IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ON ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM:
A CASE STUDY OF CIVIL
BUREAUCRACY IN PAKISTAN

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
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<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td>Basic Democracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>Central Board of Revenue</td>
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<td>CEC</td>
<td>Chief Election Commissioner</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>CES</td>
<td>Central Engineering Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
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<td>CML</td>
<td>Council Muslim League</td>
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<td>COP</td>
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<td>CS</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Defense of Pakistan Rules</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBDO</td>
<td>Elective Bodies Disqualification Order</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>EPR</td>
<td>East Pakistan Rifles</td>
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<td>FSF</td>
<td>Federal Security Force</td>
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<td>GAR</td>
<td>General Administrative Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GOC</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Indian Civil Service</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspectors-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Indian Police Services</td>
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<td>ISP</td>
<td>Information Service of Pakistan</td>
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<td>JUI</td>
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<td>JUP</td>
<td>Jamaat-e-Ulama-e-Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFO</td>
<td>Legal Framework Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLR</td>
<td>MARTIAL LAW REGULATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NATIONAL ASSEMBLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP</td>
<td>NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
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ABSTRACT

Political development is considered as an instrument for the strengthening of representative institutions in a political system. Political development increases the level of participation and the capacity of the political institutions to accommodate the change for the maintenance of the political system. This correlation is very significant in the context of political development which is linked with the constitutional development and it becomes an important source for administrative reforms in the form of constitutional enactments in the administrative system.

It is an established fact that bureaucracy plays a significant role in administrative development and political stability in any political setting. Political systems are composed of different components, such as bureaucracy, military, political elite and other institutions. These components are interdependent to each other. Each of them has a specified function to perform for the accomplishment of common goals. Therefore, areas of responsibilities are clearly demarcated to avoid deviation and overlapping. Deviation of any kind thus, results into disharmony and disturbances of the system. Thus, an organized and effective bureaucratic system can act as a stable center around which rapid political changes can swirl without destroying the incipient state.

The function of political leadership is to articulate policies according to the will of the people and the bureaucracy is expected to implement the policies of a representative government. The bureaucracy if captures political power and performs the political role of making policies then the harmonious functioning of the political system is affected. Combining the both functions
of policymaking and policy implementation, it overburdens itself and thus cannot effectively perform its basic function that is 'the execution of policies'. Ideally speaking the duty of a bureaucracy is to implement the orders of political representatives and perform the assigned functions within the framework of laid down rules by the law.

This research thesis has analyzed the political and constitutional development and ascertained its impacts on the administrative system of Pakistan. The Civil Bureaucracy of Pakistan and the Administrative Reforms of 1973 were selected as a case study. Riggs analyzed the role of civil bureaucracy in various political systems. According to him, a political system consists of its 'constitutive system,' 'bureaucracy,' and 'head of state'. Constitutive system refers to an elected assembly, an electoral system, and a party system. According to Riggs, the role of civil bureaucracy is determined by the nature of the political system. In a bureaucratic polity, the civil bureaucracy controls the powers of the constitutive system and the head of state. Riggs identifies such regimes 'bureaucratic polities,' and argues that the existence of a strong modern bureaucracy in a political system characterized by weak representative institutions, which hinders political and constitutional development and nullifies its impacts on administrative system.

The pace of political process in Pakistan had been very slow from 1947 to 1970, and as a result the political culture as being an important component of the political system could not develop. Particularly, during the rule of General Ayub (1958-69) political activities were banned and political parties being the representatives of the people were not allowed to participating in the political process. There top ranking leadership was disqualified to take
part in political activities through the notorious laws such as EBDO. Therefore, the Political parties in Pakistan failed to impose controls on the civil bureaucracy due to the absence of effective political structure and organization.

The civil service of Pakistan (CSP) is a legacy of the colonial rule of the pre-partition Indian Civil Service (ICS). As a consequence the functions which supposed to be exercised by elected political elites were monopolized by the civil bureaucracy. Consequently, legislatures in Pakistan were unable to establish its supremacy on the civil bureaucracy. The Bureaucratic dominance became instrumental in creating obstacles in the way of political and constitutional development and the growth of representative institutions in Pakistan. The commission reports by Rowland Egger 1953, Bernard Gladieux 1955, and Justice Cornelius Commission, 1962 (the Pay and Services Commission) were resisted by members of the Civil Service of Pakistan because they criticized the traditional ethos of the civil bureaucracy and recommended vital structural changes. These reports clearly threatened the elite status, power, prestige and exclusiveness of members of the Civil Service of Pakistan. The most important aspect is that all these Commissions were formed by the non-Representative ruling elite, the civil and military bureaucracy of Pakistan and therefore none was implemented.

The administrative reforms of 1973 were the first of its kind which were formulated by the ‘Representative Regime’ and implemented. The immediate impacts of the implementation of the administrative reforms of 1973 drastically changed cadre the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP). The (CSP), was abolished; the reservation of posts for members of the CSP and other elite services was discontinued, the CSP Academy was abolished and a
joint training system was introduced, the domain of the All-Pakistan Services newly-constituted as the All-Pakistan Unified Grade was expanded to include a majority of non-CSP and non-PSP officers, and finally it also adopted of a uniform scales of pay which eliminated the financial advantage of the CSP in salary structure and introduced a system of lateral recruitment.

Our study makes it evident that the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan exercised a dominant role in policy-making, and it was due to the weakness of representative institution. Our findings also support Riggs’ view that ‘the political function tends to be appropriated, in considerable measure, by bureaucrats in a polity with weak political institutions. However, the success of administrative reforms absolutely depends on the nature of the political system, including certain key variables like the nature of reform, the values of reformers and administrators, timing, and the political leadership.
خلصص

اختراق نظام پورسیا اورو آ کیکیز تھری کے اثرات
پاکستان میں سول اخراجات چاک بک مطالعہ

کوہیں بھی کہ نظام پورسیا کا تحریک علمی ترقی کے لئے دہشت خہاچ کے ٹرینیتی کے معاشرتی ابتدائی اور روایتی دور کے تحت ہیں۔ تحقیق کا نتیجہ ہے کہ نظام پورسیا اورو آ کیکیز تھری کے اثرات پاکستان میں سول اخراجات چاک بک مطالعہ کا ابتدائی اخراجات کا نتیجہ ہے۔

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INTRODUCTION
0. INTRODUCTION

A study of the political and constitutional development in the Indian sub-Continent can be divided into two different but interrelated phases.\(^1\) Firstly, it covers a critical analysis of the British colonial policies that kept on changing from one pattern to another, in different situations, which could meet the needs of colonial masters. And secondly, it covers several constitutional enactments and administrative reforms, which gradually brought tremendous changes in the administrative system in the Indian Sub-Continent. These enactments and reforms were introduced on the one hand to satisfy the demands of Indian masses for more rights in self-rule and the need of British colonial masters for an effective administrative system on the other.\(^2\) Thus, political and constitutional development in the history of this region continued in these two important directions under the forces of changing socio-economic conditions.

The socio-economic transformation during the colonial period resulted in emergence of an educated middle class. This class became the pioneers of the Indian national movement. Initially, however, this class was very passive, as formation of political association and political activities were not allowed. The episode of 1857 proved a turning point in the history of the Indian Sub-Continent, as the British rulers redesigned their policies and some sort of a policy of apparent association and conciliation was adopted as a realization of the incident of 1857. This change in the policies allowed some political activities, including formation of social association and with the passage of time the same associations converted into political parties and the process of political development began.
The pace of political and constitutional development during the colonial period was rather slow, despite the British masters introduced a number of regulating acts. In the beginning these constitutional enactments were meant to control the functions of the East India Company and afterwards to accommodate the demand of the political parties for more rights. As the colonial masters were accommodating the political demands, at the same time they were also introducing changes in the administrative system in the sphere of administrative structure, civil bureaucracy, recruitment and training of the administrative personnel. Thus a vivid relationship can be noticed between the political and constitutional development and the administrative changes. This relationship has not ended with the departure of the colonial rulers but continued even after the partition of the Indian Sub-Continent in 1947.

Pakistan began her life with the inheritance of the British political, constitutional and administrative system. Despite unwillingness the same colonial legacies were maintained. It may be noted that at the time of independence the political system was the parliamentary form of government, the constitutional was the Act of 1935, with nominal modifications, and the administrative system was the structure of the civil bureaucracy, which was dominated by the Civil Services of Pakistan, (CSP).

The main objective of the administrative system during the colonial era was the maintenance of law and order and collection of taxes. It is one of the reasons that the civil bureaucracy was given extraordinary powers to perform these functions more effectively. As a result the civil bureaucracy emerged as the most organized and cohesive institution. The same system of administration, with its essential requirements, was transferred to Pakistan at
the time of independence. After the death of Mohammed Ali Jinnah in 1948 and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the civil bureaucracy became the sole authority in policy making as well as policy implementation in the country. The prevalent administrative system best suited the interest of the bureaucratic elite and therefore, status quo was maintained.

This study seeks to examine the political role of bureaucracy in this country. In this study civil bureaucracy is referred here mainly to mean the higher civil servants, and specifically those members of the Civil Services of Pakistan who occupied managerial roles, and who influenced the formulation and implementation of public policy.

0.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to produce a qualitative research work, it is necessary to develop a theoretical framework. This framework examines the concepts in order to generate a model, the conceptual basis of the study. Each components of the research topic will be analyzed separately. Political development have been defined in different ways, which means the expansion of power of representative institutions or the strengthening of representative institutions in a political system.¹ Political development is the development of non-bureaucratic power centers capable of subjecting the bureaucracy to political control.² According to Huntington, political development means the institutionalization of political structure, and it “involves the creation of political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent, to absorb and order the participation of groups and to promote social and economic change in the society.”³ He argues that the most important problem of politics is “the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change.”⁴ Thus, the development of
any political system depends on the relationship between political institutionalization and political participation. Political development increases the level of participation, and the capacity of the political institutions to accommodate change must also increase, if a stable political system is to be maintained.

There is a positive correlation between administrative development and people's participation in policy-making. In other words, political development brings increasing power of people's representation. When groups outside a bureaucracy exercise major influence in controlling the actions of the bureaucrats, then the decisions of the bureaucrats will be largely concerned with the implementation of norms set by the controlling groups, and without such control, officials cannot devote themselves primarily to implementing policies. Therefore, according to Riggs, political and administrative development should go together. This correlation is very significant as political development brings administrative reforms in the form of constitutional documents and that determines administrative development and ultimately the administrative system.

0.1.1 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

A study of political development needs to be examined from the historical and typological perspectives. The historical perspective assumes that the forces of history move in a unidirectional manner. Karl Popper, for example, defines historicism as an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the rhythms or the patterns, the laws or the trends that underlie the evolution of history. Other writers such as Marx, Cointe, Hegel, Maine, Spencer, and Darkhem also maintain that
development proceeds toward the Western model. According to the Marxian philosophy, all societies transform through five stages before it reaches to communism that is the final stage of development: primitive communism (The Commune System), slavery age, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism. And development is seen as both in material as well as in 'economic relationship'\textsuperscript{8}, which are determined by the development in 'tools of production'. Marx observes that the nation that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its own future.\textsuperscript{9} This concept of unilinear growth has had a tremendous impact on the literature on political development. Following Marx, W. Rostow delineated five stages of economic growth: traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive toward maturity, and the age of High Mass consumption.\textsuperscript{10} In his later work, Rostow adds another stage, which he calls 'the search for equality'.\textsuperscript{11} Following Rostow, Organski delineates four stages of development: the politics of primitive unification, the politics of industrialization, the politics of national welfare, and the politics of abundance'.\textsuperscript{12} The concept of stage development implies that developed countries passed through the stages long ago and now the underdeveloped countries will pass through the same stages. This assumption of a single course of development for all countries cannot however be accepted since there are apparently several patterns of development. In their book, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Rustow and Ward rejected a unilinear stage theory of political development and showed that Japan and Turkey, after passing through their take-off stage, developed quite differently. They argue further that the rates and patterns of development are determined by the environmental conditions of the society.\textsuperscript{13}
The second perspective on political development is typological. It assumes that the developing countries will converge toward a Western model of development. Such ethnocentric tendencies among political scientists can be attributed to the influence of sociologists like Weber, Parsons, and Sutton upon political scientists, particularly, Almond and Pye. These ethnocentric tendencies are also a product of the values held by elites in western societies, and are also accepted by corporate elites in developing countries, interested in undertaking development activities.¹⁴

These two perspectives on political development have been severely criticized, which envisages development as unilinear, not reversible, and that they imply an identifiable historic point of departure and terminus. For this reason, Coleman has advocated an evolutionary perspective that perceives political development as a process by which a system can be changed and improved. This approach implicitly explains the idea that political development is a “continuous interaction among the processes of structural differentiation, the imperatives of equality, and the integrative and adaptive capacity of a political system”.¹⁵ According to Coleman these three variables, differentiation, equality, and capacity, constitute the development syndrome.¹⁶ The sequential concept of development offered by the SSRC Committee, lie on certain crises, such as identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution, which all societies must face in their attempt to realize equality, capacity, and greater differentiation. The sequential concept of development points out that the appearance of various crises simultaneously reduces the ability of the leaders to respond to any one of them effectively. Thus, if a country can resolve its identity crisis first, it can
easily resolve other crises such as legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution.\textsuperscript{17}

The Other writers such as Diamant, Eisenstadt, and Huntington also deal with the adapting capacity of the institutions of the system to the changing demands of the society. Eisenstadt argues that the fundamental problem of political development is the ability of a political system "to adapt itself to (the) changing demands, to absorb them in terms of policy-making and to assure its own continuity in the face of continuous new demands and new forms of political organization.... The ability to deal with continuous changes in political demands is the crucial test of such sustained political growth or political development and is the crucial focus of modern political systems or of political modernization".\textsuperscript{18} Diamant also defines political development as a process by which a political system acquires an increased capacity to sustain successfully, and continuously new types of goals and demands and the creation of new types of organizations.\textsuperscript{19} Both Diamant and Eisenstadt place considerable emphasis on the responsive capacity of the political System. On the other hand, Almond and Powell have defined political development as "the increased differentiation and specialization of political structures and the increased secularization of political culture".\textsuperscript{20}

Among the definitions of political development, Huntington's formulation seems to be most useful for the purposes of our study as he conceptualizes political development in terms of institutionalization. According to him political development is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.\textsuperscript{21} The adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures can measure the level of institutionalization.\textsuperscript{17} The adaptability of an organ can be measured by its
age, which in turn can be measured in three ways: age, generational age, and functional adaptability.

The second criterion of measuring the level of institutionalization is complexity. The more complex an organization is, the more institutionalized it is. Complexity, according to Huntington, involves both multiplications of organizational sub-units, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organization sub-units.

The third criterion of measuring the level of institutionalization is “the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of the social groupings and methods of behavior”. If political organizations are found to be outside influences, it is likely that the level of institutionalization is low. The fourth criterion is coherence. The more coherent and unified an organization is, the more institutionalized it will be. Coherence of an organization can be measured by the availability of procedures for resolving disputes.

Both Huntington and Riggs emphasize that political parties are highly significant instruments in both democratic and totalitarian societies, and they perform two major functions: ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’. The manifest function of political parties is to recruit support from the people to get elected. In the process of performing this manifest function, parties also perform certain latent functions. In addition to providing decision-makers for the political system and training such decision-makers, parties also act as ‘brokers’ of society. In pluralistic society parties play extremely important role in mediating conflict between competing interests. To use Almond’s term, the main function of political parties is to ‘aggregate’ diverse interests of the society. Political parties also ‘articulate’ interests and help resolve
conflicts in the society. Such roles are essential to the maintenance and survival of a pluralistic society. In fact, by articulating and aggregating interests, political parties can create a high level of consensus and cohesion; and can even create a national political culture. Since the 'political culture' of most of the developing countries is a fragmented one, the role of parties is extremely important in creating a homogeneous political culture. Political Parties keep a fragmented society united by performing both manifest and latent functions.

0.1.2 BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The study of bureaucracy in the present age has become imperative in public administration and the modern state system. Bureaucracy plays a significant role in administrative development and political stability in any political system. Political systems are composed of different components, such as bureaucracy, military, political elite and other institutions. These components are interdependent and interrelated to each other. Each of them has a specified function to perform for the accomplishment of common goals. Therefore, areas of responsibilities are clearly demarcated to avoid deviation and overlapping. Deviation of any kind thus, results into disharmony and disturbances of the system. An organized and effective bureaucratic system can act as a stable center around which rapid political changes can swirl without destroying the incipient state.

The function of political leadership is to articulate policies according to the will of the people and the bureaucracy is expected to implement the policies of a representative government. The bureaucracy if captures political power and performs the political role of making policies then the harmonious functioning of the political system is affected. Combining the both functions...
of policymaking and policy implementation, it overburdens itself and thus, cannot effectively perform its basic function that is 'the execution of policies'. Ideally speaking the duty of a bureaucracy is to implement the orders of political representatives and perform the assigned functions within the framework of laid down rules by the law. The effectiveness of functions of a political system depends on adequate checks and balances of components either through established traditions or safeguards in the constitution to avoid interference of a component to the others.

The most serious disagreement among political Scientists exists over the relationship between political and administrative development. LaPalombara argues that "since the bureaucracy of the newly independent countries is the only institution which is cohesive and coherent, and since representative institutions are weak, the bureaucratic structure plays a vital role in policy-making and thereby works against the development of representative institutions." In much the same way, Lucian Pye says that bureaucratic development is deterrent to the development of representative institutions. Michael Lofchi also observes 'that bureaucratic strength is one of the factors, which work against the development of effective representative institutions.' Riggs also argues that bureaucratic development hinders political development. Though these writers believe that bureaucracy plays a negative role in political development, others, including Braibanti, Esman, Weidner, Sigelman, Alfred Diamant, recognize the importance of bureaucracy in promoting political development. A well-developed bureaucracy, according to them, is a necessary precondition of, or prerequisite to, political development. Braibanti observes that "Transnational inducement of administrative reform . . . Must proceed as an autonomous
action, irrespective of the rate of maturation of the larger political process. Though these writers disagree about the proper role of bureaucracy, and recognize that an imbalance between bureaucratic and representative institutions does exist in most of the developing countries.

Since this study is an attempt to determine a conceptual framework for the study of political and constitutional development and its impacts on administrative system. In this regard we will test Riggs' 'imbalance' thesis. But before we test the thesis it is necessary to examine this thesis and to explain the meanings of several concepts, which are used in this work.

0.1.3 BUREAUCRACTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

Studies of comparative public administration consider civil bureaucracy as a sub-system of a political system. A number of analysts, such as Weber, Fainsod, Heady, and Riggs, have examined the relationship between bureaucracy and the administrative system on the perspective of political and constitutional development. Before delving into the discussion of Riggs model, it is necessary to discuss briefly the views of different writers on the subject.

Max Weber sees bureaucracy as the most rational means of implementing goals and of providing services. Weber does not make any explicit assumption that bureaucracy will play an effective role in the policy-making function of government, but he accepts that bureaucracy has a tendency to monopolize power and to absorb new areas of life in modern society. Weber also realizes that it is difficult to control the bureaucracy since day-to-day administration is in its hands, which both reflects and enhances specialized knowledge. He argues that politicians should resist bureaucratic
efforts to gain control over the administrative machinery. He warns that a nation, which believes that the conduct of State affairs is a matter of administration, and that politics, is nothing but the part-time occupation of amateur or secondary task of bureaucrats might as well forget about playing a role in world affairs. Such statements vividly prove the importance Weber attached to controls on the power of bureaucracy. It means that bureaucrats should only be concerned with the implementation of goals, while politicians dominate the policy-making function of government. In practice, however, any such distinction between politics and administration is unrealistic and leads to an incomplete analysis of the conduct of responsible government. Francis Rourke observes that politics and administration are two closely linked aspects of the same process and therefore politics and administration cannot be separated. It depends on the nature of the political system that how much power bureaucracy will exercise in policy-making. Merle Fainsod outlines five patterns of bureaucracy: representative bureaucracies, party-state bureaucracies, ruler-dominated bureaucracies, ruling bureaucracies, and military-dominated bureaucracies.

Representative bureaucracies are found in competitive party politics and are responsible to the political forces, which secure the support of the people. The initiative which representative bureaucracies exercise must be adjusted to an underlying political consensus; the competitive political process regulates the dynamics of change.

The second type, party-state bureaucracies, can be found in totalitarian political systems and in systems dominated by one party. Under this system the state bureaucracy is dominated and controlled by the party bureaucracy.
The third type, military-dominated bureaucracies, can be found in societies whose armed forces have assumed a strategic power position. The military-dominated regimes usually place emphasis on the military virtues of hierarchy and discipline and may also experience a phenomenal rise in the power of the civil bureaucracy since they depend on it to achieve their objectives.\(^3\)

The ruler-dominated bureaucracies are the highly personal instruments of an autocratic or dictators who exercises an approximation of absolute power and who uses his bureaucratic establishment to project his control and impose his purposes on the people whom he rules.\(^4\) In such system some bureaucrats may exercise considerable influence because of their personal qualities and the confidence which the ruler. The last category is the ruling bureaucracies. An example of such a system can be found in certain phases of colonial rule, where the administrators perform certain functions with minimum direction from the metropolitan centre and with more or less absolute authority over the local inhabitants.\(^5\)

The essence of the political role of the bureaucracy in different political systems clearly reflects in such a typology and suggests that interaction between the bureaucracy and the political system varies with time and across nations and cultures. Let us analysis F. W. Riggs' position on the relationship between external political leadership and the bureaucracy, focussing on their respective ability to exercise power in policy-making. We will limit our discussion to this analysis. According to Riggs, a political system consists of constitutive system\(^6\), bureaucracy, and its head of state. Bureaucracy, according to Riggs, means public executive bureaucracy including career and non-career, civil and military positions. He analyses
that the political system consists of the constitutive system and the head of state. For analytical purposes, these two elements are treated separately. Bureaucracy is considered to be a sub-system of the political system. Riggs has further described the role of bureaucracy in terms of balanced and unbalanced polities.\textsuperscript{45}

Riggs observes that when a reasonably stable balance of power exists between a bureaucracy and an administrative system, we may refer to the resultant form of government as a balanced polity.\textsuperscript{16} Riggs argues that in order to ascertain whether a-system is balanced or not, it is necessary to assess the relative power of the constitutive system and the bureaucracy. However he thinks that such an assessment was difficult. Therefore, he argues that the concept need not to imply exact equality of power but only an approximate equality, and it is clearly not easy to state how much inequality would still be classifiable as balance.\textsuperscript{11} He agrees that although the concept is useful even despite exact boundaries couldn’t be demarcated. He observes that most polities with constitutive systems can be classified as balanced or unbalanced, and suggests that in all modern states, government is balanced.\textsuperscript{43} Riggs offers an explanation for the existence of balanced polities in these countries. The reason, according to him, is that the constitutive systems of these countries emerged long before independence, and the political leaders’ are socialized into the process of sharing power. He also holds that balanced polities are more likely to be effective in the formulation and implementation of policy.

An unbalanced polity may be a party-run polity, or it may be a bureaucratic polity dominated by its bureaucracy. In party-run polities, political spoils such as appointment of party workers to important positions in the
bureaucracy, heads of bureaus, departments, prevail. Riggs argues that though party-run polities may strengthen political organization, but reduces the effectiveness of administration and also reduces the legitimacy of the political system. In a bureaucratic polity the bureaucracy tries to control the powers of the constitutive system and of the head of the state. Bureaucracy in such a system exercises substantial power in policy-making and in policy execution. Riggs argues that non-Western states often have unbalanced polities, but these are not always bureaucratic polities. Such a view seems to be a modification of his earlier view that in transitional societies bureaucracies generally usurp in the name of tutelage or popular guidance the roles, which in modern society are played by legislatures, elected executives, and party leaders. In case of Pakistan, where military regimes, supported by civil servants use the powers of the constitutive system. Riggs maintains that in order to achieve the goals of these newly independent countries, political systems must have greater political responsiveness and increased-administrative capability. There are two features, which are likely to help a country achieve a balanced political system. Riggs further maintains that balanced polities are more likely to achieve economic development than unbalanced polities. It is necessary to adopt policies likely to transform polities, which are not balanced into balanced polities.

The Riggsian model can be criticized from several angels of his imbalance thesis. First, he has not provided any criterion to measure the relative power of the constitutive system and the bureaucracy. Second, Riggs has hypothesized that balanced polities, as against unbalanced ones, are more likely to be effective. It may be noted here that no example exists which suggests a causal relationship between a balanced polity and "superior
administrative performance". Thirdly, Riggs blames bureaucracy for the weakness of political institutions and seems to have overlooked the history of these newly independent countries. Since these countries were under the colonial rule, representative institutions were not allowed to develop. Rather, the primary concern of the colonial masters was to strengthen these administrative institutions to maintain law and order. Fourthly, Riggs has overlooked the importance of bureaucratic development in these countries. Fifthly, Riggs has hypothesized that bureaucracy may exercise more power in an unbalanced polity than in balanced polities. Riggs has put most of the developing countries into the category of unbalanced polity. But empirical examples show that even in unbalanced polities, there are wide variations in the exercise of bureaucratic power. Ferrel Heady identifies six types of political systems in the developing countries, and argues that there exists a close relationship between the characteristics of these systems and the political role of bureaucracy. These different types of political systems are traditional-autocratic systems, bureaucratic-elite systems, civil and military, polyarchal competitive systems, dominant party mobilization systems, dominant party semi-competitive systems, and communist totalitarian types. 49

Finally, Riggs contends that to achieve development goals a balanced system is necessary cannot be accepted, since no positive correlation exists between balanced polities and the achievement of development goals. 50 Lee Sigelman also challenges Riggs' imbalance thesis, and argues that there is no positive correlation between the level of bureaucratic development and the extent of bureaucratic over participation. 51 He further shows that modern bureaucracy may not hinder political development, since modern bureaucracy does not
over participate. Moreover, he argues that an underdeveloped bureaucracy is more likely to over participate and may impede the development of representative institutions. Sigelman’s ‘a view contrast sharply with that of Riggs, who argues that modern bureaucracy over participates in developing countries and impedes political development. Furthermore, in contrast to Riggs’ view, Sigelman observes that the presence of a relatively modern national administrative system is a necessary precondition of, not a hindrance to... political development.52

The foregoing discussion makes it sufficiently evident that the degree of political development in a particular country possibly can be measured by using Huntington’s criterions.

0.2 **SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY**

The subject is very significant and it has multidimensional implications in the field of comparative public administration. It is not possible on the part of the researcher to cover all the aspects. Therefore the scope of the subject has been limited to identify the relationship between political and constitutional on the administrative system.

The primary objective of the study is however, to explore and analyze the impact of political and constitutional development on the administrative system through establishing relationship among the variables. It is also aimed at to identify and evaluate the reports of the administrative reforms committees and measure their success and failure in implementation with specific reference to the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan. There are indeed several convergent and divergent aspects on the impact of political and constitutional development on the administrative system in Pakistan. This
study aims at throwing light on the role of higher civil servants in policy making and in the development of representative institutions. Furthermore, it will also show the attitude of higher civil servants toward administrative change.

0.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

On the basis of the above discussion the following questions are raised in this research work.

I. What was the nature of political and constitutional development in Pakistan?

II. Whether the political and constitutional development has played the role to bring administrative reform?

III. Whether these administrative reforms have brought any changes in the administrative system, particularly to the civil bureaucracy to affect its status, privileges and prestige?

IV. Did the bureaucracy in Pakistan exercise an important role in policy-making during 1947-72? If so, why and how?

V. Did the bureaucracy obstruct participation of such political groups such as parties and relevant interest groups in the policy process?

VI. Did the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan unduly resistant to administrative change? If so, what instruments did it characteristically employ to resist reforms?
0.4 HYPOTHESIS

On the basis of the above discussion and the research questions the following general propositions have been generated which will be tested in this study:

I. Political and Constitutional development results in administrative changes in the administrative system and the Civil Bureaucracy in Pakistan played a major role in policy making, due to the weakness of representative institutions.

II. The Bureaucratic dominance hindered political and constitutional development and the growth of representative institutions in Pakistan.

III. The Civil Bureaucracy in Pakistan was not responsive to the administrative reforms. Particularly to the reform policies pursued by the regime affected its own status, prestige and privileges.

IV. The Administrative reforms introduced by a "Representative Regime" have greater impacts and implementation then the "Non Representative Regimes".

In order to test these propositions, we shall analyze the process of political and constitutional development and evaluate the performance of the civil bureaucracy and also see the process of formulation and the implementation of certain of major reforms.
0.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This is a basic exploratory research and is based on the hypothetico-deductive model. An extensive literature survey is conducted from various sources. Hence the research is essentially a product of the following sources:

I. Published material on Pakistan, Books,

II. Journals, Periodicals, Newspapers,

III. Unpublished dissertations and reports.

IV. Government documents, Reform reports and other publications.

V. Interviews of formal and structured nature with open ended and close ended questions were conducted from 15 in-service (belongs to District Management Group) and 10 retired civil bureaucrats (served in the Civil Services of Pakistan, (CSP). A convenient sampling method was adopted in this regard. Questions such as following were asked:

1. Do you agree that the civil bureaucracy obstructed the participation of non-bureaucratic groups such as political parties in policy making during 1947-71?

2. In what extent do you think that the civil bureaucracy was responsive to the changes?

3. Did the civil bureaucracy deliberately resist the change? If yes, what instruments did it employ?

4. Why do you think the commission reports by Rowland egger 1953, Bernard Gladieux 1955, and justice Cornelius commission, 1962 were not implemented?
5. What are the reasons for the successful implementation of the administrative reforms of 1973?

6. Do you agree that the administrative reforms of 1973 brought any impact on the administrative system of Pakistan? If yes, what was the nature of reform?

7. How much the administrative reforms of 1973 affected the power and prestige of the civil bureaucracy?

0.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This research work is divided in six chapters, in addition to an introduction and a conclusion.

In the Introduction we discussed the nature of civil bureaucracy in the context of the Indian Sub-Continent and also saw the British bureaucratic system was transformed and adopted in Pakistan. The Theoretical model was developed and discussed thoroughly by setting the parameters of our research.

In the Chapter I, an attempt is made to trace the political and constitutional development during the colonial era. In The Chapter II, we traced the political and constitutional development in Pakistan from the period of 1947 till 1958. The Chapter III, analysis the political and constitutional development during the first and the second martial law. In this chapter we also analyze the causes and consequences of the separation of East Pakistan.

The Chapter IV, Discusses the political and constitutional development during the first democratic government of Pakistan. We also analyze the economic policies and the administrative reform of 1973.
In Chapter V, an attempt is made to trace the evolution and development of civil bureaucracy. We also discussed the major reforms commissions and their recommendations for administrative change and in the same chapter we discussed the resistance and reaction of the civil bureaucracy, particularly of the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP) towards the reform.

The Chapter VI discusses the formulation and implementation of the Administrative Reform of 1973. We also discuss the administrative structure of Pakistan after the reform.

Finally we draw conclusion from the study on the basis of explanation and analysis.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


Ibid. p. 5.

8 Karl Marx used two terminologies, *Dialectical Materialism* and *Historical Materialism*. Historical Materialism explains the stages before communism on the bases of class contradiction.


28 Political culture is that part of political system which affects decision-making process, such as cast, religion, language, etc.
29 See G. A. Almond, op. cit.
31 See C. C. Dubz, op. cit.
33 See Joseph LaPalombara, op. cit.
38 Mustafa Chowdhury, op. cit., p. 12.
41 Ibid, p. 236.
42 Ibid.
44 Constitutive system refers to an elected assembly, an electoral system, and a party system.
46 Ibid., p. 391.
47 Ibid.
48 See F. W. Riggs, op. cit. He mentions that governments in India, the Philippines, Malaysia and some Latin American countries can be called ‘balanced politics’ because power is shared between the constitutive system and the civil bureaucracy.
52 Ibid., p. 528.
CHAPTER 1

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DURING THE BRITISH COLONIAL PERIOD 1858-1947
CHAPTER 1

1. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

DURING THE BRITISH COLONIAL PERIOD 1858-1947

A study of the political and constitutional development in the Indian sub-Continent during British rule covers two different, but interrelated aspects. Firstly, it covers a critical analysis of the British colonial policies that kept on changing from one pattern to another according to different situations and secondly, it covers several constitutional and administrative reforms. These reforms were introduced to resolve the contradictions between the interests of the rising industrial class of England, that holding power in the home country on the one hand and on the other, a class that was running a trading corporation in a foreign soil. Subsequently, the same contradictions were converted between the interests of the English colonialism at the one hand and the demands of the people of the Indian Sub-continent on the other. Political development in the Indian history continued in these two important directions, which constitutes the British colonial policies: it correlates the political development with the constitutional development in the Indian Subcontinent through different stages in the process of changing socio-economic and political conditions. The constitutional developments were also meant for an effective administrative system, which could meet the needs of colonial masters.

A study of British colonial policies in the Indian Sub-Continent can be divided into two periods, the period before 1857 that is known as the Company Era and the period after 1858, known as the Imperial Era or the
rule under the Crown. The policy of divide and rule remained the sheet-anchor of the British colonial policy throughout the period, however, during the later period; under the rule of the English Crown it assumed a somewhat softer dimension in the form of a policy of apparent association and conciliation alongside the policy of the counterpoise of the natives against the natives. The long history of British rule may, therefore, be defined as a record of India's political subjugation and economic exploitation at the hands of the English empire-builders for a period of about two hundred years. The policy of divide and rule, signifying a deliberate and persistent effort on the part of the Englishmen to keep the Indian people divided and disunited, as it alone would enable them to maintain their colonial hegemony, through exploiting the traditional antagonism of the Hindu and Muslim communities. As a matter of fact, this policy aimed at keeping the opponents divided, so that they could never be united and thereby be able to offer any effective challenge to the authority of the English masters. Even after the transfer of administration of India from East India Company to the British Crown, the colonial policies remained the same. However, the intensity of its application varied from time to time, as per the exigencies of the prevailing situation. Therefore, it can be said without any hesitations that the vigorous pursuance of divide and rule policy ultimately resulted in the partition of the country in 1947.

The study of political and constitutional development in Indian Subcontinent during the British colonial rule right from the days of the Company to the advent of Independence can be classified in four phases for the sake of a convenient study.
I. **First Period (1756-1858)**

The era of the policy of conquest, annexation and consolidation.

II. **Second Period (1858-1905)**

Era of the policy of apparent association.

III. **Third Period (1909-1940)**

Era of the policy of divide and rule.

IV. **Fourth Period (1940-47)**

Era of divide and quit.

The eighteenth century proved a turning point in the history of modern India in view of the fact that the rise of independent feudal despotism in different parts of the country and the decline of the Moghul Empire, which prepared a wholesome ground for the political success of the European colonial nations. In the beginning of the same century, the English, Dutch and the French trading corporations were engaged in eliminating each other from India. However, the British emerged triumphant in their imperialistic plans for ascendancy after the battle of Plassey in 1756 that resulted in easy possession of Bengal. As a result, the East India Company was established in 1757 and got rights implying control over and administration of revenues in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and the rights of administering civil justice as well. Finally, with the annexation of Punjab in 1849 the English could consolidate their unchangeable control over the Indian Subcontinent. Thus, the English assiduously pursued their policy of conquest, annexation and consolidation ever since the fast decline of the Mogul political order till the war of independence in 1857.
The British Parliament began to exercise its control over the activities of the British East India Company when it firmly established its political powering India. It should, however, be noted that while the East India Company remained seriously engaged in pursuing the policy of conquest, annexation and consolidation, the English government remained equally concerned with increasing its hold over the affairs of the Company. Therefore, various Acts such as the Regulating Act of 1773, Pitt's India Act of 1784 and Charter Acts of 1793, 1813, 1833 and 1853 were passed by the British Parliament in this regard. The administration remained in the hands of the alien white bureaucracy while the ultimate center of authority remained in England under whose instructions the administrative machinery created in India, acted like an instrument to govern this country as a police state.

The insurrection of independence in 1857 came as a rude shock or the first terrific jolt to the British's who called it 'Mutiny'. It compelled the English rulers to revise their colonial policy of conquest, annexation and consolidation in a way signifying gradual but cautious association and cooperation of the local people. The British Parliament enacted the Government of India Act, 1858, and assumed sovereign power over India with a view to overcoming the chaos and confusion, which prevailed in the country. With the transfer of Sovereignty to the British Crown, bureaucratic rule was firmly established in India.

1.1 **The Government of India Act 1858**

This Act was the product of the rude shock that the British's had from the War of Independence what they called by the notorious name of 'the Indian Mutiny'. The main provisions of the Act were:
I. It transferred the administration of India from the Company to the Crown. All powers hitherto exercised by the Board of Directors and Court of Proprietors were transferred to the Secretary of State for India—a member of the British Cabinet drawing salaries and emoluments from Indian revenues.

II. The Secretary of State was to be assisted by a body, called India Council, consisting of 15 members, 8 of whom were to be nominated by the Crown and 7 elected by the outgoing Directors.

III. All vacancies in the India Council were to be filled by the nominations made by the Crown. All decision was to be taken by a majority vote and the Secretary of State for India was given the power to over-ride the decision of the Council if he considered it necessary. The Secretary of State was required to lay before the Parliament an account for the financial year containing the statement of the revenues and expenditures of India and also containing a statement showing the moral and material progress made by the Indians.

The Act of 1858 is very significant in the view that it has paved the way for the accommodation of locals in administration and expansion of administrative structure. Through this Act it becomes evident that there is a positive correlation between constitutional development and administrative change. However, the real point of significance of this Act should be discovered in the termination of the rule of the Company and its substitution by the rule of the Crown. In general, the nature of the British administration remained the same. That is why Lord Derby, the then Prime Minister, said
that 'the transference of the authority of the Crown is more real than nominal'.

The British policy until the end of the nineteenth century was to maintain law and order by strengthening military and administrative services. Since India was the best market for British manufactured goods, raw material and labor, the maintenance of law and order was given the highest priority. The Indian Civil Service performed this function efficiently, while the government played the role of a referee controlling a fight rather than that of an architect designing a temple of wealth. Promise was also made to stimulate peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement and to administer its government for the benefit of all the subjects' resident therein. It was very clearly proclaimed that "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions.... We shall respect the rights, the dignity and honor of the Native Princes as our own."

The educated Indians hailed the royal proclamation as the Charter of Magna of their rights. Thus began the new era of English colonialism, as described by Lord T. B. Macaulay: 'The Benevolent Despotism'—'Benevolent' as the new policy signified association of the Indian people with the alien administration and 'Despotism' as the English Government was kept as irresponsible and autocratic as before. While the British government was consolidating its rule in India, it performed several essential functions. In 1835, the British introduced the English system of education into India. The British also improved the system of communication with a view to facilitating the growth of the British-owned industries and the movement of British troops and manufactured goods. The medium of Western education and the English language as medium of communication also exposed the
Indian middle class to Western thought and tradition. Among the peoples of India, the Hindus were more willing to acquire western secular education, which ultimately brought into existence of a new integrated all-India class with a varied background but a common foreground of knowledge, ideas and values. From the political aspirations of this class was born modern Indian nationalism. It was Western in concept and was strengthened by the unifying effects of the British rule and by the discovery of India's past under the auspices of Western scholarship. The demand for self-government that asserted by Indian nationalism in due course was also characteristically Western. Freedom and a democratic ideal became the dynamics of the Indian politics. This new middle class however was not satisfied with British autocratic rule and expressed its dissatisfaction through various attacks on the Vernacular Press Act, the Arms Act, and the Ilbert Bill.

A new step in the direction of pursuing this policy of association was taken in 1861 when the Indian Councils Act was passed whereby, for the first time, Indians were nominated as the members of the Executive Councils for legislative purposes. It obviously meant association of the native element with the alien administration in appreciation of which Sir Bartle Frere said that the addition of the native element to the Council has, I think, become necessary unless one is prepared for the perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people with few means of knowing except by a rebellion, whether the laws suit them or not.

1.2 THE INDIAN COUNCILS ACT OF 1861

In order to give a semblance of implementation to the policy of association as contained in the Royal proclamation of November 1, 1858, the Act of 1861 was passed that mainly provided:
I. First, it added some additional members, not more than 12 and not less than 6, to the Supreme Council for the purposes of legislation. They were to be nominated for two years by the Governor-General. Not less than one half of the members were required to be non-officials and the Indians were invariably nominated to fill the vacant seats.

II. Second, the Executive Councils of the presidencies of Bombay and Madras were also expanded for the purposes of legislation. These additional members were to be not more than 8 and not less than 4 out of whom not less than one half were required to be non-officials who were invariably Indians.

III. Third, the Governor-General was further empowered to create similar bodies for North-Western Frontier Province and Punjab.

IV. Fourth, fifth member was added to the Executive Council of the Governor-General. The Governor-General was given the power to frame rules and regulations for transacting the business of the Council. Thus, a sort of portfolio system was introduced. Last, the Governor-General was given the power to issue ordinances during an emergency. In this way, the Act of 1861 sought to make a beginning in the direction of seeking association of the Indian people with the work of legislation under the strict control and supervision of the Governors in the
provinces and of the Governor-General having his seat at Calcutta.

A number of societies were formed to express public opinion on political matters. The Indian Association of Calcutta was formed in 1876, and the Indian National Union in 1883. This new middle class mainly consisted of Hindus. The founding in 1885 of the Indian National Congress provided a sign of the new times. A. O. Hume, an Englishman, who is known as the architect of Indian National Congress. The aspiration for self-government reflected a profound transformation of political ideas among the Western educated classes. It also furnished the means whereby freedom from the alien rule could eventually be achieved. The empire had sowed the seeds of its own dissolution. The movement towards self-government was, however, slow.

The Indian Councils Act of 1892 marks another milestone in the direction of this policy of apparent association now slightly sharpened in response to the demands of the Indian National Congress formed in 1885. The introduction of the system of indirect election for the non-official members of the Executive Councils, nomination of some members to the Councils by the Governor-General on the advice of the provincial Councils and local bodies, conferment on the Executive Councillors the right to ask questions and discuss budgetary provisions. Above all, increase in the strength of the Indian members in the Central and Provincial Executive Councils were certain novel features of this Act that looked like a sort of constitutional movement in the sphere of responsible government. Thus, this Act was like an attempt at compromise between the official view of the Councils as
pocket legislatures and the educated Indian view of taking them as embryo parliament.\textsuperscript{20} 

1.3 \textbf{THE INDIAN COUNCILS ACT OF 1892}

As the Act of 1861 had certain weaknesses; the Act of 1892 was framed to remove some of them.\textsuperscript{21}

I. The Executive Council of the Governor-General was expanded for legislative purposes with additional members whose number was to be not less than 10 and not more than 16, in Bombay and Madras, additional members were to be between 8 and 20; for N.W.F.P. and Oudh the number was to be 15 at the most.

II. Then, a sort of indirect election system was introduced as the Governors could make nominations on the recommendations of the Provincial Councils, Municipal Councils, District Boards, Chambers of Commerce and Industry etc. The functions of these executive councils were enlarged.

III. The executive councilors were given the right to ask questions and debate budgetary provisions. Last, in the Supreme Council, 10 out of 16 additional members were to be non-officials; the non-official members of the four Provincial Councils and one to the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce allotted four of these non-official seats to the recommendations.
Thus, the Indian Councils Act of 1892 has been described as a drastic improvement upon the Indian Councils Act of 1861.

The Muslims were held responsible the insurrection of 1857 and were victimized severely. After the Mutiny, the British who were determined to reduce them to an inferior position and distrusted them. One upshot was that Muslims were kept out of government services, particularly in army and administration for several decades.\textsuperscript{22} On the other hand, it was not difficult for the Hindus to accommodate themselves in the new system, to them only their rulers are changes and thus, they accepted with thanks such crumbs as their former conquerors dropped, from the table.\textsuperscript{23} After the Mutiny, the cooperation of Hindus became indispensable to the new rulers of India.

Almost a century ago the Muslims were the rulers of India and monopolized all the important offices of state. As long as the Muslim were ruling India, they never realized that they were a minority in India and after loosing power they became a minority and suddenly realized that their religion, language and culture are insecure and had a fear of being assimilated by the Hindu majority.\textsuperscript{24} This fear resulted in taking a refuge in religion to meet the new challenges. As a result the Muslim middle class remained much smaller than that of the Hindus, owing to the fact that Muslims did not compromise with the change, remained isolated and boycotted the English education and services. In these circumstances, men like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan took the responsibility and persuaded the Muslim to acquire modern scientific education. He founded the Anglo- Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875 and laid the foundation of the Annual Muslim Educational Conference in 1886. When the Indian National Congress was founded in 1885, Syed Ahmed Khan discouraged Muslims from any participation in it, since it was mainly
Moreover, the Congress pressed for a larger share for Indians in the various services and in particular for the introduction of parliamentary government, an institution whose basis in universal suffrage would reduce the Muslims to an inferior position. Though many, like Syed Ahmed Khan, discouraged Muslim participation in the Indian National Congress, an important section of Muslim opinion (Jinnah was among them) emphasized the need for Hindu-Muslim cooperation to put an end to British rule. In the end of 19th century the British masters changed the policy of apparent association into the policy of divide and rule and as a result many members of the Congress began to criticize the British for undue favor to the Muslims. The partition of Bengal in 1905, which the Muslims favored, widened the rift between the British and the Congress. But the position of the extremists in the Congress was weakened by British concessions, including the Reform Act of 1909 and the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911.

1.4 **THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1909**

The enactment of the Indian Councils Act of 1892 was very much due to the role of the moderate leaders of the Indian National Congress. In no more time, the role of the Indian National Congress became a matter of apprehension for the English rulers who sought to sharpen the application of their policy of divide and rule. It is discoverable in the statement of George Francis Hamilton, the then Secretary of State for India, who wrote to Viceroy Curzon on Sept. 2, 1897: "I think the real danger to our rule in India, not now but say 50 years hence, is the gradual adoption and extension of western ideas of agitation and organization, and, if we could break the educated Hindu party into two sections holding widely different views, we
should, by such a division, strengthen our position against the subtle and continuous attack which the spread of education must make upon our system of Government." Thus, the shrewd English rulers adopted the divide and rule policy. The Act of Minto Morley Reform came as the first effective dose of the communalization of Indian politics. Its main provisions were: first, both the Imperial and the Provincial Councils were expanded. For the Imperial Legislative Council, the maximum number of additional members was raised from 16 to 60; the number of such members for the Councils of Bombay, Madras and Bengal was raised from 20 to 50, for UP from 15 to 50 and for all others it was fixed at 30. Separate electorate system was introduced as the constituencies for the election of non-official members were divided into Muslims, Muslim landlords, landlords, Chambers of Commerce, Universities, Corporations, Municipalities, and District Boards etc. Second, the functions of the Legislative Councils were also enlarged. The members were given the right to ask questions and supplementary questions, to move resolutions on matters of general public interest; resolutions could be moved and votes taken on the notable portions of the budget. Third, some changes took place in the composition of the Executive Councils also. The Secretary of State for India-in-Council were given the power to raise the membership of the Executive Councils of Bombay and Madras presidencies from 2 to 4 of whom at least half must have worked for at least 12 years in the service of the Crown in India. The Governor-General-in-Council was given the power to establish an executive council in Bengal of not more than 4 members with the approval of the Secretary of State for India.
In 1906 the Muslim League was founded in Dacca to protect the interests of the Muslims masses. The Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 granted the Muslims the right of separate representation on all local, provincial, and central bodies. It is observed that after this reform the Muslim League became committed to safeguarding the rights and interests of Muslims rather than fighting for the introduction of responsible government. After the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911, the Muslims were convinced that their interests could be safeguarded only through the Muslim League and by 1913 Mohammed Ali Jinnah joined it. The League Council passed a resolution in 1913 calling for the attainment under the aegis of the British Crown for self-government suitable to India. This event disillusioned Muslims, and even caused them to turn toward the Hindus. Jinnah persuaded the Muslim League to come to an understanding with the Indian National Congress. This understanding was reflected in the Lucknow Pact of 1916, which registered the Congress acceptance of separate Muslim representation in the various legislative bodies and granted them special safeguards.

It was under the impulse of the mass freedom movement launched by the Congress and the aftermath of World War-I to which India had made a massive contribution with men and material 'to make the world safe democracy' which forced the British statesmen, in Lord Asquith's phrase, to look at the Indian problem 'from a new angle of vision. The result of these developments was the momentous declaration of 1917, which stated "the progressive realization of self-government in India" as the goal of the British government.
1.5 THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1919

The Government of India Act of 1919, which followed the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1917, set up partially responsible governments in the provinces. The provinces were considered as the domain in which the earlier steps towards progressive realization of responsible government should be taken. The Act of 1909 failed to satisfy the Indian leaders, as it involved no real transfer of power. Even moderate Congress leaders like Gokhale, who wanted to give these reforms a trial, were soon disillusioned. The policy of association still remained an apparent affair. Facts show that only two Indians were appointed to the India Council of the Secretary of State and one Indian each to the executive councils of the Governor-General and Governors. It was just for the sake of giving a semblance of association that a few Indians were admitted to the decision making bodies. Even the English writers realized the inadequacy of these reforms particularly when the English Government was involved in the First World War as Professor Philips justly comments: “Lacking a clearly distinguishable and steadily British policy towards the growth of politics in India, Morley and Minto were driven to devising not so much a coherent plan as a series of expedients to meet the particular and admittedly difficult situations.”

The famous Montagu Declaration of 1917 pledged progressive realization of self-government in India. Thereafter, the Act of 1919 was announced that furnished a slightly refined version of the policy of apparent association. It kept the Central Government and its affairs entirely in the hands of the Governor-General-in-Council responsible to the English Parliament alone. The Indian Legislative Council was transformed into a bi-cameral legislature consisting of a Legislative Assembly and Council of State whose
composition was liberalized so as to put into them elective majorities though their area of authority remained far from being expanded in the direction desired by the Indian people. It introduced a novel system of administration in the provinces notoriously known as the 'dyarchy'. The subjects of administration were divided into 'reserved' and 'transferred' categories, the former under the charge of the Governor and his councilors and the latter under ministers responsible to the legislative council. These experiments failed as they were bound to prove so on account of certain inherent defects. Even an English writer admitted that the system of dyarchy failed in its primary purpose, which its authors intended to serve. It did not provide a real training in responsible government.

The Khilafat Movement and the draconian suppression of rioting in the Punjab brought the Muslims and the Hindus closer than ever before. Gandhi joined the Khilafat movement and started the non-violent and non-cooperation movement against the British government. The Hindu-Muslim alliance, which Gandhi created, broke down when he suddenly called off the entire non-cooperation movement because a mob of his supporters attacked a police station and killed a policeman. This led Muslims to believe that they had been betrayed.

The Muslim League was revived in 1924 and it was still the party of the big landowners and the upper middle class. Its purpose was to safeguard the rights and interests of the Muslims by supporting the continuance of a separate Muslim electorate, increased weighting of their votes, and more provincial autonomy.

