Government", it had already been affirmed, "to interfere unnecessarily with the customs and traditions of a Native State or to force upon it the precise methods of administration obtaining in British territory."² Curzon himself specifically disclaimed any such intention on the part of his own Government in its dealings with the Native principalities in relation to their systems of administration. "If a Native State is ruled well in its own way", he said in a speech on 28 November 1902, "I would not insist that it should be ruled a little better in the English way."³ He maintained that "a natural organism that has grown by slow degrees to an advanced stage of development has probably a healthier flow of life blood in its veins than one which is of artificial growth or foreign importations."⁴

Holkar's case confirmed rather than violated the rights of Indian rulers in matters of succession. Already in the past the

2. Parl. P. 1890 (cmd. 5072), lix, GOI to the Radd, Kashmir, 1 Apr. 1889, p. 28
3. LXXII (SS), p. 223.
4. SICK, 28 Nov. 1902, vol. iii, p. 68.
Government, as in its policy towards Dhar and Jyore, had already assured the continuance of native rule, in line with the principles of the Queen's Proclamation (1858). However, while recognising the force and value of these principles, he did not mean to deviate from some others that had been introduced under Canning. In his minute of 30 April 1860, the latter had specifically laid down some lines of action for the exercise of the Government's own rights and obligations, notwithstanding his grant of adoption sanads to the States in India.

"The proposed measure", he had firmly pointed out with special reference to the award of sanads, "will not debar the Government of India from stepping in to set right such serious abuses in a Native Government as may threaten any part of the country with anarchy, or from assuming temporary charge of a native state where there shall be sufficient reason to do so". And he had also emphatically added: "This has long been our practice".

While not by-passing the principles as laid down under Canning, Curzon had also some new ideas which constituted one of the outstanding features of his policy towards the States. He firmly stood against any move or practice which would involve the public exposition of the personal infirmities of the rulers or their trial and enquiry by their own fellow princes. He, on that account, broke away from

1. Ian M. 1858 (574) xlii, IMPL, p. 76; para 10; 1876 (436) lvi, proclamation, 1 Nov. 1856, p. 117; 1908 (524) lxiv, IMPL, pp. 2-4. See (for details regarding the restoration of the principalities of Dhar and Jyore to their ruling families) Ian M. 1859 (200) xvii, p. 589; 1861 (36) xlvi, p. 1; 1866 (112) lii, p. 485; 1867 (239) I, p. 550; 1867 (271) I, p. 560; 1908 (369) lvi, p. 415.
the practice which had been in 1875 created with the Government of India's proceedings involving the deposition of the Gaekwar Mulhar Rao of Baroda. The Gaekwar had had to submit himself to investigations concerning his conduct and administration by a Commission which had on it the Maharajas of Gwalior and Jaipur. The Government had also asked Maharaja Tukoji Holkar of Indore to sit on the Commission, who however — while expressing his concurrence with the Government's course of action — had not been able to serve upon it. Curzon endeavoured to discard the practice of the exposure of a ruler, charged with serious misconduct, before other princes and chiefs. Neither in the case of Holkar's abdication, nor in any other cases of deposition was any member of the Indian ruling community brought in to sit in judgement upon his peers. Curzon and Hamilton shared on that account the views of Lord Salisbury, who had in 1875 advised against appointing the Commission on the lines proposed by the Government of India.

Apart from the singular case of Holkar, there were as many as 67 rulers whose states had to be, at one time or another between 1898 and 1902, placed temporarily under the immediate control of the Government. However, leaving aside those charged with criminal acts and intents, and also a few others of extremely profane and dissolute

1. See (for details of the circumstances as to the misrule and misconduct of the Gaekwar leading to his deposition) Parl. Ps. 1875 (cmd. 1203, 1249–52, 1271–2) lvi, pp. 359, 389, 411, 519, 575, 731.
2. Parl. Ps. 1875 (cmd. 1272) lvi, GSI to the GOSI, 29 Apr. 1875, encl., Minute by Lord Northbrook, 29 Apr. 1875, para 13, pp. 46–47.
character, none of them was either removed from their states or allowed to abdicate. Even though there were some 17 cases of incompetence, Curzon yet scrupulously refrained from any action involving deposition. Curzon was willing to restore rulers, who had restricted powers, to the full exercise of their authority if and when they showed the requisite improvement.

One of the most outstanding instances of a restoration of powers was that of the virtually deposed Maharaja Partaji Singh of Jammu and Kashmir. The Maharaja had been, since about 1861, deprived of his authority and control over the states' administration after various charges of oppression, misconduct, intrigue and disloyalty. However, feeling satisfied that the Maharaja's conduct had shown considerable improvement in his capacity as a ruler, Curzon considered restoring him to his position. A few months before his own departure from India, Curzon had the Maharaja duly invested with ruling...
powers over his principality with due safeguards for the state's administration. And for that purpose in October 1905, he personally went to the State and installed the Maharaja in his rank and position as the ruling head of State.¹

In spite of the increasing evidence that Holkar was an impossible character who would not admit of reform in either his conduct or administration, Curzon had basically no liking for the idea of abdication. As a general principle he was opposed to encouraging any ruler to abdicate. Already before Holkar's gross misrule and its sequel, Curzon had personally dissuaded the old Raja of Nabha from abdicating. He had firmly declined, though the Raja had repeatedly expressed his great desire for retirement after ruling for about 30 years.² During his own short absence in England, Curzon had the satisfaction of seeing that the Raja, who had once again sought permission to abdicate, was told by the Government to continue with his rule over the State. Edward VII also disapproved of abdication for reasons of age.³

Curzon's marked distaste for abdication again found expression a few months before his final departure for England. In October 1905 the Raja of Cochin who was about 52 years of age, expressed a desire for retirement.⁴ As an orthodox Hindu he wished to devote the last remaining years of his life to religious contemplation and to the study of the Hindu books with which he was believed to have some

1. ibid., 16 Oct. 1905, op.cit.
scholarly acquaintance. In keeping with his religious beliefs, he wanted to lead a simple and unsophisticated life, and did not ask for any sumptuous monetary allowance. He asked only for a monthly payment of about Rs. 500 to Rs. 500 for his maintenance, and an allowance of about Rs. 100 a month for his widow in the event of his death. However, the Raja was not allowed to abdicate since his own personal influence on the administration was held to be indispensable to the welfare of his state and people.

Dolkar's case had hardly any parallel, not merely on account of the peculiarity of the circumstances connected with his conduct before the abdication. It was unparalleled also for the unusual features of his conduct and attitude afterwards during the period of his retirement. The Maharaja's conduct and general reaction in the subsequent period following his abdication presented a sharp contrast with those of the other deposed rulers of Panna and Sharatpur. The latter, for instance, failed to make any improvement or change for good in his thoughts and habits, which remained, as Curzon observed, just the same. Even though confined to a place under surveillance and away from his capital, he continued to pursue the unnatural practices and abominable habits which had brought about his downfall. The Maharaja of Panna, on the other hand, did not take kindly to the position, which his own criminal acts and intentions had brought him to. He continued, for long afterwards, to make frantic, though

2. ibid., 4 Sept., 9 Oct. 1903, supra.
3. ibid., 1902, no. 495, extract from the viceroy's letter, 3 Dec. 1902, p. 5.
ineffective, efforts against the orders of the Government by appealing to both parliament and the judicial committee of the privy council. Holkar's attitude differed substantially in his self-complacency and poise, which since his abdication disciplined him as hardly ever before - to remain content with his retirement in peaceful and honourable seclusion.

1. [Footnote text]
2. A couple of years before his abdication Holkar had in his own ways tried for some parliamentary support by, as Hamilton observed, scattering letters broadcast to the political magnates in England. [Footnote text]
IMPERIAL PARTNERSHIP AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

By the end of the 19th century there was a rapidly growing desire in different parts of the British Empire to give some form and colour to the ideas of Imperial partnership and unity. The assumption by King Edward VII of the title "Empress of India and of the British Possessions beyond the Sea" was but in accordance with such aspirations. Such ideas, which many of the Indian newspapers and princes supported, had been gradually developed anterior to Curzon's Viceroyalty. They had their origin in the political imagination of Disraeli, the main architect of Conservative thought and of the party to whom Curzon owed his own political affiliations. These ideas had taken definite shape as early as 1884 with the formation of the Imperial Federation League in London. The League had the support of many public men including the Earl of Rosebery, Lord Randolph Churchill and Lord Salisbury. It envisaged the building up of an Imperial Federation, including the various units of the Empire, on the basis of free trade and common defence with ultimate loyalty to the Crown. The idea was to bring about some permanent integration of their diverse interests in common with their military resources.

2. The Imperial titles had been so far confined to that of "The King of Great Britain and Ireland, and Emperor of India".
Curzon had been one of the most prominent advocates of Imperial
Federation. On his entry into the House of Commons in 1866, he had
fully brought out his views in support of the scheme. 1 After his de-
parture for India, discussions continued both inside and outside Par-
liament on further ideas related to Imperial Federation. 2 Amongst
such there were important discussions regarding the possibilities of
providing representation of the Empire in Parliament. 3 Already the
Queen herself had been disposed to have some important Indans created
Peers and, as such, entitled to sit and vote in the House of Lords. 4
There were also suggestions for a supreme court for the Empire. 5

Looking at the situation before him as a realist Curzon detached
himself in India from the various ideas concerning the scheme for the
Federation. 6 The scheme seemed to have minimised the difficulties
involved in vexed issues such as those pertaining to preferential and
protective tariffs. 7 So, as the Viceroy of India, it was not unreason-
able for him to realise the desirability of promoting unity and partner-
ship instead in the composite units of India and its States. The
Indian Empire with its myriads of people and princes, was, as he fully

1. 13, (L) 15 Mar. (142) 1150-6; 1905, (C) 25 May (136) 1442-5. PLBC, 19 Sept.
3. Ibid. Parl. Dbs. 2. B. Eastwick, The Representation of India in the
Imperial Parliament, pp. 1-4, 16-22.
7. It was over the issue of Preferential and Protective tariffs that
the party organisation of the Government at home - which for the
last 15 years had been more or less supreme in Imperial affairs -
was at last broken up. Hamilton and other free trade supporters
in the Cabinet, submitted their resignations in Sept. 1905. Curzon
on his own part, held the tariffs as such adverse to the economic
interests of India. IIBC, Curzon to Godley, 23 Sept. 1905, vol. 24,
pp. 1-4-5.
recognized, the main pivot and fulcrum of the whole Imperial organization. And it was here that he had the opportunity, as he pointed out, for "concatenating together the different portions of the service." In the circumstances there followed a marked shift in Curzon's thought and policy. His emphasis lay in the direction of a closer integration of India and its states vis-à-vis the Empire. Curzon expressed his views on the issue with particular reference to the locus concerning the Imperial Federation in relation to his scheme for the formation of the Imperial Guard Force. As early as Nov. 1900, he openly repudiated some popular forecasts that the Guard formation was but part of the scheme for Imperial Federation.

The Government of India under Curzon worked for formal agreements on issues of imperial significance with the states. The new system was meant to have further contractual agreements and conventions on matters of common (Imperial) interest for the safety and upkeep of the Imperial communications, with a number of states. The Kochins, the Tukums, the Durbar State, and the Mysore State.


(continued)
Curzon arranged to provide a basis for the uniformity and legality of jurisdiction on railway lines inside and outside the States. That was effectively secured as he had a number of Agreements with the States whereby jurisdiction over different stretches of territory, covered and traversed by the main railway lines, were more and more ceded to the Government. Even the Nizam of Hyderaba, one of the most reticent of the Indian rulers, who had had high ideas about his own sovereign position, showed the fullest co-operation over the issue. The main reason was obvious. The cession of jurisdiction to which some of the rulers like the Gaekwar had (earlier under Lansdowne) objected - was essentially a move towards Imperial co-ordination least harmful to the States' own interests. It did not violate the States' territorial integrity and 'sovereign rights'. Being confined merely to juridical operations and railway matters, it confirmed rather than violated the rulers' sovereign or proprietary interests. The States' own 'sovereign position' in that respect had been recently confirmed and recognised in the judgment given by the Privy Council (vide Yusuf-ud-din versus the Queen Empress 1896-7).
That was something quite substantial. It facilitated also the easy events of lands for railways and other kindred purposes, as were made, for instance, by States like Agra, Bharatpur, Cities, Cawnpore, Lucknow, Bilaspur and Sirhind. The arrangements on railways did the various rulers had hardly any purpose other than that of maintaining unbroken rights of jurisdiction on the lines in the imperial interests of India and its States.

With all his desire for partnership and unity, he still discouraged any radical ideas for parceling out India into various categories at the expense of the States. Imperial integration did not appeal to him anything like the States' disintegration and outright merger with the rest of India, as had been late been suggested by nationalists like Laccouli. Curzon on the other hand, had been used to be as he himself recorded, "a devoted believer in the continued existence of the native States", and also "an ardent well-wisher of the native princes". "The viceroy is one of these", Curzon himself explained his policy to the viceroy, "who consider that the maintenance of native States and of their princes, is essential to the durability of British rule in that country." He had no intention to do away with their class.

Taking them as his "colleagues and partners", his own duty towards then, he felt, lay in defending and protecting their joint interests by every means so as to make their principalities last and "endure". The increasing integration between India and its States was shown in the British enactments in force in native states. During Curzon's period there were additions. The Government had some definite legal powers inside the States. Some concerned personal jurisdiction over European and British Indian subjects inside the States, and also over the States' own subjects overseas. Similarly the Government had extradition rights and extra-territorial jurisdiction in cantonments, civil stations, and Residency areas besides Indian military enlistment. It had also the right to enforce measures for checking inhuman practices like infanticide, sati and the slave trade which had not yet died out in the States.

1. In 1904 the Government brought out six volumes in continuation of those published in 1866 and 1879. The volumes covered the Acts in force in the six political divisions comprising the States of Central India, Rajputana, Western India, Southern India (Madras and Bengal) for the Deccan and Hyderabad. See also the, British enactments in force in native states.
The extended rights and powers of the Government did not either conflict with the territorial integrity of the States that Curzon wanted to sustain rather than impair. The extension of the Government's own enactments inside the States was mostly regulated and limited under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act (xxi) of 1879. The powers and rights under that Act were however enlarged in their scope by Indian orders-in-Council as that, for instance, of 21 June 1902. Notifications under the authority of the Government's executive powers obviated the chance of the States ever falling under the Imperial Legislature.

The States continued to be beyond the direct authority of the Supreme Legislative Council. The rulers themselves contributed to that effect, in abiding generally by the Government's Political Practice, based on customs, treaties, usage and suffrages. Developed, in the main, by the Government of India's Political Department, Political Practice had some unifying values of its own. It provided a conveniently effective and precise system for enforcing uniformity in the Government's relations with the States. With its codes and principles, it served as a convenient substitute for Political and International Law.

3. Ibid. Parl. Dbs. 1893 (C) 25 Apr. (32), 21; 1902 (C) 16 July, supra.
4. SVDI, 1899, no. 456, GGIC to the SGST, 20 Apr. 1899.
5. Ibid. SVDI, 1901, no. 694, Viceroy's minute, 20 Feb. 1904, para 4, p. 22. DCCI, Leo-Jarner to Cunningham, 21 Jan. 1901, July 1907, vol. 12, pp. 15-40, 1908. Curzon had the Political Practice still further enlarged and codified. Now for the use of the Political Authorities as a safeguard against mistakes and irregularities in dealing with the States. It had been compiled under the authority of the Government, though earlier Lord Lansdowne had objected to its codification.
bearing on the government's political relations with the States in India. That was, he held, "a system of jurisprudence of European and non-Indian origin" which had its roots not inside but outside India and its States. ¹

Unity over different issues could be effectively promoted by a mutual understanding between the States and Government as to the scope and limitations of political practice. The Government had the right to enforce, as paramount power, its own authority in relation to a number of issues, sanctioned neither by express laws nor treaties. On all such occasions it had with it the commonly recognised sanction of political practice, which regulated the Government's own relations with the States. ² However there were, on the other hand, matters which could not be brought within the pale of political practice. These included, as Curzon observed, substantially "difficult and complex questions". ³ Most of these were directed to securing settlement and accord over points of common interest. ⁴ Important amongst these were the agreements for the overall share of imperial control over: exports, imports, customs, communications, minerals, mining, canals, arms, ¹ Mill, 1906, supra.
³ J. DICK, 4 Nov. 1905, vol. iv, p. 201.
⁴ CAR.P. 1999, (C) 71 Nov. (60), 3999, (C) 8 June (72) 694; 1902, (C) 28 July (113) 565; 1902, (C) 11, 16 Dec. (160), 62, 1951-2; 1905, (C), 23 Nov. (143), 939-40; 1905, (C) 20 June (147), 1093; 1905, (C) 3 Aug. (151)
ammunitions, explosives, saltpetre, poppy and opium. 1

Under Curzon's influence there were concluded not less than 69 specific Agreements for control over opium with the States in Kathiawar. Similarly the Nizam of Hyderabad, who was opposed to the extension of Imperial authority in matters of currency and postal union, finally agreed with Curzon's policy on the issue. 3 He provided support and recognition to the Imperial postal system by deciding not to levy custom duties on export parcels sent through the British post offices in the State. 4 On the other hand, British money including sovereigns was declared the only legal tender to be accepted at the British post offices within his dominions. 5 At the same time Curzon succeeded in strengthening and extending the government of India's authority for the regulation of excise and custom duties in a number of maritime States. 6 Important among such states, situated mostly in Kathiawar,


2. LFP( Intl.) Apr. 1899, no. 121, 1 Dec. 1902; July 1902, no. 252, 3 Nov. 1899.

3. JIL, 1909, no. 926 (4 Sept.) para 656 (III-IV) vol. 116, p. 524. LFP( Intl.) Mar. 1899, no. 289, 29 Nov. 1898; May 1900, no. 69, 17 Feb. 1900, para 2; May 1901, no. 95, 3 Feb. 1901; June 1901, no. 82, 31 May 1901; Aug. 1901, no. 134, 3 Aug. 1901; June 1902, no. 22, 3 June 1902; LFP( Intl.) Mar. 1903, no. 144, 17 Apr. 1902.


were Verbandar, Mahuva, Cutch, Norvi, Junagadh, Bhavnagar and Navnagar. In providing for the Imperial Customs Line and uniformity in the customs operations of the maritime states, Curzon forged yet another link for integration and unity. In 1904, he turned his attention towards still another such scheme for an Imperial Customs Service with a Director-General of Salt, Excise and Opium. This service came to be established just before he left India in 1905.

Apart from the manifold settlements with the States, Curzon tried to develop the character and strength of imperial partnership and unity as a positive and tangible reality. The reality of the growing bonds of imperial integration was evident in some of his own measures consequent upon the outbreak of natural calamities. Shortly after his arrival, India and its States had to meet with a distressing situation of drought and scarcity, by the end of the year the situation at last turned itself into one of the gravest calamities.


4. Ibid. LCII (53) 30 Mar., 6 Nov. 1905, pp.150, 180.


failure of crops and also fever, the famine was followed, as Curzon poignantly remarked, by "its familiar attendant furies" of fever, cholera, smallpox and plague.\(^1\) It lasted for not less than one full year (1899-1900) during which it stretched its fatal grip over plants and crops, food and water, man and animal alike. Extending over an area of no less than 400,000 square miles, it afflicted therein a total population of about 60,000,000 of which approximately 35,000,000 belonged to the States.\(^2\)

In the matter of assisting the afflicted States, Curzon made a significant departure from the Government's financial policy with regard to famine loans.\(^3\) Ever since 1877 (with the famine situation under Lytton) the government had been averse to any policy and obligations which would accustomed the States to borrow from it.\(^4\) By 1884 the policy of opposing loans to the States had definitely established itself. In 1896 the Government refused to advance money to the State of Travancore on the ground that it would be, as Hamilton observed, "opposed to the policy laid down in 1844".\(^5\) However Curzon managed

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5. Ibid. ILPI (Int'l.) Oct. 1902, no. 125, SOSI to the GCIC, 29 Mar. 1901.
to secure Hamilton's support. 1 Already in the famine of 1896-7, the Government had in a way recognised the necessity of some change, by having itself guaranteed some of the loans advanced to the famine States. Rich princes like the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior had been encouraged to advance loans, guaranteed by the Government, to the States of Cundhelkhand. 2 Similarly the Nizam, having tried to raise a loan in England, had secured an advance of 550,000 from the National Provincial Bank ostensibly on the Government's own guarantee. Curzon also facilitated loans from the English money market. 3

Apart from the changes in the Government's financial relations with the States, Curzon built up the strength and character of Imperial integration with reference to the Indian Famine Relief Fund. He strengthened the elements of partnership and unity by moving away from some of the existing precedents concerning the utilisation of the Fund for charitable purposes in India. With a basic collection of 237,000,000 the Fund had been started in 1896-7 under Ajax with the queen herself as its patron. Though meant for providing gratuitous assistance as famine relief for the indigent people, there had been so far little extension of its benefits to those living inside the


3. PPC, 24 Oct.; vol. 4, no.30, 1899; vol. 1, no.16, 5 June 1907, no.211, 1897, 23 Oct. 1907.

the States. Curzon did away with the invidious distinction in the matter of its distribution. While recognizing famine administration and relief as basically the Government's own duty, he did not ignore the utility of private charity. So he managed to increase the Fund by some further contributions amounting to a total of Rs. 14,000,000 collected from India and abroad. The Fund had a most encouraging response from England, in particular, where the Lord Mayor of London gave a lead in instituting a special charity Fund after Curzon's own appeal in India.

