MUSLIM POLITICS AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS
IN THE PUNJAB 1932-1942

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This thesis is presented to Islamia University Bahawalpur
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the Degree of Ph.D. in History
I hereby declare that this thesis is a result of my individual efforts and that I will not submit this thesis to any other University for any Degree whatsoever.

Muhammad Arshad
I dedicate this work to the memory of

my father

Late Abdul Rahim
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ABSTRACT

In the present study, political, economic, social and religious conditions of the Punjab had been traced since 1849 to serve as a background to the forthcoming chapters which discuss the politics and political movements of the Punjab from 1932 to 1942. A study of various agitational campaigns of the Majlis Ahrar-i-Islami, along with the background inception and objectives of the organisation, have been discussed evaluating their activities. It is followed by description and analysis of the Shahidganj movement since 1935. How the various parties and groups reacted to the movement and what was the impact of the movement upon them have also been discussed. Khaksar Movement of Allama Mashraqi has also been dwelt upon discussing its basis, nature, objectives, and ways and means adopted to achieve these objectives followed by an evaluation of the movement and its leader. Among the political parties, the roles of the Unionist Party and Punjab Provincial Muslim League have been discussed. The tussle between the leaders of the Punjab Provincial Muslims League and the Unionists and the relationship between the Unionist Muslims and the All India Muslim League is also a subject of study. In the last chapter the demand of Pakistan at the Lahore session of All India Muslim League in March 1940 and the efforts to popularise it among the Muslim masses in the Punjab on part of local Muslim politicians as well students up to 1942 have been discussed preceded by an exposition of some of proposals put forward by prominent Muslims from the Punjab including Allama Muhammad Iqbal. In the conclusion it is asserted that the reactions to the happenings of the decade starting from 1932 in the Punjab culminated in the demand and popularity of Pakistan movement in a limited span of a few years.
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I am grateful to my supervisor Professor Dr. Muhammad Khurshid who had constantly been encouraging me and took pains in going through the draft minutely pointing out many a mistake and lapses and giving valuable suggestions despite his busy schedule. During the collection of material from a variety of sources I got full co-operation particularly at National Documentation Centre (Islamabad), National Archives of Pakistan, NIHCR, Quaid-i-Azam University Library, Punjab Archives (Lahore), Lahore Museum Library, Punjab Public Library, Dayal Singh Public Library, Research Society of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Library, Punjab University Library and N. D. Hasan Library Cadet College, Hasanabdal. I am thankful to all the officers and staff of these sources of knowledge and learning. Apart from them, among the individuals who helped me in the collection of material, my thanks are due to Professor Khalid Hamayun (Oriental College, Lahore), Khawaja Abdul Hamid Nasir (Sialkot), Raja Sher Zaman (Rawalpindi), Irshad Hussain Qidwai (Karachi) and Mr. Sohail (Hasanabdal).

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My special thanks are due to my mother, my wife and children for they generously allowed me to devote the time to this study which belonged to them.
PREFACE

In British India the Punjab was the largest Muslim majority province. The British were very conscious of its special importance because of its tremendous agricultural resources and manpower. No proposal for establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent was feasible without its inclusion. That is why Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah never ignored the importance of the Punjab in All-India politics.

Very few writings on the Muslim Punjab of British period have appeared so far. Quib-i-Abid's is a good attempt but his work could not afford extensive and detailed analysis of the events because a comparatively long period of twenty-eight years had to be covered. He also not aimed at a detailed discussion about the movements like Shaheedgunj, Khaksars and Majlis-i-Ahrar.

On Shaheedgunj movement, a thesis for MA was written as far back as 1971. During the last twenty-three years a number of resources have been made available which could not be utilized by the author. The author was not allowed to have access to Civil and Military Gazette and she had to depend mostly upon the material available in the files of Inqulab.

No work of objective and real scholarship has been rendered on Khaksar movement and Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam except Aslam Malik's very recently published biography of Allama Mashraqi which is a comprehensive study of its kind but the book, as a biography, covers the whole life of Allama Mashraqi from 1888 till Mashraqi's death in 1963, a span of some 76 years and the period from 1932 to 1942 naturally formed a small part of the book. Secondly, the study has been made in isolation with other contemporary movements like the movements of
Shaheedgunj mosque and the Ahrar. Most of the other writers who paid attention to these movements were either followers and participants of the movements or deeply influenced by the leadership.

Some biographies of important personalities like Fazal-i-Hussain, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, Barkat Ali and Sikandar Hayat have been written. Politics of some political parties of the Punjab have also drawn attention of some writers.

The aim of our present study, however, is to give an extensive and all-inclusive analysis of Muslim politics and political movements of the Punjab covering a period from 1932 to 1942.

This period of the British Punjab enjoys a special importance from Muslim point of view because of certain reasons. Communal Award was issued in 1932 which was a prelude to the Act of 1935. Because of the introduction of provincial autonomy, the strings of politics in the Punjab were to be woven around it for the years to come. At the beginning of this decade tumultuous movements like Khaksars and Majlis-i-Ahrar appeared on the scene which influenced not only the politics of the Punjab but that of the whole sub-continent and in this very period these movements faced a rapid decline. The movement of Shaheedgunj was also started and met its ultimate in this decade. Second World War started in this period and the importance of the Punjab was tremendously enhanced for the British because of their war considerations. Re-organization of All India Muslim League was started by Muhammad Ali Jinnah in this decade and the Muslim League passed its famous Lahore Resolution demanding a separate homeland for Indian Muslims of which the Punjab was to be a vital part. Again it was during the
last two years of this decade that Pakistan movement took roots in the Punjab and succeeded eventually.

- In the present study, first chapter has been included as an introduction studying socio-economic, religious and political conditions existed in the Punjab since the British occupation of the Punjab in 1849. Second chapter deals with the Ahrar and their agitational campaigns discussing and evaluating their strong and weak points. Next chapter comprises a study of the movement for restoration of the Shaheedganj mosque and the attitude of various groups or parties to it. In the fourth chapter, Khaksar movement has been discussed at length since its inception upto 1942. The chapter is concluded with an evaluation of the movement and the role of its founder, Allama Mashraqi. The fifth chapter deals with the Muslim politics since the Communal Award and introduction of provincial autonomy in the Punjab. Relationship between the Muslim Punjab and the Muslim politics at centre forms a part of the chapter. In the last chapter, discussing some of the important proposals for the division of India presented by some prominent Punjabi Muslims, we come to the Lahore Resolution of 1940 which ultimately resulted in the establishment of Pakistan. This chapter also includes the contribution of Punjab Muslim Students' Federation, Punjab Provincial Muslim League and position of Sikandar Hayat vis-à-vis the demand of Pakistan. The study is concluded with the assertion that the long cherished urge for freedom, the sense of political subjugation, economic deprivation and the injured religious feelings — all found expression in the demand of Pakistan, making it popular among the masses within limited period of time under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah who enjoyed full confidence of Muslim India.
CHAPTER I

THE PUNJAB SINCE 1849: AN INTRODUCTION
SOCIO-GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE OF THE PUNJAB SINCE 1849

The Punjab had been the cradle of civilisations since the ancient times. The world famous Indus Valley Civilisation and the Early Vedic culture flourished here. The Buddhism reached its zenith in this region. It was annexed to the Gaznavide Empire in 1022 AD. It was the strongest defence line against the Mongol hordes during the reign of Balban and later Delhi sultans. It lost the political and strategic importance that it enjoyed during the sultanate period though Mughal emperors had been visiting and staying in the Punjab from time to time and they also built some of their greatest master pieces of architecture here like Lahore fort, Shahi Mosque, Shalimar gardens etc. Even in later period, the Punjab was destined to be the home of Sikhism. The Sikhs had been a spiritual group but the 6th guru Har Gobind Singh started organising the Sikhs as a military force. Later the ninth guru Tegh Bahadur revolted against the Mughal rule, suffered defeats and was killed.

Before the occupation of the Punjab by the British, there had been a period of Sikhashahi covering about half a century since 1799. During these years the Sikhs were the only privileged class and for all others there prevailed
nothing but tyranny and oppression. Mutilation and heavy fines were the common punishments for the poor and the rich respectively. Therefore, when the British occupied the Punjab they were considered by the Muslims as emancipators. In the Second Sikh War the British had a decisive victory, as a result of which Lord Dalhousie proclaimed the annexation of the Punjab on March 29, 1849. In the beginning administration was entrusted to a board of three commissioners two of whom were Sir Henry Lawrence and his brother John Lawrence (1811-1879). Within a period of three years law and order was restored in the province by disarming the people and construction of fortresses along the frontier. Means of communication and transport were developed. New codes of criminal and civil procedure were drawn up. After having developed serious difference of opinion with his brother regarding administrative policy towards the Sikh aristocracy, Sir Henry Lawrence was removed, the Board was abolished and John Lawrence was appointed as the first chief Commissioner of the whole Punjab in 1853. When the Punjab was given the status of an Indian province in 1859, John Lawrence became its first Lieutenant Governor. In 1901, the entire north-western region beyond Indus was separated from the Punjab to constitute NWFP. Delhi was made a part of the Punjab after the War of 1857 but in 1911 it was separated again when it became the capital. In 1931, total area of the Punjab was 99,265 Sq. Miles.

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3 Ibid., p. 518.
The province was divided into four natural divisions with reference to physical and climatic features: Indo-Gangetic Plain West, the Himalayan Area, the Sub-Himalayan Area and the North West Dry Area. To run the administration effectively, the province was divided into five administrative divisions each headed by a commissioner. Divisions were further divided into twenty-nine districts under Deputy Commissioners. The basic unit in the hierarchy was a village. About one thousand villages were grouped under each district. Tehsil headed by a tehsildar was another administrative unit between a village and a district containing approximately 150 villages. At lower levels there were lamberdars (the village headman) and zaildars (head of a zail containing 10 to 30 villages). In all cases, zaildars happened to be local landowners loyal to the government.

Because of development work and other factors, there was a marked change in the percentage of urbanization and literacy in the decade 1921-31 as compared with earlier decades, having its political, religious and economic implications (See the graphs on the next two pages). According to 1931 census the Muslims of the Punjab formed 56.54%; the Hindus 26.83%; the Sikhs 12.99%; the Christians 1.74% of the total population and other tiny communities formed 1.9% of it.  

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5 Census of India 1931, pp. 3-4. The physical features indicated through these names may extend into other provinces or states crossing the administrative boundaries of the Punjab.
6 Ibid., p. 2.
7 Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj (New Delhi, 1988), p. 35.
8 Census of India 1931, p. 291.
GRAPH SHOWING A MARKED INCREASE IN LITERACY IN THE PUNJAB IN 1921-31 AS COMPARED WITH EARLIER DECADES

NUMBER OF LITERATE PER MILLION (AGE 15 YEARS & OVER)

YEARS

1901 1911 1921 1931
THE GRAPH SHOWING A MARKED INCREASE IN URBANISATION IN THE PUNJAB IN 1921-31 AS COMPARED WITH EARLIER DECADES
### TABLE NO. 1

**TOTAL POPULATION OF DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES IN THE PUNJAB IN 1931 IN THOUSANDS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>13,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>6,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>3,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Census of India 1931, p. 291.*

Among the Muslims 95.62% were the *Sunnis*, 2.27% were the *Shias*, 1.22% were *Ahl-i-Hadith*, and 0.38% were the *Ahmadis*.

Drastic changes with far-reaching economic, social and political effects took place after the annexation of the Punjab. The government undertook the projects of extending old roads constructing new ones and building a network of railway tracks. Lord Dalhousie had himself drawn the first map of important track lines and most of the track lines were built according to that plan. As the Punjab was basically an agricultural province, the British not only renovated and

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9 Census of India 1931, p.313 (This percentage also includes Muslim population of Punjab states). In the census the Ahmadis were listed as a sect of the Muslims. For details see infra, pp. 21-25.
extended old canals but also constructed the World's largest splendid system of new canals.

Bari Doab Canal was remodelled and restored. It was finally opened in 1873. In 1886 Sidhnai canal was built. Lower Chanab canal was opened in 1893. Gujranwala, Shaikhupura, Layalpur (Faisalabad) and Jhang districts were irrigated by these canals. Bari Doab canal and Chanab canal alone irrigated areas of 856041 acres and 1748129 acres respectively in 1901-1902. Many other large and small canal projects were completed. As a result large areas of barren land in Jhang, Lyalpur and Shahpur districts were brought under cultivation. By 1937, 47% of the total cultivated area of the Punjab was irrigated by these canals.12

With that, the process of building agricultural colonies commenced which continued even up to 1940s. Newly irrigated land was laid into regularly shaped plots called squares and in later colonies, rectangles. At suitable places, villages, market sights etc. were planned on both sides of the roads

13 Ian Talbot, *op. cit* p.39.
and railway tracks.\textsuperscript{13} Sidhnai colony in Multan and Sohag Para colony in Montgomery were completed between 1886-1888. Chanab colony covering the districts of Gujranwala, Jhang, Lyallpur, Lahore, and Sheikhupura was completed in two phases between 1892-1905 and 1926-1930. Other important colonies were Jhelum, Lower Bari Doab, Upper Jhelum and Nili Bar. The work on the later was started in 1923 and it was not completed by 1940s.\textsuperscript{14} Colonisation released the pressure of population over densely populated Eastern districts because most of the abadars settled in the canal colonies were drawn from eastern region of the province.\textsuperscript{15} Generally the Government preferred for settlement the peasants and yeomen (sufaidpush) for grant of land who could themselves work on their small land holdings but there were capitalist grants to reward the rais and nawabs who had been usefully loyal to the British. There was at least one example of making a grant of 7,800 acres to a single person Baba Sir Khan Singh Bedi as he exercised considerable influence over the Sikh community because of his claim to be the descendant of Baba Guru Nanak (1469-1538), the founder of Sikh religion. There were also


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 9.

\textsuperscript{15} Gazetteer of the Chenab colony (Lahore, 1905), p.29.
horse-breeding grants in some colonies. To encourage the martial races, retired army officers were offered squares of land on very attractive terms.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE PUNJAB

For the British the Punjab assumed a special importance out of all proportion to its population and size because of its immense agricultural resources and its significant contribution to the army. The perennial canal schemes were classified as profitable projects. Abhara (water charges), land revenue and different types of cesses were the sources of income form the canals. Lower Chanab Canal provided a net profit of Rs. 11,574,000 in 1915-16 which further increased to Rs. 17,805,000 in 1925-26. Lower Jhelum Canal earned a net profit of Rs. 2,763,000 in 1915-16, which increased by 42% within ten years. Most of other canal schemes also earned significant profits. Apart from the

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18 Imran, op.cit., p. 163.
19 Upper Jhelum canal was an exception which suffered a loss. Ibid., p. 167.
revenues, agricultural production from the areas watered by the canals had its own importance. Up till the 1920s Punjab was capable of producing 33% of wheat and 10% of total cotton produce of the British India. Overall increase of its per capita crops production was about 45% between 1891 and 1921.20 Thus the Punjab rightly assumed the title of “the granary of the sub-continent”.21

Punjab also excelled all other provinces in its contribution to British army which made it even more important in the eyes of the British. When the First World War started, half of the British army was constituted by the Punjab soldiers i.e., 2,50,000.22 According to one estimate, among them 1,90,078 were the Punjabi Muslims.23

20 Talbot, op.cit., p. 39.
21 Ibid., p. 38.
22 Ibid, p. 41.
### TABLE NO 2

**SHARE OF THE PUNJAB IN ARMY RECRUITMENT**

**DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL RECRUITMENT</th>
<th>RECRUITMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IN BRITISH INDIA</td>
<td>FROM THE PUNJAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,04,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1,86,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>3,17,000</td>
<td>1,34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,28,000</td>
<td>3,29,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Punjabis fought in France, Gallipole, Egypt, Somaliland, Africa, Syria, Mesopotamia and Persia and were decorated with three Victoria Cross and 22 Military Cross in addition to the jagirs and special pensions. During the war army lost 2.6% of the total men enrolled and the Punjabis

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equally shared the burden of casualties by sacrificing the same percentage of their own enrolment.  

Land Alienation Act

Keeping in view the strategic importance of the people of this region, Land Alienation Act was passed to prevent the transfer of land from cultivators to the money-lenders against the debt taken by the former. In pre-British period the proprietary rights of land in villages belonged to the "community and not to the individuals." The land being a community property, the money-lender could not hold it against debt, and the cultivator could return the debt whenever he had surplus. But after annexation the land settlement resulted in individual proprietary rights and the influence of community was considerably reduced. Secondly, the prosperity following the restoration of peace and order, and opening of canals development projects undertaken by the British administration, the land-owning class became used to an extravagant way of life. Large sums were borrowed on marriages and other occasions. During lean years, the landowner had to borrow to pay the land revenue and to

24 Ahmad Saleem, op. cit., p. 453.
maintain their improved standard of life since they had no savings because of their extravagance.\(^{27}\) Rise of prices of agricultural production had naturally resulted in the rise of price of land and the landowners started borrowing more freely and had more temptation to sell or mortgage a part of his land to get money or to pay the debt incurring heavy interest.\(^{28}\)

Under these conditions transfer of cultivable land from agriculturists to the money-lenders was increasing over the years at an alarming rate.\(^ {29}\) This was specially causing concern in the British administration because the army was largely recruited from the Punjab's land-owning classes and the Government could not afford discontentment among them. In response to this situation the Government passed Land Alienation Act in 1900 to arrest the process of land alienation.\(^{30}\)

One important feature of the situation was the fact that almost all the money-lenders were Hindus and Sikhs and more

\(^{27}\) For the rise in standard of life see Darling, op.cit., pp.136-141. Alluding to the extravagance in eating habits of the Punjabis Darling refers to a Multan proverb see p. 138.

\(^{28}\) Darling, op.cit., p. 172-73.

\(^{29}\) For a table showing this fact see Sharma, Punjab in Ferman, p. 30.

\(^{30}\) Sri Ram Sharma, op.cit., p.34.
than half of the total debt was incurred by the Muslims. Naturally, the Muslims appreciated the Act whereas the Hindus protested against it. Later in 1901 when the list of agricultural tribes was published there was no evidence of any special favour done to any religious community including Muslims. But rural-urban division was encouraged by the Act.

MUSLIMS' BACKWARDNESS IN EDUCATION AND UNDER-REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES

Educationally the Punjab was backward as compared with other provinces. Literacy ratio of the Muslims was lower than the other communities of the province. In 1871-72 only 34.9% of Muslim children of school-going age were at schools and in a period of ten years i.e., by 1881-82 it increased only by 3.3% to make it 38.2%.33 According to 1891 census, literate Muslim males were 2.25% against 9.44% Hindus and 7.64% Sikhs.34 While analysing the status of the Muslim education during 1897-1902, the Fourth Quinquennial Review expressed

31 Darling, op. cit., p.19.
its dissatisfaction over the progress of Muslim education.³⁵ The percentage of Muslim pupils compared with total pupils in the year 1891-92 was 73%, which further decreased to 21.6% in 1901-1902.³⁶ Government College, Lahore was established in 1864 which prepared students for F.A. and B.A. examinations of the Calcutta University because there was no university in the Punjab.³⁷ Punjab University, established in 1882, produced its first Muslim post graduate, Pirzada Muhammad Hussain, in 1883.³⁸ In 1886 Aitchison College Lahore was founded with the admission restricted to the sons of a few rural elite of the province. It aimed at creating an educated class among the landlords with strong sense of loyalty to the British.³⁹ The Muslims were badly under-represented in government services. In 1876, when a survey of Muslim employment was conducted by the Punjab Director of Public Instruction, the Muslims asserted that the Government should stick to its known policy of distributing the government posts equally between the Hindus and the Muslims. However, the Government denied the existence of any such policy.⁴⁰

³⁶ Ibid., p. 254.
³⁹ Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, p. 57.
At the appointment of Hunter Education Commission in 1881, once again the Muslims were denied any special privileges on the basis of their backwardness and the government blamed that the Muslims themselves are responsible for their under-representation in employment. Communal representation in the government services was again discussed by the Aitchison Public Service Commission in 1886. Both Hindus and Muslims presented their cases very enthusiastically. Lieutenant Governor, James B. Lyall (1887-1892) realised the necessity to shift the policy in favour of the Muslims to maintain peace and ensure loyalty of the "warlike" Muslims. The new policy, however, was not made public and the officers were instructed to use "tact and caution" to balance the two communities.\(^{41}\) In 1899, when S.S. Thorburn became Financial Commissioner he devised a program to raise the number of the Muslims in executive and judicial posts aiming at striking a balance between the two communities.\(^{42}\) But the later statistics show that it was not proved effective.\(^{43}\)

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\(^{42}\) Ibid., 256.

In the pre-British Punjab the Muslims had monopoly in the field of education as Persian continued to be the court language under the Sikhs. The Muslims retained this domination in the first decade of the British rule. According to the first report on education published in 1856-57 by the education department of the Punjab, the Muslims still monopolised the teaching profession. Sir Arnold, an officer of education department, asserted that the Muslim domination in teaching profession should be curtailed. In 1860-61 there were as many as 334 Muslim teachers against 111 Hindus and six others. Again the District Education officers were instructed by the Director of Education to encourage the Hindus to join as teachers to strike a right balance.

Earnestly, following this policy, the Government, on the one hand, reduced the number of Muslim teachers in general education and on the other, the English schools established at district headquarters were handed over solely to the non-Muslims. Hence a list of 23 Headmasters of District schools had only three Muslims. In 1871 at the college level there were only 13 Muslims against 84 non-Muslims. Within twenty-five years the Muslim element was eradicated from education

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45 Syed Tufail Ahmad, Mulsaimanavan ka rathan mustaqbil (Delhi, 1945), pp.173-74.
46 Ibid. P.174.
47 Zarina, op.cit., p.11.
department and up to 1890 almost all the inspectors and
teachers were Hindus.\(^48\) According to the figures collected by
the *Paisa Akhbar*, at one time in the telegraph department
there were 455 persons working on various posts. Among them
two were Muslims.\(^49\) Eight years later, among 116 persons
working in different grades in the office of Post-Master
General Punjab, only 28 were Muslims.\(^50\) The position was not
very different in Judiciary, Railway, law, local self-
government and other departments.

\[\text{BEGINNING OF RELIGIOUS ANTAGONISM}\]

In the second half of the 19\(^{th}\) century there emerged a
number of Hindu revivalist movements in the sub-continent. In
Bengal, Ram Mohan Roy (1774-1833) founded Brahma Samaj in
1828, which was further developed and re-organised by
Debenbhranath Tagore (1817-1842) and Kesnub Chandera Sen
(1838-1884).\(^51\) Brahma samaj was founded in Lahore in 1863 by

\(^{48}\) Syed Tufail Ahmad, *loc cit.*

\(^{49}\) *Paisa Akhbar*, April 15, 1910, p. 2.

\(^{50}\) *Ibid.*, February 13, 1918, p.5 cited by Ahmad Saeed, *Tebrk-e-Pakistan Muashi aur Muasharti tanazir
main.*, p. 42.

\(^{51}\) For details of internal schisms within the samaj see Abdullah Yousof Ali, *Ahngraiz ahd main Hundustan kay
tamazun ki tarikh* (Karachi, 1967), pp. 191-196, 263-265. For the ideas and teachings of founders of Brahma
some Bengalis but later in the 1880 Lajput Rai (1856-1928), Pandit Guru Dutt, Munshi Ram, and Lala Sain Das of Lahore Brahm Samaj joined a more militant organisation, Arya Samaj which was founded in Bombay in 1875 by Sawami Dayananda Saraswati (1824-1883) and two years later its headquarters were shifted to Lahore. Dayananda believed in one God, infallibility of the Vedas and transmigration of soul. He was a strong advocate of Hindi language and protection of the cow. He initiated a violent criticism against other faiths particularly Islam, Christianity and Sikhism using derogatory and abusive language. Maha murakh (great fool) was his favourite phrase for his opponents. In his book, Satyarat Prakash published in 1875, he violently attacked Islam, Quran, and the Holy Prophet The tone set by Dayananda was followed more zealously by his followers like Lekhram. Apart from publication of literature, Arya Samajis often emulated

samaj see Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed. Sources of Indian Tradition (New York. 1958), vol. II, pp.21-37, 52-75.

52 Nina Puri, op. cit., p. 184. Original name of Dayananda was Mul Shanker, Saini, op. cit., p. 91.

53 Ibid., p. 92; “The Arya Samaj in the Punjab” Supplement to Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, No. 5, February 2, 1929, p. 49. For ten basic principles of Arya Samaj see P. N. Chopra, ed., India’s Struggle for Freedom: Role of Associated Movements (Delhi, 1985), Vol. II, pp. 275-76.


55 His remarks are too insulting and abusive to be reproduced at any length by the present writer. For some of rather "mild" remarks see Police Abstracts of Intelligence, Punjab, February 2, 1929 but to have a real idea of how he hurled the most vitriolic abuses at Allah Almighty, the Holy Prophet of Islam and the Holy Quran see his actual words from Satyarat Prakash quoted by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Kitab al-Bariyya (Qadyan, 1898), pp. 120-123.
the Christian missionaries' technique of street-corner preaching and addressing the people at railway stations and other public places. The topics of their lectures were often aggressive.57

Christian missionaries did not lag behind the Arya Samaji militants. Rather they were the pioneers to set the tradition of using objectionable language about Islam and the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him). The Government was openly supporting the missionary activity, had granted 2000 acres of irrigated land in Chunian to Church Missionary Society. Within a decade a network of mission centres was spread in the Punjab. According to an estimate the Christian missionaries published in the sub-continent at least 60 million copies of various books to refute religions other than Christianity during the second half of the 19th century. Half of them must have been deployed against Islam.58 One of these was Ummahat al-Mumineen published in 1897 by a Christian Ahmad Shah about the wives of the Holy Prophet. The most infuriating thing about this publication was that its

56 Lekhram's assassination in 1897 resulted in increased Hindu-Muslim tension and violence. See infra, pp. 35-35.
57 Talbot, op. cit., p. 72. Moulvi Muhammad Saeed in his reminiscences refers to a typical example of one Pundit Budh Dev who addressed the villagers on "Whether the Vedas or the Quran is a Revealed Book?" The author sees no harm if the Pundit had addressed on a topic like "The Vedas are Revealed Scriptures". Muhammad Saeed, Aakah-e-Bazgush (Islamabad, 1989), p. 51.
one thousand copies were sent without demand, and free of charge, to prominent ulema and important Muslim personalities. The missionaries also used the churches, Bible societies, mission schools and hospitals to propagate against Islam.

MUSLIM RESPONSE TO HINDU AND CHRISTIAN MILITANCY

In the wake of growing Hindu and Christian militancy, backwardness in education and exclusion from government services, the Muslims found themselves insecure and responded with the establishment of various organisations to defend their interests and to improve themselves as a community. Anjaman-e-Islamia Lahore was the first important Muslim organisation established in 1869. Though its main aim was limited to the repair of the Badshahi mosque, yet it came forward to safeguard the Muslims interest in general and grew into the most important organisation of the Muslims. It was

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58 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Faryad-e-Dard (Qadyan, 1922), p. 39. For some of the examples of their extremely vitriolic criticism see: Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Kitab al-Baryyu (Qadyan, 1898), pp. 104-131.
60 Muhammad Ayub Qadri, "Urdu main mazhabi adab," Urduimation, No. 51-52 (December, 1975), p. 60.
followed by Anjuman Islamia Amritsar in 1873. The next decade witnessed a large number of anjumans on the same pattern and in some cases the same name in almost every important town. Anjuman Hamayat-e-Islam, Lahore was established in 1884 to look after the interests of the Muslims. Its objectives were to answer the objections against Islam raised by the non-Muslims, to arrange for suitable education to the Muslim boys and girls specially the orphans and the needy so as to make them true Muslims and to improve social conditions of the Muslim community while promoting the feeling of harmony and friendship among different Muslim sects. The Anjuman did a great work for Muslim education by opening a large number of schools both for boys and girls. Later, Islamia College Lahore was established. Various books were compiled for children which soon became popular and were adopted as text books in Muslims schools all over the sub-continent. The Anjuman maintained orphanages, provided facilities for medical education (Tibbiya classes) and embroidery classes for girls. It also published literature and appointed preachers (muballigheen) to refute anti-Islam propaganda of missionaries and the Arya Samaj. It protested and submitted

63 Syed Razi Wasti, The Political Triangle in India 1858-1924 (Lahore, 1976), p. 27.
64 Ibid., pp. 29-36.
memorials to the government authorities against publication of Muhammad ki tawarikh ka ijmal by Father William and Ummahat al-Momineen by another Christian missionary. In fact, Anjuman Hamayat-e-Islam did the same for the Muslims of the Punjab which was done by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) in Northern India.

Another well-organised and effective response to the threats posed by the missionaries and the Arya Samaj came from the Ahmadiyya movement. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) of Qadian was the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement. (It had been a matter of controversy whether it was a sect within the pale of Islam or a separate religion but with the decision of the government and the National Assembly of Pakistan in 1974, declaring Ahamadiyya as non-Muslims, the controversy came to an end.) He was born in 1835 to Mirza Ghulam Murtaza rais of Qadian in Gurdaspur district. He got his primary education in Persian and Arabic at home and was employed in a court of Sialkot district in 1864. Since then he developed a special taste for religious studies and had discussions with Mr. Butler and other missionaries. After the death of his father, he devoted himself solely to the study of religion and wrote

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65 Syed Razi Wasti, The Political Triangle in India 1838-1924, p. 18. For more detail about Ummahat al-Momineen see supra p. 20.

his most important book *Burahin-e-Ahmadiyya* in four volumes. The first and second parts were published in 1880, the third part appeared in 1882 and the forth in 1884. Basically the book was aimed at establishing the superiority of the *Quran* over the *Vedas* etc and refuting the views of the *Arya Samaj*. It was appreciated for its originality and power of arguments.\(^{67}\) Maulavi Muhammad Hussain Batalvi, a famous Muslim scholar of *Ahl-e-Hadith* sect, considered the author of *Burahin* to be "the best defender of Islam since the demise of the Holy Prophet".\(^{68}\) In 1886 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had a debate on miracle of *shaq al-gamar* (the Spilt of the moon) of the Holy Prophet and authencity of the *Vedas* with Lala Murliidhar of Arya Samaj at Hushiarpur and published the debate, in the work *surma chashm-e-Arya* from Amritsar. A rejoinder to it from the *Arya samaj* was again answered by the author in *Shehna-e-Haq*. With the passage of time the conflict between the *Arya samaj* and the Muslims became more and more intense. Lekhram, a zealous follower of Dyananda, published anti-Islam literature. On 20\(^{th}\) February 1893 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad predicted that within six years Lekhram would meet a terrible misfortune (azab) as a punishment of his insulting remarks


and abuses to the Holy Prophet.\textsuperscript{69} Lekhram was assassinated on March 6, 1897. Ghulam Ahmad claimed that his prophecy of 1893 had come true whereas the Arya samajis accused him of conspiring against Lekhram. A search warrant was issued by the government and Ghulam Ahmad’s house was searched by the police but no proof of any conspiracy was found.\textsuperscript{70}

Reacting to the challenges posed by Christian and Arya Samaj missionaries was one aspect of the Ahmadiyya movement for which the founder became quite popular as defender of the faith even among the orthodox Muslims but this popularity was replaced by extreme denunciation when he claimed to receive revelation from Allah and in 1890 he announced that he was the ‘promised masih’. He further said that Jesus Christ had died and would never come back to this world contrary to the popular belief of the Christians and the orthodox Muslims and that it was he (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad) who was the Jesus incarnate.\textsuperscript{71} Moulvi Muhammad Hussain Batalvi was the first to denounce this claim. A number of books appeared refuting Ghulam Ahmad’s claim. In 1891 Muhammad Hussain Batalvi toured throughout India including Punjab, a fatwa (religious decree)


\textsuperscript{70} Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, \textit{Istafiat} (Qadian, 1897), pp. 1-2; \textit{The Ahmadiyya Sect: Notes on the Origin, Development and History of the Movement} (Lahore, 1938), pp. 1-2.
was issued against Ghulam Ahmad by the ulama of almost every sect\textsuperscript{72} and his popularity "plummeted to earth from the celestial heights".\textsuperscript{73} Though Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be a prophet (nabi and rasool) yet his meaning of these words were not clear even to his followers.\textsuperscript{74} Anyhow, his claim to be a prophet, the promised Massih and Mahdi was not generally accepted by the Muslims. His views of cancellation of Jihad were also very difficult to swallow for orthodox Muslims.\textsuperscript{75} In spite of stern opposition from the orthodox Muslims his movement continued to grow. He had started accepting an oath of allegiance (bai'at) from his followers since December, 1888. The ten conditions of the "bai'at" announced in January next year contained nothing against the established teachings and beliefs of Islam. In the census report of 1901 Ahmadis were listed as a separate Muslim sect at the request of its founder.\textsuperscript{77} After the death of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1908, Hakeem Nur-ud-din (d. 1914), his right-hand-man, succeeded him as Khalifa-tul-Masih. At his death in 1914, Mirza Bashir-ud-din (1889-1965), son of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was

\begin{footnotes}
\item[71] Abdul Qadir, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 75-76.
\item[73] Mirza Tahir Ahmad, \textit{loc. cit.}.
\item[76] Shaikh Abdul Qadir, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 70.
\item[77] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 224.
\end{footnotes}
elected as Khalifa-tul-Masih al-Thani. Moulvi Muhammad Ali developed differences with Bashir-ud-Din over the question of Khilafat. With some of his fellows he withdrew from Qadian and founded a new faction at Lahore under the name of Anjuman Isha’at-e-Islam. Mirza Bashir-ud-Din group declared that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet but his role was limited to interpret the laws laid down in the Holy Quran and that anybody who did not accept Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet of God was a non-believer whereas the Lahore faction considered him as a reformer rather than a prophet and, unlike the Ahmadis led by Bashir-ud-Din, put no restrictions on following non-Ahmadi Imams in congregational prayers and establishing matrimonial relations with non-Ahmadis.  

Campaign against the Ahmadiyya movement initiated by Muhammad Hussain Batalvi was joined by a majority of other ulema including Deoband and Bareilly schools of thought. Maulana Zafrar Ali Khan (1873-1956) and particularly the Ahrar devoted their energies to oppose both the factions of the Ahmadis.

Bitter criticism against Islam and the Holy Prophet, publication of poisonous literature, religious debates started by the Christian missionaries and further promoted by the Arya Samajis, establishment of anti-cow-killing

78 L.S. May, op. cit., pp. 157-158.
79 See infra, Chapter II, pp. 75 ff., 103-108
societies (which were very active against cow-slaughter) caused great bitterness between the Hindus and the Muslims and during the years 1883-1891 at least 15 serious Hindu-Muslim riots took place at Multan (1881), Ambala, Ludhiana, Hoshiarpur, Delhi (1886), Rohtak (1889), Isakhel (1893) and other places. The occurrence of a Hindu festival, Ramlila coincided with the mourning days of Muharram for the years 1885-1887 and in the most cases a riot ensued when a Muslim Muharram procession collided with a Hindu parade. Moreover, development of the means of communication and publication of newspapers spread the news of such incidents far and wide more rapidly than in the past. Sometimes, negligence, failure to take timely action or precautionary measures on the part of the administration also contributed to the extent and frequency of communal riots. It does not mean, however, that the administration deliberately encouraged communal problems as maintenance of peace and order was in their own colonial interest.

81 N. J. Barrier, “The Punjab Government and Communal Politics, 1870-1908,” in Iqram Ali Malik, ed. A Book of Readings on the History of the Punjab 1799-1947. (Lahore, 1985), pp. 247-48. Talbot says, through a quotation from the Army News, that “a couple of Hindu and eight or ten Mohammedan newspapers were fanning the flame of bigotry with their mischievous writings for monetary gains. Punjab and the Raj, p. 66. In fact the newspapers reflected the emotions and feelings of their respective communities. If because of such writings the papers were sold in larger number, as the Army News alleged, it shows that the atmosphere was already charged with such feelings as to make those writings sell.
There were also economic reasons that created antagonism among the different communities. Lawrence brothers adopted a strictly impartial policy to all communities. In 1881 when the Hunter Commission was appointed, both the communities submitted their memorials. Demands and counter demands were made and much communal tension was created specially because of Hindi-Urdu controversy. Again at the time of Aitchison Public Service Commission Hindu-Muslim tension increased, because each community demanded more rights and privileges against the others. The old policy of strict impartiality was changed by Lt. Governor James Lyall (1887-1892) who recommended that Muslims should have been given preference until the ratio of the Muslims in government services came closer to the ratio of their population. The Hindus who had been dominating every government department would naturally not be ready to lose their monopoly. Consequently it contributed to the rise of Hindu-Muslim antagonism to further heights.

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83 See supra., p. 16.
84 Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, pp. 67-68.
Constitutionally, the Punjab was less fortunate than any other province of India to have early constitutional reforms. The Indian Council Acts of 1861 and 1891 had been enforced in Madras Bombay and Bengal but the Punjab was denied this privilege till 1891 when a council was created with nine members, all of them being nominated (four British government officials and five Indian members). Only the Governor was empowered to convene and preside the meeting.\textsuperscript{85} Every legislative bill passed by the council could only be enforced as law after the approval of the Lt. Governor and the Governor General-in-Council. Some of the bills even required prior approval of the Governor General before its introduction to the council.\textsuperscript{86} Since its inception till 1909, the Punjab Council met only twenty-two times and during these meetings most of its business was carried out by the British members.\textsuperscript{87} According to Minto-Morley reforms of 1909, the Punjab Council was to be re-constituted with thirty members.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p.63.
\textsuperscript{87} Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, p. 63.
This was discrimination against the Punjab, as Assam having a population of one-third of Punjab’s, was to consist of the same number of members. The percentage of the elected members in the Punjab Council was also set at 15% against 53% in Bengal, 48% in Bombay, Madras and Eastern Bengal and 42% in U.P. The principle of separate electorate was accepted in the Minto-Morley reforms but it was not conceded to the Punjab Muslims. Moreover, unlike other provinces, Punjab Muslims were represented in the Imperial Council through nomination. “Contrary to the other provinces, the representative of landlords of the Punjab was also to be nominated.” In the absence of separate electorate, apprehensions of the Punjab Muslims proved true as in the elections of 1912 for eight elected seats only one Muslim candidate could succeed. Though the government nominated four Muslims to compensate but even then the Muslims got only five seats out of fifteen non-official seats, their population being 55%. Five went to the Hindus three to the Sikhs and two to the Europeans.  

In July 1916 fresh elections of the Punjab council were held. Mian Sir Fazl-I-Husain (1877-1936) succeeded without

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88 Azim Husain, Fazl-I-Husain A Political Biography (Bombay: 1946), pp. 75-76.
89 Paisa Akhbar, January 7, 1913 cited in Ikram Ali Malik, A Book of Readings, p. 295. Earlier in the elections of 1909, the Muslim candidates fortunately won all the three Municipality seats of the Punjab Council because
contest from the University seat. For this contest, Fazl-I-Husain, being a Muslim could get support of only three Hindu leaders out of thirty. All the rest refused to favour him despite their confession of his being "the best man." This shows the intensity of Hindu-Muslim antagonism in case of a Muslim leader who "was among the designers of Hindu-Muslim unity" and who only a few months later effectively contributed to the effort of Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) to bring about Lucknow Pact between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. At the provincial level, he himself was the President of Punjab Congress since 1913. He continued his political activities in the Punjab Council till the introduction of Mont-Ford reforms of 1919.

The Punjab was highly communal religiously and backward educationally (So far as the Muslims were concerned) but it was also far lagged behind other provinces in legislative progress and political activity. Indian National Congress established its branch in Lahore in the very year of its

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90 Azim Hussain, op. cit., p. 81.
92 Ibid.
93 This time his good fortune was with him, otherwise he had lost the elections in 1912.
94 Azim Husain, op. cit., p. 83.
inception. The Muslims at large were not attracted to the Congress. In the first Congress session, out of seventy-two delegates only two were the Muslims.  

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan forbade the Muslims from taking part in agitational politics of Indian National Congress. By the partition of Bengal and the ensuing Hindu agitation against it, the non-communal character of the Congress had vanished. The Muslims of the Punjab too did not show interest in its activities. Its annual sessions of 1902, 1903 and 1904 were not attended even by a single Muslim from the Punjab. During the Hindu agitation against the partition of Bengal, the Hindus also started a campaign to boycott the British made goods. Meanwhile John Morley (1838-1923), Secretary of State for India (1905-1910), announced that the government intended to expand the existing Legislative councils. The Muslims apprehended that their position in the expanded councils might become worse than that in 1892. On October 1, 1906 a delegation of thirty-five leading Muslims waited on the

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96 For Sir Syed’s point of view see his lectures on December 28, 1887 at Lucknow and March 16, 1888 at Meerut, included in Ismail Panipati, ed., Khutbat-i-Sir Syed (Lahore, 1973), Vol. II, pp. 3-52; Muhammad Imam Din Gujrati, Majmu’a Lectures—w-Speeches 1863-1898 (Lahore, 1900), lecture No. 48, 49; His letter to Badr-ud-Din Tayyibji (the then President of Indian National Congress) included in Ismail Panipati, ed., Maktoobat-i-Sir Syed (Lahore, 1976), vol. I, p. 143.
99 Mohammad Noman, Muslim India, (Allahabad, 1942), p. 70.
Viceroy Earl of Minto (1905-1910). Eight of the delegates belonged to the Punjab. The deputation demanded separate electorates for the Muslims and weightage in all elected bodies on the basis of their historical past and their contribution to the defence of the Empire. Having got a sympathetic reply from the Viceroy that the Muslims' rights would be safeguarded, the All India Muslim League was founded on December 30, 1906 in the last session of the Muhammadan Educational Conference. The name "Muslim League" given to this first Muslim Political organisation was proposed by Sir Mian Muhammad Shafi (1869-1932). In the Punjab Fazl-I-Husain had already established an organisation having the same name at Lahore in February 1906. In November 1907, Mian Shah Din (1868-1918) established a separate organisation "Punjab Muslim League", Mian Shah Din himself being the President and Shafi its General Secretary. As a result, at the Aligarn session of All India Muslim League (presided by Mian Shah Din, March 1908), Shafi and Fazl-I-Husain


101 For complete text of the address see B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India (Lahore, 1976), pp. 428-438.


103 Ibid., p.19; Azim Husain, op.cit., p. 96.
representing their respective 'provincial Muslim Leagues' proposed two separate lists for membership from the Punjab. Before the next sitting, however, the differences between the two groups were resolved and a mutually agreed list of twenty-two members was submitted. Mian Shah Din was elected as President, Shafi as General Secretary, and Fazl-I-Husain as Joint Secretary of Punjab Provincial Muslim League. The entente, however, could not last for more than two months. Before long Shafi became President and continued till 1916.

The aims and objectives of the Punjab Muslim League were set according to those of All India Muslim League which could be amended with at least two-third majority of the total members. Punjab Provincial Muslim League strived for solution of the problems faced by the Muslims for instance the issue of separate electorate, due share in educational institutions and other government services, and protection of Urdu language against Hindu movements in favour of Hindi. According to Land Alienation Act of 1900, transfer or

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104 Bashir Ahmad, Justice Shah Din: His Life and Writings, (Lahore, P.63), p. 48. For complete list of those who attended the inaugural meeting see Paise Akhbar, December 6, 1907 cited in Muhammad Anwar Amin, Punjab Tehrik-e-Pakistan main (Lahore, 1969), Part I, pp.49-50.


106 Jahan Ara Shahnawaz, op. cit., p. 27.

107 Azim Husain, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

mortgage of agricultural land to non-agriculturists was prohibited. Hindu Mahasbha and Indian National Congress were trying to get this act cancelled. The Punjab Provincial Muslim League, at its annual sessions, specially in 1909 and 1912, passed resolutions in favour of Muslim point of view regarding all these issues. It presented addresses to Lord Minto in 1909 at Lahore and Lord Baron Hardinge (1910-1916) in 1911, pleading the Muslims case and countering the demands of Hindu Mahasabha. It also published numerous articles in British newspapers, collected statistics about the Muslims' share in government services besides collecting some 350 thousand rupees for Muslim university fund.  

Like its parent organisation at centre, Punjab Muslim League believed in peaceful constitutional struggle to solve the political problems and condemned all sorts of seditious activities. The party became popular among the Muslims and within the short period of a couple of years as many as eighteen branches were organised at important places through out the province. The differences between Fazi-I-Husain (progressive group) and Shafi (conservative group), once subdued in 1908, reappeared under the changed political situation after 1911. At this stage provincial politics of the Punjab was mostly shaped under the influence of Muslim politics at centre.

After the annulment of partition of Bengal (so called "settled fact") the Muslims felt that they had been betrayed by the British and that the policy of loyalty could not have brought boons to them. Next year (1912) the Muslims were given another shock by the government when it finally refused to permit establishment of Muslim university. The failure of Muslim university movement was followed by the Cawnpur mosque incident (1913) which caused deep stirrings among the Muslims. The British anti-Turkish policies during the Italian attack on Tripoli and the Balkan wars also contributed to the isolation of the Indian Muslims from the British, leading to the revision of attitudes and policies.

In the Lucknow session of All India Muslim League (March 1913) "attainment of a system of self-government suitable to India" was adopted as the goal and ideal of the Muslim League.\footnote{Syed Razi Wasti, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 147.} It was a marked change in its policy of unconditional loyalty to the British government. This change of the creed enabled All India Muslim League to come closer to the Congress. In this situation, the progressive group of the Punjab leadership consisted of Chaudhari Sir Shahab-uddin (1865-1949), Pir Taj-ud-Din (1887-1954), Khalifa Shujah-
ud-Din (1867-1955) and Malik Barkat Ali (1886-1946) led by Fazl-I-Husain wanted to bring about a change in policies of the Punjab Muslim League on the same lines. In January 1916, the "progressive" group established a parallel provincial Muslim League and approached the All India Muslim League for its recognition. Shafi had already developed severe differences with All India Muslim League regarding its policy of co-operating with the Congress and isolation from the government, whereas the leaders of new Punjab Muslim League were in favour of new policy adopted at centre. As a result, the new Punjab Provincial Muslim League was recognised and the old Provincial Muslim League was disaffiliated. Mian Muhammad Shafi was also removed from the Vice-Presidency of the Central organisation. On December 31, 1916 Lucknow Pact was signed by All India Muslim League and the Congress on further constitutional reforms in India. According to the Pact the Congress conceded separate electorates for the Muslims. Weightage was also to be given to the minorities in the Legislatures. Punjab Muslims were allocated 50% seats in the provincial legislature. Though Shafi had been a staunch supporter of separate electorates, he opposed the Lucknow Pact. Dubbing the Pact as "the killing

111 Sharif-ud-din Pirzada, op. cit., pp. 279.
of the Muslim nation as a separate entity with our own hands,"\textsuperscript{114} he resigned from the membership of All India Muslim League in August 1917.\textsuperscript{115} On the other hand Fazl-I-Husain played an important part in bringing about the Pact.\textsuperscript{116} Having been elected as General Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League in early 1917, he held its meetings to support the Lucknow Pact and the Home Rule Movement.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{PUNJAB POLITICS AND MONTE-FORD REFORMS 1919-1930}

At the end of World War I there was a lot of discontent and restlessness among the people whose expectations for reward of their contribution to the War were extremely high. The Punjab shared this discontent as much as it had contributed to the War effort. Sir Michael O'Dwyer (1864-1940), the Governor of the Punjab (1913-1919), who adopted repressive measures during the War for forcible recruitments, opposed the introduction of further reforms particularly in the Punjab.\textsuperscript{118} The issue of Khilafat and passing of Rowlatt Bill also further aggravated the situation. Despite their moderate views and loyalty to the government all the three

\textsuperscript{114} Jahan Ara Shahnawaz, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{115} Azim Hussain, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{116} See supra, p. 30, f.n. 94.
\textsuperscript{117} Rafique Afzal, \textit{Malik Barkat Ali: His Life and Writings}, p. 7.
representatives of the Punjab in the Imperial Legislative Council, Sir Muhammad Shafi, Nawab Zulfigar Ali Khan (1873-1933) and Sunder Singh Majithea (1872-1941), opposed the Rowlatt Bill.\textsuperscript{119} Constantly increasing prices of wheat, rice, and other food grain was another factor adding to the turmoil.\textsuperscript{120} Punjab was thrown into the most violent agitation. Some political leaders like Duni Chand, Dr. Saif-ud-din Kitchlew (1888-1963) and Dr. Satya Pal (1884-1954) wanted to follow the program of passive resistance under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1860-1948). Though the government had notified that no procession could be taken out, the ban was violated. On April 6, in the meeting held in Bradlaugh Hall, Lahore, a resolution demanding repeal of Rowlatt Act was passed. Mian Fazl-i-Husain seconded the resolution but at the same time he tried, though in vain, to keep the movement within constitutional limits as he was not in favour of the course adopted by Gandhi. On the same day the movement was completely taken over by the extremist element. On the other hand O'Dawyer was adamant to suppress the agitation by sheer force. Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew were arrested. Gandhi’s entry in the Punjab was banned.\textsuperscript{121}


\textsuperscript{120} For detail of the rising prices see Brij Narain, \textit{India Before the Crisis} (Allahabad, 1935), pp. 254, 256. For graphs of the price hike \textit{ibid}. Plate Nos. 13 & 14

\textsuperscript{121} Azim Husain, \textit{Fazl-i-Husain A Political Biography} (Bombay, 1946), p. 116
This further worsened the situation. In Lahore and Amritsar complete hartal was observed and the business came to standstill. Absolute Hindu-Muslim unity was exhibited by drinking from the same cups and eating from the common langar khanas. Attempt to disperse the crowds caused several casualties.  

The worst happened at Jallianwala Bagh, Amritsar on April 13, where a crowd of 6000 to 10000 people was fired by General Dyer without warning, killing 300 to 600 persons according to varying estimates. Martial Law was imposed in five districts of the Punjab which was not completely withdrawn before August 25. As Fazl-i-Husain stated before the Hunter Committee, the Martial Law administration aimed at humiliating and disgracing the Indians rather than to secure peace. To give voice to the feelings of the people about the happenings in the Punjab, annual sessions of the Indian National Congress, the All India Muslim League and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind were held at Amritsar in December 1919. The All India Muslim League considered the reforms as "inadequate and unsatisfactory" yet

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122 Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain A Political Biography, p. 117.


126 Syed Tufail Ahmad, op. cit., p. 398.
“a definite step towards the goal of full responsible Government”. Hakim Ajmal Khan (1853-1927), in his presidential address said that “we are not likely to forget the deep agony caused by the occurrences of the Punjab and the events related to holy places, the Khilafat and Turkey, we would...make a united effort to make the reforms successful.”

Mont-ford reforms of 1919 established partially responsible governments in the Punjab along with seven other provinces of British India. Punjab Legislative Council was considerably enlarged. Out of 94 total seats (against 24 under 1909 reforms, with only five by election) 71 were to be filled through elections. Among these 71 members 44 were to be elected through separate electorates: 32 Muslims and 12 Sikhs. There were 20 general and seven special constituencies including four for landlords, one for the University and two for commerce etc. As in the reforms of 1909, landed interests were safeguarded by the government. Apart from four special seats of landlords, 27 out of 32 Muslim seats and 13 out of 20 non-Muslim seats (other than the Sikhs) were allocated to rural areas. In case of Sikhs, rural-urban

128 Ibid., p. 517.
contrast was even more prominent i.e., 11:1.\textsuperscript{130} Under the system of dyarchy introduced in the provinces, provincial departments were divided into 'reserved' and 'transferred'. Reserved subjects were to be headed by the members of the Executive Council, responsible not to the legislature but to the Governor directly. The transferred subjects were to be headed by the ministers responsible to the legislature.

First elections under the Mont-ford reforms were held in December 1920 during the tumultuous days of Non-Co-operation. Congress and urban Muslim leaders like Saifuddin Kitchlew and Malik Lal Khan (1890-1976) decided to boycott the elections, whereas Fazl-i-Husain and other rural Muslim leaders contested the elections.\textsuperscript{131} Having won the elections from a special seat of Muslim landlords, Fazl-i-Husain was appointed Minister of Education and Local Self-Government in January 1921. Lala Harkishan Lal (1864-1937) was also appointed as Minister of Agriculture on Fazl-i-Husain's request.\textsuperscript{132} Sardar Sundar Singh Majithia (1872-1941) was given a seat in the Executive Council, representing the Sikhs.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{131} Zarina Salamat, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 193-194.
\textsuperscript{132} Syed Noor Ahmad, \textit{Mian Fazl-i-Husain: A Review of His Life and Work} (Lahore, 1936), pp. 36, 38.
\textsuperscript{133} Khashwant Singh, \textit{A History of the Sikhs} (Delhi, 1987), Vol. 2, p. 224.
Fazl-i-Husain sincerely worked for the backward and downtrodden classes without any communal considerations. He introduced compulsory education, established new high schools, colleges and dispensaries, released the district boards, and municipal committees from the official control, granted loans to the peasants on low interest rates and established Panchayat system in the rural areas. Land Alienation Act was also amended to remove certain flaws and rates of revenue and abiana were decreased.\

The Muslims were under-represented in almost all government departments in the Punjab. As minister, Fazl-i-Husain adopted a policy of promoting the Muslims and other backward communities in department of education and local-self government and carried out certain reforms to ensure that all the under-represented communities including the Muslims should get their due share. The Hindus who enjoyed a dominating position up till now naturally resented these measures and launched a campaign against Fazl-i-Husain. In August 1922 a delegation of 22 non-Muslim members of the Council waited on the Governor who refused to get influenced by them. An intense campaign against Fazl-i-Husain by the

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135 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
Hindu press continued dubbing his policies as "mischievous".\textsuperscript{137} During the budget session of the Punjab Council, the Punjab Hindu Mahasabha moved a resolution against Fazl-i-Husain on March 13, 1923 for a cut in his salary, protesting against his policies as minister. At this stage the Council was divided on purely communal basis and the motion was defeated by 50 to 23. Out of 50 members voting against the motion only three were non-Muslims: Harkishan Lal, Sundar Singh Majithia and a nominated Christian Ralia Ram.\textsuperscript{138} Despite all opposition from the Hindus Fazl-i-Husain continued his policies and took another step of reconstituting the municipal committees with re-distribution of seats among various communities on the basis of their respective population. In case of Lahore municipal committee, out of 32 seats 17 were allotted to the Muslims and 11 to the Hindus and two to the Sikhs under the new system, whereas before 1923 Muslims were given only nine seats out of 22 in total, their population being 55 % and the Hindus enjoyed a privilege of having eight seats while the Sikhs got only one.\textsuperscript{139} Being unable to prevent this move, Hindu members of the Lahore, Rawalpindi, Ferozpur and Ambala municipal


\textsuperscript{138} Zarina Salamat, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 223-225.

committees resigned.\textsuperscript{140} Fazl-i-Husain was bitterly criticized by the Hindu members of the Punjab Council. Hindu press raised hue and cry. On the other hand Muslim members of the Council, Muslim press and Muslim organizations appreciated his policy. Hindu-Muslim tension reached its heights and Hindu-Muslim riots took place in the province during 1922-1929.\textsuperscript{141}

By the end of 1923 Gandhi had suspended the Non-Co-operation and Fazl-i-Husain had organised a Rural bloc or Rural Party which was converted into Punjab National Unionist Party when second elections to the Punjab Council were held and new Punjab Council came into being with a definite communal tinge. Punjab National Unionist Party was established by Fazl-i-Husain in December 1923\textsuperscript{142} on non-communal basis to safeguard common rural interests. Majority of the members were Muslims but there was a Hindu element including the Rajputs of Ambala division and the Jats of Rohtak who were being exploited by the moneylenders.\textsuperscript{143} According to an estimate the Jats formed about 50\% of the

\textsuperscript{140} S. Qalb-i-Abid, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 77; S. C. Mittal, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 197-198.

\textsuperscript{141} It was mostly in the post-Khilafat period.

\textsuperscript{142} Muhammad Khurshid, "Fazl-i-Husain", p. 100.

\textsuperscript{143} Ian Talbot, \textit{Punjab and the Raj}, p. 55. Feroze Khan Noon relates an incident of disgrace suffered by Chhotu Ram at a moneylender’s house in Rohtak where he had to go during his childhood with his father who was a petty cultivator. Feroze Khan Noon, \textit{Chashmeed} (Lahore, 1974), p. 148.
notified agricultural population of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{144} The aim of the Unionist Party was to assist backward classes and communities without any consideration to caste or creed.\textsuperscript{145}

Now the fact that Fazl-i-Husain enjoyed the support of 39 members belonging to the Unionist Party helped the Governor to reappoint Fazl-i-Husain as minister for another term against all hopes of the Hindus to get rid of him in the Second Council.\textsuperscript{146} From among the Jats of Rohtak Lal Chand, a unionist, was appointed as minister of agriculture but, being disqualified as a result of a petition against him for electoral malpractice, the new governor Sir Malcolm Haily (1872-1969) replaced him with Sir Chhotu Ram (1881-1945), one of the founder members of Unionist Party, again to the great disappointment and resentment of Urban Hindus who had recommended Narendra Nath for ministership.\textsuperscript{147} Haily, however, changed his attitude towards Fazl-i-Husain when the later got Shaikh Sir Abdul Qadir (1874-1950) elected as President of the Punjab Legislative Council in place of Mr. H. A. Casson whom Haily wished to be re-elected for the same office after


\textsuperscript{145} Azim Husain, op. cit., p. 151.

\textsuperscript{146} Zarina Salamat, op. cit., pp. 228-229.

expiry of his term.\textsuperscript{148} Hindu opposition to Fazl-i-Husain and his policies also continued. In August 1925 when Fazl-i-Husain was temporarily sent to the Viceroy’s Council at center, the Hindus had “a sigh of relief”\textsuperscript{149}. When he came back to the Punjab in January 1926, the Governor offered him to work as Revenue Member which, being a reserved subject, was considered to be of lesser importance. In the changed circumstances of post-Khilafat days Fazl-i-Husain accepted the offer and worked as Revenue Member till spring 1930 except for two short intervals in 1927 when he when represented India in the League of Nations and in 1929 when he again occupied temporarily a seat in the Governor General’s Executive Council.\textsuperscript{150}

In November 1926 third elections of the reformed Punjab Council were held. This time Unionist Party could not do as well as it did in the second elections. Chhotu Ram, who occupied the Ministry of Education and Local Self-government after Fazl-i-Husain’s departure for the Viceroy’s Council, was replaced by Manohar Lal (b.1879), an Urban Hindu who tried his best to undo the work of Fazl-i-Husain in the


\textsuperscript{149} The Tribune, August 26, 1925 cited in S. Qalb-i-Abid, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{150} Syed Noor Ahmad, \textit{Mian Fazl-i-Husain: A Review of His Life and Work}, pp. 84, 86-87.
Ministry. Sardar Sir Jogandera Singh (1877-1946) was made Minister of Agriculture to alienate a group of Sikhs from the Unionist Party. These changes carried out by Haliy, aimed at weakening of the Unionist Party. There was no Muslim minister in the Punjab Council before the appointment of Feroze Khan Noon (1893-1970), in January 1927 as minister of Local Self-government.