British Government sent its Statutory Commission (also known as the Simon Commission) in 1927 to study and submit its report on the implementation
part of the new constitutional reform based on the scheme devised by Secretary of State Montagu and Viceroy Chelmsford. Indian leaders staged a boycott of this Commission. With a view to placate the Indian public opinion, Viceroy Lord Irwin in 1929 announced that the goal of British policy was 'Dominion Status'. The Commission was boycotted by the Indian leadership, as there was no local representative in the Commission. In pursuance of the decision of the All-Party Conference, to provide an alternative constitutional scheme, a committee was formed presided over by Motilal Nehru made a report in 1928, known as the 'Nehru Report', laying down the principles for framing a constitution for India. The Report rejected separate electorates for the Muslims and federal nature of the future constitution.35 At the All-Party Conference, Jinnah pleaded for the acceptance of the amendments; however, all the proposed amendments were rejected. Jinnah is recorded to have commented: “This is the parting of the ways.”36 Jinnah put forward the demands of the Muslim League in his 14 points37 in 1929 and rejected the Nehru Report. The 14 Points put forward by Jinnah, were approved at the All India Muslim League session held at Delhi in March 1929, included the demands of a federal constitution with residuary powers vested in the provinces, separate electorate for Muslims, separation of Sind from Bombay Presidency, introduction of reforms in the N.W.F.P. and Balochistan on the same footing as in other provinces.

The Lucknow Pact of 1916 was in shreds. H. M. Seervai has explained the attitude of the Congress by observing that, “the war of succession to the British Raj had not begun in 1916, but had begun in 1928, as full provincial autonomy was the obvious line of political advance in India as the Simon Commission Report in 1930 was to show. The few opportunities for averti
that war were missed by the Congress. The war of succession ended with the partition of India.”[^38]

Although vague ideas about a possible state for the Muslim were floating for quite sometime, yet it was left to Iqbal to develop a political philosophy of such a state and announce its feasibility from the platform of All India Muslim League. The constitutional scheme presented by Sir Muhammad Allama Iqbal in his presidential address at the Allahabad session of the all India Muslim League in 1930 offered a solution of the inter-communal conflict.[^39] He said:

“I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Balochistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated north west Indian State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of north-west India.”[^40]

This scheme is known as the ‘Dream of Pakistan’, provided a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Sub-continent, was based on the geopolitical realities of the time. Initially did not include the eastern parts of the Muslim majority areas. The eastern parts were included in 1937.[^41]

The Muslim League was not yet ready for a radical break. It did not pass any resolution in support of the proposal made by its President. But Allama Iqbal had provided a vision to the later rise of the Pakistan movement. Muhammad Ali Jinnah returned to India after a temporary stay in England in 1934 and began the reorganization of the Muslim League. In the same year he was elected as the president of the Muslim League. Muhammad Ali Jinnah realized that without a strong organization, it would be impossible to “secure
from the Congress the kind of constitutional safeguards which would assure Muslim interests in a self-governing India. 12

On the bases of these constitutional schemes, the Simon Commission Report, Nehru report and Jinnah’s 14 points, the Round Table Conferences of 1930, 1931 and 1932 held in London but failed to resolve the controversy, as the English leaders were not prepared to grant reforms that would weaken the foundations of the empire and were adamant for a stronger central government. Not only that, a policy of the counterpoise of the natives against the natives became more effective at this stage that had its manifestation in the 14-point program of Jinnah and in the representation of the Indian princes in the Round Table Conferences. However, eventually, the Government of India Act of 1935 agreed.

1.6 THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935

This Act provided for an all-Indian federation of a novel type consisting of all provinces as well as the princely states. It provided that the federal cabinet would be responsible to the legislature but the defense and foreign relations would be reserved subjects under the Governor-General who was also given certain special responsibilities in respect of subjects under his ministers. Thus, he was given special responsibilities to secure due administration of the reserved subjects, to ensure financial stability and credit of India, and for the protection of minorities, Indian princely states and public services. The notorious system of ‘dyarchy’ was thus transferred from the provinces to the Center. In the provinces all subjects were transferred to the ministers accountable to provincial legislatures. But here too, the Governors were given special responsibilities to act in their
individual judgment and to assume all power in the case of the breakdown of constitutional machinery. This was called provincial autonomy.

In the election to the provincial assemblies in 1937 held under the Act 1935, the Muslim League was able to secure only about 7% of the Muslim votes. The Congress was able to form ministries in seven provinces out of 11. Flushed with victory the attitude of the Congress became further hardened. The conduct of the provincial ministries, notably in the United Province (UP), gave a foretaste of rule by the Hindu majority. The Congress offered two ministries to the Muslim League members of the assembly, on the condition if the Leaguers carry out the Congress policies and programs and merge the Muslim League party in the assembly with the Congress Parliamentary Party. The offer was rejected for obvious reasons. The Congress thereupon formed a one party ministry. On this situation, Ian Stephens has observed: "The effect of this, simultaneously on many Muslim minds, throughout India, was of a lightning flash. What had before been guessed at now leapt forth in a hurriedly clear outline. The Congress, a Hindu dominated body, was bent on the Muslims eventual absorption; western style majority rule, in an undivided subcontinent, could only mean the smaller community being swallowed up by the larger, as Syed Ahmed Khan had long ago pointed out."

The Working Committee of the League after its meetings held in February 1940 came up with its recommendation. Jinnah seems to have thought "a hundred times" before making up his mind. On March 23, 1940 at the historic session of the Muslim League held at Lahore, the resolution, that later came to be popularly known as the 'Pakistan Resolution' was passed. The resolution was moved by the Bengal chief minister, A. K. Fazlul Haq,
and was seconded by Choudhury Khaliquzzaman and others. The resolution stated that:

"Resoled that it is the considered view of the Session of All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituting units shall be autonomous and sovereign. Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights."  

It was further said that federal government should have the subjects such as defense, communication, foreign affairs and currency; the residuary subjects should be given to the provinces.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was able to transform the League into a mass organization by 1945, having resolved the horizontal cleavages, which had existed among Muslims. This transformation of the League into a mass organization enabled it to capture the great majority of Muslim seats in the 1945-46 elections. It needs to be pointed out here that, following the Lahore Resolution of 1940, the League sought to achieve independence rather than to prepare any program or ideology for building a new state. Professor
Sayeed has nicely described the circumstances leading to the establishment of the Pakistani State.\textsuperscript{50}

It is also noted that a convention of Muslim League legislators, central and provincial, met in Delhi, on April 9, 1946 and passed a resolution demanding that the six provinces, Bengal and Assam in the north-east and the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Balochistan in the north-west, should constitute a sovereign independent State of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{51}

In February 1946, the British government announced its decision to send to India a special mission (the Cabinet Mission) consisting of three cabinet Ministers to seek, in association with the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, and in consultation with the Indian leaders, an agreement on constitutional issues. It represented the last attempt of the British to preserve the unity of India.\textsuperscript{52} The Congress and the Muslim League followed their established positions. In brief, the Congress wanted a single Constituent Assembly to draw up a constitution for, “an all-India Federal Government and a Legislature with full powers.”\textsuperscript{53} Following its resolution of April 9, 1946, the Muslim League proposed two constitution-making bodies, one for the six provinces in the Pakistan group; and the other for the group of six Hindu provinces. The mediation of the Cabinet Mission could not bridge the gulf.\textsuperscript{54}

It is further mentioned that the Cabinet Mission on May 16, 1946 offered its own solution. A three tier constitutional plan was proposed providing in the main:\textsuperscript{55}

1. Union of India, embracing both British India and the states, which should deal with the subjects of foreign affairs, defense, and communications and have the power to raise the necessary finances.
II. Three groups of provinces;
   a. GROUP A, comprising the six Hindu majority provinces;
   b. GROUP B, the provinces of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh, and Balochistan; and;
   c. GROUP C, the provinces, of Bengal and Assam.

III. The Provinces and the states would be the basic units. All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers would be vested in the provinces.

The provinces had the right to opt out after the first general election under the constitution framed by the national legislature.\textsuperscript{56} The Muslim League after weighing the pros and cons accepted the plan.\textsuperscript{57} Hudson has observed, "The fatal blow was struck by Jawaharlal Nehru in the speech in which he made clear that the Congress would accept the plan only to destroy it, by seeking to demolish the system of grouping of provinces which was its essence."\textsuperscript{58} The plan was in tatters. The Muslim League thereafter withdrew its acceptance, which had only been tactical. A compromise rather became impossible and ultimately on the scheme of the Independence Act of 1947 India was divided into two-country Pakistan and India.

Muslim League had a tremendous influence on political and constitutional development in Pakistan. An analysis of the league will be essential for our study. The league, firstly, was not a homogeneous organization. Various groups joined the League in the fight for independence. Secondly, the League was a highly centralized organization. Jinnah realized that without a strong political organization it would not be possible to protect the interests of Muslims.\textsuperscript{59} He reorganized the League to transform it into a mass
organization. Provincial, district and local committees were formed in various parts of India. Powers of the League were concentrated in the hands of the President and the Central Parliamentary Committee of Action.\(^6\) The center controlled provincial branches. Jinnah took the supreme political decisions of the League. Unlike the Indian National Congress, the League organization was highly dictatorial. No one was allowed to question the decisions of the leader. By contrast, Gandhi, Nehru and Sardar Patel took the political decisions of the Congress over partition. Nehru was not able to dominate the Congress because of the presence of other able political leaders. In addition the fact was that the Muslim League was mainly "a coterie of landlords and retired senior officials."\(^6\) Also, since the League was mainly concerned with the achievement of independence after the Lahore Resolution of 1940, it failed to formulate any program or ideology for the building of the new state.\(^6\) In the elections of 1945-46, many young intellectuals urged Jinnah to develop a comprehensive social and political program for the new state, but he refused to become involved in discussion of ideology, stating that, "We shall have time to quarrel our selves and we shall have time when these differences will have to be settled, when wrongs and injuries will have to be remedied, we shall have time for domestic programs and policies, but first get the government. This is a nation without any territory or any government."\(^6\)

1.7 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT OF 1947

Like previous constitutional reforms, the Act of 1935 also failed to achieve the real purpose on account of the very fact that, as Clement Attlee himself said its keynote was 'mistrust' and 'distrust'. The role-played by the Congress party in the elections of 1937 and in the working of the provincial ministries.
The experiment of provincial autonomy, however, came to an end in 1939 when the Congress governments resigned in protest against the declaration of the British Government in joining India on the side of the Allied Powers without seeking the advice of the Indian leaders. During the war period, the British Government made a number of attempts to end the deadlock. In Aug., 1940, Viceroy Linlithgow offered enlargement the size of executive council to include more Indians and also proposed that a new constitution would be devised with the co-operation of all shades of opinion after the war. The August Offer failed and later the Cripps Scheme of 1942 appeared. This scheme stated that after the War, India would have Dominion Status and that a new constitution would be framed by a constituent assembly subject to its ratification by the English Parliament. A treaty between the English Government and Indian Constituent Assembly would be signed to provide for the complete transfer of power. Finally the Wavell Plan of 1945 was announced, saying that the Cripps Proposals still stood and a new constitution was to be worked out by the Indians alone. A conference of the Indian leaders with the Viceroy was held in Simla to consider this plan, but nothing could materialize on account of unbridgeable differences between the Congress and League leaders.

The Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 is very important. It rejected the demand for country's partition as raised by the Muslim League ever since its resolution adopted at the Lahore session of 1940. It suggested a three-tier system: a Union-Center, an intermediary the authority representative of the groups of contiguous provinces and, finally, the Indian provinces. It chalked out a scheme for the formation of the Constituent Assembly consisting of the representatives of the provinces and of the native states. Finally, it suggested
the formation of an Interim Government consisting of the leaders of major political parties. After prolonged discussion, the Congress joined the interim government in September 1946 and the League did so about a month after. This government failed to run smoothly owing to the obstructive role of the League members. The British government then decided to convert its policy of divide and rule into that of divide and quit. Thus, on February 20, 1947 came Prime Minister Attlee’s historic declaration that the British would leave this country by the end of next year. The Gordian knot was cut on June 3, 1947 when the Congress leaders accepted Lord Mountbatten’s plan to partition the country. Thereupon, the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act that provided the division of the country into India and Pakistan. It signified the termination of the centuries old British rule over India.

It is, therefore, clear from the above discussion that all these constitutional reforms were devised by the English rulers to somehow safeguard the interests of the empire threatened by the challenging. The policy of association as well as the declarations of progressive realization of self-governing institutions were all hoax in view of this political axiom that “imperialism and popular government have nothing in common: they differ in spirit, in policy, in method.”

Muslim politicians and the Muslim masses lacked an adequate understanding of the parliamentary system of government, and especially its requirement for substantial participation of masses. Under the Act of 1919, four provincial elections were held with only 3 per cent of the people forming the electorate. Under the Act of 1935 two provincial elections were held with only 14 per cent of the people forming the electorate. Since the
Muslim League was not a mass-based party before 1940, elections were fought on communal and personal issues rather than on programs. Though the election of 1945-46 began to reverse this trend of low public participation, the leaders were not able to capitalize on this experience because of the fact that partition occurred barely a year later. As noted, the Muslim League before 1940 was not a mass-based party. Furthermore, Muslims were not well represented in the various legislatures. Finally, since Muslim leaders were more, concerned about achieving independence, they were less likely to be in a position to acquire experience in the functioning of representative institutions.

The above pages prove that the process of political and constitutional during the British colonial period was rather very slow. The struggle of the Muslim League was primarily meant to achieve constitutional safeguard. The preceding analysis also helps us to understand some of the problems posed for political development in Pakistan. It also enables us to measure the level and the nature of political and constitutional development during the formative period of Pakistan and to determine that relationship between political, constitutional and administrative development.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

4 J. C. Johari, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
6 These Acts kept on increasing the authority of company and control of Crown simultaneously.
8 See Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, Known as the Act of 1919, p. 31. Sir Bartle Frere, a member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General said in 1861: "The terrible events of the Mutiny brought horns to English men mind the dangers arising from the entire exclusion of Indians from association with the legislation."
9 For a detailed reference see Reginald C. Coupland, *op. cit.*
10 J. C. Johari, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
11 Percival Spear. *India, Pakistan and the West.* (Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 149.
13 "The destinies of our Indian Empire are covered with thick darkness. It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system, that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that having become instructed in European knowledge they may, in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come, I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history." Speech delivered in the House of Commons on July 10, 1833, on the India Bill, 1833. Quoted in Hamid Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
14 The English language is considered to be the primary reason for the emergence of Indian National Movement
16 These laws were based on discrimination against the local people.
18 For a detailed reference see Reginald C. Coupland, *op. cit.*
21 For a detailed reference see Reginald C. Coupland, *op. cit.*
31 See the Preamble to the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.
32 J. A. Hobson, op. cit. It was confessed in the Proposals of the Government of India and Dispatch of the Secretary of State (1908) that "the avowed purpose of these changes, however, was not to train Indians in the self-government, but simply to enable the Government the better to realize the wants, the sentiments, of the governed, on the other hand to give the governed a better chance of understanding, as occasion arises, the case for the Government against the misrepresentation of ignorance and malice."
33 'Dyarchy' means dual rule at the same level.
34 Reginald C. Coupland, op. cit., p. 70.
35 K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 63.
37 Ibid., Also see Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
38 H. M. Seervai, op. cit., p. 16.
43 Quoted in Hamid Yusuf, op. cit., p. 15.
44 Ibid.
47 K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 115.
48 Ibid. For the viewpoint of Lahore Resolution, read with initial acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan of 1946, was used by Jinnah as a bargaining counter. A review of the criticism has been made in Pakistan Resolution Revisited (Chapter- III), (National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1990).
50 See Ian Stephens, op. cit., also see K. B. Sayeed, op. cit.
51 Quoted in Hamid Yusuf, op. cit., p. 15.
52 The Cabinet Mission, consisted of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India; Sir Stafford Cripps, the President of the Board of Trade; and Mr. A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty.
53 Quoted in Hamid Yusuf, op. cit., p. 15.
54 Ibid.
56 See K. B. Sayeed, op. cit.
57 Jinnah could not - straightaway rejects the plan summarily. He was convinced, as he himself put it: "In fact the foundations and the basis of Pakistan are there in the
scheme.” The plan was considered as unworkable, given the realities of Hindu-Muslim politics. Jinnah knew that the grouping clause would not be acceptable to the Congress. In fact, the Congress and the League had their conflicting compulsions and vision, which could ultimately be resolved only by the partition of the sub-continent.


CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN FROM 1947-1958
CHAPTER 2

2. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

IN PAKISTAN FROM 1947-1958

This chapter attempts to analyze the political and constitutional development in Pakistan since the independence in 1947 till 1958. This study will also be a thorough examination of the chaquered history of political and constitutional development of the early days which is known as the era of upheaval.

Pakistan achieved her independence on August 14, 1947 through the Indian Independence Act of 1947. The Government of India Act of 1935, with necessary modification and the Indian Independence Act of 1947 were adopted as the interim constitution of the country. Parliamentary form of government and federal system were also maintained. A Constituent Assembly was set to frame a constitution for the newly born country. The Constituent Assembly was also authorized to act as the central legislature until the new constitution may be framed. The Assembly, by acting as the central legislature, exercised its power to amend the Government of India Act of 1935, as well as the Indian Independence Act of 1947. However, the centralized structure of the Government of India Act of 1935 was retained. Under this Act the Governor-General had adequate discretionary powers and responsibilities, which were not given to the Governor-General under the adopted or amended Government of India Act of 1935. The Governor-General remained as the head of State, and was to act, however, only as titular head, i.e., on the advice of the cabinet. The Governor-General had
also enjoyed certain emergency powers, which were enumerated, in Section 102 of the adopted Government of India Act of 1935 and when the emergency powers were in force, the federal nature of the country ceased to exist and its administration took the form of a unitary system of government. The structure of government in the provinces was similar to that at the center. The Governor was appointed by the Governor-General and was titular head of the province. He was to act on the advice of the cabinet, but in the similar way had also enjoyed certain emergency powers like the Governor General, which could be exercised on the direction of the Governor-General. The Governor was the executive head of the province, but was not under the direct control of the province. This is one of the essential features of the Government of India Act of 1935. In sum, Pakistan's political system was parliamentary as well as federal only in a formal sense during the first decade of the independence.

However, the circumstances under which Pakistan began to achieve her independence were the most unfavorable. The problems faced by this newly independent country included an inadequate administrative System, an extreme refugee problem, the lack of financial resources, and inadequate means of communication and transportation. Pakistan's difficulties were even more colossal than those faced by India. Politically, it was engaged in preparing a constitution. It is established fact that soon after independence, Pakistan stared her struggle to organize its national government and the administrative system. Many believed that Pakistan would not survive for long. It is also necessary to point out that carnage and communal violence attended the dawn of independence. About seven million people, uprooted from their homes in India, trekked down to Pakistan to seek refuge and
resettlement. The problems of reprisals and the safety of the Hindus and Sikhs moving eastward weighed down on a skeleton administration already strained to breaking point in dealing with the vast influx of refugees.⁷

However, the partition line of the subcontinent cut across the two major provinces of Pakistan, namely, the Punjab in the west and Bengal in the east, which moved Jinnah to remark about a ‘truncated’ and a ‘mouth-eaten’ Pakistan.⁸ Unlike the case with India where these provinces lay on the periphery and the system of government was already established and functioning. This also needs to be mentioned that the consequences of Sir Cyril Radcliffe award was the fatal demarcation of the Punjab boundary whereby overland access was allowed to India to the princely Muslim Majority State of Jammu and Kashmir. Its significance became apparent during the first war with India on Kashmir in October 1947, just two months after the independence.⁹ The determined hostility which the Indian Congress leadership showed towards Pakistan from the very beginning sprang not only from embittered memories of a conflict of interest and a sense of defeat arising from its failure to prevent the partition of the sub-continent but also from the conviction that Pakistan was going to be short-lived and its collapse, in the perception of the Congress, could be hastened.¹⁰

The Cabinet Mission considered Pakistan as impracticable, a feeling that was also shared by Lord Mountbatten.¹¹ Pakistan’s unpaid share of cash balances was withheld by the Indian government, which showed itself equally determined to deprive Pakistan of its share of the large stocks of reserve arms, equipment, and stores belonging to the Indian army¹² at the time of independence. The commutative weight of the problems was of such
a magnitude that Jinnah had anxious moments about the survival of the new state.  

This research work also undertakes to examine the impacts and influences of civil bureaucracy on the parliamentary in the early phase of Pakistan. The edifice of the parliamentary system adopted at independence was based on a bureaucratic foundation. It has also been observed in the political tradition in Pakistan since beginning that the civil services were long established institutions, with a strong esprit de corps. They were, however, unaccustomed to any immediate parliamentary authority and worked almost independently. The military stood by the civil bureaucracy, which shared the ethos of the bureaucracy and was supported by a political tradition, where obedience to authority was based on effective force, while obedience to an authority based on the principle of elected representation was a new phenomenon. The politicians faced the challenges of building the institution of the political democracy in essentially an administrative state. Soon after the independence, a strong feeling was developed among the politicians and people of the country to frame a constitution and initiate to institute an elected house to reflect the democratic will of the people.

It is also to be stated that the authoritarian feudal culture, which dominated political life in the west wing, was itself needed reform to accord with democratic values. A few discerning eyes might have visualized that if the politicians failed to establish their pre-eminence, the civil-military bureaucracy, in the resulting institutional imbalance, would appropriate political functions. For the time being, there was no ambiguity. The mantle of authority fell on the Muslim League, a movement, which now
transformed itself into a political party and became responsible for shaping
the destiny of the country.

2.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT

The establishment of the government began with the swearing in of Quaid-e-
Azam as the country's first Governor General by the last of the British
viceroy, Lord Mountbatten.14 M. A. Jinnah appointed Liaquat Ali Khan, as
the Prime Minister. Liaquat Ali Khan was also given charge of two other
ministries, foreign Affairs and commonwealth relations and defense. The
cabinet, also included political stalwarts like Abdul Rab Nishtar from the
North-West Frontier province who was placed in charge of the ministry of
communications; Fazlul Rehman, a leading politician from East Bengal was
given the ministry of interior and information; I. I. Chundrigar, a lawyer.
was given commerce and industries; Ghazanfar Ali Khan, from the Punjab,
agriculture and health and Ghulam Muhammad the ministry of finance.
Outside the cabinet, Sir Muhammad Zafarullah, later became the foreign
minister, who had an outstanding record of judicial service, was deputed to
represent Pakistan at the United Nations. Sir Feroze Khan Noon was
appointed as Pakistan's envoy to the Middle East. The cabinet and other
appointments to such a high political office reflected a paucity of talent
among the politicians.

The position of Muhammad Ali Jinnah as Governor General was unique and
he could not obviously fit into the traditional pattern of a ceremonial head of
the state. He was indeed above any office, which could be offered. As a
leader who had successfully led the Muslim nationalist movement to achieve
a homeland, he personified the new state and was a symbol of its identity.
On June 9, 1947 he had remarked that he had done his job and appeared
reluctant to assume any office. The long struggle had apparently taken a toll of his fading health. The powers as envisaged in the Act of 1935, were supposed to be exercised by a cabinet through parliamentary convention the cabinet was answerable to the legislature, now the same powers to be exercised by Mr. Jinnah. Affected by the plight of the refugees he took the portfolio of the ministry of refugees under his own control. The Constituent Assembly elected him as its first President and also appointed its legal advisor.

However, under the parliamentary system of government, the Prime Minister, with his Council of Ministers, becomes the real executive. In the case of Pakistan, the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers failed to play their appropriate role as they depended more on the father of the nation. It is also one of the reasons that “Mr. Jinnah ‘personified’ the new state of Pakistan and served in triple capacity as President of the Muslim League, Governor-General of Pakistan, and President of the Constituent Assembly.” During his brief tenure, Jinnah’s decisions became obligatory on the new state of Pakistan. Khalid B. Sayeed has maintained. “As long as Jinnah was alive, he was Pakistan. He held the position of Governor-General, but the powers and influence that he exercised were far beyond those normally associated with that office. The cabinet rarely functioned without his directives. He was the supreme arbitrator between the Center and the Provinces.”

Following the death of Mr. Jinnah, Khawaja Nazimuddin became the Governor-General of the country. But it may be noted that the capability and authority of Khawaja Nazimuddin were not a match with the prestige and powers as exercised by Mr. Jinnah. Liaquat Ali Khan tried to improve his
authority and prestige of his office and succeeded in establishing parliamentary conventions. The powers of the Governor-General still remained. The power exercised by Mr. Jinnah was therefore dispersed between the Governor-General, the President of the Constituent Assembly, and the Prime Minister. Keith Callard states, “This dispersal of the power of the Quaid-i-Azam... was to have important consequences in 1953 and 1954”.¹⁹ The evidence suggests that Liaquat Ali Khan was at first able to control the government, the Muslim League and the constituent Assembly, but nevertheless failed to reach consensus on a constitution.²⁰ Consequently, political opposition, however ineffective, began to grow as the provinces protested against the central government for its failure to solve the various problems faced by the country. After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1952, Khawaja Nazimuddin left the office of the Governor-General and assumed the responsibilities of Prime Ministership. He retained most of the members of the previous cabinet, but included Choudhury Mohammed Ali, as Finance Minister. Since Nazimuddin, an old Muslim Leaguer was a Bengali, the new Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, feared that Nazimuddin might triumph in an electoral contest and will eventually oust him from the office.²¹ Though Nazimuddin was, a man of piety, and integrity, he was incapable of imposing his will upon the members of the cabinet, who had long experience in administration and politics.²² Moreover, Nazimuddin failed to deal effectively with the language riots in East Pakistan in 1952²³ and the Ahmadiya riots in Punjab in 1953²⁴. The Governor-General accused Nazimuddin and his cabinet of being incapable of solving Pakistan’s numerous problems, declaring, “I have been driven to the conclusion that the cabinet of Khawaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties facing the country. In the
emergency which has arisen I have felt it incumbent upon me to ask the
cabinet to relinquish office so that a new cabinet better fitted to discharge its
obligations towards Pakistan may be formed.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, the Governor-General
invited Mohammed Ali Bogra, Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States,
to become Prime Minister. Mohammed Ali assumed the office of the Prime
Minister and retained six members of the outgoing ministry in his cabinet.

Though not a leader of a party, he was the personal choice of the Governor-
General. Such an action by the Governor-General indicated a fundamental
lack of power and leadership in the Muslim League. From this period
onwards, the Governor-General, and later on the President, emerged as the
country's most powerful officer. It may be noted that the Muslim League
party despite its overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly did not
challenge the action of the Governor-General. There were two major parties
in the House, the Muslim League, which held 60 seats, and the Congress,
which held 11. Even the Constituent Assembly, consisting mainly of
lawyers, landlords, business and the liberal professions, did not challenge the
new government. Technically speaking, it was still a government of the
Muslim League, which filled almost every Muslim seat in the central and
provincial legislatures,\textsuperscript{26} but in reality this was not so. The Muslim League
was split in many directions and could not act on future action. The defeat of
the Muslim League in East Pakistan in the March 1954 elections showed
that East Pakistan repudiated the leadership of the Muslim League.

In September 1954 the Constituent Assembly adopted legislation to ensure
that the Governor-General would act only with the advice of the cabinet, and
that the members of the cabinet must be selected from the membership of the
national legislature. Sensing that his powers would be reduced by this
legislation, the Governor-General issued a proclamation dissolving the Constituent Assembly. The proclamation reads as follows: "The Governor-General having considered the political crisis with which the country is faced, has with deep regret, come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery has broken down. He, therefore, has decided to declare a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function."27 A new government was formed with Mohammed Ali Bogra as the Prime Minister. The President of the Constituent Assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, challenged the Governor-General's authority of dissolving the Constituent Assembly. He also petitioned the Sind Chief Court to issue writs of mandamus and a quo warranto against the members of the cabinet who were not qualified to become Ministers under Section 10 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as substituted by the Government of India Act (Fourth Amendment), 1954. The Court decided in favor of Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan. On appeal, however, the Federal Court of Pakistan upheld the power of the Governor-General to dissolve the Constituent Assembly.28 However, the court ordered the Governor-General to summon a Second Constituent Assembly, to be elected indirectly by members of the provincial legislatures. The members elected to the Assembly were divided into approximately 12 groups, of which the Muslim League was the largest, though it failed to command an absolute majority (see Table 2.1). It is also noted that the Second Constituent Assembly consisted mainly of lawyers, landlords, retired officials, industrialists, and businessmen. Others who represented in the Assembly included newspaper proprietors, journalists, ulemas (religious leaders), teachers, trade unionists, tribal chiefs and rulers of
### Table 2.1

**Party Alignment in the Second Constituent Assembly**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Front</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awami League</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krishak Sramik</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Awami Party</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noon Group</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizam-e-Islam</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled Caste Federation</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Progressive Party</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total No. of Seats</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Princely States. The landlords were dominant force in West Pakistan because of the highly concentrated pattern of land ownership. By contrast, members of the legal profession were dominant force in East Pakistan. The first session of the Second Constituent Assembly was held in Muree in July 1955. Since Ghulam Mohammed was ill, Iskander Mirza succeeded him in August 1955. Meanwhile the various groups who formed the Assembly were engaged in seeking alliances and a coalition of the Muslim League and the United Front Party of East Pakistan was formed with Chaudhuri Mohammed Ali as Prime Minister, replacing Mohammed Ali Bogra (an East Pakistani Muslim Leaguer). This new coalition government, now in power at the
center, was one in which East Pakistan was well represented, and it quickly sought to frame a constitution for Pakistan. During the period of this coalition government, the Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution and Iskander Mirza became the first President in March 1956. During the first two years of his presidency four Prime Ministers held office and there were several coalition cabinets. Table 2.2, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, show the persons who held the office of the Governor-General, President, and Prime Minister during 1947-88.

**TABLE 2.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNOR-GENERALS</th>
<th>TENURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M. A. Jinnah</td>
<td>August 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khawaja Nazimuddin</td>
<td>September 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghulam Mohammed</td>
<td>October 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskander Mirza</td>
<td>September 1955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.1 shows that the Muslim League, which was defeated in East Pakistan in the elections of 1954, became a minority party in the constituent assembly when many of its members joined other parties. By September 1956, the Muslim League was ousted from the central cabinet and from two provincial cabinets. It was replaced by the Republican Party, which for several years controlled West Pakistan and became a major participant in the central cabinet. For about a year the Republican Party shared power with the Awami League (see Table 2.1). But a split between the Republican Party and the Awami League on the one unit issue led to a new short-lived
coalition headed by the Muslim League. The cabinet fell when the Republican Party withdrew its support because it did not agree with the Muslim League on the separate electorate issue. In December 1957, another government was formed with Republican leader Malik Firoz Khan Noon as Prime Minister. He was supported by a coalition that included the Awami League, the Krishak Sramik Party (the party of peasants and laborers) and his own Republican Party. But the Awami League and the National Awami Party did not join the cabinet. As a result of the transfer of allegiance from one party to another, the parliamentary government at the center was on the verge of collapse, and the situation in the provinces was not much better. Thus, one would argue that from 1947 until the coup in October 1958, Pakistan experienced a high degree of political instability, which was caused by the shift of allegiance from one party to the other. For this reason, Keith Callard has observed:

"The system of political parties in Pakistan bears little resemblance to that of most other countries. Politics has begun at the top. Pakistan has neither a two-party system, in which the political struggle is waged between fairly stable groups, one of which is in office and the other in opposition nor a multi-party system, in which clear differences of program or ideology separate a variety of opponents in Pakistan politics is made up of a large number of leading persons who, with their political dependents, form loose agreements to achieve power and to maintain it. Consequently rigid adherence to a policy or a measure is likely to make a politician less available for office. Those who lacked fixed ideas but who control legislators,
money or influence have tended to prosper in political life. Political parties... have not turned their attention toward the primary voter. This has not been necessary. The national legislature has never been chosen by popular vote."

TABLE 2.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF PRESIDENTS</th>
<th>TENURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iskander Mirza</td>
<td>March 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Ayub Khan</td>
<td>October 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Yahya Khan</td>
<td>March 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto</td>
<td>January 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. Fazal Ilahi</td>
<td>August 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Zia ul Haq</td>
<td>January 1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Both politicians and heads of state were thus responsible for the break-up of party solidarity. For one example, Ghulam Mohammed dismissed the Nazimuddin cabinet in 1953 even though he held the confidence of the majority party in the legislature. Similarly, Iskander Mirza encouraged the formation of a dissident group under the name of the Republican Party the Muslim Leaguers in 1956. In addition, the powers permeating central interference in provincial politics were undeniable. Finally, the cabinet used the emergency powers given to the head of the State for partisan purposes. For example, Prime Minister Suhrawardy imposed emergency rule in West Pakistan in 1957 with a view to preventing the Muslim League from forming the provincial government. In sum, it can be said that the years before the
October Revolution of 1958 were years of instability, chaos and disorder, which culminated in the declaration of martial law, by President Iskander Mirza on October 7, 1958. President Mirza appointed General Mohammed Ayub Khan the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Within three days of the declaration, Ayub was able to secure Mirza’s resignation and became both head of the State and head of the government.

**TABLE 2.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIME MINISTER</th>
<th>TENURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khawaja Nazimuddin</td>
<td>Oct. 17, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Ali Bogra</td>
<td>April 17, 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. Mohammed Ali</td>
<td>Aug. 11, 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussain S. Suhrawardy</td>
<td>Sept. 12, 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail I. Chudrigar</td>
<td>Oct. 18, 1956</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 2.2 THE DILEMMA FOR CONSTITUTION MAKING

Within hours of the death of Liaquat Ali Khan and without reference to the Constituent Assembly and in curious circumstances, which bore the aspect of a palace intrigue, an arrangement was arrived at under which Khawaja Nazimuddin, who was then the Governor General, became prime minister. Ghulam Muhammad who was the finance minister moved up to the office of
Governor General. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali who was the Secretary General of the civil services entered the cabinet and became the finance minister. Both the Punjabi and the Bengali groups had united in this arrangement, with a Bengali as the Prime Minister and a Punjabi as the Governor General. Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar who was considered to be the legitimate heir of Liaquat Ali Khan by most of the Muslim Leaguers was ignored. The group representing the Punjab apparently considered him too independent and forceful. However, after the assassination of Liaquat Ali, the regional conflicts between the two wings of the country came to the surface and presented an extraordinary dilemma in the framing of a constitution. With the rise of Ghulam Muhammad to the office of Governor General, the clash between the bureaucracy and the politicians crystallized into a conflict between the Governor General and the Prime Minister. The conflicts of regions and personalities found the Constituent Assembly as the natural arena. It was in this supreme body that the struggle for the supremacy of the politicians was lost. The tangled web of political and constitutional developments that followed was intertwined with the fate of the Constituent Assembly itself.

In 1946, following the proposals of the Cabinet Mission, a constituent assembly, indirectly elected by the provincial legislatures, had come into existence, and charged with the responsibility of framing a constitution for undivided India. With the partition of the sub continent, the original constituent assembly was also divided. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan consisted of members elected by the provincial legislatures from the areas, which came to constitute Pakistan. It comprised sixty-nine members. The States of Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Frontier and Balochistan and
the Tribal Areas were later given additional seats. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 gave to the Constituent Assembly two separate functions: to act as the legislature under the interim constitution and, as a sovereign body, to frame a constitution for the country.

There were only two parties in the Constituent Assembly. The Muslim League representing all the Muslims with the exception of one or two members, and the Indian National Congress representing twelve million Hindus, mostly in East Bengal. The Muslim League had 59 members and included some of the principal associates of Jinnah in the movement of Pakistan. The members from East Bengal were mostly of middle class origin in contrast with the western wing, which was represented by many landlords. The only opposition to the Muslim League in the Constituent Assembly came from within, in the shape of different groups.36

The major problem, faced by the constitution makers, arose from the nature of the state itself. In brief, East Bengal had more population, aspired for democratic self-expression and an improvement in its economic conditions. It was, however, only about one-sixth the size of the western part. The west wing, besides having a larger area, had advantages of strategic situation and natural resources. It also predominated in the services and in the army and was apprehensive of Bengali predominance, which posed a threat to the feudal interests. A thousand miles of Indian Territory separated the two parts. The problem of devising a constitutional arrangement acceptable to both wings of the country was destined to tax the resources of statesmanship for seven years.

Jinnah had estimated a period of eighteen months to two years a new constitution to be framed. What kind of a constitution did Jinnah visualize?
Since he did not leave a blue print, it has remained a matter of speculation. On June 9, 1947 he had remarked:

"I do not know what the ultimate shape of the constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be a democratic type, and embodying the essential principles of Islam. Democracy is in our blood. It is in our marrow. Only centuries of adverse circumstances have made the circulation of that blood cold. Islam and its ideals have taught equality of man, justice and fair play to everybody."

Muhammad Ali Jinnah apparently saw no disharmony between the ethical and moral ideals of Islam and the modern structure of the state. In his famous address of August 11, 1947 at the inaugural session of the Constituent Assembly he said:

"I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority community-the Hindu community and the Muslim community-because even as regards Muslims, you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, and Sunnis and so on. Among the Hindus you have Brahmans, Vaishnavites, Khatries; also Bengalis, Madrasies and so no will vanish. Indeed, if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain its freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free people long ago. No power can hold another nation and especially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection: nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have its hold on you for any length of time but for this.
Therefore we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed— that has nothing to do with the business of the State. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste and creed or another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.”

The above address of Mr. Jinnah had received differing interpretations. Ch. Muhammad Ali viewed it as an assurance to the minorities and Justice Munir saw it “one of the clearest expositions of a secular state.” He also stated that religion is nothing to do with state and in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, but in the political sense as citizens of state."

The Constituent Assembly had shown little progress in the way of framing a constitution even after two years of independence. The religious sentiment, which had underlined the nationalist upsurge, had found expression in the Objectives Resolution passed in March 1949 during Liaquat Ali Khan’s tenure to which an allusion has been made earlier. On March 12, 1949, the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) comprising twenty-four members was appointed by the Constituent Assembly to report on the main principles by which the constitution of Pakistan was to be guided. The Interim Report of the Committee produced during Liaquat’s Prime Ministership in 1950 to be withdrawn in the face of strong opposition from East Bengal. The report
proposed a bicameral legislature. The Lower House was to be elected on the basis of population. The upper house, comprising all the provinces, was given equal representation. Matters of dispute were to be decided by joint session. It ensured in practice the supremacy of the western part of Pakistan.

The second report of the Basic Principles Committee in 1952 recommended a scheme based on ‘the Principle of Parity’. The upper House was to have 60 members each from both wings of the country. East Bengal was one unit where as West Pakistan comprised the provinces of West Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Balochistan, besides Karachi, Tribal areas and the States of Bahawalpur, Khairpur and Balochistan. It was now the Punjab’s turn to oppose the proposals on the obvious ground that the Bengali group by aligning itself with one or more provinces of the western wing could command a majority.

It has also been seen that during those days the regional conflicts were underpinned by the apprehensions of vested interests in the west wing, which were heavily represented in the armed services and the bureaucracy. The feudal classes, in the Punjab, and the emerging industrial and commercial bourgeois, of Karachi, were also located in or controlled by the western wing. These interests were apprehensive of Bengali predominance which, it was feared, would involve a sharing of authority and privilege and possibly worse, in the shape of radical economic and social reforms. The land reforms carried out by East Bengal soon after independence had created strong concerns for the elite in the west wing. The position of relative dominance inherited at independence made the west wing look upon the eastern wing as less than its equal and denied the logic of democracy with far-reaching consequences.
The Central Government, after the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954, decided to merge the provinces and states of West Pakistan into one unit with a view to ensuring parity of representation between East and West Pakistan. In spite of strong opposition from provincial governments, the Second Constituent Assembly adopted this policy and the new province of West Pakistan came into being in October 1955.42 It may be pointed out here that the governments of Pirzada in Sind and Rashid in the North-West Frontier Province were dismissed by the Central Government because of their opposition to the merger into one unit.43 The first major clash between East and West Pakistan took place in 1952 on the question of national language. The 1950 draft Constitution stated, "Urdu should be the national language of the State".44 Liaquat Ali Khan, first Prime Minister of Pakistan, stated in 1950 that "Pakistan is a Muslim State and it must have as its lingua franca the language of the Muslim nation... (Hindus) should realize that Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this subcontinent and the language of a, hundred million Muslims is Urdu. It is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language."45 Since 56 per cent of the population of Pakistan spoke Bengali, the Bengalis resisted the imposition of Urdu as the national language. This attempt to make Urdu the national language led to a violent clash between the police and students in Dacca in February 1952 and 19 persons sacrificed their lives for the cause of Bengali language. (Bengalis still celebrate February 21 as Shaheed (Martyrs' Day)46 after the provincial election of 1954 in which the Muslim League Party was totally defeated in East Pakistan; a compromise formula was reached whereby Bengali and Urdu were recognized as the State languages of Pakistan.
2.4 **MARTIAL LAW IN LAHORE**

While the regional differences thus rose in the way of a consensus on the principles on which the constitution was to be framed, an unexpected event burst upon the political scene that changed the political course of the country. On January 21, 1953, a deputation of the Ulema authorized by the Majlis-e-Amal (Action Committee) set up by religious Parties Convention, delivered to Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin an ultimatum which threatened to resort to direct action if within a month Qadiani / Ahmadis were not declared a non-Muslim minority, and Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan, the Foreign Minister, a Qadiani, and other Ahmadis occupying key posts in the state were not removed from their offices.

The demands set out in the ultimatum, therefore, reflected very strong feelings of the Muslims in general. A large section of the religious ulema, it may also be observed, had felt disillusioned and dissatisfied at the failure of the government to establish an Islamic state. They were denied a share or say in the government. The moving spirit behind the agitation was the Ahrar, a political group which had aligned itself with the Indian Congress before independence, and was unsparing in its denunciation of the Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah.\(^{47}\) The central in February 1953 took a fateful decision to reject the ultimatum and to arrest the prominent members of the Majlis-e-Amal. The government, however, decided to take a firm action with the support of the army, to impose martial law in the Lahore. The relief with which the people in the west wing received martial law awakened in the army a sense of its power and position in the body politic. It demonstrated that the rule by the army could not only be effective but that it could also be acceptable. The politicians who were the legitimate heirs to British authority
went down in public estimation. The military - bureaucratic rule was now on its way to gaining legitimacy. This was true of the west wing but not so in the case of East Bengal.

It may be noted at this point that by the year 1953 the military had become a major force in the body politic of the country. Some of the major decisions taken by the Governor General, to which we shall presently refer, were only possible with the support of the military. In the realm of security and defense, the military ruled supreme. General Ayub Khan, the commander-in-chief, who had devoted himself to the modernization of the army, was the architect of Pakistan's military alliance with the United States. Faced with a hostile large neighbor, especially in the aftermath of the war in Kashmir in 1948, Pakistan had turned to the US for aid and military assistance. However, the initial efforts were not successful. In the fifties the US adopted a policy of containment and of building a wall around the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe. Pakistan's strategic position fitted in well with this policy of which John Foster Dulles was the chief protagonist. Although the US had its own objectives, Pakistan viewed its admission to the US sponsored military pacts, South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), as a guarantee of a US role in the preservation of its independence and security. General Ayub Khan conducted the negotiations of military alliances.

2.5 DISMISSAL OF PRIME MINISTER NAZIMUDDIN

It was against the background of the Anti-Ahmadiya agitation and language, which led to the imposition of martial law in Lahore, that Nazimuddin forced the resignation of the Punjab chief minister, Mian Muntaz Daultana. In the ensuing political crisis Nazimuddin was made to pay the price.
Governor General Ghulam Muhammad soon after martial law was lifted in Lahore in April 1953 called a cabinet meeting and demanded the resignation of Nazimuddin and the other cabinet members. Upon Nazimuddin’s refusal Ghulam Muhammad dismissed him. “When Nazimuddin arrived back to the Prime Minister’s House after the cabinet meeting at which he had been dismissed, he attempted to reach the Queen in London to advise her to remove the Governor General. He found that his telephone had been cut. When he attempted to leave his house, it was surrounded by a heavy police detachment.”

There is little doubt that the dictatorial action of the Governor-General dealt a serious blow to the nascent parliamentary system in the country. The Governor General, however, could succeed with the support of many members of the Constituent Assembly, with the firm backing of the army and the formidable plenary powers of police suppression, which were at his disposal. Keith Callard has observed, “The price of the governor-general’s coup was high. Three major conventions of cabinet government had been destroyed or gravely weakened. First, the tradition of the impartiality of the governor-general had been demolished. Second, the convention of cabinet and party solidarity had been disregarded. Third, the role of the Legislature as the maker and sustainer of government had been impugned.” As Callard has rightly remarked the action was aimed as much against the Assembly as against the Prime Minister.

The Constituent Assembly was not summoned until about five months after the dismissal of Nazimuddin. Muhammad Ali Bogra, who was at that time Pakistan’s ambassador in the USA was summoned and hoisted as the new prime minister on the Muslim League Parliamentary Party which was still
smarting under the humiliation caused by the dismissal of Nazimuddin. However, six of the nine Ministers of Nazimuddin’s cabinet (including Chaudhry Muhammad Ali) had joined the new government. The remaining three (including Nishtar) had been removed along with Nazimuddin. Lawrence Ziring has observed, that “By his dismissal of Nazimuddin and by the shuffling of the cabinet, Ghulam Muhammad was also eliminating the Muslim League as an independent voice in the central government, as Muhammad Ali Bogra was also elected as President of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party and replaced Nazimuddin who had resigned fearing a successful vote of no-confidence By repudiating Nazimuddin, the Muslim League surrendered whatever remaining claim it had to leadership at the federal level.”

Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, President of the Constituent Assembly, challenged the order of the Governor-General dissolving the Constituent Assembly, in the Chief Court of Sindh by a writ petition filed under Section 223-A of the Government of India Act, 1935. A full Bench of the Chief Court presided over by the Chief Justice, George Constantine, gave its verdict in favor of the President of the Constituent Assembly, whereupon the Governor General filed an appeal in the Federal Court. The Federal Court did not go into the merits or the constitutionality of the action of the Governor-General but concerned itself with the validity of Section 223-A, which had been passed by the Constituent Assembly. By a majority judgement delivered by Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, with Cornelius J. dissenting, it was held that since section 223-A of the Government of India Act, under which the Chief Court of Sindh had issued the writ, had not received the assent of the Governor General, it was not yet law and,
therefore, the Chief Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writs.\textsuperscript{54} The Federal Court thereby validated the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly the powers of the Governor General came up indirectly for determination by the Federal Court in \textit{Usif Patel’s case}.\textsuperscript{55} It was held by the Court that the Governor General could neither claim the powers of the Constituent Assembly nor could he claim to succeed to the Constituent Assembly. The new body could validate the Federal Court observed that the first concern should be to bring into existence another representative body so that all legislation rendered invalid by Tamizuddin Khan’s case.

The legal difficulties to which the decisions of the Federal Court had forced the Governor General to move the Federal Court for an advisory opinion under Section 213 of the Act of 1935. The Federal Court, Cornelius, J. and Muhammad Sharif, dissenting held that the dissolution had become imperative because the Constituent Assembly had failed to frame a constitution within a reasonable time. The Governor General’s action was held to be valid under the ‘doctrine of necessity’. \textsuperscript{56} The fact that the dissolution had in fact aborted the approved draft constitution was not placed before or considered by the court.

It may be observed that the coup of 1954 caused no stir among the people, coming as it was fast on the heels of the first coup of 1953 in which Prime Minister Nazimuddin had been dismissed.\textsuperscript{57} Binder has observed that, “No public protest was raised, no procession taken out, no further agitation went on; the man in the street was unconcerned, completely indifferent.”\textsuperscript{58} It may, however, be observed, that the people were generally unaware of the great legal battle which was being fought out in the courts and which was destined
to alter the course of Pakistan’s history. In East Pakistan the reaction of the people could not find expression as the province was under the Governor’s rule.

2.6 THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY

The organization of the machinery of government had claimed the first priority. One of the first acts of Jinnah as Governor General was to appoint senior British officers of the Indian Civil Services (ICS) as governors in three of the four provinces. Services of many other British ICS officers were obtained to fill the posts in the central as well as in the provincial governments. A large number of indigenous officers and staff, emigrating from India, helped to fill the places left vacant by the departing Hindus and Sikhs officers. The traditional structure of administration, which had developed under the British, was in existence. The important positions went to the centralized services, crucial power being wielded by the members of the ICS. The bureaucracy worked tirelessly to meet vast new responsibilities. The administrative system which had developed over a period of more than a century, guided by elaborate codes and procedure, tradition and adherence to law, made the governance of the new state possible in its initial phase.

The structure of British rule had rested on the governors in the provinces assisted by the civil servants, serving in the secretariat as well as in the field jobs. The members of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) held key positions. With the introduction of partially responsible governments in the provinces, the politicians had made an entry on the political scene but their powers were circumscribed and their activities were kept under watch. The chain of authority between the Governor General and the governors remained
undisturbed even after independence. Muhammad Ali Jinnah continued to receive fortnightly reports from the governors about the affairs of the provinces,\textsuperscript{60} although the provincial ministries responsible to the legislatures had come into existence.

2.7 POLITICS OF REGIONALISM

The political parties in Pakistan fail to arrive at a consensus on various issues, they also failed to articulate and aggregate the interests of various regions. The policies pursued by the ruling elite in the first decade of independence were directed to increasing the capabilities of the government. Such policies created an imbalance in the distribution of power among the various ethnic groups. In the first decade of Pakistan’s existence, participation of the East Pakistan in the “national power elite” was limited.\textsuperscript{61}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICIALS</th>
<th>EAST PAKISTAN</th>
<th>WEST PAKISTAN</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Heads of State- Presidents /</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governors Generals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministers</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers, State Ministers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Constituent and</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National assemblies</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Though the Bengalis were well represented in the central political elite (see Table 2.5), their representation in the army did not exceed more than 5 percent (see Table 2.6).
Bengalis, moreover, had only 30 per cent representation in the civil bureaucracy. In part, such an imbalance was due to historical factors. Before independence East Bengal had formed part of the hinterland of Calcutta. Its principal product, jute, used to be processed and exported. Calcutta and its mills now formed a part of India.

**TABLE 2.6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>EAST PAKISTAN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>60</td>
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</table>


Consequently, after independence East Bengal did not have any means of processing its staple products. Moreover, the peasants of Bengal were generally poor. Pakistan inherited 133 Indian Civil Service and Indian Police Service officers at the time of partition. Among these officers only one was a Bengali Muslim. Though post-independence recruitment policies were designed to increase Bengali representation in the civil service, the initial differences created an insuperable gap between the participation of East and West Pakistan (see Table 2.7ans 2.8). And no conscious policy was adopted to remedy the imbalance in the military services. As a result, Bengali participation in the power structure of Pakistan following independence was insignificant. The policy pursued by the Muslim League, which dominated the political life of Pakistan in the formative years, “a policy of one state.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL ENTERENCE</th>
<th>EAST PAKISTAN</th>
<th>WEST PAKISTAN</th>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43.3</td>
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one government, one economy, one language, one culture,"""" perpetuated the imbalance. Not only did an imbalance exist in the political-administrative Sector but also in the economic sphere. The economic policy pursued by the Muslim League in the first decade of independence widened economic disparities between the two sectors of Pakistan. Per capita income in East
TABLE 2.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EAST PAKISTAN</th>
<th>WEST PAKISTAN</th>
<th>TOTAL ENTERENCE</th>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ralph Braibanti (ed.), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, op. cit. p 266. (Updated till 1969)

Pakistan actually decreased from Rs. 305 crores (One crore is equivalent to 10 Millions) in 1949-50 to Rs. 288 crores, whereas in West Pakistan it increased from Rs. 330 crores in 1949-50 to Rs. 373 crores.  