The large and liberal grants made from the Fund to the States were mostly for the purchase of cattle, seeds and general assistance to cultivators and others with no financial means. The grants, as Curzon observed, "far exceeded the expectations of the rulers or their subjects". Out of a total disbursement of Rs. 15,000,000, nearly

4. JFRI, supra, pp. 12-13, 19, 63-4, 92.
Re.5,000,000 or almost one-third of the amount distributed was allotted for helping the people inside the States. The fundamental principle of helping the helpless inside and outside the States found further recognition in the year 1900 with the formation of the Indian People's Famine Trust. The Trust was constituted out of "the magnificent endowment" and princely benefaction of a total contribution of Rs.2,100,000 from the Maharaja of Jaipur. The endowment provided a nucleus, as Curzon remarked, for a permanent insurance fund for relief against any future outbreaks of famine in India and its States.

Curzon showed a marked interest in the formation of the Indian People's Famine Trust instituted under the terms of the Charitable Endowment Act (vi) of 1890. The Trust had a significant and beneficial effect on the growing bonds of the Imperial partnership in relation to the extended scope of relief for India and its States. At the same time it bore a favourable comparison with the Government of India's own Famine Insurance Fund which had been created in 1877 with an amount of about Rs.1,100,000. Unlike the Trust's own specified.

5. Ibid.
methods of disbursements, the Government's Famine Fund showed fluctuations which he tried, though ineffectively, to fight against. ¹ The Government's own Fund, as Curzon observed, was "being swept in ordinary unfamine years into the Government's pool" instead of being set aside for future famine relief and insurance. ²

Apart from the different Funds suggested and sponsored by the States and the Government itself, Curzon had been hoping for a special Imperial Famine Grant from the Home Exchequer. ³ However, there developed some differences between him and Hamilton, and discussion arose in Parliament. ⁴ The difference between them centred on Curzon's expressed desire that the Imperial Grant should provide for interest-free loans when the necessity arose. The Grant, Curzon maintained, "if it be made at all should take the form in some shape or other of a gift, and of not a mere trivial bonus in respect of a diminution in the rate of interest upon a loan". ⁵

The idea of an Imperial Famine Grant started more or less from suggestion in Parliament, to which during April 1900 Walton had referred Curzon. The suggestion was to make good the different

³ PLCH, 5, 10 Apr. 1900, vol. xvi, pp. 25th, 320; 9, 16, 30 May, 11 July, 4 Aug 1900, vol. xvii, pp. 6, 50, 58, 125, 125-6, 321-2, 555.
⁴ Ibid. Parl. Pro. 1900 (C) 15 Feb. (70) 89; 3, 4 May (59) 174-2, 1 112; 26, 50 Apr., 3 May (32) 15, 275, 100; 16 May (51) 58-1; 5 June (52) 250-1; 15, 26 July (6) 156-57, 1555-57, 157; 23 Feb. 1904 (33) 18th, 15 (92) 1200, PLCH, 5 Apr., 10, 24 May, 6 June, 12, 17 July, 3, 26 Aug., vol. iii, pp. 175-4, 492, 174-6, 201, 5, 90, 60, 105-6, 201.
⁵ PLCH, 11 July 1900, vol. xvii, p. 256. PLCH, 6 June, 27 June, 27 July 1900, supra.
between what would have been received from the Lord Mayor’s Fund in ordinary years and that obtained under the present circumstances of the South African war. 1 Suggestions of a similar nature, with a substantial likeness to Curzon’s own ideas on the subject, continued to be made in Parliament for some time after the severity of the famine had subsided. It was, for instance, suggested that 35,000,000 to 37,000,000 should be made over to the Government of India, as compensation for the military charges in the form of famine relief. 2 The suggestion, which came from Sir Lancherjee Bhavnagar, was not quite unexpected. It was rather a continuation of what had been urged also by the London Indian Society and even by the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. 3 In the circumstances, the issue as stressed on by Curzon could not simply pass off without having in the meanwhile forced some divisions in the House of Commons. 4 However, in the first division on the matter, there were not less than 150 votes for against 72 for the imperial grant. 5 In another division subsequently in August 1900, the motion reiterating the need for the imperial grant on the occasion, was eventually rejected by 112 against 65. 6

2. Parl. Deb. 1900, (C), 25 Feb., (56) 1124. The military charges, under the recent report of the Welby Commission, had been held to be involved under strain upon the resources of the Government of India.
5. Parl. Deb. 1900, (C), 3 Apr., (81) op. cit.
There was little doubt that the famine event, if used, as Gurzo suggested, would have been highly demeretric of the value of Imperial integration among the composite units of the Empire. However, the authorities at home, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir J. Hicks-Balfour, could not think that the Imperial Grant would alleviate the famine situation. It was rather feared that as a 'state dole' it would staunch the flow of private charity, and would, moreover, vitiate the Government of India's own efforts to husband its resources. Also apart from the fact that the Government at home had been hard-pressed with the recent burden of war in South Africa, there was no precedent to support the Grant in question. The Government of India had no Imperial Grant from the Exchequer for coping with the last famine in 1897 in India and its States. Moreover, any Grant, if advanced to the Government of India, was likely to bring, as Hamilton thought, the vast financial powers of the former under the further restraint of Parliament.

In insisting on an Imperial Grant, which was equally demanded by most of the nationalist organs in India, Gurzo had to treat with...
earlier precedents. The situation under his was far more serious than that during the last outbreak under Elgin, who had shown no particular interest in an Imperial Grant from home. Apart from its serious character, the situation had a special difference about it in the obligations for the States' famine demands which hardly any Viceroy before Curzon undertook to provide. At the same time, Curzon looked upon the situation in the light of the Government's own moral duties together with the Imperial obligations towards India and its States. On that account he did not shrink British parliamentary criticism of Indian finances. "Here I Secretary of State", he wrote, "I should no in the least burke a House of Commons discussion upon India". There was, he held, "a great deal unselfish and noble in our Government of the Country", but also some things equally "crooked and near." "Pothe will suffer", he affirmed, "by the light being let in upon them". 3. He did not attach any importance to the plea for avoiding any strain on the British tax-payer when he did not mean to appear at the expense of those in India and its States. With particular reference to the British tax-payer, he emphatically stated:

"He pays so little towards India in any circumstances; he is relieved of so much that under an equitable distribution of financial charges would fall upon him; benefits so immensely by the Indian connection in a score of ways... that I think, at a time like this, he ought to be prepared to put his hand in his pocket, and find money - to the extent of 2,00,000 or even 4,00,000 - to help India in her affliction."

1. Gt. 42, 1870, no. 11 (25 June) para 42 (xiii-xiv) vol. 123, pp. 374-5;
   no. 11 (25 June) para 42 (iii-vi) vol. 123, pp. 374-5.
2. P. 5 (int'l) july 14, 1869, no. 42, 24 Jan. (1) vol. 123, nos. 1-3, 43, 44;
   vol. 123, p. 374.
3. 43 (int'l) 2 Jan., 5 Apr., 1874, vol. xv, p. 71; 1 June 1874, vol. xv
   p. 71.  
Despite his pronounced views on an Imperial Finance Grant for India and its states, Curzon had little intention to press for it unless forced to do so under stress of circumstances. He found no such justification for insisting strongly on the situation in relation to the rain and financial conditions did not grow worse. With the break of the monsoon by October 1900, the situation had markedly improved. Meanwhile, the Welby Commission (of which Curzon was a member in 1895), awarded the Government of India a yearly sum of not less than $257,000 as expenditure charges from the home Government. In the circumstances there was no longer any substantial reason for taking an official appeal to the Imperial Exchequer. The home Government had, as Curzon fully recognized, "gone as far as at the present moment we could legitimately ask". Apart from that, Curzon had been himself equally reluctant and hesitant to press the issue as a matter of urgency unless forced to do so by the pressure of circumstances. "My attitude", he told Hamilton, "has been one of desistance from appeal, almost entirely because... I feared that if we came to you too soon, we might compromise our chances of generous treatment later on".  

1. 11th, 1 Apr. (11), vol. xvi, p. 1; 30 May, 6 June, 11 July 1900, vol. xvii, p. 41, 1, 12, 20.  
2. 11th, 1 Oct. (11), vol. xi, p. 1.  
3. 11th, 1 July (11), vol. xvi, p. 7.  
4. 11th, 1 July (11), vol. xvi, p. 1.  
5. 11th, 1 July (11), vol. xvi, p. 1.
Apart from improving the Government's famine policy towards the States, Curzon also improved its military policy in relation to the employment of the States' forces outside India. He was given a lead more or less by the Queen herself. With the outbreak of the South African war (1899-1900) she repeatedly wrote to Curzon urging that use be made of the services of some of the rulers like those of Kutch Behar and Jodhpur. Both of them had already served with much credit on the frontier campaigns in the recent past.

In spite of the marked keenness and outbursts of loyalty on the part of the Indian Princes and Chiefs, Curzon still could not utilise their services in South Africa. He was handicapped by the ever-growing intensity of racial feeling (which the Queen wished to be broken through) in South Africa, besides the outbreaks of famine and pestilence in India and the States. In the circumstances, Curzon preferred to see the Indian rulers remain in their States with their own people, attending to their needs on occasion required. However Curzon had considerable monetary contributions from the rulers for the separation fund for the wounded soldiers. The Maharaja of Jaipur once again along with many other rulers like the Nizam of Hyderabad, distinuished himself by a handsome gift of as much as

Rs. 1,00,000 for the fund. In the same time Curzon also accepted offers of cavalry equipment, with duffadars, farmars, sowars and syces from a number of states. He had, for instance, 100 horses each from Hyderabad and Mysore besides 210 from Jodhpur. He had, moreover, 810 horses from Baroda, Patiala, Nabha, Jhind, Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Kapurthala, Faridkot, Alwar, Rampur, Bhavnagar, Jamnagar, Junagadh, Gwalior and Bhopal.

It was the China expedition that, in July 1900, at last provided the occasion for the participation of the Indian rulers along with their forces in the Imperial campaign outside India. Curzon's own ideas on the employment of the States' Imperial Service Troops were however in sharp contrast with those of some of the distinguished military authorities in England and India. Persons like Sir Donald Stewart of the India Council, Sir William Lockhart, the late Commander-in-Chief and Field-Marshal Sir George White, had some serious misgivings as to the worth and utility of the States' forces.

Like his immediate predecessor, Curzon had quite optimistic views about the political and military merits of the States' Imperial

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Service Contingents. However, he differed from Gladstone in making a close liaison between the States and the Government's own forces. Curtin had in that respect the necessary support from both Hamilton and Sir Palmer who had succeeded Sir William Lockhart as Commander-in-Chief in India. However, the official reaction to associating the States' duly trained forces in the conduct of imperial campaigns outside India was in a way facilitated by the Indian rulers themselves. The princes and Chiefs had of late been expressing, as Curzon observed "absolutely spontaneous" sentiments of loyalty which the campaign in China awakened among them. "He would think," Curzon said in his annual address, "have been a cold and narrow-minded sentiment, who, on such an occasion, would have cramped their enthusiasm or turned aside the offer of co-operation.

Notable among those who offered to serve were the Katoorajas of Kotah, Benares, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Alwar, Bikanir, Phalaur, Fatehgarh, and the sages of Agra, Bijnor, the Sardars of Kishanpur and the Raja of Cutch. Similar offers were made also by relatively lesser, but no less, Chiefs like the Raoja of Madia, Rao of Alipur and Ch miał of Biijanpur. Even

1. ASIA, 11 Jan., 1904, vol. 8, p. 15.
5. Ibid., 1 Nov., 1901, vol. 8, p. 400.
such ungenerous and crotacious rule as those of Indore and Baroda were equally keen like others, as Curzon remarked, "to share the responsibilities of Empire and to vindicate their loyalty". There were some 45 States which had Imperial Service troops of their own for the purpose; however, the most outstanding offers were those from the States of Kasimir, Patiala, Bhavnagar, Shind, Saba, Kapurthala, Jodhpur, Alwar, Dungarpur, Coates, Court, Hyderabad, Calcutta and Sirmur. One of the contributions for the conduct of operations which excited much consent inasmuch itself was the presentation of a fully equipped capital ship "Galician" at a total estimated cost of £200,000. In the circumstances the States, taken as a whole, provided the government with the best possible means of help in terms of their own men, money, and resources in general.

The reverse at least considerably shine choice in the matter of the crooks' collection in which Curzon himself, noted a "real interest."

He had a total formation of two battalions of infantry, a regiment of
cavalry and a company of sappers. These contingents comprised some of
the best troops of the Bikanir Camel Corps, Alwar State Infantry,
Jodhpur Lancers and the Halfordia Sappers. Along with the Contingents
there proceeded Maharaja Scindia in charge of the Hospital
Ship, Maharaja of Bikanir with the Camel Corps and Sir Partab with
the Jodhpur Lancers. So it had been, as Curzon observed, "reserved
for me not merely to praise but to employ them, and this not in local
service or in frontier warfare, but in an Imperial campaign on a far
distant land".

The participation of the States' own forces along with some of
the Indian rulers themselves in the China campaign had a significance
of its own. It was, Curzon claimed, "a turning point in the history
of the Imperial Service movement which had already formed a strong
link between the Government and the States. Long before Curzon it
was Lord Mayo who had discerned in the States' own ill-organised
armies a vast unused force that, he believed, could be harnessed to
some useful purposes. It was however under Dufferin and Lansdowne
that the Government at last decided to utilise and accept their ser-


ii, pp. 19, 62, 151. IPP(Int.) Nov. 1900, no. 66, 26 July 1900, no. 67,
26 Sept. 1900, no. 87, 2 Aug. 1900; Aug. 1902, no. 137, supra. Parl. Ps.
1902(130)lxxxiii, MNP, p. 191.

2. IPP(Int.) Oct. 1900, no. 83, 27 July 1900; no. 90A 8 Oct. 1900; no. 202
2 Aug. 1900, Parl. Ps. 1903(249)lxxvi, MNP, p. 25.

3. SLOR, 22 Nov. 1902, vol. iii, p. 59. Parl. Ps. 1902(130)lxxvii, MNP,


5. Lins. Ps., Cross to Lansdowne, 17 Dec. 1885, vol. ix/1(iii) pp. 6-7;
vol. ii, p. 186; 7 Nov. 1885, vol. iii, pp. 205-04. VCC, Dufferin to
Cross, 26 Jan., 26 Feb. 1885, vol. 24, pp. 2-3; 3 Aug. 1885, vol. 25,
military authorities had been engaged to reorganise and modernise the States' forces, showing the Government's trust in the loyalty of their rulers and their States. Curzon carried that policy of mutual trust and confidence to its logical conclusion, with a marked continuity and effect. He utilised Imperial Service Contingents also subsequently in 1904 in the campaigns in Tibet and Somaliland. It is surprising to me he himself privately recorded, "how few people if any have recognised at home that the despatch of these Contingents to serve against the queen's enemies outside India is really a notable step in the history of the Empire." It was the more remarkable, in that it imparted to the military forces of India and its States a character, in accord with the queen's thoughts and feelings, not much different from those of the Colonies. It struck at the roots of such discrimination as had earlier brought the Colonial forces, while excluding those of India and its States from the theatre of war, in South Africa.

The extent to which the Indian rulers could be integrated on a political level with the Imperial organisation became apparent, also,

4. "Still altogether that racial feeling," the queen had earlier on 16 Feb., 1900 written to Curzon, "as to the employment of Indian troops, who are no darker than Canadians and South Africans and who have features like ourselves, must be broken through.
5. Supra, 15 Jan., 13 Apr., (b) 27 Apr., (c) 13 Apr., (d) 13 Apr., (e) 114-7.
after the South African war and the death of the Queen. \(^1\) Their position in the organisation of the Empire was distinctly brought out in the elaborate arrangements for their participation in the two Imperial occasions of the Coronation in England and India itself. \(^2\) They had in the meanwhile, further recognition as what Curzon called, "an integral factor in the Imperial organisation of India" in his scheme for the Victoria Memorial Hall at Calcutta. \(^3\)

The scheme for the memorial, which was mainly after Curzon's own ideas, had a distinct place for the Indian ruling class. Outside the central wing of the Hall which was to be devoted exclusively to the mementoes of the late Queen, Curzon proposed to have the princes' own Gallery. The Gallery was to exhibit whatever was most peculiar and remarkable in the tradition and history of the Indian states and their princely houses down the ages. \(^4\) The scheme for the Memorial, however, continued to be subjected to criticism for a couple of decades after Curzon. \(^5\)

But Curzon found for it ample and enthusiastic support from:

1. *II (Int.)* Lay 1901, no. 457, 9 May 1901; *Jute* 1901, no. 45, 6 June 1901.


4. *Pall. 1899, 1901, (C) 6 Mar. (61) 1901, 27 June (62) 1899; 1901, (C) 27 Apr. (63) 1901, 6 Apr. 1901, no. 122; 26 Apr. 1901, no. 123; 14 Apr. 1901, no. 126. The two of Sir Henry Cotton who edited the *Victoria Memorial Hall Journal*, attacked Curzon in virulent terms in the Calcutta Press after the fashions fad of his father when Curzon had not appointed the Lieut. Governor of Bengal. However, the Government's official views and statements were brought out in the *Journal of Queen Victoria Memorial Fund* (601, Apr. 1901). All that was further followed up by an article for readers in England in the *Indian House* (June 1901).
the Princes and Chiefs, 1 In about two years (up to 20 March 1903) the total subscriptions to the memorial fund came to a sum of not less than Rs.55,379,601. 2 The Indian rulers lent also readily from their armouries and treasuries, rich and rare articles of historical significance. 3 Though his practice in that respect was not followed by his successor, Lord Hinto, Curzon included precious articles from the States. 4 That collection, he hoped, would convert the princes' Gallery into a "microcosm of the romance and pageantry of the East". 5 And it would, he believed, constitute "a National Gallery of which all India may well be proud". 6

In building up the strength and corporate character of the Imperial organisation of India and its States, Curzon had his eyes equally on the industrial and technical advancement of the Country as a whole. 7 The establishment, before he left India, of the Department of Commerce and Industry under the overall direction of the Central Government indicated the extent to which he was interested in the

3. Id. Ps. 4 Nov. 1900, vol. iv, pp. 109-120.
6. Id., 4 Nov. 1900, p. 104.
the matter. In attending to the states' own needs to keep pace with the rest of India in technical education and industrial progress, Curzon had a clear vision. He proceeded slowly, but surely and systematically, on lines not much different from those he followed in relation to the encouragement of technical education and compilation of industrial surveys in the remaining provinces and parts of India. In doing so neither Curzon himself nor Hamilton had any intention to bypass or minimize the value of indigenous industries. Curzon tried to encourage the building up of the country's own industrial potentialities, with emphasis on the arts for which, he observed, "the artificers of India were once so renowned." In the circumstances he appreciated the establishment of such institutions as the Baha-ud-Din Arts College and Technical School which in 1900 the Nawab of Junagadh set up in the State.

Curzon looked to revive the indigenous arts and industries by some timely care and attention in view of their marked decadence which was particularly noticeable in the states generally. Due to the increasing austerities of the Indian rulers the total expenditure in the states on industrial schools and institutions had been steadily going down. During the quinquennium 1896-7, the annual expenditure had

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2. Papers relating to technical education in India, pp. 249-257.
5. SLEK, 5 Nov. 1900, vol. ii, p. 50.
gradually dwindled by about 50 per cent, reducing the total amount to a paltry sum of ₹3,14,926. However, Curzon still tried to provide a stimulus to Indian arts and industries. For that purpose, he had been the precedent of the Colonial and Indian Exhibition (London, 1886) and the Paris Exhibition (1900). So he arranged for an Arts Exhibition in India itself. The Exhibition which he himself personally opened on the eve of the Delhi Durbar on 20 December 1902, had its distinctive emphasis on exclusively Indian arts. He had for this occasion, from the various states, unique specimen of ancient skills and craftsmanship, including such interesting exhibits as the silver and gold cannon and floral carpets from Calcutta.

The Exhibition at Delhi was fully illustrative of the artistic achievements of the past and present of India and its states. Besides some rare contributions from the Indian princes and Chiefs, Curzon had on loan for a day articles from collections as far away as the South Kensington Museum, London. The Exhibition, as he himself remarked, provided, "the long sought opportunity of doing something to rejuvenate the threatened handicrafts of India and its states."

1. Cmte. 1st (vid. 1900) 1xv, op. cit., Table no. 190, p. 165; 1900 (cmd. 46111), Table no. 192, p. 167.

2. See the reports of the Home Commissioners for the Exhibitions: Parl. Res. 156 (vid. 1900) xx, pp. xxv, xxvi, 26, 29, 101-04.

3. 1910 (int. int.) Apr. 1902, nos. 1, 2, 10/09; Mar. 1902, nos. 69, 14; June 1902, nos. 20, 21, 28; Nov. 1902, vol. xiii, p. 135; Parl. Res. 1903 (vid. 1903), 26; vol. 1, 26 Sep., 1903, 29; Nov. 1903, pp. 169-72, 185-7, 201-2.


5. The canons and carpets were subsequently in 1905 sold away by the Sahebwar to whose family those belonged. However, Curzon tried, just before leaving for England in 1905, to have the requisite authority from the Sahebwar to bring home to the Indian rulers in general that the rare things in the nature of family heirlooms should not be disposed of as private property.

6. 1910 (int. int.) Apr. 1902, no. 1, 2, 10/09; Jan. 1903.