KHILAFAT MOVEMENT IN THE PUNJAB

The formation of First Reformed Council of the Punjab coincided with the tumultuous period of Khilafat and Non-Co-operation movements. The Ottoman Sultan of Turkey was considered the caliph of the whole Islamic World. Ottoman claim to the caliphate was further strengthened in India when the British got a letter from the Ottoman caliph advising Tipu Sultan not to co-operate with the French against the British. Later during the War of 1857 the British obtained a decree from the Sultan declaring that it was not lawful for the Indian Muslims to take part in the war against the

153 S. Qalb-i-Abid, op. cit., p. 92
Towards the end of 19th century the Ottoman Empire declined. During World War I Turkey fought on the side of Germany. In order to get their co-operation during the war, the British promised the Indian Muslims that they would respect the institution of caliphate and the political integrity of Turkey. At the end of the war, a large part of the Ottoman Empire was occupied by the Allies and it was apprehended that Turkey might be divided among the Allies and that the British would not respect their promises to the Indian Muslims. Since the Ottoman caliph was also the guardian of the scared places of Islam such as Makkah, Madina and Bait-ul-Maqdas, the integrity of Turkish Empire was very important to the Islamic world particularly the Indian Muslims who had contributed a lot to the war effort hoping that the British would keep their promises about Turkey. Under these circumstances the Indian Muslims organised the Khilafat Movement. Khilafat Committee was established in March 1919 in Bombay.156

Khilafat and Non-co-operation movements remained in low profile in the Punjab because the province had undergone the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy and the subsequent repressive

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155 Syed Tufail Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 272-273

measures of the Martial law. However, it did not keep it aloof altogether. Khilafat Day was observed on October 27, 1919. First Khilafat Committee in the Punjab was founded in Amritsar in November 1919. In December, 1919 Fazl-i-Husain presided a public meeting in Lahore, attended by Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and other prominent Muslim leaders. Allama Iqbal put forward a resolution to remind David Lloyd George (1863-1945), the British Prime Minister (1916-1922), of his assurances about Turkey. Later, however, moderate leaders like Allama Iqbal and Fazl-i-Husain withdrew their active support to the Khilafat Committee when the Committee devised and adopted an aggressive programme of Non-Co-operation based on Hindu-Muslim unity. After the first session of Khilafat Conference on November 22, 1919 in Delhi, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind was established and its first session was held on December 28, 1919-January 1, 1920 at Amritsar under the presidency of Maulana Qayamuddin Abdul Bari Firangi Mahali (1878-1926). At the same time the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League also held their annual sessions at Amritsar. The Congress extended

157 Zarina Salamat, op. cit., p. 86.
158 Javed Iqbal, Zinda Rod (Lahore, 1989), p. 408.
159 Ibid., pp. 409-410.
its favour to the Muslims on the issue of Khilafat.\textsuperscript{161} The All India Muslim League expressed its deep concern over the issue of Khilafat and future of the holy places and resolved that the Muslims were fully justified "to carry on all the possible methods of constitutional agitation...including a boycott of the British Army if it is likely to be used ...for anti-Islamic purposes."\textsuperscript{162} However, Khilafat Committee, with its strong and emotional programme of Non-Co-operation soon eclipsed All India Muslim League which being more sedate "continued to stick to the old "methods of constitutional agitation".\textsuperscript{163}

A delegation consisted of 77 Hindu and Muslim leaders of all shades ranging from Gandhi to Moulvi Abdul Karim Fazl al-Haq (1873-1962) waited upon the Viceroy on January 19, 1920. From the Punjab Dr. Kitchlew, Agha Muhammad Safdar Qizilbash, Mirza Yakub Beg, Moulvi Ghulam Mohayyuddin (1880-1963), Maulana Muhammad Sanaullah (1868-1948) and Muhammad Ali of Lahore (Head of Lahore faction of Ahmadiyya movement) were included.\textsuperscript{164} It demanded that the integrity of Turkey must not be affected. The delegation got a polite but disappointing

\textsuperscript{161} Zarina Salamat, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{162} Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. II, p. 537.
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Ibid.}
reply from the Viceroy.\textsuperscript{165} Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar (1878-1931) led a delegation of the Khilafat Conference to England to see the British Prime Minister Lloyd George but failed to get any concession for Turkey.\textsuperscript{166} Allama Iqbal who had developed differences with the Khilafatists on the question of sending a Khilafat delegation to England and seeking Hindu-Muslim unity for Non-Co-operation programme, resigned from the Khilafat Committee.\textsuperscript{167} The humiliating Treaty of Sevres (1920) was thrust upon Turkey. Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar and other Khilafatist leaders, after their disappointing visit to England, led a vigorous campaign for Non-Co-operation with the help of Gandhi, who had toured the Punjab in mid February 1920 and preached his three basic principles: Satyagraha, Hindu-Muslim unity and the use of sawadeshi cloth.\textsuperscript{168} Fazl-i-Husain opposed the idea of Non-Co-operation when in August Punjab Muslim League Council passed a resolution in favour of Non-Co-operation.\textsuperscript{169} The session of


\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{167} Javed Iqbal, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 409-410 & 414-415. On this situation he wrote a few verses in a personal letter to Syed Sulaiman Nadvi:

\begin{quote}
श्रोता निहारिंग प्रेम अपने अपने

जहाँ विद्वान ने कहा है चीते

श्रद्धालु से श्रद्धालु रहे, आप कर दिया यह भूमि.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{168} \textit{A History of Non-Co-operation in the Punjab} 1919-24 (Lahore, 1925).

\textsuperscript{169} Zarina Salamat, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 111-112.
Khilafat Conference held at Burhanpur in March 1920 was
presided over by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan who brought the
message of Khilafat movement to thousands of people in
Lahore, Amritsar, Sialkot, Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Wazirabad,
Hazro, Bombay, Calcutta, Meerat and Allahabad.\textsuperscript{170} In 32
important cities of the Punjab, 22 district-level Khilafat
committees and more than two thousand primary Khilafat
committees were established.\textsuperscript{171} The Punjab did not lag behind
in contributing funds for Khilafat. Hundreds and thousands of
rupees were collected as Khilafat fund during the Khilafat
movement. From the Punjab, apart from the help sent for the
Turkish soldiers on the war-front, 250,000 rupees were sent
to Mustafa Kamal. Another 200,000 rupees were sent for the
affected people of Samarna.\textsuperscript{172} Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888-
1958), Ali Brothers and Gandhi addressed a large public
gathering at Lahore on October 19, 1920. From the Punjab Dr.
Kitchlew, Syed Daud Ghaznavi (1885-1963), Dr. Muhammad Alam
(1887-1947) and Malik Lal Khan also attended and addressed
the meeting insisting on Non-Co-operation.\textsuperscript{173} Fazl-i-Husain
tried to control the situation but in vain. The students of
Islamia College went on strike and the college had to be

complete text of presidential address of Zafar Ali Khan see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 668-694.

\textsuperscript{171} Muhammad Jamil, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 126-130.

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 137-140.
closed. Later it was opened on Allama Iqbal's intervention, who was General Secretary of Anjaman Himayat-e-Islam at that time. In this situation Professor Maulvi Hakim Ali (1869-1944), the Vice-Principal, who had issued a fatwa (religious decree) against Non-Co-operation, resigned from the college. Generally, the move to boycott the educational institutions was not very successful in the Punjab. According to a survey, out of 1,11,078 students of Government educational institutions in the Punjab only 828 could stick to their decision of boycott and this was the lowest percentage as compared with that of other provinces of British India.

Meanwhile the ill-advised Hijrat movement was launched. India was declared as Dar-al-Harab. In April 1920 Ghulam Muhammad Aziz of Amrisar (Aziz Hindi) (1886-1971) pleaded for hijrat in a meeting of Khilafat workers in Delhi. When Maulana Abdul Bari was asked for a religious ruling regarding hijrat, he, adopting a very guarded language, refused to give a clear injunction. To him it was permitted under certain

174 Ibid., pp. 103,105.
175 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
176 Ibid., pp. 108-110
conditions. However Maulana Abul Kalam Azad clearly announced in his fatwa that it was incumbent upon all the Muslims who wanted to do the greatest Islamic deed in India to migrate from the country. In the Punjab Aziz Hindi, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Agha Safdar, Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, Malik Lal Khan and Ataullah Shah Bukhari (1891-1966) actively worked to instigate the Muslim masses for hijrat. However, Dr. Kitchlew, Allama Iqbal, Sir Muhammad Shafi and Mian Fazli-Husain adopted very reasonable attitude and did not favour the Hijrat movement. Pir Mehr Ali Shah of Golra (d. 1937) and Pir Syed Jama’at Ali Shah (1845-1951) of Alipur (Sialkot) were also against the ill-conceived Hijrat movement. Maulana Ahmad Ali of Lahore (1886-1962) not only favoured migration but he himself along with a large group of Muslims migrated to Afghanistan. The Afghan government initially encouraged the immigrants but the influx of people was far greater than the Afghans expected. In August 1920 the Afghan government sealed its borders and the muhajreen had to come back and the movement came to a disastrous failure.

184 Ibid., p. 319.
185 Shahid Hussain Khan, op. cit., pp. 49-51.
During the hijrat movement Païsa Akhbar played a positive role as it had been warning the people that migration was not in the interest of the Muslims. On the other hand the Zamindar of Zafar Ali Khan instigated the people to continue Hijrat even when the Afghan government had prohibited any further migration. The Zamindar alleged that the news about the sealing of borders was a fraudulent move to stop the hijrat.\textsuperscript{186} Another newspaper Hurriyat edited by Maulana Arif Hasvi (1888-1936) also provoked the people for hijrat.\textsuperscript{187} Many people migrated from the provinces of Sindh, Punjab and NWFP. Exact number of the Muslims who migrated to Afghanistan is not definitely known. The estimates drastically vary ranging between 18,000 to 2000,000.\textsuperscript{188} Keeping in view various evidences, the estimate of 100,000 people appears to be more reasonable.\textsuperscript{189}

Though Gandhi favoured the Non-Co-operation movement of the Muslims, some of the Hindu leaders were against the idea of Hindu-Muslim unity on the issue of Khilafat. The leaders like Lala Lajput Rai and Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviyya (1861-

\textsuperscript{186} Zamindar, August 18, 1920 quoted in Raja Rashid Mehmud, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 302.

\textsuperscript{187} Ubaidullah Qudsi, \textit{Azadi ki Tehriken} (Lahore, 1988), p. 163.

\textsuperscript{188} Raja Rasheed Mehmud, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 374-380.

\textsuperscript{189} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 386-388.
1940) apprehended that the Muslims favouring the Khilafat and Turkey were Pan-Islamists and they would possibly make a common cause with the Afghans and the Turks against Hindu India.\textsuperscript{190} The idea was further reinforced by some strong statements of Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar.\textsuperscript{191} In this background Gandhi himself wanted to withdraw from the movement. The incident of Chauri Chaura provided this opportunity and he called off the Non-Co-operation movement unilaterally without consulting any of the Muslim leaders. Muslim leadership and Muslim masses were left in bewilderment high and dry.

The movement continued for some time but in 1924 Mustafa Kamal Ataturk himself abolished the institution of Khilafat. Khilafat movement appears to be a story of purely emotional approach, political short-sightedness, and failure to appreciate the existing international realities on the part of the Muslim leadership. It should have been taken for granted that the Hindus had no sympathy for the Ottoman caliphate. They participated in the Non-Co-operation but always kept their own objectives and interest in their mind. During the Non-Co-operation movement, the Prince of Wales

\textsuperscript{190} Abdul Waheed Khan, \textit{Musalmnon ka isar oor azadi ki jung} (Lahore, 1982), pp. 102, 122, 134; H. B. Khan, \textit{Bar-e-Saghir Pak-o-Hind ki siyasat main ulema ka kirdar} (Karachi, 1985), p. 168.

\textsuperscript{191} Muhammad Yamin Khan, \textit{A' malnama} (Lahore, 1970), Vol. 1, pp. 164-167.
came to India. When he visited Aligarh University, a mass picket was organised but Pundit Malaviya did not allow Gandhi to enter Benaras Hindu University and awarded an honorary doctoral degree to the Prince.\textsuperscript{[192]} Gandhi and other Hindu leaders had whirlwind tours of the whole country financed through the Khilafat funds. It was actually Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar and other Khilafatists who had transformed Gandhi into 'Mahatma Gandhi' during the Khilafat movement without knowing that the same 'Mahatma' would betray the Muslims before long.\textsuperscript{[193]}

It was at this cost that Muslim leadership was trying to protect the Turkish Khilafat in spite of the fact that the Turks themselves had lost their interest in Khilafat and were no longer ready to keep this institution. Probably they were more capable of appreciating the political realities of the Muslim world than the Khilafatists of British India.\textsuperscript{[194]} Even after the abolition of Khilafat by the Turks Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar and others were not mentally prepared to give up their romantic affiliation with the Khilafat. This attitude rendered the Khilafat Committee an aimless and useless

\textsuperscript{[192]} Abdul Waheed Khan, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 128

\textsuperscript{[193]} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{[194]} Meem Kameel Okay, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 186, 188, 204, 205, 210.
organisation. On the other hand Abul Kalam Azad advanced from one extreme to the other i.e., from pan-Islamism to Indian Nationalism. To solve the Khilafat riddle he tried to identify Ataturk's government with the institution of Khilafat. Allama Iqbal who did not participate in the Khilafat movement, could well appreciate the changing realities of the Muslim world in general and Turkey in particular.

HEIGHT OF HINDU-MUSLIM TENSION IN THE PUNJAB

Failure of Khilafat and Non-Co-operation movements resulted in increased Hindu-Muslim tension particularly in the Punjab. In March 1923 when a censure motion was brought against Fazl-i-Husain in the Punjab Legislative Council, the house was divided purely on the basis of Muslims and non-Muslims. Though the motion was defeated, yet it further embittered Hindu-Muslim relations. Hindu-Muslim hostility increased in the Punjab to the extent that All India

195 Abu Slaman Shahjahanpuri, op. cit., p. 406
196 Meem Kmal Okay, op. cit., pp. 211-212.
197 Ibid., pp. 213-218.
198 S. Qalb-i-Abid, op. cit., p. 75.
Nationalist leaders including Motilal Nehru (1861-1931), Sarojini Naidu (1879-1949), Abul Kalam Azad, Hakim Ajmal Khan etc. had to visit the province. During the discussion when Chitta Rajan Das (1870-1925) said that the Punjab "must not retard the progress of the rest of the country" since it was "not the whole of India" a Hindu member retorted that though "the Punjab is not the whole of India, it has enough poison to kill the whole of India".\textsuperscript{199} As it was expected, no entente could be brought about finally. Meanwhile the situation was further intensified when a long series of communal riots broke out in the cities like Nawan, Amritsar, Karnal, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Gurgaon, Ambala etc.\textsuperscript{200}

Appearance and activation of extremist Hindu organisations like Sanghtan and Shuddhi further inflamed the communal situation. The Muslims also organised Tablígh and Tanzim as counterparts of Shuddhi and Sanghtan. Branches of the extremist Hindu Sabha and Mahabirdal multiplied rapidly in number. In 1925 there were as many as 218 branches of Hindu Sabha and 104 branches of Mahabirdal in the Punjab.\textsuperscript{201}

\textsuperscript{199} Rafique Afzal, Malik Barkat Ali: His Life and Writings, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{200} Zarina Salamat, op. cit., pp. 347-371.
\textsuperscript{201} Zarina Salamat, op. cit., p. 304.
Eruption and multiplication of Hindu extremist organisations was appended with the publication of abusive literature by the Arya Samajis against Islam and the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him). Publication of *Rangila Rasool* by Rajpal of Lahore, "Sair-e-Dozakh" in a Hindu magazine *Vartaman* (Amritsar) and various articles by Swami Munshi Ram Shardhananda (1856-1926) in *Daily Tej* are the typical examples of such literature.\(^{202}\) Shardhananda was killed by Abdur Rashid in 1926, Rajpal was killed by I lm-ud-Din in 1929.\(^{203}\)

Hindu newspapers made it a habit to use derogatory and abusive language for the Muslims. In 1926 *Zamindar* prepared a list of abuses published in various Hindu newspapers which counted in thousands.\(^{204}\) On the other hand when the *Muslim Outlook* criticised the decision of High Court in the case of Rajpal, it was immediately convicted.\(^{205}\)


\(^{203}\) *Monthly Darvaish* Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 35-36, 40-41. There were many other Muslims who killed certain Hindus who had produced derogatory writings against the Holy Prophet. For detail see *ibid.*, *passim*.


\(^{205}\) Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-362.
PUNJAB AND THE PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCE

1927-1930

While the second half of the decade of 1920's witnessed the height of communal estrangement, the Hindu-Muslim conflict was also reflected in the discussions and proposals for constitutional reforms at the centre. On March 20, 1927 Muhammad Ali Jinnah presented his Delhi Muslim Proposals to achieve his long-cherished goal of Hindu-Muslim unity, giving his consent to the system of joint electorates provided a few other demands of the Muslims were accepted by the Hindus i.e., separation of Sindh from Bombay, reforms in NWFP and Baluchistan, Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal according to the ratio of their population and 1/3 representation at the centre.  

Most of the Muslim leaders of the Punjab were not ready to accept joint electorates in any event. Sir Muhammad Shafi, though attended the conference at Delhi, rejected the formula after his arrival at Lahore.  

Alama Iqbal and Fazl-i-Husain also opposed it. In a meeting of Punjab Provincial Muslim

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207 Syed Noor Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law. p. 65.
208 Ibid. 
League on May 1, 1927, it was resolved that the system of separate electorates should continue to exist as basic principle of the constitution. The resolution was moved by Allama Iqbal as General Secretary. Stern opposition of these three important political leaders of the Punjab diminished the success of the proposals. In June 1927 Muhammad Ali Jinnah himself visited Lahore to enlist the support of Punjab Muslim League but failed. Zafar Ali Khan bitterly criticised Jinnah in a long article published in Zamindar in three instalments. In July 27 Muslim members of the Punjab Council including Allama Iqbal signed an announcement in favour of separate electorates. Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan (1893-1985) and Dr. Zia-ud-Din, during their visit to England, propagated against Delhi Muslim Proposals. The differences on the issue between Punjab Provincial Muslim League and the central organisation caused the division of Muslim League and both the factions (Jinnah League and Shafi League) held the 19th annual session separately in Calcutta and Lahore respectively. On the other hand Indian National Congress initially tended to

210 Zarina Salamat, op. cit., p. 426.
213 Syed Noor Ahmad, From Martial to Martial Law, p. 66.
accept the Delhi Muslim Proposals but finally it decided to call an All Parties Conference to discuss the issue.²¹⁵ Hindu Mahasabha rejected the proposals bitterly criticising the initial acceptance of the formula by the Congress.²¹⁶

Apart from the issue of separate electorates there arose another cause of rift between Punjab Muslim League and the central organisation when the British government appointed an ‘all white’ commission known as Simon Commission to consider the issue of constitutional reforms for India. Because of the exclusion of the Indians from the commission most of the Indian leaders were planning to boycott the Commission. The Governor of the Punjab prepared the ground by influencing Punjab Muslim leaders like Sir Muhammad Shafi, Feroz Khan Noon and Zafrullah Khan to co-operate with the commission.²¹⁷ According to Jahan Ara Shahnawaz (1896-1979), Sir Muhammad Shafi sincerely felt that “if the full case of the Muslims is not placed before the Simon Commission at this critical juncture when the labour government is in the saddle, my

²¹⁴ Syed Sharif-ud-din Pirzada, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 107-108. 128. There was another important issue causing the conflict i.e., co-operation with the Simon Commission.
²¹⁵ Syed Noor Ahmad, From Martial to Martial Law, pp. 67-68.
²¹⁶ Indian Annual Register 1927 cited in Zarinia Salamati op. cit., p. 424.
nation will have to suffer for decades to come."\textsuperscript{218} Punjab Muslim League met under Sir Muhammad Shafi on November 13, 1927 and resolved that boycott of the Commission would be against the interests of the Muslims.\textsuperscript{219} Allama Iqbal along with five other Muslim leaders appealed to the Muslims particularly to co-operate with the commission.\textsuperscript{220} This was against the view held by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and other leaders of All India Muslim League. The net result was a split in the Muslim League.\textsuperscript{221}

On the contrary, Dr. Kitchlew, Malik Barkat Ali, Zafar Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohayyuddin dissenting from Punjab Muslim League urged upon a complete boycott of the commission.\textsuperscript{222}

Sir Fazl-i-Husain, when he came back from Geneva after representing India in the League of Nations, talked against the commission in an interview.\textsuperscript{223} The Governor Sir Hairy objected to the interview considering it against the policy of the government. Fazl-i-Husain, instead of begging for

\textsuperscript{218} Father and Daughter, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{219} Rafique Afzal, Malik Barkat Ali: His Life and Writings, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{220} Rafique Afzal, Gúftar-e-Iqbal, pp. 53-54. Other five leaders were Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Nawab Sir Abdul Qayyum (NWFP), Mian Abdul Haye, Syed Rajuš Shah (Members Central Legislative Council) and Moulvi Muhammad Ali (Amir Jama’at Ahmadiyya). \textit{ibid.}, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{221} As already discussed earlier in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{222} David Page, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 159; Rafique Afzal, Malik Barkat Ali, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{223} Waheed Ahmad, ed., \textit{Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain}, pp. 40-44, 47-48.
excuse, tendered his resignation. The governor could not afford losing support of Fazl-i-Husain at that critical juncture. Handling the situation tactfully, he not only yielded but also informed Fazl-i-Husain of the appreciating remarks of the Viceroy about his role at Geneva. Since then Fazl-i-Husain was among the supporters of the commission.

Simon Commission visited the Punjab twice. First time in March 1928 when it was warmly welcomed by the Shafi group, representatives of organisations like Anjaman Hamayat-e-Islam and government officials though there were protests and demonstrations at various places. Second time its members reached Lahore on October 30, 1928. This time opposition to the commission was stronger. In spite of all the preparations, the commission was greeted with black flags and the demonstrators, led by Zafar Ali Khan, Dr. Kitchlew, Maulana Abdul Qadir Qasuri (1865-1942) and Lala Lajpat Rai near the railway station, were baton charged, many receiving injuries including Zafar Ali Khan and Lala Lajpat Rai who later died of the injuries. Amidst this tumult, the

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224 Waheed Ahmad, ed., Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, pp. 46-47.
225 Ibid., pp. 48-50
226 Zarina Salamat, op. cit., p. 440
Unionist leaders and the government officials arranged a 'warm' welcome to the members of the commission.

The Punjab Legislative Council proposed a Reform Committee of seven members including four Unionists, Sikandar Hayat Khan (1892-1942), Zafrullah Khan, Chhotu Ram and Owen Roberts, to consider the constitutional issue. The report of this committee was in fact a summary of Jinnah's 14 points against which the non-Unionist members of the committee wrote their notes of dissent. The Punjab Muslim League (Sir Muhammad Shafi's group) submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission demanding retention of separate electorates and reservations of Muslim seats. Official report was also submitted by the Punjab government to which Fazl-i-Husain's note of dissent was appended against the wishes of the Governor Hally.

The Simon Commission Report was published in May 1930. The Commission rejected most of the demands of the Muslims including majority representation in Punjab and Bengal by separate electorates, extension of franchise and landed

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228 Ibid., p. 78.
229 Ibid., p. 78-79.
231 For details see Syed Noor Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, p. 76-78.
interests. The Commission took an aversion even to retention of communal electorates and allowed them to continue only because there was no other way out.\textsuperscript{232} Naturally, the report was resented by all shades of Muslims. Allama Iqbal considered it a document based on the policy to please the extremist Hindu element by rejecting important demands of the Muslims.\textsuperscript{233} Fazl-i-Husain remarked that the report proposed no political advance.\textsuperscript{234} All Parties Muslim Conference considered the report as "unacceptable reactionary and retrograde."\textsuperscript{235} Thus the Simon Commission Report fell short of the demands and expectations of the Muslims. It was particularly disappointing to the Muslims of the Punjab who had co-operated with the Commission in the face of bitter criticism and protests.

The Congress had constantly been losing popularity among the Hindus and could not do well in the elections of 1926 except in Bengal and Madras. Particularly it could not win even a single seat in the Punjab.\textsuperscript{236} It was in this background that the Congress deviated from the course it had taken in May 1927 Bombay session vis-à-vis the Delhi Muslim

\textsuperscript{232} Qalb-i-Abid Syed, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{234} Zarina Salamat, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 479.
\textsuperscript{235} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 478.
Proposals and tried to persuade the Muslims to accept the Nehru Report next year. Nehru Report was published in August 1928 denying almost all the Muslims demands. Surprisingly, Punjab Khilafatists including Dr. Kitchlew, Dr. Muhammad Alam, Hassam-ud-Din (1897-1967), Ghazi Abdul Rehman and Zafar Ali Khan consented to the Nehru Report's recommendations of joint electorate with adult suffrage without reservations of seats. Later in July 1929 they formed Nationalist Muslim Party.

Allama Iqbal, in a press statement, expressed his dissatisfaction about the report and stressed the importance of separate electorates and reservation of seats especially for the Punjab Muslims. Fazl-i-Husain viewed that the report "flashes the Indian autonomy...while it takes no account of the real India which lives in the provinces...."

237 In May 1927 All India Congress Committee accepted the Delhi Muslim Proposals. Syed Hasan Riaz, Pakistan Naaguzir Tha (Karachi, 1987), p. 158.
239 M. H. Saiyid, op. cit., p. 137.
Apart from the majority of the Muslims of the Punjab, the Sikhs also strongly criticised the Nehru Report and Sardar Mangal Singh, who had signed the report on behalf of the Sikh community was accused of selling out the interests of the community.\textsuperscript{242}

On October 26, 1928 when Muhammad Ali Jinnah reached Bombay from England, he was hopeful to find some solution to the problem in consultation with the Congress.\textsuperscript{243} Later on December 28, 1928 in the open session of All Parties National Convention organised by the Congress at Calcutta, Jinnah put forward his amendments to the Nehru Report but all of his amendments were rejected due to the opposition of Hindu Mahasabha.\textsuperscript{244} In March 1929, during the Budget session of the Central Legislative Assembly when Motilal Nehru referred to the Nehru Report as unanimously agreed constitutional proposal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah corrected him that Nehru Report was not acceptable to the Muslims.\textsuperscript{245}


\textsuperscript{243} M. H. Saiyid, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 131.


In order to organise the Muslims against Nehru Report, an All Parties Muslim Conference was convened at Delhi on December 31, 1928 with Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah Aga Khan (1877-1957) as president. Sir Muhammad Shafi President of Punjab Provincial Muslim League, Allama Iqbal, the General Secretary, and Zafrullah Khan were also in the forefront. Maulana Muhammad Ali, being disappointed from the Hindu attitude at the Calcutta Convention, reached Delhi and attended the meeting of Muslim Conference. The All Parties Muslim Conference passed a resolution demanding federal from government with residuary powers vested in provinces, continuance of separate electorates, due share in the central and provincial cabinets, majority representation in the provinces where Muslims were in majority, 1/3 representation in the central assembly and adequate share in the services.\(^{246}\)

On the other hand the Indian National Congress threatened that if by the end of the year 1929 Nehru Report was not accepted by the government, it would be cancelled and the Congress would adopt the objective of "complete independence". In the Lahore session of Indian National Congress presided by Jawahar Lal Nehru the recommendations of Nehru Report were cancelled and "thrown into the Ravi”,

adopting the resolution of "complete independence." Thus in the words of Khashwant Singh, the Nehru Report "found honourable burial in the archives of the National Congress".

Since both Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Sir Muhammad Shafi had finally rejected the Nehru Report, this helped them to come closer, particularly after the former's formulation of 14 points containing the demands similar to those presented by the Muslim Conference at Delhi. Both the factions of the League were united in a meeting of the Council of Muslim League on February 28, 1930.

While the debate on constitutional issue was going on, Fazl-i-Husain was appointed against a temporary post in the Governor General's Executive Council later extended for a full term of five years.

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247 Syed Tufail Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 34-35.
249 Indian Annual Register 1930, Pt. I, p. 28.
250 Syed Noor Ahmad, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, p. 87.
CHAPTER II

MAJLIS AHRAR-I-ISLAM

AND

ITS AGITATIONAL POLITICS
BACKGROUND

Majlis Ahrar-i-Islam was founded on the remnants of the Khilafat Committee.¹ The members of the Punjab Khilafat Committee criticized Moulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Jan Muhammad Chotani (1873-1932) on the issue of Khilafat funds. Leaders of the Punjab Khilafat Committee also developed differences with Muhammad Ali about the Nehru Report. Muhammad Ali was against the Nehru Report whereas the Punjab Khilafatists were in its favour. Both the groups continued to disturb each other's public meetings.² Another issue that widened the gulf between Central Khilafat Committee and the Punjab Khilafatists was that of the demolition of tombs by Ibn-Saud. Moulana Muhammad Ali Johar was against the act. Abul Kalam Azad was in favour of Ibn-i-Saud's policy. All these differences resulted in expulsion of the Punjab Khilafatists by Moulana Muhammad Ali Johar from the Khilafat Committee.³

When Indian National Congress held its session at Lahore in December 1929 and decided to throw away the Nehru Report

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¹ Ashraf Ata, p. 48.
² Ibid., p.56.
³ Ibid., pp. 60-64.
⁴ Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, pp. 24-25.
in the Ravi and to adopt the demand of complete independence, a meeting was held on the instigation of Moulana Azad on December 29, 1929 in the camp of the Congress to establish Majlis Ahrar-i-Islam. Chaudhry Afzal Haq (1895-1942) presided the meeting. Name of the organisation was suggested by Moulana Azad himself. Among the leaders joining the new organisation, Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Zafar Ali Khan, Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman of Ludhiana, Sheikh Hassam-ud-Din, Khawaja Abdur Rehman Ghazi, Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar (1895-1974), Syed Daud Ghaznavi were prominent apart from Afzal Haq himself. 

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

There had always been a confusion and ambiguity about the clear-cut aims and objectives of the Majlis since its very inception. When it was established on December 29, 1929 in the Congress camp at Lahore, Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari (1891-1961), the first President of the Majlis wished the

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5 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 9.
Muslim youth to be in the vanguard for independence of India. In July 1931 Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman declared in his presidential address that the Muslims would share the authority in the government of India based on equality. Going a step further, he appealed to the Indian Muslims to unshackle the chains of slavery because only the nation that brought freedom for India would be exalted. In May 1936, Afzal Haq, in his presidential address in Ahrar Political Conference at Amritsar declared that the Ahrar stood for the Independence of India and uplift of the Islamic world. In April 1939 Majlis Ahrar approved a revised constitution of the organisation laying out three main aims and objectives: to achieve complete independence of India through peaceful means, to guide the Muslims correctly about Islamic politics inside and outside India and to work for religious, political, economic and social uplift of the Muslims.

Anti-British policy with a leaning towards socialist ideas and co-operation with Indian National Congress had been the main traits of the Majlis. The fact that the Ahrar leaders were influenced by the Communist Revolution of Russia

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5 Afzal Haq, p. 9
10 Ihsan, May 10, 1936.
11 Dastoor al Amal, p. 5.
and Marxist ideas behind it were reflected in their speeches. Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman while presiding the annual session of the Majlis Ahrar in 1931 gave the idea of establishing the government of the poor in place of a capitalist government. Likewise Sahibzada Faiz-ul-Hasan talked in terms of socialist philosophy i.e., the class struggle between the capitalists and the workers, unjust distribution of production etc. He made no bones in preferring socialism to fascism and other contemporary ideologies. Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar also expressed similar ideas. Ismail Zabih, the administrator of Majlis Ahrar wrote in an article that the Majlis was “the champion of such a revolution in the country which should improve the lot the suppressed people”.

In the election manifesto approved by the Working Committee of the Ahrar Parliamentary Board, a detailed program was given according to which the Ahrar ministers would accept minimum salary and it would be ensured that low-paid employees could meet their expenses within their lawful resources. Cottage industry including hand-looms would be encouraged. Beggary would be eliminated by converting the

beggars into good and responsible citizens. Measures would be taken to increase the agricultural resources. Facilities would be provided to educate every child and researchers would be encouraged.\textsuperscript{15} The program also included improvement of public health and judiciary, reformation of police department, elimination of bribery and modification in the Panchayat system.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{ORGANIZATION}

According to \textit{Dastoor-al-Amal} every adult and sane Muslim of British India or Princely states who believed in three main objectives of the Majlis could become a member of local branch after signing a declaration and paying an annual fee of two annas. Every branch at village or town level must have at least ten members and this local branch could send its two representatives in the branch at district level. If the primary members acceded fifty, for every extra fifty members one more representative was to be sent in district level branch. For every 200 primary members at district level two members would be elected to represent at the provincial

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Intakhabi manshoor}, pp. 14-15.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ihsan}, April 10, 1936.
Majlis which in turn, would elect 25% of their members for Central Majlis Ahrar.\footnote{Dastoor al Amal, pp. 5-7.}

The Central Majlis Ahrar-i-Islam was to consist of elected representatives of various provincial branches and all ex-presidents of the organisation \textit{(provided they retained their primary membership)}. Salar-i-Azam Jayoosh Ahrar Hind would be an ex-officio member of the Central Majlis. The Majlis would meet at least three times a year.\footnote{Ibid., p. 8.} Office bearers of the Central Majlis would include a President, two Vice Presidents, one General Secretary, one Secretary, one Secretary Jayoosh (volunteer corps) and one Treasurer. The President would nominate all other office bearers and preside the annual Ahrar Conference.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 9-10. Initially the number of Vice Presidents and Secretaries was different.} There would be a Working Committee \textit{(Majlis-i-Aamila)} consisted of 21 members including the office bearers. A quorum of at least five members would be maintained in its meetings.\footnote{Ibid., p. 10.}

After its inception the Majlis remained inactive for some time while the Ahrar leadership participated in the non-
co-operation movement started by the Congress. Most of them were arrested including Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Habib-ur-Rehman and Mazhar Ali Azhar. Though they had accepted the Nehru Report in the beginning, before long most of them changed their point of view and felt that separate electorates were important for the Muslims. Now the Majlis was revived and its first Conference presided by Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman was held at Lahore on July 11-12, 1931, which passed a resolution in favour of separate electorates. By August 1931 many new branches of the Majlis were established in important cities of the Punjab like Multan, Rawalpindi and Ferozpur. Ataullah Shah Bukhari was appointed the president of the Central organisation. In the beginning the organisation of Majlis Ahrar was confined to the province of the Punjab. Gradually it grew and expanded outside the province particularly due to its agitation against the Kashmir state. In view of its expansion in and assistance received from outside the province of the Punjab the Provincial Committee decided to rename the Majlis as Majlis

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22 Ibid, p. 95.

23 Ibid, p. 118.


25 Among other office bearers there were three Vice Presidents, Moulana Ghulam Murshid, Muhammad Amin and Dr. Abdul Qadir, three Secretaries Muhammad Daud Ghaznavi, Mazhar Ali Azhar and Sh. Muhammad Hayat. Muhammad Din was the Finance Secretary. The Executive Council of the party, consisted of two members Afzal Haq and Ghazi Abdur Rehman. Ibid, p. 6.
Ahrar-i-Islam Hind on January 3, 1932. In July the organisation was further expanded on all-India level and the leaders from the Punjab, UP Bombay, Calcutta, NWFP and Sind attended the meeting of All India Ahrar Working Committee at Amritsar. Next year Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman of Ludhiana was elected as President of the Central Majlis Ahrar-i-Islam Hind. He was re-elected as President every years till September 1939 when he expressed his inability to preside because of being bound for Rs. 2000 under Section 562 CPC and was replaced by Hassam-ud-Din. On the same occasion Hassam-ud-Din was appointed as "Dictator" of the "War Council" of Majlis Ahrar. Because of civil disobedience movement in connection with war-recruitment numerous Ahrar dictators were arrested by the government one by one until March 1941 when Hassam-ud-Din was released and he took over the office of the President. He was replaced by Moulana Abdul Qayyum of

26 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, January 9, 1932.
29 From July 1939 to March 1941 the following Ahrar Dictators were arrested. Their names are given in chronological order: Qazi Ehsan Ahmad Shujahabadi (Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, July 30, 1939) Ismail Zabih (Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, October 7, 1939) Moulvi Ahsan Usmani (Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, November 4, 1939), Muhammad Ali of Jullundur (Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, November 25, 1939), Sahibzada Syed Sukainman of Alwalpur (Janbaz Mirza, Karwan-i-Ahrar (Lahore, 1979), Vol. IV, p. 248), Khalil-ur-Rehman (ibid, p. 336), Sardar Muhammad Shafi, Moulana Ghulam
Cawnpur when the former was arrested again in July 1941.\footnote{Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, July 26, 1941.} Next year Hassam-ud-Din again became the President and was re-elected for the year 1943-44.\footnote{Janbaz Mirza, Karwan-i-Ahrar, Vol. II, 1981, Chap. 1.}

There were two secondary organizations of the Central Majlis Ahrar. One of them, Shoba Tabligh-ul-Islam was started in Amritsar in April 1934 headed by Habib-ur-Rehman with Abdul Karim Mubahila as Secretary.\footnote{Confidential Report on The Ahrar Movement in the Punjab 1931-1938, Vol. 11, p. 55.} It was declared as a purely religious organization separate from Central Majlis Ahrar. Its objectives were to safeguard the Muslims against apostasy and heathenism, and to arrange for an active group of preachers (muballigheen) for propagation of Islam inside and outside India, to do social service and to set practical examples of Islamic moral values in isolation to politics.\footnote{Janbaz Mirza, Karwan-i-Ahrar, Vol. 11, p. 55.} The other secondary organisation was the volunteer corps. The volunteers were to be trained for drilling equipped with lathis and marching in red uniforms with band and bugles. Amritsar was the center of such activities.\footnote{Confidential Report on The Ahrar Movement in the Punjab 1931-1938, p. 40.}

Ghouth of Hazara (Ibid, V, pp. 21-22); Taj-ud-Din Ansari (Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 31, 1941).
were named after their commanders. Certain volunteers of each corps were trained for the use of band and bugles. All the corps were required to parade at least one hour daily. The corps were also instructed to provide assistance to widows and orphans living in their vicinity. In March 1939 Afzal Haq advised the Ahrar volunteers that each volunteer must keep an axe for "self-defense" and within very short period of time the Ahrar volunteers equipped themselves with axes.

Ahrar volunteers were later divided into two groups: "Mujahideen and Khuddam-i-Khalq. When the Punjab government banned all sort of military drill, the group of the Mujahideen was absorbed into the Khuddam-i-Khalq who confined their activities to social service. Khaki pajama, Red shirt and red cap were their dress."

AGITATIONAL POLITICS OF MAJLIS-I-ahrar

The Ahrar involved themselves in successive agitational campaigns one after another. First important agitation in

31 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, October 26, 1935. The Ahrar corps were advised to avoid interference with the Khaksars. To some extent the Ahrar were imitating the Khaksar volunteers organised earlier by Inayatullah Khan al-Mashraqi.
32 Janbaz Mirza, Karwan-i-Ahrar, IV, p. 64.
33 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, September 6, 1941
which the Ahrar participated actively was against the oppressive policies of the Maharaja of Kashmir.

The Ahrar and the Kashmir Agitation

The Kashmiri Muslims had been suffering under the Dogra raj. The situation in Kashmir was very well reflected in a statement of an ex-member of Maharaja’s Executive Council who also worked as the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of the state. While explaining the reasons for his resignation from his office in Kashmir state he told the press that the Muslims of Kashmir were living a life of distress and poverty. They were treated high-handedly by the ruler. There was no co-ordination between the public and the government nor there was any opportunity to redress the complaints of the people who had been denied of all joys of life.\footnote{Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah, Aalish-i-Chunamar, Lahore, n.d., p. 45.} In fact the Muslims were deprived of basic human rights. They were excluded from public offices. Limitations were imposed on observance of religious ceremonies. Even the mosques and the Muslim graveyards were not safe.\footnote{Confidential Report on The Ahrar Movement in the Punjab 1931-1938, p. 9.} The unrest among the Muslims was further increased by some incidents in the Jammu province. In April 1931 when an Imam was reciting the Khutba
of the Eid prayer, a Dogra sub-inspector ordered him to stop the khutba. Since it was a clear intervention in the established Islamic practices, the Muslims of Jammu were infuriated. In another incident in Jammu Police Line, a Head Constable Labhuram snatched a copy of the Holy Qur'an from a Muslim constable and profaned it by throwing it away on the floor.⁴⁰ Now the Muslims started fierce agitation. Abdul Qadeer, a Pathan servant of a British army official who had come to the valley for vacation, was arrested by the state authorities for delivering inflammatory speeches.⁴¹ It further enflamed the situation and during the trial against Abdul Qadeer, the frenzied Muslim mob at Srinagar clashed with the Police on July 13, 1931. Twenty-two Muslims were killed by the police firing, scores of others were seriously wounded and the important leaders were arrested but the movement against the oppressive rule of the Maharaja could not be suppressed.⁴²

Under these circumstances, the Muslims of the Punjab also felt concerned. Ghulam Rasul Mehr and Moulana Salik, the editors of the Daily Inqalab continuously criticized the

⁴⁰ *Indian Annual Register* 1931, II, p. 10.
⁴¹ Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
oppressive measures of the state authorities. In a meeting at Simla, attended by Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Khan, Khawaja Hasan Nazami, Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mehmood, Moulana Ismail Ghaznavi, Nawab Ibrahim Ali Khan and others, Kashmir Committee was formed on July 25, 1931. Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mehmood, Amir Jama'at-i-Ahmadiyya and Abdul Rahim Dard, also an Ahmadi, were appointed President and Secretary of the committee respectively.

After its inception, Majlis-i-Ahrar led emotional agitation on different issues, as its leadership believed that if the leaders of a party remained out of sight for a year or so, the people would forget them. The situation in Kashmir was suitable to apply this theory and to gain popularity among the Muslim masses. The Ahrar had great orators like Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Habib-ur-Rehman of Ludhiana and Sheikh Hassam-ud-Din among their ranks. They got themselves fully involved in the Kashmir agitation. Ataullah Shah Bukhari delivered a number of fiery speeches and instigated the people to raise jathas and collect money for the Kashmir agitation. “Kashmir Day” was observed throughout

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43 Ma'keen Ali Hijazi, Punjab main urdu sahafat, p. 361; Abdul Salam Khurshid, Sahafat Pakistan-o-Hind main, p. 450.
44 Inqalab, July 31, 1931.
45 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 136.
the Punjab and at Lahore some 10,000 people attended the
public meeting held by the Ahrar.\(^{46}\) Mazhar Ali Azhar was
appointed as ‘dictator’.\(^{47}\) It was announced that a delegation
headed by Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar would be sent to Srinagar
in September to enquire into the matter and to hold talks
with the Maharaja of Kashmir.\(^{48}\) Other members of the
delegation were Afzal Haq and Khawaja Ghulam Muhammad. Rana
Aftab Ahmad accompanied the delegation as stenographer. On
September 4, the Ahrar delegation was allowed by the state
authorities to enter Kashmir under certain conditions.\(^{49}\) The
Maharaja offered them to stay as state guests in a well-
furnished houseboat. The offer was readily accepted by the
Ahrar.\(^{50}\) It was a blunder on part of the Ahrar because while
the talks were in progress between the Prime Minister and the
Ahrar leaders, there were rumours in the city that the Ahrar
leaders were even ready to neutralize the anti-Kashmir
movement in the Punjab against a heavy amount which they very
badly needed to promote their organisation against All India
Muslim League and the Khaksar movement.\(^{51}\) However the Ahrar
delegation returned from Kashmir without any achievement and


\(^{47}\) The Tribune, August 18, 1931.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.


\(^{50}\) Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 46.

\(^{51}\) Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah, op. cit., pp. 139-140.
Mazhar Ali Azhar launched a civil disobedience movement on October 3, 1931. A band of 119 Ahrar volunteers led by him was arrested by the Sialkot authorities. Now the jathas of the Ahrar volunteers were constantly being sent to Kashmir border where they were being arrested by the state authorities. Within three days some 1500 Ahrar volunteers were arrested. On his birthday on October 5, the Maharaja withdrew the restrictions on Muslim religious observances and released all the political prisoners, which was a clear victory for the Ahrar. Now the Ahrar stopped the civil disobedience movement temporarily and the Ahrar delegation led by Mazhar Ali Azhar visited the state second time. Afzal Haq, Hassam-ud-Din and Ghulam Muhammad were included in the delegation. Mazhar Ali Azhar negotiated with the Prime Minister and the Governor of Jammu but the negotiations could not satisfy the former and the Ahrar re-mobilized the volunteers after coming back form the state. One of reasons behind the Ahrar's being disgruntled was the presence of the representatives of the Kashmir committee who were paid more attention by the local Kashmiri leaders like Sheikh Abdullah.

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54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 12.
(1874-1965) and others. As in case of their first visit to the Kashmir state, the members of Ahrar delegation accepted the honour of being state guests again and their activities were limited to the houseboat. On the other hand the representatives of the Kashmir Committee were working for the people giving economic and legal assistance to the workers being trialed by the state, visiting the houses of the martyrs and prisoner helping and consoling them. In this situation it was but natural that the people of Kashmir were attracted towards the Kashmir Committee. Secondly the Kashmir Committee was dominated by the Ahmadi element and the memorial being prepared for submission to the Maharaja by the Kashmir leadership was comparable to what the Kashmir Committee suggested. This annoyed the Ahrar. When the negotiations were in progress, Ashraf Ata continued vigorous campaign to collect Ahrar volunteers in large number. After the failure of negotiations, thousands of volunteers marched towards Kashmir border and Mazhar Ali Azhar courted arrest alongwith a band of volunteers at Sochaitgarh. Since early November 1931 the agitation gained full momentum. The situation in Kashmir was further aggravated by military

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56 Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah, *op. cit.*, p. 141.
59 *Ashraf Ata, op. cit.*, p. 133.
firing on November 3 at Jammun (killing at least nine persons) and by the Hindu-Muslim riot that followed. The dead body of an Ahrar volunteer, Illahi Bakhash, who had succumbed to the injuries at the hand of the state forces, was paraded at Gujrat, Gujranwala, Lahore and Chiniot to gain sympathies of the people. On January 3, 1932 the movement was reported to be in full swing. However, the arrest of more than fifteen thousand volunteers including important Ahrar leaders, appointment of Glancy Commission by the Maharaja to enquire into the Muslims' demands and the Maharaja's assurances of religious tolerance resulted in gradual decline of the agitation. The movement came to a lull also because of the month of Ramazan. Moulana Kafayatullah (1875-1953) and Afzal Haq met Sikandar Hayat, the Revenue Minister of the Punjab government, in connection with Kashmir agitation but the talks could not prove fruitful. Meanwhile the agitation continued to die away. The

60 Indian Annual Register 1931, II, p. 23.
61 At this occasion "in the Ahrar coffers...subscriptions poured in from all sides" Confidential Report on The Ahrar Movement in the Punjab 1931-1938, p. 12. By November 18 the Ahrar had collected funds amounting to Rs. 17000 and the money was still coming Rs. 500 per day. Ibid, p. 13.
62 Inqilab January 3, 1932.
63 The Ahrar gives the number of the Mujahids arrested as 25,000. The Ahrar January, 1932.
66 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, January 9, 1932.
attempts of raising funds and collection of volunteers also met with a little success. The position of the *Ahrar* was further affected by the mutual squabbles between the Lahore district branch and the Central Majlis *Ahrar* regarding misappropriation of funds. The hopes to give fresh impetus to the agitation after Eid could not materialize. More than five hundred copies of three different pamphlets were seized by the Punjab government at the *Ahrar*’s office. Likewise the entire issue of Eid number of the daily *Ahrar* (4000 copies), two thousand Eid cards were proscribed and the security deposit of the *Ahrar* was also forfeited. Towards the end of February no printer of Lahore was ready to publish even quite harmless posters of the *Ahrar*. As a reaction to the repressive measures of the government the *Ahrar* decided to launch a civil disobedience movement on February 28. The *Syasat* Lahore deplored the possibility of any success in the intended civil disobedience by the *Ahrar*. The *Eastern Times* also regretted the unconstitutional situation by means of

67 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, January 16, 1932.
72 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, February 27, 1932.
picketing. Yet, different branches of the Majlis were instructed to send jathas to Kashmir, to travel on Railway trains without tickets, to send unpaid letters through government postal services and to start peaceful picketing of wine and foreign cloth shops. Lahore, Amritsar, Multan, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Delhi, Wazirabad, Rawalpindi and Jullundur were the centers of Ahrrar activity of civil disobedience. The new program could not be popularized among the people because it coincided with the civil disobedience movement of the Congress and most of the people thought that the Ahrrar leaders had been bribed to follow the policy of the Congress. Afzal Haq himself says that the Ahrrar's treasury was empty; therefore, in order to arrange for the expenses, we decided to participate in the civil disobedience of the Congress by picketing shops of foreign goods. That is why the denial on part of the Ahrrar leaders that they had disassociated from the Congress was not effective as the Muslim public judged the Ahrrar not only by their pronouncements but also by their actions. Under these


75 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 5, 1932.

76 In fact the Ahrrar did approach a Congressite Achint Ram with the offer that if a payment of Rs. 500 per month was made, the Ahrrar would organise the civil disobedience movement in the mufussil but the All India Congress Committee refused to give sanction to the proposal. Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 3, 1932.

77 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrrar, p. 75.
circumstances, the interest of the masses in the Ahrar's activities could not be revived even by the arrest of Mufti Kafayatullah on March 11.76 However towards the end of the month some two thousand Muslim refugees arrived at Jehlum with horrible tales of atrocities committed by the state authorities and the Ahrar immediately tried to exploit the grievances of the refugees though with little success because during the first week of April the refugees returned home after getting assurances from the British officials appointed by the state for this purpose.77 On March 27, 1932, the Glancy Commission submitted its recommendations to the Maharaja of Kashmir.80 The Commission recommended a legislative council consisting of 75 members, 33 to be elected and the rest of them were to be nominated. Out of 33 elected seats, 20 were to be given to the Muslims, 11 to the Hindus, the Sikhs and the Buddhists one each. The Maharaja enforced the proposed reforms with minor amendments on April 10, 1932.81 The reforms were accepted by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah and he called off the civil disobedience movement.78 On the other hand the Ahrar due to charges of embezzlement of funds, had lost the confidence of the public to the extent that the funds

78 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 19, 1932.
79 Confidential Report on The Ahrar Movement in the Punjab 1931-1938, p. 16
80 Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah, op. cit., p. 169.
81 For details see Civil and Military Gazette June 6, 1932 and April 24, 1934.
82 Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah, op. cit., p. 169.
collected by some well-to-do people for refugees from Kashmir were not handed over to the Ahrar, rather they formed a Hijrat committee to use the amount properly. Similarly the amount received in the office of Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind was also spent through the Jamiat's own representatives. 93 In the next two months (i.e. April and May 1932) the Ahrar had to face further difficulties as having failed to raise more funds the leaders were threatened to be ejected out of their offices due to non-payment of rent. 94 By the month of July the Ahrar office in Lahore had to be shifted to the office of the daily Ahrar in view of poor financial position and the telephone line was also cut off, as the dues could not be paid. 95 Meanwhile the Secretary Majlis Ahrar Sialkot filed a civil suit against the treasurer about the funds and such internal conflict further disorganized the Ahrar and tightened the strings of the public purse. 96 After the arrest of Afzal Haq, Chaudhry Abdul Sattar vainly tried to revive the agitation by bringing the women in the movement. 97 This was also an imitation of the Congress technique. 98 It incurred lot of criticism from the Muslims instead of boosting up the

93 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 80.
94 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 4, 1932.
96 Confidential Report on The Ahrar Movement in the Punjab 1931-1938, p. 17
97 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 83.
agitation. In July 1932, the Ahrar sought another field of action Alwar state, where Muslim converts called Meos agitated against the highhandedness of the state authorities. The Muslims had also economic and communal grievances. The Ahrar seizing the opportunity celebrated July 22 as "Alwar Day" and interviewed the refugees. All India Ahrar Conference was held on December 3, in Gurgaon district, which attracted 8,000 to 1,0000 audience. The Ahrar tried to repeat the same tactics of collecting and dispatching jathas, and displaying of the corpses of those killed in clashes as they had implied in case of Kashmir agitation but with little success and the movement completely died off by the end of May 1933 because of paucity of funds, dispatch of British troops to Alwar and non-co-operation on part of the Meos themselves who did not welcome the jathas.

From March 1933 onward the Ahrar turned their attention towards the Ahmadis. In a meeting held on March 1 presided by Moulana Zafar Ali Khan the "most scathing remarks were made"

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89 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 16, 1932. Afzal Haq himself had tried to persuade Abdul Sattar not to involve the women in the agitation. Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 73.


91 For details of the proceedings see Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, December 12, 1932.

against their religion and the character of the Ahmadies. Domination of Ahmadies over the Kashmir committee was an eyesore to the Ahrar. In addition to that, during a meeting at Sir Sikandar's residence at Lahore, Afzal Haq and Mirza Bashir-ud-Din indulged in mutual recriminations on the issue of elections and the former expressed his determination to destroy the Ahmadiyya movement. Afzal Haq and Attaullah Shah Bukhari along with other Ahrar leaders law Dr. Muhammad Iqbal and insisted that the later should disassociate himself from the committee. Allama Iqbal and other non-Ahmadi members of the committee sent a letter to Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mehmood, the President, to call a meeting of the committee at Lahore within two weeks to have fresh elections of the office-bearers of the committee. In the meeting convened on May 7, 1933 Mirza Bashir-ud-Din's resign was accepted by the committee and resolution was unanimously passed to appreciate the services of the out-going President. Allama Iqbal and Malik Barkat Ali were elected as Officiating President and Secretary of the Committee respectively. In the next month, Allama Iqbal resigned from presidentship of the committee because he felt that the Ahmadi members of the

93 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 4, 1933.
94 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 76; Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat, Vol. IV, p. 477 f.n.
95 Janbaz Mirza, Karwan-i-Ahrar, I, p. 182.
96 Inqalab, Muharram 19, 1352 A.H. (May 6, 1933).
97 Inqalab, May 18, 1933.
committee had not been co-operating with the committee after resignation of Mirza Bashir-ud-Din. A new Kashmir Committee was constituted in a meeting at Lahore on July 3 Allama Iqbal and Malik Barkat Ali being the President and the Secretary respectively. The Ahmadis were turned out of the new committee. On the other hand Mirza Bashir-ud-Din revived the old Kashmir Committee and offered the Presidentship to Allama Iqbal, which he refused to accept on the grounds that the reasons for which the old Kashmir Committee was dissolved "still existed." Since there were two parallel Kashmir committees now, the old Kashmir committee was renamed as All India Kashmir Association and Syed Habib (Editor Syasat) and Munshi Muhammad Din Fouq (1877-1945) were elected as President and Secretary respectively. While Allama Iqbal continued to raise his voice against inhuman punishments like flogging and lashing inflicted upon the political workers in the Kashmir state, the Ahrar found yet another field of agitation in Kapurthala state.

100 Tribune, May 7, 1933.
101 Inqalab, September 6, 1933; Javed Iqbal, Zinda Rood, Lahore, 1984, p. 511
102 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat, 4, p. 628
Agitation against Kapurthala state

The unrest had been growing in the Kapurthala state since 1933 due to economic distress of the agriculturist class and the conflict between the Hindu sahukars and zamindars that included Muslims as well as other communities like Sikhs but before long it took a communal turn when Abdul Aziz Khan Begowalia, a prominent Muslim of the state, organised and headed Kapurthala Zamindar League.\(^{103}\) Abdul Aziz was a relative of Afzal Haq and a member of the Working Committee of the Central Majlis Ahrar.\(^{104}\) He had been in contact with the Ahrar office in December 1932 and discussed with them the question of agitation in Kapurthala state.\(^{105}\) In January 1934 the Ahrar leaders: Hubib-ur-Rehman, Daud Ghaznavi, Afzal Haq and Mazhar Ali Azhar decided to assist the Kapurthala Zamindar League.\(^{106}\) Since the volunteers of the Kashmir agitation had been released, the Ahrar got fully involved in Kapurthala agitation. Meanwhile the Sultanpur incident gave considerable impetus to the movement. A Muharram procession was to be taken out through a route where branches of a banyan tree put hindrance in the way of the

\(^{103}\) *Civil and Military Gazette*, January 8, 1934.


\(^{105}\) *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, January 2, 1933.

tazia. The Sikhs declared the tree sacred and gathered to prevent the Muslims from cutting the branches. The Muslims were also adamant to carry the tazia form the same route without bringing the tazia down to avoid the cutting of the branches of the banyan. The police and the state troops opened fire on the procession killing at least 22 persons within 45 seconds. Muslims newspapers like Eastern Times and The Pilot raised the voice in favour of the Muslims. The Working Committee of the Central Majlis Ahrar passed resolutions to condemn the Kapurthala state authorities for opening fire on unarmed Muslim crowed and demanded the formation of an independent enquiry committee and the grant of compensation to the families of the killed and injured. In order to keep the agitation of the Muslim zamindars alive, the Ahrar themselves instigated the Hindu shopkeepers against the zamindars because to the Ahrar the unrest and disturbance was the "undeniable proof of life of the people". In this movement also the Ahrar leaders accused one another of misappropriation of funds and accepting bribes from the Prime Minister of the Kapurthala state. In meeting at Jullundur Habib-ur-Rehman and Pizada Abdul Hamid had a wordy fight

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107 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 5, 1934. According to Muzhar Ali Azhar 70 persons were killed. Inqalab, April 30, 1934.


109 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 5, 1934.

110 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, pp. 131-132.
regarding the use of funds. In this background, the changing attitude of the Ahrar leadership towards the state may be well understood. On May 13, 1934 the Working Committee of the Central Majlis under the presidency of Habib-ur-Rehman recorded its no confidence in enquiry committee appointed by the Prime Minister of Kapurthala state and expressed its full confidence in the enquiry commission appointed by the Jullundur Muslims, of which Pirzada Abdul Hamid, Chishti Fazal-i-Karim and Abdul Qayyum were the members. The Working Committee also declared that the demands and the program of this enquiry committee would be followed by the Ahrar. However, in the next month Afzal Haq expressed his satisfaction at the findings of the official enquiry committee and suggested that the Muslims "should not press for any further action." Surprisingly, the Working Committee, in an emergency meeting on June 15, again demanded "responsible government for the people of Kapurthala state, the award of compensation to the relations of those who had been killed or injured in the firing at Sultanpur, a reduction in land revenue and communal representation in services, ...condemning the repressive measures...adopted by

111 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 19, 1934.
113 Ibid, June 16, 1934.
the State administration." The Ahrar continued its agitation to press for these demands. Large processions were taken out at Jullundur, the jathas proceeded to Kapurthala and several arrests were made by the state authorities. Later a fresh resolution was passed by the Ahrar demanding the dismissal of Sir Abdul Hamid, the Prime Minister of the State. To gain public sympathy it was decided that a deputation of the Ahrar should have a tour of the Punjab to acquaint the Muslim masses with the repressive measures taken by the state authorities against the Muslims. Public meetings were also held at Jullundur, Hoshiarpur and other cities to reiterate the demands like dismissal of Sir Abdul Hamid, establishment of independent assembly in the state and reduction of land revenue. Towards the end of September the Ahrar agitation subsided and finally died altogether. Now the Ahrar turned their attention to the forthcoming assembly elections and to their campaign against the Ahmadis of Qadian.

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114 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 23, 1934.
116 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, July 28, 1934.
118 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab. September 29, 1934 and October 6, 1934. It is noticeable that by September 1934 none of the demands of the Ahrar was accepted. Sir Abdul Hamid was replaced withColonial Fisher in December 1934, the report of Kapurthala Franchise Committee for establishment of responsible
Ahrar agitation against the Ahmadis

Since the elimination of Ahmadiyya element from the Kashmir Committee, the Ahrar had been active against the Ahmadis. Afzal Haq had expressed his determination to destroy the Ahmadiyya movement. In March 1933 Ahrar established a separate organisation Majlis Dawat-o-Irshad to continue the anti-Ahmadi campaign and it was decided that the Ahrar should take part in anti-Ahmad propaganda only in their individual capacity. Holding public meetings, marching in the streets reciting anti-Ahmad poems, distribution of handbills etc., celebrating "Tabligh days" and hiding Tabligh conferences were the propaganda tactics of the Ahrar against the Ahmadis. On the other hand the Ahmadis also celebrated "Tabligh Day" in Lahore and Amritsar and distributed their literature. Office of the Majlis Ahrar had been established in Qadian in early 1934. In September 1934 when Kapurthala agitation subsided, the Ahrar decided to

government in the state was published in 1935. Abdul Aziz was released in January 1935 and Sultanpur controversy was decided by Col. Fisher, the Prime Minister of the state, in February 1935 against the Muslims.

Janbaz Mirza, Karwan-i-Ahrar, II, pp. 106, 131 & 143.
119 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 76.
120 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 25, 1933.
121 Ibid. March 11, 1933.
hold a Tabligh conference at Qadian, the hotbed of the Ahmadies and the center and the birthplace of the Ahmadiyya movement. For this purpose, Moulvi Baha al-Haq Qasmi, Abdul Karim Mubahilla and Abdul Ghaffar Asar were very active. Apart from other guests, Moulana Husain Ahmad Madni, Mufti Kafayatullah, Moulana Ahmad Ali Lahore, Moulana Abdul Rahim Populzai and Zafar Ali Khan also attended the Conference. On October 21, first meeting of the Tabligh Conference presided by Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari was attended by some 10,000 people. The President advised the audience not to enter Qadian in view of the restrictions imposed by the Government. By the next day the Muslim deputations from the far off places like Dera Ghazi Khan, Bahawalpur, Shahpur, Muzaffargarh, Paniput, Peshawar and Bareilly had reached. Second day meetings were attended by some 12,000 persons. During the speeches of the Ahrar leaders scurrilous attacks were made on Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and his sons. The conference came to a close on October 23 without any mishap. Ahmadi organ al-Fazal claimed that no unpleasant incident took place because the Khalifa of Qadian had advised his

123 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, October 27, 1934.
124 Ibid.
followers to exercise the utmost restraint.\textsuperscript{126} Orthodox Muslim press rejoiced that the conference had been a great success.\textsuperscript{127}

In November a boy armed with a knife was arrested in Qadian who, allegedly, intended to murder Mirza Bashir-ud-Din.\textsuperscript{128} This was followed by the threatening speeches, raising funds and enlisting volunteers from both sides.\textsuperscript{129} The Ahmadis established National League which practically had the same relationship to the Central Jama'at-i-Ahmadiyya as the Akali Dal had to the Shiromani Gurdawara Parbandhak Committee.\textsuperscript{130} Mirza Bashir-ud-Din promoted his "Tabligh" work appealing to the Ahmadiyya community to provide 500 volunteers to work in Gurdaspur district.