84
The Central Government dominated by the Muslim League until 1954 was mainly responsible for such widening economic disparities between the two wings of Pakistan. The Central Government allocated nearly two-thirds of its developmental and non-developmental funds to West Pakistan. A similar disparity also existed in the allocation of foreign aid.\textsuperscript{65} It is important to point out here that these disparities did not play an important role in politics until 1954. Only after the Awami League won the provincial election of 1954 (East Pakistan) and became the Opposition party in the National Assembly in 1955-56, did economic policy become an important subject of controversy between the two parts of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{66} The East Pakistan Awami League demanded more provincial autonomy for economic reasons, and when the Awami League came to power in 1956, economic disparity remained the main point of controversy. It was as a result of the Awami League's demand for more provincial autonomy in the economic sphere that it lost its governmental power in 1956.\textsuperscript{67}

2.8 DISSOLUTION OF THE FIRST CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The Governor General After the dismissal of Nazimuddin and his cabinet apparently felt confident that he could now manipulate the Constituent Assembly to give approval to his own proposal of an interim constitution that would have provided for the integration of the province in the west wing into a single province of West Pakistan. The Governor General also wished to see the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the election of a new assembly over which he would have the power of veto.\textsuperscript{68} The One Unit plan had greatly appealed to General Muhammad Ayub Khan. In his proposal of One Unit the Governor General, therefore, enjoyed the support of the army. To allay the fears of the smaller province against the likely dominance of the
Punjab, it was proposed that the Punjab would agree to forty percent of the voting power in the One Unit, which was less than its entitlement based on population.

The Constituent Assembly met in September 1953, its first session after Nazimuddin's dismissal about five months later. Muhammad Ali Bogra submitted the plan of the interim constitution. It was, overwhelmingly rejected, an unsuspected setback for the Governor General who was entertaining fanciful notions of viceregal power. Therefore, Bogra submitted the Second Report of the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) in an effort to arrive at a consensus on a constitution. He introduced an amendment, known as the 'Muhammad Ali Formula' relating to representation of the provinces in the legislature. It proposed the election of the Lower House on the basis of population. (See Table 2.9). The upper house was to comprise equal representatives from all the five constituent units. In joint sittings each of the two wings would have equal representation. Powers were to be divided equally. A joint sitting could resolve deadlock, but the majority must include at least 30% of the total members belonging to each Zone. This somewhat complicated and a new mechanism had been worked out to satisfy the both regions but it could still be feared that the Bengalis, by combining with one or more provinces, could still manage the required majority. The Prime Minister announced that the proposals had met with the approval of the cabinet, the chief ministers and the members of the Muslim League parliamentary party. The Constituent Assembly passed without discussion the amendment embodied in the Muhammad Ali Formula and it adjourned to enable the East Bengal members to attend to the provincial elections.
In the provincial elections held in East Bengal in 1954, the Muslim League was completely routed. Its strength from a position of an overwhelming majority party was reduced to 10 members in a house of 309. Nurul Amin, the Muslim League chief minister, lost to a medical student. Since then on the Muslim League ceased to be a significance factor in East Pakistan politics. The representative capacity of the Bengali members of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party in the Constituent Assembly had been undermined. The United Front Party led by A. K. Fazlul Haq, which had won in the provincial elections, demanded new elections to the Constituent Assembly and called for provincial autonomy under its 21 Points.  

**TABLE 2.9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>UPPER HOUSE</th>
<th>LOWER HOUSE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Bengal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP, Frontier states, and</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh &amp; Khairpur</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan, BSU,</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahwalpur-Karachi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>300</strong></td>
<td><strong>350</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A. K. Fazlul Haq fell foul of the central government on account of his advocacy of autonomy and his alleged failure to maintain law and order. Fazlul Haq had also aroused an adverse reaction by his reported advocacy of a united Bengal. The ministry was dismissed in May, 1954 and the province was placed under the governor’s rule. Iskander Mirza, who was then the
defense secretary, was sent as the governor. The result of the provincial elections in East Bengal aroused fears notably among the politicians of the Punjab, about East Bengal exploiting the differences among the provinces in the West Wing. The proposal of One Unit gained momentum.

Notwithstanding the challenges to the proposed constitution on which a consensus had been reached, the Constituent Assembly moved ahead with the draft constitution. Sir Ivor Jennings was supervising and vetted the same constitution. Muhammad Ali Bogra announced that the constitution, which was ready for publication and would be implemented in December, 1954. The constitution contained the Objectives Resolution as its preamble, the Government of India Act of 1935, as adapted by the Basic Principle Committee Report. The Constituent Assembly was apprehensive of Governor General’s reaction to the proposed constitution; therefore as a defensive measure it repealed the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (PRODA) in September, 1953. Although Muhammad Ali Bogra enjoyed a majority in the Assembly, the memories of Nazimuddin were still fresh in the minds of the members. On the same day the Constituent Assembly amended the Act of 1935 whereby the Governor General could act only on the advice of his ministers; requiring ministers to be members of the assembly; the ministers to hold office so long as they retained the confidence of the legislature and was to be collectively responsible to the house. The constitutional conventions of a cabinet form of government were made a substantive part of the constitution and thus became enforceable in a court of law.

The Governor General after securing the assurance and approval of General Ayub Khan to the dissolution of the assembly, the formation of One Unit and
his agreement to serve in the new cabinet, the Governor General issued a proclamation:

"The Governor General, having considered the political crisis with which the country is faced, has with deep regret come to the conclusion that the constitutional machinery has broken down. He therefore has decided to declare a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function...The ultimate authority vests in the people who will decide all issues including constitutional issues through their representatives who are to be elected; fresh elections will be held as early as possible."73

2.9 THE NEW CABINET

A new cabinet assumed office under Muhammad Ali Bogra who continued as the nominal Prime Minister. The main direction of the affairs of the country was, however, placed in the hands of the administrators and the army. The Governor General had himself been a bureaucrat and had contempt for the politicians and deep admiration for the viceregal system of government. Iskander Mirza was made the interior minister. The former head of the civil service, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, retained finance.74 The commander-in-chief of the Army, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, became the defense minister.75 The foremost objective before the ministry was the integration of West Pakistan into a single unit. This was what the political leader from the Punjab, notably Ch. Muhammad Ali, Gurmani and Daultana had been pressing as a condition precedent to a constitutional settlement with East Wing. General Ayub Khan, for reasons of strategy, had come to a
similar conclusion and had pleaded for the Punjab accepting less than its due share, in the larger interests of the country.

But the minority provinces were fearful of losing their identity, which was likely to be submerged in the larger unit in which Punjab would predominate. The strategy devised to carry the scheme into effect aggravated such fears. The implementation scheme was embodied in the One-Unit documents. The plan recommended that, "All opposition of which we are morally convinced that it is motivated by evil must be made inoperative." It recommended 'the dismissal' of Abdul Sattar Pirzada, a 'self-denying ordinance' on Noon (Sir Feroze Khan Noon), "unreserved support to Rashid" (a former Inspector General of Police of N.W.F.P. and then chief minister of the North west Frontier Province). "stilling his suspicions, fortifying his nerve," and employment of various other means such as the use of news media and of the mullahs.

The documents outraged Sardar Abdur Rashid when they were disclosed to him. The consequent opposition of Abdul Ghaflar Khan and Sardar Abdur Rashid was overcome by offering the Chief Ministership of the newly created province of West Pakistan to Dr. Khan Sahib. The regime was determined to take speedy actions. In Sindh, Pirzada was dismissed and replaced by Khuhro who produced a dramatic reversal of votes by the provincial assembly in favor of One Unit. The province of East Bengal had been under the governor's rule since May 1954. In March, 1955 the Emergency Powers Ordinance was issued to amend the Act of 1935 and to invest the Governor General with the powers to establish the province of West Pakistan.
It is to be noted that the Governor General was denied by the Usif Patel’s case\textsuperscript{79} to the right to arrogate the functions of the Constituent Assembly. The Governor General was, therefore, obliged to call into existence a new Constituent Assembly. The new Constituent Assembly, however, it may be observed, was going to be subject to the Governor General’s veto power, as a result of the Court’s earlier verdict in Tamizuddin Khan’s case.

2.10 \textbf{THE CONSTITUTION OF 1956}

The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan had failed to frame a constitution for Pakistan Until 1956. The delay was caused by fundamental disagreement on two major questions: the role of Islam in the new state, and the relations between East and West Pakistan and the central government. To some extent the extended nature of the constitutional debate was caused by the untimely death of Jinnah in September 1948. Unfortunately he was unable to evolve a constitutional formula on which his followers could build the future constitution. Neither did he resolve the issue of the role of Islam in the new state. In his inaugural speech to the Assembly, Jinnah declared that Pakistan would be a secular state.\textsuperscript{80} Later he declared that Pakistan would be a state “where principles of Islamic social justice could find free play”.\textsuperscript{81} One could predict from these statements that Jinnah would fail to establish an ideology for the new state of Pakistan.

Muslim leaders hoped to build an Islamic state after the death of Jinnah. Liaquat Ali Khan, first Prime Minister of Pakistan, stated in 1949 that: “The state is not to play the part of a neutral observer, wherein the Muslims may be merely free to profess and practice their religion, because such an attitude on the part of the state would be the very negation of the ideals which prompted the demand for Pakistan and it is these ideals which should be the
cornerstone of the state which we want to build. The state will create such conditions as are conducive to the building up of a truly Islamic society, which means the state will have to play a positive part in this effort. 82

In March 1949, the Constituent Assembly passed a resolution on the 'Aims and Objects of the Constitution', popularly known as the 'Objectives Resolution, which sought to base the Constitution of Pakistan on the ideals of Islam. The main characteristics of Objective Resolution were as following: 83

I. Sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone, and the authority, which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him, is a sacred trust.

II. This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign Independent State of Pakistan.

III. Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed.

IV. Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah.

V. Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures.
VI. Whereby the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed.

VII. Wherein adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes.

VIII. Wherein the independence of the judiciary shall be fully secured.

Even the members of the Muslim League could not agree on the proper role of Islam. Though the draft constitution of 1950 contained little of institutional importance that could be called Islamic, the Assembly was able to insert Islamic provisions in the constitution of 1956. This latter constitution contained specifically Islamic provisions, and many groups and parties refused to accept the idea of identifying the state with Islam. The Awami League in particular pressed for the establishment of a secular state. Another area of disagreement was the issue of political representation in the central legislature. Since the Constituent Assembly was entrusted with the task of framing a constitution for Pakistan, it became the arena of conflict. The Constituent Assembly set up the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) in March, 1949, to adumbrate the main principles on which the future constitution of Pakistan should be framed. The Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee, submitted in 1950 under Liaquat Ali Khan's Prime Ministership, envisaged that the central legislature would be a bicameral one: the House of Units and the House of the People. Regions
were to be equally represented in the House of Units, while the House of the People was to be elected on the basis of population. The houses were given equal power, and disputes were to be settled by joint sessions of both. Though East Bengal representation would be greater in the House of the People, West Pakistan representation in the House of Units would be four times larger than that of East Pakistan. East Pakistanis opposed the draft vehemently on the ground that it would permit domination by the West Pakistanis. The Second draft,85 submitted by the BPC in 1952, envisaged a parity of representation in the central legislature. The Punjabis opposed these proposals on the ground that they would establish Bengali domination. Another report was submitted by the BPC in 1954, but it also failed to solve the problem of representation.

The preceding discussion demonstrates clearly that the Assembly dominated by the Muslim League until 1954, failed to solve the problems of representation, national language, and the role of Islam in state. All these issues were temporarily resolved only after they had evoked a high degree of bitterness and suspicion from the people of Pakistan. Instead of being resolved through the process of accommodation, these issues were temporarily dealt with by force. Moreover, the drafting process of the Constitution of 1956 indicated clearly how "controlled" the debate really was. As Keith Callard observed, "The government resolved to profit by the lessons of the previous attempts to reach agreement on the constitution, and the new Assembly was not asked to set up machinery to prepare a draft. Instead the government prepared its own draft, which was published in January 1956. On the day after publication the Law minister rose to introduce a Bill to provide a constitution for the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan. After the Minister's speech the House adjourned for a week, so that the members might have an opportunity to study the provisions of the Bill. After general discussion had taken place on twelve days, the Assembly proceeded to consider the Bill in detail. This required a further seventeen sittings, during which the closure was frequently invoked. On one occasion the Opposition was so unwise as to leave the chamber in protest against a ruling of the Chair; this enabled the government to secure approval of many clauses without discussion. The 1956 Constitution can thus only be described as another temporary stabilizing action; it was an expression of the desires of a small group of people.

Besides the issues discussed above, another controversy was that the Constitution of 1956, did not reach a decision on the question whether Pakistan should adopt a joint or a separate electorate. A "joint electorate" implies that the Muslims and non-Muslims would have joint representation in the legislature, while a "separate electorate" would require Muslims and non-Muslims to have separate representation in the legislature, meaning that a certain number of seats would be reserved for the Hindus. The Hindus were opposed to separate electorates since it would reduce them to a permanent minority, having no voice in the administration of the country. The electorate issue was left to the National Assembly (legislature) to decide. When Suhrawardy came to power in 1956, the National Assembly passed a law providing for a joint electorate in East Pakistan and separate electorate in West Pakistan. Various groups, including the orthodox ulema, Jamaati-Islami and the Muslim League opposed the policy of a joint electorate on the ground that it would negate the two-nation and the very spirit of Pakistan Movement. Suhrawardy however defended the joint
electorate system, stating: "The two-nation theory was advanced by the Muslims as a justification for the partition of India and the creation of a state made up of geographically contiguous units where the Muslims were numerically in a majority. Once that state was created the two-nation theory lost, its force even for the Muslims... Today we do not want to develop fissiparous tendencies within the country but create one nation. I, therefore, advocate a joint electorate because this will help... in destroying the seeds of suspicion, distrust, and hatred between the citizens professing different religions." The electorate issue created additional bitterness between the two parts of Pakistan. West Pakistan supported the introduction of the separate electorate since it would reduce the East Pakistan Muslims to a permanent minority. Since the Hindus constituted about 19 per cent of the population, they would have received 31 seats of the 155 allotted to East Pakistan. When the Muslim League-Republican government came to power after the Ouster of Suhrwardy, an attempt was made to introduce the separate electorate. Realizing that it would create tension in East Pakistan, the Republican Party abandoned the attempt. Thereafter, the issue was resolved in favor of a joint electorate. In sum, though the, parties temporarily resolved the various issues, they failed to achieve a lasting consensus.

The new Constituent Assembly met on July 7, 1955. Out of its 80 members the Muslim League had only 26, all except two from West Pakistan. In view of the drastically changed party position, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali replaced the Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra. Meanwhile, Iskander Mirza succeeded Ghulam Muhammad as the Governor General. The two major acts of the Second Constituent Assembly were the establishment of the province of West Pakistan on September 30, 1955 and the first
constitution of Pakistan was adopted on March 23, 1956. The constitution of 1956 has been justly acclaimed as the work and achievement of Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali whose tireless exertion in bringing about a consensus deserves to be recorded.\textsuperscript{90}

The constitution retained a substantial portion of the Act of 1935 and provided for a federal parliamentary system. However, the federation consisted of two provinces only, namely, East Pakistan and West Pakistan. As there was a parity of representation between the two provinces, a second chamber was not considered necessary. Parity denied the principle of majority and the retention of One Unit in the shape of West Pakistan constitutionally demolished the federal principle particularly in the west wing. The Objectives Resolution was embodied as the preamble. The constitution contained fundamental rights, and judicial review, empowering the superior courts to issue writs of \textit{certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant and habeus corpus}. It also embodied a number of Islamic provisions. These were new additions. The emergency provisions of the Act of 1935 were also retained in the Constitution of 1956.

The legislature was to consist of 300 members, equally divided between the two provinces, with additional 10 seats for women, five for each province.\textsuperscript{91} Until the national assembly was elected, the second Constituent Assembly, having 80 members, was to serve as the legislature. The constitution empowered the president to dismiss a Prime Minister if he was satisfied that the Prime Minister did not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the national assembly.\textsuperscript{92} Iskander Mirza had made his assent to the constitution conditional on his election as president, an office to which he was elected with fateful consequences.\textsuperscript{93}
The constitution barely lasted two turbulent years of a triangular conflict of power between the two wings and president Iskander Mirza who had a passion for authority and intrigue for which the decaying political life of the country provided him with abundant opportunities. Political conflict in West Pakistan was provoked by the decision of the Muslim League under Daultana’s leadership to oppose Dr. Khan Sahib who had been made the chief minister of West Pakistan as a price for his support of One Unit. Dr. Khan Sahib, with Iskander Mirza’s support, promptly lured away 26 out of the 30 members of the Muslim League to form the Republican Party. In the tussle for power, a small group of the National Awami Party (supported by Khan Abdul Wali Khan and G. M. Syed of Sindh and committed to dissolve West Pakistan into four provinces. The Muslim League which had been the moving spirit behind the integration of West Pakistan sided with the minority group to bring down the Republicans, who were in turn saved by the imposition of the Governor’s rule. They re-emerged again but this time found it more expedients to support the National Awami Party group.

The president was supporting the Republicans in West Pakistan, in East Pakistan he was behind the Krishak Sramik Party as against the Awami League of Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali at the center lost the majority and abandoned efforts to regain it. Suhrawardy, who became Prime Minister in September 1956, headed a coalition cabinet of the Awami League and the Republicans. The distrust between Mirza and Suhrawardy was acute. His advice to the president to summon the national assembly so that he could find out his position in the house alarmed Mirza who saw in the move a design to shift the decision from the Governor
General to the assembly. Suhrawardy was made to resign on October 11, 1957.

Sir Feroze Khan Noon, who succeeded Suhrawardy, failed to win the president's confidence. The latter suspected that Suhrawardy had offered presidency to Sir Feroz Khan Noon. Mirza was not the man to yield authority. In fact the political fragmentation provided him with superb opportunities for political maneuver. His overriding concern was to continue as the president. The prospect of a general election due to be held in February 1959 would have brought into existence a house of 300 members which would not have lent itself to manipulation by the president. An assertive United Front, dominated by the Awami League of Suhrawardy, would have represented East Pakistan. The prospect was chilling for Iskander Mirza who was planning to impose martial law early in 1957. A no-confidence motion against the Speaker, suspected of supporting the opposition, was met under Mirza's prompting with an assault on the Deputy Speaker who was a member of the Awami League. The victim, a few days later, succumbed to the injuries. This happened in the House on September 23, 1958.

Eleven years after independence the people had yet to undergo the experience of a general election, the vehicle of political mobilization and of the assertion of the electoral will of the people. The second Constituent Assembly, which in the interim served as the legislature, was a diminutive body of 80 members, divided by regions and political loyalties. Without the strength, that emanates from direct elections, without the party discipline, which could hold them together and without the fear of accountability, the members, driven by their personal interests and ambition, became an
irresponsible body. The power given by the constitution to the president to remove a prime minister and appoint some one of his own choices proved lethal weapons, as the members tended to line up behind the president's nominee, owing to the shifting loyalties of the politicians. Within two years of the adoption of the constitution, ministries changed with bewildering rapidity. In these changes, which looked like a palace intrigue, the people were not involved as a general election had yet to take place. They were only the spectators of change and the sufferers of its consequences.

The situation could not continue indefinitely and it seems that about the time of the ugly scene in the provincial assembly meeting at Dacca a "tactical outline" had been prepared to impose martial law in the country. The man behind the plan was General Muhammad Ayub Khan who apparently had decided that the politicians had had enough time to time to prove their sincerity. Thus, during the night of October 7-8, 1958, a group of Generals led by the commander-in-chief seized the power, and the President, abrogated the constitution of 1956, dismissed the central and provincial cabinets 'with immediate effect', dissolved the central and provincial legislatures, banned all political parties throughout the country, and imposed Martial Law. General Ayub by an order abolished the office of the Prime Minister was declared himself as the President of the country.

In sum, as a result of the constitutional evolution in the sub-continent, Pakistan had acquired a federal parliamentary system. The tradition of democracy and federalism, for reasons already discussed, was weak. The political mechanism, in the shape of political parties or even a single party, was insufficiently developed to translate these ideals into deed. The political culture of a pre-industrial society was dominated, in the ease of the west
wing, by a powerful land owning elite, which provided unfavorable conditions for democracy. The Muslim League due to its late rise had been unable to establish an institutional strength. The early loss of its top leadership left a vacuum and aggravated the institutional imbalance between the politicians and the bureaucracy, civil and military.

These difficulties were compounded by the fact that the country had to face since its inception a problem of extraordinary complexity arising from the physical distance between its two halves. Although the east wing had more population, the west wing enjoyed a position of dominance-political, military, administrative and economic, which led to regional tensions.

The inter-wing conflict caused a fatal delay in the framing of a constitution and a general election could not be held. With the decline of the League politics became fragmented and power began to be concentrated in the hands of the bureaucracy, with the military dominant. The dismissal of Prime Minister Nazimuddin in 1953 and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954 by the Governor General were only the more dramatic instances of the shift in the balance of power. In the circumstances the hopes engendered by the Constitution of 1956 proved illusory. The democratic forces had in fact crumbled before they were able to lay the foundation of democracy. The administrative state re-asserted itself under a new dispensation. The military, which had steadily become the major force in the body-politic now, becomes the ruler of the country.

What is evident from the above analysis is that none of the parties in Pakistan was able to articulate and aggregate the interests of different regions. The strength of regional cleavages in Pakistan worked against the development of national political parties. In other words, unevenness in
economic development created differences in the ideology of parties, which in turn produced high levels of political instability. The facade of parliamentary politics in Pakistan led in turn to the advent of a military dominated politics in 1958. We will now review the Ayub period in order to determine the extent to which representative institutions were allowed to function.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 Pakistan was granted a Dominion status under the Independence Act of 1947.
3 Ibid., p. 17.
7 Quoted in Viqar Ahmad and Rashid Anjum. The Management of Pakistan's Economy 1947-82. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 71. It is mentioned that until 1955, about 7 million refugees entered into West Pakistan from India and as compared to about 5.6 million Hindus and Sikhs refugees left Pakistan. In East Pakistan the number of entering refugees was 1.25 million.
8 It was only in 1946 when Pakistan became a certainty and it was realized that the partition of India would entail the partition of the two Muslim majority provinces.
9 Choudhury Muhammad Ali. The Emergence of Pakistan. (London: Longmans, 1967), pp. 203. The controversial award discussed was announced on August 18, 1947, that led to a mass exodus of refugees and communal violence.
11 See Andrew Roberts. Eminent Churchillians. London: Weidenfell and Nicholson. 1994, pp. 55-136. (Lord Mountbatten's role has come in for a critical reappraisal by the British historian Andrew Roberts who has shown that Mountbatten had entirely come over on the side of the Indian Congress. He was opposed to Pakistan and had disdain for Jinnah. To provide India with on overland access to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, he influenced the Punjab Boundary Commission Award of Sir (later Lord) Radcliffe and
exerted a powerful influence in securing the accession of the princely States to India. He had a crucial role in obtaining for India the instrument of accession by the Hindu Maharaja of the predominantly Muslim State of Kashmir, whose accession to Pakistan was considered a foregone conclusion. Mountbatten personally supervised the landing of the Indian troops in Srinagar. He was indifferent to the warnings about the communal violence, which followed partition. Andrew Roberts has argued that Mountbatten should have been court-martialled upon his return to London.

12 Field-Marshal Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian Army was appointed the Supreme Commander and entrusted with the responsibility for the movement of stores, ammunition, equipment, and installations from one Dominion to the other. He reported about the hostility of the Congress to any just division of assets. Quoted in Hamid Yusuf, Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments 1947-1997. (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1999), p. 36.


14 The proposal of having a common Governor General for both India and Pakistan favored by Lord Mountbatten had to be dropped in view of opposition from Jinnah. Mountbatten, however, became the first Governor General of independent India. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, op. cit., pp. 174-78, discusses the background of Jinnah’s appointment.

15 Ibid.

16 Hamid Yusuf, op. cit., p. 34.

17 Mustafa Choudhury, op. cit., p. 52.


20 Ibid., p. 22.

21 Hamid Yusuf, op. cit., p. 34.

22 Mustafa Choudhury, op. cit., p. 39.

23 Language riots took place when Government of Pakistan tried to impose Urdu as the national language of the country.

24 Violence erupted in Punjab when some religious parties sought to declare a sect known as the Ahmadis / Qadianis / Mirzais, as non-Muslim and a result of rioting; the first Martial Law was imposed in Lahore in 1953.

25 Quoted in Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 22. It is mentioned that Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan were active participants in the removal of Nazimuddin and had the army in readiness in case there was opposition. Nazimuddin enjoyed a majority support in the Constituent Assembly. In fact, the budget had been passed a few days before his dismissal. Nazimuddin as “an illegal and unconstitutional course against the principles of


27 Keith Callard, *op. cit.,* p. 141.


29 One Unit, which amalgamated the four provinces of West Pakistan into the province of West Pakistan. It was done with a view to ensuring parity of representation in the central legislature between the East and West Pakistan.


35 Ghulam Muhammad had spent about 20 years in Audit and Accounts Service of India. He was finance minister in Hyderabad State before he joined the first cabinet after independence. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali who was the Secretary General of the Civil Services also belonged to the Audit and Accounts Service. He was a principal associate of Ghulam Muhammad. He now succeeded to the office of finance minister, as Ghulam Muhammad became Governor General.

36 See Keith Callard, *op. cit.,* pp. 77-123. The inadequacy of the Constituent Assembly is discussed that at the time of its inauguration the first Constituent Assembly had 69 seats. At the end of its life the number did not exceed 79, although all the seats were not filled.


38 Quoted in Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia,* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), p. 29.

42 *Dawn*, October 14, 1955.
46 A *Shaheed Minar* (Martyr's Monument) was erected at the sight of the firing. Ever since the day is commemorated every year.
47 See Syed Sibt Hasan, op. cit., p. 93.
49 In the "Cabinet of Talent" which was at a later stage formed by Ghulam Muhammad, Gen. Ayub Khan, the commander-in-chief of the army, held the defense portfolio.
50 These powers derived from the preventive detention laws of pre-independence era; from the police rules; from the Code of Criminal Procedure; from the Public Safety Acts of 1949-50 and from the Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act (PRODA) passed during the period of Liaquat Ali Khan's government.
51 Keith Callard, *op. cit.*, p.137.
56 The case has been described as, "A momentous ruling, from which Pakistan has not yet recovered." See Ayesha Jalal, in D. A. Low's, ed., *Constitutional Heads and Political Crisis*, (London: McMillan, 1988), p. 5. The decision practically shifted the sovereignty from the Constituent Assembly to the Governor General as under the verdict of the court he possessed the power of veto.
58 Sir Ivor Jennings, who was an advisor to the Government, had vetted the final draft. Chief Justice Muhammad Munir had also spoken about the draft constitution while addressing the Lahore Bar Association in October 1954. The litigation attending the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly is discussed at length by Allan McGrath in *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1996, see also Sir Ivor Jennings, *Constitutional crises in Pakistan*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956).
59 Ian Stephens, *op. cit.*, p. 64, describes it as the second *comp.* the civil servants, was more thorough than the first.
60 *Ibid*.
61 With the establishment of All Pakistan Services, the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP) took the place of Indian Civil Services (ICS), other services included were Pakistan Police services (PSP) and Pakistan Foreign Services (PFS).
62 Lord Linlithgow had started the practice.


69 See G. W. Choudhury, *op. cit.*

70 Hamid Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

71 The corrections made by Sir Ivor Jennings on the final draft of the constitution are shown in his handwriting in the *Jennings Papers*. (London: Institute of Commonwealth Research, 1957) B/XV/4-S.

72 Quoted in Hamid Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p. 57.


74 He had been finance minister since 1951.

75 There were nine ministers included in the new cabinet, who were not the members of the Assembly at the time of its dissolution, including General Ayub, C-in-C of army; Iskander Mirza (governor of East Pakistan), and Mr. Ghulam Ali Talpur from Sindh, landowners, and others. The cabinet also included two ministers from the opposition, namely Dr. Khan Sahib (dismissed as chief minister of Northwest Frontier Province in 1947) and Mr. Hussain Shabeed Suhrawardy, leader of the Awami League.

76 See Khalid Bin Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 77.


78 Quoted in Hamid Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p. 57.


80 See the speech of M. A. Jinnah, of August 11, 1948 on page no. 71.


84 Quoted in Mustafa Chowdhury, *op. cit.*, From, *Constitution and Regulation of East Pakistan Awami League*. (Dacca. n. d.)


86 Keith Callard, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

87 Quoted in Mustafa Chowdhury from the *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, April 10-11, 1952.
The United Front had 16, Awami League 13, Congress 4, and Scheduled Caste Federation 3, United Progressive Party 2 and others 16. The composition of the Assembly was thus heterogeneous.

Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy headed the Constitution Committee.

See the Constitution of 1956.

Ibid.

Governor General's assent was required, following the Federal Court's verdict in Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan's case.


CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FROM THE MARTIAL LAW OF 1958 TILL 1971
CHAPTER 3

3. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
FROM THE MARTIAL LAW OF 1958 TILL 1971

In the preceding chapter we discussed political and constitutional development from 1947 to 1958 and pinpointed the controversies for framing a constitution soon after the emergence of Pakistan. We also identified how did the civil bureaucracy managed to weaken the representative institutions that ultimately led to the military took over. In this chapter an attempt will be made to analyze the nature of political and constitutional development under the leadership of an army General Muhammad Ayub Khan who introduced the system of Basic democracy and gave his presidential constitution, the constitution of 1962. This chapter will also discuss the era of General Yahya Khan and finally we will discuss the circumstances that led to the separation of the East Pakistan.

3.1 THE ERA OF CONTROLLED DEMOCRACY

General Muhammad Ayub Khan took over power of the country through a military coup in 1958. Even before the coup, as the chief of the army, his opinion mattered on every political issue of the country. Although General Ayub Khan claimed in different statements that he had declined the offer of the Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad, several times to 'take over' the country. Nevertheless, he had placed the weight of his authority behind the Governor General's three crucial actions: the dismissal of Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin in 1953, which demolished the principles of cabinet responsibility to the legislature, the dissolution of the first Constituent
Assembly in 1954, and abrogation of the draft constitution of 1954, before its adoption. The influence of the army in the body-politics of the country had steadily grown since the death of Muhammed Ali Jinnah in 1948. Furthermore, decline of the Muslim League resulted in shift of power from the politicians to the civil bureaucracy and it is also to be noted that it had increased the role of the Army in the body-politics of the country.

General Ayub Khan had reflected on the course of political events and formed his own ideas. It is to be noted that in a memorandum, before joining the Cabinet as Defense Minister in 1954, he wrote that a sound, solid and a cohesive nation could be achieved only if a constitution is evolved that would suit the genius of the people and is based on the circumstances confronting them, was the aim of making Pakistan. During the ten years of rule, General Ayub Khan, was driven by reformist zeal and a mission, strove to realize his plans of re-invigorating national life through his own vision.

Following the assumption of power by General Ayub Khan in 1958, he said, the activities of politicians have brought the nation to the verge of disintegration. According to him, “Ever since the death of the Quaid-i-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan, politicians started a free-for-all type of fighting in which no holds were barred. They waged a ceaseless and bitter war against each other regardless of the ill effects on the country, just to stimulate their appetites and satisfy their base motives. There has been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation. Having nothing constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian, religious, and racial differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani. In this mad rush for power and acquisition the country and people could go to the dogs as far as they were concerned.” General Ayub thereafter made an attempt to bring
about a fundamental change in the bases of political power and political
dynamics of the country. He said: "Our aim is to restore democracy, but of a
type that people can understand and work." 5

Another innovation of General Ayub Khan was the creation of a new
Constitution of 1962 that replaced the parliamentary form of government
with a strong centralized presidential system. It was an attempt to
institutionalize one-man rule through this system. In his words: "The
President should be made the final custodian of power on the country’s
behalf and should be able to put things right both in the provinces and at the
center should they go wrong. Laws should be operative only if certified by
the President . . . No change in the constitution should be made unless
agreed to by the President." 6 However, The Constitution of 1962 differs
fundamentally from that of 1956. The Constitution of 1962, introduced a
"controlled" National Assembly. 7 The legislators were only permitted to
discuss and conduct debate, while the power of the purse and final decision
was remained in the hands of the President, who was the real Chief
Executive of the country. It is also observed that the constitution of 1962 has
conferred unlimited powers in the hands of president, making him absolute
and authoritarian ruler of this country.

The party system was another institution modified by General Ayub Khan.
Nevertheless this was allowed to function because of the exigencies of
politics and international pressure. General Ayub was opposed to political
parties, and they were not allowed to function during the period of Martial
Law from October 8, 1958, till June 1962. 8 He argued: "Political parties
regulated by law . . . would provide an organizational framework for mass
mobilization on behalf of the government. They might further aid such
development by clearly demarcating the difference between those groups, which were opposed, to some government policies and others, which advocated the repeal of the entire constitutional structure. Finally, political parties could fragment the leadership of the Opposition. Nonetheless, General Ayub for the moment removed the ban on political activities, except the politicians whose political activity were not banned by EBDO’ (Eletive Bodies Disqualification Order, 1959)\textsuperscript{10}, participated openly; many of them won assembly seats as well. The EBDOed politicians began to operate behind the scenes, resisting the concentration of power in a single individual.\textsuperscript{11}

It is also necessary to mention that in January 1963, General Ayub Khan imposed new political restrictions. The Political Parties Act was redefined by an amendment, which prohibited the ‘ebdoed’ politicians even from associating with any political party.\textsuperscript{12} Soon after the promulgation of political party act, General Ayub’s supporters decided to take over the Muslim League, considering that its past glory would help to gain legitimacy before the people and Convention Muslim League was organized officially.\textsuperscript{13}

In sum, during the period of the Ayubian regime, political parties were not allowed to function normally, that is the articulation and aggregation of the interests of various groups and regions. The politics of the Ayubian period (1958-1969) can accurately be described as a politics of control over representative institutions. General Ayub Khans believed that the parliamentary democracy has failed to answer the two foremost needs of the country: political stability and national unity. He considered the system as

\textsuperscript{*} About 7000 people became the victim of EBDO disqualification.
unworkable in the midst of poverty, illiteracy and in the absence of a democratic tradition.

3.2 **THE SYSTEM OF BASIC DEMOCRACIES**

Another landmark development in the political history of Pakistan is the promulgation of the system of the Basic Democracies by General Ayub Khan Order on October 27, 1959, providing for the creation of a five-tiered structure. According to General Ayub the scheme of Basic Democracies was designed to give to the country a type of democracy, which, "the people could understand and work."¹⁴ Subsequently, in 1962, under a presidential form of government, General Ayub Khan sought to give to the country a political system initially conceived as free from party-politics and to give opportunities to the people to participate in the affairs of the nation through development programs, such as rural development, construction of roads, bridges, etc.¹⁵

The system was consisted of a union council, thana council (*Tehsil* in West Pakistan), district council, divisional council, and a development advisory council.¹⁶ Reasons for the introduction of the Basic Democracies System included "the need to accelerate rural development, improve social welfare facilities, and create a new politically conscious class of leaders with administrative skills capable of mobilizing the rural population."¹⁷

Initially, each province was divided into 40,000 electoral units. The number of electoral units was subsequently to 120,000, 60,000 for each province. Each electoral unit would elect from among themselves an elector who must be at least 25 years of age. The electors of all electoral units would collectively constitute the Electoral College of Pakistan. The latter would
elect the president and the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies. After completion of this political function, the members of the Electoral College were supposed to be converted into members of the union councils in the rural areas under the new system.

It is stated that the Basic Democracies System created a hierarchical administrative structure for local government. Essentially a four-tiered

**TABLE 3.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRUCTURE OF BASIC DEMOCRACY, 1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DIVISIONAL COUNCIL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chairman:</em> Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Members:</em> Half or more elected, remainder officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DISTRICT COUNCIL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chairman:</em> Deputy Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Members:</em> Half or more elected, remainder officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RURAL AREAS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>TEHSIL OR THANA COUNCIL</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chairman:</em> Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Members:</em> Half or more Chairman of union council, remainder officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>URBAN AREAS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CANTONMENT BOARD</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chairman:</em> Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Members:</em> Half Chairman of union committee, half officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chairman:</em> Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Members:</em> Half Chairman of union committee, half officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNION COUNCIL OF TOWN COMMITTEE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chairman:</em> Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Members:</em> 10 – 15 Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNION COMMITTEE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Chairman:</em> Elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Members:</em> Elected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WARDS**


system, the lowest tier was composed of the union councils in rural areas and the union and town committees in urban areas. The chairman of the union council was elected by the members of the union councils from
amongst themselves. The second tier was the thana council in East Pakistan and tehsil in West Pakistan. A thana council consisted of the chairman of the union councils and town committees, if any, and a number of official members, as determined by the commissioner. The sub-divisional officer appointed the official members while remaining as chairman of the thana council. The district council above the thana / tehsil was the most important tier in the Basic Democracies System. It consisted of officials and elected members as determined by the government. But the total of elected members could not be less than the total number of official members. Elected members of the district council were designated by the chairman of the union councils and town committees within the district. Official members were appointed by the commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner (usually a CSP officer) was chair man of the district council and chief executive of the council. Elected members, however, failed to act independently because of the presence of the Deputy Commissioner and other official members.

The divisional council was the highest tier of the system. Elected members of the district council in turn elected the members of the divisional council. Before promulgation of the 1962 Constitution, half the members were appointed officials, and half were not. The Commissioner was the presiding officer. The council was really a coordinating body, meshing the activities of all local councils and municipal bodies within the division. It also recommended certain development schemes to the government. This discussion suggests that different tiers of the system were interdependent, and that the civil servants like the Sub-divisional officer, the deputy commissioner, and the commissioner were the key individuals empowered to supervise the activities of its different tiers. Civil servants continued to
dominate these institutions as chairman of the thana / tehsil, district, and divisional council.

**TABLE 3.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kutcha Roads (miles)</td>
<td>20,920</td>
<td>27,553</td>
<td>28,410</td>
<td>17,841</td>
<td>16,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pucca Roads (miles)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4,928</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges and Culverts (nos.)</td>
<td>7,428</td>
<td>103,798</td>
<td>300,415</td>
<td>8,585</td>
<td>20,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drainage and Canals (miles)</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1,248</td>
<td>5,357</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>1,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embankments (miles)</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>3,654</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>1,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Community Centers</td>
<td>2,307</td>
<td>1,742</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Community Centers</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thana training and Development Centers</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is not possible from our part to understand the system of Basic Democracy fully without examining the role of the Basic Democracy played as envisaged by General Ayub Khan.

It is prescribed in the Basic Democracy Order, 1959 that one of its functions was to undertake development activities, but a shortage of made this key task virtually impossible. Though the Basic Democracies System had taxing powers; the villagers had no way of paying the taxes. 18 Moreover, government grants to the union councils were not sufficient to underwrite development activities. "In 1961-62, compared with a province-wide current budget of... approximately 36 million dollars, the resources commanded by the Basic Democracies, was only... approximately 16 million...
dollars. Of this about one-third was required for current operations, leaving less than... twenty-one cents U.S. per capita for development. While the Basic Democracies made a brave effort and supplemented their limited resources with voluntary assistance, it is not surprising that the villager should have found it difficult to see any improvement."

TABLE 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EAST PAKISTAN</th>
<th>WEST PAKISTAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>200.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>100.55</td>
<td>87.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>121.08</td>
<td>19.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Second Five Year Plan, scheduled to begin in 1960, provided the government with an opportunity to formulate strategies of economic development. Since available resources were not sufficient to insure development activities, the government had to adopt a strategy which called for an expanded program of United States Public Law 480 assistance. With this assistance, the government introduced Rural Works Programs, first as an experiment in 1961 by the Comilla Academy and then as a province-wide scheme in 1962-63. The economic objectives of the program included the following:

1. To provide larger employment, by creating work opportunities in the rural areas on local projects not requiring large capital
investment, the benefits of which can be easily recognized by the workers.

II. To create an infrastructure such as roads, bridges, irrigation channels, and the like in the rural areas, and

III. To raise additional financial and manpower resources for the implementation of local projects, through taxation or voluntary labor.21

The Rural Works Program undertaken by the Basic Democracies System achieved considerable success. A large number of roads, bridges, canals, embankments, community and training centers were constructed or repaired in East Pakistan.22 Table 3.2 shows the physical achievements of the works programs in East Pakistan. In West Pakistan, the program also realized success.23 About 1600 projects were undertaken in 1963-64. Table 3.3 shows the allocation of resources in works program. Responding to these successes, General Ayub observed in 1963, “You would be surprised how much happiness it (the Rural Works Program in East Pakistan) has given the people of East Pakistan... and how much they really feel thankful to the government... wherever you go you get the spontaneous word of thanks from even the ordinary villager.... We are going to continue the system.”24

In support of General Ayub’s enthusiasm the government released the following figures.

“Comparative study of the physical achievements of the Works Program during 1962-63 and 1963-64 reveals that a larger percentage of allocations were devoted in 1963-64 to complex works. ... The Municipal Committees and Town Committees
built 363 culverts and bridges, 28,250 miles of *pucca* (hard-top) roads and 163 drains and canals in 1963-64; the corresponding figure for 1962-63 were 112 bridges and culverts, 336 miles of roads and 84 miles of drains and canals. Of 27,818 miles of roads built during 1963-64 in rural areas 487 miles were *pucca* construction as against 20,926 miles of roads during 1962-63... 856 miles of embankments were raised or repaired and 1,315 miles of canals were excavated or re-excavated during 1963-64 as against 248 miles of embankments and 902 miles of canals during 1962-63.  

Although there is considerable skepticism about the reliability of official statistics on the performance of the Rural Works Program, it is beyond dispute that the Works Program achieved considerable success in developing a rural infrastructure. Our main question is this: What role was played by civil servants in carrying out the Rural Works Program? The evidence suggests that they were an essential part of its success, again providing empirical evidence of bureaucracy’s capacity to implement change when change is consistent with its own interests. The three major activities of the Works Programs, planning, approval and execution will now be discussed.

### 3.3 THE CONSTITUTION OF 1962

The Constitution of 1962 is another important step taken by General Ayub Khan. The constitution commission headed by Justice Shahabuddin recommended a presidential system, direct franchise, though restricted by educational and property qualifications, restoration of political parties and a strong legislature. Apart from the ambiguities and contradictions, which a
closer analysis revealed, the recommendations were greatly at variance with President Ayub's views about political parties and adult franchise.

The idea of controlled democracy enshrined in the scheme of Basic Democracies, in which General Ayub Khan had placed such great trust had been ignored simply. The recommendations understandably were not found acceptable. The cabinet members from West Pakistan, though not from East Pakistan, supported General Ayub Khan for the proposed plan of a constitution. General Ayub Khan promulgated the constitution, drafted by Manzur Qadir, in March 1962. He observed that the constitution was "a blending of democracy with discipline." The constitution provided for a quasi federal and a presidential form of government. At the centre the executive authority was vested in the president, who was elected for a fixed term by an electoral college consisting of the Basic Democrats (BD's). The legislature consisted of a single house, the national assembly, consisting of 150 members, equally divided between the two provinces, East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Its members were also to be elected by the BD's. The Acts passed by the national assembly were not subject to judicial review. The federation consisted of two provinces only, East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Each province was placed under the executive control of a governor, who was the nominee of the president. The BD's also elected the provincial legislatures. However, a few fundamental rights were incorporated in the constitution by a subsequent amendment. Under the constitution the centre was dominant over the provinces and at the centre the president was all-powerful and towered over the national political scene. It was an administrative state in which General Ayub Khan had placed great faith and hoped to bring into existence.
The politicians were debarred for the time being and power was centered in the bureaucracy for practical administration. While pleading that the constitution be given a chance, General Ayub Khan was candid in saying that this was 'his' constitution, and was based on his philosophy of government. It was the result, he remarked, of his "wide study, deep and prolonged thought and a burning desire to help the people in building the country into a sound, vigorous, progressive and a powerful State."12

3.4 REVIVAL OF PARTY SYSTEM

Within a few days of the summoning of the national assembly, the house began to be divided itself into groups. Although the members of the assembly had been indirectly elected on a non-party basis, their role and function was political. The idea of ordering the political life of the country under a constitution without the mechanism of a party system, the vital principle of representative government, was hardly realistic. Election on a non-party basis led to the formation of groups mainly on a regional basis, the opposite of what General Ayub Khan and the constitution makers had anticipated or hoped for. Practical need persuaded General Ayub Khan to reconsider the issue of political parties to which by temperament and conviction he had thus far stood opposed.

Within five weeks of the holding of the first session of the national assembly, the Political Parties Act, 1962, was brought on the statute book. With the legalization of political parties it became unavoidable that General Ayub Khan himself joined one of the existing parties or formed a party of his own. It was therefore, decided to that is, to create a party from the top. The party, which was selected for adoption, was the Muslim League, a hallowed name in the public memory. Within two months of the passing of
the Political Parties Act, the 'Convention Muslim League' was organized as the official government party, deriving its name from the convention of the Muslim League, which had been called with a view to the formation of the new party. The traditional Muslim League, which had refused to accept the Conventionalists as the legitimate Leaguers, came to be known as the Council Muslim League. In December 1963, about six months after the promulgation of the constitution, General Ayub Khan was unanimously elected as the President of Pakistan Convention Muslim League (PCML). The idea so firmly held of running the government under the constitution without party politics disappeared in no time under the stress of political necessity. Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, the then minister for commerce, who had made great efforts in bringing the Convention League into existence, was appointed as its secretary general of the party.

3.5 THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY

General Ayub Khan, after promulgation of the Constitution of 1962, although placed his authority on a constitutional foundation but the army remained the ultimate source of his power. For actual administration the bureaucracy was relied upon as the instrument of governance. The reforming impulse which after the imposition of martial law led to removal or retirement of several hundred officers was brought to a halt, as it was leading to disheartenment among the civil servants, but without destroying the security of tenure, long considered by the civil servants as their most valuable right. The bureaucracy, however, readily transformed itself into the position of a partner in autocracy. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the lineal descendant of the Indian Civil Service (ICS), occupied the pivotal
place. In practice, which it came to wield, the line between the political and the administrative functions was blurred.

General Ayub Khan had entered the political arena with the promulgation of the Political Parties Act in 1962, and could not maintain a steady pace in the changed situation and was obliged to match his wit and talents against the emerging opposition. Without a popular political base, he was driven to rely more on the use of force to silence dissent or on patronage to win the allegiance. In this situation his dependency further increased for the support on the bureaucracy.  

The feudal classes, the emerging bourgeoisie's and business communities provided the two other pillars, which sustained the new political edifice. The land reforms carried out during the early period of martial law was not implemented, high ceilings of land holding allowed and the concessions made on several accounts. The landed classes now also included many army officers and civil servants by the grants of state lands. The traditional feudal leadership in West Pakistan leaned on state power to maintain its dominant position and in turn kept the masses under its hold. The landed aristocracy in West Pakistan was sufficiently represented in the assemblies.

3.6 REGIONALIMS AND OPPOSITION TO THE SYSTEM

With the revival of political activities, the main criticism centered against the constitution and the autocratic rule, as Chaudhry Muhammad Ali called it, 'the rule by rod'. It was evident from the beginning that the politically conscious urbanite middle classes can not reconcile to the scheme of government in which they stood excluded and practically disenfranchised. The indirect elections and the restrictions on 'EBDOed' politicians were the
obvious objects of criticism. The main target was, however, General Ayub Khan himself. The opposition in the west wing, however, did not as yet pose a serious threat to the government because of the bureaucratic hold and the solid support of the landed interests and of big business over the province. The gradual disillusionment of the masses did not find an outlet through the traditional leadership and they were too intimidated to produce leaders from their midst.

In East Pakistan, the ambitious plan of Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy to lead the opposition against General Ayub Khan through his newly formed United Democratic Front (UDF), a device designed to circumvent the ‘ebdo’ disqualification, came to an end with his death on December 5, 1963. After his death the leadership of the Awami League passed into the hands of Sheikh Mujib, who was passionately regional in outlook but loved by the people of East Pakistan. The other notable leader in East Pakistan was the enigmatic Maulana Abdul Hameed Bhashani, who had a radical program, leaned towards Maoist socialism and was devoted to the cause of the poor people.\(^{39}\) The field was left open to these two men with the death of Khwaja Nazimuddin. Nazimuddin in October 1964, like Suhrawardy, had declined General’s offer to join the Convention Muslim League and instead accepted the leadership of the Council Muslim League, which was in opposition.

During Ayubian period the centre of authority lay completely outside East Pakistan. During the parliamentary period Nazimuddin’s premiership ended in his summary dismissal. Suhrawardy held the office for a short period but was forced to resign by Iskander Mirza. But for these two brief and unhappy interludes, the province could not get any opportunity to exercise authority over the affairs of the country since independence. This situation convinced
the most East Pakistanis that an army general in place of the erstwhile administrators exercised the powers. The disparity in income and economic growth, gross under-representation in the army and the civil services and a feeling of economic exploitation began to develop in the minds of the people of East Pakistan, which ultimately resulted in centrifugal tendencies.

It was traceable from a number of factors, such as the difference in natural resources, the initial gap in economic advancement, the availability of capital and entrepreneurial skills and the relatively undeveloped infrastructure. The difference in economic level was accentuated by much the larger share given to the west wing in the development funds and foreign aid from 1950 onwards.

Initially, East Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings from the export of jute and tea were a major source in the industrial development of the west wing. As development began to take place in East Pakistan in pursuance of a deliberate policy, much of the gain was neutralized by the flight of capital from the east wing to the western part, hence, most of the industrial and commercial enterprises originated, were owned by the western wing. A stage came when the impetus of economic growth achieved was widening the gap. Thus, despite the expressed provisions in the 1962 constitution to remove disparity, greater diversion of funds to the eastern part and emphasis on their utilization, bifurcation of departments, such as the railways, the Water and Power Development Authority and the Industrial Development Bank, and the allocation of the seat of the national assembly and the building of a second capital at Dacca, failed to respond to the actual needs and increasing expectations of the people.
The Finance Commission in 1963 while analyzing the problem of disparity could see no way of bringing the provinces at par except by a total deceleration of growth in the western wing, which was obviously impossible. The issue of disparity, therefore, vitiated the political atmosphere and the region became more conscious of the fact of disparity, more vocal in its expression of dissatisfaction and more insistent on bringing about a change in their relative backwardness.\textsuperscript{40}

The regime did not seem to have realized danger of the situation. It tended to view the growing dissatisfaction as the work of unscrupulous agitation and vainly relied on the bureaucracy to find an answer to what was essentially a political problem. There was thinking as early as 1963 that a solution on the lines of economic autonomy could perhaps be an answer to save the country from irresistible tension and disintegration.\textsuperscript{41}

The central problem, however, eluded General Ayub Khan. He was conscious and proud of what he had done and was doing for the uplift of the eastern region. He did not seem to realize that what has been done was not sufficient in an atmosphere of mounting expectations and that in any event economic improvement could not be a substitute for a share in political authority.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, in both parts of the country, the masses began to feel alienated. The political institutions, which General Ayub Khan had created, were unable to bridge the increasing gulf between the government and the people. The legislature was a small house of 150 and under the constitution its powers were limited. The members of the house mostly represented vested interests without a following among the masses and lacked the moral strength and popular legitimacy. The national assembly in the circumstances failed to reflect the national will.
The Convention Muslim League had also become an instrument in the hands of General Ayub Khan to mobilize public opinion in favor of the regime. It was a creation from the top and suffered the disabilities of a 'King's party'. The party did not have economic program to inspire the people. It stood in effect for the maintenance of the status quo. The advent of the political parties, as may be recalled, was a later development and although Ayub Khan had been forced to allow their existence and become the head of an official political party, his instincts were administrative rather than political.