Curzon strove to emphasize as vividly as possible the fact that India and its states had still not lost the creative powers and artistic potentialities to imagine and create. All that art and skill wanted in India was, he held, "a little stimulus and encouragement" from the Country's own aristocracy in particular and the people in general. He deplored the increasing trend, among especially the princes and Chiefs who went abroad, to accumulate things of European art and origin for the decoration of their homes and palaces. Already before arranging for the Exhibition he had expressed his views on the issue with particular reference to the foreign visits and travels of the Indian princes and Chiefs abroad. However, it was in relation to his programme for the Exhibition that he once again laid stress on the value of encouraging patronage for the varied arts and industries of India and its States. And though his remarks to that effect were to the distaste of some London firms, there was yet, he held, little need looking for Indian furniture in Tottenham Court Road stores.  

Unlike the indigenous industries and handicrafts which depended mostly on encouraging the artificers, the States' industrial and economic progress needed something more. It needed increased capital investment, with free circulation of money on industrial and scienti-
sic undertakings besides technical knowledge. There was a marked dearth of all that, in most of the territories under Indian rulers.

In the circumstances, Curzon tried to impress on the Indian rulers and their subjects the necessity for promoting industrial enterprise and scientific exploitation of the state's own resources. In 1906, during his tour through the states in the Indus Presidency, he opened his mind on the subject while speaking at some of the colleges in Cochin and Travancore. He criticized the increasing tendency which noticed among the states' people, and students in particular, to prefer government service to trade and industry. There was a general tendency among them for positions in the civil service and judiciary rather than in industrial undertakings for the development of the states' own natural resources and mineral wealth. Curzon tried to facilitate for the states' people and aristocratic families the acquisition of basic qualifications in scientific and technical pursuit.

His own interest was a parent during the two educational conferences at Calcutta in 1902 and at Ajmer in 1904. In his ideas on the 1930s he differed from figures like Dufferin who had laid much stress on the utility of learning in English language. However, Curzon recognized and emphasized the need for learning more than the language itself.
the rudiments of science also, with special reference to the importance of technical education. Changes to that effect were deemed necessary and were introduced equally into the institutions throughout India for the sons and scions of ruling and aristocratic families of the Country.¹

While encouraging industrial and commercial enterprise in India and its States, Carton noticed a far more serious obstacle than the lack of scientific knowledge and technical skill. There was a general apathy and indifference, even among the people and princes who had ample financial means and resources, to invest money in industrial undertakings and commercial pursuits.² In account of that deplorable trend he tried to expose, as did also some of the rulers like the Gaekwar of Baroda, the widespread hoarding, instincts of the people as a whole.³

The extent to which hoarding had been going on was made amply clear in the State of Udaipur at the close of the 19th century. The people had come out with their buried hoards or ornaments as, with the stabilisation of the value of a rupee from 1s.1d to 1s.4d, the State sold bullion to the Government. The occasion had been provided by the decision of the State to sell bullion to the Government which was prepared to buy 75 lakhs worth of silver more than originally contemplated.⁴ The buried wealth of the Country was roughly estimated to

¹ Cart. Dis. 1009 (c. 5000) supra. L., 1 Nov. 1906, vol. ii, p. 54. L.P. (Int'l) Nov. 1904, no. 10, section no. 4, p. 50; no. 105 supra.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Cart. Dis. (G) County (G) 1907-8, animation, 1 Jan. 1904, vol. iii, p. 10.
(ty 134, 11 was equivalent to 5 lb 10).
amount to not less than Rs. 825 crores. In the circumstances Curzon felt somewhat bitter to find that even those who laid stress on the 'drain' of India's resources could have been so wrong in their appraisal of the situation. He felt this all the more since he firmly held that what India and its States needed most was the wide circulation of their own capital. "I am a believer", he said as early as Nov. 1900, while speaking in a southern State at Trivandrum, "not in the talent that is laid up in a napkin, but in the talent that is turned to productive employment, and that brings other and more and more talents after it".

Seeing the want of employment and circulation of money within the Country itself, Curzon's ideas as to the merits of free trade and inevitable flow of capital from outside gained strength. In a speech at Jaipur on 18 Nov. 1902, he pointed out that for industrial and mineral development, besides scientific works in general, "outside enterprise" was essential for the future of the Country. It was "absolutely indispensable" to help the full exploration and utilisation of the varied hidden resources of India and its States. The import of capital and initiative from abroad was, he maintained, a positive asset to the Country. He differed from those who hesitated to provide an outlet for the Country's buried assets by preferring to denounce not the hoarding instincts but the Government of the land.

inc; the arguments of the Government's critics on that point, he stated his ideas on the issue in "a very plain speaking" speech in 12 February 1905. "What astonishes me", he said, "is that those who tie up their talents in a nest and bury them underground are never so vocal as when they are denouncing the introduction of English capital into India to fill the gap which their own timidity or indifference has left open."

In the matter of recognizing the value of the inflow of capital from abroad, Curzon shared the views of Hamilton. Being out and out as Hamilton remarked, by instinct a free trader and a consequent believer in competition, he was not averse to the import of capital. Having at the same time also "a strong belief in the coming prosperity" of India and its States as a composite unit of the Empire, Hamilton wanted "to associate increased investment of British capital there. Capital being in itself a factor conducive to imperial stability required "a simultaneous action on the part of the Government in developing industrial enterprise."

The extent to which the States could benefit from their own hidden resources of mineral wealth as a result of foreign capital and industrial enterprise was exemplified in the case of Jwanoo. The Jwanoo legislation, which had been enacted for conservation and exploration by not less than eleven Hindu maharajahs, were "one of the most

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remarkable British enterprises that can be seen in any part of Asia". The fields which were visited by Curzon excited much of his praise and admiration, due to their own intrinsic worth and splendid achievements. Though opened only some 16 years ago, there were by the end of 1900 over 30,000 persons employed in the mines. At the same time the total population of the mining camps had risen to figures varying between 30,000 and 50,000. The output of gold from the mines at the opening of the century yielded a sum of money approximately to 30,000,000. The royalty of 5 per cent on the gross output earned the state a net annual income of 300,000. Ten years before in 1891-2, the state's income from mining leases had been only 234,500, rising however to a sum of 379,000 in 1899-1900. By 1900 almost all the total produce of gold which steadily increased to 636,800 ounces valued at 2,547,000 came from theSolar fields, with nearly 15,000 ounces from the Chitini mine, Hyderabad. Curzon managed to have the produce of gold mines duly approved for currency reserve, thus, besides to - as the Secretary of State noted - "want of sufficient fitness", it had been deemed "not in a condition for coinage".

1. JNGL, 16 Dec. 1900, pp. 77-80.
2. SLCL, 10 Dec. 1900, op. cit.
3. Ibid., IFP (Int. ) June 1901, no. 10, 1 Jan. 1900, paras 2, 4, no. 10 2 May 1901; Nov. 1902, no. 6, 17 Jan. 1902.
4. Parl. Ps. 1901 (207) x. liv, NMPI, p. 157; 1903 (249) xlvi, NMPI, pp. 31, 256.
5. Parl. Ps. 1905 (175) lxxii, NMPI, p. 117; 1907 (149) lxiv, NMPI, pp. 15, 16.
6. SDI, 3051 to 6610, 13 July 1899; 15 Sept. 1900, vol. 96, p. 27. vol. 90, pp. 71, 72.
In order to attract capital from abroad one of the requisites for facilitating its inflow was the creation of the stability of exchange with general confidence in the currency system of India and its States. Curzon tried to secure that by his reforms of the India financial system, on which he had set his thought right from the start of his regime in India.\(^1\) Curzon endeavoured, as early as 1866, to impart stability to the exchange value of the Indian currency by carrying through what had been envisaged in 1876 under Lytton.\(^2\) He succeeded in introducing changes in the currency system of India by adopting the Gold Standard with a Reserve Fund for minting sovereigns as legal tender in India itself.\(^3\)

The adoption of the Gold Standard, for which Curzon had support both from Sir R. Law, the Finance Member, and also - despite the India Council's opposition - from Hamilton, was none too soon.\(^4\) It had been contemplated as far back as 1865, and had struck the thought and imagination of General Sir Evelyn in particular, even though without any substantial result. Some persons like Sir David Hamilton (who a

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2. Ibid., 31st, SGO to GCIC, 9 Sept. 1879, vol. 46, p. 33. Lyt, P.., Lyt to the Queen, 21 Apr. 1876, vol. 315/1, p. 105. "If our silver does not recover its normal relative value, Lytton had acquainted the Queen "(and I fear it is more likely to fall still lower), I can foresee no escape from insolvency but the adoption of a Gold Standard.
few years afterwards changed his views on the issue) had written strong minutes of dissent against the proposed change to the Gold Standard. However, the change at last under Curzon was greatly assiduous by the courteous decision which the Government in 1901 had wisely taken for closing the mints against the free coining of silver in India. That decision had gone a long way in averting the decline in the exchange value of the rupee so that in 1897-98 the Government had no marked necessity for reopening the minting of silver. The closing of minting operations was designed to effect, in face of the impracticability of adopting anything like a bimetallist currency, conditions conducive to the stability of exchange. The idea was to have conditions facilitating the fixation of the artificial value, to begin with, for the Indian rupee. Curzon succeeded in the circumstances in stabilising the exchange value by dismissing with the Indian system of currency calculated upon a fluctuating silver standard.

1. Ladda, in Cross to Lansdowne, 28 Apr. 1897, vol.i, p.3(i), c. 11.
2. [Missing reference] 6th of April (1897) 10th of July (1897), vol. iv, p. 11.
3. During the period of some 20 to 25 years (preceding 1890), increasing coining of silver over gold in the world has reduced the gold price of silver to an enormous extent. As a result of that, the annual payments of India to England had very largely increased. Payments at 100 had become nearly doubled. It meant that with silver at its normal value (without any exchange depreciation), £1 in 1860 would have also received the same payment as 5s. 7d. in 1890.

In planning for the stability of the exchange Curzon naturally felt anxious to encourage the States to plan for some monetary unification with the Government's own standardised currency system. He wanted their coinage improved and renovated so as to help them fit in with the changing monetary system. He endeavoured quite effectively to persuade many of the hitherto hesitant States to have their coinage remoulded on an improved pattern with the standards prescribed for the British India currency. His ideas found further expression in the Government's decision, with reference to the currency system of Indore, that the native Coinage Act(1978) should be held in abeyance. The Government's move for establishing its control over the minting operations in India and its States was not arbitrary in character. Curzon did not propose to secure anything further than had been already known to have substantial support from the commercial interests in India. It was as far back as 1928 that the increasing rapid appreciation of the Indian currency had forced the issue on some Indian Chambers of Commerce besides the Government. The remedy proposed for stabilising the value of currency in the money markets abroad was that of tightening up the minting operations in India and its States. Apart however from the adoption of the Gold Standard, the most convenient way to secure that was to suspend also

3. The depreciation of the value of India's silver currency was mainly due to the following factors: (a) The substitution of gold as the standard of value in a number of countries like Germany, Netherlands, and Scandinavian States, (b) the increased production of silver in United States of America and (c) the decreased demand for silver India.
Clause 19 of Act XXIII of 1870 and section II, Clause 2 of Act III of 1874. Under the former it was obligatory on the mints in India to receive all silver tendered for coinage. So also under the latter, it was similarly obligatory on the Currency Department to issue notes against silver bullion sent in.\(^1\)

The monetary unification and gradual subjugation of the independent coinage systems of the Indian States, on which Curzon had set his mind had special value in relation to ordinary currency transactions inside India.\(^2\) It was bound also to be a useful and convenient source for detecting, for instance, the surreptitious outflow of false currency which impaired the economy besides the circulation of money at large. The Government of India had already experienced much of that after the reopening of the Paroda mint in October 1874. There had been an attempt to use the mint for coining copper coins for export to British India where they were passed into circulation at a fictitious value.\(^3\)

The increasing integration of India and its States did not suffer any setback from the complexities of the currency issue. Integration rather gained further strength with the willing co-operation of a number of States to adjust their systems of local currency in line with Imperial requirements.\(^4\) The Indian rulers were not slow to

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appreciate the gradual emergence of a unified and integrated system of currency control, after Curzon's own ideas, covering both India and its states. As a result, there followed schemes for the conversion and reform of their states' own half pice to coins to replace and bring them into conformity, in one way or another, with the currency of British India. Important among such rulers were those of: Kashmir, Cawnpore, Narkoda, Jindore, Chhakpur, Kota, Barauli, Jaisilmar, Jhalawar, Penerpur, Karnagpur, Sunkpura, Orchha, Jodhpur, Kevnagar and Cashay.

Mutual integration in relation to the unifying operations of currency reforms in India and its states had a special significance, particularly for the states hard hit by famine and pestilence. The grave situation in that respect established rather than incurred the soundness of Curzon's ideas on the issue of monetary unification in the light of the serious depression of the states' own currency systems. Famine conditions were then anything, else demonstrated a grave fall with erratic fluctuations in the relative values of the.


currency had been occupying in quite a number of states in India. They were particularly noticeable in, for instance, states like Bundi and Partabgarh in Rajputana; Orchha and Satia in Central India; and Kairpur in the Bombay Presidency. Even in a big and famous state like Baroda, the state's own 114 (cabashah) rupees in their assay value were intrinsically equal to only 100 British India rupees. With further depreciation in 1899-1900, their exchange value fell even down to the extent of as much as about 150 state's rupees for 100 British rupees. In the circumstances, the council could not do better than to recognize the intrinsic merit and utility, as recommended by Curzon, of replacing the local coinage with the British India currency. Arrangements were accordingly made with the government of India for withdrawing the state's own rupees at the exchange rate of 150 for 100 British rupees. Moreover, the state's own mint, having been, as decided in 1900-01, closed down, the Government arranged to provide the state with a total sum of £5,00,000,000 in British currency.

The depreciation in the value of currency in all the different cases, as Curzon could see, had its inevitable adverse effects on the economy of the states concerned. However, fluctuations and falls in the currencies of the states were almost invariably followed by increasing demands for British rupees, even in groups of states such as those in Kathiawar and Rajputana. The declines in the value

4. For a letter to Lawrence, Dec. 19, 1858, Dawkins to Lawrence, 29 Nov.
of their coinage and the demand for British rupees to pay for the imports, the States undertook the conversion of their Akalshahi and Salimshahi siccas. 1

The growing integration with the Government's own system in matters of currency was a definite asset to the faltering economy of many States. At the opening of the present century, the Indian State on that account had from the Government of India in one single year, British India currency to the amount of as much as Rs.35,508,539. 2 The average annual coinage for the States from 1901-02 to 1907-08 was estimated to be amounting to a sum of Rs.10,125,441. 3

Curzon's plans for stabilising the States' currencies in relation to their exchange values inside and outside India had a strong economic basis. His main idea was to help the gradual development of their industrial resources and commercial potentialities with the steady growth of capital. 4 But had the States the requisite capacities for expansion? The situation in that respect was amply disclosed by, for instance, the development of huge tea and coffee plantations in some of the States in India. Plantations such as those in the south ern States of India were in effect substantial industrial organisations involving gigantic operations of organised skilled labour. 5 It was estimated that in 1899, there were 75,000 acres of land under coffee

1. Parl. Res. 1902 (160) supra, pp.129-31; 1903, supra, EMPI, pp.92,35-6, 46
3. Ibid. 1902, (6) 2 June (108) 1086.
apart from tea cultivation, which had been gradually increasing since 1974.\(^1\) And out of that 22,414 were in Coimbatore and 10,000 in Travancore and Cochin, employing upwards of 1,000 malarkar (Native labour contractors) and 2,00,000 labourers.\(^2\)

With the stress Carson laid on the importance of promoting private initiative in the matter of capital investments, the states offered considerable opportunities for the expansion of commercial and industrial undertakings.\(^3\) Fresh prospects and new outlets were, for instance, opened up for the cultivation of opium in the Central Indian Agency and sugar at Kanyakumari in the United Provinces. There were similar commercial activities also in the southern states, with scientific development in the growth of teak, ebony, sandal, sathiswood, tobacco, coconut, cardamom and oils extraction.\(^4\) In Cochin, which like the States of Mysore and Travancore had a vast expanse of forest ranges, the state developed a considerable business enterprise with some 605 square miles of a bare forest area, the state used its resources to develop almost one-half of its territories for scientific afforestation and forestry. It was hoped to build up its own industries and economy by providing teak, cardamom, and railway sleepers and varied for

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\(^1\) "..." cited, p.97.
\(^2\) "..." cited, p.9.
\(^3\) "..." cited, p.97.
\(^4\) "..." cited, p.97.
of timber for such consumers as the South Indian Railways, Gun
Carriage and Cordite Factories. By 1904, just before Curzon left
India, the forest revenues of the State had shot up from a meagre
annual income of Rs. 50,000 to about Rs. 800,000 per annum.¹

¹ IAC, supra, vol. 70, pp. 1480–8, 1496–7, 1509–12.
IMPERIAL PARTNERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(part ii)

With the steady growth of commercial and industrial enterprise, Curzon took care to provide some protection for the States. One of the important duties of the Paramount power, as Hamilton pointed out, was to "see that the States are not plundered by concessions obtained, not always by clean methods", by foreign companies. Already in the recent past extortionate means and fraudulent practices were reported to have been effectively practised in securing concessions even in big and important States like Bysore and Hyderabad. However, Curzon on his part was not slow to strike against any such foreign adventurer and business entrepreneur who wanted to exploit the situation to their own advantage against the interests of the States. He did not hesitate to take strong action against the exploiters, some of whom, as he himself observed, had resorted to "every notorious device" for extorting concessions from the rulers. "There is no spectacle", he asseverated in a speech at Jaipur, "which finds less favour in my eye or which I have done more to discourage, than that of a cluster of Europeans settling down upon a native State and sucking from it the moisture which ought to give sustenance to its own people.

In affording protection against the infiltration of foreign industrialists and capitalists into the States Curzon had ample support.

3. Parli.mbs.1868-69(C)4,25-7 Apr. 1868, 25-2, 564-6, 762; 11, 17 May (520)42, 516-7; 27 July, 4 Aug., 29 July, 1 Aug., 15, 12, 6 Aug. (530)106-9. Also see Parli.mbs.1883-84(61)1, p.657; 1884(191)lix, p.377.
5. L.C.I.(33), 26 Nov.1902, p.239.
in the earlier traditions and practices of the Government. It was as far back as 1867 that the Government had explicitly set forth its policy of not encouraging European capital and enterprise in the States. However, Curzon's policy in that respect had its distinguishing feature in its marked stress on the States' economic and industrial interests rather than on the political interests of the Government. He gave practical expression to his own views in 1899 by the keen interest that he personally took in protecting the vast forest resource of the Jammu and Kashmir State from foreign agencies. "I have no doubt", he firmly recorded, "that included in the duties of the Paramount power is that of seeing, that the interests of the feudatory State, of which the conservancy of forests is one, are not selfishly jeopardised and even sacrificed, by indefensible bargains surreptitiously concluded".

Curzon had little desire either to encourage or protect foreign interests and investments at the expense of the States which could afford to dispense with capital and initiative from abroad. It was quite recently that indigenous products like those of the highly renowned shawl and silk industry in the Kashmir State had attracted the attention of a foreign syndicate. That the Kashmir State could excite some interest outside India itself was an indication of the potentialities for industrial development of the States at large. The syndicate had of late been carrying on negotiations to obtain control of the whole enterprise in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The

Government of India, however, did not encourage the scheme for the take over of the industry - a scheme which had its origins as far back as the year 1874. Keeping the industry in its own hands, the State succeeded in improving, as advised by various experts in England, the quality and output of the materials produced. Pieces of brocade made of Kashmir silk were highly praised by Sir Thomas Hardie, President of the Silk Association of Great Britain and Ireland. Some of the pieces were also presented to Queen Alexandra and Her Highness the Princess of Wales.