It is strange to note that towards the end of January 1935 the Ahrar leaders changed their tone against the Ahmadis for some time. Moulana Inayatullah said that he respected

\textsuperscript{126} Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab, October 27, 1934; Dost Muhammad Shahid, op.cit., VII, pp. 494-495.
\textsuperscript{127} See Zamindar October 28, 1934 and Ihsan October 25 and 27, 1934. Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman claimed that more than 60,000 persons attended the conference which seems to be an exaggerated figure as the Intelligence reports say it did not exceed 12,000 at a time. Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, October 27, 1934 and November 11, 1934.
\textsuperscript{128} Dost Muhammad Shahid, op. cit., VII, p. 387-388.
\textsuperscript{129} Confidential Report on The Ahrar Movement in the Punjab 1931-1938, p. 36.
Mirza Bashir-ud-Din as the later belonged to a respectable Mughal family and that the Ahrar's opposition was only because of his attacks on the Holy Prophet. On February 4, at a meeting of Majlis Ahrar, Lahore, it was decided not to abuse Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and his son or to read in Qadian the quotations from Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's writings to avoid provocation. However this proved to be a temporary phase and much indignation against the Ahmadis was aroused in two public meetings in March held at Gurdaspur due to the trial of Ataullah Shah Bukhari for his objectionable remarks made at the Tabligh Conference in Qadian. Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman who presided one of these meetings, making highly provocative speeches, abused Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in unrestrained language and the audience were asked to invoke a crore (ten million) of curses on him. Another Tabligh conference was held by the Ahrar at Ludhiana towards the end of April 1935. Habib-ur-Rehman, Faiz al-Hasan of Alumahar, Qazi Ehsan Ahmad Shujahabadi and Moulana Ahmad Sa'eed (1886-1959) were the principal speakers who spoke in the same tone. Bukhari's initial sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment was finally reduced in the Sessions Court to simple imprisonment.

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131 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, February 9, 1935.
132 Ibid., April 4, 1935.
till the rising of the court. Bukhari and the other Ahrar leaders continued their anti-Ahmadiyya campaign. In a public meeting at Layalpur in August 1935, Bukhari declared that he was given by Allah Almighty the mission to destroy the Ahmadiyya movement.

Meanwhile the Ahrar paid attention to training and drilling of volunteers in red uniform. The volunteers were equipped with lathis. Band was used for marching. Demolition of the Shaheedgunj mosque had taken place in July 1935 and the movement for restoration of the mosque had been started but the Ahrar kept themselves aloof from the whole affair. Since June 1935 onward the Ahrar started so called "graveyard agitation" and had had a number of clashes with the Ahmadi on the issue of burying their dead bodies in the Muslim graveyards. For instance on June 15, 16 & 17 Ahrar-Ahmadi clashes took place when the Ahmadi tried to bury the dead bodies of the Ahmadi children in the Muslim graveyard and the police had to intervene. Incidents of similar nature occurred in Amritsar in June and August

134 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 8, 1935.
135 Ibid., August 17, 1935.
137 Sometimes the band continued to play even during recitation of the Holy Quran. Muhammad Saeed, Aahung-i-Bazgushi, p. 100.
1936. In Batala in January 1937 about 1000 Ahrar prevented the burial of an Ahmadi and the internment could be made possible only after intervention of the police and the district officials who found that the Ahmadis were entitled by the past custom to bury their dead in the graveyard. Later Baha-ul-Haq Qasmi was sentenced four months imprisonment for obstructing the internment of an Ahmadi child in a Muslim graveyard. In Batala signboards and notices were affixed by the Ahrar in graveyards and the mosques prohibiting the burial/entry of the Ahmadis and the Ahmadis started engraving names of their dead on the tombstones to prove that the Ahmadis had been burying their dead bodies in those graveyards. In March 1938, again an Ahrar-Ahmadi clash at a graveyard was averted through intervention of police authorities. Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman at a meeting of Majlis Ahrar at Lahore suggested that an act should be passed in the Punjab Assembly by the Muslim members declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslims but the suggestion could not take effect.

139 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 20, 1936.

140 Ahmadiyya Sect, p. 21.

141 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 3, 1937.

142 Ahmadiyya Sect, loc. cit.

143 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 2, 1938.

144 Ibid, March 20, 1937.
While the Ahmar were campaigning against the Ahmadiyya movement, they found yet another field for their agitational capabilities, this time in Lucknow, U.P. where Madh-i-Sahabah controversy had been continued since early 20th century. Before the year 1904 both the communities the shias and the sunnis took part in Muharram processions in Kucknow, but the sunnis started taking out their separate Muharram processions and tazias after introducing and insisting upon purely shia customs and traditions by Maqbool Ahmad of Lucknow and other shias. The sunnis arranged their own Karbala Phorkatora separate from that of the shias i.e., Talkatora. Since the separation of shia and sunni Muharrum processions in 1906 the differences between the two communities became more prominent. The sunnis started reciting "Madh-i-Sahabah" along with Marthaas etc. and taking out "chaaryari flags" in their Muharram procession whereas the shias started saying tabarra in the separate

145 Reciting poems in praise of the four pious caliphs of the Holy Prophet. It was reported that apart from the praise of the caliphs, the poems sometimes include remarks and abuses against those who did not believe in the first three pious caliphs. Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahmar, pp. 201-202.

146 The flags attributed to the four pious caliphs, Abu Bakar Siddique, Umar Farooq, Usman Ghani and Ali al-Murtaza.

147 Expression of disapproval or fulminating against the first three pious caliphs.
processions more openly in the absence of the sunni element in their processions.\textsuperscript{148}

The government of U.P. appointed a commission under Justice Piggot on October 8, 1908 to look into the matter after receiving complaints from the shia community.\textsuperscript{149} According to the recommendations of the commission the government prohibited reciting Madh-i-Sahabah and taking out flags attributed to other than those to the Ahl-i-Bait for three days, Ashora-i-Muharrum, chelum and 21\textsuperscript{st} of Ramazan.\textsuperscript{150} The sunnis who formed 80 % of the population of Lucknow against 20 % shias protested against the ban on Madh-i-Sahabah and violating the ban, about one thousand sunnis were arrested and sentenced in 1909. In spite of the protests the ban continued till 1935 when the Ahrar got themselves involved in the affair and a number of arrests were made in 1936, following a shia-sunni riot.\textsuperscript{151}

For the year 1937, a temporary arrangement was agreed upon according to which the sunnis assured not to recite Madh-i-Sahaba in public that year and the shias also agreed

\textsuperscript{148} Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, pp. 193-194.
\textsuperscript{149} K. K. Aziz, A Chronology of Muslim India: 1700-1947, p. 165.
\textsuperscript{150} Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, pp. 212-213.
not to commit any breach of the order.\textsuperscript{152} Though the commission had recognized the right of the sunnis to recite Madh-i-Sahabah, the government did not act accordingly and the Ahrar started civil disobedience in the province of U.P. To counter the movement of the Ahrar, shia volunteers from various parts of the Punjab starting entering the province of U.P. in 1939. Since April 22 more than 400 shia volunteers left from various parts of the Punjab for Lucknow within a period of four weeks.\textsuperscript{153} In the first half of June 1939 about one thousand shia volunteers passed through Lahore to participate in tabarra agitation.\textsuperscript{154} On the other hand more than 900 sunni volunteers entered U.P. from the Punjab in three weeks since May 24, 1939.\textsuperscript{155} By the end of July the movement lost its momentum though the Ahrar leaders tried to keep the agitational movement alive till July 1941 by holding public meetings and courting arrests.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{152} Civil and Military Gazette March 18, 1937.

\textsuperscript{153} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 6, May 20 and May 27, 1939.

\textsuperscript{154} Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/7/2587.

\textsuperscript{155} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 3, June 10 and June 17, 1939.

\textsuperscript{156} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, August 5, 1939; Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, pp. 218-221.
Miscellaneous Campaigns and Decline of the Ahrar

Constant tumult and agitation, consistent campaign and pandemonium was the 'creed' of Ahrar in politics and along with the major issues that they took up for agitation, there were lesser issues also for which they stood for time to time. In 1931 the Ahrar participated in the agitation against the Principal MacLagan Engineering College, Captain Whittakar. It helped them to increase their prestige and to establish their influence in the urban circles. Next year they held protest meetings against the changes brought about by the University of the Punjab in the curriculum of Islamic history for the B.A. degree. In 1933 the Ahrar picketed the Pearl Talkies against exhibition of a film Hur-i-Haram which was alleged to offend Muslim religious sentiments. Protest meetings were held and a number of Ahrar volunteers were arrested. Ahrar leaders also held protest meetings against bombing operation by the Royal Air Force in Bajur. Fazl-i-

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158 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 18 and July 2, 1932.
Husain, Feroz Khan Noon and other Muslims leaders were taunted for their indifference.\textsuperscript{160}

During the Shaheedganj agitation, started in 1935, the Ahrar remained indifferent and their agitation against forward policy of the Government of India on NWFP failed to capture public attention. Their involvement in revival of Shaheedganj agitation in 1938 bore no fruit. Now they turned their attention to the Palistine problem. Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman was arrested after delivering a rebellious speech on Palistine Day.\textsuperscript{161} In October 1938 the Palistine Day was observed and public meetings were held by the Ahrar at Lahore, Gujrat, Lyallpur, Jullundur and Ambala. However towards the end of the year the agitation died out.\textsuperscript{162} In January next year, speeches were delivered by Ataullah Shah Bukhari against Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act.\textsuperscript{163} In February 1939 Habib-ur-Rehman’s proposal to start agitation against the Maharaja of Patiala was dropped by the Working Committee of the Majlis.\textsuperscript{164} In April-May they attempted to

\textsuperscript{160} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, September 2, 1933. Tow years later the Ahrar themselves exercised complete indifference to the Shaheedgunj movement because they wanted to contest elections. They failed to realize that Sir Fazl-i-Husain and others who were in the government must have had limitations.

\textsuperscript{161} Inqalab, April 10, 1938.


\textsuperscript{163} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, January 14, 1939.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., March 4, 1939.
start agitation against the Bahawalpur state and speeches were delivered against the "oppressive regime of the...Prime Minister" of the state.\textsuperscript{165} Soon they devoted their energies against army recruitment and continued their anti-war campaign for the rest of the year.\textsuperscript{166} However, in October there were signs of exhaustion and the Governor reported to the Viceroy that the "sting has been taken out" of the Ahrar's anti-recruitment agitation.\textsuperscript{167} However, the Ahrar continued the campaign somehow. In July 1941 Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar declared it "unwise" on part of the Ahrar "to pursue...anti-recruitment campaign."\textsuperscript{168} At last, in All India Ahrar Conference held at Lahore on February 21-22, 1942 a resolution was passed tabooing all forms of civil disobedience and prohibiting speeches against the recruitment.\textsuperscript{169} Their agitational campaigns being eclipsed by other events in 1940-41 like Muslim League's demand for a separate homeland, the Khaksar tragedy and its implications, the Ahrar suffered a rapid decline. In November-December 1940 attempts to hold Tabligh Conferences met with complete failure as only 500 to 600 people attended these

\textsuperscript{165} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 6 and June 3, 1939.

\textsuperscript{166} For details see ibid., August 16, August 23, October 28, November 25, December 2, December 16, December 23, and December 30, 1939.

\textsuperscript{167} Governor Punjab to Viceroy, November 16, 1939.

\textsuperscript{168} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, July 19, 1941.

\textsuperscript{169} Indian Annual Register 1942, Pt., II, p. 332.
In January next year unpopularity of the Ahrar further increased and at a congregational prayer of Eid at Badshahi mosque Lahore attended by 44,000 Muslims, the Ahrar could collect a fund of Rs.41 only.\textsuperscript{172} By November the Ahrar were forced to give up their campaign against army recruitment efforts because nobody was ready to volunteer for this campaign.\textsuperscript{172} In 1942 the death of Afzal Haq was also a deadly blow to the Ahrar. Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar who replaced him was no match for his predecessor.

\textbf{THE AHRAR AND THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS}

The Policy of the Ahrar towards the Congress had always been obscure and fluctuating. The Ahrar recognized Indian National Congress as "the greatest organisation of selfless people" and admitted that aims and objectives of the Majlis Ahrar are resembling with those of the Congress.\textsuperscript{173} In March 1932 the Ahrar were blamed to be bribed by the Congress to get their favour but the charges were denied by Ataullah Ghaznavi, Dictator Majlis Ahrar, and the Ahrar were advised

\textsuperscript{170} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, December 7, 1940.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid, January 11, 1941.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid November 8, 1941, Supplement No. 3.
\textsuperscript{173} Ahrar Parliamentary Board ka Intakhabi Manshoor (Lahore, 1936), p. 4.
to keep away from the Congress.\textsuperscript{174} However, the Ahrar practically adopted the Congress policy of agitation through picketing and the Muslim newspapers deplored this policy being against the rights of the individuals and against law and order.\textsuperscript{175} In October 1932 Pundit Malavia’s visit to the Punjab was opposed by the Ahrar and the Pundit was dubbed as a “bitter enemy of the Muslims”.\textsuperscript{176} In the same month Shaikh Sadiq, one of the Ahrar leaders presided an exhibition in which a poem contest was also held. In the poems, Gandhi was extolled as the greatest reformer of the age and the Hindu heroes were exalted.\textsuperscript{177} In December “Unity League” was formed which included the Ahrar leaders like Daud Gaznavi and Hassam-ud-Din alongwith a few Hindus and Sikhs.\textsuperscript{178} In mid 1934, the Working Committee of the Majlis Ahrar decided not to co-operate with the Congress Parliamentary Board but a few months later when Abdul Qayyum Defence Committee visited the Punjab, the Ahrar desired to receive it calmly to avoid Hindu-Muslim tension.\textsuperscript{179} The Ahrar appeared to be friendly with the Congress when Afzal Haq encouraged the Congress to

\textsuperscript{174} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 5, 1932.
\textsuperscript{175} Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab, March 5, 1932.
\textsuperscript{176} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, October 22, 1932.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., November 5, 1932.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., November 26, 1932.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid. June 9 and November 3, 1934.
occupy the ministries.\textsuperscript{180} On November 9, 1934 at the All India Ahrar Conference held at Sialkot the Majlis declared the attainment of complete independence as its goal.\textsuperscript{181} The resolution was welcomed by the Congress which resulted in "something of a rapprochement" between the Majlis and the Congress.\textsuperscript{182} Next month the Executive Committee of the Majlis asserted the Muslims to participate in Jubilee Celebrations of the Congress.\textsuperscript{183} In a series of eight articles of \textit{Mujahid}, Mazhar Ali Azhar opined that in the Punjab formation of non-communal parties could guarantee the success of the new constitution.\textsuperscript{184} Afzal Haq while presiding the Ahrar Conference at Amritsar in May 1936 stressed upon the need of an agreement between the Congress and the Majlis Ahrar.\textsuperscript{185} In the same month Jawahar Lal Nehru was presented an address by the Majlis when he visited the Punjab.\textsuperscript{186} The Ahrar leaders appealed to the Muslims to participate in "Independence Day Celebrations" of the Congress on January 26.\textsuperscript{187} Working Committee of Shoba-i-Tabligh of the Majlis resolved "to join forces with the Congress... retaining the separate entity of

\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Mujahid}, October 19, 1934.

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab}, November 16, 1935.


\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab}, December 21, 1935.

\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Civil and Military Gazette} January 12, 1936.

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab}, May 16, 1936.

\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Indian Annual Register 1936}, Pt. I, p. 21; \textit{Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab}, June 6, 1936.

\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Civil and Military Gazette}, January 28, 1937; \textit{Indian Annual Register 1937}, Pt., p. 4.
the Ahrar party organisation."^{188} Later, Shaikh Hassam-ud-Din, addressing public meetings at different places, stressed upon the Muslims to join the Congress.^{189} By mid 1937 the Ahrar were regarded to be "an admitted ally of the Congress."^{190} In November 1937, at least one local committee of the Ahrar (at Rawalpindi) decided to amalgamate with the local Congress committee.^{191} On the other hand the Congress did not give importance to the Ahrar and set up a candidate to oppose Afzal Haq in the by-elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly over which Afzal Haq and Hassam-ud-Din expressed "great regret".^{192} The Ahrar were not consulted by the Congress when the later started negotiations with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the President of All India Muslim League. This was also a matter of disappointment for the Ahrar. However they did not desist from favouring the Congress.^{193} Finally, in a meeting of the Working Committee of the Central Majlis Ahrar held at Lahore in the first week of August 1938 the Ahrar were prohibited to be the members of any other political body including the Congress and a committee was

^{188} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 15, 1937.

^{189} Ibid September 4, 1937.

^{190} Oriental India Office Collection, L/P/J/5/238.

^{191} Ibid.

^{192} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 7, 1938.

appointed to revise the party constitution accordingly.\textsuperscript{194} However, confusion and ambiguity in the constantly fluctuating attitude of the Majlis towards the Congress continued to be reflected in the statements of responsible Ahrar leaders.\textsuperscript{195} In March 1939 Ahrar leaders held joint meetings with the Majlis Itihad-i-Millat in Amritsar and criticized the conduct of Hindu Congress leaders. Only a week later, in Provincial Political Conference held at Jullundur under the presidency of Hassam-ud-Din, Abdul Rehman, the Chairman of the Reception Committee, offered full cooperation of the Majlis Ahrar to the Congress in the agitatin. In the same meeting Habib-ur-Rehman advised the Muslims to join the Congress.\textsuperscript{196} In early 1940 the Ahrar volunteers controlled the public when Jawaharlal Nehru visited Lahore and the proceedings of the public meeting opened with anti-Muslim League speech of Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman.\textsuperscript{197} In August 1940 Advisory Committee the Provincial Majlis Ahrar (Punjab) decided "to co-operate" with the Congress in the freedom movement without maintaining "any special connection" with it.\textsuperscript{198} In January 1941 Moulana Daud

\textsuperscript{194} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, August 13, 1938.
\textsuperscript{195} See \textit{Ibid.}, October 29, 1938; January 7, 1939; January 21, 1939; January 28, 1939; February 11, 1939; February 18, 1939; March 18, 1939.
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Ibid.}, March 18, 1939 and April 1, 1939.
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Ibid.}, January 6, 1940.
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Ibid} August 10, 1940.
Ghaznawi announced that "the Ahrar had thrown in their lot with the Congress" but the other Ahrar leaders who were in favour of independent action took strong exception to it and later he explained that he had expressed his personal point of view and not of the organisation. Majlis Ahrar launched the civil disobedience campaign in Lahore towards the end of 1940. Soon the campaign failed as it was unable to find volunteers in Lahore to court arrest. During the last week of January, only two Ahrar courted arrest one of whom was Muhammad Shafi, the Dictator Provincial Majlis Ahrar himself. The question of co-operation with the Congress was discussed again by the Working Committee the Punjab Provincial Majlis Ahrar who met under Sahabzada Faiz-ul-Hasan on February 21, 1942 at Lahore but nothing came out of it and the matter was postponed indefinitely. One group of the Majlis under Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman wanted to co-operate with the Congress whereas Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar was against it. In August 1942 when the Majlis decided to abstain from anti-government activities, Moulana Ghulam Ghous desired to take part in civil disobedience movement in

199 Governor's confidential Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of January, 1941.
200 Ibid., for the second half of January, 1941.
201 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, February 1, 1941.
202 Ibid., February 28, 1942.
203 Ibid., April 25, 1942.
204 Ibid., August 15, 1942.
N.W.F.P. as the pro-Congress Jamiat Ulema had announced to participate but he could not get his proposal through. In spite of the decision of the Majlis Ahrar, probably many of the Ahrar continued to take part in the civil disobedience movement and the Working Committee of the Majlis had to warn them through a circular not to participate in the civil disobedience campaign of the Congress. In fact the Ahrar never disassociated themselves from the Congress completely. Majority of the Ahrar leaders continued their membership of the Congress. Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman participated in the salt-satyagraha in April 1930. Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar was the General Secretary of the Congress Provincial Committee and took part in civil disobedience programme. Taj-ud-Din was also member of the Majlis as well the Congress.

The Congress, however, never gave due weight to the proposals and suggestions of the Ahrar. It were the Ahrar who continued the civil disobedience movement in 1932 when the Congress was banned and most of the Congress leaders were imprisoned. When Gandhi was to set for London to participate in second session of the Round Table Conference,

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205 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, August 22, 1942.
207 Ibid., pp. 354, 356.
208 Ibid., pp. 357-358.
Ataullah Shah Bukhari and Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman reached Bombay to persuade him not to attend the Round Table Conference but he refused to change his intention.\footnote{Janbaz Mirza, \textit{Hayat-i-Amee-i-Shariat} (Lahore, 1976), p. 146.} According to another source, the Ahrar asserted that Gandhi should have been accompanied by a nationalist Muslim Dr. Ansari but this proposal was also rejected by Gandhi.\footnote{Aziz-ur-Rehman Jam’ai, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 147.} In fact, despite their services for the Congress and respect for the Congress leaders, the Ahrar were rejected by the Congress whenever they tried to rise higher than the status of lackeys and flunkies. The Ahrar, however, could not detach themselves from the Congress. Probably their allegiance to the Congress was "much too deep to be ruffled by ugly demonstrations of Hindu intentions."\footnote{Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, \textit{Ulema in Politics}, (Karachi, 1974), p. 289.} The Majlis Ahrar came into being in the Congress camp and it could never come out of it.

MJLIS AHRAR-I-ISLAM: AN APPRAISAL

The objectives and the policies of the Ahrar had never been clear to them. Sometimes their policies appeared to be self-contradictory. They were in favour of anti-British and allegedly con-communal policies of the Congress but at the
same time they raised the slogan of *Hakoomat-i-Illahiyya*. On one hand they preached the necessity of *Hakoomat-i-Illahiyya* but on the other, they were strongly against All India Muslim League that had resolved to establish a separate homeland for the Muslims. The non-communal stand of the Ahrar and their belief in the unity of India could not correspond with their slogan of *Hakoomat-i-Illahiyya* and at the same time because of this slogan they could not fit into the Congress’ scheme of things. They were anti-British but did not hesitate siding with the unionists against the Muslim League. Elections were so important to them that they remained aloof from taking part in the Shaheedgunj movement and paid for it heavily but on the other hand the most important leaders of the Ahrar like Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari were fully convinced that elections were the greatest mischief (*fitna-i-azeem*) and every time he tried that the Ahrar must not take part in the elections. In Kapurthala, we find Afzal Haq negotiating with the state authorities for carrying the *tazia* and even he was ready to arrange for digging the ground sinking the road ten feet deeper so that the *tazia* could be carried through without any hindrance.

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On the other hand, he led the Madh-i-Sahabah movement in Lucknow and the Ahrar were ready to make every sacrifice while campaigning against the shias. They wanted to establish "the government of the poor" but they nominated Nawabzada Khurshid Ali son of Sir Zulfiqar Ali as their candidate to the Punjab Legislative Council in defiance of their socialist principles.

Their emotions and their enthusiasm could not formulate itself into some practicable and useful form. They did demolish and devastate but could not conserve and institute. "Their zeal outruns their sense. Their enthusiasm outruns their intelligence."

They concentrated on minor and insignificant problems giving importance out of all proportions to trivial matters while ignored the issues of primary importance. Being indifferent to the ground realities, they were carrying Ludharam Foot Constable with them throughout the Punjab in their public meetings or quarrelling on the burial of the dead-bodies of Ahmadi children in Muslim graveyards when the

216 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. "30".
217 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, September 2, 1933.
218 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 247.
All India Muslim League was struggling for the demand of a separate Muslim state in the sub-continent.\textsuperscript{220}

The Ahrar had often been unfair while dealing with their opponents and charged them with totally baseless allegations. During the Kashmir agitation when Shaikh Abdullah differed with them, they immediately accused him of being a Qadiani.\textsuperscript{221} There are instances when in public meetings responsible Ahrar leaders like Habib-ur-Rehman dubbed the followers of Moulana Zafar Ali Khan as Qadianis and asked the volunteers to turn them out from the meeting.\textsuperscript{222} Even a venerated spiritual leader like Syed Jamat Ali Shah was accused by the Ahrar of having pro-Ahmadi views when he differed from them on the issue of Shaheedgunj.\textsuperscript{223}

The Ahrar often acted imprudently. They picketed the cloth shops of the Muslim shopkeepers and dealers of fireworks in a period of economic distress.\textsuperscript{224} Their leaders did not care for the public sentiments in certain locations and created resentment against themselves by speaking unnecessarily against popular religious and spiritual

\textsuperscript{220} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, July 27, 1940.

\textsuperscript{221} Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 142.

\textsuperscript{222} Muhammad Saeed, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{223} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, September 21, 1935.

\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Ibid.}, November 26, 1932.
personalities highly venerated by the local people. Their confusion sometime led them to behave ridiculously. They were ready to have a picketing on the house of Mr. Jinnah in Bombay because Sikandar was unable to solve the Shaheedgunj issue. They could appeal to the Congress for the funds to organise jathas for restoration of the Shaheedgunj mosque.

So often, the policy and the objectives of the Ahrar were ascertained by or at least adjusted to their requirement of funds. When the Ahrar discussed their policy towards the Congress in their meeting in early 1942, their considerations can be judged through the condition that the Ahrar would accept the membership of the Congress provided they were exempt from paying the membership fee.

In fact the Majlis Ahrar had always been facing paucity of funds. Financial difficulties had been the "greatest

225 For instance, Ataullah Shah Bukhari criticized the local pars in Dera Ghazi Khan and had had a narrow escape from thrashing. Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 1, 1933.
226 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, July 18, 1939.
228 They decided to picket foreign cloth shops so that the Majlis, whose "treasury was empty", could spare expenditure by following the civil disobedience movement launched by the Congress. Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 75.
229 The other condition was about the foreign policy towards the Muslim countries. Surprisingly there was no consideration of the political rights of the Indian Muslims. Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, February 28, 1942.
hurdle” (sad-i-Sikandari) in the way of the Ahrar. At one stage it was decided by the Majlis to appoint peddlers to hawk around to collect contributions from the public in Lahore. Toward the end of 1932 the Ahrar organ Hurriyat had to discontinue its publication due to non-availability of funds. Next year again the Majlis was reported to be in deplorable financial position which continued so till the Quetta earthquake when the Ahrar leaders appealed to the public to give contributions to the Ahrar for relief work instead of contributing to the Government. How people gradually became reluctant to give contributions to the Ahrar is well demonstrated by the fact that on the occasion of Eid at Lahore the Ahrar could collect only an amount of Rs. 41 from a gathering of more than 40,000 Muslims. In 1942 the Working Committee of All India Majlis Ahrar had to postpone the annual session indefinitely due to shortage of funds apart from other considerations.

One possible reason for failure of the Ahrar in collection of contributions from the public was the frequent

230 Afzal Haq, Tarikh-i-Ahrar, p. 46.
231 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, October 29, 1932.
232 Ibid., November 26, 1932.
233 Ibid., August 12, 1933; June 22, 1935
234 Ibid., January 11, 1941.
235 Ibid., February 28, 1942.
charges of embezzlement of funds. In 1932 on at least three occasions, apprehensions were raised regarding the funds etc. In Sialkot, the Secretary of the Majlis filed a suit against the Treasurer accusing him of embezzlement. In July, Zain-ul-Abdin Shah, the president of Multan branch resigned and refused to render an account of the funds at his disposal. There were instances of stealing the property of the organisation by responsible workers of the Majlis. Hussain Mir, the Manager of Hurriyat was dismissed on the charges of stealing 250 reams of newsprint. Sometimes the Ahrar workers were found guilty of stealing petty office goods and misappropriating cash from the office of the organisation. Janbaz Mirza, General Secretary Majlis Ahrar Amritsar, was accused by his Ahrar friends, of stealing Rs.300 from the Ahrar office and he resigned from secretary-ship. There was a split again among the Lahore and Sialkot Ahrar in March 1933 and the Ahrar leaders were accused of misappropriating funds and not accounting for expenditure. Next year the Jullundur Muslims accused Ahrar leaders of accepting bribe.

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236 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 14, 1932.
237 Ibid., July 30, 1932.
238 Ibid., October 22, 1932.
239 Ibid., February 11, 1933; April 8, 1933.
241 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 8, 1933.
from Kapurthala state authorities and of embezzlement of funds collected for propaganda purposes.²⁴² Abdul Karim Mubahillah of Amritsar was accused of misappropriation of funds of Shuba-i-Tabligh which caused lot of resentment and disappointment among the sincere workers.²⁴³ Even at the highest level, because of apprehensions against Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman the money was remitted directly to Ataullah Shah Bukhari, who in turn, was suspected by Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman, of misusing party funds to purchase a house at Amritsar worth Rs.3000.²⁴⁴ After the death of Afzal Haq, the Ahrar collected at least Rs.12,000 in Afzal Haq Memorial Fund.²⁴⁵ Any memorial built in the memory Afzal Haq is not known. He is buried at Miani Sahab, Lahore.²⁴⁶ Later, Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar was accused of receiving an amount of Rs.95,000 from Congress and the Unionist Party which he could not deny.²⁴⁷

In the Majlis-i-Ahrar individual leaders were more important and prominent than the organisation itself. In the absence of any comprehensive party program, they were out to celebrate ‘Abdur

²⁴² Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 19, 1934.
²⁴³ Ibid., November 9, 1940.
²⁴⁴ Ibid., January 19, 1935.
²⁴⁵ Ibid., June 13, 1942.
²⁴⁷ For details see Shorish Kashmiri, Baa-i-Gul Nala-i-Dil Dood-i-Charagh-i-Mehfil (Lahore, 1972), pp.343-344. In the new addition of the book published in 1994 the whole of this affair was excluded.
Rehman Day", "Bukhari Day", "Afzal Haq Day" etc. Every leader had his individual ideas. They did not have internal harmony of thought. It was only their anti-British feelings that had united them. They were anti-British but they had no positive clear-cut political program. They fawned upon other anti-British organisations like Indian National Congress and Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind. Despite their profession of socialist ideas, they failed to mobilize the support of lower strata of the Muslims society like the farmers, cultivators and artisans. Some of the important leaders left the Majlis one by one. In 1931, Zafar Ali Khan and Ghazi Abdul Rehman left the organisation.\(^\text{249}\) Daud Ghaznavi joined the Indian National Congress in 1940, Habib-ur-Rehman left the Majlis in 1945 and accepted the leadership of Abul Kalam Azad. Next year, Mazhar Ali Azhar resigned.\(^\text{250}\) Some of the orthodox Ulema like Moulana Ahmad Ali of Lahore disapproved the Ahrar's practice of beating drums for marching.\(^\text{251}\) Young and inexperienced persons occupied important offices of the organisation. For example Abdul Karim Shorish was made General Secretary of the Majlis in 1939-1940 who was a boy of school-going age in 1935 and in the same year discontinued his education without completing his Matriculation.\(^\text{251}\)


\(^{249}\) Shorish Kashmiri, Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari, pp. 105-106.

\(^{250}\) Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, September 31, 1936.

\(^{251}\) History Sheet No. A-11, Intelligence Department of the Punjab Police. According to his own account, he passed his Matriculation examination in 1932. Shorish Kashmiri, Boo-i-Gul Nala-i-Dil Dood-i-Charagh-i-Mehfil,(Lahore, 1972), p. 59.
The Ahrar did not participate in the movement for restoration of Shaheedgunj mosque in 1935. Later in 1939, when they started the campaign for the restoration of Shaheedgunj, it made their position even more ridiculous.\textsuperscript{252}

Their opposition to the Pakistan movement was not acceptable to the Muslim masses. Though Afzal Haq advised the Ahrar not to oppose the demand for Pakistan,\textsuperscript{254} the Majlis-i-Ahrar passed resolutions against Pakistan.\textsuperscript{255} While opposing Pakistan, their slogan of \textit{Hakoomat-i-Illahiyya} was nothing but a fallacy because there was no possibility of establishment of \textit{Hakoomat-i-Illahiyya} in a united India which had been their creed all the time.\textsuperscript{255}

Despite their shortcomings, the Ahrar gave birth to anti-Imperialist minds among the Muslim youth. They produced a group of active political workers and excellent orators. There were some brave, sincere and anti-Imperialist persons among their leaders but the fact remains that they could neither unite the Muslims under any progressive program nor could they unite the Muslims and the non-Muslims of the Punjab.

\textsuperscript{252} Their role in the Shaheedgunj movement has been discussed in Chapter III.


\textsuperscript{255} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 9, 1940: April 20, 1940.

CHAPTER III

THE MOVEMENT

FOR

THE RESTORATION OF SHAHEEDGANJ MOSQUE
HISTORY OF SHAHEEDGUNJ MOSQUE

In 1935 there emerged a strong agitational movement, shaking the whole of the province of the Punjab, for the restoration of a mosque called Shaheedgunj mosque in Lahore. The Shaheedgunj mosque was originally built by Abdullah Khan, Khan-i-Saman of Dara Shikoh.¹ Later during the reign of Muhammad Shah, when Yahya Khan was the governor of the Punjab, the Sikhs had become a strong group and they started plundering the areas to the north of Lahore. In order to crush them Yahya Khan send some troops under Jaspat Rai who was overpowered and killed by the Sikhs. Yahya Khan sent another expedition against the Sikhs under Lakhpat Rai, the brother of Jaspat Rai. Lakhpat Rai defeated the Sikhs and slaughtered them in large number. To take the revenge of his brother, one thousand Sikhs were brought by him to Lahore. The prisoners in chains were paraded in the bazaar of Lahore and then all of them were mercilessly killed at nakhashkana (Horse Market) outside the Delhi Gate near the mosque of Abdullah Khan. In 1746

¹ Noor Ahmad Chishti, Tehqiqat-i-Chishti (Lahore, 1966), pp. 826-827.
Bhai Taru Singh an old companion of Govind Singh was also executed there. Later a samadh was erected and since then the place was called Shaheedganj by the Sikhs to commemorate killings. Mir Manu who was appointed as the governor of the Punjab in 1748 continued the policy of persecuting the Sikhs more vigorously. Under his orders, hundreds of the Sikhs were brought daily to Lahore and were killed at Nakhaskhana or Shaheedganj outside the Delhi Gate. "Their misfortune ended" when Mir Manu died in 1753. In 1763-64 when Gojar Singh, Lahna Singh and Sobha Singh occupied Lahore, they also took possession of Shaheedganj, the mosque of Abdullah Khan and the adjacent area. Under the Central door of the building, Granth Sahab was kept and the other rooms were used as langar. In 1883 the Guru Granth Sahab was removed because of dilapidated condition of the building. Professor Gulshan Rai in his article tried to prove that it had never been a mosque, rather it was the Qazi's court used for passing the orders of execution of

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4 Syed Muhammad Latif, *op.cit.*, p.221.
5 Aziz Ahmad Choudhari, *op.cit.*, p. 146.
7 *All India Reporter* 1938, p.372.
the Sikhs. However, in the High Court it was considered as a proved fact accepted by both the Muslims and the Sikhs that in the year 1722 the building dedicated to God as a Mosque and it was used as a Mosque until the establishment of the Sikh Rule in 1762. Since 1762 onward however, the building had not been used as a Mosque. At the time of dedication of the mosque in 1722 one Sheikh Din Muhammad was appointed as its first mutawalli. Year after the annexation of the Punjab to the British India in 1849, Noor Muhammad, a descendant of the original mutawalli Din Muhammad filed a civil suit for possession of the mosque but failed because of adverse possession of the Mahants. A number of other attempts between 1852 to 1930 on part of the individuals and Muslims Institutions to get possession of the mosque through legal means also failed on the same.

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9 All India Reporter 1938, Shaheed Ganj Versus Shiromani Grudawara Parbandahak Committee, p.372.

10 Ibid., p.378.

11 Decision of District Session Judge, Cave No.7, 1935. Naseem Kaur, op.cit., p.12; Muhammad Khurshid, op.cit., pp.5-6. According to the Limitation Act, the limitation began to run when the Sikhs took possession of the mosque in 1762 and the Muslims lost all rights to the mosque at the expiry of the period of twelve years prescribed in the Act. The Court of view that the personal law of the Muhammadans had been modified by the Punjab Laws Act and the Limitation Act.
When Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee applied for possession of Shaheedganj Gurdwara and other buildings including the mosque according to Gurdwara Act 1925, the Gurdwara Tribunal refused to admit that the mosque formed part of the property attached to it and Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee got possession of the mosque compromising privately with the Mahants. However, this compromise was ratified by the Gurdwara Tribunal. Finally, the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee with Tara Singh as its President took possession of Gurdwara Shaheedganj, the mosque, the attached shops etc. in March 1935.

DEMOLITION AND AGITATION

The tension between the Sikhs and the Muslims began when the Sikhs occupied the tomb of Hazrat Kaku Shah and erected walls around the tomb in the absence of the

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mutawalli of the tomb. On June 28, the Sikhs attempted to demolish a portion of the mosque and during this action two of them were buried under the debris resulting in the death of one of them and acute injuries to the other. When the Muslims heard of the incident, they gathered outside the Gurdwara on the next morning and the trouble was averted by the arrival of Deputy Commissioner, the City Magistrate and other local officers who ordered the Sikhs to cease their activities of demolishing the mosque. According to Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar, who happened to be a witness to the incident, the City Magistrate while persuading the Muslim mob to go back, assured the Muslims that demolition of the mosque had definitely been stopped and that the Sikhs would not be allowed to demolish the mosque any further till some decision was reached between the parties.

On June 30 and July 1, the Sikhs in their diwans, held in Gurdwara Dera Sahib in Gurdwara Shaheedgunj resolved that they would lay their lives to defend their Gurdwara because the Muslims had no reason to interfere in demolition of the building that had been granted to the

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16 Zamindar, June 28, 1935.
18 Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence, July 6, 1935.
Sikhs by the High Court. On the other hand the Muslims gathered on July 1, at the house of Mian Abdul Aziz (1872-1971) and Anjuman Tahaffuz-I-Masjid Shaheedganj was founded. On the same date a public meeting of 8000 Muslims was held at night outside Mochi Gate presided by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan. Resolutions were passed to protest against the sacrilege of the mosque by the Sikhs, recording anxiety at the threatened demolition of the mosque. Maulana Zafar Ali Khan announced that at the meeting of selected representatives of various Muslims organisations held earlier in the morning at Mian Abdul Aziz’s house, a number of sub-committees had been formed connected with the Anjaman Tahaffuz-I-Masjid Shaheedganj. The following committees were announced before the public to get the approval of audience:

(I) Committee of Ulema and Pleaders

1. Sheikh Azeem Ullah, Vakil
2. Malik Barkat Ali
3. Syed Muhammad Hassan
4. Mohsin Shah, Vakil
5. Ghulam Murshid
6. Dr. Muhammad Alam
7. Muhammad Aslam, Convenor

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21 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 7, 1935.
(II) Committee to collect material regarding the property of the mosque.

1. M. Habib
2. Zafar Ali Khan
3. Muhammad Ali Jafri (Convenor)
4. Qazi Ihsan Ahmed
5. Haji Habib Ullah

(III) Committee to negotiate with the Sikh leaders:

1. Dr. Kitchlew
2. Zafar Ali (Convenor)
3. Dr. Muhammad Alam
4. Malik Lal Khan
5. Sayed Habib
6. Afzal Haq
7. Mazhar Ali

(IV) Sub-Committee to interview the Deputy Commissioner and other high officials:

1. Khan Ghulam Mustafa Naik
2. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din, Barrister
3. M. Akhter Ali Khan
4. Syed Mohsin Shah
5. Farrukh Hussain, Bar-at-Law
6. Murtaza Ahmed Maikash
(V) Propaganda Committee

1. Akhtar Ali
2. Muhammad Din Mir
3. Moulana Ayaz
4. Shaikh Kanwar Din
5. Daud Ghaznavi
6. Dr. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din
7. Abdul Hanan
8. Hassan Jafri

(VI) Committee to collect funds

1. Nawab Muhammad Shahnawaz of Mamdot, President
2. Nawab Nisar Ali Khan, Vice President
3. Zafar Ali Khan, Secretary
4. Syed Habib, Joint Secretary
5. K.S. Amir-ud-Din, Financial Secretary
   and a few members.

At the end of the meeting the audience demanded that Ataullah Shah Bukhari should be included in all the sub-committees. According to Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, the public also insisted to include the other Ahrar leaders in the sub-committees but Ahrar leaders, except Afzal Haq, Maulana

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22 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, 1935, pp.277-278.
23 Ibid., July 6, 1935.
Mazhar Ali Azhar and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi himself, were not included in the committees.24

The Akalis also held a secret meeting on July 1 at Amritsar at the office of Shiromani Akali Dal. On proposal of Master Tara Singh, jatha of 20 Akalis armed with kirpans, lathis, safajangs immediately left for Lahore and other subordinate jathas were held in readiness. By July 4, about 1000 Akalis had collected inside Gurdwara Shaheedgunj and still more expected to come.26 On the night of July 3, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Syed Habib and other Muslim leaders addressed the gathering of 10,000 Muslims outside Mochi Gate. Though the Muslim leaders advised the Muslims to remain peaceful, but the emotions raised high and the tension between the Sikhs and the Muslims was very acute.26 Muslim newspapers expressed their anxiety about jathas of Akalis armed with axes and kirpans pouring in Lahore.27 On July 5, a rumour went round that the walls of the Shaheedgunj Mosque were being knocked down. This led to great excitement and about 400 Muslims immediately marched

24 Mujahid, September 16, 1935.
26 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 6, 1935.
27 Inqalab, July 5 & 6. For comments of other Muslim newspapers, like Eastern Times, Siyasi and Zamindar on the situation, see Report on Newspapers and Periodicals 1935, July 6, 1935.
towards the mosque, collecting en route a large number of Muslims and at Landa Bazar the police had to confront a crowd of about 2,000 Muslims which was dispersed by the police. On July 6 again there was a rumour at 2.00 pm that the Sikhs were demolishing some parts of the mosque but on investigation it was found baseless.\textsuperscript{29} On the same day the local Sikh leaders at the Gurdwara decided that the question of demolishing the mosque would be postponed until the Sikh deputation had talked to the Governor.\textsuperscript{30} On July 6 Muslims and Sikh deputations waited on the Governor who held lengthy discussions with them to find an amicable settlement.\textsuperscript{31} The Governor Sir Herbert Emerson, reached from Simla to Lahore on Saturday morning (July 6) accompanied by Mr. D. J. Boyd, the Finance Member; Mr. F. H. Pucke, Chief Secretary; and Mr. J.D. Anderson, Legal Membrancer. Apart from these officials, Mr. Alan Mitchell, the Commissioner of Lahore and Mr. S. Partab, Deputy Commissioner were also present during the discussion with the deputationists on July 6. The Muslim Deputations consisted of Muhammad Din Malik, President of Lahore Municipal Committee; Mian Abdul Aziz, ex-President of Lahore Municipal Committee; Nawab

\textsuperscript{28} Civil & Military Gazette, July 7, 1935. Dispersal of 2,000 Muslims on July 5 also reported in Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 13, 1935.

\textsuperscript{29} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 13, 1935.

\textsuperscript{30} Civil & Military Gazette, July 7, 1935.
Muhammad Shahnawaz Khan of Mamdot (1883-1942), Nawab Nisar Ali Khan Qazilbash; Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Syed Habib, Dr. Muhammad Alam, Bar-at-Law; Malik Lal Khan (1890-1976), Dr. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din (b.1887), Bar-at-Law; Syed Mohsin Shah Advocate; Mian Amir-ud-Din (1889-1989), Municipal Commissioner; Maulana Ghulam Murshid; Mian Ghias-ud-Din, MLA and Maulana Izz-ud-Din, Imam of Badshahi Mosque. The Muslim Deputationists asserted that according to Muslim Law of Waqf a building once made a waqf remained waqf for ever. However, they agreed that this was not a part of the civil law of the country. They expressed their strong wish that the building should be returned to the Muslims and if it was not possible, at least it should be left as it was and must not be used for a purpose that would offend the feelings of the Muslims. The Governor explained to the Muslim Deputations that so far the legal position of the case was concerned, the Government had reached the conclusion that all the decisions of the civil courts had been consistently in favour of the Sikhs and was not possible for the Government to go against the decisions. However, the Sikhs should be impressed upon to realise their moral responsibility. This being a position, the Governor assured that, despite the difficulty that the

31 Ibid., July 7, 1935.
feelings were extremely high on both sides, the Government would do its utmost to bring the Sikhs to a reasonable frame of mind and to explore the possibility of an agreement between the two communities honourable to both.\textsuperscript{33} The Sikh deputation comprising Master Tara Singh, Sardar Mangal Singh (MLA), Sardar Harnam Singh, Dr. Kartar Singh, Sardar Amar Singh, Sardar Gopal Singh, Sardar Gurmukh Singh, Sardar Ujjal Singh, Gyani Khazan Singh, Sardar Gurdit Singh, Sardar Jawahar Singh, Sardar Waryam Singh, Bhagat Jaswant Singh, waited upon the Governor on July 6 at 2.30 pm.\textsuperscript{34} The attitude of the Sikh deputationists was not encouraging. They stressed that the legal decisions had been consistently in their favour. Therefore, they were free to do with the building whatever they like. In this background they refused to give any assurance that the building would not be demolished at least up to an agreed time so that various possibilities for solution might be explored. However, they gave the Government an understanding that the final decision for or against demolishing would not be taken before the meeting of Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee scheduled to be held on July 8.\textsuperscript{35} Both the Muslims and the Sikhs held


\textsuperscript{34} Civil & Military Gazette, July 7, 1935.

\textsuperscript{35} Government of the Punjab, Press Communiqué No. 1379 dated July 10, 1935.
meetings at night attended by about 20,000 and 5,000 people respectively. Though great enthusiasm prevailed on both sides, the speakers advised the audience to be peaceful.³⁶ The situation improved slightly because both the parties were waiting for the results of negotiations of the deputations with the Governor.³⁷ On July 7 when the Muslim delegation again met the Governor at noon, they were told that his only hope was that the Sikhs would keep their words and would not demolish the mosque until the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee gave its considered decision.³⁸ Meanwhile the Sikh Leaders were slowly losing their control over their more extreme followers. In the evening of July 7, a Sikh was found dead near Shahalmi Gate. Though the post mortem report showed that the man died of a natural death, the Sikhs assumed that he had been murdered by the Muslims. Infuriated by the incident the Sikhs commenced demolition of the mosque during the night of July 7.³⁹ On Monday morning (July 8), "The City woke up to find the mosque being demolished by the Sikhs".⁴⁰ Next morning there were two incidents of stabbing of Sikhs one of that being a police constable by a Muslim on the same

³⁶ Civil & Military Gazette July 7, 1935.
³⁷ Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 13, 1935.
³⁹ Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 13, 1935.
⁴⁰ Civil & Military Gazette, July 9, 1935.
day. As soon as the demolition of the mosque was reported to the authorities, extra troops and police force were made available at certain places to avoid bloodshed and rioting. Curfew Order was imposed on July 8 and pre-censorship was imposed on all articles, news items and comments about Shaheedgunj Gurdwara to be published in the newspapers of Lahore. Lahore remained calm on July 9 and there were no individual assaults. Though in the evening a public meeting of 5,000 Muslims was held in the Badshahi Mosque, the crowd dispersed quietly. However, eleven persons were arrested on the night of July 9, for defying the Curfew Order. On the next night 36 arrests were made for disobeying the Curfew Order. At this stage Zafar Ali Khan and Syed Habib of Daily Siyasat created great excitement by their speeches. The later, in his speech at Mochi Gate on July 14, announced that a volunteer corps and a council of action had been formed with Zafar Ali Khan as the first dictator. During the course of his speech he further said that the Muslims did not want any confrontation with the

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41 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 13, 1935.
43 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 13, 1935.
44 Ibid., July 13, 1935. According to the statement of D.J. Boyd, one company in addition to the troops normally stationed at Lahore (the Dorsetshire Regiment) was brought into Lahore on July 8. It stayed up to August 1 with exception of two days July 17 and 18. Another company also arrived at Lahore on July 16, followed by the Head Quarter Wing and another company on July 23. The 9 troops stationed in Lahore till August 13. Punjab Legislative Council Debates 1935, Vol. XXVII, p.963.
Government but if the Government continued to insist upon rights of the Sikhs on the mosque the Muslims would forcibly occupy the mosque despite the presence of troops, police and the Sikh jathas.\textsuperscript{45} On the same night (July 14) Zafar Ali Khan, Syed Habib, Malik Lal Khan and Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad (1901-1946) were interned from the Lahore District. Zafar Ali Khan and Malik Lal Khan were confined at Karamabad and Naushehra Virkan respectively. Whereas Syed Habib and Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad were restricted in Montgomery (Sahiwal) prohibiting all of them from any political activity.\textsuperscript{46}

Muslim Press was furious and the internment of Zafar Ali Khan, Syed Habib and others was condemned as it was their effort to restraint the Muslims and to keep them peaceful.\textsuperscript{47} Employment of volunteers continued in the office of Zimindar throughout the day on July 16 and about 115 volunteers were enrolled.\textsuperscript{48} All the important leaders had been arrested and irresponsible youth unfortunately took

\textsuperscript{45} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 27, 1935.

\textsuperscript{46} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 27, 1935. Maintenance allowance given to them for financial loss suffered by them due to internment since July 15 was as under: Zafar Ali Khan Rs.120 per month; Syed Habib Rs.120 per month; Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad Rs.75 per month; Malik Lal Khan Rs.75 per month. Punjab Legislative Council Debates 1935, Vol. XXVII, p.525.

\textsuperscript{47} Inqalab, July 19, 1935.

\textsuperscript{48} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 27, 1935.
the lead. In the afternoon a meeting in the Badshahi Mosque was presided by Abdul Karim Shorish, then a boy of 16 or 17 years of age. He provoked the public and emotions were let loosed when he blasted that the Muslims would take possession of the Shaheedgunj Mosque and very soon the flag of Islam would be hoisted on the Red Fort of Delhi. The meeting had to be dispersed by the police and eight persons were arrested from the crowd marching towards Lange Mandi.

Next day a meeting of some 1500 people was addressed by Shorish. He moved the regulations to congratulate the speakers of July 16 on their arrest and to condemn the disbursement of the Muslims crowed near Lange Mandi. The speakers urged the audience “to take to the sword, attack Shaheedgunj Gurdwara and take possession of the site” to rebuild the mosque. With much difficulty and trouble Shorish was arrested by police along with other speakers after the meeting was over. After the arrest of Shorish another young man Amin-ud-Din Sahrai continued to instigate the people to take out a procession under his leadership from the Badshahi Mosque to defy the orders under section

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50 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 27, 1935. Shorish could manage to escape from the police but on next day he was arrested. Abdul Karim Shorish, Boo-i-Gul, op.cit., pp.81,85.

51 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 27, 1935.

52 Shorish Kashmiri, Boo-i-Gul, op.cit., pp.84-85.
144 CPC. After the meeting in the mosque on July 19, he took out a procession of the excited Muslim crowd and marched towards Landa Bazar. On its way to the Shaheedgunj, the crowd was held up by the police and a large number of arrests were made. The frenzied mob destroyed three police-vans and at least fifty persons who had been arrested by the police were rescued by the crowd. The clash between the police and agitators continued from 4.00 pm till 4.00 am on the next day and the police affected about sixty more arrests during the night. On the morning July 20, violent the session of about 2,000 Muslims marched towards Delhi Gate. Consistent efforts were made by the authorities to disperse the crowd by lathi charges and Cavalry charges by the mounted police but the crowd re-assembled and continued throwing stones and brick bats on the police and the army troops. When the continued efforts of two hours failed and the mob became more violent, six rounds were fired and after sometime two more rounds were fired resulting at least three casualties. According to Mr. D.J. Boyd, the Finance Member, initially the crowd outside the Delhi Gate was of about 5,000 participants and

54 Ibid. See also Waheed Ahmad, ed., Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain (Lahore, 1976), pp.412-414, Chhotu Ram to Sir Fazl-i-Husain, July 20, 1935.
55 Indian Annual Register 1936, Pt.II, p.333.
56 Waheed Ahmad ed., Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, op.cit., p.413.
later it swelled to about 10,000 excluding the large part of the crowd inside the Delhi Gate. Feroz Khan Noon made conciliatory efforts and consulted the Muslim leaders like Zafar Ali Khan, Syed Habib, Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad and Nawab Shahnawaz Khan persuaded all of them to agree that the ownership and the possession of the mosque site should vest in the Sikhs but the site would be walled around, fenced and not built over nor used for ever. The Sikhs were initially willing to agree to this position provided if they were allowed to have a right to mow the lawns and to grow flowers etc., however, later they backed out and the negotiation failed. On the other hand, the Muslim mob lead by irresponsible "wild youth" were not ready to listen to anybody, "all ready to die". In spite of firing and resultant casualties, the crowd at the Delhi Gate remained in position throughout the night though it became rather peaceful. The mobs that had swelled considerably during the night were on the Circular Road on both sides of the kotwali. On July 21, when some of the mob moving towards the outer road, blocked the only way of communication with the kotwali, i.e. Landa Bazar, the police was sent to

disperse the crowd in order to open the road. When the police failed to do so because of heavy stoning by the mob, two rounds were fired by the troops and after warning more rounds were fired. The crowd on the Akbari Gate side of the Kotwali was also fired. This resulted in diminishing of the crowd and by 9.00 pm the Circular Road was completely cleared. 60 On the same evening after the firing, Akhtar Ali Khan and some of the Ahrar leaders persuaded the crowd to leave the Delhi Gate and go to the Wazir Khan Mosque to continue the struggle peacefully. Akhtar Ali Khan delivered a message of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan to discontinue the morcha and that also had a great effect. 61 July 22 and 23 were calm days and the situation improved considerably though a complete strike was observed in the city. Maulana Ghulam Murshid addressed gathering of about 1,000 people and advised them not to defy the Government's Curfew Orders and to avoid violence. 62 Some people started courting

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60 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 27, 1935. In two days, July 20 and 21, the firing was resorted to on ten occasions. However, only 23 rounds in all were used. Punjab Legislative Council Debates 1935, Vol. XXVII, p.847. According to the official sources nine persons were killed. Noon to Sir Fazl-i-Husain, July 23, 1935. Waheed Ahmad, ed., Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, op.cit., p.416.

61 Shorish Kashmiri, Boro-i-Gal, p.92. Shorish considered it "a false message" but it appeared to be a genuine message as under the new circumstances Zafar Ali Khan and other leaders had been convinced by Feroz Khan Noon of the necessity of coming to some peaceful settlement with the Sikhs on the issue instead of attempting to forcibly occupy the site of the mosque. See Noon to Sir Fazl-i-Husain, July 20, 1935 in Waheed Ahmad Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, op.cit., pp.409-410.

arrests in jathas of five or six persons. However, it could not be continued after July 25 and nobody offered himself for arrest on July 26, though there was some agitational activity outside Lahore in the districts of Montgomery, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala, Amritsar and Lyallpur without any serious threat to law and order. The Council of Punjab Muslim League at a meeting held on July 25, 1935 passed resolutions condemning the demolition of the Shaheedgunj mosque by the Sikhs in spite of clear pledges given by them to the Muslims and to the Punjab government that the mosque would not be demolished until it was discussed by the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhndhak Committee to explore if there was a chance of some settlement of the issue. The role of the government before and after the demolition was also criticized and profound sympathy was expressed with the relatives of those Muslims who were killed or injured. Towards the end of July the agitation had diminished and the Muslim press advised the Muslims to adopt constitutional methods. At this stage Civil & Military Gazette reported that the Muslims in Lahore were

63 Civil & Military Gazette, July 24, 1935.
64 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 27, 1935.
"returning to the saner method of securing ... their rights by constitutional means".  

A joint conference of the Ahrar and the Anjaman-I-Tahaffuz-I-Masjid Shaheedganj was called in the Barkat Ali Hall on July 28. There was a sharp difference of opinion about the objectives of the conference, as a section of the people present there proposed that the restoration of the mosque should have been declared as one of the objective of the conference. The Ahrar leaders, opposing this proposal, walked out of the conference but on the next day when the proceedings were resumed, they were persuaded to join again and a compromise resolution was passed declaring that the Muslims could not be satisfied unless the Shaheedgunj mosque is "protected". In the conference, a body Majlis Ithad-i-Milli was established under Malik Muhammad Din as President, Lal Din Qaisar (1899-1956) as Vice President (later rose to the office of President) and M. Daud Ghaznavi as General Secretary. Later various sub-committees were formed at the Zamindar's office on July 30. One of them to negotiate with the Sikhs on the issue of

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67 Civil & Military Gazette, July 31, 1935.
68 Civil & Military Gazette, July 30, 1935.
69 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 7, 1935.
70 Ibid., August 3, 1935; al-Islah, September 13, 1935, p. 5.
Shaheedgunj mosque consisted of M. Sher Nawab (President), Mazhar Ali Azhar, Chaudhri Afzal Haq, Haji Abdul Qadir of Kasur (anti-Ahrar), Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq, Mian Abdul Aziz and Mir Maqbul Mahmud. Another sub-committee was formed comprising Akhtar Ali, Haji Abdul Qadir, Abdul Majid Salik (1895-1959), Chaudhri Afzal Haq and Lal Din in order to plan for the future course of action.\[1\]

On July 24, 1935 the Punjab government had appointed a committee to find out the number of persons killed or injured on July 20 and July 21 due to the firing and other reasons.\[2\] After holding six meetings to record evidence and examine 104 witnesses the committee estimated the number of deaths resulting from firing on July 20 and 21 at 15 and the number of persons wounded by bullets at 50 and by lathi blows etc. from 1000 to 1500.\[3\] However, all the three non-official Muslim members of the committee wrote their notes of dissent urging that the fear of subsequent prosecution or harassment by the police might have caused withholding of evidence on part of considerable number of injured.

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\[1\] Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, August 3, 1935.

\[2\] Civil & Military Gazette, September 8, 1935. The committee consisted of the following members: Lt. Col. H. K. Rowntree (Chairman), Mr. K. V. F. Morton, Mian Abdul Aziz Bar-at-Law, Khan Sahib Mian Amir-ud-Din, and Dr. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din Bar-at-Law. Ibid., September 7 and September 8, 1935.

\[3\] Civil & Military Gazette, September 7, 1935. For complete text of the report see ibid., September 8, 1935.
persons. Allama Inayatullah al-Mashriqi, leader of the Khaksar movement also pointed out in his statement that four Khaksars had been killed due to the firing and about 200 persons had been treated in the "Khaksar Dispensary" alone, a large number of whom approached him and requested that their names might not be given to the committee appointed by the government as they, having no faith in the government's assurance did not want to be in trouble any further. Thus the report failed to satisfy the Muslims.