The system of Basic Democracies no doubt tended to pull the people away from a state of passivity. The Rural Works Program provided jobs to the rural urbanites. The Basic Democrats constituted a fraction of the population. They were unable to develop an independent character of their own. Most of the BD's were men of straw, thanks largely to the rejection or disregard of the scheme by the intelligentsia and the politically conscious sections of the society. The hopes initially placed on the scheme to provide a base on which a process of democratization would be gradually built up had begun to fade, while the scheme was still in its early years. The tutorship of the administrators gave place to trusteeship and the system became an appendage to the bureaucracy, reminiscent of the District Boards of pre-independence days. Corrupted and smothered by the bureaucrats, the system of Basic Democracy became the objects of mockery, a development bound inevitably to react on the moral authority of those elected by them, including the president.
3.7 THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1965

General Ayub Khan before the presidential elections adopted certain measures to strengthen his position. Under the Second Amendment to the constitution, 46 the order of the election of BD's the president and the members of the assemblies were changed. The election of the Electoral College was scheduled in November 1964, followed by the presidential election and the elections of the assemblies.

The need of a favorable press led to the promulgation of West Pakistan Press and Publication Ordinance in August 1963, empowering the government such powers as removal from the approved media and confiscation of the press. Powers for the detention of editors and publishers were available under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance and the safety laws. The journalists softened the terms of the Ordinance in the face of protest. The concessions made to the journalists were, however, counter-balanced by the establishment of the National Press Trust in 1964. The National Press Trust, which was apparently the brainchild of the information ministry, could acquire existing newspapers or establish new ones from its own resources. The regime thereby acquired independent means of projecting the personality of General Ayub Khan and his policies. By centralizing government advertisement and through the dispensation of patronage, favorable reporting was encouraged and criticism got diluted.

As the presidential election (scheduled to be held in January 1965) approached, the opposition parties in the national assembly formed an alliance called the Combined Opposition Parties (COP). The alliance comprised the Council Muslim League led by Khawaja Nazimuddin and Mian Muntaz Mohammad Khan Daultana; the Awami League of Sheikh
Mujib; the National Awami Party (NAP) led respectively in East and West Pakistan by Maulana Bhashani and Khan Abdul Wali Khan. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali headed the Nizam-e-Islam Party while Maulana Maudoodi was the chief of the Jamait-i-Islami.

The main interest of the elections centered on the presidential candidates. The elimination of General Azam Khan as a likely COP candidate had been secured through a condition laid down by Moulana Bhashani that the COP would not accept any one as a candidate who had been associated with the martial law of October 1958. The other likely candidate, Khawaja Nazimuddin died in October 1964. The heterogeneous opposition alliance, dubbed by the regime as the Jugto Front appeared for a while undecided or unable to find a candidate of sufficient stature to challenge General Ayub Khan and seemed to be heading towards a fiasco due to internal discord.

Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the Father of the Nation, Quad e Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, agreed to be a candidate for the office of the president on behalf of the COP. The entry of Fatima Jinnah, Madr-e-Millat upset all calculations of the regime and turned the presidential election into an event of the first importance. Elections in the country turned on personalities rather than on a program, more so in a presidential election, but with this significant difference that whereas Fatima Jinnah represented revival of democracy, while General Ayub Khan stood for the maintenance of autocracy. General Ayub’s personality and conduct was put to the test due to the concentration of authority in his hands. The constitution and the dictatorial nature of General Ayub Khan’s rule indirectly elections, corruption and nepotism, figured as prominent issues. Fatima Jinnah took up all these issues and lashed out against the regime in a countrywide
campaign. There were restrictions on public meetings. Thus it was that when Fatima Jinnah castigated General Ayub Khan's rule there was a tumultuous response from the people as she articulated their feelings.

The election resulted in the victory of General Ayub Khan with 49,647 votes; Miss Fatima Jinnah secured 28,345 votes.\(^5\) When considered that the voters comprised the Electoral College of the Basic Democrats who were highly amenable to official persuasion\(^6\) her performance was indeed remarkable. It is interesting to know that she carried the votes from the urban centers of Karachi, Dacca and Chittagong. General Ayub Khan's victory no doubt marked the high watermark of his authority and he proceeded henceforth with renewed self-assurance. It was, however, proved to be a perilous triumph.

3.8 THE DECLINE OF GENERAL AYUB KHAN

As discussed earlier the essential weakness of General Ayub's system notably was its failure to establish a popular basis of authority. However, the war of 1965 with India and subsequently the 'Tashkent Agreement' exposed the weaknesses of the regime made it defensive. This situation provided the opposition a renewed sprite to stand against the regime. Although, after the war General Ayub Khan realized that the decision to go war with India in 1965 was a fatal mistake of his career,\(^7\) and he blamed Z. A. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad,\(^8\) the foreign secretary, for misleading him.\(^9\) The theory of a conspiracy allegedly hatched by the foreign office appears to lack a solid basis. Stanley Wolpert has observed "Bhutto's rhetoric thrilled every Pakistani who heard it, especially the men back home who knew they had lost the war but whose dream of victory was being kept alive by the words carried by the wireless radio to Karachi, Rawal Pindi and Lahore."\(^10\) The
speech relayed on the radio and the television and projected by the newspapers, lifted Bhutto immediately into the position of a hero. In the aftermath of the war and the Tashkent Declaration, dissatisfaction had broken out into an outburst of rioting by the students, which was later joined by the urban population, a situation that was ripe for exploitation by the politicians. More portentously, General Ayub Khan’s prestige within the army had suffered eclipse.

In an atmosphere of disillusionment and economic discontent the movement for the dissolution of West Pakistan from One Unit in the west wing and the movement for regional autonomy in East Pakistan began to assert them with growing strength. On his return from Tashkent, President Ayub Khan chose to maintain silence. He was to pay heavily for this grave misjudgment of the nation’s temper. His belated broadcast to the nation on the radio two days later in the wake of widespread demonstrations and rioting by the students in West Pakistan failed to assuage feelings.

The demonstrations by the students exposed the unpopularity of the regime and the politicians felt encouraged to take advantage of the situation. The main opposition came from West Pakistan and mainly from the Muslim League but it proved powerless to organize dissent into an effective challenge. A National Conference was convened in February 1966, to evolve a common stand on the Tashkent Declaration. More than 700 delegates attended the National Conference; only 21 represented East Pakistan and were led by Sheikh Mujib. It was in this Conference Sheikh Mujib put forward his famous Six Points. He appeared more concerned with the issue of autonomy for East Pakistan than with the Tashkent Declaration. The conference failed, though it condemned the Tashkent Declaration. The
ineffectiveness of the Opposition was demonstrated by the arrests of the prominent leaders as soon as the conference was concluded. Protests over the arrests took place failed to shake the government. The government turned its attention to East Pakistan with more confidence, after subduing the opposition in West Pakistan. In a sudden crackdown, Sheikh Mujib and a number of his supporters were arrested. Sheikh Mujib was later accused, along with some others, of a secessionist plot, known as the Agartala Conspiracy. 58

The circumstances attending the establishment of One Unit i.e., the integration of the provinces of West Pakistan into a single province had been inauspicious. Its practical working ensured its failure as well. The concentration of authority at Lahore, the seat of the provincial government, became a source of infinite irritation and constant inconvenience, and led to the neglect of local needs and problems. It offered little scope for regional political ambition. While the first problem was amenable to some kind of a solution, like the delegation of authority or bifurcation of departments, the second defied a solution. This unsatisfactory state of affairs was, however, allowed to drift, setting in motion centrifugal forces within the body-politic, further weakening the declining authority of the regime.

The rise of the movement for regional autonomy in East Pakistan constituted the most significant political development during the rule of Ayub Khan and bore testimony to its major political failure. In a democracy, a majority is not in need of protection or safeguards. An exclusion from political authority had combined with a grievance against economic exploitation to create a climate, which threatened national unity. Twenty-six years after the Lahore Resolution was passed in 1940, a veiled scheme for complete provincial
autonomy was presented by Sheikh Mujib in the same city, which was embodied in the famous ‘Six Points’. These developments moved rapidly towards a climax. In the tangled web of events it is difficult to pick out one factor as being more important than the other is. It was the cumulative weight of various factors under which the regime staggered to a fall.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after his removal from the cabinet, at first maintained silence and later, he played with the idea of forming a forward block within the Convention Muslim League. When faced with the choice to either conform to the party discipline or quit, he left the Convention League and formed his own independent party, called the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). His opposition to the regime had been cautious. In the months following the blessings of some of the generals he lashed out against the policies and person of General Ayub Khan whom he portrayed as having capitulated at Tashkent and threatened to disclose the secret clauses. A scuffle between the students and the police at the Polytechnic College in Rawalpindi led to the death of one student, which was immediately seized upon by Bhutto to spark off a countrywide agitation. The movement soon spread to East Pakistan where the Awami League already prepared the ground.

The decline in General Ayub Khan’s authority was shown in the matter of the Agartala Conspiracy. The accused allegedly had been meeting at Agartala, a border town in India, where P. N. Ojha, a First Secretary, joined them in the Indian High Commission who was declared a persona non grata. The accused included two CSP officers, Lt. Commander Muazzam and a few junior officers. It may, however, be observed that during the trial, Mujib gained virtual martyrdom and the death of one of the accused in detention, who was shot down while attempting to escape, caused serious large-scale
riots. Agitation, which had hitherto been mainly confined to West Pakistan now, spread to East Pakistan and martial law imposed in major cities.

The Emergency imposed since the Indo Pakistan War in September 1965 was curiously lifted in February 1969. Thousands of political workers who had been detained were released. A call for a meeting with the opposition leaders went from the President. Agartala case was ordered closed. Sheikh Mujib was apparently vindicated. Ayub was, thus forced to seek accommodation with the politicians. General Ayub’s attempts at negotiations were initially unsuccessful.

Opposition alliance was prepared for talks on the platform of Democratic Action Committee (DAC), on certain pre-conditions. The president’s statement in February 1969 to retire on the expiration of his term in January 1970 made it possible for the round table talks to take place which were finally held in Rawalpindi and were attended by the representatives of the DAC and Sheikh Mujib. By obtaining the President’s agreement to the restoration of the parliamentary system and adult franchise, the DAC had won its principal demands. The emergency was already lifted. The President did not yield to the demand for the dissolution of West Pakistan (One Unit) and to the Six Points. Mujib, being unsatisfied on these issues withdrew from the DAC and the Round Table talks broke down. The withdrawal of Mujib and the consequent breakdown of the talks provoked disorder in East Pakistan, beginning with the call to strike by the All-Pakistan Students Action Committee at Dacca which brought to a halt train services and governmental work. Violence penetrated the rural areas and many of the lower functionaries and the Basic Democrats were murdered. Agitation grew unabated and the situation evidently gone beyond the power of the civilian
authorities. The imposition of martial law evidently implied that the constitution would be scrapped. General Ayub Khan resigned his office in March 1969, and formally asked General Yahya Khan, commander-in-chief of the army, to take over authority. General Yahya Khan promptly imposed his martial law, abrogated the constitution of 1962 and imposed a bane on the political parties.

3.9 General Yahya Khan and the New Martial Law

After the resignation of General Ayub Khan in March 1969, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan imposed martial law and abrogated the constitution of 1962. The authority General Ayub was melted away in the midst of political agitation. In East Pakistan, the movement for regional autonomy led by Sheikh Mujib of the Awami League, threatened and in West Pakistan, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto led a mass Populist Party, the Pakistan People’s Party, on a platform of popular radical program of social and economic change. These movements, as perceived by General Ayub Khan ‘a senseless agitation’, were the outgrowth of political suppression over a decade.

General Yahya Khan had been a closed ally of General Ayub Khan in the military take over of October 1958. He gained rapid promotions and became a general at the young age of 40. General Ayub later elevated him to the top slot in the army. During his career he had little exposure to politics, except perhaps during his term as the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in East Pakistan in the year 1962. That was the time when disturbances had broken out and unnies prevailed in the eastern province as a result of the unceremonious dismissal of General Azam Khan, the governor of the province.
General Yahya Khan and his colleagues lacked the vision of political understanding, which were astir in the country, much less to attempt a political and a constitutional answer before the problems became insurmountable. He took major political decisions and called into existence a national assembly under a Legal Framework Order (LFO). That assembly was destined never to meet and the country drifted towards civil war, followed by a military action in East Pakistan and the separation of East Pakistan.

3.10 **LEGAL FRAMEWORK ORDER (LFO 1969)**

During his negotiation with the politicians in the closing phase of his rule, General Ayub Khan 'had agreed to restore the Parliamentary system of government, and hold elections under the universal adult franchise, in place of the electoral college of the Basic Democrats. But he stood firm against the demand for the dissolution of 'One Unit' into its former federating unites, a demand made by the political leaders of the smaller provinces, notably Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Mir Gaus Bux Bizanjo and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Neither did he agree to replace the parity principle of representation between the two wings in the legislature, which formed the basis of the constitutional settlement of 1956. General Yahya Khan decided to dissolve West Pakistan and to undo parity in the vain hope of satisfying political demands in both parts of the country. The principle of one-man one vote was unexceptionable from the democratic viewpoint. Its application, however, have been resisted in the past by the elite in the west wing on account of its fears of Bengali predominance. Parity of representation of the two wings was adopted as a compromise formula in the constitution of 1956, but it was not put to a test, since elections under the constitution of 1956 were never held. The general
elections which were scheduled to be held in February 1959 could not be held due to the abrogation of the constitution of 1956 in October 1958. Under Ayubian system, 'parity' became unimportant because the center of power was located in the office of the President and rather in the legislature, and East Pakistan was practically excluded from a share in authority, a factor contributing in due course to the rise of the movement for regional autonomy.

When General Yahya Khan assumed power, the politics of the country already polarized between its two wings. The decision to hold election on adult suffrage, one-man-one-vote, was fraught with danger. With the grant of numerical preponderance to East Pakistan, the prospect of its domination become real as no political parties existed at the national level with a following in both parts. It seems that the military regime naively visualized the emergence of a number of political parties in the legislature leading to unstable coalition governments, leaving the initiative in the hands of the military which could order the political life of the country according to, its own dispensation.

General Yahya Khan had a pledge to transfer authority to civilian hands as soon as the elected representatives framed a 'suitable constitution'. In July 1969, Justice Abdus Sattar was appointed as the Chief Election Commissioner. In November, General Yahya Khan announced that One Unit would be dissolved and announced the date for the forthcoming elections as October 5, 1970.

The Legal Framework Order (issued on March 30 1970) laid down the principles to which the constitution must conform. The national assembly was required to frame a constitution within 120 days. Out of 313 seats of the
proposed national assembly (including 13 seats reserved for women) the number of seats allotted to East Pakistan was 169, including 7 reserved for women. The remaining seats were apportioned among the provinces of the west wing.\textsuperscript{45} Political activities were allowed from January 1970. Incredibly, a simple majority of the proposed national assembly was prescribed for the approval of the constitution. Although G. W. Choudhury provided the requirement of 60 per cent vote of the total membership of the legislature in the L. F. O, draft; However, General Yahya Khan dropped the clause from the plan at the eleventh hour.\textsuperscript{46} It was evident that the constitution would be federal in form.\textsuperscript{47} The prescription of a simple majority implied that East Pakistan could over-ride the four provinces of the west wing. The provision of a simple majority, besides being most unusual for the approval of a constitution for several provinces carried the obvious risk of political confrontation between the two parts of the country.

3.11 \textbf{THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1970}

In the history of Pakistan the first general elections were held in 1970. However, general elections were frequently promised but not held. During General Ayub Khan's regime (1958-69), under the controlled democracy, elections to the legislatures and to the office of the President were indirectly held under the constitution of 1962, but the voters comprised the Electoral College of 80,000 Basic Democrats (subsequently the number was later increased to 1, 20, 000), equally divided between the two wings. The general election promised by General Yahya Khan and scheduled to be held on October 5, 1970 on the basis of universal adult franchise were the first, which signaled an event of major significance.\textsuperscript{48}
The election campaign, which began in January 1970, was allowed to continue for almost a year. Awami League under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib in East Pakistan dominated the political scene from the beginning. The charter for a provincial autonomy was contained in the Six Points, first announced in March 1966, at Lahore. Briefly, they called for:

I. A Federal Pakistan on the basis of the Lahore Resolution; a parliamentary form of government and adult franchise.

II. Federal government to deal only with defense and foreign affairs.

III. Two freely convertible currencies for East and West Pakistan, or in lieu, effective provisions to prevent the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. A separate Banking Reserve and a separate fiscal and monetary policy for the eastern province.

IV. Provinces alone to have tax-levying powers, but Center would be entitled to a share for its expenditure.

V. The two regions to establish trade links with foreign countries with separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings. The two Wings to share equally the Center’s expenses.

VI. The establishment of a separate militia or a para-military force for East Pakistan.

The Awami League’s election campaign gathered increasing momentum during the yearlong campaign and turned into a movement of Bengali resurgence. On the other hand, in West Pakistan, the emergence of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto on the political scene was a relatively new development. The election campaign gave him the opportunity for the exercise of his political
talents. He enunciated a program, which carried a mass appeal. The Pakistan People's Party presented its philosophy thus; Islam is our religion; Socialism is our economy; Democracy is our politics and all power belongs to the people. It summed up its electoral promise as the provision to every one of *roti, kapra* and *makan* (lit. food, clothing and shelter) and the grant of 12 acres of land to each landless peasant.\(^7\) Within months, Bhutto was able to gain ascendancy over all other parties despite their traditional hold and the influence of individual candidates. His politics of change, carrying a promise of economic uplift and his charismatic personality emerged as a politician with a capacity to reach the masses. He was able to acquire the image of a man of the people.

The polls were finally held in December 1970. In the western wing, the Pakistan People's Party emerged with 82 seats (out of 138 allotted to West Pakistan) as the single largest party, though it was able to secure only one seat from the NWFP and none from Balochistan. In the Eastern Wing, Awami League of Sheikh Mujib swept the polls by securing 167 seats out of 169 allotted to the province. National Awami Party (NAP) proved the largest party in Balochistan and NWFP.

### 3.12 DILEMMA OF TRANSFER OF POWER

The results of the elections astonished the military regime. Sheikh Mujib's victory was no doubt anticipated but not the extent. In the western part, while the success of PPP of Bhutto exceeded its own expectations. For the military junta the results of the election were a real crisis. According to the Legal Framework Order no special majority or a consensus required among the provinces for making a constitution.\(^7\) As the largest party, the Awami League by itself could legally frame a constitution and even to form the
government. In fact there could be only one legitimate government in Pakistan, the one formed by the Awami League. Ever since Sheikh Mujib propounded the Six Points in March 1966, they had been viewed by the elite in the west wing as a charter of separation.

General Yahya Khan seems to have naively regarded the Six Points as negotiable. During the yearlong election campaign the movement for regional autonomy, however, turned into full-blown nationalism. A hypnotic hold over the masses seemed to generate in Sheikh Mujib with the electoral triumph now came a defiance which could question Yahya Khan, "Whose representative are you?" The elections had undermined the political basis of General Yahya Khan's authority. The landslide victory of Awami League seemed to have sealed the doors of a compromise. The hard-liners in his party were strident and bent on realizing their demands to the full.

The procedure prescribed by the Legal Framework Order was clear. The national assembly should meet, frame a constitution and submitted it to the President (General Yahya Khan) for authentication. The constitution was, however, required to conform to the principles laid down in the Legal Framework Order. Bhutto wanted Sheikh Mujib to frame a constitution with his consent. Wilcox has remarked that by taking a stand on the Six Points, he (Bhutto) posed as the greater nationalist. There were three parties in the country, declared Bhutto: the army, the Awami League and the Pakistan People's Party. Bhutto wanted a prior settlement outside the National Assembly and demanded the postponement of the National Assembly session scheduled to be held on March 3, 1971, and General Yahya did the same. This unilateral announcement of the postponement of the Assembly Session provoked strike and violence in East Pakistan and also
confirmed the apprehensions for a smooth transfer of power. The strength of the protest forced General Yahya Khan to announce a fresh date for the session, as March 25, 1971. But the deadlock remained unresolved. Riots, strikes and violence continued. General Yahya Khan left Dacca unannounced on 25 March. In the same night Sheikh Mujib was arrested and was flown out to West Pakistan. It was the beginning of the end.

3.13 THE ARMY ACTION AND FALL OF EAST PAKISTAN

The arrest of Sheikh Mujib was a sheer miscalculation of the military regime that left no choice for the Awami League but to resist. Awami League was not ready for a physical armed conflict with the army. Initially the army met with resistance from the Bengali members of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), from the police and para-military organizations. Due to the poor means of communications impeded the rapid movement of the army. It was only after a few weeks the province was controlled through military means, which was rested on unstable foundations. In the emotional frenzy, which took possession of the people, thousand of people belonging to the minority communities settled in East were slaughtered. Counter measures brutalized the soldiers. During the army action, a few thousand persons belonging to the East Pakistan Rifles, the police and other semi-military organizations fled across the border into India to grow, with Indian support and training, into the future Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army) of Bangladesh.

The army, although its strength had been increased, barely exceeded 40,000 at the time, facing a vast hostile population and seemed rather difficult to have military solution to the problem. Therefore the regime counted on a political arrangement with the moderate sections of the Awami League and the rightist or orthodox parties. However, the regime acted swiftly to
establish firm military control over the province before attempting a political solution.

The crisis in East Pakistan caused extraordinary excitement in India, which was understandable with the background of Indian hostility towards Pakistan. The position taken up by the Indian government was summed up in the resolution moved by Mrs. Indira Gandhi and unanimously adopted by the Indian Parliament on March 31, 1971. The resolution accused the Pakistan government of committing genocide. The Indian declared the cause of the ‘macabre tragedy’ as the refusal by the government of Pakistan to transfer power to the legally elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan. The resolution concluded with the key passage: “This House records its profound conviction that the historic upsurge of the 75 million people of East Bengal will triumph. The House wishes to assure them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the whole hearted sympathy and support of the people of India.” The policy of armed intervention leading up to the war was implicit in the resolution of the Indian Parliament and it seems that plans for the same had been taken in hand soon after the crisis broke out in East Pakistan. “After 25 March”, as Jackson has pointed out, “the deliberate choices of the Indian government became the decisive factor in the situation.” The training and the arming of guerrillas with the object of their incursion into East Pakistan began. Indian efforts were, however, initially aimed at securing international intervention by the mobilization of opinion to prevent the alleged violation of human rights and to safeguard peace in the subcontinent.

The Awami League or the forces, which it had been able to organize with Indian assistance, could not hope to overcome or destroy the power of the
army. Although some kind of a solution was considered as likely to emerge in the long run, it was difficult to predict that it would have necessarily resulted in the separation or independence of East Pakistan. Meanwhile, the activities of the Mukti Bahini with increasing Indian support became menacing with the launching of the guerrilla offensive. In short the Indian Army moved in and the war began which lasted 14 days. Dacca fell on December 16, 1971. The Eastern Command surrendered. Ninety thousand persons, including some civilians, were taken as prisoners of war. General Yahya was forced to step down and hand over the powers to Bhutto. Bhutto assumed power as President and the civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator.

From the above discussions it can be concluded that General Ayub Khan’s rule thus ended on a note of disillusionment and failure of his system. He strived to give to the country a stable political structure but his rule exposed the weakness and limitations of an administrative state and the unreality of aiming at political stability through bureaucratic discipline. The experiment of training people in the art of self-government under the scheme of Basic Democracies had failed in its early stages and had left them more than ever alienated. At the same time, the futility of indirect elections had been demonstrated. General Ayub Khan’s rule, through exclusion of East Pakistan from a share in political authority and its economic subservience to the west wing, only contributed to the rise of the movement for regional autonomy and Bengali nationalism in the eastern province. The urge for political participation the hopes and aspirations of the urban population, and even the rural masses, found no response in the man or his program. The traditional power structure based on land owning, continued, to which were aligned the
rising commercial and industrial classes. General Ayub gave to the country a modernistic face. He unleashed private initiative to usher in vast industrial and agrarian development. But the social cost of development was underestimated or not understood. As Ayub Khan's authority declined in the midst of a mass discontent, new political forces gripped East and West Pakistan.

The bureaucracy looked upon General Ayub Khan's rule as its golden period. But as partners in autocracy it had to share the blame for its failures. The experiment of controlled democracy failed to prepare the people for democracy. In fact, it arrested a genuine growth of politics. There was a little freedom for the growth of a genuine political system. Whatever little politics was allowed it veered round the towering and authoritarian personality of General Ayub Khan. The political system was also linked with the person of General Ayub Khan to permit its Continuity. The system and the party, which he had created, crumbled to the dust after his fall. General Ayub Khan thus left a political vacuum.

It is clear from our analysis that an imbalance existed not only in the political-administrative sector but also in the economic sector. These fundamental differences had a tremendous impact upon political development in Pakistan. Our analysis also shows that Muslim politicians in pre-independence days could not acquire much experience in the art of government because of the absence of disciplined parties in the legislature. Moreover, the masses were not permitted by the colonial power to exercise their franchise, to elect responsible, broadly representative parties. Politicians after independence failed to perform their proper, traditional functions. In the first decade of independence, Pakistan experienced a high
level of political instability caused by the shifting allegiance of politicians from one party to the other. The Muslim League, which dominated the politics of independence of Pakistan, after independence, failed to deal with various critical issues like language, the role of Islam in the new state of Pakistan, and political representation in the federal legislature. The failure of the League to deal with these issues led to its downfall. Its disintegration led to the development of several smaller parties, which in turn created an unstable political situation in Pakistan. Thus political parties in Pakistan did indeed fail to provide stability for the system. The facade of parliamentary politics finally culminated in the advent of military dictatorship in 1958. During the Ayub regime (1958-69) political parties in Pakistan were not allowed to function independently. The constitution, which President Ayub introduced in 1962, was an attempt to institutionalize one-man rule, based on a "controlled" National Assembly that could only discuss and debate and had no control of the purse. Political parties failed to work independently. Finally, our analysis points out that political parties in Pakistan failed to satisfy Huntington's four criteria of institutionalization, i.e.; adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Therefore, it can be said without hesitation that the pace of political development in Pakistan was very slow.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 General Ayub Khan had been the commander-in-chief of the army since 1951. It might be of interest to observer that during the same period there was one Prime Minister in India but several C-in-Cs. But in contrast Pakistan there had nine Prime Ministers during the same period.


5 Ibid.


9 Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, op. cit., pp. 256-57. (Ayub admitted that some political activities were allowed only on the persuasion of his friends.)

10 The politicians who were ‘FBDed’ were such as Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Guramani, Amin Muntaz Muhammad Khan Daulatana and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy.


13 The name Convention Muslim League was derived from the convention of the Muslim League which was called with a view to form a new political party.

14 See Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, op. cit., p. 205.


16 The Development Advisory Council was abolished in 1962.


19 Ibid., p. 36.


27 For a detailed reference of the role of Circle Officer. see M. Anisuzzaman. The Circle Officer, (Dacca: NiPA, 1963).
34 Mustafa Choudhury, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
38 *Ibid*.
41 Hamid Yusuf, *op cit.*, p. 82.
42 G. W. Choudhury, *op. cit.*, p. 44. Choudhury has reported a conversation when Ayub Khan was no longer in office in which Ayub Khan is said to have remarked: “Tell me, what they were asking for? Did not my provincial Governor Moneem enjoy all the powers needed for running the provincial government in East Pakistan? What more could I grant?”
44 Mustafa Choudhury, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
48 *Hugo* is a Bengali word meaning 'of whole world', a sarcastic expression implying all and sundry.
49 *Lit*, mother of the nation.
The maneuvering of votes by Monem Khan, Governor of East Pakistan was too well known, as was also the case in many parts of West Pakistan. For further reference see K. J. Newman, Basic democracy as an Experiment, Political Studies, (X, 1962), pp. 46-64, and M. A. T. R. Rehman, Basic Democracies at Grass Roots, (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1962); and Raunia Jahan, op. cit.

G. W. Chaudhry, op. cit., p. 37.

As a result, both Z. A. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad were removed from the offices.

G. W. Chaudhry, op. cit., p. 20.


See Altaf Gauhar, op. cit., p. 391.


See G. W. Chaudhury, op. cit., pp. 23-31, writing in 1974 on the basis of personal knowledge and the revelations made to him by General Peershada has stated that the agitation launched by Bhutto was the result of collusion between him and General Peershada who was an archenemy of Ayub Khan. In 1964, Peershada had been removed from the office of Military Secretary to the President following a heated attack. He had never forgotten it. He now wanted to re-enter the President’s House but this time as Yahya’s associate and with more powers.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan pronounced Yahya Khan’s assumption of authority as illegal and he was declared a usurper. See Asma Ijani vs. State, S. C. 1972 PLD, p. 139. Yahya Khan was, however, no longer in office.

This act was considered to have been in breach of the constitution, on which Ayub Khan claimed that he had ‘sweated blood’. Under the provisions of the constitution the speaker of the assembly should have assumed authority, pending election of the new President.

For detail see G. W. Chowdhury, op. cit.

See Raunia Jahan, op. cit.

The state of the country in March 1969 was vastly different from its condition in October 1958. The authoritarian rule stood rejected and was no longer acceptable in the conditions of the time.

For a detailed reference of 1970 elections see G. W. Choudhury, Last Days of United Pakistan, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 87. G. W. Choudhury had drafted the LFO and was a member of the cabinet.

Ibid.

After the dissolution of the ‘One Unit’ the West Pakistan was divided into four provinces, Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Balochistan. The Princely States were merged to the geographical boundaries of the respective provinces.

In the early fifties elections in the province were held on the basis of adult franchise. On these the Election Commission of 1961 has observed that, “they were a mockery and a farce, a fraud on the electorate.”
69 See S. Humayun, *op. cit.*


71 Hamid Yusuf, *op. cit.,* p. 87.


74 According to *ibid.,* Yahya Khan is reported to have been informally assured by Mujib that he would modify the Six Points after the election.

75 See G. W. Choudhury, *op. cit.,* p. 237. On January 31, 1970 an Indian plane Ganges, which had taken off from Srinagar en route to Delhi, was hijacked and landed at Lahore. The hijackers claimed to belong to the Kashmir Liberation League. This incidence assumed great significance during the war of 1971. As a result the Indian government stopped overland flights of Pakistan, civil and military aircraft to East Pakistan.


77 W. A. Wilcox, “Political Role of the Army”, *South Asian Studies,* (Vol. 7 No. 1. 1972), p. 43.


82 The text of the Resolution is reproduced in *Ibid.,* p. 171.

83 *Ibid.,* p. 149.

84 Hamid Yusuf, *op. cit.,* p. 132.
CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW PAKISTAN FROM 1971-1977
CHAPTER 4

4. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

IN THE NEW* PAKISTAN FROM 1971-1977

The consequences of the fall of East Pakistan and surrender of army† left no other choice for the army to hand over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the largest political party in the West Pakistan, the New Pakistan.1 The chapter attempts to study the era of first elected government in Pakistan. This era is very significant for our study, as the major administrative reforms, the Administrative Reform 1973 was formulated and implemented during this period.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed the position of the highest authority as a result of an extraordinary political career. He had already served in the cabinet of President Iskander Mirza and General Muhammad Ayub Khan as a minister. The developments following the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965 had led to Bhutto’s exit from Ayub Khan’s cabinet in 1966.2 He had, however, by then earned a reputation as a young nationalist with flair of appeal for the youth.3 His image as the champion of the rights and sovereignty of the country was greatly enhanced by his moving presentation of Pakistan’s case in the Security Council during the 1965 war.4 The period from the mid of 1966 until 1970, Mr. Bhutto spent most of his time in building up his political position.

*The New Pakistan is the present Pakistan, after 1971, previously, the West Pakistan.
†The war of 1971 ended with surrender of Pakistan army. About 90000 soldiers reported to have surrendered.
Bhutto formally announced his new party the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) at Lahore in December 1967. J. A. Rahim, a diplomat, and Dr. Mubashir Hasan, an engineer by profession, were the ideologues of the party. Towards the end of 1968, he had emerged as a formidable opponent and rival of his former patron, who was then in decline. In 1969, Ayub Khan was ousted from the office in consequence of a mass political agitation which paved the way for military regime of General Yahya Khan to assume the power. In the following year general elections were held in the country for the first time. Bhutto who came forward with a promise of economic uplift received spontaneous support from the people in West Pakistan. Bhutto’s charismatic leadership projected himself as a passionate champion of the rights of the common man. He rode to triumph in West Pakistan during the general election. Although he had now emerged as an elected leader in the western wing, political office eluded him. As discussed earlier, the country was engulfed in a deep political crisis, followed by the cataclysmic events of the army action and the civilian uprising in East Pakistan that culminated in Indian aggression and the secession of the eastern province. The defeat of the army during the India-Pakistan war of December 1971 paved the way for Bhutto to use his mandate to get political power transferred from General Yahya Khan.

J. A. Rahim, who had been instrumental in framing the fourfold motto and drafting the Manifesto of the Pakistan People’s Party in October 1966. The nutshell of the program of the new party was on the following slogans: 

I. Islam is our Faith,  
II. Democracy is our Polity, and  
III. Socialism is our economy.
IV. The source of power rests to the People."

Through a grand synthesis Bhutto apparently sought to society based on religious faith, economic justice and popular rights. He came forward with a program of economic and social reform and laid down the guiding principles of his policy: Islam, Socialism and Democracy. A promise of economic uplift was epitomized in the slogan of *Roti, Kapra and Makan* (food, clothing and shelter). The manifesto contained the pledge to nationalize basic industries. During the election campaign of 1970, Bhutto found the opportunity to develop a mass following in the provinces of the Punjab and Sindh, which led to his electoral victory in the two provinces Sind and Punjab.

The majority of the people of Pakistan resides in the rural areas and is mostly landless peasants, workers or tenants, who lived in appalling conditions of extreme poverty and endured the oppression of the landlords for generations. The inability to change the conditions of their lives had bred deep apathy and they lived as if they were the victims of nature’s seemingly unchanging laws. At the time of independence, the Muslim League was able to gain favor of these vast multitudes, stirred their imagination and planted a New Hope in their hearts. The bitter realization that their lot had remained the same even after independence had driven them to disillusionment and despair. Meanwhile, social expectations had risen by the growth of education, urbanization and an awareness of the amenities for life, by a steady growth of political consciousness and the will to improve. Oblivious of the times, the rapid growth of industry had ignored the legitimate claims of labor for adequate wages, security of employment and the provision of a minimum of social amenities. Discontent smoldered alongside the growth
of big business. The emerging class of capitalists and business flaunted its newly gained wealth and made the contrast between extreme poverty and affluence, too sharp to be accepted in the changing circumstances.

Despite his feudalist background, Bhutto represented the educated middle class as well. The personality, education and the style and the essentially secular foundation of his party charmed and attracted the educated sections of society. There were, besides, a growing number of young educated people qualified for a wide range of professions, but unable to find careers or avenues of employment, who were resentful of the iniquitous economic system and of a social set-up, which has been denied to them a rightful place in the society. They found a radical program a New Hope in the program of his party.

The role of Mr. Bhutto, although, during the East Pakistan crisis had been controversial, the trust placed in him by the people on his assumption of authority was almost total. It was a testimony to his popular hold over the people that the country, barely recovering from the trauma of defeat and the loss of its eastern wing, appeared to many as on the threshold of a new era.

On assumption of authority, as the president and the chief martial law administrator, Bhutto made Swift and resolute moves to consolidate his position. Yahya Khan was placed under house arrest. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was released. A large number of senior army officers were removed in a rapid sweep, culminating on March 3, 1972 in the dismissal of Lt. General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan who were accused of showing “Bonaparte tendencies.” Within four months 43 senior officers of the army were retired. General Tikka Khan who had led the army operation in East Pakistan was appointed as the new chief of the army.
Reinforcement of authority of Bhutto came by the appointment of his nominees as governors in all the four provinces. As the chief martial law administrator Bhutto’s powers were practically unlimited and the Emergency proclaimed by General Yahya Khan was still in force. The Defense of Pakistan Rules (DPR) placed in his hands formidable powers over the life, person and property of the citizens.\textsuperscript{11}

4.1 \textbf{BHUTTO AND PROGRAM FOR REFORM AND CHANGE}

The first task of Bhutto apparently was to repair the damage caused by the aftermath of the war of 1971. The return of surrendered soldier and the restoration of the economy were a priority. However, to bring life back to normalcy under a democratic dispensation, Bhutto was impelled by his agenda of reform and the party’s commitment to a new social and economic order. Armed with the powers of chief martial law administrator he pushed through far reaching changes in the economic sphere and administrative system.

4.1.1 \textbf{ECONOMIC POLICIES AND LAND REFORMS}

The economic growth during the Ayub Khan era, which was his notable achievements, had led to a great concentration of wealth and power into a few hands. The bureaucracy had aligned itself with the new group of industrial and commercial barons. There was social discontent and hatred of the upper class. These socio-economic factors had provided the driving force behind the mass movement against Ayub Khan. The emergence of People’s Party in West Pakistan had the background of same circumstances and was committed to bring into existence a new economic, administrative and political order. The manifesto of the People’s Party contained a program of
the nationalization of key industries. Under the Economic Reforms Order passed in January 1972, i.e. barely two months after Bhutto had assumed office, the government took over from the private sector 32 industrial units under 10 basic categories.\textsuperscript{12}

The Economic Reforms Order expressed it, as its objective to ensure that the wealth and economic resources are exploited to the maximum advantage of the common man and not as hitherto confined to the privileged few.\textsuperscript{13} The public sector, which had started from the ‘commanding heights of the economy’, descended to small units and the rural hinterland. As many as 3000 small units, engaged in flour mills, rice husking and cotton ginning, were taken over. Trading Corporations were set up with a monopoly over the import and export of vital commodities. It is not proposed to consider at this stage to what extent the noble objective set forth in the Order was realized in practice. It may, however, be observed that as a result of large-scale nationalization, the country’s economy was radically modified, causing a decisive shift in favor of the public sector. The control of governmental over industry and financial institutions and Private business try were allowed, which had limited their scope of progress and increased their dependency, which resulted in absolute access of state to finance. In fact, it was not a process of nationalization but a process of bureaucratization of public wealth. In the field of land reforms there was no misappropriation of land corresponding to the large-scale nationalization of industry. However, under the Martial Law Regulation (MLR 115) a ceiling of land holding was prescribed at 150 acres in the case of irrigated and 300 acres in the case of un-irrigated lands. The exemption allowed under the land reforms carried out by Ayub Khan in 1959, of orchards, Shikaargahs (hunting preserves),
studs and livestock farms, religious and educational endowments were withdrawn. Under MLR 64 of 1959, the ceiling for land holding for irrigated and un-irrigated lands was fixed 500 and 1000 acres, respectively. However, this ceiling was fixed per family. Under MLR 115 of 1972, the ceiling was fixed per head. Ownership of most of the land holdings had already been sub-divided by the landlords in anticipation of land reforms. The area resumed was consequently not considerable. However, the tenant had been secured in his tenancy. In his speech of March 1, 1972 Bhutto declared that the purpose of land reforms was to end "the oppressive and iniquitous agrarian system under which the people have suffered in silence for centuries" and to eradicate "the curse of feudalism and man's unjust overlordship of the God's earth." Significantly, however, the members of the armed forces, a large number, who had been recipients of land grants, were exempted from the operation of MLR 115.

4.1.2 THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM OF 1973

Bhutto's contribution in the administrative system has been highly significant. In the history of the country, it was the first time the reform were formulated and applied. In 1972 the Government of Pakistan appointed an Administrative Reforms Committee to study all aspects of the civil bureaucracy and formulate recommendations. These recommendations of the Committee were taken seriously into consideration by the government and formulated the Administrative Reforms of 1973. In a widely publicized address to the nation on August 20, 1973, the then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, announced the Administrative Reforms in the civil service of Pakistan, which were termed as 'revolutionary' reforms in the administrative system of Pakistan.
In the reform history of Pakistan the Administrative Reform of 1973 has been the most comprehensive in the sense of its formulation process and effectiveness. Under MLR 114 some 1300 officers were summarily removed from office. This measure was presumably inspired by reform. The lists were however made in haste, and many persons were penalized on flimsy grounds. The action, however, signified political assertion over the bureaucracy, which had grown over-bearing as partners in autocracy under Ayub Khan’s regime.¹⁷

Under the administrative reforms carried out in 1972 all the traditional civil service cadres were abolished. The bureaucracy was reconstituted into a single civil service divided into twenty-two grades, which were extended to all the service of the state. Reservation of posts for the CSP was abolished and its impacts on this cadre were drastic.¹⁸ The scheme professed to do away with the colonial structure of administration, notably by its abolition of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) the elitist cadre, and demonstrated the egalitarian spirit of the new regime. As a result of the unification of various civil service cadres, there were large-scale promotions and a number of officers moved into positions, which had hitherto remained outside their reach for years. Opportunity, it was claimed had been provided for talent wherever it was to rise to the highest position in the service of the country. (We will discuss the administrative reform of 1973 in detail in chapter 6).

By a swift succession of reforms or changes, major sectors of the society were thrown into a melting pot. There was excitement and hope, as well as bitterness and despair. All appeared uncertain for the time being. National life became malleable in the hands of the powerful new political leader. The ultimate pattern was hidden from view, even perhaps from Bhutto himself.
4.2 THE EFFORTS FOR THE CONSTITUTION MAKING

Framing a new constitution was the highest priority for Bhutto. Therefore, the developments in the direction of constitution making began soon after Bhutto had taken over power. The appointment of governors belonging to the Pakistan People’s party in the provinces of North-West Frontier (NWFP) and Balochistan provoked the reaction of the National Awami Party (NAP) and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), which were the majority political parties in those provinces. It may be recalled that whereas the PPP had 82 seats out of the 144 National Assembly seats, in the provinces it commanded a majority only in the legislative assemblies of the Punjab and Sindh. In the North West Frontier Province, the People’s Party had secured only 3 seats out of the 40 seats of the provincial assembly. In the case of the province of Balochistan, the PPP had not been able to win a single seat out of a house of 20. In both these provinces, the National Awami Party and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam together commanded an absolute majority.

The NAP and the JUI insisted on the appointment of their nominees as governors in these two provinces on the same basis as Bhutto had appointed his own party men as governors in the Punjab and Sindh. It also campaigned for the lifting of martial law and for the end of the Emergency, a demand which was joined in by other parties. It appeared that in any constitutional scheme Bhutto could not ride roughshod over the wishes of these two provinces where, apart from its negligible representation in the legislatures, the hold of the People’s Party was practically non-existent. Obviously, Bhutto could not continue to act indefinitely on the strength of martial law, which would have meant increasing reliance on the army. There was a need to place his authority on constitutional and a more durable basis.
An accord was reached with the National Awami Party and Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam on March 6, 1972. An order for a short session of the National Assembly 1972 was issued, summoning the national assembly on April 4, 1972 at Islamabad to frame an Interim Constitution for the country. In its session held on that day a unanimous vote of confidence in the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was passed. It was also announced that the martial law would be lifted from April 2, 1972. The draft interim constitution was adopted on April 17, 1972 and laid the legal basis of Bhutto's authority. The interim constitution prescribed a presidential form of government at the center and a parliamentary form of government in the provinces.

4.3  THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973

On the day the interim constitution was adopted on April 17, 1972, the national assembly also appointed a committee to prepare a draft of the permanent constitution. The progress towards the permanent constitution was very difficult. Controversy and political conflict centered on the presidential versus a parliamentary form of government and on the division of powers between the center and the provinces. Bhutto's own preference for a presidential system with a strong and stable executive was well known. Equally determined was the opposition to make the executive answerable to the legislature. Apart from the genuine fears of placing too much authority in the hands of a president, a parliamentary system appeared to be a more practical response to the demand for regional self-expression, keeping in view the lessons of the One Unit and the Constitution of 1962. However, an accord was signed by the leaders of all the parliamentary parties and groups in the assembly representing the Pakistan People's Party, Muslim League (Qayyum), National Awami
Party, Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam, Council Muslim League, Jamiat-e-Ulama e-Pakistan, Jamait-i-Islami, Tribal Areas and Independents on October 20, 1972. However, NAP and JUI[^21] had boycotted the National Assembly in the wake of the dismissal of NAP-JUI government in Balochistan and the resignation of the NAP-JUI government in the Frontier Province, and the violent disruption of the meeting held by the opposition at Liaquat-Bagh in Rawalpindi on 23 March. The boycott was ended on 10 April and the assembly adopted without dissent, though not unanimously, the constitution. The president authenticated the permanent constitution on 12 April 1973. The constitution laid down a federal parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature. In yielding to a parliamentary form Bhutto had shown flexibility. He was keen that the constitution should carry a broad political consensus. But Bhutto's concern for a stable executive was also conceded. A vote of no confidence against the Prime Minister was virtually made impossible for ten years in view of the conditions, which were required to be satisfied before it could be moved.[^22] At the same time NAP-JUI dropped some of their demands in the larger interest of the constitution.[^23]

The constitution of 1973 marked a major step forward. The framers of the Constitution of 1956 could claim only a qualified representative position as the members of the Constituent Assembly had been indirectly elected. The general election planned for February 1959 was aborted by the promulgation of martial law. Besides, the integration of the provinces of the west wing into a single unit, which was an integral part of that constitution, could not be said to have enjoyed the free consent of the smaller provinces and it negated the federal principle. As for the constitution of 1962, it had owed its
creation to the will of a single man and provided for indirect elections. By comparison, the constitution of 1973 had the distinction that the elected representatives of the people framed it and was based on consensus and provided for adult franchise as the basis of election for the national and provincial assemblies, and set up a federation consisting of all the provinces.

The rise of Bhutto to the office of the chief executive of the state had signaled the return of the politicians after an interval of about fifteen years. For the first time the politicians were truly ascendant. In resolution, vision, and ability, the new leader was equal to the task of creating a democratic order based on social and economic justice to which his party was committed. However, the foundations on which such a system could be built were required to be laid. Over a long period authoritarian rule, the institutional framework of a representative system based on adult franchise could not come into existence. On the other hand, even the basic institutions of government had undergone a decline. Likewise, public opinion had been unable to find an opportunity to develop and organize itself to a level where it could compel observance of the spirit of the constitution. New traditions and values were needed for a democratic reconstruction.

It is necessary to note that the five years of Bhutto’s governance shows a curious contrast with the ideals of the party, which is more a matter of dismay. The constitution of 1973 was a notable achievement, and it has ever since served as a symbol of national consensus. Within a few hours of its promulgation, however, under a proclamation of emergency, the right to enforce fundamental rights was suspended. The organization of the party was neglected. In the absence of party election, leadership at various levels was nominated. Power shifted from the people to the party and from the
party to its leader who towered over his lesser associates. No system of local
government was established to develop local leadership and democracy at
the grass roots.

The land reforms had generated a sense of self-respect, even defiance,
among the hitherto lowly, but a vast population of peasants, tenants and farm
workers. But they did not break or alter significantly the traditional power of
the feudal class. Anwar H. Syed has expressed the view that, "Bhutto may,
indeed, have despised feudalism and wanted to abolish it. But it would not
be fanciful to suggest that he hoped to abolish it as much by inducing
landlords to become successful entrepreneurs as by awakening the peasant to
resist assaults on his dignity as a human person and on his rights under the
law."24 Nevertheless, the radicalism of the party conflicted with the
perpetuation of the feudal power structure.

The administrative reforms did not create a system under which the civil
service could become more public-spirited, just and independent. The
demolition of the old system enabled the government to pick men favorable
to the regime to fill key positions at all levels. There were large-scale
promotions, which created a body of loyal civil servants. Esprit de corps, the
tradition of public service, of uprightness and competence as the key to
promotion, the close relationship of caliber and responsibility, were mostly lost.
Under a scheme of lateral entry, more than 5,000 officers were recruited
from the private sector, mainly on political considerations. The process was
rounded off by the removal of Constitutional guarantees of civil servants and
the assumption by the government of arbitrary powers over their retirement
or removal from service.
There was unnecessary police repression. Under the preventive detention laws, the powers derived from the continued state of the Emergency and the Defense of Pakistan Rules (DPR), political leaders were detained and many subjected to violence, indignity and torture. The heavy hand of the authority, which fell on their humbler followers, can be easily imagined.\textsuperscript{25}

The policy adopted to deal with the Opposition was not related either to any resistance within Bhutto’s own party or to a threat from the opposition. Most of the members of the assembly belonging to the ruling party had owed their election to Bhutto’s personal appeal. The opposition in the assembly comprised splinter groups whose fate in general followed the pattern of the fable of the lamb that lay with the lion. The president of the Council Muslim League, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, accepted an ambassadorial appointment in the UK and resigned his membership of the assembly. The orthodox parties, despite their efficient organization enjoyed a restricted appeal and their representation in the assembly was small. The policy of repression appears to have been aimed at eliminating perceived rather than any actual threat to government’s authority.

The repressive press laws of Ayub Khan’s days were still enforced. The National Press Trust was not disbanded as promised. The licenses of newspapers and periodicals could be cancelled at will and editors, publishers detained under various preventive detention laws or under the Defense of Pakistan Rules.\textsuperscript{26} It was also observed that the free speech was restrained by the simple expedient of preventing politicians opposed to the government from holding public meetings. Under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1885, described by Herbert Feldman as ‘a stroke of genius’ in view of its political misuse during Ayub Khan’s days, an order could be
passed by the executive authorities prohibiting the assembly or procession of five or more persons. Originally intended to meet situations arising out of riots or civil commotion, the potential of this provision of the law was exploited extensively during the Ayub regime as a means of suppressing opposition. Except for brief interludes, all the major cities throughout Bhutto’s tenure of office remained in the grip of section 144 and the opposition was thereby disabled from projecting its viewpoint or voicing criticism. The meetings held in defiance of the ban or even held with permission were disrupted with the support of the Federal Security Force. In such break-up of meetings, the use of firearms was not infrequent; of which the case of the meetings held at Liaquat-Bagh in Rawalpindi on March 23, 1973 resulting in several deaths provided an illustration.

The powers, which sprang from large-scale nationalization and from the control acquired over the financing institutions, were in certain respects wider and more effective. The vast power over employment and financial patronage, which had been placed at the government’s disposal, was used to strengthen authority and to satisfy a vast number of party functionaries and sympathizers at all levels. The rationale behind nationalization was that the commanding height of the economy should belong to the people and that the economic system should be subservient to socio-political objectives. The government lacked the managerial skills to run the nationalized sector. The traditional inefficiency of the public sector was aggravated by political considerations. The average annual GDP growth rate during 1971 to 1973 dwindled to 4.6% with little to spare for the common benefit. Private enterprise became shy of investment and there was a flight of capital.
The idea of building an independent force took shape in the form of the Federal Security Force (FSF), which was, created in 1973 “to assist the civil administration and the Police Force for ensuring the maintenance of law and order.”\(^2\) The FSF, however, became the hated instrument of suppressing political dissent.