Curzon was anxious to encourage undertakings that would enable the States to keep pace with the other parts of the British Indian Empire in the utilisation of their resources. One of the most outstanding industrial and scientific undertakings sponsored by a State and encouraged by the Government itself was that of the Cauvery Falls hydroelectric scheme. Curzon took keen interest in the Mysore Government's scheme for generating electricity from the Falls which he personally visited in December 1900. Designed especially to provide electricity for the machinery of the Gold Lines and Companies operating at a distance of some 40 to 60 miles, the scheme had hardly any parallel. It provided a unique network, as Hamilton observed, of

2. SRL, 1905, no.1173, 601 to the 301, St John Wood, 10 Dec.1900; 1PP(Ext.), Sept.1903, no.55, by July 1903.
"the greatest electric installation which the world has yet seen". 1

Soon after Curzon's visit to the Falls, the Government in 1904
leased to the State the requisite areas of land for the scheme in the
nearby island of Divasamudram. 2 Having been given a start with an
initial investment of $110,675 in 1900-01, electric installations were
successfully brought under operations in 1902-3. The additional ex-
penditure on the undertaking amounted to $23,000. However in supply-
ing electricity of originally about 4,000 horse-power to the Mines,
the scheme earned for the State in the first year (1902-03) an income
of not less than $79,000. 5 Encouraged by its successful start, the
State undertook to invest another sum of $57,591 on a second installa-
tion with an approximate outlay and maintenance expenditure of
$56,712. The State had again, as Curzon observed, like the previous
year a substantial income rising up to a sum of about $54,000. 4 By
the close of his regime, the gross income realised from the supply of
to the Gold Fields was estimated to be $109,200 with a net inc-
amounting to $93,100. Up to the end of June 1906, the State had a
capital of $410,700 sunk in the scheme, with net income returns of
$175,000 or about 47 per cent of the amount invested on the outlay. 5
It was calculated that if the scheme, as expected, worked well, the
State would cover its expenses by the returns from the power supplied to the Compani

the entire capital invested, within just a decade. 6

1. LEG, Hamilton to Amuthali, 31 Apr. 1903, vol. 6, p. 88.
2. H.P.(Intl.) 14Oct. 1901, no. 1, encl. v, 17 Nov. 1903; See Fm. Dept. GOI t
Being much interested in the scheme's prospects, Curzon went to see the installation in August 1902 after the completion of the technical arrangements and electrical fittings at Sivasamudram.\(^1\) He was much impressed. The design and installation of the machinery was the result of outside technical skill.\(^2\) It was, for instance, an American firm that installed and worked the plant including the turbines and current generators. The dynamos came from Switzerland and the insulators from Italy. All the rest of the components, with the iron cylinders which stood so impressively riveted together constituting the great penstocks, were from England.\(^3\) At the same time, the Government of India had lent out for the scheme the services of one of its most eminent Superintending Engineers, A.J. Lettiniere from the West Circle, Bangalore.\(^4\) The latter whom the Gold Mining Companies had thought of rewarding with a special bonus, was, as the Mysore Resident observed "undoubtedly the pioneer electrician of the East".\(^5\) It was he "who by his own genius, energy and power of organisation carried to a successful completion a project which he himself conceived and designed and which has no equal outside of America".\(^6\)

In encouraging the development of electric current and hydroelectricity, Curzon had the support of Hamilton. Electricity had immensely

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5. SPIL, 1905, no. 1659, 19 Aug. 1905. LAC, Sir J.A. Bourdillon, the Mysore Resident, to Amphill, 17 July 1904, vol. 5/1(i), pp. 150-1.
6. LAC, Sir J.A. Bourdillon to Amphill, 17 July 1904.
importance and utility in that it fitted in with the needs of industrial
growth in India as a whole. "Incessant steam," Hamilton pointed out,
"aggregates the workers under one roof and necessitates wholesale pro-
duction, electricity can be carried into units, to the houses or dwell-
ings of individual workers." The power generated from the Falls in
Mysore was something that could be similarly produced elsewhere. Man
great rivers abounding in the country, fed by glaciers and mountain
ranges, offered "natural facilities for developing electrical power
such as few countries possessed." That was particularly true of the
immense possibilities of the river Jhelum. With its number of
affluents, canals, lakes such as those of Lidar, Jina, Harbuji, Arrah,
Erin and Bandipur, the Jhelum formed a sort of arterial system for the
valley of Kashmir. With the rains of spring and the melting of the
snow, the river received a great accession of volume which continued
swelling all through the summer. So naturally the state, after the
lead of Mysore, was encouraged to take up a scheme for generating
hydroelectric power. The services once again of Notbinner were
placed at the disposal of the state. Apart from its value as a
profitable device for providing motive power, the project had also
incidental benefits for the Punjab. It was calculated to also allow
a greater supply of water to pass down the Jhelum at the time when

1. P&CH, 14 June 1906, vol.iii, p.211.
2. IAC, Hamilton to Amphill, 24 Apr. 1904, vol.6, p.84.
3. IAC, supra, vol.6, pp.43-4.
4. Ibid.
5. IFP(Intl.), June 1906, no.18, 15 Nov. 1904, encl.1, sub. encl.1; no.66.
6. IAC, Sir J.A. Boullion to Amphill, 30 July 1904, vol.36/I(i),
p.1129; Amphill to Boullion, 25 July 1904, vol.36/I(ii), p.113
most needed. It meant that the project could meet the wishes and ideas, which the Government of India under Curzon had of late been suggesting to the Kashmir Durbar, for damming up the Wular Lake. However the electric works and installations could not be commenced until sometime after the departure of Curzon from India, in November 1906 when his successor Binto paid a visit to the State.

In accordance with his views on promoting the works of public utility Curzon naturally turned his attention towards protective irrigation and canal projects for the States. The question of the extension and utilisation of irrigation facilities consequent upon the increasing network of canals in various parts of India had attracted him as early as 1899. That the reclamation of substantial land areas in parts of India including its States could be secured to the advantage of both the State and people was something that he took on notice of. He recognised the importance of encouraging the irrigation and colonisation of the Chenab area in the Punjab. However, there was not much scope for similar projects by the States on their

1. JAC, Amuthil's Speech at Srinagar, 22 Nov., 1904, op. cit.
2. JMRP, Binto to Morley, 11 Nov., 1906, vol. 9, p. 87.
5. IRP(Intl.), Oct. 1909, no. 110, 115, supra. In the Chenab Colony land were generously distributed to the Khandars and patamrans(pers with resources) on payment of the lowest possible rate of nazaran (token presentations), entitling the holders to hereditary and occupancy rights.
own without Government help. In the circumstances, Curzon tried to extend some of the existing canal facilities and others for irrigation purposes to the States at the Government's expense. For instance, he enabled many of the States in and around the Bundelkhand agency to profit by the recent project regarding the Jelwa Canal which the Government itself undertook to construct near Jatia.  

One of the most outstanding projects revealing Curzon's policy on the issue of canal irrigation was that for constructing a canal from the Indus river to the State of Cutch. The Government undertook in the British district of Sindh adjoining Cutch, to plan extending irrigation from the Indus. The canal provided a source of protection against the vagaries of nature to some of the hard-hit areas which during the last four years had been overtaken by famine with all its rigour. In view, however, of the existing inabilities of the State Curzon encouraged the Indian rulers to have tanks and wells constructed for protection against famine. As a result of the extensive enquiry into the problem, as embodied in the Report of the Irrigation Commission (1904-05), Curzon found still further encouragement for his policy. Recognising the practical difficulties of further ramification—


tions of the canal system, he continued to support plans for water storage and reservoirs. So except for a few large projects mainly in the Madras Presidency, almost all the irrigation works proposed to be taken up in, for instance, Rajputana and States of Kathiawar were of a comparatively limited nature.¹

The Government's relations with the States enabled them to attain technical help which Curzon ungrudgingly provided them with. In regard to the works of public utility with particular reference to protective irrigation projects, different States had the requisite facilities for technical co-operation and advice from the Government. Noticeable among such States with the facilities were:- Alwar, Jaisilmir, Sirohi, Bikanir, Shahrpur, Kota, Jodhpur, Jaipur, Tonk, Jhallawar, Bharatpur, Kashmir, Hyderabad, Puddukota, Jhind and Malerkotla.² Curzon also arranged for the appointment of a Consulting Engineer at the Government of India's cost to advise the States in Rajputana.³ Similarly for the investigations entrusted to the Irrigation Commission concerning the irrigation projects for the States, no charges were to be paid by the latter.⁴

Apart from the smaller protective works that the Commission recommended, larger irrigation projects in canals and waterways had their own remunerative values for the States. While approving of the Commission's recommendations, which were readily adopted by the Government of India, Curzon, like many Indian rulers, had

¹Parl.Ps.1902(cmd.1180)lxxi(ii) 'Note on the Construction of Tanks', pp.40-19; 1904(cmd.1851)lxxvi, supra, para 364, pp.119-20; (cmd.1852) supra, paras 243-6,577,811-9,665-4,671-2,740, pp.100-2,213-4,224-6,238-41,251-8.
³SPLT,1902, no.301,2 Aug.1902. LCII(SS), 19 Oct. 1900, p. 386.
hardly any strong objections against increasing canalization. The arterial system of canals and waterways seemed to be a positive source of income and a protection against famine. The branches for instance of the Sirhind canal passing through the states of Nabha, Patiala and Jhinda in the Punjub were sufficiently indicative of the apparent values of the waterways. Irrigating annually an average area of 314,000 acres, the states earned an income of about 5 per cent on the total capital expenditure for their outlay and maintenance. 2

Many rulers including even the profuse haunted of Rampur turned their attention to the improvement and extension of irrigation canals and waterways. Some of them, with sufficient capital resources, undertook also new irrigation projects at their own cost and initiative. 5 Schemes were put into practice in the states for instance, for Jadav Canal Janapadhi, inundation canals and waterworks in the north-eastern states of Jaspurana and swatpur, Patiala Canal Khair and Joolar Lake Sarinagar. 6 Similarly beside the seded and Kanjira irrigation canals system, the state of Yerabad undertook on its own cost the Venjar project to cut a canal from the river Tangabhadra.
Apart from its irrigation values the project was expected to provide also income, large enough, to bear the cost and maintenance of the Victoria Technical Institute on which the Nizam had spent a sum of Rs. 1,640,000. One of the most outstanding of the larger irrigation projects was that sponsored by the Travancore State with its 150 mile of newly improved line of waterways. The State went ahead in developing the Kottiyar Irrigation project on which it had as early as 1901 spent a sum of about Rs 10,000. While entailing a huge additional expenditure which by 1905 rose to a total sum of Rs 160,000, the project earned the State an income of 10 per cent on its whole cost and outlay.

While recognising the values of irrigation schemes, Curzon also realised the necessity for State enterprise in the extension and improvement of the railway systems. He was, like his immediate predecessor again, a firm believer in the utility of railways as a valuable and unifying agency for India and its myriad States. Curzon:

1. LAC, Hamilton to Amphill, 19 June 1902, vol.5, pp.92-3. (Attachment to the Institute there was also an orphanage, providing for the admission, maintenance and training of some 1,000 boys).
2. Parl.Ps.1900(287)lxvi,IMPI, p.206; 1900(207)lxvi,IMPI, p.191; 1900(110)lxviii,IMPI, p.206.
had indeed set his mind on a programme for the steady expansion of the network of railways throughout India and its States. Soon after his assumption of office, he contemplated the construction during the three ensuing years, of new lines of railways to the cost of about Rs.250,000,000. Included in that expenditure for the proposed lines covering some 1,537 miles of territories were a number of States. Prominent amongst these were the States of Jodhpur, Udaipur, Jaipur, Bikanir, Gwalior, Reva, Rajpipla, Mysore, Hyderabad and Kashmir.¹

In encouraging the programmes of railway expansion in the State, many of which already had their own lines,² Curzon's policy on the issue was not easy. Like the hoarding instincts that he so vehemently decried, there were, for instance, the extortionate practices of Indian bankers and capitalists.³ They could easily make such large profits by advancing capital to agriculturalists that they did not care for the modest return of 5 to 7½ per cent obtainable from railways.⁴ However, the Government in a Resolution of 5 September 1893 and again in March 1894 had envisaged the possibilities for the expansion of railways under private enterprise.⁵

1. Parl.Deb.1893, (G) 6 May (71) 42.
2. See (for the States' lines of railways and mileages, etc.) Enclosure.
5. Parl.Deb.1894, (G) 17 Aug. (c3) 1395-6. Also see Parl.Ps.1897 (86 lxv, p. 235.)
Though Curzon tried to improve the situation by extending to the States the facilities of loans from the Government, yet that alone was not enough for railway requirements. It was private enterprise and initiative that more than anything else were needed to provide a sound basis for the development of railways in India and its States. So long as the railways could only be built by guarantees of the Government itself, the final decision for the railway programmes was bound to rest with the authorities in London. It meant that there was little scope for freedom of initiative in the construction of railways on the part of States or even on the Government of India. Indeed despite his repeated efforts, Curzon could not obtain any extension of his powers in that respect. Those, as under the Indian Railway Company Acts of 1872 and 1894, continued to rest with the India Office. The annual decision of the authorities on the issue of railway programmes to determine what the limit of charge upon revenues should be, could not be dispensed with so long as the guarantees existed. Only with the growth of private enterprise could there be some possibility, as Hamilton observed, "to sanction all the year round schemes which depend upon themselves for a return."
Apart from the inadequacies of private enterprise, the question of the extension of the railways in India and its States had a controversial colouring. Nationalists, while objecting vehemently to the construction of railways, emphasised the need instead for irrigation projects, as an effective insurance against drought and famine. The catastrophes of scarcity and famine in the recent past might have been averted — they maintained — had the Government spent money on irrigation instead of railways. In standing, on the other hand by his own views against those of the nationalists, Curzon had no false hopes and ill usages. It was, he pointed out in a Durbar at Rajkot, "a barren and senseless controversy" to argue whether railways or irrigation projects were of greater service against famines.

"To ask the Government", he again emphasised in the Legislative Council, "to prevent the occurrence of famine in a country like India the meteorological conditions of which are what they are here, and the population of which is growing at its present rate, is to ask us wrest the keys of the Universe from the hands of the Almighty". Th development of railroads was, however, not suited to the permanent settlement which the nationalists, in objecting to the expenditure on new lines in India and its States, hoped to facilitate. The


2. SP1, 10 Nov. 1899, para 672(i) vol. 116, p. 354. The Champion (Bombay) 20 Aug. 1899.


Expansion of railways and a Permanent Settlement, as Hamilton duly stressed, were "quite incompatible". For the Government to develop railways and at the same time to grant to those in temporary occupation of the soil the increased values of land would have been possible only if the Government or the States could trust private enterprise (without guarantees) to carry on similar works.²

With his well-marked and consistent stress in recognising the utility and importance of expansionist schemes in relation to the railway programmes, Curzon had a fairly wide response from the rulers in India.³ Many of the Indian States enthusiastically adopted extensive programmes of adding to the existing railways and constructing new ones.⁴ The railway mileage on that account developed faster but at a higher cost than that of protective irrigation works which had only a limited range and application.⁵ The main question determining the limited utility of the latter in comparison with that of railway works was not whether irrigation could be made directly remunerative. The problem, as Hamilton pointed out, was whether the financial burden entailed in that way was too high for protection.

2. Ibid.
5. India, Railways, 1899 (149), vol. iii, p. 150.

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The text above is a continuation of previous discussion, starting with the second sentence, which correctly references the source as India, 25 June, 5 July 1897, vol. ii, pp. 398-359, and so forth.
against occasional outbreaks of famine and natural calamities. ¹

In contradistinction from protective irrigation works, the railways were capable of yielding, Curzon maintained, a comparatively more regular and profitable returns with less drain on the States' resources. More than railway incomes, it was the outbreak of famine that provide indirectly an impetus to the expansion Curzon had been looking for to bring about in the existing system. Apart from the employment of labour for building earth embankments for new lines which Curzon encouraged as a measure of relief, the railways had their own value in fighting the catastrophe. ² They reduced the cost of transportation and supplies in general. ³ During the earlier famine of 1868 in Rajputana, the cost of carrying food provisions with camel and horse transport had been as much as Rs. 2/- per maund. ⁴ But now under the altered conditions due to the extended network of railway communications the rate had fallen to less than three annas a maund. Moreover, having facilitated for the States regular supplies from markets outside the orbit of famine, the railways had a stabilising effect on the economy of prices. The Government of India as also the States were enabled thereby to reduce the dangers of price fluctuations. ⁵

1. Parl. Dbs. 1901, (C) 12 Aug. (140) 429
5. Ibid. See for the conditions in the earlier famine in 1868; Parl. P. 1892 (53) xii, p. 465.
Prices, as Curzon noted, were generally kept at a point "consistently lower" than during the last famine of 1896-7. In the circumstances even some of, as Curzon observed, "the diffident" rulers and States were not slow to recognise the utility of "a forward railway policy."

Curzon also encouraged the States such as those in Kathiawar and Baroda to undertake harbour development projects. Apart from the state of Bombay, one of the most outstanding projects of the sort was that taken up at a huge cost by the Cochin Harbour. It entailed a capital expenditure of not less than Rs.3,100,000 which included two years' balance of revenues amounting to Rs.4,500,000. Concerned basically with improving the harbour facilities for shipment of cargoes, it had much to do with connecting the Malabar coast with the railways in the hinterland. In the circumstances, the Cochin Durbar as Curzon observed, threw a new light upon the development of Cochin as a first class harbour. Apart from opening up at a cost of Rs.1,600,000 some 114 miles of railroad for the exploration of its vast forest reserves, it undertook to provide 65 miles of railways.

1. SLCK, 6 Nov.1900, vol.ii, pp.76-7. See for the famine situation of the earlier occasion during 1896-7: Parli.Ps.1907(end.8302,b355,85(lixiv,pp.1,247,47); 1908(end.8812,8823)lixii,pp.423,513.


from shoranur. The idea was to improve the harbour prospects and
cargo facilities on the Malabar coast by linking up the northern
frontier of Cochin to a terminus at ernakulam. The development
of Cochin on that account as a harbour on the west coast of India
was something quite deserving of the government's appreciative reac-
tion and support. Hamilton plainly stated the government's
policy in that respect — he emphasized that the fact that the harbour
was in a Native State should not preclude us from helping the Raja to
develop it.

A distinctive railway project was that of the valley of Kashmir
The scheme for cutting a railway line through the valley had been
contemplated as early as 1890. Apart from the strategic importance
of the State, situated as it was on the northern frontier of India,
Curzon was not unconscious of the valley's richness of mineral wealth
and natural charms. Those, he hoped, could be better utilized and
enlarged with steady expansion of the railroads through the valley, as
had been first contemplated under Lord Lansdowne. Curzon advised
the Maharaja Partab Singh as he met him at Calcutta in January 1899.

1. IFP (Int.) Jan. 1899, no. 229, 20 June 1899; Feb. 1901, no. 45, 17 Oct
1901; Apr. 1901, no. 17, 17 Mar. 1901. LAC, Autumn Tour, 1905, vol. I,
pp. 45, 148, 149, 149-150, 1497-1506. Parl. Ps. 1901(207)xli, 159, p. 40;
1903(209)xlv, 159, p. 40.
2. LAC, supra, vol. 6, p. 5.
3. LAC, Hamilton to Amuthill, 10 Apr. 1899, vol. 5, pp. 36, 54-
1900; no. 134, 21 Feb. 1899.
5. LAC, Lansdowne to Gross, 5 May 1890, vol. IX/2, p. 50.
pp. 183-4.
7. Ibid. LAC, Lansdowne to Gross, supra, IFP (Int.) Apr. 1902, 1
52, 1 Nov. 1904, para 3.
to give some practical expression to the ideas concerning mountain railways.⁴ The State had on that account from the Government of India the services of some famous engineers including the renowned Lathiniere. After the necessary survey by the experts, it was decided that the line could be operated by means of electricity, for which the State had a separate scheme for hydroelectric power.²

Covering a distance of 175 miles, the electric line was to run through the Lalial Pass in the Kashmir valley from Jammu to Srinaga. It was estimated to cost not less than Rs.1,50,000.³ In the circumstances the scheme, as Curzon observed, naturally took some time to mature. It was just a couple of months before he left for England in December 1903, that it began to take shape. By that time, the alignment and gauge were almost fixed while the shares to be borne by the undertaking by the Mahar and the Government of India were finally determined. However, what still remained, as Curzon remarked, was "to commence work". And since that could not be started before his departure, the scheme was bequeathed to his successors.⁴

The conservation of Indian antiquities and archaeological finds which had been exciting much interest both inside and outside India, had attracted the Government's attention as early as 1875.⁵ However, for quite a long time after Lutton raised the question, the laxity in the preservation of ancient monuments in India and its States

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3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
still persisted. It did not escape the observation of some learned institutions in England, which had little hesitation in presenting a memorial on the subject in 1894 to the Secretary of State. Including among the institutions were the Royal Academy of Arts, the Society of Antiquaries of London, and the Royal Archaeological Institute. At the same time the Indian nationalists, with some of their staunch supporters like Sir William Wedderburn, were not slow to bring the issue as they did in 1897, to the notice of Parliament.\(^1\) Curzon hoped, "to inaugurate or to persuade a more liberal attitude on the part of those with whom it rests to provide means, and to be faithful guardian of the priceless treasure-house of art and learning that has, for a few years at any rate, been committed to my charge".\(^2\) His proposal in that connection for the appointment of a Director General of Archaeology\(^3\) as elaborated in his despatch of 20 December 1900, received the approval of the Secretary of State in May 1901.\(^4\)

The appointment of a Director General was soon followed by the division of India and its states for archaeological purposes into five circles under the supervision of the Surveyors.\(^5\) The States of

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2. *LGII (SS), 7 Feb. 1900, p. 19h.
3. IA & EP, Jan. 1901, no. 5, 6616 to the JOSI, 20 Dec. 1900; Feb. 1901, no. 796, 6 June 1900; May 1901, no. 7, 14 May 1901; May 1904, no. 126 April 1905.
4. Curzon secured the services of the renowned archaeologist, J.K. Marshall, as the Director-General of Archaeology. See for the latest contributions to Indian Archaeology, his works: *Henenjo-Jaro and Indus Valley Civilisation*, *The Monuments of Sanchi*, *Taxila Excavations*, *A Guide to Sanchi*, *The Monuments of Ancient and Muslim India*.
Kashmir, Rajputana, the Punjab and Baluchistan were placed in the Punjab, Baluchistan and Ajmer Circle. The States of Baroda, Bombay and Hyderabad were included in the Bombay and Barar Circle. Similar the States under the Madras Presidency were put under the Surveyor of the Madras Archaeological Circle, while those of the Bengal and Manipur under the Surveyor of Bengal and Assam. 1 The States of Central India were placed in the North-Western Provinces and Central Provinces Circle. 2 Apart from the Surveyors and the Director-Generals when the States were to consult freely for technical advice, the States were also provided with adequate financial help, safeguards and protection for their monuments and antiquities. 3 That was effectively secured with the Ancient Monuments Act (VII) of 1904. 4 The Act, which found the greatest possible support, as Curzon noticed, from all sections of Indian society, had something more than ordinary care for the conservation and repair of monuments. 5 It provided the much-needed safeguard against any surreptitious sale of Indian antiquities and their transit or passing beyond the territorial confines of the country. 6

1. L & E, June 1904, no. 6, February 1904.
2. G.I.F., 17 July 1900, no. 4, 20 June 1900; no. 5, 19 July 1900.
4. L & E, Jan. 1900, no. 1, 16 July 1899, 1st (Int'l.) July 1900, no. 69.
5. L & E, June 1900.
6. Ibid. L & E, Nov. 1901, no. 3, Circular no. 50, 3 Nov. 1901; Oct. 19:
with the steady growth of the Government's harmonious relations with, and internal development of the States, Curzon was not unconscious of the deep political and constitutional bearing of the rapidly developing situation on the issue of the British Paramountcy.