Muhammad Ishaq Mansehravi convened a conference at Rawalpindi in the Angora Mosque to consider the Shaheedgunj question on August 31. It was attended by seventy representatives from NWFP and various districts of the Punjab. Pir Jama'at Ali Shah was elected to preside the conference. The Secretary of the Reception Committee Khuda Bakhsh Azhar, in his speech said that Majlis Ithad-I-Milli of Lahore could not devise an effective program due to its

74 Civil & Military Gazette, September 8, 1935.
75 al-Islah, August, 9, 1935, p. 9
76 Later when Sh. Sadiq and other members of the Punjab Council demanded an enquiry to ascertain whether the firing was necessary and the Muslim leaders had been rightly interned, the Finance Member Mr. D. J. Boyd remarked that since no step of importance had been taken by the D.C. without knowledge and approval of the government, it was of no use of an enquiry about the conduct of its own officers. However, the Punjab government would have welcomed an enquiry of the India Office or Government of India had asked for it. Punjab Legislative Council Debates 1935, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 668 & 847.
77 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 7, 1935.
mutual differences. He proposed the course of civil disobedience to recover the mosque under a new effective organisation. Some of the speakers, who followed, differed with Khuda Bakhsh Azhar. Allama Mashraqi suggested that the organisation should retain its old name “Majlis Ithad-i-Milli” and proposed Pir Syed Jama’t Ali Shah as president. Aziz Hindi and others seconded the name of Pir Jama’t Ali Shah. Aziz Hindi further suggested that the Pir should be elected as Amir-i-Shariat. When Pir Jama’t Ali expressed his willingness, large number of people including Allama Mashraqi took the oath of allegiance (dai’t) on his hand. In the second session of the conference Muhammad Ishaq Mansehravi was elected as Naib Amir-I-Shariat. After a good deal of discussion and confusion it was finally decided in the third session that the date to start the civil disobedience would be fixed after the observance of

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78 Al-Islah, September 13, 1935, p. 6.
79 Ibid. According to Syed Akhtar Hussain Shah and Tahir Feroqi, the name of the Pir was proposed by Maulvi Imayat Ullah of Pishor and the title proposed for the Pir was Amir-i-Millat instead of Amir-i-Shariat. Syed Akhtar Hussain Shah and Muhammad Tahir Feroqi, Searat-i-Amir-i-Millat (Sialkot, 1394 AH), pp.455-46. On September 1, when Ghulam Mustafa shah gave an account of the proceeding of the conference at a public meeting he declared that Pir Jama’t Ali Shah had been elected as “Amir-i-Millat-i-Islamiya-i-Hind” (Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 7, 1935) but “Amir-i-Shariat” is also given at various places in the same report. It seems that in the beginning both the titles were being used. Muhammad Sadiq Qasuri writes by mistake that after becoming Amir-i-Millat he got the news of the firing in Lahore. Akobir-i-Tehrik-i-Pakistan, Pt.1 (Gujrat, 1976), p.72.
80 Al-Islah, September 13, 1935.
"Shaheedgunj Day" on September 20. The Rawalpindi Conference was extolled by the Muslim Press as a great success. On September 1, a public meeting was held at Rawalpindi attended by some 3,000 people and the proceedings and resolutions passed at Angora Mosque were made public. The speakers recommended that September 20, should be observed as "Protest Day". The workers of Majlis Itihad-i-Milli became active specially, at Lahore and Amritsir for preparation of the forthcoming "Shaheedgunj Day". Most of the speakers urged to start civil disobedience and thousands of people took oath of allegiance at the hand of Pir Jama‘t Ali Shah. The government was alarmed at this new situation and apprehended that an unconstitutional campaign of civil disobedience was about to be launched. As a result during the second week of September ten more agitators were restricted to various places including Maulana Ishaq Mansehravi (to Kasauli), Akhar Ali Khan (to Kaithal), Lal Din Qaiser (to Rohtak), Ghulam Muhammad alias Aziz Hindi (to Dharam Sala), Syed Zain-ul-Aabidin Shah Gilani (to Sirsa), Ghulam Mustafa Shah Gilani (to Hissar) and Abu Said

81 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 7, 1935.
83 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 9, 1935
85 Civil & Military Gazette, October 27, 1935.
Anwar (to Karnal), Mir Muhammad Din (to Rupar), Maulvi Shir Nawab (to Bhiwani) and Syed Sarwar Shah Gilani (to Mogh). The Governor also ordered the internment of Pir Jama’t Ali Shah. However, when he was apprised of all the grave consequences that would follow the Pir was not arrested. Still there was confusion and difference of opinion regarding the course of action to be adopted. Pir Jama’t Ali Shah announced that for the time being there was no intention to launch civil disobedience and only the constitutional means would be adopted to achieve the objective. He advised the Muslims to wear black badges and organise peaceful procession after the Juma Prayers on September 20. The Muslims acted accordingly, and the “Shaheedgunj Day” was observed with enthusiasm but peacefully, in most districts of the central and western ranges. In Badshahi Mosque Lahore over 100,000 Muslims gathered for Juma Prayers and an unparalleled procession led by Syed Jama’t Ali Shah was taken out after the prayers, which exhibited marked restraint and peacefulness throughout. Outside the Mochi Gate Pir Jama’t Ali Shah

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87 *Report on Newspaper and Periodicals, September 21, 1935.*
88 *Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 21, 1935.*
89 *Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 28, 1935.*
presided over a meeting of more than 60,000 people. He announced that after visiting Ajmer and discussing the issue with other leaders he would call an Advisory Committee to determine the future course of action.

On the appeal of Pir Jama’at Ali Shah, the Muslims launched a “buy Muslim” campaign after Shaheedgunj Day celebrations were over. According to a Muslim correspondent of Civil & Military Gazette the appeal for “buy Muslim” Pir Jama’at Ali Shah had nothing to do with the Shaheedgunj issue, nor the Pir was the first advocate of such movement. Pir Jama’at Ali Shah himself clarified that he never appealed the “boycott” of the Hindus or any other community, rather he advocated only the “buy Muslim” movement in order to improve the economic conditions of his own community. The Hindus, however, taking it in the wrong spirit, started a counter campaign for boycotting the Muslim shopkeepers which resulted in increased communal

92 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 28, 1935. Even the non Muslim Press reported the gathering of not less than 70,000 at the Badshahi Mosque. Tribune, September 22, 1935.
93 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 28, 1935.
94 Civil & Military Gazette, October 27, 1935.
95 Report on Newspapers and Periodicals, October 19, 1935.
tension at many places on the province. Professor Gulshan Rai in one of his article accused the Muslims of initiating and "economic civil war" in the country. The "buy Muslim Campaign", however, could not last long as the opposition to the movement also came from some sections of the Muslims. For instance, Mufti Kifayatullah, President of Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind appealed to stop the campaign. Similarly, Khawaja Hasan Nizami (1878-1957) also declared the "buy Muslim" campaign as dangerous and futile.

A Muslim deputation comprising K.L. Gaba, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Dr. Zia-ud-Din Ahmad, Ghulam Bhik Nairang, Syed Murtaza and Syed Abdul Hafiz waited upon the Viceroy and the Governor on September 27 in connection with the Shaheedgunj affair and submitted a memorandum. The Governor of the Punjab and the Home Member were also there. The Governor saw no chance that the Sikhs would hand over the sight of the mosque to the Muslims. To him some other settlement with the Sikhs could also be hoped only after the cessation of the agitation. About the release of

96 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 28, 1935, October 5 & 12, 1935.
97 Civil & Military Gazette, October 19, 1935.
98 Report on Newspapers and Periodicals, October 5, 1935. The Eastern Times (Lahore) of September 29, remarked that Mufti Kifayat Ullah was deceived by the pro-Hindu propaganda. Ibid.
99 Tribune, October 22, 1935.
100 Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/7/931.
prisoners, the Governor said that he was ready to release all of them except those, who were involved in lethal attacks on Sikhs but the release of prisoners must follow the stoppage of agitation and the economic boycott.\textsuperscript{101} Maulana Shaukat Ali, K.L. Gaba and Syed Murtaza Shah also talked to the Sikhs at Amritsar in early October. Mir Maqbool Mahmud and Sheikh Sadiq also took part in the discussion.\textsuperscript{102} Master Tara Singh observed that the Sikhs being exasperated due to the present agitation by the Muslims would not accede to any demand of the Muslims and that the negotiations should be prolonged till the Gurdwara and Council elections were over. During this period the Muslim leaders should exert to calm their followers so that the ground for an amicable settlement between the two communities might be prepared. At the same time the Sikhs expressed their determination to retain the possession of the disputed site.\textsuperscript{103} Thus the results were not encouraging and the Muslim leaders came back disappointed.\textsuperscript{104} Deputy Commissioner Amritsar observed in his letter (October 5, 

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., Surprisingly this visit gave Maulana Shaukat Ali "hopes of an honourable settlement", Civil & Military Gazette, October 29, 1935.

\textsuperscript{102} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, October 5 & 12, 1935.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.,

\textsuperscript{104} Ihsan, October 9, 1935.
1935) that the "Sikhs are even less inclined to make concessions then they were two months ago.\textsuperscript{106}

The situation of increasing Sikhs Muslims tension was further deteriorated by the incidents of stray assaults on the Sikhs. One Hasan Muhammad ran amok in Lahore city and committed murderous assaults on three Sikhs with a hatchet. One of them Bushan Singh succumbed to the injury.\textsuperscript{106} In November three other persons (one Hindu and two Sikhs) were injured in the three individual assaults and one of the Sikhs died of the injuries.\textsuperscript{107} The non-Muslims, in reaction, held a Hindu Sikh meeting near Dera Sahib Gurdwara where strong speeches were made threatening the Muslims with the reprisals and great excitement prevailed among some 8,000 audience. Meetings of the same nature were held at other places in Lahore and Amritsar.\textsuperscript{108}

Pir Jama'at Ali Shah appealed the Muslims to celebrate the "Shaheedgunj Day" on November 9, to attend the Juma

\textsuperscript{105} Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/7/931.

\textsuperscript{106} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, October 26, 1935.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, November 2, November 30, December 7, 1935. Such incidents show the extent to which the Muslim youth were mentally perturbed. Hasan Muhammad, (his correct name was Hasan-ud-Din as his tombstone reads) according to his elder brother, was emotionally excited and extremely perturbed as he had had a dream (most probably about the Shaheedgunj mosque) when he wildly attacked the three Sikhs. Muhammad Tufail, ed., Naiyosh (Lahore Number), February 1936, p.427.

\textsuperscript{108} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, November 2, 1935.
Prayer at the Badshahi Mosque and to take part in the procession.\textsuperscript{109} Malik Inayatullah, President of the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat issued a statement giving the details of the programme to be observed by the Muslims throughout India on November 8 for celebration of "Shaheedgunj Day". According to the programme the Muslims were instructed to offer their Friday prayers in Juma mosques, to take out peaceful processions wearing green armlets with the words "fida-I-Islam". The Muslims were further advised not to attack the religious susceptibilities of the other communities and not to shout any slogan except specified in the programme.\textsuperscript{110} To celebrate the "Shaheedgunj Day" about 50,000 Muslims reached the Badshahi Mosque on November 8. Pir Jama’at Ali Shah, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Syed Ghulam Bhip Nairang and Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew along with other Muslim leaders were also present. The Juma Prayers were followed by the procession taken out from the mosque under the guidance of Pir Jama’at Ali Shah. As the government had allowed to keep the swords vide Punjab Gazette dated

\textsuperscript{109} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, November 2, 1935.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., November 9, 1935. According to the intelligence reports, Pir Jama’at Ali Shah cancelled his orders about the Lahore Procession but "his announcement to the effect was suppressed and his hand was forced by the workers of the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat. Ibid., though his biographers are silent about it, the announcement issued on November 9 from the presidential chair contains a clue as it was regretted that "due to some clerical misunderstandings" the representatives of the Frontier, Peshawar and Rawalpindi could not join. Syed Akhtar and Tahir Farooqi, op.cit., p.467.
September 20, 1935, a large number of the Muslims including the Pir himself were carrying unsheathed swords. The procession having 120 Khaksars in the vanguard marched through one and half mile route to the Delhi Gate with great excitement and enthusiasm but at the same time with utmost restraint.\textsuperscript{111} When the procession ended outside Delhi Gate a public meeting was held presided over by Pir Jama'at Ali Shah. Other prominent figures present were Maulana Shaukat Ali, Syed Bhik Nairang, K.L. Gaba, Dr. Muhammad Alam, Mazhar-ud-Din of Delhi, Hamid Raza Khan of Brailly and Inayat Shah, Editor of the Siyasat.\textsuperscript{112} In the presence of about 15,000 audience resolutions were passed expressing resentment and despair at the attitude of the Punjab Government on the issue and assuring the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat that the Muslims were ready to carry out the programme of the Majlis under the guidance of Amir-i-Millat.\textsuperscript{113} Next evening at a meeting of Advisory Committee of the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat held at Barkat Ali Islamiya Hall decided, after six hours of discussion, to postpone

\textsuperscript{111} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, November 16, 1935, Anwar-al-Sofia, November 1935. Syed Akhtar Hussain and Tahir Farooqi op.cit. pp.462-463. Sources differ as to how many people attended the procession. Intelligence reports read the figure as 30,000 to 40,000; Indian Annual Register estimates them at 50,000 (Indian Annual Register 1935 Pt.II p.32), whereas Muslims Newspapers estimated the number at 100,000. Ihsan vide Syed Akhtar Hussain and Tahir Farooqi op. cit. p.462.

\textsuperscript{112} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, November 11, 1935.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
the question of starting civil disobedience and devising the future programme till January 9. Resolutions were passed appealing the Muslims to enlist one million volunteers and not to make any move to negotiate with the Sikhs unless the Sikhs themselves offer to discuss the issue.\textsuperscript{114} On November 10, resolutions carried at a meeting at Badshahi Mosque precisely give the demands of the Muslims; an inquiry into the necessity and results of firing, release or trial of persons interned, return of securities forfeited of newspapers and restoration of the rights of the Muslims over the mosque.\textsuperscript{115} The Muslim members of the Punjab Legislative Council got an opportunity to discuss the Shaheedgunj issue at length in the Council when a motion was moved for the grant of a supplementary sum of Rs.72,670 to be spent on the police on November 11. Afzal-ul-Haq, Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, Chaudhry Asadullah, Maulvi Mazhar Ali Azhar and Pir Akbar Ali discussed various aspects of the Shaheedgunj affair and opposed the move to grant additional amount for the police. Most of the speakers alleged that government had connived at or rather helped in the demolition of the mosque by the Sikhs.

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ibid.}, intelligence report, by mistake, gives the date as January 10 instead of January 9. \textit{Indian Annual Register 1935, Pt.II, p.32 and Anwar-al-Sofia, November 1935 quoted in Syed Akhtar Hussain and Tahor Farooqi, op. cit., p.467 give the correct date.}

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Punjab Legislative Council Debates 1935, Vol. XXVII, p.666.}
Discussion continued till November 15. However, the motion was carried with 44 Ayes against 24 Nos.\textsuperscript{116}

To lesson the tension among the Muslims, the government released two of the internees, Syed Habib and Feroz-ud-Din who were presented a welcome address at a public meeting of some 6,000 Muslims on November 24 in Lahore presided by K.L. Gaba.\textsuperscript{117} However, the situation continued to deteriorate in November and December and there were incident of stray assaults and individual fights between the Muslims and the Sikhs. As a result of increasing communal tension a Sikh-Muslim riot broke out at Gurdwara Chomla Sahib which also affected a number of other places at Lahore.\textsuperscript{118} Syed Habib and Feroz-ud-Din, continuing their activities after their release, persuaded Pir Jama't Ali Shah to appoint an Advisory Committee to formulate the proposals of future course of action and to submit the same to the Pir for approval. The committee consisted of fifteen members including Allama Iqbal.\textsuperscript{119} The differences on the

\textsuperscript{117} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, November 30, 1935.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., November 11, December 7 and December 14, 1935.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., December 14, 1935. The other members of the Advisory Committee were: Mr. K.L. Gaba, M.L.A.; Syed Inayat Shah of the Sīṣaṭ; Syed Habib of the Sīṣaṭ; Dr. Muhammad Alam, bar at Law; Malik Lal Khan; Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad, Municipal Commissioner; Professor Inayat Ullah; Maulvi Sher Nawab of Kasur; Maulvi Syed Ahmad of Wazir Khan’s Mosque; Hafiz Miraj-ud-Din of Mochi Gate; Mistry Allah
issue of starting civil disobedience gradually became more prominent in the ranks of Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat. The proposal of holding an All India Conference further widened the gulf between the moderate and the extremist elements of the Majlis. Pir Jama’at Ali Shah issued posters and a circular announcing that the All India Ittihad-i-Millat Conference would be held at Amritsar from January 17 to 19. Syed Habib, Feroz-ud-Din and others of their group immediately issued the statement that since they were not taken into confidence, they would not cooperate. Allegations and counter-allegations followed from both sides. The Pir remained determined to hold the conference but it could be held “behind closed doors,” at the house of Mian Ghulam Mahmud, ex-Municipal Commissioner of Amritsar. About 100 delegates from various districts of the Punjab attended the conference. The president Pir Jama’at Ali Shah apprised them that his appeal for one million volunteers and one million rupees had met with little response. Majority of the delegates felt that in the present state of affairs, civil disobedience movement could not be launched. During the session lot of squabbling took

Bakhsh of Mori Gate; Maulvi Muhammad Din of Lahore; Mian Muhammad Hussain of Mochi Gate; Haji Ghulam Jilani. Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, December 14, 1935.

120 Ibid., January 18, 1936.

121 Ibid., January 25, 1936.
place outside the house and the police had to intervene to disperse the mob lead by Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din the ex-Secretary of Local Ittihad-i-Millat Party who dubbed the delegates of the conference as traitors. Professor Inayatullah, President Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat, Amin-ud-Din Sahrai and Maula Bakhsh also demonstrated and shouted questioning the representative character of the delegates.  

During the other two sessions a subject committee consisting of 35 members and a sub-committee to unite the Muslims of the Punjab consisting of 25 members were appointed. Moreover, Pir Jama't Ali Shah, Amir-i-Millat delegated his powers to the Central Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat so that he could proceed for Hajj.

Being disappointed from the policy of Amritsar Conference, Maula Bakhsh announced on January 24, in the Badshahi Mosque to send badges of volunteers to offer prayers and to take over the Shaheedgunj Mosque. The first jatha of five Muslims was arrested on the same day when it left the mosque for Shaheedgunj.  

Towards the end of January “Anjaman-i-Niliposhan” was established at Amritsar by Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din and others to obtain volunteers and

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122 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, January 25, 1936.
123 For complete list of the members of both the committees see Ibid.
124 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, January 15, 1936.
to collect funds for the continuation of the civil disobedience movement of Maula Bakhsh.\textsuperscript{125} The disobedience campaign started by Maula Bakhsh was disliked and condemned by the Muslim Press. Eastern Times of January 26 and February 8 & 12 condemned this movement as "ill-advised", "a false step" an idea "foreign to Muslim religion" and appealed to the irresponsible people involved in it "to retrace their footsteps before it is too late".\textsuperscript{126} Inqalab remarked that no responsible section of the Muslims approved the recently started civil disobedience movement.\textsuperscript{127} Ihsan condemned it as a step taken by "rash youth".\textsuperscript{128} In spite of all the criticism from all sections of responsible Muslims, Maula Bakhsh continued the civil disobedience movement. At a secret meeting of Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat held in its office at Delhi Gate on February 7 an attempt by a saner section of its members to stop the civil disobedience failed and a resolution urging continuance of the movement was carried with the support of younger lot including Amin-ud-Din Sahrai, Abdul Karim

\textsuperscript{125} It is mysterious and interesting to note that its President was an attam, Vice President was a tin maker and Secretary was a compounder. Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, February 1, 1936.

\textsuperscript{126} Report on Newspapers and Periodicals, February 1 and February 15, 1936.

\textsuperscript{127} Inqalab, February 7, 1936.

\textsuperscript{128} Ihsan, January 27, 1936. Likewise, Paigham-i-Sulah (Lahore) of February 11, opines that civil disobedience is not a proper way for restoration of the mosque. Vide Report on Newspapers and Periodicals February 15, 1936.
Shorish and others.\textsuperscript{129} After the arrest of Maula Bakhsh by the police, Yasub-ul-Hasan, Umar Din and Professor Inayatullah continued the effort and were arrested one after another.\textsuperscript{130} Meetings attended by a few thousand people continued to be held daily in the Badshahi Mosque prior to the arrest of Maula Bakhsh and Yasub-ul-Hasan on February\textsuperscript{131} but after that the meetings attracted very few people.\textsuperscript{132} Total number of arrests coursed up to February 20, 1936 was 400.\textsuperscript{133}

As the civil disobedience movement showed the signs of exhaustion, in a secret meeting called on February 14 at the Badshahi Mosque, K.I. Gaba informed that Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was willing to come to Lahore for negotiations on the Shaheedgunj issue provided the civil disobedience was stopped. After good deal of debate it was finally decided that Jinnah should be requested to visit.\textsuperscript{134} On the other hand Henry Craik, the member of Executive Council of the Governor General was asked by Herbert Emerson to

\textsuperscript{129} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, February 8, 1936.

\textsuperscript{130} Shan Muhammad mistook Inayatullah al-Mushraqi, the leader of Khaksar Movement for Professor Inayatullah. President Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat who is a different personality altogether. See Shan Muhammad, Khaksar Movement in India (Meerit, 1933), p.28.

\textsuperscript{131} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, February 15, 1936.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., February 22, 1936.

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., February 22, 1936.
persuade Jinnah to visit Lahore and help the Muslims come out of the crises. Jinnah reached Lahore on February 21 and on the same evening welcome address was presented to him at a meeting held at Badshahi Mosque attended by 30,000 Muslims and Professor Inayatullah announced the suspension of civil disobedience. On the next evening Jinnah met the Sikh leaders including Master Tara Singh who exhibited an uncompromising attitude during the discussion on the issue but ensured Jinnah that the site of the mosque would be used by the Sikhs only for sacred purposes and that efforts would be made to have an announcement from Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee expressing regret on demolition of the mosque. In order to facilitate the task of Jinnah to bring about the mutual understanding between the Muslims and the Sikhs and keeping in view the suspension of civil disobedience campaign on his appeal, Punjab Government released the Muslim leaders interned during the Shaheedgunj agitation and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Lal Din Qaisar, Akhtar Ali, Aziz Hindi, Ghulam Mustafa Shah Gilani and Khuda Bakhsh Azhar reached Lahore immediately. After consulting other leaders Jinnah announced on February 28 in the Badshahi Mosque Lahore, the

136 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, February 29, 1936; Tribune, February 23, 1936.
137 Ishar, February 27, 1936; Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, February 29, 1936.
decision to adopt legal and constitutional methods instead of civil disobedience for the redress of Muslim grievances regarding the Shaheedgunj issue. As a result of this announcement, the Punjab Government decided on the same day to meet the demand of Jinnah to release all the prisoners convicted in connection with the Shaheedgunj agitation except those involved in serious violence such as murder etc.\textsuperscript{138}

Jinnah was feted by the speakers of different communities including the Sikhs on March 2 at a meeting in Town Hall presided by the Bishop of Lahore. It was particularly noticeable during the days of great communal tension because of the Shaheedgunj issue.\textsuperscript{139} He was even taken to Shaheedgunj by Giani Gurmukh Singh Mussafir and Harnam Singh on March 5.\textsuperscript{140} No immediate positive results of negotiations with the Sikh leadership, however could be achieved and Jinnah appointed a Conciliation Committee consisting of Allama Iqbal, Mian Abdul Aziz, Moulana Abdul Qadir Qasuri, Pundit Nanak Chand, Raja Narendra Nath, Sardar Sampuran Singh, Sardar Ujjal and Bota Singh, on


\textsuperscript{139} Civil & Military Gazette, March 3, 1936; Tribune, March 3, 1936.

\textsuperscript{140} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, March 7, 1936.
March 7 before leaving for Delhi. Mian Ahmad Yar Doulta na (1896-1940) was appointed the convener.\textsuperscript{141} The Reconciliation Committee held its first meeting on March 15 at the residence of Mian Abdul Aziz and Raja Narendar Nath was elected President of the Committee. The declared objectives of the Committee were not those of an arbitration board but to promote mutual confidence and the feelings of good will between the two communities.\textsuperscript{142} The Conciliation Committee appealed to the public and the press that in order to enhance the chances of peaceful settlement of the dispute criticism might be avoided.\textsuperscript{143} The Committee held a few meetings one of which was also attended by Zafar Ali Khan and Lal Din Qaisar but because of Tara Singh's non-cooperation they could not proceed and towards the end of April it expressed its inability to negotiate a settlement.\textsuperscript{144} Since the hearing of the civil suit filed by Dr. Muhammad Alam continued, most of the Muslim leaders accepted the advice of Jinnah not to start agitation and to appeal to the High Court if the decision of the District Court went against the Muslims.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., March 14, 1936; Zamindar, March 14, 1936.

\textsuperscript{142} Civil & Military Gazette, March 17, 1936.

\textsuperscript{143} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, March 21, 1936.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., April 4, April 25 and May 2, 1936.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., May 2, 1936.
LEGAL FIGHT AND THE SECOND PHASE
OF SHAHEEDGanj MOVEMENT

At the Shaheedgunj Conference Rawalpindi Dr. Muhammad Alam claimed that a good legal case under section 295 I.P.C can be made out based on the papers relating to the Shaheedgunj as the Sikhs had demolished the Muslim mosque, the latter had a right to sue the Sikhs in the court of law and that he himself would plead the case. On October 30, 1935 the case was filed in the district session court under order 20 Rule 7 C.P.C. the plaintiffs being the mosque itself, Moulana Abul Hasanat Syed Muhammad Ahmad, Syed Anayat Shah, Moulvi Ahmad Ali of Lahore and fifteen others. It was argued in the suit that the mosque was dedicated to God and according to Islamic sharia the site of the mosque could not be used for any other purpose unsuitable for the mosque. Therefore, the plaintiffs and all other Muslims had a right to say their prayer at the site without any hindrance. Moreover, the defendants, Shiromani Gurdawara Parbandhak Committee and the Committee for Sikh Gurdawaras at Lahore, might be ordered by the court that

146 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 7, 1935.
147 Tarjaman-i-Sarhad, Peshawar, November 7, 1935.
the demolished mosque must be rebuilt on the same place in the same shape.¹⁴⁸

The case was decided in adverse to the Muslims on May 25, 1936. The judge admitted that the building was originally a mosque in 1722 A.D. He also admitted that according to Islamic law once a mosque remains always a mosque despite any physical changes. However, he laid down that according to Anglo-Muhammadan law as administered by the British courts of Justice, the law of limitation modified the Muslim personal law when the parties to a case were not all Muslims. As the mosque had never been used as a place of worship since about 1750 A.D. because of occupation of the mosque by the Sikhs, the Muslims had lost their rights whatsoever over the building because of adverse possession by the Sikhs for a certain period of time i.e., more than 12 years.¹⁴⁹ Another case about the tomb of Kaku Shah was also decided in favour of the Sikhs.¹⁵⁰ The Muslim press expressed deep sorrow and grief over the decision but advised the Muslims to exercise

patience and remain peaceful.\textsuperscript{151} To the Muslims the decision came as "a bolt from the blue"\textsuperscript{152} as they had "great expectations."\textsuperscript{153} Moulana Zafar Ali Khan presided a meeting of about 40,000 Muslims in the Badshahi mosque on May 25 and a resolution was passed expressing grief and resentment over the decision of the court contrary to the sharia.\textsuperscript{154} The Zamindar published the details of public meetings and demonstrations held by the Muslims throughout the province in numerous instalments.\textsuperscript{155} At a number of meetings the Sikh speakers had declared that even if the decision of the civil suit went against them they would not relinquish possession of the Shaheedgunj to the Muslims and with that intention Giani Khazan Singh arranged for the performance of 125 akhand paths the first of which commenced on April 5. Giani Khazan Singh expressed his determination to continue akhand paths for several years with the support of the Sikh community.\textsuperscript{156} On the other hand in a special session of Central Committee of Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat


\textsuperscript{152} Zamindar, May 27, 1936 vide Ibid.

\textsuperscript{153} al-Islah, May 29, 1936, Ihsan of May 27, 1936 expressed 90% chances of Muslims success.

\textsuperscript{154} Ihsan, May 27, 1936.

\textsuperscript{155} Fifth installment was published on June 3, 1936. At the centre of the page, a box contained Zafar Ali Khan's appeal with his verse in bold:

\texttt{Jo lami hay tumhian Masjid to niliposh ho jao}

\texttt{Khuda ka naam lo aur 'ajibat bar dosh ho jao}

\textsuperscript{156} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, May 2, 1936.
presided by Zafar Ali Khan held at the Zamindar's office on March 25 it was decided to abolish the office of Amir-i-Millat and Naib Amir-i-Millat as after re-organisation of Majlis-i-Ittihad-i-Millat these offices were not needed in the changed circumstances. In the wake of forthcoming elections the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat had vainly been trying to revive the agitation in connection with Shaheedgunj but the feelings over the issue had abated by mid-November. All India Ittihad-i-Millat Conference was inaugurated on November 13, 1936 presided by Moulana Shoukat Ali initially attended by 12,000 people. The president and Moulana Zafar Ali Khan made moderate speeches. However, a group of hotheads like Yasub-ul-Hasan, Abdul Karim Shorish and Abu Said Anwar urged upon commencing civil disobedience. Yasub-ul-Hasan went to the extent of observing "elderly leaders of the party were traitors and cowards". As a result skirmishes occurred and considerable disorder continued for half an hour. However, at the last session of the conference on the night of November 15 Abu Said Anwar and Yasub-ul-Hasan again expressed their loyalty to the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat and

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158 Emerson to Linlithgow, November 16, 1936, Oriental India Office Collection, 1299 R/3/1/4.
submitted to the decision reached by the leaders.\textsuperscript{159} The Council of Action appointed during the conference was asked to prepare the Muslims for boycott of British made goods and coronation ceremonies and to prevent the recruitment to Indian army.\textsuperscript{160} But the governor rightly expected “little...to come of this”.\textsuperscript{161}

In the same conference it was also decided to file an appeal in the High Court against the judgment of Mr. Sale.\textsuperscript{162} As Allama Iqbal also advised to go to the High Court, Malik Barkat Ali and Dr. Muhammad Alam filed an appeal to the High Court Lahore on November 30, 1936.\textsuperscript{163} The hearing continued till January 1937. Dr. Alam joined the Congress party after winning the elections and the Legal Defence Committee prevented him from fighting the Shaheedgunj case. On the advice of Jinnah, Malik Barkat Ali associated an English Barrister of Bombay, Mr. F. J. Coltman.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{159} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, November 21, 1936.

\textsuperscript{160} Civil & Military Gazette, November 18, 1936.

\textsuperscript{161} Emerson to Linlithgow, November 16, 1936, Oriental India Office Collection, 1299 R/3/1A.

\textsuperscript{162} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, November 21, 1936.

\textsuperscript{163} Muhammad Khurshid, “Tanaz`a Masjid Shaheedgunj”, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{164} Rafique Afzal, Malik Barkat Ali: His Life and Writings, Pt. I, p. 44. Malik Barkat Ali had requested Jinnah to fight the case but he declined saying that once having played the role of conciliator in the same case it was not proper for him to plead the case of the Muslims. \textit{Ibid.}
As the High Court proceeded with the case, Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat decided to discontinue the agitation on the issue till the announcement of the decision of the High Court. However, it continued to hold public meetings and celebrate "Shaheedgunj Day" on July 8, and "Martyrs Day" on July 22. Moula Bakhsh, at a meeting at Lahore on August 27, urged the restoration of Shaheedgunj mosque to the Muslims and formed a "War Council" consisting of the extremist elements of the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat i.e., Professor Inayatullah, Amin-ud-Din Sehrai, Moula Bakhsh himself etc. But nothing came out of it and Zafar Ali Khan again clarified that he was against the civil disobedience at that stage. He suggested that the Muslims should wait for the decision of the High Court before having recourse to civil disobedience.

On January 26, 1938, the full bench of the Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal of the Muslims in the Shaheedgunj case. It was held that the Punjab Laws Act

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165 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, May 15, 1937. In the same meeting the following office bearers of Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat, Lahore were elected: Zafar Ali Khan, President; Malik Lal Khan, Vice President; Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad and Khuda Bakhsh Azhar, Secretaries. Ibid.

166 Governor's confidential Report on situation in the Punjab for second half of July, 1937.

167 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 4, 1937.

168 Ibid., December 25, 1937.

169 Tribune, February 1, 1938; Governor's Confidential Report, January 27, 1938.
and the Limitation Act had modified Islamic law and the mosque being a moveable property was not exempt from the operation of the Limitation Act. The court further laid down that due to adverse possession of the mosque by non-Muslims over 12 years, it had lost its sacred character. Justice Din Muhammad wrote a note of dissent contending that the mosque has a character different from other immovable properties. It could neither be adversely possessed nor lost its sacred character if possessed by non-Muslims until it retained its original shape and form.

While the Shaheedgunj case was in the High Court, the Ahrar leaders announced that Majlis-i-Ahrar would start civil disobedience from December 17, 1937. Though the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat continued to stay out of agitation, Zafar Ali Khan declared to reconsider its policy on

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170 *All India Reporter 1938*, p. 369.

171 *Ibid.*, p. 411. Justice Din Muhammad’s note of dissent spread over 35 pages negates each and every argument of the respondents, and also discusses in details the authorities quoted by them. For his complete note of dissent see *ibid.* pp. 390-425. The Muslims appealed to the Privy Council against the decision but on May 2, 1940 the appeal was dismissed and the Muslims expressed the greatest grief at the decision. *Ingolab*, May 4, 1940. For a summary of the decision of the Privy Council see *Ingolab*, May 16, 1940. The Muslim daily newspapers appeared with black edges but advised patience and restraint. Governor’s *Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of May, 1940*.

172 The Ahrar’s agitation on Shaheedgunj follows in this chapter.
Shaheedgunj if the decision of the High Court went against the Muslims.\textsuperscript{173}

When the High Court decided against the Muslims, Zafar Ali Khan addressing a meeting of about 25,000 persons announced that the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat had not so far decided the future course of action. However, Abdul Karim Shorish, the Secretary of Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat and Amin-ud-Din expressed their intention to join the civil disobedience movement of the Ahrar for the recovery of the mosque.\textsuperscript{174} Later Ittihad-i-Millat decided to start civil disobedience but its secretary remarked that to have resort to civil disobedience was a mistake and the Ahrar had compelled the Ittihad-i-Millat to commit that mistake.\textsuperscript{175}

Meanwhile, a group of Muslim politicians felt that the main obstacle in the way of restoration of the mosque was the Limitation Act and other laws of British India and unless those laws were modified through fresh legislation, taking the advantage of the Muslim majority in the Punjab Assembly, neither the Shaheedgunj mosque could be restored nor the other Muslim auqaf were safe. In this background

\textsuperscript{173} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, January 8, 1938.
\textsuperscript{174} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, January 29, 1938.
\textsuperscript{175} Inqalab, April 6, 1938.
Malik Barkat Ali at the advice of Allama Iqbal drafted a bill "the Punjab Muslim Mosque Protection Act" and gave a notice in February 1938 to move the bill in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. The bill, if passed, would restore the Shaheedgunj mosque and many other buildings to the Muslims because the bill was to be given a retrospective effect. Thus the bill created a critical situation for Sikandar Hayat and the governor withheld the consent to the bill acting on the advice of his minister. On March 16, 1938 Sikandar Hayat addressed the Punjab Legislative Assembly to justify his advice to the governor not to accord sanction to introduce the bill. During the speech of the Premier, Khawaja Ghulam Hussain delivered a notice of no confidence against the Premier to the Secretary. However, the vote of no confidence had only two supporters in the Assembly. The agitation started by the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat, walking in the footsteps of Majlis Ahrar-i-Islam continued and by May 22, 310 volunteers of the

177 Rafique Afzal, Malik Barkat Ali: His Life and Writings, Pt. I, p. 45
178 Oriental India Office Collection, 1273 MSS Eur. F/125/86.
180 Ibid., p. 810.
181 Oriental India Office Collection, 1273 MSS Eur. F/125/86.
Ittihad-i-Millat courted arrest. However, towards the end of March the agitation distinctly waned and the public interest in the movement gradually declined. At last Ittihad-i-Millat formally announced to suspend the civil disobedience on May 23 on the ground that All India Muslim League had taken upon itself to solve the Shaheedganj problem at Calcutta session.

SHAHEEDGANJ AND THE AHRAR

On the issue of Shaheedganj mosque the Ahrar remained aloof from the very beginning. Initially they by taking a "bold course" even condemned the agitation in clear terms. Later however, when the Ahrar had to face resentment of the people, even among their own followers, they changed their attitude and in meeting presided by Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman held on July 27 1935 expressed sympathy with those who took active part in the agitation.

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182 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, May 28, 1938.
183 Ibid., April 16, 1938.
184 Craik to Linlithgow, May 26, 1938; Secret Report on the Ahrar Movement, p. 73; Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, May 28, 1938.
185 Wahed Ahmad, ed., Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-I-Husain, p. 155.
for the Shaheedgunj mosque and demanded that government should release all the prisoners. On the very next day Habib-ur-Rehman, President of the Majlis issued a poster and declared that the Majlis was not in favour of agitation and that there was no chance of success for Anjaman Tahaffuz-i-Masjid Shaheedgunj in this movement. The people grew so much hostile to the Ahrar because of their non-participation in the agitation that they had to give up attempts to clear their position in the public meetings at Lahore and Amritsar. Gradually, the Ahrar were forced by the public opinion to turn their attention toward the Shaheedgunj issue. In early September 1935 the Ahrar leaders were of the view that by civil disobedience the mosque could not be recovered and therefore the Ahrar should not participate in, nor oppose the demonstrations.

On September 16, the Working Committee of Central Majlis-i-Ahrar took another step forward when it was decided that Ahrar as a body should not take part in demonstrations but the Ahrar might attend the demonstrations in their individual capacity. It was also urged to submit resolution to the Mashawarat (consultation) Committee demanding the

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166 *Siyasat, July 31, 1935.*


168 *Ibid., pp. 16-17.*

169 *Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 14, 1935.*
restoration of masque, release of prisoners convicted during Shaheedgunj agitation and the grant of compensation to the bereaved families.190 Again in October, the same demands were repeated in a circular letter to the subordinate branches with additional demand of returning the securities of the newspapers forfeited during the Shaheedgunj agitation.191 At the Ahrar Political Conference held at Sialkot form November 10 to November 14, resolutions were passed to strongly condemn the Sikhs who demolished the mosque, to sympathise with the affected families and to demand immediate release of internees.192

In the Punjab Legislative Council, during the budget session of November, the Ahrar members like Aizal Haq and Mazhar Ali Azhar bitterly criticized the government for its alleged connivance at demolition of the mosque by the Sikhs.193 However, practically the Ahrar made no appearance during Sikh-Muslim riot in December 1935, remained aloof from events of 1936 like the Amritsar Conference called by Pir Jama‘t Ali Shah, civil disobedience movement launched by Moula Bakhsh and Jinnah’s efforts for reconciliation.194

190 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 21, 1935.
191 Ibid., October 19, 1935.
The year 1936 is marked with frequent fights, heckling, and exchange of blows between the Ahrar and the Blue Shirt Volunteers of Ittihad-i-Millat at each other's public meetings. Even Zafar Ali Khan himself was manhandled at Amritsar.\textsuperscript{195} For the first half of 1937 the electioneering campaigns eclipsed the Shaheedgunj issue and the agitation subsided, Ahrar being indifferent as ever. An Ahrar conference held at Daska on September 18-19, none of the Ahrar speakers including Afzal Haq, Mazhar Ali Azhar and Habib-ur-Rehman considered Shaheedgunj worth mentioning.\textsuperscript{196} Since the Ahrar drifted considerably towards the Congress by mid-1937, it was but natural for the Ahrar to keep silent on a "communal issue" like Shaheedgunj.\textsuperscript{197}

As a result of the provincial election 1937, the Unionist government was established and after signing Sikandar-Jinnah Pact Sir Sikandar Hayat declared his commitment to All India Muslim League. Hence, after October 1937, the Ahrar's criticism appears to be multi-dimensional

\textsuperscript{195} For some of such incidents see al-Islah, March 27, 1936, p. 8; Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, March 21, July 18 and November 14, 1936; Ihsan, May 8, 9, 23 and 27, 1936. Emerson while commenting that on various political parties wrote to the Viceroy on November 16, 1936 on the Ittihad-i-Millat "is bitterly opposed the Ahrar and there is always the chance of a free fight when the two come into contact". Oriental India Office Collection, 1299 R/3/11.

\textsuperscript{196} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 25, 1937.

\textsuperscript{197} See supra, Chapter II, p. 148.
targeting All India Muslim League and the Unionist government along with Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat. This attitude was displayed at a well attended meeting of All India Political Conference of the Ahrar held at Batala on October 23-25, when Mazhar Ali Azhar, apart from criticizing Unionist Party and the Muslim League, even opposed the restoration of Shaheedgunj to the Muslims and warned the Unionist government not to disturb the status quo in this connection.¹⁹⁸

To embarrass the Unionist government the Ahrar decided to start civil disobedience for restoration of the Shaheedgunj in an important private meeting of the Majlis-i-Ahrar held at Lahore on November 18 attended by Mazhar Ali Azhar, Afzal Haq, Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari and Daud Gaznavi.¹⁹⁹ After trying hard for a month or so, to coax Zafar Ali Khan and other leaders to join the Ahrar in the civil disobedience, Mazhar Ali Azhar along with nine other Ahrar marched towards the Shaheedgunj from the Badshahi

¹⁹⁸ *Police Abstract of Intelligence*, Punjab, October 30, 1937.
¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, November 27, 1937. At that stage the governor had already reported to the Viceroy that the Ahrar were short of support and money and they may have “resort to desperate measures for they have nothing to lose and they may gain some sympathy if they stage a revival of civil disobedience”. *Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/5/238.*
mosque on December 17, to court arrest. A week's interval the Ahrar started civil disobedience campaign from December 24 and on the same date Ittihad-i-Millat, accepting the challenge thrown by the Ahrar, three of its members courted arrest. A jatha of five or more Ahrar courted arrest daily. Two well-known members of Ittihad-i-Millat, Moula Bakhsh and Sufi Inayat joined the Majlis-i-Ahrar to promote the Shaheedgunj agitation. When the decision of High Court against the Muslims was announced on January 26, 1938, the Ahrar agitation was further strengthened by inclusion of some prominent members of Majlis Ahrar including Shorish Kashmiri, the General Secretary of Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat, who led a jatha of more than 40 Ahrar to the residence of Sir Sikandar on the Bakr-i-Eid Day (February 11, 1938) and was arrested alongwith all others who joined him. Towards the end of March most of the Ahrar leaders expressed their opinion that the civil disobedience should be suspended to give an opportunity to the Premier to come to an honourable

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201 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, December 25, 1935.


203 Ibid., p. 61; Tribune, February 13, 1938.
settlement with the Sikhs. Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar who was released from jail after providing the required security, said in his statement on April 1, 1938 that the point of view held by the Ahrar for the last two and a half years had been proved correct and that the Ahrar had started the civil disobedience campaign to help the All India Muslim League in its determination to achieve the restoration of Shaheedgunj mosque. He further declared that the Ahrar were prepared to suspend the civil disobedience if Sir Sikandar asked them to do so. By May 22, 73 Ahrar volunteers courted arrest. Most probably the Ahrar having exhausted their resources, could not provide more jathas and were trying to manage escape. When Sir Sikandar to their utter disappointment did not make a request to the Ahrar to abandon the civil disobedience movement the Ahrar leaders said that they would continue civil disobedience till the Calcutta session of All India Muslim League and after that they would act according to the decision of the League knowing fully well that Jinnah and Sir Sikandar

204 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, April 2, 1938. The Premier while addressing the Punjab Legislative Assembly on March 16, 1938 on Malik Barkat Ali’s Bill, had expressed his hope “to devise an honourable and satisfactory solution” with the co-operation of “reasonable elements in all communities”. Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates1938, Vol. III, p. 807.


would not stand for extra-constitutional methods at the Calcutta session of the League.\(^{207}\)

At the Calcutta session All India Muslim League passed a resolution on April 10, to assure Sir Sikandar of its full co-operation in view of the fact that the Punjab government was “adopting every means for arriving at an honourable settlement of the Shaheedgunj problem”. It also appealed to the Muslims to create and maintain a peaceful atmosphere in order to facilitate the settlement”.\(^{208}\) Two days later Afzal Haq announced that in view of the League’s resolution, the Working Committee of the Majlis Ahrar had decided to stop civil disobedience. The decision was finally confirmed by the Majlis-i-Ahrar on May 21, 1938 when a formal resolution to the effect was passed.\(^{209}\)

RESPONSE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Unionist Party was among largest political parties of the province. Sir Fazl-i-Husain, the founder of the Unionist Party, could not play an active part because of


his health problems. Sir Sikandar, as a Premier, advised the Governor to disallow Malik Barkat Ali’s bill about Muslim Auqaf. He appealed to the Sikhs that in view of the best interests of their own community and the traditions of their religion, “they would generously and spontaneously contribute towards the honourable settlement of the question”. In early April 1938 he appointed a committee of 14 members to solve the Shaheedgunj problem. However, it could not work out any solution. On the whole the Unionist Party could not help politically or morally for restoration of the mosque. Indian National Congress claimed to be a representative body of all the communities of British India and stood professedly for mutual harmony among various communities but it took no steps to solve this problem. When Jawaharlal Nehru visited the Punjab, Moulana Zafar Ali Khan requested him to act as arbitrator between the two communities on the issue but he plainly refused. Most of the Hindus particularly the urban Hindus

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210 For more details about his opinion on the agitation and the civil disobedience see infra., p. 213.
212 Ibid., p. 811; Civil & Military Gazette, March 17, 1938.
215 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, June 6, 1936.
looked upon the problem as "God-sent" because they expected they would "gain in many ways" if the problem remained unsolved.\textsuperscript{216} Though Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind remained inactive on this issue as a political party, Mufti Kifayatullah and Moulana Ahmad Saeed issued a fatwa (religious decree) to the effect that "once a building duly constituted a mosque, it remains so till eternity and no... adverse possession can take it outside the scope of a mosque".\textsuperscript{217}

So far as All India Muslim League is concerned, it did try to solve the problem through legal and constitutional means. All India Muslim League kept itself aware of the happenings at Lahore since beginning of the problem and Hidayat Hussain, Honorary Secretary of All India Muslim League, exchanged letters with different Muslim leaders of the Punjab. Feroz Khan Noon in his restricted letter dated July 24, 1935 wrote the details of the whole affair. He strongly denied that the mosque was demolished at the instigation of the governor.\textsuperscript{218} On the other hand Malik Barkat Ali, in his letter dated July 29, 1935, wrote to Mr. Hidayat Hussain that the Shaheedgunj Mosque affair was a

\textsuperscript{216} Chhoto Ram to Sir Fazl-i-Husain dated July 21, 1935 in Waheed Ahmad, ed., \textit{Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain}, p. 415.

\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Report on Newspapers and Periodicals}, August 3, 1935.

\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Archives of Freedom Movement}, Vol. 521-522, p. 31.
"real tragedy" and "the real responsibility rests with the present governor". Malik Barkat Ali reported to him that a perfectly peaceful Muslim crowd was fired on without necessity and with the utmost cruelty and that the mosque was demolished under the cover and protection of the military. The Council of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League in a meeting held on July 25, 1935 passing a lengthy resolution on the Shaheedgunj issue strongly condemned the sacrilegious action of demolishing the mosque on the part of the Sikhs and opined that the demolition could have been avoided if the authorities had taken in time measures to prevent it. The firing against the Muslim crowds considered as "unjustified, excessive and inhuman" in the resolution and adequate compensation to the bereaved families was demanded. Moreover the Muslim members of the Punjab Legislative Council were called upon to take necessary steps to get a Muslim Augaf Act passed in accordance with Islamic teachings. Malik Barkat Ali wired to Jinnah, the President of All India Muslim League, that the central organisation should take "vigorous action" and demand "an impartial enquiry".

221 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
222 Ibid., p. 59.
Council passed a resolution on December 30, 1935 regretting "the most unfortunate position created", and requesting the Government of India to order an impartial enquiry as the Punjab government had "mishandled the situation." However, the Government of India did not consider such an enquiry necessary because "the government of the Punjab have throughout kept in close touch with the Government of India who fully approve all the action taken by the local government". In February 1936 Jinnah visited Lahore and tried to normalize the situation. As a result of his visit civil disobedience was abandoned and all the prisoners were released. At the annual session of All India Muslim League in 1937 at Lucknow, a resolution was passed condemning the demolition of the mosque as "a most intolerable interference with the Law of Islam" and the British Government was called upon "to restore the mosque to its original condition". Next year in a special session of All India Muslim League held at Calcutta in April Sir Sikandar Hayat, the Premier of the Punjab, assured that he was trying his best to solve the problem and that if his activities did not satisfy the Muslims, he

225 For details of his efforts during his visit see supra, pp. 171 - 173.
would be ready to resign. In view of the assurance given by the government of the Punjab to adopt every means for arriving at an honourable settlement of the Shaheedgunj issue, All India Muslim League in a resolution appealed to the Muslims "to create and maintain a peaceful atmosphere in order to facilitate that settlement". While speaking on the Shaheedgunj issue in his presidential address, Jinnah pointed out the only reasonable course open to the Muslims at that critical time and advised the Muslims "to realize that the way to settlement is not reached by dictation form one community to the other". Thus the Muslim League leadership tried to persuade the Muslims to adopt constitutional means and peaceful measures to seek for the settlement of the issue. When the decision of the Privy Council was given, Pakistan resolution had already been passed which before long eclipsed every other issue including Shaheedgunj.


228 *Civil & Military Gazette*, May 1, 1938. When this resolution was put to vote, out of 200 members of the subject committee only four disagreed, *Inqalab*, April 21, 1938.

The Shaheedgunj mosque had been in possession of the Sikhs for 170 years. They were using the building for residential purposes and even the evidence of existence of a toilet was brought on record. The Muslims and their leaders had been observing all this with open eyes but nobody took any affective measures for recovery of the mosque before the coming of the issue into prominence as a communal problem.\textsuperscript{230} At one stage the Sikh owners of the mosque were even willing to sell it to the Muslims but nobody among them was interested to accept the offer.\textsuperscript{231} Anjaman Islamiya filed a case in Gurdawara Tribunal but did not follow it wholeheartedly and no appeal was made to the High Court when the Gurdawara Tribunal dismissed the claim.\textsuperscript{232} When the issue assumed a communal ting neither the Muslims nor the Sikhs behaved sensibly. Inflamed emotions and unbridled enthusiasm prevailed without any consideration of prudence on both sides.\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{230} Makhdoom Murid Hussain Qureshi, \textit{Masjid Shaheedgunj Lahore} (Multan, 1935), p. 6.

\textsuperscript{231} Muhammad Anwar Amin, \textit{Mian Abdul Aziz} (Lahore, 1971), p. 53.

\textsuperscript{232} Makhdoom Murid Hussain Qureshi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., p. 2.
The Sikhs had their mutual differences particularly there were two distinct groups one led by Master Tara Singh and the other by Baba Kharak Singh. These differences had become prominent as far back as 1932.\textsuperscript{234} It was reported that when the negotiations were in progress, a prominent Sikh leader (Baba Kharak Singh) took oath that he himself would demolish the mosque on July 8 if the Sikh party in possession did not do so themselves.\textsuperscript{235} Though Master Tara Singh denied that any such statement was made by any Sikh leader\textsuperscript{236} When the Sikh and the Muslim deputations were having talks with the governor, it became evident that although the Sikh leaders were not in favour of immediate demolition of the mosque, their more ardent followers were no longer ready to follow the advice of their leaders and the Sikh jatha who arrived from Gujranwala threatened to demolish the mosque.\textsuperscript{237} Large scale Muslim demonstrations exaggerated accounts of which were reported by the Muslim press with large headlines resulted in the ingress of Sikhs into Lahore though the authorities tried their best to stop them.\textsuperscript{238} There were instances of stray attacks on the Sikhs and the dead-body of a Sikhs found at Shahalmi gate on July

\textsuperscript{234} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, November 5, 1932; July 1, 1933 and September 9, 1933.

\textsuperscript{235} Report on Newspapers and Periodicals, July 13, 1935.


\textsuperscript{237} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 13, 1935.

7 further infuriated the Sikhs who also might have reached the conclusion that until the building was intact the Muslims would continue to raise the question of their right for possession of the mosque again and again. Thus the fanatical group of the Sikhs commenced demolition of the mosque on July 8 at about 1.00 am without waiting for the decision of Gurdawara Parbandhak Committee and the Sikh representative body came to know of the demolition at 8.00 am on July 8.\textsuperscript{239} At that critical moment when the mosque was about to be demolished, the excitement caused by Baba Kharak Singh among the Sikhs gathered inside the Shaheedgunj "made it impossible for the Sikh leaders to keep their followers under control".\textsuperscript{240} Once the mosque was demolished, no Sikh group could afford opposition to the action already taken and the Executive Committee of Gurdawara Parbandhak Committee resolved in its meeting of July 8 that the committee had every right to make any changes or to demolish the building altogether.\textsuperscript{241} After that, every Sikh leader was bound to defend the cause of the Panth. In 1936 when Jinnah came to Lahore in February he found that the Sikhs had adopted an uncompromising


\textsuperscript{240} Emerson to Linlithgow, May 8, 1937. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/S/238.

\textsuperscript{241} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 27, 1935.
attitude.\textsuperscript{242} When Moulana Shoukat Ali wanted in September 1936 to negotiate on the issue with Master Tara Singh, the latter plainly wrote back to Shoukat Ali that any question related to the site of the mosque must be considered as closed. He further wrote, “the so called mosque and its site infinitely more to the Sikhs than to the Muslims and any Sikh leader who for a moment put this fact out of sight would be traitor to his religion and his community”.\textsuperscript{243} Despite all such exhortations on part of the Sikhs leader, Moulana Shoukat Ali saw master Tara Singh, the latter told him to prolong the negotiations until the Gurdawara and the Council elections were over.\textsuperscript{244} Later, when Sir Sikandar secretly met Master Tara Singh on April 3, 1938, the latter told him that “if he made a move, his opponents would use it against him to oust him from his position in Akali circles”.\textsuperscript{245} This explains why it was so difficult for the Sikh leadership to come to a settlement with the Muslims. On the other hand the conflict between Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat and the Majlis Ahrar-i-Islam and the emergence of factions within the Ittihad-i-Millat also complicated the situation.

\textsuperscript{242} Supra, p. 172.
\textsuperscript{243} Tribune, September 30, 1935.
\textsuperscript{244} Supra, p. 161.
\textsuperscript{245} Emerson to Limliythgown, April 6, 1938. Oriental India Office Collection, F. 125/86.
The Ahrar remained aloof from the agitation. Rather, in the beginning they even observed on July 23 that "it would be height of bravery for the Muslim community to retrace the wrong step".\textsuperscript{246} Various arguments for their attitude towards the agitation were advanced. They considered it impossible to restore the mosque through agitation and nothing could be achieved except bloodshed. Ataullah Shah Bukhari in one of his speeches observed that by withholding their support to the Shaheedgunj agitation the Ahrar "had stopped a civil war in the province".\textsuperscript{247} It was also argued that at a time when elections were ahead,\textsuperscript{248} they did not desire to go to jail by joining a struggle out of which the Muslims were not likely to emerge successful.

As very rightly observed by a researcher on the Shaheedgunj issue, the Ahrar did not have a single argument that could validate their evasion of the Shaheedgunj issue.\textsuperscript{249} If they did not support the agitation in order to avoid "civil war", there was no logic in starting a vigorous agitation later in 1938 on the same issue. If in


\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab}, August 8, 1935.

\textsuperscript{248} P. N. Chopra, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. II, p. 367.

\textsuperscript{249} Muhammad Khurshid, "Tanaz'a Masjid Shaheedgunj", p. 21.
1935 it was impossible to get the mosque restored through agitation it was equally impossible in 1938 when they started the direct action. If their indifference was because of avoiding imprisonment in the wake of elections, why, during the same period of time, they launched the campaign against the Ahmadis making the most provocative speeches resulting in imprisonment of many of the Ahrar including Ataullah Shah Bukhari. On one hand they argued in 1935 that Shaheedganj was a trap to stop the Ahrar from participating in the forthcoming elections but on the other, in 1936 they claimed that the issue of Shaheedganj was a creation of Zafar Ali Khan "with the sole object of securing seats in the Assembly". It comes to the absurd conclusion that the Shaheedganj issue was a trap to stop the Ahrar from entering the Assembly through elections and the same issue was a tool to secure seats in the Assembly for Zafar Ali Khan. If the Ahrar did not want to join the active agitation for recovery of the mosque to avoid imprisonment (while they did afford in their campaign against the Ahmadis) they should have at least raised their voice against the demolition of the mosque. Their failure to condemn the act of demolition committed by the Sikhs and their failure to express sympathy with the bereaved.

250 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, May 30, 1936.
families because of the firing lead us to the conclusion that the Ahrar had in sight to form a majority group in the Assembly and to form the next cabinet with the help of Akalis whom they did not want to annoy. This conclusion is further confirmed by more than one sources. Going a step further it was also observed that the Ahrar “did not want to offend the Sikhs from whom they had received support in Qadian”.

Even their well-known sympathisers considered it a “political blunder”, “wrong and unwise” on part of the Ahrar to remain aloof from the body of Muslims on the Shaheedgunj issue. It was nothing more than crying over split milk when the Ahrar took the self-contradictory decision of launching the civil disobedience campaign to recover the mosque in 1939. The most absurd thing in this respect was that they resolved to request the Indian

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251 Inqalab, July 30, 1935.


National Congress to provide funds for organisation of jathas for this purpose.\footnote{Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, January 15, 1938.}

The Ahrar alleged that the issue of Shaheedgunj was raised to destroy them and that Sir Fazl-i-Husain and the government were involved in this conspiracy.\footnote{Janbaz Mirza, Hayat-I-Amir-I-Shariat, op. cit., pp. 189-199; Shorish Kashmiri, Boo-i-Gul, pp. 75, 81 and ff. Speech of Mazhar Ali Azhar, Punjab Legislative Council Debates 1935, Vol. XXVII, pp. 749-761; Afzal Haq’s statement in Punjab Legislative Council Debates 1935, Vol. XXVII, pp. 655-656; Ehsan Ahmad quoted in ibid., p. 621.} The allegation does not seem to be based on solid footings. First of all, when in the Punjab Council Afzal Haq accused the government of helping the Sikhs in demolition of the mosque through military staff and his statement was immediately contradicted by Mr. D. J. Boyd as “absolute lie” and “totally untrue”, Afzal Haq, instead of proving his allegation retreated saying that “I do not mean to rely on those statements”.\footnote{Punjab Legislative Council Debates 1935, Vol. XXVII, p. 655-656.} Secondly, a day after the demolition of the mosque Deputy Commissioner Lahore warned Syed Habib (the editor of the daily Siyasat), Moulana Zafar Ali Khan and Akhtar Ali Khan not to incite the people or else severe action would be taken against them.\footnote{Civil & Military Gazette, July 9, 1935 vide Muhammad Khurshid, “Tanaz’a Masjid Shaheedgunj”, p. 11, fn.} Had the government intended to fan the trouble, the administration...
would not have warned the Muslim leaders against inflaming the movement. Thirdly, if the government’s intentions had been bad, it would not have tried to suppress the agitation and to pacify the Muslims by restoring to them the Shah Charagh Mosque. Fourthly, if the Sikhs had demolished the mosque at the instance of the government, the government would not have held the Sikhs morally in the wrong in the official communiqué issued after the demolition of the mosque. The government could not have condemned the Sikhs, if it had been in league with them, nor the Sikhs would have allowed to go that part of the communiqué unchallenged. Shorish Kashmiri claims with full confidence that the person who struck the first pickaxe at the mosque was one Binta Singh, a sub-inspector of the CID. The claim is unacceptable as if any definite proof of the involvement of the government such as this was in his possession, there was no reason not to put it before the public during his public speeches in the Badshahi mosque or to get it published. If it was not possible for him for certain reasons, at least he could have handed over such documents to the Ahrar who became his favourites in the second phase of Shaheedgunj agitation in 1938, and who would happily use such documents to strengthen their claim.

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259 Shorish Kashmiri, *Boo-i-Gul*, p. 75.
that the government was behind the issue.\textsuperscript{260} Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to examine some of other allegations made by Shorish Kashmiri. He alleges that original document showing that the building was dedicated to God as a mosque was handed over to Akhtar Ali Khan who 'lost' the document.\textsuperscript{261} The reality about the document is that it was neither lost by Akhtar Ali Khan nor by anybody else, rather it was submitted by Dr. Alam to the District Court and it was on the basis of this 200 years old original deed of dedication that the court recognised the claim of the Muslims that the building was originally a mosque.\textsuperscript{262} Shorish Kashmiri and other Ahrar leaders also regret the failure on part of Zafar Ali Khan or Akhtar Ali Khan to request the government to apply section 144 to prevent the demolition of the mosque after they had taken the responsibility to do it.\textsuperscript{263} The responsibility of filing an application under section 144 C.P.C. was actually given not to an individual but to a committee of three persons.

\textsuperscript{260} Weekly secret reports of the CID, Governor's quarterly reports to the Viceroy and the secret correspondence between the Governor and the Viceroy are now available. In fact there is no trace of authenticity of such allegations.

\textsuperscript{261} Shorish Kashmiri, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 193-194.

\textsuperscript{262} \textit{Civil \\& Military Gazette, May}, 1936.

\textsuperscript{263} Afzal Haq says that Zafar Ali Khan took the responsibility but trusting the Deputy Commissioner did not request the government to apply section 144. Afzal Haq, \textit{Tarih-i-Ahrar, op.cit.}, p. 167. Shorish Kashmiri accuses Akhtar Ali Khan of trusting the D.C and not getting the stay order under section 144. Shorish Kashmiri, \textit{Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari}, p. 95; \textit{Bou-e-Gul}, p. 77.
Muhammad Ali Jafri, Master Jalal-ud-Din and Syed Inayatullah by the Anjaman Tahaffuz-i-Masjid Shaheedgunj according a resolution passed in a public meeting at Mochi Gate on July 1, 1935.264 As we see, neither Zafar Ali Khan nor Akhtar Ali Khan were entrusted the task of getting the stay order. The Law Member, Mr. J. D. Andersan in his statement in the Punjab Legislative Council touched this question. Though the matter being sub-judice, he was unable to explain the point in clear terms, it can be inferred from his statement that taking into consideration the existing facts and the previous decisions of the courts, the government had expressed their inability to apply section 144 C.P.C.265 It is a matter of common sense that if the option of getting a stay order under section 144 had been open to the Muslims, the Governor would not have desperately tried to persuade the Sikh leaders to assure him not to demolish the mosque until all the ways and means of mutual settlement were exhausted. He would simply ask the Muslim deputationists to get a prohibitory order under section 144 and then to continue negotiations with the Sikhs. Thus the whole story about Zafar Ali Khan and Akhtar Ali Khan trusting in the assurance of Deputy Commissioner and not filing the application under section 144 letting

264 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 6, 1935.
the mosque demolished, stands fake, it is probably because of the hostility between the Ahrar and Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat that the Ahrar sources held Zafar Ali Khan and his son responsible. Moreover, even if we assume that Zafar Ali Khan or Akhtar Ali Khan trusted the Sikh Deputy Commissioner and did not get stay order, then the Ahrar should have come forward at least to proceed on this legal point to save the mosque particularly when they knew that allegedly Akhtar Ali Khan and others were not sincere in the movement for restoration of the mosque.\textsuperscript{266} Shorish Kashmiri while criticizing the role played by Pir Syed Jama'at Ali Shah, also accused that Pir Sahab was one of the signatories of the \textit{spasnama} (thanksgiving address) to the governor of the Punjab Michal O'Dyer.\textsuperscript{267} The fact is that Pir Jama'at Ali Shah did not sign the \textit{spasnama} and he had made it clear as far back as 1921 in his presidential address of Laylpur Khilafat Conference held on March 3-4, 1921.\textsuperscript{268} The Ahrar leaders also alleged that the Muslims were given assurance that the mosque would not be

\textsuperscript{266} Muhammad Khurshid, "Tanaz'a Maqsid Shohideygar^n%", \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22.