As mentioned earlier that Bhutto inherited the proclamation of Emergency, which remained continually in operation and was retained throughout his tenure. The Emergency gave vast powers to the government over the life, person and property of the citizens. One of its consequences was that the right to enforce fundamental rights under the constitution remained suspended. In order to continue the Emergency, a reference was required to be made to Parliament every six months. The constitution was amended to empower the government to continue the Emergency indefinitely unless revoked by an adverse vote in Parliament. By the same amendment, powers of the executive were extended in relation to preventive detention. The government could now keep a person in detention without trial for an indefinite period of time. The Fourth Amendment deprived the High Courts of their power to grant bail to any person detained under a preventive detention law.\(^2\) The High Court’s power to grant bail was finally extinguished by the Fifth Amendment in the matter of offences falling under the Defense of Pakistan Rules (DPR).

Excluding a whole range of political offences from their jurisdiction further reduced the power of the courts. Special courts and tribunals were created to try these offences. The Bar Council Act was amended so that only such a foreign counsel could be admitted as an advocate in this country who “had resided in Pakistan for a period of not less than one year immediately
proceeding the day on which he applies for admission.‖ Under the Sixth Amendment a tenure system was introduced for the Chief Justice of a High Court without involving any obligation on the part of the executive to appoint a Chief Justice on the basis of seniority.

Robert La Forte Jr., writing in late 1972 about Bhutto’s policy towards the NAP, observed, “Bhutto’s strategy has been one of circumscribing the NAP’s ability to govern with the ultimate goal of replacing the NAP governments in both provinces.” In the accord reached in March 1972 between the NAP and Bhutto, the right of the NAP to form the provincial ministries had been conceded. Both these parties had been in the forefront in the campaign for the lifting of the martial law and for ending the One Unit and Emergency. Now placed in the provincial seats of power, they faced the unceasing hostility of the central government. Attempts at creating disunity between NAP and JUI, however, proved unsuccessful. The NAP, although held a majority in the North West Frontier Province, surrendered its right to form the provincial government in favor of the JUI.

The NAP was accused of a ‘so called’ London Plan, followed by the disclosure of a discovery of a large quantity of arms at the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, allegedly imported by the NAP for use in the armed resistance in the province of Balochistan. This affair ended in a fiasco and nothing more was heard about it. As a result the provincial government in Balochistan was dismissed early in February 1973, whereupon its counterpart in the Frontier province resigned in solidarity with the Balochistan government. Within three months of the dismissal or resignation of the opposition governments in the two provinces, Article 17 of the constitution which provided the right to every citizen to form or be a member of a political party was amended on
May 24, 1974, to give powers to the government to declare, *inter alia* any political party as operating prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of the country, and refer the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court declared the NAP as illegal, a decision upheld, on reference. The dismissal of the Balochistan government provoked a rebellion by the affected political groups. The army was called in to suppress the 'insurgency'.[32] Significantly, it marked the first direct involvement of the army under the new regime to deal with political adversaries. The army had re-entered the body-politic.

The loss of civic liberties and political repression hurt the elite groups, the intelligentsia and the politically conscious urban population. Economic policies alienated the industrial and business community. But the number of those disaffected, though sizeable, was small compared with the large sections of the masses notably in the rural areas with which Bhutto had built emotional identification. Various actions of the executive cast a cloud over the nature and character of governance, but did not erode the vote bank of the party. A chain of party functionaries, which stretched down to the humblest village, strengthened the popular hold of the People's Party. As benefits flowed down, a chain of following, as J. A. Rahim, his mentor and former senior minister, expressed it, grew up.[33]

The new order appeared to have settled down firmly by a combination of repression against political opposition and a popular hold over the masses, notably in the Punjab and Sindh, which could be described as 'the populist authoritarianism'.[34] But signs of discontent had begun to appear. Student unrest in the universities was an early indication. The results of student's union's elections in the universities went against the proteges of the ruling party. The public meetings, which Bhutto addressed, became fewer. It was
not until the general election in 1977 that the city of Lahore saw him address a public meeting again.

The Bhutto regime also faced a number of crises, among these one crisis was the movement launched in 1976 for the declaration of the Ahmadi as a non-Muslim minority. The movement, which had a long history, was animated by a powerful religious sentiment. The politicians were of the view that in the process of confronting the situation the regime would be faced with a dilemma. The Ahmadi had rendered considerable service to Bhutto during his election campaign and it was anticipated that he would find it difficult either to ignore this fact or the strength of the community which had international affiliations. But the opposition leaders had misjudged. Having allowed the movement to reach a climax, Bhutto allowed the community to be declared as a minority by the national assembly in dramatic circumstances and thus claimed credit for an act, which he said, had eluded politicians in the past. The religious sentiment was no doubt satisfied. The political aspect proved to be an arrow shot in the air.

The moment of danger thus came and passed and the government became entrenched in a position of seemingly impregnable authority. As the enrolment of the membership of the People’s Party began in the summer of 1976, the last stalwarts in the opposition were falling in order to gain access to power. It was a long distance from the ideals with which the new government had begun its career. The institutions of the state had been subordinated to serve the needs of an authoritarian rule. The executive authority had been used to bend all opposition and the resources of the nation employed to win the allegiance of men.
On 7 January 1977 news appeared in the national press announcing the dissolution of the Assemblies and the holding of a general election to the national and provincial assemblies on March 7 and 10, respectively. Although there had been some speculation about the holding of the election or its likely announcement of a date, the news hardly caused any stir. The result of the elections was considered as a foregone conclusion.

4.4 THE ELECTIONS OF 1977, PNA MOVEMENT AND FALL OF THE REGIME

Although the opposition lay inert and resourceless, it nevertheless responded with confidence and promptitude. Two days after the call to the general election nine political parties belonging to the opposition met at Lahore on 10 January 1977 and formed a united election front named as the Pakistan National Alliance or, briefly, the PNA. The parties were: The Muslim League, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Pakistan Jamhoori Party, National Democratic Party, (the new version of NAP) Khaksar Tehrik and the Muslim Conference of Azad Kashmir.

The parties in opposition had apparently been working for some time to evolve a united front in the event of a general election. Their total unity, however, came as a surprise, especially the speed with which it was accomplished. The alliance came as result of common feeling against oppression borne by the leadership of the opposition, so it seems, more than any lesson of the general election of 1970 united its leaders in the firm resolve to go to the polls as a single body with such strength as they could muster to oppose the government. Political parties with widely different persuasions, such as the National Democratic Party, which had socialist
financing to cover budget deficit, had an adverse impact on the life of the common man. The government did not seem to have any planned effort. Reliance was placed on adhoc decisions. The traditional five-year plan was abandoned. Even the small trader was thrown out of business by the nationalization of wheat milling, cotton ginning and rice husking units. The remolding of the institutions of the state to serve the needs of an authoritarian rule had begun to tell upon the life of an average citizen. To the bureaucratic oppression was added the overbearing attitude of the party functionaries. Although the people were used to the exercise of wide power, even its abuse, by the government functionaries, the sight of fellowmen, often with unenviable reputation, parading their authority sent waves of anger. Quick fortunes made through doubtful means excited envy and hatred. People in private business had to turn more and more towards government and their success depended increasingly on the support of the party. Even the legal profession largely lost its traditional freedom as a number of lawyers could be engaged in the nationalized sector, an inroad made for the first time into and hitherto independent and politically vocal section of society.

The extinction of political liberty and civic rights ran counter to the process of liberalization, which had been taking place for nearly a century. It ran counter to the democratic will of the people to the rise of which Bhutto himself had made a signal contribution. The occurrence of a number of murders of political leaders, including a prominent leader of the PPP, which went untracked, cast a deep shadow on the law enforcing institutions. It was expected that the resumption of political activity would generate criticism. It was decided to release controls gradually to minimize or
dissipate the effect. As often happens, the party, which employs propaganda, as a shield against criticism, or truth is the first victim of its deception. The mass fury, which manifested itself, was a development for which the government, so it seems, was not prepared. When the pent-up anger broke out, it had the passion of a revolt. Though there were signs of bewilderment in the party, even panic Bhutto himself appeared unmoved at the turn of events, confident of his charismatic appeal and the support of the common man with whose interests he had striven to identify himself. Effective political opinion in the country had arrayed itself against the government. The elements, which it represented, had their individual grievances. Businessmen, traders and industrialists, students, lawyers and religious groups, for example, had their separate causes for complaint. The common and the dominant note were protest against authoritarianism. The PNA had provided a platform for a broad spectrum of disaffected public opinion. Though a minority of the nation had come forward, it was nevertheless, an effective minority.

The upsurge in the cities and the towns, which converted itself into a movement, carried the message of replacing an unjust government with a just order. The protest was expressed in the moral framework of religion, a natural idiom known to the people. The PNA promised to usher in a system practiced by the Prophet of Islam, which it called as Nizam - e - Mustafa (lit. the system of the Prophet).\textsuperscript{38} The religious parties and orthodox sections of the people combined their forces with the movement. From the beginning, the religious sections had viewed with skepticism the purported blend of socialism with Islam. Socialism was in fact conceived as opposed to religion, and was regarded as a god-less creed.
Bhutto, however, still enjoyed popular support among large segments of the population, notably in the rural areas of the Punjab and Sindh, but was unable to mobilize the support to meet the challenge of the PNA movement. It lacked the will, the organization, and a cause to place its weight behind the regime, which was now under assault.

The PNA movement placed the government on the defensive. There was a move towards securing unopposed election of candidates' apparently to release senior politicians or important candidates from worrying about their own election. The attempt boomeranged in view of the blatant manner in which the rival candidates in several cases were removed from the contest. By January 23, 1977, about 69 candidates to the provincial assemblies, (including all the four chief ministers) and 25 candidates to the national assembly (including Bhutto) had been declared to have been elected unopposed. A few of the cases might have been genuine. But credibility in the unhindered process of the ballot had been eroded. To meet the challenge, the mechanism of a genuine political organization was not available to Bhutto. Many of his ministers and party members of the assemblies owed their position to the personal appeal of Bhutto. They were mostly the beneficiaries of patronage but in turn lent no strength to the party. No system had been built up for elected local bodies or for developing local leadership. Bhutto thus lacked an organization capable of mobilizing public opinion.

The results of elections to the National Assembly were announced on the evening of March 7, 1977. PPP had won 154 seats and PNA 38 seats. About the same time political activity was placed under a ban and the assembly of five persons or more as prohibited by orders issued under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in all-important cities. The
landslide victory of the People's Party came as an anti-climax to the PNA movement and was received with disbelief by large sections of the people. It was probably considered too glittering by the PPP itself to call for jubilation. The results were promptly rejected by the PNA, which it declared, were the product of large-scale rigging. The elections to the provincial assemblies, scheduled to take place on 10 March were boycotted. The PNA demanded fresh elections under the judiciary and the army and the resignations of the Chief Election Commissioner and of the Prime Minister himself.

Was the National Alliance a bad loser? Did the silent 'majority' and the female vote upset calculations? Was it a question of a margin only, a few more seats to the PNA (as conceded later by the ruling party itself) but leaving the PPP in a comfortable majority? The credibility of free elections, of the unhindered process of the ballot was at issue. If this was in doubt, the number of seats won by either side did not matter. The legitimacy of the assembly and the position of the Prime Minister himself depended on this. In the public mind, a number of factors tended to reinforce the PNA's stand. It recalled that the People's Party at the height of its popularity had polled a minority of votes in the elections of 1970 when the opposition was divided. Things stood differently in March 1977. The unopposed elections in many cases had been viewed with skepticism, even disbelief. The bye-elections had set a poor example and made the public responsive to accusations of malpractices. During the campaign and at the actual polling, the partiality of the administration and misuse of government facilities had become well-known. The people directly witnessed the tactics of rowdy-ism and intimidation adopted by many of the candidates. There were small incidents pointing in the same directions. The PNA's allegations were lent perhaps the
most convincing, though indirect support, by the polls to the provincial assemblies, boycotted by the PNA, where the turnout of voters had been extremely low, at places virtually nil. It was, however, announced that 62% of the voters had cast their votes. These factors, weighty in themselves, were inflated by a generous sentiment in favor of the PNA. The movement had in fact pitched itself against the government and it was determined to bring about its fall. The sanctity of the ballot was the stick to beat the government with.

Bhutto was on the horns of a dilemma. To concede the demand for fresh elections amounted to an admission of rigging, which could hardly be acceptable to a man who had intense pride as a democratic leader, although in a free run of the polls he would have won, though with a reduced margin. On the other hand, lay the choice of suppression. But the employment of force could harden resistance and conceivably plunge the country into a deeper crisis. It was, however, the latter course, which was adopted. The Federal Security Force, the police and other exe agencies, fearful of the prospects of PNA's rule, waited with restless energy to stamp out any show of resistance by the Alliance.

If Bhutto had judged the situation dispassionately he might have promptly offered to go to the polls again because he would have won, notwithstanding the sharp failings of his government and the upsurge of disaffection. But other counsels apparently prevailed. Curiously, Bhutto seemed to ignore the danger of military intervention in a prolonged civilian conflict, despite his acute sense of realism.

The PNA took the decision to launch a movement of protest from 14 March if its demands were not met. During the four months, which followed, the
nation was locked in a mortal conflict. Unarmed, normally peaceful, civilian people stood up against a regime determined to stay in power at all costs. Widespread arrests of workers and leaders of the PNA followed in a rapid sweep. Yet, the regime appeared unable to control the situation as each mosque turned itself into a citadel of resistance, sending out volunteers to maintain a steady stream of resolute defiance. On April 19, the army was called in Lahore, Hyderabad and Karachi and curfew was imposed in Karachi. On 21 April following the call for a ‘wheel jam’ strike, which would have brought all business to a frightening standstill, martial law was imposed in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore. Important cities were placed under curfew.

The entry of the army marked the end of a phase. Evidently, the army, which had held back from any large-scale shooting by the daring of the people to face the bullets, could not have remained immune to the mass upsurge, to suppression and to the moving expression of religious zeal. It was probably now under persuasion from the generals that Bhutto met with Mifti Mahmood at Sihala and thus began the tortuous course of parleys with the imprisoned leaders of the Alliance.

The proposal taken by Bhutto to Maulana Mifti Mahmood during his first meeting with him at Sihala on 23 April was the one, which had previously been made by Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar, the Attorney General of Pakistan. Dubbed as the Yahya Bakhtiar formula, the proposal contained an offer to hold fresh elections to the national assembly provided the PNA was able to secure an overall majority of votes in the elections to the provincial assemblies, earlier boycotted by the PNA, which the government was willing to hold again. This proposal, which conceded the possibility of new
elections to the national assembly, had however, been already rejected by the General Council of the PNA on the ground that the main issue was election to the national assembly itself.

Meanwhile, the government took some other steps. On April 27, the Army Act was amended whereby army action in aid of civil authority could now include martial law as well. On the same day, a joint statement appeared in the press, issued by the three chiefs of staff and the chairman, expressing their loyalty to the state and to the government. A seat in the Senate was made available for General Tikka Khan, former C-in-C of the army and he was made minister of state for defense and national security.

The PNA stood firm on its three main demands, the resignation of the Prime Minister, and fresh elections under the auspices of the army and the judiciary, a new Election Commission. Behind these demands were arrayed the passions of public opinion, which left little room for flexibility. The negotiations, which had a hopeful start, seemed to run into an impasse. But a hope emerged through the mediation, of the emissaries of King Khalid of Saudi Arabia and of Sultan Sheikh Zaid Bin Al Nahyan of the UAE. There were further proposals from both sides. The PNA’s demands, or proposals, made public on 5 May, were expressed in Five Points, under which were grouped thirty-two proposals. The last point related to the resignation of the Prime Minister. To these proposals Bhutto responded with the declaration that conditions inside and outside the country were not suitable for holding a general election, which seemed to bring the talks to an abrupt halt. In view of the position taken up by the government, the PNA declined to hold any further talks until its three main demands were met.
Bhutto's again referred to the unfavorable conditions for holding elections, which, he declared, would lead to serious polarization in society and open the door to foreign intervention. He, however, offered to hold a referendum on the issue, and to have the constitution amended for this purpose. The proposal of a referendum was however, promptly rejected by the PNA. With that ended the first round of negotiations. There was a fresh wave of repression and the PNA leaders were shifted from Sihala and taken to undisclosed far off prisons.

A referendum, if successful, would have signified for the government a kind of popular approval or a mandate. The failure or inability of the government go ahead with the proposal represented a setback. The ground was prepared for further talks by the good offices of the Saudi Ambassador, Mr. Riaz-ul-Khatib, as a result of which Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, apparently with government's blessing, met with the PNA leaders now detained in different prisons. The PNA team comprised Maulana Mufli Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Professor Abdul Ghafoor. They were released a day before the first meeting scheduled for 3 June and brought back to Sihala. The other leaders of the Alliance were still under detention.

The government team comprised, besides Bhutto, his two ministers, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada. During the first meeting, held on 3 June, the government agreed to release the PNA leaders, as well as those who were detained under section 144, and also to lift the press censorship. On its side, the PNA agreed to suspend the political agitation.

It seems unnecessary at this stage to trace the tortuous course of the negotiations, which carried moments of tension and uncertainty. It appears that an agreement was eventually on the anvil. But, by then, too much time
had already elapsed, and the generals had gone far too ahead in their plans. On the night of 4-5 July, under an operation, code-named, ‘Fair Play’, the army took Bhutto and leaders of the PNA into custody and assumed control of the administration of the country. The constitution of 1973 was not abrogated. Martial law was proclaimed. General Zia-ul-Haq, chief of the army staff, expressed it, as his aim to restore authority to civilian hands after a new election, which he visualized, would be held within three months. Bhutto was later sent to the gallows by the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, following his conviction for murder by the judiciary.

The above study abundantly proved that the army transferred power to Bhutto in circumstances when it became indispensable for them to rescue the remaining Pakistan after the fall of East Pakistan. Bhutto was highly successful in this test. He gave the country for the first a constitution farmed by the representatives of the people. Introduced reforms in the civil services of Pakistan and again for the first time in the history of Pakistan he was able to implement the reforms to curtail the powers of the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 In the general election of 1970, Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was the largest party in the West Pakistan.
3 Ibid.
1966. J. A. Rahim, an ICS officer, was then serving as the country's ambassador to France. Bhutto has left a record of high praise for Rahim: "Above all he more than any one else made me to decide for launching a new party. Actually he and I founded it in Paris in 1966. He worked hard on the Foundation Papers." Both also served as ministers in Bhutto's first cabinet after his assumption of power.

7 See the Manifesto of Pakistan People's Party, op. cit.
8 Hamid Yusuf, op. cit., p. 140.

9 Despite the high annual growth rates of GDP (6.3%), manufacturing (8.1%) and per capital income (4.0 %), the index of real wages in large-scale manufacturing rose from 100 in 1959-60 to only 102 in 1967-68. See Vigar Ahmad and Rashid Amjad, Management of Pakistan's Economy, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987) p.89.

10 Hamid Yusuf, op. cit., p. 144.


12 The following industries were nationalized: - (1) Iron and Steel Industries, (2) Basic Metal Industries, (3) Heavy Engineering Industries, (4) Heavy Electrical Industries, (5) Assembly and Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, (6) Tractor Plant-Assembly and Manufactures, (7) Heavy and Basic Chemicals, (8) Petro-Chemical Industries, (9) Cement Industries and (10) Electricity, Gas and Oil Refining. In September 1973. 26. vegetable ghee units were nationalized. Public Corporations were set up for the export of cotton and rice. In 1974, the banks were nationalized, placing control over access to finance in government hands.


14 Ibid., p. 36.

15 Ibid.


17 Quoted in Hamid Yusuf, op. cit., p. 144.

18 There is a general opinion that Bhutto became a victim of its reforms. It was the revenge of the CSP that Bhutto ultimately was executed.


23 Specifically the demand on provincial Autonomy was dropped by the NAP and JUI.

24 See Anwar H. Syed, op. cit., p. 113.

Bhutto had a harsh attitude toward the written media, particularly to those who were critical of the regime. A number of journalists were arrested and papers were banned for publication.


There was a stormy scene in the House when this amendment was passed. Some of the opposition members were literally lifted and thrown out of the House by the security.


During the army action in Balochistan as claimed in the white papers published by the government of Pakistan more than 5000 Baloch guerrillas and 3500 army soldiers were killed. The army action lasted about four years. See for other details *ibid.*, and Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on Balochistan*, (Islamabad: Manager, Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1974).


Ibid.

There were aggravating circumstances. Oil prices jumped from US $3.70 per barrel to US$ 11.65 between October 1973 and February 1974. Rupee was devalued in 1972 and the exchange rate was shifted from US. $1= 4.76 to US $ 1 =Rs.11.00. Fiscal deficit increased from 6.4% of the GDP in 1973-74 to 8.6% in 1975-76. The balance of payment deficit increased from 6.1% of the GDP in 1973-74 to 7.0% in 1975-76. The rate of inflation was 30% in 1973-74 and 1974-75, 11.6% in 1975-76 and 11.8% in 1976-77.

See Viqar Ahmad and Rashid Amjad, *op. cit.*, p. 94.


It must be noted that PNA was alliance of both the extremist groups, the extreme orthodox, like Jamiat-I-Islami and progressive secular parties like NDP and *Tehreek e Insaf*.


CHAPTER 5

THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN BEFORE 1972
CHAPTER 5

5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN TILL 1972

The institution of civil bureaucracy had always been a driving force in the administrative and political system of Pakistan. It had played a significant role in the socio-economic development of the country. It is also an established fact that since the inception of Pakistan the bureaucracy was significant factor in rising and declining the governments. The institution of civil bureaucracy was one of the most organized and effective institutions that inherited Pakistan from British colonial rule. After the independence in 1947, the system of civil bureaucracy that was adopted in the country was based on the same legacies which were left by the colonial masters.

In the preceding chapters we discussed the circumstances in which the civil bureaucracy perpetuated its control on the government and dominated on the policy making process in the country. This chapter attempts to trace the evolution and development of the civil bureaucracy and discuss its services structures from 1947 till the administrative reforms of 1973. We will also discuss the important reports of the administrative reforms commissions during this period and analyze their recommendations for administrative change. Further we will analyze the attitude, responses and reaction of the civil bureaucracy for resisting the reforms.

5.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY

The origin of the civil bureaucracy can be traced back to a long tradition of administration in history, i.e. during to the twelfth century. The Sultans of
Delhi Sultanate are known to be the first who developed a strong centralized authority. The Mughal rulers further broadened and extended the same system and the structure of the civil bureaucracy in the 15th and 16th Centuries. They introduced the Mansabdari System, which was the backbone of the administrative system of the empire and was controlled and managed by the foreigners. It was a kind of a dualistic hierarchy, a chain of officials responsible for law enforcement and second for supervision and collecting revenue. The key officials in the empire were the governors (Subedars), who exercised control over criminal justice. Its counter part was the finance minister (Deewan). The provinces were divided into districts, where the same dual system was practiced and were headed by the district officers. The British rulers in India retained the basic features of the Mughal administrative structure. However, they introduced gradually, changes the administrative system which was brought to a high degree of refinement and efficiency.

An analysis of the character of the British imperial administrative tradition reveals clearly the impacts of these traditions and attitudes on the development of the administrative system in Pakistan. The colonial system of administration was designed mainly to maintain law and order and to collect taxes. The administrative system during the British rule, depended heavily on Indian subordinates who collected taxes and maintained law and order, but the trust accorded to them was nominal. This system of administration developed elaborate rules in order to minimize the opportunities for corrupt practices and to improve the capacity of the bureaucracy to punish offenders.
Another characteristic of the Indian Administrative Service was that it was a ‘self-regulating corps’. The members of the Indian civil bureaucracy were given the power to act as guardian to meet the needs of the system without supervision. However, British officials did not fully trust their Indian subordinates and maintained a close supervision over them. As a result, the pattern of authority that developed in India differed fundamentally from that of England. A pervasive, reliance upon hearts and punishments impeded the growth of identification of subordinate workers with the agencies of government. Certain features of the British administrative system like excessive noting and referral procedures have thus had an influence on the functioning of the administrative system of Pakistan as well. The goals of British colonial administration were to maintain stability and order, and therefore administrative functions were routine and structured. Little or no initiative was involved in the performance of these functions.

The colonial civil bureaucracy is termed as a ‘political bureaucracy’ where the powers were thoroughly separated between policymaking and policy execution. It may be noted that the functions of bureaucracy was not only to maintain law and order but also to make decisions on a wide range of social, economic, political and even judicial issues, and was empowered to make decisions on the spot. Robert Heussler also argued that “the colonial administrators have not been civil servants in the usual sense, that is, servants of elected or appointed governments whose higher officers hold the lion’s share of whatever power there is to be exercised. They themselves were the Government. Spread thinly over the ground, relying on their wits, personalities and physical stamina, they have embodied in their own persons virtually all the staff and substance of rule.”

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The Indian administrators exercised and enjoyed the same powers of discretion as the civil bureaucracies serving in other colonies as well. Therefore, the role played by Indian administrators was quite different from that of the British administrative class. Though both these groups consisted of a small number of individuals who were generalists in nature, the Indian Civil Service (ICS) differed from the British Administrative Class because it had no superior authority, and had to obey the orders of the colonial power. The function of the British Administrative Class was to bring together the disparate issues involved in taking major decisions of policy, to advise on what these decisions should be and subsequently to put them into effect. In the same manner the British Indian civil servants, instead of acting as the servants of the people, functioned as the guardians. The impact of the pre-partition Indian Civil Service upon the Pakistani Civil Service becomes increasingly evident when we analyze the structure and the role of the members of the Civil Bureaucracy in Pakistan.

The British in India, after the establishment of the East India Company introduced the present system of the civil bureaucracy. The higher employees of the East India Company initially assumed the form of a Mercantile Service (1601-1858) and Imperial Service (1858-1947). During this period the civil service of the East India Company and the Imperial Service under the British crown, had undergone considerable changes according to the requirements of colonial master. The higher employees of the company typically signed agreements with their employer and those who signed agreement were known as ‘covenanted Servants’. At the same time the other servants who did not sign such agreement were identified as ‘uncovenanted servants’.
The first important change in the system of the civil bureaucracy of the East India Company came as a result of the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission, 1886-87.\(^4\) (See Table 5.1) One of the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission was to abolish this distinction between Covenanted Service and the Uncovenanted Service, and to establish the 'Imperial Civil Service of India'. The Government of India accepted this recommendation, but the nomenclature was later modified to the 'Civil Service of India' (CSI), and subsequently to the 'Indian Civil Service', (ICS),\(^5\) which was used in India until the partition of the Indian Sub-Continent in 1947.

**TABLE 5.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF SERVICE DEPARTMENTS</th>
<th>THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1888</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Imperial Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Public Works Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Custom Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Geological Survey</td>
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<td>IX</td>
<td>Opium Department</td>
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<td>XI</td>
<td>Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>XIII</td>
<td>Registration Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV</td>
<td>Survey Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Aitcheson Commission Report, 1888, paragraph 75, 92, 119 and 127.*

The Imperial Civil Service of India was constituted mainly of Covenanted Civil Servants. In addition to the Imperial Service the Aitcheson Commission recommended the creation of the Provincial Civil Service. Another cadre known as 'Subordinate Civil Services,'\(^6\) was created for the lower ranks of the Provincial Civil Service. This was an important basis for the structure of the Central and Provincial Civil Services in India, and continued with, slight modifications until Independence. According to the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission, the ICS had been placed at
### TABLE 5.2

**LIST OF THE SERVICE DEPARTMENTS**
**THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1917**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPERIAL SERVICES</th>
<th>ROVINCIAL SERVICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>II Provincial Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV Provincial Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPERIAL AND PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENTS WITH BRANCHES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I II Civil veterinary Department II Agriculture department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III III Education Department IV Forest Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>V V Medical Services VI Survey of India Department</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VI VI Public Works Department VIII Railway Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HOMOGENOUS DEPARTMENT UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

| I I Custom Department II Indian Finance Department |
| III III Military Finance Department IV Mint and Assay Department |

**HOMOGENOUS DEPTS. NOT UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

| I I Post Office of India Telegraph Dep’t. II Railway Department (R.E.) |
| III III Factory and Boiler Inspection Dep’t IV Geological Survey Department |
| V V Bengal Pilot Service VI Land Record (Burma) Depart. |
| VII VII Northern India Salt Revenue Depart. VIII Survey of India Department |
| IX IX Madras Survey Department X Indian Mines Department |
| XI XI Registrar n Department XII Salt and Excise Department |

*Source: Compiled from The Iddington Commission Report, 1917.*

The apex of the service structure in India. In Pakistan, soon after independence, the ICS cadre was re-designated as the PAS (Pakistan Administrative Service), and subsequently as the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). The Provincial Civil Services were known as PCS and other specialized Provincial Services.

Another feature that inherited to Pakistan from the pre-Independence structure of the civil service was the distinction between All-India Services, later renamed as the all Pakistan Services, and the Central Services. The Secretary of State in Council formally controlled the All-India Services and
recruitment was made by the Central Government. Members of the service were usually assigned to the provinces, but sometimes also served under the Center. The All-India Services included such services as the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police Service, etc. The Central Services were appointed by the Governor-General in Council and served the Central Government. They included such services as the Indian Audit and Accounts Service, the Central Engineering Service, the Imperial Customs Service etc. Members of these services were also posted all over India but were directly controlled by the Central Government.

The Islington Commission in 1912\(^7\) introduced a class distinction to distinguish the levels of civil servants according to their position in the hierarchy of the administration. The Class I officers were those who held positions of executive or administrative levels while Class II officers held posts of operational levels. This class distinction however expanded and subsequently Class III (consisting mostly of clerical jobs and other jobs with corresponding nature of work) and Class IV (consisting of peons, messengers etc.),\(^8\) were also created. This classification continued after Independence until the Administrative Reforms of 1973. However, in 1924 the Lee Commission, recommended changes only in the service structure\(^9\) (See Table 5. 3). This commission was constituted in the light of the intention of the British government, as outlined in the Government of the India Act of 1919, (The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms), to eventually transfer power to Indian people.\(^{20}\) Subsequent to this act, no other substantial changes took place in the administrative services structure until 1947, (See Table 5.4).
### TABLE 5.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE SERVICE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 1934</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. ALL INDIA SERVICES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>I. Indian Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Indian Education Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Indian Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Political department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Ecclesiastical Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS UNDER JOINT CONTROL OF IMPERIAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. State railways Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Department of the Posts / telegraph</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>D. CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS UNDER PROVINCIAL CONTROL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List not provided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Developed from the Lee Commission Report, 1924.*

### 5.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

The administrative structure of the civil bureaucracy, which existed in India at the time of Partition, was adopted in Pakistan with negligible changes. As discussed above, the administrative system developed slowly in the environment of the sub-continent. It was a product of adjustment between the competing needs of the British to maintain its control of the civil administration, and the demands of the Indian people for increasing self-rule. Thus, in this context the administrative system developed. In the following pages we will trace the development of Central Superior Services in Pakistan. It may be noted that the two categories of the service i.e. All-Pakistan Services and Central Services were maintained in Pakistan until the Administrative Reform of 1973.
5.3 **ALL PAKISTAN SERVICES:**

On structure of the All-India Services that was functioning before partition of India, the All Pakistan Services were created in Pakistan, which consisted of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), and the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP). Officers of these services served under the Central as well as Provincial Governments. Officers when serving under the Provincial Governments were controlled by the Provincial Governments, but the basic control of the services remained with the Center. As mentioned earlier the term ‘All Pakistan Services’ is analogous to the inheritance of British institutions of the All India Services, which were in direct control of the secretary of State.

5.3.1 **CIVIL SERVICE OF PAKISTAN (CSP):**

The civil service of Pakistan (CSP) was the descendant of the Indian Civil Services (ICS) in India, and mostly consisted of the ICS officers in India who had opted for Pakistan. It was soon realized that the number of ICS Officers who had opted for Pakistan was not adequate to fill the required number of the CSP cadre in Pakistan.\(^{23}\) The officers of other services were therefore inducted into the CSP cadre. When the CSP cadre was formally encadred in 1950, it included, besides the former ICS officers and officers who had been selected on the basis of their services in World War-II. However, the finance Service officers and the officers who were selected on the basis of the Competitive Examination and Indian Administrative Service competitive examination held in 1949 and 1950 were appointed on an ad hoc basis.\(^{24}\) The CSP in Pakistan continued to be at the apex of the service structure in Pakistan like the ICS in India, and held most of the senior
appointments in the Center as well as in the provinces which, in most cases were reserved for them.\textsuperscript{25}

### TABLE 5.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE SERVICE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AT THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE IN 1947</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALL INDIA SERVICES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Indian Civil Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>II Indian Education Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>III Indian Police Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV Indian Forest Engineering Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>V Indian Service of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CENTRAL SERVICES (CLASS I ONLY)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Indian Audit and Account service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Imperial Custom Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Indian Posts / telegraph Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Zoological Survey of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>V Political Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>VI Central Revenue Chemical Service</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CENTRAL SERVICES (CLASS I &amp; II)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>.I Geological Service (Class - I)</td>
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<tr>
<td>II Imperial Secretariat Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>III Income Tax Department</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CENTRAL SERVICES (CLASS II ONLY)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Imperial Secretariat Stenographers Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>II Telegraph Engineering Wireless Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Postal superintendents Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Military Assistant surgeon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V  Custom Appraisers Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Assistant Accounts / Audit Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Developed from Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Pay Commission* (Karachi: AMGGPP, 1949) (Known as the *Munir Commission Report*, 1949), and Government of Pakistan Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal, Rules)* (Islamabad: MPCPP 1972).

The CSP officers held such posts as Secretaries in the Central Secretariat, and those of Divisional Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, Assistant
Commissioners etc., in the provincial administrations. Besides the posts in the Provincial administrations, most of the other senior posts in the Central and Provincial Governments, Attached Departments under the Central Governments, and posts of Chief Secretaries and Secretaries of the Provincial Governments were also held by CSP officers. The relative rank, prestige and multifaceted career patterns of CSP officers were also analogous to the British service structure of ICS. The CSP officers were paid higher scale than the other Central Superior Services, officers of the same cadre. They also held a disproportionately a larger share of higher posts in the civil administration, and membership in the accorded a certain difference from the public and from other member of the civil bureaucracy.26 The size and importance of the CSP cadre steadily grew since 1947. (See table 5.5).

5.3.2 POLICE SERVICE OF PAKISTAN (PSP):

The Police Services in Pakistan (PSP) assumed almost the same form as the Indian Police Services (IPS) in India and like the CSP consisted of IPS officers who had opted for Pakistan. The organizational structure of IPS was constituted largely in the Police Commission of 1860. Before 1860 military police was performing the police responsibilities in India. The police Commission of 1860 established a homogenous force with civil an officers. The Fraser Committee in 1903 established the imperial and provincial branches of the police services and afterwards came to be encadred into separate services- the Imperial Police services and provincial Police services. The cadre of the former service was subsequently increased with recruitment in Pakistan either from probationers through CSS or through promotions from the provinces. The posts held by PSP officers included those of 'Inspectors-General', 'Superintendents', 'Deputy Superintendents'
and Assistant Superintendents’. Under these posts were ‘inspectors’, ‘head constables’, ‘sergeants’ and ‘constables’. Most of the PSP Officers served under Provincial Governments, while some of them were also inducted to hold senior posts under the Central Government although this practice was quite rare.

**TABLE 5.5**

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<tr>
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<td>461</td>
<td>482</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>109</td>
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<td>PSP (E)</td>
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<td>81</td>
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<td>PTS</td>
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<td>P/T(Postal)</td>
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<td>CES</td>
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<td>GAR</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS/ISP</td>
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The police establishments were reorganized into two branches, when ‘One Unit’ system was adopted in Pakistan, which were corresponding to East and West Pakistan: the PSP (E) and PSP (W). According to Kennedy the officers of the two branches could be deputed from one cadre to another but
such assignments were exceptional.\textsuperscript{29} However, after the annulment of One Unit, Police was restructured on provincial bases again.

5.4 **CENTRAL SERVICES OF PAKISTAN**

The term 'Central Service' is derived from the British administrative practices.\textsuperscript{30} In 1971, there were 13 Central Service, which are described briefly in the following:

5.4.1 **PAKISTAN FOREIGN SERVICE (PFS)**

The government of Pakistan soon after the emergence established diplomatic missions in most countries of the world. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was responsible to control these missions. In 1948, the units of the Political and External Department, which were attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were separated to form the Ministry of States and Frontier regions and the remained as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. In the same year Pakistan Foreign Office was formed to manage personnel diplomatic, counselor and commercial posts abroad and within the ministry. In order to meet the requirements of the foreign missions a large number of officers were recruited by the Central Government for appointment at different levels. The Pakistan Foreign Service was thus created. In the beginning, the PFS officers also performed specialized duties like commercial press etc., but subsequently separate services were constituted which met the requirements for specialized jobs in the foreign missions. For example officers of the Central Information Service, created in 1963, were appointed as Press Attaches, and officers of the Trade Service of Pakistan (created in 1969), as Trade Commissioners, Commercial Attaches etc., in the foreign missions.
However, non-PS officers usually performed commercial and later press duties in the foreign missions.31 PFS officers held such posts as of First Secretary/Counselor, Second Secretary and Third Secretary in the foreign missions, and could also be promoted to the rank of Minister or Ambassador although such appointments were often made by direct appointment. When posted at the Center, PFS officers held such posts as Secretary, Director General, Director, and Section Officer etc., in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Munir Commission of 1949, argued that specialist officer employed abroad should be under the control of diplomatic personnel the ultimately of the foreign office.32 However, the G. Ahmed Commission 1959 recommended that the officers of the Pakistan Foreign Services should undertake the responsibilities of Press and commercial as well, as part of their normal duties and the same recommendation was agreed by the Pay and Services Commission in 1962.33 To resolve this issue one after another, three secretariats were established, the Central Secretariat Services (CSS) in 1959, the Central Information Services (CIS) and the Trade Services of Pakistan (TSP) in 1963 were created. Even an attempt was made to amalgamate the PFS into the CSP was scraped soon after its introduction.

5.4.2 ACCOUNTS SERVICES

The following services form the account services of Pakistan. These services included:

I. The Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service (PAAS)
II. The Pakistan Military Accounts Service (PMAS) and
III. The Pakistan Railway Accounts Service (PRAS)
The officers belonging to the above account services held posts pertaining to finance and accounts in the Ministries, Attached Departments, Subordinate Offices, Corporations etc., as Financial Advisors, Accountant-General, Auditors-General etc., as well as lower posts in the respective hierarchies of the Accounts Services. The origin of the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service can be traced back to the Account Department of the Government of India. This department was opened in 1899 to European entry – The British Government reserving four-ninths of the post of the reformed Department for Europeans. In the end of the same century the military Finance Department was established to deal with the military accounts. In the beginning this department consisted of military personnel was converted into a civilian department in 1909 and in 1913 it was centralized under the direct control of the Secretary of State. The Pakistan Railways Account service was created in 1929. After independence in 1947, these departments were reorganized under the control of the Audit and Accounts Department. Initially although separate branches and cadres were maintained civilian accounts, the military audit, the railways accounts and postal accounts. In 1948, the later branch was merged with the civil accounts, leaving three departments and their corresponding service structures intact, the PAAS, the PMAS, and PRAS. No significant modifications were made in this regard until 1973.

5.4.3 PAKISTAN CUSTOMS AND EXCISE SERVICE (PCES)

The Pakistan Customs and Excise Service (PCES) were formally constituted in 1959 when the Sea Customs Service and the Central Land Customs and Excise Service were combined to make one service. The posts held by PCES
Officers included those of Assistant Collector, Deputy Collector etc., and posts of corresponding status in the Central Board of Revenue.

5.4.4 **PAKISTAN TAXATION SERVICE (PTS)**

Initially this cadre consisted of junior officers promoted from Provincial and Class II services on an ad hoc basis. In 1957, recruitment to this service was normalized and the cadre was upgraded to Class I status. Officers of this service held posts of Commissioners of Income Tax, Deputy Commissioners of Income Tax, Income Tax Officers etc.

5.4.5 **PAKISTAN MILITARY LAND AND CANTONMENT SERVICE (PMLCS)**

The British administration in the Sub-continent created vast cantonment areas, formed to house military and civilian personnel, which were controlled by the Government of India. Until 1924 the military personnel administered these areas but after that most the posts were transferred to the civilian. During that time this department had two branches,

I. The Land Branch

II. The Cantonment Executive Services.

The Public Service Commission recruited the officers of the Cantonment Executive Services. This service was constituted soon after partition for the administration of cantonment areas after combining aforementioned both departments into the Military land and Cantonment services. Officers of this service were appointed as Cantonment Executive Officers and were in charge of maintenance and control of lands within the cantonment areas. They also supervised the local governments of those areas.
5.4.6 PAKISTAN POSTAL SERVICE (PPS)

The origins of the Pakistan Postal Service (PPS), in Pakistan can be traced to the formation of the Postal Department of the Government of India in the mid-nineteenth century. The Traffic Branch of the Telegraph Department was assimilated with the Postal Department in 1914, though separate cadres were maintained.\textsuperscript{38} From the earliest days the Postal Department was manned predominately by Indians, and though classified as a Central Service, members of the Department were never under the control of the Secretary of State. Soon after Independence direct appointments were made to the General Central Service, (to three services) which was interrelated, namely the Pakistan Postal Service, the Telegraph Traffic Service and the Telegraph Engineering Service. By the time of Independence there were only four, Class I services, which performed the functions of the Postal and Telegraph Department,\textsuperscript{39} which after Independence came to be known as the Pakistan Postal Service. The Posts and Telegraph Service was comprised of senior officers from the former two cadres, and some officers from the Telegraph Engineering Service. The Postal Department and the Telephones and Telegraphs Departments were formally separated in 1961, under different Directors General, with the Posts and Telegraph Service and the Pakistan Postal Service falling under the authority of the Postal Department, and the Telegraph Engineering Service and the Telegraph Traffic Service under the Telephones and Telegraphs Department. In 1965, the Telegraph Traffic Service was formally encadred as the Telegraph Engineering Service,\textsuperscript{40} and in 1968, the Posts and Telegraph Traffic Service was incorporated into the Pakistan Postal Service.\textsuperscript{41} Officers of the PPS preponderantly remained within the boundaries of the Postal Department for
the duration of their careers. Officers of the PPS were appointed to senior executive posts in the Postal Department.

5.4.7 TELEGRAPH ENGINEERING SERVICE (TES)

Officers of the TES entered service through a separate Engineering Examination administered by the Federal Public Service Commission or through promotion from Class II posts. Members of the cadre were assigned almost exclusively to technical posts within the ambit of their Department. The position regarding this service has been briefly mentioned above. Officers of this cadre were appointed to technical posts in the Departments concerned.

5.4.8 INFORMATION SERVICE OF PAKISTAN (ISP)

Central Information Service was formed in 1963 for posts requiring journalistic qualifications and experience for appointment-in Pakistan and in foreign missions. Officers of this cadre held appointments in the Ministry of Information, Press Information Department, Radio Pakistan, the Pakistan Television Corporation, etc. In 1970 the designation of this cadre was changed into the Information Service of Pakistan (ISP).

5.4.9 CENTRAL ENGINEERING SERVICE (CES)

Before Independence, the Indian Service of Engineers was classified as an All-India Service. After Independence the Central Engineering Service (CES) was made a Central Service and its officers were mainly appointed to hold technical posts in the Pakistan Public Works Department.
The Railway Branch of the Public Works Department was abolished in 1905, though officers of the Building and Roads Branch, Irrigation Branch, and Railway Branch continued to be treated as members of the same cadre at least as late as 1918. However, the engineering establishment was divided into two cadres by 1924: The Indian Service of Engineers, with two branches—the Building and Roads Branch and the Irrigation Branch; and the State Railway Engineers, a Central Service. At the time of Partition the Indian Service of Engineers was classified as an All-India Service. Since Independence the CES has grown very rapidly. Officers of the CES were exclusively assigned to positions within the Pakistan Public Works Department.

5.4.10   CENTRAL SECRETARIAT SERVICE (CSS)

This cadre was formed as a result of the Section Officers' Scheme, introduced on the proposal of the G. Ahmed Committee in 1959. The main objective of the scheme was to cut down the number of administrative tiers in the Secretariat for decision-making (Clerks, Assistants, Superintendents, Assistant Secretaries / Under-Secretaries). According to the scheme, a new rank of Section Officers was to be created for performing the functions of Assistant Secretaries / Under-Secretaries. They assumed most of the clerical functions and were also given the responsibility for disposing of routine cases without reference to the Deputy Secretary.

The CSS was constituted by including the following categories of personnel: Redesignated Assistants / Under Secretaries, officers promoted from Superintendents, officers promoted from Assistants, Military officers, Class I officers other than Assistant / Under Secretaries, other Class II officers, Officers on Special Duty, Specialist officers, educators, etc. Formally
encadred in 1965, the officers of the CSS held the posts of Section Officers in the Secretariat and were eligible for promotion as Deputy Secretaries etc.

The intention of this reform was to eliminate unnecessary time-consuming review of cases at levels below that of the disposing authority. To affect these ends the Committee proposed the organization of a Section Officer cadre on the following lines:

I. All Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries would be redesignated as Section Officers;

II. Members of the Central Superior Services would be eligible for promotion as Section Officers;

III. 70 per cent of the remaining cadre would be filled by promotion from Superintendents, Assistants, and other Class II posts; and

IV. The remaining 30 per cent of the cadre would enter by direct recruitment. This proposal was accepted as it was by the Government in 1959.

The Pay and Services Commission of 1962, argued that the Section Officer's Scheme produced a 'blind-alley cadre,' in which Section Officers would not be qualified for promotion to Deputy Secretary status due to lack of experience in the field. Consequently the Commission recommended that the system of Under Secretaries be revived. However, the Services Reorganization Committee, tempered this criticism in 1969, but again called for its revival. Similarly the Zuberi Report of 1967, though deploring the lack of esprit de corps among Section Officers and the relatively low levels of education among promotees to the Service, concluded that 'remedial' and not 'wholesale changes' were needed in the system. Until 1971, members of
the CSS held positions in virtually every Ministry of the Government and the cadre strength of the Service was greater than that of any other Central Superior Service. However, the preponderate share of the cadre was locked into posts at the Section Officer level, and no CSS officer held a charge higher than that of Deputy Secretary.53

5.4.11 TRADE SERVICES OF PAKISTAN (TSP)
Like the ISP, the trade service of Pakistan was created to meet the requirements of the commercial fields in the country and the missions abroad. This cadre was formally constituted in 1070.

5.4.12 GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE RESERVE (GAR)
The general administrative reserve (GAR) was created in undivided India by recruiting 100 senior officers from various walks of life on a competitive selection basis at the Under Secretary / Deputy Secretary levels.54 The Government of Pakistan continued the program after Partition, and inducted approximately additional 100 officers at the Deputy Secretary level during the years 1948-52. Moreover, 7 GAR officers from pre-partition India also were inducted into the newly constituted GAR. From among the officers so inducted, 35 were selected into a ‘Special Wing,’ GAR (SW), encadred by officers with financial experience for appointments to posts within the Ministry of Finance.55 As such, the creation of the GAR represents the first experiment by the Government of Pakistan with wide-scale lateral recruitment. Corresponding to the regularization of recruitment practices in regularly constituted services, recruitment to the GAR stopped in 1952. Despite repeated demands from the Association of GAR Officers, the GAR was never encadred into a separate service, nor was specific posts in the
secretariat reserved for its members, nor was officers in the GAR absorbed into other services.\textsuperscript{56} The Government examined the status of the GAR in 1959. It decided to allow members of the organization to serve out their terms of employment until retirement, but not to support the creation of an additional service cadre. The Commission argued that since recruitment to the GAR had stopped, thus, there was no further need to encadre members of the GAR, that it was not 'administratively sound' to reserve posts in the secretariat for its members, and finally that the 'absorption of GAR officers into the regular Central Superior Services (would) go against the basic concept of these services ... It (would) also upset their rank, structure, affect prospects of promotion, undermine morale, and cause endless administrative difficulties over such questions as pay and promotion.\textsuperscript{57} Consequently, the cadre strength of the GAR has steadily decreased. In 1961, there were 84 GAR officers, by 1970 only 24 of these were still employed by the Government, and by 1982 all had retired.\textsuperscript{58}

Due to the paucity of experienced officers just after independence, the Central Government recruited some officers at the level of Under Secretary and Deputy Secretary in 1948-1952. The cadre was designated as the General Administrative Reserve (GAR). Officers having financial experience were encadred in a "Special Wing" of the GAR. The GAR was however ad hoc cadres to meet the requirements of the emergency just after Partition and was not regularly constituted as a Central Superior Service.

5.4.13  **ECONOMIC POOL**

The Wheeler Committee introduced the idea of the Economic Pool before Independence, in 1937. It is a cadre of specialist officers for appointment in the Finance and Commercial Departments of the Government of India.\textsuperscript{59} As
a consequence of their recommendations the Finance and Commerce Pool was formed in 1939. The composition of this Pool was primarily drawn from ICS officers and officers of the Accounts Departments. Pakistan, at the time of Independence, inherited 8 Pool officers. The Government of Pakistan decided, in 1950, to reconstitute the Pool, and 24 officers were duly appointed. However, the Finance and Commerce Pool did not come into effective operation until 1959. At that time, the G. Ahmed Committee proposed the restoration of the pool concept and consequently Government of Pakistan established the Economic Pool. Initially it was manned from Commerce, Finance and Industry ministries, (about 60% of them) were CSP officers and the remaining 40% came from the accounts and finance services.\textsuperscript{60}

5.6 \hspace{1em} \textbf{ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN PAKISTAN}

The Government of Pakistan, soon after Independence decided to review the system of administration and some foreign experts were invited to Pakistan to study and report on the deficiencies of the system. It would be interesting to discuss the following important commissions and their observations.

5.6.1 \hspace{1em} \textbf{THE EGGER COMMISSION 1953}

In 1953 Professor Rowland Egger of USA in his report, made the following observations regarding the deficiencies of personnel management in Pakistan:\textsuperscript{61}

1. It is entirely heavily oriented towards, too bound up in, and too subservient to mere academic notions of intelligence and ability; it carries too little of the dynamic, the organized action, and the
human relations orientations. It is entirely obsessed with the interests of those already in service.

II. Recruitment standards are archaic, and recruitment and examination techniques are far removed from currently accepted good practices; they under-estimate profoundly both the personnel potentialities of the society and the growth potential of intelligent and intellectually active, even though by university standards, undisciplined minds.

III. The selection system is self-perpetuating and tends to repeat its own type, as though the civil service drew most of its inspiration from looking in the mirror.

IV. The limitations of cadre strength in the central superior services, and the relative disregard of capacity for growth, create a sort of official predestination introducing a jarringly Calvinistic note into the machinery of an Islamic State.

V. Personnel admitted to the services are immediately imprisoned behind the high walls of many services, and little common allegiance is ever developed.