He took particular care, as in his famous speech at Gwalior, as early as November 1899, not to use language of 'political extravagance or exaggeration in relation to the nature of their ruling status. Despite the substantial powers exercised by the rulers of Indian States, the latter were yet each one, as Curzon pertinently pointed out, nothing but "a loyal subject of Her Majesty the Queen". The Indian rulers as such had, he maintained, a peculiar, non-sovereign position which it was difficult to be classified with any particular accuracy. Even the term 'feudatory' on that account lacked precision and in its application to India and its States had "no meaning". I was, he observed, "employed in default of any better term with which to describe the subordination of a number of States to a common superior." However the very subordination of this sort was strangely enough the source and essence nonetheless of both the existing power and status of the Indian rulers as a class in India. In the situation the congeries of Indian States with myriads of their rulers had a peculiar character of their own. The political system of India was, Curzon pointed out, "neither Feudalism nor Federation". It was "embodied in no constitution", had "no resemblance to a League" and

1. SLCA, 29 Nov. 1899, vol. i, p. 188. SPLI, 1899, no. 11442 (17 Dec. 1899) para 934 (i-iv) vol. 118, pp. 758-6.


3. SPLI, 1904, no. 694, op. cit., para 1B.
did not necessarily "always rest upon treaty" stipulations.\(^1\) The Paramountcy of the British Government in India was not strictly dependent upon anything like a delegation of authority by the Sovereign States to the Crown.\(^2\) "It represents", he pointed out, "a series of relationships that had grown up between the Crown and the Indian Princes under widely differing historical conditions, but which in process of time conformed to a single type."\(^3\)

Curzon deemed it necessary to call the attention of political officers against incautious use of any terms implying sovereignty or sovereign status of the Indian rulers.\(^4\) He took exception to the use, by the Government of the United Provinces, of the word 'reignin regarding the family of the Nawab of Rampur.\(^5\) Similarly he could not approve the use, in particular, of such words as 'throne', 'reign royal family', 'prince as', 'crown prince', 'sovereign' with reference to the Indian ruling houses.\(^6\) The Government of India under it political practice had on the other hand some widely recognised terms as equivalents covering the words which Curzon disapproved of. Noticeable amongst such common equivalents were the words like raj in stead of throne, heir-apparent in place of crown prince, rajkumar as raja for the son and daughter of a (Hindu) ruler. In the

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1. Lelli(33), 12 Nov.1903, p.226.
2. Ibid. For the view that sovereignty (such as exercised by the British Government in India with particular reference to the Indian States) could grow up, without any delegation of authority, on a constitutional basis, see: Julian Palmer, Sovereignty And Paramountcy In India, pp.34, 37. B.B. Haik, Paramountcy In Indian Constitutional Law, pp.35, 36-37. A.R. Keith, The Governments Of The British Empire, p.4. Salmond, Jurisprudence, p.515.
6. IPR(Intl.) Aug. 1901, no.152, op. cit.; Sept. 1901, no.12, 8 Aug.1901; SPLI, 1904, no.694, supra.
...instances the Government of India tried to enforce uniformity for the use of appropriate terms commensurate with the actual standing an status of the Indian rulers. 4 The Foreign and Political Department had to issue a circular on that account discouraging, in Curzon's words, "the rapidly growing practice" among some of the Indian rulers of assuming colours of royalty. 2 One of the most conspicuous of such rulers was the notorious Puddukota. He had, of late, been growing more and more used to adopting, apart from a coronet and livery, the playing of the national anthem at his public appearance. 3 However, playing the anthem on one's appearance at a public and state function was something, that Curzon and also Hamilton strongly disapproved of, even for the Presidency Governors. 4

Besides some of the Indian Princes and Chiefs, even the President Government of Bombay, as Curzon observed, had hardly any accurate estimation of the policy in relation to the issue concerning the character of Indian States. Curzon did not desist on that account from drawing the attention of the local authorities to the inaccuracies of some of their observations as to the nature of the powers as exercised, for instance by the Maharaja of Kolhapur, who had been some times officially spoken of as "in full possession of the sovereignty of his State". That was not only untrue, but, as Curzon held, basically contrary to the general policy of the Government.5

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Curzon thought that exaggerated and confused notions of the 'independent' and 'sovereign' status of the rulers had been largely due to the rising and increasing waves of nationalism at the opening of the century. However, he noticed something over and above the habitual practice of the nationalist papers of supporting the rulers in any issue concerning the latter against the Government. The prevailing state of confusion, he noticed, had been the outcome of also the general ignorance of the people, particularly in England itself, about the true position of the Indian rulers. He found some typical instances of confused thought in the writings of Sir William Lee-Warner, with whose ideas, as to the semi-sovereign status of the Indian rulers he could never agree.

Curzon had sufficient reason to differ from Lee-Warner on the basis of some principles which derived their main strength from considerations of constitutional and political import. Lee-Warner's views, which found a strong refutation in his controversy over the issue with Dr. Seetahale, were founded basically on Sir Henry Laine's


3. Ibid., 30 July 1900, op.cit.

4. Ibid., no. 591, he suggests draft letter (for Imperial Gazetteer) on Native States, pp. 1-35; Viceroy's Minute, 19 Feb. 1904, op.cit.

5. Ibid.

6. The minute of Sir Henry Laine on the character of relationships between the Government of India and the Indian States could not find any immediate and wide publicity. It could not be fully brought out even as late as 1898, vide Parl. Deb. 1898 (C) 20 Apr. (56) 1369.
cept as to the divisibility of sovereignty. 1 Curzon, unlike
Lee-Stacker, held that the principles of sovereign States and of Inter-
national law could not be extended outside Europe to the case of Indi-
States, not only were the Indian States, he emphatically maintain-
ing anything but sovereign. Also international law itself, he stressed,
was essentially of European origin which could not in the circumstance
be stretched artificially outside its natural limits. 2 The Indian
States with their marked dependence on the support of the Paramount
power had their own peculiar character which had been camouflaged
rather than clarified by a host of terms. "I deprecate the constant
usage", Curzon wrote, "of all these vague and unsatisfactory terms -
the invention of constitutional lawyers - such as 'subordinate isolation'
'subordinate co-operation', 'protected sovereignties', 'subordinate
allies' and the like". 3 The "essential attributes of sovereignty",
his observed, had been taken away from the native States "to such a
extent" that to give them the title of sovereignty was but "a misnomer.

It was indeed long before Curzon, as far back as the period of
Lord Hastings, that the issue concerning the Indian States had been
virtually set apart from the vortex of international affairs. It

1. R.R. Rangwala, The Legal Status of the Indian States, para 3, pp.xv, para 1, p.304. See for the details of the Westlake and Le-
Werner controversy, besides the theory as to the divisibility of
sovereignty and the international sovereign position of the Stat-
Chapters on the Principles of International Law, pp.118-107, 217-31
S. Leacock, Elements of Politics, pp.50-70.

4. Dr. Hehta, op.cit., p.66.
had been practically "removed from the province of international law and transferred to that of the practical statesman and political philosopher where it rested ever since". What could then the relation between the British government and the Native States be governed? If relations were regulated, Curzon held, not by international law but by positive engagements, by actual usage and practice determined by the requirements of the general interests of Empire. And on that account, even Lee-carner himself had in 1896 objected to the Nizam's sovereignty. In his official capacity as the Secretary, Political and Secret Department at the India Office, he had disapproved of the "hair-splitting" analysis of current treaties in support of the Nizam's sovereign status. It was moreover, due to his influence and, as Hamilton remarked, "at his instigation" that the India Office had made a private protest to the Privy Council over a case affirming the sovereign rights of the Nizam.

Curzon resolutely refused to have Lee-carner's views incorporate officially in the forthcoming new edition of the Imperial Gazetteer.

1. *Ibr. Lehta, op.cit., p.262.*
4. *The case was none other than that of *Jugmá-á-in versus The Queen Empress.* The case was related to the arrest on the Nizam's railways of a British subject on a warrant (which came to be question in parliament itself) by a magistrate from Simla, however the Privy Council in giving their judgement spoke of, and indirectly upheld the sovereign rights of the Nizam.*
He would not have then approved for the purpose, unless altered substantially in the light of the States' own actual standing in the essentially non-sovereign position. Curzon's views on the issue, though not supported by the India Council Members, were shared by Hamilton who felt "very much surprised" to find Lee-Warner using the word sovereign in connection with the circumscribed powers of the Indian Princes and Chiefs. In India, Hamilton admitted, "history moves rapidly, though the country to which it relates socially stand still". Naturally, therefore, the time since Lee-Warner had left India a decade or so ago had its own impact on the Indian States' polity in their relations with the Paramount Government. It had made great and substantial changes not only in the material condition of many of the native States but also "in their relations with the Supreme Government" in India.

Curzon thought that it was in the very interests of the ruling families themselves, if the Government pointed out that they were the rulers, but not the sovereigns, of States. But for that clarity, h


4. Lee-Warner's own personal experience of India and its States which was rather a limited kind, having been mostly confined to the Bombay Presidency, had ended somewhat abruptly. And even though he had been nominated by a possible successor to Lord Sandhurst as the Governor of Bombay, he had not gained any remarkable understanding or even respect, of the country and its institutions at large. SPLI, 1899, no. 945 (11 Sept.) para 674, vol. 116, p. 525; no. 1060 (9 para 794 (xxvii) vol. 117, p. 504.

These conclusion would "some say insensibly transform the Indian ruler, chiefs" into merely "an aristocracy of rank and prestige". And in that case, almost of their powers and differing only from the hereditary nobility of ancient countries in the West, they would have nothing but "the superiority of prerogatives, dignities and wealth" such a decline in their rank and power was something which he wanted to avoid.

The active and increasing association of the States with the Government, such as Curzon wanted to build up, had its practical expression in the course of recent wars on and beyond the frontiers of India.

The growing unity and partnership amongst the composite units of the Indian Empire had, in the circumstances, already brought out some features of the Government's relations with the States. Indian States and their rulers, as Curzon remarked, were "no longer detached appendages of the Empire, but its participators and instruments". And having none ceased to be mere "architectural adornments of the imperial edifice", they had put on new colour and strength "the pillars that hold to sustain the main roof". They were not "actors in a petty court", but "figures on a great stage" of the Empire in India.

Curzon repeatedly acclaimed the Indian rulers as his "colleagues and partners" in relation to the Government's responsibilities.

for the administration of India. The part he envisaged for them was "not of passive acceptance of an established place in the imperial system, but of active and vigorous co-operation in the discharge of its onerous responsibilities". The open enunciation of his views in that respect, as early as November 1906 during his tour through the states of Kathiawar, was something that had been, as Jamison remarked, "pitched in the right key". Again in a similarly "long and impressive speech" in July 1904 (when he was awarded the freedom of the City of London) Curzon alluded to his views on the present a future role of the princes and chiefs in India. He did not want to be treated and reckoned as simply "survivals of an obsolete era with any practical utility", sunk in selfishness and lethargy. It was a general tendency among the people, he pointed out, to regard the Indian princes as chiefs of interesting historical institutions providing "picturesque excrescences from the dull uniformity of Indian life". Differing from that, he said: "My lords that is not my idea of the Indian princes". What did he himself think an intent thus to be? "I want them" he succinctly stated summing up his views, "to share the responsibilities as well as the glories of British rule".

2. JGOL1, 6 Nov. 1906, p. 166.
4. DAV, O.K. Liaison to amphi III, 27 July 1934, vol.1/1x, pt.1, p. 1
while not wishing for the extension of the government's control over the total military forces inside and outside the States, Curzon had ideas on the issue of defence and military co-operation. He wished to have the Indian States more and more actively associated with the existing Imperial Service Movement rather than with the Government's own military organisation.¹ Even though some of the military authorities, including those at the India Office itself, had no high estimation of the Movement and its merits, Curzon did not minimise its importance.² He saw in it a sure and stable means of building up the Imperial defence of India and its States by giving it a wide enlarged basis with a popular character of its own.³ Despite its inception as far back as the time of Lord Lytton, the Movement had not yet struck roots anywhere beyond a few of the important States. Only 23 States or about 1/5th of the important principalities had Imperial Service Contingents, while most of the others, even wealthier ones like Baroda, had none, with no interest in the matter.⁴ A disparity of this sort in respect of maintaining the Contingents had naturally put into high relief, as Curzon observed, "the selfish immunity enjoyed by many rich States and Chiefs". ⁵ In the circum

3. LAC, 601 to the SOSI, 17 July 1905, supra.
stances some of the States with contingents were quite keen to reduce the burden of their expenditure, however whereas by Curzon's own time the annual charge upon the contingents had risen by some 7 to 8 lakhs of rupees, yet there had been no increase in their total strength. Their number had been steadily decreasing. And as a result, by 190 the contingents, despite their increasing cost, were short of some 3,000 as compared with their original strength of 25,000 fixed by Lord Cress in 1889.

The existing inequalities in the contributions of the States towards maintaining the Imperial Service troops were the result as as the cause of the basic wants in the movement's popular features. The First Initiative, the government had neglected to take the Indian princes and chiefs into their confidence over the matter. However Curzon who had definite ideas of his own on the issue of Imperial defence endeavoured to contact them confidentially, seeking their advice and opinion. He did this on his own initiative which acted however, was by no means highly appreciated either by the political authorities in India or by the new Secretary of State, Sir John Brodrick.

1. [Here are citations for footnotes 1-6.]
2. [Further citation details are provided.]
Gurdon's initiative and interest in addressing the Indian rulers on the issue of Imperial defence with particular reference to the Imperial Service movement was largely determined by the need of putting the question of the States' contributions to Imperial defence on what he called "an assured and scientific basis". And on that account he had found some positive support from Hamilton, even though the latter like Sir Donald Stewart of the India Council, was not keen on increasing the strength of the States' military forces.

Gurdon circulated his proposals on the issue of defence in relation to the States' military contributions in 1904 when he was shortly due to proceed to England, handing over his charge to Amthill. Apart from elaborating his ideas in that respect in a secret circular, he hoped to have discussions over the matter personally with the Secretary of State, Sir John Frederick while in London.

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3. As the most senior member of the Presidency Government, Amthill (under section 56 of the India Council Act 1861) officiated as Governor-General till Gurdon's own return to India in the second week of December 1903. Gurdon had left India on 30th April 1903.
Curzon's ideas on Imperial defence differed from the Government existing policy. He laid great stress on the desirability of providing a more efficient and practical system of training for the Imperial Service Troops outside the States' own borders. He suggested that arrangements could be made at repeated intervals for periods of their 'peace service' and training during ordinary peace time with the regular army in the British cantonments. This idea, however, was not basically different from what had been already proposed by Lord Lytton in 1873 on political rather than military grounds. The latter had advocated the formation of a camp at Hasan Abdal, joint composed of the States' forces and British troops. Curzon also suggested equalizing and lightening the burden of military charges for Imperial defence without reducing the number and strength of the Imperial forces. That could be possible, he stressed, if the State which had the requisite means and resources in both men and money, could embark on a fixed proportion of their revenue for Imperial defence. That money, he hoped, could be conveniently utilised for raising Imperial Service Regiments in the States almost throughout India.

Curzon was on bringing his ideas on Imperial defence the notice of the princes and chiefs in his circular of 27 April.

2. Parl.PP.1903-4(130)xxvili, NMPI, pp.191, 201; 1903(249)xlvii, NMPI, LAC, GOI to the GOI, 13 July 1903, supra.
3. *Ibid.* Lytton to Cranbrook, 17 Oct.1903, vol.518/3, p.757. (The note was to provide "the best and most conspicuous refutation the mischievous nonsense recently published by the English Press about the dangers of Native Armies").
yet they could not be readily adopted into practice. They were not implemented as a scheme, owing to the diversity of conflicting opinion among the political authorities and the Indian princes and Chiefs. However, Curzon had other important ideas on the issue, providing for the adequate recognition of the Indian rulers' own share in building up India's defences. So, once again on his return from England in December 1903, he tried to carry through a scheme for the formation of a Council of Princes for the similar object of Imperial defence.

The Council of Princes which Curzon thought of instituting was conceived to be something ancillary to his ideas on defence with particular reference to the States' Imperial Service forces. It was meant to impose trust in the Indian rulers and to give them an active share in Imperial concerns so as to encourage the habits of cooperation which showed signs of spontaneous development. As such, having primarily a military objective rather than a political one before it, the Council was to be set up on the basis of ideas which had much to do with the defence rather than the internal politics of India. It was not designed with the particular object of enforcing military cooperation or as a political counterpoise against the Indian nationalists.

4. Cf. Horley to Linto, 12 June, 6 Aug. 1905, vol. 1, pp. 139, 140 (Lord Horley rather presumed that Curzon had a political motive associated with the scheme). Curzon, 1 believe, he wrote to Linto who had specific political ends in view, "thought such a Council would be a counterpoise to the Congress party." Horley to Linto, 12 June 1906.
It was just a few months before Carson finally left India in December 1905 that his government formally proposed to His Majesty's Government at home the creation of the Council of Princes in India. Resting on the basis of the Imperial Service contribution, the Council was to comprise 25 members to be selected by the Viceroy from among the rulers contributing to Imperial defence.¹ These members were to be over and above the rulers of a select group of 17 states.² The latter on account of their costly Imperial Service Contingents, were to have their place in the Council in their own rights.³ The States with expensive establishments for defence purposes were thus to be distinguished from others. These were to be distinguished automatically from, for instance, the other 6 States with comparatively meagre military forces, and also from others who made no contribution at all. The members of the council were to be appointed for a term of three years, but to be eligible for reappointment as long as they possessed the requisite qualifications. All of them were to be entitled to prefix 'Most Honourable' before their names and 'P.C.', or if the English analogy be disapproved of, 'G.P.' after their names.⁴

The Council was to be convened at least once a year by the Viceroy at such time and place as he might think convenient and desi

¹ LAC, GOI to the Viceroy, 16 July 1905, vol. 7(vi), pp. 31-32.
² Ibid. 31st July 1905, no. 1066, 1 Oct. 1905, supra. The States were: Hyderabad, Kashmir, Rajpore, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bharatpur, Alwar, MIR, Mavalwar, Jodhpur, Jodhpur, Patiala, Bahawalpur, Jhiri Lakh, Kapurthala.
³ See (For the role and individual expenditure of the States on Imperial Service Contingent see appendix).
⁴ The States were: Junagadh, Lakhnagar, Idar, Faridkot, Sirmur, and Buler Bolla.
⁵ LAC, GOI to the Viceroy, 15 July 1905, supra, pages 25-8, pp. 10-11.
It was suggested that if the Viceroy could not find it possible to be present and preside, he should depute a representative to officiate for him. The latter was to be either the Agent to the Governor-General or the leading political resident in the place of meeting. The Foreign Secretary and Inspector-General of Imperial Service Troops were to be always present, besides as many other political officers might be required for purposes of advice. It was expected that the Indian rulers themselves would not probably ask for their presence.

The Government of India suggested that no decision or resolution of the Council would have any force until it had been submitted to and accepted by the Government itself. The Council as contemplate under the Government's proposals was to be a purely advisory body or consultative chamber. It was to have no executive authority, except in such matters as already lay within the independent powers of its individual members in their own States.²

Curzon could not personally carry through his scheme for the constitution of the Council of Princes as he left India just some months afterwards. In his last speech to the Princes and Chiefs of Indore on 4 November 1905, he alluded to his genuine interest in respect of the scheme for the Council.³ He alluded to it along with his other achievements as the "only other big measure that I had to carry in my time", but which, "if it is permitted to bear fruit must now bequeath to my successor".⁴ However, unlike Curzon his

1. JAC, GOI to the SCG, 15 July 1905, supra.
2. Ibid. "Imperial Service Contributions", i.e. 6 June 1905, para.
successor into had little interest either in increasing the strength of the states' forces or in constituting the Council for purposes of Imperial defence. He could not do so, having associated himself nor with the country's internal political-constitutional issue rather than that of India's military resources and Imperial defence. In the circumstances he naturally preferred to utilise Curzon's basic ideas concerning the Council as a consultative chamber for political rather than military purposes of defence. Consequently Curzon's scheme if the Council of Princes became merged with another scheme under Hinte for an Imperial Advisory Council. The latter Council, unlike the contemplated under Curzon, was to include both ruling Princes and Chiefs as well as territorial magnates drawn from different parts of India.

Curzon recognized the value of the existing territories for cooperation, partnership and unity among both the Government and the Indian Princes and Chiefs, and he tried to direct them into a channel which he hoped would be in accord with the spirit underlying the Qu (Allahabad) Proclamation, "Honourable, safe and useful". However, he was not simply anxious to provide adequate recognition of the Princes' prominent share in building up the composite character of the Imperial fabric and defence. He also wanted to enlist marked conformity with his own ideas, the importance of India's states, along with the colonies, as the main pivot and fulcrum

 Parl. Ps. 1907 (cem. 3710) livii, sec. I, Dpt. 601 to the Local Government and Administrations, 2 Aug. 1907, para 4; Smith's telegram 23 Aug
the British Empire. "If before I leave India", he had pointed out in one of his private letters, "I could put the question of the Native States' contributions to Imperial defence on an assured and scientific basis, I should do for India what Chamberlain has tried to do for the Empire in the case of the Colonies". And indeed his ideas as to the constitution of the Council of Princes in relation to the issue of Imperial defence did not fail to have subsequently their recognition and force. Those turned out to be the forerunners of the Council of Imperial Defence, formed during the First World War when Curzon had his last and most important role in the Government at home as the Head of the Foreign Office, London.