\textsuperscript{268} "Presidential address of Khilafat Conference Laylpur" included in Syed Akhtar Hussain Shah and Tahir Farooqi, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 588-599. For his statement regarding the \textit{spasnama} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 592. The \textit{spasnama} is included in a number of Ahrar and other sources but the list of the signatories does not contain the name of Pir Jama'at Ali Shah. See Janbaz Mirza, \textit{Hayat-i-Amir-i-Shariat}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 592; Muhammad Farooqi Qureshi, \textit{Wali Khan aur Qurwadadi-Pakistan} (Lahore, n.d.), pp. 310-313; Moulana Noor Muhammad, \textit{Baraivi Fatway} (Lahore, 1983), pp. 165-172.
demolished until the dispute was settled between the two communities or at least until the Shiromani Gurdawara Parbandhak Committee took some decision on the matter but the mosque was demolished silently in the dead of night with connivance of the government.\textsuperscript{269} Some other sections of the Muslims also shared the same views on the matter.\textsuperscript{270} The question was answered by the Chief Secretary, Mr. F. H. Puckle in the Punjab Legislative Council. According to him, on the afternoon of July 2 the Deputy Commissioner saw a deputation of prominent Muslims of Lahore like Dr. Shuja-ud-Din, Akhtar Ali Khan, Syed Mohsin Shah and Mian Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad. The reports of the Deputy Commissioner written within 24 hours of the reception of the representative deputation show that what the deputation was told by him was "local Gurdawara committee had given him a solemn undertaking not to demolish the mosque until the Punjab Government had time to come to a considered opinion on the rights of the question".\textsuperscript{271} This was the only undertaking ever given and it rested not on any legal or extraordinary power of the Deputy Commissioner but on the


\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Civil & Military Gazette}, August 18, 1935.

undertaking given to him by certain Sikh representatives.\textsuperscript{272} On the morning of July 6 when the Muslim deputation waited on the Governor, they were told that "the government had examined the legal position and found that the Sikhs were legally in possession of the mosque and that the government had no legal power to prevent them from doing whatever they liked".\textsuperscript{273} The Punjab government declared that they did not give any assurance to the Muslim deputation that the mosque would not be demolished. The government however, assured that "so long as a way to a solution lay open, they would make every effort to reach one".\textsuperscript{274}

So many people particularly the Ahrar asserted that the government provided a crane to the Sikhs to demolish the mosque.\textsuperscript{275} The government was accused of supplying the crane etc. to the Sikhs for the first time on November 11, 1935 in the Punjab Legislative Council and it was never

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid., p. 663.
\textsuperscript{274} Punjab Government Communiqué No. 1379, of July 10, 1935.
asserted before even in the Vernacular Press. The facts about it are that no instrument of any kind was supplied by any government department. The instrument allegedly used to demolish the mosque, far from being a crane or even a winch, was a small pulley round which chains or ropes were to be passed. That small thing was procured by a Sikh named Dhayan Singh. It was used for a few minutes and then it broke down. It is interesting to note how the fable of "a crane supplied by the government" was produced, later to be repeated blindly by various writers. Afzal Haq in his speech in the Punjab Legislative Council on November 11 said that he had been informed by "a respectable person that the winch or crane was supplied by the North Western Railway. Mr. D. J. Boyd relying on Afzal Haq thought that if it had been supplied at all, it must have been supplied to a Railway contractor for the sake of Railway work. In this context, Mr. D. J. Boyd asked Afzal Haq that on what understanding it had been supplied. Afzal Haq replied that he did not know what was the understanding. Three days later, Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar making a mountain out of a molehill, admittedly just on the basis of the above-

278 Ibid.
mentioned conversation between Afzal Haq and Mr. D. J. Boyd, alleged during his speech that "all traffic towards Shaheedgunj was stopped on the 7th at about noon. No one was allowed to go to Shaheedgunj with the exception of motor lorries which had taken tools and winch to the spot" to demolish the mosque.\textsuperscript{279} This is not the only example of totally baseless allegations on the part of the Ahrar. Janbaz Mirza, an important leader of the Ahrar, taking a step further, claims that while answering to the questions raised by Moulana Mazhar Ali Azhar, in the Punjab Council, Mr. D. J. Boyd told the house that it was so and so Sikh contractor who demolished the mosque with his crane. Incidentally, that Sikh contractor was present in the Council and he strongly denied the charges laid down by D. J. Boyd, and claimed that he neither had a crane nor he had demolished the mosque.\textsuperscript{280}

Shorish Kashmiri asserts that the day Akhtar Ali Khan advised the agitators to end up the morcha of Delhi Gate by deceiving them with a fake message of Moulana Zafar Ali Khan to this effect, there remained no possibility of any positive results.\textsuperscript{281} If we consider the whole situation


\textsuperscript{281} Shorish Kashmiri, Boo-i-Gul, pp. 92 & 101.
existed at that time, it appears that Akhtar Ali Khan took
the wisest step to persuade the Muslim young men to retreat
towards Wazir Khan mosque. There was no possibility of any
positive result rather it would bring most disastrous
consequences if the morcha of Delhi Gate continued.
According to a reliable source, the governor had called and
warned the prominent Muslims that if the Muslims, gathered
at Delhi Gate, did not disperse by the next day, they would
be subjected to air attack for which the governor had
already been permitted by the Central government and some
of the bomber plains were alert to deal with any
emergency.²⁸²

It is also often alleged that Sir Fazl-i-Husain threw
the debris of the Shaheedgunj mosque over the Ahrar. Sir
Fazl-i-Husain's health had already deteriorated to a great
extent by April 1935 when he reached Lahore.²⁸³ When the
Shaheedgunj issue came into prominence, he was taking rest
at Abbotabad in seclusion. In July he had a severe attack

²⁸² Ashraf Ata, *op. cit.*, pp. 244-245. The fact that the authorities in the Punjab had been in close contact
throughout with the Central government is also confirmed by the Secretary to the Government of India in
his letter dated January 29, 1936 addressed to Honorary Secretary, All India Muslim League. *Archives of
Freedom Movement*, vol. 521-522, pp. 53-54.

²⁸³ Syed Noor Ahmad depicts his physical condition on his arrival at Lahore in these words: "the veriest [?] shadow of human figure, an old man, weak and emaciated, with dark rings round his eyes and a sickly smile on his thin, worn out face". *Mian Fazl-i-Husain: A Review of His Life and Work* (Lahore, 1936), p. 108.
of bronchitis. Constant fever throughout August and September and malfunction of kidneys in December 1935 made his condition worse. He felt so depressed that on December 28 he wrote to his wife, “Forgive me for my trespasses during the last thirteen years. Life is uncertain and possibly there may not be another chance, so I hasten to choose this occasion (Eid) for asking your pardon. This year I am completely broken down.” When Syed Habib and Moulana Zafar Ali Khan started agitation for restoration of Shaheedgunj mosque, Sir Fazl-i-Husain was totally against this move. On July 12 the note about Syed Habib’s agitation in the diary of Sir Fazl-i-Husain reads “nothing could come out of it except a few murders, a few hung and imprisoned, and general bitterness.” Some of his letters to Syed Habib show that the later decided to start the Shaheedgunj agitation contrary to the advice of Sir Fazl-i-Husain and after the exchange of harsh words between the two, Syed Habib threatened to launch a campaign against Sir Fazl-i-Husain. On one hand Sir Fazl-i-Husain was annoyed with those who chose the option of civil disobedience and active agitation to restore the mosque and

284 Azim Hussain, op. cit., pp. 287 & 349.

285 Ibid., p. 349.

286 Waheed Ahmad, ed., Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-I-Husain, p. 149.

on the other hand he appreciated the "bold course" taken by the Ahrar who "plumped right" which "will make Ahrar a constitutional party".\(^{288}\) He wrote to the Muslim leaders in Lahore to publish a statement that the direct action was not the right course to adopt.\(^{289}\) He was of the view that the Muslims should just "drop the matter" because "there was no advance possible at this stage" and this is what he advised to so many people who saw him for consultation on the issue.\(^{290}\) Once he said to Ghulam Rasul Mehr and Abdul Majid Salik of Inqalab that the Muslim orators and Muslims papers must stop all discussion on the Shaheedgunj as we, the Muslims had been defeated on the issue and lamenting the loss again and again would create in the community an inferiority complex. To him the best course to adopt was to let the emotions calm down and afterwards at some later stage, the Muslims forming majority under the new reforms, there might be an occasion to threaten the leadership of Tara Singh or the status of Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee by introducing a piece of legislation and the Sikhs would be ready to affect a compromise restoring at least the actual site of the mosque.

\(^{288}\) Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-I-Hussain*, p. 155.

\(^{289}\) Azim Hussain, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

\(^{290}\) Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-I-Hussain*, p. 197.
to the Muslims keeping the Gurdawara with them. This was the course he wished the Muslims to adopt for restoration of the mosque. He felt satisfied and happy when the government accepted Jinnah’s offer to help on the issue. On Jinnah’s arrival at Lahore Sir Fazl-i-Husain also wrote to Jinnah if he could contribute towards Jinnah’s efforts to solve the problem.

Besides, the Unionist party, the masterpiece created by Sir Fazl-i-Husain’s mind, was a non-communal party based on promoting mutual harmony and cooperation between the Muslims and other communities of the Punjab. Fazl-i-Husain could very easily understand that raising of a communal issue like that of a Shaheedgunj mosque would result in increased bitterness and resentment between the Muslims and other communities of the Punjab particularly the Sikhs. Naturally, he could not have defeated the cause of his own party by raising such a communal issue which might bring the party in confrontation with the situation that later Sir Sikandar had to face when he, as the Premier, had to advise the governor to prevent the introduction of Malik Barkat Ali’s bill related to Shaheedgunj. The Shaheedgunj

292 Waheed Ahmad, ed., Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, p. 200.
issue “had shaken the very roots of the Unionist party”.

In the final analysis neither Sir Fazl-i-Husain nor the governor and the government of the Punjab could have taken the risk of experiencing the adventure of Shaheedgunj that resulted, in the injury of 124 government personnel including three military officers and 12 of other ranks of the British troops, and 22 of the Indian troops in addition to the numerous killings of the Muslim agitators within two days and disruption of the peace of the most important province of British India for more then three years. Shaheedgunj must have contributed to unpopularity and the downfall of the Ahrar as one of the factors but to say that the whole drama was staged to destroy the Ahrar and it was the only reason for the downfall of the Ahrar is an oversimplification of history and it just make us recall the simple villager who having lost his blanket, thought the whole fair was arranged for the sole purpose of depriving him of his blanket.

The government, however, cannot wash their hands of the responsibility of the disastrous happenings. The government committed a great blunder when they interned

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295 Indian Annual Register 1936, p. 334.
Moulana Zafar Ali Khan and other Muslim leaders on July 14. As a result of this measure the situation further deteriorated and "wild young-men" took the lead of the mob. Feroz Khan Noon in his letter of July 23, 1935 to Sir Fazl-i-Husain, lamented that there seemed to be no leader and "they [the crowd] are not willing to take any advice except the one which pushes them on with law-breaking". When the comparatively reasonable and senior leaders like Zafar Ali Khan were interned the inexperienced and irresponsible teenage boys like Shorish Kashmiri took over and that proved to be most unfortunate. Pir Jama'at Ali Shah who was appointed as Amir-i-Millat very sensibly advised not to adopt the course of violence and civil disobedience but the same group of hot-heads like Moula Bakhsh, Khawaja Mohy-ud-Din, Professor Inayatullah, Shorish Kashmiri etc. tried to disturb the Amritsar Conference and insisted on civil disobedience and in January the civil disobedience was started. According to Shorish Kashmiri,

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298 Shorish Kashmiri was less than seventeen when sat on the pulpit presiding the public meeting in the Badshahi mosque and delivered his most intemperate and infuriating maiden speech. Shorish Kashmiri, Boo-i-Gul, pp. 80-81. The opinion of Shorish himself about the financial position and general character of these young-men is also important to note. For details see Shorish Kashmiri, Boo-i-Gul, pp. 107, 113, 115, 118-119, 206. See also Muhammad Jamil, op. cit., p. 259
299 Shorish Kashmiri, Boo-i-Gul, pp. 104-105.
Mirza Mehraj Din was behind the civil disobedience of Moula Bakhsh and the latter was paid Rs.50/- per month by Mirza Mehraj Din to continue the civil disobedience.\textsuperscript{300} To substantiate his allegation Shorish fabricated the story of conflict and rivalry between Mirza Mehraj Din and S. Pertab, the Deputy Commissioner. All the circumstances and the related happenings described by Shorish Kashmiri himself indicate that Syed Habib was behind the civil disobedience of Moula Bakhsh, Yasub-ul-Hasan etc. According to Shorish Syed Habib and Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad were released by the government suddenly under mysterious circumstances.\textsuperscript{301} Syed Habib, Feroz-ud-Din, Moula Bakhsh and Shorish grew against Pir Jama'at Ali Shah on the question of civil disobedience as the Pir was against this extreme measure. After the Amritsar Conference, Moula Bakhsh started civil disobedience. Shorish accuses Mirza Mehraj Din for it. On the other hand Shorish himself admits that Mirza Mehraj Din was a loyal police officer and he was one of those prominent followers of Pir Jama'at Ali Shah who on the instance of the government persuaded Pir Jama'at Ali Shah not to adopt the course of civil disobedience and to go for the Hajj instead of leading the movement for restoration of the mosque.\textsuperscript{302} If it was so, Mirza Mehraj Din could not have patronized Moula Bakhsh to launch civil disobedience movement. Syed Habib Feroz-ud-Din and Moula Bakhsh were, however, against the policy adopted by the Pir. So it appeals to reasonable minds that Syed Habib, though

\textsuperscript{300} Shorish Kashmiri, Boo-i-Gul, pp. 109-112, 118.

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., p. 107.

\textsuperscript{302} Ibid., pp. 102-103.
apparently he condemned Moula Bakhsh, must have instigated and patronized Moula Bakhsh’s civil disobedience movement for his personal ends.\textsuperscript{303} This notion is further confirmed by the fact that when Moula Bakhsh was arrested Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad immediately bailed him out of jail.\textsuperscript{304}

In 1940 when Pakistan was considered as the final destination of the Muslims and Jinnah became the Quaid-i-Azam, Zafar Ali Khan decided to favour the All India Muslim League and its demand of Pakistan saying that the solution to the enigma of Shaheedgunj laid in the achievement of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{305} It would not be incorrect to say that the dream of Independence was in the sub-consciousness of the Muslims that vaguely expressed itself in their Shaheedgunj agitation but their sincerity to the cause was exploited by most of the so-called leaders for their selfish ends.

\textsuperscript{303} This is also affirmed by an Intelligence Report which reads that Moula Bakhsh started the civil disobedience campaign at the instance of Syed Habib and Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad who were interested in continuance of Zafar Ali Khan’s internment by prolonging the agitation in order to collect all the funds they could during his absence. Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, February 1, 1936.


\textsuperscript{305} “Shaheedgunj kay Uqdey ka hal hay Pakistan”, Muhammad Tufail, ed., \textit{Naqosh: Lahore Number} (Lahore, 1962), p. 1179.
CHAPTER IV

THE KHAKSAR MOVEMENT

1932-1942
THE FOUNDER AND THE BEGINNING OF THE MOVEMENT

The founder of the Khaksar Movement, Inayatullah Khan later known as Allama Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, was born in 1888 to Ata Muhammad Khan a well-known rais of Amritsar. Inayatullah had an exceptionally brilliant academic career at the University of the Punjab and Cambridge. After completion of his formal education he returned to India and was appointed as Vice Principal Islamia College, Peshawar. He was later offered the post of under-secretary Government of India and he worked at this post for more than three years from 1917 to 1920. In 1920 he was appointed to the Indian Education Services and worked as head of various educational institutions in N.W.F.P. till October 1932 when he was retired because he had been on leave on medical grounds for the last two years and his application for further extension of leave was rejected. Mashraqi felt deeply concerned with the events of Hijrat Movement of 1920. The moving and tragic scenes resulting from the imprudent decree of the Ulema to migrate to Afghanistan inspired him

1 Weely al-Islah (Lahore), April 5, 1935, p. 9.
2 al-Islah, July 16, 1937, p.4.
to write *Tazkira*.\(^3\) Mashraqi published the first volume of this monumental work in 1924. In his view the sole objective of all the prophets of Allah particularly Hazrat Muhammad (Peace be upon him) was to establish Muslim sovereignty over the whole world.\(^4\)

Mashraqi pointing to Darwin’s theory of survival of the fittest, asserts that the Holy *Quran* had presented this law of nature thirteen hundred years ago as to the *Quran* two things are pre-requisite for domination, the faith (الْعِیَانْ) and the “Righteous Actions” (الْعِیْاه). The members of the community possessing these two pre-requisites are aslah (fitter) and always destined to rule the world.\(^5\) To Mashraqi the concept of ruling the world by the fittest community is based on ten principles that include: (1) the unity of God, (2) unity of the umma, (3) fighting out its battles with money (5) and with sword (6) readiness to migrate from one’s country, (7) steadfastness with the struggle, and trust in God regarding the results of the struggle, (8) moral excellence, (9) pursuit of knowledge and (10) belief in the

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\(^3\) *al-Islah*, June 9, 1939.


To act upon and implement the concept enunciated in Tazkira Mashraqi decided to launch the Khaksar Movement. It was at Pandoki, a village twenty-two miles away from Lahore, that the first Khaksar party was organised in August 1931. 

ORGANISATION

The founder of the movement, Allama Mashraqi commanded the whole organisation on behalf of Idara-i-Aliyya. Majlis-i-Shoora consisted of highest officials of the organisation.

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6 Muhammad Inayatullah Khan al-Mashraqi, al-Ijtibahiyat min kitab Tazkira (Rawalpindi, 1972), pp.56-57, 80-82, Shan Muhammad gives an erroneous picture of Mashraqi’s religious beliefs saying that “he discards the five articles of the faith taught by the Prophet and contrary to them introduces ten articles of faith. Shan Muhammad, Khaksar Movement in India (Meerit, 1973), p. 23. For denial by Mashraqi himself see his address to the Quetta Camp in Baluchistan, al-Islah July 28, 1939, pp. 7-12.

7 A unanimously agreed date of inception of the movement is not available. Inayatullah himself gave different dates at different times. At one place he says that “the first act” of the Khaksar Movement was done by him towards the end of 1930. al-Islah, August 7, 1936, p.5. In his letter dated November 12, 1932 to Governor of NWFP he says that he established the first group of the Khaksar Movement on February 14, 1931 and in a village it was started in August 1931. al-Islah, July 16, 1937, p.5. At another occasion he said, “the Khaksar Movement was started in the Punjab in April, 1931... but the first group was organised in February 1932 in Lahore. al-Islah, September 20, 1935, p.5. According to Safdar Saleemi, establishment of the Khaksar Movement was announced in April 1931 and on August 25 and the first group was organised at Pandoki. Safdar Saleemi, Khaksar Tehrik Ki Sola Sala Jid-o-Jahd (Lahore, n.d.), pp.35-36. According to a secret official report on the Khaksar Movement, it was established in Ichhra in September 1931. Oriental India Office Collection, B15/2/168. A correspondent of the Times of India gives the date of inception at Pandoki as August 25, 1930. Times of India, August 8, 1939.

8 Idara-i-Aliyya was a formal name for the institution vested in the founder of the movement himself and it enjoyed unquestionable authority and command over the whole organisation. Qaol-i-Faisal (Lahore, 1935), p.15.
was a separate unit from Idara-i-Aliyya and the latter could
issue orders overriding the suggestions of Majlis-i-Shoora.
In his individual capacity however, the founder of the
movement Allama Mashraqi was considered an ordinary member
and worked under the command of the Salar of his area.  

The organisation had a para-military structure and the
hierarchy consisted of the officers in the following
descending order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amir</td>
<td>Dictator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salar-i-Akbar</td>
<td>District Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salar-i-Markazia</td>
<td>Assistant District Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salar-i-Aala</td>
<td>Commander of 12 Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salar-i-Idara</td>
<td>Assistant to Salar-i-Aala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sar Salar</td>
<td>Commander of three groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salar-i-Mohallah</td>
<td>Commander of Mohallah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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9 Qauil-i-Faisal (Lahore, 1935), p.15. Up to 1933 there was an executive committee in place of Idara-i-Aliyya headed by Allama Mashraqi himself, consisted of four other members. Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168.

10 al-Islah December 6, 1933, p.4. For the details of the elaborate and well thought system devised by Mashraqi describing the rights and responsibilities of various officers and Khaksars, penalties and punishments, payment of promissory notes, emblems, uniform, caution and command, rules and regulations, procedure for the unemployed Khaksars, procedure for daily action and Khaksar meetings see Khaksar Ka Dastoor-ul-Amal (Lahore, n.d.), pp.3-4, 6-10. For details of various cautions etc. Ibid., pp.42-50.
Khaksars were supposed to practice drill and marching in the evening in khaki uniform and with belcha (spade) on their shoulders, commanded and guided by the Salar-i-Mohallah. Mashraqi was aware of the importance of uniform, caution and command to create discipline and the spirit to obey the leader. In Qaul-i-Faisal he explains how the cautions like left turn, right turn or about turn create ability in the group to listen to and obey their leader. Due to this training the soldier becomes ready even to lay his life to carry out the orders of his leader.\textsuperscript{11} Similarly khaki uniform, he says, has not only a relationship to the word "Khaksar" but it also indicates to association with an army-man and at the same time through its uniformity it creates a special sympathy and consideration among the members of the organisation.\textsuperscript{12} In fact Mashraqi adopted the uniform, belts, shoes, Nishan-i-Akhawwat, and drill with army like band to attract the people towards the organisation immediately.\textsuperscript{13} It was natural for civil population to be attracted to the lure of uniform, parade and elaborate army like discipline under which a blacksmith, as a Salar, ordered Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang (1905-1944) to run a round of the ground as a punishment and he obeyed without hesitation and at the Delhi

\textsuperscript{11} al-Islah, November 8, 1935, p.11.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p.16.

\textsuperscript{13} Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, Din-i-Qayyim (Lahore, n.d.), p.2.
Camp a 19 years old Salar, Abdur Rehman had a courage to give physical punishment of lashes to Allama Mashraqi, on the violation of discipline, in presence of 30,000 people.\textsuperscript{14} The spade (belcha) was the emblem of the Khaksars. The spade being a typical implement of labour, was useful for social service and at the same time it was adopted to emphasize the dignity of labour and for Mashraqi it had a religious importance as well. At a number of places he quoted the hadith how the Holy Prophet broke an obstructing rock with a spade in the battle of Ahzab pronouncing that with three strokes of spade he broke the might of three empires.\textsuperscript{15} Though it was contended by Idara-i-Aliyya and the Khaksars that belcha was an implement of social service and anybody who used it wrongly or unlawfully would be expelled from the organisation,\textsuperscript{16} sometimes Allama Mashraqi himself did not hesitate to describe the spade as “a very powerful implement better than a graceful sword.”\textsuperscript{17}

The publicized aims of the movement were:

(i) To unite the community by practical life;

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{al-Islah} December 25, 1936, p. 6. A British intelligence officer who worked in the Punjab Province for several years, asserts that the spades of the Khaksars were “razor sharp and were intended as weapons of offence.” \textit{Oriental India Office Collection, Memoirs of John P. Morton, MSS Eur D1008/1.}
(ii) To promote equality;

(iii) To promote mutual love and affection by persuading people to serve one another;

(iv) To exalt the vision of the people by turning them into servants of God;

(v) To establish uniformity by making people wear clothes of one colour;

(vi) To eschew communal disputation;

(vii) To abandon political sectarianism;

(viii) To strengthen the community by the practice of silence;

(ix) To make the community smart by providing an Islamic symbol, the belcha (spade) and training them in drill;

(x) To discipline all villages and cities under one officer and the entire community under one Amir and to make its members obey one command;

(xi) Not to collect subscriptions;

(xii) Not to withdraw any step taken by former national or Indian leaders, nor to oppose any person, community, association or movement;

(xiii) To become the ruling power by promoting unity.¹⁸

¹⁸ Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, pp. 3-14.
The above-mentioned objects were reported in November 1933. About four years later, Mashraqui published the "Fourteen Points of the Khaksar Movement" which were more offensive and powerful as compared with those advertised in 1933:

(i) **Khaksars** wish to crush all communal feelings and religious prejudices by setting up an impartial, tolerant, but dominating organisation in which all peoples should be treated fairly and which should be based upon righteousness, endeavour, action and justice;

(ii) The Islam of the first century is the true Islam: A Khaksar soldier bases his conduct and Islamic faith on the actions of the Prophet of God;

(iii) The teachings of Maulvis are wrong. The Khaksar soldier has arisen to wipe out these false doctrines from the face of the world and to teach the doctrine of Islam in accordance with the principles laid down by the Holy Prophet;

(iv) The terms "Maulvi" or "Moulana" must be abolished and must be replaced by such terms as "Sheikh" or "Fazal";
(v) Khaksars do not wish to interfere with the religion of any sect among the Muslims, but wish to create unity of action amongst all sects;

(vi) Khaksar soldiers consider it the religious right of every Muslim to act in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Prophet, and are prepared to make every sacrifice to prevent the Government of the time from exercising political or legal control in this respect;

(vii) Khaksars believe in religious toleration;

(viii) Khaksars are prepared to admit any community as their allies;

(ix) The goal of the Khaksar soldier is the kingdom of the world and the collective and political domination of the community;

(x) The goal of the Khaksar soldier is to set up a Bait-ul-mal in India under the control of the Idara-i-Aliyya;

(xi) Khaksar soldiers believe that by their virtuous conduct they can overpower every community and individual in the world;

(xii) Khaksars consider it their duty to enhance trade in order to reform the economic condition of the community;
A "muawin" Khaksar is one who contributes to the Khaksar funds and who carries out any orders given to him by the Idara-i-Aliyya;

Khaksars are deadly enemies of treacherous leaders, hostile editors and newspapers, and communal mischief-mongers, and desire to wreak vengeance on them even if this involves maximum sacrifices."^{19}

Important Features of the Movement

Mashraqi urged the Muslims and prepared the Khaksars to adopt the soldierly life as Sunnah of the Holy Prophet.^{20} Another aspect emphasized by Mashraqi was the complete and unconditional obedience to the leader (Amir). Unconditional obedience to the leader was one of the ten principles propounded by Mashraqi in Tazkira.^{21} Later in 1926, while addressing the Khilafat Conference at Cairo, he again discussed the importance of the Amir for the Muslim Ummah.^{22}

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^{19} al-Islah October 22, 1937, p. 5.
^{20} Qaum-i-Faisal, pp. 7-8.
^{21} Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, Tazkira, Arabic Preface, p. 56.
In the Khaksar Movement unconditional obedience to the Amir was considered one of the important principles and Mashraqi urged upon the dictatorial authority (ikhtiar-i-mutliq) of the Amir.²³ He was of the view that under democratic system the elected leader could not reform the community because he being elected by the people could not go against the trends already adopted by them.²⁴ Social service to all without any discrimination of cast creed or religion was also an important objective of the Khaksar Movement.²⁵ Another unusual feature of the organisation was prohibition of raising subscription. Salar was supposed to be a well off person who could not only bear his own expenses but also spent for the organizational work from his own pocket.²⁶ Every member, attending Khaksar Camps at different parts of the country, would bear his own expenses as well as spend to meet expenditure of pitching the camp.

In fact the instances of embezzlement of funds on large scale during the Khilafat Movement and later during the agitational campaigns of the Ahrar haunted the mind of Allama Mashraqi. Even before the Khilafat Movement, the funds collected by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan for Muslim education

²³ For his detailed arguments see al-Islah March 19,1937, pp.1-4; al-Islah September 1937, pp.5-7.
²⁵ Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, Qaul-i-Faisal, p. 16.
²⁶ Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, Ishaarai, pp. 127-128.
were misappropriated which greatly aggrieved Sir Syed himself. In this background, Allama Mashraqi bitterly criticized the practice of raising subscriptions and it was strictly prohibited in the Khaksar Movement.\textsuperscript{27} Though regular subscriptions were not demanded, some of the members of the movement voluntarily donated large sums of money and properties for the proposed \textit{bait-ul-mal}. Establishment of \textit{bait-ul-mal} was the idea that Mashraqi floated as far back as in 1926, in the Cairo Conference and asserted that central \textit{bait-ul-mal} of the whole Islamic world might be established at Cairo with a capital of 20,000 pounds.\textsuperscript{28} For the \textit{bait-ul-mal} of Khaksar Movement Mashraqi neither demanded any regular subscriptions nor a single rupee was spent from it on camping, demonstrations or other activities of the movement. Whatever was donated voluntarily by the members of the movement to the \textit{bait-ul-mal}, sometimes being a property worth hundreds of thousands of rupees offered as \textit{waqf} for the movement, was not to be spent unless it was direly needed by the Muslim community in case of some great

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Qaul-i-Faisal}, pp.13-14. However Mashraqi intended to take some drastic and revolutionary steps in this regard in future. “We want to organise a group of people ready to sacrifice their lives... once we have a \textit{Jama’i} of selfless persons and the final destination is insight, instead of requesting for subscription we will forcibly take all the wealth of each Muslim in the way of Allah ... we have the Quranic authority to seize the wealth of the Muslims...”. \textit{Ibid.}, p.14.

\textsuperscript{28} Inayatullah Al-Mashraqi, \textit{Khitab-i-Misr}, pp.26-27; Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168.
national calamity.\textsuperscript{29} In May 1937 it was claimed in \textit{al-Islah} that the \textit{bait-ul-mal} contained 900,000 rupees.\textsuperscript{30}

Mashraqi wanted the \textit{Khaksars} to live hard and soldier-like lives, and he frequently ordered the \textit{Khaksars} to perform most difficult tasks against their own will. The salars and other officials of the movement were also advised by Mashraqi to adopt the same policy.\textsuperscript{31}

Mashraqi also introduced a novel scheme of issuing \textit{qirtas-i-a’zazi} or promissory notes to the officers of the \textit{Khaksar} movement as a substitute for their salaries. These notes were issued on monthly basis and would be exchanged for cash when sufficient funds were available.\textsuperscript{32} The Persian writing on these promissory notes was reported by the CID, NWFP to be capable of two interpretations:

(i). I promise to pay the bearer the above-mentioned rupees with certainty;

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{al-Islah}, September 4, 1936, pp. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, May 14, 1937, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{al-Islah} December 11, 1936, p. 5. For instance, when the Eid moon was cited in Lahore, the \textit{salar} of Lahore ordered the \textit{Khaksars} to attend a camp on the next day and the \textit{Khaksars} pitched their camp in open ground on the Eid Day in Lahore. Mashraqi also addressed this camp. \textit{al-Islah}, December 25, 1936.
\textsuperscript{32} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, August 26, 1933. For further details see \textit{Idara-i-Aliyya Hindiyya, Khaksar Ka Dastoor-ul-’Amal}, pp. 17-18.
(ii) I promise to pay the bearer the above-mentioned rupees on the attainment of independence (of India).  

Initially these notes were of Rs.10 & Rs.5 but later notes of Rs.50, Rs.25 and Re.1 were also circulated. Certain title-holders of the movement were entitled to receive promissory notes by virtue of their titles. The notes were also issued to certain Khaksars as prizes for their commendable performance in the Khaksar Camps they attended.

Taking a step further from khaki uniform, military style drill and marching, Mashraqi started holding "military" camps and demonstrations of mock wars. He wanted to "astonish" the world through the glorious bands of "trained disciplined and armed" Muslims "ready to move." He declared that he intended not to create a religious sect

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33 Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p. 25. According to Shan Muhammad the writing on the qirtas was in Arabic. Shan Muhammad, op. cit., p. 12. This is not correct. The Persian text was:

"میں دیکھا گیا کہ ہم نہیں رہیںگے نہیں رہیںگے بارہ۔ہے (خیال) (ر)گیا" (Darya)

34 Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168; Islah, March 5, 1937, p. 12.

35 For instance every Khaksar holding the title of Sahib-i-Nishan was paid Rs.50/- per month. al-Islah, April 16, 1937, p.5.

36 al-Islah April 28, 1939, p. 5.

37 Ibid., April 5, 1935, p. 3.
but a “military group” (الجُمُعُرُوج).\textsuperscript{38} Mashraqi could not hide his military motives in his writings. Answering a question from one of his followers, he urged that camping activities of the Khaksar must be taken as “preparation for war”.\textsuperscript{39} He also hinted at the possibility of replacing spades with guns in future.\textsuperscript{40} The Khaksar camps were referred to in the columns of al-Islah as “great military camps.”\textsuperscript{41} Even there were instances of holding “military Courts” by Khaksar Officials.\textsuperscript{42} Mock wars fought at the Khaksars Camps.\textsuperscript{43} In the mock wars fought at big Khaksar Camps the Khaksars successfully tried to display an aura of real wars by building huts and artificial forts at strategic points, using crackers and even iron shells filled with gun powder, artificial cannons to fire shells up to the range of more than 400 yards, using maps to learn strategic movements of the armies and moving the “wounded soldiers” to the “field

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{39} al-Islah, January 21, 1938, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{40} al-Islah, August 14, 1936, p.2., June 24, 1939, p.2.

\textsuperscript{41} al-Islah April 24, 1936, p. 12; October 23, 1936, p. 12. These events were held with strict military like discipline and formalities. For details see al-Islah April 12, 1935, p. 11, February 19, 1937, pp. 5-7, April 23, 1937, pp. 6-7 and January 20, 1939, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{42} The details of such a trial and decision of Khaksar “military court” see Ibid., June 12, 1936, p.6.

\textsuperscript{43} Such wars were started in 1935. Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p.17. According to Aslam Malik the concept of mock wars was introduced towards the end of 1936 which is incorrect. At least five mock wars were reported between the last three months of 1935 by various sources. Ibid., p.18, al-Islah, November 1, 1935, p.12; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, November 16, November 30 & December 7, 1935.
In al-Islah while discussing the proposed mock wars at the forthcoming Khaksar Camp such terms as artillery, infantry, covering fire, concentrations, dumps and assault were freely and frequently used. A number of lengthy articles on the science of war were published in installments in al-Islah. More than 50,000 copies of Mashraqi’s address “Islam Ki Askari Zindagi” were circulated. In fact all these activities were for “preparation of (real) war and Allama Mashraqi, at least on one occasion, explicitly told that he wanted the mock wars gradually transformed into real wars.

Signing of pledges of loyalty and obedience written in one’s own blood was another extraordinary feature of Khaksars movement. The pledges of absolute obedience and loyalty were made by 21 Janbazes of NWFP on April 5, 1935 in writing and they were followed by 13 others from Hayderabad.

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44 Civil & Military Gazette, June 6, 1939, al-Islah, November 1, 1935, p. 12, December 31, 1937, p. 44 and April 28, 1939, p. 5. In mock wars sometimes the participants received injuries. In a mock war at Lahore in 1938 a Khaksar Tayyab Ali Shah received fatal injuries and latter succumbed to the wounds in the hospital. Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p. 23.

45 al-Islah March 5, 1937, pp. 9-10.

46 For example the review of Ahmad Saeed’s book “The Watch” (صبریہ), al-Islah, July 24, 1936, p.2.


48 Ibid., January 1, 1938, p.4.
(Duccan). The first of them was Syed Haji Hussain Shah of Peshawar. Dr. Nazar Muhammad, Salar-e-Akbar Jehlm was the first to write the pledge of loyalty and obedience to Idara-i-Aliyya in his own blood on August 4, 1936.

By mid July 1939, 840 Janbazes were registered in Idara-i-Aliyya. The process continued even after the ban on the movement by the Punjab government and towards the end of May 1941 more than 1200 Janbazes had sent their pledges to Idara-i-Aliyya.

THE REAL MOTIVES OF THE MOVEMENT

Though the founder of Khaksar Movement did not clearly announce the real motives behind the movement in the

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49 al-Islah, August 21, 1936, pp.10-11.
50 Ibid., August 7, 1936, pp. 5-6. Dr. Naheed Nazar, Sang-i-Girun hey Zindagi (Jhelum, 1988) pp. 71-92. For details of his biography see ibid., passim. Though the Janbazes who signed their pledges before August 4, 1936 were not written in blood but they were considered by Mashraqi equal to the Janbazes who later wrote the pledges in their blood. al-Islah, August 21, 1936, p. 10. The text of their pledges might differ from one another but the concept was the same. For some examples see ibid., August 14, 1936, p.3; September 25, 1936, p.15; October 30, 1936, p.12
51 al-Islah July 14, 1939, p.12.
52 Ibid., May 30, 1941, p. 6. There were very few instances of alienating from the movement on part of Janbazes. In such cases Mashraqi refused to accept the resignation saying that the pledge was made not to Mashraqi but to Allah Almighty and the Janbaz should send his resignation to Allah if he could. Ibid., March 5, 1937, p. 3.
beginning, since the very inception of the movement Mashraqi had in his mind the revolutionary and novel idea of seizing the control of the state and establishing Muslim sovereignty over the Sub-continent. It was in the early 1920’s that he conceived this idea and wrote Tazkira with the same view. Isharat, the gospel of the Khaksar Movement published in 1931, contains hints to this idea.”\(^{53}\) In 1935 he declared that the movement aimed at “dominating and ruling the whole world.”\(^{54}\) “It is a preparation for rule and kingship.”\(^{55}\) In 1936 he claimed that if 50,000 Khaksars camped at Delhi next year, in the same year they would vanquish the whole of India.\(^{56}\) In March 1938 he wrote “if the kingship of the whole world is handed over to Khaksar, none will be annoyed by his rule.”\(^{57}\) In October 20, 1939 he published his thrilling offer of 50,000 Khaksar soldiers to the Government of India in al-Islah pleading that the right to rule India goes to the Muslims alone because they shed their blood for the defence of India 125 times more than the Hindus did during the last 200 years.\(^{58}\) A few weeks later he again

\(^{53}\) “In fact the spade is the implement by holding of which in hand, yearning to take possession of the earth is developed.” Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, Isharat, p. 119.

\(^{54}\) Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, Qaul-i-Faisal, pp. 2-4.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 18.

\(^{56}\) al-Islah February, 28, 1936, p. 4.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., March 25, 1938, p. 8.

\(^{58}\) For complete text see ibid., October 20, 1939, pp. 5-7.
pointed towards the final destination of the Khaksar movement: "If you the Khaksars become the rulers of India, all communities would accept [your supremacy] without any objection."⁵⁹ At least there is one evidence already brought to light that Mashraqi visited the Chiefs of certain pathan tribes for help in the proposed rebellion against the British rule and Malik Ghazi Masal Khan the Chief of Karakhkhal tribe received Rs.60,000 to provide salaried mujahids for this purpose but in spite of repeated messages from Mashraqi, Masal Khan did not provide the promised force. Meanwhile the Khaksar Movement was banned in 1940.⁶⁰ In 1947 he clearly stated that if the Khaksar Movement was re-organised on Mohallah basis in such a way as to provide hundreds of thousands of Khaksars, on the orders of Idara-i-Aliyya, Safdar Saleemi’s government could replace Jawaharlal Nehru’s in Delhi, rather over the whole of India within a few days.⁶¹ In 1931, when the movement was initially organised, Mashraqi was of the view that within five years 80 million Muslims would emerge victorious.⁶² Thus, by 1936 he expected the Khaksar movement to reach its destination.

⁵⁹ Ibid., December 1, 1939, p. 5.
⁶² al-Mashraqi, Isharat, p. 136.
In 1935, however, realizing that the pace had been slower than his expectations he expressed his determination "to take the Muslims to "permanent destination within next ten years" (i.e. by 1945)." After the intervention in the Shia-Sunni conflict in the U.P., the prestige of the Khaksars increased considerably and the movement gained popularity. As a result Mashraqi again hoped that in 1940, the movement could reach its destination if stern efforts were made. Hence in early 1939, he threatened the Khaksars to terminate the movement if at least 300,000 Khaksars could not gather at the proposed camp in 1940.

In November 1939, he ordered the Khaksars to register at least 2.5 million (2,500,000) new volunteers within next six months. The next year, however, was to witness disruption of the movement and imprisonment of its founder.

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63 al-Islah, March 1, 1935, p. 5.
64 al-Islah, January 20 & 27, 1939, pp. 7-8.
65 Ibid., November 17, 1939, p. 6. In the same article he wished that the Khaksars might put their faith on trial in the torrent rain of guns and cannons instead of crackers. Ibid. "The victory at Lucknow has made us so crazy and out of our head as we cannot be content with our present position." Ibid.
A few months after its establishment at Pandoki, the Anjaman-i-Khaksaran held its meeting in Lahore presided by Professor Ala-ud-Din on February 14, 1932 and belchas, the emblem of the society, were distributed among the members attending this meeting of some 300 audience. The proceedings were reported as perfectly harmless by the intelligence department. Occasionally, the Khaksars paraded in Lahore city with belchas in khaki uniform under the command of Mashraqi himself. A group of Khaksars led by Inayatullah Khan marched in front of Badshahi Mosque on Eid. Another branch was established at Rohan (District Jalandhar in March 1933. Three months later, Amritsar branch was formed, Abdur Rehman Ghaznavi being the commanding officer (salar). They paraded in the streets and bazaars twice in a week and did social work such as helping the people in repair of their houses damaged by rains. By mid August 1933, 200 persons joined the Anjaman in Amritsar. The Ahrar opposed the movement and under their influence some of members of Anjaman-i-Khaksaran objected to certain instructions given

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66 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, February 20, 1932. However, after four weeks, in an intelligence report the previous impression of its being harmless was belied in the light of a careful study of Isharat. Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 19, 1932.
67 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, February 4, 1933.
68 Ibid., March 11, 1933.
69 Ibid., June 26, 1933.
70 Ibid., July 22, 1933.
71 Ibid., August 19, 1933.
in Isharat to salute the Europeans and to help them.\textsuperscript{72} A group of six Khaksars started long march on foot from Peshawar to Lahore on September 15 and reach Lahore on September 27. They failed to attract the attention and interest of general public. However, the Khaksars of Lahore accorded them an impressive reception.\textsuperscript{73} Towards the end of 1933, Inayatullah Khan claimed the membership of the movement between five to six thousand and formation of its branches at Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sargodha, Ferozpur, Jalandhar, Sheikhupura and Hoshiarpur apart from Lahore and Amritsar in the Punjab and also at Bangalore, Madras, Sitapur and Peshawar.\textsuperscript{74} In NWFP the movement was seen with suspicion since the very beginning and the authorities ordered to limit the recruitment to 250 and restricted outward activities of the movement.\textsuperscript{75} In March 1934, a new branch was established at Gujrat and its membership rapidly swelled from four to about one hundred within three months.\textsuperscript{76} The movement also made considerable progress in other cities and particularly the branches at Lahore, Gujranwala and Amritsar had been very active. They visited other cities and marched

\textsuperscript{72}Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, September 9, 1933. However Inayatullah somehow satisfied them, advised them to act upon the rules and not to be mislead by the Ahrar. Ibid., August 16, 1933.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., September 30 & October 7, 1933.

\textsuperscript{74} Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p.14.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., pp. 14-15.

\textsuperscript{76} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 31, May 26, June 9 & 6 1934.
in uniform to introduce the movement.\textsuperscript{77} They also attended the procession of Milad-al-Nabi marching in khaki dress and belchas.\textsuperscript{78} It was observed that initially the movement gained popularity mostly among the lower middle class like petty shopkeepers, tailors, blacksmiths etc.\textsuperscript{79} Inayatullah bought a plot of land at Lahore in March 1933 for establishment of a training center to impart military training to the Khaksars.\textsuperscript{80} The movement received further boost with the publication of al-Islah the weakly newspaper of the movement. The first issue was published on November 23, 1934.\textsuperscript{81} The idea was originally conceived in September 1933, when Inayatullah Khan and Abdul Hamid, one of his devotees, donated sums of Rs.300 and Rs.100/- respectively to start the paper.\textsuperscript{82} Since 1934 its publication continued regularly till February 1940, when the movement was disrupted by the Punjab Government. By the end of 1935 the movement had spread from Peshawar to Rangoon (Burma) and Bihar.\textsuperscript{83} In October 1935 Mashraqi claimed that 50,000 Khaksars had been

\textsuperscript{77} Police Abstract of Intelligence, January 20, March 17, April 7, October 20, November 3, 1934.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., June 30, 1934.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., January 20, 1934; March 31, 1934.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., March 17, 1934.

\textsuperscript{81} Muzir, op.cit., pp. 21-22.

\textsuperscript{82} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, September 23, 1933.

\textsuperscript{83} In May 1935 it was reported that in 25 villages of Bihar the movement had been established. al-Islah, May 3, 1935. In the same year branch of the movement was established at Rangoon (Burma). Ibid., November 15, 1935.
enrolled.\textsuperscript{84} Though there were a few instances of dissenting the organisation and joining the Majlis-i-Ahrar, new branches were established in Wazirabad, Chakwal, Jalalpur Jattan and Dera Ghazi Khan.\textsuperscript{85} Though the desertion did not cause much harm to the movement as a whole and Khaksars continued preparation for forthcoming Delhi Camp vigorously under the advice of Mashraqi who had ordered that 50,000 Khaksars must attend the Delhi Camp, the secret agencies of the government did get the false impression that the prestige of Mashraqi had been lowered considerably and that the movement would not make further progress.\textsuperscript{86}

In October 1936, 155 branches at different places in the Punjab, NWFP, Bengal, Sindh, Bihar, U.P., Hayderabad State, Birar, Baluchistan and Burma were instructed to strive hard to make the forthcoming Delhi Camp a success.\textsuperscript{87} By October 1936, 147 Janbazes had signed the blood pledges, fifteen horses and 31 tents were provided for the organisation and donations of more than 12,000 rupees were

\textsuperscript{84} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, October 26, 1935.

\textsuperscript{85} Particularly in Amritsar a group of 50 Khaksars headed by Dr. Allahditta joined Majlis-i-Ahrar thus disbanding two Khaksar groups in the city. Ibid., September 21, 1935. Ihsan reported that a number of Khaksars at Gujranwala had left the movement. Ihsan, May 4, 1935.

\textsuperscript{86} al-Islah October 11, 1935, pp.2-3. Pir Jama’t Ali shah’s cancellation of his previous statement issued in favour of the movement and denial of Nizam of Hayderabad to attend the Delhi Camp were also reported as the factors hampering the progress of movement. Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{87} al-Islah October 11, 1935, pp.3-5.
collected in the *bait-ul-mal.*

Towards the end of 1937 total membership was claimed as 170,000 at about 25000 centres throughout the country and the cash in the *bait-ul-mal* was Rs.15,000. Number of blood pledges of *Janzabes* increased to 308 and fourteen of them were honoured with the title of *Pakbaz.*

In mid 1938 branches of *Khaksar* movement were established in Nagpur (U.P.) and Mesore. Next year (1939) the movement extended its influence in Kashmir Abbotabad and Hazara district and the branches of *Khaksar* movement were found in 22 different villages. Some influential and important personalities also joined the movement in 1939. For instance G. M. Syed from Sindh province, *Sajadanashin of*

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90 *al-Islah*, December 31, 1937, p. 5. *Pakbaz* is not merely or necessarily a senior *janzab* as misunderstood by Shan Muhammad (op. cit., p.11) and the writer of a secret Note on the *Khaksars* (*Oriental India Office Collection, R/152/168*, p.21). *Pakbaz* was the one who, apart from signing the blood pledge, declared that his all (or almost all) property and wealth was *waqf* for *Idara-i-Alifya. al-Islah*, January 14, 1938, p. 5. For detailed list of *Pakbazis* and the *waqf* property see *ibid.*, December 24, 1937, p.12. Eleven *Pakbazis* actually handed over all the legal documents of their properties etc. to Allama Mashraqi on the orders of *Idara-i-Alifya. Ibid.*, January 14, 1938, pp. 5-6.


the Shrine of Khawaja Baqibillah and the son of Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh Prince of Sindh joined the movement this year. The latter also advertised the Khakser cause in his magazine Munadi. In Attock district the Sajadanashin of Burhan Sharif, Pir Muhammad Mushtaq who had considerable influence in the area joined the movement and actually participated in the drill with belcha. Thus the movement attained great momentum. Sometimes even the whole families including wives and children and house servants became Khaksars. The influence of the movement was felt even outside India. A branch of the movement was established in Behrain in early 1939. Pioneer of the movement in Behrain were Ghulam Muhammad and Nazar Muhammad Qureshi and total strength of membership was reported to be 35. A small branch of the Khaksar movement also existed at al-Khobar in Saudi Arabia. The Behrain branch sent a sum of Rs.600 to the Headquarters of the movement at Lahore during the

95 al-Islah, July 14, 1939, p.4.
96 For instance see ibid., August 18, 1939, p.12.
97 Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168. A secret report from Behrain points out that the Khakser movement was started in Behrain in 1937 by Nazar Ahmed of Amritsar and had about 40 members. See the next foot-note for reference.
98 Secret Report No.C/853-1 a/47 dated December 20, 1939 from Assistant Political Agent Behrain to the Director Intelligence Bureau (Home Department) government of India, Delhi. Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168. See also al-Islah, March 26, 1937.
Lucknow campaign.\textsuperscript{99} In November 1939 Mashraqi decided to enlarge the scope of the movement and ordered the *Khaksars* to enlist 2,500,000 new Khaksars within next six months. He divided the whole of India into fourteen "provinces" and a Hakim-i-A’la for each province was appointed who was supposed to take the charge by December 15 in his respective province and organise the campaign for enlisting new *khaksars*.\textsuperscript{100} However, the attempts to enrol new voluntaries on large scale did not meet considerable success.\textsuperscript{101} Meanwhile the Khaksars put great pressure on the Punjab Government in connection with "three demands." Sir Sikandar decided to ban the military drill of all volunteer organizations including Khaksars Movement. The Punjab government proscribed the pamphlet *aksariyat ya khun*, demanded security from Muhammadi Press and later the movement was declared unlawful after the clash of March 19, 1940 when Mashraqi was in Delhi to seek an interview with the Viceroy.

\textsuperscript{99} *al-Islah*, March 26, 1937.

\textsuperscript{100} *al-Islah* November 17, 1939, pp.5-7.

\textsuperscript{101} *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, January 20 and February 10, 1940.
THE THREE DEMANDS OF THE KHAKSARS AND THE PUNJAB GOVERNMENT

As we have already seen towards the end of 1937 the Khaksar movement had gained considerable momentum. Despite its mock wars, military camps and other activities of this kind, the movement did not involve itself in political matters. However, in December 1937 Allama Mashraqi decided to make some "non-political" demands from the Punjab government. A delegation of prominent Khaksars headed by Dr. Nazar Muhammad met the Premier of the Punjab, Sir Sikandar Hayat on December 11 and presented the following demands:

(i) The Government may organise a system to collect Zakat and Sadaqat in the bait-ul-mal established by the Khaksar movement;

(ii) A Broadcasting station may be established at Ichhra, the headquarters of the movement to disseminate the true teaching of the Quran and Hadith and to deliver a common Khutba of Jumma prayers etc;

(iii) The Government should permit the government servants to join the Khaksar movement as the movement had proved through its five years performance that it was a purely social and religious organisation.¹⁰²

¹⁰² al-Istah December 31, 1937, p.5; Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p.24.
The Khaksar delegation was heartened by the Premier so far the first and the third demand was concerned. However he told the delegation that the Broadcasting, being the central subject, was out of his jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{103} Mashraqi ordered his followers to bombard the Punjab Premier with resolutions, announcements, memoranda, posters, private letters, appeals and newspaper articles in favour of the three demands.\textsuperscript{104} Within ten days 85,000 such posters from Lahore, 36,000 from Laylipur, 10,000 from Gujrat and 7000 from Rawalpindi were published apart from other smaller centers, and by June 30, 200,000 signatures, 150 different types of posters, 200 resolutions, and hundreds of other requests, and threats favouring the three demands reached the table of the Punjab Premier.\textsuperscript{105} From NWFP alone some 100,000 memoranda stressing upon the three demands were sent to Premier of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{106} On February 20 another Khaksar delegation of three members met the Premier who expressed sympathy with the three demands but did not clearly promise to accept the demands.\textsuperscript{107} On March 6, Mashraqi sent a letter on behalf of Idara-i-Aliyya to Sir Sikandar urging that the Punjab Government should take measure to fulfil the three demands of the

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{al-Islah}, December 31, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{ibid.}, January 21, 1938, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{al-Islah} February 4, 1938, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Weekly al-Mashraqi (Peshawar)}, March 21, 1938, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{al-Islah}, February 25, 1938, pp. 5-6.
Khaksars. He also ordered all the janbazes and other Khaksars to be alert and ready to sacrifice their lives. Mashraqi continued to press for the demands in al-Islah and his tone continued to become more and more aggressive.

When Sir Sikandar and Chhotoram visited Chakwal on April 2, the Khaksars also attended the reception at the Railway Station. In the evening the Premier visited the Khaksar camp held at Chakwal under Dr. Nazar Muhammad Salar-i-Akbar. The latter presented a memorandum to the Premier regarding the three demands stressing that the Khaksar organisation and their demands were non-political. The Premier expressed his sympathy with the Khaksars and prayed for their success. However, he pointed out some practical difficulties in accepting and implementing the three demands of the Khaksars. Mashraqi immediately expressed his happiness over the "offer of friendship" extended by Sir Sikandar. A Khaksar delegation again met Sir Sikandar and

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108 al-Islah, March 25, 1938, pp. 4-6 & 8.
110 "Khaksars will shed the last drop of their blood." Ibid., March, 25, 1938, p.7. "Caesar's empire was broken up in fragments as he dared tear apart the letter of the Holy Prophet. The Khaksars would cause the same to the Punjab government." "Once the orders are given, either the 200,000 brave Khaksars would come and sacrifice their lives in the Punjab or they would succeed to change the fate of their country." Ibid., March 25, 1939, pp. 7-8.
111 al-Islah April 15, 1938, pp. 5-6.
112 Ibid., p. 5.
in two sessions on May 29 & 30 the three demands were discussed with him for more than seven hours. Though the Premier generously gave time to the Khaksar delegation and treated them kindly but the three demands were not accepted.\textsuperscript{113}

Mashraqi again became harsh and continuously made threats to Sir Sikandar in the columns of \textit{al-Islah}.\textsuperscript{114} Towards the end of October referring to a verse of the Holy Quran describing the extinction of the Pharaoh, Mashraqi warned Sir Sikandar, "If he considers the Holy Quran a joke he must prepare for his death."\textsuperscript{115} Meanwhile Mashraqi successfully tried to enlist the support of various non-political societies, persons of religious, social or political importance including some of the members of Punjab Legislative Assembly and published their names alongwith their recommendations for the three demands of the

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{al-Islah}, June 10, 1938, pp. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{114} "We are determined to lay our lives and we know that success will not be achieved but through death and blood." \textit{Ibid.}, June 10, 1938, p.7. "If the circumstances lead us to clash, hundreds, nay, thousands will be killed... I will be ahead of them... everywhere there will be blood... the five rivers will turn red." \textit{Ibid.}, June 24, 1938, p.5. An ultimatum was sent to the Premier to accept the three demands of the \textit{Khaksars} by October 15. \textit{al-Islah}, September 30, 1938, p.2. "To obey the orders to kill and to be killed is just like game for the \textit{Khaksars}." \textit{Ibid.}, October 14, 1938, p.10. "The \textit{Khaksar} soldier is ready to die and if he is destroyed he would eliminate everybody... if Sir Sikandar have a courage to destroy us he must do it. We are not the real \textit{Khaksars} if would not lay a bed of corpses around his bed." \textit{Ibid.}, October 28, 1938, p.1.
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Ibid.}, November 4, 1938, p.7.
Khaksars. Mashraqi claimed to have received the recommendations of 54 members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly. The tension between the Khaksars and the Punjab government was at its full height when Mir Maqbool, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Punjab Government met Allama Mashraqi on November 10 and discussed the issue for four hours. A delegation headed by Allama Mashraqi himself waited on Sir Sikandar on November 18 and later Mashraqi announced that the Khaksars had succeeded as the Punjab government had accepted their three demands. The Punjab Government adopted delaying tactics however, it had to make some moves to satisfy and cool down the Khaksars. The Government officials offered Allama Mashraqi to make use of the government broadcasting station to broadcast non-communal and peace-encouraging speeches and articles until the Central Government approved the demand of the Khaksars to establish a radio station of their own. The facility was in fact never extended to them. It is interesting to note that the government of India had refused to grant

116 al-Islah, August 26, 1938, pp.7-10; September 2, 1938, pp.7-10; September 9, 1938, pp.3-14; September 16, 1938, pp.1-2; September 30, 1938, pp.9-11; November 4, 1938, pp.5-7, 10-11; November 11, 1938, p. 5.
117 Ibid., November 11, 1938, p.8.
118 Ibid., November 18, 1938, p.5.
119 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, December 3, 1938; al-Islah, November 25, 1938, p. 5.
120 al-Islah August, 18, 1939, p.12.
license for installation of a separate broadcasting station or to allow the Khaksars to make use of local Radio Station as early as February 1939. However, most probably the government of the Punjab did not convey the refusal of the Central Government to the Khaksars. About the Government servants' joining the Khaksar movement, the Government cancelled a previously issued letter dated September 20, 1938 in which Anjaman-i-Khaksaran was specifically mentioned not to be joined by the Government servants. However, it was approved that the new circular should prohibit the Government servant to have the membership of any political organisation without specifying any particular organisation. Thus the Government in fact did not clearly accept the third demand of the Khaksars but al-Islah published a lead about the acceptance of the third demand and gave the impression that the Government orders

122 Department of Communication letter No. K433 dated February 13, 1939. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&I/8/680, pp. 471-472. The government of India regretted the application on the ground that it was against the policy of the Central Government to grant licenses for setting up independent broadcasting stations except in very exceptional circumstances which did not exist in the case of Khaksars. The Government of India also regretted the recommendations of the Punjab government to allow the Khaksar movement to broadcast their programs from All India Radio station of Lahore because the government of India could not allow the station of All India radio to be used for the programs having political or communal complexion. The recommendations were not acceptable also because after setting a precedent of this type, it would be impossible to refuse similar facilities to other organizations of similar nature. Ibid.

123 This is confirmed by the instructions of Idara-i-Alia, issued on August 9, 1939, which read that the correspondence between the Punjab government and the government of India regarding the demand of a broadcasting station still continued. al-Islah, August 18, 1939, p. 12.

prohibiting the government servants to join the Khaksar movement had been cancelled.\textsuperscript{125}

Meanwhile the Khaksars turned their attention for a few months to the Madh-i-Sahabah controversy and the pressure upon the Punjab government to accept the three demands was released to some extent temporarily only to be rebuilt when the Lucknow mahaz was over.

KHAKSARS' CAMPAIGN AGAINST MADH-I-SAHABAH CONTROVERSY

IN THE U.P.

Madh-i-Sahabah controversy had been going on in Lucknow since long. Shia and Sunni jathas were going to U.P. from the Punjab to participate in tabarra and Madh-i-Sahabah agitation. On January 21, 1938 Allama Mashraqi warned the Muslims contributing to the controversy and threatened to march into U.P. to intervene in the dispute to end the controversy.\textsuperscript{126} He declared that if the leaders of both the conflicting Muslim groups did not take the measures to stop the agitation by June 30, he would issue "very serious orders to his 2000 Khaksars and 800 diehard jambazes to take..."