VI. Posting of personnel to particular jobs is too remote from and too little influenced by the opinions of those exercising responsibility for what is done in the job; there is too little attention given to the special interests and emotional pulls of individuals towards particular sorts of assignments: members of a class are supposed to be like a box of interchangeable parts in an assembly line. Officers tend to be observed with service
membership, title, and class and rank and too little concerned with particular job responsibilities.

However Professor Egger did not consider that the above deficiencies were peculiar to the civil service in Pakistan; they are more or less common to other governments also. Pleading for moderation, Egger wrote: — "No civil service system can, with safety, disregard academic standards in its recruitment policies; but it cannot, with safety, become entirely subservient to academic standards. Personnel have to be put behind some walls, but the wall should be low and the gates frequent. An officer ought to have some pride of service and even pride of place, but he ought to be even more proud of the work in which he is co-operating and the government which he is serving". Egger recommended inter alia the unification of the entire group of employees into a single Civil Service of Pakistan with internal grouping solely for administrative convenience e.g. into Administration, Foreign, Audit & Accounts Revenue, Engineering, Education, Medical, Police etc. He also recommended standardized pay scales based on comprehensive job analysis.

5.6.2 THE GLADIEUX COMMISSION 1955

In 1955 the Government of Pakistan engaged Bernard Gladieux, also from the USA as a consultant on Public Administration to the Planning Commission in Pakistan. He was strongly critical of the superiority of the generalists over the specialists and expressed the following views:

"Many of these incumbents are able and enlightened civil servants who are devoted to the welfare of their country and who aspire to the highest principles of public service. However,
the administrative leaders of Pakistan, both Central and Provincial are not uniformly able and too many have breadth without depth in terms of governmental experience particularly in development subjects. The generalist in the ICS-CSP tradition is becoming an obsolete phenomenon in modern government and this administrative group would do well to accept this fact and to prepare itself better for specialized program administration." 62

He was of the view that the technical and professional civil servants also possessed administrative skills in addition to their professional attainments and should be encouraged to hold higher posts in the development areas of the administration. According to him, regardless of their personal and professional qualifications no democracy can afford to entrust its administrative destiny to any single cadre group, class or service. To do so is to run the risk of creating and maintaining a civil service oligarchy. Therefore, it will be well to open up the channels of aspiration for high public positions to all those qualified for the duties and responsibilities of public office. This should be on a free and open competitive basis without the continued monopoly of a favored small class predestined at the time of initial selection for the role of administration. 63 Gladieux, like Egger, also emphasized the need for more professionalism in the civil services and recommended that all groups of employees under the Central Superior Services, as well as all other professional grade officers, including engineers, doctors, agricultural experts etc., should be placed in a single cadre. 64 According to him it will allow an internal grouping of posts in the same
field, as for example Engineering, Agriculture, Revenue, Audit & Accounts etc.\textsuperscript{65}

The First five-year Plan of the Government of Pakistan came in 1955. It also took note of the dominance of the generalist cadre of civil service over the other cadres.\textsuperscript{66} It was recommended in the plan report that non-technical Central Superior Services should be combined into a single civil service: that existing services should be converted into branches of this combined civil service, all having identical scales of pay, prospects of promotion and leave, retirement and pension rules with protection for the established rights of existing incumbents: that even if they continued to be separately designated by their existing names, they should not be treated as independent and self-contained cadres.\textsuperscript{67} In other words, it was recommended that they should be treated as if they were branches of a single civil service.

\textbf{5.6.3 CORNELIUS COMMISSION 1962}

The government of Pakistan created a Pay and Service Commission under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice A. R. Cornelius, in 1962, which also strongly criticized the generalist nature of the CSP and its preponderance over other services.\textsuperscript{68} The commission observed in the following lines that in recent years, men who have stood as low as 120th in the list have secured appointments to this elite service, which enjoys reservation of the plums in the administration to the numerical extent of about 31\% in excess of its own total numbers’.\textsuperscript{69} This situation cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed. The initial claim, namely of superiority of intellect as proved by examination test, which was one of the pillars on which the superiority of the Indian Civil
Service has been based, cannot possibly be raised in respect of the CSP as it is composed at present.

The normal method of claiming a right to occupy a post in public service should be proving competence to do so, and in our opinion, the public which has been enjoying the benefit of the satisfactory service which these officers have rendered owes them this right, and cannot refuse it on the basis of reservation or vested rights, in favor of a certain section which comes down from the period of colonial rule. Steps should be taken to replace the 'monopoly' by a more equal division of responsibilities and the corresponding rights among all those in the public service who by their education, training, experience and aptitude are found fit to carry them.  

Criticizing the reservation of senior posts for the CSP especially in the Central Secretariat the report maintained that a majority of these posts are reserved for the CSP although, in actual fact, a considerable proportion of these reserved posts are competently held by officers of Provincial Services in an officiating capacity. Reservation of these Secretariat posts for the members of the ICS was based on political considerations which exist no more and it was recommended that these Secretariat appointments should be laid open, as a step in their careers, to officers of the Civil Executive Service in every department, on the ground of aptitude alone. It was recommended that the entire public service should be built up in seven tiers or groups:

One of the most important roles in the career of a CSP officer was to function as Coordinator at District and Divisional levels. According to the report that the position of Coordinator at district level and divisional level should be laid open to members of all the Superior Services, to be achieved by pure selection, proof of talent shown, and of possession of managerial
capacities which have been improved by courses of training. Regarding District Administration the report observed that was the various functions of a special nature, which are at present incorporated in the person of the Deputy Commissioner, should therefore be separated and placed under their own district heads."

There was a note of dissent by two members of this Commission, in which they emphasized the coordinative role of the CSP officers. The following is an extract from the note of dissent:

"With the increase in the development functions of Government, the need for the type of co-ordination and leadership offered by officers of the CSP is not over. The administrator's function is to understand and coordinate public policy and interpret it to the operative services. The technical and professional heads of the services can seldom have a view of the entire picture of Government or see what is necessary in their own work to produce in the end a correlated public service. Application of decisions of public policy to the technical field is beyond the competence or responsibility of the technician. In the meantime the Report of the Fulton Committee was published in the UK, which has been mentioned earlier in this chapter. It was of special interest to Pakistan because the British, who had introduced the system of civil service in India during their colonial rule, had felt the necessity for changing the structure of the civil service in their own country. This report was studied in depth by a Working Group comprising CSP as well non CSP officers appointed by Government in 1969."
Commenting on the position of specialists as compared to generalists in the civil service, the report observed that, "As against 500 members of the CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan), there are probably over 5,000 Class I officers in the various technical and non-technical specialist services and posts under the Central and Provincial Governments. However, as there is a system of reservation of posts for the CSP in the secretariat and elsewhere (under both the Central and Provincial Governments), the non-CSP officers do not have adequate avenues for promotion, and are increasingly frustrated on this account. Largely members of one Service, namely, the CSP, occupy the highest administrative jobs in Pakistan, in practically all fields. Even where a technician on rare occasions is selected for a higher administrative post, he gets it after 20 to 25 years while a generalist would get to the same level in 10 to 15 years. For instance, while the Chief Engineering Advisor in the Central Government (equivalent to Joint Secretary) is generally an engineer with 25 to 27 years of Class I service, a CSP officer expects to be Joint Secretary in 14 to 16 years. This lack of opportunity and position of subservience, continued over a period can instill diffidence and a feeling of inferiority even in talented and highly qualified technicians."

The Working Group after due study and analysis identified some governing principles and guidelines for its report. Some of the observations enunciated in the report were: -
I. The public service structure in future will be based on equality of status and pay for all its component branches (occupational groups), technical as well as non-technical, and on equality of opportunity for advancement without the impediments of horizontal or vertical divisions.

**TABLE 5.6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. #</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th># OF GRADES</th>
<th>NATURE OF JOB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Group F</td>
<td>4 Grades</td>
<td>Unskilled Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Group E</td>
<td>4 Grades</td>
<td>Semi-skilled Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Group D</td>
<td>5 Grades</td>
<td>Skilled workers and rank and file supervisory staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Group C</td>
<td>5 Grades</td>
<td>Lower inspectorial and Middle supervisory staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Group B</td>
<td>4 Grades</td>
<td>‘Basic Officer’ Class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Group A</td>
<td>4 Grades</td>
<td>Managerial Class; District level up to divisional level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>P A S</td>
<td>4 Grades</td>
<td>Top directly and higher Administrative posts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


II. ‘Professionalism’ will be emphasized and developed as a deliberate policy, and given weight instead of ‘generalist’. Within each cadre (or occupational group) there should be built in opportunities for advancement in order to encourage professionalism, and outside the cadres there should be such broader areas of inter-related fields that knowledge and experience in one field is useful for the others and thus professionalism continues to be emphasized.
The recommendations of the Working Group regarding the structure of the civil service included the following:

"The existing Class I Services of the Central Government and other identifiable groups of Class I officers should become branches of a combined Service to be known as the Central Public Service; all branches should have uniform status and grades of pay, though they should retain their identity as separate occupational groups. The present use of labels at the end of names should be discarded. On the same lines, at the Provincial level, all existing Class I Services and identifiable groups should become branches of a combined Provincial Public Service (for each Province) which should have the same status as the Central Public Service and in due course, similar grades of pay.

The present CSP will continue as a branch, but its regular field should be specified as magisterial functions and land revenue collection, and its own cadre should include only the relevant posts in the Districts, Divisions and Provincial Boards of Revenue. For ex-cadre posts, its officers should be eligible on the same and equal basis as officers of other branches."  

The above view was held by the majority. However, the CSP members of the Working Group who were in a minority, disagreed with some of the recommendations although they agreed to the principle to encourage more professionalism in the civil service. Some observation made by the minority was as follows:
"We felt that a beginning could be made towards removing the barriers and distinctions between services/cadres and inequalities in pay and status by bringing under one umbrella the various services / cadres as well as the large body of Government servants who are not encadred. The prospects of promotion within the different occupational groups should be re-examined and adequate avenues of advancement provided to the extent feasible having regard to the nature of work and level of responsibilities entrusted to each occupational group."**77**

5.7 **CIVIL BUREAUCRACY AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS**

This research study also attempts to examine the responses, reactions and the attitudes of officers of the civil bureaucracy toward various major administrative reforms in Pakistan. This evidence will be used to indicate the extent to which bureaucracy tends to resist change when administrative reforms bring threatening impacts on its existing status, power and prestige. Our Study will be restricted to the reforms by Egger, Gladieux, the Pay and Services Commission and the Administrative Reform of 1973 to answer the following questions:

I. Why the pre-1973 major administrative reforms could not be implemented? And what were the reasons for the failure of reforms in Pakistan?

II. Why did the higher civil servants oppose administrative reforms? And what was the nature of opposition by the civil bureaucracy?
Administrative reform involves a change in the attitudes and behavior of the bureaucracy; it is closely related to the culture of the society. Robert Presthus also maintains that variations in bureaucratic behavior stem from cultural differences. Dwight Waldo observes that “Despite Weber’s stunning and his strenuous attempt at universality, his presentation of bureaucracy was culture-bound. Despite his heroic effort to be objective, and value free, his presentation of bureaucracy reflects his own, and his culture’s values.” Although the values of administrators are shaped by cultural conditions of the society, fundamental differences between the general culture of the society and the “administrative culture.” Whereas culture implies certain ways of thinking, feeling and behaving, the ‘administrative culture’ refers to conventional ways in which administrators act yet this culture is not unrelated to the general culture of the society. Such cultural factors are highly significant in determining the behavior of bureaucracy precisely because their impact on such behavior is likely to be more substantial than bureaucracy’s impact on the general culture. For example, Mime recognizes the importance of culture in administrative reform observing that reform “must be conceived in terms of cultural conditions.” LaPalombara maintains “administrative reforms were closely associated with certain ends -in- view (values, ideologies) held by those who sought to bring about change, or to impede it. For the Great Elector, Frederick William I, Louis XIV, and the early Norman Kings, the overriding value appears to be the extension of territorial power. Where such extensions occurred, they required some administrative reorganization in advance in sectors of defense and the military. They also required, after the fact of extended jurisdiction, the creation of new administrative arrangements to make effective control of enlarged nation-states possible.” Thus, in these countries at least, the
reasons why earliest administrative reforms occurred in the military and financial sectors appear self-evident.\

The success or failure of administrative reform depends on the following variables:

I. The nature of reform;
II. The values of reformers;
III. The nature of administrative culture as a subset of the general culture;
IV. Timing; and
V. The nature of leadership.

Our analysis of the studies by Rowland Egger, Bernard Gladieux and the Cornelius Commission, show the significance of the above variables to the success or failure of administrative reform. Pakistan felt that it had to improve its administrative machinery since it had inherited an administrative structure that was designed to enforce law and order and collect taxes. The highly centralized structure of colonial administration was simply not conducive to the speedy disposal of business. Gladieux summarizes its defects in the following way:

"The basic problems surrounding present-day administration in Pakistan arise largely from the fact that an administrative system born as an instrument of colonial policy has been carried over with but few modifications and utilized as the machinery for democracy . . . (The major weaknesses of the present administrative system with respect to national development stem largely from the fact that the government is still substantially directed to the law and order function in its organizational, procedural, personnel and fiscal aspects."

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II. The offices, departments, bureaus and directorates represented no planned functional development of the government machinery. They were either replicas of agencies existing in undivided India or the consequences of administrative accidents or personal idiosyncrasies.

III. The ministries did not provide coherent functional grouping of divisions through which coordination could be achieved.

IV. No distinction was made between line and staff functions.\(^9\)  

Egger also studied personnel management and pointed out that it was heavily oriented to academic notions of general intelligence and ability, while human relations orientations were noticeably absent. Also, recruitment procedures were outdated, that is, recruitment and examination procedures were far removed from currently accepted standards of good practice. Finally, the selection system was self and personnel recruitment to the services were “imprisoned behind the high walls of many services and many classes, and little common allegiance (was) ever developed.”\(^1\)  2 Egger deplored the elitist attitude of the secretariat employees: “Officials tend to be obsessed with service membership, and too little concerned with particular job responsibilities...Secretaries condescend to joint secretaries, and assistant secretaries take the snubs of their superiors in the order named, while all secretarial employees unite in deploiring departmental personnel.”\(^2\)  2 Egger also stated that no personal management system could be healthy which was based on closed recruitment. He suggested that personnel management should provide opportunities for lateral recruitment that would bring persons with technical qualifications into the service. To overcome such deficiencies Egger suggested the following lines of development:
I. The building of strong functional operating departments in which both executive and administrative duties and responsibilities would be vested; the heads of these departments, who would ordinarily come from the technical services but might well be generalist civil servants specialized in their subject matter, would be on a parity with secretaries to Government in the administrative hierarchy, and would be permanent general managers of the departments which they head.

II. The decentralizing, to the maximum degree possible consistent with the maintenance of ministerial responsibility, of ministerial authority, by delegation from the Minister to the Executive Head, and by the Executive Head to the heads of his sub-divisions.

III. The conversion of the present secretariat into a ministerial general staff, not in the line of command, to advise and assist the Minister on the one hand and the Executive Heads on the other, and to handle the general staff work of the ministry such as budgets and accounts establishment, program progress supervision and reporting etc.

IV. The revision of procedures to permit top departmental personnel to deal quickly and economically with problems and to secure rapid consideration by the Minister of major issues on which his instructions are necessary.93

Egger's recommendations manifested considerable insight into the administrative system of Pakistan. Nevertheless these recommendations
could not be transformed into policy, in large part because they were not well received by the civil service of Pakistan, as will be demonstrated further on.

Bernard Gladieux was also appointed by the Planning Board to prepare recommendations concerning the administrative and organizational aspects of development activities in Pakistan. Gladieux submitted a report in 1955, which contains strong criticisms of the administrative system of Pakistan. It had, he argued, “too many ministries and major organizational sub units, and not enough integrating of functions into stronger and more unified structures.”94 He identified the following deficiencies:

I. Many broad functions of government were split into separate ministries, which created problems of coordination.

II. Various ministries and departments were not self-contained; consequently, there was a constant train of referrals and cross checks being made between agencies of government.

III. Most of the development departments suffered as a result of the concentration of power at the top levels.

IV. Authority did not always accompany responsibility in relatively commensurate terms.

V. The organization of work in the substructures of government frequently reflected the extremes of over centralization, i.e., the existence of a conglomerate of functions without structural form.95

Like Egger, Gladieux also has criticized the secretariat system because politicians and technocrats were “prisoners”. Sir the secretariat system
placed emphasis on precedents and on the overflowing of files; it increased the decision-making power of clerks. In order to overcome these deficiencies, Gladieux recommended decentralization of development activities. He also criticized the personnel system which was “self-perpetuating and self-regulating”. “Those who control the system are at once its beneficiaries and product and are themselves an integral part of the dominant administrative class of the public service.”96 In the earlier chapters, we noticed how the Establishment Division, dominated by senior members of the CSP who controlled recruitment, promotions, transfer, the posting of administrative personnel, and disciplinary activities The report also contains criticisms of the public service system because it both placed excessive emphasis on academic standards and gave disproportionate weight to seniority. It was also inflexible regarding transfers between services, cadres, and classes. Gladieux also criticized the British colonial tradition of subordination of technical officers to the generalists: “The submersion of the technical and operating units of government under superfluous layers of general officers possessing knowledge-ability on a scale clogs the channels of decision and action. There are often so many levels of super visors, planners, coordinators, advisers and administrative reviewers over the action department that decisions on pro grams and proposals are inordinately delayed and sometimes result in diluted program execution. The regulating of technical and professional personnel to a status of secondary rank and prestige in the public service is also an attribute of the current administrative system.”97

Gladieux also noted the tendency to, push decision-making up the line to superior authorities. This propensity for over-centralization was indicative
of a failure to comprehend the processes or techniques for assuring central control with decentralized operations. He blamed the secretariat system for such over-centralization: "Under this system a specially trained cadre of generalists is selected through an academic examination process, and eventually promoted to positions of responsibility in the administrative ranks of government. As the secretariat they supervise the technical and program departments. All decisions of government, both policy and administrative, come about as the result of elaborate staff consideration within the secretariat which serves as the almost exclusive channel of advice to the ministers." This type of system did not permit subordinates to make decisions something for which CSP officers are to blame: "The CSP group and its ex-officio associates have been in unchallenged control of government both central and provincial, since partition... Theirs must be the chief responsibility for the general lack of a simplified and expeditious system of administrative management....over the years." He suggested that top administrative posts should be open to all who were qualified for the duties and responsibilities of public office. To overcome such deficiencies Gladieux recommended the establishment of a Public Service Board which would take on the personnel functions then performed by the Establishment Division, and the creation of a single civil service in which all groups of employees in the central superior services would be included. What is clear from the foregoing analysis of the two reports (and Gladieux) is that both were highly critical of the traditional nature of a bureaucracy which had been designed by the colonial power to rule the Indian subcontinent and inherited virtually intact by Pakistan. Both reports contained substantial criticisms of the elitist character of the administrative or civil service of Pakistan, based as it was on British assumptions.
The most serious attempt to alter the power structure within the career services was made by the Pay and Services Commission, set up by General Ayub, under the chairmanship of Justice A. R. Cornelius. The Commission, in its report criticized the privileges of the elitist administrative Civil Service of Pakistan. It pointed out the discrepancy that existed between "the promotional chances of officers in the Civil Service of Pakistan and other officers of the top ranks in the Specialized Services." It also noted that the academic qualifications of the members of other services were in no way inferior to those of the members of the Civil Service of Pakistan. For this reason the Commission argued strongly against the rapid promotion of CSP officers, which reflected the continuation of a system of "antiquated or colonial rule." The Commission also recommended the integration of the various Services into a Seven-tiered structure, and lateral entry by promotion from one class to the other. The Commission also argued against the concentration of leadership functions in single persons (Deputy Commissioner). The British with a view to controlling the people had made this arrangement. The Deputy Commissioner was the 'kingpin' of administration. He was virtually the government in the district. He was also the head of the police force in the district. In short, he acted as magistrate, collector and supervisor in the district. It was in response to this heavy concentration of responsibility that the Commission suggested that functions of the district magistrate in particular should be performed by separate bodies. The Commission also rejected the idea of reserving a majority of posts like under-secretary, deputy secretary, joint secretary, and secretary for members of the CSP. It also suggested that a Pakistan Administrative Service be established to replace the CSP and that men of the technical services be admitted into the CSP.
It is clear from the three reports cited that the recommendations of the various commissions were directed to changing the colonial bureaucracy into one more suited to undertaking the developmental activities of Pakistan. All three reports were critical of the elitist character of the administrative civil service of Pakistan and its domination by generalists.

In order to discover the attitude of the civil bureaucracy toward these reforms, civil servants were interviewed personally. The most important reason given by the civil servants was that it provided them with the greatest possible amount of occupational prestige, including the guarantee of security of tenure, the prospect of pension on retirement, and prospects of the promotion and the exercise of authority. Civil servants were also asked whether they would leave the civil service if they were offered a job with more money. None of the civil servants interviewed was willing to leave the Civil Service of Pakistan. The ‘more money’ reason was not very important to the Pakistani civil servant. This suggests that civil servants were more concerned with prestige and status. Such status consciousness was a retention of an earlier period when a special ethos was inculcated into civil servants by the colonial power, and which was thereafter passed on to civil servants of Pakistan.

The cultural values of Pakistani society also stressed the differences of status, demonstrating once again that social values are reflected in the attitude of civil servants. The civil bureaucrats held the view that cadre posts should be held only by generalists, i.e., members of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). They also maintained that technical persons should only be placed in charge of technical departments. One of the reasons why civil servants took issue with the statement was that major decision-making
power rested in the secretariat. They were, as a consequence, opposed to the view that technicians should be allowed to hold such secretarial posts. Moreover, the entry of technical personnel into these posts would have diminished the dominant role of the generalists. When asked to express their opinion about the establishment of a Pakistan Administrative Service, as suggested by the Pay and Services Commission, most of the civil servants expressed the view that admission of technical persons into the administrative service would create conflict between the generalists and the specialists and would destroy the unity of the service. 101 One of the reasons for their opposition to lateral recruitment was probably that such a system would destroy their supremacy over the secretariat system. Civil servants were also asked what they considered to be the best criterion for promotion in bureaucratic organizations. Ninety per cent of those interviewed expressed the view that up to certain level (joint secretary), promotions should be made on the basis of seniority. Above that level, both seniority and merit should be used as criteria for determining promotion in bureaucratic organizations. The remaining ten per cent of the civil servants maintained that both merit and seniority should be used as the main criteria for promotion.

The above study suggests that values like exclusiveness, elitism, status, prestige, consciousness, and a generalist service orientation held by the bureaucratic elites in Pakistan were inconsistent with the values of those who recommended these reforms. Both Egger's and Gladieux's recommendations were based on North American values. For example, both suggested that the technicians should also be allowed to hold secretariat posts. Both spoke against the secretariat system where the members of the
civil service occupied most of the important posts. Since Egger and Gladieux’s recommendations directly threatened the status and power of established officials, they naturally resisted the implementation of these recommendations.

The report of the Pay and Services Commission was resisted because of its vehement criticism of the dominance of the Civil Service of Pakistan. All members of the Commission except two were taken from outside the bureaucracy. The values of these individuals were also quite different from the bureaucratic values of Pakistan. The two CSP members of the Commission did not agree with many of the recommendations of the Commission and defended the elitist service of Pakistan. Since all three reports contained criticisms, which attempted to bring about fundamental changes in organizational and personnel areas of the secretariat system, CSP officers who perceived that their power and interests were directly threatened resisted them. Therefore, in addition to the values of administrators and of members of administrative reform committees, the nature of reform also determines its fate.

The success and failure of administrative reforms also depends on conditions in the surrounding environment. The political environment in particular often determines the fate of reform, in the sense that administrative reforms cannot be successful where political apathy prevails. Both Egger’s and Gladieux’s study were undertaken at a time when Pakistan was experiencing a high level of political instability. For this reason, political leaders were not really interested in bringing about fundamental changes in the administrative structure of Pakistan. Rather they were obliged to depend on civil servants for building the new nation. Another reason why political leaders did not
take any real interest in administrative reform is that they were more concerned with the fate of their political survival. It may be note that it was the Planning Board, not political leaders, which appointed Egger and Gladieux to study the administration of Pakistan. The recommendations of the Pay and Services Commission also could not be transformed into policy since it did not get the full backing of President Ayub. He did not want to antagonize the bureaucracy by adopting its radical reform proposals, since he was dependent on it for the achievement of his objectives of socio-economic development and modernization. In this case it is clear that extensive administrative reform is almost impossible to implement when top political leaders do not support it.

The strategies and methods, which the Civil Service of Pakistan used in order to resist the administrative reforms, as recommended by Egger, Gladieux, and the Pay and Services Commission. One of the most important ways in which the Pakistan bureaucracy resisted change was through their membership in various commissions. For example, two CSP officers were members of the Pay and Services Commission. They were against the proposals contained in the majority report, and argued that the changes recommended by the Commission would create a “psychological upheaval of the first magnitude”. They stated that the introduction of such changes would reduce the incentive for development activities, and that official, would be involved in “a new and unprecedented scramble for promotion and selection to the new services. We are of the opinion that the present system which has stood the test of time, not only during the British regime but also during the tumultuous and important years after independence, should be permitted to continue with only such changes as experience has shown to be
necessary.” They also objected to the proposal of the majority report that various functions should not be concentrated in the hands of a single person, that technicians should be free from the control of administrators, and that technical officers should be entrusted with purely administrative duties. The CSP members of the Commission also defended the elitist character of the administrative service, pointing out that the Indian Administrative Service had not been abolished. Two CSP members also protested against the idea of drawing members from other services into the top ranks of the bureaucracy:

“We do not agree that the Civil Service of Pakistan.... Should be abolished and its place taken by a service drawn from all the cadres. The esprit de corps of this service has been built upon a long tradition of devotion to duty. The selection, the initial training and experience from the very beginning in posts of responsibility which bring the young Assistant Commissioner or Sub-Divisional Magistrates in contact with rural problems and the people of the country all contribute to the promotion of efficiency and the development of character. This has permitted comparatively young officers to handle difficult situations with tact and confidence. We doubt if persons with this training or experience would be qualified to tackle the difficult duties of a Deputy Commissioner.”

They also maintained that many of the proposals in the majority report would “involve the Ministers in questions of routine and implementation. It is important that Ministers should be responding for the formulation of policy and general guidance but should not be called upon to take decisions
in matters of departmental routine. The table 5.7 indicates the extent to which CSP officers dominated the various commissions. It shows that 77 persons of the 141 serving on reform commissions were from the CSP cadre. About 84 per cent of those serving on reform commissions were government officials. Since 1958, the participation of CSP officers in various commissions had increased while that of politicians had decreased. The predominance of CSP officers in various commissions is one of the reasons why efforts to minimize the power and status of CSP officers were unsuccessful. Another device employed by the bureaucracy in its effort to resist change was its use of the colonial structure of administration, which was highly centralized. By controlling strategically located jobs throughout the administration, it was able to resist reforms, which adversely affected its status and power. It was noticed in the earlier chapters that how the members of the Civil Service of Pakistan continued to hold the important posts of Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Under-Secretary in the Planning Division of the President’s Secretariat and in the Planning and Development Department of the provincial government’s secretariat. They also held important positions in the central and provincial secretariats. In 1963, CSP officers held the seven highest positions in the President’s Secretariat. Amongst the various ministries and divisions, of 21 important positions, CSP officers held fourteen in 1963. Since CSP officers held important positions in the secretariats, they were able to establish close contact with the President, Ministers, and other politically responsible persons. It was through such contact that they were able to block administrative reforms and provide inputs to policy-making. For example, Altaf Gahar, a senior member of the Civil Service of Pakistan who held the post of secretary, exercised tremendous influence over the President of Pakistan. Moreover, a large
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. #</th>
<th>NAME OF COMMISSION</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</th>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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**Percentage**

|       | **57.4** | **7.4** | **1.4** | **2.2** | **20.1** | **8.9** | **2.2** | **100** |

number of members of the Pakistan Civil Service held important portfolios in Ayub Khan’s cabinet.108 These civil servants-cum-ministers always tried to protect the interests of higher civil servants. The Establishment Division of the President’s Secretariat provided another instrument through which bureaucracy was able to resist reforms. The Division, comprised almost entirely of CSP officials, exercised control over administrative reforms through “a very ‘effective, efficient organization and management wing.”109 Its importance is clearly reflected in Braibanti’s claim that it “embraced functions of the Bureau of the Budget Office of the President, Civil Service Commission as organized in the U.S.A., and extensive training functions not found in the American System.”110

Another method of resisting change was through statements issued to the various commissions. When the Pay and Services Commission recommended the creation of cadres of specialists, technicians and generalists, the CSP Association submitted a long memorandum to the Commission, defending the role of a “closed generalist cadre”. Radical changes which had been recommended by the Commission were not accepted by President Ayub who announced that no changes should be made in the structure and organization of the civil services. These development activities required continuity in the functions and organization of the civil services. As the following evidence suggests, Ayub accepted their point of view:

“We have been also conscious that engaged as we are on a gigantic effort for the economic development and progress of our country, the government must get a fair proportion of the talent in the country keeping in view the attractive careers being
offered to our young men by our industry and commerce... With regard to the service structure the Commission recommended certain radical changes involving a complete redesigning of the existing scheme and organization of public services in Pakistan. In our considering these recommendations the supreme importance of concentrating all our efforts and energies on the task of national development has to be kept in view. This task requires that continuity in the functions and organization of the public service, which have grown in time and have become familiar to the people, be maintained and that nothing should be done which might involve the risk of disrupting the administrative fabric. At the same time the necessities of reorienting the administration so as to serve the national objective of development cannot be ignored. The government has, therefore, come to the conclusion that while no radical change should be made in the existing structure, all the public services should be enabled to make their best possible contribution to the service of the nation in their respective spheres and that with that end in view they should be provided with suitable avenues for advancement."

The preceding analysis strongly suggests that since the various recommendations made by Egger, Gladieux and the Pay and Services Commission directly threatened the status and power of CSP officials, and the latter resisted their implementation. Such resistance to change is not unusual in the case of Pakistan or perhaps any bureaucracy. Every bureaucratic organization has “its own hierarchy of values and its drives for
status and power. Like other institutions, it resists change when change threatens its interests.\textsuperscript{112} Even in the West the bureaucratic resistance to change is readily discoverable. During its short stay in power (1929-31), the Labor Government in Britain tried to introduce radical reforms, particularly in the field of unemployment, old-age pensions, and education, but these reforms could not be carried out because of bureaucratic resistance.\textsuperscript{113} In Weimar Germany, the Social Democratic Party (1918-20) failed to bring about fundamental changes in the economic and political power structures.\textsuperscript{114} Even the Nazi Party complained about bureaucratic apathy toward certain reforms.\textsuperscript{115} Party leaders of Roosevelt's administration criticized bureaucratic rigidity. As James Farley observed, "Some of the greatest troubles The President had, were caused by subordinate officials who were in sharp disagreement with his policies and, rightly or wrongly, were sabotaging the job he was trying to accomplish."\textsuperscript{116}

In short the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan was able to resist certain administrative reforms, which were directed at breaking their monopolistic hold over key posts and reducing their domination in the administrative structure. The civil bureaucracy through its representation to various commissions, and its access to the President, ministers, and other influential political leaders sabotaged administrative reform. We have also suggested that 'certain key variables like the, nature' of reform, the values of administrators, the values of reformers, timing, and the nature of top political leadership, play an important role in administrative reform. One conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that administrative reforms which were more likely to bring adverse impacts directly threaten officials with status, prestige and power in the administrative structure could not be
carried out in a polity dominated by a strong, self-conscious bureaucracy, as was the case with Pakistan during 1952-70.

Our analysis clearly demonstrates that CSP officers maintained the traditions of the pre-partition Indian Civil Service, achieving unity among them by obstructing members of other services from holding certain posts. Our analysis also identified that the Civil Service of Pakistan was generalist in orientation and that lateral recruitment was virtually non-existent.

We now turn to the issue of administrative development. Before attempting to measure the level of administrative development using Huntington’s criteria of institutionalization, we will try to compare the Pakistan Civil Service to the “ideal typical” bureaucracy delineated by Weber. At the beginning of this chapter we cited the characteristics of Weber’s “typical” administrative systems. Viewed from the perspective of Weberian bureaucracy, the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan was well-developed in the sense that bureaucratic structures were hierarchically organized; jurisdiction was fixed by certain rules; the formal internal operation was achieved through transmission of decisions; and officials showed a certain degree of specialization concerning the operating demands of the organization. The Civil bureaucracy of Pakistan achieved these characteristics in part because it satisfied the two conditions, time and size, that contribute to the development of bureaucratic organization. On the matter of size of the organization as a key factor, it can be argued that the bureaucracy was quite large. It had also been in operation as an independent unit about 24 years, during this time a bureaucratic orientation had emerged. Moreover, since the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan also inherited its administrative structure from the pre-partition Indian Civil Service and retained many of the bureaucratic
traits, like specialization and 'rational' behavior. Therefore, it can safely be said that the Civil Service of Pakistan had developed several bureaucratic traits.

On the other hand, using Huntington's criteria of adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence to measure the level of bureaucratic development in Pakistan, the first criterion of institutionalization is adaptability. This means an organization's capacity to adjust to "changes in its environment and ... its principal functions". Huntington argues that the adaptability of an organization can be measured by the extent to which "its leaders and members come to value it for its own sake, and it develops a life of its own quite apart from the specific functions it may perform at any given time." The Civil Service of Pakistan, despite political instability, and army intervention and rule, was able to perform the various functions required to maintain the continuity of the system. It was able to maintain law and order, to undertake developmental activities, and to act as an agent of socio-economic change. Therefore, it can be observed that the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan was able to adapt itself to the needs of the society. The second criterion of Huntington to measure the level of institutionalization is complexity, which involves multiplication of organizational sub-units and specialization of function. Huntington argues that "the greater the number and variety of sub-units the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members." Specialization, therefore, helps to achieve efficiency and effectiveness by avoiding duplication of effort while it permits the development of expertise and is important then the other two criteria for measuring the level of institutionalization, adaptability and autonomy. The civil bureaucracy in Pakistan, no doubt, meets the
requirement of complexity. There were many sub-units of the central services in Pakistan which had developed a high degree of specialization. For example, there was the generalist-administrative service, the Civil Service of Pakistan; there were functional services like Audit and Accounts, Taxation, Accounts, etc.; and there were specialized services like the Central Engineering and Geological Survey. From the standpoint of complexity, it is clear that the institutionalization of bureaucracy in Pakistan was substantial.

The third criterion of institutionalization is autonomy. The level of institutionalization of an organization depends on the extent to which it has developed “procedures... independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior.” Our analysis of the organization of civil bureaucracy has shown that civil bureaucracy in Pakistan had developed elaborate procedures, like those used in recruitment, promotion, and training, which were not for the most part susceptible to outside influences. Therefore, it can be said that the Civil Service of Pakistan acted with considerable autonomy. An organization, which is “penetrated - by the kinship system (nepotism), the economic system (bribery and conflict of interest) or the political party system (political favoritism) cannot act independently; and consequently, cannot accommodate the interests of the various groups of the society. Such an organization cannot survive for a long period of time. Thus, we can say that autonomy of an institution is closely related to its adaptability both are closely related.

The last criterion for assessing the level of development is the coherence of an organization. According to Huntington, the more unified and coherent an organization is, “the more highly institutionalized it will be the greater the disunity of the organization, the lesser the institutionalized it will be."
Therefore, an organization, to be coherent, must develop a substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes, which come up within those boundaries. Coherence is an essential attribute of an organization because "it contributes to institutional autonomy, minimization of internal conflict, the *esprit de corps* and sense of mission necessary to...consistent administration." The degree of an organization’s influence depends highly on the degree of its coherence or cohesiveness. Our analysis of bureaucracy’s recruitment, training, promotion has shown that Pakistani bureaucracy was coherent in spite of sharp differences in its ethnic composition. Thus, it normally acted as a unit when its interests were threatened. We examined earlier that how the members of the Pakistani Civil Service resisted changes in the seniority basis of promotion. This all-pervasive seniority principle promoted unity among members of the civil service and prevented dissension. Coherence is an important factor in the development of bureaucratic institutions. It enabled the bureaucracy to resist many proposed changes in the administrative structure of government. On the whole, it would appear from our analysis that the level of institutionalization of the bureaucracy in Pakistan was quite high.

In this chapter we examined that the level of political development in Pakistan was quite slow. Political parties in Pakistan generally failed to satisfy Huntington’s criteria of institutionalization. On the other hand, our analysis of Pakistan’s administrative system has shown that it did meet Huntington’s criteria of institutionalization. Any comparison between Pakistan’s political and administrative development would only serve to make our point more forcefully. Political and constitutional development in
Pakistan lagged behind administrative development. The case of Pakistan lends support to Riggs' "imbalance thesis", namely, that in developing countries an imbalance exists between political and administrative development that favors the civil bureaucracy. This condition, in turn, helps us to understand why the civil bureaucracy plays such a central role in such societies. It is simultaneously a force for preserving continuity while participate jag in the introduction of socio-economic change.

The above study suggests that the development of the cadre system of organization in Pakistan has to be outlined in hard-working detail. Firstly, the origins of the cadre system were not the consequence of any well- or ill-formulated policy of the British Government in India. Rather, the cadre system developed in an ad-hoc fashion due to the distinctive set of circumstances facing British policy-makers in the Subcontinent. The cadre system of organization was exclusively suited to these tasks. It allowed British nationals to effectively control the civil administration of India with relatively small numbers of public servants. However, secondly, the Government of Pakistan embraced the cadre system of organization with only minor modifications subsequent to Partition. Pakistan adopted a service structure that largely paralleled British practice:

NOTES AND REFERENCES

2 Ibid. As it is mentioned that the high officials were Turks, Afghans and Persians.


10 Mustafa Chowdhry, *op. cit.*, p. 73.


12 A. I. Hussain, *op. cit.*


16 Aitcheson Commission report 1888, paragraph 75.


18 Ibid.


21 Ibid., p. 29.


23 Charles H. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, P. 32. See also A. I. Hussain, *op. cit.*


26 For detail see *ibid.*, pp. 129-31. See also Charles H Kennedy, *op. cit.* pp. 33-45.


[34] Islinton Commission report, 1917, Annexeure XVI, p. 132.

[35] Ibid., Annexeure VII, pp. 139-40.


[49] Ibid., p. 257.

[50] Ibid., pp. 261-3.


[52] Ibid., p. 71.


[56] Ibid., p. 186.


[58] Charles H Kennedy, op. cit., p. 45.
60 Charles H Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
64 *Ibid.*
75 A. I. Hussain, (ed.) *op. cit.,* p. 137.
81 Mustafa Chowdhury, *op. cit.,* p. 168.
85 Bernard Gladieux, *op. cit.,* p. 4.
86 Rowland Egger, *op. cit.,* p. 23.
Rowland Egger, *op. cit.*, p. 11.


S. P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 15.


CHAPTER 6

THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS OF 1973:
FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
CHAPTER 6

6. **THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS OF 1973**

In 1972, the Government of Pakistan appointed an Administrative Reforms Committee to study the role of the civil bureaucracy in the context of socio-economic political development of the country and formulate recommendations. These recommendations of the Committee were taken into consideration seriously by the government and formulated the Administrative Reforms of 1973. In a widely publicized address to the nation on August 20, 1973, the then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, announced the Administrative Reforms in the civil service of Pakistan, which were termed as ‘revolutionary’ reforms in the administrative system of Pakistan.¹

This chapter will analyze the historical, political and intellectual bases that shaped the administrative reforms which were formulated in the course of political and constitutional development. It is contended that only the application of such a multifaceted examination will help to explain the formulation and implementation of the reforms of 1973. This research will discuss the domain of the debate concerning the adoption of the reforms. This study also attempts to analyze and identify the issue areas addressed by the reform and trace the range of opinion within each issue. Secondly, it also explores the intellectual antecedents of the reform movement focusing on significant administrative reports and their respective positions in regard to the each issue area. Thirdly, this research work also analyzes the stances taken by service associations towards the same. It will also discuss briefly the historical and political setting of Pakistan as it applied to the civil
bureaucracy during the years immediately before the adoption of the reforms and finally, this research will discuss the implementation of the reform to examine its impacts on the civil services of Pakistan in particular and administrative system of the country in general.

6.1 FORMULATION OF THE REFORMS

It is significant to mention that the Administrative Reform of 1973 has been the most comprehensive in the sense of its formulation process and implementation in the reform history of Pakistan. The basis of the formulation policy included the followings:

I. The abolition of service cadres, and their functional replacement by the 'occupational groups'.

II. The establishment of a Unified National Pay Scales replacing the numerous pay scales in practice at the time of the reform.

III. The discontinuance of the practice of reservation of posts for members of the elite cadres such as the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP).

IV. The abolition of the CSP Academy.

V. The establishment of a joint pre-service training program.

VI. The introduction of 'lateral recruitment' program.

VII. The establishment of a provision for vertical movement between cadres was also introduced.

VIII. The creation of Federal Public Services Commission (FPSC).²

Each of these provisions was taken separately that constituted a significant departure from the established patterns of administration which inherited

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from the colonial legacies. If the above provisions were considered in sum, their scope was certainly ambitious and, perhaps without much exaggeration could be described as ‘revolutionary’ in the reform history of the country.

The objective conditions were highly favorable for the administrative reforms in 1973. It was indeed, a suitable time for the formulation and implementation of administrative reforms. The most important factor was the dismemberment of the country in 1971 that eventually created an objective situation for the adoption of the reforms. As a result, membership in the higher circles of the civil bureaucracy was reduced nearly in half, when Bengali officers opted for the newly created state of Bangladesh. Finally, the aftermath of the War of 1971 opened a vacuum for the first civilian government in Pakistan in the history of the country, which were the logical outcome of the first ever general elections since the independence 1947. The reforms were primarily designed to achieve political motives; it is undoubtedly the case that Prime Minister Bhutto’s regime had compelling motivations to challenge the authority of the civil bureaucracy. Bhutto unlike the preceding political leaders also enjoyed legitimacy and support of the people.

6.2 THE DEBATE OF THE REFORMS

The debate for reform began with two basic questions:

I. What were the major issues addressed by the earlier reform commissions?

II. What was the range of opinion in each of these issue areas?

Several reform commissions have produced a number of voluminous literatures on administrative reforms in Pakistan and innumerable issues
have been addressed, which have been diverse in contents. However, for the purposes of our study, our discussion will be restricted only to the ‘major issue areas’, which are directly correspondence to reform, measures implemented in 1973. Thirteen such issue areas have been isolated; for four policies positions, ‘Positions A to D,’ which have been abstracted. These positions range from A to D. For example Position A, those advocating the maximum or drastic changes in the civil bureaucracy, and Position D, to that advocating resistance to any change. The same degrees of the policy options are applied the issue areas to determine the ranges from A to D, as follows:

I. **POSITION A:** Stances ‘strongly favor’ the adoption of modifications in a given issue area;

II. **POSITION B:** ‘Favors’ moderate changes in the respective issue area.

III. **POSITION C:** Describes a stance in which the issue is either not substantively addressed, or is addressed

IV. **POSITION D:** Retain current status, return to, or continuing confidence in, the *status quo.*

6.3 **THE ISSUES OF THE REFORMS**

The issues of reforms are listed here for the purpose of easy reference. Throughout the analysis only those actual issues, which were advocated by one or more commissions, service associations, or by the provisions of the reform, have been identified.

The following ‘major issue areas’ were identified by the administrative reform committee.

**ISSUE 1:** *Reservation of Posts.*
Whether certain posts in the secretariat, district administration, Economic Pool, etc., should remain legally reserved for members of designated service cadres.

**ISSUE 2:** 
*Pay Differentials.*
Should remuneration of officers be based on a cadre-wise or system-wise scale?

**ISSUE 3:** 
*Status of All-Pakistan Services.*
Whether the functions and roles of the All-Pakistan Services should be continued?

**ISSUE 4:** 
*Status of CSP.*
Whether the roles, functions, and powers of the Civil Service of Pakistan should be modified?

**ISSUE 5:** 
*Affective Sentiments, CSP.*
Whether the Civil Service of Pakistan is corrupt, inefficient and arrogant etc.?

**ISSUE 6:** 
*Lateral Recruitment.*
Whether provision should be made for recruitment to posts within the Central Superior Services other than through direct entry, competitive examination?

**ISSUE 7:** 
*Horizontal Movement.*
Should movement from posts of comparable levels within a given cadre be allowed to take place to posts in other cadres?

**ISSUE 8:** 
*Status of Technical Officers.*
Should officers with ‘technical’ training hold policy-making posts?
ISSUE 9: *Role of Head of Department versus Secretary.*
What is the optimal relationship between line and staff officers? Should the system favoring the paramountcy of the latter be modified?

ISSUE 10: *Status of Pre-Service Training.*
Should changes be made in the system of pre-service training for recruits to the Central Superior Services?

ISSUE 11: *Service Tribunals.*
Should service tribunals be established?

ISSUE 12: *Role of the Public Service Commission.*
What role should the Public Service Commission play in the affairs of personnel administration and recruitment?

ISSUE 13: *Status of the Establishment Division.*
What role should the Establishment Division play in the affairs of personnel administration and recruitment?

6.4 **THE BASES OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS OF 1973**

6.4.1 **THE HISTORICAL BASE**

It does not seem necessary to present a detailed historical background of political events between 1969 and 1972. However, it is noted that three events of this period were of definite importance. First, there were the 'disturbances' of 1969, that led to the resignation of General Ayub, and the imposition of martial law; secondly, the consequences of the civil war in the East Pakistan that led to War with India in 1971; and, finally, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto rose to power as President and later Prime Minister of Pakistan.
6.4.1.1 THE DISTURBANCES OF 1969

It is not denying the fact that severe civil unrest gripped Pakistan during January-March, 1969. The problems erupted on November 7, 1968, when the students’ demonstration championing the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and pressing for a list of student demands including the revocation of the University Ordinances, was fired upon by the police and three students were shot dead. From these rather modest beginnings, the fabric of Pakistan’s civil order rapidly unraveled. Students angered over the deaths of their peers, the subsequent closings of the universities, and the arresting of Bhutto, staged ever more widespread and frequent processions, strikes, and demonstrations. Joining the students in their demands were lecturers and a myriad of labor organizations. Adding to the confusion, government physicians and engineers staged similar demonstrations to press demands for upgrading their relative standing within the civil bureaucracy. Then, almost inevitably, the mobs took over. Indeed, the last week of January 1969 marked a hitherto unprecedented period of civil violence within Pakistan. Virtually every major Pakistani city was brought to a standstill as mobs battled with police, and hundreds, if not thousands, of people were killed. Though the intensity of the demonstrations quieted somewhat after this bloodbath, the damage to the government of General Ayub was irreparable. On February 21, 1969, General Ayub announced that he would not contest the general elections. On March 25, 1969 in a televised address General Ayub claimed he could no longer maintain order in the nation by constitutional means, he resigned, declared martial law, and appointed General Yahya Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator.
It is to mention here that the role of the civil bureaucracy in the ousting of General Ayub had been very crucial. Although, it was the teachers, engineers and doctors, who were in the forefront of the disturbance of 1969 and these groups, were joined by organizations at the center of orthodox administrative authority during February and March. It is also observed that on February 12, 1969 and again on March 5, 1969 postal employees went on strike; officers of the Telegraph Engineers Association struck on March 11-14, 1969; and officers of the Pakistan Customs and Excise Service as part of their demands for enhancement status for their cadre, threatened to strike. The most significant list of demands, however, came from the Class I Officers Services Association. This petition, signed by the Central Superior Services Association which saved those representing the CSP and the PFS called for the radical restructuring of the service structure of Pakistan. This demand for restructuring was responsible for the disturbances.

On the other hand, the participation of the civil bureaucracy in the disturbances of 1969, coupled with the wide publicity given to the service association demands, adversely affected the perception of the people towards the civil bureaucracy. During the disturbances the alleged deficiencies of the civil bureaucracy, as corruption, malfeasance, laziness, mediocrity, and aloofness were publicized in the streets of Pakistan. The CSP, as the symbol of the civil bureaucracy, came under the most biting criticism, both from disaffected service associations and from these politicians in opposition who attributed this cadre as a bulwark of General Ayub's power.

The newly constituted government moved quickly to deflect such overt manifestations of opposition to the bureaucracy. General Yahya took several
steps and one of them was the establishment of a *Services Reorganization Committee*. The preface to the 'composition and terms of reference' of this committee provides evidence that the government had chosen to meet the criticisms of the bureaucracy by reforming its structure.

Among the causes of public resentment, which led to countrywide demonstrations during the period preceding Martial Law on March 25, 1969, the resentment against the structure of administration of the country figures prominently. People in all walks of life including a majority of those in government services, condemned this structure on the following grounds:

1. It was a relic of the colonial past in which the relationship between the government functionaries and the people was that of ruler and ruled.

2. It had during the last 22 years proved to be unsuited to the needs and aspirations of a free and sovereign people.

3. It had continued to sustain and even to strengthen ruling elite within the service cadres, which had sacrificed administrative neutrality for political partisanship.

4. It had helped to promote corruption, inefficiency, and selfishness.

It is evidence that General Yahya’s government gave priority to administrative reform and six other bodies, in addition to this committee, were also constituted to consider various aspects of reform in the civil services. On December 2, 1969, under the terms of the Removal from Services (Special Provisions) Regulation, (popularly known as Martial Law No. 58), 303 Class I officers were removed from service. Many of these officers were highly placed—38 were members of the CSP and 78 were members of the Central Superior services. Such a widespread purge was unprecedented in the history of Pakistan, and violated the well-established
principles of the insulation of the bureaucracy from political control. Nevertheless, the action was met with acclaim throughout Pakistan. Favorable editorials were run in the major dailies; Yahya was pictured. As has done great service in rooting corruption and rejoinders from the bureaucracy were half-hearted and ineffective. This act and the comparatively mild reaction to it clearly demonstrate the extent to which the public’s perception of the bureau racy had changed after the disturbances of 1969. The removal of senior bureaucrats on non-justifiable charges, an unthinkable policy option in 1968, was routine in 1969.

6.4.1.2 SEPARATTION OF THE EAST PAKISTAN

In the aftermath of the separation of East Pakistan in December 1971, many officers opted for Bangladeshi citizenship, which had left the most immediate consequence on the administrative system of Pakistan. There was nothing disturbing about this phenomenon; however, the effect of this exodus on the membership of the bureaucracy of Pakistan was quite significant. As there were 645 of the 1,656 officers in the ten Class I Services for which requisite data was available, 39 per cent of the total opted for service in Bangladesh. Each cadre underwent severe curtailment. The PFS was least affected but still lost 23 per cent of its officers. the Pakistan Postal Service; the worst affected lost 48 per cent of its cadre strength. It brought significant changes in regard to membership in the civil service of Pakistan (CSP). Unlike other Class I Services, CSP officers held important posts in virtually every ministry and division of the central government. Indeed this was the hallmark of the All-Pakistan Services and a basis for the high degree of influence the CSP enjoyed. In the aftermath of the War, however, 89 CSP officers holding posts at policy-making level (Deputy

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Secretary and above) opted for Bangladesh. Among them 28 held posts at the level of Joint Secretary or above. The net result, then, was that the CSP lost a significant portion of its influence in the federal government. On the other hand, other Class I Services, though they may have lost proportionally more officers than the CSP, lost for the most part officers who were serving out their careers in provincial government, and consequently did not lose the same degree of relative control over the affairs of the federal government. To put it simply, Bengali CSP officers before the formation of Bangladesh held more influential posts than Bengali non-CSP officers. Therefore, when Bengali officers opted for Bangladesh, the CSP lost relatively more influence than other cadres did.