2. Ronaldshay, op.cit., vol. iii, pp. 205, 209, 369. Imperial Partnership, (Speeches of His Highness the Maharaja of Bikanir as one of the delegates to the Imperial War Cabinet and the Imperial War Conference, 1917), pp. 5-8, 13-16, 21-28.
Curzon would not treat the problems presented by the Indian States as something fundamentally apart from the situation in the rest of India which was beginning to beat itself under new forces and pressures, especially of a militant nationalism. He recognised the need for a shift of emphasis in the current policy of protection, which was to be associated with measures for the general reformation and progressive evolution of the Indian States as an integral factor of the British dominions in India. He wanted the members of India's hereditary aristocracy comprising its Princes and Chiefs to have their due part in the affairs of the Country as a whole.

While standing close by his own political convictions, Curzon found himself driven by the Nationalists themselves to oppose their radical outlook, and was convinced of their unfitness, in the circumstances, for any further grant of political powers or constitutional concessions. The general mass of the populace, though apathetic towards the rising generation of India's middle class politicians, were yet firmly attached to what were still supposed to be the natural and born leaders of the Country - the Indian Princes and Chiefs. And so Curzon did not mince matters. "The notion that the so called 'woes of India'," he wrote to Hamilton who shared his ideas, "are likely to be met by placing one or two Natives who would always be in a minority in a Cabinet of Europeans, quite apart from its political absurdity sug-
gested to me Sydney Smith's reply, to the little girl whom he saw
stroking the back of a tortoise, that you might as well expect to
gratify the Dean and Chapter by tickling the dome of St. Paul's.¹

In its political implications and constitutional aspects Curzon's
policy towards the States was not necessarily either a blindly extrem-
ist move or a retrogressive measure in outright conflict with the ad-
vancement of India and its States which he had no intention to decry.
Underlying his policy and measures concerning them was his view of
their future position.² "Sometimes I cast my eyes", he said in a
public Durbar, "into the future and I picture a state of society in
which the Indian Princes, trained to all the advantages of Western cul-
ture but still not divorced in instincts or mode of life from their
own people, will fill an ampler part than at present in the admini-
stration of Empire."³ And again still on another occasion he gave
expression to almost similar feelings and ideas, as he observed:-
"In India I am thinking of what will happen fifty years hence, and I
confidently assert that from these years of active labour and fermenta-
tion there must spring results that will convert the Indian nobility
and landowning classes into a much more powerful and progressive factor
in the India of the future".⁴

¹PLCH, 11 Jan. 1900, vol. xvi, p. 61.
²IcII(SS), op.cit., p. 586.
³SICK, 28 Nov. 1902, vol. iii, p. 69.
He conceived of the reformed body of the rising generation of the Indian ruling houses to be setting the pace "as types, leaders and examples" inside the Country itself to the general masses of the people including, of course amongst the latter, the radical Indian Nationalists who by their own lack of political poise, moderation and vision were, he held, hindering rather than helping any further political advancement and constitutional progress of the Country.¹ The chances of progress in India and its States, he openly told and rather warned them, were likely to be "imperilled" if the claims of the Country's political advocates were to remain "associated with a perpetual, an unceasing abuse", of those who do not grant concessions in the circumstances because of particularly the former's own manifold failings.² He wanted to retain and develop on improved lines the institution of an Indian Ruling Community. He hoped that the Princes and Chiefs would give a new orientation to the Nationalists' thoughts and aspirations by standing forth not necessarily as political leaders but as leaders of political thought, with an emphasis on the principle of moderation rather than extremism, on loyalty and reliability instead of the existing radical outlook and hostility to the Government. It was not unnatural for him to think in that style since his whole policy was founded on the belief that the aristocratic and ruling classes as much in England as in India were the select instrument for the harmonious develop-

¹SVGGI, 5 Nov. 1900, p. 339.
ment and healthy transformation of the subject peoples, races and
States. "Above all I realise more", he said with reference to his
estimation of the worth and utility of India's own hereditary aristo-
cracy, "that they constitute a school of manners, valuable to the Indian
and not less valuable to the European, showing in the person of their
Chiefs that illustrious lineage has not ceased to implant noble and
chivalrous ideas, and maintaining those old-fashioned and punctilious
standards of public spirit and private courtesy which have always been
instinctive with the Indian aristocracy, and with the loss of which,
if ever they be allowed to disappear, Indian Society will go to pieces
like a dismantled vessel in a storm".¹

Curzon's ideas regarding the reform of India's hereditary aristo-
cracy in the shape of the Indian Princes and Chiefs did not develop
as an abrupt or sudden scheme which forced itself upon his political
imagination in India alone. His ideas drew much of their vigour from
principles of a relatively earlier political origin of which he had
become a strong advocate soon after his entry into the House of Commons
in 1886. Democratic Toryism during the late nineties of the last
century was being successfully preached by Lord Randolph Churchill, with
successful effects upon the young Conservatives, including of course
Curzon, in the Commons.² That had signified to Curzon a political

¹LCII(SS), 28 Nov. 1902, p. 222.
²Lord Randolph Churchill, op. cit., vol. i, pp. 250-51, 290, 296, 349,
411-12, 463; vol. ii, pp. 307, 404, 428.
creed which was instinct with the spirit bequeathed into the dry
tones of an almost decaying set of doctrines by the genius of Lord
Beaconsfield.¹ That political creed put much emphasis on measures
of reformatory and progressive character, and Curzon had little
hesitation in repudiating the charge that it was unduly influenced
by class interests. His own political party was, he held, "no more
composed of bloated aristocrats, or feudal despots or grasping
land owners or selfish monopolists... than the Jockey Club is com-
posed of jockeys or the Crystal Palace is built of crystal."² Com-
prising an unusually large number of young men under the influence
of Tory Democracy, his political party in the House of Commons was,
he declared, "animated by a haughty contempt for the sham distinctions
of party titles, a healthy freedom from the shackles of old super-
stitions and an active interest in the inexhaustible work of reform"³.

The stress such as Curzon, while he was still in England, laid
on the utility and need of reform as the guiding principle of the
young Conservatives had already found certain practical expression at
his hands in 1886, almost a decade before it was expressed in India
in his policy regarding the reform in the conduct and administration
of the Princes and Chiefs. He had, for instance, in 1888 and 1890,
from both inside and outside Parliament tried to direct the attention

¹Curzon, 'Conservatism and Young Conservatives', National Review, Jan.
²'Conservatism and Young Conservatives', supra, p. 579.
³Ibid., p. 585.
of his Country's own aristocracy, especially that of the Members of the House of Lords, to effect some reform in the direction of improving upon, if not abolishing, the hereditary principle in the constitution of the Upper House.1 His aim was to avoid a rupture between the classes, which the increasing pace of industrialisation and the strength of the working class people in the Country was otherwise likely to bring about. His insistence on reforming the Princely Community was based on the principles that he had earlier maintained in England. It was meant to avoid the social strife, which otherwise, due to the increasing strength and appropriation of more and more powers by the rising middle class in India, was likely to occur sooner or later between India's own hereditary aristocracy and the former. Curzon wanted to speed up what he called the process of change and reform lest with the march of events and the manifold social and economic, moral and material, political and constitutional progress of the Country the Indian Princely Community should be in the long run thrown out of its present security as an unwanted superfluity.

Side by side with the influences generated by the internal political situation of India, beside the earlier impact on his thought of the reformative urges, Curzon's own conception of Imperial obligations had a profound bearing on his policy towards the States.

Indeed one would find in his thinking a recurrent contrast between those who regarded the Empire as 'an irksome burden', and those to whom it signified 'the most majestic of all responsibilities'. This sense of duty dominated his conscience. "A hundred times in India have I said to myself" he recollected as a final expression of his faith in regard to the duty owed to India and its States, "Oh! that to every Englishman in this Country as he ends his work, might be truthfully applied the phrase 'Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity'."^1 Again, writing in a similar strain and referring to the duties for the reform and progressive evolution of the Indian States' polity which he believed to be resting on the Government of India, he held to much the same thought and determination, as he privately wrote to Hamilton: "There is not a day in my life in which I do not say to myself, 'What is going to happen to this Country 20 or 50 years hence?'". And he added: "I say with the profoundest conviction that any Viceroy or any Government that adopted the attitude of letting all these Chiefs run to their own ruin, would be heaping up immeasurable disaster in the future".^2 He, thus, firmly believed that reform was essential and that the time for some appropriate action to that effect had arrived. "So long as Lord Canning's policy is adhered to, so long as we regard the Native States and their Chiefs as an integral part of our system, so long as we guarantee them a security enjoyed by no other potentates in the world", he ex-


plained his policy, "— so long we are bound to train, to discipline
and to control them, and so to fit them for the unique position we
have placed within their grasp." And in holding himself in that
context to his beliefs, he felt encouraged and almost inspired by
his singular sense of Imperial obligations and duties towards both
the Indian people and the Princes. In his last address to his friends
and his own Countrymen in India, he alluded to his convictions in that
respect as he emphatically observed:  

"To fight for the right, to abhor the imperfect,
the unjust or the mean, to swerve neither to the
right hand nor to the left, to care nothing for
flattery or applause or odium or abuse.... but to
remember that the Almighty has placed your hand on
the greatest of His ploughs, in whose furrow the
nations of the future are germinating and taking
shape, to drive the blade a little forward in your
time, and to feel that somewhere among these mil-
lions you have left a little justice or happiness
or prosperity, a sense of manliness or moral dign-
ity, a spring of patriotism, a dawn of intellectual
enlightenment, or a stirring of duty where it did
not exist before — that is enough, that is the Eng-
lishman's justification in India. It is good enough
for his watchword while he is here; for his epitaph
when he is gone."

2LCII(33), 26 Nov. 1905, pp. 589-90.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Political Divisions</th>
<th>Area in square miles</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Military Force</th>
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<td><strong>17,70,01,190</strong></td>
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(i) States under the Political Charge of the Government of India.
## AREA, POPULATION, REVENUE, MILITARY FORCE OF STATES UNDER THE CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

(1896)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Political Divisions</th>
<th>Area in square miles</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Military Force</th>
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<td>792,491</td>
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<td>Name of State</td>
<td>Name, title and religion of Chief</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Date of Succession</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salutes of 21 guns</td>
<td>Baroda</td>
<td>His Highness Farzand-i-Khas-i-Daulat-i-Inglishia Maharaja Sir Sayaji Rao Garkwar Sena Khas Khel Shamsher Bahadur G.C.S.I. (Maharatta Hindu)</td>
<td>16 Mar. 1863</td>
<td>27 May 1875</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Mysore</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Sri Krishnaraja Wadiar Bahadur. (Kahatriya Hindu)</td>
<td>4 June 1834</td>
<td>1 Feb. 1895</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Indore</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja-Dhiraj Raj Rajaishwar Sawai Sir Shivaji Rao Holkar Bahadur, G.C.S.I. (Maharatta Hindu)</td>
<td>12 Nov. 1859</td>
<td>12 July 1886</td>
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<td>Name, title and religion of Chief</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Date of Succession</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salutes of 19 guns</td>
<td>Jammu - Kashmir</td>
<td>Major-General His Highness Maharaja Sir Partab Singh Indar Mahinder Bahadur Siper-i-Saltanat, G.C.S.I. (Degra Rajput Hindu)</td>
<td>14 July 1850</td>
<td>12 Sept. 1885</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Kalat</td>
<td>His Highness Beglar Begi Mir Sir Mahmud Khan, G.C.I.E., Wali of Kalat, (Brahui, Sunni Muslim)</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>15 Aug. 1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Kothapur</td>
<td>His Highness Sir Shamu Chhatrapati Maharaj, G.C.S.I.Raja of (Kshatriya,Hindu)</td>
<td>26 Jan. 1874</td>
<td>17 Mar. 1884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Mewar (Udaipur)</td>
<td>His Highness Maharana Dhiraj Sir Fateh Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I. (Sisodiya Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>1849</td>
<td>21 Dec. 1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Travancore</td>
<td>His Highness Sri Padumabba Dassa Vanchi Sir Bala Rama Varma Kulasekhara Kiritapati Mani Sultan Maharaj Raja Rama Raja Bahadur Shamsher Jung, G.C.S.I. (Kshatriya Hindu)</td>
<td>25 Sept. 1857</td>
<td>19 Aug. 1885</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salutes of 17 guns</td>
<td>Bahawalpur</td>
<td>His Highness Rukn-ud-Daulah Nasrat Jang Hafiz-ul-Mulk Mukhlas-ud-Daula Nawab Muhammad Bahawal Khan Bahadur. (Daudputra, Muslim)</td>
<td></td>
<td>25 Mar. 1866</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Bharatpur</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Sri Brajindra Sawai Ram Singh Bahadur Bahadur Jang. (Jat Hindu)</td>
<td>9 Sept. 1872</td>
<td>25 Dec. 1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Bikanir</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Raj Rajeshwar Siromani Sri Ganga Singh Bahadur. (Rathor Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>13 Oct. 1880</td>
<td>19 Aug. 1887</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Salutes</td>
<td>Name of State</td>
<td>Name, title and religion of Chief</td>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
<td>Date of Succession</td>
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<td>Cutch</td>
<td>His Highness Maharao Shri Mirza Raja Sawai Sir Khengarji Bahadur G.C.I.E. (Jadeja Rajput Hindu)</td>
<td>23 Aug. 1866</td>
<td>1 Jan. 1876</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Karauli</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Sir Bhanwar Bal Deo Bahadur Yadukul Chandra Bhal, G.C.I.E. (Jadon Rajput Hindu)</td>
<td>24 Feb. 1864</td>
<td>14 Aug. 1866</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Kota</td>
<td>His Highness Maharao Umed Singh Bahadur (Hara Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>15 Sept. 1873</td>
<td>11 June 1889</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Marwar (Jodhpur)</td>
<td>His Highness Raj Rajeshwar Maharaja-Dhiraj Sardar Singh Bahadur. (Rathor Rajput Hindu)</td>
<td>11 Feb. 1330</td>
<td>24 Oct. 1895</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Patiala</td>
<td>His Highness Farzand-i-Khas Daulat-i-Englishia Mensur-i-Zaman Amir ul-Umara Maharaja-dhiraj Rajeshwar Sir Rajendra Singh Mahendra Bahadur G.C.S.I. (Sidhu Jat Singh)</td>
<td>25 May 1872</td>
<td>14 Apr. 1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Salutes</td>
<td>Name of State</td>
<td>Name, title and religion of Chief</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Date of Succession</td>
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<td>17 guns</td>
<td>Rewa</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Sir Vyankatesh Raman Singh Bahadur, G.C.S.I. (Baghel Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>23 July 1876</td>
<td>4 Feb. 1880</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alwar</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh Bahadur. (Maruka Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td>1842</td>
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<td>Banswara</td>
<td>His Highness Rai-i-Rayn Maharawal Sri Lakhman Singh Bahadur (Sisodiya Rajput Hindu)</td>
<td>13 Aug. 1845</td>
<td>20 Nov. 1857</td>
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<td>Datia</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Lokendra Sir Bhawani Singh Bahadur, K.C.S.I. (Rundale Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>1849</td>
<td>Jan. 1861</td>
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<td>Dewas</td>
<td>His Highness Raja (Puar Rajput Hindu)</td>
<td>10 Aug. 1877</td>
<td>23 May 1892</td>
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<td>Dewas (Junior)</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Malhar Rao Puar (Puar Rajput Hindu)</td>
<td>30 Sept. 1886</td>
<td>29 July 1898</td>
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<td>Dhar</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Udaji Rao Puar. (Puar Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>4 May 1863</td>
<td>9 Feb. 1873</td>
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<td>Dungarpur</td>
<td>His Highness Maharawal Bijal Singh Bahadur (Sisodiya Rajput Hindu)</td>
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<td>Number of Salutes</td>
<td>Name of State</td>
<td>Name, title and religion of Chief</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Date of death</td>
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<td>15 guns</td>
<td>Idar</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Shri Sir Kesari-singji Jawansingji, K.C.S.I. (Rathor Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>31 May 1862</td>
<td>26 Dec. 1868</td>
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<td>Jaisalmer</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja-dhiraj Maharawal Salivahar Bahadur (Jadu Bhatti Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>12 June 1867</td>
<td>12 Apr. 1891</td>
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<td>Khairpur</td>
<td>His Highness Mir Sir Faiz Muhammad Khan Talpur, G.C.I.E. (Muslim)</td>
<td>2 Apr. 1894</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Partabgarh</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Raghmath Singh Bahadur (Sisodiya Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>18 Feb. 1890</td>
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<td>Sikkim</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Thotab Namgyel (Tibetan by descent, Buddhist)</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>Apr. 1874</td>
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<td>13 guns</td>
<td>Benares</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Sir Prabhu Narayan Singh Bahadur</td>
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<td>Aug. 1863</td>
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<td>Number of Salutes</td>
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<td>Salutes of 13 guns</td>
<td>Jaora</td>
<td>His Highness Fakhr-ud-Daula Nawab</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>25 June 1895</td>
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<td>Muhammad Iftikhar Ali Khan Bahadur</td>
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<td>Saulat Jang. (Pathan, Muslim)</td>
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<td>Salutes of 11 guns</td>
<td>Rampur</td>
<td>Major Eis Highness Farzand-i-Dilpaziri-Daulat-i-Inglishe Nawab Hamid Ali Khan Bahadur. (Pathan, Muslim)</td>
<td>31 Aug. 1875</td>
<td>27 Feb. 1889</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tippera (Hill)</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Radha Kishore Deb Barman Manikya. (Kshatriya Hindu)</td>
<td>26 June 1857</td>
<td>11 Dec. 1896</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ajaigarh</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Sawai Sir Ranjor Singh Bahadur, K.C.I.E. (Bundela Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>29 Sept. 1849</td>
<td>9 Sept. 1859</td>
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<td>Bhavnagar</td>
<td>His Highness Thakur Sahib Bhavsingji Takhtsinghji. (Gohel Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>26 Apr. 1875</td>
<td>10 Feb. 1896</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bijawar</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Sawai Singh Bahadur. (Bundela Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sambay</td>
<td>His Highness Nawab Jafer Ali Khan Sahib Bahadur (Moghul, Shiah Muslim)</td>
<td>26 Aug. 1848</td>
<td>11 June 1880</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chamba</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Sham Singh. (Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>7 July 1866</td>
<td>17 Apr. 1873</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Charakhari</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaj-Dhiraj Sipahdar-ul-</td>
<td>25 Oct. 1870</td>
<td>10 July 1880</td>
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Appendix "B" (contd.)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Number of Salutes</th>
<th>Name of State</th>
<th>Name, title and religion of Chief</th>
<th>Date of birth</th>
<th>Date of Succession</th>
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<tr>
<td>Salutes of 11 guns</td>
<td>Chhatarpur</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Vishwanath Singh Bahadur. (Puar Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>29 May 1866</td>
<td>4 Nov. 1867</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Faridkot</td>
<td>His Highness Farzand-i-Saadat-i-Nishani-i-Hazrat-i-Kaisar Hind Berer Bans Raja Balbir Singh Bahadur. (Sidhu Jat, Sikh)</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>7 Mar. 1887</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Jhabua</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Udai Singh. (Rathor Rajput Hindu)</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>26 Apr. 1895</td>
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<td>Jhalawar</td>
<td>His Highness Raj Rana Bhawani Singh (Jhala Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>3 Sept. 1876</td>
<td>6 Feb. 1899</td>
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<td>Jhind</td>
<td>His Highness Farzand-i-Dilband Rasikh-ul-Itikad Daulat-i-Inglishia Raja-i-Rajagan Raja Ranbir Singh Bahadur. (Sidhu Jat, Sikh)</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>7 Mar. 1887</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Junagarh or Junagadh</td>
<td>His Highness Sir Rasul Khanji Mahabat Khanji, K.C.S.I. (Babi Pathan, Muslim)</td>
<td>30 July 1858</td>
<td>21 Jan. 1892</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Kahlur (Bilaspur)</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Bije Chand. (Rajput Hindu)</td>
<td>27 Jan. 1873</td>
<td>3 Feb. 1889</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Kapurthala</td>
<td>His Highness Farzand-i-Dilband Rasikh-ul-Dulal Daulat-i-Inglishia Raja-i-Rajagan</td>
<td>23 Nov. 1872</td>
<td>5 Sept. 1877</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Salutes</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Name, title and religion of Chief</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
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<td>Salutes of 11 guns</td>
<td>Mandi</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Bije Sein Bahadur (Chandrabansi Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>27 July 1845</td>
<td>26 Jan. 1851</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Chura Chand. (Kshatriya Hindu)</td>
<td>15 Apr. 1885</td>
<td>18 Sept. 1891</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Morvi</td>
<td>His Highness Thakur Sahib Sir Waghji, G.C.I.E. (Jadeja Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>17 Feb. 1858</td>
<td>17 Feb. 1870</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Nabha</td>
<td>His Highness Farzand-i-Arjumand Akidat Peiand Deulat-i-Inglishia Barar Bana Sarmur Raja-i-Rajagan Raja Sir Hira Singh Malwandar Bahadur, G.C.S.I. (Sidhu Jat, Sikh)</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>9 June 1871</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Narsingarh</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Arjun Singh. (Umat Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<td>8 June 1896</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Navanagar</td>
<td>His Highness Jam Shri Jaswant Singhji Vibhaji. (Jadeja Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>10 Oct. 1882</td>
<td>10 May 1895</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>Palanpur</td>
<td>His Highness Sir Sher Muhammad Khan Lohani, G.C.I.E. (Pathan, Muslim)</td>
<td>2 Jan. 1852</td>
<td>19 Sept. 1877</td>
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<td>Panna</td>
<td>His Highness Maharaja Madho Singh Mahendran Bahadur. (Bundela Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>23 Mar. 1872</td>
<td>10 Mar. 1898</td>
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<td>Forbandar</td>
<td>His Highness Rana Shri Vikramatji Khimaji. (Jaitwa Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>1 Apr. 1819</td>
<td>20 June 1831</td>
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<td>Pudukota</td>
<td>His Highness Sri Bribadamba Das Raja Narinda de Plawree Gujjar Bahadur</td>
<td>27 Nov. 1875</td>
<td>15 Apr. 1886</td>
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<td>Number of Salutes</td>
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<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Date of Succession</td>
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<td>Radhanpur</td>
<td>His Highness Muhammad Sher Khan Bahadur Babi. (Pathan, Muslim)</td>
<td>8 June 1866</td>
<td>Jan. 1896</td>
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<td>“” “” “”</td>
<td>Rajgarh</td>
<td>His Highness Raja Balbhadur Singh. (Umat Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>20 Mar. 1860</td>
<td>6 July 1882</td>
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<td>His Highness Maharana Chhatrasinghji (Gohel Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>18 Dec. 1861</td>
<td>10 Jan. 1897</td>
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<td>His Highness Raja Sajjan Singh (Rathor Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>6 Mar. 1893</td>
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<td>His Highness Raja Jaswant Singh (Rathor Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>27 Nov. 1895</td>
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<td>His Highness Maharaja Bir Singh Deo Bahadur. (Gujar Ahir, Hindu)</td>
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<td>17 June 1896</td>
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<td>His Highness Raja Surinder Bikram Prakash Bahadur. (Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<td>27 Oct. 1898</td>
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<td>His Highness Raja Sadul Singh. (Rathor Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<td>21 June 1899</td>
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<td>His Highness Raja Dasht Nikandar Sain (Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<td>6 Feb. 1887</td>
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<td>Alirajpur</td>
<td>Rana Partab Singh. (Sisodiya Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>1881</td>
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<td>Balsinor or Vadsinor</td>
<td>Nawab Jamiyat Khanji. (Babi Pathan, Muslim)</td>
<td>About 1894</td>
<td>11 Sept. 1899</td>
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<td>Banasa</td>
<td>Maharawal Shri Raja Pratapsingji Gulabsingji (Solanki Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>23 Nov. 1864</td>
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<td>Barundha</td>
<td>Raja Thakur Prasad Singh. (Raghbansi Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>1847</td>
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<td>Maharawal Shri Raja Mansinghji. (Chauhan Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<td>31 Feb. 1864</td>
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<td>Rana Ranjit Singh. (Sisodiya Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>26 Dec. 1888</td>
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<td>Maharawal Shri Raja Fatehsinghji. (Chauhan Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<td>Maharana Shri Raja Mohandevji Narayandevji. (Sisodiya Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<td>Dec. 1891</td>
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<td>Thakur Sahib Harisinghji Jaisinghi (Jadeja Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>24 June 1845</td>
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<td>Nawab Sidi Sir Ahmed Khan, K.C.I.E. (Abyssinian, Muslim)</td>
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<td>Raja Brajmoohan Deo (Nagabansi Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<td>Rao Bahadur Bhanwani Singhji. (Khichi Rajput, Hindu)</td>
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<td>Salutes of 9 guns</td>
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<td>Maihar</td>
<td>Raja Ragbir Singh. (Jogi Hindu)</td>
<td></td>
<td>16 May 1852</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maler Kotla</td>
<td>His Highness Nawab Muhammad Ibrahim Ali Khan Bahadur (Afghan, Muslim)</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>16 July 1871</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagod (Uchehra)</td>
<td>Raja Jadabindar Singh. (Parihar Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>30 Dec. 1855</td>
<td>12 June 1874</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palitana</td>
<td>Thakur Sahib Sir Man Singhji Sursinghji, K.C.S.I. (Gohel Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>4 June 1862</td>
<td>7 Dec. 1885</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajkot</td>
<td>Thakur Sahib Lakhaaji Bawaji. (Jadeja Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>17 Dec. 1885</td>
<td>16 Apr. 1890</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawantwari/ Sawantvadi</td>
<td>Raghnath Sawant Bhonsle Raje Bahadur, (Maharatta, Hindu)</td>
<td>20 Sept. 1862</td>
<td>29 Aug. 1870</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadhwan</td>
<td>Thakur Sahib Balsinghji. (Jhala Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>29 Jan. 1863</td>
<td>20 May 1885</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Salutes</td>
<td>Name of State</td>
<td>Name, title and religion of Chief</td>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>Date of Succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salutes of 9 guns</td>
<td>Vankaner</td>
<td>Raj Sahib Amarsinghji. (Jhala Rajput, Hindu)</td>
<td>4 Jan. 1879</td>
<td>12 June 1881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vankaner</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) Table of Personal Salutes