\textsuperscript{126} Oriental India Office Collection, L/P/\&J/7/2587.
effective and practical steps who had already been ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reach Lucknow.\textsuperscript{127} Meanwhile Nazim-i-Akbar of the three provinces, Waheed-ud-Din Haider continuously tried to end up the conflict and held talks with the leaders of both the sides and the orders to proceed to Lucknow were postponed in view of his report.\textsuperscript{128} Alongwith the attempts at reconciliation between the two sects and the offer of full cooperation of the Khaksars with the U.P. Government to end the Shia-Sunni conflict, the last date for sending the Khaksars to the U.P. continued to be postponed.\textsuperscript{129} At last on August 22, 1939 Idara-i-Aliyya ordered 500 Khaksars of the Punjab and N.W.F.P. to reach Lucknow by September 1, and 1000 Khaksars of U.P. to reach Lucknow by August 30. Five hundred Janbazes were also ordered to reach Lucknow by August 31.\textsuperscript{130}

At the same time Mashraqi ordered the Khaksar volunteers in the Punjab to prevent the dispatch of Shia jathas to Lucknow using non-violent methods. However, the efforts of Khaksars to dissuade Shia jathas at Lahore and

\textsuperscript{127} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 24, 1939.
\textsuperscript{128} al-Islah July 28, 1939, p.1.
\textsuperscript{129} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, August 5, 19 & 26, 1936.
\textsuperscript{130} al-Islah August 25, 1939, p.2.
Amritsar Railway Station proved ineffective.\(^{131}\) Now Allama Mashraqi warned the Congress government of U.P. to settle the dispute and threatened to affect forcible settlement of the Shia Sunni conflict and to smash the U.P. government.\(^{132}\) On August 24, Mashraqi himself set out for Lucknow.\(^{133}\) To ensure the continuous dispatch of the Khaksars bands to Lucknow, Dr. Nazar Muhammad Salar-i-Tehrir Hind pitched a Khaksar camp at Qaroolbagh, Delhi and started sending the Khaksar volunteers in the bands of 500 one after another to Bulandshar, Lucknow. This camp remained functional up till the fall of congress government in U.P.\(^{134}\)

After arrival of Mashraqi in Lucknow, his lieutenants Waheed-ud-Din Haider and Makhdoom Manzoor Ahmad Shah negotiated with the ministers of U.P. government throughout the day on August 27 and Shia leaders decided to suspend the tabarra agitation for two weeks. The same day Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim assured Waheed-ud-Din Haider that the statement regarding suspension of tabarra agitation would be released by the U.P. government to the press by the evening of August

\(^{131}\) Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p. 28.

\(^{132}\) Hindustan Times, October 12, 1939; The Indian Review (Madras), Vol. XLI, No.8, August 1940, p.478.

\(^{133}\) Sher Zaman, op. cit., Vol. 1, p.378; Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168 p.8 gives the date of his departure as August 23.

\(^{134}\) Naheed Nazar, op. cit., pp.132-134. For details about Delhi Camp and biography of Dr.Nazar Muhammad, the first \textit{janbaz} who signed the blood pledge see \textit{Ibid} 132-142 & ff. Ghulam Sarwar Bodla a prominent \textit{Khaksar rais} continuously provided Rs.1000 after every four days for three months to meet the expenditure. \textit{Ibid.}, pp.135-136.
Mashraqi claiming the credit for suspension of *tabarra* agitation, tried to prevent the further influx of *Khaksar* bands into U.P. and announced that the *Khaksars* having achieved their goal must suspend their inflow from the Punjab into the U.P. Since the *Khaksars* had already left for Lucknow in large number according to the orders previously published in *al-Islah* of August 25, they continued to pour into U.P. which resulted in some minor clashes of the *Khaksars* volunteers with the Ahrar and the local authorities. The former had started a vigorous propaganda against the *Khaksars* and during marching in the city they were physically attacked by the Ahrar at a number of places. Allama Mashraqi himself along with Sher Zaman, an important *Khaksar*, became the victim of such an attack by 20 Ahrar and both of them suffered injuries. The authorities imposed restrictions unilaterally on the *Khaksars* banning their

135 *al-Islah*, September 15, 1939, p.1. The Congress government and intelligence reports urged that the *Khaksars* played no roll in reconciliatory efforts and whatever was achieved was only due to the efforts of Abul Kalam Azad. *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, September 2, 1939; *al-Islah* September 8, 1939, p. “ahl”; September 15, 1939, p.2. It is true to the extent that Allama Mashraqi himself did not take part in the negotiations but in view of the pressure that he built up on both the groups and on the U.P. government and participation of responsible Khaksar officials in the negotiations, it is far from the truth to claim that the *Khaksars* did not contribute to the settlement.

136 *Oriental India Office Collection*, R/15/2/168, p.29; *al-Islah* September 8 & September 15, 1939, p.2; *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, September 2, 1939.

137 Sher Zaman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 378. The congress government of U.P. was of the view that Mashraqi and his volunteers adopted an aggressive attitude against the Ahrar and committed various acts of aggression and lawlessness. *Hakomat Subajai-i-Muahidda aur Khaksar* (Allahabad, 1939), p.4. However the point of view of U.P. Government should be taken with caution because the Ahrar had always been close to the congress.
march in the city with spades and wearing uniforms. "It was a gross injustice" because no such restrictions were imposed on the Ahrar. Allama Mashraqi protested against the discrimination and demanded relaxation in the restrictions, withdrawal of cases under 144 CPC against the Khaksars, due punishment of the Ahrar aggressors and severe action against the Ahrar press for publishing highly provocative articles. The U.P. government decided to arrest Allama Mashraqi and on September 1 the police entered the Khaksar Manzil silently at 4.20 am. Allama Mashraqi was arrested along with Ghulam Mustafa Bhargari and Shah Din Aslam under section 107. Most of the Khaksars in the camp were not aware of the arrest of Allama till morning.

On September 2, Mashraqi and his Lieutenants were dramatically released and they along with other Khaksars set out for Delhi. According to al-Islah Allama Mashraqi and other Khaksars were released unconditionally. The Congress Government of U.P., however, claimed that Mashraqi had tendered an apology and promised that he and his followers would not intervene in Shia-Sunni controversy at

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139 *al-Islah*, September 15, 1939, p.3 Information Department U.P., op.cit. pp.4-5.
140 *al-Islah*, September 15, 1939, p.4
The government published a copy of the agreement allegedly signed by Mashraqi and others, attested by the jail superintendent. According to a press statement of Allama Mashraqi, Hafiz Ahmad Hussain MLC and Syed Wajid Hussain Rizvi started negotiations with Mashraqi on behalf of the U.P. government on September 1. On September 2 after lot of discussion by Hafiz Ahmad Hussain with Mashraqi on one hand and with the authorities on the other, "it was decided...that a document would be written by the government without my [Mashraqi's] signatures describing that the Khaksars must not intervene in Shia-Sunni conflict for one year and after showing this agreement [to Mashraqi?] I would be released...and I accepted this condition." At another place, Mashraqi says that when the document was shown by Hafiz Ahmad Hussain to one of the salars, he pointed out to Mashraqi that the document bore Mashraqi's forged signatures. But Mashraqi in consultation with his three colleagues connived at it with a view that if the government wanted to get rid of him and other Khaksars under the cover of this forgery while he neither signed it nor discussed it with the authorities, he must benefit with the

143 Information Department of U.P. Hokoomat-i-Soojaat-i-Mutahuida aur Khaksar, pp. 5-7.
situation and manage his release.\textsuperscript{145} From these two statements of Mashraqi on the issue we may infer that the terms were written by the government authorities and Mashraqi did not sign the document. However it was shown to him and there was an ambiguous verbal understanding that Mashraqi and his followers would leave Lucknow if the cases against them were withdrawn and certain other demands were accepted. This is further substantiated by the fact that when Mashraqi denied the existence of any pact between him and the government and entered the U.P. again, he was arrested under section 144 and not for the violation of the agreement with the government.\textsuperscript{146} The other undertaking signed by Shah Din (Editor of \textit{al-Islah}), Mehmood Ahmad Minto, Sher Zaman and Zain-ul-Abidin was interpreted in a different way by the Khaksars. According to Raja Sher Zaman, who was one of the signatories, a leader of U.P. Muslim League told them that he had persuaded the government to release them and they were asked to put their signatures on a blank paper for this purpose which they did trusting his sincerity with the Khaksars. Afterwards the authorities wrote the undertaking on that paper.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{145} Sher Zaman, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 397-398.

\textsuperscript{146} Information Department of U.P., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{147} Interview of the present writer with Raja Sher Zaman, on August 23, 2000 at Chah Sultan, Rawalpindi.
After the departure of Mashraqi and 300 other Khaksars from Lucknow, the U.P. Government again arrested some of the Khaksars of Lucknow. On September 6, Mashraqi sent a Khaksar delegation to U.P. to negotiate with the government about them. The delegation was received by the U.P. Government with a spirit of rapprochement.\(^{148}\) On September 12, 1939 Mashraqi accompanied by Mian Ahmad Shah, Sarfraz Ahmad Khan, Khan Habibullah Khan, Arbab Sher Akbar Khan and others returned to Lucknow.\(^ {149}\) This delegation was arrested at Nahabad railway station for violation of section 144.\(^ {150}\) On September 16 Mashraqi was sentenced to one month's imprisonment and a fine of Rs.50 while other members of the delegation were only to pay a fine of Rs.10 each.\(^ {151}\) After the sentence of Mashraqi the Khaksars started civil disobedience in U.P. on September 17. Headed by Qazi Abdul Baqi the first band of seven Khaksars including two lawyers, two MA's and a civil engineer courted arrest and clash occurred between the public and the police resulting injuries from both sides.\(^ {152}\) On September 19 Idara-i-Aliyya Hindiyya ordered 25,000 Khaksars to reach Lucknow.\(^ {153}\)

\(^{148}\) Sher Zaman, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 402

\(^{149}\) Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p. 29; al-Islah, September 22, 1939, p. 6.


\(^{151}\) Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, September 23, 1939.

\(^{152}\) Safdar Saleemi, op. cit., p. 156.

Khaksar camp set up at Jagadhri in the Ambala district was used as a base for operations against the U.P. government and on the arrival of the Khaksars in Lucknow in large number from N.W.F.P. and the Punjab, in uniform with glittering spades, the campaign of defying section 144 CPC was reinforced.\(^{154}\) Within eight days since September 30 some 1100 Khaksars from various districts of the Punjab left for Lucknow.\(^{155}\) According to al-Islah 10,000 Khaksars had reached Lucknow by October 6, 1939.\(^{156}\) Salar-i-Khas Hind ordered 21,500 Khaksars to enter U.P. by October 12 and reach the pre-determined places in the province.\(^{157}\) By the end of September, 93 Khaksars had been arrested by the U.P. government under section 188 IPC and section 107 CPC which caused violent demonstrations.\(^{158}\) The Khaksar prisoners were denied the privileges of political prisoner and there were complaints of mistreatment and gross injustice to the Khaksars by the police and the jail authorities.\(^{159}\)

\(^{154}\) Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, pp. 29-30.

\(^{155}\) Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, September 30, 1939; October 7, 1939.

\(^{156}\) al-Islah, October 6, 1939, p. 8. For details of various arrests, agitation and clashes with the police see ibid., pp. 5-8.

\(^{157}\) Ibid., October 12, 1039, p. 1.

\(^{158}\) Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, October 7, 1939.

\(^{159}\) al-Islah October 6, 1939, p. 6 & October 13, 1939, p. 6.
During his imprisonment Allama Mashraqi handed over to the government of U.P. a telegram dated September 30 to be sent to the Viceroy offering to put at his disposal 50,000 "well-drilled best disciplined Khaksar soldiers for military defence of India, for the maintenance of internal peace or to fight in Turkey or on European soil.\textsuperscript{160} The U.P. government did not allow this telegram to be sent to the Viceroy and to the press. The Governor of U.P. urged upon the provincial government to reconsider the decision and sent a copy of the telegram to the Viceroy confidentially.\textsuperscript{161} The telegram was issued to the Associated Press, United Press and 37 newspapers on October 9 from Lahore by the editor of al-Islah according to a pre-arranged understanding between Allama Mashraqi and responsible Khaksars at Lahore Headquarters of the movement.\textsuperscript{162} In al-Islah instructions were given to the 21,000 Khaksars from all over India to reach the U.P. in accordance with provincial quotas by October 12. The Punjab province was to send 7050 volunteers.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{160} Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/8/680, p. 436.
\textsuperscript{161} From Haig to Linlithgow, October 11, 1939. Ibid., pp. 434-435.
\textsuperscript{162} Acting prudently. Allama Mashraqi had already given the text of the telegram to responsible Khaksar leaders at Lahore before leaving for Lucknow with the instructions that if he was arrested in Lucknow or did not return to the Punjab, telegram must be sent to the Viceroy and issued to the press from Lahore provided it did not appear in the newspapers by October 9. al-Islah, October 20, 1939, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., October 6, 1939, p. 1. For the quotas allotted to other provinces see Ibid.
Two days latter the police attempted to arrest a band of 500 Khaksars near Bulandshar. The Khaksars resisted as the Magistrate had promised not to arrest them but to send them back to Delhi. During the struggle between the police and the Khaksars the former opened fire killing five Khaksars. Twenty others were seriously injured. On October 9, dead-bodies of the five Khaksars were received by a detachment of Khaksar volunteers at Lahore and the proceedings attracted a crowd of 2500 persons. Khaksar flags were flown at half-mast on October 15 at 3845 centres of the organisation all over the country to mourn the death of the Khaksar volunteers at Bulandshar. According to the report submitted by the judge who enquired into the Bulandshar firing "the firing was not ordered but was the action of individual policemen who rightly or wrongly imagined that that was the only way to protect their own lives." The judge did not recommend any action either.

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165 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, October 14, 1939.


against the Khaksars or the police.\textsuperscript{168} Punjab Muslim League and Majlis Ittihad-I-Millat held meetings at Lahore and other cities of the Punjab to mourn the death of the Khaksars killed at Bulandshahr and to condemn the U.P. government.\textsuperscript{169}

On the instance of Jawaharlal Nehru the acting Prime Minister of U.P. Mr. R. A. Qidwai sent a report to Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah on the Khaksar activities in U.P. and on the action of government against them.\textsuperscript{170} Jinnah who had already received several letters and telegrams from prominent Muslims and the members of Khaksar organisation urging him to do something in the matter, suggested to R. A. Qidwai to release Allama Mashraqi un-conditionally to enable the latter to see Jinnah in Delhi or to allow him to talk to Jinnah on telephone from jail. When Allama Mashraqi was contacted by the authorities and he refused to do either, Jinnah contacted Mashraqi through Dr. Zia-ud-Din (1876-1947) and also wrote a letter to Mashraqi stressing to come to Delhi immediately to discuss the conflict between the U.P.

\textsuperscript{168} Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/8/680, p. 407.


\textsuperscript{170} Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-101, pp. 43 & 60.
government and the Khaksars.\textsuperscript{171} Mashraqi saw Jinnah on October 15 and also on 16 after he had been released from jail on completion of his term of imprisonment on October 14.\textsuperscript{172} Jinnah discussed the possible terms of settlement with Mr. Katju a representative of the U.P. government, negotiations advanced considerably and Mr. Katju went back to consult the authorities in U.P. He informed Mr. Jinnah that he would send the reply on behalf of U.P. government on October 24 or 25.\textsuperscript{173} Meanwhile Mashraqi sent three telegrams to Jinnah followed by a letter on October 25 threatening that he would have "to do something very drastic in order to bring the present ministry down to reason", as "twelve precious days have been wasted" during which "I would have moved mountains."\textsuperscript{174} As a result Mr. Jinnah who had been "moved entirely in the interest of Muslim India"\textsuperscript{175} sent the answer of the U.P. government to Mashraqi without expressing his opinion leaving it to Mashraqi to adopt such course as he might think proper.\textsuperscript{176} Civil disobedience of the Khaksars and their clashes with the police continued. During the last.

\textsuperscript{171} Jinnah to Mashraqi, October 11, 1939. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-101, p. 43; Jinnah to Mashraqi, October 26, 1939.\textit{Ibid.}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{172} Jinnah to Mashraqi, October 26, 1939.\textit{Ibid.}, F-101, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{173} Jinnah to Mashraqi, October 26, 1939.\textit{Ibid.}, F-101, pp. 9-12.

\textsuperscript{174} Mashraqi to Jinnah, October 25, 1939.\textit{Ibid.}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{175} Jinnah to Mashraqi, October 15.\textit{Ibid.}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{176} Jinnah to Mashraqi, October 26, 1939.\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 9-12.
week of October 164 Khaksars were arrested in Lucknow and clashes with the police took place in four districts of U.P.\textsuperscript{177} Next week seventy-five Khaksars were arrested and clash between the Khaksars and the police party resulted in injuries from both sides.\textsuperscript{178}

When the Congress ministries throughout India quitted as a protest against declaration of war against Germany without taking Indians into confidence, Mashraqi announced to suspend the dispatch of Khaksar parties to Lucknow for ten days to arrive at a settlement with the new government of U.P.\textsuperscript{179} Mian Ahmad Shah and Dr. Zia-ud-Din negotiated a settlement with the new government on behalf of Allama Mashraqi. The former had a written authority from Allama Mashraqi to affect a settlement.\textsuperscript{180} An agreement was signed by R.F. Mudie and Mian Ahmad Shah on November 4, 1939 according to which Mian Ahmad Shah would order all the Khaksars deputed from outside the province to leave and the U.P. government would cancel all bans imposed on the Khaksars with the understanding that the Khaksars would obey the orders of the U.P. government necessary for maintaining

\textsuperscript{177} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, October 28, 1939.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., November 4, 1939.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., November 4, 1939.

law and order. The government would release all the Khaksars convicted or under trial, paying them sufficient money to reach their homes. The Khaksars would not involve themselves any further in Shia-Sunni dispute. The government would consider any specific case if a claim was made on the basis of any unjustified action on part of a public servant.¹³¹ Resignation of the Congress government in U.P. was declared by Allama Mashraqi as the Khaksars' victory.¹³² Large batches of the Khaksar volunteers were given rousing welcome when they reached Lahore and Amritsar after their release from jails of U.P.¹³³ The U.P. campaign "undoubtedly enhanced the prestige of the organisation."¹³⁴

TRAGEDY OF MARCH 19 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Immediately, after the end of U.P. campaign, Allama Mashraqi announced a "new course of action."¹³⁵ The

¹³¹ Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/8/680, p. 406 The term agreed regarding compensation was not different from what Katju had already conveyed to Jinnah. Ibid. p. 404. The agreement was made possible because of the fact that the Governor of U.P. was anxious to conclude it without delay and the Khaksars were also "in chastened mood and had felt the strain of the struggle," Ibid., p. 405
¹³³ Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, November 11, 1939.
¹³⁵ al-Islah, November 17, 1939, p. 5.
recruitment of 2500,000 new Khaksars by June 15, 1940 was the next program for the movement. Allama Mashraqi divided the whole of India into fourteen zones, each headed by a Hakim-i-A’la ("Governor") and the quota for the new recruitment was allotted to each zone. Idara-i-Aliyya ordered all the Hakiman-i-A’la to take the charge of their zone by December 15, 1939. Idara-i-Aliyya also issued general orders for all the Khaksars to launch a vigorous campaign for the recruitment and work like "mad-men" to meet the target of 2500,000 volunteers. It was also urged to increase the circulation of al-Islah up to 25,000 per week. In order to have large scale recruitment of volunteers Allama Mashraqi offered to hand over the command of the movement to the Hakim-i-A’la who would recruit the maximum number of Khaksars in India provided the number not be less than half of the target i.e., 1250,000. All the future appointments to various offices in the organisation were also to be given only on the basis of maximum number of

186 Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p. 32.

187 Following quota was allotted: NWFP & Kashmir: 300,000; Punjab & Punjab states: 500,000; Sindh, Kach, Jodhpur & Bekanir: 100,000; Baluchistan: 200,000; U.P: 200,000; C.P. Bihar & Central India: 100,000; Bihar: 100,000; Bengal: 400,000; Bombay: 100,000; Hyderabad & Madras: 200,000; Assam: 100,000; Burma: 100,000; Delhi & Ajmer: 100,000. al-Islah, November 24, 1939, p. 6.

188 Ibid., December 1, 1939, p. 6.

189 Ibid., December 1, 1939, p. 6.

190 Ibid.
volunteers recruited. Giving ‘incentives’ on one hand, Mashraqi also announced the severe corporal punishments, public disgrace or expulsion from the organisation for the officers who were not working hard to meet the target of the recruitment. Mashraqi also threatened the Khaksars that if the response to the orders was not satisfactory he would wind up the movement in 1940. The result of all this persuasion and warning, however, was not according to expectations of Allama Mashraqi and he admitted that by mid February, during the last two months only a few hundred membership forms were sent to the headquarters of the organisation whereas to meet the target set by Idara-i-Aliyya within the given time, 14,000 new members (1000 from each zone) were to be enlisted daily.

Though the target was too high to be met, the vigorous campaign and high-sounding forceful writings of Allama Mashraqi in al-Islah did alarm the government. In fact Sir

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191 al-Islah, December 15, 1939, p. 5.
192 Ibid., February 9, 1940, p. 1.
193 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, December 2, 1939.
194 al-Islah, February 16, 1940, p. 5.
195 Since the force of Allama’s writings is difficult to be converted in English a piece of his writings is given in Urdu:

کسی شخص کو دور میں تھا جیسے کہ کوئی بھی، میں ہم لوگ بہت بڑی مشکلات نہیں لگا رہا تھا کہ چچے پیا کے معاشرے کے ساتھ کیا کام کر گا اس پر چھوٹے پیچھے پا کے تھا، تاکہ وہ معاشرہ میں خود کا اغداشتہ کر سکے۔ یہ کارکردگی کی تعلیمات کا بہت خطرہ ہے اور کوئی بھی کبھی کبھی معاشرہ کو آباد کر سکتا ہے کہ یہ کیا کرے۔ یہ کہ کوئی بھی کوئی بھی کا تعلیم کے منصوبے پر ہیں جسے یہ کتاب میں لیکھا گیا ہے۔
Sikandar had already felt the menacing strength of the Khaksar movement during its campaign for the three demands. He adopted an ambiguous attitude and evading policy for the time being to gain time for preparation to crush the movement. He might have taken a sigh of relief during the Khaksars' campaign in U.P. but the Khaksars turned their attention to the Punjab government again after their 'victory' against the Congress government in U.P. During the first half of the year 1939 Sir Sikandar prepared a scheme to establish a volunteer organisation of his own in the Punjab to counter the Khaksar movement but to his surprise and disappointment objections were raised against it by the Viceroy and the Army Chief and the idea had to be dropped.196

Now Sir Sikandar decided to take effective measures to suppress the Khaksar movement when Mashraqi printed the pamphlet aksariyat ya khoon from Lahore. As far back as 1931 Allama Mashraqi visualized the strength and domination of the Muslims in the fact that they form a minority in the

subcontinent. The pamphlet aksariyat ya khoon was based on the telegram of Mashraqi sent to the Viceroy during his imprisonment in Lucknow and some articles published in al-Islah. In the pamphlet, urging that it was mean and un-Islamic to bargain with England when the latter was engaged in a struggle involving life death consequences and also India’s future, Mashraqi declared that the Muslims had been shedding their blood for the defence of India for hundreds of years which had given them the natural and hereditary right to rule it. The government of a country was gained by means of shedding blood and not by the use of spinning wheel because blood and rule have always gone together in all history.

The police raided Muhammadi Press on February 22 where the pamphlet aksariyat ya khoon was republished and security was demanded from the press. Three days later the pamphlet was proscribed by the Punjab government and the police raided at three places in Lahore to confiscate the copies of the pamphlet available there for sale. On February 28 the

197 Inayatullah Khan, Isharat (Lahore, 1931), p. 133.
199 al-Islah, March 8-15, 1940, p.7. According to the government warning had already been issued to al-Islah in October for publishing the same material but Mashraqi, in the face of warning, republished it in the form of pamphlet with even worse additions. Oriental India Office Collection, L P & S/6/688.
Punjab government banned drilling in military formation with or without arms or with articles capable of being used as arms throughout the Punjab. Moreover, carrying any arm (other than sheathed sword) or any article capable of being used arm in a procession of ten or more persons was prohibited in three cities of the Punjab i.e., Lahore, Amritsar and Rawalpindi. 201

Immediately, after the raid on Muhammadi Press and confiscation of the copies of aksariyat ya khoon Allama Mashraqi sent the editor of al-Islah Shah Din Aslam to talk to Sir Sikandar but found him inflexible. On February 27 telegrams were sent to Sir Shah Muhammad Sulaiman, Sir Zia-ud-Din, Governor of the Punjab, Premier of Bengal etc. requesting to intervene but Mashraqi felt that all that had no effect on Sir Sikandar. 202 Masraqi wired to the Viceroy that the Premier of the Punjab was attempting serious clash with the Khaksars on the basis of the pamphlet containing Mashraqi’s offer of 50,000 Khaksars to help the British in the war and requested the Viceroy for immediate interview to

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202 al-Islah (Delhi), March 15, 1940, p. 9.
avoid "terrible disaster." Allama Mashraqi left Lahore for Delhi on February 27 to have an interview with the Viceroy. Meanwhile, Laithwhite the Private Secretary of the Viceroy received a letter from Justice Shah Muhammad Sulaiman of Federal Court asking him to allow Dr. [sic.] Inayatullah Khan to see him personally so that the Khaksar leader might explain his position. Mashraqi was called by Laithwhite and the former tried to assure the loyalty of his organisation to the British and requested that the Viceroy might hear him and if necessary hear Sir Sikandar also as the Punjab Premier was adamant to crush the Khaksar movement for no good reason and that Mashraqi had exhausted all possible alternatives other than submitting his case to Viceroy. Laithwhite expressed Viceroy's inability to intervene in a provincial matter and suggested to Mashraqi to approach the Punjab government. He told Mashraqi, however, to communicate further with him after reporting the matter to the Viceroy. When Laithwhite contacted Mr. Penny, the Chief Secretary of the Punjab on the matter, the

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203 Telegram from Inayatullah Khan al-Mashraqi to the Viceroy, February 27, 1940, Oriental India Office Collection, MSS Eur F-125/135, p. 154.

204 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 9, 1940.


latter told him that Mashraqi was "almost mad" and he had a "swollen head" after his success in U.P. and Bahawalpur.\textsuperscript{208} Penny further complained that Mashraqi was violently communal and in spite of consistent warnings he repeatedly published highly inflammatory material. Therefore, the Punjab government had finally decided that he must be put down.\textsuperscript{209} The Chief Secretary also conveyed Sir Sikandar's opinion that Mashraqi should not be granted an interview by the Viceroy as it would "inflate him" and the Viceroy declined to receive Mashraqi.\textsuperscript{210}

In order to evade the ban Mashraqi issued a press statement from Delhi that the orders of the Punjab Government of February 28 did not apply to the Khaksar movement because it was a non-communal and non-political body that did social service irrespective of caste and creed under strict discipline.\textsuperscript{211} A copy of the statement was also sent to the Private Secretary of the Viceroy.\textsuperscript{212} In response to the interpretation of Mashraqi, the Punjab government issued a clarification explaining that the Khaksars were not

\textsuperscript{208} Oriental India Office Collection, L/P/J/8/680, p. 558.

\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., p. 157.

\textsuperscript{211} Civil & Military Gazette, March 6, 1940; Oriental India Office Collection, L/P/J/8/680, pp. 367-369.

\textsuperscript{212} Oriental India Office Collection, MSS Eur F-123/135, p. 161.
exempt from the ban.²¹³ On March 12 Mashraqi issued another statement interpreting the ban as not applicable to the Khaksars because they were "not doing drill of a military nature" nor did they drill "with arms or articles capable of being used as arms."²¹⁴ He pointed out that the knife of the Khaksars and belcha being instruments of social service could not come under the definition of "arms".²¹⁵ Moreover, he declared that the Khaksars had been going in procession on roads for the last ten years "We possess that action as a right now and will fight bodily those who wish to dispossess us of it without trespassing the limits of law".²¹⁶ At the same time Allama intended to file a case against these orders to get stay orders from a court of law but no such case was actually filed.²¹⁷ Muhammad Ali Jinnah during his interview with the Viceroy on March 13, 1940 requested the Viceroy that Sir Sikandar should not be allowed to have a clash with the Khaksars.²¹⁸ Thousands of Khaksars had reached Lahore and it was reported that they would not follow the Congress' methods of non-violence if civil disobedience was

²¹³ Civil & Military Gazette, March 7, 1940. See also Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first half of March 1940.


²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 178.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 195.
resorted to, rather they would freely use the spade as defense and offensive weapon. A Khaksar leader who was in a position of command at Lahore hoped that "it will be a severe encounter and we are looking forward to it."219 Al-Islah of March 8-15, 1940 was published from Delhi with inflammatory articles of Mashraqi and the orders of Idara-i-Aliyya in the issue read that the Khaksars must remain peaceful and orders of Naib Hakim-i-A’la Lahore must be obeyed but in the event of clash 36,000 Khaksars should be sent to Lahore within a week and every Janbaz must reach Lahore within five days from every corner of India and "lay a bed of corpses around the cot of Sir Sikandar".220

On March 17 Muhammad Sharif Khan, the Naib Hakim-i-A’la Punjab set out for Delhi to receive further orders from Mashraqi and it was decided that no measures would be taken until he returned from Delhi.221 In his absence, Khushhal Khan Jadun commanded the mahaz and decided to take out a jaish of 313 Khaksars on March 19 to defy the ban on the Khaksars without waiting for the return of Sharif Khan or

219 Civil & Military Gazette, March 17, 1940.
221 Safdar Saleemi, op. cit., p. 208.
the instruction from Allama Mashraqi. during preparations at night of March 18, kerchiefs of white cloth were distributed to the members of the jaish to be used as winding sheets and the belchas were sharpened. The jaish of 313 Khaksars in khaki uniforms wearing white kerchiefs as shrouds and carrying glittering belchas came out of Havaili Dactran near Uchi Mosque inside Bhati gate at about 10.00 pm on March 19. The District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police reached the spot and the Khaksars were warned but they continued to proceed. A small police party of 20 foot-constables armed with lathis was ordered to block the road. According to official sources, as soon as the Khaksars reached the police party they made a fierce attack on the police with their heavy and well-sharpened belchas and the Senior Superintendent of Police struck down alongwith some other policemen. The Khaksars swarmed onward breaking through the thin police ranks. After some 100 yards when they turned into Hira Mandi Bazar, they encountered and attacked another body of police led by Mr. Beaty, the Deputy Superintendent who received serious injuries at the hands of the Khaksars and the police

222 Saifdar Saleemi, op. cit., p. 208.
223 Interview of the present writer with Qadir Bakhsh Mughal of Hasanabad who was included in the jaish of 313.
224 Hakim Ahmad Hussain, 19 March 1940 key Khaksar Shuhada (Lahore, 1990), p. 13.
225 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 23, 1940.
resorted to fire in self-defence.\textsuperscript{226} Thirty-one Khaksars were killed and 63 were injured whereas two policemen were killed apart from the D.S.P and 17 injured.\textsuperscript{227}

Immediately, after the clash a curfew order was imposed in Lahore forbidding any person being out of doors between 7.00 pm to 6.00 am. Carrying of arms or assemblies of five or more persons were also forbidden.\textsuperscript{228} Pre-censorship was imposed on the press in Lahore and Amritsar, which remained effective till the end of March and Khaksar funds were seized. On the same afternoon, the police along with a company of Indian Infantry raided Idara-i-Aliyya, the Khaksar Headquarters at Ichhra. With the help of tear-gas the Khaksars guarding the headquarters were arrested, the building was occupied and the office records were seized.\textsuperscript{229} The Khaksar headquarters in other districts like Multan, Ambala etc. were also raided by the police.\textsuperscript{230} Steps were

\textsuperscript{226} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 23, 1940.

\textsuperscript{227} Oriental India Office Collection, R/13/2/168. Initially 26 Khaksar casualties were reported. Telegram from Governor of the Punjab to Secretary of State for India, dated March 20, 1940. \textit{Ibid.}, U/P&J/8/680, p. 376.

\textsuperscript{228} Craik to Linlithgow, March 20, 1940. \textit{Ibid.}, R/13/1/62, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Ibid.}, R/15/2/168, p. 34; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 23, 1940.

\textsuperscript{230} Craik to Linlithgow, March 21, 1940. \textit{Ibid.}, R/3/1/62, p. 45.
also taken to arrest Allama Mashraqi and the same evening he was arrested from Delhi under Defence of India Act.\textsuperscript{231}

Sir Sikandar who was put into extremely difficult position by the incident tried his best to persuade Jinnah indirectly to postpone the Annual session of All India Muslim League but Jinnah insisted to hold the session according to the schedule.\textsuperscript{232}

There is a difference of opinion as to the background of the tragedy of March 19. It is generally held that Sir Sikandar incurred the clash intentionally to postpone the Lahore session of All India Muslim League.\textsuperscript{233} This is not a new notion. It was apprehended in the columns of al-\textit{Islah} even before the clash took place.\textsuperscript{234} Sikandar’s relations with the Khaksar movement were strained since Mashraqi presented his three demands to the Punjab government. It was during the Khaksar campaign for the three demands that Sikandar must have felt necessary to crush this movement and in order to gain time for this purpose he involved the Khaksar leadership in fruitless discussions. Meanwhile

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\textsuperscript{231} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 23, 1940; Civil & Military Gazette, March 21, 1940.
\textsuperscript{232} Craik to Linlithgow, March 20, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, R/3/1/62, p. 41.
\end{flushleft}
Mashraqi turned his attention to Madh-i-Sahabah controversy in the U.P. and Sikandar waited for failure of the movement. When the Khaksars emerged 'victorious' in the U.P. due to the resignation of the Congress government, they again started their campaign for the three demands and now Sir Sikandar decided to crush the movement with a heavy hand. However, what Sikandar expected to be sufficient to enforce the government orders in case of defiance of the ban by the Khaksars, was the 'arrest of a large number of Khaksars.' It means that resort to the firing causing casualties was not contemplated by Sikandar.

On the other hand Allama Mashraqi did not intend to have a clash with the Punjab government, nor did he order the Khaksars to defy the ban. This is confirmed by a number of facts: In early 1939, answering to the appeal for help from the Muslims of Jaipur for restoration of a mosque,

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235 Aslam Malik is of the view that Sikandar had been friendly with the Khaksars till mid February 1940 as he defended them in the Punjab Assembly and helped Mashraqi when the latter faced some difficulties in Bahawalpur State. Aslam Malik, Allama Mashraqi: A Political Biography (Karachi, 2000), p. 123. In fact Sikandar defended the Khaksars in the Assembly out of necessity because he wanted to gain time to crush the movement and in the meanwhile could not afford to oppose the movement openly, rather he was bound to 'defend' the Khaksars for the time being. So far Sikandar's help to Mashraqi in case of Bahawalpur State is concerned again Sikandar pretended to be friendly and helpful but in fact instead of helping Mashraqi he attempted to cheat him. See Mashraqi's own description of the fact in al-Islah, March 8-15, 1940, pp. 6 & 7-8.

236 Craik to Lucthigow, March 18, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, R37/1/62, p. 35.

237 This view is further confirmed by Abdul Majid Salik, Sarguzasht, pp. 410-420.
Mashraqi explained that his strategy was not to clash with the government that might result in extinction of the movement but to keep restraint, be patient and to save the strength of the organisation to be used at some later stage in the larger interest of the whole of Muslim India.\textsuperscript{238} Immediately after his arrival at Delhi on February 27, Mashraqi met Sir Shah Sulaiman, Sir Zia-ud-Din, Sir Zufrullah and Jinnah and requested them that Sir Sikandar might be asked to avoid clash with the Khaksars.\textsuperscript{239} Every "Hakim-i-A’la was required by December 31, 1940 to give a declaration on oath, which included the assurance that he would not incur any kind of clash with the government or with any group without explicit orders of Idara-i-Aliyya in black and white.\textsuperscript{240} On March 3, 1940 Allama Mashraqi gave some instructions on behalf of Idara-i-Aliyya to the Khaksars which clearly read that uniform, belts, marching, bugle etc. were not the goal. These were adopted temporarily as means to achieve the goal. If these were declared unlawful by the government, the Khaksars must not let themselves be crushed by defying ban on these temporary

\textsuperscript{238} al-Islah, February 10, 1939, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid., March 8-15, 1940, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., December 1, 1939, p. 9.
things. On the basis of "good record" Sharif Khan was specially appointed by Idara-i-Aliyya as Salar of Lahore mahaz on March 4 because he was "wise and brave" enough to "control" the Khaksars at Lahore. On March 13 Allam Mashraqi called him again at Delhi and ordered him "not to have a clash with the police under any circumstances." The Khaksars who defied the ban on March 15, 1940 in front of the Punjab Assembly were awarded punishments by the sala for violating party discipline. They would not have been punished if Mashraqi had given consent to defiance of the ban. On March 17, Raja Sher Zaman reached Lahore from Delhi with strict instructions from Allama Mashraqi for Shari Khan, the salar-i-Awwal Lahore, to remain peaceful and not to defy the ban under any circumstances. Since Sharif Khan had set out for Delhi, the instructions were communicated to Walayat Hussain Janbaz. The Chief Secretary Punjab reported that until March 18 there were no indications tha

244 Aslam Malik, Allama Mashraqi: A Political Biography, p. 129.
245 Interview with Raja Sher Zaman by present writer on September 23, 2000. See also Sher Zaman, op. cit Vol. II, p. 51.
any “serious defiance of order was contemplated.”\textsuperscript{246} According to the intelligence report a meeting of the salars held at Ichhra on March 18 “it was decided that 313 Khaksar janbazes should assemble in the Sunehri Mosque the following day ... and should openly defy the ban by marching through the city.”\textsuperscript{247} The report further reads, “Police dispositions for the 19\textsuperscript{th} of March were made accordingly.”\textsuperscript{248} In the light of the above mentioned evidence we may infer that the decision to defy the ban was taken by the salars at Lahore on March 18 contrary to the instructions of Allama Mashraqi and the intelligence agencies being aware of the decision, made preparations to prevent the defiance of ban on part of the Khaksars.\textsuperscript{249} This is further confirmed by the private and press statements of Mashraqi that defiance of ban was not ordered by him nor did he know it in advance.”\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{246} Report on the situation in the Punjab for the second half of March 1940; Craik to Linlithgow, March 18, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, R/3/1/62, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{247} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 23, 1940.

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid. See also Report on the situation in the Punjab for the second half of March 1940 which reads, “On that day (March 18) the leading Khaksars in Lahore held a meeting at Ichhra ... a plan to assemble 313 Khaksars and march them to the Badshahi mosque ... was eventually evolved.” Surprisingly, with reference to the same report Aslam Malik claims, “Intelligence agencies of the government had failed to collect the correct information.” Aslam Malik, Allama Mashraqi: A Political Biography, pp. 127-128.

\textsuperscript{249} Cf., “Defying of ban was neither spontaneous nor emotional ... it was completely premeditated, thoroughly calculated, and had the blessings of Mashraqi.” Ibid., p. 128.

\textsuperscript{250} Civil & Military Gazette, March 20, 1940; Inqalab, September 5, 1940.
However, there is no denial of the fact that Mashraqi's writings in *al-Islah* had been inflammatory and provoking and he was in a habit of unbridled use of very strong phrases.\textsuperscript{251} Khushhal Khan Jadun, a firebrand speaker who commanded the Khaksars in the absence of Sharif Khan, incited the Khaksars to take out the jaish of 313. Mr. Bourne the Deputy Commissioner Lahore was of the view that the police opened fire in self-defence at its own as he being the competent authority did not order to fire.\textsuperscript{252} Sir Sikandar also admitted that fire was opened without the orders of any responsible official.\textsuperscript{253} Probably Mr. Beaty ordered to fire while falling down\textsuperscript{254} after he had been attacked by the Khaksars in response to his slapping of a salar Syed Farman Shah.\textsuperscript{255}

Annual session of All India Muslim League was held according to the schedule. On the third day of the session a resolution was moved by the Quaid-i-Azam himself from the Chair expressing "deep sense of sorrow at the unfortunate and tragic occurrence" and sympathising with those who


\textsuperscript{252} *Inqalah*, April 17, 1940.


\textsuperscript{254} *Inqalah*, April 17, 1940.

\textsuperscript{255} Ashraf Ata, *op. cit.*, p. 223.
suffered and their family. It was called upon the government “to appoint an independent committee of inquiry, the personnel of which would command the perfect confidence of people...to make full and complete investigation and inquiry in the whole affair.”\textsuperscript{256} It was urged upon the provincial government to remove as early as possible the orders declaring the Khaksar organisation unlawful.\textsuperscript{257} Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang thanked the Quaid-i-Azam for his “wise handling of the Khaksar situation” and told the audience that as a Khaksar representative he was negotiating with the Punjab government.\textsuperscript{258} However, the Khaksars and the general public demonstrated their resentment against the Premier during the session.\textsuperscript{259} Punjab government took measures to arrest the local leaders of the organisation and the janbazes. Initially, 292 arrests were made in Lahore and 138 from other districts of the Punjab and by the end of December the total number of arrests rose to 986 in Lahore and 696 elsewhere.\textsuperscript{260} During the first three weeks after the tragedy more than 1400 Khaksars including some salars and janbazes

\textsuperscript{256} Pirzada, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 346-347.
\textsuperscript{257} Pirzada, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 346-347.
\textsuperscript{258} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 30, 1940.
\textsuperscript{259} Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., pp. 35 & 41. For the details of the arrests and convictions during the year see Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 23, 1940; Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, April 15, April 17, April 22, 1940; Report on the situation in the Punjab for second half of April 1940; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 10, 1940.
disassociated themselves from the movement to avoid arrest or conviction.\textsuperscript{261}

Repressive actions of the government were resented by various sections of the Muslims. Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat in its meeting held at Lahore on May 9 passed resolutions demanding the removal of ban on all semi-military organizations including the Khaksars\textsuperscript{262} and release of Allama Mashraqi,\textsuperscript{263} assuring the Khaksars of its sympathy.\textsuperscript{264} The students of Islamia College Lahore decided to go on strike for three days to express their sympathy with the Khaksars. The students of Shairanwala School and Dyal Singh College also protested, processions were taken out, mock funerals of Sir Sikandar were performed and release of Mashraqi was demanded.\textsuperscript{263}

Meanwhile, some bands of the Khaksars took shelter in the mosques of Lahore. According to an estimate they were

\textsuperscript{261} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 6 and April 13, 1940. See also Inqalab, May 4 and November 11, 1940; Craik to Linlithgow, April 14, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/S/243.

\textsuperscript{262} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 10, 1940. Apart from Moulana Zafar Ali Khan, Sheikh Sadiq Hussain, Khuda Baksh Azhar and Mian Feroz-ud-Din Ahuad also attended the meeting. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid., April 25, 1940, Craik to Linlithgow, May 29, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/S/680, p. 147; Inqalab, April 31, 1940, Report on situation in the Punjab for second half of May 1940. According to a letter intercepted by the government sent from Dr. Kazmi to Arbab Sher at procession breast beating was resorted to and the shouts of “Sikandar hai hai, Sikandar Yatul Sani, Bull-dog Sikandar, Sikandar Murdabad” etc. were raised. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/S/680, p. 203.
about 164 but later grew in number and resorted to demonstrations and marching carrying spades. Particularly, from Sunehri mosque and Uchi mosque they frequently addressed the people gathered out side the mosques and paraded outside the mosques with belchas and if the police tried to arrest them they again entered the mosques. Before long same tactics were adopted by the Khaksars using the mosques in other cities such as Rawalpindi, Hoshiarpur, Amrisar, Gujrat, Jullunder and Lyllpur and the situation became "much worse". Police pickets were placed around the Sunehri and Uchi mosques from May 2 to prevent the supply of food for the Khaksars sheltering the mosques. Muslim women of Lahore helped to carry edibles, bread etc. for the Khaksars in the picketed mosques but the pickets being very strict the Khaksars had to starve most of the time. This created restlessness and resentment against the government among the general Muslim public and sympathy with the Khaksars increased. The Khaksars continued to come from

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264 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 20, 1940.
265 Report on the situation in the Punjab for second half of April 1940; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 27, 1940.
266 Craik's statement during a conference convened by the Viceroy on May 26, 1940; Oriental India Office Collection, MSS Eur F 125/335, p. 317; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 4, 1940.
267 Craik to Linlithgow, May 5, 1940; Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/8680, p. 201.
other provinces like U.P., Bihar, Calcutta Hyderabad, Sindh and Peshawar and all of them took shelter in the mosques.\textsuperscript{268}

The government took measures to deal with the situation and services of women police were utilized to search women supporters of the Khaksar movement who carried food into the mosques under their clothes. To control the crowded outside the mosques and to save the police pickets from the surprise attack of the Khaksars wire barricades were erected around the mosques. Since the arrangements resulted in great inconvenience for the worshippers going to the mosques for prayer, the Muslim press strongly condemned these steps. Particularly, strong protests were made against them searching of men and women entering the mosques.\textsuperscript{269} On May 8, the government removed the police pickets from the mosques and the decision to withdraw the blockade was warmly welcomed by all sections of Muslim opinion.\textsuperscript{270}

Some of the Ulema and Ahrar leaders criticised the Khaksars and alleged that it was against the sanctity of the

\textsuperscript{268} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 5 and May 19, 1940.
\textsuperscript{269} Report on situation in the Punjab for first half of May 1940.
\textsuperscript{270} Ingalab, May 11, 1940; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 10, 1940.
mosques to use them for the purposes other than prayers.\textsuperscript{271} But a section of Ulema like Moulana Ghulam Murshid and others declared that to take refuge in the mosques was not un-Islamic.\textsuperscript{272}

The Khaksars in the mosques further increased in number from 200 to more than 300 between May 23 and June 5, 1940.\textsuperscript{273} The situation further deteriorated when the Khaksars of Sunehri mosque marched in Dabbi Bazar on May 29 and during a clash with the police a sub-inspector opened fire on them. Two Khaksars were killed and two others were injured. The funeral prayers of the deceased were attended by some 100,000 Muslims including 400-500 women and 40 Khaksars in uniforms carrying spades.\textsuperscript{274} At last the government decided to expel the Khaksars from the mosques by using force. At the night of June 19, 1940 all the mosques harbouring the Khaksars were raided by the police simultaneously and 276 Khaksars were arrested in all.\textsuperscript{275} About 1000 policemen took part in the raids and eight police officers were wounded.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{271} Civil & Military Gazette, May 16, 1940; Inqalab, May 19 and May 23, 1940; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 10, 1940.
\item \textsuperscript{272} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 10, 1940.
\item \textsuperscript{273} Ibid., May 25, 1940; June 8, 1940.
\item \textsuperscript{274} Inqalab, May 31 and June 1, 1940; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 1, 1940. For details of the incident see Civil & Military Gazette, June 6, 1940.
\item \textsuperscript{275} Oriental India Office Collection, R/1/1/33. For details of the raid on Uchi mosque see Ibid, pp. 136-138.
\end{itemize}
because of the resistance offered by the Khaksars during the raids, whereas one Khaksar was killed.\textsuperscript{276} The plan to raid the mosques simultaneously with the help of tear-gas was carried out with "most successful results" and Sir Sikandar was "very pleased at so clean and successful an operation."\textsuperscript{277} Same action was repeated at Rawalpindi, the mosques were evacuated and the Khaksars were arrested.\textsuperscript{278} These surprise raids and arrests produced "salutary effects" and the situation improved greatly.\textsuperscript{275}

Immediately after the tragedy of March 19 Sir Sikandar proposed to the governor to appoint and inquiry committee of two high court judges.\textsuperscript{280} Terms of reference for the committee suggested by the governor were "to enquire into circumstances in which certain officers were killed and injured and the police opened fire on March 19.\textsuperscript{281} The committee consisted of Sir Douglus Young, the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court (Chairman) and Mr. Ni'matullah, a

\textsuperscript{276} Civil & Military Gazette, June 12, 1940; Inqalab, June 13, 1940; al-Islahi (Calcutta), June 15, 1940, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{277} Linlithgow to Emery, June 13, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P\&J/8/680, p. 140.
\textsuperscript{278} Inqalab, June 13, 1940; Report on situation of the Punjab for first half of June 1940. Six Khaksars who had managed escape were arrested later from the Sunebhi mosque. Civil & Military Gazette, June 23, 1940; Inqalab, June 2, 1940.
\textsuperscript{279} Civil & Military Gazette, June 14, 1940; Craik to Linlithgow, June 15, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P\&J/8/680, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{280} Craik to Linlithgow, March 21, 1940. Ibid. R/3/1/62.
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid.
retired judge of Allahabad High Court was appointed to investigate different issues arising from the clash of March 19. From April 11 the committee started recording the evidence. During its proceedings gross accesses on part of the police were brought to light. Though the report of the inquiry committee was never made public Sir Douglas Yong was convinced that undoubtedly there had been “uncontrolled firing” by the police. The Muslim members of the Central Legislative Assembly while speaking on the Khaksar issue also very rightly apprehended that if the conclusion of the committee had gone against the Khaksars it would not have been suppressed.

After the arrest of Allama Mashraqi differences emerged among the leaders of the movement, Bashir Ahmad Siddiqi, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang, Dr. Ismail Nami, Mian Ahmad Shah and Shah Din Aslam were the most important leaders. Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang who was also an important figure in All

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282 Civil & Military Gazette, March 29, 1940.
283 Craik to Linlithgow, April 14, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/5/243.
284 For some examples of the violence committed by the police see Inqalab, May 8, May 9, May 11 and May 12, 1940.
285 Civil & Military Gazette, May 16, 1940
286 Central Legislative Assembly Debates, September 23, 1942, pp. 480 & 484.
287 Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, pp. 26 & 37. For more details about the Khaksar leaders that became prominent after the arrest of Allama Mashraqi see Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/8/680, pp. 232, 235-236.
India Muslim League, attended the Lahore session of the
League and played an important part in guiding and advising
the Khaksars to adopt a sane attitude.\(^{288}\) He called a meeting
of all the salars of the Khaksar movement at Meerit on March
28 to appoint the leader of the organisation and to discuss
the future course of action for the Khaksars.\(^{289}\) Nawab
Bahadur Yar Jang was authorised by the salars to negotiate
with the Punjab government for removal of ban and at another
meeting held at Delhi on the next day Muhammad Ismail Nami
was asked to take over the charge of Khaksar operations.\(^{290}\)
Meanwhile Nami stressed in a press statement that neither
Bahadur Yar Jang nor anybody else other than Allama Mashraqui
had the right to negotiate with the government and that the
Khaksars were ordered to be ready to sacrifice their
lives.\(^{291}\) Difference also surfaced between Agha Ghazanfar Ali
Khan and Mian Ahmad Shah.\(^{292}\) Thus the differences among the
Khaksar leadership became more prominent. Though Bahadur Yar
Jang had moderate views but he could not prove himself

\(^{288}\) Safdar Saleemi is of the view that Bahadur Yar Jang very deceitfully presented himself before the
Khaksars as Hakim-i-A'la NWFP and the Punjab and ordered them to returned to their homes. Safdar
Saleemi, op. cit., p. 214. The fact is that Allama Mashraqui himself appointed Bahadur Yar Jang as Hakim-i-
A'la NWFP and Kashmir when he ordered the enrolment of 2500,000 Khaksar volunteers. (al-Islah,
December 1, 1939, p. 3.) and Bahadur Yar Jang had refused a request from the government to order the
Khaksars to return to their homes. Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 6, 1940.

\(^{289}\) Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 30, 1940.

\(^{290}\) Ibid.

\(^{291}\) Ibid.

\(^{292}\) Inqalab, November 7, 1940.
effective because generally he was considered as “Sikandar’s man.” Gradually, Nami assumed a position of accepted leader of the Khaksars.

In early April it appeared from some reports and articles published in vernacular press as if the government was considering removal of ban on the Khaksar movement but the governor of the Punjab made it clear to Sir Sikandar that rescinding the orders declaring the Khaksars as unlawful organisation was just out of question until the direction and control of the movement passed to “reliable and responsible person”, and that Allama Mashraqi must not be restored to his position of the leader of the organisation. It was also required that the Khaksars assembled in Lahore and Rawalpindi must be asked to leave and use of arms, uniforms and drill must be abandoned. Nami refused to accept the terms and announced that according to the previous orders of Allam Mashraqi all the Khaksars must reach Lahore. In response to the announcement of Nami more Khaksar bodies started pouring

293 Craik to Linlithgow, April 3, 1940; Oriental India Office Collection, L/P.&J/S/680, pp. 298-283.
294 He published al-Islah from Calcutta and worked as Madar-un-Nizam, wrote editorial of the magazine al-Islah (Calcutta), July 10, 1940.
295 Craik to Linlithgow, April 6, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P.&J/S/680, pp. 276-277; Report on situation in the Punjab for the first half of April, 1940.
into Lahore from N.W.F.P. and other provinces. In a conference convened by the Viceroy on May 26, it was concluded that the provinces like U.P. must tighten up the police watch to prevent infiltration of the Khaksars into the Punjab and Nami and Bashir Ahmad Siddiqi must be arrested if they were traced in any province of India.

Under these circumstances Muhammad Ali Jinnah as a leader of Muslim India felt deeply concerned. In a press statement he expressed his sympathy with Khaksars but he could try to find "an honourable solution of the present impasse" only if the Khaksar leaders jointly gave him authority to serve them and followed his advice. Responding to such statements of Jinnah Nami as the then head of the organisation delegated authority to him to negotiate with the government on his behalf and suspended defiance of law till July 27 on the advice of Jinnah.

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297 Craik to Linlithgow, April 23, 1940. Ibid., p. 236.
299 During an interview between Linlithgow and Jinnah on June 27, 1940 Jinnah said that all sections of the Muslim community had deep sympathy with the Khaksars. The Viceroy noted that "Mr., Jinnah had a soft place in his heart for the movement." Oriental India Office Collection, Linlithgow Papers. MSS Eur F 125/135, p. 356.
300 Hindustan Times, June 29, 1940. See also Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-197, pp. 9-10.
301 Telegram of Nami to Jinnah dated June 30 and July 6, 1940 and telegram of Jinnah to Nami dated July 5, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, R/3/1/62, p. 12; al-Islah (Calcutta), July 10, p. 1 and July 31, 1940, p. 5.
Now Jinnah wrote to the Viceroy not to "miss this opportunity" to find a satisfactory solution of the problem as it had become an all-India question for the Muslims.302 By then, however, after forcible but successful expulsion of the Khaksars from the mosques the situation had improved from the government point of view and the government was contemplating a ban on the Khaksars on all India level, the Viceroy gave a curt reply to Jinnah expressing his inability to intervene in a provincial matter and suggested that Sir Sikandar would revoke the ban if his published terms were fulfilled.303 Helplessly Jinnah wrote to Nami to consult Sir Sikandar directly and Nami appointed a negotiating committee on July 29 consisted of Mian Ahmad Shah, Dr. Sir Zia-ud-Din, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang, Whaedd-uz-Zaman Haider and Nawab Abdullah Khan.304 On August 6 the government of India notified to prohibit drill, wearing of uniforms etc. extending the Punjab government's ban of February 28 to all-India level and leaving Mian Ahmad Shah, who was to negotiate with the government of the Punjab, with no other option but to agree to the terms of the Punjab government

303 Linlithgow to Jinnah, July 24, 1940; Oriental India Office Collection, L/P.&J/8/680, p. 134. The governor of the Punjab had reported to the Viceroy Sir Sikandar's view that the movement had already practically died out and by opening talks, Jinnah probably wanted "to create mischief in order to give a fillip to the movement." Craik to Linlithgow, July 16, 1940. Ibid., p. 131.
304 al-Islah, July 31, 1940, p. 7.
and in turn the Punjab government cancelled the order of March 19 by which Anjaman-i-Khaksaran had been declared an unlawful association. At the beginning of the year 1941 it appeared as if the movement was tending towards the Congress as in a meeting of the salars attended by important leaders like Mian Ahmad Shah and others a proposal to withdraw the offer of 50,000 soldiers and to co-operate with the Congress was overruled by Qazi Abdul Baqi, the newly elected Madar-un-Nizam. In February the offer of 50,000 soldiers was repeated by Nami. A few weeks later Mian Ahmad Shah took over the leadership of movement according to Mashraqi's instructions and in view of the existing circumstances in the country. At the same time he requested Sir Sikandar to recommend the release of Mashraqi, assuring that nothing unwanted would take place in future. Though the request had no effect, he continued his efforts, peacefully of course, to get Mashraqi released till May 1941 when he being disappointed by the stern attitude of the government announced his resignation from the leadership as he could

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305 Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/8/680, pp. 124-126; Report on situation of the Punjab for second half of August 1940; Inqalab, August 24, 1940. Nami also endorsed the decision taken by the Mian Ahmad Shah. Mian Ahmad Shah to Mudie, October 17, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/8/680, p. 120

306 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, January 11, 1941.

307 al-Istah, February 14, 1941.

not get Allama Mashraqi released. It appears through intelligence reports that a section of the Khaksars were tending to civil disobedience again and to co-operate with the Congress, and Main Ahmad Shah did not want to take responsibility in this regard. This is further confirmed by the revival of the Khaksar activities and editorials of al-Islah of May 16 and May 23, 1941. At a meeting of Khaksar leaders, held at Peshawar on June 1, it was decided that the agitation for the release of Allama Mashraqi must be intensified from June 6 and the Khaksars should enter the mosques in all towns of India on that date. Official warnings from the government against this move were ignored and the Khaksars continued to mobilize themselves with the intention to enter and stay in the mosques indefinitely with spades and supply of food. The government of India, being alarmed at the situation, decided to declare the Khaksar movement unlawful association throughout India and to arrest immediately all the important leaders of the movement. On

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309 al-Islah (Aliqarh), May 9, 1941, pp. 5-6.
311 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 7, 1941.
312 Telegram from Government of India to Secretary of State for India, June 6, 1941. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/8/680, pp. 94, 103-104; Inqilab, June 7, 1941. The Central Government also wrote to the heads of various princely states suggesting to ban the organisation in their respective states. In Hyderabad, Mysore, Dhar and Ratlam the movement was declared unlawful accordingly whereas Bhopal and Rampur
Madras Presidency. He issued a press statement ordering his followers to discontinue drilling, wearing of uniform, badges and the carrying of belchas for the duration of the War.\textsuperscript{317} On September 23, 1942 a resolution was moved in the Central Legislative Assembly by Sir Raza Ali Khan that "the ban on the Khaksar movement be lifted and restrictions placed on the liberty of Allama Mashraqi be immediately withdrawn."\textsuperscript{318} The restrictions on Allama Mashraqi, however, continued till the end of 1942. In December 1942, Mashraqi issued a statement reaffirming his orders to the Khaksars to abandon the wearing of uniforms and badges, carrying of belchas or any weapons and marching or drilling of any kind as long as the War continued.\textsuperscript{319} All restrictions on Mashraqi were removed finally, and the provincial governments including the Punjab cancelled the ban on the Khaksar organisation under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act.\textsuperscript{320}

\textsuperscript{317} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, January 24, 1942.
\textsuperscript{318} Central Legislative Assembly Debates, 23rd September 1942, p. 486. Zafar Ali Khan while speaking on the resolution and urging upon the removal of restrictions on Mashraqi said, "When you do not put any restriction upon his movements in the Madras Presidency, why can you not allow him in Heaven's name to cross the Narbada and go to the Punjab and to Lahore? Will the Heavens fall down or will the British government tumble down? Why can not you do it?" \textit{Ibid.}, p. 482.
\textsuperscript{319} Report on situation in the Punjab for second half of December 1942, Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/S/5/245.
\textsuperscript{320} \textit{Ibid.}
Allama Mashraqi reached Lahore on January 3, 1943 where he was given a warm welcome by the Khaksars and other Muslims. Subsequent events lay outside the scope of the present study. In brief, the Khaksars were gradually re-organised and their activities were revived though to a limited extent but after receiving a final warning from the Government of India threatening the re-imposition of ban, Mashraqi ordered the Khaksars to abandon wearing any kind of badge etc. and any display of military nature at camps and his orders were followed. For sometimes Mashraqi preached Hindu-Muslim unity and wired the Muslim and Hindu leaders to come to terms with each other. Meanwhile, the relations between All India Muslim League and the Khaksars became tense, particularly after Rafiq Sabir’s attack on Jinnah as he was alleged to be a Khaksar. In order to keep the military spirit alive, as the drill could not be performed, Mashraqi introduced an innovative form of askari namaz and the Khaksars were ordered to say their prayers with the smartness resembling that of military soldiers. When All India Muslim League and its demand of a separate homeland

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322 *Oriental India Office Collection*, R/12/2/168, p. 38.
323 Though the allegation could not be proved in the court. *Zamiindar*, November 7, 1943.
became popular among the Muslims, the Khaksar movement declined with the passage of time.

THE KHAKSAR MOVEMENT IN RETROSPECT

The Khaksar movement emerged on the scene of British India in early thirties and by the beginning of 1940 it reached the peak of its popularity. March 19, 1940 was the point when its decline ensued and at last Allama Mashraqi decided to disband the Khaksars at the end of June 1947.