The War of 1971 had also been one of the main instrument for the declining the public image for the civil bureaucracy. General Yahya’s regime, blamed for the debacle, was discredited in the eyes of most sectors in Pakistan. Indeed, in the result of the War the former government was characterized in the press as ‘corrupt’, ‘weak’, and ‘inefficient’. It is in this context that, less than three months after Bhutto became President of Pakistan, he promulgated the Removal from Service (Special Provisions) Regulation, 1972 under Martial Law No. 14. This regulation although it mirrored the 1969 regulation was implemented much more enthusiastically. Press reports of the period list a total of 1,828 officers who were compulsorily retired as a consequence of the regulation—six times as many as were removed in 1969. Because of erroneous reporting, however, this figure was later amended to 1,303 officers.

The overall affect of the removal resulted in weakening the power of each of these cadres to some extent, but its influence on the CSP was relatively
greater. The CSP lost relatively more officers holding senior level posts. Therefore it is contended that the events of 1969-72 both adversely affected the esteem and prestige of the bureaucracy and lessened the relative power and authority of the Central Superior Services, particularly the CSP. Both of these factors were conducive to the implementation of administrative reforms. That is, to the extent that there was intera-bureaucratic resistance to provisions of the reform, the strength of such resistance declined after 1969-72. The bureau and particularly the CSP, became less able to block change and less able to resist political control.

6.4.2 THE POLICAL BASE

So far this analysis has dealt primarily with the attitudes of service associations and service commissions as they relate to reforms of 1973. Here the analysis shifts its focus to the political environment facing the other main actor in the formulation of the reforms, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Assigning political motives is a tricky business, and admittedly the vantagepoint of this analysis allows only a murky picture of decision-making process that shaped the formulation of reforms.

First, from all available evidence, Bhutto demonstrated a decided antipathy towards members of the CSP. This may have stemmed from his days of imprisonment during Ayub’s government, or from the generally perceived notion that CSP represented an impediment to his social and economic reforms; it might also have been based on the perception that the CSP was a potent and competing base of political authority.\textsuperscript{13} Bhutto was very critical to the CSP in his public utterances, referring to the CSPs dominance of the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{14} Further, in administrative matters he relied closely on the advice of Vaqar Ahmed, the Cabinet and Establishment Division Secretary.
and the author of the highly vituperative Class I Services Association demands. This shows the government’s acceptance of the radical restructuring of the authority of the CSP.

Another general motive behind Bhutto’s attitude towards the administrative reforms was the desire to gain some measure of political control over members of the civil bureaucracy. The purge of 1972 has already been chronicled. The message that was received by the civil bureaucracy as a result of the purge was clear and straightforward: ‘Support the policies’ of the people’s Party or look for another job.’ This message was reinforced the day before the formal announcement of the administrative reforms when 18 additional senior officers compulsorily retired with no benefit of extraordinary martial law provisions.\textsuperscript{15} Bhutto also had a vested interest in gaining some measure of control over the selection process to the bureaucracy. This intention provides a convincing explanation for the introduction of wide-scale lateral recruitment and horizontal movement under the terms of the reform. Indeed, as was noted above, neither of these provisions commanded broad-based support either in service association demands or in the reports of indigenous administrative commissions.\textsuperscript{16} Another provision of the reforms, the transfer of certain recruitment and disciplinary functions from the Public Service Commission to the Establishment Division, also seems to have originated with Bhutto. It was palpably easier in the context of Pakistan’s administrative system to control the policies of an orthodox administrative institution with no independent constituency, such as the Establishment Division, than to contend with the long-established tradition of independence from political influence enjoyed by the Public Service Commission. Further, such a transfer of authority was
never contemplated by the report of any administrative commission or by any service association petition. The combined effect of the provisions of the administrative reform and particularly of the introduction of lateral recruitment, horizontal movement, and the transfer of authority from the Public Service Commission to the Establishment Division, was therefore to challenge the autonomy of the services, and to further Bhutto’s goal of gaining a measure of political control over the bureaucracy.

6.4.3 **THE INTELLECTUAL BASE**

The intellectual groundwork for the reform had already been carefully laid by the quite remarkable achievements of the ‘*Cornelius Commission Report, 1962*’, which was made public in 1969.\(^{17}\) This document was the first indigenously composed report that recommended a complete restructuring and reorganization of the civil bureaucratic system inherited from the British colonial masters. However, it would be interesting to note that even before Cornelius Commission Report of 1962, Roland Egger, 1953 and Bernard Gladieux, 1955; commissions also recommended drastic changes in the administrative system of the country.\(^{18}\)

One fact, which emerges from even a cursory investigation of the bureaucracy of Pakistan, is that if the number and length of reports addressing the issue of administrative reforms is an indicator of fervor then, the Government of Pakistan has been very keen concerning the need for reform. Indeed, administrative reports concerning reform have been so voluminous that only a handful of researchers and government officials have seen all of the relevant documents, let alone read them and no library in the world has more than a small fraction of such reports in their collections. Further, fully 459 individuals have served as full members on such
committees.\textsuperscript{19} Table 6.1 presents a listing of such reports issued since 1967.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{center}
\textbf{T A B L E 6.1}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{S \#} & \textbf{NAME OF BODY} & \textbf{CHAIRMEN} & \textbf{No. of Members} & \textbf{Report Signed} \\
\hline
1 & Pay and Services Commission & M. Munir & 4 & 1949 \\
3 & Reorientation of Government of Pakistan & Bernard Gladieux & 1 & 1955 \\
4 & Review committee on Section Officers Scheme & M. H. Zuberi & 05 & 1967 \\
5 & Working Group on the Reorganization of the Public Service Structure & D. K. Power & 10 & 1969 \\
6 & Working Group on Developing the Consultancy and Contractual Services & B. A. Kureshi & 12 & 1969 \\
7 & Committee on Regional Administrative Reorganization & Fazl-e-Akbar & 06 & 1969\textsuperscript{*} \\
7 & Pay Commission, 1972 & Mubashir Hassan & -- & 1972\textsuperscript{*} \\
8 & Constitution Committee & Hafeez Pirzada & 25 & 1972 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{*} indicates the Unpublished Reports

Fortunately, this welter of reports can be reduced to manageable proportions by considering only those documents which deal with several of the issues of the reform cited earlier and which have had a significant impact on the reform movement of 1973. There are eight such reports.\textsuperscript{21} Table 6.2 summarizes the relevant arguments of these commissions in terms of the
‘Position A-D’ classificatory scheme introduced earlier juxtaposed to the relevant position advanced by the reforms.

### Table 6.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT</th>
<th>ISSUE AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POSITION OF COMMISSION</strong></td>
<td>Reservation Of Posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munir 1949</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egger 1953</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gladiex 1955</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Five year Plan 1957</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornelius 1962</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Ahmed 1963</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power 1969</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornelius 1970</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: C. H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 64. (For Position stances see page # 247 in this chapter).*

Three conclusions follow from a consideration of Table 6.2. First, no single administrative report corresponds exactly with the position advanced by the reform. This means that the introduction of the reforms cannot be attributed to the wholesale adoption of the recommendations of any one administrative report. Second, each individual provision advanced by the reform; save for the dilution of the responsibilities of the Public Service commission (Issue12) had its origins in one or more of the administrative reports.
analyzed. Therefore, at the same time that the reforms did not mirror precisely the recommendations of any one administrative report, each of the provisions eventually adopted was already in the policy arena.

Finally, it is important to note that two provisions of the reform—the first advocating wide-scale lateral recruitment, the second advocating horizontal movement, were not conceived by indigenous administrative commissions, but rather originated in the recommendations of Rowland Egger’s Report of 1953. Though more will be said concerning these two provisions of the reform later, it is important to bear in mind at this point that these two provisions and the provision limiting the authority of the Public Service Commission has been the only provisions of the reform.

6.4.4 SERVICE DEMANDS AND ISSUES OF THE REFORM

Other factors, which must be explored to gain a complete picture of the antecedents of the reform, are the opinions of the bureaucracy itself. After all, it is a generally accepted and long-standing proposition, that administrative reforms in Pakistan were blocked before 1973 because of the machinations of government officials unwilling to accept the consequences of such reforms. The intimations of such a concern were first voiced by Bernard Gladieux in 1955, when he stated that whatever reforms were contemplated would have to be accepted by the Establishment Division, whose interests were opposed to any fundamental modification of the powers of the ‘administrative class.’ Such a concern was reiterated in the Cornelius Report, 1962, and both, the Services Reorganization Committee and the Power Commission provided procedures whereby the implementation of their respectively contemplated reforms would bypass orthodox channels of bureaucratic authority. Of course, the main villain in
these scenarios was conceived to be the CSP, whose officers, it was argued, stood to lose most from the adoption of any reform challenging their 'elite status.' Whether this reading of history is accurate or not, the argument was certainly a potent salvo in the polemical war between those favoring reforms and those opposed to the reforms.

The most systematic approach to the study of the demands of the intra-bureaucratic actors is through the examination of the policy statements of service associations. Prior to 1973, when service associations were banned by the administrative reforms, such associations served as a formal institutional link between individual officers and the relevant level of political authority. There were literally hundreds of service associations in Pakistan, ranging from organizations representing the most elite services, such as the CSP Association, to the most mundane, such as the Association of Peons Working in the Federal Government. Virtually every government servant was represented by one or more such organizations and the more mobilized service associations collected dues and organized social and political events for their members.

Fortunately for the purposes of this analysis, the service association petitions made to the Services Reorganization Committee, the Government of Pakistan preserved 1970. These documents are doubly valuable because hundreds of service associations made presentations to the Committee, and because all the presentations were submitted during a relatively short time span, six months. There fore, they represent an extremely wide range of opinion on very similar policy concerns. Further, since the petitions were written for a Committee entrusted with reforming the bureaucracy, the service association petitions perforce deal with relevant issues of
administrative reform. Finally, it must be added that the political environment during the period of the composition of the petitions was particularly turbulent from the standpoint of the bureaucracy. The ‘disturbances of 1969’ called into question the very foundations of the bureaucratic system. As a consequence of the latter, the service association petitions possess a flavor of introspective self-criticism, are highly politicized, and extremely frank.

The content analysis\(^{27}\) of these petitions enables a categorization of the petitions in regard to the thirteen issue areas dealt with earlier, and in terms of the ‘Position A-D’ classificatory scheme, within each given issue. That is, the purpose of such an analysis is to present the information contained in the service petitions in a manner directly comparable to the presentation of the positions of the administrative commissions. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 6.3, which reveals two dimensions for the support of the issue areas of the reform. In one hand, by reading dawn the columns it demonstrates aggregate services support for the various issues of the reform; on the other by reading across the rows, it presents the disaggregated support of individual services for these issues.

6.4.5 AGGREGATED SERVICE SUPPORT

An examination of the issue areas reveal that Issue 1, reservation of posts; Issue 2, pay differentials; Issue 3, status of the All-Pakistan Services; Issue 4, status of the CSP; Issue 5, affective sentiments—CSP; Issue 9, role of Heads of Departments versus Secretary; and Issue 13, status of the Establishment Division generated high levels of support. Issues 7, 8, 10, and 11, respectively: horizontal movement, status of technical officers, status of pre-service training, and the establishment of service tribunals, were given
moderate support. And Issues 6 and 12—lateral recruitment and the role of the Public Service Commissions—generated low levels of support. Although there is no direct relationship between the support given by service associations and the subject of the issue addressed, it seems generally to be the case that those issues calling for reassessment of the dominance of the CSP and of the relationship between services (Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 13) were of high salience to the service associations and were accorded overwhelming support. Conversely, issues calling for a change in the basis of recruitment and the terms and conditions of service of the Central Superior Services as a whole (Issues 6, 7, 12), were resisted. Finally, issues bearing on general service matters (Issues 8, 10, 11) were of low salience to the bureaucracy and were given only lukewarm support.

The Table 6.3, indicates clearly that direct service support for any individual issue of the reform varies widely, from a high of eleven service associations supporting the reform’s position on Issue 1 (reservation of posts), to no service supporting the reform’s stance on Issues 8 (status of technical officers), and 12 (role of Public Service Commission). A more useful array of support is described when one explores the number of stances by service associations in the ‘direction of the reform.’28 Using the latter measure, one can delineate issues in which there was a ‘high’ level of overall service support (eight or more service associations agreed with recommendations of the reform), a ‘moderate’ level of support (four or five service associations supported the reform measures), and a ‘low’ level of support (three or fewer service associations supported the position advanced by the reform).

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### TABLE 6.3

**POSITIONS OF COMMISSIONS AND ISSUES OF REFORM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>ISSUE OF REFORM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position of Service Associates on a</td>
<td>Reservation of Posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFS</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMAS</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAR</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCES</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMLCS</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASS 1</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Proposal of 1973 Reforms
- A A A A B A A B B B B D B

### Notes

- The policy stances advocated by the administrative commissions, as presented in this Table are categorized here in terms of the following four positions.
  - **Position A**: 'strongly favors' the adoption of modifications in a given issue area.
  - **Position B**: 'favors' moderate changes in the respective issue area.
  - **Position C**: 'is a stance of neutrality or disinterest towards in given issue.
  - **Position D**: 'advocates a return to, or Continued in the status quo.

#### Source

6.4.6 DISAGGREGATED SERVICE SUPPORT

The positions of individual service associations were more important than aggregate levels of service support for the adoption of any given issue of reform. Namely, two complementary questions must be addressed:

I. Which services supported the adoption of the reforms?, and

II. Which services resisted the reforms?

A glance at Table 6.3 provides partial answers to these questions. Most obviously it shows that the CSP and the PFS were more likely to disagree with the measures of reform than any other groups. That is, the stances of these services corresponded directly only twice, in the case of the CSP, and never in the case of the PFS, with the positions adopted by the reform. All other services had more points of correspondence. This relationship is even clearer when one looks at agreement with the 'direction of the reform.' Using this looser criterion, the PFS still never agrees with the thrust of the reform measures and the CSP demonstrates agreement only three times. The lowest level of agreement demonstrated by any of the other services is with five of the reform measures.

Even a useful analysis may say nothing concerning the strength of such relationships or the particular in-service issues such positions represent. To address such questions the thirteen issues of reform were divided into three clusters according to subject matter. Namely:

I. Those calling for a reassessment of the CSP and of the relationships between services (Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 13);

II. Those bearing on the role of the specialists versus generalists (Issues 6, 7, 8, 9); and
III. Those dealing with personnel administration and training (Issues 10, 11, 12, 13). Then a numeric value was applied to the specific stances taken by each service. Position A: stances, those that ‘most strongly favor’ reform, were assigned 2 points. Position B: stances, those ‘favoring’ reform, were given 1 point. Position C: in which the issue was not addressed, were assigned values of 0. Position D: stances, advocating a return to the status quo, were assigned a value of —1.

An examination of Table 6.4 supports the hypothesis that the CSP and the PFS were opposed to certain aspects of the reform movement. However, it cannot be argued that these cadres were opposed to all provisions of the reform. Opposition by these cadres to the reform measures is displayed most clearly by an examination of the first issue cluster—‘service reforms.’ Here, the CSP and the PFS stand-alone against the demands of the remainder of the Central Superior Services. Such a dichotomy does not prevail within the other two issue clusters.

A more compelling explanation of service positions on individual aspects of the reform is provided by the straightforward dicta of interest group behavior: Interest groups support issues deemed to be in their group interest; oppose issues which are deemed to not be in their group interest; and remain unconcerned with issues which are perceived to be neither in, nor not in, their interest.

Understandably, the PFS seems to have approached the issues described by ‘service reforms’ in an ambivalent manner. Members of the PFS were the obvious beneficiaries of several of the characteristics of the service structure
of Pakistan that the reforms hoped to abolish, most notably, reservation of posts and differential pay scales. At the same time, however, the PFS was never a part of the All-Pakistan Services, nor did its members have direct access to higher posts in the secretariat, even in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given these conflicting interests, the PFS abstained, expressing no substantive opinion on six of the seven issues of service reform. Of course, given the politically charged atmosphere of 1969, such an abstention was tantamount to implicit support of the status quo.

6.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS

It is really commendable Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan that due to his constant efforts in the history for the country, a comprehensive and extensive administrative reforms were taken place. The following are the main features of the reforms:

I. All services and cadres were merged into a unified graded structure with equality of opportunity for all who entered the service at any stage based on the required professional and specialized competence necessary for each job.

II. All ‘classes’ among Government servants would be abolished and similarly replaced by a unified graded structure: a peon or equivalent at the bottom, a Secretary or Departmental Head at the top. The existing classification of the services from Class I to Class IV would no longer operate. The road to the top would be open to all on merit.

III. The use of ‘service’ labels would be discontinued forthwith.

IV. The Unified Structure would enable promotions to the higher posts throughout the range of public service and for horizontal movements.
from one cadre to another including the movement of technical personnel to the cadre of general management. There would also be scope for out of turn promotion afforded to exceptionally able officers.

V. The correct grading of each post would be determined by job evaluation. 36

VI. It allowed the ‘Lateral Entry’ into the service as it provided provision for of talented individual to enter into Government service from the private sector in fields such as banking, insurance, industry and trade.

VII. The Administrative Reforms of 1973 also provided a quota system for representation to various regional groups in the civil services. (See table 6. 11 )

VIII. The maximum age limit for the competitive examination held by the Federal Public Service Commission for initial recruitment to Grades 16-17 (i.e. for most of the occupational groups) was raised from 28 to 30 years.

IX. Rules and Regulation were framed for implementing the reforms.

In the light of these directives the measures taken for implementing the reforms included the following.

6.6 BASIC GRADES

There were about 600 grades or scales of pay of Government servants under the various Ministries and Departments. All these grades were reduced to 23 grades, which were applicable to all Ministries and Departments of the
Government. Each grade carried a scale of pay and allowances etc. Grade 1 was the lowest grade applicable to peons, messengers etc. and Grade 23 was the highest for the post of Secretary-General (There were only 2 or 3 posts in this grade which were abolished). The usual head of a Ministry i.e. the Secretary was in Grade 22, the Additional Secretary in Grade 21, the Joint Secretary in Grade 20 and the Deputy Secretary in Grade 19 etc. There were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADES</th>
<th>PAY SCALES *</th>
<th>POSTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BPS 1</td>
<td>600-13-860</td>
<td>Peon, Messenger, Gardener, Watchman etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 2</td>
<td>625-16-945</td>
<td>Record Sorter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 3</td>
<td>650-19-1030</td>
<td>Dispatch Rider / Duplicating Machine Operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 4</td>
<td>675-22-1115</td>
<td>Staff Car Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 5</td>
<td>700-25-1200</td>
<td>Lower Division Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 6</td>
<td>725-28-1285</td>
<td>Sanitary Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 7</td>
<td>750-31-1370</td>
<td>Upper Division Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 8</td>
<td>790-34-1470</td>
<td>Typist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 9</td>
<td>830-38-1590</td>
<td>Lady Health Visitor, Library Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 10</td>
<td>870-42-1710</td>
<td>Key Punch Verifying Operator Machine Operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 11</td>
<td>910-46-1830</td>
<td>Assistants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 12</td>
<td>970-52-1830</td>
<td>Stenotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 13</td>
<td>1025-58-2195</td>
<td>Assistants -in-charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 14</td>
<td>1100-64-2380</td>
<td>Naib Tehsildar, District Accountant etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 15</td>
<td>1165-71-2585</td>
<td>Stenographer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 16</td>
<td>1350-105-2925</td>
<td>Superintendent, Private Secretary to Secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 17</td>
<td>2065-155-3925</td>
<td>Section Officer / Research Officer / Security Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 18</td>
<td>2710-195-4660</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary / Assistant Financial Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 19</td>
<td>4130-205-5770</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary / Deputy Financial Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 20</td>
<td>4900-235-6780</td>
<td>Joint Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 21</td>
<td>5800-235-8400</td>
<td>Additional Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 22</td>
<td>5800-235-8400</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS 23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Pay Scales have been revised several times since 1973.
lower grades for junior executives, stenographers, clerks, typists’ etc. These grades were applicable to all employees and all professional or technical posts were integrated into this unified system. All the posts under the various Ministries, Attached Departments, Subordinate Offices, etc were placed in any one or other of the Basic Scales of pay. (See the table 6.4)

The scales of pay were also termed as ‘Grades’. The term ‘Grade’ was used in the Civil Servants Act 1973 and in other documents pertaining to the civil service indicating, the levels of various posts in the hierarchy of the administration. However since necessary amendments were still to be issued by Government for other documents pertaining to the civil services, the term ‘Grade’ has been retained in this chapter to facilitate reference to other un-amended documents, orders instructions etc).

6.7 THE REFORMS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE OF PAKISTAN

The civil bureaucracy, inherited to Bhutto upon assuming power was dominated by certain well-established traditions. It was dominated by the omnipresent reality of the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP). These are:

I. The single most important determinant of an individual officer’s career pattern in the bureaucracy was membership in one of the numerous semi-functional ‘cadres’ or ‘services.’ At the federal level there were two ‘All-Pakistan Services’ the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP) and the Police Services of Pakistan (PSP). Besides, there were eleven Central Services.

II. There also existed several technical services and paradoxically two ‘services’ whose members belonged permanently to other ‘services.’
Further, many of these cadres were divided into sub-cadres, variably dependent upon type of task performed, geographical region of such performance, type of recruitment to original service and / or relative status of occupation.

III. The civil bureaucracy was divided into innumerable sub-civil bureaucracies, each with distinct career patterns.

IV. Two characteristics of such cadre membership are greatly significant to considerations of status and prestige within the civil bureaucracy.

a. The prospects of individual officers closely correlated with the prospects of fellow cadre members. That is, the individual mobility of officers within the bureaucracy was determined by the general level of mobility of the cadre as a whole.

b. There was very little interchange of personnel between cadres. Once an officer became a member of a cadre, he was consigned to such membership for life. When it was necessary for an officer to be assigned to a post which did not fall within the ambit of his cadre's normal responsibilities, the typical solution was to borrow such an officer for the duration of the assignment. Such officers were considered to be 'on deputation,' or in the case of officers borrowed by the CSP, to be 'listed post holders' or 'ex-cadre officers.' In practice, such borrowing was not limited to temporary assignments. Indeed many officers were 'listed post holders' or were 'on deputation' for the bulk of their careers.
This pattern of organization were so-called the ‘class’ designation of officers; and the numerous pay schedules applicable to different types of employees. In pre-reform phraseology, all officers in the bureaucracy fell into one of the four classes, Class I—Class IV. Interacting with such designations and with the cadre system of organization and partially a consequence of such resultant complexity were the numerous pay schedules applicable to public servants. Cadre membership and rank within the cadre were the factors that determined the level of pays of an officer. An indicator of the complexity of this arrangement is the fact that in 1971 there were over 600 distinct pay scales in the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan.

Perhaps inevitably, membership in certain cadres afforded greater benefits than membership in other cadres. By far the most favored cadre was the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP). The bases of such dominance were “located both in the statutory provisions which favored the CSP, and in the more subtle, though arguably more important, realm of the norms and practices governing behavior within the bureaucracy”.32

The most significant position, the officers of the CSP enjoyed was the ‘reservation of posts’. During 1968-70, in the federal secretariat, two-thirds of the positions carrying a rank equivalent to Joint Secretary or above were reserved for members of the CSP, and in the provincial secretariats, 70 percent of the posts at Deputy Secretary Levels or above were similarly reserved.33 Also, CSP officers dominated district and divisional administration, due in large measure to the customary practice of starting CSP probationers at posts of Assistant Deputy Commissioner. Indeed, so many posts were reserved for the CSP that its actual cadre strength never equaled the number of posts reserved for its members. In 1970,
approximately 570 such posts were reserved for members of the CSP, while the actual cadre strength of the CSP, including probationers, was only 522.\textsuperscript{34} Further, when the Economic Pool was formed in 1959 (with the intention of attracting and organizing economic and financial talent in the bureaucracy), 60 per cent of such vacancies were allotted to members of the CSP.\textsuperscript{35}

These reservations were given de-facto sanction through relevant provisions of the 1956, 1962, and interim 1972 Constitutions of Pakistan concerning safeguards against dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, or compulsory retirement of public servants.\textsuperscript{36} A second advantage enjoyed by members of the CSP was associated with the training opportunities afforded its members. A newly-selected probationer to the CSP was subjected to a lengthy period of training at the Civil Service Academy.\textsuperscript{37} Though other cadres had training programs for their probationers, none approached the glamour of the Academy. Instructors at the Academy contained a sample of the best minds in Pakistan, and the Academy drew upon foreign scholars to buttress its status. Perhaps more important than the information conveyed during training sessions however, was the implicit process of socialization, akin to the initiation of an individual to a guild or a fraternity, which the Academy fostered. Many of the practices undertaken at the Academy—horseback riding, ‘games,’ mandatory mess nights, complete with formal attire—were important components in the formation of a ‘we-feeling,’ a sense that the CSP was separate and better than other sectors of the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{38}

Attendance at the CSP Academy opened the door to a web of affiliations, and provided avenues of informal influence within the bureaucracy. A well-timed call to a well-placed ‘batch mate’ often cut through resistance to a given action, better than working through the cumbersome channels of
authority. Finally, a CSP officer was much more likely to receive additional much sought after foreign experience/training than a non-CSP officer.39

One of the most immediate impacts of the reform was the elimination of the reservation of posts and the advantages which accrued from the training process were a remarkable degree of positional dominance by the CSP. In 1971, 12 CSP officers were federal Secretaries, 5 others were Additional Secretaries; all 5 Chief Secretaries of the provinces were CSP officer as well as 3 Additional Chief Secretaries; 18 Divisional Commissioners were members of the CSP, 38 were Deputy Commissioners; 5 others were High Court Justices; the administration of the national training institutions was dominated by 12 well-placed CSP officers; 12 others were Chairmen/Managing Directors of autonomous governmental corporations; and 8 members of the CSP were Advisors/ Private Secretaries to major political actors.40

A final consequence of the dominance of the CSP was the fact that its officers were subject to much more rapid promotion than other members of the bureaucracy. Even when compared with officers of other 'elite cadres' the comparative advantage enjoyed by CSP officers was amazing.

The above study makes it abundantly evident that the administrative reform of 1973 was highly revolutionary. As mentioned above that Bhutto's policies called for the disbanding of the CSP, the abolishment of the cadre system of organization, elimination of training advantages heretofore enjoyed by CSP officers, the establishment of a unified pay scale, and introduction of lateral recruitment on the a system of quota that provided representation to the different regions of Pakistan. These policies constituted revolutionary changes from the earlier system of civil bureaucracy.
6.8 THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AFTER THE REFORMS

The service reforms introduced by Prime Minister Bhutto in 1973 manifested one of two forms:

I. Reforms associated with the statutory bases of cadres; and

II. Reforms associated with the membership and composition of the newly created occupational groups. The thrust of such reforms was ambitious, challenging the firmly entrenched and long-standing practices of Pakistan’s bureaucracy. First, all ‘services’ in the federal civilian bureaucracy were formally abolished and replaced with ‘occupational groups.’ Second, as a corollary of the abolition of the ‘service,’ the century old practice of reservation of posts for members of elite services was discontinued.

The implementation of such reforms, however, was not immediate, nor has its application been uniform. Originally, the reforms faced resistance from within the bureaucracy itself, both due to the bureaucratic inertia and to the particularistic interests of affected services. Now we discuss the implementation of service reforms during the period of Bhutto’s administration (1973-7) and it will analyze the structural reforms initiated during Bhutto’s tenure and determine the level of implementation of such reforms. After introduction of the Administrative Reforms, 1973, one of the most important steps taken by the Government was to unify the various services under the Federation into the following three unified grades:41

I. All Pakistan Unified Grades (APGU).

II. Federal Unified Grades (FUG).

III. Provincial Unified Grades (PUG).
6.8.1 THE ALL-PAKISTAN UNIFIED GRADE (APUG)

The Establishment Division issued several memoranda, after the announcement of the administrative reforms, which fundamentally altered the structure of the All-Pakistan Services. First, the government discontinued the practice of designating certain posts in the All-Pakistan Services as ‘listed posts.’ Listed posts had been defined as positions which were reserved for members of particular services (predominantly the CSP), but were temporarily filled (due to a shortage of membership in such favored services) by members of other services. Officers who held listed posts, regardless of time served in said post or relevant qualifications, were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMER SERVICE</th>
<th>GRADE OF POST HELD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>01</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
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<td>01</td>
</tr>
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<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMAS</td>
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<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCES</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISP</td>
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<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
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<td>PMLCS</td>
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<td>00</td>
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<td>GAR</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

rarely inducted into the relevant service to which their position was linked. Rather such officers maintained their original service affiliation throughout their careers. Consequently, such listed post officers did not become members neither of the CSP nor of the All-Pakistan Services, nor were such officers eligible for the favorable terms and conditions of appointment, which accrued to members of such services. Bhutto's reforms abolished this system by mandating that once an officer is appointed to a post reserved for a particular service that he became a member of the relevant service and ceased to be a member of his original service.

The government, three weeks later abolished the CSP and PSP services, assigning the embers of these services to the All-Pakistan Unified Grade (APUG). Furthermore, the government designated that all officers holding listed posts against reservations in the services were also members of the APUG. Such reforms eliminated the century-old practice of reservation of posts for members of elite services. Also, such reforms significantly altered the composition of the All-Pakistan Unified Grades, formerly All Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMER SERVICE</th>
<th>GRADE OF POST HELD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Recruits to TAG</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Services. Before the reforms, the All-Pakistan services were composed entirely of members of the CSP or the PSP. Consequent with the announcement of the reform (1973), neither the CSP nor the PSP formally existed and 40 per cent of the newly-constituted APUG was composed of the officers who had not previously been members of the All-Pakistan Services. In following months, Bhutto’s reforms were further rationalized through the creation of four new groups within the APUG — the Tribal Areas Group (TAG), the District Management Group (DMG), the Police Group (PG), and the Secretariat Group.

The Tribal Areas Group as its name implies was formed to hire officers concerned with tribal administration. “Tribal Areas include certain partially incorporated administrative districts in Balochistan, the NWFP, and the Northern Areas.” Given the fact that prior to the reforms such posts were served for members of the CSP, the formation of the group served to expand the APUG to include listed post holders occupying relevant positions in tribal administration (mostly senior officers). Subsequent to its encadrement, recruitment to TAG was made either through direct competition or through lateral recruitment. The largest induction to the TAG by the latter means occurred in 1975, when 38 military officers were inducted into the group. Table 6.6, provides details of the composition of the TAG as of 1976.

The counterpart to the TAG, the District Management Group (DMG), was formed in February 1974. This group was formed from posts in district administration not included within the geographical ambit of the TAG. That is, the DMG encadred posts of district administration in ‘settled’ areas. Like the TAG, the DMG was initially encadred through the induction of officers holding such relevant posts, and subsequent recruitment to the DMG was
made either through direct competition or through lateral recruitment. As the 6.7 demonstrates, the DMG as of 1976 was composed primarily of former CSP officers and of direct recruits to the group. While positions formerly reserved for members of the CSP in district administration were deputed to the TAG and DMG, the positions formerly reserved for the PSP were deputed to the newly formed the Police Group (PG). Officers gained membership in the PG either through holding former membership in the PSP or by holding posts in the provincial police establishment at the level of Superintendent of Police or higher. The table 6.8 presents the original membership of the Police Group.

| TABLE 6.7 |
| THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE DISTRICT MANAGEMENT GROUP BY CADRE OF FORMER SERVICE AND BY RANK IN THE REFORMED SERVICE STRUCTURE, 1976 |
| FORMER SERVICE | GRADE OF POST HELD | TOTAL |
|                | 21  | 20  | 19  | 18  | 17  |
| CSP            | 04  | 11  | 01  | 19  | 09  | 44  |
| CSP            | 04  | 03  | 00  | 00  | 00  | 07  |
| Direct Recruits to DMG | 00  | 00  | 00  | 00  | 42  | 42  |
| Others         | 00  | 03  | 04  | 00  | 00  | 07  |
| TOTAL          | 08  | 17  | 5   | 19  | 51  | 100 |


The final constituent element of the APUG is the Secretariat Group. It was formed in 1975 in order to regularize and encader all posts of Deputy Secretary and above in the Federal Secretariat and Provincial Secretariats as are borne on the cadre of the All-Pakistan Unified Grade. That is, the Secretariat Group was formed to wide cadre status to all officers of the APUG who had not inducted into the TAG, the DMG or the PG.
Unlike recruitment other groups within the APUG, the Secretariat Group could not be entered through direct competition. Rather, the Secretariat Group was an amalgamation of lateral recruitment, promotion and/or horizontal movement from other cadres. Induction into the Secretariat Group through the latter two avenues was mediated through the actions of the Central Selection Board. The initial encadrement of the group included all officers holding posts as defined above and all former CSP officers including those who had not attained the rank of Deputy Secretary. The

**TABLE 6.8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMER SERVICE</th>
<th>GRADE OF POST HELD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Recruits to PG</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>05</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled by comparing gradation lists of PSP as found in Civil List, against Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division) Graduation List of Police Group Grade 17-22, (ASP), Provisional), October 1, 1975, unpublished.*

Table 6.9 describes the composition of the Secretariat Group by former service affiliation as of 1976. In sum, Bhutto’s reforms of the APUG were designed to constitute significant modifications in the structure and composition of the elite services and specifically were directed at the status and authority of the CSP. Each of the provisions described above can be interpreted within such a framework: the discontinuance of reservation of posts; the abolition of services; the trifurcating of the functions of the CSP;
finally, the dilution of the dominance of the CSP in the APUG through the induction of lateral recruits. One indicator of the scope of the reforms was that the CSP and PSP constituted 100 per cent of the membership in the All Services (1971), constituted only 38 per cent of membership of the APUG by 1976. 

<p>| TABLE 6.9 |
| THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECRETARIAT GROUP BY CADRE OF FORMER SERVICE AND BY RANK IN THE REFORMED SERVICE STRUCTURE, 1976 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMER SERVICE</th>
<th>GRADE OF POST HELD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAAS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
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<td>PMAS</td>
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<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCES</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMLCS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total former CSS</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Other refers to all officers who do not belong to one of the designated service cadres.

It is not surprising to note that the implementation of the reforms provoked widespread resistance from the most adversely affected services, particularly the erstwhile CSP officers. Consequently, when President General Zia
replaced Bhutto in July 1977 considerable sentiment reverse or at least to blunt the impact of the services reforms.

6.8.2 **THE FEDERAL UNIFIED GRADES (FUD)**

The scope of Bhutto's modifications of the Federal Unified Grades (FUG), formerly 'Central Superior Services,' was much more narrowly defined than reforms associated with APUG. However, four services underwent significant reorganization and one new group was formed as a consequence of the reforms. The Federal Unified Grades include the Occupational Groups Other than those belonging to the All Pakistan Unified Grades.

The FUG was constituted in the same manner of the creation of the APUG. Indeed, the FUG was defined in terms of the latter organization. The Federal Unified Grades, was comprised of all services and civil posts connected with the affairs of the Federation other than those included in the All-Pakistan Unified Grade.\(^{55}\) In other words, the Federal Unified Grades are same as the Central Superior Services for the fact that membership the former does not include listed post holders who had become, by the All-Pakistan Services Rules of 1973, members of the All-Pakistan Unified Grade.\(^{55}\) However, subsequent to the promulgation of these directives two sectors of the Federal Unified Grades did undergo significant reorganization. The Accounts Group (AG) was formed by merging (a) the PRAS, the PMAS, and the PAAS; (b) the accounts officers of the Telephone and Telegraph Department and the Pakistan Postal Office; and (c) all other accounts posts in the Central Superior Services.\(^{54}\) The former services remained as 'departments' within a unified 'interdepartmental cadre.' The departments (Military Accounts Department, Pakistan Audits Department, and Railway Accounts Department) maintained their autonomy by retaining authority over entry-
level (Grade 17) officers of the Accounts Group. Of course, the most obvious consequence of this merger was to increase the cadre strength of the Accounts Group. In 1970, 260 officers were members of the PAAS, the PMAS, or the PRAS. By 1976, the combined cadre strength of the Accounts Group had grown to 386. Further, only 160 of the latter were associates of the original three services. Table 6.10 presents the cadres of the newly constituted groups in combination with their pre-reform position. Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Group (FAG) was constituted as the amalgamation of 'all posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in Pakistan Missions abroad viz., —all posts of Commercial Attaches, Press Attaches, Education, Labor, Agriculture, etc.' The formation of this group therefore, arbitrated the issue of the status of 0 officers in foreign missions. The reform also sanctioned the induction of lateral recruits into the FAG. As was the case of the AG, the consequences of such reorganization led to both an increase in the aggregate size of the cadre, the PFS had 180 members in 1970, the FAG 331 in and to a decrease in the importance of the PFS cohorts unified cadre, only 151 of the 331 officers of the FAG were cohorts of the PFS. The 6.10 describe also, a new occupational group, the Economists and Group, was formed in 1976. This group was designed to incorporate 'all economists . . . in the Economic Division, Finance Division, and federal government with economic matters and planning and development the economic field.' Though the original idea behind the creation of the group had envisioned recruitment at are levels both through direct recruitment and through promotion, in practice the group has been formed solely by incorporation of officers (Grade 17 and above) serving in ant departments and ministries who did not possess other group affiliation. The Economist and Planners Group are entered through direct competition.
TABLE 6.10

FORMER SERVICES PRIOR TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS
OF 1975 AND GROUPS SUBSEQUENT TO THE REFORMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF FORMER SERVICE</th>
<th>NAME OF CORRESPONDING OCCUPATIONAL GROUP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP)</td>
<td>District Management Group (DMG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tribal Areas Group (TAG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Service of Pakistan (PSP)</td>
<td>Police Group (PG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Service of Pakistan (FSP)</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Group (FAG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Audits and Accounts Service (PAAS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Military Accounts Service (PMAS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Railways Accounts Service (PRAS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Taxation Service (PTS)</td>
<td>Accounts Group (AG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Customs and Excise Service (PCES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Service of Pakistan (TSP)</td>
<td>Income Tax Group (ITG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Service of Pakistan (ISP)</td>
<td>Customs and Excise Group (CEG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Postal Service (PPS)</td>
<td>Commerce and Trade Group (CTG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonments Service (PMLCS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Secretariat Service (CSS)</td>
<td>Information Group (IG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Railways Service</td>
<td>Postal Group (PG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Lands and Cantonments Group (MLCG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office Management Group (OMG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Railways Group (RG)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretariat Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economists and Planners Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Essentially modifications in other sectors of the Central Superior Services (now FUG) merely constituted changes in nomenclature. That is, the pre-reform designation of ‘service’ aced with the post-reform designation of ‘group’. Table 6.10 presents a summary of changes in the nomenclature constituent elements of the FUG as well as a summary of similar changes in the APUG.
6.9 **OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS**

In order to emphasize professionalism in one field of administration, the following 'Occupational Groups' were constituted:

I. District Management Group
II. Police Group
III. Income Tax Group
IV. Customs and Excise Group
V. Accounts Group
VI. Information Group
VII. Postal Group
VIII. Commerce Trade Group
IX. Foreign Affairs Group
X. Office Management Group
XI. Military Lands and Cantonment Group
XII. Railways Group
XIII. Secretariat Group
XIV. Tribal Areas Group
XV. Economists and Planners Group

6.9.1 **ACCOUNTS GROUP (AG)**

This group comprises all posts in: —

I. The Pakistan Audit and Accounts Department, the Military Accounts Department, and the Railway Accounts Department;

II. The Accounts cadres of the Telegraph and Telephone Department and the Pakistan Post Office; and

III. All Accounts posts under the Ministries / Divisions and Departments of the Federal Government (other than the posts of
Budget and Accounts Officers or Finance and Accounts Officers in the Ministries and Divisions of the Federal Secretariat).

Each Department operates the posts from Grade 1 to Grade-17 separately except those included in the inter-departmental cadre. The inter-departmental cadre includes all posts in Grade-17, which were formerly borne on the cadre of the former Accounts Services and 25% of Grade-17 Accounts posts in the T & T Department and the Pakistan Post Office Department. Besides these all posts in Grade-18 and above in the Accounts Group belong to the inter-departmental cadre. Officers of the inter-departmental cadre can be transferred from one Department to the other.

Initial recruitment to Grade-17 of the group is made on the basis of the results of the competitive examination held by the Federal Public Service Commission, and after integrated training in the Civil Services Academy followed by departmental training and examination; the officers are allocated to a particular Accounts Department. Officers of the Accounts Group are eligible for secretariat posts of Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries etc. There is a provision for accelerated promotion to posts in Grade-17 on the basis of a departmental examination.

6.9.2 COMMERCE & TRADE GROUP (CTG)

This group comprises posts in the following departments and such other posts as may be included in the group from time to time:

I. Export Promotion Bureau.
II. Import and Export (Control) Department.
III. Tariff Commission.

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IV. Council Board.
V. Department of Insurance.
VI. Trade Marks Registry.

Each Department or Office operates separately with regard to all posts in Grade 1 to 16. All posts for which appointments are made directly are advertised and initial recruitment to Grade-16 is reported to the Federal Public Service Commission. Appointments to 75% of Grade-17 posts are made through competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission, and 25% by promotion from amongst the departmental incumbents holding posts in Grade-11 and above. Candidates recruited for initial appointment through the F.P.S.C. undergo integrated training at the Academy followed by departmental training and examination after which each candidate is allocated to a particular Department. Promotion or direct recruitment according to the relevant rules makes recruitment to Grade-18 and above. Officers of this group are also eligible to appointment on secretariat posts of Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries etc., by transfer.

There was provision for accelerated promotion to posts in Grade-17 on the basis of a departmental examination. All officials having a minimum of 5 years' Government service in Grade-11 and above are eligible to appear in this examination if otherwise qualified.

6.9.3 CUSTOMS & EXCISE GROUP (CEG)

This group comprises all posts in the Customs & Central Excise Department. All posts to be filled by direct recruitment are advertised and recruitment to posts in Grade-16 and above is reported to the Federal Public Service Commission. Recruitment to 75% posts in Grade-17 is made through a
competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission, and 25% through promotion. Candidates selected by the F.P.S.C. for the Group get integrated training in the Academy, followed by departmental as well as on-the-job training and finally by an examination. Officers of this group are also eligible for secretariat appointments as Deputy Secretaries, Joint Secretaries etc. by transfer. There is provision for the accelerated promotion of qualified persons in Grade-16 and below for promotion to Grade-17 on the basis of a departmental examination.

6.9.4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS GROUP (FAG)

This group comprises all posts in or under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and includes officers serving in the Ministry in Pakistan as well as those serving in diplomatic missions abroad. Initial entry to Grade-17 in the Foreign Affairs Group is made through the competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission. On completion of training at the Academy the candidates allocated to the group are given departmental or on-the-job training. There is provision for promotion to Grade-17 for all departmental candidates on the basis of a departmental examination held by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). The age limit for this examination is 35 years.

6.9.5 INFORMATION GROUP (IG)

This group comprises all posts in the departments and organizations and such posts in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting as may be specifically included in the group:

1. Press Information Department and its Regional Information Offices.
II. Directorate of Research and Reference.

III. External Publicity Wing and its offices in Pakistan Missions abroad.

IV. Border Publicity Organization and its Regional Offices

V. Audit Bureau of Circulation and its Regional Offices.

VI. Directorate of Economic Publicity.

VII. Directorate of Films and Publications.

Each Department and Organization operates the posts in Grades 1-16 under its control. All posts to be filled by direct recruitment are advertised. The posts in Grade-16 which are to be filled by direct recruitment are reported to the Federal Public Service Commission. Initial recruitment to 75% posts in Grade-17 is made through a competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission. Selected candidates undergo integrated training at the Academy followed by departmental and on-the-job training and examination. The remaining 25% posts are filled on the basis of selection from amongst Grade-16 officers of the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting and the Departments and Organizations included in the group. Officers of the group are eligible for secretariat posts of Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries etc., by transfer. There is also a provision for accelerated promotion for posts in Grade-17 on the basis of a departmental examination.

6.9.6 MILITARY LAND & CANTONMENT GROUP

This group comprises all posts in the Military Lands and Cantonment Department and such posts as may be included in the group from time to time. All posts in Grade 1-16 to be filled by direct recruitment are advertised
except posts in Grade-16 which are reported to the FPSC. As regard posts in Grade-17, 75% posts are filled through the competitive examination held by the FPSC and 25% by promotion from departmental incumbents holding posts in Grade-11 and above. Candidates selected for direct recruitment to Grade-17 get integrated training in the Academy followed by departmental training and departmental examination. Appointments to posts in Grade-18 and above is made by promotion as well as by direct recruitment or by transfer of suitably qualified and experienced officers from other groups. The officers of this group are eligible for appointment to secretariat posts of Deputy Secretaries, Joint Secretaries etc. by transfer and are also eligible for induction in the District Management Group according to the relevant rules and procedure.

There is provision for accelerated promotion to posts in Grade-17. Officials having a minimum of 5 years' Government service in Grade-11 and above, if otherwise qualified are eligible to appear in the examination for accelerated promotion.

6.9.7 OFFICE MANAGEMENT GROUP

This group comprises the following posts:

I. all ministerial posts in the Federal Secretariat from Grades 1 to 16,

II. posts of Section Officers in Grades 17 and 18

III. Other posts including posts in Grades 19 and 20 as may be specified and included in the Group from time to time.

The administrative control of the group is with the Establishment Division. This group consists mostly of Section Officers in the Secretariat. In the cadre of Section Officer in Grade-17, two-thirds of the vacancies are to be filled
by direct recruitment and the rest through a promotional examination conducted by the Establishment Division. Candidates selected by the FPSC undergo integrated training in the Academy, followed by on-the-job/departmental training and examination. Promotion to Grade-18 is made from amongst Section Officers of Grade-17 who have rendered at least 5 years of service in this grade. Section Officers are also eligible for promotion to Grade-19 and above on the basis of relevant rules and regulations.

There is provision for accelerated promotion to the posts of Grade-17. Eligible ministerial staff of the Federal Secretariat and its attached departments including Assistants, Superintendents, Stenographers, Private Secretaries etc., who hold university degrees and are over the age of 25 years but below the age of 30 years may appear in the examination for direct recruitment to the posts of Grade-17 Section Officers conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission, if they have been in continuous service for a period of not less than two years. Two chances are allowed within the age limit for taking advantage of this provision for accelerated promotion.

6.9.8 POLICE GROUP

The Police Group comprises all Police posts in Grade-17 and above viz. Assistant Superintendent of Police, Superintendent of Police, Deputy Inspector General, Additional Inspector General and Inspector-General, and some other posts relating to Police Administration. Direct recruitment to Grade-17 i.e. Assistant Superintendent of Police is made through the competitive examination held by the Federal Public Service Commission. Candidates selected for the Police Group are given integrated training at the Academy and are thereafter posted to the provinces and given further
specialized training at the Police Training College at Sihala. Appointments to Grade-18 are made by promotion of officers of Grade-17 of the Police Group as well as of Grade-17 officers of the Provincial Police. As in most other Occupational Groups, officers of the Police Group are also eligible for appointments to secretariat posts (Deputy Secretary and above) by horizontal movement.

6.9.9. POSTAL GROUP

This group comprises all posts in the Pakistan Post Office Department except the Accounts posts and also such other posts as are included in the group from time to time. The Pakistan Post Office Department operates the posts in Grades 1-16. All posts to be filled by direct recruitment are advertised except the posts in Grade-16 which are reported to the FPSC. 75% posts in Grade-17 are filled through competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission and 25% through promotion. Candidates selected by the F.P.S.C. undergo the same process of integrated training at the Academy and Departmental Training etc., as do most of the other groups. Officers of the group are eligible for secretariat posts by transfer. There is provision for accelerated promotion to posts in Grade-17 through a departmental examination.

6.9.10 SECRETARIAT GROUP

This group comprises posts of Deputy Secretaries and above in the Federal Secretariat and such posts in the Provincial Secretariats as are borne on the cadre of the All Pakistan Unified Grades. The Secretariat group is under the administrative control of the Establishment Division. Appointments to the various grades in the group are made according to the following methods:
1. The posts of Deputy Secretaries are filled either by promotion of Grade-18 officers of the Office Management Group or by horizontal movement from other Occupational Groups of Grade-19 officers.

II. Appointments to the posts of Joint Secretaries are made by promotion from the Grade of Deputy Secretary or by horizontal movement of Grade 20 officers of the other Occupational Groups.

III. Appointments to the posts of Additional Secretaries are made by selection from amongst Joint Secretaries, officers of Grade-20 and above belonging to various Occupational Groups and professionally qualified persons in the public enterprises and the private sector.

IV. Appointments to the posts of Secretary are made by selection from amongst Additional Secretaries, officers of Grade-21 and above in the various Occupational Groups and professionally qualified persons from the public enterprises and the private sector.

6.9.11 **INCOME TAX GROUP**

The group comprises all posts in the Income Tax Department. The overall administration of this group is with the Central Board of Revenue in the Ministry of Finance.

All posts to be filled by direct recruitment are advertised except posts in Grade 16 which are reported to the Federal Public Service Commission. 75% of the posts in Grade 17 are filled through competitive examination.
conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission and 25% through promotion. After completion of one year's training at the Civil Service Academy, the probationer officers allocated to this group undergo departmental and on-the-job training to be followed by an examination.

6.9.12 **DISTRICT MANAGEMENT GROUP (DMG)**

This group comprises field posts in the civil administration of the district and the Division viz. Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and such other posts, which are included in the group from time to time.

Recruitment to Grade-17 posts is made through the FPSC except for those posts, which are filled by promotion according to rules. Probationers (Grade-17) of the District Management Group are sent to the Civil Service Academy for integrated training, and thereafter undergo departmental training followed by an examination. Officers of this group are eligible for secretariat appointments according to the prescribed procedure.

6.10 **ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AFTER THE REFORMS**

Pakistan is a federal state. According to the Constitution of 1973, the Federal Government, in the name of the President exercises the executive authority of the federation. The Prime Minister is the Chief Executive of the Federation and the Federal Cabinet exercises its authority through him. The Prime Minister, however, may act directly or through the Federal Ministries, which are collectively responsible to the national assembly.
According to the Fourth Schedule, Article-70 (6) of the Constitution, there is a list of Subjects to be dealt with by the Federal Government and another by the Federal and Provincial Governments concurrently. All the remaining subjects and residual matters of administration are in the purview of the Provincial Governments. The subjects within the purview of the Federal Legislature, whether in the Federal list or the Concurrent list are administered through the Ministries / Divisions of the Federal Government and their Attached Departments and subordinate offices or other agencies which employ a work force of public servants for the purview. To facilitate their deployment and mobilization, the public servants have been grouped into Occupational Groups, Cadres or Services where such grouping is feasible. Similar grouping exists for the administration of subjects under the purview of the Provincial Governments. However, we shall deal mainly with the Federal Government Servants in this chapter.