- Salutes of 21 guns
  - Jaipur
  - His Highness Sir Madho Singh Bahadur
  - Nevar
    - (Udaipur)
    - His Highness Sir Fateh Singh Bahadur
  - Travancore
    - His Highness Sir Bala Ram Varma

- Salutes of 19 guns
  - Mysore
    - Her Highness Maharani Kempunanjammani Vanivilas Sannidhanma

- Salutes of 17 guns
  - Orchha
    - His Highness Sir Partap Singh Bahadur

- Salutes of 15 guns
  - Nabha
    - His Highness Sir Hira Singh Bahadur

- Salutes of 11 guns
  - Maler
    - Kotla
      - His Highness Muhammad Ibrahim Ali Khan Bahadur

(iii) Table of Local Salutes

- Salutes of 21 guns within the limits of their own states' territories permanently.
  - Bhopal
    - Her Highness Nawab Shah Jehan Begam
  - Gwalior
    - His Highness Sir Madho Rao Sindhia Bahadur
  - Indore
    - His Highness Sir Shivaji Rao Holkar Bahadur
  - Jammu-Kashmir
    - His Highness Sir Partab Singh Indar Mahindar Bahadur
# Imperial Service Troops and Contributions

For the War in South Africa 1899-1900.

*(Number of horses and conducting parties as taken by the Government of India from the States' Imperial Service Troops.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Number of horses</th>
<th>Duffadars</th>
<th>Farriers</th>
<th>Sowars</th>
<th>Syces</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>60</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patiala</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabha</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhind</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>* 50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Bahawalpur</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapurthala</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faridkot</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alwar</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rampur</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhavnagar</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamnagar</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junagadh</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwalior</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bhopal</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>810</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>252</strong></td>
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*The number of horses as such was exclusive of 400 horses from: Hyderabad Contingent 100, Nysore 100, Jodhpur 210.*

---

*Appendix "C"*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native State</th>
<th>Nature of Offer</th>
<th>Offer in Relation to the Strength of the Imperial Service Troops Maintained</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authorised Strength</td>
<td>Strength on 1 July 1900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghumir</td>
<td>Two Regiments of Infantry</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Mountain Battery</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Mountain Battery</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratiala</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troops and 1st Infantry</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State's Forces 2nd Infantry</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bhawalpur</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hind</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbha</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apsuthala</td>
<td>His Highness's Troops</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State, Chief</td>
<td>Nature of Offer</td>
<td>The Offer in Relation to the Strength of the Imperial Service Troops Maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Authorised Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhopur</td>
<td>One Regiment of Imp.</td>
<td>1st Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service Cavalry</td>
<td>2nd &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purnia</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jhalawar</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>1st Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fully equipped</td>
<td>Transport Corps:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hospital Ship</td>
<td>Men, ponies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udaipur</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Lancers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumer Kotla</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Sappers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikar</td>
<td>Imperial Service</td>
<td>Camel Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purnia</td>
<td>One Cavalry Regiment</td>
<td>No Imperial Service Troops maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State, Chief</td>
<td>Nature of offer</td>
<td>The offer in relation to the strength of the Imperial Service troops maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Authorised strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. The Maharaja of Kashmir</td>
<td>Personal services of Raja Sir Amar Singh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. The Maharaja of Patiala</td>
<td>His own personal services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. The Raja of Kishanganj</td>
<td>His own personal services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. The Maharaja of Jodhpur</td>
<td>Personal services of Maharaja Sir Partab Singh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. The Maharaja of Gwalior</td>
<td>His own personal services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. The Maharaja of Dholpur</td>
<td>His own personal services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE FIRST IMPERIAL CADET CORPS NOMINEES

(1) Educated at the Mayo College Ajmer:

Raja Samundar Singh of Jair in Bahawalpur
Kunwar Khuman Singh of Kota
" Deo Singh of Kota
" Jawahir Singh of Jaisalmir
" Sardar Singh, second son of the Raja-dhiraj of Shahpura
Sahibzade Amnatullah Khan of Tonk
Gopal Singh of Gandoz in Jodhpur

(2) Educated at the Daly College Indore:

H.H. the Nawab of Jaora
" the Raja of Ratlam
Bharat Singh, cousin of the Raja of Ratlam

(3) Educated at the Aitchison College Lahore:

Basant Singh of the Atari family in the
Armitsar District of the Punjab
Muhammad Akbar Khan, son of Khwaja Muhammad Khan of Hoti, Peshawer

(4) Educated at the Rajkumar College Rajkot:

Kumar Shri Ram Singh Ji, son of the Thakur of
Virpur in Kathiawar
Zorawar Singh Ji, of Bhavnagar

(5) Not educated at any of the Chiefs' Colleges:

H.H. the Maharaja of Jodhpur
" the Maharaja of Kishengarh
Nawab Wali-ud-Din, son of the Nawab Sir Vikar-ul-Umra
of Hyderabad
Akhey Singh of Jodhpur
Amar Singh, son of Kunwar Narain Singh of Jaipur
Kunwar Hari Singh Ji, of Chhota Udaipur in the
Rewa Kantha Agency Bombay
Kunwar Partap Singh of Kama
Cassim Shah, nephew of His Highness the Aga Khan of Bombay
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Rs 72,207</td>
<td>Rs 63,631</td>
<td>Rs 5,75,890</td>
<td>Rs 2,41,866</td>
<td>Rs 2,49,390</td>
<td>Rs 55,651</td>
<td>Rs 58,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,44,531</td>
<td>Rs 88,900</td>
<td>Rs 1,11,697</td>
<td>Rs 63,302</td>
<td>Rs 12,21,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,63,034</td>
<td>Rs 24,00,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost</td>
<td>Rs 1,10,680</td>
<td>Rs 59,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 4,91,256</td>
<td>Rs 6,25,134</td>
<td>Rs 8,45</td>
<td>Rs 1,86,000</td>
<td>Rs 15,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,76,499</td>
<td>Rs 1,79,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,01,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,01,000</td>
<td>Rs 13,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,63,034</td>
<td>Rs 24,00,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual cost</td>
<td>Rs 2,21,360</td>
<td>Rs 76,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 7,45,824</td>
<td>Rs 8,90,272</td>
<td>Rs 4,44</td>
<td>Rs 7,80,000</td>
<td>Rs 2,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,05,603</td>
<td>Rs 1,81,500</td>
<td>Rs 1,01,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,01,000</td>
<td>Rs 2,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,63,034</td>
<td>Rs 24,00,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Cost on States Revenue</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rs 72,207</td>
<td>Rs 63,631</td>
<td>Rs 5,75,890</td>
<td>Rs 2,41,866</td>
<td>Rs 2,49,390</td>
<td>Rs 55,651</td>
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<td>Rs 1,44,531</td>
<td>Rs 88,900</td>
<td>Rs 1,11,697</td>
<td>Rs 63,302</td>
<td>Rs 12,21,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,63,034</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rs 1,10,680</td>
<td>Rs 59,00,000</td>
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<td>Rs 1,86,000</td>
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<td>Rs 1,76,499</td>
<td>Rs 1,79,000</td>
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<td>Rs 13,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,63,034</td>
<td>Rs 24,00,000</td>
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<td>Rs 1,21,959</td>
<td>Rs 76,00,000</td>
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<td>Rs 8,90,272</td>
<td>Rs 4,44</td>
<td>Rs 7,80,000</td>
<td>Rs 2,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,05,603</td>
<td>Rs 1,81,500</td>
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<td>Rs 1,01,000</td>
<td>Rs 2,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,63,034</td>
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<td>Rs 2,02,000</td>
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<td>Rs 2,00,000</td>
<td>Rs 1,63,034</td>
<td>Rs 24,00,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures for last two years are not available for any organisation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Cost of each corps</th>
<th>Total Cost (to each State)</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Average annual cost for five years ending 1901-2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faridkot</td>
<td>Faridkot Sappers</td>
<td>33,038</td>
<td>33,038</td>
<td>4,25,000</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>31,000 (figures for last two years since reorganisation)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sirmur Sappers</td>
<td>45,620</td>
<td>45,620</td>
<td>5,12,000</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maler Kotla</td>
<td>Maler Kotla Sappers</td>
<td>38,595</td>
<td>38,595</td>
<td>2,67,559</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>43,000</td>
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<td>Alwar Lancers</td>
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<td>4,62,872</td>
<td>30,00,000</td>
<td>15.4</td>
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<td>Alwar Infantry</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Bharatpur Transport Corps</td>
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<td>2,15,405</td>
<td>36,54,000</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2,22,000 (for three years service since reorganisation)</td>
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<td>Jodhpur</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
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<td>Bikanir Camel Corps</td>
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<td>1st Gwalior Lancers</td>
<td>2,92,598</td>
<td>6,67,096</td>
<td>37,79,232</td>
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<td>2,99,022</td>
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<td>Gwalior Transport Corps</td>
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<td>States</td>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Cost of each corps</td>
<td>Total Cost (to each State)</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Average annual cost for five years ending 1901-2</td>
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<td>Bhopal Lancers</td>
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<td>Indore Lancers</td>
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<td>Mysore Lancers</td>
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<td>5,00,269</td>
<td>1,87,76,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5,23,000 (including over 5,00,000 initial)</td>
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<td>Mysore Transport</td>
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<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>Hyderabad Lancers</td>
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<td>4,98,715</td>
<td>3,58,80,000</td>
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<td>91,516</td>
<td>44,22,900</td>
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<td>65,398</td>
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<td>Towns</td>
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<td>55,511</td>
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<td>780</td>
<td>109,817</td>
<td>266,994</td>
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<td>489,955</td>
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<td>464,635</td>
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<td>10,997</td>
<td>762,557</td>
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<td>29,901</td>
<td>1,911,483</td>
<td>5,104,246</td>
<td>4,619,055</td>
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<td>3,576</td>
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<td>414,414</td>
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<td>43,474,748</td>
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<td>Amount</td>
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<td>a) Hyderabad</td>
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<td>b) Central India States</td>
<td>14,36,680</td>
<td>The states include Ajaigark, Amjeera, Bihot, Charkhari, Indore,</td>
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<td>Khilchipur, Paldeo, Panna, Ratlam, Sailana.</td>
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<td>c) Rajputana States</td>
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<td>The states as such were: Banswara; Bundi, Dungarpur, Jaipur,</td>
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<td>Jhalawar, Jodhpur, Kota, Lawa, Sirohi, Shahpura, Udaipur.</td>
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<td>(ii) Under the Provincial Governments</td>
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<td>50,100</td>
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<td>Dharampur, Dhrangadhra, Goudal, Jasad, Jetpur, Junagadh, Kotda Sangani,</td>
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<td>Limbdi, Lunawara, Morvi, Muli, Navanagar, Patri, Porbandar, Rajkot,</td>
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<td>Sasla, Sunth, Thar, Vankaner, Wadhwand, Wansda, Zhinjuwada and other</td>
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<td>Central Provinces States</td>
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<td>Madras States</td>
<td>45,08,000</td>
<td>The states comprised: Travancore, Cochin, Lecadive Island and Mysore.</td>
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<td>North Western Provinces States</td>
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<td>Political divisions</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Punjab States</td>
<td>Rs. 2,77,794</td>
<td>The states were: Baghal, Baghat, Balsar, Bashahr, Bhaaji, Bijja, Bilaspur, Chamba, Dhizi, Iaroch, Jubbal, Kathar, Kumhersain, Kunhier, Kapurthala, Kahlog, Kandi, Nalagarh, Suket.</td>
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Total 74,90,524
### CHARGES DEBITABLE TO THE INDIAN REVENUES

FOR ORGANISING IMPERIAL SERVICE TROOPS (31. Mar. 1905)

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<td>Rs As Ps</td>
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<td>(i) Inspecting staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Salaries</td>
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<td>1,94,862 7 6</td>
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<td>9,953 14 3</td>
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<td>c) Allowances (Travelling etc.)</td>
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<td>38,931 6 9</td>
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<td>d) Contingencies</td>
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<th>Camel Corps</th>
<th>Transport Corps</th>
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</table>
MAIN UNPUBLISHED SOURCES AND THEIR LOCATIONS

1. INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY:

(a) minutes of the India Council, London.
   (b) Private Papers.
   (c) Proceedings and Despatches
   (d) Secret and political Records
   (e) Treaties and Engagements
   (f) Various Records (miscellaneous).

(a) MINUTES OF THE INDIA COUNCIL LONDON

1899 (Jan. to June) vol. 62.
   (July to Dec.) " 63.

1900 (Jan. to June) " 84.
   (July to Dec.) " 85.

1901 (Jan. to June) " 86.
   (July to Dec.) " 87.

1902 (Jan. to June) " 88.
   (July to Dec.) " 89.

1903 (July to Dec.) " 91.

1904 (Jan. to June) " 92.

1905 (Jan. to June) " 94.
   (July to Dec.) " 95.

(b) PRIVATE PAPERS

1. Baron Kilbracken Collection, MSS. P.102.

(The Kilbracken Collection consists of the correspondence and papers of Sir Arthur Godley, 1st Baron Kilbracken of Killegar (1874-1932) as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India from 1865 to 1909. The papers were left behind in the Indian Office by Lord Kilbracken upon his retirement in 1909, and were transferred to the custody of the India Office Library in January 1961. The Collection comprises sixty-two volumes containing printed, typed and manuscript material).


4. Letters from the Secretary of State, Lord Cross (1886-1891).


7. Letters from the Secretary of State, St. John Brodrick (1903-1905).
10. Letters from Lord Dufferin (1884-88).
17. " " Lord Curzon (1898-1899).
18. " " " (1900).
19. " " " (1901).
20. " " " (1902).
21. " " " (1903).
22. " " " (1904).
23. " " Lord Ampthill (1903-04).

2. Baron Lamington Papers. MSS. Eur. B. 159 and MSS. Reel 675.

These papers comprise two letter books with indexes of the 2nd Baron Lamington (1860-1940), Charles Wallace Alexander Napier Cochrane Baillie, as the Governor of Bombay from 1903 to 1907. These contain copies of his letters to the King-Emperor, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, the Maharaja of Kolhapur, Sir William Lee-Warner and others. The original of the Reel 675 (413 exposures) are in the Duke University Library, North Carolina, U.S.A. The papers were purchased by the India Office Library in July 1960.

R.No. 675. Letters to the Viceroy (Part 1)
Letters to the Secretary of State (Part II).


The Manuscript comprises fourteen boxes of correspondence and official papers dating from 1853 to 1912 of Field Marshal Sir George Stuart White, Commander-in-Chief of India from 1893 to 1898. The official papers are relating to the Army in India during the time when Sir George was C-in-C, while the correspondence includes, apart from private letters, papers relating to Curzon-Kitchener dispute over the administration of Army in India for which he was consulted by both sides unofficially, though he served on the Cornis enquiring into the matter. The Manuscript was deposited in the India Office Library by his daughter, the Hon. Lady Napier in March 1961.


LE/14. Copies of Commander in Chief's letters with general index and separate index of letters to the Viceroy.


(The collection comprises the correspondence of Lord George Francis Hamilton (1843-1927), Under Secretary of State for India from 1874-75; Secretary of State for India from 1895-1903. The collection, which was present by Ronald Hamilton, O.B.E., in September 1951, to the India Office, covers the period (1895-1903) when Lord George Hamilton was Secretary of State for India. It consists of one printed volume and thirty-four volumes contain printed, typescript and manuscript material.)
(i) Hamilton to Elgin (HSS.Eur.C.125).
   " " " (1895-6) vol.I.
   " " " (1896-7) " II.
   " " " (1897) " III.

(ii) Hamilton to Curzon (HSS.Eur.C.126)
   " " " (1899) vol.I.
   " " " (1900) " II.
   " " " (1901) " III.
   " " " (1902) " IV.
   " " " (1903) " V.