The movement had certain inherent weaknesses, which were responsible for its failure. Domination of Islam was the main objective of the movement. It appears that Allama Mashraqi could not visualize little chances of success of the movement with such objectives in the circumstances existed in the British India of 20\textsuperscript{th} century. His concept of "domination on the glob" and "attainment of kingship" could not have gone unnoticed by the British despite his claims that the Khaksars would not intervene in the politics of the British.\textsuperscript{325}

\textsuperscript{325} Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, \textit{Qoul-I-Faisal}, p. 3.
The Amir in the Khaksar movement was not accountable to anybody. Absolute obedience to the Amir was demanded and he was considered to be practically infallible. There are instances of alienation from the movement after having developed differences on part of some very sensible persons. Dr. Muhammad Baqir, a well-known scholar and sympathiser of the movement differed with Allama Mashraqi in 1935 on the issue of Amir's absolute authority.\textsuperscript{326} Another eminent scholar and historian Akbar Shah Khan Najibabadi who was influenced by the movement in the beginning developed differences with Allama Mashraqi on his concept of *ata't-i-Amir* and grew against the movement.\textsuperscript{327} More than once the concept of *ikhtiar-i-mutliq* (absolute authority) of Amir proved harmful for the movement. Under the system evolved in the movement once the order was given by the salar, right or wrong, the Khaksar soldier was supposed to obey.\textsuperscript{328} It was also not necessary for the Amir to take them into confidence and explain his decisions. In Bulandshahr one of the reasons of the stampede and the subsequent firing was that the Khaksars were not taken into confidence by the salar about what was agreed with the authorities. As a result when the salar entered the jail with the first group of the Khaksars,

\textsuperscript{326} Sher Zaman, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 210-211.

\textsuperscript{327} *al-Islah*, July 23, 1937.

the second group left outside the jail, being ignorant of the settlement between the salar and the authorities and in the absence of the salar refused to follow the instructions of the authorities.  

There was no definite system to determine the alternative leadership in case the Amir was arrested. When Allama Mashraqi was arrested on March 19 the Khaksars were left without an Amir. A number of Khaksar leaders tried to take over the movement simultaneously in the absence of any definite system for the appointment of the next Amir which resulted in the internal rifts and confusion. Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang, Mian Ahmad Shah, Ghazanfar Ali and Ismail Nami differed with one another in the absence of Allama Mashraqi.  

The Khaksars of Sunehri mosque, when consulted by a representative of the Inqalab, stated that they would leave Lahore in a minute if they got the instructions of Allama Mashraqi to do so.  

It shows that after the arrest of Allama Mashraqi there was no unanimously accepted leader of the Khaksars and they resorted to act according to the old orders of March 15 issued by Allama Mashraqi in al-


330 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, April 6, 1940; Inqalab, November 7, 1940.

331 Inqalab, May 7, 1940.
Islah. Whereas, the circumstances in Lahore and elsewhere had entirely changed after the ban on the movement.

Most of the Hakman-i-A’la and Naib Hakiman-i-A’la not being fully committed to the movement, disassociated form it immediately after the tragedy of March 19.332

Allama Mashraqi pointed out at a number of places that the movement did not intend to have clash with the government. The salars were instructed not to order the Khaksars to fight even if the opponents resorted to thrashing.333 He wanted to save the strength and energy of the movement as the other political and communal parties could not achieve any success because they incurred clash with the government.334 But ultimately the Khaksar movement did the same. Though it had been established that the actual clash did not take place with the consent of Allama Mashraqi, however, in all events the final and ultimate responsibility lay with the leader of the movement particularly when he enjoyed dictatorial powers. In fact Allama Mashraqi had adopted the threatening attitude and

332 al-Islah, March 31, 1947, pp. 1-2; Oriental India Office Collection, R/13/2/168, p. 35. G. M. Syed who was appointed as Salar-i-Awwal Central Camp, Karachi even provided information about the organisation to the Governor of Sindh province. Report from the Governor of Sindh to the Governor General, April 9, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&I/8/680. p. 214.
333 al-Islah, June 3, 1938, p. 7.
gave terrorizing statements regarding the three demands which must have filled the Khaksars with great enthusiasm and mentally prepared them for the clash with the government.\footnote{335 See for instance al-Islah, June 24, July 1 and November 11, 1938.}

Allama Mashraqi showed a lot of indifference to the personal problems of the Khaksars. Most of his followers belonged to lower middle class. They were ready to sacrifice their lives but they had nothing to spend. It was practically very difficult for them to reach far-flung areas of the sub-continent to attend the camps one after another. Calls in quick succession must have exhausted their meagre resources. Those who had already been worn out in the Lucknow campaign were again immediately given the grandiose task of the enrolment of 2500,000 volunteers and Allama Mashraqi appointed various officers and their assistants in far off provinces involving inter-province 'transfers'. As a result, many Hakaman-i-A'la and Naib Hakiman-i-A'la could not reach to take the charge of the required area.\footnote{336 al-Islah, February 16, 1940, p. 5.} Under these circumstances the campaign for enrolment of 2500,000 Khaksars proved to be a complete failure.\footnote{337 Ibid.} During the detention of Allama Mashraqi at Vellore Nami also continued
the same attitude. Disregarding the entirely changed circumstances and practicability of the orders he insisted that the Khaksars must complete the enrolment of 250,000 new volunteers within ten days.\textsuperscript{338}

The salars and other high officials of the Khaksar movement could not come up to the expectations of Allama Mashraqi who wanted them "to bring about a real and successful revolution" in the sub-continent but they could not teach the Khaksars anything more than "clearing of gutters and burying of dead-bodies."\textsuperscript{339}

Reactions to corporal punishments in public some time created rifts and schisms in the file and rank of the Khaksars. Even persons like Shah Din Aslam and Masud Ahmad were reported to have raised a rival faction in May 1937 as a reaction to public flogging of Shah Din Aslam and Masud Ahmad under the orders of Allama Mashraqi at the Delhi camp in December 1936.\textsuperscript{340}

\textsuperscript{338} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 8, 1940; Governor's Report on situation in the Punjab for the first half of June 1940.

\textsuperscript{339} al-Islah, March 31, 1947, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{340} Oriental India Office Collection. R/15/2/168, pp. 22-23. The secessionists, however, fail to organise any real opposition. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 23.
Allama Mashraqi severely criticised the maulvis in his writings and sometimes used extremely derogatory and contemptuous phrases for them.\(^341\) Most of Ulema grew against him and their enmity influenced the public opinion of the Muslims against Allama Mashraqi in certain areas. Moulana Abul Barakat Syed Ahmad Shah of Hizb-al-Ahnaaf Lahore, and Moulana Abdul Hakim Qasuri of Ahl-i-Hadith issued religious decrees against him.\(^342\) Ulema of district Hazara including Ghulam Ghouth Hazarvi also declared him an infidel.\(^343\) Anjaman Hizbul Mujahidin was particularly active against the Khaksars. Moulvi Zahur-ud-Din and Moulvi Baha-ul-Haq Qasmi delivered speeches in public meetings organised by the Anjaman at different places against the Khaksar movement.\(^344\) Allama Mashraqi tried to defend himself by explaining his beliefs, but the opposition of the ulema could not be mitigated.\(^345\) Though Allama Mashraqi prohibited the Khaksars to involve themselves in such religious discussions, the

\(^341\) For example see al-Islah, February 8, 1935, p. 11 and April 5, 1935, pp. 5,6; Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, Tazkira, ‘debacha’, pp. 60-61, 81; Qaul-i-Faisal, p. 3.

\(^342\) Ihsan, May 3 and May 5, 1935; Zahoor Ahmad Bagvi, Khaksari Mazhab (Bhera, 1939), passim.

\(^343\) al-Islah, January 20, 1939, p. 5 and May 12, 1939, p. 7.

\(^344\) Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, August 19, August 26 and December 23, 1939.

\(^345\) For explanations on part of Allama Mashraqi see al-Islah, October 26, 1936, p. 9; al-Mashraqi (Peshawar), June 27, 1938, pp. 17-21; al-Islah, July 24, 1940, pp. 2-3. A small cross-section of ulema defended Allama Mashraqi. Among them were Moulvi Muhammad Ishaq qf Abbotabad and Moulvi Habib-ur-Rehman Agrori of Hasanabad who challenged Moulvi Ghulam Ghouth Hazarvi to hold a religious debate (munazaara) on the views of Allama Mashraqi expressed in Tazkira. al-Islah, May 12, 1939, p. 8; October 14, 1938, p. 11.
campaign of the Ulema against his religious beliefs and writings did affect the popularity of the movement particularly among the orthodox Muslim masses.

Allama Mashraqi’s intention since the very beginning were to supplant the British from India forcibly. Though he talked of the social service but he could not hide his real motives. In fact he failed to conceal his contempt and hatred for the British even in his early writings. As a result the intelligence agencies reported as far back as March 1932 that the Khaksar organisation was not a harmless body. In 1933 the British sensed that “this apparently innocuous movement is in reality intended by its founder to be used for subversive ends.” If Mashraqi thought that giving salutes to the Englishmen and doing ordinary service like taking care of their daily petty needs such as bread and eggs would prevent them from being suspicious of his real intentions he was gravely mistaken particularly when he himself explained the real purpose of such salutes in his writings in very clear terms which belied all his

346 See for instance Inayatullah al-Mashraqi, Isharat, pp. 57-58, 65.
347 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 19, 1932.
348 Oriental India Office Collection, R/15/2/168, p. 15.
professions of loyalty to the British. Thus it was not surprising when the Governor of NWFP while taking to a delegation on November 14, 1937 indicated that the Khaksar movement had potential to become dangerous and menacing overnight. The government officials even apprehended that if the Khaksar movement emerged victorious, it would result in massacre of English men women and children throughout the country and “it would be more disastrous then the mutiny.”

Though the reports of intelligence agencies had been against the Khaksar movement since the very beginning, it seems that the British government did not have direct access to such writings of Allama Mashraqi up till April 1940 when Henry Craik, the Governor of the Punjab, came cross a compilation of Mashraqi’s writings by the editor of a Hindu newspaper Tej and he sent it to Sikandar and to the CID for verification. This booklet must have contributed a lot to the determination of the Viceroy and the British government,

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349 In Qaul-i-Faisal he wrote: “The salute of the Khaksars to the British is for making them fearless against the British.” At another place in the same work, answering to the objections that why did the Khaksars salute the British, he said meaningfully, “tum khaksari ki zar ki unor hithiaar per hath mar ka salam karna kia samjho,” Qaul-i-Faisal, p. 17.


351 Home Department File No. 74/2/40 quoted in Shan Muhammad, op. cit., p. 62.

352 Craik to Liniithgow, April 8, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, LP&J/8/680, pp. 4-5, 268-269. The booklet was compiled by Deshbandhu Gupta from the extracts of Allama’s writings to prove that “the Khaksar organisation is the cult of violence and ... its object is securing by force Muslim domination over the whole of India.” For complete English translation of the booklet see Ibid., pp. 164-189. Most of the extracts were taken from Qaul-i-Faisal, Maulvi ka ghalaat mazhab and Islam ki askari zindagi.
particularly after April 1940, not to permit the slightest action on part of the Khaksar movement that might have revived the military character of the organisation. It was in this background that all the Mashraqi's professions and assurances of loyalty and friendship fell flat on the British and they identified the organisation as the only "private army" in the country which must be crushed.  

Some of the adherents of the movement were not really committed to the ideals of its founder. Many of them joined the movement for the sake of pump and show of the Khaksar officials. There were cases of bargaining over the offices of salar and were sometimes sold for Rs.100 or Rs.200. Some of them joined it being influenced by the lure of attractive and smart uniforms akin to those of the proud officials of the British army. Such members of the organisation could never been the real asset to it. As soon as the tragedy of March 19 took place, almost all of such people disassociated from the movement immediately.

The ban on the publication of al-Islah had disastrous effects on the movement. This weekly organ of the Khaksar

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353 Oriental India Office Collection, LP & I/8/678, p. 63.
movement played a vital role in the progress and development of the movement and according to Allama Mashraqui himself it was due to al-Islah that the message of the movement reached from Peshawar in the north-west to as far as Burma in the east within four months.\footnote{al-Islah, April 5, 1935, p. 3. Three years later Mashraqui again admitted that "the only instrument to spread the movement in every corner of India was al-Islah." \textit{Ibid.}, March 25, 1938.}\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, December 1, 1939, p. 6.} Mashraqui estimated that each copy of al-Islah created 100 Khaksars in six months.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, December 1, 1939, p. 6.} Almost all the orders of Idara-i-Aliyya were sent to the ordinary members and janbazes through al-Islah. It was the life and soul of movement but when it was banned the movement received a fatal blow because there was no alternative means to co-ordinate among the Khaksars and keep them united and well informed. The movement so heavily relied on al-Islah for its organisation, activities and co-ordination that it could not have breathed in its absence. There were other local magazines of the Khaksars like al-Mashraqi (Peshawar), Behr-ul-A'mal (Lucknow), al-A'loun (Cawnur), Khaksar Sipahi (Hayderabad), Khum-i-Hijaz (Simla), Tarjuman (Gujrat), Khaksar-I-Burma etc. but none of them could substitute al-Islah. Thus al-Islah proved to be a source of strength as well as impotence for the movement as relying heavily on it nobody thought of its alternative before hand if its publication was discontinued.
The allegations that the Khaksar movement had connections with the Nazis and the Khaksars were playing the role of fifth column during the War also provided the government with a pretext to crush the movement, though the allegations could not be proved even after thorough and careful investigations and censoring more than 108,000 letters and 40,000 money-orders sent or received by the headquarters of the movement.356 One of causes of suspicion was the fact that al-Islah almost regularly published articles and photographs related to the history of Nazi movement and the struggle of Hitlar.359 Moreover, there striking similarities between the organisation, discipline, tactics and philosophy of the Khaksar movement and the Nazis, though it is difficult to say whether one influenced the other or both the movements emerged and developed independently.360

360 To observe the similarities between the two movements see Alam Bullock, Hitlar: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1959), pp. 39, 64-69, 112, 140-141, 143, 146-147, 150-151, 167 and various issues of al-Islah.
Despite its inherent weaknesses, the movement was not devoid of positive features and useful effects. The Khaksar movement made the Muslims accustomed to soldierly lives and discipline. Hundreds and thousands of Muslims in length and breadth of India were organised under one command, confident and proud of being part of a great fraternity. At that time there was no other organisation that worked without subscriptions and contributions. Khaksar movement created a sense of selflessness among its followers, the desire to act and to spend from one's own pocket for the betterment of the community. In the columns of al-Islah and other relevant sources we frequently find moving examples of selflessness and sacrifice, unparalleled deeds of devotion dedication and commitment. A brave Khaksar soldier, Mumtaz of Rawalpindi reached the Adori Camp Karachi on his bicycle covering more than 1000 miles and the last 100 miles he walked on foot as the bicycle had become unusable.\textsuperscript{361} Another Janbaz travelled 1200 miles on his worn out bicycle to reach Lucknow to carry out the orders of Idara-i-Aliyya.\textsuperscript{362} The Khaksars did a variety of exemplary social service on non-communal basis from serving drinking water to fire fighting and donating their blood to the sick.\textsuperscript{363} How strong was the conviction and

\textsuperscript{361} al-Islah, January 1, 1939, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., September 8, 1939, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{363} Ibid., June 10, 1938, pp. 7-8.
spirit of sacrifice among the Khaksars can be estimated by a letter of a salar of Behraich sent to Mashraqi which reads that “if you donot call me to lay down my life earlier then anybody else, I will complain against you to Allah Almighty on the Day of Resurrection.”364 Zaigam who held the Khaksar flag in the jaish of 313 on March 19, 1940 received the news of death of his father when the jaish was about to march but he refused to leave before the march was over.365

There were pakbazes among the Khaksars who made waqf for the movement of almost all what they possessed, sometimes land and property worth hundreds of thousands of rupees. Muhammad Sarwar of Bodla visited the Delhi Camp during the Lucknow campaign and enquired about expenses of the camp. When he came to know the hardships being faced by the Khaksars at the camp, he told the salar-i-awwal, Dr. Nazar Muhammad that he had 900,000 rupees of cash, cultivated land and property, horses and oxen and ornaments of his wife and that he was ready to Hand over everything to Dr. Nazar Muhammad. “If all what I possess is spent” said the rais, “sell me and my children if necessary to meet the expenses

364 al-Islah, May 6, 1938, p. 10.
365 He was one of those who laid their lives during the firing on March 19, 1940. Muhammad Ali Fariq, Angraiz, Sir Sikandar aur Khaksar Tehrik (Lahore, 1978), pp. 73-75.
Chapter V

Introduction and the Working of Provincial Autonomy in the Punjab 1932-1942
Communal Award and The Punjab

Though the Indians had boycotted the Simon Commission at large, the Tory Party of England was not prepared to accept any basis other than the report of this All-White Commission for the constitutional progress of India because it would not suit its imperialistic outlook. The Labour Party was, however, committed to the principle of self-determination for all the colonies including India. When Labour Party came into power in England in May 1929, Muhammad Ali Jinnah wrote a letter on June 19, 1929 to the Ramsay MacDonald the newly elected Prime Minister and a friend of Jinnah, emphasising that before evolving any constitutional formula for India the British Government must invite at least fifteen true Indian representatives to discuss the constitutional problems of India with the British Government to reach a unanimously agreed solution.1 Accepting the Jinnah's proposal, the British Government informed the Viceroy of its decision and the Viceroy Lord Irwin announced on November 1, 1929 that in near future a

Round Table Conference would be held in England to discuss the issue of dominion status of India.² On May 12 the Viceroy in view of “wide spread desire throughout India to see the real political advance”, declared the date of the conference as on or about October 20, 1930.³ The idea of holding a Round Table Conference was welcomed by different political circles in India. Jinnah and most of the political leaders of the Punjab including Muhammad Shafi and Sir Zafarullah Khan also welcomed the idea.⁴ The Executive Board of All India Muslim Conference also passed a resolution on December 30, 1929 to the same effect.⁵ First session of the Round Table Conference was inaugurated on November 12, 1930 and the session continued its proceedings till January 19, 1931.⁶ From Punjab Sir Muhammad Shafi was one of the delegates to the first session.⁷ Fazl-i-Husain was strongly in favour of separate electorates and he apprehended that Jinnah and Sir Shafi might agree to joint electorates under some conditions. Fazl-i-Husain wanted someone at the MTC “strong-minded enough” to say firmly that that was not the Indian Muslim view. In this background he suggested the names of Sir

²Riaz Ahmad, “Quaid-i-Azam’s role in London Round Table Conferences 1930-1931,” p. 7.
³Indian Annual Register 1930, Pt. I, p.44.
⁴Zarina Salamat, op.cit., p.466.
⁵Indian Annual Register 1930, Pt.I, p.346.
⁶Ibid., Pt.II, p.36; Riaz Ahmad, op.cit., p.11.
Zafarullah and Shafat Ahmad Khan to be included in the Indian delegation being sent to the RTC in London. In fact, at one stage, Shafi was ready to accept the joint electorates subject to certain conditions. Shafi worked as a member of the Federal Structure Committee and Minorities Committee. While speaking to the second session of the RTC, Shafi urged that the constitution framed for India must include the safeguard for the interest of 80 million Indian Muslims. Second session of the RTC was held from September 7 to December 1, 1931. From the Punjab Allama Iqbal was also invited to attend the second session of the RTC. He was also a member of the Minorities Committee and attended its four meetings but kept silent. He has been criticised by his opponents for this behaviour. Actually Jinnah and Shafi were presenting the Muslim case on the basis of fourteen points of Jinnah whereas Iqbal had presented an entirely different solution to the communal problem of India in his Allahabad address. Had Iqbal spoken in the meetings of

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9 The Leader (Allahabad), January 9, 1931, p.9.
10 Jahan Ara Shahnawaz, op. cit., p. 140.
11 Riaz Ahmad, op. cit., p.17
Minorities Committee and given vent to his views, it would have split Muslim opinion, the chances of arriving at a settlement with the Hindus, if there were any, would have diminished and Iqbal would have been held responsible for that. Iqbal was sure that the Hindus would not agree to the Jinnah and Shafi’s point of view and the Muslim leadership would have to come ultimately to the solution presented by Iqbal at Allahabad. That is why he remained silent during the proceedings of the Minorities Committee. This is further confirmed by the fact that during his presidential address of All India Muslim Conference on March 21, 1932 he reiterated that the idea of All India Federation was a great hindrance in the way of political progress of India and that he had already raised his voice against it at Allahabad session of All India Muslim League in 1930. Later, in a speech at a reception arranged by the National League London on November 24, 1932 he again insisted that formation of a large West-Indian Muslim State was the only possible solution. As expected, the negotiations at the second session of the RTC proved abortive. Third session of the RTC could not come to any definite conclusion. In the words of Sir Patrick Fagan everything lay in a “fluid” and “in a

15 Shami, Harf-i-Iqbal (Lahore, 1945), pp.64-65.
16 Javed Iqbal, Zinda Rood, p. 493.
nebulous condition". The British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald announced the Communal Award on August 17, 1932. The award retained separate electorates for the Muslims and other minorities. Out of 175 total seats for the Punjab, there were 43 general seats (including one woman), 86 seats were allocated to the Muslims (including two women), 32 to the Sikhs. Five seats were reserved for the Landlords, three for Labour, two for Indian Christians and one each for Anglo Indians, Europeans, Commerce and University. Forty-nine percent seats given to the Muslims through separate electorates combined with four seats expected by the Muslims to win out of five seats reserved for Landlords, the percentage of Muslim representation would rise up to 51% in the Punjab Assembly whereas the Muslims formed at least 56% of the total population.

Communal Award was received with mixed feelings by the Muslims of the Punjab. Though not fully satisfied, they generally seemed to adopt the policy of taking with one hand what was being given and extending the other hand for the rest. Inqalab struck a note of satisfaction writing that

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17 The Asiatic Review (London), Vol. XXIX, No.98, April 1933, p.201
18 Tribune, August 18, 1932; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, August 20, 1932.
19 Indian Annual Register 1932, Pt. I, p.236. For detail of seats allocated to various communities and classes in other provinces see ibid.
though the government had not conceded the Muslim demands properly, the Award at least did not reduce the Muslims to the level of minority in the Punjab as it was commonly alleged by some of nationalist Muslims because the Muslims were sure to get at least 51% and might possibly 52% representation in the Punjab. Certain Ahrar leaders refused to support a campaign against the Communal Award by nationalist Muslims unless an alternative to it was placed before them. Zafar Ali Khan suggested that in the Punjab Muslim majority by one seat (51%) had been based on probability and a grievous blow had been given to natural rights of the Muslims. He suggested that either 51% representation for the Muslims should be definitely secured through separate electorate or mixed electorate with adult franchise be introduced in the province.

The Hindu Mahasabha and Congress leaders had proposed to the Prime Minister to arbitrate on the issue of communal representation in the RTC and promised that they would accept the Award. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya admitted in one of his speeches that he and certain other prominent

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20 _Inqalab_, October 13, 1932.

21 _Civil & Military Gazette_, December 25, 1933.

22 _Zamindar (Lahore)_ , August 13 & August 20, 1932.

Hindu leaders had requested the British Prime Minister to give an award on the communal problem during the RTC negotiations.\textsuperscript{24} Once the award was announced the Hindus bitterly criticised the award.\textsuperscript{25} Punjab Hindu Mahasabha declared that it would launch an effective agitation against the award.\textsuperscript{26} The Sikhs very unreasonably wanted 30% representation in the province.\textsuperscript{27} They expressed their determination never to accept 51% representation of the Muslims and to make every sacrifice to get their rights.\textsuperscript{28} 'Khalsa Review' remarked that the government had denied the Sikhs their legitimate demands and proposed all the Sikhs Councillors, the Sikh Minister and the two Sikh delegates to the RTC to resign as a protest against one sided Communal Award.\textsuperscript{29} Both the Sikh delegates to the RTC, Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Sampuran Singh resigned from the Consultative Committee of the RTC.\textsuperscript{30} The Sikh Press even

\textsuperscript{24} Civil and Military Gazette, May 7 & May 20, 1934.

\textsuperscript{25} For the comments of Herald (Lahore), Tribune (Lahore), Bande Mataram (Lahore), Milap (Lahore) etc. See Report on the Newspapers, August 20, 1932.

\textsuperscript{26} Partab (Lahore), December 9, 1933 vide Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab for the week ending December 9, 1933.

\textsuperscript{27} Indian Review, Vol.XXXXIII, No.3, March 1932, p.186.

\textsuperscript{28} Nawab Jug (Lahore), July 23, 1932; Shere-i-Khalsa (Lahore), July 23, 1932 vide Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab for the week ending July 30, 1932.

\textsuperscript{29} Khalsa Review (Lahore), August 18, 1932 vide Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab for the week ending August 20, 1932.

\textsuperscript{30} Sher-i-Punjab (Lahore), August 28, 1932 vide Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab for the week ending September 3, 1932. Sher-i-Punjab wrote highly provoking editorial. Rebutting the Sikh
declared that the Sikhs would prefer to retain the existing constitution rather to accept the new one. 31 On November 7, 1932 the Hindu and Sikhs members of the Punjab Legislative Council walked out of the Council as they were not permitted to give a statement against the award in the Council and later they issued the statement to the press rejecting the award because it "divided the people of the Punjab and gave permanent majority to one religious community [Muslims]." 32 Even the Minister of the Punjab Government Gokal Chand Narang condemned the award as "a cup of poison." The Muslim members strongly reacted to the walk out and the remarks of the Hindu Minister. 33

The Hindus started a campaign to reopen the issue of communal decision with the help of Nationalist and Khilafatist Muslims like Moulana Shoukat Ali and Sheikh Abdul Majid. 34 Such attempts were countered by All India Muslim Conference and All India Muslim League. Allama Iqbal, raises for their lethargy it wrote: "Will not their blood tingle in their veins now that the Muslim Raj has been established in the Punjab? Will they tolerate slavery to the Mussalman? Will they throw their kirpans at the feet of the Turks? Does the Khalsa blood run in the veins of those who do not shudder at the idea of slavery... disgrace to the punth." Ibid.

32 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, November 12, 1932; Indian Annual Register 1932, Pt. II, pp.212-213.
33 Ibid, p.213.
34 Indian Annual Register 1932, Pt., II, p. 282.
President of All India Muslim Conference, Sir Muhammad Yaqub, Secretary of All India Muslim League and other Muslim leaders issued a statement from Simla on October 7 considering it “highly inopportune to re-open the question of separate versus joint electorates.” Muhammad Yaqub stressed that it was “hardly prudent or dignified for the Muslims to knock once again the same door which has so often been slammed in their faces. It is now for the majority community to fling their door wide open and to come out to meet us with liberal terms...” Later, in December 1933 when Jawaharlal Nehru criticised the members of Muslim delegation to the RTC accusing that they, out of bigotry, refused to accept Mahatama Gandhi’s offer of granting all the Muslim proposals if they favoured his struggle for Indian independence, Iqbal came with a prompt rejoinder to contradict the charges formulated by the Pandit.

One could very easily see that the Hindu and Sikh opposition to the Communal Award was not justified. The Muslims were granted only 49% seats in the Punjab through separate electorates their population being 56%. Even if

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33 *Indian Annual Register*, pp. 283-284.
they won two more sets out of the four seats reserved for the landlords they would get 51% representation i.e., 5% less than what the ratio of their population warranted. On one hand the Hindus and Sikhs were shouting for “national unity” for freedom struggle and on the other hand they were criticising 1% Muslim majority representation in the Punjab as “setting up of Muslim rule” and swearing to die rather than “to allow the Muslims to rule.”

Pre-Election Politics: 1932-1936

On August 1, 1930 Fazl-i-Husain was appointed as member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council but he continued to lead the Unionist Party, remained in touch with the political affairs of the Punjab and guided the Unionist leaders on various occasions during the years 1930-1935. However, in his absence the Unionist Party continuously weakened due to personal squabbles among the Unionist leaders. Gokal Chand Narang, the Mahasabha minister, brought two bills in the

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38 Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab for the week ending September 3, 1932. What about dominating Hindu majorities in other five provinces where Muslims were to live under the Hindu rule?


40 For details see Waheed Ahmad, ed., Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, pp. 96-99; 102; Waheed Ahmad, ed., Diary and Notes, pp. 27, 28, 30.
Punjab Council to deprive the elected representatives of the executive power and to increase the control of the government officials over the municipalities. Despite the opposition of the Unionists like Chhotu Ram and Malik Din Muhammad, Gokal Chand succeeded to carry both the bills with the support of official bloc and urban Hindus.\footnote{Indian Annual Register 1931, Pt. I, pp. 215-216; Indian Annual Register 1932, Pt. I, pp. 279-280.}

Fazl-i-Husain completed his five years term as a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council on April 1, 1935 and on his arrival at Lahore Railway Station he was given a warm welcome by the Municipal Committee Lahore, attended by prominent unionists like Nawab Muzaffar Khan (1879-1951), Feroz Khan Noon and Shahab-ud-Din etc.\footnote{Civil and Military Gazette, April 1 & April 2, 1935.} When he started mobilising his sources in view of the forthcoming elections under the Unionist Party, he had to face criticism from three different sides, the Congress and Hindu press who never liked him\footnote{Tribune, April 4, 1936; Herald, April 22, 1936 vide Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab for the week ending April 25, 1936.}, the Ahrar who were against him because he had recommended the appointment of Zafarullah Khan (an Ahmad) as a Muslim representative at the RTC\footnote{Mujahid, May 14, 1936.}, and the Muslims who were against joining hands with the Hindus in
the Punjab. In May 1936 he was offered by the Governor the seat of Minister of Education, vacated by Peroz Khan Noon, which he accepted on May 26, 1936.

Jinnah started reorganizing All India Muslim League after coming back from England. Being well aware of the importance of the Punjab province as well as the rare capabilities of Fazl-i-Husain, Jinnah invited him to preside over the next session of All India Muslim League in April 1936. The language and the stresses that he used in his letter to Fazl-i-Husain explain how strongly Jinnah wished Fazl-i-Husain to be with him in the struggle he was going to start to organise the Indian Muslims to enable them to face the challenges of the future. Fazl-i-Husain, however, could not accept the request. In fact he viewed the forthcoming elections in entirely different perspective. According to the constitution of 1935 the Legislative Assembly of the Punjab was to consist of 175 seats and 86 seats (including two women) were reserved for the Muslims through separate electorates. It was almost impossible for any Muslim Political party to win 100% Muslim seats and to form a

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47 Jinnah to Fazl-i-Husain, January 5, 1936. Ibid., pp. 477-478.
coalition with other Muslim and non-Muslim parties after contesting the elections on communal basis to get sufficient majority in the assembly. On the other hand under the Unionist Party the alliance between the Muslims and non-Muslims had already proved its worth and by extending the election campaign at least up to 130 constituencies, there were ample chances of getting an absolute majority in the assembly.\(^\text{49}\) Since Jinnah was thinking in All India perspective and was of the view that the Muslims of India should have organised themselves under the banner of All India Muslim League and after contesting the elections on communal basis, they might form a coalition with any other party if the situation required so in a particular province. This line of action was also consistent with the separate electorates, a demand so often stressed by Fazl-i-Husain himself. He, however, could not agree to this point of view that is why when Jinnah visited the Punjab to constitute Muslim League Parliamentary Board and saw Fazl-i-Husain, the latter declined.\(^\text{50}\) Jinnah then met Iqbal who assured him of his full co-operation. Malik Barkat Ali, Khalifa Shujah-ud-Din Pir Taj-ud-Din and Ghulam Rasool (d.1949) also joined

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\(^{50}\) *Civil & Military Gazette*, May 2, 1936; Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, *Iqbal ke Aakhir Do Saal*, pp. 290-291.
All India Muslims League.\textsuperscript{51} Jinnah appealed to the various Muslim political groups to join hands with All India Muslim League and help in formation of a Central Muslim League Parliamentary Board.\textsuperscript{52} Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat decided to help All India Muslim League and Moulana Zafar Ali Khan delivered a speech supporting the efforts of the League and its leader.\textsuperscript{53} The Ahrar were also contacted and they also, decided to favour All India Muslim League in the elections.\textsuperscript{54} For the moment it was felt that Jinnah would succeed in forming a purely Muslim alliance in the Punjab but immediately after the Ahrar’s inclusion in the alliance, Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat refused to co-operate with the Muslim League due to mutual differences between the Ahrar and Ittihad-i-Millat.\textsuperscript{55} However Jinnah announced the names of the members of All India Muslim League Parliamentary Board, which included eleven names from the Punjab.\textsuperscript{56} Four of them

\textsuperscript{51} Ihsan, May 9, 1936.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., May 3, 1936.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., May 2 and May 3, 1936.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., May 8, 1936.
\textsuperscript{55} Ihsan, May 8 and May 9, 1936. The same excuse put forward by Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat was that it was in favour of complete independence whereas Muslim League was content with dominion status. Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, May 16, 1936. It is evident that the League had the same objectives when the Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat decided to co-operate.
\textsuperscript{56} Following were taken at the Board from the Punjab: Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Zafar Ali Khan, Moulana Ishaq Mansehravi, Mian Abdul Aziz, Zain-ul-Abidin, Abul Qadir Qasuri, Raja Ghazanfar Ali, Hassam-ud-Din, Afzal Haq, Abdul Aziz Begowala and Khawaja Ghulam Hussain. Ihsan, May 23, 1936; Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 6, 1936.
belonged to the Ahrar and four to Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat.\textsuperscript{57}

The Board adopted a manifesto on June 11, 1936 which read that the All India Federal scheme embodied in the Act of 1935 was fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable. However, provincial part of the Act must be utilized for "what it is worth", under the prevailing conditions. In view of this decision the Central Parliamentary Board was formed which could constitute provincial election boards in various provinces.\textsuperscript{58} At provincial level when the text of the pledge for Muslim League candidates was composed, the Ahrar leader, Moulana Habib-ur-Rehman Ludhianvi insisted to incorporate a new article requiring the candidate to try to secure the exclusion of the Ahmadios from the Muslim community and their formation into a separate minority.\textsuperscript{59} When it was done, Afzal Haq objected to the demand of election expenditure and before long the Ahrar also decided to sever their connection with the Muslim League Parliamentary Board.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ihsan}, May 24, 1936.

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Indian Annual Register} 1936, P. I, pp. 299-300. For complete text of the manifesto see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 299-301.

\textsuperscript{59} Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, \textit{Iqbal ke Aakhir Du Saal}, pp. 325-326. For other articles of the pledge see \textit{ibid.}, p.323.

\textsuperscript{60} Civil & Military Gazette, October 3, 1936. Cf. S. Qalb-I-Abid, \textit{Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1927-1947} (Lahore, \textit{\textsuperscript{4}}\textsuperscript{4}), p. 188. According to Afzal Haq Rs.750 were demanded for each Muslim League ticket from the Ahrar which they were unable to pay and they had to leave the Muslim League. Afzal Haq, \textit{Trikh-i-Ahrar}, p. 183. Another opinion is that the Ahrar expected that at least Rs. 100,000 would be given to the Punjab by the Central Muslim League most of which would be spent on the Ahrar's discretion but this hope did not materialize. Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, \textit{Iqbal ke Aakhir Du Saal}, p. 321. Imyalaq opined that the Ahrar
Meanwhile the Punjab Muslim League was re-organised and at its special meeting held on May 30, 1936 new office-bearers were elected. Allama Iqbal was elected as Patron, Mian Abdul Aziz as President, Malik Barkat Ali and Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din as Vice Presidents, and Ghulam Rasool as General Secretary. The newly elected leaders of the Punjab Muslim League were quick to issue an appeal extolling the services of Jinnah regarding the Shahidganj and reorganisation of Muslim League urging the Punjab Muslims to vote for the Muslim League candidates in the name of Islam.

Fazl-i-Husain who had been having very bad health since his arrival from Delhi in 1935, died on July 9, 1936. Sikandar Hayat Khan came back from his post of the Deputy Governor Reserve Bank of India and assumed the leadership of the Unionist Party after a meeting in which 50 leading and joined the Board with the sole purpose of raising themselves in the estimation of the Congress to strike a more lucrative bargain with it. Inqalab, September 5, 1936.

61 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 6, 1936. According to another source Dr. Iqbal was elected as President instead of Mian Abdul Aziz. M. Rafique Afzal, Malik Barkat Ali, p. 36.

62 M. Rafique Afzal, Malik Barkat Ali, p. 36. Talbot argued that the appeal was not effective because it was issued in Urdu rather than Punjabi. Ian Talbot, Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-1947 (Karachi 1988), p. 87. It does not hold any truth as Urdu was the commonly understood language and literature of all political parties including that of the Unionist Party was published either in English or in Urdu.

63 Civil & Military Gazette, July 10, 1936. Sir Shahab-ud-Din was appointed by the Governor as Education Minister on the very next day. Abdul Majid Salik, Sarguzasht, p. 368.
influential unionists declared unanimously their confidence in him.\footnote{Civil & Military Gazette, July 23 and July 28, 1936. Sikandar was appointed to the post at Calcutta in 1934. Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab, October 27, 1934. It was alleged that having Sikandar cut off from the Punjab politics, ground was paved for Fazl-i-Husain to become the Premier of the Punjab under the new reforms. \textit{Ibid.}, November 3, 1934. In fact there had been a tussle between Sikandar and Fazl-i-Husain for leadership but the former always rejected such rumours and considered it “great privilege” to serve under the guidance of Fazl-i-Husain. Civil & Military Gazette, March 4, 1935. Probably “Sikandar did not like to fight an already dying man” knowing that he was destined to become the Premier of the Punjab, second Premier if not the first. For details see Yusuf Abbasi, “A Tussle for the Punjab Leadership”, Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society, Vol. XI, June 1960, pp. 399-405.}

Elections in the Punjab and the Results

Though the untimely demise of Fazl-i-Husain was a big set back to the Unionist Party, the election campaign continued with the same vigour. Apart from the Unionists there was another non-communal party, the Punjab Congress. Three other parties were on the scene: Muslim League, Majlis Ittihad-i-Millat and Majlis-i-Ahrar. The last two decided to contest the elections at their own after deserting the Muslim League. Ittihad-i-Millat made a special promise to the voters to try to secure the restoration of the Shahidganj mosque, whereas the Ahrar were trying to get the credit of their anti-Ahmadi agitation.\footnote{Civil & Military Gazette, December 1, 1936; Majahid, May 14, 1936.}
### Elections 1937
#### Party Position in the Punjas Assembly

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<th>General Seats</th>
<th>Muslim Seats</th>
<th>Sikh Seats</th>
<th>Landlords</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Indian Christians</th>
<th>Anglo Indians</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Commerce &amp; Industry</th>
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**Source:** Return Showing the Results of Elections in India 1937 (Delhi, 1937), pp. 73-81.
Provincial elections in the Punjab were held on January 19, 1937 and in most of the constituencies the results were declared by the end of the first week of February.\footnote{Oriental India Office Collection, 1299 R/3/1/1, pp. 12 & 19; Civil & Military Gazette, February 2, 1937; Kirpal Yadev, Elections in the Punjab (New Delhi, 1987), p. 84.}

**WORKING OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY IN THE PUNJAB**

**Formation of Unionist Government Under Sikandar Hayat**

Among the parties in the newly elected Punjab Legislative Assembly the National Unionist Party emerged as the largest party with 95 seats. Its strength could possibly increase further as the discussions continued with independents. Even with 95 seats it enjoyed majority over all other parties combined. In a meeting of the party held in mid February 1937 the leadership of Sikandar Hayat was confirmed unanimously.\footnote{Craik to Linlithgow, February 22, 1937. Oriental India Office Collection, 1299 R/3/1/1, p. 28.} Congress formed the second largest party with 18 seats including two Muslims. It had few successes in the Southeast rural Punjab where the influence of Chhotu Ram played a decisive role in favour of the Unionist Party. There were two main parties among the Sikhs, Khalsa National Party led by Sardar Sundar Singh Majithia and the Akali Party. Despite the stern contests and spending money freely out of Gurdawara funds by the Akalis Majithia...
did well with 14 seats. Muslim political parties failed badly, the Ahrar capturing only two seats, Ittihad-i-Millat also only two in spite of its professions to champion the Shahidganj Movement and Muslim League getting only one seat after desertion of Raja Ghazarfar who joined the Unionist Party immediately after the elections.

Sikandar Hayat Khan was appointed by the Governor as the Chief Minister, Manohar Lal and Sardar Sundar Singh were made Minister of Finance and Minister of Revenue respectively. Chaudhry Chhotu Ram was given the Ministry of Development, and two Muslims, Major Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana and Abdul Haye (1838-1946) were appointed as Minister for Public Works and Minister of Education respectively. Sikandar Hayat belonged to Hayat-Doultana faction and Khizar Hayat (1900-1975) to Noon-Tiwana faction. Mian Abdul Haye represented Urban Muslims. Chhotu Ram represented the rural Hindus. Urban Hindus were represented in the Cabinet through Professor Manohar Lal and Sardar Sundar Singh represented the Sikhs.

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68 Oriental India Office Collection, 1299 R/3/1/1, p. 29.
69 Ibid.
Outlining his policy and programme Sikandar Hayat made his first speech on the inauguration of the new constitution on April 1, 1937 and expressed his determination to make the new reforms a success in the Punjab. He identified that the solution to the problem of unemployment and difficulties faced by the agriculturists lay in the encouragement of communal harmony and constraints on existing expenditure of the government as important parts of his programme.  

The Punjab Assembly held its first session on April 5 and Shahab-ud-Din was elected as its speaker. Sikandar Hayat immediately started taking steps in the direction pointed out in his speech. It was decided to set up strong Conciliation Boards in every district to enquire into the causes of communal riots. At the same time he issued instructions to all government servants not to help inciting communal passions or else they would be dismissed and heavily punished. The assembly authorised the government by a large vote to take strong measures to prevent communal disputes.

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72 Inqalab, April 2, 1937.

73 Civil & Military Gazette, April 7, 1937; Inqalab, April 8, 1937; K.K. Aziz, A Chronology of Muslim India 1700-1947, p. 318.

74 Civil & Military Gazette, July 6 & July 14, 1937.

75 Emerson to Llinithgow, July 31, 1937. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P & J/S/238.
Muslim League-Unionist Alliance and its Impact

Before 1936 the Punjab Congress was a weak party due to internal conflicts. There were rifts between the two factions lead by Dr. Satyapal and Gopi Chand. The opposition to the Congress from Punjab Socialist Party further weakened its position.\textsuperscript{76} It was so unpopular in the mid 1935 that its membership came out to be 5\% of what was required by Indian National Congress Executive Council.\textsuperscript{77} By mid 1936, however, the situation seemed to be different. In June 1936 Jawaharlal Nehru toured the Punjab and at public meetings he declared that only solution to the problems of unemployment and poverty is socialism. At a place like Gujranwala about 60,000 people thronged the route of his procession and the revolutionary slogans of "Long Live Revolution" and other Congress and Communist slogans were displayed on standards.\textsuperscript{78}

In his second visit during the elections he addressed large public meetings at Lahore, Gujranwala, Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Amritsar, etc. and at each city these meetings were attended by 30 to 60 thousand people. He stressed that all religious, political and economic problems would be solved by the replacement of British Imperialism with Socialism. Appalling

\textsuperscript{76} Civil & Military Gazette, June 13, 1935.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, June 6, 1936.
poverty, hunger and unemployment would be eradicated.\textsuperscript{79} Immediately, after elections the Congress' onslaught on the Punjab as in other provinces became more prominent. Muhammad Alam and Maulvi Abdul Qadir Kasuri were deputed by the Congress high command to reorganise Punjab Congress and a sum of Rs.50,000 was allocated for this purpose.\textsuperscript{80} With the acceptance of offices by the Congress in eight provinces and possible agrarian legislation in U.P. and other provinces was bound to give an impetus to socialism and Communism in the Punjab and the new Punjab Government must have noticed that these development might place it in more difficult position. Further startling effect must have been produced by the mass-contact movement launched by the Congress. For this purpose Nehru again toured the Punjab during second week of October 1937 and addressed a number of public meetings at various small and large villages and towns. He attracted an audience of 60,000 at Lahore and thousands of rupees were collected to promote the programme of the Congress.\textsuperscript{81} Ahrar were already annoyed with the Unionist government because of the Qadiani and Shahidganj issues.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{79} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, January 23, 1937.
\textsuperscript{80} Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-24, p.43.
\textsuperscript{81} Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, October 16 & 23, 1937.
\textsuperscript{82} See for details supra chapters 2 & 3.
Under these circumstances it is quite understandable that Sikandar tended towards All Muslim League to get its support against the policies initiated by the Congress because the influence of an All India party could be countered only by the other All India party.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{83} In the light of the above mentioned facts it does not seem fair to claim that “he was not in need of Muslim League support” (Muhammad Noman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 352) and that “there was no pressure whatever or need for Sikandar to join the Muslim League.” Sirdar Shaukat Hayat Khan, \textit{The Nation That Lost Its Soul}. (Lahore, 1995), p.93. As to the view that the Congress’ anti-Muslim activities did not play any role in Sikandar’s tending towards Muslim League because long before that, Iqbal’s letter to Jinnah dated June 25, 1936 containing the basic compromising formula indicated to the Sikandar’s plan to see Jinnah in Bombay (S.M. Ikram, \textit{Modern Muslim India And Birth Of Pakistan}), suffice is to say that such moves of Sikandar during the life Fazl-i-Husain must be interpreted in the perspective of the conflict between Sikandar and Fazl-i-Husain for leadership in the Punjab.

Still another opinion that it was due to the blessings of the British Governor of the Punjab Henry Emerson that Sikandar went to Lucknow and the pact was made possible (Zahid Chaudhry \textit{Pakistan Ki Siasi Tarikh}, Vol. V, pp. 220-221) cannot be substantiated by the facts. Governor of the Punjab, Emerson even did not know the intention of Sikandar and the latter did not take him into confidence about the matter. The governor in a secret letter wrote to the Viceroy, “I still did not know whether Sikandar went to Lucknow with the previous intention of coming to an agreement with Jinnah or whether he was carried off his feet by Muslim enthusiasm.” Emerson to Linlithgow, November 12, 1937. \textit{Oriental India Office Collection, 1300 R/3/1/2}, p.106.

According to Khizar Hayat Tiwana it was the home member Sir Henery Craik whom Sikandar consulted and the former “emphasised to him the need of strengthening the All India front without which the Government of India ... might find it difficult to withstand the Congress demands.” Sir Khizar Hayat Tiwana, “The 1937 Elections and the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact”, \textit{The Punjab Past and Present}, Vol. X-II, October 1976, pp. 370-71. This assertion is not acceptable because: Firstly, no source has been quoted as a reference by Tiwana. Secondly had Sikandar been emphasised by Henry Craik, the Home Member, to conclude the pact with Jinnah, the Governor and the Viceroy would not have been ignorant of it as they were. No reference to this could be traced in the correspondence between the Viceroy and the Governor of the Punjab. Thirdly, Khizar Hayat Tiwana himself, in his statement issued on April 28, 1944 gives entirely different reason for concluding the Pact and there is no mention of Henry Craik’s persuasion. “To meet the
On the other hand Jinnah also wanted a mandate from Muslim majority provinces to speak on the behalf of Muslim India facing the Indian National Congress on equal footing at centre.\textsuperscript{84} All this made possible what later came to be called Sikandar-Jinnah Pact.

The 25\textsuperscript{th} Session of All India Muslim League was held at Lucknow on October 15-18, 1937. In this session those members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly were also invited who were the members of Muslim League Council before joining the Unionist Party as according to the Party Constitution of Muslim League their membership of the League Council was not affected by their inclusion in the Unionist Party.\textsuperscript{85} When these members of the Unionist Party lead by Sikandar and ten representatives of the Punjab Provincial League lead by Malik Barkat Ali reached Lucknow to attend the session, both the groups were at war with each other despite the fact that both were associated with the Muslim League.\textsuperscript{86} Negotiation criticism questioning Mr. Jinnah's status as the accredited Muslim Leader and to enable him to represent the whole Muslim community and settle terms with other parties in All India matters, Sikandar Hayat Khan concluded the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact”. Papers of Col. Nawab Malik Sir Khizur Hayat Tiwana (Southampton University, U.S.A.), Folder No. 13.

\textsuperscript{84} Such mandate was also given by A. K. Fazalul Haq on part of Bengal the other Muslim majority province and Sir Saadullah the Premier of Assam.


\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, p.129.
were held between Jinnah and Sikandar and at last Sikandar read out the following statement:

(a) That on his return to the Punjab Sikandar Hayat Khan will convene a special meeting of his party and advise all Muslim members of the party who are not members of the Muslim League already, to sign its creed and join it. As such, they will be subject to the rules and regulations of the Central and Provincial Board of All India Muslim League. This will not affect the continuance of the present coalition of the Unionist Party.

(b) That in future elections and by-elections for the Legislature after the adoption of this arrangement, the groups constituting the present Unionist Party will jointly support candidates put up by their respective groups.

(c) That the Muslim members of the Legislature, who are elected on or accept the League Ticket, will constitute the Muslim League Party within the Legislature. It shall be open to the Muslim League Party so formed to maintain or enter into a coalition or alliance with any other party consistently with the fundamental principles of the policy and programme of the League. Such
alliances may be evolved before or after the elections. The existing combination shall maintain its present name the "Unionist Party."

(d) In view of the aforesaid arrangement, the Provincial League Parliamentary Board shall be reconstituted.\(^7\)

Generally, it was understood that on all-India matters Sikandar and his Muslim colleagues would follow the policy adopted by All India Muslim League but in provincial sphere the existing arrangement i.e., Unionist Party would remain undisturbed and the Provincial Parliamentary Board would be reconstituted of course to give adequate representation to Sikandar and other Muslims Unionists. The agreement was received with immediate and very hostile criticism from the Hindu and Sikh press opposed to the government, while the extremist elements pretended to see it as a combination to be operated in the interest of British Imperialism.\(^8\) Sardar Sundar Singh's party, the Khalsa National Party passed a resolution asking that the position should be cleared.\(^9\) On the other hand it was very favourably received in Muslim

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\(^7\) Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-785, p.97. & F-1049, p.2.; Khizar Hayat Tiwana Papers, Folder No.19.

\(^8\) Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/3/238.

\(^9\) Emerson to Linlithgow, November 12, 1937. Oriental India Office Collection, 1300 R/3/1/2. n 106
circles where it was considered as a Muslim declaration of organised resistance to what they regarded as the danger of the Congress domination.\textsuperscript{90}

Meanwhile a controversy started regarding the interpretation of the agreement between Barkat Ali (and his colleagues) and Sikandar (and the other Unionists). Both the groups consistently sent complaints against each other to Jinnah and the organisation of Provincial Muslim League was made a mess because of this conflict. Ghulam Rasool, the General Secretary of old Provincial Muslim League, complained to Jinnah that Sikandar’s men did not sign the forms of the League sent to them. He wanted Jinnah to clarify whether the latter had agreed to give majority to Sikandar and his colleagues in the Provincial League Board as the agreement only warranted the reconstitution of the Board. He also recommended the names of 25 persons to constitute the Organising Committee in the Punjab if necessary at all to establish such a committee.\textsuperscript{91} Ghulam Rasool also demanded that in the Working Committee of the Muslim League Sikandar and his group must not be given

\textsuperscript{90} Emerson to Linlithgow, November 12, 1937. Oriental India Office Collection, 1300 R/3/1/2, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{91} Ghulam Rasool to Jinnah, November 4, 1937 vide Mukhtar Masud, \textit{Eye Witness to History}, pp. 47-54. The list of 25 proposed members of the organizing committee did not include names of Sikandar or any other Muslim Unionist. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 52-53.
majority over the old Muslim Leaguers.\textsuperscript{92} On the other hand Sikandar also complained to Jinnah that his "opponents" wanted to embarrass him and Sir Chhotu Ram through their unwanted statements misinterpreting the agreement.\textsuperscript{93} He requested Jinnah to tell Iqbal that the former (Jinnah) had agreed to give "effective" and "controlling voice" to the Muslim Unionists in the Parliamentary Board and in the Provincial League organisation and it was subject to the condition that the (Sikandar) agreed to advise the Muslim Unionists to join the League.\textsuperscript{94} Sikandar also sent a list of 25 proposed members.\textsuperscript{95} Barkat Ali again wrote to Jinnah that Sikandar had stopped the Muslim Unionists from signing the creed of the League and wanted to replace Ghulam Rasool, the General Secretary, and the Finance Secretary with his own men.\textsuperscript{96} On the other hand Ahmad Yar Daultana wrote to Jinnah that Sikandar and other Unionists were ready to sign the creed of the Muslim League but they could not rely upon persons like Ghulam Rasool and others with the only exception of Iqbal. He reminded Jinnah of his commitment to reconstitute the Provincial League and informed that Ghulam Rasool had enrolled a large number of his friends and

\textsuperscript{92} Mukhtar Masud, \textit{Eye Witness to History}, p. 54.

\textsuperscript{93} Sikandar to Jinnah, November 3, 1937 included in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 29-33.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{95} Sikandar to Jinnah, November 9, 1937 included in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 34-35.

relatives as Leaguers and in the Provincial Board they included some 300 men.97

'It appears that Barkat Ali, Ghulam Rasool and other 'old leaguers' were unable to appreciate the reality that Sikandar and his colleagues had strength of about 90 seats in the existing provincial legislature and Sikandar was the Premier of the Punjab. In view of this, if Sikandar and his allies were willing to join Muslim League, naturally they expected dominating position in the Provincial Parliamentary Board and in the re-organisation of the Provincial Muslim League and probably an understanding to this effect had already reached between Jinnah and Sikandar as Jinnah did not take any action against Sikandar on the complaints of Barkat Ali and Ghulam Rasool. Rather he wrote to Barkat Ali asserting just one basic principal without going into details of the complaints, "Once the Muslim members of the Unionist Party or any Mussalman who becomes a leaguer and pledges himself to the creed, policy and programme, he is no longer anything else but a leaguer, and those who have been already in the League are not better than the [new] leaguers...they whole-heartedly join us. After that there is

97 Ahmad Yar Dowlata to Jinnah, November 15, 1937. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-255, pp. 6-7.
no such thing as this group or that group..."58 However Barkat Ali and his friends could not reconcile with their relegated position. In February 1938 Iqbal decided to give a press statement against Sikandar explaining the whole situation but Jinnah advised not to give it to the press.99 Names of 10 office-bearers100 and a list of 90 elected members of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, none of whom belonged to Sikandar’s Unionist Muslims, were sent by Barkat Ali group to represent on the Council of All India Muslim League, requesting for affiliation to the All India Muslim League.101 All India Muslim League appointed a committee headed by Nawab Isma’il Khan to consider the applications for affiliation. The committee rejected the request of Punjab Provincial Muslim League (Barkat Ali group) on the ground that its constitution was not in accordance with that of All India Muslim League.102 At a meeting of Punjab Provincial Muslim League on April 13, 1938 the party constitution was amended in the light of the objections raised by the

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100 Dr. Iqbal, Patron; Nawab Muhammad Shauwaz Khan of Mambot, President; Malik Zaman Mehdi Khan, Deputy President; Malik Barkat Ali, Vice President; Dr. Khalifa Shujah-ud-Din, Vice President; Ghulam Rasool, Hon. Secretary; M.A. Majid, Finance Secretary; Sheikh Muhammad Hassan and Mian Bashir Ahmad, Joint Secretaries; Sh. Ashiq Hussain, Joint Secretary. Archives of Freedom Movement, Vol. 131, pp. 13-14.
committee and again with the copies of the amended constitution All India Muslim League was requested for affiliation. Since Sikandar and other Unionist Muslims were completely ignored by Barkat Ali's Provincial Muslim League, they stressed that it would not be fair for All India Muslim League to accept the request of the Barkat Ali's group for affiliation. At Patna session of All India Muslim League Jinnah contemplated a way out by constituting a committee under the chairmanship of Sikandar to organise and establish Provincial and District Leagues in the Punjab. According to a press statement of Jinnah dated April 19, 1938 the committee consisted of 35 members 10 of whom belonged to Barkat Ali's Provincial Muslim League and the rest of them were the Unionist Muslims. Having ensured his dominating position in the Organizing Committee, Sikandar and his colleagues declared to have signed the creed of All India Muslim League.

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103 Ghulam Rasool to Hon. Secretary of All India Muslim League, April 15, 1938. Ibid., Vol. 131, pp. 26-34.
104 Inqilab, April 22, 1938.
106 Ihsan, April 20 & April 21, 1938. In fact he declined to do it earlier because in the words of Governor of the Punjab, "he does not intend to burn his boats until the situation is not clear." Emerson to Linlithgow, December 3, 1937. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/5/238.
Iqbal’s death on April 21, 1938 was a great setback to Barkat Ali and his group. Not only they were deprived of the most important figure and patron of their group but also their strength in the Organising Committee was further reduced from ten to nine. The tussle between Barkat Ali and Sikandar however continued and Jinnah again received complaints from both the groups against each other when Sheikh Sadiq contested a by-election. The Organizing Committee headed by Sikandar supported Sh. Sadiq considering him as Muslim League candidate whereas the Provincial Parliamentary Board controlled by Barkat Ali and his allies refused to accept him as a leaguer.  

107 Ahmad Yar Khan Doultnana complained to Jinnah against Bakrkat Ali and his group requesting that Provincial Parliamentary Board might be abolished and its authority be delegated to the Organizing Committee since the Board had practically declined to take interest in any by-election.  

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An expected fight between Bakrkat Ali group and the Unionist Muslims in December 1939 at Patna session of All India Muslim League was fortunately averted and the rapprochement brought about between them continued during

107 Inqalab, May, 15, 1938.
the year 1939 and Barkat Ali co-operated with Sikandar’s government opposing a number of no-confidence motions moved by the Congress against the Unionist ministers which were defeated.\textsuperscript{109} However, Ghulam Rasool and Ashiq Hussain Batalvi (d.1989) did not follow the change and continued to oppose Sikandar. Batalvi tried to form a “Punjab Muslim League Radical Party” within the Punjab Muslim League and even contacted some leftists in the Congress like Dr. Muhammad Ashraf for support against Sikandar.\textsuperscript{110} He submitted two resolutions against Sikandar to be discussed at the meeting of All India Muslim League Council on August 27, 1939.\textsuperscript{111} Sikandar expressed his inability to attend the meeting of August 27 because, apart from important official engagements, President or the Secretary of the League had allowed three “frivolous resolutions” to be put on the agenda by “a political adventurer” who was “in league with the enemies of All India Muslim League.”\textsuperscript{112} Sikandar did not attend the meeting, however, at the instance of Jinnah, both

\textsuperscript{109} Indian Annual Register 1939, Pt. I, pp. 271-272; M. Rafique Afzal, Malik Barkat Ali, pp. 50-51.

\textsuperscript{110} Zamindar, August 27, 1939.

\textsuperscript{111} Resolution No. 13 and 14 on the agenda dated August 12, 1939 suggested disciplinary action against Sikandar because of his Federal Scheme and his statement in the Punjab Legislative Assembly regarding Indo-British Trade Agreement. Resolution No. 15 was to urge dissolution of the Organizing Committee and appointment of a new one. Still another resolution against Nawabzada Khurshid Ali Khan, Nawab Muzaffar Khan etc. (Resolution No. 7) was also submitted by Batalvi. It was however withdrawn. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-49, pp. 226-228.

\textsuperscript{112} Sikandar to Jinnah, August 24, 1939. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-16, pp. 199-200.
the resolutions of Batalvi against Sikandar were withdrawn. His third resolution regarding the dissolution of the Organizing Committee was amended and passed giving time up to November 15, 1939 to the Committee to establish a Punjab Provincial Muslim League failing which the Committee would be dissolved.\footnote{Indian Annual Register 1939, Pt. II, p. 348. Batalvi had sent clippings of newspapers to Jinnah with his letter of June 28, 1939 explaining that only six district and city Muslim Leagues were working under the Organizing Committee in the whole province after refusing the affiliation of old Provincial Muslim League which had with it 27 district leagues and 104 primary branches. Quaid-I-Azam Papers, F-49, pp. 114-116.} Another resolution moved by Syed Ali Muhammad Rashidi expressing a sense of regret at Sikandar’s statement on the question relating to the war was also withdrawn, despite the objections raised by the mover of the original resolution, through an amendment of Syed Raza Ali which read that the opinion expressed by Sikandar Hayat Khan did not represent the view of Muslim India.\footnote{Indian Annual Register 1939, Pt. II, p. 349.} Now it was the turn of Sikandar group to retaliate. Punjab Provincial Muslim League Organizing Committee passed two resolutions against Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, Ghulam Rasool and Malik Zaman Mehdhi Khan accusing them of anti-Muslim League activities and recommended to the President of All India Muslim League to expel Ashiq Hussain Batalvi from the Muslim League and to remove the other two from membership of the Council of All India Muslim League and the Punjab Organizing Committee.\footnote{Sikandar to Jinnah, September 16, 1939. Archives of Freedom Movement, Vol. 131, pp. 60-62.}
On November 8, 1939 the formation of Punjab Provincial Muslim League was announced by the Organizing Committee and all district and city Muslim Leagues were directed to send their representatives to the Provincial Muslim League Council. On January 10 the following office-bearers were elected: President, Nawab Sir Muhammad Shahnawaz Khan of Mammad; General Secretary, Mian Ramzan Ali (1881-1964); Finance Secretary, Mian Amir-ud-Din; Joint Secretary, Mian Bashir Ahmad (1893-1971). Malik Barkat Ali, however, refused to accept the constitutional position of the newly formed Punjab Provincial Muslim League and the issue of two parallel Provincial Muslim Leagues, one presided by Shahnawaz Khan of Mammad and the other led by Malik Barkat Ali, was taken up on February 25, 1940 by an enquiry committee appointed by All India Muslim League Working Committee. After due consideration the Enquiry Committee granted affiliation to the Provincial Muslim League headed by Nawab Shahnawaz Khan on March 16, 1940, a week before passing of the historic Lahore Resolution.