6.10.1 TECHNICAL AND NON-TECHNICAL POSTS

The services and posts under the Government of Pakistan, whether subject to the control of the Federal or Provincial Governments can be classified into the following three categories according to the mode of selection and requirements of the job: —

I. Generalist Services.
II. Semi-Technical Specialized Services.
III. Purely Technical Services.

By generalist services or posts is meant the posts for which recruitment is made on the basis of the general education of the candidates. Candidates having a certain level of education, (graduation or Master's Degree)
irrespective of any specialization in a particular subject are considered eligible for a course of training for these posts. They are recruited on the basis of a combined competitive examination, (as will be discussed later) and those who are selected according to the rules are trained for various categories of jobs, which are, termed ‘Occupational Groups’. These candidates are selected for a particular course of training rather than for direct appointment to a post. After allocation to the Occupational Groups, the officers assume a particular rank and begin career in a particular service. This system of recruitment and appointment may therefore be considered to belong to the ‘Rank Oriented System’, because the recruitment is made for a career, rank, or Occupational Group (which includes several jobs) rather than for a specific job.

There are some posts to which recruitment is made on the basis of advanced academic attainment in a University without formal education or training in a professional institution. For example, candidates with higher qualifications in Economics, Statistics, Administrative Sciences etc., are selected on the basis of their qualifications for such semi-technical and specialized posts as Research Officers, Economic Investigators, Economics Advisors, Scientific Advisors, and Management Consultants etc. Since recruitment to these posts is mainly based on the requirements of the job without any formal course of training, these appointments may be considered to belong to the Job Oriented System.

The purely technical services and posts are those to which recruitment is made on the basis of technical qualifications acquired mainly in professional institutions e.g. doctors, engineers, computer programmers etc. The job requirements for each post are determined and persons meeting the
requirements are selected, on merit, for direct appointment without formal training. The appointments to these services or posts may also be considered to belong to the Job Oriented System.

It is observed from the above points that the system of selection and appointment to the categories of services and posts belonging to semi-technical and technical posts is comparatively simple. Candidates are recruited to specific jobs according to the job requirements. Some of these posts get integrated into the Occupational Groups and the incumbents acquire the privileges and prospects of promotion enjoyed by the Occupational Groups, while others remain in the posts for which they are selected, until they find better opportunities for advancement.

6.11 PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

The Establishment Division of the Cabinet Secretariat is the Central Agency for personnel management within the Federal Government in Pakistan. The Establishment Division is a depository of all regulatory powers in respect of establishment matters and issues necessary directions to all personnel agencies within the Ministries / Divisions and their department offices. The Establishment Division as a part of the Cabinet Secretariat is usually under the direct charge of the Prime Minister, however, sometimes a Minister also is the in charge of the Division. The intention has been to keep the civil services free from political influences as far as possible. Subject to any general or specific delegation to any Division the Establishment Division is required to be consulted by other Divisions on the following matters:
I. Initial appointments, other than those made through the Federal Public Service Commission, in the Federal Secretariat and Attached Departments.

II. Change in the terms and conditions of service of federal civil servants;

III. Change in the statutory rights and privileges of any Federal Government servants;

IV. Selection of an officer serving in connection with the affairs of a Province for appointment in the Federal Secretariat or an Attached Department, except for appointment in the Intelligence Bureau;

V. Expenditure proposals relating to the Finance Division under Rule 12(1) (b), (2) and (3);

VI. Interpretation of rules and orders made by the Establishment Division; and

VII. Rules for recruitment to any post or service, including the question of removing a post or service from the purview of the Federal Public Service Commission for the purposes of recruitment.  

Similarly the functions relating to Personnel Administration in each Province are entrusted to the Services and General Administration Department, which is directly under the Chief Minister of the Province.
6.12 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In Section 240 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, provision has been made for regulating the appointment and conditions of service of the Government employees. This section reads as follows:

Subject to the Constitution, appointments to and the conditions of service of persons in the service of Pakistan shall be determined:

I. In the case of the service of the Federation and posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation all-Pakistan Services, by or under Act of Parliament; and

II. In the case of the services of a Province and posts in connection with the affairs of a Province, by or under Act of the Provincial Assembly.

In pursuance of the above provision in the Constitution, the Government of Pakistan has promulgated the Civil Servants Act, 1973.

This Act applies to all Government servants who are holders of civil posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation excluding those who are:

I. On deputation from the Provinces;

II. Persons employed on contract or on a work-charged basis or who are paid from contingencies; and

III. "Workers" or 'Workmen' as defined under the Factories Act, 1934 or the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

Section 3 of the Act provides that the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant shall be as provided in this Act and the rules.
The Act deals with and / or provides the framework for regulating the following matters:

I. The tenure of office of civil servants.
II. Appointments.
III. Probation and confirmation.
IV. Seniority and promotions.
V. Postings and transfers.
VI. Termination of service.
VII. Reversion to a lower grade or service.
VIII. Retirement from service.
IX. Employment after retirement.
X. Conduct and discipline.
XI. Pay and leave.
XII. Pension, Gratuity and Provident Fund.
XIII. Benevolent Fund and Group Insurance.
XIV. Appeals and representations.

Under Section 25 (1), of the Act the President or any person authorized by the President in this behalf may make rules as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under Sub-section (2) thereof, any rules, orders or instructions in respect of any terms and conditions of service of civil servants duly made or issued by an authority competent to make them and in force immediately before the commencement of the Act, shall, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, be deemed to be rules made under this Act. For example, the following rules which were in force prior to the promulgation of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 will fall in the latter category of rules:

I. Fundamental Rules.


6.13 RECRUITMENT AND THE QUOTA SYSTEM

The civil services in Pakistan have an old tradition of selection based on merit. According to Para 11 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 except in the case of posts of Grades 1-2 it is necessary that all posts should be advertised before making selection. Assessment of the candidates is made by selection boards, selection committees etc., after considering the qualifications, experience, personality etc., of the candidate and in certain cases candidates are also required to appear for a test. Although merit is the main criterion, in order to give due

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<tr>
<th>S. #</th>
<th>REGIONS</th>
<th>QUOTA RATIO</th>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Merit Quota</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>PUNJAB including Islamabad</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>SIND</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIa</td>
<td>Sind Urban 40% of 19%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIIb</td>
<td>Sind Rural 60% of 19%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>N.W.F.P</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>BALOCHISTAN</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>NAFATA Northern Areas and Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>AZAD KASHMIR</td>
<td>2%</td>
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**TOTAL** 100%

representation to all the provinces and regions of Pakistan in the sphere of public administration, Government has specified provincial and regional quotas for direct recruitment to all posts under the Federal Government. (See Table 6.11)

6.13.1 **FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

The Federal Public Service Commission, (and the Provincial Public Service Commissions for the Provincial posts) earlier was required to be consulted before any disciplinary action was taken against civil servants in the higher grades. After the reforms consultation with the FPSC was dispensed with. However, Service Tribunals were created consisting of a Judge of the High Court as Chairman and two other members. They were authorized to hear appeals by a civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service.

In order to rationalize the procedure for selection, Commissions, Boards etc., have been constituted for conducting the process of recruiting according to the rules and regulations. One of the most important recruiting agencies is the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) and the Provincial Public Service Commissions (PPSC). The provision for the establishment of the Federal and Provincial Commissions has been made in the Constitution of Pakistan. According to the Article 242 (1) of the constitution “the Parliament in relation to the affairs of the Federation and the Provincial Assembly of a Province in relation to the affairs of the Province may by law, provide for the establishment and constitution of a Public Service Commission. (2) A
Public Service Commission shall perform such functions as may be prescribed by law.\textsuperscript{61}

In consonance with the above provision in the Constitution, the Federal Public Service Commission was established under an Act of Parliament, known as the Federal Public Service Commission Act, 1973.\textsuperscript{62}

Appointments on an ad-hoc basis for a period of up to two years and employment / re-employment of officers of the Armed Forces of Pakistan are not within the purview of the Commission. Although the FPSC is a statutory body, yet its role is advisory. Its recommendations / advice are not binding on the Government. However, in order to ensure that the recommendations made or the advice tendered by the Commission receives the consideration it deserves, the Rules provide for the submission of cases of non-acceptance of its advice to the President through the Establishment Division.

Besides the Federal Public Service Commission there are Departmental Selection / Promotion Committees in each Ministry Division, Department or Office of the Federal Government, which act as recruiting agencies for the posts which do not fall within the purview of the Commission, i.e. in Grade 15 and below. According to Rule 4(u) of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973, each such Committee consists of at least 3 Members one of whom is appointed as Chairman. These Selection Committees are technically of an advisory nature and submit their recommendations regarding the selection of candidates to the authority concerned competent to make appointment. The Appointing Authority is required to record its reasons for non-acceptance and obtain orders of the next higher authority.
6.13.2 THE CENTRAL SUPERIOR SERVICES EXAMINATION

As stated earlier, recruitment to the various Occupational Groups is made on the basis of a combined competitive examination. This examination, usually called the Central Superior Services Examination is held every year by the Federal Public Service Commission. According to the Rules the minimum qualification required for this examination is a Bachelor’s Degree in the second division, but if a candidate with U division in the Bachelor’s Degree has obtained a higher division in his Master’s or Law Degree he is considered eligible. The age limit is 21 to 28 years, relax able up to certain limits for Scheduled Castes and Buddhists, candidates from certain tribal areas, military personnel, Government servants etc.

The CSS Examination is conducted in three parts, namely the written examination, psychological tests of general ability and the viva voce. The written examination is divided between compulsory and optional subjects and carries a total of 1200 marks. In optional subjects a candidate has to select subject equivalent to 600 marks among a range of 53 subjects. The compulsory subjects carry 600 marks. (For details of the subjects see Appendix B)

The main objective of the examination in the compulsory subject is to test the general knowledge of the candidate and also his ability to express himself effectively in English which is still the language mostly used in Government Departments and offices. The remaining parts of the written examination consist of optional papers and are designed to test the knowledge of the candidate in the particular academic discipline selected by
him during his University education, and, presumably his capacity to assimilate knowledge at a reasonably high intellectual level. The optional subjects cover most of the disciplines, human sciences, natural sciences, languages, literature etc, taught in the universities in Pakistan and a candidate has a wide choice of subjects, to select optional subjects which should carry a maximum of 600 marks. (Appendix B)

Candidates who qualify in the written examination are called for a viva voce i.e. interview before the Federal Public Service Commission. Some high Government officials may be co-opted by the Commission for the purpose. Besides interviewing the candidates the viva voce board also takes into account the report of psychological tests of general ability of the candidates preceding the viva voce test, (although no specific marks are assigned to the psychological test). The viva voce carries 300 marks. After completing the assessment of the candidate's performance in the written examination as well as in the viva voce examination, the result is compiled on the basis of the marks in the written and viva voce examination and the candidates are then arranged in order of merit. The allocation of the candidates to the various Occupational Groups is made on the basis of the order of merit obtained by a candidate, his domicile (for provincial quota) and his own preference for the Occupational Groups. The result when compiled by the FPSC is sent to the Establishment Division and after due approval by the competent authority the selected candidates are required to appear for a medical test and after clearance are sent to the Civil Service Academy at Lahore for pre-service training.
6.13.3  LATERAL ENTRY

In order to induct into service professionals and specialists available in the country, as well as provide better opportunities of promotion to those talented Government servants who had not been provided opportunities for promotion due to the system of 'reservation' and other inhibiting rules, a new system called 'lateral entry' was introduced. According to this system well-qualified persons in service as well as outside Government service were invited to apply for the posts of Deputy Secretaries, Joint Secretaries, and Additional Secretaries in the Federal Ministries. Appointments to these posts were made directly through a competitive examination or by interview or both. Previously, the candidates were assigned to various services on the result of the competitive examinations held by the Public Service Commission and were trained in separate academies for each service. After the reforms all candidates who qualified in the examination held by the Federal Public Service Commission were trained in a common institution called the Academy for Administrative Training and assigned to the 'Occupational Groups' after the training.

6.14  TRAINING

The training of civil servants has always been considered of great importance for any efficient administration. During the British colonial rule, and even for some years after Independence the training of civil servants in India and Pakistan was mostly on the job preceded by a short course of instructions and training in the respective field. After Independence, particularly after 1960, greater importance was given to training in Pakistan. The training of civil servants can be divided, into two phases; Pre service Training and In-service Training.
6.14.1 **PRE-SERVICE TRAINING**

Pre-Service Training is imparted to candidates duly selected by the FPSC or by other competent organizations before they are posted to their duties in the respective occupational groups. The institution for Pre-Service Training of the candidates selected through the Central Superior Services Examination by the FPSC for appointments to posts in Grade 17 in the various occupational groups and above is the Civil Service Academy at Lahore. The objectives of the training are as follows:

I. To prepare the probationers for induction into public service;

II. To educate them in the basics of Islam and provide them with an Islamic orientation;

II. To promote amongst them mutual understanding and a common outlook;

IV. To acquaint them with the background and history of the struggle for Pakistan and its ideology;

V. To motivate them for public service and to develop in them responsiveness to the needs of the people;

VI. To inculcate in them a national outlook and develop a sense of involvement in national and local problems;

VII. To impart basic knowledge of:

   a. Administration and modern management;

   b. Structure and functioning of the Government of Pakistan;

   c. Economic and social planning and development of Pakistan;
The duration of the training is about six months and the training is imparted through lectures, panel discussions, syndicate discussions, case studies, district and village tours, audio-visual aids etc. Those who complete the trainings successfully are sent to the respective training institutions for specialized training for the requirements of the Occupational Group concerned.

6.14.2 **IN-SERVICE TRAINING**

This training is imparted to civil servants who have already put in some years of service in the Government. The major training institutions are the National Institutes of Public Administration at Karachi and Lahore, the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Peshawar and the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore. The officers of the level of Grade 18-19 receive In-Service Training in the National Institutes of Public Administration and the Rural Academy at Peshawar, while officers of Grades 19-20 are trained at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore. The main objective of the In-Service Training is to provide refresher courses to the civil servants away from their usual surrounding in the Secretariat or other Government Departments and expose them to the latest trends of thought and administrative experience in Pakistan as well as in other countries of the world.

6.15 **PROMOTION**

In order to provide better opportunities of promotion to professionals it was ensured in the rules that there should be no barrier to the promotion of a professional or specialist to higher grades in the administration, including senior appointments at the higher levels of decisions-making. Hence
 provision was made in the rules that all Government servants including professionals and specialists could rise to the high levels of the hierarchy in the Departments and in the Ministries, including the levels of Joint Secretaries, Additional Secretaries and Secretaries, subject, of course, to certain regulations regarding qualifications etc. The system of "reservation" of some higher posts for any particular occupational group was done away with. Similarly provision was made for horizontal mobility of officers from one group to another group particularly in the higher grades of the civil service.

In order to facilitate promotion, Government servants in lower grades who had reached the maximum of their scale of pay could move to the higher grades automatically (subject, to good work, conduct etc.) irrespective of whether or not a vacancy existed in the higher grade. Such automatic movements to higher grades, however, could take place up to and including Grade' 18, i.e. up to the level of Section Officers. Provision was made for accelerated promotion of well-qualified persons in some of the grades through departmental examinations. Those who did well in these examinations could be promoted to higher grades even if they were junior to others in service.

6.15.1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

The main basis for promotion in any modern system of civil services is performance evaluation. In Pakistan the main document which forms the basis of performance evaluation is the annual confidential report written by the superior officers of the civil servant concerned. The proformas of the
ACR’s are quite elaborate and do present an overall picture of the personality, capabilities and achievements of the civil servant under report.

For objective assessment there are provisions that the report should be seen and countersigned by a superior officer other than the reporting officer and that adverse remarks if any must be communicated to the civil servant concerned. Unfortunately, sometimes the adverse remarks are not communicated to the civil servants concerned and they are not given the opportunity to state their side of the case (as required under the rules). Even so, these adverse remarks are taken into consideration in cases of promotion, “screening” etc. Besides, there have been cases in which reporting officers expressing doubts regarding the efficiency or integrity of civil Servants reported upon were them dismissed or removed on grounds of inefficiency or corruption etc., and yet their adverse remarks persisted in the annual confidential reports and were taken into account by the authorities. It is therefore extremely important that the system of performance evaluation and that for assessing ACR’s should be rationalized in such a way that the possibility of miscarriage of justice is reduced to the minimum. One recommendation would be to communicate the entire ACR to the civil servant concerned and allow him the opportunity to present his side of the case if he so desires. Both the ACR as well as the statement of the civil servant should be considered at the time of evaluation of his performance. After all, if it is necessary that adverse remarks should be communicated to the civil servant, there is hardly much logic in not revealing the good remarks about his performance.

In the above study an attempt has been made to analyze the circumstances of the pre-reform movement in which the administrative reforms of 1973 have
been formulated. The policy announced in August 1973 was based on a number of administrative commissions which laid the culmination of the intellectual groundwork, the particular configuration of forces within the bureaucracy, and the political and historical environment prevalent at the time of the adoption of the policy.

Our analysis has proved conclusively that the process of administrative reform in Pakistan has been an intensely political phenomenon. The administrative reforms proposed in 1973 were not simply the reflection of the deliberations for an effective public administration, neither were they the end product of conspiracies among clever politicians. Rather, the forms were the consequence of an implicit compromise between politicians and bureaucrats. The turbulent and unsettling political environment of which both sets of actors were a part influenced the particular form that compromise took.

It has been discussed that despite Bhutto’s claim that the service reforms of 1973 constituted ‘revolutionary’ departures from the prevailing system of bureaucratic organization in Pakistan had a concrete basis. The impacts of the reforms were highly significant in the history of Pakistan.

It has been observed that the implementation of Bhutto’s service reforms altered the cadre system of organization of the bureaucracy in several important ways. The Civil Bureaucracy of Pakistan (CSP), which was the descendent of the Indian Civil Services (ICS), was abolished. Its membership was scattered to the newly-created District Management Group, Tribal Areas Group, and the Secretariat Group. Second, the practice of designating non-CSP officers as ‘listed post holders’ in the All-Pakistan Services was abolished and as a consequence of the former the century-old
practice of the reservation of posts for members of the CSP and other elite services was discontinued. Fourth, the domain of the All-Pakistan Services newly-constituted as the All-Pakistan Unified Grade; was expanded to include a majority of non-CSP and non-PSP officers. Fifth, the former Accounts services (PAAS, PMAS, and PRAS) were merged to form the Accounts Group. Finally, the composition of the PFS was greatly modified and expanded to form the Foreign Affairs Group. In each of these instances the cadre system as it was inherited from the British, and as it developed since Partition, was significantly modified. In each of these instances the 'elite of the elite' was watered down by an expansion of the size of the respective cadre and a concomitant decline in the relative proportion of former service cohorts in the newly constituted occupational groups. Given the heretofore-impervious nature of the cadre system, such modifications were indeed 'revolutionary.' But it must be stressed that the reform of the cadre system of organization left the role of the cadre system to the overall scheme of Pakistan's administrative system unaltered. Despite the changes in the relative authority and power of given services within the bureaucracy attendant with the reforms, the organization of the bureaucracy into semi-functional occupational groups has persisted. Such redefined groups still manifest the characteristics of the services, which they replaced. An officer's promotional prospects, job type, and relative status are still determined preponderantly by group affiliation. Further, the role exercised by 'service' membership in defining the self-identity of individual officers has been mirrored in the functionally equivalent role exercised by 'group' membership. Finally, the relative rank order of group preferences for group membership closely accords with the previous rank-order for service membership.
However, importantly, the reforms have not modified the contextual importance of the cadre system to the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan. The reforms have not significantly modified the belief among relevant bureaucratic actors that some form of cadre system of organization is necessary. A pertinent example was the formation of the Economist and Planners Group in 1976, a new group with no earlier similar example in the pre-reform service structure. The formation of this group was designed to improve the relative standing of economists and ‘planners’ in the civil bureaucracy. It is important to note that such improvement is perceived as a necessary by product of cadre affiliation. Patently then, the reform did not challenge the nature of the cadre system and the prevailing relationships between members of different cadres. In short we can say that the reforms were designed to eliminate the statutory bases of inequality between cadres, not to modify the institutional functions performed by the cadre system.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

5 For a detailed analyses of the disturbances are found in: K. B. Sayeed, ‘Mass Urban Protests as Indicators of Political Change in Pakistan’, Journal of Commonwealth and

The establishment of the Services Reform Commission; in brief tenure of General Yahya Khan, proves the priority of his government.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 80.

The substantive provisions of this Regulation are identical to the provisions of Martial Law Regulation No. 58.

Pakistan Times, Lahore, 13, 14, 19, and 20 March 1972.


Bhutto has dubbed the CSP as naukarshahi, means servants of the monarch.


Pakistan Times, Lahore, August 21, 1973, There is considerable doubt as to whether the Administrative Reforms Committee, 1972, recommended all of the provisions of the reform as was stated in the press announcement of Khurshid Hassan Meer, Chairman of the Committee.


These figures were compiled by summing relevant data from Table 6.1 and combining it with Ralph Braibanti's listing of 'Major Administrative Inquiries' in Braibanti, op. cit., 1966, p. 215 and C. H. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 63. This exercise gives a combined estimate of the reports produced since 1947. This estimate does not include reports concerned primarily with other aspects of the administrative system of Pakistan, nor does it include works that were not 'officially Sanctioned' by the government.

No Official list of such documents has ever been published. However, Table 6.1 in conjunction with Braibanti's listing, op. cit., p. 215 and C. H. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 63, is the closest thing to such a compilation.

For Full citations of these reports see the list of selected bibliography on page No. 338.


26 In all, discounting cases of personal grievance, there were 1,051 petitions addressed to the Committee, in excess of 200 of these documents were official representations of service associations.

27 For the purpose of the analysis, only those service petitions written by service associations representing federal services were selected for inclusion. The sample was chosen from the Central Superior Services, the General Administrative Reserve, and the Central Class I Services. In each case, a content analysis of the relevant service petition was performed.

28 By ‘direction of reform’ is meant stances taken by service associations that are either identical to those adopted by the reform or which agree substantially with the reform. That is, if for a given issue the reform took Position A or B, a service association’s position would be said to be in the ‘direction of the reform’ if it advocated Position A or B, and conversely, it would be deemed to not be in the ‘direction of the reform’ if it took a stance advocating Position C or D.

29 As is clear from this treatment, two issues—Issue 9, the role of Head of Department versus Secretary and Issue 13, the status of the Establishment Division—do not fall neatly into any one category. The former issue substantively bears on the broader question of specialists versus generalists, but its treatment is inextricably linked with the relationship between services and the future role of the CSP. That is, generalist dominance by the premier generalist cadre, the CSP. Similarly, Issue 13 ostensibly falls under the rubric of ‘personnel administration and training,’ but it is also linked to the alleged dominance of the CSP officers in the Establishment Division.

30 *Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation on August 20, 1973, “Implementation of Administrative Reforms”,* (Government of Pakistan, Administrative Reform Cell, Establishment Division, 1975.

31 The Government later issued an Ordinance No. III of 1984 dated January 22, 1984, according to which the term ‘Grade’ is not to be used in the Civil Servants Act 1973, which has been amended accordingly.


33 CSP Association Rawalpindi, ‘Memorandum to the Services Reorganization Committee’, 1969.

34 Computed by author from data provided in CSP Association Rawalpindi, ‘Memorandum to the Services Reorganization Committee’, 1969.


37 Officers of the PFS also periodically underwent a separate training program at the Civil Service Academy.
There are a number of excellent accounts of the style of training at the Civil Service Academy. Among the best are R. Braibanti, *op. cit.*, 1969; and Nazim (Hassan Habib), *Babus, Brahmins and Bureaucrats: A Critique of Administrative System of Pakistan*. (Lahore: People’s Publishing House, 1973).

In 1971, 21 CSP officers were on deputation abroad.

C. H. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 211, see also the *Civil List*, 1971.

Quoted in A. I. Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

Z. A. Bhutto made announcement on August 20, 1973; the notifications introducing changes in the composition of, and rules governing the All-Pakistan Services were drawn on August 21, 1973.


Formed as per *Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division*, O. M. ‘N0. 3/2/75—ARC, May 31, 1975.


For the full procedures see the *Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1973*, S. R. O. 1498 (1) / 73, October 20, 1973.

This latter provision gave rise to a great deal of confusion and spawned it conceptually messy phenomenon of former CSP officers seeking lateral appointment to a group (Secretariat) to which they already belonged.


This latter provision was amended in 1976. During that year 100% of all Grade 17 direct recruits were assigned to the interdepartmental cadre while 23% of P and T and Postal Accounts officers were assigned to the interdepartmental cadre. This amendment served to consolidate the Accounts Group. Since that time “departments” serve only as divisions of training, *Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division*, O. M. No. 1/2/74—ARC, January 23, 1974 as amended by Establishment Division, O. M. No. 2/1/75, March 3, 1976.
56 Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O. M. No. 3/2/74- ARC, April 8, 1974.
57 Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O. M. No. 10/2/75- ARC, March 25, 1976.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

This research has analyzed the political and constitutional development and ascertained its impacts on the administrative system of Pakistan. The Civil Bureaucracy and the Administrative Reforms of 1973 were taken as a case study. The thesis of F. W. Riggs has been used as the theoretical framework of this study.

Riggs analyzed the role of civil bureaucracy in various political systems. According to him, a political system consists of its ‘constitutive system,’ ‘bureaucracy,’ and ‘head of state’. Constitutive system refers to an elected assembly, an electoral system, and a party system. According to his analysis, ‘constitutive system’ and ‘head of state’ collectively imply as the ‘political system’ and bureaucracy is a sub-system of a political system. However, for analytical purposes, we have treated these two factors separately. According to Riggs the role of civil bureaucracy is determined by the nature of the political system. He also divides political systems into two categories, i.e. the ‘balanced’ and the ‘unbalanced’ polities. Riggs observes that when a reasonable and lasting balance of power exists between civil bureaucracy and a constitutive system is a ‘balanced polity’, and an ‘unbalanced polity’ may be a party-run polity, or a bureaucratic polity, dominated by its civil bureaucracy. In party-run polities, political spoils, including the appointment of party workers to important positions in the bureaus and departments. Riggs argues that though party politics may strengthen political organization, but they reduce the effective performance of the administration, while their spoils systems reduce the legitimacy of the political system. In a bureaucratic polity the civil bureaucracy controls the
powers of the constitutive system and the head of state. In this type of system, civil bureaucracy exercises the dominating role in policy making and as well as policy execution. Therefore, Riggs argued that an imbalance exists in the transitional societies between political policy making institutions and bureaucratic policy implementing structures and such an imbalance typically favors bureaucracy. The political function "tends to be appropriated, in considerable measure, by bureaucrats." Riggs identifies such regimes 'bureaucratic politics, and argues that the existence of a strong modern bureaucracy in a political system characterized by weak representative institutions, hinders political and constitutional development and nullifies its impacts on administrative system. In such system bureaucracy cannot be effective and responsible and thus, administrative reforms cannot be carried out.

On the basis of the above discussion, we developed and tested the following propositions, that:

I. Political and Constitutional development results in administrative changes in the administrative system and the Civil Bureaucracy in Pakistan played a major role in policy making, due to the weakness of representative institutions.

II. The Bureaucratic dominance hindered political and constitutional development and the growth of representative institutions in Pakistan.

III. The Civil Bureaucracy in Pakistan was not responsive to the administrative reforms. Particularly to the reform
policies pursued by the regime if affected its own status, prestige and privileges.

IV. The Administrative reforms introduced by a ‘Representative Regimes’ have greater impacts and possibility of implementation then those introduced by the ‘Non Representative Regimes’.

In the following paragraphs we conclude our research findings in an effort to determine if the propositions developed are valid and we also ascertained the impacts of political and constitutional developments on the administrative system of Pakistan.

In the study of political and constitutional development during the British Colonial period, we examined the different phases of political and constitutional development. Through this study it became evident that the process of political and constitutional development during the colonial period was slow and was unidirectional; that is to perpetuate the control of the colonial masters. However, in the later period particularly from 1857, some sort of policy of conciliation and apparent association was adopted by the Colonial Masters to accommodate the basic demands of the Indian masses.

The study determined that a disproportionate relationship between political and constitutional development existed and its impact on the administrative system were highly visible. Despite, the administrative reforms, introduced during the colonial era were meant only to enhance the control of the government on the civil bureaucracy still it was able to bring impacts on the administrative restructure, recruitment and training.
The study and analysis of the political and constitutional development in Pakistan from 1947 till 1958, has demonstrated clearly that the colonialism had tremendous impacts on the development of representative institutions in the Indian Sub-Continent. After the independence, the efforts of Muhammad Ali Jinnah to frame a constitution were failed and after his death, the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan further reduced the hopes of framing a constitution for the country. The civil bureaucracy since was the most organized institution at that time and it gradually captured the powers and the country turned into a 'Bureaucratic Polity'. The constitution which was then in practice was the Act of 1935, (with slight modifications), that best suited the interest of the bureaucratic elite and therefore, it hindered the process of political and constitutional development. Although during this period a number of Administrative Reform Commissions were formed which also submitted lengthy reports but none was implemented, because their implementation would have drastic impacts on the power, privileges and prestige of the civil bureaucracy. During the same period a number of prime ministers were removed by the Governor Generals / Presidents. The Constitution of 1956 was adopted and abrogated within two years by the same regime, although the basic structure of the Constitution of 1956 was not much different from Government of India Act 1935.

The second aspect was that the Muslim politicians, in pre-independence days could not acquire much experience in the art of government because of the lack of disciplined political parties in the legislature. Moreover, the masses were not permitted by the colonial ruler to exercise their franchise. Following the independence politicians were unable to perform their proper functions. The Muslim League Party, which dominated the political life of
Pakistan after independence, failed to deal with various critical issues like language, the role of religion in the new state, provincial autonomy and political representation of the regions or provinces in the central legislature. The same regional discontented aspirations ultimately led to dawn fall of the Muslim League. The disintegration of the League gave rise to several smaller parties which created an unstable political situation in Pakistan. The facade of parliamentary politics finally culminated in the advent of military dictatorship in 1958. In our analysis we also found out that the dominant position of the West Pakistan in civil bureaucracy controlled all the policy making process. The then prevailing circumstances suited the civil bureaucracy and therefore it maintained the status quo.

In our analysis and discussion of the General Ayub Khan era (1958-69), we identified that political parties in Pakistan were not allowed to function and the first rank political leadership was disqualified through (EBDO) Elected Bodies Disqualification Order, 1959. Finally, our analysis has demonstrated that political parties in Pakistan were not allowed to satisfy Huntington’s criteria of institutionalization, i.e., adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. The vacuum which was created due to the failure of the political parties and the whims of the bureaucratic leadership, that was ruling the country at the time were fulfilled without any negligible hindrance.

General Ayub gave his own constitution and introduced the Basic Democracies System which was administratively again managed by the civil bureaucracy. Elections were held but through an Electoral College. As we have seen, that the Constitution of 1962 was an attempt to institutionalize the one man rule by replacing the Parliamentary system to the Presidential one. It was a highly centralized constitution in which parties failed to articulate
and aggregate the interests of the various groups and regions. The quasi federal system had two federating unites on the basis of the Principle of Parity (One-Unite) was highly irrational and repugnant to vary nature of the multiethnic state, like Pakistan.

President Ayub also failed to impose controls on the civil bureaucracy because of his dependency on it to achieve of socio-economic development and modernization and run the Basic Democracy System. The bureaucracy looked upon General Ayub Khan's rule as its golden period. But as partners in autocracy it had to share the blame for its failures. The experiment of controlled democracy failed to prepare the people for democracy. In fact, it arrested a genuine growth of politics. There was a little freedom for the growth of a genuine political system. Whatever little politics was allowed it veered round the towering and authoritarian personality of General Ayub Khan. The political system was also linked with the person of General Ayub Khan to permit its Continuity. The system and the party, which he had created, crumbled to the dust after his fall. General Ayub Khan thus left a political vacuum.

We also analyzed that the policies of Martial Law Regime give rise to polarization between the both the wings. The resentment against the One-Unite, which perpetuated the unjust distribution of resources and share in the bureaucracy and government, ultimately turned into a mass movement and General Ayub Khan was replaced with another military leader General Yahya Khan. He introduced Legal Framework Order 1969, dissolved the One-Unite into four federating unites of the West Pakistan. General Yahya Khan also held General Elections in 1970 on adult suffrage. As a result of the elections, Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujib, swept the polls in the
East Pakistan and emerged as the largest political party in the National Assembly and was legitimised to form the government. The civil bureaucracy with the connivance of army and the feudal elite in the West Pakistan did not allow the transfer of powers to the East Pakistan. Subsequently the developments led to the civil war. The army action further aggravated the situation and the war with India culminated into separation of the East Pakistan. The resultant conclusion is that the civil and military bureaucracy wanted to perpetuate their control on the government and was not ready to share the power with others.

It is clear from the above analysis that an imbalance in fact existed not only in the political and administrative sectors but also in the economic sector. These fundamental differences had tremendous impacts upon political and constitutional development in Pakistan.

Our analysis also proved that Muslim politicians in pre-independence days could not acquire much experience in the art of government because of the absence of disciplined parties in the legislature. Moreover, the masses were not permitted by the colonial power to exercise their franchise, to elect responsible, broadly representative parties. Politicians after independence failed to perform their proper, traditional functions. In the first decade of independence, Pakistan experienced a high level of political instability caused by the shifting allegiance of politicians from one party to the other. The Muslim League, which dominated the politics of independence of Pakistan, after independence, failed to deal with various critical issues like language, the role of Islam in the new state of Pakistan, and political representation in the federal legislature. The failure of the League to deal with these issues led to its downfall. Its disintegration led to the development
of several smaller parties, which in turn created an unstable political situation in Pakistan. Thus political parties in Pakistan did indeed fail to provide stability for the system. The façade of parliamentary politics finally culminated in the advent of military dictatorship in 1958. During the Ayub regime (1958-69) political parties in Pakistan were not allowed to function independently. The constitution, which President Ayub introduced in 1962, was an attempt to institutionalize one-man rule, based on a "controlled" National Assembly that could only discuss and debate and had no control of the purse. Political parties failed to work independently. Finally, our analysis points out that political parties in Pakistan failed to satisfy Huntington’s four criteria of institutionalization, i.e.; adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Therefore, it can be said without hesitation that the pace of political development in Pakistan was very slow.

The analysis has also determined that political parties in Pakistan failed to impose controls on the civil bureaucracy because of the absence of effective structure and organization. As discussed earlier that the political parties in Pakistan failed to function the way they operate in Western democratic countries. They also failed to aggregate the interests of various groups and to educate the public regarding the critical issues. Politics was focused upon personalities rather then issues. Moreover, political parties in Pakistan could not act independently because of the legal restrictions imposed on their activities. The legal system, specifically the Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code, gave enormous discretionary powers to the civil bureaucracy. For example, Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code gave the district magistrate discretionary powers to control public meetings and to confiscate leaflets or pamphlets which contained writings hostile to the
government of the day and Section 144 the Criminal Procedure Code gave powers to disperse the assembly of more than five people. Finally, the advent of the military in politics in 1958 reduced the power of politicians and increased the powers of civil bureaucracy.

It was also demonstrated clearly that the heads of state after 1951 till 1971 were members of either the civil or military bureaucracy, who had little regard for the conventions of the parliamentary system. The dismissal of the Nazimuddin cabinet by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed is a case in this regard. Similarly Iskandar Mirza was also skeptical about the functioning of parliamentary democracy. He was mainly responsible for the unstable political situation which existed before the promulgation of martial law in 1958. Meanwhile, the absence of strong, effective interest organizations also increased the power of the civil bureaucracy. Therefore, it can be said that representative institutions like political parties, legislature, and electoral systems generally failed to impose controls on the civil bureaucracy. It is noted that the heads of state after 1951 were members of either the civil or military bureaucracy. These elites could also be blamed for the poor functioning of representative institutions in Pakistan. Bureaucracy, however, is not the main cause of the weakness of representative institutions. More important by far are factors like the impact of colonialism and the problems of pluralistic society, which militated against the development of representative institutions in Pakistan. Indeed, one could argue that bureaucracy itself performed certain more subtle representative functions.

This study also analyzed the circumstances in which Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was given the reign of the country. The rule of Bhutto is characterized as the first elected government (Representative Polity), in the history of Pakistan.
Bhutto restored the parliamentary form of government and gave the country the first consensus constitution, the Constitution of 1973, which was framed by an elected parliament. And Bhutto's regime was the first that introduced and implemented the administrative reforms in the administrative system to control the civil bureaucracy. The Administrative Reform of 1973 is the most remarkable contribution of the regime. Our proposition is supported that reforms introduced by the representative regimes, which successfully brought greater impacts on the administrative system, particularly, in the Civil Bureaucracy, then non representative regimes. In the reform history of the country these reforms were able to influence the power, privileges and prestige of the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan, especially of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP).

In our study of the administrative development in Pakistan, it was revealed that the civil service is a legacy of the colonial rule of the pre-partition Indian Civil Service (ICS). Several characteristics of its predecessor's, like exclusiveness and elitism were retained by the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). Our analysis also made it clear that representative institutions failed to impose adequate controls on the civil bureaucracy. As a consequence functions typically exercised by elected political elites tended to be monopolized by the civil bureaucracy. This was clearly apparent in the case of budget formulation. Legislatures in Pakistan failed to review the budget recommendations of the administration properly and thereby failed to influence policy matters. During the period 1952-58, central and provincial legislatures in Pakistan did not function properly for about five years because they were either prorogued or dissolved by the Governor-General. The Governor-General enacted the budget by executive order without
referring to the legislature. Even when the budget was presented in the legislature during those infrequent periods when it was allowed to function, its members took little interest in reviewing the recommendations. However, the constitutions of 1956 and 1962 limited the powers of the legislature with respect to certain expenditures. The weak position of the legislature also stemmed from the ineffectiveness of the electoral system, and weakness of political parties. Consequently, legislatures in Pakistan were unable to impose controls on the civil bureaucracy.

We also discussed and analyzed that the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan resisted certain administrative reforms, particularly the reforms that directly susceptible to its status, privileges and prestige. The study proved that the commission reports by Rowland Egger 1953, Bernard Gladieux 1955, and Justice Cornelius Commission, 1962 (the Pay and Services Commission) were resisted by members of the Civil Service of Pakistan because they criticized the traditional ethos of the civil bureaucracy and recommended vital structural changes. Egger and Gladieux criticized both the organizational and personnel systems. They were also highly critical of the secretariat system in which both politicians and technocrats were prisoners of the civil bureaucracy. The report of the Pay and Services Commission was also resisted for implementation because it tried to replace the CSP with a Pakistan Administrative Services, which also would have been included both the generalists and the technicians. A proposal like this clearly threatened the elite status and exclusiveness of members of the Civil Service of Pakistan. The most impotent aspect is that all these Commissions were formed by the non-Representative ruling elite, the civil and military bureaucracy of Pakistan. Despite the excellent recommendations, none was
implemented to reform the administrative system, because implementation of these recommendations would have been tantamount of loss of power, privileges and prestige of the civil and military bureaucracy, and thus, how would the cat bell itself?

In this context the administrative reforms of 1973 has been highly significant in the turbulent history of the country. These administrative reforms were the first of its kinds which were formulated and implemented by a representative regime. This aspect of success of the reform supports our fourth proposition that the Administrative reforms introduced by a ‘Representative Regimes’ have greater impacts and implementation-ability then those introduced by the ‘Non Representative Regimes’. This also supports Riggs thesis that a bureaucratic polity hinders political and constitutional reforms.

One of the basic reasons for the earlier administrative reforms could not have been implemented is that the most of the reforms commissions either were headed by the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP) or had a high proportion of representation of CSP officers, and thus, were formulated by the civil bureaucracy themselves. The implementation was again at the whims of the civil bureaucracy. Therefore, the reforms were implemented only to the extent that it did not affect their power and prestige, specifically that Civil Services of Pakistan. In the contrast the administrative reforms of 1973 were formulated and implemented by the representatives of people and the government which was elected through a general election on the basis of one man vote. Therefore, it also supports our proposition that political and constitutional development brings impacts on the administrative system; however, this statement can not be generalized.
On the other hand, our findings also indicate that other reforms which did not affect or promoted the interest of the civil bureaucracy were carried out successfully. For example the reforms suggested by the Administrative Reorganization Committee, Provincial Administration Commission, and the Administrative Training Council were implemented. The Administrative Reorganization Committee suggested a number of structural and procedural changes, including the introduction of the Section Officer System in the secretariat, changes in the system of financial control, and the creation of an Economic Pool intended to include officers selected to serve the Ministry of Industries as well. These reforms were implemented without resistance from the CSP officers. Moreover, the civil bureaucracy also accommodated other administrative changes brought about by the consolidation of West Pakistan into one unit. Further the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan proved its effectiveness by undertaking rural works programs.

In short, our analysis proved that the civil bureaucracy only resisted the reforms that would have affected its power, prestige and privileges and supported the reforms that would not have any adverse effect on its position. But Riggs' model does not accommodate such circumstances. However, our findings support Riggs' generalization to the extent that the administrative reforms that might affect the interests of the civil bureaucracy cannot be carried out in a bureaucratic polity.

In our study it was also identified that the policy announced in August 1973 was based on a number of administrative reforms commissions, which laid the foundation of the intellectual groundwork. We analyzed that the purpose of the administrative reforms of 1973 was to disestablish the cadre system of the civil bureaucracy, the system, which was introduced by the British rulers
and continued in Pakistan with nominal modifications. According to Bhutto the motive underlying such disestablishment was to weaken the bureaucratic resistance specifically the resistance of the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP) for administrative and economic reforms to be pursued by the regime.\(^3\)

Our analysis ascertained that the process of administrative reform in Pakistan has been intensely a political phenomenon. Even the administrative reforms proposed in 1973 were not the reflection of the deliberations for an effective public administration. In fact, the reforms were designed to reduce the obstacles of the civil bureaucracy for socio-economic change. As claimed by the regime that the service reforms of 1973 constituted ‘revolutionary’ departures from the prevailing system of bureaucratic organization in Pakistan, is not correct. However, the impacts of the reforms were highly significant in the history of Pakistan in the context of its implementation.

The immediate impacts of the implementation of the administrative reforms of 1973 were that it drastically changed the cadres of the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP), which are briefly mentioned in the following: -

I. The Civil Bureaucracy of Pakistan (CSP) was abolished and its membership was distributed into the newly-created District Management Group, Tribal Areas Group, and the Secretariat Group.

II. The practice of designating non-CSP officers as ‘listed post holders’ in the All-Pakistan Services was abolished.

III. The century-old practice of the reservation of posts for members of the CSP and other elite services was discontinued.
IV. The domain of the All-Pakistan Services newly-constituted as the All-Pakistan Unified Grade; was expanded to include a majority of non-CSP and non-PSP officers.

V. The former Accounts services (PAAS, PMAS, and PRAS) were merged into one group to form the Accounts Group.

VI. The composition of the Pakistan Foreign Services (PFS) was greatly modified and expanded to form the Foreign Affairs Group (FAG).

VII. The abolition of the CSP Academy and a joint training system was introduced.

VIII. It adopted of a uniform scales of pay which eliminated the financial advantage of the CSP in salary structure;

IX. The reforms also introduction the system of ‘lateral recruitment’ that reduced the monopoly of services membership in the civil bureaucracy.

In each of these instances the cadre system as it was inherited from the British, and as it developed in Pakistan since Partition, was significantly modified. And the ‘elite of the elite’ was watered down by an expansion of the size of the respective cadre and a simultaneous decline in the relative proportion of former service membership in the newly constituted occupational groups. Considering the impermeable nature of the cadre system, such modifications were indeed revolutionary.

Our study also made it evident that despite the above mentioned affects the overall scheme of Pakistan’s administrative system remained unaltered. For example the relative authority and power of given services within the
bureaucracy, the organization of the bureaucracy into semi-functional occupational groups has persisted. Such redefined groups still manifest the characteristics of the services, which they replaced. An officer's promotional prospects, job description, and relative status are still determined strongly by the group affiliation. Further, the role exercised by 'service' membership in defining the self-identity of individual officers can be visualized in the functionally equivalent role exercised by 'group' membership. Finally, the relative rank order of group preferences for group membership closely accords with the previous rank-order for service membership.

The reforms did not modify the contextual importance of the cadre system to the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan. A pertinent example was the formation of the Economist and Planners Group in 1976, a new group with no earlier similar example in the pre-reform service structure. The formation of this group was designed to improve the relative standing of economists and 'planners' in the civil bureaucracy. It is important to note that such improvement is perceived as a necessary by product of cadre affiliation. Obviously, the reform failed to challenge the nature of the cadre system and the prevailing relationships between members of different cadres. In short we can say that the reforms were designed to eliminate the statutory bases of inequality among the cadres, not to modify the institutional functions performed by the cadre system.

An important basis of assessment of a reform is to find out that whether it has removed such barriers, which had been obstructing social, economic or political progress. Such barriers are created sometimes by the various designs of vested interests and sometimes they are created automatically in societies which lack a healthy infrastructure for self-appraisal and self-
criticism. These barriers become stronger in suitable time and climate until reform or a revolution depending upon the rigidity and strength of the barriers and the political consciousness of the people to remove them. Once the barriers have been removed it becomes possible to advance towards the ideals of social justice. This is a crucial stage in progress. The degree of achievement, of course, depends upon the speed of advancement in the prevailing circumstances and the dynamics of history. The Administrative Reforms removed many such barriers. Except for barriers in society created by socio-economic disparity as a result of feudal and colonial-domination for centuries, there is hardly any barrier now in the civil service for entry and advancement of talented citizens to serve the people. At least in theory there is no privileged class in the services and no reservation of posts for them. There is ample provision for vertical and horizontal mobility in all cadres of the civil services. Professionalism, specialization, and all kinds of scholarship, which was often at a discount in the pre-Reforms era, are now gaining more and more importance. Occupational or functional groups have been created but they are different from the privileged classes of the old system in many respects. These groups are open to all qualified people. There is no closed elite now. The present system tends to provide equal opportunity of advancement for all.

The administrative reforms were confined mainly to one sector of administration of the civil service. They can therefore be termed as Civil Service Reforms rather than Administrative Reforms. In certain respects the position of the civil service was weakened e.g., the main provisions regarding the civil service do not have constitutional support as before and are contained in the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The procedure for disciplinary
action against civil servants has also been made easier which can create some sense of insecurity in the civil service. The implementation of the Reforms was often faulty and inadequate and some of the objectives were not achieved. In spite of these and other drawbacks, the Reforms were an important landmark in the evolution of the civil service in Pakistan. It was for the first time that a serious attempt was made towards integration of the services, which had previously been proposed in one way or the other by many experts, Pakistani as well as foreign, who had studied the structure of the civil service.

The Civil Bureaucracy in Pakistan has played a preponderant role in policy-making, especially in the area of economic policy-making. The reasons for administrative dominance are due in the main to retention of the colonial structure of administration and the weakness of representative institutions. The central secretariat was the wheel of all central government activities where all administrative policies emerged, took their final shape, and were passed down to the heads of operational departments for execution. All decisions of the government, both policy and administration, originated as a result of “elaborate staff consideration within the secretariat which serves as the almost exclusive channel of advice to the Ministers.”

Most important posts in the secretariat like Secretary, Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary, deputy Secretary, Under-Secretary, and Section Officer were held by members of the Civil Service of Pakistan. These officials also occupied most important posts in the cabinet secretariat, Planning Commission, National Economic Council, and government corporations.

Our analysis indicates that civil bureaucracy played an important role in the formulation of economic policies. The Five Year Plans which outlined the
main economic policies of the government were prepared by civil servants and economists in the Planning Commission, Economic Affairs Division and the Ministry of Finance. Such plans were never submitted to the legislature for prior approval. The final authority for approval was the National Economic Council, but its review of the plan was only symbolic because it was difficult for members of the council to pass expert judgments on complex issues and programs. The real power was exercised by the Ministry of Finance, the Economic Affairs Division and the Planning Commission, all of which were dominated by members of the civil service. In sum, our analysis supports Riggs central thesis to the effect that in an 'unbalanced polity', i.e., one in which representative institutions are weak, domination by the civil bureaucracy, will tend to occur.

Finally, we analyzed the level of Pakistan's national administrative development in terms of Huntington's criteria of institutionalization—adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence—and concluded that the level of administrative development in Pakistan was quite high, compared to its level of political and constitutional development. Our analysis of political and administrative development shows that an imbalance did in fact exist between political and constitutional and administrative development in Pakistan. The civil bureaucracy in Pakistan was over developed and more organized institution as compared to others, more specifically political the institutions.

In sum, our analysis makes it clear that the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan exercised a preponderant role in policy-making, due mainly to the weakness of representative institution our findings support Riggs' view that 'the political function tends to be appropriated, in considerable measure, by
bureaucrats in a polity with weak political institutions. However, the success of administrative reforms does not depend absolutely on the nature of the political system, as Riggs argues, but as noted above on certain key variables like the nature of reform, the values of reformers, and the values of administrators, timing of the reforms, and the political leadership.

Our findings, however, do not support Riggs’ view that, administrative reforms cannot be carried out in a bureaucratic polity; to be successful, the reform must be seen by the crucial decision-makers in the bureaucratic elite as either desirable in terms of their personal values and institutional interests. Desirable reforms include those enhancing the efficiency or effectiveness of the civil bureaucracy without threatening the status and privileges. These institutional interests appeared to be more important in general than the class interests of the bureaucratic elite, though regional interests sometimes were significant as discussed.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


APPENDICES
APPENDIX - A

PROVINCES, DIVISIONS AND DISTRICTS OF PAKISTAN DURING 1973-1977

Territorially the Province of Punjab is divided into 8 Divisions and 27 Districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS</th>
<th>DISTRICTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Territorially the Province of Sind is divided into 3 Divisions, and 15 Districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS</th>
<th>DISTRICTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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Territorially the **Province of N.W.F.P** is divided into 5 Divisions and 13 Districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS</th>
<th>DISTRICTS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. PESHAWAR</td>
<td>1. Peshawar 2. Mardan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. KOHAT</td>
<td>1. Kohat 2. Karak</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Territorially the **Province of Balochistan** is divided into 4 Divisions, 17 Districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISIONS</th>
<th>DISTRICTS</th>
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# APPENDIX - B

## LIST OF SUBJECTS FOR THE CENTRAL SUPERIOR SERVICES EXAMINATION FOR WRITTEN EXAMINATION

### COMPULSORY SUBJECTS (600 MARKS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. NO.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Essay</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>General Knowledge:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paper I  Every Day Science</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Paper II Current Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paper III Pakistan Affairs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Islamiyat</td>
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</table>

a. The Non-Muslim candidates have the option either to take Islamiyat as one of the compulsory subject or otherwise Pakistan Affairs (G.K. Paper-III) will be treat of 200 marks in their case and half of the total marks obtained by them in the paper on Pakistan Affairs (G.K. Paper-III) will be counted in lieu of Islamiyat.

b. A candidate who does not appear in any compulsory paper will not be allowed to appear in the remaining papers of the Examination.

### OPTIONAL SUBJECTS (600 MARKS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. NO.</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>6.</td>
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</table>

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