(iii) Private Telegrams (HSS.Eur.D.508)
   " " " (July 1895-Dec.1899)

(iv) Elgin to Hamilton (HSS.Eur.D.509)
   " " " (7 Oct. - 30 Dec.1896) vol.III
   " " " (6 Jan. - 21 Apr.1897) " IV
   " " " (17 Sept. - 10 Nov.1897) " VII
   " " " (4 Aug. - 5 Jan.1899) " XII

(v) Curzon to Hamilton (HSS.Eur.D.510)
   " " " (5 Jan. - 31 May 1899) " XIII
   " " " (7 June - 13 Sept.1899) " XIV
   " " " (15 Sept.-28 Dec.1899) " XV
   " " " (4 Jan. - 18 Apr.1900) " XVI
   " " " (23 Apr.-12 Sept.1900) " XVII
   " " " (17 Sept.-27 Dec.1900) " XVIII
   " " " (3 Jan. - 17 Apr.1901) " XIX
   " " " (22 Apr.-4 Sept.1901) " XX
   " " " (17 Sept.-26 Dec.1901) " XXI
   " " " (2 Jan. - 23 Apr.1902) " XXII
   " " " (30 Apr.-24 Sept.1902) " XXIII
   " " " (1 Oct. - 28 Dec.1902) " XXIV
   " " " (1 Jan. - 30 Apr.1903) " XXV
   " " " (7 May - 15 Oct.1903) " XXVI
5. **Hugh Barnes Correspondence, MSS. Eur. Reel 603.**

(it comprises correspondence from 1893 to 1904 of Sir Hugh Shakespeare Barnes, I.C.S. (1853-1940) with Lady Barnes, Lord Curzon, Lord Ampthill, Sir Arthur Godley, Sir John Strachey and others. It was purchased in September 1959 from his son Sir George Barnes, Principal of the University College of North Staffordshire.

6. **Lord Ampthill Collection, MSS. Eur. E.233.**

(The Ampthill Collection of Arthur Oliver Villiers Russell, 2nd Baron Ampthill (1869-1935) was presented to the India Office by the Dowager Lady Ampthill in November 1948. It consists of thirty-six volumes or files of manuscripts and forty-seven volumes of printed works relating to the late Lord Ampthill's period of office as Governor of Madras from 28 December 1900 to 30 April 1904 and from 13 December 1904 to 15 February 1906; and ad interim Viceroy and Governor-General of India from 30 April to 15 December 1904).

- **No.4.** Correspondence with Lord Hamilton. (Dec. 1901-1902).
- **No.5.** Correspondence with Lord George Hamilton. (1902).
- **No.6.** Letters from Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India (1903).
- **No.7.** Letters from Lord Ampthill as Governor of Madras to the Secretary of State. (Jan. 1901 to Jan. 1906).
- **No.8.** Letters from Lord Ampthill as Governor of Madras to The Viceroy and Governor-General of India (Curzon and Minto). (1901 to Feb. 1906.)
- **No.10.** Letters from the Secretary of State for India, St. John Brodrick. (23 Oct. 1903 to 7 Apr. 1904).
- **No.11.** Letters from the Secretary of State. (8 Dec. 1904 to 30 June 1905).
- **No.12.** Correspondence with the Secretary of State, St. John Brodrick. (July 1905 to Dec. 1905).
- **No.14.** Letters from and to Sir Arthur Godley. (July 1903 to Jan. 1906)
- **No.15.** Correspondence with Lord Curzon. (1901).
- **No.16.** " " " " (1902).
- **No.17.** Letters from Lord Curzon (5 Jan. 1903 to 15 Apr. 1904).
- **No.18.** Letters from Lord Curzon (Mar. and Apr. 1904, Jan. 1905 to June 1905.)
- **No.19.** Letters from Lord Curzon (July to Oct. 1905).
- **No.22.** Correspondence concerning the Royal Visit to Madras.
- **No.23.** Letters from Princes, Chiefs and others to Ampthill. (1905-1922.)
No. 27. Letters from Princes and others on assumption of Viceroyalty. (1904).

No. 29. Letters from Princes and others on relinquishing the office of the Governor of Madras. (1906).

No. 32. Correspondence with His Majesty (Apr. to Dec. 1904).

No. 34. Correspondence with persons in India.
Correspondence with persons in India.
(Sept. - Dec. 1904). Vol. II.

No. 37. Correspondence with the Secretary of State, Lord Curzon and Sir A. Godley. (Apr. - Nov. 1904).

No. 40. Correspondence with persons in England and abroad.
(Apr. to Dec. 1904).
Letters and telegrams to Ampthill (pt. i.)
Letters and telegrams from Ampthill (pt. ii).

No. 43. Telegraphic correspondence with the Secretary of State. (1904).
Telegram from the Secretary of State. (pt. i.)
Telegram from the Secretary of State. (pt. ii.)

No. 49. St. Banquet at Srinagar. (22 Nov. 1904)

No. 51. The Royal Visit to Madras. (1 Jan. 1906).

No. 52. Delhi Coronation Durbar. (29 Dec. to 10 Jan. 1905).

No. 53. Programmes during the Royal Visit.

No. 57. List of Princes and Chiefs addressed by Ampthill.

No. 58. Ampthill's Address on 'British Administration in India'. (21 Nov. 1906).

No. 60. Autumn Tour of His Excellency the Viceroy (1900).

No. 61. " " " " " " " (1904).

No. 65. Delhi Durbar and Tours (1903).

No. 66. The Tours to Cochin, Trichinopoly and South Arcot Districts. (1905).

No. 70. Autumn Tour (1905).

No. 73. Sundry official papers sent by the Foreign Secretary, Government of India, regarding Curzon's letters on Imperial Service Troops.
no. 76. Durbar (1903).

7. Lord Curzon Collection, MS. Bur. 4. 111.

(It was deposited on extended loan by the Trustees of Kesleston Estate in March 1962. The Collection which comprises seven hundred and sixteen volumes of printed typed and manuscript material covers the correspondence and papers of George Nathaniel, Marquis Curzon of Kesleston (1859-1925), Under Secretary of State for India from 1891 to 1894, and Viceroy and Governor-General of India from 1899 to 1905).

(i)

No. 9. Letters from Curzon to St. John Brodrick (1876-1893)

No. 10. " " " " " " " (1894-1903)

No. 22. Copies of periodicals containing articles by Curzon (1897)

No. 126. 'A phục c. British Senate', and folder of press cuttings about Curzon. (1868)

No. 154. Scrapbook of press cuttings of Curzon's speeches and writings on the House of Lords (1896-1911)

(ii) Semi-official Correspondence:

No. 135. Correspondence with the Queen Empress (1898-1901)

No. 156 " " " King Emperor (1901-1905)

(iii) Correspondence with the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, Mr. Malfour, Lord Lansdowne, Sir Arthur Godley and others:

No. 155. Correspondence (1899)

No. 159. " " " (1900)

No. 160. " " " (1901)

No. 161. " " " (1902)

No. 162. " " " (1903)

No. 163. " " " (1904)

No. 164. " " " (1904-05)

(iv) Telegrams to and from the Secretary of State:

No. 169. " " " " " " " " " " " " (1899)

No. 170. " " " " " " " " " " " " (1900)

No. 171. " " " " " " " " " " " " (1901)

No. 172. " " " " " " " " " " " " (1902)

No. 173. " " " " " " " " " " " " (1903)

No. 174. " " " " " " " " " " " " (1904)
(v) Correspondence with persons in India:

No. 149. " " " " " " (1899, Jan.-June)
No. 200. " " " " " " (1899, July-Dec.)
No. 201. " " " " " " (1900, Jan.-June)
No. 202. " " " " " " (1900, July-Dec.)
No. 203. " " " " " " (1901, Jan.-June)
No. 204. " " " " " " (1901, July-Dec.)
No. 205. " " " " " " (1902, Jan.-June)
No. 206. " " " " " " (1902, July-Dec.)
No. 207. " " " " " " (1903, Jan.-June)
No. 208. " " " " " " (1903, July-Dec.)
No. 209. " " " " " " (1904)
No. 210. " " " " " " (1905, Jan.-June)
No. 211. " " " " " " (1905, July-Nov.)

No. 230. File of Correspondence with Sir Mackworth Young.

No. 231. Letters from Lord Knollys, Private Secretary to the king. (1901-04)

No. 232. Letters from A.J. Balfour (1902-03)

No. 233. Letters from the Duke of Connaught, mainly in connection with the Delhi Durbar. (1902-03)

(vi) Papers relating to the Internal Administration of India (1904-05):

No. 240. Spare copies of minutes on various subjects by Curzon (1899-1905)

No. 241. Official papers on various subjects including the Governments of Madras and Bombay (1899)

No. 242. Copies of a summary of Lord Curzon's administration, and list of measures designed for the benefit of Natives in India (1899-1905)

No. 243. Memoranda, reports, votes, news cuttings and pencil notes by Curzon on Hyderabad and Berar (1899-1902)

No. 244. Memorandum on the Berar question (1901)


No. 247. Letters, notes and official papers about Indian Chiefs' Commissions in the Army for Native officers; Careers for the aristocracy of India; and Chiefs Colleges, etc.
No.254. Official publications with notes about Indian Chiefs and Native States (1899-1904)

No.255. Memorandum of the provision of an outlet for the military ambition of Natives in India, by Sir William Lockhart (1899)

No.256. Memorandum on interviews of Curzon with the Gaekwar of Baroda, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Maharaja of Orchha. (1899-1902)


No.258. Minutes, printed correspondence, etc., about Imperial Defence and Imperial Service Troops.

No.259. Folder of photographs of scenes during Curzon's Viceroyalty.


No.261. Maps, plans, news cuttings and official papers in connection with the Durbar held at Delhi. (1902-03).

No.262. Portfolio of photographs with text in connection with the scheme for the preservation of the National Monuments of India.

No.321. Memorandum on the scheme for administration of the NWFP by the Lieut.-Governor of the Punjab. (1907)

No.322. Minutes and memos; by the Viceroy on Frontier Administration. (1899-1904)

No.420. Letters and telegrams received on the occasion of the Resignation of Lord Curzon (1905).

No.454. Letters and telegrams received and despatched of the Victoria Memorial Hall:

Correspondence (1901-03) Vol. I.

Correspondence (1904-05) Vol. II.

8. Lord Northbrook collection, hist. no. C.144.

(The Lord Northbrook collection was deposited on permanent loan by the Lord Northbrook in January 1936. The Collection comprises the correspondence relating to Indian affairs of Thomas George Saring, 1st Earl of Northbrook (1826-1904), Under Secretary of State for India from 1859 to 1861, and from 1861 to 1864; and Viceroy and Governor-General of India from 1872 to 1876. The Collection consists of six volumes of manuscript correspondence.
and seventeen volumes of printed correspondence. It covers the period preceding, during and following Lord Northbrook's viceroyalty.

No. 7. General Correspondence (1876-79)
No. 8. Letters to the Queen (1872-6)
No. 12. Correspondence with Lord Salisbury (1874)
No. 13. Correspondence with persons in India (1876-7)


(These comprise sixty-four (printed) volumes of papers of the 5th Marquis of Lansdowne (1845-1927), Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, from 1888 to 1894. The papers came to the Library in 1958).

No. iii. A. Summary of the measures considered and carried out. (Dec. 1888-Jan. 1894)
   B. Secret selection of despatches and other papers (part i and part ii)

No. ix. Confidential letters to and from the Secretary of State (Nov. 1888-Dec. 1889) Vol. I

No. ix. Confidential letters to and from the Secretary of State (Jan. 1890-Dec. 1890) Vol. II

No. ix. Confidential letters to and from the Secretary of State (Jan. 1891-Dec. 1891) Vol. III


No. x. Confidential letters from Her Majesty (Dec. 1888 to Jan. 1894) Vol. II

No. xi. Confidential telegrams to and from the Secretary of State. (Jan. 1893-Dec. 1894) Vol. IV

No. xiii Notes and minutes of Lord Lansdowne (Jan. 1869-Jan. 1894)


(It was deposited on permanent loan in 1955. The papers comprise one hundred and seventy volumes of typescript, printed and manuscript material, pertaining to the period of Robert Bulwer Lytton (1851-1891) as Viceroy and Governor-General of India from 1876 to 1880).

No. 518/1. Letters despatched. (1876)
No. 518/2. " " (1877)
No. 518/3. " " (1878)
No. 518/4. " " (1879)

The Papers, consisting of 43 volumes of printed, typescript and manuscript material were deposited in Records of the India Office in 1933 by Mr. F. W. Hurst, a friend of Mr. Guy Morley, the nephew of Viscount Morley with whom the papers had originally been lying. These were transferred to the Library in 1959. The Papers comprise mainly the private correspondence between John, 1st Viscount Morley of Blackburn (1832-1923) and Lord Minto the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, from 1905 to 1910 and March to May 1911.


(ii) Minto to Morley

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Apr. 1906 - 11 July 1906</td>
<td>Vol. VII</td>
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<td>15 June 1907 - 26 Sept. 1907</td>
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<td>5 Aug. 1908 - 29 Sept. 1908</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Oct. 1908 - 31 Dec. 1908</td>
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(The Temple Collection was presented to the India Office Library in 19 by Sir Richard Carnac Temple. The Collection with its printed, typed and manuscript material comprises three hundred and twelve volumes of the papers of Sir Richard Carnac Temple and his father, Sir Richard Temple. It is mainly concerned with the papers relating to Indian affairs of Sir Richard Temple (1826-1902), Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab in 1854; Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces 1862; Resident at Hyderabad in 1867; Financial Members of the Governor General's Council in 1865; in charge for famine operations in Behar i 1874; Lieut.-Governor of the Bengal from 1874 to 1877, and Governor of Bombay from 1877 to 1880.)

Nos. 74/75. Papers relating to Sir Richard Temple's period of office as Resident Hyderabad (1861/1867).

No. 76. Demi-official letters (1867).

No. 77. Letters from Sir Salar Jung (1867-77).
10.73 Letters, Calcutta and the Deccan (1867-77)
10.74 Letters, Hyderabad Residency, (1867-8)
10.31 Political Diary Hyderabad.
10.36 The Report on the Commission on the Civil, Military and Political Expenditure, Hyderabad (1861)
10.167 Sir Salar Jung's letters (1872-75)
10.162 Prince of Wales' Visit (1875)
10.166 Imperial Assemblage (1877)
10.263 The Native Chiefs and their States (1877)


(The Cross Collection was deposited on permanent loan to the library of the Rt. Hon., the Viscount Cross in June 1953. The collection, which comprises the papers of Richard Viscount Cross, 1st Viscount Cross (1829-1914), as Secretary of State for India from 1886 to 1892, consists of fifty-seven volumes of correspondence, with indexes dating from 1886 to 1892.)

(i) Letters from the Earl of Dufferin:

These letters are apart from the Dufferin Collection (Reels 496-559, with 20,969 exposures) as microfilmed from the originals in London and Northern Ireland by permission of the Marchioness of Dufferin of Ava in April 1953.

No.22. " " " " " " " 6 Aug.-24 June 1866) Vol. 1.
No.23. " " " " " " 1 July-27 Dec. 1866) Vol. 1.
No.24. " " " " " " 2 Jan.-29 June 1867) Vol. 1.
No.25. " " " " " " 6 July-4 Nov. 1867) Vol. 1.

(ii) Letters from the Marquis of Lansdowne:

No.27. " " " " " " 5 July-31 Dec. 1868) Vol. 1.
No.30. " " " " " " 7 Jan.-30 June 1869) Vol. 1.
14. **Sir William Foster Collection, MSS. Eur. E. 242.**

(The Collection consists of two volumes (1265 folios) of the letters and papers of Sir William Foster who was Registrar and Superintendent of the India Office Records from 1907 to 1927. The Collection includes, apart from many of Sir William's lectures, notes and copies of his numerous articles, series of letters written to him by scholars, colleagues and friends, including Curzon, between 1890 - 1906).

No. 1. Letters from Curzon (3 Apr. 1906 - 11 Sept. 1902)

15. **Sir William Lee-Warner Collection, MSS. Eur. F. 92.**

(It comprises two boxes of various papers and Press-cuttings of Sir William Lee-Warner (1846-1914) I.C.S., Secretary, Political and Secret Department, India Office (1895-1905), and Member of Council of India from 1901 - 1912).

(c) **PROCEEDINGS AND DESPATCHES**

(1). **General Political Proceedings**

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(2). **Bombay Political Proceedings**

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(5). Bombay political proceedings (Confidential)

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(4). Central provinces Foreign and Political Proceedings

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(5). Famine proceedings India

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(6). Undersecretary proceedings

(i) Home 1906

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(ii) Foreign (Native States) 1906

Foreign (Native States) 1907

Vol.5820

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(ii) Foreign (native States)  
1909  
Vol. 6998
(iii) P. H. B.  
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5. Political and secret letters from Madras (with enclosures)

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7. Secret and political letters from India (with enclosures)

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(c) TREATIES AND ENGAGEMENTS

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(ii) Copies of treaties and grants with some correspondence relating thereto. (1643-1800)
(iii) Copies of rash-ul-Hookams (1671/2-1717)
(iv) Treaties, Agreements and Engagements (1638-1849)
(v) Translations of Thirmauns at Port St. David (1690-1751)
(vi) " " " " St. George (1716-17)
(vii) Treaties etc., between the East India Company and the States bordering on the Presidency of Bombay (1759-1833)
(viii) Treaties and Engagements between the East India Company and the native powers in Asia (1739-1844)
(ix) Collection of Treaties and Engagements etc. (1739-1835)
(x) Treaties and Grants from the country powers to the East India Company (1756-1780)
(xi) Treaties and Agreements with country Powers in India (1781-94)
(xii) Treaties and Agreements with country Powers in India (1795-1802)
(xiii) Treaties and Agreements with country Powers in India (1802-66)
(xiv) Treaties (1781-1806)
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(xvi) Treaties and Agreements with Native Princes in India (1846-47)
(vii) Treaties of commerce with native princes and
    states (1726-1810).
(viii) Treaties with the native states connected
    negotiations (1860).
(xii) Treaties and engagements with native princes
    (1877-78).

(2) Miscellaneous (Miscellaneous)

1. Indian office Matters:
   1st: one volume (1st) one volume
   2nd: one volume (2nd) one volume
   3rd: one volume (3rd) one volume
   4th: one volume (4th) one volume

2. Register of any orders (Honours, etc.):
   December 1877 to March 1878 Vol. II

3. Register of letters present

4. Indian office correspondence

5. Correspondence with sovereigns of India, Press
   (Bengal, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras
   native newspapers) 1877-78

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(a) Indian correspondence
(b) Indian reports
(c) Government of India's publications
(d) Miscellaneous collection of literary, political
    and other letters to Lord Curzon, 1873 and
    1874.
(e) Acts on the various orders of day (House of Commons).
(f) Parliamentary questions answered.
(g) Proceedings of the various orders-in-Council.
(h) Office records and papers (Miscellaneous).

(i) Miscellaneous documents and papers.

(ii) Correspondence with the Marquis of Salisbury:

   Dec. 1876 to Oct. 1877) Vol. VI
   " 1878-79 (VII)
   " 1879-80 (VIII)
   " 1880-81 (IX)
(ii) Correspondence with Curzon:
Mss. No. 49752 (1884-1904) Vol. L.

(iii) Papers relating to foreign affairs:
Mss. No. 49746 (1876-1904) Vol. LXIV

(iv) Letters to Lord George Hamilton:
Mss. No. 49778 (1886-1909) Vol. XCVI

(b) CURZON PAPERS

(i) Letters and telegrams issued when in England
(ii) " " received " " "

(c) GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S PUBLICATIONS

1857 Papers connected with the establishment of Universities in India.


1873-91 Hyderabad Assigned Districts: Police, Annual Reports (1891-1902).

1874- Archaeological Survey of India (1874-1905).


1884 A Collection of statutes relating to India, compiled by J. Stokes.

1884 The repealed General Acts of the Governor-General in Council (1877-81).

1885 Control of the Indian railways.

1885 The repealed General Acts of the Governor-General in Council (1882-84).

1887 Report of the Public Service Commission (1886-7).


1887 Proceedings of the Public Service Commission 1886-7.

1889 Rules and orders of the Governor-General in Council relating to the conduct of public servants in respect of borrowing money, receipt of compliments, addresses and other matters.

1899 The repealed General Acts of the Governor-General in Council (1885-88).
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<td>Statistical atlas of India.</td>
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<td>Rules regulating the grant of loans from general revenues.</td>
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<td>The un repealed General Acts of the Governor-General in Council (1854-1903).</td>
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<td>British enactments in force in Native States (compiled by C.J. Neeperson).</td>
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<td>1918</td>
<td>Draft Memorandum and scheme for establishing improved relations between the Government of India and the Indian States.</td>
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<td>1918</td>
<td>Some notes on the Hyderabad Residency, collected from original records in the Residency Office.</td>
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1926  States in the Central Provinces.

1929  Chamber of Princes. (The British Crown and the Indian States, being an outline sketch drawn up on behalf of the Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes).

1929  Indian States' Committee Report.

1930  Report of the special committee appointed to investigate certain facts relevant to the economic and financial relations between British India and Indian States.

1935  Encyclopaedia of the General Acts and Codes of India (under the general editorship of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru).

(d)  MISCELLANEOUS LITERARY POLITICAL AUTOGRAPHS AND LETTERS TO CURZON

NSS. No. 49458. Letters to Lord Curzon, 19th-20th Cent. Paper. For

(e)  MOTIONS, QUESTIONS, ORDERS OF THE DAY (House of Commons)

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(g)  PROCLAMATIONS AND CERTAIN ORDERS-IN-COUNCIL

1.  Proclamation of Lords and others for proclaiming His Majesty King Edward the 7th. (23 Jan. 1901)

2.  His Majesty's speech in Council (23 Jan. 1901)

9.  By the King. A proclamation dated 20th June 1901, declaring His Majesty's pleasure touching his Royal Coronation.

13.  By the King. A proclamation, dated 10th Dec. 1901, fixing Thursday the 26th day of June 1902 as the date for the Coronation of Their Majesties.
(h) **Public General Acts** (Parliamentary)

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(i) **Varicuus Records, Journals and Papers**


III **Senate House Library, (University of London).**

(a) Abstract of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General.

(b) British and Foreign State Papers.

(c) Parliamentary Debates.

(d) Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons).

(e) University of London's unpublished Theses.

(a) **Abstract of the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General**

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