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117 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, January 13, 1940.
119 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 23, 1940.
Hence we see that Jinnah protected Sikandar and his colleagues against Malik Barkat Ali group in every possible way and almost all the moves of the 'old' Punjab Provincial Muslim League directed against Sikandar and his party were either stopped or made ineffective by Jinnah. In fact Jinnah wanted at All-India level the cooperation of Sikandar, the Premier of the largest and most important Muslim majority province, even at the cost of ignoring some of the genuine complaints of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, though Jinnah must have been determined to redress such complaints in due course at some proper time when the League's popularity would have taken roots among the masses and its organisation would have been sufficiently strengthened to come into a direct clash with Unionist Ministry. Meanwhile Sikandar also reciprocated the friendly moves of Jinnah through his bitter criticism of the Congress Ministry on more than one occasion, following the policy of All India Muslim League.\textsuperscript{129}

Stability of the Unionist Ministry

Sikandar's Ministry worked very smoothly during the first year of the Provincial Autonomy despite its typical

composition that had made it dependent upon three communities, each of them represented in the cabinet, none of them being satisfied with the present position.

In July 1937 when the Legislature was divided on the issue of release of political prisoners, the government obtained a majority of 100 to 29, which showed its established position. An other positive sign of its being stable and strong was that the budget was passed by the Assembly without having been made a single cut. In first quarter of 1938 the British authorities expressed their satisfaction that the Unionist Ministry cooperated well and there were no considerable internal differences in the party. However, in mid 1938 a new group or "cave" was formed within the Unionist Party of twelve members some of whom announced their intention of forming a separate group. But this could not have considerable negative effect and the Unionist Party was reported to be "well organised" and "with substantial support" in December 1939. This was also confirmed through the defeat of a no-

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121 Emerson to Linlithgow, July 31, 1937. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&G/5/238.
122 Report on situation in the Punjab for the first half of July 1937. Ibid.
123 Secret Quarterly Survey of the Political and Constitutional Position in British India, February 1 to April 30, 1938, pp. 11-12. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&N/7/1813.
125 Linlithgow to Craik, December 20, 1938. Oriental India Office Collection, 1274 R/IV/1160.
confidence motion tabled by Nasrullah, a dissident of the Unionist Party, against Sir Sikandar by a majority of 112 votes to 53 on April 22, 1939.\footnote{Indian Annual Register 1939, Pt. 1, p.272; Civil and Military Gazette, April 25, 1939. According to Qalbi-Abid the motion of no-confidence was “engineered” and a “command performance”. Qalbi-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-1947. p. 210. However the claim that it was a command performance should be considered in the light of the fact that Nasrullah, the mover of the no-confidence motion had resigned from the Unionist Party and Sikandar announced that he had been expelled from the party. Ibid., pp. 109 & 222.}

Agrarian Legislation of 1938-39

An important engagement of the Unionist Party was its carrying through the Agrarian Legislation in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Land Alienation Act was originally passed in the year 1900 to stop the transfer of cultivable land from the agriculturists to the money-lenders which was later amended from time to time.\footnote{Supra, Chapter 1, p. For further details see Sikandar Hayat Khan, Presidential Address Zamindara Conference Lyallpur, September 4, 1938, pp. 2-20; Director Information Department, Punjab, Punjab main soobai khudmukhtari key aath saaf (Lahore, 1945), pp. 7-8.} Despite various amendments to fill up the loopholes in the legislation, the money-lenders still continued to mortgage the agricultural land with the help of benami transactions.\footnote{Generally the method was adopted to conceal the identity of the real creditor who happened to be a money-lender receiving all or most of the benefits of the transaction while the creditor mentioned in the deed of the transaction was merely a cover to bypass the provision of Land Alienation Act in the interest of the money-lender. Director Information Department, Punjab, Punjab main soobai khudmukhtari key aath saaf (Lahore, 1945), p. 18.} An other important piece of legislation, Restitution of Mortgaged
Lands Bill, was taken by the Punjab Legislative Assembly on June 23, 1938 and passed.\textsuperscript{129} The bill provided for the termination of the mortgages of land owned by the members of agricultural tribes effected before the enforcement of Land Alienation Act i.e. June 8, 1901 and it was to affect 7,56,131 acres of mortgage land.\textsuperscript{130} The Punjab Registration of Money-lenders Act was also a measure by the Unionist Government intended to check dishonesty and frauds on the part of money-lenders and to protect the agriculturist class.\textsuperscript{131} The growers of agricultural commodities were protected by the Agriculture Produced Marketing Act 1939 against the various malpractices on part of the shopkeepers and brokers.\textsuperscript{132}

The agrarian legislation was opposed by the non-agriculturist Hindus. The Punjab Non-Agrarian Association observed "Black Week" from August 15 to 21. It was characterised by the intelligence agencies as "a complete

\textsuperscript{129} Indian Annual Register 1938, Pt. II, p.189.
\textsuperscript{130} Director Information Department, Punjab, Punjab main soohai khudmukhthi key aath saal, p. 17. According to the provision of the Bill, most of this land was to be returned to the owner without any further payment. \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 16-17; Sikandar, \textit{Presidential Address Zamindara Conference Lyllipur September 4, 1938}, pp. 23-25.
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 21.
fiasco". Raja Narendra Nath approached to the Governor in opposition to agrarian bills and when the latter gave his assent to the bills, Narindra Nath resigned his seat in the Legislative Assembly as a protest against enactments. At the Non-Agriculturist Conference at Multan, a cry of "Hinduism in danger" was raised and "The Non-Agriculturist Opposition to the Agrarian bills assumed the character of Hindu communalism". Intelligence Agencies also consistently reported it under "Hindu affairs." Gradually "the agitation died down" particularly after the resignation of Sir Gokal Chand Narang from the Presidentship of the Non-Agriculturists Association in July 1939. As a whole the legislation was received with satisfaction and "the prestige of the Punjab Ministry" was "greatly increased." After Sikandar-Jinnah Pact, the Agrarian legislation was another

132 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, August 27, 1938.


135 Civil and Military Gazette, October 1, 1938. Nath was the leader of the National Progressive Party which had opposed the legislation in the Assembly. Ibid.


137 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, August 13, August 27 and October 15, 1938.

138 Craik to Linlithgow December 9, 1938. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/5/240.


140 Craik to Brabourne. August 24, 1938. Oriental India Office Collection, 1274 R/2/1/60. Probably Henery Craik, while giving assent to agrarian bills, had had in his mind the remarks of Hailly that Craik quoted to Brabourne, "so long as you have a loyal and contended Punjab peasantry, you can rely on your Indian Army and can face with confidence any situation that may arise in other provinces." Craik to Brabourne, September 10, 1938. Ibid.
move of Sikandar that made it more difficult for him to continue to assume the cloak of non-communal leader despite his loud professions that the legislation had not been effected against the followers of any particular religion.\textsuperscript{141}

CHAPTER VI

Pakistan: Demand and the Movement in the Punjab

1940-1942
Punjab and the Idea of a Separate Homeland for the Muslims

The idea of partitioning the sub-continent and carving out a separate homeland for the Muslims was put forward by a number of persons in 19th and 20th century as a solution to the communal problem of India. Some of them belonged to the Punjab. Allama Iqbal, Chaudhri Rahmat Ali (1897-1951), Sikandar Hayat, Mian Kafayat Ali and Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi (1915-2001) are the Punjab Muslims who in one way or the other proposed a division or redistribution of India.

Allama Iqbal's Idea of Separate Muslim State

The most important proposal was made public by Allama Iqbal at Allahabad on December 29, 1930 in his presidential address at the annual session of All India Muslim League. The session was held at a palatial house called Dawazdah Manzil.1 The Allahabad session was very thinly attended and among 600 audience, there was a large majority of local people including many boys.2 Among the delegates who arrived from outstations Maulvi Abdul Qadir, Syed Habib, Maulana S.

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1 The Leader (Allahabad), December 31, 1930. For details about Dawazdah Manzil and its owner see Mukhtar Zaman, "Dawazdah Manzil sey Manzil-i-Pakistan Tak." Naqoosh: Iqbal Number, September, 1979, pp. 499-500.

2 The Leader, December 31, 1930. According to some other sources there were hardly 400 people or less than that. Mukhtar Zaman, op. cit., p. 501.
Sadiq belonged to the Punjab. In the presidential address Iqbal analysed at length the entire political situation and communal problem of the sub-continent. He said that, India not being homogenous country, the enforcement of the democratic principles by the British was "to prepare her [India] for a civil war." To him, therefore, "the Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India" was perfectly justified. Then coming to the most remarkable part of his address, he said, "Personally I would go further ... I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India." It had been a subject of controversy among the historians and writers whether Iqbal proposed a separate independent Muslim

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3 Ibid. Among other delegates Abdullah Haroon (Karachi), Seth Taiyab Ali (Karachi), Mr. Abdul Majid (Hyderabad, Sind), Nawab Ismail Khan (Meerut), Maulvi Alla-ud-Din (Meerut), Maulana Abul Khair (Ghazipur), Khan Bahadur Barkatullah (Ghazipur), Shaha Nazir Hassan, M.L.C. (Behar), Maulvi Abdul Kafi (Cawnpur), Maulvi Abdus Samad (Badaun), Mr. Muhammad Ismail (Gorakhpur), Mr. Azhar Ali, M.L.A. (Lucknow), Syed Hussain Imam, Member of Council of State (Patna), Maulana Abdul Majid (Badaun) and Syed Zakir Ali (Lucknow) were prominent. Ibid.

4 Ibid.

state or only a Muslim India within Indian federation. A careful examination of the arguments of these writers and the original text of Iqbal’s Presidential address leads us to the conclusion that so far as the “demand” is concerned, Iqbal did not “demand” an independent Muslim state as he wrote in his letter to Edward J. Thomson that what “I suggested in my address is the creation of a Muslim Province ... in North-West of India ... [it] will be ... a part of the proposed Indian Federation.” But at the same time we must take into consideration his other letter published in The Times (London), October 12, 1931 in which, while


7 S. Hasan Ahmad, Iqbal: His Political Ideas at Cross Roads (Aligarh, 1979), pp. 80, 94. The Urdu translation of this letter included in the collection of Iqbal's letters by Syed Muzaffar Hussain Barani is very misleading and did not convey what Iqbal meant in his letter. Iqbal’s letters reads “you call me protagonist of the scheme called ‘Pakistan’. Now Pakistan is not my scheme.” The Urdu translation of these sentences in Barani’s collection read: "اپنا پاکستان ہمارا ہے، ماں یہ دنیا کے میں ہے۔ اسے نہیں بنا سکتے۔" Syed Muzaffar Hussain Barani, ed., Khilat-i-Mukathib-i-Iqbal, Vol. III (Delhi, 1993), p. 472. “Pakistan Scheme” [of Chaudhri Rahmat Ali] has been translated twice as “Nazria-i-Pakistan.” It is evident how misleading it is. In the second sentence Iqbal used a word “Now” which, in the context, does not mean ‘At present time’. Since the word “now” is also used to “emphasize or draw attention to what is about to be said” or “to express a mild warning or order,” S. Hornby, Oxford Advance Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (Oxford, 1995). It is very clear from the context that Iqbal used the word “now” here in this sense because Iqbal wanted to warn Mr. Thomson against his mistake or to draw his special attention. The translation misleadingly suggest that Iqbal had retracted his views about Pakistan.
admitting that he did not put forward "a 'demand' for a Muslim state outside the British Empire," he did "guess" that "the mighty forces now shaping the destiny of the Indian sub-continent" might possibly lead to the establishment of such a state. Iqbal, however, was very sure of his "guess" as a few years later, in his letter to Jinnah, he urged "it is necessary to redistribute the country to establish one or more Muslim States with absolute majorities. Don't you think that time for such a demand has already arrived." In 1943 Jinnah wrote that his views were similar to those of Iqbal and a careful study of constitutional problems of India had led him to the same conclusion which later became the basis of Lahore Resolution of March 1940. 

Iqbal's address was not given much importance by the press. However, among Urdu Newspapers, Inqalab published its Urdu translation and strongly favoured Iqbal's ideas writing a number of editorials defending Iqbal against his critics. Hindus bitterly criticised Iqbal. A Bungali Hindu, 

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8 Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah (Lahore, 1943), p. 18.
9 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
10 Inqalab December 30 & 31, 1930.
11 For instance see editorials of Inqalab January 9, January 11, January 15, January 20 (in this editorial Iqbal's proposal has been interpreted as a demand of creation of a new province comprising Sind, NWFP, Baluchistan and Punjab less Ambala), January 21 and February 4.
Bean Chandra Pal, rebuked him alleging that Iqbal dreamt of re-establishing Muslim rule over India with the help of Afghans.\textsuperscript{12} The Leader (Allahabad) dubbed the address as "provoking ... aggressive in tone" and threatening which must be regarded as "unfortunate and uncalled for."\textsuperscript{13} Mr. Jaykar attributed "extra-Indian ambitions of Pan-Islamic character" to Iqbal and alleged that the purpose behind Muslims' cry for the safeguards and concessions was aimed at "consolidating their position and eventually forming a Muslim India on the frontier."\textsuperscript{14}

Rahmat Ali's Pakistan Scheme

Chaudhari Rahmat Ali born in 1897 in Hoshiarpur District of the Punjab was a student at Cambridge from 1931 to 1940.\textsuperscript{15} During the Round Table Conference in London he came into contact with the Muslim delegates and discussed with them his ideas about a separate federation of Muslim India. But his point of view was dismissed as "the fantasy of the mind of a student."\textsuperscript{16} However, he continued his efforts and issued an appeal in 1933 entitled Now or Never

\textsuperscript{12} Quoted in Inqolob January 21, 1931.
\textsuperscript{13} The Leader January 2, 1931.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., January 4, 1931.
signed by Rahmat Ali himself and his three colleagues. In the booklet, combining the first letters of the Punjab, North West Frontier Province (Afghan), Kashmir, Sind and last three letters of Baluchistan, he defined the homeland of Indian Muslims as "PAKSTAN". Bitterly criticising the Muslim delegates of the Round Table Conference and accusing them of bartering away the very souls of Indian Muslims, he explained heterogeneity of the people of Indian Sub-continent and stressed that the Muslims having a distinct national identity separate from that of the Hindus in every sphere of life, must be granted a separate Federal Constitution for the five pre-dominantly Muslim units denoted through the word PAKSTAN. He concluded with the remarks that if the Indian Muslims did not demand and established a separate federation of the five homelands, they would perish forever.

The Hindu and the Congress press condemned the scheme. Reacting to the "PAKSTAN scheme", The Tribune remarked that the scheme was "absurd and ... essentially selfish." Daily Herald characterised the scheme as a "bombshell". A writer

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18 K. K. Aziz, Rahmat Ali, pp. 495-501
19 The Tribune, May 3, 1933.
20 Report on newspapers and periodicals, May 6, 1933.
in *The Partab* considered it "ridiculous and ... mischievous." A correspondent of *Civil and Military Gazette* considered it impracticable as the defence and communication systems and thousands of other details of corporate life of India developed during the past hundred years had given her the unity of a single state which could not be altered. It was apprehended that if the communal policy of the Hindu Mahasabha to have a Hindu dominated India continued, it would undoubtedly strengthen the hands of those who believed in a separate federation of the Muslim provinces of Northern India. In 1933 Rahmat Ali founded Pakistan National Movement to promote his idea of Pakistan and to fight an All India Federation. The Movement stood for spiritual, cultural, social, economic and national liberation of nations of South Asia from "Indianism" i.e., Hindu Imperialism. Rahmat Ali as the President of Pakistan National Movement urged that Pakistan and its people had always possessed a historical, spiritual and national individuality of their own and that river Jumna formed a natural boundary between Pakistan and Hindustan. According to him the Pakistan National Movement stood for the right of

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21 *Partab*, May 4, 1933 vide *ibid*.

22 *Civil and Military Gazette*, December 11, 1933.

Pakistan for equal status with Hindustan in the British Common Wealth.\textsuperscript{24} In view of some of Rahmat Ali’s professions, the Pakistan scheme seemed to have an extra-territorial outlook.\textsuperscript{25}

A few young Muslims of Lahore established an association, Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan in February 1937 to work for an independent Islamic state for the Indian Muslims. Among them Mirza Abdullah Anwar Baig (b.1907), Khurshid Alam (b.1911), Sahabzada Abdul Hakim and Sarwar Hashmi were prominent. Scores of their articles in favour of “Pakistan scheme” were published in Urdu dailies of repute like Angalab and Ihsan during 1938-39 explaining almost every aspect of the idea, clearing misconceptions and answering objections raised by the opponents.\textsuperscript{26} When All India Muslim League was examining various schemes of divisions or re-distribution of India in 1939, Ahmad Bashir (b.1920), the Secretary of Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan was in contact with Jinnah and wrote a number of letters explaining the Pakistan scheme and the views of Majlis-i-Kabir-i-


\textsuperscript{25} Syed Abdul Latif, A Federation of Cultural Zones for India (Hyderabad-Deccan, 1938), p. 2. The Movement stood for “international consolidation of South Asia” and “the creation of a new order of ‘Asianism’ to take the place of old order of ‘Indianism’ in South Asia.” K. K. Aziz, Rahmat Ali, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{26} Sarfraz Hussain Mirza, Tatawar-i-Pakistan sep Qaraddad-i-Pakistan Tak (Lahore 1983).
Pakistan. After the adoption of Lahore Resolution by All India Muslim League in March 1940, Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan receded into background as Muslim League had taken up the demand for Pakistan.

Scheme of 'a Punjabi'

In July 1939 the most comprehensive scheme dealing with the communal problem was published by Muhammad Shahnawaz Khan of Mamdot. Mian Kafayat Ali using the pen-name of "A Punjabi" authored the book. The Confederacy of India envisaged a tripartite confederation of three federations, one comprising of North-Western India (Indusstan Federation), the second consisting of Hindu majority areas of Central and Southern India (Hindu India Federation) and the third incorporating Bengal and the adjacent Muslim majority areas (Bengal Federation). Shahnawaz Khan of Mamdot, the publisher, suggested that Hindu India Federation might be converted into three separate federations.

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27 For his letters addressed to Jinnah see Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-96, pp. 63-65; F-96, pp. 57-60; F-900, pp. 100, 157-163; F-1097, pp. 294-302

28 Sarfraz Hussain Mirza, Tazawar-i-Pakistan say Qararud-d-i-Pakistan Tak, p. 56-61. Prominent members of Majlis—i-Kabir-i-Pakistan, Mirza Abdullah Anwar Baig, Khorshid Alam, Ahmed Bashir, Muhammad Abdul Majid and Muhammad Younus met Jinnah on March 25, 1940 at Lahore and on his advice devoted themselves for Pakistan Movement under All India Muslim League. For their life sketches see ibid., pp.261-272.
separating Rajistan and the Daccan states.\textsuperscript{29} One important aspect of the scheme was its provision for division of the Punjab and Bengal detaching the Hindu majority areas of these provinces,\textsuperscript{30} which essentially made it more reasonable scheme as compared with others. The author of the scheme commented upon the other schemes of division and tried to prove the worth of his own scheme.\textsuperscript{31} In the confederation proposed by "A Punjabi" the confederal authority could be vested in the Viceroy and an assembly consisting of the members drawn from the component Indian Federations. The number of representatives of each federation would be fixed according to the geographical and economic position, population, etc. of the respective federation. Foreign relations, defence and the matters pertaining to the common natural resources could be entrusted to the governor-generals of the federations. Expenses of the confederacy would be met through contribution from the component federations.\textsuperscript{32} If the Hindus did not agree to the idea of the proposed confederation then the Muslims would just rightly demand secession of Muslim majority regions having no connection with the Hindu India. However, the author did not

\textsuperscript{29} A Punjabi, \textit{Confederacy of India} (Lahore, 1939), pp. 10-12. See also the map facing page 12 in \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 11, 208-210, 243-249.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 5-10.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.
aspire to have what he called “extra-territorial ideals or ambitions” linking the Indian Muslims with the states outside the Indian subcontinent because “Ultimately our destiny lies within India not out of it.”

Sikandar Hayat’s alternative

Sikandar Hayat had also been contemplating his own federal scheme since early June 1938 when he verbally explained the scheme to Craik. In March 1939 the Viceroy wanted Sikandar’s scheme to be ventilated but by then it had not been put “into black and white in a form suitable for publication” and he did not intend to disclose its details at the meeting of the Working Committee of Muslim League which he would attend on March 26, 1939 at Merrut. During the first week of July 1939 Sikandar Hayat gave copies of his federal scheme in confidence to Gandhi and Jinnah and waited for the reactions. He requested Jinnah to send him “a line or give a brief statement to the press ... that the scheme is worth consideration.” Jinnah, however, did not

33 Ibid., p. 17.
34 Craik to Linlithgow, June 5, 1938. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&S/S/5/239.
35 Craik to Linlithgow, March 20, 1939. Oriental India Office Collection, R/3/1/61; Linlithgow to Zetland, March 21, 1939. Oriental India Office Collection, F 125/7. It is interesting to note that the Viceroy considered it Sikandar’s “Pakistan Scheme.” Linlithgow to Zetland June 16, 1939. Ibid.
37 Sikandar to Jinnah, July 19, 1939. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-353, p. 3.
think it proper to comment upon the scheme while all the schemes including that of Sikandar were under consideration to the sub-committee appointed for this purpose. Sikandar ultimately issued the scheme to the press and it was published on July 30, 1939. In the very beginning Sikandar considered "a Federation of some kind ... not only desirable but indispensable for ... the country as a whole." To establish an All-India Federation, he proposed to demarcate the country into seven zones as under:

Zone 1 Assam + Bengal (minus one or two western districts in order to reduce the size of the 'Zone' with a view to approximate it to other 'Zone') + Bengal States and Sikkim;

Zone 2 Bihar + Orissa (plus the area transferred from Bengal to Orissa). This would benefit Orissa which is at present handicapped to some extent on account its limited resources and area;

38 Jinnah to Sikandar, July 3 [sic], 1939. Ibid., p. 12.
39 Indian Annual Register 1939, Pt. II, p. 11: The Times, August 2, 1939. For complete text of the final draft of the scheme see Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-96, pp. 90-109. For the printed text in form of booklet see Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/7/2808.
40 Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-96, p. 91.
Zone 3 United Provinces and U.P. States;

Zone 4. Madras + Travancore + Madras States and Coorg;

Zone 5. Bombay + Hyderabad + C.P. and Berar + Bombay States + Mysore and C.P. States.

Zone 6. Rajputana States (minus Bikaner and Jaisalmer) + Gwalior + Central India States + Bihar and Orissa States + Western India States;

Zone 7. Punjab + Sind + N.W.F. Province + Kashmir + Punjab States + Baluchistan + Bikaner and Jaisalmer.\(^{41}\)

Each zone was to have regional legislature consisting of representatives of the British Indian provinces and the Indian states belonging to the zone. Members of the regional legislature would collectively constitute the Central Federal Assembly with the combination of 250+125 from British India and Indian states respectively, 33% of the

\(^{41}\)Ibid., p. 103.
total members being Muslims. Share of representation of each unit and the minorities would be allotted according to the provisions of the Act of 1935.\textsuperscript{42} All the subjects included in the federal list of the Act of 1935 would be transferred to the zones or units except Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs, Coinage and Currency, etc.\textsuperscript{43} The scheme envisaged Dominion status as the "only practicable course open to India."\textsuperscript{44} Sikandar’s scheme attracted criticism from all sides. "A Punjabi" (Mian Kafayat Ali) considered it "an all-round sub-ordination of the Muslims to the Hindus in India and their consequent extinction as a communal entity."\textsuperscript{45} He also pointed out that if the provisions of the Act of 1935 were applied to the Regional Legislature as recommended in the scheme, in case of Muslim North-West, the Muslims would get only 29 seats against 26 non-Muslim seats in a House of 58 and in the Zone comprising Bengal and Assam the Muslims would expect to get 24 seats against 22 non-Muslim seats. At the same time in the remaining five Hindu Zones the overwhelming Hindu majorities would remain undisturbed.\textsuperscript{46} On the other hand the Hindus also

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 100.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 99.

\textsuperscript{45} A Punjabi, Sir Sikandar’s Regional Scheme Under Searchlight (Lahore, 1942), p. 11.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., pp. 13-14. Other provisions of the scheme were also criticised. See ibid., passim.
condemned it.\textsuperscript{47} The Congress could not be satisfied with it as it aimed at achieving “dominion status”. Moreover, the composition of zones was apprehended to be an attempt on part of Sikandar to achieve “Pakistan plan ... by a side-wind”.\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{Niazi’s Khilafat-I-Pakistan Scheme}

Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi also sent a scheme “Khilafat-i-Pakistan” to Liaqat Ali Khan proposed by the Punjab Muslim Students Federation for consideration of the sub-committee of Muslim League appointed for this purpose.\textsuperscript{49} The scheme was an ambitious one demanding a corridor between the North-West India and Bengal through Delhi and Lucknow (U.P.).\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{Lahore Resolution of All-India Muslim League and the Punjab}

The results of the elections of 1937 proved that the Muslims had no confidence in Indian National

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Civil and Military Gazette}, August 11, 1939.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Times of India} (Bombay, August 9, 1939 vide Waheed-uz-Zaman, \textit{Towards Pakistan} (Lahore, 1969), p. 163.

\textsuperscript{49} Niazi to Liaqat Ali Khan, October 17, 1939, \textit{Archives of Freedom Movement}, Vol. 230, pp. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{50} Baider Malik, \textit{Yaran-i-Maktab} (Lahore 1985), p. 273. For further details see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 273-277.
Congress.\textsuperscript{51} Atrocities and injustice inflicted upon the Muslims during the Congress rule in the Hindu majority provinces \textsuperscript{52} and its unbending attitude to proceed with the idea of a Hindu-dominated united India was one of the reasons that the proposals of division or redistribution of India and separate Muslim federation became more and more popular among the Muslims during the period of Congress rule in the provinces. Anti-Muslim utterances of the Hindu Mahasabha attracted the Muslims further in the same direction. Even before the elections and formation of Congress ministries, the Mahasabha leaders like Jetaguru Kurthoti and Bhai Parmanand declared that "India was for the Hindus and other communities were merely guests of the country ..., [and they should be] warned to behave themselves as guests." \textsuperscript{53}

As discussed in the previous pages, a number of schemes were already being discussed in the Muslims circles as alternative to the Federation embodied in the Act of 1935.

\textsuperscript{51} Out of 482 Muslim seats in the eleven provinces, it contested 58 and only 26 Congress Muslim candidates could return. \textit{Indian Annual Register 1937}, Pt. 5, p. 168(2).

\textsuperscript{52} For details of such complaints see K. K. Aziz, ed., \textit{Muslims Under Congress Rule 1937-1939}, 2 Vols. (Islamabad, 1978-1979). The most wicked example was reported in \textit{Inqilab}, May 11, 1938.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Civil and Military Gazette}, January 12, 1936. The tone of the speech of Sawarkar, the President of All India Hindu Mahasabha delivered at Ahmadabad in 1937 is also worth-noticing. For the complete text of his speech see Archives of Freedom Movement, Vol. 469.
The Working Committee of All India Muslim League in a meeting held at Meerut on March 25, 1939 appointed a committee to examine various schemes and to report its conclusions to the Working Committee.\(^{54}\)

Meanwhile the British were also alive to the emergence of the schemes like "Pakistan Scheme" as alternative to the Act of 1935. Though none of these schemes "really does justice to the difficulties involved"\(^{55}\) and therefore, do not "merit serious considerations,"\(^{56}\) the British were certain that "the Muslims were uniting in their determination not to be dominated by the Hindus in any form of central government which may come into being."\(^{57}\) Zetland told Feroz Khan Noon that there were "almost insuperable difficulties in the way of our acceptance" of a policy leading to "the creation of a new country separated from India"\(^{58}\)

On the other hand, along with condemnation of Indian National Congress "Pakistan Scheme" was being supported at

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\(^{55}\) Linlithgow to Zetland, April 4, 1939. *Oriental India Office Collection*, F 125/7.


\(^{57}\) Zetland to Linlithgow, December 13, 1938. *Oriental India Office Collection*, F 125/6, Vol. III.

\(^{58}\) *Ibid.*
the public meetings of local Muslim Leagues held in various districts of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{59} It appears that Jinnah had made up his mind by early 1940 to adopt the idea of a separate Muslim state on the basis of two-nation theory as the creed of All India Muslim League. On February 13, 1940 he issued an article written for the \textit{Time and Tide} elaborating the idea of \textbf{Two Nations} that rendered the "Western democracy ... totally unsuited for India and its imposition on India is a disease in the body politic."\textsuperscript{60} He urged, "The difference between the two [the Hindus and the Muslims] is not only of religion ... but also of law and culture. They may be said indeed to represent two distinct and separate civilizations."\textsuperscript{61} A note sent to the Viceroy by Zafarullah Khan in February 1940 also referred to the different "faiths, races, languages, culture, social habits and intellectual outlook" in the Indian sub-continent.\textsuperscript{62}

Ten days before the passing of the Lahore Resolution, during an interview with the Viceroy on March 13, Jinnah made it very clear that if there could be no improvement on

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab}, April 29, 1939.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Indian Annual Register 1940}, Pt. I, pp. 302-305. The article appeared in the \textit{Time and Tide}, March 9, 1940, pp. 238-240.

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Time and Tide}, March 9, 1940, p. 239.

the "present solution for the problems of India's constitutional development, he and his friends would have no option but to fall back on some form of partition."  

It was on the historic Lahore session that All India Muslim League, according to the aspirations of the Muslims of India, declared a separate homeland as its goal.

All India Muslim League session was to be held at Lahore on March 22-24, 1940. Preparations were in full swing. The pandal had been erected in the extensive ground of Minto Park. The central office of All India Muslim League was shifted to Lahore on March 18, 1940. After the Khakhar tragedy in Lahore on March 19, Sikandar Hayat and his colleagues wanted the session to be postponed. However, Jinnah told in a press statement that there would be no change in the programme of holding the session of All India Muslim League at Lahore. Jinnah reached Lahore on March 21, 1940

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63 Oriental India Office Collection, F 125/135, p. 193. On the Viceroy’s enquiry for further details of his program, Jinnah expressed his inability to go into further details, however he promised to send him a flag embroidered by some young Muslim woman which expressed his [Jinnah’s] present position. “It bore on one side the flag of Muslim India flying at full mast: on the other the flag of Congress flying at full mast: and above it with the usual superscription India the Union Jack flying half-mast with a patriotic Muslim slogan.” Ibid.
64 Civil and Military Gazette, March 19, 1940.
65 Ibid., March 21, 1940
and he was given an enthusiastic reception. Soon after his arrival, he remarked that the Lahore Session was going to be a landmark in history of Muslim India. In the afternoon he delivered a brief speech at the flag-hosting ceremony attended some two thousand persons and expressed his profound grief over the tragedy March 19. The open session All India Muslim League was held on March 22. Under the president-ship of Jinnah, Shahnawaz Khan Mamdot opened the proceedings after the recitation of the Holy Quran and in his welcome address he asserted that the Muslims had repudiated the Federal scheme to save themselves from Hindu domination in internal affairs and the British control on external affairs. He urged that the entire Muslim community must follow the lead of Mr. Jinnah to fulfil its national aspiration. When the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah stepped before the microphone to deliver his presidential address, prolonged shouts “Quaud-i-Azam Zindabad” raised by more than 100,000 audience greeted him. In the course of his extempore speech, Quaid-i-Azam made an assessment of the political situation since 1938 and dwelt on the issue of

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66 Civil and Military Gazette, March 22, 1940
67 Ibid.
68 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 23, 1940, Civil and Military Gazette, March 22, 1940.
69 Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 30, 1940, For full text of his address see Zamindar, March 24, 1940.
70 Times of India, March 25, 1940 quoted in Pirzada, op. cit., Vol.II, p. 237. Zamindar gives the number of audience as more than 80,000 including more than 2,000 delegates, Zamindar, March 24, 1940.
future constitution of India and the theory of Two Nations. He declared, "the problem in India is not an inter-communal but manifestly of an international character and must be treated as such."71 Exploring the real nature of Islam and Hinduism he said:

"They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and the Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality ... the Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and, indeed, they belong to different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. There aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derived their inspirations from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap."72

He further said that Muslims not being a minority but "a nation according to any definition of a nation ... must have their ..., State .... to live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as free and independent people."73 In the second open session held on March 23, presided by Quaid-i-Azam, Maulvi Fazal-ul-Haq, the Premier of Bengal, moved the historic Lahore Resolution which resolved that: "no constitution plan would be workable ... or acceptable to the

71 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed., Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore, 1943), p. 152.
72 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., p. 153.
73 Ibid., pp. 155-156. For full text of the speech see ibid., pp. 138-156.
Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in North Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent state in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign." 74 Chaudhry Khaliq-uz-Zaman seconded the resolution and leaders from different provinces including Khaliq-uz-Zaman himself spoke in favour of the resolution. 75 On the third day, when the discussion on the resolution was resumed, again different leaders favoured the resolution in their speeches and it was "carried amidst." 76

Sikandar Hayat claimed that he had prepared the original draft of the Lahore Resolution but the Subject Committee changed the draft "out of all recognition" to the extent that the resolution finally passed at the All India Muslim League Lahore Session could not be considered as his


76 Ibid. Vol. 214, p. 98. Two other resolutions, one on the Palestine problem and the other on Khaksar question were also passed. Through another resolution certain amendments in the party constitution of All India Muslim League were made. Ibid., pp. 101-103.
work. Unfortunately the original draft of Sikandar Hayat is not available to enable us to determine what he originally proposed in the resolution. However, in the light of his explanation in the Punjab Legislative Assembly on March 11, 1941 one may infer that his draft suggested to delegate necessary minimum powers by the sovereign provinces to a central authority “for the purpose of coordinating the defence of the country and other necessary subjects on all-India basis” but the central authority would not dominate over the provinces. If this actually was the gist of his draft, it is evident that it was amended drastically. According to one opinion the final resolution was so loosely and vaguely worded that despite all the changes and amendments it was “not quite incompatible” with Sikandar’s ideas. A few days after the Lahore Resolution when Jinnah was asked what kind of state he wanted, he replied, “it should be a Muslim Federation ... including North-West Zone which comprised Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, the North

77 Tiwana Papers, Folder No. 13; Inqilab, March 25, 1942. According to Tiwana, Sikandar Hayat was not present in the meeting of the Subject Committee on March 22 when the draft was discussed and amended. Tiwana Papers, Folder No. 13; Syed Noor Ahmad, trans. Mehmoon Ali, p. 153. However, Ashiq Hussain Batalvi and Muhammad Yamin refer to the contrary. Batalvi, Chand Yudain Chand Tasraat, pp. 246-247; Hamari Qaumi Jis-o-Juhd (Lahore, 1995), pp. 610-611; Muhammad Yamin Khan, Nama-i-A’mal (Lahore, 1970), pp. 779-780.

78 Ikram Ali Malik reproducing a preliminary draft of the resolution from the Archives of Freedom Movement Vol. 214 opined that “this was most probably the draft present by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan.” Ikram Ali Malik ed., Muslim League Session 1940 & the Lahore Resolution (Islamabad, 1990), p. 280.

79 Tiwana Papers, Folder No. 13.

West Frontier Province and Kashmir, and an eastern zone, comprising Bengal and Assam."\textsuperscript{81}

The Lahore Session of All India Muslim League "greatly enhanced Jinnah's prestige" and League rose to "a position of far greater authority than it previously enjoyed."\textsuperscript{82} However, the Lahore Resolution was criticised by a few Muslims and most of the non-Muslims. The Ahrar, as expected, criticised it and Atullah Shah Bukhari condemned the "Pakistan scheme" in his speeches.\textsuperscript{83} Among the non-Muslims of the Punjab, Sikhs bitterly opposed the Resolution. Sikh leaders, Kartar Singh and Master Tara Singh, while addressing a procession of 2000 Sikhs on March 24, 1940 at Amritsar, urged their community to be ready to make sacrifices to resist the scheme outlined in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League.\textsuperscript{84} The Executive Committee of Shiromani Akali Dal passed a resolution on March 27, 1940 at Amritsar condemning the "Pakistan resolution."\textsuperscript{85} Various Sikh associations passed resolutions to resist "to the last

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\textsuperscript{81} Daily Express, March 30, 1940 vide Oriental India Office Collection, L/1/874.
\textsuperscript{82} Craik to Linlithgow, March 31, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, R/3/1/62.
\textsuperscript{83} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, July 6, 1940. Important Ahrar Leaders like Asal Haq and Mazhar Ali Azhar opposed the Pakistan Movement. Ihsan, April 20, 1941; Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, September 6, 1941. In 1942, when Pakistan movement became more popular, the Ahrar leaders spoke in a rather changed tone. See Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, June 6, July 18, August 22, November 28, December 12 & December 19, 1942. However, in the later years they again opposed Jinnah and Pakistan.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., March 30, 1940.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
ditch" the demand embodied in the Lahore Resolution of All India Muslim League.\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{PAKISTAN MOVEMENT IN THE PUNJAB 1940-1942}

Though Sikandar Hayat participated in the proceedings of the Working Committee and Muslim Council while Lahore Resolution was being formulated and he was also present for some time in the open session, it was known that the League’s adoption of a scheme with having

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Police Abstract of Intelligence}, Punjab, July 6, 1940. Important Ahir Leaders like Afzal Haq and Mazhar Ali Azhar opposed the Pakistan Movement. \textit{Ihsan}, April 20, 1941; \textit{Police Abstract of Intelligence}, Punjab, September 6, 1941. In 1942, when Pakistan movement became more popular, the Ahir leaders spoke in a rather changed tone. See \textit{Police Abstract of Intelligence}, Punjab, June 6, July 18, August 22, November 28, December 12 & December 19, 1942. However, in the later years they again opposed Jinnah and Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.}, March 30, 1940.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Craik to Linlithgow}, April 14, 1940. \textit{Oriental India Office Collection L/P&S/5/243}. 
Central government was against the wishes of Sikandar Hayat.\textsuperscript{87} Meanwhile, Muslim League started a campaign to popularised demand of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{88} As the Pakistan Movement made headway in the province and gained momentum, the difficulties of Sikandar Hayat also consistently increased. Hostility between Barkat Ali group and Sikandar Hayat, and the ever-widening gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims after the passing of the Lahore Resolution made it more and more difficult for Sikandar Hayat to maintain his position of a non-communal leader whereas considerable damage to this position had already been done by Sikandar-Jinnah Pact of 1937. To add to his difficulties, the Punjab Muslim Students Federation also became active in favour of Pakistan Movement. During the course of his speech at Hoshiarpur, Sikandar Hayat remarked that if Pakistan meant pure Muslim Raj, the Punjab would not accept it and the Inqalab had to clarify in the editorial “the misconception” regarding his statement.\textsuperscript{89} A few weeks later Jinnah drew his attention to his statement against Lahore Resolution published in Bombay Chronicle and instructed to contradict if his statement was incorrectly reported.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{87} Craik to Linlithgow March 24, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, R/3/1/62.
\textsuperscript{88} It was decided to observe April 19 as “Pakistan Day”, Craik to Linlithgow April 14, 1940. Oriental India Office Collection, R/3/1/62.
\textsuperscript{89} Inqalab, December 13, 1940.
\textsuperscript{90} Jinnah to Sikandar, February 3, 1941. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-353, p. 43.
Pakistan cause was also being promoted in the Punjab by the Muslim League and particularly by the Punjab Muslim Students Federation. On March 1-2, 1941 “Pakistan session” of Punjab Muslim Students Federation was held at Lahore which attracted some 20,000 audience. Jinnah had been invited to preside over the session. Having arrived at Lahore on March 1, he performed a Muslim League Flag-hoisting ceremony in the Islamia College grounds amidst great applause. Notably Sikandar Hayat was not present and his absence was criticised by the speakers. Liaqat Ali Khan and Khaliq-uz-Zaman also delivered speeches in favour of Lahore Resolution. Jinnah in his address emphasised that Lahore Resolution was a solution to the communal problem of India and would benefit not only the Muslims but the Hindus and the British also. He concluded with an appeal to the Sikhs to consider the Pakistan scheme and there position would be far better under Pakistan Scheme as

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91 Punjab Muslim Students Federation was formed on September 1, 1937 at Lahore. Hamid Nizami, Muhammad Shafi and Abdus Salam Khurshid were elected as President, Vice President and Secretary respectively. Inqalab, September 1, 4, 1937. On the same day Allama Iqbal, Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mandot, Barkat Ali, Zafar Ali Khan and others welcomed the establishment of the Federation to organize the Muslim students of the Punjab. Ibid., September 4 and October 2, 1937. At the suggestion of Allama Iqbal, “establishment of a Muslim National State in North-West of India comprising Punjab, NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan and Kashmir” was made the motto of the Federation. Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza, The Punjab Muslim Students Federation 1937-1947 (Islamabad, 1991), Vol. I, p. 33.
92 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, March 8, 1941.
93 Inqalab, March 4, 1941.
94 Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, March 8, 1941.
95 Inqalab, March 4, 1941.
compared with that in a Federal India.\textsuperscript{96} A few days later, Sikandar Hayat, reacting to the criticism against him attacked the concept of a divided India and divided Punjab, intending "to tell meddling busybodies from outside, Hands off the Punjab."\textsuperscript{97} Punjab Muslim Students Federation continued its activities to promote Pakistan Movement and on March 25, 1941 Jinnah was informed that the Federation observed the "Pakistan Day" on March 23 and that it was "a great success".\textsuperscript{98} Punjab Muslim Students constituted a Rural Propaganda Committee to carry the message of Pakistan to far-flung rural areas of the Punjab.\textsuperscript{99} The Lyallpur Branch of the Federation invited Sikandar Hayat to preside the Conference being held at Lyallpur on July 5, 1941. To the surprise and utter disappointment of the students, Sikandar, in the course of his address, criticised the idea of Pakistan which according to him aimed at vivisection of India.\textsuperscript{100} The counter blast to Sikandar Hayat's speech came

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{97} Ibid. Legislative Debates, March 11, 1941.
\item \textsuperscript{98} Bashir Ahmad to Jinnah, March 25, 1941. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-197, p. 39.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Rural Propaganda Committee was appointed during the Pakistan Conference, March 1-2, 1941 comprising Zafarullah Khan Malik, Nasrullah Khan, Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi and Zahoor Alam. Inqalab, March 4, 1941. A week later, four other students, Manzoor ul-Haq Siddiqui, Chaudhry Muhammad Sadiq, Khawaj Muhammad Asraf and Mukhtar Ahmad were also co-opted. Manzoor-ul-Haq Siddiqui, Hakayat-i-Saadig (Lahore, 1990), p. 29. For further details see ibid., pp. 30-49. Jinnah appreciated the work of Rural Propaganda Committee in his letter addressed to Niazi, August 8, 1941. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-393, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{100} Inqalab, July 8, 1941. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-1092, pp. 72-74. For the objections raised by Sikandar Hayat against Pakistan quoted by Malik Barkat Ali in his speech see Indian Annual Register 1941, Pt. II, pp. 231-232. See Zamindar July 10, 1941 for a reporting favourable to Sikandar Hayat, Punjab Muslim
\end{itemize}
with Malik Barkat Ali’s presidential address at the Pakistan Conference at Lyallpur on July 19-20 organised by the Muslim Students Federation. Barkat Ali, in his forceful speech explained at length the justification of Pakistan Scheme and replied all the objections raised by Sikandar Hayat two weeks earlier in speech.\(^{101}\) Immediately after presiding over the Pakistan Conference, Barkat Ali wrote to Jinnah that Sikandar Hayat was speaking and working against Jinnah and Muslim League. He requested Jinnah to “release the Punjab Provincial Muslim League from his grip.”\(^{102}\) Pakistan Muslim Students Federation continued its efforts to establish branches of the League in the districts of the Punjab where the League did not exist.\(^{103}\) Fatama Begum toured Northern Punjab and explained the importance of the demand of Pakistan to women.\(^{104}\) At the second annual session of Punjab Muslim Students Federation held on March 7-8, 1942 at Rawalpindi, resolutions were passed to stress the principle of Muslim nationality and to express full confidence in the leadership of Jinnah.\(^{105}\) Sikandar Hayat was in fact trying to sail in two boats. On one hand he did

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\(^{101}\) Police Abstract of Intelligence, July 26, 1941. For the full text of Barkat Ali’s speech, see Indian Annual Register 1941, Pt. II, pp. 223-234.


\(^{103}\) Fatama Begum to Jinnah, August 8, 1941. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-770, p. 118.

\(^{104}\) Fatama Begum to Jinnah, March 19, 1942. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-582, p. 2.

\(^{105}\) Indian Annual Register 1942, Pt. 1, p. 326.
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\textsuperscript{101} Police Abstract of Intelligence, July 26, 1941. For the full text of Barkat Ali’s speech, see Indian Annual Register 1941, Pt. II, pp. 223-234.

\textsuperscript{102} Barkat Ali to Jinnah, July 21, 1941, Rizwan Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 63-65.

\textsuperscript{103} Fatama Begum to Jinnah, August 8, 1941, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-770, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{104} Fatama Begum to Jinnah, March 19, 1942, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-582, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{105} Indian Annual Register 1942, Pt. 1, p. 326.
not want to annoy the Unionist Hindus and the Sikhs by favouring the partition of India because their alienation would make it extremely difficult for Sikandar Hayat to remain in power. On the other had, he could not afford a clear cut denial of All India Muslim League’s demand to which he was supposed to be committed according to Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. As a result, he, time and again issued different and to some extent contradictory statements. At Lyallpur he had criticised Pakistan. Later, at a meeting of Muslim League held at Lahore to celebrate the “Pakistan Day” on March 23, 1942. Sikandar Hayat during his speech denied that he was opposed to Pakistan. Expressing his confidence in Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam, he reiterated his allegiance to the Lahore Resolution. However, he tried to some extent to explain it in the light of his zonal scheme. Punjab Muslim leaders continued vigorous campaign in favour of Pakistan and a number of public meetings were held in various districts of the Punjab. Zafar Ali Khan, Barkat Ali, Nawabzada Rashid Ali and Zain-ul-Abadin Shah were the important speakers. On the other hand, Hindu and Sikhs started holding anti-Pakistan conferences and communal tension greatly increased. The Punjab Government

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107 Police Abstract of Intelligence, March 21, 28 & April 4, 1942.
stopped the forthcoming Pakistan Conference at Jullundur. Anti-Pakistan conferences and demonstrations were also called off. Sikandar Hayat informed Jinnah of the decision through a telegram explaining the grave situation. In November 1942, Jinnah toured the Punjab and he was invited to inaugurate the first annual session of Punjab Provincial Muslim League on November 19, 1942 at Lyallpur. The audience was estimated more than 50,000. On November 20, Jinnah arrived at Lahore and his speech attracted some 80,000 audience. The next day he addressed the meeting of 5,000 Muslim women. At the beginning of his Punjab tour, while addressing annual session of All India Muslim Students Federation at Jullundur made a pointed attack on the author of a certain political formula and though he did not mention Sikandar's name, it was understood that he referred to Sikandar’s formula. However, at Lyallpur when Sikandar expressed his confidence in and obedience to Jinnah, the latter, said that at Jullundur he had not been alluding to Sikandar’s formula which he had not had time to study. It was clear that Jinnah’s tour had put Sikandar

108 Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&1/5/245.
109 Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-353, p. 61.
111 Inqalab, November 19, 1942.
112 Police Abstract of Intelligence, November 21, 1942.
113 Ibid.
114 Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&1/5/245; Inqalab, November 20, 1942.
into an embarrassing position. He could not risk an open rupture with Jinnah, but at the same time, at the expression of his being in agreement with Jinnah, his non-Muslim allies particularly the Sikhs felt disturbed and annoyed. Jinnah’s visit to the Punjab was a great success so far as the cause of Muslim League and the Pakistan Movement was concerned. The authorities, however, still wishing “to improve communal relations”, were disturbed. This is evident from Governor’s letter to the viceroy which opens with remarks, “the best thing to be said about Jinnah’s tour in the Punjab is that it has come to an end.”

Apart from the demand for Pakistan there was another less important issue which puts Sikandar Hayat into conflict with Jinnah temporarily when the Viceroy declared war on behalf of India. All India Muslim League refused to allow its members to join the Civic Guards and Provincial War Committees. Jinnah was of the view that he could not tell his people to join War Committees when their representatives had no say in the government of the

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115 Police Abstract of Intelligence, May 16, 1942; Governor’s Report situation in the Punjab for the first half of the May 1942. Oriental India Office Collection, L/P&J/5/245
116 Ibid.
country. On the other hand Sikandar Hayat was in favour of giving full support to the war effort. A delegation of Punjab Muslim League saw Jinnah to get exemption from the League’s decision but did not succeed. Sikandar Hayat alleged that the Premiers of the Punjab and Bengal had been exempted from the Muslim League’s decision not to join War Committees. Jinnah, contradicting the statement, advised Sikandar Hayat and Fazal-ul-Haq not to commit to War Committees unless the assurances, the Muslim League had asked for, were given by the government.

Meanwhile the Viceroy established National Defence Council on July 21, 1941 and along with others, Sikandar Hayat was also appointed as a member. The Unionist leaders of the Punjab requested Jinnah not to take severe action on the War Committees and the Defence Council, appreciating the difficulties involved. The Muslim League, however, urged Sikandar Hayat at the meeting of the Working Committee on August, 24-25, 1941, that he had been appointed to the Defence Council.

117 Oriental India Office Collection, F 125/135, p. 357.
119 Jinnah to Sikandar, July 11, 1940. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-97, p. 8. Jinnah also advised Shahnawaz not to go against the League’s decision, Jinnah to Shahnawaz, June 21, 1940. Ibid., F-97, p. 11.
120 Indian Annual Register 1941, Pt. II, p. 300.
121 Ahmad Yar Daulata to Jinnah, August 6, 1941, Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-255, pp. 30-31; Faiz Ali to Jinnah, August 8, 1941. Ibid., F-579, pp. 35-39.
Council as the Punjab Premier and not as the representative of the Muslim community. However, when Jinnah produced the letter of the Viceroy proving that Sikandar was taken as representative of the Muslims, he decided to resign from the Defence Council to resolve the conflict.\textsuperscript{122} Later, in 1942, probably in view of the Congress’ Quit India Movement, Muslim League softened its policy to the war effort.\textsuperscript{123}

Resignation of Sikandar Hayat from the Defence Council and his allegiance to the Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League on Lahore Resolution reflected that the Muslim League had become a movement of Muslim masses, so strong as to preclude any chance on part of Sikandar Hayat to come into direct clash with it. However, his obligations to the non-Muslims of the Punjab as the Premier and the as the leader of the Unionist Party must have put too great a strain on him to be sustained. On December 26, 1942 at midnight, Sikandar Hayat suddenly died of heart attack at the premature age of 50.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{122} Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-97, p. 35; Indian Annual Register 1941, Pt. II, p. 212. Sir Sultan Ahmad and Begum Shahnawaz refused to resign from the Defence Council and were expelled from the League for five years. Press statement of Jinnah, September 12, 1941. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, F-97, pp. 38-40; Police Abstract of Intelligence, September 13, 1941. For Begum Shahnawaz’s point of view see Jahan Ara Shahnawaz op. cit., pp. 174-175.

\textsuperscript{123} Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, August 15, 1942.

\textsuperscript{124} Civil and Military Gazette, December 27, 1942.
The period after 1942 lays outside the scope of the present study. Putting it briefly, in 1943 Jinnah received complaints from the President of Punjab Provincial Muslim League that the League assembly party was not active. At a meeting of All India Muslim League Council held on March 8, 1943, the complaints against Khizar Hayat, who replaced Sikandar Hayat after the latter’s death, were to be discussed. Khizar Hayat assured the Muslim League Council to organise the Provincial Muslim League effectively and the resolution against him proposed by Abdul Hamid Badauni was withdrawn. On Khizar Hayat’s return to the Punjab the situation remained un-altered. There also arose a controversy over the interpretation of Sikandar-Jinnah Pact between the non-Muslim Unionist and the members of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League. Under these circumstances Jinnah, in order to study the situation, stayed at Lahore in March-April, 1944 and held talks with Khizar Hyat Tiwana. At last the talks broke down and Khizar Hayat refused to accept the demand of Muslim League to maintain Muslim League party in the Punjab Assembly and to rename the Unionist ministry as the Muslim League coalition Ministry. The Working Committee of All India Muslim League considered the case of Khizar Hayat and after hearing him, decided to expel him from the League. Punjab Government retaliated through the dismissal of Shaukat Hayat Khan from the

123 Tiwana Papers, Folder No. 13, pp. 10-12; see also the press statement of Khizar Hayat in ibid.
125 Syed Noor Ahmad, from Marsha Law to Marshal Law, pp. 168-169. For Khizar Hayat’s point of view see “Jinnah’s Two Voices,” Tiwana Papers, Folder No. 16, pp. 60-70.
cabinet. After Jinnah's severing connection with the Unionist Party, a small group of some 20 members decided to sit on the opposition benches in the Punjab Assembly.\textsuperscript{128}

In the elections of 1945-46, the Muslim League emerged as the sole representative of Muslim India winning all Muslim seats at centre and 95% of the provincial seats. In the Punjab, the Muslim League won 75 seats and later 4 more members of the Legislative Assembly joined Muslim League raising its strength to 79. Though Muslim League was the largest single political party in the Punjab Assembly, it could not form a ministry without having coalition with some other political party or group. Negotiations between the Muslim League, the Congress and the Akalis, to form a coalition ministry broke down as the Akalis and the Congress put forward certain conditions unacceptable to the League. As a result the Unionists, the Congress and the Akalis formed a coalition and Khizar Hayat was invited by the Governor to form a ministry.\textsuperscript{129} In January 1947, the Muslim League decided to launch a civil disobedience movement against the Khizar ministry which resulted in his resignation on March 2, and establishment of Governor raj in the province.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{128} Syed Noor Ahmad, from Marsha Law to Marshal Law, pp. 168-169.
\textsuperscript{129} Syed Hasan Riaz, Pakistan Naguzir Tha (Karachi, 1987), pp. 382-383.
\textsuperscript{130} Syed Noor Ahmad, Marshal Law to Marshal Law, pp. 224-226.
CONCLUSION

In the early decades of 20th century, the Muslims of the Punjab were subjected to political, economic and educational backwardness and deprivation as compared with the other communities of the province, the Hindus and the Sikhs. Islam was also under insolent attacks by the Christians and the Hindus. This multidimensional devastation and depression created the enormous energy that emerged in form of various movements in the Punjab in 1930's.

Unfortunately the Muslim leadership could not channel this energy in proper from and into suitable direction. We observe the Ahrar, known for their agitational capabilities and oration at times rushing into Kashmir "to get into the Paradise" and at times, because of internal confused thinking, penetrating in the U.P. and participating in the Madh-i-Sahabah controversy on one hand and insisting to carry the tazia of Muharram through a particular route even it
required digging down the street ten feet deep, at
times opposing the Shaheedganj movement tooth and nail
and at times courting scores of arrests for restoration
of the mosque at times directing all their energies to
destroy the Ahmadi movement ignoring all other issues
of national importance.

The movement for restoration of the Shaheedganj
mosque was another form taken by the misdirected
energy. Again the leadership mistook the symptom for
the disease. Shaheedganj was only a symptom of the
disease from which the Muslim community had been
suffering for decades. They failed to understand that
there was no use of suppressing the symptom since it
would necessarily emerge in from of another symptom
unless something was done to cure the disease
working at the root. In fact the Muslims of the Punjab
had lost their balance on the issue. Prominent Muslim
leaders had been interned and totally irresponsible
Muslim youth were "leading" the masses. There seemed to
be no way out because despite the sacrifice of a number
of precious lives the government and Sikhs remained
unmoved. The community had exhausted its resources of money and volunteers but the young emotional "leaders" were not prepared to discontinue the civil disobedience. It was Jinnah who visited the Punjab at this critical stage and played the role of a saviour, managing the release of important leaders of the movement and making the irresponsible young "leaders" ineffective, and urging that the Muslims were facing the issues of much greater importance which required complete unity in their ranks. Of course Jinnah did not, and in fact nobody did, possess the magic enchanting the Sikhs to restore the mosque to the Muslims but he did provide, at least, a way out of the blind alley the Punjab Muslims had been blocked in. Shaheedganj movement was an aggressive expression of the injured feelings and emotions religious as well as political, the urge for freedom from the Hindu and Sikh antagonism as well as from the British colonialism which could not articulate itself in clear and proper from. That is way when Jinnah demanded Pakistan and

131 That is why the people refused to listen Moulâ Bakhsh and agitated when he tried to address the people at the Badshahi mosque on March 7, 1936. Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab, March 14, 1936.
started Pakistan movement, Zafar Ali Khan, the most important leader of the Shaheedganj movement favoured it whole-heartedly declaring, “

(he solution to the Shaheedganj enigma lies in “Pakistan”). In fact Pakistan was not only the solution of the Saheedganj enigma but of so many riddles that had been disturbing and confusing the Muslims during the British rule.

The sense of Muslim deprivation and devastation and the urge and determination to turn the tables in favour of the Muslims took yet another form i.e., the Khaksar movement of Inayatullah Khan al-Mashraqi who tried to organise and convert the Muslims into a disciplined and well-trained army on the basis of his exposition of Islamic ideal to dominate the entire world which, according to him, was the main objective of the Holy Prophet of Islam as well as of all the prophets of God who preceded him. Mashriqi’s objective to achieve the Muslim domination over the whole of the Indian sub-continent was not practicable in the mid

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\[132\] Naqoosh: Lahore Number, p. 1179.
of 20th century. It must be recognised that through his movement he did achieve some other positive objectives of secondary importance i.e., to re-inculcate among the Muslims selflessness, the spirit to sacrifice personal interests, to reinforce the idea of Islamic brotherhood and to commit to social service. But his ideal of domination of Islam over the whole sub-continent, and ultimately over the entire world, could not have been fulfilled through the ways and means he suggested and through the limited resources that he had at his disposal within a limited time of a few years that he expected to be sufficient. Wandering into his romantic vision of early Islam, he failed to appreciate the ground realities of the 20th century. He was successful to some extent to manage the “chain-reaction” resulting in the tremendous energy but keeping his pace too fast and by setting his target too high to be achieved, he was unable to control that energy to be used for useful and constructive purposes and the result was the explosion of March 19, 1940. At that crucial moment again it was Jinnah who rescued the Muslims of the Punjab particularly the Khaksars by cooling down the
inflamed emotions and immediately suggesting a more realistic alternative in the form of the Lahore resolution. After the failure of the Mashraqi’s movement, Jinnah was destined to make use of that energy most intelligently and to achieve his practicable objective of carving out a separate homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent.

Once the real, rational and practicable solution to the problems of Muslim India, identified by Iqbal and others, was voiced through the well-established and well-organised political party of the Muslims at all-India level under the capable leadership of Jinnah, and the demand of a separate homeland was determined as the final goal in March 1940 at Lahore, the Muslims of the Punjab, of course along with those of other parts of the sub-continent, rallied round the Muslim League at the clarion call of Jinnah with their hearts throbbing with what had been felt by them so often but had not been deciphered so far into something tangible, now articulated itself in one word “Pakistan”. We find frequent instances of joining the Muslim League and
striving for Pakistan by those who had once been active workers of the other Muslim par-ties or movements.\textsuperscript{133} That is why we see that all other movements and political parties of the Muslims were eclipsed and deprived of their following as the Pakistan movement snowballed.

Unionist Party of the Punjab was bound to fail because it continued to work on the obsolete principle of non-communal politics. Whereas neither a non-communal nor even a communal organisation opposing the ideal of Pakistan, could have been successful any longer in the Punjab in the perspective of 1940’s.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{133} As some of the examples the names of Aziz Hindi, Ashraf Ata, Ismail Zabih, Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi, and Bashir Ahmad Siddique, almost all belonging to the Punjab, can be mentioned.

\textsuperscript{134} It has been argued that as the “economic dislocation,” resulting from World War II, worsened, the position of the Unionist Party became “increasingly vulnerable” because of its “total commitment to the war effort.” Talbot, \textit{Punjab and the Raj}, p. 144. If this line of argument is correct, the Congress\textsuperscript{d} communists should have emerged successful in the Punjab who strongly opposed the war effort and they should have replaced the Unionist Party in the Punjab. Secondly, had the commitment to the war effort been the cause of failure of the Unionist Party against the League, the latter would not have swept against all other Muslim political parties in the other provinces, in Bengal for instance, where the war effort was a negligible factor. Influence of war, however, may be acceptable as a secondary factor, reinforcing the Muslims’ aspiration of establishment of a separate homeland of their own.
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